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Back board: ❑ ISBN ❑ Barcode
THE NETWORK SOCIETY Edited by Louis Albrechts and Seymour J.Mandelbaum
CHECKLIST (must be completed before press) (Please cross through any items that are not applicable) Front board: Spine: ❑ Title ❑ Title ❑ Subtitle ❑ Subtitle ❑ Author/edited by ❑ Author/edited by ❑ Series title ❑ Extra logo if required ❑ Extra logo if required General: ❑ Book size ❑ Type fit on spine
The Network Society A New Context for Planning?
Edited by Louis Albrechts and Seymour J.Mandelbaum
ISBN 978-0-415-70150-1
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The Networked Cities Series www.routledge.com ï an informa business
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The Network Society
The papers in this book, based on conference proceedings of the 2003 joined conference of the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning and the Association of European Schools of Planning, investigate the challenges that Urban and Regional Planning is faced with today. The contributors deal with the questions of contemporary organization of social, economic, cultural, political, and physical spaces and center their arguments on the notion that social and physical networks are transforming the way in which we see planned cities and regions. The book’s five sections focus on models of network society, the impact of physical networks, the challenges faced by planners in a society heavily reliant on new technology, local networks, such as community networks, and a comparison between spatial and policy networks. The Network Society is essential reading for everyone interested in urban studies, city and regional planning and urban design. Louis Albrechts is Professor of Planning in the Department of Architecture, Urban and Regional Planning, University of Leuven, Belgium. Seymour J. Mandelbaum is Professor of City and Regional Planning at the University of Pennsylvania, US.
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The Networked Cities Series Series Editors: Richard E. Hanley New York City College of Technology, City University of New York, US
Steve Graham Department of Geography, Durham University, UK
Simon Marvin SURF, Salford University, UK
From the earliest times, people settling in cities devised clever ways of moving things: the materials they needed to build shelters, the water and food they needed to survive, the tools they needed for their work, the armaments they needed for their protection – and ultimately, themselves. Twenty-first century urbanites are still moving things about, but now they employ networks to facilitate that movement – and the things they now move include electricity, capital, sounds, and images. The Networked Cities Series has as its focus these local, global, physical, and virtual urban networks of movement. It is designed to offer scholars, practitioners, and decision-makers studies on the ways cities, technologies, and multiple forms of urban movement intersect and create the contemporary urban environment. Moving People, Goods and Information in the 21st Century The Cutting-Edge Infrastructures of Networked Cities Edited by Richard E. Hanley Digital Infrastructures Enabling Civil and Environmental Systems Through Information Technology Edited by Rae Zimmerman and Thomas Horan Sustaining Urban Networks The Social Diffusion of Large Technical Systems Edited by Olivier Coutard, Richard E. Hanley, and Rae Zimmerman The Network Society A New Context for Planning? Edited by Louis Albrechts and Seymour J. Mandelbaum
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The Network Society A New Context for Planning? Edited by Louis Albrechts and Seymour J. Mandelbaum
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First published 2005 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2005 Edited by Louis Albrechts and Seymour J. Mandelbaum Typeset in Times New Roman by Florence Production Ltd, Stoodleigh, Devon Printed and bound in Great Britain by The Cromwell Press, Trowbridge, Wiltshire All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data The network society : a new context for planning/ Edited by Louis Albrechts and Seymour J. Mandelbaum p. cm. – (The networked cities series) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. City planning. 2. Regional planning. 3. Policy networks. 4. Sociology, Urban. 5. Globalization – Social aspects. I. Albrechts, L. II. Mandelbaum, Seymour J. III. Title. IV. Series. HT166.N425 2006 307.1′216–dc22 2005015390 ISBN10: 0–415–70150–3 (hbk) ISBN10: 0–415–70151–1 (pbk) ISBN10: 0–203–79933–X (eb) ISBN13: 9–78–0–415–70150–1 (hbk) ISBN13: 9–78–0–415–70151–8 (pbk) ISBN13: 9–78–0–203–79933–8 (eb)
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CONTENTS
LIST
OF ILLUSTRATIONS
NOTES
ON
CONTRIBUTORS
PREFACE INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER TWO
CHAPTER THREE
CHAPTER FOUR
COMMENTARY
xi xvii
A New Context for Planning? Louis Albrechts and Seymour J. Mandelbaum
PART I The Network Society: A New Paradigm? CHAPTER ONE
ix
Communicative Action and the Network Society: A Pragmatic Marriage? Niraj Verma and HaeRan Shin Planning and the Network City: Discursive Correspondences Robert A. Beauregard Escaping the Prison of “the Present Place”: Can We Plan the Future of Localities in the Context of a Network Society? Dowell Myers The Discourse Network: A Way of Understanding Policy Formation, Stability, and Change in the Networked Polity Nicholas Low Networks and Planning Thought Judith E. Innes
1
7 9
24
34
45 57
Contents
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PART II Organization of Space and Time
63
IMPACT
65
OF
PHYSICAL NETWORKS
CHAPTER FIVE
CHAPTER SIX
Cities and Transport: Exploring the Need for New Planning Approaches Luca Bertolini Networking for Trans-national “Missing Links”: Tracing the Political Success of European High-speed Rail in the 1990s Deike Peters
67
81
CHAPTER SEVEN
Strategies for Networked Cities Stephen Graham
CHAPTER EIGHT
The “Network City”: A New Old Way of Thinking Cities in the ICT Age Paul Drewe
110
Challenging the “Old” Urban Planning Paradigm: The Network Approach Gabriel Dupuy
120
COMMENTARY
ORGANIZATION OF SPACE AND TIME: CHALLENGES FOR PLANNING AND PLANNERS CHAPTER NINE
CHAPTER TEN
COMMENTARY
95
123
Planning as Persuasive Storytelling in the Context of “the Network Society” James A. Throgmorton
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Network Complexity and the Imaginative Power of Strategic Spatial Planning Patsy Healey
146
Imagining Urban Transformation Leonie Sandercock
161
PART III Policy Networks and Governance
165
LOCAL NETWORKS AND CAPITAL BUILDING
167
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
CHAPTER TWELVE
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
COMMENTARY
Why Liberal Planning Cannot Manage the Network Society: Lessons from Community Action Howell S. Baum ICT-enforced Community Networks for Sustainable Development and Social Inclusion Klaus Frey
CHAPTER SIXTEEN
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN
CHAPTER EIGHTEEN
183
Recovery from Disasters: Challenges for Low-income Communities in the Americas William J. Siembieda
197
The Multicultural City in the Age of Networks Xavier de Souza Briggs
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Local Networks and Capital Building Susan S. Fainstein
GOVERNANCE CAPACITY, POLICY NETWORKS, AND TERRITORIAL SPECIFICITIES CHAPTER FIFTEEN
169
222
227
The Global Emergence of Private Planning and Governance Chris Webster and Shin Lee
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Inter-agency Transport Planning: Cooperation in a Loose Policy Network Tore Sager and Inger-Anne Ravlum
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Collaborative Planning, Commitment, and Trust: Dealing with Uncertainty in Networks Ronald G.H. van Ark and Jurian Edelenbos Reconnecting Space, Place, and Institutions: Inquiring into “Local” Governance Capacity in Urban and Regional Research Enrico Gualini
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284
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COMMENTARY
Governance Capacity, Policy Networks, and Territorial Specificities Patsy Healey
307
BIBLIOGRAPHY
313
INDEX
339
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ILLUSTRATIONS
Figures 3.1 3.2 5.1 5.2 5.3 8.1 8.2 9.1 9.2
Planning’s “Present Place” Prison Relative to the Network Society Breaking Spatial and Temporal Confines of the “Present Place” Prison Amsterdam, the Metropolitan Area, with Main Transport Infrastructure and (Sub)Centers The Node-place Model Application of the Node-place Model to Station Areas in the Amsterdam Urban Region Three Levels of Network Operators that (Re)Structure the Urban Space The Internet Interrelations between Supply, Demand, and Performance Five Dimensions of Place-connectedness Place-connectedness in a Global-scale Web of Relationships
37 44 69 75 77 112 114 135 137
Tables 1.1 6.1 13.1 13.2 15.1 16.1 16.2 16.3
Comparing Habermas and Castells Key Decisions and Stakeholders for the EU High-speed Rail Initiatives in the 1990s Community Sample Organizational and Institutional Involvement Interpretations of Private Neighborhoods Properties of the Cooperating Transport Administrations Factors Influencing the Administrations’ Interest in the Common National Transport Planning Process The Administrations’ Potential Outcomes and Cooperation Strategies
16 86 200 201 234 254 257 265
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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Louis Albrechts is Professor of Planning in the Department of Architecture, Urban and Regional Planning, University of Leuven, Belgium. He has qualifications in social sciences and planning. His research interests currently focus on the practice and nature of strategic spatial planning and on diversity in planning. He is the editor of European Planning Studies. Howell S. Baum is Professor of Urban Studies and Planning at the University of Maryland, College Park. He has studied and participated in community planning, community development, and community action. Two recent books are The Organization of Hope: Communities Planning Themselves and Community Action for School Reform, both published by SUNY Press. With support from a Guggenheim Fellowship, he is doing research on Baltimore school desegregation and American liberalism’s struggles to deal with race. Robert A. Beauregard is Professor of Urban Policy in the Milano Graduate School of Management and Urban Policy, New School University. He writes on urban theory and postwar urbanization (mainly regarding the US) and has also written on planning theory. His most recent books are Voices of Decline: The Postwar Fate of U.S. Cities (Routledge 2003) and the coedited Emerging Johannesburg: Perspectives on the Post-Apartheid City (Routledge 2003). Luca Bertolini received a Master’s degree in architecture and a Doctoral degree in urban planning and real estate development from the Politecnico di Torino, Italy. After completing his doctoral dissertation – a pioneering crossnational, cross-disciplinary study on the redevelopment of railway station areas – he has researched and taught on the interface of urban and transport development. He is currently Senior Lecturer in the Geography and Planning Department, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Xavier de Souza Briggs is Associate Professor of Sociology and Urban Planning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a former member
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of the public policy faculty at Harvard University. His interests are in racial and ethnic diversity, inequality, and democracy in cities. He is the author of The Geography of Opportunity: Race and Housing Choice in Metropolitan America (Brookings Institution Press 2005). Paul Drewe is Professor of Spatial Planning at the Faculty of Architecture, Delft University of Technology, the Netherlands. He is director of the design studio “Network City.” He also works as a consultant both in the Netherlands and abroad. Gabriel Dupuy received a civil engineering degree from École Centrale de Paris and a Ph.D. in social sciences from La Sorbonne. He headed the Institut d’Urbanisme de Paris and was Dean of Curriculum at the École Nationale des Pont et Chaussées in Paris. He was appointed director of the Interdisciplinary Research Program “Cities” of the CNRS (French National Science Institution). He taught in Universities Paris XII and Paris X and he is currently Professor of Urban Planning at the University Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne and director of a research unit in this University (CRIA – Center for Research on Networks, Industry and Spatial Planning). Jurian Edelenbos graduated in Public Administration at Leiden University and Erasmus University Rotterdam in 1994. In 2000 he finished his Ph.D. at the Faculty of Technology, Policy, and Management, Delft University of Technology. From 1999 to 2001 he also worked as a consultant at TNO Strategy, Technology, and Policy. There he mainly gave advice in the field of process management, sustainable development, and interactive governance. From 2001 to 2003 he worked as a research fellow in the field of multiple land use and complex decision-making at the Center of Public Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam. He continued working at the same university as Assistant Professor in 2004. His fields of research and teaching areas are interactive governance, public–private partnership, urban planning and infrastructure, process management, dilemma management, trust in inter-organizational cooperation, and democratic renewal. Susan S. Fainstein is Professor of Urban Planning in the Graduate School of Architecture, Planning, and Preservation of Columbia University. She has written extensively on planning theory and comparative urban policy. She is co-editor of Readings in Planning Theory and Readings in Urban Theory and author of The City Builders: Property Redevelopment in New York and London, 1980–2000. Klaus Frey received a Ph.D. in social sciences from the University of Konstanz, Germany (1997). He is director of the Master’s program in urban management and Professor of the Department of Environmental Engineering at the Catholic University of Paraná (PUCPR) in Curitiba, Brazil. Between 1998
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and 2000 he was Professor of Political Sociology at the Federal University of Santa Catarina. From 2001 to 2002 he conducted a project concerning the use of ICT for sustaining civic networks, at the Paraná Institute of Technology (TECPAR). He is the author of several articles in the field of urban governance, urban sustainable development, environmental policy, ICT, and civic networks. Stephen Graham is Professor of Human Geography at Durham University, UK. He has a background in urbanism, planning, and the sociology of technology. His research addresses the intersections of urban places, mobilities, technology, war, surveillance, and geopolitics. His books include Telecommunications and the City, Splintering Urbanism, and The Cybercities Reader. His latest book, Cities, War and Terrorism was published in November 2004 (Blackwell). Enrico Gualini received a Ph.D. in urban and regional planning from Politecnico di Milano. He has since worked at the University of Dortmund and at the University of Amsterdam, where he is currently Senior Lecturer in the Department of Geography and Planning and a member of AMIDSt – Amsterdam Institute for Metropolitan and International Development Studies. His research interests focus on urban and regional governance, regionalization and Europeanization processes, European spatial policy, and planning theory. He has published on the role of interactive planning approaches in fostering institutional change, on the Europeanization of regional policy, and on urban and regional governance in Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands. Patsy Healey is Professor Emeritus in the School of Architecture, Planning and Landscape at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne. She has qualifications in geography and planning and is a specialist in planning theory and the practice of planning and urban regeneration policies. She has undertaken research on how planning strategies work out in practice and on partnership forms of neighborhood regeneration experiences. In recent years, she has been developing approaches to collaborative planning practices, linked to an institutionalist analysis of urban socio-spatial dynamics and urban governance. She has undertaken empirical work in the UK and in other European countries. Recent books include Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies (1997) and Urban Governance, Institutional Capacity and Social Milieux (2002). She is currently working on a book on Strategic Complexity and Territorial Governance, which includes cases from Milan, Amsterdam and Cambridge. She is Senior Editor of Planning Theory and Practice. Judith E. Innes is Professor of City and Regional Planning at the University of California, Berkeley, where she recently retired as a director of the
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Institute of Urban and Regional Development. For the last ten years she has been studying in depth a variety of collaborative and consensus-building processes, both to understand how these can work and to build theory about them. Recent topics include water policy, growth management, and transportation planning. Her writings on planning theory have dealt with comprehensive planning, information in communicative planning, network power, collaborative dialogue and governance, evaluation of collaboration, and participation. Her articles can be found in the Journal of the American Planning Association, Journal of Planning Education and Research, Planning Theory and Practice, Planning Theory, and Journal of Environmental Planning and Management. She teaches collaborative methods, communicative planning theory, research design, and urban sociology. Shin Lee is a lecturer in spatial analysis at the School of City and Regional Planning, Cardiff University. Her research and teaching interests include analysis of urban spatial patterns, application of economic principles in urban management, travel behavior, and the interface between transport and environment. Nicholas Low is Associate Professor in Environmental Planning in the planning program of the Faculty of Architecture, Building, and Planning, University of Melbourne, Australia. He is the author or editor of eight books. His book (with Brendan Gleeson) Justice, Society and Nature won the Harold and Margaret Sprout Prize of the International Studies Association in 1998 for the best book published on ecological politics. He is a Fellow of the Royal Australian Planning Institute. His current research interests are the institutional aspects of transport infrastructure policy, environmental justice, and ecological sustainability. Seymour J. Mandelbaum joined the Department of City and Regional Planning at the University of Pennsylvania in July 1967, and formally retired as Professor Emeritus on January 1, 2005. He continued the department’s longstanding interest in planning theory while crafting a distinctive concern with the ways in which planners construct pasts and futures, with flows of information, energy, and matter through complex networks, and with the links between communication and community. Dowell Myers is Professor in the School of Policy, Planning, and Development, University of Southern California. His recent work has explored differences between the planning field’s collective future orientation and the presenttime or historical, individualist focus of the social sciences. Widely recognized as an expert on demographic change as a guide for planning, he has also specialized in analysis of immigrant trajectories and future projections. Deike Peters is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Center for Metropolitan Studies at the Technical University (TU) Berlin. Before that, she was a lecturer in
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the Urban and Regional Planning Department at the TU. She received a Master’s degree in international affairs and in urban planning from Columbia University and a Ph.D. in urban planning and policy development from Rutgers University. Her academic writing focuses on policy analysis, comparative urban and regional governance (US and Europe), postmodern urban restructuring, environmental and social dimensions of transport, large-scale infrastructure decision making, and planning theory. She also has almost ten years’ experience in transport-related NGO advocacy and consulting to international development institutions. Inger-Anne Ravlum is Senior Research Political Scientist at the Institute of Transport Economics in Oslo, Norway. Her main research interests are institutional reform, policy-making and planning in the transport sector, and especially how institutional design and planning methods affect political decision making. Tore Sager is Professor in the Department of Civil and Transport Engineering at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim. His main research interests are planning theory, transport planning processes, and institutional economics. He is the author of Communicative Planning Theory and Democratic Planning and Social Choice Dilemmas. Leonie Sandercock is Professor in Urban Planning and Social Policy and associate director of the School of Community and Regional Planning, where she also chairs the Ph.D. program. Her most recent publications include Towards Cosmopolis: Planning for Multicultural Cities (1998), Making the Invisible Visible: A Multicultural History of Planning (1998), and Cosmopolis 2: Mongrel Cities of the 21st Century (2004). She has taught and done consulting work in Australia, the US, and the UK. HaeRan Shin is a lecturer at the University College London’s Bartlett School of Planning. She completed her Ph.D. dissertation on the topic of gendering culture of capability poverty based on Amartya Sen’s capability approach at the University of Southern California. She currently teaches Urban Politics, International Planning, and Advanced Research method courses in London. William J. Siembieda is Professor and Head, City and Regional Planning Department, College of Architecture and Environmental Design, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo. He holds degrees from the University of California-Berkeley (BA, MCRP), the University of California-Los Angeles (Ph.D.), and was a Fulbright Fellow. His extensive teaching and field experience in Mexico, Brazil, and Central America includes work on strategic planning, land policy, and national housing. His areas of research include: land development economics, housing subsidy policy, and disaster mitigation. He has served on the editorial boards of five academic journals in the US and abroad.
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James A. Throgmorton is Professor of Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Iowa. His work focuses primarily on the roles of rhetoric and narrative in planning, especially with regard to making city-regions more just and ecologically sustainable. He is the author of Planning as Persuasive Storytelling: The Rhetorical Construction of Chicago’s Electric Future (University of Chicago Press 1996) and co-editor (with Barbara Eckstein) of Story and Sustainability: Planning, Practice, and Possibility for American Cities (MIT Press 2003), as well as author of many articles in a range of planning-related scholarly journals. He is currently working on a critical history of planning in Louisville, Kentucky, from 1890 to the present, as juxtaposed against planning in Berlin, Germany. He received a B.A. in history from Notre Dame, an M.S. in community development from the University of Louisville, and a Ph.D. in urban and regional planning from the University of California, Los Angeles, and he has worked in both the public and private arenas as an environmental planner, consultant, and researcher. From 1993 through 1995, he served as an elected member of the city council of Iowa City, Iowa. Ronald G.H. van Ark graduated in Land Use Planning at Wageningen University in 1999, the Netherlands. In 2005 he finished his Ph.D. at the same University. The topic of his research was the role and meaning of contractual arrangements in inter-organizational planning processes. In his dissertation (in Dutch) and in several articles and papers, he discusses the organizational and procedural aspects of these collaborative planning approaches, focusing especially on strategies to deal with complexity and uncertainty in planning processes. Currently, he is working on these topics as a consultant at DHV Management Consultants in Amersfoort, the Netherlands. Niraj Verma is Associate Professor of Planning and Management, and Director of Doctoral Programs at the University of Southern California. Verma is the author of Similarities, Connections, and Systems: The Search for a New Rationality for Planning and Management (Lexington Books 1998) and he has been widely published in planning journals. In addition to his current interest in the role of rationality in the Network Society, Verma is engaged in a joint project with colleagues from Political Science and Religion that investigates the role of religion in development in transitional countries of Eastern Europe. As part of this project he did field work in Romania in 1987 and 1988 where he interviewed heads of Romanian NGOs, including leaders of the Orthodox Church and international aid organizations. This project is supported by the Zumberge Foundation at the University of Southern California. Chris Webster is Professor of Urban Planning at Cardiff University, where he leads the Cardiff spatial analysis research group, directs the UK Centre for Education in the Built Environment, and co-edits the journal Environment and Planning B. His research and teaching interests currently focus on New Institutional Economic analysis of urban management, planning, and urban geography.
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PREFACE
This anthology began in Leuven, Belgium, in 2003 with the Third Joint Conference of the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning and Association of European Schools of Planning. Although the conference intended to generate a book, no template for the papers was provided beforehand. Preliminary versions of the essays in this anthology were delivered at Leuven and then significantly revised. The complementary units in which the essays are grouped are the result of the papers selected on the one hand and, on the other, were used actively to urge the authors to apply them as a frame when rewriting their papers. The editors were helped in all their tasks enormously by Annemarie Strihan, the editorial assistant. She kept the process moving when the authors and commentators were ready to dawdle. We are deeply grateful to her. We are also grateful to the authors and commentators who stayed with us for 18 months and who tolerated, with remarkable grace, what was often an aggressive editorial hand. We thank also the sponsors of the Leuven Congress: the Flemish Ministry of Spatial Planning, Housing, and Monuments; the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning, and the Environment; the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy; the Fannie Mae Foundation; the Fund for Scientific Research Flanders; the National Lottery; and the K.U. Leuven, Department of Architecture, Urban and Regional Planning. Without their financial support this anthology would not have been possible. Louis Albrechts Seymour J. Mandelbaum
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INTRODUCTION
A New Context for Planning? Louis Albrechts and Seymour J. Mandelbaum
In the call for papers, the committee organizing the Third Joint Congress of the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning and the Association of European Schools of Planning in 2003, in Leuven, Belgium, asked participants to reflect on whether the “network society” was a new context for planning. There certainly has been a great deal of talk in recent years about networks in both popular and academic journals. Some of the Leuven participants were enthusiastic advocates of an intellectual revolution in our time; some spoke cautiously about incremental changes over the last two centuries. The latter group questioned the extent to which the development of “epistemic communities” and “policy networks” has changed the ways in which we think about interest groups, agencies, civil society, and governance. This anthology captures both of those positions. The papers and commentaries ask whether the “network society” provides a cogent context for planning or could provide one if appropriately revised. Is there a middle path between skepticism and enthusiastic exaggeration? Some 650 papers were delivered at the Leuven Congress. The main criterion for a first selection was the extent to which a paper spoke to the overall theme of the conference. The editors then narrowed that group (some 80 papers) to form this anthology. Each essay was read by the two editors and revised several times. All sections of this collection are organized in the same way: a set of essays grouped into complementary units and a critical commentary by a distinguished planning theorist. The editors have relied on those commentaries to link the essays to each other and to introduce readers to the literature in the field. As we live in a world in which all societies depend on networks, we briefly reflect on some challenges engendered by the image of the “network society.”
1
Louis Albrechts and Seymour J. Mandelbaum
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The Challenges Both social relations and the technical infrastructure of society have changed significantly over the last three or four decades. Even the skeptics among us are prone to speak of the “crisis” of this and the crisis of that. The image of the network society is sometimes brilliant and sometimes a clumsy attempt to relate social and technical relations. A network is a set of channels through which flow matter, information, and energy. The channels connect nodes in which flows are stored and processed. It comprises physical as well as social relations. The character of networks varies. A sewer system and an electric power grid can both be treated abstractly but no one would try to connect a high voltage line to a sewer main. It is, indeed, impossible to imagine a society that is not dependent on networks; that is not a “network society.” Some scholars (Castells 1996; Frissen 2002) argue that the way relations between individuals, firms, and other actors emerge today differs fundamentally from past ways. For Castells and Frissen, the fundamental difference is that the means of communication among actors in networks have increased spectacularly due to new technologies. But networks supporting the concentration of activities in space have grown in size, speed, and global reach since the invention of the telegraph and steam engine. Would it then be a mistake to ascribe that dramatic expansion only to the last two decades or to the development of the Internet? Characteristics of the Network Society Castells in his brilliant trilogy (1996, 1997, 1998a) weaves threads between these trends and a theory of what he calls the information age or the network society. Out of the analyses, a number of characteristics are attributed to the network society. In a first one Castells stresses that the new social structure is open and decentralized. Hierarchy and bureaucracy are reduced and participation and demonstration are enhanced. Many people are active in several networks at once. In this way networks act, overlap, and intersect. Changes in society also give rise to a specific planning- and policy-related literature (Sager, Healey, Innes, Forester, Hajer) grounded in the theory of relation-building processes. This literature focuses the attention on the relational dynamics of policy networks and on the internal dynamics of the networks in which we live our lives. A persistent criticism of traditional representative democracy forces politicians, theorists, and practitioners to rethink traditional governing, politics, and administration. The challenge for planning is to respond and to strive for inclusiveness in democratic procedures, for transparency in government transactions, for accountability of the state and planners to the citizens for whom they work, for the right of citizens to be heard and to have a creative input in matters affecting their interests and concerns at different scales and levels, and
2
Introduction
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for reducing or eliminating unequal power structures between social groups and classes (see also Friedmann and Douglas 1998). Pluralist democratic tendencies are developing in the wake of a crisis of representative democracy and a demand to transform the state in ways that will serve all of its citizens, and especially the least powerful. Out of this shift toward a more hybrid democracy, in some places there emerged a type of governance that expands practical democratic deliberations rather than restricts them, encourages diverse citizens’ voices rather than stifles them, directs resources to basic needs rather than to narrow private gain. This type of approach uses public involvement to present real political opportunities, learning from action not only what works but also what matters. Or is that all wishful thinking! Berry et al. (2004: 550) warn of the dark side of network structures such as convergence to group thinking, dependency on effective leaders and collaboration skills, focus on those who “have access to the microphone.” A second characteristic of the “network society” is that activities become more and more footloose. The new means in the field of ICT allow interaction without face-to-face contacts. The consequence is that spatial barriers become less relevant. Deterritorialization has an important impact on the mainly territorial, organized government. Processes and interactions confine themselves less rigidly to the strict administrative boundaries of an administrative unit. Planners have been struggling for ages with boundaries of cities and regions. Administrative boundaries cannot catch the complex relations of a housing market, a labor market, and the subsequent transport links. The socio-spatial patterning and physical structure of cities, in interaction with the context – in its broadest sense – result from multiple webs of relations, each with its own space–time dimensions. A third important characteristic is virtualization. The physical space of interaction is gradually replaced by a space of interaction without material basis: the virtual space of mass media, virtual financial markets. This allows the network to coordinate its actions increasingly better and over increasingly larger distances. With a simple mouse-click Europeans can buy a book or compact disc with an American dot-com firm (or vice versa). This firm delivers the goods through a sophisticated logistic chain. Payment happens smoothly through branches of financial institutions transferring the right amount of money via all sorts of telecommunication systems with the right firms. Although many transactions take place in a virtual space (Internet, stock exchange . . .), this virtual space needs a material component. Communication via the Internet becomes possible through a network of cables, routes, hubs, and servers. The stock exchange is located in a specific building. Castells (1996) points to the growing distinction between the space of flows and the space of places. In the space of flows all network transactions are settled. For Castells (1996) and Graham (in this book) these are not just virtual communication lines but also physical structures such as large gateways and terminals in the traffic and transport networks. The space of flows constitutes a globalized system of
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Internet hubs, airports, high-speed train stations, financial markets, etc. linked to a number of physical developments for the users of these spaces (hotels, recreative and touristic services, restaurants . . .). The space of places is constituted from these places where local social and economic interactions occur in a more or less closed system. A New Context for Planning? Does all the above mean that the new structural form – the network society – also constitutes a (the?) new context for planning? It definitely provides a powerful analytical context for relationships of many large-scale trends in worldwide processes. Should we read the network society as a sustained attack on the idea of hierarchy and market to steer processes of change in society, or as a focus on the mere relational dynamics of governance processes and forms? But to unravel relationships between trends is not the same as providing a context for places and communities in the (Western) world. Indeed, although according to all the evidence listed above networks are becoming a prime mode of organization, they are not the full content of our society. Society still consists of individuals, groups, and organizations. They form internal and external relations but these relations do not equal society. Their organic and material properties, their rules and resources should not cut out society to bring it back to its supposed bare essence of relationships (see van Dijk 1991). Management theorists Lipnack and Stamps (1994) argue that there is a shift going on from a predominantly hierarchical world to one in which hierarchies and networks will coexist and co-evolve. They regard networks as the successors to hierarchy and bureaucracy; not as replacements for, but as additions to them (Lipnack and Stamps 1994; see also Battram 1998). Toward a Research Agenda Planners hardly ever have an empirically accurate picture of the network(s) they are dealing with. This means actively considering how they theorize on what the network does, how they identify its actors, and how they deal (realistically) with its boundaries (see also Berry et al. 2004). As literature and research in many different disciplines (from biology to policy sciences) draws on networks, there is a need for cross-fertilization across disciplines. Understanding what this literature may add to our knowledge of cities, city-regions, and neighborhoods and how this could be integrated into planning theory and practice could be critical to effective and efficient (spatial) planning. The context (in the broadest sense) is instrumental in framing, guiding, and substantiating the actions of the participants. Therefore, its impact on the
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Introduction
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relational dynamics through which diverse actors come together in settings and try to build trust and understanding (governance practices), and the creative force of new governance initiatives and experiments must be carefully studied. Processes and interactions confine themselves less rigidly to the strict administrative boundaries of an administrative unit. The socio-spatial patterning and physical structure of cities result from multiple webs of relations, each with its own space–time dimensions. The tension between a more relational approach (see Friedmann 1993; Graham and Healey 1999) and fixed, inflexible, administrative boundaries, needs careful consideration. We have lived with the Leuven questions and papers for nearly two years. This introduction looks beyond Leuven to the next step. What sort of papers would we commission were we to organize a second conference on the same theme? We hope that thinking ahead to the next step will encourage an active critical reading of the arguments in this Leuven anthology. We distinguish four topics in that next step: 1
A concern with the design and control of networks and the attributes of their nodes, channels, and codes is certainly not new. As Judith Innes argues in her commentary on the first section, that concern plays a critical role in all forms of planning. It is, indeed, impossible to imagine a society that is not dependent on networks; that is not a “network society.” A second conference should deal with the design of networks of various types and their performance in moving, storing, and processing materials, information, and energy.
2
The development of networks has enhanced the global dispersion of urban activities and, paradoxically, the concentration of those activities in space. That paradoxical pattern is not new and it has not appeared in the same forms everywhere. A second conference would attempt to make sense of the paradox and of its implications for planning new links and enlarged spaces for flows.
3
We are intrigued by the repeated claim in the Leuven papers that the development of “epistemic communities” and “policy networks” has altered the ways in which political actives think, on the one side, about interest groups and the agencies of government and, on the other, about civil society and governance. We are not, however, persuaded that the real or alleged shifts from government to governance have encouraged everywhere intelligent public deliberation and collaboration across the fault lines of conventional politics. Tracking those relations would be one of the principal tasks of a second conference.
4
For most of the participants in the Leuven meeting, the image of the network society was associated with the work of Manuel Castells.
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Unfortunately, Castells was not in Leuven. While he is a distinctive presence in several of the papers in this anthology, we did not succeed in grappling with the network society as a synecdoche – an element of a system that somehow represents and integrates the whole. Readers of this volume will have no difficulty in distinguishing authors who have been deeply influenced by Castells and those who have not. A second conference would help those groups speak to one another.
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PART I
The Network Society: A New Paradigm
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CHAPTER ONE
Communicative Action and the Network Society: A Pragmatic Marriage? Niraj Verma and HaeRan Shin
Pursuant largely to the works of Manuel Castells, sociologists and social theorists have recognized the network society as a new construct within which to think about society. But, despite Castells’ prominence within planning, planning theory has been slow to see the network society as central to its agenda. This tide may be changing. A new literature on the network society is emerging in planning (Innes and Booher 2000; Graham and Healey 1999; Hajer and Zonneveld 2000) and – as this volume further attests – there is continuing interest in the network society on both sides of the Atlantic. This chapter is addressed to planning theorists and to others with more than a passing interest in ideas of a network society. Our goal is to assess whether the thesis of a network society raises fundamental challenges for planning and planning theory, demanding, for instance, a new paradigm or a new theoretical apparatus to deal with planning issues. Alternatively, we want to explore whether the recognition of networks simply implies – as some authors have claimed – an extended role for collaborative planning and related theories of planning (Booher and Innes 2002). Given that there has been a “communicative turn” in planning (Healey 1996), a turn that has come to stand for a vast array of approaches, such as rhetorical analysis, storytelling, negotiation, and even Deweyan pragmatism (Beauregard 1995; Innes 1995), our way of assessing the import of the idea of a network society is to ask whether it can be “accommodated” within the ambit of these ideas. That is to say, might the ideas of a network society find a home within the communicative turn of planning theory or are they so different that they constitute a new kind of planning theory?
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Such a question is more about the potential of communicative action theories than it is about the particular forms these theories have taken in planning. It is for this reason that we have not limited ourselves to planning applications of communicative action but have looked toward Jürgen Habermas as the inspiration behind these applications. Similarly, while there may be other contributors to the debate on the network society, we take the network society to exclusively mean the construct so convincingly articulated by Manuel Castells in his trilogy beginning with The Rise of Network Society (1996) to The Power of Identity (1997) and finally to End of Millennium (1998a).1 From this lens our operational questions become: Can the Habermasian tradition in planning theory incorporate Castells’ ideas about the network society with only modest accommodation in its theory? Or, does Castells’ work on the network society constitute a new paradigm to think about planning?2 Castells describes the network society as a global behemoth of firms, groups, territories, and populations that are interconnected and interdependent. On one hand this brings us closer but in a deeper way it brings about, what Castells calls, a struggle between the Self and the Net. The struggle is consequential. Self-determination, meaning, and identity are challenged by external forces of the Net: globalization, mobility, information, and technology. As a result, meaning and identity do not change as part and parcel of civil society but do so by an enlarging of the struggle outside civil society. The provocative significance of this thesis becomes clear when contrasted to Giddens’ (1991) notion of “reflexive life-planning.” As Giddens and Pierson (1998: 115) tell us, reflexivity is about “how we live in a world after the retreat of tradition and nature,” and where presumably organization is by information rather than tradition. In such an information-rich world, life-planning is about seeing life itself as a project. But, even though the network society is also about information and the connectivity it brings, Castells’ main argument is that the tension between Self and Net makes reflexive life-planning impossible. That is to say, it is impossible to be reflexive and to see life itself as a project because the main struggle between Self and Net does not happen within civil society. But such a thesis, we will argue, relies on a much too formal interpretation of reflexivity. A reading of Habermas, inspired by American pragmatism’s influence in his writings,3 tells us that although reflexive life-planning in a traditional sense might become impossible, in reality, the meaning of reflexive life-planning has itself changed. Reflexivity happens within a vastly intricate web of relations – no less complex than the network society – and in continued contact with everyday practice. So, while the contact with civil society is not a formal contact, such as in the labor movement, it is a de facto contact because members of the civil society are, first and foremost, ordinary human beings with ordinary, everyday aspirations. In this sense, civil society is not limited by the Gramscian idea (1971) of the rise of organizations and institutions that help to secure the capitalist enterprise. As capitalism is becoming the norm rather than only an alternative, the Gramscian idea is much less compelling.
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Rather, civil society is the kind of “deliberative democracy” (Sunstein 2001: 7) where ordinary values are coveted and where there is “a high degree of reflectiveness and a general commitment to reason-giving.” Our chapter is divided into four parts. First, we discuss the roots of communicative action by delving into Habermas’ works. Our goal here is to show how communicative action can help to restore ordinary unconstrained virtues. Next, we visit the idea of the network society to show its key arguments and trace it in Castells’ terms to the tension between the Net and the Self. Our debt in this part is almost completely to Castells’ works. Third, we compare the ideas of communicative action and the network society. Our argument is that there is an analogical link between them and that Castells describes for social movements what Habermas describes for epistemology. Finally, we go to the pragmatism-inspired literature on civil society and democracy and argue that if civil society is broadly interpreted in the context of deliberative democracy, it retains its vibrancy and relevance for the network society. Communicative Action and Habermas As the Marxist ideas of an economic crisis of capitalism are made irrelevant by the successes of the welfare-capitalist state, an important goal of the Habermasian project is to explain the consequences of the emergence of this welfare state (Baxter 2002). A key consequence is the transformation of an economic crisis to a social crisis, where fragmentation and the lack of social cohesiveness threaten the legitimacy of the nation-state. The explanations for this are complex and we will show this through a recounting of some key ideas in Habermasian philosophy. The Tension between System and Lifeworld One way of understanding Habermas’ argument concerning the penetration of a cultural regime by a political one is by framing the question within a Habermasian (1975, 1984) dialectic between “system” and “lifeworld.” System can be best explained by contrast to lifeworld, a concept that Habermas borrows from Husserl and Schutz, and which denotes the broad assembly of shared understandings, ordinary values, and practices. Based on these shared values and practices, lifeworld identifies with communicative rationality, while instrumental rationality defines the logic of the system. The competition between these two rationalities brings out the tension between system and lifeworld resulting in the colonization of the lifeworld by the system; a phenomenon that eventually becomes what Habermas (1975) has called “the legitimation crisis.” Colonization can be thought of as the manipulation of ends by means, i.e., the disassociation and eventual replacement of moral considerations by instrumental ones. This plays out in different arenas. When system denotes the legal system, the concern is the replacement of the ordinary idea of justice by formal
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laws, i.e., Mary Glendon’s (1991) example of the legal language of rights percolating into ordinary American discourse. When system denotes the state, the concern is the transformation of the “citizen” to a “client” of the nation-state, which reduces the nation-state to becoming merely a service provider. The demise of ideas such as loyalty and entrepreneurship is a casualty of this kind of colonization. More generally we can say that the colonization of the lifeworld by the system results in pathologies that interfere with the reproduction of the lifeworld and that this, in turn, contributes to the problems of the nationstate in advanced capitalist societies. If nation building is the expressed goal of the nation-state, this aim is not helped by its colonizing of the lifeworld. Rather, colonization forces it into a situation of crisis. On the other hand, increasing distance between the system and the lifeworld can also be problematic. In the extreme case this implies total autonomy of the lifeworld from the nation-state. An autonomous lifeworld poses a challenge to the capitalist nature of the nation-state because its values, culture, symbols, and traditions are intrinsically different from the functional way in which such values reside in the capitalist state. In the hands of the capitalist nation-state, the symbols and traditions become strategic tools to buttress the very idea of the nation-state. In this reduction, a value such as loyalty, which is otherwise linked with honor and dignity, becomes the worst form of nationalism. Religion – once thought of as the Protestant ethic that accompanies capitalism – can just as easily become an intolerant fundamentalism. As communicative rationality is replaced by instrumental rationality, meaning, motivation, commitment, and loyalty are not produced within the lifeworld, and this creates the legitimation crisis where legitimation refers to “an interchange relation between the polity and the lifeworld.” When the lifeworld is colonized by the system, the concern is the withdrawal of legitimation to the nation-state and the identity problems for the collective or the individuals. When lifeworld is autonomous, the issue is the manipulation of its ideals as strategic elements in the design of the nation-state. Ideologiekritik and Self-examination How might the authenticity and reproducibility of the lifeworld be restored? Planning theorists know of the Habermasian idea of the undistorted speech and its consequent dictums from Forester’s works (1980, 1985, 1993). But, just how does this distortion-free situation result? To answer this is to inquire into the tradition of the Frankfurt School of which Habermas was a leading member. The Marxist idea of an Ideologiekritik is central to understanding the stance of the Frankfurt School and, particularly, to critical theory. Although somewhat simply translated as a criticism of ideology, an Ideologiekritik is, in fact, much more. Raymond Geuss (1981: 26) explains its significance by contrasting it with the customary meaning of criticism of ideology. Whereas this criticism is usually “moralizing,” i.e., it is only concerned with ideology as being immoral or unpleasant, in Marxism and in the Frankfurt School ideology can be criticized for being wrong or delusionary. Another way of saying this is that when
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ideology is immoral, it is not just about false consciousness but also about distorted reason. Hence, Habermas emphasizes getting rid of speech distortions and exposes the conditions of ideal speech. Consciousness cannot be transformed from the outside and Ideologiekritik, in this sense, extracts “the very instruments of criticism from the agents’ own form of consciousness – from their views about the good life, from the notions of freedom, truth, and rationality embedded in their normative epistemology” (Geuss 1981: 87). Said differently, this process of self-reflection has the emancipatory goal of ridding agents of mistaken consciousness – or as Geuss calls it “from the frustrations of consciousness” – and restoring to agents the ordinary values of the lifeworld free from the effects of the system. Habermas has been seen as being interested in the role of Ideologiekritik in reducing identifiable suffering. One method of doing so – and this is a key role of an Ideologiekritik – is by assisting people to reflect on what they would want if they knew what they could want. In this sense, an Ideologiekritik is about restoring meaning as well as being about interests. The word “to restore” suggests a preceeding pathology. The pathology is the replacement of everyday communicative rationality by instrumental rationality where every end becomes a means and where shared values, shared meaning, motivation, commitment, and loyalty become casualties. Restoration of the lifeworld by bringing back communicative action seeks to undo the ills of this pathology. Ideologiekritik, in this sense, is the deepest form of self-examination and the most fundamental form of restoration. Castells and the Network Society Castells’ network society is characterized by the twin phenomena of an ever increasing globalism on the one hand and a narrowness resulting from people’s search for self-determination and control on the other. The globalization is embodied in the widely distributed networks of communication that end up changing the structure of modern organizations. The Net, as Castells calls this, represents not only organizational forms such as the distributed multinational corporation but also other forms such as widely distributed diasporic connections and the almost professionalization and globalization of protest movements.4 Characteristic of the growing reach of the Net is the emergence of almost parochial identities, called the Self, through which individuals take control in an otherwise growing sea of anonymity. The identities of the Self are often fundamental in nature and are developed around a parochial but powerful sense of belonging. The core value around which the Self thrives can take many forms: religious entities may evolve such as the Islamic Jihad; social entities may arise such as the ones around environmentalism or nature preservation; ethnic identities arise as in the independence movement in Indonesia or in Eastern Europe; and professional identities evolve as in “the expatriate worker.”5
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The Tension between the Net and the Self Castells’ contribution is to show both empirically and conceptually how the tension between the Net and the Self plays out and how it ends up changing and redefining technology relationships, power, and experience. We might contrast this, for instance, with the World Systems Hypothesis of Immanuel Wallerstein (1974). Wallerstein studied the transformation from a feudal to a modern capitalist world: a change that was, in its time, no less far reaching. His interesting contribution was to show that the political and economic hegemony of European capitalist countries came at the cost of feudal economies and was achieved by transforming the political and labor conditions of these feudal economies. But, although Wallerstein was interested in disparities and his work foreshadowed the emergence of linkages between national economies, Castells’ variables are more far reaching. In Castells’ world it is possible to work “in real time on a planetary scale” (Castells 1996: 92) allowing for new kinds of flexibility. This is reminiscent of David Harvey’s (1989) description but goes beyond it in documenting the emergence of flexible organizational forms that can change strategies with sudden shifts in global markets (Castells 1996: 439). It is within this Net of flows – and confronted by it – that the Self asserts its independence by its identification with primary identities. Hand in hand with globalization we see the construction of meaning on the basis of cultural and social attributes. Castells (1997: 8) categorizes these into three distinct identities that play different roles and are identified with different social associations. The Three Identities in the Network Society The “Legitimizing Identity” for social action is traditionally the nation-state. But, increased globalization of the Net makes it cede its power and some sovereignty to a diverse group of institutions formed by inter-country unions (such as the European Community) or multilateral agreements (such as Interpol).6 As Castells shows, the more a nation-state acts under the influence of the Net the deeper its problems of legitimation. We see this, for example, in the case of Pakistan, where being part of “the global war on terror” is distancing the current government from its Islamic population (although the dictatorial Musharraf regime may have other problems of legitimacy independent of this issue!). As the legitimizing identity weakens, a stronger “Resistance Identity” takes form. The Zapatistas of Mexico, the Japanese Aum Shrinriko, and American Militia groups are Castells’ choices for inquiry but to the list we might also add the recent Al Qaeda and perhaps also the WTO protests. The “Resistance Identity” develops to counter what it sees as the threats to its immediate surroundings due to globalization and often sees itself as a martyr in stopping the march of a homogeneous culture of globalization. When dissent is visible and proactive, Castells finds it useful to identify it as the “Project Identity.” When the growing reach of the Net makes people feel powerless, project identities such as environmentalism, feminism, gay and lesbian movements make for the possibility of self-determination.7 More
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generally, the more the Net makes the Self powerless, the greater the quest of the Self to search for meaning through project and resistance identities. How and why the identities transform is a complex phenomenon, which Castells explains as involving the everyday interaction of humans with themselves, with others, and with the external world. In our view, Castells’ description matches the spirit of what Habermas might have called “communicative action,” and shows the mutual relevance of their approaches in a fundamental way. We take this up in the next section. Comparing Habermas with Castells Although the three identities – legitimizing, resistance, and project – can be treated as separable, they are also intimately linked. Take the case of minorities who are excluded from the Net. These could be nations, as in large parts of Africa, which are not quite part of the global economy, or they may be groups, such as gays or lesbians, who, before they were understood as collectivities worthy of being seen as such, struggled to be part of mainstream society. The struggle of these groups, while initially forging a resistance identity, can take on a project identity in challenging mainstream society. In Castells’ (1997: 9) felicitous phrase, resistance identity involves the “exclusion of the excluders by the excluded,” but a transformation around a project can change this by a recognition of the status of the formerly excluded leading to their eventual domination “thus becoming legitimizing identities to rationalize their domination.” The forces that condition the creation and transformation of identities in a network society are complex. Castells (1996: 15–16) describes three relationships that are key to understanding this transformation. Production is the relationship between humans and the external world and involves the appropriation and consumption of matter. Experience is the relation of humans with themselves and is often driven by needs and desires. Power denotes the relationship between humans in light of production and experience, often suggesting control of some over others, and often with the potential for serious violence. Add specificity and particularity to these relationships, made possible by symbolic and actual communication between agents and between agents and the external world, and these relations coalesce to form cultural and collective identities. An Analogical Comparison What is the relationship between the Habermasian tension of system and lifeworld and the forging of relationships that undergird the production and transformation of the three identities? One possible answer to this question is to consider the tension between Net and Self as being analogical to that between system and lifeworld. Table 1.1 summarizes the discussion on the two pairs of tensions. It is as important to see the differences between the two, as it is to
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Table 1.1 Comparing Habermas and Castells Tension
Manifestation
Consequences
System versus lifeworld (Habermas)
Colonization of lifeworld by system
Net versus Self (Castells)
Increasing distance between Net and Self
Erosion of ordinary communicative action Instrumentalization of ends and purpose Declining legitimacy of the nation-state Emergence of resistance identities
see their structural similarities. While at least some of the structural similarities should be apparent, the key difference is between the overall orientations of their respective authors. As a philosopher and ethicist, Habermas is interested – and at home – in normative recommendations that emanate from the tension. It is fair to say that the normative conclusion is the restoration of the lifeworld and its reproducibility through communicative action. In contrast, the sociologist in Castells accurately portrays the tension as one of increasing distance between Self and Net. This is a statement of fact that is buttressed by empirical examples. The normative lessons are more tacit and when Castells does venture out he does so in a language of caveats, tentatives, and uncertainties. And even when these speculations appear, they are made because Castells (1997: 361) “feel[s] obligated to suggest some hypotheses, as grounded as possible on the observations reported.” Given the reluctance with which Castells approaches the normative, our attempt to defend a normative role for an Ideologiekritik and for Habermasian communicative action in the network society warrants an explanation. There are several reasons why we head in this direction. First is the issue of the relatively strong connection between Castells and the Frankfurt School. Indeed, both critics and admirers of Castells – and sometimes they are the same people – point to such a nexus (Stevenson 1998: 472). And if such a nexus exists – and there seems to be broad consensus of its evidence8 – it is not inconceivable that some normative implications that derive from the Frankfurt School would be of relevance to the network society. The other reasons have to do with the basis for Castells’ reticence to make normative arguments. As Castells explains extensively in the third volume of his trilogy and also in abbreviated form in other contexts,9 this attitude is consonant with his self-image of an analyst of society: “What I think I know how to do, a little bit, is to analyse society. That is my job, and that is what I have tried to do all my life” (Castells 1998b: 483). Elsewhere in the essay, Castells describes the separation of his own values and the possibility of a detached analysis as instrumental in his goal of maximizing his personal contribution as an analyst of society. Yet another reason, as Castells (1998b: 482) tells us, is
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that despite his strong worries and cares about society in general, there are serious methodological problems in generalizing from the diversity of the various settings and the contexts and processes: [W]hat is advisable for the UK is not the same for the USA, even less so for Brazil or for Spain. And there is no universal solution, or ideology (e.g., the interests of the working class), that could be proposed as a standard everywhere. Such scholarly integrity is laudable but the Frankfurt School or Habermas do not make the kind of “concrete” proposals that Castells’ worries are impossible to make in general terms. Habermas’ normative claim is as general as Castells’ positive one and, like the Net and Self, his constructs – or more generally those of the Frankfurt School – pervade the UK, the US, Brazil, and Spain. Said differently, the concreteness of these normative positions is methodological, not situational and so they are able to accommodate variety in more robust ways.10 We know, from Habermas, that communicative action counters the tension between system and lifeworld. Its success is measured by its ability to further the reproduction of the lifeworld so as to overcome the colonization of the lifeworld by the system. Drawing on the analogical relation of the tension between system and lifeworld with that between Net and Self, success in resolving this latter tension would imply reduction in distance between the Net and Self (Table 1.1 is relevant here). Evidence of this success might come from the very emergence of a project identity because a project identity represents a more sustainable relation between Self and Net. Although it is possible to hold a different view by focusing on the liabilities of the project identity, we are emboldened by Castells’ choice of examples to illustrate this transformation. The environmental movement and feminism are two instances where resistance identities have given way to project identities and in both cases the movements have increased their following and really have graduated to mainstream status constituting what Castells calls a new social movement. In discussing this transition of identities Castells poses what we see as two fundamental interrelated challenges that must be addressed if we are to have any role for communicative action in this transition. The first of these concerns the non-relevance of civil society in this transition and the second concerns the impossibility of what Giddens (1991: 53) calls “reflexive life-planning.” In our view, the two cannot be separated and we will address them together. The Challenges of Civil Society and of Reflexive Life-planning One of the most interesting insights of Castells’ work is that the transformation from resistance to project identity happens as an extension of communal resistance without any reliance on civil society. In other words, in sharp contrast to modernist norms, civil society has become irrelevant to this transformation. In Castells’ words (1997: 11):
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The search for meaning takes place in the reconstruction of defensive identities around communal principles . . . the constitution of subjects at the heart of the process of social change, takes a different route to the one we knew during modernity, and late modernity: namely, subjects, if and when constructed, are not built any longer on the basis of civil societies, that are in the process of disintegration but as prolongation of communal resistance. (emphasis original) We can cavil about the extent to which such a decline has happened in civil society. After all, others have pointed out that “communities without propinquity” (Webber 1963) or Open Moral Communities (Mandelbaum 2000) are competing for space where traditional communities may have declined. But, that is not the point that we want to contest. Indeed, we agree with the general point that civil society is in decline and see this, in Habermasian terms, as the meaning of colonization of lifeworld by system. But then by extension we also see the possibility of arresting or reversing this decline in civil society by recovery of the lifeworld and by ensuring its reproducibility. Castells is silent on the possibility of such a recovery. He stops at documenting the crumbling of civil society under the tension of Net and Self but does not take a stand on whether it is desirable – or even whether it is possible – for a reinvigorated civil society to emerge. However, this seeming agnosticism is accompanied by a much stronger argument concerning reflexive life-planning that Castells regards as impossible. We want to address this latter commentary of reflexive life-planning more substantially because we see it as being skeptical on the possibility of ensuring the conditions that lead to the reproduction of the lifeworld and thus to a recovery of civil society. Giddens (1991: 32) explains reflexive life-planning as the conversion of the Self to a reflexive project. Or, we might say that it is the quest for deeper meaning about one’s project as influenced by one’s life experiences. Extrapolating from Giddens but differing from him in important ways, Castells argues that such reflexive life-planning involves the interplay of “power” and “experience.” Recall that experience is an internal relation whereas power is about the relationship with others and with production. The trouble with the network society, Castells argues, is that it has brought about fundamental disjunctions between the enactment of power and the relationships of experience. When these were contiguous in modern and late-modern societies: temporally, spatially, and intellectually, it was possible to derive nourishment and meaning from them. Now that they are separated into different time-space frames, coping and mastering them is only for elites who can simultaneously inhabit their locales and the globe. While these elites still derive meaning and identity from them, for most people the burden of the separation of power and experience makes reflexive life-planning impossible. It is in this situation, Castells argues, that the search for meaning happens in narrowly constructed domains in the development of resistance identities around communal principles. New social movements, such as environmentalism
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and feminism, emerge, not in the traditional paths set by the emergence of labor movements through the legitimizing and eventual domination of the movement by the state, but by a widening of resistance. As we see it, Castells is building here a much larger thesis that is ultimately the denial of the possibility of enlightenment or even of rationality itself.11 While much has been written about this12 – and this writing is conspicuous by its absence in Castells’ account – the originality here is in tying this thesis to globalization. It is not for us, in this chapter, to mount a full-scale rescue of reflexive life-planning. Still less, do we intend to explain the possibility of rationality in the contemporary world. This has been done eloquently by philosophers who take a pragmatism-inspired position, notably Hilary Putnam (1990) in his articulation of the possibility for a realistic but also liberal and humane epistemology and by Habermas (1990) in showing a role for moral consciousness in a pragmatism-inspired world of communicative action. In expansive form, the subject has been treated by Charles Taylor in his Sources of the Self (1989) and then topically adapted by him and others (including Habermas) in a set of essays that bring the Hegelian idea of the “struggle for recognition” to the issue of multiculturalism in the contemporary world.13 Our intent is simply to pick out some promising pragmatic threads from this conversation and apply them to the case of identity transformation for new social movements. In this we find two issues particularly persuasive: (a) the role of the agent in identity transformation, and (b) the meaning and role of civil society in the contemporary world. Agency and Identity Transformation The agents in Castells’ story, who first become the resistance identity and who then transform from it, are first and foremost ordinary human subjects. Their interests are thus not only in the singular mission of a social movement but also in many attendant everyday events that mediate the lifeworld. Reproduction of the lifeworld among these agents does not mean a crassly instrumental conversation that would magically raise their consciousness about their subjectmatter. Rather, moral consciousness results, as pragmatists such as Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey saw, in the midst of the rich shamble that we call daily life. James’s (1947) way of saying this was to rescue such fundamental ideas as meaning and truth and to make them more relevant to the practices that comprise the everyday lifeworld. Peirce’s stance was to intimately connect the logic of everyday things with ethics. These pragmatists helped us to see how a pragmatic rationality (Verma 1996, 1998) can connect the sentiments of the lifeworld with the play of reason. They looked outwards into everyday practice and not inwards, as philosophers of consciousness have tended to do (Blanco 1994; Hoch 1996; Stein and Harper 2000). Interestingly, Habermas himself provides an excellent account of this direction of pragmatism. “Pragmatism and hermeneutics,” he writes (1990: 9), “oust the traditional notion of the solitary subject that confronts objects and becomes reflective only by turning itself into an object.”
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In other words, reflexive life-planning, as we knew it, may be fading even as a new version of reflexive planning may be emerging. In this latter reflexive life-planning, the rationality of the agents of change is not predicated on the absence of worldly influences, regardless of whether these influences are global or systemic. Rather, these agents maintain their sanity and their freedom in the thick of everyday life by seeing meaning in the ordinary and the everyday. This is the message of pragmatism. One of the most telling illustrations of this comes from the pragmatic philosopher and William James’s student, Edgar A. Singer. Singer (1924) was not showing the meaning and relevance of pragmatism under the constraints of globalization. However, he was interested in the meaning of freedom in a constrained world. True freedom, according to Singer, is not the ability to do different things at the same time. That would simply be caprice. Genuine freedom consists of doing the same thing in different situations and at different times. In other words, freedom is not about escaping the constraints of the world, whether they are borne of globalization or of other forces. It is acting in purposeful ways while mired in these constraints.14 It is quite possible for ideologies and approaches that look very different, i.e., have different structural components, to be in fact united by common sentiments and even to aspire to a common purpose. Castells’ discussion of the environmental movement, which he sees as an example of a new social movement, is useful in this regard. For Castells, the diversity of approaches represents a “creative cacophony” (1997: 112). The contradiction in the label does not go unnoticed and Castells is faced with the task of showing the differences between the various strands as well as their ultimate similarity. He does so by adapting Alain Touraine’s categories of “identity, adversary, and goal” to describe each version of an environmentalism in its own terms. How do these separate movements finally add up to a new social movement? Castells’ position (1998b: 477–8) on this comes through much more clearly in his response to his critics than it does in his books. The main difference between how these new social movements add up as compared to how we expect social movements to develop is in their non-reliance on the “capitalistic/informational logic.” These identity-based social movements act, Castells tells us, “by setting a different hierarchy of values, values that cannot be traded or virtualized: my god, my nation, my locality.” But, these are the everyday values that pragmatism champions and on which Habermasian communicative action depends! We do not argue with Castells’ assessment that new social movements, such as the environmental movement or feminism, are not reflexive in the traditional sense of objectifying or commodifying themselves.15 But, given the lessons of pragmatism and Habermasian communicative action it is not enough for us to say that this resistance to commodification implies the impossibility of reflexive life-planning. While we agree with the sentiments implied in Castells’ account of the network society, we see evidence of the new social movements engaging in a visible form of cognition that is more intimately connected to self-determinism than ever before. Ideologiekritik, the reinstatement of the lifeworld, communicative
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action, and pragmatic rationality are even more relevant to these movements if only because they are so nakedly visible. Meaning and Role of Civil Society The second point concerns the meaning and purpose of civil society in the contemporary world. For Castells, the role of civil society should be to bring legitimacy to social movements. Recall that this is Gramsci’s notion of civil society where the concern is that civil society merely becomes the captive of the elite or the capitalist class that uses it to secure its domination of others. Castells seems to say that the social movements of the network society do not – or cannot – seek this legitimation. Instead, they start as communal movements and continue to grow as communal movements without much to do with civil society. In other words, new social movements – as the social movements of the network society are called – fail the test of democracy when democracy is defined in terms of formal representation or one-person one-vote or other such structural ways of describing democracy. That may be true but there is a larger meaning of civil society where civic discourse in the public sphere becomes the vehicle to rescue the lifeworld from its colonization by the system or by the Net. The democratic value here is of democracy as a social idea (Dewey 1954) or as “communal” in nature (Selznick 1992), or more generally as “deliberative democracy” (Dryzek 1996; Sunstein 2001). In this richer notion of civil society, the possibility of discourse – whether face to face or spatially non-continuous – is what rescues everyday existence and hence everyday values. For Dewey, such a democratic way of life is embedded in human relationships and not in formal voting mechanisms. For Sunstein, the contrast is within those who champion deliberative democracy as either majority rule or popular will and those who see deliberative democracy as being about accountability through reflective and reasoned debate. Communicative rationality makes such a democracy possible and it is this engagement between reason and democratic design that makes for the deepest meaning of reflexive lifeplanning. Social movements, even when they are about resistance play an important part in such deliberative democracies. Their communal stance is a source of engagement and not a threat to deliberation. The Case for a Pragmatic Marriage Planning theory has well recognized the Habermasian tension between system and lifeworld and much of communicative action theory derives in a direct or indirect way from this tension. At the same time, contemporary planning theory has recognized that the existence of the network society is part of the changing context that planners must confront. In this chapter we have argued that although the network society is real and is enormously complex, its recognition does not imply a disavowal of communicative action.
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To make our case we have found it important to go to the roots of communicative action and to some of the most sophisticated writing on the network society. The two writers who have served as our icons for these two traditions are Habermas and Castells, respectively. The Habermasian tension between system and lifeworld, we have argued, bears an analogical similarity with the description of the Net and Self in the network society. This analogy becomes most usable when we see the core ideas in the network society, such as civil society, communalism, and reflexive life-planning, from a broader perspective of the impact of these ideas on human relations rather than as stand-alone esoteric concepts. Such a perspective is associated with American pragmatism, a philosophy that is known in planning theory. It is a perspective that emphasizes the importance of ordinary values and daily living and elevates them to epistemological status. These ordinary values permeate the meaning of civil society and reflexive life-planning and make a pragmatic marriage between communicative action and the network society possible. So, while the network society may not necessitate a new paradigm, read in conjunction with Habermas and communicative action, it vividly underscores the need for a broader meaning of civil society and communicative action along the traditions of American pragmatism.
Notes 1 We find the first two books particularly helpful in understanding Castells’ ideas of the network society and will largely rely on them for Castells’ position. 2 We might point out that although Castells carefully documents the new organizational structure of the Network Society he makes no claim that his work calls for a shift in paradigm. 3 American pragmatism is closely linked with communicative action, largely through the influence of Peirce and Dewey, on Habermas’ theorizing. 4 The protests in places as far away as Seattle and Rome against the World Trade Organization were a case in point. 5 In the heydays of the computer revolution in Silicon Valley, it was not uncommon for people to think of their identity as being tied to their immigration or visa status: “green card holder,” “professional visa status,” or other such categories became immanent. 6 As recent world history shows, not being a signatory to a convention does not insulate a nation-state from the influence – and pressure – of the Net. Nuclear proliferation, weapons of mass destruction, and drug enforcement are examples. 7 A dialectical assessment of Castells’ argument must confront the question of just how such self-determination escapes the captivity of the “Net”? We address this question in the next section when we compare Habermas and Castells and visit the Frankfurt School idea of an Ideologiekritik, which is about self-reflection. 8 There are, of course, differences such as the movement away from theories of the determinism of technology to a more sophisticated account. 9 See, for example his rejoinder to his critics – and particularly to Kumar (1998) and Stevenson (1998) – published in the New Political Economy. 10 Moreover, a strong separation between positive sociological categories and normative goals and categories may itself be ideological and problematic (Proctor 1991) but, although this is a correct argument, pursuing it at this point is likely to detract from our
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11 12
13 14 15
immediate goal of showing the relevance of communicative action for the network society. This may sound sympathetic to the postmodern agenda. Yet Castells is largely dismissive of postmodernism, seeing it as faddish and lacking seriousness. See Charles Taylor’s Sources of the Self (1989) for a wonderful exposition on the modernist identity. On the Enlightenment project Taylor (1989: 366) quotes Kant who saw Enlightenment as “Man’s emergence from self-incurred immaturity” or as “the courage to use your own understanding.” Amy Gutman’s (1994) edited collection Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition is a wonderful set of essays, including one by Habermas (1994). See Verma (1998) for a more expansive description of the connection between Singer’s notion, Jamesian pragmatism, and purposeful categories. But see an interesting anthropological essay by Peter Brosius (1999) that sketches how the analytical apparatus used to describe the environmental movement in these terms may itself be contributing to their commodification as visible in their increasingly formulaic treatment. Taking the example of “contestation” which he identifies as a key trend in the environmental literature, Brosius points out, that the emphasis on contestation may have been routinized and naturalized into a bureaucraticized version of the notion of “stakeholders.”
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CHAPTER TWO
Planning and the Network City: Discursive Correspondences Robert A. Beauregard
Although we can theorize abstractly, imagining ourselves doing so in a world free of material constraints, we cannot act abstractly (Flyvbjerg 2001). Action occurs – only occurs – in specific historical and geographical settings. In fact, it is precisely the material basis of action, and no more so than its consequences, that distinguishes action from mere intention. One can think in the abstract, but not act there. This necessary connection between action and setting has particular resonance for planning, a necessity that comes as no surprise to planning practitioners. They know intuitively that what they do must make sense in relationship to what is possible. Any proposed instance of planning thus requires a specific reality that must exist for the intervention to be successful (Beauregard 1998). Conversely, how planners characterize that reality signals their intentions. One way to understand the relationship between planning aspirations and the context in which those aspirations will have to be achieved is to consider the relationship between planning interventions and corresponding understandings of the city. How is what planners imagine as possible entwined with the city whose possibilities planners are attempting to unlock? The purpose of this chapter is to reflect on the many ways in which the city is conceptualized and the implications this has for planning practice. The theoretical framework is the interplay of representation and “an epistemologically mediated reality, constructed linguistically as well as materially” (Walton 1995: 62; see also Mitchell 2002). The focus is a specific discursive construction – the adjectival city – and one of its most recent manifestations, the network city. Numerous theorists and commentators deploy single adjectives – global, European, garden, spontaneous – to characterize the city. Doing so opens up
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and closes down opportunities for planning intervention. To focus the discussion, I will address three of these consequences: (1) the potential for purposive intervention locked within the adjective, (2) the importance of intellectual and professional networks in providing lessons for planning practice, and (3) the way in which the network city enables planners to negotiate the disjuncture between specialization and synthesis. The Adjectival City In the late nineteenth century, scholars began to write about the city from a professional perspective. Faced with the city’s inherent complexity and the unavoidable differences among cities, they drew on adjectives to stabilize their understandings. Adna Weber, one of the first to systematically explore the processes of urbanization, carefully distinguished between commercial and industrial cities and among American, European, and Asian cities (Weber 1963). For him, these distinctions were not just ready labels. They also served an analytic purpose by enabling comparisons and thereby organizing the evidence. Of course, a phenomenon so complex as a city, and so variable across time and space, will be subjected to a variety of adjectives. The architect Sir Richard Rogers (1997), for example, conveys his sense of an ideal city by applying two adjectives: sustainable and humanistic. He further disaggregates the sustainable city into the just city, the creative city, the ecological city, the compact city, the polycentric city, and the diverse city. Because each adjective represents a different city (Low 1996), a different type of intervention is implied. Any reader of the urban literature can quickly generate a list of such adjectives. In the early twenty-first century, “global” and “sustainable” are two of the most common, followed closely by “edge” and “world.” “Postmodern” seems on the wane and “tourist” and “postcolonial” ascendant. Those in area studies are quite adept at thinking about southeast Asian cities, European cities, and North American cities. Urban historians, of course, navigate across the centuries and between various eras from “medieval” to “colonial” to “postwar,” while the more economically inclined have left behind “industrial” for “post-industrial.” City planners will remember “garden city” and urban designers can hardly avoid the “physical city.” “Third world city” and “mega-city” share a conceptual space (Robinson 2002), while numerous other characterizations – postborder, unruly, fantasy, informational, and captive – hover in orbit around the main adjectival planets. One of the most important ways to think about these adjectives is in terms of their theoretical intent (Beauregard 2003c). Frequently, the chosen adjective refers to a particular theoretical stance or point of view. To write or speak of the “gated city” is to propose a critical perspective concerned with the erosion of public space, invidious spatial divisions, and social polarization, all wrapped up in a political economy of the city. The “postmodern city” has a similar theoretical thrust. Its use by such scholars as Michael Dear (2000) is meant to
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portray a theoretical orientation at odds with the Chicago School of urban sociology and the tenets of human ecology. One reads the phrase and knows what to expect. Another example is Neil Smith’s (1996) “revanchist city.” The adjective itself contains his argument; the middle class in the US of the 1980s and 1990s mobilized neoliberal policies (e.g., zero tolerance policing) and gentrification to re-take the city from the poor, homeless, criminals, and racialized “others” who had taken it from them in the 1960s and 1970s. “Sustainable city” also signals its intent (Portney 2003). The sustainable city is one that can only be understood at the intersection of ecology and economy. The primary theoretical function of these adjectives is to enable the theorist to manage the complexity of the city. This is where the network city is most powerful. Certain adjectives – unruly, wild, unfinished – point to the city’s complexity but suggest little in the way of a resolution. The authors of such phrases embrace the city’s unpredictability and resistance to theoretical discipline. Their intent is to turn their listeners and readers away from any expectation that one can make final sense of the city or interpret it as a purposive totality. To say the city is unfinished or incomplete, however, is to suggest something different; a city that is changing as we speak of it, a city without a final destination. Such cities are only temporarily capitalist, post-industrial, or global. Adjectives that have a clearer theoretical thrust are those that function as metaphors: the machine city and the organic city are two of the most common of these formulations (Donald 1999: 27–61; Ellin 1996: 241–69). Here we are encouraged to think of the city as being like a machine or like a living organism. If the machine is an analogy for the city, we can think of the city as having parts, with each of those parts serving a purpose in a larger scheme. The function and technology (whether computer chips or gears) of the machine (the city) offer a logic for intervention. The city as organism operates similarly. It has a heart (the central business district), a brain (its institutions), and arteries (highways, sidewalks). Consequently, the organic city is amenable to a medical intervention, as when blight is surgically removed from the urban core. These adjectives organize the city’s complexity and provide us with ways of thinking about how to act. Such metaphorical characterizations were quite common in the first half of the twentieth century but have become less so as theorists have chafed at their simplicity and their functionalist and teleological qualities. What has become more common is the use of adjectives as synecdoche (Amin and Graham 1997). While a metaphor asserts a similarity in a difference, in synecdoche the “whole as a totality . . . is qualitatively identified with the parts that appear to make it up” (White 1978: 73). Thus, for example, the city becomes the “tourist city” or the “commercial city” or the “fortress city.” In each case, we are meant to understand that tourism or commerce or defensive spaces and activities such as gated communities and surveillance cameras do not constitute all of what exists in the city or the city’s sole function. Rather, these elements are put forth as the defining ones for a given time and place.
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By distilling the city into a single and pivotal element, the theorist can explore what is essential about the city, leaving aside what is less important. Complexity is curbed, bounded. No expectation exists that the city will be considered in its messy totality. To the extent that an element is richly connected to others, our understanding is enhanced. If it is not, the adjective limits our perception and appreciation. In fact, this is one of the dangers of the adjectival city – the marginalization or suppression of an important quality (for example, gender relations) of the city (Spain 2002) or the stretching of the label to cover incompatible realities (Collier and Levitsky 1997). It is in regard to the messy totality of the city that the “network city” is most important. The “network” adjective reduces the city’s complexity and reintegrates it in a way that makes the city intellectually and practically manageable. Network City/Network of Cities As an adjective, the term “network” is quite successful in negotiating the multidimensionality of the city. It simultaneously erases complexity and then re-introduces it in a more malleable form. The innumerable parts of the city, or the differences among them, are recognized and then connected to a larger whole – the network. Such a rhetorical move has theoretical power, making it one of the more attractive metaphorical constructions currently present in urban theory, if not (yet) a new paradigm. In its ideal-type formulation, a network consists of a set of components, all linked to each other and functioning so as to achieve one or more common purposes (Castells 1996: 470–1). These purposes are utilitarian, based not on an organic or even teleological “essence” of the network but on the aggregate of member interests. Networks are self-organizing. Being a member of the network – whether as an individual, nonprofit organization, business, or government – is voluntary and each member contributes to the network based on their capacity and the predicted benefits. Efficiency is not a network quality. Rather, what is valued is the collaboration, openness, adaptability, and creative redundancy that enables the network to be innovative and to function regardless of fluctuations in membership and changes in member interests. Ideal networks are often contrasted with hierarchies and systems. Associated with Weberian bureaucracies (Mouzelis 1967), hierarchies are viewed as rigid entities that channel authority, impede the flow of ideas, and stifle innovation; although Pumain (1992) argues that hierarchies are simply a special type of network. Systems are also contrasted with networks. They have a core function, strive for efficiency, and are tightly designed. To posit a system is to suggest not only a stable knowledge of that entity’s dynamics but also of its purpose. A system is focused; a clear path exists to a pre-determined goal. Moreover, the actors in a system are less volunteers than employees, metaphorically speaking. In the ideal formulation, networks are neither hierarchies nor systems.
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Leitner and Sheppard (2002) label this ideal-type formulation the progressive interpretation of networks. They argue that the progressive network is centered in civil society and serves as an alternative to capitalist markets and strong states. They contrast it with a neoliberal interpretation in which networks are cast as mechanisms for shrinking the state and dispersing its powers while strengthening markets so that they become arenas of opportunity for individuals, governments, and businesses. Neoliberal networks rely on competition rather than cooperation, strategic alliances rather than serendipitous encounters, and professional models of network governance rather than mutual adjustment. Innovation is meant to support competitiveness and flexibility so that capital can move quickly in and out of investment opportunities. Yet, as Leitner and Sheppard point out, it is the ideal type network, the progressive network, that dominates the discussion. Neoliberal intentions tend to be veiled. The progressive interpretation is what one finds in writings on the worldwide web, nonprofit organizations, flexible workplaces, and professional networks (see, for example, Boyer (1999)). It is also the portrayal that pervades writings on cities, particularly by scholars who draw upon the “spaces of flows” made famous by Manuel Castells and who emphasize the purported revolution in information technology. An interest in networks and cities, though, has existed for decades. It can be traced back to Walter Christaller and August Lösch and central place theory (Lampard 1968; Pumain 1992) and forward to the notion of systems of cities (Bourne and Simmons 1978) and world systems (Friedmann 1986). Subsequently, the metaphor was given a boost by research into industrial districts (initially in the Third Italy and later in Silicon Valley) and their regional networks of firms (Castells and Hall 1994; Scott 1993). These themes combined to produce global cities and, when crossed with telecommunications (Townsend 2001), engendered a vision of the network city that seems to underlie most scholarly writings on this theme. The story of the network city, however, must begin back in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with the first systematic probings of the city’s form (Choay 1988; Ellin 1996). These probings were as much practical as theoretical and became centered on the emerging professions, particularly city planners but also civil engineers, transportation specialists, and public administrators. Urban professionals began to conceive of the city analytically rather than holistically. In doing so, they disaggregated the city into a series of systems: water supply, sewage disposal, modes of transportation, housing markets, retail centers, and policing services among many others. These systems – not yet networks – enabled professionals to isolate parts of the city for intervention, thereby improving the city’s micro-manageability. At its apogee in the 1950s, this perspective gave rise to “plug-in” systems – components – that could be combined to create cities and their neighborhoods (Jencks 1973: 67–76). The contemporary version of this perspective turns systems into networks. The emphasis is shifted from centrally controlled and fixed activities and
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technologies to entrepreneurial or consumer-driven activities suffused with a high degree of flexibility. Graham and Marvin (2001) are well-known proponents of this perspective. They write of the demise of the integrated city and its replacement by a splintered urbanism of unbundled infrastructure driven by risk minimization and profit maximization. The public telephone system of the modern era has been replaced by competing land-line and wireless telephone providers, Internet telephone capabilities, and telephone cards among the available options. This unbundling brings competition, but it also undermines public provision of services. The infrastructure of the city is increasingly “networked” rather than “systematized.” For Graham and Marvin, flexibility and innovativeness are beneficial. Yet, the privatization of basic necessities and public goods is regrettable. Not everyone is networked, and even when networked not equally so. The network city is not only about what is happening within the city. It is also about systems of cities; that is, how the city is linked externally to other cities throughout the world. The foundational writings here involve world cities and the work of John Friedmann (Friedmann 2001; Knox and Taylor 1995) and others to identify the functional differentiation of cities on a global scale. In the earliest formulation, theorists distinguished world cities from regional cities and further divided regional cities into those at the periphery and those in the center, meaning the advanced industrial countries. The intent was not simply to differentiate but also to better understand how regional economies, and the world economy, were organized through the connections among different types of city-regions. This investigation has its empirical roots in international trade, specifically the commodity chains formed by transnational corporations, immigration, and telecommunications (Knox 1997). A sense that a new round of globalization was under way in the 1980s spurred theorists to search out the mechanisms that were being created to tie together production and consumption, labor, foreign-direct investment, and financing. Out of this emerged the global city, the city whose nodal position in urban networks provided the command-andcontrol functions and financial and legal services that shaped global production, consumption, trade, and immigration (Sassen 1991). Urban networks are not so voluntaristic or flexible as the ideal formulation implies. Cities such as New York, London, Tokyo, and Frankfurt have disproportionate control in financial markets. Washington is near-hegemonic militarily and a dominant player in diplomatic networks. Johannesburg, a regional city in Africa, holds sway in the world diamond market. Nevertheless, such networks are more or less open and while some cities wield greater influence than others, the networks, with exceptions, are without centralized control, despite having very powerful entities (for example, the World Bank, OPEC) engaged in organizing them. What makes these networks open to new members is their purported synergism (Paye 1996). To the degree that innovation is one of the network’s most valued objectives, any city that can add to this capability will be welcomed.
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Consequently, the notion that such networks exist takes a normative turn. Networks became growth opportunities for cities (Beauregard and Pierre 2000). Given the increasingly globalized nature of regional and national economies and given the shrinkage of central government supports, numerous theorists argue that urban economic growth is a function of the ability of a city-region to be competitive in global networks. There, such city-regions establish synergistic relationships, uncover opportunities, and are exposed to “best practices” (Leitner and Sheppard 2002; Tomlinson 2002). This can only occur if actors in the cityregion recognize the importance of being competitive. That much of what occurs in markets and intercity networks, such as Eurocities, involves both competition and cooperation is elided in this formulation (Friedmann 2001: 127–9). The global aspect of network cities should not blind us to an important regional or metropolitan formulation. This is the multi-nucleated metropolis that many theorists argue has displaced the nuclear metropolis with its single central city, an urban form that existed for over a century beginning in the mid1800s (Gottdiener and Kephart 1991). Office functions within edge cities have significantly challenged the older central business districts of these metropolitan regions. Central place functions have been dispersed. One interpretation of these multi-nucleated metropolises is as networks of centers, each center servicing a sub-region but also dependent on all the others within the metropolis for the functions, such as corporate legal services, that it does not contain (Bingham and Kimble 1995). Discursively, the network city takes the disparate parts of the city or the complexity of multiple cities and brings them together in a single entity, the network. Then, by positing the network as open, fluid, and innovative, complexity is re-introduced. The city is simultaneously unpredictable and organized. Using the network metaphor, the urban theorist manages to embrace complexity (albeit one that has been tamed) yet avoid complexity’s debilitating tendencies. Planning and the Network City How we imagine the city opens up and closes down opportunities for planning. Consequently, certain adjectival cities are more useful than others. For example, the “contemporary city” provides no direction for either analysis or intervention, while the “private city” suggests little need for, and even antagonism to, planning. Contrarily, the garden city, a characterization with particular historical resonance, invites a series of integrated interventions and suggests the urban form that will be its ultimate outcome. Planners must imagine the city they desire before they can satisfy their urge to plan. Three themes tie the adjectival city, and network city in particular, to planning. The first is the most general and concerns the potential for purposive intervention contained within the adjective. The second focuses on the importance of networks of cities for the sharing of planning ideas and tech-
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nologies. The last considers the way in which the network city helps planners to negotiate the divide between specializations and synthesis. Consider the potential for intervention implicit in adjectives. Adjectival cities characterized as wild, disarticulated, or spontaneous, subvert the planning imagination. There is no predictability and no logic and thus no points of intervention. The wild city resists being tamed. The disarticulated city precludes the kind of functional relationships that are the value-added of planning. And, the spontaneous city is too unpredictable. Such cities have a low receptivity to planning. At the other end of the spectrum is the “planned city.” The planned city implies a central analytical capacity, responsive leadership with the capacity to effectuate plans, and a strong sense of what form the city should take (Nelson 1977). The corresponding decision model, one of comprehensive-rationality, assumes a monolithic analyst and policymakers acting in the public interest. The planned city is both functionally and conceptually centered. In the US context, though, the planned city seems a political liability. Given the ideological disposition against large-scale and centralized planning in the US and against state intervention generally, it has unsettling undertones, though one could imagine it being attractive during certain historical periods as it was during the Progressive Era and in the decades of urban decline and mass suburbanization just after World War II. Of course, the comprehensive-rational approach associated with the planned city has lost favor over the last few decades and been replaced by a more democratic, de-centered, flexible, and citizen-driven model of planning (Forester 1999; Healey 1995). Whether in the form of participatory planning or communicative action, or another variation on this theme, contemporary planning is disinclined toward the concentration of power that the planned city implies. The tendency in contemporary planning – more in theory than practice I suspect – is to mobilize intentions not by relying on the power of a centralized authority but by drawing on the collective will of those for whom – and with whom – planning is done. At the same time, contemporary planning theorists and practitioners have embraced the notion of the city as multi-centered. This and the move toward more participatory and open planning practices have their roots in the abandonment of the self-assuredness, even arrogance, of earlier planners. The “ideal” network city dovetails nicely with these trends. It does so both in its implications for how collective action in the city might unfold and in its formulations of how the city works. The progressive network, as defined by Leitner and Sheppard (2002), is a relatively democratic social entity. Entry and exit are relatively uncontrolled, each participant is expected to contribute, opinions and actions bubble up from public deliberations, and rewards are widely distributed. Voluntarism and flexibility are defining qualities. Participatory and communicative action models of planning parallel this network philosophy. They rely on individuals voluntarily coming together to
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craft shared goals and then to adapt as obstacles appear, failure strikes, and success happens. Just as organizations, say, are empowered by being part of networks, individuals are empowered by participating in joint planning exercises. The parallels between networks and these new models of planning are striking. In fact, it would seem that these models rely on the existence of networks to function at all. Such models, moreover, have a tendency to be communitarian in their assumptions (Sandercock 1998a). They expect individuals to be pro-active, flexible in their opinions, and willing to search for a common good. Networks are often conceived in a similar way. The common good that they create is likely to be a bit more ephemeral than what planners, with their future orientation, might be comfortable with, but this transience can be conceived as flexibility. As flexibility, the trade-off between long-term commitment and adaptation to rapid change becomes tolerable. Networks thus make planning participation and communication manageable in a way that, for example, classes or interest groups – both hierarchies of sorts – do not. These latter ways of thinking about society fix interests and positions and establish barriers that block engagement across social divides. Consequently, the search for a common good and the fluidity of democratic debate are undermined. Joint action is the strength of (ideal) networks and of (ideal) communicative action. In the network city, individual citizens – socially connected – are available to participate in planning activities. Such a city is not dominated by one or a few groups. At the same time, its underlying logic – of things potentially linked to each other in functional ways – facilitates intervention. Democratic planning and network cities make sense together. The network city also encourages planners to greater recognition of the debt that planning theory and practice owe to the intellectual and professional networks that channel ideas and technologies among cities. The importance of early planning consultants, such as John Nolen, in the US, in spreading planning practices from one city to the next has been recognized. Less studied is the robust flow of people and ideas across the Atlantic Ocean in the early twentieth century, not just involving the work of Ebenezer Howard and Garden City advocates but also ideas about large-scale clearance (Paris and Birmingham), zoning (Berlin and Frankfurt), and housing (London) (Rodgers 1998: 112–208). The contemporary equivalent is “best practices.” Numerous government agencies and foundations publicize the successes that have occurred in specific places and encourage other cities to emulate them. Agencies such as the International Monetary Fund tout the importance of specific practices to countries and cities around the world. What large city has not hoped to replicate the planning success that Barcelona achieved by tying the Olympics to redevelopment? Richard Tomlinson (1999), for example, tells the story of World Bank consultants visiting Johannesburg and asking whether the city’s future would be that of Detroit or Pittsburgh. These flows occur through networks that
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link cities to each other. Their existence makes the network city even more important for planners. Last, the network city helps to resolve planning’s enduring tension between specialization and synthesis. By recognizing and reducing the inherent complexity of the city, it enables planning to be both functional – focusing on the component processes of the city – and synthetic, bringing those processes together into an organic whole. This allows planning specializations – transportation, environmental, land use – to maintain their integrity while providing a mechanism for considering how these specializations interact, thereby enabling interventions to be coordinated. The challenge for planners is to figure out how one sub-network connects to another. In doing so, and if they are to remain true to the network characterization, planners must avoid a pre-conceived notion of the outcome of their interventions. The network city is not teleological; it does not function according to a pre-determined image of itself. To this extent, the synthesis that planners desire is elusive but attainable. Of course, the compatibility between the network city and contemporary planning depends on how each is interpreted. A network city formulated in neoliberal terms in which competition and individualism are the defining values is less compatible with planning than the ideal or progressive model that I have been discussing. Nonetheless, the parallels between planning and the network city are undeniable. Conclusion In order to act, planners need to conceptualize the city. Without a sense of context, plan-making neither enjoys the benefits of limits nor the possibility of implementation. One extremely evocative way to characterize that context and to give meaning to the city is to capture its defining quality with a single adjective. Common in the urban literature, such adjectival cities and the rhetorical move that they represent have been given little attention. Their influence on how planners assess the potential for acting effectively cannot be ignored. The network city offers a particularly receptive way of thinking about cities. It focuses on the dynamics of the city’s connective tissue and, by doing so, brings action into view. It offers, in its ideal-type formulation, a fertile field for democratic deliberations and thus participatory planning and communicative action. It sets the city in an array of cities that are connected economically, politically, socially, and intellectually, cities whose connections bring ideas and technologies for improving planning practice. And, the network city suggests how planning specializations might be retained and synthesis achieved. Capable of managing the complexity of the city, adjectives can either open or close opportunities for intervention. That the network city does the former and not the latter is a large part of its appeal.
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CHAPTER THREE
Escaping the Prison of “the Present Place”: Can We Plan the Future of Localities in the Context of a Network Society? Dowell Myers The concept of a network society poses severe challenges for urban planning. Networks challenge planning to break the confines of its spatial borders. The practice of urban planning is spatially bounded because planners’ authority, if not responsibility, is restricted within borders sharply demarcated by governmental jurisdictions and units of political representation. Nonetheless, despite these political and administrative restrictions, the social and economic context for planning is heavily shaped by flows of activities that cross spatial boundaries and pass through locales. Simultaneously, temporal dynamics also challenge the spatial confines of a present place. Over longer sweeps of time, the disjuncture between the local place and broader planning context grows ever greater. With the passage of time, networks have longer opportunity to work their influences on the local place. In particular, the local population is in flux. Migration networks transform the place by importing a large proportion of the population to replace others who have departed. And over time the ebb and flow of investment capital favors some places more greatly than others. Even though bounded by space and time, the present place constitutes the strategic site within which residents and elected officials are self conscious of changes that confront them and which they wish to control. These local actors may be less conscious of how the social networks in which they participate shape development of shared meaning, valued conceptions of local identity, and the multiple, conflicting place identities that are socially constructed (Healey 1999). Multiple, competing narratives arise from interest groups in each place (Molotch 1976; Throgmorton 2003b). These place-based outlooks and debates
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sharply control the ability of the present place to interact with regions beyond local borders and futures not yet present. In this chapter I consider the challenges of “the network society” for urban planning. The heart of the problem is that planning practice is imprisoned in an orientation to “the present place.” How can planning better incorporate changes from beyond the local borders? In turn, how can planning prepare local contributions for the larger region beyond the borders? Given the confines of present consciousness, it is always difficult to plan the future. The odds of consensus about problems and solutions are always weighted to the shared experience of the local place or to the memory of its recent past. Finally, how can planning help residents achieve a satisfying self-identity that is based, in part, on attachments to a local place even while it changes in response to regional or global forces? These are weighty challenges to consider. Satisfying answers are not easily found, but the juxtaposition of these multiple challenges suggests the need for a more richly formulated response. Indeed, the locally grounded perspective of urban planning is beginning to illuminate new facets of the network society that have yet to be appreciated. The Prison of “the Present Place” Spatially Fixed Boundaries of Planning Authority The practice of urban planning in the US and in most democratic societies is conducted largely at the local level. Local governments control the development process and local residents fiercely defend their home rule of land use and other matters within their communities. Urban planners strive to improve the quality of places within their jurisdictions, leaving discussions about regional or national development issues to others. The relative importance of planning for broader areas varies from country to country, as well as between states in the US. To varying degrees, financial incentives from higher level governments, or outright control of infrastructure or other vital elements, may be able to enforce local respect for goals of extralocal areas. In general, however, the democratic process strengthens local voters’ control over matters within their own communities. The Orientation of Urban Planning to the Present Planning is not only conducted within local places, it is also oriented toward the present, even while espousing an intention to address the future. Given planning’s professed goals, it may seem paradoxical that planning is so oriented to the present, rather than the future, but the predominant forces direct planners’ attention to the present. Planners aim to be responsive to local stakeholders, and the democratic process directs attention to current concerns of voters and elected officials. The latter operate with time horizons limited to the next election, as well as to the pressures of short-term budgetary cycles. And the
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voters are most sensitive to current problems and perceived deficits. Even when planners try to lead a forward oriented investigation into longer term goals of advance planning, the decision-making process is locked in the present. Local citizenry and officials evaluate the planning alternatives in light of their current goals and perceptions of the world. Planners also may have shied away from addressing the future for professional reasons, namely to avoid “the twin hazards of uncertainty and disagreement” (Myers 2001b). It goes without saying that necessary consensus in support of collective planning is undermined by dissension over goals, as well as by uncertainty about the causes and solutions of problems. The future is especially problematic because facts in the future are impossible to test, verify, or legally defend, and both facts and goals for the future are difficult to agree about. Accordingly, local consensus is achieved more easily with regard to current problems or shared knowledge of recent local events. Only with more highly skilled narratives might planners create persuasive stories of local futures that are embracive of extralocal forces and ethical duties to a broader geographic sphere (Throgmorton 2003b). Confrontation with the Network Society The result of these forces is that urban planners have been driven to be strongly focused on the local area and the present. Planning practice has been imprisoned in the “present place,” making it little able to address either regional needs or concerns of the future. This contrasts sharply with demands imposed by the network society (Castells 1996). Global communications allows capital and enterprise to distribute freely across a broad terrain. With improved regional transportation systems, local places have become ever more tightly wired to the economic and social forces of the surrounding region and even the globe. The paradox noted by Castells and others is that the process of global integration and hyper communication is accompanied by an opposing force of local fragmentation. Residents search for self-identity in relation to ascribed or acquired self-characteristics, including a sense of belonging and attachment to places. Nonetheless, in this integrated spatial context, residents and leaders of a local place cannot control its work force, employment base, cultural messages, or many things other than the local land uses and physical appearance. Control of the physical place becomes a surrogate for control of the social, economic, and perceptual. Even that control is difficult in the face of relentless pressures. Not only is the spatial separatism of the local place challenged as never before, but its temporal isolation is also under stress. Castells emphasizes how the pace of work, of enterprise development and of industrial evolution has been accelerated. For example, where once we had factory towns that provided stable work and residence environments for two or three generations of time, now we have an economic life cycle that seems much more ephemeral. Today, change is more of a constant and looking toward the future a more frequent necessity.
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Global
Network Society
National
Regional
Local
The Present Place
Present
Nearterm
Longterm
Figure 3.1 Planning’s “Present Place” Prison Relative to the Network Society
Figure 3.1 offers a diagram of spatial and temporal relations that contrasts the network society with the prison of the “present place” in urban planning. Whereas planning is focused at the local level and in present time, the network society expands the activity sphere of local places by embedding them in regional, national, and global forces. The network society also stretches the time frame to include the near term, the period in which the next economic change or other innovations will be introduced.
Breaking the Restrictions of the Present Place Responsibilities of the Place to the Surrounding Region The space–time discordance between urban planning and the network society is not easily resolved. However, that discrepancy will make planning ever more powerless to cope with the changes under way in many local areas. This challenge may prove a healthy opportunity for urban planning, because the issues exposed are ones that have undermined planning success for many years. Residents in local places often feel that their current place has no necessary linkages to the surrounding region or world at large. Even though the
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roadways permit most residents to commute outside to work, there is no presumption of reciprocal responsibilities to the region. Some years ago, Frank Popper coined the term LULU (locally unwanted land uses) to characterize the garbage dumps, prisons, half way houses, and low-income housing projects that were needed in the region but which were not considered to be desirable in most communities. Planners who serve in the “present place” may well recognize the wisdom and ethical duty of their community to share in these regional responsibilities. However, local citizens and elected officials are prone to act in ways that are more locally self-serving. The planner who serves the interests of his/her community usually finds it difficult to argue for regional responsibilities. The challenge being faced in much of the US is how to adapt the precepts of home rule to the needs of larger regions. Communities that cannot address reciprocal ties at this level will have an even harder time responding to the national and global forces of the network society. European nations may be better able to address extralocal concerns through a multi-level governance based on the concept of subsidiarity, namely that government decisions should be taken at the appropriate geographic scale for a given function. The Place as Temporary Residence in the Network One way in which local places are most clearly impacted by larger areas is the movement of local residents into and out of the community. Although this has always been true, in recent decades the spatial integration of populations has been extended to the international arena (Castles and Miller 1993). For some communities and regions, the population influx and outflows have become so large that the implicit assumptions of urban planners and urban theorists have been completely overturned. The transience of local residents accentuates the classic distinction of policies based on people versus those based on place. The experience of the two diverges when residents are mobile, either moving in or out. The policy implication is that investments targeted to a place may benefit people for a sustained time only if the residents are permanently rooted in that locale. The divergence between history of people and the place in which they reside is highlighted in an essay on “Demographic Dynamism,” in which I have documented the pervasive assumptions of urban theory that the history of the residents and the city are synchronous (Myers 2001a). Evidence collected from census data revealed that more than 60 percent of adults in the Chicago or New York regions were born in the vicinity, but only 27 percent of adults in the Los Angeles region were born in California. (Among the dominant white majority, more than 80 percent of adult New Yorkers were born in the region, but still only 31 percent of Los Angeles residents were born in California.) Massive numbers of Los Angeles residents either migrated from elsewhere in the US (white or black residents) or from abroad (Asians and Latinos). This high rate of mobility has reciprocal effects on social networks. Not having grown up in the region, Los Angeles’ residents are much less likely to
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be rooted by parents and kinship networks, or to have deep longstanding social connections. Indeed, many of these residents may not have any memory or personal knowledge of what Los Angeles was like in the 1950s or 1960s. The opposite conclusions hold for residents of New York or Chicago. In fact, despite its reputation as a global city (Sassen 1991), with so many homegrown residents, New York does not reflect the impact of the network society as fully as does Los Angeles. Often the new arrivals to a place have different goals and ambitions for the place than do longtime residents. The group that is arriving and growing in numbers will increasingly assert its view of desired changes (or non-change) while those who are longer established often exercise an entrenched political position to resist the views of newcomers (Spain 1993). An apparent contradiction may be that the old time, long-settled residents who claim seniority and special status for their views may in fact be on the way out (if for no other reason than old age and death). The newly arrived, short-term residents could well represent the future, although that is contested by the oldtimers. The example of new immigrants is especially challenging to planners. By definition, these are mobile people newly arrived in the community. A key question is whether they will settle permanently or whether they will move on to other communities later in their lives. The dilemma for local planners and government officials is that an investment to help new immigrants adjust to life in their new country may not be repaid at a later time if the upwardly mobile immigrants carry their newly developed assets to another community (Myers 1999). In such cases, it makes much more sense for a higher level of government to fund the investments in new immigrant residents, but the current philosophy of devolution in the US has thrust more of the service burdens to lower levels of government. That strategy seems inconsistent with the practical effects of the network society. In sum, the longstanding discrepancy between history/future of residents and history/future of place has been accentuated under the network society. Some communities and regions are feeling this more acutely, but all places serve as only temporary destinations for at least a portion of their residents. Planners can no longer afford to assume that the people found residing together in a place at one point in time have always been, and will always be, linked together in that place. Challenges of a Network Society Can Present Residents Plan a Future Place? Planners imprisoned in the present place face not only spatial but temporal confines. Just as planners find it difficult to address needs or reciprocal relations beyond the local borders, so are those planners trapped in short-view improvement activities. The “twin hazards of uncertainty and disagreement”
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about the future (Myers 2001b) drive planners to seek consensus around issues that are most tangible in the present. One approach to enlist citizen participation in planning the future has become very popular in North America. “Visioning” is a group exercise that encourages residents to imagine desired changes in their communities or regions. Although successful at mobilizing audience attention in some contexts, the technique has been faulted for several reasons, including the false hopes created, lack of follow through, and disconnection between citizen imaginations and professional projections of feasible outcomes (Helling 1998; Grant and Orser 2002). Given the divergence cited above between history of residents and history of place – the transiency of local residence – there is a deep problem of how today’s residents are to plan tomorrow’s place. Only if we assume the future residents will be the same people as today’s, or at least that they will hold similar goals and preferences as today’s, can this process be reasonably legitimate. The argument here is different from the standard rationale for a regional framework for establishing needs and sharing resources. That rationale is based on class disparities in the internal spatial structure of regions (Orfield 1997). The present argument complements that point of view but emphasizes the temporal discontinuities and inequities that surround decision making in the present place. Local citizen desires for the future often conflict with regional needs for the future. Two examples illustrate the pitfalls. One is the common situation of housing construction in a community. Is housing a desirable goal for people who are not yet residents? Residents of today pass judgment on the desirability of new housing, but the prospective future residents of that housing have no voice. Indeed, one of the greatest imbalances in the democratic planning process is that the future residents of housing have few advocates relative to the many current residents who already have housing and who see few benefits of new construction (and indeed only costs of added congestion, loss of open space, and possibly new fiscal burdens). Even though we know a certain amount of new housing will be needed for young people coming of age, it is often difficult to get existing local residents to acknowledge that truth and accept a share of the obligation to future generations. A second example is the planned reuse of a retired military airbase in Orange County, California, a formerly suburban area south of Los Angeles that is now home to three million residents. The future use of the El Toro airport has been hotly contested and local residents are sharply divided. (About 60 percent of elected officials and residents oppose building a new airport, while 40 percent support it.) Although air travel demand has grown rapidly along with the population, many residents long for a future that reflects the lowdensity suburban past. They have voted to turn the air field into a large park, even though regional air traffic has already surpassed the combined capacity limits of Los Angeles International Airport and several smaller air fields.
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Contradictory Demands for Control of a Localized Identity Even as global integration proceeds through digital communication and a homogenizing mass culture, the counterforce is a movement toward fragmentation of places and more individualized choices of identity. Whether based on inherited ethnicity or religion, on group memberships from the past, or on new lifestyle choices formed around leisure pursuits, members of Western societies are seeking distinction and identity as a defense against the anonymity of mass integration. The local place of residence forms a key component of this identity. Castells (1997: 60) highlights the importance of these “territorial identities.” People socialize and interact in their local environment and build social networks among their neighbors. Castells argues that a process of social mobilization must occur in order for “people to cluster in community organizations that generate a feeling of belonging and, ultimately, a communal cultural identity. People must engage in urban movements through which common interests are discovered and defended.” However, the same dynamic is also at work among the business community and local development interests, whose own social mobilization is founded on what Molotch (1976) calls nurturing of “the growth machine.” Members of social networks occupying the same space often find themselves in conflict, because their group projects have opposing objectives, whether it be the local development and business interests versus neighborhood and environmental activists, or whether it be the longtime residents of a community versus a network of newly arrived immigrant entrepreneurs (Fong 1994). Castells (1997: 66–7) explains how local citizen movements evolve and develop their strong attraction for local residents. When the world becomes too big to be controlled, social actors aim at shrinking it back to their size and reach. When networks dissolve time and space, people anchor themselves in places, and recall their historic memory . . . These defensive reactions become sources of meaning and identity by constructing new cultural codes out of historical materials . . . This form of identity building revolves around resistance identity. It leads to a new meaning of project identity. Of the three main sets of goals Castells posits for urban movements, two may be especially tied to contests over “the present place.” Both the affirmation of local cultural identity and the conquest of local political autonomy (and citizen participation) firmly wrap residents’ self-identity and newfound meaning within the borders of their place. This is well illustrated by the Orange County case above of the proposed airport. As Castells (1997: 61) notes, this may be seen as a “defensive identity” – defensive against the unpredictable and uncontrollable. This actually has been deliberately fostered by local and federal governments. Such urban movements
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have been integrated into the structure and practice of local government either directly or indirectly through a system of citizen participation and community development. In addition, NIMBYism has mutated beyond its origins in the environmental movement so that not only environmental threats but any unwanted local land use is now opposed. But Castells (1997: 62) draws a major distinction between the search for controlling space (a defensive reaction) and the search for controlling time. The latter is a local desire for the preservation of nature and of the planet for future generations, substituting a long-term approach for the “instant time approach of instrumentalist development.” Castells views the offensive timing approach with special favor because it opens up “the reconciliation between culture and nature, thus introducing a new, holistic philosophy of life.” In light of the present analysis, one wonders if it is wise to summarily judge residents as acting so benevolently with regard to the future. Surely it is good to introduce a long-term perspective where one is lacking. But whose future should be promoted? Within the present place, which social network’s preferred vision should be made paramount? And, when the interests of residents in the present place diverge from those in the region or beyond, how do we reconcile that disparity in the planning process? Locally Persuasive Planning Narratives In a series of essays and books, James Throgmorton has argued for a rhetorical approach to planning, one that emphasizes narrative structure, audience response, and the planning aims of persuasive storytelling about the future. This body of work is best summarized, especially with regard to themes of the network society, in Throgmorton (2003b: 6): [C]ities and their planning-related organizations can be thought of as nodes in a global-scale web, a web that consists of a highly fluid and constantly (albeit subtly) changing set of relationships . . . Plans, in turn, can be understood as persuasive stories about how particular nodes or links in the web should or will change in the future. To plan effectively, planners (and others) have to recognize that they are embedded in an intricate web of relationships, that they have to construct understandings of that web, and that they then have to persuade others to accept their constructions. But they also have to accept the fact that people tell diverse and often conflicting stories. That means planners must also find ways to set these alternate stories side by side, let them interact with one another, and thereby let them influence judgements about how particular nodes and links in the web should change, are likely to change, and why. Planners need to help local residents construct desired local futures using many tools available today (Myers and Kitsuse 2000). Our challenge is to help
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them find meaning and identity that is locally anchored while at the same time acknowledging responsibilities to a broader world. In this capacity, it is necessary to assert a locally based narrative that embraces local interests and integrates those with broader objectives. A host of themes suggest themselves as potential bases for helping local actors create future communities that both serve the world and meet the demands for locally based identity and meaning: the sustainable or green community; opportunity for the children’s generation; the wired community; the creative and socially responsible community; the fair share, balanced community; our legacy of the good community. These are narratives that planning scholars should help write, illustrate with the specifics of one community, and then make available for customization by local communities worldwide. Conclusion Local residents’ sense of meaning derived from their local place attachments is drawn from an imaginary base – in reality, the prison of the present place. However, each locality is not an island that is independent of its regional or the global economy, or independent of regional needs and of the transportation and communication systems that knit together the separate places. And the current residents are not synchronous with the historic or future residents. The residents are merely the current placeholders, and yet they seek to anchor and cohere their identities in a fixed place and permanent time. That is a powerful social force, even if the fixity and permanence is imaginary. Local residents are encouraged in this fiction by planners and elected officials. The artifice of “the present place” is aided and abetted by governmental structure of place-based voting and present time decision making. Local municipal plans are shown with sharp spatial boundaries and the residents are led through visioning exercises to dream what future conditions they hope to see within those borders. No matter that the bulk of residents may be only temporary members of the community, or that the fate of the locality is strongly controlled by forces from beyond the borders. Planners need to explore how we might plan localities in ways that acknowledge extralocal ties and that reach beyond the present to embrace broader futures (Figure 3.2). To escape the prison of the present place, planners need to identify a wider spatial framework, and they need to expressly address temporal development of the community that will dynamically forge the future. Following Throgmorton (2003b), planners should engage citizens in broad, future-oriented narratives that help residents see their communities more globally and imagine how their communities can become better because they are more regionally responsible and sustainable places. Planning for the future cannot be successful from the present place alone. Although this may be an essential starting place for every resident, the local
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Global
Network Society
National
Regional
Local
Expanded Domain of Local Planning
The Present Place
Present
Nearterm
Longterm
Figure 3.2 Breaking Spatial and Temporal Confines of the “Present Place” Prison
community cannot remain the fixed limit. Imprisoned in this perspective, planners, officials, and residents are prevented from seeing the dynamics of network flows that link localities across space and across time. The future can only be developed successfully if we take account of the lack of fixity and permanence that has been the fictional basis for local planning.
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Discourse Network: A Way of Understanding Policy Formation, Stability, and Change in the Networked Polity Nicholas Low
Introduction A feature of modernity is self-improvement, and “planning” is modern society’s official approach to social “self-improvement” – whether improvement of the city or improvement of the decision and implementation process. In this skeptical post-modern world, such a statement sounds a little ludicrous. Yet, if in the late 1960s some French philosophers could tire of the endless appeal to social self-improvement of the Stalinist parties of the left – giving birth to postmodernism – it may be that today, faced with a world tumbling again into global war and the insidious creep of global environmental degradation, it is time to rekindle the flame of social self-improvement. What has to be rejected, though, are two nineteenth-century beliefs about society and its processes of change: that a small coterie at the apex of a representative parliamentary government can garner the wisdom to steer society toward a better future; alternatively, that a simple set of rules held in place by such a government can automatically mobilize the collective wisdom to steer society toward a better future. On the one hand the hierarchy, on the other the market. Useful though these two kinds of institutions have been in many ways, they do not exhaust the description of modern society. A third institutional form is the network, which is increasingly seen as a necessary supplement to hierarchy and market. We have Manuel Castells, among many others, to thank for the observation of the “network society.” Albrechts (2003: 264) observes that planning “forms knowledge, produces discourse, constitutes a productive network and builds
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institutions that act as a catalyst for change” – and sometimes not only change, but also continuity. In this chapter I do not want to debate whether the “network society” is a new social form or simply an aspect, now thickened and intensified, of a social form that has always been present in modern societies, but has been ignored. I want to argue that planners, as political agents, need to pay attention to a particular aspect of the network society; the “networked polity.” I then want to propose that networks be viewed as institutionally stabilizing features of modern societies, and that stable networks of people are held together by stable networks of ideas: “discourse networks.” In order to make the concept more concrete I refer to conventional transport planning, which has proved extremely resistant to attempts to introduce a change of direction. The context is Australian but there are parallels with other wealthy developed countries. I conclude by reflecting on the normative consequences of such a perspective. The Networked Polity Castells and others have noted how the geography of urban centers and businesses is influenced by the speed and information-bearing capacity of the means of communication, whose basic material organization is a network of circuits and nodes. Castells’ point is that the spatial form of cities and regions today is constituted by the network: “the spatial articulation of dominant functions does take place in our societies in the network of interactions made possible by information technology devices” (Castells 1996: 412). He continues, “places do not disappear but their logic and their meaning become absorbed in the network” (ibid.). Places thus become, primarily, nodes or hubs. Such is the impact of advances in communications technology on the organization of spatial relationships. But what of the organization of political relationships? There is a substantial and growing body of work on the impact of networks on the polity – that is to say the structure of relationships linking civil society and the state. Thatcher (1998) provides a comprehensive survey so we need not cite directly the many scholars who have contributed to this perspective. It is possible to identify a political form that we might, with Ansell, term “the networked polity”: “a distinctive form of modern polity that is functionally and territorially disaggregated, but nevertheless linked together through a web of interorganizational and intergovernmental relationships” (Ansell 2000: 303). Ansell immediately qualifies this statement by saying that “it is doubtful that such a polity does or could exist in a pure or extreme form” (ibid.). However, two different observations of modern politics suggest that the network is playing an increasing role in political structures. The first is the observation that networks importantly help government function in circumstances of increasing complexity. The second is that political issues increasingly transcend both established spatial boundaries and functional bureaucratic divisions – environmental
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problems being a striking case in point. Eckersley (2004: 111), for instance, argues that those affected by environmental risks have a right to be represented in the processes of decision making that impose such risks. Environmental risks typically extend across territorial, temporal, and even species boundaries. She explores the moral and prudential ramifications of this “ambit claim” for ecological democracy. We will not go further down that track but rather concentrate on the implications of networks for systems of governance with particular emphasis on networks of persons and concepts. To crystallize the definition of the networked polity it may be helpful to contrast the network with the two other key political structures of modern societies: the market and the hierarchy. The social relations of the market center on the contract. Exchange takes place according to a matrix of legally binding promises among formal equals. The hierarchy organizes social relations through structures of command, obedience, and defined function – actors carry out designated functions in exchange for a variety of positionally distinctive rewards. The social relations of the network combine a sense of equality among the participants with a sense of mutual obligation that is not, however, normally legally binding. Actors in a network do not command and obey. Nor do they buy and sell. But they do exchange, and what they exchange is information, political support, and trust. Ansell enlarges on the hierarchy–market–network distinction. The hierarchy, he says, is characterized by a vertical form of organization with the strategic “thinking” part at the top, while operatives at the bottom of the chain of command suffer from “structured ignorance” limited to narrowly specified routine tasks. Networks, within and between bureaucratic hierarchies, can operate both horizontally and vertically, enriching communication and diffusing the thinking capacity of the organization. Their participants work by “mutual adjustment” rather than command (Lindblom 1959). The “organic organization” (Burns and Stalker 1994) actively encourages lower level units to communicate with higher level units in “many-to-many communication.” Front line operatives are granted more discretion, and there is increased emphasis on projects on which multifunctional teams work, rather than programs in which staff are dedicated to routine tasks (Ansell 2000: 305–6). Markets, according to Ansell, are characterized by “discrete” exchanges in which the goods or values to be exchanged are carefully measured. The parties to the exchange are “well defined” and “act authoritatively on the agreed terms at a pre-specified time and over a narrow time horizon” (Ansell 2000: 308). Markets are also “impersonal” and the parties’ knowledge of one another is narrow and limited. It is surprising that Ansell seems to miss what is central to markets, namely the legally binding contract between parties to any exchange, though it is implied in what he says. Networks, by contrast, have “thick rather than thin” communication and the “goods” exchanged are characterized by unclear or ambiguous values. The absence, normally, of contractual exchange must mean that mutual trust plays a much more significant role in networks than markets, though it is far from lacking in the former.
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Paraphrasing Ansell then (2000: 311), the networked polity is a structure of governance in which both state and societal organization are vertically and horizontally disaggregated (as in pluralism) but linked together by cooperative exchange (as in corporatism).1 Knowledge and initiative are decentralized and widely distributed. Horizontal relationships are at least as important as vertical relationships and, accordingly, communication is many-to-many rather than many-to-one (the upward chain of accountability). Exchange is diffuse and social, rather than discrete and impersonal. The logic of governance emphasizes the bringing together of unique configurations of actors around specific projects oriented toward integrative solutions rather than dedicated programs. Ansell’s is, on the whole, a positive and even optimistic account of the direction of modern European politics. The networked polity defeats such negative-sounding phenomena as “structured ignorance,” “many layers of middle management,” “command and control,” “mechanistic organization” (Ansell 2000: 306), a “program-oriented mentality,” “compartmentalization of information,” and “turf boundaries” (p. 310). It embodies positive sounding features such as: “many-to-many” relationships, a “high degree of connectivity,” “heterarchical organization,” “project teams,” “shared common commitments” (pp. 308–9) and “cooperative exchange” (p. 311). Nevertheless, the author in the final paragraph raises three crucial questions which he does not attempt to answer: Who benefits? Is it effective? Is it democratic? If the networked polity is symptomatic of the network society and “the space of flows,” then Castells’ answer to “who benefits?” would probably be, “the techno-managerial elite” (Castells 1996: 415–16). In answer to the last two questions, Habermas’ critique provides some useful insights. He finds a profound contradiction between democracy read as the responsiveness of governments to the diverse needs and demands of their constituents (the state “knowing itself ”) and “effectiveness,” meaning the capacity of the state to act decisively in the interests of those constituents (the state’s “steering” capacity). However, he contends that to be democratic, a society must be able both to “know itself ” and “steer itself ” (Habermas 1996). Democracy is therefore beset with antinomy. To know itself, a society must understand its challenges and the options available, and employ rational, inclusive, and empowering arguments to define and inquire into societal problems. To steer itself, a society must have the capacity to take action to deal with the challenges it faces in knowing itself. Habermas considers “mediatization” the central impediment to democratic knowing and steering. Despite the apparent existence of constant debate, government increasingly relies on steering mechanisms based on the logics of instrumental reason, rather than on conscious collective deliberation (Habermas 1984: 187, 1996: 35). Instrumental reasoning leads to choices based upon achieving success in a given sphere. In a market society money and law instrumentally coordinate action such that individuals act for economy or profit – the medium’s success criteria. The medium of money tends to “steer” society via “markets,” as many individuals act according to the same logic.
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A similar analysis can be applied to hierarchy as a structural form, with professionalism and bureaucracy working as the steering media (Habermas 1984: 65, 214). Professional training acts with hierarchy to create mediatized responses to policy needs. The effect of mediatization can be seen in the resistance to change of transport infrastructure and housing policy. Investment continues to be poured into transport infrastructure when open debate might suggest alternative priorities; market principles appear to encourage the continuing construction of highly unsustainable housing estates and office buildings when an inclusive debate might suggest different principles based around, for example, sustainability and zero greenhouse emissions, principles that are already well understood and have been implemented in isolated instances. Accordingly, the various media (law, bureaucracy, professionalism, markets) represent one pole of a dilemma: instrumental steering in the interest of decisive action versus the deliberative formation of norms. In liberal democracies media both facilitate democracy by making it effective, but also restrict it by preventing discursive norm development and rational dialogue. It seems likely that networking may facilitate effectiveness in an instrumental sense, that is, may help actors in the network achieve their goals. But in focusing on the responsiveness of the system to the diversity of actors within it, it is important not to neglect the wider responsiveness of the system to actors beyond it, populations whom democracy is meant to serve. The advantage of a hierarchy for democracy is that the trail of accountability leads with reasonable transparency to an elected official. The danger with a networked polity is that the trail becomes utterly confused (see Hart et al.: 1996). The danger is that the network could become, indeed has already become, yet another steering medium with its own internal logic defeating public, discursive, normative planning. Only passing attention is given by Ansell to another aspect of network governance: the effect of discursive structures in coordinating network activity. Ansell (2000: 308) notes that the parties to a network “share common normative commitments.” In fact, these normative commitments are the filaments that link the nodes of a network together. Recent work in institutional analysis by North and his colleagues has placed considerable emphasis on “shared mental models.” Denzau and North (1994: 4) divide the institutional field into two parts: “Mental models are the internal representations that individual cognitive systems create to interpret the environment; the institutions are the external (to the mind) mechanisms individuals create to structure and order the environment” (emphasis added). These mental models are resilient. Denzau and Grossman (1993) and Denzau and North (1994: 22–6) discuss the process of discursive change. A critically important, prior distinction they make is between change within the “model space” (learning) and change of the model space or “representational redescription.” What then do they mean by “model space?” It seems that they mean something like (but not exactly like) the notion of “paradigm” in the history of science identified by Kuhn (1970). The dimensions of the “model space” are shaped by one or more key
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assumptions that generally do not change as learning from new observational data occurs. These assumptions define the parameters of a discourse network. It could even be argued that discourse is what forms a network, allowing ideas to travel, rather than the network shaping discourse. It is the discursive factor in networks, I want to propose, that makes them such formidable and impenetrable barriers to paradigm change. Equally, perhaps, exposing the discursive filaments to the public gaze and public debate may be a way of introducing some public selfreflection and eventually fundamental change, when it is needed, in policy settings. Discourse Networks and Urban Transport in Australia Within the policy network literature, different kinds of analysis point to the structuring connection between groups of ideas and groups of people (Rhodes and Marsh 1992; Smith 1993). The concept of “policy community” emphasizes the social structure of mutual influence with implicit rules of inclusion and exclusion (Laumann and Knoke 1987). At international level, members of an “epistemic community” may come from different scientific disciplines but share a common body of knowledge which they interpret in a similar way with similar policy implications (Haas 1992; Toke 1999). The work of Sabatier and his colleagues locates shared core beliefs centrally in the coordination of policy (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). Hajer focuses upon the discourses that influence conceptions (Hajer 1995: 42–72). These discourses are comprised of particular “storylines” that tell what the problem is and what to do about it (Davies and Harré 1990). Storylines connect different core belief systems with policy solutions. All these analytical systems illuminate the connection between social interaction and the beliefs of policy actors within and among more formally structured organizations. Knowledge about how to make urban transport sustainable is reasonably widespread in Australia. Planners and politicians in Sydney, Melbourne, and Perth have even expressed serious commitment to the idea. What is interesting now is what is blocking its implementation. For instance, the metropolitan plan for Melbourne – Melbourne 2030 – unveiled in early 2003 after much internal turbulence, presented an uncompromising vision of Melbourne as a compact city, complete with brownfield development, transit villages, and commitment to public transport, walking, and cycling (State of Victoria 2002). Yet the government (of the State of Victoria) is going ahead with the construction of an outer ring motorway costing AU$2.5 billion or more (about £1.02 billion, 1.46 billion euros) which will displace funds from public transport and encourage a car-dependent “edge city.” This infrastructure policy is guaranteed to increase outward-sprawling pressures which, in the longer run, governments will find hard to resist. A theory is needed not only of what promotes social transformation but also of what resists it.
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No doubt resistance to social change is overdetermined. It is not difficult to pick the usual suspects: the “road lobby,” the oil and automobile companies, the engineering profession, the weakness of the public transport agencies, the propaganda of the road service agencies (e.g., the Royal Automobile Club of Victoria), all constantly reinforced by the shock jocks of talkback radio, as well as cowardly or blinkered politicians responding to what they perceive to be public demand (see Mees 2000). But apportioning blame does not serve as an explanation. The idea of a conspiracy among these various actors is intuitively unappealing, as is the notion that any one of them gets what it wants by simply going to the government of the day and lobbying for it. Positions have to be argued, reasons given. It is not as though counterarguments or oppositional lobbies do not exist. The rise of the Green Party throughout Australia in recent years (commanding up to eight percent of the vote nationally and much more in some places) is evidence of the considerable dissatisfaction of a substantial proportion of the electorate with the major parties. The uptake of “sustainability” rhetoric by governments shows the impact of the “green lobby” as well as simple common sense on the part of the public. Whether the substance of sustainability will follow is still very much in question. There is a wealth of public documentation containing reasoning for transport and land use policy. This not only sets the terms of public debate, but it also defines the parameters of what is debatable. It contains a range of “storylines,” and implicitly filters acceptable from unacceptable stakeholders. As Maarten Hajer discovered in relation to the acid rain debate in Europe, storylines cover metaphors, analogies, historical references, clichés, and appeals to collective fears or senses of guilt. Because storylines are what hold discourse together, they are “prime vehicles of change” (Hajer 1995: 63). Storylines both legitimate an actor’s political stance, and position other actors – e.g., as helpful and politically relevant or the reverse. As well as excluding actors from influence, storylines facilitate coalitions. However, while discourse is important, it does not explain the influence of budgetary and socio-organizational factors: the division of responsibility for transport infrastructure funding in a federal system (resource dependency), the cohesion of infrastructure planning agencies (policy community), and the power position of their personnel in the public service (authority). These are the “external” structures mentioned by Denzau and North (1994). Formal institutional structures limit what action can occur and what storylines are influential. Moreover, the concept of “storyline” is insufficient to capture all aspects of discourse. First, in environmental planning, especially where it impinges on infrastructure projects, formal logics play a key role in policy making, especially environmental impact statements which contain closely argued logical structures. Although they may make reference to storylines, they need to be treated differently from government policy documents and other documentary sources. The logic needs to be carefully unpacked and the black box of a statistical model’s assumptions opened up. Second, arguments often need to be backed by evidence of an external reality, so discourse is not always mere
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rhetoric. Sometimes the evidence can be tested in courts or through quasijudicial processes. Storylines coordinate action through what Hajer calls “discourse coalitions.” These are “the ensemble of (1) a set of storylines; (2) the actors who utter those storylines; and (3) the practices in which this discursive activity is based” (Hajer 1995: 65). Hajer distinguishes between discourse coalitions and “traditional political coalitions or alliances” in that storylines, not interests, form the basis of coalition (Hajer 1995: 66). Our view is that this is not the key point. Interests are always present. More importantly, coalitions are facilitated through storylines that provide common, largely tacit understandings for groups of actors, whether they have any actual alliance or not. These understandings powerfully shape the tacit attitudes of one group to another. Vigar (2002) in his analysis of transport politics in the UK showed how the “paradigm” of “predict and provide” gradually shifted toward “predict and prevent” or a “new realism” (Owens 1995; Goodwin 1996). We do not think that “predict and provide” constitutes a “paradigm” but, rather, that is one among a number of storylines supporting a paradigm. In fact, a close reading of Vigar’s analysis reveals the existence of a number of related storylines (e.g., “local economic competitiveness,” “balanced approach,” “heroic engineering”) as also can be found in the work of Mazza and Rydin (1997) comparing traffic policy in UK and Italian cities. Gleeson et al. (2003) found four main barriers to sustainable transport in Australia: a balance of funding at federal level strongly favoring roads, institutional divisions between road and public transport agencies at state level, discourses that excluded consideration of alternatives, and weak political leadership to change the pattern of transport planning. In recent research we found ten varying storylines coordinating action among the engineering, town planning, and economics professions, with central and local government and road service agencies (Low et al. 2003). Our research so far shows that what we have to deal with is a loosely connected, though not necessarily logically coherent, set of storylines (and sometimes arguments) appealing to different groups of actors. Though discourse creates the potential for coalition, actual communicative linkage among actors is not necessary for action to be discursively coordinated. Linking the research of Hajer with that of Latour (1987) and Callon (1987), we use the term “discourse network” to describe the specific set of storylines and arguments that coordinate action in a particular policy domain (findings are discussed in Low and Gleeson 2001, and Low et al. 2003). The “knots” in the network are the related discursive threads of argument, the “nodes” (or “arenas,” (Albrechts 2003: 257)) are institutional structures binding people together, often in particular places, for telephonic or face-to-face communication (Latour 1987: 180, 232). While many planning events take place over a short time, the discourse network is a language domain created through continual persuasive activity over a period of many years. We believe that discourse networks have the primary function of, so to speak, pointing people in the same direction, in the way a magnetic field does to iron filings. In doing so they are able to overcome sector
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logics. These people may have widely diverse opinions and cultures, and the diversity of storylines reflects the diversity of professional, political, and bureaucratic contexts from which they come. For instance, in the transport domain, the well known “predict and provide” storyline (a typical sector logic) appeals to engineers who like the scientific appearance of statistical modeling. A different kind of engineering storyline, “technical fix,” appeals to those who like technical innovation: there is no need to worry about greenhouse emissions resulting from growth in road vehicles because vehicles will soon be powered by hydrogen-based fuel cells. The storyline that excessive demand for road space can be managed by congestion pricing appeals to economists – therefore, again, there is no need to worry that investment in roads will induce additional traffic and produce terminal gridlock. In Australia, though undoubtedly less in Europe, planners have been aligned with road-building policy by the storyline that low-density cities cannot be served effectively by public transport. Politicians are particularly attracted by the storyline that building roads will bring economic growth. All of these stories point to one solution: build more and better roads. All have been challenged – singly. We argue that the whole discursive network needs to be seen for what it is: the discursive foundation of a single policy project. Once a discourse network is well established, there is no need for active coalitions or conspiracies. The web of storylines is enough to ensure that influential persons think and speak in harmony when it comes to discussion of what is, in reality, an extremely controversial policy. Consider the latest war on Iraq. The US president, and the British, Spanish, Danish, and Australian prime ministers (among others), formed a coalition, but articulated a variety of different storylines – shifting emphasis from moment to moment and audience to audience. In opposition, the global peace network was able to mobilize through the Internet a variety of contrary storylines to bring together temporarily a huge variety of oppositional elements articulating in one voice the simple message, “No War.” In both cases the immediate purpose was rapid coordinated action in response to a perceived crisis situation. But whether the coalitions (of the willing and the unwilling) will endure will depend to some degree on how well the discourse networks they constructed can be sustained. The discourse network should be seen as a key element in the networked polity. People are connected to one another by communication media. The networked polity is one in which nodes form around projects coordinating people from different places, organizations, and organizational cultures. To people, interests, and communication technology, therefore, should be added the power of discourse. Institutional Change in the Networked Polity Renewed interest in institutions took hold in political science during the 1980s and 1990s (Hall and Taylor 1996). This “new institutionalism” pays particular
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attention to informal aspects of institutional life, networks of actors, and their cultural norms subsisting within and between formal hierarchies (Torfing 2001: 281) or the “networked polity” (Ansell 2000). The foregoing discussion of “mediatization” raised the question of how societal steering, essentially planning, should be conducted. Questions of particular importance from the planning point of view are how institutions change in the networked polity, and whether (and how) such change can be guided. The new institutionalists are interested in history, in questions such as: how did we arrive here? Denzau, Grossman, and North, for instance, consider that discursive change tends to be marked by “punctuated equilibrium.” The process takes the form of long periods of slow, gradual institutional evolution punctuated by relatively short periods of dramatic change, which we can presume to be periods of “representational redescription” (Denzau and North 1994: 23). During the latter, equilibrium is upset, and a change of the “model space” occurs. The process of punctuated equilibrium is not quite the same as that of “paradigm shift” in Kuhn’s analysis because of the relative precision of terms used in science compared with the interpretive flexibility of meaning characteristic of terms used in political speech and common parlance. Instead, in the field of governance new meanings in one field of application gradually permeate other fields through analogy or metaphor. As this begins to happen, “ideological purists, such as religious fundamentalists, try to resist any change, and their resistance may generate a crisis” (Denzau and North 1994: 25). In Torfing’s perspective, the institutional path becomes dislocated not only by the absorption of new interpretive schemes (as above) but also by the impact of exogenous events. The history of environmentalism in the late twentieth century provides many examples of both: exogenous shocks from Minamata disease, Love Canal, and Bhopal through the “ozone hole” to “global warming”; new interpretive schemes from the “silent spring” and “limits to growth” to Factor 4, Agenda 21, “sustainable development,” and the “triple bottom line.” The oil price has delivered in the past acute external shocks and may be about to deliver some more. This perspective of institutional change pertinent to the networked polity raises new questions about how public policy ought to be shaped. It directs attention to an uncomfortable feature of modern politics, namely that policy is not entirely, and sometimes very little, shaped at will by an elected superior tier of politicians who “make policy.” There is institutional continuity stemming from the cultures and organizations of political structures spanning between state and civil society. Sometimes this continuity is desirable, sometimes it needs to be shifted. But when? Who is to decide, and how? When considering the difficulty that some planners and advocates have encountered in bringing about change in the obdurate field of transport policy in Australia, let us not fall into the assumption that institutional change is always desirable. Paul Pierson’s work, after all, reflects upon the great difficulty of dismantling the welfare state (Pierson 1994). If Pierson is to be believed, European nations have “path dependence” to thank for not being made into clones of the US, thus retaining major elements of their public welfare services.
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The fact that Australian cities still have substantial and extensive rail-based public transport systems is also probably due in no small part to path dependence. Urban planning, and certainly environmental planning, operates over time horizons much longer than those of markets or politics in a representative democracy. It could even be said that institutional and policy continuity is a condition of effective environmental planning. Under what circumstances and when is institutional change, in the sense of “representational redescription,” desirable? The answer at first appears to depend on where one stands politically. If that is indeed the answer, then we live in a relativistic moral universe in which no universal values can be discerned. Whether values are judged to be “good” or “bad” just depends on what interests one represents or from what group one derives one’s identity. The arguments of some philosophers (Derrida, Rorty, Bauman) and some planning theorists (from Rittel and Webber to Flyvbjerg) tend strongly in this direction. If that is the case, then the best planners can do is to leave the matter to be decided by whatever political system happens to prevail in a particular place and time – any political system, because to decide on whether political systems are better or worse, values have to be employed, such as justice, that are meaningless unless in some sense universal. Most environmental planners, we would imagine, do not want to be part of such a relativistic moral universe, and, in any case, there are equally powerful and cogent arguments against pure relativism (e.g., Bhaskar 1993). If those who argue that the stability of the global climate is being destroyed by carbon emissions are correct, not many people are likely to argue that institutional change to correct the global economy is unnecessary. Yet we cannot leave the answer to be determined by prior moral norms, not because we believe in a relativistic moral universe but because one of the universal values we hold true is the essential indeterminacy of democratic politics. That leaves open the question of the key actors and their legitimacy. Even if we assume that strategies to influence path dislocation may be designed by benign actors with the public interest at heart, if benign actors can learn how to change embedded institutions, then so can malign ones. If there is to be democracy, the question of when deliberate institutional change of path is to occur should be left in the hands of an informed public, and the outcome of the decision process cannot be determined in advance. There are, however, a number of reasonable qualifications that could be added. Bhaskar’s argument is that there exists a reality out there “beyond the text” even though we interpret it through our own mental maps. Therefore, we need to find the most effective ways of illuminating that reality. Since there will always be different interpretations of the truth, the best way is to create a forum where competing models of reality can be laid out (together with the supporting evidence), for some kind of debate to take place, and for judgment to be made by . . . well, whom? The only answer one can give to this, if one still believes in democracy, is “a well informed public.” Let us remember the insistence of John Stuart Mill on the vital importance of education for democracy – an ignorant and bigoted public will make ignorant and bigoted decisions. “Social learning,”
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in which the participants “enter a public dialogue with a preparedness to have their preferences changed through reasoned argument,” becomes a crucial aspect of deliberation (Eckersley 2004: 117). If there is to be deliberate, as opposed to accidental change of path (brought about by exogenous shocks), then the only just way of doing it is to let the public, in full possession of the facts, decide, in something like an “environmental review” of the internal and external aspects of key institutions (following the distinction of Denzau and North 1994). In this respect, some attention might be given to Fishkin’s ideas about deliberative polls and citizens’ juries to strengthen democracy (see Fishkin 1992, 1995). This “review” would always be a complex, time-consuming, and financially expensive process that could not occur very often. Nor should it, in the interests of continuity. Perhaps such a review could be conducted on a 15- to 20-year cycle. There are, of course, precedents for such periodic reviews in the field of urban planning. There are also many kinds of practical problems of fairness and representation to be resolved about this process, as well as lessons from past failures. If planners are to be proactive policy advocates and networkers employing many kinds of strategies in support of their goals, should the same planners also have charge of the design and management of an inclusive deliberative process such as a periodic environmental review? Such questions cannot be pursued further here. What should be understood, though, is that in the networked polity we can no longer depend so heavily for reasoned institutional change on the model of topdown steering by elected politicians, with the parliament or council chamber as the only forum for deliberation. Conclusion This essay has suggested that the network society may increasingly be governed by a networked polity. It was then proposed, with some illustration from the transport policy field, that the network in question is not just one of people but also of ideas. This discursive network is path dependent and changes only slowly in ways we are only now beginning to understand. If we can no longer rely on hierarchy or markets to deliver democracy, then the question of how democracy is to be inscribed in the real polity needs to be revived. This essay ends on a somewhat inconclusive note, but it is as well to signal that democracy is a far from completed project, while also looking forward to a more deliberative form of democracy fitted to the reality of a network society. Note 1
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Networks may augment and link hierarchies. Viewed as a political structure, the specific network characteristic, however, is that the nodes are not integrated within a structure of command. This point does not appear in Castells’ analysis where networks are understood primarily in terms of channels of information from node to node, irrespective of the formal power relationship among nodes.
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COMMENTARY
Networks and Planning Thought Judith E. Innes
Networks may well turn out to be the defining concept of the emerging era. While networks have always existed, globalization, information technology, and the accompanying rapidity of change and increasing complexity of our social and political systems have greatly increased the importance of networks and our need to understand and work with them. Fortunately there are major literatures on networks dating back into the 1960s for scholars and practitioners to draw on, as well as literatures emerging today with the revival of interest in networks. Understanding what this work has to offer will be critical to effective urban planning in the century to come. It offers a rich set of ideas and empirical findings that can and should be integrated into planning thought and practice. A good starting place for those new to the topic is a review article (Berry et al. 2004) for public managers. This outlines three intellectual traditions in network thinking that are as relevant to planning as to public management. In the sociological tradition the authors identify three distinct schools of thought, each with potential for enriching different aspects of planning thought. Sociometry diagrams relationship networks among individuals and identifies patterns of interaction, cliques, and small-group dynamics. It also has developed methods to look at the quality and intensity of interactions. The Manchester anthropologists believe in focusing both on structures of relationships and on the contents conveyed in these. They look at the roles of people in these networks and pay attention to embedded context and institutionalized expectations. They have developed measures of the quality of dyadic relations such as reciprocity, intensity, and durability and measures of macro network features such as density, reachability, or diffusion of information. This group includes the classic work of Claude Fischer (Fischer et al. 1977), who looked at place-based social networks and how they are linked to attachment to place and to the creation of authentic community. The Harvard
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structuralists developed the mathematics of networks and were able to develop models to see the larger patterns of network dynamics. In the political science tradition the authors also identify three streams of thought. The first links policy change, agenda-setting, innovation, and diffusion to networks. Another looks at agenda-setting through the lens of community power, interest groups, and issue networks of policy insiders. This includes the work on advocacy coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). A third stream of thought is linked to Ostrom’s institutional rational analysis and her research on collaborative management of common pool resources (Ostrom 1990). Public administration scholars tend to focus on network management as they rely increasingly on decentralized forms of action where different groups are tasked with implementing aspects of public programs. They have written on intergovernmental management, typologies of networks based on field studies, the different skills needed for managers in networks as opposed to hierarchies (Gage and Mandell 1990), and the impacts of networks on policy outputs and democratic values (Provan and Milward 1995). Another line of research focuses on network performance and outcomes, as befits a field which tries to use networks instrumentally (Provan and Milward 1995). Recent literature is exploding, emerging in part from the information technology field, which addresses the workings of complex, far-flung networks. This looks for example at what is efficient and effective in terms of pathways and connectedness. The business literature explores such topics as how effective business strategy can involve a large organization working with an array of smaller and more nimble organizations. This kind of networked group can stay ahead of the rapid changes in society and respond quickly to external events and changes in technology and opportunities (Saxenian 1994). I have laid out this brief summary in the hope that it will trigger ideas in the readers about intellectual traditions they can draw on to help build planning thought for the network society. As a field we have barely tapped the potential of network thinking and certainly have not tightly linked our work with these highly pertinent bodies of research and theory. All three of the disciplinary traditions speak to key aspects of what we do in planning. The sociological tradition offers rich opportunities for new work on place-based networks and how they are changing and for linking them to non placebased networks. It can help us see the social and spatial consequences. Sociometry can help us with understanding the small-group work that constitutes much of planning’s basic activity. This work allows opportunities for rigorous quantitative analysis and identification of network patterns that we cannot see without this kind of study. The political/policy science tradition offers much to those who think about and try to develop more effective planning practice and theory to aid that practice. The concepts and empirical research on how policy networks operate can help us to build theory and gain insights into what network planning and governance might look like. The public administration tradition can help us to work instrumentally with networks to accomplish goals. The information technology literature helps us to see large and complex network
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patterns that offer models and empirical evidence about which patterns produce which results. The business literature provides a model for how public agencies, jurisdictions and nonprofits can cooperate for greater productivity and faster response time to crises and urgent needs. It is my view that ultimately understanding the role of networks in contemporary society and learning how best to build and take advantage of their power in planning will depend on the use of complexity thinking. In this view our complex social/political system is in the best case a complex adaptive system – that is, one that operates on the basis of distributed intelligence, with all its actors able to work in their own local arenas with some shared heuristics, but also able to make their own self-interested decisions as they face their immediate environment. This involves considerable dialogue, and depends on a system that is not hierarchical and regulatory, but rather incentive-based. It involves three features, diversity of players, interaction among them and selection mechanisms that allow individual actors to use feedback from the environment so they can adapt their actions in a timely way (Axelrod and Cohen 1999). If these conditions can be met, complexity theory suggests that both urban systems and planning systems can be productively responsive to change and move to higher levels of performance. The chapters in this section each have something different to say about networks and cities or networks and planning, as each looks at the idea from a different angle. Low’s focus is on networks in governance – on networks as part of the polity. In particular he looks at discourse networks, which, he says, are a key element of a networked polity. He illustrates this with the example of urban transport in Australia and adds to our understanding of how storylines and language help to empower certain networks and frame policy debates. Low also examines how discursive change, along with exogenous events, play a part in institutional change. He notes that hierarchy and markets cannot be relied on to deliver democracy, but that a more deliberative democracy can fit better to the reality of a network society. His argument is a valuable one in linking discourse, deliberation, and institutional change through the concept of networks. Verma and Shin take as their starting place Castells’ concept of the network society and of networks, which they describe as a globally interconnected and interdependent “behemoth” of firms, groups, territories, and populations. They explore the potential theoretical relationship of the “network society” to Habermas’ views of communicative rationality. They conclude quite correctly, I believe, that the communicative action paradigm is broad enough to accommodate the new reality. Indeed, my own work has linked networks particularly to collaborative planning, arguing that collaboration builds networks and helps them to work effectively in a variety of ways (Booher and Innes 2002). Beauregard is interested in the literary and linguistic dimension of the network idea, exploring the metaphor of the “network city.” He compares along the way some of the other adjectives and metaphors that have been used to
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describe the city, making the case that these descriptors help the scholar and planner to intellectually manage the complexity of the city. In his view the network metaphor is a particularly powerful one in that it opens into a variety of other ideas, gives form to the city’s complex and changing organization, and helps us see it in new ways. The networks are potentially self-organized, voluntary, interest-based, collaborative, adaptive, and innovative. Beauregard’s attention to metaphor is valuable for planning thinkers. Too often we ignore the importance of language and figures of speech for shaping our ideas. His argument that the network concept can lead us in more interesting directions than some other city descriptions gives us food for thought. Myers identifies the importance of networks, especially at the place-based local level and notes how networks are now making linkages across places. He is interested in how networks can help with thinking about and doing planning for the future – in how networks might stretch into at least the near-term future to help people to go beyond thinking solely about the present place. His chapter reminds us that planning is, indeed, about the future and that we need to explore ways that the network idea can help us advance planning’s fundamental purposes. To move forward on integrating the ideas and potential of networks into planning thought and practice, as a community of scholars, we need first to familiarize ourselves with the ideas and accomplishments of scholars in other fields who have made important advances in the understanding and analysis of networks in many settings. Second, we need to design and implement systematic empirical research (both quantitative and qualitative) to document the networks that exist in urban settings and planning processes today. We know very little about these though we talk about them a lot. This research should look at the linkages between actors as well as at the content of what flows through the network. If it is information, what kind? If it is heuristics or shared meanings, how do these come about? If it is power, how does the power play out and who benefits? We need to gather adequate data to identify patterns in networks and assess what kinds of patterns are productive and how they came into being. We should also look at how networks evolve over time and at what kinds of results emerge from networks. We need to find ways to identify the kinds of networks we want to encourage and the kinds we should change or even destroy (such as power elite networks, or criminal networks). Professionals in policy fields will never be able to “use” networks in an instrumental way as they might a planning tool like zoning, because these are evolving, typically not bounded, and adapt constantly. We are all embedded in networks and they both constrain us and offer opportunities. We need to “go with the flow” while trying to improve that flow to achieve some of the outcomes that can at best emerge from networks. These include social cohesion, linkages of otherwise excluded groups into the opportunity system of the larger society, mobilization that requires many players acting on their own, integration of various forms of knowledge into action and policy, and the building of
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deliberative democracy and a civil society which can better participate in public decisions. As we learn more about how different network patterns produce different results, we can do things such as create more densely linked networks through collaborative processes or encourage clusters of networked players in particular places or among particular unorganized interests. We can have an impact on the information and ideas that flow through networks, find ways to reward those who participate, and troubleshoot when necessary networks start to disintegrate.
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PART II
Organization of Space and Time
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Impact of Physical Networks
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CHAPTER FIVE
Cities and Transport: Exploring the Need for New Planning Approaches Luca Bertolini
Which Transport for which Cities? The major cities of Western Europe and North America changed dramatically in the last half of the twentieth century. The vast flows of people, capital, energy, goods, and information through ever expanding networks impressed themselves on – without eradicating – the older spatial patterns of the pre-war metropolis. The tasks of adapting old forms to new possibilities (and vice versa) demand a shift in the way that professional planners, and most importantly infrastructure specialists, describe their objectives and actions. Rather than focus just on mobility and communication demands, the deliberative process of the “network society” appropriately focuses on the complex interaction between the forms of movement and those of land use, environmental quality, and sustainability; on balancing the transformative claims of the extended networks and the conservative claims of local political jurisdictions and neighborhoods. In recent years, I have tried to shape these conversations swirling around (an extended) transportation planning by embedding them in a normative conception of “urbanity”.1 For this purpose, I distinguish four dimensions of the concept: 1
specialization and interchange in the economic sphere;
2
diversity and freedom of choice in the socio-cultural sphere;
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civic exhibition, or the public realm;
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connectivity, in addition to the traditional emphasis on proximity and territorial continuity.
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In the first part of this chapter, I illustrate the practical implications of these four dimensions of urbanity for an extended transportation planning by pointing to several projects and controversies in Amsterdam.2 In the second part, I explore the related issue of how to actually bring about change. Specialization and Interchange The first dimension of urbanity refers to the ongoing division of labor, particularly developed in cities, where opportunities to network with closely related, specialized activities and various producers, and to interact directly with consumers, abound. An innovative urban climate emerges from the combination between this extensive division of labor and the multiple physical and institutional marketplaces (see, among others, Storper (1997), Porter (1998), Simmie and Kirby (1998) on the territorial and cultural dimension of the urban economy). Besides this innovative cultural climate, the development of specialized economic activities requires an array of attractive conditions for location. Accessibility becomes increasingly important in this respect. In Amsterdam (Figure 5.1), several new “nodes” emerged next to the historic core (around the Central Station – CS), still the node best connected by public transport. The new nodes typically combine excellent public and private transport accessibility. The main node, the Schiphol airport, integrates in a unique way intercontinental air links and direct connections to regional and national motorways and railway networks. The airport area has concentrated within it a rich range of activities requiring spaces for offices, conferences, hotels, retail, and logistics; office space rents rank the highest in the Netherlands and the employment base – roughly 50,000 – is equivalent to the city center’s employment. Besides the airport area, other transportation interchanges have specialized functionally, such as Amstel and, particularly, Zuid stations that have clustered large office complexes in financial and business sectors. The areas around Sloterdijk and Bijlmer stations accommodate a mix of warehouses and office spaces (some of these offices are part of a dynamic ICT sector). The firms there benefit more, not only from space availability but also from better access to the regional labor market and to the metropolitan facilities, than do firms in the city center, dependent on public transportation, and firms in the suburbs, dependent on private transportation. On the contrary, many specialized, small-scale professional services remained located in the densely built historic center, a pedestrian and cycling area, which proved to be the ideal setting for Internet-based and multi-media businesses. Services have clustered functionally: hospitals along the western and southern sections of the motorway ring; the congress and exhibition center, the insurance exchange, the district tribunal, and the Free University around Zuid station; a regional retail and leisure complex at Bijlmer station. In the old city, more small-scale shopping, entertainment and cultural activities continue to thrive. These patterns of functional specialization have been reinforced, after
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Built-up areas Airport Seaport Railway Motorway Railway station
Zaanstad
Central Station
Haarlem Sloterdijk
Almere
Lelylaan
Amstel Zuid
Schiphol Airport
Bijlmer
Hoofddorp
0
5 Kilometers
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Hilversum
Figure 5.1 Amsterdam, the Metropolitan Area, with Main Transport Infrastructure and (Sub)Centers
an unfortunate attempt to develop downtown offices there between 1980 and 1990, through newly opened (or in the course of being opened) cultural and leisure facilities along the waterfront, east and west of the Central Station. All in all, two basic types of urban centers are thus developing in Amsterdam: dynamic sub-centers in nodal zones enjoying exceptional accessibility by both car and public transport, and an expanding and specializing old city. Similar trends can be observed in other cities and towns in the metropolitan area, albeit with a somewhat lower dynamics and a more local orientation. While its lower accessibility by car puts the old city at a disadvantage, it also fosters a unique environment. Certain kinds of economic activities, including many high-profile, and innovation-oriented activities, appear to profit from its specific, diverse accessibility mix. The high share of car-free modes can be said to be even a necessary prerequisite for the unique degree of informality and conviviality (a decisive location factor for many). But there are limits: a key transport planning challenge is that of identifying the level of regional accessibility, including accessibility by car (and truck), that the historic center still needs in order to maintain its vitality and to avoid turning into the exclusive domain of tourists. On the other hand, the emerging sub-centers need to ensure that slow forms of accessibility, including pedestrian, fit a lively urban environment. At the regional level, the broad concern is how to deal with this diversity of accessibility conditions and with changes caused by transformations in the hierarchy
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of transportation networks. Transport planners should not reject these differences and instabilities through a pursuit of generic accessibility improvements or through an exclusive focus on shorter-term mobility management. Rather, they should capitalize on the distinctive accessibility features of different locations, in order to cater for the combination of mobility requirements – both fast and slow, both individual and collective, both physical and virtual – that seem to characterize contemporary urban economies (Phelps and Osawa 2003). Reinforcing such diversity would not only be important for the economy, but also conducive to an urban environment where a variety of cultures and lifestyles can thrive, as will be discussed below. Diversity and Freedom of Choice A variety of lifestyles and cultures and their interactions provide the city’s inhabitants with a host of new choices that represent, traditionally, one of the most attractive dimensions of urbanity. This does not mean that each location must be organized in terms of a mixed formula; but rather that there will be a mosaic of different cultures at the scale of the city, often displaying characteristics of homogeneity within their particular communities. Homogeneity becomes problematic in spatial terms only if its magnitude is a factor aggravating deprivation. Diversity in the accessibility features of locations can contribute to the development of such a variety of living environments. In Amsterdam, residential choices (at least of those who can choose!) seem increasingly influenced by differences between more and less accessible, more and less intensely used, urban areas. For instance, the walking and cycling environments of the historic “canal belt” of Amsterdam and the car environments of the green suburbs around Hilversum and Haarlem are both highly desired residential environments, albeit by different sorts of populations. Furthermore, a recent upsurge in the demand for high-quality apartments has emerged next to multimode peripheral nodes that are well connected to destinations outside of the urban region. At the other extreme, there are the relatively non-accessible locations that provide an ideal setting for experiments in alternative cultures and lifestyles, illustrated by the squatter tradition in Amsterdam. On a different level, the accessibility to natural features (green areas, water) plays also an important role in bringing about an attractive and varied range of living conditions. As regards the use and perceptions of nature and open space, the immediate surroundings of the home seem more important to users than the facilities available on a larger scale (in Amsterdam, for instance, 90 percent of the green areas used by residents is in the immediate vicinity, only 10 percent is in more remote areas). However, from the point of view of transport planning and infrastructure development, the crux of the matter lies, rather, at the regional scale, as choices at this scale directly affect the possibilities at local levels. In Amsterdam, the traditional concept of a “lobe city” (star-like, built-up urban “fingers” along public transport corridors alternating with “wedges” of open space at walking and cycling distance) is still relevant in terms of its aims – especially that of generalized access to open space – but
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it does not meet the needs of the increasing scale of activity, the differentiation of lifestyles and, crucially, the high mobility. A more useful concept in this respect may be that of the “aesthetics of mobility,” recently introduced by the Dutch architect Francine Houben (Houben and Calabrese 2003). Houben’s central thesis affirms a shift of emphasis from places to routes in the use and perception of the landscape, from “staying in” to “moving through.” Under this thesis, the transportation infrastructure needs to be considered as a “room with a view.” Houben applies this idea mainly to motorways and railways, although the “slow” cycling, pedestrian, and sailing routes that network the urban with the regional landscape and that make possible its discovery and experience, are as important as the “fast” routes. Civic Exhibition In the preceding sections the focus has been on the potential role of transport and infrastructure policies in fostering specialization and diversity in the economic and socio-cultural sphere. An essential characteristic of urbanity, however, is that alongside opportunities to create these individual realms, there are enough places for the various economies and lifestyles to meet and confront each other, or opportunities for the development of “public” realms (Lofland 1998). As Geddes (1915) already contended a long time ago, for a city to be truly urban, it is of fundamental importance to have meeting places, which are the scene of the population’s strivings and conflicts, and act as places of “civic exhibition.” Fundamental preconditions for developing a strong public realm are qualities such as physical and institutional accessibility, non-coercion of behavior, conditions for spontaneity, an informal sphere, and, perhaps above all, the presence of diverse people and activities, coupled with the possibility to express even radical differences (Sennett 1970, 1977; Crawford 1995; Deutsche 1996; Lofland 1998; Hajer and Reijndorp 2002). Traditional examples of places where this can occur are city squares and streets, parks and markets. In today’s highly mobile urban society, however, places at the confluences of traffic flows are possibly becoming more important (Bertolini 2000; Hajer and Reijndorp 2002; Bertolini and Dijst 2003). These are invariably the places that gather the most diverse groups of people; on the contrary, many traditional public spaces tend to be increasingly dominated by a single group, be it the tourists in the historic city center, or the local residents in the socially homogeneous peripheral estates and suburbs. But there is a flip side, best typified in Amsterdam by Schiphol airport. Schiphol is often referred to as the prototype of a new urbanity and, arguably, it is a distinct contribution to other dimensions of urbanity, but only to a limited extent is it a place of civic exhibition. The efficient handling of flows is such a paramount objective in this “zero-friction” environment (Hajer 1999), that there are few civic exhibition opportunities for different individuals and groups. And this seems the core of the problem, because it is precisely the presence of contrasting manifestations of culture and lifestyle that is important (Crawford 1995; Deutsche 1996). In this respect, there may be more interesting possibilities at
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other emerging urban nodes, and, most notably, at the railway station areas in Amsterdam. A unique variety of mobility flows (from local to regional, and beyond) is matched there by a great variety of functions (including offices, retail and leisure, and housing). However, too often the reality is still that of a strict separation of flows and functions in space and/or in time, and of strong limitations to the range of possible uses. To a large extent, transport planning and infrastructure development cannot determine the actual degree of mixing and interaction in the public realm. They are never neutral, however. For instance, the internal organization of the transportation interchange and the characteristics of the physical links to the immediate surroundings will have a direct impact on the opportunities for interaction between different groups. How much do the worlds of car and public transport users, of cyclists and walkers actually overlap? And how permeable is the transportation interchange to the local neighborhood? These are matters that become even more important if put in the context of a strong in-built tendency of new urban centers and networks of mobility to form enclaves and effectively “splinter” from the rest of the city (Graham and Marvin 2001). Connectivity The fourth and last dimension of urbanity is the most explicitly linked to transport planning and infrastructure development. The assumption of a direct, simple relationship between the urban built environment and the city’s social and economic life – or of an urbanity strongly rooted in physical proximity – is increasingly questionable. Since the industrial revolution, modern transport and telecommunications techniques have provided humans with ever more ways of interacting in the absence of physical proximity. It has thus become increasingly possible for people to live, work, and recreate in different places, and for firms to spatially de-couple different components of the production processes. Many urban households and businesses continue to seize these opportunities to escape from the disadvantages of physical concentration and to decentralize spatially. There is, however, an intriguing paradox (Ascher 1995; Hall 1996; Urry 2002; Graham in this book). Notwithstanding all the hype about decentralization or even dematerialization of the city, physical interaction between people in many urban activities is proving to be still irreplaceable and increasing rather than decreasing in value. It has been demonstrated, for instance, that face-to-face contacts play a pivotal role in high-quality business services (Wheeler et al. 2000), but it seems that this has also been the case with the up-and-coming sectors of culture, leisure, and the media. Physical human interaction appears to be retaining its essential role in the socio-cultural sphere too, as testified by the enduring, and in many cases growing, success of live festivals and other events. The effect of the progress in transport and telecommunication technologies seems to grant the possibility of being much more selective about when (i.e., for which purpose) and to what extent (i.e., how often) physical proximity – or face-to-face contact – is needed (Mitchell 2000; Urry 2002), rather than to produce a one-way decentralization or even diffu-
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sion of the city. All these developments make connectivity – or the qualities of the “space of flows” (Castells 1996) – an increasingly important dimension of urbanity. Infrastructure provides the material links allowing for the spatially disjointed city to continue functioning as a whole and, thus, for the possibility of maintaining physical contacts when required. Connections at various scales are needed to complement the variety of types of economic activity and individual lifestyles that go with urbanity, each with its specific accessibility demands. In this respect, transport planners face a practical dilemma. While the evolution sketched above ideally requires connections at all levels, infrastructure development remains highly capital intensive and, increasingly, also politically complex to implement, making it essential to set priorities: which spatial scales should be privileged? In the Amsterdam case two appear especially important. The first is the regional scale, which corresponds to a broadly defined daily urban system, or, roughly, to the area represented in Figure 5.1. This is because it is at this scale that by far the largest and growing share of the everyday flows of people and goods feeding the local economy and civic society takes place. The main thing missing is a high-grade public transport system; moreover, the congestion in the overcrowded motorway network is becoming a pressing issue. The second strategic spatial scale is that of the international links. Exchanges are expected to intensify, in parallel with developments in business and tourist networks. Currently, these links rely almost entirely on air travel, but soon high-speed trains will also serve them. The first point here is that more convincing, long-term answers to the question of how to combine sustained growth in air travel with quality of life in the airport surroundings need to be found. The second important task is to find ways to link effectively all the major centers in the region (not just the airport or the high-speed train stations) to these evolving international networks. In the field, a clear vision on transport development priorities is absent, and the municipality – like local governments elsewhere – seems, rather, to participate in all sorts of negotiations for all sorts of infrastructure, reacting to opportunities and threats as they arise. What, then, is a better approach? A more explicit debate and clearer choices relative to the urbanity dimensions discussed above would be part of it, but the intrinsic complexities of change in real world cities must be also recognized. The latter point is the object of the next section. How to Bring about Change? In the preceding section, the task of transportation planning has been specified through the characteristic dimensions of urbanity. In this section, the focus will shift from discussing relevant problems and potential solutions to identifying specific urban mobility policies that can bring about change in the existing urban transport and land use system. This is a crucial and often neglected
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point. Most urban mobility policies are defined in terms of optimization: how to maximize mobility benefits and minimize mobility costs. Policy documents typically follow this line (see for instance, Commission of the European Communities 2001, or World Business Council for Sustainable Development 2001). While certainly reasonable, this approach also has important limits. A well-known difficulty is agreeing on definitions and measurements of benefits and costs, that is, on the goals of the policy process. But there is more than that. An approach that centers on optimization also requires that there is a sufficient degree of certainty about the ways to achieve those goals, that is, about the actual impacts of suggested policy measures. This is, however, seldom the case. Rather, uncertainty about both policy goals and ways to achieve them seems an intrinsic feature of the urban mobility system, which fundamentally restricts the scope for optimization and, more generally, for a purely rational-choice approach to change. A considerable body of literature on the limits of rational-choice approaches has emerged; this is particularly relevant to complex processes of change, such as those connected with urban mobility issues (for an overview, see Chapter 2 in Meyer and Miller 2001). However, promising ways of dealing with these issues have been proposed. A recent and particularly appealing way is the application of evolutionary theories and methods. The rest of the chapter explores this potential and illustrates it in the Amsterdam case. The Transport Land Use Feedback Cycle, and Beyond The relationship between transport and urban form has long intrigued scholars. Both historical (Muller 1995; Hoyle and Knowles 1998) and geographical (Cervero 1998; Kenworthy and Laube 1999) analyses document the high degree of interdependency between the two. However, causal links remain difficult to prove. A feedback cycle where changes in transport and land use patterns both influence each other, and where external factors also interfere, is the widely accepted way of illustrating this complex relationship (Manheim 1974; Hanson 1995; Wegener and Fürst 1999; Meyer and Miller 2001). The time aspect is particularly important (Batten 1996; Wegener and Fürst 1999): while the activity and mobility patterns of individual actors can adapt quite rapidly (in some cases even on a day-to-day basis), changes in the shape of transportation networks and in urban morphology are of a very long-term nature (in the order of decades). Limits to the rationality of actors (due to lack of or inability to cope with information, organizational constraints, conflicting interests, etc.) further complicate the picture. The node-place model introduced by the author (Bertolini 1999, Figure 5.2) offers a framework to further penetrate this dynamics. The basic idea underlying the model is that – in line with the feedback cycle – improving transport provision in a location (or its node-value) will create conditions favorable to the further concentration and diversification of functions there (because of improved accessibility). In turn, intensification and diversification of land uses in a location (or increase in its place-value) will create conditions favorable to
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the further development of infrastructure there (because of growth in the demand for connections). The emphasis on “conditions for” is important, as it allows a distinction between the existence of a development potential, and its actual realization. As we will see, the latter may or may not occur, and reactions can be in different directions. Five ideal-typical situations can be distinguished in the model. Along the middle line are “balanced” locations, where the node and the place are equally strong. At the top of the line are areas “under stress.” Here the intensity and diversity of both transportation flows and urban activities is maximal. This indicates that the potential for land use development is highest (strong node) and that it has been realized (strong place). The same can be said about the potential for transport development. However, these are also locations where the large concentrations of flows and activities mean that there is an equally great chance of conflicts between multiple claims on a limited space. At the bottom of the middle line is a third ideal-typical situation, represented
Node Stress Unbalanced node
Balance
Unbalanced place Dependence
Place
Figure 5.2 The Node-place Model
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by the “dependent” areas. The struggle for space is minimal here, but the demand for transportation services from residents in the area, workers, and other users and the demand for urban activities from travelers are both so low that supply can be held in place only by the intervention of other factors (such as peculiarities in the topography of the area or in the morphology of the transportation networks, external subsidies, etc.). Finally, two “unbalanced” situations can be identified. On one side – at the top left of the diagram – are the “unbalanced nodes,” areas where transportation supply is much more developed than urban activities (such as at new motorway outlets or new railway stations). On the other side – at the bottom right of the diagram – are the “unbalanced places,” where the opposite is true (as, for instance, in many historic city centers). The latter two are particularly interesting sorts of location types. It can be assumed that they will show a strong tendency to move toward a more balanced state. However, and this is crucial, this could happen in two radically different ways. An “unbalanced node” could either increase its place-value (for instance by attracting property development) or decrease its node-value (perhaps through reduction in the level of transportation services). A reverse reasoning can be applied to an “unbalanced place”: either the level of connection will be increased or a different, and perhaps more locally oriented, functional mix will be developed. The emergence of “unbalanced” nodes and places, either as a deliberate policy move or as the result of autonomous trends, can be seen as a condition for the development of the transport and land use system: without unbalanced situations, there will be no change at all. At the same time, the fact that the system can react in different ways means that different, and possibly divergent, development paths are possible. Development Paths With the help of the node-place model both up- and downgrading processes of either single locations or entire urban-regional systems (as accumulations of single-location developments) can be analyzed. Let us illustrate this through an application of the model to station areas in the Amsterdam urban region (Figure 5.3; for details see Bertolini 1999). In Amsterdam, there are examples of station areas under stress (Central Station, CS), of dependent locations, and of unbalanced nodes and places (most evidently Sloterdijk, AS). Since this analysis was done, developments have confirmed this characterization of the different locations: for instance, the “under stress” Central Station is still struggling with the complex redevelopment, the “dependent” Vlugtlaan (AV) has been closed down because it was not economically viable, and the unbalanced station areas in the periphery of the city show the greatest development dynamics. Strikingly, both upgrading and downgrading processes are under way here, as described in the preceding sections of this chapter. Most interesting are the cumulative patterns at the level of the entire urban region. As already discussed, areas at the very top of the middle line can offer high opportunities for development but may bring about the most intense
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AC
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0.0 0.0 Legend Amsterdam Amstel Amsterdam Bijlmer Amsterdam CS Amsterdam Lelylaan Amsterdam Muiderpoort
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Figure 5.3 Application of the Node-place Model to Station Areas in the Amsterdam Urban Region
conflicts. The (relative) borders of growth will be reached here before the ones in areas with lower node- and place-values. The withdrawal, in the beginning of the 1990s, of an ambitious project to redevelop the areas around Amsterdam Central Station (as part of the so-called IJ-banks project) is a concrete signal of this. Crucial factors were the great complications and high costs of accommodating a massive new program in a location already “under stress,” combined with institutional risks. If growth is not to end up in areas not well connected to the railway network, it becomes important then to have alternatives with adequate public transport capacity. Amsterdam has those alternative station areas, and in this respect differs from other cities in the Netherlands and elsewhere. The better starting position of Amsterdam does not mean that planning always capitalizes upon it, however. While the market demand has been clearly oriented toward the peripheral railway and motorway rings for several years, node and place development initiatives have long remained uncoordinated. There are, for instance, important public transport nodes in relatively undeveloped places, and intense and/or diverse concentrations of activities around relatively undeveloped nodes. Current developments, such as the intensification and diversification of functions around Zuid station and the
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improvement of transport services at Bijlmer station, go in the right direction, but address the situation only partially, because they still try to direct growth toward single areas, not toward the entire urban-regional network of nodes and places. From a change-centered perspective, it is particularly interesting to connect the development patterns in the urban region to the morphology of the transportation networks. Most importantly, in Amsterdam the railway network shows a combination of a radial and a tangential pattern (Figure 5.1). Without this highly articulated network, peripheral areas would never have enjoyed a public transport accessibility matching that of the historic city center, and new development would most likely have ended up as car-dependent locations, as in many other cities, ultimately resulting in a very different urban configuration. This fact underlines that the process of shaping conditions favorable to a particular transport and land use pattern is a very long one. The present network morphology in Amsterdam is the result of a very long chain of decisions and actions at different levels that often, unconsciously or unwillingly, contributed to the final result. These include the reservations for a railway freight line around the city as early as the beginning of the twentieth century (which never materialized, but which provided for crucial rights of way), the development of a national motorway grid since the 1960s (which, in Amsterdam, could largely profit from those rights of way), and the gradual connection of the Schiphol airport to the national railway system since the 1980s (which followed the same corridors). Perhaps needless to say, all these decisions and actions were unrelated to any deliberate attempt at developing the multimode, polycentric urban system described in this chapter. The only major transport infrastructure that purposefully sought to support such a pattern is the metro ring line, which connects all the major peripheral centers, and which was opened as recently as 1997. Although Amsterdam’s pattern of development has evident theoretical advantages, it was lengthy and dependent on chance to some extent. It may not represent the best solution for other cities. The gap between the model and the reality requires an alternative strategy. For instance, how much of a solution is transit-oriented development (Calthorpe 1993) of this sort for car-dependent American cities? Haven’t they gone too far? And how about exploding, resourcepoor cities in the developing world? Will they ever be able to build such extensive transportation networks? The point is not to exclude an affirmative answer. However, the great complications, unpredictability, and very long-term nature of every transition to a different transport and land use pattern should be better assessed than the urban mobility literature and practice do. This means that, crucially, the same general urbanity objectives discussed in the preceding sections of this chapter could, and often should lead to different transportation and infrastructure choices in different contexts, depending on specific possibilities and limitations. What works for urbanity in Amsterdam will not necessarily work in San Francisco or Curitiba, and vice versa.
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An Evolutionary Approach The way of looking at the interaction between transport and land use changes sketched above has many analogies with the kind of evolutionary thinking that is successfully extending from biology into the social sciences and particularly into economics (Nelson and Winter 1982; Van den Bergh and Fetchenhauer 2001). Within this stream of work, the assumption of (a single) equilibrium as a “natural” state of the system is also questioned, and attention is directed, rather, to processes of change. Most relevant are studies of technological change, which have often focused on transportation (Grübler 1990, 1998). In these studies, technological change is seen as a process in which, similar to biological evolution, new technologies emerge and old ones disappear through a continuous process of variation and selection. A crucial concept is that of coevolution, or the idea that in the process also the selection environment (in our case, the city) changes together with technologies (in our case, transportation networks). The application of evolutionary theories and methods to the study of the interaction of transport and land use in an urban setting, as embodied in the node-place model discussed above, and more explicitly and thoroughly elaborated in other fields, seems extremely promising. More specifically, the main objectives would be: (i) to understand better the interdependencies between changes in the urban transport and land use systems as they translate into different co-evolution paths, and consequently (ii) to identify transport and land use policy interventions that can facilitate such a development within given (or chosen) context-constraints. The latter would most notably include limitations, but also possibilities in the locally available economic, social, and/or environmental resources. Conclusions: Claiming Ground In this chapter I have explored two related paths of enquiry into the relationship between transport and cities, in order to go beyond some of the limitations of the current approaches to urban transport planning and infrastructure development. The first path of enquiry, reacting to the generic way in which urban qualities are typically treated in urban mobility discussions, has searched for links between transport planning and infrastructure development issues and a broader debate on the dimensions of urbanity, as most notably carried out in the urban studies and sociological literature. The second path of enquiry has attempted to address the limits of approaches centered too much on ideal models and non-replicable examples, by shifting the focus to the evolution of existing urban transport and land use systems. The worth of this double exercise does not lie so much in the provision of final answers but, rather, in the identification of relevant questions. Economic and social processes shape mobility networks and urban morphologies, but the latter provide, in turn, a still essential physical support for those same processes, selectively constraining and
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facilitating them. This second relationship has always been central to the discipline of urban planning. However, the present shift to a “network society” urgently demands that more attention is given to the specific implications of developments in the infrastructure domain, claiming ground that is still too much dominated by narrow technical rationalities and obscure political bargaining. Notes 1 2
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I am greatly indebted to Salet 1996, and to our common project documented in Bertolini and Salet 2003. Amsterdam – with 735,000 inhabitants – is the core city of a metropolitan area of around 1,750,000 inhabitants, which is, in its turn, part of the wider constellation of cities known as the Randstad, the highly urbanized West of the Netherlands, with around 6.5 million inhabitants. While Amsterdam is unique in many respects, I believe that this discussion can be of inspiration for other cities as well.
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CHAPTER SIX
Networking for Trans-national “Missing Links”: Tracing the Political Success of European High-speed Rail in the 1990s Deike Peters
Introduction Already well before Manuel Castells’ (1996) The Rise of the Network Society, “networks” had become an important new buzzword concept in planning and public policy-making. Broadly speaking, scholars associate it with the move from more hierarchical political and societal structures firmly rooted in the idea of the sovereign nation-state to a world where decisions at the local, regional, national, and global level all involve an increasing multitude of both governmental and non-governmental actors. This move toward multi-level governance has been particularly dramatic in Western Europe, where the establishment and progressive institutionalization of the European Union as a new form of both government and governance has brought about important shifts in policy-making structures (Marks et al. 1996; Bache 1998; Hix 1998; Peterson and Bomberg 1999; Scharpf 1999; Wallace and Wallace 2000). This chapter uses the development of trans-national high-speed rail infrastructures in Western Europe in the 1990s as a case study to investigate which kinds of governance “networks” were, and still are, responsible for embarking on such a vast international infrastructure program. This study questions the often only implicitly made yet wide-spread assumption that a move from hierarchical structures to “networks” necessarily implies a move toward more democratic and transparent decision-making structures. Rather, the evidence supports instead Benz and Papadopoulos’s (2003: 2) conclusion that “networks are necessarily exclusive – i.e., they consist of interactions among limited groups of actors. They
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constitute particular power relations, which do not conform to the principle of equality and inclusiveness.” At least in the case of infrastructure planning, “democratic” networking at the EU level includes a rather narrow set of key actors. The story of “networking for ‘missing links’ in Europe” appears more like a story of semiexclusive “old boys networking” between industry representatives and national politicians than anything else. On the other hand, broader political and social movements in favor of a “modern,” “sustainable” transport system as well as other factors, more institutional and structural, also played a key role in promoting the construction of an international high-speed rail system. This chapter also provides insights into the effectiveness of the EU as a new form of governance. The move toward an “ever closer union” has had an undeniably positive impact on decision making in Europe. However, this favorable assessment is mostly limited to contexts in which prospects for economic modernization and growth provide additional motivating factors for taking action. Analyzing Networks: Inspiration from the Literature What is the best way to go about analyzing and characterizing stakeholders and their powers and preferences within the new context of European governance? The concept of “policy networks” is a particularly abused term here. At this point in the debate, there are probably more articles claiming to “clarify” the concept as there were articles defining it originally. Although my own approach is similar to that of Robinson (1994: 872) who treats the term as “a ‘generic term’ encompassing all types of interest group mediation,” at least one key distinction should be made: The German (and Dutch) literature on the concept tends to treat networks more broadly as a new form of governance and an alternative to markets and hierarchies, while British and American scholars tend to focus more narrowly on how networks influence the development and implementation of particular policies. Börzel (1998), for example, distinguishes between an (Anglo-American) “interest intermediation school” and a (German) “governance” school of policy networks. Building on Rhodes’ (1997: 7) definition of policy networks as aggregating the interests of actors in a highly “differentiated polity” in a context of fragmented policies, Peterson and Bomberg (1999: 8) characterize EU policy networks as tending to be “technocratic, consensual, and policy-specific.” What remains unresolved, however, is how far policy networks should be regarded as a full-blown theory, a model, a method or even simply a metaphor. This chapter tends to treat it as the latter, thus reverting to the broad way the British originators of the concept employed the term (Richardson and Jordan 1979). But what are the alternatives to relying on the over-used concept of “policy networks”? Two well-known alternative – also increasingly fashionable – policy concepts for analyzing multi-level decision making and networking in Europe are Sabatier’s “advocacy coalitions” and Haas’s “epistemic
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communities.” According to Sabatier (1988: 138), “advocacy coalitions” can be comprised of a mélange of interest groups, administrative agencies, analysts, researchers, journalists, and other stakeholders with an interest in a given policy sector. By contrast, Haas’s “epistemic communities” are a more narrowly defined group consisting of “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain . . . [and] (1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs . . ., (2) shared causal beliefs . . ., (3) shared notions of validity, and (4) a common policy enterprise” (Haas 1992: 3). The usefulness of these two concepts has been widely and controversially discussed in the literature (Sabatier 1998; Radaelli 1999; Toke 1999; Dudley et al. 2000; Dunlop 2000; Miller and Fox 2001; Zito 2001). Yet both actorcentered models and concepts do not give adequate attention to the structural rationales underlying material decisions. In other words: the key problem of the inadequate or unclear conceptualization of the relationship between the agendasetting powers of the so-defined “networks,” “coalitions,” or “communities,” and external institutional constraints and/or structural factors (“discourses”) remains. I therefore take additional inspiration from two key sources: from Peterson and Bomberg’s three-tier model of EU decision making and the so-called “discursive” or “argumentative turn” in policy analysis and planning. According to Peterson and Bomberg (1999: 9): the student of EU decision-making must be concerned with explaining a range of different decisions taken at different levels in a multi-level system of governance. [One should therefore] draw on a range of theories that are “pitched” at different levels of decision-making. More precisely, they suggest distinguishing between three types of decisions: history-making, policy-setting, and policy-shaping decisions. Only for the last, sub-systemic level of decision making, do they consider policy network analysis to be the most appropriate theory for explaining decisions. By contrast, they find New Institutionalist approaches (see e.g., Bulmer 1994), with their focus on path dependency and differentiation between institutions as “rules of the game” and organizations as “the players” (North 1990) most appropriate for the intermediate, policy-setting level, and (liberal) intergovernmentalism (especially Moravcsik 1998) and/or neofunctionalism (see e.g., Burley and Mattli 1993) most appropriate for the history-making level. In the end, the message of their three-level model aimed at “putting theory in its place” is unmistakable: “Policy network analysis . . . [only] seems apt for a system of governance that is weakly institutionalized, resource-poor and has no ‘government’.” As we will see in our case study example, these three criteria do not apply to highspeed rail decision making. More importantly, depending on the level of decision making, very different rationalities and modes of power come into play – something that policy network analysis does not adequately account for. This brings us to our second analytical amendment for analyzing EU networking in practice: discourse-orientation.
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Defined broadly, the “discursive” or “argumentative turn” in policy analysis and planning focuses on “practical processes of argumentation” and on how “institutionally disciplined rhetorics of policy and planning influence problem selection analysis” (Fischer and Forester 1993: 2). Following Hajer’s (1995) The Politics of Environmental Discourse, there has been a rapidly evolving literature on (environmental) discourses in planning and public policy. Its interdisciplinary influence is reflected in several recent articles in scientific journals relating to environmental studies, planning, geography, and even anthropology (Campbell 1996; Nygren 1998; Fischer and Hajer 1999; Lumley 1999; Ruzza 2000; Harper 2001). In the wake of Foucault and other postpositivist critics, scholars of all disciplines have found it necessary to focus more closely on the various discourses that both researchers and practitioners employ. Struggles over transport-infrastructure decision making, in particular, clearly illustrate the use of different discourses and their consequences, and there is now a rapidly evolving literature on sustainability discourses in transport policy (see e.g., Flyvbjerg 1998; Sager 1999; Baeten 2000; Langmyhr 2000, 2001; Richardson 2000; Vigar 2000, 2001; Willson 2001; Peters 2003a; Low et al. 2003).1 Additionally, Flyvbjerg et al.’s recent study on Megaprojects and Risks (2003) has refueled a debate over the rampant problem of excessive cost overruns and the misleading information that project promoters often provide with regard to large-scale transport projects. Such “sugarcoating” certainly has also been a factor in getting high-speed rail projects approved within EU member states. Yet rather than tracing the genesis of individual highspeed rail lines in the national context, the following case study focuses more on the general networking and the discourses in favor of high-speed rail in the EU in the 1990s. I have characterized EU transport policy in general as being dominated by the discursive framework of “ecological modernization” (Peters 2003b) and demonstrated that within the particular policy arena of Trans-European Transport Networks (TEN-T), EU transport infrastructure investment policies are mostly being guided by the two key “storylines” of “missing links” and “bottlenecks” (see especially Peters 2003b: 332–6). I will now take a closer look at how such discursive elements play out in the case of trans-national highspeed rail in Europe. The Case Study: Networking for a European High-speed Rail System The Push for European High-speed Rail in the 1990s: Key Decisions and Stakeholders Plans for developing a high-speed, European-wide integrated rail system predate the EU and had been discussed in other international forums, but no trans-national high-speed lines had resulted from these initiatives. By contrast, numerous national-level high-speed rail lines were established in Europe during the 1970s and 1980s, particularly in France and Germany. Yet even among these
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national initiatives, only France followed a genuine network approach from the beginning, based mainly on the construction of a new “TGV” high-speed system. In Germany, the initial approach to high-speed rail was to concentrate on particular stretches of the dense network to overcome bottlenecks. Today, Germany features a comparatively dense network consisting of a mixture of newly constructed lines especially intended for its high-speed ICE trains, and others which are more multi-purpose, running both the very fast (> 250 km/h) ICE trains and more conventional EC or IC trains (up to 200 km/h) at frequent intervals. Then, in 1992, the EU’s Maastricht Treaty made the development of the so-called Trans-European Networks (TENs) a European Union priority. In particular, five of the 14 TEN transport priority projects endorsed by the EU’s Essen European Council in December 1994 were high-speed rail links, with another five being conventional rail and/or multi-modal projects. In 2001, the EU proposed six additions and two extensions to this priority project list, again with a strong emphasis on high-speed rail. In 2003, the EU then extensively revised both the guidelines and the financial regulations for the TEN-T as a whole. Moreover, in light of the accession of the ten new EU member states in May 2004, several additional potential priorities for funding, as well as a significant rise in overall funding for TEN-T projects were proposed. Despite these official EU plans, the EU has not been the primary decision-maker in devising these networks, however. And it was also not the key initiator. The EU explains its own role in developing the TENs as follows:2 Responsibility for creating transport networks lies mainly with the Member States, in line with subsidiarity . . . The Union’s role is to act as a catalyst and problem solver – it takes project proposals from the Member States and turns them into a network design, it encourages Member States to push the projects forward and tries to find ways around financial and regulatory obstacles. To think of “the EU” and “Member States” as the only relevant stakeholders would be misleading, however. Following the Peterson and Bomberg model, Table 6.1 provides an overview of the key decisions and their respective levels, as well as the pertaining stakeholders, rationalities, and power modes relevant to high-speed rail decision making in Europe in the 1990s. Power of Decision and Discourse: Putting the Priority “Missing Links” on the European Map The original discourse around the so-called “missing links” within European transport networks was not brought into play by national or inter-governmental initiatives but by industry players (Peters 2003b). More specifically, it was the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT), an industry lobby group based in Paris, which in the 1980s and early 1990s produced a series of reports pushing the EU and national governments to embark on a series of costly, high-profile
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Table 6.1 Key Decisions and Stakeholders for the EU High-speed Rail Initiatives in the 1990s Level
Type of Decision
Examples Relevant for the Case Study
Key Stakeholders
Type of Rationality
Key Mode of Power
Supersystemic
Historymaking
Maastricht Treaty, commitment to TEN-T
National governments industry lobby (ERT)
Political
Decision and discourse
Systemic
Policysetting
Misc. Council Directives and White Papers
High-level Political Eurocrats, technocratic NGOs, and other interest groups
Decision and discourse implementation
Subsystemic
Policyshaping
Commission initiatives and memorands
Mid-level Technocratic Eurocrats, consensual NGOs, and other interest groups
Implementation, operation
Source: Adapted and expanded after Peterson and Bomberg 1999: 9
transport infrastructure projects linking Western European countries. ERT membership is by invitation only, consisting of about 40 all-male chief executives of large, multi-national – including transport and oil sector – giants such as Total, BP, Volvo, Volkswagen, Rolls Royce, and Renault.3 The ERT’s first landmark report (1984) “Missing Links – Upgrading Europe’s Transborder Ground Infrastructure” proposed three core measures that would eventually – over the course of the next 20 years – be turned into real(istic) infrastructure proposals endorsed by national governments, the EU, and the private sector: (1) the Anglo-French Channel tunnel, (2) road/rail links from Scandinavia to Northern Germany across the Oresund and/or the Fehmarn Belt, and (3) a general network of high-speed train links. Astonishingly, these proposals are mostly congruent with the subsequent rail sector priority proposals for the EU TENs.4 These concrete infrastructure proposals were followed up by further ERT reports in 1989, 1991, and 1992. ERT pro-high-speed rail lobbying of European transport was particularly intense in the late 1980s. The ERT was operating at a level where, according to former ERT General Secretary Keith Richardson, members were “able to phone Helmut Kohl and recommend that he read a report, . . . or [have] lunch with the Swedish Prime minister” (quoted in Doherty and Hoedeman 1994: 135–7). Other scholars have confirmed this highly influential nature of the ERT’s interventions. Tim Richardson (2000), for example, quotes a Brussels bureaucrat as summarizing TEN transport policy as follows: “TEN-T as a policy has been around for a long time, developed
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from the missing links and the European Round Table, and all this kind of business, you know.” Subsequent to the ERT’s initial report, the “Missing Links” rhetoric was picked up by the European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT), and by the European Union. Of particular importance was Delors’ “White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness, and Employment,” which was endorsed by all heads of state and also promoted the idea of the TENs (Commission of the European Communities 1993). The Commission then gave the respective high-level expert (“Christopherson”) Working Group the mandate to identify a list of potential priority projects. Pressure from industry lobby groups was not the only reason for the success of the “Missing Links”/TENs concept and the resulting EU-backed high-speed rail initiatives in the early 1990s, however. Another important strategic reason was that in the particular political context of the 1990s, (transport) infrastructure policy provided a new, “safe” field of cooperation at a time when it was too early for the EU to seriously embark on a common defense/foreign policy and/or monetary union (also see Turro 1999: 102ff.). In this context, the TEN-T priorities are interesting precisely because they do not just express an obvious patchworking together of Member state preferences of national network connections, but also an emerging consensus among those Member states that vesting the EU with additional political powers would ultimately be beneficial to everyone. As Piodi (1997: 24, quoted in Peters 2003b: 321) notes: The 1990s saw the start of the European Union’s involvement in infrastructure policy . . . This innovation was far more radical than has generally been suggested by politicians, researchers or journalists. Historically, the role of public works in the Member States has far exceeded their specific function . . . [T]hey also function as a symbol of the tangible reality of power, which is of crucial importance even in the modern age. The fact that responsibility for this sector has been conferred on the Union means that the prospects for the political legitimization of the Union have been enhanced . . . Its new responsibilities mean that it now plays a major role in the decision-making process at all levels of government in the Member States. Additionally, the promotion of new, competitive high-speed rail lines as a modern, clean, and technologically advanced transport mode was highly compatible with the discourse of “ecological modernization” which has dominated political decision making in EU countries since the 1990s. “Ecological modernization” emphasizes “sustainable growth” and a competitive, efficiencyand market-oriented approach to the environment using advanced, high technology (Hajer 1995; Fischer and Hajer 1999; Peters 2003b, especially pages 117–23). In the 1990s the ill-effects of mass motorization were increasingly problematized and official rhetoric turned against road-based transport. Tellingly, much of the focus in academic and policy debates was on safety issues, emissions control and, most recently, pricing schemes. Sustainable
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transport, understood in the context of ecological modernization, always implied a desired modal shift from road (or air) to rail (or non-motorized) transport, as reflected in many official EU and OECD/ECMT policy statements. So the EU’s emphasis on high-speed rail provided a highly visible, politically important signal supporting this new discourse. Overall, TEN-T network policy should thus be interpreted not simply as an example of (realist) intergovernmentalism but, rather, as a process of multi-level governance that already included key actors beyond the national governmental level. Nevertheless, discourses and decision-making rationalities at this super-systemic level were highly politicized and access to the decisionmaking process for both civil society and lower-level bureaucrats was rather limited. Power of Implementation: Funding and Constructing the TEN-T HSR Projects Vesting the EU with the power and responsibility to develop a Trans-European transport network and a list of priorities did not yet answer the key question as to how individual projects would be funded and implemented. Grant funding for TEN-T projects was provided through various EU programs. Additionally, the house bank of the European Union, the European Investment Bank (EIB) provided billions of euros for TEN transport projects over the last decade. Despite the EU’s stated preference for rail, the TEN-T funding record initially remained more dominated by road funding than by rail funding. This contradiction to official policy rhetoric was most pronounced in the mid-1990s. From 1994 to 1999, over 70 percent of the EU’s EDRF Objective 1 funding for the least developed regions went to roads, and 69 percent of the €5 billion TENT project funding in the four EU Cohesion countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) went to roads as well. Meanwhile, until 2000, the EIB had also committed less than 30 percent of its transport funds to the rail sector. However, over 60 percent of the EU’s special TEN-T budget line until 1998 went to rail, with two-thirds of that devoted to high-speed rail. For the years from 2001 onwards, the TEN-T budget figures show that now that three of the other TENT priority projects were completed, almost 37 percent of all special EU TEN transport funding, a total of about €1 billion, was to go into the five high-speed rail priority projects, with another 10 percent going into the other remaining priority projects.5 However, no matter how large the EU’s committed sums seem when seen by themselves, they cover but a fraction of the total investments necessary. As the EU itself notes: The EU budget for 1995–2000 earmarked a total of €1,830 billion for the TEN-T. The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Union’s Cohesion Fund contributed a total of some €14 billion for projects of common interest in the “cohesion countries.” The transport networks’ share [of the RTD budget] is expected to be around €4 to 4.2 billion . . .
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To appreciate the scale of this investment we need to compare these sums against the figure of €400 billion or so which is the overall cost of the projects currently ongoing or planned (including €110 billion for the 14 priority projects identified at the European Council in Essen).6 So without extensive support from national governments and/or the private sector, the projects cannot get off the ground. Nevertheless, the EU’s official political and financial support to the various cross-national high-speed projects identified has made a crucial difference in getting these approved and financed. The example of the TEN-T priority project No. 2, the so-called PBKAL (Paris–Brussels–Cologne/Köln–Amsterdam–London) high-speed train, is a particularly interesting example. Conceived as Europe’s first cross-border highspeed passenger link, the PBKAL was launched in 1989 by an official agreement between France, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK. While the French section of the link was completed in 1995, the UK, Belgian, and Dutch sections were in financial difficulties, since studies undertaken at the national level had generated relatively low levels of economic profitability for the various stretches. (The German section had not been evaluated yet.) Then, in 1995, the EC/PBKAL Working Group published its final report, which included an annex written by Rana Roy (1995) called “Lost and Found: The Community Component of the Economic Return on the Investment in PBKAL.” In this annex, a detailed economic argument was made that the various national-level studies ignored significant additional supra-national benefits which, if properly included in a new, Community-level analysis, would demonstrate the project was economically attractive enough to warrant additional Community support. The success story of this “community component” argument is recounted by the author in a later paper (Roy 2000: 1): It is a peculiarity of cross-border projects that correctly specified national evaluations of their respective national sections will tend to generate an incorrect estimate of their overall economic profitability and, therewith, an incorrect estimate of the extent of public support which they merit . . . The solution to the problem depends on the presence of a decisionmaker with an interest in, and responsibility for, recognising and securing this stream of “supra-national” benefits. Clearly, in the case of the TENs, the European Union has an interest in recognising and securing these supra-national benefits. . . . In the case of the PBKAL, therefore, the solution was to produce for the Union a new evaluation which integrated the formerly excluded stream of benefits: we called it the community component. The new evaluation of the PBKAL established that the community component constituted 27% of the corrected economic return of the project as a whole. With it, the project – as a whole and in each of its national sections – passed the relevant hurdle rates; without it, it did not. Lost and Found thereby established the case for the level of public subsidy required to enable the project to proceed. In turn, this
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triggered the national and Union subsidy decisions that have indeed enabled the project to proceed. It also triggered the injection of one billion euros to the Commission’s TENs budget (emphasis added). What is interesting here, especially given its alleged influence in releasing key funds for TEN-T high-speed rail projects, is that while couched in very objective, economistic terms, the study was by no means an independent evaluation of the PBKAL’s viability. Rather, the study had been provided to the EC Working Group by the European Center for Infrastructure Studies (ECIS). The ECIS, officially a research bureau, had been formally set up in early 1994 by the ERT, and in particular by Umberto Agnelli, president of Fiat, essentially in order to ensure the implementation of the ERT-backed missing links projects by providing technical and financial advice to the Commission. During the relatively brief period of its existence, the ECIS proved highly successful at its task. In 1994, ECIS founder Agnelli chaired a High Level Panel on Private Finance which presented various proposals for the decisive EU Essen Summit and the Christopherson Group on the TENs. As a result, the Summit endorsed both the idea of public–private partnerships for cross-border projects as well as the concept of a “single agent” to improve the regulatory framework for decision making. Apart from the “Lost and Found” report, ECIS provided several other key “independent, academic” inputs for the Commission promoting TEN-T investment. The other important one was the 1996 follow-up report “The Macroeconomic Effects of the PBKAL,” which was extensively used by the Commission for its special report to the parliament on the job creation effects of the TENs and for their general 1996 TEN report. NGO watchdog organizations always pointed to these close links between pro-growth industry players and the Commission and criticized this highly unequal situation of access to decision makers, albeit with little success.7 The ECIS was closed in 1997 under somewhat mysterious circumstances. Funding from the European Commission was cut, and plans to reopen the Center never materialized. While EU and national-level support for the TENs indeed slowed down somewhat in the late 1990s, TEN-T support through loans from the European Investment Bank (EIB) increased. This transition from EU and national-level grants to EIB infrastructure loans reflects, in part, the increased maturity of several of the TEN-T priority projects. By 2003 EIB support for the PBKAL stood at €2.4 billion since the 1990s (European Investment Bank 2003). Power of Operation: Interoperability as an Ongoing Challenge As evident from the above section, decision-making rationalities at the systemic, policy-setting level are already moving from being less political to being more technocratic. The emphasis on decisions and discourse is increasingly replaced by a focus on implementation. This section will now focus on the operational aspects of international high-speed rail. At this sub-systemic,
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policy-shaping level, decision-making rationalities are still technocratic but increasingly consensual. Power supply systems and gauge widths for rail systems can vary widely from place to place. Unlike road-, water-, or air-based modes, the rail sector therefore always had to face the difficult issue of interoperability. The frequent lack thereof has been problematic from the mode’s inception. Therefore, much effort has been sunk by industry interest groups into lobbying for interoperability. And, unlike in the case of infrastructure expansion schemes, sustainable transport advocacy organizations are almost unanimously in favor of making better use of existing infrastructures and are therefore highly supportive of this approach. Apart from the re-evaluation and extension of the priority project list, the first implementation report on the TENs focused on how to shift the emphasis from infrastructure investment to quality of service, on the integration of the modal networks, their extension to the east, and on how to use existing infrastructures more efficiently by using Intelligent Transport Systems. Interoperability, which lies at the heart of these challenges, is primarily a question of technical standardization, and therefore requires the EU and its partnering agencies to work out specific legal measures to be implemented by the member states. The EU Council already adopted Directive 96/48/EC on the Interoperability of the Trans-European High-Speed System on July 23, 1996, but it took the joint representative body defined in the directive, the European Association for Railway Interoperability (AEIF), several years to draw up the pertaining tools and methodologies and the resulting technical specifications for interoperability (TSIs). Pending the adoption of these TSIs, the Commission adopted two instruments to guide technical choices for projects in progress,8 and in May 2002, the TSIs for six subsystems were adopted by the Commission: for maintenance, control and command, infrastructure, energy, rolling stock, and the operation subsystems.9 Concerning conventional rail, a Directive 2001/16/EC for Interoperability was adopted by the Commission on March 19, 2001 and had to be implemented in the Member States by late April 2003. More importantly, the EU’s so-called “second railway package” – establishing a European Railway Agency and outlining three additional rail-related directives – was passed via the EU’s co-decision procedure in April 2004, with a third package aimed at further opening the rail market for international services already adopted by the Commission. The Commission is thus confident that new Trans-European high-speed and upgraded lines can and will from now on be built to the new interoperability standards.10 Not surprisingly, when looking at the key stakeholders involved in making the TEN-T priority high-speed rail lines truly interoperable, a significant shift away from high-level to mid- to lower level bureaucrats at the EU can be discerned. At the same time, high-powered lobby groups such as the ERT leave the scene in favor of international organizations, associations, and NGOs with specific expertise in the rail sector. Key commentators on the various directives were the International Union of Public Transport (UITP), the Community of
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European Railways (CER), the International Union of Railways (UIC), and the Union of European Railway Industries (UNIFE) as well as the Brussels-based umbrella organization of European Traffic Clubs, Transport and Environment (T&E). Together with the European Commission, UITP, CER, UIC, and UNIFE created the European Research Advisory Council (ERRAC) which aimed to bring together “all stakeholders in the railway sector in Europe.” Conceived as an advisory board to the EU, ERRAC made interoperability one of its five priority themes, and began to forge strategic alliances between the Commission, national government representatives, and other private and public organizations. ERRAC, whose primary mission is “to establish and carry forward a Strategic Rail Research Agenda that will influence all stakeholders in the planning of research programmes, particularly national and EU programmes,”11 thus exhibits an interesting membership structure, which could in fact be said to comprise an entire “policy network” of European rail within itself. Its terms of reference specify a structure whereby its 40 members are to come from Member States (15), European Commission (4), manufacturing industry (6), Research establishments and academia (2), operators (5), infrastructure managers (3), environmental (1) and urban planning (1) organizations and transport users groups (freight (2), rail safety (1)