Iranian
Studies
Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies
Volume
XII
(1979)
AlRBanuazizi,Editor Ervand Abrahamian, Book Review Editor Anne Enayat, Associate Editor John D. Gurney, Associate Editor Vahid F. Nowshirvani, Associate Editor NaomniSchorr, Copy Editor
The Society for Iranian Studies COUNCIL Ahmad Ashraf Ali Banuazizi Lois Grant Beck Michael M. J. Fischer (ex officio) Gene R. Garthwaite Mary-Jo DelVecchio Good Eric J. Hooglund M. A. Jazayery Heshmat Moayyad Marvin Zonis
Address all communications concerning the Journal to the Editor, Iranian Studies, Box J-154, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts 02167, U.S.A. Copyright 1980, The Society for Iranian Studies Published in the U.S.A. USISSN 002-0862
IRANIAN STUDIES Jourmalof The Society for Iranian Studies
Contents:
Volume
XII
(1979)
ARTICLES
Atkin,
The Strange Death of Ibrahim Muriel. Khalil Khan of Qarabagh .....................
79-107
Hossein (Trans. & Adapted by J. R. Perry) Mirjafari, The Haydarl-Nicmati Conflicts in Iran ..... Naficy,
Hamid. Nonfiction on Iran ...........
Fiction:
Documentaries 217-238
Page, Mary Ellen. Professional in Storytelling Iran: Transmission and Practice .......... Parvin,
195-215
Manoucher, and Zamani, Amir N. Political Economy of Growth and Destruction: A Statistical of the Iranian Interpretation Case ..............
43-78
Reid, James J. Comments on "Tribalism as a Socioeconomic Formation in Iranian History".. Ricks,
Thomas M. U.S. Military 1943-1978: The Political Military Assistance .......
275-281
Missions to Iran, Economy of
.
....
P
163-193
*.
Soroudi, Sorour. Poet and Revolution: The Impact of Iran's Constitutional Revolution on the Social and Literary Outlook of the Poets of the Time Part I .............................. Part
Zamani, Amir N.
II ....
See Parvin,
135-162
.
M. above.
.ivi
.
3-41 .
239-273
REVIEW ARTICLE
Arjomand, Said Amir. the
Religion
in
and Ideology
Revolution
Constitutional
283-291
...............
BOOKREVIEWS Bakhash, S. Iran: Reform under
(reviewed
Monarchy, Bureaucracy 1858-1896 the Qajars,
by Guity Nashat)
and
114-118
...............
Beck, L., and Keddie, N., Eds. Womenin the Muslim World (reviewed by Richard T. Antoun) .. Gluck, J.., and Gluck, S. H., Eds. Persian Peterson Graham, R.
Handicraft (reviewed ............................. The Illusion
Iran:
(reviewed
by Jerrold
A Survey of by Samuel R. ......
Poetry
122-127
See Beck, Lois
of Shah cAbbas
the
Richard W. Bulliet)
Great
(reviewed
History by
293-296
.................
to Nasr, S. H., Ed. IsmaiclTll Contributions Islamic Culture (reviewed by Farhad Daftari).
I.,
The Middle
(reviewed Shaked, H.
119-122
by Michael
Monshi, E. B. (Trans. by R. M. Savory).
Rabinovich,
306-309
An Anthology of (reviewed
Craig Hillmann) ............................. Keddiee, N.
.
of Power
D. Green) ..............
Karimi-Hakkak, Ed. and Trans. Modern Persian
109-113
314-320
and Shaked, H., Eds. East
1967-1973
between
by Shahrough Akhavi) .
See Rabinovich,
I.
iv
.......
297-304
Stober, Utas,
G. Die Afshar (reviewed Reinhold L. Loeffler) ......
by .........
B. A Persian Sufi Poem (reviewed by Annemarie Schimmel) .......v..
Vaghefi, M. R. (reviewed
...
310-313 305-306
of Iran
Entrepreneurs
by Anne Enayat) ..............*....
v
128-132
Iranian
Studies
Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies
POET AND REVOLUTION Sorour Soroudi
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH AND DES TR UCTION Manoucher Parvin and Amir N. Zamani
THE STRANGE DEA TH OF IBRAHIM KHALIL KHAN OF QARABAGH Muriel Atkin
Books Reviews by Richard T. Antoun Guity Nashat Jerrold D. Green Michael Craig Hillmann Anne Enayat
Winter-Spring1979
Volume XII
Numbers1-2
THE SOCIETY FOR IRANIAN STUDIES COUNCIL AhmnadAshraf, Plan & Budget Organization and University of Tehran Ali Banuazizi, Boston College Lois Grant Beck, Washington University Michael M.J. Fischer, Harvard University (ex officio) Gene R. Garthwaite,Dartmouth College Mary-Jo DelVecchio Good, University of California at Davis Eric J. Hooglund, Bowdoin College M.A. Jazayery, University of Texas at Austin Heshmat Moayyad, University of Chicago Marvin Zonis, University of Chicago EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE Lois Grant Beck, Executive Secretary Michael M.J. Fischer, Treasurer Ali Banuazizi, Editor
IRANIAN STUDIES Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies Editor: Ali Banuazizi Book Review Editor: Ervand Abrahamian Associate Editors: Anne Enayat, John D. Gurney, Vahid F. Nowshirvani Copy Editor: Naomi Schorr Circuiation Manager: Kathleen McNally
Copyright, 1980, The Society for Iranian Studies Published in the U.S.A. USISSN 002-0862 Address all communications to IRANIAN STUDIES, Box J-154, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts 02167, U.S.A.
Iranian
Studies
Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies
Volume XII
Numbers1-2
Winter-Spring1979
ARTICLES 3 POETAND REVOLUTION:THE IMPACT REVOLUTION OF IRAN'SCONSTITUTIONAL ON THE SOCIALAND LITERARYOUTLOOK OF THEPOETSOF THETIME:PART I 43 POLITICALECONOMYOF GROWTHAND DESTRUCTION:A STATISTICALINTERPRETATIONOF THEIRANIANCASE
SorourSoroudi
ManoucherParvin AmirN. Zamani
79 THE STRANGEDEATHOF IBRAHIMKHALIL KHANOF QARABAGH
MurielAtkin
BOOKREVIEWS 109 L. BECKAND N. KEDDIE, Eds.: Womenin the Muslim World 114 S. BAKHASH:Iran:Monarchy, Bureaucracyand Reform under the Qajars,1858-1896 119 R. GRAHAM:Iran: TheIllusion of Power 122 A. KARIMI-HAKKAK, Ed. and Trans.:An Anthology of Modem PersianPoetry 128 M.R. VAGHEFI:Entrepreneurs of Iran
RichardT Antoun GuityNashat
JerroldD. Green MichaelCraigHililmann
Anne Enayat
Iranian Studies, Volume XII, Nos. 1-2, Winter-Spring 1979
Poet and Revolution: The Impact of Iran's ConstitutionalRevolution on the Social and Literary Outlook of the Poets of the Time: Part I SorourSoroudi PART I The Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1911 and the developments of the following decade greatly altered the social and political atmosphere in Iran. Poetic changes created in the wake of these developments were of considerable transitional importance and generated a suitable literary atmosphere for the more basic changes introduced by Nima Yushij in the 1920s and the 1930s. A major issue in this regard is the impact of revolutionary developments qn the general outlook and the literary creativity of the contemporary poets.1 The present paper includes a short introductory survey of the background and the characteristics of the "constitutional poetry" and a general discussion of the revolution's impact on the contemporary poets. A number of "constitutional poets" are then discussed individual
ly.
Sorour Soroudi is Senior Lecturer in Persian language literature in the Department of Iranian and Armenian Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
3
WINTER-SPRING
and
1979
two covers the first The period under discussion Revcentury. The Constitutional decades of the twentieth at an end by 1911, but its dynamics olution was virtually up to the 1921 coup Iranian society continued to influence Therefore, I apply the term "condletat, and even beyond. stitutional" rather widely to those poets whose works had developand post-constitutional bearing on constitutional and political or literary. ments, whether social The terms poem and poetry have been used here in their widest sense, with the awareness that much of the slogan-laden poetry written during this period was but a of political howand social beliefs; versified declaration ever, not all the poems of this kind were devoid of genuine poetic qualities. In translating poetic specimens I have tried to be faithful to the original, without any attempt to create a On the other hand, I have tried, metrical English version. the stylisin the translations where I could, to recreate of the original Whenever specimens. tic characteristics of the translation was not crucial to the the exactitude I provided a rather free version point under discussion, of the poem in order to communicate to the reader some of of space Because of limitations the charm of the original. I have given the original Persian only when discussion of Due to the or prosodic aspects called for it. stylistic I have given only a minimal number of same considerations, footnotes.
Introduction
Fath Ali Shah, the second monarch of the Qajar dyfond of the pomp and was particularly nasty (1797-1834), He revived the tradisplendor of the old Iranian courts. lost tion of the court poetry which had, to some extent, its importance during the reigns of the Safavids and their Poets from all over the country gathered in successors. the new capital, Tehran, to be honored as members of the The style these poets adopted entourage. shah's literary the literary movement which Adabi, was that of B3zgasht-e IRANIAN STUDIES
4
had evolved during the second half of the eighteenth century as a reaction to the "Indian" (Hendi) School, which was then in decline. The new school aimed at returning to the poetic styles of the classical masters. In this "neo-classical" movement, poetic language underwent refinement and regained lucidity and fineness. Some of the in poets of this school scored remarkable achievements in ghazal panegyric ode (Sorush, Qalani) and particularly (Neshat, Forughi, Shurideh). But the guiding principle of emulating the masters as closely as possible in both substance and style produced negative results as well. Traditional themes, images, and similes were repeated over and over again and the balance between language and content suffered considerably. The subsequent interest in "shell" was nourished at the court of Fath Ali Shah and his successors, themselves dabblers in poetry. The first signs of change appeared already by midnineteenth century. Contrary to the impression of tranand prosperity quillity created by the court poetry and to the serene detachment of the mystics, we encounter at times expressions of pessimism and anxiety in the works of a few poets of this period. Prominent among them was Mirza Rahim Yaghma (d. 1859). Yaghma was quite exceptional among the poets of the Qajar era. His poetry is noted of administrative for criticism corruption, religious hypocrisy and official injustice, although it was expressed mainly in the form of personal diatribe. To provide only a mild example, we may quote a few lines from his long strophic poem against the governor of Semnan, who had treated the poet, then his secretary, with cruelty. In this personal satire, Yaghma is bitter about his own sufbut does not fail to criticize fering, the negative aspects of the governor's rule as well: Of governance he knows nothing For the people he cares not. He is not moved by their tears He wants his treasure-gold to When in court he sits to judge Abused is property and wasted Seventy stable-full ass-holes 5
or sorrow grow. innocent amass
blood.
WINTER-SPRING 1979
and ignorance. Will not match him in foolishness As long as the governor holds his office This would be the topic at all parties: 2 May all Semnanis, rich and poor The wife of the governor in the ass screw. Yaghmals frequent use of obscene language should as a sign of debauchery or a response to not be dismissed poetry In classical perverse demands in high circles. or obscene of khabis3t, there are indeed many precedents form but a small portion of the popoems, which generally et's divan, and their writing is excused on the "patron's In Yaghmals case, is a case.) order" (Sacdi, for instance, permeate a good many of his poems expressions four-letter His accounted for by such orders. and they are not usually extensive use of obscene language seems to be the outcome at, and revolt against, of his frustration and the expression that elite and religious administrative a hypocritical and polite with beautiful tried to cover up its ugliness The poet is unable to cope with a words and manners. He curses the whole universe, world of "cuckold" quality. or else sinks into a deep despair and creates touching rewith venerated vicin which he identifies eulogies ligious and gives vent to his pent-up anger. The tims of injustice complaint apply no less to the lines of bitter following poet's time than to the tragedy at Karbala and the massacre of Imam Husayn and his camp: age of danger and the day, day of battle, Time to war, time to shed blood. and the era, era of The reign, reign of injustice oppression, 3 Abused is property and wasted innocent blood.
The age,
the Yaghma can be considered With these opinions, the in reflecting poets the constitutional precursor of Yaghmals tendency problems of his contemporary society. mournful songs for formal patterns of now heh-ye sineh-zani, as in the above example, and his for religious processions, indicate his involveexpressions ample use of colloquial to deviate from ment with the people and his willingness In this reestablishment. of the literary the conventions IRANIAN STUDIES
6
gard, too, stitutional
Yaghma served poets.
as an example for quite
a few con-
shown by Yaghma and a few other poThe sensitivity of their contemporary realities ets toward the disquieting did not derive from a change in their basic values. society century The alarming developments of the late nineteenth and political awareness that resocial and the increasing led in 1892, gradually sulted from the Tobacco uprising to question these like other intellectuals, some poets, to do so was the poet and writer One of the first values. who had lived in IstanMirza Aqa Khan Kermani (1853-1896) In the growing malexile. bul since 1887 in self-imposed the necessity to century, aise of the early twentieth articulated by some po"change the tune" was manifestly that the first It is significant ets inside the country. belongs to Amiri Farahani, himself a such articulation greatly at the hands of the who had suffered panegyrist The changing mood of the time is clearruling nobility. lines in which Amiri critiin the following ly reflected These lines were poetry. cizes the nineteenth-century written in 1900, six years before the outbreak of the Revolution: How long will you, 0 eloquent poet praise? Ravishing beauties out of grudge, Slander the praiseworthy Out of greed the blameworthy praise? At times of mysticism you boast And on the real and the unreal orate. In depicting a fancied beloved now you expatiate. Now you choose brevity, These legends have turned obsolete, A new story you should relate. 4 If to discourse you wish, Henceforth to the motherland serenade. Perhaps Amiri to change, necessity or to the revolution. carefree atmosphere ity of the mystical
was not the only poet who felt the were rare pribut such articulations that the familiar, It is possible of the court, or the detached serensphere to which the poet was accustomed, 7
WINTER-SPRING1979
with the new world he was just discovering,creconflicted within him. This ating mental anguish and inner struggle predicament was further aggrevated by the fact that most poets were dependent on the court or local khans for their The ocand were thus unable to choose sides. livelihoods, at this stage are, of discontent manifestations casional in general terms as in the previous example, articulated of the authorities. without open criticism apply to These limits did not, except occasionally, as a channel functioned the folk poetry, which frequently thoughts, of the people's for the expression hopes, and anthe court poets greeted the When, for instance, xieties. with their customary new king, Muzaffar al-Din (1896-1907), the people who had hoped for praise, and baseless flattery but expected that these hopes would a reduction of prices, of their estimation reflected accurately be disappointed, in a simple folk song: the new shah's personality We thought there would come a new shah Spring will smell in Fall. The treasury doors would be wide open fall. And prices would certainly When, then, will this good shah come? He'll arrive at the right time, When shadow of the tree is on top! When they went to greet him, wow! Muzaffar's come. They saw sister of an ass he's come. In the likeness come.5 The wet noodle's of subject language, the diversity The simple, colloquial and of feeling, matter, rhythm, and rhyme, the sincerity nature of the folk poetry stood in conthe humoristic and detached nature of the unrealistic trast to the rigid, century. main body of the high poetry in the nineteenth Revolution was the turning point The Constitutional between the high and folk interaction at which a productive atmosphere and The new social and political poetry began. called for adequate struggle the needs of the revolutionary Neither the phlegmatic response in the poetic domain.6 IRANIAN STUDIES
8
Qajar court poetry, nor the aloof mystic poems of the period could provide the proper response. Poetry had long been it had to feed on from its vital sources; kept in isolation or able to aclife again. Not all the poets were willing and quite a few continued to follow cept this challenge, "Return Movement" both the path of the nineteenth-century Yet, events in the real world were at in theme and style. times reflected in the works of some of the "Return Movement" Im(1864-1925) was one of them. poets. Adib Neishapuri mersed in love poetry, two public events seem to have touched about them. the poet enough for him to express his feelings forces against of the constitutional One was the victory the tyrant MuhammadAli Shah (1909), to which he dedicated The other was the Angloa short qetCeh (poetic fragment). Russian treaty of 1907, according to which Iran was divided About this event into zones of influence by the two powers. (monorhyme ode) in the best traAdib wrote a long qasideh dition of the Khurasan style. Shurideh Adib, and poets like him (Forsat 1854-1920, at moments of great 1857-1926), expressed such sentiments into their secluded worlds. excitement and then retreated It was a different inflamed. kind of poet whom the revolution Most of them young men in 1906, they accepted the revolugave themselves up to the new social and tionary challenge, involved and in some cases became actively political causes, in the struggle. Indeed, we find among these poets varying But whatsincerity, and consistency. degrees of devotion, they were the ones who left a deep ever their shortcomings, The period. imprint on the poetry of the constitutional the base of their dependency from revolution had shifted The from the shah to the people. the court to the streets, the granting of the sudden growth of a free press following Constitution provided them with a platform from which they could address not just a handful of aristocracy and courtOutstanding iers, but people from all walks of life. poets as well. of the time were frequently journalists between the poet and his audience The new relationship the nature of the conwas a major factor in determining especially during the period of active stitutional poetry, step struggle. The poet had to accompany the revolution by step. He had to excite a large audience that was most9
WINTER-SPRING
1979
to his powhich listened or semi-literate, ly illiterate etry read by others or sung by folk singers and revolutionto speak to them with simHe had, therefore, ary bards. in order to touch the cords of their and clarity plicity demanded of the revolution The impatient spirit heart. immediate response on the part of the poet, and he created under the impulse of events. spontaneously of the nineteenth-century Some of the characteristics high poetry could not meet the new demands; there was need innovations, But drastic kind of poetry. for a different at that time, would not have served the even if possible cause because of their very novelty and strangerevolutionary found their poets naturally In these circumstances, ness. includliterary traditions, way to the wealth of existing Some poets, with a popular bent, employed ing folk poetry. and familiwhose simplicity forms and modes of expression In poetry the people. arity were best able to influence and formal subtlety rhetorical with such a popular slant, .A bytake a less important position. artistry frequently was, though not in product of the new order of priorities poof traditional the works of all the poets, violation between poetic and non-poThe distinction etic taboos. the poet used any term, including etic terms was blurred; for the suitable foreign loan words, that he considered bombast but reHe did away with the classical subject. which he infused tained well-known images and expressions penelanguage increasingly Colloquial with new meanings. The gap between poetic and colloquial trated the poems. language diminished to the degree that entire poems were written in the latter. forms and There began a search for more flexible forms of Some neglected diversified modes of expression. the classical such as musamnaf (a kind of strophic poetry, thereof (tail rhyme), and elaborations poem), mustazad anBut these provided only a partial gained prominence. Demands were met mainly by what folk poetry had to swer. Since offer by way of form, rhythm, and mode of expression. element of folk poetry, music forms a vital taqnif (street took the lead in the works of poets with a popular ballad) melodies made of Constitutional themes with soulful bent. IRANIAN STUDIES
10
the tasnif
the battle
hymn of the revolution.
It must be emphasized again that not all the poets adopted these changes to the same degree, as will be shown It would also poets. of the individual in the discussion poets created to maintain that constitutional be misleading Side poems. and exhortative only topical, journalistic, poems we find other by side with the simple, slogan-laden poems also inspired by the contemporary events but on a In vein. in a classical usually level, higher artistic these poems the balance between content and language,which century, was relost in the nineteenth was considerably stored. The other point to be remembered is that revolutionof some constitutional poets tendencies ary or progressive codomains did not necessarily in the social and political to break away from poor ability incide with willingness A radical like Farrokhi revolutionary etical traditions. whereas in his poetic style, remains a thorough classicist a moderate figure like Iraj readily breaks some of the classical taboos. aspect of the poIn general, however, the literary content. ems was for a while secondary to its revolutionary the order of priFollowing the defeat of the revolution, mood crept in and altered once more. A quiescent orities developments. deepened because of subsequent disheartening supwas the increasing A crucial factor in this connection reForeign occupation, of freedom of expression. pression of newsand the frequent suspension newed local autocracy, created an atmospapers and imprisonment of poet editors Under these conditions, and repression. phere of insecurity the direct and active involvement of the poets in current events were now distant events decreased. Revolutionary kind of influence enough from the poet to exert a different on him, not only with regard to the content of his poetry, Lack of action called but to its aesthetic aspect as well. what to say was not the only issue; now, for reflection; Some poets felt that change how to say it also engaged him. They did not change as well. in content demanded artistic know, however, what shape this change should assume and how 11
WINTER-SPRING 1979
to bring
it
about.
As we have said, revolutionary ideas had not, in most cases, resulted in a new poetic outlook. Poetically, many poets continued to see the world through the eyes of the classical masters, who maintained their hold over the souls of the new generation. Consequently, in the first decade following the revolution, the main novelty was still to be found in the content. Form and mode of expression underwent only mild modifications. The beloved and the panegyrized king of classical poetry were replaced by the fatherland or the nation. Philosophical and mystical questions gave way mostly to social and political issues. But most of the images, similes, and metaphors remained the same. In the absence of a fresh, stimulating approach toward poetic creativity, some poets wrote about new discoveries and inventions such as electricity and airplanes, or used loan words from foreign languages and considered themselves or innovator. In the field of prosody, too, mutejadded, attempts at innovation were usually no more than a "tinkerforms and meters. ing" with classical They were at times and less courageous than the prosodic modless significant ifications introduced earlier under the influence of folk These changes had been made during the active strugpoetry. gle and had been created "along the way" under the influence of sweeping revolutionary when the poet did events, not have time to reflect on whether they contradicted the To do the same following sanctioned classical traditions. the revolution was apparently more difficult. However, the renovating attempts of the post-revolutimid and indecisive tionary period, though they were, were a "generaas symptoms of a restlessness, quite significant tion gap" that had finally come to the fore but whose exinhibitions. was still pression being hindered by traditional aware of the new needs and Some younger poets were strongly in a basic change, but did not know how to were interested did not dare to rebel bring it about, or, more accurately, against the revered, demanding, uncompromising generation of the fathers, as the latter were conceived of in the eyes of Iranians. Whatever they did was determined by the imposing shadow of their ancestors. IRANIAN
STUDIES
12
fewer in number, who But then, there were others, were ready to rebel. The literary experiments up to that point had failed to satisfy their demands. They demanded a poetry that would reflect their times not only in the themes that it treated, but in its tempo, just as the tempo of their lives increasingly differed from that of their ancestors for whom the classical poetry was written. It was the difference in the outlook of these two groups that set off the heated discussions-known as "the dispute of the old and the new." The poetic dispute lasted a long time and still rages now and again. The demands of the poetic revolutionaries were practically answered in the new poetics of Nima Yushij, who although not a constitutional poet, was the true child of the revolution in both his social and aesthetic outlook. In the following pages we shall examine the influence of the Constitutional Revolution and its aftermath on the works of some contemporary poets. The number of poets who were, each in his own way, involved in these developments is many times the number of those surveyed here, but their major social and poetic tendencies are represented in the works of those discussed.
Amiri
Farahani
Mirza MuhammadSadeq Amiri Farahani (1860-1918) had been a court poet for nearly 30 years when the Constitutional Revolution began. He had been granted two literary titles by the royalty and the nobility he panegyrized: Amir alShucara (Prince of the Poets) and Adib al-Mamalek (The Literateur of the Empire). he was one of the Nevertheless, first to express concern over the country's deteriorating condition even before the outbreak of the revolution and was an ardent supporter of the constitutional regime.. The fact remains, however, that Amiri never quite gave up his conservatism and his panegyrist qualities. His poetry and his autobiography provide some clues to the reasons for and the nature of these conflicting tendencies.
13
WINTER-SPRING
1979
Amiri was born into an aristocratic family, the Qalem Maqam. An orphan at grandson of the grand vizier of the local by the exploitation 14, he was dispossessed This material seems princely rulers of Arak.8 adversity as to have driven the young man to magnify his privilege and he became quite class-minded. a member of the nobility, Therefore, being a court poet meant more to Amiri than having a profession that suited his aptitude and raised him from destitution. on which His career as a panegyrist he embarked as a youth helped him to reestablish his position among the nobility. But at the same time, he had defor the unjust ruling class. His veloped a strong dislike own bitter experience generated in him an acute critical sense and a desire for justice. But he did not conceive of justice as a "right," as something that can result from Rather, he tended to think of the equality of all people. it as some "favor" granted from the upper classes to the masses. He expected equity from the king and was hopeful that under a constitutional regime l"nobody would be deHis criticism of the prived of the sultan's justice."19 but frequentis piercing, appalling contemporary situation Amiri at ly assumes the form of hajv, personal satire. times dwells on the deprived condition of the masses, but on the whole he remains aloof and does not seem to feel real solidarity with them.10 and reMore than its social aspects, the national Revolution appealed ligious aspects of the Constitutional to Amiri. He was a zealous patriot and a devout Muslim and conceived of the revolution both as national strife and as a struggle Thus, between Islam and Christianity. he rejoices over the formation of the first Majlis: Be merry, 0 National Assembly! For I see That soon the nation's maladies you will cure. For through you Be merry, 0 National Assembly! The Mosque has prevailed over the Church and the light of Quran has the Cross subdued. For through you Be merry, 0 National Assembly! of her youth.11 Iran has regained the prosperity
IRANIAN
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Amiri Later on, when his hopes were disappointed, falls back on the idelike many other contemporary poets, alized past. To him, however, both ancient Iranian and Isand he does not downlamic pasts are equally significant the other. Unlike grade either one in order to glorify in ancient Iranian culture and Pur-Davud, Amiri Is interest his employment of parsi-ye in some of sareh (pure Persian) his poems do not bear any anti-Arab or anti-Islamic significance. On the contrary, he is a supporter of the Isin Islam. lamic unity and decries the sectarian divisions Already in a poem written a few years before the Revolution, he calls upon Muslim peoples to unite and describes the reason for their predicament: lies in that, out of obstinacy, Our failure One Muslim became CAli's devotee, the other
cOmarls.12
The same straightforward attitude characterizes Amiri's criticism of dignitaries, institutions, officials, or blameworthy national habits. Before the revolution, Amiri was unscrupulous all enough, as were of necessity of panegyrists, to eulogize the royalty and the nobility whose corruption and cruelty he was well aware. Following the revolution, he becomes bold enough to criticize despotic rulers and their collaborators at the peak of their power, and nothing, be it a person or an instituIn the foltion, was immune from his lashing criticism. MuhammadAli lowing lines Amiri, who had once eulogized Shah, denounces him for having bombarded the Majlis, using the same form and style as he used in his eulogy: 2 at , ^ jl& -L
This day that Truth has sanctioned the Law Justice addresses MuhammadAli Shah: 15
WINTER-SPRING 1979
Beware 0 shah!
steed of rule will throw ?ou off, now. she is though
For the restive
Tamed and submissive
Despite poems like this and despite his enthusiastic regime, Amiri was not able support for the constitutional He conto sever himself from the ruling class. or willing odes as he did before, perhaps tinued to write panegyrical as a source of as a habit hard to abandon or, more likely, The poet himself seems to be aware of his conlivelihood. apparent behavior when he refers to the people's tradictory of of him because he had accepted the editorship distrust newspaper after the defeat of the revolution.14 an official in Amiri's public life did not affect Oscillations The convictions. literary his almost thoroughly classicist the revocontent of his poetry changes somewhat following the but the form and the style remain basically lution, style "neo-classical" same. He uses the nineteenth-century lamentor rulers, despotic denouncing kings, for eulogizing poetry in classical His erudition ing foreign oppression. which he is anxious to display, render and his vast learning, contrast many of his poems heavy and abstruse in striking in his exOnly occasionally to the dynamism of the times. masnavis does he somewhat hortative poems and didactive in which he In the following lines, his style. simplify addresses his fellow Iranians and blames them for their inertia in defending their country, the language, although and unornamented: is forceful classical,
1_b L SLJ T WSSj L
I
cS)
-? L0T L0..K
1?&s
J
#r
51 c4',
0 honorable and grand! O Iranians, Wherefore did you thus forsake the land?
IRANIAN
STUDIES
16
Did you not call her 'motherland'? All that rhetoric, 0 patriots, where is it gone?15 Amiri's
employment of colloquial
expressions
does
not change the general picture of his stylistic orientation. His knowledge of European languages (Russian and some English and French) does not basically affect his poetry but results only in the introduction of foreign terms and expressions, a widespread vogue of the time. The overwhelming majority of poems in Amiri's voluminous divan are qasidehs and qetCehs treating both classical and constitutional themes, as in the above example. The strophic forms employed by Amiri are also within the limits of classical conventions and are not influenced by folkloric patterns. Only three poems written for music are marked by some popular influence in their short strophic form and their style. The following lines from the "Song of Sadness" about the shah's bombardment of the Majlis may serve as an example. The form is, in effect, a qasideh turned strophic by insertion of the refrain after each distich:
v-- ej-v
t
_*
..
J .
jJUs
1'
__6>- j~
t ~>
'er
_
Q
Sr
l
L J
&?2t
j-
A;-JlJS
i
aJL*
rr
KL L
A.
-oNES'G,
17
WINTER-SPRING 1979
O Baharestan Palace, why did your ceiling collapse?! Your blood-stained soil did the Negarestan surpass. O alas, alas; in a dark cloud is our moon clad. Jesus of wisdom was crucified for the wicket spite Moses of justice was disgraced for Korah's opulence. o alas, alas; in a dark cloud our moon is clad.16 On the whole, it can be said that Amirils literary convictions were resistant to new ideas and notions more than his political beliefs were. If he had much criticism for the existing systems of government and society, he was full of reverence and admiration for the classical masters. It seems that his class arrogance and the resultant detachment from the people were also responsible for his literary conservatism. At a time when cav5m (common people) were a main consideration, he continued to write in a language understandable chiefly by the khav5Q (elite).
Iraj
Iraj Mirza Jalal al-Mulk (1874-1925), was a prince of the House of Qajar, but he did not attach much importance to descent and at times even expressed his dislike for the "species of princes."17 The fact that he was not a well-to-do does prince and did not enjoy all the princely privilegesl8 not suffice to explain his contemptuous attitude toward his own "1species." It seems that his intimate knowledge of the character of his peers, his broadmindedness, his candor, and his rebellious nature were the main reasons for his critical as well judgment of the royalty and the nobility, as other segments of the society. all bonds Iraj resisted and fetters. His love for personal freedom expressed itand he self in various ways during his rather short life, was not a conformist as might have been exprince-poet, As befits pected. the great-grandson of Fath Ali Shah and an excellent the son of a poet laureate, traIraj received ditional education to which he added a good knowledge of French and Russian. His marriage at the age of 16 and the death of his father three years later laid heavy responsia youth. on Irajls bilities shoulders when he was still IRANIAN STUDIES
18
of poet laureate One of these was the office at the court of the crown prince Muzaffar al-Din Mirza in Tabriz, a post held by his father. With this position he also previously received the title Fakhr al-Shucara (Pride of Poets); but he did not pride himself either in the title or the posiIn the capacity of court poet, however, he had to tion. write congratulatory and threnodic odes on religious and official occasions. As expected, his poems at this time abound in exaggerated in praise of religious flatteries and courtiers. figures But despite his success, and contrary to the usual behavior of the court poets, Iraj refor he was not able to bear the "yes signed his position, sir, yes sir" atmosphere, was tired of considering the shah "the shadow of God," and was reluctant to be associated with court entertainers and buffoons.19 For a while, he of noengaged himself in secretarial jobs in the service but to be "privy" to them also proved too restrictbility, the Coning to the poet. However, it was only following stitutional Revolution that Iraj severed himself completely from the service of the nobility. For the rest of his life he worked as a government employee. The degree of Irajls support for and involvement in the revolution is a moot point to this day. His poems, however, point to his sympathy for the constitutional movement and his identification with some of its goals.20 As a broad-minded intellectual, Iraj now had an excellent opportunity to give vent to his liberal opinions and to point out the ailments of the Iranian society as he conceived them. To this purpose he spared no one, not even the shah and the rest of the Qajar dynasty.21 He exposed the corruption and the treachery of the ruling class, unveiled the hypocrisy and selfishness of the mullahs, and criticized the widespread grip of superstition. In contrast to Bahar, Nasim-e Shomal and others, who, despite their anti-clerical positions remained Muslim Iraj gradually believers, developed into an atheist and as such took God to account in his unmatched facetious language:
19
WINTER-SPRING
1979
How long shall I keep quiet 0 God! You are to blame for all the rot. You have spellbound everything down here, And play those tricks up there. Why do you poke your nose into our affairs? Why not leave us alone and try to be fair? You created all these akhunds and mullahs You disturbed our sweet nap on the terrace. Tell me, were you really so bored and idle, To create snake in garden?22 social criticism was focused on the mores of Irajls his fellow Iranians, especially regarding the position of women. He did not always display a good understanding of social and cultural problems, though. There is a considerable naivete in his assumption, for instance, that abolition of the veil would solve the problem of pederasty which was so widespread in Iran and which Iraj himself admittedly practiced. 23 It seems, however, that through his shockingly--for the Iranian society of that day--frank treatment of sexuin all its forms Iraj intended to shake up the moral ality of a society in which a woman's chastity principles resided no matter how loose she might have been.24 in her veil, Many people labeled him corrupt and immoral because most of the stories he told in this category were admittedly But he did not care, for he based on his own experience. did not share their principles and this was a way through which he could express his contempt for them. This was true also of the obscene and debauched language he used in many of his poems. The popularity of this kind of language in some high circles may partly account for Iraj's bold use of it. But the main reason seems to be his desire to defy, like Yaghma, those "hypocrite shaykhs" who in public behaved piously and used polished language, but It was these shaykhs committed the worst crimes.25 secretly whom Iraj held responsible for women being veiled, pointits use: ing out that the Quran had not instructed On the front wall of a garden-gate A woman's figure was molded in paste. IRANIAN STUDIES
20
In a few minutes the turban-wearers Heard the sad news told by believers. They clamored all woe to rellgion, woman. People have beheld a veilless Faith and piety were in big danger came in red anger. When the believers one water in haste, One brought some dirt, A mud veil they fixed for the woman's face. Thus it was restored, the lost chastity By a handful of mud and so readily. When the Prophet's law escaped this menace They went home to rest calmly on terrace. I wonder friends, with such ulama Iran.26 Why do people doubt a prosperous on the social and perAlthough Iraj concentrated sonal status of women and glorified them in his tender poems on motherhood, he did not ignore other problems. condigap and the desperate He was aware of the social tion of the masses, leaving no doubt where his own sympathy lay: I heard, looked down in pride A landlord, And in arrogance at his laborer. The workman's spirit was annoyed by his lord quite narrow-minded views of this sort. For he considered he said to the rich lord, "Why this arrogance," "What you pay is wage for the workman's toil. "I desire your gold, and you my strength, "No indebtedness between us is left."i 7 At a time when nationalistic was rising high, feeling to narrow-minded national and reIraj expressed opposition and bloodattitudes "which cause much disturbance ligious to the destiny shed."*28 But he was by no means indifferent of his country. He opposed any kind of foreign interference in the affairs of Iran, whether openly or in disguise. He also sympathized with the cause of the rebellious Col. to preferred the colonel MuhammadTaqi Khan and clearly of the central governpoliticians the "self-interested" ment. 29
21
WINTER-SPRING 1979
Iraj expressed so boldly were unorthodox The opinions for a Qajar Prince, but he was far from being a "fighter" Some critics claim that he did not use for his beliefs. his poetry seriously as a means for social and political attitude he had developed because of the negative struggle There poet.",30 early in life toward being a "professional or to indicate that this assertion is no evidence to justify about the opinions he or was insincere Iraj was not serious, bent lent even his most serTrue, his facetious expressed. as seen ious writing a humorous, seemingly light coloring, In these lines addressed to the in the following quotation. (narrator of religious poet, Aref, who was once a rawzeh-khan the ruling class, and religious Iraj criticizes tragedies) These lines theme of his poetry. a recurrent non-religious, form of masnavi and his are also an example of his favorite style. simple facetious
4i$LI>
*e
-tJ
L-AwA
cs
L* ?
J.r-
*&Jjy',_t
L c @k
9!
e~~
'v-J
I
91 .L-
cJ y.jL.L..-1J
Jy
F
k &
desire, to your heart's If you want everything Have an easy life and on velvet lie, dear, a bigger turban Fetch yourself, known as a good rawzeh-khan. And make yourself
IRANIAN STUDIES
22
Since you have a good taste and a praiseworthy voice, Don't worry if in your learning you are not the choice. All the rawzeh-kh3ns are illiterate You are not the only one with this privilege. When on the pulpit, bless our ministers If you can't be honest, be a deceiver. Say, it is thanks to our leaders alone That yogurt is available in this season. are holy spirits [of Majlis] Say, that deputies Fallen here from heaven, with no retreat. They won't accept bribe, God forbid, never, Even if they die, for want of bread. welfare They have worried so much for people's That they are about to meet their Maker.31 Iraj himself followed this pragmatic advice and dehe outwardly praised those to whom spite his reluctance, he had to turn in time of need. He was not, therefore, a man of principle, but it must be pointed out that he never claimed to be one. Contrary to Bahar, Iraj was not interested in leaving behind a good reputation and cared little for what people thought of him. As in his social opinions, so in his literary style Iraj refused to be restricted by traditional ties and bonds. reDespite his mastery of classical language, he eventually the formal odes and ornamented style of his linquished court poetry and in later years tended to ignore his early works both thematically and poetically. Significantly, his divan includes only a few of his panegyric works. The diof expression of the constitutionrectness characteristic own tendencies. al trend suited Irajls He adopted a simple, close to, and straightforward style which was frequently even identical with, spoken language, as can be seen in the examples quoted above. In this tendency, Iraj was influenced by his predecessors, especially Qalem Maqam, and and later generain turn followed by his contemporaries But his poetry has remained matchless in the unpretions. of his language and in his felicitous tentious simplicity use of colloquial expressions and proverbs. Irajls carein observing the severe prosodic rules of classilessness
23
WINTER-SPRING 1979
cal poetry was perhaps another expression of his rebelliThere are indications ous nature. that he broke some of those rules intentionally. In the same light must be seen the predominance of the masnavi form in Iraj's writing. In the framework of the classical prosody, ma-navi is one of the least rigid forms on account of its being an equal heroic couplet, a fact no doubt appreciated by Iraj. This form also suited the narrative style and the stylistic simplicity of the poet. Iraj 's masnavis best exemplify the crossroads where the liberal, simplifying tendencies of the contemporary high poetry met the popular styles then arising.32 On the whole, Irajls poetry, in form and style as in content, was responsive to the needs of the time and was open toward the future, although he ridiculed changes introduced by some of the younger generation poets.33 Iraj's acquaintance with European languages does not seem to have exerted any considerable influence on his poetry despite his successful partial translation of Shakespeare's Venus and Adonis.
Bahar
MuhammadTaqi Bahar (1886-1951) is an outstanding figure in the constitutional and post-constitutional political and literary scenes in Iran. At the beginning of the revolution, he was a young poet of 20. He was then, like his father Saburi before him, Malek al Shu'ara (King of Poets) at the holy shrine of Imam Reza in Mashhad. He wrote pompous odes honoring religious feasts and memorial days and praised the king and the nobility whose patronage he enjoyed. when only 18 he thus panegyrized For instance, the timid and incapable Muzaffar al-Din Shah whose folk portrait we discussed earlier: O Zephyr, 0 ingenious courier Traverse this time from Tus to Ray. Carry a message from the servants of the Holy Shrine To the threshold of the sagacious monarch. The most noble, the conqueror king of kings IRANIAN STUDIES
24
Sovereign over sultans, king Muzaffar al-Din. The king at whose court each morning, each evening The Sun and the Moon their foreheads lay on the earth.34 The Constitutional was a turning point in Revolution Bahar's life. naHe was of a rebellious and self-asserting ture and displayed courage in defending his revolutionary beliefs. In his autobiography, first in 1922, published Bahar proudly declares: "I have not humbled, and will not humble, myself before anything under any rule or circumstance except the discretion of my own mind."35 He suffered much to remain loyal to this commitment, but did not stand the trial to the end. His inner conflicts defeated him. Bahar's revolutionary activities during the first two the granting of the constitution years following were carried out in secret. The following passage is from a memorable poem he wrote at this time to denounce the despotic The poem is a qapideh-ye king MuhammadAli. mustazad (tailrhyme ode), a popular form of the time, and was published in the clandestine newspaper Khurasan: To discuss
freedom with the shah of Iran is a folly To God we trust Iran's destiny. of the shah is not shared by any, Religion To God we trust Iran's destiny. If the shah of Iran cares not for justice, no wonder, For he is of no pure nature. To the eyes of a bat sunshine is agony, To God we trust Iran's destiny.36
It was only after the defeat of the despotic shah in 1909 that the poet openly became involved in the RevoIn 1910 he joined the central lution. committee of the more radical Democratic party in Mashhad and like several other poets of the time set up his own newspaper, Naw-Bahar (Early Spring), as the organ of the party. In this paper the panegyrist of yesterday published fiery articles and enthusiastic poems in defense of the constitutional regime, against foreign influence, and in support of the unity of the Islamic peoples. During the first years of struggle
25
WINTER-SPRING 1979
His pressure and intimidation. Bahar was firm in resisting in his exile and imprisonresulted attitude anti-Russian time in 1911), but he did not give up ment (for the first He was also excommunicated by fanatic relihis struggle. but he "did not leave the arena" and contingious circles, and hypocrisy and to detheir fanaticism ued to criticize fend the rights of women.37 Bahar's stand in matters of popuimportance won him considerable and political social walks of life who eventuamong people of different larity He directed his ally elected him to the Majlis (1914). creation to the masses and contrary to Amiri, literary He exhorted them wrote for them in their simple language. to revive the splendor of anto stand up for their rights, cient Iran and the prowess of early Islam.38 As time did not last. attitude But this energetic to take root, beginning just freedom, of the sapling passed, When under pressure from inside and out. started withering gradually closed in on inthe vise of renewed dictatorship Bahar had more arrived. the time of trial tellectuals, than once committed himself to "die with moral bravery At and counterfeit."'39 with flattery rather than [live] times he had gone as far as risking his life out of loyatHe had escaped an assassination alty to his beliefs. tempt made against him for opposing Reza Khan's intention But then, as early regime (1924). to set up a republican advice" to write as 1917, he had accepted "his friends' poems in praise of the last Qajar shah, two conciliatory of his in order to resume publication Ahmad (1909-1925), antinewspaper, which had been suspended for publishing that beThese were rather mild eulogies court poetry. and embarrassment at having trayed the poet's reluctance more manifests itself, to write them. The same conflict Bahar, who had sharply though, during Reza Shah's rule. praised him when Reza opposed Reza Khan as prime minister, ascended the throne (1925: for to the Kayanian throne has Glad is the tiding, ascended the king of the world, the world champion amir. Pahlavi, The true genius, the leader of the land of Iran sultan.40 The matchless monarch, the invincible IRANIAN STUDIES
26
Later on, however, not being able "to put up with the court's requirements,"1 Bahar withdraws from political life and membership in the Majlis and dedicates himself to scholarly research (1926). in 1929 and Nevertheless, again in 1933 he is thrown into jail and later exiled to Isfahan for suspicion of anti-government activity, or, as he himself believes, for not cooperating with the government.41 Despite his initial he once more gave resistance, in to "his friends' advice," panegyrized the shah, and was released. It is true that after he had joined the revolution, Bahar ceased to write panegyrics for financial gain, but later he found it expedient to compromise in order "to avert affliction." What furthered his readiness to compromise was Bahar's political ambition which ran opposite to his belief as an intellectual. The politician-panegyrist in Bahar freed him from jail, ended his exile, and for a short time even secured him a Cabinet chair, but he lost his intellectual and the good reputation he integrity valued so much. It may well be that Bahar's fascination with power and his hero-worship also was behind the poet's readiness to praise powerful politicians or to cooperate with them. Despite the fact that he supported the constitutional regime and defended freedom for all, he held that: A kingdom is based on the bayonet No one will [dare] touch the bayonet. Justice will prevail by the bayonet's tip By the bayonet's tip sedition will fall.42 He qualifies this statement by advocating wisdom and fear of God in a ruler. Still, his vision of government is a far cry from a democratic, constitutional His supregime. port and admiration for politicians like Qavam al-Saltaneh and Vosuq al-Dowleh show that he was ready to make concessions for the sake of a powerful leader and a society of law and order. It is possible, therefore, that Reza Shah's powerful, centralized government and his nationalistic bent appealed to the poet and facilitated for him the task of 27
WINTER-SPRING 1979
zeal, In his nationalistic the shah. having to eulogize Bahar goes so far as to call upon Reza Shah to shape up (the boundaries of) the land and to set the Tigris and In nostalgic poems on ancient Iran Oxus as her borders. past too, powerful monarchs, their and Islam's glorious are magnified43 vast empire, and their conquering ability can be though less intense, The same conflict, He was tired of approach. traced in Bahar's literary masters and wanted to "escape the classical following his sporadic atBut despite the prison of imitation." almost always in the wake of others, tempts at innovation, This was vision. he remained a prisoner of his classical language command of classical partly due to his excellent which interested him not only as a poet, and literature He can be considered the scholar. but as a distinguished He has no doubt style. last great poet of the classical poetry created some of the best examples of classical grafted onto contemporary subjects.44 poetry and his Bahar's attachment to the classical admiration for the masters did not prevent him from refor period, sponding to the needs of the revolutionary he was aware of the importance of the masses in time of In response to these needs strife. social and political which were tasnifs, poems, including he wrote folk-like Bahar's two-level, sung by people in their gatherings. evidenced in two poems writing is clearly classical-folk inspired by the same event, the ex-Shah MuhammadAli's atThe first poem tempt to regain power by force in 1911. of the Khurasan panegyrics is a reminder of the classical It emthe main style of Bahar's numerous odes. school, in a written is and of form ploys the monorhyme qaqideh lengthy meter solemnized by the use of words ending in like chang (lyre) and jang (war): consonants two successive
UDIE y9U STJ .Sz IRANIAN STUDIES
28tr
28
)j
\L
Lay down the cup 0 beloved, and put the lyre aside, it is time for war. Don battle raiments, Illume your face, and the enemy's face blacken in tar, Raise your stature, and the enemy's stature bend like a lyre.45 The second poem on the same event is a satirical piece put in the ex-shah's own mouth, as is frequently done in folk cast in a folk-like satires. It is in colloquial language, strophic form with refrain, and employs a short popular meter:
'Tr)
j
1>~
I'm the fleeing Mamdali To the Tsar I'm privy 0 Tehran, you're so far from me! It's you I wish to see. 'Cause I'm crazy with your love, Good God, what's going on?46 At times, he follows a middle course by using a modified language that reverberates in the classical style but is interspersed with colloquial in the main expressions lines or the refrain. The following passage from a poem on the constitutional of 1909 is an example of this: victory
29
WINTER-SPRING 1979
*1 ..-
t.
L.J
.XWtu -'-S'c&<
..L..
@----w
LA L t
c;d _U L; t I?-fbL aWlv aWs_, C&~J
C.
JaI
ct)
co
Jr
of
^-vS
l
&-r Ly tiriSJrJJ
y
Pass on the wine, hard times are gone, Lord's is the throne. Land is relieved, Blessed will be our new patron let the foe bemoan. He holds the scepter, Darkness is over, and morning has dawned Praise be to God, praise be to God. us with sword Those who walled us up and killed Impaired the land and tortured her soul. Those evil doers who broke their word, hold. Did not, after all., escape people's the shaykh His majesty the shah, his holiness Praise be to God, praise be to God.47
IRANIAN STUDIES
30
Bahar tried his hands at different forms and styles with different degrees of success, but contrary to Iraj, he never gave up the writing of qa4ideh, which remained vehicle for poetic expression, his favorite even after the This strong classical revolution. tendency frequently supHe therefore pressed his desire to innovate. claims "novelty of expression" by writing a ghazal in which he inserts terms.48 foreign loan words and constitutional In later years and under the influence of his contemporaries (mainly Dehkhoda and Nima Yushij), Bahar tried his hands at some moderately new forms and styles. But of these and his simple poems , the main with exception body of Bahar's two-volume divan is poems in classical style. A considerable part of this poetry is distinguished from the nineteenth-century "neo-classical" poetry of the feelings by the intensity expressed and by realistic descriptions. However, Bahar does not always reach the charming simplicity of Iraj, by whom he was influenced in some of his marnavis, nor the sincerity and enthusiasm of Nasim-e Shomal. A condescending air is frequently present in his poems. Unlike Iraj, who displayed a gradual, persistent development in his poetic style, Bahar kept falling back on his pre-constitutional On the same line, style. qaqideh, a form which lost much of its importance following the revolution, remained his favorite Bahar poetic form. claimed mastery in all the classical and folk genres and in introducing modern forms and styles.49 originality He claimed more than he can be credited with.
Ashraf
al-Din
Hoseini
(Nasim-e
Shomal)
Seyyed Ashraf al-Din Hoseini (1871-1934) was born into a religious family in Qazvin and was raised as a deHis father and forefathers vout Muslim. were, according to his own testimony, local ulama.50 Ashraf's father died when the infant was a suckling, and the family fell victim to a grasping shaykh who brought them to destitution. The ineradicable memory of the hunger-stricken days of child-
31
WINTER-SPRING 1979
in the many food-related exhood and youth is reflected and images he uses and which form a distinctive pressions As a young man Ashraf wandered to feature of his poetry. of Najaf and Karbala where he received rethe holy cities After his return to Iran he met a sufi ligious education. is traceable in some of a mystic whose influence elder, Later on, he settled in the northern city Ashrafls poems. of Rasht (Gilan) wherefrom he came to be known as Gilani. Ashraf worked At the beginning of the revolution, in Rasht. for freeThe struggle as a manuscript copyist aroused the seyyed, who had dom and justice in the capital injustice and corruption. suffered from social personally he set up his In order to give expression to his sentiments (The North Breeze), one-man weekly newspaper Nasim-e Shomal of which was apparently inspired by the Russian the title of 1905. The paper, which later on was pubRevolution lished in Tehran, became so popular that people identified with it, and Ashraf himself came to be the poet-editor known as "Mr. Nasim-e Shom&l." Once a week "when the errand newsboys shouted 'Nasim-e Shomal,' people would rush in the tea-houses to get a copy....Then and at the corner of the streets the paper would pass from hand to hand... and the literate would read it to the swarming illiterate ..., t151 Nasim himself was quite aware of his popularity to his descent from the Prophet Muhamwhich, in addition to him.52 mad, was a source of pride and satisfaction from his sincere love originated Nasim's popularity for the people with whom he identified and to whom he reNo one among the poets mained loyal throughout his life. voiced the asof the constitutional period has so plainly the daily problems of the deprived and discussed pirations knew he could find man in the street masses. The little his thoughts and feelings expressed in Nasim's poetry if, for example, the price of sugar went up or bread was scarce contrasted the affluThe poet frequently and expensive. In of the poor. ence of the rich with the deprivation of desires many of his poems he portrays the unfulfilled Perthe poor as a hungering for delicious, sweet-smelling found in abundance at and fruits, sian dishes, candies, The poor are always offered empty the tables of the rich. IRANIAN STUDIES
32
promises
and asked to put up with the existing
reality:
Be patient my darling, be patient! Be patient my dear, be patient! Tehran'll become like a rose garden soon In the shops bread will abound for sure. Meat for shish-kebab will be very cheap By patience problems are solved with much ease. Be patient my darling, be patient. Don't worry, next year you'll eat bread And sweet fruits to suit your taste. You'll lunch dear with roasted chicken Fesenj an will be your share for dinner. Be patient my darling, be patient.53 Nasim was aware of the existing social and economic conditions gaps and of the possibility that the existing He warned the rich of the day "when the could be changed. will come" and rejoiced over the deposition Bolsheviks of the Tsar Nicholas at the hands of the "justice seeking BolIn one case, he even deplored that the Iranians' sheviks." zeal did not equal that of the French, who had beheaded Louis XVI.54 But despite and his social consciousness, contrary to Lahuti and Farrokhi, Nasim was far from being a revolutionary in his social beliefs. He conceived of social justice terms: he deplored the mainly in religious lack of equity in his time; he rebuked the wealthy and called upon them to have mercy on the poor and to give them a share of their wealth; he denounced the landowners for their oppressive attitudes toward peasants and reminded them that according to the Prophet's the farm's injunctions, crops belong to the farmer.55 In political and national affairs Nasim took a more the grandeur of ancient Iran and vigorous stand. Recalling early Islam, he called upon people to unite and fight against internal tyrants and foreign intruders and to defend the cause of Islam. of the Tabrizis over The victory the forces of the tyrant MuhammadAli Shah fills the poet with joy and he sings spontaneously:
33
WINTER-SPRING 1 979
May God be with you 0 people of Tabriz! May the divine hand your holy cause assist. You have won renown all the world over and for your valor. For your good skills Your great deeds have been registered in every corner. On golden tablets May God be with you 0 people of Tabriz.56 person he never lost However, as a deeply religious hope and eagerly awaited the emergence of the Hidden Imam and social problems and to restore the to solve national Meanwhile, he supported, with reservations, glory of Islam. exand personal status, the advancement of women's social of some mullahs, deposed the hypocrisy and corruption and encouraged the of superstition, nounced the prevalence which training spread of modern education and vocational circles.57 and religious was opposed by some conservative the poet addresses himIn a poem called "Maktub" (Letter), self to this last subject: Why do you moan 0 Nasim, for what do you ache? sake? Why should you cry for the people's star shone to no avail; Constitution's The Sun of science rose, but what did we gain? and towns you now want to base In cities there teachers to raise. Training centers, It is a pity; to learn at school? To send children and alleys. Children must wander in streets and we are laid to rest When our day arrives English will not help us to confess! in this world friend, We may be despised But we shall be exalted on the Day of Judgment. Do not encourage the learning of crafts And don't talk please of the foreign lores. and the murshed the fanatic, The fortune teller, break up your bones.58 Will, I am afraid, as well as in its style, In the content of his poetry, by the contempoinspired and influenced Nasim was greatly Caucasian poet, Ali Akbar Saber (d. rary Turkish-speaking A considerable number of his poems are free trans1911). or adaptations of Saber's poems. Saber, however, lations IRANIAN STUDIES
34
was more militant the ruling class
and uncompromising in his and existing conditions.59
criticism
of
Whatever stand Nasim took regarding social and political he always remained close to the people. issues, His literary of this closeness. style is another indication The majority of his poems are written in folk-like, strophic forms, short melodious rhythm, and simple, often colloquial Nasim's colloquialism went beyond the language. use of colloquial A language by Bahar, Iraj, and others. number of times he employed the language as it is pronounced in everyday usage with all its contractions and omissions, something found only infrequently in the works of others. The following strophes from a poem in which Nasim satirizes an old bigamous man may serve as an example of his use of colloquial language and of the formal and rhythmic influence of folk poetry:
--
'r
CvL-2
.jL
^L
it ,> d
'a2t
bA
.
Lc
c
DLS
J} ?
1
^
jj1
djy'
r _S9 wo)
MJ
?2;
A husband I've got, ninety years of age, His all-white beard reaches to his waste, Wherever he goes, his kids'll trail, He's got two wives, one more he desires.
35
WINTER-SPRING l1979
Love ballads he sings like a young lover, Cashew nuts he eats for lunch and dinner, Hoping soon to hug a sweet angel, He's got two wives, one more he desires.60 of folk poetry is evident also in dirges and The influence in during times of despair, poems of admonition written, under the nawlzehs, possibly the form and style of religious influence of Yaghma. of Nasim's poetry, combined The folk characteristics sense of humor and his sarcasm directed with his delightful turned many circles, against the ruling class and fanatic These were sung by of his poems into genuine folk poems. in differand parties feasts, people in their gatherings, Nasim never took advantage of ent parts of the country. He led a very simple for his own benefit. this popularity personal amlife without depending on others or nourishing Thus, he was able to express his opinions and his bitions. In his own words: without fear. feelings I have never accepted bribe, nor do I covet nor to be jailed I do not fear to be killed,
61 a mite; or chained.
It was perhaps this unshakable stand that led Nasim's enemies to declare him "insane" and put him in an asylum.
NOTES
1.
I first this issue within the framework of discussed "Persian Poetry in entitled, dissertation my doctoral of California, University 1900-1925."' Transition: 1972; under the guidance of Professor Los Angeles, I am thankful to Professor Michael Zand Amin Banani. who read the manuscript of of the Hebrew University I am, howand made useful suggestions; this article for its content. ever, solely responsible
2.
San&li 1339/1960), (Tehran: Yaghma Jandaqi, Kulliyat see pp. 174, 268satire p. 305; for his anti-clerical 283.
IRANIAN STUDIES
36
283.
3.
Ibid.,
4.
(Tehran: Amiri Farahani, Divan, ed. Vahid Dastgerdi pp. 285-286; see also pp. 485Forughi 1345/1966), 487.
5.
TvorNarodnogo Persidskogo V. A. Zhukovskii, Obraztsy chestva 1902), appendix, pp. 6-7. (St. Petersburg,
6.
in prose during For changes introduced centuries, teenth and early twentieth Prose Literature shad, Modern Persian Press, 1966), pp. Cambridge University
7.
Maknun, ed. A. Zarrin-Qalam La'ali-ye Adib Neishapuri, pp. 113respectively, Ebn-e Sina 1333/1954), (Tehran: 114; 55-56.
8.
All account, Divan, p. XII. Amiri's own biographical about the poet are taken from this details biographical indicated. source, unless otherwise
9.
Ibid.,
10.
See,
11.
Ibid.,
p.
12.
Ibid.,
p. 265; see also
13.
Ibid.,
p.
14.
Ibid.,
p. 508.
15.
Ibid.,
p. 315; see also
pp. 650-654,
16.
Ibid.,
p. 683; see also
pp. 682,
17.
MohammadJacfar afkar
p.
p.
the late ninesee, Hasan Kam(Cambridge: 13-40.
54.
for example,
549.
pp. 455,
ibid.,
53.
p. 28.
86.
Mahjub, Tahqiq
va ashC3r-e
Andisheh,1353/1974),
Iraj
Mirza,
682-685.
684.
dar
third
ahv3l
va asar
printing
va
(Tehran:
p. 140.
37
WINTER-SPRING 1979
18.
Iraj did not have an indeContrary to most royalty, From biographical notes pendent source of income. scattered throughout his poetry, we learn that at times, especially in his later years, he lived in hardship; see ibid., pp. 127, 175, 182, 201.
19.
Ibid.,,
20.
For instance
21.
Iraj criticized Ahmad Shah's behavior and defined him as "stupid, weakminded, and unfaithful to his country" The writing of CAref-N3meh (ibid., pp. 168, 204). attached to it, does not seem, despite interpretations for to have been originated from Irajls partisanship indicates that in the Qajar dynasty. Iraj clearly writing the satirical poem he was motivated mainly A short by Aref's personal behavior toward the poet. while before the concert in which Aref damned Fath Ali Shah, Iraj's Aref had ignored great-grandfather, their long Iraj in the presence of others despite friendship (ibid., pp. 75-77, 89).
22.
Mahjub, Iraj,
23.
Ibid.,
p. 78; also
24.
Ibid.,
pp. 79-85.
25.
Ibid.,
p. 13.
26.
Ibid..,
27.
Ibid.,
pp. 164-165;
28.
Ibid.,
p. 127.
29.
It is possible Ibid ., pp. 87, 168, 182-183. sonal reckonings were also involved in this
p. 121. ibid.,
pp. 13, 50.
pp. 84,
85.
p. 151.
pp. 177-178; this poem is based on a real incident which occurred in Mashhad when the poet resided there.
IRANIAN STUDIES
also
38
pp. 94,
184,
195.
that case,
perbut
to doubt Irajls
there is no evidence for the colonel.
respect
sincere
30.
Ibid.,
p. 272.
31.
Ibid.
, pp. 95-96.
32.
p. XXXXV;for some detailed Iraj has not observed the prosodic pp. 202, 234, 262, 266, 272.
33.
Ibid.,
34.
MohammadTaqi Bahar, Divan, second printing Vol. I, 3. Amir Kabir, 1344/1965),
35.
Ibid.,
II,
36.
Ibid.,
I, pp. 146-147.
37.
Ibid.,
38.
Ibid.,
39.
Ibid.,
40.
Ibid.,
41.
MuhammadTaqi Bahar, Tarikh-e mukhtaqar-e ahzab-e enqeraz-e Qajariyeh (Tehran, 1323/1944), siyasi: Vol. I, XII.
42.
Bahar, Divan, pp. IX-X.
examples in which rules see ibid.,
Ibid.,
p. 122. (Tehran:
IX.
I, p. 376; for examples of his anti-clerical Despite criticism see pp. 165-167, 419-421; II, 386. all Bahar remained a Muslim believer his criticism, his life. I, pp. 257-258; for more examples of his simple, exhortative poems see ibid., I, pp. 148-150, 208-213, ibid., 222-223, 285-287, 388-397; also his taqnifs, II, pp. 561-565. I, p. 480;
see also,
II,
pp. 333,
I, p. 403; for his other eulogies see pp. 408, 411; and, II, pp. 148ff.
I, p. 359; see also
39
his
395,
522.
on Reza Shah
Tirikh-e
ahz3b,
WINTER-SPRING 1979
II, respectively, 673-674, 713-714,
pp. 153; and I, 775-777.
43.
Bahar, Divan, pp. 218, 287,
44.
I, p. 184; for more examples Ibid., style poems on contemporary subjects 183, 213-215, 235-239; II, pp. 406,
45.
Ibid.,
46.
Ibid., I, p. 211; Mamdali is the popular, pejorative, form of MuhammadAli.
47.
Ibid., I, p. 148; "his majesty" refers to Muhammad to Shaykh Fazlollah Ali Shah and "his holiness" Nuri, a high-ranking mullah who supported the shah and was in 1909. tried and executed by constitutionalists
48.
Ibid.,
II,
49.
Ibid .,
I,
50.
Ashraf al-Din Hoseini (Nasim-e Shomal), Bagh-e behesht p. 269; this is a biographical (Tehran: Nesbi, n.d.), details about the poet poem from which the following have also been taken.
51.
I, p. 217; the and style of a famous 1038); see his Divan, Eqbal, 1335/1956), p.
etry
of
II,
Introduction;
at times
p. 238.
as quoted by M. Abbasi,
matTarikh-e mashrutiyat, of E. G. Browne's Press and Po-
Iran
va adabiyat-e
translation
annotated
poem follows the meter, rhyme, (d. ode by Farrokhi Sistani ed. M. Dabir Siyaqi (Tehran: 204.
pp. 386-387.
SaCid Nafisi, buCat
of classicalsee I, pp. 177424.
Modern Persia
dar dawreh-ye
(Tehran,
1335/1956),
Vol.
I,
p. 122. p.
27.
52.
Bagh-e
53.
rather pp. 87-88; fesenjan is a dish requiring For more examples where poverty expensive ingredients. see of the masses or the social gap are depicted, pp. 15, 71, 77, 125, 127, 191, 261.
Behesht,
Ibid.,
IRANIAN STUDIES
40
54.
pp. 192, 268, 271; the joy over Nicholas's overthrow was generated by religious sentiments as well; it was during the Tsar's reign that in 1911 the holy shrine of Imam Reza in Mashad had been attacked by Russian soldiers.
55.
Ibid.,
pp. 77,
56.
Ibid.,
p. 177.
57.
Ibid.,
58.
Ibid.,
59.
For examples in which Nasim has followed Saber, see Y. Ariyanpur, Az .ab3 ta Nima (Tehran; Jibi, 1351/ 1972), Vol. II, pp. 64-72.
60.
Bqgh-e
Ibid.,
203,
262 , 269.
respectively, pp. 70, 113, 115-116, 132, 176177, 193-194, 202. Despite his support for the advancement of women, Nasim opposed abolition of the veil. pp. 173-174; to bear a pejorative
Ibid.,
(spiritual connotation here.
murshed
pp. 58-59; cashew nut to be an aphrodisiac.
behesht,
is believed 61.
126-127,
leader)
(qur.-e
seems
kamar)
pp. 116-119.
41
WINTER-SPRING 1979
Iranian Studies, Volume XlI, Nos. 1-2, Winter-Spring
1979
Political Economy of Growth and Destruction:A Statistical Interpretationof the Iranian Case ManoucherParvin AmirN. Zamani Introduction
The completion of this article preceded the triumph of the Revolution in Iran. During the previous regime, critical studies on the subject of political economy of Iran, either went unpublished or were sufficiently to cause diluted no alarm and thus no harm. We write from personal experience and from knowledge of the experiences of other colleagues. This study is not free from the effects of such constrictions since most available official data generated in Iran during the past regime were tampered with somewhat to satisfy political interests and concerns. The data at hand fail to reflect what we think of as the "economics of growth and destruction." By using available data, reaching for alternative sources when possible, and pointing out the observed inconsistencies, we have uncovered a bleak picture, despite the distortions by authorities who, unwilling to reform the condition of life in Iran, kept reforming the data.
Manoucher Parvin is professor of Economics at the University of Akron. Amir N. Zamani is Ph.D. candidate, Department of Economics, Columbia University.
43
WINTER-SPRTNG 1979
Growth and Income Shares:
An Overview
The Iranian economy during the last two decades has Whether these changes have undergone sweeping changes. been for better or worse depends very much on the position of modern the introduction Undoubtedly, of the observer. has altered many aspects of economic and social technology have been To some, these alterations life of the country. Others the symbol and essence of progress and development. of these changes, the vices that point to the superficiality or absolute decline have accompanied them, and the relative in the standard of living of a large portion of the populaThis study will focus only on some aspects of this tion. Undoubtedly a more thorough study change or growth process. of the economic life of Iran should begin with an account changes the country has undergone in of the socioeconomic We limit ourselves to the period from 1338 to the past. in a more The reader who is interested 1355 (1959-1976).l should account of Iran's recent economic history detailed consult a number of works that deal with the subject more thoroughly.2 of rural populaDuring this period the proportion tion declined from 67 percent to 53.2 percent of the total to the GNP of agriculture while the contribution population and concomitantdeclined from 30.1 percent to 9.2 percent, increased and oil sectors ly the shares of the manufacturing respecfrom 15.9 and 9.7 percent to 20 and 37.2 percent, rate of 13 percent The GNP grew at the impressive tively. sector's while the rate of growth of the manufacturing value added even exceeded that and reached 19.5 percent. In terms of employment, the growth process was less the oil sector at Industry grew at 5 percent, impressive. 4 percent and services at 4 percent. Employment in agriincrease (from 3.6 to 3.9 million), after an initial culture, dropped to 3.4 million. growth rates of The relatively high and impressive in partiand its various sectors the economy in general, create the cular (especially that of the manufacturing), that the country during this period was undergoillusion IRANIAN STUDIES
44
and development process. ing a genuine industrialization the contrary. However, a closer look at the economy reveals To begin with, the high growth rate of the GNP was partly The role played by the oil revenues. due to the country's oil sector had been quite minimal, limited to the pumping The country was engaged in of crude out of the oil wells. by thus the value-added the primary stages of production; should wage bill, aside from a negligible the oil sector, asnational as the sales of an exhaustible be interpreted In fact, the role played by the oil sector is best set. shown by the number of persons engaged in oil production. for about 28 percent of GNP in 1351 (1972), While accounting the oil sector employed only 0.54 percent of the country's of the the contribution One year later, active population. to about 47 percent oil sector to the GNP had increased while the employment in the oil sector accounted for .53 The 1973 oil embargo percent of the active population. and later the quadrupling of oil prices brought about a As we menin the country's oil revenues. huge increase in that year the share of the oil sector tioned before, level of 47 percent, in the GNP reached the unprecedented of the the heavy reliance signifies which incidentally in oil prices brought The increase country on oil revenues. revenues which in the government's with it a large increase current and increased in turn led to, among other things, Fifth Plan's inThe original expenditures. developmental were increased of about $36 billion vestment expenditures As a result, the gap between the to nearly $70 billion. and and the demand for many goods widened output levels increased (see Table 1)1 the inflationary pressures from both within The government, facing pressures on many lowered the import tariffs and outside the country, for all the ills goods and, while blaming the profiteers The policy. of the economy, embarked on a price-control of many of these policies shortages were: net results port conof black markets, unprecedented items, creation widening of already alarming disand, finally, gestions economic parity between the rural and urban populations' As Table 2 indicates, the ratio of urban to well-being. rose from about rural per capita consumption expenditure 2 in 1338 (1959) to about 4 in 1355 (1976).4 45
WINTER-SPRING1979
TABLE 1 PRICE TRENDS, 1338-1355
Cost of Living Index
Year
(1338
Wholesale Price Index
= 100)
(1338
Various zi
Issues
of the Annual
= 100)
100.0 102.0 102.2 103.6 104.0 109.6 110.6 110.0 110.2 110.9 114.7 118.6 127.0 134.2 151.7 175.9 185.2 210.2
100.0 107.9 109.6 110.6 111.7 116.7 117.0 117.9 118.9 120.7 125.0 126.9 133.9 142.2 158.1 182.6 200.6 235.9
1338 1339 1340 1341 1342 1343 1344 1345 1346 1347 1348 1349 1350 1351 1352 1353 1354 1355 Sources:
(1959-1976)
Report
of
Bank Marka-
Iran.
of the problem However, the gravity and acuteness unless we take a closer look at cannot be fully realized A compariof income within each sector. the distribution of income in 1342 and 1352 suggests son between distribution that even within the rural sector of the economy, the size In of income worsened during this period. distribution was re1342, the lowest 40 percent of the rural population for 19.5 percent of the total rural consumption sponsible to 16 perIn 1352, their share had declined expenditures.5 IRANIAN STUDIES
46
TABLE 2 PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES OF THE URBAN AND RURALHOUSEHOLDS (IN 1338 RLS.) Per Capita Consumption Expenditures Urban Rural
Year
1338 1339 1340 1341 1342 1343 1344 1345 1346 1347 1348 1349 1350
14,923 15,740 15,857 16,502 16,213 16,743 16,277 18,714 19,197 22,027 24,659 26,820 25,866
7,012 7,164 7,400 7,638 7,443 7,993 8,375 8,314 8,648 8,590 8, 134 8,243 8,036
1351
27,542
7,423
1352 1353 1354 1355
31,843 34,159 38,595 40, 789
source:
Plan and Budget Organization, Iran, 1976, pp. 410-416.
cent, while creased its expenditures
8,351 9,183 9,328 10,706 Economic
Trends
of
the upper 20 percent of the rural population inshare from 41 percent of the rural consumption in 1342, to 48 percent in 1352 (see Table 3).
attention. these Two points deserve special First, of various brackets figures are the consumption expenditures of the rural population, and not their incomes, it seems reasonable to assume that, had we considered incomes instead of we would have arrived at a more skewed distriexpenditures, 47
WINTER-SPRING 1979
TABLE 3 EXPENDITURES)SHARESBY VARIOUS INCOME(CONSUMPTION DECILES OF THE RURALPOPULATION,1342 AND 1352 1342 (%)
Deciles 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th Total figures
1352 (%)
3.5 4.5 5.0 6.5 7.5 9.5 10.5 12.0 15.0 26.0
2.5 3.5 4.0 6.0 7.0 9.0 9.0 11.0 15.0 33.0
100.0
100.0
were read-off
fitted
Lorenz Curves.
Note:
All
Sources:
of the Rural Expenditures Survey of Consumption Families (1352), and H. Sadeg-Nowbari, An AnalyBudget in the Rural Areas sis of the Households'
(in Persian),
pp. 82-84
In fact, bution since as a general rule the rich save more. a recent study suggests that in many cases the rural housebanks and other specialized holds' debts to agricultural This suggests exceed the annual income of the households.6 savings among the that one can find many cases of negative with the implilow-income groups of the rural population, of income is much more skewed cation that the distribution of expenditures. Second, up to compared to distribution on the our attention entirely this point, we have focused of the of different deciles shares income (expenditure) rural population, showing that over the 1342-52 (1936-73) in income distriinequality period there was an increased IRANIAN STUDIES
48
in addibution. However, it seems that during this period, real incomes of the tion to the income share, the absolute first four deciles of the rural population had also decreased. four deciles In 1342, the first of the rural households enjoyed monthly consumption expenditures of Rls. 2,500 or less. of the same By 1352, the monthly consumption expenditures to Rls. 2,400 or less, and all of this group had declined had happened while the GDP during the same period had increased by more than 300 percent.7 The same general picture emerges when we consider the urban sector. Although we do not have reliable data on the of the urban households consumption expenditures for a base of expenditures in that year to compare the distribution year with that of 1352, the available data point to an skewed distribution of urban consumption expenalarmingly ditures (see Table 4). TABLE4 INCOME(EXPENDITURE)SHARESBY VARIOUSDECILES OF URBANPOPULATION,1352 Deciles
1st
2nd 3rd
Income Shares 1.5% 3.5
4
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
5.5
6
7
9.5
12
15
36
Note:
All
a fitted
Lorenz Curve.
Source:
Survey of Consumption Expenditures Families (in Persian).
of the Urban
Figures
were read off
In 1352, the share of the lowest 60 percent of the urban households was almost equal to that of the top 5 percent of the urban families. While the lowest decile had an expenditure share of only 1.5 percent, the highest decile claimed about 36 percent of the total urban consumption expendiThese figures tures. clearly point to an even worse dis-
49
1979 WINTER-SPRFING
tribution of expenditures in urban areas compared to that of rural centers. But more importantly, they cast serious doubts on the nature of the whole growth process that the country has experienced over the last two decades. It seems that the beneficiary of the growth was merely a narrow layer of the population, while bypassing the majority of the people. And indeed some segments of the population (about 40 percent of the rural households) experienced impoverishment and deterioration of their standards of living. In what follows we first will focus our attention on rural areas where the land reform program could be singled out as the major contributing factor or determinant of the income distribution. We will also briefly examine the agricultural credit policy of the government. Then we will turn to the urban sector and will examine the effects of the import-substitution strategy and the monetary policy of the government on the structure and development of the manufacturing sector of the economy. Agriculture Land Reform
Program
(LRP)
A thorough study of the land reform program and the related issue of land tenure in Iran is beyond the scope of this work. Suffice it to say that before land reform, the agricultural sector of Iran comprised 72,000 villages and 22,000 hamlets (mazra'ehs), inhabited by 3.2 million households who had traditional rights to the land they cultivated (nassagh-daran), and by about 0.8 to 1 million landless peasant households (khoshneshins) who worked as hired hands. Sharecropping was based on the ownership of one or more of the five traditional factors of production: labor, land, water, seeds, and oxen. In the first phase of the Land Reform Program (LRP), initiated in 1341 (1962), it was proposed that the ownership of land, per person, should be or an equivalent amount limited to one village (shesh-dang) The rest was of land scattered among a number of villages. to be distributed among the peasants. Furthermore, the government was supposed to pay for the distributed land and IRANIAN STUDIES
50
the peasants were to repay the government ments in fifteen years.
by annual
install-
In the second phase of the LRP (1963), a number of options were provided to the landlords in the remaining villages. These included: (a) leasing their land to the peasants; (b) dividing their land with the peasants according to the ownership of the five traditional inputs; (c) selling their land to the peasants; (d) forming agricultural units with the peasants, with shares of each group determined on the basis of the ownership of the five factors; and (e) buying the peasants' rights and employing them as wage laborers. The third phase of the LRP (1965) set guidelines for establishing private farm corporations by peasants and landlords and as such was in fact an extension of the (d) option mentioned above. Finally the fourth phase (1966) anticipated that the leaseholds created by the (a) above should be either divided between landlord and peasant according to the (b) option or be sold to the peasants. As a result of the implementation of the first two phases of the LRP, about one million households, i.e., less than one-third of the peasant households, acquired land (either through implementation of the first phase or through the second or the third of the above options. About 1.4 million households (44 percent of the peasant households) became tenants, and finally, about 81,000 households (2.5 percent of the peasant households) acquired shares in the newly formed agricultural units. These figures suggest that more than 20 percent of the rural households were totally bypassed by the first two phases (or indeed by all four phases) of the LRP. To this we should add about one million landless households that were, by definition, excluded from the categories of persons to whom land might be transferred.8 Aside from such serious flaws and a number of leeways that were intentionally or otherwise included in (or later added to) the Land Reform Laws,9 the first two phases of the LRP could be regarded as a move toward creation of tenancies in place of the old peasant-landlord system and a crackdown on large landownership. So far as the implementation of the 51
WINTER-SPRING 1979
that of the fourth phase) is next two phases (especially concerned, not enough information has been made available with respect assessment, particularly to allow a definitive All that can to the number of peasant families affected. be said at this point is that the third phase was essentially a reformulation of the fourth of the above options, and it merely set the guidelines for the establishment of farm corporations in which the peasants were required to exchange rights for shares in the cortheir permanent cultivating Abolition of the tenancies that were created by poration. option (a) and the division or sale of the leaseholds to the tenant peasants were the proposed targets of the fourth phase. However, this phase when considered in conjunction with the previous phases, represented an abrupt shift of emphasis from the break-up of large landholdings (the proof posed goal of the first two phases) to a reconsolidation the small peasant holdings thus created into the proposed As mentioned before, the third phase farm corporations. the farm corporations; set the guideline for establishing but, as a result of the first two phases of LRP, only onethird of the peasant households could even be considered as potential shareholders of the proposed farm corporations, while 44 percent of the households had reached tenancy agreements with their respective landlords and as such were not It was against this to form farm corporations. eligible background that the fourth phase of the LRPwas formulated and introduced. The task of the fourth phase was to increase the number of peasant households that could form a farm corporation.10 Two points about farm corporations the exchange of the noted: first, should be particularly peasant's permanent farming rights for ownership of paper shares paved the road for the concentration of shares because now the large shareholders could buy the shares of less well-to-do peasants; second, the fact that these corporations had been controlled by paid employees of the government created much doubt about the whole program among (and rightfully) the peasants, who have been traditionally suspicious of the government. The government, since the inception of the first farm corporation, has heavily subsidized these corporations (see Table 5). The corporations are in which good generally established "mainly in districts but it seems land and adequate water have been available,"ll IRANIAN STUDIES
52
TABLE S AND DISTRIBUTIONOF CREDITAMONG THE MEMBERSHIP MEMBERS OF FARMCORP. AND THE CO-OP. SOCIETIES Year 1347
1350
1S 4,698 42.1 60.4 13,770 2.9
37 8,687 44.1 51.6 28,468 3.3
1355
Farm Corporations
Number Membership Cap./Member (1000 Rls) Credit/Member (1000 Rls) Land under Cult. (Hects.) Land/Member Co-op
Societies
Number Membership Cap./Member (1000 Rls)
8,388 1,260,000 1.3
*Due to merger of the co-op. Source:
89 33,663 42.2 --138,000 4.1
8,450 1,606,000 1.5
societies
2,880* 2,868,000 2.4
in 1352.
Plan Organization, Tahavolat-i-Iqtesadi-va-Ijtemai(Socioeconomic Changes of Iran), 1355, pp. 113 and BMI (1355 Bulletin), pp. 61 and 178.
i-Iran
that the efforts of the government to sell the idea of farm as had been expected. corporations was not as successful By with a membership of 33,663 1976, only 89 farm corporations, a meager one percent of the rural households) were (i.e., the peasants who established. As we mentioned earlier, chose to join them received shares in the profit (if any) of the corporation in exchange for giving up their farming right to the land, and were supposed to be employed as wage laborers by the corporations. The enhancement of the already widespread unemployment in the rural areas where modern irrigation, cultivation and harvest techniques were and the fact that all the employed by the farm corporations 53
WINTER-SPRING 1979
by were run or controlled of these corporations affairs idea whole the made government central of the appointees suspect and risky to the majority of of farm corporations the peasants.12 the of income is concerned, So far as distribution claimed, did not bring LRP, contrary to what it originally of land among the rural about a more equal distribution byFor one thing, the program completely population. Furthermore, khoshneshins. passed more than one million by various phases of even among those who were affected of land was anything but the program, the distribution land (about 8.6 As Table 6 shows, the cultivable equal. among 3.6 million in 1974) was distributed million hectares Out of this about 2.4 Hec./Unit. i.e., production units, comprised about 1.7 percent) (i.e., 150,000 hectares total, inunits, by 320 large agricultural the land cultivated foreign and domesformed by private cluding agri-businesses progovernment projects, farm corporations, tic investors, large commercial farmers. and finally duction cooperatives,13 by the were mostly the landlords not affected The latter LRP. At the other extreme, one finds about 800,000 landsmall farmers who and about one million less peasantsl4 on average about one hectare of the irrigated cultivated In the middle there were about 645,000 and dry lands each. about medium-size production units which, while representing cultivated production units, 18 percent of the agricultural land, 52 permore than 58 percent of the total irrigated cent of the dry land, or on the whole about 52 percent of land of the country. the total cultivated on Up to this point, we have focused our attention of the Land Reform Program and effects the distributive have shown that, contrary to what might have been expected, the program did not bring about any major changes in disGiven the of land among the rural households. tribution the post-reform way in which the program was formulated, of land should not come as a surprise skewed distribution as the logical to anyone; rather it should be considered the landless By excluding consequence of the program. peasants from those to whom land could be transferred, according to the land among Nasaghdaran and by dividing IRANIAN STUDIES
54
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the program could not bring about any rules, traditional As such of land holdings. major changes in the distribution the program could only be viewed as a measure that changed Access to other factors of the pattern of land ownership. and transcredit, such as water, fertilizer, production, were undoubtedly as important as the facilities portation of land. And it is to this subject that we availability now turn briefly.
Credit
and Price
Policies
of the LRP, the Immediately after the implementation land were required to become members peasants who received (RCS) through which, it was Societies of Rural Cooperative asand financial they could receive technical suggested, As Table 5 shows, by 1355 (1976), 2886 RCSs, with sistance. were peasant households, a membership of about 2.9 million Since 1347 (1968) the government, along with the formed. of large agriRCSs, had also encouraged the establishment which, it claimed, would and farm corporations, businesses gradually provide the country with the bulk of its marketed intensive by using modern capital agricultural products, the share of agriculture As Table 7 indicates, techniques. exand credits in the government development disbursements low. tended by the banking system, was disproportionately in gross domestic As a result, the share of agriculture the share formation was negligible--e.g., fixed capital in machinery and in aggregate investment of agriculture equipment dropped from 17.6 percent in 1341 (1962) to 7.3 percent in 1355 (1976). the sector itself, However, within the agriculture the bulk of credit and delarge production units received As Table 7 shows, during the velopment disbursements.15 received the agri-businesses 1347-52 (1968-76) period, to agdisbursements about 18 percent of the government's and farm corthe share of rural cooperatives riculture; while encompassing more than 90 percent of porations, declined from 16 percent in 1352 to peasant households, to about 8 percent of the 9 percent in 1353, and finally earlier in 1355. As indicated (see Table 5), disbursements IRANIAN STUDIES
56
TABLE 7 CREDIT BY THE BANKINGSECTOR(EXCLUDINGEQUITY PARTICIPATION)TO THE PRIVATESECTORAND GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT DISBURSEMENTS TO VARIOUSSECTORS(BIL. RLS.) 1347
1350
1352
1355
18.9 25.2 22.9 11.5
17.4 42.6 34.4 6.3
37.3 90.8 61.7 7.7
131.1 368.9 237.8 8.9
5.1 15.6 9.8
9.7 24.2 24.0
12.8 25.3 48.2
34.3 94.4 147.7
1.9 19.6
2.4 18.9 2.0 16.0
5.2 15.3 2.8 8.2
Bank Credit
Agriculture Industry ?, Mine Construction Agriculture as % of total Government
Development
Disbursements
Agriculture Industry t Mine ? Housing Construction Government
Disbursements
to Agriculture
Large agricultural units % Rural Co-op and Farm Corps. %
Sources:
.9 16.0
For Banking Sector's credit ard for Development Disbursements: BMI 1349, 1350, and 1355.
and capital/land capital/labor were much greater corporations in the cooperative societies.16
ratios associated with farm than the comparable ratios
In short, massive importation of agricultural products (e.g., imports of wheat, which had accounted for 0.05 percent of the domestic output in 1330, increased to 5.4 per57
WINTER-SPRING 1979
cent in 1344 and to 27.2 percent in 1356), a gradual but persistent decline in the relative prices of traditional crops, the unfavorable credit policies of the government, and the LRP, set in motion a process which resulted in a major shift of financial resources away from agriculture (rural areas) and toward other sectors of the economy (urban areas). Furthermore, there was a shift of financial resources (within the agricultural sector itself) from small farmers constituting the membership of rural cooperatives to agri-businesses and other large production units. of small farmers and their forced miGradual elimination gration to the urban areas followed in time. One last point should be mentioned about the efficiency of large agricultural units. In 1977, the large units occupying 100 hectares and more comprised 12 percent of the land and produced 6 percent of the agricultural output,17 while the medium-size units of 10-100 hectares occupied less than half the available land but produced of the country's three-fourths agricultural output.18
Manufacturing
of the manufacturing The structure sector of the economy over the years has undergone sweeping changes. the policies Undoubtedly, adopted by the government were for some of these changes. responsible But the availadue to huge oil exports, of foreign exchanges, bility was the major factor that not only affected the growth process of the sector, of but also shaped the development policies the government. Since the early 1960s, the government had followed a policy of import substitution. A host of imand licensing port-tariff were adopted with regulations the aim of protection and promotion of the home-produced The net result of these policies, howconsumer goods. did not bear any reever, as might have been expected, semblance to what the government had claimed for them. with the highest rates being imposed Differential tariffs, on finished consumer goods and the lowest on capital and intermediate goods, created a desirable, competition-free environment for the firms that, taking advantage of the IRANIAN STUDIES
58
goods, set up asand intermediate low tariffs on capital consumer goods. finished sembly operations for manufacturing as the development stratThe adoption of import substitution In fact, in Asia, Africa egy was not an Iranian innovation. have relied and especially South America, numerous countries However, on this policy as the "engine of development." of foreign exwhile in many of these cases the scarcity application changes has set an upper limit on full-scale on the one hand, of this strategy,19 in Iran, oil revenues, havens for the changed the local markets into profitable lifted the forfirms operating in Iran and, on the other, confront. which many other countries eign exchange constraint assert that in Iran, the producThus, one can justifiably tion units were least motivated to search for alternative techniques of production and to reduce the heavy reliance on the foreign suppliers and capital goods. of intermediate
The Structure
of
the
Manufacturing
Sector20
sector of the As Table 8 shows, the manufacturing available data, Iranian economy, according to the latest scattered throughcomprises about 245,000 establishments out the country with Tehran having the highest rate of although representdensity. The large establishments,21 estabing only 3 percent of the total urban manufacturing of the urban industrial lishments, employ about one-third of the industrial labor force and produce about two-thirds output. of the large urban the distribution Table 9 depicts of acaccording to their fields industrial establishments of industry has been As indicated, the structure tivity. heavily geared to provide the basic needs of the market. In 1352, 50 percent of the large urban establishments were Fursector. concentrated either in the food or textile combined accounted for about 60 thermore, the two sectors percent of the total sales and 52 percent of the urban industrial One point worth mentioning is that employment. shares of various sectors the observed changes in relative in manufacturing output (and employment) suggest that both and textiles sectors had inelastic the food-processing 59
WINTER-SPRING 1979
TABLE 8 OF MANUFACTURING STRUCTURE INDUSTRIES--URBANAREAS (VALUESIN 1338 PRICES) 1341 Large Number of Establishments Employment Employment/Establishments Sales (bil. Rls.) Value added (bil. Rls.) Sales/Employee (1000 Rls. Smnall Number of Establishments Employment Employment/Establishments Sales (bil. Rls.) Value added (bil. Rls.) Sales/Employee (1000 Rls. Sources:
2, 839 149,730 52.7 ---
---
94,610 245,744 2.6 ---
_
1346
1351
1354
4,386 217,000 49.5 101.1 38.7 465.9
5,651 7,S00 303,626 392,000 53.7 52.3 191 62 630
155,879 456,000 2.9 50.1 20.0 109.9
203,296 238, 000 633,000 786,000 3.1 3.3 86.6 32.4 132
Ministry of Industries and Mines, Statistics on Large Industrial Establishments (1351), and Industrial and Commercial Statistics of Iran (1976); Ministry of Economy, Iranian Industrial Statistics (1342).
sales (employment) possibilities. Whether this observed behavior was due to shortages of investment funds (i.e., a supply constraint) or due to the sticky and inertial demand conditions is not quite clear.22 Whatever the cause, the implication is that these two sectors could not be relied upon as the sources of manufacturing employment without some fundamental changes in the demand and/or supply conWe shall return to this subject later due to its ditions. importance and policy implications. IRANIAN STUDIES
60
TABLE 9a LARGEINDUSTRIALESTABLISHMENTS (URBANAREAS) 1341 No, of No. of EstabPersons lishments Engaged
Sector
C Food, beverages tobacco 586 Textiles 1,154 4 apparel Wood 4 furniture 104 Paper & cardboard 12 Printing 60 & publishing Leather 29 Rubber 4 tire 21 Chemical 64 Oil 4 coal 7 Non-metal minerals 444 Basic metals 12 Metal products 178 Non-Electric 5 Machinery Elec. & Electronic 12 Mach. Transportation 138 Equipment Miscellaneous 13 Total
2,839
No. of Establishments
26,394 65,877 2,677 49S 1,782 1,870 1,409 4,588 14,583 16,027 326 5,358 107 301 7,863 73 149,730
1352 No. of Persons Engaged
1,208 1,908 209 60 139 70 S4 267 16 1,087 88 534 141 150 49 81
68,162 121,134 6,041 4,263 4,780 2,568 5,869 26,914 1,487 38, 267 21,9342 20,133 7,344 20,337 11,730 1,808
6,056
362,179
Notes:
Over the years, the definition of some industries has undergone some changes. As a result, there has been some inconsistencies in the related data.
Sources:
Ministry
trial
of
Census
Economy,
(Persian),
Results
Industries Statistics 4 Mines, al Establishments (1352).
61
of
Tables
the
3-9.
1341
Indus-
Ministry
on Large
of
Industri-
WINTER-SPRING 1979
TABLE 9b SHARESIN THE INDUSTRIALOUTPUTBY SOMESECTORS (ENTIRE COUNTRY EXCLUDINGDOMESTICOIL AND POWER) IN PERCENT Sector
1338
1346
1352
1354
C tobacco Food, beverages 1 apparel Textiles Leather Basic metals Metal products Transportation equipment
38.5 33.9 3.5 0.6 5.5 2.8
41.5 29.0 1.2 1.7 4.2 4.4
32.8 25.8 1.1 4.6 4.3 8.4
27.2 21.5 0.9 7.4 8.3 7.5
Sources:
For 1338 and 1346: Ministry of Industries and Mines, The Iranian Industrial Statistics (1972). For 1352 and 1354: Ministry of Industries and and Commercial Mines, Industrial Statistics of and Statistics on Large Industrial Iran (1976), Establishments (1356).
The government, since the early 1960s, followed an import substitution policy, imposing on the average a tariff rate of from 15 to 20 percent on capital goods, while the of many consumer goods, if not completely importation prowere discouraged hibited, through an array of exorbitant Even moderate tariff rates and licensing tariff procedures. rates imposed on capital goods were bypassed if the imwas to be used in what the Ministry of Econoported capital which in es-23 my had called "approved productive projects," units. sence boiled down to large-scale, capital-intensive on The pursuit of this policy had detrimental effects if Iran's growth process. It, for example, discouraged, not totally and growth of capithe inception strangulated, conwhile the production of finished tal-goods industries, sumer goods, with heavy reliance on foreign sources of machinery and intermediate goods, were being supported. IRANIAN STUDIES
62
of imTable 10 shows changes in the size and composition As shown, the ports over the period from 1338 to 1355. from share of consumer goods in total imports declined The 34.5 percent in 1338 to around 12 percent in 1350. rose from goods, on the contrary, share of intermediate The ef41 percent in 1338 to about 64 percent in 1350. of the manufacfects of this process upon the structure reInter-industry turing industry were quite deleterious. and the degree of interdependence which represent lations, of various sectors of the economy upon each other reliance goods, were and not on the foreign sources of intermediate firms enjoying the protected weakened, and the manufacturing in the world markets. home-market became less competitive 1962 and 1970 input-output Table 11 shows the consolidated tables of Iran.
TABLE 10 OF IMPORTS COMPOSITION Year
Consumer Goods
41.4 44.2 43.6 53.4 64.0 64.8 62.1 52.6
34.5 28.9 35.2 22.8 10.9 11.7 12.9 17.6
1338 1341 1343 1346 1348 1350 1351 1355 Sources:
Intermediate
Goods
Capital
Goods
24.0 26.9 21.2 23.8 25.1 23.4 25.0 29.8
For 1338, 1341, and 1343:
Foreign Trade Statisin Ministry of Economy, of Iran, p. 9. For 1346: Industrial Table 1. Trade Statistics of Iran (1340), Foreign B.M.I. 73-74, p. 160. For 1348 and 1350: of For 1351 and 1355: Foreign Trade Statistics Iran (1355), Table 1. tics
of
as cited Development
Iran,
63
WINTER-SPRING 1979
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In 1962, the contribution of the manufacturing secaccounted for 31 percent of the sector to other sectors tor's output. By 1970 this ratio had fallen to 19 percent. This clearly points to a weaker linkage among the various of the economy. sectors Furthermore, whereas in 1962 consumer goods accounted for 62 percent of the manufacturing to 68 percent in 1970. sector's output, the ratio increased the performance of this In terms of its export potentials, As the above sector fell quite short of a success story. table indicates, exports accounted for 4.7 percent of the The sector's output in 1962 and only 2.3 percent in 1970. that the import picture becomes more gloomy when we realize content of the sector's output was much higher in 1970 comIn fact, according to some estimates, pared to 1962. the ratio for the modern manufacturing sector was import-output 44 percent.24 On the basis of these figures, one can characterize the manufacturing sector as follows: (a) it was heavily toward production of consumer goods; (b) within oriented the sector the tech(i.e., among various production units), link was quite weak, and the observed trend seems nological to suggest that these links became weaker over the years; (c) the technological link between the manufacturing sector and the other sectors of the economy over the years became weaker; (d) conversely, the reliance of the sector on foreign sources of capital and intermediate goods increased sharply; and (e) the export performance of the sector declined. Hence, it seems that the units engaged in various of manufacturing fields industry depended more on the forof the machinery and equipment than on each eign suppliers other. However, this process should be viewed as a logical to the adoption of import substitution corollary as the industrialization policy of the country. One can expect that as long as the needed intermediate and capital goods can be imported with relatively few, if any, restrictions, of already established the competition foreign competitors and growth of the units engaged in will render the creation production of capital goods virtually impossible.25 The whole process of importing capital and intermediate goods 65
WINTER-SPRrNG 1979
consumer goods could go on rather and producing finished smoothly, however, as long as the needed foreign exchanges And here the key role played by the oil could be obtained. Over the years, revenues in the process is quite evident. become the major foreign the oil sector had increasingly contributor exchange earner of the country and the largest on As such, the oil sector, coffers. to the government's the one hand, provided the country with its exchange reand, on the other, through the government's quirements, to it contributed current and development expenditures, In consumer goods. markets for the finished the existing and the founshort, the oil sector became the cornerstone This sector was built. dation upon which the manufacturing meant that any shock, such as a drop in the world's demand not only into an imitself for Iranian oil could translate in the national income, but also a lagged mediate decline (and other sectors') sector's decrease in the manufacturing Since the early 1960s government output and employment. policy had claimed that the import-substitution officials in fewer imports from abroad and higher nonwould result They had claimed that the exports. oil, non-traditional which the creation of new indusdiversification, ultimate units will bring about, would lessen the country's trial In order to achieve on oil for foreign exchanges. reliance in Iran direct foreign investments this diversification, the impact of Before discussing encouraged. was zealously on the Iranian economy, however, a brief foreign investments review of the export performance of the country is necessary. exports Table 12 gives a breakdown of the country's the As the table indicates, during 1341-1355 (1962-1976). non-oil exports fell from about 20 percent in 1341 to about 9 percent in 1353 and to 4 percent of the imports in 1355. these figures say a lot about whether or not Undoubtedly, of the government in achievstrategy the industrialization It should be economy was successful. ing a diversified non-traditionthat the bulk of the non-oil, noted, further, (such as vegetable al exports comes from food processing and from like soap and detergents) oil and some by-products which are traditionally and apparel sectors, the textile This dominated by Iranian firms with no foreign partners. that the provides at least one piece of evidence suggesting IRANIAN STUDIES
66
TABLE 12 EXPORT-IMPORTS IN MILLIONOF DOLLARS
Export of traditional agricultural goods Export of industrial
goods:
1350
1353
1355
--
192.3
272.9
385.6
338.5
--
24.6
61.7
163.1
169.0
--
4.2
7.9
12.1
19.5
--
7.3 1.0
31.8 4.5
51.6 21.2
32.4 24.2
114.7
216.9
334.6
581.5
517.7
547.6
1,389.2
2,061
6,614
12,567
16.2
8.8
4.1
--
of goods
Imports Non-oil exports of imports
as %
Source:
Bulletin,
B.M.I.
1347
&
- Soap & detergent - Shoes, textiles, apparel - Transport equipment
Non-oil export & services
1341
20.9 various
15.6 years.
export potentials associated with foreign investments much less than what government officials had claimed.
Direct Impact
Foreign on the
Investment Economy
were
and Its
As mentioned before, the large manufacturing establishments (i.e., units employing ten or more employees) accounted for about 3 percent of the establishments engaged in manufacturing activities, employing about one-third of the total industrial labor force. They were responsible
67
WINTER-SPRING 1979
for about two-thirds Table 8).
of the industrial
value-added
(see
of a "large establishment" However, the definition units employing besmall-scale is a broad one, including estaband manufacturing tween ten and twenty employees, lishments with more than fifty workers, and, in a few cases, data suggest The available even more than 1,000 workers. employing more than establishments that the manufacturing although comprising less than 1 percent of the 50 persons, firms, employed about 20 percent of the inmanufacturing labor force and accounted for more than 55 percent dustrial As such, these gross value added.26 of the manufacturing firms seem to have been the driving force behind the growth sector. performance of the manufacturing data lump the available Unfortunately, Thus, firms with and without foreign partners together. about the operation of we do not have enough information All we do know is of the foreign firms. the subsidiaries the firms with foreign partners that, almost invariably among the employ more than 100 persons and are, therefore, in Iran. operating establishments manufacturing largest data on the foreign investA glance at the available period rements in Iran during the 1341-1355 (1962-1976) tire and rubber, metallurgical, veals that petrochemical, transportation, home appliances, and electronic electrical were the most favored industries pharmaceutical and finally In fact, of activity of the foreign investors. fields about 75 percent of the total forattracted these sectors data furThe available during 1346-1352. eign investments and texthermore seems to suggest that the food processing of the Iranian entrewere the strongholds industries tile simpliWhether this was due to the relative preneurs.27 or whether involved, city of the production techniques does not concern us here. other factors were responsible, However, in view of the fact that most of the large inin the food were concentrated establishments dustrial the foreign that and sectors,28 and textile processing in these two sectors was minimal, it seems reainvestment non-traditional, sonable to assume that the modern (i.e., IRANIAN STUDIES
68
or non-food, sector was mainly non-textile) manufacturing dominated by the subsidiaries of the foreign firms, and that a study of the modern manufacturing sector would shed some on the Iranian light on the impact of foreign investments economy. Conversely, one can assert that any study of the of the subsidiaries operations of foreign firms could also help explain the working and the future of the modern manufacturing sector of the economy. So far as the export potentials of the firms with foreign partners were concerned, the export figures (Table 12) show no significant correlation between foreign investment and exports of the country. The exported goods were generally produced by the sectors with the lowest rate of foreign investment.29 Furthermore, a recent I.L.O. study of the of multinational operation in Iran shows that corporations out of a sample of 23 firms with foreign partners, only in four cases did the firms have some exports, and even in the case of these firms, the foreign markets accounted for between S and 10 percent of total output.30 This is mainly a result of the fact that their unit costs, due to the smallness of their market, were much higher than the internationof the I.L.O. survey al prices. Furthermore, the results chose Iran not because suggest that the foreign investors of lower labor costs or access to raw materials, but rather due to the lucrative market created, and forcefully protecwalls.31 ted, by the tariff So far as the diversification of the country's industries is concerned, the I.L.O. sample survey shows that the of the foreign firms were engaged mostly in subsidiaries final stages of production of mostly consumer goods which did not enter into the production process of other conumodities as inputs.32 The needed intermediate and capital goods low import tariffs with relatively were provided by the In fact, except for a few cases, the parent companies. local industries provided from zero to 30 percent of the inputs required by these firms, the rest being imported.33 Thus, the backward-linkage effects associated with foreign firms seem to have been negligible, with a very low level of value-added accruing to Iran.34
69
WINTER-SPRING1979
The Role
of
Financial
Intermediaries
The monetary policy of the government, on the other rates below the inflation hand, by keeping the interest for labor, and of capital encouraged substitution rate,35 the the problem and further distorted thereby exacerbated of income. The in distribution already alarming inequality played a major role in this prointermediaries financial of these institutions discussion As a more extensive cess. is beyond the scope of the present paper, we shall be conbetween the banking with the relations cerned here briefly sector and the firms with foreign partners. Development banks were the sources of medium and and Mining Development The Industrial long-term loans. Credit Bank of Bank of Iran (IMDBI) and the Industrial capital Iran (ICBI) were the major sources of industrial Both banks drew heavily on govat below-market rates.3 ernment funds and foreign borrowings for their resources. of 19 major foreign banks were the shareholders In fact, of the shares held by the IMDBI. Although the percentage insigwas relatively institutions these foreign financial of these the real significance (about 15 percent), nificant loans derived from the fact that the industrial institutions to the firms with foreign partners were extended against of guarantee either from the parent company or from letters It seems that a foreign bank known to the local officials. were among the institutions financial (which these foreign in the IMDBI, mainly banks in the world) invested largest of the large of the subsidiaries the operation to facilitate them in using the local firms and to assist multinational In fact, the needs. for their capital resources financial firms with a 23 of sample of out that reveals survey I.L.O. on the Iranian banks for solely 14 relied foreign partners, needs and not one of these 23 firms had retheir financial lied on the parent company as the sole source of finance.37 it appears that, contrary to the offiAll in all, of the of the subsidiaries the contribution cial claims, was nil. foreign firms to Iran's economic self-sufficiency which seems to be an invariA very weak backward linkage, of all the firms with foreign partners, able characteristic
IRANIAN STUDIES
70
local induswas not able to promote the growth of related at the end of the period sector, The manufacturing tries. seemed to more than any time before, under investigation, be merely a conglomerate of thousands of firms that, while on the foreign sources of a very heavy reliance displaying indegoods, were technologically and capital intermediate pendent of each other.
Sununary and Conclusion
Iran's economy experiDuring the period 1959-1976, of this growth and rapid growth. The benefits enced painful The rest of fell to only a small segment of the population. or was faced was bypassed by the prosperity the population and absolute in its relative with further deterioration for the growing responsible A number of factors incomes. It can be identified. in income distribution inequality rather seems that the Land Reform Program of 1962 increased, in in income distribution the inequality than eliminated, on development policies, The industrial the rural areas. intensive the other hand, by encouraging capital techniques, of employment needed by the growing limited the creation the monetary policy that Specifically, urban population. aggravated techniques the use of labor-saving subsidized foreign investclaims, Contrary to official this problem. of the economy, ment failed to enhance the export potentials in Iran corporations and financial subsidy of multinational with an production activities in capital-intensive resulted and income disadverse impact on employment opportunities tribution. of income, in turn, appears to have The distribution had a decisive on the growth of the manufacturing effect kept of income distribution The extreme inequality sector. the demand for a number of manufactured products at a low Iranian exports of manufacturing products were level. During recent years, or negligible. non-existent generally and the output shares of the food-processing the relative affecthus adversely declined, sectors textile-and-apparel Undoubtedly, ting employment growth in these industries. over the the increased inequality in income distribution 71
WINTER-SPRING 1979
years was a contributing factor to this process. At the same (e.g., alcoholic and nontime, the expansion of some sectors home appliances, alcoholic beverages, motor vehicles, tire and rubber) which incidentally attracted the highest level of foreign investment. Manyof the firms in these sectors capinot only on the high import tariffs talized imposed on finished consumer goods, but also on low price elasticities of demand (by their relatively small yet wealthy customers) for non-textile their non-food, products and were able to increase their output shares over the years. NOTES
1.
of Iraformula gives the correspondence The following G=I+621; thus 1338-1355 nian and Gregorian calendars: to 1959-1976. corresponds
2.
to Obstacles See, for example, A. Ashraf, "Historical in Iran," Iranian the Development of a Bourgeoisie Vol. II, Nos. 2-3 (Spring-Summer 1969); M. A. Studies, A Study in the PolitKatouzian, "Land Reform in Iran: of Peajournal ical Economy of Social Engineering," (January 1974); M. A. Katouzian, "Oil versant Studies sus Agriculture: A Case Study of Dual Resource Depletion in Iran," ibid. (April 1978); and L. Rey, "Persia in (74) Katouzian's (1963). New Left Review Perspective," of Iran's interpretation gives a Wittfogelian article recent history.
3.
computed using price index was generally The official As such they systemprices. prescribed the officially rate; however, the inflation underestimated atically in the absence of any other source, we were forced to price index. rely on the official
4.
growth of the urban center The rate of population during this period was much higher than that of rural that there had been a large shift areas, suggesting from rural to urban sector. of resources
5.
figures instead of We have used consumption-expenditures the difference being They are clearly different, incomes. of savings will not alter However, inclusion savings. our results.
IRANIAN STUDIES
72
6.
H. T. Oshima, Employment and Income Policies (Geneva: I.L.O., 1973).
7.
all variables As we mentioned before, are expressed in 1338 (1959) prices. Thus, the decline points to a real decrease in the economic well-being of this segment of the rural population. Some might argue that the use of C.P.I. as the deflator might not be appropriate. However, in the absence of any comparable data for rural areas, we had to rely on the urban figures. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that the rate of inflation was lower in rural areas than in major and towns. In fact, during most of the period cities under consideration the rate of inflation in 22 small towns was greater than the comparable rate for nine which in turn was greater than the inmajor cities, flation rate of Tehran (see for example: B.M.I. 1349, Table 43, p. 145). Note further that had we used the rural private consumption expenditures figures, it could be shown that the lowest 40 percent of the rural population had, on average, a greater per capita private consumption expenditure in 1342 than in 1352. Our results, suggest that there can be incidentally, a positive association between economic growth and absolute impoverishment of some segments of the population.
8.
I (ii) of Land Reform Law of 9 January 1962 Article defines peasant (zaric) as "one who is not the owner of the land but who, possessing one or more of the agricultural or with the help of inputs, personally members of his family, cultivates land belonging to a landowner, to whom he gives a portion of the crop in cash or in kind."
9.
See Katouzian
10.
(1974),
for
Iran
op. cit.
When a farm corporation is formed, the participating peasants exchange their permanent farming rights for shares in the corporation. Farmers then are supposed to be employed by the corporation as wage laborers
73
WINTER-SPRING 1979
as shareholders,
to receive, and are entitled profit. of the corporation's
11.
A. K. S. Lambton, The Persian Oxford University
12.
1969),
Press,
a share
(Oxford:
Land Reform
p. 359.
that farm corporations A recent I.L.O. study suggests companies employ only between 40 and and agri-business of the active population 50 percent of the economically that in 1973, It further suggests areas they cover. of cultivation, the same techniques under prevailing output could be produced by 2.6 million agricultural that about 1 million workers workers, thus suggesting wholly unemployed. may be potentially in agriculture
See E. Hirsch, Employment Iran (Geneva: E.I.P.I.).
I.L.O.,
and Income
1973),
Policies
pp. 24-29
for
(hereinafter
13.
were another attempt by The production cooperatives small peasant holdings the government to consolidate The farmers who joined production into large units. retained as opposed to farm corporations, cooperatives, full ownership of their land.
14.
Notice that the just mentioned figure shows the number in 1974. Thus, compared to the preof Khoshneshins it suggests that Land-Reform figure of 1 million, peasants were forced to migrate about 200,000 landless to the cities.
15.
of the Dez Dam In 1968, the IBRD made the financing of more than upon allocation Project conditional of the land irrigated by the dam 100,000 hectares each coverof large agricultural units, for creation Between 1968 and 1973 ing at least 5000 hectares. of Iranian and four such units with participation were established. They received foreign investors (2 percent, 30-year leases on land with low interest rate of inflation long-term loans) while the official during the same period was about 11 percent per year.
IRANIAN STUDIES
74
16.
In 1355 the capital in farm corporations per households was about twenty times the comparable ratio in cooperaIt seems that some of the figures tive societies. recent (1977) article cited in Table 5 of Katouzian's are erroneous. His conclusions, however, are valid.
17.
Mostly
18.
Business International, Operating in Iran, pp. 340; notice that these figures are for 1356 (1977). See, also Katouzian who has mentioned a study of the comparative performance of the agri-businesses, farm corporations and small-scale peasant farming, according to which peasant farming has had a better performance than farm corporations (and farm corporations, in turn, better than the agri-businesses), not only in land probut also in labor productivity and in total ductivity, productivity. See Katouzian (1977), p. 361.
19.
of the home-proHistorically, the export potentials duced goods for various reasons (such as smallness of the home market, which results in higher unit costs) have been quite slim. Thus, traditional goods have been almost invariably relied upon for earning the needed foreign exchanges. The exchange constraints at the same time have forced the operating firms to rely more on domestic sources of the capital and intermediate goods.
20.
Does not include oil sector. Notice that unless otherall references wise indicated, are to urban manufacturing establishments. Data on the rural establishments are sketchy; all we know is that the size of these establishments is quite small (one or two persons per establishment) and that they are mostly engaged in production of handicrafts.
21.
Establishments
22.
A recent study suggests that even a not-so-radical of income will result redistribution in the following increases in the value-added of various sectors
cotton,
sugar beet,
employing
fodder,
fruits
and nuts.
ten or more workers.
75
WINTER-SPRING 1979
food 39 per25 percent, of the economy: agriculture trade 16 percent. cent, wearing apparel 10 percent, by 10 peremployment will be increased As a result, of income postudistribution This alternative cent. lates that the share of the lowest 60 percent of the will be 37 percent and that of the last population J. Skolka See: 18 percent of total income. decile, Employand M. Garzuel, Changes in Income Distribution, ment Iran
and Structure
(Geneva:
of
I.L.O.,
Economy:
the
Study
A Case
has been esticustom revenues
23.
The cost to the custom administration of the total mated to be one-quarter pp. 89-94. each year; see E.I.P.I.,
24.
G. Pyatt, (Geneva:
25.
The 1357 (1978) budget of the government of Iran companies, among which 47 157 state-owned listed losses were reported The highest ran at a loss. by the National Steel Corp., Tabriz Machine Tool See Business Plant, and Arak Machine Tool Plant. 23-24. pp. International,
26.
"Methodology for Macro-Economic 1973). I.L.O.,
D. Kochav, Financing I.B.R.D.,
Industries,
of
1976).
the
Development
1974,
of
p. 52, Table
Projection"
Small-Scale
I.
27.
part of a negligible constituted Foreign investments For example, sectors. these in formation the capital in it comprised .6 of one percent of the investment whereas the comparable ratios sector, food processing 19.9 percent for some other sectors were as follows: in tire and rubber, 16.6 percent in home appliances, are for All figures 16.5 percent in petro-chemicals. period. the 1346-1352 (1967-1973)
28.
estabIn 1351 (1972) out of 5,651 large manufacturing were engaged in 1,114 (about 20.2 percent) lishments, and 1,732 units (i.e., sector, the food-processing Furtherand apparel sector. in textile 30.6 percent) more, in the same year, firms with foreign partners
IRANIAN STUDIES
76
accounted for 40 percent of the firms employing 100 persons or more. Notice that if we take into account the fact that most of the large-scale manufacturing and textile units are in the food-processing sectors (in 1345, 55.5 percent of the units employing 100 or more were engaged in the food processing and textile one could assume that the majority of the sectors), non-food, non-textile units with more than 100 employees were subsidiaries of the foreign firms. 29.
Aside from traditional exports which on average accounted for about 75 percent of total exports, the bulk of non-traditional exports came from the foodprocessing and textile sectors which, as we mentioned, were the least attractive sectors to the foreign investors.
30.
F. Daftari, in
Iran
Multinational (Geneva: I.L.0.,
Enterprises 1976).
and Employment
31.
Daftari,
32.
Ibid.,
pp. 74-77.
33.
Ibid.,
p. 75, Table
34.
As we mentioned before, the impact of foreign firms on the Iranian economy and the structure and growth performance of the modern manufacturing sector are two interrelated issues. Thus, most of the conclusions that we derived earlier about the modern manusector are relevant facturing to the and applicable present subject.
35.
In 1355 (1976) the maximum effective rate (including commissions and other charges) on two-to-five-year loans was 10 percent, while the rate of inflation, according to B.M.I., was set at 16.6 percent. For more details on the Banking System of Iran, see Business International, operating in Iran, pp. 128-34. See also E. Hirsch, pp. 89-94.
op.
cit.,
Table
B-2.
III-24.
77
WINTER-SPRING 1979
36.
In 1355, the two combined accounted for 92 percent of industrial loans. See B.M.I. (1355), pp. 63-67.
37.
Daftari,
op. cit.,
(Received
IRANIAN STUDIES
p. 116.
for publication
78
in Spring
1979)
Iranian Studies, Volume XII, Nos. 1-2, Winter-Spring
1979
The StrangeDeath of Ibrahim Khalil Khan of Qarabagh
MurielAtkin
Ibrahim Khalil Khan, the octogenarian ruler of Qarabagh in the southern Caucasus, was shot by Russian soldiers on the night of June 14, 1806. In one sense, there is nothing mysterious about the khan's death. Qarabaghi, Russian, and Iranian sources agree that he was killed for having sided with Iran against Russia's attempt to take control of his khanate and all the lands between the High Caucasus and the Aras River.1 However, this explanation raises more important questions which have gone unanswered. For years Ibrahim Khalil had sided with Georgia and then Russia against Iran. What made him switch sides in time of war? Russia did not plan to supplant rule by khan in Qarabagh and did not kill every ruler it deposed. Why then did the Russians kill this khan? How was it possible for the execution of Russian policy to slip out of St. Petersburg's control? Ibrahim Khalil's for increasingly desperate struggle political survival embodied many of the key elements of the multi-sided contest for power which gripped the territory from the High Caucasus to the Aras in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. For local rulers, it represented the continuation of long-established rivalries in
Muriel Atkin is Assistant Washington University.
Professor
79
of History
at George
WINTER-SPRING 1979
ofstrove to increase his strength, which each participant larger with another local ruler or interested ten in alliance However, the nature of this maneuvering had been state. At that particular changed by renewed outside involvement. in the area interested time, the Ottomans were not seriously from Yerevan and the kingdom of Georgia east, but the newly The region had been ascendant Qajar rulers of Iran were. subject to Iran for much of the Safavid era and, after the fall of that dynasty, had been claimed with varying degrees in the competition by several contenders of effectiveness By the turn of the century. for power during the eighteenth two Qajar shahs, having gained control century, the first atonce ruled by the Safavids, over many of the provinces east Caucasian states to tempted to add the once-prosperous Their plans were opposed not only their domains as well. but also by the Russian Empire, which had by local rulers, to be and economic benefits its own vision of the strategic focused Russian interest the area. derived from controlling mostly on the uses of the Causasus as a base of operations against the Ottoman Empire and as a commercial center for the Russian notion In addition, expanded trade with Asia.2 than that of more restrictive, of suzerainty was different, Tradithere. exerted influence powers which traditionally most often meant that a local ruler suzerainty tionally, would retain autonomy in his domains while paying tribute taking up arms to supto his overlord and, when necessary, in the region. Some vassals, interests port the latter's might be like the monarchs of Georgia under the Safavids, importance in the Iranian Empire. The men of considerable involvement in the Caucafor Russia's rationale principal and, local rulers were weak and unenlightened sus--that and guidance-in need of Russian protection therefore, vassalage.3 the premises of traditional directly contradicted over the eastern Caucasus brought with Russian suzerainty conof a permanent Russian military it the establishment tingent there and a variety of measures aimed at reforming in some cases, as in Georgia, by the the principalities, These conflicting amof local rule. complete elimination intense power struggle inbitions produced a particularly From volving the two empires and a host of smaller states. the available options were the point of view of the latter, from aggranshifting whittled down over time, the objective
IRANIAN
STUDIES
80
dizement to survival. Russia prevailed, Ultimately, but not with the ease it had hoped for and without the support of local rulers, who had been expected to welcome the RusThe Muslim ruler most likely to have sided sian take-over. with the Russians was Ibrahim Khalil Khan of Qarabagh. Rusto hold his loyalty sia's failure casts light on the nature of the struggle for the Caucasus. Qarabagh lay north of the Aras River, occupying fertile land well suited to agriculture and animal husbandry. It was one of the foremost grain producers of the eastern Caucasus and was famed for its horses.4 On the eve of the Russian conquest, political power was in the hands of a Turcoman tribe, the Javanshirs, who enjoyed the support of local Kurds as well.5 The ruling family and most of its subjects were Shilite Muslims, but there was a Sunni minority as well as a sizable of Armenian Christians.6 proportion Qarabagh's existence as an independent khanate was a comrecent development. paratively Until the second quarter of the eighteenth century, Qarabagh had been ruled by its northern neighbor, Ganjah, at the time a leading local power. The two were separated by Nadir Shah, who, in striving to a new imperial dynasty in Iran, sought to weaken establish of the fallen supporters Safavids, like the branch of the Qajar tribe which ruled Ganjah. After Nadir's death, a member of the Javanshir tribe took power in Qarabagh only to fall prisoner to Karim Khan Zand and die a captive in Shiraz. His son, Ibrahim Khalil, escaped from Shiraz and made himself master of Qarabagh by overthrowing his brother.7 Ibrahim Khalil went on to become one of the most powerful rulers in the eastern Caucasus. By political intrigue and occasional battles, he attempted to force the submission of most of the Muslim-ruled territory from the High Caucasus as far south as Tabriz. There is some sketchy evidence that his ambitions ranged further into Iran but that he backed down in the face of rising Qajar power.8 To strengthen his position against his rivals, Ibrahim Khalil made an alliance with King Erekle of Georgia, who, in the 1780s, was a force to be reckoned with. The plan was for a number of years, as the allies fairly successful in-
81
WINTER-SPRING 1979
terfered puppet.9
in the affairs
of Yerevan and made Ganjah their
about the GeorgianThere was nothing innovative even though it involved a Muslim ruler Qarabaghi alliance, After against fellow Muslims. with Christians cooperating of the monarchs had been vassals all, Georgia's hereditary had important this alliance Nonetheless, Safavid shahs. the pattern whereby Ibrahim It established repercussions. Khalil tried to maintain his independence by whatever fajust at a time when Aqa Muwas available vorable alliance hammad Khan Qajar and Catherine the Great began their efemforts to add the eastern Caucasus to their respective The serious involvement of outside powers in the pires. region after a lull of several decades opened up new possithe dangers of while increasing for alliances bilities Moreover, Qarabagh and Georgia became allies subjugation. of Russia. shortly before Georgia became a protectorate This raised the prospect that Ibrahim Khalil, urged on by The khan could King Erekle, might make a similar agreement. to Iranian claims while in his resistance be strengthened without difficulty. Russia would extend its suzerainty bethat the enlightened Catherine the Great was confident by all reasonnevolence of her reign would be appreciated able people. Thus, in 1783, when she planned to bring Caucasus under her rule, she hoped eastern most of the over the khan of of her suzerainty that the establishment Qarabagh and the king of Georgia "could serve as an exand a stimugentle proprietorship ample of this country's lus for many of our neighbors there to imitate the example of these two rulers."10 The Things began to go wrong almost immediately. crux of the problem was something which was characteristic Musespecially with Caucasian rulers, dealings of Russia's Russia had a very clear sense of the advantages lim ones. it expected to derive from involvement in Caucasian affairs. interIt had no awareness of the fact that local rulers' Whenever Russian officials from Russia's. ests might differ of interests, were confronted by evidence of that disparity at actions were deemed at best unenlightened, local rulers' IRANIAN STUDIES
82
worst pernicious, rulers' concerns.
but little
consideration
was given
to the
of a RusIbrahim Khalil regarded the establishment trepidation. The sian garrison in Georgia with considerable fact that communications were taking place between some of his Armenian subjects and the Russian commander in Georgia Even the made him suspect there was a plot against him.11 way in which the Russian general in charge of negotiations tried to convince him of the advantages of vassalage had an ominous undertone in that he held up the example of Shahin of Russian protecGiray of the Crimea to show the benefits tion.12 There was little in this argument to comfort Ibrafor him Khalil since Shahin Giray was hated by his subjects by repeated upbeing a Russian puppet and was challenged to weaken the risings. Russia had used various tactics in April 1783, the Crimea and finally annexed it outright month before Russia began encouraging Ibrahim Khalil to follow Shahin Giray's example.13 the promptings of King Erekle and fear Nonetheless, with Russia led Ibrahim Khalil to of a direct confrontation maintain contact with Russian authorities. He quickly discovered that Russia would take Georgia's side in any dispute and Qarabagh, as in the matter of which between the latter Moreover, there ally would have upper hand in Ganjah.14 was the fundamental problem that no genuine negotiation of whatwould be tolerated by Russia, only the acceptance Catherine granted. There were unsubtle ever conditions hints that a delay would lead to the Russian conquest of Given the efforts of King Erekle to convince Qarabagh. Ibrahim Khalil to follow his example in becoming a Russian vassal, the khan must have known that his ally had been alterms which generally resembled lowed to negotiate, offering those of the final agreement.l5 Not only was Ibrahim Khalil prohibited from negotiating, but he also could not obtain reassurance that Russia would allow him to keep his of his khanate. in the internal affairs In June authority of 1784, he made one last attempt to negotiate his submiswas not answered.16 sion to Russia. His letter
83
WINTER-SPRING 1979
to acquire a powerful new ally, Despite his failure Ibrahim Khalil held to the policy he had already established-the maintenance of his autonomous power by any means available. He pursued this course even when it meant refusing to submit to the formidable Aqa MuhammadKhan Qajar, who, most of Iran, brought a large army in 1795, after subjugating to the Caucasus to compel the submission of local rulers. The elimination of local rule was not his aim; several khans were left in office. who submitted, with or without a fight, of dislike for the prospects So intense was Ibrahim Khalil's of submisthe possibility that he rejected Qajar suzerainty sion and chose to fight even though he was at a considerable of the His own army was a small fraction disadvantage. 60,000-man Qajar force, and his khanate had been weakened Moreover, he could not count by several years of famine. the The Russians underestimated on any help from outside. of the situation and sent Georgia no help deseriousness to do so. Local rulers either spite their treaty obligation welcomed Aqa Muhammador, like King Erekle, were preoccustruggle against him. 7 Despite pied by their own desperate He and his supIbrahim Khalil chose to fight. everything, of Shusha, the in the citadel porters remained besieged capital, for over a month while the bulk of the Qajar army went on to other targets.18 In a sense, Ibrahim Khalil's Aqa policy succeeded. Muhammadwithdrew from the Caucasus at the customary end of He had the campaigning season, before the onset of winter. not forced Ibrahim Khalil into submission though he was sucthe cessful with other khans in the region and devastated However, Ibrahim Khalil's kingdom of Georgia. once-powerful In addition to battle casualties, victory was a pyrrhic one. there were, according to an Iranian source, wholesale masThe already elements in Qarabagh.l9 sacres of anti-Qajar was further depleted by the enslavement sparse population and civiliof as many as several hundred Qarabaghi soldiers The Qajar army employed a scorched-earth policy in ans. area and took much of the rethe already famine-stricken This, and the general dangers maining food for its own use. both of nomads and sedentary of war, spurred the flight farmers from Qarabagh to more remote mountain regions.
IRANIAN STUDIES
84
Many of those who fled did not return during the last eleven if they ever returned at years of Ibrahim Khalil's reign, all.20 had a profound impact on the All these misfortunes For many of them, a outlook of the remaining Qarabaghis. renewed Qajar attack was a horror to be avoided at all costs. If Ibrahim Khalil imperiled his subjects by opposing the Qajars, he might find the matter taken out of his hands. When Aqa Muhammadlaunched a new campaign in the Caucasus to risk opposing him. in 1797, the Qarabaghis were unwilling Ibrahim Khalil had to flee to the high mountains and the reof Shusha opened the capital's sidents gates to the Qajars.21 That might have decided the status of Qarabagh had it not been for Aqa Muhammad's assassination soon after by two of his servants. At that point the whole campaign fell apart. In the interval between the two Iranian campaigns, to Catherine the Great tried to atone for Russia's failure protect Georgia by sending an army to the Caucasus. The 1796 expedition had two purposes: to establish Russian suzerainty throughout the eastern Caucasus and to overthrow Aqa Muhammad. The campaign was incompetently planned and even more incompetently executed. Russia's troops met with a host of difficulties but not with Aqa Muhammad, who was campaigning hundreds of miles away in Khurasan that year. The troops were recalled the day after Catherine's death on November 17, 1796 and were out of the region before Aqa Muhammad returned the following year.22 The brief Russian presence in the Caucasus during 1796-1797 did more to alienate local Muslim rulers than to win their support. One major concern was whether Russian protection would be good enough to justify running the risk of a Qajar reprisal. Georgia's experience in 1795 supported a negative conclusion. The scale of the 1796 expedition was not such as to inspire confidence. The Russians were certain that their tight squares of infantry assisted by arwere a match for any Asian army. Many Caucasians, tillery used to the traditional style of fighting based on large numbers of cavalry, believed that the Russian expedition,
85
WINTER-SPRING1979
estimated to be no more than half the size of the Qajar Even King Erekle, who had force, was doomed to defeat. to been a Russian vassal for a dozen years, threatened make an agreement with Iran unless Russia gave him what 3 to be sufficient protection. he considered Many Muslim rulers in the area suspected that Ruswas actually a threat to their power. sian "protection" As it happened, the Russian commander's real intention of religion was to work with all local rulers regardless opposition. Howmilitary except in cases of unyielding ever, the actions of the Russian entourage lent credence That was the light in to fears of anti-Muslim hostility. Russia's demand to station which Ibrahim Khalil interpreted In addition, the expeof Shusha.24 troops in the citadel dition began with the conquest of the khanate of Darband, where the Russians ousted the khan and replaced him with Moreover, the Russians two more tractable inhabitants.25 utility. had brought with them an ally of questionable losif Argutinskii-Dolgorukov was an Armenian archbishop who lived in Russia. He was intensely anti-Muslim and that the Russians would free the made public declarations This threat was taken seriousArmenians from Muslim rule. ly enoufh for King Erekle to warn Ibrahim Khalil of the danger. 6 Instead of being able to play one powerful neighbor like most of the other off against another, Ibrahim Khalil, concerned about the danger of bekhans, became increasingly He stated the probfor power. ing crushed in the struggle lem forthrightly when he said that he feared the Russians he joined with two as much as the Iranians.27 Therefore, of the comthe assassination khans in plotting neighboring The plot was discovered mander of the Russian expedition. with attack unless he and Ibrahim Khalil was threatened Unable to risk a contest even with the modest submitted. he complied with the commander's demands.28 Russian forces, effect. discernable In the short run, submission had little his Ibrahim Khalil did not sign a formal treaty defining No to Russia as King Erekle had done in 1783. relation in Qarabagh, and the whole Russian troops were garrisoned within months of the khan's subwas cancelled expedition IRANIAN STUDIES
86
mission. significant eyes, the the other actively following
However, in the consequences. empire's claim khanates which and permanently 1803.
long run, submission had extremely It justified, at least in Russia's to suzerainty over Qarabagh (and had submitted) when Russia became involved in the region in the years
in position The comparative weaknesses of Russia's the Caucasus in the period from 1796 to 1803 and the contrasting Iranian strength pushed Ibrahim Khalil into the Iranian camp. It was all very well for the new tsar, Paul, of good will to the khan of to make ceremonial gestures role However, Paul's basic concept of Russia's Qarabagh.29 in the Caucasus did not give local rulers the one thing they protecmilitary with Russia: most desired from association tion. that he could best serve Caucasian inPaul believed terests and his own by encouraging the local rulers to band together for their own defense without relying upon Russian in when an Iranian attack threatened participation--even 1800.30 Although the same year saw Paul decree the incorporation of Georgia into his empire, this action was not to inspire confidence in an effective Russian sufficient Given nearly 30 years of Russian presence in the Caucasus. between engagement and disengagement in the revacillation of Rusgion, there was good reason to doubt the steadiness Those doubts were heightened when Paul was sian resolve. in March of 1801. Paul had reversed a number assassinated of Catherine's now many Caucasians expected the policies; to reverse Paul's.31 new tsar, Alexander, Russian policy in the Caucasus was so thoroughly misthat it managed to alienate calculated those rulers whose it most desired, even those like Ibrahim Khalil, cooperation to make an agreement. willingness who showed some initial entertained the possiIn 1783, when Ibrahim Khalil first with Russia, he was at the height of bility of an alliance his power and had no desperate need for Russia's help. By Qarabagh had not rewas much weaker. 1798, his position Qajar attacks of 1795 and 1797. covered from the devastating having been brought Georgia was no longer a powerful ally, to the verge of collapse by the 1795 attack and internecine
87
WINTER-SPRING 1979
strife. When a large Qajar army returned to the Caucasus in 1798 to enforce the claim of suzerainty of the new shah, Fath Ali, Russia's performance record of menace and ineffectiveness kept Ibrahim Khalil from asking St. Petersburg for help. Instead, he complied with Fath Ali's demands: the return of Aqa Muhammad's body; the sending of a son as hostage and a daughter to be the shah's wife. Ibrahim Khalil also made the symbolic gesture of vassalage by minting silver coins bearing the shah's name.32 In return, Fath Ali gave the khan the kinds of rewards Russia was unwilling to give. The marriage of the khan's daughter to the shah, apart from being considered an honor, was the symbol of an alliance between Qarabagh and Iran. This alliance, and the fact that Fath Ali continued his predecessor's policy of sending large armies to the eastern Caucasus, increased the likelihood that Iran would provide the protection which Ibrahim Khalil had sought at times from Georgia, at times from Russia. Moreover, Fath Ali gave the financially pressed khan valuable gifts and the revenues of a district across the Aras River from Qarabagh. By 1802, the shah had also decided to back the return to power of Ibrahim Khalil's son-in-law and ally, Salim, who had ruled the khanate of Shakki in 1796 and 1797.33 Ibrahim Khalil not only made peace with Iran, he embarked on a course of active hostility toward Georgia In 1800, he cooperated in the unsuccessful and Russia. attempt to enthrone Prince Alexander, a son of Erekle's second marriage, who would not be reconciled to Russian For the next couple of years, governance of the kingdom. of Georgia and, in he raided the Muslim border districts in Iran's Caucasian campaign, the ob1802, participated of which included the installation of Prince Alexjectives ander and Salim of Shakki.34 was forced open in The whole question of alliances Russian policy in 1803 by the launching of an expansionist the Caucasus. Caucasian fears of a Russian withdrawal afresemblance to what ter Paul's death bore only a slight Tsar Alexander did question the wisdom really happened. and superficiof annexing Georgia but did so only briefly
IRANIAN STUDIES
88
ally. By the second year of his reign, he had not only confirmed the annexation, but also determined to add the rest of the eastern Caucasus to his realm.35 He appointed a hardto take charge of Caucafighting soldier, P. D. Tsitsianov, and concentrated sian affairs extensive power in his hands by giving him all the previously separate key offices dealing with the Caucasus: commander-in-chief (of Russia's Caucasian troops); civilian governor of Georgia; inspector of the Caucasian Line (in the north Caucasus); and military governor of Astrakhan.36 was an exceedingly Tsitsianov ambitious and ruthless man who felt that, at 48, he had to make up for lost time to win the adulation which had unfairly been denied him.37 As the Russified grandson of a Georgian prince who had entered the service of Peter the Great, he often took the stance, plus royaliste que le roi, of the champion of Western civilization in the face of "Asiatic" barbarism and When he chose, he could also take the stance treachery. of a Georgian upholder of the rights of all Caucasian Christians against Muslims.38 He was determined to bring all of the eastern Caucasus under his jurisdiction. As far as Tsitsianov was concerned, negotiations or inducements, even of the hard-line variety used by previous officials, were insufficiently rigorous ways of dealing with inherently treacherous Asians. Only military intimidation was practical since, lamong Asians, nothing works like fear as the natural consequence of force."39 Alexander was taken with this general's toughness and championing of Russian honor and consistently deferred to the latter's judgment on crucial isIt would have been difficult sues. in any event to monitor the activities closely of officers so far from St. Petersburg, but, especially in Tsitsianov's case, Alexander did not even try to do so. The tsar gave Tsitsianov virtually free rein, accepted his explanations for any unexpected developments, and rewarded him amply with a promotion, decorations, and money. Alexander had hoped that Caucasian khans would welcome Russian rule as a step toward progress but, when Tsitsianov insisted that coercion was the only way to establish Russian control, the tsar believed him.40
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began his conquest of the Caucasus with Tsitsianov Ganjah, a prime target because it adjoined Georgia and was From his point of view, the to it. hostile traditionally conquest of Ganjah was a major step toward gaining control From the point of view of many Cauof the whole region. Ruscasian Muslims, it was an ominous warning of hostile All the sian intent underlying promises of protection. problems which Ibrahim Khalil had encountered in his atin 1783 were encountered by the khan tempt at negotiations that Tsitsiof Ganjah in 1803, with the added complication Faced wlth a choice between anov was eager for a fight. This time submission or war, the khan chose to fight.41 As that appeared ineffective. it was Iranian protection the Iranian Army approached Ganjah early in January 1804, which fell after fierce stormed the citadel, Tsitsianov The khan, his eldest son, and at least 1,500 of fighting. number of nona sizable including were killed, his subjects of Georgia and recombatants. Ganjah was made a district The wave in honor of Alexander's wife .2 named Elizavetpol left many of the of plundering that accompanied the battle A variety of anti-Muslim measures were ruined. survivors ones which impoverished and intimidated including enacted, the ulama.43 was pleased by the turn of events in GanTsitsianov He wrote to Ibrahim jah and wanted to make the most of it. Khalil and several other khans warning them that he would destroy them as he had the khan of Ganjah unless they subIbrahim KhaHe emphatically rejected mitted immediately. The fly cannot fight lil's attempt to open negotiations. the eagle, he said, and added, "I rely on your Persian to as much as I rely, as much as it is possible loyalty '144 rely, on the wind... Ibrahim Khalil found himself in an extremely diffidemonstrated The fate of Ganjah clearly cult position. and it of opposing the Russians, the grim consequences called into question the value of Iranian protection. Ibrahim Khalil also had domestic problems to take into not recovered from the manHis realm had still account. it in the had befallen which natural disasters and made
IRANIAN STUDIES
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needed to avoid involvement 1790s and it desperately in war, which threatened from within as well as without. By He wanted his eldest 1804, the khan was in his 80s. son to succeed him but his second son, Mahdi Quli, had other ambitions and was suspected of conspiring with Iran to seize the throne. At least Tsitsianov promised that he would recognize Ibrahim Khalil as khan of Qarabagh and would also recognize to that office succession on the basis of primogeniture. He also made similar promises to the eldest son and won the latter's support.45 In the spring of 1804, Ibrahim Khalil informed Tsitsianov that he would submit to Russia and, in May of the following year, signed a treaty to that effect.46 On the surface, it seemed as though both Tsitsianov and Ibrahim Khalil had reason to be satisfied with the state of Russo-Qarabaghi relations. The treaty gave each side what it wanted. Russia obtained the submission of Ibrahim Khalil, who abjured his loyalty to the shah; Russian authorities were to have full control over the khanate's external affairs and would station troops in Shusha; the khan of Qarabagh would pay tribute In reannually. turn, Russia recognized Ibrahim Khalil and his descendants through the eldest son as rulers of Qarabagh in perpetuity with full authority over all domestic affairs of the khanate.47 On closer look, it turned out that there was much to alarm Ibrahim Khalil and his Muslim subjects. First of all, Russia's military position proved to be much less impressive than it had seemed when Ganjah was conquered at the start of 1804. Tsitsianov boasted of routing cowardly Iranian troops to impress his superiors in distant St. Petersburg, but people in the theater of war knew better. In 1805, he tried to assure a worried Ibrahim Khalil that he could provide Qarabagh with complete protection against any Iranian attack and offered as proof his splendid triumphs of the previous year.48 In fact, 1804 had been a time of disaster for the Russians. The initial encounter between the Russian and Iranian armies in 1804 gave no clear victory to either side, but the siege of Yerevan
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The khan of setback for the Russians. was an unmistakable against a siege by about Yerevan held out in his citadel who were in turn besieged by an Iranian Army 3,000 Russians, The Iranians burned the surrounding fields of about 30,000. to prevent the Russians from living off the land and cut off In the meantime, rebeland reinforcements. their supplies lion broke out in part of Georgia, while various tribes of The the Russians. the High Caucasus joined in fighting on from July into September, by which time siege stretched more than a third of the Russian troops were ill and the Retreat became imperative. rest weak from lack of food. had an arduous journey back The weakened Russian soldiers to Georgia, harried by Iranian troops much of the way. were assembled and the uprising reinforcements Eventually, of Ossetian mountaineers harshly suppressed.49 in 1805, Tsitsianov At the height of the fighting manC of them had fewer than 2,000 troops at his disposal, who did not know how to fire a gun. ? Moreraw recruits lacking the maneuover, most of his troops were infantry, With of the cavalry armies they had to fight. verability he had to protect Georgia against these meager forces, and Iranian inraids, mountaineers' domestic uprisings, of Migreli vasion; protect the west Georgian principalities Shakki and Qaraand Imereti; garrison the newly subjected The bagh; and force three other khanates into submission. course of the war in 1805 was hardly such as to inspire Tens of thousands of Iranian troops in Russia. confidence were able to evade a small Russo-Qarabaghi border patrol and rampaged around Qarabagh while the Russian garrison uprising. was tied down in Shusha to prevent a pro-Iranian The Iranian Army destroyed Qarabaghi crops in the fields causing another famine.51 By late spring of 1806, when Ibrahim Khalil broke army was hard pressed by atwith Russia, that country's walked into a trap set Tsitsianov tacks on all fronts. on Februfor him by the khan of Baku and was assassinated The troops he had brought to Baku withdrew ary 20, 1806. Mountaineers from the High Caucasus raided Georgia hastily. and rebellion broke out within that province. The west
IRANIAN STUDIES
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Georgian kingdom of Imereti threw off Russian authority There was an outbreak of plague in the eastcompletely. Iranian forces invaded ern Caucasus and food was scarce. The son Ibrahim Khalil had sent to Qarabagh and Georgia. Iran as a hostage in 1798 raided Qarabagh and caused confor a time. disruption siderable that had prompted Ibrahim Khalil to The conditions Russia was unable to submit to Russia were now reversed. but the Iranian army was its Caucasian vassals, protect parts in several areas, including successfully operating of Qarabagh. The son whom Ibrahim Khalil had wanted to at the end of 1805, leavsucceed him died of tuberculosis According to the Russoclouded.53 ing the succession power would pass to the dead son's eldest Qarabaghi treaty, teen-age boy on son, but that would put an inexperienced Mahdi Quli, the khan's second son, was still the throne. to prevail. maneuvering for power and was now more likely was changing, confident In addition, attitude the Russians' and contempt for Asian barbarians giving way to desperation vengefulness. Caucasian forces The present weakness of Russia's The latter dreaded both Russians and Qarabaghis. frightened In light of the deva repetition of the horrors of 1795. wrought by the Iranian Army in the summer of 1805, astation of Shusha believed most of the officials and inhabitants In the face that their only hope was to submit to Iran. of another Iranian campaign in 1806, Ibrahim Khalil asked that the Russians reinforce their garrison in Qarabagh. With Russian proThe troops were promised but not sent. Ibratection ready to rebel, and his subjects discredited him Khalil offered his submission to Fath Ali Shah as he had done 1798. The shah pardoned him and sent an army to Having comhelp him expel the Russians from his khanate. mitted himself to the Iranian cause, Ibrahim Khalil left Shusha so that the small Russian garrison in the citadel camp on a could be besieged and established an unfortified of the nearby hill where he awaited the imminent arrival Iranian troops.54
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from a different corps suffered The Russian officer The Russians had been kind of fear, the fear of failure. and in matters military of their superiority so confident they encountered that the enormous difficulties political Instead of sweeping in and angry. left them exasperated triumph to the Aras River, by the end of 1805, Russia could be moderately sure of its control over a third to a half of The Iranians had such a superiority the eastern Caucasus. No flood. of numbers that they seemed like an unstoppable in battle or how many times matter how many were killed they were still they maneuvered away from the Russians, had seemed on Tsitsianov able to return and fight again. the verge of frenzy in 1805 as he blamed Ibrahim Khalil for the Russian losses in Qarabagh and heaped abuse upon the khan. The general lamented that the 300 Russians killed His in Qarabagh were worth 30,000 Qarabaghis.55 in battle He told Ibrabiting. were particularly personal insults of him Khalil that "With you, God and Mohammadconsist rule is so weak because of tour age greed and money..your Tsityou and no one obeys you... ,"6 that no one respects last message to the khan was a warning that he had sianov's in Qarabagh.57 Thus, no more patience with the "traitors" was an attilegacy to his officers part of the general's toward the khan of Qarabagh. tude of intense hostility Russian morale sank even lower after Tsitsianov's The general was not even allowed a heroic death in death. worse still, outsmarted by a "Perbattle but was tricked, sian." By the beginning of June 1806, the assassination throughout the had yet to be avenged and Russia's position Caucasus was in grave danger. which must have been The resentment and bitterness were felt with parwidespread among the Russian officers the commander keenness by Major D. T. Lisanevich, ticular to the burIn addition of the Russian garrison in Shusha. he was under dens he shared with his brother officers, had used him as a scapegoat pressure because Tsitsianov When, in that year, Lisansetbacks in 1805. for Russia's rebellion led by Abu al-Fath, evich suppressed a pro-Iranian the son Ibrahim Khalil had sent to the shah in 1798, Tsitbecause as worthless the major's victory sianov dismissed IRANIAN STUDIES
94
Abu al-Fath had been allowed to escape. He accused Lisanevich of being too cowardly to pursue the rebel leader into the mountains but made no allowance for the difficulty of fighting cavalry with infantry.58 Using the language he he threatened hurled at Muslim rulers, more frequently did not Lisanevich with severe punishment if the latter informed of the activities of Ibrakeep him satisfactorily sons and blamed the major him Khalil's presumably traitorous of another Russian unit during for the brush with disaster the fighting in Qarabagh.59 His last message ot Lisanevich, as to Ibrahim Khalil, dripped scorn. He accused Lisanevich of frittering his time away in Shusha playing politics while ignoring his, Tsitsianov's, need for reinforcements.60 Lisanevich was not the sort of man to suffer in silence. He was proud to the point of arrogance and had a temper almost as volatile as Tsitsianov's.61 Before Tsitsianov decided to use Lisanevich as a scapegoat, he described the major as a man of noteworthy courage and recommended him for a decoration.62 The major had the rare distinction in the Caucasus among Russian officers of knowing Azeri Turkish. At the very least, this shows to learn a that he had the initiative and determination language which would help him communicate with the Caucasians. Perhaps he was also looking for something to give him a competitive advantage over his brother officers. Eventually, his temper, his knowledge of Azeri, and his contempt for Muslims combined to undo him. He had the habit of swearing in Azeri. One day in June of 1825, he began cursing so violently at an Azeri-sp eaking Caucasian that the latter killed him on the spot.63 The decision to attack Ibrahim Khalil's camp rested ultimately with Lisanevich, but the people who provided him with the information which led to that decision all had a personal interest in One of those who accused Ibrahim the khan's downfall. Khalil of treason was an Armenian melik, Jamshid, the khan's long-time enemy. For years, his ambition had been to have Russia overthrow the khan and make Qarabagh a protectorate under an Armenian governor. Perhaps he also looked forward to filling that office In 1796, he emigrated to himself. Georgia and was given an annual pension of 1,400 rubles by Tsar Paul; later he returned to Qarabagh.64
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The most conspicuous denouncer of Ibrahim Khalil was his grandson, Jacfar Quli, who expected to become the next khan in accordance with the primogeniture clause of the Russo-Qarabaghi treaty. The strength of his determination to take the throne through outside help can be judged by his actions after his grandfather's death. First, he went to Georgia to await the arrival of Tsitsianov's successor and ask for rewards for his services to Russia. When the Russians chose his uncle, Mahdi Quli, to be khan instead, he tried to use Iran as he had used Russia. For the next several years, he fought with Iranian support against Russia and Mahdi Quli, attracting a substantial following and creating enclaves of power outside Shushals control. Not until 1815, when the war was over and Iran defeated, did he return to Qarabagh.65 In the last months of his grandfather's reign, he was certain that his interests could best be served by the continuation of Russian suzerainty over Qarabagh. Therefore, he joined with the Russians in fighting Iran in 1805.66 When he learned of Ibrahim Khalills resubmission to the shah, he informed Lisanevich, or, as another officer he did not conceal the explained later, khan's "treason."67 The night of the attack on his grandfather's camp, his house was used as the assembly point for Lisanevich' s troops .68 Once Lisanevich was aware of Ibrahim Khalil's plans, he sent Jacfar Quli and Mahdi Quli to tell the khan to break with Iran and return to Shusha. Since both emissaries were themselves eager to become khan, there is reason to suspect their reliability in delivering Lisanevich's message and Ibrahim Khalil's reply. According to their report, the khan refused to change his mind and looked forward to the arrival of the Iranian Army the same night. When Lisanevich learned of this, he decided to attack first.69 On the night of June 2, 1806, Russian troops overran Ibrahim Khalil's camp. The khan, one of his wives, a daughter, and his youngest son, as well as 30 of the 35 others in his camp were killed. The khan's belongings were seized as booty. The nearby Iranian Army was attacked by Russian troops based in Georgia and forced to withdraw from
IRANIAN STUDIES
96
Qarabagh.70 Protests against the khan's murder came from several Many Muslim Caucasians took this as evidence of quarters. Ibrahim Khalil's son-in-law, Salim Russian malevolence. and drove Khan of Shakki, denounced Russian faithlessness Mahdi Quli the Russian garrison out of his territory. murder, claimed the right of vengeance for his father's although the moral basis of his argument was weakened not the Russians only by the role he had played in convincing but also by his emphasis on of his father's disloyalty, of his father's belongof the confiscation the illegality that his real concern was to the suspicion ings, raising stressed a difShusha's inhabitants acquire the booty.71 of the khan's ferent theme by focusing on the injustice later murder in a complaint they made to Russian officials years of coThey pointed to Ibrahim Khalil's in the year. the last year of his life, with Russia, including operation They Iran. in the war against during which he participated the just argued that if he were suspected of wrong-doing, in course of action would have been to hold him prisoner Even General Shusha until the tsar could pass judgment.72 was genuinely I. V. Gudovich, who replaced Tsitsianov, of Ibrahim Khalil and for much the shocked by the killing To him, the attack was same reason as the Qarabaghis. "does not corre"without motive" and, even if justified, with the duty or rank of the offispond in the slightest cers [Lisanevich and his second in command] ." He ordered "that Caucasian subjects an inquiry to prove to Russia's of His Imperial Majthe strength of the laws and justice esty leave no place for crimes and always provide just protection."i73 reply to the charges against him emphaLisanevich's sized two themes: that Ibrahim Khalil was guilty of treason, as proven by the information from Jacfar Quli, received for the Mahdi Quli, and Jamshid, and that responsibility with the khan's entourage.74 loss of life rested entirely the truth when he claimed Even if Lisanevich was telling that the attack had been staged for the purpose of capturthe manner in which that attack was ing the khan alive, carried out and the contemptuous double standard which he
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applied to Russo-Qarabaghi relations inevitable. virtually frontation
made a violent
con-
the attack force sneaked According to Lisanevich, to within firing range of the khan's thinly guarded encampWhen that hapment before their presence was discovered. pened, the khan's entourage raised an alarm and began firing wounding one of them. To punish Ibrahim on the attackers, for their "impudence," Lisanevich Khalil and his supporters However, according to ordered that the camp be overrun]75 the version of events accepted by Gudovich, based largely Ibrahim Khalil's on the testimony of other Russian soldiers, in a last, and the khan himself, party offered no resistance attempt to appease whichever ally posed the greatdesperate est threat at the moment, went forward to greet the RusLisanevich Even if there really were resistance, sians.76 it improper for people did not explain why he considered who suddenly found an army marching on them in the middle intent and defend themselves. of the night to assume hostile Nor did he explain why he employed such extreme measures when he had 300 men and the khan's party, besides members of his family, numbered only 35, some of whom were women that the khan was Except for the accusation servants. justificagave no specific Lisanevich guilty of treason, him. However, he did offer a curious extion for killing for the deaths of the khan's wife and children. planation He claimed that in the darkness they could not be recogThis justithe battle.77 nized among the others fleeing It reveals that the only him. hardly exonerates fication of unarmed women problem he acknowledged in the killing victims happened and children was that those particular about whom a fuss was made. to be prominent individuals to firing on groups It also shows that he had no objection were him but, instead, of people who were not attacking running away. Gudovich's inquiry did not lead to punitive measures Other Rusor the rest of the garrison. against Lisanevich that Lisanesian officers serving in the Caucasus insisted In order to vich had been right to kill Ibrahim Khalil.78 in Qarabagh, Lisanevich and his second in soothe tensions elsewhere in the Caucommand were given new assignments IRANIAN STUDIES
98
to Lisanevich colonel, kept the rank of lieutenant casus. been promoted, and continued to serve which he had recently Mahdi Quli benefited in the Caucasus until his death.79 He ouster. less than he had expected from his father's death until 1822 but then ruled Qarabagh from his father's fo the plotting in reaction had to flee to Iran, apparently and threats of the head of the Russian garrison in Shusha, rule by khan in Russia then eliminated General Madatov. into the empire. it directly Qarabagh and incorporated a Russian inquiry uncovered Madatov's machinaYears later, Mahdi Quli was tions and removed him from the Caucasus. allowed to return to Qarabagh in 1836 but not to resume the of khan. He spent the remainder of his life as a office Russian pensioner.80 not of Qarabagh was certainly acquisition Russia's of Transcaucasian peoples from the part of the "liberation it.82 For foreign yoke," as a Soviet scholar has described Russian suzerainty Qarabagh and the other principalities, was at least as much a "foreign yoke" as that of other states that had formerly dominated the area. neighboring power in late eighteenthof political The fragmentation century Iran and the weakness of the Ottoman Empire had of Caucasian the emergence of a generation made possible rulers who were accustomed to building up their own power At the end of from larger states. without interference the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, Iran began to press claims to when Russia and a reunified rulers like Ibrahim Khalil strove Caucasian territories, their power by whatever allito maintain, even increase, However, the ance seemed most advantageous at the time. maneuvering was much less than it aproom for political understanding Not only was Russia's peared to the khans. vasthan traditional of alliances far more restrictive in the Caucasus, but also both empires salage relations vassals were better able to pressure or punish recalcitrant Caught between these than they had been for a generation. local rulers began to alter their objectives, pressures, had coming round to the view their subjects eventually of power from the increase long held; the goal had shifted sense. to simple survival as well as political in a physical Thus, Ibrahim Khalil and the other khans kept looking for
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the alliance that would afford the greatest protection at a time when both potential suzerains had shown themselves to be occasionally ineffective protectors and sometimes enemies of their intended vassals. A few khans finally chose to side with Russia and found themselves involved in a more binding arrangement than they had intended. Most of the khans either leaned in the direction of Iran or, like Ibrahim Khalil, formally committed themselves to the Iranian side. Their khanates were brought into the Russian Empire by force. The circumstances under which force was applied and the severity of the force was decided by officers on the scene, who in essence, were not held accountable for their actions as long as they produced results in the form of victories claimed or territory acquired. The policy of expansion based on positive inducement as determined by St. Petersburg gave way to of individual highly personalized undertakings officers in the field. Among the most important of those undertakings was the conquest of Qarabagh and the killing of its khan, who was put to death to avenge the setbacks and humiliations experienced by the Russian officers in the Caucasus.
NOTES
I
(Tehran, Abd al-Razzaq Dunbuli, Ma'asir Sul4nlyyah p. 171; Mirza Jamal Javanshir Qara1392/1972-3), (Baku, 1959), p. 139; Plea Karabaga baghi, Istoriia of Javanshir Khanum [a wife of Ibrahim Khalil] to Tsar Alexander, January 16, 1807, Report of the elof Qarabagh] of Shusha [capital ders and inhabitants 1806, General I. V. Gudovich [to Russian authorities], in the Caucasus] to Minister of [commander-in-chief August 21, 1806, Major land War Froces Viazmitinov, [commandant of Russian garrison in D. T. Lisanevich Shusha] to Gudovich, September 4, 1806, Russia, Vicekavkazskoiu royalty of the Caucasus, Akty sobrannye Tiflis, (12 vols., kommissieiu arkheograficheskoiu III, 343, to as Akty), referred hereafter 1866-1904, The dates of the Russian documents 341, 331, 335. according to the Julian caleni.e., are "old style,"
IRANIAN STUDIES
100
dar then in use. In the eighteenth it was century, eleven days behind the Gregorian calendar, in the ninetwelve days. teenth,
2.
D. M. Lang, The Last Years of the Georgian Monarchy, (New York, 1957), pp. 170, 183 ff.; Session of the State Council, February 23, 1792, Russia, State Council, Arkhiv Gosudarstvennago Soveta (5 vols., St. Petersburg, 1869-1904), I, part ii, col. 795; Manifesto announcing the Russian annexation of Georgia, September 12, 1801, Tsar Alexander to Lieutenant General K. F. Knorring [commander of the Caucasian Line (of forts in the northern Caucasus)], September 12, 1801, Akty, I, 432, 436. 1658-1832
3.
Catherine II to General V. A. Zubov [commander of the 1796 expedition to conquer the eastern Caucasus and Iran], February 19, 1796, N. F. Dubrovin, Istoriia voiny i vladychestva russkikh na Kavkaze (6 vols., St. Petersburg, 1871-1888), II, 69-78.
4.
R. Gordon, "Journal of Robert Gordon in Transcaucasia and from Tiflis to Moscow," British Museum, Additional Manuscripts, 43, 217, f. 26; Kh. Kh. Steven, "Memoire sur les provinces qui avoisinent le Caucase, tire du Voyage fait au Caucase en 1810 par le conseiller de III (Februcollege Stewen," Le Moniteur Universel, ary 28, 1812), 240; General A. P. Tormasov [commanderin-chief in the Caucasus] to Active Secret Counsellor Gurlev, August 2, 1810, Akty, IV, 39.
5.
"I0 politicheskom Ahmadbeg Javanshir, sushchestvovanii karabakhskogo khanstva (s 1747 po 1805 god)," translated and edited by E. B. Shukiurzade, Istoriia Karabakhskogo khanstva (Baku, 1961), p. 70.
6.
Javanshir,
p. 72; Tormasov to Gurlev,
August 2, 1810,
Akty, IV, 37-39; G. T. Keppel, Personal Narrative of a Journey from India to England through Persia (London, 1818), p. 280; R. Mignan, A Winter Journey through the Caucasian Russia, Alps and Georgia to Kothence ordistan (2 vols., London, 1839), I, 92; S. Bronevskii,
101
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o Kavkaze (2 parts, 7.
Tehran,
8. 9.
p. 75; Bakikhanov,
Qarabaghi,
p. 130; Dubrovin,
M. F.
Brosset,
Histoire
quite
jusqu'au
Xjxe
II,
ii,
part
al-.Safa-yi
(10
Nasiri
IX, 297.
1960),
Javanshir,
1849),
Abbas Quli Aqa Bakikhanov, pp. 127-28, 130, 136, 142;
Rawzat
Khan Hidayat,
Quli
Ri4a
I, 28.
Moscow, 1823),
pp. 69-70, 73-75; Javanshir, Giulistan-Iram (Baku, 1926), vols.,
izvestiia
i istoricheskila
geograficheskiia
Noveishiia
II,
40-41,
de la Georgie (4 parts,
siecle
224,
p. 130.
p. 138; Qarabaghi, 51-52,
149,
175;
l'antidepuis St. Petersburg,
263.
252,
10.
Catherine to Prince G. A. Potemkin [in charge of Ruswith Asia], May 5, 1783, N. K. Shilder, relations sia's Istoricheskago ed., Sbornik Imperatorskago Russkago XXVII (1880), 256. Obshchestva,
11.
Dubrovin,
12.
Ibid.,
13.
of the Crimea, The Russian Annexation A. W. Fisher, (Cambridge, 1970), chapters 4-7. 1772-1783
14.
Dubrovin,
15.
Lang, p. 183.
16.
II,
29-30.
IIJ
II,
41.
II,
Dubrovin,
Kavkaza
istorii
II,
32, 34.
35-36;
P. G. Butkov,
s 1722
Materialy St. (3 vols.,
po 1803
dlia
novoi
Petersburg),
144.
17.
Lang, pp. 226-29; Dubrovin, 143; Hidayat, IX, 268, 271.
18.
Hidayat,
IX, 262-68;
19.
Hidayat,
IX, 267.
IRANIAN STUDIES
Dunboli,
102
III,
39-42;
p. 24.
Bakikhanov,
20.
Ibid.,
21.
Qarabaghi,
22.
Dubrovin, III, 133, 88, 190-91, 195.
23.
Lang, 219.
24.
Dubrovin,
25.
Ibid.,
26.
Dubrovin,
27.
Ibid.,
III.,
149.
28.
Ibid.,
III,
149-53.
29.
Paul to Ibrahim Khalil,
30.
Paul to the khans of Yerevan, August 1800, ibid., I, 108-9.
31.
Kalb Ali Khan [of Nakhjavan] to Archbishop Hovannes, n.d. (1800), ibid., II, 634; S. A. Tuchkov, zapiski
IX, 263-64; General P. D. Tsitsianov in the Caucasus] to Ibrahim Khalil in-chief tember 2, 1805, Akty, II, 665.
Sergeia
burg, 32.
p. 134; Javanshir,
III,
III,
133-34,
120-23, III,
146,
Alekseevicha
1908),
Javanshir,
136,
[commanderKhan, Sep-
p. 78.
139-53,
172-75,
179-80,
184-
180-81.
142; Bakikhanov, 148,
p. 145.
149.
May 2, 1797,
Tuchkova
Akty,
Ganjah,
1766-1808
II,
1143.
and Qarabagh,
(St.
Peters-
p. 190. p. 93; Qarabaghi,
p.
136; Hidayat,
IX, 314-
15.
33.
Qarabaghi, p. 136; Bakikhanov, p. 148; Knorring to Tsar Alexander, August 9, 1802, Akty, I, 376.
34.
Brosset, II, part ii, 270-71; I. P. Lazarev [commandant of Russian garrison in Georgia] to Knorring, October 6, 1800 and February 20, 1801, Knorring to Tsitsianov, December 4, 1802, Akty, I, 159, 593, 410.
103
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35.
Dubrovin, III, 418-19; Meeting of the Secret Committee, March 31, 1802, Grandduke Nikolai ed., Mikhailovich, Graf Pavel Aleksandrovich Stroganov (3 vols., St. II, 205-6. Petersburg, 1903),
36.
Imperial
rescript,
37.
Tuchkov,
p.
38.
Tsitsianov Tsitsianov II, Akty,
39.
Tsitsianov to Foreign Minister A. Czartoryski, tember 26, 1805, ibid., II, 1037.
40.
Alexander to Tsitsianov, January 30, March 19 and 20, 1803 and February 5, 1804, Czartoryski to Tsitsianov, February 14, 1805, ibid., II, 16, 782-83, 594, 63.
41.
Javad to Tsitsianov, n.d. [December, Javad, December 9, 18, and 28, 1803,
September
8,
1802,
Akty,
II,
3.
197.
to Alexander, March 12 and April 27, 1803, to Jacfar Quli Khan Dunbuli, June 24, 1804, 610, 289, 855.
1803], ibid.,
Sep-
Tsitsianov II, 589-91.
42.
Dunbuli, pp. 109-10; Qarabaghi, p. 136; Hidayat, IX, to 389-90; Brosset, II, part ii, 279-80; Tsitsainov Chancellor A. R. Vorontsov, January 13, 1804, Akty, II, 592.
43.
to Alexander, May 29, Dubrovin, IV, 143; Tsitsianov to the akhundof Elizavetpol', 1804, Tsitsianov May 14, 1805, Akty, II, 601 , 285.
44.
Tsitsianov II, 696.
45.
to Ibrahim Khalil, May 26, 1805, TsitsiTsitsianov anov to Major D. T. Lisanevich, January 16, 1805, to MuhammadHasan Aqa [Ibrahim Khalil's Tsitsianov eldest son], January 16, 1805, ibid., 697-99, 700.
46.
to Czartoryski, Tsitsianov May 29, 1804, Russo-Qarabaghi treaty, May 14, 1805, ibid., II, 697, 705.
IRANIAN STUDIES
to Ibrahim Khalil,
104
February 4, 1804, Akty,
47.
Russo-Qarabaghi
48.
Tsitsianov II, 711
49.
Dunbuli, pp. 117-20; pp. 252-55.
50.
to Alexander, July 1, 1805, Tsitsianov Tsitsianov to Czartoryski, July 10, 1805, Akty, II, 835 and 1030.
51.
Qarabaghi,
52.
Bakikhanov, p. 156; Dunbuli, pp. 161-62; Brosset, II, part ii, 287, Dubrovin, IV, 489-90, V, 3-9, 13, 37-38, 44-48, 50-51, 69.
53.
Tsitsianov 725.
to Alexander,
54.
Qarabaghi,
p. 138; Dubrovin,
55.
Tsitsianov Akty, II,
to Ibrahim Khalil, 709, 715.
56.
Tsitsianov II, 717.
to Ibrahim Khalil,
August 17,
57.
Tsitsianov II, 727.
to Ibrahim Khalil,
January
58.
Tsitsianov 718.
to Lisanevich,
59.
Tsitsainov to Lisanevich, November 23, 1805, ibid.,
60.
Tsitsainov 726.
61.
Gordon, ff.
treaty,
ibid.,
to Ibrahim Khalil, Tuchkov,
II,
705.
June 28,
1805,
ibid..,
249; Lang,
pp. 242-44,
p. 138.
November 28,
1805, Akty,
II,
V, 38-41. July
19 and 20, 1805,
August 27,
1805,
ibid.,
9, 1806,
ibid.,
1805,
ibid.,
II,
June 28, October 28, and II, 834, 722, 723.
to Lisanevich,
December 1, 1805 , ibid.,
II,
12-13.
105
WINTER-SPRING 1979
to Alexander,
May 22, 1805,
ibid.,
II,
62.
Tsitsianov 704.
63.
W. Monteith,
64.
to Gudovich, September 4, 1806, Meliks Lisanevich UJkase of Jamshid and Feridun to Tsar Paul., n.d., April 22, 1799, Akty, III, 334, I, 633-34, II, 1149.
65.
Gudovich to Foreign Minister A. Ia. Budberg, November 23, 1806, Abbas Mirza to JaCfar Quli Aqa, Zu alQalda, 1226 A. H. [1811), Jacfar Quli to Marquis F. 0. in the Caucasus], n.d. [commander-in-chief Paulucci General N. F. Rtishchev [commander-in-chief [181]], in the Caucasus] to Secret Counsellor Veidermeier, III, 339, V, 132, 134, 585-86. May 16, 1815, ibid.,
66.
[in charge of Russian Major General P. D. Nesvetaev troops along the Aras River] to Gudovich, July 18, III, pp. 330-31. 1806, ibid.,
67.
to Gudovich, September 4, 1806, Lieutenant Lisanevich [commander of troops north Colonel P. S. Kotliarevskii August 22, 1806, III, of the Aras River] to Nesvetaev, 334, 333.
68.
Dunbuli,
69.
Lisanevich 334.
70.
Plea of Javanshir Khanum to Alexander, January 16, of Shusha, 1807, Reports of the elders and inhabitants III, 343, 341; Dunbuli, p. 171. 1806, ibid.,
71.
Dubrovin,
72.
Report of the elders Akty, III, 341.
73.
Gudovich to Nesvetaev, August 20, 1806, Gudovich to III, 331. August 21, 1806, ibid., Viazmitinov,
Kars
and Erzerum
(London, 1856),
p. 49.
p. 180. to Gudovich,
September 4, 1806, Akty,
III,
V, 56.
IRANIAN STUDIES
and inhabitants
106
of Shusha,
1806,
to Gudovich,
74.
Lisanevich 334.
75.
Ibid.,
76.
Gudovich to Viazmitinov, 331.
77.
Lisanvich 335.
78.
Gudovich to Nesvetaev,
79.
Dubrovin,
80.
Mahdi Quli Khan to Prince Abkhazov, June 21, 1827, General I. F. Paskevich [commander-in-chief in the Caucasus] to Foreign Minister K. Nessellrode, Februto General Rozen [commanderary 25, 1828, Nessel'rode in-chief in the Caucasus], April 4, 1833, Rozen to Mahdi Quli, October 4, 1836, Akty, VII, 458-59, VIII, 479-80, 498.
81.
A. M. Stanislavskaia, Russko-angliiskie problemy sredizemnomor'ia (1798-1807) p. 248.
III,
September 4,
1806,
ibid.,
III.,
335.
to Gudovich,
August 21, September
August 20,
1806,
ibid.,
III,
4, 1806,
ibid.,
III
1806,
ibid.,
III,
331.
V, 56.
107
otnosheniia i (Moscow, 1962),
WINTER-SPRING 1979
Iranian Studies, Volume XII, Nos. 1-2, Winter-Spring
1979
BOOK REVIEWS
the Muslim World. Edited Keddie. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Press, 1978. 698 pp. $30.00.
Women in
by Lois Beck and Nikki Harvard University
RichardT. Antoun The editors and the Harvard University Press are to be congratulated for bringing together such a diverse group of papers on the status of women in the Middle East and North Africa. The volume is divided into four parts consisting of 33 essays written by historians, litterateurs, and students of law, as well as political soscientists, and (in the main) anthropologists. ciologists, The first part is devoted to general perspectives--country reviews or particular essays on certain aspects of legal or socioeconomic change; the second part to historical perspectives; the third part to examining variation among nomads, viland town and city dwellers; lagers, and the last part to ideology, religion, and ritual. The Iranian-speaking area and North Africa have received the most thorough coverage, although essays dealing with women in Egypt, Turkey, Syria, Kuwait, and Lebanon are also featured. Some of the most interesting essays take a historical perspective. Dengler, for instance, dealing with Turkish women in the Ottoman Empire, points out that the separation into men's and women's worlds was probably more to be ex-
Richard T. Antoun is Associate Professor of Anthropology the State University of New York at Binghamton. 109
WINTER-SPRING 1979
at
rather than negative reincentives plained by positive women's sense of personal worth after marstrictions: riage and motherhood; the value of marriage as symbolizing entrance into the world of Islam; and the importance of property rights and influence. marriage for attaining of the Cairene harem among the affluent Marsot's analysis the necessary at the beginning of the century stresses the skills developed: and political management, social, involved in serving meals to numerous households logistics ranks each of which was composed of members of different and and slaves, clients, freeborn, including Circassians and the master; guests, governesses, co-wives, Egyptians, in authority and delegate to make decisions the ability was absent the absence of the head of the household--who of mediating and/or arbimost of every day; the necessity arose in such large that inevitably the disputes trating that life in the conclusion The unlikely households. for the training Cairene harem was a form of preadaptive Egyptian women's rights movement that began later in the century is not farfetched. to in this review to do justice It is impossible of views expressed with respect to the status the variety economic, historical, ethnic, of women in the particular with which each of the circumstances and geographical authors deals. Peters argues in his comparative analysis and olive-growing popuof pastoral nomadic, horticultural to in Libya and Lebanon that it is impossible lations about the status of women, not only because generalize vary, but also because their status their circumstances in terms of their point in the always has to be evaluated life cycle and in terms of the bias of the observer making background, sex, cultural observer's the evaluation--the affiliation. rural or urban origin and religious class, Nevertheless, an examination of the essays in the volume with respect to the way women's does indicate bimodality for inOne group of authors, status is conceptualized. Minces, Youssef, stance Arcad, Cosar, Dengler, Friedl, and analysis and Vieille, proceeds with the description in terms of separate worlds of men and women and with the societies general assumption that women in traditional tutelage: proceed through their life cycles in perpetual IRANIAN STUDIES
110
always under the authority of men--first the father, then the husband, then the son, with little or minimal possibilities for the achievement of status outside the home or through anything other than familial roles. Frequently, an ambiguity exists as to whether what is being described is a set of ethical norms or actual social relations. for instance, Vieille, in a number of indulges stereotypical statements which are all too familiar: "Everything concerning the child from gestation to the end of childhood is the woman's domain" (p. 458); or "she [the wife] had no other rights than those the husband conferred on her in a paternalistic way according to the habits or injunctions of custom and religion" (p. 459). In his insightful capsule commentary on "matrimonial politics" and the strategies available to women to deal with men's attempts at dominance, e.g., "the culture of injury;' and "open violence," duplicity, Vieille makes it quite clear that the discrepancy between the normative and the social relational aspects of behavior is quite sizeable. One is led to query whether the norms he stipulated are ideal and not at all the practical norms according to which Iranian society in fact operates. Another group of authors (e.g., Beck, Chatty, Dwyer, Gulick, Peters, Tapper, Rosen) presents a more complex and balanced view of women's status based upon the description and analysis of particular social situations in specific contexts. Beck, for instance, notes that among the Qashqa' i, household and camping tasks are shared and often interchangeable, and women are able to exert influence in public, i.e., political affairs through their management of hospitality, information, and their sons. Dwyer points out that Moroccan women actually are the decision makers for the family with respect to the affiliation of children to Sufi (Islamic mystic) orders, rather than husbands and fathers, as the ethical norms indicate. And Tapper, dealing with the Shahsevan, indicates that even when men's and women's worlds are separate, the women have their own "subsociety" in which achievement of status is possible in the medico-magical and religious such spheres, achievement of status being entirely independent and unas-
ill
WINTER-SPRlNG 1979
with the rankings given to the men of their famisociated Rosen has argued that men and women commonly engage lies. in which men and women take very in "reality-bargaining" events and through which it views of particular different of the situfor women to get their definition is possible acceding to the ation accepted rather than necessarily dominant male in the household. in the volume are articles Many of the generalizing although their claims of valuable, at least heuristically White's may exceed the evidence presented. validation achieveof women's educational between levels correlation ment and the degree of Islamic law reform is interesting between the passage of such although the great discrepancy (note the repeated necessity laws and their enforcement bastards-in Turkey to legitimize legislation for special makes the polygynous marriages) the products of illegal on the basis of such correlations drawing of conclusions brief review of Coulson and Hinchcliffe's dangerous. women and law reform is very good in drawing attention Occasionalwithin the Muslim world. to the wide variation to their own evily, however, they do not pay attention is the out(p. 44), "Rigidity dence as when they declare law relating of the traditional standing characteristic and follow this statement to the custody of children," of the law relating of the variations with a description in Ithna cAshari as opposed to to the custody of children as opHanafi as opposed to Maliki as opposed to Shafili whether It is also questionable posed to Hanbali law. "the Sunni notion of the family is that of a unit based ties" on tribal (p. 46) since one of the basic changes inwas the retroduced by the Quran in the family structure of the nuclear family as separate legitimate cognition heirs. in this volume was the anthroMost disappointing to draw on anthropological notable reluctance pologists' theory to explain the very facts and events several of substanOne of the most interesting the essays discuss. tive comments made in the volume was that by Youssef, who in the work force observed that increased participation did not neceseducation, by women, and their increased IRANIAN
STUDIES
112
sarily result in their emancipation or in lowered fertility rates. Perhaps related to this fact is the Islamic revival taking place in Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey, (and now) Iran (a revival referred to in a number of essays)--in most cases after a period of rapid social change or revolution. Such a revival has had and will have important implications for the status of women. Linton's work on nativistic movements, Wallace's on revitalization movements, Turner's on liminal periods, Friedl's on lagging emulation, Redfield's on the social organization of tradition, or Yalman's on the bilateral as opposed to the unilineal inheritance of status, to name a few, could have been utilized and refined to deal with the changing status of women, or the lack of such change in the pre-revolutionary, or post-revolutionary revolutionary periods. This is not to suggest that sensitive descriptions of ideology and ritual (e.g., Fischer's account of certain aspects of Muslim ideology and popular rituals of women) or of social and mode of living relations (e.g., Peters's above-mentioned four-way comparison) will not always be valuable. It is to suggest, however, that the formulation of problems and questions based on them and the of the appropriate data can help us to ask gathering more sophisticated questions about such matters as the status of women in the Middle East. Besides the White essay, only one essay in the present volume, and that a very interesting one by Tessler, Rogers, and Schneider, had a problem orientation. In a volume more than half t such a of whose contributors are "social scientists, fact is worthy of note.
113
WINTER-SPRING 1979
Iran:
Monarchy,
Bureaucracy
and Reform
under
the
Qajars:
London: Ithaca Press (St. By Shaul Bakhash. 1858-1896. L 7.50. Anthony's Middle East Monographs, No. 8), 1978. Guity Nashat of Iran from for the transformation The foundations monarchy were a medieval kingdom to a constitutional-type laid down during the reign of Nasir al-Din Shah (1848-1896). the attention his reign has not attracted But surprisingly, monograph, Dr. Shaul Bakhash's scholarly it deserves. will be warmly welcomed by all those interested therefore, Iranian history. in nineteenth-century Unlike most works written in European languages, use of the rich contemporary Dr. Bakhash makes extensive Iranian hisworks of present-day and scholarly materials He also draws on a vast range of unpublished torians. those of the especially sources from European archives, Furthermore, Dr. Bakhash belongs Foreign Office. British from Iran who are trained of historians to a new generation research and are devoted to its in the methods of critical with Iran's language, culture, His familiarity standards. insight. provides the author with additional and traditions This combination enables him to put the events of the perisome of the and to examine and to describe od in context, makwithout of the course events, that influenced factors of any person or group. ing heroes or villains concerned with the reform Dr. Bakhash is primarily and administrative machinery of governof the political is limited to ment in the period 1858-1896; his interest The choice reforms inspired by Western models and ideals. point of this study seems unforof 1858 as the starting tunate since it neither corresponds to the scope suggested
of History Professor Guity Nashat is Assistant at Chicago Circle. of Illinois University
IRANIAN STUDIES
114
at the
nor to any significant by the title attempt at reform. The reign of Nasir al-Din Shah began in 1848, as did the energetic attempts of Mirzd Taqi Khan Amir Kabir to put the chaotic affairs of the state in order. In 1870, another advocate of reform, Mlirza Husayn Khan Mushir al-Dawlah, bein running the affairs of the govcame a major influence ernment; either of these years would have been a more apDr. Bakhash's choice, propriate starting point. however, is determined by the signing of the Anglo-Iranian Peace a war which put an end to Iran's Treaty in 1858 following claim to suzerainty over Herat. The war and the signing of this treaty, according to Dr. Bakhash, created an atmosphere receptive to the reformist ideas of men like Malkum Khan and a few others during the next decade. The exposition of the reform ideas of Malkum Khan, the most well known and vociferous of the group, takes up most of the introductory and last chapters of this work, but the views of several other men, notably, Mirz& Yisuf Khan Mustashar al-Dawlah, Mirza FathcAll Akhundzadeh, and Mirz& Husayn Khan Mushir al-Dawlah are also discussed briefly. One of these advocates of reform, Mirza Husayn Khan Mushir al-Dawlah, had the opportunity to put his ideas into practice in the 1870s. Though Western sources hardly mention Mirza Husayn Khan and the reforms he initiated, he looms large in the history of the period. The various monographs and repeated mention of him in contemporary Iranian sources attest to his significance. Therefore, Dr. Bakhash's detailed narrative of the major administrative reforms undertaken by Mirza Husayn Khan, or at his behest, is an important first step in filling the gap about this neglected nineteenth-century Iranian statesman. ter of served bul. of the ports Sacid
Until his appointment by Nasir al-Din Shah as minisjustice in December 1870, Mirz& Husayn Khan had as Iran's minister, and later ambassador, to IstanHis stay there (1858-1870) with the height coincided Tanzimat reforms, about which he sent numerous reto Nasir al-Din Shah and the foreign minister, Mirza Khan. He hoped these reports would induce the
115
WINTER-SPRING 1979
Iranian
leaders
to undertake
similar
measures
at home.
that his return to it is not surprising Therefore, in November Iran and his appointment ten months later, aCzam should have initiated 1871, to the post of sadr-i period of though not always successful, a systematic, Though various groups reform. Western-cum-Ottoman-type managed to force the shah to dismiss his of opposition aCzam in November 1873, Mirza Husayn Khan did not sadr-i He regained much of his lost power lose the shah's favor. a few months later when he was appointed minister of forof war. as minister and shortly thereafter eign affairs, alienated Nasir al-Din Shah Mirz& Husayn Khan eventually and was banished to Khurasan a few months before his death he in 1881; but he did not cease to use every opportunity during the rest had to promote new ideas and innovations of the decade of the 1870s. on those In his monograph, Dr. Bakhash concentrates power declining the strengthening aimed at reforms which some degree of the central government and at introducing in certain branches of the administration. of efficiency of a Eurothe creation The most important of these were: (1873); a pean-type cabinet headed by a prime minister councils (1875). and provincial council; consultative Very few of the major or minor reforms implemented met with success. by Mirz& Husayn Khan and his associates reasons for their several convincing Dr. Bakhash offers In the case of his early reforms, one important failure. from various groups, such as high reason was opposition of government and several powerful Qajar princes, officials on the influence by his increasing who felt threatened funds and his Another was his lack of sufficient shah. to his resources to divert any of the available inability succeeded in improving the When he partially projects. of salaries revenue system by updating the lists existing the result was massive resentment and hosand stipends, government among even lower-level to his efforts tility in 1872, The granting of the Reuter concession officials. which greatly alarmed the ulama, dealt the final blow to and led to his temporary removal from power his efforts
IRANIAN STUDIES
116
in 1873 (pp. 102-111). to the fate Equally detrimental of the reforms introduced was their haphazard nature (p. 155). not mentioned by Dr. BakOther important reasons, hash, also contributed of most of the reto the failure forms attempted in these decades. First, the number of those advocating European-type reform was too small--a handful to be precise--to have had sufficient impact. Moreover, with the exception of Mirza Husayn Khan, most of them did not have sufficient power to override opposition from all the other members of their society. Even a partial would have required success of their efforts prolonged and sustained support from Nasir al-Din Shah, who proved unwilling or unable to offer them the needed support. All of these men, Mirz& CAll Khan Amin al-Dawlah had lived abroad, serving varibeing the only exception, ous diplomatic missions. Their foreign residence made them more keenly aware of what was wrong with their country, but it did not provide them with any special insights as to what needed to be done, for they lacked an understanding of the socioeconomic changes that were needed to accomplish the fundamental reforms they advocated. They naively thought that sweeping change could be brought about by fiat and by good intentions. The types of solutions advocated for arresting the country's decline reveal the reformists' lack of awareness of the enormity of the tasks involved. One solution was the Reuter concession, which in 1872 granted the right of exploiting all of the country's natural resources for a period of 70 years to a British citizen. Here I agree with Dr. Bakhash that these men were motivated not by cupidity, but by a desire to affect immediate change in order to arrest the further deterioration of their country. In his concluding chapters, Dr. Bakhash concentrates on the last decade of N5sir al-Din Shah's reign, which was characterized by "a serious deterioration in the already indifferent standards of Qajar administration" (p. 261).
117
WINTER-SPRING 1979
He offers many illustrations of the shah's increasing indifference and cupidity, of the abuses of justice, and of widespread corruption among the highest officials, headed by the young sadr-i aCzam, CAll Asghar Khan Amin al-Sultan. These details, as interesting as they are especially for those who do not have access to them in the original, do not provide satisfactory answers as to why the country was declining so rapidly. Perhaps a more analytical treatment of the basic issues, such as the drop in the revenue of the state, would have been a more useful approach. About this important issue Dr. Bakhash only states, "For a number of reasons meantime, there was a drop in the tax revenue" (p. 263). An examination of the causes of the decline of revenue would have revealed that the debasement of the Iranian currency during the decade was not primarily due "to dishonest tampering with the silver content of the kran" (p. 270), but was a result of more complicated factors. Furthermore, he would have discovered that his assertion that "the instability of the currency discouraged the expansion of trade" (p. 272) is erroneous, because Iran's trade during this period flourished. (See of Iran, pp. 70-151.) Issawi, Economic History The great wealth of detail offered by Dr. Bakhash may detract from his stated intention as suggested by the title, namely to analyze the relationship between monarchy, The reader learns a great deal reform, and bureaucracy. about the monarch, Nasir al-Din Shah, the individual buand the numerous reforms attempted and suggested. reaucrats, But he does not learn enough about the nature of the monor about the nature of the bureauarchy as an institution and its relationship to the monarchy. cracy, its structure, Moreover, some concluding remarks about the impact of these reforms would have been desirable. After all, the efforts of these men of reform, as naive, misguided, and impatient as they were, were not totally desperate, wasted. Many of the ideas they expressed and tried to for the next generation. enact provided the guidelines That was perhaps their greatest long-run contribution.
IRANIAN STUDIES
118
Despite these limitations, Dr. Bakhash has put tosets of material on an important period gether valuable of Iran's history. All scholars interested in the emergence of modern Iran would be well advised to read this book.
Iran:
The Illusion
Croom Helm, 1978.
of
Power.
228 pp.
By Robert Graham. L7.95.
London:
JerroldD. Green Events in Iran have put a premium on current, critical analyses of recent Iranian history and politics. Thus, when Robert Graham's book appeared, scholarly appetites were whetted because he had served as correspondent for the Financial Times in Teheran during the crucial 1975-1977 period. The reputed ban of the book by the shah's government due to its anti-regime tenor further heightened expectations. This book does not fulfill such expectations. Writing on the eve of the revolution, Graham attempted to determine whether "Iran [has] been able to maximize the opportunity created by the incredible wealth that accrued from the 1973 oil price rises" (p. 206). Predictably, his answer is a resounding "No." It is not this conclusion that disappointed me; rather it was Graham's failure to provide an adequate explanation of why this was the case. In the first part of the book, Graham provides a broad review of the outstanding events in Iranian history since World War II. Eschewing in-depth analysis, Graham leapfrogs through his "data" unsystematically, displaying
Jerrold D. Green teaches sity of Michigan.
Political
119
Science
at the Univer-
WINTER-SPRING 1979
and ignoring penchant for sensationalism a journalistic contexts within which these events occurred. the crucial far short of analyses treatment falls Graham's superficial Binder, of Iran by Bill, studies scholarly found in earlier The author provides some inCottam, Zonis, and others. from the abbut his treatment suffers details, teresting order. Because of his atheoretical sence of intellectual a shopping list the early chapters constitute perspective, of them. of events, rather than an ordered analysis what he In Part II of the volume, Graham discusses calls the "cycle of the boom." He reviews the formulation fifth Five disastrous of the ultimately and implementation Graham enumerates Iran's economic Year Plan (1973-1978). of factors catalogue and provides a veritable failures doubling of that served to undermine the ill-conceived to But he fails during this period. Iran's expenditures address those issues that would allow us to understand what the Ramthose failures. For example, in discussing caused level sar meeting of August 1974, at which the expenditure of the Plan was doubled, he writes that there were "really only three actors - the Shah, the Prime Minister Amir Abbas on what to The decision Hoveida, and [Abdolmajid] Majidi. Hoveida was there like an obedo was to be the Shah's: pulse of the dient doctor to give the Shah the political with technocrat country, Majidi was the Harvard-trained This state(p. 78). the statistics and the projections" about Iranian decision little us relatively ment tells about the Plan and discussion A more detailed making. (PBO), which included its changing Budget Organization its fortunes since the beginning of the Ibtihaj period, to the schemes in relation role in Iranian developmental of the personalities rest of the government, a discussion they provided (such involved and the type of leadership and the role of the Shah, would as Hoveida and Majidi), of how Iran's more to our understanding have contributed so quickly. Such an economic difficulties proliferated than would have been more informative approach certainly of economic catastrophes presented here, the recitation in the Western press and, more reavailable but readily the Iranian press itself. cently,
IRANIAN S TUDIES
120
of "The Influence entitled One chapter is promisingly iswith exogenous strategic but deals primarily the Military" if any, serious study To date there has been little, sues. Iranian politics. as a factor in internal of the military an analysis of this important subBut rather than providing Graham relies largely on secondary sources to conject, of Iranian-U.S. relations, portrait struct a pedestrian the Shah's view of Iran as the policeman of the Persian Gulf, etc. The final chapter deals with "Problems of Culture" Graham atone. and is in many ways the most problematic for various explanation a cultural tempts to construct him aspects of Iranian life which apparently bewildered beAlthough it is tempting to attribute as a Westerner. from one's own to "culhavioral patterns vastly different ture" and to treat culture as a kind of vague, residual to justify epissuch a strategy is difficult category, I was troubled and is at times offensive. temologically element within such as: "The technocrat by statements is little more than one generation the administration is still of the decision-makers deep, and the mentality The Iranian bazaars influenced by the bazaar. strongly of astute tradesmen, but in a have produced generations of quick profeconomy their philosophy modern developing Had Graham quick returns is a handicap" (p. 196). its, element," or the told us more about the "technocrat bazaaris for that matter, we might better know how much labeling credit or blame they deserve and what justifies And elsethem as possessors of the "bazaar mentality." evidence that where in the book Graham himself presents report He cites an unpublished undermines this argument. produced in 1976 by the PBO which, he says, "pointed out was being ignored, that producbluntly that agriculture tion and labour costs had risen so fast in the past three exthe future of Iranian non-oil years as to jeopardise had been ineffectually ports, and that the bottleneck The conclusion was slower growth and tightened tackled. Presumably comcontrol on government spending" (p. 101). at the PBO, this report demonstrates piled by technocrats anything but a bazaar mentality.
121
WINTER-SPRING 1979
to Graham's use of the notion of a bazaar mentality explain the behavior of Iranian modernizers is but one exthat pervade this work. The author ample of the defects He can provide a at recording events. is highly skilled to account of what happened, but his failure journalistic framework for the analytical use a serious and systematic of these events renders him incapable of ansexplanation why did they happen?. wering the question,
and transSelected Poetry. of Modern Persian Boulder, by Ahmad Karimi-Hakkak. lated with an introduction Persica: Westview Press, 1978 (Bibliotheca Colorado: Number 1), xvii + 203 pp. Series, Modern Persian Literature $15 .
An Anthology
MichaelCraigHillmann in Modernist Persian verse has been anthologized "Contemporary Iraniin several places: English translation 3-17, features no. 28 (1968): vivante, an Poetry," Poesie samples of the verse of Ahmad Reza Ahmadi, MahmudAzad, Hushang Ebtehaj, Forugh Farrokhzad, MohammadHoquqi, SiyaNader Naderpur, and Ahmad Shamlu; Manuchehr vash Kasrali, A Short View of Moder and Progress: Aryanpur, "Retrospect Today 46 (1972): World Literature Persian Literature," of poems by Azad, pp. 200-210, offers brief translations Shamlu, and Nima Yushij, Sohrab Sepehri, Rahi Mo'ayyeri, Review the "Iran" issue of The Literary Feridun Tavallali; Akhavan-e Mehdi by 18, no. 1 (Fall 1974) offers poems Farrokhzad, Naderpur, Nima, and Shamlu; in the Sales, of New Writing from the Midsection "Persian Literature" dle East (Mentor, 1978), poems by Akhavan, Farrokhzad, and poems by and Shamlu appear in translation; Sepehri,
of Iranian Professor Michael Craig Hillmann is Associate of Texas at Austin. at the University Literature
IRANIAN STUDIES
122
Akhavan,
Farrokhzad,
the special
Naderpur,
Nima, and Shamlu appear in
issue of Literature
East
and West
entitled
"Major Voices in Contemporary Persian Literature" (1979). Also, poems by individual poets have been anthologized in essays about the poets; for example,, the translations in Girdhari Tikku's "Forugh Farrokhzad: A New Direction in Persian Poetry," Studia Islamica 26 (1967): pp. 149-173, and in Michael C. Hillmann's "Forugh Farrokhzad: Modern Iranian Poet," Middle Eastern Muslim WomenSpeak (University of Texas, 1977), pp. 291-317. of Modern Persian But An Anthology Poetry is the of Iranian first separate volume devoted to translations so-called "new poetry" and as an anthology of some 83 poems mostly from the 1950s and 1960s by 26 poets is a commendable publication. An Anthology
of
Modern Persian
Poetry
features
lib-
eral samplings of shorter poems by Nima (1895-1960; 1959 is erroneously cited in several places as the year of Nimals death, and his untitled poems are given titles), Shamlu (b. 1925), and Farrokhzad (1935-1967), with somewhat less space devoted to Akhavan (b. 1928), Sepehri (b. 1928), and Naderpur (b. 1929), the six of whom are often reckoned the major figures in modernist Persian Then one to three poems are offered by Tavallali, poetry. Manuchehr Shaybani, Esmalil Shahrudi, Ebtehaj, Kasra'i, Nosrat Rahmani, Jalali, Ateshi, Yadollah Royali, Azad, Farrokh Tamimi, Mahmud Kiyanush, Manuchehr Nayestani, Hoquqi, Maymanat Mirsadeqi, MohammadCAli Sepanlu, Esma' il Kholi, Kiyomars Monshizadeh (represented with 5 poems), M. R. Shafi'i Kadkani, and Ahmadi. of Modern Persian in compariPoetry, standard compilation SheCr-e No az Aghaz ta Emruz, 1301-1350 [1922-1971] (Tehran: Ketabha-ye Jibi, 1972), omits five poets represented in the latter antholYadollah Amini, Feridun Moshiri, Mansur Owji, ogy: Tahereh Saffarzadeh, and MohammadZahari. It further does not feature a number of the more famous individual poems of the 1950s and 1960s, such as Shamlu's "Pariya," Kasra'i's "Arash-e Kamangir," or Akhavan's "Zemestan" or An Anthology
son with Hoquqils
123
WINTER-SPRING 1979
"Akhar-e Shahnameh."1 Of course, there were many possible reasons for the inclusion and exclusion of poets and poems in the anthology, which, in any case, presents a sufficient range of shorter lyric forms, thematic concerns, and styles to make the volume a usable text for undergraduate students in Middle Eastern studies courses or lovers of poetry who can't read Persian. But there is no statement of selection criteria in the volume. In this regard, the omission of Reza Baraheni (b. 1935), whose critical remarks on commitment in literature, biographical and translations (in collaboraintroduction, tion with Harris Lenowitz) of "Armful of Solitude," "The Mask of Turk I, ' and "Triumphal" appeared in the typed manuscript of An Anthology of Modern Persian Poetry, is noteworthy. In that manuscript, Mr. Karimi-Hakkak opined: Perhaps the most controversial figure in modern Persian poetry [and] a staunch advocate of literature of social commitment and political action, for some of the most Baraheni has won distinction forceful of the last two decades. criticism Truly a versatile man of many talents, Baraheni must be regarded as his generation's most effective gadfly. The translations themselves, which in most cases seem intended to be no more than straightforward prose are uneven. renderings, The five poems by Monshizadeh as do Tavallali's (pp. 183-188) read very naturally, "Moonlight" (p. 41), Sepehri's "Friend" (pp. 102-103), Ateshi's "Mountain Song" (p. 115), Royali's "Sea Song 14" "Fac(p. 118), Kiyanush's "Silence" (p. 135), Neyestani's But in the transand other poems. tory" (pp. 162-163), lations from Nima, for example, phrases such as the fol"the arena of the paddy" lowing make the English rough: "stands with me (p. 30), "the thought...breaks sleep," in the volume the transthe dawn" (in nearly 35 instances or verbof normal subject-verb lations inversions exhibit object word order), "my hands I chafe" (p. 31), "many a stream" (p. 32; in a dozen or more places the pattern "many a..." appears), "night.. .begets my pain" (p. 33), IRANNIANSTUDIES
124
"winter separates," "imybarque," "begetting (p. 34), and "woe and welladay" (p. 37).
A more serious
our loss"
problem with An Anthology
of
Modern
from the specialist's point of view is that it does not seem to be based on academic research or a systematic with Persian literature, acquaintance but merely the fruits of wide, enthusiastic reading and impresthematic interpretation, of recent Persian sionistic, verse. The volume features no scholarly or critical apparatus,, nor even acknowledgment of sources of data, such
Persian
Poetry
as Hormoz Khabir's compilation
SheCr-e
Mo'aer-e
Iran,
2nd
ed. (Tehran: Raz, 1971) whose biographical notes seem to have been used extensively and in some cases word for word, as in the citations on Mirsadeqi (p. 169) and Kholi (p. 177). A look at the treatment of Farrokhzad, who receives the greatest amount of translation space in the volume, may demonstrate the sorts of problems inadequate research may cause. In a one-page introduction (p. 137) to the translations of twelve of Forugh's poems, Mr. KarimiHakkak asserts that her "later poetry began to appear in various literary journals between 1960 and 1963, and were published in . .Another Birth in 1964. " But Another Birth was published in 1963; and a number of poems in it, including "Aftab Mishavad,"I "Ruy-e Khak," "She'r-e Safar," "CAsheqaneh," and "Jomleh," appeared in various magazines before 1960. Also, because of the various printings of these poems in those magazines, Another Birth (1963), AshC5r-e Forugh Farrokhzad (1965), and Az Bargozideh-ye Nimi ta Bacd (1974) exhibit significant verbal variants, and the lack of citation of primary sources can only cause the reader to wonder whether the translator has been aware of and consistently used authoritative Persian texts. For example, in the title poem of Another Birth, Mr. KarimiHakkak is obviously translating the variant neg3h-e gij (line 10) in "dazed look"; but Forugh herself used the variant obur-e gij in several contexts, including recorded readings of the poem. Here it is a question of the twofold failure to compare various editions of the texts and to peruse earlier original published translations. "AMother Birth," for example, seems not to have
125
WINTER-SPRING 1979
ever since Karim Emami's 1964 English needed retranslation with Forugh herself, prepared in collaboration version, although Mr. Karimi-Hakkak's version reads better than He most of the other six or so published translations. fares less well in "Friday," with phrases such as "Friday "artful sinuous stretches" "ailing thoughts," silent," (p. 149), (in this case, perhaps and "house of.. .augury" and Ms. Janet between the translator the collaboration rendering of the with a straightforward Rodney interfered Persian). of the whole volume AnThen, the characterization blaze of genuine irresistable as "a poignant, in which the poet's and public, poetry, at once private makes an immediate, ulto experience unmarred fidelity (p. 137) seems exuberance without insight. timate effect" "The speaker in to assert: Mr. Karimi-Hakkak continues the crooked narthese poems is driven forwards...through row alley ways of her childhood as in... 'The Wind-up Doll' (p. 137)."1 But "The Wind-Up Doll" is not at all about the is not and the translation itself childhood; speaker's mow"faint slogans" for khatti error free; for example: khoshk hum (1. 8), "wrinkled fingers" for panjeh'hA-ye (1. 19), "degrade with guile" (1. 9), "remote" for biganeh for mitavan ba ziraki tahqir kard (1. 27), "one can in one's basin dry up" for mitavan chun ab dar gowd3l-e khod pass" for har fesharkhoshkid (1. 42), and "every lustful e harzeh-ye dast (1. 55). other
Birth
Perhaps this reviewer expects too much from a volune the logo of R3hnem3-ye Ketab! But An whose cover features Anthology of Modern Persian Poetry is a commendable volume. the output fairly above, it represents as indicated First, of much shorter lyric verse in Iran in the 1950s and 1960s. and has, through his introduction Second, the translator notes on individual poets, provided a brief prefatory breath of fresh comparative air in his attempt to characindividual and compare and contrast For, poets. terize studies structuralist and so-called in the orientalist the reader rarely gets of modernist Persian literature, is aware of European and the impression that the critic nor are the names of Aragon, Breton, American literatures;
IRANIAN STUDIES
126
Halderlin, Hopkins, Lamartine, Lorca, Musset, Pound, Rilke, Rimbaud, Roethke, Valery, and Whitman--Mr. Karimi-Hakkak's favorites--ever mentioned. Third, the very variety of poems and poets represented in the anthology makes it possible, for even a reader unfamiliar with Persian literato begin to characterize the literature in the original, ture of the post-Mosaddeq, pre-Khomeini period in Iran On the basis of this anthology, for example, (1953-1977). the reader can surmise: (1) that the modernist poets and presumably their readers were anti-establishment during this period, the establishment including both the Pahlavi regime and the formal institution of Twelver Shi'ite Islam; (2) that although the poetry of this period is palpably engage, it is basically neither radical nor revolutionary; (3) that much of the poetry seems, at least in translation, inspired by Western models in terms of forms and techniques and that, in that context, it is not particularly esoteric or experimental; and (4) that although this modernist verse seems here to stay, Persian prose even on the basis of what has appeared in transfiction, lation, seems a more varied, socially committed, and mature Iranian mode of literary expression critically to this point than modern Persian poetry.
127
WINTER-SPRING 1979
Entrepreneurs
Alto,
Calif.:
of Iran. By MohammadReza Vaghefi. The Altoan Press, 1976. 196pp.
Palo
Anne Enayat Theories of entrepreneurship have often, quite properly, been criticized for their one-sided emphasis on the importance of the risk-bearing businessman in the process of economic development, the psychological or cultural reductionism of many of their exponents and, at times, a thinly veiled ethnocentricism. Yet even opponents of this kind of analysis of the problems of capitalist development would not deny the intellectual value of some of the more sophisticated work produced by the school. Unfortunately, because a well thought-out study of entrepreneurship in Iran might have been challenging, Mr. Vaghefils book falls a long way short of the kind of standards set by these. Its purpose is an assessment of the contribution of businessmen to the socioeconomic development of the country, to which end the author seeks to identify "present entresummarize their personal attributes, preneurs," determine the "social which aided their emergence, and constructs" examine the attitudes and techniques of management. However, so numerous are the flaws of methodology, interpretation and historical understanding that the study fails even when considered within its own terms of reference. Quite apart, that is, from the irritating mixture of obsequity and jargon with which it is festooned and which will probably deter most from reading beyond the first two chapters (e.g., with reference to Abolhassan Ebtehaj: "To set aside the wealth of knowledge he had gained and to stop being creative was antithesis to the nature of a man who had for productive efforts fought a good portion of his lifetime and goal achievement" And Khalil Taleghani: "In(p. 41). deed he makes an excellent Maslowian example for (sic.) self-actualizing man, constantly exploring new thresholds,
Anne Enayat is Lecturer in Sociology at the University Tehran and Associate Editor of Iranian Studies. IRANIAN STUDIES
128
of
never butes
satisfied to Iran's
with new achievements, growth" (p. 48).
and thereby
contri-
The data are derived primarily from a questionnaire completed by 106 of the "top men" of large industrial organizations and three "lengthy interviews" with "already established leaders." But the odd (undocumented) reference to their importance in the private sector substitutes for a systematic discussion of why these rather than other entrepreneurs should be singled out, or of the extent to which those who actually replied to the questionnaire may be said to be representative of the survey population. And, if some of the information collected is interesting in itself, analysis of its significance is rarely illuminating. The influx of entrepreneurs from the provinces to Tehran is, for example, said to indicate a transference of loyalty from a city or district to a country as if the roots of this concentration could be traced solely to personal values rather than the structure of economy or polity. Worse still, such superficialities are often compounded by sheer conceptual or logical confusion. Thus in the discussion of the entrepreneurs' perception of their role we are, at one point, given the impression that a low ranking of the "social motive" shows a persistence of particularistic loyalties (despite all the efforts of the "ruling dynasty" to arouse "patriotism and national pride") only to learn a few lines later that "when self-interest is subordinate to other concerns one suspects a preponderance of traditional thinking" (pp. 85-86). And this section is crowned by what must, among tautologies, be a collector's item: "It seems reasonable that managers of these industries... would rate 'contributing to industrial'ization' as an important social role since such a role is consistent with their belief that as an industry expands it thereby contributes to industrialization" (p. 86). The state is credited with being "largely but not exclusively" responsible for the emergence of entrepreneurship. But the account of what is rather curiously described as "four decades of rigorous implementation of modernization programmes" adds little more to our understanding thanmight
129
WINTER-SPRING 1979
be gained
from a casual
though their journalists
reading
of the pages of Kayhan--
would probably not make such mis-
in gross domestic takes as using the 100 percent increase formation between 1965 and 1971 (emphasis mine) as capital
evidence ipso facto of "a more active private sector joining government's expenditures" (p. 21). Nowhere does the author attempt to analyze the circumstances that have determined the dominant role of the state in economy and society (except to refer us to the dynamic leadership), and his consideration of the factors that would explain why this particular group, or the subgroups within it have been able to take advantage of what he calls the government's "green light" is lame. Thus, with respect to social origins we merely learn that the 68 percent from a commercial background had "many things prepared for them." And, in a typical unquestioning application of the platitudes of social science, the slightly disproportionate numbers of religious minorities among entrepreneurs is said to be consistent with the hypothesis that "Islam traditions (sic.) do not encourage business as a career and that high government or military careers are virtually closed to non-Moslems."1 Yet 82 out of 106 declared themselves to be Muslim, surely enough to throw serious doubts on the notion that Islam is a barrier to commerce? all this is merely background. The central Still, purpose of the book is to assess the role of the business leaders in Iran's economic development. The sort of questions that immediately spring to mind (about the nature of the interests of these men and the extent to which they leverage to pursue them; possess the economic and political whether investment decisions taken in their private interest are simultaneously in the public interest in terms of criteria such as employment creation, income distribution and the need to build up an industrial sector that can survive the demise of oil revenues; the implications for fudependence on the ture development of their technological West and many more) are, however, excluded from the start and theoretical position which by virtue of an ideological of the one-hundredattitudes reduces all to a matter of the is deThis business. approach of and-six to the practice rived from a branch of the theory of entrepreneurship which IRANIAN STUDIES
130
claims that sustained economic development requires not but also that entrepreneurs only "innovation" should contasks of business duct the day-to-day "effectively." is no more than a truism. Which, in itself, The problem is how one may judge an effective performance and the kind of conditions that are conducive to it--many or even most of which could in principle be external to the behavioral norms of the capitalists themselves. Theorists of this as they do in the centrality genre, believing of "personality" and "culture" would not go so far. Nevertheless the type of values or practices regarded as favorable to economic development are a matter of dispute among them and, as anyone acquainted with the literature on Japan knows, there is by no means a consensus over the superiority of Western norms in this respect. However, Mr. Vaghefi does not address himself to such issues. Indeed, he never enters into any real theoretical of the discussion validity of the criteria he applies to evaluate entrepreneurial performance at all. Instead, he merely adopts wholesale the tenets of what can only be called a rather crude managerial ideology ending up with a position something like this: given a favorable environment in the form of a state whose policies (with some reservations) promote private enterprise, the economic development of Iran will depend on the extent to which businessmen adopt not only "modern" norms but those purveyed by the Western "science" of management. Thus, "Industrialization can be achieved by fundamental changes in the value system of the actors, i.e., the entrepreneurs. Adherence to traditional modes of production and business management tends to block rational decision-making processes, while (sic.) awareness and cognizance of modern managerial application is vital for resource allocation and operation measurements" (p. 102). The socially committed reader will, perhaps be relieved to know that Iran's industrialists do not come off badly on this score. Nasty old traditions, of course, linger on. Some businessmen still lack confidence in "nonfamily members of the society" as indicated, among other things, by their refusal to grant interview to Mr. Vaghefi. Others insist that because they have invested the capital they will do the hiring and firing, "a traditional atti-
131
WINTER-SPRING 1979
And tude based on the feudal pattern of master-servant." most are not yet quite advanced enough to understand the advantages of the labor relations policies of the soulful There were other types of deviation from the corporation. ideal too, mainly explicable in terms of such transitory phenomena as the monopoly of some firms. However, hope is there because, in keeping with "a modern managerial concept," nearly half considered the profit of the firm to be attia major criterion of success whereas, "A traditional tude would not consider this to be the predominant goal since its strong reliance of paternalism (providing employment and connotations of profit making) tends to lower the prestige attached to profit" (p. 103). And, if those lurk on they can be laid to rest earlier questions still since, according to the author, in a society like Iran the efforts of entrepreneurs "guarantee a proper system of checks and balances as regards ownership, production, and of goods and services" (p. 67). Once, the distribution that is, people and organizations have "restructured their modes of behavior so that the full productivity of modernization can be obtained" (p. 172).
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Iranian Studies is published by The Society for Iranian Studies. It is distributed to members of the Society as part of their membership. Annual membership dues are $18.00 ($12.00 for students). The annual subscription rate for libraries and other institutions is $22.00. A limited supply of the back volumes of the Journal (1968 to present) is available and may be ordered by writing to the Editor. The opinions expressed by the contributors are of the individual authors and not necessarily those of the Society or the editors of Iranian Studies. Articles to be considered for publication and all other communications should be sent to the Editor, Iranian Studies, Box J- 154, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Mass. 02167, U.S.A. Communications concerning the affairs of the Society should be addressed to the Executive Secretary, The Society for Iranian Studies, c/o Department of Anthropology, Washington University, Saint Louis, Missouri, 63130, U.S.A.
Iranian Studies Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies THE HA YDARI-NIcMATI CONFLICTS IN IRAN Hossein Mirjafari
U.S. MILITAR Y MISSIONS TO IRAN Thomas M. Ricks
PROFESSIONAL STOR YTELLING IN IRAN MaryEllenPage NONFICTIONFICTION: DOCUMENTARIESON IRAN HamidNaficy
POET AND REVOLUTION (PART II) SorourSoroudi
COMMENTSON "TRIBALISMAS A SOCIOECONOMICFORMATION" JamesJ. Reid Book Reviews by Shahrough Akhavi Said Amir Arjomand Richard W. Bulliet Farhad Daftari Reinhold L. Loeffler Samuel R. Peterson Annenmrie Schimmel
Summer-Autumn 1979
Volume XII
Numbers 3-4
THE SOCIETY FOR IRANIAN STUDIES COUNCIL Ahmad Ashraf, Plan & Budget Organization and University of Tehran Ali Banuazizi, Boston College Lois Grant Beck, Washington University Michael M.J. Fischer, Harvard University (ex officio) Gene R. Garthwaite, Dartmouth College Mary-Jo DelVecchio Good, University of California at Davis Fric J. Hooglund, Bowdoin College M.A. Jazayery, University of Texas at Austin Heshmat Moayyad, University of Chicago Marvin Zonis, University of Chicago EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE Lois Grant Beck, E`xecutiveSecretary Michael M.J. Fischer, Treasurcr Ali Banuazizi, Editor
IRANIAN STUDIES Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies Editor. Ali Banuazizi Book Review Editor: Ervand Abrahamian Associate Editors: Anne Enayat, John D. Gurney, Vahid F. Nowshirvani Copy Editor: Naomi Schorr Circulation Manager: Kathleen McNally
Copyright,1980, The Society for IranianStudies Publishedin the U.S.A. USISSN002-0862 Addressall communicationsto IRANIANSTUDIES,Box J-154, 02167, U.S.A. BostonCollege,ChestnutHill, Massachusetts
Iranian
Studies
Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies
Volume XII
Summer-Autumn 1979
Numbers 3-4
ARTICLES Hossein Mirjafari 135 THE HAYDARI-NICMATI CONFLICTS IN IRAN Trans. & Adapted by J. R. Perry 163 U.S. MILITARY MISSIONS TO IRAN, 1943-1978: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE
Thomas M. Ricks
195 PROFESSIONAL STORYTELLING IN IRAN: TRANSMISSION AND PRACTICE
Mary Ellen Page
217 NONFICTION FICTION: DOCUMENTARIES ON IRAN
Hamid Naficy
239 POET AND REVOLUTION: THE IMPACT OF IRAN'S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION ON THE SOCIAL AND LITERARY OUTLOOK OF THE POETS OF THE TIME: PART II 275 COMMENTS ON "TRIBALISM AS A SOCIOECONOMIC FORMATION IN IRANIAN HISTORY"
Sorour Soroudi
James J. Reid
REVIEW ARTICLE 283 RELIGION AND IDEOLOGY IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION
Said Amir Arjomand
continued on next page
Volume XII
Summer-Autumn 1979
Numbers 34
(Continued) BOOK REVIEWS 293
ESKANDAR BEG MONSHI: History of Shah CAbbasthe Great (Trans. by R. M. Savory)
Richard W. Bulliet
297
I. RABINOVICH AND H. SHAKED, Eds.: The Middle East between 1967 and 1973
Shahrough Akhavi
305
B. UTAS: A Persian Sufi Poem
306
J. GLUCK and S. H. GLUCK, Eds.: A Survey of Persian Handicraft
310
G. STOBER: Die Afshdr
314
S. H. NASR, Ed.: Ismacili Contributions to Islamic Culture
Annemarie Schimmel Samuel R. Peterson
Reinhold L. Loeffler Farhad Daftari
Abst racta Iranica revue editee par L'INSTITUT FRANQAIS D'IRANOLOGIE DE TEHERAN BP. 51-1968 Teheran. Iran.
ABSTRACTA IRANICA est une revue bibliographiquepour le monde iranoaryen. Les travaux scientifiques (livres et articles) publies chaque annee sur l'Iran, I'Afghanistan,et ['ensembledu monde irano-aryensont selectionneset commentes par des sp&ialistes. Principalesrubriques: Histoire, archeologie, philosophie, islamologie, litterature, linguistique, geographie, ethnologie, economie, sociologie, sciences politiques... Deja paru (un vol. par an): -Volume 1, 1978. (Publicationsde 1977/1356). -- Volume 2, 1979. (Publicationsde 1978/1357). Volume 3, 1980. (Publicationsde 1979/1358). Diffusion: Editions E.J. BRILL, Oude Rijn 33a-35, LEIDEN, Pays-Bas. Abonnements: Association pour I'Avancementdes Etudes Iraniennes, 13, rue de Santeuil, 75 231 PARIS Cedex 05. ABSTRACTA IRANICA est un supplement annuel a STUDIA IRANICA.
Iranian Studies, Volume XII, Nos. 3-4, Summer-Autumn1979
The Haydarl NiCmati Conflicts in Iran Hossein Mirjafari Translated & Adapted by J. R. Perry
has always been one From earliest times, religion in social cohesion and at the of the most important factors and strife. same time a major cause of urban factionalism of opposing sects in the same city has inThe existence variably provided a breeding ground for economic, social, in the guise of sectarian and political differences disputes. in the IsThe basic elements of urban organization lamic period were local government (huk3umat), religious associations (the craft solidarity (ummat), professional or the wards . and quarters guilds, city (maha11lat) aqn5f), rose to prominence Occasionally, other social organizations such as esoteric and derv:ish orders, fraternities, mystical and paramilitary and chivalrous (futuvvat, associations social life cayyjr5n); these too formed part of the overall The wards or city quarters were the centers of the city. of group activity or ethnic or sectarian based on kinship, Iranian cities affiliation. during the Islamic period saw
of History at the Hossein Mirjafari is Assistant Professor of Isfahan; he completed the present article at University the Center for Middle Eastern Studies of the University of during 1978-79. Chicago, where he was a Research Associate J. R. Perry Civilization
is Associate Professor of Persian at the University of Chicago. 135
Language and
SUMMER-AUTUMN1979
by the followers of the and social activities political Hanball, Vanafl, and four rites of the Sunna--Shdficl, Mdlikl--and by Shi'ite and other dissident sects such as Adand Ismacllis. the Zaydis, Carmathians, Mu'tazilites, herents of each sect generally lived in the same quarter and built their own small bazaar and communal shrine (takya, 1usayniya) .1 Inter-communal quarrels of a purely social origin tended to take on an aspect of sectarian conflict. Such sectarian disputes between rival urban groups Muqaddas1 mentions are encountered in various sources. Nishapur, Marv, Samarqand and many other cities as being Yaqfit, passing through Rayy hotbeds of factional strife.2 in 617 A.H./1220 A.D. while fleeing from the Mongols, found two-thirds of the city in ruins; on inquiring about the reason, he was told that following a religious dispute beand Sunnites, the Shi'ites were defeated tween Shi'ites and extirpated; war then flared up between the Hanafites and the Shafi'ites, from which the latter, though in a "the ruined quarters you minority, emerged victorious: and the Hanafites, and only see are those of the Shi'ites standing.. .the only Shi'the Shafi'ite quarters are still left are those who kept quiet ites and Hanafites still Khwandamir, moreover, regards about their- religion."3 sectarian strife as a major factor in the Mongol massacres, claiming that the invaders would slaughter the Hanafites and then annihilate at the instigation of the Shafi'ites, the latter.4 Concerning sectarian quarrels at Isfahan, "Most of them [the citizens] Hamdullah Mustawfl writes: are Sunnis of the Shaficil rite, but they are nearly always quarreling and fighting among themselves, and the Ibn city has never been free from bipartisan strife."5 Batata describes Isfahan as "a large and handsome city, but a great part of it has been demolished as a result going on; of Sunni-Shici sectarian riots which are still the peogle of this town live in a perpetual state of conflict." Reference is made by Barthold to sectarian struggles between the townspeople and the peasants on the out"In Sava, as in Rayy, there was skirts of various cities: IRANIAN STUDIES
136
constant conflict between the town dwellers, who were adherents of the Shafici and the villagers, who were rite, Shi'ites. The Shi'ite center and the focus of conflict with the Sunnites was the village of Ava, which lay directly south of the town.,"7 Not only did sectarian wars break out between rival groups within one city, and between towns and adjacent villages, but such disputes could also escalate into wars between whole cities.8 In every period, the more urban settlement the more the city flourished, wards appear to have formed tight kinship, or reethnic, ligious The various wards together communities. represented the fissiparous and centrifugal forces, as opposed to the picture of civic cohesion and order projected by the administrative, commercial, and religious centers of the city.9 Among the best known of these groups or sects with a following in many Iranian cities were the large and mutually hostile NicmatU and Haydarl factions, which have not yet been adequately This article studied. will attempt to throw some light on the origins and rise of these factions and the reasons for their antagonism. The Nicmatis (variously NiCmatullhls, NiCmatiya) and the Ijaydaris (Ijaydarlya) were rival groups that engaged in constant and violent in most cities conflict of Iran from the Safavid to the Qajar period. Their violent street fights sometimes paralyzed whole cities, during especially the mourning month of Mubarram and on the CAshard--the tenth day of the month--when their rivalry reached a climax. The Nicmatis originated as a cult that grew up around Sayyid Nicmatullh Kirmani, known as Shah Nicmatulldh Vali (d. 834/1431), a well known poet and mystic who came to be called the sultan of Iranian dervishes. His career has been fully described by several competent scholars and needs no amplification here. 0All sources for the Nicmati-Haydarl conflicts agree in characterizing the Nicmatis as followers of Sayyid Nicmatullah Val1. The Haydarl sect is named for one Qutb al-din dar Tini, who has not been accorded adequate study; 137
Hayit will
SUMMER-AUTUMN 197.9
here to present a few facts about this perbe appropriate son and also about another mystic with the same name, with whom he has been confused. such as Hamdullah Mustawfl and Some historians, of the Haydari cult as the followers Khwandamir, identify a thirteenthone Qutb al-din Haydar Thni (d. 618/1221), whom they also call Qutb al-din century mystic, jaydar Zavali on the grounds that he was buried at Zava in KhuraIndeed, after his death, Zava was renamed Turbat-i san. In the eighth/ Ijaydarlya (Haydar's tomb) in his honor.11 Shaykh Haydar's Ibn Batata encountered century, fourteenth in Zava: "From there [Sarakhs] we journeyed to followers The HayHaydar. Zava, which is the town of Qutb al-din is named after persuasion, of the Shi'ite dariya cult, symbol of piety is that this Shaykh Haydar; their peculiar and necks, and even arms their iron round rings hang they their congress with so as to inhibit round their genitals, women. "12 quotes a couplet of Shah Sanjan The ijablb al-Siyar him as a in praise of Qutb al-din ljaydar, which describes Accordmystic.13 a dissolute and licentious i.e., rind., "Shaykh FarId al-din CAttar, the celeing to Dawlatshah, by Qutb albrated Iranian mystic and poet, was inspired Ibrahim b. Ishaq, was a father, din Haydar, and cAttar's of his; moreover, CAttar wrote a verse Haydarnama disciple to him in his youth. dedicated Qutb al-din Haydar was an and ascetic, and lived to the age of 110 (or by esoteric other accounts 140); he came of the lineage of the khans Dawlatname was Shahvar." of Turkistan, and his father's or 602/1205-6.14 Qazshah dates his death as 597/1200-01 in his account of Zava, records several miracles of vini, "In summer he would walk through fire Qutb al-din Haydar: day he was spotand in winter would sit in the snow....One dome.. .and proceeded to walk ted on top of an inaccessible as anyone else would on level down the side as easily ground. "15 From these brief accounts of Shaykh Qutb al-din ijaydar Zavall we may conclude that a community of dervishes of this same mystic, did excalled Haydarl, the disciples IRANIAN STUDIES
138
century on; but it appears ist from the late sixth/twelfth and seclusion, asceticism that because of their excessive and they should not be their numbers gradually decreased, enemies confused with the Haydaris who were the traditional of the NiCmatis. of the view, the origins In the present writer's go back to the second half of Haydarl and Nicmati factions At this century A.D.). the eighth century A.H. (fourteenth time, when Shah NicmatullTh Val! had gathered a considerable Iran (Kerman), another mystic in eastern number of disciples by the name of Sultan Mir Haydar Tani appeared in western a large following. This Sultan Iran (Tabriz) and attracted four years before the i.e., Mir Ijaydar Tani (d. 830/1426-7, who also went by the title death of Shah NicmatullTh Val!), to the Qutb al-din Haydar of Qutb al-dTn, bears no relation who died in 618/1221 and of Central Asian Turkish extraction was buried at Turbat-i Haydarlya. Sultdn Mir Haydar was born in Baku and buried in Tabriz, and was a contemporary and his son Qara with Qara Yiusuf Qaraquy5nlu (d. 823/1420) Awlad al-Ath5r, his In the Tgr1kh-i Iskandar (d. 841/1437). Baku) and his geneais given as Badkiuba (i.e., birthplace "Thni" logy traced back to the Prophet, while his epithet by his having grown up in the town of Tun in is explained known as Ibn al-KarKhurasan.16 Hafiz Husayn Karbala'i, teacher of the a leading mystical (d. 997/1588), bald'! A.D.), also refers to Sultan tenth century A.H. (sixteenth of Mir Haydar, in his account of the shaykhs and divines Tabriz, as the "leader of the Haydarl community" (pishv3his tomb as a welland describes yi jamaCat-i Haydarlin), known shrine (takya) in the Darb-i Acla district.17 He is of the Qalandarlya order, who are doctrinally close to the Malamatiya. He was born and raised in traveled Baku in Shirvan, became a noted ecstatic, a great deal, and in some towns he visited he set his dervishes (takya) and installed up a cloister During were as famous as he. Few qalandars there. the time of Qara Yusuf and his son Mirza Iskandar in Tabriz., at the same takya which he he was living built there and which is now his tomb, and was known to all as Baba Haydar. Mirza Iskandar had great 1394
1979 SUMMER-AUTEUMN
It is said that this ruler had a faith in him. minister called Qa?i Nawrfiz, who had made some remark to him about Mir Haydar behind spiteful his back; that same day, or a few days later, QazU Nawriuz happened to be passing by the shaykh's trance, takya, and Sultan Mir Haydar, in an ecstatis gestured toward him in such a way as if he were aiming a bow and arrow and said to him, "Take this arrow!" When he arrived home, Qaz1 Nawriuz collapsed Mirza Iskandar and fell ill to the point of death. wvas informed and was so concerned for the Qaiz that with Sultan Mir he went personally to intercede The shaykh Haydar, begging him to pardon the Qdt!. that once an arrow has been shot and hit its replied target it cannot be called back; nothing could be This done, Qazl Nawruz would die that same day. faith Mirza Iskandar's increased episode greatly in Mir Haydar, whom he treated with even greater until the Shaykh's death in 830 A.H., veneration Mirza Iskandar is said to have during his reign. had his body buried in the same takya he lived in. in a memoir (tazOne of the Ijaydari dervishes, gives the kira) he composed for another dervish, as follows: Sultan Mir lineage shaykh's spiritual of Sayyid MubammadNajaf!, L.'aydar was the disciple of Sayyid lbrahim Madan!, the discithe disciple of Sayyid ple of Sayyid CAll Yamani, the disciple of Mujassam Makki, the Qasim Madani, the disciple of Sayyid IbrThim Khwarizml, who personaldisciple Imam Mfisd al-Kazim and enly knew the [seventh] as his devoted follower....18 listed One important point that can be gleaned from this genealogy is that Qutb al-din Haydar was devoted spiritual sect and can to the seventh Imam of the Twelver Shi'ite thus be regarded as an adherent of the Imamite Shi'a. a scholar of the Safavid Qazi Narullah Shiishtarl, traces the lineage of this Sultan Mir likewise period, the seventh Imam of the Haydar Thni to Muisa al-Ka;im, to various miracles and attributes sect, Twelver Shi'ite him, such as, "iron became as wax in his hands."119 ShuishIRANIAN
STUDIES
2140
tarn also confirms the fact that he was a Shilite, and that "this was repeatedly since from the time Qutb alevident, din Sayyid I3aydar Tan1 first arrived at this place [Tabriz], many of the local people who joined his cult professed Imamite Twelver Shi'ism."t20 Furaat-i Shirazi, the Qajar writer, gives an account of Qutb al-din Haydar (of Tabriz), that "there concluding is no room for doubt that he was a Shi 'ite" (though he erroneously gives the date of his death as 618/1221 i.e., that of the death of Qutb al-din Haydar Zava'l).22
The author of the
Tara'iq
al-Haq5'iq,
quoting from
and Bust3n al-SiyaIa, refers briefly to both Qutb al-din l1aydars and asserts that the Haydarlya were evidently the disciples of the Qutb al-din ilaydar who was buried at Turbat-i Haydarlya.22 The author of the Riyaz al-Siyaha is likewise unaware of the Qutb al-din Haydar who lived in Tabriz, and traces the Haydarlya cult to The author of Ray4anat alQutb al-din Haydar Zava'i.23 Adab, and even the great scholar Dihkhuda, confuse the two Qutb al-din Haydars, conflating their biographies into that of a single person.24 Most early modern writers, in are poorly informed concerning fact, Shaykh Haydar, having copied their material from the IJabib al Siyar, whose author was unaware of Qutb al-din Haydar of Tabriz.
Majalis
al-Mu'minTn
The author of the Mir'at al-Buldan-i ing in part on Chardin) shows even greater sidering the Haydarlya to be the followers dar the father of Shah Ismacll Safavi:
NaAirl
ignorance, of Sultan
(rely-
conHay-
The uniform of this order consisted of a red fivescalloped cap of tanned sheepskin or a cape of hide over their shoulders, a hefty staff of the sort dervishes call muntasha in their right hand and a horn of animal's horn which they call shakh-i nafilr in their left. The Nicmatis are dervishes devoted to Shah NicmatullTh Val!; they wear the dirtiest garb of all Iranians, with bare heads, and generally act like madmen. These two orders (silsila) are deadly enemies, and can never meet without fighting. The 141
SUMMER-AUTUMN 1979
callcity wards of Isfahan imitated this tradition, ing themselves variously Haydarl or Nicmati, and were constantly at odds with one another; and this hostile dichotomy in the quarters of Isfahan has spread to all the provinces of Iran.25 description of the dress of the The Ictimad al-Saltana's Nicmati and Haydarl dervishes may be accurate in part, with the caveat that the followers of Shaykh Haydar the Safavid Another erroneactually wore caps with twelve scallops. ous assumption here is that Isfahan was the source of the communal violence; Nicmati-Uaydari riots were commonin Tabriz and Qazvin before Isfahan became the Safavid capital and was transformed into a major city. Petrushevsky, in charting the development of the mystical orders in Iran from the sixth to the ninth (twelfth the followers both characterizes centuries, to fifteenth) of Qutb al-din Ilaydar Zavall and of Shah Nicmatullah Val! This though without adducing any evidence.26 as Shi'ites, of the is pure conjecture, since the religious affiliation who is buried at Turbat-i Haydarlya is not Qutb al-din Shah Nicmatullah Val!, mentioned in any of the sources. as will presently appear, was an adherent of the Sunna, though his successors gradually came to profess Shi'ism during Safavid times as a result of marriage alliances with that dynasty. It may therefore be surmised that the origins of the Iaydarl-Nicmat1 conflict are to be found in sectarian and doctrinal disputes between Sunnite and Shi'ite factions, championed by the Nicmatlya and Ijaydariya respectively. During Safavid times, of course, Shah NicmatullTh Vall's descendents and successors became intimately affiliated were with the Safavid dynasty and they and their disciples They even composed poetry gradually converted to Shi'ism. which they attributed to Shah Nicmatullah Vali, purporting An example is found in the to prove that he was a Shi'ite. verses produced by Mawlana SuncullTh NicmatullThi in 1080/ during the reign of Shah Sulayman:$afavi 1668-9, i.e., (1077-1105/1667-94), and attributed in his book to Shah NiCmatullah: in these lines he represents Shah NicmatullTh IRANIAN STUDIES
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as proclaiming to the people the advent founder of the Safavid dynasty.27
of Shah Ismacll
I,
refuses The fanatically Shi'ite Narullah Shishtarl could have been a Sunnite, to accept that Shah Nicmatulldh and explains who regarded themthat "a group of Tabrizis under the imas disciples of Sayyid NicmatullTh, selves pression that he was of the Shafi'ite school, were Shafici Sunnltes."128 own wording reveals that Shah NiSh5shtaril's Cmatullah must have been a Sunnite. It therefore and conseems clear that the disputes flicts between the Haydarl and Nicmatj cults or factions when the contempobegan in the eighth/fourteenth century, raries Shah Nicmatullah Val! and Sultan Qutb al-din Ilaydar founded their mystical schools at opposite ends of Iran, in Kerman and Tabriz; the direct confrontation of these in Tabriz, where both shaykhs had cults occurred first gained a following It is of course among the citizenry. that other cults known as Haydarl arose indepenpossible around individuals dently before or after this period, called Haydar; but these are different from the Ijaydarlya who are traditionally opposed to the Nicmatlya.29 This sectarian conflict evidently began as a doctrinal dispute presumably to be found in the different approaches to mystical revelation or sectarian doctrine of the two gnostics. The followers of Shah Nicmatullah belonged to the Sunna, those of Shaykh Uaydar to the Shica. However, these purely doctrinal did not long differences remain valid. On the one hand, with the victory of the in Aqquiytinlii over the Qaraquy-u1nlu Dynasty in 1467 Tabriz, and regions of Iran, fell common with many other cities into AqqiiyFunla hands; and Ozfin Uasan Aqquiyuinlu (1457In 78) strove to diminish the power of the Haydariya. a letter to Sultan Bayazid II (1447-1512) after his Iranian conquests, Uzuin Hasan wrote: "we have endeavored to promote and preserve the mosques and other holy places by appointing imams and muezzins, and in accordance with the [Qur'anic] injunction to 'put people in their proper places' we have treated everyone according to his deserts, and have from the practice of their heresies prohibited (bidaC) such 143
1979 SUMMER-AUTUMN
heretical
cults
as the Qalandars and Haydarls.",30
On the other hand, with the subsequent accession to the power of the Safavid Shah Ismacll I (907-30/1502-24), Iranian populace went over willy nilly to the Shica, and leaders lost their power. Henceforth the Sunni religious doctrinal aspect of the Haydari-Nicmati factionalism had no meaning for the people in general; it is evident, however, that whenever the inhabitants of different wards in be it social some Iranian cities had a clash of interests, factions would or economic or whatever, the conflicting From Safavid times label themselves Haydarl and Nicmati. of the on, the inveterate group chauvinisms and rivalries and mashdi organiza1Ui, ward-based Cayyar, javanmard, tions were certainly not without influence in the polarization of their quarters under the Haydarl and Nicmati banners. And so to this day the Haydari-Nicmati clashes invoked to refer to an unfounded hostilare proverbially ity rooted in popular fanaticism. It is certain that during the Safavid period this factionalism became widespread and often violent, and that played an active part in sowing and the ruling authorities nurturing these dragon's teeth of discord in the soil of Several travelers who visited Iran in their own realms. Safavid times refer in their writings to the Haydarl-Niand are Their observations are striking, cmat1 clashes. summarized below to convey the forms taken by this divithe origins ascribed to it, and the atsion and conflict, titude of the authorities. This factionalism was witnessed in all three of the (Tabriz, Qazvin, and Isfahan), successive Safavid capitals and Krusinski, Tavernier, Chardin, and Kaempfer add that it was a feature of several, if not most, other cities of Iran. Fights between the factions were observed both on during Muharram) and on ormourning holidays (especially on the dinary days, and most of the travelers--doubtless the regular informants--characterize authority of Iranian escalating into pitched battles as a timeconfrontations hallowed annual ritual.
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Vicentio who visited D'Alessandri, Tabriz in 1571 during the reign of Shah Tahmasp, and Chardin, who was there a century later under Shah CAbbas II and Shah Sulayman, report that the nine wards of the city were partitioned between the .Haydarl and Nicmat- parties, five for the one and four for the other, and that the two parts of Tabriz were permanently feuding.31 who made Tavernier, six journeys to Iran during the seventeenth recentury, ports the same of Isfahan: The populace of Isfahan...is divided into two factions or classes, one called Haydarl and the other On festive NicmatullThi. occasions when the people gather to watch bear- and bull-baiting, cock-fighting and other such sports, these two factions place bets on the outcome of the bouts, sometimes wagering considerable sums.32 Chardin delineates
the polarization
more precisely:
Isfahan is divided into two quarters, one called Jiubara-yi NicmatullTh1, which faces east, and the other called Dar-i Dasht-i Haydarl, which looks west... .These two quarters are actually like two factions, which include the adjacent suburbs and of the city.... dependencies Indeed, all the cities of Iran are divided like this...the two halves of Isfahan are so bitterly hostile that on holidays and other occasions of public assembly the one party will attack the other on the pretext of ensuring precedence for itself; and on ordinary days the wrestlers and young toughs of each side hurl at each other. challenges Sometimes there ensue pitched battles on the old square, with hundreds of people fighting on either side. The participants are always of the lower classes, and although they fight only with sticks and stones, there are always some killed and many injured.33 Engelbert Kaempfer, who spent two years in Iran (1683-85), includes a physical description of the Haydarl
145
1979 SUMMER-AUTlJMN
in his chapter on the dervish and Nicmat1 protagonists orders, as well as an account of the way in which their were staged, that combines features of confrontations Tavernier's and Chardin's narratives: turban made The Haydariya wear a five-scalloped from an old rag, and a cape of untanned sheepskin; in one hand they carry a staff, and in the other a horn. They are sworn foes of the Nicmatullahis, who wear a less outlandish costume, and take their name from a certain Nicmatullah, whose tomb is an object of great veneration at the city of Kerman ....
This
is not the place
to expound the reasons
for the proverbial enmity between these orders; I will mention only that everyone in Iran is a passionate partisan of one or the other, so that the cities of Iran are split into two camps...consequently contests between the two factions are held every year among the young men and the common After wagers have been placed on the outpeople. horseplay ends up in fisticuffs, come, the initial clubbing and stonethrowing in deadly earnest.... The most violent clashes occur on the anniversary of the killing of the ImamIusayn, when the people, fired by the tragedy of cAll's progeny, turn upon one another and draw blood.34 The attitude of the monarch and the local authorities toward these disturbances struck several foreign visitors as no less remarkable than the Iaydari-Nicmat1 conD'Alessandri notes that neither the flicts themselves. shah nor anyone else could prevent the fights, so implacable was the enmity of each party; Kaempfer indicates that the darugha (chief of police) would at times intera general riot; vene with a force of armed men to forestall but Chardin states that when the king was absent from Is(mayor) made no real effort to prevent fahan, the kalantar these affrays, "by reason of the profit that his office derived from them."35 Pietro della Valle, who visited Isfahan during the reign of Shah CAbbas, writes in the course of describing IRANIAN STUDIES
146
the mourning rituals observed on 21st Ramazan (Imam CAll's martyrdom) in the year 1617 (1026 A.H.): "Shah CAbbas sometimes intervenes to incite the two factions and, having brought them satisfactorily to blows, nimbly quits the field and sits at a window watching the ensuing battle and its dismal consequences."'36 That CAbbas did indeed engineer such free gladiatorial displays for his private amusement is attested in Persian sources. Whenever he visited Qazvin, this monarch seems to have indulged in ijaydartNicmatl-baiting for entertainment. His personal astrologer, Mulla Jalal Yazd!, records under the events of the "on Sunday the 19th Rabic I we arrived year 1003/1594-5, at Qazvin, and on Tuesday the 20th Jumadi I there took place by royal decree a battle of the Nicmatis and baydarts on the Maydan-i Sacadat in Qazvin. Victory fell to the Mir Haydarl party...a similar fight was also decreed at the shrine of Shahzada Husayn. "37 Krusinski, looking back a century from his vantage point at the demise of the Safavid empire, squarely attributes not only the continuance, but the very origin, of these factional to Shah cAbbds's policy of divide fights et impera. Not content, he claims, with transporting alien communities into all the cities of the kingdom to lessen the chances of anti-government alliances, Shah cAbbas created in all the large towns two artificially antagonistic parties called Pelenk and Felenk. These were forbidden to intermarry or even to eat together, and were given permission to fight publicly each year during Muharram, which they did with a vengeance. Each one killed by the enemy was a martyr and an incitement to further bloodshed. Though they fought without arms, because they were not supposed to make use of anything else but stones and sticks, it was with so much fury and bloodshed that the King [Shah Sultan Uusayn, 1694-1722] was obliged to employ his guards to separate them with drawn swords ... .at Isfahan in 1714 they were under a necessity, before they could separate the combattants, to put about three hundred to the sword on the spot.38
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This policy worked in the short term, claims Krusinski, for there were no urban risings against Shah cAbbas. a similar pair of factions at He even tried to institute Qandahar on his conquest of that city, but they lapsed when Qandahar was reconquered by the Moguls. However, the two to the court factions spread from the urban proletariat and the countryside, contributing to the hopeless disunity of Safavid Iran in the face of the Afghan invaders.39 Though it is extremely unlikely that Shah cAbbas the Haydarl and Nicmati factions, under actually instituted manner, it is beyond queswhatever name, in this artificial tion that he--and other rulers and governors--encouraged for the motives Krusinski attributes their mutual hostility to him. Some found it advantageous, or even necessary, to Shah Sulayman, take sides with one or the other faction. according to Kaempfer, was a supporter of the laydariya. Shah's chief ij?jj1 Ibrahlm, before becoming Agha Muhammad minister, was alderman of the Haydar1 wards (Kadkhuda-yi of Shiraz under CAll Murad Khan Zand (1781Ijaydarl-khina) 85).41 govAt the outset of Mascid Mirza Zil al-Sultdn's ernorship of Isfahan (1882), a bloody riot flared up on account of some trouble between the Haydaris and Nicmatis. The new governor asked his aides what it was all about and was duly apprised of the origins of the dispute and the fact that the city was formally divided--and that "in accordance with the partition of the city, Your Highness is a Haydart." Whereupon he was delighted and exclaimed, "Since I'm to be a Haydarl, let's give the Nicmatis hell!' Most of the accounts given both by European travelers and Persian chroniclers of the origins of the feud (including that of Krusinski mentioned above) belong to Tavernier claims that "the the realm of folk etiology. archives of the Persians tell that Isfahan formerly conone of which belonged sisted of two adjacent villages, to a certain Haydar and the other to Nicmatullahi; and the two halves of Isfahan have kept the same names, whence two parties have arisen among the people which frequently Chardin reports the same tradivie for preeminence."43 IRANIAN STUDIES
148
of the Iaydarl village tion, adding that the population Dar-i Dasht, the same as the klaydar1 sec(which he calls tion of the city in his time) was Sunni and Turkish, that of the Nicmati village (Juibara) Shici and Persian. Although he does not imply that these sectarian affiliations continued after the growth of the city, his information is for in fact, Mir Sultan Haydar was a Shilite, garbled, and Val! a Sunnite, Shah Nicmatullah as we have seen. Chardin identifies NicmatullTh as the same person whose correctly tomb is a well known shrine at Kerman and seems to lend he reports, credence to the alternative tradition namely that Haydar and NicmatullTh(l) were two "princes" who in former times split of Iran into two the whole population factions.44 Elsewhere he dates this dichotomy to the fifteenth century, and makes a pertinent analogy with the Guelph and Ghibelline factions which polarized much of Italy in the late Middle Ages.45 In his description of Shiraz in about 1880, the author of the FRrsn5ma-yi Napirl neatly summarizes both the continuing Iaydarl-Nicmati strife and the traditional accounts of its origins: Of the eleven wards, five are counted as the Haydarl-khana, viz. those of Is4aq Beg, the Bazar-i Murgh, Bala Kabt, the Darb-i Shahzada, and the Maydan-i Shah. Five others form the Nicmati-khTna, viz. the Darb-i Masjid, Sar-i Bagh, Sardang, Sang-i Siyah and Lab-i Ab. The Jewish quarter is outside this scheme. It is said that during the time of the Safavid shahs of blessed memory, they decreed that, for the purpose of fostering dissent among the inhabitants of the different quarters of the cities--and even the towns and villages of Iran-the people of the eastern section of each such community call themselves Haydart, i.e., become adherents of Sultan Haydar, the ancestor of the Safavid shahs and the shaykh of their mystical order, and the people of the western half of each community call themselves Nicmati, i.e., followers of Shah Nicmatullah the shaykh of the order of Nicmatullahi dervishes; that the people of the Haydarl-khana in 14.9
SUMMER-AUTUJMN 1979
concert should at certain times fight against the people of the Nicmatl-khana, as they in turn against on either the Haydarl-khana; and that casualties be subject to not should battles these side during This custom obtained in Shiraz, and retaliation. three or four times a year the inhabitants of the opposing parties would fight, with several deaths and serious injuries resulting on each occasion. [of Through the diligence of the state officials Nasir al-din Shah], this misguided custom has been discontinued for almost forty years.46 Robert Grant Watson, attache of the British Legation at the Iranian court during the early years of Nasir al-din Shah's reign (mid-nineteenth century), describes Shiraz as follows: The population of the city is estimated at thirtyfive or forty thousand souls, and it is composed of Mohamedens, Jews, Armenians and Guebres. The people of Sheeraz bear the reputation of being turbulent Once a week, on Friday, and prone to insurrection. the inhabitants of the two divisions of the population called Hyderi and Neametali, repair to the open ground beyond the city walls, and engage in a skirmish with slings and stones; an exercise which is not infrequently followed by a close fight with swords and daggers.47 It may thus be seen that the Uaydari-Nicmat1 conflicts were not a feature of the Safavid era only, but were in Qajar times and poalso present, with equal ferocity, larized not only major cities but also provincial towns. A writer from Dizfiul, in an account of the buildings and shrines of his town, indicates which of them were situated The wards in the Haydarl and which in the Nicmat1 quarters. of the liaydarl-khana he mentions are the Labi-i khandaq, Baba Yiusuf, and Sar-i Maydan-i Sablan; those of the Nicmatikhana include that of the Masjid, the Migahl, and the Sah.ra ba-dar.48
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Sir John Malcolm, who headed a British military mission to Iran in the reign of Fatl CAll Shah, notes the continuing Haydar-lNiCmatl conflicts, the fact that the government, for its own advantage, made no effort to stop them, These and the ritualized and symbolic nature of the clashes. conflicts would reach a violent peak "during the last three days of the Mohurrum" (evidently he means the three days leading up to the CAshiird, the tenth of Muharram), so much so that "if a mosque is decorated by one party, the other, if they can, drive them from it, and destroy their flags or If they force their opponents from their houses ornaments. they do not enter or plunder them, but make a mark on each door with a hatchet, as a token of victory."49 The Haydarl-Nicmati urban riots continued into the period of the Constitutional Revolution, by which timeeven the folk traditions of their original motivation were dying out. The noted historian Ahmad Kasravi writes: A regrettable aspect of Iranian history is the dichotomy. do not know when We this Vaydarl-Nicmati first appeared, or who "Haydar" and YNicmat" were; we of Iran were for a long time know only that the cities at the mercy of this factional strife....This persisted from Safavid times, gradually diminishing in severity and dying out in most towns, until by the Constitutional period very few places were still so divided. Every few years, however, they would suddenly give voice to the old antagonisms, especially during Mularram, when processions would form and the tragedy of Kerbela would be re-enacted, giving the mob a stage for vindictiveness and violence. One such town was Qazvin, where in the very first year of the Constitution [1906], on 10th Nluharram, the two factions clashed outside the city gates, killing two persons and injuring some thirty or forty others. Another place was Shushtar, where the factions were still active until quite recently. I myself [sc. Kasravi] witnessed them in action in 1302/ 1923 on my first visit to Khuzistan: the town was partitioned into two sections, one called the Nicmatl-khana and the other the Haydarl-khana, and 151
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would have nothing to of each section the inhabitants do with those of the other. Yet another place where this survived until the Conup of where the setting period was Ardabil, stitutional (anjuman) led to violent society the Revolutionary The governor at the start of the Constituclashes. of was Sacild al-Mulk, an associate Revolution tional ruler] Mutammad cAll Mirza and him[the oppressive and The populace rose in opposition self a tyrant. council and the sent telegrams to the consultative anjuman of Tabriz urging them to insist provincial and back came a reply addressed to on his dismissal; mujtahid of Mlrza CAll Akbar Aqa, the influential revoluhim to set up a regional Qazvin, requesting Mirz& CAll Akbar Aqa assembled the tionary society. and people in the mosque and read out the telegram, However, since they convened the anjuman. together Mirza CAll Akbar Aqa belonged to the Nicmati faction, set up an anjuman of their the Haydarls indignantly of j3jjl MiLrza IbrThlm Aqa. own under the leadership gathered in their hostility, Both sides persisted every day in separate mosques and even stayed there Finally their solidarity. for meals to demonstrate the Haydaris summoned the help of the Fuladlu tribesboth of men, and the Nicmatls that of the Q6jablgl, When which were branches of the ShThiseven tribe. rode into town the two sides these reinforcements and fired on each other, which erected barricades When the in several deaths and injuries. resulted news reached Tabriz the anjuman decided to summon both Mirza cAll Akbar Aqa and Hajjl Mirza IbrThim to Arto Tabriz, and to this end sent two couriers dabil.50 the constitution to establish During the struggle Sattar Khan Sardar-i Milli decided on one in Azerbaijan, Ismacll Amir and invited Ardabil, of his journeys to visit certain on Khlzl to accompany him. Amir Khizl accepted, should not that upon impose was first they The conditions. since Haydari-NiCmati bigotry was anyone for hospitality, and if he stayed at a Nicmati household the still rife, IRANIAN STUDIES
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Vaydaris versa.51
would have nothing
more to do with him, and vice
Today there is no longer any trace of the HaydarlNicmati conflict in the major cities of Iran, most of whose inhabitants have no idea what these conflicts were. There are, however, traces of this factionalism in some small towns and villages, without the antagonists being aware of the former significance of the Haydarl and Nicmati labels they still A few examples may be given here, use. culled from interviews with village elders and other local people. In the rural community of Ardakan near Yazd, the people are still partitioned between Haydaris and Nicmatis. Informants among the present population affirm that the two factions were formerly located in two districts, the Nicmatis in one called Zardak and the Haydaris in a district three kilometers south of there called Kachlb, where the ruins of a mosque are still visible. After a qanat of sweet water was opened to the present location of Ardakan, the population of these two districts moved there, where the Haydaris founded a quarter called Mahalla-yi Bazar-i Naw, and the Nicmatis another some 500 yards distant known as Kuishk-i Naw. Their closer proximity led to increased rivalry and disputes between the factions, durespecially ing the mourning rites of Mu4arram: each has its own busaynlya (where the taCziya or passion play is performed), the members of which would assemble each ninth of Muharram in their own quarter of the town,and a number of men from each group would make the rounds of their neighborhood to collect contributions for the next day's mourning rituals. They would tour the streets with a donkey and saddlebag, clashing a pair of cymbals, and people would put what food or money they could afford into the donkey's saddlebag. While thus "making the rounds" (parsa zanl), they were not supposed to trespass into the rival quarter, and if the two parties met a fight would likely ensue. During performances of the taCziya, the drums of each husayn-iya would be beaten as loudly as possible, so as to be heard in the rival busayniya. Generally the Haydaris would make every effort to ensure that their celebration of the 153
1979 SUMMER-AUTrUMN
if, CAsh5rd was more impressive than that of the Nicmatis: four sheep, the Hayfor example, the Nicmatis sacrificed darts would slaughter more than four, or several cows inSome of the Uaydaris regarded the Nicmatis as ritustead. ally unclean (najis) and would not visit the bathhouse in Marriages were never contracted betheir neighborhood. Anyone who entered the tween Nicmati and Maydarl families. other side's lusaynlya had to demonstrate respect by kissing the kelak (a circular platform two meters high and the same diameter in the center of the husayniya, where a fire was lit to keep the enclosure warm and well lit during performances); if he refused he would be forced, a procedure that often led to bloody heads and noses. slogans. The two parties had their characteristic In reciting the conventional invocation to the family of the Prophet or writing it on a bijla (a portable memorial for a young man who has died unmarried), kIaydaris used the formula "Haydar, ~afdar, CAl,'" and the Nicmatis "Muhammad As we have seen, the Haydaris were invariably ast o CAll.' more grimly partisan in their religious and social cereScurrilous anecdotes were cirmonies than the Nicmatis. culated to demonstrate and intensify their differences. The Nicmatis, for example, maintained that it was easy to recognize a Haydarl boy: if you picked him up while he was urinating and moved him a few paces away, he would return to the same spot and carry on as beinvoluntarily such as the taboo against Some of these practices, fore. mixed marriages and the kissing of the kelak, are still prevalent in the Haydarl and Nicmati sections of ArddkanS2 Similarly, throughout the region of Julga-yi riudasht to the east of Isfahan, the Haydarl-Nicmati split in varihas a long tradition and still manifests itself ous guises. The local people themselves are unaware of its origins, but it seems certain that the factionalism between in its present form was perpetuated by rivalries Most of the peasants the landlords of different villages. have long been divided between two mutually hostile factions, as for example in the village complex of Varzana, where the split is between Upper and Lower Varzana: in there is one landowner with greater aueach sub-village IRANIAN STUDIES
154
thority than the rest who is able to enlist the support and obedience of most of the lesser landowners in his section against his adversaries in the other section of the village. Landowners who remain aloof from both factions act as spies and informers for the one or the other group. Each faction exercised an absolutely despotic authority over its adherents until quite recently, and occasional minor differences could lead to blows and full-scale fights, which were usually started (according to the informant) by known ne'er do-wells on some such pretext as abuse of water rights; their respective supporters would rush into the fray and a vicious free-for-all would ensue. Undoubtedly, these differences turned upon attempts by each party to improve access to or dominate commoneconomic or agricultural facilities. Such disputes in this region occurred once every three to six months, and normally involved only handto-hand combat with sticks, knives, cleavers, and chains, though firearms are known to have been used. These ijaydarlNicmati affrays were commonup to twenty years ago. Any prisoners taken by either side were exposed to various indignities, including being tied up in a stable and forced to eat hay. Nowadays, the violence that used to characterize this factional strife has diminished, though the problem itself has by no means entirely disagpeared, and still reveals itself in less obvious forms .5 The township of Ardakan in Fars (which was recently renamed Sapiddn) still has two of its four quarters (Qaz and CUlya) known as Haydar1 territory, and the other two (Ishaq and Ra'is Iabibulldh) as Nicmat1. The two groups are chronically at loggerheads, and their verbal altercations sometimes escalate into vicious brawls during which some of the combatants are killed or wounded, their houses and property set on fire, and considerable damage is sustained by both sides. On June 11, 1975, an incident like this resulted in one death and about 100 injuries, as well as heavy property damage on both sides. So fierce was the fighting that local security forces were unable to cope with it, and order was restored only with the arrival of a shock battalion from Shiraz. Although these fights traditionally began under the banners of the Haydarlya and NiCmatiya, each side has come to accuse the other of all 155
SUMMER-AUTUMN 1979
kinds of theft,
knavery, and corruption.54
Such were the Haydarl-Nicmati conflicts that affected the dynamics of so many communities over a long period of Iran's social evolution, and which deserve serious consideration as an important aspect of the social history of Iran. One conclusion that may be drawn here is that central rulers and local governors and magnates alike have consistently stoked the fires of this conflict, especially in periods of popular unrest and opposition to auin order to bolster their own position by divertthority, ing the course of popular rage and fragmenting a potentially united front. NOTES
1.
three E.g., I~takhrli writes of Bam: "On Fridays, mosque in the baKharijite mosques are in use--the and zaar, the Sunni mosque in the drapers' quarter,
a third one in the citadel" ed.
Iraj
[Tehran,
Afshar
wa'l-Mamia7ik,
(Al-Masilik
1957],
p. 143).
2.
fl Absan al-Taqaslm Mulbammadibn Ahmad al-Muqaddasi, ed. M. J. De Goeje (Leiden 1906), MaCrifat al-Aq3l1m,. p. 327.
3.
Mucjam al-Buldan,
Tehran,
4.
1965),
II,
ed. F. WUstenfeld pp. 893-94.
(Leipzig,1924;
Ghiyas al-Din Khwandamir, H.ablb al-Si yar fl Akhb3r Afrad
al-Bashar
(Tehran,
1955),
III,
5.
Hamdullah Mustawfl, p. 53.
6.
Ibn Batiuta,
7.
V. V. Barthold, Historico-Geographical Tarlkhi-yi Jughrafiya-yi (Tazkira-yi by H. Serdadver (Tehran 1308/1930),
IRANIAN STUlDIES
Rihla
Nuzhat
(Cairo,
156
al-Qulub
1964),
p. 2. (Tehran,
1957),
Part 1, p. 124. Survey of Iran Iran), translated p. 186
8.
See,
e.g.,
Abii Dulaf,
Safarnama
(Cairo,
n.d.),
p. 41;
MuCjam al-Buldan, ed. Wiustenfeld, I, p. 53; W. Bosworth, Mussulman Culture (Calcutta, 1934), pp. 168-
Yaqut,
69. 9.
See further Ahmad Ashraf's article "Vlzhaglha-yi tarikhi-yi shahrnishini dar Iran-i dawra-yi Islm1,'' in Nama-yi CUlum-i IjtijimaCl I, No. 4 (Tehran, 1970).
10.
Accounts of the life and works of Shah Nicmatullah Vali may be found in the following: Rasa'il-e Janabi Shah NiCmatullah Vali-yi KirmTnl , ed. J. Nfirbakhshi Kirmani, Vols. I-V (Tehran,1961-65); Dlv5n-i Shah NiCmatullah Val-, ed. M. cIlmi (Tehran, l949) ;Divani Shah NiCmatull5h (Kerman, 1957); Manuscript Vall collections of the treatises of Shah NicmatullTh Vali in the Khanaqah-i Shams al-cUrafd, the Malik Library and the National Library, in Tehran; MajmuCa-yi tarjuma-yi ahval-i Shah NiCmatull5h Val!, ed. Jean Aubin (Tehran, 1966). For the NicmatullThi order of dersee Richard Gramlich, Die Schiitischen vishes, Dervischorden Persiens (Wiesbaden, 1965: Abhandlungen fUr die Kunde des Morganlandes XXXVI; 1), pp. 27-69.
11.
Zava had not yet developed into anything resembling a town by the early 7th century A.H. (early 13th A.D.); in the geographical works prior to the Mongol invasions the cultivated area now comprising the town and its fields was included in the district of Khwaf, and only with the growth of a settlement round the nucleus of Qutb al-din Haydar's tomb did the present town, renamed for the Shaykh, come into being. See CAbd alHamid Mawlavi, Asar-i Khurasan B3stgnl-yi (Tehran, 1976), I, p. 3.
12.
Rihla, Part the Eastern
I, p.
252; cf.
Lands of Guy Le Strange, 356. In addition to this encounter, Ibn Batutta met yet another Shaykh Qutb aldin Iaydar, surnamed cAlavi, at the town of Awja in Sind, and was presented by him with an initiatory robe (khirqa) which he wore proudly until it was stolen from him by pagan Indian pirates (Rihla, Part 2, p. 8). Caliphate,
p.
157
SUMMER-AUTUMN 1979
13.
Khwandamir, IJablb al-Siyar III, p. 332. Khwdja Rukn al-din, with the laqab Shah Sanjan, was a leading poet and mystic of the 6th/14th century; see Hamdulldh Mustawfi, Tarlkh-i Guzlzda, ed. Le Strange (Leiden, 1917), p. 793; Jami, Nafahit al-Uns, ed. M. Tawhlidipar (Tehran, 1968), p. 374.
14.
ed. Dawlatshah-i Samarqandi, Tagkirat al-ShuCara', E. G. Browne (Leiden, 1898), p. 192. There is a manuscript H.aydar-nama with the title Dlvan-i Qutb aldln Haydar in the Library of the Sipahsalar Mosque at Tehran (No. 248).
15.
cAm.idal-din al-Bilad 83.
16.
al-Qazvlnl, Asar Zakariya ibn Muhammad 1969), pp. 382(Beirut,
wa Akhbar al-CIbgd
Muhammad Riza Tabatabi'l Tabriz!, (Tabriz, 1888), p. 99.
Tgrikh Awlad al-
Afhir
17.
Hafiz Husayn Karbala'i, Rawzat al-Jannat va Jannat (Tehran, 1965), pp. 467-68. Today Takya-yi Haydar is the name of a spot at the edge of the Surkhab quarter of Tabriz, where the tomb of Sultan M;r Ilaydar used to be, in or near the former Darb-i ACla The shrine was frequented by great numbers quarter. of Sufis from near and far, even from Ottoman Turkey, As an obj ect of veneraand prospered accordingly. tion to both Shicl and Sunni Muslims, it remained undamaged by zealots of either sect until the reign of He denounced the Shah CAbbas (995-1038/1587-1629). shrine as a heinous center of heresy and had it demolished. The ruins, or a part of them, were extant until the later Qajar period, but nothing of the original now remains except the name. The site has been built over, and part of the courtyard of the shrine has evidently been superseded by a street running north and south through the area (see Jacfar Sultan notes to the Raw?at al-Jannat, p. 597). al-Qar'li's Shah cAbbas' motive in reviling and destroying the tomb was probably his fear of the strength of the Shaykh's following, and his desire to divert his sub-
a1-Jinan
IRANIAN STUDIES
158
jects' veneration in the direction of Shaykh Safi and the Safavid family. This propaganda campaign is preserved in a saying still current in Tabriz: "What business has a good man with the Takya-yi Haydar?" 18.
Ibid.
19.
Qati Nuirullah Shuishtar;, 1958) II, p. 51.
20.
Ibid.,
21.
Fursat-i
22.
Mulammad Macsuim Shirazi (Mac*5mcall Shah), .Tara'iq aled. M. J. Mahjub (Tehran, 1960-66) II, p. 642. laq3'iq,
23.
Hajjl Zayn al-CAbidin Shirvan1, Riyaz A. Hamid (Tehran, 1960), p. 226.
24.
MuhammadCAll Mudarris-Tabriz1, al-Adab Ray4anat (Tehran, 1944-53) III, p. 303; Lughatnama-yi Dihkhuda Fasc. 84, p. 349, s.v. Qutb al-din Ilaydar-i Tani.
25.
MuhammadHasan Khan $anic al-dawla, Ectemad al-salNairl (Tehran, 1874) I, tana, Mirlat al-Buldan-i p. 55. The physical description of the dervishes, though attributed by the author to Chardin, appears in fact to be a slightly garbled version of Kaempfer's description (see below and note 34).
26.
I. P. Petrushevsky, Islam dar Ira-n, 3rd ed. (Tehran, 1974), pp. 366-67.
27.
Mawland Suncullah NicmatullThi, al-Ayyam Saw5nii fi Mushahadat al-ACv5m (Bombay 1307/1883), p. 5. See also the article by iamid Farzam, "Ikhtilafat-i Jimi ba Shah Vall,"' in Nashrlya-yi Danishkada-yi Adab7yit-i Ilfah3n, No. 1 (1964), pp. 48-57, and the Danishgah-i same writer's book Shah Val.- va DaCvl -yl Mahdavlyat (Isfahan, 1979); Farzam establishes on the evidence
Majalis
al-Mu'minln
(Tehran,
p. 82. Shirazi,
Asar
al-CAjam
159
(Bombay, 1934),
al-Siyaha,
tr.
p. 73.
ed.
K. Kishavarz,
1979 SUMMER-AUTUtMN
of the poetry and other works of Shah NiCmatullTh Val he was a Sunni. that, contrary to general assumption, II,
p. 82.
28.
Shuishtar1,
29.
From the time of Shaykh Haydar, the father of Isma-there arose in several I Safavi (907-930/1502-24), sect known of Anatolia an extreme Shilite provinces as Ijaydariya, which is not the same as our Iaydariya. the killwere they that they considered So fanatical as the slaying ing of one Sunnite to be as meritorious of five pagans, and held that the divine in battle in in cAll, and ultimately nature had been incarnated Zindig3nithe Safavid Haydar (see Naarulldh Falsafl, V, pp. 32Avval, [Tehran, 1956-76], yi Shah CAbbas-i 34).
al-Mu'minTn
Majalis
Cl
Selebi, 1956),
ed. N. Lugal
A.
30.
Sa'di Taci-zgde Erzi (Istanbul,
31.
D'Alessandri," "Narrative of the Most Noble Vicentio Travels of Italian tr. Charles Gray, in A Narrative (London, 1873), Hakluyt Society Ser. 1, in Persia appear The names of the factions Vol. 49, p. 224. which forms are howand Himcaivatu, here as Nausitai than many others of D'Alessanever more recognizable His statement of Persian names. dri's transcriptions in Qazvin resident that when Shah Tahmasb was still between 1524 and about 1533) the feud had al(i.e., years lends support to the view ready lasted thirty of the that it probably predated the establishment See also Jean Chardin, Voyages (AmSafavid dynasty. sterdam, 1711) II, p. 316.
32.
Jean Baptiste I, p. 396.
33.
Chardin,
34.
VIII,
Munaeat,
28. p. n
Tavernier,
pp.
11,
Les Six
(Paris,
1677)
13.
GrossKaempfer, Am Hofe des Persischen by W. Hinz (Leipzig,1940), German edition This description appears to have found 110-11.
Engelbert konigs,
pp.
Voyages
IRANIAN STUDIES
160
its way in part and note 25).
into
the
Mir'at
35.
D'Alessandri,
36.
Pietro
37.
Quoted in Nasrulldh Falsafi, Zindaganl-yi i Avval (Tehran, 1344) II, p. 328.
38.
Kaempfer,
Tadeusz
VIII,
above
p. 13. 1'Egypte, et autres
Shach CAbbAs-
Judasz
Krusinski, The History of the Late (London 1750), I, p. 91. This was copied by Hanway (An Historical of the Account British Trade over the Caspian Sea, London, 1753, III, p. 32)--somewhat inaccurately, as the names of the factions appear here as Peleuk and Feleuk; it is also cited by Browne (Literary of Persia, History IV, p. 119 and note). We are unable to throw any light on the terms Pelenk and Felenk.
39.
Ibid .,
40.
Kaempfer,
of
pp.
Persia
91-93. p. 111.
Nadir Mtrza Qajar, Tabriz
Sallana-yi 42.
Chardin,
della Valle, Voyages dans la Turquie, la Palestine, la Perse, les Indes orientales lieux (Rouen, 1745) III, p. 42.
Revolutions
41.
ibid.;
(see
al-Buld3n
"'...
bezanid
anecdote heard it
Tarlkh (Tehran,
pidar-i
va Jughrafiya--yi
Nicmatlha
1972), dar
Dar al-
p. 192. artd!"
I owe this
to my friend the poet CAll MazThirl, from a village headman of Isfahan.
who
I, p. 388.
43.
Tavernier,
44.
Chardin,
VII,
45.
Chardin,
II,
46.
Ha-ijji Mtrza Hasan Husayni Fasal', Farsnama-yi (Shiraz, 1933), II, p. 22. Note that Fasa'l's graphical location of the factions is opposite
pp.
12-13.
p. 316.
161
Na.-ir7
geoto
SUMMER-AUTUMN 197-9
that of Chardin (VIII, p. 11), who places the Nicmatulin the eastern half and the Haydaris in the westlhis of Isfahan. half ern 47.
Robert Watson, A History p.
48.
of
Persia
(London, 1866),
110.
Tazkirat Sayyid CAbdullah DaCl-yi Dizffll, (Ahwaz, 1826), passim.
al-Akhyar
wa MajmaC al-Abrar
(London, 1829),
49.
Sir John Malcolm, History II, p. 429.
50.
AhmadKasravi, Tarikh-i Mashruta-yi Tehran, 1974), pp. 195-97.
51.
Ismacll Amirkhlzl, Qiyanm-i Azarbayjan (Tabriz, 1960), p. 411.
52.
This information was supplied by Muhammad Uusayn Ansarl Ardakn-1, a history student at the University of Isfahan.
53.
The materials relating to Julga-yi Rii-dasht were supplied by Nadir cAli Nazirian Jazzi, a geography student at the University of Isfahan.
54.
Reported by Majid Hdshimi Ardakani, local high school This place is not the Ardakan of Yazd menteacher. tioned above.
IRANIAN STUDIES
162
of Persia
Iran
(10th ed.;
va Sattar
Khln
Iranian Studies, Volume XII, Nos. 3-4, Summer-Autumn1979
U.S. Military Missions To Iran, 1943-1978: The Political Economy of MilitaryAssistance Thomas M. Ricks "Aid to Iran is not recommended primarily because Iran needs economic aid, but because it offers the most effective means of forcing the Iranians in spite of themselves to put their house in order." Mr. McGhee to the Secretary of State, UM D-97, Relations of the United April 21, 1950 in Foreign States: 1950, Volume V (Washington, D.C., 1978), p.
516.
"The largest, most pervasive source of technical assistance, on manpower problems was the United States foreign aid program, both civilian and
Thomas M. Ricks is Assistant Georgetown University.
Professor
of History
at
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 13th Annual Middle East Studies Association Meeting, November 1979, Salt Lake City, Utah, and at the 12th Annual Association of Arab-American University Graduates, November 1979, Washington, D.C. A lengthier version of the present article will be published in a forthcoming volume by A.A.U.G., U.S. in the Middle East Intervention (1981).
163
1979 STUMMER-AiUTUMN
There was hardly an agency or program military. of the Iranian Government concerned with training or education that did not have its Point IV exgroup." George Baldwin, perts or U.S. contract and Development in Iran (New York, 1967), Planning p. 145. is all U.S. foreign assistance "Taken on balance, or paramilitary in nature, even military ultimately its ostensibly economic aid: it is designed prito support a marily to enable foreign countries capable of saving the superstructure military United States the cost of having to provide miliMichael with its own armed forces." tary service Economy of Foreign Aid," Hudson, "The Political in The Myth of Aid, by Denis Goulet and Michael Hudson (New York, 1971), p. 80'. From the months of May to November 1942, the United States Department of State and the Iranian Government conof agreements on the sending of American adcluded a series Three missions were designed to leave imvisors to Iran. in obtaining the difficulties for Iran despite mediately In October in the midst of World War II. skilled personnel 1942, Major General Clarence S. Ridley arrived in Tehran as of General John Greely to the Iranian advisor and successor Army; Colonel H. Norman Schwarzkopf, along with Lieutenant as adColonel Philip T. Boone, and Captain William Preston, visors to the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie, had preceded mission having arrived in August 1942, while Dr. Ridley's Arthur C. Millspaugh soon followed in January 1943, with all fields of in "virtually as advisors six assistants The three American advifinance."11 Iranian governmental to warsory teams were only the beginning of such missions time and post-World War II Iran. and financial The nature and purposes of the military of Ridley, Schwarzkopf, and Millspaugh were, in the missions to the needs of the various Aldirectly short term, related Nazi war Germany in the Middle East, efforts against lied IRANIAN STUlDrES
164
such as to the Cairo-based and British-operated Middle East Supply Center and to the Persian Gulf and American-operated Persian Gulf Service Command. The latter was under the command of General Donald H. Connolly. The long-term purpose of the three missions, to the however, related directly United States-Iran post-World War II relations. Wallace Murray, Chief of the Division of the Near Eastern Affairs and later Ambassador to Iran remarked in August 1942, that "we shall soon be in the position of actually 'running' Iran through our impressive body of American advisers eagerly sought by the Iranian Government and urgently recommended by the British Government."2 More explicit than Murray was the October 1942 letter from Sumner Welles, the Under Secretary of State, to President Roosevelt in which he detailed six missions including those of Ridley, Schwarzkopf, and Millspaugh noting the special of General Ridsignificance ley's military mission: The work of these various missions will be of great benefit since the officers and experts we have sent to Iran will not only be able to exert considerable personal influence upon Iranian opinion in a sense favorable to the general cause of the United Nations, but they will also be able to assist in the rehabilitation of the country which would seem to be a fundamental requisite for the ultimate conversion of Iran into an active and willing partner on our side. I feel now more than ever that the United States Army mission to work with the Iranian Army could in fact play an extremely important role in this work.3 Correspondence between the Department of State and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning other American missions referred to wide-ranging requests for specialists in entomology, rubber cultivation and municipalities, an advisor for the Iranian National Bank (Bank Melli), a teacher of mechanics for agricultural schools, a specialist in artesian-well drilling, engineers for agricultural "and an American to lead the Boy Scout movement irrigation in Iran"! While considered "less important Iranian requests," the 1942 shopping list for American assistance did embrace 165
SUMMER-AUTUMN 1979
every phase of Iranian governmental and financial practically to Iran's rural and urban police, in addition institutions Unlike most missions, forces. and military paramilitary, however, the Ridley Mission to the Iranian Army and the or Gendarmerie conSchwarzkopf Mission to the rural police, tinued well beyond the end of World War II; the Millspaugh firms and the Mission was continued via American consulting Plan Organization. the history of to periodize therefore, It is possible, according to the origin of the mission, U.S. -Iran relations of the United States interests to the economic and political and military within Iran and the region and to the political of American global interests: exigencies 1.
1943
to 1946.
World War II, Iran as "bridge to victory," and and the 1944 to 1946 oil concessions Azerbaijan Crisis.
Mission in 1943. GENMISH/Gendarmerie Military U.S. Army Mission of Generals Wheeler, Greely and Ridley in 1942. Persian Gulf Service Commandof General Donald H. Connolly in 1943. American Financial Mission of Dr. Arthur C. Millspaugh in 1943. 2.
1947
to 1949.
Truman Doctrine in 1947, Marshall Plan in for Europe in 1948, CIA established 1947, NATOin 1949, Point Four in 1949, and Iran's Seven-Year Plan in 1949.
ARMISH/U.S. Army Military 3.
1950
to 1962.
Mission
in 1947.
Korean War in 1950, CIA coup in 1953, SAVAKin 1957, Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957, CENTOin 1958, Harvard Advisory Group, 1958 to 1962.
Advisory Group in 1950. MAAG/Military Assistance from 19S8 to 1962. consolidation ARMISH-MAAG Advisors, Extraterritorial Legal Status to U.S. Military 1962-1964. IRANIAN STUDIES
166
4.
1963 to 1978.
Viet Nam War in 1965, National liberation movements in Africa and Asia, Shah's in 1963, June Upris"White Revolution" ing in 1963, rise of Iranian guerrilla movements from 1963-1965, Nixon-Kissinger Doctorine of 1969, Events of 1973 (in arms sales begun, in March, $5 billion June, Lt. Colonel Hawkins is killed, in and in December, October, oil price rise, Iranian troops in Dhofar, Oman).
TAFT/Technical "White-collar"
Assistance mercenaries
Field Teams in 1973. to Iran, 1973 to 1978.
The wartime "running" of Iran noted by Wallace Murray was only part of the hope that Iran would become "an active and willing partner on our side" according to Sumner Welles. The feeling expressed by the Under Secretary of State that "the United States Army mission to work with the Iranian Army could in fact play an extremely important role in this and ominous. work" was both prophetic In either case. Welles could not have foreseen all the implications of his insight. The hope he expressed would not result, however, in a partnership with the Iranian people but in an alliance with the the Iranian population, monarchy against nor in any noticeable improvement for the majority but only in the improvement of the elite and emerging "middle class" minority. To a considerable extent, the U.S. military missions to Iran contributed as much to the restructuring of the economy for and by agribusiness and the multinationals, the expanding of the monarchy, and ultimately dictatorship to the Iranian of 1978-1979 as had the CIA-supported coup against Revolution the popular Mossadegh Government of 1953. The escalation of U.S. military missions from 1943 to 1978 cum economic and on the part of the United States governmilitary assistance mental, military, and intelligence agencies is an excellent barometer of increased U.S. intervention in Iran and, proportionately, the increased militant resistance by the maof Iranian people. jority The military missions of 1943 to 1978 were an intervention of another kind. According to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes in a letter to the Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson, on October 17, 1945, 167
SUMMER-AUTU1MN 1979
the issue of the U.S. military missions in Iran was critical for the post-World War II U.S. foreign policy: Continuance of the Military Missions to Iran, at the request of the Iranian Government, is considered to be in the national interest of the United States. Strengthening of Iran's internal security forces by the American Missions contributes to the stabilization of Iran and, thereby, to its reconstruction as community. By a sound member of the international increasing the ability of the Iranian Government to it is hoped to remove maintain order and security, any pretext for British or Soviet intervention in of Iran, Iran's internal affairs... .The stabilization moreover, will serve to lay a sound foundation for the development of American commercial, petroleum, in the Middle East.4 and aviation interests
I On November 27, 1943, the United States agreed to October 2, 1942, send a U.S. Army mission to Iran effective "to advise and assist the Ministry of Interior in the reorganization of the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie" with the U.S. officers maintaining "precedence over all Iranian Gendarmerie officers of the same rank."5 The Minister of Interior was charged with appointing the chief of the Mission "as head of the Imperial Organization of the Iranian Gendarmerie" from the American officers also to maintain rank "precedence over all officers of the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie. "6 According to Article 20 of the November Agreement, the American chief of the Mission was also granted the right to recommend to the Iranian Minister of Interior "the appointment, promotion, demotion, or dismissal of any employee of the Gendarmerie" with no other auFinally, Iran thority having "the right to interfere."7 will serve in countries of other agreed that no officers States of the United military members while the Gendarmerie mission were engaged.
IRANIAN STUDIES
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The November Agreement of 1943 concluded the establishment of GENMISH,or Gendarmerie Military Mission; a mission first mentioned in State Department diplomatic records on January 6, 1942, in response to a request from Iran for an advisor to their police force. It was then mentioned on several occasions between January and October 1942 that an advisor to the Iranian police was desirable for the Wheeler Mission of December, 1941, for that mission's of transport to the Soviet Union, and as "a valuable supplies source of information to our legation at Tehran regarding the conditions in Iran."'8 While the powers granted to GENMISHin November 1943, were not only advisory but also executive, the uses of the mission and its personnel were not limited to the wartime allied effort of "bridge to victory." GENMISH became a target of increasing opposition by Iranians for its "intelligence" as well as for its "executive" activities function within the Iranian Government. The principal object of both popular and organized opposition was Colonel H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the first chief of GENMISH. Wallace Murray, State Department's Advisor on Political Relations, described Colonel Schwarzkopf's qualifications to Louis Dreyfus, the U.S. Minister in Iran in an August 24, 1942 letter. Murray stated that Schwarzkopf was "exceptionally qualified for the job" due to his his fifteen personality, years of experience as "founder and head of the New Jersey State Police" and as a graduate of West Point recently returned to the regular Army.9 With his equally qualified assistances, Lieutenant Colonel Philip T. Boone and Captain William Preston, Schwarzkopf spent June and July 1942 in Washington, D.C. preparing for the Mission's August departure. In the meantime, State Department informed Dreyfus in Tehran that L. Stephen Timmerman was preparing to leave for Iran in September 1942, as City Police Advisor while Schwarzkopf was assigned to the rural police, or Gendarmerie; the January 1942 job request ultimately was divided between Timmerman and Schwarzkopf. Along with Timmerman, James P. Sheridan was also being sent in September 1942 as the Food and Supply Advisor. of the two American advisors The arrival did not however prevent the December 1942 "bread riots" in Tehran; Timmerman even reported that the Tehran police handled themselves 169
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well. Colonel Schwarzkopf's Mission in August 1942, defined in October 1942, and finally confirmed officially in November 1943, also did not prevent tribal or peasant uprisings from occurring. The overall affect of GENMISH was long-term while the political and popular suspicions and opposition were felt almost immediately. From 1942 to 1946, Schwarzkopf and his assistants reorganized, trained, armed, and commandedIran's 20,000 rural police/paramilitary force from the Gendarmerie headquarters in Tehran. By March 1943, Schwarzkopf and his assistants had submitted a 200-page reorganization plan of the Gendarmerie to the Ministry of Interior with considerable detail on "basic and staff organization" as well as "district and regimental organization." Hindered at that time by his "unofficial" advisory status due to the delays in formalization of his mission, Schwarzkopf had already found his relationship with certain Iranian military a difficult one. In March, 1943, for example, General Aghevli, head of the Gendarmerie, encouraged his subordinates to "withhold action" with Schwarzkopf, failed to support the carried on a whisper campaign against Mission's suggestions, the U.S. advisor, and withheld vital information from Schwarzkopf and his assistants.10 While the November 27, 1943 GENMISH Agreement solved Schwarzkopf's chain-of-command problems by giving him "executive" power and placing the Gendarmerie under the Ministry of Interior, the Shah and the Iranian Army commandwere greatly displeased with the arrangement. According to the Office of Strategic Services, the Shah was "incensed" at the granting of "very broad powers" to Schwarzkopf while Generals Riazi, Razmara, Ansari, and Hedayat (former and future Ministers of War and Chiefs of Staff) continued to work for the return of the Gendarmerie to the Army's control.11 Despite the formidable opposition from within Iran, however, the unflagging support from State Department and to carry Schwarzkopf's GENMISH Allied Commandwas sufficient through the war not only as an "independent" police/paramilitary unit but also as one of the most successful "advisory" missions to Iran. The successful reorganization, recruitment, and training programs were noticed particularly IRANIAN STUDIES
170
by Sir Clarmont P. Skrine. His April 1943 visits from Mashhad, capital city of the northeastern province of Khurasan, the "scale and comprehento Tehran brought to his attention of the American intervention" siveness by the Spring of 1943. After noting the work of the Persian Gulf Command, General Ridley's Mission to the Iranian Army, and other American missions to police administration, irrigation, agricultural education, and public health, Skrine then wrote: By far the most successful, however, of the missions sent by the U.S. to help Persia in her war-time plight was that
of
Col.
H. Norman Schwarzkopf
....
His
assign-
ment was to reorganize the Gendarmerie, which he and his team of handpicked American officers did most thoroughly and in a remarkably short time.12 By 1944, the Schwarzkopf mission along with General Ridley's Iranian Army advisory mission had "stabilized" Iran' s In two 1944 intelligence rural and urban areas. reports from Cairo and from Tehran, the coordination between the Ridley as well as the noticeable and Schwarzkopf missions improvement in both the Army and the Gendarmerie were stressed. In November 1943, and again in March 1944, the Soviet military notified Colonel Schwarzkopf of its intention of withdrawing Russian troops along Iran's northwestern border from Maku to Mahabad; a border separating northern Iranian Kurdistan from Iraqi and Turkish Kurdistan. Schwarzkopf proposed a plan to place six battalions of Iranian Army in "base camps to guarantee quiet along the border where the armed Kurds form a great majority of the population" while nine companies (of about 150 men each) of Gendarmerie "patrol the roads and village posts.",13 The general purpose of the Schwarzkopf plan was to use the Iranian Army to subdue the region by disarming the Kurds and setting up base camps. The Gendarmerie "can only maintain security after the area is put under control of the army."14 The incident is noteworthy in explaining the role of the Iranian rural police/paramilitary as envisaged by Schwarzkopf at the time of Soviet occupation of Azerbaijan and during the period of increased Kurdish nationalism. In the end, however, while the Soviets twice proposed to aban171
1979 SUMMER-AUTU7MN
border area in Iranian Kurdistan to Iranidon the strategic the Soviet proforces, and police/paramilitary an military plans came to naught due posal and Colonel Schwarzkopf's by the Shah reception to "a very half-hearted principally pique The earlier General Riazi'"15 and the Chief of Staff, of the Gendarmerie from the Ministry of over the separation powers granted to Schwarzkopf acWYarand the "executive" reception. that of much for counted Attache in the United In December 1944, the Military "rebellious States Embassy in Tehran reported that despite of the country," Allied tribesmen in various remote sections government's the central will not affect troop withdrawals improved Gendardue to "the Army and the greatly stability further that General Ridley's The Report states merie."16 concerned with immission "of an advisory nature primarily of the Iranian Army" functioning proving the administrative has improved the Army as "the main bulwark of the central of the Shah"; Colonel Schwarzgovernment, and particularly briin discouraging effect kopf's mission "has a definite along the routes" and gandage and in promoting security factor in maintainis also "a decided strength therefore The Reand law and order in the country."17 ing stability port concluded that "the Army and Gendarmerie are capable or rebeldisorders putting down any tribal of eventually with any disof dealing effectively [and]...capable lions which may break out in urban centers."'18 orders or violence movements for autonThe Turkish and Kurdish national omy in 1946, the Soviet delays in troop withdrawal from of the Tudeh activism Northern Iran, and the heightened to the central (Masses) Party of Iran were all challenges to government and to the Shah; they were also challenges interin general and the United States' Allied interests While the Iranian Parliament strugests in particular. gled with the Tudeh Party, Allied and Soviet oil concesand trained the American-organized and Azerbaijan, sions, in the reinstrumental Army and Gendarmerie were clearly The observations of those issues of 1944 to 1946. solution In instructive. of Sir Clarmont Skrine are particularly that: he states back upon 1946, reflecting
IRANIAN
STUDIES
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the finanIt was the vigorous American intervention, and gendarmerie Missions cial, military [of Millsthe apparent U.S. paugh, Ridley, and Schwarzkopfl, drive to capture the Persian market, and above all of Socony-Vacuum and Shell to oil-prosthe efforts pecting rights that changed the Russians in Persia if not ento cold-war rivals, from hot-war allies Gendarmerie and the emies.. .Colonel Schwarzkopf's and armament of the regular improved discipline troops were two of the best cards in the Prime Minister's hand.19 II or ARMISH On October 6, 1947, the U.S. Army Mission, became the official military mission to the Iranian Army the limited advisory mission of General Clarence succeeding to Ridley and the Chief of the S. Ridley. As the successor mission, General Robert W. Grow became the new head of ARMISH Mission Military in Tehran with the signing of the U.S.-Iran of Agreement. The purpose was to enhance "the efficiency with the Ministry of the Iranian Army" through cooperation War and the Iranian Army command. The American officers, were asby Iran and the United States, approved jointly signed to the Advisory Department of the Iranian Ministry of War; a department under the command of the American chief of mission. The officers were to maintain their rank held in the U.S. Army with "precedence over all Iranian Army ofof the same rank" while executing their mission "to ficers respect the Ministry of War of Iran...with advise and assist to plans, problems concerning organization, administrative The American officers' methods.".20 principles and training duties involved the General Staff and all departments of and stratethe Ministry of War in Tehran "except tactical enemy, which against a foreign gical plans or operations As with to the duties of the Mission.",21 are not related the GENMISHAgreement of November 1943, the ARMISHAgreement bound the Government of Iran to consultation with the United States on the employment of any personnel "of other foreign government for duties for any nature connected with the Iranian Army.",22
173
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by necessitated In 1949, a number of alterations, the replacement of the War Department by the Departments of Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force, occurred in the ARMISHAgreement. The principal change was the inclusion of the phrase "United States Air Force" along with the United States Army into the original text thus expanding The Army the Mission's officers corps. (and clarifying) and Air Force Mission to the Iranian Army continued to be called ARMISHeven after the 1958 to 1962 consolidation Advisory Group; from Assistance with MAAG,or Military to were referred 1962 to 1978, the two advisory missions
the same functions and carried essentially as ARMISH-MAAG prescribed until the February 1979 collapse of originally the Pahlavi monarchy and the Imperial Guard. The principal reasons, according to the State De(1) were threefold: partment, for the creation of ARMISH the "extension of the Truman Doctrine" to include Iran as and strategic sense, a "bastion in both the political the virtuwhich, if breached, would create a situation, ally inevitable result of which would be Soviet domination of the entire Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East"23; (2) the inclusion of Iran in a military assistance program similar to Korea and the Philippines in 1947; and (3) the continuation of U.S. military assistance "aimed at internal security, not national defense, of Iran."'24 The combination of strategic position on the Soviet periphery, an oil-based economy favorable to the credit and loan arrangeand DeBank for Reconstruction ments of the International velopment (IBRD), or "World Bank," and a history of politiindependence against the monarchy for national cal struggle
and foreign Ridley's in 1947.
capital
advisory
necessitated mission
the changes from General
of 1942 to General
Grow's ARMISH
Along with ARMISH,moreover, State Department continually prescribed social and economic reforms in place of an expanding military and police budget which limited found in the limitations economic development; internal The first step towards Marshall Plan for European recovery. such reforms was made on December 17, 1946, when Iran signed with an American firm, Morrison-Knudsen Internaa contract IRANIAN STUDIES
174
tional Engineering Company. The firm, also under contract was to survey Iran's economic potentials with Afghanistan, and prepare a report within six months; the cost of the surseemed adequate to cover the expenses of vey ($100,000) Iran's irrigation, seven or eight experts to investigate dams, agriculture, transportation, power and fuel, industry, mining and communication in order to secure loans from ExBank or World Bank.25 port-Import The July 1947 Report on Programs for the Development of Iran by Morrison-Knudsen recommended concentration on agriculture, then roads, railways, sea and air ports, and a private Persian oil company. While the Prime Minister's Permanent Commission headed by Dr. Ali Amini revised the Report by 1949, State Department discussions with Morrison-Knudsen, and World Bank continued into August, 1948, until it was agreed that further recommendations on Iran's economic and social be made conditions by another survey team. On October 7 , 1948, Overseas Consultants', Inc., or with Iran to conduct another survey OCI, signed a contract of its economic and social the American enconditions; in OCI had completed surveys firms participating gineering in post-World War II Germany and Japan. An associate of the Standard group of oil companies, OCI was chaired by the former vice-president of California Texas Oil Company and former petroleum advisor to the State Department, Max Weston Thornburg. Like many other American "oil men," Thornburg held executive in oil corporations positions at the same the State Department on its post-World War II time advising oil policy.26 He also became, like men such as Torkild Rieber, George C. McGhee, A. A. Curtice, Herbert Hoover, Jr., and Walter Levy, intimately involved in the "reconstruction and development" of Middle Eastern countries; in the case of Thornburg and the others noted above, all were in Iran's economic and political closely involved development during the crucial years of 1945 to 1955. At the same time, Thornburg and the other "oil men" were advising State Department, private consulting firms, World Bank, and even Iran itself.27 Due to his 1940 to 1943 advising to State Department and his consulting for Iran's Supreme Planning Council in 1946 to 1948, Max Thornburg not only suggested the hiring of Morrison-Knudsen, he also headed and promoted 175
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the Overseas
Consultants,
Inc.
in 1948.
of State Dean AcheOn September 22, 1949, Secretary Husson wrote the Iranian Ambassador to the United States, both economic and military sein Ala, that Iran would receive in agriculture, advisors technical including assistance under training and industrial education, public health, Furthermore, Achethe Smith-Mundt and Point Four programs. son noted: It is the opinion of this Government that early implementation of the Seven-Year Program by the Government availpresently of Iran through the use of resources the means of raising able to it is the next possible thereby of the Iranian people, standard of living to the aggression to Iran's resistance contributing mentioned in the Ambassador's note under reference.28 assurance of support for the oil-revenue The Secretary's based and World Bank funded Seven-Year Plan in order to conwas simito Soviet aggression to Iran's resistance tribute to lar to Ambassador John C. Wiley's August 1949 letter Acheson concerning ARMISHand the purposes of Secretary Noting the Assistance Program (MAP) to Iran. the Military to Iran and the importance of the U.S. Advisory missions need for MAP, Wiley pointed out that: No one imagines that now or in future Iranian Army As we understand it, could prevent Soviet invasion. point of view is to inobject of MAP from military and to increase cost of invasure internal security and and time required, sion in terms of personnel some form assistance to maintain with tribal possible in southern mounof prolonged resistance particularly tains.29 that the U.S. military Two events in 1950 indicated to Iran were undergoing a third phase of developmissions Program In May 1950, the Mutual Defense Assistance ment. Assistance and the Military Advisory Group, or MAAGwere In was to implement the former. the latter established; October 1950, the Technical Cooperation Mission to Iran, IRANIAN STUDIES
.176
or "Point Four" was signed into force by the United States and Iran. As with ARMISHand the Seven-Year Plan between 1947 and 1949, the MAAGand Point Four agreements were further commitments to Iran's "stability" and "internal security"; that is, commitments to the increase of capitalintensive development and the preservation of the monarchy. Such a policy meant, in time, a collision and confrontation
with every national movement for change and labor-intensive development towards self-reliance. Such changes and developments, moreover, were consistently flagged as "evidence" of Soviet infiltration and thus opposed from the beginning by the State Department and multinational corporations. "Hence," according to Gabriel Kolko, "nationalism and modest but enuine reform were quite as great an enemy as bolshevism.50 III In comparison with GENMISH and ARMISH,the Military Assistance Advisory Group, or MAAG was by far the most important U.S. military mission to Iran. MAAG,like the previous missions, strengthened the existing military command structure as well as increased the efficiency of the Army and Gendarmerie through training programs and arms purchases. Unlike the previous missions, however, MAAG facilitated extensive military and financial assistance, created new military and paramilitary commandstructures and participated in commercial as well as governmental arms sales. From 1953 to 1979, MAAG became involved in every branch of Iran's military and police forces and affected nearly every facet of Iran's
economy.
As a result
of MAAG, Iran was finally
and firmly placed in the same U.S. military assistance category as Greece and Turkey after years of vacillation on State Department's part as to whether Iran belonged with the Eastern Mediterranean countries or with the East Asian nations of Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Iran's regional position became defined more clearly than ever before with the establishment of MAAG in 1950, and Iran assumed greater importance in such alliances as the 1955 Baghdad Pact and the 1958 Central Treaty Organization. To a considerable extent, the U.S. military missions "came 177
SUMMER-AUTUMN 1979
of age" with the establishment " "regional influential.
and Iran became a of MAAG
On May 23, 1950, the U.S.-Iran Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was signed and the Military Assistance the Agreement bound Essentially, Advisory Group created. the United States to grant to Iran "such equipment, materias the Government of the United States als, and services of the subject to the terms and conditions may authorize" Iran In return, Act of 1949.31 Mutual Defense Assistance 4, that: agreed, according to Article The Government of Iran, after giving due considerafor domestic use and requirements tion to reasonable commercial export of Iran, which are to be determined agrees to faciliby the Iranian Government itself, export and transfer transport, tate the production, to the Government of the United States of America, and upon for such period of time, in such quantities
such terms and conditions as to the value, method of payment, et cetera, as may be agreed upon, of raw and materials required by the Uni'ted States semi-processed or potential of deficiencies of America as a result and which may be in its own resources, deficiencies in Iran.32 available
Finally, in order to implement the Agreement and to faciliMAAG was created as "technitate the military assistance, cal personnel" according to Article 7 with a permanent status in Iran. rested on its function of The importance of MAAG providing technical advice on new arms purchases, new training projects and related equipment maintenance programs as prescribed by expanding U.S. military and economic assistance. Secondly, MAAG'stasks were tied to a new form of military aid, that is, to the military grant based on Iran's natural resources, primarily oil, not just loans as in the was thus much more than MAAG previous MAParrangements. was from the outset a an advisory support mission; MAAG part of a long-term military sales program involving the sophisticated training and maintenance of increasingly IRANIAN STUDIES
178
as well as those of weaponry in defense of NATO interests assistance The military the United States and Iran.33 program which MAAGadministered, moreover, was possible only in exchange for Iran's raw materials and semi-processed goods. and Iranian military The monarchy, ruling families, and manufactured had thus mortgaged key Iranian resources in exchange for their own future goods as well as processes In the midst of increasand, they believed, that of Iran. Oil ing difficulties with England over the Anglo-Iranian Company and with the Soviet Union over the American adviand the American sory missions, American oil interests, of the Mutual supported Seven-Year Plan, Iran's signature Defense Assistance Agreement might be interpreted as Iran's of the British-Russian leap out of the stranglehold rivalry and an embrace of a "neutral power"; many interpret the that manner. events of 1950 to 1962 in precisely However, the increasing not decreasing cooperation between England and the United States on the one hand, and, the increasing hostility between the Soviet Union and the United States on the other, partially revealed an aggressive global foreign policy in Washington, D.C. Other evidence of the assertive post-World War II role of the United States in Iran, to the Truman Doctrine, the ARMISHAgreement, in addition the May 1950 and Iran's Seven-Year Plan, was certainly of exchanging resources MAAGMission and the beginnings and semi-processed goods for arms; an exchange so clearly teams throughpart of the later MAAGand other assistance out the 1970s. In October 1950, therefore, the signing of a civilian another technical assistance program, albeit not military to observers. one, came as no surprise The Technical Cooperation Mission, or, as it was popularly known, "Point Four, " was like MAAGa grant program of technical aid in exchange for Iranian skilled labor and the use of local resources. By January 1952, Point Four was ready to begin its technical mission in earnest under the directorassistance ship of William E. Warne with a grant of $23 million; the mission was considered "as a part of the diplomatic mission....for the purpose of enjoying the privileges and im179
1979 SUMMER-AUTUMN
Warne, whose role munities accorded to that mission."34 from 1951 to 1955 as the first country director, is well described in his own personal account, stated that "fundamentally, Point 4 was designed to help strengthen Iran's integrity."35 economy and to help underwrite her political State Department, furthermore, spoke of the relationship between Point Four and private investment when it noted that: Private investment from the United States can thus make a fundamental contribution to economic development abroad. However, in relation to United States income and savings and in relation to the need for American development capital abroad, recent levels of net private capital flow abroad seem low. It is apparent that the rate at which United States private capital is invested abroad will need to be greater than at present, and that capital will need to flow areas of investment if substaninto more diversified tial progress toward the objectives of Point Four Program is to be made.36 Finally, while describing the twofold character of Point and managerial knowledge as scientific Four, as technical, President well as the creation of productive enterprises, Truman wrote in his June 24, 1949 message to Congress that: Technical assistance is necessary to lay the groundInvestment, in turn, work for productive investment. In general, brings with it technical assistance. however, technical surveys of resources and of the of economic development must precede possibilities Furthermore, in substantial capital investment. many of the areas concerned, technical assistance communications, or educain improving sanitation, tion is required to create conditions in which capital investment can be fruitful.37 MAAG and Point Four in Iran were, therefore, related not only to military assistance and rural improvement but also to American capital investment in Iran's economy for American corporate interests and the monarchy's "integrity." IRANIAN STUDIES
180
the grants of While a trusted ally of the United States, aid to Iran were nonetheless limited and under Embassy conor the "eye dropper" technique. trol, In a detailed memorandam on the "Political and Economic Factors Involved in Military to Iran in FY 1951," the State DepartAssistance ment stated that: of our policy toward Iran is The primary objective to prevent its domination by Soviet Russia, and to its orientation strengthen toward the West. Our policy lays first emphasis on economic and social development to strengthen the country's resistance to communism. Principal reliance in this connection is placed upon the Iranian seven-year program which is expected to draw largely upon the country's own financial resources for its implementation. American aid to Iran in the economic and social fields, as now planned, will be confined to technical assistance under the Point Four, Smith-Mundt and Fulbright program. A second facet to the implementation of our policy is to develop Iranian and power to resist self-confidence by providing assistance under MAP.38 military In May 1954, Major General George C. Stewart of the U.S. Army and Director of the Office of Military Assistance in the Pentagon, testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that: I think it can be said - and I do say it - that if it had not been for what the MAAGand the Army mission had done in creating confidence and friendship among the Iranian armed forces, that Iran today would be behind the Iron Curtain.39 General Stewart, in describing in detail the events of August 19, 1953, and the part played by MAAGin the overthrow of Mossadegh's Government, testified: Now when this crisis came on and the thing was about to collapse, we violated our normal criteria and among the other things we did, we provided the army 181
SU7MMER-AU1TUJMN 197.9
immediately on an emergency basis blankets, boots, generators, and medical supplies uniforms, electric that permitted and created an atmosphere in which they could support the Shah.... The guns that they had in their hands, the trucks that they rode in, the armored cars that they drove through the streets, and the radio communications that permitted their control, were all furnished through the military defense assistance program... had it not been for this program, a government unfriendly to the United States probably would now be in power.40 While the testimony of General Stewart confirmed the short-term importance of ARMISHand MAAG,Senator Hubert statement of April 1961 demonHumphrey's frequently-quoted strated the overall effect of twenty years of military and to ARMISH-MAAG. police assistance programs from GENMISH In reacting to a statement from an Iranian general, Senator Humphreyexclaimed: Do you know what the head of the Iranian Army told He said the Army was in good one of our people. shape, thanks to US aid - it was now capable of That Army coping with the civilian population. It's planning Russians. to the fight isn't going to fight the Iranian people.41 Between 1958 and 1962, two events indicated that the U.S. military missions' commitment to Iran's internal security and to the Army's ability in "coping with the important to the civilian population" were increasingly United States and to the monarchy. The establishment of and SAVAK,or the Organization for State Intelligence Security, in 1957 "with American aid and technical assisof ARMISH tance"42 along with the 1958 to 1962 consolidation for Iran's internal security for with MAAG were essential (1) "for uncovering and combatting antithree reasons: within the country" such as collecting regime activities anti-government activiinformation on counterespionage, incipient group violence, and parties, ties, political (2) "providing subversive organizations and individuals;43 advice and assistance on military matters to the Government IRANIAN STUDIES
182
of Iran" through ARMISH-MAAG and (3) assisting advisors; the U.S. security Iran in "administering assistance activities (FMS and MAP)," primarily through the Vice Minister of War.44 By the early 1970s, ARMISH-MAAG'sprimary funcdefined as advising tions were more specifically the Iranian Armed Forces on weapons procurement, assisting in FMS, or Foreign Military and assisting Iran in assimilatSales, ing equipment purchased from the U.S.45 of SAVAKand consolidation The establishment of the U.S. military to Iran were complimented by a vigmissions reforms. orous and renewed interest in social From 1958 to 1962, the Harvard Advisory Group, under the directorship of Edward S. Mason of Harvard University, advised and cooperated with Iran's Economic Bureau in the Plan Organizawas also founded in 1958 and headed by tion; the latter Khosrow Farmanfarmaian. Financed by a four-year Ford Foundation grant, the Harvard Advisory Group worked on the Plan Organization's Third Seven-Year Plan (1962-1967) alongside other American advisory groups, such as the Governmental Affairs Institute, Inc., George Fry Associates and Point Four.46 By September 1962, the Third Plan was begun. While it continued to 1967, covering one of the most conPahlavi reform troversial periods of American advising, and street with the Iranian population, clashes the Third Plan advisers had as much trouble with plans, and budgets, staff as had the 1945-1949 "founding fathers." Furthermore, one of the Harvard Advisory Group members noted that: During the past fifteen years Iran has received huge amounts of economic aid, including technical assistance. More aid has gone to Iran than to any country in the Western hemisphere, to any country in Africa, or to any other country in the Middle East except Turkey.47 In spite of the multibillion dollar economic and military aid from the United States alone between 1950 and 1964, including Point Four technical assistance, as well as the fact that there was "scarcely any area of institutionbuilding that has not had the benefit, or at least the presence, of one or more foreign experts,"48 Iran was "not 183
SUMMER-AUTlUMN 1979
nearly as far along the road of industrial India, Mexico, Brazil, Egypt, Nationalist Turkey. "49
modernization as China, or even
IV By January 1973, moreover, the last of the U.S. military missions was accepted by the Iranian Government. The Technical Assistance Field Team, or TAFT Agreement bound the United States to send "552 personnel at-the cost of $16.6 million" to provide "in-country instruction to foreign personnel on specific equipment, technology, weapons and supporting systems" on a scale beyond mobile training teams, or MTTand ARMISH-MAAG.50 TAFT became necessary by 1973 following Iran's request for increases in U.S. arms sales to Iran and the May 1972 visit of President Nixon to Iran; the visit and the 1972 Congressional request to limit MAAG personnel coincided with the Shah's interest in increased arms sales. Finally, to avoid possible confusion of purposes, the Department of Defense distinguished the TAFTs from the MAAGsin three critical areas: (1) ARMISH-MAAG in Iran continued to concern itself with long-term advisory and staff functions whereas the TAFTs were to be "shortterm" teams focusing "on the introduction of new equipment and associated with logistics systems"; (2) Iran assumed 70% of the MAAG's costs while undertaking "all expenses associated with the TAFTs"; and (3) while MAAGwas usually located in Tehran, 40% of the TAFTs were located in the provinces.51 of TAFTs in Iran in 1973 does not The significance become clear unless it is also stated that the TAFTs were and primarily involved in the sophisticated increasingly weaponry in the billion-dollar While Iran was range. capable with its 1972 oil revenues to purchase arms and police equipment from the United States, Europe, and the Sovriet Union, it was not until the oil prices were raised substantially that Iran could afford the more sophisticated weapons and logistical systems it was to acquire from 1973 to 1978. like ARMISH-MAAG,the TAFTs were under Secondly, the command of the Chief of ARMISH-MAAG,or CARMISHin IRANIAN STUDrES
184
Tehran who, in turn, operated "under the direct military command of U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR)and under the supervision of the U.S. Ambassador to Iran" as well as the representative of the Department of Defense.52 Lastly, due to the changes in the global defense systems and the war in Viet Nam, President Nixon along with his principal advisor, Henry A. Kissinger, announced the "Nixon Doctrine" in Guam in July 1969. The "need" for international in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean perimeters security in particular drew the attention of U.S. policy makers to
the "needs" of Iran in regard to sophisticated
weaponry and
to the possibilities of Iran as a surrogate U.S. force in the region, or as a "regional The sale of influential." arms, financed like the Seven-Year plans and the U.S. military advisory missions by oil revenues, necessitated the eventual introduction of the Technical Assistance Field Teams. From 1973 to 1978, the arrival of the TAFTs as "short-term" (twelve to eighteen months) technical advisors was joined by private U.S. companies also engaged in the sale of weapons, logistical systems, weapons and equipment and technology.53 training, While hearings were held in Congress over such sales as the E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System Aircraft (AWACS), or the F-16s, it was genclear that the TAFTs as essential erally of the features Nixon-Kissinger Doctrine were not "short-term." Rather, if the major military programs in Iran were to be completed it was clear that the TAFTs "will continue to successfully, play essential roles in the areas of training, logistics, and maintenance until well into the 1980s."5 In addition, it was also clear that private companies as well as TAFTS were located principally in Central and Southern Iran with a Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean focus, not a Northern Iran and Soviet Union focus. With the increase of oil prices and revenues after 1973, Iran's billion-dollar "wish list" grew in leaps and With the expansion of the sophisticated bounds. weapons programs, particularly the U.S. military mission of TAFT, as well as the increased role of ARMISH-MAAG in the conand selling of American weaponry and training tracting pro185
SUMMER-AUTUMN 1979
grams to Iran, there arose the natural influx of American In a February 10, 1977 personnel and their dependents. Report to the Senate by Senator Ribicoff, several important problems were cited relating to the U.S. military missions to Iran. Among the several problems noted by Senators Culver and Eagleton were the sudden increase in American personnel and dependents into Iran causing inflated housing costs and rentals, the emergence of a "new class of retired and the military personnel" in key governmental positions, weaponvolume of sales of American's highly sophisticated Principal among the objections to U.S. poliry arsenal.55 cy of arms sales to Iran was the following statement: With few exceptions we found the military forces of the American weaputilize Iran unable to effectively ons purchased for them without an excessive degree It is our view that of U.S. technical assistance. equipment received which cannot be operated and mainto enhance tained by Iranian forces would do little Iran's war-time defensive capability were the United States to remove its citizens at the outset of hostile actions.56 In short, while the MAAG'sprovided internal security integrity" against infor Iran to preserve its "political ternal or external "threats," the TAFT's along with the "white-collar mercenaries" provided external security for In both the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean regional interests. cases, military assistance accompanied economic readjustments of Iran's oil revenues; in the first case, the 1954 restructuring of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Companyinto the American-British dominated National Iranian Oil Company and, in the second, the 1973 escalation of oil prices for and expensive weaponthe purchase of highly sophisticated systems from American arms and technology ry and logistics While the 1950 MAAG Agreement bolstered the industries. monarchy, assisted in overthrowing the Mossadegh Government, and established with the CIA the Security Police force (Ran(SAVAK)as well as the Airborne anti-guerrilla and U.S. industrial insured 1973 TAFT the Agreement gers), a market and profits through oil exfinancial interests, The TAFT's ports, capital goods imports, and arms sales. must, therefore, be seen as an escalation of American presence not only in Iran but also in the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean region. IRANIAN STUJDIES
186
to Iran from 1943 to 1978 fulmissions U.S. military both for the Shah and the filled a number of key functions and for U.S. corporate and military Iranian ruling families, not seen as counterrevolutionary While clearly interests. in the military missions, by the individuals or repressive of the hated monarchy and supportive or viewed as solely of Schwarzkopf, the military missions U.S. corporations, serve a multiRidley, ARMISH, MAAGand TAFT did in effect and purposes. One observer of Iran noted tude of interests found every aspect of that while many of the Shah's critics such as consequences to have political the aid missions and research, training, agricultural "land reform, police implying a "commitment to a even rural medical service" a linkage to Western free market economy and frequently that: he also states institutions," When American weapons are placed on a host nation's controlled by (prioperationally but are still soil, American advisors, there is obviousvate or public) imposed upon the host nation's ly a limitation It is an assembly in which some comsovereignty.... ponents are human and some are electro-mechanical.... to shoot A given rifle can be used indifferently and communists, but a surveillance capitalists system, an air defense network, and an anti-suballegiances marine system all have the political of their human components.5 missions to Iran from 1943 to The U.S. military to economic and polrelated were clearly 1978, therefore, of the United States, Europe and other itical interests nations not only in the context of World War II, industrial albut also in the context of the post-war realignments, and economic reagencies, international liance systems, moreover, The missions, programs. covery and reconstruction entailed the eventual involvement of American advisors, in nearly every phase of Iranand military, both civilian in the related institutions ian governmental and financial security. and external remotest fashion to Iran's internal From GENMISHto TAFT, the U.S. missions assisted in the economic and political of Iranian society; restructuring in time, the military structhe social missions affected were an interventure as well. the missions In effect, tion of another kind. 187
SUMMER-AUTUMN1979
NOTES 1.
United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1942, Volume IV (Washington, D.C., 1963), p. 262. (Hereinafter as Foreign Relations: 1942.)
2.
Ibid.,
p. 242.
3.
Ibid.,
p. 259.
4.
United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1945, Volume VIII (Washington, D.C., 1969), p. 534.
S.
United States, Department ment Series, Nos. 351-400 p.
3.
6.
Ibid.,
7.
Ibid.
8.
Foreign
9.
Ibid.,
10.
of State, Executive Agree(Washington, D.C., 1944),
p.
6.
Relations: p.
1942,
p.
223.
248.
United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1943, Volume IV (Washington, D.C., 1964), p. 514. (Hereinafter as Foreign Relations:
1943.)
11.
National Archives, United States, Records of the Office of Strategic Number 61233 "Police, Services, Genand Army," February 1944, fol. 1 and Number darmerie, 76263 "The Army and the Gendarmerie," 16 May 1944, fol. 1.
12.
Sir Clarmont P. Skrine, World War in Iran (London, 1962), p. 170. as Skrine, World War.) (Hereinafter
13.
United States, National Archives, Records of the Office of Strategic Number 73660 "USSR in the Services, Middle East - Activities in Spring 1944," May 8, 1944, fol. 2.
14.
Ibid.
IRANIAN STUDIES
15. 188
Ibid.
16.
Records of the OfUnited States, National Archives, fice of Strategic Services, Number 109456 "Annual Estimate of Political Stability," December 19, 1944, fol. 2.
17.
Ibid.,
fols.
18.
Ibid.,
fol.
19.
Skrine,
20.
United States, Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts, Series 1650-1699 (Washington, D.C., 1947), pp. 3-4.
21.
Ibid.,
p.
3.
22.
Ibid.,
p.
10.
23.
Foreign Relations: 1947, "'The Pentagon Talks of 1947,"' p. 577. See Michael K. Sheehan, Iran: The Impact of United
2-3 and 7. 7.
World War, pp. 227 and 236.
Interests
States
lyn, N.Y., Iran.)
1968),
and Policies,
pp. 32-43.
1941-1954
(Hereinafter
(Brook-
as Sheehan,
24.
United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1948, Volume V (Washington, D.C., 1975), p. 88. Hereinafter as Foreign Relations: 1948.
25.
Foreign
Relations:
Sutton,
Persian
1955), Oil.
p. 159.
26.
1947, Oil:
p. 4.
A Study
Hereinafter
in
See L. P. ElwellPower
Politics
as Elwell-Sutton,
(London,
Persian
Max Weston Thornburg graduated in 1917 from the Uniof California versity as an engineer. After three years in the Army, he joined Standard Oil of California in 1920 acting as chief engineer of the manufacturing department from 1924 to 1929, as manager of the Richmond Refinery from 1929 to 1931, and as chairman of the board of engineers from 1931 to 1936; the latter was during the critical years of SOCAL's work in Saudi Arabia's oil fields. Soon after, Thornburg became
189
SUMMER-ALYTUMN 1979
vice president of Bahrein Petroleum Company (owned by the Texas Companyand Standard of California) and, from 1940 to 1943 served simultaneously as the petroleum advisor to the State Department; Thornburg's successor in the State Department was Charles B. Rayner of Socony-Vacuum; the same company which was so intimately involved in the 1944 oil concession "scramble" in Southeastern Iran. In 1946, Thornburg was in Tehran consulting for the Government of Iran on a sevenyear plan "for Iran's Reconstruction and Development" His associaplans. along with the industrialization tion, while still an oil executive of his own company and living in the Persian Gulf, with the Supreme Planning Council led him to suggest Morrison-Knudsen International as a survey team of ten American engineers. From 1948 to 1951, he was chairman of Overseas Consultants, Inc. and helped complete Iran's Seven-Year Plan. He returned to Turkey in 1954-1955 to assist Between 1954 and 1960, in Turkey's industrial plan. Thornburg taught at the University of California and Center was a visiting fellow at Harvard University's for International Affairs; during his visit at Harvard, Thornburg prepared his book, People and Policy in the Middle East and worked with the Harvard Advisory Group
and its draft of Iran's Third Plan under the directorship of Edward S. Mason. See Max Weston Thornburg, A Study of and Policy in the Middle East: Change as a Basis for United and Political George (New York, 1964), pp. ix-xii; Policy Baldwin, Planning and Development in Iran (Baltimore, of Oil, pp. 281-282; 1967), pp. 25-28; Engler, Politics Persian Oil, pp. 141, and 159-161. and Elwell-Sutton,
People Social States
27.
Like Max Thornburg, Torkild Rieber worked closely with business while associated with an oil international company and later consulting for the Government of Iran. Rieber was a "business man of wide interests" having been associated with the Texas Companysince 1905 and its chairman from 1935 to 1940. In 1951, Rieber arrived in Tehran on December 31, as the petroleum advisor to the World Bank in the company of Hector Purdhomme, Director of IBRD's loan department; follow-
IRANIAN STUDIES
190
ing the CIA overthrow of the Mossadegh Government, Reiber returned to Iran as General Zahedi's OIL advisor in 1955. Edward S. Mason and Robert E. Asher, Woods (Washington, D.C., The World Bank Since Bretton See also Elwell1973), pp. 602, fn. 11 and 602-609. Sutton, Persian Oil, pp. 276-277; Kolko, Limits of of Oil, pp. 200 and Power, p. 419; Engler, Politics 431. 28.
Foreign
29.
Ibid.,
30.
Gabriel Kolko, The Roots (Boston, 1969), p. 79.
31.
United Treaties
p.
Relations:
1949,
554.
See Sheehan,
p.
States,
Department
and Other
Iran,
p.
49.
American
Foreign
Policy
of State,
United States Agreements: 1950,
International
Volume I (Washington, p. 421.
of
559.
1952),
D.C.,
(The emphasis
p. 420.
has been added.)
32.
Ibid.,
33.
to the U.S. For the scope of MAAGand its relationship General Commander-in-Chief, Europe, see United States, AdProfiles of Military Assistance Accounting Office, (Washington, D.C., 1978), visory Groups in 15 Countries pp. 26-37 and Paul Hammond, David J. Louscher, and Michael D. Salomon, "Growing Dilemmas for the Manage-
ment of Arms Sales," 34.
1979),
pp.
United
States,
Treaties
Armed Forces
Department
and Other
of State,
International
Volume 3, Part 4 (Washington, 35. 36.
United States Agreements: 1952,
D.C.,
1955),
William E. Warne, Mission For Peace: (New York, 1965), p. 60. United operative mically
(Fall,
and Society
1-20.
States,
Point
Series
4 in
of State, Point Four: of Aid in the Development Publication 3719, Areas.,
Department
Program for Underdeveloped
mic Cooperation
p. 4742.
24 (Washington,
191
D.C.,
Iran
CoEcono-
Econo1950),p.S4.
SUMMER-AUITUMN 1979
37.
Ibid.,
38.
Foreign
39.
United
p.
99.
Relations:
1950,
p.
465.
States,
House of Representatives, The Mutual 1954, Hearings of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C., 1954), p. 503.
Security
Act
of
40.
Ibid.,
41.
As quoted in David Horowitz, (New York, 1965), p. 186.
42.
Marvin Zonis, 1971), p. 85.
43.
Harvey H. Smith et al., Area Handbook (Washington, D.C. , 1971), p. 574.
44.
United lated
pp. 504 and 569-570.
The Political
General
States, to U.S.
(Washington,
See Sheehan,
Elite
Accounting
Military
D.C.,
From Yalta
Sales
1974),
of
Iran, to
pp. 55-65.
Vietnam
(Princeton,
Iran
for
Iran
Office,
ReIssues to Iran
and Assistance
p. 9.
45.
A Sales to Iran, United States Senate, U.S. Military Staff Report to the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, July 1976 (Washington, D.C., 1976), p. 34. as u.s. Military (Hereinafter Sales.)
46.
and Development George Baldwin, Planning (Baltimore, 1967), pp. ix-x.
47.
Ibid.,
p. 200.
48.
Ibid.,
p. 201.
49.
Ibid.,
p.
50.
See Sheehan,
Iran
p. 49.
99.
House of Representatives,
United
States
States
Arms Policies
IR-ANIAN STl1DIES
Iran,
in
in
192
the
Persian
Gulf
United and
Red Sea Areas:
and Future, Past, Present, Report of a Staff Survey Mission to Ethiopia, Iran and the Arabian Peninsula, 95th Congress, 1st Session, December 1977 (Washington, D.C., 1977), p. 141. (Hereinafter as U.S. Arms Policies.)
51.
U.S.
Military
52.
U.S.
Arms Policies,
53.
Ibid., p. 36.
pp.
54.
Ibid.,
p.
55.
United
States
Sales,
See also
U.S.
Military
Sales,
143.
"The Middle East and Iran," 95th Congress, Proceedings, 1st 10, 1977 (Washington, D.C., 1977),
Senate, Record,
February
56.
Ibid..,
57.
E. A. Bayne and Richard Views from Saudi Arabia ties
35.
141.
p.
145-157.
Congressional
Session, p. 12.
p.
p.
Field
1 (January,
13.
Staff
1976),
0. Collin, and Iran,"
Reports:
"Arms and Advisors:
American UniversiSouthwest Asia Series, XIX,
p. 13.
193
SUMMER-AUTUMN 1.979
Iranian Studies, Volume XII, Nos. 3-4, Summer-Autumn1979
Professional Storytelling in Iran: Transmission and Practice Mary Ellen Page
In this paper I shall describe briefly the background and setting in presof professional storytelling (naqqali) ent-day Iran.1 Then I shall examine some aspects of how the craft of storytelling with is transmitted, particularly and what respect to how a young man becomes a storyteller I are seen as important. aspects of storytelling Finally, shall examine how this transmission relates to the way in which storytellers their performance. construct actually There are two separate, but related, aims in the told and the paper. Through a comparison of the stories I shall demonstrate works used as their source, literary that the Iranian national legend remains creative today. I shall demonstrate More generally, valthat the abstract ues expressed as important to a craft may disregard those very elements which make a craftsman successful and which breathe life into the craft. Background
itBefore beginning the discussion of storytelling I will say a few words about the literary sources of self, the Iranian national legend,2 the material that forms the
Mary Ellen University
Page has her Ph.D. of Pennsylvania. 195
in Oriental
Studies
from the
SUMMER-AUTUMN 1979
The best known of the literary focus of the stories told. works concerned with the national legend is Ferdowsi's epic, written about 1000 A.D. This work includes much ShihnJma, story material dealing with national heroes and the continuous battle between Iran and her enemy Turan. At the same time, many strains of the national legend exist besides Soon after the appearance of Ferdowsi's work, Ferdowsi's. other epics arose that added to the story line of the naMost of these later epics were written down tional legend. in the eleventh and twelfth centuries and include such works In addias the Borzunama of CAta'i and the Faramarznama.3 tion to the material that has been written down, many strains have existed and have been passed down through time orally. These oral strains have also continued to influence the shaping of the national legend and are apparent in the natoday. storytellers tional legend as told by professional find the proone may still In major Iranian cities, performing daily before a (naqq;l) fessional storyteller crowd of as many as 100 or 200 men. While the craft is certainly one that has been practiced for centuries in Iran, In the city of Shiraz in it is now rapidly falling off. The storytellers. 1974-1975, there were four full-time first was CAli Sanakhan, a man in his mid-60s, who had The second for about 30 years.4 worked as a storyteller was Habib Allah Izadkhasti, a native of Isfastoryteller han who spent half the year in Isfahan and half the year Izadkhasti was in his mid-50s and had been a in Shiraz. In 1974-1975 he spent for about twenty years. storyteller September through early March in Shiraz, leaving just before the Iranian New Year, an arrangement he had followed hadbeen The third full-time storyteller for several years. trained by Sanakhan and was not yet recognized to have sucwas workThe fourth storyteller ceeded as a storyteller. ing in a coffee house run by the Iranian National Tourist This coffee house was frequented mostly by Organization. middle- to upper-class Iranians and Iranian and foreign therefore, was not performand the storyteller, tourists, The discusing before the usual coffee house clientele. Habib Aland Sanakhan on CAli sion below will concentrate lah Izadkhasti. IRANIAN STUDIES
196
Each storyteller is associated with a coffee house where men would come daily at specified times to see him perform. A storyteller may perform in two coffee houses in one day or two storytellers may perform at different as we times in the same coffee house. The storyteller, have seen, may split up his year, spending some time in is one town and some time in another town. The clientele primarily composed of regulars who come every day to hear the story. These men form attachments to the storyteller, to the coffee house, and to the time of day. An audience member may say he comes to hear the storyteller because he is so good, but chances are that the audience member will not go to hear the same storyteller at another coffeehouse. He may also be apt to leave when "his" storyteller has finished, not waiting to hear another who might be performing later. During the performance, however, everyone in the audience is expected to be listening. If the storyteller is good, the audience will be genuinely interested. The storyteller has no qualms about pointing out the bad manners of those who talk during the performance. Some degree of a storyteller's success might be seen, therefore, in his ability to captivate a ready-made audience and his ability to add others to the audience who are attracted by the storytelling. A performance lasts approximately one hour and a The storyteller begins with the formula "in the name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate" (besmellah ar-rahman ar-rabim). Then he recites a selection of poetry, either in praise of one of the imams or from the major poets of Iran, such as Sacdi or Nezami. The bulk of the period is taken up with the story proper. The story is serialized, a new segment being told at each session. Storytellers generally confine themselves to the parts of the national legend dealing with the period from the beginning of the world to the end of King Bahman's reign and the conquest of Iran by Alexander the Great. half.
Sanakhan told the material in one session a day for one and a half years. Izadkhasti told the same material in six months of two sessions per day. The story is told in prose with occasional recitation of lines from Ferdowsi. 197
SUMMER-AUTUMN 1979
On religious holidays, the storyteller will add a rowta before the end of the session, telling the story of the Shi'ite martyrs. The storyteller watches his time very careIf he goes over the allotted time, his audience is fully. apt to leave before he has finished. Whenthe allotted time is over, the storyteller ends his story, calling down blessings on those people giving him money. Transmission
The steps a man takes to become a storyteller vary from person to person. There are, however, some similar steps for training which may be outlined.5 The storyteller usually learns his craft from a master storyteller. As a student (shggerd), he takes lessons from a master (ostad) whomthe student pays for lessons and for providing material. The master is himself a practicing storyteller. The student works alone with his teacher. The stress in training is on rote memorization of material. The student is taught the literary work Shahn3ma line by line. The teacher gives him a segment each day to memoThe student returns the next day to demonstrate that rize. he has learned the material. In addition to the literary work, the student must also copy and learn the tum5r, which he receives from his teacher. This tumar is a story outline in prose of the episodes making up the stories he will The student also learns philosophy and religion, and tell. poetry from poets other than Ferdowsi. The period of time of training varies from individual to individual. Both Izadkhasti and Sanakhan were trained by master storytellers. They both went through the same steps of training. Izadkhasti went to his teacher each evening for a year, after spending the day working as an artisan. At the end of this year of training he went off on his own with no period of apprenticeship. Sanakhan, on the other hand, spent two years working with his teacher. Afterthese two years he did not feel that he was yet prepared to go off on his own. Instead, he spent a short period of semiFrom time to time his apprenticeship with his teacher. teacher would let him take over sessions until Sanakhan IRANIAN STUDIES
198
felt sure enough of himself to take up his own position. Once the storyteller goes out on his own, he succeeds or A man who has become a practicfails on his own merits. Sanakhan ing storyteller may himself become a teacher. has been a teacher, but not Izadkhasti. A storyteller may enter his profession on his own without having gone through the more rigorous training. He may simply be attracted by the craft of storytelling, learn from listening go to hear a number of storytellers, to them how the stories are told, pick up the literary work and memorize it, then go off on his own to practice his new trade. Two successful storytellers in Tehran told me on their own. they had taken up professional storytelling One of these men began at the same time he was an office worker in a ministry office. From the time he was young, he had been frequenting coffee houses and picking up stories which he then learned and polished up on his own. He compiled his own tum5r. Whenhe felt he was ready, he bestories himself. He continued at both jobs gan telling until he retired from his office position. Even then, he continued telling stories at the coffee house. Whether a man comes to storytelling through formal training or whether he trains himself, he will list the same things as significant for succeeding as a storyteller. A good storyteller is described by storytellers and audiHe ences alike as well versed (vared) in his material. feels that he must be in possession of a full and complete knowledge both of the literary source and of the tumar. A storyteller is said to have a good tumar. A storyteller also prides himself on having in his memory a considerable body of lyric poetry. The audience is familiar with the storyteller's reand a storyteller pertoire, will not perform material which is unknown to his audience. The audience, he feels, will not come back every day and pay to hear a story it has never heard before (balad nistand). In short, the valued aspects of being a good storyteller are those which are most reflected in the training to become a professional
199
1979 SUMMER-AUTUMN
storyteller--memorization material.
of texts
and commandof familiar
Practice
In addition to training, practice is crucial in creIt seems that the values ating a successful storyteller. make for a transmitted in his training do not necessarily Examining what is needed to produce popular storyteller. with material, rote memorizaa storyteller--familiarity tion--one would expect to find in Iran a tradition of storytelling that is very highly dominated by a literary text. In fact, there is a good deal of This is not the case. variation allowed within the material. There is only minimal effort made at keeping the If the story line exactly the same as the written models. does not perform a particular text frequently, storyteller he may have to consult his 1um5r before he begins his performance. If he wants to quote a long section of poetry, he may rely on the poetic version as a prompt while he creates But generally speaking, the storyteller quotes. the story as he performs, relying on his memory.6 The often bragged, in fact, that since they knew storytellers both the Shlhn5ma and their bum3r well, they no longer had any need to consult them. In fact, some said they had not Izadkhasti left all referred to these materials for years. the entire period he in Isfahan for his materials at home was in Shiraz. actually allows for some variaThe material itself The tumar, on which the stories are based, is not tion. of story the Sh3hnama of Ferdowsi, but rather a collection plots, including many of the basic Shahnama stories plus a to another mass of material passed from one storyteller but not included in Ferdowsi's work. Both the storyteller of Shahnama and his audience include in their definition any material dealing generally with the heroes of the naSome of this material describes the extional legend. ploits of characters mentioned in Ferdowsi's Shahnama, but
IRANIAN STUDIES
200
some includes the exploits in the literary work.
of characters
who do not appear
If the tradition can be said to be textof naqq5li dominated, that text is the bum5r. There seems to be little difference between the tumars used by different storytellers or the basic story line presented by the storytellers. The tum3r itself, however, allows for a great deal of the material. of variation. It is only a bare outline A session of one and a half hours may be summarized in a short page or two of tumar text. The actual story performed need not follow even this rough outline absolutely. To illustrate the range of variation between the Slhhnama of Ferdowsi, the tumar, and the storytelling session, I shall examine one session briefly and compare it with the tum5r and with Ferdowsi's work. The section presented is the last session of the telling, the death of King Bahman, which leads up to the conquest of Iran by Alexander the Great. Just as an indication of the extent of the difI might mention that the whole reign of Bahman ference, takes up about 200 lines in the Shahnama,7 48 pages in the storyteller's tumar, and rouglhly a month in the telling. The story session examined was recorded from cAli Sanakhan. The 1um5r text presented is translated from that of the same storyteller.8 Space does not permit a full account of the storyA synopsis telling session. follows. Sanakhan begins by saying he has come to the end of the story. Bahman had them gone to war with the Zaboli heroes, finally bringing back into his service. All Bahman's people lived in fear of him. He had killed the Prophet Zakariya for opposing his marriage to his own daughter Homa. At this time some merchants came to Bahman and told him that a dragon had made the road in their area unsafe. In the evening, the royal guests sat down to eat with the king. They began talking about the dragon. Bahman asked Azarbarzin, the Zaboli hero and descendant of Rostam, if he had ever seen a dragon. Azarbarzin answered In fact he beyes, he had seen one in this very area. 201
1979 SUMMER-AU1TUIMN
lieved that this dragon could be the same dragon he had If the dragseen and wounded there about 30 years before. on was scarred, they would know it was the same one. Bahman said it required great courage to confront and defeat a dragon. He remarked how his father, Esfandiyar, and his grandfather Goshtaseb had both defeated dragons. Now it was his turn to kill a dragon. Azarbarzin objected to the king putting himself in such danger. Bahmantook offense at Azarbarzin, accusing him of suggesting that the king was not capable of such a great feat as killing a dragon. Bahman decided to go fight the dragon the next day with his The king and his heroes drank and retainers watching. This was to be Bahman's last feasted far into the night. feast on Earth. After the night's revelry they all went to their quarters to sleep. Morning came. Bahmanprepared his armor for the All his courtiers came and greeted him. He orbattle. He put on his armor, took his dered his horse readied. Azarbarzin, Rostam Tur weapons and mounted his horse. Mazandarani (another young hero), and the thousand guests went with him, but they could not find the dragon. Some of the party flattered King Bahmanby saying that the dragon must have heard that the king was coming to fight him and had hidden somewhere in the mountains. Near the GombadanCastle, in the Zanjir Pass, a hero cried out that they were in danger. The dragon was near. The king continued to look for the dragon. The heroes cautioned Bahmanto be careful, but he paid no attention to them. The dragon suddenly appeared in the middle of the road, looming up high as a mountain. Rostam was closest to the dragon and wanted to kill it himself. Bahmanordered Azarbarzin to stop Rostam, saying that the dragon was to be the king's prey. Azarbarzin asked Bahman to allow the young hero to kill the dragon, but Bahmaninsisted that he would kill a dragon as had his father and his grandfather. Rostam was already moving toward the dragon. It became apparent that this was the same dragon Azarbarzin The dragon saw Rostam and opened had faced years before. IRANIAN STUDIES
202
his mouth to eat Rostam. Azarbarzin shouted to Rostam to get out of the way and save himself. When Rostam realized the extent of his danger, he hid himself in a tree so the dragon could not see him. Bahman drew his sword and started towards the dragon. His horse would not go forward. Bahman dismounted and moved forward. The dragon saw this other man coming. He began sucking Bahman into his mouth. Bahman could do nothHe turned to Azarbarzin for help. ing to save himself. When Bahman was close enough, the dragon wrapped his tail around the king's body and lifted him into his mouth feet first. Bahman shouted to Azarbarzin for help. The dragon began swallowing Bahman. Bahman flailed about calling for Azarbarzin dismounted and shouted that he was coming. help. Bahman cried out for him to hurry. Azarbarzin came forward, but he was thinking that this king had killed a prophet, married his own daughter, and had done all manner of evil things. The king did not deserve to live. Even so, Azarbarzin called out again that he was coming to help, but the king was disappearing into the dragon's mouth. Azarbarzin went forward while the dragon's mouth was still full and struck the dragon. He stabbed the dragon and with the same thrust also stabbed Bahman's body, saying: be-yek tigh kardam do doshman tabah shah az khun-e bab azhdar az khun-e
shah
With one sword I destroyed two enemies: The king in revenge for my father and the dragon for the king. After Azarbarzin had killed the dragon, Homa was told that her husband/father was dead. She took up the rule of Iran. The people salvaged what they could of Bahman's body and took it to the dakhma (repository for the dead). The rest of the body was covered with stones along with the body of the dragon. This spot became known as Bahman's Grave. Whenever animals pass that point, up to today, they urinate over Bahman's grave to mark his tyrannical rule.
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SUMMER-AUTUMN 1979
This narration takes up just over half the time period. After Bahman's death, Sanakhan fills up the rest of the time with a short sketch of Homa's reign and the story of Darab up to the point where Alexander conquers Iran. With this the telling of the Sh3hngma is complete. The tum5r text of the same story is presented in translation below. Since the material from one session is not fixed, what is presented is a section out of a longer chapter on the reign of Bahman. Due to the age of Sanakhan's tumar, many of the pages are in poor condition. are indicated in Indistinct segments and reconstructions brackets. r'umar Text
Bahmanwould also inspect [his daughter's castle] from time to time until Azarbarzin came to Fars with Rostam [Tur Mazandarani] and the leaders of Zabol in order to Bahmanwent with them to see his daughter's visit the king. castle on the top of the mountain. Just then the news came that a dragon had appeared in the pass of GombadanCastle, the Zanjir Pass, and closed off the road to travelers and The king smiled and said to Azarbarzin, "Let's caravans. go see this creature." Riding out from there with a group of leaders who were with the king, they came to the creature's area. The acting as if he were not afraid and as if king came first, he considered this beast nothing, until they saw the creaHis thickness of a plane tree. ture. He had a [...] A height was about twenty zarCs [about seventy feet]. river was coming out of his mouth. His eyes were like [...]
fire
flashed.
Rostam Tur dismounted from his horse, and asked for permission to kill the dragon, but Azarbarzin signaled with his head to Rostam not to go forward. Since Rostam had permission, he could not stop him. He went toward the dragon. When Rostam got close, he looked as if he was not capable of fighting the dragon. Just of handling the responsibility IRANIAN STUDIES
204
then the dragon attacked Rostam. Rostam fled and climbed up a tree and from the tree further up the mountain. King Bahman said to Azarbarzin, "This hero--your friend--was not up to the task, so he fled." Azarbarzin said, "Your servant! Didn't your grandfather, Goshtaseb, kill the dragon of Saqila Mountain in Rum? I have also heard that your father, the hero Esfandiyar, a dragkilled on. Show your hand, and grip, and power." King Bahman was taken in by Azarbarzin's words, particularly since Rostam Tur had fled [...] he struck the horse's side in front of Iran's nobles and Azarbarzin. He went toward the dragon. The king's horse shied away from the creature. Bahman, known as Ardashir the Long Armed, because he had a tall stature and long arms, pulled his feet out of the horse's to the ground [...] stirrups with his sword in hand. He went toward the dragon. Suddenly the dragon grabbed Bahman with his tail, drew him forward and coiled around Bahman's frame. He opened his mouth and put half his body, beginning with Bahman's feet, into his mouth. Bahman to the place [...] when the dragon had brought Bahman's body up to his waist between his sharp teeth, he swallowed. Bahman's shouts rose crying out to Azarbarzin, "World hero! Kill the dragon!" Azarbarzin stayed his hand. No one wanted Bahman to escape from the dragon's clutches. Because he had killed Zakariya, the people had grown to hate him. The mournful cries Bahman were [...] loud in helpless to Azarbarzin as the dragon drew entreaty Bahman's head into his mouth and saved the world from defilement by a [ ... ] tyrant. Azarbarzin [ ... ] the swelling in the dragon's body where Bahman was in its stomach. By the time he had collected his thoughts, the dragon had finished Bahman off. Then the son of Falamarz [sic] the world hero [...] Garshaseb [i.e., Azarbarzin] came up to the dragon. First he cut off the dragon's tail with one blow. Second he thrust a [...] for that part where Bahman was. He cut up the dragon with Bahman into four pieces. Up to today that spot, at the beginning of Zanjir Pass, is known as Bahman's Grave. 205
1979 SUMMER-AUTUMN
Whenever animals and beasts of burden belonging animal drivers reach that place, they urinate, that is commemorate Bahmanand his tyranny. After Bahmanand known] it is, that Azarbarzin dragon were killed [ ...
to they the said:
With one sword I destroyed two enemies: The king in revenge for my father and the dragon for the king. Even though they separated Bahman's body from the dragon's carcass and carried it to the dakhma, and [ ... ] threw mud over the dragon's carcass so that it was covered by dirt and stone, that place is still known as Bahman's Grave. The story of Bahmanis finished. One can see here how the uznmris an outline of the For exhas changed some elements. The storyteller story. ample, Azarbarzin's part in the tumzr story is much more In the recorded story, it is Bahman's own proud active. In the tumar, he is urged decision that leads to his death. on by Azarbarzin who then will not help him. Furthermore, Bahmanis encouraged by the thought that this is the same One can also see how nondragon Azarbarzin fought earlier. elements may be added to fill time and embellish essential the story. The banquet is an example of how a scene that does very little to further the action may be added. Not only does Sanakhan spend time describing the banquet, but he also expounds on the fact that it is Bahman's last banquet on Earth and sings several lines of poetry on the sorrows of leaving the world. With the whole banquet sequence, therefore, Sanakhan fills up time while also relieving the Such pace of the prose narrative with poetic recitation. freedom for additions as the banquet allow the storyteller artistry of expression without endangering the movement of the story line. The story line is presented in the tumrr, but storytellers are free to embellish it as they wish. Once again it should be mentioned that only a page and a half of tumar text make up the 45 minutes of storytelling. The most striking feature of this material is that it does not coincide at all with the Sh3hn3ma of Ferdowsi. Most of Bahman's reign is taken up with his battles with IRANIAN STUDIES
206
the house of Zabol in revenge for Rostam's having killed Bahman finally kills Faramarz, his father Esfandiyar. Rostam's son, thus ending the great line of Zaboli heroes. Much of the description of Bahman's reign, furthermore, consists of letters and speeches to his people, to his advisers and to the house of Zabol. Bahmandoes fall in love with his own daughter by whomhe has a son, Darab. Rather than presenting Bahman's marriage as an incestuous offense against God, Ferdowsi explains the marriage as allowable under the religion of that time: az nikavi pedar dar paziroftash bar an din ka khani hami pahlavi
[Bahman] took her [his daughter] due to her beauty, 9 By that faith which is called Pahlavi.
The father
The Prophet Zakariya, who plays an important part in the oral story and turnr, does not appear in Ferdowsi's work. Neither is Bahmaneaten by a dragon. 10 In fact Bahman's death is summedup in one line: be-bimari andar bemord ardashir hami bud bikar t3j o sarir
Ardashir [Bahman] died from an illness; The crown and throne were left idle.11 Besides the different manner of Bahman's death in the tumar/recorded story versions and in Ferdowsi's work, Bahman's character and actions are presented much differently, with less comment on the morality of Bahman's actions. The reader might feel that Bahmanhas been too rash in his dealings with the Zabolis, but Ferdowsi says In the virtually nothing to condemn him for his actions. versions presented by the storytellers, however, Bahmanis a terrible sinner. He sins against divine law by marrying his daughter and killing the Prophet Zakariya. He sins against secular law by destroying thehouse of Zabol which, in these versions, has been set up by Tahmuras to be the equal of the royal house. His work against that 207
1979 SUMMER-AUTUMN
house exceeds even the rights of kings. Ultimately, Bahman dies, not by natural causes, as in Ferdowsi's work, but violently and as a direct result of his own actions. It is surprising to find such variation between the tumnr/recorded versions and Ferdowsi's work because it contradicts the testimony of the storytellers themselves. A look at other aspects of the storyteller's craft makes this seeming paradox more understandable. Although storytellers staunchly maintain that they are being faithful to their material, if pressed they will frankly admit that they also consciously vary their material (Cavaz kardan). Their justification for the variation is that since the material is old (mz1l-e qadim), the alterations are allowable. They also acknowledge this variation for row?as, even though the row2a is supposed to be the narration of a series of facts that are not only historically true true, but religiously In varying their material, storytellers as well. are aware of the needs of their audience. An audience does not want to hear a totally unfamiliar story; nor does it want to hear exactly the same story over and over. The storyteller realizes that the audience will be bored (sir mishan) hearI do not mean to imply ing the same story time and again. with all this that a good storyteller is not totally familiar with the material he uses or that he has forgotten it over the years. He always has major Quite the contrary. goals and characters in mind for the work he is telling, but this familiarity is only the basis for being a good a craft which requires other talents as well. storyteller, Episodes or descriptions may be added. Episodes may be repeated in various forms for emphasis. Because the storyteller does know his material thoroughly, he may add or subtract in the telling without losing the basic train of movement in his narrative. are It is apparent, therefore, that the storytellers not tied to repetition of the same material, neither to Ferdowsi's work nor to their own lumzr. There is still room for variation in the story. During the performance of the stories a number of other factors come into play In fact, some besides the presentation of the story line. of the audience of the values expressed in the relationship IRANIAN STUDIES
208
the audience's reliance to the storyteller underscore on the storyteller to do more with the material than to recite it. When pressed, Sanakhan said his responsibility for his auwas to translate (tar joma kardan) his material inor interpretation, dience. Part of this translation, cludes a sense of wanting to teach an audience proper valof the stories. ues and behavior through the presentation The audience recognizes a good storyteller as being a good and wise man and refers to him as "teacher" (morshed). In keeping with the role of teacher, storytellers may insert anecdotes analogous to the story in order to demonstrate values they feel are inherent within the story. The anecdotes include familiar proverbial expressions and may be of a religious nature. One such anecdote is given the story of the death of below. Izadkhasti is telling Afrasiyab's father, Pashang. Before he dies, Pashang asks his son for certain promises. One of these is that Afrasiyab return Pashang's body to Iran for burial near his grandfather Feridun's tomb. Afrasiyab agrees. After Pashang's death, Afrasiyab orders the body buried in Turan. He maintains that it makes no difference where a person is buried. Izadkhasti inserts a short analogous situation The comparison here to explain how wrong Afrasiyab is. is given below: ... na janam farq mikonad be-mola be-khodi farq mikonad qadh3 hadis darim az emam-e sheshom ya ru diga ya 4adis bar3t goftam Cali ebn-e abi ollah va salam Calayh [audience: ~lSeb salavat all3homma salla Cal3 molammad va 5l-e mohammad] umad be-khab-e khoddambashish goft farda az folan darvaza ya jenaza-st qarar-a biyarand vadi ossalam dafn konan boro maneCsh sho in qadar in zendiq-a k3fer-a sherk 5vorda o maCsiyat karda ka agar biyad az atashash digaran-am moCazzab mishan sobh khoddamrbashi sayyed al-jadd ol-qaddi [?] jamCiyati-ra bar dasht o raftan darvazaha-ri bastand ka jenaza nayad ta ghorub sabr kardand khabari nashod bar gasht shab khab-e morteza Cali-r3 did ha2rat farmud farda berid az hamun ka gof tam un jenaza-ra darvaza'i miyarand ba
209
1979 SUMMER-AllTUMN
Cezzat biyarid o biyarid tu qa1n dafnash konid Carl kard ya cali shorn dishab be-khab-e man un towri gofti ma harcha raftim az u khabari nashod 4zlL )iarf Cava2 shod farmud ina rah-ro gom kardan mikhi2stan biyarandash najaf be-suy-e karbaliy-e 4osaynam bordan badi vazid ghobari az kuy-e 40osayn ruy-e jenaza-e u neshast khoda bakhshidash farq namikonad...
No, my dear. It makes a difference by Mola [CAli]. By God it makes a difference. We have hundreds of traditions from the sixth imam.12 One day I related a tradition for you. CAli b. abi Taleb--God's blessing and peace be upon him [audience: "May God bless Muhammad and his family."]--came in a dream to the leader of his worshipers. He said, "Tomorrowthere is a body which it has been decided will be brought through a certain gate to be buried in the Valley of Peace.13 Go stop it. He is such a heretic, such an unbeliever, such a pagan and has sinned so much that if he comes, the others there will be tormented in his flames." In the morning the leader of the worshippers, the descendant of the Prophet, the great ancestor [?], got a group together. They went and closed the gates so that the body couldn't get in. They waited until nightfall, but there was no sign of He went back. it. That night he dreamed of Morteza cAli. Blessed CAli said, "Go tomorrow. They will bring that body through the same gate I told you about yesterday. Bring it in with honor. Bring it in and bury it in the courtyard [of the cemetery of the Valley of Peace]." He said, "'cAli, yesterday you said one thing in my dream. Even though we went, there was no sign of him. Now you are saying something else."
IRANIAN STUDIES
210
[CAli] said, "They lost their to take him to Najaf. They went A of Karbala, my Husayn's city. dust from Husayn's street landed forgave him." Doesn't
it
way. They wanted in the direction wind blew. Some God on his body.
make a difference?
in terms that are Izadkhasti shows up Afrasiyab's villainy to his audience. understandable Iran's purifying easily are analogous to the purifying effects of the dust effects of Karbala. As any sinner may be forgiven by being touched by the dust of the city of Husayn's martyrdom, so Pashang's sins may be forgiven by a return to the country against which he has sinned. is filled Each storytelling session with comparisons, and assertions on the part of the storyteller. proverbs, While these do not move the story forward, they do enhance the storyteller's position as wise and able to express not only the story line of his material but the meaning of his as well. In practicing his trade, the storyteller material is always aware of his dependence on the audience. He may for cutting say that the only criterion off the story action is time, but he will only do so in a place where some probin order to encourage his audience lems remain unresolved to return the next day. Besides the material told, some attributes of the storyteller purely physical bear on his work. Things like vocal quality and gestures have an effect on the audience and its reaction to the storyteller. of course, Most will, agree that one must have a good voice to be a storyteller. Audience members will complain if a voice is weak (2aCif). storyteller's They appreciate storywho have voices which they describe tellers as warm (garm), a voice which is effective in moving them. Storytellers manners of presentation, may develop stylized but these are as the subject of instruction not offered or as the major The vocal presentation value of storytelling. seems to be a style which each storyteller has developed informally All storytellers throughout his career. recognize, too,
that they take elements of storytelling style from other whomthey have the occasion to hear. In this storytellers 211
SUMMER-AUTUMN 1979
way, despite the more formal training, these storytellers through inforare like the men who came into storytelling mal self-training. Concl usions
It is apparent from this examination that written coexist in Iran today, neither still and oral literatures The national legend exists in dominating the other.14 many versions, the same time,
some of which have been written down. continues storyteller the professional
At to
rework and reinterpret his materials today. This recognias it would seem to defy interesting tion is particularly of the storytellers. The storytellers the very testimony unaware of the and audience members are not illiterates, They all know and revere Ferdowsi and written tradition.
pride themselves on their abilhis work. The storytellers ity to recite from memory great amounts of the Shahnama of Ferdowsi. Yet, at the same time, in the view of the and audience, there is still no fixed text of storyteller Shahngma is not only a text written in a these stories. particular year by a particular man but also a collection of stories dealing generally with the history and great and heroes of Iran. It seems that for both storyteller audience, Ferdowsi's work represents only one rescension The today also tell. of a Sh3hnAma which storytellers work but someone else's does not recreate storyteller version in the prohis own interpretive rather creates the story. Through the use of such decess of telling imbues the familiar the storyteller vices as analogies, to his audience and puts material with meaning relevant Even though Iran his own particular stamp on the stories. with a highly developed written tradihas been a society
literary tion familiar to many levels of the society, inhibit new versions of written texts do not necessarily material. We can see, furthermore, how transmission of a craft may in fact ignore many of the elesuch as storytelling Here a successful craftsman. ments which go into creating a body of texhas been on learning in training the stress IRANIAN STUDIES
212
tual materials. The practice, however, incorporates many time span of perforother things, such as voice quality, mance, and audience interest. Because the formal training of storytelling takes place with one teacher and one student, the actual problems of confronting an audience cannot be experienced It seems to be during the training. the informal training experienced by all storytellers-watching and copying or modifying the techniques of other storytellers--that forms the storyteller's style of presentation. It is the process of the actual telling before an audience that forces the storyteller to shape and continually to reshape his material.
NOTES
1.
This paper is part
of a longer study of professional See my Naqqali and Ferdowsi: Creativity in the Iranian National Tradition, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1977. I would like to thank Profs. William L. Hanaway, Jr. and Renata Holod of the University of Pennsylvania for their comments on an earlier version of the paper which was presented at the Middle East Studies Association Conference in November 1975. The research represented here was conducted in Shiraz and Tehran, Iran in 1974-1975. I would like to thank Prof. Grant M. Farr of Portland State University for his help during the period of field work, and Mr. Khalil Zanuzi and Ms. Haydeh AghaMirzadeh, also of Portland State for help on difficult University transcription passages.
in Iran.
storytelling
2.
The Iranian national legend has been dealt with in several works. Among the most important are Zabih
Allah Safa,
dar
Uam5sasarg'i
and Theodor Noldeke,
Iran
(Tehran, 1333/1954),
"Das Iranische
Nationalepos," 2:130-211. Storytellers also narrate stories completely outside the national legend, including short pieces about the Sassanian or Safavid rulers or Safavid prose romances.
Grundriss
der
Iranischen
Philologie
213
SUtMMER-AUTUlMN1979
3.
On these works see M. Mole, "L'epopee iranienne apres Firdosi," La Nouvelle Clio 5 (1953), pp. 377-93. While sometimes tell some of these epics as storytellers separate accounts, much of their material is commonly included in the Shahnama narrative.
4.
Sanakhan has since died.
5.
Jacfar Mahjub, "Sokhanvari," Sokhan 9 See Mohammad (1337/1958), pp. 780-86 on general aspects of more formalized levels of training and accomplishment for I have reconstructed this dethe Safavid period. scription of training from the accounts of several and have not personally witnessed trainstorytellers ing.
6.
performing My findings with regards to storytellers without prompts are contrary to those of Stephen Blum. See "The Concept of the cAsheq in Northern Khorasan," pp. 28-29 where he mentions Asian Music 4 (1972), uses prompting aids Whether a storyteller naqqals. I only saw or not is largely a personal preference. in Iran regularly using a text to tell one storyteller his story.
7.
Abu 'l-Qasem Mansur Ferdowsi, Shahnama, ed. A. Y. Bertels et al., 9 volumes (Moscow, 1966-71), 6:343-53 (hereafter cited as Shahnama) and The Epic of the translated by Reuben Levy (London, Kings: Shah-N3ma, 1967), pp. 219-20 (hereafter cited as Epic).
8.
For a transcription
of this
and Naqqali: my Ferdowsi National pp. Tradition,
section
Creativity
of the tumar see in
the
Iranian
129-30. Some of the textual of these examples given are taken from a translation The preparation of this stories now in preparation. translation was made possible in part by a grant from the Program for Translations of the National Endowment for the Humanities, an independent federal agency.
9.
Shahnama,
IRANIAN STUDIES
6:352,
line
167 and Epic,
214
p. 219.
10.
This ending to Bahman is a common one, found in several texts. See for example Malek Shah Hosayn b. Malek Ghiyas al-Din Mohammadb. Shah Mahmud Sistani, Ebya' al-Moluk (Tehran, 1344/1965), pp. 44-45 which resembles the story version greatly.
11.
Shahnama,
12.
The sixth imam is JaCfar al-Sadeq, known as an expert on tradition. He lived in the eighth century. See M. H. Tabataba'i, Shiite Islam, ed. and trans. by S. H. Nasr (Albany, N.Y., 1975), pp. 203-05.
13.
See "Nadjaf," Encyclopaedia of Islam (1st ed.) 3, The valley of peace (vadi as-salam) pp. 815-16. is located in Najaf and contains a famous cemetery. The whole of Najaf is holy to the Shilites.
14.
On the general problem of the relationship between oral and written literatures see Albert Lord, The of Tales Singer (New York, 1974), p. 100 and the article by Ruth Finnegan, "How Oral is Oral Literature?" Bulletin of the School and African of Oriental Studies 37 (1974), pp. 52-64.
6:354,
line
1 and Epic,
215
p. 221.
1979 SUMMER-AUTUMN
Iranian Studies, Volume XII, Nos. 3-4, Summer-Autumn1979
Nonfiction Fiction, Documentaries on Iran Hamid Naficy
Iran has often been the subject of many nonfiction films and television programs produced by Western countries, Britain and the United States. particularly Although these films about Iran were made by a diverse group of private and governmental agencies, overall they have tended both to emphasize the supremacy of West over the ancient, backward East and to support the evolving and ideolopolicies gies toward Iran held by the Western governments and their multi-national corporations. Western audiences who viewed these films and programs as employees of corporations, members of armed forces units, students in schools or the general public, must have experienced a certain self-congratulatory gratification with their own ideological and material conditions and a confidence in the policies espoused by their governments toward underdeveloped countries such as Iran. From the scant information it seems that the responses available, of the Iranian audiences (especially of those educated in the West and whose views of Iran, as we shall see later, partially coincided with those of Westerners) to these films were composed of a mixture of shame for their failure to modernize, and ex-
Hamid Naficy produces educational television programs for of California, University Los Angeles and periodically teaches a class on ethnographic film analysis at University of Southern California. 217
SUMMER-AUTUMN 1979
incorrectly
or insufficiently
repre-
asperation sented.
at being
The about Iran it is rich be divided
films and American nonfiction of British history is an area which has hardly been explored though It can and valuable materials. in interesting as follows:1 into two general categories
Iran (1900-1941) Exotic Underdeveloped Modern Iran (1942-1979) Strategic
I. II.
I.
Exotic
Underdeveloped
Iran
(1900-1941)
filmmakers Most of the films produced by non-Iranian about Iran in this period fall under the general headings of and institutional and ethnographic travelogues newsreels, films.
Newsreels
and Travelogs
Until 1953, all film stock used was of the flammable in the loss stock. This has resulted nitrate and unstable films. Some years ago, Ernest of great number of valuable National Film to the British Lindgren, in the introduction noted that: Archive Catalogue, to be brief, film is likely The life of cinematograph and in fact the great majority of the films made in many of them thirty years of this century, the first and not least but many of great interest, worthless lost.2 have already been irreparably the newsreel, "Grand Review of Arnewsreel is titled, One such valuable tillery by His Imperial Majesty the Shah." This is a 35 mm film made by Robert Paul on August 22, black and white silent leading Muzzafar1902 and shows Lord Roberts on horseback, al-din Mirza and his entourage into Woolwich Commons, where they view a parade of horse-drawn artillery.3
IRANIAN STUDIES
218
Iran are: "An taken inside Examples of newsreels Eastern Gate Crasher" (1935), a 35 mm sound film distria journey by car through depicting buted by Pathe Pictures, "A Persian portion of Iran into India. the Baluchistan by film, again distributed Caravan" (1935), a 35 mm silent and of a caravan at a caravansarai Pathe, shows the arrival that ensues. the trading and bargaining was provided by A more extensive newsreel travelog This "Yellow Cruise" (1934). who directed Leon Poirier, film, which was sponsored by the Citrden car manufacturing company, showed a caravan of yellow Citroens carrying an scientists and filmmakers from Lebanon entourage of social In 1933, en route, they passed through the to Indochina. city of Tehran (where they filmed the horse-drawn capital in Iran. street cars). This film was not well received as abroad was negative of Iranians living The reactions the film had shown Iran to be well, because they believed in Belgium wrote a backward country. One Iranian living in which he stated a letter, in a Tehran daily, published that to the foreigners who saw the film, the sight of the as horse-drawn street car in Tehran seemed so ridiculous He then went on to say: to embarrass Iranians. and hats and the variBefore, it was the dress, who resembled colored turbins worn by Iranians, the that attracted characters in a masked ball, this great Fortunately, attention. foreigners' defect has been overcome, but the thing that now of our country is this the prestige destroys car.4 horse-drawn street (1935) was The New Persia" Another film, "Iran: firm which was sponsored by Kampsax, a Danish engineering in the construction of railway lines in Iran. involved by Theodore Christensen, The film, which was directed showed the construction of the trans-Iranian railway, by the Iranian audiand these segments were well received But the ences as signs of progress and modernization. film also contained life and road sequences about village in Iran, and these aroused audience ire, and a conditions
219
SUJMMER-AUTUMN 1979
daily newspaper characterized tent with the "social ethics"
the sequences as not consisof the Iranian people.
The reviewer of the film pointed out that European filmmakers often focused their attention on bizarre people so much so that the viewers of their films, and practices, such as "Iran: The New Persia," would be led to believe and their country is that "Iranian people are uncivilized leveled against the charges While ruin."5 an uninhabitable the European filmmakers of the time were fair and accurate, the reactions of Iranian audiences to these films belied a coupled with a desire to appear modern sense of inferiority Acand progressive notwithstanding tradition and reality. cordingly, during the reign of Reza Shah, a law was passed which permitted the taking of photographs and moving pictures of buildings and scenery, but forbade the photographAlthough, this law could be ing and filming of people.6 seen to have been enacted to accommodate the Muslim religious beliefs which prohibit the representation of human was that, figure, the real reason behind such legislation many foreigners going to Iran were taking pictures of what they regarded as picturesque sights--beggars, dervishes, and, in general, the ragged, halfThe Iranians felt that such starved peasantry. films or photographs, even though the foreigners may have considered them quaint and picturesque, were being passed off as being typical of Iran.7 In order to ensure that images of "modern Iran" or of the "glorious Iranian past" were being captured on film, the government passed a number of laws; e.g., one that forbade any undeveloped or uncensored film from leaving the country, of all movie equipanother that required the registration ment, including cameras, and yet another that required a permit for filming anywhere in Iran. of legislation, In accordance with these articles a report for the U.S. Department of State, which was interested in developing a film production and distribution program in Iran, prepared by the Society for Applied Anthropology in 1951, made a number of recommendations, among IRANIAN STUDIES
220
of religious them: "any pictures ceremonies...should be in making films about Iran, "emphasis should be avoided"; on avoiding anything which might suggest that the people of Iran are second-rate"; in order to be effective in pro"it is important to emphasize those things ducing films, that unite the country rather than divide it"; and finally, since Iranians have a very strong sense of national pride in the achievement of their ancient civilization, where possible in connection with technical assistance films, such 8 material should be used which "reflect the achievement of Iran." and supported Reza These recommendations reflected Shah's two-pronged policy (supported by the Iranian upper of modernizing Iran and at the same time rekinclasses) for its glorious dling Iranian chauvinism and nostalgia imperial past. They also seem to have provided a set of guidelines for producers of films sponsored by Western governments and business enterprises.
Ethnographic
Films
The most well-known ethnographic film made by nonIranians about Iran, is "Grass" (1925), a 35 mm silent, black and white film directed by Merian C. Cooper, photographed by Ernest B. Shoedsack, and written by Margueritte In the fashion of popular travelogs Harrison. of the time, the film begins by showing the filmmakers (with Harrison on camera) traveling through Turkey and Iran to meet up with the "forgotten the Baba Ahmadi branch of the Bakhpeople," tiari tribe in Charmahal near the city of Isfahan. From there, the film follows the route of the yearly migration of the tribe and their 50,000 herd animals, from winter pastures to summer pastures. The film does not reveal much about the social and economic basis of the tribe's way of life, or its relationship to the central government, which under the leadership of Reza Shah was bent on bringing the armed tribes under control. During the 46 days of migration when the filmmakers accompanied the tribe, the audience is shown precious little of nomadic existence. Many of the inter221
1979 SUMMER-AlUTUJMN
titles Ire merely cute or amusing and reveal an almost Unlike culture. naivete or ignorance of tribal childish Cooper and Shoedsack Robert Flaherty, their contemporary, on a single family or a small nucleus did not concentrate and coherence to to give warmth, detail of individuals Cooper an unexplored mass. The tribe remains their film. inthat had they to this criticism, in response has said, tended to make a second trip to Iran to film a single famwere thwarted due to insufficient ily but that their efforts However, even if the filmmakers had had this second funds.9 that they would have produced a chance, it seems unlikely since document of the Bakhtiari migration, more authentic been not had he that years later Cooper expressed regret able to "superimpose a dramatic story upon this material!'10 of Georges Sadoul also casts doubt on the authenticity "Grass" by claiming that, for the sake of filmmakers the tribe had chosen a more scenic and out-of-the-ordinary route. 11 some very fas"Grass" contains Despite all this, on its torturous tribe the of and dramatic footage cinating goat One sequence shows the tribesmen inflating route. and fording the to form rafts, tying them together skins, waters of the Karun River with their wives, chilturbulent herding 50,000 sheep, dren, and all of their belongings, inIn this process, goats, donkeys and horses across. are lost each year; and this lives and livestock evitably remains one of the most dramatic sequences in ethnographic of the Zardeh Kuh through film. The sequence of the crossing climbing up huge rock faces, winding, dangerous passes, is also unforgettable. through the snowy slopes, barefoot One wonders whether the filmmakers feared that the the authentiin the West might question general audiences since the film opens (or city of the raw events depicted depending which version is viewed) with a letter, closes, written by Haydar Khan and notain Persian and English, that the filmrized by the U.S. Vice Consul confirming to have crossed the Zardeh foreigners makers "are the first to have made the 48 day migration Kuh pass and the first it is 46 days) with the tribe."12 (in the Persian version, IRANIAN STUDIES
222
"Grass" was infrequently shown in Iran, perhaps beIn recent years, cause it depicted tribesmen bearing arms. however, the British Council in Tehran has added "Grass" to for loan numerous requests its film library and had received of the film from various Iranian organizations, especially universities. During MuhammedReza Shah's reign, strinand repression gent censorship reduced socially significant art forms, including cinema, to the level of banality. Movie theaters were inundated with tried and untrue escapist pap. "Grass" offered a chance to Iranian audiences see and appreciate the heroism and valor of their own The popularity of this film with the younger people. of Iranians, generation brought up during the compromising reign of the Pahlavi regime seems to indicate that the film served as something more than entertainment. It is fair to assume that the youths drew strength from the example of the nomads and that the analogy was drawn between the life and death struggle of the nomads against insurmountable natural forces and of the dissident forces battling the forces of the Shah. seemingly insurmountable a number of short films of lesser During this period, value were also produced, but these films, ethnographic in the choice and treatment of their subject matter revealed "A Persian Wedding" (1929) and "Persian their bias, e.g., Carpetmaking" (1935). Institutional
Films
These films represent the companies and countries which at the time had a great deal of economic and political interests and influence in Iran. In addition to Chrisfilm "Iran: tenson's The New Persia" sponsored by Kampsax, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in the mid-1920s, enmeshed in a controversy involving the continuation of its oil concession, sponsored the production of "The Persian Oil Industry" (1925), which depicted the activities of the company in locating oil fields, drilling and pumping oil. It also shows the various departments of the company and the life it provides the company workers. Originally one-anda-half-hour long, the film was shortened to 45 minutes in
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1979 SUMMER-AUTUMN
order to make it suitable for showing in schools and techshorter fifLater, in 1926, a still nical institutions. teen-minute version was prepared for exhibition in British "In the Land of the public cinemas, bearing a new title: Shah." The change was prompted by the feeling that the original title would have "at once branded it an advertising film."*13 The film in its various versions was shown with much success in hundreds of theaters in England, and seen by a million Europe.
persons,
mainly
in England and some in
"AngloThe same company sponsored a film called Iranian Oil Company's Operation in Iran" (1939), which deof the company after World War I; and picted the operation "Dawn of Iran.. .Dawn in the East...The yet another called film, produced This latter Story of Modern Iran" (1938). by John Taylor of John Grierby Arthur Elton and directed son's famed documentary film group, gives a brief history under Reza Shah, and of the country and its modernization
contains many "handsome" and dramatic shots of Iran but lacks involvement and carries a "heavy commentary."14 It would seem that these documentaries were not made without reference to the demands of certain elements of the Iranian
population;
these
were the Iranians
who, while
shar-
ing the West's notion of Iran as an "exotic" country on the way to positive Western modernization, were yet dissatiselements of Irafied with the depiction of the traditional of course, served Their interests, nian society in film. nicely the purposes of the companies themselves, as the films clearly indicated the important role which the companies played in the development of Iran, while simultaneously coinciding with and reinforcing the Iranian government's policy of Westernized modernization. II.
Strategic
Modern Iran
(1942-1979)
half of this period (1942-1979), During the latter adopted a false image of the Pahlavi regime increasingly and industrialization Westernization, progressiveness, manipulate and began to systematically stability, political IRANIAN STUDIES
224
all media, including film and television, to eulogize its The majority of mainline Western media also achievements. contributed to this propaganda campaign, most of them either condemning or disparaging the nationalistic and revolutionary movements of the 1950s, the 1960s and the 1970s. Most Western film and television programs of this period noted the ancient historical roots of Iran and apprised their of the backwardness of the country, audiences the importance of oil to the West, the strategically important position of Iran, and the valiant efforts of the Shah to modernize his country along Western guidelines. In the Cold War era, many film series and organizations produced films and TV programs along the guidelines described above. A case in point is "Crisis in Iran" (1950), produced by "March of Time," which presented the American and economic conditions point of view of the political leading to the rise of the popular anti-Shah, anti-British movea few statements ment in Iran. The film contains by knowledgeable persons, but these have been buried in the body of the film in such a way as to render them ineffectual. One sequence shows the Iranian ambassador to the United States delivering a statement on the oil issue. Considered an unimportant bit of rhetoric then, the statement takes on a new meaning and importance in the light of the recent events in Iran: For fifty years the oil resources of my country have been exploited by a foreign company whose have been sent overseas... profits .The time has now come.. .to put Iranian natural resources to use for the well-being and benefit of its own people. The film also contains a brief statement by the U.S. Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas, who had traveled to Iran and to other Middle Eastern countries, in which he acknowledged the anti-government and anti-foreign movements as a "popular revolution" which could not be stopped by any country. These views notwithstanding, the film's general tone and direction remains in accordance with the formula described earlier and the film ends with the claim that the 225
1.979 SUMMER-AUT7UMN
real
enemy of Iran is
its
ancient
enemy, Russia.
BritThe oil issue was dealt with in many different Oil Co., which The Anglo-Iranian ish and American films. "Oil, the Story in 1951, sponsored, had been nationalized of oil on the politiof Iran" (1952) in which the effects cal and economic modernization of the country were shown. Iran" (1952), sponsored by the U.S. DepartIn "Strategic ment of Defense for use by the U.S. armed forces personnel, economic and political the geography, government, cultural, of the country were described and the importance features Britannica produced, of oil was emphasized. Encyclopaedia Two Worlds" (1954), showing the historical "Iran--Between to and pointing backwardness, roots of Iran and its social developof the West and technological the growing influence Brit"Iran: "CBS Reports" presented, ment in the country. tle Ally" (1959), in which Edward R. Murrow and Winston of a nation faced with the Burdett examined the prospects and of oil wealth and entrenched poverty, great contrasts A three-minute reforms. recounted the shah's progressive by Official filnm, "Iran in Turmoil" (1961), distributed the rise of Prime Minister Mossadeq, the Films, discussed of the shah of the oil industry, the flight nationalization from Iran, his return to power and the subsequent signing of a 25-year pact with Anglo-Iranian concerns. During the Cold War era in the early 1950s, U.S. official foreign policy was to "help Iranians help themin an effort to help stem the spread of communism selves" To assist from Iran's northern neighbor, the Soviet Union. of that policy, in the realization the United States Information Service (USIS) in Tehran undertook an extensive throughout Iran, using 40 moprogram of film distribution bil cinema units, 15 which with the aid of the Iranian govto various parts of the country and ernment, traveled Information Agency (USIA) films showed United States In and townspeople. to villagers (dubbed into Persian) order to create a product better suited to Iranian audiwith Syracuse University to ences, USIS signed a contract in Iran. The Syracuse team, its proproduce films locally from U.S. universities, drawn primarily duction personnel of five travelogs about Iran, and sevenproduced a series IRANIAN STUDIES
226
sanitation teen films on nutrition, detailing problems, and prescribing as viable alternatives. techniques
and agricultural methods, American solutions and
AdIn 1951, USIA and the International Cooperative ministration (known in Iran as Point 4) signed a new agreeof which 60 films ment with Syracuse University, as a result and 38 filmstrips on similar subjects, with greater emphaand instructional sis on technical aspects were produced. An audio-visual production center was set up and a large number of Iranians were trainecL to produce and employ these methods. this more or less educational program, in Alongside politi1954 USIA/Tehran pressed on with its more directly cal mission, producing a local newsreel, "Iran News." Unlike British which and German newsreels, this newsreel, later became a weekly series, contained sequences shot in Iran on a regular basis. Between 1954 and 1964, when it was terminated, 403 issues of "Iran News" had been produced in Iranian theaters.16 and exhibited The most recurring of Point 4 in Iran, the visits, themes were the activities and activities of the shah at home and abroad, audiences important news items from the U.S., and general human-interest features. USIS also produced a number of documentaries for in theaters many of release and via the mobil-film units, which promulgated U.S. government policies and featured of various U.S. agencies the activities or U.S.-supported in agencies, such as "CENTOHelps the Farmers," "Fulbright Iran," "Peace Corp in Iran," and "CARE." agencies The involvement of USIS and other related in film production in Iran helped in the and distribution development of a local documentary-film unit with sufficient equipment and trained technicians and production some of whom are still The staff, active in the field. and instructional educational values of some of the films are indisputable. However, this involvement held some for Iranians as well. these negative aspects Indirectly, posipro-U.S. films helped disseminate an unrealistically
227
1979 SUMMER-AUTUMN
tive and humanitarian image of the U.S. helping an ancient, They showcased and supported the American backward nation. way of life and advocated the use of U.S. technology and know-how as the "cure all" to social and economic backwardThey also strengthened the position of the shah durness. ing a period of rising nationalism in Iran, giving him exin the "Iran tensive and favorable exposure, especially Ultimately, control of the production and News" series. of documentary films in Iran became locked in distribution USIA exthe hands of the government, which following-the purposes. public-relations for primarily film ample, used Thus, USIA provided a model for the government take-over and monopolization of all media, which was to occur in the near future. The U.S. government agencies produced films about In to the American public as well. Iran for distribution educafor produced Cyrus," of 1962 USIA released "Legacy greattional uses within the U.S., in which the historical and economic progress ness of Iran, the social, political of the country, and its natural resources were recounted. The U.S. Department of the Army in 1965 released two films: "Assignment Iran" documented the preparation of an army officer for an assignment to Iran, and "Exercise Delaware" from Fort Campbell to Iran. showed troops being airlifted so far Although a number of the films discussed rethey directly were not made by government agencies, vis-a-vis position U.S. and British the official flect in Iran. situation and social military the political, produced in films These same themes were again reflected Today" "Iran is which of a example the typical 1970s, in (1974) produced and narrated by Robert Rogers and broadcast This film, while making passing network. by NBC television
repression and the shah's dictareferences to political torial rule, advocates the shah's adoption of the Nixon Doctrine (without mentioning it by name) by acting as a policeman for the region, and supports the shah's enormous military build-up, his strong ties to the U.S. military "The shah's air force is establishment (says the film: made in the U.S.A."), his military adventurism strictly in capturing three islands in the Persian Gulf, his dis-
IRANIAN STUDIES
228
forces in the patch of troops to fight against nationalist and "Great CiviliYemen, and his "Shah-People Revolution" The reporter, caught up in the spirit zation" programs. that if the object of the shah's proclaims of the events, "he probably has sucprograms were to make him popular, ceeded." Inc. and titled, Another film, produced by Time-Life is based on the poems "Tales from a Book of Kings" (1974), (from the Houghton collecof the "Shahnameh" by Ferdausi miniature painttion) and shows some of the 258 exquisite Through ings which accompany this version of the book. photography and and excellent the use of music, narration, in related some of the stories the film recreates editing, are the film for generally selected The stories the book. of the shahs, about kings and emphasize the regal position and the wisdom of sense of justice kindness, their glory, Although some of the motifs are in fact present obedience. poems, the undue emphasis placed on them in the original of the film itself sugand the timing of the production The film ends with a gests more than mere coincidence. caption in which the Iranian ambassador to Washington is for and cooperation" thanked for his "generous assistance of the film, "In commemorathe production making possible of the Founding of the Pertion of the 2500th Anniversary sian Empire by Cyrus the Great and the First Declaration of Human Rights." In the late 1960s and 1970s, a number of worthwhile A wellfilms were also produced. and less propagandistic under the ausknown French filmmaker, Albert Lamorisse, pices of Iran's Ministry of Culture and Art, produced the percent of Eighty-five film "Lovers' Wind" (1969). poetic a film from is shot helicopter, visual this dramatically a kaleidoscopic view of the vast expanses, providing and villages monuments, cities natural beauty, historical of the film are the various winds of Iran. The "narrators" winds), which accord(the warm, crimson, evil and lovers' They sweep the viewers from Iran. inhabit ing to folklore, introducing place to place across the Iranian landscape, The of life and scenery in Iran. variety the incredible prowith smoothness and agility, camera, defying gravity, 229
SUMMER-AUTUMN 1979
minarets and domes, peekvides a bird's eye view, caressing over remote villages ing over mountain tops beyond, gliding to reveal the life enclosed within the high mud-brick walls, following the rhythbouncing along with the local wildlife, and and train tracks, mic, sinuous flow of the oil pipelines nmosaic of the rice paddies hovering over the mirror-like the clouds and sky. that reflect to the Iranian landscape The film is a testimonial and kings have ruled and people over which so many dynasties on the tenth Ironically, and have, in turn, passed away. of the completion of the film, yet another seemanniversarv as the leaving, has fallen, ingly powerful dynasty (Pahlavi) nomads tribal film points out, the land and the migrating for centuries. who have survived more or less intact of the film, the Ministry of Culture Upon completion emphaand Art decided that Lamorisse had not sufficiently So he was called back of Iran. sized the industrialization This sequences documenting that progress. to film additional crashed because the helicopter task was never completed, while filming the Karaj Dam near Tehran, plunging Lamorisse This film, whose storybrook and his crew to their deaths. does not purport to is often contrived, style of narration it has never be a social document on Iran; nevertheless, in Iran, and in fact, no in theaters been shown publicly Persian language version of it can be obtained. under Claude Lelouch, another noted French director, the aegis of the Iranian government, pioduced "Iran" (1973), of the dichotomies a short, dynamically assembled collage and contrasts of the country on its way to rapid modernization and Westernization. sharply with most other docuA film that contrasts mentaries on Iran is "Dervishes of Kurdestan" (1973) diThis film rected by Brian Moser and filmed by Mike Dodds. ignorance, generalizations, avoids the superficial largely films made by of most ethnographic and Western prejudices familiarity instead a sufficient exhibiting non-Iranians, with the subject matter which is treated with candor and Part of this might be due to the fact that the respect. IRANIAN STU7DIES
230
of two anthropologists, filmmakers obtained the services Andrew Singer and Ali Bolukbashi in producing the film. It presents an account of the daily life, as well as the of a group of Qaderi dervishes beliefs, in the village of Bay-veh in western Iran, near the Iraqi border. The film details the routine activities of the dervishes in living the village, working in the fields, herding sheep and attending a wedding, with voice-over narration by the natives. The devotion of the individual to the dervishes master (Sheykh), is illustrated that if by their belief they acquire the permission of the master, they will be from harm when performing dangerous ceremonies. protected The film provides ample evidence for such a contention. A man attached to 220-volt electrical current is able to pass the current through his body and light up a bulb placed on his head without the use of wires and socket; and children are able to lick with their tongues the back of a red hot iron spatula without apparent injury. However, the film does not ignore the economic exploitation of the dervishes by the master, who takes advantage of their devotion and uses them to work for him, cook for him, run errands and build a mosque.17 The film fails to point to the reciprocity of their relationship, i.e., the comfort and security the dervishes derive from their devotion. The effects of agrarian reform and urbanization in reducing the hold of the master on his people is described, and the film ends with a shot of an infant in a cradle sucking on a pacifier and a query as to whether or not in the future the devotees of the master will continue to follow his way, which dates back eight centuries into the past. The annual migration of the Bakhtiari a tribe, source of fascination for filmmakers and viewers, was in this period again the subject of films in "Bakhtiari Migration" (1974) directed by David Anthony and "People of the Wind" (1976) directed by the British filmmaker Anthony Howarth. The latter, filmed by Mide Dodds (cinematographer of "Dervishes of Kurdestan"), is a vivid and evocative film with narration by James Mason and the lyrical songs of Shusha, an Iranian folksinger. It shows
231
SUMMER-AUTUMN1979
showing womof the Babadi sub-tribe, the daily activities herding, migrating, cooking, milking, en, men and children Jaafar participating in a wedding, shopping and trading. efforts chief, decrying the government's Qoli, the tribal that "migration declares to settle the migrating tribes, rivalry and He also talks about tribal is what we are." and coexisfeuds and the manner in which reconciliation Despite several overly long sequences, tence is achieved. to the nuances of this is a worthwhile film, sensitive tribal life and perceptions. "The Woven Gardens" (1976) is an hour-long film produced by BBC and Warner (part of the Tribal Eye series) film, focusing on the Brothers. It is a visually exciting by the Qashqai tribes art of carpet weaving as practiced the various phases of Iran. In its attempt to illustrate of this process, the film examines the Qashqai way of life The wool comes from their from which the rugs evolve. flock, the dye from the plants which grow on their migrain the design of the rugs tory route, the irregularities stem from the jostling of the pack animals which carry on their backs the unfinished carpets attached to their looms. The functional and utilitarian nature of the carpets is of labor, and the social, as well as the division explained, the deand technical elements which influence traditional, sign of the Qashqai rugs and turn them into "documents of the tribe." from all those In 1976 a film entirely different discussed was produced. "The Temptation of previously and Marie Power" by French filmmakers Gordian Troeller Defarrage is one of the very few films produced by Western the shah's publicize filmmakers which did not uncritically in modernizing Iran, and chose instead to achievements toll those proeconomic and cultural focus on the social, The film from the Iranian population. grams were exacting robbed of its paints a real and grim picture of "a society and human dignity in the name of progress.,"18 identity Moreover, in an impassioned and graphic manner it analyzes yf such social and economic ramifications the disastrous "Shahmodernization programs as the "White Revolution," IRANIAN STUDIES
232
land reform, compradore industrialiPeople Revolution," massive military zation, foreign-dominated agribusiness, and widespread political spending, military adventurism, that every revolution The film explains repression. has the victims of the its victims; in Iran, it declares, (White) revolution are the Iranian people, especially the workers, and the poor. the peasants, It the tribes, was not made that this revolution concludes by stating or even in spite of them, but against for the people, them. "The Temptation of Power" combines compassion and to recount and display factual the conditions analysis which two years later led to the successful uprising against the shah and his regime. In the 1970s, the Iranian government, ever seeking to improve its image abroad as the supporter of humanitarian and artistic projects, embarked on a grandiose project of feature films with foreign involving the co-production A number of well-known American, production companies. and West German film companies French, British, Italian, and filmmakers were assembled and agreed to produce a large films (one reportedly number of high-budget for $10 mil"F for Fake" (1976) directed lion). They are: by Orson Wells, "La Chair de L'orchidee" (1976) directed by Patrice Chereau, "Golgo 13" (1976) directed by Junya Sato, "The Desert of the Tartars" (1977) directed by Valerio Zurlini, X" (1978) directed A and "Missile by Leslie Matinson. for example, Orson Wells's number of such films, "The Other Side of the Wind" and "Cyrus the Great" were left unfinished, apparently primarily due to the Iranian revolution of 1978. None of these co-production projects have achieved the artistic, financial, or image-building status expected of them, and at any rate Iran's major contribution to these projects was usually limited to the supply of funds, natural scenery, and extras. One prestige co-production fiction is of significance category part series titled "Crossroads of which was produced by the Iranian Art and David Frost, the British
233
film project in the nonhere. It is the eightCivilization" (1978) Ministry of Culture and producer-interviewer. SUMMER-AUITUMN 1979
wvas funded by the Bank Melli Iran to the tune The series the money spent for equipof $2 1/2 million, 19 excluding proservices and the logistical ment, manpower, material, is designed The series vided by the Iranian armed forces. to emulate the basic style and format of such acclaimed "America," as "Civilization," series television British "a and "Ascent of Man." It is in the form of an odyssey, and across some journey made through 3000 years of history In in the world.",20 landscapes of the most spectacular of Iranian the series covers the entirety seven episodes and the to the present; from the early Mede tribes history with the eighth program is devoted to a lengthy interview
now deceased shah. seven shows reveals
A study of the scripts of the first a generalized tendency to represent
monarchy as the only viable form of government for Iran, sporadic) (albeit recurring the periodic disregarding which are also a and democratic uprisings nationalistic of the Iranian people. part of the long history of the Iranian regime to augment the The decision by the British image of the country as presented positive public relations and American films led to a wide-ranging campaign on behalf of the Iranian government in the West, and most important in the U.S., its staunchest especially have embarked on publicMany foreign countries ally. media campaigns in the U.S., for one or more of relations reasons: the following in need of U.S. aid and support They are countries to influence representawho want to use television whose posiThey are countries tives and senators. freedom have tions on human rights and political taken a beating in the American press and who would And they are countries like to change their image. business U.S. investments, that want to stimulate and tourism.21 In the case of Iran, it seems that all the reasons cited Moreover, the shah needed to legiabove were operative. the way American people timize himself by manipulating This he did by hiring a viewed him and his government. firm to promote Iran, in part by making public-relations IRANIAN
STUDIES
234
publicity films to influence U.S. legislative An bodies. example of this is the involvement of both Senator Jacob Javits, who had allegedly been used to form a pro-Iran a $67,000 lobby, and his wife, Marion, who had received firm representing consultant fee from a public-relations Iran Air (a relationship which was terminated by Mrs. Javits soon after it came to light). Other attempts included underwriting by the Iranian government of travel costs and expenses of producers and reporters of local and syndicated television travelogues, documentaries and For example, since 1975, the syndicated specials. travel series, "Journey to Adventure," which has been on the air for 25 years, has produced four programs on Iran. Its producer, Gunther Less, was a paid consultant to Iran Air, the government monopoly. Disregarding the mounting dissatisfaction of the Iranian people with the shah and his regime, Less's programs extolled the shah, the freedom of thought and the progress that the shah's policies had brought to the country. In terms of using local TV stations as a conduit for its propaganda, the case of KVORin Sacramento, California can be cited. John Landers, whose trip to Iran had been subsidized by the Iranian government, reported in a fourteen-part program on Iran in 1977. Citing the government's request not to film any anti-government demonstrations because of the danger to the lives of his crew,22 the programs ignored the open demonstrations and clashes of the people with the security forces in the streets. Such programs were justified by the reporter as sound competitive practices which would in addition give the viewers of the local station something they otherwise would not have seen. Another example was the production of pro-Iranian films by U.S. organizations, even universities, under direct contract to the Iranian government. A case in point is the $250,000 contract between the National Iranian Radio and Television and Michigan State University, for a number of projects, among which was the production of nine films on Iranian history to be used in the classrooms of American high schools and colleges.23 These films, which were described by an MSU economics professor as an attempt to legitimize the regime by "distracting us into the glorious 235
SUMMER-AUTUMN 1979
attack by Iranian
past of Persia,"24 came under vociferous and American students at MSU.
Thus, in over eight decades, Western concerns, especially those of the British and the Americans, have produced a great number of non-fiction films about Iran, as newsreels, TV news the subject of curious travelogues, documentaries, educational documentaries, propaganda and training films, whose basic theme was Iran as the Western military-industrial-political operatives perceived it to be. During the past two decades, another factor entered as the interests of the government in Iran came to coincide The Pahincreasingly with those of the Western countries. lavi regime found in Western film, TV and news media a willing collaborator for its own particular brand of image building abroad and this happy meeting of interests was reflected in the general uniformity of the messages which flowed from the nonfiction factories of the West. Only a few documentaries provided a realistic picture of Iranian society or delved beneath the stable, progressive veneer created by media presentations both at home and abroad. The result was the widespread surprise and confusion on the part of the Western media at the depth of feeling and the speed with which the Iranian revolution of 1978 toppled the "benevolent monarch," so popular in the West, but whose popularity in Iran ran not much deeper than the on which it was documented. celluloid NOTES
1.
films by Iranian of fiction history For a critical "Iranian Feature please see Hamid Naficy, filmmakers, Review of Quarterly History," A Brief Critical Film: 1979). (Fall 1 No. 5, Vol. Studies, Film
2.
The British
3.
Film Institute,
Catalogue,
Part
(London:
British
Ibid
,
I,
Silent
Film Institute,
p. 13.
rRANIAN STU7DIES
National News Films
236
Film Archive (1895-1933)
1965),
p.
11.
4.
Ettela'at,
27 Bahman 1310 (2/17/1932),
5.
Ettela'at,
4 Bahman 1309 (1/24/1931),
6.
Society
for Applied
Program Series: for Making Films
Anthropology,
p. 2. p. 1.
Technical
Assistance
Iran, Report No. 4--Recommendations 22, in Iran (New York, February
"A Historical 1951) quoted in MohammadAli Issari, Study of the Advent and Development and Analytical in Iran (1900of Cinema and Motion Picture Production Ph.D. dissertation, Los Angeles: 1965)" (unpublished of Southern California, 1979), p. 578. University 7.
Ibid.,
p.
598.
8.
All
9.
Film Karl Heider, Ethnographic of Texas Press, 1976), p. 25.
quotes
from ibid.,
pp. 580,
581 and 588. (Austin:
University
10.
Emilie Rahman de Brigard, "History of Ethnographic MA theses, Los Angeles: University Film" (unpublished of California, 1972), p. 53.
11.
Georges Sadoul, tions du Seuil,
Dictionnaire
1975),
des
Films
(Paris:
Edi-
p. 105.
12.
conversation in June 1979, Ernest ShoedIn a telephone confirmed the durasack, now blind and in ill-health, tion of the trip to be 46 days.
13.
Oil Company), p. 1, From Films by AIOC (Anglo-Iranian with the British Petroobtained through correspondence leum in December 1979.
14.
Rachael 1930s
15.
Issari,
16.
Ibid.,
Films of the and Educational Low, Documentary George Allen & Unwin, 1979), p. 125. (London:
p. 232. p. 244.
237
SUMMER-AUTUMN 1979
17.
Hamid Naficy,
Documentary
(in Persian) (Tehran: Vol. two, p. 328.
Film:
and Substance
Source
Free University
Press,
1978),
at the Third World flyer distributed held at UCLA, April 1979.
18.
From the film Film Festival
19.
Mehrdad Azarmi, "The Filming of 'Crossroads of Civili(June 1977), p. 644 zation' ," American Cinematographer and the Variety article.
20.
Clive Irving, "The Making of an Odyssey," (June 1977), p. 636. Cinematographer
21.
How They Try to John Weisman, "Foreign Lobbyists: TV Guide (November 18, Manipulate U.S. Television," 1978), p. 7.
22.
John Weisman, "Foreign Lobbyists and U.S. Television: More," TV Guide (November 25, Buying Goodwill--and 1978), pp. 35-36.
23.
Jay Levine, Detroit Protests
"MSU's Iran Film Triggers
Free Press, Ends Sit-in
Ibid.,
Levine.
IRANIAN STUDrES
Sit-ins,"
June 5, 1977 and Steve Orr, "MSU Free Press, Detroit Quietly,"
June 6, 1977. 24.
American
2-3R
Iranian Studies, Volume XlI, Nos. 3-4, Summer-Autumn1979
Poet and Revolution: The Impact of Iran's Constitutional Revolution on the Social and Literary Outlook of the Poets of the Time: Part II Sorour Soroudi Farrokhi
Yazdi
Mirza MuhammadFarrokhi Yazdi suffered a long series of persecutions, and exile during his rather imprisonments, short life (1889-1939). At the age of 16, two years before the Constitutional Revolution, Farrokhi showed his national and Islamic zeal by writing poems against the authorities of the British missionary school at Yazd, where he was a student. Following the circulation of one of these poems, in which he had defended the cause of Islam against the "devilish designs" of the Christians, the headmaster expelled him from school and thereby ended his formal education.1 This was the first and by far the lightest punishment the poet was to suffer for his beliefs.
Sorour Soroudi is Senior Lecturer in Persian language in the Department of Iranian and Armenian literature of Jerusalem. Studies at the Hebrew University
and
of a two-part article, This is the concluding section Part I of which appeared in Volume XII, Nos. 1-2 (WinterSpring 1979) of this Journal. 239
1979 SUMMER-AUTUMN
Farrokhi was a dehAs he himself proudl testifies, Whenhe was forced out of a peasant's son. His family school, the peasant's son became a laborer. background and his own experience as a laborer greatly influenced the direction of his thought in later years. When the Revolution began, Farrokhi supported it and later joined the local branch of the Democratic Party, at the time the only radical party with some interest in social issues. But in the few extant poems of this time, he concentrates mainaspects of the revolution ly on the national and religious At one of the assemblies and not on socioeconomic issues. of the party in Yazd, Farrokhi read his now famous strophic on the occasion of the Persian New Year of 1910. In qasideh this poem he recalled the grandeur of ancient Iran and Isq3n-z3deh,
of his lam, bewailed the inertia ing the land of Cyrus and Darius
fellow Iranians British against
in defendand Rus-
sian oppression, and called upon them to unite as did the Contrary to the traJapanese who defeated the Russians. dition of the panegyrists on similar occasions, Farrokhi ended his poem by warning the local governor, a tyrannical tribal chieftain: I am not one of the weedling poets, you know, To kiss someone's feet for gain of silver; Or to raise a base person to heaven. I do not say: you are like Tus at time of war; But I do say: would you properly carry out the law, You will become the just Afridun.3 The governor was so enraged that he had the lips of the poThis first imsewn up and threw him in jail. et literally prisonment, like others that followed, not only failed to but forged and strengthened shake Farrokhi's convictions, them. The poet managed to escape the prison and late in 1910 arrived in Tehran where he found a more suitable atmosphere for his revolutionary beliefs. However, Farrokhi's hopes for freedom were soon disappointed as the Majlis was closed and the country came unculminating in Iran's occuder growing foreign influence, pation during World War I. As did some other nationalists, Farrokhi wandered to Iraq, but British persecution forced IRANIAN STUDIES
240
him back to Iran where he was imprisoned and harassed by the The failure Russians. of democracy to take root and Farrokhi's and political consciousness growing social directed to bring about the neceshim toward more radical solutions a social He rebelled sary changes. against system in which "a whole world hungers for the sake of a few eating their fill."4 It is apparently the Russian Revolution following of 1917 that Farrokhi's militant and opinions crystallize, he openly preaches for class struggle: Masses must be taught class struggle The battle ought to be between poverty and riches. The rich have infiltrated the ranks of the poor We should separate these two classes. To secure justice for all mankind and equality is to be waged, one that is relentless. A world revolution
5
his earlier Farrokhi relinquishes appeal to the Hidden Imam to the rulers and calls upon peasants and his exhortations "the main pillars and laborers, of society," to take hold to overthrow the existing of their destiny, system, and "to and hammer."*6 However, remove the king of devils by sickle these radical despite views and despite his advocacy of "bloody revolution," Farrokhi never became an avowed Communist. The poet himself does not provide us with any clue as to the reason for this noncommittal position. A possible partial explanation may be sought in Farrokhi's religious beliefs, for it seems that despite his revolutionary views, he had remained a believer in God, though not an orthodox In one of several Muslim. cases when he praises the peasant and the laborer, he declares: The provider of the shah and the beggar, Is the peasant's bleeding, sowing hand.7
after
God,
In times of despair, too, he turns to God and expresses mystical sentiments. It is also possible that Farrokhi's strong national feeling prevented him from joining the ranks of the Communists, because the very term Communism usually postulated pro-Soviet inclinations.
241
SUMMER-AUTUMN 1979
Farrokhi's ideas were bound to bring drastic reacA main tions on the part of the government authorities. target of his criticism following World War I was the 1919 agreement between Britain and Iran.8 The poet was jailed on Vosuq al-Dowleh's orders, butwas freedbecause the agreeHaving savored freement was not ratified by the Majlis. dom but for a short time, he was imprisoned again for his A few months after his opposition to the 1921 coup d'etat. release, he set up his own newspaper, T!ufan (Storm), which in spite of frequent suspensions and harassment was pubIt was no doubt a testimony to lished for several years. Farrokhi's national stature that he was elected as a Majlis deputy, from his home town of Yazd, in the generally rigged of 1928. It has been suggested that the authorelections ities allowed his candidacy hoping that once elected he would cooperate with the government.9 But he became a member of a two-man minority in a Majlis packed by the supautocratic regime. Under these porters of the increasingly conditions even his parliamentary immunity was not able to For a while he took sanctuary in the Parprotect his life. liament building, and when the danger increased, he left His escape route went through Mosthe country secretly. cow, but he did not stay there, and he arrived in Berlin where he resumed his fight through Persian newspapers. The Iranian ambassador brought him to trial for his antiThe government, government publications but lost the case. interested in projecting a democratic image abroad, enticed the poet to return to Iran, promising complete immunity. Farrokhi, who had been asked by the Germans to leave the country and was himself anxious to go home, allowed himself to be trapped. Once in Iran (1933-34), he was put He lived in penury at this time, yet under surveillance. refused to accept a job offered to him in the police department. Eventually he was arrested, ostensibly because dossier was soon opened against of a small debt. A political the poet charging him with insult against the monarch. His sentence, three years in prison, came as no surprise as the judicial system was controlled by the government. Farrokhi could have enjoyed a comfortable life had he complied with the wishes of the government. But he abhorred such solutions and valued his beliefs and principles IRANIAN
STUDIES
242
freedom. The plaintive more than his life and personal poto his desire for freeems he wrote in prison are witness it. But he never gave up dom and his despair of regaining his fight and even inside the walls continued to preach and Some of the poto read his poems to his fellow prisoners. The authorities did not ems leaked to the outside world. put to He was reportedly spare him even this last refuge. death by injection of air into his veins. struggle social and political outshone Farrokhi's a revolutionary He was first and his poetic creativity. Unlike Nasim-e Shomal, who disthen a poet. a fighter, cussed people's problems on their everyday level, Farrokhi principal asand explaining in analyzing was interested even the Poetry, issues. and political pects of social flexible poetry of the time, was not suitable topical, for this kind of reasoning. To this purpose he wrote editorials, the frankness and boldness of which won him great repoems,10 of a few exhortative With the exception spect. exprespoetry seems to have served him mainly for personal of his powerful sentiments. sion, a channel for the relief he did not try to adapt his poetry to the popuTherefore, lar taste. This is perhaps the main reason for his almost are not expressions Colloquial style. thorough classical poems, but constitutional in Farrokhi's found frequently or terms relating ideology to his social expressions are. are mainly those of the His images, metaphors, and similes poetry, some of which the poet has infused with classical new significance. The majority of his poems are ghazals in poetry. tendencies and roba'is in tune with his lyrical to contempohis ghazals with lines referring He sprinkles to them allegorically, rary issues and events or alludes as in the following example:
243
243
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ATN
SUlMMER-AUTUMN 1979
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-
rA
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46
A
5
Happy was the day when in the tavern we abode Until late at night the goblet's lips we kissed. Had the mashsh3tah of the north breeze had a combin hand, She could have resolved the devout's problems like a knotted hair. How can he share a nest with me and the bird of paradise, The narrow-minded one who looks for water and grain. The flash of fire in the wings of the moth Burned the candle head to foot by only one flame. In one instant did destroy our inhabited house The oppression which reigned in this desolate land. Of these people whomever I did befriend Turned out to be confidant to strangers Fortune will not humble one who like Farrokhi Is of manly ambition and of lofty nature.11 In the literary aspect of his poetry, Farrokhi was a folReturn Movement. It is the lower of the nineteenth-century message of his poems and the sincerity and intensity of his feelings that rank him among the foremost poets of the twentieth century. IRANIAN STUDIES
244
Lahuti
Abolqasem Lahuti (1887-1957) underwent gradual metamorphosis from a devout Muslim and a devoted sufi to a comwere mitted Communist. Lahuti's early mystical tendencies influenced by his father, Elhami, a shoemaker in Kermanshah, who also wrote sufi poetry.12 Due apparently to this influence, Lahuti entered the Necmat al-Lahi sufi order and wrote mystical poems of which the following quatrain is an example: I am all ugliness and shame And He all clemency and grace. O Lahuti, how long will you be unaware of God? 13 Of servitude this is not the way. Shamed you are! in Tehran where he Lahuti began his public activity was sent by his father to get a good education. He soon circles of the capital and participated entered the liberal of shabn3mehs in the publishing (clandestine political nocHe also wrote poems for the newspaper Fabl alturnes). which like other nonofficial Matin, papers of the time was outside the country, in Calcutta. Later on, Lapublished huti stood in the forefront of the Constitutional RevoluHis first tion both as a poet and as an activist. active was in the ranks of the constitutional involvement muj3hein Rasht, who fought the central forces durdin (fighters) ing the Lesser Autocracy of 1908-1909. Rasht at that time was, next to Tabriz, a main center where Iranians came in touch with Caucasian, also Russian, and occasionally revolutionaries, many of whom were of socialist convictions. Lahuti's poetry indicates that his class consciousness begins to take root at this time. Lahuti himself reminisces over this period in the following passage: Under the influence of the speeches of the liberals, Malek al-Motekallemin, especially and encounter with people who were really revolutionaries, new ideas took hold of me and I realized that the achievement of freedom was not in itself the main issue. Mere freedom would not ameliorate the black destiny of the laborers. We co-idealists used to gather together in Aqa cAli Akbar's grocery shop in Kerman245
1979 SUMMER-AlUTUMN
shah and I used to read my labor poems, which were the first labor poems. This was around 1909.14 The first such poem was perhaps his famous "Ey RanjLaborer). In this pobar-e Siyah-Talec'' (O Black-fortuned the poetry of em, the style and content of which recalls Saber and Nasim-e Shomal, he compares the misery of the life of the peasants and the laborers with the affluent upper classes. But unlike Nasim, Lahuti does not speak of he calls upon the opjustice and equity as a solution; pressed to join hands in order to gain power and become masters of their fate.15 In the same year (1909), preceding Farrokhi, he exof the above goal is pospressed the view that realization by means of "hammer sible only through a bloody revolution But unlike Farrokhi, and sickle." wha relied both on God and the will of oppressed people, Lahuti develops a strong anti-religious tendency and turns into an atheist: the world sets of in vain that these are God's doing. Do not believe Doubtless there is no God; if there is, Why does he turn the oppressed into the hands of oppressors? Allah and the shah are playthings in the hands of the rich And the devout worships usury and on hypocrisy feeds.16 Peasant
provides
the food and the laborer
God and religion having lost their grace in Lahuti's to fight for his new creed, eyes, the poet now was willing As a gendarof the laborer and the peasant." "salvation to wage this merie officer, he was in a convenient position of opinion with his Swedish commanders war, but differences and accusations of subversive activity brought against him the rise of some gendarmerie officers against the following government, forced him to flee the country for the first time (1911-1912).17 He was sentenced to death in his abIn 1915, Lahuti returned to Kermanshah from his exsence. ile in Istanbul in the company of the German delegation. there the newspaper During the war years he published IRANIAN
STUDIES
246
and according to one source founded the Ferqeh-ye the Workers Party, in 1917.18 After the defeat of under sentence the Central European Powers, Lahuti, still of death, wandered again to Istanbul where he published the In the poems of this period, bilingual paper Pars. Lahuti ideas and more and more continued to propound his socialist departed from his previous and mystic tendencies. religious One of the opinions at this time was his defense expressed of the rights of women "bound in veil by the chain of sobheh [rosary]."*19
Bisotun, Kiugar,
In 1921, Lahuti was pardoned by the government on his own behest and returned to Iran and to his position as a major in the gendarmerie. in the winA short time later, ter of 1922, he headed an abortive in counter coup de'etat Tabriz against Reza Khan and the central government. The rebellion lasted only ten days. Its failure has been attributed by some, among other factors, to Lahuti's deficiency as a leader and his hasty retreat.20 He again fled the this time to the USSR where he lived for the rest country, of his life. It was only in the Soviet Union that Lahuti became a party member (1924), although he had been expressing Communist views since 1909. Lahuti did not relate himself directly to the question of poetic expression in the context of the revolution, but the development of his poetry indicates that he was not indifferent toward this issue. He was one of the first to display innovating tendencies in his poetry, but contrary to his radicalism in matters social and political, he was quite moderate in introducing poetic changes. He started out, as already noted, a classicist who wrote mystical ghazals and rob3Cis. Under the revolutionary pathos, he, like most constitutional poets, employed traditional forms and styles to convey new ideas. Ghazal, masnavi, and robaCi were used more frequently than other forms. At the same time and in keeping with constitutional trends,simplicity of expression and realistic descriptions creep into his poetry as may be seen in the following lines addressed to the peasant:
247
SUIMMER-AUTUMN 1 979
i,~~__-j_J-_-JJ
In the heart of winter In snow and thunder No cloak you have on and no fire to get warm. But the rich in warm gowns Lie under eiderdown.21 Lahuti's early innovating tendency was displayed in Later a few poems in which he used the sequential do-beiti. on, in the 1920s and 1930s, employment of this form was considered a sign of "poetic modernism. "22 Lahuti employed this form already in 1908, and in it he used the then uncommon rhyme patterns of abba, cddc, and efff, gggh. The poem was written on the occasion of the Tabrizis' victory over Muhammad Ali Shah's forces, which ended the severe shortage of food in the city:
RANIANS'
j248 J
5,,, i,_ ?,,jT,
IRANIAN
STUDIES
248
L
sz
u, zjL
-d
,- ,
* w
=
j
J
4
0L ,
j
The camp of oppression, frustrated For freedom fighters did give them Roads then opened up and provisions Arrived in Tabriz from all over the
IjT
2
and tired, a blow. by tons land.
turned back,
When that determined, resolute people were delivered From eating horses, tree leaves, and herbiage A noble woman stood over a grave With tearful eyes and a lapful of bread. She said: "For hunger you closed your eyes And I pledged, if I ever earn a loaf of bread, I bring it first to your dear grave. Rise! that I may give you the bread and give up my life.23 With the exception of these few innovations, Lahuti's poetry during the first period remained basically classical; the main changes introduced were directed toward simplicity of expression. During the second period (1922-1957), when he was politically inactive, Lahuti carried out more diverse in the poetic domain, including experiments use of free blank verse (in translations), verse, and some syllabic poems.24 Influence of folk poetry, limited during the first is more traceable period, in the works of the Soviet peri249
SUMMER-AUTUMN 1979
of his close study of Persian and as a result od apparently do not seem to have exOther experiments Tajik folklore. Lahuti's on Soviet poetry. influence a lasting erted Even in the second period the main body forms and meters, in classical poems is written The qasideh language. in his simple, vigorous lowing Khaqani's famous "Eivan-e Mada'en" is a poems, Lahuti In his ghazals and other lyrical The style up to the end. follow the classical like a cypress and "the army stature was still the poet from four directions.25 besieged still cause it was a link with the land of his birth, sical poetry did not lose its charm for Lahuti, new Soviet homeland.
of Lahuti's albeit often "Kreml" folgood example. continued to beloved's of sadness Perhaps bePersian claseven in his
CAref
Abolqasem CAref (1882?-1934) As a popular figure, even rivaling poets, outshone most of the constitutional the soul with his charmNasim captivated Nasim-e Shomal. and his sincere his witty satires, style, ing colloquial man." cAref inflamed people's concern for the "little set to touching patriotic heart with passionate ta$nifs, sung by him and artfully melodies of his own composition, Perto his own accompaniment on the tar, the six-stringed ShaCer-e All this won for cAref the title sian guitar. National Poet. Melli, (profesForced in his youth to become a rowzeh-khan by an oppresof religious tragedies) sional narrator-singer after his CAref left this hated profession sive father, outfit, in his religious In 1899, still death.26 father's he arrived in Tehran where he found favor with royal and him "the singing shaykh," who entitled circles aristocratic He refused the honor though silently. he resented, a title This servant." shah's private the "permanent of becoming stemmed from cAref's concern for his personal freerefusal On the contrary, awareness. dom and not from any political passed by without touchthe first stage of the revolution in attendance" ing cAref, who spent his time as "entertainer IRANIAN STUDIES
250
to the establishment. The turning point came following the heroic resistance of Tabriz. The excited poet wrote his first political poems congratulating the victorious entrance of the constitutional forces into the capital in 1909. The following lines are from a ghazal in which he follows Hafez: The old taverner sent me a message last night: Drink wine, for a whole nation has woken up. Despotism defamed Iran many times Constitution will restore our grace, thanks God. We raised our cup to the victory of the young fighters, Drink-hail! There came a joyous cry.27 CAref 's sentimental and rebellious character, which till then had displayed itself in more limited and negative forms in defiance of his late father's wills, found a worthy object--his country. He ceased to sing the praise of pretty faces and narrow waists in the private of princes parties and ministers; instead, he sang in revolutionary meetings and demonstrations, enthralling the people with his love for Iran. Many have given testimony to the impact of concerts given by cAref, the minstrel of revolution.28 The is one stroph of CAref's memorable ta.nif following lamenting the fall of revolutionary youth. As in the previous example, the poet uses classical style and traditional images for a contemporary subject: Tulips have grown from the blood of Iran's young men; To mourn their stature, the cypress is bent, The sad nightingale has beneath the rosebush crept, And the rose, like me, has his garment rent. How crooked you are 0 Fate! How crooked is your conduct 0 Fate! How revengeful you are 0 Fate! 29 No creed you have, no belief, 0 Fate! In social and political domains, cAref followed his sentiments and acted instinctively. For a naive and simple person like cAref, who was politically this unknowledgeable, attitude was bound to bring upon him much disappointment and 251
197 SUMMER-AUITUMN
He was dragged here and there, wherever his sentianxiety. torrents carried him. He attached ments and the political Revolution, and when it great hopes to the Constitutional failed he fell prey to melancholy and prayed for death. His criticism of the Regent, Naser al-Molk made him a wanderer Later on, he went to Istanbul under for a while (1912). German patronage out of opposition to the British and the There he fervently supported the unity of Islam, Russians. but was soon disappointed when he found out that the Ottomans intended to separate Azerbaijan from Iran. Now he was and xenophobic sentiments driven to extreme nationalistic against the Turks and the Arabs. He called upon especially the residents of Azerbaijan not to speak Turkish any more, "for the presence of Zoroaster is not the abode for Gengiz's tongue.",30 CAref's position against the Turkish tenlanguage was only one expression of his nationalistic He believed in the "purity" of the Iranian race dencies. and boasted that he himself had no doubt as to the "purity of my race and blood," for all his forefathers down to his grandfather had remained loyal to their ancient faith (Zoroastrianism) and had long fought the conquering Arabs.31 Accordingly, he displays sympathy for "pure Zoroastrian Iranians" and expresses the view that: If you are to be bound in the twentieth century 2 It is preferable to believe in the Zoroastrian religion.3 Iran's chaotic internal conditions and her weakness vis-a-vis foreign powers made CAref, like Bahar and others, yearn for the appearance of a strong leader who would save Seyyed Zia al-Din's measures the country and the nation. following the 1921 coup d 'etat attracted his eye and created in him high expectations for the betterment of Iran. CAref was jubilant, but the Seyyed was deposed after only three months. The poet accompanied his departure with grief and sorrow while other poets mocked cAref's naivete. Taqi Khan PesThen he placed his trust in Colonel Muhammad yan, the commander of Khorasan's gendarmerie, who had rebelled against the central government of Qavamal-Saltaneh and the colonel's The rebellion was short-lived (1921). violent death inspired the poet to write touching ghazals In these poems he compared the colonel with and ta4nifs. IRANIAN STltDIES
252
the Afsharid Nader Shah, for whose second coming CAref had In 1924, for the last time and already expressed desire.33 again without understanding the complex reality, cAref rejoiced over the republican movement. He burst with enthusiastic praise for Reza Khan and expressed fierce opposition to monarchy in general and the Qajar dynasty in particular: Do not dare have mercy for them, 0 And spare them not, the children of No flower will grow on this branch Cut the tree, 0 God, cut it to the
God Qajar. anymore, core.34
But republicanism also faded out, and Reza Khan himself became a monarch, to cAref's great disappointment. Later on, however, he praised the shah in an unpublished esletter, on account of his being "a Persian" and because pecially of his steps toward national integration.35 By this time, cAref was so low spirited that he retired to a secluded life in self-imposed exile in Hamedan, depending on his and a small government pension. friends' charity CAref was fundamentally a patriot rather than a revHe supported the revolution olutionary. but hardly underHe sympathized with laborers stood it. and peasants lorded over by the aristocracy, but his desire for revolution and bloodshed was generated mainly by his frustrated patriotic and rarely bore any socialist feelings significance. He became enthusiastic over any personality or group he deemed able to save the sinking ship of Iran. He even invited Lenin, "the angel of mercy," to come to Iran because "Bolshevism is the way to salvation."*36 It is doubtful whether he knew much about Bolshevism. When all the doors were or he so believed, closed, cAref gave himself up to extreme pessimism. He cursed the whole universe, even his beloved Iran and his fellow Iranians, and yearned for the "blessed Gengiz Khan to shed the putrified blood of this people"'37 cAref was too proud to bow before power and too weak to stand firm in face of calamity. He broke down and retired from life.
253
SUMMER-AUTUMN 1979
were the main literary vehicles Ghazal and tasnif The suitabilthrough which cAref conveyed his sentiments. ity of ghazal for musical performance contributed to its poetry, popularity in the context of the constitutional in the works of CAref, who used to sing most especially of his poems. In his ghazals, cAref followed the classical masters, mainly Sacdi and Hafez, without introducing novelties other than those commonto most poets stylistic terms, expressions, political colloquial of the period: and foreign loan words. Like Farrokhi, CAref interspersed lines relating to contemporary subjects in his ghazals, and and frequently dedicated whole poems to political images In such poems, though classical social issues. retained, the language is more straightforward. are still The following lines are from a ghazal cAref sang at a concert in Tabriz in 1924 to express his love for Azerbaijan, a main center of the revolution, which was frequently threatened by foreign powers:
<jI
U 0s1.-L<2;I
LA.T
J,~~~~~ ^-^jrjL ~~
U1.,QtL; ~81) ;
)k
L
WS
ow _
o
sLT4,a
T=
e,
IMANIAN STUD TES
ICX
: L.; e.j .Lw ^JD)D zL1.. Jz,) a~41t,
-gJL-
ILzj?Lz ?
. t. L
"ij-Sjs5>
s~~~~~~~j IRA- IAN) STUDTS
-.
25 254
doLIrT 5E
,)
1 S L..'-
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, J. _-~C) l-. ,_,IS L;"
J
sets my soul on fire Love for Azerbaijan As long as I live I cherish this fire. is firm because of Zardosht and Goshtasb My nationhood is my pride. In ancients In candor I say: between a exists code no difference In the nationality and a Muslim, Christian Hence I estrange myself from both alike. of the bloody history the Turkish language, Relinquish which the plains of Moghan and the Has covered with tulips Aras heights. Cast off the reminder of the Gengizian period For this period I nourish bloody spite. deaf, dumb and silent If you be blind, From the language of Turks It is better than saying: and Arabs I bear this sign. What is left from the honor of the land of Darius In which the ruler is from a Turkoman tribe.38 of ghazal to the popularization Such songs contributed hymn. The same is true of as a sort of national-patriotic from gift raised the tasnif CAref 's special CAref 's ta4nifs. His genre. respectable of a status the to position its folk written before him is based partlow esteem for the tasnifs and partly on his knowing self-esteem ly on his exaggerated rather than genuine popular court doggerels, only worthless was close to that of The style of cAref's taqnifs taqnifs. of the literary The combined effect ghazals. his topical pathos of the poems, and the soulthe nationalist language, to the reful melodies cAref himself composed contributed CAref's aspects, In their prosodic of ta4nif. spectability were closer to folk examples than in their style. taqnifs codes, and because of prosodic Contrary to the classical two or contained some of his taqnifs musical requirements, in This is the case, for instance, meters. more different 255
1979 SUJMMER-AUTUIMN
against Morgan Shuster's in which CAref protests the taqnif In the ouster from Iran because of the Russian ultimatum. of ramal meter in stroph, cAref uses a variation following of hazaj in the refrain: the main l'ines and a variation
4
.
J
.J,Jc)L44?J-4 4, 1
Do no
le
m
If Shuster leaves,
O young patriots,
L,
e
0T ?W
.SLs J
s
.J
m
c
Iran will be destroyed. let not Iran die !
To the dead you are the soul ! To a world you are the soul! gold! You are a treasure Would to God that you stay! Would to God that you stay!39 in number of hemistichs in rhyme pattern, Variations also chareach stanza, and the length of bobs and refrains Some taqnifs were but acterized the folk-style taqnifs.
IRANIAN STUDIES
256
mosamor classical ghazals made into strophs by refrains was added.40 The possibilities mats to which a refrain were a source of study and by such variations presented infor later poets who worked toward poetic inspiration Nima Yushij. including novation,
of lack of eloquence and prosodic weakInstances nesses blemished CAref's poems, but his pathos and his sinshortcomings. poetic cerity managed to shine through despite cAref kept in touch with the people unThrough his tasnifs, and indulgence in til he lost his voice because of sickness was The esteem CAref gained through his tasnifs alcohol. and his social and politgreater than his poetic abilities ical stature warranted.
CEshgi
Seyyed MuhammadReza Mirzadeh CEshqi (1893-1924) was He grew up in its atmosphere of a child of the revolution. and consequent disillusionment early hopes and struggles cEshqi was only 13 years old at the beginning and despair. but the exciting atmosphere of those days of the revolution, at circles drew him into political and his own sensitivity an early age. In two doggerel poems written apparently the chaotic conditions when he was 14 and 15, he criticized But of the authorities.41 of the country and the corruption seem to have seriously neither poetry nor orderly studies He was already a restless engaged CEshqi during his youth. to the centers of acperson who spent more time travelling high school. tion in Rasht and Tehran than he spent attending In 1914, at the age of 21, CEshqi followed his older colEshqi newspaper, Nameh-ye leagues and set up his first in his hometown of Hamedan. Only a few Epistle), (Eshqi's for cEshqi soon joined issues of this paper were published, to set up a nathe anti-British camp that was attempting they imWhen they failed, government in the west. tional and under strong It was in this city, migrated to Istanbul. that CEshqi devoted more time to inspiration, nationalist the necessity ideas concerning His first writing poetry. The senalso took shape in Istanbul. of poetic renovation timents he expressed in the poems of this time were basical257
SUMMER-AUTUMN 1979
the ly shared by other poets of this period, especially He supported the unity of Iran and the Ottoreminisced over Iran's past man Empire and nostalgically grandeur. But the attention he paid to ancient Iran was quite unique among the poets of the time, with the exception of Pur-Davud. On his way to Istanbul in 1915, cEshqi had passed through the ruins of Mada'en (Ctesiphon), the This encounter with the ruins of "the Sasanian capital. inspired the poet's musical cradle of world civilization" Iran (Resurrection of the play, Rastakhiz-e Shahriy3r5n-e Iranian Kings) . In a pathetic tone, cEshqi compares Iran' s In this, as in most present misery with her glorious past. poems of the time, the emphasis is not on nationalistic Iran's past cultural achievements, but mainly on her miliholdings and mighty kings. tary prowess, large territorial In the course of the play, the action of which unfolds in the poet's dream, he makes Darius, the Achaemenian king, boast: "emigres."
From China to Rome I mastered by the time of my death; I entrusted to posterity half the globe of Earth. Now it is all plundered All subjugated. Alas, what became of this world-conquering land, Now even a small part of it is not left in hand. This ruined graveyard is not Iran, 42 This desolate place is not Iran; where is Iran? of Iran's glorious past, accompanied Idealization or implicit blame of the Arabs for its dewith explicit provided a refuge against the frustrating realicline,4 But this very ties of Iran's present depressed state. In the same past also bears the hope for a better future. last scene of the play, the spirits of the ancient kings pray to the prophet Zoroaster to restore Iran's prosperity. Their prayer resounds as an appeal to Iranians to return The spirit of Zoroaster comes to their ancient heritage. prophesies: to a cradle, forth, and pointing From this very cradle before long Sons will arise, pride of Iran. Iran's lot no more lament deserves, IRANIANSTUDIES
258
The destiny of the land of Cyrus bears no more stains. I have overcome the Ahriman of Iranians; Now I retreat, Yazdan will protect Iran.44 CEshqi does not limit his hope for reawakening to Iranians only. Through Zoroaster he appeals to the "pure" nations of the East: Indians, Iranians, Turks, and Chinese who are equally afflicted by the covetous designs of the the common Islamic-Christian West. He disregards dichotooriented my that appeared in the works of the religiously poets such as Amiri, but compares the ancient grandeur of the East with the "savagery" of the West.45 In another long poem also inspired by the ruins of Ctesiphon, cEshqi puts forward a moving plea for the cause of Iranian women and condemns the veil which he defines as a "black shroud."46 cEshqils hopes, fancied in the world of poetry, crashed on the solid ground of reality when he returned to Iran after World War I. Confronted with the desperate condition of his country, cEshqi launched a campaign against the xenophile and corrupt establishforeign intervention, ment, and economic and social atdisparity. His fearless tacks against the government, especially against Vosuq alDawleh, who had signed the 1919 Anglo-Persian agreement, in his harassment. resulted He was eventually imprisoned for a short time following an abusive personal attack against the prime minister. Most of the later articles and poems of cEshqi were published in his second newspaper, Qarn-e Bistom (Twentieth Century), which was established in 1921. In the last issue of this paper he launched his most vehement attack, this time against the republican plans of Reza Khan in 1924, which he defined as a "fake republic" sponsored by the British.47 Two days after the publication of the "republican" poems and articles in Qarn-e Bistom, CEshqi was assassinated, reportedly by agents of the police department. cEshqi's violent death his own prophecy and even his he had declared: 259
appears to have fulfilled own desire. More than once
SU1MMER-AUITUMN1979
I am not the one to die a natural death To squander this cup of blood in a comfortable bed.48 Without casting doubts on the sincerity of the feelings expressed by the poet, one may trace some degree of romantic Already as in his mentality and behavior. self-indulgence a youth he had expressed, in a quatrain he wrote on the margin of his photograph, the wish to be a center of gravity: 0 Eshqi, if you live unknown like the secrets of the universe, Everyone will turn around you to find out what you are. If you wish to be the dot around which wanders the whole world, Cover your existence with the cloak of nonexistence.49 Later on, the desire for death and destruction manifest's itissues. self in his attitude toward social and political One can hardly avoid the impression that cEshqi was influWe know next to nothing enced by nihilistic philosophy. about the European writers and philosophers with whose But we know that cEshqi knew works he was acquainted. French quite well and that during his stay in Istanbul he It attended the School of Philosophy and Social Science. is quite probable that in the course of his studies there he became familiar with the ideas of French and Russian In his writings he expresses belief in the usenihilists. He himself of human existence. lessness and senselessness is not able to bear his life; he mocks "the Commanderof Creation" and puts "Nature and the Stars" on trial for havTo solve this personal ing created him against his will.50 problem he prescribes death and recommends this solution to others as well. cEshqi had accepted the notion of "glorious crime" which he presents to the whole world as a revolutionary cure for all the social ailments originating from the evil inherent in humanity: panj ruz Cid-e khun, a yearly five-day feast of blood which would replace all In these five days, the other feasts and entertainments.51 people, dressed in their best, would come out to punish all betrayers of society by killing them and demolishing their This is the only way to polish the machinery of houses. human society. IRANIAN STUDIES
260
was due mainly to his radical CEshqils popularity ideas and to his bold struggle against the establishment. His literary contribution is that he was among the first to draw attention to the need for poetic change and that he was one of those who tried his hand in meaningful, inThe advantage he had over most other novating experiments. poets was that he had come to poetry through the revolution; consequently, his literary vision was not entirely molded by the classical as was Baharls, for inoutlook, stance. Moreover, despite his claims to an ability to write classical-style poems,52 CEshqi was far from being an able classicist. His meager classical knowledge, combined with his romantic temperament and his acquaintance with French literature, made CEshqi susceptible to new ideas in the literary domain. The changes introduced by cEshqi in respect to rhyme and form were directed toward more freedom for the poet. He experimented mainly on variation of mosammat, creating versatile strophic forms which nevertheless were still governed by the classical rule of pre-fixed patterns. Of more significant value was his suggestion, practiced in few cases by the poet himself, to exercise greater freedom in the number of hemistichs in each stanza when there is a need to expatiate.53 Of the same nature were less rigid rhyme regulations employed by cEshqi: I refer to his use of rhyme according to the sound value of the letters and syllables of their spelling independent or word constructions, contrary to classical regulations.54 cEshqits main literary innovation is in the domain of poetic expression. As a romanticist, and perhaps under the influence of his friend Nima Yushij, cEshqi gradually developed a fresh poetic vision. He no longer looked at objects through the eyes of the classical masters, but through his own personal feelings. One of his last and best poems, "Ideale," which is also a summary of his political and social views, duly represents this new literary vision, although some of his earlier works also bear marks of stylistic novelty.55 Although not without aesthetic defects, a fresh poetic approach, "Ideale" displays in its descriptions especially of nature. The moon, which
261
SUMMER-AUTUIMN 1979
poetry was the symbol of beauty and of the bein classical loved's face, strikes a different impression on the imagination of the romantic poet:
L).L
js ~~~~J'.
.%
,.
Through the twigs of the weeping willow White moles the moon casts over the meadow Like a despairing heart with bright dots of hope. Likewise in the description of autumn, the cypress does not seem to him like "the beloved's stature" as in the classical poetry and in some of his own poems: J
4
'd
t:uT I
1.D
z2-%
d97*
LJL_Ln
v
L$
L
Rays of sun are feeble and pale plants have dried up and withered Birds have crept underneath their feathers 57 The beauty of nature is impaired Like a flag of sorrow looks cypress to me. Despite his talent and his relative success in adopting a new style, cEshqils poetry suffered from some weakLack of a sound knowledge of Persian language and nesses. his impatient and hasty temperament, intensified literature, IRANIAN STUDIES
262
as it was by the nature of his activities, and his disastrous lack of self-criticism, combined to lower the level of his poetry. His uneven style frequently lacks eloquence and is marred by prosodic weaknesses and faulty diction.S8 Nevertheless, he came among notable contemporary poets, to Nima's poetic vision. closest Had he lived longer, he would probably have joined Nima in tracing a new path for Persian poetry.
Pur-Davud
and idealization Glorification of pre-Islamic Iran, prominent in the works of cEshqi and expressed by other poets as well, found their zealous and devoted narrator in the poet Ebrahim Pur-Davud (1885-1969). His poems and later scholarly writings were the climax of interest and pride in Iran's ancient history and civilization which had been expressed by a growing number of Iranians since the second half of the nineteenth century. The beginning of Pur-Davud's scholarly and poetic career did not portend drastic developments in his thinkIn his hometown of Rasht, the young Pur-Davud was a ing. a student of Islamic studies, lalabeh, and according to his own account wrote religious threnodies and wailing songs.59 In 1905, shortly before the Constitutional Revolution, PurDavud went to Tehran to study traditional medicine. There he wrote poems in which he followed the classical masters in expressing his "maddening love for fancied beloveds," until he was caught up in the rising tide of nationalist sentiments and destroyed all his previous writings. Shortly after the granting of the constitution, he left the country to pursue his studies abroad. During the Lesser Autocracy and the developments that followed, Pur-Davud addressed exhortative poems to his fellow Iranians through newspapers. He supported the Constitutional Revolution as a whole, but he was interested mainly in its strong national feeling, which directed him toward a search for self-identity. Motivated by this search, he developed his great love for ancient Iran and tried to create a new national self-image based on the idealized past of his people. He eventually 263
1979 SUMMER-AUJTUMN
reached the point where he considered the whole Islamic As a result, conera as a period of foreign domination. trary to other contemporary poets who had also put their trust in Germany, he refused to support the unity of Isdichotomy, he lam and instead of the Islamic-Christian placed Zoroastrianism against Islam in a poem in which he contemplates Iranian history: The cry of Mo'azzen out of the mosque's minaret Prevailed over the fire-temple and the magi's hymn. The Arab army, hungry and bare-footed Took hold of palaces and rose-gardens.60 Arabs, Turks, and all non-IraPur-Davud identified nians with Ahriman, the Zoroastrian god of darkness and The Qajar malevolence, and with divs, demonic creatures.61 dynasty was a main target for Pur-Davud's xenophobic sentiIn 1914, on ments, on account of its "Turkish origin." the occasion of AhmadShah's coronation, he wrote: No hope is inspired by the House of Qajar No fruits will grow in a barren salt-marsh. Nothing did we gain from the Mongol masters And no good was done by the Arab ass-drivers. Ahmadis a foreigner, though he is now a king Foreigners yield nothing, but gloom and suffering. He who does not belong to the Iranian race Worships himself, not the people and their aims.62 On the other hand, he attributed all praiseworthy traits to ancient Iranians or their descendents, the Parsees of India, and found evidence in the legacy of pre-Islamic Iran for the progressive ideas he propounded. He expressed solidarity with the peasants and praised them as did the prophet Zoroaster in the "Ancient Book."63 He also condemned Islam for having allowed polygamy and called upon Iranians to return to Zoroaster's legacy regarding the position of women.64 In his effort to underline the grandeur of ancient Iran and between Iranians and other Muslim peoples, to differentiate Pur-Davud suggested as early as 1927 that 539 B.C., the year Cyrus conquered Babylon, be the basis for a new Iranian calendar, instead of 622 A.D., the year of prophet IRANIAN STUDIES
264
Muhammad's hijra. that: by stating
He explains
the choice
of the year
539
This was an important event in world history... proved Iranian superiority to the whole world, and was the beginning of our ancestors' glory and greatness .... We can again strengthen our weakened nationhood by reviving such traditions.65 in Berlin over the Pur-Davud's premature rejoicing news of the overthrow of the Qajars through Reza Khan's republican plans originated not only from his strong dislike for the "Turkman dynasty," but from the hope that Reza Khan, an Iranian, to a degree recallwould revive Iran's spirit ing the Kayanian glory.66 Reza Shah's nationalistic policy proved gratifying to Pur-Davud's wishes, although he spent the greater part of Reza Shah's reign in India where he In 1938, he studied and taught ancient Iranian culture. returned to Iran to assume a similar at teaching position Tehran University and to become a member of the Farhangestan, the Iranian Academy, whose main aim was to purge the Persian language of foreign terms. Pur-Davud himself had practiced purism long before the establishment of the academy (1935), for he thought that through the use of "pure Persian" one can contribute to the revival of Iran and Iranism.67 However, contrary to his extreme opinions in other fields, he was rather realistic in this regard and did not advocate complete rejection of Arabic words. He did, howuse archaic words and expressions ever, occasionally and supported the adoption of the Avestan din-dabiri alphabet instead of the present Arabic-Persian for "it suits script, the Persian pronunciation and had been chosen by our forefathers."68 The poet does not relate himself to the foreign, Semitic origin of din-dabiri. Pur-Davud's attachment to the legacy of his ancestors went beyond the glorification of pre-Islamic Iran and its heroes common to the works of most constitutional poets. He displayed in the Zoroastrian great interest and religion according to his own testimony even embraced his ancestral In a poem written during his visit faith. to Jerusalem in 1910 he says: 265
SUMMER-AUTUMN 1979
The azan,
the bell-ring,
and the hymn of the and the priest All equally traverse their way to the Divine Pur [-Davud] would choose one of these three palaces Had his heart not been the hearth of sun and temple.69
Jew, the shaykh presence. domed the fire-
No wonder, therefore, that in his hope for Iran's salvation Pur-Davud appeals not only to ancient Iranian kings and heroes as do other poets of the time, but turns also to Ahura Mazda and to Ameshaspandan, Zoroastrian archangels. In the following lines, the poet expresses his wishes through the use of Zoroastrian messianic figures and notions: Would that through the [deadly] deluge of Malkoshan Our soil be cleansed from the ignobles. May then from his garden-palace Jamshid come out to kindle the lamp. May he establish our fame And raise up a [worthy] Iranian race. May our Iran begin her life afresh May she be freed from disgrace and shame. May the ancient land be delivered forever From the Ahrimans and the foreigners. May the ancient Fire illuminate our lives And burn up deceit, and lies.70 falsehood, Pur-Davud's worshipful drove love for Iran eventually him to relinquish his other studies and to dedicate himself to the study of Iranian language and literature, and PreIslamic religions. Although others before him had interested themselves in these subjects, Pur-Davud was perhaps the first Iranian to study the past culture of his country with a scholarly Iranian writinterest. Many of the first of his devoted studies. ings on these subjects are the result His emotional with the subject, involvement however, drove him to some biased conclusions and opinions regarding the for Persian culture of the Islamic era. He was irritated, on this instance, by the strong Arabic and Islamic influence culture to the degree that he condemned Hafez, the greatest the command of Arabic lyrical poet of Iran, for considering IRANIAN STUDIES
266
as an art.71 Aside from the characteristics discussed, Pur-Davud's He usually poetry has very little follows the clasnovelty. sical poets in both prosody and style, though he too shares the contemporary tendency for strophic His style poems.72 is marked by a tendency toward simplicity and clarity of language. In accordance with his puristic tendency and national in a considerable pathos, number of poems he follows Ferdowsi's style in Sh3hn5meh. The following lines from an exhortative poem may serve as an example:
t--L,L ;i j
5j~~~'
It is time to saddle the Rakhsh To elevate the Kavian f lag. The enemy I shall not fear, for God of the two worlds is our support. We are from the Kayanian land, kings' scions We are from the pure Iran, and noble born.73 Pur-Davud, as he himself testifies,74 wrote poetry mainly as a hobby, and this only in his younger years. His main importance lies in his strong nationalistic views that were reflected later in his study of Iran's pre-Islamic culture. In these two regards he found a considerable following among later-generation Iranians who relied on his legacy in their search for self-identity.
267
1979 SUMMER-AUTUIMN
NOTES
1.
by Farrokhi Yazdi, Divan, edited with an introduction Elmi 1332/1953), (Tehran: Hosein Makki, fourth printing details biographical indicated, p. 93; unless otherwise about the poet are taken from Makki's introduction.
2.
Ibid.,
3.
p. 80; Tus is a legendary hero and Afridun (FeIbid., reidun) is the king who ascended the throne following against the tyrant Zahhak. a popular uprising
4.
Ibid.,
p. 11.
5.
Ibid.,
pp. 41-42.
6.
Ibid.,
p. 43.
7.
Ibid.,
p. S1; see
8.
Ibid.,
pp. 90-91.
9.
p. 82; No. 2 (Aban, 1329/1950), See Setareh-ye olt, I am thankful to Prof. Ervand Abrahamian for drawing Farrokhi had opposed to this source. my attention see Divan, pp. 36, 46, Reza Khan from the beginning; 76, 103, 123.
p. 58.
also
pp.
112,
Divan,
Farrokhi,
133.
pp. 82-85,
87-89.
10.
For instance,
11.
pp. 32-33; mashshgteh is a woman hairdresser. Ibid., Poems of this sort abound in his divan.
12.
life are, if not otheron Lahuti's details Biographical taken from Yahya Ariyanpur, Az Sabg ta wise indicated, Nizima, Vol. II, pp. 168-171, 381-383.
13.
Lahuti Abolqasem Lahuti, La'ali-ye p. 49; see also pp. 48-56. n.d.),
14.
Donya, VIII,
IRANIAN STUDIES
No. 3 (Fall 268
1346/1967),
(Istanbul: p. 107.
Shams,
15.
Abolqasem Lahuti, Divan-e AshCar, edited and annotated by MuhammadCAbbasi (Tabriz: Helal-e Naseri, 1320/ 1941), pp. 2-3.
16.
Ibid., p. 38; for more examples of atheistic, ligious, and anti-clerical poems see pp. 15, 35-36.
17.
Muhammad Taqi
Bahar,
yisi
1323/1944),
(Tehran,
Tjrikh-e
Mokhtaqar-e
Vol.
I, pp.
anti-re17, 29,
Ahzab-e
Si-
169-170.
18.
Jiri Becka, "Tajik Literature from the 16th Century to the Present," in Rypka and others, of Iranian History Literature (Dortrecht, 1968), p. 564.
19.
Lahuti,
20.
Bahar, Tarikh-e Ahzab, p. 178; Bahar's account is based on the notes of an ex-officer of the gendarmerie.
21.
Lahuti,
Divan,
22.
See for 561-566,
instance Bahar, 648-649.
23.
Lahuti, 71.
Divan,
24.
For examples, see translation from va qol1 (Moscow, poem "Partizan,"
25.
Sorudha,
26.
Abolqasem cAref, Divan, edited by A. Seif-Azad, with introduction by Rezazadeh Shafaq, fifth printing (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1347/1968), p. 64; biographical accounts about cAref are taken from his own autobiography, ibid., pp. 62-167, unless otherwise indicated.
27.
Ibid.,
Divan,
p.
p.
22.
2.
pp. 3-4;
Divan,
Vol.
for a later
I, pp.
example
370-372, see pp. 69-
respectively ibid., pp. 54-56; his Maxim Gorki in his Sorudha-ye Azadi 1954), pp. 157-169; and the syllabic pp. 136-144. ibid..,
pp. 347-348.
p. 200; see also
p. 269
341. SUMMER-AUTUMN 1979
28.
Ruhollah Khaleqi, IlCAref, ShaCer va See for instance, Musiqi, Vol. III, No. 70 Naghmeh-pardaz," Majalleh-ye (1341/1962), pp. 4-12.
29.
CAref,
Divan,
30.
Ibid.,
against
p. 384; see also p. 427. Turks and Arabs see also
31.
Ibid.,
p. 443.
32.
Ibid.,
p. 530.
33.
Ibid.,
pp. 225,
34.
Ibid.,
p. 392; see also
35.
Ibid.,
36.
Ibid.,
p. 300.
37.
Ibid.,
p.
38.
here and in pp. 425-426; the term izar (fire) Ibid., alapparently other lines of the poem not translated in the Zoroposition principal ludes to Azerbaijan's of famous fire temples and the location religion astrian of The rule of the Turkomans refers, in this area. to the Qajars and the contemporary Ahmad Shah. course,
39.
Ibid.,
pp. 365-366;
see also
40.
Ibid.,
respectively
pp. 348-349,
p. 359. On his sentiments pp. 293-296, 367, 443.
475. pp. 282-284,
416-417,
434, 436.
P?. 518-519; in an earlier poem CAref had denounced Reza Shah at the beginning of his reign, withpp. 474-475. out mentioning his name; ibid.,
206; see also
p. 312.
pp. 380-382. 362-364,
and 340-342,
365-366. 41.
edited with an Mosavvar, Mirzadeh cEshqi, Kolliyat-e fourth printby CAli Akbar Moshir Salimi, introduction pp. 432, 475; Amir Kabir, 1342/1963), ing (Tehran: introducare taken from Salimi's details biographical tion.
IRANIAN STUDIES
270
42.
Ibid.,
p. 235.
43.
Ibid.,
pp.
44.
Ibid.,
vases itude
218,
211.
with two silver p. 240; the poet was presented by the Parsees of India as a token of their gratfor having composed this musical play.
45.
Ibid.,
p. 239.
46.
Ibid.,
pp. 201-218.
47.
Ibid., pp. 275-278; see also pp. 279-297 for his other poems on the republican howIt is ironic, movement. ever, that one of these poems, "Jomhuri-Nameh" (ibid., pp. 284-292) was from the pen of Bahar.
48.
Ibid.,
p. 380.
49.
Ibid.,
p. 417.
50.
Ibid.,
pp. 311,
51.
Ibid.,
pp.
52.
Ibid.,
53.
Ibid.,
54.
pp. 269, lines 2-3; 393, line 12; for a similar experiment before Eshqi, see Jacfar Khameneh'i's poem in E. G. Browne, Press and Poetry off Modern Persia, p. 298.
55.
See for instance the long poem "Kafan-e particular its preamble, Eshqi, Kolliyat,
56.
Ibid..,
p. 174.
57.
Ibid.,
p. 179.
334-335 , 370.
121-139;
see also
pp.
192-193.
p. 259; see also the poem on p. 271 which he considers a testimony to his classical ability. pp. 259;
204-205,
261,
266.
Ibid.,
271
Siyah," in p. 201.
SUMMER-AUITUMN 1979
stroph; 263, first
58.
pp. 177, first For a few examples see ibid., 205, line 5; 211, first and second strophes; and last strophes; 337, last line.
59.
Ebrahim Pur-Davud, Purandokht-Nameh, edited with an English translation by Dinshah J. Irani (Bombay, 1927), p. 20; biographical details are based mainly on PurDavud's own autobiography, pp. 7-15.
60.
Ibid.,
61.
Ibid.,
62.
Ibid.,
p.
63.
Ibid .,
pp.
64.
Ibid.,
p. 83; see also pp. 90-94. pp. 45,
74,
86, 94.
39.
34-36.
to compare It is interesting pp. 59-61, 89-90. Pur-Davud's approach with that of MuhammadReza Shah
Pahlavi, in his book on the White Revolution; the shah provides references for each principle from Zoroastrialthough he an and other ancient Iranian traditions, balances them by presenting evidence from Islamic pp. 32-34, sources as well. See for instance Sefid (Tehran, 120-121, 123, of his Enqelib-e 1966).
Fifty years later (1976), pp. 16-17. Pur-Davud's basic suggestion was adopted by the Iranian government to mark the 50th anniversary of the PahThe government, however, chose the year lavi dynasty. 559, the beginning of Cyrus's rule, as the basis of the new calendar.
65.
Pur5ndokht-N3meh,
66.
Ibid.,
67.
p. 88. and Poetry, p. 293. For examples of his poems see Purandokht-Nameh, pp. 21, 62, 68-
Browne, Press puristic 75.
68.
36-37, 1345/
Pur3ndokht-N3meh,
IRANIAN STUDIES
p.
16.
272
p. 25; see also
69.
Ibid.,
70.
Ibid.,
71.
M. Ishaque, Sukhanvaran-i
72.
See for instance 47-48, 86-88.
73.
Ibid.,
74.
Ibid.,
p. 289.
is based on Dinp. 81; the English translation shah Irani's; Malkoshan (angels) equal Noah's deluge; the Earth and will do so again they have once destroyed in relation to the coming of the Zoroastrian Messiah. On Pur-Davud's messianic hopes see also pp. 38, 75. Iran dar Apr-i HaIzer (Delhi: Jamia Press, 1937), Vol. I, p. 52; Hafez, Divan, edited by M. Qazvini and Q. Ghani (Tehran: Zavvar, 1320/1941), p. 45. Purandokht-Nameh,
p. 33; Rakhsh is hero Rostam. p.
pp. 29-31,
the famous horse
40-42,
of the national
14.
273
SUMMER-AUTUMN 1979
Iranian Studies, Volume XII, Nos. 3-4, Summer-Autumn1979
Comments on "Tribalismas a Socioeconomic Formation" James J. Reid
The argument proposed by Professor Leonard M. Helfgott in a recent article in Iranian Studies (Vol. X,Nos.l2, 1977) cannot be accepted as an accurate evaluation of and economic structure the social of tribalism in Iran. The picture presented in his article portrays the situation almost solely in terms of theoretical considerations, with relatively little attempt to substantiate the theories with a monolithic As a result, fact. view of tribal is society put forth. The most objectionable theoretical approach in his article in the following proffered is expressed statement: "Tribal societies contain neither a concrete superstructural entity such as the state nor a separate economic do not sphere.... But that is not to say that these functions of pre-state exist or are not necessary for the production societies. Rather superstructural functions appear as embedded within the kinship system.111 tribes Traditionally, throughout Iranian history existed above and beyond the reach of the various kinship entities that they governed or controlled; indeed, they provided formal superstructures by which they exploited the various sources of wealth, and The tribes maintained order. were, through most of Iranian history, something more than just collectivities of pas-
James J. Reid is Lecturer in the Department of California, Los Angeles. the University
275
of History
at
SUMMER-AUlTUMN 1979
Even in discussing organized as kinship systems. toralists the eighteenth century, when the tribal structures of Iran elements of were in an advanced state of disintegration, survived, making tribthe old tribal (ugmgq) superstructures alism the most predominant of a number of social and economic entities. limit itself The present critique must necessarily in scope, and it must be realized that the information given The form below is relevant mainly to the Safavid period. and conception of the Safavid uymaq evolved out of the Mbngol/Chaghatay concept of tribe (aymak).2 Even though the Safavid tribal systems possessed their own characteristics with other they shared one characteristic and traditions, conception systems derived from Turco-Mongol patterns--the Subsequent states in Iran, such of tribe as a formal state. of these as the Afshar and the Qajar, were derivatives "states," and continued to maintain many of their attributes, though in an altered and enlarged form. From the eleventh century onward, the administrative, economic, and social systems of Iran were fundamentally affected by continual integration with Turkish pastoral soci(The product of this interaction was the developeties.3 ment, in the Safavid period, of the structural entities known as uymaqs. While the term uymaq is frequently translated as tribe, it was much more than a kinship system; it and econoadministrative, was a whole series of military, mic relationships between numerous groups that might or The reason that might not be related by ties of kinship. as a tribe is that the group(s) ruling it can be classified over any given uymaq operated on the principle of kinship as a means of succession to the rule, or drew its chiefs from a certain number of families that were considered reThe various units ruled sponsible for providing leaders. by these families may have also formed themselves into kinship units (whether inhabiting a pastoral camp or a village) The as subtribes. and may therefore be classified itself was not a kinship unit, and did not confront the There economic system solely on the basis of kinship.4 was, in fact, a more or less standard superstructure in which had become current in the period of the existence, IRANIAN STUDIES
276
Ilkhans. The high point in the formation of these tribal came in the sixteenth superstructures when most century, of Iran fell under the auspices of various uymaq structures. Pastoral, agricultural, and even urban forms of production were subjected to the command of various famiincreasingly lies of chieftains, who controlled them for their own benefit.5 Their control was never complete, of course, but a zenith was reached during the reign of Tahmasp I (1524-76). Never before, and never after, were so many different economic forms integrated into the Iranian uymaq system. The exact extent of this integrative process cannot be determined since much of the documentary evidence disappeared in the conflagrations that accompanied the Afghan invasions of the eighteenth century. But an idea of the joint economic and administrative system that existed at the time of Tahmasp I can be obtained by taking note of which authorities were subject to the rule of any uymaq chieftain. Turks, and representatives of the pastoral segment fell under the authority of an uymaq r'sh sifld just like Tajiks or other non-pastoralists (including many settled Turks, Georgians, Armenians, Lurs, and many others). The rlsh sifid or elder-chief was a tribal political and military leader who, in addition, often held high position in the central government of the Safavid state. Some of the most important rish sifids to occupy high state offices were Amir Khan Mausillu, Badr Khan Ustajlu, and Mirza CAli Beg Qajar.6 Beneath the rish sifid(s) of each uymaq were extensive networks of social and economic controls. A parallel system of controls existed--one system that sought to control the pastoral enclaves owing obeisance to a chieftain, and another that sought to control the agricultural/ urban systems under the authority of each chieftain. The core of these dual administrative systems was the household compounds of the chiefs, which were nothing more than great fortresses located either in or around great cities and in the territories to the chiefs' belonging families. These households were not only military centers, but markets, and centers of political activity. The double systems of administration that from these centers of control, though overlapping 277
emanated in a num-
SUMMER-AUTUMN 1979
ber ofcases, can beshown to consist of two distinct groups: (a) offices and positions held by membersof the chiefs' families or retainers, and (b) offices held by Iranians, generally for the supervision of the agricultural sector. Many of the positions were obviously of the nature of a private service, but the cornerstone of the system was the use of private, family organizations as public institutions. This practice was best expressed in the double interpretation of intisab to mean both political, non-kin protege, and kinsman.7 The following chart demonstrates some of these relationships. It must be noted explicitly here that the relationships depicted in this chart were not absolutes. There were indeed Kurdish pastoralists inhabiting Khurasan as early as the fourteenth century, while there were Turks who were agriculturalists. By the same token, there were many Iranian officers who held uymaq posts that were nor-mally allocated to Turks, while Turks like Iskandar Beg-i Munshi held administrative posts in the mostly Tajik bureaucratic system of the central government. The alignment below is made solely for ease of reference. The Khan or Beg A
Category (Chiefs)
Ish1k-aq3s!-bANshl
Category (Iranians)
(com-
yasavul-i suhbat (master of court ceremonial - commander of the khan's bodyguard)
(keeper
of the
zmunshlsl5
(scribes)
(herald) 9 LOCALFUNCTIONARIES
LOCALFUNCTIONARIES h2kiml?
or daftardar (chief treasurer and tax collector)
khazlna-d5r
librarian
khan's table) elchi
(chief administrator of the khdn)14
vazir
mander of the haram guard)8
sufrachl
B
(governor
provincial
4akim (Khan AhmadKhan of
of a
Gilan and his relatives or colleagues in the service
post)
IRANIAN STUDIES
278
Category
A--Continued
(warden
kutval citadel)1l
of
B--Continued
Category of
a
the
various
and
Talish Kurdish
Ustajlu;
and
Luri
chiefs) aqa - onbashi12and yuzbashi of provincial (commanders from levied troops garrison owing communities pastoral to the khan) allegiance
kalntars village kadkhudas
the
the taxes)
unassigned
amirs
or
lower
a
(provost town)
of
(village
headmen)
in soldiers of foot levies khan of the service the and as auxiliaries serving or musketeers pikemen
of the khan (agent for responsible bazar of certain collection
darilgha13
in
or
level
(an amXir had the
to right and their
revenues certain collection)
or elders ak sakals (heads subsections of pastoral known as oks or migration or camp and obas units groups)
uymaq subtribes of the were considered villages Some of the The symbiosis between own tribal officials. and had their did not prevent agriculturalists and the the pastoralists various onward, 1560s and from the a growth of tensions, and towns in the villages especially chieftains, Iranian of uymaq chiefs. rule the against of Gilan to agitate began alranges and Alburz in the Talish, Zagros, Kurdish chiefs evenbut these of the uymaq khans, so defied the authority and sixteenth, late in the own uymaqs their formed tually uymaqs smaller of the The growth centuries. seventeenth Iran of Safavid of uymaq substates on the crisis brought of the free-for-all the into that degenerated eventually so lost uymaqs greater Some of the century. eighteenth as entities, altogether disappeared much power they that
279
SUMMER-AUTUMN 1979
while other uymaqs like the Qajar and Afshar were forced to compete on the same level as the new uymaqs. Only after 1795 was the Qajar uymaq able to establish itself temporarcontrol of Iran. ily in uncontested The evidence
presented
above clearly
shows that super-
structural functions were not imbedded in the kinship system, as Professor Helfgott would have it, but that the reverse was true. The tribe was a dynamic social element in which changes were always taking place, and in which the values of the community were formulated not solely by blood ties, but by super-familial relationships. Kinship, in fact, was of greater ambisubordinated to the interests frequently tions, and nothing could attest to this more than the careers of such uymaq chieftains as Amir Khan Mausillu (whose that turned upon him for his crass imperialism relatives were contrary to their own interests) and others like him CAli Quli Khan Shamlu and Murshid Quli Khan Ustajlu. (e.g.,
NOTES
1.
Forma"Tribalism as a Socioeconomic Leonard Helfgott, X (1977), Iranian Studies, tion in Iranian History," p. 39.
2.
was in One of the major Safavid uymaqs, the Ustajlu, colonists. Chaghatay of descendents of part composed Iran, in Islamic and Society James J. Reid, Tribalism UCLA, 1978, Chapter 7, Appendix C. Ph.D. dissertation,
3.
Anonymous, ijudud al-CAlam, ed. V. Minorsky, E. J. W. Luzac Vol. II (London: n.s., Gibb Memorial Series, Musaand Co., 1937), pp. 100-101; Mahmud al-Aksaray, Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, merat Ul-Ahbar (Ankara: 1944), p. 10.
4.
Helfgott,
5.
"Tribalism,"
p. 47,
citing
Chayanov.
A Manual of Safavid al-Muluk: Anonymous, Tadhkirat ed. V. Minorsky, E. J. W. Gibb MemoriVol. 16 (London, 1943), pp. 100-105. n.s., al Series,
Administration,
I.RANIAN STUDIES
280
6.
Iskandar Beg-i Munshi, Tarlkh-i CAlam Ara-yi CAbb3sl (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1350), I, p. 227 for the institution of rlsh sifid just after the death of Tahmasp I, in each of the Safavid uymaqs (hereinafter cited as TAAA).
7.
Political affiliations could be non-kinship and kinship terms. true in the reign of Tahmasp I, tains of different uymaq lineages another extensively in military san-i Rumlu, Ahsan al-Tav5rikh: Early Safawis (Baroda: Oriental passim (cited as AT).
8.
interpreted on both This was especially when qizilbash chiefcooperated with one expeditions. See HaA Chronicle
Institute,
the
Qazi Ahmad Qumi,
Khulasat ed. Hans Muller, al-Tav5rikh, Die Chronik Khulasat at-Tawarikh, Der Abschnitt uber Schah CAbbas I (Wierbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1964),
pp. 90-91 (cited as KhT), (Mehdi Quli Sultan the Ishik-Aqasi-Bashi at Hirat). 9.
of
1931),
TAAA, p. 416 (Shahvirdi
Shamlu as
Chulaq Qajar).
10.
TAAA, pp.
11.
TAAA, p. 500.
12.
TAAA, p. 43; AT, p. 70 (Hasan Aqa Ustajlu, Khizr Aqa Ustajlu. The aqa was not an amir, and generally did not hold land or revenue equivalencies).
13.
A. K. S. Lambton, "Islamic
Society
and Cultures
East,
139ff.,
1085ff.,
and passim.
in Persia," Peoples ed. Louise Sweet (Garden City: Natural History Press, 1970), I, pp. 84-85; Jean Chardin, Voyages, Amsterdam, 1711, II, pp. 302303; TAAA, p. 208 (CAbd al-Ghani Beg Ustajlu) and p. 948 (Takhta Beg Ustajlu). of
the
Middle
14.
TAAA, pp. 267 (Muhammadi Khan Saru Sulagh Ustajlu), 296 (the Tajik vazir of Amir Khan Mausillu).
15.
TAAA, pp. 85ff. 281
SUMMER-AU1TUMN 1979
Iranian Studies, Volume XII, Nos. 3-4, Summer-Autumn1979
REVIEW AR TICLE Religion and Ideology in the ConstitutionalRevolution Ideologi-ye
Tehran:
Nahzat-e
Mashrutiyyat-e
Iran.
By F. Adamiyyat.
Payam, 1976/1355.
in Iran, A Study of ShiCism and Constitutionalism of Iraq in Iranian Residents by the Persian Played
By A. H. Hairi.
Leiden:
E. J.
Brill,
the Role Politics.
1977. Said Amir Arjomand
of the reliShortly before the sudden re-emergence forefront of the now triumgious leaders in the political movement, these two books on the role phant revolutionary in the Constitutionand of religious ideology of religion They are noteworthy in al Revolution of 1905-11 appeared. to some currently held views, all the correctives providing more so because these views may appear to be corroborated of the rebased on a superficial assessment by a hindsight factor in the present revolution. ligious Adamiyyat departs from some of the accepted views of the role of the ulama in the Constion the significance Ever since Kasravi (1941) considered Revolution. tutional of "the two Sayyids," Sayyid MuhammadTabatathe alliance ba'i and Sayyid CAbdullah Behbehani, to be the starting many have tended to take it for point of the revolution, Revolution. granted that the ulama led the Constitutional
of Sociology Professor Said Amir Arjomand is Assistant of New York at Stony Brook. State University
283
at
1979 SUMMER-AUTUMN
Adamiyyat's anti-clericalism predisposes this view, and he does so effectively.
him to challenge
Adamiyyat is correct in asserting emphatically that "there were two distinct and opposing fronts among the Culama': the traditionalists and the constitutionalists" (p. 148). Furthermore, he argues that the.ulama did not have any distinct and clearly formulated revolutionary or reformist political objectives, and that their prominence was largely ceremonial. The definition of the goals of the movement--more specifically, the creation of a Constitutional and parliamentary form of monarchical government, was the work of the intellectuals who had been influenced by Western political ideas. "The ulama are not at all informed about political matters and cannot undertake [political tasks]. Today they consider themselves devoid of [competence in] political affairs," writes Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani--admittedly not an impartial contemporary commentator--in a passage cited by Adamiyyat in support of his contention (p. 30). He also adduces the more weighty testimony of Yahya Dawlatabadi relating to the inception of the constitutionalist movement in December 1905, when the prominent religious leader had taken sanctuary in the shrine of CAbdul-cAzim. who was in charge of conveyDawlatabadi, ing the ulama's proposal to the central government, expressed astonishment at "the extent of [their] thoughlessness" in drawing up the proposal. He claims to have taken the initiative in persuading the religious leaders to include at least "one general item" in the list of seven trivial and mundane demands. They were persuaded to call for the creation of a House of Justice Daw(CAdalat-khaneh-ye latl) (p. 155). Later, they modified the demand, and asked for the creation of a national consultative a deassembly, mand which was eventually met by the Decree Granting Iran a Constitution. This example shows that the crucial initiative was taken by Dawlatabadi who, though "turbaned," was an intellectual and an active advocate of educational reform. Adamiyyat also maintains that it was largely the pressure of the intellectuals--and, he may well have added, of the merchants--that made the religious leaders insist on obtaining the demands of the constitutionalist movement (pp. 156-164). "the Adamiyyat sums up his view as follows: IRANIAN
STUDIES
284
in the common (hamagani) ulama as a group did participate rebellion and the constitutionalist movement, but the basis of their political thinking was weak" (p. 148). Furthermore, "the religious institution did not have a modern progressive political philosophy, and did not produce valid political works until after the formation of the constitutionalist movement" (p. 3). Part III, the most interesting part of the book, fotheories cuses on the social and political of the constituIn addition of the secular tional period. to the writings intellectuals, which, apart from those of the Social Demoare well known, Adamiyyat introduces crats, many of the neMost notable among glected books and tracts of the period. them are the books and pamphlets written by the religious in defense of autocracy, scholars constitutionalism, and finally of the "mashruteh-ye mashr5Ceh. " These writings, reproduced in some detail, clearly show the sharp division of opinion regarding the political order within the clerical circles. The division of the Shi'ite ulama into constitutionalist and absolutist camps, both in Tehran and the CAtab5t, is amply demonstrated in Hairi's ShiCism and ConstitutionIt is clear from his account that, with the notable alism. of Shaykh Hadi Najmabadi and Sayyid Muhammad exceptions Tabataba'i, about whom Hairi has two very good sections, the ulama's intellectual response came after the event of the revolution. It consisted of attempts to deal with this unprecedented contingency by drawing on the sources of the Shi'ite tradition and on the UsulT jurisprudential methodIt is equally clear, ology. at least in regard to the holy centers of learning in Iraq with which Hairi is chiefly concerned, that the clerical partisans of the anti-constitutionalist camp were numerous and that they decisively predominated after 1911 (see especially pp. 123-4). Many of the constitutional ulama became disillusioned with the course of events and withdrew their support. These included the group's ablest political Mirza Muhamtheorist, mad Husayn Na'ini, who eventually ordered the unsold copies of his pro-constitution tract to be withdrawn from circulation (pp. 124, 158). 285
SUMMER-AUTUMN 1979
Shi' ism and Constitutionalism in Iran is the published version of a McGill doctoral thesis on the life andworks of the prominent Shilite jurist, Mirza Muhammad Husayn Na'ini (1860-1936). It is a virtually unrevised version of the thesis, with spelling errors and redundant cross-references, and it could do with much restructuring and tightening up. Nevertheless, it contains a good deal of valuable information about the activities of the ulama during the first decades of the century, including the significant help they gave to Reza Shah in the creation of the Pahlavi dynasty.
Much of the book consists of a careful and clear exof Na'ini's political views as stated in the Tanb7h al-Umma wa Tanz7h al-Milla. Although the Tanb7h, a difficult and technical tract in Shi'ite jurisprudence, has now become famous, it is rarely read and its arguments are known entirely through the writings of the Ayatullah MahmudTaleqani. However, Taleqani's intemperate exposition of the contents of the Tanbih was colored by immediate political It was thus presented as essentially concerns. an attack on tyranny and despotism. As Hairi points out (p. 157), this obscured the main purpose of the tract, which was the of constitutional justification government. Hairi provides a more balanced and comprehensive analysis of Na'ini's political thought and puts Na'ini's important contribution to Shilite political conphilosophy in its proper historical He correctly underlines the influence of the Islamic text. Kawakibi, whose Tab3yiC al-Istibdad modernists, especially was in fact translated into Persian just before the Constitutional Revolution, in 1905. Kawakibi's important influence is stressed by both Hairi and Adamiyyat. In the light of Taleqani's emphasis on the quintessentially Shi'ite nature of Na'ini's outcry against tyranny, it is worth quoting Hairi's statement that "the concept of tyranny, however, the Western explanation of its characteristics, particularly was borrowed from Kawakibi," who in turn acknowledges the influence of Vittorio Alfieri, the author of Of Tyranny (p. 162). Here my intention is not to deny the consonance of the attack on tyranny with the political ethos of Shi'ism, but rather to insist that Na'ini's work should be treated, and emphatically, as an important instance of explicitly I cannot say that Hairi himself does Shilite modernism. position
IRANIAN STUDIES
286
so, or that he shows any real appreciation of the significance of this last point. He brings out Na'ini's Shilism but not his modernism. In fact, having demonstrated the heavy influence of Kawakibi on Nalini, and of Alfieri on Kawakibi, Hairi proceeds to make the contradictory statement that "in Nalini's discussion of tyranny, there is little modern element" (p. 175). (Incidentally, this is not the only instance in which Hairi fails to draw the implications of the materials he presents. Another important instance is his failure to draw out the broader implications of the political and intellectual strength of the reactionary camp, headed by Sayyid Kazim Tabataba'i Yazd! in the CAtab5t and Shaykh Fazlullah Nuri in Tehran. Although Hairi's account of this group hints at their potency [especially pp. 170-1, 209ff], he neither explains nor their significance.) analyzes In addition to these analytical weaknesses and the structural Shi'ism and Constitutionaluntidiness, ism in Iran suffers from a number of substantive defects. Hairi's account of the historical background of the authority of the Shilite religious leaders is superficial and on the institution facile. The section of marjaC-e taqlld is a case in point. It does not tell us how very late in the history of Shi'ism this institution was formalized. Nor does Hairi seem to appreciate that the title used to designate the highest religious in the Safavid position and most of the Qajar period was n3'ib-e imam rather than taql7ld. Even with regard to the period under conmar jaC-e sideration one is puzzled by the inclu(roughly 1906-25), sion in the list of the sole marajiC of four strictly conof whom three died within a very short temporary mujtahids, span of time (1919-20), and the fourth, the Akhund-e Khurasani (d. 1911) was certainly never the sole marjaC-e taq1Td (p. 64). general
The section on the ulama's rivals to refollowing, ligious leadership, is equally unsatisfactory, consisting of a fairly lengthy but shallow and indiscriminate treatment of a number of "movements" including the Ahl-e Haqq (!), Akhbarism, Shaykhism, Cirfan, Babism, and the (totally insignificant) "revolt of Sayyid cAlamgir."? 287
SUMMER-AUTUMN 1979
A much more serious defect--more serious because of its pertinence to the central theme of the book--is Hairi's treatment of traditional Shi'ite political theory prior to this century. Hairi, whom we would expect to know better because of his clerical family background, unfortunately bows to the prestige of Western scholarship and accepts the prevalent view on the political implication of Shi'ism. In the section entitled "Who is the Legitimate Ruler?" (pp. 55-62), Hairi reiterates the prevalent view, presenting the ulama as entitled to political authority on behalf of the Hidden Imam. He is extremely hard put to amass only seven hadiths (of varying degrees of pertinence), which he presents as "the Shi'i theory of government," and feels constrained to add an apologetic remark: This is, of course, not an exhaustive treatment of the basis of the political and legal claim of the ulama; nor have all these hadiths been accepted by all the ulama unquestionably. In other words, the political of the ulama is one of the subauthority jects of polemics in clerical circles, and no final conclusion has yet been achieved....One of the mujtahids who strongly the ideas presented questioned in some of the above-mentioned hadiths was Na'ini, came to the conclusion that the although he finally has the same ruling authority as the Imam faqih (p. 60). Hairi proceeds to report Keddie's and Nevertheless, about the illegitimacy of secular Algar's assertions government in Shi'ism. These assertions are, needless to All one could conclude from the evidence say, nonsequitur. adduced by Hairi is that there exists no "Shi'i theory of government." would be misleading; However, even that conclusion Pace Algar and Hairi, there are Shi'ite political theories, written by the ulama in the nineteenth which lecentury, the political of the ruler during the gitimatize authority Occultation, whose right to rule derives from the Imamate. Modon in his Sayyid Jacfar Kashfi's chapter on Siyasat-e written in 1818, is one such example. Tubfat al-Muluk, IRANIAN
STUDIES
288
part of the Qajar period (Other examples from the latter are cited in the recent book by Adamiyyat and Nateq's va ejtemaC i-ye Afkar-e siy5s! MangbiO-e Montasher-nashodeh
Dawreh-ye
Qpjar
bas
Asas-e
(Tehran, 1977, pp. 11-19). After all, the reader may legitimately ask, in view of the character of all governallegedly inescapably usurpatory how was it that so ment during the Greater Occultation, monmany of the ulama wrote in defense of the absolutist obiter dicta regarding the disagreement archy? Hairi's in the poon their authority among the Shi'ite jurists litical regard to anyway, sphere, which he pays little are hardly a substitute of the diverse for an analysis concepts of Shi'ism, interpretations of the key political most notably the velayat-e and the niy3bat-e c5mma. faqih in its own right, is surely Such an analysis, crucial called for by Hairi's The towering figsubject matter. ure of nineteenth-century Shaykh Murtaza Ansari Shi'ism, (d.
1864)
went
so
far
as
to
consider
niyabat-e
Cjmma
of
the jurists as not well established (Shaykh Asadullah [Istanbul Mamaqani, Din va Sho' un, Tehran 1335/1956-7 See also Shaykh Murtaza Ansari, 1336Q./1918]: p. 48. who took a somewhat real-Makasib, 1299/1881-2:71-72, of the ulama, strictive view of the political authority the powhile the Akhund-e Khurasani [d. 1911] considers litical of the Imam to devolve upon the jurists. authority See his commentary on the Makasib, 1319/1901-2: 52.) Hairi had the resources study to undertake a systematic of these Shi'ite and should have done political notions so in view of his subject matter. Instead, he unfortuin secondary and nately relies on incidental statements remarks of some of the tertiary sources, or on uncritical colored by their contemporary ulama, which are heavily present-day political concerns. Although the novel feature of Adamiyyat's Ideologl and intelis, in my opinion, his thesis on the political lectual movement, role of the ulama in the constitutional his book has a much more ambitious and impressively broader In addition scope. to covering the whole gamut of political thought from social apologia democracy to the clerical for absolutism, Adamiyyat provides us with a pioneering of the early parliamentary politics in terms of analysis 289
SUMMER-AUTUMN 1979
the two-pronged struggle of the secular reformists: with the absolutist monarchy--in their attempt to bring the executive under parliamentary control; and with the religious institution--in their attempt to secularize the judiciary. The book's defects, exasperating at times, stem predictably from Adamiyyat's unabashed liberalism, nationalism, and anti-clericalism. The partisan commentaries of the Whig historian of modern Iran on the political views of the nonliberals, though transparent, occur far too frequently to be countenanced without irritation. Adamiyyat naively presents the Western theories of democracy as the standard for judging all political thought, and divergent or alternative political views are often simply presented as "incorrect" without any attempt to elucidate their intrinsic logic. Adamiyyat's nationalism makes him insist that Britain played no part in the victory of the constitutionalists. It is true that to the great disappointment of the, radical reformists, Britain did not support the constitutionalists after the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, but the importance of the sympathetic British policy in 1906 as a contributory factor to the success of the movement in obtaining the Constitutional Decree from Muzaffar-ed-Din Shah should not be denied or minimized. Writing about the events of 1906 shortly afterward, Majd ul-Eslam Kermani was to remark, "the British Embassy in Tehran, and the British Consulates in other cities became the Mecca (sajdehgah) of the Iranian people" (T5r1kh-e Enhelal-e University Majiles, of Isfahan, 1351/1972-3, Vol. I, p. 23). often vitiates Finally, Adamiyyat's anti-clericalism his analysis. It makes him incapable of grasping the genuine attachment of many of the constitutionalist radicals to their religious Such attachment is unmistaktradition. ably manifested in the title mujahedTn assumed by the Social Democrats, and even more so, in the designations of popular or the Anjoman-e societies such as the Anjoman-e Abu'l-Fazl Such allied to the mujahedin in Gilan (p. 471ff). CAbbasl, phenomena escape Adamiyyat's Westernized analytical network. of attachment to the Islamic traSimilarly, manifestations dition on the part of the radicals come up time and again IRANIAN STUDIES
290
in the course of Adamiyyat's discussions, but are written off as insincere and tactical. Thus, without giving us the slightest evidence in support of his judgment, Adamiyyat takes it as self-evident that Taqizadeh's "Islamic" viewpoints on women's rights or even on some financial matters were adopted opportunistically, or that Dehkhoda's affirmation of the correspondence between "the poor-loving principles of Islam" (uqU1-e-faqYr-parast-e Islam) and the principles of socialism was hypocritical (pp. 281, 428). As has been pointed out, Adamiyyat's contention that the ulama did not define the goals of the constitutionalist movement is correct. However, it would be a grave mistake their critical to underestimate importance in rallying popular support for the movement, or, conversely, to overestiinfluence of the intellectuals mate the direct on the people. Adamiyyat does commit both of these mistakes, especially in connection the latter. For instance, with Sanic ed-Dawfor reform, he refers lah's proposals to "the scholarly article of... Forughi in the s5r-e Esra3fi as 'representative of the general opinion"' (baznam3-ye caq-ldeh-ye cumiimi, a term presumably used for "public opinion" [p. 456]). It is highly unlikely that such scholarly articles had any effect comparable to the injunctions of the leading reliin shaping the "public opinion"--i.e., gious figures in giving focus to the political opinion of the people. Despite
these
Ideologi-ye Nahzat-e reservations., is Adamiyyat's most important book to this date. Though Adamiyyat's historiography is not very careful or sophisticated, he should be thanked for presenting a great deal of interesting and suggestive materials that have not hitherto been accessible to the general reader.
Mashrdtiyyat-e
Iran
291
SUMMER-AUTUMN 1979
Iranian Studies, Volume XII, Nos. 3-4, Summer-Autumn1979
BOOK REVIEWS of Shah CAbbas the Great. Eskandar Beg Monshi, History Roger M. Savory. Persian Heritage Series 28, Boulder: view, 1978 , 2 vol., 1326, index, glossary. xxxix,
Trans. West-
Richard W. Bulliet Roger M. Savory's translation of the "T5ri-kh-e CAlamunder the title of Shah CAbbas the CAbbasTU" History Great inaugurates a new era in the study of Iranian history. For the first time one of major chronicles of the Safavid period has been made readily and genavailable to scholars eral readers who are unequipped to penetrate the original text. In view of the power and grandeur of Iran under Shah of CAbbas, and given the precision and breadth of interest the chronicler Eskandar Beg Monshi, this new translation will unquestionably prove of substantial value for historians of such contemporary states as the Ottoman and Mogul Empires as well as for historians of all varieties who might wish to gain insight into this vital period of Iranian history.
ara-ye
A description of the book's contents will serve to illustrate the richness and scope of the work. Eskandar Beg, whose approximate dates are 1560 to 1632, served in the Safavid bureaucracy and therefore approached his work in the frame of mind of a court chronicler. Yet the first discourse of Book I, which accounts for just over 500 pages
Richard W. Bulliet Columbia University.
is Associate
293
Professor
of History
at
SUMMER-AUTUMN 197.9
consists of a summaryhistory of the of the translation, Safavid family and state up until CAbbas's accession to Even though the material in this section is the throne. drawn from other chronicles, largely, though not entirely, Thus it in English. available been previously not it has in its own.right a useful and moderately deconstitutes tailed history of the early Safavids for the reader who does not know Persian. The remainder of Book I comprises eleven discourses on the virtues and exemplary character of Shsh cAbbas. Altogether this amounts to only thirty pages and is insignificant in comparison with the information concerning the Shah given in Books II and III. The chronicle as such is contained in Books II and III, the former covering the years 1587-1616 and the latter 1617-1628, together the full forty-one year.s of Shah Within each year major events are covered CAbbas's reign. by a narrative that may run beyond the specific year if Lesser events and obitusuch continuity seems called for. aries are grouped at the end of each year in accord with The obituaries become earlier Islamic historiography. noticeably more numerous in the second half of the Shah's reign as he, his court, and the chronicler all aged toThe calendar used in these two books is a Turkish gether. solar calendar beginning each year at Nowruz, the first day of spring, and taking year names from the animals of the At the end of Book III there is a list of Chinese zodiac. office holders under Shah cAbbas including the emirs of and other tribes. qezelbash From this enormous richness one can glean informaPolitical tion of use for almost any type of historian. and military history obviously loom most heavily, but there is much more. We read, for example, (321) that in the time of Shah Esma'il II the doors and walls of the mosques in Qazvin were plastered with love poems And that a frivolous mobtaseb carried out the Shah's order to cleanse the mosques of poetry with such diligence that he also removed verses praising CAli and the Twelve Imams. of notes about emirs, ulama, Elsewhere, in a collection IRANIAN STUDIES
294
etc. of secretaries, poets, (222-82), we read about the ing to Iran (273) and on the gave up his art to become a
the period before Shah cAbbas introduction of European paintsame page about a painter who wrestler.
The activities of wandering qalandars in rousing support for false or messianic to the throne are pretenders also spoken of (195,401-5), as are the Jalali rebels who loom so large in late sixteenth century Ottoman history and who found temporary refuge in Iran (960-73, 1002-4). There is even a detailed of road building description in Mazandaran which will be of interest to historians of transportation. Yet this marvelous opening up to the general reader of the too long obscured riches of Safavid history and historiography poses certain problems of its own. These are the problems that arise from the abridging of the Persian text for the purpose, successfully of producing realized, a compact, readable translation. The florid embellishments common to such a work have been dropped or greatly reduced while poetry and other passages judged superfluous have been excised entirely. For the most part, one can surely trust in the experience of the translator, who has been working throughout his career with Safavid texts, but one can still wish that the location of any substantial deletions had been indicated. There is, moreover, an unavoidable alteration in the literary tone of the work that the non-specialist will have difficulty compensating for. For example, the phrase "scarce as dragon's teeth" appears on p. 119. Should the student of dragon imagery take this for a Persian expression, or is it the translator's? In numerous other inas well, the turn of phrase chosen by the transstances, lator sounds out of keeping with the original text. There is also reason to regret the paucity of notes accompanying the text. Locations and official offices are most often made the subject of notes, but there are many other places where the translator's erudition could have provided a valuable contribution to the reader's understanding.
295
SUMMER-AUTlUMN 1979
however, in amount to little, These reservations to an immensely comparison with the merit of revealing of Safavid history broader audience some of the glories Safavid monarch Shah CAbbas. The and of the greatest with the publicaand everyone else associated translator tion deserve commendation.
IRANIAN STUlDrES
296
From June
to October:
The Middle
East
between
1967
and 1973.
Edited by Itamar Rabinovich and Haim Shaked. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction 419 pp. Books, 1978.
Shahrough Akhavi
Most of the essays in this volume deal with the structure of the Arab-Israel conflict and inter-Arab relations. Only 53 pages deal with Iran, and of these there is a 10page essay by Professor Rouhallah Ramazani and a nine-page paper by Professor Aryeh Shmuelevitz. This leaves Professor Mordechai Abir's 31-page article on "The Persian Gulf as a Focus for Regional Conflicts" as the basis for the present review. Ramazani's chapter, "Iran and the Middle East," argues that Iranian foreign policy in the period under review was a function of its concerns in the Persian Gulf. Aryeh Shmuelevitz's essay, "Stability and Tension in the Persian Gulf," outlines the sources of stability and the activities of the states there in facing up to, and removing, existing tensions. Mordechai Abir feels that the Arab-Israel conis so deep-seated flict that another war "may be inevitable" and will "very likely" spill over into the Gulf (p. 391). Each author, in his own way, feels duty bound to underscore the importance of the Gulf in Middle East politics. They collectively mention the following as evidence or symptoms of this new-found significance: (1) British withdrawal by 1971; (2) the independence of Bahrayn, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and 'Uman; (3) the suddenly successful mixing of oil and politics by the producing states; (4) growing superpower rivalry. Apart from these new elements are mentioned certain continuities, including inter-Arab and
Shahrough Akhavi is Associate Professor International Studies at the University
297
of Government and of South Carolina.
1979 SUMMER-AUTUMN
Because the essays were written for Arab-Iranian conflict. a symposium held in December 1974, a number of major developments are not always reflected here. These include the Iran-Iraq rapprochement at Algiers in 1975; the assassination of King Faysal of Saudi Arabia in March of the same year; the decision (under the Shah) to drop ambitious plans on the southeastern coast of Iran for naval installations in November 1977 in late 1977; President Sadat's initiative for the Gulf region; and, of course, and its ramifications the revolutionary ferment in Iran in 1978. The authors employ a narrative and descriptive methdiploodology in keeping with their craft as professional Dealing with large issues, they "paint" matic historians. the theowith broad strokes of the brush. Nevertheless, For retical components of their inquiries are implicit. Professor Ramazani, these components may be summarized as: of its Gulf poli(1) Iran's foreign policy is a reflection cy; (2) its Gulf policy is a function of its defensiveness aspirations dating back to in regard to Arab nationalist it is maintained, were unthe 1950s. Such aspirations, leashed by Egyptian "colonial" claims to the oil-producing province of Khuzistan not long after the Suez War of 1956. with the Soviets Ramazani argues that Iranian negotiations during the late 1950s and during the 1960s should be viewed of the Gulf. over the security in light of their anxieties a as concern for larger even loomed zone that Since 1967, Given these lines of argument, makers in Tehran. decision to say that for Ramazani atI do not think it hyperbolic under the monarchy, was a deterto Gulf security, tention foreign policy. overall mining element in the country's will of causal determination Perhaps this perception does not help to but this analysis bear up under scrutiny, Noththe question of Iranian sale of oil to Israel. resolve
ing would seem better
calculated
"moderate" ones--than ties--even Iranian cooperation Furthermore,
to offend Arab sensibilidoing business with Israel. exwith Israel eventiually
It is at matters. on intelligence tended to collaboration least necessary to demonstrate how such policy does optimize long-range security concerns in the Gulf, even if it may dovetail with these concerns in the short run. It may IRANIAN STUDIES
298
on Ramazani's behalf that Iranian leaders were be objected "forced" into this alignment because of Arab hostility and the resultant need to defend against it. But this argument does not address the fact that it was the government of Dr. MuhammadMusaddiq that extended de facto to the recognition state of Israel in the early 1950s--long before Arab hostilthe little ity came into being. And, surely, advantage Iran could secure from selling oil to Israel was not commensurate with the adverse consequences accruing to the country in antagonizing the Arab states. If the Shah's regime had evolved a security consciousness over the Gulf after the 28th of Murdad, then why did it not rescind the The point is earlier decision to do business with Israel? that the government's participation in the Western alliance not more system seems to have been just as determining--if so--of Gulf policy than fear of the Arabs. If Ramazani inon a threshhold of an ausists date for the establishment I should think it would be 1969 tonomous Iranian policy, or 1971 (the Tehran accords that paved (the Nixon Doctrine) the way for the price rises of 1974 and afterwards). To put it another way: the 1950s and 1960s indeed seem to have been decades in which the frameworks and context for clientship were consolidated as a natural followup to the 1940s, when clientship Iranian policy in began. the 1950s and 1960s was to hew to the Western defense system, encourage the integration of its political economy into the international market economy of the West, and rely on the British and Americans to take care of the Gulf. Ramazani makes much of Egyptian hostility to the Shah's policy of doing business with Israel in 1960. Yet, it is clear that Iraq, not Iran, was Egypt's nemesis in that period. Thus, Egypt's denunciation of the Baghdad Pact as a "Zionist plot" is depicted by Ramazani as "an attempt to link [Nasser's] conflict with Israel with his antagonism toward the Shah's regime" (p. 348). It is questionable, however, whether this is the best way to interpret Egyptian behavior in this period. It is, again, if not more, justifiable equally, to see such behavior as a product of Nasser's attempt to discredit Egypt's historic rival in Middle East relations--Iraq. This is all 299
SUMMER-AUTUMN 1979
in light of the claims interpretation the more a possible 'Abd made by the strange leader of the Iraqi revolution, al-Karim Qasim, to be the vozhd of the Arab nationalist movement. of a balance sheet consists The essay by Shmuelevitz in the and conflict tending to promote stability of factors The emphasis is Gulf region during the years under review. economic exBritish withdrawal, on macro-trends including for price increases pansion in the wake of the substantial and force levels expenditures and growth of military oil, inquiry, to systematic in the zone. These are not subjected about and the reader is left to draw his own conclusions of or feedback influences consequences certain specific is to portray a genAgain, the effort these developments. For example, if economic expansion eral picture of issues. we still occurred (and few would deny it) in this period, are not sure whether this enhances the independence or deDo these entisystems in the area. pendence of political or decreasingly "penetrated ties then become increasingly of such transnain the context of the operations states" liberation corporations, tional phenomena as multinational parties? movements and political The author has a short list of only two items tending of self-policing to enhance stability: (1) the principle of mutual respect of terriof the Gulf; (2) the principle of borders. and integrity Surprisingly, torial sovereignty cultural factors are not cited, even though these have been that Midat cooperation the basis for much of the efforts Gulf elites have undertaken and, specifically, dle Eastern, in recent years. They are also the ones that stand out in inof analysts of the subordinate the theoretical writings One also misses references systems literature. ternational stabilizing to regional trade, presumably another possibly that the And while it may turn out empirically factor. within this is not integrated trade of the Gulf states out of it in a manner but is rather directed sub-region that leaves few trading ties linking the member states of would refer to it in the zone, one would think Shmuelevitz either context.
IRANIAN
STIDIES
300
The instability factors are more numerous: Iraqi irridentism in regard to Kuwayt and to the Shatt al-'Arab River boundary with Iran; Arab demands to promote the Arab character of the Gulf; boundary problems involving many of the states; the factor of "foreign" Arabs in indigenous national labor and professional forces; commando activities; super-power rivalry. Remarkably, the Arab-Israel conflict is not cited as a cause of tension and/or stability, despite the overwhelming importance of this problem for the entire region. Surely, in this period the ramifications of that conflict transcended the confines of the Levant/ Egypt heartland that admittedly has been the center of the actual fighting. Mordechai Abir's essay is the most informative of the three in this volume that deal with Iran. It contains much factual information on the internal of developments certain key Gulf societies in the late sixties and early/ Taken together, mid-seventies. these three individuals are an excellent example of the continuing of influence geopolitical traditions in international relations. The intellectual grid through which these authors perceive and analyze international relations is that of the state-centric rational actor model. Nation states are viewed as "black boxes" and their leaders are perceived to act according to a rational calculus, means/ends perspective. Two caveats are necessary, though. The authors only implicitly utilize these categories; and often they write in a manner that makes clear that they feel the behavior of Gulf elites is provocative and "irrational" in the context of their own preferences and ideologies. I believe Yet, withal, that the geopolitical and strategic criteria dominate the analyses, here. The audo not question their own premises and assumptions. Professor Abir's essay, notwithstanding its many important observations and evidential basis of analysis, contains some misleading arguments and, occasionally, subjective characterizations that--at best--do not advance his logic and--at worst--diminish his claims to objectivity. He begins with the disturbing gratuitous assertion that "the people who inhabit [the Persian Gulf's] shores have always 301
SUMMER-AUTUMN 1 97.9
(p. 369). Aluninfluential" been backward and relatively though the statement is made in apposition to the conclusion that the region has on that other hand consistently it is not at all clear been of great strategic significance, what Abir wants to convey by the remark. For good measure, "...the majority of he repeats it further on when he says: the Gulf countries are among the most backward in the MidAbir dle East .... ." Two problems arise in this context. fails to define what he means by backward and backwardness. there is no way that the reader can appreCorrelatively, ciate how these terms lend themselves to any sort of anaThis sort of thing in the argumentation. lytical utility elites are deArab when later passage, lurks in a still of OPECsucin the backdrop power" with "drunk as scribed (p. 377). One wonders what cesses in the mid-seventies are to scholarship and earthly use such characterizations is led to reject them for their utter inutility. Abir wants "to establish a rorrelation Substantively, between OPEC's ability to force its will on the industrial West, the decline of Western power in the Gulf and Soviet In my view, he fails to strategy in the region" (p. 370). in the most general sense that these phenodo this--except In passmena were occurring at more or less the same time. summaryof the ing, however, he presents a good descriptive policy preferences and the events affecting the Gulf states. There is also a pithy discussion of the importance of the (pp. 374Palestinian emigre community in those societies 376). unless, one is difficult Establishing correlations Thus, wishes to limit one's efforts to general statements. (although it is one of his main aims) almost incidentally Abir claims that the naval build-up by the Soviet Union in the late 1960s and early 1970s "was no doubt a factor in OPEC's aggressive price policy and determination between 1971 and 1973 to gain control of the major oil companies" But do we not need grounds upon which to base (p. 378). Perhaps the Soviet naval build-up was a this conclusion? For making, but to what extent? decision factor in OPEC's that matter, to what extent did OPEC's aggressive price policy affect the Soviet build-up? What about the fundaIRANIAN STUDIES
302
mental change produced in the political economy of international oil by the Libyan government's nationalization of British Petroleum in 1970? The closest Abir comes to taking this into account is in the following observation: "With the development of a 'seller's market' in the early 1970s, OPEC--radicalized by new members such as Libya and by Soviet support--began to flex its muscles" (p. 382). But may we simply leave it at that? is The implication that Col. Qadhdhafi's strident radicalism, supported by cynical Soviet leaders, lay behind OPEC's behavior. Yet, a more persuasive case may be made for such behavior by linking it to the Libyans' success in refusing to deal rather collectively with the oil companies and choosing, with each. to negotiate had individually This, in itself, and far less to do with Qadhdhafi's idiosyncratic attitudes to "talk turkey" with the inmore to do with the ability dependent oil companies. Indeed, Abir makes no attempt to account for the centrally important structural changes in the system of international political economy involving the emergence of the independent oil companies as a factor not become a to be reckoned with. Had the independents to the "seven sisters," viable alternative no amount of in breakposturing by Qadhdhafi would have been successful ing down the united front of resistance thrown up by the oil majors. This, in turn, would have made it impossible indefor OPEC members to gain the price and production pendence that they achieved in February 1971 at the Tehran of great significance in the still later itself Conference, price hikes of the mid-seventies. These are all structural that would appear to provide greater explanconsiderations atory value than a putative Soviet-OPEC collaboration that is strongly implied, if not explicitly asserted, by ProAnd in any case, in establishing fessor Abir. his correlation between OPEC pricing behavior and Soviet military behavior in the Mediterranean/Persian Gulf regions, Abir into the trap of the has fallen fallacy. Another problem, here, is Abir's ness to the possibility that the United may have wished to encourage OPEC price own interests of state. Such increases 303
complete obliviousStates government increases for its would aggravate SUMMER-AUTUMN 1979
balance of payments problems for European countries and The adJapan, so heavily dependent upon Middle East oil. vantage, from the American point of view, is that balance of payments problems would weaken European currencies in In addition, OPECprice to the U.S. dollar. relationship increases could make the domestic U.S. oil industry more leading to its re-entr) into the internationcompetitive, statements al market. If there are general correlative that Professor Abir wishes to make, he might have considinto play, as well. ered putting these considerations Finally, by way of a cavil, one must wonder why Professor Abir rejects out of hand the connection between the underlying issues of the Arab-Israel conflict political, He believes he has explained the and the energy crisis. reason permitting him to sever this connection by saying: "It is now clear that the price of oil, rather than its supply, is affecting the Western and third world economies!' What does he intend
by this
non-sequitur?
Even if
it
be
true that price, not production, is the decisive problem for the West, on what grounds may we dismiss the political for the Saudis, Kuwaytis and others--conissues--raised cerning Palestinian rights and occupation of territories One is only as causal factors in OPECoil price levels? baffled by this kind of argument. The authors of these essays have presented us with a good deal of information about developments in the politThis fills a clear need ical history of the Gulf states. to keep abreast of what is happening in a zone of such obrelations today. And, in vious relevance to international the case of Professor Abir's essay, the descriptive materirich and covers developments beyond al is both relatively the conference date of December 1974. Where work needs to exbe done is in the area of the authors' more explicitly oband transcending general own assumptions their amining servations in the search for explaining the phenomena with which they are concerned in these essays.
IRANIAN
STUDrES
304
and Terminology. Sufi Poem: Vocabulary By Bo Scandinavian Institute of Asian Studies Monograph No. 36. London and Malmo: Curzon Press, 1977.
A Persian
Utas. Series
294 + 54 pp.
Annemane Schimmel
A few years ago, Bo Utas published a useful critical into a mathnav7 ascribed to Sana'i, the tariq investigation at-tah)qiq, which, as he could prove on the basis of 24 manand five printed editions, is the work of Ahmad-i uscripts In this new study, the Swedish scholar returns Nachchavani. once more to the same poem, this time aiming at a description of the vocabulary. He takes up the recent linguistic studies, such as Osmanov's Wordlist, and offers a complete concordance of all Persian words (the category "word" is first defined); it comprises 2,159 entries. Rank/frequency relations are illustrated in tables and graphs, and the result of the Arabic loanword vocabulary, which quantitative is one of the two major subjects of this study, is compared with results of previous word counts in neo-Persian. But I think that it was known even before the invention of the computer that the Arabic vocabulary of neo-Persian texts is largely interA particularly determined by the topic. esting, and to me the most important, part of the book is the statistics of the Sufi vocabulary with approximately 600 entries; however, I was not able to fully understand why so many key terms that are typical of Sufi texts--from to v3jib alast al-vujud--are excluded. Utas rightly stresses the inherent tendency of dichotomy in the Sufi terminology (which is found already in the oldest Arabic texts and gives Sufi poetry, up to Iqbal in our century, its specific flaA list of antonyms if given, and the most frequent vor). placements of key terms in the verse--either in the rhyme of in a rhythmically important foot--are discussed. As for Cadam, one instance in Rumi is cited; the concept of Cadam
Annemarie Schimmel is at Harvard University.
a Professor
3305
of Indo-Muslim
Culture
1.97 9 SUMMER-AUPtJMN
belongs to the most protean words in Maulana's terminology (vd. my Triumphal Sun, pp. 239-44) and would deserve a speUtas then compares the Sufi vocabulary of the cial study. of in the studies with the terms offered tarlq at-ta1qlq
Massignon, Nwyia, Nicholson, and others, and thus provides the student with a good tool for further research in the detext of the farlq atA critical velopment of terminology. ta4qlq is given as an appendix. "A Persian Sufi Poem" is a useful,
carefullyprepared
that can be expected from a comeverything book that offers But what about the approach to Persian poetry. puterized does not write his verse art of the poet who, after all, The poet is a human being who with a view to statistics? enstrict conventions) (as much as Persian poetry follows at times in his attempts at times, and fails joys inspiration "Have you As Maulana Rumi says: to convey his experiences. ever plucked a rose from R-O-S-E?"
A Survey of Persian to the Contemporary
A Pictorial Handicraft: Folk Arts and Art Crafts
Introduction of Modern Iran.
Edited by Jay Gluck and Sumi Hiramoto Gluck; Teheran, New York, 1977.
London, Ashiya 416 pp.
(Japan);
Survey of Persian
Art;
1535/
Samuel R. Peterson in Iraniof the sequels to the milestone The latest in 1938-39, A Survey of Persian published an art studies Art (edited by the late Arthur Upham Pope), A Survey of is one of several attempts in recent Handicraft Persian consideration. scholarly years to give Iranian handicrafts
Samuel R. Peterson is Assistant at Arizona State University.
IRANIAN STUDIES
306
Professor
of Islamic
Art
Originally planned as a volume on contemporary crafts by Mr. Pope in fulfillment of the subtitle of the original Survey, "From Prehistoric Times to the Present," the realization of the present volume is to be credited to its editors Jay and Sumi Gluck, two of Pope's associates at the Asia Institute of Pahlavi University. Besides a salute to Iranian craftsmanship and an appeal to preserve and to foster Iranian handicrafts, the volume is intended by Yousef Khoshkish, President of the Bank Melli, which commissioned the project, "to stimulate 'good art' as well as commerce." The large size of the volume--which is nonetheless smaller than the original Of its survey--is misleading. of about 85 full pages only are 416 pages, the equivalent in the volwritten text on the craft categories considered ume: Stone, Pottery, PaintGlass, Needlework, Basketry, ing, Architectural Decoration, Rustic Metalwork, Textile, Floor Coverings, and Woodwork. The latter four include subcategories. Nearly one-third as many pages, 36, are given to a preface, two forwards, three general articles, an afterward and an index. Since the remainder of the volume so many fine photographs, 403 in color, reproduces only scholars wishing for more complete commentary are likely to be disappointed with the total result. Among the craft entries written by fourteen contributors (including the two editors), the approaches adapted in basically result three types of discussion: documentation of contemporary crafts, historical background, and, occasionally, symbolic interpretation. The most significant and concrete entries are those which document craftsmen's techniques, survey regional craft production, and master craftsmen. identify inAccordingly, particularly are Namad Felt Mats (Jasleen formative Dhamija, Nikki Keddie, and Khosrow Pir), Musical Instruments (Fozieh Majd and Mehdi Kamalian) and certain sections on Pottery (Jay Gluck), Textile (Iran Ala Firous and Sumi Gluck), and Needlework (Firous). Jewelry (Firous) Although inaccurately entitled Painting, an account of papier mache work (Ali Kerimi) is concise and excellent.
307
1979 SUMMER-AU'TUMN
While the lack of documentation makes historical comundertaking, mentary on traditional handicrafts a difficult the commentaries in this volume, based mostly on Western travellers' accounts, the original Survey volumes, and sevand eral Persian texts, could have been more originally aware Some contributors--perhaps thoroughly researched. backof the problems involved--do not attempt historical ground; but the results of those who do may encourage more lengthy studies in the area. Certain comments (e.g., a double cloth has been "made up into a Japanese kimono") reportseem inappropriate within the context of scientific age. It seems the editors advised each contributor to comment on the conservatism that spans millennia of artistic in Iran. If this was to give a unifying theme traditions since the to the publication, it does so only superficially comments themselves frequently lapse into cliches. Only the editor Mr. Gluck, in his entry on pottery, presents novel observations on this theme. Commentsof others, for exand potample, include schematic depictions in textiles even What is significant, tery of a horse with a rider. impressive, about this motif being repeated in the native arts of Iran--or, for that matter, in native arts elsewhere in expecting more in the world? The reader is justified than the observation that such timeless motifs simply occur. Mr. Gluck admits that he was confined to a tight schedule in order for the volume be printed in time to comNevmemorate the 50th anniversary of the Pahlavi dynasty. since there is no bibliography, ertheless, particularly footnotes with no indication of date, edition, and someAlso, help. times without page references are of little conversion of Muslim dates references to illustrations, to the Western calendar and, so it seems certain readings of craftsmen's names on signed works are not always accu rate. Errors in the text, which more research might have corrected, are: marquetry can be traced back three centuries earlier to the eleventh century as demonstrated by several preserved Fatamid examples: "continuous linked pottery swastika patterns" are not limited to prehistoric and flat weaves of the Lurs, but are fairly commonin IraIRANIAN STUDIES
308
in medieval brickwork; the drinking nian art, particularly of tea was not introduced in Iran "less than a century ago," but is reported by the late seventeenth century to have been common practice and in the early nineteenth century to have been imported over land from China; and, Olearius traveled in Iran in the seventeenth and not the sixteenth century. are also to be noted. Certain omissions Since the entry on stonework includes a historical survey, the Zand period, one of the most prolific periods of stonework in Islamic Iran, deserves comment. Although, as elsewhere, glass production in Shiraz and Isfahan is mentioned, we still wait for that of Maraghe to receive its due. A sentiment repeated in the volume is the hope that Iranian handicrafts will continue in traditional modes. If, in spite of its price, this volume becomes readily available to Iranian craftsmen, the splendid illustrations-surely pleasing to any viewer--may serve such a purpose. Also, the various entries which specifically deal with twentieth century craft techniques, regional production, and master craftsmen will remain a unique and valuable source. These entries are the longest, and in comparison, they point out the inadequate coverage of other areas; for it is impossible instance, for three pages of text to adequately survey ancient, medieval, and contemporary glass production and to explain more than eleven pages of photographs of contemporary examples. It is reported that time and money were allocated for adding extra illustrations; it is to be regretted that the more important problems of text, format, and editing were not given equal consideration. As it is, the publication is lavish, and as a source for contemporary crafts, unique, but for the series of surof solid scholarship veys, the instances are few.
309
1979 SUMMER-AUTlUMN
Die
Afshar:
Nomadismus
in
Raum Kerman/Zentraliran.
By
Georg StSber. Marburg/Lahn: Marburger Geographische Schriften, Heft 76, 1978. 322 pp. DM39.00. Reinhold L. Loeffler
The Afshar arrived in Iran presumably in the course of the Turkic movements from Central Asia during the eleThey seem to have concentrated in the south venth century. and west of Iran, but, in contrast to the Qashqa'i, who leadership, eventually consolidated under strong political Their groups formations were short-lived. Afshar political expanding were fragmented by governmental interference, and, dispersed and deneighbors, and internal rivalries, ported, frequently became assimilated to other tribes, or As formed core groups around which new units developed. a result of this history, Afshar groups of varying.sizes today are found in almost every province of Iran. The prein geography at the sent volume, a doctoral dissertation University of Marburg, is the first modern monograph dealing with one such group, the Afshar of Kermanprovince. The work provides a detailed description of their economic and some aspects of their social organization and concludes with a comprehensive examination of the role of pastoralism As a in the overall economic context of the province. data survey-type the author uses his mainly own, basis, from field research conducted in three sessions totalling twelve months between 1973 and 1975, and draws on literary and statistical historical sources to provide essential background information. The Afshar of Kerman live, together with other, minor tribes, in the largely mountainous regions about half-way between Kermanand Bandar Abbas, spread over an area some The author di200 kilometers across in either direction. vides them into a western, largely nomadic group of
Reinhold L. Loeffler is Associate at Western Michigan University.
IRANIAN STUDIES
310
Professor
of Anthropology
and an eastern almost entirely to 2,000 families, sedentary group of about 300 families. Among the former, a wide range one being a is found, the prevalent of adaptive patterns located in the semiannual migration between summer quarters, south of Kerman, and winter mountains about 100 kilometers some 200 kilometers farquarters, in the low, broad valleys used to take about three months ther south. These migrations visper year; by now, however, more than half of the tribes ited by the author are renting trucks to transport people and goods in the fall, though not in the spring when animals The description of the pastoneed to be milked en route. a great similarity ral economy of these tribes suggests with the patterns found in western Iran. The author inhe presents are to be diates, however, that the figures since they reflect considered only as rough estimates inor only small samples. This points to formant statements a major gap in our now 20-year-old what I consider research what is needed is an input-output on Iranian pastoralism: and distudy of the productive process based on methodical counts and observations. Such research rect measurements, of protein producappears to be basic for an understanding tion in the semiarid areas of the Middle East. Besides animal husbandry, the Afshar, like the pastoral tribes of western Iran, also practice some form of agriculture. Landholdings, however, appear to be small (though they may not be as small as the author, using Lambton's quite unrealistic and wheat profigures, estimates), a family's duction is said to satisfy needs for only one to six months per year. The remaining needs and additional cash requirements are met by only a minority of families, In from the sale of animals and dairy products. exclusively most cases, families depend on outside sources of income, such as rug weaving, gum-tragacanth collecting, and migrant labor; in earlier times plundering and caravan services offered supplemental incomes. In recent years, loss of pastures to encroaching agricultural entrepreneurs in combination with dry years and increasing cash needs have created conditions that led to the impoverishment of sections of the population. Strat-
311
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work for other include: egies to deal with the situaticn tribesmen (shepherding), temporary settlement to concenwork as migrant laborers, and, eventrate on cultivation, Permanent sedentarization, tually, emigration to a city. however, so the author concludes, tends to be the result not so much of economic stringency, but of a relative prosto be made and of the perity that allows the transition realization tha't the new way of life is rather desirable. The other, eastern group of Afshar already settled in the 1930s, presumably as a result of measures taken by Reza Shah's regime. Since then, they have become largely assimilated to the surrounding population, having also They too adopted Farsi instead of their Turkic dialect. subsist on a mixed economy, but their herds are small (fifteen to twenty animals per family as opposed to an average 88 in the western group) and agriculture is their main source of income. Besides, there is increasing income from a rather massive influx of summer tourists under the impact of which the settlement is transformed into a rural of the occupacenter with an accompanying differentiation tional structure. Thus, pastoralism among the Afshar is declining today. This process appears to be part of a longstanding trend: it is estimated that the nomadic population of Kerman province declined from 44 percent at the end of the nineteenth century to 12 percent around 1970. But even in this reduced number, the tribes still play a decisive role in the economic structure of the province as a whole. They provide up to 35 percent of the dairy produce and 50 percent of the meat consumed in the urban centers, notably Kermancity, besides furnishing considerable amounts of tribal rugs and raw wool for the well documented chapter, urban market. In an extensive, the author delineates the nature and mechanisms of this This adds materially to English's form of integration. analogous study of the Kermanbasin, because it demonstrates that not only the hinterland of Kermancity is interwoven with that city in an encompassing intricately socioeconomic system, but also the pastoral groups in the IRANIAN STUDIES
312
wastelands
some 100 to 300 kilometers
away.
material, of the presented The wealth and pertinence and in maps, diagrams, and tables, organized painstakingly into an argument, makes this volume integrated convincingly to the literature Iran, on tribal a valuable contribution and of Kerman province, the economy and economic history It aptly continues in general. the nature of pastoralism started of the Marburger series the Middle East tradition work on the Kurds and followed pioneering by Hiitteroth's and Momeni. The volumes by Ehlers/Goodell by the excellent of Marburg is to of the University Institute Geographical these publications. be commended for facilitating
313
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Ism5ClL37 Contributions
to Islamic
Culture.
Edited
by Seyyed
Hossein Nasr. Imperial Iranian Academy of Philosophy, Publication No. 35. Tehran: Imperial Iranian Academy of Philosophy, 1977. xii + 265 pp. Farhad Daftari
The Ismaclll movement appeared first on the stage of Islamic history in the second half of the third/ninth cenliterThe Ismclll tury and spread with unusual rapidity. ature itself preserves no record of any "founder" or any definite date marking the "foundation" of the movement. The early Ismacllis were almost never so denominated by themselves or their contemporaries, being called instead by The movement was later names such as Qarmatis or Batinis. named after Ismacil, the son of Jacfar al-$ddiq (d. 148/765), the sixth imam of the twelver Shicis, merely because it was with him that the line of the imams recognized by the Ismacills parted from the succession accepted by the twelver In short, Ismacllism seems to have originated simpShlcts. ly as another branch of Shicism, though a radical branch with
strong
revolutionary
and Messianic
attributes.
with are well acquainted The students of Ismacilism the hisissues regarding and obscure numerous dark periods branch of the extremist of this important tory and doctrine with the major As it is well-known, Shica sect of Islam. of time, when Ismacshort period of a relatively exception
religion under the Fatimid Caliphate, ilism was the official the Ismacllls were almost continuously treated as heretical throughout the Musand as such were persecuted ruthlessly lim world. Indeed aside from the practical implications of the high importance given to esotericism in the Ismaclll
Farhad Daftari Theses
in
the
writing
is currently Development
IRANIAN STUDIES
of
a book on The Main
Ismacilism.
314
adherence to the Shici principle and their strict doctrine the of belief), dissimulation of Taqiyya (precautionary in the largely of Ismacilism, forced underground existence over a wide region, from form of local communities dispersed North Africa to Central Asia and India, did not permit the Again, volume of literature. of any substantial production to the sorelated being particularly the only exception or the "golden age" of "classical" called Fatimid period, from about 296/909 until the death of the eighth Ismacllism, in 487/1094, and the ensuing Fatimid Caliph, al-Mustan*ir, schism in the movement that proved to be the Nizari-Mustacli It was during for IsmAcilism. catastrophe internal greatest that the Ismaclli thought this period of nearly two centuries Subsequentattained their full development. and literature to the stretching ly, in the course of its long history, from further major and suffered Ismacllism present times, with all that these developments imply in terms of schisms, tenets. in the sectarian and differentiation interruption The problems of research in this complex field were until recent times further aggravated due to the fact that sources were almost completely unknown to genuine Ismacill were studied the Ismacilis As a result, non-sectarians. on the basis of evidence coland judged almost entirely adversaries. by their numerous hostile lected or fabricated of that the Orientalists therefore, It is not surprising, in line with a majority of Muslim century, the nineteenth of the mediaeval times as historians and heresiologists painted such a damaging Crusaders, well as the Christian of the Ismacllis as a scheming secret band of depicture praved "Assassins." and our knowledge of the picture, This distorted true nature of the Ismacill movement, has however been reespecialcentury, in the twentieth vised rather drastically of efforts ly since the 1930s; thanks to the pioneering Henry Corbin scholars such as Louis Massignon (1883-1962), Marshall G. S. Samuel M. Stern (1920-1969), (1903-1978), Hodgson (1922-1968), MubammadKamil Husayn, and above all The breakthrough of modern Vladimir Ivanov (1886-1970).l has been mainly due to the studies research in Ismaclll and study of a good portion of the extant secdiscovery 315
SUMMER-AIUT(1MN 1979
through access to the made possible tarian literature, preof manuscripts, collections guarded private secretly world such served in the remotest corners of the Ismaclll in It is precisely as the Yemen, Badakhshan and India. and the progress the light of these new research vistas, that it has now become posmade in the last few decades, view of the development of Issibl*e to convey an overall to contributions of Ismactli with an assessment mdcllism, of the work unthe objective Islamic thought and culture, der review. in the series of the The present volume, published established former Imperial Iranian Academy of Philosophy, in the early 1970s by Seyyed Hossein Nasr, was sponsored by imam of the family of the present Aga Khan, the forty-ninth as part of a five-volume the Nizari branch of Ismacllism, thought commemorating the centenary on Ismclll sub-series The colof the birth of the late Aga Khan III (1877-1957). by the introduction a short, four-page, includes lection editor and ten essays, all written in English and published including only for the first time, by leading Islamologists, namely, studies, in the field of Ismacill three specialists the late Henry Corbin, Wilfred Madelung and Pio FilippaniRonconi. Professor Nasr, who is In the words of its editor, the aim of the collection not a specialist in the field, is "to present at least some of the major aspects of IsThe col(p. 2). to Islamic culture" maclll contributions essay in which Professor opens with a historical lection the events leading to the deJohn Andrew Boyle narrates in 654/ state in Persia, struction of the Nizdri Ismaclll of Alamiit, in the fortress 1256, which had its headquarters of HUlegiu. The by the invading Mongols under the leadership activities narrative deals mainly with military historical and draws heavily on Professor Boyle's own previous transIn the next Thrikh-i Jahan gushay.2 lation of Juvaini's excellent Hamid Professor exposiwe find Enayat's essay, in the famous contained tion of the political philosophy an anonymous of the Ikhwan al-bafd', Epistles, Rasa5il, affiliations in Ba*ra, who group of authors with Ismaclli of fifty-one treatises in the produced their encyclopaedia IRANIAN ST1UDIES
316
The treatment brings together, for fourth/tenth century. the first time, the group's scattered notions on the subject, culminating in the exposition of their views on the of the "utopian state" whose structure combines attributes concept of Shici Imamate with insights from Green political philosophy. The next two essays take up the problem of theology. conProfessor Madelung deals with the important Ismcill the works of the Fatimid utilizing ception of divinity, stages, offered a period. Ismacllism, from its earliest comprehensive view of God, the universe and the meaning of history; in terms of the so-called haqa'iq, or the esoteric philosophical system. This system was adopted by the Ismacllls as a superstructure imposed on their dogmatic system. The esoteric truths, dispersed by the divinely guided gnostic members of the prophetic chain, were essentially in nature; and the IsmaClll conceptions of God and the physical and spiritual worlds reflected strong Neoplatonic influences. This complex subject matter is treated in a masterly fashion, as expected from a leading specialist. Then Professor Corbin, who has contributed so much to our understanding of the various aspects of the Ismacill doctheosophy, presents the Ismaclli reply trine, especially to the polemic undertaken against Ismacilism by the famous The polemical trea(d. 505/1111). theologian al-Ghazzall edited, in 1916, by Ignacz tise in question was partially Goldziher3 (1850-1921), and the reply, which takes up all the major themes of Ismcill gnosis, and appearing now in print for the first time, is the work of al-Walld (d. 612/ 1215), an Ismacill dacl (missionary) in the Yemen. This original essay is a valuable addition to our knowledge of Ismacllism.
then deals, in the fifth Professor Filippani-Ronconi cosmology of the Ismacllls essay, with the soteriological from the viewpoint of the Central Asiatic sectarians. Cosduring the Fatimid period, occupied a mology, particularly fundamental place in the doctrinal system of the Ismacllls. Their cosmology, which was closely interlinked with metacontained elements from the Greek physics and religion, Ptolemaic system as well as a variety of other influences, 317
1979 SUJMMER-AUTUMN
As the author points out, "the fundasuch as Neoplatonism. mental character of the Ismacili cosmology is that of impurpose; in plying, from the very outset, a soteriological of man aiming at the reintegration other words, explicitly realizaand the mediation through Being, into his cosmic tion of the living symbols" (p. 101). The exposition cenof cosmologiinterpretation ters around the psychological cal symbols, mainly in terms of the tenets of Ummal-kitab,4 the most sacred and secret book, containing many Manichaean of the Upper Oxus region. ideas, of the Ismcil'is The next three essays deal with sciences in a more detailed manner. Professor Alessandro Bausani, by again turning to the Epistles of the Ikhwan al-$afa' for their ideas in the fields of geometry, geography, scientific natural history, and physical sciences, amongst others, shows that "such a deeply gnostic community as the Ismacilis were also interested in the esoteric sciences, sometimes in a remarkably practical and experimental way" (p. 123). Dr. Sami Hamarneh, an expert in the field of Islamic medicine and pharmacology, in the next essay, that is the longevaluates the medico-pharmaceuest one in the collection, Assessing the accomtical contributions of the Fatimids. as plishments of al-Tamimi, the famous physician-therapist, well as those of others, the author ably presents the most Then detailed survey available in English on the subject. Professor Abd al-Hamid Sabra, an expert in the field of Islamic history of optics, takes up the question of the theory of vision according to Ibn al-Haytham (d. ca. 432/1040). As expected of someone who has devoted many years studying Ibn al-Haytham, Professor Sabra's treatment of the visualray hypothesis of this Fatimid physicist is outstanding. In the penultimate essay, Professor Oleg Grabar, one on Islamic art, evaluates the of the leading authorities contributions of the Fatimids, who, in 362/973, artistic transferred the seat of their caliphate from the Maghrib to the then newly founded city of Cairo and turned Egypt Various aspects of Fatimid into a centre of Islamic art. are assessed on the basis of art, including architecture, In the final essay, two the existing monuments and texts. IRANIAN STUDIES
318
Aziz Esmail and Azim Nanji, young IsmaCllls, brief survey of the IsmClllTs in history.
present
a
In conclusion, a few general observations may be in order. Nasr has rendered a valuable to Professor service studies the contributions of some Ismaclli by collecting and producing this collection. leading authorities He has also done a satisfactory the system of job of standardizing and spelling. transliteration However, the learned editor to provide, has failed in his introductory chapter or anywhere else in the collection, the proper historical and doctrinal perspective required for the evaluation of the contributions of Ismaclllsm. A shortcoming that has been further accentuated of the due to the piecemeal compilation As a result, collection. the collection lacks any underlying theme or concept. The collection also lacks an index, which would have facilitated the use of a work of this nature. The essays are mainly concerned with the Ismaclll contributions In during the "classical" Fatimid period. the light of its temporal focus of attention, the chosen of the collection title is, therefore, somewhat inappropriate; while its scope and coverage suffer from serious lacunae and deficiencies. It is true that the bulk of the Ismacill contributions to Islamic culture did in fact take place during the Fatimid period. These contributions, however, were, by and large, to the writings of the related great Ismaclll thinkers, who interestingly enough were for the most part Iranians, such as Abiu Haktim Razi (d. 331/942), Abu Yac qub Sijistani (4th/lOth century), A1mad b. IbrThim al-Nishapiirl (5th/llth century), Iamid al-Din Kirmanl (d. ca. 408/1017), al-Mu'ayyad Shirazi (d. 470/1077), and Na-iri Khusraw, the famous poet, traveler, theosophist and dai of Yumgan in the fifth/eleventh century. Most of these thinkers are not accorded even a passing reference in the a serious deficiency collection, reflecting the lack of proper treatment of the Ismaclll thought during its golden In other words, the volume, with minor exceptions, age. fails to give sufficient recognition to the most significant aspect of Ismaclli contributions to Islamic culture. Similarly, Fatimid contributions in the field of fiqh, as elaborated particularly in the legal works of Qd4i al-Nuc man (d. 363/974), are completely ignored. It is interest319
SUMMER-AUTUMN 1979
the same system of ing to note that, after ten centuries, jurisprudence is still practiced by the Bohoras, the Musof india and East Africa. taclian Ismcills, All in all, the volume is most useful to the specialfield of enquiry, and list, in an already highly specialized as such it is an important addition to the limited literature on Ismacllism. NOTES
1.
2.
Farhad Daftary, "Bibliography of the Publications of the Late W. Ivanow," Islamic Culture, Vol 45 (January 1971), pp. 55-67; and idem, "W. Ivanow: A Biographical Notice," Vol. 8 (May 1972), pp. 241-44. Middle Eastern Studies, of the World-Conqueror
The History
Harvard University 3.
4.
(Cambridge,
Mass.:
1958), Vol. 2.
des cOazil' gegen die Batinijja-Sekte
Streitschrift
(Leiden:
Press,
E. J. Brill,
1916).
in the original Persian, by W. Ivanow in Der Band 23 (1936), pp. 1-132, and translated into ummum'l-kitab: IntroItalian by P. Filippani-Ronconi, Istituto UniverTraduzione e Note (Napoli: duzione, di 1966). Napoli, sitario Orientale Edited,
Islam,
IRANIAN STUDIES
320
A NOTE OF TRANSLITERATION In manuscripts submitted for publication, only those words need be transliterated which do not appear in the third edition of Webster's New International Dictionary. The system of transliteration used by IRANIAN STUDIES is the Persian Romanization developed for the Library of Congress and approved by the American Library Association and the Canadian Library Association. Copies of this table (Cataloguing Service - Bulletin 92) may be obtained by writing directly to the Editor.
Iranian Studies is published by The Society for Iranian Studies. It is distributed to members of the Society as part of their membership. Annual membership dues are $1 8.00 ($1 2.00 for students). The annual subscription rate for libraries and other institutions is $22.00. A limited supply of the back volumes of the Journal (1968 to present) is available and may be ordered by writing to the Editor. The opinions expressed by the contributors are of the individual authors and not necessarily those of the Society or the editors of Iranian Studies. Articles to be considered for publication and all other communications should be sent to the Editor, Iranian Studies, Box J-1 54, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Mass. 02167, U.S.A. Communications concerning the affairs of the Society should be addressed to the Executive Secretary, The Society for Iranian Studies, c/o Department of Anthropology, Washington University, Saint Loulis, Missouri, 63130, U.S.A.