Neuropsychological Research
In a broad sense, neuropsychology stands for the branch of brain sciences that aims to und...
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Neuropsychological Research
In a broad sense, neuropsychology stands for the branch of brain sciences that aims to understand how the structure and function of the brain relate to specific cognitive and psychological processes. The idea of developing a research field somewhere between neurology and cognitive psychology emerged in the 1960s as a result of studies conducted by both disciplines which, although using different methodologies and tools, were analysing the same issues. Neuropsychology particularly puts emphasis on the clinical and experimental study of the cognitive effects of brain injury or neurological diseases, taking models of normal cognitive functioning into account. Neuropsychological Research: A Review provides a meticulous overview of what has been achieved in the field of cognitive neuropsychology from its early beginnings in the 1960s and 1970s to the present day. Authors include some of the pioneers involved in the genesis of neuropsychology as an independent and distinct field of neuroscience. The comprehensive coverage includes language disorders, skilled movement disorders, recognition disorders, attentional and executive disorders, visuo-perceptual disorders, memory disorders, and neurodegenerative diseases. This fascinating text forms an enjoyable tribute to the rich heritage of neuropsychology, and will be essential reading for researchers and students of neuropsychology, clinical psychology, cognitive psychology, and behavioural neuroscience. Peter Mariën is a Clinical Neurolinguist in the Department of Neurology at ZNA Middelheim Hospital, Antwerp, Belgium. He is Professor of Neurolinguistics and Psycholinguistics at Vrije Universiteit Brussels and the University of Ghent. His main area of research is in the field of clinical neurolinguistics and neuropsychology. Jubin Abutalebi is a Cognitive Neurologist and Senior Researcher at the Faculty of Psychology of the Vita-Salute San Raffaele University in Milan, Italy. His research interests lie in the area of clinical neuropsychology and, specifically, language disorders in theory and practice.
Neuropsychological Research A Review
Edited by Peter Mariën and Jubin Abutalebi
First published 2008 by Psychology Press 27 Church Road, Hove, East Sussex BN3 2FA Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2008. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Psychology Press is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Copyright © 2008 Psychology Press All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. The publisher makes no representation, express or implied, with regard to the accuracy of the information contained in this book and cannot accept any legal responsibility or liability for any errors or omissions that may be made. The publication has been produced with paper manufactured to strict environmental standards and with pulp derived from sustainable forests. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Neuropsychological research : a review / [edited by] Peter Mariën and Jubin Abutalebi. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-84169-620-1 (hardcover) 1. Neuropsychology. I. Mariën, Peter, 1962– II. Abutalebi, Jubin, 1969– [DNLM: 1. Neuropsychology–methods. 2. Brain Diseases– physiopathology. 3. Cognition. 4. Nervous System Diseases– physiopathology. WL 103.5 N4935 2008] QP360.N49363 2008 612.8–dc22 2007025344 ISBN 0-203-93890-9 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN: 978-1-84169-620-1 (hbk)
This book is dedicated to our scientific mentor, inspiring colleague, and dear friend, Professor Luigi Amedeo Vignolo.
This photograph was taken on 17 September 2005, during a “festa” for Luigi’s retirement, organized by Anna (“Mimi”) Basso and Stefano F. Cappa near Lerici, Italy. © Giuseppe Vallar.
Contents
Contributors
xi
Introduction
1
JUBIN ABUTALEBI AND PETER MARIËN
Homage to Luigi Amedeo Vignolo
7
ARTHUR L. BENTON
Dedication to a pioneer in neuropsychology
9
ENNIO DE RENZI
SECTION I
Approaching the brain 1 A multiplicity of intelligences
15 17
HOWARD GARDNER
2 Neural circuitry underlying language
25
MICHAEL PETRIDES AND DEEPAK N. PANDYA
3 Structural and functional neuroimaging in neuropsychology: a concise overview JUBIN ABUTALEBI, LISA BARTHA DOERING, PASQUALE ANTHONY DELLA ROSA, AND PETER MARIËN
51
viii Contents SECTION II
Language disorders 4 Information-processing models of aphasia: updating the diagram makers
73
75
KENNETH M. HEILMAN
5 The impact of right-hemisphere lesions on language abilities: theoretic and clinical perspectives
93
YVES JOANETTE, ANA INÉS ANSALDO, KARIMA KAHLAOUI, AND ANDRÉ ROCH LECOURS
6 Acquired dyslexia and dysgraphia
113
RIA DE BLESER AND CLAUDIO LUZZATTI
7 Developmental dyslexia: from neuropsychology to genetics, and back again
127
ALBERT M. GALABURDA, JOSEPH LOTURCO, AND GLENN D. ROSEN
8 Aphasia recovery: neural mechanisms
137
STEFANO F. CAPPA AND JUBIN ABUTALEBI
9 Aphasia rehabilitation
147
ANNA BASSO
SECTION III
Skilled movement, music, and number-processing disorders
159
10 The forelimb apraxias
161
KENNETH M. HEILMAN, LESLIE J. GONZALEZ ROTHI, AND BRENDA HANNA-PLADDY
11 Should we make aphasic patients sing?
185
SYLVIE HÉBERT, ISABELLE PERETZ, AND AMÉLIE RACETTE
12 The neuropsychology of calculation and number processing XAVIER SERON
201
Contents
ix
SECTION IV
Modality-specific recognition disorders
229
13 Perceptual categorization: language and thought
231
JULES DAVIDOFF
14 Visual agnosia
249
H. BRANCH COSLETT
15 Auditory agnosia
267
MARIE DI PIETRO, MARINA LAGANARO, AND ARMIN SCHNIDER
16 Somaesthetic recognition disorders
285
GABRIELLA BOTTINI AND MARTINA GANDOLA
SECTION V
Neglect, attentional, and executive disorders
305
17 Subcortical neglect
307
GIUSEPPE VALLAR
18 Neuropsychology of attention
331
MICHAEL I. POSNER
19 Measuring human cognition online by electrophysiological methods: the case of selective attention
349
ANNA CHRISTINA NOBRE AND LAETITIA SILVERT
20 The frontal lobe: executive, emotional, and neurological functions
379
PAUL J. ESLINGER
SECTION VI
Memory disorders and neurodegenerative diseases
409
21 Memory: structure, function, and dysfunction
411
OLIVIER PIGUET AND SUZANNE CORKIN
x
Contents
22 Effects of aging and dementia on memory
437
GIANFRANCO DALLA BARBA, FRANÇOIS BOLLER, AND DOROTHÉE RIEU
23 Semantic dementia: the story so far
471
JONATHAN KNIBB AND JOHN R. HODGES
24 Frontal lobe dysfunction across diagnostic dementia categories
491
SEBASTIAAN ENGELBORGHS, PETER MARIËN, AND PETER P. DE DEYN
SECTION VII
Concluding remarks Concluding remarks
511 513
PETER MARIËN AND JUBIN ABUTALEBI
Author index Subject index
515 541
Contributors
Jubin Abutalebi Centre for Cognitive Neurosciences, Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Via Olgettina 58, 20132 Milan, Italy, and Interdisciplinary Center for Cognitive Studies, Faculty for Human Sciences, University of Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany Ana Inés Ansaldo Centre de recherche, Institut universitaire de gériatrie de Montréal, 4565 chemin Queen Mary, Montréal H3W 1W5, and École d’orthophonie et d’audiologie, Faculté de médecine, Université de Montréal, Canada Anna Basso Institute for Neurological Sciences, University of Milan, Via F. Sforza 35, 20122 Milan, Italy Arthur L. Benton Department of Neurology and Psychology at the University of Iowa (the author died on 26 December 2006) François Boller Inserm Unit 610, Pavillon Claude Bernard, 47, boulevard de l’hôpital, 75013 Paris, France Gabriella Bottini University of Pavia, Piazza Botta 6, 27100 Pavia, and Cognitive Neuropsychology Laboratory, Neuroscience Department, Niguarda Hospital, Milan, Italy Stefano F. Cappa Department of Neuropsychology, Vita-Salute San Raffaele University-DIBIT, Via Olgettina 58, 20132 Milan, and Department of Neurology, San Raffaele Turro Hospital, Milan, Italy Suzanne Corkin Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 46–5121, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA H. Branch Coslett Department of Neurology, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine, 3400 Spruce Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA Jules Davidoff Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths College, University of London, Lewisham Way, London SE14 6NW, UK Gianfranco Dalla Barba Inserm Unit 610, Pavillon Claude Bernard, 47, boulevard de l’hôpital, 75013 Paris, France
xii
Contributors
Ria De Bleser Department of Cognitive Neurolinguistics, University of Potsdam, PF 601553, D-14415 Potsdam, Germany Peter P. De Deyn Department of Neurology and Memory Clinic, Middelheim General Hospital (ZNA), Lindendreef 1, B-2020 Antwerp, and Laboratory of Neurochemistry and Behaviour, Institute Born-Bunge, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium Pasquale Anthony Della Rosa Functional Brain Mapping Laboratory, Neurology Department, Geneva University Hospitals, 24 Rue Micheli-duCrest, 1211 Geneva 14, and Laboratory of Experimental Psycholinguistics, Université de Genève, Geneva, Switzerland Ennio De Renzi University of Modena, Modena, Italy Marie Di Pietro Division of Neurorehabilitation, Department of Clinical Neurosciences, University Hospitals of Geneva, Av. de Beau-Séjour 26, CH-1211 Geneva 14, Switzerland Lisa Bartha Doering Department of Psychosomatics and Psychotherapy, University of Münster, Münster, Germany Sebastiaan Engelborghs Department of Neurology and Memory Clinic, Middelheim General Hospital (ZNA), Lindendreef 1, B-2020 Antwerp, and Laboratory of Neurochemistry and Behaviour, Institute Born-Bunge, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium Paul J. Eslinger Departments of Neurology, Neural and Behavioral Sciences, Pediatrics, and Radiology, Center for NMR Research, Penn State Concussion Program, and Neurorehabilitation Unit, Penn State University College of Medicine and Milton S. Hershey Medical Center, P.O. Box 850, Hershey, PA 17033–0850, USA Albert M. Galaburda Harvard Medical School, Division of Behavioral Neurology and Memory Disorders, and Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, 330 Brookline Avenue, K-274, Boston, MA 02215, USA Martina Gandola University of Pavia, Piazza Botta 6, 27100 Pavia, Italy Howard Gardner Harvard Graduate School of Education, 14 Appian Way, 201 Larsen Hall, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA Leslie J. Gonzalez Rothi Brain Rehabilitation Research Center, Veterans Administration Medical Center and University of Florida College of Medicine, Gainesville, FL 32610, USA Brenda Hanna-Pladdy Landon Center on Aging and Department of Neurology, University of Kansas Medical Center, Kansas City, KS, USA Sylvie Hébert International Laboratory for Brain, Music, and Sound Research (BRAMS), École d’orthophonie et d’audiologie, Université de Montréal, BRAMS-Pavillon 1420 Mont-Royal, Montreal, Canada H3C 3J7
Contributors
xiii
Kenneth M. Heilman Department of Neurology, Veterans Administration Medical Center and University of Florida College of Medicine, Gainesville, FL 32610, USA John R. Hodges MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, 15 Chaucer Road, Cambridge CB2 7EF, UK Yves Joanette Centre de recherche, Institut universitaire de gériatrie de Montréal, 4565 chemin Queen Mary, Montreal H3W 1W5, and École d’orthophonie et d’audiologie, Faculté de médecine, Université de Montréal, Canada Karima Kahlaoui Centre de recherche, Institut universitaire de gériatrie de Montréal, 4565 chemin Queen Mary, Montreal H3W 1W5, and École d’orthophonie et d’audiologie, Faculté de médecine, Université de Montréal, Canada Jonathan Knibb MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, 15 Chaucer Road, Cambridge CB2 7EF, UK Marina Laganaro Division of Neurorehabilitation, Department of Clinical Neurosciences, University Hospitals of Geneva, Av. de Beau-Séjour 26, CH-1211 Geneva 14, Switzerland André Roch Lecours Centre de recherche, Institut universitaire de gériatrie de Montréal, and École d’orthophonie et d’audiologie, Faculté de médecine, Université de Montréal, Canada (the author died on 12 June 2005) Joseph LoTurco Department of Physiology and Neurobiology, University of Connecticut, 75 North Eagleville Road, U3156, Storrs, CT 06268–3156, USA Claudio Luzzatti Dipartimento di Psicologia, Università di Milano-Bicocca, Piazza dell’Ateneo Nuovo 1, I-20126 Milan, Italy Peter Mariën Department of Neurology, ZNA AZ Middelheim, Lindendreef 1, B-2020 Antwerp; Vakgroep Taal en Letterkunde, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, B-1050 Brussels; and Faculty of Medicine, University of Ghent, Belgium Anna Christina Nobre Brain and Cognition Laboratory, Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, South Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3UD, UK Deepak N. Pandya Departments of Anatomy and Neurology, Boston University School of Medicine, Boston, MA 02118, and Harvard Neurological Unit, Beth Israel Hospital, Boston, MA 02215, USA Isabelle Peretz International Laboratory for Brain, Music, and Sound Research (BRAMS), Psychology Department, BRAMS-Pavillon 1420 Mont-Royal, Montreal, Canada H3C 3J7
xiv
Contributors
Michael Petrides Montreal Neurological Institute, McGill University, 3801 University Street, Montreal H3A 2B4, and Department of Psychology, McGill University, 1205 Dr. Penfield Avenue, Montreal, Canada H3A 1B1 Olivier Piguet Prince of Wales Medical Research Institute, Barker Street, Randwick NSW 2031, Australia Michael I. Posner Department of Psychology, 1227 University of Oregon, Oregon, USA Amélie Racette International Laboratory for Brain, Music, and Sound Research (BRAMS), Psychology Department, BRAMS-Pavillon 1420 Mont-Royal, Montreal, Canada H3C 3J7 Dorothée Rieu Inserm Unit 610, Pavillon Claude Bernard, 47, boulevard de l’hôpital, 75013 Paris, France Glenn D. Rosen Department of Neurology (Neuroscience), Harvard Medical School, and Dyslexia Research Laboratory, Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, 330 Brookline Avenue, K-274 Boston, MA 02215, USA Armin Schnider Division of Neurorehabilitation, Department of Clinical Neurosciences, University Hospitals of Geneva, Av. de Beau-Séjour 26, CH-1211 Geneva 14, Switzerland Xavier Seron Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium Laetitia Silvert University of Clermont-Ferrand (UMR CNRS 6024) and Université Blaise Pascal, LAPSCO–UMR CNRS 6024, 34, Avenue Carnot, 63037 Clermont-Ferrand Cedex, France Giuseppe Vallar Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, Dipartimento di Psicologia, Edificio U6, Piazza dell’Ateneo Nuovo 1, 20126-Milan, and IRCCS Istituto Auxologico Italiano, Milan, Italy
Introduction Jubin Abutalebi and Peter Mariën
Neuropsychological Research originated as a Festschrift for Professor Luigi Amedeo Vignolo, an extraordinary behavioural neurologist, excellent neuroscientist, and dedicated teacher, who has done excellent work on various aspects of neuropsychology. The book was conceived as a project to stimulate the understanding of how neuropsychology has developed since Norman Geschwind’s influential reintroduction of the Wernicke–Lichtheim model in the 1960s to a modern multifaceted and most intriguing discipline of neuroscience. We believe that the work and writings of the pioneers in experimental and cognitive neuropsychology, and the scholars who were educated by them, may generate a lasting appreciation for the sense of wonder that drives scientific efforts. In a broad sense, neuropsychology is the branch of brain sciences which investigates how brain structure and function relate to specific cognitive and psychological processes. The discipline particularly emphasizes the clinical and experimental investigation of the impact of brain injury on cognitive processes, while taking models of normal cognitive functioning into account. Modern neuropsychology emerged during the 1960s following a series of influential studies which established a reliable basis for the study of brain– behaviour relationships. It is generally accepted that scientific research into the neural correlates of cognitive functions derives from the early innovative anatomoclinical observations of the French surgeon Paul Broca and the findings of the German neurologist Carl Wernicke during the second half of the nineteenth century. Apart from their historical importance, these hallmark studies marked the early beginnings of neuropsychology as a scientific discipline and they had a number of crucial implications for the understanding of brain–behaviour relationships. Firstly, these studies revealed that a variety of cognitive processes can sustain isolated damage, which indicates that these processes may be subserved by distinct and independent cognitive and neural mechanisms. Secondly, the early insights gave rise to the view that cognitive processes and their underlying neural substrate might be localized in specific, non-contiguous areas of the brain. Although both of these claims have to some extent remained controversial, they refocused attention on brain injury
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as a potentially fruitful way to explore the relationship between brain and behaviour. During the 1960s, information-processing paradigms became the predominant method to investigate cognitive processes. This approach provided an important theoretical framework for neuropsychology. It not only allowed a better insight into the functional role of particular brain regions but also provided a deeper understanding of brain injury in abstract terms, such as impairment of the information-processing abilities within a larger cognitive system. The term “cognitive neuropsychology” emerged to denote these new approaches in the study of brain–behaviour mechanisms. In the genesis of cognitive neuropsychology, two parent fields played a crucial role: psychology and neuroscience. In general, traditional psychologists investigated overall principles and properties of cognitive processes, such as perception, attention, problem solving, language production (speaking and writing), and comprehension (listening and reading), with little interest in the functional neuroanatomy that supported these functions. On the other hand, neuroscientists from different backgrounds investigated the nervous system, focusing on relatively low-level mechanisms within a specific system. Since the first efforts to establish an integrated approach to mind and brain relationships in the 1960s and 1970s, neuropsychology has boomed as a research area, by combining segregated approaches to understand the basic rules underlying the functional organization of the brain. While neuroscience made enormous progress in understanding the neural system, psychology created an interest in the characteristics of intelligent systems, in nature or in computers. In particular, cognitive psychologists focused attention to a detailed analysis of mental events. From the 1960s onward, neuroscience, psychology, and linguistics joined forces to study how the human brain computes particular aspects of higher cognitive functioning. The approach had become multidisciplinary. In addition, these research areas relied on new assessment methods and innovative neuroimaging techniques that allowed in vivo visualization of the structural anatomy of the human brain for the first time. Neuropsychologists are particularly interested in how the brain completes very complex tasks such as perception, memory, attention, problem solving, and language. Using a combination of theoretical and methodological techniques from a variety of related disciplines, neuropsychology attempts to understand the complex dynamics of the working brain. The study of the human brain has recently confirmed that each cognitive act involves a close interaction of distinct neural networks. This equally applies to thinking, reading and listening to music. This was achieved by the need for knowledge about brain–behaviour relationships and the tremendous improvement of technology, such as advanced neuroimaging and neurophysiological techniques. It is clear to most neuroscientists that progress in neuropsychology is just opening up the field of brain and mind sciences. So far, progress has been quite impressive but it is far from completed. The future will certainly bring
Introduction
3
more powerful and precise techniques, the application of which will open up new avenues for research. The founders of modern neuropsychology strongly promoted the communication of knowledge to future generations. Professor Luigi Amedeo Vignolo, enthusiastically and patiently communicated his meticulous dedication to the study of human brain functions, inspiring many disciples in many different countries. His desire to stimulate greater knowledge guided us to edit this book in order to share the rich heritage of neuropsychology with others. Neuropsychological Research is organized as follows. Arthur L. Benton, who sadly passed away in December 2006, enthusiastically accepted our invitation to pay homage to his friend Professor Vignolo. Benton provides an interesting account of the developments in Italian neuropsychology in the 1960s and 1970s. Ennio De Renzi discusses the contribution of Vignolo to the field of neuropsychology and gives some interesting facts about the people who implemented the basic framework on which an important tradition of cognitive neuropsychology was founded. The first section of the book is called “Approaching the Brain”. There are many different approaches to the study of cognitive functions. This section introduces three entirely different ways to approach cognition. Chapter 1 by Howard Gardner updates his excellent Scientific American paper from 1998, recasting the subject of “intelligence” from a psychometric IQ to a broader range of computational capabilities. Gardner underlines how the discoveries in neuropsychology have emphasized the theory of multiple intelligences. Chapter 2 by Michael Petrides and Deepak N. Pandya provides a neuroanatomical description of the brain circuits that support language functions. This chapter summarizes a wide range of research that does not usually appear in neuropsychology handbooks and offers an expert description of the histological brain anatomy underlying language. It is an authoritative comparison of work on monkeys and man that relates to the role of neural circuits in language processing. Chapter 3 by Jubin Abutalebi, Lisa Bartha Doering, Pasquale Anthony Della Rosa, and Peter Mariën concisely discusses neuroimaging in neuropsychology and includes a guide on how to carry out a functional neuroimaging experiment. Section II of Neuropsychological Research focuses on language disorders. Because of the importance of the study of language in the history of neuropsychology, this section is the most elaborate one. In Chapter 4, Kenneth M. Heilman provides an innovative insight into the diagram makers and their models. It presents an interesting theory of how a modified and updated Wernicke–Kussmaul–Lichtheim model can account for much of the extensive aphasic symptomatology that has been described in recent years. Chapter 5 by Yves Joanette, Ana Inés Ansaldo, Karima Kahlaoui, and the late André Roch Lecours provides a survey of research on the role of the right hemisphere in language functions. This chapter summarizes current knowledge about right-hemisphere language functions. It attempts to bring right-hemisphere
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language impairments under the umbrella of “aphasiology”. This view is substantiated by sound clinical evidence, and some theoretical and functional justification is given. In Chapter 6, Ria De Bleser and Claudio Luzzatti discuss acquired disorders of reading and writing. It presents a comprehensive survey of two different approaches to the contemporary study of acquired dysfunctions of reading and writing: the classical approach that prevailed until the early 1990s and the cognitive approach. In Chapter 7, Albert M. Galaburda, Joseph LoTurco, and Glenn D. Rosen focus on the neuropsychological and genetic aspects of developmental dyslexia. This chapter is particularly relevant for cognitive neuropsychologists interested in reading and orthography: it is a particularly insightful review of neuroanatomical, genetic, and behavioural aspects. In Chapter 8, Stefano F. Cappa and Jubin Abutalebi illustrate the main principles of the neural reorganization that may take place after damage to the language areas. In Chapter 9, Anna Basso reviews the principles of aphasia rehabilitation and asks some important questions that are often ignored in efficacy studies, such as the effects of the amount of therapy provided. The third section of the book is dedicated to the neuropsychology of skilled movement disorders such as apraxia and disorders of digit and music processing. In Chapter 10, Kenneth M. Heilman, Leslie J. Gonzalez Rothi, and Brenda Hanna-Pladdy present an important overview of the historical and contemporary issues into forelimb apraxia. Sylvie Hébert, Isabelle Peretz, and Amélie Racette report on the use of music in the rehabilitation of aphasic patients in Chapter 11. These experts examine the old idea that aphasic patients can use the intact ability to sing in language treatment. This chapter presents an excellent review of issues of hemispheric preference. The historical perspective and the background on normal singing are a useful basis for discussion. In the last chapter of this section (Chapter 12), Xavier Seron, one of the world’s leading experts in the field, discusses the neuropsychology of number processing and the clinical aspects of acalculia. This is a very comprehensive and accessible account with useful historical notes. The fourth section of Neuropsychological Research is dedicated to the neuropsychology of modality-specific recognition disorders. In Chapter 13, Jules Davidoff presents useful historical insights and a thorough overview of perceptual categorization deficits. The chapter relies on a detailed examination of research in which the subject LEW has featured. Chapter 14 by H. Branch Coslett discusses visual agnosia. This chapter presents fascinating data, and contains interesting information about the historical background. Chapter 15 is a comprehensive overview of auditory agnosia by Marie Di Pietro, Marina Laganaro, and Armin Schnider. In Chapter 16 of this section, Gabriella Bottini and Martina Gandola review the somaesthetic recognition disorders, which are not usually covered in neuropsychology texts in any detail. Section V of the book examines neuropsychological issues such as neglect and attentional and executive disorders. In Chapter 17, Giuseppe
Introduction
5
Vallar discusses subcortical neglect, seldom covered in neuropsychology texts. This chapter presents an interesting account of the development of Italian neuropsychology. Chapter 18 is an excellent contribution by Michael I. Posner to the neuropsychology of attention: it discusses his early imaging work in St Louis (USA) and provides a historical background. The application of electrophysiology as an online method to measure attentional mechanisms by Anna Christina Nobre and Laetitia Silvert (Chapter 19) expands on selective attention. A historical sketch is followed by a well-formulated description of the contribution and limitations of EEG techniques. In the last chapter of this section (Chapter 20), Paul J. Eslinger presents an exhaustive survey of the role of the frontal lobe in executive, emotional, and neurological functions. The detail on frontal lobe structure and function is excellent, covering clinical and experimental work. Section VI of Neuropsychological Research deals with the branch of human psychology that may be considered the primary source of neuropsychology: the study of human memory systems and related disorders. The section starts with an introduction (Chapter 21) on structure, function, and dysfunction of memory by Olivier Piguet and Suzanne Corkin. It discusses memory in art and popular culture, and presents an excellent review of models of memory and imaging studies of memory and memory impairments. Chapter 22 by Gianfranco Dalla Barba, François Boller, and Dorothée Rieu discusses the effects of ageing on human memory functioning and, hence, dementia. The chapter contains an excellent discussion of memory in normal ageing and dementia. Chapter 23 by Jonathan Knibb and John R. Hodges reviews semantic dementia, a type of dementia that has recently attracted a great deal of attention in neuropsychological research. This is another expert review of the status of semantic dementia, with a very useful explanation of its history and its cognitive, behavioural, and neurological features. The authors differentiate between various forms of progressive aphasia and dementia, paying attention to the grey areas as well. The figures illustrating proposed relationships between conditions are particularly clear and useful. Finally, in the last chapter of the volume, Sebastiaan Engelborghs, Peter Mariën, and Peter P. De Deyn review the clinical, behavioural, and neuropsychological correlates of frontal lobe features in several diagnostic dementia categories and discuss how the pathophysiology of frontal lobe symptoms in dementia can be studied. We are immensely grateful for the impressive range of eminent authors who expressed their enthusiasm for the initiative to honour Professor Vignolo in an entertaining, informative, comprehensive, and very up-to-date contribution. The product of their efforts is a thoroughly comprehensive collection of chapters covering the mainstream and emerging issues in current neuropsychology. In addition, the authors provided a historical sketch of their topic, citing original studies and theoretical developments, from which readers may benefit greatly. We wish to thank Professor Jo Verhoeven from the department of Communication Sciences at City University, London for
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Abutalebi and Mariën
his all-round support and constructive criticism during the entire production of the volume. We also acknowledge the editorial assistance provided by Hanne Baillieux, Hyo-Jung De Smet, Psychology Press, as well as the anonymous reviewers, whose favourable comments encouraged us throughout this project. But most of all we are grateful to Professor Vignolo, whose exceptionally warm personality, great wisdom, and tremendous knowledge inspired us in many aspects of our professional and personal life. To him we dedicate this book.
Homage to Luigi Amedeo Vignolo
Time: 1961; place: Rome; occasion: International Congress of Neurology. I had been appointed rapporteur of the session on aphasia at the Congress. This involved summarizing the contents of some 24 papers on aphasia in the course of 110 minutes, allowing perhaps 4 minutes per paper. This tedious recital was intended to accomplish one basic purpose, namely, to record for posterity that the paper had indeed been presented at the Congress and was an official part of the program. Rebelling against this dismal prospect, I decided to break bounds and try to make the session more interesting. I selected three papers that seemed to me particularly timely in the field of aphasia. The first was a report from the Genoa Clinic on the use of acetylcholine to alleviate the symptoms of aphasia; the second was a report by Davis Howes and Norman Geschwind of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on a stylistic analysis of aphasic speech. The third was a report by two young researchers of the Milan Clinic on a new test of language comprehension or language understanding for patients with extremely limited vocabularies; they called it “the Token Test”. At that time, Ennio De Renzi’s English was somewhat limited; in contrast, Luigi Vignolo, who spent some of the World War II years as a high school student in Connecticut, spoke excellent English. Consequently, I discussed the details of the presentation of the Token Test with Luigi. Three years later, in 1964, Professor Gildo Gastaldi invited me to conduct a 2-month course on neuropsychology at his clinic in Milan (there was no doubt that Professor Gastaldi’s invitation was the result of the maneuvers of De Renzi and Vignolo). This introductory course marked the onset of the study of neuropsychology in Italy, the birth of the renowned Italian school of neuropsychology. From that summer of 1964 onward, I have had a continuing and ever deepening friendship and collaboration with Luigi Vignolo and Ennio De Renzi. I count this association as one of the most gratifying experiences of my professional career. It gives me great pleasure to salute Luigi and Ennio. Arthur L. Benton Evanston, Illinois, USA 16 October 2004
Dedication to a pioneer in neuropsychology Ennio De Renzi
I first met Luigi Amedeo Vignolo in the late 1950s in the wards of the neurology department of the University of Milan, which he was attending in his sixth year as a medical student, and I as a doctor and research assistant. He had just asked Professor Gildo Gastaldi, chief of the department, for a subject for his thesis, and I was entrusted with the task of assisting the candidate. In Italian universities, a thesis was, and still is, the final step required to obtain a degree in medicine, and it can be either bibliographic or experimental, that is, a review of the literature on a given topic or a clinical investigation aimed at clarifying a controversial issue. The latter type was valued more highly and considered appropriate for a bright student. It was usually conducted with the assistance of a tutor, already experienced in research, and so it came about that we had to work together. Luigi stood out among the students of his year for his easy and elegant manners, his familiarity with foreign languages and countries—an asset shared by few in those days—and a genuine curiosity about the relationship between brain and mind. He was born in Monte Carlo, where he spent his early years, attended high school in Genova, spent a year in the USA, and then matriculated in medicine at the faculty of São Paulo in Brazil. Consequently, he had a good command of French, English, and Portuguese. We concurred that an attractive area of investigation for his thesis would be the study of language disorders, although we soon realized that it was hard for people with little experience to find a safe way of approaching such an entangled issue. Luigi had read the Brazilian translation of a test for aphasia, originally devised by Wepman and Halstead for American patients, and he proposed to prepare an Italian version of it. We agreed that its administration to left-brain-damaged patients would serve the dual purpose of providing a useful instrument for future investigation and improving our knowledge of aphasia. Although the test eventually turned out to be in need of radical revision and ceased to be used by us, the net result of the hours passed in discussing how to classify the patients’ responses to its items was positive, as we got to learn the intricacy of language disorders. Vignolo took his degree in medicine in 1960 and stayed in the department of neurology of Milan, where he became one of the outstanding members of
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a team of enthusiastic, young investigators of the behavioural consequences of brain lesions, known as the Milan group. His training as a neurologist and a neuroscientist was completed by successive stages passed at the Centre du Langage of La Salpetrière in Paris, under the direction of Professor François Lhermitte, where he studied the phonemic and semantic components of jargon aphasia, and at the department of neurology of the Boston University School of Medicine, where he cooperated with Deepak A. Pandya in tracing the callosal projections from the parietal lobe in the monkey. He pursued the study of aphasia and participated in the construction and validation of the Token Test. His work with François Boller contributed remarkably to convincing people that the test was sensitive to minor deficits of verbal comprehension, since it was able to reveal them even in left-braindamaged patients with no apparent language disorders, that is, those who had passed Pierre Marie’s “three pieces of paper” test, considered in the literature as a demanding comprehension task. Their performance on the Token Test was significantly poorer than that of control patients and right-braindamaged patients (who did not differ between them). This paper was remarkable, not only for its findings, but also for its rigorous methodology and the elegance of its design, features that were to characterize all of Vignolo’s subsequent papers, and that were somewhat uncommon in the neuropsychological literature of that time. These assets were well exemplified by two studies in which Vignolo addressed a thorny question that had been long debated without definite evidence, the efficacy of language rehabilitation. Though practised in several centres and requiring a large amount of effort and money, its efficacy had never been put to a rigorous test due to the many factors involved and the difficulty of their assessment. Taking advantage of the booming activity of the rehabilitation centre set up by Anna Basso within the neurological department of Milan University, Vignolo carried out a preliminary study in which 42 patients, who had undergone a minimum of 20 rehabilitation sessions, were compared before and after treatment with 27 non-rehabilitated patients on a comprehensive aphasia test. The groups were matched for aetiology (mainly vascular), age, time elapsed from the disease onset, and type of aphasia. The percentage of patients who were found to be improved at the second examination was greater in the treated (71%) than in the untreated group (52%), a difference that was encouraging, albeit not significant, and warranted a replication with a larger number of patients and a longer period of treatment. This second study was carried out with Basso, Capitani, and Faglioni in 1975 and involved 91 patients in the treated group (three therapy sessions a week for at least 6 months) and 94 patients in the control group. The number of improved patients was significantly greater in the rehabilitated group, and the efficacy of the treatment was inversely proportional to the length of aphasia; that is, the sooner it was initiated, the better the results. Several questions remained to be addressed, and some of them still wait a definite answer, such as whether the improvement shown by the rehabilitated group is
Dedication to a pioneer in neuropsychology
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specifically linked to the type of treatment used or reflects the benefits of a generic stimulation. Yet, this was the first time that the result of therapists’ efforts to teach patients how to circumvent the disruption of language skills was confirmed by a scientific study. The late 1950s and the early 1960s witnessed an upsurge of research on hemispheric specialization, which was found not to be confined to the left brain and to involve a wider range of abilities than was formerly thought. In the wake of these studies, Vignolo, working with Faglioni and Spinnler, made an original contribution to specifying the role played by each hemisphere in stimulus recognition, with the right side leading when the task demands perceptual discrimination and the left when it requires the attribution of a meaning or the conceptual categorization of the stimulus. Comparing the performance of right- and left-brain-damaged patients on two tests given in the auditory modality, they brought out a typical instance of double dissociation, the phenomenon thought by Teuber to represent a mainstay of clinical neuropsychology. That is, when two groups are given two tests, group 1 passes test A and fails test B, while group 2 shows the opposite pattern of performance. The two tasks used in this research were the same-different judgement of two meaningless sounds, delivered in succession, and the matching of a meaningful sound with the figure representing its source. The same association of perceptual deficit with right brain damage and of meaning identification with left brain damage was found by other members of the Milan group in the visual modality, and a few years later it was replicated by Vignolo, Cappa, and others in the tactile modality. An issue that remains to be resolved is the extent to which the impairment shown by left hemisphere patients in operations involving conceptual manipulation is contingent upon the loss of the language code or is independent of it. Hemispheric specialization of function in the auditory modality was the subject of further investigation, first in a review paper on auditory agnosia and, more recently, in an experimental study assessing the performance of patients with lesion restricted to either hemisphere on tests requiring the recognition of environmental sounds and certain dimensions of musical sounds (melody and rhythm). The differential contribution of the two halves of the brain to the processing of this kind of stimuli was confirmed: melody was impaired by right brain damage and rhythm by left brain damage, whereas on the environmental sound test, errors were predominantly acoustic in the former group and semantic in the latter. Another area in which Vignolo’s contribution is remarkable is apraxia. Relying on standardized tests and quantitative scores, he succeeded in demonstrating that ideomotor apraxia and apraxia of use are independent disorders affecting the limb gestures, and that apraxia of limb movements dissociates from apraxia of oral movements, the latter being frequently associated with the phonemic-articulatory disorders of Broca’s aphasia. In the 1970s, the introduction in clinical practice of the CT scan began a new chapter in the investigation of the anatomical correlates of neurological
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syndromes. Vignolo was ready to take advantage of this technological breakthrough to address the old, but never exhaustively answered question of language function localization. The traditional approach, based on necroscopy findings, was of unparalleled value in identifying the extent and severity of damage, but suffered from the severe limitation that data were only available in a small minority of patients—those who had died and for whom there was permission to carry out the autopsy—and that they were often obtained at some distance from the behavioural assessment. Although the CT scan is not comparable with necroscopy in terms of sensitivity and accuracy, it represents a remarkable advance in fulfilling the neuropsychologist’s dream of localizing brain damage by non-invasive procedures, suited to be administered to practically every patient. In a series of 90 vascular patients affected by aphasia, Vignolo classified language disorders according to the traditional syndromes and compared them with the locus and extent of damage, as mapped from the CT scan. By and large, there was good agreement between the CT scan and the locus of lesion predicted by the classical theory, as far as the syndromes of fluent aphasia (Wernicke’s and amnestic aphasia) and nonfluent aphasia (Broca’s and transcortical motor aphasia) were concerned. The same held for alexia, agraphia, and pure verbal deafness. On the contrary, some disagreement emerged for global aphasia, which can also follow damage confined to the anterior areas, and for conduction aphasia, which is not necessarily contingent upon the lesion to the arcuate fasciculus. A new finding, which had never been brought out by the traditional clinicoautoptical approach, was the association of aphasia with thalamic haemorrhage. The same methodology was applied to the study of the relation of oral apraxia to language disorders and the definition of its neuroanatomical correlates. More recently, Vignolo has addressed some of the questions raised by the occurrence in right-handed patients of aphasia following a lesion of the right hemisphere, a rare, but long-known exception to the rule of left hemisphere dominance for language, which has been labelled crossed aphasia. In cooperation with a group of Belgian neuropsychologists, he carried out a meticulous revision of the recent literature and identified those patients who had been adequately investigated. To them, nine personal cases were added. The main contribution of the study is the definition of the requirements that must be met to ground the diagnosis of crossed aphasia on a firm basis and the clarification of the hemispheric deficit patterns associated with right brain dominance for language in dextrals. In 1974, Vignolo became associate professor of neurology at the Milan Faculty of Medicine, and in 1982 he was appointed chief of the department of neurology of the Faculty of Medicine of Brescia. Here he assumed the chair as professor of neurology in 1984 and became head of a flourishing group of young investigators, among them J. Abutalebi, S. F. Cappa, F. Mattioli, A. Miozzo, and A. Padovani, who first collaborated with him and then developed their own lines of research, gaining independent reputation. Professor
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Vignolo has come to the end of his academic career. People who have had the privilege to work with him share a feeling of gratitude for the opportunity they had to enjoy the acumen of his mind, the breadth of his knowledge, and, last but not least, the wisdom of his appraisal of men and facts and the keen sense of humour with which he comments on them.
SECTION I
Approaching the brain
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A multiplicity of intelligences1 Howard Gardner
As a psychologist, I was surprised by the huge public interest in The Bell Curve, the book on human intelligence by psychologist Richard Herrnstein and policy analyst Charles Murray (1994). Most of the ideas in the book were familiar to both social scientists and the general public. Indeed, the Berkeley educational psychologists Arthur Jensen (1969) and Richard Herrnstein (1973) had written popularly about the very same ideas a quarter of a century before. Perhaps, I reasoned, every quarter century a new generation of Americans—and perhaps individuals from other lands—desires to be acquainted with the psychologist’s orthodoxy about intelligence. Thanks to the energies and convictions of a few researchers, the major precepts of “intelligence theory” had been put forth by the second decade of the twentieth century. According to this orthodoxy, there is a single intelligence, often called g for general intelligence. Individuals are born with a certain intelligence or potential intelligence, this intelligence is difficult to change, and psychologists can assess one’s intelligence (or IQ) by short-answer tests and, perhaps, other “purer” measures, such as the time it takes to react to a flashing light or the presence of a certain pattern of brain waves. Soon after this “hedgehog” orthodoxy had been proposed, more “foxlike” critics arose. From outside psychology, commentators like Walter Lippmann (1976) challenged the kinds of items used to assess intelligence, contending that intelligence is more complex and less fixed than the psychometricians had proposed. From within psychology, scientists questioned the notion of a single, overarching intelligence. According to their analyses, intelligence is better thought of as a set of several factors. According to the University of Chicago’s L. L. Thurstone (1938), it makes more sense to think of seven largely independent “vectors of the mind”. The University of Southern California’s J. P. Guilford (1967) enunciated 120 factors, later inflated to 150. The Scottish investigator Godfrey Thomson (1939) spoke about a large number of loosely coupled faculties. And in our own day, Yale’s Robert Sternberg (1985) has proposed a triarchic theory of intellect: these arches encompass a component that deals with standard computational skill, a component that is sensitive to contextual factors, and a component that deals with novelty. Somewhat surprisingly, all of these commentators—whether in favor of or
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opposed to the notion of single intelligence—share one feature: they all believe that the nature of intelligence will be determined by the devising of tests and the analysis of data thus secured. Perhaps, reason monists such as Herrnstein and Murray, performance on a variety of tests will yield a strong general factor of intelligence. And indeed, there is evidence for such a “positive manifold” across tests. Perhaps, counter the pluralists such as Thurstone and Sternberg, the right set of tests will demonstrate that the mind consists of a number of relatively independent factors, with strength in one area failing to predict strength or weakness in other areas. But who says that intelligence needs to be determined on the basis of tests? Were we incapable of making judgments about intellect before Alfred Binet and Francis Galton cobbled together the first set of psychometric items a century ago? If the dozens of IQ tests used around the world were suddenly to disappear, would we no longer be able to make assessments of intellect? Twenty-five years ago, posing just these questions, I embarked on a distinctly different path toward the investigation of intellect. I had been conducting research with two groups: children who were talented in one or more art form and adults who had suffered from a stroke that compromised certain capacities while sparing others. Every day I saw individuals with scattered profiles of strengths and weaknesses, and I was impressed by the fact that a strength or a deficit could cohabit comfortably with different profiles of abilities and disabilities across the variety of humankind. It seemed to me that the data of neurospsychology are a powerful critique of the notion that there exists but a single intelligence. On the basis of such data, I arrived at a firm intuition: human beings are better thought of as possessing a number of relatively independent faculties, rather than as having a certain amount of intellectual horsepower (or IQ) that can be simply channeled in one or another direction. I decided to search for a better formulation of human intelligence. I proposed a new definition: intelligence is a psychobiological potential to process information so as to solve problems or to fashion products that are valued in at least one cultural context. In my focus on fashioning products and my sensitivity to cultural values, I departed from orthodox psychometric approaches such as that adopted by Herrnstein, Murray, and their predecessors. To proceed from an intuition to a definition to a set of human intelligences, I developed a set of criteria. These criteria were drawn from several sources: • • •
psychology: the existence of a distinct developmental history for a capacity; the existence of correlations (or lack of correlations) between certain capacities observations of unusual human beings: individuals who were prodigies, who were idiot savants, or who exhibited learning disabilities anthropology: ethnographic records of how different abilities are developed, ignored, or prized in different cultures
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cultural studies: the existence of symbol systems that encode certain kinds of meanings the biological sciences: evidence that a capacity is represented in particular neural structures; evidence of a distinct evolutionary history for a particular capacity.
Armed with these criteria, I considered many capacities, ranging from those based upon the senses to those involving planning to such possibilities as sense of humor or sexual prowess. To the extent that a candidate’s ability met all or most of the criteria handily, it gained plausibility as intelligence. In 1983, I concluded that seven candidate intelligences met the criteria sufficiently well: linguistic, logical-mathematical, musical, spatial, bodily-kinesthetic, interpersonal, and intrapersonal (Gardner, 1983). Most standard measures of intelligence primarily probe linguistic and logical intelligence, some survey spatial intelligence, and the remaining four are almost entirely ignored. In 1995, invoking new data that fit the criteria, I added an eighth intelligence, that of the naturalist: I am also considering the possibility of a ninth or existential intelligence—one that captures the human proclivity to raise and ponder fundamental questions about existence, life, death, finitude (see Gardner 1999a, Chapters 4 and 5). Whether existential intelligence gets to join the inner sanctum depends on whether convincing evidence accrues about the distinct neural basis of such intelligence. The theory of multiple intelligences (MI theory, as it has come to be called) makes two strong claims. The first claim is that all human beings possess all of these intelligences: indeed, they can be considered a definition of Homo sapiens, cognitively speaking. The second claim is that, just as we all look different and have different personalities and temperaments, we also exhibit different profiles of intelligences. No two individuals, not even identical twins or clones, have exactly the same amalgam of intelligences, foregrounding the same strengths and weaknesses. This is because, even in the case of identical genetic heritage, individuals undergo different experiences and also seek to distinguish their profiles from one another. Within psychology, MI theory has generated controversy. Many researchers are nervous about the movement away from standard tests, and the adoption of a set of criteria that are unfamiliar and less susceptible to quantification. Herrnstein and Murray (1994) called it a “radical theory”. Some have questioned whether the theory is empirical. However, this criticism misses the mark. MI theory is based completely on empirical evidence. The number of intelligences, their delineation, and their subcomponents are all subject to alteration in the light of new findings. Indeed, the naturalist intelligence could be asserted only after evidence had accrued that parts of the temporal lobe are dedicated to the naming and recognition of natural kinds, as opposed to manmade “artificial” objects (Damasio & Damasio, 1995; Warrington & Shallice, 1984). Much of the evidence for the personal intelligences has come from research in recent decades on emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1995) and on
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the development in children of a “theory of mind” (Astington, 1993). The intriguing finding that musical experiences may enhance spatial capacities raises the possibility that musical and spatial intelligences may draw on certain common abilities, such as the capacity to handle complex architectonic structures (Rauscher, Shaw, & Ky, 1993). It is also worth noting that the movement toward multiple intelligences is quite consistent with trends in related sciences. Neuroscience recognizes the modular nature of the brain, evolutionary psychology is based on the notion that different capacities have evolved in specific environments for specific purposes, and artificial intelligence increasingly embraces expert systems rather than general problem-solving mechanisms. Indeed, within science, the believers in a single IQ or general intelligence are increasingly isolated, their positions more likely to be embraced by those, like Herrnstein and Murray (1994), who have an ideological ax to grind. If psychologists express skepticism about MI theory, educators around the world have embraced the idea. MI theory not only comports with their intuitions that children are smart in different kinds of ways but also holds out the hope that more students can be reached more effectively, if their favored ways of knowing are taken into account in curriculum, instruction, and assessment. In many parts of the world, a virtual cottage industry has risen to create MI schools, classrooms, curricula, texts, computer systems, and the like. Most of this work is well intentioned, and some of it has proved quite effective in motivating students and in giving them a sense of involvement in intellectual life. However, various misconceptions have risen: for example, that every topic should be taught in seven or eight ways, or that the purpose of school is to identify (and broadcast) students’ intelligences, possibly by administering an octet of new standardized tests. I have begun to speak out about some of these less advisable beliefs and practices (Gardner, 1999a). MI theory is best thought of as a tool, rather than as an educational goal. Educators need to determine, in conjunction with their communities, the goals that they are seeking. Once these goals have been articulated, MI theory can provide powerful support. In my view, schools should seek to develop individuals of a certain sort—civic-minded, sensitive to the arts, and deeply rooted in the disciplines. Schools should probe pivotal topics with sufficient depth so that students end up with a comprehensive understanding of these topics. Approaches founded on MI theory have demonstrated considerable promise in helping schools to achieve these goals (Kornhaber, Fierros, & Veenema, 2003). Experts interested in intelligence have debated certain topics for nearly a century: is there one intelligence or more than one? Can intelligence(s) be altered? Is intelligence inborn or acquired? It would take a brave seer to predict that these debates will disappear. (In fact, if I am correct, a latter-day Herrnstein or Murray will author her own variation on The Bell Curve around 2020.) As the person most closely associated with MI theory, I record three wishes for this line of work.
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A broader but not infinitely expanded view of intelligence It is time that intelligence is broadened to include a range of human computational capacities, including those that deal with music, other persons, and skills in deciphering the natural world. However, it is important that intelligence should not be conflated with other virtues, such as creativity, wisdom, or morality. I also contend that intelligence should not be so broadened that it crosses the line from description to prescription. I endorse the notion of emotional intelligence when it denotes the capacity to compute information about one’s own or others’ emotional life. However, when the term comes to encompass the kinds of persons we hope to develop, we have crossed the line into a value system—and that should not be part of our conception of intelligence. Thus, when Daniel Goleman stresses the importance of empathy as part of emotional intelligence, I go along with him. But Goleman also urges that individuals care for one another, thus crossing an important boundary. The possession of the capacity to feel another’s suffering is not the same as the decision to come to her aid. Indeed, a sadistic individual might use her knowledge of another’s psyche to inflict pain.
A shift away from standardized, short-answer, “proxy” instruments to real-life demonstrations or virtual simulations During a certain historical period, it may have been necessary to assess individuals by administering items that are themselves of little interest (such as repeating numbers backward) but are thought to correlate with skills or habits of importance. Nowadays, however, given the advent of computers and virtual technologies, it is possible to look directly at individuals’ performances, to see how they can argue, debate, look at data, critique experiments, execute works of art, and so on. As much as possible, we should train students directly in these valued activities and we should assess how they carry out valued performances under realistic conditions. The need for ersatz instruments, whose relation to real-world performance is often tenuous at best, should wane.
The use of multiple intelligences ideas for more effective pedagogy and assessment I have little sympathy for educational efforts that seek simply to “train” the intelligences or to use the intelligences in trivial ways (such as singing multiplication tables or playing Bach while one is doing geometry). For me, the educational power of multiple intelligences is exhibited when these faculties are drawn on to help students master consequential disciplinary materials. In The Disciplined Mind (1999b), I focus on three rich topics: the theory of evolution (as an example of scientific truth), the music of Mozart (as an
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example of artistic beauty), and the Holocaust (as an example of immorality in recent history). In each case, I show how the topic can be introduced to students through a variety of entry points (drawing respectively on several intelligences), how the subject can be made more familiar through the use of analogies and metaphors drawn from diverse domains, and how the core ideas of the topic can be captured through not a single symbolic language but rather a number of complementary model languages or representations. By this approach, the individual who understands evolutionary theory can think in terms of a historical narrative, a logical syllogism, a quantitative examination of evolving populations in different niches, a diagram of species delineation, a dramatic sense of the struggle among individuals (or genes or populations), and so on. The individual who can think of evolution in only one way—using only one model language—actually has a tenuous command of the principal ideas. The issue of who owns intelligence has been an important one in our society for some time, and it promises to be a crucial and controversial one for the foreseeable future. For too long, society has been content to leave intelligence in the hands of psychometricians. Often these test makers have a narrow, overly scholastic view of intellect; they rely on a set of instruments that are destined to valorize certain capacities, while ignoring those that do not lend themselves to ready formulation and testing. And in the hands of those with a political ax to grind, they often skate close to the dangerous territory of eugenics. MI theory represents at once an effort to base the conception of intelligence on a much broader scientific basis, to offer a set of tools to educators that will allow more individuals to master substantive materials in an effective way, and to help each individual achieve his or her human potential at the workplace, in avocations, and in the service of the wider world.
Note 1 An earlier version of this chapter was published in Scientific American (1998).
References Astington, J. (1993). The child’s discovery of the mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Damasio, A., & Damasio, H. (1955). Recent trends in cognitive neuroscience. Lecture presented at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California. Gardner, H. (1983). Frames of mind: The theory of multiple intelligences. New York: Basic Books. Gardner, H. (1999a). Intelligence reframed: Multiple intelligences for the 21st century. New York: Basic Books. Gardner, H. (1999b). The disciplined mind. New York: Simon and Schuster. Goleman, D. (1995). Emotional intelligence. New York: Bantam Books. Guilford, J. P. (1967). The nature of human intelligence. New York: McGraw-Hill.
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Herrnstein, R. (1973). IQ in the meritocracy. Boston: Little, Brown. Herrnstein, R., & Murray, C. (1994). The bell curve. New York: Free Press. Jensen, A. (1969). How much can we boost IQ and scholastic achievement? Harvard Educational Review, 39, 1–123. Kornhaber, M., Fierros, E., & Veenema, S. (2003). Multiple intelligences: Best ideas from research and practice. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Lippmann, W. (1976, trans. 1922–3). Readings from the Lippmann–Terman debate. In N. J. Block & G. Dworkin (Eds.), The IQ controversy: Critical readings. New York: Pantheon. Rauscher, F., Shaw, G. L., & Ky, K. N. (1993). Music and spatial task performance. Nature, 365, 611. Sternberg, R. J. (1985). Beyond IQ: A triarchic theory of human intelligence. New York: Cambridge University Press. Thomson, G. (1939). The factorial analysis of human ability. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Thurstone, L. L. (1938). Primary mental abilities. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Warrington, E., & Shallice, T. (1984). Category-specific semantic impairments. Brain, 107, 829–854.
2
Neural circuitry underlying language Michael Petrides and Deepak N. Pandya
The neural processing underlying language, one of the higher cognitive achievements of the human brain, is mainly dependent on the cerebral cortex. Many cortical regions contribute to language, and specific association pathways that interconnect these cortical regions permit functional interactions underlying various forms of linguistic processing. Current understanding of the cerebral cortical structures and the association fiber pathways that are involved in language are based on the pioneer investigations of scientists, such as Broca (1861), Wernicke (1874), Lichtheim (1885), and Dejerine (1914). In the 1960s, Geschwind presented his ideas on the higher cortical functions and, in particular, language in an influential series of papers on disconnection syndromes (Geschwind, 1965, 1970, 1974). This work, which synthesized the classical views on the anatomy of language in a modern form, has had a tremendous influence on current conceptions of the anatomical organization of language. Geschwind’s ideas were largely based on older anatomical observations obtained in the human brain in the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century, as well as on physiological, neuronographic studies carried out on nonhuman primates from the 1940s and 1950s (e.g. Bailey, Bonin, Davis, Garol, & McCulloch, 1944; Bailey, Bonin, Garol, & McCulloch, 1943; Dusser de Barrene, Garol, & McCulloch, 1941; French, Sugar, & Chusid, 1948; Pribram & MacLean, 1953; Sugar, French, & Chusid, 1948; Ward, Peden, & Sugar, 1946). In the latter part of the twentieth century and more recently, major advances have been made in experimental neuroanatomical methods, permitting a precise understanding of the origins, trajectories, and terminations of the association fiber pathways of the nonhuman primate brain. Although the information provided by experimental anatomical methods is based largely on studies of the macaque monkey brain, it provides important insights on the general organization of the primate cortical connections with major implications for our understanding of human cortical functions, including language (Petrides and Pandya, 2002a). Modern studies with diffusion tensor imaging promise to provide important information regarding the association fiber pathways of the human brain, but this work, which is still in an early stage of development, can, at present, demonstrate only the major parts of fiber pathways without
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detailed information on their precise origins and terminations within particular cortical architectonic areas (e.g. Campbell, Siddiqi, Rymar, Sadikot, & Pike, 2005; Catani, Jones, & ffytche, 2005; Croxson et al., 2005; JohansenBerg et al., 2004; Makris et al., 2005, in press; Mori & van Zijl, 2002). In this chapter, we shall describe the association pathways that are considered to be involved in language processing, both from the classical perspective and from insights provided by modern neuroanatomical studies on the macaque monkey.
Core language pathways The currently dominant conception of the anatomy of language, which is based on the classical studies and has been crystallized in the writings of Geschwind, postulates a predominantly receptive language-processing region (Wernicke’s area) in the posterior temporal lobe of the left hemisphere and an anterior language region (Broca’s area), located in the posterior part of the inferior frontal gyrus, that is thought to be primarily involved in the expressive aspects of speech (Figure 2.1). These two major language regions are thought to be connected via the arcuate fasciculus (AF), which permits functional interactions between the receptive region in the temporal lobe and the expressive region in the inferior frontal gyrus (Geschwind, 1965, 1970, 1974). Although it is widely held that the arcuate fasciculus is the main association fiber pathway enabling these interactions, the anatomical evidence on which this view is based is fraught with difficulties (e.g. Petrides & Pandya, 2002a, 2006). In the older literature, the terms “arcuate fasciculus” and “superior longitudinal fasciculus” were used interchangeably (e.g.
Figure 2.1 Schematic drawing of the lateral surface of the left hemisphere of the human brain showing the arcuate fasciculus (A), which is presumed to connect Broca’s area (B) with Wernicke’s area (W). Based on Geschwind (1974).
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Dejerine, 1895). These pathways were first demonstrated by the then available method of gross dissection, and toward the end of the nineteenth century, various attempts were made to elucidate the origin, trajectory, and termination of these association pathways by histological staining methods, such as the myelin stain of Pal and Weigert (Dejerine, 1895). Despite these efforts, the precise origin and termination of these fiber systems remained uncertain. Dejerine (1895, p. 758) reviewed the knowledge available at that time and concluded that the arcuate/superior longitudinal fasciculus did not consist of long association fibers connecting distant cortical regions, but rather of short association fibers joining adjacent convolutions. Later, the term “arcuate fasciculus” was restricted to the fibers derived from the temporal lobe, which arch (hence the term “arcuate”) around the caudal part of the Sylvian fissure on their way to the frontal lobe. The term “superior longitudinal fasciculus” was restricted to the fibers derived from the parietal lobe and directed to the frontal lobe in a more or less horizontal course in the white matter above the Sylvian fissure. Thus, the arching fibers originating from the caudal superior temporal lobe, namely the arcuate fasciculus, and those from the parietal region, namely the superior longitudinal fasciculus, were considered to run a common course above the Sylvian fissure toward the frontal lobe. Since the 1960s, the experimental anterograde tract-tracing methods that were developed, initially the silver-staining method (e.g. Nauta, 1957) and later the autoradiographic method (Cowan et al., 1972), permitted extensive investigations of the cortico-cortical association pathways in the nonhuman primate brain (Petrides & Pandya, 2002a). Although linguistic processing does not exist in the macaque monkey brain, our comparative architectonic studies of the human and the macaque monkey frontal cortex show a comparable architectonic organization, including precursor zones in the nonhuman primate brain to the language areas found in the human brain (Petrides, Cadoret, & Mackey, 2005; Petrides & Pandya, 1994) (Figure 2.2). Comparable observations regarding the existence of equivalent auditory-related areas in the temporal lobe of the monkey and the human brain have been recently made by Hackett, Pruess, and Kaas (2001) and Fullerton and Pandya (2007). Using the autoradiographic, tract-tracing method, which allows excellent visualization of the origin, trajectory, and termination of fiber pathways, we have studied, in the rhesus monkey, the connections originating from the parietal and temporal cortical areas and terminating in the frontal cortex, as well as the reciprocal connections originating in the frontal cortex and directed back to the parietal and temporal areas (Petrides & Pandya, 1984, 1988, 2006, 2007). These studies have demonstrated that there are three distinct, long association pathways that emanate from the superior temporal gyrus and the adjacent cortex of the upper bank of the superior temporal sulcus and lead to the frontal lobe (Petrides & Pandya, 1988). The most caudal part of the superior temporal gyrus (area Tpt) (Figure 2.3) and the adjacent region of the superior temporal sulcus give rise to a pathway that arches around the caudal part of the Sylvian fissure
Figure 2.2 Architectonic subdivisions of the lateral surface of the human (A) and the macaque monkey (B) prefrontal cortex (Petrides and Pandya, 1994).
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Figure 2.3 Composite diagram to show the location of the architectonic areas on the medial, lateral, and ventral views of the monkey cortex.
and progresses forward in the white matter above the Sylvian fissure, eventually moving dorsally to terminate in the rostro-dorsal part of area 8 (area 8Ad) of the frontal cortex. This pathway can, therefore, be considered as the arcuate fasciculus, because its fibers arch around the caudal end of the Sylvian fissure as they are directed toward the frontal lobe (Figure 2.4). The middle part of the superior temporal gyrus (areas PaAlt, TS3, and TS2) and the adjacent part of the superior temporal sulcus (TAa and TPO) give
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Figure 2.4 Schematic diagram to illustrate the origin, course, and termination of the arcuate fasciculus (AF) (Petrides & Pandya, 1984).
rise to association fibers that travel via the extreme capsule and terminate in ventrolateral area 45 and the dorsal prefrontal areas 9 and 46, as well as area 10 (Figure 2.5). From the rostral-most part of the superior temporal gyrus (areas TS1 and TS2) and the dorsal part of temporal polar proisocortex (Pro), association fibers course via the uncinate fasciculus and terminate in
Figure 2.5 Schematic diagram to illustrate the origin, course, and terminations of the extreme capsule fiber system (EC) (Petrides & Pandya, 1988).
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area 47/12, as well as in area 13, the proisocortex of the orbital frontal cortex, and the medial prefrontal areas 25, 14, and 32 (Figure 2.6). As pointed out above, the classical view has been that the arcuate fasciculus is the main language pathway connecting Wernicke’s area in the posterior temporal region with Broca’s area in the inferior frontal cortex. However, the experimental anatomical studies in the monkey show that the temporofrontal fibers that arch around the Sylvian fissure, and which therefore form the arcuate (i.e. arching) fasciculus, connect the caudal part of the superior temporal gyrus with the dorsal part of area 8. This region of the frontal lobe is involved in spatial attentional processing and is not a precursor of Broca’s area, which is found in the caudal ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (Petrides et al., 2005). The fibers which are directed toward the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex originate from the middle to posterior part of the superior temporal gyrus and adjacent superior temporal sulcus, course via the extreme capsule, and terminate in prefrontal areas, including area 45 (Petrides & Pandya, 2002a). It should be noted that these connections are bidirectional (Petrides & Pandya, 2006, 2007). Area 45 in the human brain occupies the pars triangularis of the inferior frontal gyrus and, in the left hemisphere, is part of the anterior language region (e.g. Amunts, Schleicher, Ditterich, & Zilles, 2004; Amunts et al., 1999; Petrides, 2006). Experimental anatomical studies of the association pathways in the monkey brain showed that the fibers originating from the parietal cortex, and which are directed to the frontal cortex, course via the superior longitudinal fasciculus (Petrides & Pandya, 1984). We demonstrated that the superior
Figure 2.6 Schematic diagram to illustrate the origin, course, and terminations of the uncinate fasciculus (UF) (Petrides & Pandya, 1988).
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longitudinal fasciculus (SLF) is a complex fiber system consisting of three separate components. SLF I fibers stem from the medial and dorsal parts of the parietal lobe (areas PE, PEc, and PGm) and course through the dorsal white matter of the parietal and frontal lobe leading to the supplementary motor area (MII) and dorsal areas 6 and 8 (Figure 2.7) (Petrides & Pandya, 1984). SLF II fibers originate from the caudal part of the inferior parietal lobule (areas PG and Opt) and the lower bank of the intraparietal sulcus (area POa) and travel in the white matter above the Sylvian fissure to terminate in the dorsal parts of areas 6 and 8 and in areas 46 and 9/46 (Figure 2.8). In contrast, SLF III fibers originate from the rostral part of the inferior parietal lobule (area PF) and the adjacent part of the intraparietal sulcus (rostral area POa, also known as AIP), and course through the white matter of the dorsal Sylvian operculum to terminate in the ventral part of area 6 and adjacent area 44, area ProM, as well as in the ventral part of area 9/46 (Figure 2.9). Thus, area 44, which in the human brain is the part of Broca’s area occupying the pars opercularis of the inferior frontal gyrus, is connected via SLF III with the rostral inferior parietal cortex, a region equivalent to the supramarginal gyrus (Economo’s area PF or Brodmann’s area 40) of the human brain. These observations in terms of connectional origins and terminations have been supported by a number of other studies in recent years using retrograde tracer techniques (Cavada & Goldman-Rakic, 1989; Deacon, 1992; Hackett, Stepniewska, & Kaas, 1999; Petrides & Pandya, 1999, 2002b; Romanski, Bates, & Goldman-Rakic, 1999). In addition, in a recent study using diffusion tensor imaging, the stem portion of these three distinct components of the
Figure 2.7 Schematic diagram to illustrate the origin, course, and terminations of the dorsal component of the superior longitudinal fasciculus (SLF I) (Petrides & Pandya, 1984).
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Figure 2.8 Schematic diagram to illustrate the origin, course, and terminations of the middle component of the superior longitudinal fasciculus (SLF II) (Petrides & Pandya, 1984).
superior longitudinal fasciculus have been demonstrated in the human brain in vivo (Makris et al., 2005). When the above-mentioned findings from experimental anatomical studies in the monkey are extrapolated to the human brain, they suggest that there
Figure 2.9 Schematic diagram to illustrate the origin, course, and terminations of the ventral component of the superior longitudinal fasciculus (SLF III) (Petrides & Pandya, 1984).
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are two distinct association pathways that are involved in language functions. One such pathway consists of fibers originating from cortex on the middle to posterior part of the superior temporal gyrus and the adjacent superior temporal sulcus, running through the extreme capsule, and terminating in area 45. The other pathway, namely SLF III, originates in the rostral part of the inferior parietal lobule and connects preferentially with area 44. It should be pointed out that, according to our recent studies, both these pathways are bidirectional in nature (Petrides & Pandya, 2006). Thus, it appears that the notion of a single language pathway, namely the arcuate fasciculus, connecting a posterior temporal language region (Wernicke’s area) with Broca’s region in the inferior frontal gyrus needs to be revised. The currently available experimental anatomical material suggests instead the following scheme: the two distinct architectonic entities that constitute Broca’s region, namely the dysgranular area 44 and the granular area 45, have different connection patterns with posterior cortical regions. These differences in connectivity can provide important clues with regard to the cortical networks in which these two areas are embedded and therefore to their fundamental function. Area 44 is bidirectionally linked with the rostral part of the inferior parietal lobule (area PF) (Figure 2.9), which, in the human brain, occupies the supramarginal gyrus. The rostral part of the inferior parietal lobule is a multimodal cortical region with emphasis on action processing, as shown by the fact that neurons in this area of the monkey brain exhibit complex bodycentered responses (e.g. Hyvarinen & Shelepin, 1979; Leinonen, Hyvarinen, Nyman, & Linnankoski, 1979; Robinson & Burton, 1980; Taira, Mine, Georgopoulos, Murata, & Tanaka, 1990). The local connections of area 44 within the frontal lobe also suggest that it is a primarily somatomotor structure. Area 44 is connected with the rostral part of the ventral premotor cortex (area F5), which has both orofacial (most ventrally) and hand/arm representations (more dorsally) and is, in turn, connected with the parts of the primary motor cortex (area 4) that control the orofacial and the arm/hand musculature. Area 44 is also connected with motor areas on the medial part of the hemisphere, such as the supplementary and cingulate motor cortical areas (Petrides and Pandya, 2004). This connection pattern of area 44 suggests that it may be at a privileged position for the high-level control of motor behavior and, by extension, the expression of communicative behavior. The fact that architectonic area 44 can be identified in the ventrolateral frontal cortex of the macaque monkey suggests that the contribution of this area to the expressive aspects of communicative behavior may have preceded the evolution of linguistic ability in the human brain and may reflect a general function of area 44 (Petrides and Pandya 1994; Petrides et al., 2005). With the evolution of linguistic ability in the human brain, area 44 is, therefore, an ideal structure to serve certain aspects of speech production. Kimura (1993) has reviewed the large body of evidence suggesting a strong link between communicative function in the human left hemisphere and its capacity for complex motor control.
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In sharp contrast to area 44, which is linked to the inferior parietal lobule via SLF III, area 45 is bidirectionally linked to the middle part of the superior temporal gyrus and the adjacent superior temporal sulcus via fibers that course in the extreme capsule (Figure 2.5) (Petrides & Pandya, 1988). The middle part of the superior temporal gyrus is a primarily auditory association cortical region (Kaas & Hackett, 2002; Pandya & Sanides, 1973; Wallace, Johnston, & Palmer, 2002), and the adjacent superior temporal sulcus is thought to be a polysensory cortical region based on anatomical (Seltzer & Pandya, 1978, 1994), lesion/behavioral (Petrides & Iversen, 1978), and neuron-recording studies (Baylis, Rolls, & Leonard, 1987; Benevento, Fallon, Davis, & Rezak, 1977; Bruce, Desimone, & Gross, 1981; Desimone & Gross, 1979; Hikosaka, Iwai, Saito, & Tanaka, 1988). Petrides has argued that the midportion of the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (areas 45 and 47/12) is critical for the active (i.e. controlled strategic) regulation of information in the posterior cortical association areas where information is perceived and coded in short-term and long-term form (Petrides, 1994, 1996). This role of the midventrolateral prefrontal cortex (areas 45 and 47/12) can be contrasted with that of the mid-dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (areas 9, 9/46 and 46), which is involved in the monitoring (tracking) of mnemonic performance on the basis of the subject’s current plans (Petrides, 1994, 1996). These fundamental functional contributions of the mid-dorsolateral (areas 9, 46, 9/46) and the mid-ventrolateral prefrontal regions (areas 45 and 47/12) are true of the nonhuman, as well as the human, primate brain (see Petrides, 1994, 1996, for details). It is likely that, with the evolution of language in the human brain, the more general prelinguistic role of the mid-ventrolateral prefrontal region (areas 45 and 47/12) in the active controlled retrieval of information from posterior cortical areas was adapted for the active retrieval of linguistic information, particularly in the left hemisphere (see Petrides, 2006). In recent years, a large number of data on language processing has been provided by functional neuroimaging studies of the normal human brain. One can therefore ask whether the overall picture emerging from functional neuroimaging research is consistent with the suggestion from monkey experimental anatomical studies that there might be two distinct and separable language circuits involving the two architectonically distinct parts of Broca’s region, namely areas 44 and 45, which interact with different posterior cortical association regions via distinct fiber pathways. The following section will review the available data, which appear to be consistent with the experimental anatomical evidence, and not with the classical view of a single fiber pathway linking anterior and posterior language areas. In an early positron emission tomography study, Paulesu, Frith, and Frackowiak (1993) observed that area 44 shows increased activity during articulatory/phonological processing and, importantly, that it is coactivated with the supramarginal gyrus during such processing. Note that this finding is perfectly consistent with the experimental anatomical studies in the monkey which have shown that the posterior cortical connections of area 44 are with
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the rostral inferior parietal lobule (i.e. the supramarginal gyrus), and not with the caudal part of the superior temporal gyrus, as is often assumed. There is also other functional neuroimaging evidence suggesting that area 44 may be involved in articulatory/phonological processing (e.g. Fiez, Raife, Balota, Schwarz, Raichle, & Petersen, 1996; Poldrack, Wagner, Prull, Desmond, Glover, & Gabrieli, 1999; Price, Moore, Humphreys, & Wise, 1997), consistent with the anatomical evidence showing that area 44 is embedded in a primarily somatomotor network. In contrast to the role of area 44 in articulatory/ phonological processing, there is evidence that the mid-ventrolateral prefrontal area 45 is involved in the active retrieval of verbal information. Active, controlled retrieval is required in situations where information cannot simply be retrieved as a result of automatic recognition or strong contextual associative links (Petrides, 1994, 1996). In this context, it has been shown that activity in the mid-ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (area 45) increases during active verbal retrieval, primarily, in the left hemisphere (Petrides, Alivisatos, & Evans, 1995). Increased activity in the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (area 47/12) is observed during active retrieval for nonverbal visual or visuospatial information (Cadoret, Pike, & Petrides, 2001; Kostopoulos & Petrides, 2003; Petrides, Alivisatos, & Frey, 2002). In the positron emission tomography study which tested the prediction that the mid-ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, in the left hemisphere, is involved in the active, strategic retrieval of verbal information from long-term memory, the main experimental condition involved the free recall of a list of arbitrary words that had been studied before scanning (Petrides et al., 1995). Free recall under these conditions is the result of active strategic retrieval processes, since the subject is asked to recall a specific set of arbitrary words that were presented on a particular occasion, namely the particular words studied before scanning. One of the control conditions, a well-learned verbal associate task, was designed to involve automatic verbal retrieval. In comparison with the highly learned, paired-associate task (i.e. automatic retrieval), the free recall task (i.e. active retrieval) revealed significantly greater activity in the left midventrolateral prefrontal cortex (area 45) and at the same time less activity in the middle part of the superior temporal gyrus and adjacent superior temporal sulcus (Figure 2.10). Note that this activation pattern is consistent with the above-mentioned experimental anatomical findings in the monkey showing that area 45 is strongly connected via the extreme capsule with the middle section of the superior temporal gyrus and superior temporal sulcus (Figure 2.5). Another well-known and reliable finding from functional neuroimaging studies is the frequently observed increase in activity within the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex during the performance of tasks that require semantic retrieval (Buckner, Raichle, & Petersen, 1995; Klein, Milner, Zatorre, Meyer, & Evans, 1995; Petersen, Fox, Posner, Mintun, & Raichle, 1988). The evidence suggests that the mid-ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (areas 47/12 and 45) is involved in the controlled retrieval of semantic information, while the
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Figure 2.10 Three-dimensional reconstruction of the left hemisphere of the human brain showing increased activity in ventrolateral area 45 during verbal episodic active retrieval. Note that activity in the middle part of the superior temporal gyrus and adjacent superior temporal sulcus has decreased. Based upon a positron emission tomography study by Petrides et al. (1995). AS: ascending sulcus; HS: horizontal sulcus; IFS: inferior frontal sulcus; SF: Sylvian fissure; STS: superior temporal sulcus. (This figure is published in color at www.psypress.com/brainscans-etc/)
posterior ventrolateral region (areas 44 and 6) is related to the control of phonological processing (Fiez et al., 1996; Poldrack et al., 1999; Price et al., 1997). One example of semantic retrieval is the verbal fluency task, in which the subject is required to produce words from a certain semantic category (e.g. animals). When activation during the semantic retrieval task (e.g. listing animals) is compared with activation of highly automatic retrieval (e.g. listing the days of the week), greater activity is often observed within the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, involving area 45. This finding has recently been confirmed in a functional magnetic resonance imaging study, in which regions of interest within area 44 and area 45 were set up, using cytoarchitectonic, probabilistic maps (Amunts et al., 2004). The increases in activity during semantic retrieval were clearly shown to be focused within area 45, rather than area 44. Thus, by virtue of the distinct connectivity patterns of area 45 and the above functional neuroimaging observations, Petrides (2006) suggested that the temporofrontal extreme capsule fiber system is involved in nonarticulatory aspects of language processing that are necessary for the retrieval of linguistic information, both episodic and semantic lexical. By contrast, the ventral component of the superior longitudinal fasciculus (i.e. SLF III)
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provides a means of functional interaction between area 44 and ventral premotor area 6, which deal with the articulatory/phonological aspects of language, and the rostral inferior parietal lobule (supramarginal gyrus and rostral intraparietal sulcus) (Petrides, 2006).
Pathways involved in metalinguistic processing Language operates in the context of other higher cognitive processes, and it both influences and is influenced by those other cognitive processes. Thus, in addition to the cortical areas and pathways that are directly involved in language processing, other cortical regions and association pathways may contribute to language by subserving aspects of metalinguistic processing. Below, we comment on the possible role of these other pathways. Arcuate fasciculus The experimental anatomical studies in the monkey have shown that the arcuate fasciculus, which was classically thought to be the core language pathway, connects the most caudal part of the superior temporal gyrus with the dorsal part of area 8 (Figure 2.4). In the monkey, the caudal part of the superior temporal gyrus has been shown to play a role in the processing of sound location (Kaas & Hackett, 2002; Leinonen, Hyvarinen, & Sovijarvi, 1980; Romanski et al., 1999; Tian, Reser, Durham, Kustov, & Rauschecker, 2001). There is also evidence from functional neuroimaging that this may be the case in the human brain (Warren, Zielinski, Green, Rauschecker, & Griffiths, 2002; Zatorre, Bouffard, Ahad, & Belin, 2002). Furthermore, the dorsal part of area 8, with which the caudal part of the superior temporal gyrus is connected, has been shown to play a role in the allocation of attention to sound location (Azuma & Suzuki, 1984; Lilly, 1965; Suzuki, 1985; Vaadia, Benson, Hienz, & Goldstein, 1986). These facts suggest the following hypothesis. Information from the primary auditory cortex of the supratemporal plane would reach both the middle part (areas PaAlt, Ts3, and Ts2) and the caudal part (Tpt) of the superior temporal gyrus, as well as the adjacent polysensory parts of the superior temporal sulcus (i.e. area TPO). These areas, in turn, both send and receive information from the frontal cortex via separate pathways. The middle section of the superior temporal gyrus and sulcus would, via the extreme capsule, be primarily engaged in language processing, whereas the most caudal portion of the superior temporal gyrus (area Tpt) might contribute to the direction of attention to the source of sound via the arcuate fasciculus (Figures 2.4 and 2.5). Although the arcuate fasciculus has been demonstrated with diffusion tensor imaging in the human brain (Catani et al., 2005), it is not possible with current methodology to determine with certainty that the axons terminate in Broca’s region. It should also be noted that these axons would mingle with those of SLF II and SLF III in the white matter of the supramarginal gyrus and would be hard to
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separate them so as to establish their respective terminations. Note that SLF III does terminate in area 44 in the macaque monkey. Superior longitudinal fasciculus: SLF I and SLF II In addition to the classical peri-Sylvian language zones, Penfield and his colleagues identified a supplementary speech region on the medial surface of the hemisphere anterior to the primary motor region (Penfield & Roberts, 1959). Electrical stimulation of either hemisphere in the supplementary motor region produces vocalization of meaningless sounds, as well as slowing, hesitation, slurring, or even arrest of speech. Stimulation limited to the left supplementary motor region produces failures to name stimuli or misnaming them because of substitution of synonyms and unrelated words, while speaking per se might not be affected. Despite these observations, the role of the supplementary motor region in language remains obscure. Lesions of the dorsomedial surface of the frontal lobe do not cause long-lasting aphasia. Immediately after such brain damage, mutism or severely reduced and hesitantly initiated speech is observed. During the recovery phase, initiation of spontaneous propositional speech may be severely impaired, but other forms of speech output, such as repetition of heard speech or serial automatic speech (e.g. counting), may be intact. Within months, most patients recover their ability to initiate and sustain conversation (Alexander & Schmitt, 1980; Jonas, 1981; Masdeau, Schoene, & Funkenstein, 1978; Rubens, 1975). There also appears to be no difficulty with the syntactic structure of language after lesions of the supplementary motor region. Thus, the supplementary motor region appears to play a role in the initiation and fluent execution of speech, particularly of propositional speech, perhaps reflecting a general role in motor production in the context of language. Electrocortical activity, referred to as the readiness potential, is often recorded from the frontal midline during the preparation for voluntary motor activity (Deecke & Kornhuber, 1978). It has been shown that this electrical response is related to activity in the supplementary motor cortex and the cingulate motor areas (e.g. Cunnington, Windischberger, Deecke, & Moser, 2003). The supplementary motor region is primarily connected with the superior and medial parietal cortex via SLF I (Figure 2.7) and, perhaps, this somatomotor system may be involved in the initiation of voluntary motor behavior. As pointed out above, the second component of the superior longitudinal fasciculus, namely SLF II, interconnects the caudal part of the inferior parietal lobule (a region equivalent to the angular gyrus in the human brain) with the dorsal frontal areas 6 and 8 and area 9/46 (Figure 2.8). Since the classic cases of Dejerine (1891, 1892, 1914) that demonstrated the syndrome of alexia with agraphia after lesions of the left posterior parietal cortex involving the angular gyrus, it has been traditionally accepted that this region of the cerebral cortex is critical for reading and writing (Geschwind, 1970). SLF II provides critical interactions between the caudal part of the posterior parietal
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Figure 2.11 Three-dimensional reconstruction of the left hemisphere of the human brain showing increased activity in the supramarginal gyrus, the central sensorimotor cortex, and the supplementary motor cortex during writing. Based upon a positron emission tomography study by Petrides et al. (1995). CS: central sulcus; IPS: intraparietal sulcus; SMA: supplementary motor area; SF: Sylvian fissure. (This figure is published in color at www.psypress.com/brainscans-etc/)
region with the premotor cortex (area 6) and the visuospatial prefrontal region (area 8A) that may underlie various aspects of the reading and writing process. The contribution of the inferior parietal lobule to reading and writing processes may reflect the engagement of the spatial information processing that is well known to depend on this region of the cortex in the service of linguistic processing that is critically dependent on spatial analysis (reading) and action in space (writing). Strong activation of the rostral inferior parietal cortex (supramarginal gyrus), the midportion of the central sensorimotor region (i.e. the hand/arm representation), and the supplementary motor cortex has been observed during writing to dictation (Petrides et al., 1995) (Figure 2.11). Activation of the posterior inferior parietal cortex (angular gyrus) during reading has been rather inconsistent in functional neuroimaging studies, but it has been observed during slow reading of unrelated words (Price et al., 1996) and during reading of sentences (Bavelier, Corina, Jezzard, Padmanabhan, Prinster, & Braun, 1997). Middle longitudinal fasciculus The posterior region of the cerebral cortex that is involved in language is very extensive, as shown by intraoperative electrical stimulation, and includes not
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Figure 2.12 Schematic diagram to illustrate the course and termination of fibers originating in the inferior parietal lobule and the prefrontal cortex, and entering the middle longitudinal fasciculus (MdLF) in the white matter of the superior temporal gyrus.
only the posterior part of the superior temporal gyrus, but also the middle temporal gyrus and the inferior parietal lobule (supramarginal and angular gyri) (Penfield & Roberts, 1959; Rasmussen & Milner, 1975). Seltzer and Pandya (1984, 1994) showed that areas PFG, PG, and Opt of the inferior parietal lobule are connected with the cortex of the superior temporal gyrus and the polysensory area TPO in the superior temporal sulcus via a specific pathway running in the white matter of the superior temporal gyrus, which they named the middle longitudinal fasciculus (MdLF) (Figure 2.12). This pathway is bidirectional in nature, since the neurons in area TPO of the superior temporal sulcus are known to project to the inferior parietal lobule (Barnes & Pandya, 1992). Recent observations by Petrides and Pandya (2006) have shown that fibers originating from the prefrontal cortex (areas 10, 46, and 8Ad) connect with parts of the superior temporal gyrus (areas TS2 and TS3) and the superior temporal sulcus (area TPO) via the extreme capsule. In the temporal lobe, these fibers merge with those of the MdLF (Figure 2.12), which conveys information from the inferior parietal lobule to the superior temporal gyrus and sulcus, which are involved in language-related functions. The specific type of contribution conveyed by the MdLF to temporal language areas remains to be ascertained. The existence of the MdLF in man has recently been demonstrated in DT-MRI tractography (Makris et al., in press).
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Uncinate fasciculus There is a strong link between the rostral part of the superior temporal gyrus (areas TS1 and TS2) and the temporal proisocortex with the orbital frontal cortex (areas 13 and 47/12) and the medial prefrontal cortex (areas 14, 25, and 32) via the uncinate fasciculus (Figure 2.6). The orbitofrontal cortex, especially its more caudal part, and the adjacent limbic medial frontal regions are strongly connected with the amygdala (Aggleton, Burton, & Passingham, 1980; Amaral & Price, 1984; Barbas & De Olmos, 1990; Carmichael & Price, 1995), a structure that is critical for affective responses (see Aggleton, 1992, for review). Lesions of the orbitofrontal cortex in both monkeys (Butter, Snyder, & McDonald, 1970; Ruch & Shenkin, 1943) and man (Angrilli, Palomba, Cantagallo, Maietti, & Stegagno, 1999; Hornak, Rolls, & Wade, 1996; Sarazin, Pillon, Giannakopoulos, Rancurel, Samson, & Dubois, 1998) demonstrate that this region plays a major role in the regulation of behavioral responses to emotional stimuli. In a functional neuroimaging study, Frey et al. (2000) demonstrated a major increase in activity in the caudal orbitofrontal region in relation to the perception of unpleasant auditory stimuli, such as the sounds of violent car crashes. These findings suggest that the connections between the orbitofrontal cortex and the rostral superior temporal region established via the uncinate fasciculus may be critical for enabling the organism to evaluate and regulate responses to emotional auditory input. It is therefore likely that the interactions between the orbitofrontal and medial prefrontal cortex with the rostral superior temporal gyrus, and the interactions of the latter with the middle sector of the superior temporal gyrus and adjacent superior temporal sulcus enable emotional and motivational states to influence language processing. Ventromedial limbic pathways Finally, it is interesting to note that the lateral temporal cortical regions that are involved in language processing are also under the influence of medial temporal and posterior cingulate limbic areas. Thus, the rostral and middle parts of the superior temporal gyrus (TS1, TS2, and TS3) are connected with area TH of the parahippocampal gyrus, and area TPO in the upper bank of the superior temporal sulcus is connected with area TF in the medial temporal region (e.g. Blatt, Pandya, & Rosene, 2003; Seltzer & Pandya, 1976; Suzuki & Amaral, 1994a, b) (Figure 2.13). In contrast, the caudal part of the superior temporal gyrus (area Tpt) is preferentially related to retrosplenial area 30 and the caudal cingulate region (areas 23 and 31) (Morecraft, Cipolloni, StilwellMorecraft, Gedney, & Pandya, 2004; Morris, Petrides, & Pandya, 1999a; Pandya et al., 1981; Vogt & Pandya, 1987) (Figure 2.13). These connections might provide interactions of linguistic processing with medial temporal limbic regions that are known to be involved in mnemonic encoding (Milner, 1972; Mishkin, 1982; Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991) and thus permit the
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Figure 2.13 Schematic diagram to illustrate the origin, course, and terminations of the ventromedial limbic pathways linking the rostral and middle superior temporal region with the parahippocampal region, and the caudal superior temporal region with the caudal cingulate and retrosplenial regions.
acquisition of novel verbal information. Perhaps, the parahippocampal cortical connections underlie aspects of verbal declarative memory, whereas the cingulate/retrosplenial areas may permit certain kinds of interactions needed for working and spatial memory (see Morris, Pandya & Petrides, 1999b). It
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remains for future studies to clarify the role of these connections in the interaction between linguistic processing and mnemonic processing. The complex sets of processes that are subsumed under the term “language” are the result of computations in widely distributed neural networks. Luigi Vignolo was never comfortable with the basic diagrams depicting only Wernicke’s and Broca’s areas, and the arcuate fasciculus as the main mode of interaction between these primary language regions. In this chapter, we have outlined an alternative proposal with several possible pathways, some being directly involved in language processing and others playing an indirect role in metalinguistic information processing. Future research will undoubtedly unravel the subtleties of the connectional pathways of the human brain involved in language, a topic that was dear to Professor Vignolo.
Acknowledgement We thank Ms Veronika Zlatkina for preparing the figures.
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Structural and functional neuroimaging in neuropsychology A concise overview Jubin Abutalebi, Lisa Bartha Doering, Pasquale Anthony Della Rosa, and Peter Mariën
The lesion-behavior method For more than a century, the lesion-behavior method has grounded the development of insights in the functional anatomy of the brain and the neural organization of cognitive functions. The attempt to establish a direct relation between injury in a specific brain region and cognitive manifestations dates back to Jean-Baptiste Bouillaud (1825), who linked disruption of oral language functions in a series of aphasic patients to postmortem findings of frontal lobe damage. The modern era of anatomoclinical insights in neuropsychological and neurobehavioral syndromes started in the 1860s in Paris with Paul Broca’s seminal contributions to the Société d’Anthropologie. In the course of 4 years of intensive discussions about the representation of language functions in the brain, Broca presented clinical and neuroanatomical evidence that established a correlation between expressive aphasia and damage to the frontal region of the language-dominant hemisphere (that is, the left hemisphere in dextrals and the right hemisphere in sinistrals). New concepts and methods of investigation exposed during the debates on the localization of speech rapidly extended to other aspects of language and related cognitive areas. During the last decades of the nineteenth century, vigorous application of the lesion-behavior method led to several innovative insights and influential discoveries in the understanding of brain–behavior relationships. In 1874, the German neurologist Carl Wernicke introduced the prototype of fluent aphasia that substantially differed from Broca’s nonfluent, expressive variant following frontal lobe damage. In his monograph Der aphasische Symptomencomplex, Wernicke (1874) described what he called “sensory aphasia” following structural damage to the posterior part of the superior temporal gyrus of the language-dominant hemisphere. In addition, Wernicke identified global aphasia and conduction aphasia on the basis of a model that explained aphasic syndromes as the result of lesions affecting different, noncontiguous language centers and their unidirectional anatomical connections capable of performing a variety of complex functions with relative independence. During
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the last decades of the nineteenth century, a considerable expansion of knowledge about specific aspects of aphasia and related disorders was realized. Déjerine (1892), for instance, elucidated the neuranatomic substrate of pure alexia, Brissaud (1894) described the phenomenon of prosodic speech disturbances (aphasie d’intonation), and Pitres called attention to aphasia in polyglots (Pitres, 1895) and to the syndrome of amnestic aphasia (Pitres, 1898). In this period of intense experimental, clinical, and anatomoclinical activity, a variety of neuropsychological functions and skills were localized as well. Munk (1878) first identified “cortical blindness” and “mindblindedness” as examples of higher-level impairment of visual perception and recognition after occipital lobe lesions. Freud (1891) coined the term “agnosia” to denote the phenomenon of disrupted recognition skills. Astereognosis as the somesthetic counterpart of visual agnosia was described by Hoffmann (1885) and related to damage of the postcentral gyrus by Wernicke (1895). Diverse forms of apraxia after focal lesions of the language-dominant hemisphere were described during the first decades of the twentieth century (Liepmann, 1900; Strauss, 1924). By contrast, the early scattered attempts to demonstrate that the nondominant right hemisphere also possesses some distinctive functional qualities in the regulation of cognitive behavior had no significant influence on the development of neuropsychological knowledge until after World War II. Although the nineteenth-century connectionist framework succeeded in explaining a variety of neurocognitive syndromes such as aphasia, agraphia, alexia, agnosia, apraxia, and amnesia, its theoretical substrate was fundamentally criticized by the “holists”, who strongly rejected the view of the nervous system as a series of functionally independent centers connected by unidirectional pathways. One of the most influential skeptics of localizationalism was the English neurologist John Hughlings Jackson (1835–1911), who regarded the nervous system as a hierarchically organized and functionally interactive mechanism that could not be broken down into pieces. Hughlings Jackson’s (1878) often-quoted assertion that “to locate the lesion which destroys speech and to locate speech are two different things” summarizes the criticism of the anti-localizationalists. Because of its strong association with the theory of localizationalism, the lesion-behavior approach, as a principal means to investigate the neural substrate of human behavior and cognition, was largely abandoned soon after the turn of the century. The innovative work of leading behavioral neuroscientists such as Arthur Benton, Norman Geschwind, Henri Hécaen, Alexandrej Luria, Brenda Milner, Hans-Lukas Teuber, and Oliver Zangwill gradually established a revival of the lesionbehavior method from the 1960s onward as a reaction to the tradition of antilocalizationalism and “black-box” behaviorism. While most of the advances in brain–behavior relationships before the 1960s had been achieved by studying individual or small cohorts of patients without quantitative measures, neurologists and neuropsychologists in the 1960s started to develop experimental designs patterned on research methods applied in experimental psychology
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to investigate a variety of cognitive skills such as intelligence, language, attention, memory, praxis, gnosis, perception, and executive functions. Large groups of patients with different lesion distributions and neurocognitive syndromes were studied by means of standardized test batteries, yielding quantitative results that could be statistically compared across patient groups and control groups.
Structural neuroimaging The advent of modern neuroimaging at the beginning of the 1970s solidly reinstalled and even revolutionized the application of the lesion-behavior approach in the cognitive and behavioral neurosciences. Growing sophistication of neuroimaging techniques and further refinement of the methods and instruments to assess and quantify neurobehavioral characteristics substantially advanced insights in brain–behavior relationships during the past three decades. The inception of computerized X-ray axial tomography (CT) in 1973 and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) of the brain less than a decade later opened a new avenue to define with much precision the anatomic substrate of behavioral and cognitive disorders in living subjects at the time the deficit appeared or at any time later in the course of the disease. The application of CT scanning in the study of aphasic syndromes was introduced by Naeser and Hayward (1978); Damasio, Damasio, Hamsher, and Varney (1979); Kertesz, Harlock, and Coates (1979); and Mazzocchi and Vignolo (1979). Evaluation of classical aphasiological concepts with CT yielded some unexpected results and refinement of the classical insights in lesion–aphasia correlations. Studies, for instance, showed that cerebral damage confined to Broca’s area (Brodmann areas 44 and 45) is more likely to produce apraxia of speech than Broca’s aphasia, which results only from larger and deeper lesions involving Broca’s area and the adjacent posterior frontal and anterior parietal region. Although most of the lesion-behavior studies in the 1970s and 1980s were devoted to a critical evaluation of traditional autopsy-based models of language localization and aphasia typology, the pioneer studies of the 1970s and 1980s had already succeeded in extending the view of the anatomic substrate of aphasia beyond the boundaries of the perisylvian region of the language-dominant hemisphere. The use of structural neuroimaging techniques in aphasia research rapidly led to irrefutable evidence of the existence of the much debated subcortical and thalamic aphasias (Cappa & Vignolo, 1979; Damasio, Damasio, Rizzo, Varney, & Gersh, 1982; Mohr, 1983; Naeser, 1983). Structural neuroimaging not only had a major impact on the understanding of the cerebral representation of language functions but also substantially contributed to the expansion of knowledge in other cognitive domains such as the neural basis of memory, visuoperceptive skills, praxis, and executive functions (see Damasio & Damasio, 1989, for a review).
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Functional neuroimaging Principles The search to understand the functional organization of the human brain by means of techniques that assess changes in cerebral blood flow has occupied neuroscience for more than a century. William James’ (1890) monumental, two-volume Principles of Psychology refers to the work of the Italian physiologist Angelo Mosso (1881), who recorded the pulsation of the human cortex in patients with skull defects following neurosurgical procedures. Mosso (1881) showed that these pulsations increase regionally during mental activity and concluded that blood circulation changes selectively with neuronal activity. Despite a promising start, interest in this research area virtually ceased during the first quarter of the twentieth century. The advent of structural brain-imaging techniques in the 1970s reopened this research area. Structural neuroimaging techniques, although of crucial clinical importance, provide anatomic and structural information but do not inform us about the functioning of the brain. In recent years, functional neuroimaging, broadly defined as techniques that provide measures of brain activity, has further increased the ability to study the neural basis of human behavior. The modern era of functional brain imaging started with the use of positron emission tomography (PET) and single-photon emission computerized tomography (SPECT). Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) emerged a few years later as an extremely powerful and safe technique to study the anatomic substrate of motor and cognitive processes. There are many ways to visualize the working human brain. One of the techniques used by PET is a radioactive tracer administered to the subject in order to measure cerebral metabolism, cerebral blood flow, or neuroreceptorsneurotransmitters. A large part of metabolic cerebral needs (and, therefore, of glucose consumption) serve to maintain synaptic activity. Since the brain does not have the ability to store oxygen and glucose, the intake of these energy resources through cerebral blood flow is crucial to guarantee constant neural activity. It has been shown that, under normal conditions, there is a high level of coupling between energy metabolism and regional cerebral flow (rCBF) (Sokoloff, 1975), even though a number of experiments demonstrated that the increase in rCBF exceeds the local energy demand (Fox & Raichle, 1986). This observation is important because it shows that changes in regional blood flow can provide more meaningful information than direct measurements of cerebral metabolism. PET PET is a technology that creates images of the distribution of radiation in the brain within the central opening of a doughnut-shaped PET scanner. To obtain measurements of functional parameters, such as rCBF and glucose
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consumption, PET scanning needs the combination of three basic requirements: (1) a PET scanner; (2) a cyclotron (an accelerator of particles which produce positron-emitting radiotracers), and (3) a method of data analysis. Radioactive substances, called tracers, are employed to “image” different physiological processes, such as brain blood flow or metabolism (that is, glucose consumption). Indeed, PET shows a three-dimensional (3-D) brain distribution of positron-emitting radiotracers attached to molecules, such as fluorinedeoxyglucose when the measurements refer to glucose consumption, or to water molecules when the measurements refer to rCBF. In the latter case, areas of higher blood flow have a larger amount of radioactive tracer, and thus emit a stronger signal. It should be underlined that blood flow is an indirect measure of local synaptic activity. Regarding the study of cognitive functions, most studies investigating rCBF increase (cerebral activation) linked to the performance on cognitive tasks (such as language, memory, and attention) have employed labeled oxygen (15O2) as radiotracer; that is, oxygen from which an electron has been removed from its atom to create an unstable compound capable of emitting positrons. The 15O2 is used in the form of water (H215O) and is administered intravenously to the subject. The advantage of this tracer is that it decays in a short period of time (approximately 2 min). As a result, several scans (up to 16) can be made during a single session before the decay of the tracer starts, enabling researchers to study different conditions while patients carry out different tasks. At the beginning of each PET scan procedure, a small amount of labeled water is venously injected while the subject is positioned in the scanner. After about 30 s, the tracer starts to appear in the brain and the next 30 s, when radiation has reached its peak in the brain, constitutes the “critical window”. Images of rCBF are obtained during this “critical window” phase. By data analysis methods, a 3-D representation of the brain is obtained in the form of a mapping of radioactivity distribution, which indicates cerebral activity linked to the task performed during scanning. SPECT SPECT also uses radiotracers (usually containing iodine) incorporated in biologically active compounds whose distribution is studied at the brain level. This technique makes it possible to study the cerebral blood flood in tissues with an intense metabolic activity. Like PET, the term SPECT was derived from the type of radioisotopes utilized in the scanning procedure. In this case, the isotopes produce a single photon when they decay. The radioisotopes used for SPECT are available on the market and do not require the use of a cyclotron to fabricate the tracer. For this reason, SPECT scanning has become more widespread and more commonly used than PET scanning. However, as SPECT images depend on the release of a single photon, its spatial resolution is considerably poorer than that obtained with PET scans. SPECT is frequently applied to study dementia, and Alzheimer’s disease in
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particular, where a decrease in frontal and bilateral temporal-parietal cerebral blood flow has been proven (Perani et al., 1988a). Moreover, SPECT scans have highlighted an excellent correlation between the neuropsychological pattern and a decrease in cerebral blood flow in patients with vascular lesions and those suffering from aphasia (Perani, Papagno, Cappa, Gerundini, & Fazio, 1988b), in patients with isolated, progressive cognitive deficiencies (Cappa et al., 1993), and in patients suffering from Parkinson’s disease with or without associated dementia (Antonini, De Notaris, Benti, De Gaspari, & Pezzoli, 2001). Although the techniques of PET and SPECT are more widely applied in clinical diagnostics due to cost-effectiveness (in particular the SPECT technique) and user-friendliness, their use in neuropsychology research is rather limited. In many research centers, application of SPECT and PET is restricted to study groups of neurological patients, as healthy subjects often cannot be investigated because of ethical considerations. Furthermore, PET and SPECT techniques have poor spatial resolution compared with structural images and a low signal-to-noise ratio in the activation images. fMRI The main reason why fMRI rapidly became extremely popular and widely applied in neuropsychological research is that this noninvasive technique does not require exposure of the subject to radiation. It is therefore particularly suitable for cognitive activation studies in normal subjects and patients. The two most important characteristics of fMRI are the high spatial resolution typical of magnetic resonance (MR) and the ability to visualize areas of the brain while subjects perform a cognitive task. The principle underlying MR is the particular property of certain atomic nuclei, when positioned in a magnetic field and stimulated by radio waves at characteristic frequencies, to re-release part of the energy absorbed in the form of a magnetic signal (the MR signal). The properties of the hydrogen nucleus are most commonly used for clinical structural MR purposes, while fMRI uses the paramagnetic properties of deoxyhemoglobin, as illustrated below. Ultrarapid image acquisition techniques, termed EPI (echo planar imaging), make it possible to measure the changes in blood oxygenation that occur during cerebral activation tasks. This is known as the BOLD (Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent) effect. In case of functional activation (as via a cognitive or sensorimotor task), a local increase in cerebral blood perfusion occurs, inducing an increase in the quantity of oxyhemoglobin (the oxygenated form of hemoglobin) that reaches the capillary district. However, as oxygen is not completely used by the tissue in an activation state, a greater amount of oxyhemoglobin consequently reaches the venous side of the capillary district where deoxyhemoglobin (the deoxygenated form of hemoglobin) usually prevails. Given that deoxyhemoglobin, unlike oxyhemoglobin, is a
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paramagnetic substance, a temporary local reduction occurs in the magnetic sensitivity generated by deoxyhemoglobin. As the concentration of deoxyhemoglobin decreases to the detriment of oxyhemoglobin concentration in the activation phase, an increase in signal intensity is observed. In other words, it is the oxygen itself that acts as an endogenous contrast medium. In conclusion, fMRI measures blood flow and is an indirect measure of neural activity. The sluggishness of the hemodynamic response limits the effective temporal resolution of the fMRI signal to a few seconds, as opposed to the millisecond temporal resolution of electrical recordings of neural activity (such as from event-related potentials (ERPs) studies). However, several investigators have reported significant differential functional responses between two trial types with trials spaced as closely as 500 ms apart, provided that these stimuli are presented in a random fashion (Savoy et al., 1996). Some tasks, such as delayed-response tasks, have individual trial events (such as the presentation of a sentence, the delay period, and the response) whose order cannot be randomized. In these types of tasks, the temporal resolution is necessarily lower. The limited temporal resolution of fMRI does not necessarily mean that brief changes in neural activity cannot be detected with sufficient statistical power. Several investigators have reported fMRI signal changes that were correlated with short-lasting events. Thus, fMRI has superb temporal and spatial resolution, making it a powerful method of neuropsychological research. Since fMRI does not require radiation, subjects may be examined several times, and hence the experiment may be repeated many times. Early experiments with fMRI were designed to study the reliability of the method and to evaluate how the BOLD signal correlates with cerebral flow measured with PET. Soon after these pioneer studies, more and more complex experimental designs with increasingly articulated research objectives were conducted. Thanks to these stringent efforts, cognitive neuroscientists can now study the cerebral architecture of cognitive functions in relative detail. However, like all means of investigation, fMRI has methodological drawbacks too. Image acquisition is often confined to a “region of interest” of the brain and therefore relies on neuroanatomic prerequisites. For instances, in the landmark study of Kim et al. (1997) that was designed to investigate whether bilinguals use the same brain areas or segregated brain areas for language production in the first (L1) and in the second language (L2), the authors focused only on Broca’s and Wernicke’s area as their “regions of interest”. In addition, problems related to motion features may arise. Due to its excellent spatial resolution (under 1 mm), even minimal movements made by the patient introduce features that may alter functional results. The recent introduction of image-co-recording algorithms should reduce this problem. Moreover, image acquisition with fMRI is difficult in the orbitofrontal and inferior temporal lobe regions because of susceptibility to artifacts caused by the sinuses in the adjacent anatomic regions. However, improvements in pulse sequences for acquiring fMRI data should eventually eliminate these
58 Abutalebi et al. artifacts. Electrical recordings, such as the electromyogram (EMG) or the electro-oculogram (EOG), during fMRI scanning also present a technical challenge that has been tackled in some laboratories. The types of hypotheses that can be tested with fMRI relate to the following: • •
•
Functional specialization: the concept of functional specialization is based on the premise that functional modules exist in the brain, that is, cerebral areas that are specialized for specific cognitive processes. Testing cognitive theory: an exciting innovative direction for functional neuroimaging is illustrated by studies that use imaging data to test theories regarding underlying mechanisms of cognition, such as the concept of a critical period in which language learning is neurologically wired-in, as illustrated below. Functional integration: functional neuroimaging studies can also test hypotheses about interactions between brain regions by focusing on covariances of activation levels between regions. These covariances have been referred to as “functional connectivity”, a concept that was originally developed in reference to temporal interactions among individual cells.
How to construct a functional neuroimaging experiment The most obvious rationale for conducting functional neuroimaging experiments is to correlate structure with function. Complex neuropsychological processes are best described in terms of combinations of constituent elementary operations. These elementary processes may not be localized in single locations in the brain; rather, they are often the result of networks of neurons acting together. Exactly this consideration is the limit of the lesion-behavior approach: the lesion is usually confined to a single brain location, and inferences from the lesion site to the impaired cognitive function may be too vague. Cognition is a distributed process; hence, cognitive functions, such as language, may not be localizable in a single brain region (Berns, 1999). Most evidence points to networks of regions functioning with a particular choreography that gives rise to a cognitive function. Therefore, to study the neural basis of cognitive functions, techniques are needed that are able to measure neural function simultaneously in the entire brain. PET and fMRI provide enough spatial and temporal resolution to make plausible conclusions possible about the role of specific brain regions in cognition. In the following paragraphs, we will illustrate how to build, carry out, analyze, and interpret functional neuroimaging experiments. It is clear that before starting a neuroimaging experiment, several important issues must be taken into consideration. First, a specific and relevant hypothesis must be created; second, appropriate methods must be selected; third, the experiment must be appropriately conducted, analyzed, and interpreted. These choices
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will be constrained by the nature of the task chosen, the available imaging technology and its limitations, and the types of inference one wishes to draw from the study. Designing an experimental task The design of an experimental task limits the ultimate interpretability of the data. Tasks must be chosen that yield theoretical insight into the neuropsychological processes under investigation, and they must avoid the influence of nuisance variables. Nuisance variables may be neural processes unrelated to the question of interest, either prescribed by the task or unrelated to it. They may be physiological artifacts due to phenomena such as heart rate, respiration, and eye movements that may interfere with rCBF, or even technological artifacts. To the extent that nuisance variables influence brain activations in a task, they may have repercussions on the interpretation of the data. Constructing adequate tasks can be quite challenging, and may not be possible in some situations. Once an adequate task is created, important decisions need to be made concerning the right frame to fit around the task; that is, the experimental paradigm. This decision is constrained by the technique that will be employed and is related to the advantages and limitations linked to the physical properties underlying the detection of a specific signal. A final caveat with regard to the choice of certain cognitive paradigms is that the brain systems involved do not necessarily remain constant through many repetitions of the task. Rather, when a task is novel, major changes can occur in the systems fired by the task. Such changes have both practical and theoretical implications when it comes to the design and interpretation of cognitive activation experiments. The prevailing paradigms for analyzing task-related changes with PET or fMRI are the “blocked” paradigms and “event-related” designs. Block designs A block design is the standard experimental design used in PET activation studies because long intervals of time (30 s or more) are required to collect sufficient data to yield a good image. In such a block design, different conditions in the experiment are presented as separate blocks of trials (such as picture naming in one block and lexical decision in a different block), with each block representing one scan during the experiment. The activations of interest in a PET experiment are the activations that accumulate over the entire recording interval of a scan. If one is interested in visualizing the neural effect of some briefly triggered psychological response (such as the activation due to a flashed light stimulus), one would have to repeat the event repeatedly during a block of trials so that activations accumulate over the recording interval of a scan. The activations obtained can be compared with an appropriate
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baseline control scan in which the stimulus event does not occur. However, given its temporal limitations, PET is not well suited to examine the time course of brain activity that may change within seconds or fractions of a second. The blocked structure of PET designs is a major factor in the interpretability of results, and, most commonly, activations related to slowly changing factors such as task-set are captured in this type of design. Many fMRI studies also apply blocked designs. Again in these “blocked” paradigms, subjects alternate between performing an “active” (such as picture naming) and a “control” task (such as a rest condition) for short periods of time (e.g. 30 s). The images acquired during the active task blocks are statistically compared to the images acquired during the control task block. One advantage of using a blocked design with fMRI is that it offers more statistical power to detect a relevant change. Event-related design To take advantage of the rapid data-acquisition capabilities of fMRI, the event-related fMRI technique was developed to create images of the neural activity related to specific stimuli or cognitive events within a trial. The technique involves spacing stimuli far enough apart in time so that the hemodynamic response to a single stimulus or cognitive event is permitted to return to baseline before the onset of the next stimulus or event. Most researchers consider 14–16 s enough time for this process (Aguirre, Zarahn, & D’Esposito, 1998; Dale & Buckner, 1997). By means of this technique, signals from individual trials of the same task (such as reading single words) can be averaged together, and the time course of the hemodynamic response within a trial can be determined. This technique permits randomization of trials from different conditions (such as presenting words belonging to two different languages intermingled), which is essential for certain tasks such as language switching. It also allows researchers to analyze only selected types of trials in a mixed trial block, enabling the study of a number of processes that occur only on some trials. For instance, during a lexical decision task, an event-related design allows us to analyze only correct responses, since false responses may be discarded from the final analysis. During a block design, the latter option is not possible, and hence the brain activity may be related to both correct and false responses. The limiting factor of event-related designs lies within the temporal resolution of fMRI; that is, it is not the speed of data acquisition, but the speed of the underlying hemodynamic response to a neural event, which peaks 5–8 s after a specific neural activity has peaked. However, the recent advent of “rapid event-related fMRI techniques” has provided an adequate means to perform experiments in which successive stimuli or cognitive events can be presented in as little as 750 ms (Dale & Buckner, 1997). Importantly, potential effects of fatigue, boredom, and systematic patterns of thought unrelated to the task during long intertrial intervals are minimized with such designs. It
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is noteworthy that in employing “rapid event-related fMRI techniques” the intertrial interval must be varied from trial to trial. Without jittering the intertrial interval, the neural events would occur too rapidly to be sampled effectively. Subject selection When neuroimaging techniques are applied to make some inferences on a process of interest, it is important to use an appropriate number of subjects in order to obtain enough statistical power to allow generalization of the findings to an entire population of individuals. In addition, subjects should be controlled for age, handedness, language, and education. Depending on the fMRI experiment, further data about cognitive functions can be helpful, such as IQ, memory state, and attentional functions. Data analysis Once a task is designed and the data are collected, analysis comprises two important substages: preprocessing of the images and statistical analysis of the activations. Preprocessing refers to image processing in which the various images in a set of data must be aligned to correct for head motion that may have occurred from one image acquisition to the next. Following alignment, images are often normalized to a standard brain template (often provided by the software package) so that results from several subjects can be combined into averages and plotted into a standard 3-D brain space. Many researchers also smooth images, in order to give the noise in the images a more Gaussian distribution. This smoothing of images effectively produces a weighted average of the signal across neighboring voxels (3-D pixels). Although smoothing may decrease the spatial resolution of the images, it helps to estimate and control for statistical noise. It is useful to know that data in neuroimaging experiments are in the form of a matrix of signal intensity values in each region of the brain expressed in voxels (the smallest distinguishable box-shaped part of a 3-D image). Following these preprocessing stages, statistical tests are performed on the data. How to contrast experimental conditions? The problem of deriving conclusions about cognitive processes from neuroimaging data is that nearly any isolated task produces changes in most areas of the brain. To associate changes in brain activation with a particular cognitive process (such as a lexical decision task), changes related to that process must be isolated from changes related to other processes (for instance, related to a picture-naming task). At its simplest, the fMRI experiment can be considered a “subtraction experiment”. In a subtraction experiment, images are acquired during two different conditions (such as the lexical
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decision task and the picture-naming task). To identify “differences” between both conditions, the activations obtained in one condition are subtracted from the activations obtained in the other condition (for example, lexical decision versus picture naming, in order to illustrate what is more activated during the former task). The logic of subtraction is that if two experimental conditions that differ by only one process are investigated, subtraction of the activations of one condition from those of the other should reveal the brain regions associated with the target process (see Figure 3.1, for an example during a fluency task in a second language in different groups of bilinguals). However, as will be discussed below, a number of considerations may limit this study design. At first sight, the simplest experimental condition is between a task performed during “block A” and a “rest block” in which no task is performed. This is often referred to as the “A versus rest” design. While this is conceptually simple (the hypothesis is that there is “some” activity during block A and “no” activity during the rest block), it may be difficult to ensure that there is no confounding brain activity during the rest block (simply instructing the subject “not to think of anything” may not suffice to ensure no neural activity). An alternative approach is to set up a condition during the “rest block” to distract the subject from confounding memory, imagination, or continued activity. In fact, the “block A” versus block “rest” design can be considered a special case of the more general “block A” versus “block B” (that is, a lexical decision task in block A and a picture-naming task in block B) design, in which different activity is expected between blocks A and B, and the purpose of the analysis is to identify those differences. Clearly, this method imposes a considerable burden on the choice of an appropriate “block B” to complement “block A” without (unintentional) obscuring or canceling out activation that might be common to both. Once the experimental conditions are built in order to highlight adequately the activations elicited by different cognitive processes, the subtraction is accomplished one voxel at a time. The results of the voxel-wise subtractions yield a 3-D matrix of the difference in activation between the two conditions throughout the scanned regions of the brain. Statistical approaches A number of statistical strategies are available to analyze the data obtained in functional activation studies. In principle, the mean signal intensity can be compared on a voxel-wise basis between images acquired during “condition A” versus “rest” (or “condition B”, etc.). The significance of any observed difference can then be tested by the simple Student’s t-test. A more elegant extension of this is to compute the correlation coefficient of each voxel’s signal intensity time course against a reference “boxcar” function defined as “−1” during rest and “+1” during “condition A”. The magnitude (r) and significance level ( p value) can then be described on a voxel-wise
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basis and used as a basis for constructing color overlay maps, in which “activated pixels” are identified in color overlaid on gray-scale source images. The choice of a correlation coefficient threshold to delineate “significant” activation from “spurious” noise introduces a somewhat uncomfortable arbitrariness in the analysis. The interpretation of significance is clouded by consideration of the many multiple comparisons being made in the above simplified approach. Consider an image matrix of 128 × 128 pixels (>10,000 pixels). Assuming that a significance level of p < .05 is considered “significant”, it is clear that we might expect over 500 pixels to pass this threshold “by random chance”. But a single pixel’s signal intensity behavior is neither truly independent nor exactly dependent on other pixel responses. It is reasonable, therefore, to entertain the notion that “neighboring” pixels might have a similar underlying neuroanatomy and thus similar physiological responses, but “how neighboring” and “how similar”? These two questions clearly evoke some form of correction to the simple t statistic. The simplest approach is the Bonferroni correction method, which approximates the actual probability of n comparisons as n times the p value at any one voxel. The uncorrected (or voxelwise) p values indicate the proportion of voxels in the image that will light up by chance, while the corrected (or map-wise) p values indicate the probability of false-positive voxels occurring anywhere in the image. These represent two rather extreme viewpoints, whereas what really matters is the proportion of voxels declared as active but probably being false positives. This corresponds to the so-called false discovery rate, which has been recently incorporated into several of the standard analysis packages, although it has not yet become the standard reporting method in the literature.
Applications in neuropsychological research Activation studies aim to map brain functions in both neurologically healthy and cognitively disordered subjects. The functioning of the brain during various cognitive tasks is based on the activities of complex neural connections in which each neural network node may have a specific function. Knowledge of the anatomic substrate of cognitive functions as provided by neuropsychologically derived insights is crucial for a better understanding of the functioning of the cognitive systems that subserve memory, speech, etc. Neuroimaging techniques have widened the scope of surveys and allow us to evaluate these systems under normal conditions. In the following sections, the study of Wartenburger et al. (2003) on bilinguals is discussed as an example of how to design an fMRI experiment. The authors aimed to determine whether grammatical and semantic processing is differentially influenced by the age of second language (L2) acquisition and the degree of L2 proficiency. For the sake of brevity, we will not mention the extensive advancements achieved by functional neuroimaging studies in other neuropsychological domains such as memory, attention, visual processing, and
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Figure 3.1 The subtraction method in functional neuroimaging experiments. The figure displays the pattern of brain activity when generating words in a second language in two different groups of subjects. The conditions were a second language to which subjects of the study were less exposed (on the left) and a second language to which a different group of subjects were highly exposed (in the middle). As may be observed, more extensive brain activation in the left dorsolateral frontal cortex is found when generating words in a less exposed second language. These findings suggest that a second language associated with lower environmental exposure is in need of additional neural resources. In order to know where these additional neural resources are located, the subtraction method can be used: the brain activity pattern of the wellexposed group is subtracted from the pattern found in the group of lowexposed subjects’ brain activity. The result is illustrated on the right, and the pattern of brain activity shows those areas necessary for supporting a second language to which subjects are relatively less exposed (modified from Perani et al., 2003). Note that the subtraction method may be used either between different groups or between different conditions in the same group (that is, word generation in L1 versus L2). In our example, subtraction is used between groups. (This figure is published in color at www. psypress.com/brainscans-etc/)
neuropsychological recovery. In many of the chapters of this volume, mention is made of functional neuroimaging studies, and hence, the reader is referred to these chapters.
A brief sample of how fMRI may test a cognitive theory Wartenburger et al. (2003) aimed to study whether age of L2 acquisition or rather the degree of second language (L2) proficiency is more important for the neural representation of L2. Psycholinguistic evidence related to this issue is controversial. Theories range from the postulation of biologically based “critical periods” for some aspects of language, such as grammatical processing, to differences between infant and adult learning contexts (Birdsong, 1999; Johnson & Newport, 1989; Lenneberg, 1967). Likewise, some authors argue that, at least for lexical-semantic aspects, the level of language proficiency is more important for the mental representation of a L2 (Kroll & Stewart, 1994).
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Hence, Wartenburger et al. (2003) tried to enrich the discussion by providing neurobiological evidence of how an L2 is represented in the brain. The authors used fMRI to investigate the effects of age of acquisition (AOA) and level of proficiency (PL) on the neural correlates of grammatical and semantic processing in Italian-German bilinguals who learned L2 at different ages and showed different proficiency levels. Subjects To assess the effects of AOA and PL, three groups of healthy, adult ItalianGerman bilinguals were considered for the experiment: • • •
group 1: subjects who acquired L2 since birth and showed high proficiency for both languages (early-acquisition and high-proficiency bilinguals) group 2: subjects who acquired L2 late but showed a proficiency level comparable with group 1 (late-acquisition and high-proficiency bilinguals) group 3: subjects who learned L2 late and showed low L2 proficiency at the time of the experiment (late-acquisition and low-proficiency bilinguals).
In the experiment the groups consisted of 10 subjects on average. Stimuli and experimental paradigm The stimulus material in the experiment consisted of 180 short sentences (90 German sentences and 90 Italian sentences). Forty-four of the German and Italian sentences were semantically and grammatically correct. In both languages, the remaining 46 sentences contained either semantic (23 sentences) or grammatical (23 sentences) violations. Thus, there were four conditions: German grammatical judgment, Italian grammatical judgment, German semantic judgment, and Italian semantic judgment. A large number of stimuli within each experimental condition was necessary in order to elicit the desired effect on the cognitive process under investigation. The sentences were divided into 12 blocks (block design), lasting 128 s, resulting in three blocks for each of the four conditions. After an initial resting period (60 s), the blocks of sentences were presented in a random order. Between each block, a fixation cross appeared for 32 s indicating a rest period. Each block was made of 15 pseudorandomized correct and incorrect sentences and was preceded by an instruction sentence (e.g. grammatical judgment German). After each sentence was presented, a fixation cross was displayed for 4 s. Subjects under the scanner were asked to judge whether sentences in both L1 and L2 were semantically or grammatically correct and were asked to indicate by a right-hand button press when they identified a correct sentence.
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Data acquisition and statistical analysis Scan acquisitions were performed on a 1.5 T scanner, and subsequently images pertaining to each subject were realigned, normalized, and spatially smoothed (Friston et al., 1999). Images were also created for the differences between each condition across L1 and L2 for each subject. Contrast images for each condition and for differences between the respective conditions in L2 and L1 were computed for each subject. Moreover, group effects were computed, using these contrast images by a random-effects analysis in order to be able to generalize the observed effects to the population (Friston et al., 1999). One-sample t-tests were performed separately for each group in order to identify regions within the groups that showed greater activation in L2 than L1 (that is, L1 served as baseline condition in within-group comparisons). Subsequently, two-sample t-tests were performed between groups to highlight regions that were significantly more activated by one group than the other. Results and interpretations While the pattern of brain activity for semantic judgment was largely dependent on PL, AOA mainly affected the cortical representation of grammatical processes (see Figure 3.2 for the brain correlates of grammatical processing in
Figure 3.2 This figure shows the results for grammatical processing of the study of Wartenburger et al. (2003) (see text for details). Results for three groups of bilinguals are displayed: early-acquisition bilinguals (left), late-acquisition and high-proficient bilinguals (middle), and late-acquisition and lowproficient bilinguals (right). The images refer to direct comparisons between L2 and L1 (subtracting L1 from L2 within each group in order to show whether L2 activates a more extended neural system for grammatical processing). As demonstrated, the degree of L2 proficiency does not seem to have strong influences on the pattern of brain activity. The late-acquisition and high-proficient group used the same additional brain activity as the low-proficiency group. Only when L2 was acquired early in life, was the same pattern of brain activity found (left) (modified from Wartenburger et al., 2003). (This figure is published in color at www.psypress.com/ brainscans-etc/)
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a direct comparison between L2 and L1). In detail, in the case of grammar, a comparable performance/proficiency on L1 and L2 was not associated with the same pattern of neural representation. These findings may support the hypothesis that parameters for grammar are set in a “critical period” within the very first years of life, and that this fixation is associated with a distinct pattern of brain activity that is highly specific, and cannot be attained, even in the case of a highly proficient acquisition, later in life. The same did not apply to semantic processing, for which the only difference in the pattern of brain activity appeared to depend on the level of attained proficiency. Thus, these findings support the notion of the existence of a “critical period” of language acquisition and indicate that grammatical processing, given its dependence on age of acquisition, is based on a competence that is neurologically “wiredin”. This experiment is a good example of how neurobiological evidence obtained from functional neuroimaging may enrich linguistic and psycholinguistic debates, yet, as mentioned above, test cognitive theory. Hence, functional imaging techniques may contribute significantly to theories of language representation and language processing.
Concluding remarks A large body of structural and functional neuroimaging studies has been devoted to the investigation of cognitive functions both in the intact human brain and in neurological patients. The studies applying these techniques have not only confirmed the anatomic knowledge gained from neuropsychological lesion studies, but have also opened a number of new perspectives in the understanding of the brain–function relationship. New concepts and methods have led to innovative insights in the understanding of the neurological network underlying neuropsychological functions. New functional neuroimaging methods have shown that the assumption of single, circumscribed localization (lesion-behavior method) for complex and even some basal neuropsychological functions cannot be maintained. For instance, in the case of language processing, most structural imaging studies underline the importance of classical language-related areas within the perisylvian cortex of the left hemisphere, such as Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas. However, functional neuroimaging studies have considerably enlarged and redefined the scope of these areas and their participation in language processing: the left frontal convexity is involved in many tasks, such as word generation (Martin, Wiggs, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 1996), semantic and phonemic fluency (Mummery, Patterson, Hodges, & Wise, 1996; Paulesu et al., 1997), semantic monitoring (Thompson-Schill, D’Esposito, Aguirre, & Farah, 1997), and verbal working memory (Smith, Jonides, & Koeppe, 1996). Moreover, language-related activation has been reported also outside the classical language zone, such as in the inferior temporal gyrus and the temporal pole, the lingual and fusiform gyri (see reviews in Démonet et al., 2005; Indefrey & Levelt, 2000; Price, 2001), the hippocampal formation (Bartha et al., 2005), and even the right cerebellar
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hemisphere (see Mariën, Engelborghs, Fabbro, & De Deyn, 2001). Furthermore, right hemispheric activation in mirror regions is observed during the performance of most language tasks. Functional neuroimaging has brought to the fore that areas related to cognitive processing in the normal human brain appear to be not only more extended, but also less fixed than previously thought. For example, even when the task and experimental design are held constant, changes in languagerelated brain activation can be observed as a consequence of increased familiarity with the task. Striking evidence was provided by Petersen, Van Mier, Fiez, and Raichle (1998), who investigated the effects of practice on a verbal task by PET. The neural differences putatively related to processing differences between a high- and a low-practice performance of verb generation were highlighted by this study, in which decreasing brain activity in the left frontal convexity was reported after practice. Likewise, functional neuroimaging studies have shown that the acquisition of language is achieved through a shift from learning-related activity in the left hippocampus to left perisylvian brain areas (Abutalebi et al., 2007; Opitz & Friederici, 2004). Many challenging breakthroughs in neuropsychology have already been achieved through the advent of functional neuroimaging. Many of the chapters of the present volume show how our basic knowledge significantly increased thanks to these innovative techniques. Further refinement of the methods will help to gain more insight into the healthy human brain and will allow routine application in neurological patients for better diagnosis and treatment.
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SECTION II
Language disorders
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Information-processing models of aphasia Updating the diagram makers Kenneth M. Heilman
Aphasia is a common, disabling cognitive deficit. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the aphasic syndromes, using both a historic and cognitive, information-processing-diagrammatic, modeling approach. Much of this chapter is an updated version of a previously published paper (Heilman, 2006). It is hoped that this approach may have heuristic value and will allow people to understand as well as investigate the neuropsychological mechanisms that lead to aphasic disorders as well as the rationale for testing, therapy, and management. It is also hoped that this information-processing approach will help us gain understanding of the means by which the normal human brain processes speech and language.
Gall and Broca Broca’s aphasia The localizationist concept that the brain is organized in a modular fashion dates back to the early part of the nineteenth century when Franz Joseph Gall proposed that specific areas of the brain are important for mediating different cognitive functions. Unfortunately, this localizing hypothesis, together with his postulate that bigger is better, led to the pseudoscience of phrenology, whose followers believed that by palpating and measuring the skull a phrenologist could determine a person’s mental abilities. Although phrenology had been discredited, the postulate of localized function—or what is now termed modularity—was widely discussed in nineteenth-century Europe. Paul Broca, a French physician-surgeon and anthropologist, was strongly influenced by the lectures and discussions of Auburtin, who, along with his father-in-law Bouillaud (a student of Gall), believed that speech is mediated by the frontal lobes. According to Head (1926), Auburtin’s belief in this localization of speech was so strong that he offered to recant his faith in Gall’s localization doctrine if anyone could show him a patient with a loss of speech not associated with a lesion of the frontal lobes. In reaction to Auburtin’s statement, Paul Broca invited Auburtin to his hospital to see Leborgne, a patient who was recently admitted to the hospital because of
76 Heilman cellulitis of his leg, but Leborgne had a history of a stroke that induced speech loss and right hemiplegia. At the hospital, the patient was known as “Tan”, because this was the only word he could utter. When Auburtin saw this case with Broca, he agreed that the patient had a loss of speech and should have a lesion of the anterior lobes of the brain. Broca noted that although Tan was unable to speak or write, he was able to understand spoken language. About 6 days later, the patient died and a postmortem examination revealed a discrete lesion—approximately the size of an egg—in the left hemisphere. This lesion included inferior portions of the frontal lobe, portions of the insula, corpus striatum and the anterior superior temporal lobe. Broca presented this patient’s brain to members of the French Anthropology Society, citing this case as support for the localizationist postulates of Gall, Bouillaud, and Auburtin. According to Broca, the inability of this patient to speak was caused by a disorder of the special faculty of articulated language mediated by the frontal lobe. Broca termed this speech disorder aphemia. Subsequently, he observed another patient with a fractured femur who also suffered from aphemia. On postmortem examination, this patient also exhibited a lesion of the second and third frontal convolutions, providing further evidence for Gall’s localizationist postulate. Broca’s reports had a dramatic influence on thinking in Europe, including England, where he lectured and presented his findings. In 1864, Trousseau learned from a Greek physician that Broca’s term aphemia meant “infamous” and therefore suggested the term aphasia. Broca’s aphasia is now a well-recognized disorder. Patients with Broca’s aphasia present with a phonetic disintegration of speech (Alajouanine, Ombredane, & Durand (1939), whereas speech comprehension is relatively spared. Consequently, their speech is characterized by reduced fluency with frequent phonological errors. Patients with this type of aphasia demonstrate syntactic disorders in both expression and comprehension. Naming and repetition may be disturbed as well. Mohr, Pessin, Finkelstein, Funkenstein, Duncan, and Davis (1978) demonstrated that when patients’ lesions are confined to the inferior frontal operculum, including the pars triangularis and opercularis, their speech impairment is usually only temporary and that a larger lesion, involving the motor and insular cortex, as well as subcortical structures such as the basal ganglia, might be important in persistent aphasia. The observation that lesions restricted to the frontal operculum might not cause a persistent speech disorder does not, however, contradict Broca’s localization of this disorder but rather suggests that other areas may be able to compensate for the injured areas. Broca (1861) also observed several other patients that had a right-hand preference and aphasia associated with right hemiplegia. Based on these observations, Broca concluded that in people who prefer their right hand, speech is primarily mediated by the left hemisphere. These reports by Broca provided strong evidence that the human brain is organized in modular
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fashion, as Gall predicted, and subsequent studies of Broca’s area have also demonstrated that in patients who are left hemisphere dominant for speech, the Broca’s area on the left is larger than that on the right (Foundas et al., 1998), supporting Gall’s second postulate that bigger is better.
Wernicke’s information-processing model Wernicke’s aphasia Broca’s reports were probably the impetus for the increased interest in neuroanatomy that occurred in the second half of the nineteenth century. Meynert demonstrated that sensory input to the cerebral cortex predominantly projects to the posterior portions of the cortex, whereas the neuronal networks that control efferent-motor output are mainly anterior. Accordingly, Broca’s aphasia would be considered primarily an efferent disorder. In 1874, Carl Wernicke, one of Meynert’s students, wrote Der aphasische Symptomencomplex, probably the most influential paper on aphasia. In this paper, Wernicke contrasted Broca’s (motor) aphasia with a sensory type of aphasia that is currently called Wernicke’s aphasia. Unlike patients with Broca’s aphasia, who are nonfluent, patients with sensory aphasia are fluent. Some patients are so fluent that their speech may be characterized as logorrhea. These patients’ spontaneous speech contains not only phonological and semantic errors but also many pseudowords or nonwords, also called neologisms. Furthermore, the speech of patients with Wernicke’s aphasia may be entirely comprised of neologisms such that they may sound as if they are speaking a foreign language. Unlike patients with Broca’s aphasia, who can understand speech that does not exceed their working memory or syntactic abilities, patients with Wernicke’s aphasia suffer from a severe comprehension disorder. They also have naming and repetition deficits. Whereas patients with Broca’s aphasia have anterior perisylvian lesions, patients with Wernicke’s aphasia have posterior perisylvian lesions. Wernicke suggested that the critical area might be the posterior portion of the superior temporal lobe, a portion of the auditory association cortex. Wernicke stated that patients with sensory aphasia have lost the memory of how words sound. In the absence of this information store, now called the phonological lexicon, the words heard by these patients sound like a foreign language that they never learned. When attempting to name an object, they are unable to recall the set of speech sounds or phonemes that represent this object. They also have this same problem when attempting to speak spontaneously, being unable to activate the word representations that symbolize or express their thoughts. In patients with lesions restricted to Wernicke’s area, Broca’s area remains intact and able to produce phoneme sequences. As a result, these patients can speak, but the words used are not constrained by phonological-lexical knowledge. Consequently, these patients’ speech disorder is also often called jargon aphasia.
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In Wernicke’s classical paper, not only did he suggest a second speechlanguage module, but he was also the first to introduce an informationprocessing network when he suggested that the area that contains the memories of how words sound (the phonological lexicon or Wernicke’s area) provides information to other areas of the brain where the sounds that comprise these words are programmed (Broca’s area). Consequently, according to Wernicke, the posterior portion of the superior temporal gyrus must be anatomically connected to Broca’s area in the frontal operculum. Conduction aphasia In accord with his information-processing system (Figure 4.1), Wernicke further posited that if this connection between Broca’s area and the posterior portion of the superior temporal gyrus were disconnected by a lesion, the patient would also be aphasic. Since the phonological lexicon cannot entirely inform Broca’s area about the sound ( phonemic) composition of words, the production of words is impaired, resulting in phonological errors and neologisms. However, unlike the patients with sensory (Wernicke’s) aphasia who cannot monitor their errors, due to destruction of their phonological lexicon, patients with this disconnection disorder are able to monitor their errors and may attempt to correct them. In Wernicke’s hypothetical form of aphasia, the phonological lexicon has been disconnected from Broca’s area; therefore, according to this information-processing model, these patients should also
Figure 4.1 Wernicke’s model. A = pure word deafness (impaired comprehension and repetition, intact spontaneous speech, naming, and reading); B = Wernicke’s aphasia (fluent jargon with multiple phonemic errors, impaired comprehension, repetition, and naming); C = conduction aphasia (fluent with phonemic, paraphasic errors, impaired repetition, naming, and intact comprehension); D = Broca’s aphasia (nonfluent, impaired naming and repetition, and intact comprehension of major lexical items).
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have problems with repetition and naming. However, because they maintain an intact phonological lexicon, stored in the posterior portion of the superior temporal gyrus, they should be able to comprehend speech. After Wernicke suggested this new form of aphasia, patients who demonstrated this constellation of symptoms were reported, and the term currently used for this aphasic syndrome is conduction aphasia. Pure word deafness Bastian (1869) and Kussmaul (1877) described patients who were unable to comprehend speech or to repeat but who could name things and speak normally. As mentioned above, Meynert demonstrated that auditory input from the thalamus projects to the primary auditory cortex situated on the dorsal surface of the superior temporal gyrus. In addition to this, Wernicke posited that sensory aphasia is caused by a lesion of the auditory association cortex posterior to this primary auditory cortex. In accord with the information-processing model of Wernicke, the disorder described by Bastian (1869) and Kussmaul (1877), now called pure word deafness, is thought to be related to the inability of auditory information to access an intact Wernicke’s area.
Head’s diatribe against the “diagram makers” Although one of Wernicke’s most important contributions was the development of information-processing models, Henry Head (1926) dismissed both Wernicke and other investigators who used this information-processing approach as “diagram makers”. Head believed that the reports of these “diagram makers” were biased or even untruthful. For example, referring to Wernicke’s report, Head (1926) wrote, “No better example could be chosen of the manner in which the writers of this period were compelled to lop and twist their cases to fit the Procrustean bed of their hypotheses.” Instead of detracting from these early diagram makers’ observations, subsequent reports, by other clinicians, replicated these diagram makers’ clinical observations. In addition, the information-processing model approach first put forth by Wernicke and the other early diagram makers has been demonstrated to have strong heuristic value. Just as it helped Wernicke to predict conduction aphasia, the information-processing model may allow one to develop hypotheses about how the brain works and what type of dysfunction may be encountered with various brain lesions. In spite of Henry Head’s diatribe and admonitions, in the past three to four decades, there has been a renewed interest in using information-processing models to help explain cognitive deficits associated with aphasia and to develop new a priori hypotheses.
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Lichtheim’s model Eleven years after Wernicke’s influential report, a third landmark paper was written by Lichtheim (1885). In this paper, he reviewed the seminal contributions of Paul Broca (1861) and Carl Wernicke (1874) and proposed modifications to Wernicke’s schema (Figure 4.2). This new information-processing model or schema contained Wernicke’s arc, which includes the following: the primary auditory cortex, which performs the auditory analysis of the incoming auditory signals; the posterior superior temporal gyrus (Wernicke’s area), which stores memories of how words sound (now called the phonological lexicon); connections from Wernicke’s area to the anterior perisylvian region (Broca’s area), where word sounds are programmed (phonetic programmer); and projections from Broca’s area to the regions of the primary motor cortex that control the articulatory apparatus. According to Lichtheim, in addition to Wernicke’s arc, the speech cortex contains a region where concepts are elaborated: the conceptual or semantic field. Before describing the cases that Lichtheim thought would support this model, he explained how this system worked. According to Lichtheim, after auditory analysis, speech input is processed by Wernicke’s area (the phonological lexicon), where the representations of word sounds are activated.
Figure 4.2 Lichtheim’s modification of Wernicke’s model. Dysfunction at A, B, C, D, E, and F; see Figure 4.1. G or H = transcortical sensory aphasia; I = transcortical motor aphasia; G, H, and I = mixed transcortical aphasia.
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After phonological lexical activation, this information is transmitted to the area where concepts are elaborated (conceptual-semantic field). Repetition would take place as Wernicke has posited, via auditory analysis, phonological-lexical activation, and transmission of this lexical information through the arcuate fasciculus with activation of the motor-phonetic representations. These motor speech representations then activate the motor cortex. According to Lichtheim, spontaneous speech starts with activating concepts, which, in turn, activate the motor representations of speech sounds and then the motor cortex. According to Lichtheim’s model, and as suggested by Bastian and Kussmaul, a lesion that prevents auditory information from reaching the phonological lexicon would impair comprehension and repetition. Spontaneous speech, however, would be normal. As discussed above, this disorder has been termed pure word deafness. As demonstrated by Wernicke, damage to the phonological lexicon would produce Wernicke’s aphasia since word sound knowledge is important for verbal comprehension, spontaneous speech, naming, and repetition. Conduction aphasia with impaired repetition can be explained by disconnection between the phonological lexical representations, which contain word sound knowledge, and the phonetic motor representations, important in providing the articulatory programs to the motor cortex. This disconnection would not impair comprehension, since the lexical representations can still get access to the region where concepts are elaborated. Destruction of the motor phonetic representation of speech (Broca’s aphasia) would also not impair comprehension because word sounds ( phonological lexicon) can still access concepts, but would impair spontaneous speech, naming, and repetition because the phonetic-articulatory representations would not be available to program the motor cortex. Transcortical sensory aphasia From Lichtheim’s schema, two additional types of aphasic syndromes can be identified. If there is a functional disconnection between the phonological lexicon and the conceptual-semantic field, patients should not be able to comprehend, but, unlike patients with Wernicke’s aphasia, they should be able to repeat because Wernicke’s arc remains intact. To support his postulate, Lichtheim described a 60-year-old man who had impaired ability to understand but preserved ability to repeat; this now is a well-known syndrome called transcortical sensory aphasia. Transcortical motor aphasia Lichtheim’s schema also suggests that interruption between the area of concepts and motor phonetic representations should also produce nonfluent aphasia, which would be unlike Broca’s aphasia, because these patients should have normal repetition and should not make frequent phonological
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paraphasic errors, but, as in Broca’s aphasia, they would have relatively spared comprehension. Lichtheim provided evidence for the existence of this type of aphasia by presenting a patient who, after a carriage accident, could say only “yes” or “no”. Although this patient was nonfluent, he was able to comprehend well. Unlike patients with Broca’s aphasia, this patient, even early in the course of his disease, was able to repeat flawlessly. This disorder is known as transcortical motor aphasia.
Kussmaul’s model About 8 years before Lichtheim reported a patient with transcortical sensory aphasia, as well as his alteration of Wernicke’s model to account for this patient’s signs, Kussmaul (1877) also reported a patient who had impaired comprehension with intact repetition, and Kussmaul also posited an information-processing model similar to Lichtheim’s model. Kussmaul’s schema, however, differed from Lichtheim’s in that the area of concepts could gain access to the phonetic motor representations only via the phonological lexicon (Figure 4.3). After an experiment with a patient with Broca’s aphasia, however, Lichtheim rejected Kussmaul’s model. Lichtheim showed this patient objects and asked him to indicate by squeezing his hand the number of syllables of the word that denoted this object. He found that Broca’s aphasia patients could not adequately perform this task. According to Lichtheim’s model (Figure 4.2), conceptual representations cannot directly access the phonological lexicon. Therefore, after the object is seen and the area of concepts is activated, motor speech (phonetic) representations are activated in concert with activation of the phonological lexical representations. In Broca’s aphasia, the motor speech (phonetic) representations are degraded and, according to Lichtheim, patients are unable to detect how many syllables a word contains since they cannot access the phonological lexicon. In Kussmaul’s model, the seen objects activate the semantic conceptual representations, and these concept representations directly access the phonological lexicon. Therefore, according to Kussmaul’s model, patients with destruction of the motor speech ( phonetic) representations should have no difficulty in accessing the information stored in the phonological lexicon. Since the patients with Broca’s aphasia examined by Lichtheim appeared to be impaired at accessing the lexicon, he rejected Kussmaul’s model. According to Lichtheim’s model, when patients with Broca’s or conduction aphasia are presented with pairs of objects and have to determine whether the names of the two objects are phonologically identical (homophones versus nonhomophones), they should fail to do so. They should be impaired in this homophone test because lesions in Broca’s area or its connections to Wernicke’s area ( phonological lexicon) should prevent the conceptual field from accessing the phonological lexicon where word sounds are stored. Feinberg, Gonzalez-Rothi, and Heilman (1986), however, demonstrated that
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Figure 4.3 Kussmaul’s model. Dysfunction at E together with G and/or F induces the signs of transcortical aphasia, in which patients have impaired comprehension and naming, fluent but empty speech, and intact repetition. Unlike the patients with transcortical aphasia from dysfunction at F, patients with dysfunction (dissociation) at E and G have evidence of intact semanticconceptual representations. Patients with dysfunction at G have anomic aphasia, and those with dysfunction at E have transcortical aphasia with intact naming and speech.
patients with conduction aphasia can successfully perform homophone judgments on words that they cannot vocalize. The evidence that these patients can access their phonological lexicons argues against Lichtheim’s suggestion that semantic-conceptual representations access the phonological lexicon through Broca’s area, and instead appears to support Kussmaul’s model. Lichtheim’s model has two other possible flaws. According to this model, patients with a disconnection between the phonological lexicon and the area of concepts should be impaired in comprehending speech but should be able to repeat, just as he demonstrated in his case report of the patient with transcortical sensory aphasia. However, a detailed review of this case revealed that this patient used incorrect words and occasionally mutilated words. He also had problems with naming. According to Lichtheim’s model, the area of concepts has direct access to motor speech (phonetic) representations, and the motor representations can access the phonological lexicon. Since these three areas are intact and interconnected, this patient should have
84 Heilman had normal spontaneous speech and should have been able to name, but he was impaired. Anomic aphasia Lichtheim’s model cannot account for the patient with anomic aphasia whose word finding is impaired when speaking spontaneously and when attempting to name objects and actions that are presented visually or in other modalities (confrontation naming), but who has normal speech comprehension and repetition. Lichtheim was aware that his model could not account for anomic aphasia. He considered that the interruption of the pathway between the area of concepts and motor speech ( phonetic) representations could theoretically produce a defect in naming, but he had already stated that this defect causes decreased fluency with intact repetition (transcortical motor aphasia). Since Lichtheim realized that his model could not account for anomic aphasia, he tried to dispense with anomia as a specific aphasic subtype: “It seems to me questionable, however, to place amnesia [anomic aphasia] on a par with the other phenomena of aphasic disturbance.” Lichtheim was partly correct when he noted that anomia is often a residual of many different forms of aphasia, but it has also been clearly demonstrated that anomia, in isolation, can occur after a discrete lesion. Whereas patients with deficits in the semantic-conceptual field or in the phonological lexicon may be impaired in naming, patients with transcortical sensory aphasia and Wernicke’s aphasia have comprehension and repetition deficits. The patient with true isolated anomic aphasia displays normal comprehension and normal repetition. Unlike Lichtheim’s model, Kussmaul’s model contains reciprocal pathways from the phonological lexicon to the area of concepts or semantics, and from the area of concepts to the lexicon. A functional disconnection between semantics and the phonological lexicon in Kussmaul’s model may be the best explanation of pure anomic aphasia. Transcortical aphasia with intact naming This explanation of anomic aphasia, which is based on Kussmaul’s model, of Wernicke’s model, presumes that a patient can have a one-way disconnection or dissociation between the conceptual-semantic field and the phonological lexicon. If anomic aphasia is caused by the inability of the semantic field to access the lexicon with a preserved ability of the lexicon to access the semantic field, it should be possible to observe the occurrence of the opposite oneway dissociation. Heilman, Tucker, and Valenstein (1976) reported a patient with mixed transcortical aphasia who was nonfluent and had impaired comprehension but did have intact repetition and naming (mixed transcortical aphasia with intact naming). In addition, Heilman, Gonzalez-Rothi, McFarling, and Rottman (1981) reported a patient who had impaired comprehension, but intact repetition, naming, and spontaneous speech (transcortical
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sensory aphasia with intact naming and speech). These patients’ profiles suggest a one-way dissociation, such that the phonological lexicon cannot access the semantic-conceptual representations, but these conceptual-semantic representations can access the phonological lexicon.
Modified Wernicke–Kussmaul–Lichtheim model The transcortical motor aphasias: adynamic aphasia, speech akinesia, and spontaneous speech anomia Kussmaul’s model, unlike Lichtheim’s, can explain almost all the traditional aphasic syndromes, including transcortical sensory aphasia (impaired comprehension, naming, and spontaneous speech with intact repetition), as a functional disconnection between the phonological lexicon (Wernicke’s area) and the conceptual-semantic field or a destruction of the conceptual-semantic representations. Kussmaul’s model also can account for other disorders such as pure anomic aphasia and transcortical sensory aphasia with intact naming and speech. However, this model cannot account for transcortical motor aphasia, in which patients have nonfluent speech with normal comprehension and repetition. When patients have transcortical motor aphasia, their brain injuries are most commonly in the medial and dorsolateral frontal lobe (superior to Broca’s area) in addition to subcortical lesions (as in the medial thalamus). The medial and dorsolateral frontal lobe, including the anterior cingulate gyrus together with the basal ganglia and thalamus, forms what we have termed an intentional system. As described by Nielsen (1951), bilateral damage to these areas is associated with akinetic mutism, and it appears that lesions to these areas that are restricted to the left side are associated with transcortical motor aphasia (Rubens, 1975). There appear to be three different types of transcortical motor aphasia. The first type is characterized by inability to activate the semantic-conceptual network (adynamic aphasia), and the second type by deficit of motor speech activation (speech akinesia or extrasylvian motor aphasia type II of Benson). Recently, we have observed what might be a third type that we call “spontaneous speech anomia”. Nonfluency is the major sign of all three of these disorders, but, unlike patients with Broca’s aphasia, patients with all these forms of transcortical motor aphasia show normal repetition. Whereas patients with adynamic aphasia may be mildly impaired at naming to confrontation, those with speech akinesia and spontaneous speech anomia name normally or almost normally when presented with objects and asked to name them. Patients with spontaneous speech anomia have difficulty in word finding when attempting to speak spontaneously, but those with akinesia of speech have little or nothing to say. These three forms of aphasia with reduced fluency and intact repetition might be best distinguished by different forms of fluency testing. Patients with adynamic aphasia have a greater decrease in fluency when performing the
86 Heilman category fluency tests (in 1 minute, name as many different animals as you can) than when performing the letter-phoneme fluency test (name as many words that begin with the letter f as you can in 1 minute). In contrast, patients with spontaneous speech anomia are more impaired with letter-phoneme fluency than category fluency. Patients with speech akinesia have a severe reduction of fluency with both tests and often show a dramatic reduction of output in the second 30 s of these fluency tests (cognitive impersistence). Benson and Ardila (1996) suggest that adynamic aphasia is associated with dorsolateral frontal lesions (superior to Broca’s area), whereas speech akinesia is more frequently observed in patients with medial frontal lesions. The patients that we have seen with spontaneous speech anomia appear to have early semantic dementia, a form of frontal-temporal lobar degeneration that is most often associated with left anterior temporal lobe atrophy. Our modification of the Wernicke–Kussmaul–Lichtheim model is illustrated in Figure 4.4. As indicated by this diagram, damage to the intentional system and its interactions with the output lexicon induces spontaneous speech anomia with impaired letter-phoneme fluency. In contrast, damage to the intentional system and its interaction with semantics induces adynamic aphasia with impaired category fluency, and damage to the intentional system and its connection with the motor speech areas causes akinesia of speech. Deep dysphasia There is an additional problem with both the Lichtheim (Figure 4.2) and Kussmaul (Figure 4.3) models. Several investigators have described a rare aphasic disorder called deep dysphasia (Katz & Goodglass, 1990). These patients’ speech strongly resembles that of patients with conduction aphasia. However, unlike patients with classic conduction aphasia, who primarily produce phonological errors when attempting to repeat, these patients make semantic errors, saying good, well-formed words, but not the correct words. In addition, patients with deep dysphasia cannot repeat nonwords. Although none of the models we discussed above can explain this syndrome, a further modification of the Wernicke–Lichtheim–Kussmaul’s model can account for deep dysphasia. There is some evidence that the phonological lexicon might be composed of two separate but connected modules, a phonological input lexicon that is important in word recognition and a phonological output lexicon important in word production (Figure 4.4). This separation of the input and output phonological lexicons may explain the two different forms of conduction aphasia. One form may be caused by a functional dissociation between the phonological input and output lexicons. The second form may be caused by a degradation of the phonological output lexicon or a functional dissociation between the phonological output lexicon and Broca’s area. According to our modification of the Wernicke–Kussmaul–Lichtheim model, the degradation
Figure 4.4 Modified Wernicke–Kussmaul–Lichtheim schema. Locus of dysfunction. A = pure word deafness ( patients can spontaneously speak and name, but cannot understand speech or repeat speech). B, C, and D = Wernicke’s aphasia (patients are fluent, make phonological errors and neologisms, and have impaired comprehension, repetition, and naming). D, and E = conduction aphasia (patients are fluent but make phonological errors; they can comprehend (A, B, H, and I), but cannot normally repeat or name). C = deep dysphasia (this disorder is similar to conduction aphasia except patients make semantic errors and cannot repeat nonwords; patients repeat by pathway A, B, H, I, M, D, E, F, and G). F = Broca’s aphasia (nonfluent, phonemic errors, impaired repetition, and naming but intact comprehension (A, B, H, and I). I = transcortical sensory aphasia (patients have semantic jargon output (D, E, F, and G) and cannot comprehend or name, but can repeat (A, B, C, D, E, F, and G). G = aphemia ( patients are nonfluent, and impaired at repetition and naming, but can comprehend and write). M = anomic aphasia ( patients are fluent with circumlocution, impaired naming with intact repetition (A, B, C, D, E, F, and G), and comprehension (A, B, H, and I); patients name and speak by using pathway I, Q, and F). N = optic aphasia ( patients are impaired at naming visually presented object, but can describe objects via pathway L, K, I, M, D, E, F, and G; patents can also comprehend (A, B, H, and I), repeat (A, B, C, D, E, F, and G) and speak normally (L, M, D, E, F, and G)). K and I = nonoptic aphasia ( patients name objects by pathway L, N, D, E, and F, but cannot name to definition because of degradation of the semantic field). J = adynamic aphasia ( patients do not initiate speech or carry on a conversation, but can understand speech, repeat, and name); patients with milder defects in the system might have reduced semantic-category fluency, but have normal or better letter-phoneme fluency (e.g. Controlled Oral Word Association test). O = speech akinesia (not an aphasic disorder; patients might be hypophonic and have palillia). P = patients with disorder might not appear aphasic, but are impaired in letter-phoneme fluency test (Controlled Oral Word Fluency Test).
88 Heilman of the phonological output lexicon or a functional disconnection between the phonological output lexicon and Broca’s area causes the traditional type of conduction aphasia, in which lexical (word)-phonological information has a reduced influence on Broca’s area, which is important in the selection of the phonetic sequence programs used in speech. Thus, patients with this traditional form of conduction aphasia make phonological paraphasic errors when repeating, naming, and speaking spontaneously. In contrast, when patients with a functional disconnection between the phonological input and output lexicons attempt to repeat, since their input lexicon cannot directly access their output lexicon, they might attempt to use an alternative route. According to the modified Wernicke–Kussmaul– Lichtheim model illustrated in Figure 4.4, after incoming speech is processed in the input lexicon, where word recognition takes place, this information then can access the semantic-conceptual field, where word meanings are derived. These semantic-conceptual representations could then access the output lexicon and then Broca’s area, which can program speech output. Since the semantic field codes meanings and concepts, but not phonology, the use of this indirect route might lead to the semantic paraphasic errors associated with deep dysphasia. For example, when a patient with deep dysphasia is asked to repeat the word “sea”, the phonological representation, activated in the input lexicon, may activate the neuronal network that represents the concept of a large body of water. Subsequently, when the neuronal network in the semantic-conceptual field that represents a large body of water accesses the output lexicon, it might activate other lexical representations of large bodies of water such as “ocean”, and therefore the patient with this disorder who is asked to repeat “sea” might say “ocean” rather than “sea”. When normal people are asked to repeat a nonword, they usually can perform this task without difficulty. Throughout life, people hear new words and are often able to learn these words even after one presentation. This observation suggests that both the input and output lexicons can rapidly learn the phoneme sequences that constitute words. Thus, when asked to repeat nonwords, normal people might rapidly learn these nonwords, and in normal people the repetition of nonwords might require the use of the same system as for real words. If patients with a disconnection between the input and output lexicons are asked to repeat real words, they might be able to repeat correctly many of these words, but make occasional semantic paraphasic errors. When they are asked, however, to repeat nonwords, since there is no semantic representation for nonwords, they should not be able to repeat nonwords, and patients with deep dysphasia are severely impaired at repeating nonwords.
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Two forms of transcortical sensory aphasia: asemantic transcortical sensory aphasia and isolation transcortical sensory aphasia According to the modified Wernicke–Kussmaul–Lichtheim model (Figure 4.4), anomic aphasia is induced by inability of the conceptual-semantic representations to access the phonological output lexicon, and transcortical sensory aphasia with intact naming and spontaneous speech is induced by inability of the phonological input lexicon to access the semantic-conceptual field. Transcortical sensory aphasia is induced by either degradation of the semantic-conceptual field or isolation of these representations from both the phonological input and output lexicons. These two forms of transcortical sensory aphasia could be dissociated by nonverbal tests of semantics where, on each trial, the patient attempts to distinguish semantically related objects (from foils). Failure on the test suggests deterioration of the semantic conceptual representations and thus asemantic transcortical sensory aphasia. Good performance on this test suggests the relative preservation, but isolation, of semantic-conceptual representations (Heilman, Tucker, & Valenstein, 1976) that we call isolation transcortical aphasia. Optic and nonoptic aphasia Optic aphasia is another aphasic syndrome for which the Wernicke, Kussmaul, and Lichtheim models cannot account. This disorder was first described by Freund (1889), who reported a patient with right hemianopia that was unable to name objects presented in the visual modality, but could correctly name objects presented in other modalities. In addition, whereas patients with optic aphasia cannot name objects in the visual modality, they can describe and pantomime the use of these objects, suggesting that visual object recognition units can access the semantic-conceptual field, and hence that these patients do not have visual agnosia. Intact naming of objects presented in the tactile and auditory modalities suggests that semantic-conceptual representations have access to the phonological output lexicon. Freund thought this disorder was caused by a disconnection between the visual areas in the occipital lobe and the speech areas in the left hemisphere important for naming. Based on Freund’s postulate, this dissociation could be accounted for on the modified Wernicke–Kussmaul–Lichtheim schema (Figure 4.4) by a functional dissociation between the portion of the brain that contains object recognition units and the phonological output lexicon. This direct, nonsemantic route between object recognition units and the phonological lexicon might also allow people to learn pseudonames for pseudo-objects. Unlike the patients with optic aphasia who can name objects when they are verbally defined, but are impaired when naming seen objects, patients with nonoptic aphasia can name visually presented objects, but cannot name the same objects when a definition of these objects is presented to them (Shuren, Geldmacher, & Heilman, 1993). Since patients with this disorder are able to
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name visually presented objects, their object recognition units are able to access their phonological output lexicon, and this intact lexicon can access Broca’s area. Since these patients’ repetition is intact, the pathway, primary auditory cortex → phonological input lexicon → phonological output lexicon → Broca’s area-motor cortex, is also intact. These patients’ spontaneous speech is characterized by semantic jargon, and they also have poor comprehension. Naming to definition, comprehension, and normal speech all require intact semantic-conceptual representations, and thus these patients’ nonoptic aphasia is probably caused by degradation of their semanticconceptual representations.
Parallel distributed processing (PDP) The information-processing model illustrated in Figure 4.4 can explain almost all known aphasic syndromes. However, this model does not describe how information in these processing modules is stored, although it does explain how these modules interact and communicate. Nadeau (2001) proposed a parallel, distributed processing model based on the Wernicke– Lichtheim information-processing model. In Nadeau’s model, the acoustic module that is akin to Wernicke’s area contains a large number of units that represent the acoustic features of phonemes, and Broca’s area, or what Nadeau calls the articulatory module, contains units that represent discrete articulatory features of speech. Within these language-speech modules, all representations correspond to specific patterns of activity of all the units contained in this module. In addition, each of the units in these modules is connected to the units of other modules, and the entire set of connections between any two modules forms, what has been termed a pattern associator network. During the learning of a language, information is stored by alterations in the strength of the connections between units both within and between modules. For example, the meaning of a spoken word is mediated by the connections between the acoustic module that determines the phonemic structure of the heard word and the module that contains the features of the concept.
Summary This chapter reviews the aphasic syndromes, using both a historic and an information-processing or cognitive diagrammatic modeling approach. The classical information-processing models and diagrams of the Wernicke, Kussmaul, and Lichtheim have been modified to account for more recently described disorders, such as transcortical sensory aphasia with intact spontaneous speech and naming, deep dysphasia, and nonoptic aphasia. In addition to introducing additional modules and connections to the classical Wernicke, Kussmaul, and Lichtheim models, such as an input and output phono-
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logical lexicon, this revised model suggests that there are many parallel processing systems or routes, and parallel processing in normal people might help constrain perturbations (noise) in these systems. Although the revised Wernicke–Kussmaul–Lichtheim model presented here helps us to understand many of the signs and symptoms associated with a variety of aphasic syndromes, it is far from complete, and future research is needed to gain a better understanding of the means by which the brain mediates language and what happens in brain dysfunction.
References Alajouanine, T., Ombredane, A., & Durand, M. (1939). Le Syndrome de la désintégration phonétique dans l’aphasie. Paris: Masson. Bastian, H. C. (1869). Aphasia and other speech defects. London: H. K. Lewis. Broca, P. (1861). Remarques sur le siège de la faculté du language articulé, suivies d’une observation d’aphémie. Bulletin de la Société Anatomique de Paris, 2, 330–357. Feinberg, T. E., Gonzalez-Rothi, L. J., & Heilman, K. M. (1986). “Inner speech” in conduction aphasia. Archives of Neurology, 43, 591–593. Foundas, A. L., Eure, K. F., Luevano, L. F., & Weinberger, D. R. (1998). MRI asymmetries of Broca’s area: The pars triangularis and pars opercularis. Brain and Language, 64, 282–296. Freund, C. S. (1889). Ueber optische Aphasie und Seelenblindheit. Archiv für Psychiatrie und Nervenkhrankheiten, 20, 276–297. Head, H. (1926). Aphasia and kindred disorders of speech (vol. 1, ch. 4, pp. 54–60). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Heilman, K. M. (2006). Aphasia and the diagram makers revisited: An update of information processing models. Journal of Clinical Neurology, 2, 149–162. Heilman, K. M., Gonzalez-Rothi, L. J., McFarling, D., & Rottman, A. (1981). Transcortical sensory aphasia with relatively spared spontaneous speech in naming. Archives of Neurology, 38, 236–239. Heilman, K. M., Tucker, D. M., & Valenstein, E. (1976). A case of mixed transcortical aphasia with intact naming. Brain, 99, 415–525. Jacobs, D. H., Shuren, J., Gold, M. Adair, J. C., Bowers, D., Williamson, D. J. G., et al. (1996). Physostigmine pharmacotherapy for anomia. Neurocase, 2, 83–91. Katz, R. B., & Goodglass, H. (1990). Deep dysphasia: Analysis of a rare form of repetition disorder. Brain and Language, 39, 153–185. Kussmaul, A. (1877). Die Störungen der Sprache. Leipzig: Vogel. Lichtheim, L. (1885). On aphasia. Brain, 7, 433–484. Mohr, J. P., Pessin, M. S., Finkelstein, S., Funkenstein, H. H., Duncan, G. W., & Davis, K. R. (1978). Broca aphasia: Pathologic and clinical. Neurology, 28, 311–324. Nadeau, S. E. (2001). Phonology: A review and proposals from a connectionist perspective. Brain and Language, 79, 511–579. Nielsen, J. M. (1951). The cortical components of akinetic mutism. Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases, 114, 459–461. Rubens, A. B. (1975). Aphasia with infarction in the territory of the anterior cerebral artery. Cortex, 11, 239–250.
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Shuren, J., Geldmacher D., & Heilman, K. M. (1993). Non-optic aphasia. Neurology, 43, 1900–1907. Wernicke, C. (1874). Der aphasische Symptomencomplex. Breslau: Cohn and Weigart.
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The impact of right-hemisphere lesions on language abilities Theoretic and clinical perspectives Yves Joanette, Ana Inés Ansaldo, Karima Kahlaoui, and André Roch Lecours1
Acquired language impairments following a brain lesion—aphasia—are usually the consequence of a left-hemisphere lesion (Lecours & Lhermitte, 1979). This fact has been known since the nineteenth century. First, came the unpublished, early, but intelligent, observations of a young surgeon, Marc Dax (1836/1865), who treated young soldiers with and without acquired language impairments after saber blows on the left or right side. However, the first published position paper concerning the relationship between language and the left hemisphere is attributed to Paul Broca (1865). Broca clearly stated that the same hemisphere was responsible for the dominant hand and for language, thus linking language abilities and the left hemisphere in righthanders. This statement proved to be largely, but not entirely, true. First, it rapidly became obvious that Broca’s statement only applied to right-handers. The neurobiological bases of language in left-handers and ambidextrals follow other rules that are still unclear, such that a majority of left-handers will become aphasic following a left-hemisphere lesion (Joanette, 1989). Second, there is a small, but measurable, proportion of right-handers in whom language representation appears to depend heavily upon the right hemisphere, as exemplified by the occurrence of crossed aphasia (Bramwell, 1899; Joanette, 1989). Professor Luigi Vignolo contributed significantly to this literature on crossed aphasia. He published the first MRI-ascertained case of crossed aphasia (Faglia & Vignolo, 1990) and contributed to a thorough and critical review of published cases (Faglia, Rottoli, & Vignolo, 1990; Mariën, Engelborghs, Vignolo, & De Deyn, 2001). More than anyone else, Vignolo and his colleagues have made it clear that crossed aphasics’ brain organization does not mirror that usually seen in right-handers, since a righthemisphere lesion frequently affects both language and visuo-spatial abilities (Paghera, Mariën, & Vignolo, 2003). His interest in crossed aphasia has extended until recently, as he has contributed to an impressive and critical review of all cases of crossed aphasia, including some important methodological recommendations for future studies (Mariën, Paghera, De Deyn, &
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Vignolo, 2004). However, even if one limits oneself to right-handers—and to non-exceptional right-handers at that—Paul Broca’s statement is still only partially true. The goal of this chapter is to describe the theoretical aspects and clinical implications of the right hemisphere’s contribution to language abilities, and the impact on communicative abilities of a lesion in that hemisphere. The exclusion of any role for the right hemisphere in language and communication lasted for approximately a century. The recognition of the right hemisphere’s importance to language was due to the clever clinical observations of a limited number of pioneers. Jon Eisenson (1959, 1962) was the first to suspect that right-handers with an acquired lesion in the right hemisphere that did not result in crossed aphasia proper still exhibited “subtle” language impairments, namely at the lexicosemantic level. These findings were immediately supported by Ed Weinstein (1964) and Macdonald Critchley (1962), and a series of clinical observations of the impact of right-hemisphere lesions on some components of language followed. At the same time, there was a growing interest in the linguistic capacities of the isolated right hemisphere, as described in the early cases of split-brain patients (e.g. Code & Joanette, 2003; Sperry & Gazzaniga, 1967). Once again, Luigi Vignolo made a seminal contribution to this question. With his student François Boller, he was the first to use a systematic evaluation procedure developed for aphasia, this time applied to nonaphasic, right-hemisphere-damaged (RHD) individuals (Boller & Vignolo, 1966). Some years later, Vignolo was also among the first to compare left- and right-hemisphere-damaged individuals on phonological and semantic tasks (Faglioni, Spinnler, & Vignolo, 1969). However, as was the case with Jon Eisenson (1959, 1962), Weinstein (1964), and Critchley (1962), Vignolo’s descriptions of the impact of a right-hemisphere lesion on language abilities suffered from the lack of the kind of theoretical framework required to describe fully these impacts: not only were the models of the components of language known at that time limited (e.g. semantic processing of words), but some of the components of language recognized nowadays had not even been thought of (such as discourse processing or pragmatic abilities). Consequently, the impact on language of a righthemisphere lesion was referred to by “impressionistic” concepts, such as “superordinary” aspects of language (Eisenson, 1962), or “latent aphasia” (Boller & Vignolo, 1966). Nevertheless, these contributions were of paramount importance for the field to develop. This chapter offers a summary of the impact of a right-hemisphere lesion on language and communication as recognized now, and discusses the clinical implications of the contributions made in the last 40 years, since the first descriptions by the pioneers, including Luigi Vignolo.
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Language impairments following a right-hemisphere lesion in right-handedness: a description Since the seminal contributions of the pioneers, numerous studies have allowed us to clarify the right hemisphere’s contribution to language processing. There is, however, a distinction to be made between studies reporting on the right hemisphere’s capacity to process language, and studies describing its actual contribution to language abilities (Joanette & Goulet, 1994, 1998). Studies looking at language and the right hemisphere first focused on its linguistic potential, as explored in experimental or quasi-experimental conditions (as in split-brain patients, individuals with anatomical or pharmacological left-hemisphere knockouts). These studies generated myriads of other studies looking at the right hemisphere’s linguistic potential in young adults—usually undergraduates—using the technique of divided visual-field tachistoscopic presentation or, to a lesser degree, dichotic listening presentation (for a review, see Joanette, Goulet, & Hannequin, 1990). The vast majority of these studies used single-word presentations. Taken together, these studies show that the isolated right hemisphere does have the potential to process meaning more than form (such as phonological aspects) of isolated words, and particularly when these words are frequent, concrete, and imageable. However, these studies reveal only that the right hemisphere has some linguistic potential; none of them can demonstrate that this potential is actually necessary for word processing when the left hemisphere is intact (Joanette & Goulet, 1994). Moreover, most of these studies say very little about the right hemisphere’s capacity to process components of language that go beyond the isolated word or sentence, such as discourse or pragmatic components. This is why the most relevant information about the actual contribution of the right hemisphere to language comes from other studies, namely those reporting discrete language impairments following a right-hemisphere lesion, as well as the most recent ones using functional neuroimaging. A number of studies have analyzed the nature of the impact of righthemisphere lesions on language and communicative abilities (Code, 1987; Joanette et al., 1990; Myers, 1999; Tompkins, 1995). The following sections offer a condensed review of the possible impacts of such a lesion. This description benefits from the increasing availability of theoretical frameworks allowing the description of some of these impacts, which were only vaguely described by the pioneers. For instance, the major developments regarding discourse-level processing (e.g. Joanette & Brownell, 1990) now make possible better description and understanding of the impact of such lesions on the ability to process narrative or other types of discourse. In general, it can be said that the occurrence of a right-hemisphere lesion may result in impairments in four different components of language: prosody, semantic processing of words, discourse, and pragmatic abilities. This is, of course, notwithstanding the fact that the same lesion may also significantly affect other cognitive abilities, as is the case when apraxia or spatial neglect is
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present. In the latter case, spatial neglect can determine the presence of what is clinically known as spatial type alexia and/or agraphia (Hécaen & Marcie, 1974). In those individuals, there may be an important interference with reading abilities, while writing can be characterized by the restricted use of the right hemi-page, the lack of horizontality, and the presence of duplicated strokes (e.g. “n” written as “m” and “i” as “u”). Prosody Prosody is the component of language that refers to the cognitive processing needed to understand or express communicative intent by the suprasegmental aspects of speech. These include variations in intonation, pauses, and modulations of vocal intensity. In this chapter, a basic distinction will be made between linguistic and emotional prosody. While the latter allows speakers to express their own emotion about the message, or to process that of the interlocutor, the former is more directly linked to a number of phenomena which operate directly on the linguistic message itself. Linguistic prosody can itself be divided into three phenomena: •
•
•
Lexical stress, which operates at the phoneme/syllable level and, in many languages—including English—makes possible the appropriate expression of a lexeme or the semantic disambiguation of two phonologically similar words (as in ímport versus impórt). This particular aspect of linguistic prosody does not have the same semantic implications in a language, such as French, in which all words have their lexical stress on the same syllable (the final one, in French). Emphatic stress, which operates at the syllable/word level and allows the speaker to emphasize a specific piece of information, usually corresponding to a word (e.g. Paul is eating a lizard versus Paul is eating a lizard ). Modalities, which operate at the sentence level and allow the speaker to express complementary communicative information such as the status of the sentence-based communicative intent (e.g. “The door is open.” versus “The door is open?”).
Many studies have allowed the description of the possible impairments of prosody in RHD individuals, and have compared them with those that can be found in a left-hemisphere lesion. The most characteristic prosodic impairments in RHD individuals involve the processing of emotional prosody and of modality. The fact that emotional prosody can be impaired in RHD individuals is certainly no surprise, given the known contribution of the right hemisphere to the processing of emotions in general (Borod et al., 1996). Recent studies using functional neuroimaging confirm the right hemisphere’s role in the processing of emotions (e.g. Mitchell et al., 2003). However, the fact that RHD individuals may also exhibit impairments in the processing of
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modalities testifies to the existence of a purely linguistic prosodic deficit in these individuals. For example, our group has already encountered an RHD individual in whom the only impairment was to report and express in a declarative modality all types of modalities (e.g. orders, questions) (Théroux, 1987). When such impairments exist, they are referred to as aprosodia or dysprosodia. Ross’s (1981) suggestion that such prosodic impairments mirror in their taxonomy and lesion localization the different clinical types of aphasia has not proven to be either empirically confirmed or clinically useful. Prosodic impairments in individuals with left-hemisphere lesions appear to be qualitatively different from those reported in RHD individuals, as they frequently interfere with the ability to process lexical stress. In this case, as is true of many components of cognition, the role of each hemisphere appears to be complementary, supporting the idea of interhemispheric cooperation (Sergent, 1994). In fact, apart from the emotional content itself, it looks as if a right-hemisphere lesion interferes with the processing of those aspects of prosody that arise from suprasyllable or word processing, as is the case with modality. This would be consistent with the right hemisphere’s suspected superiority in the processing of large time-scale acoustic events. Indeed, studies looking at the processing of melodic curves as a component of musical abilities also point to the privileged role of the right hemisphere (e.g. Peretz & Babaï, 1992). In summary, impairments of prosody may be the result of either a right- or a left-hemisphere lesion. However, the prosodic impairments in RHD individuals appear to be more specific to the processing of emotional prosody, as well as large time-scale-based prosodic components such as modalities. Semantic processing of words A fair number of studies have looked at the impact of a right-hemisphere lesion on word processing. Most looked at written-word comprehension, while a limited number described impairments on the expressive side. Briefly, such impairments affect the semantic processing of words more than their formal (such as phonological or morphological) dimensions, and they appear to affect particularly words that are infrequent, abstract or nonimageable (Joanette et al., 1990). Since this description may express impairments in the most resource-demanding types of word processing (see below), the quest for possible impairments that are specific to a right-hemisphere lesion has been intense. Two examples of word-processing impairments that may be characteristic of a right-hemisphere lesion are described below. Difficulty in the processing of the alternative metaphorical meanings of polysemic words (Brownell et al., 1990; Gagnon et al., 2003) Convergent observations tend to indicate that a right-hemisphere lesion may result in an impairment of the processing of the alternative metaphorical
98 Joanette et al. meanings of polysemic words. For example, RHD individuals may have more difficulty in perceiving the alternative metaphorical meaning “love” of the polysemic word warm (the literal associate being temperature), as compared to the alternative nonmetaphorical meaning “student” of the polysemic word pupil (the literal associate being eye) (examples taken from Brownell et al., 1990). Although care was taken to eliminate the possibility that the problem might simply be a general difficulty in the processing of any alternative meanings (Brownell et al., 1990), there is still some doubt whether this impairment is specific to RHD individuals (Gagnon et al., 2003). It remains the case, however, that the processing of the alternative metaphorical meanings of polysemic words is frequently presented as an example of a specific word-processing impairment following a right-hemisphere lesion. Tendency to activate low-predictability semantic relationships in word production tasks (Le Blanc & Joanette, 1996) It is well known that a right-hemisphere lesion interferes with normal performance on a verbal fluency (or word-naming) task. Numerous studies have suggested that RHD individuals perform worse than matched controls on word-naming tasks in which the production criterion is semantic (such as “animals”) but not when it is orthographic (as in words starting with the letter l; Cardebat et al., 1990; Goulet et al., 1997; Joanette & Goulet, 1986; Koivisto & Laine, 1999). Such an impairment appears, moreover, to be more frequent when the production criterion is particularly productive; that is, it allows for a large number of items (animals versus birds). However, none of these characterizations appear to be specific to a right-hemisphere lesion. In looking for such an impairment, one study that used an unconstrained oral naming paradigm suggested that the production of low-predictability items (items that were rated as having a low degree of prototypicality with regard to the natural semantic cluster in which they were produced) might be the only specific impairment characterizing the oral naming of RHD individuals (Le Blanc & Joanette, 1996). This characteristic of RHD individuals may express a lesser lateral inhibition in the semantic activation pattern of RHD individuals, a tendency which could be coherent with RHD individuals’ general tendency to produce tangential discourse (e.g. Gardner et al., 1983). According to some theoretical frameworks, there are a number of other possible semantic impairments that might be shown specifically to characterize individuals with a right-hemisphere lesion. Although at this point they are still unproven, the following examples represent theory-based expected specific impairments in RHD individuals. Only future studies will indicate whether such expected specific impairments are indeed found in RHD individuals.
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Depth/spread of activation and coarseness of coding hypotheses (Beeman, 1998; Chiarello, 1998) According to these two related hypotheses, the neural networks sustained by the right hemisphere do not semantically process words in the same way as those in the left hemisphere. The right hemisphere processes the semantics of words in a more shallow and less focal manner, using a coarse (versus finegrained) coding strategy. For example, the activation of a given semantic node would result in less focused activation propagation in the right hemisphere, thus favoring the activation of categorical—cohyponymic—relationships as a result of the left-hemisphere activation, and remotely associated functional— experiential—links in the right hemisphere (Chiarello, 1998). A different way of referring to a somewhat similar distinction is Beeman’s (1998) suggestion that the right hemisphere processes the semantics of words through a coarse semantic coding process, while the left hemisphere uses fine-grained coding. If these two hypotheses (or one of them) are right, then a right-hemisphere lesion would be distinguished by a greater impact on the individual’s ability to perform on functional, as opposed to categorical, semantic links. However, it should be mentioned here that any such prediction is very daring, since it is very difficult to predict a putatively specific impairment on the basis of a greater potential noted in the normal brain dynamics (Joanette & Goulet, 1994). Time-course hypothesis (Burgess & Simpson, 1988; Koivisto, 1997) A second hypothesis represents to some extent the right hemisphere’s superior processing of large time-scale acoustic events, as described above. According to the results obtained by these authors, the propagation of the activation in the semantic network sustained by the left hemisphere appears to activate both closely and remotely linked nodes. However, this activation is probably relatively brief as compared to that sustained by the right hemisphere, in which the activation of distantly related information starts later, but lasts longer. Thus, the right hemisphere is characterized by the fact that the semantic activation it sustains allows for longer-lasting activation of more remote nodes in a smaller number. Again, if anything can be predicted about the impact of a right-hemisphere lesion, it could be expected that such a lesion would interfere most with longer-lasting activation, particularly of remotely linked semantic nodes. Inter-/intraconceptual hypothesis (Drews, 1987; Nocentini et al., 2001) Another way of referring to a similar view of the right hemisphere’s semantic characteristics has been proposed in reference to the nature of semantic relationships (Drews, 1987). According to Drews, the right hemisphere is particularly efficient in the activation of interconceptual links (that is, functional and
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experiential), while the left hemisphere is more efficient at activating intraconceptual links (that is, categorical). Measuring the inter- versus intraconceptual sensitivities between left-hemisphere-damaged and RHD individuals, Nocentini et al. (2001) obtained results that only partially support this prediction. More studies are needed to verify this hypothesis, as well as the three others described here. The possibility that some impairments of the semantic processing of words might be specific to RHD individuals does not mean that an acquired righthemisphere lesion would not also have some nonspecific impacts. Indeed, many of the “subtle” impairments noted in RHD individuals’ language and communication abilities could also express the impact of limited access to or availability of cognitive resources (Joanette & Goulet, 1998; Monetta & Champagne, 2004; Monetta & Joanette, 2001, 2003). Although still unproven, the hypothesis that limited access to cognitive resources might account, at least in part, for the impaired semantic processing of words by RHD individuals is indirectly supported by the fact that some impairment patterns presumed to be specific to RHD individuals have been reproduced in normal individuals whose cognitive resources were temporarily limited by a dual-task condition (Monetta et al., 2003). In summary, the integrity of the right hemisphere of right-handers appears crucial to the full semantic processing of words. A number of word semantic impairments following a right-hemisphere lesion have been described. It is not certain, however, which of those are specific to a right-hemisphere lesion—a limitation that does not diminish the fact that RHD individuals have to live with some of these impairments. There is also a possibility that these impairments, as well as those of the discourse and pragmatic components, also reflect the fact that a right-hemisphere lesion is responsible for limited resource availability, a condition resembling that observed in left-hemispheredamaged, aphasic individuals (e.g. McNeil, Odell, & Tseng, 1991). Discourse abilities Discourse impairments, whether receptive or expressive, represent one of the possible manifestations of communicative impairments in individuals suffering from a right-hemisphere lesion (Joanette et al., 1990). RHD individuals’ conversation has been described as inappropriate in its context and its form (such as turn-taking), with tangential topic shifts, and an overall feeling of lack of appreciation of the gist of the communicative exchange, as well as a lack of reaction to unexpected content (such as humor). However, more systematic descriptions of RHD discourse impairments have been made with regard to narrative discourse abilities, essentially because of the availability of more comprehensive theoretical frameworks (Brownell & Joanette, 1993; Frederiksen et al., 1990). The narrative abilities of RHD individuals have been examined in many ways. Although available, the formal aspects of RHD narratives (such as
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noun/verb ratio) have not been the focus of much attention, since a righthemisphere lesion definitely affects the content (semantic) more than the form of communication. Thus, the most relevant descriptions of RHD discourse refer to its organization and its semantic content. These studies have pointed to a number of possible characteristics, briefly summarized here (e.g. Joanette et al., 1986; Stemmer & Joanette, 1998). •
• •
a tendency to produce incoherent discourse expressed through erroneous or absent anaphoric references, a tendency to digress or to shift tangentially on a topic, and an absence of topic/theme progression and/or relation impoverished informative content in terms of the quantity of information conveyed with reference to a given quantity of words/sentences difficulty in processing some types of inferences, particularly bridging inferences (such as inferences allowing the reinterpretation of a narrative with reference to the global framework, such as the reinterpretation of a narrative of an accident in the more global framework of a dream, as indicated by late-arriving information).
It is important to mention that the narrative discourse impairments described in RHD individuals do not appear to be pathognomonic; that is, specific to a right-hemisphere lesion. In fact, some of the characteristics described here as “impairments” can also be seen in “normal” individuals (Joanette et al., 1986) or in individuals with other kinds of traumatic brain injury. Consequently, the occurrence of narrative discourse impairments can certainly not be taken as exclusive to individuals with a right-hemisphere lesion. In summary, discourse abilities, whether conversational or narrative, can be impaired following a right-hemisphere lesion. The exact nature of these impairments is still the object of many studies. Though these impairments are not exclusive to individuals with a right-hemisphere lesion, they certainly represent a dimension of their communicative deficit that deserves attention and care. Pragmatic abilities The pragmatic component of language represents another important aspect of communication that allows for a better appreciation of language impairments in RHD individuals. The theoretical frameworks of pragmatics (e.g. Searle, 1969) were, however, first introduced 10 years after the first description of language impairments in RHD individuals (Eisenson, 1959). It has since been recognized quite clearly that RHD individuals may suffer from inadequate and incomplete communicational abilities in natural contexts (e.g. Gardner et al., 1983). Since then, the development of pragmatic theories has made a major contribution to our understanding of pragmatic impairments in RHD individuals.
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Although pragmatics has long been conceived as merely the relationship between the verbal message and the context in which this verbal message is expressed or captured, current proposals insist on the fact that pragmatics corresponds to the ability to process—express or understand—communicative intent by reference to a given context (Gibbs, 1999). Such pragmatic abilities are required to understand the true meaning of sarcastic or humorous speech, or the exact sense of indirect speech acts, and to adjust the content and form of a message according to the perceived shared knowledge. In fact, in everyday life, it is quite rare for people to express a given communicative intention precisely and specifically; in fact, this contributes to the pleasure of verbal communication. In this respect, many impairments of pragmatic abilities have been reported over the last two decades. Impairment of the appreciation of humor or sarcasm (e.g. Gardner et al., 1975; Wapner, Hamby, & Gardner, 1981) Many studies have suggested that RHD individuals exhibit difficulty in appreciating and understanding discourse segments in which the real intention is greater than or different from that expressed on the surface, with reference to a given communication context (e.g. This is a very smart comment!). Unfortunately, though, many of these studies suffer from methodological limitations that make it impossible to know whether such “impairments” exist by themselves, or whether they appear only when the individual is put in the context of a forced-choice task (Joanette & Goulet, 1994). Be that as it may, clinical observations do tend to suggest the existence of such deficits, which affect RHD individuals’ ability to fully understand the communicative intention beyond the surface discourse. Impairment of indirect speech act processing (Foldi, 1987; Stemmer, Giroux, & Joanette, 1994; Vanhalle et al., 2000) Indirect speech acts (Searle, 1969) are another type of discourse in which the communicative intent is not explicitly expressed in the verbal message (e.g. It is quite warm here! in order to convey Open the window!). Numerous studies have shown that RHD individuals exhibit indirect speech act deficits. However, according to Stemmer et al. (1994), such deficits are present only for nonconventional indirect speech acts. Thus, RHD individuals have no problem in processing conventional speech acts such as Do you have the time? Their difficulties arise when they are faced with previously unknown indirect speech acts that require an analysis in context in order to be understood. Other studies have insisted that such deficits are generally present when an RHD individual is subjected to a condition that demands a metacognitive analysis in a context that is not familiar (Vanhalle et al., 2000).
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Deficits in taking shared knowledge into consideration (Chantraine, Joanette, & Ska, 1998) Other studies have shown that RHD individuals have difficulty taking into account the common knowledge shared with the interlocutor. Indeed, using a common reference construction task, Chantraine et al. (1998) showed that RHD individuals do not adequately take into account what they should know about their interlocutors’ common knowledge in order to adjust their communicative intent accordingly. Pragmatic disabilities appear to characterize the communication abilities of some RHD individuals. The reasons underlying such deficits are still unknown, however. While some authors have suggested that they may result from the presence of inferencing deficits—an explanation which has been only partially supported (Hamel, Giroux, & Joanette, 2003)—or from a limitation in cognitive resource availability (Monetta et al., 2003), the discussion is still open (McDonald, 2000). One possibility is that the pragmatic deficits in RHD individuals might be due to some deficit of theory of mind abilities (Winner et al., 1998). However, it is uncertain whether the theory of mind and the pragmatic abilities really refer to independent cognitive constructs. Recently, Champagne, Desautels, and Joanette (2004) reported that RHD individuals with pragmatic and theory of mind deficits are characterized by the coexistence of lower executive functions, and particularly those having to do with inhibition, rather than mental flexibility. In summary, pragmatic deficits can result from a lesion of the right hemisphere. Such deficits appear to coexist with limitations in theory of mind abilities. However, the exact source of these deficits—whether this is a specific cognitive ability or a general resource limitation—is still unclear. The fact remains that individuals with a right-hemisphere lesion may suffer from deficits that interfere significantly with everyday communication abilities.
Incidence and distinctive profiles of communication impairments in RHD individuals Very few studies have looked directly at the incidence and the possible different clinical profiles of communicative impairments in RHD individuals. Although no population-based study has yet been done on this subject, clinical experience makes it very clear that not all RHD individuals suffer from the communicative deficits described here. According to Joanette, Goulet, and Daoust (1991), one can suspect that about 50% of all RHD individuals exhibit one or more of these communicative deficits. This proportion is similar to the proportion of left-hemisphere-damaged individuals who suffer from a persistent language disorder (aphasia). When present, such deficits appear to be the consequence of a cortical lesion (Joanette et al., 1983), usually in the perisylvian area, as is the case for aphasia. Another important observation concerns the nature of the communicative
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impairments when present. Just as with aphasia, not all RHD individuals with communicative impairments show the same pattern of deficits (Joanette et al., 1991): in some cases, only one of the components described will be affected (prosody, or semantic processing of words, discourse, or pragmatics). In other cases, more than one component will be impaired, and contrasting clinical patterns of communicative impairments can then be observed. A recent study by Coté et al. (2007) confirms the presence of subtypes of clinical profiles of communication impairments among RHD individuals. In this study, only a small percentage of RHD individuals had normal or nearnormal communicative abilities as evaluated by the MEC battery (Joanette et al., 2004), a clinical protocol which allows the description of possible impairments in prosody, lexical-semantics, discourse, and pragmatic abilities. Given the fact that the RHD individuals included in this study were all undergoing rehabilitation in a specialized center, this result probably expresses the higher incidence of communication impairments in this overselected RHD population. However, the results do point to at least three subtypes of clinical profiles whose relationship with lesion sites and other characteristics still has to be explored. In summary, communicative impairments can be observed in about half of all RHD individuals. When present, these impairments can take different clinical forms, from the isolated impairment of one communicative component to the contrasting clinical profiles associated with the impairment of more than one such component. Consequently, clinicians should be very careful and should not expect all RHD individuals to experience such deficits.
The challenge of the clinical label The previous sections have summarized, in general terms, the different communicative impairments which can occur following a right-hemisphere lesion in right-handers. It has been suggested that approximately half of all RHD individuals may exhibit such impairments, a figure which is grossly comparable to the proportion of left-hemisphere-damaged individuals with persistent aphasia. However, whereas acquired language disorders following a lefthemisphere lesion are clearly referred to as aphasia, the clinical labels used for the communicative impairments following a right-hemisphere lesion are much more diverse. Labels such as cognitive-linguistic disorders, verbal communication impairments, or even nonaphasic acquired language disorders have been used in the past. Although meant to distinguish these deficits from “genuine” aphasia, these labels have become a growing source of confusion. Indeed, some aphasiologists are tempted to force into the clinical label the explanation for the impairments observed. This corresponds to a perversion of the clinical label, which is meant to be a simple descriptor, not an explanation of the clinical phenomenon. But why are we faced with such a labeling challenge?
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The study of aphasia has benefited from numerous early-nineteenth-century contributions. This is clearly an advantage, since aphasia has always been a window into the functional organization of the brain for cognition. However, the study of aphasia has also suffered from its early description, since the “definition” of its clinical descriptors appears to have frozen in time in the late nineteenth century. Indeed, the definition of aphasia—an acquired language disorder following a brain lesion—appears to rely upon the definition of language at that time, essentially referring to articulation, phonology, lexical semantics, and morphosyntax. However, as explained in this chapter, the concept of language has evolved a great deal since the nineteenth century. Abilities such as discourse or pragmatics were only added to our understanding of language in the late twentieth century. Although, at first, there was some hesitation about considering discourse and pragmatics as part of language itself, their position is now very clear. Pragmatics, for example, has evolved from a definition as the mere context in which language occurs to recognition as a component of language (Gibbs, 1999). The position of pragmatics is so clear that Noam Chomsky himself now considers it to be a central component of any linguistic theory that aims to be comprehensive (Stemmer, 1999). Consequently, if discourse and pragmatic abilities are now considered as an inherent part of language abilities, and if aphasia is defined as an acquired language disorder following a brain lesion—without any reference to its etiology or localization—it follows that the communicative impairments that can be found in half of all RHD individuals represent newly described forms of aphasia (Joanette & Ansaldo, 1999, 2000). Not recognizing this obvious fact, and maintaining the opinion that such impairments are “nonaphasic”, would be like neuropsychology arbitrarily segregating amnesic and nonamnesic memory impairments, or apraxic and nonapraxic gesture impairments. There is no reason for these communicative impairments not to be simply included as new instances of the general family of aphasia. If so, then new forms of aphasias will have to be introduced (such as pragmatic aphasia to describe RHD individuals whose impairments affect only their pragmatic abilities). Of course, including these deficits within aphasia does not contribute in any way to better understanding of their causes. However, from a clinical standpoint, it ensures that those RHD individuals will benefit from the same attention and care that left-hemisphere aphasic individuals receive.
Summary and conclusion In summary, a lesion of the right hemisphere of right-handers can result in verbal communication impairments. The recent development of theoretical frameworks with regard to discourse and pragmatic abilities, among others, now allows us to recognize and describe these impairments. The goal of this chapter was to offer an overview of the verbal communication deficits that can be found in RHD individuals. These deficits can interfere, at different
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levels, with prosody, the semantic processing of words, and discourse and pragmatic abilities. Such impairments appear to be present in about half of RHD patients and, when present, can result in different clinical profiles. These deficits raise the question of their labeling and their relationship with aphasia. Given the evolution of the concept of language and the universal definition of aphasia, it is proposed that these deficits correspond to another manifestation of aphasia, thus challenging the idea that they are of a “nonaphasic” nature. The association between the left hemisphere of right-handers and language abilities has now become more nuanced. The right hemisphere of righthanders has also been shown to possess some ability to process certain components of language, mostly related to content. In line with this described potential, a right-hemisphere lesion has been shown to result, in some individuals, in isolated or co-occurring impairments of prosody, the semantic processing of words, discourse abilities, and pragmatic abilities. Though the exact sources of these impairments are still largely unknown, it is thought that they correspond either to deficits specific to RHD individuals, to impairments that can be seen in both left- and right-hemisphere-lesioned individuals, and/or to the nonspecific impact of the limited availability of cognitive resources. When present, these impairments interfere with everyday life to the point that they represent a major communicative handicap. It is proposed that, because such deficits affect components of communication now included within the concept of language, these individuals should be referred to as aphasic patients and should benefit from the same attention and care as conventionally defined aphasic patients. Such a view of the right hemisphere’s contribution to language does not simplify things, but language is a very complex human activity that ranges from the communicative intention to the articulation/gesture, and from the acoustic/visual message analysis to the extraction of the communicative intention. Obviously, language abilities represent a key example of the need for the two hemispheres (Sergent, 1994) of the brain to cooperate fully.
Acknowledgments This work was supported by grants from the CIHR (Canadian Institutes of Health Research) (no. MOP-15006) and from the Heart and Stroke Foundation of Canada (no. YJ-13-FMCQ) to Yves Joanette.
Note 1 Professor André Roch Lecours passed away on 12 June 2005. He was a good friend of Professor Vignolo and admired his work.
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Acquired dyslexia and dysgraphia Ria De Bleser and Claudio Luzzatti
Classical and cognitive neuropsychological approaches to graphemic processing Acquired dyslexia and dysgraphia refer to disturbances in reading and writing in a previously competent reader/writer subsequent to brain damage (as in stroke or closed head injury). Contemporary studies of acquired dyslexia and dysgraphia emphasize patterns of preserved and impaired abilities in order to understand the mental processing architecture in normals. This objective has been explicitly stated in the program of modern cognitive neuropsychology, which was established especially by the new approach taken to acquired disorders of written language. In the previous, syndrome-oriented, neuropsychological paradigm, the focus of attention was predominantly on acquired disorders of the spoken language system (aphasia), their classification, and their lesion correlation. Because reading and writing skills develop after the acquisition of a spoken language system, and their normal development in fact crucially depends on the successful development of spoken language abilities, the general view was that written language does not have a system of its own. As a consequence, the majority of written language disorders was considered to be a consequence of the impairment of the system of spoken language (see De Bleser & Luzzatti, 1989 for a review). The only classical modality-specific impairment of written language was alexia, a total impairment of reading already affecting letter-level processing, with and without agraphia (see below). This view radically changed with the introduction of cognitive neuropsychological models of reading. These were based on models of normal reading that introduced the view that unimpaired readers of alphabetic scripts, in which the smallest written unit corresponds approximately to a phoneme, have at least two routines for deriving the phonology of written words: a lexical route, which allows the association of whole-word pronunciations from stored lexical knowledge to a sight vocabulary, and a nonlexical routine, in which phonemes corresponding to a word’s graphemes are sounded out one by one. Of importance for the dual-route model is the distinction between regular words and exception words. Regular words in reading comply to the
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grapheme-to-phoneme correspondence (GPC) rules of the language (e.g. EA pronounced as /i:/ as in speak or beak), whereas irregular/exception words deviate from these (e.g. EA pronounced as /ei/ as in steak). The proportion of exception words in reading varies among languages using an alphabetic script. It is low in Italian and German but high in English. Furthermore, there may be an asymmetry between reading and writing. Thus, there are few exception words for reading German and French, since GPCs are highly transparent, but the proportion is much higher in these languages for writing, where the relations between phonemes and graphemes are less transparent. For example, the German word Saal (room) can be read unambiguously by a sequential procedure using the correspondence rule AA → /a:/, but writing is ambiguous, since the phoneme-to-grapheme correspondence (PGC) rules provide three alternatives, Sahl, Saal, and Sal, only one of which is lexically correct. Thus, apart from chance, correct responses in writing require lexical processing in writing such words, though reading may be successful by using nonlexical sequential processing. Dual-route models of reading Figure 6.1 depicts a version of a dual-route model of reading. The ability a normal subject has to read regular nonlexical strings as well as words with irregular or unpredictable orthography (such as yacht, and pint, or the ambiguous pronunciation of the letter string EA in dear, bear, heart, or steak) can best be explained by assuming two complementary reading procedures, a sub-word-level route and a lexical route (Figure 6.1). The sub-word-level procedure takes the string of graphemes as its input and converts it into a string of phonemes by using sublexical GPC rules (orthographic-to-phonological conversion). This is the only possibility of reading nonwords, since they do not have a lexical entry. Furthermore, reliance on this route leads to the correct realization of words with regular GPC. However, words with irregular GPC lead to regularizations if read by this route (steak → /sti:k/). Their correct realization in reading aloud relies on reading via the lexical route. With this procedure, graphemic strings activate the graphemic word stored in long-term memory in the orthographic input lexicon, which, in turn, activates the corresponding phonological word as a whole in the phonological output lexicon. Activation of the phonological output word from the graphemic input word may be achieved by direct lexiconto-lexicon mapping, or indirectly if the graphemic lexicon first activates the relevant concept in the cognitive system, which then fires to the corresponding phonological entry in the output lexicon. The lexical procedure is mandatory for correctly reading irregular words, but it can also be used for the realization of regular words, which also have lexical entries. In normal reading, the three procedures work in parallel, and the one leading to the fastest output wins. However, for nonword reading, the sublexical route is obligatory whereas correct reading of irregular words requires lexical activation. All procedures
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Figure 6.1 Dual-route model of reading. Sub-word-level (sublexical) reading route: one-step orthographic-to-phonological conversion (grapheme-to-phoneme correspondence (GPC)). Whole-word (lexical) reading routes: (1) direct lexical route: directly from the orthographic (graphemic) input lexicon to the phonological output lexicon; (2) lexical-semantic route: indirectly from the orthographic input lexicon via the cognitive system (lexical semantics, conceptual knowledge) to the phonological output lexicon.
require a short-term deposit in the so-called phonemic/phonological buffer before articulation is executed. Obviously, buffer resources needed for sublexical reading are higher, given that a graphemic string results in the sum of the corresponding phonemes, whereas for lexical reading, the unit which the buffer needs for processing is the entire morpheme, and not the single phoneme. Since less familiar graphemic words and nonwords have to use the sublexical route for their realization, an interaction between lexical status and length
116 De Bleser and Luzzatti is predicted. Items in sight vocabulary should not be affected by letter length since the letters can be identified in parallel, whereas nonwords do not exist in sight vocabulary and should therefore be affected by length if phonics reflects serial processing. This is indeed what was observed by Weekes (1997), who showed longer reading reaction times to longer nonwords (7 letters) compared to shorter ones (3 letters), but not in the case of words. A further prediction of dual-route models is that normal readers should show an interaction between lexical factors such as word frequency and regularity. Paap and Noel (1991) demonstrated a regularity by frequency interaction in reaction times of normal readers. There was no difference in reaction times to high-frequency regular and exception words, which have a stable lexical representation, but there were significantly longer reaction times to low-frequency exception words than to low-frequency regular words. Based on such dual-route models, the prediction for conditions of brain damage is that there are different modality-specific disorders of graphemic processing that are not just a consequence of an aphasic disorder of the spoken language system; that is, they are not qualitatively similar to this disorder. In this view, acquired dyslexia refers to a group of organic impairments of different aspects of reading in cases where reading was acquired normally and visual perception is unimpaired. The reading impairment can be due to a loss of phonological recoding ( phonological dyslexia/ deep dyslexia; see below) resulting in the inability to read nonwords, or loss of direct lexical access (surface dyslexia, see below) characterized by difficulty in reading irregular/exception words. Dual-route models of spelling Following the dual-route models of reading, similar models were developed to account for normal writing skills (Figure 6.2). Once more, sublexical and lexical routes were postulated. The sublexical procedure takes the phonological string as its input and converts the product of auditory acoustic analysis into a corresponding graphemic string by means of PGC rules. In contrast to reading, where the sublexical conversion is a one-step procedure, the model for writing in Figure 6.2 adopts a two-step procedure: first auditory-to-phonology conversion with short-term deposit in the phonological output buffer, and then phonology-to-orthography conversion (phoneme-tographeme conversion), with subsequent short-term retention in the graphemic output buffer. This procedure is the only possible one if nonwords have to be written to dictation, and it can also be used in writing regular words. However, the correct spelling of irregular words is based on usage of the lexical route by means of either direct mapping between the phonological input and graphemic output lexicons, or indirectly mapping these two by first associating the conceptual meaning with the phonological input word and only then activating the graphemic word in the output lexicon. Of course, the lexical procedure can also be used for successful writing of regular words, since, like irregular words, they have lexical entries. As in reading, the lexical
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Figure 6.2 Dual-route model of spelling. Sub-word-level (sublexical) route of spelling: two-step (1) acoustic-to-phonological conversion (APC) and (2) phonemeto-grapheme conversion (PGC). Whole-word (lexical) spelling routes: (1) direct lexical route: directly from the phonological input lexicon to the graphemic (orthographic) output lexicon; (2) lexical-semantic route: indirectly from the phonological input lexicon via the cognitive system (lexical semantics, conceptual knowledge) to the graphemic output lexicon.
and sublexical procedure send their products to the graphemic output buffer, but resource requirements on this short-term memory system are much higher if it receives its input from the sublexical procedure in terms of graphemes rather than in terms of morphemes, as is done in the lexical procedure. The dual-route model of writing postulates that, like acquired dyslexia, acquired agraphia/dysgraphia similarly refers to a group of organic impairments affecting different aspects of the ability to write even though writing
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was acquired normally and hand motor skills are preserved. Problems may occur in writing nonwords when the sublexical PGC route is not available ( phonological dysgraphia/deep dysgraphia, see below) or in writing irregular words when direct lexical access has become impossible (surface dysgraphia; see below). There are a number of languages, such as Chinese or Japanese kanji, that have opted for a nonalphabetic (logographic) script; that is, one in which a symbol represents a word. Other languages, such as Arabic and Hebrew, use a consonantal script in which vowels are not realized. Given such variability among writing systems, the question is whether the models developed for alphabetic scripts are universally valid. We will return to this question in the discussion. In the following, we will restrict ourselves to examples from alphabetic writing systems.
Dyslexia Classical modality-specific impairment of graphemic processing: alexia with and without agraphia Déjerine (1892) developed an anatomofunctional model of reading and spelling involving a representation of the graphemic word (CVM (center of visual memories); Figure 6.3) in the angular gyrus. Wernicke (1886) had explicitly rejected this view. For him, only the single letters of the alphabet are psychologically real, but not the graphemic words. Déjerine’s model of graphemic processing became most influential because of his careful neuropsychological and neuroanatomical description of two patients suffering from isolated impairments of written language without concomitant aphasia: one patient had pure alexia without agraphia and another presented with alexia with agraphia. The lesion in Monsieur C with pure alexia involved the left occipital lobe, including the splenium of the corpus callosum. In the patient who also had agraphia, the lesion was confined to the left angular gyrus. This was taken to be the center containing representations of graphemic words (CVM). Visually processed letters in the left or the right occipital visual center (OVC) must access the CVM for graphemic word processing, and from there information is transmitted to the center of auditory memories (CAM), that is, Wernicke’s area, for further language processing. Reading aloud requires a further projection to the motor center of word articulation (MCA), that is, Broca’s area. For writing to dictation, the projection goes from the CAM to the CVM, and from there to the hand motor center (HMC), where the graphic motor patterns of letters are stored. From this model, it follows that a lesion in the CVM results in both alexia and agraphia, which is exactly what Déjerine found. If the CVM itself is preserved but dissociated from the OVCs, writing is still possible but there will be pure alexia. This corresponds to Déjerine’s anatomical findings for Monsieur C, whose brain showed
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Figure 6.3 Déjerine’s anatomical model of written language. CVM: center of visual memories; OVC: occipital visual centers; CAM: center of auditory memories (i.e. Wernicke’s area); MCA: motor center of word articulation (i.e. Broca’s area); HMC: hand motor center. Alexia with agraphia is caused by damage to the CVM, while pure alexia requires damage to the left OVC and isolation of the CVM from the contralateral right OVC (from Déjerine, 1914).
damage to the left OVC and an isolation of the CVM in the left hemisphere from the contralateral right OVC due to the splenial lesion of the corpus callosum. Déjerine’s view of graphemic processing became influential again in modern neurology after its resurrection by Geschwind (1965). Cognitive neuropsychological impairments of graphemic processing: varieties of dyslexia Deep dyslexia In deep dyslexia, patients read fluently but make semantic errors in reading words. In a simple test situation in which single words are presented for
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reading aloud without context and with unlimited view, responses occur that are related to the target in meaning but may be totally different graphemically and phonologically (Marshall & Newcombe, 1966, 1973). For example, deep dyslexics may read king as sovereign, boat as anchor, and skirt as dress. Such semantic errors are the cardinal feature of deep dyslexia, but other symptoms occur as well (see Coltheart, 1987, for a review). Nonwords (neologisms) such as ling or fullip cannot be read. Exception words and regular words lead to similarly incorrect responses. In addition to semantic errors, visual errors may occur in which target and response share a large number of letters (boat → brat). Furthermore, word reading is characterized by a concreteness effect such that concrete (highly imageable) words (tulip) are read better than abstract ones (idea). Function words such as and, the, and or are rarely read correctly, and they are at the bottom line in a part of speech effect (nouns > verbs > adjectives > function words). Writing is often impossible, but if the patient can write, there is often deep dysgraphia; that is, the writing shows similar symptoms to reading. Patients with deep dyslexia usually have an extensive left-hemisphere lesion leading to aphasia (usually Broca’s aphasia) and right hemiplegia. Notwithstanding the severity of the disorder, symptom-guided therapy of deep dyslexia has been demonstrated to be effective (de Partz, 1986). Surface dyslexia Patients with surface dyslexia can be either fluent or nonfluent readers. In contrast to patients with deep dyslexia, they are quite able to read nonwords but are impaired in reading exception words. In a simple testing situation, in which exception words have to be read aloud without context and with unlimited presentation time, so-called regularization errors occur; that is, words are pronounced according to the regular GPC rules. For example, dough may be read as rhyming with cough, and pint with hint. Exception words are read worse than regular words even when they are matched for word frequency, grapheme number, etc., and responses are produced that are phonologically similar to the target. Regularizations are the cardinal symptom of surface dyslexia, but other symptoms also occur (see Patterson, Marshall, & Coltheart, 1985, for a review). In particular, a length effect is often observed for regular words and nonwords such that stimuli with more graphemes lead to more errors than those with less graphemes. The patient’s writing is often also surface dysgraphic; that is, writing shows similar symptoms to reading. Surface dyslexia is often encountered in slowly progressive aphasia but has also been reported in aphasic patients with vascular etiology. Treatment of surface dyslexia has been shown to be effective if a mnemonic technique is used to repair the direct connection between graphemic words and the corresponding spoken words (Byng & Coltheart, 1986; Coltheart & Byng, 1989; Weekes & Coltheart, 1996).
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Phonological dyslexia Clinically, patients with phonological dyslexia often appear to be unimpaired, since they are able to read words fluently. The main symptom of phonological dyslexia is an impairment in reading nonwords, although this ability is usually not totally lost (for an exception, see Funnell, 1983). Reading exception words and regular words is relatively preserved, but there are no cases where word reading was 100% correct. There are many similarities between phonological dyslexia and deep dyslexia. In both cases, nonword reading is more severely impaired than word reading. The additional symptoms of deep dyslexia, such as the presence of a concreteness effect or a frequency effect, have also been observed in some cases of phonological dyslexia. Distinguishing characteristics are the occurrence of semantic errors and a total inability to read nonwords, which point to deep rather than phonological dyslexia. Little is known about the writing performance of phonological dyslectics and of the underlying anatomical lesion. Furthermore, there are presently no therapy studies on acquired phonological dyslexia, although successful therapy may be expected, since patients with the more severe symptoms of deep dyslexia have been shown to respond well to intensive treatment and regained the ability to read by the GPC reading routine. Letter-by-letter reading This refers to the oldest and clinically best-known form of acquired reading disorder, Déjerine’s alexia without agraphia, but it stresses the functional rather than the neuroanatomical analysis of the impairment. Patients have lost the ability to read words and nonwords. The single letters of the stimulus are named from left to right, and the patient may reach the target phonological string using a backward spelling strategy, but the procedure is slow and laborious, and the total stimulus reading time is linear, since it is the sum of the reading time for each letter. Patients can write spontaneously but are unable to read the text they produced after a few minutes. Many but not all published cases of letter-by-letter reading involve an occipital lesion extending to the splenium (posterior part) of the corpus callosum, as originally described by Déjerine. A lesion in the left occipital lobe not extending to the splenium provokes a right homonymous hemianopia, but no reading impairment for stimuli presented to the left visual field. Patients who have only right hemianopia can process stimuli via the left visual field (right-hemisphere visual cortex) and transmit this information via the splenium to the left hemisphere reading areas. However, if the splenium is disrupted, the transmission from right to left is impaired. The ability to read slowly in a letter-by-letter fashion probably expresses how the transfer to the left hemisphere proceeds when the normal transmission via the splenium is no longer available (Coslett & Saffran, 1989).
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Letter-by-letter reading sometimes recovers partly or in full during the first couple of weeks or months after the stroke. In chronic cases, successful treatment has been demonstrated (Moody, 1988; Moyer, 1979). Neglect dyslexia Neglect dyslexia is usually associated with general visuospatial unilateral neglect, in which case it does not represent a specific impairment of reading. In cases of unilateral neglect, the patient has a hemi-inattention and/or representational impairment on the side contralateral to the lesion, as a rule, the left side of a patient’s visual field, body, and extrapersonal space. In word reading, patients neglect the left part of the word, resulting in either omissions (dying for studying) or substitutions (window for meadow) (Arduino et al., 2002; Arguin & Bub, 1997). In sentence reading, they tend to ignore the words from the left to the middle. In rare cases, neglect dyslexia has been reported as a specific impairment without accompanying general neglect (e.g. Patterson & Wilson, 1990). In neglect dyslexia, there is no difference between processing words and nonwords. Reading is fluent, and it is correct if stimuli are presented vertically. There is no aphasia, and language comprehension and production are unimpaired. There may be associated neglect dysgraphia (Baxter & Warrington, 1983). The lesion underlying left neglect dyslexia is in the right hemisphere. In many cases, there is spontaneous recovery, but the impairment may be persistent. Therapy makes use of scanning cues such as red markings on the left side of the page, which are gradually blended out. Assessment of reading impairments Assessment material based on the dual-route model of reading has been developed for English (the Psycholinguistic Assessment of Language Processing in Aphasia (PALPA) test (Kay, Lesser, & Coltheart, 1992)). This test is available in German, Dutch, and Spanish translations. Such material typically includes a large number of tasks addressing each box and route of the model. For example, visual lexical decision of graphemic words and nonwords is used to examine the status of the graphemic input lexicon; reading aloud nonwords, to investigate the functioning of the GPC route; reading irregular words of different frequency levels, to determine whether the direct lexical route is accessible, etc. In the German test LeMo, developed by De Bleser et al. (2004), functional lesions in the model are automatically generated from the test results, and a comparison of the variables is included.
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Dysgraphia Classical modality-specific impairment of the spelling process In classical aphasiology, the possibility of modality-specific impairments of writing, so-called pure agraphia, was debated. Whereas Wernicke’s French contemporaries predicted and described motor aphasia of the hand (Charcot, 1883), or motor agraphia (Pitres, 1884) as a result of damage to orthographic representations, Wernicke (1903; see De Bleser, 1996) rejected the concept of a motor orthographic center and consequently also of pure agraphia. In his view, cases of “isolated” agraphia had to be the consequence of an undiagnosed aphasic disorder. The only agraphia without aphasia he accepted was alexia with agraphia (see previous discussion of alexia), that is, a modality-unspecific impairment of written language. Almost all classical authors had their own classification of agraphic disturbances with or without aphasia, leading more to confusion than to interest in the topic, but they usually agreed on one form, apraxic agraphia. Apraxia of writing is characterized by the patient’s inability to realize letter symbols due to ideokinetic or constructional factors. If the former predominate, letter symbols cannot be realized graphically, and individual letter strokes cannot be combined adequately. In this type of dysgraphia oral spelling and typing on a keyboard are unimpaired. If constructional factors are predominant, there may be an impairment in retrieving the spatial aspects of letter forms from memory. However, the disorder cannot be traced back to a general ideomotor or constructional apraxic deficit, since there can be apraxic agraphia without any other major apraxic impairment, and the reverse. Cognitive neuropsychological impairments of the spelling processes Interest in writing disorders reappeared after the introduction of dual-route models of spelling, constructed in analogy to the dual-route models of reading. Empirical evidence was obtained from aphasic patients with subtotal impairments of writing (dysgraphia) who showed a variety of patterns of acquired spelling disorders qualitatively different from the aphasic and, in some cases, dyslexic disorders (Beauvois & Dérouesné, 1981; Patterson, 1986; Shallice, 1981). Varieties of dysgraphia As in dyslexia, the dysgraphic disorder may reflect an impairment of the lexical or sublexical writing procedure. Impairment of the lexical procedure results in surface dysgraphia, which is characterized by preserved writing of nonwords and words with regular PGC but regularization of irregular words. Impairment of the sublexical route results in the superiority of word over nonword writing, and a length effect may be expected in spelling nonwords.
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In phonological dysgraphia, regular and irregular words are spelled relatively well, especially if they are of high frequency, but spelling of nonwords is impaired. Like deep dyslexia, deep dysgraphia is mainly characterized by semantic errors in writing words and the inability to spell nonwords. A post-lexical impairment may occur at the level of the graphemic buffer. This will express itself in graphemic substitutions, generally respecting the orthosyllabic structure of the target; that is, vowels are substituted for vowels, consonants for consonants, and consonant clusters for clusters. Given that requirements for buffer resources are higher for nonwords than words, nonwords are more affected. Ellis (1988) suggested that after the graphemic level there is a peripheral, allographic level that is sensitive to different letter case and shape. An impairment at this level will usually be restricted to handwriting. Two adjacent letters may be mixed; typically, the patient confuses upper and lower case. In contrast to apraxic agraphia (see above), patients with allographic dysgraphia write fluently with well-formed letter shapes. Specific treatment of acquired spelling impairments has not always been successful. Model-oriented rehabilitation of dysgraphia seems to be most effective (1) in languages with shallow orthography, (2) when the spelling impairment is treated by the sub-word-level routine, and (3) when it involves not only the phonology-to-orthography but also the auditory-to-phonology conversion process (Luzzatti, Colombo, Frustaci, & Vitolo, 2000). Assessment of spelling impairments In analogy to assessment material for reading, writing tasks have been developed based on the dual-route model (the PALPA test by Kay et al., 1992; the Johns Hopkins University Dysgraphia Battery by Goodman & Caramazza, 1986). They include writing to dictation of nonwords of different length to examine the PGC route and the graphemic buffer, writing regular and irregular words of different frequency to investigate the lexical route, written naming to examine the semantic route. For post-lexical processing, letter transposition tasks are often included.
Conclusion Dual-route models of written word processing have become paradigm cases for cognitive science and have been very successful in accounting for word and nonword reading and writing and their impairments. Although they were originally based on English, research has meanwhile been conducted on other languages and orthographies. Data are now available on several other European languages based on alphabetic scripts (French, German, and Italian), consonantal scripts (Hebrew), syllabic scripts (Japanese kana), and ideographic scripts (Chinese and Japanese kanji). Taken together, these studies point to the universality of two routes for reading, a lexical and a sublexical one, applying to nonalphabetic as well as alphabetic languages, and each
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route can be selectively impaired, thus suggesting their independent neural organization (Butterworth & Yin, 1991; Weekes, 2005). At the same time, neuroimaging studies of subjects in different alphabetic languages with a different degree of transparency between graphemes and phonemes suggest that a greater reliance on one or the other route depends on language-specific features (Paulesu et al., 2001). Given the similarity between languages with respect to the architecture of the model, future research can now focus on the role of specific differences.
References Arduino, L. S., Burani, C., & Vallar, G. (2002). Lexical effects in neglect dyslexia: A study in Italian patients. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 19, 421–444. Arguin, M., & Bub, B. (1997). Lexical constraints on reading accuracy in neglect dyslexia. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 14, 765–800. Baxter, D. M., & Warrington, E. K. (1983). Neglect dysgraphia. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry, 45, 1073–1078. Beauvois, M. F., & Dérouesné, J. (1981). Lexical or orthographic agraphia. Brain, 104, 21–49. Butterworth, B., & Yin, W. G. (1991). The universality of two routines for reading: Evidence from Chinese dyslexia. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B., Biological Sciences, 246, 91–95. Byng, S., & Coltheart M. (1986). Aphasia therapy research: Methodological requirements and illustrative results. In I. G. Nilsson & E. Hjelmquist (Eds.), Communication and handicap: Aspects of psychological compensation and technical aids (pp. 191–213). Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing. Charcot, J.-M. (1883). Le differenti forme di afasia. Milan: Vallardi. Coltheart, M. (1987). Deep dyslexia: A review of the syndrome. In M. Coltheart, K. Patterson & J. C. Marshall, (Eds), Deep dyslexia (2nd ed., pp. 22–47). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Coltheart, M., & Byng, S. (1989). A treatment for surface dyslexia. In X. Seron (Ed.), Cognitive approaches in neuropsychological rehabilitation (pp. 159–174). London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Ltd. Coslett, H. B., & Saffran, E. M. (1989). Evidence for preserved reading in ‘pure alexia’. Brain, 112, 327–359. De Bleser, R. (1996). Wernicke’s 1903 case of pure agraphia: An enigma for classical models of written language processing. In Ch. Code, C. W. Wallesch, A. R. Lecours, & Y. Joanette (Eds), Classic cases in neuropsychology (pp. 13–29). Hove: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Ltd. De Bleser, R., Cholewa, J., Stadie, N., & Tabatabaie, S. (2004). LeMo Lexikon modellorientiert: Einzelfalldiagnostik bei Aphasie, Dyslexie und Dysgraphie. Amsterdam: Elsevier. De Bleser, R., & Luzzatti, C. (1989). Models of reading and writing and their disorders in classical German aphasiology. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 6, 501–513. Déjerine, J. (1892). Contribution à l’étude anatomo-pathologique et clinique des différentes variétés de cécité verbale. Mémoires de la Société de Biologie, 4, 61–90. Déjerine, J. (1914). Séméiologie des affections du système nerveux. Paris: Masson. De Partz, M. P. (1986). Re-education of a deep dyslexic patient: Rationale of the method and results. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 3, 149–177.
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Ellis, A. W. (1988). Modelling the writing process. In G. Denes, C. Semenza, & P. Bisiacchi, (Eds.), Perspectives on cognitive neuropsychology (pp. 189–213). Hove: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Ltd. Funnell, E. (1983). Phonological processes in reading: New evidence from acquired dyslexia. British Journal of Psychology, 74, 159–180. Geschwind, N. (1965). Disconnection syndromes in animals and men. Brain, 88, 237–294; 585–644. Goodman, R., & Caramazza, A. (1986). The Johns Hopkins University Dysgraphia Battery. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Kay, J., Lesser, R., & Coltheart, M. (1992). Psycholinguistic assessments of language processing in aphasia (PALPA). Hove: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Ltd. Luzzatti, C., Colombo, C., Frustaci, M., & Vitolo, F. (2000). Rehabilitation of spelling along the sub-word-level routine. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 10, 249–278. Marshall, J. C., & Newcombe, F. (1966). Syntactic and semantic errors in paralexia. Neuropsychologia, 4, 169–176. Marshall, J. C., & Newcombe, F. (1973). Patterns of paralexia: A psycholinguistic approach. Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 2, 175–199. Moody, S. (1988). The Moyer reading technique re-evaluated. Cortex, 24, 473–476. Moyer, S. B. (1979). Rehabilitation of alexia: A case study. Cortex, 15, 139–144. Nelson, H. E. (1982). National Adult Reading Test Manual. Windsor: NFER-Nelson. Paap, K. R., & Noel, R. W. (1991). Dual-route models of print to sound: Still a good horse race. Psychological Research, 53, 13–24. Patterson, K. (1986). Lexical but nonsemantic spelling? Cognitive Neuropsychology, 3, 341–367. Patterson, K., Marshall, J. C., & Coltheart, M. (Eds.) (1985). Surface dyslexia: Cognitive and neuropsychological studies of phonological reading. Hove: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Ltd. Patterson, K., & Wilson, B. A. (1990). A rose is a rose or a nose: A deficit in initial letter recognition. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 7, 447–477. Paulesu, E., Démonet, J. F., Fazio, F., McCrory, E., Chanoine, V., Brunswick, N., et al. (2001). Dyslexia—cultural diversity and biological unity. Science, 291, 2165–2167. Pitres, A. (1884). Considérations sur l’agraphie à propos d’une observation nouvelle d’agraphie motrice pure. Revue de Médecine, 4, 855–873. Shallice, T. (1981). Phonological agraphia and the lexical route in writing. Brain, 104, 413–429. Shallice, T., & Warrington, E. K. (1980). Single and multiple component central dyslexic syndromes. In M. Coltheart, K. Patterson, & J. C. Marshall (Eds.), Deep dyslexia (pp. 119–145). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Weekes, B. S. (1997). Differential effects of number of letters on word and non-word naming latency. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 50A, 439–456. Weekes, B. S. (2005). Acquired disorders of reading and writing: Cross-script comparisons. Behavioural Neurology, 16, 51–57. Weekes, B. S., & Coltheart, M. (1996). Surface dyslexia and surface dysgraphia: Treatment studies and their theoretical implications. Cognitive Neurospsychology, 13, 277–315. Wernicke, C. (1886). Die neueren Arbeiten über Aphasie. Fortschritte der Medizin, 4, 463–482. Wernicke, C. (1903). Ein Fall von isolierter Agraphie. Monatsschrift für Psychiatrie und Neurologie, 13, 241–265.
7
Developmental dyslexia From neuropsychology to genetics, and back again Albert M. Galaburda, Joseph LoTurco, and Glenn D. Rosen
It is becoming possible to establish links between gene dysfunction and neuropsychological symptoms; this is not the same as discovering the genetics of complex behaviors, but it is a start. Developmental dyslexia is the most common specific learning disorder in children, yet its underlying causes have escaped full understanding. Neurophysiological and neuroanatomical findings indicate that dyslexia is associated with alterations in both neocortical function and structure (Brambati et al., 2004; Galaburda & Livingstone, 1993; Paulesu et al., 2001; Siok, Perfetti, Jin, & Tan, 2004). The pattern and timing of such neurobiological changes suggest that developmental dyslexia may be caused in part by alterations in early brain development and neuronal migration (Brambati et al., 2004; Galaburda, Sherman, Rosen, Aboitiz, & Geschwind, 1985). In addition to neurobiological correlates, there is substantial evidence that dyslexia susceptibility associates with multiple genetic loci (Fisher & DeFries, 2002; Grigorenko, 2003). In the present review, presented in honor of Luigi Vignolo for his outstanding contributions to neuropsychology, we will outline the main steps between a proposed genetic mutation or variant and a neuropsychological deficit that often accompanies developmental dyslexia—abnormal auditory processing. The chapter summarizes a journey that began with learning about the neuropsychological, behavioral, and cognitive disorder we call developmental dyslexia; continued with an attempt to describe its neurological underpinning; and finally ended with the discovery of the genetic mechanism leading to anomalous brain development affecting areas involved in the neuropsychological functions of interest.
Genetic background Dyslexia susceptibility loci have been shown to be present on the X chromosome as well as autosomal chromosomes 1, 2, 3, 6, 11, 15, and 18 (de Kovel et al., 2004; Fisher & DeFries, 2002; Grigorenko, 2003; Scerri et al., 2004; Taipale et al., 2003; Wigg et al., 2004), and the first candidate dyslexia susceptibility gene, DYX1C1 (also known as EKN1), is located on 15q21 (Taipale et al., 2003; Wigg et al., 2004). In utero interference (RNAi) with the
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translation of DYX1C1 protein disrupts both the migration and morphology of developing neurons (Wang et al., 2004). Cellular and biochemical experiments indicate that DYX1C1 functions within the cytoplasm of migrating neurons, interacts with the neuronal migration gene LIS1, and regulates the association of LIS1 with the cell motor protein dynein. These results have established DYX1C1 as a novel neuronal migration protein, and have linked dyslexia susceptibility to molecular mechanisms underlying neocortical development. The results also suggest that the disorder of neurodevelopment and migration associated with dyslexia is only one possible outcome in a range of mild to severe disturbances of cortical development related to altered genes involved in neuronal migration, which also includes lissencephaly type I. Given the growing number of genes discovered to be involved in neuronal migration and cortical development, an important aim of current and future studies is to determine whether proteins coded by genes within other dyslexia susceptibility loci play similar roles in neuronal migration and development.
Neuroanatomical background Abnormal migration secondary to developmental genes such as DYX1C1 is capable of triggering a cascade of anatomical changes likely to be responsible for the cognitive and behavioral deficits seen in developmental dyslexia. Work on the mechanisms of function of the altered DYX1C1 gene indicates that the gene has both cell-autonomous and non-cell-autonomous effects on cortical development (Wang et al., 2004). Thus, while cell-autonomous mechanisms explain the abnormal interactions between young neurons and the radial glia along which they must migrate to the incipient cerebral cortex, and the resultant periventricular migrational arrest, additional non-cell-autonomous effects lead to focal disorganization of the layering of neurons in the developing cortex. Other non-cell-autonomous effects may lead to breaches in the external glial limiting membrane, resulting in the production of layer I ectopic collections of neurons and glia (ectopia) (Galaburda et al., 1985) (Figure 7.1). Experimental induction of ectopia by physical means in rats or mice, such as by freezing injury to the surface of the cortex at postnatal day 0 or 1 (P0, P1), can reproduce these same effects and lead to layer I ectopia and focal areas of microgyria in the affected cortex (Humphreys, Rosen, Press, Sherman, & Galaburda, 1991; Rosen, Sherman, Richman, Stone, & Galaburda, 1992). Induction of ectopia by physical means, which themselves are quite insignificant in size, triggers changes of a widespread nature in other areas of the cerebral cortex as well as in the thalamus (Figure 7.2), which is thought to be the actual mechanism underlying the functional changes. These changes include alterations in the types and proportions of neuronal types and in patterns of neural connections (Herman, Galaburda, Fitch, Carter & Rosen, 1997; Rosen, Burstein, & Galaburda, 2000; Rosen, Herman, & Galaburda, 1999; Rosen, Jacobs, & Prince, 1998; Sherman, Stone, Press, Rosen, &
Figure 7.1 Brightfield photomicrograph of ectopic collections of neurons in the molecular layer of the cortex of a rat (left) and human dyslexic patient (right). In the case of the rat, cortical neurons were embryonically transfected with shRNA targeted against the candidate dyslexia susceptibility gene Dyx1c1. Bar = 250 µm.
Figure 7.2 Fluorescence photomicrograph of Fluoro-Jade B-stained neurons in the ventrobasal complex of the rat thalamus following induction of microgyria in the newborn cerebral cortex. Cell death is felt to be the principal mechanism by which proportions of neuronal types in the thalamus change in cortical malformations.
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Galaburda, 1990). Evidence exists of decreased cortical inhibition in affected cortical areas (Jacobs, Gutnick, & Prince, 1996; Jacobs & Prince, 2005) and of anomalous connections between injured cortex, adjacent cortex, and even homotopic and nonhomotopic cortex in the contralateral hemisphere (Rosen et al., 2000). With respect to the thalamus, abnormal afferent and efferent connections between the injured cortex and thalamus result from the induction of cortical ectopia (Rosen et al., 2000). There are changes in the numbers of large and small neurons in specific thalamic sensory nuclei, even when they do not directly project to the area of affected cortex (Herman et al., 1997). The cellular changes are associated with deficits in auditory processing (see below). In the lateral geniculate nucleus, the average size of neurons in the magnocellular layers was found to be reduced by 30% in the brains of dyslexic individuals (Livingstone, Rosen, Drislane, & Galaburda, 1991). In the medial geniculate nuclei, dyslexic human brains showed a shift to smaller neurons, and this again could be produced in experimental animals by induction of focal cortical malformations by freezing injury at P0 (Fitch, Tallal, Brown, Galaburda, & Rosen, 1994; Herman et al., 1997). Of additional interest was the finding that, despite comparable severity of the cortical injury and resultant cortical malformation, female rats, unlike their male counterparts, did not develop the predicted changes in thalamic neurons (Herman et al., 1997). This indicated that females are more resistant than male rats to the secondary changes in the thalamus that result from induction of cortical malformations at birth. However, the pattern of male reaction to cortical injury could be induced in the females when the latter were exposed to the male sex hormone testosterone (Herman et al., 1997).
Behavioral consequences In alphabetic languages, phonological problems describe the majority of children with developmental dyslexia (Lyon, 1996). This is usually demonstrated by tests addressing conscious awareness of the phonological structure of words, such as rhyming or phoneme deletion tasks and pig Latin games. The origin of these metaphonological deficits is not known, but some experts believe that they result from abnormal auditory perceptual processing during critical stages of phonological development early in childhood (Benasich, 2002; Tallal, 1976; Tallal, Stark, & Mellits, 1985). A variety of temporal auditory processing problems have been reported, some that concern rapid sound changes, and others involving slow auditory transitions (review and critique by Ramus; see Galaburda & Cestnick, 2003). Behavioral and cognitive aberrations can also be demonstrated by functional imaging methods, such as PET and fMRI. The application of these tools often discloses differences in activation of cortical areas between good and poor readers, which involve perisylvian cortices, inferior prefrontal regions, temporoparietal junction cortex, and the “word-form” area located at the border between the temporal and occipital lobes on the left side
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(Dehaene, Le Clec’H, Poline, Le Bihan, & Cohen, 2002; Demonet, Taylor, & Chaix, 2004; Pugh et al., 2000). These are also areas where ectopia has been shown to be present in dyslexic brains (Galaburda & Cestnick, 2003; Galaburda et al., 1985). In languages such as Chinese, the details of the dysfunctional activation may differ in quite an interesting way, reflecting a different relationship between the orthographic code and semantics (Berman, Berger, Mukherjee, & Henry, 2004; Siok et al., 2004). Induction of cortical malformations in neonatal rats leads to temporal processing auditory deficits similar to some described in children with developmental language impairment. Affected animals show difficulty in processing rapidly changing sounds, as can be demonstrated in operant conditioning, oddball, and evoked potential paradigms (Clark, Rosen, Tallal, & Fitch, 2000; Fitch et al., 1994; Herman et al., 1997; Peiffer, Friedman, Rosen, & Fitch, 2004; Peiffer, Rosen, & Fitch, 2002; Rosen et al., 1999; Rosen, Waters, Galaburda, & Denenberg, 1995). Of further interest is the finding that only animals with induced cortical malformations that also demonstrate changes in the thalamus exhibit the temporal processing deficits, and this group comprises only males, the females being resistant to thalamic changes. Exposure of pregnant dams to testosterone leads to females acquiring thalamic changes, like the males, and, also like the males, temporal processing deficits. Therefore, the temporal processing deficits are linked to the secondary thalamic changes rather than to the initial cortical malformation.
Pathway: from gene to behavior Several susceptibility loci on the human genome have been linked to the phenotype of dyslexia, but only one candidate gene has been identified and studied so far. At the same time, several forms of developmental dyslexia must exist, affecting different components of language processing and perhaps also nonlinguistic abilities involved in reading. Of the Western form of dyslexia, the phonological type is the most common, and a tentative pathway now exists that can explain the phonological core deficit beginning with a gene mutation. Thus, we propose the following developmental scenario to explain phonological dyslexia in people who carry the DYX1C1 mutation or variant or another mutation affecting neuronal migration and cortical development in a comparable manner. Initially, there is a mutation in a gene crucial for proper neuronal migration and cortical development, such as DYX1C1. A mutation in such a gene leads to cell-autonomous and non-autonomous neuronal migration problems. These may begin with subventricular neuronal migration arrest, some of which may not be demonstrable later in life because of the shortened survival of subventricular, poorly migrated neurons. The abnormal process of neuronal migration, because of secondary effects on the health and integrity of radial glia, may also end with disruptions in cortical layering and ruptures in
132 Galaburda, LoTurco, Rosen the external glial limiting membrane (which is made up of the foot processes of radial glia). The latter changes comprise the main anomaly in cortical development as it concerns dyslexia, which includes the generation of layer I ectopia. Either the generation of ectopia or the underlying cortical changes lead to changes in cortico-cortical and corticothalamic connections, which in turn produce secondary cell changes in the thalamus. These thalamic cell and connectional changes lead to problems with auditory temporal processing, which in turn disrupt development of normal phonological representations and processes during language development. In turn, weakness or anomaly of phonological processing results in problems with phoneme-to-grapheme mapping—the core problem in developmental dyslexia.
Lingering questions Although a rough pathway can be drawn between a mutation or variant in a neuronal migration and development gene and a complex behavior such as phonological dyslexia, there are several areas where additional information is still needed. Several chromosomal locations may independently be responsible for genetic subphenotypes. This may affect people unevenly according to ethnic/ genetic background, as one may account for most dyslexics in one geographic or ethnic group but a few cases in another. We have already seen this phenomenon with regard to DYX1C1, where involvement of Finnish dyslexics is different from dyslexics in the UK or in Canada (Scerri et al., 2004; Wigg et al., 2004). The question remains as to whether the different genes are all neuronal migration genes, or whether they affect cortical development by interfering with different developmental molecular pathways, either pre- or post-migrationally. We have inconclusive evidence for the statement that neuronal migrational errors lead to non-cell-autonomous changes in layering and ectopia formation in the overlying cortex. Additional work needs be done to specify the steps by which secondary cortical malformations follow the impairment of subcortical neuronal migration directly linked to the gene mutation. Another set of questions relates to the exact mechanisms, described at cell biological and molecular levels, of the abnormalities in corticothalamic interactions felt to be crucial in the proposed step for abnormal phonological development. We do not yet know which signals are involved in transforming a cortical injury into an abnormal thalamus. Changes in programmed cell death are probably involved, but more data are needed to rule in or out other contributors. Yet another outstanding question has to do with the variation that may exist in the anatomical underpinnings of dyslexia. The only neuronatomical studies published thus far have been done in Western individuals, most likely suffering from phonological dyslexia. Other forms of dyslexia in Western languages (surface, deep), and dyslexia in nonsyllabic languages such as
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Chinese, may in fact be associated with different neuroanatomical substrates, which need to be characterized. The possibility that some aspects of the dyslexic phenotype are learned, rather than acquired in utero, suggests that brains will be found with functional anomalies not caused by underlying neuroanatomical defects. Modern neuroimaging tools will permit the discovery of such cases, and further developments in in vivo imaging will disclose details of the underlying neuroanatomy heretofore not possible to conceive. High-strength magnets and especially designed imaging protocols are even presently disclosing details of cortical anatomy previously only possible to see in postmortem or biopsy tissue (Berman et al., 2004; Maas et al., 2004). Nonetheless, it is clear that an important proportion of dyslexics do indeed have unusual brains from birth or before, which can be understood on the basis of comprehensible errors in cortical development beginning with a single gene mutation.
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Rosen, G. D., Sherman, G. F., Richman, J. M., Stone, L. V., & Galaburda, A. M. (1992). Induction of molecular layer ectopias by puncture wounds in newborn rats and mice. Brain Research and Developmental Brain Research, 67, 285–291. Rosen, G. D., Waters, N. S., Galaburda, A. M., & Denenberg, V. H. (1995). Behavioral consequences of neonatal injury of the neocortex. Brain Research, 681, 177–189. Rosen, G. D., Windzio, H., & Galaburda, A. M. (2001). Unilateral induced neocortical malformation and the formation of ipsilateral and contralateral barrel fields. Neuroscience, 103, 931–939. Scerri, T. S., Fisher, S. E., Francks, C., MacPhie, I. L., Paracchini, S., Richardson, A. J., et al. (2004). Putative functional alleles of DYX1C1 are not associated with dyslexia susceptibility in a large sample of sibling pairs from the UK. Journal of Medical Genetics, 41, 1–5. Sherman, G. F., Stone, J. S., Press, D. M., Rosen, G. D., & Galaburda, A. M. (1990). Abnormal architecture and connections disclosed by neurofilament staining in the cerebral cortex of autoimmune mice. Brain Research, 529, 202–207. Siok, W. T., Perfetti, C. A., Jin, Z., & Tan, L. H. (2004). Biological abnormality of impaired reading is constrained by culture. Nature, 431, 71–76. Taipale, M., Kaminen, N., Nopola-Hemmi, J., Haltia, T., Myllyluoma, B., Lyytinen, H., et al. (2003). A candidate gene for developmental dyslexia encodes a nuclear tetratricopeptide repeat domain protein dynamically regulated in brain. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA, 100, 11553–11558. Tallal, P. (1976). Rapid auditory processing in normal and disordered language development. Journal of Speech and Hearing Research, 19, 561–571. Tallal, P., Stark, R. E., & Mellits, D. (1985). The relationship between auditory temporal analysis and receptive language development: Evidence from studies of developmental language disorder. Neuropsychologia, 23, 527–534. Wang, Y., Paramasivan, M., Thomas, A., Bai, J., Kaminen-Ahola, N., Kere, J., et al. (2004). Regulation of neuronal migration by DYX1C1. Submitted for publication. Wigg, K. G., Couto, J. M., Feng, Y., Anderson, B., Cate-Carter, T. D., Macciardi, F., et al. (2004). Support for EKN1 as the susceptibility locus for dyslexia on 15q21. Molecular Psychiatry, 9, 1111–1121.
8
Aphasia recovery Neural mechanisms Stefano F. Cappa and Jubin Abutalebi
Recovery of aphasia has been a central topic of Luigi Vignolo’s research. In his early paper on the evolution of aphasia and language rehabilitation, Vignolo (1964) clearly indicated some “principles” that would be confirmed by later research, such as that “the receptive aspect tends to improve more than the expressive aspect” and that “improvement of oral expression is not influenced by the initial level of auditory comprehension”. Given the relatively long history of research in this area, it is somewhat disappointing that the neural mechanisms underlying the spontaneous recuperation of aphasia, as well as, in general, the recovery of neurological function after acute brain injury, remain incompletely understood. Even less is known about the neural basis of the effects of therapeutic interventions aiming to rehabilitate neurological dysfunction. Much of recent research on the neural mechanisms underlying recovery is based on the assumption that the brain, rather than a static entity, is a constantly changing organ. Brain plasticity can be studied at various levels, from observable behavioral changes to cerebral maps, and from synaptic organization to molecular structures. Changes of cerebral maps after brain injury and functional recovery of lost functions may be studied in vivo with functional neuroimaging. These methods can be employed to explore what happens in the brain of aphasic patients after their stroke, and to track the modifications of brain function that may be correlated to recovery. In the present chapter, we will describe the functional neuroimaging evidence of cerebral reorganization, associated with both spontaneous and rehabilitation-induced improvement of language function.
Brain mechanisms involved in language recovery It has been repeatedly observed that, in general, language recovery occurs during the first months after the clinical onset of aphasia, the greatest improvement taking place during the first 3 months (Kertesz, Lesk, & McCabe, 1977; Sarno & Levita, 1971). The degree of functional improvement generally decreases over time. However, a lesser degree of recovery may still be observed 2 years after onset. The recovery period has often been divided into at least
138 Cappa and Abutalebi three stages, referring to the supposedly different pathophysiological mechanisms underlying clinical improvement. The three-epoch, time-frame model of aphasia recovery (Alexander, 1989; Mazzocchi & Vignolo, 1979) divides the clinical stages of aphasia into an early stage (lasting for about 2 weeks post-onset), a lesion stage (up to 6 months post-onset), and a chronic stage (after 6 months). The length of the period of “spontaneous recovery” varies, according to different authors, from the first weeks to first months after onset. Further improvement is likely to be more specifically related to language therapy. The difficulty in establishing an early prognosis is related to the contribution of different mechanisms to clinical recovery, both at the cognitive and at the anatomofunctional level. Many group studies on the prognosis of aphasic patients have indicated that the severity of the initial cognitive impairment (Pedersen, Jorgensen, Nakayama, Raaschou, & Olsen, 1995) and the volume of cerebral tissue loss (Mahagne et al., 2000) are negatively correlated with outcome. The availability of new magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) techniques, characterized by improved pathological specificity, now allows a more accurate estimate of the effects of the lesion characteristics on the recovery process. Indeed, good neurological recovery 2 months post-onset has been associated with the volume of tissue showing low blood flow and high oxygen extraction fraction (penumbra) at the acute stage that does not progress to complete infarction (Furlan, Marchal, Viader, Derlon, & Baron, 1996). One possible explanation is that penumbral tissue near the infarct is not viable early after injury and therefore cannot be recruited to support behavior. In the course of recovery, this tissue may return to a normal metabolic state and become functionally relevant to the substitution of the infarcted areas for task performance. However, in each individual case, the respective contribution of these mechanisms to the functional restoration of language and communication remains largely undetermined. During the early period, other mechanisms at the anatomofunctional level that might contribute to clinical improvement are the disappearance of cerebral edema and intracranial hypertension, the reabsorption of blood, the normalization of the hemodynamic situation in ischemic penumbra areas, and the resolution of local inflammation. All these factors may restore the excitability of the neurons, the functionality of local circuits, and the efficiency of cortical tracts. Another crucial mechanism, in particular at the early stage, is the regression of diaschisis effects. Diaschisis is the term used to describe the effect of brain injury to a certain area to inhibit connected, noninjured areas. In this specific case, recovery consists of the removal of this inhibition and return to normal function. Theoretically, synaptogenesis, as well as axonal and collateral sprouting, could also play a role after the first stages of recovery (Heiss, Kessler, Karbe, Fink, & Pawlik, 1993; Heiss et al., 1997; Karbe, Thiel, Weber-Luxenburger, Herholz, Kessler, & Heiss, 1998). However, these phenomena are very limited in space, and their contribution to clinical improvement in aphasics remains
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hypothetical. The notion of redundancy assumes that there is an excess of neurons and connections for a given function, so that neural tissue can be lost without functional consequences, because the uninjured neurons in the damaged area function as spare systems that can compensate for those that are nonfunctional. Finally, a functional cortical reorganization involving structures not primarily and directly involved in normal language functions might also take place. This vicariation phenomenon might occur even at an early stage of clinical improvement, probably by means of bringing into play silent synapses (either by release of previous inhibition or by increase of synaptic efficiency). How recovery may be achieved by the brain and how vicariation, redundancy, and diaschisis may take part in this process are hotly debated. Recovery may be achieved by adopting novel cognitive strategies for performance (that is, recruitment of uninjured cerebral areas, which are usually not necessary for the lost function in the intact brain). On the other hand, recovery may be achieved because of the involvement of homotopic (that is, homologous) areas of the contralateral hemisphere that may have compensatory function. Likewise, recovery may be due to the recruitment of perilesional areas surrounding the lesion, which gradually return to normal metabolic values and contribute over time to restore the impaired language function. Which mechanisms effectively participate in the language recovery processes, in which temporal succession they operate, and which of them is the most efficient are, so far, unanswered questions. In principle, vicariation, redundancy, and diaschisis may be involved in combination. For instance, adopting a novel cognitive strategy may be possible by a combination of left- (redundancy) and right-hemispheric (vicariation) recruitment. Modern neuroimaging techniques, in particular functional MRI (fMRI), allow us to test directly the role of these mechanisms. For instance, several studies have highlighted the presence of increased right-sided activation during the performance of language tasks in recovered aphasics. Weiller et al. (1995) reported a pioneering group study of six partially recovered patients with Wernicke’s aphasia. The patients’ cerebral perfusion was measured with positron emission tomography (PET) at rest and during nonword repetition and verb generation. According to a classical “subtractive” design, each language condition was compared with the rest in order to detect the areas of significant task-related activation. The same activation paradigm was applied to a group of normal controls, and the results provided the baseline to evaluate the presence of functional reorganization. The main conclusion was that, in comparison to control subjects, the patient group had a more extensive recruitment of frontal and temporal right-hemispheric regions, homotopical to the language areas of the left hemisphere. The interpretation that the increased right-hemispheric activation was responsible for aphasia recovery must be considered with caution. While the patients were largely recovered, as shown by the change in their aphasia test scores, the verb-generation task is very demanding and calls for
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an extensive activation of the right hemisphere, which was also observed in many normal right-handed subjects (Frackowiak, 1997). Furthermore, the use of a group analysis decreases the likelihood of detecting activation in perilesional areas, which will necessarily vary in individual subjects because of differences in lesion size and location. The results of Weiller et al. (1995) were considered to support the capacity of the right hemisphere to take over the damaged dominant hemisphere by means of its compensatory linguistic skills; at the same time, many other studies ascribe the contribution of preserved areas of the left hemisphere to a better and long-term recovery. In particular, follow-up studies with aphasic patients have revealed the existence of a temporal gradient in the enrollment of cerebral reorganization mechanisms after stroke. The initial employment of undamaged homologous areas of the right hemisphere is followed by their gradual discarding and concomitant, significant increasing of activity in lefthemispheric perilesional areas. The passage of functional competence from the right to the left is associated with improvement of linguistic performances (Karbe et al., 1998). Cao, Vikingstad, George, Johnson, and Welch (1999) reported an fMRI study conducted with aphasics in which there was a significant inverse correlation between activations of the nondominant and dominant hemisphere when subjects performed a picture-naming task and a verb-generation task. Indeed, a better and long-term recovery was associated with left-sided activations. Furthermore, Warburton, Price, Swinburn, and Wise (1999) have demonstrated in recovered aphasic patients, who underwent PET scans while performing a word-retrieval task, that even limited salvage of perilesional tissue may have an important impact on recovery. In line with this experimental evidence, some authors have argued that “righthemispheric recruitment” in functional recovery may simply reflect reliance on additional cognitive and linguistic resources, which are not required by normal subjects during linguistic processing. A similar interpretation was proposed by Rosen et al. (2000) to account for the increased perilesional activation in the area of the left inferior frontal gyrus in patients with superior recovery during a word-stem-completion task. Our recent study with fMRI has given similar results (Perani et al., 2003). Studies of recovered aphasic subjects indicate that the pattern of reorganization observed during word-fluency tasks is heterogeneous, but shows mainly left-hemispheric activation, in the same areas activated in normal subjects, or in other language-related regions. In the case of comprehension, it is also likely that compensatory activation in what appears to be a largely redundant cerebral network may be responsible for improvement. Zahn et al. (2004) studied a group of seven global aphasics who, 6–12 months post-onset, had partially recovered single-word comprehension. During a semantic judgment task, the patients showed activations in areas observed to be engaged in lexicalsemantic comprehension and which were also seen in normal subjects. The balance between ipsilateral and contralateral contributions is probably a crucial component of recovery. Recently, Fernandez et al. (2004) have
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performed a longitudinal study in a patient with conduction aphasia. At 1 month post-onset, during a phonological task, the patient showed an extensive engagement of right-hemispheric areas, homotopic to those activated by normal subjects. When the patient was reassessed 12 months post-onset, there was an enhanced activation of perilesional left hemispheric areas.
Pre- and post-speech therapy fMRI correlations Most of the above functional neuroimaging studies were “single-session” studies; better insight into this issue may be gained by the use of “repeated” functional neuroimaging studies that aim to monitor the recovery process and/or speech therapy in aphasics. This would definitely allow us to document the processes involved in language recovery. For example, Cardebat et al. (2003) reported bihemispheric increases in language-related perisylvian regions, and decreases in regions associated with emotional processing, in a group of aphasic patients studied twice with PET over a period of 6 months. However, the number of studies that attempted to evaluate the neural basis of training-induced modifications of language performance is still limited. One of these studies was conducted, using PET, by Belin et al. (1996). These authors studied patients with chronic nonfluent aphasia who had shown considerable improvement after the introduction of additional rehabilitation training with melodic intonation therapy (MIT). This treatment involves speaking with exaggerated prosody, characterized by a melodic component (Albert, Sparks, & Helm, 1973). Patients were poor at repeating words with a natural intonation, but improved when they used an MIT-like intonation. The pattern of brain activation in comparison with the rest state indicated extensive right-sided involvement during single word repetition with natural intonation. However, in the other active task, which required repetition of words with MIT, the right hemisphere was reported to be deactivated, and a significant increase was found in the left frontal areas. The authors argued that the right-sided activations might reflect a “maladaptive” functional reorganization, due to the presence of the left lesion itself, while actual recovery mediated by MIT training might be associated with the reactivation of left-hemispheric undamaged structures. This latter hypothesis is supported by evidence suggesting that in the case of right-sided activation, recovery is rarely complete and residual deficits usually persist (Cappa, 2000). An important role of the right hemisphere is, however, suggested by the study of Musso, Weiller, Kiebel, Muller, Bulau, and Rijntjes (1999), who investigated with PET the neural correlates of intensive verbal comprehension training in a group of aphasics. Intensive 2-h language comprehension training on a modified version of the Token Test (De Renzi & Vignolo, 1962) was carried out during the PET interscan intervals. The training entailed an increase of correct answers on the Token Test in all patients. Performance on this test was positively correlated with the pattern of rCBF (regional cerebral blood flow) in the right homologs of Wernicke’s and Broca’s areas. This study
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demonstrated that intensive verbal comprehension training recruited rightsided cerebral regions. However, it is difficult to draw strong conclusions from the study, because it is unclear how the results of a 2-h training may be extended to what happens normally during speech-therapy-induced language recovery. It is noteworthy that another “acute training” study reported rightsided effects. Blasi et al. (Blasi, Young, Tansy, Petersen, Snyder, & Corbetta, 2002) found that the learning of a stem-completion task was associated with specific response decrements in the right frontal and occipital cortex, rather than in the left-sided network engaged by normal subjects. More recently, Léger et al. (2002) compared the results of fMRI during a naming task, pre- and post-rehabilitation, in a patient with prominent phonological errors in speech production. The main difference between the two studies was a reactivation of perilesional left-hemispheric areas, in particular Broca’s region and the supramarginal gyrus in the post-treatment study. Another interesting effect after rehabilitation has been recently reported by Peck et al. (2004): the training resulted in a return of the time-to-peak of the BOLD response during word generation in selected brain regions, paralleling the improvement in the speed of word finding in three treated aphasic patients. While the differences observed after rehabilitation in these studies may reasonably be considered to reflect treatment effects, the evidence remains indirect, and is based on the fact that the neural effects are parallel to the behavioral improvements. An attempt to overcome these limits is a recent study performed in our laboratory (Vitali et al., 2007). Using event-related, functional MRI (er-fMRI), we monitored the neural correlates of naming performance in two anomic patients ( patients S.A. and G.R.), before and after specific language therapy for anomia (phonologically cued naming training). A set of pictures that the patients could not name either spontaneously or after being phonologically cued, was selected for intensive speech therapy. The latter consisted in repetitively cuing patients, starting with the initial syllable of the target word and subsequently adding lacking syllables, until the correct answer was produced. After acquisition of the first er-fMRI session, training was intensively administered on a daily basis by a speech pathologist, until a 50% correct naming performance (at least) on the training picture set was achieved (8 weeks for S.A. and 4 weeks for G.R.). Before and after specific speech therapy, an er-fMRI acquisition was performed, during which patients had to overtly name the visually presented pictures of the experimental set and items of a control set (that patients were able to name prior to admission to our study). Improvement in overall naming performance upon therapy administration was more pronounced in patient S.A. than in G.R. In both patients, naming was mainly associated with activations in the nondominant hemisphere before starting speech therapy, while perilesional areas of the dominant hemisphere were mainly activated after speech therapy (Figure 8.1). This finding suggests that the perilesional areas of the dominant hemisphere may be crucial for effective
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Figure 8.1 The pattern of brain activity is measured by functional magnetic resonance imaging, associated with anomia (left column, pre-speech therapy) and with successful naming performance (right column, post-speech therapy) in two anomic patients (S.A., top rows; G.R. bottom rows) (see text for further details). As may be observed, a hemispheric shift of brain activity associated with a better performance in naming occurred in both patients. However, in G.R., also the right homolog of Broca’s area was activated, probably because his original brain lesion extended into the left Broca’s area proper. Areas involved in phonological processing are circled (red circles = Broca’s area; green circles = supramarginal gyrus), emphasizing that both patients used the trained phonological strategies for successful naming (modified from Vitali et al., 2007). (This figure is published in color at www.psypress.com/brainscans-etc/)
recovery. However, in patient G.R., also the right homolog of Broca’s area proper was found to be activated, probably because his original brain lesion extended into the left Broca’s area (Figure 8.1). In the absence of the left Broca’s area, successful naming may be mediated by its right homolog area. These findings agree with studies that have highlighted the ability of the contralateral nondominant hemisphere (in particular of the perisylvian areas) to compensate for a loss of function in the damaged dominant hemisphere. It is also worth underlining that the anomia-specific rehabilitation, based on phonological cuing, was associated with activation in brain areas classically ascribed to phonological processing, phonological working memory, and lexical retrieval (left inferior frontal gyrus and supramarginal gyrus); this activation pattern could reflect a facilitated access and retrieval of lexical items from the mental lexicon by enhanced and trained sublexical, phonological strategies.
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Conclusion Functional neuroimaging techniques brought to the fore new evidence in the cortical organization of cognitive functions that previously were difficult to study due to the limited information classical methods may provide. These techniques are suitable for a clinical use; that is, to study the cortical reorganization of language areas after brain injury. The repeatability of fMRI over time allows one to investigate how patterns of cerebral activity may change during the course of recovery and to observe consequently the influence of treatment on brain functioning. Without these new techniques, it would have been quite impossible to document the cerebral plasticity that may occur during recovery of function. In particular, the results of the research conducted in our laboratory (Vitali et al., 2007) have shown that the activation of spared perilesional tissue in the left hemisphere is associated with a better and long-term language recovery. Moreover, the training-induced cerebral reorganization observed in both patients reflected also the ability of the damaged brain to display plastic changes in response to a specific rehabilitative treatment. Furthermore, it supports the usefulness of functional imaging as a tool to assess the neurobiological effects of specific rehabilitation training. Apart from increasing our knowledge of the mechanisms of functional recovery and their temporal sequence, pre- and postoperative language, fMRI is revolutionizing the field of neurolinguistics: instead of thinking in terms of the classical anatomoclinical correlations dating back to Broca’s time, we are now able to draw correlations directly between cerebral activity and linguistic performance. Thus, the actual question is no longer “What is injured?”, but “What is working?”
References Albert, M. L., Sparks, R. W., & Helm, N. A. (1973). Melodic intonation therapy for aphasia. Archives of Neurology, 29, 130–131. Alexander, M. P. (1989). Clinical-anatomical correlations of aphasia following predominantly subcortical lesions. In F. Boller and J. Grafman (Eds.), Handbook of neuropsychology (vol. 2). Amsterdam: Elsevier. Belin, P., Van Eeckhout, P., Zilbovicius, M., Remy, P., Francois, C., Guillaume, S., et al. (1996). Recovery from non-fluent aphasia after melodic intonation therapy: A PET study. Neurology, 47, 1504–1511. Blasi, V., Young, A. C., Tansy, A. P., Petersen, S. E., Snyder, A. Z., & Corbetta, M. (2002). Word retrieval learning modulates right frontal cortex in patients with left frontal damage. Neuron, 36, 159–170. Cao, Y., Vikingstad, E. M., George, K. P., Johnson, A. F., & Welch, K. M. (1999). Cortical language activation in stroke patients recovering from aphasia with functional MRI. Stroke, 30, 2331–2340. Cappa, S. F. (2000). Recovery from aphasia: Why and how? Brain and Language, 71, 39–41. Cardebat, D., Demonet, J. F., De Boissezon, X., Marie, N., Marié, R. M., Lambert, J.,
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et al. (2003). Behavioral and neurofunctional changes over time in healthy and aphasic subjects: A PET language activation study. Stroke, 34, 2900–2906. De Renzi E., & Vignolo, L. (1962). The Token Test: A sensitive test to detect receptive disturbances in aphasics. Brain, 85, 665–678. Fernandez, B., Cardebat, D., Demonet, J. F., Joseph, P. A., Mazaux, J. M., & Barat, M. (2004). Functional MRI follow-up study of language processes in healthy subjects and during recovery in a case of aphasia. Stroke, 35, 2171–2176. Frackowiak, R. S. J. (1997). The cerebral basis of functional recovery. In R. S. J. Frackowiak, K. J. Friston, C. Frith, R. J. Dolan, & J. C. Mazziotta (Eds.), Human brain function (pp. 275–299). New York: Academic Press. Furlan, M., Marchal, G., Viader, F., Derlon, J. M., & Baron, J. C. (1996). Spontaneous neurological recovery after stroke and the fate of the ischemic penumbra. Annals of Neurology, 40, 216–226. Heiss, W., Kessler, J., Karbe, H., Fink, G., & Pawlik, G. (1993). Cerebral glucose metabolism as a predictor of recovery from aphasia in ischemic stroke. Archives of Neurology, 50, 958–964. Heiss, W., Kessler, J., Thiel, A., Ghaemi, M., & Karbe, H. (1997). Speech-induced cerebral metabolic activation reflects recovery from aphasia. Journal of the Neurological Sciences, 145, 213–217. Karbe, H., Thiel, A., Weber-Luxenburger, G., Herholz, K., Kessler, J., & Heiss, W. D. (1998). Brain plasticity in post-stroke aphasia: What is the contribution of the right hemisphere? Brain and Language, 64, 215–230. Kertesz, A., Lesk, D., & McCabe, P. (1977). Isotope localization of infarcts in aphasia. Archives of Neurology, 34, 590–601. Léger, A. Demonet, J. F., Ruff, S., Aithamon, B., Touyeras, B., Puel, M., et al. (2002). Neural substrates of spoken language rehabilitation in an aphasic patient: An fMRI study. NeuroImage, 17, 174–183. Mahagne, M. H., Darcourt, J., Migneco, O., Fournier, J. P., Thiercelin, D., Ducœur S., et al. (2000). Early (99m)Tc-ethylcysteinate dimer brain SPECT patterns in the acute phase of stroke as predictors of neurological recovery. Cerebrovascular Disease, 10, 364–373. Mazzocchi, F., & Vignolo L. A. (1979). Computer assisted tomography in neuropsychological research: A simple procedure for lesion mapping. Cortex, 14, 13–144. Musso, M., Weiller, C., Kiebel, S., Muller, S. P., Bulau, P., & Rijntjes M. (1999). Training-induced brain plasticity in aphasia. Brain, 122, 1781–1790. Peck, K. K., Moore, A. B., Crosson, B. A., Gaiefsky, M., Gopinath, K. S., White, K., et al. (2004). Functional magnetic resonance imaging before and after aphasia therapy: Shifts in hemodynamic time to peak during an overt language task. Stroke, 35, 554–559. Pedersen, P. M., Jorgensen, H. S., Nakayama, H., Raaschou, H. O., & Olsen, T. S. (1995). Aphasia in acute stroke: Incidence, determinants, and recovery. Annals of Neurology, 38, 659–666. Perani, D., Cappa, S. F., Tettamanti, M., Rosa, M., Scifo, P., Miozzo, A., et al. (2003). An fMRI study of word retrieval in aphasia. Brain and Language, 85, 357–368. Rosen, H. J., Petersen, S. E., Linenweber, M. R., Snyder, A. Z., White, D. A., Chapman, L., et al. (2000). Neural correlates of recovery from aphasia after damage to left inferior frontal cortex. Neurology, 55, 1883–1894. Sarno, M. T., & Levita, E. (1971). Natural course of recovery in severe aphasia. Archives of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, 52, 175–179.
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Vignolo, L. A. (1964). Evolution of aphasia and language rehabilitation: A retrospective exploratory study. Cortex, 1, 344–367. Vitali, P., Abutalebi, J., Tettamanti, M., Danna, M., Ansaldo, A. I., Perani, D., et al. (2007). Training-induced brain-remapping in chronic aphasia: A pilot study. Neurorehabilitation and Neural Repair, 21, 152–160. Warburton, E., Price, C. J., Swinburn, K., & Wise, R. J. (1999). Mechanisms of recovery from aphasia: Evidence from positron emission tomography studies. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry, 66, 155–161. Weiller, C., Isensee, C., Rijntjes, M., Huber, W., Müller, S., Bier, D., et al. (1995). Recovery from Wernicke’s aphasia: A positron emission tomographic study. Annals of Neurology, 37, 723–732. Zahn, R., Drews, E., Specht, K., Kemeny, S., Reith, W., Willmes, K., et al. (2004). Recovery of semantic word processing in global aphasia: A functional MRI study. Brain Research and Cognitive Brain Research, 18, 322–336.
9
Aphasia rehabilitation Anna Basso
In this chapter, I shall consider an important problem faced by aphasia therapy efficacy studies, an issue that we—in collaboration with Professor Luigi Vignolo—started to study some 40 years ago at the neurological clinic of Milan University, where a few years earlier an aphasia rehabilitation centre had been opened. Many different techniques and experimental designs have been employed in an effort to solve the thorny problem of aphasia therapy efficacy, but no general agreement has been reached, notwithstanding the increasing body of evidence that aphasia therapy works. Some researchers still maintain that the reported studies are not experimentally sound and that their results cannot be taken as evidence; they say that such studies should be based on randomized, controlled trials (RCTs). I am not going to discuss whether or not RCTs provide the best scientific method for the assessment of aphasia treatment efficacy, but I shall focus on a different problem: the need to define the disorder to be treated and the treatment to be evaluated before evaluating its efficacy. This chapter starts with a brief review of aphasia therapy efficacy studies and the definition of the terms efficacy and effectiveness. Subsequently, examples of different production disorders and different treatments are given, followed by a discussion of the importance of the amount of treatment in evaluating its efficacy. The conclusion will be drawn that the question of aphasia therapy efficacy is too broad and that the aphasic disorder to be treated, the chosen treatment, and its implementation must be defined first.
Summary of research on aphasia therapy efficacy The first group studies on treatment efficacy were performed in the 1950s and 1960s. Only rehabilitated subjects were included, and their results at a first and a second (generally subjective) evaluation were compared. All authors (Butfield & Zangwill, 1946; Leischner & Lynk, 1967; Marks, Taylor, & Rusk, 1957; Sands, Sarno, & Shankweiler, 1969; Sarno & Levita, 1979) agreed that aphasia therapy is effective, but they ignored the possible effect of spontaneous recovery. This shortcoming was corrected in the following group of studies that compared treated and untreated subjects, evaluated by
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standardized batteries. The results of these group studies were equivocal because therapy was found to have a significant effect on recovery in some (Basso, Capitani, & Vignolo, 1979; Basso, Faglioni, & Vignolo, 1975; Gloning, Trappl, Heiss, & Quatember, 1976; Hagen, 1973; Poeck, Huber, & Willmes, 1989; Shewan & Kertesz, 1984), but not in all studies (Lincoln, McGuirk, Mulley, Lendrem, Jones, & Mitchell, 1984; Pickersgill & Lincoln, 1983; Vignolo, 1964). Other criticisms of this group of studies refer to the heterogeneity of the subjects (different age, aetiology, education, etc.) and the nonrandom allocation of subjects to the treated and untreated group. Exceptions to the non-random allocation of subjects are the US Veterans Administration studies (Marshall et al., 1989; Wertz et al., 1981, 1986) and Lincoln et al.’s study (1984). Treated and untreated subjects were also compared in a wellcontrolled study, in which the effect of therapy was studied in pairs of subjects—one rehabilitated and one non-rehabilitated—matched for type and severity of aphasia, lesion site, age, and educational level (Mazzoni, Vista, Geri, Avila, Bianchi, & Moretti, 1995). Treated subjects recovered more than untreated subjects. Another way of dealing with the problem of spontaneous recovery is to study chronic aphasic subjects beyond the period of spontaneous recovery. This has been done in a number of studies (Aten, Caligiuri, & Holland, 1982; Broida, 1977; Mackenzie, 1991; Wepman, 1951), which all found a certain amount of recovery, always ascribed to therapy, since all subjects were supposed to have reached a plateau before entering the study. The effect of rehabilitation has also been studied by comparing results obtained by speech therapists and by volunteers (David, Enderby, & Bainton, 1982; Hartman & Landau, 1987; Marshall et al., 1989; Meikle et al., 1979; Wertz et al., 1986). This approach permits circumvention of the ethical problem of denying rehabilitation to a group of patients and, at the same time, it responds to the criticism that rehabilitated and non-rehabilitated subjects differ in the amount of attention they receive. None of the studies that adopted this strategy found significantly better results for the group of subjects treated by speech therapists. Taken separately, none of the aforesaid studies provide sufficient unequivocal evidence to demonstrate that aphasia therapy is effective. It should be noted that negative results cannot demonstrate that aphasia therapy is not effective. The null hypothesis cannot be proved; it can only be disproved. However, more studies support the efficacy of aphasia therapy. It can be objected that more “positive” than “negative” papers have been published because negative findings tend not to be published, the so-called file-drawer problem. While it is not possible to reach certainty, Robey (1998) studied this problem by plotting sample size over effect size and concluded that there is no publication bias. More recently, scientific evidence in support of the efficacy of aphasia therapy has come from meta-analyses. A meta-analysis is a scientific way to synthesize research findings and to establish the weight of the scientific evidence bearing on a certain research hypothesis. Three meta-analyses have
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supported the efficacy of aphasia therapy (Robey, 1994, 1998; Whurr, Lorch, & Nye, 1992). Greener, Enderby, and Whurr (1999) conducted a review analysis for the Cochrane Collaboration. The inclusion criteria were strict: all subjects had to have a vascular lesion and to be randomly allocated to the treated and untreated group. Only two studies comparing treated and untreated subjects were found, and the authors concluded: “Speech and language therapy treatment for people with aphasia after a stroke has not been shown either to be clearly effective or clearly ineffective within a RCT” ( p. 1).
Level of evidence scales Means for evaluating the results obtained in outcome research are called level of evidence scales. Two large reviews on level of evidence for cognitive rehabilitation were performed (Cappa, Benke, Clarke, Rossi, Stemmer, & van Heugten, 2003; Cicerone et al., 2000). Cicerone et al. (2000) classified class I studies as prospective RCTs, class II studies as prospective cohort studies, retrospective case-control studies, and clinical series with well-designed controls; and, finally, class III studies as clinical series without controls. Cappa et al. (2003) classified evidence level (EL) as Ia when based on meta-analysis of RCTs, as Ib when based on at least one RCT, as IIa when based on welldesigned, controlled studies, and as IIb when based on well-designed, quasiexperimental studies. Thus, both groups of researchers consider the statistical design of the study of primary importance, and the RCTs as the reference standard. No one would challenge the view that a well-controlled study provides more adequate information than a methodologically inadequate study, but it is striking that the amount of provided therapy has never been considered as an exclusion or inclusion criterion. The effect of the amount of therapy has been studied and found to affect recovery significantly. However, the evidence of two hypothetical studies, a positive and a negative one, carried out with the same statistical work-up, would be considered equal, independently of the amount of therapy. This is questionable, since the amount of therapy (hypothetically smaller in the negative study and larger in the positive one) could by itself explain the different results.
Efficacy and effectiveness It is possible to explain, at least partially, the non-complementary conclusions from different studies if one takes into consideration the difference between efficacy and effectiveness as postulated by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA, 1978). Efficacy is defined as “the probability of benefit to individuals in a defined population from a medical technology applied to a given medical problem under ideal conditions of use” ( p. 16); effectiveness has been defined in the same terms except for the conditions of use, which are average.
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Therefore, it seems logical that the efficacy of a treatment should be proven first. Only after a treatment has been demonstrated to be efficacious, can effectiveness be investigated by changing, for example, the duration of the treatment to find out what is the shortest efficacious duration. Incidentally, two of the most frequently cited “negative” studies (David et al., 1982; Lincoln et al., 1984) are effectiveness, and not efficacy, studies, as clearly acknowledged by the authors themselves. David et al. (1982), for instance, wrote, “We attempted to design a study which represented the kind of patients with aphasia and the amount of treatment normally encountered in speech therapy departments in this country” (p. 959), and David (1983) adds: It is likely that more intensive treatment would produce more positive changes over a longer period in most patients. Unfortunately the British speech therapy service is not usually able to provide many patients with more intensive treatment than was investigated in our study. (David, 1983, p. 691) The only conclusion that can be drawn is not that aphasia treatment is not efficacious, but that the amount of treatment provided in the way it was provided was not effective.
Variability of the disorder As stated above, I leave the question open whether or not aphasia therapy efficacy has been demonstrated and what the best experimental design is to study it. I am more interested in tackling a different and, in my view, logically preceding issue. To study the efficacy of a given medical treatment, we must know which problem we want to treat and which treatment is used to treat it. In aphasia therapy efficacy studies, neither the problem—aphasia—nor the treatment has been clearly defined. When the first efficacy studies were conducted, our knowledge of aphasia was scantier than today. No one would have questioned that people with aphasia differ not only because of the severity of the disorder but also because there are different forms of aphasia, such as Broca’s, Wernicke’s, and conduction aphasia. Researchers observed contrasting patterns of performance for different patient groups and argued that distinct collections of symptoms (that is, syndromes) occur as a result of brain lesions to different neural substrates. It was then believed that the underlying disturbance for each syndrome could ultimately be linked to a specific brain area. Over the past two to three decades, patients’ data have increasingly been used to constrain claims about the structure of the normal cognitive system. The emphasis was not on the relationship between a constellation of symptoms and a brain area but on the relationship between cognitively impaired performance and the normal cognitive system. Cognitive neuropsychologists did not engage in the investigation of syndromes. They mostly engaged in thorough investigations
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of the impaired performance of single patients, since careful analysis of the impaired performance of a single patient can provide a basis for fine-grained hypotheses about the structure of normal cognitive mechanisms. This increased interest in the underlying damage has obvious consequences for therapy. If we can identify different functional damages, we should also be able to instantiate different treatments. To illustrate the variability of the aphasic disorders, I report samples of the spontaneous speech of four aphasic subjects, the first with verbal jargon, the second with phonemic jargon, the third with anomia, and the last with agrammatic speech. All subjects described the same picture of a living room in which a woman is knitting, a man sits in an armchair reading a newspaper, a young girl is watching television, a boy is playing with cubes, and a cat is playing with a ball of wool. Verbal jargon Subject P.M., a 62-year-old man with 17 years of formal education, had suffered a cerebrovascular accident 2 months before assessment at the aphasia unit of Milan University. A CT scan showed a temporal-parietal lesion in the left hemisphere. His speech was fluent with frequent paraphasias; he scored 6 on the Token Test (De Renzi & Faglioni, 1978) and 21 on Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices (RCPM) (Raven, 1965). He described the picture in the following way: “What do we see here? And the girl the boys the share because has difficulties here where the children lean who tie the girls here who carry the (feminine singular) plugs those for the usual lamps who however do not look. Now then, we were saying that the children through it looked at the light and the children made the reading for the plug light. The girls moved the sight of the yo yo youngs who are passing here the visit of the children with the whole plug of the children the sight of the children and the fastening.” [Cosa vediamo qua? E la ragazza i ragazzi la quota perché ha difficoltà qui dove poggiano i bambini che legano le bambine qua che portano la prese quelle per le lampade solite che però non guardano. Allora si parlava che i bambini attraverso si guardava la luce e i bambini facevano la lettura per la presa della luce. Le bimbe hanno mosso la vista delle gio gio giovani che passano qui la vista dei bambini con tutta la presa dei bambini la vista dei bambini e la chiusura.] Phonemic jargon G.R., a 49-year-old man with a degree in architecture, underwent total ablation of a left temporal tumour a month before testing. A CT scan performed after surgery showed an ischaemic lesion in the left temporal-parietal-occipital region. G.R. had fluent speech, characterized by phonemic jargon. He scored 4 on the Token Test and 11 on the RCPM.
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His description is reported here; the translation of the rare sequences that corresponded to existing Italian words is written in parentheses. “Normerugia dorcuore sircora sircore mori chiari (light) brava bravo (good; feminine, masculine) qui (here) nustase dormire (sleep) oce seluta chestari chelone sostali iusta questo (this) cocchieri no no nola questi e basta basta (these and enough enough).” Anomia A.S., a 62-year-old woman with a degree in biology, was admitted to hospital following an intracerebral left temporal haemorrhage; neurosurgery was not performed, and 3 months later a CT scan revealed a hypodense area in the left subcortical temporal region. She was tested 2 months later at the aphasia unit. Her speech was fluent and abundant with frequent word-finding difficulties. She scored 18 on the Token Test and 20 on the RCPM. Her description of the picture was as follows: “The dog that plays with . . . I don’t know what’s its name . . . of the owner who is knitting. Here there is the television but it is disconnected the . . . what do you say . . . the back, well! The girl who looks and the father who is looking the . . . the small brother is playing with 5 cards and the shorter cards and one in hand. Here there is . . . I don’t remember its name, and there are . . . one two bookcases.” [Il cane che gioca con . . . non so come si chiama . . . della padrona che sta lavorando a maglie. Qui c’è la televisione però è staccato il . . . come si dice . . . il didietro, insomma . . . la bambina che guarda e il papà che sta guardando il . . . un fratellino sta giocando con 5 carte più le carte più corte e una in mano. Qui c’è . . . non mi ricordo come si chiama e ci sono . . . una, due librerie.] Agrammatism U.S., a 43-year-old woman with 13 years of formal education, taught mathematics. Four months before testing, she suffered a rupture of an aneurysm of the left middle cerebral artery, which was immediately clipped. Her speech was nonfluent, halting, and effortful and presented the characteristic of agrammatism. She scored 22 on the Token Test and 34 on the RCPM. She described the picture as follows: “Grandfather to read newspaper girl television, cinema . . . boy lego . . . not the grandfather, husband. Stiches, stich, cat, ball, wool.” [Nonno leggere giornale, bambina TV, cine . . . bambino lego . . . non il nonno, marito! Maglie, maglia, gatto, palla, lana.] It is difficult to believe that underlying these contrasting speech outputs is the same functional damage; that is, that they are the result of one and the same disorder. At a very superficial level of analysis, we can hypothesize that agrammatic speech has to do with sentence construction processing, anomic production with the processing of the phonological forms of words, semantic
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jargon with the relationship between a word form and its meaning, and phonemic jargon with phonological planning. If this is the case, that is, if these speech samples must be attributed to different underlying deficits, they require different treatments, even if they can all be grouped under the generic definition of production disorders.
Variability of the treatment content Under the vague definition of aphasia therapy, we can find treatments that differ widely in their content and in the rationale they are based on. What really happens during treatment is largely unknown, and we use the words treatment or therapy to indicate any exchange between an aphasic subject and a person who is professionally entitled to treat the patient. I briefly report two treatments, the first for global aphasia and the second for transcortical motor aphasia, which have been considered interesting enough to be published but which, in my opinion, well illustrate how poorly motivated treatments can be. Collins (1983) argues that the first aim in a global aphasic subject’s treatment is the intentional production of “yes” and “no”. He proposes that the therapist physically assist the subject with five repetitions of yes (head nod) while he or she says “yes” and with five repetitions of no (side-to-side head movements) while saying “no”. The second step consists of alternatively saying “yes” and “no” while physically assisting the subject to nod and move the head from left to right. Finally, the therapist asks a simple question and physically helps the subject to move the head in the appropriate way while saying either “yes” or “no”. Assuming that there are motor processing problems in transcortical motor aphasia, Johnson (1983) considers improvement of motor processing the primary goal in the treatment of transcortical motor aphasia. The subject is first required to imitate gross conventional movements, such as waving goodbye, and then to pantomime an action, such as throwing a ball. The final step consists in having the subject perform the same action (throwing a ball) while saying, “I am throwing a ball.” These are two extreme examples, and I hope that nobody today would agree with these suggestions, but the literature is still full of examples of different treatments for the same impairment and similar treatments for different impairments, and it is highly unlikely that they all work adequately. As an example, some proposals for the treatment of agrammatism will be discussed. Agrammatism has always attracted the attention of researchers and therapists. Many theories have been proposed to explain this language disorder and many different interventions have been developed to treat it. Two intervention strategies derived from different theoretical interpretations of the disorder will be briefly illustrated. The treatment proposed by HelmEstabrooks, the Helm Elicited Language Program for Syntax Stimulation (HELPSS) (Helm-Estabrooks, Fitzpatrick, & Barresi, 1981; Helm-Estabrooks & Ramsberger, 1986), is derived from principles of behavioural psychology: if
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a response is associated with a given stimulus and the stimulus is presented many times, the response will be learned. HELPSS is based on a study by Gleason, Goodglass, Green, Ackerman, and Hyde (1975), in which a storycompletion technique was used to elicit spoken responses to 14 syntactic constructions with an order of difficulty from eight subjects with agrammatism. HELPSS incorporates the order of difficulty and the story-completion technique. Subjects are shown a picture, and the therapist describes it. For example, “Rob’s grandchild is bored. Rob gets a book, and he reads his grandchild a story. What does he do?” Target response: “He reads his grandchild a story.” Many instances of the same grammatical structure are presented, and when the subject is 90% correct, the therapist proceeds to the second level in which the target sentence is not spoken by the therapist. Jones (1986) proposed a therapeutic programme designed for a non-fluent aphasic subject with agrammatism. The programme is based on the hypothesis that the subject’s fundamental problem is in mapping meaning relations between semantics and syntax, that is, in the argument structure of verbs. Verbs form the basis of sentence construction and have a structure inherent to their meaning. The verb “eat”, for example, requires an animate actor who performs the action of eating—the agent—and something to be eaten—the food. Jones did not ask her agrammatic subject to produce sentences, as in the HELPSS method. The subject was required not to produce sentences but to analyse them. In a simple subject–verb–object sentence, the subject had to identify the verb and underline it. The role of the agent was then explained and the subject was required to find out who was the doer of the action in the sentence. The following step consisted in explaining to the subject that in many cases the action is performed on something and to ask him to isolate the undergoer (or patient) of the action in the sentence. These two interventions strategies are quite different; it cannot be excluded that they are equally efficacious for exactly the same subjects, but this seems rather implausible and published data do not permit comparison of their efficacy. In any case, it does not seem sensible to pool studies using different treatment methods and evaluate their efficacy simultaneously in all subjects.
Variability of treatment implementation Treatments do not vary only in their content; they also differ in the amount of therapy delivered and in its intensity. The issue of amount of therapy has been frequently addressed in aphasia research. A careful review of the studies that compared treated and untreated subjects shows that treatment was of short duration in all “negative” studies where it was not found to be effective (Levita, 1978; Lincoln et al., 1984; Pickersgill & Lincoln, 1983; Prins, Schoonen, & Vermeulen, 1989; Sarno, Silverman, & Sands, 1970; Vignolo, 1964), whereas it lasted for longer periods of time in all “positive” studies (Basso et al., 1975, 1979; Gloning et al., 1976; Hagen, 1973; Mazzoni et al., 1995). The difference between the mean number of therapy sessions in the
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positive and the negative studies was found to be significant (Bhogal, Teasell, & Speechley, 2003). The effect of amount of treatment was also studied by Robey (1998), who performed a meta-analysis of clinical outcomes for treatments of acquired aphasia. He calculated the effect size (an index of the observed departure from the null hypothesis) for 12 studies that reported data on amount of recovery. Results indicate that amount of recovery was positively correlated with length of treatment and number of sessions. A priori, we would expect inadequate treatment to have no effect. The available evidence suggests that aphasia therapy needs to be prolonged if it is to have any effect. However, studies of efficacy of aphasia therapy have been criticized for many reasons (the most frequent being that subjects were not randomly allocated to the treated and untreated group), but the question of the minimum amount of therapy required has never been raised.
Conclusion Researchers have done their best to tackle the question of the efficacy of aphasia therapy, and they have used different techniques (treated and untreated subjects, chronic aphasic subjects, and matched subjects). In the behavioural sciences, however, it is practically impossible to carry out an ideal experiment, and none of the reported studies stand above criticism. More or less welldesigned group studies have attempted to respond to the question of efficacy of aphasia therapy in the past when we did not appreciate as well as we do now how much even apparently similar aphasic symptoms can be the expression of widely different underlying damage. Consequently, aphasia therapy was less tailored to each subject than it is now. Some meta-analyses, which are attempts to put together the results of efficacy studies, were also performed. Metaanalyses are based on a literature search of studies concerned with efficacy, and studies considered inadequate are excluded from the meta-analysis. The metaanalyses performed on aphasia clinical outcomes were based on different data sets. Greener et al. (1999) used the most stringent criteria (100% of vascular subjects, randomly allocated to the treated and untreated group) and could only include two studies (Lincoln et al., 1984; Wertz et al., 1986). They could reach no conclusion about aphasia therapy efficacy. The results of the other meta-analyses confirm the efficacy of aphasia therapy. The bulk of experimental evidence is greatly in favour of the efficacy of aphasia therapy. However, I tried to show that the question, “Is aphasia therapy efficacious?”, is definitely too broad because there is no such thing as “aphasia” or “treatment for aphasia”. Aphasia and therapy for aphasia are comprehensive terms; under the cover term “aphasia”, many different disorders are grouped and various, totally independent treatments have been described for aphasic disorders. If we agree that aphasic disorders and their treatments are numerous, different, and independent, we must admit that a positive answer to the generic question, “Is aphasia therapy effective?”, would be of no help for people
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involved in aphasia therapy. A positive answer does not specify which treatment is effective for which disorder. A positive and uncontroversial response to such a question would have “political” importance because it could be used to obtain social investments in aphasia therapy, but it could in no way guide therapy. To solve the problem of the efficacy of aphasia therapy in a more scientifically correct way, researchers should agree on a small number of relatively homogeneous areas of disorders, such as single word processing, reading, and writing. Each of these areas is sufficiently large to justify research on its own; it covers various functional disorders that, however, are sufficiently homogeneous to be considered together. Furthermore, the minimum requirements to define what can be considered a treatment should be established. Unfortunately, at this moment, we are not in the position to agree on which treatments are sensible and merit evaluation and which are not. However, the content of a treatment should be clearly defined and reproducible, and the reasons why it is supposed to work should be clearly stated. Only if these minimal requirements are satisfied will it be possible to evaluate first the efficacy of a specific treatment for a given disorder and then its effectiveness in less ideal conditions. What we will probably find is that certain treatments for certain disorders work and others do not.
References Aten, J., Caligiuri, M. P., & Holland, A. L. (1982). The efficacy of functional communication therapy for chronic aphasic patients. Journal of Speech and Hearing Disorders, 47, 93–96. Basso, A., Capitani, E., & Vignolo, L. A. (1979). Influence of rehabilitation of language skills in aphasic patients: A controlled study. Archives of Neurology, 36, 190–196. Basso, A., Faglioni, P., & Vignolo, L. A. (1975). Étude controlée de la rééducation du langage dans l’aphasie: Comparaison entre aphasiques traités et non-traités. Revue Neurologique, 131, 607–614. Bhogal, S. K., Teasell, R., & Speechley, M. (2003). Intensity of aphasia therapy: Impact on recovery. Stroke, 34, 987–993. Broida, H. (1977). Language therapy effects in long term aphasia. Archives of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, 58, 248–253. Butfield, E., & Zangwill, O. L. (1946). Re-education in aphasia: A review of 70 cases. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry, 9, 75–79. Cappa, S., Benke, T., Clarke, S., Rossi, B., Stemmer, B., & van Heugten, C. M. (2003). EFNS guidelines on cognitive rehabilitation: Report on an EFNS Task Force. European Journal of Neurology, 10, 11–23. Cicerone, K. D., Dahlberg, C. Kalmar, K., Langenbahn, D. M., Malec, J. F., Bergquist, T. F., et al. (2000). Evidence-based cognitive rehabilitation: Recommendations for clinical practice. Archives of Clinical Medicine and Rehabilitation, 81, 1596–1615. Collins, M. (1983). Treatment of global aphasia. In W.H. Perkins (Ed.), Language handicaps in adults (pp. 25–33). New York: Thieme Stratton. David, R. M. (1983). Treatment of acquired aphasia: Speech therapists and volunteers compared. A reply. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry, 46, 690–691.
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David, R. M., Enderby, P., & Bainton, D. (1982). Treatment of acquired aphasia: Speech therapists and volunteers compared. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry, 45, 957–961. De Renzi, E., & Faglioni, P. (1978). Normative data and screening power of a shortened version of the Token Test. Cortex, 14, 41–49. Gleason, J. B., Goodglass, H., Green, E., Ackerman, N., & Hyde, M. (1975). The retrieval of syntax in Broca’s aphasia. Brain and Language, 24, 451–457. Gloning, K., Trappl, R., Heiss, W. D., & Quatember, R. (1976). Prognosis and speech therapy in aphasia. In Y. Lebrun and R. Hoops (Eds.), Recovery in aphasics (pp. 57–62). Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press. Greener, J., Enderby, P., & Whurr, R. (1999). Speech and language therapy for aphasia following stroke (Cochrane Review). In The Cochrane Library, Issue 4. Oxford: Update software. Hagen, C. (1973). Communication abilities in hemiplegia: Effect of speech therapy. Archives of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, 54, 454–463. Hartman, J., & Landau, W. M. (1987). Comparison of formal language therapy with supportive counselling for aphasia due to acute vascular accident. Archives of Neurology, 24, 646–649. Helm-Estabrooks, N., Fitzpatrick, P., & Barresi, B. (1981). Response of an agrammatic patient to a syntax program for aphasia. Journal of Speech and Hearing Disorders, 46, 422–427. Helm-Estabrooks, N., & Ramsberger, G. (1986). Treatment of agrammatism in long-term Broca’s aphasia. British Journal of Disorders of Communication, 21, 39–45. Johnson, M. G. (1983). Treatment of transcortical motor aphasia. In W. H. Perkins (Ed.), Language handicaps in adults (pp. 87–95). New York: Thieme Stratton. Jones, E. (1986). Building the foundations for sentence production in a non-fluent aphasia. British Journal of Disorders of Communication, 21, 63–82. Leischner, A., & Lynk, H. A. (1967). Neure Erfahrungen mit der Behandlung von Aphasien. Nervenartz, 38, 199–205. Levita, E. (1978). Effects of speech therapy on aphasics’ responses to the Functional Communication Profile. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 47, 151–154. Lincoln, N. B., McGuirk, E., Mulley, G. P., Lendrem, W., Jones, A. C., & Mitchell, J. R. A. (1984). Effectiveness of speech therapy for aphasic stroke patients: A randomized controlled trial. Lancet, 1, 1197–1200. Mackenzie, C. (1991). An aphasia group intensive efficacy study. British Journal of Disorders of Communication, 26, 275–29. Marks, M., Taylor, M., & Rusk, H. A. (1957). Rehabilitation of the aphasic patient: A summary of three years’ experience in a rehabilitation setting. Archives of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, 38, 219–226. Marshall, R. C., Wertz, R. T., Weiss, D. G., Aten, J. L., Brookshire, R. H., GarciaBunuel, L., et al. (1989). Home treatment for aphasic patients by trained nonprofessionals. Journal of Speech and Hearing Disorders, 54, 462–470. Mazzoni, M., Vista, M., Geri, E., Avila, L., Bianchi, F., & Moretti, P. (1995). Comparison of language recovery in rehabilitated and matched, non-rehabilitated aphasic patients. Aphasiology, 9, 553–563. Meikle, M., Wechsler, E., Tupper, A., Benenson, M., Butler, J., Mulhall, D., et al. (1979). Comparative trial of volunteer and professional treatments of dysphasia after stroke. British Medical Journal, 2, 87–89.
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OTA (Office of Technology Assessment) (1978). Assessing the efficacy and safety of medical technologies, (OTA-H-75). Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. Pickersgill, M. J., & Lincoln, N. B. (1983). Prognostic indicators and the pattern of recovery of communication in aphasic stroke patients. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry, 46, 130–139. Poeck, K., Huber, W., & Willmes, K. (1989). Outcome of intensive language treatment in aphasia. Journal of Speech and Hearing Disorders, 54, 471–479. Prins, R. S., Schoonen, R., & Vermeulen, J. (1989). Efficacy of two different types of speech therapy for aphasic stroke patients. Applied Psycholinguistics, 10, 85–123. Raven, J. C. (1965). Guide to using the coloured progressive matrices sets A, Ab, B. London: H. K. Lewis. Robey, R. R. (1994). The efficacy of treatment for aphasic persons: A meta-analysis. Brain and Language, 47, 582–608. Robey, R. R. (1998). A meta-analysis of clinical outcomes in the treatment of aphasia. Journal of Speech, Language, and Hearing Research, 41, 172–187. Sands, E., Sarno, M. T., & Shankweiler, D. (1969). Long-term assessment of language function in aphasia due to stroke. Archives of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, 50, 202–206. Sarno, M. T., & Levita, E. (1979). Recovery in treated aphasia in the first year poststroke. Stroke, 10, 663–669. Sarno, M. T., Silverman, M., & Sands, E. (1970). Speech therapy and language recovery in severe aphasia. Journal of Speech and Hearing Research, 13, 607–623. Shewan, C. M., & Kertesz, A. (1984). Effects of speech and language treatment in recovery from aphasia. Brain and Language, 23, 272–299. Vignolo, L. A. (1964). Evolution of aphasia and language rehabilitation: A retrospective exploratory study. Cortex, 1, 344–367. Wepman, J. M. (1951). Recovery from aphasia. New York: Ronald Press. Wertz, R. T., Collins M. J., Weiss, D., Kurtzke, J. F., Friden, T., Brookshire, R. H., et al. (1981). Veterans Administration cooperative study on aphasia: A comparison of individual and group treatment. Journal of Speech and Hearing Disorders, 24, 580–594. Wertz, R. T., Weiss, D. G., Aten, J. L., Brookshire, R. H., Garcia-Bunuel, L., Holland, A. L., et al. (1986). Comparison of clinic, home, and deferred language treatment for aphasia. A Veterans Administration cooperative study. Archives of Neurology, 43, 653–658. Whurr, R., Lorch, M. P., & Nye, C. (1992). A meta-analysis of studies carried out between 1946 and 1988 concerned with the efficacy of speech and language therapy treatment for aphasic patients. European Journal of Disorders of Communication, 27, 1–17.
SECTION III
Skilled movement, music, and number-processing disorders
10 The forelimb apraxias Kenneth M. Heilman, Leslie J. Gonzalez Rothi, and Brenda Hanna-Pladdy
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the clinical aspects of five types of limb apraxia (limb-kinetic, ideomotor, ideational, dissociation, and conceptual) that represent disorders of skilled movement induced by deterioration of stored information in the “how” motor programming system.
Definition of apraxia Only organisms that move have brains, and thus one of the most important features of a brain is the control of movements that allow the organism to interact with and change the environment. The corticospinal system (which in man starts in layer 5 of Brodmann’s area 4 and travels through the internal capsule, cerebral peduncle, brainstem pyramids, and the dorsolateral spinal cord) activates specific motor units (e.g. anterior horn cells, motor roots, and nerves together with muscles) that can mediate an almost infinite number of difficult movements. Therefore, for successful interaction with the environment, the corticospinal neurons in the cerebral cortex must be guided by instructions or what can be termed the “how” programs. These programs instruct the motor system about (1) how to position one’s hand, forearm, and arm; (2) how to move the forelimb through space; (3) how to orient the limb toward the target of the limb’s action; (4) how to time movement and control speed; (5) how much force to exert; (6) how to order components of an act; and (7) how to solve mechanical problems. Disorders in the implementation of these “how” programs are termed apraxia, and each of the forms of apraxia we discuss in this chapter (limb-kinetic, ideomotor, ideational, dissociation, and conceptual) is a deficit in one or more of these “how” programs. According to Geschwind (1965), apraxia is clinically defined in part by what it is not. Hence, if a person fails to carry out a purposeful movement because of paralysis, abnormal movements (such as tremor, chorea, ballismus, or myoclonus), severe sensory-perceptual deficits, or cognitive impairment, this failure should not be attributed to apraxia. By this definition, when clinicians observe a disorder of purposeful movements that cannot be explained by these motor, sensory, or intellectual deficits, the patient is labeled as having apraxia. There are many forms of apraxia that involve
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various parts of the body; some of these include gait apraxia, speech apraxia, oculomotor apraxia, and even apraxia of the eyelids. We will not discuss all these forms of apraxia because this chapter will focus on forelimb apraxia. With regard to the forelimbs, patients without sensorimotor or severe intellectual deficits might have trouble dressing (dressing apraxia) or impairment in portraying the graphic representations of spatial relationships (constructional apraxia). Both of these disorders can be induced by attention-intention disorders, such as neglect, as well as visuospatial cognitive disorders. Thus, these two disorders might not be examples of deficits in the “how-praxis” systems and therefore will not be discussed in this chapter. The forms of limb apraxia that we will discuss in this chapter can be induced by a variety of diseases, including those that cause focal injuries such as cerebral infarction or those that are more widely distributed, including degenerative diseases such as Alzheimer’s disease or corticobasal degeneration. In this chapter we will also not discuss the specific diseases that can induce apraxia.
Brief history The term “apraxia” was originally proposed by Steinthal (1871); however, this word is derived from Greek and literally means without action. The absence of action is nowadays called akinesia, but the term “apraxia” has persisted. The greatest advance in the description and understanding of these disorders is contained in a series of papers written between 1900 and 1920 by Hugo Liepmann. He was a student of Carl Wernicke in Breskau, and Wernicke’s concepts of modularity and information-processing models had a great influence on Liepmann’s research. Unfortunately, Liepmann was never offered nor did he ever hold an academic appointment, although he was an excellent teacher and perhaps could have enhanced his creative endeavors. According to Kurt Goldstein (1970), he was told that if he changed his name and converted to Protestantism, he could obtain an academic appointment. However, he preferred to keep his name and to remain Jewish. He continued to practice in Germany until he developed severe Parkinson’s disease. Eventually, this disorder disabled him to such a degree that he took his own life. Liepmann (1920) described three forms of apraxia: limb-kinetic or melokinetic (similar to what Kleist subsequently called innervatory apraxia (1907)), ideomotor, and ideational. These three forms of limb apraxia will be discussed in the following sections, as well as two other forms of limb apraxia, dissociation and conceptual. Liepmann’s seminal papers brought about a “paradigmatic shift” in the understanding of motor control. From that time, little further important research was performed in this domain until Norman Geschwind and Edith Kaplan noted a patient with apraxia in response to verbal command of his left but not right hand (Geschwind & Kaplan, 1962). Fortunately, at that time, Fred Quadfasel was a staff neurologist at the Boston Veterans’ Hospital and often collaborated with Geschwind
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and Kaplan. Quadfasel had been trained by Kurt Goldstein, who, in turn, had been trained by Hugo Liepmann. Thus, when Geschwind and Kaplan informed Quadfasel about this case, he referred them to the works of Liepmann. These seminal papers had been forgotten for more than 40 years, and it was Geschwind and Kaplan’s interest in apraxia that induced a renaissance of interest in this common and disabling disorder. While the first author of this chapter (KMH) was a fellow at the Harvard Neurological Unit of Boston City Hospital, Derek Denny-Brown retired and Norman Geschwind replaced Denny-Brown as chief. It was Geschwind who first excited my (KMH) interest in apraxia. The first papers that I (KMH) wrote on apraxia were coauthored with Geschwind. During the time I was a fellow with Geschwind, I met and worked with another neurologist who was visiting from Italy, Luigi Vignolo. Although Luigi Vignolo remained interested in aphasia, it was apparent from our first meeting that he was destined to be one of the world’s leading behavioral neurologists.
Limb apraxia syndromes Limb-kinetic apraxia (melokinetic apraxia, innervatory apraxia) Clinical description According to Liepmann (1905, 1920), patients with limb-kinetic apraxia (LKA) have slow and stiff movements. He noted that when they attempt to perform a skilled act, their movements are coarse and clumsy. Kleist (1907) noted that people with this type of apraxia have a loss of independent finger movements, and also have problems coordinating simultaneous movements. As noted above, this loss of deftness or the ability to make finely graded, precise, rapid, and independent but coordinated finger movements has been termed by several names, but here we will call this disorder LKA. Testing Finger tapping can be used to test the speed of finger movements, and a pegboard task can be used to test precision. To assess a patient’s ability to perform independent finger movements, together with speed, precision, and coordination, we use the coin-rotation task (Hanna-Pladdy, Mendoza, Apostolos, & Heilman, 2002). In this coin-rotation task, the patient is asked to rotate a nickel between their thumb, index finger, and middle finger as rapidly as possible for 20 revolutions. The examiner measures the time it takes to complete this task and does not stop the clock if the nickel is dropped. Normal subjects demonstrate right-hand preference on this coin-rotation task. Normative data collected on the coin-rotation task (based on 60 male subjects) yielded a right-hand mean of 12.9 s (sd 2.5) and a left-hand mean of 14.5 s (sd 2.6) for task completion (Hanna-Pladdy et al., 2002). Both
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left-hemisphere (LHD) and right-hemisphere (RHD) stroke subjects displayed contralesional motor deficits, particularly on this coin-rotation task. This coin-rotation task might be the most sensitive test for LKA. In addition, unlike the finger-tapping and grooved-pegboard tests, the coin-rotation test can be used by clinicians at bedside, without having to carry additional apparatus. The classical definition of LKA includes loss of deftness for the hand contralateral to a hemispheric lesion. However, Heilman, Meador, and Loring (2000) and Hanna-Pladdy and colleagues (2002) have found that people with right-hand preference are more likely to have additional ipsilateral loss of deftness (LKA) following left- rather than right-hemispheric dysfunction. Possible mechanisms In his classical diagram, Liepmann (1920) illustrated that the location of the lesion that induces LKA includes the primary motor cortex (precentral cortex or Brodmann’s area 4), and the primary tactile sensory cortex (the postcentral gyrus or Brodmann’s areas 3, 2, and 1). Bucy and Keplinger (1960) treated patients with disabling abnormal movements by sectioning their contralateral corticospinal pathway in the cerebral peduncle and found that these patients were not hemiparetic, but did have a loss of hand deftness. These observations suggested that the corticospinal system might be important in deftness and that injury to this system induces LKA. Further support for this postulate came from the work of Lawrence and Kuypers (1968), who trained monkeys to retrieve food from different-sized wells. After sectioning the corticospinal tract in the brainstem pyramid, they noted that monkeys could retrieve food from the large wells with a palmer grasp, demonstrating that they were not terribly weak and knew the task. However, they could not retrieve food from the small wells because this required the monkey to use a pincher grasp. In the pincher grasp, only the forefinger and thumb are used, and the monkeys could not make these independent, precise finger movements. Lesions of the convexity premotor cortex might also be important for inducing this defect. In his apraxia diagram, Liepmann illustrates that the cortical areas, which, when injured, induce LKA, also include what appears to be the convexity of the premotor cortex (Brodmann’s area 6). The role of the convexity premotor cortex in LKA is not fully known, although the premotor neurons in this area connect to many portions of the primary motor cortex. Fogassi, Gallese, Buccino, Craighero, Fadiga, and Rizzolatti (2001) demonstrated that functional ablation of the ventral convexity premotor cortex induces a deficit in precision grasping, and Freund, together with Hummelsheim (1985), showed that damage to the premotor cortex is associated with LKA. In addition, Nirkko and coworkers (2001) studied these areas with fMRI and found that discrete unilateral distal finger movements were associated with activation of the convexity premotor cortex.
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Heilman and colleagues (2000), as well as Hanna-Pladdy and colleagues (2002), have demonstrated that right-handed patients with left-hemisphere dysfunction often have both ipsilateral and contralateral LKA. In contrast, patients with right-hemisphere dysfunction display LKA that is primarily limited to their left hand. These observations suggest that the left hemisphere might have stronger ipsilateral control of spinal motor neurons than the right hemisphere, and physiological studies appear to support this postulate. There are two possible means by which this ipsilateral control might be mediated: through ipsilateral corticospinal tract projections or by way of the interhemispheric commissures. Motor evoked potential studies using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) have revealed that there are stronger ipsilateral connections from the left hemisphere to the left arm (MacKinnon, Quartarone, & Rothwell, 2004) than vice versa. However, these asymmetries primarily affect proximal muscles and the deftness defect, which is a characteristic of LKA, primarily involves the muscles that control distal movements. This finding suggests that in right-handed people, the left hemisphere’s ipsilateral control of distal movement might be primarily mediated by the cerebral commissures, most likely the corpus callosum. Support for this callosal postulate comes from the work of Gilio, Rizzo, Siebner, and Rothwell (2003), who demonstrated that repetitive TMS to the left hemisphere leads to an increase in corticospinal excitability in the right hemisphere’s motor cortex. Ideomotor apraxia Clinical description Patients with ideomotor apraxia (IMA) make primarily spatial and temporal production errors that cannot be attributed to a loss of deftness as described above. Spatial errors include postural (or internal configuration), spatial movement, and spatial orientation (Poizner, Mack, Verfaellie, Rothi, & Heilman, 1990; Rothi, Mack, Verfaellie, Brown, & Heilman, 1988). The test most likely to reveal these temporal and spatial errors is to ask patients to gesture ( pantomime) to verbal command. Patients with IMA often perform more poorly with transitive than intransitive acts (Haaland, Harrington, & Knight, 2000; Rothi et al., 1988). Although patients with IMA typically improve with imitation, their performance remains impaired. When using actual tools, their performance may improve even more, but even with the use of actual tools and implements their performance remains abnormal (Poizner et al., 1990). There are at least two postural errors that can be associated with IMA. Goodglass and Kaplan (1963) noted that when apraxic patients are asked to pantomime, they often use a body part as the tool. For example, when asked to pantomime using a pair of scissors instead of positioning their hands in the correct posture, they may use their fingers as if they were the blades.
166 Heilman, Gonzalez Rothi, Hanna-Pladdy Many normal subjects initially make similar errors, but patients with IMA are unlike normal subjects since these patients may continue using their body parts as tools in spite of instructions not to use their fingers as blades (Raymer, Maher, Foundas, Heilman, & Rothi, 1997). When not using their body parts as tools, patients with IMA often fail to correctly position their hands as if they were holding a tool or object. Patients’ ability to adopt correct postures can also be tested by having them imitate the examiner’s posture. Patients with apraxia frequently make configuration and body part errors as tool errors even when they are imitating (Haaland et al., 2000). When normal subjects are asked to use a tool (such as to slice turkey with a knife), they will orient the tool to an imaginary target of that tool’s action (e.g. the turkey). However, patients with IMA often fail to orient their forelimbs to an imaginary target (Poizner et al., 1990; Rothi et al., 1988) or to maintain this orientation when the pantomime calls for repeated actions (such as slicing). When patients with IMA attempt to perform a learned skilled movement, they often execute the correct core movement (e.g. twisting, pounding, cutting), but the way in which they move their forelimb through space is often incorrect (Poizner et al., 1990; Rothi et al., 1988). For example, when asked to slice turkey with a knife, they make vertical chopping movements rather than producing primarily horizontal (back-and-forth) slicing movements; or when asked to use a screwdriver, they form arcs rather than making movements so that the imagined shaft of the screwdriver stays on axis. Movements of the incorrect joints can cause these movement errors, and these incorrect joint movements are made because the patients contract the incorrect muscles. Thus, patients with IMA often stabilize a joint that they should be moving and move joints that should not be moving. For example, when attempting to pantomime using a screwdriver, they might fixate their elbow and shoulder joints and just move the wrist. Movements isolated to the wrist cause the patient’s hand to move in arcs rather than on axis. In addition, movement errors are also caused by these patients’ inability to coordinate multiple-joint movements. For example, when patients with IMA pantomime the act of slicing a turkey with a knife, as they bring their arm forward at the shoulder they often do not extend their forearm at the elbow. Hence, they make stabbing movements or they might alternatively flex–extend their forearm at the elbow when their arm is moving backward, thereby creating chopping movements. By computer analysis of apraxic patients’ movements, Poizner and coworkers (1990) noted that patients with IMA might also make timing errors, including a long delay before initiating a movement and brief multiple stops (stuttering movements). When normal subjects pantomime slicing, they reduce the speed of their movements as they are about to change the direction of the knife, and increase their speed when they move the imaginary knife in a straight line. However, patients with IMA do not demonstrate smooth sinusoidal hand speeds when pantomiming slicing movements.
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Testing GENERAL NEUROLOGICAL EXAMINATION
As mentioned above, the diagnosis of apraxia is in part a diagnosis of exclusion. Thus, before any form of apraxia can be diagnosed, the clinician should determine that the failure to perform purposeful motor acts cannot be entirely explained by elemental motor disorders such as weakness or movement disorders, sensory defects, or intellectual disorders that would prevent the patient from understanding the task. The presence of elemental motor disorders, sensory defects, and cognitive impairments (such as aphasia) does not preclude praxis assessment, but the examiner must interpret the results of praxis testing with the knowledge gained from the general neurological examination. FORELIMB TESTED
When one forelimb has an elemental or sensory disorder that would preclude testing, the nonparetic limb should be tested. Whenever possible, however, both forelimbs should be tested. GESTURE TO COMMAND
Patients should be requested to pantomime/gesture both transitive acts (e.g. “Show me how you would use scissors to cut a piece of paper in half ”) as well as intransitive acts (e.g. “Wave goodbye”). In general, patients with IMA have greater difficulty with transitive than intransitive gestures. GESTURE IMITATION
The patient should be asked to imitate the examiner performing both meaningless and meaningful gestures, both transitive and intransitive. GESTURE IN RESPONSE TO SEEING AND HOLDING ACTUAL TOOLS AND OBJECTS
Independent of the results of pantomime to command and imitation tests, the patient should also be allowed to demonstrate how to use actual tools or objects after viewing and holding these implements. The examiner may also show the patient objects upon which tools work (e.g. nail) and, without having the patient hold a tool or object, request that the patient pantomimes the action associated with that object.
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PANTOMIME RECOGNITION AND DISCRIMINATION
It may be valuable to see whether the patient can name or recognize transitive and intransitive pantomimes or postures made by the examiner, and discriminate between correctly and incorrectly performed pantomimes or postures that are performed by the examiner. Recently, Mozaz, Rothi, Anderson, Crucian, and Heilman (2002) developed a praxis-posture discrimination test that contains cartoons of people performing transitive and intransitive acts, and this test also can be used to test recognition. Patients with IMA have been noted to have more difficulty in performing transitive than intransitive gestures (Goodglass & Kaplan, 1963). The fact that patients with IMA have more problems gesturing transitive than intransitive movements might be related to differences in movement complexity, since transitive movements are often more complex than intransitive ones. Alternatively, the programs for intransitive gestures might be better defined, more widely distributed, or easier to activate than those for transitive pantomimes. To test these alternative hypotheses, Mozaz et al. (2002) studied normal subjects’ ability to discriminate between correct and incorrect transitive pantomimes and intransitive gestures. This discrimination was performed by having subjects look at cartoons of a person performing transitive or intransitive acts, but this person’s hand could not be seen. Below these cartoons, three hand postures were displayed, one correct and two foils. The subjects were instructed to point at the illustrations of correct hand postures. The subjects performed better when discriminating postures associated with intransitive gestures than the postures associated with transitive pantomimes. These results cannot be explained by complexity because the hand postures associated with the transitive versus intransitive gestures were equally complex. Thus, these results appear to refute the complexity hypothesis and provide support for the representational activation-hypothesis. Possible mechanisms In right-handed people, IMA is almost always associated with left-hemisphere lesions. However, in left-handed people IMA has been reported with righthemisphere lesions (Heilman & Coyle et al., 1973). IMA is associated with lesions in a variety of structures, including the corpus callosum, the inferior parietal lobe, and the premotor cortex (supplementary motor area (SMA) and the convexity premotor cortex). IMA has also been reported with subcortical lesions that involve the basal ganglia, the hemispheric white matter, and the thalamus. We will briefly discuss each of these anatomic areas. CORPUS CALLOSUM
Liepmann and Maas (1907) reported that a 70-year-old carpenter with a lesion of his corpus callosum was unable to correctly pantomime to commands with
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his left arm. Unfortunately, this patient also had a right hemiparesis from a pontine lesion, and so his right hand could not be tested. Since the work of Paul Broca, it has been known that the left hemisphere is dominant for mediating language, especially for those individuals with right-hand preference. Liepmann and Maas (1907) could have attributed their patient’s inability to pantomime to verbal command with his left hand, to a disconnection between language, which is mediated by the left hemisphere, and motor areas that control the left arm in the right hemisphere. However, Liepmann and Maas (1907) suggested that the left hemisphere of right-handed people contains movement formulas or memories of the spatial-temporal patterns required to make these skilled movements, and that the callosal lesion in this patient disconnected these movement formulas from the right hemisphere’s motor areas. Subsequently, Geschwind and Kaplan (1962), as well as Gazzaniga, Bogen, and Sperry (1967), also found that their patients with callosal disconnection could not correctly pantomime to command with their left hand. However, unlike the patient reported by Liepmann and Maas (1907), these patients could imitate and correctly use actual tools and objects with their left hand. The preserved ability to imitate and use actual tools and objects suggests that the inability to gesture to command in patients with callosal lesions was induced by a language–motor disconnection rather than a movement formula motor disconnection, as proposed by Liepmann and Maas. In addition, theoretically, a disconnection between movement formula stored in the left hemisphere and the motor areas of the right hemisphere should produce spatial and temporal errors, but many of the errors of the patient described by Liepmann and Maas appeared to be content errors. Watson and Heilman (1983), as well as Graff-Radford, Welsh, and Godersky (1987), described patients with infarctions limited to the corpus callosum. Watson and Heilman’s patient had no weakness in her right forelimb and performed tasks, such as pantomiming to command, imitation, and the use of actual objects, flawlessly with her right forelimb. As Liepmann and Maas might have predicted, however, with her left hand she could not correctly pantomime to command, imitate, or use actual tools. Like the patient described by Liepmann and Maas, immediately after her cerebral infarction she made content errors, but these types of errors diminished, and she subsequently made primarily spatial and temporal errors. Her performance indicated that not only language but also spatial-temporal movement representations (movement formula) were stored in her left hemisphere, and the callosal lesion disconnected these representations from her right hemisphere. LESIONS OF THE LEFT HEMISPHERE
Liepmann (1905) reported that of 42 patients with left hemiplegia from righthemisphere lesions, none were apraxic when using their ipsilesional right forelimb. In contrast, 20 of 41 with right-sided weakness from left-hemisphere
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lesions were apraxic when using their ipsilesional left forelimb. Based on these observations, as well as the report of the patient with a callosal lesion mentioned above, Liepmann concluded that in right-handed patients the left hemisphere has a special role in mediating skilled movements. Many patients with left-hemisphere lesions who present with IMA are also aphasic. Shortly after Steinthal (1871) described and used the term “apraxia”, Finkelburg (1873) suggested that apraxia is a form of asymbolia. Hence, aphasia might be explained as an inability to use verbal signs, and apraxia as an inability to use gestural signs. However, Liepmann noted that aphasia and apraxia are dissociable, some apraxic patients having no aphasia and some aphasic patients do not demonstrate apraxia. These dissociations provide evidence against the postulate that apraxia is a form of asymbolia. More recently, Papagno, Della Sala, and Basso (1993) demonstrated the same dissociation. PARIETAL LOBE
Although he originally considered the supramarginal gyrus of the left parietal lobe to be the site storing the “movement formulas” or spatial-temporal movement representations, Liepmann (1920) later denied believing that there were praxis centers and proposed that white-matter tracts below the supramarginal gyrus carry information about the nature of the desired movements. As mentioned in the history section, after reading Liepmann’s papers, Norman Geschwind became aware that the left-hemisphere lesions most commonly associated with IMA were located in the region of the supramarginal gyrus of the left parietal lobe. In order to explain why lesions in this region induce IMA of both hands, he stated that the lesions in the left hemisphere could induce a disconnection syndrome (Geschwind, 1965). Thus, when a patient is given a command to perform a gesture, the incoming verbal message is decoded in Wernicke’s area, but this message must then be transmitted to the left premotor convexity cortex for the command to be implemented by the left primary motor cortex. According to Geschwind, if the command is to use the left hand to gesture, the left premotor cortex transmits this information to the right hemisphere’s motor systems. The Liepmann–Geschwind disconnection hypothesis could not account for the observation that patients with apraxia resulting from left parietal lesions are also impaired when imitating and even when using actual objects with their left forelimb, because their right-hemispheric connections (between the anterior motor areas and the posterior visual areas) are intact. To help explain the lack of dissociation between verbal commands and imitation or actual object use, Heilman, Rothi, and Valenstein (1982) and Rothi, Heilman, and Watson (1985) proposed that the movement representations of right-handed individuals are stored in the left parietal lobe. Therefore, destruction of the left parietal lobe should produce both a production deficit (apraxia) and a gesture/pantomime comprehension/discrimination disorder. In contrast, apraxia induced by each of the following lesions might
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cause just a production deficit: (1) premotor lesions, (2) lesions in the pathways that connect the premotor cortex to primary motor cortex, and (3) lesions to the pathways that lead to the premotor areas from the parietal lobe. However, unlike parietal lesions that destroy the movement representations, these more anterior lesions should not induce gesture comprehension and discrimination disorders. Heilman et al. (1982) and Rothi et al. (1985) tested patients with anterior and posterior lesions and found that while both groups of patients were apraxic (had production deficits), the patients with a damaged parietal lobe (unlike those with frontal damage) had comprehension and discrimination disturbances. Halsband, Schmitt, Weyers, Binkofski, Grutzner, and Freund (2001) attempted to replicate these findings, stating: Taken together, these findings support Heilman’s model of apraxia . . . that apraxia results from destruction of spatiotemporal representations of learned movements. . . . In order to perform a skilled learned act, one must place particular body parts in certain spatial positions in a specific order at specific times. This implies that the nervous system stores knowledge of motor skills. When this knowledge is called into use, it is retrieved from motor memory rather than being constructed de novo. According to Heilman’s model, spatiotemporal representations of learned, skilled movements are stored in the parietal cortex which is thought to instruct the premotor cortex for the necessary movements. In addition to the report by Halsband and colleagues (2001), Haaland et al. (2000) performed a lesion localization study on patients with and without apraxia. They found that, in addition to frontal convexity lesions, patients most often have lesions in the region of the intraparietal sulcus, which is at the top of the supramarginal gyrus, and in the superior parietal lobe (Brodmann’s area 7). In regard to Geschwind’s disconnection hypothesis, Haaland et al. (2000) found that 49% of their subjects had subcortical damage that disconnected the pathways between the occipital and frontal cortex, but yet performed imitation normally. The results of the Basso, Luzzatti, and Spinnler (1980) study also provided evidence against the disconnection hypothesis of IMA. Finally, recent functional imaging studies performed with normal right-handed subjects, provide converging evidence that the parietal lobe plays a critical role in the production of skilled movements (Moll et al., 2000; Rumiati et al., 2004). SUPPLEMENTARY MOTOR AREA (SMA)
For each skilled movement, parts of the forelimb must traverse a set of spatial loci in a specific temporal pattern. For example, during the upswing in hammering, the arm should be flexed at the elbow and the wrist extended, while on the downswing the forearm is extended at the elbow while the wrist is
172 Heilman, Gonzalez Rothi, Hanna-Pladdy flexed. At the same time that this flexion and extension occurs, the arm should be kept in the same radial plane (e.g. sagittal plane). We have proposed that movement formula representations, stored in the inferior parietal lobe, are represented in a three-dimensional supramodal (temporal visual-spatial and temporal kinesthetic-spatial) code. In order for the corticospinal neurons to properly activate the anterior horn cells in the spinal cord, this stored spatial-temporal movement knowledge has to be transformed into a motor program. The medial premotor cortex, including the SMA, the cingulate motor areas, and perhaps the pre-SMA, appear to play an important role in mediating skilled movements. In man, it has been shown that electrical stimulation of the primary motor cortex induces simple movements, but SMA stimulation induces complex movements that may include the entire forelimb (Penfield & Welch, 1951). The SMA receives projections from parietal neurons and projects directly to both the motor cortex (Brodmann’s area 4) and to the convexity premotor cortex. In addition, the SMA projects to the basal ganglia (to be discussed in a subsequent section) as well as to the motor neurons in the spinal cord. Supplementary motor neurons discharge before neurons in the primary motor cortex. Studies of cerebral blood flow, an indicator of cerebral metabolism and synaptic activity, have revealed that single repetitive movements increase activation of the contralateral primary motor cortex, whereas complex movements increase flow in the contralateral motor cortex and the SMA (Lauritzen, Henriksen, & Lassen, 1981; Rao et al., 1993). When subjects remain still and think about making complex movements, blood flow is increased to the SMA, but not the primary motor cortex. Watson, Fleet, Rothi, and Heilman (1986) reported several patients with leftsided medial frontal lesions that included the SMA who demonstrated IMA when tested with either arm. Unlike patients with parietal lesions, these patients could both comprehend and discriminate between correctly and incorrectly performed pantomimes. Studies of patients with corticobasal degeneration with IMA suggest that part of their deficit might also be related to SMA dysfunction (Leiguardia, Lees, Merello, Starkstein, & Marsden, 1994). In Haaland et al.’s (2000) study of lesion sites associated with IMA, the authors did not identify left medial frontal lesions, including SMA, as critical. However, strokes in the distribution of the anterior cerebral artery are much less common than those in the middle cerebral artery, and these investigators’ findings might be related to a sampling bias. In addition, the investigators tested their patients by an imitation task. In the speech domain, patients with medial frontal lesions are very often nonfluent but repeat normally, and it is possible that the imitation test is not the proper means of detecting IMA that might be associated with medial frontal lesions.
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CONVEXITY PREMOTOR CORTEX
Liepmann (1920) did not think that lesions of the convexity premotor cortex induce IMA, but in Geschwind’s (1965) disconnection model the convexity premotor cortex appears to play a critical role. In an excellent review of apraxia, Faglioni and Basso (1985) commented that “the unanimous acceptance of the crucial role played by the premotor cortex in practice functioning by so many authors is, however, a bit surprising when one considers how hard it is to find in the literature well documented cases of apraxia from lesions confined to this area.” Kolb and Milner (1981) did report that patients with frontal premotor excisions have difficulty in imitating motor sequences, and, recently, there have been some other reports that lesions restricted to this region might induce IMA (Barrett, Schwartz, Raymer, Crucian, Rothi, & Heilman, 1998; Haaland et al., 2000). Barrett et al. (1998) suggested that the premotor cortex might be important in coordinating several joint movements. These authors also suggested that different portions of the premotor cortex (convexity versus medial) might implement two different types of innervatory patterns. Whereas the medial portion might be important in top-down or offline-prepared programs, the convexity might be more important in bottomup or online programs that require sensory feedback to guide movement. Goldberg (1985) also suggested that since the convexity premotor cortex receives projections from the visual association areas, this area might be the portion of the premotor cortex that is important in mediating externally (visually) controlled movements. The patient reported by Barrett et al. (1998), with a convexity premotor cortex lesion, had normal comprehension/ discrimination of gestures, but gesturing-pantomiming was severely impaired. On further testing, Barrett’s patient could execute correct isolated movements and even sequential movements, but she could not coordinate simultaneous movement of more than one joint. However, even though she had a convexity premotor lesion, she did not appear to have a specific deficit in bottom-up or online movements as would be expected from Goldberg’s hypothesis. However, these hypotheses need to be further tested. Haaland et al. (2000) used the lesion overlap method for localization of premotor lesions that are associated with IMA. They found that the middle frontal gyrus appeared to be the critical area. However, Freund and Hummelsheim (1985) studied a population of patients with convexity premotor lesions and found that these patients had LKA, but not IMA. In addition, Haaland et al. (2000), as well as Kolb and Milner (1981), studied patients who had to produce imitations. Imitation, especially of novel gestures, requires working memory, and performance on this task might also be more dependent on visual kinesthetic feedback. Thus, the defect these investigators found in their subjects with convexity premotor lesions might have been related to either a working memory deficit or the fact that imitation of meaningless gestures is heavily dependent on sensory feedback.
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BASAL GANGLIA AND THALAMUS
As we discussed above, IMA is most often associated with lesions of the cerebral cortex as well as cortical-cortical connecting pathways such as the corpus callosum, but there have been reports of apraxia associated with subcortical lesions (e.g. Agostoni, Coletti, Orlando, & Tredici, 1983; Kertesz & Ferro, 1984; Kleist, 1907; von Monakow, 1914). After reviewing these cases, however, Faglioni and Basso (1985) concluded, “In fact, no convincing case report has ever been published in support of this association.” Following Faglioni and Basso’s review, other studies of apraxia in patients with subcortical lesions have been reported (Basso & Della Sala, 1986; Della Sala, Basso, Laiacona, & Papagno, 1992; De Renzi, Faglioni, Scarpa, & Crisi, 1986). However, after these reports, Pramstaller and Marsden (1996) performed a meta-analysis of 82 cases of “deep” apraxia reported in the literature. These reports were subdivided into those with small isolated lesions that involved nuclei of the basal ganglia only, those with pure, subcortical white-matter injury, and those with both. The main conclusion that these authors drew from this meta-analysis was that lesions confined to the basal ganglia (putamen, caudate nucleus, and globus pallidus) rarely, if ever, cause apraxia. In many of these studies of IMA associated with subcortical lesions, subjects were assessed only by means of imitation, and data were quantitatively analyzed. Since the use of tests such as pantomime to command and qualitative analysis of errors might better elucidate the role of the basal ganglia in the production of learned skilled movements, Hanna-Pladdy, Heilman, and Foundas (2001) studied a population of patients with both cortical and subcortical strokes and compared praxis performance on a variety of tasks. The patients with cortical injury presented with deficits in the production of transitive pantomimes and intransitive gestures-to-verbal command as well as imitation. These patients also had impaired gesture discrimination. The patient group with subcortical injury, however, demonstrated only mild production-execution deficits for transitive pantomimes to command, but improved on imitation and discrimination. The subcortical group showed more postural errors whereas patients with cortical lesions produced more sequencing and content errors. These behavioral dissociations suggest that subcortical structures provide an independent contribution to the praxis processing system. In regard to the thalamus, several case reports of patients who developed apraxia from lesions of the left thalamus have been published (Nadeau, Roeltgen, Sevush, Ballinger, & Watson, 1994; Shuren, Maher, & Heilman, 1994). The reason why thalamic damage induced apraxia in these patients is not known, but they had involvement of the pulvinar nucleus. The pulvinar nucleus is strongly connected with the parietal lobes, and injury to this nucleus might interrupt normal parietal lobe function and consequently it may be critical in the control of purposeful, skilled movements.
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Dissociation apraxia Clinical observations Heilman (1973) described patients who, when asked to pantomime to command, looked at their hand but failed to perform any recognizable actions. Unlike patients with IMA, these patients’ imitation and use of objects were flawless. In addition, when they saw the tool or object they were also able to pantomime flawlessly. De Renzi, Faglioni, and Sorgato (1982) reported not only patients similar to those reported by Heilman (1973), but also patients who showed a similar defect in other modalities. For example, when asked to pantomime in response to visual or tactile stimuli, some patients were unable to do so, but these patients could pantomime to verbal command. Testing The tests used to assess patients for dissociation apraxia are similar to those used to assess patients for IMA. The most important part of this testing is to determine whether there are any modality-specific differences when the patient pantomimes in response to verbal command, seeing the tool-implement, or holding but not seeing the tool or implement. Possible mechanisms As we discussed above, lesions that induce an interhemispheric disconnection by damaging the corpus callosum may cause IMA, in which patients are unable to correctly pantomime, imitate, or use actual objects with their nonpreferred left hand. Some patients with callosal disconnection, however, might demonstrate dissociation apraxia where they fail to correctly pantomime to command with their nonpreferred left hand, but are able to correctly imitate and use actual objects. For example, the callosally disconnected patients described by Geschwind and Kaplan (1962) presented with dissociation apraxia of their left hand. With their left hand, they could not gesture normally to command but performed well on imitation and used actual tools and objects normally. To explain dissociation apraxia in these patients, we proposed that whereas language is mediated by their left hemisphere, movement representations ( praxicons) are stored bilaterally. Therefore, their callosal lesion induced a dissociation apraxia only of the left hand because the verbal command could not get access to the movement representations in the right hemisphere. Whereas these patients with callosal dissociation apraxia were not be able to correctly carry out skilled learned movements of the left arm to command, they could imitate and use actual tools or implements with their left hand. Using actual objects and imitating do not need verbal mediation, and the movement representations stored in their right hemisphere can be activated by visual or tactile input.
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Right-handed patients who have both language and movement formula represented in their left hemisphere may show a combination of dissociation apraxia and IMA associated with callosal lesions (Watson & Heilman, 1983). When asked to pantomime with their left hands, they may look at them and perform no recognizable movement (dissociation apraxia), but when imitating or using actual tools and objects, they may demonstrate spatial and temporal errors as observed in IMA. Dissociation apraxia might also be associated with left-hemisphere lesions. The patients reported by Heilman (1973) and De Renzi et al. (1982) probably had intrahemispheric, language-movement formula dissociation, visionmovement formula dissociation, or somesthesic-movement formula dissociation, such that, depending on the type of dissociation, stimuli from one of these modalities (such as language) cannot activate the movement representations, but stimuli in other modalities (such as vision) can activate these representations. The anatomical loci of the lesions that cause this intrahemispheric dissociation apraxia are not known but the advent of diffusion tensor imaging might help inform investigators of the localization of the injuries that induce these disorders. Ideational apraxia Clinical observations The inability to perform a series of acts, an ideational plan, has been called ideational apraxia (Marcuse, 1904; Pick, 1905). Pick’s patient, however, produced two types of errors. One error was characterized by incorrect use of objects. Although patients with IMA might incorrectly use actual objects, their errors are usually production errors (postural, temporal, or spatial), but Pick’s patient used objects for purposes for which these tools or implements were not designed; for example, using a razor as a comb (Brown, 1972). Hence, this patient’s errors were conceptual. In addition, when performing a task that requires a series of acts, Pick’s patient (Brown, 1972) had difficulty in performing the sequence of acts needed to properly complete the task. Unfortunately, since Pick’s report, the term “ideational apraxia” has been erroneously used to label other disorders. For example, Heilman (1973) used this term when he first described dissociation apraxia. It was thought that patients with IMA performed normally with actual tools. Thus, when production errors with actual tools were observed, some clinicians thought that this inability to demonstrate how the tool is used, might be indicative of ideational apraxia (De Renzi & Lucchelli, 1988). Although patients with IMA usually improve when using actual tools and objects, they still may produce errors (Poizner et al., 1990). Although the inability to use actual tools and implements might also be associated with a conceptual disorder, patients with a severe production disorder might appear to have a conceptual-ideational
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disorder because they are unable to demonstrate how tools are used (Zangwill, 1960). As mentioned above, the term “ideational apraxia” has been used to describe patients who make conceptual errors. However, to distinguish this form of apraxia from those patients who fail to sequence a series of acts correctly, we term this former disorder “conceptual apraxia”. We reserve the term “ideational apraxia” to refer to the inability to perform a sequence of acts that lead to a goal, such as making a sandwich, consistent with Liepmann’s (1920) reference to a sequencing disorder or ideational plan. Testing The most important test for diagnosing ideational apraxia is having the patient perform a task that requires several sequential motor acts (as in making a sandwich). Possible mechanisms Most of the patients with this type of ideational apraxia suffer from degenerative dementia. However, Liepmann (1920) and others suspected that the lesion that induced this disorder was localized in the left occipital parietal region. The support for this localization, however, has not been strong. Focal injury to the frontal lobes is often also associated with temporal order processing deficits. For example, disorders of verbal syntax in which there are word-ordering defects, are most often associated with anterior aphasia such as Broca’s aphasia. In addition, when patients with frontal lesions are asked to recall a series of objects, they might be able to recall these objects, but not in the order in which they were presented. Hence, the critical focus of dysfunction in ideational apraxia might be in frontal-subcortical systems. Although there is some support for this postulate (Humphreys & Forde, 1998), more research is needed. Conceptual apraxia Clinical observations To perform a skilled act, two types of knowledge are needed: conceptual knowledge and production knowledge. Whereas dysfunction of the praxis production system induces IMA, defects in the knowledge needed to select tools and perform the correct action with these tools is termed “conceptual apraxia”. Therefore, patients with IMA make production errors (such as spatial and temporal errors), and patients with conceptual apraxia make content and tool selection errors. Patients with conceptual apraxia make these errors because they may not recall the type of actions associated with specific tools, utensils, or objects (tool–object action associative knowledge)
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(De Renzi & Lucchelli, 1988; Ochipa, Rothi, & Heilman, 1989). For example, when asked to demonstrate the use of a screwdriver by either pantomiming or using the tool, the patient with loss of tool–object action knowledge may pantomime a hammering movement or use the screwdriver as if it were a hammer. Content errors (using a tool as if it were another tool) can also be induced by object agnosia. However, Ochipa et al. (1989) reported a patient who could name tools (and therefore did not display agnosia) but often used these tools inappropriately. Patients with conceptual apraxia may be unable to recall which specific tool is associated with a specific object (tool–object associative knowledge). For example, when shown a partially driven nail, they may select a screwdriver rather than a hammer. This conceptual defect may also be present in the verbal domain such that when an actual tool is shown to a patient, the patient may be able to name it (e.g. hammer). However, a patient with conceptual apraxia may not be able to correctly point to or name a tool when its function is described. In addition, these patients may be unable to describe the functions of tools or demonstrate them with impaired mechanical knowledge. For example, if they are attempting to drive a nail into a piece of wood and there is no hammer available, they may select a screwdriver rather than a wrench or pliers (which are hard, heavy, and good for pounding) (Ochipa, Rothi, & Heilman, 1992). Mechanical knowledge is also important for tool development. Patients with conceptual apraxia may also be unable to correctly develop tools (Ochipa et al., 1992). Testing When we test patients for conceptual apraxia, at least three types of tests might be useful. When assessing tool–object knowledge, the examiner attempts to learn whether patients can match tools with the objects upon which tools operate (for example, given a partially driven nail, will they select a hammer, and vice versa (Schwartz et al., 2000). In contrast, when we assess associative tool–action knowledge, we might ask the patient to pantomime to command or view tools or even hold tools, and then determine whether the patient makes content errors (such a making a pounding motion with a screwdriver). The examiner might also attempt to learn whether the patient can match a specific tool (from a series of tools) with an action that is performed with that tool. To assess mechanical knowledge, the examiner might want to learn whether the patient knows the mechanical advantage that tools afford. This assessment can be performed by having the patient substitute or even fabricate tools to solve mechanical problems. For example, if there is a nail that needs to be pounded into a piece of wood and there is no hammer to complete the job, will the patient select a wrench or a screwdriver to finish pounding the nail into the wood?
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Possible mechanisms Liepmann (1920) thought that mechanical conceptual knowledge was located in the caudal parietal lobe, whereas De Renzi and Lucchelli (1988) localized it to the temporal-parietal junction. The patient reported by Ochipa et al. (1989) was left-handed and rendered conceptually apraxic by a lesion in the right hemisphere, suggesting that both production and conceptual knowledge have lateralized representations and that such representations are contralateral to the preferred hand. Further evidence that these conceptual representations are stored in the hemisphere contralateral to the preferred hand was derived from the observation of a patient who had a callosal disconnection and demonstrated conceptual apraxia of the nonpreferred (left) hand (Watson & Heilman, 1983). Heilman, Maher, Greenwald, and Rothi (1997) studied right-handed patients who had either right- or left-hemisphere cerebral infarctions, and found that conceptual apraxia was more commonly associated with left- than right-hemisphere injury. However, no specific anatomical region appeared to be critical, suggesting that mechanical knowledge may be widely distributed in the left hemisphere of right-handed people. Although conceptual apraxia may be associated with focal brain damage, it is perhaps most commonly seen in degenerative dementia of the Alzheimer type (Ochipa et al., 1992). Ochipa and coworkers also noted that the severity of conceptual apraxia and IMA do not always correlate. The observation that patients with IMA may not demonstrate conceptual apraxia and patients with conceptual apraxia may not demonstrate IMA supports the postulate that praxis production and praxis conceptual systems are independent. However, for normal function, these two systems must interact.
Conclusions We have described the clinical characteristics that define five forms of forelimb apraxia: limb-kinetic, ideomotor, dissociation, ideational, and conceptual. We have also discussed the possible neuropsychological mechanisms that may account for these cognitive motor disorders. Based on this information, we have developed an anatomically distributed modular network that is responsible for mediating skilled movements. In this model, movement (temporalspatial) representations are stored in the left parietal lobe. Injury to these representations induces IMA, such that when patients attempt to perform learned, purposeful movements, they make spatial (postural, orientation, and joint movement) and temporal errors. Because these representations are disrupted, these patients are also impaired at discriminating spatialtemporal errors. These movement representations have to be activated from input coming from language, visual, or kinesthetic systems, and if one of these systems cannot activate these movement representations, there is a modality-specific deficit in performing these learned skilled acts, called dissociation apraxia. Once activated by either visual systems or language
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networks, the visuospatial-kinesthetic information stored in these networks is transferred to the premotor cortex so that innervatory patterns can be developed. Injury to the systems that develop these innervatory patterns, based on input from the movement representations, also induces IMA. In contrast to patients with injured movement representations, patients with premotor injuries are not impaired at discriminating spatial-temporal errors. The innervatory pattern must be implemented by the motor cortex, which activates the motor neurons in the spinal cord. In patients with LKA, injury is located in the motor cortex and perhaps also in portions of the premotor cortex. These injuries interfere with the ability to make precise and coordinated independent finger and hand movements. When people see that an action is needed, they must decide what tool can best complete that action. They must also know what action that tool performs. When the correct tool is not available or a new tool is needed, they also need to know the mechanical advantage that tools afford and how this could be accomplished by alternatives. A loss of this knowledge is called conceptual apraxia. In right-handed people, this knowledge is stored in the left hemisphere, but the exact locations of these representations are unknown. Finally, the completion of a task sometimes requires that a series of independent acts be performed in a specific temporal sequence. An inability to sequence correctly a series of acts to achieve a goal is called ideational apraxia, and this deficit might be related to frontal-executive dysfunction.
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11 Should we make aphasic patients sing? Sylvie Hébert, Isabelle Peretz, and Amélie Racette
Singing is a highly enjoyable experience. It also constitutes the most widespread mode of musical expression. All people across cultures have taken part in singing in some form. This pleasurable experience is most likely rooted in the early exposure to maternal singing, which is swiftly imitated by the infant. Infants spontaneously sing around the age of 1 year. At 18 months, the child begins to generate recognizable, repeatable songs (Ostwald, 1973). These spontaneous songs have a systematic form and display two essential features of adult singing: discrete pitches, and the repetition of rhythmic and melodic contours. They are unlike adult songs, however, because they lack a stable pitch framework (Dowling, 1984). It is later, around the age of 5, that children appear to hold a stable tonality and a regular beat as adults do (Dowling & Harwood, 1986). Thus, by the age of 5, children have a fairly large repertoire of songs of their own culture and display singing abilities that will remain qualitatively unchanged in adulthood, unless the child receives musical tutoring or is regularly practicing in a choir or ensemble. Thus, even without much practice, the ordinary adult seems to be endowed with the basic abilities that are necessary to sing simple songs of their culture. Despite their ubiquity and early acquisition, the singing abilities of aphasic patients and ordinary people in general, are rarely studied. There are two main reasons for this limited attention: cultural bias and measurement problems. First, the widespread cultural bias is that singing is poor in the general population. Most people are believed to be unable to carry a tune. This point of view was probably shared by Luigi Vignolo, who has always been interested in the nonverbal abilities of aphasic patients, as shown by his pioneering work on the recognition of nonverbal sounds (Vignolo, 1969, 1982) and his more recent interest in music processing (Vignolo, 2003). Had Luigi Vignolo trusted his own musical abilities, he would have tried to make his patients sing. Indeed, there is a growing body of research showing that ordinary adults are able to sing. Nonmusicians are found to be highly consistent in their ability to sing familiar songs. They exhibit precise memory for both pitch level and tempo (Halpern, 1988, 1989). This precision in singing seems to hold not only for a given singer, when we measure individual stability across song renditions (Bergeson & Trehub, 2002; Halpern, 1988, 1989), but
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also for a group of singers, when we measure consistency across individuals in the sung recall of a popular song (Levitin, 1994; Levitin & Cook, 1996). Therefore, as far as singing a familiar song is concerned, heterogeneity in singing abilities does not seem to be a serious limitation. The second reason for the neglect of singing abilities relates to the problem of measurement. It is always easier to collect data in the form of responses from a limited set (e.g. “same-different” classification) than it is from multidimensional performance. This concern for precision and simplicity in measurement has led to a concentration of research on musical receptive abilities in the ordinary listener. This is also true in neurological settings. It is unfortunate because production data are much richer. The analysis can rely on auditory transcription into notation, or to auditory-only analysis by expert musicians. For example, Bergeson and Trehub (2002), in their study of maternal singing, had the mothers’ productions judged by two experts, who matched the initial or tonic pitch of the song to a keyboard note, to the nearest quarter tone, and used a metronome to match the average tempo of the renditions. Although constrained by the “ear” of the listeners, to a certain extent, these analyses usually yield very good interrater reliability (95% and over in this case). And more importantly, the examination of production allows discoveries that could not be obtained by simple perception studies. Bergeson and Trehub (2002) found that mothers, when singing to their baby, have little variability in a given song’s starting pitch over 1-week time, whereas they have high variability in their speech starting pitch for a given sentence. This finding suggests that mothers with no special music training have almost an “absolute” mental representation of a song. Although the child’s productions are stable only around the age of 5 years, this remarkably stable rendition of songs by the mother over time may serve different needs in the mother–baby relationship, such as soothing the baby, the promotion of social bonds, and, perhaps, the focusing of attention to particular words of the songs. Some bits of information about the singing of aphasic patients come from neurologists who have commented on, or reported (qualitatively), the singing of their patients. For example, Luria’s famous patient, Zasetsky, was damaged on the left side of the brain. He could easily remember the melodies of songs, though not their words (Luria, 1973). However, many reported that severely aphasic patients who have recovered none or few of their speech abilities are still able to sing previously learned songs with well-articulated and linguistically intelligible words. Such patients, with a very restricted output with respect to spontaneous speech, seem to be able to recover word articulation with the support of melody. These observations come mainly from patients who became aphasic after brain damage due to vascular cerebral accident (Assal, Buttet, & Javet, 1977; Jacome, 1984; Yamadori, Osumi, Masuhara, & Okubo, 1977). For instance, Keith and Aronson (1975) reported the case of a brain-damaged woman who could not express herself by speaking, but could do so by singing phrases such as “How are you?” or “I
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want coffee”. With the exception of Assal et al. (1977), whose patients were amateur or professional musicians, other reports concern patients with no particular music training. Thus, this ability to sing with words seems not to be restricted to people with previous music training, but seems rather to reflect a general trait of cerebral organization. The traditional interpretation of this long-standing observation has been that singing familiar songs depends on right-hemisphere functions, whereas propositional (generative) speech depends on left-hemisphere functions. Damage to the left hemisphere, therefore, would leave intact the patients’ ability to sing previously learned songs, whereas damage to the right hemisphere would impair “automatic” speech and familiar song singing. The question of why aphasic patients would be able to sing while not being able to speak is of clinical and theoretical interest. On a clinical level, the observation of such patients is the origin of the melodic intonation therapy (MIT), a technique that has been considered as the most promising avenue for aphasia rehabilitation by the American Neurology Association (Therapeutics and Technology Assessment Subcommittee of the American Academy of Neurology, 1994). MIT does not use the singing of familiar songs per se as a form of therapy. Rather, it uses intonation patterns that exaggerate the normal melodic content of phrases that gradually vary in complexity as the patient makes progress, the underlying idea being that musical tonal ability, a form of singing, is a right-hemisphere function. An early interpretation of successful recovery from aphasia with the MIT technique was that it facilitates the use of language areas of the right hemisphere, after damage to the language areas in the left hemisphere (Albert, Sparks, & Helm, 1973). Subsequently, this interpretation was revised and it was suggested that the increased use of melodic aspects of speech increases the role of the right hemisphere in interhemispheric control of language (Sparks, Helm, & Albert, 1974). However, a study by Belin et al. (1996) did not support either of these interpretations. They examined seven nonfluent aphasic patients who had been successfully treated with MIT after a period of time when spontaneous recovery had stopped. They used PET technology to measure relative cerebral blood flow during the hearing and repetition of untrained words, and during repetition of MIT-loaded words. Repetition of untrained words activated right-hemisphere structures homotopic to those usually involved in language tasks, and deactivated left-hemisphere language-related zones. However, repetition of words trained with MIT elicited the opposite pattern of activation: that is, right-hemisphere structures were deactivated while language-related left-hemisphere structures were active. Thus, activation of language areas homotopic to the damaged ones indicated the persistence of aphasia rather than its recovery, suggesting that right-hemisphere activation is a direct consequence of brain damage rather than an adaptive process. While the study supports the potential value of MIT in functional rehabilitation, this rehabilitation was here associated with a shift from right-hemisphere activation to a reactivation of left-hemisphere structures. This finding is
188 Hébert, Peretz, Racette consistent with other recent data showing reactivation of left-hemisphere structures in successful recovery of language (e.g. Heiss, Kessler, Thiel, Ghaemi, & Karbe, 1999), and contrasts with the classical view about the right-hemisphere structures taking over left-hemisphere structures in aphasia recovery (e.g. Papanicolaou, Moore, Deutsch, Levin, & Eisenberg 1988; Sparks, Helm, & Albert, 1974). Certainly, from a clinical point of view, understanding if, and why, singing may be an important tool in rehabilitation, is of significant importance. On a theoretical level, there is a growing body of evidence supporting the autonomy of speech and music. The terms “aphasia” and “amusia” used in neurology designate acquired impairment of language and music processing, respectively. These disorders occur jointly more often than not (Marin & Perry, 1999), probably because a natural brain lesion or disease is most likely to globally affect cognitive functions such as language and music. However, several clinical cases of patients afflicted with aphasia but without amusia have been described. Often, the patients were professional musicians. The most notable case is probably that of Shebalin, who sustained a second vascular hemorrhage in the left hemisphere of the brain at the age of 57. This stroke left him without speech and deaf to the spoken world. While Shebalin could no longer communicate verbally, he continued to teach and to compose until his death, 4 years later. According to the composer Shostakovitch, one of his peers, Shebalin’s last music was undistinguishable from what he had composed before his illness (Luria, Tsvetkova, & Futer, 1965). Other similar cases have been reported in the literature (Assal, 1973; Basso & Capitani, 1985; Jacome, 1984; Signoret, van Eeckhout, Poncet, & Castaigne, 1987; Tzortzis, Goldblum, Dang, Forette, & Boller, 2000). Aphasia without amusia is, however, not limited to musicians, as illustrated in Zasetsky, who was not musically trained (Luria, 1973). Reverse cases, although less common, have also been reported of the presence of amusia without aphasia. These are more recent cases, and often concern patients who did not have any particular music training. The case of IR, for example, is outstanding, since, despite being able to write poems, IR could not recognize her national anthem or the song “Happy Birthday” (Peretz, Belleville, & Fontaine, 1997). Other such cases have been described (e.g. Ayotte, Peretz, Rousseau, Bard, & Bojanowski, 2000; Griffiths, Rees, Witton, Cross, Shakir, & Green, 1997; Hébert & Peretz, 2001; Peretz et al., 1994; Piccirilli, Sciarma, & Luzzi, 2000; Steinke, Cuddy, & Jakobson, 2001; Wilson & Pressing, 1999). On the whole, such double dissociations suggest independence between language and music processing. Songs, however, probably the most ancient form of art, uniting music and language within the same frame, represent an interesting challenge. Songs are a unique combination of text and music. They are separable in many ways, for they rely on separate codes and are even often composed by different persons. Yet, music and text are linked and are most often, if not always, heard and played in a combined form, from an early age. In normal (healthy)
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listeners, studies have shown that recognition of songs is always better when text and tune are put in their original combination, with respect to when they are heard in a combination other than original. This effect had been taken as evidence that the text and melody of a given song are integrated in memory, which is represented by a single code rather than two (Serafine, Crowder, & Repp, 1984; Serafine, Davidson, Crowder, & Repp, 1986). Further studies, however, have suggested a strong association, rather than integration, between text and melody (Crowder, Serafine, & Repp, 1990; Hébert & Peretz, 2001; Peretz, Radeau, & Arguin, 2004). This strong association in memory would enable music to facilitate word recall. Yet, although music is used as a mnemotechnic to learn and remember text by students and children (Dickson & Grant, 2003), it is still unclear by what mechanisms it would be effective. One hypothesis is that production of words is slowed down when singing compared to when speaking. Kilgour, Jakobson, and Cuddy (2000) have shown that a sung text is better recalled than a spoken text as long as the sung text is slower than the spoken one. When the sung text is compressed to be as brief as the (same) spoken text, the advantage in recall disappears. Speed is thus a crucial variable in the effect of music on word recall. The repetition and simplicity of a melody have also been brought forth as explanations for the better word recall of songs over spoken text: it has been documented that the advantage of having a simple melody repeated throughout a song is reversed when the music is complex and changing (Wallace, 1994). Overall, experimental studies that have addressed the question of the effect of music on verbal recall have mainly examined whether or not presenting music along with text enhances word recall. Only one study has examined whether the response produced (sung or spoken) yields an advantage in word recall according to the way it is presented (sung or spoken). It was found that learning digits by singing on a simple melody rather than merely speaking is detrimental to recall, whether they are presented in a sung or a spoken form, whereas singing has no consequence (either good or bad) on word recall (Jellison & Miller, 1982). We (Racette & Peretz, 2007) recently conducted a study of whether singing is better than speaking in normal listeners, depending on the mode of presentation and production (sung versus spoken). The study was based on oral learning of unfamiliar songs, in three different conditions. In the first condition, the participant listened to the sung version of the lyrics and had to sing them back. This condition will be called the sung-sung condition. In the second condition, the sung-spoken condition, the participant listened to the sung version of the lines and had to recite lyrics, without singing. The comparison of these two conditions aimed at determining the effect of music on production. In the third condition, the divided-spoken condition, the participant listened to the spoken lyrics and recalled only the lyrics. In this condition, presentation was defined as divided because, as the lyrics were spoken, the corresponding melody was sung on /la/ in the background. Consequently, when the lyrics were spoken, the context was equivalent to when lyrics were
190 Hébert, Peretz, Racette sung, since the melody was presented in both cases. Thus, the comparison of the sung-spoken and the divided-spoken conditions aimed to determine the effect of music at encoding. Thirty-six university students participated in our study, half being nonmusicians and half music students. Participants learned one different song in each of the three conditions by an adaptive procedure. Songs selected for the study had eight lines that were taken from real songs composed by a folk singer, but that were unfamiliar to all participants. The percentages of correctly recalled words (all three conditions) and musical notes (sung-sung condition) were calculated. The first surprising finding was that musicians did not recall more words and notes than nonmusicians. This might be explained by the fact that musicians usually learn a song with the score. In the procedure used here, participants had to rely on the auditory code of the song, which is also familiar to nonmusicians. Therefore, musicians had no advantage over nonmusicians in an oral learning procedure with no visual support. When the data of the two groups were pooled, the sung recall was significantly lower than both spoken recalls. This means that music interfered with word recall on production. Moreover, because there were not more words recalled in the sung-spoken condition than in the divided-spoken conditions, there was no facilitation of music at encoding either. The results suggest that the lyrics and melody of a song are represented in independent codes in memory. Participants would have to access both the melody and the lyrics, making singing a dual task, at least in the first steps of learning. To summarize, studies in normal listeners have shown that reduced speed, repetition, and simplicity of music are elements that may help to recall words of songs. Yet, when a sung text is presented as fast as speech, when melodies are complex, when listeners have to produce a sung response, or when text is presented against a melodic background, the advantage of singing over speaking disappears. In other words, a song per se does not grant any actual advantage to text in memory, over text alone. These findings with normal subjects raise questions regarding the classical observation that aphasic patients can sing words that they are unable to pronounce otherwise. In fact, these observations are anecdotal. They were not substantiated by quantitative data of patients’ production. The only study that did so does not support the idea that music facilitates word production. Cohen and Ford (1995) examined the production of 12 patients who became aphasic after a unilateral left-hemisphere vascular accident. Patients were asked to choose three songs from a list of eight songs they had sung in therapy over the previous 3 months. Patients had to produce the words of the choruses of the chosen songs under three experimental conditions, that is, spoken naturally (without any support), spoken with a steady drumbeat accompaniment, and sung accompanied with the melody played on a keyboard. Content, error types, and number of intelligible words per minute were the dependent variables. It was found that the speech content and error types did not differ across conditions, but that word intelligibility was higher
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when utterances were spoken without any support, with respect to when sung or spoken accompanied with a drumbeat. However, several methodological problems weaken the conclusions to be drawn. To name a few, the type and severity of aphasia of the patients were not specified. It is unknown how impaired these patients were in their expressive speech abilities. The group data may not be representative of how each patient performed in the different conditions. For instance, the averaging of performance may create effects that do not reflect any of the individual performance patterns, or may cancel out effects that would have been significant at the individual level (Caramazza & McCloskey, 1988). Moreover, as was suggested by the authors themselves, the word intelligibility index (that is, the average number of intelligible words divided by the average duration of each condition) could have been compromised in the rhythm and melody conditions because judges had to listen to recorded speech with a drumbeat or electric keyboard in the background. Masking effects could thus be involved in the finding of lower intelligibility in these conditions. Another important factor is that the word intelligibility index was only an approximation of the patients’ production, because the whole set of productions was not analyzed. Rather, a random sample taken from each patient in each condition was examined, and this rendered the productions not necessarily comparable from one condition to another, or from one patient to another. Finally, performance on the melody of the songs was not assessed, so it is unknown whether singing with the words was detrimental because patients had to produce both melody and words (a double task), or because the words themselves were more difficult to produce while singing than while reciting with accompaniment. In addition, given that amusia is more often associated with aphasia than not, the presence of amusia, in some, or all of the patients cannot be ruled out: a double deficit (amusia plus aphasia) could, in itself, explain why the singing condition was least successful. We recently revisited this question of singing in expressive aphasia and reported the cases of two aphasic patients in whom we assessed singing and speaking abilities within the same utterances (Hébert, Racette, Gagnon, & Peretz, 2003; Peretz, Gagnon, Hébert, & Macoir, 2004). The first patient, CC, was a severely nonfluent aphasic patient who became aphasic after a stroke. Two experiments examined familiar and novel materials, respectively. CC had to repeat sung words (the sung condition), spoken words (the spoken condition), or melodies on the syllable “la” (the music condition). Productions were analyzed in terms of words and notes produced, in order to establish whether or not music imposes a load on memory and production, as it can occur in text recall. The findings showed that word production was comparable in the sung and the spoken conditions, with both familiar (Figure 11.1) and unfamiliar (Figure 11.2) materials. CC was also as competent as his controls in producing the music, and there was no additional cost to produce the music with the words with respect to the music alone. The same findings were essentially replicated in the second patient, GD,
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Figure 11.1 Percentage of correctly repeated notes or words by CC and his matched controls, with respect to the experimental condition, for familiar songs.
who suffered from primary progressive aphasia. GD was tested on familiar material only since he was too deteriorated at the cognitive level to be tested on novel songs. His production of sung and spoken text was comparable in terms of number of syllables correctly repeated. His production of notes was significantly higher than for text, and comparable in the sung and music conditions. Also, in both cases, the same error types were found on spoken and sung words (Figure 11.3). These two patients, having word-finding difficulties from different causes, point to the idea of separate codes for language and music in songs, rather than to granting songs a special status in the cognitive auditory system. The fact that nonfluent aphasic patients are able to sing, as reported previously, could therefore stem from the mere observation that their rote memory of automatic material, such as songs, is superior to their performance in generative tasks, such as spontaneous speech. This was indeed the case for CC and GD. In another study (Racette, Bard, & Peretz, 2006), we examined the
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Figure 11.2 Percentage of correctly repeated notes or words by CC and his matched controls, with respect to the experimental condition, for unfamiliar songs.
production of sung and spoken words of aphasic patients following the same paradigm as the one described earlier in normal listeners, and that involved the production of sung or spoken words in three conditions (sung-sung, spoken-sung, and divided-spoken). Eight patients suffering from a variety of expressive aphasia (going from anomia to severe mixed aphasia) after a leftsided brain lesion were tested. There was no difference between conditions. Thus, singing did not improve word production compared to speaking. This was true for the quantity of words produced but also for the types of errors in the different conditions. Moreover, aphasic patients did not produce more words than notes. The same profile was obtained in subsequent experiments using familiar material. Hence, there were as few words of familiar songs repeated by singing or by speaking. Even if songs were naturally sung with both the lyrics and the melody, there was no cost of producing the lyrics alone. This again suggests that the words and the melody are accessed separately in memory for songs.
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Figure 11.3 Percentage of correctly repeated syllables with respect to the experimental condition for GD.
Would these findings constitute grounds for discontinuing the use of MIT in speech therapy or music therapy sessions? We would like to argue quite the opposite. First of all, the fact that empirical studies point to independence between language and music suggests that the transfer of skills acquired from singing to speaking has real potential to occur. The suggestion of a special right-hemisphere competence for singing with words, which would involve mechanisms different than for speaking, would represent a serious clinical obstruction to therapeutic success. For instance, if patients had to learn words in songs in therapy, they would then have to learn not to sing those words for a transfer from singing to speaking to occur in their daily life. This type of rehabilitation would not constitute a very sensible strategy. The suggestion of special mechanisms for singing words and speaking would also stand in contrast with the increasingly growing (empirical and brain imaging) evidence on the independence of language and music neural networks. Secondly, studies did show that presentation of a sung text, in a natural context (that is, when songs are not artificially compressed for faster presentation) and with normal (simple and repetitive) melodies, is superior to a spoken text on recall, or at least is not detrimental to it. For instance, syllable lengthening, which is an acoustic correlate of speed reduction in singing, helps nonfluent aphasic patients when they use MIT; the longer the syllables are, the more phrases are produced by patients (Laughlin, Naeser, & Gordon, 1979). Singing generally enhances fluency and word intelligibility of patients with speech disorders such as dysarthria or stuttering, possibly or partly
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via such mechanisms, although rigorous empirical studies are still lacking (Cohen, 1988; Colcord & Adams, 1979; Healey, Mallard, & Adams, 1976; Pilon, McIntosh, & Thaut, 1998). Studies using language pathologies other than aphasia are crucially needed. In particular, one common characteristic of the patients examined in our studies is that they all had word-finding difficulties. The advantages of singing over speaking could well be more apparent in other language disorders involving suprasegmental (beyond the word) impediments. For instance, we (Hébert & Béland, unpublished data) examined the case of a stutterer and compared his fluency during sung, spoken, and spoken-pacedwith-a-metronome renditions of the same texts. While, in terms of percentage of words, the advantage of sung words over spoken was modest (but nevertheless significant, in the order of about 5% and 15% for familiar and unfamiliar songs, respectively), it was when listening to his productions that the difference between these conditions was astonishing. The improvement could not be explained by speed reduction, since word production was faster when the patient spoke to the pulse of a metronome (therefore, it was not singing per se), and the performance in the latter condition was comparable to when singing. Thus, although improvement did occur when singing, the singing per se did not give this advantage, since metronome-paced speech was as good as singing. However, maybe some component (yet to be found) that encompasses the word level, and that is common to singing and metronomepaced speech, is responsible for these effects. Another study (Kempler & Van Lancker, 2002) examined the intelligibility in a dysarthric patient with Parkinson’s disease in spontaneous speech, reading aloud, repetition, repeated singing, and spontaneous singing. The singing stimuli (both repeated and spontaneous) were conversational phrases such as “It’s a small village”, similar to what is used in MIT. Not surprisingly, the spontaneous speech was found less intelligible than the other conditions, which did not differ significantly from each other. However, an interesting finding was that spontaneous singing was louder than the other conditions. Dysfluencies were also more frequent in spontaneous speech than in the other conditions. Disturbance in speech rate and reduced speech volume have been described as a prominent and even as an initial clinical feature of Parkinson’s disease. Speech impairments in this disease also include imprecise articulation, prosodic abnormalities, monotone, reduced stress, monoloudness, imprecise consonants, inappropriate silences, short rushes, harsh voice, continuous breathiness, pitch level disturbances, and variable rate, to name but a few. Therefore, even if in terms of number of words singing has no advantage over speaking, the communication benefits that could be gained with music in therapy (via MIT or active music therapy) for this population are hardly doubtful. And this is exactly what Pacchetti, Mancini, Aglieri, Fundarò, Martignoni, and Nappi (2000) have shown. They compared physical therapy sessions (which included passive stretching, specific motor tasks, and strategies to improve balance and gait) with active music therapy sessions (which
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included choral singing, voice exercise, rhythmic and free body movements, and active music involving collective invention). While physical therapy produced significant improvement over music therapy in rigidity, music therapy produced significant improvement in bradykinesia (at a motor level), as well as in happiness, activities of daily living, and quality of life, over physical therapy. These studies bring about two further points: the fluency issue and additional benefits from speech and music therapy. Fluency is an ill-defined concept that is difficult to measure empirically, and its corresponding acoustic cues are unknown (Gordon, 1998). Rather, what we are aware of are fluency disruptions. Although fluency can be thought as applying to the word level (as in stuttering, for instance), it is most useful to describe prosody or phrase contour (that is, beyond the word level). In our studies reported here (aphasic and stuttered patients), the singing conditions yielded a strong impression of fluency that was not captured by the number of words or syllables produced. Therefore, the impression of fluency in singing, presumably produced by the smooth legato between words (i.e., no or few pauses), certainly contrasts with the limited and jerky spontaneous speech of nonfluent aphasic patients, stutterers, and possibly patients with Parkinson’s disease. A therapy based on the exaggeration of prosody, perhaps by singing, may provide grounds for better modeling of sentence production. Finally, additional benefits may be provided by music in therapy. First, because aphasic patients do not necessarily suffer from a music disorder (Hébert et al., 2003; Peretz et al., 2004), producing musical notes alone is still a good way for them to produce vocal sounds, and incidentally develop proper breathing and increase in volume. Second, a treatment emphasizing the rhythmic support of speech may improve repetition to a greater extent than the melodic support (Boucher, Garcia, Fleurant, & Paradis, 2001). Finally, most aphasic patients seem to enjoy singing, which motivates them to participate in sessions and keeps their spirits high. Music and language have to be compared on similar levels to determine whether they share or not the same underlying processes. When comparing the production of sung and spoken words, it was suggested that there is a unique speech code for words, be they sung or spoken. This verbal code would be separated from the musical code for musical notes production. Therefore, oral production of words and music in neurologically intact participants and in aphasic patients gave additional support for independent representations of music and language in memory for songs. However, the extent of interinfluence between music and language in songs, and how one can benefit from the presence of the other when damaged, because of the strong association between the two, has to be studied further.
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Acknowledgments The writing of this chapter was made possible by a grant from Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC) to both S.H. and I.P.; by a grant from the International Human Frontier Science Program to I.P. and A.R.; and by a Canadian Institutes for Health Research (CIHR) graduate fellowship to A.R.
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singing. In W. R. Crozier & A. J. Chapman (Eds.), Cognitive processes in the perception of art (pp. 145–163). Amsterdam: North-Holland. Dowling, W. J., & Harwood, D. (1986). Music cognition. New York: Academic Press. Epstein, C. M., Meador, K. J., Loring, D. W., Wright, R. J., Weissman, J. D., Sheppard, S., et al. (1999). Localization and characterization of speech arrest during transcranial magnetic stimulation. Clinical Neurophysiology, 110, 1073–1079. Gordon, J. K. (1998). The fluency dimension in aphasia. Aphasiology, 12, 673–688. Griffiths, T. D., Rees, A., Witton, C., Cross, P. M., Shakir, R. A., & Green, G. G. (1997). Spatial and temporal auditory processing deficits following right hemisphere infarction. A psychophysical study. Brain, 120, 785–794. Halpern, A. R. (1988). Perceived and imagined tempos of familiar songs. Music Perception, 6, 193–202. Halpern, A. R. (1989). Memory for the absolute pitch of familiar songs. Memory and Cognition, 17, 572–581. Healey, E. C., Mallard, A. R. III, & Adams, M. R. (1976). Factors contributing to the reduction of stuttering during singing. Journal of Speech, Language, and Hearing Research, 19, 475–480. Hébert, S., & Peretz, I. (2001). Are text and tune of familiar songs separable by brain damage? Brain and Cognition, 46, 169–175. Hébert, S., Racette, A., Gagnon, L., & Peretz, I. (2003). Revisiting the dissociation between singing and speaking in expressive aphasia. Brain, 126, 1836–1850. Heiss, W. D., Kessler, J., Thiel, A., Ghaemi, M., & Karbe, H. (1999). Differential capacity of left and right hemispheric areas for compensation of poststroke aphasia. Annals of Neurology, 45, 430–438. Jacome, D. E. (1984). Aphasia with elation, hypermusia, musicophilia and compulsive whistling. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry, 47, 308–310. Jellison, J. A., & Miller, N. L. (1982). Recall of digit and word sequences by musicians and nonmusicians as a function of spoken or sung input and task. Journal of Music Therapy, 19, 194–209. Keith, R. L., & Aronson, A. E. (1975). Singing as therapy for apraxia of speech and aphasia: Report of a case. Brain and Language, 2, 483–488. Kempler, D., & Van Lancker, D. (2002). Effect of speech task on intelligibility in dysarthria: A case study of Parkinson’s disease. Brain and Language, 80, 449–464. Kilgour, A. R., Jakobson, L. S., & Cuddy, L. L. (2000). Music training and rate of presentation as mediators of text and song recall. Memory and Cognition, 28, 700–710. Laughlin, S. A., Naeser, M. A., & Gordon, W. P. (1979). Effects of three syllable durations using the melodic intonation therapy technique. Journal of Speech, Language, and Hearing Research, 22, 311–320. Levitin, D. J. (1994). Absolute memory for musical pitch: Evidence from the production of learned melodies. Perception and Psychophysics, 56, 414–423. Levitin, D. J., & Cook, P. R. (1996). Memory for musical tempo: Additional evidence that auditory memory is absolute. Perception and Psychophysics, 58, 927–935. Luria, A. R. (1973). The man with a shattered world (pp. 154–155) (L. Solotaroff, Trans.). London: Cape. Luria, A. R., Tsvetkova, L. S., & Futer, D. S. (1965). Aphasia in a composer (V. G. Shebalin). Journal of Neurological Sciences, 2, 288–292. Marin, O. S., & Perry, D. W. (1999). Neurological aspects of music perception and
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performance. In D. Deutsch (Ed.), The psychology of music (2nd ed., pp. 653–724). New York: Academic Press. Ostwald, P. F. (1973). Musical behavior in early childhood. Developmental Medicine and Child Neurology, 15, 367–375. Pacchetti, C., Mancini, F., Aglieri, R., Fundarò, C., Martignoni, E., & Nappi, G. (2000). Active music therapy in Parkinson’s disease: An integrative method for motor and emotional rehabilitation. Psychosomatic Medicine, 62, 386–393. Papanicolaou, A. C., Moore, B. D., Deutsch, G., Levin, H. S., & Eisenberg, H. M. (1988). Evidence for right-hemisphere involvement in recovery from aphasia. Archives of Neurology, 45, 1025–1029. Peretz, I., Belleville, S., & Fontaine, F. (1997). Dissociations entre musique et langage après atteinte cérébrale: Un nouveau cas d’amusie sans aphasie. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 51, 354–367. Peretz, I., Gagnon, L., Hébert, S., & Macoir, J. (2004). Singing in the brain: Insights from cognitive neuropsychology. Music Perception, 21, 373–390. Peretz, I., Kolinsky, R., Tramo, M., Labrecque, R., Hublet, C., Demeurisse, G., et al. (1994). Functional dissociations following bilateral lesions of auditory cortex. Brain, 117, 1283–1302. Peretz, I., Radeau, M., & Arguin, M. (2004). Two-way interactions between music and language: Evidence from priming recognition of tune and lyrics in familiar songs. Memory and Cognition, 32, 142–152. Piccirilli, M., Sciarma, T., & Luzzi, S. (2000). Modularity of music: Evidence from a case of pure amusia. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry, 69, 541–545. Pilon, M. A., McIntosh, K. W., & Thaut, M. H. (1998). Auditory vs. visual speech timing cues as external rate control to enhance verbal intelligibility in mixed spastic-ataxic dysarthric speakers: A pilot study. Brain Injury, 12, 793–803. Racette, A., Bard, C., & Peretz, I. (2006). Making non-fluent aphasics speak: Sing along! Brain, 129, 2571–2584. Racette, A., & Peretz, I. (2007). Learning lyrics: To sing or not to sing? Memory and Cognition, 35, 242–253. Rubin, D. C. (1977). Very long-term memory for prose and verse. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 16, 611–621. Ryding, E., Bradvik, B., & Ingvar, D. H. (1987). Changes of regional cerebral blood flow measured simultaneously in the right and left hemisphere during automatic speech and humming. Brain, 110, 1345–1358. Serafine, M. L., Crowder, R. G., & Repp, B. H. (1984). Integration of melody and text in memory for songs. Cognition, 16, 285–303. Serafine, M. L., Davidson, J., Crowder, R. G., & Repp, B. H. (1986). On the nature of melody–text integration in memory for songs. Journal of Memory and Language, 25, 123–135. Signoret, J. L., van Eeckhout, P., Poncet, M., & Castaigne, P. (1987). Aphasia without amusia in a blind organist: Verbal alexia-agraphia without Braille. Revue Neurologique, 143, 172–181. Sparks, R., Helm, N., & Albert, M. (1974). Aphasia rehabilitation resulting from melodic intonation therapy. Cortex, 10, 303–316. Steinke, W. R., Cuddy, L. L., & Jakobson, L. S. (2001). Dissociations among functional subsystems governing melody recognition after right hemisphere damage. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 18, 411–437.
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12 The neuropsychology of calculation and number processing Xavier Seron
It is not easy for a numerate person to understand the everyday consequences of acquired calculation and number deficits. However, we need numbers in many daily activities: to have a sense of time, to locate a house, to change money, to understand the score of a match, to read a price, to estimate a distance, to make a telephone call, and so on. Not only do we have to understand numbers, but we also have to be able to manipulate them for cooking, driving a car, changing money, selling, buying, checking our bank account, arriving in time for an appointment, and so on. Although the domain of number is crucial in everyday situations, it has been neglected for a very long time in neuropsychology, and it is only over the last 20 years that the neuropsychological approaches to numbers and calculation have made any major progress. Although debate still rages over the cognitive architecture of our numerical abilities, a great deal of research has delineated the main questions that remain to be solved. In our review of the domain, I will arbitrarily consider two main fields: the basic quantification processes and the numerical and arithmetic symbolic processes. At the end of the chapter, I will also discuss some aspects of the relationships between symbolic and non-symbolic arithmetic. There is a consensus within scientific literature that before the acquisition of symbolic arithmetic, human babies, as well as several animal species, possess some mechanisms to discriminate, categorize, and represent the numerosities of objects or events (Hauser, Carey, & Hauser, 2000). It has indeed been observed that babies and young children, well before the appearance of language, react specifically to changes in numerosities, and that such a capacity for discrimination operates in a precise way in the range of small numbers (up to 3 and sometimes 4), but becomes approximate for larger numerosities (Antell & Keating, 1983; Starkey & Cooper, 1980; Strauss & Curtis, 1981). It has also been shown that children as young as 4½ months can anticipate the results of simple addition and subtraction (Wynn, 1992). However, many debates continue on (1) the philogenic continuity between human and animal numerical competencies, (2) the format of these “protonumeric” representations, and (3) the relationships between these precocious protonumeric mechanisms and the subsequent adult arithmetic competencies. Some authors
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suggest that there is a direct link between the initial numerical competencies and the symbolic adult competencies (Butterworth, 1999; Dehaene, 1997), while others consider that the appearance of language creates a gap, a discontinuity, in the development (Carey, 2001). In this review, I will examine the contribution of neuropsychology to some of these debates by looking first at some basic numerical competencies, and then by examining numerical and arithmetical activities that require the use of language and of symbolic arithmetic such as transcoding processes and simple calculation. Finally, in the last section, I will discuss the question of the semantic representation of numbers.
Basic quantification processes As concerns our basic quantification abilities, three mechanisms have been described: subitizing, counting, and estimation. Subitizing is a nearly instantaneous process that allows us to discriminate between small sets of different sizes (up to three). Subitizing occurs automatically, accurately, and without conscious attention. At the chronometric level, subitizing is characterized by a very modest increase in the reaction times according to the number of elements to be estimated (no more that 50 ms per item), while for more than three items, the reaction times abruptly increases by up to 200 ms per item. This increase in response time is considered to reflect the intervention of a counting process. Counting is a more complex process that requires an association between the elements to be counted and the sequence of verbal numerals according to some basic counting principles (Gallistel & Gelman, 1982). Finally, for the numerosities above the subitizing range, when counting is not possible (because the stimuli are presented too briefly or are too numerous, for example), the numerosity of the sets can nevertheless be evaluated through the use of an estimation process that gives only an approximate representation of the size of the set. Some unsolved questions remain about these three quantification processes. A first question is whether subitizing and counting are actually different mechanisms, or whether the difference is limited to the degree of difficulty. Some data from experimental psychology indicate that, on the one hand, counting, unlike subitizing, is influenced by different experimental manipulations related to the control of ocular movements, the spatial organization of the items, the load in short-term memory, the homogeneity of the stimuli, or the cueing of attention (Piazza, 2004). On the other hand, the only variable that influences subitizing but not counting is the manipulation of the saliency of the targets (the perceptive pop-out). Such an asymmetry in the variables that specifically influence the two processes may nevertheless be interpreted by considering that subitizing is in fact a rapid and automated counting process that can be affected only by a reduction in the perceptive pop-out. Furthermore, the critical discontinuity in the reaction times around the limit of four stimuli, which is considered as the frontier between the two processes,
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has not always been observed, and its statistical reliability is questioned (Balakrishman & Ashby, 1992). The issue is thus uncertain, and it is interesting to examine whether there is any evidence in neuropsychology for a dissociation between these two abilities. Dehaene and Cohen (1994) have documented a dissociation between a preserved ability to subitize small collections of objects and impaired counting abilities through the individual analysis of five patients presenting a simultagnosia. The patients were given quantification tasks ranging from one to six items in random or canonical presentation, both accuracy and response time measures being used. They proved to be able to subitize two or (less often) three objects, while their counting performance beyond this range was clearly impaired. However, the French authors have examined the visual exploration of their patients and have shown in a classical conjunction research task that their visual exploration was slower than that of normal subjects. Thus, they proposed that the impaired counting performance in simultagnosic patients is due to a fundamental inability to use spatial tags to keep track of previously explored locations. In this view, subitizing was preserved because it depends on a preserved parallel searching algorithm different from the serial research processing typically involved in counting, and that is impaired in simultagnosic patients. Such observations, however, constitute a pattern of simple dissociation that may simply mean that the impaired task is more complex than the preserved one. Given that it is legitimate to postulate that the quantification process becomes more difficult with the increase in numerosities, the preservation of subitizing together with a deficit in counting is not theoretically constraining. A more convincing proof would be to observe patients unable to subitize but still able to count objects. Two such patients have been described in the literature, but neither is convincing. The first patient, exhibiting a developmental dyscalculia, Charles, has been described by Butterworth (1999). The patient was able to estimate the elements of a collection only if he received enough time to count them. Furthermore, when asked to evaluate dots in the range of subitizing, Charles showed an increase in his reaction times of about 200 ms for the dots, suggesting that he used a counting strategy. However, recent data have demonstrated that he was still able to estimate small numerosities even for a very brief stimuli presentation (100 ms) and that he presented the classical discontinuity around the numerosity four (Piazza, 2004). A second patient, described by Cipolotti, Butterworth, and Denes (1991), was a woman with Gerstmann syndrome with very severe acalculia. She was unable to correctly subitize a set of dots arranged in the canonical way, but could count aloud and point out the dots (Cipolotti et al., 1991). However, the fact that this woman was unable to process any numerosity or number beyond four cannot be considered as a strong argument for the dissociation of the two mechanisms since she was only able to count within the subitizing range. Research on counting is limited in neuropsychology. Deficits in counting have, however, been observed in different groups of patients: simultagnosic patients (Cohen & Dehaene, 1995), those with right and left hemisphere
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lesions (Seron, Deloche, & Cornet, 1991; Warrington & James, 1967), and those with dementia (Halpern, McMillan, Moore, Dennis, & Grossman, 2003; Seron et al., 1991). With regard to demented patients, it has been shown that frontotemporal dementia (FTD) and dementia of Alzheimer type (DAT) patients score better than those with corticobasal degeneration (CBD). However, most of these studies concerned the counting of small numerosities, and the only study devoted to large dot arrays has been done by Seron and his collaborators on a group of aphasic, right-brain-damaged, and demented subjects. The results indicated that right-brain-damaged subjects encountered more difficulty with the spatial components of the task (correctly pointing to the dots), while aphasics experienced more difficulty with its verbal components (producing the correct number word sequence). The difficulties evidenced by demented patients were less systematic. Finally, the detailed analysis of the patients’ strategies indicated that the basic counting principles (cardinality, one-to-one correspondence, and the word-order principle) proposed by Gallistel and Gelman (1992) and Fuson (1988) were preserved, but that the patients had some difficulty with their correct application. This result is interesting but concerns only a small sample of demented subjects (seven patients). However, preservation of a good level of performance in dot counting as well as in subitizing has been observed in a subsequent study with a more extended sample of demented subjects (Kaufmann, Montanes, Jacquier, Matallana, Eibl, & Delazer, 2002). Approximate estimation of large numerosities without resorting to counting has not been systematically studied in neuropsychology. Some research has been done on the estimation of numerosities in specific contexts, but these studies do not tap into the basic estimation quantification process. As we can see, up to now, the basic quantification processes have not been systematically studied by neuropsychologists. Furthermore, most studies are limited insofar as they have mixed basic quantification processes and symbolic arithmetic. In most studies, indeed, the subjects have been asked to give their answer orally. Thus, there is a lack of studies looking into basic numeric and arithmetical skills that do not require a symbolic component. However, even if there is a lack of sufficient data, the present results suggest that the basic quantification processes are more resistant to brain damage than symbolic arithmetic (Girelli & Delazer, 2001).
Symbolic arithmetic In symbolic arithmetic, the research has been more extensive and can be grouped into two main domains: the processing of numerals (writing, reading, and transcoding) and basic calculation. We will briefly examine what has been observed and the main unsolved questions.
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Processing of numerals One of the particularities of the numerical domain is the presence in the written modality of two different notation systems: Arabic and verbal numerals. These two notation systems are composed of different elements and present a different structure. The Arabic system is a logographic one, since its smallest units (the digits) represent a quantity, whereas the verbal system is alphabetic. Its smallest units (the letters) have no meaning but represent the sound of the language. Both systems are, however, equally able to represent with precision an infinity of numerosities, and any quantity may be expressed without ambiguity in both notations.1 The verbal system does not permit easy calculation, unlike the Arabic system that sustains most of our complex written calculations. In the initial research on acalculia, it was observed that some patients essentially presented difficulties in reading or writing Arabic numerals (Hécaen, Angerlergues, & Houiller, 1961; Henschen, 1926). But in these group studies, the description of the disorders was relatively vague, and while in the rare, old single-case studies the descriptions were more refined, the authors did not propose any interpretation of the disorders (Benson & Denckla, 1969; Berger, 1926; Lewandowsky & Stadelman, 1908; Singer & Low, 1933). A first question concerns the existence of a specific lexical component for Arabic numerals. Some authors have proposed that Arabic digits are processed like objects and contact their semantic representation directly (Brysbaert, 2005). By comparison with words, Arabic numerals indeed lack many of the classical characteristics of language lexical entities. They do not have morphological, phonological, or orthographic information, and they do not play any syntactic role. However, unlike objects, they enter into sequential compositions following precise rules in order to constitute an infinity of numerosities. However, even if many authors postulate that there is an Arabic lexicon, it remains difficult to establish its content and its precise extension. Aside from the Arabic lexical primitives, such a lexicon may well contain frequently used Arabic numerals such as some round numbers (10, 100, 500) and maybe also all the two-digit numbers. The Arabic lexicon may also contain familiar Arabic numerals corresponding to encyclopaedic knowledge (such as certain historical dates, ages, brands of cars, etc.). A better reading of familiar numerals (such as 1789, the date of the French Revolution) than unfamiliar ones (such as 8179) has indeed been shown in single-case studies (Cohen, Dehaene, & Verstichel, 1994; Delazer & Girelli, 1997). Most of the research on the processing of numerals has been done under the heading of the transcoding processes. Transcoding refers to the processes involved in the transformation of numerals presented in a specific notation system or modality into another one. One can distinguish between intranotation transcodings, as in reading written verbal numerals aloud, and internotation transcodings, when this results in a change of notation, such as reading Arabic numerals aloud or writing Arabic numerals under
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dictation. The first detailed studies on transcoding were performed by Deloche and Seron (Deloche & Seron, 1982a, 1982b; Seron & Deloche, 1983, 1984), who observed two types of transcoding errors: the lexical errors resulting in lexical substitutions or omissions (twenty-four → 23) and syntactic errors that result in a transformation of the whole structure of the numerals (twenty thousand one hundred and forty → 2,010,010,040). Similar dissociations between lexical and syntactical errors have since been reported frequently in the literature (Cipolotti, Butterworth, & Warrington, 1994; Delazer & Denes, 1998; McCloskey, Caramazza, & Basili, 1985; McCloskey, Sokol, & Goodman, 1986; Noël & Seron, 1993, 1995). Other dissociations between impaired and preserved components in transcoding have been observed between comprehension and production mechanisms, and between the two notation systems. Patients have been described with preserved comprehension mechanisms, together with impaired production mechanisms, while the reverse performance profile has also been reported (Benson & Denckla, 1969; McCloskey, Sokol, & Goodman, 1986; Singer & Low, 1933). Similarly, dissociations between notation systems have been observed, such as impaired comprehension of verbal numerals with intact understanding of Arabic numerals (McCloskey & Caramazza, 1987; McCloskey et al., 1985, 1986) and vice versa (preserved understanding of verbal numerals together with impaired comprehension of Arabic numerals) (Delazer & Girelli, 2004; McCloskey et al., 1985). Finally, dissociations between notations have also been described at the production level in a patient able to produce Arabic numerals while presenting an impaired production of verbal numerals (McCloskey, Sokol, Goodman-Shuman, & Caramazza, 1990). These observations have generally been interpreted as the result of selective breakdowns within a modular functional architecture proposed by McCloskey and Caramazza (McCloskey & Caramazza, 1987; McCloskey et al., 1985, 1986). McCloskey’s model for number and calculation processing is a classical modular architecture that presents many similarities (but also some noticeable differences from) to the functional architectures proposed in the 1970s for reading, writing, and other lexical processes. The architecture is composed of comprehension and production modules for the Arabic and verbal formats. The comprehension modules are used to generate a semantic representation of the number; that is, a representation of the quantity to which the number refers. The production modules convert the semantic representation of a number into the appropriate output format (Arabic or verbal). Mental calculation and other arithmetical processes are performed in specific modules on amodal abstract representations resulting from encoding stages. This architecture had provided a general framework that allows the interpretation of most of the double dissociations observed between lexical and syntactic mechanisms, between verbal and Arabic numerals, and between comprehension and production mechanisms. However, immediately after its publication, McCloskey’s architecture was questioned on several points. The two major criticisms concerned (1) the existence of a central semantic
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representation that constitutes an obligatory bottleneck between the satellite input and output systems, and (2) the format of the semantic representation of numbers (Campbell & Clark, 1988, 1992). We will briefly examine these two continuing debates. McCloskey’s model, assumes that transcodings are achieved by the successive activation of the comprehension, production, and semantic modules. For instance, reading aloud an Arabic numeral such as “345” requires the intervention of the Arabic comprehension module in order to recognize the lexical Arabic primitives, to analyse their position in the sequence, and to transform it into the corresponding base-10 semantic representation (here: {3}10EXP2; {4}10EXP1; {5}10EXP0). Then the verbal production module translates this semantic representation into the verbal numeral “three hundred and fortyfive”. In this perspective, the base-10 semantic representation of numbers constitutes an obligatory bottleneck between the input and output systems for transcoding operations. A direct consequence of the model is that if subjects can transcode a numeral, they can also understand the quantity it represents. In contrast to this semantic transcoding model, alternative models that do not require an intermediary elaboration of a semantic value of the number between the input and the output numerals have been proposed (e.g. Cipolotti & Butterworth, 1995; Dehaene, 1992; Deloche & Seron, 1982a, 1982b; Seron & Deloche, 1983, 1984). In the asemantic models, the output numeral is simply produced by applying a set of rewriting rules to the lexical primitives of the input numeral. In reference to the dual-route models for word reading, it has also been suggested that both conceptions are valid and that there may be parallel semantic and asemantic routes for numeral transcoding (Cipolotti, 1995). However, the demonstration of the existence of two different types of transcoding is not that simple to establish. At first view, and by analogy with word reading, the existence of two transcoding routes may require (1) patients able to transcode Arabic numerals into verbal numerals without being able to understand them, and symmetrically (2) patients able to transcode Arabic numerals into verbal numerals by a semantic route, but unable to transcode them by the non-semantic route (Seron & Noël, 1995). Yet, if there are two routes and if one is impaired, then it is expected that the other may compensate. However, as concerns Arabic numerals, it is difficult to establish which route is used because routes have no specific signature. There is indeed an important difference between word reading and reading of Arabic numerals. In word reading, when the lexical route is impaired, the functioning of the asemantic route is revealed by the appearance of specific regularization errors in the reading of irregular words. Symmetrically, when the impairment concerns the asemantic route, this is suggested by the patient’s incapacity to read non-words or unfamiliar words. At first sight, a similar line of reasoning might apply to the reading of Arabic numerals. However, any attempt to prove such a double dissociation faces two particular difficulties. First, every Arabic sequence can, in principle, be transcoded via a non-lexical route because there are no “irregular numerals” (except
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maybe those beginning with zero). Consequently, if the semantic route is damaged, the non-lexical route would in principle be able to read every numeral. Second, every unfamiliar numeral may in principle receive an interpretation via a semantic route, since it is always possible to compute its corresponding meaning or numerical value. Therefore, in case of lesion of the non-lexical route, the semantic route may still mediate the reading of every numeral. The evidence for a dual-route reading process is thus more complex to establish in the domain of Arabic numerals than in the case of word reading. Nevertheless, many single-case studies that are not compatible with McCloskey’s semantic model have been published. Firstly, it has been observed in transcoding tasks that the pattern of errors produced by some patients is more easily interpreted by the use of asemantic mechanisms acting directly on the entry codes than by the use of a semantic algorithm. For example, the patient LR described by Noël and Seron (1995), while correctly understanding the verbal numerals, made different types of errors when he had to transcode two different verbal numerals sharing in McCloskey’s model the same semantic representation such as “one thousand and five hundred” or “fifteen hundred”. Although LR understood these two numerals well, he made different errors: “1,000,500” for “one thousand and five hundred” and “1500” for “fifteen hundred”. This pattern of errors suggests that for LR the production of Arabic numerals is not guided by a base-10 abstract semantic representation, but, rather, it is the syntactic structure of the verbal numerals that influences the production of the corresponding Arabic numerals. In the same way, the observation of specific errors made by the French aphasics on complex teens, such as transcoding “quatre-vingt dix sept” as “420,107,”2 seems to suggest that the errors are due to impaired mechanisms acting upon the elements of the verbal numeral rather than upon an abstract semantic representation. Other evidence in favour of the use of asemantic transcoding comes from the existence of patients able to understand and to produce numerals but unable to transcode them. Given that, according to McCloskey, transcoding results from the succession of comprehension and production mechanisms, it is thus difficult to understand why, when in some patients both these comprehension and production processes are intact, transcoding is nevertheless impaired. Cipolotti (1995), for example, reported the patient SF with probable DAT who had severe difficulty in reading Arabic numerals aloud with an otherwise spared ability to recognize and understand them, and to produce similar verbal numerals in a non-reading context. The normal performance of SF in comprehension and production tasks suggests that his reading errors cannot be interpreted by a semantic deficit. This case therefore raises a central difficulty for models postulating a single semantic route for transcoding. To interpret this pattern of preserved and impaired processes, Cipolotti proposed to distinguish two independent routes for reading Arabic numerals aloud: one requiring an intermediate elaboration of number semantic representations
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and another a direct asemantic route. In this framework, SF’s impairment is suggested to result from a deficit at the level of the asemantic route. However, if the other route, that is, the semantic one, is spared, why does the patient not use it? To answer this recurrent question, Cipolotti (1995) speculated that the demands of the task influence the selection of the adequate route. In particular, the instruction “to read the Arabic numerals” would preferentially activate the “asemantic route”. Furthermore, she proposed that the activation of “the asemantic route” inhibits the use of the semantic one. Such an interpretation has been extended by Cohen and Dehaene (1995), who have shown that the reading of Arabic numerals in two cases of pure alexia is influenced by the task demands. Both these patients were dramatically impaired in reading words and multidigit Arabic numerals, and much less severely in reading single digits. The errors were mainly lexical. Yet, the authors observed an important variation in the reading performances when exactly the same Arabic numerals had to be processed in the context of a magnitude comparison (“read these two digits aloud and tell me which is larger”: 10–15% errors) or for a subsequent addition (“read these two digits aloud and give me their sum”: 31–45% errors). This suggests that, in the very first stages of digit identification, task demand would already influence the system to use one processing route rather than another. The authors explain these patterns by hypothesizing the existence of two distinct visual identification processes (one in each cerebral hemisphere) that contribute differently to reading, calculation, and comparison. Thus, like Cipolotti, the authors explain the competition between the impaired and intact reading routes by relying upon the task demands: calculation would bias the subjects to use their asemantic pathways, whereas a transcallosal semantic route would be privileged in comparison context. Although most studies on transcoding have postulated the autonomy of the verbal and the Arabic lexicon, some studies have investigated the hypothesis that the processing of the Arabic code is systematically mediated by the verbal code. The question asked is as follows: do tasks such as the comparison, reading, or use in operations of numbers presented in Arabic numerals induce the systematic activation of the verbal code? The hypothesis that the verbal code is automatically activated was suggested by Noël and Seron (1993), who described a patient who compared two numbers not on the basis of the Arabic numerals (e.g. 3) presented to him but on their verbal counterparts (e.g. /trwa/). The authors suggested that some subjects might employ a “preferred code” to access number-related knowledge. However, this hypothesis has never been further developed. The possible activation of verbal representations when processing Arabic numbers is also suggested by the observation of code intrusion errors in transcoding tasks. For instance, Thioux, Ivanoiu, Turconi, and Seron (1999) observed a patient with DAT who exhibited systematic intrusions of verbal numerals when she had to produce Arabic forms. These intrusions gave rise to mixed errors such as
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“three mille” instead of “3000” (trois mille/three thousand) or “15ZE” instead of 15 (quinze/fifteen) or even “h8t” instead of eight (huit/eight). In other neuropsychological group studies, intrusion errors have been observed in both directions (Arabic → verbal and vice versa), mainly in DAT patients (Kessler & Kalbe, 1996; Tegnér & Nybäck, 1990) but also in normal patients (Della Sala, Gentileschi, Gray, & Spinnler, 2002). These errors have been interpreted as being the result of an impairment in the transcoding mechanism itself as well as in the inhibitory processes. The inhibitory processes are postulated as being necessary to inhibit one code when the task requires the production of the other. In such a perspective, when subjects have to process a number in one code, the other code is automatically activated but not produced thanks to the inhibitory processes.
Arithmetical facts and arithmetic The knowledge of basic arithmetical facts such as 2 × 3 or 3 + 7 is an essential part of our general semantic knowledge and is of crucial importance in daily life situations. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, it has been well known that a left posterior parietal lesion may generate dyscalculic disorders. The first detailed description of a specific calculation disorder without language or intellectual disorders, or even disorders in reading or writing Arabic numerals, was reported by Lewandowsky and Stadelman (1908). Several years later, Warrington (1982) presented the case of a physician (DRC), who, although unable to do simple addition, subtraction, and division, presented no language disorders and remained able to read Arabic numerals. Interestingly, although the patient was unable to give the correct answers to simple arithmetical problems, he could propose approximate responses, that is, a number close in magnitude to the correct one. A similar dissociation between deficit in exact calculation with preservation of approximate calculation was described later by Dehaene and Cohen (1991). They observed a patient, NAU, who produced many errors in simple calculation, but was able in a verification task to reject incorrect responses far from the solution (such as 2 + 3 = 9), although he erred with incorrect but close responses (2 + 3 = 6). The authors thus proposed the existence of two calculation systems: one processing numbers as precise values and another one considering them as approximate magnitudes. This proposal of different representations of numbers remains at the centre of many debates (see below the section on number semantic representations). Certain specific patterns of errors produced by patients when solving simple arithmetical problems led McCloskey to propose a distinction between arithmetic problems solved by retrieval (2 × 3 or 5 + 6) and those solved through the use of a rule (product by 0 or by 1). In a multiple case study, Sokol and his collaborators (Sokol, McCloskey, Cohen, & Aliminosa, 1991; see also McCloskey, Aliminosa, & Sokol, 1991) reported several cases evidencing a double dissociation between retrieval and rule-based problems. For
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example, the patient HM produced 100% of errors on the 0×N problems, but he made only 3% of errors on N × M basic problems. The reverse dissociation was observed in another patient, CM, who correctly solved multiplication by 0 but made 17% of errors on N × M multiplication. The pattern of patient performances also revealed that the N × 0 or N × 1 problems were altogether either correct or missed in a regular way, while no such regularities were observed for the N × M problems. These data therefore suggest that the 0 and the 1 problems are solved by reference to a general rule (0 times any number is 0), while N × M problems are retrieved in memory and stored individually. For the rule-based problems, the patients in some cases have “lost” the rule, while in other cases they have applied an inadequate rule (for example, by systematically proposing N as the answer to the N × 0 problems). Deficits in arithmetical problem-solving have also been examined with regard to the nature of the operation. Some early anecdotic observations have indeed documented acalculic patients with arithmetical fact impairments specific to a particular type of operation. For example, Lewandowsky and Stadelman’s patient was clearly better at multiplication than addition, subtraction, and division problems (Lewandowsky & Stadelman, 1908). Singer and Low (1933) also described a patient who, while unable to solve division and subtraction problems, was good at addition and multiplication. However, these old data lack precision since they do not sufficiently describe in detail the stimuli, the procedures, and the results. Recently, Dagenbach and McCloskey (1992) have reported a patient whose performance in simple subtraction problems was significantly better than his performance in addition and multiplication problems. Since this observation was made, other patients with selective preservation of subtraction have been reported (Lampl, Eshel, Gilad, & Sarova-Pinhas, 1994; McNeil & Warrington, 1994; Pesenti, Seron, & Van der Linden, 1994), and, more importantly, various patterns of selectively preserved and impaired arithmetical facts according to the operation have been reported. For example, selective impairment of multiplication with better or entirely preserved addition and subtraction has been documented (Dehaene & Cohen, 1997; McCloskey et al., 1991). The reverse pattern—that is, a selective preservation of multiplication—has also been reported (Delazer & Benke, 1997). Finally, even a patient with selective impairment of simple division has been described by Cipolotti and de Lacy Costello (1995). These findings of highly selective impairment of arithmetical facts according to the operation has led to the formulation of two influential proposals regarding the organization and the retrieval of arithmetical facts in memory, one by McCloskey and colleagues (Dagenbach & McCloskey, 1992; McCloskey, 1992), and the other by Dehaene and Cohen (Dehaene, 1992; Dehaene & Cohen, 1995, 1997). According to McCloskey and his colleagues, retrieving arithmetical facts involves first converting the problem, either verbally (“four plus three”) or by Arabic digits (“5 + 7”), into an abstract and amodal representation. This representation is then used to activate in memory the corresponding
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arithmetical fact. The model also postulates that each arithmetical fact is stored as a distinct representation and that the facts are segregated in memory according to the operation. There are thus separate representations for addition, multiplication, subtraction, and division problems. Such a model may, according to the location and extension of the brain lesion, predict any pattern of dissociation between preserved and impaired operations. According to Dehaene’s triple code model, numbers are represented in the human brain in three different formats: as a sequence of digits in the visual Arabic representation, as number words in the auditory-verbal representation, and as magnitude in the analogical representation. In this perspective, the arithmetical facts that have been learned by rote, such as simple addition and the multiplication table, are stored in verbal representations, while subtraction and division require the activation of the magnitude representation. Consequently, there are two different routes for simple arithmetic problems: a direct asemantic route, specialized in storing and retrieving the rote verbal knowledge of arithmetic tables, and an indirect semantic route, specialized in quantitative processing. In the asemantic route, the problem (whatever its format) is first transcoded in an internal verbal representation. This representation is then used to trigger completion of this word sequence by rote verbal memory. This hypothesis is derived from the observation that multiplication and simple addition have been systematically learned by rote at school as rote verbal sequences. On the contrary, subtraction, division, and large addition (larger than 10) have not been learned through intensive rote verbal learning; their resolution thus requires a semantic manipulation of the corresponding quantities, termed by the authors to be “semantic elaboration”. In such a model, some specific associations and dissociations between the four operations are privileged: simple addition and multiplication may have a common fate if there is an impairment of the asemantic route (that is, a degradation of number verbal memories), while deficits in complex addition, division, and subtraction may be more dependent on an impairment in the semantic route. The prediction of the triple code is, however, slightly more complex, as the authors also add that subjects may in some cases (for example, for addition) use both the semantic and the asemantic route in solving arithmetical problems. Consequently, Dehaene suggests that it would be simplistic to expect a full dissociation between the arithmetic problems according to the operation. In any case, the best evidence of an impairment of the semantic route would be a deficit in subtraction problems and in large addition, while the clearest evidence of an impairment of the asemantic route would be a deficit in very simple multiplication. Moreover, given the expected common fate of the operation solved through rote verbal memories, the model does not expect to find patients with a selective impairment or selective preservation of addition relative to multiplication and subtraction. Consistent with these predictions are reports of selective impairments in multiplication relative to subtraction (Dagenbach & McCloskey, 1992; Dehaene & Cohen, 1997; Pesenti et al., 1994) and of selective impairment of subtraction relative to multiplication
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(Dehaene & Cohen, 1997; Delazer & Benke, 1997). Also in agreement with the proposal that multiplication is mediated through verbal associations is the finding that several patients present an association of language disorders and impairment in multiplication (Dagenbach, & McCloskey, 1992; Dehaene & Cohen, 1991, 1997; Delazer & Bartha, 2001; Delazer, Girelli, Semenza, & Denes, 1999; Girelli, Delazer, Semenza, & Denes, 1996; Pesenti et al., 1994; Sokol et al., 1991), whereas those with preserved multiplication tend to have intact linguistic skills (Dehaene & Cohen, 1997; Delazer & Bartha, 2001). However, some cases reveal patterns of performance that do not support Dehaene and Cohen’s model. For example, Van Harskamp and Cipolotti (2001) have described a patient (FS) who was specifically impaired in the resolution of simple and complex addition, but perfect in other operations. Such a selective deficit points, on the one hand, to an unexpected dissociation between simple addition and simple multiplication (the asemantic route), and, on the other hand, to a dissociation between complex addition and subtraction (the semantic route). The same authors (Van Harskamp, Rudge, & Cipolotti, 2002) have also described a patient with a deficit in single-digit subtraction who did not present any difficulty in quantity manipulation. Such patterns of dissociations are more compatible with a model postulating selective damage in a memory network segregated according to each operation. Finally, Whalen and his collaborators (Whalen, McCloskey, Lindenmann, & Bouton, 2002) have reported two patients that often retrieved the correct answer to simple arithmetic problems from memory, although they were unable to generate the phonological representation of either the arithmetic problem or the answer to that problem. This pattern of performance is not compatible with a model postulating that arithmetic problems, especially simple addition and multiplication, are stored exclusively in memory in a phonological format. There is thus now no agreement on the format of the arithmetical facts in memory. Although Dehaene’s proposal for verbal storage has not been definitively established, it seems reasonable to suggest that the storage and retrieval of arithmetical facts are related to the surface characteristics of the stimuli used during the learning phase, as has been demonstrated in normal subjects (Spelke & Tsivkin, 2001). Beyond the analysis of arithmetical skills, some authors, especially Margareth Delazer, have emphasized the need to look into the understanding of arithmetical operations (Hittmair-Delazer, Semenza, & Denes, 1994). This level of processing—termed “conceptual” by Delazer—concerns the understanding of arithmetical operations and the laws pertaining to these operations. With such a level of analysis in mind, Delazer had reported a study of a patient, BE, who developed aphasia and calculation deficit after a left haemorrhagic lesion, but who compensated for his calculation deficit by complex strategies. The deficit of BE was not global since he was still able to retrieve the results of addition and subtraction, and to retrieve multiplication by two and also some arithmetical problems with three, four, and five as operands. He was, however, completely unable to retrieve the result from
214 Seron memory of larger multiplication and division problems. When BE was asked to solve the arithmetic problems he could not retrieve from memory, he started to develop strategies that consisted of breaking the complex problems down into smaller ones in the range of his preserved abilities. In the development of such decomposition strategies for multiplication and division, BE used his preserved knowledge of the mathematical principles tied to these operations. For example, to resolve multiplication with six as an operand, BE multiplied the second operand by 10, divided by two, which was no problem for him, and finally added the second operand. Interestingly, BE always seemed to have good intuition as to which strategies were useful and economic for solving the problem presented. He always chose the strategies that simplified the solution process. He demonstrated a dissociation between impaired arithmetical fact knowledge and intact conceptual knowledge that allowed him to use back-up strategies based on mathematical principles. The proposal that conceptual knowledge and fact knowledge are mediated by separate cognitive mechanisms is reinforced by the observation of another patient, DA, who, although unable to answer from memory half of basic additions, subtractions, multiplications, and divisions, was able to answer algebraic equations perfectly (Hittmair-Delazer, Sailer, & Benke, 1995). He could also enumerate the steps required to solve arithmetic text problems though he was unable to perform the actual computational steps themselves. These cases considered together, as well as other but more anecdotal reports, show that the understanding and the use of arithmetical principles can be considered as different from and independent of stored fact knowledge.
The semantic representation of numbers There is much debate over the representation of numbers in the brain. How is our knowledge of numerosities, numbers, and arithmetic represented in the brain? On the one hand, there is the proposition that our number knowledge is rooted in a basic and innate “number sense” (Dehaene, 2001) or “number organ” (Butterworth, 1999) already present in babies and that we share with other animal species. According to this view, babies are equipped with a cognitive component that allows them to represent the number of events and to operate on these representations by adding or subtracting small numbers. It has been suggested that the format of these number representations may be analogue magnitudes, akin to a number line (Meck & Church, 1983). Another proposal is that numbers are represented in infants by a unique symbol. For each object in the set, a unique representation is opened, the resulting representation implicitly representing the number in the array. The symbol created for each object has been called an “object file” (Feigenson, Carey, & Hauser, 2002; Simon, 1997, 1999). These two representations present different properties. The object file representation is subject to a major
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size limitation, as only small sets can be individuated in parallel and stored in short-term memory. In contrast, large sets can be encoded by analogue magnitudes, but discrimination is subject to Weber’s law such that only sets with a constant ratio can be discriminated. Although there is still competition between the analogue and the object file representations to determine which one is at the origin of symbolic arithmetic, in neuropsychology, only the analogue magnitude representation has received any consideration. Much research in psychology and in neuropsychology has converged to sustain the existence of an analogue magnitude representation for numerosities in the human brain. The main evidence for such analogue magnitude representation in man is deduced from the fact that a distance and a size effect3 has been observed regularly even when the brain processes numbers presented in symbolic notations (Arabic digits or verbal numerals) (Buckley & Gilman, 1974; Dehaene, 1996; Dehaene, Dupoux, & Mehler, 1990; Moyer & Landauer, 1967). This suggests that, even when presented in a symbolic format, number processing converges to the analogue quantity representation. It has also been demonstrated that such access may be automatic, since it is found even when the subjects do not have to process the numbers semantically (Dehaene & Akhavein, 1995) or in priming experiments (Brysbaert, 2005; Koechlin, Naccache, Block, & Dehaene, 1999). Much research into brain-damaged patients and brain-imaging studies has also converged to indicate that the inferior parietal region of the brain may well be the critical area that, if impaired, creates a deficit in the semantic representation of numbers. Indeed, it is well known that a lesion of the inferior parietal region of the left hemisphere results in a deficit in number processing that constitutes, together with other associated disorders, the Gerstmann syndrome (Gerstmann, 1940; Hécaen, Angerlergues, & Houiller, 1961; Henschen, 1926; Mayer, Martory, Pegna, Landis, Delavelle, & Annoni, 2000). There are, however, not many cases with a semiology confined to the interpretation of number semantics without disorders in the recognition of the notations. The patient MAR described by Dehaene and Cohen (1997) is such an exception. The patient was able to read and write Arabic numerals correctly, but he was impaired in number comparison, simple calculation, and approximate judgment of magnitude. Aside from these pathological data, brain imaging also furnishes some evidence as to the crucial role of the intraparietal sulcus for the manipulation and the semantic representation of numerical quantity. In number comparison tasks, the activation is essentially bilateral: some loci of activation have also been observed in the supramarinal gyrus and in the angular gyrus, but the largest and most frequent activations have been observed in the intraparietal sulcus (Chochon, Cohen, Van de Moortele, & Dehaene, 1999; Dehaene et al., 1996; Rickard, Romero, Basso, Wharton, Flitman, & Grafman, 2000). Furthermore, the intraparietal activations have been shown to be modulated by the distance between the numbers (Pinel, Dehaene, Rivière, & Le Bihan, 2001), and they have also been observed when numbers are processed unconsciously (Naccache & Dehaene, 2001). This
216 Seron activation is bilateral with an either left or right dominance according to the reference task (Zago, & Pesenti, 2004). The possible location into the parietal lobe of the semantic representation of numbers has induced some authors to ask, “Why are numbers located there”? The answer is not simple and at present certainly not definitive. One suggestion is that this inferior intraparietal region is genetically determined to process specifically numerosities. The intraparietal region is viewed as the biological basis of the “number sense”, which is qualified as a biologically determined category of knowledge. In such a perspective, the parietal localization is viewed as highly specific and not easily transferred to other brain regions. This constitutes, for example, the innate and category-specific position of Dehaene (1997). In another perspective, it is suggested that the parietal localization of the analogue magnitude representation is linked with several functions that rely on estimating magnitudes of one type or another. This view emphasizes that, in addition to spatial computations coded in action coordinates (Stein, 1992), the parietal cortex is also important for numerosity estimation, temporal judgment (Critchley, 1953), and size judgments (Walsh, 2003). In this direction, a brain-imaging study done by Fias and his collaborators (Fias, Lammertyn, Reynvoet, Dupont, & Orban, 2003) showed that when subjects are asked to indicate whether a difference of orientation between two oblique gratings is larger or smaller than a fixed standard, significant loci of activation are found in the left parietal lobule and left ventral premotor cortex consistent with results obtained in numberprocessing tasks. In a third orientation, results from brain-imaging studies indicate that number-processing activates a network including not only parietal regions but also premotor cortex, as shown in positron emission tomography (PET) (Chochon et al., 1999; Pesenti, Thioux, Seron, & de Volder, 2000; Zago, Pesenti, Mellet, Crivello, Mazoyer, & Tzourio-Mazoyer, 2001) and functional magnetic resonanc imaging (fMRI) (Pinel, Le Clec’H, van de Moortele, Naccache, Le Bihan, & Dehaene, 1999; Stanescu-Cosson, Pinel, Van de Moortele, Le Bihan, Cohen, & Dehaene, 2000). As the premotor activation in number processing is close to the representation of fingers, it has been suggested (Zago et al., 2001) that the premotor activity represents the trace of a developmental finger-counting strategy used for numerical acquisition. Although this interpretation is still speculative, it has reactivated the studies on the relationships between finger discrimination and numerical abilities. Finally, an involvement of the parietal lobe has also been observed in the coding of order information in working memory. The fact that the parietal activations overlapped those involved in number processing has led to the suggestion that the underlying representation of order and numbers may share some common process (Marshuetz, Smith, Jonides, DeGutis, & Chenevert, 2000). However, we also must emphasize that certain authors have questioned the specificity of the activations observed during numbercomparison tasks, and it is suggested that activation in the intraparietal sulcus during number-comparison tasks may simply reflect a parietal role in
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maintaining a representation of a possible motor response (Gobel, JohansenBerg, Behrens, & Rushworth, 2004). Although such an argumentation remains possible, it does not correspond to the data (even if they are rare) indicating that a left parietal lesion may result in an impairment of number semantics. Aside from the analogue model for number representation, human beings also acquire and process verbal and Arabic numerals as well as many other conventional arithmetical signs. These words and symbols constitute symbolic arithmetic, which is also represented in some way in the brain. The point we want to discuss here is not the format-dependent representation of the verbal numerals or Arabic numerals in the brain, but rather the representation of their meaning. The defenders of the analogue representation of numbers have done a lot of research to find the signature of the analogue representation when numerate adults process symbolic arithmetic, and, given that both the distance and size effects have been observed with symbolic notations, it has been proposed that the use of numerical symbols is rooted in brain circuits devoted to presymbolic processing of numerosities. The general idea is that the arithmetic symbols are in some way connected to the compressed analogue magnitude representation and that such a connection brings some precision to the analogue representation.4 But as we have discussed elsewhere (Fayol & Seron, 2005), this view is clearly insufficient. In fact, if a compressed number line may constitute an adequate support for approximate arithmetic, it is clearly not a sufficiently strong structure to capture the essence of symbolic arithmetic. First of all, since the analogue numerical representations become ever more approximate as numerosity increases, this type of model does not possess any precise semantic representation of large numbers. Another difficulty in conceiving analogue representation as the sole semantic representation of numerosity lies in the fact that the numerical representation is unitary, since it corresponds either to the length of the activated segment (Gallistel & Gelman, 1992) or to a position marked by a pattern of activation (Dehaene, 1992). Moreover, this type of representation fails to capture the base-10 organization of the notation of the Arabic system and does not represent the multiplicative and additive relations that are specific to verbal notation. Finally, when semantic representation is understood as a type of compressed continuum, it is unable to represent the equivalence of numerical distances between numbers situated at different points within the continuum, since it violates the equidistance property of the number system. Thus, unless we posit a considerable extension of the properties of the number line, it is difficult to see how this type of representation of numerosity can represent the precise meanings that are associated with large numbers and expressed by the verbal and Arabic notational systems and the corresponding calculations, in particular with regard to the specification of the results. One of the key functions of language and of notational systems is, in effect, to permit the precise representation and processing of quantities which go beyond the
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discriminatory limits of our perceptual systems and the imprecision of our elementary quantification processes (counting and estimation). The present focus of research into presymbolic arithmetic and into the socalled number sense has been highly detrimental to the study of the properties of the symbolic number system per se. Currently in neuropsychology, two main proposals concerning symbolic number representations have been proposed: McCloskey’s (1992) base-10 semantic system and the verbal semantic system developed by Power and Longuet-Higgins (Power & LonguetHiggins, 1978; Power & Dal Martello, 1990). McCloskey considers that the internal semantic representation of numbers is assumed to specify in an abstract form the basic quantities in a number, and the power of 10 associated with each. For example, an Arabic number such as 6042 generates through some comprehension processes a semantic representation of the form {6} 10 exp2; {4} 10 exp1; {2} 10exp0. The digits in the braces indicate the quantity representations and 10EXPn indicates a power of 10. This notation is adopted to avoid any confusion with either the verbal or the Arabic representations. In McCloskey’s model, the semantic representations are precise. They are also componential since the quantity is expressed by a combination of the basic quantities and their associated powers of 10. The semantic representations are also abstract, that is, independent of the notational system for numbers (Arabic or verbal codes), and they are amodal, the same representations being activated whatever the channel of presentation of numbers (visual for Arabic or auditory for verbal numerals). Although this model has had some success, it has encountered two important limitations. On the one hand, it cannot easily explain the two main effects usually encountered in number semantic tasks (such as number magnitude comparison): the distance effect and the size effect. On the other hand, the model has been elaborated exclusively in relation to tasks concerned by symbolic arithmetic. For example, there is no indication as to how such a semantic representation may be activated by non-symbolic numerosities such as a collection of dots. The argument is not to affirm that McCloskey’s model is intrinsically unable to represent concrete numerosities or explain the distance or the size effects; the point is that the representation of concrete numerosities has not been systematically addressed by McCloskey and his collaborators. Another model, also using exact and abstract semantic representations for numbers, has been proposed by Power and Dal Martello (1990). Contrary to McCloskey’s model, this model does not assume a base-10 representation, but rather a semantic representation that reflects the lexical structure of the verbal numeral system and its product (two hundred means two times hundred) and sum (hundred and two means hundred plus two) relationships. For example, the numeral “three thousand and forty-two” would be represented by (C1000 × C3) + (C10 × C4) + C2, in which Ci corresponds to the semantic concept referring to the quantity “i”, and the operator “+” and “×” the sum and product relations. In fact, this model is very close to McCloskey’s model,
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since it shares both the idea of a precise and componential representation of the quantities as well as the same limitation in the representation of symbolic arithmetic.5 In fact, while Power and Dal Martello’s model has been less influential in neuropsychology, it has nevertheless been used frequently to interpret the errors made by brain-damaged patients or by children in transcoding tasks (Lochy, Pillon, Zesiger, & Seron, 2002).
Conclusions Much work remains to be done before we understand how the human brain is able to represent many of the properties of the symbolic number systems per se, and there currently remains a gap in psychology and in neuropsychology between the research that has focused on symbolic arithmetic and the research that has tried to establish the biological basis of our “number sense” or “number organ”. If we are to bridge this gap, two directions of research must be emphasized: research firstly on order processing and secondly on the use of fingers. Research on order processing and representations is critical, because order is one of the fundamental characteristics of the symbolic systems (Arabic or verbal). In these notation systems, the iconic representation of magnitude is transformed by the order of the elements in the sequence. The symbolic systems encode the quantity in terms of the rank occupied by the signs in the verbal or the Arabic sequences (one (1), two (2), three (3), four (4), five (5), etc.). “Six” (6) refers to a larger quantity than “five” (5) because it comes in the sequence after “five” (5). However, there is nothing in the term “six” (or the sign “6”) to indicate that the cardinal value to which it refers is greater than “five” (5). The name or the Arabic signs provide no information about the increase in the quantities. The transformation of magnitude into order relations is thus an essential aspect of symbolic arithmetic. As rightly underlined by Wiese (2003), the numeral verbal system and the Arabic system constitute a progression; that is, their sequence can be characterized by discrete elements ordered along a relation with specific properties (antireflexive, asymmetric, and transitive). Secondly, the reason to look at fingers is of course related to the association of a deficit in finger identification together with the impairment in number processing, sometimes observed in the Gerstmann syndrome. But more generally, it should be stressed that the use of fingers as a representative medium may play an intermediary role between presymbolic and symbolic number representations. There is indeed a body of different but converging evidence to support the idea that fingers are involved in the development of some procedural and declarative knowledge in arithmetic. Children use their fingers to count before they are systematically taught arithmetic (Butterworth, 1999), and in the cultures within which counting procedures exist, finger counting precedes or accompanies the development of the symbolic procedures (Dantzig, 1962). Brain-damaged adult patients suffering from severe acalculia exhibit a set of associated disorders (the Gerstmann syndrome), a key element of which is the loss of finger
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sense (digital agnosia) (Cipolotti et al., 1991; Gerstmann, 1940; Mayer et al., 2000). At the developmental level, bidirectional links have been established between the presence of digital agnosia and arithmetical deficit (Kinsbourne & Warrington, 1962, 1963; Pebenito, 1987; Rourke, 1993; Strauss & Werner, 1938). And the hypothesis of a functional link between digital representations and numerical representations has been further reinforced by the work undertaken by Fayol and his co-workers (Fayol, Barrouillet, & Marinthe, 1998), who have shown in a longitudinal study that the perceptuotactile performances evaluated at 5 years of age are better predictors than the general development scores of subsequent arithmetical performance at 6 and then 8 years of age. Finally, in various functional imaging studies (Dehaene et al., 1996; Pinel et al., 1999; Pesenti et al., 2000), the involvement of the left precentral gyrus and close areas in the frontal lobes has been repeatedly observed when subjects are asked to perform simple arithmetical tasks. Such recurrent associations have led Pesenti et al. (2000) to propose that “the joint activation of these frontal areas with the parietal ones may reflect the involvement of the finger movement network that might underlie finger counting (Butterworth, 1999; Simon, 1999), one of the basic numerical learning strategies spontaneously developed by children (Fuson, 1988)” (Pesenti, Thioux, Seron, & de Volder, 2000, p. 474). These data have therefore led Butterworth to suggest that “as the child grows and develops, the subitizing circuits in the inferior parietal link with the finger circuits in the intraparietal sulcus. The fingers, therefore, gain an extended representation by this link: they come to represent the numerosities” (1999, p. 250). A number of characteristics of the finger-based representations make these a powerful candidate for the establishment of such a link. The fingers, like language, have an abstract character, since the same pattern of raised fingers can equally well represent three giraffes, three toys, or three elements in an argument. However, whereas language permits the same type of abstraction, finger representations retain an analogue character since they preserve the one-to-one matching relation between the represented set and the fingers used to represent it, given that raised fingers have an analogue relation with numerosity. Fingers also have the advantage that they can act as a support for the subject’s actions since they can be mobilized in concrete situations in order to represent the various additive and multiplicative procedures. Finally, it is perfectly conceivable that the joint use of the fingers and the hands also constitutes a useful representation that plays a mediating role in the understanding of base-10 (or, indeed, base-5). We believe that the external representations that make use of fingers and that are actively incorporated in children’s activities could play an important role in establishing these abstract mental representations. However, although these particular structural and processing aspects of finger use make fingers plausible candidates as the missing link between presymbolic and symbolic representations, a lot of work is still necessary to establish more precisely their role in math cognition.
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Notes 1 Both numeric systems may be described in terms of an ensemble of lexical primitives plus some combinatorial rules. The Arabic system is composed of a small set of symbols, the digits from 1 to 9, which represent numerosities that are smaller than the base. To represent larger quantities, it uses a positional notation. In a multidigit number, the position of each digit indicates the power of the base by which it must be multiplied (e.g. 432 = 4 × 102 + 3 × 101 + 2 × 100). The digit 0 indicates the absence of a value for a given power of 10 in the number. The verbal numeral system is also composed of lexical primitives, which can be grouped into different lexical classes (the units from one to nine, the Tens from ten to ninety, and the Teens from eleven to nineteen, as well as some multipliers such as hundred, thousand, and million). The lexical units are embedded in two kinds of semantic relationships, the multiplicative relations, such as “two hundred” or “five thousand”, and the additive relations: “one hundred and two”, “one thousand and forty”, or “sixty-three”. In English and in French, any numerosity can thus be decomposed as a tree with successive embeddings of multiplicative and additive relationships (Power & Longuet-Higgins, 1978). 2 In French from France, the verbal sequence “quatre-vingt dix sept”, literally “fourtwenty-ten-seven”, represents “97”. 3 The distance effect in number-comparison tasks corresponds to the fact that subjects take more time and make more errors responding when the two numbers are numerically close (e.g. 8 vs. 9) than when they are further apart (e.g. 2 vs. 9). The size effect corresponds to the fact that at the same distance, small numbers (e.g. 5 vs. 7) are easier to compare than larger ones (e.g. 25 vs. 27). 4 For a simulation study that presents a concrete proposal on the linkage between higher-order numerical cognition and more primitive numerical abilities, see Verguts and Fias (2004). 5 The two models differed, however, in the way they represent the numerals above 9999. For example, twenty-one thousand would be represented in McCloskey’s model by (2)10EXP4, (1)10EXP3, which is formally equivalent to (C10 000 × C2) + (C1000 × C1), whereas Power et al.’s model does not postulate the existence of a concept such as C10 000, which does not correspond to a lexical primitive in French or English. A second difference concerns the numerals between 1100 and 1999, which can be expressed through hundred or thousand verbal structures. For example, 1200 can be expressed either by “twelve hundred” or by “one thousand and two hundred”. In McCloskey’s model, such a change in the verbal structure makes no difference at the semantic level, whereas these two verbal structures activate different representations in Power et al.’s model.
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SECTION IV
Modality-specific recognition disorders
13 Perceptual categorization Language and thought Jules Davidoff
History Vignolo (1999) pointed out that the inability to carry out tasks requiring categorization is a common consequence of aphasia and is crucial to the debate concerning the relationship between impaired language and thought. On that issue, different opinions were strongly expressed in the early days of modern neuropsychological research. Wernicke (1874), for example, considered aphasia a lexical impairment. Contrary to Wernicke, Hughlings Jackson (1879; see Zangwill, 1964), famously declared that aphasic patients are “lame in thinking”. The argument between the two opposing views was considered one of the most crucial in neuropsychology and surfaced many times in the subsequent 100 years (Geschwind, 1974; Goldstein, 1948; Head, 1926; Marie, 1906). Yet, there would not be a large corpus of evidence if one were to search only through current investigations. The cyclical nature of investigations in science is well known, and, at present, the cycle concerning the effects of aphasia on categorization is at a low point. From Vignolo’s chapter (1999) in the Handbook of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, one could give an estimate of around 20–30 years between high points of activity. The present stage of the cycle probably explains why so little of the previous research on categorization is included in current neuropsychological texts (Ellis & Young, 1996; Shallice, 1988). On the view that related aphasia to conceptual impairment, the two disorders have been variously seen to derive from a more general impairment in the use of symbols (Finkelburg, 1870; see Vignolo, 1999), or from impaired abstraction and categorization capacity (Goldstein, 1948; Teuber & Weinstein, 1956). It was Goldstein (1948) in particular who considered that a loss of abstract processing could explain impairments in all categorization tasks (Noppeney & Wallesch, 2000). Goldstein (1948) remarked on the particular difficulty that patients with amnesic (anomic) aphasia show when categorization requires the ability to think abstractly. Similar categorization tasks to those employed by Goldstein were used in a few studies in the last major revival of interest in the issue in the 1970s and early 1980s. For example, De Renzi, Faglioli, Scotti, and Spinnler (1972)
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asked patients to sort skeins of coloured wool in the classical Holmgren Test. However, they could only conclude that the “reason for aphasics’ poor performance is not clear” (p. 147). Impaired categorization was also restricted to anomic aphasia by Caramazza and colleagues (Caramazza, Berndt, & Brownell, 1982; Whitehouse, Caramazza, & Zurif, 1978). While patients with Broca’s aphasia had no difficulty with a categorization task, those with anomic aphasia were substantially impaired (Whitehouse et al., 1978). Similarly, in the task of discriminating between a cup and a bowl (Labov, 1973), Caramazza et al. (1982) found that patients with anomic aphasia were impaired and relied on the crude visual similarity of the presence or absence of a handle to make categorical judgements. Caramazza et al. (1982) commented that “the strongest statement that can be made at this time is that the type of semantically based deficit we have uncovered appears to be associated with some types of posterior pathology, but not with all posterior lesions” (p. 186).
Current revival: the patient LEW The current revival of interest in the relationship between language and thought in anomic aphasia comes from the work of Davidoff and colleagues in their studies on the patient LEW (Davidoff & Roberson, 2004; Roberson, Davidoff, & Braisby, 1999). LEW had a stroke that left him with a moderate right-sided motor weakness. LEW is severely anomic and this is particularly marked in his naming to visually presented stimuli (Druks & Shallice, 2000) (Figure 13.1). In his more recent assessment (Davidoff & Roberson, 2004), LEW was given the full set of objects (nouns) and verbs from Druks and Masterson (2000). For nouns, he scored 47/162 correct and verbs 17/100 correct (Figure 13.1) with no evidence of any predictive value of frequency, familiarity, age-of-acquisition, imageability, or visual complexity in analyses of correct and incorrect noun items. Errors were, as in Druks and Shallice
Figure 13.1 LEW’s naming and comprehension. From Davidoff & Roberson (2004); Druks & Shallice (2000).
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(2000), for nouns, attempts at circumlocutions, attempts to gesture, and occasional semantic errors; for verbs, there were mostly omissions. However, his comprehension was much better. On the spoken presentation of the word/ picture-matching task of the Psycholinguistic Assessment of Language Processing in Aphasia (PALPA) (Kay, Lesser, & Coltheart, 1992), he scored 33/40 when examined by Druks and Shallice (2000); on retesting, his performance was very similar; he scored 35/40 at the beginning of testing and 37/40 when retested a year later (Davidoff & Roberson, 2004) (Figure 13.1). LEW was unable to name or reliably point to colours, and this prompted an investigation of his ability to sort by colour. Goldstein (1948) noted that patients with anomic aphasia had particular difficulty in sorting colours. Moreover, he reported that patients had distinctive approaches to performing such tasks. They would pick a colour and try to find one identical to it. If the display contained no identical colours, then the colour was reluctantly placed next to one that was very similar; this was repeated for the whole display giving many pairs of colours. An alternative approach was to declare that all the colours belonged to the same group. Thus, the colours were either all the same or all different. Goldstein summarized his patients as having lost an abstract attitude. They, for example, did not put the categorized items into piles but rather required them all to be visible; Goldstein interpreted this behaviour as an indication that the categorization was not being driven by an abstract concept. With only a concrete attitude to the stimuli, an individual colour is not seen as representative of a class of colours and cannot be put into a group. Goldstein noted that the concrete attitude adopted by the patients could be seen by their unwillingness, when sorting, to put colours on top of each other. Not being driven by an idea of “redness”, “blueness”, etc., the patient can assign groups only by perceptual similarity, and for this it is necessary to see the stimuli. LEW’s approach to sorting colours was very similar to that recorded by Goldstein (Roberson et al., 1999). LEW’s inclination to sort by perceptual rather than categorical similarity was further assessed in a recent examination. He was given a task in which he had to point to the odd-one-out from three stimuli drawn from all possibilities (n = 120) of 10 different colours. The 10 colours (set 1) all had the same lightness and saturation. The colours were two pinks, three greens, two blues, one orange, one brown, and one purple. Another set of 10 stimuli (set 2) was chosen so that the colours with more than one example in each category were as perceptually distinct from each other as possible while still reliably given the same name (blue, green, etc.). It is possible to work out the solution for each triad by perceptual similarity from the trichromatic coordinates of each colour (Wyszecki & Stiles, 1982). For our purposes, a choice was considered to be an error if it was different from the solution based on perceptual distance. We examined the numbers of errors made by LEW and eight controls. The calculation of perceptual distance is not an easy matter by observation alone,
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and, as for many triads there was not an obvious answer; errors were predicted for both LEW and controls. However, for the second set of stimuli in particular, there would also be errors from making judgements based on category similarity. For some triads, the two stimuli that were from the same category (e.g. blue) were not perceptually the closest. If performance was based on category similarity, there would be an increase in errors. It was argued that LEW would be less influenced by the effect of category than controls. The prediction was confirmed. For set 1, LEW made 38 errors compared to 34.9 for controls (sd = 4.45) errors (z = .70, p > .05). For set 2, LEW made 32 errors compared to 66.0 for controls (sd = 8.45) errors (z = 4.02, p < .001). LEW was also unable to categorize shapes (Davidoff & Roberson, 2004) and facial expressions from stimuli where one expression was morphed into another (Roberson et al., 1999). Again, LEW was bewildered by the tasks. For example, in sorting circles, squares, and triangles, he picked up one of the circles and found a few of the other circles that he considered should go with it. He then declared that all the rest (circles, squares, and triangles) should be considered another group. Are these problems part of a more general intellectual decline as suggested by the phrase “lame in thinking”? In answering this question, there is a problem in that LEW has considerable difficulty in reading and writing; so, many standard intelligence tests would be inappropriate. However, Druks and Shallice (2000) reported his verbal IQ as 71 and his performance IQ as 83. More recently, he was given three subtests from the Vespar (Langdon & Warrington, 1995). His scaled scores were verbal odd one out = 8, spatial odd one out = 11, and spatial analogy = 8. These scores were not different from what might be expected from someone, like LEW, who left school at 14 and found employment as a bailiff (rent collector). His performance on the WAIS Matrices was 13/32, putting him at percentile 43. An example of the level at which he can succeed is given in Figure 13.2. Thus, standard intelligence testing gives no reason to believe that his impaired sorting is part of a more general intellectual decline. We also investigated LEW’s ability in analogical reasoning because Rattermann and Gentner (1998) argued that relational labels invite children to notice patterns and hence to make comparisons. They found that young children have greater difficulty in making choices based on relational size (such as the smallest item in a set) with “rich” objects (varying in many dimensions, including size) than with “sparse” objects (varying only in size). Young children (3 and 4 years old) were unable to resist matching by overall object similarity, rather than relational size. Not until 5 years of age were children able to overcome the temptation to match objects, and to choose by relational similarity. However, younger children made more relational choices when prompted with the labels “big”, “little”, “tiny” or “mommy”, “daddy”, and “baby”. Thus, hearing common labels could embark children on a comparison that helps promote abstract thought. The age at which analogical reasoning develops is greater than that currently found for the acquisition of colour labels (Davidoff, 1991; Rattermann & Gentner, 1998). So, it might be a
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Figure 13.2 Example of the non-verbal reasoning task at which LEW can succeed. LEW has to choose which of the five alternatives should go into the place marked with a ?
reasonable assumption that, as LEW cannot make use of colour labels, he would also not be able to make use of relational labels. Davidoff and Roberson (2004) gave LEW a close version of the tasks as used by Rattermann and Gentner (1998). In their task, the experimenter and child were presented with cards containing three objects of increasing size. The cards differed only in one respect. For the child, the objects were decreased in size so that the middle object had the same size as the smallest object, and the largest the same size as the middle object, etc. There were both rich and sparse object sets. Rich stimulus sets contained three objects that varied along multiple dimensions, including size, within the two sets (e.g. a large black hat, a medium-sized red rose, and a small white door). Sparse stimulus sets contained three simple sparse objects that were identical in all respects except size within the two sets (e.g. patterned squares). The experimenter and LEW sat opposite to each other and the experimenter explained, “I’m going to point to one of the three things on my card while you watch me. If you think about the thing I’m pointing to, you’ll be able to guess which the equivalent one in your set is.” If LEW were to use a relational rule to make his decision, when the experimenter pointed to the middle object in her set, LEW should also choose the middle object.
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However, if LEW’s decisions were based on overall similarity, then he would choose the smallest object. Feedback was either “yes, that’s the one” or “no, I was thinking of another one”. There were 12 trials for each set of stimuli. LEW completed all 24 trials on four different occasions. On separate occasions, LEW was given “family” labels for the stimuli. Following Rattermann and Gentner (1998), the experimenter used the labels “daddy”, “mummy”, and “baby” to label the large, medium, and small stimuli. On further subsequent occasions, LEW was tested with the “size” labels: “big”, “middlesized”, and “small”. Figure 13.3 shows results for LEW for sparse and rich stimuli with and without labels compared to those made by 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds in Rattermann and Gentner (1998). LEW performed above chance in all conditions. In the no-label condition, his scores resembled those of 4- and 5year-old children. LEW did not show the same pattern of improvement that Rattermann and Gentner (1998) found for 3-year-olds when prompted with family labels. LEW seemed confused by the labels “daddy”, “mummy”, and “baby” in that these resulted in decreased (albeit not reliably) performance. However, with size labels, LEW’s performance improved in both conditions. For the sparse condition, ceiling effects prevented a significant improvement, but not for the rich condition. Errors were always to the identical object for the rich condition; this was also the predominant error in the sparse condition. Rattermann and Gentner (1998) suggested that children succeed with plain stimuli because they have some understanding of the relative size of objects, but fail on the complex set because the object identity match
Figure 13.3 LEW’s performance on the analogical reasoning tasks taken from Rattermann and Gentner (1998) with no labels and with family or size labels. Asterisks indicate significant increase in performance from the no-label condition.
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overrides the relative size match. The same explanation could well hold for LEW. From these data, it can be seen that LEW was able to reason analogically at least to the ability of a 4/5-year-old child and did not make all judgements on the basis of perceptual similarity between objects. Indeed, LEW showed evidence of analogical reasoning even with randomly arranged stimuli, he did not do any worse with abstract rather than with real-life stimuli, and he improved on the tasks with the assistance of (some) labels (Davidoff & Roberson, 2004). However, like children, his analogical reasoning could be confused by complex stimuli and distracted by object similarity. Yet, there is no doubt that a 4/5-year-old child can sort colours. Gentner has argued that language plays a critical part in acquiring rules, but it is unclear whether that should be a necessary part or rather that language directs the child’s attention to the critical aspects of the similarity judgement. LEW achieved analogical similarity judgements without being able to perform perceptual categorizations. Thus, there is an argument for believing the two types of thought are different in kind and that the linguistic abilities required for analogical reasoning are not those required for taxonomic classification.
Thematic versus taxonomic relationships LEW was not generally intellectually impaired, so what was the origin of his inability to sort colours? Semenza (1999) has argued that the impairment in anomic aphasia is better understood as a difficulty with conceptual (taxonomic) as opposed to thematic relationships (see from the last cycle, Bisiacchi, Denes, & Semenza, 1976; Gardner & Zurif, 1976; Melice-Ledent, Gainotti, Messerli, & Tissot, 1976; Semenza, Denes, Lucchese, & Bisiacchi, 1980). Thus, LEW was given a task that taps the distinction between rulebased (taxonomic) and associative (thematic) learning systems (Sloman, 1996). Rule-based systems operate on symbolic structures, whereas associative systems reflect the similarity structure of acquired knowledge and relations of temporal and spatial contiguity. The task was based on experiments 1–3 of Markman and Hutchinson (1984). Twenty-two triads were constructed of three coloured photographs of common objects arranged to form a triangle. A standard object (e.g. police car, tennis shoe) was placed at the top of the triangle, and a taxonomic choice (e.g. saloon car, high-heeled shoe) or thematic choice (e.g. policeman, foot) was placed at the two lower apices. LEW, as for the children tested by Markman and Hutchinson, was asked to point to another one that was the same as the standard object. For these simple tasks, adults always make taxonomic choices, but young children do not. LEW approached the task like the 4-year-olds in Markman and Hutchinson. Clearly, LEW had at least a pronounced bias to approach these tasks by association. However, there is an alternative explanation. In the last cycle, an alternative to the taxonomic versus thematic distinction was proposed by the Konstanz group (Cohen, Engel, Kelter, List, & Strohner,
238 Davidoff 1976; Cohen, Kelter, and Woll, 1980; review in Vignolo, 1999; Kelter, Cohen, Engel, List, & Strohner, 1976). Their alternative represents a quite different kind of explanation and implies the loss of a type of knowledge rather than of a type of thought. In their tasks, similar in design to those of Markman and Hutchinson (1984) and those used in the Pyramids and Palm Trees Test (Howard & Patterson, 1992), the patient has to decide which two out of three pictures go together. They found that aphasic patients were considerably more impaired if the connection was “perceptual” rather than “situational”. For example, aphasic patients failed to connect that a snowman should go with a swan because both are white but succeeded in a task that required putting together a guitar and a bull because both are connected with Spain. Thus, the Konstanz group made, from many studies, the conclusion that it is visual knowledge about objects that is impaired in aphasia. In doing so, they attributed the impairment to a loss of knowledge concerning the visual attributes of objects. LEW was given odd-one-out tasks, similar to those used by the Konstanz group, in a paradigm taken from Hillis and Caramazza (1995). LEW was asked, from both words and line drawings, which was the odd-one-out in three tasks: colour, size, and function. He showed no evidence that he could judge which object of the triad had a different colour from the other two (Figure 13.4) and was accordingly worse than young and old (agematched) controls. The dramatic difference between the tasks was independent of the form (line drawings or words) of presentation (see Hart & Gordon (1990) for a similar finding in a similar task). There was a similar but less dramatic pattern of performance for the size judgements. The pattern for function judgements was different. LEW did not differ from controls in judging line drawings; he was somewhat impaired on function judgements from words, but not to the same extent as for colour and size judgements. LEW’s performance on the colour odd-one-out task does not simply derive from loss of knowledge. He could recognize a picture that was wrongly coloured (Davidoff & Roberson, 2004). Apparently, it is rather the type of question that can produce apparent failure. In that, he resembles the patients described by Beauvois and Saillant (1985), and it is worth pointing out the similarities but also the important differences. Beauvois and Saillant (1985) showed that optic aphasics might demonstrate little ability to retrieve objectcolour knowledge in the tasks used by De Renzi and Spinnler (1967); yet, they could be made to show normal performance with other procedures. The particular procedures used by Beauvois and Saillant to show normal performance concerned the inhibition of verbal associations. When their patients were allowed to use their visual imagery uncontaminated by verbal associations, they showed excellent retrieval for object-colour. Beauvois and Saillant (1985) argued that their cases were examples of optic aphasia caused by a visual–verbal disconnection. LEW certainly does not fit the normal pattern of an optic aphasic (Druks & Shallice, 2000), not least because his
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Figure 13.4 LEW’s performance on three odd-one-out tasks with both pictures and words. Latencies at bottom are from young controls and show that the three tasks are matched for speed as well as accuracy. From Davidoff & Roberson (2004); after Hillis & Caramazza (1995).
performance on the odd-one-out task was equivalent in pictures and words. However, the principal difference from the cases of Beauvois and Saillant (1985) is that LEW was not failing at object-colour retrieval but at the taxonomic classification of colour. Considering the function odd-one-out tasks, there are two interpretations of LEW’s preserved performance. The first is that perceptual and functional aspects of knowledge might be both modularly represented and therefore can be selectively impaired (Warrington, 1975; Warrington & Shallice, 1984). An alternative interpretation is that his thinking is based on associations (thematic) and this ability can solve apparently taxonomic tasks. In another
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task, LEW was asked to divide animals into British and foreign (Roberson et al., 1999), and he did this accurately and rapidly. LEW was asked how he did the task. His answer was “zoo”. If, by “zoo”, he meant that these animals were found in a zoo, his thought process was of an associative type. LEW would also go wrong in a few object-categorization tasks by basing his classification on his personal knowledge. He, for example, put a shirt with chest of drawers presumably based on where it would be kept in his house. Whether or not all function odd-one-out tasks can be solved by LEW by association remains to be resolved. Certainly, he could not solve odd-oneout tasks of colour and size in the same way, as these are not associations but object attributes. To solve those tasks, he would need to retrieve the verbal knowledge that a camel or bear is brown or name the colour in a visual image. It is doubtful that such perceptual knowledge is stored verbally, but we also know that he cannot name those colours. So, he could not name the colours in an image. In the Goldstein framework, he would need to understand that different-coloured exemplars were in the same taxonomy.
Implications for perceptual categorization LEW’s profile of preserved and impaired function casts light on four important and related issues for perceptual categorization. The first of these concerns a debate about different types of thought processes (Fodor, 1998a; Gentner & Medina, 1998), the second concerns the different representations for concrete and abstract nouns, the third is the role of preserved naming in perceptual classification, and the fourth concerns the type of patient who would show similar disorders of perceptual classification. Turning to the first of these issues, Fodor (1998a, 1998b) has argued that concepts—of the taxonomic kind—cannot be derived empirically. In contrast, and in support of an empiricist position, Gentner and colleagues have shown that similarity judgements can be affected by object similarity; hence, they argue that similarity may bootstrap the acquisition of rule-based skills. LEW was susceptible to the same distractions as are children in his analogical reasoning; nevertheless, like children, he was also somewhat immune to them. The important point is that children at the same level of analogical reasoning as LEW perform very much better at taxonomic tasks. Thus, LEW showed that the ability to make taxonomic classifications does not depend on the ability to reason analogically. In the contrast between concrete and abstract nouns, abstract nouns are essentially of the taxonomic type and concrete nouns essentially thematic, although the distinctions are not always straightforward. Consider, for example, an apple. The abstract (taxonomic) classification of an apple would be “fruit”. The concrete (thematic) classification of an apple could relate it to another object (such as tree). However, two types of fruit (apple and banana) might be classified together by virtue of their being seen together, just as
13. Perceptual categorization 241 LEW classified animals as foreign because they are in the zoo. Indeed, he may well have made relatively few errors (see Davidoff & Roberson, 2004) on the Pyramids and Palm Trees Test (Howard & Patterson, 1992) because an apparently taxonomic decision can, in fact, be based on a thematic decision. A similar complexity can arise for thematic classification. The fact that an apple is red might be considered a concrete property of an apple. Nevertheless, if the decision to classify an apple is based on redness, it is a taxonomic decision and one that LEW failed abysmally. The best neuropsychological evidence for distinctly separable concrete and abstract representations is that they are known to double-dissociate in naming studies. Aphasic patients, in general, show a concreteness advantage in word retrieval (Goodglass, Hyde, & Blumstein, 1969), but this not always the case (Breedin, Saffran, & Coslett, 1994; Goldstein, 1948; Sirigu, Duhamel, & Poncet, 1991; Warrington, 1975; Warrington & Shallice, 1984). For example, Warrington’s patient could define an abstract word, such as supplication, as “making a serious request for help” but could give no definition for the word alligator. Their separation is also confirmed by a study in which there was a selective difficulty in retrieving abstract words without an impairment in comprehension (Franklin, Howard, & Patterson, 1995), thus ruling out damage to knowledge structures as causing impairment in abstract terms. Of course, abstract words are generally less common and longer, but these characteristics too have been shown to be insufficient to explain their difficulty for an anomic patient (Henaff Gonon, Bruckert, & Michel, 1989). The taxonomic difficulty will be seen especially for perceptual terms, such as colour, because these are essentially abstract. Colour, for example, only allows taxonomic classification. Turning to the third issue that is addressed by LEW’s pattern of performance, we can argue that language (that is, naming) is even more critical in classification than the role proposed for it by Gentner. The failure of LEW at perceptual categorization tasks is extremely important. Despite what might appear otherwise, the critical aspect of perceptual categorization is that it depends on language (see Dummett, 1975; Roberson et al., 1999). However, the relationship between naming and other categorization tasks is not straightforward (Hampton, 2001; Sloman, Malt, & Fridman, 2001). The complexity arises because of the many ways that objects may be categorized (determined to be similar). For some tasks, perceptual similarity may be the dominant procedure for categorization; for other tasks, it could be some functional or contextual similarity. The consequence is that there may be categorization tasks, including sorting, that for normal individuals are not affected by the names given to objects (Sloman, Malt, & Fridman, 2001). Yet, we know that the effects of name dominance can be striking after brain damage, allowing a patient to produce gestures or drawings that correspond to verbal mistakes rather than to the object presented (Beauvois, Saillant, Meininger, & Lhermitte, 1978; Davidoff & Wilson, 1985; Lhermitte & Beauvois, 1973; Ohtake, Fujii, Yamadori, Fujimori, Hyakawa, & Suzuki, 2001; Oxbury, Oxbury, &
242 Davidoff Humphrey, 1969). These effects are so dramatic as to suggest that it is not only memory codes that are altered by naming but also the processing of current visual stimuli. A similar claim has recently been made for perceptual categorization (Davidoff, 2001). We therefore consider LEW’s deficits in the context of his loss of naming. The naming of objects in aphasia is multidetermined, and there are many contributing factors to an inability to name objects. One of these factors is impairment resulting from damage to semantics or features of object knowledge (Hillis, 2001; Katz & Fodor, 1963). Semantic errors in comprehension are generally associated with semantic impairments in naming (Gainotti, Miceli, Caltagorone, Silveri, & Massulo, 1981), but Butterworth, Howard, and McLoughlin (1984) caution against making a direct link between the two disorders. LEW does not make a substantial number of semantic errors. Thus, semantic errors are not the major cause of LEW’s naming disorder. Impaired semantics also cannot be the reason that LEW prefers to make thematic decisions in categorization tasks. Semantic errors in comprehension and naming may accompany preserved thematic associations (Howard & Orchard-Lisle, 1984), but this is not the case for LEW. For him, there is a limited ability to name objects but when given a description of an object’s features and functions, his naming showed some improvement (Druks & Shallice, 2000), suggesting that LEW’s impairment does not stem from a weakened knowledge base. We argue that LEW’s critical impairment was his anomia, but he lost more than just the names. He, like other patients with colour anomia (Davidoff, 1991; Davidoff & Ostergaard, 1984), also could not point correctly to a named colour or benefit from a colour label. LEW’s loss, as Goldstein put it, is that of an abstract attitude that makes him unable consciously to allocate items to perceptual categories. Hence, his impairment refers not to a type of knowledge store but to a type of thought. A disorder that prevents naming would at the very least promote associative (thematic) rather than taxonomic procedures for categorization. One reason would be the general inclination to solve categorization tasks verbally (Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken, & Waldron, 1998), and this would be particularly the case for complex multidimensional stimuli. However, it is not the case that LEW’s categorization difficulties were only present for complex stimuli. LEW had also difficulties in categorizing even the simplest perceptual stimuli. For these stimuli, observation by itself is insufficient to arrive at a categorical solution (Anderson & Fincham, 1996; Dummett, 1975), and therein lies LEW’s difficulty. For such classifications, the concept and the name are, in effect, the same thing, and LEW is without names to assist the categorical solution. Where patients such as LEW can name, they can categorize. In an odd-one-out task in which LEW can successfully name each item, he would succeed in categorization just as he could succeed when given names in the Markman task. With respect to the fourth issue, clearly related to the third issue, concerning the types of patient that would exhibit similar disorders, it might be first
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noted they ought not to be rare. Disorders of taxonomic classification should be common because naming disorders are common. They may appear less common than they are because so many sorting tasks are soluble by thematic associations. It is only for perceptual categorizations that the taxonomic failure becomes vivid, because, for those tasks, there is no other way to the solution. However, before restricting a taxonomic impairment to a naming disorder, it is necessary to rule out other likely candidate populations that might be argued to show the same sort of deficit. The type of aphasic patient that would show disorders of taxonomic classification has to be one in which language impairment is central. One would not expect impairments of perceptual categorization where there is merely a problem in production. Indeed, previous research on the impaired perceptual categorization abilities of aphasic patients has eliminated those patients with more anterior damage (Caramazza et al., 1982; De Renzi et al., 1972). So, the least likely candidate patients are those whose problems involve the syntactic elements of language however essential they are in linguistic theory. Impaired sentence comprehension is demonstrable in patients with good word comprehension (Caramazza & Zurif, 1976; von Stockert & Bader, 1976), and preserved syntax coexists with naming impairments (Hodges, Patterson, & Tyler, 1994). Furthermore, Varley, Siegel, and Want (2001) have shown that severe grammatical impairment does not preclude many abstract reasoning tasks such as theory of mind or playing chess. The locus of lesion critical for taxonomic classification is the left posterior cortex (Caramazza et al., 1982). Yet, such lesions may also result in degraded or inaccessible knowledge stores (Warrington, 1975), a disorder often referred to as semantic dementia (Snowden, Goulding, & Neary, 1989). Such patients often demonstrate loss of naming and, indeed, difficulty with taxonomic as opposed to thematic relationships (Semenza et al., 1980). However, the generally intact knowledge store of LEW (Druks & Shallice, 2000) does not prevent him making taxonomic errors; clearly, the disorders must be different. The same conclusion was drawn by Franklin, Howard, and Patterson (1995) in considering the selective impairment of the production of abstract words. In summary, we suggest that there are two types of categorization procedures (taxonomic and thematic) that have separable mental representations. In attempting to distinguish the two types and understand the processes underlying categorization, the major problem is that classification (family resemblance) of objects (animals, tools, etc.) could be obtained from visual similarity, by common habitat or size, or a myriad of other associations. It could even be argued that these associations are what constitute the category. The central thesis that derives from work on impaired perceptual categorization is not concerned to demonstrate problems with these thematic types of category. Aphasic patients may turn out to be over- or under-inclusive in the features of objects that, for them, define a category (Grossman, 1978, 1981) or be completely normal except for difficulties derived from word retrieval
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(Hough, 1993). The thesis is that there is a type of classification, independent of feature classification, unavailable to aphasics with naming disorders. One is, therefore, driven to the view that applying a name to a class of objects is a theoretically different ability from associating features in object knowledge, although, here, Goldstein (1948) warned of difficulties of interpretation if the naming is by rote (in his term, “pseudonaming”), rather than reflecting an abstract attitude. The critical impairment for LEW is argued to be his anomia, but he has lost more than just the names. LEW’s loss, as Goldstein put it, is that of an abstract attitude. LEW’s impairment makes him unable consciously to allocate items to perceptual categories. Hence, his impairment refers not to a type of knowledge store but to a type of thought.
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14 Visual agnosia H. Branch Coslett
Picture a table set for a holiday banquet with multiple place settings—each with knives, forks, spoons, plates, and glasses—as well as candelabras, serving bowls, condiments, chairs, and the table itself. The visual information that will ultimately yield an internal representation in which object identities are registered and their locations computed in a fashion that affords action, is registered by retinal cells that contain a variety of light-sensitive molecules that influence the firing rates of the cells. From this seemingly impoverished input that yields only a representation of light and, in a restricted spatial domain, color, the rich depiction of the visual world is generated by means of a series of transformations and elaborations. Although under normal circumstances visual processing is effortless and remarkably efficient, the construction of an internal representation of the visually perceived world around us is, in fact, complex, as witnessed by the fact that it may be disrupted in strikingly different manners by brain dysfunction. This chapter focuses on one aspect of visual processing—the manner in which visually presented objects are identified and how this process breaks down, culminating in the disorder of visual object agnosia. We start with a brief historical overview of the disorder. In an effort to frame the subsequent discussion, a brief description of the processes underlying visual processing will be presented. Classical disorders of visual object recognition as well as several recently described disorders will be discussed with reference to this theoretical framework.
Historical overview Interest in the neural basis of object recognition can be traced to the latter portion of the nineteenth century. In 1876, Hughlings Jackson reported a patient with a large tumor of the posterior portion of the right hemisphere who was unable to navigate in familiar places and failed to recognize people and places. Jackson concluded that the posterior region of the right hemisphere was crucial for visual memory and recognition. Perhaps the first experimental exploration of this issue was reported by Munk (1878), who reported that bilateral ablation of the upper convex
250 Coslett surface of the occipital lobes produced a phenomenon termed “Seelenblindheit” (or mindblindness) and characterized by a relatively preserved ability to negotiate complex environments but an inability to recognize objects. Thus, Munk’s dogs did not bump into furniture, walls, or people but were unable to recognize their masters or distinguish food from other items by vision alone. The most influential early account of object recognition deficits was provided by Lissauer (1888, 1890). Presaging later reports, Lissauer suggested that brain lesions could selectively disrupt the processing of color, form, and motion. He also introduced the first and still most commonly employed nosology for visual agnosia by distinguishing between “apperceptive” and “associative” agnosia. In his terminology, apperception referred to the “stage of conscious awareness of a sensory impression”. Thus, apperceptive agnosia was regarded as an impairment in the early visual processes by which an adequate internal representation of the object was achieved. Like other investigators, Lissauer distinguished between apperceptive agnosia and object recognition deficits attributable to primary visual loss; it is clear that apperceptive visual agnosia would not be diagnosed in the context of severe loss of visual acuity or profound visual field restriction. For Lissauer—and contemporary investigators as well—the boundary between low-level visual deficits and apperceptive agnosia is not always clear. Associative agnosia is characterized by preserved ability to compute a representation of the object but failure to “recognize” the object, as evidenced by inability to name or provide specific information that would unambiguously identify the object. In Lissauer’s view, recognition results from the simultaneous activation of the many attributes (sound, touch, smell, etc.) of an object that are linked to the visual form. Visual agnosia is differentiated from a loss of semantic knowledge by the fact that the deficit is modality specific; visual agnosics are able to identify objects on the basis of sound, description, or touch. Lissauer suggested that apperceptive and associative visual agnosia may be distinguished by assessing the ability to copy the object; apperceptive agnosics may be unable to copy even a simple figure whereas associative agnosics are able to copy a figure—sometimes with remarkable precision (Rubens & Benson, 1971)—but are unable to recognize the object. It should be noted that the very existence of visual object agnosia has been questioned by some investigators. Whereas Munk (1890) described the behavior of his dogs with the phrase “the dog sees but does not understand”, Pavlov (1927) argued that “the dog understands but does not see well enough.” Later, Bay (1953) argued that visual agnosia is attributable to primary visual disturbances, perhaps in conjunction with higher cognitive functions. Bender and Feldman (1972) also argued that visual recognition deficits reflect a combination of elementary visual processing problems in conjunction with deficits in memory, attention, and general intelligence.
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An information-processing account of visual recognition Although Lissauer’s (1890) distinction between apperceptive and associative visual agnosia remains a useful starting point in the discussion of these disorders, subsequent descriptions of clinical phenomena as well as recent developments in the understanding of visual object processing have demonstrated the model to be insufficient. In this section, we offer a brief account of the processes involved in visual object recognition that is based on recent advances in visual neuroscience. We will attempt to demonstrate that this model can account for many (but not all) of the reported disorders of visual object-processing disorders. Perhaps the most important insight into visual processing during the last century has been the recognition that different types of visual information are segregated, starting at the level of the retina; furthermore, although there are substantial interactions at many levels, this segregation persists in early visual processing and is evident in higher-level vision with respect to the distinction between the ventral “what” stream and the dorsal “where” (Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982) or “how to” (Milner & Goodale, 1995) stream. This basic architecture is illustrated in Figure 14.1 depicting the types of representations computed by the nervous system and the processes that modulate these representations. Detailed physiologic and anatomic investigations in animals and more studies in human subjects involving functional imaging have confirmed Lissauer’s century-old contention that distinct cortical regions operating (at least in part) in parallel, subserve different functions. Attributes that appear to be processed in parallel include motion, color, depth, and multiple attributes regarding edges such as orientation, length, and angle. Influenced by relatively low-level visual routines such as “boundary marking” (e.g. Ullman, 1984), the latter attributes are grouped together to generate visual forms. Although the nature of the procedures by which low-level visual information is grouped was intensively investigated by the Gestalt psychologists among others (e.g. Kanizsa, 1976), these procedures remain poorly understood. Grouping of visual feature information occurs early in visual processing and is a prerequisite for all types of higher-level vision except perhaps motion perception. Despite the fact that a substantial body of evidence supports the view that visual processing proceeds in parallel fashion, healthy individuals do not “see” the world in a piecemeal fashion; thus, the information that is partially segregated in the course of early and intermediate visual processing must be linked together. This “binding problem” is not restricted to vision, of course, but represents a major challenge for accounts of virtually all sensory-motor and cognitive operations. Substantial experimental evidence suggests that the binding of visual information together to generate an integrated representation is mediated by a limited capacity operation typically referred to as “visual attention”. As suggested by the commonly used “spotlight” (Eriksen
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& Hoffmann, 1973; Posner, 1980), visual attention appears to be spatially based under most circumstances. Experimental evidence suggests that attention can also be allocated to other visual attributes, including color (Cave, 1999), motion, and even objects (Duncan, 1984; Vecera & Farah, 1994). The “binding” function of visual attention is illustrated by the phenomenon of “illusory conjunctions” reported by Treisman and Gelade (1980), Treisman (1985) and others (Cave, 1999; Prinzmetal et al., 2002). These investigators have demonstrated that when visual attention is “overloaded” in normal subjects, visual attributes can miscombine. For example, when presented with an array containing red “X ”s and green “T ”s for 200 ms, subjects may report seeing a red T even though no such stimulus was present in the array. These and similar findings have been taken as evidence that visual attention is the “glue” that links visual feature information computed in different brain regions. Note that for the sake of simplicity visual attention is indicated at only one level of processing in Figure 14.1; in fact, the effects of visual attention are apparent at multiple levels of processing (e.g. Moran & Desimone, 1985); indeed, in some investigations, the effects of visual attention have been demonstrated in the primary visual cortex (Vidyasagar, 1998). We will argue below that impairments in visual attention at different levels of processing may give rise to distinctly different syndromes. Functional imaging data (e.g. Corbetta, 1998), as well as data from brain lesion subjects, argue for a central role of the posterior parietal cortex in visual attention. Under normal circumstances, visual feature information is correctly spatially coregistered, generating a viewer-centered representation of the orientations and depths of the surfaces of an object as well as the discontinuities between the surfaces. This representation is similar in most important respects to the “2½D model” described by Marr (1982). The process of object processing culminates in a representation that makes explicit the form, shape, and volume of the object as well as the hierarchical relationships between the parts. This type of representation has been termed a “structural description” (Pinker, 1985; Riddoch & Humphreys, 1987) and is similar to the 3-D representation of Marr (1982) in that it is assumed to be perspectiveindependent; that is, it is a representation that is abstracted from the color, form, and surface information that is perspective invariant. Various lines of evidence suggest that the fusiform gyri and lateral occipital region are crucial anatomic substrates for the integrated feature representation and structural description systems (Grill-Spector, Knouf, & Kanwisher, 2004; Haxby et al., 2000 for reviews). Under normal circumstances, familiar objects are quickly and effortlessly recognized when viewed across a wide range of angles and perspectives. A bowl, for example, may be viewed from the side when sitting in a dishwasher, from below when stacked on a high shelf, or from above when clearing a table. Although the low-level visual information regarding surfaces, color, form, etc., is remarkably different in these circumstances, the visual feature and
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surfaces provided being markedly different, these forms are immediately recognized to be the same. In the context of Figure 14.1, the mechanism that supports object constancy is termed the view normalization system. The nature of the processes that mediate between the viewer-dependent, integrated feature representation and the perspective-independent or objectcentered structural description remain unknown. As reviewed briefly by Farah (2000), a variety of accounts have been proposed, from connectionist architectures to template matching procedures. Details of these proposals are beyond the scope of this chapter. The visual processing discussed to this point is in the service of object recognition—that is, knowledge of the form, function, name, and other attributes of entities in the environment. Following Lissauer (1888, 1890) and Wernicke (cited in 1977) as well as recent accounts of semantic representations (Allport, 1985; Rogers et al., 2004; Saffran & Schwartz, 1994; Warrington & Shallice, 1984), we suggest that recognition entails the simultaneous activation of the many aspects of object-specific knowledge; thus, as argued by Lissauer (1888), for example, recognition of a violin consists of the activation of stored knowledge regarding the sound, heft, feel, and manner of manipulation of the instrument.
Disorders of object processing Achromatopsia Achromatopsia is an acquired disorder of color perception characterized by a loss of the ability to distinguish color. The disorder varies in severity, from color desaturation to a complete loss of the sense of color. Some patients with the disorder state that they see the world in “black and white” or shades of gray. The defect often occurs in one visual field (or a portion thereof) but can involve the entire visual field. Depending on the location and extent of the underlying lesion, achromatopsia may be observed in isolation or in conjunction with other deficits in visual processing such as prosopagnosia, alexia, or superior visual field deficits (e.g. Pearlman, Birch, & Meadows, 1979). Presumably reflecting the fact that color is not a defining feature of most objects, achromatopsia is typically not associated with a profound object agnosia. Since Verrey’s initial report of the disorder in 1888, achromatopsia has been associated with lesions involving the lingual or fusiform gyri. Subsequent studies with static brain imaging (Damasio et al., 1980) and functional brain imaging have yielded generally similar results. Impaired motion perception Motion is a crucial element of visual perception; the importance of motion is illustrated by the fact that cells that appear to be optimized for motion perception may be identified at the retina, lateral geniculate, primary visual
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cortex, and a number of higher-level visual cortices, including MT (see below). Patients with relatively selective deficits in motion were reported almost a century ago but are relatively rare (Goldstein & Gelb, 1918; Potzl & Redlich, 1911). The most extensively investigated such patient, LM (Zihl, Von Cramon, & Mai, 1983), developed a profound impairment in the ability to detect motion after bilateral infarcts involving the posterior portions of the middle temporal gyri extending into the occipital lobe as well as adjacent subcortical white matter. LM was severely affected by her deficit. She did not perceive movement as a continuous process but stated that objects seemed to jump from one position to the next. When she poured water into a cup, the liquid appeared to be static, like a piece of ice. Although profoundly impaired in motion perception, LM performed well on other measures of visual processing. Her visual fields were full and she performed normally on tests of stereopsis, visual acuity, color perception, and critical flicker fusion. At least under most circumstances, LM exhibited no impairment in object recognition. Several patients have been reported whose object recognition is influenced by motion. Botez et al. (1965) reported two patients whose recognition of letters and objects was greatly facilitated by motion. A similar but perhaps less striking facilitation of recognition with movement was exhibited by the “visual form agnosic” reported by Benson and Greenberg (1971) as well as a patient reported by Horner and Massey (1986). We have observed this phenomenon in a number of patients with degenerative diseases preferentially involving the posterior portions of the hemispheres (that is, “posterior cortical atrophy”). Several lines of evidence point to the posterior portion of the middle temporal gyri as a critical structure for motion perception. As previously noted, LM’s lesions involved this region. Newsome and Pare (1988) reported that experimentally induced lesions in the posterior portion of the middle temporal gyri of monkeys caused a substantial deficit in motion perception without a concomitant impairment of spatial contrast sensitivity. Finally, a number of functional imaging studies showed that moving stimuli, such as an array of moving dots or shrinking/enlarging concentric rings of circles, reliably generate robust activation in the lateral occipito-temporal cortex bilaterally (Kable, Lease-Spellmeyer, & Chatterjee, 2002; Zeki, 1993). Visual form agnosia As noted above, information concerning visual features such as angle, orientation, and line length appears to be computed in parallel; we are unaware of patients with selective deficits involving individual features such as angle or orientation, perhaps because such an impairment would be expected to produce such a pervasive and severe “low-level” visual impairment that the patient would be considered too visually impaired to be agnosic. Several patients exhibiting substantial problems in the segregation of coherent
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regions of visual input have been reported under the term “visual form agnosia”. One such subject, Mr S., was reported by Benson and Greenberg (1971) and investigated in detail by Efron (1968). This 24-year-old man suffered carbon monoxide poisoning. Although intellectually preserved, he performed poorly when asked to name objects, drawings, letters, or faces. Testing of his visual processing revealed normal performance on tasks requiring the detection of differences in luminance, wavelength, area, and motion. He was substantially impaired, however, when asked to discriminate between visual objects that differed only in shape. Thus, for example, Mr S. could not reliably distinguish between a square and a tall thin rectangle (e.g. a height:width ratio of 4:1). DF, a woman who suffered carbon monoxide poisoning at the age of 34, also exhibited visual form agnosia (Milner & Heywood, 1989). Structural MRI demonstrated bilateral lesions involving the lateral occipital area. Like Mr S., this patient exhibited profound visual recognition problems and performed poorly on tasks requiring that she discriminate between different shapes. DF is of particular interest, however, because of her preserved ability to act on visual stimuli that she was unable to recognize. Although unable to discriminate between a square and tall rectangle, she performed normally with respect to hand posture and shape when asked to pick up the objects; for example, the distance between her thumb and index finger and timing of the movements of the fingers in the reach trajectory were normal. Thus, information regarding visual form that was not available for the purposes of object analysis was available to the motor system. Disorders of visual attention As noted briefly above, visual attention is a limited-capacity resource that serves to bind together information that is distributed across multiple brain regions to generate a representation in which information regarding shape, color, and movement are integrated (Figure 14.1). Impaired visual attention appears to play the major role in a number of disorders of visual object recognition. Perhaps the prototypical syndrome of this type is “simultanagnosia”, an inability to “see” more than one object in an array (Wolpert, 1924). The first detailed description of this syndrome was by Balint (1909), who described a patient with bilateral posterior parietal infarcts. Although able to identify visually presented familiar objects when presented in isolation, he exhibited a striking difficulty in the processing of visual arrays. For example, when shown a letter and a triangle, he reported seeing only the letter; when told that a second object was present, he reported the triangle but no longer saw the letter. As Balint’s patient had normal visual fields and visual acuity, the disorder could not be attributed to low-level visual processing deficits. Similar patients have been reported by a number of investigators (Coslett & Saffran, 1991; Holmes, 1918; Luria, 1959). Several different types of simultanagnosia may be identified. In one variant,
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Figure 14.1 An information-processing model of the processes involved in object processing.
termed “ventral simultanagnosia” by Farah (2004), patients are impaired in the processing of arrays but also in the recognition of single objects. For example, when confronted with a complex object such as a car, subjects with this disorder may report only a tire; similarly, when shown the word “table”, subjects may not see the entire word but report constituent letters, often identifying the word in a letter-by-letter fashion. Performance of patients with this disorder is strongly influenced by object familiarity; for example, they may read the word “table” correctly but misread the less common word “sable”; nonword letter strings (e.g. “tarle”) present the greatest difficulty. Unlike patients with visual form agnosia, dorsal simultanagnosia (see below), or other types of “apperceptive” agnosia, ventral simultanagnosics do not behave as if they are profoundly visually impaired; that is, they do not walk into objects, stumble over chairs, etc., as noted by Farah (2004). Although these patients appear to be able to recognize only one object at a time, they appear to “see” more than that. Patients with “dorsal” simultanagnosia exhibit a somewhat different and, often, far more dramatic deficit than that observed in ventral simultanagnosia. Patients with this disorder will often behave as if they are blind; for example, we have reported a patient who fell over a dining room table while walking across a