No title

Iranian

Studies

Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies

IRANIANREVOlUTION INiPERSPECTIVE

Farhad Kazemi, Guest Editor The publication of this volume has been cosponsored by The Hagop Kevorkian Center for Near Eastern Studies, New York University, and The Society for Iranian Studies.

Volume XIII,Nos. 1-4, 1980

Table

of

Contents

3 PREFACE 5 COMMUNICATION AND REVOLUTION IN IRAN: THE PASSING OF A PARADIGM

Majid Tehranian

31 PSEUDOPARTICIPATION AND COUNTERMOBILIZATION: ROOTS OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION

Jerrold D. Green

55 CAMOUFLAGE, CONSPIRACY, AND COLLABORATORS: RUMORS OF THE REVOLUTION

Karen L. Pliskin

83 BECOMING MOLLAH: REFLECTIONS ON IRANIAN CLERICS IN A REVOLUTIONARY AGE

Michael M. J. Fischer

119 SHI'ITE LEADERSHIP: IN THE SHADOW OF CONFLICTING IDEOLOGIES

David Menashri

147 THE STATE AND KHOMEINI'S ISLAMIC ORDER

Said Amir Arjomand

165 WOMEN IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN 195 THE STRUCTURAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL MINORITY PROBLEM IN REVOLUTIONARY IRAN 215 TRIBE AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY IRAN: THE RETURN OF THE QASHQA'I KHANS 257 URBAN MIGRANTS AND THE REVOLUTION 279 AMERICAN POLICY AND THE IRANIAN CRISIS 307 AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 1979-1981

Guity Nashat

Leonard M. Helfgott

Lois Beck

Farhad Kazemi

Richard W Cottam

Barry Rubin

327 A CHRONOLOGICAL SURVEY OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION

Nicholas M. Nikazmerad

369 A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SURVEY OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION

Jo-Anne Hart

Iranian Studies, Volume XIII, Nos. 1-4, 1980

Preface

in Perspective Iranian Revolution was commissioned by for Iranian Studies during its the Council of the Society thirteenth annual meeting in November 1978 at Ann Arbor, Michigan. The purpose of the special volume, as envisaged Council was to make available by the Society's to the academic community and the public at large the specialist's in Iran. The process of solicitknowledge of the crisis and editing the volume entailed ing articles far greater time and effort than anyone had anticipated. The delay, to served make the final product a more thorough however., account of the Iranian revolution and its various, and as yet unending, ebbs and flows.

As the guest editor of this volume, I have attempted to bring together a reasonably comprehensive collection of the more basic themes underlying the revolutionary upheaval, not every issue could be included. but understandably The economic factor and the guerrilla movement, for example, are not directly But these gaps are at least analyzed. partially offset by the coverage given to topics not treated adequately In the matter of translielsewhere. for the most part the process was simplified teration, to resemble modern spoken Persian and all diacritical marks were eliminated. able

Several individuals and institutions have made valucontribution to the successful completion of this 3

volume. These include Ervand Abrahamian, Marvin Zonis, and the members of the Society's Council. Ali Banuazizi, as the editor of Iranian Studies, has assisted the various stages of the volume's preparation with his patience, advice, and invaluable expertise. Naomi Schorr has been called upon at all hours and times to help with every facet of the publication. Without her unfailing assistance, this volume would not have materialized. I am also thankful to Ina Moses for her extraordinary and efficient typing skills. it Finally, is my pleasure to gratefully acknowledge the generous finanof the Hagop Kevorkian Center for Near cial contribution Eastern Studies at New York University, the cosponsor of I would like to specifically this volume. thank the Director of the Kevorkian Center, R. Bayly Winder, for his continuous support. Farhad Kazemi New York September, 1981

IRANIAN STUDIES

4

Iranian Studies, Volume XIII, Nos. 1-4, 1980

Communicationand Revolution in Iran: The Passing of a Paradigm Majid Tehranian

"I am glad that the good God has created us all I am glad that if we change his plans, ignorant; we do it at our own risk."l --

Mark Twain

"We are struggling against autocracy, cracy, by means of xerocracy." --

A Tehran

October

University

for demoProfessor,

1978

to present an The purpose of this essay is twofold; argument on the role of communication in the processes of modernization that goes substantially against the dominant views of the last two decades, and to illustrate that point

Majid Tehranian is Visiting Professor the University of Hawaii and Visiting Communication Institute.

of Communication at Fellow, East-West

The author wishes to thank all those friends and colleagues who have commented critically on this article or the portions of it that appeared in Intermedia, London, March 1979. He is particularly grateful to the Middle East centers at Oxford and Harvard and the Center for International Studies at MIT where he has been an itinerant visiting scholar during the past two years. 5

was written at Ihe article of view by the example of Iran. 1979, when in January-February-of a moment of enthusiasm, looked like one of the most unanimous, the Iranian revolution of modern history; social revolts and liberating nonviolent support. enjoying widespread domestic and international was spoiled by diviopportunity Alas, that rare historical The revoleadership. sion and rancor in the revolutionary but lution seems to have devoured not only its own children of chances for the reconstruction also its own exceptional on more autonomous, free, humane, and equiIranian society a great temptaThere was, therefore, table foundations. tion when the present volume was ready to go to press to rewrite the whole piece in the light of the shattered hopes But of the last two years. gained insights and painfully for Iran, on Unfortunately was resisted. that temptation as valid as seemed generally the article a second reading, many of the seeds of the Plainly, when it was written. troubles under the Islamic regime were sewn under the preof modernization vious monarchical regime and the strategy and some except for a few revisions Therefore, it pursued. for better or for worse, in style or tenses, alternations form. in its original stands substantially the article

The Cultural

and Ideological

Cleavage

for Iran, as for many other less deModernization In the curse. a triple has entailed veloped countries, other to as in many Iran, came first place, modernization in the form of Westprimarily African and Asian countries, the uprooting of indigeIt meant, therefore, ernization. and legal educational, economic, political, nous social, The in favor of their Western counterparts. institutions corporate society cohesion and coherence of a traditional and contradicreplaced by the tensions was thus gradually with few, if any, indigetions of a modernizing society institutions The indigenous nous modernizing institutions. to respond to the time or opportunity have had very little they have by adoption and adaptation; Western challenge in reaction. recoiled largely

IRANIAN STUDIES

6

of Westernization Secondly, the processes bred a powith a missionary and cultural litical elite zeal for the complete overhaul of Iranian society in the image of the most "advanced" sectors of Western society. For some memin evidence in the 1970s, bers of this elite, particularly with all of its sethis came to mean Southern California The habits and tastes, the attitudes ductive trappings. and life styles, even the dreams and utopias of this elite increasingly set them sharply apart from the rest of Iraniconsciousness of this elite an society.2 The historical was this-worldy and secular, but its cultural was identity rooted in a mystification of Iran's pre-Islamic past and the power and pre-eminence it promised. the By contrast, of the masses was based primarily historical consciousness on the oral traditions that conveyed in mytho-poetic terms of Iran from its the historical and cultural continuity collective memories. pre-Islamic to post-Islamic In their utopian yearnings and deliverance, for redemption, justice, however, the masses identified themselves with primarily the Islamic archetypical heroes and martyrs. Thus, the of slogan of "The Great Civilization" as the expression the ideological and cultural ethos of the ruling elite was pitted against the slogan of an "Islamic Republic" which became the rallying cry of a mass revolt . Last but not the least, the processes of moernization in and by themselves have shown an inherent tendency, in Iran as elsewhere, toward atomization of society, bureaucratization

and centralization

of

authority,

and homogeni-

zation of culture.4 These triple are fundatendencies mentally rooted in the nature of modernization, which calls of manipulation for increasing of nature and levels society, technological production, bureaucratic rationaliand cultural zation, secularization. These primary carriers of modernization have operated universally in the and cultural economic, political, spheres to produce conof exploitation, ditions transience, anonymity, and anomie for modern man. However, some secondary carriers of modern industrial society have provided antidotes and defense mechanisms. The urbanization of society, the professionalization and pluralization of life worlds, the political mobilization of the oppressed, and the cognitive participaCOMMUNICATION AND REVOLUTION

7

tion of the emerging sectors in the decision-making processes represent forces which have each in a complex variety of ways provided multiple sources of identity, legitimacy and community. By contrast, mass communication, mass education, and mass consumption as the tertiary carriers of modernization have performed in a variety of contradictory ways under different historical settings and institutional arrangements. In general, however, we could say that wherever the institutions of social and political participation have lagged behind the carriers of modernization, the triple tendencies of atomization of society, centralization of authority and control (includingabureaucratization of communication through the mass media), and homogenization of culture, have produced various forms of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. The cult of the state as the embodiment of all that is true, good, and beautiful (i.e., Reason and Order) plagued Iran no less than it has other modernizing societies with totalitarian tendencies. The state did not recognize any truth beyond itself and could not tolerate any challenges to its authority and legitimacy. All other institutions were to serve its mundane yet mystified purposes and designs with no claim to any purpose and design of their own. Every whisper of opposition was considered the ultimate treason, leaving little room for a natural development of contradictions and their resolution. In Iran, the forces of modernization--particularly in the nearly 60 years of Pahlavi rule--thus represented a relentless drive toward Westernization, secularization, and centralization of authority buttressed by a modern army and police apparatus, an expanding and parasitic and the support and blessings bureaucracy, of Western In this process, powers. the indigenous institutions of social and political comparticipation (the village munity, the tribes, the urban voluntary associations such as the guilds, the mosque, the khaneqah, the zurkhaneh) were repressed or undermined without being effectively replaced by modern institutions of social participation. The parliament, the press, the labor unions, and the professional and voluntary which could have associations, IRANIAN STUDIES

8

served such a purpose, trol and manipulation. produced sham results.

were kept largely under central Thus they engendered skepticism

conand

However, largely because of the absence of mass supof totalitarian port, the pretentions power (one command, one party, one book, one ideology) were not matched by totalitarian and efficiency. organization Mounting oil revenues had made it possible for the monarchical regime, in the last fifteen particularly years, to pursue a policy characterized aptly by Marvin Zonis as a policy of "No taxNo participation."5 ation, The decision-making apparatus and deperduring this period was increasingly centralized sonalized of all major through a dual process of attribution and minor decisions to the person of the monarch, while an anonymous and expanding bureaucracy was penetrating all aspects of social, economic, political, and cultural life. if, as Sir Ernest Barker holds, democracy is government by discussion, there was little democracy in the system because there was so little discussion even at the higher ranks of the bureaucracy and even on such vital issues as the formation of a one-party state or the ban on private schools. Despite all of this, the system was not a full-proof totalitarian one. It operated under an economy open to international movements of goods, services, and capital, sensitive and vulnerable to world public opinion, and with a great deal of population movement both within the country and without. The general collapse of the system should be attributed, therefore, as much to feelings of homelessness, depersonalization, and humiliation in most sectors of the population as to economic mismanagement, political repression, social cultural injustice, alienation, and moral corruption. Imperial pretensions increased as the substance of power diminished. Thus, the legitimation of the regime of interactive through the processes communication, cognitive participation, self-identification, and self-authenof the citizens tification with the state faltered. In the meantime, the processes of atomization, bureauand homogenization cratization, took place largely through COMMUNICATION AND REVOLUTION

9

conrapid economic growth, the unfolding of an acquisitive sumer society, a high rate of urbanization and social moin the and great drives toward secularization bilization, The social syslegal, educational, and cultural spheres. tem was not able, however, to absorb the disintegrating effects of all these forces which were unleashed, particafter the so-called "White Revolution" of the early ularly What seemed to many foreign observers as a showcase '60s. and development, was in fact of enlightened dictatorship The financial corrupthe making of a national tragedy. repression, and intelpolitical tion, social injustices, lectual arrogance of the regime, augmented particularly after the quadrupling of oil revenues in 1973, provided only additional fuel to the deepening resentments of a society undergoing the agonies of change. Although the collapse of the system took place in a dramatically short period of time, from September 1978 to February 1979, the surprise was not in its demise but in the fact that it had survived for so long. A profound sense of malaise characterized Persian society in the '70s--the hour of its material triumphs; and the glitter did not conceal to the perceptive the moral decadence and cultural vacuity. In this context, therefore, it was no wonder that for leadership Iranian society turned to a sector least affected by the corrupting influences of modernization, the ulama. Because the ulama under the Pahlavis had been stripped of their control over the legal, progressively and endowment (waqf) institutions educational, charitable, while still retaining their spiritual powers through the mosque and minbar, they had both the cause and the means Twice in this century the ulama to stir the opposition. had entered into an alliance with the bazaar merchants and in campaigns to limit the monthe liberal intelligentsia Revoluarchy. In both of these cases (the Constitutional m'ovementof tion of 1905-11 and the oil nationalization who led the 1951-53), it was the liberal intellectuals way and the ulama who provided the mass support, but the situation had radically changed in the meantime. The riots of 1963, taking place in protest against the "White to come. Revolution," were a harbinger of the new politics led from Qom They were organized and almost exclusively IRANIAN STUDIES

10

with Ayatollah Khomeini as its leading spokesman. They had been preceded by a visit paid to Qom by the shah in December 1962, during which he had castigated the radical ulama as backward, and lice-ridden," to be crushed if "tobscurantist, they resisted his enlightened reforms. This was followed by the referendum of January 1963, which seemed to have given him popular support for his six-point reform program. But the program was rejected in the following June by massive riots. The last vestiges of rapport between the monarchy and the ulama, which had supported each other since the coup of 1953 against the common threat of communism, was ruptured. For the moment, however, the radical ulama seemed to have been isolated from their allies among the bazaaris and the liberal intellectuals who, represented by the National Front, acted bewildered during the riots of 1963. This was the beginning of a relentless bestruggle tween the radical ulama and the monarchical regime, characand venom. terized by bitterness In interviews conducted by the author with some leading religious leaders in 1974, the issues emerged quite clearly.6 To the ulama (though not a monolithic and homogeneous group), it seemed that the entire trend of Iranian society was going against their sense the of truth, and justice. goodness, Their archenemies, and their foreign Bahais, the secularizing technocrats, advisers were ruling supreme in every niche and corner--in the court, in the armed forces, in SAVAK, in important branches of the civil and in the booming fibureaucracy, nancial and industrial enterprises. Having wrested the and charitable educational, from their institutions legal, hands, the monarchical regime was intent on taking their prerogatives away even in family and religious matters. The new Family Law of 1967-74 introduced measures that undermined some of the fundamental tenets of Islam on marriage and divorce. The grant of suffrage to women in 1963, the organization of the Women's Corps in 1968, the appointment of women to highly visible public offices, but above all, the display of decadent life styles and permissive sexual relations The organization of grieved the ulama. a Religious Corps in 1971, the drafting of theology graduates for religious services under the auspices of the milCOMMUNICATION AND REVOLUTION

of an Islamic Univerthe plans for the organization itary, sity in Mashad, the change of calendar from the Islamic of the introduction hegira to the Imperial Shahanshahi, time, the shari'a time which trespassed daylight-saving of the arrogance of the new all were further indications These measures were deeply resented by omnipotent state. among the ulama, but it took the political, all factions of the new secular society economic, and moral exhaustion of the Khomeini facand persistence and the determination power. the monarchical tion to dismantle

Dissonance

and Dualism

in Communication

of Iran's social structure dualist The increasingly perhaps above all in itself and economic systems revealed We can best examine the salient the communication system. of this dualism in terms of the two competing refeatures and processes structures, and secular ideologies, ligious autonomously side by side communication--living of social wherever and whenever they collided. with immense frictions in the autumn of 1978 were The massive demonstrations for being predominantly made among other things, remarkable, and for the singular absence up of the younger generation conliberal to Mosaddeq, the charismatic of any references large Instead, leader of the early '50s. stitutionalist Khomeini and the martyrs of the new of Ayatollah portraits everywere prominently displayed struggles urban guerrilla was the theme of the demonstrations The underlying where. For years, the greatest of a second coming. expectation by the people was neither celebrated festival spontaneously ZoroNowruz (the Persian New Year, dating to pre-Islamic It was, times) nor the birthday of the Prophet. astrian as banners throughout the country declared on those blessed "the sacred birthday of His Majesty Imam Mahdi." occasions, the other temand utopian, one spiritual Two legitimacies, ruled Iran in the name of two comporal and ideological, peting monarchies. systems The emergence of two nations with two belief in the two sepaitself perhaps most dramatically revealed IRANIAN STUDIES

12

rate but intertwined modes of political communication. The secular view was profoundly Westernized and couched in Faustian terms: a remorseless search for power by means of the mastery of science and technology. The shah himself typified such an attitude by his love of gadgets (particularly military gadgets); his fetish for high, capital-intensive technology (e.g., nuclear energy, in a country endowed with immense resources of oil and natural gas); and his ambition, flaunted with missionary zeal, to transform Iran within twenty years into the world's fifth major industrial power. Symbolic throughout, one of his first acts after returning to power in 1953 was to change the name of the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of War. But all this show of strength was undermined by a tragic undercurrent of mysticism and martyrdom, a constant appeal to the unseen powers who protected his life in four assassination a steadfast attempts, call to meet his destiny, and in the end a resignation to accept the inevitable instead of engaging in a bloody counterrevolution.7 The same themes of power, blood, and martyrdom also ran in the religious opposition's world view, but as a major note. The unconscious motives beneath the choice of Dr. Mosaddeq and Ayatollah Khomeini as the opposition's charismatic leaders in less than a generation reveals a profound continuity of historical archetypes. The historical consciousness of Iranians has been always deeply moved by the memory of those heroic martyrs who achieved positions of spiritual power through acts of defiance against tyrants, by shedding their blood to redeem the weak and the oppressed. The legendary Siyavosh in the Shahnameh, Imam Hosayn in Shi'ite history, and Hallaj in Sufi memory represent such archetypes. Dr. Mosaddeq's combination of (apparent) weakness and determination, and Ayatollah Khomeini's righteous yet (apparently) selfless cause, represented similar drives to power through righteousness and martyrdom. The Competing

Communication

Systems

These two competing world views, based on two rival epistemic communities, were also equipped with two parallel COMMUNICATION AND REVOLUTION

13

of the Through a rapid acquisition communication systems. as well as of informaof broadcasting modern technologies the and wire-tapping, retrieval, storage, tion production, in the last state had acquired--particularly monarchical formidable arsenal of monofifteen years of its life--a SAVAK's exand control. transmission information lithic gathtensive domestic and foreign network of intelligence to have employed some 50,000 people, was ering, estimated The Imelement in this system. only the most notorious branches of the and civilian perial Court, the military informagovernment, each had its own units for gathering in the imperial court, the The Royal Inspectorate tion. in the municipality, second column in the Army, the police in the and organizations as well as a number of ministries the for reinforcing civilian branches, were responsible power of the state to watch over the lives of citizens. however, never lessened of functions, The division The Ministry of units. the preponderance of the security for checkresponsible Information and Tourism was primarily private and independent, ing the press (which was ostensibly offices But the security subsidized). but in fact largely them what telling to publishers, issued daily bulletins Each of news to print and how to arrange the columns. Tehran's four major daily newspapers began to look the Despite Prime Minmonotonous, and faceless. same--drab, journalist, ister Amuzegar's appointment of a professional of information, and his Dariush Homayun, to be minister the practice policy, in 1977, of a liberalization promises, of the daily bulletin was not discontinued. which was written by the seOne particular article, and pushed through the ministry as a routine curity offices so inflamed the rein the press, message to be published Khomeini to Ayatollah by its insults opposition ligious with may be credited that its publication (in Ettela'at) after of the opposition's struggle the rapid escalation of information feigned igThe minister December 1977. he also claimed to have stopped norance of the article; he received of further abusive articles the publication offices. from the security By this time, however, it was to stop the tide of opposition. too difficult IRANIAN STUDIES

14

The Ministry of Art and Culture was nominally responof films and printed matter. sible for the censorship Yet here again it was often the security offices which acted in the ministry's name. Books and films were censored or reor showing for a variety of reasons, mostfused publication with claims about the security of the rely in connection of the monarch. Sometimes the gime and the inviolability took an arbitrary, or even comiprohibitions or sinister, Macbeth and Hamlet were prohibited cal turn. for some time The color red was because they showed the murder of a king. of books and films treated with circumspection in the titles because of its revolutionary portent. Sometimes, "subversive" books were placed in bookshops in order to catch the potential student revolutionaries unaware. The showing of a film directed by Dariush Mehrju'i, Dayre-ye Mina, was not for some time because it dramatized the criminal released commercial gang which, in colluof a real-life activities sold the auctioned blood of sion with some medical staff, drug addicts to hospitals.8 Insult was added to injury Two Children, when in a televised religious play, Muslim's one of the two holy personages was portrayed by a Bahai boy! National Iranian Radio Television By contrast, (NIRT), the national broadcasting monopoly, enjoyed some measure of This independence from both government and security forces. autonomy grew partly from the managing director's close political links to the throne, his reputation for loyalty and patriotism, his liberal inclinations, and partly from the nature of broadcasting professional itself. This relative autonomy and insularity, however, did not prevent NIRT from including SAVAK-sponsored programs. Early in the '70s, when the urban guerrilla movement had just begun, a high Parviz Sabeti, took long hours on telesecurity official, vision to deliver political lectures on "the sinister designs of the subversives." Subsequently, some captured were brought before the cameras to be interguerrillas viewed as they confessed their "crimes." These interventions tainted the early reputation of NIRT's autonomy and lost it considerable political credibility. The news bulletins, meanwhile, were primarily of the royal family, to the activities supplemented COMMUNICATION AND REVOLUTION

devoted by a 15

Docoverage of Western and Third World news.9 reasonable mestic news was kept to a minimum and mostly confined to Whenever NIRT attempted to break ceremonial occasions. by interviewing instance, through this restriction--for or issues as inflation on such vital people in the street Entertainment opposition. faced official corruption--it Both impact. programs probably had an even more disastrous and imports imposed the cultural tastes domestic productions upon preferences, and their metropolitan of an urban elite, strong experienced that inevitably a premodern population An Ingmar Bergman film festival of impropriety. feelings provided the and "The Loves of Napoleon," for instance, programming in those years of highs and lows of television covThe rapid expansion of broadcasting elitism. cultural for radio 100 percent of the population erage (to virtually brought such programs into and 70 percent for television) domain of almost every Muslim Persian family. the sanctified Few days passed without some outraged remarks from or the press on the immorality and parliament, the pulpit, At the same time, of NIRT's television programs. violence that were more subtle but no less real, the with effects standards of living of upper- and middle-class TV portrayal envy, and outmust have augmented the sense of injustice, A bank commercial, rage felt by the poor and the devout. checks encouraged the purchase of travelers' for instance, for weekend shopping in Paris or London! The unparalleled through protest and violence spread in 1978 of political the entire country, even in the remotest towns and villages, in some measure as the unintended conshould be considered of mass media. sequence of this penetration by the regime as a Mass communication was considered The political communication. for real political substitute and the press were used as means to broadcasting, parties, and persuade rather than as chanlegitimate, promulgate, social social participafeedback, nels for agenda-setting, views of conflicting reconciliation tion, and the social was used as a in particular, Television, and interests. The direct broadcastand mystify. device to awe, attract, the festivities of the 2500th ing of the shah's coronation, of the Persian monarchy, and the SOth anniveranniversary IRANIAN STUDIES

16

as well as all the "salaams," sary of the Pahlavi dynasty, the ceremonial occasions on which the shah gave audience, aimed to impress. were deliberately The major channels of political communication were the shah's frequent but formalized interviews and the lectures he delivered to officials or at large mass rallies. The power of television to demystify was thoroughly forgotten. The king increasingly appeared as a jester, with no clothes at all. The absence of intermediary channels of communication between the state and the people meant that messages often fell on either deaf or incredulous ears. A vicious circle was at work; the government imposed its own construction of reality upon the audiences and received in turn, through the media and the intelligence network, its own prettified reconstruction of unTo paraphrase Lord Acton, power blinded pleasant truths. and absolute power blinded absolutely. It was Prime Minister Sharif-Emami who, in the fall of 1978, shrewdly recognized the extent of the credibility "If we say it gap: is daytime when it is daytime, people will deduce it is night-time." The technological feat of covering this vast and mountainous country by a large network of microwave communication system within a decade or so was thus largely countercommunicative. Meanwhile, in direct contrast, the traditional communication system was thriving. religious Its success depended on several factors. It used informal channels and small, as opposed to big, media. Its message was familiar and designed in terms of the archetypical legends of Persian historical memory. And it was credible because it corresponded to the living reality of its audience, delivered by legitimate opinion leaders. The network was organized around some 60,000 to 200,000 mullahs10 who had come from small towns and villages to be trained in Qom, Najaf, or Mashad and then go back to their towns and villages--with little or no brain drain. Whereas the professional broadcasters and journalists were mostly Westernized urban dwellers, the mullahs retained organic ties with the lower and middle classes COMMUNICATION AND REVOLUTION

17

and knew their

hopes and sufferings.

The madrasa (theological seminary) at Qom alone could claim a student population of some 12,000-15,000 talabehs, mostly of peasant origins, who led a life of monastic simplicity on small stipends from the ayatollahs. The talabehs were the hard core of the religious revival, increasingly radicalized by the widening gulf between rich and poor, between the religious and secular life, and the heavy burden of political Khorepression. After 1963, it was Ayatollah meini's militancy and Ali Shari'ati's special blending of Shi'ism, Marxism, and existentialism that captured the imagination of this religious intelligentsia.11 The communication network on which this increasingly and revolutionary volatile group depended was as old as Islam itself. It was based on some 90,000 mosques, ranging from the city centers to the smallest settlement. These mosques were increasingly supplemented by numerous new religious lecture halls (hosayniyeh), by informal meetings at people's homes where the Quran was read and interpreted, and by religious processions (dasteh) and religious mournings (rowzeh khani). The best known of these religious centers was the Hosayniyeh Ershad in Tehran, which became intellectual center of a modernist movement the thriving But the center was soon in the late '60s and early '70s. and Ali Shari'ati, its closed down, the movement repressed, leader, detained by the government.12 link in this communication network Another essential to the ulama through allied was the bazaar. Historically the bazaar merchants have promarriage and economic ties, sources with their greatest vided the religious institutions of income and support.13 Despite its sanctions against Islamic ethics has also usury and unjust profiteering, of capitalism. to the spirit been congenial Prophet Mowho married hammad himself was a merchant by profession as a commerKhadijeh after having served her faithfully to a thriving commercial cial manager. Addressed first community in Mecca, the Quran is also equally divided beand exhortations tween admonishments on social injustice Islamic civilization on the honor of work and commerce. IRANIAN STUDIES

18

has been thus primarily urban and commercial. The network of guilds (asnaf), mosques, and covered bazaars has always formed the throbbing centers of Islamic cities. This netallied to a whole host of other work has been historically of mixed secular and religious urban voluntary associations The khaneqah (the Sufi house of worship), functions. the zurkhaneh the (the traditional sports house of strength),

or qahvehkhaneh dowreh (periodic

the chaikhaneh

(coffee

or tea houses),

the

of small urban peer groups) get-togethers all served to provide a resilient informal network of communication which could always mobilize the urban population on behalf of mass political causes. The two other critical links in this system consisted of the lutis (the chivalrous men who combined physical strength with moral uprightness) and the retail merchants. Although this combination of forces degenerated at times into mob action on behalf of obscurantist and sectarian causes, given the right leadership, it also acted through history as the only real urban power against the unlimited and arbitrary powers of the shahs. Since the turn of the century, this informal communication network has effectively galvanized three mass movements. On all three occasions (the constitutional revolutionary movement, the oil nationalization movement, and the Islamic revolutionary movement), the ulama and the bazaar entered into an alliance with the radical intelligentsia to work against and despotism. imperialism Through this alliance, the traditional communication networks were linked directly with the more modern networks, using schools and universities, the urban dowrehs, the underground and exiled publications, the poetry reading circuits, It etc. was this combination of forces and communication channels which was put to work against the monarchy, particularly after June 1963. The ulama's last ties to the monarchy were severed after the shah's bitter attack on the "liceridden and obscurantist" mullahs, delivered in a staged demonstration in Qom six months earlier. Although the bitter confrontations of that year subsided with the exile of Ayatollah Khomeini and the monarchy's efforts to reestablish its reputation as the defender of Shilism in a predominantly Sunnite Islamic world, the relations were AND REVOLUTION COMMUNICATION

19

community had The religious one again. never a comfortable Khomeini's antimonarchical and Ayatollah been radicalized When in 1977, as an austerity set the standard. position measure, Prime Minister Amuzegar cut the government's annuto from $80 million affairs to religious al contributions as a further slight. this too was interpreted $30 million, from the economic boom of benefiting Although financially by the the '70s, the bazaar merchants also felt slighted to Bahai and non-bazaari of favoritism policies government's "antias well as its arbitrary and up-starts, entrepreneurs campaigns of 1976-78. and antiprofiteering" inflationary the institutions, credit of state-run The organization of the economy, the of important sectors monopolization Chamber of Guilds of a government-appointed superimposition comof a price-control the establishment Asnaf), (otaq-e of the bazaar, inand the repeated humiliation mission, a major highway through it, cluding a plan to construct However, the anticauses for alienation. were sufficient polcampaigns of Hovayda and the deflationary profiteering icies of Amuzegar pushed the bazaar further into the opposition. Within the ten months of a campaign organized by some 10,000 "volthe government to reduce prices forcibly, to check into some 250,000 retail unteers" were mobilized stores leading to the arrest of some 8,000 and the exile The abuses of this campaign of some 23,000 merchants. rent by Amuzegar's tight money policies, were exacerbated which and the attack on urban-land speculation, controls, conInflation in 1978. stagflation all led to a serious while unemtinued high at a rate of some 30-40 percent, in and particularly in most industries ployment increased where most of Iran's labor force industry, the construction was employed. to the ulama and the bazaar, as noted In addition communication the third link of the opposition's earlier The organization intelligentsia. network was the radical of two rival guerrilla groups in the '70s--Cherikha-ye with revolutionary Sacrifices), (People's Fada'i-ye Khalq Cruand Mojahedin-e Khalq (People's Marxist tendencies, a great deal to undersaders) with Islamic leanings--did by SAVAK. Although mine the reign of terror established in their military campaigns, they seemed to have failed IRANIAN STUDIES

20

by the late '70s opposition had gathered sufintellectuals ficient courage to come out into the open by organizing posessions and issuing clandestine letters etry-reading (shabnameh) of protest. The German Goethe Institute in Tehran became, in 1976-77, a focal point of such meetings attended into the by thousands of poets and students overflowing No sooner were they closed down when a series of streets. of protest open letters intellectuby leading opposition als addressed to the shah and the prime minister found a widespread circulation. Together with the Carter administration's human rights policies, the psychological environment they created for the opposition was significantly encouraging. The university-students' strikes and occasional confrontations with the police took on a more ominous turn toward the late '70s. The opposition who intellectuals, had long been denied access to university teaching or publishing, began to regroup themselves inside government and newly emerging research institutes bureaucracies where they were allowed to be employed. Small Media as Revolutionary

Vehicle

The revolutionary movement was thus gradually infiltrating society at large, as well as the establishment camps, employing the rumor circuit, the seminar rooms, the xeroxing facilities, the telephone system, and the small electronic media. Small-scale publishing thrived more than ever. Maktab-e a serious religious Islam, sold journal, over 50,000 copies, an impressive total when compared to the 3,000 copies sold by Sokhan, the country's most prestigious literary journal. The number of periodicals published in exile abroad rose to more than 35. The newer electronic devices provided opportunities for many novel uses. The introduction of transistorized audiotape machines greatly increased the sales of prerecorded religious messages. Tapes were used both for strictly religious and for political messages. Most of Ayatollah Khomeini's messages sent from exile (from 1963 to 1979) came in the form of tapes of elamiyeh (pronouncements) which were transcribed and mimeographed or xeroxed AND REVOLUTION COMMUNICATION

21

on a massive

scale.

The communication blackout which lasted from November of jourby strikes 1978 to mid-January 1979 (precipitated led many people to put the teleand broadcasters) nalists If one dialed phone system to a number of ingenious uses. the latest news several numbers abroad to give and receive local operaor rumors of the domestic scene, the friendly enough to charge the call to the tor would be obliging imMessages of political authority. telecommunication by as well as internally portance were relayed externally on a wide scale. and then taped and duplicated telephone also used Various campaigns of terror and counterterror governthe telephone network to threaten the opposition, and foreign residents. strikers, ment officials, were set up, mostradio stations Several clandestine ly abroad, to relay to Iran the messages of diverse opposition groups, ranging from the Tudeh (communist) Party to guerrilla bands. the National Front and the new revolutionary always popuBBC's World Service program in Persian, a vacuum news, filled lar in Iran as a source of reliable by the domestic mass communication blackleft especially its programs by news that bordered It also enlivened out. commentaries that were interpreted on rumor and by special The worldwide media attenas support for the revolution. subsequent to his tion that Ayatollah Khomeini received (outside of Paris) from Iraq to Neuphle-le-Chateau expulsion boost they needed; the psychological gave the revolutionaries that the it also gave the impression to the monarchists a popular Muslim fundamentalist Western powers considered than regime a surer guarantee against communist penetration the IraniUnderstandably, a loyal but unpopular monarchy. an revolution provided for the world media one of the most tales of sound and in the end tragic, dramatic, bizarre, and fury yet to unfold on the world scene; consequently, But thanks its full due in media attention. it received of a revolutionary leadership in part to the histrionics communicators, and in religious trained as professional of the commercial mass media, part due to the frailties IRANIAN

STUDIES

22

lost of much its human import and was transthe revolution formed into a "media event" with its own autonomous ratings value.

Some Theoretical

Implications

some important theoin Iran contains The revolution Indeed, for the left as well as the right. lessons retical as they the very meaning of the terms "left" and "right," must be rediction, are understood in Western political revolutionary examined when applied to this extraordinary economic Even though its weapon was largely situation.14 to the lower and its ideology appealed primarily (strikes) symthe revolution employed religious strata of society, economic interpretations. bols and thus defied strictly component of the was no doubt an essential Class conflict alone would not have but class conflict mass revolt, as a populist, national achieved what should be considered ethnic groups, across all social classes, cutting uprising The revand ideological orientations. faiths, religious the major economic issues; demands transcended olutionary after the in fact, took place, and demonstrations strikes to the workers government had granted huge pay increases Outside of a few pampered groups and government employees. bureaucin the top layers of the armed forces and civilian support in any other sector of the there was little racy, The system collapsed to sustain the monarchy. population of its own accord; it did not take an armed insurrection in to destroy it. This was a genuine popular revolution or class theconspiracy sense, and it defies the fullest ories. The people as a whole, rather than any particular had been subjected for quite some time to class thereof, of economic exploitation, cultural depersonthe processes and social atomizadehumanization, bureaucratic alization, The economic situation was simple enough to define: tion. Iran as many other parts of the Third World provided a key to fuel the Western economies which oil, key raw material, in turn dumped their surplus products in order to recycle the petrodollars back. In the meantime, Iran served as AND REVOLUTION COMMUNICATION

23

area of the world by the Western gendarme in a volatile hardware, worth of military of dollars paying for billions rapidly, in the process, into an acquisitive disintegrating dependent on imincreasingly consumer society and wasteful with ports and a myriad of assembly plants and industries The automoprospects. competitive dubious international of a nouveaufeeding on the status anxieties bile industry, of such induswas perhaps the most visible riche society, trafcosts in noise, social incalculable entailing tries, tenenvy, psychological social pollution, fic congestions, and sheer human degradation. sions, were, by depersonalization of cultural The processes The dual imbut no less damaging. contrast, less visible had gradually and secularization pact of Westernization autonomy taken away the remnants of pride in the cultural the deep simply represented of Iran. Imperial pretensions from their Iranian of the ruling elite sense of alienation to compensate psychologeffort roots and also a desperate inferiority for their profound sense of cultural ically by the queen and Some meek efforts the West. vis-a-vis some measure of pride in the speher entourage to inspire Iranian arts and culture was often overswept by cifically rendering policies, the more dominant imperial cultural them a romantic farce. of bureaucratization and centralization The processes a dominant feature of Iran under the Pahlavis, of authority, state which had also created by the '70s an all-powerful and legitimacy beyond its own. Unno authority recognized into the soul of the people and able, however, to penetrate of political particito organize any genuine institutions in a ranof this state was exercised the authority pation, manner. The state and police apparatus dom and arbitrary face and claimed thus assumed a dehumanized bureaucratic without having acall of the totalitarian prerogatives power and the mass quired the substance of totalitarian called for. loyalties of modernizathe processes Last but not the least, tion acting through the growth of a rapacious and rentier on the oil revenues, dependent for its survival capitalism

IRANIAN

STUDIES

24

The fluatomized Iranian society beyond all recognition. and an active policy idity of the Iranian class structure of co-optation combined to produce not so much class strugThe status struggles gles as status and identity anxieties. revolved around proximity to the throne and the imperial of all moral legitimacy state apparatus, depriving politics and creating a Byzantine atmosphere and class solidarity of intrigue The identity and atomistic power struggles. anxieties, by contrast, pitted the secular against the rethe ligious, the Francophiles against the Americophiles, the Freeforeign-educated against the domestic-educated, masons against the nationalists, the technocrats against A ruling elite thus atomized and the co-opted communists. torn against with little moral basis of legitimacy itself could not but collapse in the face of a populist religious while elicideology that had a firm hold over the people, iting considerable sympathy within the ranks of the government itself. there are also In studying the Iranian revolution, some important implications The revolution beyond Iran. in so many ways the contemporary social, economic, typifies political, and cultural forces at work in the Third World. of power that has followed in the wake The fragmentation of the revolution cyclical pattern in has been a recurrent and continuity is in no Iran, but its depth, intensity, small measure due to style of the despotic modernization could be conthat preceded it. The Iranian revolution sidered as representative of the four latent and suppressed revolutionary processes in the Third World which have been chaotic, and bewilderfused and compressed into a single, national libing phenomenon. First, an anti-imperialist eration movement that began in the Iranian case way back in the nineteenth time and century only to be frustrated politics and inagain by the omnipresence of great-power terventions. Second, a bourgeois democratic revolution that has approached power and then failed to achieve its objectives three times in this century (the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-11, Dr. Mosaddeq's oil-nationalization movement of 1951-53, and the Bakhtiyar/Bazargan episode of 1979). that Third, a proletarian social revolution has tasted power this time but has so far failed to grasp COMMUNICATION AND REVOLUTION

25

cadres and organizations. it through its own leadership that has assumed the guise revolution Fourth, a cultural of liberalism, of Islam only because the modern ideologies associated had come to be closely Marxism, and nationalism ideals and life whose interests, with a secular elite majority set them sharply apart from the traditional styles of the population. of Third World sotransformation The revolutionary to quasi-indusfrom tribal and agrarian entities cieties This pace. ones has assumed an ever-accelerating trial politsuppressing in contexts has produced, particularly abstraction, of transience, conditions ical participation, In the meantime, the communianonymity, and alienation. of the that began with the invention revolution cations to provide a multipress has also accelerated printing values, media exposure to a complex variety of life styles, and ideas as well as access to the small media for purand small group communicaposes of personal explorations tions. The fusion of these two phenomena and their comanxieties, in time has produced severe identity pression of abstractions of the rational a rejection facilitating and a focus on definitions identity class and national sex, (i.e., primordial the more concrete and affective, Conidentities. and ethnicity) language, race, religion, that modern life imidentities fronted with the multiple demands it and the difficult poses upon the individual systems, the and personality social makes for integrated has alimpulse to return to some simple self-definitions recognized As Alexis de Tocqueville so been very strong. a century and a half ago, the roots of the problem are of democratization.15 deeply embedded in the processes of conditions drive toward the equality The inexhorable movements in the paved the way for social and political individusacrificed century that have gleefully twentieth However, al freedom at the altar of democratic equality. could not have foreseen was the extent what de Tocqueville and of technological acceleration to which the processes neocoloni(undertaken by colonial, modernization despotic in the Third World) would proelites al and postcolonial and identity duce such great measures of rootlessness could be easily anxiety that both freedom and justice IRANIAN STUDIES

26

to satisfy the demands for a sense of identity, sacrificed The desperate yearnings for even though anachronistic. context bear the meaning and community in this historical and for social reconstruction both for creative potential of civility. The Iranian of all traditions destruction has the possibility of leading to a more autonorevolution but if the identity and humane society, mous, free, just, of the uprooted are exploited for the advantage anxieties leadership, it can also degenerate of a new authoritarian more pernicious in corruption into new forms of political than the tyranny it set out to correct. consequences

NOTES

1.

This quotation is a tribute not only to Mark Twain's wry humor but also to the late Daniel Lerner who at the beginning of his book, The quoted it first of Traditional Passing The Free Society (Chicago: Lerner was one of the first Press, 19S8). not only to recognize the importance of communication in the process of modernization, but also one of the earliest to acknowledge the shortcomings of some of his own views. See the interview with Daniel Lerner by Khosrow Jahandary, Communication and Development Review 1 (Summer-Autumn 1977).

2.

The extent of the alienation of the elite from the mass revealed itself in the debates of the late '70s on how to alleviate urban traffic Prince Ghojams. lam Reza, who owned shares in an airplane assembly plant in Isfahan, admonished the harassed city commuters to fly their own private planes. This was of Marie Antoinette's reminiscent remark at the peak of the French Revolution: "If there isn't enough bread, let them eat cake."

3.

The two most important documents to consult on the two rival ideologies are, of course, the shah's short book on Tammadon-e Bozorg (The Great Civilization) and Ayatollah Khomeini's lecture notes delivered in Najaf on Velayat-e of the Faqih (The Trusteeship

AND REVOLUTION COMMUNICATION

27

Jurist), titles:

published under a variety

of different

Hokumat-e Islami (The Islamic Government), Nameh'i az Imam (A Letter from the Imam), etc.

4.

The themes in this paragraph are developed more fully elsewhere by Tehranian, "The Curse of Modernity: The Dialectics of Communication and Modernization," InterSocial Science Journal 32, No. 2 (1980). national Peter Berger is one of the first and the few who has paid particular attention to the human costs of modThe Homeless Mind: Modsee especially, ernization; (London: Penguin Books, and Consciousness ernization Ethics Political 1973) and Pyramids of Sacrifice: and Social Change (London: Penguin Books, 1974).

5.

and Social Systems of Marvin Zonis, "The Political Iran in the Year 1990," unpublished paper, December 1977.

6.

Those interviewed included Ayatollah Shari'atmadari (the de facto center of liberal hopes in the postrevolutionary period), Ayatollah Mottahari (a leading ideologue and chairman of the Revolutionary religious in 1979), Ayatollah Council until his assassination Nuri (leader of the Black Friday movement of September 1978), and Falsafi (the fiery preacher who has survived all changes of regimes during the past 30 Despite differences of nuances in their years). views, there was considerable unanimity of grievance among them.

7.

George Ball seems to be far closer to the truth than of Henry Kissinger in their opposing interpretations see the shah's downfall; States role in the United The Economist (London), February 10 and 17, 1979 issues. By giving the shah an option to purchase unlimited military hardware, the Nixon administration whetted the shah's appetite to play a regional superpower role in the Middle East to the detriment of Iran's domestic development needs. However, the human rights policy also unCarter administration's dermined the shah's sense of security without giving

IRANIAN STUDIES

28

of a sense of direction. him the benefit In the end, it was a test of wills between a fundamentally weak and insecure monarch, culturally and politically alienated from his people, and a strong and determined charismatic leader who knew that sooner or later the armed forces would respond positively to his irresistible appeals of peace and fraternity. Nevertheless, history may remember the shah,as well as Bakhtiyar, kindly for having facilitated a relatively peaceful transition to the new order. 8.

This title

9.

See Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi and Maryam Mahlouji, "News from Nowhere: Foreign News in the Iranian Press," Communications and Development Review 2, No. 2 (Summer 1978), pp. 19-22. Once censorship was somewhat lifted from the press in the fall of 1978, domestic news dominated and circulations increased from 50,000 to over 1 million. For a comparison of the pre- and post-revolutionary communication indicators, see Tehranian, Socio-Economic and Communication In-

film has been released of "The Cycle."

in the West under the

dicators and Development Planning: Iran (Paris: UNESCO, 1981).

A Case

Study

of

10.

Estimates for the number of mullahs show a wide variation because there are no accurate statistics and no way of defining who is or is not a bona fide precisely Shi'ite cleric. This has become the case particularly in the aftermath of the revolution by the appearance of a large group of instant ayatollahs and hojjatolislams as well as lower-rank clerics who have reassumed clerical robes.

11.

For Ayatollah Khomeini's sult his Towzih al-Masa'el

theological positions, conof Problems). (Elucidation

For his political

see Velayat-e

views,

Faqih,

op. cit.

Ali Shari'ati's overall view of Islam is best expressed in his Islam-shenasi (Islamology). His influence is, however, due primarily to his many short polemical writings characterized by moving rhetoric, AND REVOLUTION COMMUNICATION

29

his Shi 'a Alavi va Shi 'a Safavi (the see especially Alavid and the Safavid Shi'isms) and Thar(Blood). 12.

Ali Shari'ati and the Hosayniyeh Ershad movement clearly threatened some of the more conservative members of the ulama. As a lay theologian, educated in sociology at the Sorbonne, Shari'ati did not commandthe same authority that a bona fide ayatollah would. The government thus used the occasion of a split in the ulama's ranks on this issue to extraordinary suppress the movement. Shari'ati's among the university stupopularity, particularly dents, continued, however, unabated. His sudden and suspicious death in London after his release from prison, gave him the image of a martyr. In the processions of the fall of 1978, his portrait was displayed second only to that of Ayatollah Khomeini.

13.

though somewhat exaggerated, comFor an interesting, of the bazaar in the upheavals, on the role mentary see Don A. Schanche, "Iran's Bazaars Reveal Power," Herald Tribune, January 16, 1979, p. 1. International The article claims an annual disbursement of some $320 million from the bazaar to the ulama.

14.

and perceptive interpretation, For an enthusiastic see Edward Mortimer, "Iran: The Greatest Revolution February 17, 1979 and its since 1917," Spectator, sequel, "Fedayin Threat to Khomeini," Spectator,. February 24, 1979.

15.

Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vols. 12, translated by Henry Reeve (London: Saunders & For an elaboration of the arguOtley, 1835-1840). ments in this paragraph, see Tehranian, "The Fetish Communications Revolution and Fundaof Identity: mentalist Revivals,"Media Asia 8, No. 1 (1981).

IRANIAN STUDIES

30

Iranian Studies, Volume XIII, Nos. 1-4, 1980

Pseudoparticipationand Countermobilization:Roots of the Iranian Revolution Jerrold D. Green The Iranian revolution a unique challenge presents to social Marked by massive popular participation scientists. in urban areas), (primarily of violence by the rejection by the

and by the

revolutionaries,

goals,

the Iranian

experience

rapid

of

fulfillment

seems to elude

its

prevailing

paradigms for the study of revolution. Although there were that made the country several factors ripe for revolution-of relative widespread feelings a state deprivation, appafrom the international ratus under pressure system, impeded and conflicts elite circulation, among various social of these classes--none can explain alone why the upheaval While it is unlikely that a definitive occurred.1 explanation of the revolution can ever be found, all virtually of revolution theories ask two questions: implicitly (1) What social conditions lead to revolution, and (2) What is the nature of participation in such revolutions? It is with the first of these questions that this essay is primarily concerned.2

pose.

Revolutions They are

are products the culmination

of the very forces of sociopolitical

Jerrold D. Green is Assistant Professor at the University of Michigan. I would like this paper.

of Political

to thank David Gordon for useful

they opactivity

Science

comments on

31

whose revolutionary character is recognizable only upon the advent of revolution itself. This seeming tautology indicates the bankruptcy of expost facto theorization about revolution,when what in fact is needed is a mode of analysis able to determine under what circumstances a given set of factors will lead to revolution and under what conditions seemingly identical factors will not. In short, we should be as interested in explaining how revolutions come about as we are in their mechanics. Given the extraordinarily high level of popular participation in the Iranian revolution, an attempt should be made to link participation in the revolution with participation in the prerevolutionary period. Additionally, an explanation must be sought that accounts for the broad-based urban support for the revolution, and minimal rural involvement. In sum, because the most salient aspect of the Iranian revolution lies in the of political nature of participation in it, the perspective participation should aid us in understanding the questions In this paper I argue that in Iran, rapid posed above. socioeconomic development gave rise to demands for popular participation. By ignoring or trying to negate these demands, the shah forced those seeking participation into political action outside the proscribed system. At the this extrasystemic was fragmented and difoutset, activity fuse. Ultimately, however, it culminated in a coherent and overwhelming tide of anti-Pahlavi countermobilization, spearinfraheaded by the only group in Iran with the requisite and popular legitimacy--the structural attributes religious sector.

Mobilization

and Participation

in

Iran

Before the rise to power of MohammadReza Shah Pahlavi in 1941, popular political participation rarely exfelt Its relative absence became acutely isted in Iran. only during the middle and late years of the shah's rule. Forced to flee the country by Mosaddeq in 1953, returning undertook with the help of the CIA, the monarch eventually that a dramatic program of what he termed "modernization" was spearheaded by the White Revolution of 1963. Metaphorfrom above was meant to serve as the the revolution ically, IRANIAN

STUDIES

32

of the "black" revolution antithesis from below, as symbolized by the Mosaddeq affair, of terrorrecurrent instances ism, and assassination attempts against the shah. Thus, Iran evolved into what Huntington has called a "modernizing monarchy," in this case characterized by a particularly pragmatic and cynical form of modernization whose primary goal was preservation of the Pahlavi dynasty.3 Modernization had as its goal not social improvement per se, but rather the unrealized ambition of improving the country's economic status while at the same time keeping the level of popular political involvement as it had been for generations. This caricature of modernity was meant to embody all of the qualities related to such processes, with one major exception--political modernity. For inherent in the peculiarly contradictory goal of a modernizing monarchy is the maintenance of a particularly nonmodern form of state management, monarchical autocracy. It is in the tension between these two competing goals that we find the most relevant antecedents to the Iranian revolution. As a means of illuminating the origins of the Iranian revolution, we might turn to Karl Deutsch's formulation of social mobilization.4 According to him, the process of modernization a form of mobilization entails in which various sectors of society are inducted into and inculcated with the values of a changing society around them. Along with social mobilization, a process of politicization begins to occur in which citizens develop an increased awareness of the existence and activities of their national government. Through such factors as an increase in literacy, GNP, educational attainment, urbanization, and exposure to mass media and the elements of a modern society (cities, factories, shops), consciousness is raised and an irreversible desire for political involvement If stimulated. national to sanction elites are either unable or unwilling participation, they may be paving the wayfor political instability and for a government out of touch with its citizenry. Such an outcome, according to Myron Weiner, may be termed a "crisis of participation," which in i-ts most dramatic form may spell revolution.5

PSEUDOPARTICIPATION

AND COUNTERMOBILIZATION

33

that social mobilization Although others recognize they are not as sanguine as culminates in politicization, of providing opDeutsch or Weiner about the advisability Samuel Huntington for political participation. portunities is sensitive to the problem, arguing that when participation apparatus created to absorb it, exceeds the institutional for Huntington, powill ensue.6 Therefore, instability restricted. should be carefully In litical participation a more recent work with Joan Nelson, he argues for an emphasis on economic growth, which he feels will produce a 7 fashion. in a responsible to participate middle class likely the dangers of politicization David Apter also recognizes in which a population political mobilization, and discusses of is provided with the form, although not the substance, of such mobilAn example, par excellence, participation.8 ization may be found in the Soviet Union, where much effort is expended on an elaborate and cosmetic charade of the parthis that facilitate The conditions ticipatory process.9 to exist in most deare not likely "pseudoparticipation" three In Iran, the shah had essentially states. veloping options open to him in response to growing politicization, in the fashion (1) the gradual expansion of participation of particidiscussed by Deutsch and Weiner; (2) repression pation a la Huntington until such time as there was a midof the partidle class up to the task; or (3) replication cipatory process emphasizing form not substance in the by Apter. Iranian development was characmanner described terized by options two and three. Social

Mobilization

and Politicization

in Iran

modernity, large As Iran pushed toward socioeconomic in the fashion were politicized segments of the population the This was particularly discussed by the above scholars. the countryside case in the urban sector, which outstripped in virtually every sphere of endeavor enumerated by Deutsch. In large part an outgrowth of the White Revolution (shahof 1963, urbanization proceeded unhampeople revolution) Iran's urban sector more than doubling in popupered,with Tehran alone grew lation between the years 1960 and 1975. from 2 to over 4 million people from 1966 to 1976 with pubIRANIAN

STUDIES

34

lic transportation, housing, and schools growing at a much "On the eve of the revolution," slower pace. according to Abrahamian, "as much as 42 percent of Tehran had inadequate of families in only housing," while "the percentage living from 36 to 43.1110 And while GNP in ur one room increased ban areas exceeded that in the rural sector by a ratio of approximately 5:1, income distribution within the cities of inequality. reflected similar patterns Tehran best exthis with the city's emplifies top 20 percent income group 60 percent of the city's total income.11 estimated receiving were not lost on most Iranians and provided, Such inequities to revolution. as we shall see, important stimuli Deutsch also talks of the politicizing aspects of inand expanded educational creases in literacy opportunities. far more than did the Here too, the urban sector benefited While literacy rates rose from 16 percent of rural one. in 1960 to 50 percent in 1975, 60 perthe adult population resided in cities cent of the country's literate population while 70 percent of (the country is 46 percent urbanized), rural women remained illiterate.12 Proportionally, national for education consistently and by expenditures declined, 1970 Iran spent only 2.5 percent of its GNP on education, not only less than wealthy oil producers such as Iraq and Kuwait but even less than poor states such as Sudan and Egypt. one of the main goals of Iranian eduSignificantly, of obeisance cation was the routinization and respect for the shah. Obviously, this goal was not realized, as students of all ages came to play a central role in the revoluMehdi Bazargan compares them to American students tion. in the 1960s who radicalized their elders on the Viet Nam issue.14 The shah paid special attention to higher education-at home as well as sending students expanding the facilities abroad--believing that only through its immediate growth could the managers and technocrats to Iranian modcentral be produced with the necessary ernization It seems speed. to, and did not consider, that he paid inadequate attention the role education would play in politicizing the students and increasing opposition to the regime.

PSEUDOPARTICIPATION

AND COUNTERMOBILIZATION

35

were never able to accommodate Iranian universities and many of those denied the large number of applicants, that without a unirecognizing admission became alienated, degree they would be unable to partake of the beneversity For those who fits of Iran's rapid economic development. exlife often was a frustrating university were admitted, checks were subject to SAVAKsecurity Professors perience. credentials" were in order. to insure that their "political scholexcluded many of Iran's most talented Such repression life and crein university ars from active participation and peratmosphere marked by timidity ated an intellectual It was asintervention. vaded by a fear of secret-police were populated by one or more SAVAK sumed that classes and ready to inform on their professors "representatives," breach of acceptable fellow students at the slightest powere narrow and geared Course offerings litical behavior. needs rather than to the developmental to Iran's technical, Many faculty members of students. and interests desires hampered by the restrictions, and students were severely their professions for them to practice making it impossible in any meaningful way. For example, Iran boasted a national while books by eminent social science association, political about Iran were banned or removed from library scientists Iranian scientists were unusually mobile and shelves.15 was gatherings professional attendance at international abroad with encouraged, yet when they compared conditions Finalat home, they were greatly disturbed. the situation and as the literate restricted, was severely ly, publishing grew, the yearly number of books published depopulation did little to raise the Such counterincentives clined.16 quality of Iranian education and scholarship. of Iranians sent abroad to pursue their The situation was similar. educations By 1973-74, Iranians outnumbered in the United States. students of all other nationalities In 1979-80 there were anywhere from 45, 000 to 60,000 Iraniin the United States alone, while in the same an students in Iran did not exceed year the total student population less.17 Yet, ac200,000 and was probably substantially cording to one account, only 7 percent of the 325,731 Iranians completing degrees abroad between 1950 and 1968 returned with rehome.18 Iranians in the West became politicized IRANIAN

STUDIES

36

markable rapidity and many of them took to the streets against the shah with great frequency and vigor. The actiof such regime opponents were avidly followed by most vities to the crown. Iranians well aware of any and all opposition also contributed Other aspects of social mobilization For example, expansion in Iran. to popular politicization of the mass media was a central developmental priority of the shah. The reasons for this lay not in a desire to provide cheap popular entertainment, but rather to capitalize on radio and television as valuable tools for effecting social mobilization. According to one scholar close to National Iranian Radio and Television (NIRT), "broadcasting in developing countries cannot play a neutral or pasfor sive role." Instead, the media should be "catalysts while "foschange and stimuli to national development," tering the development of a socially aware and patriotic youth," and strengthening the "bases of national unity."119 The revolution attests to NIRT's failure to attain its goals, of its potential the but the regime's perceptions reflect shah's overall and strategies. developmental priorities By 1978 NIRT employed 7,000 people, with projections for doubling its staff by the 1980s. In 1975-76 its budget rose by 20 percent, while other government agencies had and mass their's cut. Indeed, the budget for information communications of which NIRT was a central component exceeded that of culture and arts as well as urban development, and was only 25 percent less than the budget for social seof NIRT's telecurity and welfare.20 Yet, fully one-third vision and radio programs were offered in English and other of the shah's European languages, a reflection, many felt, for the West and disdain for things Persian.21 preference Programming was surprisingly mediocre, with strong doses of Western-style films and thrillers. Soap operas were common fare, trying to inculcate viewers with the values of the "new" Pahlavistic society around them. Dress in these shows was predominantly Western, men and women interacted with a familiarity and lack of restraint uncommon in Iran, and generally families portrayed were upper or uppermiddle class, living in exclusive north Tehran. Given the of most Iranians to achieve such standards of inability PSEUDOPARTICIPATION

AND COUNTERMOBILIZATION

37

to a sense of living, the media worked subtly to contribute comthem with a level of material it tantalized alienation; hope of attaining. fort that they had little of social mobilLet us conclude this brief discussion ization by looking at what Deutsch terms exposure to various For the most part, such exposure subaspects of modernity. changes of resoccupations, sumes changes from agricultural and rises in per capita income, as idence, urbanization, and all well as the general exposure to shops, factories, Indeed, travel throughof the elements of a modern society. as the number of autoout Iran was immeasurably simplified along with a correspondmobiles and buses grew dramatically This "shrinking" of ing expansion of the roadway system. For example, the number of relithe country cut both ways. from 1966 to 1976.22 to Mashad grew tenfold gious pilgrims Foreign travel also increased markedly as did the number of As Iran. living and working in or just visiting foreigners earlier took place, discussed the tremendous urbanization and the rural sector grew stronger. links between the cities served as an additional The rapid growth of the military means of exposing large numbers of Iranians to life in other stationed were routinely parts of the country, as soldiers of perat some distance from their homes. This shifting lest a soldier sonnel was meant to combat local loyalties An outgrowth were ever deployed in crowd or riot control. of the shah's rapprochement with Iraq lay in an increase in to the holy places in Najaf and Karbala and pilgrimages This aceasier access to the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini. of taperecorders along with the availability cessibility, of his ideas all and photocopiers, made the dissemination to combat. And indeed, the country was virbut impossible as well flooded by Khomeini's speeches and writings tually In short, and Jalal Al-Ahmad.23 as those of Ali Shari'ati an important but unanticipated aspect of Iranian social mobilization was the spread of ideas. Pahlavi development, character as well as the unpoputhrough its politicizing of its chief proponent, the shah, not only served as larity their transthe target of such ideas but also facilitated fer. Such ideas are not necessarily dangerous, but given the absence of communication between the crown and the

IRANIAN

STUDIES

38

Iranian people, they ultimately

Political and the

and the denial of political proved to be fatal.

participation,

Mobilization, Pseudoparticipation, Crisis of Participation

The shah's rule was characterized by sporadic and tentative In 1957 liberalization. steps toward political a two-party system, although the members of he instituted were already active the Melliyun and Mardom parties in In 1963, the shah tried to reinnational life. political vigorate political life through creation of the Iran-Novin Yet at the same time, the practice Party. of politics was in SAVAKactivity. restricted severely by a marked increase and a deteriorating In response to sporadic terrorism ecoto the doubling of the expenditure nomic system traceable Five Year Plan, the shah announced that level of the fifth to the Iran-Novin Party would be sanctioned opposition in the 1975 elections. Frightened by the ensuing scurry of from his promise to expand political activity resulting the shah backed off, eliminated political participation, the two-party system completely, and created a single mobilization Melli party named Hizb-e Rastakhiz-e (National Resurgence Party).24 Like the Ba'ath movements (also meanin Syria and Iraq, or Egypt's abortive ing Resurgence) Arab Socialist Union, Rastakhiz was meant to generate support for a troubled regime while at the same time imitating the participatory process through pseudoparticipation. Highlighting the authoritarian character of his new party, the shah stated that "those who [do] not subscribe to [its]prin5 ciples [are] either traitors...or non-Iranians..". The Rastakhiz Party was doomed to failure from the Iranians had seen political outset. parties come and go and greeted the shah's newest attempt to foster pseudoparwith ambivalence or cynicism. ticipation Rastakhiz had only one significant task, supervision of the "antiprofand "price war" of 1975. iteeringcampaign" Reminiscent of the Red Guards in China, hordes of young people swept through the country looking for merchants who exceeded the price index in the sale of their merchandise. The PSEUDOPARTICIPATION AND COUNTERMOBILIZATION

39

the shah attempted to shift the blame campaign was a fiasco; to sector, economic woes onto the private for the country's and the bazaar for these woes, minorities blame religious and to create the impression that the Rastakhiz Party was conInflation participation.26 for political a vehicle tinued to rise. participation Regime attempts to sponsor political of large segments of the led to a further politicization that such a thing as participaBy acknowledging society. and that the shah felt the need for it, the tion existed, for popular desires rather than nullified regime increased is Pseudoparticipation participation. increased political refor a vulnerable dangerous undertaking a particularly while providing consciousness gime, as it raises political of such confor the manifestations outlet no legitimate Iran's most highly By focusing on the cities, sciousness. the regime was making an appeal sector, mobilized socially for to attempts to subvert desires to those most sensitive was Iran's mobilized citizenry The urban, socially change. grouping, and it was most and cynical most sophisticated familiar with the string of broken promises of which the Rastakhiz Party was only the most recent episode. By the beginning of 1977, the Rastakhiz Party had begrew in scope relic while popular dissent come a political At the same time, the shah was publicly and magnitude. for his dismal human rights record by Amnesty criticized Iranian Jimmy Carter. and U.S. President International students ran wild in the United States and Europe while as the quality of Iranians at home were losing patience doubling The disastrous life in the country deteriorated. hit of the fifth Five Year Plan took its toll as inflation 40 percent (the government admitted to 20 peran estimated of participathe type of crisis As Iran sustained cent). with periodtion discussed by Weiner, Tehran was afflicted blackouts throughout the summer of 1977. ic electricity Sweden by the year And as the shah talked of surpassing 2000 and of leading Iran toward a "great civilization," or had food spoil in their people were trapped in elevators At was vivid and shocking. The contrast refrigerators.2 the same time, the Tehran police engaged in pitched battles IRANIAN

STUDIES

40

with indigent migrants living in hovels in the southernmost part of the city. This conflict between the society's most and the government served as a particulardeprived citizens ly unflattering portrait of the shah and his modernizers. Reacting to the chaos around him, the shah replaced Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hovayda with Jamshid Amuzegar. Amuzegar was compelled to begin his tenure by restricting credit to fight the country's raging inflation. These restrictions led to a recession, a cutback on building and development programs, and an increase in unemployment which affected large numbers of urban migrants. Foolishly, Amuzegar also eliminated government subsidies to the religious sector. None of these restrictions endeared the new prime to the Iranian people. minister Regime insensitivity of to the nature and intensity to it generated further opposition, opposition while its attempts at political mobilization through the Rastakhiz Party had clearly failed. Sensing regime indecisiveness, as well as taking inspiration from criticisms by Iranian students abroad, human rights groups, and even the United States government, various middle-class professional and associational groups decided to act. Realizing that politically they had nothing to lose, these groups chose to go outside of the system to express their discontent, for no means to express dissatisfaction within the system existed. Their activities to were almost incomprehensible the regime, a regime that prided itself on having fostered the dramatic growth of an urban middle class. According to James Bill, "the middle classes in Iran.. .make up over 25 percent of the population.",29 This sector, Iran's most socially mobilized, was the sector most eager for political input and most outraged by its denial. Yet it should be emphasized that their initial goal was to bring about reform, not revolution. It was only later, after the establishment of ties with the religious sector, that they became sufficiently confident to seek an end to the Pahlavi dynasty altogether. tion

Throughout this period, Iran's crisis was gradually transformed into a crisis

of participaof the system

PSEUDOPARTICIPATION AND COUNTERMOBILIZATION

41

as a whole. In May of 1977, a group of 53 attorneys called for an investigation into the absence of impartiality in the judiciary.30 In June, the Writers' Association, long banned, sent an open letter to the prime minister signed by 40 of its members. Among their demands were regime recognition of their organization and greater cultural freedom. Three days later the National Front sent a similar letter, this time directly to the shah, asking for greater regime adherence to the constitution. The Group for Free Books and Thought was established by publishers seeking to eliminate and government control of publishing. In early censorship November a manifesto, a signed by 56 people representing of groups, was circulated. variety It asked for a return to the constitution, an end to human rights violations, the of single-party abolition rule, the release of political prisoners, and free elections. Other groups composed of bazaaris, teachers, judges, doctors, university professors, and students were also active. The Iranian Bar Association headed by Hasan Nazih and Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari (a grandson of Mosaddeq) was particularly audible in its call for free elections of political and the release prisoners. On November 20, the Iranian Committee for Freedom and Human of Mehdi Bazargan. Rights was founded under the leadership Finally, on successive evenings from October 10 through October 19, 1977, a series of poetry readings sponsored was held at the Goethe Instiby the Writers' Association tute in Tehran.31 The poems read were extremely diverse, in their criticisms of the shah and the decline yet direct in the quality of life throughout Iran. And as 1977 came to an end with an attempt on the life of the shah's sister in France, and Jimmy Carter's now famous Niavaran Palace speech, time seemed to be running out for the monarch as to him grew dramatically.32 opposition Yet such opposition of a reformist was still nature. Revolutionary sentiment grew only later in response to regime vacillationand ineptitude.

Countermobilization

while

and Revolution

to him The shah misread the substance of opposition of the to gauge correctly the composition failing

IRANIAN

STUDIES

42

middle-class groupings enumerated above. Although there had been evidence of regime opposition emanating from the religious sector, primarily Ayatollah Khomeini in Najaf, the shah chose to attribute all opposition to the religious community while talking vaguely of "Islamic Marxists." On January 7, 1978, the Tehran daily newspaper Ettela'at published a letter and personattacking Khomeini in a vicious al fashion. The letter is assumed to have been the work of the shah or one of his flunkies. During the following two days, riots of unanticipated severity swept the holy city of Qom by a citizenry outraged by the regime's attack on a respected religious leader. These riots were the start of a cycle of violent protests, and 40 days later, a commemorative gathering was held for those who died earlier. This Arba'in led to protest, further loss of life, another commemoration 40 days later, and so on. The attack of Khomeini in Ettela'at and the subsequent riots were an important watershed in the long history of to the Pahlavi dynasty, clerical opposition highlighting Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as the one religious leader from whom the regime had most to fear. While Khomeini has always been known as a political figure within Iran's religious community,33 by crudely attributing all regime oppoto the religious sition sector and to Khomeini particularly, the shah unwittingly provided a signpost delineating the as the "official" ayatollah head of a national opposition. This ineptitude on the part of the monarch in no way supports those who argue that he "created Khomeini." The obviously slanderous Ettela'at letter served to ironically enhance the ayatollah's already substantial antiregime It also helped to initiate credentials.34 the counterwhich led to the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty. mobilization Countermobilization may simply be defined as the of social mobilization forces by counterelites against an existing political order.35 The needs of such counterelites are remarkably similar to those of a national elite, for in both cases mobilization on a mass level is sought, with support drawn from a broad cross-section of a society. Therefore, it can be argued that counterelites seeking to countermobilize must be part of units PSEUDOPARTICIPATION AND COUNTERMOBILIZATION

43

within a society. are highly integrated which themselves will facilitate speedy and effective integration Such social and those to be mobilcommunications between counterelites which can be used the building of an infrastructure ized, activity, and a social to organize and support antiregime acbetween the two in which oppositional and moral affinity from a regime instituand alienation tivity is legitimized sector held such a In Iran, only the religious tionalized. position. pothe mobilization illustrated The Qom disturbances to opponents and tential of Khomeini and his coreligionists its opposidespite The middle class, of the shah. critics tion to the shah, had no popular base of support and no likeone. Cooperation between such widely lihood of developing on the need to remove groups, who agreed totally different governthe shah but not at all on the form of a successor factor in the success of the revolument, was an essential of the revolution has led to two Academic analysis tion. opposed,interpretations although diametrically conventional, of its character. One argues that what we are really talkthat happened to take ing about is an Islamic revolution as place in Iran, while the other tends to regard religion for countermobilization.36 Each of these merely a vehicle is has an element of truth while neither interpretations of Iranian countermobilizaAppreciation wholly correct. to demobilization after the ouster tion, as well as attention into the insight of the shah, provide the most sophisticated the revolution, as consensus that characterized single-goal of what would follow it.37 well as the differing perceptions of clerical participation The open and unrelenting increased draactivity political forces in oppositional fervor. the scope and magnitude of anti-Pahlavi matically On January 19 and 20, 1978, the Tehran bazaar closed down in response to a call for a general strike by Ayatollah This, Khomeini and Karim Sanjabi of the National Front. between the midthe first public instance of collaboration the type characterized dle class and the religious sector, that would provide the revolution of countermobilization And from this time on, the regime and the opits dynamic. for popular support. competition engaged in a bitter position IRANIAN

STUDIES

44

Although the shah would periodically release political prisoners, offer sweeping pay raises, or throw sops to the religious community, such as a return to the Islamic calendar or the closing of gambling casinos, most Iranians viewed these concessions as desperate attempts on the part of the monarch to buy time. Unlike other revolutions undertaken by small cadres of professional in Iran was revolutionaries, the revolution For example, on Tasu'ah characterized by its broad base. 2 million and Ashura 1978, an estimated people marched through of Tehran in what the opposition the streets termed a referendum against the shah. Through its network of mullahs and mosques, the religious was able to generate mass opposition support on extremely short notice. Combined with this external pressure on the regime, large numbers of middle-class Iranians exerted internal pressure by work stoppages and antiregime activities from within the national bureaucracy itself. Algar provides a useful description of this countermobilization, stating: As for what we call in broad terms the [revolutionary] movement, people should not be under the illusion that this is a question of a formally organized movement with membership criteria, and so forth... it was a broad-based Islamic movement and not some kind of affair in which people sit down, as an examining body, and decide who is worthy to be admitted. What is necessary is to recruit, in an informal fashion, the massive support of the overwhelming majority of the people... .This is what happened in Iran. It is not that a secret party or organization was set up which brought more and more people into the fold .... The Revolution was genuinely a people's movement. One can say that the Islamic Revolution in Iran was an example of mass political participation and is unique in modern times.38 The broad base and general informality of the Iranian opposition made it almost impervious to regime attempts to quash it. And although Algar's emphasis on the role of Islam seems most appropriate for the lower classes. he PSEUDOPARTICIPATION AND COUNTERMOBILIZATION

45

revolutionary of antishah, captures the spirit large segments of the Iranian which attracted

commitment population.

Conclusions

the poillustrated Events in Iran have dramatically highlightaccompanying social mobilization, liticization may lead to politing the manner in which "modernization" was in large part an outThe revolution ical instability. that gave rise to political growth of social mobilization among those sectors most exposed to moderniexpectations sectors, as well as resentment among traditional zation, at regime attempts to bypass or eradicate who bristled Rapid economic development is often rules. their societal good, but the presumed by modernizers to be an unmitigated A refor re-evaluation. gives cause Iranian experience gime that puts its faith in what it imagines to be the economic growth, may of accelerated potential stabilizing the More importantly, more than it expects. be getting mechanisms may magnify rather absence of participatory thus exacerbating popular dissatisfaction, than ameliorate the needs of the by frustrating popular dissatisfaction if not resolved. people to have their problems recognized, in the found expression In Iran, the hunger to participate and popuopportunity, economic equality, call for justice, When lar input into numerous aspects of state management. or seems to exist without a corsuch input does not exist, of a crisis on governmental policies, responding influence In the Iranian case, it can be may emerge. participation was more than mere of participation argued that this crisis of formalized particiabsence the over distress monoscopic inabilpatory mechanisms per se, but rather the collective or improve the quality of life ity of Iranians to influence of parunderstanding Such an ecological in their country. one, helps to as opposed to a more mechanistic ticipation, ensocial of widely different explain countermobilization Opponents of the shah simply into antishah activity. tities practice, political conventional ignored and circumvented expressources of political instead on alternative relying secon the capacity of the religious sion and, ultimately, to the Pahlavi dynasty. mass opposition tor to orchestrate IRANIAN STUDIES

46

Finally, there is much to be learned from the role in the Iranian revolution. The 1980s played by religion A recent Nobel Peace Prize portend a decade of religion. laureate was an Argentinian lay clergyman with close ties to Latin America's highly politicized Catholic church and a strong commitment to liberation theology. In the United States, the so-called Moral Majority actively contributed to the election of Ronald Reagan and the defeat of several legislators whose stands on various morally significant issues were unacceptable to it. A nervous Polish government followed the visit of a Polish pope to Poland half expecting religious-based protest in what is supposed to be a "Godless" communist society. In Israel, religious extremists are trying to annex the West Bank, which they feel has been promised them by God. And in addition to the religiousin Iran, we have seen an attack on the based revolution Grand Mosque in Mecca, an Islamic Brotherhood in Syria that is trying to topple an unpopular Alawite ruling elite, and attacks on Libya's Col. MuammarQaddafi, who has tried to reof classical place important portions Islamic doctrine with his Green Book. Muslim rebels have been active in the Philippines, Turks in eastern Anatolia have gone on the offensive against the imposed secularism and anticlericalism of Ataturk's while various Islamic-based successors, oppositionist groups in Egypt have attacked Anwar Sadat for his separate peace with Israel and insensitivity to the travails of Palestinian nationalism. Thus, we can talk not only of Islamic "revival" or "resurgence," the so-called for Islam has been vital for hundreds of years, but of a more generalized growth in world religiosity. Daniel Levine has correctly captured the spirit of such activity in his essay, "Religion and Politics, Politics and Religion," in which he the ways these two seemingly discrete discusses human endeavors are inextricably linked while influencing one another.39 Characterizations of the Iranian revolution in the West are often inaccurate and ignorant, missing the fundamental role that religion has played as a source of strength and sustenance for adherents of innumerable faiths over countless centuries in all corners of the world. Recommitments may have their place in the modernizaligious tion process, serving as a refuge from the more dehumanizing and anomic aspects of dramatic and rapid social change. PSEUDOPARTICIPATION

AND COUNTERMOBILIZATION

47

Moreover, in light of the absence of conventional participatory mechanisms, formalized religious organizations can, and in the view of some religious leaders should, act as vehicles for improving the quality of life of their adherents. In some societies such religious-based political activity can serve as an accurate reflection of wider social needs while at the same time leading to dramatic political consequences. In part, this was the case in Iran.

NOTES

1.

For an analysis emphasizing popular frustrations over relative deprivation see, Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, 1969); for a state apparatus under pressure from the international system see, Theda Skocpol, and Social States of France, Russia

Revolutions: and China

A Comparative

Analysis

(New York, 1979); for imcirculation peded elite see, Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society (New York, 1935) or Robert Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, 1976); and for conflict between social classes see, V. I. Lenin, The State and Revolution (New York, 1971). 2.

Barbara Salert, Revolutions (New York, 1976),

Theories

and Revolutionaries:

3.

of this notion For a complete discussion Huntington, "The Political Modernization Monarchies," Daedalus 95 (Summer, 1966),

4.

Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization Development," The American Political 54 (September, 1961).

5.

6.

Samuel

P. Huntington,

IRANIAN STUDIES

(New Haven,

Political

Order

see, Samuel P. of Traditional p. 766.

and Political Science

Myron Weiner, "Political Participation: Political Crises and Sequences Process," Leonard Binder et al., eds. Development, 1971). Societies

Four

pp. 3-4.

in

Review

Crisis in

of the

Political

(Princeton,

Changing

1968). 48

7.

Samuel P. Huntington Political

bridge,

David Apter,

9.

In part, bilization relative

11.

in

Developing

No Easy Choicez Countries (Cam-

1976).

8.

10.

and Joan M. Nelson,

Participation

The Politics

of

Modernization

(Chicago,

1976).

the success of Soviet efforts at political momay be attributed to its large size and the from the outside world. isolation of its citizens

Ervand Abrahamian, "Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution," MERIP Reports, No. 87, 10 (May 1980), p. 23. Farhad Kazemi, Poverty

and Revolution in Iran: The Urban Marginality and Politics (New York,

Migrant

Poor,

1980),

p. 91.

12.

These literacy rates are meant to be illustrative as it is impossible to verify their accuracy. They were provided by officials of the Ministry of Education in Tehran, "off the record, " yet still seem to underestimate of illiteracy. levels For example, according to Lois Beck (personal communication), illiteracy among rural women may reach as high as 85 to 90 percent.

13.

These data, taken from United Nations statistical sources, are presented in Hossein Askari and John Thomas Cummings, Middle proach

East

Economies

in

(New York, 1976),

the

1970's:

A Comparative

Ap-

p. 298.

14.

Personal

15.

For example, Marvin Zonis's The Political of Iran Elite (Princeton, 1971), was purchased by many university libraries. After determination that the book was critical of the existing order, it was removed from the shelves of most of them. Ironically, most card catalogues listed the book long after it became unavailable. Another instance of blatant government interference with academic affairs occurred at the Aspen Institute Persepolis Symposium in September of 1975. In addition to obvious SAVAKattendance at the Symposium, we now know

interview,

Tehran,

November 1978.

PSEUDOPARTICIPATION AND COUNTERMOBILIZATION

49

that SAVAKagents put pressure on Iranian contributors The to the volume which grew out of the conference. and Present, Past, Iran: book, Jane W. Jacqz (ed.), the views (Aspen, 1976), in many places reflects Future scholarship. of the regime rather than objective (London,

16.

Robert Graham, Iran: 1978), pp. 200-201.

17.

students is a rough The number of Iranian university trends combined with decreases estimate based on earlier in higher education after in governmental expenditures of the fifth Five Year Plan. Robert Graham, the failure of Power, reports that in 1976 The Illusion in Iran: of 154,000 (p. 205). Iran had a total student population see Carl K. Eicher et For earlier student populations

The Illusion

of

Power

An Analysis of U.S.-Iranian Cooperation al.., Education (Washington, D.C., 1976).

in Higher

18.

A 1954-1978: Relations, Hamid Mowlana, "U.S.-Iranian Case of Cultural Domination," an unpublished paper preAnnual sented at the Middle East Studies Association Salt Lake City (November, 1979), p. 5. Conference,

19.

are from the editors' preface to Majid These quotations eds., Farhad Hakimzadeh, and Marcello Vidale, Tehranian, Communications Policy Perspective parative

20.

For NIRT's budget budget information Iran 's

(Tehran,

5th

for

National

Development:

For more general p. 261. see ibid., see Plan and Budget Organization,

Development

Plan,

1973-1978:

Revised

1975).

21.

of the shah's A particularly critique influential with the West and its costs for Iranian fatuation ciety may be found in Jalal Al-Ahmad, Gharbzadegi (Tehran, 1962).

22.

Iran: Fred Halliday, Dictatorship (New York, 1979), p. 19.

IRANIAN

A Com-

pp. 2-3.

(London, 1977),

STUDIES

inso-

and Development

50

23.

In addition to Al-Ahmad's important 21, see Shari'ati's copious lectures

book cited in note and writings. Among

those available

in English are Marxism and Other WestFallacies, translated by R. Campbell (Berkeley, of a Concerned 1980); Reflections On the Plight Muslim: of Oppressed Peoples, translated by A. Bahzadnia and N. Denny (Houston, n.d.); The Visage of Muhammad, translated by A. A. Sachedina (Houston, 1979); On the Socioltranslated ogY of Islam, by H. Algar (Berkeley, 1979). ern

24.

In choosing the name Rastakhiz, the shah may have been trading on a well-known book written by a close associate of Mosaddeq which argued that only through unification could Iran reach greater pluralism. I thank Paul Sprachman at the University of Chicago for pointing out this interesting coincidence. Amir Ala'i, Mosaddeg va Rastakhiz-e Melli-ye Iran (Tehran, n.d.).

25.

Kayhan Research (Tehran, 1977),

26.

See Graham, Iran:

27.

Amnesty International had long been critical of Iran's record in the area of human rights. See for example, Amnesty International, on Iran (London, 1976). Briefing

28.

The great civilization "campaign" was preceded by a book of the same name just as was the White Revolution. MohammadReza Shah Pahlavi, Beh Su-ye Tamaddon-e Bozorg (Tehran, 1978).

29.

James Bill, "Iran and the Crisis fairs 57, No. 2 (Winter 1978-79),

30.

For an insightful review of events in this period see Ervand Abrahamian, "Iran: The Political Challenge," MERIP Reports, No. 69, 8 (July-August 1978).

31.

These poems were compiled and published by Naser Mo'azzen, ed., Dah Shab: Shabha-ye Sha'eranva Nevisandegan dar Anjoman-e Farhangi-ye Iran va Alman (Tehran, 1978).

PSEUDOPARTICIPATION

Associates, p. 68. Illusion

Iran

of

Yearbook:

Power,

pp. 94-97.

of 1978," p. 333.

AND COUNTERMOBILIZATION

1977/2535

Foreign

Af-

51

32.

"Iran In toasting the shah, President Carter stated, under the great leadership of the shah is an island of stability in one of the most troubled areas in the world. This is a great tribute to you, Your Majesty, and to your and love leadership, and to the respect, admiration, which your people give to you."

33.

fame and popularAs Hamid Algar writes, "[Khomeini's] which ity rest.. .not so much upon his learning--in Shari'atmadari and others are acknowledged to excel him--as upon his forthright and uncompromising hostility to the Shah's regime." Hamid Algar, "The OpposiIran," tional Role of the Ulama in Twentieth-Century Scholars, tutions

and Sufis: Saints, since 1500, ed. Nikki

Muslim

Religious

R. Keddie

Insti-

(Berkeley,

1972),

p. 245. 34.

to have been killed by an Khomeini's father is believed official of the state, the mayor of Khomein, and his son Mustafa died under mysterious circumstances in 1977, when presumably at the hands of SAVAK. These events, combined with those surrounding his exile in 1963 and to all contributed subsequent antiregime activities, and credibility. Ayatollah Khomeini's antishah legitimacy

35.

used by Walter The term countermobilization was first Elections and the Mainsprings Dean Burnham, Critical of

36.

American

Politics

(New York, 1970), pp. 137-138.

in the Sepehr Zabih underestimates the role of religion An InterUpheaval: revolution in Iran's Revolutionary Hamid Algar, on 1979). pretive Essay (San Francisco, See for the other hand, errs in the other direction.

example, Kalim Siddiqui,

ed.,

The Islamic

of a four-lecture transcript Hamid Algar at the Muslim Institute in

37.

Iran,

Revolution

course given by (London, 1980).

I refer to the partial disintegraBy demobilization, This tion of the antishah coalition upon his ouster. has included tension within the relidemobilization the political demise of well-known gious sector itself,

IRANIAN

STUDIES

52

such as Mehdi Bazargan, Ibrahim Yazdi, personalities among and Abol-Hasan Banisadr, and dissatisfaction groups and middle-class various ethnic minorities taken by the revolution. over the direction 38.

Siddiqui,

39.

Levine, ed., Churches and Politics 1979), pp. 16-37. (Bevery Hills, America

The Islamic

Revolution

in

Iran,

Daniel

PSEUDOPARTICIPATION

AND COUNTERMOBILIZATION

p.

65.

in

Latin

53

Iranian Studies, Volume XIII, Nos. 1-4, 1980

Camouflage, Conspiracy, and Collaborators:Rumors of the Revolution Karen L. Pliskin A well-educated, wealthy, 35-year-old woman from Tehran reported the following: "Someone I know has a man working for him whose brother is a gravedigger. He dug graves for those murdered in Jaleh Square 40 days ago. He said they needed a bulldozer to dig the ground for all the dead. An entire tent was filled with chadors. Fifty thousand people were killed."1l The Jaleh Square incident of Tehran was a momentous event in the Iranian revolution, marking popular revolt against the shah's regime by the people, and retaliatory atrocities by the shah's army against the people. Although demonstrations and killings in other cities after Jaleh Square were no less dramatic, Jaleh Square remains in the minds of nearly everyone in Iran as the principal episode of innocent citizens slaughtered. Yet, details and facts to the event are undocumented. pertaining What is known is that thousands of people participated in a massive antishah demonstration on Thursday, September 7, 1978, to demand the resignation of the shah, defying a government ban on rallies. Martial law was declared and another demonstration the following day, Friday, September 8, was held

Karen L. Pliskin is a Ph.D. candidate, Anthropology, Harvard University.

Department

of

55

in Jaleh Square in front of the Majles (Parliament) building. Soldiers, amassed in the square, first fired over the heads of the crowd and then shot into the crowd, killing and wounding. Howmany were killed and how many were wounded is anyone's guess. Official reports estimate over 100 deaths.2 Unofficial reports, as the one quoted above, estimate up to 50,000. The experience of Jaleh Square was, like many occurrences during the period before the shah's downfall and until Khomeini's arrival, fraught with ambiguity. Events occurred--important events which touched the lives of the people--but information about them was lacking. People wanted to understand what was going on. Thus, rumors evolved to explain the unexplainable.3 Studies of rumors in various situations and diverse confirm Allport and Postman's hypothesis populations that rumors arise when evidence pertaining to important topics The Jaleh Square incident, as mentioned is ambiguous.4 was one of the most important catalytic events previously, of the revolution. The news about it--ambiguous, superand incomplete--was unable to quell the anxiety ficial, and tension of the Iranian population. Moreover, the amof rumors, some exaggerations a series fostered biguity of the event, such as the one cited above, others bordersuch as those rumors which gave vent ing on the bizarre, to an underlying were used xenophobia: Israeli soldiers to kill the people in Jaleh Square because someone had

seen them and they were blond, blue-eyed men who weren't speaking Persian, but some other language which must have been Hebrew; besides, Muslims wouldn't kill Muslims. No one in Iran, or outside of Iran for that matter, was immune to the rumors of the revolution. Indeed, the BBCand other foreign-news media depended upon unorthodox networks of hearsay to gather information, much of which was often reported as fact, or if not, couched in language mystifying the source of the news. Meetings in mosques were interrupted to listen to the BBC, presumed to be the true news; no one believed the informabroadcasting

IRANIAN STUDIES

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tion disseminated by the radio of the shah's regime.5 In addition, local newspapers were uinavailable from the beginning of the military government, the first week of November 1978 until mid-January 1979. Publication ceased after four weeks of what was considered to be freedom of the press, in which the regime, but not the shah, could be criticized. Thus, local news media, often denigrated before the revolution, were deemed even more inadequate and suspect during the crisis. The country was exploding, and to make sense of the occurrences around them people turned to the BBC, Radio Iran, and reports spread by word of mouth. News and rumor fused together and circulated throughout the country and at timies, through the BBC and other foreign services, abroad. The crisis period of the revolution, from Jaleh Square to Khomeini's arrival, is the first part of the middle stage of what Victor Turner calls social dramas, or "units of aharmonic or disharmonic process, arising in conflict situations." Social dramas, of which revolution is a part, have four phases: (1) breach of normal, routine relations between people within the same system of social relations by not fulfilling some corporate obligations or rules; (2) or escalation crisis of the breach, involving transformations in social relationships, including instability and of an in-between uncertainty state, between more or less stable states of the social order; (3) redressive action by representatives of the disturbed social system to restrict the expansion of the crisis; and (4) reintegration of the disturbed group or acknowledgment and justification of a split between rival parties, change in the involving nature and relations of the social system.6 Using Turner's model of social drama to view the Iranian revolution, we may consider the first phase, or breach, to be the antishah demonstrations and proclamations that began to unsettle the regime, beginning with a mullahorganized rally in Qom in January 1978, in which a number of people were killed; the crisis and redressive action, here merged into one phase, was a united massive struggle against the shah's administration by many segments of the RUMORS OF THE REVOLUTION

57

population and the attempts to limit the rebellion by the consists of armed forces and police; the reintegration Khomeini's return to Iran, the purge of supporters of the previous government, and the establishment of the Islamic republic. We are concerned here with the second and third phases of the social drama, the crisis and redressive stages. This the time of paradoxes, is the mid-point of the revolution, bounda betwixt-and-between period when the classificatory aries of society are transgressed, a period of inner transformation, of tearing down and building up. This is a liminal period, the point of transition between two states of being in which participants are temporarily liberated from previous norms and rules, a phenoin which all previous stanmenon of "free-time activity, and fresh new dards and models are subjected to criticism, experiways of describing and interpreting sociocultural ence is formed. "7 Liminality, then, in a societal sense, is a state of being, a realm of action or thought in opposition to previous norms, actions, standards, and models of the social structure. In the liminal state, former social status and attributes are removed and people are reduced to a level of equality with others in an unpremeditated movement connected with freedom. It is in liminality, between writes Turner, that "communitas," relationships emerges to oppose those jointly undergoing transition, structure. Communitas is "a relation quality of full, unmeditated communication, even communion, between definite which arise spontaneously in and determinate identities, In all kinds of groups, situations and circumstances."8 opposition to communitas is social structure, which "holds and constrains people apart, defines their differences, their actions";9 its units are statuses and roles and sodifferentiated, segciety is seen as an institutionalized, mented system associated with obligations, liabilities, and law. Conumunitas, on the other hand, tends limitations, to overlook, invert, set aside, or transgress structural relationships.

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The communitas of the Iranian revolution consisted of all those antishah forces in Iranian society: bazaris, intellectuals, students, workers, merchants, housewives, mullahs. The leftist the National Front, and others joined parties, forces with Khomeini's Islamic fundamentalists, and women who previously went around unveiled donned the chador as a symbol of unity with their more traditional The sisters. goal of the communitas during the liminal period was to topof the monarchy and all the alliple the social structure ances that went with it. Desperately trying to maintain his power and the legitimacy of his regime, the shah's redressive actions with soldiers, guns, and tanks, only fanned the fires of revolution. Thus, for a period of five months, from September 1978 through January 1979, a liminal period prevailed-a period marked by attack and counterattack, communitas versus structure, loyalists versus traitors, curfews, demonand strikes. strations, The liminal-period rumors represented an effort to clarify the ambiguities that inhered in a country caught in an in-between state, in which one social order was breaking down and another social order was not yet replacing it. The rumors, reflecting the prolonged period of uncertainty, were metaphors for the society undergoing crisis, and they sought to explain the unknown (the ambiguity of events, the future, prospective relationships) in terms of the known (the occurrence of events, the past, previous and present As such, the rumors are multivocal relationships). symbolic statements not only a bit of information expressing about a particular event or person, but also a whole series of ideas, convictions, feelings, stereotypes, and impressions. There were two kinds of rumors--those concerning events and those concerning people. The former included rumors about the fire in the movie theatre at Abadan, the in Jaleh Square, demonstrations, killings and the gas, oil, and water strikes. Rumors about people focused on stories of innocents killed, foreign conspiracies and collaborators, infiltrators, mullahs, the shah, and Khomeini. The two of rumors are interrelated categories in that certain people were believed to have caused the events, and all-RUMORSOF THE REVOLUTION

59

communitas and structure--were

affected

by the events.

As illustrated earlier, the Jaleh Square incident was interpreted by rumors that foreigners had carried out the killings. Rumors circulated about the innocent high-school and university students killed while demonstrating in Tehran in October 1978 and about individuals shot by the unin the streets suspecting Iranian police of the capital during curfew: An illiterate old deaf woman who was walking in the streets during curfew hours would not stop when the police called out to her, so she was shot. A well-known obstetrician was riding in his car at 2 a.m., going to the hospital to deliver a baby, when he was stopped by the police. He reached into his breast pocket for his ID and the police thought he was reaching for a gun, so he was shot and killed. By mid-October, had erupted in major demonstrations cities throughout Iran and rumors circulated concerning future demonstrations, such as the forecast of riots (which actually did happen) on the shah's birthday, October 26, a holiday, and the prophecy that the revolutraditionally tion would occur on Ashura, the day commemorating the killing of Hosayn, Mohammad's grandson, since the people would be in mosques and would be instigated to revolt by the clergy. Along with rumors of demonstrations came related reports of the deterioration of the shah's regime and its of immoral stand against the people, and of deterioration the shah himself. The shah was reported to have been shot, wounded, or ill (in actuality, he was ill with lymphoma, but this information was not made available to the Iranian One story alleged that the shah's nephew shot the public). shah in the shoulder during the summer at the family's Casand that the shah was rushed to a military pian retreat, in Washington for medical care. hospital The rumor may or have been prompted by a one-month absence of pictures When a photo finally did appear in speeches of the shah. the newspaper, it was said to be an old one, and when a IRANIAN STUDIES

60

new picture and ill.

was placed

in the papers,

the shah looked

thin

The shah's demise was thought to be paralleled by his the recall government's collapse: of the Iranian ambassador to the United States, Ardeshir Zahedi, was interpreted as a harbinger of the formation of a new government. Disbelief in the legitimacy of the regime and distrust of any of its actions was a major theme during the crisis, with rumors generated by mid-October expressing the appalling position of the government against the populace. Not only was the government supposedly releasing thousands of political prisoners each month to make room for all the new ones, but it was also believed to be undermining the opposition by carrying out atrocities and making it seem as if they were perpetrated by the religious opposition. The fire in the cinema of Abadan in the summer of 1978, in which some 400 people died, was considered to be a government plot, as explained by the American wife of an Iranian professor: A man who works with my neighbor Hasan was working in Abadan and dropped off his fiancee at the movies, only to come back there later to find the theater burning. Soldiers were preventing people from opening doors and fire engines didn't come for a long time. So itsprobably the government who burned the theater. A librarian, repeated a story

also holding she had heard:

the government

responsible,

The film shown in the theater of Abadan was a pornographic movie of the royal family, in which Farah and other people were nude. Because SAVAKdidn't want anyone who saw the movie talking about it, they burned down the theater. Another rumor relating to the Abadan fire was told by a student, who mentioned that three days before the fire the police of Abadan were told not to go to the movies. By the beginning of November, when the military government had taken over, the curfew was advanced from midRUMORS OF THE REVOLUTION

61

night to 9 p.m. Demonstrations with ensuing casualties occurred every few days, not only to protest the shah's regime and to praise Khomeini, but to mourn those who were killed Stories concerning Israeli in previous demonstrations. soldiers10 were augmented by reports that Iranian soldiers-and hatred--were who became the objects of fear, distrust, following the wounded into hospitals in order to kill them. Such an account was related by a young Enlishwoman who worked for the bloodmobile in Tehran in the beginning of November: I was riding in the bloodmobile going toward the hospital when we were stopped by soldiers who said that the wounded students were criminals who deserved to die. So we got out of the bloodmobile and brought There were a lot the blood to the hospital by taxi. of dead and wounded there. One wounded 16-year-old who shot him dead in the was followed by soldiers and also shot at doctors. hospital

links in the chain and many other official Since journalists of rumor/news transference were put out of work when news paper publication was suspended in early November, others, like

the Englishwoman above,

served

as unofficial

links.

Foreign newsmen were warned to watch their reporting, and one rumor circulated in mid-November about a foreign who did not: journalist The the with all

was arrested during a Pakistani, UPI reporter, government, picked up week of the military first child at 1:30 a.m. and his wife and 2-year-old were placed in a cold jail cell with no food.

They were sent back to Pakistan. left

self,

in Zahedan to find

his

The reporter was

way to Pakistan

by him-

and his wife and child were driven to the

northern border or to a border village a major city in Pakistan by themselves. This rumor circulated

concurrently

to get to

with a fear-inspiring

hotrumor that arose in the Tehran bazaar, the traditional bed of antishah feeling and now of pro-Khomeini activism; it alarmed the foreigners who still remained in Iran: IRANIAN STUDIES

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An Englishwoman who has been a jouranlist for the Tehran Journal for twenty years and who lives in the bazaar area of Tehran was told by some of the people she knows there that next week people from the religious opposition will dress in white, representing shrouds, and will go in the streets killing foreigners, Jews, and Bahais. Tward the end of November, general strikes commemorating people killed in previous demonstrations became the norm. Food stores remained open, but most shops, businesses, and many government-affiliated offices (such as the post offices, various ministries, customs) were closed. The BBC reported, November 28, that the military government would get together with the mullahs to try to make the laws conform with Islamic law and that it had outlawed public-mourning marches on Ashura, the tenth day of Moharram (December 11). Blackouts, which were to occur regularly until the shah's departure, began on November 28, with, so it was said, a schedule supposedly distributed to various people in the opposition by the electric workers. At this time people spoke about 24- to 48-hour curfew on Ashura, the West's disenchantment with the shah and wanting his ouster, the revolution occurring on Ashura, that Pentagon personnel was teaching at Pahlavi University in Shiraz while actually information gathering on student revolutionaries. Intellectuals in the opposition were convinced that acts of violence, such as the Abadan fire and the burnings of banks, cinemas, and liquor stores, were perpetrated by the government to undermine the opposition, making it seem as if the opposition was performing such acts. Ambiguous events began to be interpreted as government-inspired--to discredit the opposition--such as bomb threats to the National Women's Organization: the assistant director of the National Women's Organization of Shiraz was called by an employee and told that someone had called the guard and said he would place a bomb in or set fire to the building if its sign wasn't removed. In spite of the mullahs' general opposition to the activities of this organization, the to be the episode was analyzed by the Shirazi intellectuals RUMORSOF THE REVOLUTION

63

Their reasoning was, because the act of government agents. the event would do nothing destructive opposition religious them. To verify was merely a government attempt to vilify several inamong the opposition, government infiltration narrated the following: tellectuals A group of mullahs in a mosque in Jahrom (or in Shah Cheragh, a shrine in Shiraz) were told to take off Then they were told They all did. their turbans. to put them back on. The real mullahs could, but and these were SAVAK there were others who couldn't agents. The beginning of December was the beginning of Moharresistance, the religious to placate ram. In another effort presentations radio and television the government curtailed Khomeini's programs for the month. to broadcast religious call for an oil strike to bring down the shah was being immessages were being disand political Religious plemented. In in Tehran and other cities. seminated from rooftops Shiraz, between December 5 and 8, people stood on their roofs after the 9 p.m. curfew began, and shouted antishah slogans and Islamic maxims. People spoke about a gas strike and a water strike to A gas strike would then cause a bread start on Ashura. Supposedly the strike since bakeries operate on city gas. gas strike was on by December 5, and whatever was in the and when that would go, the pipes was the only gas left, of By December 6, the blackwould out gas. be city (Shiraz) by the opto have been instigated believed outs, previously were now thought to be the work of the military, position, after to prevent people from chanting from their rooftops people said, would The coming Islamic state, curfew began. Nowruz, the Iranian New Year, since it is noneliminate and would make as the New Year the birthday of Islamic, one of the Imams. It was at this time, before Ashura, that the Iranian government, denying rumors that the shah would abdicate, in the country on foreign began to blame the discontent On December 5, according to the BBC, the Iranian elements. IRANIAN STUDIES

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government said that Khomeini was being used as a tool by the enemies of Iran and that saboteurs, aided by unknown foreign powers, were hindering the economy. The following day Prime Minister Azhari said that enemies of the country were waging psychological warfare to raise discontent among the people. On Radio Iran, December 7, a military spokesthe people for pouring red paint in the water man castigated and saying it was the blood of all the people killed. He also warned that men dressed as women in chadors had guns under their chadors and walked with boys in front of them so that people would not suspect them, and that there were boys who cut their hair off, wore soldiers' and clothing would destroy things so people would think the army had done it: it wasn't the army, but fake soldiers who gave the army a bad name. The xenophobic element was being manipulated by the government and rumors of foreign forces were utilized by the regime. The theme of both sides was, obviously, loyalists versus traitors, and both the communitas and the shaky structure of the government were blaming infiltrators and one another for the events that occurred. By December 8, the government decided to permit demonstrations on Tasu'a and Ashura, the ninth and tenth of MoAcharram, and on December 11 the Ashura march took place. cording to the BBC, about a million people marched in Tehran. claimed that 3 1/2 million (Some Shirazis took part in that which was viewed by many as a "Referendum demonstration, on the Monarchy.") More rumors circulated in December about innocents killed, and strikes. foreign infiltrators, demonstrations, Who did what became more obscure as the flow of resources to become, (oil, gas, kerosene, water) became, or threatened with the communitas blaming the regime and vice verscarce, sa. The situation became more ambiguous, and mysterious incidents, as reflected in the rumor that there were many dead bodies without heads at Jadid-e Quran, the northern entrance of Shiraz, on the morning of December 8: this rumor circulated a few days, but no one knew who the dead were, why or by whom. they were decapitated, RUMORS OF THE REVOLUTION

65

On the evening of December 13, another innocent person was killed in Sa'di, a village outside of Shiraz.11 Reports on how it happened and who was killed persisted until the end of the month, along with a series of runors concerning the Bahais and the Shi'ites in the village. The first account of the episode was told to the writer the day after the event by a Shirazi social worker: There were clashes between proshah and antishah demonNo soldiers strators. were there. The people themselves fought and nine people were killed, knifed by other demonstrators. Today is the funeral, and people came into the city to claim the bodies from Sa'di HosAll the people who died were Bahais, and their pital. homes were burned. A different account comes from a politically active professor at Pahlavi University, as told by an American scholar in Shiraz: and had gotten orSoldiers were sent to the village who probably got orders ders from a Bahai sergeant, from from someone else, to fire on the demonstrators rooftops. The sergeant's son, who is in the army and in that particular squadron, fired on his father and killed him, out of fear that the people would find out that a Bahai gave the orders and that the result would be a lot of bloodshed for the Bahai community. Around 40 people died. There were ambulances and fire engines that kept going back and forth between Shiraz and Sa'di. (Saturday, on the incident:

The New York Times

printed

a paragraph

December 16,

1978)

During the past 24 hours the most troubled city appears to have been Shiraz.... available According to the sketchy information here, 12 to 14 persons were shot or beaten by troops and demonstrators backing the Shah. Later, one retwo soldiers port said, opponents of the Shah killed

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and eight members of their families. The soldiers and their families were said to be adherents of the Bahai faith. A few days afterward, people said that the Bahais were warned that their houses would be burned, and they removed all their possessions. The funeral, on December 15, turned into a gathering of 100,000 men, according to the professor whose account is narrated above. An Indian doctor reported that ten people were killed--nine Muslims and one Bahai, a policeman, who was stabbed after he fired on the Muslims while they were setting Bahai houses on fire. During the mourning parade, said the doctor, people prayed over the bodies of the Muslims and spat on the body of the policeman. By December 18, Bahai houses in other were burned and/or vandalized, the cemetery the Bahais themselves began to move in with their cultural which was guarded by center, various versions of the Sa'di village story Shiraz:

parts of Shiraz bulldozed, and friends or to and soldiers, spread around

A Bahai soldier was home and saw a crowd coming. He panicked and fired on the crowd and called in other soldiers. A Bahai officer led troops into the village and fired on Muslims coming out of a service from a mosque. A Bahai soldier got into an argument with a crowd that wanted to burn his house and called in soldiers to protect it. Shooting resulted. In the village a crowd burned a Bahai house and either beat up or killed a Bahai father. His son, who was a returned with a machine gun and soldiers soldier, and began shooting. At this point, an American faculty member of Pahlavi as confused as everyone concerning University, the events of the Iranian crisis in general and the Bahai incident in particular, and sympathetic to the opposition, expressed the intellectuals' opinion that the anti-Bahai phenomena RUMORSOF THE REVOLUTION

67

were government-inspired in order to undermine the revolution and to show the rest of the world that an Islamic state would be disastrous: in the U.S. called some of their Some Iranian students friends in Shiraz, who are students of a friend of mine. They had seen in the news-film footage of the fires in Sa'di village. Supposedly fire trucks had gone to the village but they just stood there and didn't put out the fire. So how could filmmakers get to Sa'di village so quickly if it weren't set up by the CIA and SAVAK? Even on BBC there was nothing on the burnings. So it does seem very possible that this was set up for the American public who still supports the shah. Another American, a Muslim through conversion married to an Iranian professor, also considered the anti-Bahai happenings to be government-inspired and had a more elaborate version of the Sa'di village story: In the village lived a Bahai military officer who was mentally imbalanced. He had been seeing a psychiatrist. There were people in the village who were supposedly throwing stones at his house and tried to make him go to the mosque and convert to Islam. He called the martial-law people asking for help and they said they couldn't send anyone at the moment but that he should defend himself. He took this to mean that he should shoot his attackers, which he did from atop his roof. The Bahais, themselves, were cautious in expressing their reactions to the burnings and killings. They said they didn't know who was doing it, that perhaps people were or the city, being brought in from outside the village but that there was certainly no love for the Bahais among the so the perpetrators did not mind carrying out such populace, CIA or SAVAKinvolvement in the acts. Concerning possible film shown on television abroad, they said the burnings had gone on for five days and filmmakers could have been conactacted at the beginning of the burnings. By Christmas, cording to some Bahais, over 400 Bahai homes were burned. IRANIAN STUDIES

68

a man the Bahais included: Other rumors concerning their dead rehad a list of 37 Bahai houses he was after; mained unburied because the graveyard had been vandalized; incest and had nudist parties. the Bahais practiced of rumorincident is illustrative The Sa'di village took No one really knew what actually spreading phenomena. of Muslims place; the facts were that there were killings Bahais,considered and Bahais, and Bahai houses were burned. majority in Iran. are disliked by the Shilite to be heretics, of the shah and supto be supporters They were considered (religious ported, in return, by him. Thus, in all aspects the Bahais were outside the bounds of the and political), The variinto the shah's regime. communitas and integrated the signify of the Sa'di village incident ations of stories and images that the majority of people have about feelings the reflects each rumor, except for the first, the Bahais: of the Bahai officer to the innocent Muslim citihostility meanings: which is charged with multiple zen, an opposition Muslim Believer Civilian Opposition Sympathizer

: : : : :

Bahai Heretic Officer Regime Enemy

were an unas will be seen later, These oppositions, occurring not only in situaderlying motif in the crisis, across boundaries tions of Muslim versus Bahai, but cutting of all major events. oil output; had devastated By mid-December, strikes and kerosene grew as lines for the purchase of gasoline Not takto explain the strikes. longer, rumors circulated intent to use the oil of the opposition's ing cognizance financial strike to wreck the economy and thus the regime's people began to blame Carter and Israel. basis, The oil embargo is caused by U.S. economic pressure on Israel to make them sign the Camp David accords. Israel gets its oil from Iran, and if they don't get

RUMORS OF THE REVOLUTrON

69

oil, they will be under pressure to sign the treaty. So Carter caused the oil strike in Iran but he didn't think it would backfire into causing all the trouble it did. As mentioned throughout the paper, foreigners were not immune to the rumors. At a meeting in the American consulate of Shiraz on December 14, those present were told that the gas pipelines were cut a week before and that there was only one more week's supply of gas left. A week later the same rumor was heard by people waiting in line for kerosene, and a complementary rumor ensued: a man in Tehran ordered and bought 700 barbari breads to keep in his freezer since the gas shortage made him fear that there would soon be no bread. Even the BBC broadcasted, on December 23, a rumor similar to that of the gas pipeline, but pertaining to the oil pipeline, albeit in language camouflaging the reliability of the information: there had been talk that a saboteur causeda leak in the pipeline with a blowtorch, but the government denied it. Iran ceased oil exports on December 26, but the opposition maintained there was enough fuel and that the shah was giving it to Israel and South Africa. Yet, Khomeini himself refuted the opposition's claims when he called on the oil workers to go back to work at the end of December to meet Iran's needs. of the opBesides the oil strike, the intellectuals position attributed other events--occurrences that in one way or another involved a form of destruction considered un-Islamic or against the utopian ideals of the revolution-to the government. Flyers handed out one night threatening to throw acid at women without chadors were believed by the intellectuals to be the work of the government, as was an anonymous call to the National Women's Organization that its building would be burned. The burning of the IranAmerican Society at the end of December was believed by some Shirazi intellectuals to be government inspired, whereas witnesses living near the Iran-American Society claimed hearing the rioting crowd of youths shout be tarafe Iran-America! --"toward Iran-America!" The gas-strike IRANIAN

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threat, heard during the first first by December 30, still going strong, lavi University professor:

week of December was, as affirmed by a Pah-

My brother works for the interior He said ministry. that the gas will be shut today in order to create pressure of no heat or cooking fuel in order to make to create public pressure people go to the streets, which will result in another referendum as during Ashura. December was not without its xenophobia. There were rumors of Sunnites being paid to support the shah, of Christian homes burned in Yazd, of factionalism among the Iranian ethnic groups blamed on the United States, and of the of Iran by CIA agents (8,000 on December 20, infiltration 500 on December 30) and by 500 U.S. Marines. There was, in mid-December, a rumor that alarmed all Shirazis: the water was poisoned! The radio kept announcing the rumor was false, but some people accused the Bahais for the supposed poisoning. Thus, by the end of December, the ambiguity of events became more pronounced as the Iranian population suffered from a lack of oil, kerosene and gas, from blackouts, threats of water cut-offs, and threats of food shortages. Demonand strikes strations, deaths, were the norm. Iran Air and the postal system were no longer in operation, and banks, unable to cope with a run on their reserves, closed down. To explain the events, rumors were disseminated blaming the other side and/or foreigners, and the shah was, of course, or continually denounced. Hopeful rumors of his abdication the country spread along with stories his fleeing of the royal family running away with the wealth of Iran with which they were to have bought a tract of 100 houses in Beverly Hills. The situation became increasingly more tense as the days went by. to the tensiorr, jokes, reYet, in reaction flecting cynicism about the situation as rumors reflected were created: anxiety, Soldiers were standing at a main square in Tehran. It was 8:30 p.m. and a man walked by. A soldier shot him. RUMORSOF THE REVOLUTION

71

"What did you do that for?" another soldier "It isn't even curfew yet." "Because," replied the soldier, "I knowvthat He lives in Tajrish [a village which is one of northernmost parts of Tehran] and he'll never home in time."

asked. man. the get

It was 6:00 a.m. and a soldier shot a man who was walking along the street. "Why did you shoot him? Curfew is over!" yelled his officer. "You mean," replied the soldier, "you don't get paid for overtime?" Prime Minister Azhari was in Tehran and was standing by a statue of the shah when he heard the shah call him: "Azhari! Azhari! Get me a horse!" He looked around and saw only the statue. He thought that he was going crazy because of all the problems of Iran that he has to deal with. So he went to the shah's palace to see if the shah had called him. Azhari told him of the talking but the shah didn't believe statue, him. So Azhari took the shah with him to see the statue. When they got there, they heard the statue say, "Azhari, you are stupid. I asked you to get me a horse, and you went and got me a donkey." On January 1, 1979, Azhari resigned and on January 3, the Majles approved Bakhtiyar as the new prime minister. During the first week of January, massive airlifts of foreign residents began, terrifying demonstrations leaving hundreds dead took place in Mashad and other cities, Iranian General Golam Ali Oveisi resigned and left the country, American General Robert Huyser arrived in Iran, publication of newspapers resumed after a 62-day stoppage, Khomeini called for yet another day of national mourning, terming and the shortage of oil Bakhtiyar's government "illegal," was still "The question felt, leading to even more rumors: is," reported the BBC on Thursday, January 4, "whether oil production will stop completely on Sunday for the national Another rumor concerning the oil strike mourning strike." placed the blame on the army: oil trucks were held up on IRANIAN

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the Kazerun Road, southwest of Shiraz, only one to leave every five hours.

and the army permitted

week of January the largest In Shiraz during this first cinema, known to show foreign films, was burned, as was a a strike of the passport ofMuslim moneychanger's office, fice took place, supposedly by the people who made the stamps for the passports, and a rumor circulated attesting to the cleverness of the opposition the army: vis-a-vis The other day some teenage boys painted big radishes to look like hand grenades and threw them at soldiers at Falakeh-ye Gaz [one of the major traffic circles to the of Shiraz]. The soldiers flung themselves When they realized the trick, ground. they beat up the boys. The second week of January began with a national-mourning strike called by Khomeini, and continued with the lifting of the curfew in Shiraz (the first city, considered the most to have the curfew rescinded), folquiet during the crisis, lowed by demonstrations in Shiraz during which participants of stormed the local SAVAKheadquarters, the establishment the Islamic Revolutionary Council by Khomeini in France, and the increase in oil production. to the instability During this week, rumors attesting of the regime and to the future of the Islamic republic were On Janudisseminated by Iranians and by foreign news media. ary 8 a secretary at the university voiced the common concern that Bakhtiyar would not last very long, that a military coup would occur, and the shah would be put back on the throne with all his power--why else would the Americans send a top-level general to Iran? In reporting Khomeini's warning of a coup on January 10, the BBC, wittingly or not, helped circulate the following rumor: Khomeini told his supporters to be aware of a government-inspired plot to create disorder and take over with a military coup . He said government agents were in the streets leaflets the shah, distributing against trying to cause disorder. lie said government agents RUMORS OF THE REVOLUTION

73

to attack supporters of the shah, urged demonstrators which, Khomeini warns, might give them an excuse for a coup. now during the day, the rumor in Blackouts continued, workers (not the military, Shiraz being that the electric week during the first who were condemned for the blackouts during working hours since of December) decided on blackouts On January 13, at night they operate against the people. the followpeople spoke of an Islamic government starting ecing day, and that evening people were in the streets, at what they saw: Khomeini's face appearing on the static moon. By January 15, the communitas of the revolution in Shiraz passed around free bread during a demonstration with fellow comrades, and Khomeini's in an act of fraternity food cheaply or giving it people set up food stores selling of SAVAKheadspoke of the destruction away. People still a truly major event of the people versus the shah, quarters, no one took of the statue of the shah: and the toppling down the statue of the shah on Falakeh-ye Setad (a major because in Shiraz) until a few days before, traffic circle was planted with land mines. people thought that the falakeh The major event of the third week of January was the shah's departure from Iran on January 16. A huge demonstration for Arba'in, day after Ashura and thus the fortieth the fortieth day of mourning for the death of Hosayn, ocof participants throughcurred on January 19, with millions absent from the out the country. Troops were noticeably all marked beforehand and routes of the demonstrations, By the end of the week, the to the populace. distributed kerosene lines were shorter and banks opened part time, and it was announced by the BBC that Khomeini would be returnRumors were Friday, January 26. ing to Iran the following heard of resignations in the government and of overseas In Shiraz, people phone calls permitted only to France. said that all cars with license plates having "Shiraz-11" (in spite of stamped on them belonged to SAVAKpersonnel being one of the most common numbers), and an "Shiraz-ll" oil worker said that in the eleven months of Sharif-Emami's and Azhari's rule, 67,000 people were killed by SAVAK.12

IRANIAN

STUDIES

74

The last week and a half of January began with the in France, in front of Khomeini, of Sayyed resignation Jalal Tehrani, a leading member of Iran's Regency Council. Two days later, the government closed Tehran's airport and Bakhtiyar asked Khomeini to postpone his return. In a meaair entry to Iran, all of the sure to block any possible country's airports were closed on Thursday, January 25, as Khomeini was to arrive on the 26th. Marches were banned by the government but took place, anyway. By January 29, after several bloody demonstrations, the government announced the reopening of the airports on the following day. And by the 30th of January, the government granted Khomeini to return to Iran. permission Strikes were still taking place in Shiraz, now to speed up Khomeini's return. Although a quiet city, Shiraz was, after the incident at SAVAKheadquarters, considered by Tehranis to be dangerous. After the shah left, blackouts ceased, but from January 28, in protest to the government's refusal to permit Khomeini's return, the blackouts resumed for the next three nights until Khomeini's arrival. His return was anticipated to bring about an era of wellbeing; not only was the future Islamic state to herald a social, economic, political, and religious but some utopia, people spoke of Khomeini's coming as a time when there would be no more illness, and everyone would be happy and healthy. Rumors were heard over the airwaves. Radio Iran still tried to malign the opposition with accounts such as the following: In Tehran, people killed a sheep and put its blood on a cot or stretcher and carried it around the streets saying that the soldiers did it and it is from a dead person. "Green cards"

of Iranians

in the U.S.

will

be revoked.

On January 25, BBC's report of the clergy's position at that time contradicted a report fifteen of days earlier of a coup: Khomeini's prediction RUMORS OF THE REVOLUTION

75

The clergy appealed to the people to remain patient. They dismissed the rumors of a coup as psychological warfare. Soldiers are in favor of a revolution, they say. And on January 26, BBC stated: Bakhtiyar is depressed over his loss of control of the army, and there is speculation that he may resign. Khomeini returned to Iran on February 1, and ten days later Bakhtiyar's government collapsed, thus beginning the reintegration phase of the social drama of the Iranian revolution. The period detailed above, as elucidated in the beginning of the paper, was one of liminality, an in-between transitional time, pervaded by events both anxiety-provokand permeated by rumors explaining, ing and obscure, exof the crisis. Impounding, and expanding the experiences of the events and rumors was munity from the influences granted to no one, Iranian or foreigner, as indicated by of rumors disseminated The spread the profusion by both. of hearsay by foreign media was limited to several subjects: the shah's and deaths, demonstrations oil and gas strikes, in regime, and Khomeini. Xenophobic rumors, so prevalent Iran, rarely reached foreign audiences except when reported by the Iranian government or military. The spreading of rumors, and rumors posed as news by foreign press outside Iran, disconfirms Allport and Postman's assumptions that rumors are spread in a homogeneous a revolution with an The Iranian crisis, population.13 omiIslamic ideology new to the West, had implications, nous and momentous, which the West, and the rest of the and Not only was the political world, had not foreseen. of Iranian society but the economic structure collapsing, of the West's foreign policy, structure especially America's, tenuous as it is, was being undermined, and new and differfor the West were in the offing. ent alliances Thus, the in Iran, was and citizens West, too, with its journalists and actrying to make sense out of the Iranian crisis, cepted any news, even no firmer news than rumor. IRANIAN

STUDIES

76

The rumors of people and events are symbolic of the liminality of the crisis, particularly paradoxical, and particularly Iranian. The crisis pitted two major sections of the populace against one another--the communitas of the opposition versus the shah's regime and its supporters. Within the communitas itself were aligned Iranians of all social, economic, and educational backgrounds who, before the crisis, had little communion with each other. Suddenly, comradeship was formed, with the aim of revolution and utopia, transgressing previous structural relationships, and attitudes norms, rules, existing throughout Iran before the crisis. In liminality, as previous classifications are suspended and former structure or obscured, abolished ambiguity holds sway. The rumors, then, are not only a reaction to the ambiguity of the events, but are themselves symbolic of the ambiguity, the liminality, the communitas, and the structure, a metaphoric transformarepresenting tion of attitudes and relationships and thus exopposing, the unknown by the known. plaining, and relationships of Iranians were noted Attitudes by various scholars of Iran and by travelers and diplomats in previous centuries. Zonis noted three main characterological orientations for elite accounting political behavior, which also can be considered to be cultural of attributes most relationships and attitudes of Iranian society. These are political cynicism, inand manifest personal mistrust, of Iranian society security. Thus, within the structure under the monarchy, cynicism, mistrust, and insecurity governed relationships, attitudes, behavior, ideas, and feelings. However, in the liminal period of the crisis these characteristics no longer obtained within the communitas, and as a group in opposition, its relationships, attitudes, behavior, ideas, and feelings were distinguished by optiand security. mism, trust, But regarding relationships and attitudes of the communitas toward the regime, cynicism, mistrust, and insecurity reigned. The difference in these two orientations of the communitas--one inner-directed and positive, the other outer-

RUMORS OF THE REVOLUTION

77

directed and negative--signifies not only the ambiguity of liminality, of being both this and that, but also explains the communitas's interpretations of events as seen in the rumors. The communitas, viewing itself with trust, optimism, and security, could do no wrong, whereas the regime, and dangerous, distrusted could do only harm. Thus, certain events, such as the oil and gas strikes and blackouts, or burnings of cinemas, banks, and liquor stores, or threats to the National Women's Organization were--when the events became uncomfortable and ruinous and felt to be contradictory and against the populace--attributed to the regime, carried out to defame the opposition. The known and the unknown are opposed in the rumors, with one elucidating the other. Known arethe occurrence of certain of the shah's reevents, the social structure and attitudes of disgime, its supporters, relationships, trust, cynicism, and insecurity. Opposed to this is the ambiguity of the events and the communitas, expressive of relationships and attitudes of a future utopian state in which there will be trust, optimism, and security. Consetwo systems of attitudes quently, and relationships emerged during the crisis, one of the communitas, the other of the regime, and these attitudes and relationships were symbolized by rumors that played out the following sets of oppositions: Communitas: Khomeini: Opposition Antishah Civilians Iranians Mullahs Muslims Shi'ites Believers Martyrs: Innocents Utopia Security: Trust Optimism IRANIAN STUDIES

Structure Shah Regime Proshah :Army Foreigners : Apostates :Bahais : Sunnites : Heretics Murderers :SAVAK : Despotism Insecurity Mistrust : Cynicism 78

Both the communitas and the structure, or the antithese oppositions shah forces and the regime, exploited and of loyalists also the themes of saints and sinners, and in addition to foreign traitors, each accusing the other, of brutality and betrayal. elements and saboteurs, Implicit in the rumors, therefore, are systems of things, one to another in two diametrically referring opposed relationin a liminal period of ships of communitas and structure crisis. In this liminal period between the regime of the shah and the Islamic republic of Khomeini, the opposition, bound in communitas, transgressed previous structures and norms, and reversed former attitudinal and behavioral patterns of Iranian society. The various factions united in the communitas and men, women, Islamic fundamentalists, moderates, leftists, rightists, rich, poor, intellectuals, and illiterates assumed mostly egalitarian, straightforward, nondiscriminatory relationships and associations. They were self-confident, secure, and optimistic regarding themselves, and they were as cynical, distrusting, and insecure regardas was the regime ing the shah's regime and its supporters regarding both itself and the opposition. The rumors of the crisis, from the innocents killed at Jaleh Square to Khomeini's face appearing in the moon, from the gas-strike threats to threats of a coup d'etat, were multivocal symbolic statements reflecting the ideas, convictions, feelings, stereotypes, and impressions of the communitas of the opposition versus the structure of the regime in a but intense, liminal period of conspiracy, short-lived, and collaborators. camouflage,

NOTES

1.

this article were collected The rumors illustrating in Tehran during October 1978 and in Shiraz from November 1978 to February 1979. The sources were Iranian students, professionals, workers, children, housewives, professors, American wives of these professors, and foreigners living in Iran. The writer, as everyone in Iran during the crisis, was influenced by the events and rumors, oftentimes unable to differentiate

RUMORS OF THE REVOLUJTION

79

fact from fiction. In this article, however, flicting, ambiguous, exaggerated, and bizarre are viewed as rumors.

all constories

2.

Already by September 1978 there was a discrepancy in the reporting of the Jaleh Square incident by the foreign press. According to The New York Times of September 9, 1978, "unofficial reports said as many as 100 were killed." The Times of London on the same day had as a major headline the following: "Protestors shot down as Iran imposes martial law in 12 cities.... Up to 250 killed in street riots." A subsequent subheadline stated, "The capital's military governor said that 58 people had died in the rioting but unofficial sources put the toll at up to 250." In a Janury 1979 Newsweek article, the death toll was placed at 122.

3.

Rumor, as exemplified in this paper, is, as defined or topical by Allport and Postman a "specific proposition for belief, passed along from person to person, usually by word of mouth, without secure standards of evidence being presented." G. W. Allport and L. Postof Rumor (New York, 1965), p. 4. man, The Psychology Rumors passed on to the populace by mass media are also reviewed as elements of hearsay.

4.

See,

e.g.,

L. Festinger,

Its

Origin

and Spread,"

et al.,

"A Study of a Rumor:

Human Relations

1 (1947),

pp. 464-86; T. Shibutani, Improvised News (New York, 1966); E. Morin, Rumour in Orleans (New York, 1971); A. Anthony, "Anxiety and Rumor," Journal of Social Psychology 89 (1973), and R. Rosnow and G. pp. 91-8; Fine, Rumor and Gossip (New York, 1976). 5.

to BBC's Not only did most Iranians religiously listen did also. The informabroadcasts, but most foreigners BBC reports was gathered tion in this paper concerning nightly by the author, who kept a journal of local events or heard, and events as broadcast by BBC. witnessed

6.

and Metaphors (Ithaca, V. Turner, Dramas, Fields, 1974), pp. 37-42. Turner, in studying social processes, deof social dramas from Arnold Van rives his analysis

IRANIAN

STUlDIES

80

Gennep's study of ritual in Rites de Passage, rites associated with changes of status, place, and age, which are divided into a tripartite processual structure (1) separation or detachment from society; (2) margin or limen in which the person or persons separated are inwardly transformed; (3) reaggregation or reincorporation, as persons with new status, into the society. The crisis and redressive phases of social drama correspond to the margin or limen state of rites de passage. 7.

Ibid.,

p.

15.

8.

Ibid.,

p.

46.

9.

Ibid.,

p.

47.

10.

Other rumors pertaining to Israeli soldiers heard in Tehran in October 1978, were that Israelis practiced army maneuvers in Iran and collaborated with the Russians in an underground nuclear explosion, thus causing the Tabas earthquake in the summer of 1978.

11.

A proshah demonstration took place day in which 30,000 people, mostly lying villages, participated.

12.

An article in Time, December 4, 1978, quotes the same number: "Government workers, their salaries ravaged by inflation at more than 50% last officially estimated year, went on strike. They were soon followed by 67,000 workers in the oilfields and employees in the post office, national airline, customs, telephone and steel companies, power stations and several other industries."

13.

Rumors reported as news may be considered to be the reporting of rumors themselves, the reporting of events second- or third-hand as seen by various "witnesses," or attaching some sort of value judgment to a happening without acknowledging that what is said is being commented upon, or interpreted. editorialized,

RUMORS OF THE REVOLUTION

in Isfahan on that brought in from out-

81

Iranian Studies, Volume XIII, Nos. 1-4, 1980

Becoming Mollah: Reflections on Iranian Clerics in a RevolutionaryAge Michael M. J. Fischer and of clerics The role of religion in the events leading to and during the Iranian revolution of 1977-79 provides an instructive exercise in formulating a theory of cultural influence. The institution of religious training (the madrasah system) has been in decay and under political pressure throughout this century. That the clergy should have emerged as central actors in the revolution, therefore, says something about their cultural, rather than institutional, The popular idioms of centrality. Islamic protest--deriving from the story of Karbala and from the modernist reformulations associated with Dr. Ali Shari'ati--are elaborated with reference to the learning of the madrasahs. That forms of open, secular, political discourse were suppressed under the Pahlavi monarchy helped ensure that Islamic rhetorics would become the idiom of political debate and helped give clerics (both preachers and teachers) extra leverage. The struggle over the role of the clerics a struggle continues, in which Ayatollah Khomeini himself has intervened by drawing ambiguous distinctions between obfuscatory clerics and revolutionary ones, and by chastising clerics for meddling beyond their competence.

Michael at Rice

M. J. Fischer University.

is

Associate

Professor

of

Anthropology

83

The following paper deals with the cultural position of the clerics by surveying (a) the moral ambiguities of their roles, (b) the changing historical context of Islamic rhetorics, and (c) the nature of Khomeini's charisma. It attempts to shift the level of discussion from questions of political commentary concerning which categories of actors exercise what kind of power, to questions of how rhetorics or pedagogies focus attention, create attitudes, structure issues, and channel debate as well as consequent action. Islam is not so much a determinate set of programs-as the popular media would have it--as an arena of debate. What needs attention is the relationship between ideologies or rhetorics or pedagogies and social cleavages, contraand forces. dictions, The relationship is not transparent and needs careful exploration.

I NMullah shodan, cheh asan; Adam shodan, cheh moshkel. [How easy to become a mullah (learned); How hard to become Adam (a Man, a Mensch).]1 In 1919, a mullah of northwestern Iran wrote an autobiography which has become well known among the Iranian clerics and is regarded with affection by them as a symof the life of a repathetic account of the tribulations ligious student. This life history, Siyahat-e Sharq (Oriental Journey) by Aqa Najafi Quchani,2 is all the more reits use of traditional markable for its picaresque style, and its veritable tropes, Although written uniqueness.3 of charletans, with biting wit, and exposing a variety funritual literalist scholastic know-nothings, fanatics, and empty mystics, damentalists, Aqa Najafi Quchani is able to present an Islam which is essentially tolrationalist, and full of humor, gentle self-mockery, erant, pragmatic, and humane wisdom. maktab

of his life are traced from a village The details (elementary school) near Quchan to the madrasahs

IRANIAN

STU7DIES

84

of Sabzevar, Mashad, Isfahan, and Najaf. But (seminaries) are fitted into a series of traditional these details tropes and education. of journeys, debates, Journeys are the of the relation master metaphors of spiritual development, between man and his between man and God, or of the relation own potential. Think of the me'raj of Mohammad, the variof mystics, ous flights of inspiration the exterior pilor the interior grimages ideally providing inspiration, educational journeys in search of teachers (or manuscripts in the traditional Islamic biographies catalogued (rejal) to evaluate used in the critical apparatus of scholarship an author's reliability). Aqa Najafi Quchani engages in all these types of journey, ending with the journey from men allah God back to men (safar-e which is elal-khalq), the goal of all ulama: that is, the guidance of others into the proper paths; and so he returns from Najaf to his home town. The metaphor of education or schooling is used to deal with relations of authority (a man and his teacher), with inculcation of discipline, with learning proper, of behavior. mature, and competent patterns Marriage, as well as life in this world generally, are spoken of as arenas of schooling, whose rewards will be reaped in the next world. Education is not a pouring of knowledge into a vessel, but an active engagement; an important element and role models. is selecting teachers Out of passive and education can come only misguidance, incomplete ritualistic absurdity, and incompetence. Debating (bahs) is a major technique in the religious educational system, and a device of jousting among equals. Students study in pairs, one member defending the text under study, the other attempting to come up with all possible counterarguments to the original argument. Such dialectics sharpen the wit and eventually should develop pragmatism and an informed moral presence. If every argument has a series of counters, then when debate is not academic, but of practical concern, it must be subsumed under moral and pragmatic choices. Debates, education, and journeys are thus all interrelated. Aqa Najafi Quchani was born to a peasant family around 1875. He describes the introduction of opium culBECOMINGMOLLAH

85

tivation, the atmosphere surrounding the agitations of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution and World War I in Najaf, and the hopes among his fellow students that Emperor Wilhelm of Germany, whom they called "Haj Wilhelm, Moayyed-e Islam" (Helper of Islam), would wreak divine punishment on the Russians. But his text tells us less about politics, colonialism, and world affairs than about the immediate concerns of students: grinding poverty, marital entrapment, and theological puzzlement. His affectionate account of clerical foibles, hardships, and deficiencies come from a time when an alternative secular educational system and culture was just beginning to take root. Sixty years later, an equally puzzled, pragmatic, and humane mojtahed4 in Washington, D.C. attempted to explain the career of Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini, the leader of the new Islamic Republic of Iran, in terms of similar traditional tropes. He spoke of Khomeini's interest in mysticism and philosophy; of the grounding of the notion of imam in Plato's philosopher-king through the of al-Farabi, reinterpretations Ibn Arabi, and Mullah Sadra; and particularly of Mullah Sadra's account of the spiritual development of a leader and his relation to the community, which Khomeini studied, taught, and then attempted to execute. This account involved four journeys: from man to God, from God to God (moving back and forth between of God's attributes considerations until and His essence, their unity is apperceived), from God back to man, and from man to man (instituting the divine law). This mojtahed and doctor of philosophy was puzzled because while the metaphors were still to see why Khomeini valid, he failed should insist on written constitutional for provisions guidance of the state by clerics (velayat-e de faqih): facto guidance was Khomeini's already, and such constitutional provisions would only complicate future developments.5 Already there were practical dilemmas such as the ambiguous status of so-called "Islamic" revolutionary more revolutionary than Islamic, courts, presided over by such passionate mullahs as the infamous Sadeq Khalkhali, who proudly ran for election to the Assembly of Experts (which drew up the constitution) on the platform of having sentenced to death 200 enemies of God.'personall) IRANIAN STUDIES

86

Aqa Najafi shodan

.

.

.",

Quchani's ran:

version

"We have

of the proverb,

a hadith:

the

people

"Mullah are

dead except the ulama; the ulama are dead except those who their knowtheir knowledge; all those who practice practice ledge are dead except the pious ones, and they are in great world Aqa Najafi Quchani was worried by a clerical danger." rife archaic and decayed in knowledge and understanding, theology with false piety and with action based on facile These dangers conor on no moral reasoning whatsoever. compounded with those of the proverb--the tinue to exist, pride overcoming the higher senses.7 dangers of Iblis's power are well known to Islamic The dilemmas of corrupting A distinction and contemporary. both classical theorists, is often drawn between the true Islamic state as an ideal Fundareality.8 in historical utopia and what is possible of the modern era (after the mentalist Islamic rhetorics century) have tried to abandon this distinction, eighteenth arguing that the time of the prophet was a true Islamic the state and that it can be reproduced by introducing or by other reforms. Sayyed Mohammad Ayatollah shari'a and Sayyed Mahmud Taleqani warned on Kazem Shari'atmadari exercise posimple pragmatic ground that if the clerics for the they will bear responsibility authority litical in a real society, and injustices inevitable coerciveness will thereby become corrupted. and their moral authority with the charge that the The argument is strengthened a result of clerics have no competence in public policy, the decayed educational system in which they have trained. these dandismissed Khomeini has not entirely Ayatollah risk in the duty of gers9 but sees them as a necessary a moral society, and in an interto institute attempting to perhaps, functions esting fashion his persona itself, counter these risks. to understanding the current Iranian revoluCritical of the ambivalences toward the clerition is a recognition so vividly cal establishment expressed by Aqa Najafi Quchstrain still informs Islamic faith ani. That a picaresque in the caustic humor of the Iranian in Iran is illustrated such as "Ayatollah Ringo" titles Irreverent revolution. and "Prince for the son of Ayatollah Hosayn Ali Montazeri, paralAhmad" for the son of Khomeini, are urban witticisms BECOMINGMOLLAH

87

peasants of proletarianized expectations leling the cynical the old immight well merely replicate that the clerics with Khomeini as the new shah. perial power structure have of the revolution cartoonists and political Satirists strain in Persian thought that played to the traditional are charlaof clerics acknowledges that a fair percentage are the cartoons of graves tans. Among the most caustic marked "martyr" wearing hats (playing on the phrase kolah "to put a hat on someone, to deceive someone"; the zadan, which gives off darkness; the cleric holding a flashlight Ringo" as a gun slinger, mock movie poster of "Hojatolislam turban looking like a sombrero, guns blazwith an outsized ing, and people running for cover amid rows of high-rise caption refers to the younger Montaapartment houses--the at Tehran's Mehrabad attempt to seize an airliner zeri's to aid an unenthusiastic Airport and fly his followers the family gathered around a silent Israel; PLO against upon which TV over which a cloth screen has been affixed, shows an American Western; the mula home-movie projector lah trying to blow out a light bulb ("Out, oh cursed West"); folthe sequence of sun's rays peeking over the horizon, lowed by a second scene in which people run toward what sun, followed by a third scene they think is the rising which has risen in which they run away from the semicircle as the turban of Sadeq over the horizon to reveal itself the hanging judge of the revolution.10 Khalkhali, against the overwhelming of reason by Such cautions either antiare not necessarily passions revolutionary or anti-Islamic; they serve rather as critirevolutionary cal checks to aid the moral purposes of the revolution, have been among the leading spokesfor which the clerics of concern for men. Among the more eloquent statements Khomeini's Ayatollah is, for instance, Iranian self-respect speech on September 8, 1979 in the Faiziyeh Madrasah of Qom, commemorating Black Friday 1978 (the massacre of 17 Shahrivar) :ll are caused problems and miseries ...our In Iran until something has ourselves. name, it is not accepted .... The material must have something in the our factories IRANIAN STUDIES

by losing a Western woven in Latin 88

and inin its sleeve edges.... [Our writers script and so are we. are also "Westoxicated" tellectuals] .... We forget our own phrases and the word itself. their honor.... have completely forgotten Easterners As long as you do not put aside these imitations, you cannot be a human being and independent.... and heart cannot stand by silently An enlightened and honor are trampled upon. watch while traditions heart cannot see its people being An enlightened or watch in silence drawn towards baseness of spirit around Tehran live in slums. while individuals The second commandment which God gave to Moses was to "remind people of the Days of God"...some days The day that the great Prophhave a particularity. et of Islam migrated to Medina... the day that he Hazrat day of Khawarej...when conquered Mecca....The Ali unsheathed his sword and did away with these corof Khordad rupt and cancerous tumors.. .the fifteenth (June 5, 1963) when a people stood against a force and they did something which caused almost five months But because the people had no power, of martial law. they were not awake, they they were not consolidated, of Shahrivar (Sepwere defeated .... The seventeenth tember 8, 1978) was another one of the Days of God men, women, young people and older when a people, all stood up and, in order to get their people, were martyred... .A nation which had nothing, rights, broke a force in such a way that nothing remained of empire of 2500 years, handed, a monarchical it....Empty was done away with. 2500 years of criminals identified Note that a number of the themes are generally the phrase spokesmen: revolutionary with other, nonclerical comes from a famous essay by Jalal Al"Westoxification" was popularized Ahmad; the theme of imitation/alienation in the 1970s by Shari'ati, drawing on Sartre and Fanon. Days of God is a powerThe rhetorical device of iterated ful cosmogenic image derived from both preaching skills (which also provided such metaphorizations and literary formulations). to Shari'ati's power and popularity

BECOMINGMOLLAH

89

toward the role In sum, to strike a proper attitude of competing interboth a recognition requires of clerics folk, modernof Islam (scholastic, or ideologies pretations of the clergy and a recognition elite-privatized), sufi, ist, and as a varied group of people, with ideals and failings, that has undergone a number structure with an institutional Aqa Najafi Quchani, at the turn of the of vissisitudes. of modernist belonged to a generation century, twentieth upon an openness to learning and reformers who insisted and who derided avoidance whatever its origin, science, of learning because it might endanger faith or because it Although there transmission. was tainted by non-Islamic many things have changed between 1919 are many continuities, to inreacting Khomeini belongs to a generation and 1979. of Third World to the failures authoritarianism, creasing based on tutelage theories and to modernization socialisms, between surviving institution The clerical dictatorships. needs to be seen in three contexts these two generations context and the attempt to pro(1) the Iranian political from power over the past exclude the clerics gressively context and the cumulative (2) the international century; use of Islamic rhetchanges in the political generational context of the decay of learnand (3) the internal orics; this gening within the madrasah system and the discontent erated. II five-genchart provides a generalized The following uses of Islamic rhetorics of the political eration analysis made some enduring contribuEach generation of renewal.1 leading to the decay of but also embodied defects tions, and early nineteenth In the eighteenth its initiatives. reformism was a (the Wahhabis there puritanical centuries, the Fulani in Nigeria, in Arabia, the Sanusi in Cyrenaica, the Mahdi in the Sudan, and the victory of the Usuli mojfour themes: Iran and Iraq) which stressed taheds in Shi'ite of superstitious accretions, Islam of centuries purifying form of on a free use of ijtihad (a disciplined insisting answers to new problems), reasoning to provide religious IRANIAN

STUDIES

90

DIALECTICOF ISLAMIC RENEWAL GENERATIONAL Generation

Failings

Enduring Contributions

(premodern fundamentalism)

reformism religious 1. Puritanical centuries) (18th-19th ijtihad sociopolitical

engagement

loss of old scholarly historical & evaluative skills lack of new technoskills cratic

2. Modernist reformism (Afghani, Abduh, Shaykh Ahmad, Ataturk, Iqbal) (early 20th century) of underestimation econthe political omy of dependency the vis-a-vis elitism lower classes

science & technology democracy

political populism

4.

Islamic (post

organization (a-democratic)

socialism (Nasser, World War II)

Destour

renewal

of the 1970s,

continued devaluation skills of historical (antiplutotalitarian attitude ralist) toward nonmembers Party,

Ba'th,

Bhutto)

1980s

corrupleverage against tion & authoritarianism search for moral identity search for a new international economic order

BECOMINGMOLLAH

Jama'at-e

need for dictatorial means: decay into corrupt authoritarianisms

economic reconstruction social welfare S. Islamic

Maududi's

(Muslim Brotherhood, 1940s)

3. Neofundamentalists Islami) (1930s,

to live up to inability Islamic ideals of jusby (corruption tice power) over lack of clarity fundamentalist vs. modernist programs

91

primacy of sociomoral issues over eschatological-metaphysical ones, and political militancy. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there followed a modernist reformism (the generation of Aqa Najafi Quchani) which the compatibility stressed of Islam with modern science and with democracy (e.g., the constitutional experiments in Turkey, Egypt, and Iran). The generation of the 1930s saw a peak in secularist, Westernizing, constitutionalist faith, but also a rise of anticolonial movements. The latter, incorporating conservative ("neo-fundamentalist") Islamic reactions to the failures of the modernist reformers, were bolstered domestically by the disorientation of the growing urban lower classes, and externally by the triumphs of Japan against Russia in 1905, the Nazis in Germany and the Bolsheviks in Russia. These successes, they felt, underlined the contention that Western European social and political forms were neither invincible nor inevitable. The building social pressures led in the 1950s to the overthrow of a number of governments (Egypt, Iraq, Syria, almost Iran) and very strong pressures for the ideology that governments be held responsible for social welfare and economic reconstruction. This was the beginning of serious a-democratic mass politics, ideas and a inspired by socialist within the that unequal trade relations growing perception world economy generated relative and vitiunderdevelopment ated earlier liberal hopes that education, democracy, and would allow the Middle East to catch economic modernization in recent years, the socialist up with Europe. Finally, in the language drive in turn is being challenged--often dicof Islamic social its decay into military ethics--for than democratic socialist. more state capitalist tatorships, Altides. Iran has been part of these historical though the prevailing image of the clergy is of steadfast to government tyranny, grounded in alleged Shi'opposition of all temporal governof the illegitimacy ite doctrines ments, historical reality is, of course, much more compliits comcontains Each generation cated and interesting. of clerics and its own contemporary issues peting factions of debate. dialectic in Iran roughly corThe generational faced at the same time in the non-Shi'ite responds to issues and some differences. Islamic world, with modifications

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Shi'ism became the state religion of Iran in 1501 with of the Safavid dynasty. the establishment the Previously, in Iran was one of multiple religious situation Islamic dominant here and there, groups, Shi'ites the four Sunni schools dominant in most places, with cities factionalized between these several from groups and loyalties shifting time to time. When the Safavids established Shi'ism as the from what is state religion, they invited Shi'ite clerics now Lebanon, Iraq, and Bahrain to come to Iran. Large numbers of these clerics came, and Said Amir Arjomand makes the case that they became competitive with the already existing native Shi'ite clerics.13 were inteThe native clerics grated in the regional and state administrations as judges (qadi) and administrators of religious (motavalli) endowof the sadr. ments, under the royal ministry Many were landed, and they espoused a mandarin culture with catholic interests in philosophy and irfan ("high Sufism" or gnostiThe immigrant clergy, for whom the Safavids built cism). madrasahs, and some of whom were accommodated in the state administration as shaykhs ol-Islam of various cities, had to depend upon their religious to carve out a scholarship competitive position. them dogmatic reliArjomand calls gious professionals who attacked all rivals, not only Sunnis, but Sufis, philosophers, and popular shaykhs or pirs. MohammadBaqer Majlesi, the most prominent of this group. of the capital, became Shaykh ol-Islam in 1687. Isfahan, In his voluminous writings, says Arjomand, he not only formulated the tenets of Shi'ism in simple dogmas ordinary people could grasp, but he incorporated popular beliefs and practices so as to monopolize all forms of religious practice under the supervision of the clerics. Accommodation was made with the unorthodox claims of the Safavid kings to be representatives of the Imam. It is out of Majlesi's formulation of Shilism, Arjomand suggests, that we get an exclusivist, dominance-seeking interpretation of the role of the clergy. The attraction of Arjomand's account is that it can accommodate three otherwise puzzling features (1) the decline of the office of qadi during the Safavid period, although the influence of the clergy increased; (2) the extreme ideological hosof the clerics tility against what remains an enduring inBECOMINGMOLLAH

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mysticism, speculative of Iranians in philosophy, terest (3) the ambiguity between inof sufism; and the practices and tolerance rational argumentation on scholastic sistence for scholastically suspect popular mythology and beliefs. Vahid-e Behbehani (d. 1793), the founder of the now was a grandscholarship, dominant Usuli school of Shi'ite The fall of the Safavids caused hard times son of Majlesi. Behbehani many of whom withdrew to Iraq. for the clergy, During its early periclaims. their activist re-energized the legiod, the Usuli school was engaged in establishing that ordinary believers timacy of mojtaheds to make decisions of of obligation might follow (without yet any assertion the limits of mojtahed applicaand establishing obedience) tions of reason ("reason" was formally admitted by the Usuof legal norms: lis as the fourth basis for the validity ijma, and aql, or the Quran, the traditions sunna, ketab, of the Prophet and the imams, consensus of the learned, Behbehani's most and reasonl4). MohammadBaqer Shafti, the hudud penalattempted to introduce student, militant for adultery and ties (those enjoined by the Quran, e.g., in this period under the Qajar and another cleric theft), dynasty, Mullah Ahmad Naraqi, went so far as to propose a But Arjomand points out that the theocracy of the ulama. Shaykh Morteza leading scholar of the later Qajar period, of direct politthis tradition Ansari (d. 1861), rejected Ansari's While Arjomand perhaps overstates ical activism. a stance of pious ansaying that he represented quietism, from and tried to refrain tipathy to all worldly activity wrote even issuing (fatwa) as far as possible--he opinions law, commercial code of Shi'ite the classic what is still was inand is known for many fatwas--there the Makaseb and the politibetween the pious clerics deed a contrast and fortunes. cal ones, many of whom acquired estates remained a term of abuse cleric) Akhund-e siyasi (political of Khomeini turned it into a virtue by until followers of participation in the features the corrupting separating world from the moral ones. founded In a rough sense, then, the Usuli tradition by Behbehani and expressed most extremely by such mullahs

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as Shafti between 1801 and 1842 in Isfahan or the Najafi brothers at the turn of the century in Isfahan,lS corresponds to the generation of puritan reform on the chart. revolve around the proper The issues of that generation The latter use of ijtihad and political engagement. part of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw the rise of Islamic modernist reformers, figures like Jamaledin his movement fuldin Al-Afghani; and Iran participated a polytechnic, ly. Starting in 1851 with the Dar ol-Fonun, were introduced modern secular educational in institutions in Tehran Iran; by 1911 there were 123 elementary schools as well as a number of professional schools and a functional Ministry of Education. The clergy did not take kindly to this invasion into a field they had largely dominated. They also were prominent among the leaders against the economic concessions and bondage to foreigners brought about by the financial of the Qajar governments. difficulties In 1872-73 a successful battle was waged against a concession to Baron Julius de Reuter which would have given away much of Iran's future communications, mining, agricultural, and other productive industries. In 1891-92 a successful agitation was waged against a proposed tobacco concession. And from 1905-11 the clergy participated in the Constitutional Revolution. The clergy in this period did not form a unified party, but were factionated into roughly three positions. There were the outright modernists, who fought for a constitution and for modern education. These included Sayyed Yahya Dowlatabadi and Mirza Hasan Roshdiyeh. There were the moderates who were constitutionalist, but not necessarily in favor of modern schools, who wanted to limit the power of the shah to give the country away to to act irresponsibly and generally foreigners and tyrannically. These included the great mojtaheds Khorasani, Mazandarani, Khalili Tehrani, Nai'ni, Tabataba' i, Behbehani, And there were royalists, Modarres, and Ashtiyani. such as the Imam Jome'eh of Tehran (Mirza Abol-Qasem) and, more importantly, conservatives led by Shaykh Fazlollah Nuri, who were anticonstitutionalist as well as antimodernist. It was Nuri's agitation which caused the provisions to be written into the constitution that there be a board of five mojtaheds who could veto any proposed legislation not in accord with Islam, that freedom of press and education

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be limited to things posts and judgeships

not hostile be reserved

to Islam, and that to Twelver Shilite

cabinet Muslims.

a peak of secularizing In the 1930s, Iran experienced of Reza Shah, under the dictatorship effort and Westernizing who modeled his programs upon the example of Ataturk in but the law and the judiciary, Not only education, Turkey. of endowments, administration the notaries, of offices the After and Westernized. and the dress code wvere secularized and socialboth neo-fundamentalist Reza Shah's abdication, Dr. MlohammadMlosaddeq led a burst forth. ist pressures Kashani both -the cleric including National Front coalition, in an attempt to turn the country into a nonand leftists, and to gain a larger share of oil revenues. aligned republic but one which was also followed, restoration A royalist forced to respond to the issues of social welfare and ecofrom through a "White Revolution" nomic reorganization had been leadership In the 1950s, the clerical above. lawv and order and was willing concerned wvith maintaining from threats against perceived crown to cooperate with the and general anarchism in the aftermath of the ecoleftists of WVorldWar Twvo. In 1949, Ayatc4lah nomic devastation acknowledged leading cleric the universall)y Borujerdi, (or marja' taqlid) , convened some twvo thousand clerics He (and arena. and urged a wvithdrawal from the political of the day-to-day his then aide, Khomeini) wvas critical of Kashani, arguing that the moral in politics involvement if niot presence of the clergy wvould be more effective In 1953, Ayadragged into ordinary wheeling and dealing. oIn behalf of Behbehani praised the shah's efforts tollah came from Iraq Sharestani and Ayatollah peasant education, In to convey his approval of MohammadReza Shalh Pahlavi. conmore religious inserted government shah's the return, in a hystertent into the state school system, acquiesced Bahais, and rounided up suspected ical campaign against communists. control and began to As the young shah consolidated both the clergy on American guidance, rely increasingly from themselves and lay Muslim reformers began to distance stressing a counterideology, the government and construct

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the need for Iran to retain its sense of identity, not to not to subsimply imitate the West, and more importantly ordinate the direction of domestic development to the goals of supplying the West with a secure supply of oil. The problems of underdevelopment became recogincreasingly nized and were discussed Islamic idiom, since in a largely other, more open, political discourses were suppressed by the state. In 1960s, Ayatollah Borujerdi broke his truce with the state, signaling his opposition to land reform and other elements of the proposed White Revolution. In the period 1960-63 a group of reformers, both including and laymen, formed a discussion clerics group on how to reform .the clergy and revitalize the religious institution; there was a journal of lectures, Goftar-e Mah (Monthly and an important volume entitled Speeches), "An Inquiry into the Principle of Marja'iyyat (clerical leadership) and the Clergy." In 1963, there were major demonstrations against the White Revolution (as well as against the claims of extraterritoriality for American servicemen and government employees in Iran) during which Khomeini came to prominence; he was exiled the following year. From 1965 to 1973 the center of Islamic reformist thought was the Hosayniyeh Ershad in Tehran, and its leading light was the French-trained Dr. Ali Shari'ati, who galvanized the youth by proposing to fuse the latest in Western social theory with Islam, thereby making possible a renewal of understanding of Islam for the contemporary world, and a cleansing of Islam of decayed and corrupted scholasticism. In 1970, a cleric and a student were tortured to death for protesting American investments in Iran; Ayatollah Taleqani was jailed for attending their memorial services. Mohsen Hakim, the marja' taqlid in Iraq, died, and the shah, attempting to influence the choice of a successor, sent telegrams of condolence to ayatollahs Shari'atmadari and Khonsari, but pointedly not to Khomeini. Forty-eight ulama in Qom countered by sending their own telegram of condolence to Khomeini, and were exiled to sct+tered places in Iran for their pains. In 1971, Khomeini passed the word that Muslims should boycott the shah's celebration of 2,500 years of continuous monarchy. Guerrilla actions made the headlines; and in 1972 five Mojahedin guerrillas, former students of Taleqani, were executed.

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In 1975, on the twelfth anniversary of the 1963 demonstrations, there were major demonstrations in Qom against the imposition of a single party, the Rastakhiz Party, which all Iranians had been ordered to join. By the time of the 1977-79 revolution which overthrew the Pahlavi monarchy, an Islamic protest idiom had been honed by preachers, writers, and lecturers which drew not only on traditional themes, but which could also serve to articulate the comof various sectors plaints of the society in the dislocations experienced in the aftermath of the 1973 oil price increases. Religious rhetoric continued to evolve through the course of the revolution. Velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the clergy), for instance, the subtitle of Khomeini's 1971 book, Islamic Government, gradually came to mean more than moral guidance. In the book, Khomeini evaluated the weak basis for interpreting admittedly this phrase as rule Defenders of inserting by clerics. the phrase into the new constitution country's saw it (as well as other phrases such as Maktabi--approximately "orthodox"--in the preamble) as a means of strengthening and ensuring the role that the 1906 constitution had given to a board of five mojtaheds, but which had been simply ignored. This time such a role would be more carefully fixed. Another, equally controversial, term is the change in usage of a traditional title "imam." Khomeini, of course, does not claim to be the messiah, the returned twelfth imam, or a thirteenth imam. Indeed, his official are carefully portraits titled, used in the "Nayeb-e Imam" (aide to the imam), a title to his nineteenth He has not, however, objected century. to him. In Arabic usage, imam followers applying the title is used for ayatollah: Imam Hakim Mohsen Hakim was called in Iraq; but in prerevolutionary Persian usage, such use of the title as Ayatollah Shari'atsounded blasphemous, madari noted just prior to Khomeini's triumphal return; Shari'atmadari inand perhaps to underscore the point, sisted on his own precedence, having Khomeini pay him a For the revolutionary not vice versa. visit first, youth, rather than the usage of imam comes from Ali Shari'ati from the Arabic usage. Trying to infuse Islamic theological terms with contemporary sociological Shari'ati content,

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suggested that matic leader," choate desires them.

Khomeini

an imam fit the Weberian category of "charisin the sense of one who articulates the inof a mass of people and thereby can lead is

clearly

a charismatic

leader

in

this

sense.

oric

in both cases, The point, is that traditional is being used with quite contemporary meanings

rhetto deal

with issues of constitutional reform and to find leverage a new political for creating To dismiss system. Khomeini as a medieval anachronism--as much of the press insists-is to refuse to pay attention to the delicate maneuvering of balancing factions and trying to provide for a parliamentary form that can survive his own death--the task of as Weber would say. routinization, Khomeini's rhetoric is not only traditional Islamic but incorporates phraseology, contemporary meanings and demands, domestically and internationally (populist concerns with the welfare of the lower classes; antidependency trade relations, nonalignment foreign policy). One of Khomeini's as he acknowproblems, ledges, is the clergy: articulators of Islamic ideologies, but not necessarily visionary, technically or even trained, competent.

III People make judgments of fanaticism by what they are To a lot of Protestants themselves. I know monks and nuns are fanatics....And to a lot of monks and nuns I know, my Protestant prophets are fanatics. For my I think the only difference part, between them is that if you are a Catholic and have this intensity of belief, you join the convent and are heard from no more; whereas if you are a Protestant and have it, is no convent there for you to join and you go into the world getting into all sorts of trouble and drawing the wrath of people who don't believe anything much at all down on your head. This is one reason why I can write about Protestant believers

better

than about Catholic

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believers--because

they

99

in diverse kinds of dramatic express their belief action which is obvious enough for me to catch. -- Flannery O'Connor'6 I attempt to explore some of the In this section,17 political behind explicit understandings tacit cultural are often acted The tacit understandings maneuverings. maneuverings are expressed the explicit out dramatically; Both have perand strategy. in the language of intention in other words, is to puzzle The attempt, suasive force. forms, social between cultural out some of the relations It draws especially psychology. and individual processes, on Walter Benjamin's essays on the nature of language and mood and ethics of psychological culture and on the creation is the quesfor this exploration The vehicle of behavior. as tion why Ayatollah Khomeini should have crystallized in its second the focal figure of the Iranian revolution phase after the removal of the shah. of the reIn many ways, Khomeini is quite atypical leaders of Iran, in style as well as in political ligious A large portion of his prominence must be atstrategy. to the fact that of the top-rank of course, tributed, ulama of Iran, he was, since 1963, the only one to speak out consistently against the shah--against tyranny, against of Iran's domestic the subordination against corruption, for the inof oil supplies development to the protection strategy, denigrated His confrontational world. dustrial of in the late 1960s and early 1970s as self-indulgence toward his followers personal anger and as irresponsible virtue at the left behind in Iran, became an untarnished time of the revolution. By contrast, Ayatollah Shari'atin the 1960s of playing the good shepmadari's strategy herd within the country was attacked by Khomeini loyalists with compromise after the removal of the shah. as tainted Khomeini's uncompromising stance during the revolutionary in ensuring the success of months of 1977-79 was critical In the following stage of the revolution. the initial a shrewd sense of timing, skill, months, he showed tactical to gauge the popular mood. and an ability

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It is clear that Khomeini was a master politician, about saying merely but there is something unsatisfactory and the unsatisfactoriness is not alleviated this, by references to a resolve strengthened by his putative anger over his treatment by the shah, his exile, the deaths of or his son. his father is not his perWhat is intriguing sonal motivations, but the reception and support he elicited from the Iranian people. is someWhat is at issue thing cultural, something about legitimacy, something about charisma in the sense of the ability to articulate of a mass of followers the feelings and thereby the ability to lead. That this is at issue may be underscored by that there the fact have been other religious leaders who have offered at crucial themselves as alternatives points

in the revolutionary process, particularly qani in the spring of 1979 and Ayatollah

Ayatollah TaleShari'atmadari in

of 1979. the fall Both of them may be contrasted with Khomeini in terms of ideology--Taleqani was regarded as a patron of the Islamic left, Shari'atmadari of the constitutionalist in terms of style. center--and also Khomeini' s quiet of humor and positive eschewal monotone, and his populist affect, language often utilizing exagof almost gerated language comic-book proportions, are quite unusual for a top-rank alem. This paper works on the assumption that what attracts to political people in times of high drama is more leaders of utilitarian than calculation and strategies; programs

it

is

something

more emotional.

And insofar

as it

is

social--that it does not attract only isolated individuals--it is composed of a configuration of cultural or symbolic a "condensation forms, of meanings into a symbolic figure" (as Sigmund Freud or Victor Turner would say)

which tacitly resonates with deeply felt understandings about the world. It is this tacit background to the explicit political maneuverings which I would like to try to tease out in at least a preliminary fashion. The exercise Benjamin's inaccurately

Drama).

is

stimulated

Ursprung des translated

It is

stimulated

BECOMINGMOLLAH

by a reading

of Walter

deutschen Trauerspiels (somewhat as The Origin of German Tragic

in part

by his

theoretical

stance:

101

of what is coming to be Benjamin is one of the ancestors anthropology," an approach to cultural called "interpretive analysis drawing heavily on German philosophers, literary

critics,

and Geisteswissenschaftlers

of the late nineteenth

centuries. But it is primarily stimuand early twentieth of sevenlated by the substance of Benjamin's description teenth century baroque drama in Lutheran Germany, which generated in this writer a strong sense of deja vu, that drama the passion plays of Iran and the religio-political albeit of the revolution produce similar moods and ethics, with different characters. three parallels, Before turning to these substantive stance are worth mention elements of Benjamin's theoretical First, he arsince they serve to underpin the parallels. and sociological context is crucial gued that historical The to understanding metaphors or speech and literature. had been dismissed seventeenth century plays he reanalyzed to imitate Greek tragedy. by critics as merely poor efforts Benjamin rejected the idea that an entire genre or epoch of creative as merely decadent, writing could be dismissed and insisted contemporary obthat these plays reflected and with sovereignty, sessions with the nature of political the relatively weak powers of men to find either personal So too, this paper in a corrupt world. or social salvation that Khomeini and his argues that it is obtuse to insist fellow clerics are merely medieval anachronisms thrown into prominence by chaos and irrationality, that nothing more between leader and folcan be learned about the relation lower in the Iranian revolution. Second, Benjamin lays great stress on the historical and depth to the meaning of images, metaphors, layering here not only because This is relevant ideas, and words. between seventeenth it allows a connection century Germany but nonetheless common, roots in and Iran through distant, of both Christitraditions neo-Platonism via the mystical the depth and "immanent" More centrally, anity and Islam. undernature of imagery is what provides tacit cultural and the grounding for more ephemeral and more standings maneuvers. rapidly shifting political

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and basic to the above, is the notion that Finally, as well as much of language and these tacit understandings, are metaphorical of exin general, culture representations That is, their formulation and their validity perience. science-like not in verifiable but in resides propositions their aptness for capturing or expressing experience. They therefore glory in multiple meanings and the use of controlled ambiguity to stimulate thought or to provide flexifor maneuver. bility in The plays revolve around three stock characters varying combinations or separation: a prince or tyrant, a martyr, and an intriguer. The tyrant's raison d'etre was less as an executive head of state than as someone to restore order in a state of given absolute authority emergency or chaos. The problem of the plays is the conflict between alleged absolute power and actual limited human powers to affect the course of society. Absolute power was represented by the most powerful temporal figures one could imagine in the seventeenth a Persian century: shah, a Turkish sultan, or a Byzantine emperor invested with divine authority. The conflict for the prince between his alleged and actual power leads in the plays to "How heavy as in Shakespeare's madness or indecisiveness, of lies the head that wears the crown" or the suffering for these individuals Hamlet. The only solution is moral a proving of the self through struggle, often stoicism, ending in torture and death or martyrdom. The struggle is parallel on the political arena and within the soul: for the rule of the state is the prescription stoicism In fact, as for the emotional life. Benjamin calls these plays secularized passion plays. They portray the hopeof the worldly condition in which the only moral lessness is through stoicism. dignity possible That the concern of the plays is with this moral struggle is underscored to the development of rationales by the scant attention for the characters of evil against which the protagonist struggles: tyrants, devils, Jews are presented without any redeeming explanation. The point of these plays (and here we come closer to Iran) is to elicit lamentation. Unlike classical which was supposed to produce tragedy,

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a catharsis, but where the chorus provided a device for limiting emotional expression, these plays were intended to elicit lamentation, and even more, as Benjamin puts it, they are plays through which mournfulness finds satisfaction. In Iran, the passion plays commemorating the martyrdom of the third imam, Hosayn, and preachments (rowzehs) which draw on the same stories, elicit tears, but the emotion is only superficially grief for the dead martyr. There is a popular belief that to cry for Hosayn will gain him as an intercessor at the Last Judgment. But preachers a deeper meaning for the lamentation: stress it is a penitant identification with the people of Kufa who first invited Hosayn to lead them in revolt against the archtyrant and usurper of the caliphate, Yazid, and then sold out to Yazid, leaving Hosayn to be martyred. The identification is intended to produce a rededication to the ideals of Hosayn and Islam, to the ideals of a just society, to forswear selling out to tyrants in the present as the Kufans did in the past. The feeling one is supposed to achieve through lamentation is a hal-e khosh, a "good feeling" of quiet determination and stoicism, a willingness to struggle against even overwhelming odds for moral ends. The seventeenth-century Trauerspielen worked similarly. Lutheranism rejected the theological notions of gaining salvation One could not buy one's through good works. way into heaven. One could only gain salvation through faith, and one's fate was predestined. This theology set up an anxiety to demonstrate to oneself that one was among

the electi.

Max Weber, in his essays on The Protestant

of Capitalism, showed how success in Spirit business was taken as a sign of God's favor and that being among the electi served as an anxiety-reducing mechanism which generated an ethic of industriousness. Benjamin acof disciplined knowledges this inculcation obedience and piety, but points out that it also produced a kind of melwhich the plays both mirrored and gave relief ancholia, to. As in Iran, the plays were highly ornamental, allowing from the pious austerity people to weep and gain relief The melancholy stoicism which the enjoined by theology.

Ethic

and the

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plays encouraged, moreover, was not merely a sufferance of a corrupt world, but it was a technique, a path to knowledge The Renaissance had rediscovered and to power. the enigand melancholy. matic or ambiguous powers of stoicism Melcondition ancholia was a natural characterological influenced by both the stars and the balance of the humors. Extreme melancholia might be caused by an excess of black bile produced by the spleen. (It was suggested that the spleen was a particularly prominent organ in the dog, and to rabies.) hence dogs were susceptible Melancholia could of Saturn, the planet also be generated by the influence from the earth, and thus emblematic of the longfurthest est journey from everyday life, the deepest contemplation, a losing of the self in thought. This loss of the self threatens those subject to such intense contemplation with either depression or manic ecstasy. The way of pursuing wisdom without falling into either form of madness was through stoicism, a technique of deadening the senses. Concern with the humors and astrology is common to the traditional in knowledge of pathology and psychology Iran as well as in Europe. One need not quite suggest that Ayatollah Khomeini is the paradigm of the melancholy prince, but only that there is a play with some common of which perhaps four may be of particular elements, interest (1) a notion of tragedy and mourning/melancholia which produces stoicism and dedication; (2) a play with mystical knowledge which can be maddening or depressing, but which can also lead to wisdom and power; (3) a notion of worldly corruption and political anarchy in which the individual proves himself through struggle, in which the struggle often ends in torture and death, but in which the martyr can display magnanimity; (4) and (less clearly) perhaps the notion that laughter is emblematic of schemers or of seduction the devil, by worldly concerns. In sum, so far I merely wish to posit the possibility of a similar symbolic complex of lamentation producing an ethic of stoical determination in Iran as in seventeenthcentury Germany, in contrast to the images in the American press of manic madness. What I need to do next is establish Khomeini's uniqueness and the ways he draws on some

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of these themes. First, however, one need keep in mind two general perspectives about the Iranian revolution which should also help establish Khomeini's unique position. The first has to do with the phases through which the revolutionary process evolves; the second has to do with the changing of generations. The first phase of the revolution, which swept away the shah and the Pahlavi dynasty (roughly November 1977 to February 1979), was carried by a coalition of forces from all sectors of society with quite different goals. The coalition did not arise ex nihilo: on at least four previous occasions since 1873 an alliance of religious leaders and secular reformers had either forced a major change in government policy or a change in the government itself. In the previous efforts the secular reformers had gained the edge in leading the coalition; and again during the first phase of the current revolution the middle classes pursued the goal of a bourgeois revolution which had been left uncompleted by the Constitutional Revolution of 190511 and the Mosaddeq attempt to establish a nonaligned, nationalist, republic in 1952-53. That in the current revolution religious leaders should have gained the leadership edge is in part due to the success of the Pahlavi regime in suppressing open political discourse inand political terest-group negotiating skills. Lslam, therefore, became an umbrella language of moral protest. Within the Islamic idiom, however, at least three different strands are worth the idiom of popular religion, which keeping separate: provided much of the rhetorical and emotionally dramatic devices of mass mobilization; the idiom of the ulama, which provided a leadership framework and a vision of a moral soand the idiom of lay modernizers, such as Shari'ati, ciety; which provided a competing leadership framework and a competing vision of a just society. One key to the popular religion beand the relation tween the masses and the clergy is the form of preaching called rowzeh. The rowzeh begins with a verse of the Quran; a sermon follows; and at the end the subject of the sermon is connected to the story thirteen centuries ago of the successor martyrdom of Hosayn, the grandson and legitimate

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to the Prophet, on the desert of Karbala at the hands of and usurper of the calthe Syrian army of the archtyrant Yazid. Each year during the month of Moharram, iphate, in passion plays the events of this story were re-enacted But during the rest of the year as well, and in floats. and the rowzeh kept the memory of these events alive, of served as an important device to keep consciousness of Yazid with The identifications high. social injustice the shah and hosayn with Khomeini (or other oppositional The first phase of the figures) was all but explicit. drew not only on the symbolism of the battle revolution on of staging demonstrations of Karbala, and the effects with the Karbala-related dates associated significant for playbecame dramatic occasions stories, but funerals they became forums ing on the Karbala themes and emotions: to fire and thus for antishah chants, provoking soldiers new emotional outrage. providing new martyrs, new funerals, was comphase of the revolution Once the destructive once the shah was removed, the Karbala imagery depleted, cayed in potency and needed to be supplemented with other Interestingly, symbolic canon. portions of the Shilite asked Khomeini or the soon-to-be when newspaper reporters appointed Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan what form the new state would take, their initial response was to invoke the imam, Ali, the father of Hosayn, and example of the first with leadership the only imam to have combined religious Ali is the symbol of constructive, just temporal power. But in the fragile second phase of the revogovernment. One might of Ali proved premature. lution, the invocation reorganization, suggest that in this period of political of the components of the and competition fragmentation, coalition, the figure of Khomeini himself revolutionary became increasingly important as a temporary image and together. reference point to hold the coalition of Khomeini is made all the more strikThe centrality that the revolution is largely caring when one considers one which in the years immediateried by a new generation, idiom more drew its ideological ly preceding the revolution from Shari'ati than from Khomeini. and other modernizers of Iran is under the age of 15; Roughly half the population

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the revolution was largely carried by people in their teens in their and 20s, with a leadership drawn from a generation 70s and 80s who had been active in the Mosaddeq movement. The young generation is largely has had modern literate, and wishes education, is pro-technology, is antischolastic, to take its place as fully participant in the industrialized modern world. Insofar as Shari'ati serves as their inspiration, they stand for free-thinking Muslims, who wish to reinterpret Islam for modern technological times. and the Both the coalition nature of the revolution generational factor suggest that it was not at all selfevident or preordained that Khomeini should continue to be the focal leader or should not have been forced to share The hypothesis, of this paper is leadership. therefore, of Khomeini's persona (the image he that the uniqueness projects rather than his personality per se)18 exerts an enormous mass appeal to what might be called the Shi'ite sense of tragedy (in the broader sense than the Karbala This appeal played upon the tremendous fear story itself). that the revolution would fail, that it would be reversed is that there is more The hypothesis as happened in 1953. to Khomeini's mass appeal than just shrewdness, timing, unor populist rhetoric. compromising fundamentalist orthodoxy, In an attempt to tease out some of the elements of this apof peal, one might look to the five or six major features make him strikKhomeini's persona which, in combination, from the other top-rank ulama. ingly different is and the least distinctive, The first of these, as a feature the aura of ethnic marginality that persists His great grandfather moved from Khorasan of his persona. returned to Iran, to the town to Kashmir; his grandfather allows a persistent of Khomein. This Kashmiri connection An elder brother that somehow Khomeini is Indian. labeling as a young man, took the name "Hendi"; and Khomeini himself, Like other nationalused that surname to sign his poetry. ist leaders--the Corsican Napoleon, the Austrian Hitler, resthe Georgian Stalin--this hint of ethnic marginality and a universonates with a tension between a nationalist versus IsShi'ism as Iranian nationalism alist ideology: Iranian nationKhomeini rejects lam as universalistic.

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alism, and the story is told that great efforts had to be made to persuade him, in Paris, to speak of Iran, a necessary component in the consciousness of most Iranians. The issue arose during the drafting of the constitution again, when a provision was insisted upon that the president be an Iranian national, not merely a true Muslim. More important is that Khomeini's persona cultivates a legend of distress about his person, connecting his persona with the martyr of Karbala. There are several parts to this legend, beginning with the death of his father at the hands of--depending on the variant--a a mayor, bandit, a civil or a landowner, but whichever, servant, an agent of Reza Shah. This deprivation is said to have occurred early in Khomeini's childhood either when he was 6 months old or a year and a half. This would place the event around 1900, but Reza Shah did not come to power until the 1920s. The legend continues that his mother sought and obtained some revenge, either the execution of the murderer, or the removal of the governor, but in any case the theme is elaborated that obstinacy in pursuit of justice is part of the family tradition and is rewarded. The second important part of the legend of distress is Khomeini's banishment from Iran in 1964 after leading the mass demonstrations in 1963 against the White Revolution of the shah. This portion of the legend is made emotionally more compelling by the (apparently true) story that the shah ordered him but was dissuaded after Ayatollah executed, Shari'atmadari and others signed a statement that Khomeini was an ayatollah and the execution of an ayatollah would lead to serious consequences. Like the imams, in any case, Khomeini was denied his rightful position in Iran. Finally, the legend tells of the loss first of an infant daughter, which he endured stoically, and more importantly in the fall of 1977 the death of his elder son, an event believed by many Iranians to have been caused by SAVAKand which served as a contributing spark to the revolution. The themes of this persona of enduring distress and injustice are those of a father unjustly killed, a son deprived of rightful possessions (father, land, position, children), the need to pursue justice in the face of overwhelming odds. These are the themes of Ali and Hosayn and of the

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account, all the imams imams. According to the Shi'ite who will (except the last, were either slain or poisoned the theme of return at the end of time as the messiah); as a poison--is and colonialism poison--Westernization There is no question one that Khomeini also plays upon. to Khomeini's place as a that these legends contributed to the shah, beyond the fact that symbol of resistance A secondary opponent of the shah. he was a consistent it is said that before he elaboration also contributed: and moved to Qom in the 1920s he performed a divination learned that he would die in Qom. This was taken by his followers as a sign throughout his long exile in Iraq that he would return to Iran. feature of 4hoyet, a distinctive More interesting To the meini's persona is that he dabbled in mysticism. and mysticism is philosophy orthodox ulama, speculative as something that can easily to be dealt with carefully Not only did Khomeini teach gnostic phildestroy faith. exhe experimented with mystical osophy, but apparently At one point he abruptly stopped teaching mystiercises. inIn any case, this mystical cism for unknown reasons. to the explanations by orthodox ulama contributes terest on supreme and sole leadership, of Khomeini's insistence "imam" to be applied as well as his allowal of the title refer the use of imam and velato him. These apologists philosoyat-e faqih (guidance by the learned) to Plato's reinterpretaby way of Islamic philosophical pher-king, tions as the fourfold trip to God. to the mystical component of Khomeini's Closely allied his eschewing of humor and posipersona is his asceticism, Gnosthe studied monotone in which he speaks. tive affect, ticism as said above, and as noted by Benjamin in Europe, Isa great deal of self-control. requiring is dangerous, lamic asceticism (zohd) is not a withdrawal from the world, Bento be seduced by materialist concerns. but a refusal to avoid depresjamin's stoic Lutherans used asceticism It in a corrupt world. or corruption sion, manic ecstasy, humor cultivate is intriguing that whereas many ayatollahs Khomeini does not, and as a means of engaging followers, one wonders if there is a resonance here with Benjamin's

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observation that laughter was sometimes seen as emblematic into the corrupt world. Khomeini's of the devil's seduction functions. It is a mark of asceticism serves two related extreme courage in a world of seduction. One of the words is sangin (from sang, stone, emin Persian for saturnine Someone who is sangin of thought). blem of concentration is reserved, does not talk much, and what he says is weighty. Khomeini at times may be said to be sangin; Shari'atmadari, is that Shari'atmadari The difference however, is more so. is also seen as concerned with comfort, with running an or court full of do-nothing establishment retainers, whereas Khomeini is also ascetic in the sense of not being concerned with courtiers. He stands alone, courageously, without fear (bi-mahaba). Khomeini's asceticism Secondly, serves to ward off the suspicion that whoever exercises In a corrupt world, to get ahead power is self-seeking. one must use deceit and corruption. Persians often invoke a public one which requires a dual morality: a corrupt mask; a private one of honesty, duty, and purity. The of the public political corruption world, with which leaders must deal, almost inevitably delegitimizes leaders. Khomeini has already responded to this directly, saying, "I am an old man, what good can material rewards do me?" and by living a demonstrably frugal life.19 unlike the other top-rank ulama, Khomeini Finally, a populist cultivates language of confrontation and a propaganda style of comic-book like hyperbole. Shari'atmadari or Taleqani spoke in scholarly and measured style, but Khomeini speaks the language of the ordinary man, attackand eggheads, ing intellectuals the rich and the elite. of trusting He plays a politics the masses, plus trying to balance the factions of the revolution to keep it from splitting apart. Thus, when Banisadr was elected president, Khomeini appointed a cleric, MohammadBeheshti as head of the Supreme Court; he appointed members of the Council of Guardians, attempting to balance conservatives and modernists. When the Iran-Iraq war broke out, rather than turning to the army, Khomeini called for arms to be given to the people: if the young men cannot save the country, it is not worth saving; we have not fought a revolution just for security and economic well-being, but for Islam, for

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for nonalignment, a just society, to the common man.

for a society

responsive

of traIn sum, Khomeini's persona draws on a series way none of the other top ditional images in a forceful perseverance Like Hosayn, he represents ulama can match. to endure inagainst all odds, with an ability for justice Like Ali, Khomeini represents justice and suffering. com-. and utilizing leadership and religious bining political force and cunning on behalf all means at hand, including Like of Islam, the Muslim community, and the just society. access to wisdom and ability the imams, Khomeini represents to control the dangers to ordinary men of dabbling in esoIf one may revert to levels teric knowledge or in power. of allegory, Khomeini's persona appeals on three levels: handsome, uncompromising, to the senses as a forceful, to the reason as a shrewd tacman of justice; suffering appeal, tician, with a sense of timing, with a populist and from failing; and as the man who kept the revolution to the spirit a sense of tragedy and a sense as providing of what is worth dying for, drawn from an anger at a traway of life which must be transformed to survive. ditional The imagery and vocabulary on which Khomeini draws in many ways is similar to what Benjamin found in seventeenth-century Germany, an imagery and vocabulary which for us is must be almost lost and which in order to be recaptured, of transformation The cultural unravelled. historically contemporary Iran is similar to what Benjamin tried to in to nineteenth centuries describe for the seventeenth Europe. Benjamin was concerned in his debates about can configurations images and cultural whether artistic fraghold together a world that is becoming increasingly at the same time in mented in terms of common experiences is being leveled by modern which culture and experience Without engaging this debate deeply here, mass media. one might see Khomeini's persona as a complex image which but only together, can serve to hold a fragmenting reality of the attack on Khomeini's The beginnings temporarily. have already occurred in to criticism invulnerability and in any case his mortality will street demonstrations, to find new coordinating images. force the revolutionaries

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What this analysis has attempted can be stated two ways. Substantively, it attempts to provide a richer unof Khomeini's appeal than is usually derstanding attempted in political commentary, by looking to the cultural groundit attempts to ing of Khomeini's appeal. Theoretically, and skills account for some of the tacit understandings that provide the background to explicit cultural beliefs (the relation between "the said and the unsaid") and to see them within a historical tradition. Perhaps Flannery O'Conner can help again to express the sense of connection, dialogue, engagement, and understanding, which is the essence of interpretive ethnography: The religion of the South is a do-it-yourself religion, something which I as a Catholic find painful and touching and grimly comic. It's full of unconscious pride that lands them in all sorts of ridiculous predicaments. They have nothing to correct their practical and so they work them out heresies dramatically. If this were merely comic to me, it would be no good, but I accept the same fundamental doctrines of sin and redemption and judgment that they do.21

NOTES

The proverb refers to the story of Satan, dismissed from heaven by God because he refused to bow to Adam. Satan's sin was pride in his own reason. (Compare Ecclesiastes: "Do not be overly righteous.") God ordered the angels to bow to Adam, but Satan refused because God previously had ordered monotheism: one should bow to no one but God. The relative perfections of angels and men is the subject of much theological and moral banter: angels have no passion, hence their virtues are not achievements, not the result of moral struggle. MohammadIqbal elaborated on the struggle: Iblis (Satan) lures Adam/man out of paradise, but when man finally achieves victory over Satan, Satan performs the prostration before the Perfect Man (ensan-e kamel) which he had refused to per-

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form before the unexperienced, morally innocent, Adam. The Perfect Man (who has fulfilled the potentials of the human self and approached God) then can proclaim with the Prophet, "Aslama shaytani" (my Satan has surrendered to me, he has become Muslim): the jihad-e akbar (the greater holy war) has been won. See A. Schimmel, "Iqbal and Goethe" in Iqbal, Essays and Studies, ed. A. Ansari (New Delhi, 1978), pp. 279-80. 2.

Edited by Shakeri in 1971 and published in Mashad by Tus Publishers; an abridged English translation was prepared in 1977 by Mehdi Abedi and myself with financial support from the Center for Middle East Studies at Harvard. A detailed summary and analysis is in press: "Portrait of a Mulla: the Autobiography and Bildungsroman of Aqa Najafi-Quchani (1875-1943)," Persica (forthcoming).

3.

The only other reasonably full autobiographies roughly and less humorous sevencomparable are the briefer alteenth-century account of Sayyed Ni'matu'allah IV: 361Jaza'iri, summarized by E. G. Browne (1928: of Ahmad Kasravi, 67); and the polemical autobiography who was trained as a cleric and then became one of their most powerful opponents. See also the biographical account of Siyuti: E. M. Sartain, Jalal-al-Din al-Siyuti: and Background Biography (New York, 1975).

4.

Aqa Najafi Quchani declared himself a mojtahed when he discovered that Sayyed Kazem Yazdi, one of the great mojtaheds in Najaf, made simple mistakes in geography, knew little and took outside the religious disciplines, the know-nothing attitude that one ought not to study lest it damage faith. philosophy

5.

On velayat-e

Iran: From Relisee M. Fischer, faqih, to Revolution (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 15155; and S. Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran (Albany, 1980), pp. 64-66. gious

6.

Dispute

On the problem of revolutionary and Islamic "Iran and Islamic Justice," see M. Fischer,

IRANIAN

STUDIES

justice, Middle

114

(January 1980) and "Legal PosWit and Hierarchy in Iran," Justice, ed. D. in The Politics of Law in the Middle East, Dwyer, forthcoming.

East

Executive

tulates

Reports

in Flux:

7.

sketch of how the See Fazlur Rahman's exasperated and nineteenth puritan reformers of the eighteenth in favor in their attack on scholasticism centuries, and political engagement, threw out the of ijtihad skills and evaluative scholarly knowledge of history and legalisms, ritualisms, along with the archaisms, F. Rahman, in simplistic sloganeering. resulting Legacy and Contemporary Challenge" in Islam: "Islam: World, ed. C. K. Pullapilly in the Contemporary Similar charges are made by (Notre Dame, 1980). of the Arab InSee A. Laroui, The Crisis Laroui. tellectual 1976). (Berkeley,

8.

was drawn Laroui argues that just as the distinction in the days of the prophet between true believers converts to Islam of unsure belief (mus(muminin), and unbelievers (kahypocrites (munafiqun), limin), so too classical writers distinand dhimmi), firun sulof the patrimonial guished between the realities tanates which they could only urge to be more just in which each inand an ideal community of believers by Islam that there need be was so inspired dividual Such an ideal state little state apparatus at all. A. Laroui, did not even exist under the prophet. Lecture given at Harvard "Islamic Theories of State." Center for Middle East Studies on February 24, 1981. that counter that the implication Modern activists to make to actual polcontribution Islam has little is manifestly not the case. itics

9.

of the revoluIn his speech on the second anniversary tion (February 11, 1981), he had his son read twice a in affairs mullahs from interfering sentence enjoining beyond their competence.

10.

I am These appeared in issues 12 and 13 of Ahangar. indebted to Ervand Abrahamian for passing them on to me.

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115

11.

See the excerpts Perspectives

(Philadelphia,

translated Iranian

on the

in Tell the Revolution,

American

People:

ed. D. Albert

1980).

12.

comments are explored more The chart and the following Islam and Politics," "Representing fully in M. Fischer, 1981. Daedalus, forthcoming

13.

Hierarchy and the State S. A. Arjomand, "The Shi'ite unpublished in Iran under the Early Qajars 1785-1848," Iran," in Shi'ite M.S., 1978, "The Office of Mulla-Bashi unpublished M.S., n.d.

14.

the fourth basis by Sunnis, considered Analogy (qiyas), who cite the example of Satan by Shi'ites, is rejected as following false analogy.

15.

these brothdismisses Aqa Najafi Quchani (no relation) ers, although formally the leaders of the madrasah syswho are not particularly as intriguers tem in Isfahan, our attention instead to the He directs learned. teachers whose renown is maintained by their students Sayyed Mohammad to this day: Jahangir Khan Qashqa'i, The Baqer Dorchehi, and Shaykh Abdol-Karim Gazi. Najafi brothers are known to anyone who has read reports of the period political through the British of the London-based Church or through the archives and as having led demonstrations Missionary Society, against Bahais against the missionaries, agitations British imperialism. and Babis, and against

16.

Cited in Robert Coles, Flannery (Louisiana,

17.

1980),

O'Connor's

South

p. 99.

"The Ayatullah as entitled, originally This section, of A Walter Benjaminite Interpretation Allegory: to anthroKhomeyni's Mesmerism," has been presented of Chicago and at the University pology colloquia I am grateful and for reactions Rice University. by both audiences. suggestions

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STUDrES

116

18.

See Bruce Mazlish, "The Hidden Khomeini," New York, December 24, 1979, for an attempt to draw a psychologout of the same body of facts. ical profile

19.

A Study See also M. Bateson, "This Figure of Tinsel: of Themes of Hypocrisy and Pessimism in Iranian Culture," Daedalus (1979), pp. 125-36.

20.

See Steven 1978).

21.

Cited

Tyler,

in Coles,

BECOMING MOLLAH

The Said

op.

cit.,

and the

Unsaid

(New York,

p. 59.

117

IranianStudies, VolumeXIII, Nos. 14, 1980

Shi'ite Leadership:In the Shadow of Conflicting Ideologies David Menashri

The Context

of

Ideological

Differences

The revolution in Iran stands out as a striking exception to other Middle Eastern coups of the twentieth century. While the latter have mostly been of a military-putsch type, in Iran, an apparently stable regime was toppled by a civilian, predominantly clerical, leadership capable of calling forth mass participation on a vast scale, neutralizing the army, and forcing the shah into exile. This religious leadership was strong and resourceful enough to weld its components together and to overcome ideological barriers that elsewhere, and in other circumstances, would have precluded joint action. But in Iran--where political cooperation among divergent groups has been a recurrent feature for the past hundred years--the clergy, the National Front, other middle-of-the-road liberals, and the left were able to make common cause. Reviewing the period from 1890 to the mid1960s, Nikki Keddie writes: "Although it is a truism that politics makes strange bedfellows.. .the alliance between of Iran and the most admuch of the religious leadership vanced Westernized political activists is virtually without parallel either in the Islamic or the non-Islamic world."1 Such ostensibly disparate coalitions were at work during

David Menashri is Research Associate at the Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University.

119

the Tobacco Concession of 1891-92, the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911, the opposition movement led by Mosaddeq in 1951-53, and again from 1961 to 1964, when a combination of forces opposed the initial reforms that were to lead to the shah's White Revolution. Divergent ideologies existed not only among these groups, but also within each of them, the religious establishment included. Since the outbreak of the active opposition movement in the fall of 1977, public attention,both inside Iran and on Ayatollah Ruholabroad, has been focused predominantly lah Khomeini and his fundamentalist ideology to such an extent that some observers equated his concepts with "Islam," sect of Islam. Shi'ite or at least with the "traditional" for their part--mindful of the necesHis fellow ayatollahs, sity of maintaining "unity of word" (vahdat-ekalam) and "unito minimize the ideologty of action" (vahdat-eawal)--tried ical barriers dividing them, thus helping to confirm such an impression. The ideological gulf between several ayabe tollah ozzam (grand ayatollahs), however, could still of ideology detected. The most striking was the divergence and between the two highest ranking ayatollahs--Khomeini Sayyed MohammadKazem Shari'at;nadari.2 Having discussed the ideological the various components barriers dividing here on of Khomeini's coalition elsewhere,3 I concentrate the ideological differences between the two. By doing so I would like to suggest the following: (a) Khomeini's doctrine is by no means the only Shi'ite concept in Iran today; of highest rather it has vigorous opponents within the circle ranking ayatollahs; (b) it is also not the most popular doctrine among the small group of the ayatollah ozzam; (c) Shi'ite neither is it the "traditionalist" doctrine; many of the views presently expressed by Khomeini are unprecedoctrine dented in the Shi'ite as evolved over the last few Isas well as Sunnite, hundred years; (d) just as Shi'ite, lam has constantly changed, so too has Khomeini's views gradually changed: many of his present opinions clearly 4 contradict he himself had held several years ago. positions

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between Khomeini differences Neither the ideological nor the political of their implications and Shari'atmadari, differences, can be properly understood without taking into Since the Islam. of Shi'ite account the unique character (in condoctrine are, according to Shi'ite doors of ijtihad trast to Sunnite Islam), always open, the mojtaheds have a approach to the sources of religious free, nationalistic law--the Quran and the Sunna--to adopt it to the requireThe fact that different mojtaheds can ments of the time. the idevalidates legitimate conclusions adopt different Moreover, because each of the faithful ological pluralism. of a living mojtahed is likely to be an imitator (moqalled) for whom his example is binding, not only are (moqallad), and their mojtaheds, between the faithful ties strengthened turn into poof theological doctrine but often differences the process of selecting litical In addition, disputes. (source of imitation), the chief mojtahed, marja'e taqlid usually taqlid has never been formalized.5 The marja'e Compeaccepted by consensus. "emerges" and is gradually for the marja'iyyat candidates tition among the potential inevitably ensues.6 have had the effect doctrine These aspects of Shi'ite of sharpening the rivalry between Khomeini and Shari'atmaof the indari. conceptions different Both held entirely to the terpretation of the divine law and its application They both enjoyed a wide base of public twentieth century. although Khomeini enjoyed almost unanimous support support: leader of the antishah movement throughas the unchallenged out the revolutionary supporters-Shari'atmadari's prccess, most of whom were Azeri Turks, natives of Azerbaijan (the ethnic minority), and leading merchants of the Tehlargest Many inregarded him as their moqallad. ran bazaar--still and most of the centrist political groupings-tellectuals also positions--were though not in support of his political Moremuch closer to his ideology than to that of Khomeini. of the over, they both had been competing for the position taqlid Sayyed Mohammad since the death of Ayatollah marja'e after the Hosayn Burujerdi in 1961 and, more vigorously, death of his successor, Ayatollah Mohsen Hakim in 1970.

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differences were not the only causes Their ideological perfor hostility between them; they were also longstanding sonal rivals. Following the death of Ayatollah Hakim, Khoeach regarded himself as the zmrja'e meini and Shari'atmadari It was the latter, however, to whom the shah sent a taqlid. indicating his preference telegram of condolences--thereby 48 ulama from Qom sent a for the succession. In response, cable to Khomeini, who was exiled by the shah in 1964, pledgBy this act, which was emulated ing their allegiance to him. Khomeini emerged as the new marja'e by many other clerics, Shari'atmadari, however, remained the highest ayataqlid. inside Iran. His moderation, he mainthe contacts tollah of him for tained with the shah, and the shah's preference the marja'iyyat in an era of revin 1970, were not assets olutionary zeal. supporting Khomeini as the leader While reluctantly of the opposition, criticized the position Shari'atmadari his achis fellow ayatollahs, Khomeini acquired vis-a-vis imam, and the monopoly quiescence to the use of the title of the divine law. that he demanded on the interpretation disputed that Khomeini was the Shari'atmadari's followers Instead of using the term marja'e taqlid, rnarja'e taqlid. The folto use the plural--maraj'e taqlid.7 they preferred lowing quote, given late in 1979 by Taleb Hosayni, a close his adherents' seems to reflect associate of Shari'atmadari, is not the second man [in the attitudes: "Shari'atmadari Shi'ite after Khomeini, as several people believe, hierarchy] but the first process, Throughout the revolutionary one."8 since the seizure of power by the new and, more noticeably, failed to influence the course of regime, Shari'atmadari Khomeini. events or to lead an opposition movement against to express his controversial However, he did not hesitate ideologies examples of their divergent views. The following reveal the wide gap dividing these ayatollahs. The Scope of Ideological The Extent Character

Differences

of "The Return to Islam" and of

the

"Islamic

Republic"

between Khomeini and differences The most outstanding Shari'atmadari are over the way the divine law should be in-

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terpreted and, more significantly, how it should be applied in the twentieth century. the activist-fundaRepresenting mentalist approach, Khomeini advocates a complete return to the ideal model of pure Islam as it was in the era of the Prophet and his immediate successors. As a Shilite, Khomeini aspires to emulate the model period of Mohammad's leadership in Medina (622-632) and the rule of Ali (656661), through the application of Islamic law by word and letter. Recognizing the gap between the theory (that Islam is a leading force in the human community) and reality (the Islamic world's material backwardness), Khomeini argues that this gap can be eliminated only by the strict application of Islam, which will lead along the natural path of progress and success. Like his predecessors, Jamal e.g., al-Din al-Afghani, who dealt with the same question, Khomeini almost totally ignores the difficulty of outlining the patterns of a contemporary community according to a model drawn from the past. Shari'atmadari, on the other hand, is somewhat closer to the liberally oriented modernist movement in Islam founded by MohammadAbduh late in the nineteenth century. Unlike the modernists, he does not regard modernism as an ideal per se, nor the ijtihad as an instrument to legitimize modernization. He is, however, aware of the changes that have occurred in Islamic society since the ideal states of Mohammad and Ali and advocates the use of ijtihad to adopt Islamic doctrine to the requirements of modern society. In many other instances, however, he has argued that his own interpretations were more in tune with Islamic law than those of Khomeini. The terminology that Shari'atmadari uses to describe his ideals indicates the wide ideological gulf between himself and Khomeini. Shari'atmadari advocates the establishment of the "modern Islamic state"9 and the application of Islamic laws in a "correct (sahih) and progressive (moteraqqi) mode."*10 Like Abduh, he advocates the use of "intellect (aql) and logic (mantiq)" in the understanding and application of Islamic law.11 Shari'atmadari's Islamic republic would be "like other," but since it would have a majority of Muslims, would be natural for it to have "an Islamic orientation

SHI'ITE

LEADERSHIP

any it

123

to how " Furthermore, "there would be limits (jahatgiri). While Khomeini concan go."'l2 far even such an orientation advosiders Islam the only source of law, Shari'atmadari of Islam cates an "Islamic order" in which the "principles he adds, "The ideal Elsewhere, are [only] respected."13 in no doubt worthy of imitation state of Medina is still but this does not mean that we ignore all many aspects, that have come to the world during the 1400 the innovations challenging Implicitly years since the advent of Islam."'14 of imam and Khomisuse of the title Khomeini's supporters' with the advent of Iscomparison of the revolution meini's makes it clear that, in his view, the lam, Shari'atmadari from the times of would be very different Islamic republic "They were God's appointed representthe Prophet and Ali: "whereas now, no Prophet or imam he stresses, atives," state will be an orthe leader of the [Islamic] exists; and dismissed by other men."'5 dinary man, elected views fully correspond with those of Shari'atmadari's in the Khomeini groups collaborating most of the political Mehdi Bazargan, for example, pointed out upon coalition. that modern Iran was tohis appointment as prime minister "What in the era of the Prophet: tally unlike the society happened in Medina happened ... in the middle of a desert and in the mist of time." 16 But now, he added, the principles of the Prophet and Ali would have to be "adjusted to the Limitations on the of the current era.",17 requirements of "return of Islam" were also favored by close associates Thus, Ibrahim Yazdi spoke of a new constitution Khomeini. "drawing on the law of Islam in the light of contemporary Sadeq Qotbzadeh spoke of a constitution culture."118 "founded on Islam, taking into account the human needs of the modern world."19

Different

Approaches

Toward Democracy

the main goal of the According to Shari'atmadari, movement against the shah was to end dictatoriopposition a democracy based on the will of al rule and to establish For him, the the people in the light of Islamic law.20 above all, implementation term edalat implied, (justice)

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Khomeini, on the other hand, reof political democracy. The concern for as the main goal. gards social justice was central to his view. (mostaz'efin) the dispossessed of democin their understanding Moreover, the two differed the term "reracy. According to Khomeini's philosophy, public" does not contain the Western democratic associaRather, it reflected of the people. tions of sovereignty intentions. In fact, his ideology could his antimonarchist and sovereignty of the people's lead to the expropriation to the will of God, as interpreted its subordination by faqih (the The terms velayat-e the faqih (theologian). (Islamic governor hukumat-e Islami rule of theologians) ment), which Khomeini prefers to use, express his innermost new term jomhuriyyat-e thoughts better than the relatively In his view, the ideal regime Islami (Islamic republic). but this does not mean European parwould be constitutional, Rather, the power of the ruler would liamentary government. by the Quran and be limited "by the conditions elucidated the Sunna."*21 Even the Majles will not be engaged in enbut rather it will be an actment of laws (qanungozari), institution.22 (barnamehrizi) "agenda-setting" of republic Shari'atmadari's is much closer conception to that found in Western democracies. Like Khomeini, he of Allah and legal regards law-making as the prerogative of the religious leaderas the prerogative interpretation wider responsibility to the people ship, but he offers In his view: "The themselves in deciding their path. by the government of God is the government of the people, "Islamic regime... is a democratic regime based people."23 on the people's will. It is the government of the people, for the people and against dictatorship and despotism."24 In the Aslamic state, he said, "the people are the sovermeans that there would be no eign." "Islamic republic will the people themselves dictatorship and no despotism, have the sovereignty to decide their path."26 In the deleadcision-making process as well as inside the religious of consultaership, he demands that the Islamic principle ideologies.27 tion be applied among groups of divergent advocates the granting Shari'atmadari From this premise, of full freedom of activity groups, even to all political like the communists, who challenge the religious those,

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"I would prefer not to see communist repreestablishment: in the Council [of experts to review the sitting sentatives they must be tolare elected, but if...they constitution] erated.",28

Clerical

Involvement

in Day-to-Day

Politics

to their divergent approaches to democracy, Parallel in their approach to the involvement the two also differ such Khomeini advocates politics. in day-to-day of clerics In fact, duty. and regards it as a clerical an involvement Khoof the velayat-e his idea is re-establishment faqih. view, loyal to the orthodox Shilite meini remains strictly and last imam went inwhich claims that, since the twelfth and until his reappearin the ninth century, to occulation ance, all temporal rulers are to be regarded as usurpers. source are the only legitimate In the meantime, the clerics questions. as well as temporal, of authority on spiritual, and state as alien of religion the separation He rejects however, advocates Shari'atmadari, of Islam. to the spirit be limited politics in day-to-day that clerical involvement and supervision. instruction, of guidance, only to functions and fundamental role of the reIn his view, "the cardinal is to safeguard Islam and justice... leadership ligious they should [only] adopt a guiding and instruc[therefore] whose role is a spirtive role." 29 "Members of the clergy, .we of state.. in affairs itual one, should not interfere with regard to those in power.",30 will act as attorneys does, however, allow for two circumstances Shari'atmadari (a) "when duty to step in: in which it would be the clerics' of Islam, the a law has been enacted against the interests and (b) when "no authority" people or the constitution"; inallies, In this regard, Khomeini's political exists.31 found their views correspondassociates, cluding his closest than to those to those of Shari'atmadari ing more closlly of Khomeini. contradict Moreover, these views of Khomeini clearly in the leadership the conceptions held by the religious who supported the consticlerics Even the activist past. tutional movement at the beginning of the century had held

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imam" a s "presently "the rule of the infallible impossible" and had supported a temporal constitutional regime, provided it "corresponds with religion and limits the king's dictatorship."33 To secure this goal, the 1907 constitution provided for the formation of a committee of at least to review laws passed by the Majles five mojtaheds entitled and to determine whether they were in conformity with the religious law (shari'a). If they were not, the committee had the authority to veto them.34 More strikingly, even Khomeini himself, in his early writings, did not demand the concentration of all political authority in the clergy. In his book Kashf al-Asrar (Revealing of the Secrets), he dealt with the question of "government" (hukumat) but did not raise any of the issues marking the thrust of his ideology in the 1970s. On the contrary, his arguments were much more typical of those raised during the constitutional revolution and of those of Shari'atmadari. Thus, for example, he stated: "We do not claim that the government (hukumat) should be in the hands of the theologian (faqih) " but that the government should act "according to the divine law" and that the religious leadership should have "supervision (nezarat) over the legislative and the executive branches of the Islamic state. "35 In fact, in his book Khomeini echoed the "traditionalist" idea, at least a century old, that the ulama should advise rulers but not rule directly. The views he presently expresses are unprecedented in Shi'ite of the last centuries.36 theories The Fate

of

the

Monarchy

The limitations Shari'atmadari imposes on clerical interference in day-to-day politics, his nationalistic-Iranand his cooperation ist with the shah's regime, ideology, combined to mold his attitude to the institution of the monarchy, in many instances contradicting Khomeini's. The latter categorically rejects the monarchy, arguing that its basic principles--dynastic and ceremonial succession trappings--contradict the spirit of Islam. In his view: "The monarchic system contradicts the principles of government and political organization of Islam."37 Shari'atmadari, on the other hand, does not regard the abolition of the

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The mere replacement of the monarchy per se as a goal. he argues, would be meaningless, monarchy by a republic, unless the action were complemented by full democratizaWhat is most important in his view is the impletion. of and the safeguarding mentation of the constitution Shari'atmadari Prior to the shah's exile, democracy.38 "It is not the form preference: declared his political but the way it behaves."39 of government that is important, "We [only] saying: the target of the revolution He described to be replaced by true democracy. "40 Rewant dictatorship lating to this issue as late as May 1979 (after the abolishhe still ment of the monarchy was approved by a plebiscite), "During the phase in which we were held the same opinion: the of the] constitution, demanding the [implementation shah's throne was not a subject of discussion....[However] the guarantee of our if we could make the constitution would have lost the shah's authority interests, people's its raison d'etre."i41 emphasized that he considrepeatedly Shari'atmadari to be the enforcement ered the main goal of the revolution legitimized This constitution of the 1906 constitution. Shari'atthe monarchy, but granted it only limited powers. of the with the mere reactivation madari would be satisfied for a board of five providing clause in the constitution laws contraand invalidate mojtaheds to review legislation Islamic precepts. dicting to explore the at this juncture, It would be useful, about the monarchy held by the Iranievolving conceptions and even more Shi'ite mojtaheds, Traditionally, an ulama. as an antidote rule temporal so Sunnite ulama, supported cenSome mojtaheds began, in the seventeenth to anarchy. superior to the shah's. legitimacy tury, to claim a political Moreaccepted.42 Their views, however, were not universally involved in the Tobacco Conover, Khomeini's predecessors did not attack Revolution and the Constitutional cession but as only wished to of such, monarchy, the institution limit the power of the monarch and force him to follow the became the preThis gradually of the mojtaheds. counsels Moreover, in 1924, the foremost oppositiondominant idea. al alim, Ayatollah Sayyed Hasan Modarres, led an ulamaIRANIAN STUDIES

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sponsored campaign against Reza Khan's proposal for a rewhich the ulama identified public, with the secularizing of Kemal Ataturk. policies Even more strikingly, Khomeini himself, in his earlier writings and speeches, did not reject the institution of monarchy as un-Islamic. His book Kashf al-Asrar, which was written following the abdication of Reza Shah, was not a firm denunciation of monarchy, but rather a stinging attack against and against Reza Shah's autocratic secularism rule. In this book, Khomeini even undertook a mild defense of the monarchical system.43 It was onlv in the early 1960s, and more clearly after the 1971 celebration of the 2500th anniversary of the monarchy, that Khomeini formed his antimonarchical conceptions.44 Even so, until January 1978 Khomeini seemed always careful not to demand the overthrow of the shah.45

Iranian

Nationalism

Versus

Pan-Islam

Khomeini and Shari'atmadari differ also in their approaches to the questions of Iran's national and identity its relation to the Muslim world. The fundamentalist view held by Khomeini extends far beyond the borders of Iran; it embraces pan-Islamic motifs and aims at the attainment of an Islamic unity that would enable Muslims to play the role ordained for them in human history. Khomeini defines himself not as an "Iranian," but as a "Muslim," and regards the revolution in Iran as only the first stage in a "comprehensive Islamic revolution." The very concept of nationalism is alien to him, opposed to his ideology, and viewed by him as an "imperialist plot" to weaken Islam. According to Khomeini, "Imperialism has divided our [Muslim] motherland and transformed the Muslims into nations (shu'ub)." After World War I, the imperialist powers set up a number of states in the Middle East headed by "lackeys" whose true function was to serve the interests of their imIn his view: perialist bosses. "Muslims are one family, even if they live in regions remote from each other .... This is the important and basic point, this is the strategy. t46 He added: "Our movement is for an Islamic goal, SHI'ITE

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not for Iran alone... .Iran has [only] been the starting point'' should join the "Muslim revolution."47 Other Muslim societies of Muslim unity was incorporated Khomeini's doctrine of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Arinto the constitution 11 and 152 to 155 stipulate that "all Muslims" are ticles "one nation" (ummah) and that the government should exert "the political, economic, to realize "continuous efforts" His denial of unity of the Islamic world."48 and cultural in Iran-minorities the existence of ethnic or linguistic of deand in fact in the Muslim world--and his rejection on mands for local autonomy, springs from his insistence with foreign correspondents In an interview Muslim unity. the approval of the new constiin December 1979--following of such minorities-the existence tution which disregarded he explained: is used to refer to Sometimes, the word minorities Bapeople such as the Kurds, Lurs, Turks, Persians, luchis and such. These people should not be called because this term assumes that there is minorities, In Islam, such a difference between these brothers. a difference has no place at all. There is no diflanguages, ference between Muslims who speak different It is very the Arabs or the Persians. for instance, probable that such problems have been created by to be those who do not wish the Muslim countries united... .They create the issues of nationalism, of Pan-Iranism, pan-Turkish and such isms, which are contrary to Islamic doctrines. Their plan is to destroy Islam and the Islamic philosophy.49 Shari'atmadari's point of departure is an Iranist one. Like Khomeini, he attaches primary importance to Musconcern over the fate of other lim identity and expresses His ideology, however, lacks pan-IsMuslim communities. Shari'atmadari On the contrary, regards lamic motives. and Islam as the cohesive element of Iranian nationalism of Iran's nationthe main instrument in the strengthening soveral unity, as well as in safeguarding its national and democratic points of view, as His Iranist eignty.50 joined to shape his ethnicity, well as his Azerbaijani IRANIAN STUDIES

130

not support for "local rights" (ekhtiyarat-e dakheli)--but within for separatism--for the various ethnic minorities, the "general unity and monolithic of Iran.5' solidarity" "All of Iran's peoples have the right to auIn his view: and the tonomy within the framework of the unity, integrity independence of the Islamic Republic [of Iran].",52 However, until the country is safely out of revolutionary upheaval, Shari'atmadari would postpone granting local autonomy, thus He told his Azerbaijani avoiding divisive regionalism.53 compatriots in August 1979, that "the autonomy seekers" should delay their demands "until the government is fully he continued, "is part and parstabilized." "Azerbaijan," cel of Iran, and what is important at present is.. .the is"54 Shari'atmasue of Iran and its territorial integrity. to those of the central dari's views are much closer political parties than are Khomeini's. and the intellectuals Thus, for example, nationalism is regarded as an ideal by the National Front (as the name of the Front itself indicates), which sees the revolution as a movement of national, not religious revival, and regards religion as an im- 55 portant instrument for the forging of Iranian nationalism. Yazdi, formerly one of Khomeini's closest associates, dein Iran as "an exclusive fined the revolution product of of "exportthe Iranian people" and disavowed any intention ing" it.56 With the outbreak of the war with Iraq, he said that Islam and nationalism are "two sides of the same coin."

Khomeini did not completely Iranian nationdisregard alism in his early writings. Thus, for example, he directed his appeal to his readers, in the concluding page of Kashf al-Asrar, to his "dear compatriots" (ham-mihanan) , "young lovers of Iran" (Irandust) and "Iranians who desire for of the new the accession glory. "57 Moreover, following naregime, Khomeini himself adopted, on several occasions, the demands of the tionalist standpoints. He disregarded United Arab Emirates for the return of the three islands on the continued use captured by the shah in 1971, insisted of the name, the "Persian Gulf" (and even rejected Ayatollah Khalkhali's proposal to name it the "Muslim Gulf"),58 and disqualified Jalal al-Din Farsi's candidacy for the on the ground that his father had held an Afghan presidency and therefore he was not of "Iranian origin" nationality, SHI'ITE

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With the outbreak of by the constitution. as stipulated the war with Iraq in September 1980, Khomeini himself again In with religious--terminology. used nationalist--coupled leaders and Majles representatives a speech to religious late in September 1980, he said that "the honor and the (din) are glory of the homeland (mihan) and the religion He added that the homeland is exdependent on this war." "We pecting its sons to fight its enemy, and promised: of the soil of Iran (Iranzamin) shall fight the attackers until death. "59 for our beloved homeland (mihan-e aziz)

From Ideological Confrontation

Differences

to Political

led some of The moderate views held by Shari'atmadari to reproach him for being a associates Khomeini's closest Such accusa"puppet" of the shah and the United States.60 at the end of 1979, most frequently tions were reiterated the constitutional concerning the confrontation following in Qom issue.61 On January 4, 1980, Khomeini's adherents that Shari'atmadari was "an leaflets alleging distributed near his agent" of SAVAKand the CIA. While demonstrating like the house, they chanted that it was a "nest of spies, folShari'atmadari's occupied U.S. embassy in Tehran.",62 not hesitating to launch an issuelowers reacted strongly, They as well as ad hominem, attack on Khomeini. oriented, the status he acquired as the sole leader of the criticized for his fellow ayatollahs and inhis disregard revolution, exclusive of their views, and his increasingly tolerance the divine law. role in interpreting however, tried themselves, Khomeini and Shari'atmadari withor at least minimize, their differences to overlook, Khomeini, eventually out giving up any of their own goals. in a shrewd and cunpower, tried, fearing his colleague's to him. Shari'atmadari's opposition ning way, to neutralize in matdenied any disparity Shari'atmadari Astonishingly, The difbetween himself and Khomeini. ters of principle and stemmed he asserted, were only "tactical" ferences, for from the fact that he bore the brunt of responsibility in exwas Khomeini vis-a-vis the shah while the faithful IRANIAN

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ile. Thus, in October "Our demands are the 1978, he said: the differences same. '63 in their Explaining he policies, later added: "When you are outside the frames of a dictait is easy to be radical, torial regime but wihen you are of rifles exposed to threats one naturally and bullets, must adopt different tactics.",64 He took the same stance when disagreements between into violent conthe two developed between their in December 1979: frontations "Mr. supporters

Khomeini and I are friends meini there is an absolute kamel)

and allies"; "between me and Khounity [of opinion] (etehad-e

..6S

Despite expressions of solidarity, Shari'atmadari continued to advocate ideas that often directly opposed those of Khomeini. were clearly Such differences noticed through-

out the revolutionary process, during which Shari'atmadari always adopted more moderate stands and even voiced willingness--under certain circumstances--to accept a compromise with the shah.66 Wlith the formation of the conciliatory government of Ja'far Sharif-Emami (August 1978), Shari'atmadari agreed to grant it an "extension" of two to three months, against Khomeini's will, to prove its intentions.67 When Bakhtiyar's was formed early government in January was not unequivocal, and 1979, his opposition had been willing it seems likely that Shari'atmadari to go along with Bakhtiyar's plan for a constitutional monarchy.68 Moreover, in late 1978, the shah still contacts maintained with him, hoping to work out a solution whereby the shah would reign but not rule.69 of the new regime, Following the formation Shari'atmadari continued to voice his position, thus presenting Khomeini with a most serious from within challenge the reThe following ligious leadership. shed light on examples the scope of these and their differences political consequences: Shari'atmadari was strongly to Khomeini's inopposed in day-to-day terference as wvell as to the actipolitics of the extragovernmental vities bodies under his operating He accused these auspices. bodies--the of the revcouncil the revolutionary olution, committees, the guardians of SHI' ITE

LEADERSHIP

1 33

the revolution, and the revolutionary courts--of stripping the government of most of its powers and turning it into a "knife without a blade.",70 Making clear his bitterness over not being consulted nor informed in advance of their decisions, he said in late May 1979: "I myself do not know who the members of the Council of the Revolution are."'71 Significantly, he opposed the philosophical underpinnings of these bodies as well as the ideology of Khomeini himself. While the latter wanted to keep popular "revolutionary zeal" alive, Shari'atmadari, along with the cabinet (headed by Mehdi Bazargan), wanted to end it immediately after coming to power and concentrate, instead, on running the administration.72 At the early stage of the new regime's rule, Shari'atmadari voiced opposition to Khomeini's undemocratic modus With regard to the referendum (held on March 30operandi. 31, 1979) to decide the fate of the regime, Shari'atmadari (although then an advocate of an Islamic republic), demanded a free choice. Instead of asking one question: "Are you in favor of an Islamic republic?" (thus leaving the voters to either reply in the affirmative or in the Shari'atmadari negative), demanded more options to choose from.73 Shari'atmadari expressed resentment over the way the revolutionary courts imposed "Islamic justice." With the of the shah's regime in February 1979, he published collapse an announcement demanding humanitarian treatment: "We should not forget Islamic ethics and confuse dispensing with uncontrolled justice emotions."74 Later, he criticized the executions and the procedures adopted by the revolutionary courts, complaining that they created an atmosphere of insecurity and fear. He demanded the classification and publication of offenses and the and penalties clarification of offenses on which the death sentence could be imposed. Death sentences, he stipulated, should be restricted and applied only in those cases involving killing, or ordering killing. arHe demanded a ban on arbitrary of habeas corpus, and the right rests, the availability to counsel for the accused. The procedures being practiced, he claimed, were contrary to Islamic precepts of justice, IRANIAN

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134

as well as the government's reconstruction. 5

attempts

to promote national

to the seizure of In November he voiced opposition it an "un-Ishostages at the American embassy, labeling "If I had been in Khomeini's position, lamic action": such a thing would not have happened." He went on to say of the shah "is not such an esthat even the extradition sential matter."176 Toward the end of 1979, the differences the dividing further sharpened and turned into a violent two ayatollahs conflict verging on civil war. The immediate cause of this Shari'atconflict was the approval of the new constitution. madari saw no need for a new constitution, and when he felt it was too late to suggest a constitutional monarchy, he argued that "it would be better to retain the previous constitution and just omit the articles relating to the monarchical regime."77 Later, the question arose as to how the constitution would be finalized. Khomeini insisted upon a consultative committee of 45 individuals, while Shari'atmadari demanded the election of a constituent assembly to a Council of Exbe composed os 275 deputies. Finally, to perts (Shoray-e Khebregan) composed of 75 was elected finalize the draft constitution already prepared by the council of the revolution. When the Council of Experts (the majority of whose members were Khomeini backers) published the final version of the constitution, it became clear that rather than amending the constitution, the council had rewritten it to incorporate Khomeini's version of Velayat-e faqih.78 scorned the articles Shari'atmadari undiluted vesting powers on the clerics, claiming that the people's sovereignty was being expropriated. Explaining his decision to boycott the plebiscite to approve the constitution (held on December 2, 1979), he said: "It is inadmissible for an article of the constitution to enshrine the principle that the power is embodied in the nation [articles 5 and for other articles 56]...and [4, 5 and 110) to take the power from the people and entrust it to a few individuals.,"79 He also demanded that the constitution guarantee SHI' ITE LEADERSHIP

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autonomy for the ethnic minorities. Most of the centrist political groupings, and the ethnic minorities, as well as some senior ayatollahs, supported Shari'atmadari. The conflict between Khomeini and Shari'atmadari now turned into a violent confrontation between their followers. The use of force by the revolutionary guards to disperse a rally in support of Shari'atmadari in Qom on December 5, 1979, marked the beginning of a series of violent clashes between the supporters of Khomeini and Shari'atuntil early January 1980. madari, lasting Violent protests against Khomeini took place throughout Azerbaijan, especially in its capital, Tabriz. Supporters of Shari'atmadari, led by the Islamic People's Republican Party, seized the Tabriz radio station and broadcast appeals for solidarity with their leader. Tens of thousands of people paraded through the streets to demonstrate their devotion to Shari'atmadari, shouting: "We are your soldier, Shari'atmadari, " and, "Death to Khomeini." They asserted that rather than Khomeini, was "the leader of Shari'atmadari, the world's Shi'ite Muslims."80 Khomeini responded with a mixture of appeasement (playing on Shari'atmadari's to be drawn into confrontation) known reluctance and strongarm tactics. In a conciliatory gesture, Khomeini himself went to Shari'atmadari to express regret over the murder of his close associate. But when he failed to re-establish calm, he ordered the crushing of his opponents with force. Shari'atmadari refrained Subsequently, from making political statements. According to most reports, he was virtually under house arrest. routine in the conThroughout 1979, the following frontation between the two repeated itself: Shari'atmadari Khomeini's policies criticized and his followers demonstrated support, but the threat of direct confrontation caused him to recant. Throughout this period, Shari'atmadari was neither capable of,nor determined to, seriously challenge Khomeini. His withdrawal quieted his followers and he eventually yielded to Khomeini's dictates. While it is still not entirely clear what occasioned Shari'atmadari's avoidance of a direct confrontation with two factors--apart from Khomeini's Khomeini, the following IRANIAN STUDIES

136

nature--seem shrewdness and Shari 'atmadari 's conciliatory there was the exhis decision. First, to have influenced his Throughout the revolution, tent of Khomeini's power. status as the leader of the movement had been unquestionof his own supthe swelling During 1979, despite able. Khomeini as seems to have evaluated port, Shari'atmadari late in 1979, In fact, more powerful than himself. still enjoyed the backing of many politicians, Khomeini still He was also among them Banisadr, Yazdi, and Qotbzadeh. supported by the Tudeh Party, the Council of Revolution, (such as Beheshti and Khalayatollahs and many radical suphad the enthusiastic he still khali) and, above all, Shari'atmadari Noting this support, port of the masses. between was undoubtedly aware that a direct confrontation prospect war--a civil and would threaten Khomeini himself of Khomeini' s implementation more dangerous than the initial attempt by He was not unmindful of a possible policies. nor of the potential such conflicts, the left to exploit Late in November integrity. danger to Iran's national told a Spanish newspaper correspond1979, Shari'atmadari ent: "I have my opinion about what is happening [now in is .My silence it... the country] but I am not expressing due to the fact that I think there might be a split."'81 for Shari'atmadari's The second element accounting proba credibility may be, in essence, apparent timidity collabolem. A stigma has attached to him for allegedly Coupled with rating with the shah and the United States. for status, this has made it difficult hi s ethnic-minority effectively. Khomeini's authority him to challenge

The Prospect

for

the

Ideological

Struggle

politmost of the centrist At this time of writing, as well as other movements opposing Khoical groupings, power meini, seem to have lost faith in Shari'atmadari's beKhomeini's authority. In the competition to challenge Khomeini has won. Howtween the two leading ayatollahs, clear that the fundamentalist ever, it is not entirely in the long run, dominate the ideology of Khomeini will, moderation is unShari'atmadari's Shi'ite leadership. SH r' ITE

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doubtedly more "traditional" than Khomeini's radicalism. Moreover, it has noticeable support within the ranks of the leading mojtaheds of Iran, a fact which is of crucial importance today when the first stirring of a "war of succession" can be noticed. Khomeini's successor, if he is to be the heir to his spiritual authority, should obviously come from among the ayatollah ozzam. Significantly, at present no member of this small group (probably only six) could be regarded as completely loyal to Khomeini, either personally or ideologically. His committed followers--many of them his former students--are of the second or even the third rank. Most of them are hojjatdislams (i.e., below the rank of ayatollah), others are ayatollahs (some of them acquired the title only during the revolution), but none belong to ozzam circle. the ayatollah Although they now hold key political posts, they are in no position to claim succession to leadership by virtue of their standing as clerics and scholars. The highest-ranking cleric from among Khomeini's personal followers is Ayatollah Hosayn Ali Montazeri. Recently, Khomeini and his followers took pains to strengthen Montazeri's position by making it apparent that he was being groomed for the succession. In September 1979, he was appointed imam jom'eh of Tehran and in May 1980, in recognition of his growing spiritual he was appointed leadership, imam jom'eh of Qom. Thereafter, the radical clerics began to address him as ayatollah ozma. Montazeri lacks Khomeini's religious and falls far short of his authority political it is, however, still shrewdness; questionable whether Montazeri's would be acceptable to the authority ayatollah ozzam. Among the latter, Sayyed Abol-Qasem Kho'i, residing in Iraq, has been in sharp open conflict with Khomeini. The three others--Sayyed Shehab al-Din Mar'ashi MohammadReza Musavi Golpaygani, and Abdollah Najafi, Shirazi occupy middle ground between Khomeini and Shari'atmadari. Even among other prominent ayatollahs who do not of ayatollah hold the title ozma, such as Ayatollah Qomi Tabataba'i, support for Khomeini is not unequivocal.

IRANIAN STUDIES

138

It seems quite unlikely that Khomeini's supporters will be able to find an acceptable successor who could elicit the same degree of public support as Khomeini. The testing ground will be the coming personal, as well as ideological, "war of succession" within the religious leadership.

NOTES

1.

Nikki R. Keddie, "Origins of the Religious-Radical in Iran," Past and Present, liances No. 34 (July 70. p.

2.

Shari'atmadari (aged 77) is a Turkish-speaking native of Azerbaijan. In the early 1940s he moved to Qom and gradually established himself as one of the most promiFrom 1970 to Khomeini's return, nent mojtaheds. he was the highest-ranking mojtahed in Iran.

3.

David Menashri, "Strange Bedfellows: The Khomeini Coalition," The Jerusalem Quarterly, No. 12 (Summer 1979), pp. 34-48. For the chronicle of the crisis in Iran, and the different position adopted by the two, see: "Iran" in Colin Legum (ed.), Middle East Contemporary Survey, Vol. II, 1977-78 (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1979), pp. 463-512, Vol. III, 1978-79, pp. 488-558; Vol. IV, 1979-80, in print.

4.

On the changes in Islam, Shi'ite as well as Sunnite, as related to sociopolitical circumstances, see: Nikki R. Keddie, "Iran: Change in Islam; Islam in Change," International of Middle East Studies Journal II (1980), pp. 527-542.

5.

In 1960-61, a number of religious leaders contributed papers to a seminar on selection and functions of the marja'e taqlid. The papers were published in Tehran in 1962: Bahsi dar Bar-ye Marja'iyyat va Rohaniyyat. These were discussed by Ann K. S. Lambton in: "A Reof the Position consideration of the Marja' al-taqlid and the Religious Institution," Studia Islamica XXr (1965), pp. 115-135.

SHI'ITE

LEADERSHIP

Al1966),

139

6.

on the differences For more information of the bases of power between the Shi'ite and Sunnite ulama and their political in Iranian history, implications see: Leonard Binder, "The Proofs of Islam: Religion and in Iran," in George Makdisi (ed.), Politics Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of Hamilton A. R. Gibb (Leiden: Brill, 1965), pp. 113-140; Nikkie R. Keddie, "The Roots of the Ulama's Power in Iran," in Nikkie R. Saints and Sufis: Keddie (ed.), Scholars, Muslim Rein the Middle East since 1500 Institutions ligious of California (Berkeley: University Press, 1972), pp. 211-229; Hamid Algar, pp. 221-255.

7.

See, for example, Ettela'at, Tehran, February 1, May 31, See also interviews August 29, 1979. with Shari'atmadari in The New Yorker, December 18, 1978; El-Pais,

November 25, as quoted by Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Daily Report, Middle East and North Africa

(DR), November 27,

1979.

8.

Al-Ahram,

9.

Kayhan,

10.

Ettela'at,

May 19 and May 31,

11.

Ettela'at,

May 31,

12.

Kayhan,

Paris

Cairo; Tehran,

December 14, February

1979.

5, 1979. 1979.

1979.

February 5; International (IHT); February 12, 1979.

Herald

Tribune,

13.

Radio Paris,

November 2--DR,

November 2, 1978.

14.

Der Spiegel,

Hamburg, August

27,

15.

See also: Kayhan, February 5, 1979. IHT, October 31, In fact, Shari'atmadari 1978. refrained deliberately from using the term "imam Khomeini" and preferred the or just "mister." term "ayatollah"

16.

Le Figaro,

IRANIAN STUDIES

Paris,

January

1978.

1979.

140

17.

Elevatherotipia, ary 8, 1979.

18.

Al-Hawadith,

19.

Ettela'at,

20.

Kayhan,

January

Athens,

Beirut, January

February

January 24,

7, 1979; DR, Febru-

26, 1979.

1979.

February 24; Agence France Presse 28, 1979; DR, January 30, 1979.

(AFP), Paris,

21.

Ruhollah Khomeini, al-Hukumah al-Islamiyyeh (n.p. 1970), pp. 41-2. of lectures A collection given by Khomeini to theological students at Najaf, Iraq in the late 1960s.

22.

Ibid., See also: Shahrough Akhavi, Religion p. 53. and Politics in Contemporary Iran: ReClergy-State lations in the Pahlavi Period (New York: State Uni-

versity 23.

of NY, 1980),

The New Yorker,

May 19,

p. 169.

December 18,

1978; Kayhan and Ettela'at

1979.

24.

Kayhan, January

2S.

Ettela'at,

May 31,

1979.

26.

Ettela'at,

January 1978.

28,

1979.

See also:

1979;

Le Monde,

August 31,

24,

1979.

Ettela'at,

27.

Ettela'at, 1979.

January

28,

28.

Ettela'at,

May 31,

1979.

29.

Radio Tehran, July 30, 1979; British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Summary of World Broadcasts, the Middle East and Africa, Similar views are August 1, 1979. in an interview expressed with Shari'atmadari in: Ettela'at, January 28, February 1 and 5, May 19, 1979; Kayhan, May 19, 1979; al-Watan, Kuwait, May 25, 1979.

SHII'ITE

LEADERSHIP

Paris,

July

141

17,

42.

Keddie,

43.

Khomeini, Kashf al-Asrar, havi, pp. 163-164.

44.

Millward shows that Khomeini defended constitutional monarchy until 1963: William Millward, "The Islamic Political Theory and Vocabulary of Ayatollah Khomeini, 1941-1963. " Paper delivered at Middle East Studies Association Conference, Salt Lake City, Utah, 1970, in preparation for publication, as cited in Keddie, Islam

Islam

in

in

Change,

pp.

Change,

p.

531-532.

pp. 221-288.

See also,

Ak-

541.

45.

Akhavi,

46.

pp. 34-37, al-Mustaqbal, Paris, Khomeini., op. cit., January 13, 1979; al-Safir, January 18 and 19, 1979.

47.

Radio Tehran,

48.

The full text of the constitution November 17, 1979.

49.

Radio Tehran,

50.

Ettela'at,

51.

Radio Tehran,

52.

Le Monde, July 17, 1979. Similarly, see his interviews: Ettela'at, May 31, August 14, 1979; Bamdad, December 3, 1979.

53.

Ettela'at, May 31, 1979; Cam.bio 16, Madrid, 1979; DR, December 28, 1979.

54.

Radio Tehran,

55.

Melli See, for example, Khabarnameh-ye Jebheh-ye (organ of the National Front), No. 7 (October 30, 1978); No. 21 and 22 (November 21 and 22, 1978).

p. 167.

IRANIAN STUDIES

May 7, 1979; DR, May 8,

December 17,

August July

14, 30,

1979.

is given

1979;

by Kayhan,

BBC, December 19,

1979.

1979. 1979;

August 14,

BBC, August

1979;

1, 1979.

December 23,

BBC, August 15,

1979.

142

56.

Radio Tehran, May 10, June 19, July 17, 1979; DR, May14, June 20, 1979; BBC, July 19, 1979; The Guardian, September 18, IHT, October 5, 1979.

57.

Khomeini,

58.

Kayhan,

59.

Ettela'at,

60.

Al-Safir,

61.

The Guardian

62.

The Guardian,

63.

KIT, October

64.

Ettela'at

65.

Bamdad,

66.

Menashri, 180.

67.

Ettela'at,

68.

Upon his nomination, Bakhtiyar claimed that he had the support of "nine out of ten ayatollahs" who, although favoring a compromise with the shah along the lines he proposed, did not dare to openly defy Khomeini. Shari'atmadari, whose "support" Bakhtiyar was claimto Bakhing, neither expressed unequivocal opposition tiyar's government nor spoke in its support. Even though he was compelled to deny statements by Bakhtiyar that could have implied a measure of support for his government, Shari'atmadari still managed not to come out clearly against it.

Kashf

al-Asrar,

May 29,

p.

334.

1979.

September January

29,

18-20,

1980. 1979.

and DT, December 11 and 12, January 31,

1979.

5, 1980.

1978.

and Kayhan, February 5, 1979. For similar expressions, see: AFP, October 28, 1978; DR, October 30, 1978; Ettela'at, February 1 and May 31, 1979; alWatan, May 25, 1979.

SHI ' ITE

December 8, MECS, Vol.

September

LEADERSHIP

1979. III,

pp. 497-501;

Akhavi,

pp. 171-

3, 1978.

143

30.

Le Monde,

31.

The Guardian,

32.

See the views of the National Front, Iranian Association of Jurists, the National Democratic Front, and the Freedom Movement (all expressed at the time they were cooperating still with Khomeini) appearing in: Bamdad, Tehran, November 27, 28, 30, 1979; The Guardian, November 30, 1979; NYT, December 2, 1979.

33.

Abdul-Hadi Hairi, Shi'ism and Constitutionalism Iran (Leiden: Brill, 1977), pp. 102, 235.

34.

of the constitution The relevant article "It reads: is hereby declared that it is for the learned doctors of theology to determine whether (the mojtaheds)... such laws as may be proposed are or are not comfortable to the rules of Islam, and that it is therefore officially enacted that (for the purpose of such review) there shall at all times exist a committee composed of not less than five mojtaheds or other devoted For English text see: Edward G. Browne, theologians." A Brief Narrative of-Recent Events in Persia (London, 1959), pp. 87-101.

35.

Ayatollah Ruhollah first Zafar, 1979:

36.

Keddie,

37.

Khomeini,

38.

Der Spiegel,

July

Islam op.

31, September 39.

Kayhan

40.

AFP, October

41.

Al-Watan,

IRANIAN

17,

London, May 18, 1979.

in cit.,

Khomeini, Kashf al-Asrar in 1943/44), published

Change,

p.

p. 12.

in

(Tehran: pp. 232-233.

536.

See also,

Akhavi,

p. 163.

August 27, 1978; Ettela'at, August 29 and 1 and 3, 1978; IHT, October 31, 1978.

International,

STUDIES

1979.

28,

May 25,

Tehran

(KI),

1978; DR, October

October 31,

31,

1978.

1978.

1979.

144

69.

Ha'aretz,

70.

Kayhan,

14,

May 19,

1979;

1979; Le Monde, , May 30,

71.

Ettela'at

72.

Radio Tehran,

73.

Cumhuriyet,

74.

Radio Tehran,

75.

Kayhan,

El Pais,

December 14,

Tel Aviv,

May 18,

Ettela'at,

17,

July

1978. 12 and

August

1979.

1979.

September March 16,

February

May 13 and 19,

November 25,

15, 1979.

1979; DR, September

14, 1979.

14,

1979; DR, February

13, 1979;

The

Guardian,

May 18,

1979; DR, November 27,

1979. 1979;

1979. 1979; al-

76.

El Pais, November 25, 1979; DR, November 27, Ahram, December 14, 1979.

77.

Radio Tehran,

78.

between the draft of the differences For an analysis see Menashand the final version of the constitution, ri, MECS, Vol. III, pp. 522-524 and Vol. IV (in print).

79.

Cambio

1979. East,

80.

July

30,

1979; DR, August

1, 1979.

16, Madrid, December 23, 1979; DR, December 28, See also: Bamdad, December 8, 1979; The Middle January 1980.

Radio Tehran,

December 6,

1979;

BBC, December 8, 1979; 1979;

NYT, December 6, 1979; IHT and DT, December 7, Bamdad, December 8, 1979.

81.

November 25, 1979; DR, November 27, Also quoted in NYT, November 26, 1979.

El-Pais,

SHI 'ITE

LEADERSHIP

1979.

145

Iranian Studies, Volume XIII, Nos. 1-4, 1980

The State and Khomeini's Islamic Order Said Amir Arjomand

Iran on September 22, The Iraqi invasion of southwestern one of the though not reversed, 1980, appears to have halted, Khomeini's in modern history: experiments most intriguing in which the state is attempt to create a Shi'ite theocracy subordinated to the clergy and its powers are drastotally of the is an analysis What follows tically circumscribed. and of the way it of this attempt, foundations theoretical has been carried out in practice. analysis

devoted In the chapter of Economy and Society problem, Weber states: of the church-state

to the

charisma is stronger than poWhenever hierocratic it seeks to degrade it, if it does authority litical power Since political not appropriate it outright. claims a competing charisma of its own, it may be nade to appear as the work of Satan.1 chafor the strength of hierocratic The precondition risma is its autonomy, an autonomy which the world religions but which does not always of salvation grant in principle I have Elsewhere, translation. find adequate institutional Shi'ism argued that the most important feature distinguishing and reof political from Sunnite Islam is the separation

at of Sociology Professor Said Amir Arjomand is Assistant of New York at Stony Brook and Fellow the State University Oxford. of St. Antony's College, 147

ligious authority, and the corresponding autonomy of the religious institution from the state. This separation could, under a number of circumstances, induce a negative of political evaluation charisma on the part of the men of religion. This negative evaluation of political power by religious authorities could, in theory, manifest itself in at least two distinct manners, (1) pious withdrawal from the political sphere and indifference towards politics; (2) active endeavor to subjugate political power and subject the political sphere to ethico-hierocratic regulation. Comparative history teaches us that once the separation of political and hierocratic domination has been established, given the indisputable superiority of God over earthly powers, theocratic monism is but a further logical step which could theoretically be taken at any time. In Western Christianity, the separation of hierocratic and political domination on the basis of the "freedom of the Church" was established under Gregory VII (d. 1085). Gregory's arguments for the freedom of the Church already contained the germ of theocratic monism: The Son of God had given Peter and his successors the power to bind and loose souls, a power, that is to say, which is spiritual and heavenly; how much more, then, 2 can Peter dispose of what is purely earthly and secular? However, over a century passed before the Crusades would show "to the alert and sensitive canonistic mind the immense possibilities that existed for the expansion of papal power" in the form of the papalist claims to world monarchy.3 An argument analogous to Gregory VII's--that the limitation of the spiritual power to the soul alone is unreasonable--could be constructed all the more easily in Shi'ite Islam where the dividing line between matters spiritual and temporal is less sharply drawn. What alerted the mind of Khomeini and a number of other Shi'ite to the jurists for the expansion of the Shi'ite immense possibilities hierocratic to lead a crusade power was (a) the opportunity against foreign, imperialist domination which had presented itself since 1872; and (b) a desperate recurrently struggle IRANIAN

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for the very survival of the Shi'ite religious institutions against the onslaught of the modernizing Pahlavi state, beginning in the 1960s and becoming more intense in the mid1970s. In the nineteenth century, the Shi'ite was hierocracy content with the prevalent division of political and religious authority within the body politic, and acknowledged the legitimacy and autonomy of kingship.4 The success of the tobacco protest movement of 1891-2 kindled the political ambitions of the hierocracy, who emerged as "the leaders of the Shi'ite In his commentary on the most impornation."5 tant legal work of the second half of the nineteenth century, Shaykh Morteza Ansari's Makaseb, the eminent jurist Akhund Mullah Kazem Khorasani (d. 1911) diverged from the master's the jurists' opinion in considering collective of office "general vicegerency" (of the Hidden Imam) as well established by the legal "sources" and as inclusive of matters political as well as religio-legal.6 Nevertheless, the Akhund's commentary lay in a subsection of a highly technical gloss and was not given general publicity. In fact, as is well known, Khorasani was one of the most important of the clerical supporters of constitutionalism, and his aide, Na'ini (d. 1936) wrote the most important of the treatises legitimating constitutional government. During the Constitutional a number of Revolution, prominent ulama, acting in their capacity as the custodians of the Shi'ite tradition, supported the constitutional movement and wrote political tracts justifying parliamentary democracy in terms of the Shi'ite belief system, using the Shi'ite jurisprudential methodology as developed by the Usuli School. From our point of view, these tracts can be seen as attempts to address the twin questions of the legitimation of parliamentary legislation and the legitimation of democratic government. the ulama, as the authoritative Firstly, interpreters of the Shi'ite political ethic, had to solve the problems posed by the novelty of legislation as deliberate regulation of social relations by men. Not fully or even partly envisaging the secularizing of parliamentary effects legisKHOMEINI'S ISLAMIC ORDER

149

ulama such as Torshizi the sympathetic typically it as having to do with matters of "custom" ('urf)--as opposed to the sacred law (shar')--and with from "religious" "worldly" as distinct Secondmatters.7 ly, there was the problem of legitimating the political (executive) of monarchical constitutional authority government. lation, justified

-Irr Tanbih al-Umma wa Tanzih al-Milla, in published Baghdad in 1909 and in Tehran in 1910,-Nalini adprimarily dresses this latter problem. the funcRather than dividing tions of the Imamate into the religious and the political, as was done by Sayyed Ja'far Kashfi in the first half of the nineteenth is as follows: century, Na'ini's strategy He first states, in accordance with the classical Shi'ite doctrine of Imamate, that the ideal government is that of the Imam as the divinely and infallible inspired leader of the community of believers. The realization of this ideal form of government being barred during the occultation, Na'ini turns to a consideration of the actual types of aovernmenit, notably its "despotic" and "constitutional" forms. Having decried the evils of tyranny at great length, Na'ini proceeds to sanction the constitutional form of government as the form diverging the least from the ideal government of the Imam, and therefore the best type of government during the occultation.8

Na'ini's argument was constructed according to the jurisprudential methodology, and was grounded upon the Quran, the Hadith, and upon 'aql (reason). As such, of constitutional his justification government was in full conformity with the Shi'ite legal tradition. The legitimation of constitutionalism which follows can therefore be taken as the attempt by an eminent Shi'ite to extend jurist the Shi'ite political ethic to accommodate the requirements of modern times to provide legitimation for modern government: Usuli

There are three points of which one should not lose if one commits several evils at the sight: first, same time, it is compulsory to prevent the person from performing each of them. Every single evil creIRANIAN

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for a Muslim to prevent ates a separate responsibility it (nahy-e az munkar). . .*Second, whatever action that Islamic law should be handled by the may be against of hisbah; the latter office is unquesadministration under the authority tionably of the fuqaha' during the of the Twelfth Imam. It is true Greater Occultation that the 'ulama's responsibility as General Agents of is not the imam in all other offices, i.e., rulership, unquestionably but we know that Islam does recognized, not allow disorder and the loss of the Islamic terriorder in Islamic tory. We also know that establishing is more important than any other duty, hisbah countries or otherwise. it also becomes a definite Therefore, right and a religious duty of the 'ulama to possess the ruling power. Third, it is generally recognized by all the 'ulama that if someone establishes legal power over a certain thing which is in the sphere of vilayat (supervisorship), e.g., awqaf, and his complete removal from that position is not possible, it is still compulsory to limit his unlawful hold as far as possible. Every learned man, whether Muslim or materialist, can have no doubt about this matter. Once these three points are clear, there remains no room to doubt the necessity of changing a despotic regime into a constitutional one. This is true, because the former consists of three sets of usurpations and oppressions: 1) It is usurpation of the authority of God and injustice to Him; 2) it is usurpation of the imami's authority and oppression of the Imam; 3) it also involves of the people. oppression By contrast, a constitutional system is only oppression of the Imnam, because his authority is usurped. Thus, a constitutional regime limits three sets of oppressions to one; consequently it is necessary to adopt it. In order to remove the oppression done to the Imam, there is but one solution. As we said before, the function of the ruler in the new regime is like that of the supervisor of awqaf. The person in charge of the awqaf, even though he may have illegally occupied the office, can seek the sanction of the lawful KHOMEINI'S ISLAMIC ORDER

151

the 'ulama, to make his own function authority, i.e., then there approval, If he gains the 'ulama's lawful. of the and no oppression will remain no usurpation Imam.9

and Na'ini such as those of Torshizi writings Clerical regardwere flawed by a number of important misconceptions of parliamentary principles ing the nature and underlying of legisimplications democracy. The serious secularizing lation were played down, and a number of flat contradictions political concepts were ignored. between Islamic and liberal synthethe intrinsic weakness of these clerical Therefore, to be among the causes of their failure ses was doubtless into the political culture of modern Iran. Howincorporated rather than logical, for political, ever, it was primarily tract was not to serve as a basis for reasons that Na'ini's When Na'ini wrote, ethic. political a modernized Shi'ite ulama were already on the defensive and the proconstitution It appeared to be overcome by the anticonstitutionalists. of constitutionlegitimation should be noted that Nalini's hial government rested on the assumption that the Shilite a committee of in legislation; erocracy would participate legislation mojtaheds with veto power over parliamentary laws with the sacred would assure conformity of all ratified law of Islam. Two of the Supplementary Fundamental Article Law of 1907 was in fact designed to assure such supervisory Furtherin legislation. of the hierocracy participation the author more, by the time Na'ini was writing his tract, of Article Two, Shaykh Fazlollah Nuri (d. 1909), had turned incompatible it flatly declaring against the constitution, and remained was stillborn itself with Islam.10 The Article camp within the a dead letter. The anticonstitutionalist continued to gain in strength as time hierocracy Shi'ite went on, and was unmistakably predominant by the beginning Na'ini himself took of the second decade of the century.11 the remaining and destroying the unusual step of collecting copies of his book not long after its publication.12 of the leaders of the Shi'ite hiThe disillusionment reerocracy with the novel experiment of constitutionalism of political evaluation power, which newed their negative in pious indifference manifested itself had traditionally IRANIAN

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to worldly politics. With a few exceptions, they withdrew from the political arena after 1911. Hairi (d. 1936), Isfahani (d. 1945), and Burujerdi (d. 1961), all of whom domifor the subsequent half cennated the Shi'ite hierocracy tury, held piously aloof from the political sphere. As Weber points out, with the advent of modern mass pothe conditions of clerical litics, domination itself changes. "Hierocracy has no choice but to establish a party organization and to use demagogic means, just like all other parKhomeini Thus, in the early 1960s (1962-3/1341), ties.'13 set out to create, in contradistinction to the nationalist and the socialist a traditionalist political parties, poas litical movement which was to be led by the hierocracy the guardians of the Shilite The following statetradition. ment is made in the preamble of the constitution of the Islamic Republic: Although the Islamic way of thinking and militant clerical leadership played a major and fundamental role in [the constitutional and the nationalist/antiimperialist] movements, these movements rapidly disbecause they became increasingly integrated distant from the true Islamic position. At this point, of the nation, the alert conscience Grand Ayatollah led by...the Imam Khomeini, realized of adhering to the true ideological the necessity and Islamic path of struggle.14 A bold innovation by Khomeini consolidated the traditionalist movement and gave it a definite direction. By about 1970, Khomeini took the unprecedented step of assumof Imam and put forward a political ing the title theory which advocated direct hierocratic rule on behalf of the Hidden Imam. In contrast to Na'ini's legitimation of the least imperfect of the actual forms of government, Khomeini set up an ideal government, an Islamic theocracy, to be xealized by the movement he had launched. Thus, as the preamble declares: The plan fGr an Islamic Government based upon the concept of the Mandate of the Clergy, -which was in-KHOMEINI'S ISLAMIC ORDER

153

a fresh, troduced by Imam Khomeini...gave strong incentive to the Muslim people and opened the way for a genuine ideological Islamic struggle. This plan consolidated the efforts of those dedicated Muslims who were fighting both at home and abroad.15 Khomeini's

theory

of

the

Velayat-e

Faqih

(Mandate

of

the Clergy, or the Sovereignty of the Jurist), published in 1971, is a bold innovation in the history of Shi'ism. He converts a highly technical and specific legal discussion of the rights of the gerent into a theocratic political theory. Although Khomeini cites Mullah Ahmad Naraqi (d. 18289) as a forerunner, the latter's 'Awayid al-Ayyam, the only legal work Khomeini refers to in support of his theory of the Mandate of the Clergy, points only to an implicit invidious contrast between religious and political authority. The primary objective of Naraqi's discussion of the "mandate of the jurist" is to strengthen the juristic authority of the Shi'ite doctors on behalf of the Hidden Imam. The bulk of the discussion is devoted to the "delimitation" of the scope of the authority of the jurists as the vicegerents of the Imam, and their authority is delimited to the exclusion of temporal rule.16 of constiNa'ini's Khomeini, by-passing legitimation tutional government completely, extends the early Usuli arguments such as Naraqi's, which were designed to establish the legal authority of the Shi'ite to eliminate doctors, the duality of hierocratic and temporal authority altogether. For him, "Islamic government will differ from representative and/or constitutional monarchies because of the elimination of the separation of powers that Islamic government will implement."17 Khomeini categorically states that "the Mandate [of the clergy] means governing and administering of the Sacred the country and implementing the provisions of reLaw.",18 Thus, having firmly rejected the separation ligion and politics, he argues that in the absence of the divinely inspired supreme leader of the community of believers, the infallible from 874 A.D. to the Imam--i.e., end of time--sovereignty devolves upon the qualified jurists or the Shi'ite It is therefore leaders. the rereligious of the leaders as the authoritative ligious interpreters IRANIAN

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sacred law of Islam who are entitled to sovereignty. Furthermore, by assuming the title of Imam, he paves the way for the eventual restriction of the Mandate of the Clergy to that of its presumed supreme leader. In an interview with Khomeini in France on January 2, 1979, shortly before his triumphant return to Tehran, I asked him what room was left for parliamentary in a legislation government based on the Mandate of the Clergy as the authoritative interpreters of the Sacred Law. He did concede a role for legislation by a popularly elected parliament, but, to the dismay of his aide Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi (subsequently to become Bazargan's foreign minister), who was present during the interview, he restricted its scope to matters which are "beneath the dignity of Islam to concern itself with." The relevant section of the interview follows: Q.

How should

what you have written in to the actual political organization of Iran and the management of the daily political affairs? What, briefly, are the principles of government in Shi'ism? To what extent and under what conditions can the constitutional regime and its Fundamental Law (of 1906-07) be made to conform to them?

The Mandate

of

one relate

the

Jurist

A. The Mandate of the Jurist is about the principles of government. The organizational structure of government, the criteria for the appointment of political authorities are not treated in The Mandate of the I concentrated on the fundamental principle Jurist. [of sovereignty] because that was what I had been asked to do. There, I-wanted to make it clear that sovereignty is the right of the religious jurists. The details of the matter [actual] organization of government] will have to be dealt with by appropriate laws which will be enacted later.

The Fundamental Law will have to be studied. Whenof the nation, ever it is in the interests it will be accepted by us. Incidentally, the Supplementary Fundamental Law does state that [constitutional arrangementa] should not be contrary to the principles of KHOMEINI'S ISLAMIC ORDER

155

Islam. It is possible that some of the items of the Fundamental Law will be found contrary to [national] interests and will be abrogated. Some have already been abrogated by public referendum [in the course of the recent demonstrations] such as the monarchy. Q. You refer to the Supplementary Fundamental Law. The author of the relevant clause, Shaykh Fazlollah Nuri, did [subsequently] issue a ruling (fatwa) declaring that legislation is contrary to Islam, because in Islam, law is the divine sacred law, which is only in need of interpretation, and whose interpretation is the function of the qualified doctors of Shi'ite jurisprudence. What is your view on the above ruling? A. Lt is correct. There are certain matters which are executive affairs such as urban planning and traffic regulations. These are not related to [sacred] law, and it is beneath the dignity of Islam to concern itself with them; they are not related to basic laws. In Islam there is no room for the institution of basic laws and if an assembly is installed it will not be a legislative assembly in that sense, but an assembly to supervise government. It will deliberate [and determine] the executive matters of the kind I mentioned and not basic laws [which are already laid down by Islam]. It is highly

significant that in Khomeini's book, Isthere is no mention of an Islamic republic. There is every reason to believe that Khomeini considered the Islamic republic to be the appropriate form of government only for the period of transition to the truly Islamic government. In this final stage, sovereignty would belong to the clergy on behalf of God. There would be no room for of the people nor for the supremacy of the state sovereignty as the presumed embodiment of the national will. lamic

Government,

From the moment he returned to Iran, Khomeini never to implement the mandate of wavered in his determination a project which required a drastic the clergy, withering IRANIAN

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size. The judiciary system of the state to an appropriate and brought under the control of was to be desecularized of the state was to be rethe clergy; and the jurisdiction to matters "which are beneath the dignity of Islam to stricted and the regulations with," such as traffic concern itself Its legislative branch would pass running of the economy. laws regarding these matters and these matters only, and branch would implement them and manage the its executive of the country. day-to-day affairs in the place of the To create the Islamic theocracy intermediate steps fallen monarchy, a number of drastic Such steps were planned and executed needed to be taken. followers after February 11, by Khomeini and his clerical of the state, had been 1979. The army, the main pillar At the same paralyzed and was allowed to disintegrate. of power were not only kept in time, two rival structures the armed corps but continuously strengthened: existence, and the local (Isof the Guardians of Islamic Revolution, headed by a state, Facing a paralyzed lamic) committees. he himself weak and vacillating prime minister provisional ExKhomeini's hand-picked "Constitutional had appointed, perts" broke their prior agreement with Bazargan's team, the Mandate of the Clergy into the draft and incorporated the Mandate At the same time, by finessing constitution. of the Clergy into that of the jurist, they secured for of the first in Shi'ite caesar-pope Khomeini the position history.19 of the Islamic Republic of Iran, ratiThe constitution fied by the referendum of December 2-3, 1979, is an astoundsince the writings ing document, perhaps without parallel of thirteenth-century advocates of papal monarchy canonistic and Pope Boniface VIII's bull of November 1302, unam Sancsystem under the exclusive tam. It places the judiciary rewith the provision of extensive control of the clergy, The convision of the legal codes to render them Islamic. to the sources of stitution is remarkable in being related sacred law.20 Furthermore, putting a doctrinalthe Shi'ite quality of imamate (imaly novel emphasis on the continuous as the representamat-e mostamarr), it endows the jurist, tive of the Hidden Imam, with supreme power over men and

KHOMEINI'S

ISLAMIC

ORDER

157

it sets up a clerically only to God. Finally, responsibility with Council of the Guardians of the Constitution controlled rethe Shilite powers to represent extensive inordinately and and to insure that the legislative institution, ligious branches of the state remain within the straitexecutive for it. jacket tailored into legal reality. Khomeini's dream was thus translated weakened, At the same time that the state was theoretically Bazargan, who had defended debilitated. so it was practically of the state and the army, was ousted through the integrity of the American embassy and the taking of the occupation bid for the direct The clerical hostages on November 4, 1979. which began with this coup d'etat, takeover of the state, a setback when the Islamic Republican Party, cresuffered ated for the purpose of implementing Khomeini's blueprint, candidate of its presidential mismanaged the presentation Though not in January, 1980. and Banisadr won the elections as docile as their own candidate would have been, Banisadr the clerics' had in fact publicly urged the voters to ratify toward the clergy. hostile and was not at first constitution of the under the sway of the conviction Perhaps he was still for a return to an Islamic pattern to overcome necessity he must have acutely felt in the alienation" the "cultural had intellectuals cafes of Paris; and the Western-educated around him as they soon were to. In any not yet clustered toward the end of event, it was only after the discovery, July 1980, of the Islamic Republican Party's "plot" to emasthat Banisadr firmly and resolutely culate the presidency, leaders' expansionist designs. opposed the clerical elections, After the presidential Khomeini, for hiis part, appeared to have decided in favor of consolidating as embodied hierocracy the enormous gains of the Shi'ite camHe releinted on his Islamization in the constitution. Banisadr President paign in order to give the newly elected and his team a chance to run the state and revive the econdid not change in FebruKhomeini's position omy for him. to his seemingly seriary and much of March. In addition ous health problems, the pressure from below acted as an to strengthen important factor in inducing the aged patriarch of the clerThe temporary inability the hand of the state. IRANIAN

STUDIES

158

of power to absorb the radicalizing ical structures pressure from the grass roots was clearly demonstrated in midof the employees at the Revolutionary February by strikes and the Foundation for the DisPublic Prosecutor's office inherited, which forced Khomeini to react by publicly stressing the need for strengthening the central government. 21 However, he was not rash enough to allow Banisadr to form a Cabinet and dissolve the Revolutionary Council. The situation changed rapidly in the new Persian year which began on March 21, 1980. Emboldened by its massive electoral of the victory which secured it some two-thirds seats in the Majles (the Iranian Parliament), the Islamic Republican Party impatiently resumed the program of "Islamization" to reshape the Iranian state and society. In addition to their doctrinally the defensible legal authority, clergy had also had de facto control of the educational To restore the trasystem prior to the twentieth century. ditional pattern, therefore, the dominant clergy set out to desecularize the state educational system, and to bring it under clerical control. The desecularization of the educational system took the form of a "cultural revolution" designed to eradicate all traces of Western cultural influence from the universities and high schools and to bring the educational system under clerical control. It was launched by the Islamic Republic Party in April, and was intensified after the abortive U.S. rescue attempt. The universities and only the faculwere closed indefinitely ties of medicine were to reopen in October. The cultural revolution and "Islamization" of the state-controlled educational institutions were pursued vigorously in July 1980, with Khomeini reportedly directing the witch-hunt at the 22 universities personally. The dominant clergy turned its attention to the systematic desecularization of the judiciary system in a seminar convened in April. During the last days of May, Khomeini exhorted the deputies of the Majles to implement Islamic justice "of which our nation has been deprived under the regime of the oppressors and the usurpers of the Pahlavi dynasty." The vigorous response of the IRP deputies was expressed in early July 1980 by the revoluKHOMEINI'S ISLAMIC ORDER

15 9

tionary public prosecutor Ayatollah Ardabili. The first result of those endeavors--a penal code reviving atavistic practices that had been in abeyance for centuries--were presented to the Majles in early 1981. With the army in an advanced state of disintegration and the president deprived of a Cabinet, the religiously significant month of Ramadan (July 1980) was chosen for the official inauguration of the New Islamic Order, appropriately marked by the dismissal of a large number of female state employees for not wearing "modest Islamic attire"--i.e., the scarf as the modernized version of the veil and thick stockings. An extensive plot to overthrow the new order having been thwarted in its first days, intensive "Islamization" could continue unabated throughout the month of August. On August 17, 1980, Khomeini felt confident on enough to congratulate his clerical followers their revolution's unprecedented success in installing all the basic institutions of the New Islamic Order. On the same occasion, to the clergy as the judiciary he referred branch of the regime, completely ignoring the not-yet-dismantled secular judiciary apparatus.23 In Khomeini's Islamic order, the state has not only been constitutionally weakened but also made "Islamic"-i.e., manned, insofar as possible, by reliable Islamic perconsonnel and brought under direct or indirect clerical trol. The process was formalized in July 1979, when Bazarof a number of gan officially admitted clerical supervisors ministries to his Cabinet. It culminated in late August 1980 with the success of the Islamic Republican Party in a group of servile armed with installing lay nonentities, into the prime ministry and other a presumed Islamic piety, of the of state. high offices Meanwhile, the infiltration lower ranks of the state had been assured by the repeated purges of the "Westernized" elements during the summer of as spoils The posts thus freed were distributed 1980.24 to "Islamic," or to use the more recent shibboleth,maktabi to the school [of Islam]) activists. (belonging As distinct placement of its IRANIAN

STUDIES

from the weakening of the state, higher cadres by Islamic loyalists

the reof lower160

middle-class such as Prime Minister Raja'i and alorigins, most all nonclerical members of his Cabinet, bears a striking similarity to the fascism of the Eastern European type of the 1930s and 1940s. The Rumanian fascists, led by Codreanu were deeply committed to Christianity and strongly appealed to the religious tradition.25 The Hungarian fascist Szalasi, the leader of the Arrow Cross, was devoutly Catholic. His "Hungarist state" was to be based on a "Christian moral order"; and the Arrow Cross appointees to his short-lived Cabinet "were almost without exception of lower-middle-class origins. "26

schools,

Except for teaching posts at primary and secondary which have continued to be wrested by the maktabi

the Iraqi activists,27 invasion halted the twin processes of the withering and appropriation of the state by the domand their inant clergy Banisadr lay agents. proved inof acting in time to reverse capable the process and to on the rise capitalize in his popularity, and that of the army, to strengthen the state. The dominant clergy, by to prevent acted alertly contrast, any such development. Banisadr to accept Khomeini forced conspicuous clerical on the Supreme Defense presence Council. Moreover, in the last days of December 1980, the dominant clergy passed a law designed to assure a massive expansion of the Guardians of the Islamic Republic and to increase their participation in the war effort, at the expense of the regular The ruling army.28 also resorted clergy to another device, also tried first on the unfortunate Bazargan, of using their newly established judiciary authority for the purthe head of the state pose of keeping properly leashed. In March 1981, they commenced the criminal investigation

of the president of the Islamic turbance of public order. The war has delayed

further

Republic

for alleged

implementation

dis-

of Kho-

meini's blueprint, a chaotic producing stalemate between the president and the dominant clergy. It has not, however, the Mandate of the Clergy. revoked

KHOMEINI'S

ISLAMIC

ORDER

161

NOTES

(New York, 1968),

1.

Max Weber, Economy and Society p. 1163.

2.

Society and Christian Church, State G. Tellenbach, 1959 (London, Contest the Time of the Investiture

1963];

[Leipzig,

emphasis

Medieval

added),

Papalism

at

p. 153.

(London,

1949),

p. 120.

3.

W. Ullmann,

4.

Hierocracy and the State S. A. Arjomand, "The Shi'ite of European Journal 1785-1890," in Pre-Modern Iran: XXII, No. 1 (1981), pp. 40-78. Sociology

5.

OpposiS. A. Arjomand, "The 'Ulama's Traditionalist 1907-1909," Middle Eastern tion to Parliamentarianism XVII, No. 2 (1981), pp. 174-190. Studies

6.

Hashiya MohammadKazem al-Akhund al-Khorasani, n.p. 1901/1319Q, pp. 50-55. al-Makaseb,

7.

Thought in Iran H. Enayat, "The Religio-political Revolution," presented at during the Constitutional Society and Economy in Nineon State, the conference Iran and the Ottoman Empire, June 17teenth-Century Iran. 22, 1978, Babolsar,

8.

Tanbih al-'Umma va Tanzih MohammadHosayn Na'ini, ed. (Tehran, 1955/1334). M. Taleqani, Milla,

9.

and Constitutionalism A. H. Hairi, Shi'ism (Leiden, 1977), pp. 193-4.

in

Ketab

al-

Iran

10.

Ibid.,

pp. 192-3.

11.

Ibid.,

esp.

12.

It is true that the Tanbih al-Umma p. 1S8. Ibid., was revived some 45 years later by a staunch opponent But the book's of the present regime, MahmudTaleqani. due to its vehement attack on was entirely revival

IRANIAN

STUDIES

p. 170.

162

identified with the shah's regime. tyranny--indirectly What was totally obscured were the chief intentions of of constitutionalism, its author: the propagation and the legitimation of parliamentary democracy as the means for bringing modern government under the normative governance of the Shi'ite ethic. political Since its revival, the book has remained the object of the keen attention of the religious while the opposition chief concerns of its author have receded even further into obscurity. 13.

Weber, op.

14.

A. P. Blaustein and G. H. Flanz, eds., Constitutions of the Countries of the World: Iran, trans. Changiz Vafai (New York: Oceana Publications, 1980),p. 2.

15.

Ibid..,

16.

Mullah Ahmad Naraqi, 'Awayid al-Ayyam, 1903/1321Q, pp. 185-205.

17.

S. Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran. Clergy-State in the Pahlavi Period (New York, Relations 1980), p. 164.

18.

R. Khomeini,

19.

This last step, the jump from the vicegerency of the body of religious jurists to that of the jurist, is the most dubious from the viewpoint of Shi'ite jurisprudence. It was not called for in Khomeini's book, and since the ratification of the Constitution, it has been found objectionable by some of the highest ranking Grand Ayatollahs. It is interesting to note that Shaykh Ali Tehrani who, in Madina-ye Fazila dar Islam (1975-6/1354), had put forward an interpretation of "general vicegerency" virtually identical with Khomeini's, has condemned the restriction of this collective office to an individual as a most reprehensible bed'at (innovation). (Sorush, no. 82, 13 Day 1359, esp. p. 55.)

KHOMEINI'S

cit.,

p.

1195.

p. 4.

ISLAMIC

Hukumat-e

ORDER

Islami

(Najaf,

(?) Tehran,

1971),

p. 64.

163

20.

See the appendix stitutions

of

the

(Khatema) to the Iran. World:

19,

Persian

text

in Con-

1980.

21.

Le Monde,

February

22.

Le Monde,

July

23.

Ettela'at,

24.

By the beginning of July, after less than ten days of had been discharged. purges, over 1,000 functionaries The purges continued through(Le Monde, July 1, 1980.) On the out the month of July all around the country. last two days alone of major purges, some 450 functionMordad 5 and 6, 1359.) (Ettela 'at, aries were discharged.

25.

3, 1980.

26 Mordad, 1359.

E. Weber, "Romania," in H. Rogger and E. Weber, The of A Historical Profile (University Right. Press, 1966), pp. 525, 532. California

European

in Rogger and Weber, op.

26.

I. Deak, "Hungary," pp. 394, 402.

27.

See the back pages of Mojahed,

28.

Le Monde,

IRANIAN

STUDIES

January

cit.,

Day and Bahman, 1359.

2, 1981.

164

Iranian Studies, Volume XIII, Nos. 1-4, 1980

Women in the Islamic Republic of Iran

GmutyNashat

The image of the Iranian woman clad in the traditional chador, pointing her fist in the air or carrying a machine gun, has become one of the hallmarks of the most recent revolution in Iran. But, in spite of the role played by women in toppling the shah's regime, women have lost more from the change of government than has any other group that participated in the of revolution. This loss is evident in (1) the abrogation laws enacted under the previous regime that introduced a meafor women; (2) the dwindling of employment sure of equality to women due to the deteriorating available opportunities economic situation; (3) the long-term policy of the current government to encourage women to stay at home; and (4) a massive and persistent campaign to convince women that their own welfare and the welfare of society is best preserved if the roles of men and women are kept separate and if contact between the sexes is kept at a minimum. This article will exof the recent revolution amine some of the effects on the status of Iranian women, the attitude of the present regime of toward the role of women in society, and the reaction Iranian women to some of these developments. lamic

Throughout countries,

most of the history of Iran and other Iswomen did not play an active role in so-

of History Guity Nashat is Assistant Professor of Illinois at Chicago Ci-rcle. versity

at the Uni-

This article was partly written during my stay as a visiting on War, Revolution, scholar at the Hoover Institution and Peace. While there I received helpful suggestions from Professor Howard Reed and Dr. Karim Pakravan. 165

norms placed a woman in the home social ciety. Prevailing to childthat her duty was to devote herself and dictated to the needs of the male members of bearing and attending No attempt will and husband. brother, her family--father, Suffice this attitude. be made here to explain or justify it to say that women in general rarely showed any signs of If they expressed dissatiswith their lot. restlessness it was usually prompted by a rise in the faction publicly, On occasion women appeared en price of consumer goods. bakery or masse in the bazaars to attack an over-priced grocery or to surround the carriage of a ruler to emphawere reported size their demands. Many such incidents during the famine of 1871-72.1 Not until the twentieth century did the women of Their Iran begin to enter the mainstream of society. involvement in political ocactivity first significant Revolution curred during the course of the Constitutional was sparked of 1905-11. Their initial public participation arrest and exile of against the government's by a protest and as the events of the revoseveral religious leaders,2 involved. women became more actively lution unfolded, contook the form of making financial Their activities for the demonstrating serving as couriers, tributions, It is hard and forming a Ladies' Society. constitution, the exact extent to which women became into estimate because the evidence is at present volved in the revolution It is safe to assume, however, that despite fragmentary. the enthusiasm their participation generated in the few of the revolution, their and American well-wishers British status was mainly urban number was small and their social was reOnce the constitution middle and upper class.3 however, even those few women who had been activstored, roles as wives and mothers. ists resumed their traditional of women in the constitutional moveBut the involvement without effect. It created an awarement was not entirely in society and of the need to ness of women's potential Leading poets and provide them with a modern education. attitudes intellectuals began to bemoan the prevailing toward women. A poet warned, "If the woman is ignorant,/ the child they will bring So also will be the man./Pity was being sought in change: forth."4 The solution IRANIAN STUDIES

166

Oh girl of the Golden Era, of school. Hurry in the direction virtue, In the pursuit of perfection, from men. You do not differ How long will How long will

you be hidden? you stay behind

and knowledge,

the Purdah?

5

of this new awareness was the opening of One of the results in Tehran and major provincial schools for girls several But the spread of modern education among women was towns. slow, and they continued to be seen rarely in public until banned by Reza Shah. 1936, when the veil was officially ban of the veil was accompanied by offiThe forcible A cial encouragement of women to enter into public life. in at Tehran University woman was appointed as professor in 1940, 1937. Women began to be admitted to the university in the of capacities and they began to appear in a variety

lower echelons of government. This participation in public life ran counter to centuries of social

of women condi-

piety, religious with the veil, tioning that was associated was so strong in and propriety. The weight of tradition urban areas that many women gave up going out for fear of After removed by the police. forcibly having their veils of Reza Shah in 1941, when the rule prothe abdication the veil was abandoned, many women returned to it. hibiting reversed since the presentBut the trend was not completely day chador bears only a remote resemblance to the elaborate which was called a chador The old veil, veil of yesteryear. a heavy black piece chaqchur, was made up of two parts, from head to toe and a that covered the woman entirely small white mask that covered the face except for the eyes. for women's changing role was Even more significant of compulsory education for women under the introduction to and economic conditions Reza Shah. Although social from Iranian girls this day have prevented all school-age the law helped the spread of elereceiving some education, in urban areas, mentary and secondary schools for girls This was followed by a rapid in the capital. particularly WOMENIN IRAN

167

increase in women's attendance at institutions of higher education and universities both in Iran and abroad. By the 1950s, the entry of these women into fields such as law, medicine, and engineering, hitherto open only to men, began to have an impact on Iranian society. Women also began to enter the labor force as skilled and unskilled workers. During the next two decades, as the economy began to expand at an ever-increasing rate, employment opportunities opened up for women, and as women's role in society changed, so did societal attitudes toward them. By 1978, on the eve of the recent revolution, few occupations remained closed to women. Two women held cabinet posts, two were senators, nineteen were Majles deputies, three deputy ministers, and one an ambassador. But apart from these highly visible positions, statistics show 1,800 women employed as teachers in institutes of higher education and universities, and 316 as 793 as engineers, judges. Women accounted for 19 percent of the skilled workers in factories and 33 percent of the student body in institutes of higher education. About 26,000 women and were enrolled in technical and vocational schools, an estimated 500,000 were employed in the educational system. Finally, 2.5 million girls were enrolled in elementary schools.6 Cynics may brush aside the appointment of women to high posts in government as mere tokens of a regime bent on blindly imitating Western ways, but the statistics are not so easily dismissed. The change in the status of women was not limited affectto type and scope of opportunities. Legislation ing women had also begun to be modified to bring them greater equality under law. Although the previous regime liked to credit with changing the legal status of itself women, its critics dismissed these laws as window-dresshalf real progress by substituting ing, a ruse to stifle measures. No doubt the regime's desire to appear progressive accelerated the passage of these laws, and it cannot be denied that it used these steps in propaganda efforts to win support among the middle class.

IRANIAN

STUDIES

168

and advocates of the previous reBut both critics gime fail to take into account that many women, both into bring about and in groups, worked diligently dividually High on their list were the these changes in the laws. and voting rights. laws concerning marriage, divorce, for While some of these changes, such as the franchise relatively women (granted in 1963), could be accomplished amendment, changes in marriage by constitutional easily to effect without and divorce laws were more difficult attempts to change Initial the shari'a. contradicting from men, particthe status of women met with hostility One of the authorities. and religious judicial ularly Yahya Nuri, who stated leading opponents was Hojjatolislam and that "the real secret of various women's organizations of women lawyers in forming these groups was the federation merely to imitate European women." Although the dissatiswomwas justified, faction of women in European countries Furhad no cause for complaint. en in Islamic countries thermore, he pointed out, "fourteen hundred years ago Isgave women rights that European women are lamic shari'a those women who seek Therefore, only today." acquiring to alter the status of women "are either ignorant of the real laws of Islam, are pursuing fame or an immoral life or have been led astray by encouragement from style, men."7 and sensualist pleasure-loving Since many of the changes demanded by various groups-a change an end to polygamy and mot'a (temporary marriage), to on men's ability and restrictions in custody rules, of the shanew interpretations divorce at will--required In the view ri'a laws, they were opposed by the ulama. of opponents of change, giving women a greater voice in these vital matters would destroy the fabric of society. They maintained that women are more emotional and less to than men, hence, they would be more likely rational in making and sentimental factors be governed by frivolous and physical, emotional, This alleged major decisions.8 of women was the reason why some of the mental inferiority for women. They opposed to suffrage ulama were initially makes them unfit argued that women's mental inferiority or to of state and rulership to delve into the affairs

WOMENIN IRAN

169

attain should

the position of lawmaker or military province of men. 9 be the special

leader,

which

the leading Although women did not openly challenge ulama, they responded that they did not intend to go against but merely to extend the shari'a or change its provisions These the protection afforded the few to women in general. on the permissibilwomen felt that placing some restraint ity of men to take a second wife or divorce at will and beyond assisting women to gain custody of their children the age of 2 for boys and 7 for girls would be especially beneficial for poorer women, who were the real victims of argued that, although Islamic laws the law. They rightly to women of marriage and divorce could afford protection and that Islamic divorce is not as easy as its opponents many men have used polygamy, the unclaim, nevertheless, and child custody rights as means limited right to divorce, to abuse and exploit women. women lawyers began to To overcome the resistance, in close cooperation with sympathetic men--relisearch, of the new interpretations gious leaders among them--for shari'a that would be more in keeping with their demands. women required several years of Each major law affecting and consultation and persistent negotiation systematic the Ayatollah including with religious and lay jurists, leader of the Islamic Republican the former Beheshti, The most important of these were the franchise Party. Law in 1967. in 1963 and the Family Protection and conflicts During the 1970s the inner tensions within Iranian society began to be reflected festering attitude toward women. On the one hand in the society's women became increasingly important in the labor force-in the textile industry many of the workers were women-were more accepted by the men. and women professionals could say that, "Men began to accept A woman executive the job done without looking at the sex of the person doOn the other hand, the traditional segments ing it."10 number of educated womof society and an ever-increasing the changes that had occurred in the en began to reject role and legal status of women. IRANIAN STUDIES

170

of the traditional The disenchantment sector, which included the majority of the urban population, could be explained partly by its awareness of the attitude of some of the popular religious leaders such as the ayatollahs Khomeini and Mottahari. It was during an early disturbance that occurred in Qom in 1963 following the passage of the franchise-for-women act that the public at large heard the name of Ayatollah Khomeini. Though the issue of women's status during the 1960s was mainly an academic one-most of the activists were professional women from the upper and middle classes leading Western life styles--in the 1970s indifference began to be replaced with rising alarm and fear. This change was caused partly by the sudden appearance of Western semi-pornographic in large publications cities, especially Tehran, and the showing of such films as "Carnal Knowledge." While the regime strictly censored any kind of political expression, it began a more relaxed policy toward portrayal of sex. Even the pages of Persianlanguage publications, including the leading women's magazines Ettela'at-e Banovan and Zan-e Ruz, began to be adorned by pictures of Iranian starlets or high-society women in glittering low-cut dresses, dyed hair, with heavily madeup faces. If this was the ultimate type of woman that the changes in the role and status of women would create, then the traditional society did not want any part of it. The warnings of the ulama that the fabric of society and the family could be destroyed if the strictures of the shari'a were ignored began to have a ring of truth. Hostility to change began to be expressed also by a segment of women who regarded these changes with cynicism. Approval by the regime was enough to make these changes suspect in the view of these women. One of the most vocal critics were the Marxists and their sympathizers. They criticized these changes as mere efforts made by theregime to keep women from turning to the more radical solutions offered by Marx and Engels. They saw the efforts as means by which capitalists sought to exploit the masses of Iranian women by providing Western capitalism with cheap labor and markets for consumer goods. In their view, the lot of women could be improved only by a total overhaul of sociWOMENIN IRAN

171

utopia in a communist of a classless ety, by the creation Only then would women come into their own. But to state. must not be diverted attain this end, women revolutionaries for women alone to gain better conditions from the struggle to overthrow the and had to join in the general struggle tried to Many of these young women militants system.11 for her her life sacrificed who Luxembourg, emulate Rosa ideology. the changes inAnother group that began to reject troduced in the status of women was part of a movement Begun in Islamic modernism. that has come to be called reform and revitalthe 1960s as a movement for religious of Shilism by a small number of educated laymen, ization popular among the educated urban it became increasingly The in Tehran. middle and lower class groups, especially among for its rising popularity person most responsible (d. 1977), a Sorbonnethese groups was Dr. Ali Shari'ati In his numerous lecand professor. educated intellectual regime, Dr. Sharthe by banned mostly tures and writings, and principles to the teachings a for return called i'ati He argued that of Islam of the Prophet Mohammad's time. prevcorruption much of the moral decadence and political turning alent in the country was caused by the people's He ultimately away from real Islam embodied in Shi'ism. of Shilism on the ulama, placed the blame for the decline and cultural of environmental who had allowed centuries the cento water down and render ineffective influences in the life and tral message of Islam, best exemplified imams, such as the imams Ali of the Shi'ite teachings enjoined his readers to assume He repeatedly and Hosayn. of real for the revival and strive personal responsibility Islam.12 Shi'ite appeal for the Shari ' ti ' s thought had a particular the stuof men and women, especially younger generation high schools and at the univerdents in the upper-level They found in his arguments a viable and reassities. to the Marxist and Western concepts suring alternative alien and bankrupt which seemed increasingly of society, the image of For the younger women activists to them. IRANIAN STUDIES

172

womanhood presented in his writings was a welcome deparof the doll-like ture from the superficiality faces of the popular women's magazines or the "godless" Rosa Luxembourg of the left. Instead of these two alien images, he presented them with a new image of Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet Mohammad. She combined all the feminine virtues: modesty, education, and uncourage, patience, derstanding. She was a source of strength to her husband, the Imam Ali, and it was she who raised the Imam Hosayn, the great revolutionary hero of the 1970s.13 Thus, Fatima, who previously represented and helplessness, forbearance, was recast into an image that was both familiar suffering, and inspirational. told his readers that the contemporary Shari'ti image of woman as a creature subservient and subordinate to man, needing to be shut off from society, had its roots of Islam but in the cultural not in the teachings traditions of the region.14 He urged his readers to remember She had stood up to injustice, the true image of Fatima. without fear or compromise, in defense of her rights and her perception of the truth. She was someone to emulate. Unlike Rosa Luxembourg, the favorite of Marxist women, or the painted doll of their Westernized sisters, Fatima was not imported. Shari'ati's message fell on receptive ears. The appearance and increasing popularity of the large beige the Islamic scarf, scarf, and even the chador on the university campus, was a testimony to the great popularity of Fatima among young women. The decade of the '70s also witnessed the rise of increasing numbers of militant women who joined the undergraduate movements, especially two urban-based pro-Marxist guerrilla movements, the Mojahidin-e Khalg and Cherikhaye Fada'i-ye Khalq. The Mojahidin also espoused Islamic ideals. Many women, usually university students, were or killed arrested during the course of armed struggles with police and security forces.'15 Though their number, both on the right and left, was small, they became increasingly active in guerrilla activities against the regime. Some, such as Shahin Tavakkoli, Marziyeh Ahmadi, WOMENIN IRAN

173

Shirin Mu'azed, Mehrnush Ibrahimi, Fatima Sa'edi, and Ashraf Dehqani became martyrs and legends to their coworkers.16 As the number of women who lost their lives swelled, the enthusiasm and frenzy of their colleagues grew, and they joined the ranks as martyrs or revolutionaries. These revolutionary women did not view themselves as separate from their male counterparts, but as compatriots joined in the struggle to overthrow the regime and set up an ideal state.17 The vast majority of the more traditional women who responded to the call of revolutionary leaders, especially Ayatollah Khomeini, took to the streets without espousing a specific program for women. It was the image of the chador-clad woman, carrying a child in one arm and raising the other in protest or carrying a machine gun, that became one of the familiar symbols of the recent revolution. The active support, zeal, and enthusiasm of these women were prompted not by any specific aims to improve their of disgust condition as women, but by intense feelings with and opposition This was simito the ruling regime. larly true of the smaller and more politicized groups of women, whether students or workers. Although the number of casualties suffered by women is not known accurately, it has been estimated that on the worst day of t1e revolution, 17 Shahrivar 1357, 700 women were killed.1 Women also joined in the general elation when Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran. But their sense of jubilation was soon to fade into disappointment, and feelings and alarm over the prospect that soon "the of betrayal clocks would be turning back fourteen hundred years for women."119 This sense was particularly strong among eduand white-collar cated women in the professions jobs, uniand many who had affiliations with poversity students, litical groups that had worked to gain freedom for everyone. The first signal of alarm was sounded on March announced the need to impose 1979, when the ayatollah a demonstration Women countered by organizing veil. the ayatollah backed As a result, the following day. IRANIAN

STUDIES

7, the on down 174

and said he was merely making a recommendation. However, the exertion the last two years have witnessed of systematic pressure on women by the regime more severe than that on any other group. The role of women in the revolution is still praised by various leaders and the pictures of revolutionary women with chador, gun, and fist are a mainstay of the new regime; yet every possible means is being used to drive women back into the seclusion of the home. The leaders of the present regime have resorted to various methods to achieve this end, including a series of measures and legislation by the government, usually a following statement of policy by Ayatollah Khomeini. The most important of these are the abrogation of the Family Protection Law, the dismissal of all women judges, the banning of abortion, the dismissal-of women from top posts in the government and high executive posts in the private sector, the banning of coeducation, the banning of coed sports, the prevention of women from participating in public tournaments, and several, though as yet unsuccessful, attempts to impose an Islamic code of dress for women employed in government offices. In addition, women who have been employed for fifteen years or more have been encouraged to take advantage of a new retirement act, which permits anyone with at least fifteen years employment to retire, regardless of age. Have women truly been singled out by leaders of the revolution, and what rationale underlies the massive campaign against them? These are problems that must be viewed within the larger context of the Islamic republic, its social program, and its view of women in society. Historians and other social scientists will discuss the reasons for the fall of the shah and the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini for years to come. What concerns us here is that in the rapid development of events following the revolution, the ayatollah emerged as the unchallenged leader of revolutionary Iran. As other groups, mainly the middle-class of the National Front and intelligentsia the various groups of leftist persuasion, recovered from the shock of the achievement of the overthrow of the shah, WOMENIN IRAN

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it was the ayatollah, whose call had brought millions into the streets, who established his supremacy. Then, bolstered by his massive backing, he set about to reorganize the state and society after the pattern envisioned in his writings. It is to this model of state that we must turn to determine the role that has been assigned to women in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini, the ultimate spiritual and temporal guide of the nation, and other Islamic revolutionary leaders have repeatedly proto create a state that is wholly claimed their intention based on and derived from the teachings of Islam. This state would be modeled on the ordinances of the Quran and the early Islamic community of the time of the Prophet and his successor. Like that state, it would be a theocracy, and its law would be the will of God as revealed in His Book, the Quran, as it is taught by His prophet and His special emissaries, the imams. But, in spite of the intent to completely destroy all legacies of the old regime, the new leaders of Iran were forced to retain much of what vast apparatus of state with its minthey inherited--the or of mainly non-Islamic istries, banks, and utilities The Quran does not supply any systematic Western origin. for the organization and specific instruction of governof the early Islamic period in ment; and the experience Medina can only provide a general guide rather than an for government. extensive blueprint In one area, however, Islam has provided its adherents with extensive guidelines by which to lead the good and virtuous law. It is not surprising life: the shari'a that the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in their to restore the Islamic character of the country, effort have put as much emphasis as they have on these laws, esas they relate to the family and the unique posipecially tion of women. This emphasis is amply demonstrated in the preamble of the constitution, which, under the heading states: "Women in the Constitution" of society, which until now were The human resources of foreign imperialism, will be rein the services for and humane character stored to their original IRANIAN STUDIES

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It structures. of Islamic social the rebuilding to greater is natural that women, who were subjected regime, (tyrannical) under the taquti injustices will enjoy greater rights. and the of society The family is the cornerstone for the growth and improvement primary institution belief consensus and ideological of the individual; that the formation of family is in the principle fundamental for the future development of the inis one of main aims of the Islamic governdividual According to this line of thinking regarding ment. the family, women will no longer be regarded as a of conin the services mere (thing) or (instrument) to the worthwhile sumerism; but, while being restored task of motherhood, they will be and responsible for the raising of committed responsible primarily and will participate with men in variindividuals, of life. Consequently, they will be ous activities and a higher worth given a greater responsibility, and value from the Islamic point of view. places on wom Despite the emphasis the constitution in society, it does roles and their responsibilities en's For these we must turn to on these points. not elaborate and spokesmen of the of the leading ideologues the writings and Khomeini, Nuri, Mottahari, regime, such as the ayatollahs for women of the role envisioned for a better understanding of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Central to Islam is the notion of the covenant of the to fully obey God, even as a slave obeys a master, individual Both men and women are equal in as a sign of gratitude. in their duty to obey and in the reward they will receive needs a soThe individual for total obedience. afterlife and it is ciety that will enable him to lead a godly life, the duty of all Muslims, both male and female, to contribto the maintenance and preservation of this society. ute have different roles in society. However, individuals God's commandments must govern Hence the social individual's life. WOMENIN IRAN

all aspects of the in which the setting 177

both within the great significance, Muslim lives acquires and outside the home. The Muslim the family, home, i.e., into the godly life initiation his first child receives for the importance assigned accounting within the family, and to the place of the family within the Muslim society of the Islamic Repubin the preamble to the constitution it is the mother who has Within the family, lic of Iran. the rules the most contact with the child and can inculcate Ordained by by the shari'a. of godly life as prescribed women shoulder God to look after the needs of children, both in this well-being for the child's the responsibility between This then is the difference world and the next. the roles of men and women in society.20 tasks in society, Since men and women have different rights and it follows that they should also have different today, "the According to one leading jurist prerogatives. of Islam" attributes to men and women eternal shari'at in general laws, under which neither group is equality laws, however, In the particular superior to the other. to its innate laws suitable each sex has been assigned According to this line of thought, the role of nature.21 of in society derives from the dictates each individual It obligations. nature, and each is assigned particular "the innate and is doubtful that anyone could repudiate that exist between men and women fundamental differences from social and culdo not result differences ....These but they appear in accordance with tural conditioning, higher wisdom and command in harmony with the particulariHence they are innate and ties of the law of creation. natural ."22 between men Undoubtedly the most obvious difference "A woman's beauty and fine bone and women is physical. and the weakness of her her pleasant voice, structure, from a man. In other physique are obvious differences it is not Therefore, words, a woman is a woman all over. In differences. of the rest the to into necessary go are concerned, and mental ability short, so far as physical men excel women. But women excel men in beauty and delicacy. v23 IRANIAN

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178

WomAnother major difference is in emotional nature. and emotional, hence they judge hasten are more sensitive are not suited, as men are, for dealing ily and therefore whether in private or pubwith striving and difficulties, "This is why in Islam the expenses of the lib activities. wife and children are incumbent in every way on the man in a loving lap, and and the care and rearing of children is the suckling of the child in the middle of the night, the duty of the mother."24 to Women are aware of and accept their inferiority men, but they try to compensate for their weakness by manipulating man's weakness--his need to love and seek women. "Man is created by nature to seek and want love, as woman is created to be sought and loved. The male gender is created to be aggressive and a seeker [of women]."25 Caught in a primordial scheme in which he must pursue woman eterman is attached to her by his immense sexual appenally, tite. Women, on the other hand, are passive, seeking not sexual gratification but the love of man. In this eternal women have forever tried to use all their restruggle, sources, i.e., physical charm, beauty, and sexuality to lure men.26 This situation is inherently dangerous; it can cause the downfall of both men and women. This is why societies and religious leaders have in the past railed of marriage against sexual excess and why the institution developed. To allow men and women who are not related by marriage or by blood to come into close daily contact could create a situation fraught with danger. "It is a mistake for us to imagine that a man's sensuality when satisfied to a certain limit will attain rest. In the same way that a person, whether male or female, cannot be satisfied with wealth and power, no man ever has enough of possessing beautiful women and no woman enough of attracting the attentions of men and possessing their hearts. Finally, no heart is satiated by sexual desire.",27 Therefore, in an Islamic society, to avoid the rampant mental illness caused by sexual titillation, it is necessary that women, "in whom the desire to show themselves off and attract WOMEN IN

IRAN

179

men," should be dressed 28 regulations.

according

to certain

rules

and

Of all existing social orders, only that founded on of Islam adequately deals with this potenthe principles tially dangerous situation. Islam attains this aim through encouragement of the family and through its dress regulation, the hejab, or veiling. Islam requires this veiling for several reasons: of Islamic manner of "The philosophy dressing in our view has several reasons. Some are psychological, some concern the home and family, and others stem from the desire of the woman to elevate her position. In Islam veiling arises from a more fundamental and general that is to say, Islam wants all pleasures, question, be they sexual, visual, sensual, or any other kind, to be limited within the family and the framework of legal marriage; and work and activity should belong to society outside the home].",29 [i.e., Furthermore, to ensure that men and women do not mislead each other and that they channel their needs to be wanted and sexually fulfilled to their rightful partners, the contact between them should be minimized. Young men and women should work and study in separate institutions, since being together would weaken their ability to work and concentrate, and their reduced output would hurt soci"Where would a man be more productive: where he is ety. or where he is sitting studying in an all-male institution next to a girl whose skirt reveals her thighs? Which man can do more work: he who is constantly exposed to arousing and exciting faces of made-up women in the street, or factory; or he who does not have to bazaar, office, face such sights?"30 In a final argument to convince women of the usefulreaness of the veil, the author *resorts to psychological the He points out that the veil is in reality soning. catchbest device by w-hich a woman can attain her goal: to a man if She can be much more alluring ing a husband. to him, but and visible she is not completely accessible that await him merely gives him hints of the pleasures

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when he succeeds in having her. Seeing her from behind a veil then heightens the man's desire and increases his ardor in the pursuit of that woman. He will think of her much more highly than if she were unveiled.31 The veil will not prevent a woman from leaving her house and participating in public activities such as shopping, even if the salesperson is a male, or attending a meeting where men are present, so long as she fulfills two requirements: (1) she is dressed in the required manner so as not to attract attention; and (2) she considers the welfare of her family and leaves the house only with her husband's permission and approval.32 The reason why a husband must be consulted is that studies of the Quran reveal that among a man's most important duties is the guidance and education of women.33 A woman's emotionality, and lack of insensitivity, tellectual discernment render her unsuitable for public pursuits such as involvement in the political "It is sphere. more appropriate for women to leave politics to their husbands and to busy themselves with the work for which they are best suited,"34 such as homemaking, taking care of children, and ensuring their husbands' happiness. As for those interested in pursuing a profession, providing they follow Islamic rules of modest dress and veiling, there are suitable for them. professions These are "midwifery, gynecology, the surgical needs of women [since a woman should see a female doctor if possible], sewing, teaching in girls' schools, and nursing."35 Such professions as the judiciary, statecraft, national and parliamentary leadership, representation are the work of men because of their superiority to women in intellectual and self-control.36 ability "Governance and running the affairs of a country with acumen and legislating laws require intellectual ability. If the emotionality and sentimentality that are characteristic of women were to enter these spheres, it could lead to disaster for the country and its people. "37

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The guidance that women require and the consequences of deviation from it were summarized by Ayatollah Khomeini on Woman's Day, May 1980. In his view, a woman lacks the power of discernment due to her total innocence, so she can become subject to exploitation and the power of evil if not given proper guidance and protection. This is why, during the rule of the shah and his father, "They turned women into dolls.... In the name of giving freedom, they did her injustice... .They dragged her down from her high and respected position. In the name of freedom, they took away the freedom of our youth and corrupted the men and women. "38 These misguided women were not aware that they were being diverted from the true path of Islam when they began to demand equality with men. "The clamor of women in the legal profession, women's councils, and women's groups about the rights of women--these are all imitations of Europeans." If these women were not ignorant of their culture and tradition, they would know that Islam gave women rights fourteen hundred years ago that European womimien do not have today. "But the agents of ignorance, and imperialism continue to clamor that instead of tation, Islamic rights they want human rights."39 These are some of the fundamental views that undoubtthe edly guided the leaders of the new regime in defining role of women in the Islamic Republic of Iran and its conunder the In part three of the constitution, stitution. heading "The Rights of the People," it is stated: be Article Twenty: All the members of the nation, they women or men, will equally enjoy the protection of the law in human, political, and economic, social, in accordance with the principles cultural spheres, of Islam. The Government is obliged to enArticle Twenty-One: sure the rights of women in every way in accordance of Islam, and to carry out the with the principles following: 1.

for the developconditions Creation of favorable and the revival of ment of women's personality

IRANIAN STUDIES

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2.

3. 4. 5.

and spiritual their material rights. of mothers, especially during pregProtection Protection of children nancy and lactation. without guardians. of exCreation of a just court for protection of the family and its survival. istence Creation of an insurance for widows and older women without guardians. mothers, in to qualified Granting guardianship the absence of shari'a-approved guardians.

Although these plans for women have not yet been comto predict how women pletely carried out, it is possible The position will fare once the program is fully operative. of women, defined according to Ayatollah Khomeini's interof the shari'a and the interin Tawzih al-Masa'el pretation would of other like-minded religious authorities pretation be: legal majority at the age of 1. A girl would attain 9, at which time she could be married off by her father or Her marriage could be grandfather, her legal guardians. Her husband could have three other permanent or temporary. permanent wives and as many temporary wives as he wishes.40 2. A woman would have to abide by all of a man's and could not leave the house without wishes and pleasures, his permission. 3. A woman contracted in a permanent marriage to a man must not leave the house without her husband's permission and must surrender herself to him so he can attain any She must not refuse to make love to pleasure he desires. him without legitimate shari'a excuse. If she obeys her husband in these respects, he must provide her with food, in books specified clothing, housing, and other furnishings of shari'a.41 4.

A woman may marry only

WOMENIN IRAN

one man.

183

5. A woman may divorce only in cases where a man does not meet the requirements law, but set forth under shari'a she must give him her mahr, or dowry, to get her divorce if the judge of the shari'a court accepts her reason for divorce. However, a man may divorce his wife at will, so long as two male witnesses are present and he is willing to pay her mahr. 6. In the case of divorce (even if caused by the man) a woman will be able to keep her children only for a limited her sons until the age of 2 and her daughters until period, the age of 7, provided she does not remarry within that time: 7. the legal

Women will profession

not be permitted to pursue careers in and will not be appointed to judgeships.42

8. Women will be encouraged to pursue occupations that fulfill the needs of other women, such as gynecology, for women, teaching for women, medical services dentistry and other strictly in girls' schools, feminine work, such as dressmaking.43 from entering politics 9. Women will be discouraged or the legislature, since they lack intellectual ability and discerning such careers require. judgment, qualities For the same reason, they will also be excluded from high posts in government or any career that may require decision making.44 Women will be encouraged to marry and bear chil10. task and duty of women in dren, since this is the specific society. This is the line of thought concerning women that is advoThe cated by the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran. is advocated by many authors in the policy and philosophy

popular publications, and Zan-e Ruz.

such as Ettela'at,

Jumhuri-ye

Islami,

While causing much alarm among women, their public has not been forceful. response to these policies Many reasons account for the anemic resistance, perhaps the IRANIAN STUDIES

184

major reason being that they do not have much impact on the majority of women; rather, is on their major effect educated professional and working class women who belong to the urban middle and upper classes. The regime has tried, through a vigorous campaign in the press, to isolate the women opposed to its policies by discrediting them and representing their way of life as alien, corrupt, A reimmoral, and destructive of Islam. cent editorial commenting on the protest of a group of women employees who wore black during a demonstration against the effort of the government to impose a code of dress on them stated, "Wearing black, half naked, with gestures resembling the dance of prostitutes, with stench from their European perfumes, covered with jewels, while stepping on the bodies of martyrs, they raised their fists. Oh, yes, that same spot, where the young spilled their pure blood for preserving the independence and integrity of the Islamic Republic, is now the scene of filthy protests, which dream of creating dissent in Iran and dream of restoring the fascist regime, dependent on the U.S .... "45 It is too early to determine whether or not the present regime has succeeded in creating general antipathy toward women who oppose its policies, but no doubt its efforts in this direction will be facilitated in several ways. First, the masses of Iranian women have not been affected by the restrictions placed on the more educated working women, as illustrated by the controversy over the forcible of an Islamic hejab (either imposition chador or the large Islamic scarf). For most Iranian women, the chador is already the accepted mode of cover. Their lack of political awareness coupled with the inability of the more educated women to express their views publicly will prevent the majority of Iranian women from realizing that at issue here are more fundamental questions. Finally, some of the major laws that were abrogated, such as the Family Protection Law, had not been in effect long enough to prove their usefulness for those who needed them most, the poorer women.

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In the early months of the revolution in an atmosphere tolerant of freedom of expression, that was still relatively to the government policies. a minority did express opposition These women were afraid that the leaders of the Islamic Retoward working women. One compupublic were unsympathetic "In the near future a good perter specialist predicted, women who now have jobs will lose centage of the qualified them."46 There was anxiety that the government would tend belief that a woman's place is to enforce the traditional in the home and would thus negate the fact that "in the recent past men had begun to accept the job done without looking at the sex of the person doing it."47 Prominent women like Parivash Khajehnuri, a lawyer felt "the need and active campaigner for women's rights, groups."48 for uniting and nonpolitical both in political and professor Others, like Simin Daneshvar, a university if zealots author, were aware of the need for resistance But women were not should try to limit women's rights. able to rally their forces to prevent the rapid abrogation of laws and rights they had gained during the previous decseem surprising in view may at first ades. This failure of the large number of women who had actively participated and the large number of women in the proin the revolution in teaching. fessions, especially of wommay account for the inability Several factors en to effectively brought pressures prevent the increasing to bear on them. Perhaps the most important was the revolack of an ideological framework. In the words lution's "It was basically a fight against corrupof H. S. Javadi, true of the tion and despotism. "49 This was especially the majority of in the revolution, women who participated Of the education and awareness.50 whom lacked political in the revolution, only the regroups that participated Khomeini seems to have ligious group headed by Ayatollah it was in touch with the masses, had a definite platform; both men and women. Its view of the role of women in sofrom that of most of the secular ciety diverged radically with which the religious The swiftness group movements. the vacuum left by the shah's departure and moved to fill

IRANIAN STUDIES

186

its shrewdness in calling for an early referendum to profit by its popularity with the masses took the secular, including women's, groups by surprise. The lack of political experience and acumen among women's groups prevented them from realizing that they had more to lose by boycotting the constitutional assembly, later known as the Assembly of Experts, than by participating in it.51 The only female participant was Monireh Gorji, who had been hand-picked by the Islamic Republican Party to represent and "defend" the interests of "Iranian women." Although Mrs. Gorji believed that no group has been more exploited in the past than women, she agreed with the men of her party that any laws in contradiction to the shari'a must be changed. This resulted in the repeal of the Family Protection Law of 1967 and restored the male rights to divorce, polygamy, and--in the case of divorce--custory of children after age 2 for boys and 7 for girls. Nevertheeven Mrs. Gorji regretted less, the absence of more women in the Assembly of Experts, "where the fate of women was determined by men." She also expressed misgivings about the shooting of prostitutes, whom she looked upon as "victims of the previous regime" who "should have been rehabilitated.",52 However, neither Mrs. Gorji nor others who have condemned these executions have mentioned that these acts were not consonant with the Quran or the shari'a. women did not take advantage of the Many professional earlier free atmosphere to voice discontent or organize because they simply lacked time. A woman banker explained, "For us it is a matter of priorities, whether to spend an hour at home with the family or to spend it at a meeting with other women discussing our rights."53 The lack of and organizational political experience skill is undoutedly another reason why the majority of middle-class women employed in government offices or the private sector have not shown much reaction yet. However, the most important reason for their silence may be that for many of these middleclass women the "family budgets are as dependent on the woman's salary as on the man's," and this is likely to be controlling as the economy declines and inflation rises.54 WOMEN IN

IRAN

187

They may be hoping to keep their silent in the face of increasing ment to send them home.

jobs longer by keeping pressure by the govern-

It would be wrong to assume that all educated and professional women in Iran opposed the new regime's policies. Early on, a considerable number of university students began to voluntarily don the chador or large scarf as a mark of Islamic identity. Furthermore, as Furugh Marvi Khorasani, the newly appointed director of the agricultural committee of Tehran province said, "The pressure is directed toward women who are not conforming to the Islamic hejab."55 Some of the educated women who favored the government's policies had much to gain from the rise of the regime such as Zahra Rahnavard, who in June 1980 wrote a series of articles in defense of the veil and the philosophy of the government toward women; in July she was appointed editor in chief of the Ettela'at Banovan.56 But even some of the government supporters who agreed in general with the need for women to become more consciously Islamic, have expressed discontent about the efforts of the government to impose the hejab. A'zam Taleqani,thedaughter of the late Ayatollah Taleqani, for example, asked that the Islamic mode of dress not be imposed on women unless it were also imposed on men.57 Until recently, feminine activists who espoused Marxist ideas felt the basic conflict was a class struggle and that to separate the women's issue would weaken their cause. As the government stepped up its efforts, some of these women began to feel that women were being placed at a great disadvantage. But, whereas the principal Marxist women's group, represented by the Tudeh Party, chose to withhold criticism--in line with its policy of cooperation with the government--some independent pro-Marxist groups, such as Cherikha-ye Fada'i-ye Khalq and Mojahedin-e Khalq, became vocal in their opposition to the government's increasingly policies. Some of these women have even begun to voice discontent over the lack of sympathy and support coming from their male colleagues and over the men's failure to express public opposition to the plight of the women. One author

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188

called for women to "unite chauvanism. "58

in the face

of universal

male

Although Marxist writers did not approve of the shah's regime, they conceded reluctantly on behalf that his efforts of women were first steps in the right direction. This is reflected in their complaint that "instead of improving the Family Protection Law, they [the new regime] abrogated it" and raised the specter of forced veiling. They concluded, of the new rulers toward women's issues "The attitude indicates that their perception of women and their problems is 9 The promany times worse than was their predecessor's." Marxist groups were active in the strikes and demonstrations at the universities that were organized to protest the new regime's policies. They may have been one of main reasons for the government's to close the universities decision in September 1980. The apparent lack of opposition to government policies concerning women may also be partly accounted for by official censorship; as it becomes more pervasive, expression of opposition is becoming more difficult. Linked to its of free speech, the government is trying to suppression popularize its ideas about women by publishing regularly the views of religious figures, such as ayatollahs Khomeini, and Mottahari, Taleqani, and compatible articles by women like Zahra Rahnavard and Sadiqeh Taleqani. Womenwho express opposition are subjected to harassment. When women countered the government's intention to impose the Islamic veil on employees, demonstrators were harassed by hecklers, arrested by police for disturbing public order, and labeled as cabaret dancers and aristocrats in newspaper headlines.60 In a published newspaper photograph, however, these demonstrators appeared to be young women of university age, and they were wearing the Islamic scarf. Next, it was reported that women who opposed the veil had been fired or charged with collaborating with the CIA in arranging the demonstrations. Recent reports indicate, also, that a considerable number of women are in prison for allegedly political reasons.61

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189

The leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran seem to be hoping that eventually the dissatisfied women will acthat cept the rationale behind its policies and recognize of libwhat had formerly seemed to them as the beginnings "In the erty under the old regime was in fact entrapment. Reza Khan and name of freedom, progress, and civilization, but MohammadReza Khan led all our youths to prostitution took all their freedoms away," Ayatollah Khomeini said in an address to the women of Iran. He urged the women "to forget the behavior of the time of taqut [the tyrant (Shah)] and try to rebuild our dear Iran as it is worthy of them and their children, so that we can be freed of all dependence."62 to assess the success of these arguIt is difficult ments. in force, one may get the impression With censorship that women have acquiesced in their fate and have accepted the role designed for them by the present rulers of Iran. However, their silence may be more a sign of temporary confusion rather than a surrender of all that they accomplished however: One thing seems certain, in the last eight decades. educated women from all walks of life and of all political have become more conscious of their identity as persuasions Time women and of their own special needs and interests. will be the judge of the extent to which the chador-clad fist raised or gun women of Iran, who took to the streets, to accept the are willing in hand to support the revolution, concept of Islamic government and the notions of womanhood thrust upon them by the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

NOTES

1.

One such occasion was reported during the severe famine See Mirza Ibrahim Vaqa-ye Negar, cited in of 1871-72. Khan Malek Sasani, S7lyasatgaran-e Dowreh-ye Qajar.

2.

Nazem al-Islam

Kermani, Tarikh-e

Intisharat-e (Tehran: 1967), Pt. 1, p. 121.

IRANIAN

STUDIES

Bonyad-i

Bidari-ye

Farhang-e

Iraniyan

Iran,

1346/

190

3.

to women's roles,

For references

see Pari Shaykholislami,

Badr al va Andishmand-e Iran; Ruznamehnegar ta InMashrutiyat Muluk Bamdad, Zan-e Irani az Inqelab-e by Mangol (Tehran: 1347/1968; and articles Sefid qelab-e Zanan-e

in Iran, 1905-1911," "Womenand Revolution Bayat-Philipp, in L. Beck and N. Keddie, Women in the Muslim World Press, 1978), Harvard University (Cambridge, Mass.: Qodrat va Maqam-e Zan dar pp. 295-308; G. Insafpur, pp. 439-43. (Tehran, 1346/1967), Tarikh Advar-e 4.

"Maqam-e Zan" cited Hajji Mirza Yahya Dowlatabadi, Zanan-e Nami-ye Islam Shams al-Muluk Javaherkalam, Iran,

in va

vii-ix.

pp.

5.

Ibid.

6.

"Jam 'iyat-e Amuzeshi va Ishtiqlal-e 1978; and Simin Behbahani, June-July Irani ra Mochaleh Konand," Majalleh-ye 1979. 1358/July

Zanan," Tir 2537/ "Nagozarid Zan-e Jumhuri,

26 Tir,

7.

Shaykh Yahya Nuri, Huquq va Hudud-e Zan HojjatalIslam pp. 145-48. 1340/1961), dar Islam (Tehran:

8.

Nuri,

9.

Ibid.,

Huquq va Hudud,

pp. 106-7,

pp.

61-62.

and 242.

I, no. 3 (20 Tir

1979).

Iranian

11.

See various

12.

Cheh especially by Ali Shari'ati, See various writings Shi'a n.d.) and "Mas'uliyat-e Bayad Kard (Tehran: 1350/1971). Budan" in Shi'a (Tehran:

13.

Ali 32.

14.

Ibid.,

articles

Shari'ati,

p.

WOMEN IN IRAN

1358/11

July

10.

in Nameh-ye Parsi

Zan-e Mosalman (Tehran:

15, no.

n.d.),

1.

pp. 20-

32.

191

Enqelabi-ye

Iran,"

15.

"Zanan dar Jonbesh-i 15, pp. 82-91

16.

Ibid.

17.

Diyana, "Garayesh-e Zanan beh Sazmandehi dar Mobarezate Ejtema'i," Ketab-e Jom'eh 1, No. 30, p. 40.

18.

Nameh-ye

Simin Daneshvar, "WomenMust Educate the Masses," 1, No. 17 (2 Aban 1358/24 October 1979).

Parsi

The

Iranian,

The Iranian, the Issues," December 1979).

1, No. 22 (10 Ad-

19.

"Unveiling har 1358/1

20.

Nuri,

21.

Ibid.,

p.

53.

22.

Ibid.,

p.

54.

23.

Ibid.,

pp.

24.

Ibid.,

p.

25.

Hejab (Tehran: Morteza Mottahari, Masaleh-ye e Islami-ye pp. 70-71. Pezeshkan, 1353/1974),

26.

Ibid.,

p.

44.

27.

Ibid.,

p.

61.

28.

Ibid.,

p.

62.

29.

Ibid.,

p.

56.

30.

Ibid.,

p.

69.

31.

Ibid.,

p.

72.

32.

Ibid.,

pp.

Huquq va Hudud.

IRANIAN STUDIES

S4-60. 64.

Anjoman-

83-84.

192

33.

Khalil 1972).

Khalilian,

34.

Nuri,

35.

Ibid.,

p.

99.

36.

Ibid.,

p.

236.

37.

Ibid.,

p.

238.

38.

Ayatollah Khomeini, Jomhuri ment, 16 Urdit h sht 1359/6

39.

Nuri,

40.

Ayatollah

Khomeini,

41.

Ibid.,

490.

42.

Nuri,

43.

Ibid.

44.

Ibid.

45.

Ettela'at,

46.

Iranian

47.

Ibid.

48.

Ibid.

49.

Ibid.,

1 (7 Mordad 1358/8

August

50.

Ibid .,

17 (2 Aban 1358/24

October

1979).

51.

Ibid.,

17 (2 Aban 1358/24

October

1979).

52.

Interview with Mrs. Monireh Gorji, (16 Aban 1979/7 November 1979).

Huquq va Hudud,

p.

Huquq va Hudud,

p.

Zan dar

Sima-ye

p.

Quran (Tehran,

1351/

242.

Women's Day suppleIslami, May 1980.

iv.

Tawzih

al-Masa'el,

p.

509.

Huquq va Hudud.

15 Tir 1359/6

July

1980,

1, no. 3 (20 Tir 1358/11

WOMENIN IRAN

p. 1.

July

1979).

1979).

Iranian

1, no.

19

193

no. 3 (20 Tir 1358/11

July

1979).

53.

Ibid.,

54.

Ibid.

55.

Zan-e Ruz 780 p. 51.

56.

For Mrs. Rahnavard articles, see Ettela'at (12-15 Tir 1359/3 July 1980).

57.

Et.tela'at,

58.

Neda, "Women in Iranian graphed.)

Revolution,"

59.

Diyana,

p. 41.

60.

Ettela'at

61.

62.

16186

Ketab-e

1359/3

(10 Tir 1359/1

Jom'eh,

16182

"Dwyer Returns Chicago

(15 Shahrivar

(15 Tir 1359/July

September

July

1980),

16180-82

1980). p. 1.

(Mimeo-

1980).

from Iran; Spy Charge Nonsense," February 12, 1981, p. 25.

Sun-Times,

Khomeini, 1980.

IRANIAN STUDIES

Jomhuri

Islami,

16 Ordibehesht

1359/6

May

194

Iranian Studies, Volume XIII, Nos. 1-4, 1980

The StructuralFoundations of the National Minority Problem in RevolutionaryIran Leonard M. Helfgott We commonly think of Iran as a unified entity with a political history beginning somewhere between the sixth and seventh centuries B.C., a period roughly corresponding to the time of the religious figure Zoroaster and the pol itical figure Cyrus the Great. Iran reaches further Culturally, back in time through an epic mythology that pictures Aryan heroes in struggle with Turanian invaders and links the ancient and the mythic with the modern and the real. Conceptually, Iran begins as an empire and ends up as a nationstate, a path similar following in our minds to the movement from imperial Rome to modern Italy. The reality, however, is distinct from the myth. Iran has always been a multicultural society divided into a number of socioeconomic formations--a sedentary agricultural formation based in the Central Iranian Plateau, surrounded by pastoral nomadic and seminomadic formations located in the Zagros Mountains and other border regions. The division existed during the period of the Persians and the Medes (who were probably

Leonard M. Helfgott Western Washington

is Associate University.

Professor

of History

at

This paper has benefited through careful readings by professors Mangol Bayat of Harvard University, Lois Beck of Washington University, and Eric Hooglund of Bowdoin College.

195

during the Arab invasion of the Kurds), it was reinforced and it developed as a permanent configuraseventh century, tion during the extended Turkic conquests and migrations The current national century. that ended in the fifteenth from the clash of these distinct minority problem results formations during the period of their disinsocioeconomic by the spread of and transformation initiated tegration in Iran. capitalist relations Iranian state was composed of a The precapitalist (1) a sedformations number of separate but interlocking on the and urban formation concentrated entary agricultural (2) pastoral noCentral Iranian Plateau and in Azerbaijan; madic and seminomadic (transhumant) formations on the pein parts of Kurdistan and the southern riphery of the state, of the Zagros mountain range, northeast of the extensions and in Caspian Sea in Gurgan and Khurasan, in Baluchistan, The geographic and province of Khuzistan. the southwestern structural boundaries between the sedentary formations and the nomadic and transhumant formations were often not clearIn the case of transhumance, the very nature of econocut.; nomadic mic life combined settled farming with seasonal, relationships between the The structural animal herding. are not components of these societies nomadic and settled period However, in the precapitalist fully understood. associated with nomadism that were rooted the institutions in the communal ownership of pastures dominated social and also occurred in Sedentary cultivation political life. Cultivation nomadic tribes. areas dominated by pastoral for at least took place wherever there was adequate rainfall and econodry farming1 and wherever political subsistence Thus, mic relations encouraged it. with the nomadic tribes of these areas as pastoral nomadic and the categorization seminomadic socioeconomic formations implies the domination not their exclusivity. of pastoral nomadic structures, was somewhat more compliIn Kurdistan the situation That area contained a significant cated. urban, commercial nomadic, and transhumant population as well as sedentary, elements. Among rural Kurds there seems to have been sigmovement from peasant to nomad to peasant and a nificant and concurrent process of the formation, disintegration, IRANIAN

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formation of tribal, nomadic units as responses to unstable and external internal economic conditions and milpolitical itary pressures. These processes also stimulated movement between the Kurdish countryside and the major Kurdish cities. Thus, to reduce the entire Kurdish population to membership in a series of tribes tends to distort the complex history and social of the Kurdish people. structure However, the mountainous terrain of much of Kurdistan and the area's location between Iran and the Ottoman Empire reinforced tendencies toward political and economic isolation and toward the perpetuation and reproduction of social and political structures largely dominated by tribal khans whose military power rested on the continued support of the Kurdish nomadic tribes. Therefore, while even during the precapitalist period the Kurdish nomads were a distinct minority of the Kurdish population, they played an inordinately large role in determining both internal relations and the relations between Iranian Kurdistan and the Iranian state. Although the Iranian sedentary formations were highly compartmentalized, three major factors contributed to a tenuous unity, (1) the urban bazaar, which expressed the symbiosis of city and countryside through domination of local networks of production and exchange relations; (2) a more or less homogeneous religious system that provided legal and ideological unity; ineffective (3) a largely state bureaucracy that sought the transfer of some of the surplus into state coffers. However, it is probably accurate to argue that before the late nineteenth century, national unity was at best tenuous and that the major sedentary regions and the tribal areas were de facto independent from one another and dominated from local centers ruled by tribal khans and landlords or semiautonomous members of the royal family. 2 A national economy did not exist, and the state functioned to collect tribute from the separate sedentary areas to support the royal family, its retainers, and a limited number of public projects. However, the similar socioeconomic composition of the Central Iranian Plateau and Azerbaijan provided a basis for unification during the extended period of modern state formation beginning in the mid-nineteenth century. NATIONAL MINORITY

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nomadic and seminomadic formations were The pastoral This statement does not closed economic systems. largely with interaction of their constant preclude a recognition that the quality It simply asserts the sedentary sectors. was not of the nature to transform the of that interaction which remained, until the modern of production, relations based on communal landholdsystems era, rooted in kinship based on the ing forms rather than on monetary relations century Until the nineteenth private ownership of land.3 the nomadof Iran into world politics, and the integration ic groups on the periphery provided most of the military The tribal armies, however, reof the state. resources leaders thus rather than state, mained loyal to regional, with the state, best, at identification, a loose perpetuating of to the rise and fall of a succession and contributing coalition supported by one or another tribal dynasties century. throughout most of the eighteenth Iranian state was composed of Thus, the precapitalist the others one sedentary, formations, several socioeconomic to the state were nomadic and seminomadic, whose relations but by or ethnic consciousness determined not by national of Iran into the The integration structure. socioeconomic procentury initiated world economy during the nineteenth found changes, both on the level of the economy and in the In turn, these interand function of the state. structure and sedentary nomadic the transformed connected processes their relarelations, of society, their internal sectors It is to the state. their relations tions to one another, in this context that the uneven rhythms of development of and cullinguistic by the different consciousness national tural groups occurred. consciousness ethnic nor national Although neither role in Iranian history before the played a significant sectors of the popthe Persian-speaking century, twentieth heartland held rooted in the urban and agricultural ulation and in administrative, cultural, positions pre-eminent those groups that we now Conversely, commercial affairs. from the remained isolated minorities consider national The Azeri Turks in centers of state power and influence. to region of Iran are a major exception the northwestern IRANIAN

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whether in The Iranian state, which I will return later. took the hands of a Persian or a non-Persian ruling family, Persian character which tended to reinon an increasingly distinctions between the Persians and force the existing non-Persians. has An imperial, bureaucratic, and Persian character of Iran since the prebeen a major feature in the history interaction However, the Persian sector's Islamic period. and identification with the state and with emerging state Or stated difduring the Safavid period. forms intensified they assumed a as Safavid state forms developed, ferently, through the Zand and early which persisted Persian character the links Along with this identification, Qajar periods.4 stronger after the Safavids grew increasingly with religion Shilism deIslam as the state religion. proclaimed Shi'ite as a socioreligious on three levels: veloped simultaneously life; most areas of urban and village system that penetrated as activity; matrix of most intellectual as the theoretical a legal system. The mosque, the bazaar, and the madrasa beidecame almost interchangeable centers of Persian social, Thus, the and commercial existence. ological, religious, the state, of the Persian ethnic sector, interpenetration and Shilite Islam developed as a complex entity that preceded the development of either Persian or Iranian nationin shaping its content. alism but ultimately was central persisted nature of Iranian society The bifurcated during the period of premodern state formation under the Neither state strucZands, and early Qajars. Safavids, tures nor the economy of the sedentary sector significantformations the nomadic and seminomadic social ly penetrated from the rest of socidistinct which remained structurally commonly was one of milirelationship ety. The tributary of economic rather than an actual transfer tary levies arrangements and even these limited tributary resources, The operated only during periods of strong central rule. tribal They leaders mediated between tribe and state. unit to the state and commanded the tribal represented tribal in the state armies. Because of the corlevies the state was forced to rely on porate nature of society, NATIONAL MINORITY

PROBLEM

199

the tribal khans to maintain local security. For this reason tribal khans became provincial officials and thereby actors in state politics and competitors for the scant surplus generated by the urban and rural economies. During the extended period of state weakness in the eighteenth century, the tribal khans, supported by tribal armies, actually competed for state power. During much of the nineteenth century, the tribal units functioned in state politics by supporting one or another provincial strongman, usually a Qajar, prince and rival for the throne. The major structural changes in the pastoral nomadic and seminomadic social formations took root in the mid-nineteenth century, although in many cases the process of change had begun earlier. These changes differed in degree from group to group depending on the particular configuration of the social formation, proximity to the growing national center, and the level of involvement in state politics by the tribal elites. The state's need for revenue led to direct interference into essential inner-tribal relations. Although tribal khans previously had served the state as provincial governors, these relationships were increasingly formalized and assigning more specific tribally reby bestowing titles lated administrative duties to the khans.5 The integration of the tribal khans into the Qajar bureaucracy merged with growing monetary pressures in the rural areas to quicken the processes of internal change which took the general form of the transformation of communally held lands to private hands and the subsequent creation of landlord-peasant relationships. From his studies of the Boir Ahmad, a Luri tribal group, Leoffler concludes that: "the chiefs detached owed their themselves from those to whomthey had originally power and translated their position as tribal leaders into that of landlords.",6 "the Thus, according to Loeffler: general Iranian landlord-peasant system could overlay--imperfectly though, given the population's unwillingness to more or less egalaccept it in principle--the pre-existing itarian tribal system. "7 In addition, those tribal groups that remained primarily pastoralists were increasingly integrated into the monetary economy. The increasing monetarization of the pastoral economies is suggested by the growth of the carpet industry in the latter part of the IRANIAN STUDIES

200

areas renineteenth century. The major carpet-producing lied on the wool produced by the pastoralists and, in some women. Therefore, cases, on the carpets knotted by tribal it is not surprising that the major carpeting exporting centers emerged in areas close to large sheep- and goatherding tribes, i.e., Shiraz (Qashqa'i, Khamseh), Isfahan (Bakhtiyari), Tabriz (Shahsavan), Mashad (Turkoman, Baluch), Kerman (Afshar). Iran into the world Thus, the process of integrating the destruction capitalist economy initiated and transfornomadic and seminomadic sociomation of the precapitalist From a state whose population was more economic formations. Iran than 25 percent nomadic in the mid-nineteenth century, less than five percent nomadic. is presently This is not into a developing to imply an even integration homogeneous As capitalism economic unit. shapes uneven development it likewise among nation-states, shapes uneven development This paper argues that it is prewithin nation-states. cisely this uneven development that underlies the current minority problem. led to the transformation of the socioSedentarization of the pastoral economic structures nomadic and transhumant This was a complicated tribes. process which began with the chieftains' gaining control of the land and then extending of the tribesthis control to the sheep-herding activities after they gained men. Among the Boir Ahmad, the chieftains, to assert private the power to extort and keep rents, i.e., ownership rights over land,. were able to impose taxes on in kind, and to levy other dues on the albeit livestock, This process also affected the nomadic groups tribespeople. in that the khans' increasing power over the peasant population combined with more extensive administrative power to of dues on the pastoralists. allow for the imposition The changing relationships between chieftains and tribespeople occurred in different rhythms among the large transhumant and nomadic tribal groups that existed among the Kurds and dominated the Turkoman, Arab and Baluch socioeconomic formations. Because of linguistic and territorial claims, we now define these groups as national minorities while we con-

NATIONAL MINORITY PROBLEM

201

Qashqa'i and others tinue to refer to the Lur, Bakhtiyari, However, the process of the disinteas Iranian "tribes." formations and their insocial gration of the precapitalist into the monetary economy was similar in all cases. tegration rooted Kinship no longer expressed economic relations in defining but persisted relations in communal landholding as What Alavi has described relations. political internal changing economic despite persisted loyalties" "primordial natfrom a so-called Thus, the transformation relations.9 did not reural economy to one based on monetary relations to the tribesin relation duce the khans to mere landlords ideology concerning men. Rather, the veneer of tribal and the current role of the khan has persisted leadership of the tribof the integration is determined by the quality economy. al group into the national relations complemented changes in Changes in internal between the Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis and Turkothe relations the Persian and i.e., mans and the rest of Iranian society, process in the provinThe sedentarization Azeri sectors. of the areas to the transformation cial areas was central into economic periphminorities by the national inhabited dominated by to the center or metropolis eries in relation (1) the ways: This took place in the following Persians. of the tribal khans into the growing further integration landholding national economy as part of an interregional (2) the movement of Persian landowners into the provclass; the Pahlavi family formed the core of this inces (recently of the ba(3) the extension group in the Turkoman area); exchange network into the minority areas; zaar-dominated of an unequal exchange of labor from the (4) the creation periphery to the center which took two basic forms--recastin the modern of production relations ing precapitalist urban the size of an impoverished, economy and increasing (5) the spread of the labor pool through sedentarization; (6) with the apparatus into the provinces; state financial bypassing the Khuzistan province, of oil-rich exception and other modernizaminority regions in industrialization tion projects.

IRANIAN STUDIES

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Most of these processes affected the Persian and Azeri peasantry as well as the sedentarized nomads and semi-nomads. The Pahlavi family formed the largest unit landholding throughout the country; rural areas in Azerbaijan and the Central Iranian Plateau functioned in a peripheral and subordinate relationship to the growing urban areas; the central tax system reached the Persian as well as the non-Persian; recently dislocated Persians and Azeris formed the bulk of the unemployed and underemployed in the large cities; relative backwardness increased in some Persian and Azeri speaking areas of Iran. Simultaneously, upwardly mobile elements from the peripheral, minority regions migrated into the cities and became successful, forming part of the growing commercial, bureaucratic, and intellectual elite in modernizing Iran. Because the transition to capitalism has transformed social relations throughout Iran and also has produced a greater degree of intermingling of ethnic groups within both traditional and emerging national social classes, there has been a tendency to reduce the minority issue to one of culture rather than of structure. Class, however defined, has superseded ethnicity, the argument goes, and the linguistic minorities have been merely cultural victims of an overaggressive zeal to modernize expressed first by the constitutionalists, by much of the growing intelligent sia, including many Azeris (e.g., Ahmad Kasravi),10 and put into effect brutally by the Pahlavis. This argument, however, ignores many of the realities of Iran's recent history and of its contemporary social structure. Minorities still form a majority of Iran's population. Despite large internal the great majority of Kurds still migrations, live in Kurdistan, Baluch in Baluchistan, etc.; this is also true among the tribal Bakhtiyari, Luri, and Qashqa'i groups as well as others. The breakdown of precapitalist social formations in unique social resulted configurations that are neither reproductions nor extensions of the Persian center nor carbon copies of one another. Each minority group has experienced a unique recasting of precapitalist social relations into social relations compatible with capitalism in Iran. a consciousness Finally, of this uniqueness has emerged among the various minority groups with imNATIONAL MINORITY PROBLEM

203

plications

that go well beyond the redressing

of cultural

discrimination.

The transformation of the socioeconomic structures of the minority groups made possible their eventual integration into the state, or perhaps more correctly stated, the expansion of state forms into the social fabric of the national minority groups. The draftee replaced the tribal village became the primary military levee, the agricultural unit of taxation, the state bureaucracy expanded into the In esminority region integrating some local elements. sence, the state accomplished a surface integration of the minorities while simultaneously sponsoring economic backThis resulted in the imposition wardness in the periphery. of Persian culture on the minorities while at the same time outlawing the teaching and development of local language and culture. The integration of the minority groups into the state and into a developing national economy was part of a larger process of the integration of the Iranian state and economy Thus, the changes in the minority into world capitalism. regions occurred alongside, and as a result of, responses by the Persian sector to Western impact. One of these responses was the development of a Persian consciousness, equated at least to the Persians with a national consciousness, as a focus of resistance to outside domination. This was an extremely complex phenomenon that is inexplicable outside the context of class realignment, the redefinition of the state and the growing tensions between secular and It is a phenomenon embedded in each thought. religious major anti-Western outburst and in each major attempt at internal reform: in the response to the tobacco monopoly, Revolution, in the Mosaddeq revolt, in the Constitutional This focus on the and in the present Islamic republic. connection between a national consciousness and a Persian in the consciousness was expressed in a 1925 editorial journal Ayandeh (The Future): All who value Iranian history, the Persian language, and the Shi'ah religion must realize that they have much to lose if the Iranian state crumbles. And the IRANIAN STUDIES

204

Iranian state is in danger of crumbling as long as as its citizens consider themselves not primarily Iranians, but as Turks, Arabs, Kurds, Bakhtiyaris, minorand Turkmans. We must, therefore, eliminate ity languages, regional sentiments, and tribal allegiances, and transform the various inhabitants of present day Iran into one nation. This we can accomplish by radically expanding the elementary educational system, and thus taking the Farsi lanto the provinces.11 guage and Iranian history What must be noted here is that what appeared to the nationalism and patriotism in relation developed in the context of Persian cultural, political hegemony within Iran and, although as Persian Azeri intellectuals, was realized relation to the non-Persian minorities during century.

as Persian outside world economic, and shared by many chauvinism in the twentieth

The case of the Azeri Turkish minority is different from that of the other minorities. The Azeri Turks are a much larger minority comprising about one-fourth of the But more important, of Iran. population the socioeconomic of Azerbaijan is similar, if not identical, to structure Since the Safavid period, that of the Persian sector. element of the state econAzerbaijan has been an integral center and as the pivotomy as an agrarian and handicraft al area in trade with the Ottoman Empire, the MediterraneThe precapitalist social of prorelations an, and Russia. duction were essentially the same as those on the Central Both areas contained a landlord class Iranian Plateau. and a stratified peasantry linked to an urban network of and exchange dominated by the bazaari class. production units in the area were central Although tribal to the rise of the Safavids, they diminished in importance as the Turkic tribespeople either merged with the sedentary population, weakened or divided by the state, were forcibly or retreated to noncultivated pasturelands. Thus, the structural distinctions widened between the settled Azeri population and the local pastoral nomadic tribes while they decreased between the settled Azeris and the Persians. In addition, the central position of the Azeris in Iran's NATIONAL MINORITY PROBLEM

205

economy extended into the Qajar capital in the nineteenth century. Azeri Turks were instrumental in developing Tehran into a major commercial center through domination ofthe bazaar and still retain strong influence there. Azerbaijan is also a major center of Shi'ism and indeed served as the birthplace of the Safavid movement. The of Shi'ism and the urban middle classes interpenetration that of the Persian urban centers also duplicated in the period up to and including the Constitutional Revolution when it served as a basis for political action in both areas. It is likely that the Iranian bourgeoisie developed as a national class during the period of resistance to British and Russian imperialism before the First World War. However, this national class formation occurred in a religious setting that linked the Persian and Azeri ulama well before the nineteenth century. That this linkage persists into the present is suggested by data collected by Fischer in Qom in the mid-1970s. Fischer writes that nearly onethird of the students attending Qom madrasas are Turkish Iran.12 speakers from northwestern with the Iranian Finally, the Azeri identification state has roots in the Safavid period that deepened in the with the Russians nineteenth century. During the conflicts that ended in 1828 with the Treaty of Turkomanchai, Azerand adbaijan became the center of the limited military reform in Iran. The first ministrative Qajar ruler, Aqa Mohammad, recognized the importance of the area, made it the seat of the heir apparent, and assigned some of his most able advisers to the Azerbaijani government, thereby of relatively bureaua series forward-looking initiating crats that included Qa'im Maqam and Amir Kabir.li Although these men were Persians, they encouraged an increasingly of Azerbaijan with the Iranian state closer identification control during a period marked by a monarchy in precarious The process quickened during over the rest of the country. in the 1890s and continued the anticoncession agitation Revolution when through the period of the Constitutional Azeri identification with the state seemed all but comdifand linguistic plete. However, cultural, regional, and were exacerbated ferences persisted by the growing

IRANIAN

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of modernization identification and national strength with a linguistically unified and by the minority polpopulation icies of the Pahlavis. The development of national consciousness among the various ethnic and linguistic groups in Iran is a twentiethcentury process shaped by the integration of Iran into the world economy as a peripheral and dependent state. Nationalism emerged, therefore, in two dialectically interacting forms: first, of the state in relation as the redefinition to domination and dependence imposed externally; second, as the definition of national within the state among identity the various linguistic to an internal groups in relation domination imposed by the Persian plurality. of Iranian nationalism The expressions at the turn of the century recognized the existence of the state in relation to outside forces even if they did not articulate specifically Iran's forced participation in an international nation-state system. The internal forces most conducive to this nascent nationalism were those most threatened by capitalist economic penetration and by Western secular ideas, the bazaaris, and the ulama. During this period, the Iranian middle class was more or less cohesive and not yet marked by a significant sector attached to foreign interests. Here, notions of state, and religion people, transpurposefully cended the monarchy, which was accurately identified as an agent of foreign interests. For the first time in modern an expression history of the Iranian state developed both independent from, and in opposition to, the monarchy. This reinforced existing antiroyalist tendencies and added a secular dimension to a growing popular sentiment that questioned the power of the monarchy. At this time, however, secular thought was contained largely within a Shi'ite theoretical matrix which resulted in a pluralistic politics among the ulama-led nationalists. Only in this context can be understand the seemingly contradictory combination of fundamentalism, nationalism, constiand liberal tutionalism, reformism expressed by the ulama and other intellectuals. Thus, early nationalist expressions were marked by their religious content and were loNATIONAL MINORITY PROBLEM

207

cated primarily in the mosque-bazaar nexus. Their secular purposes were twofold: to strengthen the state in relation to external pressures and to resist the threat posed by foreign capital to the precapitalist bourgeoisie. This nationalism did not extoll the virtues of one internal linguistic group over another. Rather, early Iranian nationalism sought to uncover and glorify the past history of the state while asserting a fictional unity of the people. The Persian linguistic group, located in the center of Iran's contemporary social and economic structure and of and mythology claimed an identity its history with notions of state and people. In addition, the gates were opened for the identification of the monarchy with the image of an historically homogeneous Iranian state. Both processes ultimately excluded recognition of the linguistic and cultural differences of the large Azeri Turkish minority and of the peripheral tribal, linguistic groups. of Persian nationalism The identity with the Iranian state achieved its fullest expression during the reign of Reza Shah. He attempted to merge state, monarchy, and Perinto an ideological sian nationalism unity that explicitly rejected cultural pluralism as antimodern and treasonous. He imposed Persian culture and the Persian language on the minorities while forbidding local cultural expression in any form. His policy of forced sedentarization sought to of autonomous existence destroy any vestige that remained in the tribal areas. His economic policies favored the Persian-dominated center rather than the non-Persian provinces. He identified what was Persian as modern and forward looking, what was non-Persian as backward. By linking Persian nationalism with a concrete plan a growing secular of modernization, Reza Shah reinforced in those elements of the middle class nationalism centered attached to the monarchy and to those sectors of the econThe shah's attempted omy dominated by foreign capital. of state forms and the economy also increased modernization between the modern sectors of the middle class the distance and the traditional centered in the bapetite bourgeoisie in control of most of the indigenous zaar and still production and exchange. As the former accepted Western views IRANIAN STUDIES

208

of nationalism and modernization mediated by Pahlavi absolutism, the latter retreated into an increasingly rigid The modern sectors of the bourShi'ite fundamentalism. geoisie accepted the Pahlavi-defined unity of state, Persian nationalism, and the monarchy while the petite bourgeoisie defined that unity in terms of the state, Persian Islam. nationalism, and Shi'ite of the PerBoth sectors sian bourgeoisie scorned ethnic, and cultural linguistic, differences within the borders of the state. Both competed for control over the transfer of wealth from the periphery to the center. In this context, the development of Persian chauvinism did not result merely from the historical of the Persian linguistic interpenetration group with the state and Shi'ite Islam. Rather, it w4as the reof this interpenetration casting into a modern economy that redefined the relative economic positions of the Persian and non-Persian of society. sectors Precise data on economic underdevelopment among the to come by. is difficult minorities However, the information that is available supports the argument that the miin a dependent and relatively function norities backward to the Persian-dominated relation center. Data presented by Ghassemlou implies that the Kurdish peasants are worse off than their Persian counterparts.14 Among the small that have developed from locally mechanized industries practiced craftsmanship, of the workers is exploitation intense.15 According to van Bruinessen: "In the struggle for survival these industries are compelled to exploit the workers even more severely than happens in the center."16 Martin van Bruinessen, whose remarkable study of Kurdistan outstrips anything previously done in the area, comes to a similar conclusion in regard to underdevelopment and deIn summarizing economic change in Kurdistan, pendency. he writes: These are aspects of a process that deserves the name of underdevelopment rather than of development. Industrial progress is blocked. Kurdistan has become strongly dependent on the centers of the states that have incorporated it, and through these on the industrial centers of the world. 17 NATIONAL MINORITY PROBLEM

209

into the econoare integrated minorities The national The Kurds, Turkoman, and Baluch are ways. my in different The Arabs are both rural producers. agricultural primarily in the spring The Turkoman uprisings and urban wage earners. in Gonbad-e Qabus, focused almost exof 1979 that centered Turkoman demands for reissues. on agricultural clusively close to of lands held by absentee landlords distribution leaders of the ears deaf the on fell family the ex-royal industrialization In Khuzistan, of the Islamic revolution. has led to a large influx of Persians who now account for It is striking to population. over half of that province's note that during the present Iraqi invasion there seems to or guermilitary or significant mass celebration be little Arab In contrast, by the Khuzistani Arabs. activity rilla against struggle the during active extremely workers were in and in some cases leading industhe shah, participating This is not to suggest in the area. and oil strikes trial Rather, in the region does not exist. that Arab nationalism it does suggest that Arab activism may be in the process of demands for full adding to demands for cultural-autonomy into the economy. vertical integration nacentury, half of the twentieth During the first developed as an inawareness among the minorities tional change and concomitant tegral function of socioeconomic Among the Kurds, Baluch, and Turkoclass stratification. elites remained in the hands of traditional man, leadership thereby needs economic who shaped demands to meet their During the ill-fated issues. them to cultural limiting in 1946, no major agricultural Kurdish attempt at self-rule According to the present leader reforms were undertaken. of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, "the authorities of the the interests in the Republic strove to reconcile 18 The nature of leadership peasants and the 'feudalists."" that the weakening suggests ideology and the role of tribal is an extremely slow prokhans in authority of the tribal among the Kurds "priAccording to van Bruinessen, cess. on which they are and the ideologies mordial loyalties Both are to change. based show a remarkable resistance Spooner makes a weakening, but only very gradually."19 has a "each individual similar comment on the Baluch: or loyalty relationships place in a chain of allegiance IRANIAN SPUDIES

210

the class categories. But the tribal idewhich crosscut associated with the pastoral ology, which is explicitly In Azerbaijan nomads, pervades all communication."20 in and ideology did not dominate 1946, where tribal leadership more closely the movement and where economic conditions some agriresembled those on the Central Iranian Plateau, cultural reforms were undertaken.21 of the 1946 movements in KurSince the destruction distan and Azerbaijan, demands have centered around culof a federalist state. tural autonomy and the establishment Because these demands were unrealizable under the Pahlavis, to topple the shah. the minorities joined in the struggle In all peripheral areas and among all political persuasions, local struggles were subordinated to the struggle against the monarchy. The Marxist leader of the K.D.P.I.., A. R. "Unless the Shah's regime Ghassemlou, wrote in 1977 that: is overthrown, there will be no national self-determination for the Kurds and no democracy in Iran."122 of dependency between Iran In summary, the creation and the major capitalist countries reproduced dependency and the Persians within Iran. between the minorities Changes in the economy forced a breakdown of precapitalist social and the integration of the minorities formations into a national economy. Gradually, conditions of underdevelopment and backwardness emerged. A new class structure developed based on property relations but still reflecting traditional patterns of leadership. The existence of a statewide economy linked the propertied classes in the periphery to those in the center. However, Persians controlled the state and imposed a program of cultural uniformity throughout the country that denied the minorities rights of cultural expression. The initial manifestations of national awareness among the minorities occurred, therefore, as reactions to Persian cultural domination and reflected the interests of the minority elites. Thus, they were limited to demands for cultural autonomy and did not challenge class domination, either in the minority region or in the country as a whole.

NATIONAL MINORITY PROBLEM

211

autonomy is only of cultural However, the realization a Simultaneously, part of the minority problem in Iran. minority both within each national exists, class conflict of the minorand throughout Iran that links the interests Since its with those of the Persian underclasses. ities firmly mithe Khomeini government has rejected takeover, demands for radiand leftist nority demands for federalism Indeed, Khomeini, in the cal social and economic reform. fall of 1979, emphasized that the major threat to the future between the nalay in an alliance of the Islamic republic and the left.23 tional minorities exploration demand detailed questions The following research before an accurate assessand much more empirical minority movements and ment of the future of the national movement of the Iranian to the overall their relationship can be made. How dominant are the privileged revolution How much of their minorities? elements among the national strucand neofeudal tribal power is rooted in traditional How strong are the links between the minority batures? zaari class and the Persian bazaaris now in control of the classes among the nanational economy? Are there social their needs as capable of perceiving tional minorities facets of cultural autonomy or other direct transcending To what degree have the urbanized nationalism? localized and Arab workers, elements among the minorities--Azeri urbanized and recently peasants forced into the cities, to identities; ethnic strong tribal migrants--maintained rather than what degree are they now a part of national, how open are finally, classes; based, social ethnically to the partielements in Persian society the progressive These questions minorities? cularist needs of the national suggest that the minority issue is not merely a conflict Rather, ethnic groups within one state. between different it is a problem interwoven into the fabric of contemporary from the independently which will not be resolved society in revnow manifested and economic divisions deep social Iran. olutionary

IRANIAN STUDIES

212

NOTES

communication.

personal

1.

E. Hooglund,

2.

The Case of See E. Abrahamian, "Oriental Despotism: Qajar Iran," IJMES 5 (January 1974), pp. 3-31.

3.

Formation "Tribalism as a Socioeconomic L. Helfgott, X (Winter-Spring Iranian Studies in Iranian History," 1977), pp. 36-61.

4.

For the continuity between the Safavid and Zand bureaucracies, see J. Perry, Karim Khan Zand (Chicago, 1979); for the early Qajar period see my "Rise of the Qajar doctoral 1972. Dynasty," unpublished dissertation,

5.

Nomadism and Tribal Power," "Pastoral G. Garthwaite, Iranian Studies XI (1978), p. 180; see also L. Beck, in R. Tap"Iran and the Qashqa'i Tribal Confederacy," and Iran per, ed., Tribe and State in Afghanistan The title was ilkhani from 1800-1900, forthcoming. to the leading khan of the Qashqa'i in 1818, assigned in 1867. to the leading khan of the Bakhtiyari

6.

"Tribal Order and the State: The PolitiR. Loeffler, of the Boir Ahmad," Iranian Studies cal Organization XI (1978), p. 166.

7.

Ibid.

8.

Ibid.,

pp. 153-154, to this resistance they say, that the tors backed up by veloped the power entitled to collect pp. 155-156.

Loeffler describes the tribesmen's "It was only later on, process: chiefs in their role as tax collecthe khan and allied kadkhodas deto proclaim themselves landlords a rent from the tribal lands,"

9.

H. Alavi,"Peasant

Classes

Journal

of

Peasant

NATIONAL MINORITY

Studies

PROBLEM

and Primordial Loyalties," I (1973), pp. 23-63.

213

10.

See E. Abrahamian, "Communism and Communalism in Iran: IJMES 1 (October Dimucrat," The Tudah and the Firqah-i The Integrative 1970), p. 295; see also his "Kasravi: of Iran," in E. Kedouri and S. Haim, eds., Nationalist Toward a Modern Iran (London, 1980), pp. 115-116.

11.

Quoted in Abrahamian, p. 295.

12.

Dispute Iran: From Religious M. Fischer, tion (Cambridge, Mass., 1979), p. 78.

13.

See L. Helfgott,

14.

In G. Chaliand, 1979), p. 113.

15.

M. van Bruinessen, Social 1978),

"Communism and Communalism,"

The Rise

ed.,

and Political p. 27.

People

of

the

Qajar

without

Agha, Sheikh Organization

to Revolu-

Dynasty.

a Country

On the and State: of Kurdistan (Utrecht,

16.

Ibid.

17.

Ibid.,

18.

Chailiand,

19.

van Bruinessen,

20.

and National B. Spooner, "Tribal Relations and Anthropological Historical Baluchistan: 1980. unpublished, tives,"

21.

Chailiand,

22.

Ibid.,

23.

The New York Times Magazine, 0. Fallaci, 1979, p. 31.

IRANIAN

p.

p.

STUDIES

(London,

28.

p. 119. p. 413. Borders in Perspec-

p. 118. 133.

October

7,

214

Iranian Studies, Volume XIII, Nos. 1-4, 1980

Tribe and State in Revolutionary Iran: The Return of the Qashqa'i Khans Lois Beck This paper discusses the attempted resumption of paramount Qashqa'i leadership upon the fall of the Pahlavi regime in 1979. Paramount Qashqa'i leaders had been exiled from Iran following their support of Prime Minister Mosaddeq in the early 1950s and had, since then, either remained in exile or returned to Iran to live under political restrictions. In early 1979, those in exile returned to Iran and joined the others in resuming positions of regional and national political power. These questions are central to the discussion and analysis: What was the nature of Qashqa'i leadership both before and during Pahlavi rule, and how and why had it changed under the Islamic Republic of Iran? How had changes in Iran affecting the Qashqa'i people between

Lois Beck is Assistant Washington University

Professor of Anthropology in St. Louis.

at

Sections of this paper are based on interviews conducted in the summer of 1979 in Iran and Great Britain with many Qashqa'i leaders and on correspondence and telephone conversations since then. I am deeply indebted to the many Qashqa'i who aided me in the research. At a later date I will be able to acknowledge them by name. For any factual

215

the attempted resumption of para1953 and 1979 affected How had the nature of the Iranian state mount leadership? How are Qashqa'i leaders changed during these periods? or national-minority Are they "tribal" best characterized? and national or are they better seen as regional leaders, from other different How is Qashqa'i leadership powers? that in Iran, in particular leadership kinds of political and why? and national minorities, of other tribes the Qashqa'i century, Since the end of the eighteenth have been one of Iran's most powerful and state-threatening groups to retain They were one of the few tribal forces.1 after Reza Shah's brutal pacification viability political active again programs, and they have become politically the debilitatdespite since MohammadReza Shah's ouster, to which they were and economic conditions ing political From January 1979 to subject in the 1960s and 1970s.2 challenge June 1980, Qashqa'i leaders did not directly in Iran, of central authority the attempted reinstatement elected Qashqa'i leader but, in June 1980, after a popularly parliament by its was denied his seat in the new national with the Qashqa'i relations elements, dominant clerical and there were military hostile, state became overtly Guards sent into Qashqa'i clashes with Revolutionary territory.

An earlier I alone am responsible. errors or misjudgments, version of this paper was presented at the Anthropology in October 1979, and Gene Colloquium at Yale University offered Richard Tapper, and Leonard Helfgott Garthwaite, I comments on all or part of the written draft. helpful the lengthy comments and suggestions appreciate especially provided by Mary Hooglund and Eric Hooglund, who lived in southern Iran in 1978-79, and by Brad Hanson, who was aseducation program in Fars from with the tribal sociated 1973 to 1977.

IRANIAN STUDIES

216

Qashqa'i

Leadership

before

19543

The contemporary leaders of the Qashqa'i confederacy of reputed relative trace descent from Amir Ghazi Shahilu, Islam as the Shi'ite Shah Isma'il (1501-24) who established six generations later, state religion, and his descendant to be the founder of the conJani Aqa, who is considered elements of the confedfederacy.4 The dominant political eracy were Turkic, derived from western Oghuz/Ghuzz groups but that began to move into Iran in the eleventh century, and gypsies joined as many Lurs, Kurds, Arabs, Persians, well. between the Qashqa'i The key roles in the relation (paraand the state were that of the ilkhani confederacy leader). (tribal mount tribal leader) and the ilbegi both these positions have been held exThrough history, Shahilu patriclusively by male members of the original have attached to and charismatic characteristics lineage, The Shahilu lineage did not derive from one their rule. nor is it today a segment of one; of the Qashqa'i tribes, it has been a separate sociopolitical unit since at least the time of Jani Aqa. Members of the Qashqa'i tribes may and ilbegi have regarded their paramount leaders as ilkhani formal state appointments, before the first which appear rather to have recognized positions already in existence than to have "created" them. This is not to say that cendid not always serve in a mediatory tralized leadership Howcapacity with regard to the state and other powers. and support greatly enhanced the ever, state recognition and legitimized in terms of power and authority positions them with regard to other political powers involved in the area. The first to receive formal state Qashqa'i ilbegi recognition appears to have been appointed by Karim Khan was ilbegi mamlakat-e Fars Zand (1757-79); his title for the (tribal leader of Fars) and he was responsible of the province's populations. The tribal administration issue of whether he was more of an externally appointed tribal leader who was asked governor than an indigenous to perform services for the state is presently unknown, TRIBE AND STATE IN IRAN

217

but it is clear that state appointment did help to consoliand to date the various tribes under his administration at link them with him. The proximity of the Zand capital Shiraz and the nature of Karim Khan's rule undoubtedly conrule among the Qashqa'i tribes. to centralized tributed groups brought by Karim Khan to Fars Many of the tribal to serve as his standing army remained behind when Zand and added to Qashqa'i strength and organirule collapsed, Qashqa'i leader to hold the state-reThe first zation.5 was probably appointed during of ilkhani cognized title mamlakat-e of ilkhani The title the early Qajar period. leader of Fars) was succeeded by Fars (paramount tribal (paramount leader of the Qashqa'i of ilkhani the title over tribresponsibilities when title-holders' Qashqa'i), in general were limited to responsibilities al populations Much of written "Qashqa'i" over the Qashqa'i population. of these paramount Qashqa'i a history actually is history with national and insince they dealt directly leaders, powers. ternational political of the Qashqa'i setting and political The strategic hierarchical coordinated required centralized, confederacy were to maintain control of if the population leadership its against and compete successfully its vast territories Part of the followforces.6 neighbors and other intruding before 1953 alorganization about political ing discussion are years, and many features so refers to the following again present under the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Qashqa'i were organized into a hierarchy of by one or more groups, each represented sociopolitical organization The lowest level of sociopolitical leaders. it in most dowhose head represented was the household, The encampment was a flexmains beyond the encampment. the oldest, of households; temporary association ible, that concerned males made some decisions most respected independence. the unit, but households had considerable of encampments in a geThe pasture group, a collection arrangement defined area, was also a flexible ographically of one or more A subtribe, consisting of tents and camps. was a politpasture groups in winter and summer pastures, ical group defined largely by kinship ties and by affiliIRANIAN STUDIES

218

ation

to

a headman

(kadkhoda).

A tribe

(tayefeh)

was a

collection of subtribes and was headed by a family of of kalantar and khans, one of whom often had the title The khan families with the ilkhani. role of liaison (khaclass with socioeconomic vanin) comprised a small, distinct the confederacy dynastic, aristocratic features. Finally, of five large and a number of small (il) was a collection tribes and was headed by a male member of the ruling Shawho was often entitled The chain ilkhani. hilu lineage, was from household head to elder, of political authority headman,

khan,

kalantar,

and ilkhani.

Each tribe had its own winter and summer pastures, of usufruct and the khans' major function was allocation via the headmen, who rights to their associated subtribes, in turn allocated Copasture rights to member households. of the long seasonal migrations ordination was not a major function of any Qashqa'i leader, except under unusual political conditions. Khans, often through headmen, handled adof local leaders, affairs: general tribal designation of tribal of inministration law and justice, resolution tratribal and intertribal disputes, conduct of relations with sedentary authorities, tax collection, and certain kinds of economic redistribution. They organized defensive and offensive and attempted to prevent activities their affiliated groups from raiding when it was not politically advisable. Khans were in charge of diplomatic relations with the ilkhani, with other tribes, and with state and local officials. The ability of the Qashqa'i confederacy to act as a quasi-independent political entity, as a state within a was due to the coordinating and mediating efforts state, of its leader, often entitled ilkhani. His main functions to external related powers and to the confederacy's administration. An ilbegi, who was usually his brother, often served as his lieutenant, and other close relatives also performed leadership functions, which were informally divided according to personal skills and interests. Under Esma'il Khan Soulat al-Dawleh (ilkhani from 1902-33), the Qashqa'i had some of the main attributes of sovereignty-"an independent army, an independent economy and an indeTRIBE AND STATE IN

IRAN

219

While the "independence" of pendent foreign policy."7 did function the ilkhani is questioned, these entities entity which was often beyond as the head of a political He depended on the support and loycontrol. the state's khans, and they depended on and profalty of the tribal That he could, functions. ited from his wider leadership did, act without their consent or knowand occasionally his participation ledge was due to his mediatory position, and his foreign conpolitics, and national in provincial One of his bases was Shiraz, where his activities tacts. What difelite. were similar to those of the nontribal him from the latter., however, was that he ferentiated support behind him and could call could use the tribal His presence in upon his fellow khans and followers. as tribareas and his activities Shiraz and other settled encouraged the formation of ties with powers al coordinator to the Qashqa'i. external and ilkhactivity There were limits on confederacy by the leaders were restricted tribal First, ani power. for, activities had consequences fact that their political As powers. from, other political and generated reactions to the Qashqa'i were always vulnerable part of the state, and foreign powers and power struggles, its instabilities in the region and commercial interests with political Second, the conmanipulated and deceived their leaders. as a single, unified entity. federacy never functioned effort by "the Qashqa'i" inThe most concerted military at most, 5,000 horsemen (at a time when the total volved, khans could Also, tribal approached 400,000). population opposed the ilkhani; act independently, and some directly family. this sometimes included members of the ilkhani's were always separate activities some tribal And third, and many continleadership, from the workings of ilkhani when he was removed from the scene, as ued uninterrupted (Sometimes was the case during much of Pahlavi history. ilkhacted as leader when the official a de facto ilkhani or removed from office.) under arrest, ani was absent, membership brought benefits Tribal and confederacy that the region's non-Qashqa'i to the Qashqa'i population nomads lacked, and leaders rarely and pastoral peasants IRANIAN STUDIES

220

needed to rule by coercion. to tribal Through allegiance leaders, the Qashqa'i gained relatively secure and protected access to pastureland, which facilitated pastoral and and market relations.8 agricultural production They proffrom raids and other actions ited economically sanctioned by their leaders and were economically in times assisted with external of need. Relations powers were mediated for them, and, in their interactions with non-Qashqa'i, they had the advantage of the political power of the Qashqa'i khans. As tribal and confederacy members, Qashqa'i households and subtribes had certain obligations. An animal tithe of 1 to 3 percent of household herds was collected once every several years (or less frequently) by the tribal khans to support their expenses and by the ilkhani to pay state taxes and finance military Tribesactivities. men fought in the khans' and ilkhanis' which ofbattles, fered the possibility of booty. The 'Amaleh tribe was the ilkhani's standing army, as were the 'Amaleh sections of the component Qashqa'i tribes for their respective khans, and additional support was available from the other affiliated sections. also owed labor and gifts Tribespeople to the khans and ilkhani on special occasions. of surplus from the Qashqa'i populaThe extraction tion by tribal leaders seems not to have been exploitative. The tithe occasionally collected was not burdensome and at any rate was a small proportion of household property. Access to pastures derived from tribal ties and obligabut household economies (based on pastoralism, tions, agriculture, weaving) were not controlled by tribal leaders. Matters of animal and land ownership, labor allocation, and exchange were solely production, in the hands of individual households.9 The khans and ilkhani were hospitable and generous to loyal supporters. Poverty-stricken Qashqa'i were exempt from the tithe, and those in economic could expect some help from tribal difficulty Alleaders. so exempt from the tithe were those who performed regular for tribal services leaders, such as headmen and gunmen, as well as descendants of warriors killed in khans' battles. The actions and demands of leaders were checked by TRIBE AND STATE

IN

IRAN

221

to sever their ties. followers of dissatisfied the ability however, also in were, followers with Leaders dissatisfied including and punishments, to apply sanctions a position of and temporary imposition of poor pastures allocation scribes, and they were supported by mediators, high taxes, and gunmen who enforced leader overseers, tax collectors, Denial of pasture rights was the law. policy and tribal although those removed by one leader sanction, strongest could seek land with another who was anxious to increase did not use governThe khans and ilkhanis his following. members to enforce their rule. ment forces against tribal did not derive The wealth of the khans and ilkhani Other sources were supporters. from their tribal primarily and kept the leaders from making heavy exmore profitable which would have of wealth from the tribe itself, tractions (It is true, however, undermined and weakened its support. the best pastures and garden lothat the khans retained and some khans were The ilkhani for themselves.) cations which allowed by the state, governorships given district government them to acquire private property and to collect Most khans were some of which they held back. taxes, wealthy landowners who accumulated land from government They extracted and confiscation. investment, service, and part of the yearly production of their sharecroppers Persians and Lurs. who were usually nontribal tenants, a share raids received Khans who organized or sanctioned khans who engaged in mediation, Finally, of the booty. derived wealth and favors from for the state, especially received The ilkhani with external powers. the association cash and land payments from the state for his administraand for arming and supporting a tribal army. tive functions Foreign powers also paid him and other khans to engage in agand military as trade-route protection such activities against other tribes. gression and the khans used their various politiThe ilkhani in in their own class and personal interests cal positions followers. tribal ways that prevented them from exploiting and economic strength was drawn primarily Their political but they were able to use from domains beyond the tribe, domains to action in these external the threat of tribal IRANIAN STUDIES

222

buttress their regional and national positions. features help to explain the enduring political the Qashqa'i confederacy.

Both these power of

A final historical comment concerning the power and of the paramount leaders relates authority to their identification with, and utilization of, the Qashqa'i population's cultural distinctive Unlike paramount system. leaders of other tribal groups in Iran who identified with the urban upper class and who distanced themselves from supporters, Qashqa'i leaders nurtured their Qashqa'i identity and their relationships with supporters. The Qashqa'i were (and are) distinguished from other tribal and nomadic pastoral populations in southwest Iran by their political allegiances and affiliations. Many of the Turks, Lurs, Kurds, Arabs, Persians, and gypsies who sought resources in Qashqa'i territory aligned themselves with Qashqa'i leaders and over time assumed Qashqa'i identity. The primary basis of this identity was political alto leaders and affiliation legiance to tribal groups (subtribes, tribes, confederacy). Identity also came with residence in Qashqa'i territory and the assumption of associated rights and duties of control and defense. Qashqa'i identity implied various cultural features such as Turkic speech, dress, and custom, but these were not uniformly adopted by tribal members, and cultural variation among the Qashqa'i still exists today. The identifying labels of "Qashqa'i" and "Turk" (which in Fars is virtually synonymous with Qashqa'i) are associated with these political affiliations. The Period

of Exile:

1954-1979

Reza Shah's (1925-41) creation of a centralized, modern state included the attempted destruction of the political strength of the Qashqa'i and of other political groups in Iran. He imposed the military might of his new army on tribal populations when they showed signs of resistance, he virtually ended seasonal migrations, and he imprisoned and executed tribal leaders. In the Qashqa'i TRIBE

AND STATE

IN

IRAN

223

Esma'il case, he held the paramount leader and ilkhani, son, Naser Khan, and his eldest Khan Soulat al-Dawleh, Another son, Malek Mansur under house arrest in Tehran. Khan, was held under house arrest in Tehran until the govto handle political ernment sent him, as acting ilkhani, Reza Shah imprisoned Esma'il Khan in Fars.10 disturbances had him executed in 1933. pressure, and then, under British under British and Russian With Reza Shah's abdication in 1941, Naser Khan declared himself to be ilkhani, pressure and he and his three brothers returned to Qashqa'i territhe Qashqa'i as one of the tory, quickly re-established most powerful forces in Iran, and resumed active particiserparliamentary including politics, pation in national In the early 1950s, they supported Prime Minister vice. BeMosaddeq, and were to suffer a fate similar to his. tween 1954 and 1956, the shah ordered three of the four The and the fourth left under duress. brothers into exile, by the state massive land holdings were confiscated family's in the clauses 1958 law and special by means of a special and of ilkhani and the titles laws,1' 1962-63 land-reform were abolished. ilbegi Naser Khan Qashqa'i spent 25 years of exile in the In a fashion customary to United States with his family. he spent summers in the cool northern hills nomadic life, of Maine and winters in the warm southern ("highlands") son, Abdollah, became His eldest lowlands of California. MohammadHosayn Khan, after short resia medical doctor. returned to Iran dences in Europe and the United States, Malek Mansur Khan lived in Europe and in the late 1950s. allowed to return to the United States and was eventually travel to Fars proto forbidden were Both in 1965. Iran (SAVAK) of Iran's secret police vince, and the surveillance In 1963 Mohammad further. their activities restricted in Fars Hosayn Khan was accused of fomenting disturbances His sister's son, from his Tehran base and was imprisoned. Bahman, was executed by the state in 1966 for antiregime Khosrow Khan, the youngest brother and reactivities. garded as the most powerful leader after Naser Khan priactivities against the shah marily because of his military in the early 1950s, spent his 25 years of exile in West IRANIAN STUDIES

224

0'

cj~~~~~~~~~~c

*

4J

0

H H

4-_

HOi

:::~ to

0

2

2

91)

~~~=co

_ g

*H~

Cg

1

_

%

g

$-

_

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_

_

_

_

_

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11

0 IQ)

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TRIBE AND STATE IN IRAN

225

Germany, where he maintained contact with Iran's opposition movements. During their exile, Naser Khan and Khosrow Khan received payment from the Iranian government for part of their confiscated properties, but some interpreted the money as bribes to keep the two men out of Iranian politics. With the severance of the four brothers from tribal affairs in 1954-56, confederacy-level activities ceased, but the next level of the political hierarchy--the khans of the Qashqa'i tribes--continued of to handle the affairs their respective tribes. The state's attempts to subjugate the population faltered until the land-reform period of 1962-72, when force was exerted on a number of fronts. The tribal khans were stripped of many leadership functions, the population was disarmed and held under close surveillance by SAVAK, and military control of land use and migrations was tightened. By 1978 the Qashqa'i were under the political control of the state and most were suffering economic hardships due to pasture nationalization, land scarcity brought about by land reform and outside encroachand the absence of a market for pastoral ments, inflation, products due to massive subsidized food imports.12 A new, state-supported institution--a educatribal tion program originated in 1952 by a Qashqa'i of nonelite background named MohammadBahmanbegi- -was a major force in of the Qashqa'i and their greater the political pacification Esincorporation into the state in the 1960s and 1970s.l3 in Fars, Bahmanpecially after the 1963 political struggle linked to sources of begi became the Qashqa'i most closely He was one of the Qashqa'is' power at the center. only means of access to state resources and favors. The empress, of who in the 1970s took special interest in expressions Iran's cultural was a patron. While Bahmanbegi diversity, for financial did not appear to exploit his position gain, he did profit in terms of power, and he took over many of to His program's efforts khans' functions. the tribal while educate tribal youth were praised by Westerners, to the destruction of some Qashqa'i saw them as vehicles for instruction in the and solidarity, tribal identity and the education offered Persian language was required, nomadism but rather provided to pastoral had no relation IRANIAN

STUDIES

226

the means for urban jobs Persian population.

and assimilation

The Revolutionary

Period:

into

the dominant

1 978-1979

sufand economic depredations Given the political fered under the shah, it might be assumed that Qashqa'i would have quickly joined the leaders and tribespeople movement against him. They had benefited revolutionary of politilittle from his regime, and they had a history to Pahlavi rule. In addition, cal and military opposition played importIranian tribes in general had historically of central (and establishing) ant roles in the dispatching was coordinated--such However, the revolution authority. coordination as there was--by Muslim clergy and leftist uprisings Few military and student groups in cities. oragainst state forces on the part of Iran's tribally occurred. ganized populations From September 1978 until the fall of the Bakhtiyar government in February 1979, Qashqa'i people participated Isfain Shiraz, numbers in street protests in increasing of other along with millions han, Ahvaz, and other cities, At first Qashqa'i who rethese were primarily Iranians. and towns for purposes of education and sided in cities along with as individuals, work, and they participated students and workers. non-Qashqa'i numbers of rural, preBy January 1979, increasing demonstradominantly male, Qashqa'i joined city street in marches in Shiraz together Those who protested tions. banners, and Turkic by their clothes, were conspicuous hats and Qashqa'i men wore their distinctive slogans. women their multilayered tunics, and headscarves skirts, conin partial (with chadors tied around their waists, Onegroup of Qashqa'i men who formity to urban custom). came on horseback was dressed in the cloaks and cummerPosters of bunds worn before Reza Shah outlawed them. Khomeini and large reproductions of old photographs of armed Qashqa'i and their leaders were carried in the demgroups, and Qashqa'i women formed several onstrations. TRIBE AND STATE IN IRAN

227

tribal young Qashqa'i and Luri women and men from Shiraz's high school and normal school marched together with alerUrban Qashqa'i from the nating Turkic and Luri slogans. at first Bolvardi quarter of Shiraz also marched together, in small groups and later in a large group, with a banner their neighborhood.14 identifying Mary Hooglund comments: I personally feel that the process of Qashqa'i involvement was much the same as the process of involveOnce they started to get inment of other Iranians. in they participated volved and become less afraid, just couple of friends--anonymously, small groups--a But by the marches of Januas did other Iranians. ary 7th and 8th, more and more people were beginning by groups; groups started to to announce themselves on large pieces of white statements carry identifying cloth at the front of their groups, which told where marchAt first, they were from and who they were. ing was just groups of people who happened to get everyone was the same; there were thrown in together; for men and women. But then no differences--except came out more; the Qashqa'i were structure gradually no different and started to march in groups with It was a revolution symbols as well. identifying and strikes; the Qashof marches, demonstrations, just as did qa'i took part in these activities, other members of the population.15 of 400,000, Given an estimated Qashqa'i population acin revolutionary participating the proportion actually the identiat this stage was tiny, but certainly tivities use fiable presence of Qashqa'i groups and the conspicuous to all obof Qashqa'i dress and other symbols did indicate participants. servers that the Qashqa'i were revolutionary of Qashqa'i and other rural-based That the vast majority in any way in the affort tribal groups did not participate to rid Iran of the shah prompted me, in a previous publifactor to discount the importance of the "tribal" cation, but Mary Hooglund and in this stage of the revolution,16 Eric Hooglund have convinced me to weigh the factor more IRANIAN

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heavily.

17

The involvement of Qashqa'i leaders in Iran and in exile at this stage of the revolution is another dimension As revolutionary of the subject. action against the Pahlavi regime expanded throughout Iran in late 1978, Qashqa'i leaders in Fars, who had not been willing to use their positions to coordinate political activity without the paramount khans' involvement, Naser Khan and Khosrow Khan telephoned The khans cautioned to seek their advice. restraint and no call to action was forthcoming. They also telephoned Khomeini in France to ask if the Qashqa'i should Ayatollah attack government forces, in particular the gendarmerie, that street but he replied demonstrations and strikes were It was obvious to Naser Khan and Khosrow more effective. Khan that Khomeini was going to play an important role in and in December of 1978 they paid separate Iran's future, to him in France. visits Neither had met him previously. Khomeini expressed appreciation for the support that this and he noted that the two men's father--the implied, Soulat been the only political al-Dawleh--had leader in Iran to answer, with military action, the ulama's call for holy war (jihad) against the British during World War I. He hoped that Naser Khan and Khosrow Khan would be "their father's sons," as equally inclined to respond to the ulama as had been their father. The two brothers pledged their support and noted that their 55-year battle against the Pahlavi dynasty had cost them their father, their homeland, and their property; what else did they have to lose? The two Qashqa'i brothers then went to the United States, where Khosrow Khan attended a previously scheduled meeting of Qashqa'i university students to discuss the revolution. No action was apparently planned. In one of the shah's last speeches from Iran, he angrily attacked the Qashqa'i khans by name for continuously working against his regime.18 One Qashqa'i khan remarked that the shah, who had by then lost control over events in the nation and was psychologically disturbed, probably imagined that he saw the two ears of the Qashqa'i hat poking out from the turbans of Khomeini and the other clerics who were working to bring down his regime (that TRIBE

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is, that the shah saw the Qashqa'i the uprising).

khans as instigators

of

In January 1979, shortly before the shah's ouster, He admitted he risked imNaser Khan returned to Iran. prisonment but was unable to postpone his return any longer. but At Tehran's airport he was detained by authorities, phoned Prime Minister Shapur Bakhtiyar--a when a relative friend and fellow National Front member--he was immediately by all accounts, was released. Naser Khan's reception, came overwhelming. Hundreds of Qashqa'i and non-Qashqa'i to greet him during his few days in Tehran, and there were and groups, Many individuals warm reunions with relatives. urged him to take an active role in tribal and nontribal, a new and those involved in creating national politics, of his government offered him the ministry or governorship choice. But Naser Khan and his family were anxious to leave Tehran, and, two days after the shah's departure on January 16, a caravan of cars escorted Naser Khan south to sent a message that they wished Fars. Some Isfahan clerics to greet Naser Khan formally as he traveled through that but he feared that the army might use the occasion city, News of his and so did not stop. to attack the gathering and welcomers from towns and rural return was widespread, areas lined the road from Isfahan to Shiraz. Many stood as his car passed by. sacrificed with sheep to be ritually The largest welcome was at Takht-e Jamshid (Persepolis, of the Persian Empire), and from there the ancient capital hundreds of cars escorted him into Shiraz, where he immemost imto Shah Cheragh, the city's diately made a visit two shrine. Standing between Shiraz's portant religious Naser and amidst other clergy, most prominent ayatollahs Khan addressed the large audience that he was not back to but serve as khan or to reclaim land or former privileges, of Fars to create a new to work along with the citizens in local newsorder. His speech was published political papers. Naser Khan and his party then moved south to an area winter headquarters, where near Firuzabad, his traditional of Qashqa'i was held in a tent a huge political gathering encampment called by some an ordu, a term used in the past IRANIAN STUDIES

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Some feared that the gathering.19 military for a tribal Iranian army or gendarmerie would attack the camp, a notion of Iranian overflights aided by the frequent supervisory were made, preparations and battle-camp planes, airforce in a fashion that the region had not seen since World War civilian However, except for one small but hostile II. was left undisturbed. the gathering incursion, Khosrow Khan returned Ten days after the shah's fall, to Iran, and a small party went to Tehran to greet him and He spent less than a day in the camp and escort him south. with other former politics returned to Shiraz to discuss a speech at Shah Cheragh. He also delivered exiles. On the fall of the Bakhtiyar government on February 11, the some young Qashqa'i men from the camp, who regretted decided in the revolution, lack of Qashqa'i participation and two groups government forces, to make an attack against phase of But the first went off to seize gendarme posts. of the shah and his regime, was deposition the revolution, sense of victory. over, and there was little essentially disSmall caches of arms were taken and later ceremonially and one cache was given over to a local ayatollah tributed; another was given back to the gendarmerie by Naser Khan. On the negotiated the same day, Homa, Naser Khan's daughter, surrender of a gendarme post and ended a false rumor of an airport by going there imminent Qashqa'i attack on Shiraz's that there were no Qashand announcing publicly personally Also on February 11, a in the vicinity.20 qa'i attackers in the attack in of armed Qashqa'i participated contingent two and the Zand prison, station Shiraz against the police holdouts of government forces.21 to KhuzisKhosrow Khan traveled Shortly thereafter, of the Zagros western foothills tan through the oil-rich a Qashqa'i political Mountains, in order to re-establish priconsisting population, The region's presence there. and Arabic-speakLurs, Bakhtiyaris, marily of Qashqa'is, ers, lined his route of travel and greeted him with enworkers, who continue Qashqa'i oilfield Settled thusiasm. told him that they affiliations, to adhere to their tribal prolabor strikes, would respond to his orders concerning TRIBE AND STATE IN IRAN

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Other oilfield and sabotage. duction cut-off, also responded positively and nontribal, tribal

workers, to him.

winter Naser Khan and his family moved to a favorite pasture near Firuzabad, where he continued to have a steady in Firuzabad belonging to A building stream of visitors. which had been seized in the 1960s by the govthe family, ernment and converted into a gendarme post, was now made In the spring, headquarters. into a Qashqa'i political while Malek through summer pastures, Naser Khan traveled tent enMansur Khan and MohammadHosayn Khan established Naser Khan, statpastures. campments in their traditional reequipment and financial ing he lacked the necessary did not set up a camp, nor did Khosrow Khan, who sources, spent most of the summer in Shiraz and Tehran.

The Process

of Re-establishing

Leadership

Enthusiasm among young Qashqa'i leaders in July 1979 roles in the tribe and state had beabout their potential September 1979, when the four Qashdisillusionment by come and territory left tribal qa'i khans and their families in Tehran. Naser Khan, fatigued by into residence settled respiraof his return to Iran and suffering the intensity left in September for medical treatment tory difficulties, from many personal requests despite in the United States, December Iran in 1979.) to returned to remain. (He Khomeini various dimensions of the outlines discussion The following in 1979 after the of Qashqa'i leadership re-establishment shah's ouster. The Qashga'i Khans and High-Level The First Months Clergy: In the past, Qashqa'i leaders have been able to use in political (which is Shi'ite) identity their religious From the could not. ways that Iran's Sunnite minorities in Qom, with clergy relations of Naser Khan's return, time with Khomeini's arrival Shiraz, and Tehran were developed; to Qom by Naser Khan or in Iran in February 1979, visits IRANIAN STUDIES

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his representatives as well as delegations from Qom clergy and they maintained contact to Naser Khan were frequent, by telephone. Meetings were also held with ayatollahs Taleqani and Shari 'atmadari. Khomeini publicly attributed peaceful conditions in Fars to the two khans' presence and it to other, more unrestful contrasted such as provinces Kurdistan and Baluchistan. When a high-ranking Nicaraguan Sandinista guerrilla arrived on a formal mission to seek the new revolutionary government's support, Abdollah, Naser Khan's son, was asked to be his escort. Abdollah's visits to Khomeini on behalf of the Sandinista helped to legitimize the Qashqa'is' relationship with the new government, in the eyes of other national especially powers, and created new ties for the Qashqa i. The Qashqa'i khans' past political with alliances the punishments both groups high-level religious leaders,22 suffered under Pahlavi rule, and the khans' visits to Khomeini in exile all served to place the leadership in a vis-a-vis the revolutionary stronger position government or national-minority than any other tribal in leadership Iran at this time. with the center had Qashqa'i relations probably not been better since the reign of Karim Khan Zand in the late eighteenth century. Local Power and Authority: Qashqa'i and the State

The

As the Pahlavi regime weakened and fell, the Qashqa'i population quickly transferred local power to its own hands by heavily rearming, reaffiliating with political leaders, and renewing political contacts. Understaffed gendarmerie and army forces were weak and ineffective and did not impede this process. During its first months, the Islamic Republic of Iran had parallel, often conflicting, governments: Prime Minister Bazargan's provisional government and the Revolutionary Council operating locally through revolutionary committees (komitehs) and revolutionary guards (pasdaran). From the start, the Qashqa'i had no participation in revolutionary

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committees or guards and were not willing to allow these non-Qashqa'i, Persian, and usually urban-based lower-middle-class groups in tribal areas. Since some towns in Qashqa'i areas are dominated by Persians, religious figures and their supporters were anxious to establish their own local authority, and clashes with the Qashqa'i occurred. In Firuzabad, whose population is now about evenly divided between Persians and settled Qashqa'i, armed clashes between Qashqa'i and revolutionary guards and committee members took place in early spring 1979. Four committee members were killed, and revolutionary guards were forced out of town.23 In Semirom, a Persian-dominated town in summer pastures, conflict between the two powers was defused with an agreement that Qashqa'i would not brandish arms while visiting town if revolutionary guards would keep out of the surrounding tribal territory. It was also agreed that Qashqa'i automobiles could travel through town without being searched. Some Qashqa'i khans carried governmentauthorized guns in order to avoid harassment from revolutionary guards. Two aspects of historical relations between Qashqa'i State authorities releaders and the state emerged again. lied on the Qashqa'i khans for some aspects of local adto divideand control, but they also resorted ministration and-rule tactics by seeking out one khan and not another. local When guards and committees were unable to settle disputes, they frequently sought out and utilized Qashqa'i leaders as mediators. When the Baseri tribe and the Qashqa'i tribe of Shesh Boluki had an armed clash over pastures, on behalf of the Naser Khan was brought in by helicopter, Documents from the government, to settle the dispute. were ofRevolutionary Council and from Bazargan's office ten sent to Naser Khan, Khosrow Khan, or Abdollah for apon such matters as road development proval and signature, of officials to serve in Fars. The govand appointments nature complicated ernment's dual, often conflicting, and documents for Bazargan sent officials these relations, to the khans and often intentionally ignored committees Council and clerical while the Revolutionary authorities, In September took action without consulting Bazargan. Council sought Khosrow Khan's 1979, when the Revolutionary IRANIAN

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in its demand that the guns of Fars citizens assistance be immediately turned in to authorities, Bazargan personally informed Khosrow Khan that he did not wish to see this order implemented. At a time when local governments associated with the Pahlavi regime were being (partially) dismembered and new ones being assembled, and with accusations rampant about alleged SAVAKconnections, the paramount khans represented for a wide spectrum of the unambiguous authority figures Iranian population. Their antagonism to the Pahlavi reand they represented gime was unquestioned, in continuity leadership and authority. Their charisma stemmed from their traditional leadership, their stand against Pahlavi rule, and their association with Mosaddeq and Khomeini. Few other political figures in Iran had such credentials. While leftists could and did attack the khans for representing propertied interests, they were not able to attack them effectively on these other grounds. However, as indicated by the conflicts with revolutionary guards and committees, the issue of local power and authority was not settled in 1979, and the relationships established between the Qashqa'i (leaders and general population) and the new revolutionary government had opposing features. The Revolutionary Council, committees, and guards were particularly puzzled by the association of the Qashqa'i khans and Khomeini, on the one hand, and the Qashqa'i khans' resistance to "state" authority, on the other. The Qashqa'i, however, saw no contradiction. A personal tie with Khomeini was one thing; subservience to roving revolutionary guards and mullahs was another. The Qashqa'i had no sympathy for local mullahs who were attempting to acquire for themselves the legitimacy of the power in Qom. Qashqa'i have long had scorn for local religious the establishment of the Islamic functionaries; did not alter this. republic The geographical of the Qashqa'i also condispersion tributed to ambiguity in the issue of local power and authority, as it had during other historical periods. While

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and are found in single provinces some of Iran's minorities the Qashqa'i are spread contained, can be administratively Kuh(Fars, Isfahan, districts out over many administrative the Persian Gulf coast proAhmad, Khuzistan, giluyeh-Boir government adconditions, Under revolutionary vinces). than usual, and whatever was more dispersed ministration Abdolwas vague and unenforced. policy existed national a Qashqa'i politito re-establish lah, who was attempting complained about having to deal with new sets cal presence, from one Qashwhenever he traveled of regional officials qa' i area to another.

The Khans and the Qashqa'i

Population

a symbol of QashFor the entire Qashqa'i population, was the wearing and revived identity qa'i repoliticization Use two-eared tan or gray felt hat.24 of the traditional, somewhat under the last two deof the hat had diminished cades of Pahlavi rule, but, within a few weeks of Naser alwith the shah's ouster, Khan's return and coincident fine-looking most all Qashqa'i men were wearing expensive, but also in settled hats, not just in Qashqa'i territory strength was rewhere Qashqa'i political areas, especially towns. Before the emerging, such as in Persian-dominated to distinguish it had often been difficult revolution, Qashqa'i men in Shiraz from other rural people, but this But now even was no longer the case by February 1979. rural people were wearing the Lurs and other non-Qashqa'i with the group's renewed politiQashqa'i hat to identify Also conspicuously wearing the hat in Shiraz cal vigor. and Isfahan were the khans of the Qashqa'i tribes and Under the shah's regime, these other wealthy Qashqa'i. blended into would have intentionally same individuals class in the urban, professional, upper and upper-middle and nonQashqa'i women, too, of elite style and dress. to their dress elite background, paid greater attention and towns and were wearing more elaborate while in cities apparel. The outpouring of support for Naser Khan from the was deeply moving for both sides. Men, Qashqa'i population IRANIAN STUDIES

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came to greet him everywhere he went. women, and children and individuals specific to recognize Tales of his ability after 25 of their former association details to recall Many brought told. were frequently years of separation and workers of animals and money. Former supporters gifts him again, and some who had volunteered pledged to assist were chosen as the as gunmen (tofangchi) their services which became a regular feature of khans' armed escort, leaders were anxious to reLower-level their travels. and advice. instruction ties and receive establish however, were puzzled by the conflictTribespeople, of Naser Khan and Khosrow Khan and were uning attitudes The two khans rarely responses. sure of appropriate together and were not always in close contact. traveled they spent time They did not remain long in one location, to difficult Tehran, and they were generally in a distant and they did not policy, They did not set a tribal reach. leadership the formerly existing re-establish effectively And, except for the armed hierarchy or create a new one. with the many asthey did not surround themselves escort, sociates and helpers who had formerly been the ones to implement their policies. collecThe Pahlavi regime had removed the Qashqa'is' deeding tribpastures, tive resource base by nationalizing through land reform, and encouragal land to non-Qashqa'i by non-Qashqa' i-expansion--especially ing agricultural By 1978 the economies of many into Qashqa'i pastures. Qashqa'i households were no longer dependent on tribally to their reaffiliation As a result, resources. allocated rather than spepolitical the khans in 1979 was initially The khans made no plans to collect economic. cifically which would have supported the expenses connected taxes, leadership, partly because they wished to with tribal were currentdetractors avoid appearing as their leftist them. However, many Qashqa'i sought the ly depicting that there would be a in expectation khans' leadership exploitative land, an end to existing return of tribal a resumption of past modes and reeconomic relations,25 of tribal strength lations of production, and a re-emergence true for those who had in the region. This was especially

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been impoverished by the economic conditions of the 1960s and 1970s, who had adopted wage labor, and who were anxious to return to nomadic pastoralism and political independence. For settled, urban Qashqa'i who were now part of the Iranian middle class and encapsulated by the Iranian state, feelings about the khans' resumption of power were mixed. They rejoiced in the shah's departure and recognized the paramount khans as victims of Pahlavi rule, but their interests rested in a continued participation in middle-class Iran. The khans had not yet spoken to the class interests of these Qashqa'i, who wondered how a resumed "Qashqa'i" leadership would relate to them. For young, formally educated Qashqa'i, many of whomhad been opposed to khan rule for years, a possible resumption of paramount leadership was regarded with some distaste. The tribal education program had nurtured in many teachers and students a strong For the new wealthy landowning class antikhan sentiment. among the Qashqa'i, the khans' return meant a chance to be more politically active, which some welcomed, especially This because many had been tribal headmen in the past. group, a mere handful in the early 1950s, grew as a result mechof land reform, pasture nationalization, agricultural anization, and the Qashqa'is' depoliticization. They had, in other words, benefited under Pahlavi rule, and many worried about the loss of wealth and position that the repoof the Qashqa'i might bring. They feared politicization litical and military confrontations between the khans and the government, and between the government and Qashqa'i leftists, which would jeopardize their interests. and economic forces of the In short, the political past 25 years had created a socioeconomically diverse population, significant parts of which were now urban-based, state-encapsulated, formally educated, removed from nomadic pastoralism, and thoroughly integrated into the national capitalist economy, which meant that a resumption of traThe paraditional Qashqa'i leadership was most unlikely. mount khans' understanding of this partly explains their lack of political aggression.

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Programs

for

Leadership

Many Iranians and most Qashqa'i assumed that the khans, Naser Khan in particular, had returned to serve as tribal to restore leaders, the Qashqa'i to a powerful place in the nation, and to use the local power base to enter national leadership. But, other than a few general agreements about remaining armed, expelling non-Qashqa'i from pastoralists Qashqa'i land, and keeping revolutionary committees and guards out of Qashqa'i territory, no plans for the Qashqa'i and its place in the Islamic republic were forthcoming from either Naser Khan or Khosrow Khan. Neither supported the same kinds of notions concerning regional autonomy currently being expressed among many Iranian Kurds, Baluch, and Arabs. Given the placement of Shiraz and other heavily settled non-Qashqa'i areas between Qashqa'i winter and summer pastures and the residence of many Qashqa'i in cities, towns, and non-Qashqa'i villages, regional autonomy was not seen as feasible for the Qashqa'i as for Iran's many border-situated, national-minority and ethnic groups. Shortly after Naser Khan's arrival, of other representatives national-minority and tribal groups visited him, including Kurds, Baluchis, Bakhtiyaris, Boir Ahmads, and Baseris. His return from exile was announced in newspapers and on radio and television, and many groups, especially those with less centralized or nationally linked political systems, sought from Naser Khan solutions to their own political difficulties. Kurd and Baluch leaders had expectations that he would, through his superior national connections, aid in their own efforts to obtain regional and ethnic autonomy. They assumed Qashqa'i leaders had identical aspirations. This was not the case, and on at least several occasions the delegations left without having had discussions with him. Naser Khan's ideas about a Confederation of Southern Tribes and a Union of Iranian Tribes, although enthusiastically greeted by many, were never followed through with action. 6 Both Naser Khan and Khosrow Khan, as with other minority leaders, did support a situation in which local populations could manage their own concerns, such as pasture and water use and schools. Mohammad Hosayn Khan outlined the Qashqa'i masses' immediate needs, which he said could be financed by Iran's oil revTRIBE AND STATE IN IRAN

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gas to They included money to repay debts, bottled enues. for pasture material end the burning of natural vegetation, and trucks and tents for those resuming nomadism. reseeding, in pastures, agriculture He urged bans on unirrigated and to non-Qashqa'i, pasture rentals charcoal production, 7 raisers.2 commercial stock herding with non-Qashqa'i contract But no plan or program was agreed upon by the khans or put stating On his own, Abdollah sent a letter into action. pasture reseeding, Qashqa'i needs as he saw them (wells, and so forth) to Khomeini, Bazargan, and other clinics, There copies throughout Fars. and he circulated officials, he went alone and in frustration was no government response, Golnar, program. to Firuzabad to begin a medical-assistance daughter of Molki Bibi and niece of the four khans, proand Islamic law to imhygiene, in literacy, vided classes in Shiraz shantyQashqa'i women and children poverished towns and surrounding villages. In the 1960s and 1970s, most Qashqa'i had suffered Land reform economic hardships because of land scarcity. for the temporary use of land by nomadic made no provision and the enforcement of pasture nationalizapastoralists, With tion placed control of land into government hands. many Qashqa'i joined other Iranians in the shah's ouster, and illegal regarding these land programs as illegitimate their own rights over as his regime and in establishing Those many Qashqa'i now resuming nomadism wanted land.28 and some who had lost unimpeded access to former pastures, land through land reform now seized these lands cultivable Some Qashqa'i thought Naser Khan to do so. or threatened came ought to declare a land program and even non-Qashqa'i forcto act unwilling was but he seeking his leadership, Those taking matters into their in this direction. ibly tension with local revolutionown hands caused heightened who continued to seek Naser ary guards and committees, in land disputes. Khan's adjudication announced In the meantime, Khosrow Khan publicly in in that was practice of land use legal only that the 1953 and that the Qashqa'i should return to the land they Land had occupied 25 years before. (or their families) reform and the many changes in land tenure during the IRANIAN STUDIES

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shah's regime after 1953 were thereby denounced, but practical steps toward changing tenure were not suggested, local uncertainty. which increased The khans did publicly support the expulsion from tribal land of nontribal encroachers, commercial stock raisers including and those who had seized land illegally in the confusion of the reforms and nationalizations of the 1960s. With the rapid rearming of the Qashqa'i, expulsion was accomplished quickly in many areas. Those many urban Persians who had developed orchards in tribal territory were told they could, for the moment, keep what was within existing walls but they could not use agricultural or grazing land beyond. Conflict arose where orchard developers had encircled springs or wells within garden walls. Although Naser Khan stressed publicly that he had not returned to claim his confiscated lands, uneasy local populations were not totally convinced. He told villagers who now occupy what was once his family's land that the shah was to blame, not the villagers, and that he held no personal grudge against them. He made no attempt to resecure these lands. Another major problem over land involved the Qashqa'i tribe of Darrehshuri, which had taken over much of the 'Amaleh tribe's summer pastures after the exile of the paramount khans.29 Before the 1979 spring migration, the paramount khans told the Darrehshuri, who made no public protest, that they could not use these summer pastures. Pressure on more southern summer pastures utilized by other Qashqa'i groups was therefore intense. The paramount khans struggled with these many land issues throughout the summer of 1979, and when the fall migration commenced, they took up residence in Tehran, partly to avoid having to handle the new set of conflicts arising in winter pastures. However, the telephone was now part of tribal and disputants communications, in emerging land problems phoned them continually. Conflict was anticipated in the oil-rich area northwest of Shiraz, where Qashqa'i, Boir Ahmad, and Mamassani pastures meet, and armed supporters were sent with Ayaz Khan Darrehshuri to his winter pastures there. No conflict occurred.

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either to Iran's new government was in no position land tenure or to introduce new land regenforce previous which allowed local powers to work out land isulations, The Qashqa'i khans did not effectivesues by themselves. the in this regard, despite ly establish their authority in some areas. acceptance it probably would have received Some Qashqa'i who came to see Naser Khan sought his with the reassurance about the extent of their complicity From an early date, Naser Khan stressed Pahlavi regime. publicly that he had not returned to punish collaborators that many Qashqa'i had had to acand that he recognized Privately, he was comodate their lives to the regime. to Pahlavi rule. bitter about those who had acquiesced policy about the treatment of SAVAK He made no specific partly because there were informers among the Qashqa'i, a few among the khan families of the component Qashqa'i tribes. (Some informers were, however, arrested or sought guards.) by revolutionary There was one person who Naser Khan would not excuse: of the tribal education MohammadBahmanbegi, the director Many accused him of having atprogram mentioned earlier. and soliidentity, tempted to destroy Qashqa'i culture, by the khans for having taken darity, and he was disliked In addition, on certain aspects of Qashqa'i leadership. of young unmarried many were angry about his exploitation Qashqa i women as performing dancers for the shah and visBy so doing, he was said to iting foreign dignitaries. have jeopardized Bahmanbegi welcomed Qashqa'i honor. Naser Khan on his return to Iran, but he was not hospitBahmanbegi and his ably received, and shortly thereafter driven out of Shiraz and into hiding family were forcibly about the circumcirculate in Tehran. Although stories those involved were said to have included zealous stances, close anxious to punish state officials nontribal Shirazis to the shah, armed Lur tribesmen brought by Bahmanbegi to During and armed Qashqa'i. guard his home and family,30 to Tehran in September 1979, BahmanNaser Khan's visit but he was summarily response, begi again sought a positive that the several and Naser Khan noted bitterly dismissed, months of "exile" spent by a complaining Bahmanbegi were compared with his own 25 years of exile. insignificant IRANIAN

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The Structure

of

Leadership

Before 1954, confederacy had been divided leadership among the ilkhani and his close relatives, and competition had always occurred.31 But the four khans of the ruling family were now acutely aware that opposing interests and competition were damaging the attempted resumption of leadership. By early fall 1979, some felt that their moment had already passed, that it was too late to re-establish and the Qashqa'i as major powers. themselves (This proved not to be the case. ) Of the four khans, Khosrow Khan in particular took an independent, unpredictable course and made alliances with other powers in the area, including who wanted leftists to abolish the khan system. Naser Khan spoke about a Conof Southern Tribes and a Union of Iranian Tribes, federation but took no direct action in their formation. He generally played a quietly political, almost ceremonial, role as he traveled throughout tribal territory and did not create the political disruption that seemed to follow in Khosrow Khan's wake. Malek Mansur Khan, who is an eloquent tribal was also more interested historian, in the ceremonial aspects of Qashqa'i life than in serving as an aggressive political leader. MohammadHosayn Khan, whose concerns focused on national, rather than specifically tribal politics, visited the tribe infrequently and continued to be the one to establish links at the national level. Men such as Abol-Hasan Banisadr and Rahmatollah MoqaddamMaraghe'i, an Azerbaijani Turk who at the time was one of the most influential nonclerical members of the Assembly of Experts charged with drafting the constitution, were his frequent visitors, and both MohammadHosayn Khan and Malek Mansur Khan continued to associate with National Front members. A source of tension within the ruling family was the distinction made between the two brothers who were in exile for 25 years (and, hence, seen as untainted by political accommodation to the Pahlavi regime) and the two who had returned earlier. The latter had adequate sources of income by now, but the former were in economic difficulty. Arguments within the family about its rights over Bagh-e Eram, the ilkhani's estate in TRIBE

AND STATE

IN IRAN

243

Shiraz confiscated culties.32

by the shah,

masked some of these

diffi-

relationand crossgenerational The intergenerational of these khans were also characterships of the offspring The three and competition. ized by opposing interests or professionals khans' children are Western-educated and Western students and established in urban residences Because of (Khosrow Khan has no children.) life styles. restrictions of exile and the political the conditions most of the chilplaced upon their parents by the state, and their ideas territory, dren had never lived in tribal versions of were distilled of tribal life and leadership were Some of this generation stories told over the years. yet most of them seemed to leftist or leftist-oriented, leftist ideals to their own have difficulty transcribing status. identity and national-minority unique cultural acstatus and leftist Also, they were aware that elite with One offspring tivity held inherent contradictions. Tudeh Party affiliations took no action either for or valued age The older generation against the khan system. major leaderand experience and did not easily relinquish those who Among the latter, ship roles to the youngsters. capacities were most successfully performed in leadership those who served in deputy-like fashion to the khans, like Houman, son of MohammadHosayn Khan. between males and females over competition Explicit and to some existed in the younger generation leadership denied, on Some males explicitly degree in the older. status to women. the basis of gender, formal leadership A published genealogy of "the Qashqa'i ruling family," which included only male members, was offered as proof leaders.33 However, that no women had ever been tribal precedence for female all were aware of the historical in this family, and its most recent expression leadership in Khadijeh Bibi (widow of Esma'il Khan and mother of the four khans), two of her daughters, and two granddaughters. a functioning leader. The 90-year-old Khadijeh Bibi is still Her daughters tend to exert power through men of the family, are more overt in their political while her granddaughters activities. IRANIAN

STUDIES

244

The khans of the component Qashqa'i tribes, who had assumed greater political importance when the paramount khans were exiled and who were stripped of certain leadership functions by the state in the 1960s, were now caught dilemma. in a structural On the one hand, they could emerge again as major political in south Iran; figures on the other, they were, and felt they ought to be, politsubordinate to the paramount khans. ically (Some demonin playing active political strated no interest roles.) The key role in ilkhani-khan relations had been the kalantar, the major khan of a khan family. Before 1954, he emerged through a combined process of internal selection and external "appointment" by the ilkhani. However, there had been a 25-year hiatus in this process, and young khans now of age to serve as kalantar competed with those who had served in years past. Neither Naser Khan nor Khosrow Khan appointed kalantars from the tribes, for they wanted them to "emerge" through internal processes. However, Khosrow Khan let his favorite choices be known. The main competitor for Qashqa'i leadership between 1954 and 1979 was the khan family of the Darrehshuri tribe, which had become wealthy and well connected with the center after the exile of the ruling family and which had--incidentally--taken over its vast summer pastures. One of the few "tribal" decisions made by Naser Khan shortly after his return was to prohibit Darrehshuri tribal people from migrating into these pastures, which disrupted the renewal of ties between the Darrehshuri khans and the ruling family. Many Qashqa'i felt that the Darrehshuri khans had given less assistance to their tribal sections during the difficult post-1953 period than any other khan family. On his own, Khosrow Khan urged the Darrehshuri masses to seize the Darrehshuri khans' property, and whether or not his urgings were responsible, some Darrehshuri herders did camp on the khans' land throughout the summer. Conflicts arose among the Darrehshuri khans, the mediation of the paramount khans was sought, and; partly as a result, several councils (shura) were formed within Darrehshuri to handle land disputes between khans and commoners as well as other problems. The fall migration and the Darrehshuri khans' dispersion to winter pastures and urban residences

TRIBE AND STATE IN IRAN

245

helped

to settle

matters.

of Ayaz Khan Darrehshuri by a tribalThe assassination in December 1979 drew the various groups rebel-turned-leftist Of in mourning and in revenge against the culprit. together to the rulthe Darrehshuri khans, Ayaz had been the closest mediator among the many local ing family and an effective powers emerging in the shah's wake. His death and national that their brought many Qashqa'i leaders to the realization could be their undoing and that their internal difficulties outward. efforts should be directed

The Leftist

Challenge

had been present within the QashLeftist sentiments but Iran's revolutionary for some decades, qa'i population which enabled a resumption of khan rule, brought process, for its eradicamovements calling leftist forth incipient stated that in Iran, Qashqa'i and others, Leftists tion. landowning of the old bourgeois the khans were supporters classes and offered as evidence the khans' and clerical fresupport of Khomeini and the new government's (initial) state officials. quent use of them as mediators and surrogate one of Also, it was reported that Ayatollah Mahallati, two major leaders, had mediated in favor of the Shiraz's Qashqa'i khans in a land dispute with commoners. were primarily young men and women Qashqa'i leftists Many were profesbackground. and nonelite of both elite in the tribal education proteachers including sionals, gram. Nearly all were educated at least through high school, A few many had urban jobs, and some had army training. during their serwho were radicalized were army officers And a few vice under the shah in Dhofar and Kurdistan. during the Pahlavi regime. were men who had been fugitives Liberawith the Palestine Several of these had training several fought with Barzani in Kurdistion Organization, fought with Dhofar intan, and at least one reportedly nomadic pastoraAlthough none were currently surgents. the khans' children) their families (excepting lists, system. still had roots in this subsistence IRANIAN

STUDIES

246

While many Qashqa'i leftists had affiliations or contacts with Iranian and international leftist movements, there were, to my knowledge, no non-Qashqa'i leftists-Iranian or foreign--in in 1979. Qashqa'i territory (This was not the case for Iran's other, major tribal national were organized Some Qashqa'i leftists minorities.34) in small, well-armed groups. They spoke in general terms about class struggle, about ridding the area of "khans and feudal lords," and about allowing "the people" to rule the and they attempted to gather support from the tribtribe, al masses. One leftist itself as Mount group identifying Dina Union circulated xeroxed antikhan statements.35 Another group seized several villages and divided the property among the locale's landless. The groups were not and their members were extremely cautious unified, about discussing their affiliations; most Qashqa'i seemed uninformed about them and lumped them together under the label "communist." Coming from the ranks of the more privileged Qashqa'i, the leftists' identification with "the working class" did not sit well with many nonelite Qashqa'i, and the suspicion that international powers were at work among the leftists to the lack of support from the contributed general Qashqa'i population. Some Qashqa'i leaders stated that leftists were a greater danger to "the Qashqa'i" than the increasingly theocratic state and urged action against them before their support grew. They feared the leftist presence would provoke a government attack as it had in other minority areas, and they saw it as a challenge to traditional leadership and to the class interests of the khans and other wealthy Qashqa'i. Since the paramount khans' land had been confiscated by the state in the 1950s and 1960s, leftists no immediate economic threat to them, presented but the khans hoped to regain some of their lost land and expected to continue as leaders. For other wealthy Qashqa'i, including the tribal khans, leftists were immediately threatening.

TRIBE AND STATE IN IRAN

247

Kurdistan,

Khomeini,

and the Qashqa 'i Khans

Whenthe shah was in power, the paramount khans were willing to demonstrate their support of Khomeini, but the government's military attacks on the Kurds in the summer of 1979 abruptly altered this. Although Qashqa'i leaders had earlier demonstrated little interest in speaking with visiting Kurdish leaders, they were now outraged by the government's military aggression, and they recognized that the focus of state attention could also be directed toward them. Qashqa'i leaders were distressed that the Persian chauvinism of the Pahlavi era, so destructive to them in the past, was being perpetuated in the Islamic Republic, and they expressed concern that Khomeini had no interest in Iran's diverse minorities. In noting that he usually spoke of "Muslims" rather than "Iranians," they remarked that it was ironic that the Qashqa'i--constituting a major national minority that had been accused in the past of lacking patriotism--were more nationalistic toward Iran than Khomeini. In this context, the Qashqa'i khans spoke jokingly of the establishment of the Islamic Republic as the "second Arab invasion" (the first Arab invasion being the initial sweep of Islam into Iran many centuries ago). Many Qashqa'i leaders articulated astutely their feelings about the relationship with Khomeini. The problem, as they saw it, was one of the degree of support to with Khomeini, be offered and the extent of identification with the Islamic Republic, and even with Islam itself. While the leaders are not devoutly religious and have no religious functionaries attached to their leadership, they have found occasion in the past to ally with the ulama. By mid-1979 they saw that support for the increasingly repressive theocratic state was rapidly declining in some segments of the Iranian population. The rapid of government in Qomand Tehran was viewed recentralization with dismay by those who thought that their active revolutionary involvements could continue from the provinces. Some Qashqa'i leaders stated that, through history, whenever state authority was threatened, they always backed what eventually turned out to be the side that lost and

IRANIAN STUDIES

248

were punished for years later as a result. They planned not In the case of Khomeini, howto make this mistake again. how long he would last, and ever, they could not estimate did not know how much, therefore, they should be identified as his supporter. The military attack on Kurdistan seemed to them his true colors, and they began to withto indicate As has been noted, draw from direct expressions of support. to remain in Naser Khan did not heed Khomeini's requests Iran in September 1979. outlook and said, Malek Mansur Khan took a pessimistic "The Qashqa'i don't take sides; sides take the Qashqa'i." In the past, he noted, the Qashqa'i had been swept up in national and manipulated into positions they involvements had not specifically it was hapsought. And he believed pening again.36

Conclusion were undermined in 1978-79 State power and authority distant from the state throughout Iran, including provinces Political center and among tribally organized populations. reactivity through tribal systems has been a recurrent sponse throughout Iranian history, and, as the recent revit is proving again to be a olutionary period indicates, non-Persian populaway of providing regional, primarily in the competitive, tions with organization and protection It is not to be viewed as unrestful post-Pahlavi period. A discussion a reversion to "feudal" conditions. of tribal need not ignore issues of class or national-mipolitics as has been demonstrated, the three facnority struggles; tors can be integrally related. Tribal systems are part of regional and national political economies and have class And for many of Iran's non-Persian populations, components. of underdevelopment, Persian chauheightened perceptions are interconnected vinism, and cultural distinctiveness with the tribal Political use of tribpolitical process. al structures and ideologies is one mechanism for the arand expression of national-minority sentiments. ticulation It has been, past and present, a response by a portion of incursion, Iran's population to state repression and foreign

TRIBE AND STATE IN IRAN

249

and it has involved a dynamic process of political loci of power. ment within a context of shifting

develop-

of the Islamic Republic of Iran has The establishment of conpatterns introduced new dimensions to historical This time, between tribes and the state in Iran. flict of Shi'the threat is theocracy and the forced imposition rural, and world view on primarily ite Islamic politics and nominally renon-Persian, and pastoral, agricultural who doubt that they will receive benpopulations, ligious commensurate with the price in state encapsulation efits from them. Where Sunnite Muslims have been inextracted For the Shi'has occurred. intervention military volved, links with the the renewal of historical ite Qashqa'i, clergy set them apart, for a time, from the Sunnite Shi'ite wing of clerical However, as the conservative minorities. its power, increased establishment political the national conits lack of national-minority clearly it demonstrated between its supporters and and armed clashes sciousness, The events that accompanied the Qashqa'i have resulted. of Khosrow Khan from his duly and followed the expulsion military seat in June 1980, including elected parliament guards sent to Qashqa'i terriclashes with revolutionary tory, have served to unite Qashqa'i leaders and to drive and tribal an antagonistic wedge between state authorities leaders and members. coordinated Qashqa'i leaderThe lack of organized, response of the paramount ship and the ambiguous political can be year of the Islamic republic khans during the first unstable First, by a combination of factors. explained conditions prevented Qashqa'i leaders national political ties with the predictable effective, from establishing conhas always been directly Tribal leadership center. leaders were since tribal nected with state politics, population. mediators between the state and the affiliated the competnational leadership, Given the lack of unified and the many other competing governments, ing parallel powers, Qashqa'i leaders lacked the context to become orThe many alternating pericoordinated leaders. ganized, ods of state weakness and strength and of active and inacleaders, created tension among tribal tive tribal leadership

IRANIAN STUDIES

250

tribal members, and new and old state authorities. By their own reckoning, the khans were playing rather limited roles in leadership, and one remarked, "The only thing we have done is that we have not moved against this government. "37 They expressed about taking any poreluctance litical stance, given their thoughts that the Islamic republic might be a short-lived Naser Khan phenomenon. stressed his obligation to stand by his words of support to Khomeini, and other khans felt that actions on behalf of the Qashqa'i, whatever their intentions, could easily be interpreted by central to the authorities as threats state. The khans seemed not to want to jeopardize even an ambiguous position. A state of ambiguity did, after all, offer them time to work out their interrelationships and to assess contemporary conditions. Second, Naser Khan and Khosrow Khan had been away from tribal and national affairs Lor 25 years, during which time Iran had been economically and politically transformed. They no longer allocated land rights or had economic ties with supporters and clients, and the Qashqa'i population had developed various strategies to cope with political pacification, state encapsulation, and capitalist expansion. The population had diversified and economically, many had adopted wage labor and urban or village residences. A sizable portion of the young generation had received formal education and had entered new jobs and professions. New classes had emerged which undercut former political and allegiances. interests While many Qashqa'i were eager to make a political/military statement about 55 years of repressive Pahlavi rule, not all were eager to return to the political and economic conditions of the past, and those in the higher socioeconomic did not want to levels risk a confrontation with the state. Those who desired to achieve local self-rule before central authority had a chance to become re-established were frustrated by the khans' lack of leadership in this direction. It could be said that the Qashqa'i khans were caught between a center that could not be located and a Qashqa '3i population that they had not directly led for many years.38 However, the khans complicated the process for themselves TRIBE AND STATE IN IRAN

251

and the population by not defining what, if any, their new leadership functions were to be. Their return to Qashqa'i territory held an explicit promise of leadership; it created expectations that went unmet. Third, the circumstances under which the khans had as powerful leaders (1941-54) included last been effective a population dependent a set of factors no longer present: on allocated pastures and mediatory leadership, a weak and inexperienced shah, a supportive prime minister (Mosaddeq), and interfering foreign powers. But it could also be said that the Islamic Republic of Iran in its first year preset of cirthough different, sented an equally fruitful, cumstances for an assertion of leadership. NOTES

1.

Nomads of Fars (The Hague: The Qashqa'i Pierre Oberling, Mouton, 1974); Lois Beck, "Iran and the Qashqa'i Tribin Richard Tapper, ed., Tribe and al Confederacy," (forthand Iran from 1800-1980 in Afghanistan State coming).

2.

among Qashqa'i Lois Beck, "Economic Transformations Nomads, 1962-1978, " in Michael Bonine and Nikki Keddie, eds..,

Modern

(Albany:

Iran:

State

Dialectics

University

of

Continuity

of New York Press,

and Change

1981).

3.

of This is a summary of the dominant characteristics half and first in the nineteenth Qashqa'i leadership My forthcoming book on the century. of the twentieth depth system provides historical Qashqa'i political and context.

4.

Nomads, pp. 31, 35; "The Turkic The Qashqa'i Oberling, MiUniversity Peoples of Southern Iran" (Ann Arbor: 1960), p. 202. crofilms.,

5.

of Iran, A History See John Perry, Karim Khan Zand: 1979); Press, of Chicago University (Chicago: 1749-1779 A. K. S. Lambton, "The Tribal Resurgence and the Decline

IRANIAN STUDIES

252

of the Bureaucracy in the Eighteenth Century," in Thomas Naff and Roger Owen, eds., Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977), pp. 110-111. 6.

Beck, "Iran and the Qashqa'i

7.

Oberling,

8.

Lois Beck, "Herd Owners and Hired Shepherds: Qashqa'i of Iran," Ethnology XIX (July 1980), 351.

9.

Ibid.;

The Qashqa'i

Tribal

Confederacy."

Nomads, p. 195. The pp. 327-

Lois Beck, "Womenamong Qashqa'i Nomadic Pastoralists in Iran," in Lois Beck and Nikki Keddie, eds., Women in the Muslim World (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1978).

10.

This appears to be the last pointed an ilkhani.

11.

Oberling,

time that

the state

ap-

Nomads, pp. 200-201; A. K. S. Land Reform 1962-1966 (Oxford: 1969), pp. 68-69.

The Qashqa'i

Lambton, The Persian Clarendon

Press.,

12.

Beck,

13.

For Bahmanbegi's account of the tribal education program, see "Qashqa'i: Hardy Shepherds of Iran's Zagros Mountains Build a Future through Tent-school Education," Nomads of the World (Washington, D.C.: National Geographic Society, 1971). See also Paul Barker, "Tent Schools of the Qashqa'i: A Paradox of Local Initiative and State Control," in Michael Bonine and Nikki Keddie, eds., Modern Iran: Dialectics of Continuity and Change.

14.

Most of the information in this paragraph derives from letters (January 21, 1981, and March 30, 1981) and conversations with Mary Hooglund and Eric Hooglund.

15.

Mary Hooglund,

"Economic Transformations

personal

TRIBE AND STATE IN IRAN

among Qashqa'i

communication,

January

Nomads."

21,

1981. 253

16.

Iran and Its Tribal Peoples," Lois Beck, "Revolutionary No. 87, 10 (May 1980), pp. 14-20. MERIP Reports,

17.

Mary Hooglund and Eric Hooglund,

18.

I heard a tape recording of the speech but was unable broadcast. the date of its original to discover

19.

Other than several female members of the ruling Qashqa'i women and children did not attend this

personal

communication.

elite, gather-

ing.

20.

unrest in of political On several previous occasions Fars, Qashqa'i forces have attacked the airport and damaged equipment that could be used militarily against them.

21.

Mary Hooglund,

22.

during The Qashqa'i khans and some ulama were allied (Oberling, 1905-1911 of Revolution Constitutional the Nomads, p. 99), during World War I, and The Qashqa'i in the 1940s (ibid., pp. 186, 188).

23.

guards did not return Revolutionary force until June 1980.

24.

appearance The two-eared Qashqa'i hat made its first in the 1940s, introduced by Naser Khan upon his return to Fars after Reza Shah's abdication.

25.

With bazaar moneylenders and merchants, capitalist and some urban employers. stock raisers,

26.

and leaders of Arab and In 1910 the Qashqa'i ilkhani formed the "League of the South" (EttehadLur tribes e Jonub), and in 1946 Naser Khan formed an alliance leaders of Fars (Oberling, and religious of tribal The Qashqa'i

27.

Personal

Nomads,

pp.

communication,

99,

MohammadHosayn Khan, personal July 29, 1979.

IRANIAN STUDIES

1981.

21,

January

to Firuzabad

in

186).

communication,

London,

254

28.

For the situation in one village in Fars, Hooglund, "One Village in the Revolution," No. 87, 10 (May 1980), pp. 7-12. ports,

see Mary MERIZPRe-

29.

of the Qashqa'i tribes, The 'Amaleh tribe, the largest had received its pasture allotments from the ilkhani; the tribe had no khans of its own and was vulnerable when the paramount khans were exiled.

30.

Bahmanbegi's

31.

See Oberling,

32.

Upon their return to Iran, Naser Khan and Khosrow Khan announced publicly that they were donating Bagh-e Eram to the people of Shiraz, to be used as a religious center and museum. However, given that legal title was in question, the family continued to discuss the property. In the meantime, revolutionary guards took of it. possession

33.

Oberling,

The Qashqa'i

34.

See Beck,

"Revolutionary

35.

Dina. Ettehadiyeh-ye Mount Dina is the highest mountain in Qashqa'i territory and dominates much of summer pastures.

36.

Malek Mansur Khan, personal August 28, 1979.

communication,

Tehran,

37.

Malek Mansur Khan, personal September 5, 1979.

communication,

Tehran,

38.

This was suggested by Gene Garthwaite, munication, March 30, 1981.

wife

is a Lur.

The Qashqa'i

TRIBE AND STATE IN IRAN

Nomads.

Nomads,

pp.

237-240.

Iran,1" p. 20.

personal

com-

255

Iranian Studies, Volume XIII, Nos. 1-4, 1980

Urban Migrants and the Revolution Farhad Kazemi

of 1978-1979, which toppled The Iranian revolution as a result of masthe Pahlavi dynasty, came to fruition elements and groups in the sive participation by diverse in social order. Similar to previous riots and uprisings activities centered in Iran, the locus of revolutionary the country's towns and cities. The urban areas once again riots, emerged as the focal points for demonstrations, and other antiregime activities. Included among strikes, the participants in the revolution were large groups of and urban dwellers who had migrated from Iran's villages towns to its principal cities. The term urban migrants, sothen, encompasses a wide array of people with diverse For cioeconomic orientations. backgrounds and political the purposes of this paper, however, the term is used to refer to the urban poor who had migrated from the rural the urban center, areas to Iran's dominant and largest The poor migrants' departure capital city of Tehran. from the countryside was, for the most part, a result of in Iranian agriculture in the wake of the the dislocation

Farhad Kazemi is Associate York University. This article book, Poverty

is based on the author's

and Revolution Urban Marginality and Politics

versity

Press,

Professor

in

Iran:

of Politics

recently

at New

published

The Migrant

(New York:

Poor,

New York Uni-

1980). 257

The poor miland-reform program and other push factors. grants came from various parts of the country with diverse They continued to share linguListic and ethnic backgrounds. as rural poor and later as commoni features, however, first of the urban soimpoverished masses living on the fringes ciety. Among the poor urban migrants in Tehran three distinct and shanty (a) the squatters groups can be differentiated and (c) town dwellers, poor migrants, (b) the nonsquatting the unskilled Segments from all migrant factory workers. in varying degrees against the three groups were mobilized That any of the mishah's regime during the revolution. since grant poor were able to be mobilized was unusual, involved they are not politically under normal circumstances The process politics. and do not engage in street-level and their particmobilization leading to the poor migrants' is the primary focus of ipation in the Iranian revolution this paper. Causes

of

Migration

The vast majority of poor urban migrants in Tehran come from among the masses of impoverished peasants who problems were pushed off the land due to the multifaceted of of Iranian agriculture and the scope and administration of the Before the implementation the land-reform program. land-reform program in the early 1960s, the poor peasants The first group was made up were divided into two groups. of the sharecropping peasants who were given the right to of the land owned by the landcultivate portions (nasaq) or unspecified time on the basis of lords for a specified either written or oral contracts.1 These peasants joined in production teams of four to sixteen men (boneh) in order to cultivate the landlord's property.2 The extent of the to the usual five factors of agricontribution peasants' cultural in Iran--land, water, labor, seed, and production their share in the final distriplough animals--determined bution of the harvested crops.3 The second group was composed of the agricultural These laborers neither owned land nor had proletariat. IRANIAN

STUDIES

258

they the right to cultivate another's property. They were hired to perform agricultural labor during the peak farming seasons and survived on the meager income derived from farm work and related tasks. The sharecropping peasants often referred to the agricultural proletariat and nonfarming villagers as khoshneshin (happy squatter). This classification is misleading, however, since it includes the three (listinct and varied income groups of agricultural proletariat, nonagricultural workers (blacksmith, carpenter, coppersmith, rural bourshoemaker, etc.), and the comparatively well-off In geoisie (shopkeepers, merchants, moneylenders, etc.).4 the early 1960s, the agricultural proletariat constituted more than 80 percent of the khoshneshin population and onethird of Iran's total rural population.5 They were by far the most destitute of Iran's poor peasantry, barely managing minimal subsistence. The land-reform program attempted to deal with the plight of peasantry by redistributing the landlords' estates among only one group of the poor peasantry, the former sharecroppers. laborers and village The agricultural who had previously proletariat, enjoyed no cultivating were left out of the plan. This not only exacerrights, bated the existing intraclass tensions between the two of ecogroups, but also resulted in a rapid deterioration nomic life of the already dispossessed agricultural proletariat.6 The basic land-reform law did nothing to improve the living conditions of the agricultural laborers. In the words of Nikki Keddie, the laboring class vas "given no protection--no no minimum wage, no unemplovment relief, gleaning rights on the now-private fields, and no land."7 to obSteady employment, which had always been difficult tain, became well nigh impossible under new land distriin coInbution arrangements. The new l)easant cultivators, trast to the former landlords, preferred using their owvn workfamily labor rather than hiring outside agricultural ers.8 NMoreover, the spread of agricultural mechanization, had the which was designed to increase labor productivity, of reducinig the number of villagers inevitable side effect needed for farm work.9 In addition, large modern agricultural enterprises, such as the agribusiness complexes, were able to "employ only betweeni 40 and 50 percent of URBAN MIGRANTS

259

of the areas" they active population the economically covered.10 Since much of the labor in the agribusinesses from among the peasants whose land had been was recruited for purchased by these companies, employment prospects other agricultural workers were limited. It is, therefore, that in a survey of not surprising three villages in the Fars province in 1967, Ismail Ajami among the agriculdiscovered widespread social alienation tural proletariat. He reports that 66 percent of the agaliricultural workers in the sample expressed extensive enation as compared to 27.9 percent of the new landowning farmers. Moreover, only 11.5 percent of the agricultural Ajami attributes workers were satisfied with their jobs. the alienation and job dissatisfaction of the agricultural proletariat to the fact that the land-reform program did not distribute any land among them.11 poorer? The agricultural laborers, who were getting found themselves in a situation in which unemployment or underemployment became even more of a common feature of on the increase in agritheir lives. Official statistics cultural employment between 1956 and 1966 point to an annual rate of only about 1 percent.12 As the International Labour Office report on "Employment and Income Policies for Iran" notes, of complete stag"there are indications nation since 1966.''13 compiled by the Iranian Statistics government for 1971 indicate a rural unemployment rate of 13.9 percent for the economically active population.14 to leave the rural areas for the cities-Hence, pressures where at least from a distance chances for a better life seemed possible--increased In a classic case of daily. the Iranian agriculpush factors at the point of origin, tural proletariat far and near. migrated in droves to cities to the agricultural proMigration was not restricted letariat khoshneshin alone. Other groups of the landless population, particularly those involved in the rapidly dehandicraft joined the clining and nonfarming occupations, peasantmigratory movements. Segments of the cultivating ry, whose land was either purchased by the agribusiness companies or exchanged for paper shares in farm corporaIRANIAN

STUDIES

260

tions, found it more congenial to make the move to the city. And for some of the new peasant farmers and middlesize farm operators who remained behind, uncertainty about their land titles contributed to a slow, but steady, flight from the countryside.15 The available data repeatedly confirm the central importance of economic factors in cityward migration. In 1972, for example, 71.6 percent of the principal migrants residing in urban areas stated that they migrated either to seek work or a better job.16 Since this percentage also includes the intercity migrants, the actual ratio for the rural to urban migrants would be even higher. In a 1971-1972 report on migrants in a low-income community of southwest Tehran known as Yakhchiabad, 74.6 percent of the sample's respondents stated that the principal reason for their migration was job-related problems and low income.17 A stratified random sample of 224 poor who migrated from the rural areas to Tehran, administered by the author in the summer of 1977, confirms observations in on the importance of push factors the decision to migrate. The survey, conducted among the male heads of households, indicates that nearly 85 percent of the sample left the villages due to unsatisfactory employment and inadequate income. Aside from the basic push factors due to multifaceted problems in agriculture, a number of other reasons have conto the peasants' tributed to migrate to the cities. decision Most important has been the wide gap and perceived differences between rural and urban incomes. In 1959 the ratio of urban to rural income per head was estimated as 4.6:1. This ratio increased to 5.7:1 by 1969 and higher in the later years.18 According to official reports, in 1972 the work was average earned income per day from agricultural 19 for male and 74 cents for female laborers. only 1.40 dollars In the same year, an unskilled construction worker in an urban area earned several times this amount. On the basis of some agricultural workers decided to become urban this, rather than rural proletariats. It is, therefore, acerbated by the basic URBAN MIGRANTS

apparent that economic hardship excomproblems of Iranian agriculture 261

to leave for Tehran and other pelled many rural residents In in search of better work and higher pay. major cities the 1966-1976 decade, for example, about 2,111,000 villagers This in the urban centers. left their rural homes to settle in Iran's total amounted to over 35 percent of the increase during this period.20 urban population

The Poor Migrants

in Tehran

The poor migrants in Tehran reside in a large variety The largest of the city. of dwelling units in most sections however, is in the peof the poor migrants, concentration in its southern of Greater Tehran, particularly ripheries setunits range from squatter The residential sections. Only a small tlements to one- or two-room rented dwellings. portion of the poor migrants are able to purchase their rise in the price of real estate The exponential homes. elimiand housing in Tehran in the mid-1970s effectively of home ownership for the possibility nated any realistic migrant for the regular wage-earning poor migrants--even factory workers. with Very few of the poor migrants hold occupations The vast majority of any degree of employment security. poor miand many among the nonsquatting the squatters, workers employment as unskilled find intermittent grants, whose booming industry, in the construction and laborers of the late 1960s and early 1970s provided reasonactivity The occupational ably easy employment for many migrants. better of migrant factory workers was relatively situation than other workers, for they had at least succeeded in obIn the words of employment. regular wage-earning taining from transition John Turner, they had made the critical "consolito fully-employed "bridgeheaders" semiemploTed dators. ..2 Urban Migrants

and Politics

The poor migrants in Tehran are not involved actively, of the city. in the politics under normal circumstances, IRANIAN STUDIES

262

Their primary preoccupation is to make ends meet in a costly city with inadequate housing, and social transportation, services. National politics, which rarely attracts them, becomes important only if it dramatically affects their lives and significant external organizational support is provided. During the course of the Iranian revolution, several factors of segments contributed to the mobilization of poor migrants against the shah's regime. But before discussing the general conditions leading to the poor migrants' mobilization, the squatters' basic fear of possible government decisions to eradicate the settlements should be noted. There have been several episodes during recent years where settlements have been torn down and residents forcefully removed. Two incidents are especially noteworthy. The first concerted act of squatter-settlement eradication in Tehran took place in November 1958 in an area known popularly as the South City Pits. These pits consisted of enormous hollows dug into the ground in which the squatters had built shacks, hovels, and cave-like dwellings. According to the reports, 1,356 squatters lived in these pits at the time. On a cold night, at 8:30 p.m., a large group of government officials and workers surprised the residents and attacked their homes. The official eradication party included 130 soldiers, 100 policemen, 120 ofof the police relief ficers organization, 300 municipal officers, workers, and street sweepers, 30 military trucks, 100 police 3 fire engines, trucks, 2 ambulances, 25 large bright lamps, and a few other pieces of equipment.22 An account described eyewitness the action in detail. As planned, the official activities began behind the police precinct at the "Haji Mo'in Pit," located on the northern section of Ghar Avenue. A group of soldiers hurriedly stepped down from their trucks and A large number of bright lamps surrounded the Pit. immediately set the Pit's huge space ablaze. Loudspeakers filled the air: "Brothers and sisters, in accordance with the shah's order, we have come to save you from misery." "Brothers, don't be frightened. The government will provide you with houses, quilts, space heaters, and work." food, clothes, Dumbstruck,

URBAN MIGRANTS

263

the squatters, many of whomhad been asleep, emerged from the pits and shacks. The sight of so many people--soldiers, policemen, and street sweepers carrying shovels and picks--frightened and worried them....The mayor and other high officials entered the Pit; each, in his own way, tried to convey the shah's order and the cabinet's decision. The mayor called to one of the women: "Don't be frightened, sister. Do you always want to live in this filthy and putrid shack. Now you face happiness; gather your belongings quickly and give your children the good tidings that from now on a better and more comfortable life awaits them." Another high official spoke baby talk to a squatter child shivering in his arms. At this time, groups of officers walked into the Pit carrying shovels and picks. Another group, holding lamps and searchlights, entered the shacks and hovels... .A few of the squatters tried to escape, but were prevented by the soldiers' tight encirclement. After half an hour, about 25 squatters got into the waiting trucks. The first pit was now evacuated. Then, the mayor ordered the shacks' destruction. The remainder of the squatters' belongings were set on fire and the work of "Haji Mo'in Pit" was completed. The officials along with their entourage climbed back into their in the direction of the "Farahani

cars and sped off Pit."...23

The eradication was complete by 2 a.m. The squatters were taken to large government storage rooms for temporary housing. Meager attempts were made to find employment for a few of the squatters. Some were forced to return to their villages. Others were set free in a few days or were placed in an overcrowded institution for beggars. The net result of the whole effort was nugatory as once again squatters

soon established to their villages few days.24 In another

themselves

in the old habitat.

were back in the streets

effort

to eradicate

Those sent

of Tehran in a

squatter

settlements,

officers of the Tehran municipality made a series of attempts to evict squatters from their homes on pretexts of

IRANIAN STUDIES

264

and residence illegal in areas outside the city occupation took place on a limits. These sporadic acts of eviction in late 1977 and 1978. The basic pattern of few occasions action was based on a decision by the Tehran municipality do away with all residential units or business to forcefully stated reguoperations that had not conformed to the city's lations. Several supermarkets, and business enterprises, were destroyed by the housing units owned by the well-to-do municipality's squad of workers. As part of this decision, a few of the newer squatter settlements, which were mushrooming in the outskirts of Tehran, were singled out for destruction. However, in contrast to the 1958 debacle, this time some squatters put up stiff resistance, many of them to prevent destruction of their homes. trying physically The net result was personal injury to the squatters and their forcible detention of some by the officers. In a particularly harsh confrontation with the officers of Tehran municipality in August 1978, 200 men and women of a known as Shahbaz-e Jonubi fought the invaders settlement for five hours. The squatters' efforts, however, were to no avail as their 50 shacks were leveled to the ground by About thirteen bulldozers. of the squatters were also injured, some seriously enough to require hospitalization. One of the injured residents expressed his bitterness, shared about the government action: by others, The high cost of tenancy forced us to build a small shack with scraps of metal and oil cans in this locaI then brought my wife and four children tion. here to lead a Stone Age life in a place that has no water and no electricity. But the officers of the municiwithout prior warning and with no regard to pality, their own timetable, stated in the eviction notice, destroyed our shacks over our heads. My children's birth certificates and my other documents are all buried under the debris. I don't know how I am going to find them.25 Sometimes resistance to The squatters simply remained fused to move out. At other showered with insults. There URBAN MIGRANTS

eradication took passive forms. inside their shacks and retimes, the authorities were were also frequent expressions 265

of frustration. An extreme case of this was the attempt at self-immolation of a young poor migrant homeowner in Majidiyeh. He recounted the episode in the following manner: They destroyed my home last spring. I was furious and wanted to attack them but my brother physically restrained me. I went and poured kerosene over my head and lit a match. Everybody gathered and tried to put I spent five months in a hospital the fire out. and have no energy left... .Now I sift dirt here and make a living selling it. The municipality officers bother me. But ever since the self-immolation attempt, they say "don't go near him, he'll burn himself.",26 No attempts were made by the government to relocate these squatters after their homes were destroyed. In the 1958 removals at least an initial was exerted to effort and find, what the authorities house the squatters considto their problems. ered to be, solutions In the more recent removals the squatters were left homeless and with no At the minimum, the squatters place to go. blamed the govAs word of the government's ernment for their loss of homes. increasingly toward the settlements hostile attitude got around, more squatters were mobilized and ready to defend their homes. Clearly, through its harsh eradication policy, the regime created much ill feeling among the squatters and left them with no choice other than to stand to be unbearably repressive against what they considered action. riots of 1978 began in Hence, when the antiregime the task of mobilizing the poor against the regime earnest, was made noticeably easier. Mobilization

and Revolution

can be broadly defined, in Charles TilMobilization ly's words, as "the process by which a group goes from beof individuals to an active paring a passive collection in public life.",27 mobilization has Political ticipant involved an attempt to change the norms and strucgenerally tures of the existing In order for political authority.28 mobilization to take place, for several conditions usually IRANIAN STUDIES

266

political action need to be present. there must be First, an awareness of certain and grievances needs, issues, that can be expressed in political terms. Second, linkage between these issues and national or higher-level politics must be established. Third, it is essential that leadership and organizational means for expression of the needs and issues exist to provide direction and focus to the action groups.29 It is my contention that these conditions were largely met in the recent crisis and resulted in mobilizing groups of poor migrants, normally passive politically, into active opponents of the regime. The issues that were of particular concern to the migrants involved perception of new threats to their endeavors to obtain employment, food, and housing. The migrant squatters felt specifically threatened by the government's new policy of eradication of squatter settlements. The manner and form of removal left the squatters bitter and homeless. Many of them banded and decided to resist together the eviction attempts. The nonsquatting poor migrants found the cost of renting rooms, or other forms of dilapidated housing, increasing very A much larger share of their income now had to rapidly. be set aside for housing than ever before. The sharp rise in the price of even low-income housing destroyed for many of the migrants the hope of ever owning a home. Added to the migrants' problems was the annual inflation rate of about 30 percent, which affected the price of all commodities including basic food items. The only staple not touched by the steep rise in prices was bread, the price of which was kept artifically low by the government for fear of strong popular reaction. Finally, the credit squeeze in 1976, which resulted in a slowdown of the construction industry, adversely affected the migrants' employment opportunities. Since substantial numbers of poor migrants were employed in construction or related jobs, the slowdown left many migrants with no steady source of income. Longer periods of unemployment or less frequent temporary construction jobs became a more regular feature of the poor migrants' daily life.

URBAN MIGRANTS

267

It is apparent that by the mid-1970s, the poor miThe direct were aggravated. grants' economic difficulties connection between their worsening economic position and however, was not clear to all migrants. government policies, The linkage was made by the regime's opposition forces, most of whomhad suffered not only from economic hardship but also from the government's authoritarian and repressive acThe opposition had correctly judged that success tions. against the regime and its well-entrenched military and security forces was largely contingent upon the extent of The miand street demonstrations. popular participation could provide grants and other groups of urban proletariat important numerical support for the antiregime organizathe poor's Hence, the stage was set for politicizing tions. needs and grievances and directing them against the shah's government. The task of the opposition was made easier by the Available stagreat inequality of wealth in the country. evidence points to a society on a path of increastistical In 1973-74 in the urban of wealth. ing maldistribution areas, the highest 10 percent of households accounted for 37.9 percent of total expenditure, while the lowest 10 perInequality of incent accounted for only 1.3 percent.30 come was most pronounced in Tehran where in 1974, 60 percent of the city's total income was distributed among the top 20 percent income group.31 The opposition did not need statistical evidence to prove the growing impoverishment of the many for the benefit of the few. The extreme concentration of wealth in a small group was amply demonstrated by the monied class's conspicuous consumption and eager disto justidifficult It was particularly play of opulence. of resources in the the maldistribution fy or rationalize wake of the oil boom of the post-1973 period and the exInpectations that it had raised among the population. stead of a better and more comfortable living, the poor of their economic life discovered a relative deterioration in making ends meet. and faced greater difficulties The decisive external support needed for the poor's mobilization was provided by the religious hierarchy and to a lesser degree by the secular National Front. Both IRANIAN STUDIES

268

the religious had the groups, particularly establishment, organization and leadership required to draw the disenfranchised elements into action against the regime. The initially tacit and later explicit tactical alliance between the religious groups and the National Front allowed for a direct attempt to reach the poor. the reTraditionally, ligious organization had always been in contact with the poor and frequently had the means to provide some material assistance to them. The lower-ranking and prayer religious leaders maintained regular contacts with the poor through the network of mosques and the distribution of welfare. In some squatter settlements lowerand migrant-poor areas, ranking Muslim divines had always participated as discussion leaders in the intermittent of religious gatherings the poor. These meetings, to as hay'ats, had susreferred tained and strengthened the link between the poor migrants and the religious organization. Hence, when the struggle to topple the shah gained momentum, the existing network to contact the poor migrants and spur them was utilized to collective action against the government. The efforts of the religious hierarchy was spearheaded by the messianic appeal of the exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Tapes of Khomeini's speeches and his vehement denunciations of the shah were made readily available to the poor by the religious leaders. At the later stages of the revolution, the National Front was also instrumental in promoting the poor's participation through rallies and meetings in the southern sections of Tehran. The Front's speakers pointed to the widespread poverty of vast groups of urban residents and stressed the necessity of changing the regime as the first step toward the creation of a more equitable and just society. The frequency of these meetings increased during the Shi'ite mourning month of Moharram. The shah's regime, which had always suffered from a serious problem of questionable was now likened to the traitors legitimacy, and oppressors of the Shi ' ite cause. While the religious hierarchy stressed this theme (among others), the National Front emphasized economic and political discontent and the necessity for action to topple the government in hope of a better future. The result was that many migrant-poor areas of Tehran wit-

URBAN MIGRANTS

269

These and riots aimed at the regime. nessed demonstrations in the large were noted on several occasions demonstrations migrant poor area of Javadiyeh in south Tehran. and riots in demonstrations In many of the street were alTehran, large numbers of very young participants to state deAlthough it would be difficult so observed. that many of these likely it is nevertheless finitively, migrants. were second-generation youthful demonstrators in in the city and their socialization Their upbringing the Iranian education and school environment probably conin the and active participation to their willing tributed Clearly the regime's massive instruggle. revolutionary system (which through the educational efforts doctrination the shah's reform program based discussing included classes did not succeed in gainon his book, The White Revolution), was continuously ing support for a monarch whose legitimacy challenged.32 Another group of poor migrants who mobilized during the came from the ranks of migrant factory workers. revolution The migrant factory workers, like other workers in the inforces were among the more effective dustrial establishment, in factory Their involvement life and opposing the shah. activities provided an important organized occupational Not for collective action. only did most factories basis but the workers became in the general strikes, participate It and riots. demonstrations involved in street actively is probable that the migrant factory workers were among the conscious migrants in the revolution. most politically mobilito the nonsquatting poor migrants, In contrast Although was not as effective. zation of the squatters to defend their homes banded together groups of squatters they were not as actively and prevent forceful removals, Their and demonstrations. protests involved in political with immense problems of everyday survival preoccupation behavior. antiregime was far too great to permit sustained conThis point was made clear in some of the interviews in the squatter settlements ducted by newspaper reporters in a squatter In one instance, living during the crisis. an abandoned brick factory told a reporter that he had IRANIAN STUDIES

270

heard about the demonstrations, but stressed that he did not take part in them. To demonstrate, he said, "you have to have a full stomach. "33 Another squatter in a different settlement mentioned that he had no time for demonstrations but knew "that things will get better once the king goes.t"34 It is apparent that mobilization of the squatters was at best incomplete. The squatters' of releperception vance of politics to their lives, even in a revolutionary situation, was limited, and consequently action political by them was less forthcoming. The one issue that directly concerned their basic needs and threatened their survival was eradication of the settlements, and to prevent this, the squatters were swift in joining and taking together action. While probably some of the squatters participated in antiregime demonstrations, it is likely that many took no part in such activities. The nonsquatting poor migrants, however, were largely mobilized against the regime. The relevance of politics to their socioeconomic position, especially in the areas of housing and employment, was driven home by both the religious organization and the National Front. The external support of these groups was decisive in prompting the migrants to join forces with millions of other Iranians to overthrow the existing authority structure. The independent contribution of the poor migrants in the crisis of 1978-1979, however, was limited. Similar to other marginal groups in different of the world, the migrants' cities mobilization merely reinforced the already initiated process of structural change.35 Their participation, nevertheless, was important in providing numerical support to the antiregime forces and as a highly significant symbolic outcry by the poor against the injustices of the Iranian political and social system.

Conclusion

The victory of the revolution did not mean that the poor migrants' basic problems concerning employment and

URBAN MIGRANTS

271

their conditions In some respects housing were resolved. the revolution. The conworsened in the months following industry came to an almost complete standstill, struction did not reopen due to managerial diffiand many factories Those poor migrants who culties and other related issues. employed in these sectors were left jobwere previously in employment prospects less and without any realistic some migrants decided to return the future.36 As a result, The exof origin and begin a new life. to their villages migration is not yet clear. tent of this back-to-the-village numbers of poor It is, however, apparent that substantial Unconfirmed reports migrants continue to reside in Tehran. that Tehran's population has now reached the estimate mark, much of which is composed of new poor mi7,000,000 the only ray of For these migrants, grants to the city. Through hope is the newly created Foundation for the Poor. orthe religious channels, institutional the foundation's The more welfare among the poor. distributes ganization fundamental and long-range problems of the poor migrants, in this Viable solutions however, have not been resolved. area can only be forthcoming if more concerted and susregular employment at creating tained efforts are directed and adequate housing for the urban poor. of the On the political front, the future direction Since at least remains ambiguous. activities poor migrants' it is unlikely that these segments of them were mobilized, of prolonged poor migrants would revert back to a condition involveprevious passivity. The poor migrants' political ment in the revolution and their raised economic and social in participation point to greater political aspirations the coming years.37 The migrant factory workers and the to susceptible migrants are particularly second-generation partiorganizational and increased involvement political A possible may channel for these activities cipation. It is institutions. well turn out to be the religious the that the National Front or its offshoot, less likely effecNational Democratic Front, will be able to recruit posThe ideological from among the poor migrants. tively are ture and active membership of these two organizations and the intelliclasses tied to the professional closely to the poor migrants. and hence are less attractive gentsia, IRANIAN

STUDIES

272

Moreover, the National Front activities have been severely of the religious curtailed by the current leadership establishment. the National Front groups have Consequently, been forced into a situation where they neither possess adequate institutional means, nor have the opportunity, to recruit among the disenfranchised urban poor. The two guerrilla organizations, the People's Sacrifice Guerrillas and the Warriors of the People of Iran, have also made extensive and concerted efforts to reach the poor migrants, and especially the squatters. Internal divisions within the respective organizations and their leftist orientations have prevented a more effective recruitment of the migrant poor. However, both groups are keenly aware of the migrant poor's concrete needs and vigorously publicize their support of the squatters. Whether it is the National Front, the religious organization, or sorne other urban group, attempts will continue to be made to recruit the poor migrants because their potential role in politics of the city is now, at last, recognized.

NOTES

1.

Ann K. S. Lambton, Landlord Study

of

Land Tenure

Oxford University

(London: 2. 3.

Javad Safinezhad,

Boneh

Khosrow Khosravi, (Tehran:

Pazhuheshi

ye Iran

4.

and Peasant in Persia: and Land Revenue Administration

Eric Hooglund, Iranian

Studies

Press,

1953),

(Tehran: dar

Tus,

p. 295.

1353/1974).

Jame'eh-ye

Payam, 2535/1976),

A

Rusta'i-

pp. 67-83.

"The Khwushnishin Population of Iran," VI (Autumn 1973), pp. 229-245.

5.

Ibid.,

6.

of Iran: James Bill., The Politics Classes Groups, and Modernization (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill,

1972),

p.

256.

p. 146.

URBAN MIGRANTS

273

7.

8,

Before and After Nikki Keddie, "The Iranian Village Land Reform," Journal of Contemporary History 3 (July 1968), p. 86. William Bartsch, Problems of Employment Creation in Labour Office, International 1970), (Geneva: p. 14, n. 3.

Iran

9.

Bartsch,

p. 67.

10.

EmployLabour Office, International United Nations, for Iran (Geneva: Internament and Income Policies 1973), p. 25. The land reform Labour Office, tional of rural cooperathe creation program also envisaged and produccorporations joint-stock tive societies, and large agribusiness farms. tion cooperatives, of problems in These programs encountered a variety See R. Doroudian, "Mostage. their implementation Past, of Rural Economy in Iran," Iran: dernization and Future, ed. by Jane Jacqz (New York: Present, 1976). Marvin for Humanistic Studies, Aspen institute Policy and Development Politics Weinbaum, "Agricultural in Iran," Middle East Journal 31 (Autumn 1977), pp. 435A 450. M. A. Katouzian, "Oil versus Agriculture: of in Iran," Journal Case of Dual Resource Depletion Ahmad Studies Peasant 5 (August 1978), pp. 347-369. Ashraf and Marsha Safai, The Role of the Rural OrganiThe Case of Iran (Tehzations in Rural Development: ran, 1977).

11.

va Arezuha-ye Ismail Ajami, "Kholqiyyat, Mottaqedat, 1 (Bahman, Olum-e Ejtema'i Rusta'iyyan," Shoghli-ye pp. 36-39. 1348/1970),

12.

Employment and Income Policies Bartsch, pp. 9-17.

13.

for Iran, p. 32. The Employment and Income Policies Plan Organization's study of migration to Tehran reports 20.7 percent unemployment rate immediately beSee Iran, Plan and Budget fore migration to Tehran. Organization, Pazhuheshi Amari Baray-e Era'e-ye Sima-

IRANIAN

STUDIES

for Iran,

p. 32.

274

ye Mohajeran

dar

14.

Iran,

va Tabriz

Tehran

Budget Organization,

1977),

Plan and

(Tehran:

p. 3.

Plan and Budget Organization, Shakhesha-ye Iran (Tehran, 1978), p. 322.

Ejtema'i-ye

15.

Ismail Ajami, "Agricultural and Rural Development in of Peasants and Iran: Agrarian Reform, Modernization Agricultural Development in Iran," in Jacqz, p. 153.

16.

See Iran,

17.

National

Statistical Center, Natayej-e 1972. This percentage on the total number of city-dwelling migrants, ing those who migrated for reasons of marriage other secondary migrants who were dependents of cipal migrants. Niru-ye

giri-ye

Ensani,

Amar-

is based excludand prin-

Mehdi Salamat

et al., Elal-e Mohajerat va Barresi-ye va Ejtema'i-ye Awza'-e Farhangi, Eqtesadi, MohajerinYakhchiabad e Mantaqeh-ye (Tehran: College of Social Work, 1350-1351/1971-1972). and Income

Policies

for

Iran,

2S and 12.

pp.

18.

Employment

19.

Iran, Plan and Budget Organization, Iranian Statistical Center, Salnameh-ye Amari-ye Keshvar, 1976, p. 252/ 11.

20.

Iran, Plan and Budget Organization, Iranian cal Center, "Barresi-ye Ejmali-ye Mohajerat teq-e Shahri." (Mimeographed.)

21.

John C. Turner, "Uncontrolled The City lems and Policies," tries:

Readings

on Urbanism

Urban Settlement:

23.

Ettela'at,

This

November 13,

1958,

Prob-

Counin Newly Developing ed. by andc Urbanization,

Gerald Breese (Englewood Cliffs, 1969), p. 526. 22.

Statistibeh Mana-

N.J.:

Prentice-Hall,

p. 1.

of an eyewitness is a free translation account in November 13, 1958, pp. 1 and 17. Addition-

Ettela'at,

URBAN MIGRANTS

275

on the eradication effort al stories are reported later issues of November 15 and 16 of Ettela'at.

in

24.

of the eradication The only concrete result effort of Kuye Nohom-e Aban was the eventual construction residential unit in this area.

25.

Iran

26.

Cherikha-ye

Fada'i-ye

Mobarezat-e

Daliraneh-ye

(Tehran: 27.

28.

August 11, 1978,

Times,

1357/1958),

Khalq-e

p.

16.

Iran,

Mardom-e

az Gozareshati Kharej az Mahdudeh

pp. 54-55.

to Revolution Charles Tilly, From Mobilization ing, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978), p. 69.

J.

P. Nettl,

Analysis

of

Faber,

1967),

(Read-

Political Mobilization: A Sociological Faber and Methods and Concepts (London:

p. 136.

29.

See Owen Lynch's discussion of these conditions in and Ethnicity his "Political Mobilisation among AdiDravidas in a Bombay Slum," Economic and Political Weekly IX (September 28, 1974), pp. 1658 and 1665. See also Tilly, pp. 54-55.

30.

M. H. Pesaran, p. 278.

31.

Shakhesha-ye

32.

It is interesting to note that proshah indoctrination through the educational medium also extended to adult literacy classes. For example, in a book published for beginners in adult literacy classes by the Ministry of Education, the reader is struck by sentences such as, "Our King is kind"; "Our King is the supporter of Peasants and workers"; "We love our King"; "The People of Iran love their King and country." See Iran, Ministry of Education, Bekhanim va Benevisim: Baray-e Amuzesh-e Bozorgsalan (Tehran, 1344/1964), p. 29.

IRANIAN

STUDIES

"Income Distribution

Ejtema'i,

p.

in Iran,"

in Jacqz,

390.

276

January

14,

1979,

p. A30.

33.

The Washington

34.

The New York Times,

35.

See observations by Portes in Alejandro Portes and John Walton, Urban Latin America: The Political Condition from Above and Below (Austin: University of Texas Press., 1976), p. 109.

36.

A revealing report on the squatters in the newspaper of the People's Kar, the official publication Sacrifice Guerrillas, highlights the squatters' discontents about the housing and employment situation after the revolution. In response to the investigator's question, "What is your most important problem?" one squatter answered bitterly: "Our total life is a problem. From the moment we recognized ourselves Fe had nothing but problems. Look at the present situation. Now they say that the old regime is gone and the hands of exploiters and oppressors are cut off. But my problem, and that of a thousand other squatter families, is lack of jobs and living quarters. I have had no income for the past year. I have eaten whatever I had. There is no food for tomorrow. Believe me, I don't know how I am going to live tomorrow." See Kar, 3 Khordad 1358/1979, p. 5.

37.

See ibid., p. 5., about the elections held among the of the South City Pits for the "Committee squatters to Settle Tehran Squatters." It appears that many squatters participated in the election and hoped that the committee would work to promote their well-being. Others, however, were disappointed at the results of the revolution for not having changed their lives, and many expressed dismay about their future prospects.

URBAN MIGRANTS

Post,

December 4,

1978,

p. A3.

277

Iranian Studies, VolumeXIII, Nos. 1-4,1980

American Policy and the Iranian Crisis Richard W. Cottam

with Iranian history would not have Anyone familiar of religious been surprised by the uneasy coalition leaders, and bazaar merchants that spearsecular intellectuals, movement in Iran. Once each generaheaded the antishah has attempted to gain tion in this century such a coalition this Each time, including control of the nation. political have met the determined resistance of one, their efforts There appears to be a cruel one or more external powers. determinism at work. geopolitical Iran, standing at the meeting point of competing imperial interests, is not allowed for long the luxury of chaotic development. Internal the delicate balance of external chaos threatens competitors--each fearing the other will take undue advantage of And since the kind of regime the coalition the situation. and democratic, claims to seek, liberal to be is certain at least initially unstable, it has been consistently the negative target of the external competitors. In the constitutional period of Iran, 190S-11, the first triumph of the coalition, it was the Russians and British who applied the final coup de grace. Since the immediate object of Russian fury was Morgan Shuster, an

Richard Cottam is Professor of Pittsburgh. University

of Political

Science

at the

279

American financial adviser to the constitutional. government, the United States gained an undeserved reputation for supporting Iranian independence and liberal institutions. In 1919, taking advantage of Russian--now Soviet--weakness, the British attempted to establish a tutelary administration in Iran. Failing this, the British sponsored in 1921 a coup designed to give Iran a strong and orderly government, one which, by definition, could not be led by the same forces that produced the Constitutional Revolution. They succeeded far better than they could have hoped. Their choice of an Iranian military leader for the coup, Reza Khan, quickly consolidated power in Iran and in 1925 was proclaimed the shahanshah of Iran, the first of the Pahlavi dynasty. The American legation in this period was skeptical of, and on occasion publicly opposed, British machinations in Iran and the British monopoly of Iranian oil interests.2 This behavior further confirmed the belief of Iranians that America alone of the major Western powers was sincerely devoted to freedom and self-determination in Iran. The American image was somewhat stained by American with the British cooperation and Soviets in occupying Iran during World War II. With fond memories of Morgan Shuster, the Iranian government, both in the 1920s and during World War II, asked for an American adviser for financial affairs. But the choice on both occasions, was Arthur Millspaugh, more in the benevolently of British imperious tradition advisers than of the uniquely liberal Shuster.3 Nevertheless, when Dr. MohammadMosaddeq formed a government based on the liberal and religious in 1951, Iraniintelligentsia ans assumed the United States would be the external protector. At first their expectations were at least partially confirmed. The American ambassador, Henry Grady, had a of the Mosaddeq phenomenon. Insympathetic understanding his retirement from the Foreign Service, deed, following he made an extensive lecture tour of the United States the popular force warning of the danger in underestimating But his successor, behind the Mosaddeq movement.4 Loy cold war Henderson, saw Mosaddeq in a more conventional that perspective was remarkably parallel perspective--and to British views of the Russians for the century previous. IRANIAN STUDIES

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On August 19, 1953 the government of Mosaddeq fell, the victim of a coup in which the CIA played a central loand directing gistic To the large majority of porole.5 active litically Iranians, Mosaddeq had achieved the status of symbolic leader of the Iranian drive for national independence and dignity, and since his overthrow was attributed to America, the Iranian image of American intent in Iran was forever altered. All that remained of the previous favorable image was the fading hope that Americans had been outwitted by their devious and far more clever British cousand sometime would return to their historic ins supportive role. Indeed, for the remainder of the 1950s, a central objective of Mosaddeqists in Iran was to convince America of its great mistake. In fact, official American views of Iran dichotomized in 1953 much as they did in 1978. Those who, like Loy Henderson, were advocates of a coup, saw the Mosaddeq phenomenon as destabilizing in a period in which destabilization meant vulnerability to Soviet subversion. Like their British in earlier counterparts years, this group denied the reality of a large and assertive Iranian public support of the demand for Iranian political independence. They could not take Mosaddeq seriously, given his tendency to weep, faint, and receive state visitors in his pajamas. Skeptical of the claim that there was a public opinion in Iran, they were hardly prepared to concede that Mosaddeq had become a charismatic leader. Consequently, his overthrow in their view would not lead to serious consequences. Indeed, there is no real indication that they ever seriously considered such a consequence. The operation was clandestine and hence, so its authors believed, the few Iranians who were politically aware would not attribute Mosaddeq's overthrow to the United States.6 The Grady view was only slightly less skeptical of Mosaddeq personally. Lacking any real understanding of Iranian history, Grady did not comprehend the depth of the suspicions of and resentment toward the British role in Iran. The term "irrational" occurred easily when he described Iranian attitudes. But he did see a significantly large and assertive Iranian public opinion that

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was devoted to Mosaddeq. Furthermore, he saw Mosaddeq and Western and, more important, his movement as philosophically legitimacy. Offending this nathe bearers of nationalist shifting Iranian sentiment tional movement,therefore,,risked toward the Soviets. see the AmeriRevisionist historians retrospectively can involvement in the overthrow of Mosaddeq as an actively act rather than as a response to fear of Soviimperialistic The logic of this picture is compelling. et subversion.7 Before Mosaddeq, Iranian oil refinement and marketing was in the hands of the Anglo-Iranian

deq's fall, ternational a 40 percent

After

Oil Company.

Mosad-

a new agreement was negotiated forming an inoil consortium in which American companies had interest.

for the contention

But empirical

support

that American participation

is

lacking

in Mosaddeq's

overthrow was for the purpose of gaining some control over All for any other economic ends. Iranian oil or really overt indications are that when the documeifits of available an overriding they will reflect the period are released intent as the basis of American fear of Soviet aggressive motivation.

In 1978, the huge crowds demonstrating in favor of the return to Iran of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini chanted "death to the American shah." Amongthe slogans that covered every suitable wall in Tehran, denunciations of the royal dictatorship described it as belonging to America an aspect of the Iranian view and to Carter. This reflects of reality that was only partially appreciated in 1978 by Americans concerned with Iran: following Mosaddeq's overthrow, the Iranian attentive public overwhelmingly regarded the successor regime as the creation and faithful executor For the reason given, Americans inof American policy. volved in Mosaddeq's overthrow did not anticipate any atfor the overthrow. tribution of American responsibility Thus neither they nor their successors understood the extent to which the royal dictatorship was denied nationalist legitimacy was And this lack of nationalist legitimacy. rapid deterioan essential factor in the extraordinarily That it in 1977 and 1978. ration of the shah's position toward did not, as Grady feared, push Iranian nationalism IRANIAN STUDIES

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had moved toward the communism, as Vietnamese nationalism communists, was a consequence of Soviet policy errors and hence American good luck. in 1953 there was no evidence of any AmeriCertainly to the attitude of Iranians who had just can sensitivity truly popular leader. witnessed the overthrow of Iran's first Zahedi and for American support for Prime Minister Fazlollah In the years of conthe shah was both open and generous. aid 1953-60, American economic and technical solidation, for Iran placed Iran near the top of the list of American These were years in which the shah had to beneficiaries.8 seforce capable of providing internal build a security and American equipment were incurity. American advisers for this purpose. Furthermore, American diplodispensable Iranians looking for signs matic support never faltered. that American ardor toward the shah had cooled were conThe Iranian regime was a clear exstantly disappointed. meaning of ample of an American dependency in the fullest of the regime was dependent The very survival that term. and diplomatic support. on full American material American public criticism period, In this critical nonexistent. Whereas of the Iranian regime was virtually of the regime was apparthe American role in the creation ent to the attentive public of the Middle East and South Asia, the American public appears to have seen nothing. after the reaction had set in to Not until much later, American policy in Viet Nam, did a public awareness develop of the American role in Iran, and this awareness Thepropwith an atrophy of cold-war attitudes. coincided osition is therefore a strong one that as long as the a terrible American public perceives external threat, it will not see morally questionable policies of the American American government designed to deal with that threat. of the politiof the shah's violations public criticism cal and human rights of Iranians appeared long after the of power in Iran--the period in period of consolidation for American support was essential which unquestioning And during that period the Iranian regime survival. image of an America that had been duped by British policy

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into betraying the Iranian nation atrophied. In its place was an image of an America motivated, just as the revisionists argue, by the needs of American and world capitalism.9 From 1953 to 1960 the shah had on several occasions telegraphed his interest in liberalizing his regime and in engaging in extensive economic and social reform. But in that period his one base of societal support was the conservative landowning class. Until he had constructed a solid security force base, the shah could not risk offending these conservative elements. By 1960, however, the shah clearly felt strong enough to make the effort to broaden his base of support. He indicated that parliamentary elections would be relatively free and that Iran would move rapidly toward improving the lives of the peasantry and the laboring masses. But in 1960 as in 1977, events quickly demonstrated the difHe atficulty of political liberalization for the shah. the liberalization tempted to orchestrate process through the medium of two artificial of his own political parties one of which, the National Party, was the governcreation, ing party and the other, the People's Party, was His Majesty's loyal opposition. But Iran had a real opposition with its roots in the Mosaddeq movement, and this opposition totally ignored the shah's two parties. Then, as in 1978, this opposition consider comprocould not seriously to be imposed on them mise with a leader they considered to them, by outsiders. Instead, as the shah made gestures closer to bold and moved steadily they became increasingly a direct personal attack on the shah. The political crisis generated by the shah's moves was compounded by a severe economic crisis making the regime suddenly vulnerable-even mortally so, in the view of the opposition. and the adThis crisis with the election coincided ministration of John F. Kennedy who, like James Earl Carter of the coldwanted to move toward a redefinition later, war conflict with the Soviet Union. Kennedy tended to see Third World countries more as Henry Grady saw Iran,and he, like Carter later, alarmed the shah,who feared Kennedy would reduce the totality of American commitment to his unregime. And, indeed, his fears were not completely

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founded. When the shah appointed a strong and independentminded prime minister, Ali Amini, to deal with the economic crisis, there was such an obvious American approval that Iranians felt confirmed in their suspicions that Amini was the real American choice for Iranian leadership. However, Amini's political survival required that he gain support, or at least a positive acquiescence, from the Mosaddeqist opposition. Since Amini had had direct responsibility for negotiating the unpopular oil consortium agreement in 1954, he would have had at best a difficult task in gaining any real opposition acceptance. American power was greatly respected, if resented, by all politically conscious Iranians. But such efforts were not forthcoming and Amini was never able to construct an independent base of support. Whenthe economic crisis passed and the shah quickly dismissed Amini without serious American objection, Amini expressed publicly his disappointment with American policy.1 But the reality of American involvement in Iranian internal affairs and the Iranian perception of that involvement are miles apart. The United States was able to plan and execute a conspiracy in 1953 to replace one government with another. But that is a relatively simple task. American officials lacked both the understanding and the inclination to engage the Iranian opposition and to persuade them to support Amini. Fifteen years later they were no better prepared to generate support for either the shah, reduced to a constitutional role, or for his last appointed prime minister, Shapur Bakhtiyar. In January 1963 the shah, now with his confidence fully restored, arrested the entire central committee of the Iranian National Front. In June 1963 his security forces put down extremely serious rioting in Tehran led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. From then until 1977 Iran appeared to have the most stable regime in South Asia. The shah's security forces had demonstrated their loyalty and in putting down the rioting. effectiveness Oil income steadily rose and the economic growth rate in Iran began to rival that of Japan. Most Iranians felt a real improvement in their standards of living and there were visible signs of progress in the roads, railroads, public-health AMERICAN-IRANIAN CRISIS

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housing construction, educational institutions, facilities, industrial developvaried new and and development, urban ments. Students returning from abroad, often having engaged were easily co-opted into activities, there in antiregime Commercial a technocratic underlay with high-paying jobs. those with a large capital base, particularly interests, and a highly profited beyond their wildest expectations, visible class of newly rich Iranians developed with heavy ties to the regime. The shah did engage vested-interest of in a land reform program but the primary beneficiaries change were large agro-corporations. did find jobs, however, the cities

down of Iran's prosperity

Peasant migrants to and there was a trickle

to the laboring mass.

liberalization, Gone were any thoughts of political and the shah in a series of interviews made clear his deep disdain for liberal democracy.11 Neither by act nor stateof ment did he reveal any understanding of the fragility But as events were to prove, the regime was his regime. The base of popular support was narrow--largely fragile. confined to officers of the security force, the newly rich, There was a large and persistent and prosperous peasants. both libopposition core composed of secular intellectuals, leaders, which was always eral and Marxist, and religious active section of the supported by the most politically student population both in Iran and abroad. But the vast majority of Iranians, including most of the bureaucracy, viewed the regime with its American backing as invulnerable. As long as there were material improvements in their lives they were willing to accommodate, even though they were unhappily aware of the corruption, waste and extravagance, and most of all, the the unconcern with social justice, Revolution in Iran would occur when and if brutality. this large accommodating majority would turn to the oppofor doing this were, sition core, and the prerequisites real economic distress and, second, a belief that first, the regime, despite its foreign backing, was vulnerable. If the shah was willing to view surface manifestafundamental stain Iran as reflecting tions of stability concerned with Iran were even American officials bility,

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more so. Viet Namwas already by 1963 becoming the allconsuming preoccupation of the top echelons of the American foreign policy community. What attention the Middle East was primarily related to received from senior officials the Arab-Israeli conflict and, until the flare up in 1967, even that concern was minor. Foreign policy strategies tend toward compartmentalization, and there was no immediate need to focus on Iran. The prevailing view of Iran was that of a stable, progressive, and anti-communist regime. Furthermore, American interests in Iran were rapidly broadening. As Iranian income grew, economic aid programs were phased out. But economic relations with American incorporations developed rapidly and this increasingly volved contracting for the employment of American technicians. Always fascinated by and elaborately informed about the latest in military technology, the shah consistently appropriated a high percentage of Iranian national income for arms purchases and infrastructural support.12 The American percentage of this growing market was substantial enough to make the Iranian weapons system become closely geared to American arms. Iranian purchases became steadily more important to the economic health of the American The motivation behind American policy in arms industry. Iran, which in the 1950s had been almost exclusively related to the task of repelling a strongly perceived Soviet The defense mosubversive threat, now gradually altered. tivation remained strong, but now in addition there was a motive centered in oil compelling economic vested-interest but much broader than that. In the 1950s, interest in Iran was largely confined to the concerned bureaucracies. Now large and powerful economic interest groups focused on Iran and overwhelmingly they approved of the shah's administration. But as the Viet Namdebate was demonstrating, the cold war consensus in American foreign policy was breaking down. A growing proportion of the American highly attentive public was beginning to question the most fundamental assumptions on which the cold war rested--assumptions concerning the intent of the Soviet Union and of the international communist movement. "Disengagement," "coexistence,"

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and eventually even "rapprochement" and "detente't began to invade American vocabularies referring to Soviet-American relations. Since American policy in Iran up to 1963--the overthrow of Mosaddeq and the consolidation of the royal dictatorship--was of a classical cold-war vintage, logic would suggest that a challenge to that policy could materialize. But any such expectations would rest on an overestimation of the quality of the foreign-policy debate and of an understanding, gained by the American experience in Southeast Asia, that the Soviet Union was far less an aggressive force than imagined. Besides, Iran is Muslim and part of the Middle East, and cold-war attitudes were more persistent in this area than any other because of the merger of these attitudes with the strong concern for Israel's security. The shah, the strongest regional opponent of communism, was also Israel's one Muslim ally. There was change in the attentive public view of Iran. Now, with a decline in fear of Soviet aggressiveness, some Americans were willing to look at American policies of the cold-war era that were in violation of longstanding American norms of behavior. An awareness of the CIA role in Mosaddeq's overthrow and revulsion at that in kind of behavior was strong enough eventually to result a clipping of the wings of CIA's operations branch. But of the scope of there was almost no public questioning for the post-coup Iranian regime American responsibility relaand the consequences for long-term American-Iranian the from an act that changed drastically tions resulting the characdirection of Iranian history. On the contrary, toward Iran teristic feature of American public attitudes There is no reason to believe had been one of inattention. that prior to 1976, when some unfavorable opinions about the shah's regime began to be voiced by a few congressconcerned with policy toward men,13 that those bureaucrats American reIran felt any public pressure for distancing Public pressure from economic inwith the shah. lations on the other hand, to maintain close and supportterests, with certainty were could be anticipated ive relations, from the shah. made to dissociate any effort

IRANIAN STUDIES

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Lacking any public pressure to the contrary, the Johnson and Nixon administrations pursued a policy toward Iran that was, as Henry Kissinger phrased it, one of "total After 1967 all contacts commitment." with opposition eleabroad were broken.4 ments in Iran or their representatives Since they were just a handful of "outs," so it was argued, it would be absurd to offend the shah gratuitously by moniand their estimate toring their attitudes, of perceptions, The fact the state of the stability of the shah's regime. with the Soviet Union that the shah maintained relations and Eastern Europe which ranged from good to excellentl5 did not appear in any way to affect that he the conviction was America's most loyal regional ally. Thus, while the United States refused even to talk to Iranians opposed to his regime, the shah purchased military and artilvehicles set lery16 from the Soviets and entered into an elaborate of economic agreements with them. This reflected, in fact, a strangely dichotomized official American attitude toward the Soviet Union in the area. On the one hand, the core of American policy was surely one of deterring perceived Soviet aggressive design. But on the other hand, there was a tendency to treat this part of the Soviet littoral as if it were solidly and safely within the American sphere of influence. For a brief period in 1971, at the time of the Bangladesh crisis, there appeared a striking image of future conflict should there be a merger of the Soviet-American cold war and the Sino-Soviet conflict. With regard to this crisis, the United States and the Peoples Republic of China were de facto allies and Pakistan and Iran stood with them. Standing with the Soviet Union were India, the newly born Bengladesh, Iraq, with Afghanistan sure to join. Easily predictable if the conflict broadened was a spillover into intra-Arab and Arab-Israeli conflicts. Jordan and Saudi Arabia openly sympathized with Pakistan. For his part, the shah proclaimed his determination to prevent the further disintegration of Pakistan, or, failing that, his intention to absorb some of the breakaway peoples-especially the Baluchis.17 Eight years after barely surviving a major regime crisis, the shah was acting the part of primary re-

AMERICAN-IRANIAN CRISIS

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gional ally of the United States. And the particular alliance patterns in 1971 suggested strong crystallizing tendencies should a Soviet Union vs. U.S.-P.R.C. conflict develop--and for both the U.S. and the P.R.C. Iran would be a vital ally. In 1971 and very much in the cold-war context, the shah suggested to Richard Nixon when the American president was visiting Tehran, that the United States and Iran should jointly engage in an adventure in Iraqi Kurdistan that would both punish Iraq and damage Soviet-Iraqi relations.18 Iraq and Iran in 1971 were engaged in a bitter border dispute. Beyond this, however, the Baathist government of Iraq considered the shah's regime an outpost of the imperial West in the Middle East. For his part, the shah viewed Iraq as an obstreperous regime and encouraged the American view that Iraq was a Soviet dependency. Iraq harbored Iranian opposition elements and was a willing host to the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini. In addition, Iraq openly supported both Arab and Baluchi separatism in Iran. The shah counThus his sugtered by supporting Iraqi oppositionists. gestion to Nixon was in the context of deep hostility. Nixon and his security adviser, Henry Kissinger, agreed to the Kurdish suggestion and furthermore agreed that the Kurdish rebellion would be used to weaken Iraq but that That the Kurds would not be allowed to achieve victory. would be dangerous for Tehran's control of Iranian Kurdistan. Israel was brought into the plan, and Soviet-manufactured arms captured from Arabs by Israel were secreted into Iraqi Kurdistan in the expectation that this would create Iraqi suspicion of the Soviets. This strange episode in American diplomatic history illustrates the dichotomous American policy in the area. Nixon and Kissinger readily agreed to the shah's suggestion to use the Kurds of Iraq to weaken and destabilize a state perceived to be a Soviet dependency. And their manner of doing so was extremely provocative: they used the Kurds, an ethnic group that is found in the Soviet Union, and the operation occurred within a few hundred miles of the Soviet Union. The rebellion against Iraq

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However, the Iraqi army performed was triggered in 1974. better than expected and by January 1975 Iranian armed and inside involved in the conflict forces were directly Iraqi territory. Then with Algerian mediation and American acquiescense , an agreement was reached in March 1975 by which Iranian support for the Kurds would cease and Iraq would accept the Iranian boundary proposal and would Khomeini activities of Ayatollah restrain the opposition The failure of the Soviet Union to and his followers.19 did give any real support to Iraq in this confrontation relations; produce a good deal of strain in Soviet-Iraqi the Kurdish defeat, the Iranianand therefore, despite were achieved. But, given Soviet beAmerican objectives the image of Soviet aggressive design was hard to havior, maintain. of 1971-72 did not patterns The dangerous alliance Within a year Iranianlong survive the Bangladesh crisis. Indian relations were very good and so were Iranian relaIran Nevertheless, tions with the entire Soviet bloc. planning in American strategic continued to figure heavily Indeed, the Iraally. in the area--and as an unequivocal nian role was that of the American--and the Chinese--surThe focus of concern was the oilrogate in the area. Given the sparsely shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf. defended nature of the Arab shores populated and lightly of the Persian Gulf, these lanes were considered highly Successefforts. vulnerable to Soviet politico-military in the United Arab Emirates, for ful Soviet subversion the shipping lanes. example, could quickly jeopardize Hence a well-armed and determined Iranian regime could And the shah was more than role. security play a vital to comply. Hegemony in the Persian Gulf appears willing to have been his number one foreign-policy objective.20 But for many bemused Iranians, those in especially these were dangling scenarios--i.e., they had opposition, nor ends. neither beginnings engage Why would the Soviets or indirectly, in a casus belli directly by interdicting, in the Persian Gulf? The Soviet fleet in the oil-shipping Indian Ocean was small and the logistics problems involved AMERICAN-IRANIAN CRISIS

291

lines sevwere horrendous--supply in a maritime operation would the Under what conditions eral thousand miles long. This question, engage in such serious provocations? Soviets Given the fact that Iran has was never asked. apparently, land and sea border with the Soviet Union, why a 1,600-mile wouldn't the Soviets move over land where they would have an immediate and overwhelming advantage as long as they could not were risking war anyway? Iranians in opposition a thought Iran would resist the Americans really believe Thus, they concluded determined Soviet move in the area. gain was aggressive--to that the real American objective climate was favorcontrol of Arab oil when the political executor of this Amerithe shah was the faithful able--and of the logic of this Iracan policy.21 Still, regardless that American policy view, evidence suggests nian opposition was exactly what it purported to be and that the scenarios, dangling though they might be, were the ones on which policy rested. in Dhofar in the westernmost proWhen the rebellion vince of Oman reached its third stage in 1970, the American in the effort of a vigorous Soviet subversive expectations supwas actively The rebellion area seemed confirmed. Demoported by the pro-communist regime of the People's and personnel Republic of Yemen, and Soviet supplies cratic the People's At first were sent to support the rebels. But in 1973 Republic of China also supported the rebels. when asked by the shah to suspend all such support, they support from The government of Oman received complied.22 in the area--Pakistan, the entire array of American allies The Iran. and then finally Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Britain, More than 3,500 troops were Iranian effort was critical. machine and the Iranian military committed to the effort Iran Increasingly, was able to overpower the rebel force. thinking for the Persian Gulf, figured in American security the Arabian Sea, and even the Horn of Africa. force expanded Furthermore, as the Iranian military that the notion gained credibility and improved in quality, Iran could serve to deter a Soviet land attack in the MidIran's strength was such that only a major Sovidle East. IRANIAN

STUDIES

292

et assault could bring victory. casual attack in the area. And, assault, Iran could serve a "trip stopping Soviet arms for several nians could give American forces for defense. selves

Hence there would be no in the event of a major wire" function. By days or weeks, the Iratime to position them-

There was, however, a great deal of skepticism among American defense-policy planners regarding Iran's military effectiveness.23 Just why the shah would be so interested in super-sophisticated weapons systems when his most probable opponents would be rebel regimes in Arab shaykhdoms, which would be primitive in armament, was a difficult question to answer. Indeed, the belief was widespread that these weapons served primarily the purpose of satisfying the shah's personal grandeur needs. By 1976 congressional to the sale of arms to Iran at the level reopposition quested by the shah had grown, and congressional staff of Iran's weapons systems reinforced studies considerably the growing skepticism. But the chief source of disharmony in Iran-American relations was the shah's oil-pricing policy. At the time of the Arab oil boycott in 1973, the shah was a leader in OPEC of the forces calling for a drastic oil price rise. As the shah admitted frankly to Orianna Fallaci, the Italian journalist, he was determined to extract the highest possible oil price for Iran's oil.24 In 1974 both Kissinger and President Gerald Ford obliquely threatened the oil states with severe but unspecified retaliatory actions if they continued to disregard the economic health of the Western world.25 However, given the extraordinarily heavy arms purchases in the United States and the multiplicity of corporative financial dealings in Iran, this major irritant to good relations largely passed. When Jimmy Carter succeeded to the presidency in January 1977, the stage was already set for some significant changes in Iran and in American relations with Iran. Of the two prerequisites for revolution, one, the development of economic distress, was now realized. Since the AMERICAN-IRANIAN

CRISIS

293

oil price rise, Iranians had been suffering with inflation Iran's growth rate rates that hovered around 35 percent.26 in the same period ranged as high as 42 percent in 1974. those inThe result was that some Iranians, especially were making enorvolved in land and other speculations, mous fortunes while the vast majority, many living on salaries which were not adjusted to keep up with the inflation Thus the income rate, suffered a real-income decline. correcand the government's spread broadened dangerously applied and ineffectual. were sporadically tive efforts The large accommodating majority saw less reason to accomfor to those calling to listen modate and was more willing And the demands for change were made fundamental change. in mosques most openly and freely by pro-Khomeini clerics throughout Iran. stabildangerous for the internal This development, Ameriwith developing ity of the Iranian regime, coincided As about the value of the Iranian alliance. can skepticism to changing related was closely such skepticism mentioned, with the Soviet Union. Henry concerning relations attitudes suited those who conpolicy "total commitment" Kissinger's

tinued to hold cold war assumptions regarding Soviet intenBut Soviet passivity in the face of the Kurdish tions. to accept provocation described above, Soviet willingness and the defeat for their South Yemen and Dhofari allies, absence of any real evidence of Soviet subversive efforts in the Persian Gulf area failed to support expectations to opposition Still, image. based on a highly aggressive from Congress. "total commitment" in Iran came largely public outcry against that policy. There was no significant there was no evidence of And until Carter assumed office, to "total commitment" within the executive. opposition with apparent proclaiming, But Carter entered office of huof purpose, the centrality and seriousness sincerity adJust what Carter's man rights to his foreign policy. vocacy of human rights abroad meant in programmatic terms Within Iran, however, there was inwas not self-evident. public After all, much of the attentive tense interest. the shah's government believed and government officialdom IRANIAN

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was ultimately It controlled by the American government. in followed, therefore, that this change of administration Washington could mean an end to terrible repression in Iran. of the number of political Opposition estimates prisoners-and of course neither these estimates, nor the much lower figures the government admitted to were verifiable--was beAccounts of torturing tween 50,000 and 100,000. were wideand convincing. spread, detailed, SAVAK, the Iranian inand information had achieved a ternal security service, reputation of omniscience, omnipresence, and the ability to execute elaborate conspiracies. In this atmosphere anyone engaging in public criticism of the regime, however mild, was assumed to have SAVAKconnections. Did Carter intend to see that these conditions were altered? One organization, to circulate the Radical Movement of Iran, began cautiously critical of the lack of rule of law mimeographed statements and in so doing risked not only the wrath of SAVAK, but the of being part of SAVAK's provocation suspicion strategy. A number of well-known political But others joined. and intellectual leaders wrote and circulated open letters critical of the state of freedom and the quality of justice in Iran. A group of artists, asked composers, and literati to be allowed to form their own organization free of government censorship. a significant But, most important, number of clergymen made the lack of freedom and lack of concern with social justice the subjects of their sermons.27 The shah's response to these activities was relamild. The artists, tively and writers were alcomposers, lowed to form an organization and the letter writers were not arrested. the shah insisted Furthermore, that torturing had ceased and he made moves to reduce the arbitrariTo some extent these ness of arrest and imprisonment. actions of the shah were probably attributable to an uncertainty as to Carter's seriousness of purpose. Thus the Carter human rights program, even though it had not been out in specific terms for Iran, may have been havspelled ing an impact on Iranian internal developments. And that impact was to give momentum to a developing opposition movement. A probe was made of the boundaries for freedom of political activity and the results indicated that those

AMERICAN-IRANIAN CRISIS

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boundaries

were widening.

When American documents of this period are declassified a generation from now, they may well indicate that there was indeed some pressure placed on the shah to liberalize in the 1977-78 period. Indeed, even after the opposition momentum had gained considerable force, there were indications that the American government was advocating change in this direction.28 The course of events, in fact, clearly indicates that both American officials and the shah believed that a policy of liberalization could produce a broadening in his political base of support. Conceivably such a strategy could have been successful in the 1963-73 period in which there was palpable material improvements in living standards for most Iranians. Then the regime would be acting from strength. But even in that decade a successful broadening of his base of positive support would surely have required some acts of dissociation from American policy in the area. The image of being a tool of American imperialist to interests was a primary obstacle achieving any broadly based popularity among the critical highly attentive Iranian public. In 1977-78, howeve-, a liberalizing strategy could only appear to be a reflection of regime vulnerability. an inAs in the 1960-63 period, of creasingly bold opposition moved not toward a position demanding further liberalizing but toward reconcession, Khomeini and the placing the regime altogether. Ayatollah Marxist and non-Marxist opposition outside Iran agreed that the shah was a traitor to the Iranian nation and showed no indication that any compromise could be worked out with him. diFurthermore, the shah's moves in a liberalizing rection were part of a strangely self-defeating strategy. For example, in the summer of 1977 while loudly proclaimseing a policy of putting an end to torture, releasing lected political and effecting prisoners, legal reform to in dealing with political arbitrariness eliminate offenses, the shah suddenly had Ayatollah MahmudTaleqani sentenced to ten years in prison. Since Taleqani was, after Khomeini, of Iranian politico-religious probably the most respected act of the symbolic importance of this arbitrary leaders, IRANIAN STUDIES

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was in his 70s and had already spent brutality--Taleqani years in jail--offset any real gains the liberalizing program may have made. In the months that followed this pattern was persistent: moves were followed by liberalizing acts of brutality. As a consequence, the vulnerability of the regime and hatred of it increased. The February 1978 riots in Tabriz marked what was probably the critical point in the deterioration process of the shah's regime. The Tabriz demonstration was entireIt was part of nationwide mourning for ly predictable. the victims of government suppression of demonstrations in Qom 40 days previously. But even though the government knew the demonstration would occur, it was handled by the forces in a manner that was at the same time prosecurity vocative, and ultimately artless, brutal. Neither local police nor SAVAKcould control the situation, and the army had to be called in. SAVAKwas revealed as bungling, inand badly led; and its mystique--so efficient, for vital coercive control--was badly damaged. Instead of moving quietly to repair the damage, the shah summarily dismissed the responsible officers and shortly later removed the chief of SAVAK.29 Thus at the very moment that his survival required a strengthening of his coercive instrument, the shah indulged in a morale-shattering Now not purge. only did he appear successively weak and then brutal, but disloyal as well. After Tabriz, the shah's regime began to appear not only vulnerable, but mortally vulnerable. The mass migration of the previously accommodating public-surely the large majority of the people--to the revolution accelerated and soon was irreversible. Cut off as they were from Iranians who might challenge the picture of a stable regime, American officials dealing with Iran evinced little concern with Iranian stability until the late summer of 1978. A Central Intelligence Agency estimate in mid-1978 that the regime was in no danger was surely shared by those responsible for the direction of American policy.30 Similarly, the State Department gave a generous estimate of the state of political freedom in Iran in 1977. Really significant policy deciAMERICAN-IRANIAN CRISIS

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sions were all of the same pattern: a continuation of the "total commitment" policy of Henry Kissinger. Carter's choice of ambassador for Iran, William Sullivan, had been ambassador in Laos and the Philippines. Fairly or not, he had acquired the image of a Viet Namhard-liner and of a man who was comfortable with leaders of the shah's variety. Then the first really major policy move the Carter administration made regarding Iran was to overcome congressional opposition to selling Iran the super-sophisticated AWAC system for monitoring low-flying aircraft. The program was just exactly the variety that opponents of the shah condemned: one they saw as serving the dual purpose of satisfying the shah's grandeur needs and American strategic interests, but of no utility whatsoever to real Iranian security concerns. The fact that the shah's purchases could lower the price of AWACsfor American and NATOcustomers was part of the American public argument for the sale,31 not some leftist conjecture. The Carter administration appeared in some geographical areas, most notably Africa, to favor a policy of rapprochement and even friendship toward leaders and movements which were outspokenly neutral with regard to the East-West struggle. But in other areas, the imagery that prevailed among Carter policy makers was classic cold war. Iran was one of the latter. The shah, in this view, was the major regional surrogate of American policy--and could be counted on to stem a red tide sweeping the Horn of Africa, South Yemen and Afghanistan. When Iranian dissidents made clear their expectations that a Carter administration, devoted to human rights, should support their struggle for freedom in Iran, the Carter administration took no public note of their probing efforts. There is no real evidence that the administration ever faced the fact that the risks these people took were taken in the hope that the United States would give them some protection. of a good-will trip by In December 1977, in anticipation Carter that month to Tehran, a group of 29 leading political and intellectual figures inside Iran issued a statement describing the lack of rule of law in Iran and calling for The statement was the end of brutality and oppression. IRANIAN STUDIES

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given to the Carter administration well in advance of Carof Carter ter's trip, and the point was made that a failure to take note of this act of courage would likely lead to the punishment of the signatories. But Carter, fresh from Warsaw where he discussed to human rights, not only failed but praised the shah lavishly mention the statement, for and popularity.32 his stability, loyalty, Within weeks, officially organized goon squads had bombed the homes and automobiles of several of the signatories, and a number of arrests were made. The bitterness of the judgment of Carter as hypocritical stems from this episode. By September 1978, the frailty of the shah's regime could not longer be denied. The shah persisted in, even accentuated, the pattern of his response to the opposition momentum. He appointed a prime minister, Ja'far SharifEmami, with a mandate to reach and develop a modus vivendi with the opposition. But within days, on Black Friday, September 8, 1978, the Imperial Guard, under the direct control of the shah, fired on a crowd of demonstrators in Tehran and killed scores of people. The number of dead according to government estimates was 58, while others placed the figure conservatively at 4,500.33 of the dead Pictures were circulated everywhere. At the same time, some of the shah's most loyal servants, his prime minister including for twelve years, were arrested on charges of corruption. Weakness, brutality, and then weakness again-disloyalty, the pattern repeats. Confronted with the now undeniable, the Carter administration really had few options left. Clearly the shah was the author of his own rapid decline and fall. If, as most Iranians believed, the American ambassador made policy for the shah, he could have ordered the shah to concentrate all his efforts on strengthening the security forces and using them with brutal effect. Indeed, this was the behavior expected of him by probably a majority of politically acute Iranians. Failing this, a military coup, planned and directed by the CIA and military advisers, that would keep the shah as figurehead, but would adopt a tough suppressive policy, appeared to many Iranians as a probable

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But this view surely had little American policy choice. of the resemblance to the actual personal relationship And by September 1978 shah and the American ambassador. coup was already military for a successful the potential and many junior ofConscripts low and rapidly declining. and the shah had so divided ficers were no longer reliable, among his his command as to make the kind of cooperation extremely difficommanders required for such an exercise involvement Direct American military cult to develop. would probably fail and would surely provoke the Soviets. of the opposition Nor was any open move in the direction and Given the state of regime deterioration now possible. that the United States alone was the extent of the belief keeping the shah in power, any move toward the opposition, Ultimately, would destabilize. contacts, even low-level about in January 1979, when the shah was procrastinating the American government did taking his "winter vacation," say he should leave and in so doing removed any other option for him. There was another option for American policy to conof Irabroad coalition sider. By mid-1978, a surprisingly Iranithe form to came together leaders nian revolutionary an ad hoc oran Committee for Human Rights and Liberty, League for with the International affiliated ganization Represented were the Freedom Front, the Human Rights. National Front, the Radical Movement of Iran, and an assome prominent revolutionaries, sortment of individually the major were represented Not very close to Khomeini. was of potentially The coalition organizations. leftist and to attract great importance depending on its ability It was through Khomeini alone maintain Khomeini's support. that broad mass appeal could be exercised. Almost from the beginning this grouping of leaders government could looked for a formula by which a coalition instrument. be formed which could serve as a transitional were made. One of the last and A number of suggestions cabinet a coalition most serious called for establishing with National Front leader Karim Sanjabi as prime miniswould depart The shah, after making the appointment, ter. IRANIAN

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on vacation and appoint a regency council to preside in his absence. That council would include Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, Hasan Nazih, the Empress Farah, a general, and Ali Amini. This new government would call for free parliamentary elections. And the Parliament, when formed, would doubtless consider calling for a plebiscite regarding the monarchy and redrafting the constitution. The American role need be no more than to urge the shah to accept the plan. Could such a scheme have worked? Its proponents clearly saw dangers of institutional and a popucollapse lism that could swiftly devour the moderate centrist and essentially liberal revolutionary leadership. Success depended entirely on Khomeini's support and there were many among the religious who certainly revolutionaries would have tried to prevent that support from materializing. And the left would be sure to label any such transitional regime as nothing more than a desperate American effort to hang on in Iran. Success in other words was at best problematic. Still some pragmatic Iranians thought it could succeed, and there was support within the American government for cooperating with such efforts. Ambassador William Sullivan claims to have favored trying this option.34 But, as Sullivan describes it, American policy was firmly in the hands of Zbignieuw Brzezinski, who had no interest in anything other than full support for the shah. Even in the last moment, Sullivan tells us, Brzezinski was willing to explore seriously the military coup action.35 What was the lesson learned from the shah's collapse by the American government? Emphatically it was not the lesson that the United States must dissociate gradually from regimes that--largely because of American interventionist policies of the mid-cold war--are seen by vital elements of their publics as loyal executioners of American policy. Nor was it the lesson that American interests are best served by associating with regimes and movements that reflect the nationalist aspirations of their people. Far from understanding that the shah's primary vulnerabil-

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ity was a consequence of a deeply held conviction among Iranians that his regime, with all its brutality and corruption, was the creation of American policy, immediate American policy responses in the area were to make unmistakably clear that there was an American "total commitment" to the very regimes in the Arab world that most resembled that of the shah in terms of its American connection. reason to believe There was, in other words, little that great-power policy toward Iran was likely to change in general thrust. The United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China were all open or de facto supporters of the shah well beyond the time that detached observers had understood that the royal dictatorThe dictates of greatship would soon pass into history. power rivalry in this geographical meeting point of rival spheres of influence continued to be manifest in an abhorrence of uncontrolled and rapid change. And clearly forecast was a propensity to interfere in Iranian affairs by all the great or near-great powers in order to deny Iran to a competitor. The real change in the situation was in the internal movement. No longer was it the property of a handful of people as in 1906, or of 10 percent or 15 percent of the people as in 1951. Now, as a result of this participant upheaval, almost all Iranians were politically and the ability of external governments to interfere in Iran was sharply reduced. Had the revolutionary coalition remained with a broad popular consensus, there would have been a real possibility that the government could have compelled

the external

world to grant

Iran sovereign

equal-

ity that was informal as well as formal. But this was not to be. Under Khomeini's leadership, the revolutionary coalition fell apart. Its middle-class liberal and secular base was purged; its associates representing non-Persian and even much ethnic communities turned toward rebellion; of the old middle class in the bazaar became disenchanted. Once again Iran appeared anarchic and chaotic, the very in the past. formula that led to external interventions

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NOTES

1.

role in the episode see The Relations, 1917-21: Volume 3 (Princeton, 1972), pp. 384-

of the British

For an account

Richard Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Anglo Soviet 88.

2.

Accord,

AbrahamYeselson,

United States Persian Diplomatic ReFor the (New Brunswick, 1956). of American government view see Foreign Relations the United States (1943), Volume IV, p. 515. lations,

1883-1921

4.

of Henry Grady, US News and World ReSee interviews port, October 19, 1951, pp. 13-17 and The New York Times, October 11, 1952, 5:5.

5.

The most accurate account of this event is found in an unpublished paper by Kenneth Love, "America's Role Of published accounts in the Pahlevi Restoration." article authorized the most useful is the obviously Doings by Richard and Gladys Harkness, "The Mysterious of CIA," Saturday Evening Post, November 6, 1954, pp. 6668.

6.

Love, op. cit.

7.

For a generic left view see Gabriel of American Foreign Policy (Boston,

8. 9.

See the statistic Economics, U.S.

Kolko,

by the Office published Department of Commerce.

See Bahman Nirumand, Iran: (New York, 1969).

The Roots

1969). of Business

The New Imperialism

in

Action

10.

The New York Times,

11.

Most interesting Shah of Iran," 217:18.

July

of these

19,

1962,

2:2.

"The was Oriana Fallaci, September 1, 1973,

The New Republic,

AMERICAN-IRANIAN STUDIES

303

12.

For the statistical picture of Iranian military expenditures as a proportion of GNP see U.S. Arms Control and Development Agency, "World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1967-76."

13.

See the summary of the senate Times, August 2, 1976, 1:5.

14.

Herman Nickels, March 12, 1979,

15.

For an excellent account of Soviet-Iranian relations see Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, The Foreign Reof Iran (Berkeley, lations 1974).

16.

The New York Times,

17.

Chubin, Zabih, op. cit., Ramazani, Iran's Foreign ville, 1975), p. 434.

report

in The New York

"The U.S. Failure in Iran," Volume 99:5, p. 96.

March 19,

1975,

p. 310. Policy,

Fortune,

47:2.

See also 1941-1973

Rouhollah (Charlottes-

18.

See the summary of the Pike Committee report on CIA Februforeign policy activities, The Village Voice, ary 16, 1976, p. 85.

19.

See Richard W. Cottam, "The Case of the Kurds." Paper Science Associaat the American Political delivered tion Conference in Washington, September 1977.

20.

For a description of Iranian and American policy see Robert Burrell and Alvin Cottrell, Iran, The Arabian and the Indian Ocean (New York, 1972). Peninsula

Sultans

see Fred Halliday, viewpoint Arabia (New York, 1973), Chapters 10-11.

22.

Chubin,

Zabih,

23.

The New York Times,

24.

Fallaci,

21.

For this

IRANIAN

op.

STUDIES

op.

cit.,

cit., August

Without

pp. 310-12. 2,

1976,

1:5.

p. 21. 304

September

24,

1974,

12:4.

25.

The New York Times,

26.

The Economist,

27.

The Carter human rights policy toward Iran is detailed in Richard W. Cottam, "Arms Sales and Human Rights: The Case of Iran," a chapter in Peter G. Brown and Human Rights and Foreign Douglas MacLean (eds.), Policy, Lexington Books, 1979.

28.

See the testimony of Charles Nass in "Human Rights in Iran." Hearings the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House of Representatives International Relations Committee, October 26, 1977.

29.

Kayhan

30.

Nickels,

31.

The New York Times,

1977,

June 21,

cit.,

p.

1978.

97.

August

Kayhan

33.

See for example Payam-e

35.

25,

26,

1977,

8:2 and October

9,

1:1.

32.

34.

255:66.

February

International, op.

1975,

International,

William

Sullivan,

Foreign

Policy,

January

7, 1978.

Mojahed,

October

1978.

"Dateline Iran: The Road Not Taken," No. 40 (Fall 1980), pp. 175-86.

Ibid.

AMERICAN-IRANIAN

CRISIS

305

Iranian Studies, VolumeXIII, Nos. 1-4,1980

American Relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979-1981 Barry Rubin The triumph of the Khomeini forces and of the Iranian revolution in February 1979, sweeping away the old imperial Bakhtiyar government, marked regime and the transitional the beginning of a highly critical period in American-Iranian relations. The conflict culminated in the seizure of the American embassy in Tehran and in the holding of U.S. The hostage diplomats as hostages for well over a year. issue was the most controversial question for U.S. foreign low point in relations policy in 1980 and marked a historic between the two countries.1 this batFrom the viewpoint of most Iranian leaders, of tle was an inevitable Based on their perceptions one. bilateral relations over the previous three decades, Ayaexpected a deterministollah Khomeini and his supporters In their eyes, Washington tically hostile United States. had provided the main foreign support for the shah, a rebe hatred can scarcely gime for which their passionate overstated, and had tried to prevent the revolution's triumph.

Barry Rubin is a Fellow in Middle East Studies Center for Strategic and International Studies, town University.

at the George-

307

Even more seriously, they argued, the United States had actually ruled Iran using the shah as a puppet. Consequently, America was responsible for all their country's woes and for all the bloodshed during the revolution, as well as guilty of looting the country of its oil wealth. On still another level, they saw the United States and-equally, but less viscerally--the Soviet Union as the twin masters and exploiters of the world. The Iranian revolution would furnish a model for a whole series of uprisings in the Third World, and particularly in the Islamic countries, to upset this system. The inaccuracy of much of this world view made it none the less firmly held by the "Islamic fundamentalists" in Tehran. American policy makers were inclined by their such extreme and militant rhetoric experience to discount culture to disand were inclined by their own political in the conduct of state count the importance of ideology affairs. case Iran evinced a However, in this particular The results unity of theory and practice. were scarcely conducive to good U.S.-Iran relations. One might even argue that given the triumph of the forces and political positions represented by the Islamic Republican Party, the Komitehs, the Islamic courts, the Revolutionary Guards, the Revolutionary Khomeini himself, Council, and Ayatollah or even indifferit was impossible to maintain friendly, ties. ent, bilateral In sharp contrast to all this stood the early perof American leaders toward the new revolutionary ceptions For them, the crisis was a wasteful regime. diversion, with real American interests and intentions. conflicting Yet this view was coupled with a serious misunderstanding of the composition and direction of the postrevolutionary in Iran and by a failure to comprehend political situation the attitude of Iranians toward the United States. Washington's ambiguous attitude toward the Iranian of 1978-1979 had stirred revolution on both suspicions the pro- and anti-shah Both considered sides. U.S. polito aid their cies to be enmeshed in some grand conspiracy

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While support and encouragement were publicly opponents. given the shah, American attempts were also made toward the end of 1978 to urge him toward compromise and change. some A number of Iranian revolutionaries, including many figures close to Khomeini himself and, most obviously, to America. in the National Front, were not so hostile a friend Their idea was that America was too beneficial unnecessarily. an enemy to alienate or too threatening By the beginning of 1979, Washington was convinced that but American policy makers the shah's regime was finished, did not agree on whether it would be replaced by a stabiShapur Bakhtiyar or by lized government of Prime Minister new team headed by moderates like Mehdi Baan altogether zargan. of the shah and his supporters Given the inability or work out some means of peaceful co-opt, to repress, the United States enjoyed few options by transition, accepted the downWashington therefore February 1979. by a cabinet chosen fall of Bakhtiyar and his replacement This did not, however, mean that the by Khomeini himself. American government desired the coming to power of the ayaRather, the assumptollah and the Islamic fundamentalists. to Qom, the retire tion was that Khomeini would peacefully would gradually cool, and moderates, ardor of the revolution would emerge as dominant in and technocrats pragmatists, at a level far would settle relations U.S.-Iran Tehran. below those of the shah's era, but they would remain corcordial. rect and essentially This view was anchored by wishful thinking and based There was culture. on a misreading of Iranian political and factors dependence on "objective" also an excessive ide factors, of the role of subjective an underestimation Iranian poliof internal postshah ogy, and the requirements have to they thought, Iran would still After all, tics. produce large amounts of petroleum whlich would have to be would be pushed upward Production levels sold in the West. toward past rates to repair the economic damage of the benefits and to produce the social-welfare revolution

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that the Iranian people would no doubt expect and demand. Most important, the geopolitical and strategic situation would remain the same. Hundreds of miles of Soviet border would still lie along Iran's northern frontier. To the east, Afghanistan was controlled by a pro-Moscow communist government while neighboring portions of Pakistan, populated by rebellious tribes, also undermined stability. To the west, there was a hostile and well-armed Iraq. A new Iranian government would still have to guarantee sea routes for its exports and imports and it would still need spare parts for the mostly American-made military equipment. Mainenance of this weaponry, as well as technical assistance and the completion of ongoing development projects, would require American, or at least Western cooperation. All of these factors were expected to reassert themselves and the new regime was expected to act "normally," that is, in Iran's rational, material interests. No matter how hostile Iran's leaders were toward the United States, American interests remained essentially the same as they had been since 1946. Washington's main global and even regional problem was not Iran but the Soviet Union and its influence. Given the importance of the Persian Gulf area and given Iran's proximity to the U.S.S.R., a stable and united Iran was an American objective no matter who ruled in Tehran. This consideration was further sharpened by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Throughout the hostage crisis, the possibility that Iran might disintegrate or be pushed into Moscow's arms by American pressure or military action could not fail to be a major point always in the minds of U.S. policy makers. Before November 1979, this factor was central in persuading the United States to try to maintain good relations with the postshah government. Iranian leaders never seemed

to understand this readjustment. Further, given the postViet NamAmerican mood of disillusionment with foreign inIRANIAN STUDIES

310

there was no and overseas terventions covert operations, serious implicit position encouraging Washington to destaThe views and bilize Iran's revolutionary government. of the liberal Carter administration were parpolicies conducive to building a new relationship with ticularly Iran. While Carter seemed to the Iranians to have been toward the shah, they did not compreextremely friendly amity toward any hend that American interests dictated nonhostile Iranian regime.2 non-communist, greatest fear during Within this context, Washington's the first months of the revolutionary government was of a Yet, leftist takeover, with possible Soviet assistance. relatively surveying the make-up of the Bazargan cabinet, moderate middle-class forces seemed to be left with the actual responsibility of running the country and the economy. The armed forces might also provide an element of continuity. Finally, the belief that the mullahs could not run such a complex state was transformed into the belief that they would not do so. The strategy for the United States, therefore, was a soft policy toward Iran in order to strengthen the moderate forces and to make easier the task of normalizing the country. This analysis required that Washington show the new regime its friendly intentions through various gestures, of the including face-to-face meetings, rapid recognition The day after Bazargan regime, and material cooperation. fall in February 1979, President Carter told Bakhtiyar's a press conference that he hoped to work with the new rulers and he noted Bazargan's pledge to ensure the safety of Americans in Iran. When the American embassy was briefIbrahim Yazdi and others ly occupied by armed leftists, with the new regime helped to free the compound associated and the American hostages. This precedent was to mislead American decision makers during the later takeover. to Meanwhile, the United States offered wheat and rice, and spare parts oil products, Moderates visited the embassy and equipment. their hopes that the serious rift between the

AMERICA-IRAN, 1979-81

sell Iran for military expressed two countries

311

would soon be resolved. Several individuals close to Khomeini volunteered to act as go-betweens. Ambassador William Sullivan met with army chief of staff General Mohammad Vali Qarani, who promised to honor Iran's agreements not to transfer U.S.-made weapons elsewhere, and hinted that American maintenance personnel might be allowed to return some time in the future.3 During the course of 1979, the hopes of American analysts and of Iranian moderates were gradually extinguished. The trials and executions of shah-era figures were followed by a thorough purge of the military and other segments of society. Obviously, the official government, led by Bazargan and Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi, had little real power; the initiative lay with the Khomeinist clerics in the Revolutionary Council and with the various revolutionand judicial organs. Harsh antiary military, political, American speeches came from Khomeini, his close allies, and the Iranian media. Whenthe U.S. Congress passed resolutions in May 1979 some of the executions, there was a strong Iracriticizing nian reaction, with large anti-American demonstrations and heated media commentary. Iran's decision to reject the American nominee to replace Sullivan also indicated the tense situation. Also of great importance was the continuing domestic conflict in Iran. Regional and ethnic disand turbances, terrorist incidents, partisan dissension, even economic problems were attributed to covert American machinations. This sensitivity apparently demonstrated the correctness of the White House's earlier decision not to admit the shah into the United States for medical treatment. A secret meeting with Yazdi in New York during the United Nations session was relatively cordial, but an open encounter between National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski with Bazargan and Yazdi in Algiers stirred suspicions against those ministers among radicals back home.4 The underlying problem was not so much the daily conduct of affairs or any specific action of the United States IRANIAN STUDIES

312

or Iran as it was the Khomeinist ideological view of America. Iranian political culture was used to the idea that outside forces dictated events within the country and was prone to conspiratorial for developments. explanations British and Russian interventions in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as well as the central U.S. role in the August 1953 anti-Mosaddeq coup helped create these sentiments. Khomeini's ideas, which enjoyed hegemony in the postshah political scene, called for an unapologetic isolationism, a high priority for order and unity at home, and a popular dictatorship embodying and legitimized by Islamic symbols and practices. Victory for his plan should be relatively simple, the ayatollah argued, because it would appeal to all Muslims of good will. Anyone who objected or opposed him or any part of his movement, therefore, was not a good Muslim but rather a traitor and a foreign agent seeking to return the shah to power or to establish some new client regime. But, according to this model, domestic enemies were only a secondary problem: the real threat was the West and, in particular, the United States. The leftists, the Forqan group, the liberals, and the Azerbaijani or Kurdish autonomists were only extensions of American power seeking to weaken Iran. Autocracy alone had not brought Iran to its sorry state, explained the Khomeinists; this was rather due to an autocracy which was created by foreigners and functioned in their interest. Further, according to Khomeini's view, the West, and the United States, particularly had been engaged in a conscious effort to destroy Iran's social and economic institutions by introducing Western culture and products. In exchange, they had stolen Iran's oil income. The Islamic revolution, however, was willing to pay any price to destroy this situation. Indeed, since it was a spiritual and antimaterialistic movement, the ayatollah often said, it would not hesitate to take enormous risks and to suffer great losses to fulfill this aim. If all this was carried

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over into policy--as it in fact was--Iran's behavior would be totally contrary to the rational calculation of interests based on objective national interests which many American analysts expected. "All the problems of the East stem from those foreigners from the West, and from America at the moment. All our problems come from America," said Khomeini. This was no mere rhetoric in search of a scapegoat, but an operative principle of the revolution. For him, relations with either the United States or the Soviet Union were inherently like those between a sheep and a wolf or between a goat and a butcher: "They want to milk us...they have no desire to give us anything....If only we could totally divorce ourselves from them, we would be better off."5 Instead of the shah's concept of an Iran preserved through military strength and through an alliance with the United States, Khomeini substituted the vision of an Iran defended by its spiritual strength and the mobilization of its people. The idea is a commonone in the history of revolutions, although its validity in Iran's case can only be tested by time. Some important Iranian leaders like Bazargan and Ayatollah Shari'atmadari were less sure of its capacity to protect Iran's sovereignty from closer enemies and from internal upheaval. They virtually never attacked the United States, but their views were shoved aside. The idea then that Carter sought to build a new and friendly relationship with Iran never penetrated the radical faction of the revolution. Some hope was held in Tehran that the American people would be sympathetic to Iran's past sufferings and some propaganda efforts were made in this direction. The failure to gain such support-an outcome made inevitable by the hostage-taking--was blamed on distortions of the Western media rather than on Iran's own behavior. Whenthe shah was admitted to the United States for medical treatment in late October 1979, it was taken by

IRANIAN STUDIES

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the radicals in Tehran as But cions about America. tion of memories about the itself lead to the seizure the tide of anti-American

of all their suspiconfirmation the shah's entry, with its evocadid not by CIA's 1953 actions, of the American embassy nor to in that country. feeling

of his earlier President Carter's reversal decision not to grant entrance to the shah is not difficult to explain. The monarch's doctors were arguing that without special treatment and equipment he was likely to die. The administration's reputation for weakness and for poor treatment of allies would not be helped by the sight of a former friend so mistreated. In the face of a forthcoming election, already outspoken public criticism from its opponents, and the need for conservative support for SALT II, it seemed a worthwhile step for both political and humanitarian reasons. While dispatches from the U.S. embassy in Tehran had earlier warned of reprisals against any such action, there had also been reports that the situation was easing inside the country. The White House did inform the Iranian government of its plan and Tehran, while objecting, promised to confine its complaints to diplomatic channels. Bazargan's earlier promise to protect Americans was reiterated. The problem was, of course, that his cabinet could not really speak for the most significant political forces in Iran. Beyond this immediate dispute, however, there are four broader reasons why the government chose to support the student militants who seized the embassy and held the American hostages. First, there was the serious belief on the part of the Khomeinists that the United States was tirelessly trying to overthrow the revolution and to stir up domestic troubles. This conspiracy was allegedly being directed through the U.S. embassy. 1980, thing

"In my view," said Abol Hasan Banisadr in January "what has jeopardized Iran's security more than anyelse is the problem of an entire generation's fear

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that the revolution could fail and fear of what the future may hold." After all, the revolutions of 1905-11 and 195153 had both been defeated, in part due to foreign intervention. Thus, despite their confident rhetoric the fundamentalists thought it quite possible that the United States would destroy their new regime.6 The hostage-taking would, therefore, give Iran some counter-leverage vis-a-vis the United States and provide Tehran with a means of forestalling Washington's alleged plans. Equally important, from the standpoint of the milit would forestall itants, any reconciliation between the Since American opposition two countries. to the Islamic

revolution was deemed to be an immutable fact, any easing of relations by Iranian leaders would show them to be traitors to the cause. This explains a third reason for the commencement The militants were and duration of the hostage crisis. like Bazargan and Yazdi, were convinced that the liberals, betraying the revolution by planning to normalize bilateral ties, as in the Algiers meeting. Thus, the seizure of the embassy was used to destroy the moderate regime--and moderate political forces in general--and to open deliberately a rift between Iran and the United States. Finally, once the deed was done the holding of the hostages became a symbol and demonstration of Iran's independence and opposition to American power. Moreover, it a new phase of the Islamic struggle, a served to ignite revolution cultural designed to remodel Iran politically,

and intellectually. To achieve economically, socially, and parthis it was first necessary for the hard-liners, the clerical elements among them, to gain the ticularly key positions of power. Given the wide-ranging and long-term goals behind the militants' desire the hostage-taking--particularly leaders to maintain a U.S. -Iran confrontation--Iranian The incentive to negotiate some settlement. had little continuing power struggles within Iran, the constant antiIRANIAN STUDIES

316

American propaganda, and the use of the hostage issue as a loyalty test made it extremely difficult for Tehran to agree on any diplomatic The lack of any instisolution. tutionalized government and clear lines of authority during most of the crisis greatly contributed to the rollercoaster nature of the crisis. Again and again, apparent agreements broke down in the face of Iranian reversals. The hostage crisis also presented the United States with unusual challenges. The Iranian government's support of the student militants made the problem far more complex than other terrorist incidents. The frustrating spectacle of over 50 American representatives being held as prisoners month after month in the face of seeming U.S. impotence had a tremendous psychological effect on the American people. This experience, along with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, played a major role in changing the course of U.S. foreign policy. Almost immediately, President Carter ruled out a quick rescue attempt. In large part, he was misled by the memory of how easily the embassy takeover of the previous February had been resolved. He also had assurances from both Iranian leaders and from American observers in Tehran that the diplomats could be quickly freed. His own views and the post-Viet Nam mood in the United States also militated against such a decision. Instead, he chose to combine offers of conciliation with a pattern of gradually escalating pressure. This program involved appeals to the United Nations and to European and other allies for support, economic reprisals, the dispatch of naval units to the region, an end to imports of Iranian oil, the freezing of Iranian assets, a reduction in the number of Iranian diplomats in the United and an immigration check on Iranian students. States, There were several problems involved with these steps, including legal restrictions on presidential powers and the reluctance of some foreign friends to implement American requests.

AMERICA-IRAN,

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It was quickly clear that there were definite limitaIran. Moreover, it tions on American leverage vis-a-vis to punish a country that welcomed such meawas difficult and as sures as protective insulation for its isolationism Working through a variety proofs of its militant virtue. with no some of them self-appointed, of intermediaries, one in clear authority at the other end of the line, was Allowing the emotional hostage isslow and frustrating. sue to become the central question on the American public scene created severe pressure on Washington to demonstrate since 1980 was an election year.7 progress, particularly By the beginning of 1980, however, the shah's decision to leave the United States, the efforts of negotiators and of some relative pragmatists within Iran (most obviously Banisadr), as well as White House agreement to accept of past American involvement in Iran, some investigation permitted some progress to be made. At the same time, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979 and the subsequent Carter Doctrine slowed the pace of American pressure against Iran. The collapse of detente and the Soviet threat in the Gulf area increased America's need U.S. policy to build alliances with local countries. makers hoped to convince Iran that Moscow posed the real danger to its future. These factors, coinciding with Banisadr's inauguration as Iran's elected president, raised great hopes in February 1980. A U.N. commission was organized to go to Tehran and secure the hostages' release in exchange for some American acknowledgment of regret over the conduct After almost a month of bilateral relations in the past. of effort, though, the secret package deal fell through. This was due to the unyielding stand of the student militants, the split of the Revolutionary Council, and KhoThe proximity meini's support for the hard-line position. of a workable agreement seems illusory in retrospect. A second U.S. attempt to negotiate a solution was tried and failed in March-April 1980. This time the offer for compromise was linked to a warning from Washington:

IRANIAN STUDIES

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unless progress was made there would be tougher economic sanctions and further measures against Iran. This included, though this was not stated at the time, a rescue attempt. Due to various difficulties, the April expedition also ended in failure. Having exhausted its options, the administration put the hostage question on the back burner during the next six months. Initiatives continued behind the scenes but none seemed very promising. Finally, in mid-September, Ayatollah Khomeini made a speech listing four conditions for the return of the hostages. Iran had demanded an Earlier, American apology for alleged past misdeeds, the extradition of the shah, and the return of his wealth. The shah's death had eliminated the relevance of the second point.8 Now Khomeini put forward a new position. He called for the return of Iran's frozen assets, the sending to Iran of the royal family's wealth, an end to law suits filed against Iran by American companies and individuals, and a U.S. promise not to intervene in Iran in the future. Once again, some sort of settlement seemed possible. The acceleration of negotiations in October and November was due to several new factors on the Iranian political scene. an institutional First, framework for decision making had finally been established with the convening of the Iranian Parliament and the choice of MohammadAli Raja'i as prime minister. For several months, Khomeini had maintained that the final decision on the fate of the hostages would be made by that legislature. Under the guidance of the Ayatollah's September 12 statement, the Majiles appointed a commission and finally, after some heated debate, approved its formulation of the four conditions on November 2, 1980. In addition to the establishment of a responsible structure capable of negotiating over the hostages, there was the political content of that structure. The Islamic Republican Party and other hard-liners had triumphed not only over the moderates, but also over the more-pragmatic AMERICA-IRAN,

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319

one of the most imThus was fulfilled Banisadr faction. In the words of a Tehran radio portant aims of the action. "The reign gains from the hostage-taking, commentary, citing was astray, which was leading our revolution of liberalism, against America was exthe struggle smashed to pieces," exposed," and "a panded, other "spies and agents...were at the policy of compromise and mighty blow was delivered surrender."9 toward the United with confrontation The preoccupation in launchStates which had so well served the hard-liners their rivals and in defeating revolution ing their cultural of the Further, the failure might now become a burden. United States to overthrow the Tehran government--attributed to Khomeini's wisdom and the Islamic movement's conhave given the regime some additional strength--must fidence.10 the Iraqi invasion of Iran's Khuzistan provFinally, in late September made some important changes in the ince The United States declared neutrality, situation. political thein line with their past conspiracy but the Iranians, While Iranian leaders blamed the attack on America. ories, them toward was pressing denied that the conflict repeatedly true. this was not altogether a hostage settlement, a whole set Indeed, the Iraq-Iran war made effective real impact had little which hitherto of American sanctions high level of For example, Iran's relatively on Tehran. oil income had allowed it to circumvent the economic emNow Iranian of its assets. bargo and ignore the freezing was shut off by Baghdad's bombing and petroleum production Suddenly, foreign exchange was in short ground offensives. Furthermore, supply and many goods had to be rationed. to and America's refusal isolation Iran's international equipment began to be soresupply spare parts for military fate must be "speeded felt. Progress over the hostages' up" in order to "cut short a war which is not in Iran's the influsaid Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, interests," ential speaker of Iran's Parliament.

IRANIAN STUDIES

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There was also some hope of exploiting America's presidential but Tehran was too slow and disorelection, ganized to produce its offer in time.11 While Iran's leaders generally maintained that there was no difference between Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, Ali Reza Nobari, president of the central bank and an ally of Banisadr, noted, "I admit that on the level of foreign diplomacy we have failed completely. We could have had a direct and very positive influence on the U.S. presidential election, but alas due to our own failings we let the chance slip

by.)'12

Within the United States the hostage issue had an important effect on the election. The high visibility of the question in the closing days of the campaign brought into vivid focus Carter's inability to secure the hostages' freedom while at the same time it raised suspicions of some last-minute manipulation of the negotiations for political purposes. In fact, the White House deliberately refused to deal with Tehran's last-minute offer until after the election.13 Serious talks did begin on Iran's four conditions in mid-November, but the country's was afraid leadership to make any move even hinting at concessions. In late December, they suddenly demanded that $24 billion be put in escrow in Algeria as a guarantee. There were also continuing differences over the timetable, the disposal of the shah's assets, and the handling of the lawsuits. While certain domestic and international pressures on Iran increased the chances for a settlement, other factors operated against one and delayed a solution for several months. The level of mistrust on both sides made it to agree on a timetable extremely difficult and on details of a solution, a problem which made the skill of the Algerian intermediaries indispensable. Iranian leaders also feared that any sign of compromise or concession would be used against them by personal or factional rivals. After months of propaganda equating the hostages with spies and any agreement with the United States with treason, it was AMERICA-IRAN,

1979-81

321

no easy matter

to reverse

course.14

"How can one meet a criminal who for long years exour Muslim nation and imposed the Pahlavi dictaploited Musavi Kho'ini, a member torship on it?" asked Mohanmmad "As for now, the United of the Majles hostage commission. in a state of war against us."''5 States is actually The slow pace of Iranian leaders was not out of the The desire to hold onto calculation. realm of rational and to avoid of authority gained positions their recently by any force claiming superior militancy being outflanked made it hard for the ruling mullahs to give and patriotism Indeed, the sharp attacks on the deal later any ground. made by the "moderate" Banisadr and members of his faction touchy the issue had become. Banshow how potentially isadr claimed that he could have made an agreement earlier to Iran.l6 that would have been more advantageous were over, the At any rate, once the U.S. elections could turn defeated at the polls, Carter administration, On November 10, a U.S. its attention to the negotiations. More than two months of tough went to Algeria. delegation When, in mid-December, Iran suddenfollowed. negotiations to cover its frozen funds and the ly demanded $24 billion future appeared dim. the talks' of the royal family, assets If this was the IraWashington took a tough stand. nian position, said the American team, then an agreement was leavSince the Carter administration was impossible. for the the this was deadline on January 20, ing office Faced with the problems which had manifested negotiations. and ecothemselves early, plus rising domestic discontent began to make nomic difficulties, the Iranian leadership The fact that the State Department, whose concessions. Iran an had not shifted since September, offered position and that the inthe likelihood Reagan deal, acceptable delays to the negotiauguration would bring additional Tehran to were other factors influencing ating process, move toward a settlement.

IRANIAN STUDIES

322

The final snags an accord was completed. Finally, at the were cleared away and the hostages were released On Januvery moment that Jimmy Carter was leaving office. the ary 20, 444 days after they had been taken prisoner, left Iran. 52 American hostages The arrangements involved the return of about $11 bilfrozen by the U.S. government, with lion of Iranian assets Of the regoing back to Iran. actually only $5.1 billion to pay off loans from mainder, Iran used about $5 billion was to be put in a speU.S. banks, and another $1 billion The United cial fund to cover claims by American companies. in Iran's internal States also promised not to interfere The wealth of the shah's family affairs in the future. and the U.S. government would not block would be frozen, through the Iranian legal action to regain such treasures U.S. courts. Iran had returned to the preEssentially, November 4 situation. on the AmeriNo ransom was paid, but the bitterness of the hostages was not can side due to the mistreatment relations. further warmth in U.S.-Iranian likely to foster And in Iran itself, the antagonism toward the United States, so central to the revolution and to the ideology of the Islamic republic's also showed no sign of abatement. leaders, Carter's defeat seemed President In the United States, model of to mark at least a temporary loss for the liberal indiThe attempt to substitute American foreign policy. of American power, as symbolapplications rect for direct was struck a severe blow by ized in the Nixon Doctrine, The Carter administraof the shah's regime. the collapse obvioustion's emphasis on human rights and reform--though on regional in the case of Iran--and its stress ly limited strategy, geopolitical approaches rather than on a globalist also seemed likely victims of the new era in American diploBoth the Iranian revolution and the hostage crisis macy. the mood in Washington. played a role in altering tion

Yet even before Ronald Reagan's November 1980 electhe Carter Doctrine demonstrated the increased victory,

AMERICA-IRAN, 1979-91

323

concern with the Gulf region. The undeniable economic and strategic importance of the area, the potential for greater instability created by the Iran-Iraq war, and the growing Soviet presence in the region, all raised its priority in the eyes of American policy makers. This is the policy paradox of U.S.-Iranian relations in the postshah era. Never before have cordial relations with a stable regime in Iran seemed more important to Amerinever before has such a state of affairs can interest; seemed more unlikely. Iranian hostility toward the United States seemed to indicate that even after the end of the hostage dispute, relations will remain cool and distant. world and region long allow, for betBut would a turbulent ter or for worse, such a suspended animation of interaction?

NOTES

1.

and the events of this period are preThis analysis in Barry Rubin, Paved with sented in greater detail Good Intentions:

(New York:

The American

Oxford University

Experience

Press,

and Iran

1980).

2.

moderate regime in Iran had emerged If a relatively with to maintain good relations which had been willing link would have probthe bilateral the United States, These pre-1971 ties. to the two nations' ably reverted toward an anti-Soviet were far looser and more oriented than they were during the following alliance defensive strategy and of the era of America's "two-pillar" power. shah's drive to become the primary regional

3.

The meetings that various Iranians held with U.S. emlater relations on means of rebuilding bassy officials of treason against furnished the basis for accusations were them when the records of those conversations seized by the students who took over the embassy. Their purpose, however, was hardly to weaken the government. revolutionary

4.

It should be noted that during this whole period, and as well, Soviet-controlled at the time of the revolution

IRANIAN STUDIES

324

clandestine radio stations, most notably the National Voice of Iran, did everything possible to stir up antithere. American feeling These broadcasts, however, were not all that different in tone from those produced in Iranian stations controlled by Khomeini' s followers. They probably tell more about Soviet policy than they do about the ways in which Iranian public opinion was formed. 5.

See Ayatollah Khomeini's speech to Islamic students in Qom, October 28, 1979, text in U.S. Department of ComBroadcast Service Information merce, Foreign (FBIS), November 6, 1979 and his speech of October 27, 1979, text in FBIS, October 29, 1979.

6.

Bamdad

January

(Tehran), January 31, 1980.

27,

1980,

text

in FBIS,

7.

At this point, many observers would add that the ruling out of military force weakened the American position in Iran's eyes and that the highlighting of the hostage issue within the United States handed the Iranians additional I am not convinced of the leverage. importance of these factors, however, since Iranian leaders apparently continued to believe in the likelihood of U.S. military action. Further, during those months, the problem was not merely a bargaining over terms but far more fundamental issues within Iran.

8.

Khomeini's elimination of any demand for an American apology is often presented as a major step forward, but this had not seemed an insuperable obstacle in earlier negotiations. Again, evolution of the political situation within Iran, and not the terms themselves, seem to hMie been the main determinant of changes in the crisis.

9.

Tehran radio, November 2, 1980, November 3, 1980.

10.

text

in FBIS,

See, for example, Khomeini's speech to the militant of November 3, 1980, text in FBIS, November students 4, 1980.

AMERICA-IRAN,

1979-81

325

interview

in Le Monde,

11.

See Hashemi Rafsanjani's October 21, 1980.

12.

The Washington

13.

See The New York Times/CBS poll York Times, November 16, 1980.

14.

Ayatollah Allameh Yahya Nuri For example, the respected on over the hostages--even any bargaining criticized To place any mean"un-Islamic." the harshest terms--as in the future ing on an American promise not to intervene Since the hoswas "like asking a scorpion not to bite." he argued, they should tages were spies and criminals, be put on trial. All of these ideas, of course, were based on what the Iranian leaders who were precisely In now negotiating had been saying for the last year. Iranian leaders could only plead seeking a settlement, argument given expediency and this was not an acceptable The Washthe ideology and atmosphere of postshah Iran. Post, January 2, 1981. ington

15.

Tehran radio, October October 20, 1980.

16.

and particularly of Middle East politics, In analyses it is often arto the hostage crisis, with reference is cynically gued that an emphasis on foreign quarrels people's manipulated by local governments to distract internal attention from problems at home and to foster Sometimes this is true, but more often it is unity. with or rivalries of domestic conflicts the result states which force a regime to prove its neighboring culorthodoxy over basic issues concerning political In short, ture and ideology--i.e., Islam, Arabism, etc. leaders are the slaves more often than they national or internaare the masters of such emotional regional of this phenomenon For a discussion tional questions. in a different see Barry Rubin, The Arab context, Conflict N.Y.: and the Palestine States (Syracuse, Press, 1981). Syracuse University

IRANIAN STUDIES

Post,

November 23,

17,

1980,

1980.

on the issue,

text

The New

in FBIS,

326

Iranian Studies, Volume XIII, Nos. 1-4, 18O

A Chronological Survey of the Iranian Revolution Nicholas M. Nikazmerad 1978

January 9: Police opened fire into a crowd of religious dissidents in Qom demonstrating against government land-reform policies, the ban of the veil for Muslim women, and the forceful dispersal of previous rallies. Six were reported killed and 9 injured, according to official police sources. The opposition placed the number at 20 dead and over 300 injured. In response to these shootings, Ayatollah Shari'atmadari, one of Iran's leading religious leaders, condemned the government's action and called for the return of Ayatollah Khomeini, who was living in exile in Iraq. January 26: Qom was the scene of more demonstrating when some 300,000 people rallied in favor of the government's reforms.

Nicholas Politics,

M. Nikazmerad is a Ph.D. candidate, New York University.

Department

of

This chrpnology covers the period from the first significant demonstration of the revolution on January 9, 1978 to the election of Abol-Hasan Banisadr as the first president of the Islamic Republic of Iran on January 25, 1980.

327

1978

February 5: Prime Minister Amuzegar presented his The budget estimated a recnew budget to the Parliament. for 1978. of $59.2 billion ord expenditure in Antigovernment demonstrations February 18-19: marked the end of a 40-day mourning period in major cities in Qom. Serious riots broke out in memory of those killed Tabriz leading to the burning of banks, movie houses, and Violent clashes with the hotels by the demonstrators. and 125 injured, police and government troops left 6 killed placed The opposition according to government officials. the number of deaths at 100. February 23: Army units withdrew from Tabriz after 650 persons, arrested Authorities calm had been restored. for their role in the riots. and 60 others were indicted February 27: The Iranian embassy in East Berlin was Iranian students protestattacked and occupied by dissident They in Tabriz. handling of the riots ing their government's before they were subdued by the held 4 diplomats briefly police. denying

accused Iran of February 28: Amnesty International the right to a fair and adequate trial. defendants

with East relations March 3: Iran cut diplomatic Germany. The East German government was accused by Iran of having encouraged the student takeover of its embassy. and "Islamic Marxists" were blamed by the Terrorists for the Tabriz riots. Shah in a French radio interview March 27: Brigadier Ali Akbar Darakhshani, 85 years old, was arrested on charges of spying for the Soviet Union. he died of a heart attack According to the authorities, to his crimes. after confessing rioting antigovernment March 27-April 3: Scattered and strikes, commemorating those who died in the Tabriz erupted throughout the country leading to a number riots, in Yazd on riots In particular, of deaths and injuries.

IRANIAN STUDIES

328

1978

March 28 resulted in the death of as many as 25 people after police opened fire on demonstrators. March 31: The "unholy alliance" of the "red" leftists and the "black" religious reactionaries against the regime was attacked by the Rastakhiz Party. April 6: The government announced the uncovering and smashing of a Soviet espionage network. They claimed to have proof of Soviet involvement in Iran's extremist dissent. April 8: The homes of 4 political dissidents (Sanjabi, Bazargan, Moqaddam and Manian) were bombed in Tehran and a fifth dissident (Payman) was abducted and beaten. The Underground Committee for Revenge, a reputed government-sponsored organization, claimed credit for this and a wave of other violence against the antigovernment activists. April 9: A progovernment rally was held in Tabriz attended by some 300,000 people, including members of the The launching of armed "Peoples Committees" to cabinet. conduct "surveillance campaigns" against "foreign-backed elements" was announced during the rally in the hope of ending the violence and demonstrations throughout the country. In an interview April 16: with The Times of London, the shah stated that torture was no longer practiced in Iran and that the recent disturbances were the work of small groups of "ignorant people." April 18: The homes and offices of 2 dissident lawyers were bombed by the Underground Committee for Revenge. April 25: Riots broke out at the University of Tehran following the arrest and alleged beating of 65 students for distributing antigovernment literature.

CHRONOLOGY

329

1978

May 6-7: Clashes between students and police were reported at the University campuses in Tehran, Shiraz, Isfahan, Tabriz, and other cities, marking the end of the 40-day mourning period for those killed in Yazd. May 9-10: Renewed antigovernment rioting swept across some 34 cities. Qomwas the scene of the most serious incidents. Dissidents leaving funeral services in a mosque took to the streets setting fire to buildings, cars, and other public property. Two theology students were killed in the home of Ayatollah Shari'atmadari as the police forced their way into the homes of religious dignitaries. May 11: A large crowd of demonstrators calling for the overthrow of the shah clashed with the security forces in Tehran. The shah had reportedly taken personal command of the troops. The shah postponed his departure for an official visit to Eastern Europe. May 13: The shah announced, during a news conference, that despite the violent disturbances he would proceed with his program of political He placed the liberalization. blame for the demonstrations on political dissidents supporting the National Front, without reference to the parof the religious opposition. ticipation May 15: Troops stormed the campus of Tehran University to break up student demonstrations calling for an end to the presence of military guards at the University. A 1-day general strike was called by the dissidents. May 16: In an open letter addressed to the shah, the Iranian Association for the Defense of Liberty and Human Rights criticized the repressive policies of the monarch and his crackdown on the opposition. The shah left for a visit to Eastern Europe. May 18: Ayatollah Shari'atmadari warned that there would be no peace in the country until the shah acceded to Muslim demands for the formation of a constitutional government. IRANIAN STUDIES

330

1978

May 31: Substantial property damage was caused at Tehran University as two groups of about 2,500 male students clashed. The dispute resulted from the integration of sexes on the campus dormitories 5 months earlier and the presence of military guards. June 3:

Dormitories

at Tehran University

were closed.

June 5: A general strike was called by a coalition of antigovernment forces to commemorate the 15th anniversary of the June 1963 riots, which had led to the exile of Ayatollah Khomeini. June 6: General Ne'matollah SAVAKchief Nasiri, since 1965, was dismissed by the shah and appointed as Iran's ambassador to Pakistan. June 17: Thousands of people staged peaceful antigovernment demonstrations in Qom and 6 other cities to protest the killing of the theology students by the troops in May. The gatherings occasioned the end of a 40-day Muslim mourning period for the dead, which had become a regular occurrence since the first civilian fatalities in January. July 3: A private "Code of Conduct" for the royal family was issued by the shah barring them from profiteering in business deals. July 12: Ayatollah Shari'atmadari demanded free parliamentary elections to be held in June 1979. The government's refusal, he warned, would lead him and his supporters to view the existing Parliament as illegal. July 23-24: Riots erupted in Mashad after the funeral service for a Shi'ite leader, Ayatollah Ahmad Kafi. Police and troops intervened, resulting in-the deaths of about 40 people. In a television August 5: "message to the nation," the shah emphasized his support for free elections and Western-style political liberties.

CHRONOLOGY

331

1978

August 10: The arrest of a local religious leader in Isfahan led to demonstrations and serious rioting in the city. Martial law was imposed the next day as army troops with tanks moved in to prevent further rioting. Four were reported killed and 66 injured. Clashes between police and demonstrators in Shiraz left several people dead and about 200 wounded. killing

August 13: A bomb exploded in a Tehran restaurant 40 persons, one and injuring including 10 Americans.

In response to the continuing August 14: outbreaks of violence, the armed forces were put on a state of alert in all major towns and cities, to be prepared "to intervene if necessary."

helping

August 17: The PLO was accused to foment unrest.

theater

August 18: An arsonist's 3 people. killed

fire

by the government

of

in a Mashad movie

August 20: Two movie houses were set ablaze in ReThere were no casualties. and Shiraz. About 430 died in a movie house fire in Abadan. Ten were said to have been arrested by the police. suspects Five of them, described by the chief of police as "Islamic Marxists," had allegedly the fire. confessed to setting za'iyeh

August 22-25: Antishah riots broke out in Abadan for the victims of the theater during the burial ceremonies fire. Crowds shouting "Death to the shah" attacked governand clashed with the police. ment buildings Army troops moved in to restore order. The government blamed the fire a leader of on the 5 suspects while Dr. Sanjabi, arrested, the National Front, and other dissidents held "agents of the regime" responsible. August 27: Prime Minister Jamshid Amuzegar was dismissed by the shah in an attempt to defuse the increasing Ja'far Sharif-Emami was appointed violence sweeping Iran. IRANIAN STUDIES

332

1978

to lead a reconciliation He pledged himself to government. campaign for free elections and to the establishment of "legitimate" to the political parties. As part of a concession religious the portfolio elements, of the minister of state for women's affairs was abolished, gambling houses and casinos were ordered closed, and the Imperial Iranian Calendar introduced in 1976 was replaced by the traditional Muslim Calendar. August 29: The Iranian press 14 political groups to become legal

announced political

the desire parties.

August 31: Ten people were killed demonstrating Mashad following the 40-day mourning period for those there in July. other

September 2: major cities.

Rioting

occurred

in Tehran,

of

in killed

Mashad and

September 3: In response to Prime Minister SharifEmami's program, Ayatollah Shari'atmadari gave the new government 3 months to accede to his demands made on July 12. Ayatollah Khomeini denounced the "hypocrisy" of the new government and called for the overthrow of the regime. The Union of National Front Forces issued a 12-point program linking the credibility of the new government to the immediate implementation of their program. The program included the release of all political prisoners, the dissolution of SAVAK, and the legalization of all political movements. September 4: Some 200,000 demonstrators calling for the return of Ayatollah Khomeini and his installation as head of state marched in Tehran to mark the end of the holy month of Ramadan. September 6: The government imposed a ban on all unauthorized rallies, warning they would be "dispersed by the security forces." September 7: Some 100,000 people gathered in defiance of the government ban on unauthorized CHRONOLOGY

in Tehran rallies. 333

1978

The participants the establishment

called for the overthrow of the shah and of an "Islamic Republic."

September 8: The government imposed martial law in In Tehran, several thouTehran and 11 other major cities. clashed with protesting this imposition sand demonstrators The death toll, who opened fire into the crowd. troops, in what came to be known as "Black Friday," was estimated sources claiming at between 95 and 250, with opposition deaths between 2,000 and 3,000. September

9:

The Army ordered

censorship

of the press.

September 10: President Carter telephoned the shah to reaffirm continued U.S. support for his regime. September 11: The shah attributed the antiregime subversive organizations." violence to "international The Iranian Association of Jurists denounced the martial law and the killing of "innocent people" as unconstitutional because the new government had not been granted a parliamentary prior to its imposition vote of confidence of martial law. were activists September 12: Prominent antiregime activrounded up and imprisoned on charges of subversive Scores of former ministers, ities against the state. and businessmen were arrested civil servants, high-level on charges of corruption and bribery. Party, leader of the Pan Iranist Mohsen Pezeshkpur, of conducting a "masaccused the government on television sacre" in quelling the September 8 riots. Khomeini and Shari'atmadari September 14: Ayatollahs and to engage in passive resistance urged their followers forces. to avoid further clashes with the security government was given a September 16: Sharif-Emami's vote of confidence by the Majles with nearly 1/3 of the absent. deputies in 11,000 An earthquake hit eastern Iran, resulting deaths in Tabas and the surrounding areas.

IRANIAN STUDIES

334

1978

of martial law for September 17: The imposition Tehran and other major cities was approved by the Majles. September 24: About 10,000 oil workers employed by the Oil Service Company of Iran in Khuzistan went on strike over pay and political and other indusissues. Strikes trial actions the government began to spread to against other sectors rapidly. In a directive September 26: issued by the shah, members of the royal family were banned from financial dealings with government agencies or firms doing business with the government. September 30: Telecommunication their jobs causing serious disruptions and Telex links. telephone

workers walked off in long-distance

October 1: A 1-day nationwide work stoppage was called by the opposition to protest Ayatollah Khomeini's house arrest in Iraq. Employees of the Bank Melli and the National Iranian Oil Company staged job actions demanding higher wages. living

October 2: The shah granted abroad, including Ayatollah

amnesty to dissidents Khomeini.

October 3-8: Strike actions were stepped up in major industrial and service radio sectors, including hospitals, and television, power plants, postal services., public transport, steel industries, schools and civil-service offices. This occurred despite government assurances that it would meet the economic demands of the strikers. October 5: The government 86 political prisoners.

announced

the release

of

October 6: Ayatollah Khomeini left Iraq and arrived in France. The shah pledged to continue his reform and liberalization programs despite the current unrest. CHRONOLOGY

335

1978

port

October 10: President Carter voiced his strong supfor the shah during a Washington press conference.

October 11: The military imposed censorship on 2 daily papers in Tehran, Kayhan and Ettela'at. The action prompted an employee strike which was joined by virtually all other papers in the country. failed

October 12: A government-owned to publish due to the printers'

paper, Rastakhiz, strike.

October 13: Censorship of the papers was lifted in exchange for a promise by the press not to criticize the person of the shah or the military. October 16: honor those killed

A 1-day nationwide strike was held to in the September 8 demonstrations.

October 18: In the hope of ending the strikes, the government announced an overall pay policy for the public sector which included a flat-rate increase of 7,500 rials per month. October 22: Police opened fire on demonstrators in Hamadan. As many as 19 people were reported killed. October 23: The government announced that 1,451 on October 26, the occasion would be released prisoners of the shah's 59th birthday. October 24: Cinemas, banks, and government were set on fire during rioting in Gorgan.

buildings

October 29: A purge of SAVAKby the shah resulted in the dismissal or forcible of 34 senior ofretirement ficials. October 31: A strike by 37,000 employees of the National Iranian Oil Company over wages and political destandstill mands, brought the oil industry to a virtual and reduced oil exports to 1.5 million barrels per day, IRANIAN STUDIES

336

1978

compared with the normal average of almost 6 million barrels per day. Strikers demanded an end to martial law, the release of all political and the trial of prisoners, General Nasiri. November 1: Iran Air employees, demanding political concessions, went on strike. In clashes between troops and antishah demonstrators in Sanandaj and Zarshahr, 23 persons were reported killed and 56 injured. A large crowd marched in Tehran to commemorate the of Ayatollah release Taleqani from prison. November 3: Dr. Sanjabi met with Ayatollah Khomeini in Paris and joined forces with the ayatollah's movement. Khomeini warned that he would expel from the movement anyone who negotiated with the shah. November 4: Violent demonstrations erupted in Tehran as troops fired on students trying to topple a statue of the shah. November 5: Severe riots broke out in Tehran as demonstrators ransacked and burned government buildings, banks, and stores. The British embassy was attacked and set on fire by the demonstrators, extensive sustaining damage. Sharif-Emami and his civilian Cabinet resigned and were replaced by a military government headed by Gen. Gholam Reza Azhari, the armed forces Chief of Staff. Martial law and censorship of the press was imposed by the military government. November 6: In a nationwide television the address, shah admitted past mistakes and promised to carry out free elections and to expand his campaign against corruption and injustice. The imposition of the military government, he announced, was a temporary measure. In a joint statement Khoissued in Paris, Ayatollah meini and Dr. Sanjabi ruled out any cooperation with the regime and demanded a popular referendum on the monarchy.

CHRONOLOGY

1978

by Dr. held position of a previously This was a reversal process who had sought a genuine parliamentary Sanjabi, Khomonarchy. within the framework of a constitutional Repubof a new "Islamic meini called for the formation lic" based on "Islamic criteria." of the Parliament scheduled to open A new session that day was postponed indefinitely. strong support for the military The U.S. expressed government. Warrants for the arrest of about 60 November 7-8: leaders were issued on variand business former officials mismanagement, and abuse of ous charges of corruption, Former Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveida (1965power. 1977), former head of SAVAKGeneral Nasiri and 6 former arwere among the prominent officials cabinet ministers rested. U.S. policy Khomeini criticized November 9: Ayatollah to toward the "Islamic movement" and threatened as hostile between the two countries contracts all business reconsider after the fall of the shah. of The National Front called for the continuation restored. was government until a civilian strikes in Tehran for November 11: Dr. Sanjabi was arrested as he attempted to hold regulations martial-law violating He again after his return from Paris. a news conference with the regime. of cooperation ruled out any possibility with the President Carter expressed dissatisfaction the administrawarn to failure community's intelligence in Iran. crisis tion of the impending political November 12: The government ordered back to work or to face dismissal. Iran Air employees returned Striking

the oil

workers

to work.

Many of the oil workers returned November 13-14: Oil output rose to to work but engaged in job slowdowns. barrels per day. 2.2 million 200 people suspected of organizing An estimated were arrested. in the oil fields strikes IRANIAN STUDIES

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1978

November 19: The government prisoners as the shah renewed his law and hold free elections.

freed 210 political pledge to end martial

November 20: The bazaar in Tehran reopened for business after more than a month-long strike. An unknown number were killed in Mashad when troops fired on worshippers at a shrine. November 26: A 1-day strike mourn for the dead in Mashad.

was carried

out to

November 28: The government imposed a curfew and a ban on all marches and unauthorized religious processions in anticipation of the holy month of Moharram, due to commence on December 2. The government also announced that all Iranian laws would be revised to "conform with Islamic principles" and that religious leaders would be consulted during this process. November 30: The Majles approved a bill granting 700,000 civil servants a 25 percent pay increase, in order to end the work stoppage. December 1-2: Thousands of demonstrators marched through the streets of Tehran and other cities in defiance of the curfew and clashed with troops, who opened fire into the crowd. According to various accounts, 12 to 70 people were reported killed. December 3: Ayatollah Khomeini called on the soldiers to leave their units if ordered to fire on demonHe also urged resumption of strikes strators. by the oil workers. December 4: The crisis intensified as violent demonstrations continued and as thousands of workers in the oil and other industries renewed their strikes. Oil production fell to 3.8 from a high of 5.8 million barrels per day only a few days before. A task force headed by George Ball was formed to of the Iranian crisis study the effect on the Gulf region for the Carter administration. CHRONOLOGY

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1978

since taknews conference December 5: In his first saboing office, General Azhari accused foreign-controlled He denied for fomenting discontent. teurs and atheists were the main that Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers source of government opposition. from prison December 6: Dr. Sanjabi was released amid rumors that he had agreed to cooperate with the shah He ruled government. in his attempts to form a coalition monarchy." under "the illegal out the possibility to halt salary payments to General Azhari threatened the striking government employees. Carter commented on the chances December 7: President "I don't know. I hope so. This of the shah's survival: is something that is in the hands of the people of Iran." between the governDecember 8: Secret negotiations of the ban on ment and the opposition led to the lifting for 48 hours during the holy and highly public processions emotionally charged days of Tasu'a and Ashura (December 1011). of antishah December 10: Millions in vast and peaceful processions ipated through Tehran and other cities.

protestors particwhich passed

December 11: Massive, and for the most part peacecontinued across the counful, rallies and demonstrations of Isfahan. There, severe rioting try, with the exception of broke out as the demonstrators attacked the offices SAVAKand set fire to banks, stores, movie houses, and The unofficial death toll was put as police stations. high as 50. accused Iran of continued torAmnesty International the government's claims ture of political prisoners despite to the contrary. barrels refused

dropped to 1.2 million December 12: Oil production per day as the workers, heeding Khomeini's appeal, to return to work after the religious holidays.

IRANIAN STUDIES

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1978

Carter inPresident In a Washington news conference, the crisis by accused Khomeini of exacerbating directly U.S. He reaffirmed "bloodshed and violence." encouraging "support" for the shah. proshah supDecember 13: Troops and club-wielding motorattacking in Isfahan, porters held a demonstration ists who refused to blow their horns or display portraits At least 51 people were of the shah on their windshields. during the rioting. killed Khomeini warned foreign heads of state that Ayatollah support for the shah would deprive them of their continued of bilateral Iranian oil and would lead to the abrogation after the Islamic government gained power. treaties by in Tehran was bolstered The U.S. embassy staff The administration specialists. of additional the arrival denied a report from embassy sources that the move was to maintain power. the shah's efforts aimed at strengthening marking the deterioraIn an incident December 14: 12 officers within the armed forces, tion of discipline and several others injured when 3 were reported killed of the Imperial Guard opened fire on antishah soldiers The government them in the Lavizan army base in Tehran. wearing army uniforms. on terrorists blamed the incident to the In order to find a solution December 13-14: were climate, separate discussions political deteriorating and various opposition held between the shah's advisers Bazargan, and Amini, who was Sanjabi, including leaders, A plan was in the early 1960s. the shah's prime minister of an inthe establishment submitted by Amini suggesting terim regency council pending the formation of a coalition The shah in June. elections government after parliamentary gone furSanjabi had reportedly the proposal. rejected the formation of the council to the shah's ther by linking to abdicate. willingness to December 17: Another attempt to find a solution was the stalemate between the shah and the opposition thwarted when a compromise plan submitted by Dr. Gholam CHRONOLOGY

341

1978

under Dr. Mosadminister a former interior Hosayn Sadiqi, to gain the apdeq, was accepted by the shah but failed The plan, based on longstanding proval of the opposition. called for the reorganiopposition, demands of the liberal of the shah's powers to zation of SAVAK, the reduction monarch, a government fully rethose of a constitutional and a to Parliament, an independent judiciary, sponsible The plan was not endorsed by the National free press. Khomeini, who refused to accept any Front or Ayatollah compromise unless the shah agreed to a referendum on the monarchy. workers staged December 18: Oil and other industrial in response to a call by Khomeini and the a general strike, National Front. to the barracks in Tabriz An army unit was recalled refused to obey orders and joined antiafter some soldiers shah demonstrations. continued in Tehran, December 23: Demonstrations between In clashes Tabriz, Mashad, and other cities. in Mashad, 13 to 29 people were troops and demonstrators reported killed. December 24: Tear gas was used by U.S. Marine guards who demonstrators to disperse a crowd of anti-American gathered in front of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. In an address before a rally attended December 25: for the abdication his Dr. Sanjabi called supporters, by to Iran's of the shah, which he saw as the only solution crisis. political The export December 26-27: and domestic consumption rationed oil workers continued.

of crude oil was halted as the strikes by the

December 28: Clashes between troops and demonstrain 30 deaths while troops also tors in Ahvaz resulted fired upon crowds in Tehran and Qazvin.

IRANIAN STUDIES

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1978

December 29: Dr. Shapur Bakhtiyar, a longstanding opponent of the regime and a prominent member of the National Front, was appointed prime minister by the shah. It was later revealed, on January 1, that Dr. Bakhtiyar's acceptance was based upon four conditions: the shah leave Iran; SAVAKbe disbanded; military and police personnel responsible for shooting demonstrators be tried; and, Iran's foreign affairs be put in the hands of civilians. December 30: The appointment of Dr. Bakhtiyar was denounced by Khomeini and the National Front, which expelled the new prime minister from the movement. December 30-31: Mashad and several other cities were the scene of violent clashes between troops and antishah demonstrators. Up to 170 civilians were reported killed in Mashad, according to the authorities. The death toll was placed in the hundreds by the opposition. 1979

January 1-2: Demonstrations and unrest continued throughout the country in opposition to the new government. Qazvin, in particular, was the scene of severe rioting where up to 100 people were reported killed. January 3: Dr. Bakhtiyar received the approval of the Majles to form a government. In a news conference held in Tehran, Dr. Bakhtiyar announced the decision of the shah to leave the country temporarily after the formation of the new government. A regency council was to be chosen to rule in the shah's absence. January 4: A statement issued by the National Front condemned Dr. Bakhtiyar for "betraying our cause." The shah signed a decree appointing Dr. Bakhtiyar the prime minister. The U.S. indicated its willingness to cooperate with the new government.

CHRONOLOGY

343

1979

with the representaJanuary 5: After consultation Khomeini, the National Front and the tive of Ayatollah government oil workers agreed to produce enough oil to meet domestic requirements. consisting cabinet, January 6: Dr. Bakhtiyar's circles, unknown in political of professionals largely to the shah. was formally presented to leave Iran for The shah announced his intention in the rest and vacation as soon as order was restored country. Calling obedience to the new government "obedience emservice Khomeini urged the civil to Satan," Ayatollah and to bar ployees to refuse to obey the new ministers buildings. their entrance to ministry paving the way Dr. Bakhtiyar ended press censorship, for the first time in for resumption of news publication nearly 2 months. A crowd of some 100,000 people demonstrated against the Bakhtiyar government in Qom. January 7: Demonstrations and other cities Yazd, Ardebil, the opposition.

took place in response

in Tehran, to a call by

demonJanuary 8: Tabriz was the scene of violent schools, as mobs set fires to movie theaters, strations were held in Demonstrations shops, and other buildings. as well. Tehran, Qazvin, Isfahan, and other cities The presence in Iran of Gen. Robert E. Huyser, by Deputy Chief of U.S. Forces in Europe, was disclosed according to the Huyser's mission, the State Department. support in Iran for military was to bolster disclosure,

the civilian

government.

January 9: Members of the royal family were ordered by the shah to surrender all their private holdings to the Pahlavi Foundation, which was both a family trust and a charitable organization.

IRANIAN STUDIES

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1979

January 11: Dr. Bakhtiyar presented his Cabinet to A 17-point program proposed by the Majiles for approval. the new government included the following: the dissolution of SAVAK; trial and punishment of human rights violators; the release of and monetary compensation to political prisoners; a greater role for the religious leaders in the government and in drafting legislation; the gradual abolition of martial law; and a halt to the exportation of oil to Israel and South Africa. Soon after the government lifted martial law in Shiraz, the American flag was burned by a mob in front of the U.S. consulate. SAVAKbuildings were also set on fire. At least 14 people died. January 13: The formation of a 9-man Regency Council was announced by the government, paving the way for the shah's departure. Dr. Sanjabi and other prominent opposition leaders refused to join the council, which was headed by Sayyed Jalaleddin Tehrani, a former minister loyal to the shah. the legitimacy of the Bakhtiyar governChallenging ment, Ayatollah Khomeini announced the establishment of a Council of the Islamic Revolution, which was to serve as a shadow Cabinet responsible for the formation of a "provincial government" to replace the "illegal government of Bakhtiyar. " January the Majiles.

15:

Bakhtiyar's

government

was approved

by

January 16: The shah left Iran for an extended "vacain Egypt. Ayatollah Khomeini restated his intention to form a provisional government and to set up a constituent assembly responsible for drafting a new constitution. He also called on all government officials, the Regency Council, and the members of Parliament to resign. tion"

January 17: In a news conference President Carter reaffirmed U.S. -Iranian ties and expressed support for the "legal" government of Dr. Bakhtiyar. CHRONOLOGY

345

1979

Ayatollah Khomeini and the National Front urged their followers to continue with their strikes and demonstrations against the Bakhtiyar government. Khomeini also appealed to the armed forces to join the Islamic movement and deand punmanded that the shah return to Iran to face trial ishment. of jusIn response to Khomeini's call, the minister tice, Mr. Vaziri, and 15 members of the Majles resigned. January 18: Mr. Tehrani flew to Paris to meet with Ayatollah Khomeini. Demonstrations erupted in Ahvaz, Dezful, Tehran and Khomeini. other cities in response to the call by Ayatollah January 20: Ayatollah to return to Iran on January

Khomeini stated 26.

his

decision

January 22: Mr. Tehrani resigned as the head of the Khomeini's call. Regency Council in response to Ayatollah He handed his resignation to the Ayatollah in Paris. in Morocco. The shah left Egypt to take up residence January to resign.

23:

Bazargan urged Prime Minister

Bakhtiyar

January 24: Dr. Bakhtiyar ordered the airports Khomeini to closed to prevent the return of Ayatollah Iran when attempts at compromise between the two sides failed. Dr. Bakhtiyar had offered to resign within 4 for a monarchy months and to let the people's preference or a republic be decided by a referendum if Khomeini of a proagreed not to go ahead with the establishment

visional government. Bakhtiyar also called on Khomeini to postpone his return for at least 3 weeks. The Bakhtiyar government introduced 2 bills in the of SAVAKand the Majles providing for the dissolution establishment of legal procedures for prosecuting the Both bills wrongdoings of former government officials. were adopted on February S.

IRANIAN STUDIES

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1979

January 25: Some 100,000 people demonstrated in Tehran in support of Dr. Bakhtiyar. The government reimposed a ban on public demonstrations. Khomeini agreed to delay his return. Ayatollah January 26-29: Violent were held in Tehran and other government ban.

and massive demonstrations of the cities in defiance

January 27: Dr. Bakhtiyar offered to fly to Paris to meet with the ayatollah to discuss the "future of the nation." Khomeini refused to meet with him unless he resigned first. January 29: Anti-American slogans were chanted by Iranian soldiers stationed inside the U.S. embassy in Tehran to protect the compounds. In Isfahan the American anconsul was beaten by a crowd as he attempted to assist other American arguing with a cab driver. January 30: The government announced its decision to open the airports and allow Ayatollah Khomeini to return. The U.S. government ordered the "temporary departure" of all American dependents and nonessential government personnel in Iran. February 1: Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran. Some 3 million people gathered in Tehran to greet him. The ayatollah declared his plan to form a provisional government and asked for Dr. Bakhtiyar's resignation. Martial law was lifted in Tehran. to form a governFebruary 2: Dr. Bakhtiyar offered ment of "national unity" which would include the supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini. The offer was rejected by Khomeini, who again urged all government officials to resign. February 5: Mehdi Bazargan was appointed prime minister of the proposed provisional government by Ayatollah Khomeini. Mr. Bazargan was a member of the National Front

CHRONOLOGY

347

1979 and had served 5 years in prison in the early 1960s because of his opposition to the shah. Dr. Bakhtiyar appeared before the Majles and reiterated his refusal to resign. Some 57 members had already resigned their seats at the urging of Khomeini. February 6: The U.S. government reiterated its support for Dr. Bakhtiyar and the "constitutional process" in Iran. The U.S. government disclosed the return of General Huyser from Iran. February 7: Dr. Bakhtiyar suffered a severe setback as the followers of Khomeini took virtual control of the administrative, police, and judicial functions in Isfahan, Qom, Shiraz, and to a lesser extent in other cities. February 8: Dr. Bakhtiyar dismissed Khomeini's IsRepublic as "archaic and medieval." Mostly peaceful pro-Khomeini demonstrations were held in Tehran and other cities of people inby millions cluding some uniformed soldiers. lamic

of TehFebruary 9: In an address at the University ran, Mr. Bazargan announced some of his major proposals. They included the immediate resignation of Bakhtiyar's government, a popular referendum on the establishment of an Islamic Republic, council appointment of a constituent to draft a new constitution, and the formation of a permanent government based on a new charter. February 9-10: Troops from the Imperial Guard attacked demonstrating pro-Khomeini Air Force cadets and at Doshan Tappeh air base in Tehran. technicians Fightthe next day as each side rushed reinforceing intensified The battle ments to the scene. was joined by thousands of civilians who took control of several miliantigovernment Doshan Tappeh, seizing the weaptary garrisons including ons inside. In a broadcast on February 10, Dr. Bakhtiyar said that the fighting would have "no effect on me."

IRANIAN STUDIES

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1979

February 11: Thousands of armed civilians, Islamic militiamen, and pro-Khomeini troops fought to take control in Tehran and other cities. of military installations Several high-ranking or military commanders were arrested killed during the fighting. Others were captured as they attempted to flee the country. The Army's Supreme Council ordered the troops back to their barracks and assured Mr. Bazargan that the military was prepared to recognize his provisional government. Dr. Bakhtiyar officially resigned as prime minister and went into hiding. Members of the cabinet and Regency Council also resigned. February 12: Ayatollah Khomeini asked for the surrender of all weapons during a radio broadcast, as fighting among rival groups and disorder continued. The shah's Niavaran Palace was captured by Khomeini supporters. Mr. Bazargan began filling February 12-13: cabinet positions for his new provisional government with a mixture of close Khomeini aides, National Front leaders, and technocrats. Dr. Sanjabi was appointed foreign minister. party)

February 13: The Tudeh Party (Iran's communist expressed its support for Ayatollah Khomeini.

February 14: Several hundred people were reported killed in Tabriz as fighting broke out between guerrilla groups on one hand and the Army and SAVAKelements on the other. The People's Fedayeen, a left-wing guerrilla group numbering 2,000 to 4,000, issued a list of demands to the The demands included equal rights government. for men and women, nationalization of all industry, and the expulsion of all foreign military advisers from Iran. The U.S. embassy in Tehran was attacked by Marxist gunmen who forced their way into the chancery after they had overpowered the Marine guards. The embassy personnel, including Ambassador William H. Sullivan, were held hostage at gunpoint for nearly 2 hours. They were freed after the attackers were dispersed The by armed Khomeini forces. CHRONOLOGY

349

1979

attack was reportedly in retaliation for suspected collaboration between the embassy and SAVAK. February 15: The People's Fedayeen was charged by government officials for attacks on foreign embassies and other disruptive activities. The government announced that on March 30-31 a referendum on the establishment of an Islamic Republic would be held. The question to be put to every voter was: "Are you for the replacement of the monarchy by an Islamic Republic, the constitution of which will be approved - yes or no?" February 16: Four high-ranking generals including General Nasiri, the former head of SAVAK,were executed. February 17: Workers in the oil industry and other sectors began to return to their jobs at the urging of Ayatollah Khomeini. Many, however, remained on strike as a show of sympathy for the leftist groups. The 30,000-man Imperial Guard was dissolved by General Qarani, the new armed forces Chief of Staff. February 20: Four more high-ranking military officers were executed as the purge against officials of the former regime continued. The executions, carried out without the knowledge of Mr. Bazargan, were directed by the newly formed Islamic Revolutionary Council whose membership remained secret. The U.S. consulate in Tabriz, Shiraz, and Isfahan were temporarily closed due to a lack of adequate security. February 21: A draft constitution was published in the Tehran press. Kenneth Kraus, a U.S. Marine Sergeant kidnapped from a hospital on February 14 by Khomeini supporters, was released after intense U.S. pressure. Kraus had been injured during the attack on the U.S. embassy. February 23: More than 70,000 people attended a rally staged by the Fedayeen in Tehran. The rally was called to demand the inclusion of the Fedayeen and other leftist groups in the government. IRANIAN STUDIES

3,50

1979

February of SAVAK.

24:

Mr. Bazargan announced

the dissolution

February 28: Mr. Bazargan threatened to resign if the Revolutionary Council did not cease its interference in his government. The prime minister was particularly angered over arrests, secret trials, and executions of former officials conducted by the council outside of the formal government channels. March 1: A list of 8 demands for autonomy was presented to the government by Shaykh Ezzeddin Hosayni, the spiritual leader of the Kurs. Ayatollah Khomeini took up residence in Qom. He urged the ratification of the referendum establishing an Islamic Republic. March 5: The Swiss government rejected an Iranian to freeze the shah's assets held in Switzerland. After a 69-day interruption, oil exports were resumed. Khomeini ordered the formation of the Revolutionary Guards in support of his Islamic Movement. They were to perform a paramilitary role combining army and police functions.

request

March 7: A new secular political party called the Society of the National Movement of Iran was formed, repthe more active members of the National Front. resenting Earlier in the week, the formation of the National Democratic Front was announced by its leader, Mr. MatineDaftari.

Khomeini accused Bazargan's provisional government of being "weak" and under Western influence. He also announced that female government employees should dress according to "religious standards." March 8: In response to Khomeini's attack, Bazargan reportedly handed in his resignation to the ayatollah during their meeting in Qom, but agreed to stay on when an apparent understanding was reached between the two regarding the authority of the Revolutionary Council, which had become a rival to the provisional government.

CHRONOLOGY

351

1979

Thousands of women staged demonstrations March 8-12: Khomeini's denouncing Ayatollah in Tehran and other cities, dress code and recent government actions which they felt Earlier in the week the 1963 Family violated their rights. Protection Law was abrogated. March 9: Addressing a rally, in the provisional confidence"

"full

Khomeini expressed government.

his

criticized the Shari'atmadari March 12: Ayatollah proposed referendum, which gave the people a choice beThis, he argued, tween a monarchy and an Islamic Republic. restricted freedom of choice and opinion. cuted

were summarily exeMarch 13: Eleven more generals in secret trials. in Tehran after their convictions

In a television address Bazargan denounced March 14: and executions as "irreligious, inhuthe summary trials human rights. universal violating mane, and a disgrace," Khomeini's interference in Ayatollah He also criticized his government.

and the This the

placed a ban on all trials March 16: The ayatollah and ordered of former government officials executions to trial draft Council new procedures. Revolutionary directive was issued after a meeting with Bazargan preceding day.

March 18: The Mojahedin and Fedayeen denounced the freedom of choice. upcoming referendum for not allowing broke out between KurdHeavy fighting March 18-21: ish autonomy, and governtribesmen, demanding political The fighting was initiated during ment forces in Sanandaj. of the local the refusal a Kurdish demonstration against committee to supply weapons to the Kurdish revolutionary At least 200 people were reported killed. street patrols. March 20: The National the upcoming referendum.

IRANIAN STUDIES

Democratic

Front criticized

352

1979

According to a commentary in the Tehran Journal, more than 20,000 political prisoners were being held by the new regime and under worse conditions than before the revolution. In a major concession, March 25: the government announced its intention to grant limited autonomy to the Kurds, including the freedom to run Kurdish-speaking schools in the region. Additionally, Mr. Ibrahim Yunesi, a Kurd, was appointed governor-general of Kurdistan province. March 26: Fighting broke out between the Turkoman tribesmen, seeking autonomy, and government forces in Gunbad Qabus. More than 113 Kurdish prisoners held in Sanandaj by the army were released. March 27: The armed forces resigned his post.

Chief

of Staff,

Qarani,

March 29: Fighting continued between the Turkoman rebels and government forces. Unrest was also reported among the Baluchi tribesmen. March 30: the Bahamas.

The shah and his

family

left

Morocco for

March 30-31: The formation of the Islamic Republic was approved in a nationwide referendum. The referendum was marred by boycotts in the Kurdish and Turkoman areas and the refusal of a dozen groups to participate. April 1: Ayatol lah Khomeini proclaimed the establishment of the Islamic Republic, calling it the "first day of government by God." April 2: The government announced a cease-fire tween its troops and the Turkoman forces.

be-

April 5: New trial procedures were announced for the revolutionary courts, giving them fixed jurisdiction in murder and torture cases.

CHRONOLOGY

353

1979

and summary executions Secret trials April 7-13: and military civilians were resumed and 35 high-ranking of the shah's regime were executed by firing officials Former Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveida was squads. among those executed on April 7. were denounced by the NaApril 10: The executions Commission Democratic Front and the International tional of Jurists. of AyatolApril 13: Two sons and a daughter-in-law leader of Tehran, were the spiritual lah MahmudTaleqani, activities. by the komiteh on charges of leftist arrested Khomeini. by ordered as released, subsequently were They April 14: Ayatollah Taleqani went into hiding to actions of the and the undisciplined the arrests protest for the chaos in the komiteh, which he held responsible country. His April 15: Foreign Minister Sanjabi resigned. of interference was prompted by the excessive resignation Council and its komitehs in domestic and the Revolutionary "The kogovernment. of the provisional foreign politics "are completemitehs," according to a government official, Council can no longer The Revolutionary ly out of control. them." on hold keep its Thousands of people demonstrated in April 15-17: Tehran in support of Ayatollah Taleqani. from Ayatollah Taleqani announced his retirement and so as "not to give a chance to dictatorship politics return." to despotism Council of Dr. Sanjabi accused the Revolutionary being despotic. April 19: After a meeting with Khomeini, Taleqani interand in a television statement his previous retracted anti-revthe komiteh for its work in fighting viewpraised Khomeini announced that the komiteh forces. olutionary its would have to remain until the government established full authority. IRANIAN STtUDIES

354

1979

April mer officials

In Tehran and other 20-23: were tried and executed.

April 21: Fighting broke Turkish minorities in Naghadeh, cused the pro-Khomeini Turks of ing ceremonies of the Kurdistan office.

fighting

cities

12 more for-

out between the Kurdish and The Kurds acAzerbaijan. a plot to disrupt the openDemocratic Party's branch

April 22: Government troops intensified.

moved to Naghadeh as the

April 23: Ayatollah Taher Shobayr Khaqani, the religious leader of the Arabs in Khuzistan, to leave threatened Iran unless the komitehs' powers were curbed. Major General Qarani was assassinated in Tehran. The an Islamic socialist Forghan Fighters, group opposed to political involvement on the part of Muslim clergy, claimed credit. April 24: Bazargan denounced the actions of the Islamic courts, the komiteh, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards, accusing them of conducting a "rule of revenge" and interfering with the affairs of the government. Dr. Yazdi was named foreign minister as part of a Cabinet reshuffle. April 25: Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani, the supreme commander of Iran's central komiteh, announced the purging of corrupt elements within his organization. The action followed the recent criticism of the komitehs by both religious and secular leaders. Nearly 100,000 turned out for the public funeral of Major General Qarani. in April 26: More than 100,000 Arabs demonstrated Khuzistan in support of Ayatollah Khaqani and for Arab autonomy. A cease-fire was announced between the Kurds and the Turks in Naghadeh and both sides exchanged hostages. At least 1,000 people were reported to have been killed in the 5 days of fighting. CHRONOLOGY

355

1979

tion

April 28: A preliminary was published.

draft

of the new constitu-

May 1: Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari, a leading memCouncil, was assassinated ber of the Islamic Revolutionary in Tehran. The Forghan Fighters claimed responsibility. May 2: Dr. Yazdi stated that he had asked the U.S. government to freeze the assets of the Pahlavi Foundation. Khomeini ordered the formation of May 5: Ayatollah a security militia, to be called the Army of the Guardians only of the Islamic Revolution, who would be responsible was to the Islamic Revolutionary Council. The militia created, according to Khomeini, to "protect the Islamic Revolution." Executions May 7-8: took place. ian officials

of 22 former military

and civil-

among them 2 wealthy busiMay 9: Several persons, and antinessmen, were executed on charges of corruption This marked the first of executions state activities. individuals rather than former government officials. private a leading independent daily, May 12: Ayandegan, because of a dispute with Khomeini and ceased publication and freedom of the his followers regarding censorship the paper as "depraved" and Khomeini assailed press. "deviationist." the head of the Sadeq Khalkhali, May 13: Ayatollah in abCourt, issued death sentences Islamic Revolutionary sentia for the shah, his family, and former officials abroad. living at the daily, Kayhan, walked May 15: Journalists out to protest the government's encroachment on freedom of the press. The walkout was precipitated by a group of Khomeini, blocking the ennewspaper workers, supporting to the building on the grounds that trance of 20 reporters they were "counterrevolutionaries." IRANIAN

STUDIES

356

1979

May 17: The U.S. Senate demning the summary executions of law.

adopted a resolution conin Iran without due process

May 19: More than 100,000 people participated in a Tehran demonstration organized by the National Democratic Front. They were protesting the government's censorship of the press and the closing down of Ayandegan. May 20: The government declared that the U.S. Senate resolution was a violation of its internal and adaffairs vised the U.S. to delay sending the new ambassador, Walter Cutler, to Tehran. May 23: Mr. Bazargan reiterated his complaints regarding the Revolutionary Council's interference in government affairs, saying that Iran had become a nation of "hundreds of chiefs." May 24: Khomeini unleashed a verbal attack on the and secular critics liberal of the Islamic regime. He urged his followers to wage a struggle against those whose paths are 'separate from Islam." May 24-25: Thousands of demonstrators converged on the U.S. embassy in Tehran to protest the U.S. Senate resolution. Separate demonstrations were organized by the Islamic Revolutionary Party and the Fedayeen, who in turn clashed with each other. May 24: Hojjatolislam Hashemi Rafsanjani (an aide to Ayatollah Khomeini) was shot and wounded in Tehran. The Forghan Fighters claimed responsibility. May 26: Ayatollah Khomeini accused the U.S. and other super powers for recent assassinations and for attempting to kill the revolution. May 28: Mr. Bazargan criticized the multipolarity of the power centers, which was making the functioning his government impossible.

CHRONOLOGY

of

357

1979

Mr. Hasan Nazih, the director of the National Iranian Oil Company, was critical of Khomeini's declaration labeling those opposed to the religious leadership enemies of the revolution. May 30-31: Government troops clashed with ethnic Arabs seeking autonomy in Khorramshahr. Fighting erupted when Revolutionary Guards stormed 2 buildings housing the Arab Cultural and Political Organization. An estimated 100-200 people were reported killed in the fighting and more than 600 wounded. June 2: The National Democratic Front accused Khomeini of "dictatorship" and the abandonment of earlier pledges to keep himself and the clergy out of the government's daily activities. Taleqani also criticized the expanding role of the clergy in the government and urged them to "stay in the mosque where they can teach the people." June 4: The government refused to accept the appointment of Walter Cutler as the new U.S. ambassador. It requested that the U.S. withdraw his nomination. June 5: Ayatollah Khomeini warned lawyers, writers, Western-oriented intellectuals, and other secular critics who "oppose Islam" to take heed or be destroyed by the "same fist that destroyed the shah." tan, banks,

June 6: Admiral Madani, Governor General of Khuzisand Ayatollah Khaqani signed an 8-point peace plan. June 7: The government nationalized 37 private including 14 with appreciable foreign investments.

June 10: The shah left the Bahamas for Mexico, which had granted him a 6-month tourist visa. The nationalized foreign banks were assured of "full compensation" by the government. June 11: Ayatollah Khomeini accused the U.S.S.R. of interfering in the internal affairs of Iran and Afghanistan. IRANIAN STUDIES

358

1979

was offi-. June 18: The draft of a new constitution subject to approval by a popular referencially published, and other by the minorities dum. The draft was criticized it did not fulfill. groups whose expectations demanding a June 22: A rally at Tehran University assembly to draft a new conconstituent elected popularly The govwas broken up by Khomeini supporters. stitution for an appointed 75-member ernment's current plans called Council of Examiners to study the proposed constitution. June 25: companies.

The government

nationalized

all

insurance

July 1: The government announced its proposal for assembly to exthe formation of a 73-member constituent The body was to be elected amine the draft constitution. in a nationwide ballot. indusall of Iran's large-scale July 5: Virtually companies with large tries were nationalized, including for comThe nature and procedures foreign investments. were not disclosed. pensation ethnic

composed of July 7: The Black Wednesday guerrillas, near Abandan. Arabs, bombed 2 oil pipelines

July 8: Mr. Taqi Haj Tarkani, the founder of a center in Tehran and a strong supporter of theological by the Forghan Fighters. Khomeini, was assassinated July 9: A general amnesty was declared It applied to some 3,000 political Khomeini. held in various jails. July

10:

The shah left

by Ayatollah prisoners

the Bahamas for residence

in

Mexico. July 15: The government executed 5 alleged members and unof Black Wednesday in Khuzistan. Sporadic clashes rest continued in the province.

CHRONOLOGY

359

1979 Clashes also took place in Azerbaijan between the ethnic Turks and the Revolutionary Guards. Hojjatolislam Razi Shirazi, Chief of an Islamic Komiteh, was shot and wounded in Tehran. July 18: in Qom.

Mr. Bazargan met with Ayatollah

Khomeini

July 19: Bazargan announced an agreement with Khomeini which allowed for the sharing of power between the provisional government and the Revolutionary Council. The agreement was to promote a unity of decision by bridging the rift between the two power centers. Four members of the Revolutionary Council were to serve as ministers in Bazargan's government in exchange for the participation of some Cabinet members in the deliberations of the Revolutionary Council. July 23: Ayatollah Khomeini banned the playing of The directive was music on radio and television stations. widely ignored. A new press code was announced by the government, of foreign placing severe restrictions on the activities correspondents. Several correspondents were ordered to leave

the country.

July 26: Fighting broke out between the Kurds and government troops in Marivan when the government attempted to take over the police and paramilitary functions in the area. About 30,000 residents left the city for the surrounding mountains to protest the government's actions. August 3: Nationwide balloting was held to elect the 73 members of the Constituent Assembly that would draft a new constitution. The National Democratic Front, the Pan Iranist Party, the Muslim People's Republican Party and the Arab People's were Political Organization among some 20 groups boycotting the elections. Guards occuAugust 7: The Islamic Revolutionary of the newspaper Ayandegan, pied the offices arrested most of its staff, and confiscated the day's issues. IRANIAN STUDIES

360

1979

The newspaper was alleged by the government with foreign secret services.

to have links

August 8: A new press law went into effect requirto obtain a license from the governing all publications ment. Stiff penalties were provided for the publication of untrustworthy or defamatory reports about religious and other leaders. Officials of the shah's regime or those persons associated with him were forbidden to write articles for newspapers or magazines. clashed

August 9: Protesters against the new press with the law's supporters in Tehran.

law

of the election August 11: The official results for the Constituent Out of 73 seats, Assembly were announced. 60 were captured by the clergy and Muslim conservatives, among them 18 ayatollahs and 21 hojjatolislams. August 12: Islamic militants attacked a demonstration called by the National Democratic Front to protest the new press law and the close of Ayandegan. Hundreds of people were injured. August 14: Heavy fighting broke out between government troops and the Kurds for the control of Paveh, near the Iraq border. August 18: There were 400 persons reported killed and hundreds more injured when reinforced government troops assaulted Paveh in order to crush the Kurdish revolt. August 19: Khomeini ordered a general mobilization of the armed forces to put down the Kurdish rebellion. The Kurdish Democratic Party, blamed for the violence in Paveh, was banned by Khomeini. August 20: Khomeini ordered the closing of 22 newspapers and magazines, including those of the National Democratic Front and Fedayeen. The Tudeh and the National Democratic Front headquarters in Tehran were ransacked and a

CHRONOLOGY

361

1979

warrant was issued for the arrest antigovernment activities.

of Matin-Daftari

for

August 27: An informal truce was agreed upon between the government forces and the Kurdish rebels after a week of intense fighting in Kurdistan. The cease fire on the queswas to pave the way for further negotiations tion of Kurdish autonomy. August 28: Khomeini rejected the truce and ordered his troops to crush the Kurdish rebellion. Twenty Kurds, among them 9 government soldiers accused of aiding the rebels, were executed for their inThis brought the total number volvement in the rebellion. of Kurds executed since August 14 to 65. August 31: Mr. Bazargan tendered his resignation take over the and asked Ayatollah Khomeini to officially reins of government. Bazargan's government was criticized for lacking revolutionary zeal and for mishandling the Kurdish revolt. September 4: Mehabad, the center of the Kurdish fell to government forces as the 10,000 Kurdish rebellion, attack, were forced defenders, under heavy air and artillery to abandon the city. September 6: The town of Sardasht, the last stronghold of the Kurdish rebels, was captured by government troops. 2 large September 9: The government nationalized on the basis that daily newspapers, Kayhan and Ettela'at, they had been "the pillars of the former regime." September 10:

Ayatollah Taleqani died of natural

causes. September 12: The Constituent Assembly approved a granting supreme power to clause in the new constitution leader). the Faqih (principal religious

IRANIAN STUDIES

362

1979

September 24: Fighting resumed between the Kurdish and Arab minorities on the one hand and the government forces on the other. September 28: Hasan Nazih, Chairman of the National Iranian Oil Company and an outspoken critic of the clergy, was dismissed by Mr. Bazargan in a Cabinet reshuffle. The Justice Ministry had earlier in the week filed charges against Mr. Nazih, accusing him of attacks against Islam. October 2: Bruce Laingen, the U.S. charge d'affaires in Tehran, was appointed the new ambassador to Iran. His appointment awaited confirmation. charges

October 4: Eight persons were executed of sabotage and armed rebellion.

October 5: The U.S. spare parts to Iran.

resumed shipment

in Abadan on

of military

October 7: A 72-man troop convoy was virtually wiped out by Kurdish rebels near Sardasht. Only 5 were reported to have survived. posts

October 10: The Kurds captured several previously held by the government.

frontier

October 12: Kurds surrounded the governor's office in Mahabad and took a government representative hostage. October 14: The hostage was released by the Kurds as part of an ongoing peace negotiation between the two sides. October

18:

Khomeini ordered

a general

ban on exe-

cutions.

fighting

October 20: The Kurds retook with government troops.

October 22: The shah flew gall-bladder operation. CHRONOLOGY

Mahabad after

to New York City

heavy

for a

363

1979 November 1: Mr. Bazargan and Dr. Yazdi met with Dr. Brzezinski, the U.S. national security adviser, to discuss U.S. -Iran relations. They were all in Algiers attending the 25th anniversary of the Algerian Revolution. November 4: Mr. Bazargan was widely criticized by the clergy and the Islamic leadership for the Algiers meeting with Dr. Brzezinski. The U.S. embassy was attacked and seized by Iranian students, and 66 Americans were taken hostage, including the charge d'affaires and 2 others who were held in the Iranian foreign ministry. The captors demanded the return of the shah by the U.S. to Iran in exchange for the release of the hostages. November 5: The British embassy was attacked and occupied for 5 hours. Khomeini condoned the takeover of the U.S. embassy. The government announced the cancellation of all military treaties with the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The Carter administration rejected the captors demands for the return of the shah to Iran in exchange for the hostages. November 6: Proclaiming that "it has become impossible for me and my colleagues to perform our duty," Mr. Bazargan and his cabinet resigned. The Revolutionary Council was ordered by Khomeini to take charge of the government. called

November 9: The U.N. Security Council unanimously for the release of the American hostages.

November 11: Khomeini denounced the U.S. for its support of the shah and rejected all mediation efforts by the pope and others for the release of the hostages. oil

November 12: President imports from Iran.

November 14: in the U.S. IRANIAN STUDIES

President

Carter suspended American Carter froze Iranian assets 364

1979

November 18: Ayatollah Khomeini accused the hostages. of espionage and threatened to try them as spies. 5 women and 8 Thirteen hostages, November 19-20: black men, were released for because of "Islam's respect women and the oppressed.1" November 26: Ayatollah Shari'atmadari denounced the of the U.S. embassy and the taking of the hostages. Khomeini urged the Revolutionary Guards to recruit 20 million men and women in the event of an American invasion. seizure

November 27: The U.N. Security Council debate on the hostages was postponed at the request of Abol-Hasan Banisadr, the new Iranian foreign minister, so that he could attend the proceedings. November 28: Khomeini denounced the U.N. meeting and relieved Mr. Banisadr of his post because of his willingness to attend. Mr. Sadeq Ghotbzadeh was appointed foreign minister.

allow

November 29: Mexico announced its the shah to return to the country.

December 2: The shah was discharged hospital and flown to a military hospital Force Base in Texas.

decision

not to

from a New York at Lackland Air

December 2-3: The new Islamic constitution was overwhelmingly approved by a nationwide plebiscite. The referendum was widely boycotted in Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, and Baluchistan, where the ethnic minorities found various provisions of the proposed charter unacceptable. Ayatollah Shari'atmadari was particularly critical of Articles 5, 107, and 110 of the Constitution and the sweeping powers given to the Faqih. December 5: The home of Ayatollah Shari'atmadari in Qom was attacked b) Khomeini supporters because of his criticism of the constitution.

CHRONOLOGY

365

1979 December 6: Angered by the attack on Ayatollah Shari'atmadari's home, demonstrators in Tabriz took over the radio and television stations and occupied government buildings, virtually wrenching control from the central authorities. A broadcast from the occupied radio station proclaimed Shari'atmadari to be the leader of all the world's Shi'ite Muslims. December 9: Khomeini and Shari'atmadari supporters battled each other for the possession of the radio and television stations. December 10: A government delegation headed by Banisadr arrived in Tabriz to negotiate an end to the worsening situation in Azerbaijan. A similar mission was dispatched to Kurdistan to calm the Kurds. The U.S. appealed to the International Court of Justice for a ruling on the release of the hostages. December 10-11: In a rebuff to Khomeini, Shari'atmadari refused to order the Muslim People's Republican He also disclosed that Party in Azerbaijan to disband. he had not voted in the constitutional referendum because of his opposition to various provisions in the charter. December 13: A huge crowd of more than 700,000 turned out in Tabriz in support of Shari'atmadari. They demanded the release of denounced the new constitution, held by the government, and removal Azerbaijani dissidents of the non-Azerbaijani militia from the province. December 15: The shah left the U.S. for Panama. In a unanimous ruling, the International Court of Justice called for the release of the Americans held hostage. MofatDecember 18: Gunmenshot and killed Mohammad teh, dean of the Divinity College of Tehran, and his two bodyguards. The Forghan Fighters claimed credit for the murders.

IRANIAN STUDIES

366

1979

December 20-22: Fighting was reported in Sistan and and Sunni Baluchi Baluchistan between the Shi'ite Sistani and ethnic rivalries tribes. The traditional religious between the two groups were exacerbated by the constitutional referendum, which was boycotted by the Baluchis. December 25: U.S. clergymen and conducted Christmas ceremonies

visited the hostages for them.

December 27: Nine Revolutionary Guards were taken hostage in Tabriz by Ayatollah Shari'atmadari supporters as the unrest in the province continued. December 30: Kurt Waldheim, left tage situation.

The secretary general for Iran in connection

of the U.N., with the hos-

1980

January 2: The 9 Revolutionary in Tabriz were released.

Guards taken hostage

January 3: Secretary General Waldheim met with the Revolutionary Council but was denied a meeting with Ayatollah Khomeini. clashed

January 4: Khomeini and Shari'atmadari in Tabriz.

January 7-9: Fighting between Guards and Shari'atmadari's supporters January his followers Azerbaij an.

the Revolutionary continued in Tabriz.

8: Ayatollah Shari'atmadari appealed for calm and to refrain from violence

January 10: Fighting the government imposition of province. announced Authorities Mr. Akbar Goudarzi and 15 of out. CHRONOLOGY

followers

in Azerbaijan subsided a dusk-to-dawn curfew

to in after in the

the arrest of the Forghan leader, his followers in a Tehran hide-

367

1980

January 12: Eleven Azerbaijanis were executed in Tabriz. They were first arrested by the Revolutionary Guards in a raid of the Muslim People's Republican Party building. The execution touched off the renewal of violence in the area. January 13: The U.N. Security Council resolution to impose economic sanctions on Iran was vetoed by the Soviet Union. January 19: Twenty-five Air Force officers were arrested in Tabriz and accused of supplying arms to the outlawed Muslim People's Republican Party and for plotting to overthrow the regime. January 25: Mr. Abol-Hasan Banisadr was elected the first president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, capturing more than 75 percent of the popular votes cast.

IRANIAN STUDIES

368

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