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NINETEENTH-CENTURYNARRATIVES OF CONTAGION Allan Conrad Christensen
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Nineteenth-Century Narratives of Contagion ‘Our feverish contact’
Allan Conrad Christensen
ISBN 978-0-415-36048-7
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Routledge studies in nineteenth-century literature www.routledge.com ï an informa business
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Nineteenth-Century Narratives of Contagion ‘Our feverish contact’
Always a scourge of the human condition, epidemics of contagious disease, including venereal infections, were a devastating phenomenon that fascinated the imagination of the nineteenth century. While scientists like Pasteur were beginning to understand how microbes operated and the British parliament was enacting the Contagious Diseases Acts, epidemics spread into works of fiction. Besides driving plot lines, they provided an all-pervasive metaphor for the social transmission of ideological and ethical notions and the imposition of various forms of power. The present study examines how the contagion of the historical moment infiltrates human relationships in such activities as military struggles, clothes-making and dressing, medical practice, love affairs, financial transactions and the use of language. The many nineteenth-century texts treated, by both neglected and major writers, include Manzoni’s I promessi sposi, Dickens’s Bleak House, Gaskell’s Ruth and Zola’s Le Docteur Pascal. Drawing on recent literary theorists, Christensen suggests the permeability of the boundaries between these texts, which merge into a single narrative or grand récit of history at work. Of interest to students of cultural history, this book explores new ground in the intersections of medicine and literature. Allan Conrad Christensen is Professor of English at John Cabot University in Rome. He is the author of Edward Bulwyer-Lytton: The Fiction of New Regions (1976) and A European Version of Victorian Fiction: The Novels of Giovanni Ruffini (1996).
Routledge studies in nineteenth-century literature
1. Nineteenth-Century Narratives of Contagion ‘Our feverish contact’ Allan Conrad Christensen
Nineteenth-Century Narratives of Contagion ‘Our feverish contact’
Allan Conrad Christensen
First published 2005 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2005 Allan Conrad Christensen Typeset in Baskerville by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-415-36048-X
To the memory of Terrance W. Schwab (1940–2004) Since our first encounter in a freshman philosophy course and our years as classmates in Lowell House at Harvard, Terry has remained an admired, inspiring and loyal friend. While living on different continents, we have continued to share, as in the crises and the satisfactions of our youth in Cambridge and New York, the defining intellectual and passionate experiences of life. With regret for the speed with which a lifetime passes, I shall always thank Terry for his enrichment of my existence.
Contents
Acknowledgements Note on citations
viii x
1
History as contagion
1
2
Providence amidst pestilence and fire
37
3
Swordsmen and needlewomen
72
4
Physicians, nurses and patients
113
5
Mothers, daughters and lovers
156
6
Writers and readers
201
7
Speakers, singers and listeners
245
Conclusion: money handlers and bookkeepers
277
Notes Bibliography Index
293 331 343
Acknowledgements
In the ‘Darwinian plot’ to which the second chapter of my book refers, a sense of narrative pattern and coherence is generally perceived or constructed in retrospect. The paradigm raises the temptation to find, in looking back at my professional career, that this work, on which I have been specifically engaged for eight years, has really been in implicit gestation from the beginning. With greater certainty, however, I recognize with gratitude the long-present influence in my career of two particular colleagues in the field of Victorian studies. These intellectual mentors, encouraging advisors and faithful friends are G.B. Tennyson, both during my years in California and thereafter, and Francesco Marroni more recently in Italy. To Edwin M. Eigner, too, I am grateful for his early appreciation, as a fellow Bulwer scholar, of my initial scholarly projects and for his later directing my attention towards the neglected novelist Giovanni Ruffini. Many of the notions developed in this book have been first expounded and usefully nurtured in the context of academic conferences, especially the wonderfully stimulating occasions organized by Peter Vassallo and the Institute of Anglo-Italian Studies at the University of Malta. While devoted more to poetry than to fiction, the conferences arranged by Lilla Maria Crisafulli and the Centro di Studi Romantici at the University of Bologna have provided an additional source of inspiration. Over the years Stuart A. Curran, another close friend in the field of Romantic poetry, has certainly challenged and sharpened my critical thinking as well. For their attentive reading of portions of the manuscript of this book, I am indebted to my cousin William A. Johnsen, an eminent disciple of René Girard, and to Edgar Rosenberg. In a course taught by Rosenberg, nineteenth-century fiction came to fascinate me as an undergraduate, and then after an interval of nearly forty years we met again at a memorable conference on Bulwer Lytton in 2000 at the University of London. Robert Kiely, another of my undergraduate instructors with whom I have recently re-established friendly contact, has become one more trusted advisor.
Acknowledgements
ix
My sincere thanks to Christopher Neenan, the hardworking and academically committed chairman of my department with whom I have collaborated so harmoniously for more than twenty years, to David Miller and to my other supportive colleagues at John Cabot University. Finally, it is a pleasure to acknowledge the generous support of the university with research funds and sabbatical leaves.
Note on citations
References to works of fiction are generally given parenthetically in the text and are to numbers of chapters or to numbers of book (or part or volume) and chapter within the particular works. I have preferred to refer to chapters rather than to pages because readers will probably be using a variety of editions of these books. To make evident that the references are not to page numbers, Roman numerals are used.
1
History as contagion
The system of repression that derived from the Congress of Vienna failed to establish an authentic European stability. The restoration of order often seemed more like disorder and naturally it prompted many insurrections. In England the forty years between Waterloo and the outbreak of the Crimean War similarly offered to many observers the sorry spectacle of a peace that was phoney and sickly. At the end of Tennyson’s Maud, the speaker describes ‘a peace that was full of wrongs and shames,/Horrible, hateful, monstrous’, and one of the main characters in Charles Kingsley’s Two Years Ago asks, ‘“what if all the Anglo-Saxon world has been befooled, by forty years of peace”’: ‘“the history of the world has been as yet written in blood. . . . What right have we to suppose that it will be aught else . . . as long as anger and ambition, cupidity and wounded pride, canker the hearts of men?”’ (XXIII). In its written texts the whole nineteenth century seems indeed to represent itself as perpetually embattled despite a contrasting effort to propose myths of peaceful progress, stability and ideological consensus sustained by a bourgeois hegemony. The fierce divisions and antagonisms of the ongoing debates have commonly been referred to such polarities as faith and doubt, religion and science, freedom and necessity, teleology and chance. Related to these is also the polarity of health and disease, in which, as in the pattern just noticed with respect to peace and war, the second term proves not to be entirely negative. As an instance of Bakhtin’s ‘symbolic reversal’, the apparently ‘negative term . . . is invested with positive cultural value’.1 Physical disease and bloodshed may become beneficial when they help to cure the false health that masks the cultural disease ‘canker[ing] the hearts of men’. That cankering cultural disease, to be sure, may remain a negative term that it would be difficult to invest with positive value. Matthew Arnold unambiguously laments the prevalence of the mal de siècle and urges the scholar-gipsy of the healthy seventeenth century to remain distant from ‘this strange disease of modern life’: But fly our paths, our feverish contact fly! For strong the infection of our mental strife, Which, though it gives no bliss, yet spoils for rest.
2
‘Our feverish contact’
Besides the scholar-gipsy, the Goethe that has suffered from the cultural disease in his youth and has then recovered becomes for Arnold a paradigm of health. As ‘Physician of the iron age’ in ‘Memorial Verses’, he also proffers an escapist remedy to others: ‘Art still has truth, take refuge there!’ The refuge may appeal, however, only to a certain élite, like the poet Elsley Vavasour in Two Years Ago, for whom the Sage of Weimar has become a cult figure: ‘Elsley had a dread more nervous than really coward of infectious diseases: and he had also (and prided himself, too, on having) all Goethe’s dislike of anything terrible or horrible, of sickness, disease, wounds, death, anything which jarred with that “beautiful” which was his idol’ (X). Here then it is not only cultural disease but disease of all kinds that remains an irremediably negative phenomenon. As well as with the ‘beautiful’ Kingsley himself associates the ideal of health with moral virtue and physical strength. Instead of taking aesthetic refuge from ‘infectious diseases’, one should, he believes, fight physically and relentlessly to destroy their capacity for mischief. So the physicianprotagonist of Two Years Ago, Tom Thurnall, differs from Arnold’s notion of the Goethean physician in that he confronts the iron age, as it were, with its own iron weapons. In angrily but also gleefully denouncing the sanitary criminals that have permitted the cholera to spread, he brandishes his own weapons in his own version of a military confrontation: ‘ “I have got – and what greater pleasure? – a good stand-up fight with an old enemy” ’ (XVII). The old enemy, dirt and disease, is further identified as ‘ “my devil” ’ – ‘ “and I can’t help it, for the life of me, going right at his throat, wheresoever I meet him” ’ (XIV). The health for which Kingsley and his protagonists do battle involves a unity of body and mind that they associate with an even earlier period of history than that of the scholar-gipsy. In a lecture entitled ‘The Science of Health’, Kingsley directs attention to ‘the statues of the old Greeks; to their tender grandeur, their chaste healthfulness, their unconscious, because perfect, might; . . . these are tokens to you, and to all generations yet unborn, of what man could be once; of what he can be again’.2 Similarly, Allen Fenwick, the physician and narrator of Bulwer’s A Strange Story, refers the condition of ‘perfect health’ to ‘the golden age of the poets, – the youth of the careless Arcadian, before nymph or shepherdess had vexed his heart with a sigh’. Such ‘health, to the utmost perfection, . . . cannot be enjoyed by those who overwork the brain, or admit the sure wear and tear of the passions’ and so has largely ceased to exist in modern civilization (XXIII). The normal condition of mature men and women, as G.H. Lewes observes at about the same time, is to be more or less ailing: ‘few of us, after thirty, can boast of robust health’.3 Classical images of wholeness and health exert of course an enormous appeal for nineteenth-century civilization, but many Victorians also recognize a possibly perverse beauty or ‘cultural value’ in the enemy of such health. Walter Pater, whose enthusiasm for the Greek ideal is surely unsur-
History as contagion
3
passed by that of any of his contemporaries, thus appreciates the diseased faces of Leonardo too. ‘What may be called the fascination of corruption’, he notes of the Medusa, ‘penetrates in every touch its exquisitely finished beauty’. And against the ‘Greek goddesses and beautiful women of antiquity’, he defiantly sets ‘this beauty [of La Gioconda], into which the soul with all its maladies has passed’.4 The decadent strain, if one wishes so to denominate it, runs throughout the century. It may be related to the ‘Worship of Sorrow’ which Carlyle, Pater and others celebrate and to the many passages in literature of the period in which suffering is discovered to have a positive value. As a legacy of Romanticism, sickness becomes in Susan Sontag’s observation ‘a way of making people “interesting” ’.5 One of the most prominent of nineteenth-century invalids, Harriet Martineau, seems in her popular Life in the Sick-Room further to identify sickness rather than health with goodness. As with Pater, then, the apparently negative term is invested with positive value: The sick-room becomes the scene of intense conviction; and among these, none, it seems to me, is more distinct and powerful than that of the permanent nature of good, and the transient nature of evil. At times I could almost believe that long sickness or other trouble is ordained to prove to us this very point – a point worth any costliness of proof.6 In revealing the permanence of good and the transience of evil, the experience of illness can offer, according to Bulwer’s essay ‘On Ill Health and Its Consolations’, a Platonic awareness: just as ‘Plato retired to his cave to be wise[,] sickness is often the moral cave, with its quiet, its darkness, and its solitude, to the soul’. Human beings should even consider their earthly condition to be more fundamentally that of the patient than that of the healthy subject: in illness ‘we learn to think, with one of the most august of our moralists, that “earth is an hospital, not an inn – a place to die, not to live in.” Our existence becomes a great preparation for death’.7 Because sickness functions in the framework of natural or providential teleology, the Victorians may not, on the whole, have agreed with Kingsley’s Tom Thurnall who so implacably vilifies disease as the devil himself. Indeed not only physical but also mental disease, as Bruce Haley has further argued in analysing contemporary notions of health, occur as ‘natural phases of a general life-pattern’.8 The sickness of the Zeitgeist too, which Arnold and others diagnose so gloomily, constitutes only a natural phase in a larger historical pattern. Although that pattern remains unclear and the efforts to define health and disease lead to no conclusions, the opposing terms continue in their symbiosis to require one another. As in the memorable line from T.S. Eliot’s ‘Little Gidding’, they are ‘united in the strife which divided them’.
4
‘Our feverish contact’
Especially through the mechanism of contagion, with which the present study is concerned, diseases were seen as participating with almost military aggressiveness in the ‘strife’. By the same token the non-medical versions of cultural conflict were seen as participating with contagious aggressiveness in their battles. The contagious phenomenon fascinated the imagination of the century to the point that one can discern, according to Athena Vrettos, ‘the ubiquity of contagion as a master narrative in Victorian culture’.9 The obvious material explanation of the fascination with contagion is the dramatic virulence of the series of epidemics during the middle third of the nineteenth century. In England these began in 1831–32 when cholera, as a seemingly new and especially inexplicable disease, struck with terrifying unpredictability and claimed some 52,000 lives. Between 1836 and 1842 there occurred major epidemics of influenza, typhus, smallpox, measles, whooping cough and scarlet fever, and between 1846 and 1849 further epidemics of typhus, typhoid and cholera. And the epidemic outbreaks continued while tuberculosis and venereal disease remained a constant cause of mortality as well. On the basis of Edwin Chadwick’s influential Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Great Britain (1842), one deduces that in a particularly bad year (1839) eight deaths occurred from contagious diseases for every one death from other causes.10 The concern to understand the mechanisms of contagion prompted a widely engrossing debate between the proponents of germs and the infectionists or ‘miasmists’. The traditional, widely-accepted contagionist paradigm lost ground after 1832 to what R.J. Morris calls ‘miasmic thinking’, which attained the ‘high noon’ of its ascendancy in the summer of 1849. It then began to give way to the eventually victorious theories involving germs or bacilli. The debate was not conducted, however, on serenely rational, scientific grounds. The participants, as Morris indicates, could not agree on the nature of the problem and on what might constitute relevant evidence. Social pressures from outside the medical community, related to religious and political beliefs, economic issues, and the social class and gender of the participants, deeply influenced the arguments. The debate thus offers an interesting example of ‘the importance of moral and metaphysical assumptions in response to disease’.11 It also demonstrates the vulnerability of science, in its study of literal contagion, to a metaphorical contagion emanating from other discourses. The phenomenon of metaphorical or moral contagion operated similarly in the bitter public controversy that accompanied the campaigns to enact the Contagious Diseases Acts in the 1860s and later to repeal them. Sexist prejudice, that is, contaminated the arguments urged in support of the acts that provided for the compulsory examination and detention of women presumed to be prostitutes. While less than robust health may have been the normal human condition, this was particularly the case with
History as contagion
5
women. Doctors of the period, according to Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre English, believed that ‘woman’s normal state was to be sick’: ‘this sickness is innate, and stems from the very possession of the uterus and ovaries’.12 The sickness assumed especially virulent, contagious forms in the case of prostitutes, a ‘vicious and profligate sisterhood’. The atmosphere in which the Contagious Diseases Acts were debated naturally informs many literary works of the 1860s and 1870s. Tennyson’s Idylls of the King (edition of 1862), which uses imagery of spreading contagion in connection with the disintegration of Arthurian culture, identifies the unchaste Guinevere as the primary source of the infection. In the words of Arthur’s denunciation, ‘Her station, taken everywhere for pure, She like a new disease, unknown to men, Creeps, no precaution used, among the crowd, Makes wicked lightnings of her eyes, and saps The fealty of our friends, and stirs the pulse With devil’s leaps, and poisons half the young.’ (‘Guinevere’, ll. 514–19) Guinevere has taken refuge at this point, however, not amidst a ‘profligate and vicious sisterhood’ but with the holy sisters of Almesbury, where she hopes in nursing the diseases of others to redeem herself – to ‘ “treat their loathsome hurts and heal mine own” ’ (l. 680). Another notable example of the masculine ascription of blame to the woman for the moral contagion of the domestic environment is found in Ibsen’s A Doll’s House (1879). Although Torvald Helmer does not in this case accuse his wife of adultery, he is convinced that it is primarily a wife’s deviance that pollutes a household: ‘A fog of lies like that in a household, and it spreads disease and infection to every part of it. Every breath the children take in that kind of house is reeking with evil germs. . . . Practically all juvenile delinquents come from homes where the mother is dishonest’ (Act I).13 In the realm of fiction, Donald Hall believes, the atmosphere of the Contagious Diseases Acts contaminates Great Expectations (1860–61). The novel seems to associate Miss Havisham and Estella with prostitution and to hint at a venereal infection that emanates from them. Hall also finds here that if the current debate about contagion has contaminated the novel, the novel has in its turn affected or influenced the external ‘social reality’. Dickens’s work not only represented but helped to produce ‘the shifting of blame from women to men that led to repeal of the CDAs’.14 An even more crucial novel with respect to the CDAs is one that figures importantly in this study, Elizabeth Gaskell’s Ruth (1853), for it struck Josephine Butler with the force of a revelation. She would go on to become the leader of the Ladies’ National Association (LNA) that united working-class and middle-class members in campaigns against the acts and
6
‘Our feverish contact’
eventually secured their repeal. The controversy, Judith R. Walkowitz suggests, provides an instructive example of how a ‘technology of power’ (as here embodied in the acts) provokes ‘a formidable social and political resistance’ (in Butler’s campaigns).15 The acts themselves, in our own application of the metaphor of contagion, represent the contagious menace against which Butler’s LNA manifests the immune response. As in the case of Great Expectations, the situation also shows, according to Hilary M. Schor, a complex specularity between a fictional text, Ruth, and the historical reality: ‘at the least we can say that the history a text writes is as complicated as the text “history” wrote’.16 Hall’s and Schor’s perceptions of the porosity of the boundary between fiction and history and Morris’s similar observation about the vulnerability of the scientific discourse to other influences characterize recent habits of analysis. But the vision of contagion at work in all areas first emerges as a large-scale, generalized phenomenon in the nineteenth century and comes to constitute one of the salient features of the Zeitgeist. Whereas speculation about all-pervasive energies has in earlier ages been limited to erudite scholarship, the vision of contagion seems at this moment to have begun to fascinate everyone. The attention devoted to contagion is an aspect, Steven Connor believes, of the absorbing interest that characterizes the 1840s and 1850s in all the ‘dynamic processes which relate individual bodies to one another’. In analyses of the movements of wealth and in the new science of thermodynamics too, the age discerns instability, a constant activity of exchange, interchange and transformation, as the normal condition of things. Not just when epidemics and riots break out, individual organisms and social aggregations like the city are ‘always already in metabolic process’.17 The media in which these processes of interchange occur provide models for the moral medium that the age is seeking to imagine. Having begun to doubt the spiritual dimension in which divine grace operates, the age needs to envision a more material mechanism whereby palpable influences, for good or ill, can be communicated among individuals. ‘The process of cultural self-definition’, as Robert Douglas-Fairhurst has recently shown, involves a persistent endeavour to define a unified field, ‘a shared discourse of influence’ in which all the cultural energies interact. Samuel Smiles describes the field as ‘a system of mutual dependencies’, and the mutual dependencies among individuals is mirrored in the ‘commingling of [the] vocabularies’ of the various disciplines. The term ‘milieu’ is borrowed from the biological discourse and applied, most famously by Hippolyte Taine, in the fields of sociology and fiction. The term ‘atmosphere’ comes for the first time to refer to the prevailing intellectual climate. The literal air becomes a metaphor for the shared air of the moral environment, and metaphors of breath proliferate – a point that will occupy us more fully near the end of this chapter. Although Douglas-Fairhurst concludes that impressions of the common cultural
History as contagion
7
medium ‘repeatedly failed to come into clear focus’, the novels of the period do indicate the emergence of its unifying omnipresence.18 The concern of the Victorians to devise the terms for a ‘discourse of influence’ leads them to find in ‘contagion’ one of the most appropriate of those terms. For the purposes of the present study, it may also be more appropriate to refer to a ‘discourse of contagion’ rather than to a ‘discourse of influence’. The inescapably material phenomena of the epidemics of the period has offered precisely the master metaphor that is desired. The fascination with contagion may thus have been caused not just by the actual epidemics but by the longing of the Zeitgeist to discover, for many other reasons, precisely such an agency. One of the other reasons relates to the transition that Michel Foucault in particular has traced from an old to a new way of exercising political and social power. From a regime based on the menace of physical compulsion, there was emerging a more subtly disciplinary social order. The old order, often associated in our novels with swordsmen and military action, is being replaced by more covert forms of repression that are sometimes referred to female arbiters of opinion. For this new social order, the mechanism of contagion, with its subtle and mysterious way of imposing power over those it infects, becomes an effective metaphor. The image of contagion also relates to the mechanisms that regulate human relationships often thought to be non-conflictual like those between lovers or between writers and readers. Everywhere in this field of contagion, the normal state may be that of poise between disease and health as contagious and counter-contagious impulses maintain the perpetual tension of the power relationships. As literal episodes of contagion are metaphorically compared to military aggression and the other power struggles within society are compared to contagion in action, the distinction between literal and metaphorical is blurred. Jean Baudrillard has described this blurring, whereby ‘la possibilité de la metaphore s’évanouit dans tous les domaines’, as itself a process of contagion, ‘un processus de confusion et de contagion . . . viral d’indistinction’: aucun discours ne saurait plus être la métaphore de l’autre, puisque, pour qu’il y ait métaphore, il faut qu’il y ait des champs différentiels et des objets distincts. Or la contamination de toutes les disciplines met fin à cette possibilité. Métonymie totale, virale par définition (ou par indéfinition). Le thème viral n’est pas une transposition du champ biologique, car tout est touché en même temps et au même titre par la virulence, par la réaction en chaîne, la propagation aléatoire et insensée, la métastase.19 The vision of a world in which a contagious principle threatens to reduce all differences and distinctions to a generalized incoherence is sometimes thought to be especially characteristic of Gothic fiction. Along
8
‘Our feverish contact’
with the distinction between literal and metaphorical and between real and fictitious, such narratives collapse, Jerrold E. Hogle believes, all the other binary oppositions of our culture. It expresses with reference to gender differentiation the ‘threat of and longing for the deeply maternal abyss of non-identity’, and the menace goes beyond this: The deep Feminine level, as the Gothic mode has developed, is but one major form of a primordial dissolution that can obscure the boundaries between all western oppositions, not just masculinefeminine. . . . [The] spectral characters, images, and settings harbour the hidden reality that oppositions of all kinds cannot maintain their separations, that each ‘lesser term’ is contained in its counterpart.20 In the present study, however, only one of the principal novels under consideration may be related, and only in part, to Gothic fiction – Bulwer Lytton’s A Strange Story. Although my discussion does sometimes refer to Gothic romances and science fictions, I have preferred to concentrate upon works that do not collapse all the distinctions to the extent described by Baudrillard and Hogle. Rather than locating themselves in the Gothic atmosphere of timeless, psychological drives – ‘the hidden reality’ – these works attempt to convey an impression of historical reality. What may nevertheless be interesting is the sense in which works related to the tradition of nineteenth-century realism do also hint at ‘the hidden reality’. Since there may be no historical reality in the form of a Kantian Ding an sich, we understand that novels like ours are offering metaphorical accounts of a reality that remains problematic. Yet there may still seem to be some veritable reality, as implied by the undeniable fact of the death that strikes the victims of contagious disease. Seven of the eight principal novels under investigation here have been selected in part because they contain episodes of actual pestilential outbreaks. These permit us to distinguish between the ‘literal’ operation of contagion and the ‘metaphorical’ instances of contagion in other episodes. In the case of the eighth work, the transmission of disease occurs in a somewhat different but analogously literal manner that demonstrates a subtle violence. Contagion may exist therefore in some dimension of literal reality apart from the phenomena constructed by the novelists for which it provides such an appropriate metaphor. Still it proves difficult to maintain the distinction. Of those eight works, to identify them at this point, the majority are English novels, including both canonical works and others that merit rediscovery. Published in the decade 1852–62, they belong to what Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth considers, as we shall see, a moment of critical transition in English fiction. The novels are Dickens’s Bleak House (1852–53), Gaskell’s Ruth (1853), Kingsley’s Two Years Ago (1857), Ruffini’s Lavinia (1860) and Bulwer’s A Strange Story (1861–62).
History as contagion
9
To this group I have added Manzoni’s I promessi sposi (1827, revised 1841–42) and Ainsworth’s Old Saint Paul’s (1841), both of which deal with outbreaks of the plague in the seventeenth century (the supposedly healthy century of the scholar-gipsy). While probably the Urtext for subsequent nineteenth-century narratives of contagion, I promessi sposi has also been recently ‘historicized’ as more relevant to the age of its composition than to the vicissitudes of an earlier century.21 Indeed Goethe himself, among the earliest and the most enthusiastic admirers of the novel, believed that it had little finally to do with the seventeenth century.22 His point can characterize Old Saint Paul’s as well, which introduces a Manzonian myth of plague into English literature, although its Restoration local colour obtrudes more disturbingly than do the corresponding elements in Manzoni. To balance, as it were, Manzoni’s early nineteenth-century novel and to give a still greater European resonance to this study, my eighth novel is a French work from the end of the century. Narrating events of the years 1872–74, Zola’s Le Docteur Pascal (1893) seems initially a case apart. Although Pascal has worked energetically as a physician during outbreaks of cholera, no epidemics occur in the diegetic present of the story. The great passion of his life, which occupies much of the plot, nevertheless concerns a phenomenon that we may treat as analogous to contagion. This is the pathology of morbid transmission in the case of the hereditary diseases that so abound in his own family. The clinical history of the Rougon-Macquart family, as traced in the earlier novels of the series too, is offered by both Zola and Pascal as a metaphorical microcosm of French social history. In the present context Zola offers, however, a microcosm not only of French but of European (at least western European) history. His story is also an important portion of the single microcosm of the nineteenthcentury European Zeitgeist that our eight novels may appear, when examined together, to reconstruct. While many other novels could probably have been chosen for a similar study, these eight novels prove, I believe, especially appropriate for the definition of a common field of contagion. On that field, which can be called history as well, compelling influences travel and spread from individual to individual, imposing themselves or meeting with resistance. Individuals are thus overpowered or overpower others in a process that suggests the disciplinary forces that succeed or fail in the maintenance of the social hierarchies. And as the powerful influences, for which contagion is such an effective metaphor, spread among individuals, they may seem to spread among the eight novels as well. The novels themselves become highly permeable and vulnerable to one another in this vision of their intertextuality. As the themes, the characters and the episodes in the various works interpenetrate and overlap, they are discovered to be versions and parts of a single master text. That hypothetical master text – the term, admittedly, may be too grand
10
‘Our feverish contact’
– is not organized in terms of a plot with a beginning, middle and end. Rather than the element of plot in an Aristotelian sense, I wish to focus upon typical situations that reveal the tensions and instabilities of the continuous and never definitively resolved power struggles. To create an impression of the single larger text, my argument also emphasizes the permeability of the individual novels by moving continually back and forth amongst them. The approach, which seeks to construct the larger historical vision of the local struggles, would seem to a New Critic to violate the integrity of the particular texts. There is the possibly arbitrary imposition, another exercise of power, of my view upon the texts. But the danger of imposing a single critical viewpoint inheres in all criticism, including even the New Criticism; indeed, all written representations of reality may violate the suppositional truth of the reality itself. The danger cannot, in any case, be avoided if the reality itself, the Ding an sich, remains elusive and can only be represented or reconstructed in written texts. The present study is thus another reconstruction of history, hopefully carrying reasonable conviction, at an additional synthetic remove from the representations proposed in the eight individual narratives. The significance of the term ‘history’ that my own text proposes is obviously different from that of standard history books. It refers less to particular historical facts and political events (which are only understood to be occurring in the background) than to the climate of the cultural environment. Basing my argument upon the eight novels and a number of other relevant texts, I wish to synthesize their representations of how it felt to be living in a certain nineteenth-century environment. The environment includes philosophical factors such as the prevailing notions about teleology, whether a divine providence operates in the affairs of men and whether events can be understood as the effects of definable causes. It also relates, as I have suggested, to relationships of power, perceived as appropriate or not, between the sexes and the generations and among the social classes and the representatives of various professions and ideological positions. And it refers to weapons, like those of sword, pen and money, that can be employed in the power struggles – or, in the governing metaphor, in the spreading contagion. This contagion is the mysterious energy that inheres in all the material facts and manifestations of an historical period, a hint at least of the invisible cause behind all the visible effects. While the particular manifestations of the contagious phenomena are peculiar to the nineteenth century, it is interesting to speculate that analogous phenomena may long have seemed endemic in the processes of history. The Iliad offers possibly the earliest example. In the endless chain of causes and effects, it would be difficult for Homer to postulate even in the theft of the apple of discord an original or First Cause for the Trojan War. So the poem begins – but not, I believe, arbitrarily – with an outbreak of pestilence. The divinely inflicted pestilence suggests an appropriate metaphorical climate in which preparations for war can develop.
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Angry because of an affront to one of his priests, Apollo shoots contaminated arrows for nine days into the encampment of the Achaians, and the pestilence rages from tent to tent. The god, as in many stories of pestilence, must be placated, but the placating sacrifice arouses further anger and desire for retaliation on behalf of the sacrificial victim. An unstoppable chain reaction of resentment spreads as a metaphorical continuation of the initial pestilence. And that chain reaction continues, we might say, not only into the devastating events of the Trojan War but, through its aftermath, into the rest of history. The association between disease and military strife informs all subsequent narratives of epidemics and all narratives of warfare – as, for example, during what Barbara W. Tuchman has called ‘the calamitous fourteenth century’.23 Amidst the calamities it is often unclear whether the plagues are being represented as the cause or the effect of the wars, and whether they are the primary or the secondary term of a metaphor. One other pre-nineteenth-century example may suffice. In an ‘extensive view’ that elaborates his own master text of history, Samuel Johnson has seen history as motivated by vain human desire, the ‘Wide-wasting pest! that rages unconfined’.24 At the same time, the poem employs the military metaphor of conquest of territory whereby the military successes of the conqueror inebriate him with a desire to overreach and ensure his eventual defeat. Our own works narrate a similarly organic connection between contagion and warfare in history. In Zola’s narrative, the pathological decay of a family becomes associated with the shedding of blood and other violence that accompanies the beginning and end of the Second Empire.25 In I promessi sposi the plague is associated with the brutal lawlessness of the bravi and the depredations of the soldiers of the Emperor, who bring the plague with them in their invasion of Lombardy.26 The principal instance in the nineteenth century of the cross-referencing of plague and war occurs in the Crimea, when British deaths resulting from infectious disease are ten times as many as deaths in battle.27 Among the novels examined in this study Two Years Ago and Lavinia specifically refer to the Crimean events. The equivalence that narratives necessarily indicate between the plague and phenomena of violence is treated extensively in the work of René Girard. He proposes two sorts of eminently destructive manifestations of the contagious principle, which it is convenient to discuss before considering the more ambiguous manifestations of contagion. Reminding us of the tendencies so starkly evident, according to Hogle, in the Gothic mode, the first involves biological and social processes of disintegration, and the second the disruptive release of libidinal energy. Narratives of the plague, Girard claims with respect to the first, always portray a contagious effect that entails the disintegration of society along with the decay of individual bodies. Anarchy spreads as part of the plague,
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and ‘in a sense, it is even more of a plague than the disease itself’.28 Mary Shelley’s The Last Man (1826) provides notable examples when the plague causes whole populations to revert to barbarism: ‘their lawless spirit instigated them to violence; they took a delight in thrusting the possessors from their houses’. They rage over the countryside like a ‘locust visitation’ or ‘like a conquering army, burning – laying waste – murdering’ (II:ix). Among our principal texts, I promessi sposi and Old Saint Paul’s depict popular tumults and riots in times of plague as instances of hysterical mass contamination. In Syria, Bulwer’s Margrave is similarly menaced both by ‘the Pest of the East’ and by the ‘squalid populace’ that has degenerated into a ‘dastardly rabble’ (LXXIV). Kingsley, who has implied a connection in Alton Locke between the Chartist demonstrations of 1848 and cholera,29 introduces a character in Two Years Ago that makes the same association. In this case the confused Squire Trebooze finds that the danger comes not so much from the cholera as from Tom Thurnall’s campaign for sanitary measures that might debilitate the virulence of the epidemic. The preoccupation with the threat of cholera spreads in itself, Trebooze believes, a political contagion: ‘ “my opinion is, sir, that by what you’re doing up at Pentremochyn, you’re just spreading chartism – chartism, sir!” ’ (XIV). Chartism amounts in his mind to a version of that levelling process whereby, according to Girard, the hierarchies, boundaries and structures of differentiation that constitute a ‘cultural system’ collapse. The process ends in ‘death, which is the supreme undifferentiation’.30 The social or cultural disintegration is precisely what occurs in the narrative of fog and primal ooze in the first chapter of Bleak House, and it receives frequent attention in the novel thereafter. While Mr Turveydrop’s sense that ‘ “we have degenerated” ’ makes him complain that ‘ “a levelling age is not favorable to Deportment” ’ (XIV), Sir Leicester Dedlock broods even more obsessively about the degenerative process. Although possibly unaware of the contagion emanating from Tom-all-alone’s, he discerns signs all around him of a spreading revolutionary energy that is attacking all the structures of civilization: ‘ “upon my honor, upon my life, upon my reputation and principles, the floodgates of society are burst open, and the waters have – a – obliterated the landmarks of the framework of the cohesion by which all things are held together!” ’ (XL).31 Even without the presence of a literal plague or of some other physically infectious disease, the principle of contagion may trigger subtly degenerative processes. Vrettos discusses in this sense the study by Sir James Paget published in 1875 of ‘nervous mimicry’ or ‘neuromimesis’. Patients would involuntarily mimic an organic disease so that the disease would indeed ‘produce palpable effects on the body’. The ‘neurological contagion’ too could cause epidemics, as discerned in ‘the phenomenon of “the crowd” ’, and especially in the urban context one could speak of ‘a moral epidemic’.32 The crowd, increasing in numbers, threatens the constituted social order, as a tendency towards destructive violence spreads
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from individual to individual. Girard analyses such moral contagion as a version of the plague in his reading of a passage from Crime and Punishment: The plague is a transparent metaphor for a certain reciprocal violence that spreads, literally, like the plague. The appropriateness of the metaphor comes, obviously, from this contagious character. . . . Something harmful, which loses none of its virulence . . . is rapidly transmitted from individual to individual. Such, of course, are bacteria in an epidemic; so is violence when it is imitated. . . . Counterviolence turns out to be the same as violence. In cases of massive contamination, the victims are helpless, not necessarily because they remain passive but because whatever they do proves ineffective or makes the situation worse.33 Something like the plague may be manifested not only in episodes that show the disintegration of society but also in more private episodes that imply the disintegration of personality. As Fredric Jameson has noticed, I promessi sposi provides an interesting example of this pathology in the case of Don Rodrigo and Renzo.34 Learning of the threat that Don Rodrigo poses for Lucia, Renzo walks home ‘a passi infuriati . . . senza aver determinato quel che dovesse fare, ma con una smania addosso di far qualcosa di strano e di terribile’. Indeed the hitherto entirely peaceful and benevolent Renzo suddenly succumbs to bloodthirsty impulses, and the narrator reflects upon the double guilt of violent wrong-doers: ‘Sono rei non solo del male che commettono, ma del pervertimento ancora a cui portano gli animi degli offesi’ (II). Manzoni portrays evil as something that radiates outward from individual to individual; more than suffering evil, Jameson concludes, ‘one is contaminated by it’. Involving libidinal energy, the second sort of metaphorical contamination in Girard’s analysis is that whereby individuals come to replicate each other’s ‘desire’: ‘Desire is always an imitation of another desire’, which one seems involuntarily to catch as if it were a fever, and even ‘metaphysical desire is eminently contagious’.35 Girard deals in particular with the desire of two rivals for the same beloved, which tends to make them ‘doubles’ and to unite them in their ‘hallucinatory’ fascination with each other.36 This pattern too operates in many of the novels considered in this study and serves especially to relate Renzo again with Don Rodrigo. The desire that has the hallucinatory effect of cancelling clearcut identities and reducing individuals into mimetic doubles always contains an erotic component. This applies to its functioning not only amidst riotous crowds but in more civilized social contexts, as episodes of dancing sometimes show by making the dance too into an image of the plague. Of course the mimetic, mirroring movements of the dance can also restrain and discipline libidinal energy. An example is offered by the dancing
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school that belongs to Mr Turveydrop’s system in Bleak House for exploiting first his wife and then the son that so resembles her. The young ladies of the dancing class probably mimic, in this system, mechanical movements rather than unleash any desires. But more often dancing becomes associated in the novels with sexual transgressions. Trouble begins at a ball for the humble, Cinderella-like heroine of Ruth as she gazes from the sidelines at the happy middle-class dancers, whose movements evidently infect her with an unavowed longing to join them: ‘Bright colours flashed on the eye and were gone, and succeeded by others as lovely in the rapid movement of the dance. Smiles dimpled every face, and low tones of happiness murmured indistinctly through the room in every pause of the music’ (II). Then during a galop, boundaries of class are effectively defied, when in reaching Ruth at ‘her post in the ante-room’, the dangerously seductive Mr Bellingham erupts indeed into her life.37 On other occasions the mimetic desire released in dancing may pose even more dionysiac threats to civilized hierarchies and categories. In Lavinia desire thus breaks through heterosexual categories during a ball at the Roman palace of Prince Torlonia. Among many women that display a great deal of bare flesh, Lavinia dances with increasing wantonness, and the hero Paolo Mancini is shocked by the evident attraction between her and Juanita, Marchioness Delfuego y Arcos. The two women, who will subsequently have an affair, appear to dance more with one another than with their male partners. ‘Drunk with excitement’, Lavinia strikes the unhappy Paolo as a ‘Bacchante’ (I:xx). In Zola’s novel the unholy dancelike movements of two women suggest witchcraft, ‘un galop de sorcières’ before a blazing funeral pyre (XIII), in a scene that receives fuller treatment in my next chapter. A Strange Story too refers to a witch’s festival in describing an unruly dance. The stranger Margrave arrives at an evening party of Mrs Poyntz, the austere ‘Queen’ and arbitress of the civilized conventions of her provincial town, and initiates a tarantella on the piano. His frenzied performance propagates among the hitherto sedate guests a virulently contagious ‘desire for movement’: All were spellbound; even Mrs. Poyntz paused from her knitting, as the Fates paused from their web at the lyre of Orpheus. To this breathless delight, however, soon succeeded a general desire for movement. To my amazement, I beheld these formal matrons and sober fathers of families forming themselves into a dance, turbulent as a children’s ball at Christmas; and when, suddenly desisting from his music, Margrave started up, caught the skeleton hand of lean Miss Brabazon, and whirled her into the centre of the dance, I could have fancied myself at a witch’s sabbat. My eye turned in scandalized alarm towards Mrs. Poyntz. That great creature seemed as much astounded as myself. Her eyes were fixed on the scene in a stare of positive stupor. For the first time, no doubt, in her life, she was overcome,
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deposed, dethroned. The awe of her presence was literally whirled away. (XXVI) Besides a ‘witch’s sabbat’ the tarantella re-enacts, as the reference to ‘the skeleton hand’ implies, the medieval danse macabre – ‘which, of course, is inspired’, notes Girard, ‘by the plague’. The same dance occurs as a sort of set piece at the height of the plague in Ainsworth’s Old Saint Paul’s. The Earl of Rochester dressed as a skeleton and ‘a party of young gallants’ in costumes that mimic a pope, a cardinal, a monarch and other figures of authority enter the cathedral at midnight to dance ecstatically in the presence of King Charles himself. The ‘sacred building’ is ‘invaded’, as if militarily, and made ‘a scene of noise, riot, and confusion – its vaulted roofs, instead of echoing the voice of prayer, or the choral hymn, resounded with loud laughter, imprecations, and licentious discourse’. Less scandalized, however, than the ‘dethroned’ Mrs Poyntz (the ‘Queen of the Hill’) in Bulwer’s novel, King Charles enjoys the entertainment, which Ainsworth’s scholarly narrator refers to the historical tradition of the ‘Dance of Macabre, or Dance of Death, commonly called the Dance of Paul’s’. Various medieval and renaissance paintings of the dance have prompted Rochester and his friends to repeat the anti-ritual or, as Girard might say, have contaminated them with the desire to imitate sacrilegious acts. According to Ainsworth, the tradition or the contagion has also continued, ‘just as in our own time the lively Parisians made the cholera, while raging in their city, the subject of a carnival pastime’ (III:iii). Published the year after Ainsworth’s novel, ‘The Masque of the Red Death’ by E.A. Poe contains, as a brilliant set-piece, one of the most obvious literary examples of the Dance of Death. The thousand guests of the Prince who live in barricaded isolation from the plague raging outside the castle believe that their wild dancing is exorcizing the plague. Ironically the dance instead mimics the spread of the contagion which is present amongst them, until ‘one by one dropped the revellers in the blood-bedewed halls of their revel, and died each in the despairing posture of his fall’. As two forms of menace to civilized order, the plague and the ‘carnival pastime’ have frequently seemed to mirror one another.38 Sander L. Gilman has also included mental illness in the category of menacing disease and related it in terms of the carnivalesque to the Feast of Fools, as depicted in a copperplate by Breughel the Elder. The well-known description of Dickens of a dance held on Boxing Day 1851 for the inmates of St Luke’s Hospital for the Insane constitutes for Gilman a Victorian account of such a festival. The Christmas season, as the reference in Bulwer’s novel to a ‘turbulent . . . children’s ball at Christmas’ further suggests, provides an appropriate moment for such revelry in the world outside the madhouse too. Having observed on his way to St Luke’s the riotous behaviour
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of drunken revellers in the streets of Smithfield, Dickens reflects on the collapse of clear boundaries between the regions of sanity and insanity. Such an atmosphere of infectious liberation, Gilman concludes, permits ‘Saturnalian’ exuberance that is ‘felt to be within bounds of Victorian propriety’.39 In this kind of analysis, the apparent breakdown of order becomes a therapeutic activity rather than a symptom of disease. We turn, therefore, from the strictly destructive, degenerative aspects of the plague-like phenomena to their more ambiguous characteristics. What looks like disease to some can by others be ‘invested with positive cultural value’, as Pater implies with his own metaphors of plague and contagion: ‘When the actual relics of the antique were restored to the world’, he observes of the renaissance in the essay on Winckelmann, ‘in the view of the Christian ascetic it was as if an ancient plague pit had been opened: all the world took the contagion of the life of nature and of the senses.’40 In Pater’s own view, the contagion may actually tend to cure the Christian of his diseased asceticism. With respect to the release of specifically libidinous energy, medical authorities have also wondered whether the plague might in some sense be repairing its own damage. The distinguished Swedish physician Axel Munthe, who ministered heroically and tirelessly to the victims during many pestilential outbreaks of the 1870s in France and Italy, thus reflected on a surprising episode in Naples. While attending an old Abbess dying of cholera in her convent, an irresistible impulse caused him to act in a most uncharacteristic way, which may recall the scene in Ainsworth’s novel of the profanation of the cathedral. He suddenly embraced the pretty young nun that stood near him: ‘I felt the tumultuous beating of her heart against my heart’. His behaviour, he decided, might illustrate a sort of Darwinian law involving the struggle of the species for survival: The battle is regulated in its minutest details by an immutable law of equilibrium between Life and Death. Wherever this equilibrium is upset by some accidental cause, be it pestilence, earthquake or war, vigilant Nature sets to work at once to readjust the balance, to call forth new beings to take the place of the fallen. Compelled by the irresistible force of a Natural Law, men and women fall in each other’s arms, blindfolded by lust, unaware that it is Death who presides over their mating, his aphrodisiac in one hand, his narcotic in the other. Death, the giver of Life, the slayer of Life, the beginning and the end.41 Spreading with ‘irresistible force’, the same contagion simultaneously propagates fatal disease and the lust that renews life. After the arousal of sexual desire, according to other, less mythically inclined medical authorities, a contagious energy may initiate pregnancy on the strictly cellular level. A contagion that is presumably different from that of the pestilence
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is transmitted by the sperm. ‘The sperm operates by contact, the same as a contagion or decaying body acts’, Rudoph Leuckart states in 1853: ‘Not through intimate relations with the egg, but in this way: that it imparts a certain motion to the molecules of the egg which transmitted from atom to atom produces new arrangements, new forms and new qualities.’42 To become pregnant resembles being smitten by a spreading infection. The analogy between the developing foetus and a ‘decaying body’ may also remind us that philosophers have often contemplated life itself as a contagious disease, a corruption of the original, inanimate purity of things. Regarding the inseparability of life – at least human life – and microbes, Baudrillard has discussed the complexity of their ‘symbiose totale’. The microbe is the Other – ‘l’Autre absolu’ – that man cannot do without and with which man exists in the endless chain of continuing life: ‘ils s’enchaînent, et cet enchaînement est comme prédestiné, personne ne peut le penser autrement, ni l’homme ni le bacille’.43 In an antiseptic world without microbes – a condition, in Baudrillard’s terminology, of utter ‘transparence’ – an immune-deficient life would lose its meaning and capacity to survive. Such immune-deficiency is precisely the condition of the Martians in H.G. Wells’s The War of the Worlds (1898), a novel that reflects the awareness in the nineteenth century too of the value of germs.44 In the manner of homeopathic doses of poison, exposure to contagion not only causes disease but triggers the production of healthprotecting antibodies. Humanity thus survives in the novel of Wells because pestilential bacteria have also been decimating it through the ages: ‘By the toll of a billion deaths man has bought his birthright on the earth, and it is his against all comers’ (II:viii). (When they invade the earth, the Martians do not bring their atmosphere of germ-free ‘transparence’ with them, and their aggressive tactics include blackening and poisoning the air with ‘a strange and horrible antagonist of vapour’ [I:xv].) Foucault observes the possibility for associating disease with a curative agency in the political sphere, where contagion similarly produces its own antidote. In analysing the disciplinary provisions devised by seventeenthcentury governors of plague-ridden cities, he finds that the plague curiously gives shape to a utopian dream – ‘l’utopie de la cité parfaitement gouvernée’. A symbiosis seems virtually to unite the phenomenon of disintegration with its opposite: La peste comme forme à la fois réelle et imaginaire du désordre a pour corrélatif médical et politique la discipline. Derrière les dispositifs disciplinaires, se lit la hantise des «contagions», de la peste, des révoltes, des crimes, du vagabondage, des désertions, des gens qui apparaissent et disparaissent, vivent et meurent dans le désordre.45 While the governors could derive from the disorder the empowering justification for their imposition of order and discipline, the masses being
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governed might invert the terms of cause and effect. The desire of government to impose discipline might, that is, be the cause rather than the effect of the pestilential outbreak. During the cholera epidemic of 1831–32 the stricken proletariat evidently suspected that the authorities had purposely introduced the contagion into the urban districts in which the poor were too numerous and troublesome.46 Power could be exercised both by fostering disorder and by disciplining it. Discipline and disorder, the apparently contrasting terms also apply to military campaigns and to dancing, which are themselves imitations, or metaphors, of the plague in action. The terms parallel the ‘Life and Death’ proposed in Munthe’s phenomenology of contagion. The process of history too, which is another imitation of, or which is imitated by, the plague in action, exemplifies the same characteristics. While an essentially destructive or deathly process, history also ensures its own continuance by creating ever new material upon which to perform its destruction. But this is somewhat to anticipate the argument of this chapter. In Girard’s conception, the positions of health and disease collapse from structuralist opposition into post-structuralist identity – or into the condition of mimetic doubles. The neutral mechanism of mimesis or contagion, whereby disease can emerge as health or health as disease, thus maintains the dual potentiality of disorder and discipline: ‘mimesis, like all primitive gods, has two “sides,” one that disrupts the community and another one that holds it together’. The challenge is to harness the ‘normal human phenomena’ of mimesis on behalf of creativity, to ‘[turn] the conflictual and destructive mimesis . . . into the nonconflictual mimesis of training and learning, indispensable to the elaboration and perpetuation of human societies’.47 On the microcosmic level of an individual literary work as well, the ‘mimetic scheme’ can function in a destructive or a creative direction. In the first case, the collapse of oppositions into doublings involves an unhealthy ascendancy of insanity – a ‘delirium, in the midst of a catastrophe as definitive for the author as for the work’. In the other case, the mimetic patterns emerge through the author’s strong and illuminating sanity: his ‘progress in perceptiveness . . . casts on mimetic desire and the doubles the best light available. In the first case the obsession masters the works, in the second the work masters the obsession.’48 The impulse to imitate is not necessarily then an ‘irresistible’ obsession, as the contagious force is often thought to be; it can be mastered. The actual mechanisms of ‘delirium’ (Foucault’s ‘disorder’) and ‘sanity’ (‘discipline’) – whereby contagion either masters or is mastered – remain mysterious, and other possible explanations must be considered. In a further effort to explain how contagion or mimesis occurs, Vrettos introduces the Shelleyan term ‘sympathy’, which operates for good or ill in a very broad range of human events.49 All sorts of ‘acts of sympathy’ transmit states of mind and feelings from individual to individual, suggesting that
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‘emotions and impressions as well as diseases [may] be contagious’. Not only in private meetings among friends, but in the theatre, for example, contagious germs are communicated. Actors exercise their power, according to a treatise that Vrettos cites, published by Alexander Bain in 1859, to ‘[manifest] emotion . . . so as to render it infectious to all beholders’.50 When reading, as it is thus reasonable to speculate too, a person can be contaminated by a ‘poisonous’ book like the one mentioned in The Picture of Dorian Gray. Other books can, in contrast, insinuate healing influences. (The point naturally has implications for the very novels that we are considering: Deirdre d’Albertis has considered Ruth, for example, a contagious book.51) Any situation that demonstrates the largely involuntary susceptibility of a human being to influences coming from without may imply the ubiquitous contagious mechanism. Here the term ‘permeability’ that I have used in connection with the boundaries surrounding individual works of fiction comes into play. Vrettos points to the widespread awareness among Victorians of their ‘psychic and somatic permeability’,52 which like the impulses to imitate and to sympathize can function in contradictory ways. As a positive potentiality, the permeability of the boundaries of the body and of the psychic identity permits the contagion of healthy influences. Characters that radiate health, to return to concrete situations in our novels, counteract disorderly contagion like that unleashed in some of the episodes of dancing. In A Strange Story, curiously, the charismatic Margrave who has played the infectious tarantella at Mrs Poyntz’s party can at other times appear as one of these transmitters of health: ‘Never have I seen a human face so radiant’, Fenwick has reflected on an earlier occasion, noticing the ‘expression of contagious animation and joyousness’ which must derive ‘from the contagious vitality of that rarest of all rare gifts in highly-civilized circles, – perfect health’ (XXIII). In the other novels it is often the heroines that communicate an energy of health – moral, physical or both. These include Lucia of I promessi sposi and Grace Harvey of Two Years Ago, who seem even to be vehicles for the transmission, as their names imply, of divine illumination and grace. Also associated in this respect with light, Esther Summerson of Bleak House counteracts by her very presence anywhere the power of disease, as we are given to understand in her influence on Caddy Jellyby: Caddy had a superstition about me, which had been strengthening in her mind ever since that night long ago, when she had lain asleep with her head in my lap. She almost – I think I must say quite – believed that I did her good whenever I was near her. Now, although this was such a fancy of the affectionate girl’s, that I am almost ashamed to mention it, still it might have all the force of a fact when she was really ill. (L)
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The ‘psychic and somatic permeability’ of Caddy here to Esther’s benign influence also involves the permeability of her own mind and body to each other. What she ‘believed’, in her ‘superstition’, affects the physical ‘fact’ of her illness. Indeed in narrating the course of diseases, all the novels imply the inseparability of psychological and physical factors. Even a disease like cholera, which one might suppose to involve a purely physical pathology, appears in Kingsley’s novel to submit to psychological conditioning. As a negative manifestation of this permeability some figures in the story contract the illness and go on to die from it at least in part because of their moral weaknesses and desires. During outbreaks of plague in other stories the psychology of the crowd functions to hasten the spread of contagion and the death toll. As a physical and psychological phenomenon – and a literal and metaphorical phenomenon – the plague is therefore propagated not only through the mechanisms of violence but through imitation, doubling, desire and sympathy. Its assaults are facilitated by the permeability of the individual subjects, who can nevertheless master to some extent its insidious menace and turn it into a benign agency. Its effects include both disintegration (involving disorder and death) and a creative reaction (implying discipline and an effort to reconstitute life). The spread of such contagion implies a conception of history that I wish now to examine in a more explicitly ideological sense. The interpenetration of psychic and somatic components of disease in individual human cases provides a model for the interpenetration of immaterial and material factors in larger historical processes. The psychic or immaterial components may on this more abstract level be referred to imaginative or ideological notions of history as something that happens in invisible dimensions. The somatic or material component refers instead to the actual physical conditions and events that constitute problems for public health authorities. Because of their interpenetration, the imaginative, immaterial, or invisible phenomena cannot be clearly separated from the material, physical facts that embody them. We may notice this inseparability by attempting to deal first with the material component. The cultural disorders that are a central concern of our historical narratives regard precisely the welfare of human bodies, and this physicality of the cultural problem deserves some emphasis. Insistence upon ‘the physical basis of life’, to appropriate the title of Huxley’s essay of 1868, rather than upon some spiritual basis, itself constitutes a significant ideological position in the nineteenth-century debates. Pater thus appreciates the renaissance recovery of the ‘life of the senses’, and Carlyle’s Diogenes Teufelsdröckh concedes, although regretfully, that ‘the diseases of the Liver’ may signify more than ‘the terrors of Conscience’.53 And while Sartor Resartus attends ironically to man as an animal and digestive mechanism designed to produce excrement, so Kingsley’s Two Years Ago considers seriously the relevance of sewers to
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human well-being. Concerns about urban sewage emerge in Bleak House and to a lesser extent the other novels too, as relevant to important public debates about sanitary reforms. The novels do not then present conditions of disease and urban squalor in order to hint more importantly at moral or spiritual conditions. The narratives really do concern literally and materially, as individual and social problems, the epidemics of physical disease that they narrate. Novelists evidently consider themselves as allied with physicians and public health authorities in their solicitude for the physical health and comfort of their society. Indeed, apart from I promessi sposi, physicians figure as protagonists or near protagonists in all of our novels, and their scientific approach to human suffering appears generally to offer more hope than the ministrations of priests. According to Lawrence Rothfield, the ‘realism’ associated with nineteenth-century fiction is precisely that of a ‘medical perspective’, and the novelists that he treats imitate the techniques and respect the values of medical practice: For Balzac, Flaubert, and Eliot, the terms comprehension, concrete, individual, and sincere bear connotations that can be described without exaggeration as medical. Comprehending social totality, in the realistic novel, means defining that totality not only as a milieu (with the biological overtones that word implies), but as a pathological milieu. Capturing the concrete realistically means maintaining faith that details will prove to be ‘both particular and typical’ in the same way that medical diagnosis assumes that signs and symptoms will resolve into cases of disease. The individual, in turn, is defined in realistic fiction as a pathologically embodied person whose limits and potentialities stem from the limits and potentialities – death and growth – imposed by organic finitude. Finally, realism’s sincerity is analogous to the disinterested benevolence claimed by the medical profession.54 Yet the vision of the novelists does not coincide entirely with that of medical practitioners. In some respects its field of ‘comprehension’ is less vast, and in others it exceeds the boundaries of medical and scientific reality. With reference to the contagious phenomena of the ‘pathological milieu’, the novelists may represent only indirectly the sexually transmitted diseases that proliferated so uncontrollably and became the subject of such intense public controversy.55 The fictional plots treated in this study do largely concern transgressive sexual behaviour, as the reference to the lesbian episode in Lavinia has already suggested. Would-be seducers or rapists threaten the heroines of I promessi sposi, Old Saint Paul’s, Ruth, Two Years Ago, Lavinia, and A Strange Story. The heroines of Bleak House and Lavinia are illegitimate, while Gaskell’s Ruth and Zola’s Clotilde themselves produce illegitimate offspring, in Clotilde’s case the result of incest. The phenomena of prostitution and male libertinage figure so
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prominently as to encourage the conclusion that the cultural disorders being examined are largely to be associated with sexual practices. It surprises us therefore that syphilis, which duly appears in eighteenth-century novels and which will occur again in Ibsen’s Ghosts and Zola’s Nana, seems in our particular novels a taboo. Or perhaps the ghostly presence of venereal infection, which Hall has discerned in Great Expectations, is also being intimated in the various outbreaks of the plague, cholera, typhus and possibly smallpox. As Frank Mort has demonstrated, public opinion locates the breeding ground for diseases like cholera and typhus fever especially in areas of urban degradation in which sexual immorality also flourishes.56 So in the confusion of causes and effects, these diseases become at least in part the effect of immorality and themselves a sort of venereal disease. Ruth too hints at the causal connection in that Bellingham is the agent responsible both for the heroine’s illegitimate pregnancy and for her fatal contraction of typhus fever. The fact that the second event occurs some twelve years after the first does not erase the impression that Gaskell may have intended a moral paradigm of cause and effect.57 In only hinting at the venereal infections that strike ‘pathologically embodied persons’, the novelists may seem more limited in their vision than the medical practitioners. But in other respects their vision of the ‘pathological milieu’ is more holistic. The fictional narratives challenge the strictly material and medical analysis by figuring a contagion that is spreading in regions of the imagination or possibly the unconscious. We proceed more specifically here to the sense in which imaginative vision penetrates or interpenetrates the concern with ‘the physical basis of life’ and the debates about sewage and sanitary reforms. The common field of contagion, as I have called it, is adumbrated in these novels with respect to imaginary spatial and temporal coordinates. In terms of space, there is first a horizontal east/west axis, which is related both to real and to imaginary geography. Contagion usually comes from the east – admittedly a commonplace.58 Literally, the plague in London of 1664–65, as the narrator of Old Saint Paul’s reports it, has been imported from the Levant. It has arrived both directly with a certain ship that has sailed from a Levantine port and indirectly with goods coming from the infected cities of Hamburg and Amsterdam. As for the Asiatic cholera, the worst strains have apparently originated in India and spread to Europe and then Great Britain with alarming rapidity in a series of epidemics of the 1820s.59 The geography of London, divided between East End and West End, serves further to identify the east as source of a contagion that threatens the healthier west.60 In the literary imagination, however, the east naturally becomes chiefly a symbolic location, as the eastern fantasies of another London resident may conveniently remind us. De Quincey, that is, finds in the opium imported from the east a catalytic agent that produces his ‘Oriental dreams’ of ‘unimaginable horror’:
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Under the connecting feelings of tropical heat and vertical sun-lights, I brought together all creatures, birds, beasts, reptiles, all trees and plants, usages and appearances, that are found in all tropical regions, and assembled them together in China or Indostan. From kindred feelings, I soon brought Egypt and all her gods under the same law. I was stared at, hooted at, grinned at, chattered at, by monkeys, by paroquets, by cockatoos. . . . I was buried, for a thousand years, in stone coffins, with mummies and sphinxes, in narrow chambers at the heart of eternal pyramids. I was kissed, with cancerous kisses, by crocodiles; and laid, confounded with all unutterable slimy things, amongst reeds and Nilotic mud.61 The burial site seems a particularly lurid version of the ‘ancient plague pit’ of Pater and the pits that Manzoni and Ainsworth so graphically imagine as depositories of unceremoniously piled and rotting corpses. One may recall too the loathsome, overcrowded and rat-infested ‘berryin ground’ to which Lady Dedlock returns to die in Bleak House.62 In contrast with the pestilential east, De Quincey naturally constructs a region of health and sanity in the west, or more precisely north-west (which will actually become for him the Lake District), from which he has been exiled. During his nocturnal wanderings through the labyrinthine alleys of the East End, he fancies himself searching for the way back to this home: ‘[I attempted] to steer homewards, upon nautical principles, by fixing my eye on the pole-star, and seeking ambitiously for a north-west passage.’63 With respect to London geography, Old Saint Paul’s traces the diffusion of not only the plague but the Great Fire of 1666 that begins of course in the east (in Pudding Lane) and then spreads westward. Other versions of the pestilential east include Tom-all-alone’s, in a novel in which the ‘east wind’ (considered as a possible title for the novel)64 always blows ‘an uncomfortable sensation’ into Jarndyce’s consciousness (VI). Lavinia similarly characterizes ‘the haunts of vice and misery’ in the London East End as ‘foul excrescences’ upon the urban body that elsewhere, in the west, possesses a semblance of ‘proud, rich, and prudish’ health (II:vi). A Strange Story moves some of its characters all the way east to a clearly imaginary Syria, where the plague is forever raging, and finally to Australia. Margrave has been contaminated in Syria and has carried an infection from there back to England. The appearance of radiant health, which an eastern elixir has granted him, turns out to be a symptom of a wasting moral disease, as in cases of longevity in novels by Haggard and Stoker.65 In Two Years Ago Tom Thurnall has lived adventurously in foreign parts including China and Australia, where he has twice contracted cholera. Although he is not himself a source of infection now, his arrival in the west of England from Australia coincides with certain signs that enable him to announce an imminent outbreak of cholera. Among the many writers that situate an eastern danger in their international geography,
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‘Our feverish contact’
there is obviously Henry James. Daisy Miller, for example, moves from the apparent health of an American town to Rome and contracts in the Colosseum the infectious ‘Roman fever’ that is again associated with sexual transgression. More dangerous even than the threat of contagion to physical health and of sexual seduction to individual moral health, the mythical east seems to menace the integrity of an entire national culture. An impressive analysis by David Faulkner of Edwin Drood thus shows that emanations from the Asiatic opium den – wherein sexual and racial boundaries dissolve – implicate various threats of the colonies to the mother country. As structural oppositions between the robust Anglo-Saxon integrity of Crisparkle and the corrupt colonialized deviousness of Jasper also collapse, we perceive the uncanny – and we might say Girardian – identity of the two. Along with many other patterns of doubling and imitation, the effect associates the imperial centre with the imperial periphery: ‘[We] glimpse England itself as a colonizable, indeed a colonized space. English culture appears highly permeable, pieced together from difference and otherness.’66 Besides menacing a permeable western culture with its contagion, the east can, in an instance of ‘symbolic reversal’, serve as a factor of stability that disciplines, in Foucault’s terms, the disorder. For the east is also the ‘Orient’ that Edward Said has studied as the construction by the western imagination of its own ‘Other’ – the label applied, as we have seen, to the second term of Baudrillard’s man/microbe symbiosis. This Other loses its threatening aspect insofar as European culture has ‘gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self’.67 The particular characteristics of the surrogate self differ from one novel to another, but as Said’s point suggests, that other identity always comes from underneath just as much as it comes from the east. To the extent that the contagion coming from below positively liberates a buried or repressed identity, as it does for Esther Summerson, the resulting disease may further individual fulfilment rather than impose a defeat. The distinction that Sontag draws between contagious disease impinging from without as a penalty and illness originating from within as self-expression is partially erased in Esther’s case.68 For her disease comes simultaneously as the contagion from without (from the east) and as the liberation of a buried internal energy. In addition to the horizontal axis of east/west, the field of contagion is therefore defined by a vertical axis of low/high. The coordinates refer, with respect to actual urban topography, to the lower, typically poorer districts and to the higher, typically middle-class districts, of which ‘The Hill’ in A Strange Story provides an excellent example. The sewage, a significant factor in many analyses, flows from high to low into what may be unhealthy open sewers.69 The study by Peter Stallybrass and Allon White of
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various ‘hierarchies of high and low’ relates the topographical lowness to low portions of the human anatomy and to repressed portions of the human identity. Like the Orient, the urban slums with their open sewers and disreputable inhabitants are an exotic site of lowness that becomes the subject of intense and fascinated investigation in the nineteenth century. In the sewers which so engross sanitary reformers the final ‘truth’, after one has torn away the last ‘veil’, comes into view, as Stallybrass and White find elaborated in Les Misérables (to which we may add Our Mutual Friend).70 The truth evidently involves the repulsive but also dangerously attractive physical and psychic drives that respectable bourgeois citizens have to repress in their normal daily life: while forgetting the ‘bodily “low” ’ as ‘unmentionable’, these citizens can make the ‘city’s “low” . . . a site of obsessive preoccupations’.71 So the higher or normal identity constantly finds ways to admit the existence of the lower identity and to define itself, albeit with anxiety, in unstable opposition to it. Such considerations carry the stories of contagion well beyond the purely medical perspective that ought still, I have said, to indicate one of their principal meanings. Without then losing its medical characteristics, the material environment has become an imaginary site of psychic and cultural interactions. The contagion, which there threatens both permeable individuals and permeable cultures, also functions as a magnetic field in which those individuals and those cultures experience self-identifying attractions to versions of an Other. The spatial oppositions – in terms of the axes of east/west and of low/high – can collapse into a recognition of doubling. While operating with respect to those spatial coordinates, the contagion spreads along temporal axes too and relates to a new conception of historical time.72 The novelists imagine not only a new region in space like that associated with a mythical east but also a new temporal medium that derives from a new concept of causality. Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth suggests that around 1850 there occurs a shift in the balance of popular consensus regarding ultimate causality – the conception, that is, of what causes events to happen in time. The older conception, over which divine providence or ‘Cause itself’ presides, locates causes in the past and observes human beings bearing the necessary consequences in the present. The newer conception finds such temporal explanations less satisfactory and cannot locate causes so easily. Without ‘Cause itself’, one must remain content, as in the detective story, with ‘particular causes’, the effects of which are diffused only in a particular segment of history: Something happens to narrative in the middle of the nineteenth century, something favourable to the historical aesthetic in which the detective code makes sense, and unfavourable to the kind of providential explanation that operates so prominently in novels before mid-century.73
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‘Our feverish contact’
The older assumption of a ‘purposive’ universe constituted ‘for those who held it’, according to Lionel Trilling, ‘not merely a comfortable idea but nothing less than a category of thought; its extirpation was a psychic catastrophe’.74 As if to forestall such a catastrophe, various characters in the novels maintain the older faith in God’s purposes even amidst pestilential disasters. Indeed they almost take comfort in the outbreak of a plague because rather than threatening the assumption of a providentially purposive universe the event may serve to confirm that assumption. The plague in this sort of reasoning constitutes a divine punishment for sin and proves God’s justice. The First Cause is also the Primal Curse. The ‘Supreme Power’, as the fanatical Solomon Eagle of Old Saint Paul’s refers to it, is not then absent but terribly present in the immense disasters that defy all human powers (V:i).75 The divine power operates precisely as a contagious principle. The pestilences strike indiscriminately, however, killing the just and the unjust alike, and the view that the novels as total fictional structures convey never supports the convictions of Solomon and fanatics like him. From Manzoni onwards, it appears that insofar as the novelists believe in divine providence, their faith relates to a more merciful God, who would not unleash such indiscriminate havoc upon his creatures.76 Not God, but human beings, as Tom Thurnall so passionately argues, cause cholera epidemics to break out because of their ignorance and disrespect for principles of sanitation. Although Tom himself does not believe in God at this point, many sanitary reformers could thus maintain faith, at least, in a benevolent and providential natural order that men and women ignore at their peril. ‘All God’s judgements by fever and cholera’, as F.D. Maurice states in 1853, ‘are judgements for neglect of His physical laws. . . . [Men must feel] that it is their business to care for their fellows and for the earth’.77 The impression that God does not actively punish but regretfully observes human beings that punish themselves informs an important and passionate debate about sewage in the middle decades of the century. Providing another instance of the interpenetration of the immaterial and material dimensions of history, God becomes relevant, as in Sartor Resartus, to man’s production of excrement. The providentialists, whose views Kingsley introduces especially into Yeast, maintain, according to Christopher Hamlin’s useful summary in ‘Providence and Putrefaction’, that the Creator has established laws regarding the natural economy of matter.78 As stewards of Creation, human beings must respect these laws, which involve the recycling of organic wastes. Instead of allowing sewage to accumulate dangerously in cities so as to cause epidemics and instead of expelling sewage wastefully into the sea, the sanitary authorities should remove organic wastes to arable land. Buried in the soil, what had been the cause of disease would be providentially and marvellously transformed into fertilizing agents and blessings for human civilization. A ‘vision of a
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utopia based on sewage recycling’79 thus emerges in the works of Kingsley and others, which implies that disease forms no necessary part of the divinely planned economy. In that economy, it is interesting again to notice that the underground or ‘low’ regions can become sources of health rather than disease, of Life rather than Death. Still the exponents of providence fail to win this debate, and in the novels too the faith in a providential and temporally ordered system of causes and effects gives way to Ermarth’s ‘historical aesthetic’. But before I pursue Ermarth’s analysis of the development, it may be useful to introduce some of Jameson’s terms into the discussion. Like Ermarth, Jameson does not locate historical causes, such as the cause behind the outbreak of contagious phenomena, in an identifiable past. With reference to Louis Althusser, he rejects as uninteresting both Newtonian ‘mechanistic’ causality and Hegelian ‘expressive’ causality that permit the pinpointing of particular causative factors or truths in any historical period. While all powerful, the underlying Necessity of events remains mysterious and is best defined in Spinoza’s phrase ‘absent cause’: History is therefore the experience of Necessity, and it is this alone which can forestall thematization or reification as a mere object of representation or as one master code among many others. Necessity is not in that sense a type of content, but rather the inexorable form of events . . . the formal effects of what Althusser, following Spinoza, calls an ‘absent cause.’ Conceived in this sense, History is what hurts, it is what refuses desire and sets inexorable limits to individual as well as collective praxis, which its ‘ruses’ turn into grisly and ironic reversals of their overt intention. But this History can be apprehended only through its effects, and never directly as some reified force. . . . We may be sure that its alienating necessities will not forget us, however much we might prefer to ignore them.80 The irresistible ‘Necessity’ that we experience as ‘what hurts’ can in the context of the present discussion be identified, I believe, as an omnipresent contagious principle. It respects no ethical structure, and, although it is not reified, no one can escape its touch. We are the more helpless because the mechanisms of its transmission remain as mysterious as the hypothetical germs or miasmic influences that the medical investigators were seeking in vain to isolate. The effects are terribly visible in diseased bodies, but the causative agency can only be theorized. The effects of history, to distinguish them from the literally diseased bodies, are secondarily discernible in written texts, such as the novels that we are presently studying. Again, the cause itself, which is beyond that of the particular authors of the texts, is forever absent. The written texts, according to Althusser and Jameson, do not themselves paradoxically create that absent cause, as some fashionable theories imply, but they
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rather reflect a ghostly cause that may be present in some other unknown dimension. The unknown or absent region cannot in any case be the dwelling of a benevolent providence since the power that it emanates constantly frustrates our desires. That power may also differ here from Schopenhauer’s tormenting Will in that for Schopenhauer the Will is present in our very condition of desiring and not hostile to that condition. Our pain as creatures in history derives, moreover, less from clashes with a palpably present Necessity than from the baffling absence by which the source of Necessity eludes our efforts to control it. In this view of Necessity, Jameson expresses a pessimism that distinguishes his position from those of Girard, Foucault and Munthe, who believe that contagion may function in two contrasting directions. Girard proposes, we recall, the possibility that contagion or the ‘mimetic scheme’ can function creatively to inspire an author to identify himself as a controlling agent rather than a controlled and obsessed patient. And for Foucault and Munthe the contagion may similarly provoke disciplining reactions or life-giving effects that counteract the tendency towards disorder and death. The difference between Jameson and the others may involve, however, only a difference in emphasis. What seem for the latter to be the more positive manifestations of the phenomenon may indicate only the sinister wiliness – or ‘ruses’ – of contagion. To personify for a moment, as a rhetorical convenience, a phenomenon that has no personal qualities, we might attribute to contagion an instinct for self-preservation. The contagion that makes everything happen does not wish to die out for lack of material on which to impinge. For Jameson contagious Necessity would therefore promote the existence of the very beings that it hurts and perhaps even the desires that it refuses. So too for Girard, Foucault and Munthe would history be continuing stubbornly, in the positive aspect of contagion, to encourage the forms of life on which it can, vampire-like, nourish itself. In this respect Necessity and contagion would be informing both the aggressive and the defensive mechanisms that are locked together symbiotically in the same conflict – ‘united in the strife which divided them’. Terming the wily figure ‘Death’, Munthe makes his conception of the symbiosis particularly explicit in the passage already cited: Death ‘presides’ over the act of ‘mating’ – ‘Death the giver of Life, the slayer of Life’. In his fascination with Death, Munthe also resembles another physician, Kingsley’s Thurnall, who continually desires ‘ “a good stand-up fight with an old enemy” ’, the cholera (and the breeding-grounds of contagion) personified or demonized further as ‘ “my devil” ’. For Munthe the lifelong enemy is a ‘colleague’ as well: ‘I continued to take a keen interest in Death long after I had lost all interest in Life. I could still watch the approach of my grim colleague with the same keenness I used to watch him with when I was a student at the Salle Ste. Claire, hoping against hope to wrench his terrible secret from him’.81
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Yet, unlike Munthe, Jameson does not wish, I believe, to personify Necessity as a wily phenomenon. And the tendency in nineteenth-century teleology may be away from personifying figurations of a causative agency. The enemy or the Other with respect to whom (or to which) human beings must identify themselves is increasingly, as faith in Providence fades too, an impersonal and bafflingly impalpable force. In such impersonal terms, then, the narratives that we are considering debate the issue of causality – appearing both to propose the possibility for causality and to undermine that proposition. The debate may respect categories associated with the Russian formalists, who have defined the terms of récit (belonging to the domain of the narrator) and histoire (pertaining to the inferred author). The narrator constructs in this scheme impressions of coherent causality that are based on the merely raw data of the author.82 The distinction emerges most clearly in I promessi sposi which supposedly derives from the nearly raw data of the histoire written – badly – by an anonymous seventeenth-century author. Besides this document, the narrator has drawn on the accounts of other historians, whose texts are specifically criticized for their incoherence about causes and effects. In constructing his récit, the narrator has therefore attempted especially to focus an impression of coherent causality, employing what Manzoni’s famous letter to M. Chauvet terms ‘une des plus importantes facultés de l’esprit humain’. This is the ability, de saisir, entre les événements, les rapports de cause et d’effet, d’antériorité et de conséquence, qui les lient; de ramener à un point de vue unique, et comme par une seule intuition, plusieurs faits séparés par les conditions du temps et de l’espace, en écartant les autres faits que n’y tiennent que par des coïncidences accidentelles.83 Yet while present in Fermo e Lucia, the first version of the story, that sense of inner necessity and causality becomes attenuated in the subsequent versions.84 Manzoni comes to distrust his intuitions about causes and to believe, according to Massimo Verdicchio, that a ‘novel can be faithful to history only insofar as history itself follows an orderly path’ – as it does not.85 The novel can thus function only as a supplément to history, in the sense of Jacques Derrida that it replaces or supplies an element that history itself lacks.86 Particularly with respect to providence as a causal agent, Manzoni thus indicates, in Franco Triolo’s view, the impossibility of ever perceiving ‘the why, when, how of a specific divine action’.87 Still more specifically, among the other novelists, Zola claims to do without any principle of causality. In applying the experimental method of Claude Bernard, his procedure supposedly ignores the ‘pourquoi des choses’ and limits itself to explaining ‘le comment, pas davantage’.88 The element of histoire would thus prevail entirely over the element of récit in his narratives. In life as in narrative, the absence of providence and any substitute for
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a primary cause has led, according to Ermarth, to the ‘historical aesthetic’ whereby the human community makes do with what is present. Instead of inhabiting a dimension of eternal values, in which the same stories regarding man’s interactions with God, as original First Cause, are forever being repeated, humanity exists chiefly in the painful and elusive moments of historically passing time. The sense of a particular, all-penetrating present moment in history takes on great power as implying an all but palpable medium, if not an explanatory cause, in which all of humanity is simultaneously engaged. Humanity can therein experience at least its community. In earlier centuries each provincial community had focused on its own relationship to Heaven at the expense of an awareness of earthly life going on elsewhere. But now there emerges a consciousness that is even planetary of the unifying present. The consensus that one discerns in narratives of the mid-nineteenth century ‘is not about anything so trivial as good and evil, but about whether or not the world is One’.89 The success of the novelists, Ermarth further argues, lies in their ability to represent the temporal medium wherein that oneness is experienced: The primary ‘object’ represented in historical narrative is, like the space represented by Saenredam, the time that is common and neutral. ‘In’ these media of modernity it becomes possible to make mutually informative measurements between things apparently unrelated to each other, and thus to consider the entire world as a single arena of relationship. What is being represented in nineteenth-century narrative, then, is nothing less than the power of representation itself. The abstraction of history lies, not in the particulars which populate it, but in the temporal medium they occupy; and in the assertion implicit in such media that the world is one system of mutual relevance. To have brought history to this state of importance was the work of centuries, but by 1850 almost all literate people had absorbed it.90 The opposing terms – ‘particulars which populate [history]’ and ‘temporal medium they occupy’ – correspond to Jameson’s distinction between ‘content’ and ‘the inexorable form of events’. The interest is not in the particular details or individuals or in the raw data but in the impression of a context in which everything coexists. The ‘inexorable form’ pulling all together does not derive from a coherent temporal causality imposed by the récit but rather from an inexorable temporal medium that nothing and no one can escape. The third-person narrator of Bleak House represents the medium, ‘the single arena of relationship’, not only through implicit technique but also with explicit comments: ‘What connexion can there have been’, the chapter that connects Lady Dedlock with Jo invites us to ponder, ‘between many people in the innumerable histories of this world, who, from oppos-
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ite sides of great gulfs, have, nevertheless, been very curiously brought together!’ (XVI). Whereas for Samuel Smiles the ‘system of mutual dependencies’ may have seemed beneficial, Lady Dedlock evidently finds in the enforced connexion with Jo the historical Necessity that hurts. Whether one likes it or not, the ‘innumerable histories’ are parts of the single master phenomenon of history. In the first-person narrative of Bleak House, a good example of the representation of this single, contagiously all-pervasive historical or temporal medium occurs in reference to a particular ‘cold, wild’ Saturday night. Esther and her maid Charley are on their way to visit Jenny, the brickmaker’s wife, who has given shelter to the poor sick Jo that again functions as one of the connecting agencies. In an epiphany she suddenly becomes aware of a particular ‘spot and time’ that is also part of a unity involving other spots in both time and space: I had no thought, that night – none, I am quite sure – of what was soon to happen to me. But I have always remembered since, that when we had stopped at the garden gate to look up at the sky, and when we went upon our way, I had for a moment an undefinable impression of myself as being different from what I then was. I know it was then, and there, that I had it. I have ever since connected the feeling with that spot and time, and with everything associated with that spot and time, to the distant voices in the town, the barking of a dog, and the sound of wheels coming down the miry hill. (XXXI) Among the various simultaneous sights and noises, the ‘sound of wheels’, as we shall discover several hundred pages later in Chapter LVII, comes from the gig of Mr Bucket. He is also in pursuit at that precise instant of the urchin Jo, who is unwittingly carrying the contagion into Esther’s territory. There is suspense (undetected just then but retrieved retrospectively or discovered in re-reading the novel) about whether Bucket will reach Jo before he infects Charley and Esther. The night is meanwhile full of the menacing contagion, as Esther may intuit in stopping ‘to look up at the sky’ and in experiencing ‘for a moment an undefinable impression of myself as being something different’. A similar impression of the omnipresent contagion in action occurs during one particular night in Old Saint Paul’s: Night had fallen upon the city, – a night destined to be more fatal than any that had preceded it; and yet it was so calm, so beautiful, so clear, that it was scarcely possible to imagine that it was unhealthy. The destroying angel was, however, fearfully at work. Hundreds were falling beneath his touch; and as Leonard wondered how many miserable wretches were at that moment released from suffering, it crossed
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‘Our feverish contact’ him like an icy chill that among the number might be Amabel. So forcibly was he impressed by this idea, that he fell on his knees and prayed aloud. (IV:ii)91
In Munthe’s experience of the plague too, the night encourages an especially vivid impression of the unavoidable, ubiquitous, all-penetrating contagion. He ceases to wash before retiring: ‘what was the good of disinfecting myself when everybody and everything around me was infected, the food I ate, the water I drank, the bed I slept in, the very air I breathed! . . . I had to rush out into the street again, to spend the remainder of the night in one of the churches’.92 Recalling the dark underground regions from which noxious influences emanate, the dark sky offers a fitting cover for the work of ‘the destroying angel’, who may remind us of Walter Benjamin’s angel of history.93 Replacing providence, that angel is not a personality but the common contagion that is fearfully present everywhere and simultaneously impinging upon thousands of lives. The narrator of Wells too has a momentary impression ‘that the Angel of Death had slain [the Martians] in the night’, but then he realizes that the destroying agency is simply the germs (II:viii). The angel exists in ‘the very air’ that unites everyone in ‘one system of mutual relevance’. For Jameson and Ermarth the air that figures the medium in which history operates would therefore be even more palpably present than the angel that might signify the absent cause. Nineteenth-century writing frequently refers as explicitly as Munthe does to the omnipresent air that everyone breathes – and here we return to another of Douglas-Fairhurst’s points. The political exile Antonio Gallenga (who as friend of Ruffini, Italian tutor of Dickens, and author of a book approvingly summarized in Kingsley’s novel helps us establish them in ‘one system of mutual relevance’) believes that ‘the spirit of the age is Steam’. With this figure he naturally intends, like many of his contemporaries, not only literal steam but an intellectual principle that somehow has a materially coercive power: it ‘fills our whole atmosphere’ as a felt, inhaled presence.94 But the narrator of Bleak House perceives that Spirit in a less productive or industrially powerful form of water vapour. The fog, namely, which propagates ‘a general infection of ill-temper’ amongst the ‘foot passengers, jostling one another’s umbrellas’ (I), is the all-permeating medium that envelops everyone in that historical moment.95 The narratives of contagion naturally refer often to bad air, filled with nasty smells and ‘effluvia’ that betray the disease-transmitting miasmata. Just after the moment of epiphany cited above, Esther thus notices an unwholesome, suffocating industrial emission into the atmosphere: ‘The kilns were burning, and a stifling vapour set towards us with a pale blue glare’. In such vapours and fogs and other impressions of non-transparent, contagion-filled space, the novels are figuring, according to Ermarth, the
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temporal medium of the present moment in which history aggressively operates. The images of that medium are also representations, she believes, of the novels themselves. The message of this medium is, in part, that neither history nor the novel can offer a coherently focused impression of ultimate causality. Although the fog of Bleak House may lie most thickly around Chancery, there is no particular central point or identifiable eastern location from which it all emanates. Chancery does not cause the fog but rather suffers, like the rest of England, from the effects of a fog that it cannot help but transmit further. This is to say that the fog is simply and inescapably there and everywhere, deriving from an absent cause and pointing to nothing beyond its own presence. As its message or ideological implication, it points to the absence of providence. This is the atmosphere in which nineteenth-century men and women must breathe, the only consolation being that the sickly atmosphere unites them in a common suffocation. While such vapours and contagion suggest the synchronic dimension of an omnipresent historical moment, history still exists of course as a diachronic continuum. The loss of faith in divine providence or ‘Cause itself’ has not, that is, eliminated the impression that relationships of some kind exist between past and present moments. With reference again to Bleak House Ermarth thus notices ‘the two functions of history’, which are ‘divided between two separate narrations’. The function that I would relate primarily to the synchronic dimension is evident in the third-person narrative, ‘with a capacity for oversight but no memory’. The more diachronic orientation of the first-person narrative exemplifies, instead, ‘memory but insufficient oversight’.96 The two dimensions correspond to the horizontal and vertical axes in space that we have noticed, and the vertical spatial axis of low/high is now translated into the diachronic historical direction of past/present. In this dimension, some allusion after all to causality may initially be discerned. The contagion rises from what is dead and buried underground and infects what is living. So Pater, we recall, imagines the influence of the classical age upon the renaissance as the opening of ‘an ancient plague pit’ from which the later age took ‘the contagion of the life of nature and of the senses’. Among the plague pits and other cemeteries in our novels, the ‘berryin ground’, in which Esther Summerson’s father moulders, emits an especially maleficent pollution. Having conducted Lady Dedlock there, Jo points out a repulsive rat, which may remind us of a Freudian case in which a rat is thought to carry a contagion from the dead father.97 More often, though, the novels represent the contagion of the past as an hereditary disease, for which the vehicle of transmission is not infected air or rats but – figuratively, at least – infected blood. There may, as in the case of Sir Leicester Dedlock, even be a satisfaction in such infections, for his hereditary gout is nearly identical with the inherited rank and wealth that constitute practically the entirety of himself:
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‘Our feverish contact’ Other men’s fathers may have died of the rheumatism, or may have taken base contagion from the tainted blood of the sick vulgar; but the Dedlock family have communicated something exclusive, even to the levelling process of dying, by dying of their own family gout. It has come down, through the illustrious line, like the plate, or the pictures, or the place in Lincolnshire. It is among their dignities. (XVI)
The ‘base contagion’ communicated to other sons through ‘the tainted blood’ of ‘vulgar’ fathers probably refers among other diseases to syphilis. What the historian of the Rougon-Macquart family calls ‘l’exécrable heritage de leur race’ in Le Docteur Pascal is similarly a much less dignified form of hereditary infection and hereditary identity than the Dedlock gout. Among the many victims, the fifteen-year-old Charles dies in an especially emblematic way from a massive haemorrhage. In gazing helplessly at the blood gushing from the boy’s nose, his great-greatgrandmother Tante Dide seems to see the impoverished blood of her race and to recall two previous sanguinary crises in the family: Du sang, toujours, l’avait éclaboussée. Et un troisième choc moral l’achevait, du sang l’éclaboussait, ce sang appauvri de sa race qu’elle venait de voir couler si longuement, et qui était par terre, tandis que le royal enfant blanc, les veines et le cœur vides, dormait. (IX) The shock will cause Tante Dide herself to die the next day, at the age of one hundred and five, from a stroke – ‘une congestion cerebrale’. Corresponding to the diseases transmitted through the air in the synchronic dimension, the infection in the blood and the circulatory disorders spread contagiously, through inheritance, from individual to individual. The phenomenon may be related to the moral sickness diffused throughout the human race that Nietzsche has described as a form of ‘blood-poisoning’ (Blutvergiftung).98 In Zola the hereditary infection in the blood relates not only to precisely circulatory disorders but to mental alienation: ‘l’indéfinissable corruption de toute une race’, which one discerns in the boy’s beautiful face, is really a sign of imbecility.99 Charles has inherited this imbecility from his great-great-grandmother, and just before his fatal haemorrhage the two of them seem dumbly to recognize their kinship in madness. They stare deeply at one another: L’enfant avait levé le regard sur la folle, et tous deux se contemplèrent. A ce moment, leur extraordinaire ressemblance éclata. Leurs yeux surtout, leurs yeux vides et limpides, semblaient se perdre les uns dans les autres, identiques. Puis, c’était la physionomie, les traits usés
History as contagion
35
de la centenaire qui, par-dessus trois générations, sautaient à cette délicate figure d’enfant, comme effacée déjà elle aussi, très vieille et finie par l’usure de la race. Ils ne s’étaient pas souri, ils se regardaient profondément, d’un air d’imbécillité grave. (IX) As the boy sees his own corruption in a woman from whom he is separated in age by ninety years, he seems to be looking back into the previous century. In that intense shock of recognizing ‘leur extraordinaire ressemblance’ and their even identical eyes, there is also a striking occurrence again of Girard’s mimetic doubling. In this case a past and a present moment in history become doubled, as the former contaminates and repeats itself in the latter. Yet the relationship between past and present is not strictly that of cause and effect, and the notion of causality becomes problematic in this diachronic dimension too. In the view of Jameson, it is not the former event that causes the later event but the absent cause existing beyond time that causes both of them, forever repeating its contaminating effects. Or another possibility is that contemplated by Arnold’s quester for the scholar-gipsy. The source of contamination may be located not in an earlier but in a later event. If movement along the diachronic axis of historical time can proceed not only forwards but backwards, something in the present can cause something to happen in the past. In a pattern resembling Bakhtin’s ‘symbolic reversal’, the terms cause and effect exchange places; the effect comes paradoxically to precede the cause. So the poet fears that his effort to recapture the health of an earlier age may instead transmit the contagion of his own Zeitgeist back to the earlier period. But this must not be allowed to happen. The hitherto sought-for scholar-gipsy is ironically urged, in the lines that we have already noticed, to flee his seeker: ‘fly our paths, our feverish contact fly!/For strong the infection of our mental strife . . .’. The scholar-gipsy must not, that is, enter a historical narrative, for then he would no longer be the desired scholargipsy. Since the reality of seventeenth-century history remains elusive and inaccessible to the nineteenth-century historian, he would necessarily reconstruct and represent it in accord with his own all-contaminating vision. So as not to become a narrative of contagion, the history of the scholar-gipsy is best left unwritten. An implication of Jameson’s description of history as ‘what hurts’ is that not only in the nineteenth century but in any century the Zeitgeist must be menacing. To exist in history and to submit to its necessity means to breathe its stifling vapour, which for Jameson too penetrates everywhere. It also means to succumb to the sickness propagated by that vapour: ‘the self’, according to Keith Ansell Pearson, ‘is deeply implicated in [one’s time] as its peculiar sickness’.100 The only hope would be to drop out of history altogether, into the region of myth perhaps with the scholar-gipsy
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‘Our feverish contact’
or into the aesthetic ‘refuge’ that Arnold associates with Goethe. Yet Jameson finds that such a dropping out offers only a vain and illusory escape: To imagine that, sheltered from the omnipresence of history and the implacable influence of the social, there already exists a realm of freedom – whether it be that of the microscopic experience of words in a text or the ecstasies and intensities of various private religions – is only to strengthen the grip of Necessity over all such blind zones in which the individual subject seeks refuge, in pursuit of a purely individual, a merely psychological, project of salvation.101 In the debate that I shall trace especially in the next chapter, the providential aesthetic seems generally to give way in our novels to this grimmer historical perspective. Or to state the development in equivalent terms, the same plagues that have at first manifested the hand of God now reveal the contaminating, all-permeating, inescapable action of history. There emerges, possibly, the vision of a metaphysical power struggle in which God as First Cause succumbs to history as absent cause. Yet the novels prefer a less abstract conception of the power struggle and naturally embody it in more concrete situations – in terms, that is, of local causes and effects. Ineffable contagion and counter-contagion struggle, reverse their positions, and unite as a single master metaphor within human activities that manifest history in its fairly ordinary effects. The conflicts employ, as subsequent chapters demonstrate, the weapons of military force, the female needle and distaff, the lancet and medicines, and the pen and other linguistic tools. With such instruments, men and women attempt in their microcosms to protect what Jameson considers their precarious realms of freedom or to reduce those of others. The strategies associated with love operate with particularly interesting ambiguity both to transmit contagion and, wherever in part possible, to heal. Implying that resolutions and recoveries can occur only temporarily, the novels bring into focus their visions of men and women caught up in the historical cross-currents that elude all human control. Still the picture is not entirely bleak. The logic of contagion ensures that the sickness saves as well as dooms: ‘Nietzsche discovers’, to take an example from Pearson, ‘that it is in his becoming-sick, in his “blood-poisoning”, that human promise is to be found’.102 As the generic form of the narrative of contagion reflects the ‘inexorable form of events’, history is seen to offer individuals engaged with its inhumanity the chance to manifest their own humanity.
2
Providence amidst pestilence and fire
In the pestilential episodes and in analogous outbreaks of fire, our novels continue to locate traces of an actively providential agency. These traces reflect a human desire to hold onto the comforting view of traditional faith. The desired traces are weakened, however, by the loss of genuine belief in a divine agency that plans and predisposes the future with the welfare of humanity in mind. Suggesting a debate that is never definitively concluded, the novels imply that instead of a pre-existent First Cause human beings must make do with more tentative impressions of a causality recognized in retrospect. Although this retrospective causality may still refer to God, it is connected more immediately with human beings. It relates to the narrators that reconstruct causality in their writing and to the readers that reconstruct it, in their retrospective recognition, at the conclusion of their reading. A contagion previously thought to have emanated from the original divine will is thus redefined as the medium in which all the individual human wills and other local causes are making history happen. Novels that construct this retrospective sense of causality are designed according to what has been called a ‘providential aesthetic’, as opposed to religiously orthodox faith in divine providence. The authors of such novels, as Fielding had indicated in Tom Jones and as Thomas Vargish has observed recently, manage their plotting so that it will seem to imitate a providential pattern. While the plot proceeds with apparent ‘indirection’, discoveries near the end finally reveal ‘the unities’ that have always been operating.1 The pattern underlies what Gillian Beer terms a Darwinian plot as well – and which among our novels she discerns especially in Bleak House. An initial impression, as in Darwinian research, of ‘superfecundity without design’ later leads ‘gradually and retrospectively’ to the perception of a coherent argument.2 Leaving aside briefly the matter of contagion, which does possess relevance to the embattled faith in divine providence, we may first examine in A Strange Story an ambiguous, retrospective discovery of God’s existence. Through most of the story the physician-protagonist Allen Fenwick is looking for evidence not of God but of what he calls ‘the vital principle’ in
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nature. His scientific quest may be compared to that whereby Darwin eventually discerns his principle of natural selection. The satisfied intellectual security deriving from his initial materialism and atheism is, however, slowly eroded, and an impression of spiritual emptiness troubles him. The ‘grand discontent with the limits of the immediate Present’ inevitably arouses ‘that vague desire for the something beyond’. That unhappy impression of a lacking element is then redefined by the wise Haroun of Aleppo as ‘ “the sublime discontent of earth, which is the peculiar attribute of soul” ’ (XXIX, XXXIX). In very long discussions with the older physician Faber, which may test the patience of the modern reader, Fenwick formulates his own version of Browning’s or Ruskin’s doctrine of the imperfect (as in Cleon’s ‘imperfection means perfection hid’). Unlike the theoretical ‘absent cause’ of Spinoza, Althusser and Jameson, the soul somehow proves by its very absence here that it must be a presence elsewhere. There, with God, Fenwick will rejoin it after death. In this logic he can accept the likelihood of the death of the ethereal Lilian, who is now recognized retrospectively to have figured all along his soul. Too pure like Arnold’s scholar-gipsy for secular life, she must be translated to an ‘Hereafter’ that is immune from the contagion and imperfection of history.3 In removing God, along with the soul, from this world, such a logic does also possess the drawback of making it difficult for Him to intervene here in any providential way. Yet Fenwick does appear to believe at the end that his career has always been taking him, though by very indirect paths, towards God. His life story is now dubbed a ‘pilgrimage’. Kingsley discerns a providence that operates more clearly within history. As the most noisily committed Christian among our novelists, he has probably considered this religious discourse to be the most important element in his novels. Although Two Years Ago develops probably too many strands in its complex plotting, the spiritual history of Tom Thurnall seems designed to provide the primary element of focus. Among the many spiritual crises of the story – of the Anglican vicar, the Methodist preacher, the heroine Grace Harvey and others – we observe especially a process that converts Tom away from his cheerful godlessness. Always ‘generous and kind-hearted’, he appears an exemplary citizen from the beginning. But he is as materialist as Bulwer’s Fenwick is at first and does not share the narrator’s sense of the divine providence in human affairs: Of godliness in its true sense – of belief that any Being above cared for him, and was helping him in the daily business of life – that it was worth while asking that Being’s advice, or that any advice would be given if asked for; of any practical notion of a Heavenly Father, or a Divine education – Tom was as ignorant as thousands of respectable people who go to church every Sunday, and read good books, and believe firmly that the Pope is Antichrist. He ought to have learnt it,
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no doubt, for his father was a religious man; but he had not learnt it, any more than thousands learn it, who have likewise religious parents. (I) According to Ermarth, as we have seen, this is indeed the moment when thousands are losing the faith of their religious parents in a providential dispensation. Yet Kingsley does not observe the development as an ineluctable historical tendency and so devises Tom’s story as a reversal of that tendency. Tom undergoes his crisis in the Crimea and returns at the end to his father’s faith in a divinely paternal providence. ‘ “I found out” ’, he tells Grace, ‘that I had been trying for years which was the stronger, God or I; I found out I had been trying whether I could not do well enough without Him: and there I found that I could not, Grace. . . . I did not know that I had a Father in heaven, who had been looking after me, when I fancied that I was looking after myself.’ (XXVIII) In retrospect he realizes that the heavenly father has always been providing for him, an application of the ‘providential aesthetic’ to life that we find articulated by a character in Lavinia as well. Always the most saintly figure in Ruffini’s story, Miss Clara has never doubted the working of providence and requires no conversion, but she too can only discern the pattern in retrospect. Although she admits that ‘the ways of Providence are inscrutable’ (II:xviii), she finds it almost possible to scrutinize them when tracing a chain of events that have led to reunion with her long-lost lover. ‘ “Man proposes, God disposes” ’, she observes in a letter, as if to define the coexistence, in Vargish’s terms, of the ‘indirections’ and the ‘unities’: ‘Yes, I hope and believe that I am not indulging in a superstitious feeling, when I allow myself to trace the finger of God in the course of events which have led to this issue. The way in which it has been brought about does seem marvellous when I recall its several steps. Had I not delayed my going to Scutari for two months in deference to your wishes – had I not during that interval met Miss Holywell on her way to my aunt – had it not so happened that my aunt was from home, Miss Schmaltz unusually cross, and Miss Holywell in so sore a puzzle what to do with herself, that she enlisted my sympathies in her behalf, and that I carried her off to Owlscombe, why –’ (II:xx) And she breaks off, as if to admit that her addressees – like Ruffini and his readers too – may not find this chain of desultory events so providentially
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‘Our feverish contact’
‘marvellous’ as she does. In her mind, however, any chain of causes and effects must lead back to the tangible First Cause, ‘the finger of God’. It is possible here to bring the mechanism of contagion back into the discussion. The touch of God’s finger, as in Michelangelo’s representation of the creation, has conveyed the contagion of life to Adam and thereby to all the offspring of Adam. The recent treatise of Jacques Derrida on the literal and metaphorical significance of touching, which is related to contagion, emphasizes the importance, among the five senses, of the tactile quality of life. What is living must be immersed in a tangible context: ‘le toucher signifie l’«être au monde» pour un vivant fini. Il n’y a pas de monde sans toucher’. In the religious context, as Derrida goes on to discuss it, the hand of God – specifically ‘la main misericordieuse du Père’ – and the human soul remain continually, mutually in touch: ‘le contact entre Dieu et l’âme ou l’esprit de l’homme ne peut être, lui, que mutuel’.4 Of course this mutual contact is lost in the dark night of the soul, as so notably when the hands of the poet of In Memoriam grope in vain to encounter the father’s touch. The tangible context that permits a person to exist – ‘l’«être au monde» ’ – becomes the secular milieu of contagion. The other novels contain fewer explicit appeals to observe the tangible operations of divine providence. In I promessi sposi the good characters wish indeed to believe in an immanent providence, but Manzoni often enables the reader to view with bemused affection their naiveté. So during his desperate flight from Milanese territory, Renzo naturally hopes for divine protection to help him reach Bergamo and to gain employment there from his cousin: ‘ “la Provvidenza m’ha aiutato finora; m’aiuterà anche per l’avvenire” ’. But then he takes providence into his own hands. After treating himself to a good meal that restores him both physically and psychologically, he decides to contribute his last few coins to some evidently starving beggars: ‘ “Là c’è la Provvidenza!” ’, he announces magniloquently to the desperate mother with her undernourished baby. The narrator goes on to indicate, however, that his deed may not express pure generosity, for he hopes thereby to gain credit with God. He has made an investment upon which he can draw at future need: La refezione e l’opera buona (giacché siam composti d’anima e di corpo) avevano riconfortati e rallegrati tutti i suoi pensieri. Certo, dall’essersi così spogliato degli ultimi danari, gli era venuto più di confidenza per l’avvenire, che non gliene avrebbe dato il trovarne dieci volte tanti. Perché, se a sostenere in quel giorno que’ poverini che mancavano sulla strada, la Provvidenza aveva tenuti in serbo proprio gli ultimi quattrini d’un estraneo, fuggitivo, incerto anche lui del come vivrebbe; chi poteva credere che volesse poi lasciare in secco colui del quale s’era servita a ciò, e a cui aveva dato un sentimento così vivo di sé stessa, così efficace, così risoluto? (XVII)5
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With more plausible arguments Fra Cristoforo will seek later to educate him towards a more humble faith in providence. Renzo must not suppose that providence can be counted upon to operate predictably in the way that human beings think appropriate. God himself, as recent critics have noticed, remains fundamentally silent and inscrutable in I promessi sposi, and if providence can be discerned at all, it is, again, only in retrospective interpretation.6 A corollary to the faith in God is the belief in an apparently antagonistic supernatural agency – the power, most spectacularly, that causes disasters like the pestilences. And here we return more specifically to the phenomenon of contagion. For the believers in divine providence, the disasters of history permit two principal, alternative explanations. The disaster is either a divine punishment that functions in immediate harmony with providential purpose or an outburst of antagonistic energy, suggesting the devil, whose rebellion God permits to further ultimately divine purposes. In both cases, pre-modern plagues always occur because the guilt of human beings has justly merited the chastisement. The pestilence sent by Apollo at the beginning of The Iliad has already provided us with an example, and we might think of the plagues of the Old Testament too. ‘Beyond demons’, which were perceived according to Barbara Tuchman’s account of the fourteenth-century Black Death as immediate causes, ‘the final hand was God’s’.7 God uses the instrument of contagion for the transmission of his providentially punishing power. The two novels set in the seventeenth century, in particular, contain spokesmen for the view that Providence either directly causes or indirectly permits because it suits His purposes the propagation of plagues. So at the end of I promessi sposi Don Abbondio compares the pestilence to a whip (‘un gran flagello’) and a broom (‘una scopa’) that has swept away certain nasty people: ‘ “se la peste facesse sempre e per tutto le cose in questa maniera, sarebbe proprio peccato il dirne male; quasi quasi ce ne vorrebbe una, ogni generazione” ’ (XXXVIII). In the complacent analysis of Don Abbondio, it is not clear, to be sure, whether God or sheer good luck has provided the punishing and cleansing instrument. The far less cheerful grocer Stephen Bloundel of Old Saint Paul’s has, however, no doubt at first about the direct involvement of the hand of God: leading his family in prayers, ‘he acknowledged that this terrible visitation had been justly brought upon [the city] by the wickedness of its inhabitants; that they deserved their doom, dreadful though it was’ (I:i). The conviction, frequently echoed throughout the novel, regarding the extreme sinfulness of restoration society and the angry justice of God receives its sternest expression in the harangues of the fanatic Solomon Eagle: ‘ “Yon city has sinned so deeply,” ’ he thunders typically, ‘ “that it is the will of Heaven it should be destroyed” ’ (V:i). A famous passage in Bleak House appears similarly to support a view of the pestilence as an appropriate retribution for sin. Although ‘the will of
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‘Our feverish contact’
Heaven’ receives no direct credit, some moral power is in the contagion, guiding it in the direction (again from east to west and from low to high) of the guilty parties. The part of the city personified as Tom-all-alone’s, so abominably neglected in its squalor, ‘has his revenge’: Even the winds are his messengers, and they serve him in these hours of darkness. There is not a drop of Tom’s corrupted blood but propagates infection and contagion somewhere. It shall pollute, this very night, the choice stream (in which chemists on analysis would find the genuine nobility) of a Norman house, and his Grace shall not be able to say Nay to the infamous alliance. There is not an atom of Tom’s slime, not a cubic inch of any pestilential gas in which he lives, not one obscenity or degradation about him, not an ignorance, not a wickedness, not a brutality of his committing, but shall work its retribution, through every order of society, up to the proudest of the proud, and to the highest of the high. Verily, what with tainting, plundering, and spoiling, Tom has his revenge. (XLVI) Shelley’s The Last Man similarly includes episodes in which claims are made for the morally retributive purpose of the plague. Along with its destructive force, the plague seems in such episodes to empower, as in the cases of Don Abbondio and Solomon Eagle, a mistaken religious fervour. ‘During the whole progress of the plague’, Shelley’s narrator reports, ‘the teachers of religion were in possession of great power; a power of good, if rightly directed, or of incalculable mischief, if fanaticism or intolerance guided their efforts’ (III:iv). The novel contains instances, chiefly, of the latter, as a certain ‘impostor’ attempts – in vain naturally – to guide the contagion towards his detractors and away from his followers. At what may be the only point in the story in which the contagion takes on a metaphorical meaning, religious fanaticism is seen itself to spread like the plague. The followers of the impostor are said ‘to inhale the pestilential atmosphere which adhered to his demoniac nature’ (III:v). Except in the passage from Bleak House, attempts to read providential significance into the plague are discredited, and most often the pestilence advances without the justifying aura of a moral retribution. God’s power may not be present in the contagion, and the novels contain elements that call the operations of providential justice itself into question. Ainsworth’s god-fearing grocer Bloundel thus comes to doubt his original interpretation of the plague as retribution. He responds uneasily to the assertion of Leonard, his apprentice and the suitor of his daughter Amabel, that God has spared him because of his ‘piety’: ‘I have placed my trust on high,’ rejoined the grocer, ‘and have not been forsaken. And yet many evil doers have escaped. Amongst others –’
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‘I know whom you mean, sir,’ interrupted Leonard, with some fierceness, ‘but a day of retribution will arrive for him.’ (V:ii) In fact, a day of retribution never does arrive within the novel for Amabel Bloundel’s ravisher, the Earl of Rochester. As in the case of ‘Tom’s corrupted blood’ that ‘shall work its retribution, through every order of society’, the avenging force often seems unjustly to strike the innocent and to spare the guilty. In Gaskell’s novel, Thurstan Benson, his sister Faith and their maid Sally discern similarly an implicit lack of justice in Ruth’s death and wonder ‘why they, the infirm and worn-out, were left, while she was taken in her lovely prime’ (XXXVI). The fear of the failure of providence haunts characters in the novels especially with respect to a threat that parallels the menacing contagion – a threat, that is, to the heroine’s virginity. As we have already noticed, the pestilence that breeds in degraded urban districts is frequently associated with an environment of illicit sexuality; the contagion may express itself as rape or seduction, with the possibly additional threat of venereal disease. The desperation of Renzo’s beloved Lucia, when she is kidnapped, leads her to make an extreme promise to the Virgin in return for some providential protection. (Like Renzo she fancies that one can bargain with Providence.) In Old Saint Paul’s the threat that the libertine Earl of Rochester poses for Amabel Bloundel arouses even more constant foreboding. When Rochester abducts her, the faithful Nizza Macascree, who has undergone a similar ordeal, can only utter an anguished hope for the girl ‘in his [Rochester’s] power’: ‘ “the same [higher] power that has watched over me I trust has protected her”, cried Nizza fervently’ (IV:iii). Unfortunately that higher power quite abandons the totally unprotected Ruth in Gaskell’s novel to the unholy power of Bellingham. And in A Strange Story the heroine Lilian is rescued at the last moment from the power of Margrave, but because public opinion believes that she has fallen, she is ostracized from polite society. As providence proves unreliable in such situations of sexual menace, the plague escapes as well from any providential scheme. If there is any ultimately divine purpose, as only the most stubborn providentialists can continue to believe, it remains well hidden. In this context the charisma of supernaturality that the contagious phenomenon retains would appear only to reveal the malice of an infernal agency unrelated to providence. The narrator of Ruth compares the pestilence with its sinister fascination to an infernal fire and to a rough beast. It is ‘a fire which had long smouldered’ and which now ‘burst forth in many places at once’. Like a dragon or serpent it has been biding its time: ‘there came creeping, creeping, in hidden, slimy courses, the terrible fever – that fever which is never utterly banished from the sad haunts of vice and misery, but lives in such darkness, like a wild beast in the recesses of his den’. Once more like the
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Dickensian contagion that begins in ‘Tom’s slime’, it spreads from low ground – ‘the low Irish lodging-houses’ – to higher places ‘among the well-to-do and respectable’ (XXXIII). Kingsley’s narrator dubs the cholera ‘Baalzebub’, and as a monster or dragon he moves about at his will in the chapter called ‘Baalzebub’s Banquet’ (XVII), enjoying one succulent victim after another. His first appearance suggests his unpredictable playfulness: ‘He had come suddenly, capriciously, sportively, as he sometimes comes; as he had come to Newcastle the summer before’. For a time he has remained invisible while ‘wander[ing] all but harmless about the West country . . . as if his maw had been full-glutted. . . . But he was come at last, with appetite more fierce than ever, and had darted aside to seize on Aberalva, and not let it go till he had sucked his fill’.8 In his craftiness he seems to know that people argue about what has caused him, and it delights him to confuse them. Some of his behaviour thus tends to confound Tom Thurnall’s sanitary arguments and to offer support to the providentialists: Up and down the town the foul fiend sported, now here, now there; snapping daintily at unexpected victims, as if to make confusion worse confounded, to belie Thurnall’s theories and prognostics, and harden the hearts of fools by fresh excuses for believing that he had nothing to do with drains and water, – that he was ‘only’ – such an only! – ‘the visitation of God.’ (XVII)9 For Ainsworth’s narrator the malevolent ‘visitation’ resembles an irresistible military invasion: For awhile the disease was checked by Fleet Ditch; it then leaped this narrow boundary, and ascending the opposite hill, carried fearful devastation into St. James’s, Clerkenwell. At the same time, it attacked Saint Bride’s; thinned the ranks of the thievish horde haunting Whitefriars, and proceeding in a westerly course, decimated Saint Clement Danes. Hitherto, the city had escaped. The destroyer had not passed Ludgate or Newgate, but environed the walls like a besieging enemy. (I:i) When the great fire breaks out, the besieging enemy advances even more implacably. It is of course the same enemy that has the ability in most of our novels to emerge as either pestilence or fire and to oscillate between the two guises.10 Leonard’s impression of the fiery outbreak recalls other nocturnal visions – the ‘very night’ in which Dickens’s ‘Tom’ propagates contagion up to ‘the highest of the high’ and the night in which Ainsworth’s ‘destroying angel’ is so ‘fearfully at work’.
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Now the invisibly moving contagion has burst into most spectacular visibility as it continues to spread irresistibly from house to house: ‘There lay the vast and populous city before him, which he had once before known to be invaded by an invisible, but exterminating foe, now attacked by a furious and far seen enemy’ (VI:iii). Possessing still the malevolent intelligence of the plague, the fire thwarts the feeble powers that would quench it: the fire, disdaining such puny opposition, and determined to show its giant strength, leaped over all the breaches, drove the water carriers back, compelled them to relinquish their buckets, and to abandon their engines, which it made its prey, and seizing upon the heaps of timber, and other fragments occasioned by the demolition, consumed them, and marched onwards with furious exultation. (VI:v) In the unholy glee of the advancing enemy we recognize it as the foe of Providence rather than an agency of divine retribution. Personified as a ‘skilful besieger’, this ‘irresistible and unrelenting foe’ also finds unexpected ways to entrap and mock the city’s ‘defenders’. In its indomitable, exulting malice, the fire even recalls Milton’s Satan, another energetically rebellious phenomenon of the 1660s that exerted a terrible fascination upon the Romantics during Ainsworth’s youth. Indeed Ainsworth may have bestowed romantically Satanic overtones on the exultant Solomon who virtually identifies himself with the conflagration that he has set: ‘Solomon Eagle, who was mounted upon a heap of ruins, witnessed this scene of destruction, and uttered a laugh of exultation as the flames seized upon their prey’ (VI:vi). Yet while not expressing simply a divine anger, the fire is not purely diabolical either. At one point Leonard’s vision of it fuses the divine and diabolical aspects of its power into a single aesthetic complexity. Having seen the Satanic grandeur of the blaze, he goes on to perceive in it a rainbow that must recall the providential promise to Noah too: ‘The fire seemed to form a vast arch – many-coloured as a rainbow, – reflected in the sky, and re-reflected in all its horrible splendour in the river’. As an aesthetic experience the vision is dissociated from its moral components, and whether one assigns it to a divine or an infernal cause ceases to matter. The beauty overcomes ethical considerations in Leonard’s approach to a Keatsian moment of negative capability: In spite of its terror, the appearance of the fire was at that time beautiful beyond description. Its varying colours – its fanciful forms – now shooting out in a hundred different directions, like lightning flashes, – now drawing itself up, as it were, and soaring aloft, – now splitting into a million tongues of flame, – these aspects so riveted the
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‘Our feverish contact’ attention of Leonard that he almost forgot in the sight the dreadful devastation going forward. (VI:iii)11
Besides the aspects of providential warning and diabolical threat, the fire, shooting in all directions, commands attention as a supreme instance of natural beauty. It is indeed a symbolic revelation of God, Satan and nature at work, and beyond those forces it reveals, as the contagion made visible, history in action. Of course the image, which mingles malignant intelligence with awesome beauty, is probably too romantic to suit the Jamesonian vision of history as implacable but impersonal and uncaused Necessity. The fire is not, indeed, the effect of Jameson’s absent cause, for we know who has ignited it. In the human causes, as in the fiery effects, we also recognize a perverse confusion of divine providence and demonic antagonist, which discredits both while not yet carrying us to Jameson’s stoic historical vision. The clearly wicked causative agents, who spread both the plague and the fire, claim to be collaborating with an angry God. But although their claims win credit in certain circles, they are really usurping the functions of providence and so remain God’s enemies. While the diabolical nurse Judith Malmayns of Ainsworth’s novel thus enjoys the plague as an occasion to plunder, spread the infection and kill, Solomon sees her as fitting into God’s pattern: ‘ “I look upon you as one of the scourges appointed by heaven,” ’ he assures her, to which she agrees, ‘ “it is my mission to destroy and pillage, and I will fulfil it” ’ (II:ix). With his own megalomaniac sense of a divine calling, Solomon further defines himself and his associates as ‘ “the chosen instruments of the divine displeasure” ’ when they set fire to the city (VI:i). Obstinately convinced as he is of God’s omnipotence, even the more humane Bloundel accepts such an interpretation. He attributes the ultimate cause of the conflagration to divine will rather than to freely acting human pyromaniacs: ‘ “Man may have kindled this great fire, but the hand of God is apparent in it” ’ (VI:iv).12 In Le Docteur Pascal the self-‘chosen’ candidate for the providential, incendiary cause is Félicité Rougon, the octogenarian mother of the protagonist. A bigoted Catholic, she wishes to fit the lives of all the members of her family into her own providential, historical scheme. Her vision of a respectable family, to which God, as First Cause, has transmitted from generation to generation a saving grace, conflicts radically with her son’s view of a family riddled with hereditary flaws. On the basis of his experiments and investigations, he has written his own scientific history of the family’s physical and moral contamination in the records preserved in his archives. With stubborn self-righteousness, therefore, Félicité has plotted for thirty years to destroy those archives, as if the destruction of her son’s written history would destroy the pestilential facts recorded as well.
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History is made and unmade, she believes, in the form of its written records. Just after Pascal’s death she succeeds. In yet another association of pestilence and fire, she exclaims that the papers to be burnt themselves amount to the plague and to hell: ‘ «c’est la peste, le déshonneur, et c’est l’enfer à jamais!» ’ And as her fire begins to rage, she eagerly fantasizes its flames as a divine counter-contagion that destroys the contagion breeding in the written documents: ‘ «Au feu! au feu! . . . si nous voulons être sûres de tuer la contagion du mal!» ’ For the next two hours she keeps crying in her exultation, ‘ «Au feu! au feu! . . . Ils brûlent, ils brûlent! . . . Enfin, ils brûlent donc! . . . Ah! quel feu, quel grand feu! . . . Ils brûlent, ils brûlent, c’est si beau!» ’ The conflagration flares so terribly, as she keeps stoking it with more and more papers, that the chimney catches fire and the house itself is in danger. But she would gladly burn many houses if need be to extirpate what the papers represent to her: ‘ «j’aurai brûlé la ville, pour sauver la gloire de notre famille!» ’ (XIII). If not literally, the conflagration becomes the metaphorical funeral pyre of her son, who lies dead in another room. She has intended the pyre as an auto da fé to make reparation for her son’s sins and to save his soul as well as the family reputation. Zola’s reader sees her, however, as a hypocritical perversion of providence and discerns in her fire the raging contagion itself rather than a counter-contagious phenomenon. Far from ensuring her son’s salvation, she has destroyed the work that he has considered the immortal part of himself and that would have secured his posthumous reputation on earth. Her fire has made her son into a martyr who will never receive the reward or the crown traditionally promised to martyrs hereafter. The blaze therefore casts a lurid glare upon the flushed and dishevelled Félicité and Martine, the servant assisting her, who resemble hags performing another ‘witch’s sabbat’ or danse macabre: ‘C’était un galop de sorcières, activant un bûcher diabolique, pour quelque abomination, le martyre d’un saint, la pensée écrite brûlée en place publique, tout un monde de vérité e d’espérance détruit’ (XIII).13 Ainsworth’s novel too concludes with a particular pyre to which conflicting interpretations apply – the purificatory burning of a heretic and the martyrdom of a saint. The great fire that Solomon has ignited culminates in the destruction of St Paul’s Cathedral, the core in his view of a heretical culture and a contagion to which his fire is a counter-contagion. The magnificently burning cathedral thus signifies for him at once the providential punishment of sin and his own martyrdom; he has precisely arranged this splendid selfimmolation for himself. It is his long-prophesied moment of triumph: the flames, which had long been burning in secret [within the cathedral], burst through the roof at the other end of the choir, and instantaneously spread over the whole expanse. At this juncture, [Solomon’s] cry of wild exultation was heard in the great northern
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As with Félicité Rougon’s exultant cry, ‘Ils brûlent, ils brûlent, c’est si beau!’, we do not share the sense of triumph. Félicité who would have burnt the entire city if necessary and Solomon who has burnt London are not saints, martyrs or knights of faith that have dared all on behalf of God. Solomon’s words have not really ‘come to pass’ in the sense of being ratified by some superior power. Nor are Solomon and Félicité finally recognized as romantically Satanic figures with a supernatural charisma. They are only unfortunately obsessed and dangerous human beings, whose actions reveal no powers at work superior to their own. Although their individual human power can apparently make a spectacular dent on history, they will ultimately be dishonoured and their ultimate intentions thwarted. The ‘ruses’ of history, as Jameson believes, turn the results of such actions ‘into grisly and ironic reversals of their overt intention’. Like the plagues, the fires do not therefore convince us that they are the direct effect of supernatural providence – or the indirect effect, as it operates through a permitted antagonistic agency. There remains, however, the possibility that in the operations of nature another form of providence, unconsciously friendly to humanity, may be at work. In their eagerness to see an ethical principle embodied in nature, our narratives support the theory of Andrew Blake that science never replaces religion in the nineteenth-century context: ‘Both continue to exist side by side in the press and in the whole culture’.14 Existing side by side, the discourses also contaminate one another – as, in this case, the providential principle seeps from the religious sphere into the biological sphere. In Darwinian terms, it becomes possible for observers like Tennyson to interpret an evolving nature not as ‘red in tooth and claw’ but as tending towards ever improved forms of life. Kingsley too, as an enthusiastic Darwinian, is able to fit ‘evolutionary theory into theology’: he makes ‘natural selection itself an agent of divine power’.15 In the person of his protagonist in Le Docteur Pascal, Zola takes the further step of locating the benign divinity entirely within the biological processes, inseparable from its agents. In forever multiplying vitality there exists his ‘God’, something like Wordsworth’s ‘joy’.16 Relating his theories to those of Darwin, Haeckel, Galton and Weismann, he has developed a magnificent faith in a deity that would not at first seem to possess intelligent consciousness: Le docteur Pascal n’avait qu’une croyance, la croyance à la vie. La vie était l’unique manifestation divine. La vie, c’était Dieu, le grand moteur, l’âme de l’univers. Et la vie n’avait d’autre instrument que l’hérédité, l’hérédité faisait le monde. (II)
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The instrument whereby God, Life, the local cause of everything, propagates itself is the ‘heredity’ that we have also seen as analogous in its selfreplicating function to contagion. Later biologists would discern the role not only of genetic but of other contagious mechanisms in the apparently unerring instincts that enable life to explore ever new ways to transmit and reinvigorate itself.17 The more specifically providential quality of the unselfconscious instincts becomes clear in Pascal’s efforts to explain life to his mother: ‘ «Je crois à la vie qui élimine sans cesse les corps nuisibles, qui refait de la chair pour boucher les blessures, qui marche quand même à la santé, au renouvellement continu, parmi les impuretés et la mort» ’ (IV). The healing energy of life is ever struggling within all the cells of the body to repair the damage and expel the noxious germs of the malignant contagion. In a sort of battle for territory it gains further strength when it emerges from the unconscious domain and enters the realm of human consciousness. This entrance occurs when it is recognized like other forms of providence retrospectively – as in the pattern of a Darwinian plot. As science slowly and patiently recognizes the life-truths, the human race will learn to cooperate consciously with them. Associated now with human rather than divine intelligence, la vie will, Pascal assures Clotilde (echoing Ernest Renan), progress beyond conflicts towards a utopian peace: «Je crois que la poursuite de la vérité par la science est l’idéal divin que l’homme doit se proposer. Je crois que tout est illusion et vanité, en dehors du trésor des vérités lentement acquises et qui ne se perdront jamais plus. Je crois que la somme de ces vérités, augmentées toujours, finira par donner à l’homme un pouvoir incalculable, et la sérénité, sinon le bonheur . . . Oui, je crois au triomphe final de la vie.» (II)18 In contrast with the vision of Munthe, Life thus triumphs over Death. But the triumph is also that of the providential principle perceived to be in the natural world rather than in the supernatural dimension. In the scientific perception of it, human beings also gain their ‘incalculable power’ to wrest from the gods the control of their destinies. The slow process of acquiring ever more truth and power, as Pascal describes it, is indeed the human task foreseen in the last act of Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound: We will take our plan From the new world of man And our work shall be called the Promethean. (IV:156–8) The Promethean citation recalls the importance of the imagery of fire in the novels. The spectacular fires that have suggested to some observers
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the manifestation of retributive divine justice become representations at other points of the vital energy that Pascal sees in natural organisms. But before examining these other fires in our texts, I wish to suggest a philosophical context in which the divine fire may be said to become domesticated or humanized. Associated most readily perhaps with Heraclitus, the impression of a fire that burns everywhere emerges very frequently in classical writing. Bishop Berkeley, whose treatment of the fire provides an especially pertinent example for our purposes, refers the notion to Plato, the Stoics, Cicero and Diogenes Laertes. An ‘æther or pure invisible fire . . . seems to pervade and expand itself throughout the universe[;] . . . equally fitted to produce and to destroy, . . . [it] keeps up the perpetual round of generations and corruptions, pregnant with forms which it constantly sends forth and reabsorbs’. Within man ‘the vital flame’ is also called the ‘calidum innatum’ while the fire raging throughout ‘the whole system of the world’ suggests how that system ‘is held together and informed by one presiding mind’.19 Presumably expressing the mind of God, the all-presiding fire would suggest the immanence of divine providence in history. In the fire of Prometheus Unbound, we may then discern the historical transition that we have been considering. The faith in divine providence (or more precisely, in Shelley, divine tyranny) gives way to the ability of humanity to locate a providential factor in nature. The ‘vaporous fire’ or ‘liquid light’ felt in Act IV to be active everywhere is, as Stuart Curran has shown, the fire that Prometheus has given to man. No longer expressive of the divine will, as during the tyranny of Jupiter in Act I, the fire expresses in Act IV the energies of ‘a creative anarchy’. The universe exemplifies ‘millions of magnetic fields harmoniously interacting’, a fiery medium in which human beings freed to love have substituted the power of their love for the divine force. The fire manifests still the ‘Necessity’ of natural law, associated with Demogorgon, but a necessity that is now freedom as well20 – a benign, humanized version, we might add, of Jameson’s historical Necessity. In a discussion of Jean-Louis Chrétien, Derrida considers a similarly ideal fire in which Chrétien first of all figures not human but divine love. It is unmotivated love that bursts out spontaneously and then seems, as one of Derrida’s examples of tangibility and contagion, to set the world ablaze – . . . une flamme qui enflamme . . . (transitivement) mais parce que d’abord elle s’enflamme elle-même. . . . Devenir-amour du désir aristotélien (orexis), parce qu’elle touche et affecte, la flamme signifie d’abord la spontanéité d’une causa sui la flamme s’enflamme d’elle-même, elle semble en tout cas prendre feu sans cause extérieure. En quoi elle est divine. Comme le Premier Moteur ou l’Acte pur, . . . le Dieu désirable qui se meut de lui-même et inspire le désir.21
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The First Cause is, however, again transformed into local causes. In Chrétien’s elaboration of it, the divine phenomenon becomes, as in the transition from Berkeley to Shelley, a humanized phenomenon. Without confessing it, Chrétien seems to Derrida to substitute the inflammatory hand of man for the hand of God: ‘La Passion du Fils, l’Incarnation, le Logos, la Transsubstantion, la Passion sont des substitutions appelant à la Substitution où à l’Imitation’. In this process – ‘un processus d’hominisation’ – the divine element, to be sure, remains: ‘c’est finalement et toujours déjà l’hominisation de Dieu, le don d’un Dieu qui se fait Homme. . . . Elle passe par cette «mort de Dieu» très chrétienne’. But Derrida admits his own temptation to view the humanizing process as completed, ‘une substitution sans sacrifice’.22 To proceed to the other fires in our novels, it is interesting to see them as humanized or, more exactly, naturalized versions of the earlier fires that have expressed possibly divine purposes. Unlike the Promethean fires or the fires of Chrétien, these naturalized fires do not, to be sure, express precisely the energy of love. Yet they do not lack, as instances of the plague do, a discernibly moral meaning and purpose. They possess even a non-divine providentiality that enables us to comprehend their operation and to learn ethical lessons from them. They show that nature upholds, even if unconsciously, its principles and punishes those that offend them. ‘ “Nature never forgives!” ’ exclaims Hippias, who memorably laments his dyspepsia in Meredith’s The Ordeal of Richard Feverel. The alcoholics of our novels, who abuse their digestive systems, will suffer exemplary punishment. Without crafty and malicious forethought, like that of the pyromaniacs, nature observes its laws and responds to offences automatically. The ‘spontaneity’ (in the term of Derrida) of the fires that destroy the alcoholics should be understood in this sense. They are nature’s version of the spontaneous combustion originally seen as the prerogative of the divine First Cause. Despite their apparent spontaneity and their moral significance, the fires derive as natural events from material causes. These causes do not involve incendiary agents but are nevertheless considered explicable in scientific terms. Our novels suggest this surprising causality in three instances of spontaneous combustion – the cases not only of the alcoholics, Dickens’s Krook and Zola’s Antoine Macquart, but also of the Australian bush in A Strange Story. ‘A fire which had long smouldered’, in Gaskell’s phrase, and ‘flames, which had long been burning in secret’, in Ainsworth’s reference to St Paul’s, suddenly ‘burst forth’ to incinerate the two alcohol-soaked men and the Australian wilderness. In the aesthetic economy of the novels, spontaneous combustion possesses not only a punishing moral significance but a poetic resonance. The doomed individual, in the first two cases, functions as a microcosm of a larger contagious pattern. While contagion in literal and other senses is being diffused through all the ranks of society, the smouldering internal
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fire is spreading from cell to cell within the individual organism. The process attacks and undermines the health of organ after organ, suggesting a metastasis, whereby in a Girardian sense the disease continually replicates itself. At length no healthy tissue is left to resist the sudden kindling of the long incipient blaze, and the entire physical body disintegrates into its few essential contaminated and contaminating components. The individual disintegration corresponds to the collapse on the social level of hierarchies and systems of identifying difference that occur during grand episodes of pestilence.23 The essential components that result from the disintegration belong to the three states – gas, liquid, solid – of matter. So as Weevle awaits ‘the appointed time’ to meet Krook in Bleak House, he first becomes aware of the gaseous element suggested by some of the most fetid smells in the novel. During a discussion with Snagsby, the latter pauses ‘to sniff and taste the air’ and they agree about the ‘queer kind of flavor in the place to-night’ and the ‘tainting sort of weather’. Later the phenomenon becomes not only olfactory but visual and tactile as Guppy touches a liquid substance on the walls: ‘A thick, yellow liquor defiles [his fingers], which is offensive to the touch and sight, and more offensive to the smell. A stagnant, sickening oil, with some natural repulsion in it that makes them both shudder’. The liquid and gaseous contagion emanates of course from the room downstairs, where there is a further ‘smouldering suffocating vapour . . . and a dark greasy coating on the walls and ceiling’. Finally they discover all that is left in solid form of Krook: ‘is it the cinder of a small charred and broken log of wood sprinkled with white ashes, or is it coal? O Horror, he is here!’ (XXXII). In Le Docteur Pascal Félicité Rougon witnesses the beginning of the combustion of her drunken brother-in-law, Antoine Macquart. Not quite spontaneous perhaps, the process has required a spark from the pipe that he is smoking, and soon afterwards Félicité finds him in a visibly smouldering state: la graisse suintait par les gerçures de la peau, activant la flamme qui gagnait le ventre. Et Félicité comprit que l’oncle s’allumait là, comme une éponge, imbibée d’eau-de-vie. Lui-même en était saturé depuis des ans, de la plus forte, de la plus inflammable. Il flamberait sans doute toute à l’heure, des pieds à la tête. Deciding in her disgust not to save him, Félicité escapes before the blaze fully bursts out, and on the next day her son arrives to discover a situation entirely similar to that in Bleak House.24 The entire uncle has been reduced to nauseating smells, grease and a few cinders: dès qu’il eut poussé, à gauche, la porte de la cuisine, une odeur affreuse s’en échappa, une insupportable odeur d’os et de chair
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tombés sur un brasier. Dans la pièce, il put à peine respirer, étouffé, aveuglé par une sorte d’épaisse vapeur, une nuée stagnante et nauséabonde. . . . Qu’était devenu l’oncle? Où donc pouvait-il être passé? Et, devant la chaise, il n’y avait, sur le carreau, taché d’une mare de graisse, qu’un petit tas de cendre, à côté duquel gisait la pipe, une pipe noire, qui ne s’était pas même cassée en tombant. Tout l’oncle était là, dans cette poignée de cendre fine, et il était aussi dans la nuée rousse qui s’en allait par la fenêtre ouverte, dans la couche de suie qui avait tapissé la cuisine entière, un horrible suint de chair envolée, enveloppant tout, gras et infect sous le doigt. C’était le plus beau cas de combustion spontanée qu’un médecin eût jamais observé. (IX) The physician Allen Fenwick observes an equally strange case, but his account of it is probably designed in Bulwer’s intention as an allegorical portrayal of man versus nature rather than as clinically accurate fact. In this case, the plague-stricken and dying Margrave requires a particular ‘elixir of life’ in order to counteract the contagion that is consuming all the cells of his body. The elixir, which derives from the essential vital energy or primary cause that propagates all forms of life, must be distilled, as it were, from the bowels of nature itself. To tear this essential element loose from the natural substances that contain it is to perpetrate a dangerous sort of violence against nature, which, in the terms of Meredith, nature may not forgive. Yet Margrave persuades Fenwick to take the risk, and they proceed one night to a cavern in the Australian bush that houses primitive forms of matter useful for their purpose. After six tense hours of labouring in some kind of alchemical process to extract and brew their elixir, Fenwick becomes aware of resisting and rebellious forces. These smouldering energies finally burst into visibility in a form, Fenwick recalls, that ‘daunted my eye and quickened with terror the pulse of my heart’: The Bush-land beyond was on fire. From the background of the forest rose the flame and the smoke, – the smoke, there, still half smothering the flame. But along the width of the grasses and herbage, between the verge of the forest and the bed of the water-creek just below the raised platform from which I beheld the conflagration, the fire was advancing, – wave upon wave, clear and red against the columns of rock behind, – as the rush of a flood through the mists of some Alp crowned with lightnings. (LXXXVII) The conflagration is spontaneous, I believe, in that while no particular spark ignites it a whole forest is suddenly ablaze. Still, it remains a natural
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phenomenon that is far from uncaused or arbitrary. The forced liberation by Fenwick and Margrave of a certain natural energy has induced a violent reaction like the explosion that results, as we know, from releasing the energy that holds atoms together. By a chain reaction, indeed, the violence is also propagated to the animal inhabitants of the forest so that birds, snakes and larger beasts seek in frenzy to escape. At first Margrave does not care about the explosively spreading, contagious havoc, hoping only to save himself. With a hubris like Solomon Eagle’s exultation in the destruction of London, he cries, ‘ “Let the world be one funeral pyre! What to me is the world?” ’ He cannot, however, avoid the implications of belonging to this world, and the ferociously stampeding herds knock him, Fenwick and their precious elixir to the ground: Suddenly, unawares, from behind, I was stricken down. Over me, as I lay, swept a whirlwind of trampling hoofs and glancing horns. The herds, in their flight from the burning pastures, had rushed over the bed of the watercourse, scaled the slopes of the banks. Snorting and bellowing, they plunged their blind way to the mountains. One cry alone, more wild than their own savage blare, pierced the reek through which the Brute Hurricane swept. At that cry of wrath and despair I struggled to rise, again dashed to earth by the hoofs and the horns. But was it the dream-like deceit of my reeling senses, or did I see that giant Foot stride past through the close-serried ranks of the maddening herds? (LXXXVII) Although that mysterious Foot suggests a supernatural agency, it too symbolizes, probably, some aspect of the usually invisible forces of nature. Neither divine anger nor diabolical malevolence participates in the natural reaction that frustrates human attempts to defeat disease and mortality. The spilt elixir seeps back into the soil, into the blind and unconscious dimension of the operations of nature, and Fenwick recognizes the ineluctable claims of mortality. Shortly thereafter Margrave dies in the due pathological course of his disease. In both their surprising spectacularity and in their normal guise, natural occurrences have served to enforce the necessary limitations of the human condition. The emphasis upon inescapable mortality seems to contrast with Pascal’s insistence upon the irrepressible triumph of life. But in Bulwer’s novel too, it may be something like la vie that triumphs. Life defeats the attempt to reduce it into a reified elixir that human beings can then manipulate for their own selfish purposes. In this sense, the Australian fire also differs from the spontaneous combustion of Krook and Macquart. Whereas the combustion of the latter has suggested the flaring into visibility of the long smouldering disease, the bush fire implies the outburst of the hitherto invisible energy of healthy life. Or else, and more probably,
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the fires typify a natural energy that is involved in both death and life, disease and health, contagion and counter-contagion.25 The triumphant energy that burns – in general invisibly – in nature may not evince, however, the providential friendliness towards humanity that Pascal has apparently discerned in it. Since nature pursues in its unconscious operations no prefixed design beyond the blind instinct to perpetuate and replicate its own forms, our retrospective attribution of a benign causality reflects simply our own wishes. It is the same wishfulfilling tendency that has doubtless informed our recognitions of providence in the supernatural dimension. Still, while we must do without supernatural or natural forms of providence, the novels do not discredit the human desire to create ethically meaningful patterns in their retrospective writing of history. The narratives define areas in which human freedom and moral responsibility can respond to the historical disasters, in terms suggestive of Jameson’s own way of mitigating his pessimism. Narrating episodes of ‘a single and great collective story’, the stories develop what Jameson calls ‘a single fundamental theme’ – ‘the collective struggle to wrest a realm of Freedom from the realm of Necessity’. This great historical narrative, which evidently relates to Lyotard’s ‘récit de l’émancipation’ as well, lends a human dignity to the perceived effects of history. Although Necessity must continue to triumph, humanity can redefine, interpret – indeed humanize – its triumphs with some degree of creative freedom.26 Although the struggle for liberation is collective, a few individuals may take a particular responsibility for leading it in quiet, unassuming ways. With none of the power of divine providence, they still exercise an imperfectly providential function by rescuing others, wherever possible, from conditions of captivity. I promessi sposi assigns such a function especially to Fra Cristoforo and the Cardinal Federigo Borromeo. They obviously enact the providential role more effectively than poor Renzo does in his almsgiving. In Ruth too, a clerical figure, Thurstan Benson, performs the providential task in rescuing the heroine and helping her wisely – and sometimes unwisely – at every step thereafter in her career of self-redemption. Bleak House may provide, however, the most interesting version of an imperfectly human providence in John Jarndyce. As in the case of the ‘providential aesthetic’, his benevolence operates usually in concealment, and only in retrospect do Esther and others come to recognize the many instances of its constant propagation. At one point, in a remark that we may come to distrust, he also refers to a higher providence than his own: ‘ “Trust in nothing but in Providence and your own efforts” ’, he advises Richard: ‘ “Never separate the two” ’ (XIII). But the novel otherwise casts doubt upon the reliability of that ‘Providence’. One must not, at least, rely irresponsibly upon a rescuing figure, as the selfishly passive Skimpole always does, just as one should place no hope in chance or Chancery. The providential power associated even with Jarndyce encounters continual
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challenges and checks. This ‘grim’ novel manifests, as Vargish concludes, an unresolved ‘tension between cosmic absurdity and providential order’, and it is the Dickensian novel ‘in which the threats to divine order are most radically posed’.27 Certainly with particular respect to the plagues men and women must cease to expect any signs of a divine order. The collective struggle for liberation entails here the precise denial of causality in terms of the will of God. If the plagues also represent the ‘realm of Necessity’, a certain freedom may be wrested from that Necessity by asserting a human share in the responsibility for the pestilential outbreaks. So Kingsley’s Tom Thurnall opposes, with his sanitary projects, the proponents of providence, who consider his reforms impious and vain attempts to obstruct the divinely-willed cholera. According to old Dr Heale, the cholera is ‘ “jidgment, sir, a jidgment of God, and we can’t escape His holy will, and that’s the plain truth of it” ’. It transpires, however, that the providentialists do not themselves nourish any great respect for ‘His holy will’ as transmitted in the pestilence; their respect conceals a more fundamental economic motive. The powerful families of the town own cottages and do not wish to be put to the expense of draining them and instituting other hygienic reforms. In alienating those families and the local health authorities, Thurnall seems incidentally to resemble Edwin Chadwick, upon whom Kingsley may have based him in these episodes.28 Heale will not, in any case, offend the local powers that be by supporting Tom’s proposals before the Board of Guardians: ‘And what be you thinking of, sir, to expect me to offend all my best patients? and not one of ’em but rents some two cottages, some a dozen. And what’ll they say to me if I go a routing and rookling in their drains, like an old sow by the wayside, beside putting ’em to all manner of expense? And all on the chance of this cholera coming, which I have no faith in, nor in this new-fangled sanitary reform neither, which is all a dodge for a lot of young Government puppies to fill their pockets, and rule and ride over us.’ (XIV) Hypocritically selfish interests involving money and class status have already undermined any genuine respect for divine providence, and Tom realizes again the desirability of redefining conceptions of justice, sin and guilt. Like others engaged in the struggle, he substitutes for outworn appeals to God, as the provider of authority for human actions, an assertion of human freedom to reformulate moral principles. But while eliminating the God in whom he does not at this point believe, his new moral imperatives still saves, curiously, a place for the devil – a devil nevertheless reduced to a human scale. With an incongruous remnant of Calvinist fervour, he explains to the Anglican vicar, in a passage already quoted in part, what his ethical system condemns:
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‘You hate sin, you know. Well, I hate disease. Moral evil is your devil, and physical evil is mine. I hate it, little or big; I hate to see a fellow sick; I hate to see a child rickety and pale; I hate to see a speck of dirt in the street; I hate to see a woman’s gown torn; I hate to see her stockings down at heel; I hate to see anything wasted, anything awry, anything going wrong; I hate to see water-power wasted, manure wasted, land wasted, muscle wasted, pluck wasted, brains wasted; I hate neglect, incapacity, idleness, ignorance, and all the disease and misery which spring out of that. There’s my devil; and I can’t help it, for the life of me, going right at his throat, wheresoever I meet him!’ (XIV) The devil is involved in the contagion of waste, the proliferating breakdown of purposeful order, the tendency towards entropy, metastasis and undifferentiation. In the secularized, nineteenth-century version of a providential vision, as Peter Baldwin notices, ‘filth’ substitutes for ‘sin’ and ‘sewerage’ replaces ‘atonement’.29 For Tom the ‘sanitary sinners’ emerge as an even worse category of felons than offenders against the Ten Commandments. As responsible for the environment in which pestilence thrives, they bear a more fundamental guilt than that of the obvious criminals that later take advantage of the epidemic to plunder and kill. Against such sinners, the moral battle for a realm of Freedom may employ the collectors of waste products, the builders of sewers and the recyclers of manure.30 Bleak House too ascribes a special wickedness to the authorities responsible for public health. Resembling Tom Thurnall’s anger, the controlled rage of Dickens’s narrator thus echoes biblical denunciation in insisting that ‘Verily . . . Tom has his revenge’ against the great of the land. Similarly the direct apostrophe, echoing a passage in Bulwer’s Lucretia, to the authorities of church and state when Jo dies denounces them as hypocrites that precisely lack ‘Heavenly compassion in your hearts’ (XLVII).31 The human or local cause of the waste, dirt, ignorance, disease and misery that Jo embodies is located, among established institutions, in Chancery, which like Kingsley’s cottage-owners fails to administer responsibly its decaying properties. Referring ironically to ‘Chancery’s transcendent wickedness’, Jarndyce thus implies his own version of a moral system in which the old devil’s ‘transcendence’ is actually reduced to immanence within sanitary and other human ‘wickedness’. Behind the objectively deplorable sanitary conditions that cause diseases lies a still more fundamental subjective cause, the devil that exists within human desires and motivations. That devil is, in a sense, a debased and corrupt version of the old providence. Whereas believers used to trust in the justice of a transcendent providence, they now trust in the mock justice of a Chancery that will fulfil their greedy desires for inherited and unearned wealth. Chancery has become a system, like a lottery or other
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game of chance, that offers hopes of gain to those that invest in it. (It recalls the provvidenza of Renzo’s naïve faith when he contributes his last coins to the beggars.) In actuality the final justice, the Day of Judgement which Miss Flite awaits, will never arrive. Chancery, as Esther and honest people ‘all over England’ know, meanwhile enriches lawyers and other members of a mafia that perform mutual favours and breeds the qualities that Tom Thurnall so hates. Attending one of its sessions, Esther experiences a sense of vertigo, ‘to see all that full dress and ceremony, and to think of the waste, and want, and beggared misery it represented; to consider that, while the sickness of hope deferred was raging in so many hearts, this polite show went calmly on from day to day, and year to year’ (XXIV). The ‘full dress and ceremony’ and the ‘polite show’ ‘while the sickness . . . was raging’ recalls indeed the episodes of dancing that we have seen as paralleling the spreading contagion. Among the principal victims of Chancery, Richard falls literally ill from the ‘subtle poison’ by which, says Jarndyce, ‘his blood is infected’ (XXXV). Instead of advising Richard to trust ‘in Providence and your own efforts’, he should perhaps have reduced the admonishment to trusting simply in ‘your own efforts’. A lesson is surely that human beings should free themselves of superstitious and paralysing dependence upon forms of providence and take responsible control of themselves and their environment. In doing so, they may at least diminish the ravages of the physical and moral pestilence and liberate territory for a realm of Freedom. To exercise human responsibility in times of pestilence involves not only combating particular types of sin and wickedness but also practising particular virtues. The plague that offers an occasion for rapacity, cowardice and arrogant auto-celebration like Solomon Eagle’s offers as well an opportunity for generosity, bravery and humility. In this sense, as Francesco Di Ciaccia argues with reference to I promessi sposi, the plague resembles any other historical event. While carrying no divine message and no moral meaning in itself, it becomes a field upon which men and women can respond with free and morally meaningful action.32 Like all assertions of existential freedom, these actions may constitute challenges to the traditional, theologically defined virtues. So the response of the dedicated scientist Dr Pascal Rougon to an epidemic of cholera may even arouse suspicion of his lack of human compassion. The cholera has offered him a quantity of cadavers of pregnant women to dissect.33 Because of this opportunity he has been able to study the human embryo and the development of the foetus at almost each day of its growth. His observations have contributed importantly to his theorizing about the genetic principles that regulate the transmission of characteristics from one generation to the next (II). Similarly he treats himself during the last painful day of his life as a medical specimen to be observed as dispassionately and clinically as possible. In the course of a series of heart attacks, his minute descriptions of particular sensations and symp-
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toms are to be recorded exactly by the attending physician for the sake of their scientific interest. The moral virtue of such a clinical response to disease derives from the benevolence of Pascal’s goals. The scientific task to which his life and his death are devoted will serve the cause of freedom by liberating other human beings from needless suffering and constraint. In the other novels the pestilence provides chances for less surprising forms of generous altruism. The heroine of Lavinia, who fears that her life has lacked any moral significance, blesses the moment that inspires her to become a nurse – ‘the very day, indeed, on which I learned what an amount of misery there was in the world’. The Crimean situation offers her ‘a still wider sphere of usefulness and self-sacrifice’ than she would have ‘in the hospitals of London’ (II:xviii), and so she embarks with many other women for the East. These women may succumb, to admit possible suspicions again about the motivations, to a sort of phenomenon of mass moral contagion. Or it may be mass counter-contagion in that they propose to combat the cholera and other medical emergencies in the Crimea. The narrator observes that ‘all female England would have gone en masse, if allowed’ (II:xix), and other sources too indicate the delirious desire of the moment to imitate Florence Nightingale.34 Still the novels evidently intend to portray the many physicians and nurses that accept the opportunity for generous humanitarian service as heroically free actors rather than victims of mass hysteria. Besides self-sacrificing altruism, the pestilence can bring out an instinct of bravery – as well, of course, as the more normal instinct of cowardice. These instincts too can be transmitted contagiously from individual to individual. It turns out that such psychological contagion influences the course of the disease itself, which is not therefore a purely determinist natural phenomenon. So in Two Years Ago the terrified or cowardly and conscience-stricken inhabitants of Aberalva die more quickly and surely than do the other more psychologically hardened members of the community. The Methodist preacher’s hell-fire sermon frightens many of his auditors literally into dying, and when he is made to feel remorse, his own guilt hastens his own end. We find according to the preacher Benson in Ruth too that ‘ “tremulous passion will predispose you to take the fever” ’, and before deciding to become a nurse, Ruth examines her own degree of tremulousness: ‘ “I believe that I have no fear. That is a great preservative, they say. At any rate, if I have a little natural shrinking, it is quite gone when I remember that I am in God’s hands!” ’ Unfortunately, in the present context, the appeal to the providential hands may not bode well, and despite her entirely virtuous bravery Ruth will, alas, die. She contracts the fever, however, after the period of her service in the hospital during the worst phase of the epidemic. In that period her bravery also proves infectious in helping others to avoid the dangerous ‘tremulous passion’: ‘to her it was owing that the overwrought fear of the town was subdued; it was she who had gone voluntarily, and, with no thought of
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greed or gain, right into the very jaws of the fierce disease’ (XXXIII). As a heroine of freedom she has confronted the dragon in his own den and freed some of his captives. A last example of a virtue that the pestilential environment may call forth is resignation. Resembling the Goethean Entsagen that appeals to so many moralists of the nineteenth century, it involves none of the defiance that bearding the dragon in his den may entail. When Renzo learns that the plague has struck Lucia, his anxiety about her fate leads Fra Cristoforo, at one of the most morally significant moments of the story, to reprove him. Renzo must prepare himself serenely to accept any fate at all, and ‘ “a lodar Dio, qualunque sia l’esito delle tue ricerche” ’ (XXXV). Whatever happens, he should, that is, praise a God that no longer has the characteristics of a humanly coherent or comprehensible Providence. One must not hope or pray for any particular rewards from such a God, whose possible interventions in human affairs may be presumed but never precisely detected. As Bulwer’s Fenwick realizes too, in the precisely similar circumstance of not knowing whether his beloved and stricken Lilian will live or die, only a single sort of prayer is admissible: ‘I prayed that my soul might be fitted to bear with submission whatever my Maker might ordain’ (LXXXIX). If one still believes in that Maker, one must not only bear submissively but, according to Fra Cristoforo, humbly praise him amidst natural disasters and in any circumstances at all. Far from jubilant, such praise amounts to an internal quietude wherein, beyond just enduring, one lives freed of anxiety, hope and desire. Wrested from the Necessity of the plague, this quietude too belongs to a realm of Freedom to which most of the protagonists accede in one way or another.35 Although Renzo and Fenwick will find just after these moments that their beloved wives have recovered, the moment of resignation in the other stories occurs more often in connection with deathbeds. In the realm of Freedom, which has here become a purely private mental state, the Maker to whom Renzo and Fenwick submit exercises scarcely any divinely teleological function. Nothing indicates that this Maker, who eludes our understanding, is making or ordaining anything with any purposeful forethought. Rather than intelligent determination, his ordination is apparently to be identified with that of mysterious, uncaused Necessity or random, uncaused chance. He may equally well and indifferently ordain life as death, either of which must be accepted, almost without preference, by the human subject that is here reduced to an equally passive indifference. As implied in Fenwick’s version of a doctrine of the imperfect, God may in such a guise have effectively withdrawn from history, even if Fenwick as scientist perceives teleology in nature. Recognizing God’s absence ‘here’, Fenwick simply longs to find him in the ‘Hereafter’. It has become therefore inaccurate to attribute the term Maker to such a God.
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More importantly creative than such a Maker, are then the human makers that can make their own peace independently of God. From the materials, the Necessity of histoire, such makers construct, always narrating in retrospect, the récit that belongs to Jameson’s ‘great collective story’ or Lyotard’s ‘récit de l’émancipation’. The récit defines the more or less probable and local human causes and responsibilities – for the outbreaks of cholera, for example – that are otherwise absent from the histoire. Here Jameson might also distinguish the récit of the ‘great collective story’ from the merely private récit of a wife’s death or recovery. The latter may refer to what Jameson considers ‘a purely individual, a merely psychological project of salvation’ and so not belong to the more ‘political’ realm of Freedom that chiefly interests him. While our novels concern, as we have seen, both private and collective projects, the last part of this chapter will consider an especially important instance of the collective type. In this episode of the pestilence, all eight novels narrate an implicitly political account of the succumbing of Providence to the local causes of history. *
*
*
The stricken community seeks in this collective episode to heal itself by performing a placating or reparative gesture towards Providence. But the community has lost touch with the tradition in which such ritual gestures were once efficaciously performed. The ritual is thus enacted as a result of some subliminal, misunderstood compulsion and celebrated without conviction and in a fragmentary manner. Without leading to a collective healing, the episode reveals chiefly that the community no longer believes in the Providence that once possessed the power to respond to such gestures. The placating or reparative acts belong again to a pattern that Girard has noticed. The ‘mythical plague is never present alone’ but triggers both the process of disintegration and reparative rituals that counteract it: there is always ‘a thematic cluster that includes various forms of undifferentiation and transgression, the mimetic doubles, and a sacrificial theme that may take the form of a scapegoat process’.36 It is then in this sacrificial scapegoat process that the community gestures towards the absent Providence. To free itself, it associates the plague with a guilt that is loaded onto the goat expelled into the wilderness. Although the guilt may not derive from offences against divine law, the sacrifice expresses an obscure hope of appeasing some divinity. The sacrificial victim, according to Girard, cannot validly be reproached for any particular individual guilt, and he or she may be chosen at random. For the ritual to have effect, however, the community must believe in the guilt of the victim, whose sacrifice will then serve as a catharsis. The accounts of mob violence during the seventeenth-century plagues recall the more primitive versions of the superstitious search for scapegoats. The episodes also happen to include the marking of house-fronts, as if in allusion to the passover ceremony of marking houses with the
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blood of lambs or goats during one of the Egyptian plagues.37 In Ainsworth the mob foolishly directs its fury against the authorities that have marked and shut up houses in which the plague has broken out. In Manzoni too the targets of popular wrath are the markers of house-fronts, but of another sort – the sinister untori that spread a greasy substance thought to propagate the contagion. During the mad ‘delirio’ of seeking the guilty hand behind the nocturnal applications of that mysterious grease, the most surprising names come up – Don Gonzalo Fernandez de Cordova, Cardinal Richelieu, the Count of Collalto, Wallenstein. The anxiety to pinpoint and punish the guilty becomes itself contagious: ‘la frenesia s’era propagata come il contagio’: Il viandante che fosse incontrato da de’ contadini, fuor della strada maestra, o che in quella si dondolasse a guardar in qua e in là, o si buttasse giù per riposarsi; lo sconosciuto a cui si trovasse qualcosa di strano, di sospetto nel volto, nel vestito, erano untori: al primo avviso di chi si fosse, gl’infelici eran tempestati di pietre, o, presi, venivan menati, a furia di popolo, in prigione. (XXXII) The narrator points out that this phenomenon of stoning and otherwise punishing scapegoats, as he evidently takes them to be, has occurred in all the plagues of history, of which he lists many examples.38 Not simply the victims of mob fury, the victims now undergo legally inflicted punishments too: ‘furon processati e condannati a supplizi, per lo più atrocissimi’ (XXXII). Sadly, for the narrator, the otherwise enlightened Cardinal Federigo shares the popular superstition that guilty untori are to blame. The cardinal believes, however, that the poor wretches actually punished are only innocent scapegoats and that the truly guilty parties have not been captured. Among the many innocent sufferers for the wickedness of Chancery, we find in the crossing-sweeper Jo of Bleak House a more poignantly narrated individual case. Constantly urged by the intimidating police to ‘move on’, he has embodied guilt and infection and been a candidate for lamb-like sacrifice or goat-like exile for his entire brief existence. (It seems reasonable here to associate sacrificed lambs with the figure of the scapegoat.) When Bucket and Snagsby seek him out in Tom-all-alone’s, they find in Jo’s habitat a contagion made apparent to all five senses. Their impression of the crowded slum may illustrate what Marshall considers a contemporary tendency to see ‘working class [crowds] as rampantly procreating bacilli’.39 The infernal journey carries them past the ‘fever-houses’ containing the ‘dead and dying “like sheep with rot” ’, and they draw back at one point as a corpse is carried by: ‘ “Here’s the fever coming up the street!” ’ cries Bucket. At length they manage to take custody of Jo who stands ‘trembling to think that he has offended against the law in not
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having moved on far enough’. Although inexplicably let off this time, after being forcibly conducted in Bucket’s ‘professional hold’ to Tulkinghorn’s ‘usual room’ for interrogation (XXII), he falls even more terrifyingly into the hands of the preacher Chadband. An imprecise premonition warns him that he will, sheep-like, undergo literal shearing or worse. As Chadband considers where ‘to station’ the victim ‘ “delivered over untoe me” ’, Jo is ‘not at all clear but that something practical and painful is going to be done to him’. Chadband threatens obscurely to ‘ “employ this instrument” ’, whereupon ‘Jo, apparently possessed by an impression that the reverend gentleman wants to cut his hair, shields his head with both arms, and is got into the required position with great difficulty’ (XXV). Later Bucket and Skimpole will expel him as if he were the fever itself or a ‘sheep with rot’ from the haven of Bleak House. Even the humane Woodcourt ‘shrinks back from him with a sudden horror’ in recalling that Jo has contaminated Esther with his fever. And when he is taken to the shooting gallery to die, both Woodcourt and Mr George recoil from him as an agent, like Manzoni’s untori, of contagion: [They] have an inclination to shrink from him, partly for what he is, and partly for what he has caused. He, too, shrinks from them. He is not of the same order of things, not of the same place in creation. He is of no order and no place; neither of the beasts, nor of humanity. (XLVII) His position beyond the pale of civilized and animal hierarchies makes him an especially appropriate scapegoat whose sacrifice can help restore the components of a diseased society to their own appropriate orders and places. In uniting to brand Jo with guilt, the rest of society may overcome what Girard calls ‘the epidemic of reciprocal violence’, whereby each individual anarchically brands everyone else as guilty.40 So the sacrifice of Jo can become a factor of social cohesion, and Jo cooperates in the operation by assuming the guilt, expressing penitence for it, and begging forgiveness. He asks to have written in very large letters in his will ‘ “that I wos wery truly hearty sorry that I done it and that I never went fur to do it; and that though I didn’t know nothink at all, I knowd as Mr Woodcot once cried over it and wos allus grieved over it, and that I hoped as he’d be able to forgiv me in his mind” ’ (XLVII). Unfortunately, the sacrifice of the scapegoat is not fully effective. When Jo dies, the narrator, as we have seen, reacts with a denunciation of the authorities in high places that are far more guilty than Jo. So the guilt is not removed, and as in Ainsworth and Manzoni too, the plague continues. Although far more dumb in all senses than the curiously eloquent Jo, the adolescent Charles in Le Docteur Pascal functions as a similar scapegoat. He is an unwanted illegitimate child, the result of the seventeen-year-old Maxime Rougon’s seduction of his stepmother’s femme de chambre. A
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decent marriage is arranged for her with a saddler, who cannot, however, abide his wife’s bastard son, and the awkward child is thereafter shunted about from relative to relative. Instead of gaining in wisdom as he matures, he falls back further and further into imbecility. His uncanny physical resemblance, as we have already observed, to the ancestral Tante Dide encourages tendencies to identify him as an embodiment too of the moral and mental degeneracy with which she has infected her race. Sent off to a college, he is euphemistically accused of unmentionable practices (‘vices inavouables’) and expelled after six months (III). Yet he possesses a dazzling angelic beauty and seems a personification of meek innocence too. His richly abundant bright hair suggests associations with lamb’s wool and also strikes the narrator as a royal attribute. Reminding us of poor Jo’s particularly felt need to protect his hair, Charles’s locks tend, indeed, to fascinate everyone, as when his aunt strokes them in a train compartment: Clotilde s’amusa à lui enlever sa toque, pour lustrer ses admirables cheveux blonds, sa royale chevelure dont les boucles lui tombaient sur les épaules. Mais elle portait une bague, et lui ayant passé la main sur la nuque, elle resta saisie de voir que sa caresse laissait une trace sanglante. (IX) The other principal characteristic of his body, besides his hair, is that tendency to bleed at the slightest touch: ‘On ne pouvait le toucher, sans que la rosée rouge perlât à sa peau: c’était un relâchement des tissus, si aggravé par la dégénérescence, que le moindre froissement déterminait une hémorragie’. In addition to a scapegoat he appears a dumb and still unshorn lamb ready to shed his blood. As we have seen in the first chapter, no external hand is required to shed that blood, for it flows forth, like the combustion of his great-grand-uncle Antoine, spontaneously. With scarcely a word or sign of protest – recalling the Biblical reference to Jesus and the dumbness of the sheep before her shearers41 – he seems like Dickens’s Jo quietly to accept his sacrifice. The ritual is performed, as it were, in a surreal silence that lasts for the many long minutes required for all his blood to be spilt. Although he and his great-great-grandmother have been left alone, a scream from one or the other would have procured immediate help. Yet neither stirs, as she watches in paralysed fascination the sacrifice that she has in some obscure way ordained. Too late, she cries out at last, and it appears that in her confused mind the bloodshed has been re-enacting the more noisily bloody slaughters of her lover Macquart and her grandson Silvère. That revolutionary grandson too has died as ‘la victime des haines et des luttes sanglantes de la famille’ (IX). We identify Charles then as the innocent scapegoat who is made to bear the guilt of all the generations of Rougon-Macquart and whose elimination may heal the epidemic of hatred and violence. But of course the
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family rancours continue. Although the death of the embarrassing Charles particularly relieves Félicité, the event does not placate the bitter antagonism between her and her son Pascal. In Lavinia the young mother of the protagonist Paolo Mancini has resembled ‘an early Christian virgin-martyr’ (I:iii) and has died as a result of enmities within a family every bit as wicked as the RougonMacquart. Her death a few months after Paolo’s birth has occurred, however, long before the beginning of the story, which does not really contain other innocent victims. Still something of the scapegoat pattern may exist in an association of Paolo with the biblical Samson, who was shorn, blinded and sacrificed in the epidemic of reciprocal violence between the Israelites and Philistines. The Israelites, we recall, wished to deliver their awkward hero over to the Philistines, as a sacrifice to end further bloodshed. At the end Samson cooperates in a perverse way to make a sacrifice of himself that will, at least according to Milton’s Samson Agonistes, produce a general catharsis – leaving everyone, in the final line of the chorus, ‘calm of mind, all passions spent’. With respect more specifically to Paolo, his misadventures involve betrayals at the hands of various Delilahs, including Lavinia herself who views him for much of the story as an enemy. When she breaks an engagement to meet him and attends instead an imperial ball at the Parisian Hôtel de Ville, his rage makes him notice that ‘a new-born power swells his heart, hardens his muscles, a power boundless for mischief. Oh! that this world were built on pillars, that he might drag them down, and bury all mankind under the ruins’ (I:xxvii). The police naturally prevent the wild-looking youth from rushing into the ballroom to pull it down in the manner of Samson in the Temple of Dagon. He collapses instead with a dangerous fever thought at first to be cholera. Making him a sort of Samson, duped by the triumphant Delilah, the attending physician bleeds him copiously and, as our first literally shorn victim, cuts off ‘all his fine hair’ (I:xxviii).42 There remain, as possible sacrificial victims, four of the heroines of our novels, but while they possess many of the requisites, their sacrifices are never quite efficacious. In a passage that compares Manzoni’s Lucia to a dumbly slaughtered sheep, the guilt-ridden Gertrude may imitate a scapegoat ritual, purging her convent by sending Lucia out to become herself a fallen woman. With her Judas-like kisses, Gertrude betrays, however, a guilt that is only increased and not expiated by her delivery of Lucia into the power of the ‘butcher’. No guilt can be attached to the victim, and Gertrude’s treachery can only parody a ritual sacrifice: Gertrude ritirata con Lucia nel suo parlatorio privato, le faceva più carezze dell’ordinario, e Lucia le riceveva e le contraccambiava con tenerezza crescente: come la pecora, tremolando senza timore sotto la mano del pastore, che la palpa e la strascina mollemente, si volta a
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Bulwer’s heroine Lilian Ashleigh comes closer to fulfilling the function of the scapegoat. She possesses the requisite innocence and yet comes unintentionally to bear, like the harmless Jo and Charles, some of the guilt of her environment too. The moral contamination, which most obsesses the ruler of that environment, Mrs Poyntz, emanates especially from the fallen woman and the libertine. She has plotted, for example, to prevent Lady Sarah Bellasis, ‘of the best manners and of the worst morals’, from settling on the Hill. But the undercurrents of guilty eroticism that are already subverting Mrs Poyntz’s proprieties come sometimes to the surface, as when Margrave plays the wild tarantella. Mrs Poyntz herself entertains a partially acknowledged, illicit love for Fenwick, and we learn that Miss Brabazon, whom Margrave has led into the dance, desires Fenwick too. When it transpires that Lilian has apparently eloped with Margrave, Mrs Poyntz decrees her banishment. Entirely innocent, but thought to be guilty, Lilian loses her reason upon receipt of an accusatory letter from the jealous Miss Brabazon, and Fenwick conducts her into a quite literal wilderness in Australia. But the expulsion of Lilian, as scapegoat, does not serve, of course, to restore any genuine health to Mrs Poyntz’s realm. While Lucia and Lilian certainly have no desire to suffer their sacrifices, Grace Harvey of Two Years Ago possesses a genuine vocation for martyrdom. Kingsley’s narrator, who despite his defence of the woman’s right to enjoy a passionate sexuality often betrays a certain chauvinism, refers to ‘that strange woman’s pleasure in martyrdom, the secret pride of suffering unjustly’. Grace’s favourite volume is the Book of Martyrs, which offers her ‘strange enjoyment, for she soon found that her intense imagination enabled her to re-enact those sad and glorious stories in her own person’: Many a night, after extinguishing the light, and closing her eyes, she would lie motionless for hours on her little bed, not to sleep, but to feel with Perpetua the wild bull’s horns, to hang with St Maura on the cross, or lie with Julitta on the rack, or see with triumphant smile, by Anne Askew’s side, the fire flare up around her at the Smithfield stake, or to promise, with dying Dorothea, celestial roses to the mocking youth, whose face too often took the form of Thurnall’s; till every nerve quivered responsive to her fancy in agonies of actual pain. (X) Tom in particular offers her an opportunity for imaginative indulgence of the eros of physical agony. Knowing that Tom suspects her, unjustly, of having stolen his fifteen hundred pounds (for once the woman’s sup-
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posed crime is not sexual) she wishes herself back in the good old days: ‘ “then I should have been tortured, and have confessed it, true or false, in the agony, and have been hanged” ’ (XIV). But even before Tom’s advent, a persuasion of her own Christ-like mission has also convinced the townspeople to relate her to this most efficacious of all biblical scapegoats.43 They recognize both her charismatic power over others and her submission to the force of other personalities, whereby she identifies with sinners in clear instances of mimetic doubling: ‘Her deep melancholy was believed to be caused by some dark fate – by some agonizing sympathy with evil-doers; and it was sometimes said in Aberalva – “Don’t do that, for poor Grace’s sake. She bears the sins of all the parish” ’ (II). She comes especially to feel an ‘agonizing sympathy’ for her wicked mother and to bear her sins. The discovery that her mother has stolen the money from Tom provokes in her a flood of painful compassion like nothing that she has experienced before: Amid the most torturing horror and disgust of the great sin, rose up in her the divinest love for the sinner; she felt – strange paradox – that she had never loved her mother as she did at that moment. ‘Oh, that it had been I who had done it, and not she!’ And her mother’s sin was to her her own sin, her mother’s shame her shame, till all sense of her mother’s guilt vanished in the light of her divine love. ‘Oh, that I could take her up tenderly, tell her that all is forgiven by man and God! – serve her as I have never served her yet! – nurse her to sleep on my bosom, and then go forth and bear her punishment, even if need be on the gallows-tree!’ (XXVI) The fantasy of bearing the sins of another and being crucified for her sake continues as, barefoot, she carries her fainting mother over rocks towards their home and mentally enacts a Via Crucis: ‘slowly she bore her homeward, with aching knees and bleeding feet; while before her eyes hung the picture of Him who bore His cross up Calvary’ (XXVI). Her persuasion that she is soon, like Christ, to die echoes that of Eva in Uncle Tom’s Cabin, who indeed actually dies, as Vrettos believes, in ‘an imitation of Christ’s own neuromimetic sacrifice’.44 Despite her passionate desire for martyrdom, however, that fate eludes Grace, and the passage goes on to narrate instead the death of the terrified and evidently consciencestricken mother. Although the epidemic of cholera has almost ended, the mother suddenly shows all the symptoms and dies within forty-eight hours as the last victim – creating thereby a certain logical confusion. While the death may be read as the sacrifice that brings the epidemic to an end, the mother has not possessed the innocence required to grant the scapegoat its efficacy. The wrong woman has died. In Ruth Mr Benson appears, when the illegitimacy of Leonard becomes
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public knowledge, to propose the boy for the role of Christian scapegoat. Mentioning again the detail of the ‘bleeding feet’, he urges Ruth to encourage her son to follow Christ along the Via Crucis: ‘ “Tell him of the hard and thorny path which was trodden once by the bleeding feet of One” ’ (XXVII). The pattern receives its most significantly large application, however, in the heroine herself, who is both essentially innocent and technically fallen. Like Paolo Mancini’s mother and Grace Harvey, Ruth is associated from the beginning, I believe, with ‘an early Christian virginmartyr’ – namely, St Agnes in her incarnation as Keats’s Madeline. We notice on the third page of the story, for example, Gaskell’s version of the effect of the cold January moonlight as it passes through an old stained glass window and illuminates the virgin. There is ‘a grand carved oaken staircase, lighted by a window of stained glass, storied all over with armorial bearings’: ‘Up such a stair – past such a window (through which the moonlight fell on her with a glory of many colours) – Ruth Hilton passed wearily one January night, now many years ago.’45 Meeting her future lover while a ball is in progress, she will also come that night specifically to dream of him, and later they will elope. In Gaskell’s version of the Keatsian story Porphyro thus becomes a vile seducer while the betrayed Madeline preserves a kind of spiritual virginity. Despite that innocence, Ruth is banished by Mrs Mason and ostracized at the inn in Wales from which she must flee with Benson to Eccleston.46 There in the shearing of her ‘fine long curls’, which remind us of the magnificent hair of Charles and Paolo, she also becomes like one of the shorn lambs offered to St Agnes.47 The shearer is the servant Sally, who thus prepares the victim’s head (in an action that contrasts with Bellingham’s crowning of Ruth with water-lilies) for a widow’s cap: Sally produced the formidable pair of scissors that always hung at her side, and began to cut in a merciless manner. She expected some remonstrance or some opposition, and had a torrent of words ready to flow forth at the least sign of rebellion; but Ruth was still and silent, with meekly-bowed head, under the strange hands that were shearing her beautiful hair into the clipped shortness of a boy’s. . . . [Sally] gazed into the countenance, expecting to read some anger there, though it had not come out in words; but she only met the large, quiet eyes, that looked at her with sad gentleness out of their finelyhollowed orbits. Ruth’s soft, yet dignified submission, touched Sally with compunction. (XIII)48 This lamb or scapegoat thus freely accepts her guilt and her sacrifice. With what Francesco Marroni considers her vocation for martyrdom, she also continues, repeatedly and coherently, to enact the role of the innocent victim.49 The most harrowing repetition will occur when she becomes
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governess of the younger daughters in the Bradshaw household. Learning to his amazement of her fallen condition, Mr Bradshaw believes that the most infamous possible contagion has entered his home and pronounces a terrible sentence of expulsion: ‘He held the street door open wide; and said, between his teeth, “If ever you, or your bastard, darken this door again, I will have you both turned out by the police” ’ (XXVI). Like Jo, Ruth ‘is of no order and no place’ in the hierarchies of civilization, and she must accomplish her exile to its ultimate degree. An exile more grim, that is, awaits her than that of the unfortunate girl Pasley, upon whom Gaskell based Ruth’s story, who emigrated, like Bulwer’s Lilian, to Australia. She becomes a nurse to the outcasts of the fever ward and finally decides to tend the stricken Bellingham, who had first communicated to her, along with her pregnancy, the supposed moral contagion. This time his contamination produces the fatal typhus, of which she becomes the last victim. She dies without complaint, ‘display[ing] no outrage or discord even in her delirium’, the innocent sacrifice whose death may be supposed to appease the mysterious gods. Her death does help restore peace to the community. Humbled by the discovery of his own son’s criminality, the stern Bradshaw repents, rejoins Benson’s congregation, and seeks to make reparation to Ruth’s son. Yet all is not well in terms of the Girardian pattern. Whereas the community should believe in the guilt of the expelled goat, absolutely no one now considers Ruth sinful. Rather than being removed, a heavy sense of guilt weighs upon the surviving community. Remorse haunts not only Bradshaw but others for the wrongs done to Ruth, which they recognize too late, and the physician Mr Davis, in particular, confesses his own guilty responsibility: ‘ “Don’t add to my self-reproach” ’, he begs Benson; ‘ “I have killed her. I was a cruel fool to let her go” ’ (XXXV). They can only hope that the wrongfully slaughtered lamb will forgive and bless them, a hope to which the verses from Revelations that Benson reads at the funeral may give oblique expression: ‘ “These are they which came out of great tribulation, and have washed their robes, and made them white in the blood of the Lamb. . . . The Lamb which is in the midst of the throne shall feed them, and shall lead them unto living fountains of waters, and God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes” ’ (XXXVI). The sacrificed Lamb is not only Jesus, who will comfort Ruth, but also Ruth herself, who will comfort and lead others to God. An impression lingers, however, that her death has insufficient inner logic; it has been a gratuitous punishment that has not been required for healing the wounds of the community. Indeed according to the well-known opinion of W.R. Greg in 1859 and often repeated since then, Ruth has been made to atone not for others’ sins but for her own non-existent sin.50 The thrust of the story has emphasized the absence of genuine guilt in her original, ignorant fall and the fullness with which she has long since made reparation for the supposed guilt.
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In all eight novels, the ‘scapegoat process’ or pattern of the lamb’s sacrifice occurs in defective ways and fails to produce a catharsis. While some compulsion prompts repeated enactment of the ancient blood sacrifices that secure the benevolence of Providence, the intuitive logic of those rituals has lost its power to convince and has broken down. The inefficacy of the ritual gestures betrays, I believe, mainly the absence of the Providence to which they ought to refer. The situation provides an instance of the nineteenth-century split between conscious belief and unconscious intuition, which receives famous expression in Tennyson’s opposition of ‘freezing reason’ to ‘a warmth within the breast’. Our novels appear, however, to reverse the Tennysonian pattern by locating the ‘freezing’ voice of denial not in the conscious mind but in the intuitive dimension. On the intentional and conscious level the stories profess faith, sometimes with noisy rhetoric, in the providential aesthetic, but on a subterranean level, a conflicting intuition undermines that faith. Exemplifying one of its typical ‘ruses’, history is here producing an effect that is the reverse of what the actors intended to cause. From our own retrospective view, at least, the subversive intuition triumphs: there is, it announces, no God to be offended, no God to send pestilential retribution, and no God to be ritually appeased. Or if such a God exists, he lies concealed and silent behind the many possibilities for interpreting the contagious presence in the historical moment. Although Girard affirms the inevitability of the instinct to sacrifice scapegoats in narratives of contagion, its persistence also indicates an anachronistic element in the nineteenth-century moral context.51 In the case of Ruth, as we have seen, its presence in the story may constitute an aesthetic blunder as well. To redeem the absurdity of chance, or of uncaused history, a new moral view is replacing the providential faith in the efficacy of ritual sacrifice. The sins that abound in the world are no longer those that outrage divinity but sanitary sins and other affronts to the environment and to human solidarity. The collective narrative of liberation must therefore bring out the patterns whereby human beings unaided by Providence have been able to transmit generous and brave impulses to one another within the pestilential conditions. The pestilence will continue, but as Girard also suggests, it is possible to harness the good aspects of the contagious or mimetic principle in the service of social integration rather than disgregation. Fortunately, in their retrospective making of history, our novels do realize this creative possibility. In many of their episodes human beings choose not simply to load guilt onto one another but to assume individual and collective responsibilities for the painfulness of Necessity. The ‘great collective story’ or ‘récit de l’émancipation’ to which these episodes pertain may also be the grand meta-narrative that Arthur Schnitzler has described. ‘Il est peut-être permis’, says Schnitzler in a passage from Beziehungen und Einsamkeiten that Baudrillard cites in French,
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‘d’interpréter l’histoire de l’humanité comme un éternel combat contre le divin qui, en dépit de sa résistance, est peu à peu, et par nécessité, détruit par l’humain.’52 Again and again, this narrative reveals the interesting ambiguity of history: while Promethean humanity slowly liberates territory from the divine tyranny, it is always ‘nécessité’ that presides over the process.
3
Swordsmen and needlewomen
As portions of a collective narrative, the novels aspire at some points to a lofty overview of humanity suffering in the vast, unbounded expanse of an historical moment. The expanse is especially, in the thesis of this study, a field of contagion as when Ainsworth’s Leonard looks out at that night in London: ‘a night . . . so calm, so beautiful, so clear, that it was scarcely possible to imagine that it was unhealthy. The destroying angel was, however, fearfully at work’. Sometimes, as we have noticed, the vision surveys not only a field of contagion but a battlefield on which struggles are underway to wrest areas of Freedom from Necessity. And other metaphorical terms help as well to convey an impression of the large historical forces. Elaine Scarry translates the contagious process that Girard sees as social disintegration and reintegration into the universal activity of ‘unmaking’ and ‘making’. The redemptive or ‘making’ power, which we have already associated primarily with the human maker, is pre-eminently, for Scarry, the capacity of ‘imagination’. In Scarry’s overview of the unmaking/ making process the historical expanse also ceases to appear unbounded. The imagination works precisely to maintain protective barriers for beleaguered humanity – ‘not here and there, now on, now off, but massive, continuous, ongoing, like a watchman patrolling the dikes of culture by day and night’. The vision of the cultural dikes curiously echoes Sir Leicester Dedlock’s fear that ‘ “the floodgates of society are burst open” ’, but Scarry’s presiding watchman remains constantly vigilant to prevent such a catastrophe. He is himself invisible, for the ‘imagination is self-effacing and often completes its work by disguising its own activity’. The watchman can only be intuited retrospectively, as in the versions of providence that we have noticed in the previous chapter. He is an absent cause, a mythical figure that is imagined to be coordinating the activities of the many individual imaginations, or minor watchmen, each at work to patrol a section of the dikes.1 The figure of the invisible watchman inevitably recalls Foucault’s Surveiller et punir, which documents the emergence in the late eighteenth century of a new vehicle for the exercise of social control. Instead of exerting physical compulsion to enforce social discipline, society learns to
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apply the policing power of watching. The members of society come to believe that they are being forever watched by an unseen eye, like the prisoners in Bentham’s Panopticon. In general that impression of being under observation, which also encourages self-observation, proves sufficient to discourage antisocial transgression.2 Existing nowhere and everywhere throughout the social fabric, this fictitious eye disciplines with an all-permeating power. It operates as an irresistible contagion or, more precisely, counter-contagion, enforcing tendencies towards order and integration in ‘une société toute traversée et pénétrée de mécanismes disciplinaires’.3 On the metaphorical field of penetrating visionary forces, which is a version of the field of contagion, the imagination that ‘makes’ naturally encounters the vision that ‘unmakes’ and opens gaps in the dikes. In correspondence to the unseen, disciplining eye of the Panopticon, there are eyes that are hostile to culture and imagination. Such eyes resemble those of Keats’s ‘philosophical’ Apollonius, whose gaze sees through imaginative creations and annihilates what it looks at.4 In Bleak House we find ‘the gaunt eyes in the shutters staring down upon the bed’ of the dead Nemo (X) that suggest, according to Jeremy Tambling, the eye sockets of a death’s head.5 Nothing in themselves and staring at ‘No one’ (XI) – indeed like Esther’s doll ‘staring . . . at nothing’ (III) – they remind us of the nullity of human life, which the plague too reduces to its final undifferentiation. The threat of dissolution also comes in the form of eyes to haunt Bulwer’s Fenwick. Just before the spontaneous conflagration that we have observed, during the night in which he and Margrave seek to brew the elixir, glaring eyes initiate the incineration: About this time I saw distinctly in the distance a vast Eye! It drew nearer and nearer, seeming to move from the ground at the height of some lofty giant. Its gaze riveted mine; my blood curdled in the blaze from its angry ball; and now as it advanced larger and larger, other Eyes, as if of giants in its train, grew out from the space in its rear; numbers on numbers, like the spear-heads of some Eastern army, seen afar by pale warders of battlements doomed to the dust. (LXXXVI) These ocular ‘spear-heads’ resemble the eye of Apollonius – ‘the sophist’s eye’ in Keats’s poem that, ‘like a sharp spear, went through [Lamia] utterly’. But whereas the threat to Lamia’s reality may be metaphysical, Bulwer’s simile implies a cultural peril: an army of oriental visual energies may dissolve to dust the cultural vision of the ‘pale warders’ of the west. From the orient, as we have seen, comes the contagion against which the west must defend itself and also in opposition to which define itself. The weapons employed, it is now clear, must include not only sanitary measures and military force (spears) but vigilant eyes. The ‘pale
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warders of the battlements’ and vigilant defenders of the ‘dikes of culture’ may be further identified in this period with what D.A. Miller labels, in an all-purpose term, ‘the police’.6 The police are known especially for their eyes, as in the case of Detective Bucket in Bleak House. With his ‘most attentive eyes’ Bucket becomes especially similar to the hidden watchman in the tower of the Panopticon when he secretly surveys the crowd at Tulkinghorn’s funeral: Quiet among the undertakers and the equipages, and the calves of so many legs all steeped in grief, Mr Bucket sits concealed in one of the inconsolable carriages, and at his ease surveys the crowd through the lattice blinds. He has a keen eye for a crowd – as for what not? – and looking here and there, now from this side of the carriage, now from the other, now up at the house windows, now along the people’s heads, nothing escapes him. (LIII) Not knowing which carriages are empty and which contain an observer, Hortense would do well to watch her step. She comes under the surveillance, moreover, not only of Bucket but – as the observer observes another observer in action – of his wife. The visionary task is occurring with varying degrees of effectiveness, indeed, through many eyes at once. Diffused throughout society, the policing agents belong not only to the ranks of the official enforcers of law. On the ocular field the skirmishes are often gendered. As the reference to Keats’s Apollonius suggests, the male gaze seems readily to abash the female power of vision. Hall, who emphasizes the dynamism of ‘looking’ and ‘staring’ in Victorian texts, notices that women like Tennyson’s Lady of Shalott and Browning’s Duchess suffer punishment for daring to look about themselves too freely. In patriarchal regimes women are evidently to be seen rather than to see. Frequently represented as the object of the male gaze, the female becomes, in the analysis of Simone de Beauvoir, a commodity. And for Luce Irigaray the ‘knowing, fixing’ male gaze functions as a ‘deeply entrenched, normatized mechanism for the exercise of patriarchal power’.7 It is nevertheless possible, as will be discussed later in the chapter, that the most powerful observers are watchwomen rather than watchmen. Such women may release one another from the imprisoning patriarchal vision, as happens, Hall believes, when Miss Wade wins Tattycoram over to her view of things in Little Dorrit: ‘the spread of ocular disease between women’ leads to their spurning of male authority.8 The disease also spreads to men insofar as they must respect the arbitresses of society. Usually armed with their sewing needles, vigilant women spot danger signs and collaborate to make and impose the system of cultural proprieties and values of what is called the ‘world’. But to leave aside, for the moment, the ocular dimension of the
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disease, the first part of this chapter returns to the military domain, where the aggressively spreading contagion is associated with the sword. By containing episodes of swordsmanship, our novels continue to propose what Foucault and Miller consider the older regime of social control – physical compulsion rather than the subtler compulsion of watching. The tendency within the novels supports, to be sure, the newer regime because the proponents of physical force, the swordsmen, are most often discredited as valid makers or upholders of the cultural order. Still, as the two parts of this chapter devoted to swordsmen and to needlewomen will show, the unmaking/making functions can neither be fully disentangled nor be referred neatly to gender roles. And here too, as we have seen in the conceptions of providence, the newer regime does not completely replace the older one. Initially the swordsmen appear more often to unmake than to make. In I promessi sposi it is the army of the emperor, we recall, that diffuses the plague in its invasion and plundering of Lombardy. But the country has already been infested for many generations by the armed bands of bravos that figure so prominently right from the opening episode in Manzoni’s story. They are an endemic social pestilence, resembling ‘malattie ostinate’ resistant to all the antidotes applied by helpless legal authority in ever increasing doses (I). In similar association with the outbreak of the plague, Old Saint Paul’s portrays lawless conditions that permit swordplay to abound even more spectacularly than in I promessi sposi. The principal swordsmen, belonging to the band of the young Earl of Rochester, recognize no legitimate restraints to their libidinous desires. Authority breaks down elsewhere too as the spread of the plague seems to permit outlaws to reinforce their claim to uninhabited territory: ‘a band of highwaymen, by whom [Hounslow] heath was infested, had become more than usually daring since the outbreak of the pestilence, and claimed a heavy tax from all travellers’ (III:vii). The lawless violence of the swordsmen and the inroads of the plague stem from the same pathological syndrome. The unmaking swordsmen are spreading in their own way the wasting desolation of the plague. On the moral level, the syndrome informs the contagious process whereby the bravo mentality corrupts hitherto law-respecting mentalities. Before the opening of Manzoni’s story, the man that becomes Fra Cristoforo has thus picked up the virus of thinking and then acting in violent terms. And within the story the same infection begins to spread, as Jameson has pointed out, from Don Rodrigo to Renzo. Other youths too, like Leonard in Old Saint Paul’s, despair before the growing impotence of legal authority and are tempted to become violently anarchic themselves. In the case of Manzoni’s Don Abbondio and evidently of most other timid figures, the corruption leads not to violent defiance but, which is even worse, to a servile capitulation to illegal power. The legal structures and social hierarchies threaten, as Girard has observed of situations of plague, to collapse altogether.
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In spreading contagious impulses towards social collapse, the heirs of the unmaking swordsmen will, to anticipate briefly, become the unarmed members of the legal profession itself. The corruption of legal practitioners already begins in the stories set in the seventeenth century, and in passing to the eighteenth century, we may cite the supposed lawyer Scout of Fielding’s Joseph Andrews: ‘ “the utmost that was in the power of a lawyer, was to prevent the law’s taking effect” ’ – a power that lawyers seem frequently to have practised. But men like Scout, says the narrator, are not genuine lawyers: ‘They are the pests of society, and a scandal to a profession, to which indeed they do not belong; and which owes to such kind of rascallions the ill-will which weak persons bear towards it’ (IV:iii). In the nineteenth century, however, the genuine lawyers have become precisely like Scout and really are ‘the pests of society’ – precisely the heirs of Manzoni’s bravos. Such pests include Vholes in Bleak House, a novel in which the legal atmosphere of Chancery, far from debilitating the pestilence, enables it actually to flourish. The lawyers properly belong, though, to a later phase of our argument, and the present chapter concerns the swordsmen, the armed social pests that continue indeed to thrive in all of our novels. Besides their other predatory actions, they wreak their havoc through two types of campaigns in particular. The first involves plots to take captives, often innocent virgins, with the intent sometimes of violating them. The motif, which the previous chapter has mentioned in the providential context, is also related to the Gothic trope of the female held captive in a castle-like fortress.9 In the second type of campaign the swordsmen do not defend the fortresses containing their female captives but rather besiege and break into other fortresses. The besiegers may desire simply to despoil or gain possession of other treasures. The parallel between the assaults of the swordsmen and the assaults of the plague, both directed against the healthy integrity of individuals and of legal institutions, often remains merely implicit. Yet I trust that in the ensuing discussion the parallel will always be intuited. The swordsmen of the novels set in the seventeenth century naturally require more literal and old-fashioned prisons for their captives than prisons like the Panopticon that feature a regime of watching. In I promessi sposi the plot of Don Rodrigo and his band to capture Lucia results in her incarceration in the most impregnable of the fortresses in the novels, the castle of the innominato. In Old Saint Paul’s the scheme to secure possession of the desirable Amabel requires the swordsman first to penetrate her home. Feigning a sword wound upon his first appearance in the story, Rochester manages to require the medical help that will gain his admittance to the house. Later Amabel is held prisoner in a fortress that is impervious even to royal authority. One of her jailers, Sir Paul Parravicin laughs, ‘drawing his sword’, at Leonard’s ‘ “I command you, in the King’s name, to deliver up this girl” ’: ‘ “The King has no authority here,” he said’ (IV:iii).10
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Against the aggressive, unmaking swordsmen that recognize no higher authority, morally ‘making’ forces, as we may consider them, sometimes defend the oppressed victims. These defenders include Fra Cristoforo, who in his own violent youth has formed a band of bravos to protect the weak and downtrodden. Provoked once into a sword fight over a futile question of precedence on a public path, he has found himself constrained to slay a rival captain of bravos. Since then, however, the horror of himself as a murderer has prompted him to give up the sword and to take holy orders. His imaginative vigilance now guards persecuted innocence, in accord with what Foucault considers the new regime, in invisible ways. With other cappuccini he has established an intricate, secret network of intelligence and mutual loyalties that functions as a nonviolent and generally effective counter-mafia. So when he plots to save Lucia from the band of Don Rodrigo, his success should not surprise readers: ‘Chi domandasse come Cristoforo avesse così subito a sua disposizione que’ mezzi di trasporto, per acqua e per terra, farebbe vedere di non conoscere qual fosse il potere d’un cappuccino tenuto in concetto di santo’ (VIII). In a far less admirable and far more visible version of a counter-mafia, Ainsworth’s Solomon Eagle claims arrogantly that Heaven has armed him and his band to combat God’s enemies. Discovering Rochester and Etherege with the captured Amabel in St Paul’s, Solomon rushes against them and ‘hurl[s] them backwards with almost supernatural force’: ‘When they arose, and menaced him with their swords, he laughed loudly and contemptuously, crying, “Advance, if ye dare! And try your strength against one armed by Heaven, and ye will find how far it will avail” ’ (II:vii). On another occasion, which recalls Fra Cristoforo’s quarrel about precedence on a public thoroughfare, Solomon plants himself in the middle of the road down which two horsemen are galloping in pursuit of Amabel: ‘Seeing . . . that he did not offer to move, they opened on either side of him, and were passing swiftly by, when, with infinite dexterity, he caught hold of the bridle of Rochester’s steed, and checking him, seized the Earl by the leg, and threw him to the ground’. The same fate overtakes the other rider, Parravicin, who has drawn his sword. Solomon ‘nothing daunted . . . uttered a loud cry, which so startled the knight’s high-spirited horse, that it reared and flung him’ (III:vi). The result is once more to establish his superiority to the swordsmen and to rescue Amabel. Tom Thurnall’s turbulent past has involved him too in many violent scuffles and hairbreadth escapes in areas of the world ruled, in the nineteenth century now, by the lawless sword. In America, such adventures have occurred not only in the Wild West but in the southern slave-holding states. He has helped the beautiful young slave Marie to escape to freedom in Canada. In connection with Marie, indeed, the novel devotes much angry attention to the violence of institutionalized slavery. Episodes like those involving the captivity of Lucia, Amabel and Marie
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continue to occur even in the stories set in nineteenth-century Europe, under the new regime of supposedly subtler forms of compulsion. In A Strange Story the menaced virgin is the heroine Lilian. The intricate conspiracy of Margrave to capture her involves first the preventative neutralization of Fenwick by securing his wrongful arrest for murder. While languishing in an official prison, Fenwick understands that his secret jailer is Margrave to whom he must give certain assurances before being released. Later a peculiarly mysterious version of a sword is produced that will allow Margrave to gain possession of Lilian herself. He handles, that is, a wand that along with phallic implications functions as an instrument of psychic violence. When pointed in Lilian’s direction, it permits the concentrated power of Margrave’s will to suppress hers and to attract her even across many miles towards him. To release her, Fenwick must fight, in this case physically, for possession of that wand, which he can then use against Margrave.11 Beginning with Skimpole’s arrest for debt at the hand of ‘Coavinses’, Bleak House contains episodes involving both the literal and the metaphorical taking of captives. In that first episode the literal prisoner is Skimpole, who makes such inauthentic claims about his own childlike innocence, but Esther recalls ‘that Richard and I seemed to retain the transferred impression of having been arrested since dinner’ (VI). Esther is arrested, however, not only by Coavinses but, according to Alison Milbank who discerns Gothic patterns here, by patriarchal authority and held in a house ‘itself Gothically imprisoned in the grip of the past’.12 Subsequently, Lady Dedlock comes to feel that she is virtually the prisoner of Tulkinghorn, in a form of captivity that also involves, as in the other novels, a sexual threat. In a scene that Kucich characterizes as ‘psychological rape’, Tulkinghorn seems sadistically to exult in his power over her, a sadism that she describes to him in her own question: ‘ “I am to drag my present life on, holding its pains at your pleasure, day by day?” ’ (XLI).13 With even more explicit reference to imprisonment, Tulkinghorn establishes a similar power over Hortense by repeatedly brandishing the key that comes, as an instrument of phallic hostility, to resemble Margrave’s sword-like wand. ‘ “Look, mistress,” ’ he finally states, ‘ “this is the key of my wine-cellar. It is a large key, but the keys of prisons are larger” ’, and he gloatingly holds out the prospect of her ‘ “being locked up in jail” ’ (XLII). To escape the power of that key, she uses an arm supplied in a sense by the old soldier George, in whose gallery she has apparently learned to shoot. Among the many virgins threatened with sexual violence, she thus becomes the only one to react with a corresponding violence against her captor. (Like Hortense, however, Ruffini’s Lavinia also enjoys shooting during the lesbian phase of her life at the villa of the Marchesa Juanita, becoming thereby not only a needlewoman but a sort of swordswoman.) Besides ‘Coavinses’ and Tulkinghorn, the arresting officers include
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Detective Bucket, who takes George Rouncewell into custody in an incident that emblematically indicates the wily detective police superseding the bluff old-fashioned swordsman. He arrests George not because he believes him guilty but because his imprisonment may further the discovery of the true assassin of Tulkinghorn. As in the case of Fenwick’s arrest in A Strange Story, the opportunistic capture of the man is a first step towards the capture of a woman (Hortense), who is the principal object of Bucket’s interest. The events leading to the arrest of Hortense thus associate her curiously with innocent virgin-victims of kidnappings while they associate Bucket with the villainous bravos. Hortense believes herself of course to be badly used, first by Tulkinghorn and then by Bucket when he at last arrests her. She must submit to Bucket in another scene that suggests, according to John Kucich, the man’s assertion of an unwanted sexual intimacy.14 He enjoys locking her wrists, first one and then the other, as a definitive act of possession: ‘Now, my dear, put your arm a little further through mine, and hold it steady, and I sha’n’t hurt you!’ In a trice Mr Bucket snaps a handcuff on her wrist. ‘That’s one,’ says Mr Bucket. ‘Now the other, darling. Two, and all told!’ (LIV) The reference to ‘one’ and ‘two’ and Hortense’s subsequent mention of Lady Dedlock (‘ “Can you make a honorable lady of Her?” ’) may remind us that Hortense (two) is repeating the dishonouring experience of Lady Dedlock (one). Having been sadistically humiliated, these doubled women both take their place among the many female victims that unscrupulous armed men have trapped. But in another part of the house – for Alison Milbank one more version of the Gothic castle15 – Lady Dedlock is determining to escape apparently imminent arrest for the murder of her persecutor. So Bucket will soon be commissioned to pursue her as well, and his ‘Two, and all told!’ proves premature as an indication of the final count. A count of the casualties among the participants in the various campaigns to capture women reveals about seven deaths. Three are among the ranks of the male persecutors – Don Rodrigo and Margrave, who both die later of the pestilence, and Tulkinghorn, who dies, as it were, in action. The plague kills Don Rodrigo’s opponent, Fra Cristoforo, too. As for the female losses, the pestilence claims Amabel (who dies in captivity) and Ruth (who has been Bellingham’s prey) while Lady Dedlock evidently perishes from exhaustion or contagion emanating from her lover’s grave. Hortense, who will remain a captive, may also be referred to the casualties. In contrast to these victims, four of the women who have been captured manage to escape or to be released. These are Lucia, Nizza, Marie and Lilian, who are living happily in freedom at the end of their stories. As a
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whole, then, the outcome of these campaigns does not indicate a clearcut victory for one side or the other. In addition to the capturing of prisoners, the novels show the swordsmen involved in another unmaking type of campaign. This operation, which may also tend to end without a clearcut victory, is the storming of fortresses. Although these strongholds sometimes resemble the imprisoning structures that we have been noticing, they may also be enclaves of freedom or pockets of health in a plague-ridden world. Some of them may amount to small sections of Scarry’s ‘dikes of culture’. The imagination must guard these structures tirelessly by day and by night because they are as permeable as the individual human beings threatened in the first type of military operation. While not figuring in our principal texts, the most paradigmatic of these fortified pockets of health is the ‘castellated abbey’ of Poe’s ‘The Masque of the Red Death’. Prince Prospero and his guests seek protection in ‘this . . . extensive and magnificent structure’ from the pestilence that is ravishing his dominions: A strong and lofty wall girdled it in. This wall had gates of iron. The courtiers, having entered, brought furnaces and massy hammers and welded the bolts. They resolved to leave means neither of ingress or egress. . . . The abbey was amply provisioned. With such precautions the courtiers might bid defiance to contagion. Yet contagion in the impalpable shape that is an emptiness beneath its ghastly costume does penetrate the stronghold. The sword comes into play here in the form of the dagger with which the prince attacks the spectre: ‘There was a sharp cry – and the dagger dropped gleaming upon the sable carpet, upon which, instantly afterwards, fell prostrate in death the Prince Prospero’. (One recalls the death of Wilde’s Dorian Gray that results from his stabbing of the portrait.) A parallel is implied between the contagion and the drawn dagger as weapons used in a duel. But the contagion that kills the besieged chatelain and his guests is stronger than any sword. The same pattern emerges in Ainsworth when the grocer Bloundel shuts himself and his family up in their spacious house as a way to avoid exposure to the raging contagion. He lays in ample provisions, blocks up all the windows and locks all the doors. Like the godly Noah, he hopes to ride out the flood that may destroy the wicked world, and in fact the sign that has hung above his shop has featured the Old Testament ark.16 But the enemy begins in many guises to menace his house. A stricken neighbour breaks out of the house to which the authorities have confined him and attacks with his sword the watchman employed by Bloundel. Without a watchman to guard the house, it becomes more vulnerable to Rochester and his cohorts who make repeated stealthy attempts to break in. When
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two of them actually batter the barricaded shop door, the apprentice Leonard has himself let down in a basket from an upper-storey window so that he can repel them. This action unfortunately exiles him henceforth from the fortified house because Bloundel applies the iron rule that nothing and no one from the outside can now enter or re-enter the premises. Amabel becomes the next casualty of the siege conditions. Although the plague has not yet touched her, she has been contaminated by her illicit infatuation with Rochester, which is frequently likened to the plague itself. So she pines away in her captivity, causing her family to fear that she is dying. Since her health clearly requires fresh air and a change of scene, her parents send her too into exile in the country. Thus she becomes susceptible again to the unscrupulous Rochester and to the pestilential infection. The ark continues to protect the rest of the family and servants, and Bloundel’s desperate experiment may appear a partial success when after six months of imprisonment he re-opens the house.17 But although the plague has now abated, the prisoners recover their freedom in a sadly changed and depopulated city. The loss of Amabel too naturally mitigates their satisfaction, and in the following year the fortress that has resisted the plague and armed attacks will be reduced to cinders in the fire. In this particular case, the fiery agency is not the great conflagration but an individual fire kindled by Rochester’s underling, Pillichody, whom a servant promptly shoots to death. Pillichody’s fire has probably only anticipated by a few hours, though, the arrival of the large conflagration, which possesses all the cunning of ‘a skilful besieger’ (VI:vi). The besieging force thus combines the crafty powers of the plague, the fire and the human swordsmen in an unholy alliance against which no fortress can hold out indefinitely. George’s Shooting Gallery in Bleak House is another site of battle and a fortified refuge like the ark of Bloundel. As a battleground, it may provide opportunities chiefly for toy skirmishes. The retired soldier who no longer fights real battles has created there a field on which frustrated victims of the Chancery contagion like Gridley can vent their anger in harmless firing. While aiming at inanimate targets, Gridley pretends to be attacking the Lord Chancellor and a whole impalpable army of injustice, and he achieves possibly therapeutic victories. There Richard Carstone in his futile military phase takes lessons and pretends to be improving as a swordsman and marksman. Yet it is more than a toy battleground too in that the murderous Hortense, as we have seen, may actually have learned there to shoot effectively, and other victims really do die there. Recognizing the subversive health of the shooting gallery (amidst the Chancery contagion), Bucket indeed lays siege to it while in pursuit of Gridley. In contrast with the situation in Ainsworth, the swordsman is now inside the fortress, where he must defend his beleaguered companions from a new sort of attack that does not employ traditional weapons. The
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modern detective Bucket makes use, that is, of a disguise whereby he conceals his violent intentions behind the peaceful appearance of the physician.18 His penetration of George’s defences occurs too late to allow him to arrest Gridley but in time to witness his death. When the pursued Jo ‘moves on’ for the last time, he arrives as well at the gallery and falls there as another victim of the superior force of Chancery. Finally George himself is captured the day after Jo’s death – not in his own gallery but just after visiting the domestic fortress of Bagnet, another retired swordsman whose honourable intentions are irrelevant to modern times. Bagnet’s fortress falls too, as it were, when infiltrated by the ubiquitous Bucket disguised this time – the contagion can take many forms – as the purchaser of a ‘ “second-hand wiolinceller” ’ (XLIX). The angry or noble dreams of obtaining justice or reparation for wrongs that the shooting gallery has encouraged dissolve before the irreducible, all-penetrating contagion of Chancery. The gallery is shut up, and the sword, wielded now not by bravos but by decent soldiers, proves impotent before a symbolic weapon – the jewelled mace of the Lord Chancellor. In the perception of Miss Flite, however, ‘ “the Mace and Seal upon the table” ’, are ‘ “cold and glittering devils” ’ that do not assault fortresses or propagate contagion in the usual way. The new regime that disdains physical compulsion has found in the glittering mace an unmaking weapon that may be likened to the psychically potent wand of Margrave. Instead of being brandished in an attack, it remains fixed and attracts the prey to itself. Its contagion operates in reverse – not, that is, by imposing sickness upon the victims but by draining out, in a vampiric process, their health.19 The mace and seal have, Miss Flite tells Esther, a power to ‘draw’: ‘ “Draw people on, my dear. Draw peace out of them. Sense out of them. Good looks out of them. Good qualities out of them. I have felt them even drawing my rest away in the night” ’. The house of the Flites has fallen too in this strange assault: ‘ “First, our father was drawn – slowly. Home was drawn with him” ’ (XXXV). Then her brother, her sister and finally Miss Flite herself have been drawn. Another sort of fortress, Bleak House in its original and reproduced versions, may offer greater protection than the shooting gallery or the home of the Flites. Richard Carstone, whose military career has failed like his other careers, and who has contracted the Chancery contagion in its worst form, yet believes that the new Bleak House may save him: ‘ “If I could be moved there when I begin to recover my strength” ’, he wistfully tells Jarndyce, ‘ “I feel as if I should get well there, sooner than anywhere” ’ (LXV). Presided over by Esther, the household strikes everyone as a haven of order, compassion and health. Esther emerges as a far stronger presence in the house than Milbank’s comparison of her to the female captive within a Gothic castle has implied. What has often puzzled readers, however, is the degree to which Esther, like Tulkinghorn, is always the
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wielder of keys. Liking to jangle them to remind herself of her grateful duties, she evidently rules a household in which many items are, like Tulkinghorn’s wines, kept under lock and key. The extreme order of the house partakes of the carceral, and it probably reflects the repression and secretiveness that Esther imposes upon herself. Still, as Kucich maintains, such stern repression and ‘self-fortification’ should not be interpreted in entirely negative terms. Amidst the complexity of the psychological factors, repression becomes ‘a sign of superior inward libidinal depth’ and of a passionately intense and rich inner life – analogous again to the wines that Tulkinghorn savours in privacy. Certainly Esther’s repression offers her, as it does Tulkinghorn, a means to gain knowledge of others and power over them. The power struggle in Bleak House ‘consists entirely’, according to Kucich, ‘in the ability to invade the privacy of others, and to protect one’s own privacy’.20 In this pseudo-military action, therefore, Esther emerges with her keys as possibly the strongest figure of the novel and Bleak House, of which she is chatelaine, as the strongest fortress. The enemy can nevertheless penetrate the defences of Bleak House too. Jarndyce feels even there the east wind, and ‘Coavinses’, as Skimpole calls him, can manage to invade its privacies to capture his man. The pestilence itself intrudes as in Poe’s story, and both Esther and Richard sicken while living under its roof. His case is so bad that not even a move to the new Bleak House could have saved him. But if not Richard, the home that belongs to the physician Woodcourt as well as to the housekeeper with her keys will save many others. Besides a fortress that resists invasions and sustains casualties, it remains a centre from which successful rescue operations set forth. Le Docteur Pascal contains an interesting sort of fortress in miniature that is at the centre of never-ending attacks, defences, falls and recoveries. But before looking at the particular episodes that trace its fortunes, we should observe the larger mythic pattern to which these episodes relate. The vision of perpetual cycles, which informs the novel as a fundamental structuring principle, refers specifically to archetypes of death and re-birth – or unmaking and making – that go back to Adam and Eve. The first fortress to fall has evidently been Eden itself, besieged by the original tempter. So the story includes an Edenic allusion in Paradou (presumably an echo of paradis), the site of an idyllic love affair between the innocent Albine and Pascal’s nephew, the priest Serge Mouret. There, as Pascal now describes the idyll to Clotilde, Mouret ‘ «recommençait l’aventure adamique, dans le Paradou légendaire» ’ (V). Condemned by the Church, the affair has naturally ended unhappily with Albine’s abandonment and death, and the paradise now lies ruined and sacked. Still it will one day become the site of a renewed cycle of fertility: «Le Paradou n’est plus, ils l’ont saccagé, sali, détruit; mais, qu’importe! des vignes seront plantées, du blé grandira, toute une poussée de récoltes nouvelles; et l’on s’aimera encore, aux jours lointains de
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‘Our feverish contact’ vendange de moisson. . . . La vie est éternelle, elle ne fait jamais que recommencer et s’accroître.» (II)
In his own life too, Pascal discerns the pattern of the eternal return associated with the annual cycle of nature. After a long illness, in which he fears himself to be falling victim to the family curse (recalling also the Adamic curse), the discovery that Clotilde loves him restores him to health. Their love-making rejuvenates him as if to echo the return of a spring, in which April is precisely not a cruel month: La nuit entière fut une béatitude, dans la chambre heureuse, embaumée de jeunesse et de passion. Quand le petit jour parut, ils ouvrirent toutes grandes les fenêtres pour que le printemps entrât. Le soleil fécondant d’avril se levait dans un ciel immense, d’une pureté sans tache, et la terre, soulevée par le frisson des germes, chantait gaiement les noces. (VII) The night filled with the beatific energy of ‘making’ (here, of course, making love) contrasts powerfully with Leonard’s vision, cited at the beginning of this chapter, of the beautiful night of the ‘unmaking’, destroying contagion. Perhaps they are really the same night of history in action, but what must never fail, Pascal believes in such moments, is ‘ «la foi en la vie, en la santé, en la force, à l’éternel recommencement» ’ (VIII). And this turns out to be the principle that his scientific research forever rediscovers in the history of the family. Although cursed with hereditary degeneracy that takes many forms, the family never dies out. It takes in new vitality through marriages, and new branches continually form and thrive. The metaphor is frequently that of the tree because Pascal continually sums up his findings by designing, redesigning and annotating on paper the genealogical tree of the generations of the Rougon-Macquart.21 Representing the truth about the family, which indeed includes both a curse and a blessing, the tree naturally suggests the knowledge of good and evil offered by the fruit of the Edenic tree. Pascal detects a worm in the tree, like the serpent hidden amidst the foliage of Eden, but assures Clotilde that families, like humanity itself, will flourish forever: «Le ver était dans le tronc, il est à présent dans le fruit et le dévore . . . Mais il ne faut jamais désespérer, les familles sont l’éternel devenir. Elles plongent, au delà de l’ancêtre commun, à travers les couches insondables des races qui ont vécu, jusqu’au premier être; et elles pousseront sans fin, elles s’étaleront, se ramifieront à l’infini, au fond des âges futurs.» (V)
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While the worm attacks the tree, which yet manages to survive into infinite ramifications, the more specifically threatened fortress is Pascal’s locked armoire. His mother keeps plotting, as a sort of swordswoman that corresponds, in part, to the worm, to break into this stronghold. If miniature with respect to other fortresses, the armoire is also sufficiently massive to house the abundant archives that contain the truth of the entire family. For the mother Félicité the closeted truths are her family’s skeletons simply to be wiped out. For Pascal the truth involves both the contagious physiological taints (‘les tares physiologiques’) and the germs, inseparable from them, of a new vitality. Destruction of the archives would signify for Pascal a reactionary stifling of change, a cutting off of the possibilities that he has been nurturing for cyclical renewal. In the siege of the armoire, which has been underway for thirty years, possession of the key constitutes as in Bleak House an important motif. Catherine Toubin and Yves Malinas relate the key as an instrument of power not only to the forbidden fruit of Eden, to which I have just alluded, but to the Promethean fire.22 The key permits its possessor to control the contents of the armoire, which like the contents of the strongbox of Bulwer’s Derval, to be considered later, implies the secrets of science or nature. The plots of Félicité and her granddaughter Clotilde to gain the key thus implicate threats to Pascal’s god-like authority over his own creation. They menace his virility as well, for the key resembles in its phallic associations the sword-like wand that Margrave points at Lilian and that Fenwick manages to wrest from him. In this context the armoire, into which the key fits, eventually becomes, as Toubin and Malinas indicate, not just the repository of Pascal’s science but a symbol for the womb of Clotilde.23 It is the site in which the potentiality of the family for renewal, suggested by the archives, can be realized. At the end, in fact, the armoire serves as a wardrobe for the infant son of Pascal and Clotilde. The siege of the armoire unfolds in five phases involving five significant openings of the doors. In the first phase Félicité urges upon her twentyfour-year-old granddaughter that God’s will requires them to attack the armoire and destroy its contents. ‘ «Ah! moi, à votre place, je fendrais plutôt cette armoire à coups de hache» ’, exclaims Félicité with the menace of an accomplished housebreaker or, in the narrator’s simile, an assaulter of castles: ‘Elle s’était plantée devant l’immense armoire, elle la mesurait de son regard de feu, comme pour la prendre d’assaut, la saccager, l’anéantir, malgré la maigreur desséchée de ses quatre-vingts ans’ (I). Unhappily convinced, Clotilde who knows the location of the key gives it to her grandmother, and the latter opens the armoire and climbs onto a chair to reach its top shelves. Pascal’s unexpected entrance then blocks his mother’s assaulting manoeuvre and, deeply disappointed in Clotilde, he resolves henceforth to keep the key in his own pocket. Forgetting one warm evening, though, to remove the key from the pocket of a coat that he takes off, he retires to his bedroom without
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carrying the key with him. In this second important episode he awakens in the middle of the night to find himself without the key and rushes to the room that contains the armoire. The half-dressed Clotilde has already unlocked the doors and is evidently about to remove the contents when he attacks her in a scene of greater violence than that of the first episode. In his awareness of her semi-nudity and his apparent pleasure in wounding her, the struggle also acquires more explicitly sadistic, erotic overtones than the conflict in Dickens between Tulkinghorn and Lady Dedlock: Ils se battirent. Il l’avait empoignée, dans sa nudité, il la maltraitait. . . . . . . Il la gardait, liée à lui, d’une étreinte si rude, qu’elle ne respirait plus. «Quand une enfant vole, on la châtie!» Quelques gouttes de sang avaient paru, près de l’aisselle, le long de son épaule rond, dont une meurtrissure entamait la délicate peau de soie. Et, un instant, il la sentit si haletante, si divine dans l’allongement fin de son corps de vierge, avec ses jambes fuselées, ses bras souples, son torse mince à la gorge menue et dure, qu’il la lâcha. D’un dernier effort, il lui avait arraché le dossier. (IV) The third phase is that in which a loss of nerve makes him fear that he may be succumbing to the family curse and losing his reason. He opens the armoire secretly, unaware that Clotilde is spying on him. Anxiously examining folders relating to various members of the family, he looks for the ancestor that may be most responsible for his own hereditary destiny. ‘ «Est-ce toi? . . . Est-ce toi? . . . Est-ce toi?» ’ is the obsessive question repeated to each of the personified folders (VI).24 Falling seriously ill, he still takes pains to keep the key about him, until once again it happens to be mislaid. When Clotilde finds the key this time, however, she humbly returns it to him instead of using it to open the armoire. The gesture indicates that she belongs henceforth to him rather than to Félicité, and the joyful discovery leads to his recovery and to their so-called nuptials. Events naturally carry them in the fourth phase into another negative moment of the cycle. Public opinion in the form of insulting remarks in the streets of the town, like those that have wounded Gaskell’s Ruth in Wales, now threatens the serenity of their incestuous love. The pressure of Félicité and of financial reverses causes Pascal to send Clotilde away to care for her sick brother (the father of Charles) in Paris, and matters precipitate towards the principal crisis of the story. The stronghold being attacked is no longer just the armoire but the entire house and property called ‘la Souleiade’, which may need to be sold. Recalling a motif in Bleak House – ‘even the winds are [Tom’s] messengers’ as they carry the contagion everywhere – the wind becomes in this novel too a version of the assaulting agencies. In this particular year the mistral blows more violently than usual: ‘il y eut des orages terribles qui
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ravagèrent la contrée, un mur de la Souleiade fut renversé, qu’on ne put remettre debout, tout un écroulement dont la brèche resta béante’. In concomitance especially with the departure of Clotilde from what she terms ‘ «cette maison de vérité et de bonté» ’, the wind seems angrily to besiege the fortress, causing noises that sound like canon shots: C’était une rage, une trombe furieuse, continue, qui flagellait la maison, l’ébranlait des caves aux greniers, pendant des jours, pendant des nuits, sans un arrêt. Les tuiles volaient, les ferrures des fenêtres étaient arrachées; tandis que, par les fentes, à l’intérieur, le vent pénétrait, en un ronflement éperdu de plainte, et que les portes, au moindre oubli, se refermaient avec des retentissements de canon. On aurait dit tout un siège à soutenir, au milieu du vacarme et de l’angoisse. (XI) In response to the siege, Pascal barricades himself inside, refusing to see almost everyone and giving most stern orders to deny admittance to his mother, who makes repeated efforts to approach him. As a series of heart attacks force him to face imminent death, he can do no more than hope to consign the precious key to Clotilde, whom he now recalls by telegraph from Paris. In expectation of her return, he keeps the key under his pillow desperately fighting to remain alive for the necessary hours. But he expires forty-five minutes before her arrival, murmuring to the attending physician in his last words: ‘ «Ça marche trop vite . . . Ne me quittez pas, la clef est sous l’oreiller . . . Clotilde, Clotilde . . .» ’ (XII). Fortunately the physician Ramond will defend the key during the brief interval, keeping it especially from the invasive Félicité who soon arrives herself. As it happens Félicité will lack the nerve to steal the key from under the dead man’s pillow, even when the freshly arrived but exhausted Clotilde falls into a doze that night beside him. Instead Félicité attacks the armoire with a gimlet, her version of the sword, and after forcing the lock ignites the funeral pyre and performs with Martine the auto da fé that we have witnessed. A more hopeful fifth phase nonetheless ensues in accord with Pascal’s faith ‘en la vie, en la santé, en la force, à l’éternel recommencement’. Clotilde will bear their child, a new ramification of the family’s genealogical tree and an expression of her own renewed faith in life. In the following growing season, she opens the armoire that has lost its archives and makes it a wardrobe for the precious baby: C’était dans cette armoire, si pleine autrefois des manuscrits du docteur, et vide aujourd’hui, qu’elle avait rangé la layette de l’enfant. Elle semblait sans fond, immense, béante; et, sur les planches nues et vastes, il n’y avait plus que les langes délicats, les petites brassières, les
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‘Our feverish contact’ petits bonnets, les petits chaussons, les tas de couches, toute cette lingerie fine, cette plume légère d’oiseau encore au nid. Ou tant d’idées avaient dormi en tas, ou s’était accumulé pendant trente années l’obstiné labeur d’un homme, dans un débordement de paperasses, il ne restait que le lin d’un petit être. . . . L’immensité de l’antique armoire en paraissait égayée et toute rafraîchie. (XIV)
Like an immense nest, the massive oaken armoire will thus guard the frail, evanescent elements that offer a temporary protection to future life instead of the ponderous written records of the past. Meanwhile the unrepentant Félicité is participating at this very moment in a ceremony to inaugurate another fortress designed to endure through time as a monument to the glory of the family. Having endowed with her fortune a projected Asile Rougon to house old people, she is employing another symbolic instrument, a silver trowel, to lay the cornerstone. One may therefore intuit that the foundation and the storming of strongholds will continue through the cycles to come. The armoire with its presently frail contents of hope will need to resist the established arrogance and hypocrisy of the old generations entrenched in the Asile. Probably, given the stubbornness of the forms of life, it will hold out, to offer a refuge to ever new and unorthodox ramifications of the Rougon-Macquart. The myth of renewal exerts a stronger power than that of the unmaking sword. Ruth also happens, albeit less significantly, to contain a locked piece of furniture, belonging again to a son, that falls to his parent’s armed attack. In this case, which represents an exception amongst the episodes of the stormed fortress, the stronghold does not contain a precious, lifeenhancing treasure, and we do not sympathize with the defending party. Suspecting that the desk of his ‘pattern son’ hoards evidence of the youth’s criminal swindling and forgery, Bradshaw must at any cost discover the truth: ‘with the determination which overlooks the means to get at the end, he had first tried all his own keys on the complicated lock, and then broken it open with two decided blows of a poker, the instrument nearest at hand’ (XXX). What he finds inside is so bad that, although he has been the attacker, the fall of the desk entails his own moral collapse. His pitiable situation resembles that in Dickens’s Hard Times (1854, the year after Ruth) when Thomas Gradgrind learns of his model son’s criminality.25 The prerogative of the self-righteous Bradshaw to exercise authority in his own house is challenged, and after some blustering attempts to bully his wife, he must eventually humble himself before her. The fortress that has fallen is finally that of a whole bourgeois cultural system erected upon a foundation of hypocrisy, arrogance and injustice. An association between the contents of the miniature besieged fortress and a secret aspect of its owner’s identity emerges in A Strange Story too.
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Sir Philip Derval establishes an analogy, that is, between the steel casket, to which I have alluded as containing the secrets of nature, and his own impregnability. While the chemicals lodged within the strongbox are ‘ “the keys to masked doors in the ramparts of Nature” ’, the keys to those keys are safely secreted within himself: ‘ “The powers [the chemicals] confer are secrets locked in my breast, to be lost in my grave; as the casket which lies on my breast shall not be transferred to the hands of another, till all the rest of my earthly possessions pass away with my last breath” ’ (XXXIV). Margrave, who menaces the integrity of Lilian, also poses the principal threat to the keys that Derval, like Pascal, does indeed protect until his last breath. Hitherto fought with invisible weapons, the battle underway between them for many years now concludes with the capture of the casket during a literal assault upon Derval’s breast. ‘He was lying on his back’, when Fenwick discovers the body, ‘the countenance upturned, a dark stream oozing from the breast, – murdered by two ghastly wounds’ (XXXV). But since the weapon that penetrates the breast cannot discover the secrets locked therein, the contents of the casket do not empower Margrave to proceed to take ‘the ramparts of Nature’ by storm. Although cultural citadels may collapse, the fortress of Nature and the faith in everreturning life contained in Pascal’s stronghold will never fall. The episodes involving the storming of fortresses demonstrate the permeability and vulnerability of such structures but also suggest that the attacking and unmaking swordsmen do not achieve final victories. As happens with the plague itself, all the unmaking elements are drawn into a teleological pattern in which the combatants are ‘united in the strife which divided them’. In the old religious view the divine and diabolical agencies could be united in a pattern associated with providence, and the structuralist pattern remains even when faith in supernatural providence is lost. Now it is the human makers and unmakers that are enabling history to move on. Among these human historical agents, as history moves on in our novels, the swordsmen seem to be falling into disrepute. Especially at the end of Bleak House and Le Docteur Pascal, the dominating maternal figures appear to have domesticated the military discourse appropriate to invasions, sieges, captures and rescues. A similar motif emerges after the brewing of the elixir in A Strange Story when the besieger Margrave himself falls during his final desperate assault upon the ramparts defended by their invisible ‘armies’. Fenwick confronts another ‘face upturned’ in death, Margrave’s, and then the veiled woman who may be his mother reclaims the fallen figure for herself: ‘Ayesha tenderly, silently, drew the young head to her lap, and it vanished from my sight behind her black veil’ (LXXXVIII). It is not only the nasty, unmaking swordsmen that are discredited. The novels set in the mid-nineteenth century imply that even what might be considered the making actions of soldiers belong to the more heroic but
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superseded culture of the past. In Lavinia a moment of the past in which soldiers have bravely fought for a good cause has actually occurred rather recently, in the defence of the Roman Republic in 1849. In that action Paolo and his artist friends have exchanged their painting brushes for muskets and joined Manara in the impossible battle with the French. Now those muskets have been put away again, and the atmosphere of those days has the nostalgic charm, in Lavinia’s reaction to the story, of remoteness – ‘ “a perfume of old chivalrous times” ’ (I:x). From its somewhat later perspective, Le Docteur Pascal as well situates military activity in the recent but also oddly remote past. In 1851 Pascal had witnessed fighting and tended the wounded at Plassans, where his family still lives. But after the debacle of Sedan and the fall of the Parisian Commune, the France of the Third Republic, which Félicité scorns for its evidently unchivalrous democracy, no longer requires soldiers. Most of the professional swordsmen in the stories are now in retirement like George Rouncewell and Matthew Bagnet in Bleak House, Colonel Poyntz in A Strange Story, and several veterans of fighting in India in Two Years Ago. George Rouncewell, who has recycled himself as the proprietor of the shooting gallery, is interesting for his sense of having been defeated in life. After the closing of his gallery and his release from prison, he arrives under the name of Mr Steel in the iron country of the north where he seeks to negotiate the terms of a capitulation. The soldier will transfer his birthright to the new version of a military commander, the captain of industry. That captain, his own brother, nevertheless refuses the surrender of the steel weapon, and George finishes as the guardian of the partially paralysed feudal ruler, Sir Leicester Dedlock. The toy battles then resume as George seconds Sir Leicester’s claims in the futile, irresolvable quarrel with Boythorn – regarding, as in the episodes in Manzoni and Ainsworth, a right of way. The sword may no longer constitute, therefore, a seriously useful weapon in a world that has come according to Foucault to employ more subtle instruments to enforce social and political discipline. Yet as in the other great historical tendencies that we have been tracing – and as in the trivial quarrel between Sir Leicester and Boythorn – there is no definitive defeat or victory. The sword is not definitively sheathed as anachronistic and allowed to rust in its scabbard. Near the end of Two Years Ago and Lavinia, indeed, the sword is perhaps unexpectedly brandished in the service of masculine heroic ideals, which go beyond the succour of individual damsels in distress. In Kingsley’s novel, the slave Marie that Tom Thurnall has helped to escape pleads with passionate eloquence for the use of physical force against all tyrants like the American slave-holders. Other characters of the novel make the same plea for wars of liberation in Italy, and in the last chapters five of the main characters decide to go to the Crimea. Marie’s lover Stangrave provides the justification for aggressive military action:
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‘Yes, Marie was right.’ . . . . . . ‘What if the most necessary human art, next to the art of agriculture, be, after all, the art of war? It has been so in all ages. What if I have been befooled – what if all the Anglo-Saxon world has been befooled, by forty years of peace? We have forgotten that the history of the world has been as yet written in blood; that the history of the human race is the story of its heroes and its martyrs – the slayers and the slain. . . . What right have we to suppose that it will be aught else, as long as there are wrongs unredressed on earth; as long as anger and ambition, cupidity and wounded pride, canker the hearts of men?’ (XXIII) In the struggle to cure the cankering ills of the nineteenth century, the literal field of battle remains, even forty years after Waterloo, an important site of making, not just of unmaking. Kingsley, as Laura Fasick also maintains, believes that God ‘placed men in the world in order to be fighters’, and this in a literal rather than imaginative and invisible sense.26 Whereas Scarry considers the cultural imagination ‘self-effacing’ as it ‘disguis[es] its own activity’, Stangrave’s ‘art of war’ translates the activity of cultural patrol back into noisy visibility. Paolo Mancini reaches the same heroic conclusion in Lavinia, although subtler considerations of Realpolitik also influence his reasoning. The heroic ideal in his case is the making of a unified Italian republic, but to achieve that end it will be useful to fight first in the army of the Piedmontese monarchy. In this regard, the old Venetian patriot Daniele Manin, whom Paolo visits in Paris, offers convincing advice: ‘To be either a republic or a monarchy, Italy must first exist as a nation – that is, be independent – and form one body. Every act which tends towards that end – to make a united Italy, I mean – deserves the support of all patriots, whatever their creed. . . . Those who go to fight under the three colours of Italian redemption, are not the soldiers of the Piedmontese State, but the soldiers of Italy.’ (II:xxii) The liberation of Italy requires not only that one first fight for the monarchy but, as it transpires, that one fight in support of Turkey against Russia. To Paolo’s instinctive objection that the Crimean war has little to do with Italian matters, Manin’s strong imagination, like that of ‘a watchman patrolling the dikes of culture’, counterclaims the visionary wisdom of Cavour. The Piedmontese military policy demonstrates a genial, prophetic insight, ‘ “inasmuch as it widens her circle of influence in Europe, and strengthens her hands for good, inasmuch as it places her in manifest antagonism with Austria, inasmuch as it furnishes a precious
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occasion to add to the prestige of Italian arms” ’. The Crimea is recognized in the present moment as the most appropriate site for practising heroism, a microcosm of the larger historical conflict: ‘ “That is the spot where a man may live or die with credit” ’. So without any animosity towards the Russians, Paolo and his friend Salvator will travel far afield to give them battle, viewing ‘ “Sebastopol [as] the first stage of the journey to Milan” ’. As once before in defending the Roman Republic, Paolo exchanges his paint brush for an instrument appropriate to the ‘art of war’. After drilling then in Turin, more seriously than Richard Carstone has done in George’s gallery, he finds that the Crimean atmosphere is not so heroic as Manin had seemed to prophesy. Salvator sickens with the fever and sees no action although, unlike a soldier in Ruffini’s Vincenzo that the Crimean cholera kills, he survives. The behaviour of Paolo in the battle in which he is wounded indicates the degree to which a modern swordsman can still emerge, in an unromantic way, as a hero: This battle of the Tchernaya, according to competent judges, sealed the fate of Sebastopol. Paolo had the good luck to be one of the division Trotti, which was engaged in the action; nay, to belong to the very battalion which was sent to harass the retreat of the enemy. Mancini did not at one stroke run his lance through half-a-dozen Russians – by-the-bye, he had no lance – nor did he achieve any other supernatural feat in the knight-errantry line; but his behaviour throughout was steady and resolute enough to be noticed by the men and officers of the company. The greater their pity when they saw him stagger, reel, and fall to the ground. It was the last discharge but one of the retreating artillery which had done the deed. (II:xxiii) Paolo loses, in fact, his left arm, which permits him, after resigning whatever version of a lance he has held, to pick up his artist’s brush once more with his right arm. So he will return to a less visible and more purely imaginative battlefield. The novel of Ruffini conveys far less enthusiasm for the ‘art of war’ than that implied by Kingsley’s novel. But the victory of Tchernaya to which Paolo has contributed has played at least a part in the long, indirect campaign to liberate Milan and to make Italy. It is just as well that swordsmen in our novels have continued to practise their ‘art’. In certain circumstances the sword maintains its value as an instrument that can help not only to guard the cultural dikes but to carve out a new realm of Freedom. *
*
*
Besides on battlefields, the collective struggle for emancipation goes on, from a visionary perspective, in the places in which clothing is made. As Carlyle, in particular, shows in Sartor Resartus, the activity of tailoring and re-tailoring provides a supremely effective symbol for the fundamental,
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ubiquitous process that is forever making and unmaking, in Scarry’s terms, the cosmos. As their most glorious possibility, garments can offer to their makers and to their wearers a kind of salvation and power. The narrator of Lavinia develops the point in an ironic mode. The most powerful dressmaker of the day is ‘that famous French artist of European celebrity, Madame Lamy Housset, of the Rue de la Paix’, whose ministrations may save both body and soul: ‘Let the uninitiated be informed that out of the pale of Madame Lamy Housset there is no possible salvation for an English lady’. Not only Lavinia, but Lady Dedlock, one presumes, must know her establishment, unless the latter lady of fashion happens to favour the rival religion: ‘there was a lively opposition in favour of Madame Zenobia – no, Palmyra – the association of ideas mislead[s] me – and the Palmyrites turned up their noses very high at the Lamy Houssetites’ (I:xix). Women like Lavinia and Lady Dedlock owe their triumphs to the gowns with which these establishments arm them. When a shipment from Paris does not arrive, Lavinia therefore contemplates with horror an impending defeat at the Roman ball of Prince Torlonia. In a less ironic view than Ruffini’s of such matters, Kingsley’s Alton Locke, Tailor and Poet (1850) shows a respect for clothes that draws more directly on the Carlylean symbol. The novel mentions Carlyle seventeen times, if my count is accurate, and further represents the Scottish writer in the bookseller Mackaye.27 While omnipresent in the novel, however, the imagery of clothing does not possess the infinite, imaginative ramifications, as in Carlyle, of invisible energy becoming visible in material forms. Alton limits himself to seeing clothing as ‘ “a sure sign of the wearer’s character” ’: ‘ “Dress is a sort of sacrament . . .; according as any one is orderly, or modest, or tasteful, or joyous, or brilliant . . . those excellences, or the want of them, are sure to show themselves, in the colours they choose, and the cut of their garments” ’.28 There exists the contrasting possibility that garments may offer not power or liberating opportunities for self-expression but varieties of bondage and disease. Alton Locke characterizes the tailoring shops with their long hours and starvation wages as belonging indeed to the worst possible system of exploitation and slavery. The unventilated sweat-shops are hotbeds of disease as well, in which the overworked tailors contract the consumption and typhus that kill them and their families off in what ought to be their prime. The novel therefore concords with many other documents of the period in identifying the clothing industry as a social scandal – a site of the contagion of the historical moment at its most unjust. Like the Dickensian winds that carry the contagion from Tom-allalone’s up to the highest ranks of society, infected clothes may become an agency of grim social retribution. This happens when an elegant but disease-bearing coat kills Alton’s respectably bourgeois cousin. According to Stallybrass and White, middle class people learned, presumably from
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such incidents, to avoid touching not only the bodies but the garments of the poor.29 Of course the impression that clothing could convey contagion pre-dates the period that Stallybrass and White are investigating. Epidemics often broke out in a city, according to an old suspicion, because of the importation of tainted garments. In a Roman epidemic of 1656 the guilty items were pinpointed as ‘feminine ornaments’ and, in particular, ‘silk ribbons’, thus associating female frivolity with the contagion.30 In Ainsworth’s novel, the discovery of a pile of elegant, apparently masculine clothing – ‘ “fit to furnish wardrobes for a dozen court gallants” ’ – arouses a similar suspicion of their contagious properties: ‘ “The most daring robber would be afraid” ’, one character observes to Leonard, ‘ “to touch infected money or clothes. . . . There is contagion enough in those clothes to infect a whole city, . . . [and] rich as the stuffs are, I would not put the best of them on for all the wealth of London” ’ (IV:iii).31 Spotting swords amidst the heaped garments, Leonard wonders whether such objects too may spread contagion. He may have recalled the precedent of the pestilence-bearing arrows of Apollo at the beginning of the Iliad. And we may recall the uncanny, corrupting power of the Mace of the Lord Chancellor in the Court of Chancery. An analogy between garments and swords in their association with contagion remains, and when Leonard ventures to appropriate a sword, his companion warns him at least ‘ “to throw away that velvet scabbard. It is a certain harbour for infection” ’. Like other infected and infecting objects, all the cloth items may merit burning. Although not feasible at the moment, ‘ “it were a good deed” ’, Leonard and his companion agree, ‘ “to set fire to them” ’ (IV:iii). Clothes may not only acquire a physical contagion but also carry a moral taint already from their origin because of the exploitative means used to produce the raw materials. The cotton-growing industry partially depends upon institutionalized slavery in the southern American states. So besides the sweat shops of Alton Locke, Kingsley denounces American slavery, as we have observed, in his presentation of Marie in Two Years Ago. And Bleak House as well reminds us of Dickens’s detestation of slavery when Harold Skimpole perversely takes satisfaction in his fantasy of slaves picking cotton on an American plantation: ‘Take the case of the Slaves on American plantations. I dare say they are worked hard, I dare say they don’t altogether like it, I dare say theirs is an unpleasant experience on the whole; but they people the landscape for me, they give it a poetry for me, and perhaps that is one of the pleasanter objects of their existence. I am very sensible of it, if it be, and I shouldn’t wonder if it were!’ (XVIII) In the references to shearing that we have noticed, the novels may allude to another raw material for textiles, and here with respect to wool
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too sacrificial overtones accompany the process of production. But the production of textiles may not always have involved slavery, alienated labour and sacrificial exploitation for the pleasure of social parasites like Skimpole. In I promessi sposi Renzo and Lucia earn their living in a reasonably satisfactory way as spinners of silk. Although sometimes compelled by the decline of the Lombardian silk industry to supplement wages with other activities, Renzo in particular takes pride in his work and has no sense of being ill-used. When he must escape to Bergamo, his skills in the silk business enable him readily to find appreciated and satisfactorily compensated employment there too.32 In turning to the needlewomen that concern this last part of the chapter, we observe that the wage earners amongst them are more likely to share the slave’s condition than Renzo’s good fortune. But along with the economic and Marxist issues involved in the production of clothing, the Carlylean aspects of clothes-making acquire symbolic force with regard to the female condition. In the case of the swordsmen, we have seen the episodes of taking prisoners and laying sieges as microcosmic hints of the larger, aggressive forces of history that permeate everywhere. For the needlewomen, the activity of sewing shows them not only interacting with history but also expressing, in particular, their female identity in history. Women are the chief makers in the novels of the ‘Living Garment’ that is one of Carlyle’s figures for the visible stuff or texture of history. In the association of women with materiality and material production, they are largely responsible for the cultural furniture, the decor, the physical environment in which history is lived and fought. The expression of their femininity in the making of history leads either to their defeat or to their victory. The defeat occurs when their making of the historical clothing entails the paradoxical unmaking of themselves. They become chained or enmeshed in what may seem the trivialities of a task that begins to control them and to reduce them to cogs in a larger mechanism. The force that reduces them is also manifested in the literal contagion of the workplace and the moral contagion that turns many needlewomen, as material commodities themselves, into prostitutes. Others of them nevertheless manage to take control of the weaving process and to make its strands into emanations of their own imaginative authority. These latter are the victorious watchwomen whose strong vision, in the metaphor of Scarry, constructs and maintains the cultural dikes. Often, however, the outcome is an ambiguous combination of defeat and victory – whereby, sometimes, physical bondage is made an eloquent communication of moral superiority. Before consideration of the process that exploits many women and gives power to a few, it is worth remarking the frequent neutrality of needlework as simply a sign of female identity. As a matter of course, or of the Necessity that determines (and even over-determines) the female condition, practically all women are occupied with needlework. So Zola’s
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servant Martine always appears ‘avec l’éternel bas qu’elle tricotait même en marchant, quand la maison ne l’occupait pas’ (II). And Dickens’s Mrs Bagnet ‘busies herself with her needlework’ whenever she is not occupied with ‘washing greens’, the principal task of her existence (XXVII). Lucia, who comes to miss her winding reel (‘aspo’) in the silk-spinning mill, must find a new form of handwork in the convent, since only continual busy work (‘nel lavorar di continuo’) can comfort her. In the visits to Gertrude she carries with her the sewing that constitutes a new sort of activity for her: ‘anche nel parlatorio, portava sempre qualche lavoro da tener le mani in esercizio: ma, come i pensieri dolorosi si caccian per tutto! cucendo, cucendo . . . le veniva ogni poco in mente il suo aspo; e dietro all’aspo, quante cose!’ (XVIII). Such women need always to be active both to avoid the sin of idleness and to escape, apparently, a recognition of the present void, which may come just the same. Not quite neutral, then, their needlework accomplishes minor projects while also erasing, but only in part, consciousness of what is not being accomplished. What is not being accomplished is a scheme of life that would employ fully and validly the woman’s capacities and energies for doing more than merely busy work – more than merely material production. ‘ “Men have left us women nothing in the way of work” ’, exclaims Lavinia with some bitterness, ‘ “but the honour of mending our husband’s and children’s stockings” ’ (I:xxiii). In fairness to the men, one observes that Lavinia has collaborated in her degradation by dedicating herself so wholeheartedly to the religion of clothes furnished by Madame Lamy Housset. But apart from the question of the degrees of guilt to be distributed between men and women, the latter have cleverly turned their degradation into a form of power too. As an example of wresting victory from defeat, they have learned, according to Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar, ‘both to defend themselves and silently to speak of themselves’ in the sewing of veils. Alluding to the tradition of Ariadne, Penelope and Philomela, the veils serve both to protect women that have been violated or otherwise exploited and silenced and to imply protesting signs of their condition. The veils propagate their silent message, on the model of the other garments that transmit infection and of the winds that are the ‘messengers’ of Tom-all-alone’s, as a contagious phenomenon. For want of a better way to understand how such transmissions work, it may, that is, be referred to the ubiquity of the contagious field. In this field many messages are passing between the culture as a whole and its individual components. And amongst these communications the ones that express the female condition are especially poignant. From woman to woman the responses are replicated in a process that betrays both the weakness and the strength of the disease of being female. One of the most obvious instances of the woman whose veil thus protects and thus protests is Manzoni’s rebellious Suor Gertrude, compelled by her father to take the veil of holy orders. More mysteriously, there is
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the ‘Veiled Woman’ who appears with Margrave in Australia and who turns out to be Ayesha, the long-suffering former slave. Having first passionately loved and nursed Louis Grayle, she now loves Margrave, who may be either the rejuvenated Grayle or his son (and therefore her son too). Although mistreated and repudiated, she veils her anguish and returns faithfully at the end, the sublimity of her love intact, to succour the ungrateful Margrave. Beyond the protection and the mute protest, the sewing of the veil may further aspire, according to Gilbert and Gubar, to repair damage, ‘to heal the wounds inflicted by history’ and to convey a utopian vision: ‘sewing both conceals and reveals a vision of a world in which such defensive sewing would not be necessary.’33 Among the wronged needlewomen of our novels, such an impulse to defend herself, to speak, and to imagine a happier world seems to motivate the stitching even of the childish Esther. As recalled in the first paragraph of her narrative, I used to say to my doll, when we were alone together, ‘Now, Dolly, I am not clever, you know very well, and you must be patient with me, like a dear!’ And so she used to sit propped up in a great arm-chair, with her beautiful complexion and rosy lips, staring at me – or not so much at me, I think, as at nothing – while I busily stitched away, and told her every one of my secrets. (III)34 The comforting activity of sewing accompanies the telling of evidently unhappy secrets to an auditor that will never reveal them. The secrets (or the ‘tale-telling’ that some critics have associated with ‘tailoring’) are shared as a unifying bond amongst women, who understand the silent language of embroidery and other products of women’s work.35 Women possess chiefly clothing, observes Margaret Homans, as something of value that they can produce and pass on to one another.36 So we observe in Bleak House the items of clothing that are borrowed or passed on among the reduplicated figures – Esther, Lady Dedlock, Hortense, Jenny. While greatly confusing Jo and other males, the women who share their identity, as Cynthia Malone finds that they do, may know what they are up to. The protective veil indicates them as hidden but together, ‘inhabiting’, in the description of Gilbert and Gubar of the veiled condition, even within ‘patriarchal society, . . . a private sphere invisible to public view’.37 Esther’s handkerchief too functions as a common garment that furthers their wordless communication, an example, permitted by the Latin texere, of a woven item that is also a text.38 Offered first in compassion to Jenny to veil her dead child, it appears later in the hand of Lady Dedlock, whose silent gesture lifts the veil as she recognizes her own living child.39 The act of unveiling becomes as eloquent indeed as the assumption of the veil – just as the work of unravelling figures as importantly in
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Penelope’s scheme as the knitting task.40 Esther’s illness serves to lift from her, as if it had been a veil, the semblance of her beautiful mother, granting her thereafter the freedom to appear as herself. At first she dares not exercise that freedom and continues to talk to Ada, for example, ‘from behind the window-curtain’, but slowly mustering courage, she unveils herself successively to Ada, Richard, Guppy, Woodcourt and others. In the biblical trope, as Ragussis points out, the lifting of the veil represents ‘the hermeneutical act’, and Esther thus offers a new definition of herself.41 She removes the veil from an especially intimate phase of her identity when her early convalescence prompts an admission that recalls her childish confessions to her doll: ‘And now I must part with the little secret I have thus far tried to keep. I had thought, sometimes, that Mr Woodcourt loved me . . .’ (XXXV). In parting with that one little secret, however, she may deceive herself anew into believing that she is quite resigned to the loss of Woodcourt; a veil continues to obscure her inward vision. As she also returns to her needlework, it seems again a secretly defensive art while it is meant to express her industrious, cheerful and submissive devotion to others. After the brief illness following the death of her mother, she takes up her duties as soon as possible with renewed firmness: ‘I resumed my work, and my chair beside his’ (LX). That work, of course, can only be the sewing that goes on every evening as she sits near Jarndyce. And it goes on as she sits with Ada and sews something for her, as on the memorable evening in which Woodcourt will tell her of his love. She has expected Jarndyce to accompany her home, but apparently because of her slight delay Woodcourt accompanies her instead: One evening, [Jarndyce] had arranged to meet me at eight o’clock. I could not leave, as I usually did, quite punctually to the time, for I was working for my dear girl, and had a few stitches more to do, to finish what I was about; but it was within a few minutes of the hour, when I bundled up my little work-basket gave my darling my last kiss for the night, and hurried down-stairs. Mr Woodcourt went with me, as it was dusk. (LXI) When Woodcourt then takes advantage of circumstances later that evening to confess his love, he may break more or less violently into the comfortable routine represented by her constant stitching. Yet she has secretly wanted him to break into that protecting and self-repressive routine. We wonder, indeed, if her lack of punctuality on this occasion has been not an accident but part of an unconscious scheme. In missing the appointment with Jarndyce, she has offered Woodcourt an opportunity for ‘the first walk we had ever taken together’ (LXI). Reminding us that ‘sewing both conceals and reveals’, Esther has characteristically managed
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with her ‘few stitches more to do’ both to repress and to communicate her desire. Functioning less ambiguously in the other novels, needlework often means just one thing for the sewers – either it enslaves them or it empowers them to control others. With respect to the first possibility, Ruth and Lavinia deal most fully and realistically with the plight of women forced to sew in order to earn enough money just to survive. The other novels also contain hints of an apparently generalized conviction in the period that to be forced to sew for a living constitutes one of the worst of female destinies. To the defenders of Chancery, who think it would be wicked to put men like Vholes out of business, the narrator of Bleak House attributes the perfidious question: ‘And . . . Vholes’s daughters? Are they to be shirtmakers, or governesses?’ (XXXIX). Almost no one, it appears, believes that shirt-making can offer any financial independence or psychological benefit to women. As an unmitigated disaster, ‘the work which takes [women] from home and family’, assert Helsinger, Sheets and Veeder with particular reference to sewing, ‘is one of the evils inflicted on them by poverty’.42 Widely discussed in the press, the working conditions for seamstresses are as deplorable as the situation in tailoring shops that Kingsley denounces in Alton Locke and ‘Cheap Clothes and Nasty’.43 An impression may have prevailed too of the particular cruelty of making women sew items for the market place. Although originally forced by their female condition to sew as a mechanical task, many women had attempted to respond creatively to Necessity. They had learned to take pride in their handiwork, of the sort that Ruskin attributes to medieval craftsmen. In particular, as we have seen, their work could express secretive aspects of their female being. Besides the psychological energies that informed it, the handiwork could function as what men considered an arcane system of communication among women. To bring such products to the male-dominated market place and subject them to the laws of supply and demand therefore implied a kind of violation of the seamstresses themselves. The work that had customarily belonged to the sphere of unalienated domestic labour now became alienated labour. As Gerhard Joseph suggests in analysing ‘The Lady of Shalott’, the weaver’s labour is cursed into something different from the weaver, and the reification of the product makes the Lady too a commodity.44 For other reasons as well the seamstress became closely associated with the prostitute, the female commodity in its most obvious form. Chancery is to blame in the case of Miss Flite’s sister who first earned her living by ‘tambour work’ (embroidery) and then fell, as we suppose, into prostitution: ‘ “My sister was drawn. Hush! Never ask to what!” ’ (XXXV). Within the social environment typified by Chancery, the wicked milieu of dressmaking and millinery establishments acquired particular notoriety as a hotbed of moral contagion.45 The inadequacy of the wages might also force a woman into prostitution as the only means for supplementing
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them. And then the very elegance of the dresses that the seamstress made for women of a higher social class could corrupt her with a desire for ‘finery’ that she could only satisfy by selling herself.46 In the conclusion of Judd, the occupation of the seamstress ‘not only represents the helplessness and exploitation of the working-class woman, but sewing itself becomes a metonymy for all morally dangerous forms of female labor’.47 Ruth demonstrates precisely the cruelty of Mrs Mason’s establishment as it operates to turn the heroine into a commodity. Naturally an imaginative and affectionate girl, the young seamstress finds that the weariness of the long hours of work prevents her from developing the finer aspects of her personality. The girls sometimes attempt to articulate a certain emotional solidarity amongst themselves, but Mrs Mason encourages a spirit of rivalry, and the working conditions do not permit much confidentiality. The pressure to produce makes it impossible to sew with any of the love of the Ruskinian artisan. Although Ruth appreciates beauty in nature and in human artefacts, any aesthetic consideration is irrelevant to her own mechanical task. The relentless, repetitive, clock-work ticking of her steady sewing so horrifies her late one night that she breaks down before the consumptive Jenny, who is herself dying in the bad air: ‘Oh! how shall I get through five years of these terrible nights! in that close room! and in that oppressive stillness! which lets every sound of the thread be heard as it goes eternally backwards and forwards,’ sobbed out Ruth, as she threw herself on her bed, without even undressing herself. (I) For Mrs Mason, Ruth’s particular value resides not, obviously, in her imaginative strength and not even in her technical skill as a needlewoman, but rather in her physical beauty. So in the episode of the ball at the shire-hall, she appoints Ruth for this last reason to be one of her representatives at the ball, to mend if necessary ladies’ ballgowns. Although she pretends to choose Ruth as a reward for her industriousness, Ruth knows that this is not the case. The sense of being appraised only as a beautiful object that will reflect lustre on the dressmaking establishment humiliates her. In Mrs Mason’s further wish to procure without expense to herself a finer gown to frame Ruth’s charms, the poor girl finds gowns and her own body serving again as functions of purely materialistic calculations. The ballroom dancing represents, as always, the stylized propagation of contagion, occurring here within the elegantly fashionable milieu created by women, and so functions as a microcosm of material history in action. In the perspective of Carlyle or Scarry, the duty to mend tears in ballgowns would be making Ruth participate, within this microcosm, in the universal process of weaving reality or of repairing cultural dikes. But the
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contagion of the atmosphere comes instead to infect and unmake her. Mr Bellingham recognizes her worth as a beautiful commodity and probably assumes that as a seamstress she is available for purchase. In her inexperience Ruth falls into his banal trap, and the hypocritical or comfortably self-deceived Mrs Mason will be so shocked that she expels Ruth from her respectable establishment. In Lavinia too, the ever incumbent danger in the heroine’s sewing phase is that of falling into prostitution. The phase begins, in fact, when she learns that her long-dead mother has been a prostitute, living at the time of Lavinia’s conception, interestingly, with ‘a Spitalfields weaver, who was not her husband’ (II:vi). Then the guardian, with whom she has grown up and whom she has wrongly thought to be her uncle, makes sexual advances, and she must flee his house. The plot evidently punishes her now for her heedless insensitivity to human misery in the days of her glory, when she has also flirted so irresponsibly with men and women. As if in penitence for her wanton behaviour and the extreme décolleté of her ballgowns, she takes to dressing modestly and to wearing, like the women in Bleak House, a veil. Almost penniless, she consults the practical landlady of her London lodging house about possibilities for employment, but Mrs Tamplin responds gloomily that the market for female workers is glutted: ‘That’s why so many young women starve or do worse. There’s such a competition, you see. The men, though, God knows, often badly off enough, have more ways than one of turning an honest penny; while a woman has but one, you know – her needle; and the consequence is, that there are more needles than work for them. A firm in the city, I miss the name now, advertised the other day for fifty hand – guess how many applied? Seven hundred, my dear young lady, seven hundred, fourteen times as many as were wanted.’ (II:xi) To avoid starving or worse, Lavinia nevertheless enters the market place, working in the lodging house since the chances of employment in firms are so slim. The constant sexual threat to working women emerges again in her efforts to sell her embroidery to shopkeepers in Camden Town. A man in one shop eyes her appraisingly, more interested in her than in her embroidered shirt: he ‘noticed the small gloved fingers, took in at a glance the fine proportions of her figure, and conveyed the satisfactory impression he had received from the tout ensemble, by a wink and a grin full of meaning to some one standing behind the lady’. The head clerk attempts to ‘peep under her veil’ and then pretends to measure the sleeves of the shirt offered for sale against Lavinia’s wrist, ‘and in so doing, managed, with malice prepense, to touch the fair hand and arm more than necessary’. Finally the men propose the necessity, before they purchase anything, of her unveiling ‘just for an instant’ so that in any eventual
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dispute they will be able to recognize the maker of the item. Realizing that they are mocking her, Lavinia leaves the shop in tears, and Mrs Tamplin later comments without surprise that it is indeed ‘ “a wicked world. . . . All the effect of competition, that’s what it is” ’ (II:xiii). Lavinia does manage to sell embroidery, but her work involves frequent humiliations and ‘slaving from early dawn till late at night’. Attempts to find other employment repeatedly fail, and in walking even to a West End address in response to a newspaper advertisement, she notices that men ‘peered curiously through her veil’: Some, to do so more conscientiously, leant forwards, or raised their eye-glass. Five out of ten who were going down the street in the same direction with her, would linger, by her side, stare at her over their shoulders, and when they had passed on, turn their heads again and again. In spite of her thick veil, and her eyes on the ground, Lavinia could not help being aware of these manœuvres. (II:xi) Apparently a female worker cannot escape the fate of being treated as a sexual commodity, as this phase of her story emphasizes especially in its last episode. Mr Duncan, a hitherto respectable surgeon and friend of Mrs Tamplin, offers her a job as his housekeeper, and to her astonished, ‘ “But you are a single gentleman, sir” ’, he responds: ‘ “Yes, thank God, I am – reason the more for you to come; you will have everything your own way, don’t you see? – eh? – plenty of the best that’s to be got to eat, and to drink – plenty of fine clothes – plenty of money” ’ (II:xiii). As the uniform of the kept woman, fine clothes again suggest a form of slavery that nineteenth-century morality considers worse than that of Skimpole’s picturesque American pickers of cotton. Mr Duncan’s relish of the prospect of subjugating Lavinia also recalls Tulkinghorn’s subtler enjoyment of power over Lady Dedlock, an upper-class wearer of finery. A common system of slavery may unite many women, both the exploited producers of clothes and the fine women who have marketed themselves in order to wear those clothes. Or rather than uniting these women, the system may diffuse amongst them a contagious virus of alienation, as in Joseph’s analysis of the alienating ‘curse [that] is come upon’ the Lady of Shalott. The needlewoman who seems, albeit somewhat deceptively, to dominate the system rather than to suffer capture in its woven meshes is Mrs Poyntz of A Strange Story.48 She also constitutes the most striking instance of the possibility implied by this chapter that the needlewoman may be taking over the power of the swordsman. The sword is beaten, that is, not into ploughshares but, in her case, into knitting needles. Preferring to style herself Mrs Colonel Poyntz, she has taken over command from her husband, the affable, retired colonel whose battles now proceed endlessly
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but harmlessly at the card table. She reminds us of Mrs Major O’Dowd in Vanity Fair, of whom George Osborne remarks to Amelia, ‘ “O’Dowd goes in command of the regiment, and Peggy goes in command of O’Dowd” ’ (XXVII). And in Bleak House there is of course Mrs Bagnet, whose commanding role her retired soldier-husband will not own explicitly because ‘ “discipline must be maintained” ’. Known as the Queen of the Hill, in reference to the fashionable part of town, Bulwer’s Mrs Colonel is not a ‘constitutional sovereign; her monarchy was absolute’ (VII). She delights in her exercise of a masculine authority, believing that ‘ “All women would be men if they could” ’ (VI). Her authority secures, in her own mind, the well-being of her subjects by banning, as we have seen, fallen women from her kingdom and opposing the libidinous energy of Margrave. Since she is nevertheless a woman, her knitting needles function as the symbol of her power in action, as Allen Fenwick observes during his first commanded attendance at her Wednesday ‘at home’: There she sat knitting, rapidly, firmly; a woman somewhat on the other side of forty, complexion a bronze paleness, hair a bronze brown, in strong ringlets cropped short behind, – handsome hair for a man; lips that, when closed, showed inflexible decision . . .; . . . observing, piercing, dauntless eyes; altogether a fine countenance, – would have been a very fine countenance in a man; profile sharp, straight, clear-cut, with an expression, when in repose, like that of a sphinx. . . . There she sat knitting, knitting, and I by her side, gazing now on herself, now on her work, with a vague idea that the threads in the skein of my own web of love or of life were passing quick through those noiseless fingers. (VI) The ‘observing, piercing, dauntless eyes’ identify her as a watchwoman. Nothing escapes the all-penetrating gaze whereby she exerts as an agent of the imaginary invisible watchman her authority. She and other agents like her are observing, imagining and enforcing the laws that regulate and protect the cultural system. Styled ‘one of the Parcæ’ – we may think here of Dickens’s Mme Defarge and Eliot’s scheming Rosamund Vincy too – she also conveys not just a symbolic but an almost physical power through her knitting. Like the glittering Mace of the Lord Chancellor for Miss Flite, that knitting possesses a visually hypnotic fascination that seems to Fenwick to be ensnaring him in his destiny: ‘ “the weird web . . . springs under your hand in meshes that bewilder the gaze and snare the attention” ’. She understands even before he does that he is in love with someone, but her knitting expresses an uncertainty about whether to encourage or to hinder the affair. Not knowing yet who the woman may be, she ‘paused, while I spoke, from her knitting, and now resumed it very
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slowly and very carefully, as if her mind and her knitting worked in unison together’. Stitch by stitch, as the situation comes into focus in her imagination, intricate adjustments are being meditated in particular aspects of the historical circumstances that impinge upon him. Then she comes to a decision and tells him that ‘ “the time has come in your life and your career when you would do well to marry” ’; and ‘the knitting here went on more decidedly, more quickly’. What eventually emerges, however, is that while she recognizes the advisability of his marrying someone, her scheme requires that he remain primarily devoted in a more or less platonic sense to herself. Her loyalty is not, that is, only to supreme cultural values but also to her own comfort. The desired marriage must not be to her daughter, since it would be awkward for her to become her own daughter’s rival. So she admonishes him, in case his hopes are set in that direction: ‘ “I have settled Jane’s lot in my own mind”, resumed Mrs Poyntz, striking firm into another row of knitting’ (VII). While settling Jane’s lot, she is also scheming on her own behalf to gain an appropriate son-in-law. The desirable man is Ashleigh Sumner, for whom Mrs Poyntz predicts an interesting political future. Her ambitions include becoming the clever mentor behind the career of a Member of Parliament since she cannot go into Parliament herself. Lilian constitutes, however, an obstacle to this project because Sumner seems to love Lilian rather than Jane. So to remove that obstacle, Mrs Poyntz will promote the engagement of Lilian and Fenwick, which duly occurs, although it remains secret for a time. When Sumner, not yet aware of the development, proposes to Lilian, she refuses, and in hurt anger he transfers his affections forthwith to Jane, just as Mrs Poyntz has foreseen. Delighted by the new confirmation of Lilian’s love for him, Fenwick rushes to tell the good news to Mrs Poyntz, who appears unsurprised that matters have been settling into place according to her own scheme: She was still at work on the everlasting knitting, her firm fingers linking mesh into mesh as she listened; and when I had done, she laid her skein deliberately down, and said, in her favourite characteristic formula, – ‘So at last? – that is settled!’ (XXX) Not until much later will Fenwick understand the degree to which she has been settling his own lot: ‘How skilfully this woman had knitted me into her work with the noiseless turn of her white hands!’ (LVII). At this point her scheme is operating to separate him from Lilian, who now represents only an obstacle to her desire for an intense ‘intellectual’ friendship with him. While she can vicariously enjoy through her son-in-law the challenges of a political career, Fenwick can offer, with his scientific brilliance, an additional stimulation in her life.
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Zola’s apparently submissive Clotilde emerges as another strong woman who will live vicariously through the careers of men. One of those men is only an infant at the end of the story, the son whose baby clothes, now stored in Pascal’s armoire, she has evidently sewn. In taking control of the armoire with the products of her needle, she has already signalled in the opinion of Malinas her ‘conquête de Pascal’. All along she has been the ‘maîtresse’ of the man that she has always called ‘Maître’.49 As she sits beside the armoire nursing their son in the final paragraphs of the novel, she indulges a prophetic fantasy that he, once grown, will set forth from this base upon a messianic career. Just possibly he will become [le] messie que le prochain siècle attendait, qui tirerait les peuples de leur doute et de leur souffrance! Puisque la nation était à refaire, celui-ci ne venait-il pas pour cette besogne? Il reprendrait l’expérience, relèverait les murs, rendrait une certitude aux hommes tâtonnants, bâtirait la cité de justice, où l’unique loi du travail assurerait le bonheur. (XIV) Like Mrs Poyntz with respect to the career of her son-in-law, Clotilde will stand behind her son’s mission to re-make the nation, to construct the just city, to raise again the walls or the dikes of culture. Her imaginative construction of the future makes her, however improbably, the invisible watchwoman behind the watchman that her son will become. The future that she foresees does not involve irresponsibly utopian castles in the air since the happiness of a culture must involve the discipline of the ‘loi du travail’. And the imaginative vision of most of the watching agents includes a strong element of discipline. It is interesting to return in this context to Esther Summerson – another ‘self-effacing’, in the term of Scarry, but strong watchwoman. She and Bucket, who are companions in the harrowing pursuit of Lady Dedlock, may represent the principal disciplining powers of nineteenth-century society. With respect to Jacques Donzelot’s specification of the two regimes of discipline, the needlewoman typifies that of le contrat (voluntary self-discipline) and the detective, as successor to the swordsman, that of la tutelle (externally imposed enforcement). The needlewoman Esther disciplines, that is, not only herself but convinces others to discipline – as if voluntarily – themselves. So her subtle authority comes to resemble the unseen surveillance that controls prisoners in the famous Panopticon. A powerful observer, as suggested in her understatement, ‘I had always a rather noticing way’ (III), she controls people and events through her vision and her written representation of them. She exercises, Elizabeth Langland believes, ‘an all-seeing but unseen surveillance’,50 as to some extent, in the implication of Gilbert and Gubar,
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do the other veiled women ‘invisible to public view’ in their watchtower.51 These watchwomen come possibly to outnumber the watchmen in their patrolling of cultural dikes and in their control of a social space – the ‘ “panoptic” space’ that is, says Ermarth, more than a prison. The space is ‘the neutral medium that . . . makes possible the definition of society as . . . a system managed by people . . . and not a series of ledges in a Christian God’s cosmos’.52 Even without a veil another woman in Bleak House also manages to become one of the powerful and invisible watchwomen. In her case, however, the impression of a warden controlling a carceral space would seem to apply. Mrs Bucket, namely, fulfils to her husband’s entire satisfaction his challenging charge to incriminate and capture Hortense with her implacable, but unnoticed gaze: ‘My dear, can you throw her off continually . . .? Can you do without rest, and keep watch upon her, night and day? Can you undertake to say, She shall do nothing without my knowledge, she shall be my prisoner without suspecting it, she shall no more escape from me than from death, and her life shall be my life, and her soul my soul, till I have got her, if she did this murder?’ (LIV) In employing the eyes so aggressively, spying possesses an affinity with needlework, as a comparison in Ruth of eyes and needles (recalling the eyes and ‘spear-heads’ of A Strange Story) makes explicit: ‘Mrs Mason had clearly seen, with her sharp, needle-like eyes, the attitude in which Ruth had stood with the young man who had just quitted her’ (IV). Such heavy use of the eyes fatigues them, and the novels contain many references to the tired eyes of needlewomen – as when, at the very beginning of the story, ‘Ruth pressed her hot forehead against the cold glass, and strained her aching eyes in gazing out on the lovely sky’ (I). More powerful in one episode than Mrs Mason herself, however, is the needlewoman that watches Ruth just as intently as Mrs Bucket watches Hortense. Jemima Bradshaw, that is, takes to observing Ruth constantly, in an effort to detect signs of sexual wantonness and therefore guilt.53 Often Jemima seeks to conceal her surveillance behind a pretended interest in her sewing: ‘but whether she sewed, or wrote, or read, Ruth felt that she was always watching – watching’. Unlike Hortense and the panoptic prisoners, Ruth recognizes her jailer, who exhibits ‘the calm implacability of some severe judge. The watching, which Ruth felt was ever upon her, made her unconsciously shiver. . . . Her very being shrivelled and parched up in Jemima’s presence, as if blown upon by a bitter, keen, [and as in Bleak House] east wind’ (XXVI). The shrivelling sickness derives from the power of the all-seeing jailer to expose the prisoner to general opprobrium. To be exhibited in public
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– to be, in effect, unmade – represents the worst of punishments in the disciplinary regime based on watching. Those possessed of the power to inflict such punishment may, like the fundamentally gentle Jemima, well hesitate to use it: ‘Ruth was in her power. And, strange to say, this last certainty gave Jemima a kind of protecting, almost pitying, feeling for Ruth’ (XXV). The same compunction may trouble the watching men who find themselves in a position to exert a blackmailing power over fellow sinners. So although Donne (Bellingham) has tried to repossess Ruth by reminding her ‘ “how much you are in my power” ’ (XXIV), he does not finally carry through on the threat to disclose her past to the general public. In Two Years Ago similarly, while Tom Thurnall makes clear to both Vavasour and Trebooze his ‘power’ to expose them to their wives, the menace again remains idle. It is interesting meanwhile that despite the supposed inferiority of women the husbands may especially fear the judgement of their wives. In the case of Tulkinghorn and Lady Dedlock, however, the threat of public exposure operates with devastating effectiveness. With respect to Bucket and the allegorical Roman on Tulkinghorn’s ceiling, Bleak House also features the related motif of the pointed finger. Like those pointed against the untori in Manzoni, the fingers seem among their other meanings to be indicating prospective victims for public disgrace.54 The ‘power of public opinion’ to despise and undo individuals, as Alexander Welsh observes, will become a particularly lethal weapon in a rash of novels of the 1860s that narrate episodes of blackmail.55 As the situation in Two Years Ago suggests, the terrifying power of the ‘world’ or of public opinion is often associated more particularly with authoritative women than with men. The logic of power, which we have observed to make some potential blackmailers fearful of their own power, seems to require patriarchy to cede certain privileges to women. Besides humiliated and veiled creatures, the female category includes social queens like Mrs Poyntz, Félicité Rougon and, before her dethronement and in her non-veiled appearances, Lady Dedlock. Still the power of these queens is never absolute. The power of Lady Dedlock is that of a leader of ‘fashion’, which means that she participates in a particular system of contagion. In the novel, being ‘In Fashion’ is made parallel to being ‘In Chancery’ (the titles of the first two chapters), which may further constitute for us two ways of being in history. As a system of contagion, fashion also possesses its own particular characteristics that have defied, according to Baudrillard, the analytic efforts of sociologists and aestheticians. Baudrillard’s own description may help, however, to point out if not to unravel some of the complexity of the interactions of power in the phenomena of fashion. He begins with the observation of the coexistence of phenomena of chain reactions, suggesting Girardian imitation, and of contrasting impulses to affirm distinctions and differences:
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Other power struggles occur on actual fields of battle, on the biological level of invasive diseases, on the level of rational debate, in the law courts and financial markets and so forth. But the contagion of fashion ravages primarily the imagination, where it is apparently cut off from much of reality and where it blinds the watchmen and watchwoman of the cultural dikes. The displays of power would seem here to have nothing to do with making but only with unmaking – immense cost and waste (‘gaspillage’) in both financial and moral terms. Still we love, says Baudrillard, the rapidity with which the contamination of fashion possesses us and, like a poisonous drug, obliterates rational consideration. It also appears then that there is little difference between the operations of contagion on the biological and on the imaginative levels. We seem to accept the principle that life is most truly and importantly being lived in the insensate dimension of viral infections rather than in the sensate dimension of rational projects: Notre merveilleux social est celui de cette surface ultra-rapide de circulation des signes (et non celle ultra-lente de circulation du sens). Nous adorons être immédiatement contaminés, sans réfléchir. Cette virulence est aussi néfaste que celle de la peste, mais aucune sociologie morale, aucune raison philosophique n’en viendra à bout. La mode est un phénomène irréductible parce qu’elle participe de ce mode de communication insensé, viral, immédiatique, qui ne circule aussi vite que parce qu’il ne passe pas par la médiation du sens.57 In this sphere of quickly circulating viral infections, the leader of fashion may not possess many advantages over her followers. Indeed Lady Dedlock is more a victim than a sovereign. Her rule extends over a ‘world’ of merely ephemeral splendour, and whereas Baudrillard treats fashion as a generalized contamination, Lady Dedlock’s realm occupies only a negligible space in the territory of historical Necessity. This small compartment also possesses, in the description of Dickens’s narrator, the claustrophobic characteristics of a prison: The world of fashion is not a large world. Relatively even to this world of ours, which has its limits too (as your Highness shall find when you have made the tour of it, and are come to the brink of the void
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beyond), it is a very little speck. There is much good in it; there are many good and true people in it; it has its appointed place. But the evil of it is, that it is a world wrapped up in too much jeweller’s cotton and fine wool, and cannot hear the rushing of the larger worlds, and cannot see them as they circle round the sun. It is a deadened world, and its growth is sometimes unhealthy for want of air. (II) In its ‘unhealthy . . . want of air’ this world reminds us oddly of the ‘close room’ with its ‘oppressive stillness’ in which Ruth and the other seamstresses of Mrs Mason’s establishment languish. As they wearily produce gowns for bored, fashionable ladies, both they and those ladies submit to a similar contaminating, wasting oppression. The other two social queens, Mrs Poyntz and Félicité Rougon, reign more fully in the context of ‘the rushing of the larger worlds’. Here they recall us from the dimension that Baudrillard describes of insensate viral activity to the more conscious making and unmaking projects of history. But here too the queenly power proves limited and much less ‘absolute’ than Bulwer’s narrator Fenwick has at first believed. It cannot set fashions capriciously. For unlike the contagion of the Roman plague that stemmed from particular ‘silk ribbons’, associated with female frivolity, the reigning power does not emanate from any single source. Beyond the queens there exist the larger, invisible forces of history, which the queens must translate into the language of their decrees. While Mrs Poyntz remains, to be sure, self-gratifying in her ruthlessness, her power over Fenwick depends upon his persuasion that she speaks on behalf of a higher authority. He can ignore that authority only at his peril when she warns him for his own good against marriage to the dishonoured Lilian: ‘Look where I stand, I am the WORLD! The World, not as satirists depreciate, or as optimists extol its immutable properties, its allpersuasive authority. I am the World! And my voice is the World’s voice when it thus warns you. Should you make this marriage, your dignity of character and position would be gone. . . . You have the pride, as well as the birth of a gentleman, and the wounds to that pride will be hourly chafed and never healed. Your strong breast of man has no shelter to the frail name of woman. The World, in its health, will look down on your wife, though its sick may look up to you.’ (LVIII) Yet the World does not of course evince ‘health’. Fenwick rejects the awful threat of Mrs Poyntz, and to protect the maligned Lilian from the spreading disease of the World’s fashionable opinion, he will later emigrate with her to Australia. Having lost Fenwick, Mrs Poyntz will move on to new conquests in London, where, she says, ‘ “in Jane’s beauty and
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Ashleigh’s fortune I have materials for the woof of ambition” ’. In her last meeting with Fenwick, she makes one more attempt to convince him to follow her: ‘ “Allen Fenwick, do as I do. Be world with the world, and it will only be in moments of spleen and chagrin that you will sigh to think that the heart may be void when the mind is full. Confess that you envy me while you listen” ’ (LXVII). But he does not envy her, and the reference to the void heart makes us wonder if her own worldly victories are not very hollow. In the terrible Félicité Rougon, Zola’s novel contains a remarkably similar woman. Considering herself ‘une des reines du second Empire’, she has reigned, like Bulwer’s Queen of the Hill, over her town of Plassons for eighteen years. There in 1851 she has saved local civilization from anarchy, ‘en y faisant triompher le coup d’Etat du 2 décembre’. In concomitance with the reign of Napoléon III, her provincial world has obediently looked up to her for the setting of its tone and the definitions of its fashions. Like Mrs Poyntz, moreover, she claims not to be exercising a selfish or arbitrary power but to represent the force of ‘l’opinion publique’ (I). The advent of the Third Republic then constitutes a defeat, and as even members of her family begin to support the new political order, she finds her power eroded. Still in the ceremony of laying the cornerstone for the Asile Rougon, she intuits a new investiture of authority and reason for pride – ‘d’avoir vaincu la jeune République, en l’obligeant, dans la personne du sous-préfet, à la venir saluer et remercier’ (XIV). Her face-saving impression of making the personified young Republic bow to her authority indicates, of course, a foolish failure of imagination, for she is actually compromising with the new regime. The power of the world disciplines the very queens that are its interpreters or arbiters. If they interpret it imperfectly as Félicité does here, their own authority fails, and even Mrs Poyntz confesses her own subjection to ‘ “the social laws that I myself have set in my petty kingdom” ’ (LVII). The power, which is ‘always of the feminine gender’ according to The Mill on the Floss (VII:ii), resides therefore in the female collectivity, as Two Years Ago also implies with respect to the tireless female ‘gossips of Aberalva’ (VIII). Ultimately it may derive from something even larger than a purely female collectivity. The disciplining power, in Ermarth’s analysis, is another way of naming the contagion of history, which permeates the broad, panoptic perspective of the novels: The voice of ‘public’ opinion is much, much more than the Voice of Mrs Grundy, or of evangelical righteousness. It is the ineffable voice of social self-awareness, the Nobody narrative function . . ., the narrative voice of an emerging social entity. The special, particular narrative awareness that materializes in the narrative language of historical novels, and that broods over the narrative world in Gaskell, late
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Dickens, Trollope, Meredith or George Eliot, is like the voice of society, speaking to itself.58 In ‘speaking to itself’, the voice of the world carries on a sort of dialogue with itself, as may become interestingly evident in Ruth. The ‘world’ or ‘public opinion’ figures in the novel, Bonaparte believes, as a ‘palpable presence . . . almost a character’: Gaskell uses the term ‘ “the world” . . . as though it were a name’.59 One can then engage in an argument with this ‘palpable presence’ although Gaskell’s Bradshaw does not at first recognize this possibility. After learning the truth about Ruth, he simply repeats to Benson that one cannot safely challenge the world: ‘ “The world has decided how such women are to be treated; and . . . there is so much practical wisdom in the world that its way of acting is right in the long run, and . . . no one can fly in its face with impunity” ’. Benson, of course, opposes such moral timidity: ‘ “I take my stand with Christ against the world” ’ (XXVII). In Esther’s reading of the Gospel to her godmother, Bleak House too alludes to Christ’s stand against the world’s attitude to the fallen woman: ‘our Saviour stooped down, writing with his finger in the dust, when they brought the sinful woman to him’ (III). In the context of the motif of the pointed finger, the passage indicates that Christ, precisely, does not point his finger against the sinful woman.60 The world may well learn from Christ, and indeed Ruth goes on to suggest that it does. In the debate about his mother that Leonard witnesses outside the hospital, the gossip reported by one person – ‘ “They say she has been a great sinner” ’ – is decisively contradicted by another: ‘ “Such a one as her has never been a great sinner” ’ (XXXIII). And this moment in which public opinion shifts constitutes what a recent student of the phenomenon of ‘thought contagion’ would consider a ‘tipping point’.61 Far from condemning Ruth, the world – and Bradshaw with it – has now clearly come round to considering her a saint. In representing the effects of history, the novels prosecute in their microcosms the dialogue about whether the impalpable, invisible world controls individuals or individuals influence and make the world. Given the opportunities for dialogue and for tipping public opinion, the watchwomen who imagine and repair the cultural dikes and who observe and speak for the world possess a certain latitude. They can, even if hindered by their own imperfections and selfishness, sometimes make the social Panopticon a less carceral and more humane space. While under constant siege, the fortified domestic hearth can similarly resist and become in some instances a centre from which a beneficially colonizing impulse emanates. In contrast to the evidently spurious missions of Mrs Jellyby and Mrs Pardiggle, the charitable projects of Esther liberate generous energies and promote creative versions of discipline. Instructing Caddy and others in needlework and in her housekeeping methods, Esther emerges, in the opinion of Langland, as ‘the Florence Nightingale of bourgeois
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housekeepers’ who is extending her method ‘across the face of England’. Somewhat like la Souleiade in the fantasy of Clotilde, the new Bleak House therefore figures as a source of commanding healthy energy that is at least as powerful as the contagious wickedness of Chancery.62 Or, in this new version of imperialism, the instruments of the often exploited needlewoman prove their superiority after all to the brutality of the sword. In Jameson’s perspective of Necessity, the power for good of the individual needlewoman admittedly remains limited. While industriously weaving her webs and concealing her watchful diligence behind veils, she is executing, with more or less resistance, invisible orders. Her handiwork, as Heidegger suggests with respect to the ‘mesh’ (Geflecht) of language, is not something that she weaves but rather an unauthorized text that weaves itself through her.63 While the sword, in the logic of our metaphors, may tear the meshes and the needle may repair them, the fabric of history continues to impose upon the fabricators its own unifying patterns. The debate regarding the degree to which individual imaginations and local causes may influence or even, taken together, be that mysterious Necessity is not concluded. The novels seem on the whole to propose with respect to the clothes-making process the hopeful interpretation of Sartor Resartus. Carlyle’s Editor finds ‘many a little loophole’ opening for him ‘into the internal world of Teufelsdröckh’ which offers a view of history as life and freedom. Instead of the ‘dead, immeasurable Steam-engine . . . and Mill of Death’, he discerns ‘the roaring Loom of Time’ that figures in Goethe’s Faust: ‘all Nature and Life are but one Garment, a “Living Garment,” woven and ever a-weaving in the “Loom of Time” ’.64 With respect to our particular needlewomen, Ruth especially has progressed, in her later years, from mechanical, captivated stitching to creative and living work. Her busy sewing for her son, the Bensons and needy parishioners may suggest continuing submission to the woman’s overdetermined cultural role. Yet she performs such tasks with love and inventiveness, and her re-making – re-tailoring in the Carlylean sense – from old materials of a carpet for the vital, domestic hearth is emblematic: ‘in the final and unmendable wearing-out of the parlour carpet, which there was no spare money to replace . . . they cheerfully supplied its want by a large hearth-rug that Ruth made out of ends of list’ (XXIX). So against the Necessity of financial contingency, she forges – as in a very different medium Wagner’s Siegfried re-forges the pieces of his father’s sword Nothung – a new possibility for Freedom. With her invisible arms, Ruth will also confront like Siegfried her particular dragon, the typhus that we have seen, in his lair. Although she will finally succumb to the disease, her patient heroism has by then forced an originally hostile public opinion to come around to her fervent support. As opposed to the garments that spread contagion, the products of her imaginative making will continue to warm and protect the community in the years to come.
4
Physicians, nurses and patients
In the agonistic rhetoric that frequently characterizes treatments of disease, the combat engages not only swordsmen but also unarmed fighters. Health, as Vrettos observes, may entail ‘a form of internal combat – not just the absence of sickness, but the ability to conquer disease, to wrestle with it biologically and throw it to the ground’.1 In this internal struggle patients may sometimes have the external help of physicians like Tom Thurnall who similarly approach their task as if it were a row with a nasty bully. Tom goes ‘ “right at [the] throat” ’ of his antagonist, as we have seen, ‘ “wheresoever I meet him” ’ (XIV), and he enjoys the muscular sensations of fighting: ‘ “I have got – and what greater pleasure? – a good stand-up fight with an old enemy; and be sure I shall keep myself in condition for it” ’ (XVII). Usually less blatantly pugnacious than Tom, physicians had been engaged for at least a century in more subtle and possibly unconscious battles too. Besides fighting disease and bureaucracies, they had been campaigning to assert the authority of medicine against the religious establishment, which had traditionally exercised jurisdiction in matters relating to health as well as to morality. With particular respect to sexual practices, medical practitioners came now to take over from priests the power to define and enforce both sanitary and moral principles. ‘The secularization of society, which damaged the prestige of the clergy’, according to Helsinger, Sheets and Veeder, ‘had made physicians the new law-givers’. Or in the similar terms of Foucault and Donzelot, the ‘medicalization’ of culture had made physicians the new ‘police’ of families.2 Unfortunately, from the feminist perspective, the new medical police of families maintained the discriminatory policies against women characteristic of the old priestly police. Physicians based their claim to authority naturally upon science, a branch of learning widely considered too taxing for the female brain and so removed from the sphere in which women could protect themselves.3 In the power struggles that continue within the medicalization of culture, the priestly as well as the military models of authority still operate as challenges to the purely scientific model. The compassionate,
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Christ-like, healing priest and the pugnacious fighter like Tom Thurnall exert their fascination upon the medical practitioners. But whatever the model for medical practice, the principal antagonists remain the disorder and disease that propagate themselves in terms of contagious mechanisms. The medical police must thus devise effective strategies of countercontagion. What is called ‘the medical gaze’ provides an obvious example of the physician’s ability to exert a withering energy, as an anti-contagious influence, against patients. The gaze – more pugnacious than Christ-like – is a particular version of the disciplining stare of the watchmen and watchwomen considered in the previous chapter. While taking in information, it seems to take possession of the patient, as if to substitute the physician’s power for that of the disease. Recalling the patriarchal gaze that turns women into commodities, this far from compassionate gaze serves according to Epstein to objectify the suffering subject: ‘As Michel Foucault would have it, . . . a ‘medical gaze’ . . . alienates the body from the subjective person . . . [and] creates, in other words, the ‘patient’ as a special type of person’. In a possible further step the ‘process’ ‘convert[s] patient into case’.4 Besides this alienating tendency there is, in the analysis of Vrettos, ‘an erotics of clinical vision’ whereby the physician fascinates, intimidates and controls especially his female patient. Some physicians may virtually have conspired to create a mystique about their eyes: ‘the clinical gaze became a contested symbolic maneuver through which the Victorian medical profession attempted to define, and sometimes mystify, the basis of its authority’.5 In addition to disciplining, the ‘transgressive’ gaze can ‘dissect’ its object almost as efficiently, and as palpably, as a scalpel6 – the instrument that may incidentally relate the physician to the swordsman. An explicit association between the gaze and the scalpel occurs, as Rothfield points out, in the case of Flaubert’s Dr Larivière, the disciple of Xavier Bichat in Madame Bovary: ‘Son regard, plus tranchant que ses bistouris, vous descendait droit dans l’âme et désarticulait tout mensonge à travers les allégations et les pudeurs’.7 Like ‘the eyes that fix you in a formulated phrase’ in Eliot’s ‘Prufrock’, that disarticulating gaze has to do less with healing than with ‘murder[ing] to dissect’. In revealing truth, the gaze inspired by Bichat also operates as destructively as the transgressive contagion of the plague. It counteracts at its worst not only proliferating contagion but life itself. In the view of the medical gazer the body of the patient is already a corpse ready to be dissected. In death when the complexities of the vital processes have ceased, the pathological truth about the body finally emerges in its fixed condition. For Foucault death constitutes ‘the great analyst’, reducing an organism, in Tambling’s phrase, to ‘its most exact state’.8 Tambling associates the menacing eye not only with the dissecting scalpel but with the pointing, accusing finger that figures so prominently
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in Bleak House. Without even encountering its object, the finger seems to make its withering touch palpable. It may thus appear, when Tulkinghorn’s death is discovered, that the Roman pointing at him from the ceiling has been the cause of his reduction into a cadaver. Related to the medical gaze and the pointing finger is the force of mesmerism, which often plays a part in nineteenth-century medical practice.9 The physician needs strong powers of will, according to Sir James Paget, to counteract psychic or physical contagion emanating from his patient, and supremely so in the treatment of nervous disorders. ‘A battle of wills’, as Vrettos summarizes a treatise by Silas Weir Mitchell, ‘lay at the heart of the doctor-patient relationship in all cases of nervous disease’.10 In the practice between 1830 and 1860 of ‘heroic’ medicine, such mental coercion might also be reinforced by more literally invasive counterparts of that violence. Physicians employed acid and white-hot irons in an attempt to ‘cauterize’ both physical and nervous disorders. Especially noted for his forcible tactics, Mitchell successfully cured a woman of her hysterical seizures by threatening the re-insertion of uncomfortable and humiliating rectal tubes.11 While employing women as nurses, the medical regime sought to subordinate them too, along with female patients, to male practice. From the start, as Poovey observes, Florence Nightingale proclaimed – even ‘proudly’ – her subservience to the male medical profession. In terms of their actual power, however, nurses became more than the victims of medical practice and joined physicians in the ranks of policing agents. Bailin refers to ‘the policing aspect of the nurse-patient relationship’, especially in the many Victorian ‘narratives of women nursing disabled men’. Reminding us of the ‘needle-like eyes’ of some needlewomen, the nurse might also practice her own version of the medical gaze. In many narratives, according to Judd, the ‘controlling eye’ of the nurse reveals her as superior to physicians in her watchful, disciplining power. Florence Nightingale herself insisted upon vigilant control in her hospitals over everyone’s movements, while ‘martial tropes’ punctuate the reports of admirers to indicate the ‘aggressive’ nature of her tactics upon ‘woman’s battle field’.12 The military rhetoric used to characterize the campaigns and the policing functions of doctors and nurses suits the view of epidemic disease as a dragon to be challenged and forcibly slain. The violence of the disease is contagiously mimicked, as Girard would observe, in the counter-violence of the medical police. The result seems sometimes to ally the physician or nurse with the disease in their mutual hostility to the patient. Some physicians do, however, seek to practice a medicine that avoids coercion and the violence of dissection and invasive treatments and that allies itself with the patient’s body in more gentle treatments. As early as 1849, according to Epstein, the German pathologist Rudolf Virchow had intuited ‘that it is the body’s response to the disease, not the disease itself, that most affects
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individuals’.13 Rather than because of the mysterious phenomenon called cholera, theorized as an external contagion, disease occurs as a dysfunction of the body’s delicate internal processes and immune responses. Science should therefore find ways to reinforce these biological processes instead of conducting a frontal assault upon the supposed contagion coming from without. In this development the theories of Bichat, particularly with regard to the interrelationship of the organic and animal lives, evidently exercised considerable and productive influence. While implicitly relevant to many novels such as Le Docteur Pascal, Bichat receives explicit credit in discussions that popularize his theories within A Strange Story and, of course, Middlemarch. To gain the power of public support, medical science must indeed associate itself as it does in these works with the discourse of narrative. The relationship between medicine and narrative constitutes an instance of what Lyotard defines as a necessity recognized by all forms of knowledge (savoir) to communicate meanings in the guise of narratives (récits). Scientists thereby legitimize their research and explain their discoveries to the public: ‘Le savoir scientifique ne peut savoir et faire savoir qu’il est le vrai savoir sans recourir à l’autre savoir, le récit’.14 In theory, to be sure, the scientific discourse aspires to the rational condition in which ideas pass from mind to mind in accord with conscious reflection. But in practice it depends upon narratives that persuade in more intricately rhetorical and contagious ways too.15 The example of a medical researcher and writer in Ruffini’s novel also suggests a sense in which his work not only persuades readers but originates in an atmosphere of benign contagion. As ‘a devotee of science’ Mr Boniface breathes, in ‘the world of intelligence’, a rarefied air like that of the cloister: ‘The cell of an anchorite, as far as silence and retirement go, could alone stand a comparison with his little study. Not the faintest echo of the noisy world without found a way to it, and within, no sound but that of the scraping of a pen against paper’ (II:viii). But despite the silence and closure to external influences, such a cell is the site of intensely active vitality. In the case of the anchorite wrestling in prayer, the cell is flooded with a spiritual contagion – effluvia of grace or inspiration emanating from God and the saints. The solitary scientist holds within his ‘world of intelligence’ a similar intercourse with mental impulses referable to the past, present and future. The scientific discourse, as Lyotard emphasizes, depends upon the scientist’s awareness of his relationship to an ongoing process. The ‘intellectual pioneer’, which Mr Boniface is said to be, must be susceptible to the theories of his predecessors, and he must foresee the students to whom his own theories can be destined. In his research and his ‘scraping of pen against paper’, he thus furthers the continuity of the grand récit of science that also empowers his own work.16 His ‘tranquil, unremitting race after knowledge’ (II:viii) engages him, even in his apparent retirement, in what Lyotard considers an especially
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important instance of the historical power struggle. More than other discourses, science involves the desire to ‘know’, which is a way of taking possession of what is known and succeeding in the international competition for power. But science does not properly seek knowledge in order to impose mastery, as a contagious infection might do, over competitors. The récit of science must legitimize itself as a récit spéculatif or a récit de l’émancipation that coincides with the health-giving release of an energetic justice in political and moral life.17 The narratives that physicians compose are not only communications regarding their research or episodes of the grand récit directed towards other scientists and the public. They are also the case histories of individual patients and so derive from relationships of power between physicians and those patients. Epstein has interestingly traced this type of narrative back to the very earliest medical records in the third millennium BC. Based on the patient’s subjective account, which has always been regarded as just as important as any objective, external signs of disease, these histories narrate a truth originating within the body. That primary truth, the knowledge coming ‘from the body’, signifies more indeed than the scientific knowledge that the physician applies secondarily in treatments aimed ‘at the body’.18 The case history should therefore remain as faithful as possible to the sufferer’s own account. But because pain and illness, as Scarry emphasizes, resist translation into words, the physician must also interpret the patient’s words and the objective signs.19 Such narratives of illness serve a therapeutic purpose for the particular patient. While especially complex in psychoanalysis,20 the collaboration between patient and physician in physical illnesses as well involves the patient’s contribution of raw data that threatens, with its contagion, the coherence of the narrative. The physician must struggle with this material ‘to rebuild narrative “speakability” ’ and ‘to reembody the body in language’. As informed by ‘clinical thinking’ and ‘diagnostic reasoning’, the narrative becomes a coherent, chronologically ordered account that can ‘restrain the anarchic potential of the human body’. Like other stories, the narrative protectively re-establishes or re-defines the boundaries that have been transgressed: ‘Stories . . . draw lines and limits around the human body with their narrative authority and with their beginnings, middles and ends’. The production of a narrative coherence and understanding contributes in itself to the healing process.21 Even if the patient should die, he or she can at least be restored to some integrity in the narrative reembodiment of the original body wasted by disease. While the primary material coming from the patient is said to possess greater significance than its secondary, written elaboration, the written narrative does tend to replace the reality that it reports. Even the contagious phenomenon may seem to exist, and to be mastered, more in its textually narrated form than in its real activity. An impression is gaining ground, as Charles Rosenberg has phrased it, that cholera ‘is no absolute
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physical entity but a complex intellectual construct’.22 So the contagion operates less in the real body than in its theorized form as a narrative construction. Medical narratives, which construct like other narratives the sense of causality missing in reality, postulate the causative agent as transgressive contagion; then they control that contagion by reaffirming the boundaries transgressed. The physician as objective narrator would seem to triumph in a power struggle with the patient as subjective teller of his or her own story. (As we shall nevertheless observe, our actual physiciannarrators exemplify finally a certain humility and do not triumph in this respect.) If physicians become narrators, literary narrators must evidently become physicians, in the generalized permeability of the boundaries between the two discourses that mutually empowers them. A tendency to relate the narrators of fiction to physicians, according to Rothfield, characterizes the ‘realism’ of this period: ‘a mode of writing [emerges] in which the real has become medical, in which the relation between author and text is modeled on medical precepts, with the author viewing characters and situations as a doctor views patients and cases’. There is, furthermore, the likelihood that whenever physicians ‘appear in realistic and quasi-realistic novels, they . . . act as surrogates for the novelist’.23 With respect to medical contamination of the field of fiction, Zola may be the principal theorist. His manifesto Le Roman expérimental of 1880 advances the analogy between realistic fiction and medicine with particularly bald insistence. In rewriting the physiological treatise of Claude Bernard, he finds it possible simply to substitute the term romancier for Bernard’s médecin and to change very little else of the original text.24 So the novel becomes in Zola’s thinking about his craft, a laboratory in which to design and conduct his experiments, and the image suggests another analogy with the Panopticon too. The Panopticon could serve, according to Foucault, as a ‘laboratoire de pouvoir’ that was particularly wellconceived and equipped for the purpose of experimenting with human beings in an enormous variety of ways.25 In the Panopticon the experimenter remains all-seeing but invisible, and in this aspect of his power he reminds us of Flaubert’s description of the novelist in a letter to Louise Colet. A consideration of the overtly moralizing presence of the author in Uncle Tom’s Cabin leads to the proposition that the narrrative mode should approach the condition of drama as exemplified by Shakespeare: ‘la forme dramatique a cela de bon, elle annule l’auteur. . . . L’auteur dans son œuvre, doit être comme Dieu dans l’univers, présent partout, et visible nulle part’.26 Omnipresent and yet visibly absent, such an experimental author resembles somewhat ominously the all-penetrating but imponderable contagion of history that has replaced the old-fashioned God or First Cause. The omnipresent authorial gaze, like the medical gaze, diffuses a menacing energy, which makes the narrative less attractive than that of Lyotard’s grand récit of liberation.
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Besides as a laboratory or a Panopticon, the novel may be fitted up as a hospital or lazaretto to represent a site of the contagion. The latter architectural structures figure prominently too within some of the novels. If the world itself, in the passage quoted in Bulwer’s essay, is ‘an Hospital . . . a place . . . to dye in’, the novelist can naturally liken himself to the physician making the rounds of its wards. In the course of his rounds he observes, grimly, the stages by which the patients experimentally subjected to the contagious menace of the authorial gaze are dying. Or to judge from Sainte-Beuve’s famous description of Flaubert’s pen, the scientific novelist may practise his invasive craft especially in the operating room. While the disarticulating medical gaze of Dr Larivière, we recall, is ‘plus tranchant que ses bistouris’, Flaubert is simultaneously wielding his pen with all the deftness of a surgeon employing a scalpel.27 Such analogies tend again to associate the narrator-physician, as a source of hostile power, with disease rather than with the energies of health. As a corrective tendency, however, other scientific narrators practice their craft in more healthily serene environments than those of the hospital or prison. In Ruffini’s novel, as we have seen, Mr Boniface’s ‘scraping of a pen against paper’ occurs in a study – and not a laboratory – that resembles ‘the cell of an anchorite’. The reference to the religious institution reminds us indeed that medical science continues to possess analogies with the older religious regime against which it has been struggling for independence. The older vision contaminates, as it probably does in most cultural struggles, the emerging system. The contamination here involves presumably health-giving influences. In most of our novels the non-scientific Jesus retains his mild authority as archetypal healer, and the physician’s eyes do not always fix the patient with a hostile medical gaze. The glance may express the consolation of the compassionate priest rather than the medical objectivity of the scientist and may tend to diffuse the ‘grace’ that repairs the dysfunction of the soul. The medical finger too may not only accuse sufferers but gently touch to restore them to health. Instances of the healing touch, which also typifies impalpable and, as it were, benignly contagious power, concern nurses more often than physicians in our stories. Ruth in particular, as we shall observe, possesses the communicative fingers that can tenderly soothe her patients. (They seem precisely to contrast with the unfeeling, ‘firm fingers’ of Mrs Poyntz – a needlewoman and not a nurse – whose dexterity in ‘linking mesh into mesh’ exercises a military tyranny.) So the older, priestly style of physicians also provide a model – as do the newer style of scientific physicians that we have been considering – for the authorial task. When there is such a priestly physician within the story, his relationship to the other characters is likely to figure the author’s relationship not only to his text but to his readers. As Ruffini implies with respect to I promessi sposi, the patients subjected to medical and priestly ministrations within the story resemble the readers, outside the story, that
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Manzoni’s novel tends to ‘relieve’, ‘soothe’, ‘cheer’.28 And Edmondo De Amicis has implied the same analogy between the patients within the story and the readers of Ruffini’s own novels. The works of Ruffini comforted De Amicis during a long phase of convalescence and restored him to a calm faith in life.29 Ruffini proves himself, in the phrase that Dario Carraroli repeats, a ‘physician of souls’: Il De Amicis disse che il Ruffini è un medico di anime e ha detto benissimo. Egli è uno di quegli scrittori al quale dobbiamo ricorrere quando ci assale la importuna sfiducia di noi e della vita; quando stanchi da affanni morali o avviliti da miseri fastidi, abbiamo bisogno di una parola amica che ci consoli, ci ritempri e ci tolga dalla nostra prostrazione.30 It is the same underlying sickness that manifests itself in both the physical and moral symptoms. But in the role of physician, novelists like Manzoni and Ruffini treat less the physical symptoms than the moral disorder and spiritual contagion of the century. Their therapy is directed against the epidemics of ‘importunate doubts’ deriving from ideological crises and the ‘moral anxieties’ stemming from syndromes of existential guilt. In the diseased cultural context, the energetic human compassion of a priestly physician or novelist relieves at least the psychological symptoms even if it does not remove the ideological causes. The practitioner’s ability to offer that relief seems as valuable as any objectively scientific skill. The medical practitioners who appear in our novels contain traces, then, of the sometimes invisible author as well as signs of the historical struggle or interplay between the priestly and scientific models. Great hopes are placed in these men and women that may, with their special attributes, rise above the contagious condition of sickness and diffuse restorative, liberating impulses to the age. Yet as most of them become patients in their turn, it is clear that historical necessity conditions their actions too. We may examine the pattern with respect first to the physicians, who are always men, and then to the nurses, who in our novels are almost invariably women.31 *
*
*
The first type of male practitioner, still closely associated with the priest who diffuses compassion and consolation, is naturally most prominent in Manzoni’s novel. The afflicted inmates of the lazarettos must even do without trained physicians and rest content with the ministrations of priests,32 who have followed the urgent advice of their archbishop: ‘ “andate con amore incontro alla peste, come a un premio, come a una vita, quando ci sia da guadagnare un’anima a Cristo” ’. As they go forth to ‘gain’ souls for Christ, their spiritual campaign curiously allies them with the campaign of the plague to gain the victims’ bodies. In the dynamics of profitable exchanges the priests readily assign the body to the plague for
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the sake of acquiring a greater value or ‘recompense’, the soul. The medium or currency in which the transactions are effected is that of contagion. While contagion in the form of disease is acquiring bodies, the priests are recycling its energy in the form of love that secures souls. The archbishop Federigo Borromei willingly participates in the transaction – the ‘giving in exchange’ – with his own body and soul. Risking death, he offers consolation in exchange for despair: Visitava i lazzeretti, per dar consolazione agl’infermi, e per animare i serventi; scorreva la città, portando soccorsi ai poveri sequestrati nelle case, fermandosi agli usci, sotto le finestre, ad ascoltare i loro lamenti, a dare in cambio parole di consolazione e di coraggio. Si cacciò in somma e visse nel mezzo della pestilenza, maravigliato anche lui alla fine, d’esserne uscito illeso. (XXXII) The value of the priestly practice derives from the self-identification with the victims whose death the archbishop expects, as a patient in his turn, to share. Something is gained for the price paid. The plague that rages in accord with its own implacable principles provides a model for his more positive employment of contagion. Rather than medical therapies, he offers a consoling redefinition of what is happening: souls are being acquired. So too may the novelist’s narrative reconstruct the implications of the historical facts that themselves remain inalterable. Plato had similarly considered the desirability of the physician’s experiencing illnesses in his own body, but less for the purpose of redefining the illnesses than as a way of learning how to cure them. Since Plato many cultural traditions have recognized, Cecil Helman maintains, the value of the physician’s knowing subjectively and not only objectively the experience of illness: ‘the healer accepts being ill as part of his identity and a necessary precondition to being a healer’. With particular reference to Franz Kafka’s ‘Ein Landarzt’ (1916), Helman notes the permeability of ‘the boundaries between doctor and patient’ with the implication that healing involves an interaction rather than a ‘one-way’ transfer of power.33 While something of the patient’s disease infects the physician and the physician’s curative influence pervades the patient, the boundary between disease and health too loses its clarity. Besides the physicians of Plato, Kafka and many others, the most paradigmatic of such healers is of course Jesus, who took upon himself the sufferings of the world. The novels often refer to him as the archetypal healer of both souls and bodies. The emphasis often remains, however, upon the soulful dimension of the healing art, as when Dickens’s Charley narrates the gospel stories of healing miracles in order simply ‘to comfort’ her dying father (XXXI). The ability of the principal physician of Bleak House to cure the ailments
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of the body may seem especially modest in contrast with his other qualities. Upon his arrival as a ‘dark young man’ in the chamber of Nemo, it is already too late for that patient. He can only project amidst the opium fumes a pity that associates him with the victim. His pity reveals his spiritual superiority to the Scottish ‘medical man’, who wishes merely to abandon the repulsive spectacle and return to his interrupted dinner. Musing about the years of suffering of the man who has now found ‘a happy release’, the dark physician imagines him as a promising youth. He speaks ‘not unfeelingly, while sitting on the bedstead’s edge, with his face towards that other face, and his hand upon the region of the heart’. The narrator observes the distinction between ‘the young surgeon’s professional interest in death’ and ‘his remarks on the deceased as an individual’ (XI). In the effort to imagine the case history of a once promising youth now become an anonymous corpse we also intuit the physician’s function as a representative for the authorial imagination. The still unnamed physician begins himself to become an individual identity for us as he struggles to identify Nemo. As we come thereafter to know Woodcourt, his humane concern for individuals will emerge as an ever more important element of his character than his ‘professional’ qualities. His strength depends upon his humanity, which so attracts some of his admirers that they consider it almost divine. But as with the other physicians his power falls short of the ability to perform miracles. Miracles do not occur, probably, in reality but only as narrative constructions, and our particular narrators do not wish by the construction of miracles to violate the impression of reality. It is interesting, indeed, that he is constructed as a sort of divine miracleworker only in the inserted narrative of the unreliable Miss Flite, as she reports the episode of the shipwreck: ‘An awful scene. Death in all shapes. Hundreds of dead and dying. Fire, storm, and darkness. Numbers of the drowning thrown upon a rock. There, and through it all, my dear physician was a hero. Calm and brave, through everything. Saved many lives, never complained in hunger and thirst, wrapped naked people in his spare clothes, took the lead, showed them what to do, governed them, tended the sick, buried the dead, and brought the poor survivors safely off at last! My dear, the poor emaciated creatures all but worshipped him. They fell down at his feet, when they got to land, and blessed him. The whole country rings with it.’ (XXXV)34 The physician-hero that ought in Miss Flite’s opinion ‘to have a Title bestowed upon him’ continues his ministry in less spectacular fashion upon his return to England. His treatment of the pestilence-stricken Jo cannot save physical life but may relieve the boy’s syndrome of guilt as he
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and Jo repeat together the prayer that Jesus has taught his disciples. His simple touch cannot, like that of Jesus, convey a healing impulse but may at least comfort: ‘He knows that by touching [Jenny] with his skilful and accustomed hand, he can soothe her’ (XLVI). With her and other patients such as Richard, his mere presence soothes the mind and spirit and appears the most important component of his medical effectiveness. Ada observes that ‘ “Richard is never so well, and I am never so easy about him, as when he is with Allan Woodcourt” ’ (LX). But Richard constitutes one of his most difficult and intractable cases, for Richard’s primarily moral disease derives from the Chancery contagion at its most malignant. The infection has sapped Richard’s capacity for any disciplined, responsible commitment, as exemplified in the failures of his various professional careers. The contrast between the moral power of Woodcourt and the moral weakness of Richard has emerged from the start in the medical context. Mrs Badger has observed to Esther the great difference between Woodcourt’s commitment in body and spirit to his ‘vocation’ and Richard’s ‘languid’ feeling ‘about the [medical] profession’ (XVII). Since one-way transfers of power cannot be expected, no blame attaches to Woodcourt for his inability to infuse into Richard a quantity of his own moral force sufficient to save him. Moral infections are always among the most intractable versions of contagion in these novels, as we shall observe further in Bulwer, Ruffini and Zola. Woodcourt can at best attenuate the torments of Miss Flite and Richard. Still, if he is not a divine healer, it is no wonder that in Esther’s summary on the last page we learn that every day ‘the people bless him’. In the course of every passing day ‘his patient ministration’ ‘has alleviated pain, and soothed some fellow-creature in the time of need’. His charismatic power over patients derives somewhat parodoxically from his humble and indeed ‘patient’ sense of being a ‘fellowcreature’. And balsamic results, in the unending human struggle, are the most that one should expect from the priestly physician – and perhaps the novelist – dedicated to his vocation. Dr Hodges, an historical figure whom Bell considers in actuality ‘one of the few heroes of the plague’,35 appears in Old Saint Paul’s similarly to owe his power more to charisma than to scientific abilities. Like Woodcourt, Dr Hodges does prescribe for his patients certain medical treatments – various unremarkable draughts and powders and mild therapies such as rest. Sometimes his treatments also involve sterner measures like bleeding and cauterizing. But the particular factors that make him the only physician in London who can successfully treat victims of the plague remain undisclosed. In contrast to the many ‘quacks’, he appears modest about his abilities. He knows from the start, when confronted with a new case, whether the patient can be saved, and in fact a larger number than we would expect do recover. Among the main characters, Leonard’s cure results, according to the humble physician, from ‘ “a violent effort of
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nature, which has accomplished more than science or skill could do” ’ (II:ix). And although he cannot cure Amabel, at whose death he weeps, he can hope to save Nizza ‘ “if she herself would second me” ’ – by wanting, that is, to recover (III:iv). His therapies and the power radiating from his ‘humanity’, which is manifested in his tireless availability at all hours and in his tears, are not enough. They must be seconded by a resistance to the contagion that occurs within the patient, either as a conscious volition or as the unconscious response of biological mechanisms. Volitional or biological resistance, of which Ainsworth’s narrative offers our first examples, can therefore function as a therapy against the inroads of contagion. But whatever healing power stems from Hodges himself seems to depend upon his subjection rather than resistance to the menace. When he walks with Leonard and Nizza by ‘infected dwellings’ with ‘sick persons stretched on the steps’, he unlike the others accepts contact with them: In order to avoid coming in contact with these miserable creatures the party, with the exception of Doctor Hodges, kept in the middle of the road. Attracted by the piteous exclamations of the sufferers, Doctor Hodges, ever and anon, humanely paused to speak to them; and he promised one poor woman, who was suckling an infant, to visit her on his return. ‘I have no hopes of saving her,’ he observed to Leonard, ‘but I may preserve her child.’ (III:vi) Such humane physicians appear with most frequency and prominence in the novels of Ruffini – his way of celebrating over and over again, probably, the figure of his medically trained and martyred brother Jacopo.36 With the exception of the surgeon who makes the indecent proposal to Lavinia, Ruffinian physicians also possess closer affinities with an ancient tradition of priesthood than do those of the other novels. Their therapies constantly involve, that is, the shedding of blood and prescriptions of baths that suggest cleansing rituals. While decreasingly performed as a common practice in this period, bleeding remains Ruffini’s normal treatment for many pathologies, as we have noticed in the case of Paolo Mancini. The practice implies a felt need for atonement and unconsciously alludes, perhaps, to Jacopo’s self-sacrifice on behalf of his country; he opened a vein and bled to death. Although limited to Parisian steam baths in Paolo’s case, hydropathy of a sometimes very strenuous sort is also prescribed. With such constant insistence upon bloodshed and other sometimes sternly painful treatments, the kindly physician expresses a priestly concern to heal the guilty souls of his patients too. In Lavinia, as we shall nevertheless have occasion to notice, the most interesting medical authority is Dr Ternel, whose scientific rigour may preponderate over his priestly practices.
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With its mingling of compassion and sternness, the charisma of the priestly physicians sometimes acquires overtones of mesmerism. In a highly charged encounter, the usually mild cardinal-archbishop Federigo thus seeks, albeit unsuccessfully, to overpower with his psychic energy the selfish Don Abbondio. The latter needs to be brought to confess his guilt so that it can be forgiven. But more commonly, as we have seen, the dynamics of the relationship of power between physician and patient involves the physician’s humble identification with the patient. While the physician encourages patients to purge themselves or resist the contagion, he himself accepts contact with the contagion and becomes a potential patient. For the novelist, the implication is that he or she too accepts immersion in the historical contagion. The novel itself will be filled in some sense with the infectious odours of the lazarettos and the opium fumes of Nemo’s den. Rather than offering an escape, it will plunge the reader as well into the all-penetrating moral disorder of the times. Yet it may also help the reader to resist the moral corruption. Amidst the desolation, the priestly physician and novelist will maintain the value of love for our fallen humanity. The novel will inculcate a vision both of our fellowship in the common menace and of the worth, despite the decomposition of corpses in the plague pits, of our individual souls. The novelist’s awareness dispenses a balsamic contagion that makes the historical condition bearable. Besides the priestly physicians, however, there are the more coldly professional and scientific physicians of a newer school. Not so humbly conscious of their common humanity, they evince a certain egoism in their efforts to control their patients. If they too function, as in the guise of Flaubert’s Dr Larivière, as surrogate novelists, the implication is that novelists must be especially concerned to maintain objective technical control of their texts. In the stories of Kingsley’s Tom Thurnall and Bulwer’s Allen Fenwick, a dialectical tension between the two schools of physicians is felt. Both protagonists begin as the newer type of scientific physician and end by repenting that attitude. Although that repentance may seem surprising from our own later perspective, it is clear that the nineteenth-century Zeitgeist did not yet diffuse compelling certainties about the wave of the future in medical practice. While Thurnall has likened his strength in fighting the cholera to that of the boxer or wrestler, the power of the new scientific physician really comes, he believes, from a modern kind of knowledge. Kingsley has probably based him in part on another Tom – Thomas Wakley, who in angry impatience with the medical establishment founded the radical medical journal Lancet.37 Expressing an especially aggressive hostility to the religious mentality, Thurnall proclaims proudly that his knowledge derives empirically from experience rather than from superstition. To an officer who apparently expects him to have some sense of the miraculousness of
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his rescue as the sole survivor of the shipwreck, he responds matter-offactly: ‘ “We doctors, you see, get into the way of looking at things as men of science; and the ground of science is experience; and, to judge from experience, it takes more to kill me than I have yet met with” ’ (IV). Besides being ‘men of science’, he observes on another occasion, ‘ “we doctors are men of the world” ’, which signifies his tolerance of much human sinfulness – although certainly not sanitary sinfulness (VIII). His particular impatience with clerical thinking comes from his conviction that priests relate sin too entirely to the sphere of soul and neglect sanitary matters relating concretely to bodily health. His use of the microscope to view ‘little zoophytes’ also shows him the irrelevance of ethical considerations of sin in the biological context. These micro-organisms obey the ‘rules concerning life and death’, as do the agents that cause cholera, and have as much right as any other organisms to participate in the struggle for survival. When Vavasour finds his attitude ‘ “coldhearted” ’, he answers in effect that science supplants ethical sympathies with a recognition that the strong must win out over the weak. And against Vavasour’s belief that doctors should be ‘ “men with human sympathy and compassion” ’, he proposes the physician as ‘ “a man with human strength” ’: ‘My dear sir, one may be too busy, and at doing good too (though that is not my line, save professionally, because it is my only way of earning money); but one may be too busy at doing good to have time for compassion. If while I was cutting a man’s leg off I thought of the pain which he was suffering –’ (X) While Tom cares less about financial compensation than the designedly provocative parenthesis implies, his impatient, brusque ‘cutting’ through to the material core of matters irritates clerical mentalities and earns him enemies. These enemies include the alcoholic Squire Trebooze whose resentful feelings Tom insists upon ignoring in order to treat only the medical problem that the squire himself does not wish to acknowledge. When the squire absurdly sends the young Mr Creed to challenge Tom to a duel, the latter simply fixes his medical gaze upon Creed and reduces him as well to a pathological case: ‘I wish – to speak to you, sir – ahem!’ – went on Mr. Creed; being gradually but surely discomfited by Tom’s steady gaze. ‘Don’t trouble youself, sir; I see your case in your face. A slight nervous affection – will pass as the digestion improves. I will make you up a set of pills for the night; but I should advise a little ammonia and valerian at once.’ (XIV)
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While Tom employs it insincerely and sadistically here, the ‘medical gaze’ and the reference to the specific chemical remedies indicates his coolly scientific bias. In A Strange Story too, the newly arrived physician with his scientific attitude offends the conservative moralists of the provincial town of L—, and he quickly becomes the contested rival of old Dr Lloyd. A strong vocational commitment nevertheless continues to motivate this modern physician. So without concern for the collection of his fees, Allen Fenwick will give the benefit of his professional knowledge to all who need it. At one of Mrs Colonel Poyntz’s receptions, the hesitant approach of a man in pain who evidently ‘could not afford a fee for a physician’s advice’ stirs only a professional impulse to be of service. Although he perceives at once that the man is ‘considering how to take a surreptitious advantage of social intercourse’, his response encourages the sufferer: ‘his eyes met mine with wistful mute entreaty. The instinct of my profession seized me at once. I could never behold suffering without forgetting all else in the desire to relieve it’ (VIII). Expressing at first an awareness that the two share, the eye contact comes then to suggest something different from the compassion that suffering has called forth in the more priestly physicians. The ‘medical gaze’ now creates, more appropriately than it has in the case of Tom and Mr Creed, the patient that the man has desired to become. The process occurs again a few pages later when Fenwick is called to the sickbed of Lilian, with whom he has fallen in love. The ‘glance of his science’ converts even his beloved into his patient or his case: To the true physician there is an inexpressible sanctity in the sick chamber. At its threshold the more human passions quit their hold on his heart. Love there would be profanation; even the grief permitted to others he must put aside. He must enter that room – a calm intelligence. He is disabled for his mission if he suffer aught to obscure the keen quiet glance of his science. Age or youth, beauty or deformity, innocence or guilt, merge their distinctions in one common attribute, – human suffering appealing to human skill. (X) In contrast with the priestly phase in the dialectic, the power of the physician now depends, as it has for Tom Thurnall too, precisely upon the suppression of any compassionate sense of identity with human suffering. Beyond the ‘threshold’ that he crosses, lies a region of ‘calm intelligence’. While calm and shielded from the noise of traffic, this region is not located, however, outside of history and its contagion. For like Ruffini’s Mr Boniface in his anchorite’s cell, Fenwick returns to this region especially in his library where his scholarship puts him at the centre of contemporary intellectual currents. Among other treatises, he has published a much-acclaimed work, ‘The Vital Principle; its Waste and Supply’,
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and during the years narrated in the novel his more ambitious ‘Inquiry into Organic Life’ is in progress. The scholarly task offers a refuge from the cares and, when Lilian is gone, from ‘the aching sense of void and loss’ of his daily existence (XX). He works on it especially at night, putting all else out of mind, and often writes ‘till the lights waned in the gray of dawn’. These nights provide occasions of exaltation in which he believes himself to be creating a structure that will far outlast the fleeting present. ‘ “I have written” ’, he reflects as one such dawn breaks, ‘ “that which will found a school, form disciples; and race after race of those who cultivate truth through pure reason shall accept my bases if they enlarge my building” ’ (XX). His endeavour thus corresponds to Lyotard’s description of the continuity of the scientific discourse. Based on the theories of his predecessors – Condillac, Broussais, Bichat, Maine de Biran among many others that are mentioned38 – Fenwick’s argument is destined for his disciples and posterity. The manuscript naturally accompanies him to Australia where it again permits him to enter the dimension of scholarly intelligence in which his own truest life and identity are experienced: My Work, my Philosophical Work . . . how eagerly I returned to it again! Far away from my household grief, far away from my haggard perplexities – neither a Lilian nor a Margrave there! . . . The Work was I myself! – I, in my solid, sober, healthful mind, before the brain had been perplexed by a phantom. Were phantoms to be allowed as testimonies against science? No; in returning to my Book, I returned to my former Me! . . . Here . . . was a monument of my rational thoughtful Me, – of my individualized identity in multiform creation. And my mind, in the noon of its force, would shed its light on the earth when my form was resolved to its elements. (LXXIV) In his nocturnal activity he inhabits a tower from which the light of knowledge will pour some day into the dark places of superstition and ignorance – including the miasmic breeding grounds, we might say, of contagion. He is not, however, a humbly self-sacrificing benefactor of the race like the priestly physicians, for his task affirms his own enduring identity and exerts egoistic power over others. His lighthouse-like ‘monument’ resembles the ‘monuments of unageing intellect’ that Yeats creates at night in Byzantium. Like Yeats’s golden bird, Fenwick’s book is also – in its intellectual aspect – a work of supreme craftsmanship: ‘I clamped and soldered dogma to dogma in the links of my tinkered logic, till out from my page, to my own complacent eye, grew Intellectual Man, as the pure formation of his material senses’ (XX). Through the clamping and soldering of its logic, the work constructs, as narratives do, a system of causality.
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And the fact that the book possesses a human protagonist, the ‘Intellectual Man’ that grows from its page, suggests an analogy not only with the art of Yeats but with that of the narrator of fiction. Producing in some sense an auto-immortalizing autobiography, Fenwick becomes here too a surrogate for the novelist. The narrative that symbolizes and immortalizes Fenwick’s own identity also provides an instance of the narrative mode whereby science, according to Lyotard, necessarily communicates its knowledge. At the heart of this particular narrative, as of Fenwick himself, is a ‘creed . . . of stern materialism’ (I). The materialism refers in theory to some objective truth beyond the constructive or deconstructive power of an individual narrator. But in his narrative Fenwick has brought to bear the sternness of his own commitment to a creed, and so a subjective element helps to empower the implacable logic. Chiefly because of this element, perhaps, his ‘complacent eye’ approves the result. In the sequel he will come to realize that this bias has distorted his work and prevented it from conforming to his own paradigm of the scientific communication. Meanwhile, his creed may interest us as an example of how contemporary science conceives power to be operating at the biological level. In the biological functioning of life, as in the arena of historical Necessity, something like a contagious principle is discerned. It works within the ‘pabulum’ as Fenwick terms, with reference to Bichat, the fundamental substance of life in both its ‘animal and organic’ aspects. This substance is, we may imagine, a version of the ‘protoplasm’ that composes all living cells according to Huxley’s popular lecture of 1868, ‘On the Physical Basis of Life’. As its all-important property the pabulum exemplifies ‘the vital principle itself’, an ‘energy’ that Bichat terms the force vitale or élan, which provides for ‘the re-invigoration of the human system by principles similar to those which Liebig has applied to the replenishment of an exhausted soil’ (XX).39 The similarity of the vital principle to a contagious mechanism exists in its stimulation of chain reactions within the cells and tissues of the body. As its vital energy interacts with the material components of cells, it stimulates them into the activity of growth and self-replication. For the condition of health, however, it should not provoke hyperactivity in any one region of the body because other regions would thereby sink into underactivity. This effect follows from the limitations in the sources of pabulum, the living substance of the cells that they must burn or consume in order simultaneously to maintain themselves in life. Generally the vital principle seems healthily to regulate its own workings not only in individual cells and tissues but on the level of the entire body. But disease may result either from its generalized depletion or from a faulty distribution of its energies. The importance of distribution reflects the widespread impression of the period of the biological ‘system’ – ‘the human body as a system of dynamic exchange’. And while health involves especially an equilibrium between resources devoted to ‘mental and bodily functions’,40 the case of
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Fenwick’s wife Lilian demonstrates an exemplary situation of disequilibrium. We find, in moving from material specifically contained within Fenwick’s scientific text to the background elements of his Strange Story, that too much of the vital principle goes into Lilian’s dreaming brain. The rest of her body becomes weak, and the various parts of her constitution fail to ‘blend in that felicitous union which constitutes the perfection of woman’ (XVI). Women, it would indeed appear, are especially liable to such imbalances,41 which pose for the physician the challenge of helping nature to restore appropriate blends and proportions. As Margrave summarizes Fenwick’s own theory, ‘ “the best cure of disease is less to deal with the disease itself than to support and stimulate the whole system, so as to enable Nature to cure the disease and restore the impaired equilibrium by her own agencies” ’ (XXIV). The vital principle transmits its self-regulating impulses in the human body as if through a medium that resembles a magnetic field. That field exists outside the living organism too as a medium for the transmission of volitional pulsations. Fenwick discovers in experiments with Margrave that the ‘human Will’ generates something like an ‘electric current’ that a ‘galvanometre’ can measure and materially quantify. Operating in elusive analogy with ‘the Newtonian law of gravitation’, such ‘organic electricity’ can establish connections between individuals across great distances. The medium retains its similarity therefore to the one, being investigated in these years by Louis Pasteur, through which the impulses of diseasecausing contagion are transmitted.42 Possessed of strong mesmerizing powers, Margrave’s own particular will is especially capable of sending its contagion through space to others. For what are at first mysterious reasons, his will subjugates a certain madman and causes him to commit a murder for which Fenwick will be arrested. He then terrorizes Fenwick in ghostly apparitions and forces Fenwick’s beloved Lilian to flee from her home and come to him. His will operates here to undermine both her will and her health, which are nearly identified, because his own well-being depends upon this undermining of hers. Besides imposing his volitional power upon hers, he vampirically absorbs – as in Miss Flite’s impression of the Lord Chancellor’s mace – a power from her. The contagious principle thus involves not just the communication of maleficent energy (‘something . . . hostile, overpowering’ in the atmosphere [XXXII]) but the subtraction of beneficent vitality, the élan, from a hitherto healthy body. As Fenwick’s alter-ego, Margrave too desires immortality. But rather than creating an enduring book, a monument to his unageing intellect, he wants to live on literally through the centuries as a healthy, unageing animal. This thirst for youthful life means that he will engross as much of the vital principle as he can within himself, accordingly depleting it for others. His supply must continually be replenished, and he aspires to drink vitality in its purest, liquid form, as distilled by Haroun of Aleppo.
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(After the plague, as an anti-vital principle has depleted the élan in its Syrian victims, only the elixir of Haroun has been able to replenish that force and save them.) To learn the formula of the elixir, Margrave has arranged for the murder of its possessor, and to distil it, he requires the help of Fenwick’s science. He becomes Fenwick’s patient, but a patient who would entirely control his physician and his own case history. The connection with Margrave therefore leads Fenwick into dangerous speculations that subvert his prized region of ‘calm intelligence’. The narrative enters ‘a true border-land between natural science and imaginative speculation’ (XXXIX), where paranormal events, previously ruled out of existence by Fenwick’s scientific intelligence, occur. The fault is not only Margrave’s but that of materialistic science itself, which could not offer a secure stronghold against paranormality.43 Losing confidence in the insights of his intellect, Fenwick finds his own life force sapped. It must be replenished, as he comes to understand, not by something like Haroun’s elixir, but by the therapy of a higher, more spiritual sort of medicine. The more priestlike physician, Dr Faber, who had been his predecessor in L—, returns to town, and an instinct causes Fenwick to invite him to stay: ‘ “Willingly,” said Faber, looking at me more intently than he had done before, and with the true eye of the practised Healer, at once soft and penetrating’ (XLV). The medical gaze transforms Fenwick himself at this point from physician into patient. His narrative becomes his own case history. A series of events constitute assaults upon Fenwick’s scientific materialism, based as it is upon Bichat’s reduction of life to the two material classes of ‘animal and organic’. There is evidently the third class of the ‘soul’ for which Fenwick’s dream of immortality in a material dimension has not provided. The ailing Lilian, now in a cataleptic state, typifies his sick soul, for whose recovery the case history expresses anxiety. To the ‘physician’s eye’ of Dr Faber it is clear that the recovery requires humble faith and prayer rather than other medical remedies. Hope, says Faber, must now be based ‘ “not [on] my skill as physician, but [on] my inward belief as a Christian” ’ (LXXIX). So Fenwick himself renounces the desire for power associated with knowledge and the arrogance of defining his immortal superiority as a ‘rational thoughtful Me’: Know thyself! Is that maxim wise? If so, know thy soul. But never yet did man come to the thorough conviction of soul but what he acknowledged the sovereign necessity of prayer. . . . I prayed, – all my soul seemed one prayer. All my past, with its pride and presumption and folly, grew distinct as the form of a penitent, kneeling for pardon before setting forth on the pilgrimage vowed to a shrine. (LXXXIX) In the medium of prayer, through which he confesses his weakness, the powerful contagion of God flows into him as the true version of the ‘vital
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principle’ that the scientist has sought in vain. Rather than in the form of unageing intellect or unageing body, immortality belongs to the soul that is saved outside the historical dimension. Although Jameson would find such salvation illusory, Fenwick joins the priestly or Christ-like physicians of the older school, the physicians of the soul whose weakness is their strength. The scientific ‘Inquiry into Organic Life’ is abandoned as his private case history concludes successfully. In the intricacies of this case, the soul is saved not only outside the historical dimension but within it because Lilian, whom Bulwer had originally intended to die, recovers. The moment of her recovery coincides with the death of Margrave, who has always represented a menace to Lilian. As a possibly single event, that is, there are the death of one patient, suggestive of the physician’s worst self, and the recovery of the other patient, suggestive of his best self. We may also find in the relationship between Fenwick and Lilian an instance of the physician and patient who heal one another, his being a spiritual and hers a physical healing. Bulwer has also modelled Fenwick’s case history, as Marie Roberts maintains, upon the moral and intellectual development of Maine de Biran. The career of Biran and of Fenwick seems to have developed in three stages. In Bulwer’s impression these stages – ‘the three lives of Man’ – also correspond to the evolution of European thought in the nineteenth century. The first stage shows the influence of the Enlightenment and the mechanical materialism of Condillac and relates to the animal or instinctive aspect of the human being associated with Margrave. The second stage leads to a more vitalistic impression – Fenwick’s ‘Vital Principle’ – and is characterized by Fenwick’s self-conscious identification of himself as the founder of an ambitious new scientific philosophy. In the third stage, related to the life of the soul typified by Lilian, wisdom is likened to a child-like faith in God, as a truth that transcends rational understanding.44 We may of course doubt that European thought really entered this third phase, as Derrida implies that Biran himself doubted it.45 But it is interesting, as I have suggested, that men like Bulwer, living in that historical moment, could foresee a European evolution towards a new culture of faith. Kingsley discerned signs of such an evolution as well, to judge from his depiction of a similar defeat of the materialistic scientist. The process begins in Two Years Ago when Tom’s recognition of the inability of his science to heal the presumably spiritual disease of Mrs Vavasour takes him to the Anglican vicar: ‘ “I cannot cure her; so I come to you, as soul-doctor, to do what I, the body-doctor, cannot” ’ (X). By the end of the novel he has lost faith in himself entirely, and what he now sees as a long power struggle between himself and God finishes with his capitulation: ‘ “I had been trying for years which was the stronger, God or I; I found out I had been trying whether I could not do well enough without Him: and there I found that I could not” ’. Reduced to humility, he becomes himself the
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patient and begs Grace to ‘ “teach me, about this Father in heaven” ’ (XXVIII). The antagonists of the scientific physician turn out to be not only biological principles of degeneration and maleficent contagion but God himself. With Ruffini’s Dr Ternel, we come at last to a scientist who is not defeated by the proponents of Christian faith. The latter do not need, that is, to defeat him, for his science does not pose a threat to religion. He has managed, at the point of his career in which we meet him, to integrate with apparent success the religious and scientific components of his practice. Since that practice, in the field of mental alienation, often involves patients suffering from obsessions of guilt, he necessarily deals with what is considered the dimension of ‘soul’. He also possesses like the priestly physicians of our first phase an impression of his divine vocation. ‘ “Thank God” ’, he exclaims to Lavinia and Clara when they first call upon him, that amidst ‘ “many failures” ’ his career has included a ‘ “few successes” ’ in the great work – ‘ “to call up harmony from chaos, to rescue a noble mind from the worst of bondages, to new create a man, as it were, in God’s image. Really, it is a task almost divine” ’ (II:xix). In performing this divine mission, he frequently demonstrates the compassion that Thurnall and Fenwick had at first considered inappropriate in the scientist, and he can even be moved, like Hodges, to tears. ‘By turns physician and comforter’, the narrator remarks, ‘[he] wrestled valiantly with both bodily and mental sufferings’ (II:xxv). Among our medical practitioners, he exemplifies the most holistic approach. The gentler and the more authoritarian components of his behaviour towards patients also blend in the ‘paternal role’ that is considered appropriate for the psychiatric physician.46 Like children, his patients require both love and discipline, and sometimes punishment, and he will humour their whimsical nonsense only to a limited degree. Besides a paternally ruled home, the asylum naturally resembles a well-governed prison, a prison designed not only to keep the inmates confined but, as a refuge, to keep certain dangers out. Current theory regarding treatment of the insane patient, according to Rothfield, recommended internment in a structure that would ‘isolate him or her from possibly harmful environmental influences’: ‘alienists invented a new social space, an artificially created therapeutic milieu purified of all the temptations of the social maelstrom’47 – and protected, in our terms, from the historical contagion. Like other sick-rooms that we shall notice, indeed, the asylum seems with ‘its utopian quality’ to exist outside history. But given the essential turbulence and contagious irrationality of mental disease, an atmosphere of utopian calm cannot easily prevail there. Its order must often be firmly imposed and carceral. Evidently run on excellent principles, the Parisian asylum of Dr Ternel near the Invalides is probably based on an institution that Ruffini knew well in Ivry, in which Donizetti had been interned in 1846–47.48 Its
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patients receive treatment, certainly, that strikes us as in more verisimilar accord with enlightened contemporary practice than the therapies applied to