Nepal and Bangladesh: a global studies handbook

NEPAL and BANGLADESH A Global Studies Handbook

Other Titles in ABC-CLIO’s

GLOBAL STUDIES: ASIA Series Japan, Lucien Ellington The Koreas, Mary E. Connor Vietnam, L. Shelton Woods FORTHCOMING China, Robert LaFleur India, Fritz Blackwell

GLOBAL STUDIES: ASIA

NEPAL and BANGLADESH A Global Studies Handbook Nanda R. Shrestha

Santa Barbara, California—•—Denver, Colorado—•—Oxford, England

Copyright 2002 by Nanda R. Shrestha All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Shrestha, Nanda R. Nepal and Bangladesh : a global studies handbook / Nanda R. Shrestha. p. cm. — (Global studies, Asia) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-57607-285-1 (Hardcover : alk. paper) ISBN 1-85109-365-6 (e-book) 1. Nepal—Handbooks, manuals, etc. 2. Bangladesh—Handbooks, manuals, etc. I. Title. II. Series. DS393.4 .S55 2002 954.96—dc21 2002007223 06 05 04 03 02—10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an e-book. Visit abc-clio.com for details. ABC-CLIO, Inc. 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 This book is printed on acid-free paper. Manufactured in the United States of America

To Rev. Jon Magnuson, a loving brother, true friend, and confidant, who gave me a new life thirty years ago and who is always there for me and my family.

Contents Series Editor’s Foreword—xi Preface—xiii Acknowledgments—xix Maps—xxi

NEPAL 1 PART ONE: NARRATIVE SECTION—3 Geography and History of Nepal—5 Physical and Human Geography—7 Ecology and Regional Division—8 The Monsoon and Nepali Life—15 A Sketch of Human Habitation—17 A Historical Profile—21 Ancient History—22 Medieval History—25 Modern History—28 Conclusion—39

The Economy of Nepal—43 Government’s Role in the Economy—45 Economic Planning and Foreign Aid—45 Planning and Some Key Economic Sectors—50 Conclusion: Future Prospects—68

Nepali Institutions—73 Government and Politics—74 The Dawn and Death of Democracy and Economic Stagnation—75 Return of Democracy and the Multiparty System—80 Nepal and the World—82 Ethnic Groups, Castes, and Social Classes—85 Ethnic Groups—85 The Caste System—90 Social Classes and Stratification—93 ——vii

viii—— Contents Religion and Society—95 Hinduism—97 Buddhism—99 Education—101 Education under Rana Rule—101 Education since 1951—103 Conclusion—104

Nepali Society and Contemporary Issues—107 Family and Kinship Networks—107 Women’s Status in Society—110 Gender Relations—114 Child Labor—116 Popular Culture and Recreation—117 Hindi Movies—118 Western Popular Culture—119 Drug Use—121 Recreational Activities—121 The Internet—125 Conclusion—126

PART TWO: REFERENCE MATERIALS—129 Key Events in Nepali History—131 Significant People, Places, and Events—137 Nepali Language, Food, and Etiquette—151 Language—151 Food and Beverages—154 Common Nepali Dishes—155 Common Nepali Beverages—158 Etiquette—159

Nepal-Related Organizations—163 Business and Economic—163 Culture, Education, and Exchange—165 Nepal’s Government Representatives in the United States—167 Tourism—168

Annotated Bibliography of Recommended Works on Nepal—171

——Contents——ix

BANGLADESH 179 PART ONE: NARRATIVE SECTION—181 Geography and History of Bangladesh—183 Physical and Human Geography—184 Climate and Rainfall—187 Forests—191 Population—192 History—198 Early History—198 Mughal (Islamic) Rule—200 British Rule—201 The Pakistan Period—204 The War for Independence—206 Independent Bangladesh—207 Conclusion—209

The Economy of Bangladesh—211 Agriculture—213 Industry—218 Service Sector—221 Poverty—223 Public Finance and Foreign Aid Dependency—226 Economic Performance and Barriers to Growth—227 Conclusion—229

Bangladeshi Institutions—231 Government and Politics—232 The Mujib Era (1972–1975)—232 The Zia Regime (1977–1981)—233 The Ershad Regime (1982–1991)—234 The Begum Zia Regime (1991–1996)—235 The Sheikh Hasina Regime (1996–2001)—236 The Second Begum Zia Regime (2001–)—237 Bangladesh and the World—239 Ethnicity and Social System—241 Ethnic Groups—241 Social System—243 Religion and Society—245 Education—249

x—— Contents Educational System—249 Literacy—251 Religious Education—252 Conclusion—253

Bangladeshi Society and Contemporary Issues—255 Culture of Corruption and Violence—256 Lawlessness and Corruption—256 Gender Violence—258 Other Violence—261 Women’s Status in Society—262 Child Labor—264 Popular Culture and Recreation—266 Conclusion—269

PART TWO: REFERENCE MATERIALS—271 Key Events in Bangladeshi History—273 Significant People, Places, and Events—277 Bangladeshi Language, Food, and Etiquette—285 Language—285 Food and Beverages—286 Common Bangladeshi Dishes—287 Common Bangladeshi Beverages—289 Etiquette—290

Bangladesh-Related Organizations—293 Business and Economics—293 Culture, Education, and Exchange—295 Bangladesh’s Government Representatives in the United States—298 Tourism—298

Annotated Bibliography of Recommended Works on Bangladesh—301 Index—305

About the Author—323

Series Editor’s Foreword It is imperative that as many Americans as possible develop a basic understanding of Asia. In an increasingly interconnected world, the fact that Asia contains almost 60 percent of all the planet’s population is argument enough for increased knowledge of the continent on our parts. There are at least four other reasons, in addition to demography, that it is critical Americans become more familiar with Asia. Americans of all ages, creeds, and colors are extensively involved economically with Asian countries. U.S.-Pacific two-way trade surpassed our trade with Europe in the 1970s. Japan, with the world’s second-largest economy, is also the second-largest foreign investor in the United States. American companies constitute the leading foreign investors in Japan. The recent Asian economic crisis notwithstanding, since World War II East Asia has experienced the fastest rate of economic growth of all the world’s regions. Recently, newly industrialized Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand have joined the so-called Four Tigers—Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan—as leading areas for economic growth. In the past decade China has begun to realize its potential to be a worldinfluencing economic actor. Many Americans now depend upon Asians for their economic livelihoods and all of us consume products made in or by Asian companies. It is impossible to be an informed American citizen without knowledge of Asia, a continent that directly impacts our national security. America’s war on terrorism is, as this foreword is composed, being conducted in an Asian country—Afghanistan. (What many Americans think of as the “Mideast” is, in actuality, Southwest Asia.) Both India and Pakistan now have nuclear weapons. The eventual reunification of the Korean Peninsula is fraught with the possibility of great promise or equally great peril. The question of U.S.-China relations is considered one of the world’s major global geopolitical issues. Americans everywhere are affected by Asian political and military developments. Asia and Asians have also become an important part of American culture. Asian restaurants dot the American urban landscape. Buddhism is rapidly growing in the United States. Asian movies are becoming ——xi

xii—— Series Editor’s Foreword

increasingly popular in the United States. Asian-Americans, while still a small percentage of the overall U.S. population, are one of the fastest-growing ethnic groups in the United States. Many AsianAmericans exert considerable economic and political influence in this country. Asian sports, pop music, and cinema stars are becoming household names in America. Even Chinese language characters are becoming visible in the United States on everything from baseball caps to t-shirts to license plates. Followers of the ongoing debate on American educational reform will constantly encounter references to Asian student achievement. Americans should also better understand Asia for its own sake. Anyone who is considered an educated person needs a basic understanding of Asia. The continent has a long, complex, and rich history. Asia is the birthplace of all the world’s major religions including Christianity and Judaism. Asian civilizations are some of the world’s oldest. Asian arts and literature rank as some of humankind’s most impressive achievements. Our objectives in developing the Global Studies: Asia series are to assist a wide variety of citizens to both gain a basic understanding of Asian countries and to enable readers to be better positioned for more in-depth work. We envision the series being appropriate for libraries, educators, high school, introductory college and university students, businesspeople, would-be tourists, and anyone who is curious about an Asian country or countries. Although there is some variation in the handbooks—the diversity of the countries requires slight variations in treatment—each volume includes narrative chapters on history and geography, economics, institutions, and society and contemporary issues. Readers should obtain a sound general understanding of the particular Asian country about which they read. Each handbook also contains an extensive reference section. Since our guess is that many of the readers of this series will actually be traveling to Asia or interacting with Asians in this country, introductions to language, food, and etiquette are included. The reference section of each handbook also contains extensive information— including Web sites when relevant—about business and economic, cultural, educational, exchange, government, and tourist organizations. The reference sections also include capsule descriptions of famous people, places, and events and a comprehensive annotated bibliography for further study. —Lucien Ellington Series Editor

Preface The most important aspect of story writing is not the style one writes in, but the feelings one is able to convey . . . It is like hearing, understanding, and following the heartbeat of the people.

—Madan Mani Dixit Indeed, “hearing, understanding, and following the heartbeat of the people.” What Madan Dixit—a distinguished Nepali journalist who also writes novels—says about story writing is generally true of book writing as well. After all, virtually every book contains a story of a people, place, and time. The bubbling question is: Does the story convey the feelings, the heartbeat of the people, place, and time it covers? When Dr. Lucien Ellington, the editor of the Global Studies: Asia series, approached me to write this book, I was quite apprehensive. I felt the tight grip of my inner fear. Besides the daunting task of writing a book, what concerned me most was the essence of the question posed above. What is the point of writing a book if the story is devoid of substance, if it fails to engender feelings? So I had to first search for some meaning and message for the book before I could commit myself to the demanding task of writing it. It is not that the book lacked thematic topics, but it was important to weave those topics into a coherent story filled with feelings—a sense of people and places. Over the years, I have done my share of writing. To me, writing is generally fun. But it doesn’t always flow like a river, defying the mountains and masses of boulders it encounters along the way, running freely and creating its own gullies and fissures, deltas and plains. As it encounters a flat valley on the way to its eventual destination, it moves at a relaxed pace. Sometimes, the routine of writing feels like digging a canal, an arduous task. At any rate, writing is not about having fun no matter how fun it is to write. It is about conveying a message, not merely lifeless facts and figures or certain pieces of information. Writing has to have some message and meaning, although not everybody will agree with it. Then I began to ponder the issues to cover and the angles to pursue within the general framework of the series and, at the same time, to tell a meaningful story of Nepal and Bangladesh. One critical component of the story of this book is that both countries have failed to ——xiii

xiv—— Preface

free themselves from the shackles of their tortured pasts; each country has one foot tied to an internal feudalistic structure and the other to external domination. It is technically true that Nepal was never formally colonized in the manner that Bangladesh was. But this factual difference is largely superficial. Not too long after the British entered South Asia, they emerged as a powerful master that drew the subcontinent into its global imperial orbit. Even Nepal, which had managed to maintain its relative independence, was independent no more. Nepal was kept as a semicolony subjected to every savagery and trickery of colonialism that the world has known since its dawn—basically to the same fate that Caliban was forced to suffer in Shakespeare’s play, The Tempest, when colonial Prospero managed to control Caliban’s island as well as his destiny. In this respect, both Nepal and Bangladesh underwent the same fate as did the rest of South Asia, and they are both still reeling from the lingering specter of British colonialism. Today, the fortunes of both countries are deeply mired in the swamp of poverty that pervades every facet of life. It is nothing new, though, as its roots date far back in history. Both historically and at present, poverty is a subcontinental problem, by no means confined to the borders of Nepal and Bangladesh. In the pages of some ancient Hindu texts, one can find references to people being stricken by massive poverty. For instance, there is a parabolic story about Lord Krishna’s divine act (miracle), one in which he transforms a morsel of mustard greens into a bountiful feast to feed a mass of humanity suffering from starvation. But this entrenched historical malady developed a new and much grimmer face as the subcontinent was brought under British colonialism, which was bent on bleeding its colonies white. Yet it would be intellectually questionable and sociohistorically naive for anyone to claim that British colonialism, no matter how pernicious, was the sole perpetrator of the ongoing problems facing Nepal and Bangladesh—or, for that matter, South Asia as a whole. Equally responsible for the contemporary woes of both countries are their feudalistic institutions and factional politics. Caught in the vortex of external colonialism and internal institutional deformities, both Nepal and Bangladesh are having difficulty emerging from the dark shadow of their past in order to effectively manage the present. How well they will navigate their future or what kind of a future awaits them is a deeper question that is hard to answer at this time with any degree of certainty. Although geographically separated by a narrow strip of Indian ter-

——Preface——xv

ritory (see Map of South Asia), Nepal and Bangladesh evidently share many commonalities. There are, to be sure, noticeable differences between the two countries—in fact, some quite stark, such as their physiographic features and population sizes. Whereas Nepal is mostly mountainous, Bangladesh is largely a lowland country with a few scattered low hills. Even though they are relatively close in terms of their total areal size, Bangladesh has more than five times as many people as Nepal does. Furthermore, Nepal is dominated by Hindus and Bangladesh by Muslims. Nonetheless, they are immersed into the same drainage system that traverses the whole length of their contiguous subcontinental landscape, gradually rising from the coastal lowlands to the snow-capped Himalayas. As a result, they are integral parts of the same environmental system, although their specific ecological locations and their characteristics within the system certainly vary. What is more, their common past of being incorporated into the British colonial orbit as well as their similar contemporary socioeconomic conditions place them on the same page. It is precisely these commonalities that led me to combine coverage of Nepal and Bangladesh into this volume. Although it would have been preferable to write a separate volume on each country, enough space was made available to put them together. In other words, this volume is sufficiently deep to provide a sound topical coverage of both countries without compromising the integrity of their individual stories born out of their collective experience and vista. To repeat, despite some regional peculiarities and differences, the socioeconomic stories of these two countries—separated at their historical birth—reveal remarkable similarities in terms of both content and trends. Simply expressed, a common thread ties them together, although, admittedly, the bond is nowhere near as tight as the one that exists between North and South Korea. In reading the present volume, one should not make the inevitable comparison and contrast between Nepal and Bangladesh in the same light as that presented in The Koreas: A Global Studies Handbook. In that book, the comparative perspective was natural as the two countries were built on the same historical, cultural, and linguistic foundation. They are (were) one country, fragmented into two parts because of the ideological dictation of cold war geopolitics. In a broader sense, therefore, the comparison and contrast between them is along the ideological line: communist North versus capitalist South and how they have fared in various arenas since their partition in the post–World War II period.

xvi—— Preface

On the Nepal-Bangladesh front, there are no inherent links like those between North and South Korea. Consequently, in spite of the thematic similarities and identical chapter headings to The Koreas, the present volume on Nepal and Bangladesh contains certain variations with respect to its topical focus and specific issues. It is, therefore, advisable that any similarities and contrasts that the reader may note between the two separate segments of this book should be treated with caution and interpreted in broader historical and social contexts rather than in their specific contents. However, in order to provide the reader a sense of continuity and comparison of the two segments in the text, I have tried to maintain as much consistency as possible in their thematic coverage. This is a deliberate format designed to facilitate the reader’s comparative understanding of Nepal and Bangladesh as well as selective focus. That is to say, if the reader chooses to pick out only certain topics for, say, Nepal, he or she can do so easily without being distracted by the same topics on Bangladesh. Before concluding this preface, I would like to draw the reader’s attention to two issues. First, in order to keep the story line simple and straightforward, I have kept the language as free of academic jargon as possible. Over the years, I have come to the conclusion that the most effective way to tell a story and convey its feelings to the reader is to keep the language simple and accessible. Although I can’t claim total freedom from jargon, my academic writing has surely taught me enough to realize that language often gets in the way of a story or at least makes it inaccessible or cumbersome to the general public. When the story is lost, both its message and meaning are lost. Second, although the reader will, no doubt, be the ultimate judge of the stories of Nepal and Bangladesh told in this book, it is incumbent on me to inform the reader that it is written from my insideroutsider perspective. This is particularly true of the Nepal segment. I am both an insider and an outsider to Nepal. As a person born and raised there for the first 22 years of my life who has conducted plenty of fieldwork in the country, I am keenly familiar with its interior contours and exterior textures. On the other hand, as an academician trained and teaching in America, I am an outsider automatically. In my role as an insider-outsider, I generally read the Nepali landscape as a distant observer, wearing a pair of theoretical glasses, but always with an insider’s instinct, insight, and understanding. Given my unique role, I could not fully isolate myself as a storyteller from the story itself, for I am, at least by association, a part of

——Preface——xvii

it. In addition, some of the issues and topics covered in the book are deeply seeped in my bones—they have shaped the course of my life as well as my perspective since my early days back in Nepal. Yet I have kept the story straight not only to portray a genuine picture but to maintain its integrity. As an author, it is precisely this insider-outsider perspective—the eyes of an outsider and the feel of an insider—that I hope pulsates the heartbeat of the story as it unfolds and that the reader finds it refreshing to read and revealing in content.

——Geography and History——xix

Acknowledgments First of all, I would like to thank Dr. Lucien Ellington for asking me to write this book and for his many insightful comments and suggestions on its earlier draft. In addition, I am extremely grateful to Florida A&M University and to Dr. Sybil C. Mobley, dean of the University’s School of Business and Industry, for granting me a sabbatical leave to work on this book. Without their support and commitment to faculty scholarship, it would have been extremely difficult for me to complete the book in a timely manner. My sincere thanks go to Alicia Merrit, Carol Smith, Liz Kincaid, and Scott Horst at ABCCLIO for their unsurpassed professionalism, responsiveness, and constant support during the preparation and production of this volume and to Michelle Asakawa, whose meticulous copyediting has immensely elevated its quality. Thank you to Bill Nelson for drawing the maps. I also owe a great deal to my wife, Pamela, and son, Kiran, for their patience and understanding while I was engrossed in its writing and often negligent of my family responsibilities. Much of the book’s Bangladesh segment was coauthored with Dr. Bimal K. Paul. Born and raised in Bangladesh, Dr. Paul received his early education in his native country and his Ph.D. education in the United States. Currently a professor of geography at Kansas State University, he has published numerous professional journal articles on a variety of topics concerning Bangladesh. I am thankful to Bimal for his friendship, as well as his scholarly support and contribution to this volume.

——xix

xx——K O R E A : A Global Studies Handbook

——Geography and History——xxi

Map of South Asia

——xxi

Map of Nepal

——

Map of Bangladesh

NEPAL

PART ONE

NARRATIVE SECTION

Geography and History of Nepal The Bagmati is a river that flows right next to Pashupati, one of the holiest Hindu shrines, located in the heart of Kathmandu. This locational link makes the Bagmati more than simply a river meandering through a valley; to Hindus, it is a holy river, a revered cremation site in the Kathmandu Valley. Metaphorically, however, it has emerged in recent years as an uncanny symbol of what is rapidly unfolding in Nepal—a deepening tension between enduring traditional values and inevitable outcomes of soaring Westernization. Now a battle is brewing over the Bagmati. Because its water level is no longer sufficient to flush out ashes and human remains from endless cremations, concerns have been raised about the river’s continuing viability. So, at the suggestion of Western agencies and environmentalists, a proposal has been floated to launch an electric crematorium. But devout Hindu traditionalists are at a loggerheads with modern environmentalists over this proposal because they prefer “last rites to be performed in a manner and place prescribed by the Veda and other (Hindu) scriptures,” that is, on the bank of a holy river such as the Bagmati (Adhikary 2000). Nepal is thus a living exhibit of contradictions and conflicts, for example, between the young and old, tradition and modernity, and the past and present. As one middle-aged Nepali (or Nepalese) put it, “No Nepalese has lived or ever again will live a life like mine. My parents were born in the Middle Ages. My son belongs to the 21st century. Only my life spans both the Middle Ages and the new millennium. No Nepalese will ever again live in three epochs. Someday you must tell the story of how Nepal went from the Middle Ages to the 21st century” (quoted in Allman 2000, 98–102). What is notable about this epochal leap is that it has all happened within a short stretch of forty years. Yet it seems like a long lifetime for the post–World War II generation like myself, ironically because the transformation has been rapid, forcing one to wonder in disbelief: How could somebody who grew up in

5

6——NEPAL and BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Valley farmland with the morning sun-kissed hills in the background and a family farmhouse with a thatch roof in the foreground (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)

——Geography and History of Nepal——7

medieval times be experiencing the world of high-tech and material marvels? How could a person who grew up in the midst of ancient belief that the earth was flat and for whom time and distance seemed completely frozen suddenly be watching CNN live? Although the older generations tend to cling to traditional values, Nepal’s younger generation is mesmerized by everything Western—including X-rated movies on television that go against Hindu tenets of modesty, where even simple kissing in public is taboo. This deepening juxtaposition is increasingly turning into what can be described as an intergenerational cultural tension between the old and new. Compounding this cultural tension is the fact that the country is faced with a massive growth of material consumerism and population. As a result, Nepal is witnessing an array of problems rarely seen until about two decades ago. These problems range from increasing impoverishment to a breakdown in social order to pollution and commercialized prostitution. Because Nepal has been unable to effectively deal with its mounting problems, Western agencies have been all too eager to propose solutions, thereby giving rise to yet another problem—of East versus West.

PHYSICAL AND HUMAN GEOGRAPHY Nepal is a small landlocked country of less than 55,000 square miles, where more than 23 million human souls are compressed. Sandwiched between the two Asian giants—China and India—its geographical position is hardly enviable, as it has been traditionally characterized as a yam trapped between two rocks (see map of Nepal). The country is separated from its other two neighboring countries, Bangladesh and Bhutan, by a narrow strip of Indian territory. The territorial detachment from Bangladesh is particularly notable, for it makes Nepal totally dependent on India for its external transit routes and sea access, even for most goods and products coming from China. The country is, hence, absolutely vulnerable to India’s trade and transit policy toward Nepal, as was demonstrated by the trade embargo that the former imposed on the latter in 1989. It is precisely this geographical squeeze between China and India that has historically played a paramount role in defining Nepal’s human geography, cultural landscapes,

8——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

economic life, and diplomatic navigation. In other words, the way of life in Nepal, as it has evolved over many centuries, cannot be diagnosed in isolation from the hard realities of its geography— both from its relative locational and physiographic perspectives. An elongated rectangle nestled in the vast slopes of the majestic Himalayan massifs, Nepal stretches from west to east much like Tennessee in the United States. With a total area of 56,827 square miles, the country is roughly 25 percent larger than Tennessee (42,144 square miles), however, and the physiographic features of the two are very different. To be sure, Tennessee has its share of ridges and valleys, but they seem like mere bumps and dips compared to those found in Nepal. So stark is the difference that the comparison actually appears quite awkward. Nepal is perhaps the most mountainous country in the world, at least in terms of altitude, featuring six of the world’s ten tallest peaks. Included among these peaks is, of course, Mt. Everest, the most imposing of all, which the Nepalis fondly call Sagarmatha— the roof of the world. Despite its highly mountainous and hilly topography, about 20 percent of Nepal’s total land area lies in the subtropical lowland called the Tarai, bordering India. Indeed, within a mere south-north span of some 100 miles between its Indian and Chinese borders, Nepal’s altitude ranges from barely a couple of hundred feet above sea level to the tallest point on the earth’s surface. Consequently, the country constitutes an array of climatic zones, encompassing almost all of those found on the whole continent of North America—from the subtropical jungle and hot, humid conditions to the arcticlike permafrost regime of the snow-clad Himalayas to the arid condition of the inner Himalayan region that extends into the Tibetan (Xizang) plateau. Not surprisingly, the country’s temperature regimes are determined more by its altitudinal variations than its latitudinal location, ranging from subzero tundra conditions to over 100 degrees F in the southwestern Tarai during the premonsoon season of April and May.

Ecology and Regional Division From the lowland Tarai belt, Nepal’s elevations rise in successive hill and mountain ranges like a massive stairway, ultimately

——Geography and History of Nepal——9

reaching the soaring heights of the Himalayas and then taking a dive toward the Tibetan plateau (Sill and Kirkby 1991, 53). This magnificent rise in elevations is punctuated by valleys situated between the mountain ranges. The country is commonly considered to be composed of three broad physiographic regions based on elevation changes and ecological variations. They are (1) the mountain (Himalayan) region, (2) the hill region, and (3) the Tarai region. All three regions extend as contiguous ecological belts, occasionally bisected by the country’s drainage (river) systems and valleys. The Mountain Region. The mountain region, the Nepali term for which is parbat, is situated 12,000 feet above sea level and lies to the north of the hill region. Because the Great Himalayan Range passes through this region, the most imposing features of its landscape obviously are these renowned snow-capped mountains. The region’s inclement climate and harsh topography limit human habitation and make economic activities extremely arduous. It is no wonder, therefore, that the region is very sparsely populated, with less than 8 percent of Nepal’s total population living there. Whatever farming activity is found in this region is mostly confined to its valleys and the river basins, the same areas where most of the settlements are concentrated. The fact that the region consists of only 5 percent of Nepal’s total cultivatable land is quite telling of its agricultural status. This geographical limitation on farming is further compounded by a harsh climatic condition. The two economic activities most commonly practiced by mountain dwellers are pastoralism and trans-Himalayan trade. As regards the former, Nepali herders move their goth (temporary shelters), along with herds consisting of mostly goats and sheep, between the mountains in the summer and the valleys in the winter (see Zurick and Karan 1999). In a similar fashion, Himalayan traders migrate seasonally between Tibet to the north and the hills and lowlands to the south, buying and selling goods and products in order to generate income and to secure food supplies for the winter months, when such movement comes to a complete halt (Furer-Haimendorf 1975). This historical north-south trade has, however, witnessed a noticeable decline over recent years, following the annexation of Tibet by China in the late 1950s. This decline has resulted

10——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Machhapuchhre (fish tail mountain) as seen from Pokhara. Part of the Annapurna Range, this peak is considered to be the most beautiful mountain in Nepal. (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)

in a significant change in the regional economy and human geography of the mountains, as its inhabitants, especially those from the upper crusts of society belonging to the Thakali and Manange groups, have increasingly moved southward to urban centers, scattered in the hills and Tarai. Many of those traders have now become settled merchants in these urban centers. Despite its limited human habitation, the Himalayan Range fulfills two valuable functions. First, it acts as a series of massive walls, effectively preventing the bursts of freezing arctic air masses from Inner Asia from penetrating the lower southern hills and valleys, including the Tarai. This not only insures relatively warmer winters in these regions than otherwise would be the case but extends their effective growing season, thus permitting a higher level of aggregate farm outputs. Second, the Himalayas serve as a powerful hydraulic force in two respects: (1) When the masses of moist clouds from the Bay of Bengal encounter these permafrost walls, condensation occurs, and resulting precipita-

——Geography and History of Nepal——11

tion is bounced back in the form of monsoon rains that determine the economic fate of hundreds of millions of farmers throughout Nepal, Bangladesh, and India; and (2) the mountains are the source of most of the rivers that drain the subcontinent, eventually finding their way to the Bay of Bengal. As peasants and farmers across the subcontinent plow their rice fields year after year, it is these waters from the monsoon rains and mountain rivers that fill the furrows and nourish the paddies. So, to the countless peasants and farmers who dominate the economic life and landscape on the subcontinent, these mountains embody an eternal source of life. When the mountains are dry, farmers suffer and life is sapped. When the mountains are moist and wet, life radiates vigor and vitality. Too, the Himalayan Range played another role during the cold war era. The U.S. government saw it as a formidable barrier to block the sweeping march of Red China into the Indian subcontinent. The tiny, remote country of Nepal thus became a valuable player on the U.S. geopolitical chessboard. The policy gained heightened significance following China’s territorial annexation of Tibet. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) responded by training and arming Tibetan guerrilla bands to engage in armed insurgencies into Tibet. From the highlands of Nepal along the border, the Tibetan guerrillas routinely conducted raids across the border, thereby placing Nepal in a tenuous diplomatic position vis-à-vis China. One tragic outcome of this operation was that those Tibetan guerrillas turned into a menacing force, periodically terrorizing Nepali villages in the highlands, including raping and looting. However, those guerrilla bands have now been disbanded. The Hill Region. Commonly called the pahar in Nepali, the hill region lies mostly between 2,000 and 12,000 feet in altitude and includes the Mahabharat Range. This range is basically a chain of middle mountains that merges with the Himalayan Range to their north. In addition to many intermontane valleys, the region includes two well-known and relatively large valleys: Pokhara and Kathmandu. The Valley of Kathmandu is perhaps the most fertile of all, both in terms of its soil composition and a productivity per unit of land that approaches the Japanese level. The farmers of this valley, invariably known as jyapus, are renowned

12——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Terraced farmland in the pahar, the hill region of Nepal (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)

throughout the country for their farming skills. Containing approximately 1.5 million people within its three districts of Kathmandu, Lalitpur (Patan), and Bhaktapur, the Kathmandu Valley is the single most urbanized area in the country, with a long history and deep cultural roots. It is not only the nerve center of Nepal, both historically and in contemporary times, it is also the cradle of Nepali culture and civilization. Thanks to the centrality of the Kathmandu Valley, the hill region has long functioned as the political and cultural heart of Nepal. Consequently, whether justified or not, it is the pahar that bestows Nepal with its national identity, popularly known as Nepali. The pahar has historically contained the largest population in Nepal—almost 53 percent in 1971. However, as a result of heavy hill outmigration that began in the 1960s, the area has lost population and power to the Tarai region. According to the latest projection for 2001, the hills retain less than 45 percent of the total national population (Ministry of Population and Environment 1998, vol. 2).

——Geography and History of Nepal——13

The famous ancient peacock window in Bhaktapur. Crafted from a single piece of wood, the window is a popular tourist attraction and an embodiment of the Newars’ artistic achievements. (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)

The hill landscape is a cultural mosaic, a masterpiece of agrarian art and survival imperatives. Sculptured into a wonderful complex of winding terraces, the region on the whole is extensively cultivated. Although agriculture remains the predominant economic activity, the hills contain only 38 percent of the nation’s total cultivatable land, a significant portion of it being pakho (upland or dry land), meaning that it is not very hospitable for paddy production. The pahar as a whole suffers from chronic food shortages, which generally intensify as one moves westward. In short, its regional economic vulnerability runs deep. The situation is particularly acute in the Kathmandu Valley, as its susceptibility to external dependency was openly bared during the Indian economic embargo of 1989. The Tarai Region. Although geographically conjoined, the Tarai (plain) stands in complete topographic and climatic contrast to the mountain (parbat) and hill (pahar) regions to its north. It

14——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

is a lowland subtropical belt straddling the Nepal-India border, along the northern extension of India’s vast Gangetic Plain. Its altitude rises gradually from about 200 feet to 2,000 feet at the foot of the Siwalik Range, also known as the Chure Hills. The word Tarai, which is derived from Persian, means “damp” and appropriately describes its hot and humid climatic conditions. The level of precipitation declines gradually as one moves toward its western frontier, where the premonsoon temperature in April and May can reach well above 100 degrees F, thus making the weather condition extremely oppressive. The region is formed and fed by the three primary river systems of Nepal: the Kosi (east), Gandaki (central), and Karnali (west), all of which eventually join the Ganges River in northern India. Until the early 1950s, the region was a dense malarial subtropical jungle, commonly known as the char kose jhari (i.e., approximately 8-miles-wide dense forests). During the early period of the subcontinental British Raj, the Tarai acted as a defensive frontier against the British imperial incursion into Nepal. In its role as a front line of defense, it was the extreme malarial condition of the dense Tarai forests that was the most potent weapon against the British—a sort of natural biological warfare. To maintain the maximum potency of this malarial biological deterrence, the forests were generally left undisturbed. Today, however, malaria has been contained, and vast patches of those dense forests have disappeared through both legal and illegal logging, with much of the reclaimed wastelands being converted into farms. The Tarai’s sociopolitical standing in Nepal has fallen grievously short of its enormous economic and defensive importance. Successive ruling elites of Nepal regarded the Tarai as an internal economic colony and cultural backwater. Instead of systematically integrating it into the national political economy, it was consistently viewed with suspicion as having close affinity toward India rather than pledging its allegiance to the central authority. In essence, as an internal colonial possession, the Tarai was merely a bountiful territory to serve the economic interests of the Kathmandu-based aristocracy (Regmi 1984, 13). In fact, the region was not incorporated into the national configuration until the early 1950s. Starting in the mid-1950s, a new

——Geography and History of Nepal——15

picture began to emerge, as this internal colony was converted into a land frontier for resettlement by the pahari (hill) residents. The Nepali government opened up this land frontier by implementing a series of planned agricultural resettlement schemes in the Tarai, from east to west, as an integral feature of its national development plan. Although the policy was designed expressly to resettle hill victims of natural calamities and to mitigate population pressure in the hills, it also signaled the Nepali government’s not-so-subtle attempt at paharization of the Tarai through pahari resettlement (Gaige 1975). In essence, it signified a systematic attempt to neutralize, or even overcome, the perceived pro-India sentiment of the Tarai dwellers by populating the region with pahari residents who were presumed to be culturally superior and promonarchy, the power axis of Nepal’s hill-based central authority. It was a demographic approach to regional unity—that is, nationalization of the hill culture and authority through demographic domination of the Tarai by pahari residents. Despite its depleted forest base, the Tarai remains the principal source of commercial forestry in Nepal. In addition, with 57 percent of Nepal’s cultivatable land, the Tarai unquestionably remains the country’s granary, and all this with limited technological inputs and at a level of per-unit land productivity that is generally less than one-third of what Japanese farmers have achieved. Its relatively high agricultural prospect is complemented by a viable industrial and commercial potential due to its close proximity to India and reasonable transportation networks. It is Nepal’s richest economic region.

The Monsoon and Nepali Life The rhythm of life in Nepal is intrinsically intertwined with its physical environment. Geography is therefore not merely a geological entity but an indicator of life deeply imbued with cultural meaning and rituals, social customs and values. Nowhere is this relationship more keenly demonstrated than in the annual drama of what is commonly known as the monsoon, a climatic phenomenon that forms the umbilical cord of Nepali life. The annual cycle of the monsoon evokes both fear and reverence. To Nepali farmers and peasants, the monsoon is their rain god, who can be as

16——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Women weeding in a rice field in the Tarai. These hill migrant women, who have settled in the Tarai, represent a common scene during the weeding cycle of rice farming as weeding is usually done by women in a group setting. (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)

richly nurturing as ravagingly punishing. It all depends on the timing of its arrival. So, during every rice planting season, farmers and peasants await its arrival with a sense of urgency and eagerness, with profound fears and high hopes. As reliant as Nepali life is on the monsoon, its timely arrival is rarely assured. The start of the annual summer monsoon can vary by as much as a month, though it normally arrives in Nepal in early June. This is the season when the celestial drama of life begins in Nepal, featuring the interplay between the towering mountains and the monsoon clouds surging from the Bay of Bengal. As the mountains and the monsoon clouds engage in their swirling annual tango, Nepali farmers are busy in the valleys and lowlands, readying their fields for paddy cultivation. For the next 3–4 weeks, farmers work like bees to prepare the fields and plant rice seedlings. They wake up at the rooster’s first crow, pack their breakfast (often roasted corn or some type of homemade bread),

——Geography and History of Nepal——17

collect their tools, and hit the roads on their way to the fields, some to prepare the soil and others to plant rice seedlings. If the rain god fails to descend with nimbus clouds bearing rains, farmers fear for a life condemned to misery, and they begin to pray. The new crops of rice, the grain of life across monsoon Asia, will suffer, and the harvests will be reduced, adversely affecting millions of lives. Such is the fragility of life in Nepal, all dependent on one timely stroke of the mighty monsoon. Nepal’s plains and hills receive more than 70 percent of their annual precipitation during the summer monsoon. The amount of summer monsoon rain generally declines from southeast to northwest as the maritime wedge of air gradually becomes thinner and dryer. Although the summer monsoon is critical for farmers and peasants, it does not always represent an eternal blessing. Periodically, the monsoon turns violent, causing immense landslides and flooding. Consequently, human lives and livestock are lost, farmlands are washed away, and properties are destroyed. Besides these visible losses, day-to-day life becomes ruptured. As basic an act as daily cooking can be severely affected. Everything is so damp and soaked in rain that it is very difficult to find relatively dry firewood to cook food. Lighting a fire suddenly becomes a defiant challenge. As a result, the simple task of cooking rice turns into a daunting chore. This situation is particularly precarious for Nepal’s countless poor, for whom gathering firewood is a daily routine like securing food itself.

A Sketch of Human Habitation The demographic history of Nepal is filled with stories of migrants from both north and south. The hill region long ago became a meeting ground, a sanctuary, for the surrounding peoples and cultures. The ancient migration of the nomadic Mongoloid people from Tibet began during the unrecorded period of Nepal’s history. Available ethnic and linguistic data suggest that there were at least three distinct waves of migration into the country from the north. The first wave came primarily from the eastern and central parts of Mongolia, especially ancestors of the tribal groups such as the Kiratas (Rais and Limbus) who are concentrated in the eastern hills. The second wave most probably was composed of the Gurungs and

18——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Magars, whose geographical domain within Nepal is found in the central hills. Finally, the third wave, a fairly recent one, brought the distinctively “Tibeto-Himalayan” people such as the Dolpos in the western hills and Sherpas and Lepchas in the eastern hills, in all likelihood crossing the Himalayas only after Tibet’s conversion to Buddhism in the mid-seventh century. It is believed that these different tribal groups journeyed to the lush hills from the cold and dry Inner Himalayan region of Tibet for economic and climatic reasons. They wandered over the Himalayan passes to escape the bareness and the bitter cold of the Tibetan plateau and to seek forage for their animals in the warm, wet valleys on the southern slopes of the mountains. The earliest arrivals were pushed further south by each successive wave of later arrivals. These southward waves of migrants were later followed by the northward movements of the Indo-Aryans into the hills of Nepal. They first reached the western hills of Nepal somewhat less than 1,000 years ago (Gaige 1975). Concurrent with their migration were waves of immigration of high-caste Hindus from Indian border districts, mostly Brahmans and Rajputs, fleeing the religious crusade of invading Muslims and their subsequent tyranny against the Hindus. The northward migration of those Hindus had major consequences on Nepal’s socioeconomic transformation, including their exploitative relations with Mongoloid migrant groups. Prior to the arrival of the Aryans, the mode of production commonly found among the Mongoloids was communal. They generally practiced animal herding and limited cultivation, usually characterized as slash-and-burn agriculture. Production was based on kinship relations and communal alliances rather than class stratification. Property was characterized by communal land ownership, known as the kipat system. This system of land ownership was not only equitable and just but was based on a number of considerations, such as family needs and communal responsibility, respect, and welfare. If a family had more land than it needed, it was reallocated to others in the community. The tribal organization of land under the kipat system was equally concerned with the protection of the physical environment, making provisions for household-level fodder and fuel-collecting rights as well as imposing rules allocating certain amounts of land for grazing, so that overgrazing would not result.

——Geography and History of Nepal——19

In all likelihood, the communal mode of production found among most Mongoloid tribal groups was at a rudimentary level of technological advancement. As a result, it gradually yielded to the relatively more advanced agricultural farming technology and class-structured social institution brought with them by the immigrants from India. These Indian immigrants increasingly asserted their socioeconomic dominance over the northern immigrants through social, cultural, educational, and political control. Grabbing tribal kipat lands through treachery and deceit, they gained institutional control and thus affected the gradual demise of the kipat system. The course of Nepal’s migration history took a new turn starting in the late nineteenth century, when the hills ceased to be the migration destination from either direction. Since then, they have emerged as the prime source of outmigration, mostly people going across the border into India in search of military and menial jobs. Although the migratory waves from the north stopped many centuries ago, the southern waves continue to this day. Prior to the 1950s, most of the southern migrants from the neighboring Bihar and West Bengal provinces of India were lured to Nepal by the possibilities of acquiring land in the Tarai. Migrants from these same Indian territories still cross the border into Nepal. Although some of these migrants control significant portions of trade and commerce in Tarai urban centers and in Kathmandu, most are engaged in semiskilled construction and repair labor as well as vegetable trade. The migration pattern between Nepal and India is thus distinctly a two-way flow. Despite voluminous outmigration, Nepal still contains a large population base. The current population is almost 23.5 million, with a total of 52 percent residing in the hill and mountain regions and 48 percent occupying the Tarai. In the past thirty years the population has more than doubled, with the fastest growth taking place in the Tarai, both through inmigration and natural growth (see table 1). Given the fact that the current annual rate of population growth is nearly 2.3 percent and that over 40 percent of the population is below the age of fifteen, there is little likelihood that growth will slow down any time soon. Such a scenario of continued high population growth is bound to pose a serious dilemma for Nepal, specifically in relations to its

20——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

existing economic resource base. The simple population density, as measured in terms of population per square mile (of the total physical area), currently stands at 413 persons. This simple density picture is, however, significantly different from what Shrestha, Conway, and Bhattarai (1999) term the economic density picture, which is calculated on the basis of the available primary resource base, such as land, forests, and livestock. In terms of these resources, the Tarai is better positioned to cope with its growing population than are the hills. Irrespective of the regional outlooks, there is little question that the overall relationship between Nepal’s population growth and limited economic resource base bodes ill, no matter how one dissects it.

Table 1. Regional Distribution of Population and Cultivated Land in Nepal, 1971–2001 Region

Population (in thousands)

Cultivated Area (in thousand acres)

1971

2001

Change

1971

Per capita

2001

Per capita

Hills & Mountains (%)

7,210 (62.4)

12,223* (52.1)

5,013 (-10.3)

1,737 (35.2)

0.24

2,189** (38.1)

0.17

Tarai (%)

4,346 (37.6)

11,231* (47.9)

6,885 (10.3)

3,195 (64.8)

0.74

3,558** (61.9)

0.32

11,556

23,454

6,906

4,932

0.42

5,748

0.25

TOTAL

Region

Total Area (sq. miles)

Density Based on Total Area 1971

2001

Hills & Mountains (%)

43,692 (76.9)

165

280

Tarai (%)

13,135 (23.1)

331

855

56,827

203

413

TOTAL

Sources: Ministry of Population and Environment. 1998. Population Projections for Nepal, 1996–2016. Vol. 2, table 3, 11. Kathmandu: Ministry of Population and Environment; Shrestha, Nanda, Dennis Conway, and Keshav Bhattarai. 1999. “Population Pressure and Land Resources in Nepal: A Revisit, Twenty Years Later.” Journal of Developing Areas 33: 249, table 2. ** These are projected figures. ** These figures are for 1991. Increase in cultivated areas from 1991 to 2001 is expected to be very minimal, if any.

——Geography and History of Nepal——21

The situation is further complicated by the fact that Nepal remains predominantly an agrarian country with only limited advancements in agricultural technology. The agrarian nature of the economy is reinforced by the fact that over 88 percent of the population still resides in rural areas. Barely 12 percent is concentrated in urban centers. This makes Nepal one of the least urbanized countries in the world. With the exception of the Kathmandu Valley, Nepal has never been a city-dominated country. But it is difficult to assume that the growth of urbanization alone would bring reprieve to what can be described as Nepal’s quadrangular problems of heavily agrarian economy, low resource base, high population growth, and low technological advancements. Historically, increased urbanization was directly correlated with economic development in Europe, Japan, and North America. In fact, it was precisely this historical mode (or model) of urban-industrial development that formed the basis for the major push that both Western and national economic development experts gave to urban-industrial development in the 1960s in most underdeveloped countries following their independence from colonialism. The debate still rages on regarding the efficacy or the universal applicability of the urban-industrial development model of the 1960s. The major dilemma for Nepal is that whatever urban growth has taken place over the past three decades has mostly resulted from—and in—the demographic shift of rural population to the cities, rather than the industrial economic expansion that propelled today’s advanced countries. To be more specific, what has occurred over the years is largely a geographical shift of rural poverty to urban areas. In light of the current trend of little direct correlation between urbanization and industrialization, and given Nepal’s geographical and resource limitations, as previously discussed, it is highly unlikely that the future urban growth will lead to sustained industrial growth and economic advancements.

A HISTORICAL PROFILE Nepal has a relatively long history. However, much of it, especially prior to the medieval period, is clouded due to the lack of specificity and definable records. Notwithstanding such lapses, the

22——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

country’s history can be segmented into three distinct periods: ancient, medieval, and what can be loosely termed modern.

Ancient History The ancient history of Nepal is based on chronicles that are literary rather than historical compositions and that can be traced to the origin of the Kathmandu Valley. These chronicles suggest that the Kathmandu Valley was once a lake. This lush lake basin surrounded by hills was drained by goddess Manjusri for human habitation by cutting a deep gorge in the mountains. The chronicles also offer an explanation for how the name Nepal was derived. A muni (sage) named Ne—commonly known as Ne Muni (or Nemuni)—appeared on the scene as the pala (protector) of the land and the founder of the first ruling dynasty. In other words, in early times, the country, if it could be defined as such, was called Ne-pala, the land protected by Ne. Subsequently, the name was shortened to Nepal. Ne Muni’s successors were called gopalavamshi (cow-herd dynasty), the descendants of the gopala (cow herders) lineage. They are generally recognized as Nepal’s first ruling dynasty, which was followed by members of the mahisapala (buffalo herders), forming the mahisapalavamshi (buffalo-herder dynasty). Such descriptive taxonomies as gopalas and mahisapalas found in the chronicles offer insight into the ancient way of life in Nepal, characterized by a pastoral stage of civilization rather than sedentary agriculture. The dynasty of mahisapalas was overthrown by the army of Yellung Kirata from the eastern hill areas of today’s Nepal, thereby establishing what is known as the Kirata dynasty. This was perhaps the first (and last) dynasty of distinctly Mongoloid origin to rule Nepal, which back then consisted mainly of the Kathmandu Valley and its surrounding regions. Moreover, Shaha (1992, 8) remarks, “it is with the Kiratas that the chronicles reach slightly more solid ground above the boggy realm of myth and legend. The Kiratas have a good deal more than the shadowy existence of their predecessors in the chronicle account, for they still exist. The Rais and Limbus of eastern Nepal are collectively known as Kiratis to this day . . . (and) celebrated in the well-known Hindu epic, the

——Geography and History of Nepal——23

Mahabharata . . . as a hill-tribe with remarkable skill in archery and warfare” (the very reason why the British army recruiters fancied Rais and Limbus for their imperial army). The Kirata dynasty lasted for at least 1,500 years. The Licchavi Period. The Kirata dynasty was succeeded by the Licchavi dynasty. Although it is not certain when exactly the Licchavis entered Nepal from the south and started their reign, their rule in Nepal must have commenced around the first century of the Christian era. Only with the ascension to the throne of a prominent Licchavi king named Manadeva I did Nepal move on to the terra firma of history supported by epigraphic records. As Manadeva’s inscriptions provided a reliable glimpse of recorded history, the veil of brackish history that afflicted early Nepal was finally lifted. His inscriptions reveal that he ruled the country from A.D. 464 to 508. In many respects, the Licchavi period marked a decisive departure from earlier eras in Nepal’s history. The Kathmandu Valley made an apparent transition from a pastoral economy to a wellestablished agricultural mode of production. As the valley increasingly developed urban characters, various artisan activities, along with trade and commerce, expanded. Long-distance trade was intimately connected to the spread of Buddhism and religious pilgrimage to places well beyond the valley. In fact, Nepali merchants and missionaries served as the primary conduit of the diffusion of Buddhism to Tibet and, subsequently, to central and east Asia. In return, Nepal managed to gain money from customs duties and goods that helped to support the Licchavi state. Manadeva I was the first Licchavi king responsible for bringing about change in Nepal’s social system and for the dawn of what can be loosely described as its architectural and artistic renaissance or heritage. Among the many successive ruling dynastic lineages of Nepal, chained together by an entourage of corrupt, selfserving kings and rulers, Manadeva I was believed to be one of the rarest beacons of light, a truly benevolent king. Perhaps the most significant change that Manadeva instituted was to put into circulation coins, thus introducing a monetary basis for economic transactions, a bedrock of social and economic transformation. Besides exhibiting qualities of advanced economic thinking, he held a liberal outlook on religion. Although himself a devotee of

24——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Lord Vishnu, he was believed to be instrumental in constructing Buddhist monasteries. Following the death of Manadeva I, it appears that a renewed challenge to the Licchavi monarchy from the feudatories that he had managed to suppress resurfaced. This was manifested during the reign of Sivadeva I (A.D. 590–604). One primary source of opposition was Amsuvarman, who was thought to have belonged to a western feudatory Thakuri clan. He pursued an interesting approach of opposition, implanting himself within Sivadeva’s court. He started out as an influential officer of the court and, later, managed to elevate himself to be a coruler, eventually succeeding Sivadeva I after the latter’s death. He ruled from A.D. 605 to 621. However, as a Thakuri ascending to the Licchavi throne, Amsuvarman’s case was, in all likelihood, comparable to that of the Khans in China. Like the Mongol Khans, who generally acculturated themselves to the Chinese culture, Amsuvarman adopted the Licchavi tradition. There is no indication, in other words, that his early opposition to the Licchavi rule led him to dismantle it. Amsuvarman adopted Sivadeva’s son, Udayadeva, as his heir, thus showing no inclination to start his Thakuri dynasty in the Kathmandu Valley. Very generous and liberal like Manadeva, Amsuvarman proved himself to be a highly able ruler, one who was also learned and enlightened in terms of his religious and philosophical outlook. In addition to Manadeva and Amsuvarman, the Licchavi dynasty saw a powerful monarch in Narendradeva, the son of Udayadeva, whose rule was relatively short. When his father was ousted from the throne, Narendradeva escaped to Tibet, seeking asylum. The Tibetan government later helped him reclaim his father’s throne, most likely in A.D. 643. It was indicated that during his rule, Tibet wielded influence over Nepal. Narendradeva was the first Nepali ruler to initiate formal diplomatic relations with the Chinese court when he sent a mission with lavish gifts to the emperor. With the passage of time, friendship between the two countries solidified. Narendradeva turned Nepal into a relatively prosperous country. Few would doubt that Nepal’s prosperity during his rule was directly attributed to growing trade and commerce. “The country had,” writes Shaha (1992, 21) “become a thriving centre by serv-

——Geography and History of Nepal——25

ing as a gateway from India to China, both for merchandise and for scholars who disseminated knowledge and culture as they traveled. About this time Nepal learned from China the art of paper making. Handmade paper of the finest quality was added to its traditional exports of musk, orpiment, blankets and other woollen goods to India.” Few Licchavi rulers after Narendradeva possessed his commanding power, personality, and acumen. The heyday of the Licchavi dynasty, in essence, reached its climax during his rule. From that point on, it saw its gradual decline, ultimately coming to an end in 879, during the rule of Manadeva IV. Raghavadeva, who followed Manadeva IV and whose rule began in 880, appears to have been the transitional ruler, separating the Licchavi period from the dawn of the medieval era. Indeed, the Licchavi period is often characterized as the “golden age” of Nepali history. By the time it was replaced by the Malla dynasty, the Licchavi dynasty had set Nepal on sound footing in many respects. To repeat, in addition to creating a distinct architectural and artistic heritage and liberal religious framework, coins were introduced, thus setting a monetary basis for the country’s relatively prosperous economy. Although land and agriculture remained the twin pillars of the national economy, a reasonable network of trade and commerce had emerged. Nepal was not only a thriving center for trade and handicrafts, it was also engaged in entrepôt trade between India and China. Those foundational achievements were nicely complemented by its leaders’ effective management of diplomacy. In other words, one could make the strong argument that Narendradeva was the first Nepali king to fully grasp the geopolitical gravity of Nepal’s geographical entrapment between India and China and, hence, the necessity of a balancing act between the two.

Medieval History In 880, Nepal exited the Licchavi period and entered the medieval era. But the entry was less than auspicious, as the dawn of the new era ushered in a dark age in Nepal’s history that would last more than three hundred years, until A.D. 1200. The solid foundation laid by the Licchavi rulers was frozen or even stunted, with the dark age plunging Nepal into a state of retreat and retrench-

26——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

ment. In short, at this juncture of history, the country suffered a decline in both territory and power. Although Mary Slusser (1982, 41) treats this dark age as “The Transitional Period,” it was little more than a period of confusion. Heitzman (1993, 9) states that “it is the least understood time in Nepal history, with only a very few inscriptional sources.” The Malla Period. With the appearance of leading notables starting in A.D. 1200, the dark age finally subsided and Nepal emerged from the state of historical confusion. In essence, the path was paved for the inception of the Malla period in Nepal’s medieval history. Ari Malla (or Arimalla) was the first of several Malla kings of the Kathmandu Valley. Although it is not clear how he ascended to the throne, his rule is known to have begun in 1200 and lasted until 1216. Early in the Malla period, the Kathmandu Valley was subjected to several external attacks from the south. These attacks suggest that Nepal was a relatively weak kingdom during that period. It is, therefore, no surprise that Nepal’s overall economic progress was relatively minor, although trade and urban growth continued, along with it’s friendly relations with China and Tibet. This was evident in the fact that at the request of the Emperor Kublai Khan’s teacher Saskyapa Lama of Tibet, Nepal sent a group of artisans to Lhasa to construct a golden stupa, under the leadership of Aniko (or Arniko), who was credited with the diffusion of Nepali architectural styles to Tibet, China, and beyond. With this exception, Nepal’s advancement during these years was limited and generally insignificant. However, Nepal embarked on a path of recovery from these early setbacks following the rise of Jayasthiti Malla in 1370. Perhaps the first distinguished figure of the Malla dynasty, he gave the Malla dynasty its vigor and identity. Despite Jayasthiti’s prominent place in the annals of Nepal’s history, his ancestry is somewhat obscure, and his ability was at times overshadowed by his marriage to a royal princess of Bhadgaun. Although Jayasthiti had effectively gained control of power by 1370, he was not officially crowned until 1382. He ruled until 1395 with great foresight and vision, instituting a legal and social code to consolidate the country under one set of rules. The fact that his code still forms the general basis for the way the Newar society in the Kathmandu Val-

——Geography and History of Nepal——27

ley operates clearly indicates that it has passed the test of time. And, like Manadeva I, he adhered to a liberal outlook on matters of religion, both in word and deed. Nonetheless, the code system that he formalized to classify individuals into subcastes and the detailed rules he charted for caste marriage, dining, and drinking water still haunts Nepal, particularly the Newars. One of Jayasthiti’s most important achievements was his ability to restore “a considerable measure of order and stability throughout the land” after a period of anarchy and to consolidate the Malla dynasty (Shaha 1992, 56). He “united the entire valley and its environs under his rule, an accomplishment still remembered with pride by Nepalese, particularly Newars” (Heitzman 1993, 12). After his death, his three sons ruled the valley. Although the three sons ruled the kingdom conjointly, it was effectively divided into three administrative units, one for each, almost like three different mini states within the kingdom—an ominous sign of their eventual breakup into separate kingdoms. Indeed, it happened in 1482, exactly a hundred years after Jayasthiti’s coronation. The same Kathmandu Valley that Jayasthiti kept unified skillfully and with foresight and fortitude was fragmented into three separate and often rival kingdoms— Kathmandu, Patan, and Bhadgaun (Bhaktapur)—following the death of his grandson, Yaksha Malla, whose career signified the zenith of the power and glory of the Malla kings. This signaled the beginning of the end of the Malla dynasty of Nepal. Apparently, the breakup and consequent political rivalries and intrigues did not affect the Kathmandu Valley’s status as a main center of entrepôt trade, as it was able to maintain its overall economic vitality. The valley’s common citizens, no matter which kingship they belong to, demonstrated their remarkable resiliency, steadfastly remaining faithful to their industriousness even when there were few constructive policy measures forthcoming from their respective rulers to support them. Sadly, however, the political and moral decay was already under way, and the pomp and glitter of the three competing royal courts continued in the midst of this deepening decay. Shaha (1992, 103) remarks, “The main fabric of their political life had worn out, and became thin and thread-bare. Perpetual conspiracy, fraud and deceit had undermined their moral fibre; and their health and character

28——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

were equally affected by their excesses.” The fact that the divided three Malla kingdoms endured for almost three hundred years after the formal breakup is by no means a true measure of their strength and power, however. It lasted that long simply because there was no effective outside challenge to them—that is, until the appearance of the territorially ambitious Gorkha king named Prithvi Narayan (or Prithvinarayana) Shah.

Modern History Characterization of the post-Malla era as a modern period in Nepal’s history is strictly a matter of convenience rather than a sign of its progressive social, economic, and technological transformations associated with “modernization.” After all, Nepal remains to this day shrouded in what may be termed feudocracy. During the period the Malla kings ruled the Kathmandu Valley, Nepal was divided into a total of forty-six principalities, not counting those in the valley. They were aggregately known as the Chaubise (twenty-four principalities that were located in the central hills) and the Baise (twenty-two principalities that were concentrated in the western hills). Those fiefdoms were invariably associated with immigrant Hindu chiefs from India. Over time, they carved out separate fiefdoms for themselves and their progeny in hill areas largely inhabited by various indigenous tribes of Mongoloid origin, eventually bringing them under their rule. They were a bickering bunch, constantly engaged in petty quarrels and rarely finding common ground or seeing a bigger picture. As a result, few rose above their petty heights to form a large territorial foundation, though a few certainly made some feeble attempts. Among the fiefdoms was the House of Gorkha, founded in 1559 by Dravya Shah, located in today’s Gorkha district in the central hills. It was in the Chaubise group. In 1743, the House of Gorkha crowned Prithvi Narayan Shah its king. As it turned out, he possessed an imperial mindset, doggedly bent on massive territorial expansion, never before witnessed in the history of Nepal. Whatever his motive, Prithvi Narayan set out on an unparalleled mission of territorial conquests and consolidation of scattered fiefdoms under one flag. Historians claim that he was intent on warding off potential British

——Geography and History of Nepal——29

The Nyatapola (pagoda) temple in Bhaktapur, built around A.D. 1708. The temple is one of the most striking features of the Kathmandu Valley’s artistic and architectural heritage. (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)

30——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

territorial advances toward the hills. But the biggest trophy of his colossal territorial ambitions lay in the conquest of the agriculturally fertile, economically prosperous, and culturally prodigious Kathmandu Valley, for it was bound to propel his kingship to an unsurpassed summit of power. Furthermore, his successful conquest of the valley would not only give him an added advantage of economic strength and military might but also moral authority and justification to impose his will over the other former fiefdoms in the name of national unification. With his territorial plan set in motion, Prithvi Narayan launched several unsuccessful attacks to conquer the Kathmandu Valley before attaining his goal. Ruthless and relentless in his drive, he launched a surprise assault on Kathmandu in September 1768 while its people were celebrating a religious festival. He easily captured the town with little resistance. With this vital foothold gained, the door had been opened for his conquest of the whole valley. He wasted no time. Before any organized resistance or counteroffensive could be mobilized against his troops, he seized the adjoining kingdom (city) of Patan unopposed and moved against the next adjoining kingdom of Bhadgaun (Bhaktapur), subjecting it to his rule the following year. The Shah Dynasty. Within a year after his victory flag flew over Kathmandu, he gained complete control of the whole Kathmandu Valley. With this vital territorial mission accomplished, he moved his capital to the lush valley of Kathmandu and started a new dynastic rule in Nepal: the current Shah dynasty (Vaidya 1993). For the first time, the territorial entity and identity of Nepal extended well beyond the confines of this valley, as the House of Gorkha successfully expanded its geographical dominion. However, Prithvi Narayan’s vision of greater Nepal was far from reaching its destination. Heitzman (1993, 18) writes: “The conquest of the three kingdoms was only the beginning of a remarkable explosion of Gorkha military power throughout the Himalayan region. Prithvi Narayan Shah quickly made a movement toward the Chaubise states in the west.” Although one may debate Prithvi Narayan’s motives and tactics, few would, irrespective of their perspectives, question his strategic territorial vision and mission for Nepal, certainly not his success in terms of carrying out his mission. In this respect, he

——Geography and History of Nepal——31

has no parallel among the kings of Nepal throughout its history. In 1775, six years after he overran the valley, Prithvi Narayan died. Though he did not live to complete his mission and see his vision of a unified Nepal materialize, the vision lived on as the course of action was pursued by his successors. But, on the domestic front, trouble was brewing within the court. As is characteristic of almost all personality-based autocratic systems, the death of a strong political leader leaves a vacuum and, hence, a power struggle between competing factions. In Nepal, the death of Prithvi Narayan resulted in an intense competition for leadership. Competing queens and their vested interests often became the primary sparks of continued power struggles. The court was filled with palace plots, endless suspicions, and mindless intrigues. Consequently, court life was consumed with internal rivalries, leading to constantly shifting alignments and realignments of power and personalities, royal factions and courtiers. This gradually moved the administrative and decisionmaking power to palace-appointed bhardars (courtiers), even though the ruling monarch remained the symbolic center of power and authority. As one would have anticipated, royal factional feuds spilled over to, or became compounded by, deadly factional animosities among competing bhardar clans. As a result, murders and assassinations became routine events. A new phase of political dark age haunted Nepal during this period. Eventually, in 1799, Damodar Pande, a leader of the Pande bhardar clan, took control of the administrative power as mukhtiyar (something like a premier) and held it until 1804. Later, Damodar was executed and replaced by Bhimsen Thapa, who in 1806 became prime minister. Murder of competing characters continued. Bhimsen, however, proved to be a skillful as well as powerful prime minister, but not immune to palace plots and murderous tactics. He managed to reign in the competing bhardar factions for more than thirty years (1806–1837). Meanwhile, Nepal’s military march for territorial expansion continued, perhaps largely owing to Bhimsen’s charismatic rule. By 1814, Nepal had managed to control areas as far away as today’s Indian territory of Kangra, beyond Garhwal, in the west and beyond the river Tista into Sikkim in the east, quite a feat of achievement for a tiny power (see Shaha 1992, map; Heitzman 1993, figure 3).

32——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

But Nepal’s very territorial success became its military liability, as it drew the attention and ire of bigger players, specifically British India. Like all military powers, for example, Japan, it was blinded by its own success. Its military was spread too thin to hold on to its gains. Yet Nepal failed to learn when and where to draw the line to contain its own territorial ambitions, overestimating the scope of its ability and underestimating its enemy’s strength. Eventually, the Nepali interest collided with the British interest, and the Nepal-Anglo War broke out in 1814. Although the Nepali forces managed to engage the British forces in protracted battles for nearly two years, they ultimately proved to be no match for the superior British military resources and contingents. Decisive battles occurred in Makwanpur, the principal gateway to Kathmandu from the south, which resulted in the final defeat of Nepal. The 1814–1816 war with the British was an absolute disaster, forcing Nepal into total retrenchment. It was costly in every respect—morally, politically, and territorially, not to mention the enormous economic and human cost that it incurred. As part of its defeat, Nepal signed a treaty with the British, known as the Treaty of Sagauli. Nepal lost all of its territorial gains and more and was forced to accede to the British plan to establish its residency in Kathmandu. As Stiller (1976) poignantly remarked in the preface of his book, most appropriately entitled The Silent Cry, “the Treaty of Sagauli was a beginning rather than an end to Nepal’s time of troubles.” The time of severe crisis, however, failed to bring together the fighting factions among the nobility in the name of national interests and integrity and to present a united front against external enemies. It was, in fact, viewed as a most opportune time to decimate the ruling faction and its associates. Bhimsen Thapa was finally deposed in 1837 and was later maneuvered to take his own life in a most gruesome fashion. Deadly palace plots became deadlier, finally resulting in the deadliest of all: the Kot Parba (the courtyard massacre) of 1846. The Kot Parba and the Rise of Rana Rule. It will never be known whether Jang Bahadur Kunwar carefully planned or fortuitously expected the occurrence of the Kot massacre, which will live in infamy as the bloodiest chapter in Nepal’s history. Whatever the case, Jang Bahadur was fully prepared for it; in fact, he

——Geography and History of Nepal——33

was the only courtier prepared for it. Precisely because of his preparedness, he proved to be the principal force behind the massacre and its sole beneficiary. The massacre unfolded as follows: One of the casualties of the ongoing saga of palace plots and counterplots was Gagan Singh, whom Queen Lakshmidevi had planned to deploy to put her own son on the throne. Gagan Singh was murdered on September 14, 1846. At the discovery of her favorite courtier’s murder, the queen ordered General Abhiman Singh to immediately assemble the entire royal military and administrative entourage at the kot (courtyard). Jang Bahadur was the only leader who arrived at the court with three regiments under his command, accompanied by all of his brothers and relatives. He had his troops strategically lined up in the kot area as well as surrounding it, blocking all the entry and exit points and giving specific instruction not to let anyone leave or enter the courtyard without his order. The queen accused Birkishor Pande, the leader of the Pande faction, of Gagan Singh’s murder, and she ordered General Abhiman to execute him. Chaos followed. While the councilors were engaged in heated arguments, Jang Bahadur sparked violence. One of his soldiers stabbed Abhiman to death. Deadly fighting broke out among the assembled, with swords flying all over. Jang Bahadur had his troops slaughter everyone present at the courtyard. The extent of the carnage was enormous, not just in terms of the number of dead bodies but in terms of who was eliminated. The nobility from virtually every faction of competing courtier clans was removed from the political scene with one massacre. Leading nobles of the Pande faction were destroyed, and so were the leading Thapa clan nobles; later, the Basnyat faction leaders were liquidated. The only surviving faction was Jang Bahadur’s, that is, the Kunwar clan. Jang Bahadur faced no immediate threat from any of the aristocratic clans with palace ties. The day after the kot carnage, he became prime minister and wasted no time to embark on a massive purge campaign, executing more competing nobles, to make absolutely sure that there was no one left to outshine and undermine him, at least not before he could establish a firm grip on his newly minted power. The Kot Massacre produced three major outcomes. First, as previously noted, it eliminated competing bhardar clans. As a

34——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

result, factional feuds subsided, though not necessarily intrafamily plots within the ruling clan. Second, the Shah dynasty as a monarchical lineage was retained, but the Shah kings were relegated to a puppet status. They were, in effect, confined to their own royal compounds and subsequently rendered secondary to Jang Bahadur and his clan in terms of both power and authority. The king was stripped of all power except his titular kingship and royal crown. Finally, the massacre elevated Jang Bahadur Kuwar to the position of prime minister. As he shed his last name, Kunwar, in 1858 when King Surendra bestowed upon him the honorific title of Rana, denoting martial glory, he inserted Rana in its place, thus initiating his own prime ministerial Rana dynasty with autocratic power and authority. Previously, he was hardly a major power broker among the courtiers, nor did he come from the higher echelon of aristocracy. Yet, as a career opportunist, he was quick to seize the moment and take full advantage of it. In sum, while the first outcome was instrumental in Jang Bahadur’s sudden rise to the prominence of power (as there was nobody of higher or equal stature left to be considered as an alternative choice for his position), the second one is a direct result of his rise to power and consequent Rana rule. History has rarely been kind to Jang Bahadur Rana. This is not necessarily because of the way he usurped his power but because of what he ushered in when he instituted his hereditary Rana rule, which lasted for more than a century. In every conceivable regard, Rana rule represented the darkest phase in Nepali history. For example, the period of Rana rule was a total economic calamity except for the Ranas themselves and their associates. Judicially, their word was the law of the land, which nullified the judicial process. One bright moment arose when Prime Minister Chandra Shamsher, relatively a liberal figure by Rana standards, abolished slavery in 1924 and the sati (widow burning) tradition in 1920. To sum, “the Rana administration was a colossal network of corruption practiced for the benefit of a particular family and at the expense of the people” (Joshi and Rose 1966, 321). The Return of Shah Rule, Continued Chaos, and Palace Tricks and Treacheries. As the Rana rule saw its demise during the reign of Prime Minister Mohan Shamsher Rana, Nepal felt a sigh of relief and liberation from the Rana despots. The downfall

——Geography and History of Nepal——35

of the Rana regime resulted from the confluence of many concurrent events. For instance, the departure of their patron, the British, from India in 1947 was perhaps the biggest blow to the Ranas, whose impact was magnified by the growing internal as well as India-based opposition from Nepali citizens led by leaders like B. P. Koirala and Puspa Lal Shrestha. Armed attacks and insurgency movements at various times and in various places within the country further accentuated the gravity of popular anti-Rana struggle. On November 6, 1950, King Tribhuvan escaped the palace in protest of the Rana regime and sought asylum in the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu. He was later flown to India. All of these events forced Mohan Shamsher to negotiate and finally relinquish his power. As part of the agreement of the negotiation, the king returned to Kathmandu, and an interim ministry was sworn in during February 1951, thus officially marking the end of Rana rule and the return of the Shah rule and, supposedly, the dawn of democracy in Nepal. Little did Nepali citizens realize that the presumed dawn of democracy was merely a mirage. The whole episode proved to be little more than the revitalization of the Shah dynasty that had long been relegated to puppetry. Once secured in his throne as the sole authority, generally vested in the divine image of Lord Vishnu, the early liberal tendency that King Tribhuvan exhibited quickly dissipated. The much-anticipated general election that was supposed to have been held no later than 1952 in accordance with the negotiated agreement did not take place. Tribhuvan failed to fulfill the promise of democracy. Instead he shuffled the government like a deciduous tree that undergoes a seasonal change, appointing a different prime minister (and, thus, forming a new government) every few months. Following his death, his son Mahendra claimed the Shah throne in 1955. He took the practice of governmental shuffles to an extreme plateau. He resurrected the darkness of the Rana rule in the new Shah court with some minor twists, but with greater vigor. Ever cunning and calculative, always concerned about preserving his own absolute power but often burdened with a selfinflicted sense of insecurity, King Mahendra not only revived the nationally destructive internecine factional feuds among courtier clans, the hallmark of the pre-Rana Shah courts, but masterfully

36——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

orchestrated them like a bamboo dance. He changed the government every few months, frequently appointing a prime minister from a different faction and, therefore, never allowing any one prime minister or government to develop a firm foothold, legitimacy, or stability. This treacherous practice of Mahendra, while increasingly strengthening his power hold, was severely detrimental to the nation. First, as Mahendra deliberately pitted one faction against another, he exacerbated their preexisting distrust and animosity instead of fostering a climate of much-needed cooperation and reconciliation among them in the name of national progress—a climate he could have easily engendered from his position of monarchical power. Second, the practice severely hampered the foundation of administrative stability and predictability, policy cohesiveness and continuity, and leadership quality and commitment. As a result, this critical foundational requirement for national progress could not be met. Third, Mahendra’s practice made administrative corruption rampant at every echelon of the government. Since every new government and its functionaries knew that they were all short-timers, a temporary stop in Mahendra’s shuffle scheme, they were primarily interested in maximizing the spoils of power within a minimum time. They had little desire in serving the interest of the people, who, after all, played no role in their selection. Finally, the practice allowed Mahendra to continuously postpone general elections to form a legitimate democratic government, with which he would have to share the leverage of power. He thrived in political chaos and uncertainty. Despite his palace-centered tricks and treacheries, he was pressured to honor the popular will and hold the long overdue first general elections on February 18, 1959, to form a representative government. The Nepali Congress Party won a two-thirds majority in the elections, finally allowing B. P. Koirala to become the first elected prime minister and form a democratic government. But Mahendra was completely bent on destroying both the newly established democratic foundation and the Koirala government before they could develop deep roots among the general populace. So, reminiscent of the typical Shah (royal) tradition, he was soon busy hatching plots and mobilizing his cadre of royalists to foment social disorder in different parts of the country. Using

——Geography and History of Nepal——37

the pretext of such fabricated civil disorder, Mahendra launched a swift palace coup on December 15, 1960, against the Koirala government, sending his army to arrest the prime minister and his cabinet members. With his government dismantled, Koirala was jailed until October 1968. Democracy was abruptly brought to a screeching halt. Once again, the practice of governmental shuffles at Mahendra’s whim was renewed with full force and vigor. Mahendra introduced a partyless panchayat system with him as its ringleader. Aside from a few minor challenges waged by outlawed Nepali Congress Party workers, his absolute rule continued uninterrupted until his death in early 1972. His son Birendra carried forward his father’s policy and panchayat system. But some strain was beginning to build up. At the end of 1976, B. P. Koirala and Ganeshman Singh, another prominent leader of the Nepali Congress Party, returned to Nepal from India. They were immediately arrested. Koirala was later released and rearrested, and underwent five treason trials in early 1978 before being acquitted. But sociopolitical turmoil continued to ferment throughout 1978, as student demonstrations against the panchayat system intensified. Some students were killed. The situation reached a critical point. To avert imminent threat to his throne and the Shah dynasty, King Birendra announced a national referendum to decide the fate of the panchayat system. To the dismay of countless demonstrators, Koirala accepted Birendra’s call for a national referendum without giving much consideration to its implications. Some demonstrators and activists felt betrayed. At any rate, the referendum was held on May 2, 1980. To nobody’s surprise, the outcome was predetermined, as the king’s forces managed to rig the referendum, giving victory to him and his propanchayat forces. In a way, the panchayat system, with the king presiding at its helm, was legitimized, but only for ten more years. If we were to provide one simple explanation for the demise of the panchayat system, we can apply the same logic embedded in Joshi and Rose’s characterization of the Rana system as a colossal network of corruption. This was precisely what the panchayat system was—a colossal network of economic corruption, political suppression, and social disintegration. While it fattened a few, it

38——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

suffocated the rest, miserably failing to meet even the most basic human needs of the masses, let alone their rising expectations that the rapidly advancing time was arousing. In simple terms, except for the mechanical passage of time and some organic growth brought on by such time, there was not a whole lot of difference between the Rana system and the new Shah system. The new Shah kings should be given credit for the fact that despite massive corruption (whose hierarchical chain ultimately rests at the royal gate), they managed to keep the monarchy in complete control of national affairs for thirty years within a panchayat political framework. The Second Coming of Democracy and Continued Corruption. Once again, in 1989, the ever susceptible and corrupt panchayat system came under renewed assault. But panchayat was largely a pretext, not the real target. Although many may dispute it, what was actually coming under assault was the monarchy itself, as it remained a symbol of both reverence and revulsion. Monarchy is a sociopolitical divide, and the forces of revulsion were resurfacing to challenge it once again. The assault came from different fronts, culminating in the eventual complete dismantling of the panchayat system. The disintegration of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union and the subsequent success of the democracy movement in Eastern Europe gave new impetus for the pro-democracy movement in Nepal. The country was reeling from the economic embargo that India imposed in 1989. Ever-simmering disenchantment was beginning to openly surface in the form of protest. In late 1989, the banned Nepali Congress Party and Communist Party of Nepal formed a coalition to present a united front to pose a serious challenge to King Birendra’s regime. As a result, thirty years after the first coming of democracy was prematurely aborted by King Mahendra, the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy was established on February 18, 1990, followed by a series of antipanchayat demonstrations and rallies all across the nation. Violence, numerous arrests, and deaths ensued. Consequently, political uprising became even more widespread. In essence, the pro-democracy movement advanced at a surprisingly lightening speed, much faster than anyone expected. The political situation was getting out of control. King Birendra

——Geography and History of Nepal——39

realized that this time the threat to his 200-year-old dynasty was real and imminent. His choices were two: either to fight back to protect his absolute monarchical power and face the possibility of complete dissolution of his rule, or to accept a constitutional monarchy and preserve the crown. Determined to preserve the crown for himself and for his successors, Birendra decided to accede to the popular demand to restore democracy that his father had ruthlessly ravaged. In April 1990, the panchayat government was replaced by a multiparty interim government under the prime ministership of the Nepali Congress Party leader Krishna Prasad Bhattarai. In November 1990, a new constitution was approved, reducing the monarchy to more or less a constitutional status. Almost a year later, in May 1991, general elections were held to elect a representative government fashioned after a parliamentary system. The Nepali Congress Party won the elections with a simple majority, and Girija Prasad Koirala, a younger brother of the late B. P. Koirala, became prime minister. He proved to be an ineffective leader, the primary cause of friction and division within his own Congress Party. As some of his own party members deserted him, he lost the vote of confidence in the parliament. A new national election was held in 1994. The Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist, or UML) won the largest number of parliamentary seats, thus allowing it to form a minority government under the prime ministership of Man Mohan Adhikari. Within a year, the communist government fell. Since 1991, Nepal has undergone nine different governments, a sign of political impermanence. Recently, Sher Bahadur Deuba has returned to power as the latest prime minister.

CONCLUSION Despite its potential, the second coming of democracy has failed to deliver on its promise to bring relief to the general population. Nepal remains mired in constant political bickering both between and within parties. So far, few party leaders—be they communist, congress, or some other party members—have demonstrated any zeal and genuine commitment to the welfare of the nation and its citizens. They have all made a mockery of democracy, both indi-

40——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

vidually and collectively, thus failing to outshine the previous systems and live up to its expectations. But rhetoric continues to get louder and louder. In the midst of their piercing rhetoric and hollow anticorruption slogans that can be heard all across the hills and valleys and plains, corruption spreads like a massive network of termite tunnels, extending from peons to palace dwellers. As a result, the so-called political leaders have lost the promise of their purpose. Their failure is evident from the fact that the Maoist movement that started in mid-1990s has not only become popular but now gained vigorous steam throughout the nation. It is believed that, with their stronghold based in the western hills, the Maoists now have de facto control over some 25 percent of the country. Relief so far has eluded Nepal. Condemned to a state of permanent misery, Nepal is like an embittered soul whose silent cry goes on but always fades into an endless vacuum of leadership. References Adhikary, Dhruba. 2000. “Electric Cremation Sparks Row.” South China Morning Post, 27 November. Allman, T. D. 2000. “Nepal: Changed for Good, for Bad, Forever.” National Geographic, 198, 5 (November), 96–117. Furer-Haimendorf, Christopher von. 1975. Himalayan Traders: Life in Highland Nepal. London: John Murray. Gaige, Frederick H. 1975. Regionalism and National Unity in Nepal. Berkeley: University of California Press. Gurung, Harka. 1989. Regional Patterns of Migration in Nepal. Honolulu: East-West Center. Heitzman, James. 1993. “Nepal: Historical Setting.” In Andrea Matles Savada, ed. Nepal and Bhutan Country Studies (Area Handbook Series). Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress. Joshi, Bhuwan Lal, and Leo E. Rose. 1966. Democratic Innovations in Nepal: A Case Study of Political Acculturation. Berkeley: University of California Press. Ministry of Population and Environment. 1998. Population Projections for Nepal, 1996–2016. Kathmandu: Ministry of Population and Environment. Regmi, Mahesh C. 1984. The State and Economic Surplus. Varanasi: Nath Publishing House. Shaha, Rishikesh. 1992. Ancient and Medieval Nepal. Delhi: Manohar Publications.

——Geography and History of Nepal——41

Shrestha, Nanda, Dennis Conway, and Keshav Bhattarai. 1999. “Population Pressure and Land Resources in Nepal: A Revisit, Twenty Years Later.” Journal of Developing Areas 33: 245–268. Sill, Michael, and John Kirkby. 1991. The Atlas of Nepal in the Modern World. London: Earthscan Publications. Slusser, Mary. 1982. Nepal Mandala: A Cultural Study of the Kathmandu Valley. 2 vols. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Stiller, Ludwig F. 1976. The Silent Cry: The People of Nepal: 1916–39. Kathmandu: Sahayogi Prakashan. Vaidya, T. R. 1993. Prithvinarayan Shah: The Founder of Modern Nepal. Delhi: Anmol Publications. Zurick, David, and P. P. Karan. 1999. Himalaya: Life at the Edge of the World. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

The Economy of Nepal The people of Nepal have a life and economy of their own. “A very simple one, it may seem, but geographical and institutional restrictions make it rather complicated,” wrote Lambers (1973, 1). Life is indeed complicated—and more. With Nepal’s economy long mired in poor conditions, life is, for many, constantly swinging between bare subsistence and hunger. This precariousness of life was poignantly captured in a 1974 report by the Asian Regional Team for Employment Production (ARTEP) that concluded, “Nepal is poor and daily becoming poorer.” In the mid1970s, approximately 40 percent of the Nepali households were reported to be below the poverty line. Since then Nepal’s poverty situation has deteriorated. It is, therefore, no surprise that the World Bank has consistently ranked Nepal as one of the poorest countries in the world, with a per capita income of $220. Simply expressed, the economy of Nepal is a landscape filled with poverty. However, the fact that 88 percent of the population lives in rural areas means it is largely rural poverty that dominates the landscape. Regardless of its geographical distribution, the face of poverty is no longer strictly determined by people’s economic inability to meet the basic minimum requirements of life, such as staple food and shelter. Poverty has also grown a second face, the one that is intimately associated with what can be called relative scarcity. As the culture of consumerism penetrates every facet of life and every corner of the country, the second face becomes openly visible. As poverty is increasingly defined and measured in terms of material possessions, the visible distance between the rich and poor is widened, often leading to the stigmatization of the poor. They become the economic equivalent of the Untouchables in the Hindu caste hierarchy (see “Nepali Institutions”). Let us use Coca-Cola (any other U.S. beverage maker would also do) as a simple example to illustrate the reality of poverty’s second face. Coke became available in Nepal around the mid-

43

44——NEPAL and BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

A hill man carrying a large load takes a brief rest. (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)

——The Economy of Nepal——45

1960s, when Western tourists began to pour into the country. Its availability was almost exclusively confined to tourist hotels. Because Coke was rarely available in the open market, it was considered a luxury consumer product back then, something that only a tiny fraction of the Nepali population could afford. If one could not afford it, that was alright—nobody made a big deal about it. But the picture changed in the late 1970s, when a CocaCola bottling factory was established in Kathmandu. Coke instantly became a mass consumer product in Nepal. Because it is no longer considered a luxury drink, one is now expected to be able to afford it. The very notion of a product’s affordability compounds the problem of poverty. So those who cannot afford a bottle of Coke without sacrificing some of the basic necessities of life—for example, staple food—are automatically labeled “poor.” The point is that, today, poverty is not merely a matter of not being able to fulfill basic, minimum necessities of life. It is also associated with the deprivation of certain consumer products even though they are hardly needed as part of basic requirements. Poverty is thus more than an economic condition—it is a social stigma as well.

GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN THE ECONOMY Irrespective of how one frames the picture of Nepal’s poverty, it is real and it reverberates across the country. In its attempt to develop the economy and reduce poverty, the Nepal government has been the primary agent of economic policies and change since the 1950s. Nowhere is the government’s economic role more entrenched than in the arena of macroeconomic planning, a process that is heavily dependent on foreign aid for development financing, as well as technical expertise. Given this reality, it is important to first shed light on the nature and direction of planning that the government has carried out for nearly five decades.

Economic Planning and Foreign Aid From the dark clouds of World War II emerged a wave of independence across Asia. India became one of the earliest countries to gain independence from European colonialism. India’s freedom

46——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

from Great Britain in 1947 dealt a death blow to the Rana autocracy in Nepal, whose rulers had flourished under the tutelage of the British Raj. When the British left India, the Rana regime lost its imperial patrons and consequently became defanged. Four years later, in 1951, Nepal was able to officially shed the yoke of Rana rule (see “Geography and History of Nepal”). The euphoric trumpet of liberation was, however, tempered by the formidable task of rebuilding the national economy, which had been left in shambles by the Ranas. In other words, the country found itself in a state of bewilderment and poverty, as economic realities hit hard and political uncertainties loomed heavy. In essence, like other newly emerging nations, including its immediate neighbors in South Asia, Nepal faced, to use Baran’s (1973) phrase, two stark realities that normally accompany freedom: “the revolution of rising expectations” and “the steep ascent” of development. The gravity of these issues was profound, particularly in a society where the masses had long been politically repressed, economically deprived, and socially bereaved. So, following the end of Rana repression, the general masses felt the sudden force of rising expectation, a sort of pent-up demand, as they expected a quick turnaround in their economic fortunes and social conditions. Rising expectations seemed quite natural, especially given that their new political leaders promised them prosperity. This prosperity could not be achieved in the absence of economic development or “modernization.” But attaining economic development was no ordinary task, for its ascent was steep and demanding. This was all compounded by the new political reality. Although the monarchy was restored, Nepal suffered from the lack of administrative stability in political governance (see “Geography and History of Nepal” and “Nepali Institutions”). Marred by the utter lack of administrative stability, Nepal was paralyzed, unable to climb “the steep ascent” of development in order to quench the thirst of “rising expectations.” The country could not escape its poor economic conditions as the severe shortage of capital, technical know-how, resources, an industrial class, skilled labor, and necessary transportation infrastructure hindered the prospect of development. The notion of banking was too remote for it to serve as a reliable channel of capital formation, a critical ingredient of

——The Economy of Nepal——47

development. One time-honored source of capital formation in the very early stages of development is to tax the peasantry. Given that the vast majority of peasants had only minimal landholdings, the new Nepal government could hardly fathom the policy of squeezing peasants to generate capital. Thus, any attempt to apply the Japanese saying that “peasants are like sesame seeds; the harder you press them, the more oil you get from them” would only mean risking peasant reprisals and rebellions. As a result, the peasantry was not a viable source of capital formation. It was at this point that foreign aid entered the picture, both as an invaluable source of capital and technical expertise. From the very outset, the Nepal government has heavily relied on foreign aid as the axis of its efforts to achieve economic development and poverty alleviation. In the prevailing climate of constant administrative flux, foreign involvement in Nepal’s development process proved to be significant in charting its national economic direction and defining its purpose. With the help of foreign aid as well as foreign technical experts, Nepal launched its first five-year plan in 1956, thus firmly setting its national economy on the path of planned development—a form of social engineering to guide the economy. Planning as an institutional approach to development meant direct state (government) involvement in determining national economic priorities. In spite of its seeming intrusiveness, state economic planning had merit, as it was firmly grounded in sound economic logic. This allowed Nepal’s economic system to assume the form of what is commonly known as state capitalism. That is, in a society where capital was generally scarce, the state would serve as a capitalist, consolidating capital formation and making capital investment decisions. The logic was that the state would be better equipped to make effective allocations of the country’s limited capital resources. Nepal’s economic planning thus was patterned after India’s, and the budget for the first five-year plan (1956–1961) was entirely financed by foreign aid from different countries, including the United States. In the first plan, the largest share of the budget outlays was allocated to the development of transportation and communication infrastructure, followed by agriculture, including village development and irrigation. This was not surprising in light of the

48——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

fact that the country had few modern transportation and communication networks to link different areas of the country and that its agriculture was in dire need of development to transform its rural economy. One notable outcome of the first plan was to open the Rapti Valley in the central Tarai district of Chitwan for land settlement by hill residents and consequent agricultural expansion. Rapti Valley resettlement was the first planned land colonization scheme in the country and was designed and funded by foreign aid from the United States. Land resettlement was a deliberate government plan to redistribute population from the presumably overpopulated hills to the Tarai frontier and to increase agricultural production (see Kansakar 1979). Aside from this scheme, the economic success of the first plan was rather inconsequential, owing largely to poor planning formulation and poorer implementation. Furthermore, the first plan that initially represented a concrete course in national economic development suffered from a new round of political posturing and positioning. The National Planning Commission introduced the second plan in 1962. Hastily conceived, the plan was largely devoid of much forethought and necessary analysis. At any rate, the second plan too placed emphasis on transportation and communication. In addition, it stressed industrial development, tourism, and social services. Although Nepal witnessed some improvements in the areas of industrial production, road construction, and education, the plan’s achievements were relatively lackluster. Regardless of the outcome, foreign aid dominated the planning budget. Although its total share declined to 78 percent, it remained, unquestionably, the cornerstone of development financing. Despite its dubious records, Nepal’s ruling elites of all stripes have been steadily enamored by foreign aid (for details, see Shrestha 1997). Consequently, it remains the guiding policy framework of national development to this day. The following dimensions of Nepal’s development planning have undergone noteworthy change and so deserve a brief discussion: Foreign Aid to Foreign Debt. The overall share of development financing through foreign aid has averaged 66 percent (Shukla 1993). It is no exaggeration that in Nepal, no development project is possible without some form of foreign aid. The nation’s development fate is, therefore, inextricably predicated on

——The Economy of Nepal——49

foreign aid. Although India has historically been the largest donor nation, the Western aid and agencies, especially from the United States, are most influential in terms of setting the country’s direction of development. The very first package of American aid came in 1951, containing a mere sum of 22,000 rupees (or just a few thousand dollars). But that tiny seed of foreign aid has grown into a huge tree as the amount of aid that Nepal now receives from various countries has increased many folds. What is notable about foreign aid to Nepal is that, initially, almost all of it constituted outright grants regardless of the country of its origin. As such, foreign aid was free. These days, however, more than two-thirds of foreign aid comes in the form of loans (debt) that have to be paid back with interest. That is to say, what once came as free money has now turned into a mountain of foreign debt, a financial burden that Nepal is in no position to shake off. In a way, it is a misnomer to use the term foreign aid, for it is mostly foreign debt. By 1998, Nepal’s foreign debt burden had reached $2,646 million, a figure that amounts to almost 55 percent of its 1999 GDP (gross domestic product) of $4,904. Although this debt burden may seem minuscule compared to those of debt-laden countries like Brazil, Indonesia, and Mexico, it is an insurmountable sum for Nepal, a country saddled with economic stagnation and resource scarcity. Development Planning to Economic Privatization. Although planning still remains popular as a form of state-directed economic engineering, it has undergone some significant change in its policy focus and emphasis, especially since 1990. Urged by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and World Bank, the two most powerful development agencies in the world in terms of development policy formulation and recommendation, Nepal’s planning has now increasingly emphasized economic privatization under the new banner of neoliberalism. The sudden disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 not only ushered in an era of political democratization in many previously undemocratic countries but also signaled a massive wave of economic liberalization across the Third World. Nepal was no exception. As its new democratic government was swept by this wave of neoliberalism, national planning made provision to relax state control of many industries, stressing privatization of the econ-

50——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

omy. To be sure, Nepal was hardly a command economy. Between 1991 and 1997, the government of Nepal privatized more than fifteen enterprises, including the Bhrikuti Paper Mill, Harisidhi Brick and Tile Factory, Bansbari Leather and Shoe Factory, Balaju Textile Industry, and the Agricultural Tools Factory. The government had also agreed to privatize the Nepal Tea Development Corporation. Furthermore, many other state-run enterprises were being considered for privatization. Included in the list are the Nepal Telecommunications Corporation, Butwal Power Company, Nepal Bank, Salt Trading Corporation, cement factories, and others. To a large extent, however, the speed of future privatization of state-owned enterprises will be contingent on the government makeup. It is safe to assume that whereas the single-party majority in the parliament will have a decisive impact on privatization, any coalition government will tend to slow it down.

Planning and Some Key Economic Sectors Throughout its history, one of the distinctive features of Nepal’s planning has been its emphasis on sectoral development of the economy. Specifically, although different plans have given priorities to different economic sectors, one can discern four major targets of sectoral development: agriculture, industry, tourism, and transportation and communication. Agriculture. Historically, Nepal was a predominantly agrarian society, with the vast majority of its population composed of peasants living in rural areas. As such, it was a subsistence economy. Yet various historical accounts leave little doubt that Nepal once was a relatively self-sufficient economy. Although the country was never prosperous in a typical sense, it was not mired in poverty the way it is today. Nepal enjoyed a healthy agricultural surplus, beyond satisfying its national food requirements. The country experienced no population pressure. In fact, due to regular labor shortages, it could not harness all of its land potential. That meant that despite its small areal size and rugged topography, it had plenty of cultivatable land relative to its population size, at least in the years prior to 1951. Nepal’s economy is still predominantly agrarian, deeply embedded in crop production and animal rearing. Agriculture is undoubt-

——The Economy of Nepal——51

Spring farming in the hills. This photo shows an almost seamless blending of people, houses, and farmland into a hill landscape. (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)

edly the single most important economic activity in the country; it is the backbone of the Nepali economy. According to data provided by the World Bank, more than 40 percent of Nepal’s gross domestic product comes from agriculture. In terms of the national employment structure, agriculture directly employs over 76 percent of the total labor force, which in 1999 was estimated to be 9.5 million. Technically, however, this agricultural employment figure is lower than the actual situation, for significant numbers of those employed in the nonagricultural activities are also engaged in farming. It is, therefore, fair to assume that the number of people who are directly as well as indirectly dependent on agriculture for overall family survival is closer to the percentage of the national population living in rural areas—that is, over 85 percent. No matter how we dissect the employment structure, the agricultural sector plays the most dominant role in Nepal; unquestionably, therefore, the economic fate of the vast majority of its population is directly anchored to agriculture’s success or failure. Except when the monsoon cooperates with farming needs, allowing farmers to collect bountiful harvests, Nepal unfortunately no

52——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

longer enjoys the agricultural surpluses of the past. Food deficits have become increasingly common, especially in the hills and western parts of the country. For instance, during the five-year period between 1995 and 1999, Nepal’s annual agricultural growth averaged only 2.3 percent. When only the production of food crops—namely, paddy (rice), maize, millet, wheat, and barley— was taken into account, the annual agricultural growth rate dropped to less than 1.5 percent. In simple terms, agricultural growth failed to keep pace with population growth, which averaged almost 2.4 percent over the same period, thus providing a clear indication of agricultural deficits in relation to the population. The topic of agricultural growth (or stagnation) is particularly significant in an agrarian country like Nepal, where the population is growing rapidly in the face of very limited land resources. Although the socioeconomic survival of the vast majority of peasants is intrinsically tied to agriculture, the per capita availability of cultivatable land has been diminishing. It has reached its lowest level yet, currently standing at merely 0.25 acre per capita nationally (see Table 1 in “Geography and History of Nepal”). Nationally, 51 percent of the population owns less than 1.24 acres of land per household, which on average consists of about 6 persons. Another 16 percent owns 1.24–2.47 acres per household. In total, 67 percent of the households occupy only 17 percent of Nepal’s farm land, many being entirely landless. Generally speaking, such a small amount of land is hardly sufficient to adequately support a family of six for a year. The situation is particularly precarious in the hills, where land deficits are quite high. What is more, the prospect of further land reclamation for agricultural expansion is almost nil unless whatever forest areas that remain are sacrificed. This overall limitation on land is generally true even in the case of the Tarai, a region regarded as the granary of Nepal. This is a label the Tarai certainly deserves, for it occupies over 60 percent of the nation’s total cultivated land. In other words, future agricultural fortunes are rooted in the soils of the Tarai. As goes the Tarai, so goes the country’s agriculture. Notwithstanding this regionally confined prospect, agriculture has nationally come under increasing pressure to support Nepal’s huge rural population. The constraints of land resources are compounded by two immediate factors.

——The Economy of Nepal——53

This man is using a public space to sell bananas grown in his backyard. Such vending is a common way to earn supplementary cash income. (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)

First, the agricultural sector is lopsidedly tilted toward the production of food crops: grains. For example, 78 percent of the total land area of 5.75 million acres under cultivation is devoted to only four crops: paddy (rice), maize, wheat, and millet. Second, despite nearly five decades of relentless emphasis on agricultural development, the record of farm productivity per unit of land is far from noteworthy. This is true particularly for the four major crops noted above. For instance, the average yield for these four crops is normally around 0.8 ton per acre, a figure that is roughly onehalf of the level of land productivity attained by Japanese farmers (also see Shrestha 1990). Although emphasis on food production is undeniably important, especially in light of the country’s chronic poverty, a heavy commitment to these crops tends to reduce the amount of land available for growing more productive crops, such as potatoes and other vegetables, which can be domestically consumed or sold in

54——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

the market to generate cash. Most vegetables are high not only in terms of their nutritional value but also their market value, for they command much higher prices than do grain crops. If both summer and winter vegetables are planted, several crops can be grown on the same piece of land, thus propelling the productivity of land to a much higher plateau. In short, the agriculture sector suffers deeply from Nepal’s quadrangular problems: heavy agrarian dependence, limited land resources, high population growth, and low technological advancements (see “Geography and History of Nepal”). More specifically, while the country’s high population growth has imposed greater demands on its limited land resources, the agrarian economy’s ability to respond rapidly to such rising pressure has been stunted because of the absence of necessary agricultural technologies and foresight. For example, the lack of surface irrigation is a prevailing impediment to agricultural development. Only 15 percent of the total cultivated land is under year-round irrigation, and 25 percent has limited irrigation access. Consequently, the vast segment of crop production is excessively dependent on the vagaries of the monsoon. One additional factor plaguing the agricultural sector is that its excess labor supply suffers from the absence of regular and reliable off-farm or nonagricultural employment outlets. The fact that the country is heavily agrarian means its urban-industrial sector is grossly underdeveloped. As noted in “Geography and History of Nepal,” barely 12 percent of the country’s total population resides in urban areas, with the vast majority being concentrated in the Kathmandu Valley, the most urbanized area in the country. Given its limited urbanization, the country’s industrial base is naturally rudimentary and handicapped (discussed below). As a result, its ability to generate urban-industrial jobs in order to gainfully employ the surplus agricultural labor force and to increase national income levels is greatly diminished. The economic history of today’s advanced countries generally shows that their urban-industrial growth provided employment for surplus rural labor. It was precisely this avenue that allowed large numbers of rural workers who were employed in the urbanindustrial sector to enhance their incomes significantly, attain middle-class status, and, subsequently, generate mass consumer

——The Economy of Nepal——55

demands for manufactures. As a consequence, the industrial expansion process was reinforced. But this is not what is occurring in Nepal. The country is trapped in a catch–22 situation in that the high population concentration in rural areas, along with their heavy dependence on farming, means the demand for industrial outputs is choked off. This has led to a situation in which the domestic consumer market for industrial products is small and, hence, unable to support internal industrial growth and expansion, which in turn impedes the generation of gainful employment opportunities for the surplus agricultural labor force. In short, Nepal is caught in a negative feedback loop that perpetuates its economic stagnation. The ultimate outcome is that the ability of Nepal’s agricultural sector to free itself from the fetters of rapid population growth, land resource constraints, and heavy agrarian dependence is severely sapped. In addition to the production of various crops, most peasants and farmers are engaged in some form of animal husbandry. As an intertwined part of the farming system, livestock and poultry serve three key functions. First, they provide manure for crop production. Second, for most farmers they are a source of supplementary cash incomes, whether they are used for dairy, meat, eggs, or wool purposes. Third, they supplement the household food supply, particularly providing protein in the form of meat, milk, and eggs. It is only rarely that one will come across a farming family in Nepal without some animals and/or poultry. In 1996–1997, Nepal had more than 7 million cattle, 3.4 million buffaloes, and 5.9 million goats. The pig and sheep populations totaled almost 1 million each, whereas poultry numbered 15.6 million (CBS 1997). Industry. It is clear from the preceding discussion that, at best, Nepal’s urban-industrial development is in its infancy. This does not, however, mean the country is totally void of industrial history. Historically, Nepal was not only self-sufficient agriculturally; it was also self-supporting industrially (see Regmi 1988). There were two main reasons why the country was relatively self-sufficient and even modestly advanced in craft, commerce, and small-scale industrial activities. First, and ironically, the very geographical isolation and landlocked condition of the country that now stands as a huge economic impediment formerly led to an

56——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

economic system reliant on itself for its requirements. “Such forced isolation and self reliance made people industrious and content with whatever they had or whatever they could produce to meet all their few simple needs of daily life” (Shrestha 1967, 135–136). Second, the protective measures deliberately undertaken by the early Shah rulers safeguarded and promoted the domestic trade and industrial infrastructure against foreign intrusion and competition. One example of such measures was the protective trade policy adopted by Prithvi Narayan Shah with regard to foreign imports and foreign merchants’ entrance into the country. His instructions were to prohibit the use of foreign products and to encourage domestic production by utilizing local resources, by training local producers, and by providing them with samples of foreign products. This way money would not flow out of the country. Meanwhile, herbs, drugs, and other indigenous products could be exported to foreign countries to earn money. Even Jang Bahadur Rana fully understood the meaning and importance of Prithvi Narayan’s protective economic policy. In spite of cultivating a friendly relationship with the British in India, he kept a vigilant eye on trade relations with them. However, the situation changed gradually with the passage of time. The more the Ranas and members of the nobility came in contact with the British, the faster the measures taken by the previous rulers to protect domestic industries from foreign competition disappeared. That is, the later Rana rulers showed little regard for the protection and improvement of the existing domestic industrial foundation. Their lack of interest in fostering domestic industries was partially attributed to their preference for British imports. But it was also equally related to their perceived fear that indigenous technical innovations and economic progress would foment an upheaval in the existing social and political order, eventually dismantling their autocratic rule. Furthermore, some of the Western habits and ways of life followed by the Ranas and members of the nobility began to slowly permeate into the upper crust of the Nepali public. “This encouraged large inflows of cheap goods which hit hard, for the first time, the traditional craft of the country” (Shrestha 1967, 138). The problem was further exacerbated when the Ranas signed a trade treaty with British India in 1923,

——The Economy of Nepal——57

permitting practically unlimited imports of British goods and commodities into the country. Consequently, the domestic industries were effectively rendered impotent against British imports, thus marking their gradual demise. For instance, in a hill village called Those, some 100 kilometers east of Kathmandu, there was, Hagen (1971, 141–142) wrote, an important source of income: an iron works. “The iron works started in 1893 and developed into a boom in 1924, when 18 furnaces were in operation. . . . Hydro-electric power was installed to run an electromagnetic separator and various lathes and drilling machines. Produced were rifles and guns, chains, hammers, plough shares, shovels, pickaxes, kodalis (spades), locks, nails, khukris (knives), horseshoes, butter-lamps, and sold within areas of five days walk around Those.” Hagen further noted that instead of advancing Those’s industrial infrastructure, the Maharaja (i.e., the Rana prime minister) began importing guns and other items from the British. As a result, the iron industry at Those was pushed to the brink of extinction. By 1968 only two furnaces were left, and most of the blacksmiths had migrated to Kathmandu or India. This policy change imperiled the country’s balance of trade. The trade surplus Nepal had previously enjoyed began to dwindle rapidly because it had to pay for imported goods, most of which had been previously produced domestically. According to one report: “Annual values of trade which approximately trebled in the fifty years from 1835 to 1885 had trebled again by the end of the century, with the value of Nepali exports double that of imports. This strong trading surplus was produced with no internal transportation improvements and in a period in which emigration grew” (Blaikie et al. 1980, 37). As the imports of massmanufactured commodities from British India climbed, Nepal’s trade surplus disappeared. In the midst of the continued erosion of Nepal’s industrial foundation and fortunes came World War II, which put a brake to the eroding trend. In a sense, then, it can be plausibly argued that the so-called modern industrial history of Nepal began with the onset of World War II. In response to the demands for jute products created by the war economy, the Biratnagar Jute Mill was established in the mid-1930s in the eponymous eastern Tarai town, located

58——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

along the Indian border. As Radhe Pradhan (1984, 49) remarks, “The establishment of this enterprise can be considered a landmark in the history of industrial development in Nepal.” So high were the wartime demands for various industrial products that they engendered investment enthusiasm among entrepreneurs and industrialists. Soon after the creation of that mill, several other factories were established, almost all of them in the Tarai’s border towns because of their proximity to British India, the primary market for Nepali products. Furthermore, because Indian capital was heavily involved in the country’s wartime industrial surge, the Tarai proved to be the most attractive location thanks to its easy accessibility to Indian railheads along the border, its cultural similarity with northern India, and its ready access to Indian labor. Between 1936 and 1945, some twenty joint stock companies sprouted, manufacturing mostly agro- and forest-based products such as paper, soap, furniture, jute products, matches, sugar, textiles, cigarettes, and mustard oil. Prominent among them were the Juddha Match Factory, the Morang Sugar Mill, and the Nepal Plywood and Bobbin Company. Also established was the Morang Electricity Supply Company. By the time Rana autocracy ended in 1951, a total of sixty-five companies had been registered, with the vast majority of capital as well as labor coming from India. As the number of companies increased, so did the number of companies that went belly up, especially after the end of the war. Such a rise in the liquidation rate was not surprising, especially in view of the fact that Nepal’s industrial growth during the war period was mostly attributed to the demands of the war economy, which entailed large profit margins. It had little to do with long-range industrial foresight, managerial experiences, sustained capital reinvestment, domestic markets, and necessary infrastructural development. So, when the war economy came to a halt, a sharp reduction in the demands of Nepal’s products ensued. Nevertheless, the war economy proved to be instrumental in laying Nepal’s industrial foundation. Its manufacturing base has expanded since then, albeit at a sluggish pace. The growth of tourism (discussed later) over the past thirty years and the deliberate adoption of neoliberal economic policies or privatization since 1990 have given added impetus to industrial growth and

——The Economy of Nepal——59

expansion. During the 1995–1999 period, the industrial sector accounted for close to 20 percent of GDP, with almost one-half of it coming from manufacturing alone. In addition, the industrial sector’s share of national employment was almost 10 percent. It is estimated that this sector has been growing at the rate of 4–5 percent per annum, which is sizably higher than the annual growth rate of 2.3 percent registered by the agriculture sector during the same period. All of these statistics add up to reveal that Nepal’s industrial sector is making some headway in the national economic landscape. Nepal’s industrial sector can be broadly categorized into two major groups: domestically oriented and export based. Domestically oriented industries are generally those whose primary target is the domestic market. As such, they tend to be largely agrobased, meaning much (not all) of their raw material needs can be met domestically. Included in this group are rice, sugar, cotton, paper, timber, and oil mills, along with cigarette and match factories. Some of them produce tools, utensils, bricks, and leather products. Also significant in this group are those enterprises focused on the country’s growing tourist sector and the urban middle class. Even though the middle class comprises perhaps no more than 5 percent of the total population, it does represent around 20–25 percent of the national disposable income. Particularly notable among these enterprises are the beverage industry (namely beer and soft drink production) and the handicraft industry, for which Nepal is quite well-known. Within the export-based manufacturing group, perhaps the most widely recognized is the carpet industry. Nepal’s handmade carpet production is slowly gaining a foothold in the international carpet market, particularly in Germany. For the gradual rise of its carpet industry, Nepal owes a great deal to Tibetan refugees on the production front and to Western tourists on the consumption side. Settled in the country since the early 1960s, Tibetans are the primary drivers of this industry. On average, carpets alone account for more than 35 percent of Nepal’s total exports, followed by ready-made garments, which contribute an additional 27 percent. However, in 1999, these two exports were almost equal in terms of dollar values, with carpets grossing $144.2 million and ready-made garments $142.6 million.

60——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Besides capital, there are five principal issues with regard to the viability of Nepal’s sustained industrial growth and expansion. First, as already noted, its domestic market is very small and weak, a situation that automatically constrains its dynamic industrial growth. Second, except for some domestically oriented industrial enterprises, the country generally lacks necessary resources to fulfill its raw material needs. Consequently, it is heavily dependent on raw material imports, particularly for its export industries—for example, carpets and garments. In addition, the industrial sector, in general, relies on imported technological resources and capital equipment. Third, its transportation and social infrastructure is very cumbersome and often unreliable. The country is totally dependent on India for transit facilities or sea access, the main artery of commodity flows in the global market. Fourth, as a result of the above limitations, Nepal is hardly in a position to enjoy any competitive advantage—cost or quality—in a world where deepening globalization has heightened competition. Moreover, in the face of sweeping globalization, almost every country is eager to open its borders to multinationals, whose production operations and technologies not only are becoming increasingly mobile but they also have a tendency to homogenize export products. As a result, even Nepal’s ability to stake its claim to uniqueness in terms of products may be lost to globalization. For instance, just like China now manufactures products that were once typically Indian and handcrafted in India, any other country can produce products that were once considered indigenous to Nepal and its craftsmen. Finally, political instability and resultant periodic administrative changes, as well as directional uncertainties regarding economic policies, are totally antagonistic to continued industrial growth and advancements. To sum, with the possible exception of tourism, there are few areas in which Nepal can offer some tangible competitive advantage to attract substantial global investment capital. Tourist Industry. Tourism is the dominant segment of Nepal’s service sector and is perhaps the only reliable growth industry, the only one to have experienced a consistent upturn. Prior to 1951, Nepal was almost completely isolated—and insulated— from Westerners, who were seldom allowed into the country. But the situation changed after 1951. It is fair to claim that the coun-

——The Economy of Nepal——61

This upscale hotel in Kathmandu caters to Western tourists. (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)

try witnessed the first dawn of tourism with the sporadic arrival of some Peace Corps volunteers (PCVs), a few mountaineers, and a small horde of hippies in the early 1960s. Since its inception in the 1960s, when the number of tourists barely exceeded merely a few thousand, tourism has undergone tremendous growth. In 1999 the tourism sector boasted almost half a million foreign visitors, accounting for 3.6 percent of the GDP. Although its contribution to the GDP fluctuates somewhat from year to year, there is little doubt that it has been growing, routinely contributing more than 20 percent of foreign earnings. Although this sector is generally ranked third behind carpet and garment exports, in terms of foreign earnings it directly complements both the carpet and handicraft industries. One could, in fact, go so far as to claim that the growth of tourism is critical for the sustained growth of both industries, for it is the tourists who provide a vital link to increased sales of Nepali carpets and handicrafts. They are the primary agent of the international diffusion of Nepal-made carpets in the international markets. In addition, tourism is the central

62——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Vendors selling antiques (or counterfeit antiques) at a rent-free public retail space. Although no Westerners are seen in this picture, such vending operations are primarily intended for Western tourists. (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)

link to related industries such as airlines, travel agencies, hotels and restaurants, and trekking. The fate of these and many other auxiliary services is thus directly dependent on tourism. Speaking of hotels and restaurants catering to foreigners, their numbers have mushroomed, incessantly competing against ubiquitous ancient temples to dominate the Kathmandu Valley’s cultural landscape. One can find fancy international chains such as Everest Sheraton, Radisson, and Soaltee Holiday Inn to accommodate uppercrust tourists, as well as mediocre hotels for lowbudget travelers. Some big hotels—for example, Soaltee Holiday Inn and Annapurna Hotel—are even equipped with American-run casinos. In fact, Kathmandu has become the Las Vegas of South Asia. Equally remarkable is the parallel growth of all types of restaurants, serving everything from local delicacies to interna-

——The Economy of Nepal——63

tional dishes. Every cuisine is represented, although one may observe that the local adaptations have often led to change in both taste and form. Traditional sightseeing remains the centerpiece of Nepali tourism, but Western and Japanese visitors are increasingly engaged in various recreational or adventurous activities. Included among these activities are mountaineering, trekking, rafting, ecotourism, and even prostitution. Ecotourism is the latest trend, and Nepal has plenty to offer ecotourists. Additionally, Nepal is now seen as a safe and virgin territory in the shifting frontier of the rapidly growing global prostitution market. In short, Nepal’s prospect of growth and expansion within the tourism sector is good, at least in the short term. Posing the biggest threat to tourism in Nepal are the growing shortage of water and the Kathmandu Valley’s rapidly deteriorating environment. Water is extremely polluted and so gritty is the air in this bowl-shaped valley that the view of the mighty Himalayas, one of the focal points of tourist attraction, has become blurry to tourist eyes (see “Nepali Society and Contemporary Issues”). If the trend continues, in the next 10–15 years Kathmandu will face a massive public health crisis as a direct result of air and water pollution. This will severely undercut the country’s tourism industry, whose gravitational axis is centered in Kathmandu. Transportation and Communication. As already stated, from the very outset, high-level planning has stressed transportation and communication development. Being a landlocked country, Nepal has no direct access to sea transportation. Besides trails, which were historically the only means of transportation, Nepal now has two other principal modes of transportation. They are surface roads and airlines. Although the quality of motorable surface roads are generally poor throughout the country, largely because of massive corruption within the road construction industry and frequent landslides, Nepal’s road networks have vastly increased since the early 1950s. Currently, the country enjoys 8,265 miles of roads, of which 2,960 miles are paved, 2,175 miles graveled, and the rest considered passable only in fair weather. One noticeable characteristic of the road networks is that they are mostly concentrated in the Tarai and in certain nodal areas of the hills, the two most

64——NEPAL and BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

A rickshaw driver takes a nap during a slack time. (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)

——The Economy of Nepal——65

prominent points being Kathmandu and Pokhara. The first highway in the country was built by India in the early 1950s to connect Kathmandu with Birganj, a city located along the Nepal-India border in the central Tarai. This is still an important highway in terms of trade and transit between the two countries. Other major highways in the country include the East-West Highway that extends along the Tarai belt, the Kathmandu-Pokhara Highway, the Pokhara-Sunauli Highway, and the Kathmandu-Kodari Highway (see Karan and Ishii 1994, figure 29). Being that Nepal is a landlocked and mountainous country, airways play a critical role in its transportation system, both domestically and internationally. Air transportation provides quick links to different parts of the country that are inaccessible to motor vehicles. Because of the emergence of private airlines companies, the quality of domestic air service has vastly improved in recent years. Internationally, air transportation is more than an avenue of Nepal’s direct link to countries beyond India; it is the umbilical chord of the tourism industry. Without it, tourism would flounder. The only international airport in Nepal is situated in Kathmandu, and it is served by the Royal Nepal Airlines and numerous overseas airlines, including Aerofloat, Biman Bangladesh, China South West Airlines, Dragon Air, Druk Air, Indian Airlines, Lufthansa, Pakistan International Airlines, Singapore Airlines, and Thai International Airways. Kathmandu has direct air service to several cities in Europe and Asia, namely London, Paris, Frankfurt, Moscow, Dubai, Karachi, Delhi, Calcutta, Bombay, Dhaka, Rangoon, Bangkok, Singapore, Osaka, Lhasa, Thimpu, and Hong Kong. Regarding its telecommunication network and facilities, Nepal can hardly be considered advanced. This does not, however, mean the country is still living in the dark ages. Since the mid1980s, Nepal has made significant strides in the communication sector. Most cities in Nepal now have telephone service, and the international telecommunication network is digitalized, with fiber-optic links to India and satellite links to other countries. The telephone connection between Nepal and the United States, for example, is direct, clear, and reliable. Internet links are also fully established, especially in urban areas. There are commercial Internet hubs—or so-called Internet cafes—where tourists can access e-mail as well as surf the net. Nepal is equipped with a tel-

66——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

evision broadcast system. Programs offered by foreign TV organizations such as CNN, BBC, and those broadcast from India can be received via satellite dishes, which, by the way, have become a status symbol and one of the most visible features of Kathmandu’s cultural landscape. From a policy perspective, it is important to note that the government has created the Nepal Telecommunication Authority, an independent regulatory body, to facilitate private-sector participation and fair competition within the sector. The government plans to further develop this sector to augment the country’s trade, industry, commerce, and tourism. In addition to these four sectors, three other areas of the national economy deserve some attention; namely, foreign trade and foreign investment, banking, and water resources. Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment. Historically, Nepal traded with India mainly and with Tibet to some extent. Until the 1950s, over 90 percent of trade was conducted with India, a country that supplied, and continues to supply, the majority of basic goods, along with some raw materials and machines for Nepali industries. In addition to being almost the exclusive supplier of basic imports, India acted as the primary foreign market for most of Nepal’s exports. In these trade relations, however, Nepal always experienced a huge trade deficit with India. Though India still remains the single most important trading partner, Nepal’s foreign trade with India has been on the decline vis-à-vis other countries, especially for exports. For example, in 1996–1997, Nepal’s exports to Germany amounted to 7,652 million Nepali rupees (or roughly $134.2 million at the conversion rate of NRs. 57 to U.S. $1). The volume of similar trade with the United States was NRs. 5,930 million. India ranked third with a total export value of NRs. 5,448 million. These three major export trading partners were followed by seven other minor partners: Bangladesh, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, United Kingdom, France, and Belgium. However, with respect to Nepal’s imports during the same year, India was, as usual, the largest partner, with a trade volume totaling NRs. 25,844 million, or one-third of the total imports. It was followed by Hong Kong (not counting imports from mainland China), from where Nepal imported NRs. 20,243 million worth of goods and products. Singapore ranked third. Although carpets and ready-made garments are Nepal’s main

——The Economy of Nepal——67

exports, petroleum products, machinery, transport equipment and vehicles, medicines and medical equipment, textiles, raw wool, and electric goods top the list of imports. Also important among the imports are chemical fertilizers, cooking oil, threads, cement, and various chemicals. During certain years, gold occupies the position of a major import category. As mentioned earlier, since the early 1990s Nepal has been deliberately encouraging foreign investments in the country under its policy to promote privatization of the economy, particularly its state-owned industries. Several companies already have been denationalized. Except in certain areas with a strong domestic base, Nepal has a fairly open foreign investment policy. Broadly speaking, such investments are welcome in those industries that are focused on manufacturing, energy development, tourism, mineral resource development, agriculture, and services. And they can be joint ventures or 100-percent foreign-owned enterprises. Banking. Nepal’s banking system used to be quite archaic and cumbersome. In recent years, however, it has undergone significant improvements. Currently, the banking system consists of the Nepal Rastra Bank (the central bank of Nepal), thirteen commercial banks, and two development financing banks. The Nepal Rastra Bank’s main function is to regulate and supervise the country’s banking institutions. It issues currency as well as determines the daily buying and selling rates of foreign currencies. In essence, it is in charge of implementing the nation’s monetary policy in order to maintain financial stability and the health of the economy. In contrast, the country’s commercial and development banks are responsible for providing industrial, agricultural, and commercial credits to individuals as well as businesses. They offer both industrial long-term loans and short-term working capital loans. The Nepal Bank, Rastriya Banijya Bank (commercial bank of Nepal), and Agricultural Development Bank are quite active in the credit lending area and mostly operate through their branches, which are scattered throughout the country. There are nine foreign joint venture banks in Nepal, most of which are concentrated in the Kathmandu Valley. They are the Nepal Arab Bank, Nepal Indo-Suez Bank, Nepal Grindlays Bank, Nepal SBI Bank, Himalayan Bank, Everest Bank, Nepal Bangladesh Bank, Bank of Kathmandu, and Nepal Bank of Ceylon.

68——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Additionally, the Standard Chartered Bank, Citibank, American Express, and Union European de CIC have representative offices in Kathmandu. In recent years, there has been a noticeable increase in both the number and size of banks, financial institutions, and insurance companies in Nepal, all due to the government’s push for market liberalization. This increasing competition within the banking sector has significantly facilitated the foreign currency exchange situation. Moreover, a small stock market operates in Kathmandu. Water Resources. To be sure, Nepal’s energy needs are quite limited, largely due to its small urban-industrial base. This does not, however, mitigate the fact that the country is highly dependent on energy imports. Petroleum products top the list of Nepal’s major imports. This situation of energy dependence would be easily rectified if Nepal could harness its enormous hydroelectric potential, which is estimated to be around 83,000 megawatts, among the highest in the world. The potential is so vast and so widespread that it can be developed virtually in any region of the country. If carefully developed and efficiently operated, Nepal could readily export electricity to its neighboring countries, mainly to India, and turn it into a major component of foreign trade. Instead, Nepal currently imports electricity from India to light up some its border towns in the Tarai. As of 1997–1998, Nepal had managed to exploit only 262 megawatts of hydroelectricity, that is, less than 0.5 percent of the estimated total potential. However, to increase its hydro power capacity, several projects are either under construction or are being commissioned. Now that the so-called power of the private sector has been unleashed to develop hydroelectric power plants, Nepal may soon be in a position to convert this magnificent source of potential energy into a constant flow of electricity, not only to light up all corners of the country but also to enhance its national treasury through the export of electricity.

CONCLUSION: FUTURE PROSPECTS No matter how one analyzes Nepal’s economy, its present is mired in poverty and its future uncertain. Its problems are too varied and too entrenched to have sustained solutions. Despite this gen-

——The Economy of Nepal——69

A scene from the city of Bhaktapur (Bhadgaon), a major center of commercial chili production in Nepal. Hot chili peppers are dried on mats spread on the streets. (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)

70——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

erally gloomy outlook, its agricultural and tourism sectors hold some tangible prospect for future progress. One might ask, How could Nepal expect to achieve agricultural development under the condition of limited land resources? The simple fact that Nepal’s crop yields per unit of land are so low means there is tremendous room for raising land productivity through technological improvements and carefully balanced shifts from low-value to high-value crops such as vegetables and potatoes. Furthermore, as the bread basket of Nepal, the Tarai enjoys substantial potential for agricultural development. Tourism is the only sector, however, to have consistently expanded over the past forty years. There is enough evidence to be hopeful about its continued growth during the next few years. This will, however, require geographical diversification from its current gravitational axis in the Kathmandu Valley. It is no exaggeration that the valley’s growth potential is already saturated, if not geographically then at least in terms of its pending environmental crisis, which has no immediate remedy. The crisis of the Kathmandu Valley is too serious to continue to foster a physical environment that is tourist friendly. Some may argue that in light of the government’s determined push for privatization of various state-owned enterprises and relatively liberal foreign investment policies, Nepal’s industrial horizon appears quite bright. Although it is always hazardous to project too far into the future, no amount of neoliberalism or privatization is likely to suddenly rectify the country’s deepseated, multidimensional industrial woes. No doubt, neoliberal policies seem to have injected some temporary vigor into this sector, but they are fraught with expectations that defy the macroeconomic realities of Nepal. In addition, the advocates of these neoliberal policies are tainted with a one-sided view that greatly inflates benefits while completely ignoring detrimental effects. In the final analysis, unless Nepal can achieve dynamic agricultural development relatively fast and at a furious pace, the specter of poverty will continue to haunt the country for the foreseeable future (Panday 1999). This is not a pleasant prospect, but it is a reality that Nepal can hardly afford to ignore or treat lightly.

——The Economy of Nepal——71

References ARTEP (Asian Regional Team for Employment Production). 1974. A Challenge to Nepal: Growth and Employment. Bangkok: ARTEP. Baran, Paul A. 1973. The Political Economy of Growth. Middlesex: Penguin. Blaikie, Pier, et al. 1980. Nepal in Crisis. New York: Oxford University Press. Hagen, Toni. 1971. Nepal: The Kingdom in the Himalayas. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Karan, Pradyumna P., and Hiroshi Ishii. 1994. Nepal: Development and Change in a Landlocked Himalayan Kingdom. Tokyo: Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. Kansakar, Vidhya B. S. 1979. Effectiveness of Planned Resettlement Programme in Nepal. Kathmandu: Centre for Economic Development and Administration (CEDA). Lambers, H. W. “Foreword.” In A. Beenhakker, A Kaleidoscopic Circumspection of Development Planning with a Contextual Reference to Nepal. Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press. Panday, Devendra Raj. 1999. Nepal’s Failed Development: Reflections on the Mission and the Maladies. Kathmandu: Nepal South Asia Centre. Pradhan, Radhe S. 1984. Industrialization in Nepal. Delhi: NBO Publishers’ Distributors. Regmi, Mahesh C. 1988. An Economic History of Nepal, 1948–1901. Varanasi: Nath Publishing House. Shrestha, Badri P. 1967. The Economy of Nepal. Bombay: Vora. Shrestha, Nanda R. 1997. In the Name of Development: A Reflection on Nepal. Lanham: University Press of America (Kathmandu: Educational Enterprise, 1999, Nepal ed.). _____ 1990. Landlessness and Migration in Nepal. Boulder: Westview Press. Shukla, Vishwa S. 1993. “Nepal: The Economy.” In Andrea Matles Savada, ed., Nepal and Bhutan Country Studies (Area Handbook Series). Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress.

Nepali Institutions As an entrenched political and cultural institution, the monarchy of Nepal is an important marker in the evolution of Nepal as a nation. It was firmly consolidated as one family lineage after the rise of the Shah dynasty with Prithvi Narayan Shah in the late 1760s. But this institution recently suffered a debilitating blow: On June 1, 2001, a bizarre royal massacre left the royal family dead, tarnishing the institution greatly in the process. It all happened very fast, in a matter of minutes. King Birendra and every member of his family were gunned down in the royal dining room by his own son, Crown Prince Dipendra, who later shot himself. Obviously, the murder did not stem from some carefully hatched palace plot to assassinate the king and to prematurely usurp power. At twenty-nine years of age, Dipendra had remained unmarried well past the expected age of marriage for a crown prince. Apparently he was ready to marry the woman whom he loved. But his parents were vehemently opposed to his choice of bride. In fact, King Birendra allegedly warned him that he would be passed over as heir if he disobeyed. Because of this heated dispute, it is believed, the crown prince flew into a rage and fatally shot his father first and then the rest of his family assembled in the palace (BBC News 2001a). Because Dipendra was clinically still alive on June 2, he was declared the new king of Nepal. He was pronounced dead two days later, on June 4. With Birendra’s direct family killed and no direct heir to the throne, the Shah dynasty crown was, for the first time, passed to Birendra’s brother, Gyanendra, on June 4 (BBC News 2001b, c). The Shah dynasty thus remains in power, but a new lineage has been started—that of Gyanendra. The chain of events following the massacre is quite revealing of both the enduring quality and absurdity of monarchy as a national institution. The fact that the transition was orderly clearly indicates its centrality in Nepal’s government and politics. No known political maneuvering or conspiratorial attempts were made to undermine this institution during the hours of its greatest vulner-

73

74——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

ability. In the meantime, it clearly showed how the hereditary nature of the monarchical institution works. Specifically, there are two aspects to it. First, Crown Prince Dipendra, who had just murdered his own family in cold blood, was named as king because of his ingrained hereditary right. Second, following Dipendra’s death, Gyanendra instantly became the new monarch because of his dynastic linkage. Prior to being crowned king, Gyanendra was a very unpopular member of the royalty. The general public viewed him as an irresponsible character with a long unsavory past, who openly abused his royal privileges. His public unpopularity was evident during his coronation as the very masses who grieved over King Birendra’s death openly expressed their objections to Gyanendra’s crowning. During the coronation procession, streets were lined with protesters who shouted “Down with the king!” rather than “Hail to the king!” In addition, thousands of people marched on the royal palace, chanting “We don’t want Gyanendra” (BBC News 2001d). Corruption seemed to trail Gyanendra. In the eyes of the people, he had brought dishonor to his royal dynasty. To cite one minor example, he defiantly refused to pay his public utility bills. The people found this unacceptable, especially in light of the fact that he is one of the wealthiest individuals in Nepal, with a vast network of business enterprises. Common citizens would have their electricity cut off. Gyanendra’s son, Paras—now the crown prince—has been the perpetrator in at least three known hit-andrun vehicular accidents, including a fairly recent one in which he ran over and killed a popular Nepali musician (BBC News 2001b). No charges or court cases could be lodged against him without royal consent, which the palace would not grant. Such is the drama of the royal tradition that resides at the core of Nepal’s government and politics. Against the backdrop of this introductory snapshot, this chapter will provide brief descriptions of (1) government and politics since 1951; (2) ethnicity, castes, and social classes; (3) religion; and (4) education.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS As discussed in “Geography and History of Nepal,” the modern history of Nepal did not begin until its unification in 1769 under

——Nepali Institutions——75

the leadership of Prithvi Narayan Shah, the founder of the Shah dynasty. But, both by design and default, the country remained almost entirely divorced from the rest of the world until 1951, the year that marked the end of the autocratic Rana government and the beginning of a new era in Nepal’s government and politics. In a true sense, the year 1951 marked the dawn of the modern period in Nepali history. With the fall of the Rana rule also came the end of Nepal’s isolation. As the country emerged from its veil, it entered the world stage. Soon after 1951, Nepal was diplomatically recognized by many countries. It became a member of the United Nations in 1955. Yet Nepal and its citizens had to wait almost nine more years before they had their first glimpse of democratic governance and politics in 1959.

The Dawn and Death of Democracy and Economic Stagnation The roots of Nepal’s democracy can be traced back to the antiRana movement, much of which started in India. It should be noted, however, that the whole anti-Rana movement was driven by the desire and determination to establish democracy. So the movement was at once anti-Rana and pro-democracy. In many respects, the movement was not only influenced by India’s anticolonialism movement but also patterned after it. However, despite being centered on the immediate task of overthrowing the Rana government, it involved various political party-based factions. Perhaps the most organized and prominent of those factions were the Nepali Congress Party, under the leadership of Bishweshwar Prasad (B. P.) Koirala and Ganeshman Singh, and the Communist Party of Nepal, led by Puspa Lal Shrestha and Man Mohan Adhikari. The Congress party was much bigger and more expansive than the Communist party and espoused the ideal of democratic socialism, a system based on electoral politics and socialist economics. The movement culminated in a victory over the Rana regime in early 1951. Little did Nepali citizens realize, however, that the presumed dawn of democracy was merely a tantalizing mirage. The whole episode turned into one big revitalization of the Shah dynasty that had long been relegated to puppetry. Although King

76——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Tribhuvan had promised to hold a national election in 1952 to form a democratic government, he never held one, leaving the revolutionaries and citizens dangling under his broken promise while he consolidated his absolute power. Democracy was thus frozen. Four years later, in 1955, he died. His son, King Mahendra, also kept postponing the promised election. He shuffled his self-appointed government like a deck of cards, constantly pitting one ruling clan against another in a manner clearly reminiscent of Shah politics prior to the rise of the Rana rule. Mahendra was in total control of power as he sat on its saddle with the bridle and whip in his hands. Finally in 1959, under mounting pressure from those who had fought hard and shed blood to overthrow the Rana regime, Mahendra agreed grudgingly to hold a national election within the framework of parliamentary democracy. The Congress party won the election, and its leader, B. P. Koirala, became the first elected prime minister of Nepal. Intent on dismantling democracy, King Mahendra did not waste much time to launch a swift palace coup in December 1960, arresting Koirala and dissolving the parliament. Mahendra then declared the party system illegal. The democratic experiment was again stopped in its infancy. Consequently, the much-anticipated transition to a new, progressive social order was stymied; Nepal remained mired in feudalism. King Mahendra declared a state of emergency and ruled directly. He appointed a council of five ministers to help run the administration. The emergency lasted for two years. On December 16, 1962,—the second anniversary of his coup—he instituted a four-tier panchayat system of government. It was presented as a system of partyless guided democracy, or what Mahendra called panchayat democracy, rooted in the social and cultural heritage of Nepal. In reality, however, it was anything but democratic; it was a one-party system, a rubber-stamp body, operating at the whim of the king (Joshi and Rose 1966). In addition, Mahendra was the supreme commander of the armed forces. He appointed members of the Supreme Court, with the power to not only remove them at will but to overrule their decisions. In essence, he controlled all three branches of the government: the executive, legislative, and judiciary. His power had no limits except to his own plans and wishes.

——Nepali Institutions——77

The panchayat system continued even after Mahendra’s death in January 1972. In a short span of eleven years, from the day of the coup to his death, he ruled directly for a total of three years, including the last year of his life. During the remaining eight years, he blissfully engaged in the “government shuffle,” dissolving and reconstituting his cabinet five different times and appointing three different prime ministers. This was a legendary tactic he mastered to keep his prime ministers and cabinet members off guard and totally dependent on his whims. Nevertheless, each faction was given its turn to share the power and the spoils that came with the power as long as it remained loyal and adhered to Mahendra’s design. So the whole issue of access to power was turned into a game of musical chairs. Mahendra’s successor, King Birendra, stayed the course carefully charted by his father. In his early twenties at the time of his coronation, the new and young king encountered the growing possibility of political turmoil and agitation against the panchayat system, that is, the renewed demand for democracy. But, like his father, Birendra also relied on factional politics to consolidate his power and authority. During his absolute rule from 1972 to 1990, the government (cabinet) changed at least eleven times, with six different prime ministers leading it at different times. Only one government, headed by Prime Minister Marich Man Shrestha, lasted for more than three consecutive years. The rest changed hands usually within one to two years. Such was the nature of the political environment that the Shah monarchy created after 1951, in which the deep-seated insecurity of factional politics prevailed and the government was ever tainted with the stain of impermanence and discontinuity. Under such circumstances, no prime minister or government was allowed to develop a long-lasting framework of policy continuity for national development and governance. Nor did they have enough time to establish long-range relations with the bureaucrats and technocrats or general citizens to rally them around certain policy agendas. Nepal therefore failed to benefit from any relative certainty of political winds or any firm direction of economic development policy and implementation. The country simply lacked any sense of policy consistency and continuity. The only thing that was certain and constant was the whimsical change of

78——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

government orchestrated by the palace. And a civil society never emerged to facilitate democratic transition and a steady course of economic progress. As a result, the bureaucratic cadres simply turned into a collective body of shuttles, constantly moving from one political wind and policy agenda to another every so many months, or quietly ignored frequently changing political bosses. In other words, this critical mass of “worker ants” who form the central nerve of every government apparatus, who are integral to the efficient operation of bureaucracy and to the effective execution of government policies, was essentially neutralized or even paralyzed into inaction and indecision—or simply turned to building their own little fiefdoms of corruption, generally immune from political accountabilities and professional responsibilities. Caught in this triangular vortex of palace, power, and politics, factional political leaders became the king’s career pawns, to be moved in and out of the government at his will. Well adapted to this role, both historically and in the contemporary context, they were willing participants in this vortex. After all, access to political power translated into a profitable profession, a fail-proof and risk-free source of enormous financial gain for the political clan. In a country where there are few reliable avenues of economic advancements and industrial opportunities, the palace-centered political career was a natural choice. That is, factional leaders pursued politics as a career not to uplift the nation and its masses but because it was a proven economic enterprise for personal and clan gains. So the obvious rhetorical question was, Why bother to engage in risky industrial and commercial ventures to advance one’s economic interests when political pawnship achieves the same objective with minimal capital investment and risk? As politics became increasingly factionalized and fragmented, the national interest of Nepal was sacrificed. Economic progress was suffocated, as was the welfare of the general masses, who had little say in national political matters. In the absence of democracy, their voices were muted, along with their basic freedoms and human rights. Politically disfranchised and economically derailed, the masses were restless. Although the palace had managed to coopt the political factions within the panchayat system, those outside the system, especially those who adhered to democratic ideals

——Nepali Institutions——79

and party politics to establish a new social order, began to raise their muted voices against the status quo, demanding democracy. Frustration and discontent continued to mount, eventually reaching a boiling point in early 1979 when, guided by banned political party leaders, social agitations and protests were launched throughout the country (see Kaplan and Shrestha 1982). In the face of growing protests, King Birendra managed to outmaneuver the new pro-democracy movement and its party leaders by announcing a referendum in May 1979. The following May, a national referendum was held to determine the fate of the panchayat system. Because the outcome was essentially predetermined, the panchayat system survived and remained the central axis of palace politics and power for one more decade. In a way, the referendum ratified the panchayat system and its legitimacy, something it clearly lacked previously. But the problem did not disappear. Given its internal decay and disfunctionality, panchayat’s demise was inevitable. The system had failed on all fronts. The living conditions of the general masses saw little upswing. The pro-democracy movement reared its head once again in early 1990, with a vengeance. Dramatic events unfolded as a new popular revolution erupted, this time somewhat suddenly, but much more fiercely than in the late 1970s. The ground for the new anti-panchayat and pro-democracy movement was plowed in mid-January 1990 when the banned Nepali Congress Party defiantly held a three-day national conference in Kathmandu to chart a framework for the movement. February 18, 1990, was chosen as the launching date of what became commonly known as the “Movement for the Restoration of Democracy.” Other banned political parties, especially the various factions of the Communist party, were invited to join the movement, and they did. As scheduled, the movement got underway on February 18. As the masses joined the movement, it spread rapidly throughout the country. But the most intense battles were fought in the heart of Nepal, the Kathmandu Valley, often right in front of the palace or nearby. Plenty of blood was shed as scores of people were killed over a period of roughly fifty days. Shops were closed in support of the movement. Lights were turned out night after night across the valley as part of the protest. Nurses and doctors, students and teachers went on

80——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

strike. Workers boycotted jobs. Ordinary people joined the movement in droves, burning copies of the panchayat constitution. The demand for democracy was intensifying, virtually in every corner—in urban trenches as well as rural fringes (for details, see Parajuli 2000, 78–95). This time the movement was resolute, defiant, and determined to thwart any palace trickeries. King Birendra finally recognized the gravity of the movement as he realized the two stark choices confronting him: (1) to continue to suppress the fiery movement, kill more citizens, and risk the dismemberment of his dynastic monarchy under his own watch, or (2) to give up his absolute power and accept constitutional monarchy. He chose the latter. On April 16, he announced the dissolution of the much-despised panchayat system, and the disintegration was swift. On April 19, the king invited Krishna Prasad Bhattarai, a veteran Congress party leader, to form a coalition interim government for the purpose of drafting a new constitution and setting the date for a general election to establish a democratic government.

Return of Democracy and the Multiparty System And so thirty years after King Mahendra choked the life out of infant democracy, it was reborn in 1990. To be sure, King Birendra saved the Shah dynasty from extinction, but the form of governance changed. The multiparty system was reestablished, and a new constitution was drafted and enacted. A national election was held in May 1991. The Nepali Congress Party won 110 out of 205 seats in the House of Representatives and formed the government with Girija Prasad (G. P.) Koirala (B. P.’s youngest brother) serving as its prime minister. To the surprise of many pundits and observers, the Communist Party of Nepal (also known as the United Marxist-Leninist Party, or UML) came in second with sixty-nine seats, thus becoming the main opposition party in the House of Representatives. In addition, three other communist parties won a total of thirteen seats (see Parajuli 2000). Before his term expired, Prime Minister Koirala lost the vote of confidence. Subsequently, a general election was held in 1994. G. P. Koirala’s party lost. Although the UML fell short of the majority, it did win the largest number of seats. With its plurality in the

——Nepali Institutions——81

House, the UML was able to form a popularly elected communist government in 1994 under Prime Minister Man Mohan Adhikari. It was perhaps the first time a democratic communist government was established since Marxist President Salvador Allende’s popularly elected government in Chile. This was quite remarkable in that communism was reeling from global setbacks in the wake of the Soviet Union’s sudden disintegration. In 1995, it too was dissolved as it failed to retain enough support in the House. Since the first national election following the formation of the interim government in 1990, Nepal has seen nine governments in one decade under six prime ministers, the latest being that formed under Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba after King Birendra’s murder. In the midst of all this governmental flux and temporality, the Maoist faction of the communist bloc launched a revolutionary movement in early 1996. Commonly called the people’s war, this movement has stirred the nation and made notable gains in the past five years, expanding its guerilla operations from its stronghold in the western hills to many other areas. It is estimated that the Maoists currently exercise control in some 25 percent of the national territory. There is every indication that the movement is growing both in strength and territorial expansion. However, in fall 2001, the Maoists agreed to hold negotiations with the Deuba government, thus temporarily suspending their revolutionary campaign. In fact, Prime Minister Deuba’s one key national political agenda was to end the surging Maoist movement through negotiations. However, when the Deuba government refused to accept the Maoists’ demand to rewrite the constitution, the Maoists withdrew from any further negotiations and broke off a four-month cease-fire with a series of attacks on army and police posts, killing dozens of policemen and soldiers. Following those attacks, King Gyanendra declared a state of emergency on November 26, 2001, thus suspending civil liberties, including freedom of the press as well as freedom of assembly, expression, and movement. As the king now has total control over the leverage of power, Nepal’s nascent democratic experiment has, once again, been suspended, thus engendering a profound sense of fear among the people that Nepal might revert to the days of absolute monarchy. Whatever the eventual outcome of the state of emergency and the ongoing Maoist revolution, the country, as Panday

82——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

(1999) aptly suggests, remains cursed with political chaos and economic disillusionment.

Nepal and the World Metaphorically, Nepal has been described as a yam between two rocks. This is a reference to its geographical position of being hemmed in by India and China. As a result, Nepal has been historically forced into a situation where it had no choice but to be a proficient diplomatic juggler, constantly striving to maintain a balance between its two giant neighbors so it can preserve its national identity and independence. Nepal’s recorded history reveals that this is an ongoing dilemma that every ruler dating back to the Licchavi Era (A.D. 400–880) has had to acknowledge and accommodate in his management of international diplomacy. In spite of this long history of diplomacy with its immediate neighbors, Nepal has had virtually no role in geopolitics until the early 1950s. During the Rana period and the corresponding British Raj on the Indian subcontinent, Nepal chose isolation as opposed to a more global role. Besides, given its semicolonial status, it could not open any new door of diplomacy to other countries without a nod from the British. Consequently, Nepal’s link to the world was through its Gorkha (Gurkha) mercenaries, whom the British fancied and recruited en masse. The Gorkhas fought for the British Empire and died for it in droves all the way from the jungles of Borneo to the islands of Malvinas and across the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe (Shrestha 1998). Those who survived returned to the hill villages and valleys with a few British pounds from monthly pensions. Their homecoming brought tales of adventure from throughout the world, opening a little window to the world for their fellow villagers. Now many Nepalis had something to help them construct their world view— Gorkha soldiers’ battle tales and travel accounts. But soldiers’ trials and tales are not diplomacies, no matter how captivating. In essence, then, Nepal’s interaction with the world remained confined to China (including Tibet), India, and the British Empire. With the dawn of a new era in the 1950s, however, Nepal began opening up to the world. Although its international links continued to grow, it maintained its firm commitment to a policy

——Nepali Institutions——83

of neutrality and nonalignment. This policy was immensely facilitated as Nepal joined the Nonalignment Movement, which during the heat of the cold war had gathered tremendous momentum as a countervailing force against the two competing forces associated with the U.S. and Soviet blocs. In 1955 it was admitted to the United Nations, playing an active role. Nepal also played a significant part in the 1985 founding of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which is headquartered in Kathmandu. Today, Nepal has established diplomatic relations with about 100 countries. In reality, however, Nepal’s diplomatic relations with all other countries are dwarfed by its ties to India and China, largely because of its geographical proximity, historical links, and political necessity to safeguard its national security and independence. Perhaps the only other nations that come relatively close to Nepal’s relations with India and China are Great Britain, the United States, Germany, Switzerland, Japan, and other South Asian countries, namely SAARC members. Official relations between Nepal and Britain go back almost 200 years, to 1816, when the Treaty of Sagauli was signed and the British residency was set up in Kathmandu. The United States was one of the very first countries to extend diplomatic recognition to Nepal following its freedom from the autocratic Rana rule. The U.S. recognition was a significant event in that it paved the way for other countries to quickly recognize the young nation of Nepal, striving to enter the world of progress after being kept in the dark for more than a century. Furthermore, since the early 1990s, the United States has, in league with the World Bank, emerged as a dominant force in terms of setting Nepal’s economic agenda and framework. It is largely because of U.S. and World Bank prodding that Nepal decided to pursue a policy of economic liberalization in the 1990s. Notwithstanding some of these issues, the geographic reality is an overwhelming determinant of Nepal’s link to the world. In this sense, India tops the list, superceding even China. That is, although Nepal’s diplomatic relationship with China is at about the same par as that with India, it cannot compete with the latter at a broader level. The link simply is not as extensive and expansive with China as it is with India, largely because of its physiographic layout and orientation. Even though Nepali merchants in

84——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

the past had established viable trade networks in Tibet, the massive mountains and treacherous valleys always posed a formidable challenge in terms of transportation and movement. This geohistorical limitation has not changed much, even with the Chinese construction of a highway in the 1960s linking Kathmandu with Tibet at the border town of Kodari. To this day, most of the goods coming to Nepal from China are channeled through the port of Calcutta. Naturally, therefore, Nepal’s relations to India are far more extensive and entrenched. This inevitability has been further reinforced by the fact that, historically, Nepal’s cultural ties with India go much deeper than with any other country, although many Nepali politicians are loath to admit it. The population flows between the two countries are constant, as both sides have maintained an open border policy with respect to the cross-border movement of their citizens. Most important, it is economic relations that make Nepal and India intrinsically intertwined. This is particularly true for Nepal for at least two primary reasons. First, virtually all basic necessities that it cannot produce within its borders come from India—for example, petroleum, kerosene, salt, spices, and many other essential products, including raw materials for much of its industrial production. Second, India has a virtual choke hold on Nepal’s transit facilities. As a landlocked country, Nepal has no direct sea access. It cannot even use the port facility in Bangladesh, for the two nations are separated by a narrow strip of land, about twelve miles wide, that falls within the Indian territory. Consequently, the country is almost totally dependent on India and its diplomatic whims. This suffocating dependency was nakedly exposed and exploited in 1989, when India imposed a year-long economic embargo, closing all border entry points except two and allowing only the minimum amounts of basic necessities to enter Nepal. Although disagreement over the terms of the new Trade and Transit Treaty was outwardly evoked as the reason for the embargo, the underlying cause was rooted in the Nepali king’s decision to purchase certain military armaments from China without prior consultation with India. Because India fully realizes Nepal’s extreme vulnerability and dependency, it never ceases to cast its ominous shadow over the Nepali regime. It

——Nepali Institutions——85

is precisely this “bully” attitude and behavior on the part of India that engenders a profound sense of resentment across Nepal. But, at the same time, most Nepalis realize the position they are in; they know there is little they can do to change it fundamentally. So, when their frustration builds up and boils, they tend to vent it out through anti-India demonstrations and protests, shouting a few nasty slogans in front of the Indian embassy and even boycotting, occasionally, Hindi movies or burning effigies of Indian leaders. At the end, however, the practical reality sets in, the steam of anger evaporates, life reverts to the normal routine, and most Nepalis grudgingly bite the hard bullet. And, of course, they go back to watching Hindi movies, which, somehow, always seem to act as a palliative for social ills as well as diplomatic ill feelings. Now that is recreation with a diplomatic touch.

ETHNIC GROUPS, CASTES, AND SOCIAL CLASSES Ethnic Groups Nepal is an ethnically diverse and complex society. The people of Nepal can be classified into three broad ethnic groups in terms of their ancestral origin. In addition to those whose origins can be traced to India and Tibet, there is a sizeable pool of indigenous people. Whereas the Indo-Nepali group inhabits the more fertile lower hills, river valleys, and Tarai plains, the Tibeto-Nepali population mostly occupies the higher hills. The indigenous people comprise a number of tribal communities, such as the Tharus and the Dhimals of the Tarai. The Newar group that consists mostly of the original inhabitants of the Kathmandu Valley is also considered by some scholars as being indigenous to Nepal. It is believed that indigenous people and communities predate the advent of Indo-Nepali and Tibeto-Nepali people. Within the Indo-Nepali segment, at least two distinct categories can be discerned. The first category includes those who fled India and moved to the safe sanctuaries of the Nepal hills several hundred years ago, in the wake of the Muslim invasions of northern India. The hill group of Indian origin—popularly known as the pahari (hill dwellers)—includes descendants of high-caste Hin-

86——NEPAL and BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

An ancient stone sculpture of a Hindu goddess in a public square in Patan. This sculpture demonstrates the artistic achievements of the Newar group, the indigenous population of the Kathmandu Valley. The Newars are the source of Nepal’s civilization and urban culture. (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)

——Nepali Institutions——87

dus, mostly of Brahman and Kshatriya (Chhetri) status. They have spread throughout Nepal with the exception of the areas immediately adjacent to the northern border. They usually constitute a significant portion of the local elites and are frequently the largest landowners in their local communities. This segment of the Indo-Nepali population, at the apex of which stands the royal family, has played the most dominant role in local as well as national politics and governance (see Joshi and Rose 1966). Other ethnic groups, including those of Indian origin that settled in the Tarai and, with some exception of Kathmandu, Newars, have been peripheral to the political power structure controlled by the nexus of high-caste and dominant-class elites. All of these people, regardless of their specific geographical locations, have adopted Nepali as their official and vernacular language, which, by the way, is the country’s official language. The second group of Indo-Nepali people primarily includes Tarai inhabitants excluding hill migrants in the region. Generally identified as the madhesi, they relocated to Nepal from northern India. As Regmi (1984) notes, most of them were actually encouraged by the government of Nepal or its agents to move into the Tarai for settlement during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when the country was attempting to expand its revenue base through agricultural land settlement. Although some of those Indian migrants later became large landowners in the Tarai, most of them remain peasants with small tracts of land or no land at all. They belong to different subethnic groups with their own respective dialects as the primary medium of communication. Although their facility with Nepali has greatly improved over the years, they use it only when necessary. Most of the Indo-Nepali people are primarily agriculturalists, although a majority of them also rely on other activities to produce supplementary income. They generally raise some farm animals, particularly water buffalo, cows, goats, and sheep, for domestic purposes. The paharis (hill group) traditionally have occupied the vast majority of civil service positions since the rise of the Shan dynasty. As a result, they have managed to dominate and control bureaucracy to their advantage. It was not until the late 1980s that a prime minister came from the nonpahari segment of the population. Despite some loosening of the pahari

88——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

domination of the bureaucracy in recent years, a 1991 newspaper report summarized in the Nepal Press Digest revealed that 80 percent of the posts in the civil service, the army, and the police still were held by the Brahmans and Chhetris of the hills, who comprised far less than 50 percent of the population. As already noted, unlike the Indo-Nepali population, the Tibeto-Nepali people are generally found in higher altitudes. This discernable altitudinal pattern of geographical distribution of these groups is mainly attributed to the directional origins of their early migrations. Because the Tibeto-Nepali people originally moved into Nepal from the north, they populated the higher reaches of the hills, whereas the Indo-Nepalis with their origin in India naturally gravitated toward the lower hills and valleys (see Gaige 1975). It is believed that the migrants from India brought with them a relatively more advanced form of agricultural technology that allowed them to exploit land more intensively, thereby increasing its productive capacity to support a larger population. This technological advantage also allowed them to establish their social, economic, and political dominance over Nepal. The Tibeto-Nepali population is composed of several subethnic groups (see Bista 1967). Included among them are the Sherpa, Gurung, Rai, Limbu, Magar, Thakali, and Tamang tribes, who are widely known and studied. One notable ethnic feature of their cultural landscape is their communal settlement patterns. Unlike the Indo-Nepali people, who are scattered throughout the country and widely mixed, these subethnic groups are concentrated in their own specific geographic pockets across the hill region from east to west, that is, each within the domain of its own communal space and within a relatively self-contained community. For example, the Sherpas occupy the northeast, mainly around Mt. Everest. To the west of the Sherpa domain are found separate Rai and Limbu congregations. Then, moving westward along the hills, we see concentrations of Tamang populations, followed by several pockets of the Gurung tribe in the west-central hills. The Magars are also found in these hills as well as further west. The Gurungs and Magars apparently cover the largest geographical areas with respect to their territorial dispersal (see Karan and Ishii 1994). Yet, communally, they are concentrated in their specific geographical pockets. The Thakalis, a highly entrepreneurial tribe

——Nepali Institutions——89

A Tibeto-Nepali man enjoying a puff of pipe tobacco while taking a rest. This picture was taken along a trail in the hills. (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)

90——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

once well-known for their Himalayan trade, have settled along the upper reaches of the Kali Gandaki river basin, which served as a leading trade route between Tibet and India until the former’s absorption by China in the late 1950s. Further north to their domain is found the Bhote tribe located in the Trans-Himalayan zone near the Tibetan border. The Gurungs, Rais, Limbus, and Magars are renowned as the martial tribes of Nepal; they are the so-called Gurkhas (Gorkhas) in the British military parlance and lore. In a way, they are mercenaries whose blood has flooded and fertilized the British empire across the globe, from the jungles of Borneo to the islands of Malvinas (Falkland). Most of the Tibeto-Nepali groups traditionally could be considered agro-pastoralists. Because their physical environment offered only limited agricultural possibilities, they were almost forced to rely more on herding and pastoral activities than on crop farming. The higher the altitude, the harsher the climatic and physiographic condition. As a result, agricultural opportunities are quite limited. Perhaps the most affected Tibeto-Nepali groups are the Bhote, Manange, and Sherpa communities located in the lower flanks of the Himalayas. In addition to pastoralism, they used to participate in seasonal trading activity to supplement their income and food supply (Furer-Haimendorf 1975). Those inhabiting the midhills—for instance, the Gurung, Magar, Rai, and Limbu groups—depend on both farming and herding. These hills are relatively more suitable for agriculture. And, as already remarked, they are also famous for their mercenary service in the Indian and British militaries.

The Caste System Like religion, the caste system is a fundamental feature of Nepal as it plays a central role in one’s life from birth to death. For example, it has direct bearings on who one marries or can marry, on one’s social status and mobility, and on educational opportunities and access. Even though its influence has gradually waned over time, especially in cities, its undercurrent still runs deep. Modeled after the ancient and orthodox Brahmanic system of the Indian plains, the caste system is commonly viewed as a multifaceted status hierarchy composed of all members of society,

——Nepali Institutions——91

A Damai sewing clothes on an old-fashioned sewing machine. The Damais are a professional tailor caste, which was once treated as untouchable. (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)

92——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

with each individual ranked within the fourfold Hindu caste (varna or color) divisions (Bishop 1990). Some extend this fourtiered hierarchy to add the Untouchables—the socially polluted. Within this preordained construct, the caste is an indelible imprint of one’s identity and status. Like a birthmark, one is born with it, lives with it, and dies with it. The four castes are the Brahman (priests and scholars), Kshatriya (or Chhetri, rulers and warriors), Vaisya (merchants and traders), and Sudra (artisans and laborers). Within each group are many hierarchically ranked subcastes. Based on the Hindu ethos, the caste system finds its immediate application among Nepal’s Indo-Nepali people, the primary adherents of Hinduism. Although the Newars, who tend to follow both Hinduism and Buddhism, have adopted the caste system, they do not strictly uphold the four divisions. According to the Hindu system of castes, the Newars technically fall in the Vaisya group because of their traditional professional role. But they have their own parallel hierarchy of castes, with a distinct priestly group that is equivalent to the Brahman caste. In both systems, each caste (jati) is regarded as an endogamous group in which membership is both hereditary and permanent. One way to change one’s caste status is to undergo Sanskritization, a process that can be achieved by migrating to a new area and assuming a new caste or via marriage across the caste line. Although the former is a self-proclaimed process, the latter is normally predefined and can lead to either upgrading or downgrading of one’s caste, depending on the spouse’s caste. However, given the rigidity of the caste system, intercaste marriage carries a social stigma, especially when it takes place between two castes at the extreme ends of the social spectrum. At the core of the caste structure is a rank order of values bound up in concepts of ritual status, purity, and pollution. Consequently, caste is used to determine an individual’s behavior, obligations, and expectations. All the social, economic, religious, legal, and political activities are prescribed by sanctions that determine access to land, position of political power, and command of human labor. Within this constrictive system, wealth, political power, high rank, and privilege converge. Hereditary occupational specialization is a common feature. Yet it is perti-

——Nepali Institutions——93

nent to bear in mind that caste is functionally significant only when viewed in a local context and at a particular time. The assumed correlation between the caste hierarchy and the socioeconomic class hierarchy does not always hold. Because of numerous institutional changes over the years and increased dilution (or expansion) of the caste hierarchy stemming from intercaste marriages, many poor high-caste and rich low-caste households can be found in Nepali society. Although the footprint of the caste system can be seen in almost every facet of life, compared to the Indo-Nepali population, the question of caste is less ingrained in Tibeto-Nepali communities, which usually follow the Tantric version of Buddhism, mixed with some aspects of Hinduism. Insofar as they accept the caste-based notions of social ranks imposed on them by the Hindu system, the Tibeto-Nepalis tend not only to see themselves at a higher level than do the Indo-Nepalis and Newars but also differ as to ranking among themselves. For instance, the Rai tribe’s assumption of their caste superiority over the Magar and Gurung tribes is not accepted by the two latter groups. Moreover, the status of a particular group is apt to vary from place to place, depending on its relative number, wealth, and local power. Similar to the Newar caste system, Tibeto-Nepali subethnic groups have their own internal social hierarchies, although rarely as rigidly delineated as that found among the Newars and Indo-Nepali population.

Social Classes and Stratification In terms of differences in wealth and access to political power, the people of Nepal can be divided into three categories: (1) a small but powerful ruling elite class; (2) a growing class of government officials, large landholders, and merchants; and (3) the large majority of peasants and workers. These divisions are descriptive, functional class categories rather than social class entities based on the Marxian concept of the social relations of production. In a way, all three classes are a long continuum in Nepal’s social structure. Even though the peasant population as a whole faces similar economic and technological circumstances, it contains several strata in terms of landholdings, relative economic dependence, independence, or social status. However, landholding is the pri-

94——NEPAL and BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

An educated and upwardly mobile urban family. Ownership of a motorcycle is the first step of urban prosperity. A higher step or status symbol is ownership of an automobile. (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)

——Nepali Institutions——95

mary determinant of one’s economic position and social standing in Nepal. Although those with small or no landholdings are economically dependent and vulnerable, relatively large landholders both enjoy economic security and control local social institutions and political processes. The social, economic, and educational advantages of this segment make its members relatively homogeneous in terms of their shared interest. They generally aspire to achieve a middle- or elite-class status. Numerically, however, this group is quite small. Small landholders constitute the largest bulk of the rural population in Nepal. The smallest and least diverse of the three social classes is the ruling elite, largely composed of high-caste, educated paharis, usually from the Brahman and Chhetri castes. Moreover, its number is relatively constant. Unlike this group, the second social class— composed largely of bureaucrats—has witnessed a steady growth in its number. This is largely attributed to the continued expansion of Nepali bureaucracy and development activities. In the absence of employment opportunities in the industrial and commercial sectors, the expansion of bureaucracy has emerged as a path of least resistance to absorb an increasing number of the educated class. Moderate growth in the service sector over the past thirty years also has contributed to an increased pool of this class. Since the early 1980s, many people with a college or university level education, namely those residing in the Kathmandu Valley, have discovered a second employment outlet. Development consultant firms and associated services have sprouted throughout Kathmandu. Because of the growing pressure on foreign donors to hire Nepali consultants for development feasibility and evaluation projects, these firms have been able to tap into a large pool of foreign aid money and have generated a measurable number of jobs. This opportunity has allowed many of Nepal’s more educated persons to attain a middle-class status.

RELIGION AND SOCIETY Religion occupies an integral position in Nepali life and society. Most dominant and visible within the realms of religious faiths is Hinduism. This is hardly surprising, because Nepal is the only constitutionally declared Hindu state in the world. There is, how-

96——NEPAL and BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Kumari, a living goddess, as devotees worship her in Kathmandu (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)

——Nepali Institutions——97

ever, a great deal of intermingling of Hindu and Buddhist beliefs in terms of daily practice. Nonetheless, many individuals regarded as Hindus could easily be called Buddhists. The fact that Hindus worship at Buddhist temples and Buddhists worship at Hindu temples clearly explains why adherents of the two dominant groups in Nepal have never engaged in any overt religious conflicts. Because of such dual faith practices, the differences between Hindus and Buddhists in Nepal have been, in general, very subtle and academic in nature. However, according to the 1991 census, 88 percent of the Nepali people identified themselves as Hindus. Buddhists and Muslims comprise roughly 7 and 3 percent, respectively. Most of the small remainder are Christians, who have a visible and active presence despite their minority status. The primacy of Hinduism in the census largely stems from its status as the national religion. When asked about their faith, people tend to identify Hinduism. This is particularly true among individuals who follow tenets of both Hinduism and Buddhism. Furthermore, by identifying themselves as Hindus they reduce the probability of being discriminated against. The geographical distribution of religious groups reveals a preponderance of Hindus, accounting for at least 87 percent of the population in every region. Geographically, the lower hills are heavily influenced by Hinduism whereas the upper hills and trans-Himalayan areas are predominated by Buddhism. Large pockets of Buddhists are also found in the eastern hills, the Kathmandu Valley, and the central Tarai; in each area about 10 percent of the people are Buddhist. Buddhism is relatively more common among the Newar and Tibeto-Nepali groups. Among the Tibeto-Nepali, those most influenced by Hinduism are the Magars and Rais. Hindu influence was less prominent among the Gurung, Limbu, Bhote, and Thakali groups, who continue to employ Buddhist monks for their religious ceremonies.

Hinduism Hinduism generally is regarded as the oldest formal religion in the world. Unlike other world religions, Hinduism has no single founder, nor has it ever been missionary in orientation. It is believed that in about 1200 B.C.—earlier by some accounts—the Vedas, a body of

98——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

hymns originating in northern India, were produced; these texts form the theological and philosophical precepts of Hinduism. Hindus believe that the absolute (the totality of existence, including God, humans, and the universe) is too vast to be contained within a single set of beliefs. A highly diverse and complex religion, its religious practices tend to differ somewhat from group to group and place to place. The average Hindu does not need any systematic formal creed in order to practice his or her religion; Hindus only need to comply with the customs of their family and social groups. This is partly related to the fact that Hinduism is polytheistic. It incorporates many gods and goddesses with different functions and powers. But they are all considered merely different manifestations of a single underlying divinity that is expressed as a Hindu trinity of the religion’s three primary figures: Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva, respectively personifying the three universal roles of creation, preservation, and destruction. Vishnu and Shiva, or some of their numerous avatars (incarnations), are most widely worshiped, and their prescribed roles are often interchangeable, for they can function both as protector and destroyer, depending on the context and the demand of time. One fundamental precept is that of dharma, loosely defined as religious acts and obligations. It holds that individuals should play their proper role in society as prescribed by their dharma. The caste system has been incorporated as an integral part of its social expression. That is, each person is born into a particular caste, whose traditional occupation is graded according to the degree of inherent caste purity and impurity. Dharma cannot be viewed in isolation, however. So the other side of dharma is karma (universal justice or the outcome of dharmic acts and duties). The belief is that the consequence of every good or bad action must be fully realized. In other words, one’s dharmic act dictates his or her karmic manifestation, and one’s karmic act or outcome reflects his or her dharmic deeds and behavior. The two are, therefore, absolutely inseparable. Another basic concept is that of samsara, the transmigration of souls; rebirth is required by karma in order that the consequences of action be fulfilled. The role an individual must play throughout his or her life is fixed by his or her good and evil actions in previous existence. It is only when the individual soul sees beyond the mist of maya—illusion or the belief in

——Nepali Institutions——99

the appearance of things—that it is able to realize its identity with the impersonal, transcendental reality (world soul) and then escape from the otherwise endless cycle of rebirth to be absorbed into the world soul. This ultimate release is known as moksha (similar to nirvana in Buddhism and salvation in Christianity). Buddha, the founder of Buddhism, is regarded as the ninth avatar of Vishnu. Some Hindus regard Christ as the tenth avatar; others regard Kalkin (or Kalki) as the final avatar who is yet to come to rescue the world from total abyss, a redemptive conception of the world that has its parallel in the apocalyptic thinking in Christianity. These avatars are believed to descend upon earth from time to time to restore peace, order, and justice, to save humanity from injustice and miseries. The very notion or reason for their arrival thus signals a phase of destruction in order to rescue humanity from its own excesses and injustices. Therefore, Hinduism inherently entails an inseparable link between destruction and preservation (construction). There is, in other words, no construction without destruction. So it is tenable to pronounce that at the core of Hinduism resides the fundamental notion of creative destruction, a process that may involve a long time. Time as related to a given avatar is thus conceived in epochal terms, or what the Hindus call yuga. So the arrival Buddha symbolized the Buddha yuga (or of Jesus as the Christ yuga), that is, his time to right the wrongs of the world.

Buddhism Buddhism has its origin in the teachings of Buddha, a Sakya prince whose birth name was Siddhartha Gautama. Born in 563 B.C. in Lumbini, located in Nepal’s central Tarai, he was educated in the Hindu tradition. Frustrated with Hindu orthodoxy and disturbed by endless human sufferings and earthly trappings, Siddhartha renounced worldly life when he was twenty-nine and spent the next six years in meditation. Finally, he attained enlightenment. Thereafter, known as the Buddha, or the Enlightened One, he devoted the remainder of his life to preaching his doctrine, thus laying the pillars of Buddhism. The Four Noble Truths summarize the Buddha’s analysis of the human condition and the solution he found for the problems of

100——NEPAL and BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

A village temple in the hills against the backdrop of Machhapuchhre (fish tail mountain), which is renowned as the most beautiful Himalayan peak in Nepal. (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)

——Nepali Institutions——101

life. The first truth is that life is inherently imperfect and sorrowful, and that misery is not merely a result of occasional frustration of desire or misfortune but is a quality permeating human experience. The second truth says the cause of sorrow is desire (similar to maya), the emotional involvement with existence that leads from rebirth to rebirth through the operation of karma. In other words, it is desire that tempts people to commit misdeeds (undharmic acts) which result in rebirth. The third truth is that the sorrow can be ended only by eliminating desire. The fourth truth sets forth the Eightfold Path leading to elimination of desire, rebirth, and sorrow—or to nirvana, a state of bliss and selfless enlightenment in which the soul is free from desire and the cycle of rebirth. The religions of Nepal occupy center stage in Nepali life and society. From one’s birth till death, religious ceremonies and rituals form a seamless chain. In addition to birth, death, wedding, planting, and harvesting rituals and ceremonies, there are many other religious festivities in which people participate. Virtually every occasion requires a religious sanction or blessing. Some ceremonies are strictly family matters, whereas others are performed collectively in public settings. The people of Nepal annually celebrate numerous public festivals keyed to various seasonal occasions and events. The two biggest Hindu festivals are the Dashain (or Bijaya Dashami) and Tihar (also Deepawali or Diwali), which are celebrated about a month apart, usually in October and November, following the rice harvest. People also go to temples routinely—in many cases, every morning before breakfast—to worship their favorite gods or goddesses. Within Buddhism, Buddha Jayanti (Buddha’s birthday) is the most significant celebration. Although there is no public celebration of Christmas in Nepal, it is lately becoming increasingly commercialized as a festivity, specifically in Kathmandu, where some merchants display Christmas decorations to attract Western tourists, travelers, and expatriates.

EDUCATION Education under Rana Rule The Rana rulers feared an educated public. This fear also was held by Prime Minister Chandra Shamsher Rana, who established Tri-

102——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Chandra College in 1918 and named it after himself. During the inauguration of the college, Chandra Shamsher lamented that its opening was the ultimate death knell to Rana autocracy. He personally felt responsible for the downfall of the Rana rule, and his words proved prophetic in that thirty-three years later the Ranas’ political power crumbled (Sharma 1990). The privileged access of the members of the higher castes and wealthier economic strata to education was for centuries a distinguishing feature of Nepali society. The Ranas kept education the exclusive prerogative of the ruling elite; the rest of the population remained largely illiterate. The Ranas were opposed to any form of public schooling for the people, although they emphasized formal instruction for their own children to prepare them for a place in the government. The founder of the Rana regime, Jang Bahadur, chose to give his children an English education rather than the traditional religiously oriented training within the Sanskritic tradition. In 1853 Jang Bahadur engaged an English tutor to hold classes for his and other Rana children in his palace. This act tipped the balance in favor of English education and established its supremacy over the traditional type of Sanskrit-based education. Today, the status of English education has been elevated even higher relative to traditional education. Jang Bahadur’s school was eventually converted into the Durbar (palace) High School, again with the sole purpose of educating all Rana children in a formal setting. A brief shift in the Rana education policy came in 1901, when Prime Minister Dev Shamsher Rana called for sweeping education reforms. He proposed a system of universal public primary education, using Nepali as the language of instruction, and opening the Durbar High School to non-Rana children. So unpopular was Dev Shamsher’s policy among the conservative faction of the Rana clan that he was deposed within a few months after becoming prime minister. His call for reforms did not entirely disappear, however. A few Nepali-language primary schools scattered around the country remained open, and the practice of admitting a few middle- and low-caste children to Durbar High School continued. Before World War II, several new English middle and high schools were founded in Patan, Biratnagar, and elsewhere, and a girls’ high

——Nepali Institutions——103

school was opened in Kathmandu. In the villages, public respect for education was increasing, largely as a result of the influence of returning Gorkha (Gurkha) soldiers, many of whom had learned to read and write while serving in the British army. Some retired soldiers began giving rudimentary education to children in their villages. Some members of the high-caste, elite families sent their children to Patna University and Banaras Hindu University in India for higher academic or technical training. It was, in fact, some of those students who launched anti-Rana movements, provided revolutionary cadres, and finally began the revolution that ultimately toppled Rana autocracy.

Education since 1951 When the Rana rule ended in 1951, Nepal had merely 310 primary and middle schools, eleven high schools, two colleges, one normal school, and one special technical school, but no university for graduate education. In the early 1950s, the national literacy rate was 5 percent: 10 percent among males and 1 percent among females. Since then, Nepal has come a long way, making education available to the general public. The historical monopoly of education by members of the wealthier and higher-caste groups has gradually diminished. Schools and colleges are presently open to all, and enrollment figures are rising. The longstanding prejudice against the education of girls is gradually falling, as verified by their increasing enrollments in schools and colleges. Yet there is no denying that quality education still remains a social preserve of the wealthy and powerful, namely landlords, businessmen, government leaders, and other elite members of the society. This is largely due to the fact that they are the only ones who can easily afford and are likely to pursue higher education for their children. Although there has been a consistent growth in the literacy rates as well as the number of educational institutions over the years, Nepal has a long way to go. Its average literacy rate in 1997 was 53 percent. Only 38 percent of the female population is considered literate. What is even more dismaying is that the quality of education seems to be on the decline while the number of schools, both public and private, continues to climb. The pool of qualified

104——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

teachers and professors is shrinking, and those who are well qualified exhibit little commitment to educating their students. Because the pay scale is quite low, many professors are also engaged in other income-generating activities, thus treating their profession as a supplementary source of income. Their overall morale is low. The research focus or tradition is virtually absent, mainly because there are few research facilities available to professors in Nepal. Further aggravating this damning situation is the general lack of students’ devotion to their education. As previously mentioned, schools and colleges are frequently closed due to strikes. And cheating is rampant at all levels and everywhere. In short, the education system of Nepal is in dire need of fundamental repairs. Whereas Nepal’s poor and less wealthy families are entrapped in such a broken system with few viable alternatives, the wealthy and powerful send their children overseas—to the United States, Britain, and other advanced countries—for quality education. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Nepal’s educational access and quality remain largely polarized along the class divide.

CONCLUSION To conclude, in spite of the return of democracy, Nepal remains paralyzed in that its economic outlook is frighteningly stagnant and its social institutions archaic and feudalistic in nature. Attempts at democracy have been repeatedly thwarted, resulting in abuses of power rather than empowerment of the people and reconstruction of the nation. Opposition for the sake of opposition has become the name of the political game. The caste system still takes its toll on individual and social advancements as it severely limits access to education and other opportunities. Fueling this already gloomy scenario is the feudalistic class structure that continues to dash every hope of social transformation and progress within Nepal. The education system is deteriorating to the point where serious reform will require a massive local and national commitment that are unlikely under present conditions. These are also the very institutions that join forces to keep women, who constitute 50 percent of the nation’s social wealth, at the fringes of viable education, tangible social power, and dynamic political play.

——Nepali Institutions——105

References BBC News (British Broadcasting Corporation). 2001a. “Beauty at Heart of Killing Mystery.” http://news.bbc.co.uk. ———. 2001b. “Gyanendra: Safe Pair of Hands.” http://news.bbc.co.uk ———. 2001c. “Nepal Royal Assassin Named King.” http://news.bbc.co.uk ———. 2001d. “Police Enforce Calm in Kathmandu.” http://news.bbc.co.uk Bishop, Barry C. 1990. Karnali under Stress (Geography Research Papers Nos. 228–229). Chicago: University of Chicago. Bista, Dor Bahadur. 1967. People of Nepal. Kathmandu: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Furer-Haimendorf, Christopher von. 1975. Himalayan Traders: Life in Highland Nepal. London: John Murray. Gaige, Frederick H. 1975. Regionalism and National Unity in Nepal. Berkeley: University of California Press. Joshi, Bhuwan Lal, and Leo E. Rose. 1966. Democratic Innovations in Nepal: A Case Study of Political Acculturation. Berkeley: University of California Press. Kaplan, Paul F., and Nanda R. Shrestha. 1982. “The Sukumbasi Movement in Nepal: The Fire from Below.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 12:2. Karan, Pradyumna P., and Hiroshi Ishii. 1994. Nepal: Development and Change in a Landlocked Himalayan Kingdom. Tokyo: Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. Panday, Devendra Raj. 1999. Nepal’s Failed Development: Reflections on the Mission and the Maladies. Kathmandu: Nepal South Asia Centre. Parajuli, Ramjee P. 2000. The Democratic Transition in Nepal. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Regmi, Mahesh C. 1984. The State and Economic Surplus. Varanasi: Nath Publishing House. Sharma, Gopi Nath. 1990. “The Impact of Education during the Rana Period in Nepal.” Himalayan Research Bulletin 10, 2–3: 3–7. Shrestha, Nanda R. 1998. “The Environmental Degradation of Kathmandu: Losing Shangri-La?” Education about Asia 3, 1: 11–18.

Nepali Society and Contemporary Issues Nepal is a living contradiction. Still chained to its feudal past, its present is staggering in the midst of broken agendas and lost opportunities. What one can observe, in essence, is a great deal of both persistence and change—persistence of many traditional values, and change in attitude and behavior brought on by the demands of time and Western influence. Some of these contradictory societal and cultural issues are discussed in this chapter. Although their current treatment is somewhat limited in scope, these issues are portrayed in a manner that should assist readers in gaining an informed understanding of the people, society, and culture of contemporary Nepal.

FAMILY AND KINSHIP NETWORKS Family—or paribar, as it is called—is the central axis of social and economic life in Nepal. As the family traditionally consists of a patrilineally extended household, every aspect of life and living is a family affair. Decisions are made in consideration of what is good for the family and its honor. For many, the extended family serves as a vehicle to strengthen their family heritage, sociocultural bonds, and kinship networks. The extended family should not, however, be construed as a tightly woven, unyielding fabric of family life. The point is that many extended families break apart as sons separate from parents and brothers from each other. At the time of separation, the family property is equally divided among the sons. If parents are alive, they each receive a share. Family separation generally occurs in cases where the head of the household is less assertive and domineering, when the father dies, or when the sons marry. Generally, sons marry in the same order they are born, meaning the first-born son marries first and the youngest last. Unmarried sons normally do not separate from

107

108——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

their parents; if the parents are deceased, unmarried sons usually stay with their older brothers. Family separation always results in a division of family landholdings. Sometimes, family separation and resulting land fragmentation turn into bitter family feuds and legal battles. It should be noted that the family as a social unit in Nepal is coming under increasing pressure, both internally and externally. Internally, pressure builds as a result of rapid population growth. As the family size expands in the absence of commensurate growth of family resources, the pressure mounts and the frequency of intrafamily disputes increases, often the outcome being separation. What is paradoxical about this tendency is that already limited family resources are further reduced as they are parceled out among separating family units. As a result, these families become susceptible to debt and subsequent land sales. This is a historical pattern that continues to this day. Externally, rising pressure is coming from increasing migration and modernization. Although migration is often viewed as a release valve for mounting population pressure at the household level or as a calculated plan to enhance the family resource base, it also tends to trigger separation. To illustrate, when grown-up sons move to cities and come in contact with other migrants who are also geographically detached from their families and who have developed individualistic inclinations associated with modernization, their sense of family ties and obligations gradually erodes. The increasing flows of rural-to-urban migration have, therefore, intensified this external pressure. Beyond the immediate family, there exists a larger kinship network at a village or community level, or even at the ethnic level. Such a network normally involves sharing food, information, and helping each other out at times of need. Also included in this broader network is what can be loosely defined as a mutual support system, one in which people help their kin or village folks find employment. This type of network is particularly active and important within the framework of migration. Although farming is still the most dominant economic activity among rural Nepalis, migration is an integral part of life for countless hill residents; it has increasingly become a critical supplementary source of subsistence for many. Not surprisingly, therefore, villagers frequently

——Nepali Society and Contemporary Issues——109

encourage some of their children to migrate in search of civil service, army, and other employment opportunities in urban areas within the country or in India and other foreign countries. In other words, migration as a household economic strategy is widely practiced throughout the hills because it serves as a safety valve to mitigate growing population and employment pressures. As it generates cash incomes, it often helps households alleviate undue economic crises. But where one decides to migrate depends, to a large extent, on where family members, relatives, and members of one’s community or ethnic group have already gone and established themselves. This is particularly true of those migrants who follow the trails of pioneer migrants or who need to tap into some form of networks, a process that helps to continually expand the channels of migratory networks. Additionally, such a process reinforces the local kinship or ethnic networks back in Nepali villages and communities. In the absence of such networks, a gainful migration experience in the new place (destination) turns into an uphill battle. By implication, then, those who are outside the network are entirely left to their own personal abilities, endeavors, and initiatives to make it in the new environment. Furthermore, the kinship network at the village level acts as an important social framework of meeting farm labor needs, especially during the planting and harvesting seasons, when labor shortages are common. The village itself, in other words, functions as a broader unit of kinship network that is required for social existence and collective communal life. The community as an overarching entity is further heightened when it is viewed in light of the fact that in a society like Nepal, life is one long chain of interdependencies, where individual families cannot be seen as completely separate from their community. So villages or communities are both geographical settlements with a residential base and social units with shared cultural values and mutually interdependent collective existence and identity. Villagers periodically pool their resources and labor together to implement village-level projects such as building irrigation ditches or channels or constructing school buildings, drinking water facilities, trails, and bridges. If a household cannot afford to hire farm labor, it usually relies on the mutual labor-sharing

110——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

system called parma, which allows villagers to exchange labor for labor at times of need.

WOMEN’S STATUS IN SOCIETY Nowhere is the Hindu paradox much more vividly demonstrated than in the arena of women’s status in society. On the one hand, Hinduism features highly revered goddess figures, for example, Durga (goddess of power), Kali (goddess of power), Laxmi (goddess of wealth), and Saraswoti (goddess of learning and wisdom)—all of equal status and power vis-à-vis god figures. The two biggest and most important Hindu festivals—Dashain and Tihar— revolve around goddesses. Dashain is celebrated over a period of ten consecutive days in honor of Goddess Durga for her victory over a demon named Mahisur. And Laxmi puja (worship of Goddess Laxmi) takes center stage during the Tihar festival that lasts 3–4 days. On the other hand, as a Hindu society, Nepal treats women as if they are male properties, born to serve men at their pleasure. In fact, the practice of polygamy (which seems to be on the decline in Nepal) was directly linked to the fact that wives were viewed as free household labor. That is why it used to be quite common among males of landed families to have several wives. At the opposite end is found polyandry. In some mountain communities where resources are very limited and population control is a survival imperative, polyandry is still frequently practiced to keep household size relatively small and properties consolidated (Haddix and Gurung 1999). The United Nations has defined the status of women in the context of their access to knowledge, economic resources, and political power as well as their personal autonomy in the process of decisionmaking. When Nepali women’s status is analyzed in this light, the picture is generally gloomy. There is no denying that in this rigidly patriarchal society, women are regarded as subordinate to men, virtually in every facet of life and institutional setting. Women’s relative status, however, varies from one ethnic group to another. The status of women in Tibeto-Nepali communities is relatively better than that of pahari and Newari women. Women from the low-caste groups also enjoy relatively more social autonomy and freedom of geographical mobility than do

——Nepali Society and Contemporary Issues——111

An urban woman unhusking rice in a traditional manner (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)

112——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

pahari and Newari women, for the former are far less confined by puritanical values than are the latter. Upper-class families also would restrict the geographical mobility of their unmarried daughters to protect their complexions from being darkened by sun exposure. Nonetheless, similar to the Confucian system, Nepali women’s social status generally is directly related to that of their men—that is, with the father as a daughter, with the husband as a wife, and with the son(s) as a mother. Yet it is important to clarify that the universe of women’s status in Nepal is, by no means, unidimensional or unidirectional. There are at least two distinct terrains of women’s status: the public space and the domestic space. What was described above is a picture that generally captures the reality prevailing in the public space, where women’s status is quite diminutive. But in the domestic space, women’s status takes on greater assertiveness and complexity (Acharya 1994). Within the household, the senior female member usually plays a commanding role by controlling resources, making crucial planting and harvesting decisions, and determining the expenses and budget allocations. In general, therefore, wives are the managers of the domestic front. This is particularly true in those communities where male outmigration is common, for example, in the hills. While husbands are away, virtually every decisionmaking task, not to mention the day-today chores, falls on wives (Shrestha and Conway 1998). If a household consists of different hierarchical echelons of female members, a mother-in-law normally exercises significant control over daughters-in-law, often more than she does on her own daughters. In fact, family tensions sometimes are directly tied to wives’ influence on their husbands regarding family matters, often prompting married sons to separate from their parents and brothers. Separation allows wives not only to be freed from the vise of their mothers-in-law and the shadow of other family members but also to exercise greater leverage over their own family resources and affairs. On the whole, however, few would dispute that women’s lives remain centered on their traditional roles, that is, taking care of most household chores, fetching water and animal fodder, and doing farm work (see Des Chene 1997). Restrictions on their geographical mobility naturally limit their access to markets, employ-

——Nepali Society and Contemporary Issues——113

ment, education, health care, and local government services. Malnutrition and poverty hit women hardest. Female children usually are given less food than are male children, especially when the family experiences food shortages. Women usually work harder than men. One exception is that women from high-class families have maids to take care of most household chores and other menial work and, thus, work far less than women in lower socioeconomic brackets (Upadhya 1996). With respect to day-to-day operations, the economic contribution of women is substantial. But it is often devalued or goes unnoticed because their traditional role is taken for granted. Their contributions are seldom included in any economic calculations. Furthermore, daughters are denied rights to family properties (namely land) unless they remain unmarried until they are thirtyfive years old, the primary reason being that they become detached from their parental families upon marriage. Only thereafter can they claim their share of family properties in amounts equal to their brothers’ shares, for they are considered to have surpassed the marriageable age. Daughters-in-law are entitled to their husbands’ shares after they are widowed. When employed, their wages are substantially lower than those paid to men. In most rural areas, their employment outside the household is confined to planting, weeding, and harvesting. In urban areas, they are employed in domestic and traditional jobs. Within the government sector, they are often relegated to low-level positions such as secretarial or clerical jobs. One tangible measure of women’s status is their educational attainment. Although the constitution offers women equal educational rights, many social, economic, and cultural factors impede girls’ school enrollments and higher education (Fisher 1990). With high dropout rates, their low education and illiteracy pose the biggest hindrance to enhancing equal opportunity and status of women. In short, they are caught in a vicious circle imposed by the nexus of patriarchal feudalism, Hindu orthodoxy, and poor family conditions. Their lower status hampers their education, and the lack of education, in turn, defines their status, placing them in a tenuous position of disadvantage. Although the female literacy rate has improved noticeably over the years, their average educational attainment falls far short of the male level. Defy-

114——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

ing this general rule is the greatly higher rate of educational attainment among female children of wealthy and educated families. This class disparity in educational attainment is also true for boys. In Nepal, education is heavily class-biased.

GENDER RELATIONS A primary consideration among gender relations in Nepal is female virginity, which is treated as something sacred and fundamental to preserving family honor. If a girl is engaged in a sexual relationship prior to marriage, it is viewed as a social disgrace to the family. In the eyes of the society, she becomes an outcast, for few families will find her socially acceptable as a potential bride for their sons. Not even minor infractions with sexual connotations are tolerated. So, naturally, girls are highly protected. In fact, in order to insure their virginity prior to marital conjugation, they are commonly married away at a relatively young age, before their hormonal rise may interfere with their biological urge. Because marriages in Nepal are invariably family-arranged, daughters usually have little say in when and with whom to get married. Although the average age of marriage for girls in Nepal has been slowly climbing (while the number of arranged marriages is on the decline) with modernization and their increased education, it is still routine for girls to be married at the age of fifteen or sixteen. This is particularly true in rural areas where both education and employment for women are scarce. Given this scenario, Nepali society frowns upon male-female bodily contacts in public. Even simple hand-holding and kissing between boys and girls is taboo. One can observe a clear physical distance between even husbands and wives in public places. In short, any public display of physicality with the opposite gender is considered a lowly act, socially immoral and unacceptable. This said, it is important to note that there are some minor exceptions to the traditional taboo of male-female physical relations in public places. The Tibeto-Nepali and low-caste groups are bound to this social rule to a much lesser degree than are those from high-caste Indo-Nepali families and the Newar communities. Within the Tibeto-Nepali group, the Gurung settlements, for example, uphold a time-honored tradition of what is

——Nepali Society and Contemporary Issues——115

called rodi ghar (i.e., a collective singing house or club). Young men and women in the village—sometimes including those from surrounding villages—periodically gather at the rodi ghar after dinner and spend the night singing and socializing. Physical contacts and expressions between opposite genders are normal during rodi ghar gatherings. One other area of exception can be found among urban and educated women, who are often from high-caste and high-class families. As they attend colleges and universities in growing numbers, the parameters of their geographical mobility expands. Away from the vigilant eyes of their parents, they may encounter regular contact with men on their college or university campuses. Under such circumstances, the natural attraction between the opposite sexes tends to result in some physical contact. Moreover, as they emulate Western tourists and expatriates and are stirred by explicit Hollywood films and television shows, the frequency of physical contacts between them goes up. There are even upscale disco clubs where upper-class educated men and women dance the night away in the midst of booming Western tunes. All of these trends have increasingly contributed to the narrowing of the boundaries of sexual taboos and contacts (Liechty 1996). Gender relations are definitely undergoing some noticeable transformation in Nepal, although this is mostly limited to urban areas and tourist centers. One insidious outcome of this Western emulation and tourism has been the growth of prostitution. Prostitution in Nepal is nothing new; every year, thousands of poor girls and young women are pushed into it and are taken to India to join brothels (Shrestha 1997). But it is no longer the exclusive territory of poor women trying to eke out a living for themselves and their families. Increasingly drawn into the circle of this age-old profession are some upper-class, educated women who offer their bodies as commodities in high-class hotels patronized by Western tourists. Viewing Nepal as a virgin territory that is safe in terms of HIV/AIDS incidence, tourists are driving the demand for sexual services. In the final analysis, the expanding market of prostitution hardly bodes well for the improvement of women’s status and their empowerment in Nepal. Additionally, the growing popularity of the nightclub culture among young females has engendered in

116——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

some corners an adverse reaction toward women’s liberation and advancement. The only sure gain that a segment of Nepali women seems to have made so far is a sense of freedom from the dominant-subordinate power relations that characterize the prevailing male-female relations. Whether this sense of freedom will soon produce other tangible social, economic, and political gains for the general masses and upcoming generation of Nepali women remains a big question.

CHILD LABOR As is the case in most agrarian societies of Asia, child labor is a national feature of household labor in Nepal. However, child labor has a distinct class and geographical character within the country, for it is particularly common among the poor and in rural areas where the household economy is deeply entrenched in farming. By the time children are six or seven years old, they are required to do various family chores, from fetching water and fodder to cleaning animal sheds to taking care of their younger siblings. Simply put, child labor is a vital part of family labor; it is an unavoidable part of growing up. Many Nepali children have no time to enjoy childhood as most Western and wealthy children do. For countless children, therefore, childhood is merely a biological phase, not a social one. Their maturation process begins very early in their life cycle and proceeds at a fairly rapid pace as they are routinely assigned many family responsibilities. Moreover, children are often a source of income within poor households, working as wage earners to supplement meager family resources. This is a fact of life few can avoid. So, for countless households, child labor is not a choice but a family requirement necessitated by the imperative of survival. This hard reality does not, however, imply that one ought to defend or promote child labor (see Shrestha 2000). Although the extensive use of child labor in the household context is nothing new, a new trend is emerging. Now children are being increasingly used as a source of profit. They are used in the service sector, including restaurants, hotels, and private domestic help. In addition, child labor is becoming increasingly common in certain manufacturing operations, such as carpet weaving, because they are cheaper to hire and easier to exploit. Recent

——Nepali Society and Contemporary Issues——117

international outcries against child labor in Nepal as well as elsewhere have done little to abate the problem. Although the employers of children in such labor-intensive industries as carpet production have repeatedly heard the growing chorus of protest against child labor, their response has been basically to hide it rather than to avoid it. The employers believe that without child labor, they will lose their competitive advantage in terms of pricing. They see child labor as a business imperative rather than as a social concern. So child labor continues. As employees, children are routinely abused and deprived of their basic rights. As bad as their working conditions are, that is not the worst that Nepali children have encountered, however. What is truly tragic goes deeper than the obvious grim reality of child labor. Despite an increasing incidence of child labor use, countless children cannot find work even when they are willing to be openly exploited. Trapped in abject poverty and unable to find work, Nepali children are increasingly turning to urban streets as their ultimate refuge (see Onta-Bhatta 1996). Not surprisingly, therefore, street children have witnessed a consistent increase in their numbers over the past decade, some rummaging through garbage piles, some becoming pocket pickers, and some simply relying on begging, all for their survival. There is also sporadic evidence of them forming mini gangs. This is a social reality that is bound to intensify with the passage of time as Nepal remains mired in a state of economic stagnation, continued population growth, and impoverishment.

POPULAR CULTURE AND RECREATION When discussing the prevalence of popular culture in Nepal, it’s important to bear in mind that most of it has foreign origins. Because of this, it tends to contradict traditional values—its roots are in modernization and/or sociocultural transformation. Its consumption invariably demands additional expenses beyond basic necessities, and so its vanguards in Nepal tend to be young and relatively well-off. To be sure, some form of Western influence has been present in Nepal for a long time, at least since the rise of the Rana clan as the country’s ruling elite. The Ranas adopted many Western val-

118——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

An urban scene in Narayanghat, a city situated in the central Tarai district of Chitwan. Note the wall-size Coca-Cola sign, painted on the side of a building. (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)

ues and styles and made use of many Western products that had previously been unavailable in Nepal. Such infiltration of British cultural values was not surprising given their dependence on British support. Furthermore, Nepal’s geographical proximity to the British Raj in India also contributed to the process. However, beyond the Ranas, Western influence prior to 1950 was mostly confined to a tiny circle of the elite class, concentrated in the Kathmandu Valley (see Liechty 1997). As a result, few Western values and cultural modes seeped down to the general public, mainly because they were neither accessible nor affordable. Popular culture as a contemporary notion or value system in Nepal thus can be traced only to the early 1960s. This decade witnessed both the rising popularity of Hindi (Indian) movies and the advent of Western popular culture.

Hindi Movies From the very outset, Hindi movies have served as a vital source

——Nepali Society and Contemporary Issues——119

of popular culture in Nepal. They reveal not only the importance of film and video as a powerful medium of popular cultural diffusion, but also something about the role(s) of familiarity of language, certain aspects of cultural and social realities, and thematic plots in making certain phenomena popular for public consumption. Hindi movies are popular in Nepal for two reasons: First, Hindi is a familiar language for most Nepalis, and many can actually speak it quite well. (Movies have, in fact, acted as a medium for learning Hindi.) Second, many Hindi movie plots contain cultural and social undertones that are familiar to Nepali viewers. As in most of the world, movie theaters allow young men and women to come together to socialize or even romance in the absence of their parents’ glaring gaze. When the familiar Hindi movie plots are presented in forms and formats that defy any notion of normalcy and ordinariness, they naturally turn into objects of popular culture, something to emulate and espouse. They stir up the audience’s imagination. And, consequently, they catch on. It is, therefore, no wonder that young Nepali viewers imitate Indian movie heroes and heroines, copying their moves and dialogues, their dress styles and hairdos. They evoke their names, often seeing them as role models. They know almost every song from every movie and can detail each scene as if it is carved on their palms. One obvious reason for the popularity of Hindi movies is that they are readily accessible, both geographically and in terms of language and cultural familiarity. Furthermore, even the poor can generally afford them.

Western Popular Culture Competing with Hindi movies is the rapid current of Western popular culture in Nepal. Its public consumption has greatly increased with the introduction of satellite TV and the Internet (Himal South Asia 1996). English education has also contributed to the growth and expansion of Western pop culture. Unlike Hindi movies, however, Western popular culture is based in urban areas and along tourist trails and destinations. Additionally, as it is invariably classand education-biased—satellite hookups and Internet services cost money, after all—it tends to be socially concentrated among the well-to-do and more educated segment of the population.

120——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Within this population group, Western popular culture is definitely hip and hot, often running parallel to—or even surpassing in certain cases—Hindi movies as the primary source of the Nepali pop culture diet. To many, it is a cherished form of status symbol, a mode of exhibiting what they consider to be their “modern” or Western outlook and attitude. Also increasingly popular but still far behind Hindi songs in popularity is Western (American) music. Among the favorite artists are those who are hot in the West, including rap singers. Most of the popular Western movies tend to become popular in Nepal as well once they have been released in video—they are not typically shown in cinema halls. In many respects, the onset of Western popular culture—both movies and music—in Nepal can be attributed to the arrival of U.S. Peace Corps volunteers (PCVs) and “hippies” in the 1960s and 1970s. Particularly influential were the hippies, for they easily outnumbered PCVs, tended to be concentrated in certain areas— namely the valley of Kathmandu and the town of Pokhara—and exhibited a distinct and somewhat homogeneous behavior. As hippies poured into Nepal in increasing numbers, looking for inexpensive marijuana and hashish, they introduced a popular taste of Western culture whose tentacles have now reached many corners. In fact, it was the arrival of Western hippies that initially enhanced the locational value of Kathmandu as a desirable tourist destination, thus providing incentives for capital investment for the development of tourism. Hotels and restaurants sprouted, along with other tourist services and facilities (Shrestha 1998). As tourist flows increased, so did the growth of tourist services. This positive feedback loop between the two forces continues to grow. Hippies were soon followed by other Western tourists. With each successive wave of Westerners came an increasing penetration of Western popular culture in the forms of movies, music, fashion, foods and beverages, and a host of other Western values and tastes. Furthermore, the galloping pace of globalization during the 1990s has given an added push to the growth of popular culture. A culture of consumerism suddenly began to spread, as did cultural commercialization. In addition to hippies and regular tourists, flocks of Western development advisers and experts began to arrive in ever increasing numbers, along with diplomatic contingencies who, in their own ways, contributed to the rein-

——Nepali Society and Contemporary Issues——121

forcement and entrenchment of Western values and popular culture. Today, almost everything Western in Nepal is accepted as good and desirable, something to be imitated and adopted, irrespective of its value and benefit to the general well-being of the society and its people. There is little selectivity in terms of which Western values to adopt and which ones to avoid. This thinking is prevalent among the youth as well as development policymakers and advocates. Also joining this bandwagon are urban merchants who cater to Westerners or whose sole objective is to make profits no matter what the social consequence.

Drug Use Apart from the growth of body trade within the tourist sector, one notable adverse outcome of Western popular culture is the emerging drug culture in Nepal (Shrestha 1997). Since the mid-1980s, the situation has been progressively worsening. The number of young people, including college and high school students, who are addicted to drugs has been consistently rising. Although drug use is almost exclusively confined to young males, there is no way to prevent females from plunging into this self-destructive habit. Nowhere is this trend more gripping than in the Kathmandu Valley, where the youth receive a daily dose of Western influences through various channels. What is frightening about this deepening drug culture is that many of the addicts have stretched the drug boundaries from locally available marijuana and hashish to more potent foreign drugs such as crack and cocaine. In 1989, it was estimated that Nepal had 20,000 heroin addicts, mostly in the Kathmandu Valley (Bhandari 1989). Although it is hard to derive a definite number, there is little doubt that the number of addicts has surely reached a higher plateau. One additional dimension of drug use (abuse) in Nepal is that unlike the local drugs (e.g., marijuana) that are grown throughout the country, crack and cocaine are smuggled into Nepal.

Recreational Activities The traditional notion of “rest and recreation” is quite remote to most Nepalis for several reasons. First, the vast majority of the

122——NEPAL and BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

A Gaine with his sarangi (an indigenous stringed instrument). The Gaines are a professional minstrel caste group, previously treated as untouchable. They sing in public or for individuals and usually receive donations for their performances. (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)

——Nepali Society and Contemporary Issues——123

people simply do not have leisure time—they are too busy trying to eke out their living and worrying about where their next meal is going to come from. Whatever free time they may have is usually spent in search of jobs, for they cannot afford to miss any income opportunity. To many, “rest” is not a choice; it is simply idle time forced upon them due to the paucity of employment opportunities. Second, because they are poor and living hand-tomouth on a daily basis, they have no means to be able to engage in recreational activities. Third, the concept of rest and recreation is largely associated with the postindustrial society, and Nepal is still largely trapped in the agrarian age, where recreational facilities are limited. Whatever recreational facilities and amenities one may observe within Nepal are provided mainly to meet the demands and desires of foreign tourists. Notwithstanding religious pilgrimages and some scattered exceptions of wealthy individuals traveling to foreign destinations for visits and enjoyment, domestic tourism is essentially nonexistent. In simple terms, the Nepali masses do not participate in recreation. Socialization as Recreation. Given the above scenario, the concept of recreation has to be narrowly defined and applied to limited geographical confines. That is, in the Nepali context, recreation as a leisurely activity has to be viewed in light of socialization as a group activity that involves leisurely participation, an atmosphere where people detach themselves from work to have fun, at least temporarily. In this sense, recreational functions are invariably short and carried out in a local setting with friends and relatives rather than as a family or individual vacation and travel to some distant destinations filled with amenities. For instance, going to see movies with friends, as indicated earlier, is a favorite and popular recreational function for many people, irrespective of age and gender. The many festivals and communal festivities that occur each year also offer outlets for people to get together, to share communal meals, to discuss communal issues as well as engage in gossip (a time-honored pastime activity), to celebrate events or simply have fun, temporarily removed from their daily chores and survival routine. Also increasingly popular is the enjoyment of restaurants, which is now common among members of upper-class families and young professionals. They drink, eat, and engage in random

124——NEPAL and BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Religious festivity taking place in front of the Hanuman Dhoka (gate) in the Kathmandu Durbar Square. At the center of the photo is the statue of Hanuman (the monkey god) draped in red cloth. (Courtesy of Nanda R. Shrestha)

——Nepali Society and Contemporary Issues——125

discussions and gossiping, usually late in the afternoon. Although this type of activity existed in the past, it was quite limited. Its growing popularity is due to the growth of Nepal’s middle class. In addition, as noted earlier, many in this socioeconomic circle also enjoy Nepal’s Western-style night clubs. This type of recreational socialization is not an option, however, for the vast majority of Nepalis, especially those who reside in rural areas. It is beyond their reach both physically and materially: Such amenities rarely exist in rural areas because of the extremely limited market demand, and those that do exist are too expensive for cashstrapped villagers to enjoy. Instead of eating out at restaurants with their friends, villagers trek down to local tea stalls, that enduring symbol of rural cultural life. Almost every rural community has a tea stall within walking distance. It is an important social venue where adult villagers gather early in the morning to enjoy a cup of hot tea, fill up their chilam (short clay pipes) with home-grown tobacco and share it, exchange news and gossip, and discuss issues related to their community and crops. One can observe villagers chattering away, laughing, and enjoying each other’s company before they head back home or to the fields to carry on their daily tasks. Temple Visits as Recreation and Socialization. In Nepal, regular temple visits during weekends, namely Saturdays, are an important and time-honored form of recreational socialization that is very common in cities, where temples can be found almost on every corner. Nowhere is this traditional form of recreation more noticeable than at Pashupati, an extremely popular religious shrine in Kathmandu. Every Saturday morning, masses of people—male and female, young and old—flock to Pashupati in the company of friends and relatives. Although such visits certainly carry a religious meaning, they are also fundamental to recreation and socialization. Sometimes the visits are extended to include picnics. Interestingly, the deepening incursion of Western popular culture has failed to dampen the popularity of regular temple visits. This holds true even for the young generation, who are most influenced by Western values and modernity.

The Internet Accessed with a keystroke from within one’s own room, the Inter-

126——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

net has become a lively and friendly source of popular culture from across the globe. To put it simply, the Internet has opened a new frontier of popular culture, one that crosses and defies geographical borders, legal barriers, cultural barricades, and even parental resistance. To access and enjoy different forms of popular culture, one no longer needs to rely on the conventional agents of cultural diffusion such as books and movies. Among those Nepali citizens who can afford a computer and Internet service, the Internet is fast becoming the recreational mode of choice. One side note about popular culture in Nepal is that as the country has gained access to Western-style entertainment and recreation, social fissures between the younger and older generations regarding various sociocultural norms and values have been created. The people of Nepal are beginning to question what is appropriate versus what is not, how far to push the boundary of popular culture before it corrodes the very social fabric and soul on which the national identity is built, and where the balance lies between the advantage of cultural transfusion and the disadvantage of cultural transgression.

CONCLUSION What we see from the above discussion is a great deal of both continuity and change. Notwithstanding some relatively minor improvements, women’s status in Nepal still remains low. Similar to women’s standing in society, continuity is also seen in other areas of Nepal’s overall social system, for instance, family and kinship networks, one-sided gender relations, and child labor. Continuity does not necessarily imply that the Nepali society is totally stagnant; rather, it means, in this case, that change has been extremely sluggish. In contrast, significant changes have occurred in the popular culture and its growing consumption, a phenomenon that is closely related to the expansion of tourism. And, of course, Indian movies and Western popular cultural penetration have given an added push to the rapid infusion of popular culture. In all likelihood, the rising tide of popular culture will continue to swell as Nepal’s links to the world community deepen in terms of both diplomatic thrusts and global communication powered by satellites and the Internet.

——Nepali Society and Contemporary Issues——127

References Acharya, Meena. 1994. The Statistical Profile on Nepalese Women—An Update in the Policy Context. Kathmandu: Institute for Integrated Development Studies. Bhandari, Bishnu. 1989. “Drug Abuse in Nepal: A Case Study of the Kathmandu Valley.” Paper presented at the eighteenth annual conference on South Asia, Madison, WI. Des Chene, Mary. 1997. “‘We Women Must Try to Live’: The Saga of Bhauju.” Studies in Nepali History and Society 2, 1: 125–172. Fisher, James. 1990. “Education and Social Change in Nepal: An Anthropologist’s Assessment.” Himalayan Research Bulletin 10, 2–3: 30–34. Haddix, Kimber A., and Jit Bahadur Gurung. 1999. “‘Excess Women’: NonMarriage and Reproduction in Two Ethnic Tibetan Communities of Humla, Nepal.” Himalayan Research Bulletin 14, 1: 56–62. Himal South Asia. 1996. “Orbital Junk.” Himal South Asia 9, 4 (June): 12–28. Liechty, Mark. 1996. “Paying for Modernity: Women and the Discourse of Freedom in Kathmandu.” Studies in Nepali History and Society 1, 1: 301–330. _____. 1997. “Selective Exclusion: Foreigners, Foreign Goods and Foreignness in Modern Nepali History.” Studies in Nepali History and Society 2, 1: 5–68. Onta-Bhatta, Lazima. 1996. “Street Children: Contested Identities and Universalizing Categories.” Studies in Nepali History and Society 1, 1: 163–200. Shrestha, Nanda R. 2000. “A Personal View of Child Labor.” Education about Asia 5, 3: 47–49. _____. 1998. “The Environmental Degradation of Kathmandu: Losing ShangriLa?” Education about Asia 3, 1: 11–18. _____. 1997. In the Name of Development: A Reflection on Nepal. Lanham, MD: University Press of America (Kathmandu: Educational Enterprise, 1999, Nepal Edition). Shrestha, Nanda R., and Dennis Conway. 1998. “The Shadow Life of a Migrant’s Wife.” Unpublished manuscript. Upadhya, Shizu. 1996. “The Status of Women in Nepal—15 Years on.” Studies in Nepali History and Society 1, 2: 423–454.

PART TWO

REFERENCE MATERIALS

Key Events in Nepali History 563 B.C. The Buddha (Siddhartha Gautama) is born in Lumbini, Kapilvastu, located in the central Tarai region of Nepal and ruled by the Sakya (Shakya) dynasty. Before A.D. 400 Various pastoral dynasties rule Nepal, which at this time is constituted essentially by the Valley of Kathmandu and its surrounding areas. The most well known of these dynasties is the Kirata dynasty, established by Yellung Kirata from the eastern hills. (It is believed that the Kirata dynasty’s rule spanned at least 1,500 years, until about A.D. 400, when it was dislodged by what came to be known as the Licchavi dynasty.) A.D. 400–880

The Licchavi Era. With the inception of the Licchavi era, Nepal slowly moves onto the terra firma of history. This period is often regarded as the “Golden Age” in the history of Nepal. The era begins with the rule of Vrasadeva (c. 400–425) and ends with Manadeva IV (c. 875–879). Raghadeva, whose rule begins in 880, appears to be the transitional ruler separating the end of the Licchavi era and the advent of the medieval period. 880–1200 The medieval era is the darkest period in the history of Nepal, completely shrouded in chaos and confusion. 1200–1769 The Malla Period. The rule of Ari Malla (Arimalla) signals the beginning of the Malla period and a return to many of the foundations built during the Licchavi era. Some of the notable events that occur during this period include: 1345–1346 Sultan Shams ud-din Ilyas of Bengal raids the Kathmandu Valley.

131

132——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

1482 The Malla kingdom of the Kathmandu Valley is formally fragmented into three separate kingdoms of Kathmandu, Bhadgaon (Bhaktapur), and Patan (Lalitpur). This division signals the decline and eventual downfall of the Malla period. 1559 The Gorkha principality is established in the central hills. 1743 Prithvi Narayan Shah is crowned king of Gorkha. Soon after his coronation, Prithvi Narayan embarks on a long military campaign of territorial conquests and national unification. 1769 Prithvi Narayan Shah completes the conquest of all three valley (Malla) kingdoms, leading to the unification of fragmented Nepal. The city of Kathmandu is declared the capital of new Nepal. 1769–Present The Modern Period and the Shah Dynasty. With the unification of Nepal begins what can be loosely described as the modern period. Many notable events take place during this period. 1769–1816 Continued territorial expansion and annexation campaign 1775 Death of King Prithvi Narayan Shah 1792 Treaty of Commerce between Nepal and the East India Company. Nepal-China War. 1803 Nepal’s westward expansion resumes under the leadership of Amar Singh Thapa. Nepal’s boundary is extended as far as the Satlej (Sutlej) River in India. 1806 Bhimsen Thapa takes office as mukhtiyar (prime minister). 1814–1816 War with British India (Anglo-Nepal War)

——Key Events in Nepali History——133

1816 Treaty of Sagauli (Sugauli). As part of the treaty, Nepal cedes roughly one-half of its territory to British India. 1837 Dismissal of Mukhtiyar General Bhimsen Thapa 1846 Nepal’s bloodiest kot parba (courtyard massacre) takes place, leaving twenty-nine leading bhardars (court nobles) slaughtered by Jang Bahadur Kunwar (Rana) and his brothers. Following the massacre, Kunwar is bestowed with the title of prime minister and commander-in-chief of Nepal. 1846–1951 The Rana’s rule is rooted in hereditary and autocratic prime ministership. 1951 Successful pro-democracy revolution against the Rana rule; end of the Rana rule and restoration of the Shah rule, with attendant glimmer of democracy. 1955 Death of King Tribhuvan Bir Bikram Shah. His son Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah is subsequently crowned king. 1959 A national general election is held, resulting in majority rule for the Nepali Congress Party in the House of Representatives. B. P. Koirala becomes the first elected prime minister of Nepal. 1960 King Mahendra launches a palace coup against the elected Koirala government and jails party leaders, including Prime Minister Koirala. Premature death of nascent democracy. 1962 King Mahendra institutes the panchayat system. Although heralded as a partyless system, panchayat is a one-party system designed to serve Mahendra’s absolute rule and wishes. 1972 Death of King Mahendra is followed by his son Birendra Bir Bikram Shah’s ascension to throne

134——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

1979 Nationwide pro-democracy movement against the panchayat system. As the movement heats up, King Birendra announces a referendum on the panchayat system. 1980 King Birenda and the panchayat system emerge victorious in a rigged referendum. In essence, panchayat gains a semblance of legitimacy. 1990 Second Coming of Democracy. A second nationwide pro-democracy movement begins. Under pressure, King Birendra dissolves the panchayat system and accepts a constitutional monarchical role; an interim coalition government is formed under the prime ministership of Krishna Prasad Bhattarai. A new constitution is promulgated. 1991 A general election is held to form a parliamentary government; the Nepali Congress wins the majority of seats in the House of Representatives and forms a new government headed by Girija Prasad Koirala, a brother of the late prime minister B. P. Koirala. 1996 The “Peoples War” is launched by Maoist revolutionaries whose primary support base lies in rural areas. 2001 June 1. The royal palace witnesses a bizarre and bloody massacre that leaves King Birenda’s immediate family dead by the hand of Crown Prince Dipendra Bir Bikram Shah. He is believed to have shot himself following the massacre. June 2. The dying Dipendra is declared king. On June 4, King Dipendra is pronounced dead, and his uncle (Birendra’s brother) Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah is crowned king. November 26. King Gyanendra declares a state of emergency, thus suspending civil liberties, including freedom of the press as well as freedom of assembly, expression, and movement. Once again, Nepal’s democratic experiment is placed under severe stress.

——Key Events in Nepali History——135

2002 January 4–5. The SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) meeting is held in Kathmandu. January 17. The government announces new taxes on industrial products and additional import-export duties to fund the military offensive against the Maoists who, in February 1996, launched what is nationally known as the “People’s War.” This guerilla revolution was intended to abolish the monarchical system and establish a socialist republic. Although largely rural based, the movement begins to operate in some urban areas. The Nepali armed forces and the Maoists intensify their battles against each other— specifically since the state of emergency was declared by the king. January 18. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell visits Nepal. In addition to holding talks with the king and the prime minister, Powell is briefed by the army chief on the military offensive against the Maoists. Subsequent to his visit, American military advisors and personnel are sent to Nepal to advise and train Nepal’s armed forces in their fight against the Maoists. February 16–17. Maoist rebels launch a daring strike against the government forces, inflicting heavy losses. According to news reports, 142 people are killed. The Maoists mount attacks on a local airport, government buildings, a military barrack and an armory in Mangalsen, and the district headquarters of Achham in far western Nepal. Buildings are blown up and banks looted. Gun battles between rebels and the security break out from midnight until well after dawn. Among the dead were 57 out of 58 soldiers, 49 policemen, the chief district officer Mohan Singh Khatri, the district intelligence officer Lok Raj Upreti and his wife, a postman and a local photographer. The heavy casualties also include some rebels. March 2. The state of emergency declared on November 26, 2001, is extended. March 29. A bomb explodes on a bridge in Kathmandu, wounding at least 27 people. April 12. Maoist revolutionaries kill almost 90 policemen in four separate and simultaneous attacks in the district of Dang in western Nepal, about 190 miles west of Kathmandu. Also killed during the attacks are scores of rebels as a result of the military assaults

136——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

on the guerillas. Sixty-two Maoists are found buried in a makeshift mass grave in a ditch. According to one estimate, more than 300 are feared dead, including both policemen and rebels. April 13. A land mine blast in the far western district of Bajura kills 3 people. This is believed to be the first land mine explosion in Nepal. April 16. Maoists revolutionaries ambush a police patrol and kill at least 9 policemen in the Grokha district, about 70 miles west of Kathmandu. April 18. Two bomb explosions shake the capital city of Kathmandu. This is a clear indication that the “People’s War” has extended its frontier from the rural fringes to urban trenches. The deepening intensification of confrontations between the military and Maoists has besieged the nation and claimed more than 3,500 lives since the Maoist revolution began in early 1996. Of this total, nearly 1,700 deaths occurred since the declaration of the state of emergency in November 2001. Although the number of military and police casualties has been quite small relative to innocent and rebel body counts, the Maoists have so far gained a psychological edge over the army and police forces, especially in light of their massive military disadvantage. They have also managed to garner remarkable support from peasants across the nation. April 23. Maoists call for a nationwide strike, and Nepal is essentially shut down as everything comes to a halt. Businesses, schools, and offices are closed across the country. April 24. The nation remains paralyzed. The total shutdown is most noticeable in the bustling twin cities of Kathmandu and Patan.

Significant People, Places, and Events Acharya, Baburam (1887–1972) A famous historian, scholar, and thinker. He was decorated with the title of Itihas Shiromani (a crown jewel among Nepali historians). He was also given many other awards. Acharya, Bhanu Bhakta (1814–1861) Regarded as the father of Nepali literature, Bhanu Bhakta was born in the central hill district of Tanahu. His adaptation of the Hindu epic Ramayana into Nepali earned him a reputation as a supreme literary figure of the Nepali language. Acharya, Tanka Prasad (1912–1992) As a political leader engaged in the anti-Rana and pro-democracy movement, he founded the first political party of Nepal, called the Nepal Praja Parishad (Nepal People’s Council) party, in 1936. In January 1956 he was appointed prime minister (1956–1957) by King Mahendra. Adhikari, Man Mohan (Manmohan) (1922–1999) Adhikari received his higher education in India. Along with Puspa Lal Shrestha, he was instrumental in forming the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN). Later, he became the party’s general secretary. In 1994, when his party (United Marxist-Leninist, or UML) came to power, he became the first Marxist prime minister of Nepal. This development made Nepal the second country in the world to be led by a popularly elected Marxist government (the first being Chile in the early 1970s under President Salvador Allende). Anglo-Nepal War (1814–1816) As Nepal forged ahead with its territorial expansion policy following unification in 1769, it encountered British resistance. Eventually, a war broke out between the British and Nepali forces in 1814. This war, which lasted almost two years, later came to be known as the Anglo-Nepal War. Nepal’s

137

138——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

eventual surrender was the most humiliating defeat the nation ever suffered in the hands of a foreign army. This defeat still haunts Nepal (see Treaty of Sagauli). Aniko or Arniko (1245–1306) A renowned architect, sculptor, and bronze caster. At the request of the Chinese (Mongolian) Emperor Kublai Khan’s teacher Saskyapa Lama of Tibet, Nepal commissioned Aniko to lead a group of artisans to Lhasa to construct a golden stupa. Beijing’s White Pagoda, or Pai Ta Sze, stands today as a monument to the artistic contribution of Aniko. He evidently had over 200 apprentices and pupils, and his influence through these artists may be seen in the temple art and architecture of East and Southeast Asia. He died in China in 1306. Annapurna (Anna = grains + Purna = full, filled) In Nepali, Annapurna means a mountain filled with grain. The Annapurna Range is composed of four different Annapurna peaks: I, II, III, and IV. Of these, Annapurna I (26,545 feet) is the tallest, followed by Annapurna II (26,041 feet).The front view of 24,456-feet-high Annapurna IV as seen from the city of Pokhara looks like a cap at its summit. Legend has it that if the cap looks full in the winter, the peasants and farmers down in the valleys will have a good year. If the cap is not filled with snow, a year of hardship would follow (for a detailed discussion of the folklore, see Shrestha and Conway 1996). Aruna Lama (1945–1998) A famous musician, Aruna Lama was born in Darjeeling, India, a major hub of Nepali literature. Popularly known as the nightingale of the Himalaya, Ms. Lama played a prominent role in elevating Nepali music to a higher plateau. Bhattarai, Baburam (1954–) One of the key leaders of the ongoing Maoist movement that has launched what is known as the People’s War throughout Nepal since early 1996. He began his political career as the founding president of All India Nepali Students Association in 1977. Bhattarai, Krishna Prasad (1924–) A founding member of the Nepali Congress Party, Bhattarai actively participated in the anti-

——Significant People, Places, and Events——139

Rana popular revolution, which culminated in the overthrow of Rana autocracy in early 1951. He was prime minister during the 1990–1991 interim government (see Second Coming of Democracy). After the 1999 elections, Bhattarai formed the Congress government as its prime minister. Buddha. See Gautama, Siddhartha. Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) This political party was created in early 1949 as a revolutionary party, with the purpose of dethroning the Rana regime and establishing a socialist state. Puspa Lal Shrestha was the founding general secretary of the party. However, due to constant internal tussles for leadership positions and philosophical and programmatic differences, CPN underwent many changes in a manner similar to the Nepali Congress Party. Consequently, those who quit the CPN organized their own factions and mini parties under the overarching ideology of Marxism. However, following its Fourth Congress in the late 1980s, the CPN began to develop a much more united and cohesive front than ever seen before. During the 1990 antipanchayat and pro-democracy movement, the CPN decided to coordinate its efforts with the Congress Party. As part of this participation, the CPN under the leadership of Madan Bhandari (who was later killed) succeeded in uniting seven different communist factions into what is now commonly identified as the United MarxistLeninist Party (UML). It is now the largest CPN faction. As it won the largest numbers of parliamentary seats in the 1994 general election, it was able to form a national government with Man Mohan Adhikari as prime minister. Cow Known as gai in Nepali, it is a national animal of Nepal. It is highly revered as a sacred symbol of motherly nurturing and nourishing. As a constitutionally declared Hindu society, Nepal treats the killing of a cow as the most serious crime, worse than killing a human being. Dashain Also known as Bijaya Dashami, it is the most important and biggest Hindu festival, celebrated over a period of ten consecutive days, usually in October following the rice harvest. It sig-

140——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

nifies the victory of Goddess Durga over the demon Mahisur. Many male animals—namely buffaloes, goats, and roosters—are sacrificed as an integral part of this celebration. The official celebration inside the Hanuman Dhoka in Kathmandu involves the slaying of 108 mature male buffaloes on the eighth day (ashtami) of Dashain. Many people sarcastically refer to it as dasha (misery, trouble) because they go into debt, often mortgaging land or jewelry to borrow money so they can celebrate as expected, including purchasing gifts for family members. Devkota, Laxmi Prasad (1909–1959) One of the most versatile literary figures of modern Nepal, he wrote epics, plays, poems, essays, short stories, and novels. Many regard him as the father of modern poetry in Nepal. He was adorned the title of Maha Kabi (Great Poet). Gautama, Siddhartha (563–487 B.C.) Universally known as the Buddha, Siddhartha was born in Lumbini, a small settlement in Nepal’s central Tarai district of Kapilvastu. He was a Hindu prince of the Sakya (Shakya) dynasty that ruled that part of Nepal. Disturbed by human suffering and sorrow, he renounced his princely status and left the palace in search of truth. After years of meditation, he attained Enlightenment, thus becoming the “Enlightened One,” or Buddha. It was his preaching and philosophy that provided the foundation of what is now called Buddhism, a religion that has spread across the world with its central axis grounded in East, Southeast, and South Asia. He is sometimes referred to as The Light of Asia. Buddhism owes a great deal to its principal apostle Ashok (Ashoka; Asoka), a great Indian emperor, whose preeminent role in its early diffusion paralleled that of Paul in Christianity. Gorkhapatra Published in Kathmandu, it is Nepal’s oldest newspaper, having begun circulation in early 1901. Originally, it was a weekly newspaper; it became a daily paper in late 1966. As a government publication, it has often served as a mouthpiece of the ruling power, especially during the Panchayat System. Janakpur is a border town located in the eastern Tarai. It is believed that Janakpur was the capital of King Janak’s kingdom. Known as

——Significant People, Places, and Events——141

Mithila during Janak’s reign, it was a highly acclaimed center of Hindu philosophical learning and discussions. Janak’s daughter Sita was married to King Rama of Kosala (Kousala) in northern India. Kathmandu is both the capital city and cultural hearth of Nepal. This oldest urban center of Nepal has historically been the prime domain of Nepali civilization, including its administrative system, institutional setup, and artistic/architectural heritage. However, Nepal owes much of its cultural and commercial identity to Kathmandu’s indigenous population, the Newars. As a Hindu society where deities abound, it is no surprise that the landscape of Kathmandu is dotted with countless temples. Koirala, Bishweswar Prasad (B. P.) (1914–1982) Born and educated in Benaras, India, Koirala is one of the leading founders of the Nepali Congress Party (1947). He played a key role in spearheading the popular revolution of 1950 that toppled the Rana regime in early 1951. Following the general election in 1959 in which his Congress Party scored a solid victory, he formed the first democratic government of Nepal. Consequently, he became Nepal’s first elected prime minister. But his government was short-lived as King Mahendra launched a swift palace coup against him and against nascent democracy in December 1960. He was jailed for several years, during which time political parties were banned in Nepal. He was also a highly accomplished author whose contribution to Nepali literature is timeless. To this day, B. P. Koirala remains the most admired and distinguished political leader within Nepal and, certainly, the most well-recognized Nepali political figure in the international arena, easily overshadowing any king, including his archrival King Mahendra. B. P., as he was fondly called, was highly feared by his enemies and admired by his supporters. Koirala, Girija Prasad (1925–) The youngest brother of B. P. Koirala, Girija is perhaps the most controversial and divisive figure within the Congress Party. Nevertheless, when the Congress Party won the general election in 1991 (the first such election since 1959), he became the second elected prime minister in the history of Nepal. He lost the vote of confidence in 1994 but became prime minister again in 1998 and 2000, both times for

142——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

short durations. Typical of all clannish politics, his rise to power is largely hinged on his blood ties to B. P. Koirala rather than to his own inherent competence or leadership ability, something he has miserably failed to demonstrate despite being given several chances to prove himself. Kot Parba (Courtyard Massacre) Nepal’s infamous courtyard massacre of September 14, 1846, in which twenty-nine leading bhardars (court nobles) were butchered by Jang Bahadur Kunwar and his brothers. Prominent nobles of all competing courtier factions were either wiped out or exiled, leaving Jang Bahadur fully in charge of court affairs and without any parallel to challenge his power and authority. Following the massacre, he was bestowed with the title of prime minister and commander-in-chief (see Rana, Jang Bahadur). Kumari is a young living goddess who comes from the Newar group. For a young Newari girl to be selected as Kumari, she must be virgin, about 4–8 in age, and possess a flawless body and pass an excruciating test of endurance against fear and terror. There are presently several Kumaris throughout the Kathmandu Valley, but the main one is in Kathmandu. She lives in a house called Kumari ghar (Kumari house), which is located at the center of Kathmandu. Attendants are appointed to take care of her meticulously. According to the historical custom, the ruling monarch is supposed to visit her once a year to receive her blessing. The ruling Kumari is immediately dethroned at the first sign of menstruation. Lumbini is the birthplace of Buddha, located in the central Tarai district of Nepal. It has emerged as a leading pilgrim destination for both Nepali and international Buddhists, particularly those from Japan. Despite some attempts to develop this sanctuary of peace, Lumbini remains relatively inconspicuous in terms of its physical aura and attraction. Machhapuchhre is a mountain in the Great Himalayan Range in Nepal. In English it is called the “fish-tail mountain” because its peak, when seen from the side, looks like a fish tail, split into two halves. Situated next to Annapurna, few Himalayan peaks capture

——Significant People, Places, and Events——143

one’s imagination as much as this peak does. It is by far the most attractive Himalayan peak that Nepal has to offer; its beauty is truly striking and unsurpassed, especially when viewed against the backdrop of Phewa Tal (Lake Phewa) in Pokhara. However, it is a relatively low peak with a height of only 22,727 feet. Mount Everest. See Sagarmatha. Muktinath is a major Hindu shrine, adorned with the three-roofed pagoda temple of Jwalamai. There is a small eternal flame (jwala) inside the temple. Located close to the Tibetan border, in the inner-Himalayan district of Mustang, Muktinath is considered an important destination for Hindu pilgrims. Nepali Congress Party (NCP or CP) This is the largest political party of Nepal. Founded in January 1947, its founders’ immediate revolutionary intention was to dismantle Rana autocracy. Under the capable leadership of Bishweswar Prasad (B. P.) Koirala, the Party was, indeed, instrumental in bringing down the Rana rule in 1951. After Koirala’s death in 1982, Ganeshman Singh emerged as the primary voice of the party. The NCP played a leading role during the 1990 antipanchayat and pro-democracy movement that led to the sudden disintegration of the Panchayat System. It is not farfetched to assert that B. P. and Ganeshman are essentially synonymous with the Congress Party. Palace Massacre On June 1, 2001, Nepal witnessed an extremely bizarre and bloody massacre that left the whole royal family of King Birendra dead. The assassin was the king’s son, Crown Prince Dipendra, who was believed to have later shot himself. On June 2, Dipendra was declared king although he was lying on his death bed in the hospital. When King Dipendra, who was unmarried, was pronounced dead on June 4, there was no heir left from King Birendra’s or King Dipendra’s side to assume the throne. So, on June 4, the crown was passed on to Dipendra’s uncle (Birendra’s brother) Gyanendra. Panchayat System (panchayat raj) Two years after nascent democracy was suffocated, King Mahendra instituted the pan-

144——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

chayat system in 1962, describing it as the “Nepali plant . . . suited to the climate of our country. . . . The nationalistic feelings associated with the awakening are not as possible under any other system as they are under the panchayat system” (quoted in Joshi and Rose 1966, 397). However, over the next twenty-eight years (1962–1990), this “Nepali plant” proved to be anything but the sharp instrument of Mahendra’s monarchical dictatorship (see Shah, Mahendra Bir Bikram). Although heralded as a partyless system, panchayat was fundamentally a one-party system. Parijat (1937–1993) Simply known as Parijat in Nepal’s literary circle, she was a famous Nepali novelist, poetess, and short-story writer. Her full name was Bishnu Devi Waiba. She won many awards during her relatively short literary career. Pashupati (Temple) Pashupati is another name for Shiva, one of the principal gods of the Hindu trinity, the other two being Brahma and Vishnu. Shiva is loosely regarded as the god of destruction (Brahma and Vishnu are, respectively, the gods of creation and protection). Located on the bank of the holy river of Bagmati in Kathmandu, Pashupati is one of four major Hindu pilgrim destinations, or char dham, that every able Hindu is prescribed to visit during his or her lifetime. Every year, Hindus flock to visit Pashupati, especially during the festival called Shiva Ratri (the night of Shiva worship). Pokhara is a city nestled in a narrow central hill valley, perhaps the most preferred tourist destination outside the Kathmandu Valley, largely thanks to the fact that it is situated at the foothills of Machhapuchhre and Annapurna. Its attraction is further enhanced by the presence of Lake Phewa. It also owes its popularity to the earliest wave of Western tourists in Nepal: the hippies who came in the 1960s, mostly seeking dope and tranquility. Pradhan, Sahana (1932–) Ms. Pradhan was married to Puspa Lal Shrestha, a prominent leader of the communist movement in Nepal. She joined the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) in 1952. Following the second coming of democracy in 1990, she became cabinet minister (1990–1991) during the interim government, representing the CPN (UML), and minister of industry and com-

——Significant People, Places, and Events——145

merce (1994) during the UML government headed by Prime Minister Man Mohan Adhikari. See Communist Party of Nepal and Adhikari, Man Mohan Interestingly, unlike other Nepali women, she chose to keep her maiden name after marriage instead of adopting her husband’s family name. Ramayana A favorite Hindu epic that revolves around the story of Rama (believed to be one of the many incarnations of Vishnu) and his wife, Sita (see Janakpur) vis-à-vis Rawana (Ravana), the king of Sri Lanka. It is a fascinating story that involves many intriguing political plots and subplots and human relations. Rana, Jang Bahadur (1817–1877) Whether justified or not, few Nepali political leaders are remembered with the degree of disdain that is reserved for Jang Bahadur, perhaps because his history is scripted in the thick pool of cold blood. In terms of known records, the murderous course of history that Jang Bahadur Kunwar pursued began with his 1845 assassination of his own uncle, Prime Minister Mathbar Singh Thapa. This was followed by the Kot Parba of 1846, in which he and his brothers slaughtered twenty-nine high-ranking courtiers in one sweep, thus exterminating virtually everybody who could potentially challenge his authority. Immediately following the massacre, he became prime minister, thereby setting in motion what later became known as the Rana Rule. Jang Bahadur changed his surname from Kunwar to Rana after King Surendra bestowed upon him the honorific title of Rana. See Kot Parba. Rana Rule (1846–1951) From the pool of blood shed by the murderous hands of Jang Bahadur rose the autocratic and hereditary rule of the Rana clan in 1846. The Ranas ruled Nepal for over 100 years. During that period, they were the law of the land. Virtually in every respect, this was a dark period in the annals of Nepal. See Kot Parba and Rana, Jang Bahadur. Regmi, Dilli Raman (1915–) A distinguished historian, scholar, and politician who founded Nepal Rashtriya (National) Congress Party, which is now defunct. He has written many authoritative books on Nepali history, covering almost all periods.

146——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

SAARC This is the acronym for the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, established in 1985. Headquartered in Kathmandu, its member countries are Bhutan, Bangladesh, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Sagarmatha is the Nepali name for Mt. Everest. The word means “the roof of the world.” The Sherpas call it Chomolongma (the mother goddess of the snow). With the altitude of 29,035 feet above sea level, it is the highest summit in the world. The ultimate dream of almost any serious mountain climber, it annually attracts numerous mountaineering expeditions from all over the world, despite the fact that it has mercilessly consumed many climbers’ lives. It was first successfully scaled by Sir Edmond Hillary and his local guide, Tenzing Norgay Sherpa, in 1953. Second Coming of Democracy (1990) Led by prominent leaders of the banned Congress Party and Communist Party, Nepali citizens launched a massive antipanchayat and pro-democracy movement across the country in early 1990, on the eve of the thirtieth anniversary of the palace coup that aborted the first dawn of democracy. As the movement spread rapidly, it grew in intensity. Protesters were killed randomly. With the number of deaths increasing, King Birendra faced two stark choices: either to continue to suppress the movement, killing more and more people and, consequently, risking the total overthrow of the whole institution of monarchy; or to dissolve his panchayat system and restore democracy. He went with the second option, subsequently ending the Panchayat System and restoring democracy. An interim coalition government was formed under the prime ministership of Krishna Prasad Bhattarai, and a new constitution was promulgated, turning the institution of monarchy into a constitutional role. Under the stewardship of the interim government, a national election was held in 1991 to form a parliamentary government, thus inaugurating the second coming of democracy in Nepal thirty years after it was prematurely aborted. Shah, Birendra Bir Bikram (1945–2001) Crowned king in 1972, he was murdered during the dinner hours by his own son, Crown Prince Dipendra (see Palace Massacre) on June 1, 2001.

——Significant People, Places, and Events——147

He will be remembered for his decision to restore parliamentary democracy in 1990 and accept his role as a constitutional monarch. Because of that decision, he was widely admired by his citizens. Shah, Gyanendra Bir Bikram (1947–) Became king by default on June 4, 2001 (see Palace Massacre). Shah, Mahendra Bir Bikram (1920–1972) King Mahendra earned a dubious distinction of being perhaps the craftiest Shah king. He is most remembered for his 1960 palace coup against the democratically elected government of Prime Minister B. P. Koirala and for instituting his dictatorial Panchayat System in 1962 (see Second Coming of Democracy). Shah, Prithvi Narayan (1722–1775) Founder of unified Nepal and the ruling Shah dynasty. In a series of brilliant military campaigns, complemented by shrewd diplomacy, he completed his sweep of all three kingdoms of the Kathmandu Valley in 1769, thereby symbolizing the unification of Nepal. Staunchly nationalistic in every respect, Prithvi Narayan is regarded as one of the most farsighted rulers that Nepal has ever seen. To this day, he is remembered with fondness for his contribution to building the nation of Nepal. Shah, Tribhuvan Bir Bikram (1906–1955) King Tribhuvan is known mainly for his defiant stance against the Rana Rule and for resurrecting the Shah monarchy to its pre-Rana status. When he abruptly fled his palace on November 6, 1950, seeking asylum in the Indian Embassy, he dealt a severe blow to the legitimacy of the Rana rule and gave a tremendous moral boost to the raging popular anti-Rana revolution. In essence, his calculated move hastened the demise of Rana autocracy. Sherchan, Bhupi (1935–1989) Leftist in ideological orientation, he was a charismatic poet with a vibrant personality and a gift for wit. His bitingly sarcastic and accessible style of poetry made him perhaps the most popular modern poet of Nepal, especially among the young generation. Bhupi Sherchan commanded respect

148——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

across all political spectrums in a country where virtually everything is tainted with politics or political factionalism. Sherpa, Tenzing Norgay (1914–1986) Tenzing Norgay accompanied Sir Edmund Hillary to the top of Mt. Everest, thus becoming one of the first two successful climbers of this highest peak. As his name suggests, he belonged to the Sherpa (Tibeto-Nepali) ethnic group that inhabits the Everest region. The Sherpas are renowned as mountain climbers and as guides/porters for mountaineering expeditions. Following his legendary achievement, Tenzing Norgay became an Indian citizen and opened a mountain climbing school in Darjeeling, India. Shrestha, Marichman Singh (1942–) So far the only Newar to have risen to prime ministership (1986–1989) in the modern history of Nepal, Shrestha is also the only prime minister to have broken the monopolistic grip on Nepal’s prime ministership by high-caste Brahmans and Chhetris. Shrestha, Puspa Lal (1924–1978) Husband of Sahana Pradhan, he was a fiery and charismatic leader of the Communist Party of Nepal, which he helped to found and build. In some quarters of the Kathmandu Valley, his name still engenders a great deal of fond memories. His unyielding motto was that the political party should be policy-oriented rather than personality driven. Singh, Ganeshman (1915–1997) A true leader in every sense of the word and one of the greatest and boldest fighters for democracy that Nepal has ever seen. As a national political leader, few could surpass him for his honesty and integrity. He is perhaps the only Congress Party leader who could match B. P. Koirala with respect to stature, respect, and name recognition. In league with Koirala, he was the embodiment of the Nepali Congress Party, especially after Koirala’s death. Ganeshman was given U Thant Peace and United Nations awards in 1993 for his outstanding achievements in the field of human rights. Slavery Das pratha, as it is called in Nepali, existed particularly in the form of bonded labor. It was abolished in 1924 by Prime

——Significant People, Places, and Events——149

Minister Chandra Shamsher Rana, one of the very few positive achievements of the Rana rule. Swayambhu is a world-renowned Buddhist stupa located in Kathmandu. In addition to its enormous religious significance, it is truly a marvelous work of architecture, with the colorful symbolic “Third Eye” (i.e., the inner eye that symbolizes Enlightenment) embossed on it. Swayambhu is also regarded as a symbol of world peace. Thapa, Bhimsen (1772–1839) Recognized as the first prime minister of Nepal, Bhimsen (or Bim Sen) Thapa was one of the most powerful political figures in Nepali history; he controlled the country’s political and military machinery for more than thirty years (1906–1937). During his long tenure, Nepal experienced both its dramatic rise and colossal fall as it made its most expansive territorial gains through military conquests and suffered its most humiliating military defeat. Following the signing of the Treaty of Sagauli in 1916, Nepal suddenly shrank as it lost about one-half of its territory (see Anglo-Nepal War). Despite his political fame and fortunes, no national leader in the recorded history of Nepal was ever fated to the kind of gruesome and humiliating death that Thapa was subjected to (for a detailed account, see Stiller 1976, 284–285, including footnotes). Tihar The “Festival of Light,” usually celebrated over a period of three days. Also variably known as Diwali or Deepawali, it is the second-largest Hindu festival and is observed about a month after Dashain. Besides decorating houses with lights (butter lamps, candles, or electricity), three major events characterize this festival: cow and dog worship (homage), worship of Laxmi (the goddess of fortune), and blessing of brothers by sisters. Treaty of Sagauli or Sugauli (1816) As the British eventually prevailed during the Anglo-Nepal War of 1814–1816, Nepal surrendered to preserve its national sovereignty. It was a strategic decision on the part of Bhimsen Thapa, for a clear-cut defeat could have led to the absorption of Nepal into the colonial orbit of the British Raj. As a result, the treaty was signed and ratified in 1816. As part of that treaty, Nepal had to relinquish roughly one-half of

150——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

its territory to British India, mostly on the west and south sides, but also some to the east. In addition, a British residency was established in Kathmandu, thereby relegating Nepal to semicolonial status. However, Nepal was never formally colonized.

Nepali Language, Food, and Etiquette LANGUAGE Nepali is the national language of Nepal. It is closely related to, but not identical with, Hindi. Many words used in these languages are similar, as is the grammar structure; in fact, individuals who can read Nepali can read Hindi, and vice versa. This is directly attributed to the fact that both languages are derived from Sanskrit— the language of original Hindu texts and epics and of Vedic or religious studies in the past, monopolized by the upper crust of the Brahman caste. All three languages are written in Devanagari script with an elaborate vowel and phonetic structure. Nepali is the dominant language in Nepal, largely thanks to its persistent national push as the medium of public education. Although there are still many remote pockets where Nepali is rarely heard, it is widely spread. In fact, Nepali has been deployed not only as a common language but as an instrument to foster and fortify Nepali nationalism (patriotism) as well as national consolidation—that is, loyalty to the crown. As a result, Nepali is now spoken even among the various Tibeto-Nepali ethnic tribal groups and the Tarai-based Indo-Nepalis, who are historically least acculturated to Nepali. They each have their own dialects, some of which are quite elaborate. This is true also among the Newars. Because of their command of the language, the hill-based IndoNepali ethnic group has taken full advantage of Nepali to maintain their domination of various Nepali institutions, including social and political, from the local to the national level. In this sense, the language has historically become a source of power and prominent positions in society. Besides Nepali, other languages of Nepal include Newari, Maithili, Bhojpuri, Tharu, Tamang, Gurung, and many others. In terms of linguistic roots, Nepali, Maithili, and Bhojpuri belong to the

151

152——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Indo-European family whereas the mother tongues of the TibetoNepali groups, including Newari, are derived from the TibetoBurman language family. Irrespective of their roots, virtually every tribal group, especially within the Tibeto-Nepali and indigenous (native) population segments, has its own dialect. NonNepali languages and dialects are, however, rarely spoken outside their ethnic enclaves. Nepali is thus the common medium of communication between diverse ethnic groups. Nepali has thirty-one consonants and sixteen vowels (including both long and short vowels). Despite its elaborate structure and sound system, most of the sounds in Nepali are not difficult to master. Many are very similar to English. Unlike in some other languages, Nepali entails no contradiction between the way it is written and the way it is pronounced. For instance, in Spanish, the letter “j” in its written form often carries the sound of the letter “h” in its spoken form. But Nepali is straightforward in this respect in that the letter “j” is pronounced with a “j” sound. There is, however, one specific Nepali sound that poses a challenge for many Westerners. This sound is associated with the seventh consonant and can be written in the Roman alphabet as “chh.” This is basically the aspirated and slightly longer version of the English sound “ch” as in “church.” The sound comes more from the throat than from a single flap of the tongue against the front part of its roof. This is one sound that most Westerners, for some reason, find extremely difficult to pronounce correctly even after a long stay in Nepal. Although both sounds appear to have the same base, the “chh” sound is definitely distinct. In Nepali, there is a separate consonant for the “ch” sound that is nonaspirated. Unlike in English, in which the sentence (grammar) order is subject-verb-object, in Nepali the normal sequence is subjectobject-verb. For instance, “I go home” in English would be “I home go” in Nepali. It is, nonetheless, important to keep in mind that there is flexibility in the sentence formation both in speaking and writing. Casual conversational Nepali can be even more flexible. It is common for people to converse in single words rather than in complete sentences, yet be quite clear in communicating messages and meanings. One thing that is critical to remember about Nepali is that it is very hierarchical, with a social class connotation when it comes to addressing others. For instance, the

——Nepali Language, Food, and Etiquette——153

pronoun “you” has at least three different words in Nepali to differentiate social status: “ta” (pronounced with a dental “t” sound and nasal accent; used for those with low social status, ranks, and for children), “timi” (for medium status or among close friends), and “ta-pai” (for high status, higher ranks, seniors, etc.). The hierarchical variations for the pronouns “she, he, they” are not as severe as they are for “you.” Foreigners should avoid using the first two versions of “you” just to play it safe. The following are some useful survival Nepali expressions: Namaste.

Greetings (applicable to any time of the day, but used when one meets somebody, not at the time of parting. It is gender neutral). Lau (la) ma janchhu. Okay, I am leaving (going) now; a common and polite way to say goodbye. Ke chha? Abbreviated way to say “What’s going on?” It is usually combined with the word bhannos (please say), which can come first or last. Kasto chha? Abbreviated way to say “How are things going?” Again combined with bhannos. Dhannebad. Thank you. Kah (kaha) chha . . .? Where is . . .? Dekhai dinos. Please show me. Ek chhin. Just a moment. Kurnos Please wait. Basnos. Please sit down. Khanos. Please eat. Thik (or ramro) chha It’s good; it’s nice. Pugyo. Enough. Hunchha. Yes. Nahi (or hoina). No. Maph garnos. Please pardon me; excuse me. Pheri dinos. Give me one more, please; give me again. Man pardaina. Don’t like it. Ke bhayo? What happened? Yo ke ho? What is this?

154——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

FOOD AND BEVERAGES In Nepal, eating is more than a nutritional necessity to sustain life, it is a time-honored social activity, imbued with cultural meanings. In addition to communal eating during certain festivals and occasions, sharing meals and offering food and drink to guests is an integral cultural practice that transcends all geographical, ethnic, caste, and class boundaries. No matter how poor a family may be, they are likely to offer some snacks or at least a cup of tea to visitors, whether the visitors are relatives, friends, or neighbors. If they fail to offer some food or drink, they will be seen as either too poor or too miserly to have any social grace and sense of dignity. Those who act miserly are seldom openly welcome by other families when they come for a visit. At times, therefore, this cultural practice borders on social obligation. If somebody happens to visit a family during lunch or dinner hours, the visitor is normally offered a full meal, even if that means the family members may have to be served less than a normal portion. Furthermore, it is considered impolite for family members to eat before the visitors are fed. In terms of family hierarchies, senior male members are fed before female and junior members. In this hierarchical eating structure, daughters-in-law or wives are usually the last ones to eat, and the cook rarely eats until other members of the family have finished eating. In group settings, including in restaurants, few will dare to eat until the senior-most member—determined based on either rank or age— initiates and signals others to begin eating. This rule applies within the family as well, when several family members eat together. Such eating order and etiquette are closely observed across both ethnic and class lines. Although the frequency of dining out has increased over the years, eating is still a family affair in two respects. First, most lunches and dinners are eaten at home. Second, in most families, several members generally eat in a family atmosphere rather than individual members eating separately. However, these days members of most wealthy urban families consume their snacks in restaurants, usually with their friends and colleagues. This is an important aspect of socialization, group formation, and network building. Such a setting also acts as an important venue for con-

——Nepali Language, Food, and Etiquette——155

ducting business transactions. In sum, food and beverage consumption constitute more than nutrition—they are a central link of social networks, civility, and cultural immersion.

Common Nepali Dishes Rice. When it comes to the place of rice in the social and cultural life of Nepal, the situation is no different than what is observed throughout monsoonal Asia. Its preeminence is demonstrated not only in terms of its extensive cropping but also through its use during many festivals and ceremonies from birth to death. Rice is an unmistakable symbol of Nepali culture and social status. Those who cannot afford rice on a daily basis are generally considered poor. A family’s inability to serve rice to guests is a source of shame. And those who can afford rice consume it up to three times a day (including breakfast), certainly for both lunch and dinner. Rice is served in Nepal in a variety of flavors and shapes and to different standards of quality. Many different dishes are prepared from rice, especially in Newar communities. Beverages also are made out of rice, namely jand (fermented rice mixed with water) and raksi (similar to Japanese sake). Boiled rice is the most common preparation, followed by chiura (beaten or flat rice). In Nepal, rice is rarely consumed by itself; it is invariably mixed with cooked dal (lentils), some vegetable dish, and/or chutney (pickles). If families can afford meat, it is added to the rice. The higher the household economic position, the greater the variety and the number of side dishes to complement the taste of rice. Dal. This is a generic term used for most types of lentils. It is also a lentil dish, soupy in form and, usually, prepared from black, yellow, or red lentils or mung beans. Within most households, rice is not complete unless it is accompanied by dal, which is a very important source of protein. Meat. Meat is not a common dish for most Nepali households because they cannot afford it. It is usually limited to once a week or even once every 2–3 months in some cases. Major festivals are perhaps the only occasions when almost every family acquires some meat to consume. Nepalis consume a variety of meats, the

156——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

most common being goat/sheep, buffalo, chicken, and pork. Unlike in the United States, chicken is usually the most expensive meat in Nepal. Cultural and religious taboos against consumption of certain meats exist within the various Nepali subcultures. Although the low castes, Tibeto-Nepali ethnic groups, and the Newars are permitted to consume different types of meats, Brahmans and Chhetris were traditionally confined to goat and sheep meat. Although the concept of vegetarianism certainly exists, few Nepalis practice it as a religious dogma. Although the reason for the restriction of buffalo meat consumption within Brahman and Chhetri communities is not clear, poultry and pork were considered unclean or polluted meats because chickens and pigs eat anything, including human feces. As a result, these groups were prohibited from consuming them (as well as liquor) to preserve their caste purity. These days, however, not too many Brahmans and Chhetris adhere to such traditional prohibitions, largely due to their widespread social intermingling with other groups. Most now eat other meats when given the opportunity. People in Nepal eat almost every body part, including brains, feet, and tongues. Blood is also consumed in different forms. There are two more cultural aspects of meat consumption in Nepal. First, as a Hindu society, eating beef is absolutely prohibited. Although the Muslim and Untouchable members of society are allowed to consume beef, killing a cow (even by accident) is a serious crime, for which the perpetrator can be imprisoned for life. Such a strict observance of beef consumption does not, however, keep fancy hotels from discretely importing beef and serving it to Western tourists. Second, there is an unwritten gender rule regarding meat consumption. Specifically, female buffaloes and goats are rarely killed for meat—at least not openly. Vegetables. Vegetables are an important part of the Nepali diet, almost as important as the ubiquitous dal. Most farming families grow some vegetables for domestic consumption or to supplement their food supply. Given the fact that most families consume very limited amounts of meat and dairy products, dal and vegetables are the major sources of protein and vitamins. Although some vegetables are intercropped with other crops, some are grown

——Nepali Language, Food, and Etiquette——157

separately, both in the summer and winter. Most of the vegetables found in the United States are also found in Nepal. One dry (dehydrated) vegetable that is strictly indigenous to Nepal and is rarely found in any other cultures, including its closest neighbor India, is called gundruk. It is actually composed of a variety of winter vegetables, for example, cabbage, mustard, cauliflower, or radish greens. The greens are first slightly sun-dried; then beaten down to extract juice; packed tightly in bamboo, wooden, or clay containers for several days until they are fermented (but not rotten); and then taken out and thoroughly dried in the sun. Gundruk can be mixed with other dishes or prepared as a separate dish. No matter how it is fixed, it is a typical specialty of Nepal. Curry. It is not a particular dish or ingredient; it is largely a method of preparation using certain spices. Most common among these spices are turmeric, cumin, coriander, garlic, ginger, hot chili pepper, and, of course, salt. Most vegetable and meat dishes are cooked as curry dishes. In this respect, most of the curry dishes in Nepal are similar in taste and form to those found in northern India and Bangladesh, although some local variations are certainly normal and common. Newari Dishes. With respect to Nepali cuisine, the Newars are perhaps the most renowned chefs of Nepal. Newari dishes are quite distinct because of their sophistication, originality, preparation, and number. Most Newari dishes are also exquisite in their taste, particularly sweets and meat dishes. So well known are the Newari dishes that many of them have become national standards; they are served throughout Nepal, both geographically and demographically. One of the dishes is called momocha or momo, which is, in a way, similar to Chinese dumplings. It is, in fact, believed that its origin is rooted in Chinese dumplings that made their way into Tibet and were later introduced to the Newari communities in the Kathmandu Valley by Nepali merchants doing business in Tibet. Other highly popular Newari dishes include bhutan (thoroughly fried internal organs like intestines, lungs, hearts, etc.), chhwa-la (similar to shish kebab), and kachi-la (fresh raw meat tastefully marinated in spices). Although bhutan and chhwa-la can be made from any meat, kachi-la is restricted

158——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

to buffalo and goat/sheep meat. Momocha is also usually made out of buffalo and goat meat. These four dishes are widely served in most Newari restaurants, especially in the Kathmandu Valley. Nicely spiced and tasty, they are very popular as snacks. Although foreign dishes such as pizza have become popular on an occasional basis, they cannot compete with native Newari dishes on a sustained or day-to-day basis.

Common Nepali Beverages Raksi. Similar to Japanese sake in taste and texture, raksi is perhaps the most common and traditional alcoholic beverage in Nepal. Although it can be made from a variety of grains, rice and millet are the two most commonly used. Depending on the preparation, it comes in various levels of alcoholic content or strength. Once again, the Newars are considered to be some of the best raksi makers in Nepal. Their best raksis can easily match some of the finest scotch in the West. Few people serve or drink raksi (or any other alcoholic beverage) by itself, without some snacks, the most preferred being the above-mentioned Newari dishes. Unlike other types of commercially produced alcoholic beverages available in Nepal, raksi cannot be purchased in the open market. It is strictly a matter of domestic production, often for family consumption. Some households also sell it to neighbors and friends to generate supplementary cash incomes, but such transactions are conducted discretely because of the restriction on its commercial production. Beer. In the past 10–15 years, beer has made tremendous inroads in Nepal. It is now a very popular alcoholic drink, a status symbol among the upwardly mobile and upscale urban and educated crowds. It is “the drink to order” in restaurants. Though some imported beers are available, most beer consumed in Nepal is brewed in the country, mostly through joint ventures with foreign beer companies such as San Miguel. Tea and Soft Drinks. Tea, which is widely consumed in both rural and urban areas, is without question the national drink of Nepal. Nepal produces some tea in the eastern hills around Ilam, but most is imported from India. Few families fail to serve tea to guests and

——Nepali Language, Food, and Etiquette——159

visitors, and one can always expect a cup of hot black tea, often mixed with some milk and sugar, when visiting a Nepali home. Many Nepalis drink several cups of tea a day. These days one can find a variety of Western soft drinks, including the locally bottled CocaCola, as well as bottled water, at shops and carts throughout Nepal.

ETIQUETTE As a very structured and reserved society, Nepal certainly has some expectations with regard to certain sociocultural etiquette and manners. Although the whole cultural conception of individual social etiquette and manners is constantly evolving, there are some that seem timeless in terms of their practice. Namaste or Namaskar. These are the most common form of greeting when individuals meet. Namaste denotes both formality (respect) and informality (casualness). It is almost like “hi” or “hello” in the United States, not bound to any specific time of the day as, for instance, “good morning.” It is not used at the time of parting. Taking Shoes off. It is critical to take shoes off at the main entryway before entering homes and temples. Failing to do so is a serious breach of etiquette. This tradition is rooted in both Nepal’s agrarian structure and religious conception. Peasants and farmers returning from the field had dirty shoes. They were, therefore, required to take their shoes off at the door before entering the house so its interior would remain clean. Religiously, the house is more than a shelter built for the family’s physical security, it is a cultural hearth and a symbol of social stability and family lineage, a sacred place where a family god is kept or where gods are worshiped. As a sacred place, it is supposed to be kept clean, free of any form of pollution. And shoes are one of the prime sources of pollution, partly because they are usually made from leather (a pollutant) and partly because they can bring polluted objects like feces into the house. Social Hierarchy and Respect. As previously indicated, there is a deep tradition of social hierarchy and respect for elders and higher

160——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

ranks. Because hierarchy can be determined based on age or official or social rank, it can sometimes be difficult to figure out who is higher or lower on the scale of social hierarchy. At any rate, age and ranks command tremendous respect, and one is expected to show deference. As an expression of respect, it is common to call somebody of one’s parental age or older ba (father) and ma or ama (mother). Those of older bothers’ or sisters’ age are called dai (older brother) or didi (older sister). Such functional relations are assumed not only to show respect but also to ease the process of interaction and communication. The practice of social hierarchy and respect remains entrenched in Nepal despite the contemporary dissolution of many traditional mores; they are enduring traits of Nepali society. Compliments. Although offering compliments is acceptable, it is not necessarily common. If one offers a compliment, it should be tempered, not done excessively or profusely, for such an act, unlike in the United States, can be easily construed as phony and insincere. Furthermore, compliments and certain Western niceties may not be reciprocated openly. For example, a “thank you” may not be replied with a “you’re welcome.” This should not, however, be construed as a sign of rudeness. It is often an indication of humility and modesty in that one’s action is a matter of duty and service, not necessarily something that deserves to be thanked. Reciprocity is, normally, displayed in subtle forms. Modesty and Humbleness. It is important to explicitly demonstrate a sense of modesty and humbleness about one’s achievements when interacting with seniors and strangers in Nepal. Open bragging is viewed as impolite, ungraceful, and uncultured. When dealing with seniors and elders, one should not be direct and opinionated or look directly in their eyes. Prolonged eye contact between seniors and juniors is often avoided. If a person talks too much, he or she will lose others’ trust and respect, for such persons are regarded as shallow, undignified, or not trustworthy. Public Display of Affection between Opposite Sexes. As discussed earlier, displaying affection in public is seen as an immoral act. This is particularly true for girls/women, who will be perceived as having a loose character that would bring disgrace to the family.

——Nepali Language, Food, and Etiquette——161

Sitting. Although modern and wealthy houses are equipped with chairs, in most households one is expected to sit cross-legged on a mat on the floor. Nose Blowing. Contrary to the United States, blowing one’s nose at dinner tables or in eating places is considered extremely unsociable. Burping. Burping immediately after dinner is normal and common. In some cases, it is even expected, for it connotes a display of satisfaction with the meal. Bargaining. Bargaining is a form of cultural practice that is highly expected and common in Nepal. In the open market, few things have fixed prices. Price is something that one arrives at after some bargaining between the seller and buyer; it is set at the time of purchase. Business Cards. In formal settings (e.g., business meetings or official visits), exchanging business cards is becoming quite common. Clothes. Nepal is a relatively traditional and conservative society when it comes to clothes and dressing. Formal clothing with minimal bodily exposure is expected; adults should not wear shorts and short skirts. Women should avoid low-cut dresses to minimize the exposure of thighs and cleavage, especially in official and formal settings.

Nepal-Related Organizations BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC The following is a list of various Nepal trade- and business-related organizations. Note that telephone calls to Nepal require a country code (977) and the appropriate one-digit city code (for Kathmandu, the city code is 1). Central Carpet Industries Association P.O. Box 2419 Bijulee Bazaar Kathmandu, Nepal Phone: (977-1) -496108 Fax: (977-1) -496108 or -475291 E-mail: [email protected] Federation of Nepali Chambers of Commerce and Industry P.O. Box 269 Milan Marg, Teku, Kathmandu, Nepal Phone: (977-1) -262061, -244758, -262218, or -266889 Fax: (977-1) -261022 or -262007 E-mail: [email protected] Handicraft Association of Nepal P.O. Box 784 Maitighar, Kathmandu, Nepal E-mail: [email protected] Nepal Chamber of Commerce Kantipath, Kathmandu, Nepal Phone: (977-1) -222890, -230290, or -213535 Fax: (977-1) -229998 The Nepal Chamber of Commerce is the nation’s oldest organization of business entities from across the country, established to

163

164——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

promote the interests of Nepal’s business community both domestically and abroad. Nepal Garment Association Shankhamul Road, New Baneshwor, Kathmandu, Nepal Phone: (977-1) -482691 or -481773 Fax: (977-1) -482173 E-mail: [email protected] Nepal Home Page http://www.nepalhomepage.com This is an excellent and most comprehensive Web site; it provides information on virtually every topic related to Nepal, from politics and government to culture, society, business, economics, trade, and travel. It is also very user friendly as it is easy to navigate. In addition, it provides links to other pertinent Web sites. Nepal Industrial and Commercial Bank P. O. Box 7367 New Road, Kathmandu, Nepal Phone: (977-1) -227305 Fax: (977-1) -227507 Telex: 2845 NICB NP E-mail: [email protected] Nepal Rastra Bank Baluwatar, Kathmandu, Nepal Fax: (977-1) -414553 E-mail: [email protected] The central bank of Nepal, the Nepal Rastra Bank determines the country’s monetary policy and sets daily foreign currency exchange rates. Nepal Stock Exchange Limited Kathmandu, Nepal Phone: (977-1) -250757 or -250735 E-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] The Nepal Stock Exchange Limited is a fairly recent initiative, intended to promote stock trades and generate private cap-

——Nepal-Related Organizations——165

ital for investment. It is supposed to give a boost to recent government efforts to promote greater market liberalization and free trade. Nepali Chamber of Commerce—USA 1314 Towlston Road Vienna, VA 22180, USA Phone: (703) 759-3954 Nepal–USA Chamber of Commerce & Industry 2769 TNT Building, Teenkune, Koteswar, Kathmandu, Nepal Phone: (977-1) -478020 Fax: (977-1) -478020 E-mail: [email protected]

CULTURE, EDUCATION, AND EXCHANGE Himalayan Buddhist Education Foundation P.O. Box 100 Chakupat, Lalitpur, Nepal Phone: (977-1) -520558 Fax: (977-1) -527446 E-mail: [email protected] Nepal Education Foundation P.O. Box 833 Lazimpat, Kathmandu, Nepal Phone: (977-1) -413114 Fax: (977-1) -525111 School of International Training Study Abroad Program—Nepal Brattleboro, Vermont, 05302, USA Phone: (802) 257-7751 Toll-free within the U.S.: (888) 272-7881 Fax: (802) 258-3296 E-mail: [email protected] In addition to the School of International Training, the following universities offer excellent study abroad opportunities in

166——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Nepal, focusing on language learning, culture, society, history, geography, and economy. Cornell University Nepal Study Program Ithaca, NY 14853, USA Phone: (607) 255-6224 Michigan State University Study Abroad East Lansing, MI 48824, USA Phone: (517) 353-8920 New College of California World Studies Project San Francisco, CA 94110, USA Phone: (415) 437-3406 E-mail: [email protected] University of Connecticut College of Continuing Studies Storrs, CT 06420, USA Phone: (860) 486-5985 University of Wisconsin–Madison Center for South Asia Madison, WI 53706, USA Phone: (608) 265-6329 USEF/NEPAL—The Fulbright Commission P.O. Box 380 Kathmandu, Nepal Phone: (977-1) 415845 Fax: (977-1) 410881 E-mail: [email protected] The Commission for Educational Exchange between the United States and Nepal is known to many as the United States Educational Foundation in Nepal (USEF/Nepal) or simply as The Fulbright Commission. It administers educational exchange activities between Nepal and the United States and provides information about U.S. higher education opportunities to the Nepali public. Its principal programs are the Fulbright program, the Hubert

——Nepal-Related Organizations——167

Humphrey Fellowship program, academic and professional awards from the East-West Center at the University of Hawaii, and a full range of student counseling, standardized test preparation (ACT, SAT, TOEFL), and test administration services provided through USEF’s Educational Advising Center (EAC). The Fulbright program also provides opportunities for U.S. citizens and permanent residents (students, teachers, and professors) to study, teach, and do research in Nepal.

NEPAL’S GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES Embassy 2131 Leroy Place NW Washington, DC 20008 Phone: (202) 667-4550 E-mail: [email protected]

Consulates General of Nepal Atlanta 212 15th Street NE Atlanta, GA 30309 Phone: (404) 892-8152 Dallas 16250 Dallas Parkway, Suite 110 Dallas, TX 75248 Phone: (214) 931-1212 San Francisco 473 Jackson Street San Francisco, CA 94111 Phone: (415) 434-1111 United Nations Permanent Mission 820 Second Avenue, Suite 1200 New York, NY 10017 Phone: (212) 370-4188 or -4189

168——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

TOURISM American Embassy U.S. Embassy Panipokhari, Kathmandu, Nepal Phone: (977-1) -411179 Fax: (977-1) -419963 The U.S. Embassy provides valuable information to American tourists and travelers planning to visit Nepal, along with travel tips and alerts. Also included is information on the business climate, investment opportunities, and trade rules and regulations. The Web site for the U.S. Embassy in Nepal can be accessed through the U.S. government Web site or via www.south-asia.com/USA. Catmando.com http://www.catmando.com An excellent and comprehensive source of Nepal information on a variety of travel-related issues and topics, for example, hotels, airlines, tours, trekking, shopping, travel agencies, and a host of other useful and pertinent information. Also covered are news and trades. Fodors http://www.fodors.com Provides valuable information for tourists and travelers planning to visit Nepal Lonely Planet Online http://www.lonelyplanet.com A good Web site to visit for travel information on Nepal Nepal Association of Travel Agents P.O. Box 362 Goma Ganesh, Naxal, Kathmandu, Nepal Phone: (977-1) -418661 or -413991 Fax: (977-1) -413991 This agency seeks to insure that Nepali travel agencies and agents render quality services to tourists and travelers as well as promote the business interests of travel agencies in Nepal.

——Nepal-Related Organizations——169

Nepal Homepage http://www.nepalhomepage.com By far the best, unsurpassed by any other Web site related to Nepal. As already noted, it offers the most comprehensive and complete information on all topics related to Nepal, including travel and tourism. Visit Nepal.com Travel Information Network http://www.visitnepal.com An excellent site for tourists and travelers to Nepal—plenty of good and valuable information.

Annotated Bibliography of Recommended Works on Nepal The references listed in this section include some of those cited within this book as well as others related to Nepal. These references constitute general but very useful sources of information on various aspects of Nepal and are arranged in the same chronological order as the narrative chapters.

GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY OF NEPAL BBC News. A great deal of current news about Nepal can be accessed through the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Web site, news.bbc.co.uk. It also provides a country profile and timeline of key events in Nepali history. The timeline information is frequently updated. Encyclopedia Britannica. This is also a very good source of information on Nepal’s history and geography as well as other topics, including limited biographical information. Joshi, Bhuwan Lal, and Leo E. Rose. 1966. Democratic Innovations in Nepal: A Case Study of Political Acculturation. Berkeley: University of California Press. This book is a must for anybody who is interested in the political history of Nepal. Although its temporal coverage is obviously limited, from a historical perspective it is a classic piece, one that is filled with unsurpassed insights into the fundamental nature of Nepali politics. Nepal Home Page http://www.nepalhomepage.com This is a quick and concise source of information on various aspects of Nepal. Because it is a privately operated Web site, one is cautioned against the accuracy and completeness of certain

171

172——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

information. For the most part, it is quite reliable. A very userfriendly Web site. Savada, Andrea Matles, ed. 1993. Nepal and Bhutan Country Studies (Area Handbook Series). Washington, D. C.: Library of Congress. A U.S. government publication, this is a very useful and comprehensive source of information on various topics on Nepal, including its geography and history. Although some statistical information is somewhat dated, general information is very pertinent. Shaha, Rishikesh. 1990. Modern Nepal: A Political History 1769–1955 (2 vols.). Shaha is one of the creative scholars that Nepal has produced. His books provide a very valuable political and historical profile of Nepal that parallels the work by Joshi and Rose (1966) cited above. Sill, Michael, and John Kirkby. 1991. The Atlas of Nepal in the Modern World. London: Earthscan Publications. Although somewhat outdated, this a valuable source of information on various Nepali topics, including geography, graphically presented in the form of maps and accompanied with some text. Stiller, Ludwig F. 1976. The Silent Cry: The People of Nepal: 1916–39. Kathmandu: Sahayogi Prakashan. A long-time foreign observer of Nepal and Nepali history, Stiller provides an interesting perspective on Nepal’s historical developments. He has lived in Nepal for many years, having arrived in the country as a Christian missionary. He is now a Nepali citizen. South-Asia.com http://www.south-asia.com This is also a very good source of information on Nepal. A very user-friendly Web site.

THE ECONOMY OF NEPAL Fisher, James F. 1986. Trans-Himalayan Traders: Economy, Society and Culture in Northwest Nepal. Berkeley: University of California Press.

——Annotated Bibliography of Recommended Works on Nepal——

A very good source of information on trans-Himalayan trade in the northern parts of Nepal and on the mode of life and living in those areas where trade is a primary source of survival. Panday, Devendra Raj. 1999. Nepal’s Failed Development: Reflections on the Mission and the Maladies. Kathmandu: Nepal South Asia Centre. As a leading authority who has been in and out of government many times, Panday offers in this book an excellent and moving account of Nepal’s development policy, performance, and problems based on the vast pool of his profound theoretical knowledge, empirical understanding, and personal involvement and experience. Pradhan, Radhe S. 1984. Industrialization in Nepal. Delhi: NBO Publishers’ Distributors. This provides a good historical overview of Nepal’s industrial development policy and problems. Regmi, Mahesh C. 1984. The State and Economic Surplus. Varanasi: Nath Publishing House. There are very few Nepali or foreign scholars of Nepali economic history during the Rana period who can outdo Mr. Regmi. This is a masterful and insightful portrayal of the economic conditions and policies of Nepal during the Rana period. Schwartz, Moshe, and A. Paul Hare. 2000. Foreign Experts and Unsustainable Development. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company. This book reveals the tragedy of contemporary development conceived in a grandiose fashion that is locally unsuitable and unsustainable. The argument presented here is similar to those by Panday (1999) and Shrestha (1997). Sharma, Kishor. 1999. Trade Liberalisation and Manufacturing Performance in Developing Countries: New Evidences from Nepal. Nova Science Publishers. The objective of this book is to examine the impact of liberalization on manufacturing performance in developing countries,

174——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

with special emphasis on productivity growth and trade orientation in Nepal. Shrestha, Badri P. 1981. An Introduction to Nepalese Economy. Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar. Authored by a leading contemporary economist of Nepal, this book represents an excellent source of pertinent information on the economy of Nepal. Shrestha, Nanda R. 1997. In the Name of Development: A Reflection on Nepal. Lanham, MD: University Press of America (Nepal edition, Kathmandu: Educational Enterprise, 1999). This study provides real-life stories of how development victimizes people. It is based on the author’s personal observations and his conversations with victims of development in Nepal. Using a narrative and nonjargonistic style, the author offers what can be described as an insider-outsider perspective, a sort of social commentary, on various aspects of development. World Bank. 1999. Country Assistance Strategy: Nepal. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. This report provides an overview of Nepal’s contemporary economic condition, performance, and problems.

NEPALI INSTITUTIONS Caplan, Lionel. 1970. Land and Social Change in East Nepal: A Study of Hindu-Tribal Relations. Berkeley: University of California Press. A very good source of information on Nepal’s social institutions and social conflicts and change within an ethnic context and on how high-caste Brahmans and Chhetris came to dominate these institutions. Fisher, William F. 2001. Fluid Boundaries: Forming and Transforming Identity in Nepal. New York: Columbia University Press. A very good cultural anthropological study of identity formation, transformation, and acquisition, with a particular focus on the Thakali community of Nepal.

——Annotated Bibliography of Recommended Works on Nepal——

Fricke, Tom. 1994. Himalayan Households: Tamang Demography and Domestic Processes. New York: Columbia University Press. This provides an anthropological overview of demographic and social changes taking place in rural areas of Nepal. Gellner, David N., and Declan Quigley, eds. 1999. Contested Hierarchies : A Collaborative Ethnography of Caste among the Newars of the Kathmandu Valley, Nepal. London: Oxford University Press. A very good account of the three ancient Newar cities of Kathmandu, Lalitpur, and Bhaktapur, and of other settlements nearby. The social institutions of all the main caste groups—priests, patrons, artisans, farmers, and low castes—are given extended consideration. Guneratne, Katharine Bjork. 1999. In the Circle of the Dance: Notes of an Outsider in Nepal. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. This book depicts the effects of modernization and tourism on a society that remained closed to the West well into this century, while offering comparative insights about wider South Asian cultures. The primary focus is on the Tharu population of the Tarai region. Karan, Pradyumna P. 1996. Nepal: A Himalayan Kingdom in Transition. Tokyo: United Nations University Press. A very good source of general and comprehensive information on the various aspects of Nepali life and society. Sanday, John. 1995. The Kathmandu Valley: Jewel of the Kingdom of Nepal. New York: McGraw Hill. An attractive description of the Kathmandu Valley, the cradle of Nepal’s artistic and architectural traditions. It is an urban valley that features a vast array of religious art in diverse forms. Shrestha, Nanda R., and Dennis Conway. 1996. “Ecopolitical Battles in the Tarai of Nepal: An Emerging Human and Environmental Crisis.” International Journal of Population Geography 2: 313–331.

176——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

This article provides a contemporary portrait of Nepal’s humandevelopment relations from a political ecology perspective. Slusser, Mary S. 1983. Nepal Mandala: A Cultural Study of the Kathmandu Valley. Princeton: Princeton University Press. An excellent source of Nepal’s cultural history and traditions, with a particular focus on the Kathmandu Valley and its multifaceted contributions.

NEPALI SOCIETY AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES Ahern, Laura M. 2001. Invitations to Love: Literacy, Love Letters, and Social Change in Nepal. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. A contemporary description of what is taking place in today’s Nepal as a result of the penetrative forces of modernization. Social change is the focus of the study. Cameron, Mary M. 1998. On the Edge of the Auspicious: Gender and Caste in Nepal. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. A contemporary assessment of ongoing social change in the caste and gender relations in Nepal. Finlay, Hugh, and Richard Everist. 2001. Lonely Planet Nepal. Berkeley, CA: Lonely Planet Publications. A good travel guide to Nepal. Hutt, Michael James, ed. 1991. Himalayan Voices: An Introduction to Modern Nepali Literature. Berkeley: University of California Press. This book provides admirers of Nepal and lovers of literature with their first glimpse of the vibrant literary scene in Nepal today. It profiles eleven of Nepal’s most distinguished poets and offers translations of more than eighty poems written from 1916 to 1986. Hutt, Michael James, and Abhi Subedi. 1999. Teach Yourself Nepali: A Complete Course in Understanding, Speaking, and Writing (book & cassette). New York: McGraw Hill. The title is self-descriptive.

——Annotated Bibliography of Recommended Works on Nepal——

Taylor, Chris. 2002. Traveler’s Companion: Nepal. Guilford, CT: Globe Pequot Press. This is a combination of travel accounts and valuable information on travel in the country.

BANGLADESH

PART ONE

NARRATIVE SECTION

Geography and History of Bangladesh Bangladesh—the nation (desh) of Bangla or Bengalis—is a proud nation built on the foundation of a rich literary tradition and history. As they finally won independence from Pakistan in 1971 after many years of struggle, the masses of people in what was once East Bengal and East Pakistan were able to loudly pronounce their own nationhood: Bangladesh. With the ringing sound of freedom had suddenly vanished years of despair and shame. As this youngest nation of South Asia was finally free to chart its own destination, unencumbered by the fetters of colonialism, its citizens were not only able to restore their national pride and renew their faith in self-determination; they were also swept by the euphoria of high hopes and expectations of a better life, a brighter future for themselves and their future generations. But now all the euphoria is gone. And all those high hopes and expectations have been dashed as the country is totally drowned in a vast pool of poverty. For an average Bangladeshi, life is a daily struggle, constantly fluctuating between subsistence and hunger. As life moves with the cyclical motion of nature, it closely mirrors its inherent paradox. The same force that brings the monsoon rains—the lifeline of Bengali peasants and farmers—also unleashes the deadly wrath of cyclones and flooding, wreaking havoc throughout the coastal areas. Lives are lost, properties are damaged, and crops are ruined. Whereas some areas are immersed in massive floods from cyclones and swelling rivers, bringing life to a standstill, other parts are baked by prolonged droughts. Such is the fate of life in Bangladesh. It is no wonder the terrain of struggle waged by the majority of Bangladeshis has now shifted from political independence to economic survival. This economic battle of survival is bound to get even more intense as the country finds itself in the midst of a large and growing population and many social and environmental ills. In terms of both area and population, Bangladesh is the third largest country

183

184——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Plowing a rice field with the use of buffaloes. Throughout South Asia buffaloes and oxen are the principle draft animals for plowing. Female cattle are rarely used for labor because they are the source for milk. In addition, cows are considered sacred by Hindus. (Courtesy of Bimal K. Paul)

of South Asia, behind India and Pakistan. The areal size of Bangladesh is roughly comparable to Wisconsin, but the similarity ends there. With 128 million inhabitants (1999) crowded into an area of 55,126 square miles Bangladesh has the highest population density in the region: about 2,400 persons per square mile , compared with an average of less than 80 per square mile in the United States. Each year Bangladesh adds about 3 million people to its population—that is, about one-sixth of Australia’s total population.

PHYSICAL AND HUMAN GEOGRAPHY Bangladesh is a subtropical country located along the Tropic of Cancer. It is bounded by India on the west, north, and northeast. There is a short border with Myanmar (Burma) on the southeast, and to its south is the Bay of Bengal. Within this compact geography, the country is composed primarily of a vast area of thick alluvial and deltaic sediments deposited by three major rivers: the Padma, Brahmaputra, and Meghna. These rivers, along with their

——Geography and History of Bangladesh——185

Small-scale agriculture is common in Bangladesh, and this village farmland scene is typical. (Courtesy of Bimal K. Paul)

230 tributaries, account for a total length of 14,967 miles. Combined, the drainage area of the Padma, Brahmaputra, and Meghna Rivers is estimated at 694,980 square miles, of which only 9 percent lies in Bangladesh. With the exception of tertiary hills and two Pleistocene-era terraces, the dominant physiographic features of the country are the flood plains and coastal tidal plains. Bangladesh is the meeting ground of South Asia’s two famed rivers: the Ganga (Ganges) and Brahmaputra. The Ganga River, the source of which can be traced to the Gangotri glacier in the Great Himalaya Range, flows through the vast plains of northern India. At Farakka, about 10.5 miles west of the India-Bangladesh border, the Ganga divides into two channels. The left channel, called the Padma, flows eastward into Bangladesh. From the northern side comes the roaring Brahmaputra, which has its origin in the trans-Himalayan plateau of Tibet, known in China as Xizang. As it enters Bangladesh, it becomes Jamuna, which in Hindu mythology is regarded as the sister of Ganga. As the two separated sisters, Ganga and Jamuna, finally come together, they form the Padma River, which is then joined by the Meghna River, some 60 miles north of the coasts. Together, they flow gently toward their

186——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

ultimate destination, the Bay of Bengal, forming a deltaic landscape and depositing each year more than two billion tons of silt (see map of Bangladesh). In essence, the alluvial plains of Bangladesh are an eastern extension of the Indian subcontinent’s Gangetic Plains. Its overall elevation in Bangladesh is very low, ranging from sixteen to eighteen feet above sea level. Nowhere are the deltaic characteristics of these plains more pronounced than in the area southwest of the Padma-Meghna confluence. Overall, this area is divided into three zones: a tidal plain (active delta), the moribund (old delta), and a mature delta. The southern coastal area of Bangladesh (including the Sundarbans) is affected by tides, which play an important role in the fluvial processes of the channels of this zone. Based on the tidal characteristics of these channels, this area is termed the active delta region (Johnson 1975). Southwestern Bangladesh, north of the Sundarbans, differs from the tidal plains in that its rivers are less active—some river beds are dry, and others have reduced flows. This area is also higher in elevation compared to the neighboring areas and thus lacks the regular inundations that bring fresh nutrients for farming. The rest of the plains located southwest of the Padma-Meghna confluence is often termed the mature delta. Unlike the flood plains, this zone does not receive extensive silt or alluvial deposits. There are two systems of tertiary hills in Bangladesh: The Chittagong Hills in the southeast, and the low hills of Sylhet in the northeast. Together they occupy about 12 percent of the country. The Chittagong Hills found along the north-south mountain ranges of Myanmar constitute the only significant hill system in the country and are composed of sandstone, sandy clay, and silt stones. They rise steeply to narrow ridge lines, generally no wider than 120 feet and no higher than 2,950 feet above sea level. At 3,432 feet, the highest peak in Bangladesh is found in the southeastern part of these hills near the Myanmar border. Most of these hills are covered with forests, but their valleys are devoted to rice cultivation. Most of the tribal populations of Bangladesh reside in this region, and some still practice shifting cultivation, locally called jhum cultivation. Northwards the ranges of the Chittagong Hills extend into the Indian state of Tripura, from which their counterparts project into

——Geography and History of Bangladesh——187

the greater Sylhet district of Bangladesh. These hills are lower in elevation than the Chittagong Hills, and their slopes are the primary tea growing areas in the country. Unlike the Chittagong Hills, no rubber plantation is located in the Sylhet Hills. Another small natural zone can be found in greater Dinajpur and Rangpur districts in the north, a zone known to geographers as the North Bengal Alluvial Fan. This submontane belt of alluvial cone stretches the length of the Himalayan foothills and is composed of detrial material from the adjacent hills. Three Pleistocene-era terraces cover 8 percent of the country’s land area (Haque 1997, 88). The Barind of North Bengal is a gently undulating region consisting of soils similar to those found on the tertiary hills. Facing the Barind across the Jamuna flood plain is the Madhupur Tract. Unlike the Barind, the Madhupur Tract contains sal (Shorea robusta) forest on the slopes, and agriculture is largely practiced in the valleys. The third terrace is located in Comilla and is known as the Lalmai Hill. This hill is actually a stabilized flood plain composed of lowlands.

Climate and Rainfall Bangladesh generally enjoys a subtropical monsoon climate, characterized by high temperatures over 70 degrees F. for about eight months, with heavy rainfall during the summer months and a relatively mild, dry winter (December–January). Temperatures throughout the country are similar, with the highest temperature usually occurring during May (88–90 degrees F.) and the lowest in January (64–68 degrees F.). Given this situation, both daily and seasonal temperature variations are relatively minor. In contrast, the distribution of rainfall demonstrates not only a distinct seasonal pattern, with the heaviest concentration from June to September, but also an increase in precipitation from the west to the east. About 80 percent of all rainfall in Bangladesh occurs during the summer. This season is characterized by high humidity and high temperatures. Average annual rainfall in Bangladesh varies from around 57 inches to 117 inches, with the northeastern and southeastern hilly regions generally receiving the most rains. With under 57 inches of average annual rainfall, the driest areas are found in the west and northwest.

188——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Two women use a makeshift raft to keep food packets dry. This flood, which occurred in October 2000 near Indian West Bengal, killed 100 people and affected 2.63 million. (AFP/CORBIS)

Natural calamities such as floods, tropical cyclones and tidal bores, and droughts are associated with the climatic and physiographic conditions of Bangladesh. All of these natural phenomena are directly related to the monsoon and its intensity and timing. Heavy monsoon rains result in swelling rivers that often cause massive flooding and damage. Yet it is this very monsoon, in cooperation with the country’s river system, that renews and sustains life for peasants and farmers year after year. Every year during the summer, almost one-third of Bangladesh is flooded. Since 1954, there have been twelve occurrences of tremendous floods, six of which (1954, 1955, 1977, 1987, 1988, and 1998) were devastating. The most recent two floods, considered by many to be the most disastrous in recent history, inundated more than half of the country. Although several thousand people in Bangladesh become homeless during a normal flood season, during the 1998 flood more than 60 million were uprooted and as many as 1,500 people

——Geography and History of Bangladesh——189

House with a tin roof and bamboo mat walls (Courtesy of Bimal K. Paul)

died. This flood also damaged nearly half a million homes and many roads, schools, bridges, health centers, and industrial sites. The estimated damage exceeded $3.5 billion, an amount equivalent to 3 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) of Bangladesh (Shehabuddin 2000). One obvious cause of flooding is the heavy monsoon rains, leading to high volumes of river water discharge. Compounding this problem is a low channel gradient and loss of channel capacity due to siltation, a condition that results in rising water overtopping the riverbanks and submerging the vast flood plains. Extremely low gradients create inefficient channels for discharging the excess water received during the monsoon season, particularly when intense rainfall occurs simultaneously over the entire GangaBrahmaputra basin. The combined runoff from all rivers of this basin generates a colossal volume of discharge. Furthermore, the tropical cyclones (hurricanes) strike the coastal area of Bangladesh either in the premonsoon season (April–May) or during

190——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

the retreating monsoon (October–December). The average frequency of tropical cyclones over the Bay of Bengal is about six per year. Since 1960, Bangladesh has experienced at least six major cyclones (1963, 1965, 1970, 1985, 1988, and 1991). In 1965 alone, three cyclones occurred, each killing more than 15,000 people. These cyclone-related strong winds and storm surges frequently cause unusually high floods in coastal areas. Although their lifespan is generally no more than a couple of days, the damage can be enormous. In fact, tropical cyclones are often more destructive than are floods. For instance, the 1991 cyclone destroyed 122 miles of coastal embankment, 74,100 acres of crops, and over 900,000 head of cattle. Then there is the drought, whose impact often tends to be slower but prolonged. Droughts afflict the country at least as frequently as do major floods and cyclones. Bangladesh has suffered severe droughts in 1973, 1978, 1979, 1981, 1982, 1989, 1992, and 1994–1995. The area that is most drought-prone is the northwestern region of the country, which is relatively drier on average, receiving much less rainfall than the rest of the country. In 1994–1995, this part of Bangladesh, popularly known as North Bengal, experienced a severe drought that reduced rice production by 3.5 million tons (Paul 1998). In addition to these most visible problems, Bangladesh suffers from the presence of arsenic in tube well water at levels exceeding the permissible limit set by the World Health Organization (WHO). Nearly 76 million people are now believed to be afflicted with arsenic poisoning from contaminated tube wells, the main source of drinking water in rural Bangladesh. Long-term exposure to arsenic may lead to skin, lung, or bladder cancer. Arsenic is a crystalline metallic substance that occurs naturally in subsoil and is relatively soluble in water. The source of the arsenic is pyrite (iron sulfide), a sedimentary rock that is washed down from the Himalayas and deposited at a depth of 65 feet to 325 feet in the Bengal basin by the Ganga River (Paul and De 2000, 800). Geologists indicate that arsenic has been seeping into the water supply for decades, but the rate of seepage is more rapid now than in the last few decades due to the fast withdrawal of groundwater to both irrigate land and provide safe drinking water. Since the mid-1970s, nearly 4 million tube wells have

——Geography and History of Bangladesh——191

been installed. Today, 96 percent of Bangladeshis obtain their drinking water from tube wells.

Forests Nearly 5 million acres, or about 14 percent of the total land in Bangladesh, is forested. These forests can be divided into six categories: the hill reserved, plain land, coastal accretion, Sundarban, unclassified, and homestead/village forests. The first five are state-owned forests and managed by the Forest Department. The hill reserved forests cover about 70 percent of the total forested area. The largest concentration of reserved forests is found in the Chittagong Hill Tract (CHT) region. Rubber plantations constitute an important component of this region’s forests, along with several tea plantations. Valuable commercial trees grown in these forests are mahogany and teak, both introduced in the late nineteenth century from neighboring Myanmar. Also included are famed sal (hardwood) trees that are indigenous to South Asia; they are used to construct houses, buildings, and bridges in addition to being used for telephone poles. An extensive tidal mangrove forest along the Bay of Bengal in the south Ganga Delta includes the world-renowned Sundarban, which literally means beautiful (sunder) forests (ban). But it is believed that the name Sundarban is originally derived from Sundai trees, the main timber trees in the forest. The Sundarban covers southwestern Bangladesh and the southeastern portion of West Bengal in India. Two-thirds of this forest is within Bangladesh. The Sundarban is also the home of the world-famous Bengal tigers. Due to growing demands for land, forest covers in Bangladesh have been decreasing at an annual rate of 2.5 percent. The country currently has less than 0.05 acre of forest land per person, one of the lowest in the world. Such a low level of forest cover is considered too small to meet growing demands for timber and other forest products and at the same time to maintain ecological balance. As humans increasingly encroach into the wild habitats of the tigers and elephants, these animals have come under mounting pressure. Not surprisingly, therefore, the frequency of deadly

192——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

and destructive encounters between these wild animals and human beings has increased.

Population Race and Religion. The overwhelming majority of the people of Bangladesh are Bengalis, a branch of what is commonly believed to be Indo-Aryans. Prior to their arrival in the region around 2000 B.C., the area that is now Bangladesh had been populated by Dravidians, whose physical characteristics include relatively shorter stature and darker skin. Santals, a tribal group that lives in the Barind region of North Bengal, are considered to be the descendants of the Dravidian population. People of Mongoloid origin can be seen in eastern Bangladesh, especially in the CHT and Sylhet areas. They also are found in the northern part of the Mymensingh district. Altogether the Mongoloid group barely exceeds 1 percent of the country’s total population. To this day, the majority of the tribal population lives in rural settings. Bangladesh is predominantly a Muslim country, just the opposite of Nepal. According to the 1991 census, 88 percent of the people are Muslims and almost all of them belong to the Sunni branch of Islam. Nearly 11 percent of Bangladeshis are Hindus and the remaining are Buddhists and Christians (BBS 1994, 101). The Hindus of Bangladesh mostly belong to scheduled castes (a legal term for those formerly known as Untouchables) and are concentrated in central districts. In contrast, Buddhists are primarily concentrated in the CHT region, whereas the distribution of Christians largely corresponds to tribal populations. Throughout the twentieth century the Muslim population in Bangladesh consistently increased, whereas the Hindu population experienced the opposite trend. In 1951, four years after the partition of India and Pakistan, Muslims accounted for 77 percent of the total population of Bangladesh, and Hindus constituted 22 percent. But, according to the 1991 census, the percentage of the Muslim population has jumped to 88 percent and the corresponding figure for Hindus has been cut in half. The rest of the religious population groups remained at 1 percent. Bengali, or Bangla, is the native language of almost all Bangladeshis except for the tribal population. It is the official lan-

——Geography and History of Bangledash——193

Bicycles, rickshaws, buses, and pedestrians jam a street in Dhaka in this 1994 photo. Such overcrowding occurs during festivals and special events. (AP Photo/John Moore)

194——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

guage of the country. A member of the Indo-European language family, Bengali is believed to be derived from Sanskrit. It is written in script that is a modification of the Sanskrit writing system. As a result, it shares countless words and phrases with Hindi and Nepali, the other two Sanskrit derivatives. There are several regional dialects in Bengali, most dominant being those in Sylhet, Noakhali, and Chittagong. Bengali has a distinguished history in literature, music, and poetry. At least two Bengali poets are well known in the West—Rabindranath Tagore, a Nobel laureate, and Kazi Nazrul Islam. Despite Bengalization of all official activities after independence in 1971, English remains an important language in Bangladesh. Biharis, a group that included mostly Urdu-speaking non-Bengali Muslim refugees from Bihar, settled in area cities after 1947. At the time of independence in 1971, they totaled about one million, but since then their number has dwindled to roughly 500,000 due to their relocation to Pakistan, where they find a receptive climate in terms of both their language and customs. Distribution, Density, and Growth. Bangladesh is widely known for its chronic population problem. The country ranks ninety-sixth in the world in terms of area but is the ninth most populous country in the world. This makes Bangladesh the most densely populated country in the world with the exception of a city-state like Singapore. With current average population density of about 2,400 people per square mile, the country is extremely crowded. The fertile flood plains as well as coasts are heavily congested. According to the 1991 census, the Dhaka district had the highest density, with more than 10,000 people per square mile. In contrast, all three districts of the CHT region had the lowest population density—nearly 135 people per square mile. Currently, the population of Bangladesh is growing at an annual rate of 1.8 percent. The country had a population of 44 million in 1951 but climbed to 108 million in 1991. In 1999 it was estimated to have 128 million people. If the recent demographic trends hold, the total population of Bangladesh may reach approximately 250 million by 2030. Like most developing countries, the population growth rate of Bangladesh primarily reflects the imbalance of births and deaths. In simple terms, the greater the disparity between births and deaths, the faster the rate of population change

——Geography and History of Bangladesh——195

from one period to another. Over time, Bangladesh’s crude birth rate (i.e., the number of births per 1,000 people) has declined substantially, from 49 in 1951 to 25 in 1996. But the crude death rate (i.e., the number of deaths per 1,000 persons) has declined even faster, going down from 30 in 1961 to less than 10 for the same time period. As a result, population growth has been relatively rapid. However, in recent years, Bangladesh has witnessed a declining trend in national population growth rates. Age-Sex Composition and Dependency Ratio. The simplest demographic characteristic by which to categorize a population is by sex. The sex composition of a population is conveniently described by the sex ratio, that is, the number of males per 100 females. A sex ratio of 100 is considered balanced, as it indicates that there are equal numbers of males and females in a population. A ratio above 100 means there are more males than females (called a masculine ratio), and a ratio below 100 indicates more females than males (called a feminine ratio). Like most countries of South Asia, Bangladesh has a masculine sex ratio. There were 106 males per 100 females in the country in 1991. Although this ratio has remained high, it has decreased slightly during the past three decades. The masculine ratio tends to be even higher in urban areas and relatively lower in rural areas because of the departure of male migrants from rural to urban areas. For example, the 1991 census showed an average urban sex ratio of 124, compared to 102 in rural areas (Paul 1994). The country’s masculine sex ratio is largely attributed to high mortality rates among female children under five and women of childbearing age. This mortality trend reflects the low status of women in Bangladesh. As in Nepal and other parts of Asia, girls are often neglected; they receive less food and less health care relative to their male siblings. This is particularly true among poor families who face a chronic shortage of food and health care. Further compounding this problem is the high dowry price incurred by girls at the time of their marriage, a practice that imposes significant hardship on family resources. Family Planning. In view of the serious social, economic, and environmental consequences of rapid population growth, the government has adopted policies to reduce population growth, especially through family planning programs (FPPs). By declaring pop-

196——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

ulation growth as the number-one problem of the country, the government has greatly emphasized family planning as an integral component of its overall national development policy. As a result, FPPs were further strengthened and expanded. Currently, family planning services are provided through a network of more than 3,000 clinics and about 24,000 female field workers who visit women in their homes. Additionally, at least twelve nongovernment organizations (NGOs) provide services at 324 sites. To increase the adoption rate of family planning, the government makes available a wide variety of contraceptive methods. The overall use of short-term methods like oral pills, condoms, and injectable hormones has increased, while long-term methods such as sterilization have declined. The pill is the most preferred method of contraception among Bangladeshi women; at present 25 percent of married women are using it (Mitra et al. 1997). However, there seem to be noticeable urban and class biases in that women from well-educated, affluent, and urban families use them at a higher rate and more regularly than those in rural areas and the poor. In addition, employed women are generally more open to practicing contraception and have lower fertility than women not so engaged. Despite an increasing rate of family planning use, Bangladesh’s population growth is not expected to experience a sharp decline anytime soon. The main reason for this scenario is that 45 percent of its population is under the age of fifteen. As this population cohort enters the reproductive phase, the population will continue to grow. In essence, family planning has served as a breaker gradually slowing down the rate of population growth rather than curbing it drastically. Foreign Migration. A recent government report claims that about 3 million Bangladeshis are now living legally abroad as guest workers. An overwhelming majority of these workers are employed in Middle Eastern countries. Bangladesh entered the Middle Eastern labor market in 1976 and sent an average of 81,000 Bangladeshis annually to work in the region between 1976 and 1995. Throughout the 1980s, more than a third of Bangladesh’s international laborers worked in Saudi Arabia, followed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Qatar, and Iraq. Since the mid-1980s, Bangladeshis have moved to Southeast and East Asian

——Geography and History of Bangladesh——197

countries such as Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, and Brunei. Every year between 1980 and 1995 more than 11,000 Bangladeshi workers left the country to work in these countries. Migration to the Western world also increased in the 1980s. Now many Bangladeshis are found throughout Europe and North America, some working legally and others illegally. For instance, they constitute a significant number of taxi drivers in most major cities in the United States, from New York to Los Angeles. Their numbers have continued to swell because the economy of Bangladesh has failed to generate sufficient domestic employment for the growing population (Paul 2000). Perhaps the principal impact of labor migration to the Middle East and other foreign countries has been the volume of remittances repatriated to Bangladesh. In the mid-1990s, remittances were equivalent to more than 50 percent of all exports. Another positive aspect is that the export of labor has reduced the pressure of domestic unemployment. Additionally, some employment has been generated domestically due to the increase in the demand for several economic activities such as air transport, travel agencies, hotels, banks, health clinics, secretarial services, and recruiting agencies induced by labor migration. The consequence has not been all positive, however. Because most foreign migrants tend to be young and relatively more educated, their departure has created a void of skilled labor in the country. In some cases, young married migrants with additional income at their disposal have divorced their wives to remarry into families of higher social status. Urbanization. Historically, the degree of urbanization in Bangladesh has been low. In 1961, only 5 percent of the population lived in cities and towns. According to the 1991 census, the percentage of the population living in urban areas has risen to over 20 percent, and it is projected to approach 37 percent by 2015. In terms of absolute number, 22.5 million lived in urban areas in 1991, compared to only 2.6 million in 1961. Such a significant numerical growth in the urban population does not, however, reflect commensurate economic development; it is rather indicative of rural overpopulation and poverty. In essence, the growth of the country’s urban population has occurred mainly because of three factors: massive rural-to-urban migration, a natural increase

198——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

in the native urban population, and the territorial extension of existing urban areas together with a change in the definition of an urban area. Of these three, migration is by far the biggest contributor as rural people continue to pour into cities en masse year after year. In 1991, about 9 percent of the total population of Bangladesh lived in its four largest cities, including the capital city of Dhaka, which alone contained over 28 percent of the country’s total urban population. Dhaka is a clear case of single-city primacy, but this primacy is more prominent in functional terms than by population numbers. For example, this city accounts for about one-half of national manufacturing employment. With increasing urban population growth, the cities, especially the larger ones, are facing mounting problems associated with the provision of basic needs and services. About 12 million urban dwellers—over 50 percent—live in absolute poverty. Hunger is routine and rampant. Life is a constant vacillation between bare subsistence and starvation. Furthermore, the urban poor live in slums and squatter settlements called bustees, most with mud floors and leaky roofs; two-thirds of the urban population have no access to sanitary facilities, and 55 percent are denied access to clean water, electricity, health care, and education for their children. Under these circumstances, it is hardly any surprise that murder, torture, illegal arms smuggling, and drug addiction have become much too common. In addition, deepening urban poverty forces thousands of women to resort to prostitution as an avenue of survival.

HISTORY The area that now constitutes Bangladesh has a long history, dating back to 1,000 B.C. when Dravidians began settling in this part of the subcontinent. This long history can be divided into the following periods.

Early History Several Indo-Europeans tribes called Aryans moved from the Indus Valley to the lower Gangetic plains, and from there a group

——Geography and History of Bangladesh——199

called Bang moved to the Bengal area around 1,000 B.C. (Baxter 1984, 11). It is believed that the Bang tribe gave its name to the area, which comprises present-day Bangladesh and West Bengal in India. Others claim that the Bangs were Dravidian-speaking people who had settled in this area before the arrival of Indo-Europeans (see Blood 1989, 4). At any rate, Bengal formed the eastern extremity of the Mauryan empire, which included most of presentday India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. The empire was built by Chandragupta in the fourth century B.C. and expanded under his grandson Ashok in the third century B.C. Considered the greatest Mauryan ruler, Ashok, a Hindu emperor, converted to Buddhism and assisted in its diffusion. During his time, Buddhism came to Bengal and the seaport established during the Mauryan period was used for trade and to spread Buddhism to Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia (Baxter and Rahman 1989). Shortly after Ashok’s death, the Mauryan empire collapsed, and, subsequently, Bengal was ruled by the Indian Gupta empire (ca. A.D. 319–540). The new empire exacted tribute from Bengal but generally allowed local chieftains to exercise authority. Later, the eastern portion of Bengal became the kingdom of Samatata (located near the present city of Chandpur in the Comilla district). Although politically independent, it was a tributary state of the Gupta empire. In the seventh century, Samatata was drawn briefly into the powerful but short-lived (A.D. 606–647) Harsha empire in northern India. From the time of the Mauryan empire through rule under the Harsha empire, Bengal basically was treated as a backwater (Blood 1989). In 750, Bengal produced a dynasty of its own under a Buddhist chief named Gopala. Called the Pala dynasty, it ruled all of Bengal until 1150. The Pala dynasty expanded its territory westward and established its capital in the present-day city of Monghyr in Bihar, India. The Pala capital within Bengal was at Vikrampur, near Dhaka. As ardent Buddhists, the Palas established many Buddhist monasteries and schools and helped spread the religion throughout their empire and neighboring territories. Trade and influence were extensive under Pala leadership, as emissaries were sent as far as Tibet and Indonesia (Baxter 1984). The Senas, orthodox and militant Hindus, replaced the Buddhist Palas as rulers of a united Bengal. They ruled from 1150 to

200——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

1202 from their capital, Nadia, in West Bengal. During their brief rule, the Senas tried unsuccessfully to revive Brahmanism as the religion of Bengal. The Turkish conquest in 1202 marked the end of the Sena dynasty and beginning of Islamic rule. Collateral branches of the Senas, however, continued to rule for a short time in eastern Bengal.

Mughal (Islamic) Rule Although the Muslims entered the Indian subcontinent from Afghanistan in about the eighth century A.D., they did not take political control of the subcontinent until 1206. The Slave or Mamluk dynasty (1206–1290) was the first to rule from Delhi. It was replaced by the Khalji dynasty between 1290 and 1320. In 1341, Bengal gained independence from Delhi and Dhaka became its capital. Finally, in 1576, Emperor Akbar (1556–1605) conquered Dhaka. However, because of its remote location and poor communication system with Delhi, Dhaka governors found it easy to ignore imperial directives and maintain their autonomy. Although physically quite far from Delhi, the Mughal (Moghul; Mogul) rule had a lasting effect on Bengal. Akbar introduced the present-day Bengali calendar, and his son, Jahangir (1605–1627), instituted civil and military officials outside Bengal who collected land taxes from Bengali subjects. This institution ultimately led to the development of a zamindar (landlord) class during the British period. In essence, the former tax collectors of the Mughal period (1526–1857) became landlords during British rule. As the Mughals considered Bengal the “breadbasket of India,” they drained its resources to maintain the Mughal army. Yet Bengal prospered. Agriculture and trade expanded, and Dhaka became a major center of textile trade in South Asia. After the death of Aurangzeb, the last Mughal emperor, in 1707, Bengal governors became practically independent rulers. They were strong enough to defend themselves against the Hindu Marathas challenge from the Bombay area. In the meantime, Europeans began to arrive in Bengal, starting with the Portuguese in Chittagong in 1517. Later, British merchants founded Calcutta in 1690 and built trading networks with local merchants (Baxter and Rahman 1989, 10). So long as Bengal governors were backed by

——Geography and History of Bangladesh——201

Mughal authority and military power, they were able to keep the Europeans in check and to regulate their activities. In the early eighteenth century, however, the system began to break down and ultimately the British were able to defeat the last Mughal governor of Bengal, Siraj ud Daulah, in 1757 with the help of the treachery of Mir Jafar, a close relative of Siraj.

British Rule The British came to India under the auspices of the famous British East India Company with the initial aim to seek trade under concessions obtained from local Mughal governors. Their arrival generally coincided with the gradual decline of Mughal power. This enticed the company, formed in 1600, to become more directly involved in the politics and military affairs of the subcontinent. Aside from their superior military power, the British deployed the principle of “divide and rule” to rise to power. In this game, they greatly profited from the entrenched Hindu-Muslim animosities. The British defeated the Mughal emperor in 1764 at the Battle of Buxar on the Ganges. As a result, the British East India Company was granted diwani (the right to collect and expend revenues) in the areas of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa. Henceforth the British governed Bengal, and from there they eventually extended their rule to all of India. By the 1850s, British control and influence had extended into territories that later became the independent states of India and Pakistan. Calcutta served as the first capital of British India until 1911 when it was moved to New Delhi, partly because of its geographical centrality. The long-term dominance of Calcutta, however, made eastern Bengal a backwater, and the importance of Dhaka declined. As Calcutta became the core of commerce, business, industry, culture, arts, and literature, Dhaka witnessed its industrial base shrink, particularly most of its worldfamous muslin industry. In 1857, however, the British faced a large-scale mutiny by the Bengal army. The British East India Company’s military establishment consisted of three separate armies: Bengal, Bombay, and Madras. Although the troops (sepoy) were Indian, the officers were British. The Bengal component of the British army, mostly drawn from Muslim-dominated eastern Bengal, mutinied at the Meerut

202——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

cantonment near Delhi on May 10, 1857. The insurrection was sparked by the introduction of cartridges rumored to have been greased with pig or cow fat, which was offensive to both Hindus and Muslims. As Delhi fell to the sepoy mutineers, the British rule in India was threatened. However, the Sepoy Mutiny, often referred to as India’s “first war of independence,” was eventually brought under control, with the help of Nepal, which sent several thousand soldiers to assist the British in supporting the mutiny. As a direct consequence of the mutiny, the British East India Company ceased to function as the government of India. Administration was turned over to the British government, and the company was abolished in 1858. This marked the beginning of the British Raj in India. From then until independence, India was headed by a governor-general, also called viceroy when acting as the direct representative of the British crown. The governorgeneral embodied the supreme legislative and executive authority in India, but was responsible to the secretary of state for India, a member of the British cabinet in London. The Indian National Congress Party was formed in Bombay on December 28, 1885. It was headed by a Bengali Hindu from Calcutta. Muslims of India, including Bengal Muslims, did not join the party in large numbers because they considered the Indian National Congress to be a Hindu party that would not adequately represent Muslim interests. Muslims eventually formed the AllIndia Muslim League in Dhaka in 1906. One important event occurred at the time of the formation of the Muslim League. The British governor-general, Lord Curzon (viceroy, 1899–1905), divided Bengal into eastern and western parts. The eastern portion of the province (roughly today’s Bangladesh) was joined with Assam into the province of Eastern Bengal and Assam; the remaining area became the province of Western Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa. Dhaka became the capital of the eastern province, and some of the city’s finest buildings were constructed at this time (1905–1911). Calcutta remained the capital of western Bengal. The division of Bengal was favored by the Bengali Muslims because they viewed the partition as an initial recognition of their cultural and political separation from the Hindu majority population. But the Bengali Hindus along with the Congress Party opposed the division. Linguistically, Bengali became a minority

——Geography and History of Bangladesh——203

language in the western province, adding to the dissension. As a protest to the division, the Bengali Hindus started a swadeshi (a devotee of one’s own country and products) movement by boycotting British-made goods. The swadeshi movement spread throughout India and became a major issue in the Congress Party platform. Although the Congress Party was claiming to represent all Indians along a secular ideology, the Muslim League was essentially a political party formed to protect the interests of Indian Muslims and wished to divide British India on the basis of what was known as “Two-Nation Theory.” The Muslim League in Bengal became more and more dominated by a “national elite” concerned primarily with the problems of the Muslim population. Many of them were descendants of Delhi sultanate and empire officials and spoke Urdu as their mother tongue. In contrast, there were Bengali Muslims who used Bengali rather than Urdu as their family language and who were concerned about their own status and welfare. Notable among this group were Fazlul Haq and Husain Shahid Suhrawardy. Haq’s platform was based on economic and social issues, and the Muslim League’s on communal matters. In the late 1930s, Fazlul Haq formed his own party, called the Krishak Praja Party (KPP, or Farming People’s Party). Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1873–1938), an Islamic revivalist poet and philosopher, gave his presidential speech to the Muslim League conference at Allahabad in 1930. He spoke of a possible Muslim state composed of the Punjab, the Northwest Frontier Province (NFP), Sind, and Baluchistan. However, he chose not to mention the Muslim-dominated princely state of Kashmir and Bengal in his address. Iqbal also gave no name to his proposed state; that was done by Chaudhuri Rahmat Ali in 1933. He coined the name Pakistan by taking the P from Punjab, A from Afghania, K from Kashmir, S from Sind, and Tan from Baluchistan. When written in Urdu, the word Pakistan has no i between the K and S. The name means “the land of the Paks,” the spiritually pure and clean. Significantly, Ali neglected to fit Bengal into his imperfect acronym. In 1934, Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948) took over leadership of the Muslim League. On March 23, 1940, in Lahore, the Muslim League passed a resolution often called the “Pakistan Res-

204——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

olution” or “Lahore Resolution.” This resolution demanded two independent Muslim states, one northwestern and the other southeastern. Fazlul Haq was among the supporters of this resolution. Although Suhrawardy was in favor of the creation of a separate “united” Bengal as a third dominion on the subcontinent, in the subsequent political developments Jinnah apparently saw the possibility of achieving a single Muslim state when partition of British India became inevitable. In February 1947, Lord Louis Mountbatten was appointed viceroy and was given instruction to arrange the transfer of power from Great Britain to the local governments. On July 14, 1947, the British House of Commons passed the India Independence Act, by which two independent states were created on the subcontinent and the 562 princely states were left to accede to either. Pakistan came into existence as an independent Muslim state on August 15, 1947, but was allocated two disjointed territorial entities separated by India. As the eastern territory of the newly created state of Pakistan, East Bengal was called East Pakistan. And today’s Pakistan was called West Pakistan.

The Pakistan Period From the very outset, East Pakistan, separated from West Pakistan by 992 miles of Indian territory, felt mistreated by West Pakistan. The latter tended to look down on East Pakistanis as “second-class Muslims” and, therefore, not in the same league in terms of religious purity. The West Pakistanis considered themselves to be direct descendants of those who brought Islam to the Indian subcontinent. Furthermore, West Pakistanis, especially Punjabi Muslims, saw themselves as direct heirs to the ruling tradition of the Mughal empire, in which Bengal had been a subjugated territory East Pakistan had the larger population of the two wings, but the economic and political power resided in West Pakistan. There were very few Bengalis in the civil service of Pakistan; this imbalance was even greater in the armed services, where they were only sometimes employed as clerks. Economic development was also uneven between the two wings. Most of the new industries were established in West Pakistan, and East Pakistan became a large protected market for its products. Jute was the mainstay of the

——Geography and History of Bangladesh——205

Pakistani economy. The foreign exchange earnings gained from the export of jute, grown wholly in East Pakistan, was invested entirely in West Pakistan. The declaration of Urdu as the single national language of Pakistan further fanned the flame of East Pakistani anger and resentment. Agitation and many civil disturbances erupted in East Pakistan. On February 21, 1952, while students in Dhaka were protesting in the streets against the declaration and demanding equal status for Bengali, the police reacted by firing into the crowd. Two students were killed. A memorial, the Shaheed Minar (Martyrs’ Memorial), was built to commemorate the martyrs of the language movement. This incident ultimately led to the independence movement, and the day is still observed as Martyrs’ Day in Bangladesh. Eventually, in September 1954, the Pakistan government accepted Bengali as a national language on an equal footing with Urdu. Another blow for the East Pakistanis came on March 23, 1956, when the new constitution for Pakistan was finally passed. The constitution stated that the national parliament was to consist of one house of 300 members, with equal representation from both West and East Pakistan. Thus, the constitution disregarded the numerical majority of East Pakistan. President Iskandar Mirza abrogated the constitution on October 7, 1958, and proclaimed martial law. The army commander-in-chief, General Muhammad Ayub Khan, was named the chief martial law administrator and, on October 28, he dismissed Mirza, exiled him to London, and assumed the presidency. Martial law continued until 1962, and Ayub Khan remained Pakistan’s president until 1969, when he was forced to resign. He was replaced by General Yahya Khan. When Yahya took power, he promised to hold national elections and did so on December 7, 1970. The Awami League, mainly based in East Pakistan and led by Sheikh Mujibur (Mujib) Rahman, won a majority of the seats in the Pakistan National Legislature. The league won all but two of the 162 seats allotted to East Pakistan in the National Assembly. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party won eighty-one of the 138 West Pakistani seats in the Assembly. Neither party won any seat in the other wing. Based on the election results, Mujib should have assumed Pakistan’s prime ministership, but the election results were not acceptable

206——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

to political leaders in West Pakistan. General Yahya opened talks with both Bhutto and Mujib, trying to form a government agreeable to both and to lead them toward cooperation to draft a new constitution. On March 1, 1971, General Yahya postponed indefinitely convening the National Assembly, which had been scheduled to convene two days later on March 3. On the same date, he named General Tikka Khan, who had been dubbed the “Butcher of Baluchistan” for his suppression of Baluch separatists, as East Pakistan’s military governor. The number of West Pakistani troops entering East Pakistan had increased from 25,000 to about 60,000 in the preceding weeks. As tensions rose, General Yahya came to Dhaka in mid-March to negotiate with Mujib; later Bhutto joined them (Blood 1989, 29). But those talks failed, and President Yahya Khan left Dhaka. East Pakistanis immediately began to protest, and Yahya ordered the Pakistani army to crack down hard. At midnight on March 25, 1971, Mujib was arrested and jailed in West Pakistan. Following this brutal crackdown, Bangladesh declared independence from Pakistan and the ensuing struggle became a civil war that lingered for about nine months.

The War for Independence Between March 25 and December 16, 1971, the Pakistan army killed about 3 million innocent Bengalis during their efforts to quell the civil war. The Pakistan army and their Bengali collaborators also looted property belonging to Hindus and Awami League leaders and supporters, burned their houses, and raped girls and women. Some 10 million people fled to India to escape these brutalities, most of them taking refuge in the neighboring Indian provinces of West Bengal, Assam, and Tripura. After the tragic event of March 1971, India became vocal in its condemnation of Pakistan. India provided shelter and food to the refugees from East Pakistan and supplied aid to the rebels, known as Mukti Bahini (Liberation Force). A propaganda war broke out between India and Pakistan, and Pakistani President Yahya threatened war against India if it made an attempt to seize any part of Pakistan. Yahya also asserted that his country could count on its U.S. and Chinese allies. Additionally, in order to ease the situation

——Geography and History of Bangladesh——207

in East Pakistan, Yahya replaced Tikka Khan with the more restrained Lieutenant General A. A. K. Niazi. A civilian governor was also installed in East Pakistan. These belated gestures of appeasement, however, did not stop the fighting and the call for independence. In fact, on April 12, 1971, a “provisional” government was formed in Calcutta by a number of leading Awami League members who were able to escape from East Pakistan. They issued a proclamation of independence at Mujibnagar in the Kushtia district, located very close to the Indian border, on April 17, effective retroactively from April 10, 1971. Mujib was named president, but in his absence due to imprisonment, Syed Nazrul Islam became the acting president. Then came the decisive moment during the war. In response to Pakistan’s preemptive strike against its territory and citizens on December 3, India became directly involved in the war for East Pakistan’s liberation when it retaliated against Pakistan on December 4 in support of the Bengali resistance. India sent its forces into East Pakistan and formally recognized the provisional government of Bangladesh two days later. As Dhaka fell to the Indian army and the Mukti Bahini on December 16, Bangladesh became independent. The Pakistan army surrendered on the same day. Subsequently, in West Pakistan, President Yahya yielded power to a civilian government under Bhutto, who released Mujib. On January 10, 1972, Mujib, also known as Bangabandhu (“Friend of Bengal,” or the father of Bangladesh), arrived in Dhaka and formed a new government, the first government of independent Bangladesh.

Independent Bangladesh Although he was a popular and charismatic leader, Mujib was less than effective in governing a new nation facing many economic and political problems. One of the most glaring was the breakdown of law and order. Many had joined the Mukti Bahini during the fight for independence, and some did not surrender their weapons. Some took the law into their own hands and set up territories under their own jurisdiction. Additionally, corruption among government officials and politicians increased markedly. To control this situation, Mujib was consolidating power. However, his increasingly authoritarian rule and the distrust of the military with

208——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

a long history of political meddling led to a bloody military coup on August 15, 1975, in which he and most of his family, as well as several close associates, were brutally killed. Following the presidential massacre, General Ziaur (Zia) Rahman became martial-law administrator. He also had been a freedom fighter, and his “Z Force” (Z for Zia) had been the first to announce the independence of Bangladesh from a captured radio station in Chittagong. Having consolidated his position, Zia became president in April 1977. The following month he created his own political party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). He allowed national elections in 1979, and his BNP won two-thirds of the seats in the National Legislature. Economic conditions and law and order improved during his time, but Zia was assassinated by dissident military officers in 1981. The power vacuum created by Zia’s death led to a dispute over the role of the army in the government. This dispute was resolved in 1982 when the chief of staff of the army, General Hussain Muhammad Ershad, seized power. As Zia had done, he formed his own political party and won the presidential election in 1986. But the two leading opposition parties, the Awami League headed by Sheikh Hasina Wajid (or Wazed, daughter of Mujib), and the BNP headed by Begum Khaleda Zia (widow of General Zia), jointly initiated a public protest, calling for Ershad’s resignation and new elections. In 1990, in response to the public outcry, Ershad was forced to resign. He was replaced by Chief Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed of the Supreme Court as acting president (Norton 1999). Shahabuddin organized national elections in February 1991, and Begum Zia’s BNP won. Because Begum Zia did not command a majority of seats in the National Legislature, she formed the government with the help of the Jamaat-e-Islami, a conservative Islamic party. In the subsequent elections, held in 1996, Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League formed the government with the help of Ershad’s party. In the most recent elections held in October 2001, the Awami League lost and the BNP led by Begum Zia was returned to power. The Awami League’s defeat has been largely attributed to its inability to improve economic conditions and reduce social problems, including the deteriorating situation of law and order during its rule.

——Geography and History of Bangladesh——209

CONCLUSION The fact that Bangladesh’s past two governments were led by civilian political leaders who were able to complete their full terms does not imply that the political atmosphere in the country has necessarily improved. Although the transition of power from one party to another in independent Bangladesh has been relatively smooth (despite repeated accusations of electoral rigging and corruption), deep-seated animosities and political revenges are common. National interests take a back seat to personal and party agendas. What is ironic in all of the political propaganda and positioning is that the ruling party is patently accused of massive corruption and mismanagement. But when a different party comes to power, corruption is still there, in fact, kicking harder than ever before. Not surprisingly, therefore, every level of rising political rhetoric against corruption escalates the degree of corruption. Caught in the midst of all this are the general masses, who have no choice but to endlessly wage a silent battle of their own—the battle of survival. References Baxter, Craig. 1984. Bangladesh: A New Nation in an Old Setting. Boulder: Westview Press. Baxter, Craig, and Syedur Rahman. 1989. Historical Dictionary of Bangladesh. Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press. BBS (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics). 1998. 1997 Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh. Dhaka. _____. 1994. Bangladesh Population Census 1991: Vol. 1 Analytical Report. Dhaka. Blood, Peter R. 1989. “Historical Setting.” In Bangladesh: A Country Study. James Heitzman and Robert L. Worden, eds. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1–41. Brammer, H. 1990. “Floods in Bangladesh: Geographical Background to the 1987 and 1988 Floods.” Geographical Journal 156:12–22. Haque, C. E. 1997. Hazards in a Fickle Environment: Bangladesh. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Johnson, B. L. C. 1975. Bangladesh. New York: Barnes & Noble Books. Mitra, S. N., et al. 1997. Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey: 1996–1997. Dhaka: Mitra and Associates. Norton, J. H. K. 1999. India and South Asia. Guilford, Conn.: Dushkin/McGraw-Hill. Paul, Bimal K. 2000. “HIV/AIDS in Bangladesh: An Analysis of Risk Factors.”

210——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Pp. 283–300 in Geographic and Planning Research Themes for the New Millennium. A. G. Noble, et al., eds. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House. _____. 1998. “Coping Mechanisms Practiced by Drought Victims (1994–95) in North Bengal, Bangladesh.” Applied Geography 18: 355–373. _____. 1994. “Gender Ratios in the SMAs of Bangladesh: Is the Gap Declining?” Urban Geography 10: 345–361. Paul, Bimal K., and Sujata De. 2000. “Arsenic Poisoning in Bangladesh: A Geographical Analysis.” Journal of the American Water Resources Association 36: 799–809. PRB (Population Reference Bureau). 2000. 2000 World Population Data Sheet. Washington, D.C. Rasid, H., and B. K. Paul. 1987. “Flood Problems in Bangladesh: Is There an Indigenous Solution?” Environmental Management 11: 155–173. Shehabuddin, E. 2000. “Bangladesh in 1999.” Asian Survey 40: 181–188. Upreti, B. C. 1993. Politics of Himalayan River Waters: An Analysis of the River Water Issues of Nepal, India and Bangladesh. New Delhi: Nirala Publications.

The Economy of Bangladesh In Bangladesh, it is not uncommon to see a majhi—a fisherman or boatman—fishing from his boat. Often he is alone. He spends many a lonely hour, casting his hand net in the water and trying to catch a few fish for his family or perhaps to sell some in the market so he can earn money to supplement his family income. When one sees the sight of that majhi against the sinking sun, what emerges is a silhouette, a dark human image with no identity. To painters and innocent eyes, the image may seem quite artistic. But, for countless Bangladeshis, it is a metaphor of life, a shadow of bare survival as it serves as a constant reminder of hardship. So, for the poor, life is a lonely affair of constantly staggering at the margin. In effect, what the majhi’s silhouette reflects is the overall condition of

Fisherman hanging fish to dry. Fishing provides a means for supplemental food and/or income. (Tiziana and Gianni Baldizzone/Corbis)

211

212——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Two rural Bangladeshi women pile newly harvested rice in Nababerbagh village outside Dhaka. Nationally, the rice crop makes up a major portion of the country’s annual gross domestic product. (AFP/CORBIS)

Bangladesh’s economy: struggling to remain afloat in the midst of growing population, limited opportunities, and mounting poverty. The economy of Bangladesh has historically been dominated by agriculture and other rural activities such as fishing and raising animals, often carried out in conjunction with farming. Although its overall dominance has declined over time, it still remains the primary source of livelihood. Currently, this sector accounts for about 24 percent of the GDP, employs nearly 50 percent of the labor force, and constitutes about 35 percent of all export earnings. In reality, however, the percentage of the agricultural labor force is higher than 50 percent. The figure is generally very close to the number of people living in rural areas, which is 80 percent according to the 1991 census. After all, those who live in rural areas are engaged in some form of farming activities for at least part of the year. As agriculture’s GDP contribution has declined, the share of the industrial sector has climbed from approximately 5 percent in 1971 to 27 percent in 1997. The contribution of the service sector

——The Economy of Bangladesh——213

to the GDP increased from about 20 percent to 49 percent over the same period (Turner 2000, 257).

AGRICULTURE Cropping Pattern. With the exception of city states like Singapore, Bangladesh has the highest population density in the world. As a result, per capita cultivated area in Bangladesh is one of the lowest in the world—only 0.15 acre per person. Because of the immense pressure on arable land, agriculture is practiced very intensively. Most farmers produce double or triple crops each year on more than half of the cultivated land. For this reason, Bangladesh has a high proportion of its land area under cultivation. Most of the crops under cultivation in Bangladesh are food grains. Rice alone occupies about three-fourths of the total cropland and now accounts for nearly 90 percent of all cereal production in Bangladesh. Rice is grown almost everywhere in the country except in the hilly areas. It is grown both under rain-fed condition and with the aid of irrigation. The nation’s tropical climate and abundant water resources allow the cultivation of rice up to three times a year, the peak harvest being in June. In 1998, total rice production in Bangladesh was 28.29 million tons. Wheat and other minor cereals such as millet and barley account for about 10 percent of the cultivated land and about 8 percent of grain production. Wheat is cultivated during the dry winter season, usually following the rice harvest in September and October. Once negligible as a crop, wheat production in Bangladesh grew rapidly during the 1970s. Today, it is the third most important crop, behind only rice and jute. In 1999, Bangladesh produced over 1.9 million tons of wheat, or nearly 7 percent of total food grain production. The major factor behind the growth of rice and wheat production is what is popularly known as the Green Revolution, first introduced in the mid-1960s. This technology is based on the integrated use of high-yielding varieties (HYV) seeds, irrigation water, and chemical fertilizers. With proper and timely application of the required inputs, HYV wheat yields can be tripled and HYV rice yields can be doubled. The area sown with HYV rice and wheat in Bangladesh was negligible at independence. But, today, they are grown on 50 percent of the land under cultivation.

214——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Although mechanized harvesting is used by some large landowners, harvesting is still done mostly by hand in Bangladesh. For small farmers, which are the majority, the price of mechanization is out of reach. Additionally, an abundant supply of labor keeps the cost of manual harvesting lower than that for mechanization. (Courtesy of Bimal K. Paul)

Potatoes, chilies, legumes, and oil seeds are also grown to supplement the staple Bangladesh diet. Nonetheless, except for potatoes, the amount of land used for growing these crops has declined in absolute terms from preindependence levels, mainly due to the reallocation of land to wheat and rice. The expansion of irrigation facilities has enabled farmers to exploit the Green Revolution technology available for rice and wheat. The decline has been most severe for legumes (peas, beans, and lentils), which are the major source of protein for the poor. The production of potatoes increased slightly, from around 1.1 million tons in the early 1980s to 1.6 million tons in 1998. Among the country’s cash crops, jute is dominant, occupying 5 percent of the crop area. Jute often competes with rice for land area. In recent years, however, both the area cultivated and the total production of jute have shown a declining trend, largely because of its diminishing demand in the world market. Jute products are being increasingly replaced by synthetic substitutes, which are often more durable and cheaper. As a result, the price of

——The Economy of Bangladesh——215

Transporting rice bags to the market on rickshaws. In addition to buffaloes and oxen, rickshaws are used to haul produce and other products. (Courtesy of Bimal K. Paul)

jute products has consistently declined, thus making its production less lucrative. Bangladesh also grows some tea for both domestic consumption and export. Land Ownership and Farm Size. Most farmers are small landholders, owning less than 1.5 acres of land. Furthermore, landholdings are inequitably distributed and farm holdings are heavily fragmented. Over time, the distribution of landholdings has become increasingly disparate, resulting in increasing landlessness and near landlessness. The bottom 60 percent of the total farm households own less than 25 percent of the land, whereas the wealthiest 10 percent enjoy between 25 and 50 percent. Small farms, defined as a holding smaller than 2.5 acres, are the dominant production unit in Bangladesh. Farms of this size are usually unable to produce enough to feed the family for a year. Despite its inadequacy, the proportion of small farms has increased from 70 percent in 1983 to almost 80 percent in 1996 (BBS 2000, 168). A similar increase can be observed with respect to the percentage of farm areas under small holdings (see table 2). Conversely, both the number of farms and the area under medium and large farm hold-

216——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

ings have been declining over time, thereby indicating a trend toward landholding marginalization.

Table 2. Number and Area of Farm Holdings in Bangladesh, 1984–1996 Number of Farms Farms

1996

Size of Farms (in acres) Small (>1.5) Medium (1.5–7.49) Large (<7.5)

9,423 2,078 308

TOTAL Area of Farms (in acres) Small Medium Large TOTAL

1984

Percent of Farms 1996

1984

7,066 2,483 513

79.8 17.6 2.6

70.2 24.7 5.1

11,809

10,062

100.6

100.0

8,219 8,282 3,809

6,573 10,226 6,492

40.5 40.8 18.7

28.2 43.9 27.9

20,310

23,291

100.0

100.0

Source: BBS (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics). 1999. Statistical Pocketbook: Bangladesh 98. Dhaka, 195.

There is no precise estimate of the extent of landless households in rural Bangladesh. It is widely believed that about 50 percent of the rural households are landless in the sense that their landholdings are barely half an acre. As Alauddin and Tisdell (1989, 554) point out, “there seems to [be] a process of polarization whereby the near landless are dispossessed and join the ranks of the landless, while small farmers in turn become near landless.” As a result, many of the landless and near landless households rely on tenancy to have access to land. More than one-third of the total agricultural land in Bangladesh is cultivated by tenant farmers. The most common form of tenancy is sharecropping, a system in which tenants assume all the production costs and share 50 percent of the crops with the landlord. The concentration of landownership and the prevalence of sharecropping are considered to be two major reasons behind the slow pace of agricultural modernization in Bangladesh. After all, sharecroppers have little incentive to incur the cost of agricultural modernization when one-half of what they produce goes to the landlord. Similar to Nepal, this is a historical problem that con-

——The Economy of Bangladesh——217

tinues to haunt Bangladesh’s agrarian economy. Several land reform attempts to rectify the problem of land concentration and tenancy have produced few tangible results for tenants. In the meantime, the agrarian reality informs that the only way to increase agricultural production is to pursue its modernization because the prospect of farmland expansion is virtually nil. Moreover, any modernization efforts will have to incorporate diversification of crops as well as gainful activities such as fisheries and livestock farming. Livestock. Rural Bangladeshis rely heavily on livestock for their livelihood. Livestock are used for plowing lands, for threshing and transporting products, and as a source of manure for farming and fuel. They are a primary source of animal protein for both rural and urban residents. Many village households raise livestock and rely on livestock products such as milk to earn cash income. Even dead livestock serve as a source of income, for their hides sustain a thriving leather and tanning industry; leather goods are major exports of Bangladesh. In 1997–1998, about 12 percent of the value added to agriculture originated in livestock and poultry. Over 50 percent of all rural families own livestock, and about 5 percent of the livestock population is owned by households not engaged in land cultivation. Such rural families are essentially engaged in animal husbandry as a profession. Cattle and buffalo are generally raised by farmers with small landholdings. Irrespective of farm size, these animals are tended by men, whereas poultry is generally raised by women, and sheep and goats are raised by children. The existing commercial livestock and poultry farms in Bangladesh are mostly owned by the government. According to the 1996 agriculture census, there were over 22 million bovine animals, 15 million goats and sheep, and 127 million poultry in the country. According to recent estimates, cattle and buffalo account for about 75 percent of the livestock value, followed by poultry, and goats/sheep. Almost every household has a few chickens, for they are quite easy to raise. As the demand for meat grows with increasing population and urbanization, the livestock population as well as its commercial farming are bound to rise. Fisheries. Fish is perhaps the most preferred food in Bangladesh. More than two-thirds of the animal protein in the

218——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Bangladeshi diet comes from fish. Fisheries contribute about 18 percent of the agricultural value, or nearly 6 percent of the GDP, and account for 12 percent of national exports. Bangladesh exports fish to India, Japan, North America, the Middle East, and European countries. Prawn and shrimp constitute major fish exports. In 1997–1998 the country harvested 1.5 million tons of fish from inland and marine sources. Nearly 80 percent of the fish production comes from inland fishing (BBS 2000, 195). Worldwide, only China and India have larger annual catches of freshwater fish. The fishery sector employs about 1.3 million commercial fishermen, that is, 7 percent of the agricultural labor force. An additional 10 million are employed in fish marketing, processing, and the manufacturing of fishing nets and equipment, including boats. Bangladesh has a marine fishery area of about 27,000 square miles within its exclusive sea boundaries and almost 10 million acres of fishing areas including rivers, lakes, ponds, and flood plains. From these diverse sources, Bangladesh produced 1.5 million tons of fish in 1997–1998, representing 8 percent of the annual income. Despite the growth of the fishing industry, the per capita availability of fish has decreased due to rapid population growth and increased fish exports. As important as this industry is to the economy, it is faced with the growing problems of flood control, siltation, land reclamation, water pollution, and poor transportation. Yet there is little doubt that the country’s prospects of increased fish production are enormous, especially in light of its extensive river system and sizeable coastal areas.

INDUSTRY The industrial sector accounted for 27 percent of the GDP and employed 10 percent of the total labor force in 1997. This sector includes both modern industries and traditional cottage industries. Although large-scale industries have a larger share of the GDP, small-scale and cottage industries generate more jobs. Unlike large industries, small-scale industries are mostly family enterprises and are characterized by traditional technology and relatively low labor productivity. Before independence, large industries were primarily owned by Pakistani private investors and the state-owned East Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (EPIDC).

——The Economy of Bangladesh——219

Bangladeshi private industrialists owned only 18 percent of such industries, and foreign ownership was minimal. Following independence, Bangladesh nationalized most of the major industries, leaving small industries to the private sector. As a result of nationalization, the government owned 92 percent of the fixed assets of the modern manufacturing sector. However, a new government formed in 1975 after Mujib’s assassination reversed his industrial policy. The objective of the new policy was to encourage private investments in industrial development as well as to stimulate foreign investment. Although the new policy met with little measurable success, the government stayed the course of increased privatization. By 1985, only about 160 enterprises, or about 40 percent of industrial assets, remained under public control. As the 1990s brought a new wave of market liberalization with growing calls for privatization, the post-1975 industrial policy received a new boost. Today, most of the country’s industries are privately owned. The most important industries in Bangladesh are jute and cotton textiles, tea, paper and newsprint, rayon, sugar, cement, chemical fertilizers, tanneries, light engineering, and oil refining. Within the cottage industry sector, handlooms, carpet making, shoe making, bamboo and cane products, earthen pottery, brass and metal products, small tool production, and handicrafts play major parts. Most of the modern industries are located in the country’s three major urban centers: Dhaka, Chittagong, and Khulna. Dhaka has the largest concentration of industries, accounting for more than two-thirds of total industrial production. Historically, jute is perhaps the most dominant industry in Bangladesh. It generates almost 37 percent of employment and 26 percent of production among large industries. However, the importance of this industry has declined over time, largely because of the rising popularity of petroleum-based synthetics, which are cheaper and more durable than jute. It is no wonder, therefore, that employment in this industry has diminished from 252,570 in 1981 to 127,364 in 1999. Despite consistent declines, jute still generates a considerable proportion of national export revenues. Since the early 1980s, the garment industry has been growing noticeably. It contributes almost 70 percent of Bangladesh’s hard

220——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

currency with the export value of $3.5 billion in 1997. The number of garment factories increased from 2,353 in 1996 to 2,963 in 1999, employing 1.51 million workers. One notable characteristic of this industry is that 90 percent of it workforce consists of women. Another feature is that many of them are owned by East and Southeast Asia companies. The low labor cost and welldisciplined labor force give Bangladesh a competitive advantage in this industry. About 85 percent of garment production is sold to North America, making it the sixth largest supplier to that region and the fifth largest to the European Union. One major disadvantage of this industry is that Bangladesh is heavily dependent on imported raw materials to keep it going. Other significant industries include food and paper products, which share 15 percent of total industrial output and employ 20 percent of the industrial labor force. Then there are chemical, leather, sugar, and match industries. Of these, the chemical industry possesses the greatest prospect for future expansion due to an ample supply of natural gas in the country. This gas is the basis for fertilizer production, and Bangladesh has adequate amount to meet domestic demand for chemical fertilizers. Estimated national reserves range from 182 billion to 623 billion cubic meters. Additionally, Bangladesh has the potential for exploiting new offshore gas reserves, which are estimated to have a minimum capacity of approximately 2.5 trillion cubic meters. Currently, industrial exports constitute less than one-fourth of the gross value of manufactured outputs. The main exports include ready-made garments, jute products, leather and leather products, frozen fish and seafood, tea, chemical fertilizers, petroleum products, and newsprint. Of these, the first five can be considered major export industries because they cater largely to the export market. The United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Japan are major export markets. With respect to imports, Bangladesh’s major trading partners include India, China, and Singapore, as well as the above countries. The narrow base of exports and growing imports give rise to large trade deficits facing the country. Foreign aid and overseas workers’ remittances are two important sources for financing such deficits. Foreign enterprises are permitted wholly to own local subsidiaries. Tax concessions are available to foreign companies in the export zones of Dhaka and

——The Economy of Bangladesh——221

Chittagong. But foreign enterprises do not feature prominently in the manufacturing sector of Bangladesh. Bangladesh’s industrial growth has been significantly hampered by political instability and social turmoil. Frequent hartals (strikes) and labor unrest engender an environment of uncertainties and confusion. This chaotic sociopolitical situation is further aggravated by an inadequate physical infrastructure and unreliable power supplies (Rahman and Bakht 1997). Although the road networks have expanded, they have not kept pace with demand. Railways have stagnated, and the exploitation of waterways has been limited because of inadequate investment. Additionally, Bangladesh lacks skilled workers. To retain a competitive edge in labor-intensive production, there is a need for skilled labor. The lack of access to credit is also a big concern.

SERVICE SECTOR The service sector refers to those economic activities that have value to individual customers or clients or to society as a whole. For example, they include wholesale and retail sales, personal care, governmental functions, the exercise of legal actions, and instructional activities. This sector accounted for 49 percent of the GDP and employed nearly 40 percent of the labor force in 1997. Currently, it is the largest sector of the Bangladesh economy and continues to expand. One main reason for its expansion is the continued outflow of large numbers of contract workers to the Middle East and, lately, to East and Southeast Asia (see “Geography and History of Bangladesh”). In order to satisfy travel-related needs of contract workers, employment opportunities in many interrelated service areas were created. Included among these service areas are air transport, travel agencies, hotels, banks, health clinics, secretarial services, and recruiting agencies. Furthermore, the cash remittances sent home by those workers increased the amount of disposable income available in the country, thus generating demands for goods and services. Another element contributing to the continued expansion of service activities is the growth in economic development activities led by many foreign donors. These activities have brought into the country increasing numbers of foreign

222——NEPAL and BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

In most urban areas, including the capital city of Dhaka, where this photo was taken, rickshaws are a widely used mode of transportation. Rickshaws are perhaps the most memorable feature of the urban cultural landscape of Bangladesh. Ricksaw drivers endlessly compete with motor vehicles for passengers as well as right-of-way, and they are often extremely aggressive—partly by necessity. (Corbis)

——The Economy of Bangladesh——223

donor agencies and agents, including an exploding number of nongovernmental agencies (NGOs) from all over the world. If these trends continue as they have in the past twenty years, the service sector is likely to grow even faster, creating more employment.

POVERTY With a per capita income of $350, Bangladesh is one of the poorest countries in the world. Poverty is a way of life; it is everywhere. The problem with poverty is not merely a matter of not having enough food for the family. It also has many health effects in that the poor generally lack adequate access to medical services. When their health suffers, they have little chance of moving out of the poverty trap. They have no access to education and cannot afford to educate their children. As a result, poverty is perpetuated, passed from one generation to the next. In 1996, 41 million (36 percent) of Bangladeshis were below the poverty line (World Bank 2001, 280). Given the fact that the country is predominantly agrarian, it is the rural poverty that dominates the economic landscape. The landless and near landless villagers, including agricultural laborers, sharecroppers, and artisans, constitute most of the rural poor. In urban areas, over 90 percent of slums and squatter settlers are classified as poor. There is little doubt about the intensity of poverty infecting Bangladesh. There are, nevertheless, some signs that its grip has somewhat eased in recent years. The World Bank data reveal that the incidence of poverty has actually declined in Bangladesh from its 1992 level, when it stood at 43 percent. But the rate of reduction has been much slower than some other Asian countries have achieved over the same period of time. For instance, China has made great strides in this area, along with Indonesia. Most Bangladeshis, however, believe that their average living standards have significantly improved, especially compared to the depressing period immediately after independence. They further believe that the level of rural-urban income disparity has lessened over the past twenty years. Several factors are responsible for the decrease in poverty in Bangladesh. For example, as the Green Revolution technology spread, food production increased, leading to reduction in rural poverty in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In addition, the govern-

224——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Children with empty containers wait for drinking water in Dhaka. The city’s scarce water supply dwindles in the middle of summer as temperatures rise. (Reuters NewMedia Inc./CORBIS)

ment created employment opportunities in rural areas through the Food-for-Work (FFW) program. Under this program, the rural poor are employed to build and repair roads and other rural development activities. In return, workers are paid in food grains. This program has made a significant dent in poverty as many poor families can earn food for their work. These policies are further augmented by the provision of credit to the poor to engage in micro enterprising. The most outstanding and well-known program of this type is the Grameen (Village) Bank (GB). This program provides credit to the landless and near landless without collateral. Founded by Bangladeshi economist Muhammad Yunus in 1976, the Grameen Bank believes that access to credit is a fundamental human right, and that the poor often need only a small financial loan in order to break free from the poverty trap (Ahsan 1996). The GB further believes that economic development should start with poverty alleviation, which will empower the people. The GB has been financially self-sufficient since 1993 and now is one of

——The Economy of Bangladesh——225

Buffalo cart on a highway. Such carts are a vital means of transportation in Bangladesh. (Courtesy of Bimal K. Paul)

Bangladesh’s largest banks, with over 1,200 branches. In 1997, the bank underwrote over 2 million loans totaling $1 billion in more than 35,000 villages throughout Bangladesh. More than 93 percent of the borrowers are women, and the repayment rate of 97 percent is stunningly high. Evidence is mounting that the micro-credit program espoused by the GB has played a key role in the battle against poverty. Other poverty alleviation programs include feeding disadvantaged groups. This program has been in operation since the mid1980s with the purpose of addressing the problem of malnutrition among rural mothers and children. In 1999 alone, more than 500,000 tons of grains were distributed under this program. Also contributing to poverty alleviation is the involvement of many NGOs, whose efforts are usually focused. Presently, more than one thousand NGOs operate in Bangladesh, and most of them have poverty alleviation programs for marginalized groups. NGOs also

226——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

help to provide employment opportunities to many people. Finally, there is the increased flow of remittances sent home by Bangladeshi laborers working overseas. As already discussed, such remittances have significantly enhanced the availability of disposable incomes among those households who have family members working overseas.

PUBLIC FINANCE AND FOREIGN AID DEPENDENCY Bangladesh’s domestic budget consists of two parts: the revenue budget and the development budget. The former includes government incomes and expenditures relating to traditional duties such as defense, wages and salaries of public employees, various types of subsidies, debt servicing, and transfer payments. These expenditures are financed mainly from tax and nontax revenues. In contrast, the development budget aims at building the socioeconomic infrastructure to facilitate economic growth and development. Around 80 percent of the development budget is financed by foreign aid. What this means is that economic development of Bangladesh is extremely dependent on foreign grants and loans (Kibria 2001). Foreign aid is also important for financing trade deficits that inflict the national economy. Until 1976, foreign aid financed around 60 percent of annual imports. Although the extent of foreign aid-financed imports has since declined, it is still recorded at 45 percent. It is, however, noteworthy to point out that the decline has resulted largely from the unavailability of aid rather than policy shifts to reduce foreign aid dependency. It is also notable that the whole notion of foreign aid has taken a drastic turn since the early 1980s. Previously, foreign aid to Bangladesh was largely offered in the form of grants, which do not have to be paid back. Since the early 1980s, however, foreign aid has been provided mostly in the form of loans, which must be paid back with interest. This shift clearly reveals that continued dependence on external aid may create a serious debt problem in Bangladesh’s future. In fact, the burden of debt had already surpassed $15 billion in 1997, averaging $124 per person. This is an insurmountable amount for a country riddled with the heavy load of poverty. What is worse, the debt is on the rise.

——The Economy of Bangladesh——227

ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND BARRIERS TO GROWTH Since independence, the Bangladesh economy has grown at an annual rate of over 5 percent. The growth rate was higher during the past two decades compared to the 1970s. Despite frequent strikes, increased political polarization, a slow pace of institutional reforms, widespread corruption and extortion, and periodic natural calamities, the country’s growth performance has been relatively noteworthy. Higher agricultural outputs and increased industrial production explain Bangladesh’s growth performance. Yet the country has a long way to go in terms of attaining its full agricultural and industrial potential and in arresting poverty. A study by the World Bank and Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies (1998, 17) claims that “agricultural and industrial expansion must proceed hand-in-hand if Bangladesh is to reach the threshold of a middle income country by 2010, and achieve middle order status in that group by 2020.” As valuable as the past performance is, the road ahead promises to be bumpy thanks to the many barriers faced by national economic growth. First of all, population remains a major issue. Although the population growth rate has recently displayed a downward trend, the absolute annual population growth of some 3 million is indeed a huge economic and social concern. This is compounded when it is considered in light of future needs for child health care and literacy pressure; the country suffers from a paucity of adequate health services and from high illiteracy. Average adult literacy is still well below 50 percent, and it is less than 30 percent among the female population. In addition, low living standards, resource scarcity, massive unemployment, and periodic natural disasters cannot be ignored as potential impediments to future economic growth. Although low living standards and massive employment naturally limit the domestic market size, resource scarcities and natural disasters add to the external costs of growth and development. With the exception of natural gas, the country is heavily reliant on imports of many vital raw materials, including oil, to satisfy its industrial production requirements. There is also the question of foreign aid, which has proven to be a mixed blessing in terms of its efficacy.

228——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

These men and women are carrying earth to repair an unpaved (fairweather) road. This is a fairly common scene as most rural roads require constant repair to keep them open to rickshaws and oxen carts. (Courtesy of Bimal K. Paul)

Although foreign aid was certainly critical in sustaining the economy during the early years following independence, it has, at the same time, engendered what can be described as the “foreign aid dependency mentality” among politicians and policymakers. The availability of foreign assistance sidetracks policymakers from the need to mobilize domestic savings for sustained growth. Large and regular inflows of aid and public sector imports provide an invaluable basis for the rapid enrichment of a small segment of the population—the national ruling elite—at the top of the urban hierarchy. Many claim that “75 percent of the foreign aid received by the country in the last three decades was appropriated by people outside the targeted groups. Of the total aid received by Bangladesh, foreign equipment suppliers, agents, and consultants took 25 percent; bureaucrats, politicians, commission agents, consultants, and contractors inside the country took 30 percent; while 20 percent went to people in high income groups” (NFB, Feb. 11, 2001). In the meantime, aid dependency continues, sapping the country’s internal inertia to become self-reliant and to mobilize domestic resources for sustained growth.

——The Economy of Bangladesh——229

As already noted, poor governance, widespread corruption, heavy taxation, inadequate infrastructure, and social and political instability continue to mar the economy and undermine its prospects of attracting foreign investments and investments by expatriate Bangladeshis. The foreign direct investment (FDI) stood at $192 million in 1999, a mere fraction of such investment in many East and Southeast Asian countries. And even this amount was mainly tied to the power and natural gas sector and some to the growing garment industry. Limited access to capital due to an archaic commercial banking system and an underdeveloped capital market, inadequate domestic savings, and slow trade reforms all join forces to undercut Bangladesh’s competitive advantage in terms of attracting foreign investments (Hossain 1995).

CONCLUSION Although significant economic obstacles remain, there is no reason to infer that further progress is not possible in Bangladesh. Given the numerous problems Bangladesh has faced since independence, the country is doing better than expected. In the early 1970s, this new nation was referred to in foreign circles as an “international basket case.” In the late 1980s, Bangladesh continued to be called the “largest poorest” country and was singled out as “the test case for development.” By most accounts, Bangladesh did not prosper economically, nor was it able to substantially improve the quality of life for its huge population, but it did not lose ground either. Despite challenges, Bangladesh is about to become self-sufficient in food production. It is a major world producer and exporter of ready-made garments and frozen seafood. Bangladesh’s innovative approach to micro-credit has not only made a significant difference in rural poverty reduction in the country but has emerged as a model of micro entrepreneurial push in several other underdeveloped countries. The current trend indicates that the economy of Bangladesh is growing at a rate comparable to that in many underdeveloped countries. After many years of political turmoil, the country’s recent democratic experiment seems to be on track as the transfer of power from one elected government to another has gone rel-

230——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

atively smoothly in the past few years. Furthermore, the past two governments have served out their full terms. This is a fact that is bound to engender a sense of political stability and confidence on the part of potential foreign investors. After all, political stability is a precondition for continued economic growth as well as increased foreign investment. What is needed now is a set of policy measures focused on tangible reforms in the financial sector and institutional mechanisms, infrastructural improvements, greater emphasis on environmentally sound agricultural modernization, and sustainable industrialization stressing its massive labor utilization. References Ahsan, M. B., ed. 1996. Grameen Bank and Muhammad Yunus. Dhaka: Mowla Brothers. Alauddin, M., and C. Tisdell. 1989. “Poverty, Resource Distribution and Security: The Impact of New Technology in Rural Bangladesh.” Journal of Development Studies 25: 550–570. BBS (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics). 2000. Statistical Pocketbook: Bangladesh 99. Dhaka. _____. 1999. Statistical Pocketbook: Bangladesh 98. Dhaka. Fritschel, H., and U. Mohan. 1999. “Pushing Back Poverty in India.” News and Views (September). Hossain, Akhtar M. 1995. Inflation, Economic Growth and the Balance of Payments in Bangladesh: A Macroeconomic Study. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Kabeer, Naila. 2000. The Power to Choose: Bangladeshi Women and Labour Market Decisions in London and Dhaka. London: Verson Press. Kibria, S. 2001. “Aid Comes and Aid Goes.” Weekly 2000 3: 40–43 (in Bengali). NFB (News from Bangladesh). 2001. http://www.bangladesh-web.com. February 11. Rahman, M., and Z. Bakht. 1997. “Constraints to Industrial Development: Recent Reforms and Future Directions.” Pp. 77–114 in The Bangladesh Economy in Transition. M.G. Quibria, ed. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Rashiduzzaman, M. 2001. “Bangladesh in 2000.” Asian Survey 61: 124–130. Turner, Barry, ed. 2000. The Statesman’s Yearbook 2001. New York: St. Martin’s Press. World Bank. 2001. World Bank Development Report, 2000/2001. Oxford: Oxford University Press. _____. 2000. World Bank Development Report, 1999/2000. Oxford: Oxford University Press. World Bank and BCAS (Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies). 1998. Bangladesh 2020: A Long-Run Perspective Study. Dhaka: University Press Limited.

Bangladeshi Institutions The late Chinese Premier Zhou (Chou) Enlai once said that wherever the British went, they left a little tail behind. That little tail was directly related to the manner in which the colonial empire was consolidated. Wherever they extended their imperial dominance, they drove a wedge along the ethnic line, religious line, or whatever fissure they could find so they could materialize their time-honored policy of “divide and rule”—a policy that spawned many little tails throughout the colonies. In many respects, Bangladesh is one of those little tails that they invented and left behind upon their departure from the subcontinent in 1947. Under the political and territorial framework the British divided India and Pakistan at the time of independence, Bangladesh was bound to emerge as a by-product of that little tail. Bangladesh, or what was East Pakistan, was annexed to Pakistan at the time of partition solely based on the fact that the vast majority of its people were Muslims. There was little consideration given to the issue of Pakistan’s territorial fragmentation, to the deep-seated linguistic and other cultural issues that were incompatible between East and West Pakistan, and to the fact that West Pakistanis generally regarded East Pakistanis (Bangladeshis) as second-class Muslims (see “Geography and History of Bangladesh”). In view of these realities, it was merely a matter of time before East Pakistan bolted out of West Pakistan’s control and became an independent nation. That time, as already stated, arrived in December 1971. And Bangladesh was born. But independence was just the beginning of nationhood. With independence arose the responsibility of governing effectively. As the jubilant atmosphere of independence dissipated, internal issues surfaced, many of them revolving around the axis of domestic politics and how to best govern the new nation and guide a populace in the midst of poverty, a populace that had just emerged from the long shadow of external suppression. Instead of striving toward national goals in a unified manner, factions and fractures

231

232——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

developed, each vying for power. Coups were staged and presidents were murdered in cold blood, including the founder of the nation, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The military injected itself into national politics. Social and political instability ensued. Indeed, within a short span of thirty years since independence, Bangladesh has witnessed many upheavals in its political and social landscapes. In light of these changes, the main objective of this chapter is to provide an overview of contemporary Bangladesh politics and some of its social institutions.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS Bangladesh has a unitary form of government. Whereas the president is the head of the state, the prime minister is the head of the government. The prime minister is assisted by a council of ministers and advisers. For a better understanding of how political change has shaped the present political environment of the country, a chronological discussion is in order.

The Mujib Era (1972–1975) Bangladesh formed a parliamentary government following the return of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in January 1972 from Pakistani imprisonment. In October of that year, he crafted a constitution that enumerated four principles on which Bangladesh was to be governed: nationalism, socialism, secularism, and democracy (Blood 1989, 32). These principles were commonly known as the tenets of Mujibism or Mujibbad. As a first step to implement socialism, the Mujib government nationalized most large-scale industries, as well as banking and insurance. A large proportion of the nationalized assets had already been abandoned by their former Pakistani owners. In order to ensure religious secularism, the new government banned all political parties with a professed religious orientation, including the Jamaat e Islam, the party that had vigorously opposed independence and had collaborated with the Pakistani army during the war for independence. The Mujib government also enforced Bangla (Bengali) as the national language, replacing English, which was formerly used at all levels.

——Bangladeshi Institutions——233

During the first national election, held in 1973, Mujib’s Awami League (AL) party won 282 out of 289 contested seats. Mujib formed the government under his leadership. His government undertook several controversial actions. Included among them was the formation of the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini (National Defense Force) from the ranks of the freedom fighters. As this paramilitary force appeared to undermine the authority of the military led by repatriated military personnel, Mujib alienated the military institution and its generals. This myopic move by Mujib created a rift between the armed forces and his government; it set the stage for the military’s later aggressive incursion into national political affairs. After all, such a role was nothing new to the military given the dictatorial martial law tradition it inherited from Pakistan before independence. At the same time the rift between the government and the military was deepening, the country’s law and order situation deteriorated. In the wake of the independence war, many guerrilla bands roamed the countryside, fully armed and outside the circle of government control. They took the law into their own hands, thus effectively creating a climate of lawlessness and chaos. In addition, corruption within the high offices of the Mujib government continued, a situation that undercut the moral authority of the central government. But Mujib lacked military support to subdue the roaming guerrilla bands. On the morning of August 15, 1975, some army officers brutally assassinated President Mujibur Rahman, along with most of his family members (Heitzman and Worden 1989). Subsequently, Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmad, a conservative member of Mujib’s cabinet, was installed as president. His regime was soon overthrown. A series of coups took place in early November 1975, at the end of which emerged General Ziaur (Zia) Rahman as the de facto ruler. Some believed that Zia was behind Mujib’s murder or, at least, that he had turned a blind eye when he could have readily averted the coup, thus preventing Mujib’s murder by military officers. Even after he came to power, he did little to bring justice to those who were involved in Mujib’s assassination.

The Zia Regime (1977–1981) Following Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmad’s earlier removal from the presidency, Chief Justice A. S. M. Sayem had been appointed

234——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

president and chief martial law administrator (CMLA). When Zia came to power he first stripped Sayem of his CMLA position and then replaced him as president on April 21, 1977 (Blood 1989). Zia had created his own political party, which was later named the Bangladesh Jatiyatibadi Party (Bangladesh Nationalist Party, or BNP). On June 3, 1978, Zia held a national election to elect a president. He won the election. Parliamentary elections were held later in February 1979 to elect 300 members to the National Legislature. Zia fielded his party, BNP, in the parliamentary elections and won two-thirds of the seats in the National Legislature. Despite his heavy-handed electoral approach, Zia seemed to be on the way to establishing a popular, democratic government. For a military general, he seemed quite open to democratic processes. He had not only restored law and order in the nation but also appeared to preach the “politics of hope.” But before democracy could be firmly grounded, Zia was assassinated on May 30, 1981, by dissident military officers. Zia was succeeded by his vice-president, Abdus Sattar. Disliked by the military, Sattar was soon challenged by the army chief of staff, Lieutenant General Husain Muhammad Ershad, who called for cleaning up corruption, demanded a regularized role for the military in the governance of the country, and asked for a national security council that would be dominated by the military. When Sattar refused to accept those demands, Ershad dismissed him on March 24, 1982, dissolved the Parliament, and assumed full power under martial law.

The Ershad Regime (1982–1991) Ershad initially appointed Supreme Court Justice A. F. M. Ahsanuddin Chowdhury interim president but later dismissed him and became president in December 1983. He relaxed bans on political activities in January 1984. As his hold on power was secured, he held national elections in May 1986. His Jatiya Dal (National Party) garnered a slim majority. However, the sevenparty alliance led by the BNP boycotted the elections (Baxter and Rahman 1989, 25). Two new leaders emerged on the national scene during the early years of the Ershad regime: Begum Khaleda Zia, the widow of Gen-

——Bangladeshi Institutions——235

eral Zia; and Sheikh Hasina Wajid, the eldest daughter of Mujib. They were leaders of the BNP and AL, respectively, and both formed alliances with similar minded political parties. Although distrustful of each other, those two major alliances called for the restoration of democracy. Furthermore, their intense opposition to Earshad’s antidemocratic and promilitary policies brought these two rival alliances together, putting additional pressure on the Ershad government and eventually forcing Ershad to resign in 1990. A caretaker government headed by Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed of the Supreme Court was established.

The Begum Zia Regime (1991–1996) President Ahmed’s caretaker government held national elections in February 1991, and the BNP won 140 of the 300 seats, but not the majority. With the support of the Jamaat e Islam party, the BNP was able to form a new government on March 20, 1991, under the leadership of Begum Zia. Her regime was saddled with the continuous boycott of the Parliament in 1994 by opposition parties as they pressed their demand for a constitutional amendment to provide a caretaker government to conduct all future elections. This demand was the result of massive vote rigging by the BNP government in the Magura-2 parliamentary by-election, which was vacated due to a death (Hossain 1995). In defiance of the opposition demands, parliamentary elections were held on February 15, 1996, under Prime Minister Zia’s leadership rather than under a caretaker government as the opposition had demanded. In the absence of opposition parties’ participation in the elections, Zia’s BNP won. Defying Zia’s victory, the opposition parties called a series of local and national strikes, which brought the entire country to a standstill as banks, ports, factories, and shops closed and all transportation and communications ceased. The BNP government ultimately yielded to the pressure of the opposition parties, and a caretaker government was formed to conduct new elections, which were held on June 12, 1996. This time, the Awami League party emerged as the largest single party, winning 135 of 300 seats in the National Legislature. With the support of Ershad’s Jatiya Dal party, the AL headed by Sheikh Hasina Wajid formed a new government on June 23, 1996.

236——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Hundreds of supporters of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party marched through the streets of Dhaka during a nationwide strike in 1999. The strike, called by Bangladesh’s main opposition parties to protest taxes, shut down businesses and schools and disrupted traffic in Bangladesh’s major cities. (AP Photo/Pavel Rahman)

The Sheikh Hasina Regime (1996–2001) Despite some turmoil and tensions, for the first time in its independent history the popularly elected civilian government was allowed to serve out its full term. In addition, the transition from the Zia government to the newly elected government of Sheik Hasina was relatively smooth, as no military intervention was involved. However, political factionalism, turmoil, and animosities did not subside. Party and personal interests were always placed ahead of national interests. The fierce rivalry between the AL and the BNP continued. This time it was Zia’s (and the BNP’s) turn to stage regular demonstrations and strikes to paralyze the AL government. They were mostly demonstrations for the sake of demonstrating, chiefly based on party politics, personalities, and even family animosities.

——Bangladeshi Institutions——237

In spite of ongoing disruptions, Prime Minister Hasina was able to achieve some legislative successes. On the international front, the Hasina regime concluded a historic thirty-year Ganges watersharing treaty with India. According to the treaty, Bangladesh was assured of at least 35,000 cusecs (cubic feet per second) of water during the critical dry period. On the domestic front, the new government scored several legislative achievements (Kochanek 1998). For instance, the Hasina regime succeeded in enacting in September 1997 an important initiative for women in government, a measure that reserves for women 30 percent of directly elected seats in the 4,298 local councils. It also opened the Bangabandhu Bridge in 1998 across the Jamuna River, thus directly linking the eastern half of the country with the western portion for the first time (Rashiduzzaman 2001). Despite many of her notable legislative achievements, Sheik Hasina’s regime was marred by political strife, police brutality, violence, and charges of widespread corruption. In addition, the country was hit by several natural disasters, the most notable being the catastrophic flooding and cyclone of 1998.

The Second Begum Zia Regime (2001–) As the Hasina government approached the end of its electoral term, a new general election was held on October 1, 2001. The AL suffered a major defeat, and the BNP enjoyed a landslide victory. Consequently, Begum Zia returned to power after being on the sideline since 1996 as an opposition leader. Her government was formed on October 10. Unfortunately, after the election results became public, the country witnessed widespread violence and incidents of minority repression. It is alleged that BNP activists and certain components of its alliance parties actively participated in these incidents, which included attacks on AL leaders and activists and ransacking of their houses and properties. Scuffles also ensued over control of dormitories at many educational institutions, markets, launch and bus terminals, airport areas, and slums. Zia’s newly formed government failed to take immediate and necessary steps to stop such attacks on religious minorities and AL supporters. So far, it has failed to curb political violence against the opposition parties.

238——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Bangladeshi prime minister and Bangladesh Nationalist Party chairperson Khaleda Zia. In 1991 Zia was elected the country’s first woman prime minister. Following the October 2001 parliamentary election, she became prime minister for the second time. (AFP/CORBIS)

Crime is on the rise. Within the first thirty days of the new government, political killings totaled 262. Instead of going after the criminals, Begum Zia’s new government has targeted the reporters, journalists, and columnists who publish reports of such crimes committed by BNP cadres. Even after thirty years of freedom and ten years of democratic experiment, any sensible and necessary exercise of political civility and respect for opposition parties remains alien in Bangladesh. As a consequence, the prospect of political stability is still brittle despite the practice of electoral politics. If the current regime continues to walk down the path of physical violence and revenge against its opposition parties, as it seems to have done so far, it will have only succeeded in perpetuating the cycle of violence and in undermining national interests. Such a path will only make a mockery of democracy as a civic exercise and process. After all, in politics, what goes around comes around. Violence breeds more violence.

——Bangladeshi Institutions——239

Bangladesh and the World With respect to the physical constraint on global links, Bangladesh’s situation is vastly different from that of Nepal. With direct access to the sea, Bangladesh is much better positioned than Nepal to establish a much wider and freer network of external contacts. At the same time, however, it was precisely because of its easy sea access that Bangladesh came under British subjugation, whereas landlocked Nepal was able to defend and protect its sovereignty. As the British superseded Mughal dominance, Bengal’s links to the world became much more expansive in terms of both European cultural influence and geographical scope. Bangladesh, to put it simply, has a long history of global contact, although mostly as a subjugated land until 1971. Only after its emergence as a sovereign nation was it able to establish independent links to the world without being openly dictated by some outside power. In the arena of external relations, there are few countries in the world whose ties to Bangladesh run as deep as India’s. Notwithstanding occasional tensions between the two countries on the diplomatic front, they are inseparably linked—geographically, historically, culturally, and economically. Until 1947, as two administratively divided parts of greater Bengal, they both belonged to the same geographical entity called the British Raj and, prior to that, Mughal India. Besides geography and some of the major rivers, they share their rich Bengali history, heritage, and culture. At no point since the partition of British India was this shared history more forcefully demonstrated than in late 1971, when India intervened on behalf of Bangladeshi freedom fighters waging a war for independence against the occupation forces of West Pakistan (see “Geography and History of Bangladesh”). Few would deny that India’s military assistance was critical for Bangladesh’s relatively quick victory. Although India had its own vested interest in its neighbor’s liberation, its role in 1971 has left indelible marks in the relations between the two neighbors. Even now, what transpires in Bangladesh is often a close reflection of the events taking place in its giant next-door neighbor. In addition, India is the main source of popular culture in Bangladesh. Although their diplomatic relations have evolved and under-

240——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

gone significant changes since independence, the ties remain embedded. During the Mujib era, the relationship was extremely close, partly because of the gratitude that President Mujib felt for India’s immense support during the war—militarily as well as in terms of humanitarian aid to some 10 million refugees who flocked across the border to avoid atrocities committed by the West Pakistani military. Following Mujib’s assassination, relations between the two countries entered a period of chill and strain until the mid1990s. When Mujib’s daughter Sheikh Hasina Wajid became prime minister in 1996, relations took a new turn, almost reaching the level of warmth and friendliness that prevailed during the very early years of independence. Regardless of the hot-and-cold nature of their relations, the two countries are major trading partners. India is a big foreign market for Bangladeshi exports and the largest source of its imports, including many raw materials. Yet Bangladesh remains somewhat wary of India’s regional interests and intentions as well as of its occasional tendency to act like a bully on the block that is ready to flex its muscle against its smaller neighbors, as it did in 1989 against Nepal by imposing an economic embargo. Since its independence, Bangladesh has played a visible role in the regional affairs of South Asia. Particularly notable is the leading part it took in the founding of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to promote regional cooperation in the arena of economic development and cultural exchange among South Asian nations. Given its general neutrality on most regional issues, Bangladesh has managed to maintain close relations with all of its South Asian neighbors, that is, SAARC members, including Pakistan. As naturally expected, Pakistan was hostile toward Bangladesh in the early 1970s, following independence. However, as it came to terms with Bangladesh’s independent status and destiny, Pakistan formally recognized the new nation in February 1974 and later established diplomatic relations, followed by communication and transportation links between the two nations. Bangladesh’s relations with other Asian nations also stand on a sound foundation, although its relations with China were relatively sour in the early 1970s. For example, in 1972, China, in order to demonstrate its close ties with Pakistan, vetoed Bangladesh’s initial attempt to join the United Nations. But during a second

——Bangladeshi Institutions——241

attempt in 1974, China expressed no objection since Pakistan had already recognized Bangladesh. In 1976, China exchanged diplomatic missions with Bangladesh. Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji’s visit to Bangladesh in January 2002 is certainly bound to further cement the expanding diplomatic ties between the two nations. Although the United States recognized Bangladesh in April 1972, shortly after its independence, relations between the two countries remained relatively cool, mainly because the United States had close relations with Pakistan. What is more, the United States had supplied the Pakistan army with military equipment in addition to having stationed its Seventh Fleet in the Bay of Bengal during the war as a show of support to Pakistan. These moves had left most Bangladeshis feeling bitter over U.S. open opposition to their liberation aspirations and struggles against Pakistan. However, time healed the wounds between the two nations, and by the late 1980s the United States had become one of Bangladesh’s closest international friends, as well as a major donor, operating a wide variety of economic development projects in the country. The U.S. commitment was further reinforced by President Bill Clinton’s visit to Bangladesh in March 2000. In addition to the above ties, Bangladesh has friendly relations with Great Britain, its one-time colonial ruler, and other European countries, many of which offer development assistance to the country on a regular basis. Diplomatic relations with Bangladesh also extend to Middle Eastern and other Muslim countries as well as many African countries. In short, its link to the world is quite wide and far-reaching in terms of diplomatic ties and missions.

ETHNICITY AND SOCIAL SYSTEM Ethnic Groups Ethnically, 98 percent of Bangladeshis are Bengalis and predominantly speak Bengali as their principal language. In terms of their origin, they belong to a branch of the Indo-Aryans who entered the subcontinent around 2000 B.C. (Baxter and Rahman 1989). Prior to their arrival, the Bengal region was populated by Dravidians, whose physical characteristics of shorter stature and darker skin

242——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Questionnaire survey being conducted by rural villagers (Courtesy of Bimal K. Paul)

are still seen in Bangladesh. The Santals, a tribal group that lives in the Barind region of North Bengal, are considered to be Dravidian descendants. Half a million Bihari Muslims, who originally migrated from Bihar after the partition of British India, mostly live in Bangladesh’s cities. Although their mother tongue is Bihari, most now speak Bengali as well. During the Pakistani period (1947–1971), most Biharis were either engaged in commerce or employed in the railway sector. In 1971 about one million Biharis lived in Bangladesh. Their number has consistently decreased since then because many have migrated to Pakistan, where they find a more receptive environment than in Bangladesh, which has tended to view them with suspicion due to their unyielding support of the Pakistani military operation during the war for inde-

——Bangladeshi Institutions——243

pendence. In addition, their stalwart use of Urdu, the national language of Pakistan, as their primary language does little to alleviate such suspicion. According to the 1991 census, the tribal population of Bangladesh was 1.2 million, which constituted slightly over 1 percent of the country’s total population. More than a dozen tribal groups are found in Bangladesh. The four largest tribes are the Chakmas, Marmas (or Maghs), Tipperas (or Triras), and Mros (or Moorangs). Mostly of Mongoloid origin, they are largely the only ones who are physically distinct from the vast majority of Bangladeshis who, in general, look similar whether they are of Indo-Aryan or Dravidian origin. The tribal populations are mainly concentrated in the districts of Bandarban, Khagrachhari, and Rangamati, all located in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) region, in north and northeastern parts of Sylhet, and in the northern part of the greater Mymensingh district. Tribal members also differ from the Bengalis in terms of their social organizations, marriage customs, birth and death rites, food, and other social customs, as well as language and religion. Various tribes tend to intermingle and can be distinguished from one another more by differences in their customs than by tribal cohesion. Except for Chakmas and Marmas, no other tribal groups have any formal tribal organization. Among the tribal groups, Chakmas are the ones who seem to have adopted many elements of the Bengali culture. Moreover, they are more often formally educated than are members of other groups. Most tribal people are poor, and farming is the main occupation. Although some tribal groups still practice shifting cultivation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts region, the area under shifting cultivation has been consistently declining. Consequently, the pressure on their fundamental means of survival has intensified.

Social System More than three-fourths of the total population live in rural areas. The basic social unit both in rural and urban areas is the family (paribar, or gushti). A family generally consists of several members who live together in a homestead (bari) and share the same kitchen (chula). Married sons generally live in their parents’

244——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

household during the father’s lifetime. A bari consists of two to six houses around a square or rectangular courtyard. Bari residents are in most instances divided into households living in separate houses that are used for sleeping, storage, and cooking, and they are usually members of the same patrilineal paribar. Above the bari level, patrilineal kin ties are linked into sequentially larger groups based on real, fictional, or assumed relationships. In rural Bangladesh, members of several baris usually form a community or society (samaj). Usually a samaj is based on a neighborhood (para), which is intermediate between the bari and the village. A neighborhood is a cluster of adjacent baris, the formation of which is usually conditioned by occupational, religious, social, or topographical factors. Several neighborhoods form a village. Small villages often consist of only one neighborhood. A samaj is a voluntary informal social organization that includes members from the same or different kin groups. The leader of a samaj is called matabdar or sardar, a titular position generally held by a member of a wealthy family. The leader usually settles village disputes. Among many functions, a samaj maintains a mosque and members of a samaj help other members with money (loans) and advice. Typically, there are several samajs within a village, each competing for influence over villagers and struggling for resources from local administrative and development offices. However, the samaj system is normally absent in cities, for kinship ties that often form the basis for rural communities are usually limited and fragile among urban dwellers. Family and kinship reside at the core of social life in rural Bangladesh. A family group residing in a bari represents the primary economic unit. Patrilineal ties dominate the basis of family life, but matrilineal ties also are important. Marriage is an important event in a family. Similar to Nepali marriages, the vast majority of Bangladeshi marriages are arranged. Parents in both rural and urban areas generally select spouses for their children. But men frequently exercise some influence over the choice of their spouses, especially in urban areas where so-called love marriage— a process in which young men and women select their own marriage partners—is becoming increasingly common. Arranged marriages are often preceded by extensive negotiations between the families of the prospective bride and groom. Even among those

——Bangladeshi Institutions——245

who are engaged in love marriages, parents tend to formalize the process before the marriage actually takes place. The dowry system, a common custom in most parts of India and Nepal, has now gained popularity among Muslims of Bangladesh. Unlike in the Hindu society of India or Nepal, no formal caste system exists among the Muslims in Bangladesh. However, there are several hierarchically arranged groups within Muslim society, such as the syeds (noble born). At the opposite end are jolhas (weavers) and kulus (a specific group of people whose traditional function or role in society is to process mustard oil). Still, Muslim society in Bangladesh is not rigidly stratified; rather, it is open, fluid, and diffused, without a cohesive social organization and social structure. Social class distinctions are mostly functional, for there is considerable mobility among classes, invariably based on economic status and social standing. Even the structure of the Hindu caste system among the Hindus of Bangladesh is relatively loose in that most of them belong to the scheduled caste, previously known as the Untouchables. In essence, there is only one caste. So the complexity of the caste system and intricate intercaste relations that characterizes Hindu society in India and Nepal are rarely an issue in Bangladesh because of the caste uniformity among its Hindu population.

RELIGION AND SOCIETY Religion takes center court in Bangladeshi society and life. Although followers of several religions live in Bangladesh, the majority of the population are Muslims, followed by Hindus, Buddhists, and Christians. Islam is by far the most dominant religion, with 88 percent of the people adhering to it. Hindus constitute roughly 11 percent, and the rest belong to Buddhism and Christianity. Some tribal people living in the southeastern hills of the country are animists. With the exception of Hindus, minority religious groups are found in specific geographical pockets. Islam, unlike Hinduism and Buddhism, is not indigenous to the region. It is a religion that was introduced by Muslim (Moslem) invaders from West Asia. It all started with the Turkish conquest of the subcontinent, a process that lasted several centuries. The conquest began in Afghanistan around A.D. 1000 and moved eastward

246——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

A mosque on the Meghna River in Narayanganj (Roger Wood/CORBIS)

to India. By the early thirteenth century, Bengal fell to Turkish armies as the Hindu Sena dynasty was dismantled. Subsequently, Bengal was subjugated to the Delhi sultanate, established in 1206. During the drawn-out process of Muslim invasion and conquest, Hindus were forced to either convert to Islam or flee for safety. Many fled to the hills of Nepal. Some resisted, and countless were killed. Just as Christianity has found a receptive population among lowcaste Hindus, Muslim invaders had little difficulty in proselytizing Untouchables and other low-caste Hindus, who were attracted to its casteless system and espousal of egalitarianism (Rahim 1989). It is

——Bangladeshi Institutions——247

Thousands of Muslim devotees offered midday prayer during the World Congregation of Islamic Preachers at Tongi in 2002. The annual congregation teaches the tenets of Islam and the practice of peace and harmony. (AP Photo/Pavel Rahman)

because of this low-caste acceptance of Islam that high-caste Hindus to this day generally view Muslims as Untouchables. (There are still some orthodox Hindus in parts of India and Nepal who consider themselves polluted if they come in physical contact with Muslims. In such cases, they undergo some ritual to cleanse themselves.) Moreover, the history of Islamic invasion lies at the root of much of the Hindu-Muslim conflict in South Asia, including the entrenched animosity between India and Pakistan. The origin of Islam dates back to the early 600s, when the Prophet Muhammad preached a series of his divine revelations in Mecca, which has since then become the most important pilgrimage for Muslims across the world. Following Muhammad’s death, his followers compiled his teachings in what is known as the Quran, the holy scripture of Islam. As a religion, Islam is one of the branches of Abraham’s (Ibrahim in the Arabic/Islam canon) triple heritage: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Its five pillars (duties),

248——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

to which every Muslim is supposed to adhere, are recitation of the testimony or shahadah (kalima in Bengali), daily prayer or salat (namaj in Bengali), almsgiving or zakat (jakat; donations to the poor), fasting or sawm (roja in Bengali), and pilgrimage or hajj. The devout Muslim prays five times a day, facing Mecca: at dawn, midday, midafternoon, sunset, and nightfall. Public prayer is a widely practiced aspect of Bangladeshi Muslim society. Ramadan is perhaps the most important celebration of Islam, at least the one most well known in the West. It is a period of obligatory fasting in commemoration of God’s revelation to Muhammad. It falls during the ninth month of the Muslim calendar, which is based on a lunar system—and so Ramadan occurs during various seasons in different years. During the month of fasting, all Muslims (except the sick, the weak, pregnant or lactating women, and soldiers on duty) are supposed to avoid eating, drinking, smoking, and sexual intercourse during daylight hours. If Ramadan falls during the rice planting season, when heavy physical work is required of farmers and peasants, it imposes considerable hardship on them. Id al Fitr, a feast celebrated in the Muslim world, marks the end of the month of fasting. In addition, somewhat similar to other major religions, pilgrimage is crucial to Islam. At least once in his or her lifetime, every Muslim should, if possible, make the hajj to Mecca during the twelfth month of the Muslim calendar. The pilgrim, dressed in a white seamless garment, is required to abstain from sexual relations, shaving and cutting of hair, and nail-paring (Rahim 1989). Although monotheist like Christianity and Buddhism, Islam has many sects, Sunni and Shia being the two most prominent and widely recognized. Almost all Bangladeshi Muslims belong to the Sunni branch. Followers of the Shia faith mostly reside in cities. Additionally, there is a type of Islamic mysticism known as Sufism. This tradition emphasizes love of God rather than fear of God and stresses a direct, unstructured, personal devotion to God in place of ritualistic, outward observance of the faith. The spiritual leaders of the Sufi tradition are called fakirs or pirs. Although they do not normally gravitate toward the material world, some pirs in Bangladesh have taken an active interest in politics either by running for public office or by supporting other candidates. In Islam there has been a perennial tension between the ulema,

——Bangladeshi Institutions——249

Muslim scholars trained in Islamic theology, and the Sufis. Although a formal organization of ordained priests has no basis in Islam, ulemas have traditionally provided the orthodox leadership of the Muslim community. They unofficially interpret and administer religious laws. Ulemas include maulavis, imams, maulanas, and mullahs. Most maulavis and imams are formally educated in religious schools called madrasas. Imams lead congregational prayers, whereas mullahs perform marriage and funeral ceremonies. Many villagers are ardent followers of ulemas.

EDUCATION At the time of independence, Bangladesh inherited what is called the British system of education, which was introduced during the colonial era. Emphasis on British education led to the growth of an elite class that provided clerical and administrative support to the colonial administration; they served as the internal agents of colonialism. During the quarter century of Pakistani rule, no significant change occurred in Bangladesh’s educational system. After independence, successive governments introduced various reforms to make education accessible to the general masses, both geographically and socially. The emphasis shifted from the British to American educational system, with greater emphasis on technical education and vocational training.

Educational System Formal education in Bangladesh begins with five years of primary education, followed by another five years of study to complete secondary education. After secondary education, two more years of study are required to obtain a higher secondary education degree. An additional two to four years of study are required to obtain a college degree, which precedes a graduate degree at the university level. Both technical and nontechnical degrees are offered by various educational institutions of Bangladesh. Development efforts in the late 1980s included programs to provide low-cost vocational education to the rural populace. In 1997, there were 77,685 primary schools, with a total student population of 18 million. The student-teacher ratio was as

250——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

high as 57 students per teacher. In view of the importance of education for human resource development, Bangladesh has made universal primary education a major objective of its educational plans. Although the enrollment of primary students has risen over time, the retention rates have generally fallen short of governmental goals. High annual dropout rates are common throughout the country’s educational system, but it is particularly problematic for primary schools. The dropout rate has been estimated to be between 50 and 60 percent. Agricultural dependency and rampant poverty are two major culprits behind such high attrition rates, which are most acute in rural areas, where children constitute a vital source of agrarian labor (BBS 1994, 135). Bangladesh had 13,419 secondary schools, with over 6 million students, in 1997. Secondary education for the most part is private, but it is heavily subsidized by the government. At the secondary level, some schools are coeducational and others are exclusively for female students. The same is true at the college level. Postsecondary education is offered first at the intermediate college level (which is equivalent to the associate degree in the United States) and then at the undergraduate level, which requires two more years of college education following the intermediate degree. In 1997, nearly 3 million students were enrolled in 1,773 intermediate and 1,571 degree colleges within Bangladesh, with nearly 85 percent of them being privately operated. The country also is home to technical institutes, including five engineering colleges, eighteen medical colleges, and one dental college. Most of the engineering and medical colleges are government-owned. Admission into these colleges is highly competitive. As a result, several technical colleges were established during the 1980s and 1990s to accommodate a growing number of students interested in pursuing such degrees. But the fees required to attend private technical colleges are beyond the reach of middleincome families. Following the undergraduate degree, one can pursue a higher degree at the university level or what is called graduate studies in the United States. Unlike in U.S. universities, which offer both graduate and undergraduate curricula, universities in Bangladesh are generally confined to graduate studies at the master’s and Ph.D. levels. In 1997, there were twenty-seven general universities in

——Bangladeshi Institutions——251

Bangladesh, with about 40 percent of them being designated as public universities. In addition, several technical universities, such as the Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology in Dhaka and the Agricultural University in Mymensingh, exist. Altogether, more than 100,000 students were registered at the university level in 1997. One huge educational problem facing Bangladesh is high student-teacher ratios at all levels. Further compounding this serious problem is the lack of qualified teachers. Because education is often provided by underqualified or even unqualified teachers, its quality has degraded with each successive generation. In 1997, there were more than fifty primary school teacher and fifteen secondary school teacher training colleges. The government also provides training for science teachers. To the dismay of most people, these training institutions have a long way to go before they can rectify the chronic shortage of qualified educators, especially at the lower level. At the college and university levels, perhaps the most serious problem is the scarcity of good textbooks, research facilities, and research incentives for professors. Most professors are sparsely engaged in serious and original research; they have limited access to recent publications to keep current with ongoing theoretical developments and empirical studies in their respective fields. Many science and engineering classes lack necessary laboratory facilities.

Literacy Literacy plays a critical role in social, political, and economic progress, for its extent often reflects the level of national development. Unfortunately, literacy is low in Bangladesh. Although the current average literacy rate had jumped from 25 percent in 1991 to 40 percent in 1997, it remains quite low compared to many East and Southeast Asian countries. No less troubling is the fact that there are substantial gaps between rural and urban areas and between male and female literacy rates. In 1999 the adult male (ages 15 and over) literacy rate was 52 percent, compared to only 29 percent for adult females. The literacy rates were quite similar at the youth level (ages 15–24): 60 percent for males and 39 percent for females (World Bank 2001). In an agrar-

252——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

ian society like Bangladesh, low female literacy is a major barrier to rural and agricultural development, which, by the way, acts as a linchpin of national development. In light of the fact that women are actively involved in farming decisions, their literacy would significantly facilitate agricultural extension work, designed to enhance agricultural performance. Moreover, low literacy rates tend to place a damper on widespread family planning adoption in rural areas, where it is quite low but much needed. Overall, however, literacy tends to be higher among the younger age groups than within the older population segments, a situation that clearly reflects the government’s current emphasis on children’s education.

Religious Education As an Islamic country, the government supports religious education at several levels. In the late 1980s, efforts were being made to modernize madrasas (schools of Islamic education attached to a mosque) to introduce science and vocational courses in their curricula under the Bangladesh Madrasa Education Board. In 1975, there were 1,830 madrasas, with a total of 291,191 students. After the change of political power in 1975, their numbers increased, reaching 6,655 madrasas and 2 million students in 1997. There are more than fifty madrasas for female students in Bangladesh. The number of female students is higher at primary level madrasas (Dakil) than those at higher levels, reflecting lower priorities on female education at madrasas (see Hashmi 2000). Most primary, secondary, and postsecondary madrasas are directly run by the government. Before the political change in 1975, most of the madrasas were dependent on public charity and endowments. Madrasa graduates usually become imams at mosques or teach at secular schools. Based on their qualifications, they are also eligible for government jobs. The education sector in Bangladesh is relatively underdeveloped compared to international and regional standards. Although there is a need to improve education at all levels, added emphasis should be given to primary education, not only because it is the foundation of further education but also because it entices people to be more receptive to more education and to the forces of mod-

——Bangladeshi Institutions——253

Bangladeshi boys read Arabic scripture at a Muslim school, called a madrasa, in Dhaka. (Reuters NewMedia Inc./CORBIS)

ernization. Similar emphasis should also be given for female, technical, and scientific education.

CONCLUSION Bangladesh is facing many political, social, and economic problems. The principal causes of these problems are political instability and intolerance, lack of accountability, inefficient administration, and widespread corruption at all levels. There is widespread public uneasiness about the lack of discipline in political management and in the maintenance of law and order. Bureaucracy, corruption, bribery, patronage, and political violence have developed a life of their own, thus making governance difficult. Any sense of civility and democratic respect for opposition is sorely missing from the political scene (see Rahman 2000; Rashiduzzaman 2001). And national interests have taken a back seat to personal and party agendas, which rule supreme. As a result, genuine pol-

254——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

icy reforms and policy implementations are politically coopted and routinely undermined. References Baxter, Craig, and Syedur Rahman. 1989. Historical Dictionary of Bangladesh. Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press. Blood, Peter R. 1989. “Historical Setting.” Pp. 1–41 in Bangladesh: A Country Study (Area Handbook Series), James Heitzman and Robert L. Worden, eds. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress. Hashmi, Taj I. 2000. Women and Islam in Bangladesh: Beyond Subjection and Tyranny. London: Macmillan Press. Heitzman, James, and Robert L. Worden, eds. 1989. Bangladesh: A Country Study. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress. Hossain, Golam. 1995. “Bangladesh in 1994: Democracy at Risk.” Asian Survey 35: 171–178. Kochanek, Stanley A. 1998. “Bangladesh in 1997: The Honeymoon Is over.” Asian Survey 38: 135–141. Rahman, Mohammad H. 2000. “Human Rights in Bangladesh: Diversity in Civil Society and NGO Action.” Asian Affairs 22: 5–28. Rashiduzzaman, M. 2001. “Bangladesh in 2000: Searching for Better Governance?” Asian Survey 41: 122–130.

Bangladeshi Society and Contemporary Issues There is a website called Bangladesh Showbiz, which is entirely devoted to providing an extensive coverage of Bangladesh’s celebrities. It is all about “who’s who” and “who is up to what” in Dhaka’s “Dhallywood,” as it is called following the lead of Bollywood (Bombay’s showbiz world), which itself is a mimicry of Hollywood. Recently the website reported on its opening page that “These days, you’re nobody in Dhaka ShowBiz until you have a secret lover and a remarkable marriage coverage in publications.” This is quite a remark, a remark that clearly highlights the direction of the country’s popular culture. The web page is filled with the portraits of glittery and glamorous actors and actresses who adorn the landscape of Dhaka’s showbiz world. It is these celebrities that Bangladeshis follow and try to emulate. The sardonic reality is that these days they are bigger than any national cause or national leaders. Such is the parody of Bangladesh’s rapidly spreading popular cultural drama, which is being played out in the midst of massive poverty. In an interview with Bangladesh Showbiz, one of Dhaka’s hot celebrities of the 1960s stated that “the younger generation is under absolute grip of satellite culture. . . . Sadly, we now see a yawning gap between the younger generation and our traditional culture. If I may be allowed I would say we are living in a time of cultural ailment” (Bangladesh Showbiz 2002). The question of whether Bangladesh and its people suffer from “cultural ailment” may be moot in the face of deepening modernization. Every dose of modernization or Western cultural influence inevitably transforms the popular cultural landscape of every society it penetrates. And Bangladesh is no exception. As Bangladeshis succumb to the allure of Western popular culture in increasing numbers, with Dhallywood acting as its prime conduit, the country’s rich and indigenous cultural heritage is overshadowed. It is precisely this tendency of Western popular culture to reduce the

255

256——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

value of indigenous culture that becomes a source of tension and conflict between modernity and traditionalism, between the older generation and the younger generation, often giving rise to religious fundamentalism. Although Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh is relatively less charged than its counterpart in some Middle Eastern countries, it is on the rise among certain segments of the Muslim population. The recent victory of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party is partially explained by this rise because BNP has, from its very inception, been aligned with Islamic fundamentalists. In fact, it was only with the support of Jamaat e Islami, the Islamic fundamentalist party of the country, that BNP was able to form its first government in 1991 under Khaleda Zia as prime minister. With this backdrop, this chapter now discusses some of the contemporary issues facing the nation of Bangladesh.

CULTURE OF CORRUPTION AND VIOLENCE Despite some progress in fields such as family planning, education, and poverty alleviation since independence, lawlessness, corruption, and cultural tensions have become common in Bangladesh. And the relatively low status of women and child labor continue to linger.

Lawlessness and Corruption Over the years, the law-and-order situation in Bangladesh has deteriorated, threatening the normal activity and peaceful living of virtually every citizen. People do not feel safe at work, on the street, or even at home; they are frustrated and tension-ridden. The situation has already hindered social development, weakened the economy, and placed the future of the country’s democracy in jeopardy. Robberies, stealing, illegal toll collections, pickpocketing, drug addiction, rapes, kidnapping, hijacking and abduction, deaths in police custody, and campus violence have become commonplace. Any sense of security has been shattered as crimes and violence engulf cities, towns, and even remote villages. In the period from 1997 to 2001, nearly 4,000 people were murdered annually in Bangladesh, and several thousands more were victims of criminal activities. And political killings are climbing. As a consequence of increasing violence, the level of trust

——Bangladeshi Society and Contemporary Issues——257

appears to have gone down. Obviously, this lack of trust extends to the whole establishment of law enforcement. A question rises: What is the problem with law enforcement in Bangladesh? Although scant verifiable hard data is available, it is common knowledge that most law enforcement agencies and agents are corrupt. Their primary modus operandi is bribes. If one can afford to bribe them, that individual can get anything done or get away with anything, including murder. In other words, the law in Bangladesh generally seems to apply only to those who cannot afford to—or refuse to—bribe. This whole entrenched network of corruption is further reinforced by the fact that pressure from influential politicians or political leaders prevents law enforcement personnel from performing their official duties. It is widely known that many criminals operate under the umbrella of “godfathers,” people who are financially powerful and who have direct links to political power brokers. Given this scenario, the general public has little trust in law enforcement agencies to apply laws justly and fairly. What all of this means is that violence and corruption are sanctioned by the underhanded operation of politics no matter what politicians claim on the surface in their loud rhetoric against corruption. Recently, one adviser to the caretaker government blamed the political parties for patronizing terrorist activities and for much of the ongoing political violence across the country. Yet the political violence continues under the new government that came to power in October 2001. In fact, corruption runs so deep that policemen often arrest people for minor infractions mainly to extract bribes. Those who fail to stuff some money in police pockets are detained. News reports suggest that custodial deaths are rising across the country. Evidence of police obstruction of press freedom through attacks on journalists is mounting, and the much-promised autonomy of the electronic media has yet to be fulfilled (Rahman 2000). It should be noted, however, that violence is not limited to streets and private domains; it has also spread to college and university campuses. Campus violence and fighting between rival student groups and between student groups and policemen are frequent. Each major political party has a student wing, for student support is quite important for their vitality. Every year, students die because of clashes. At times, they use firearms during conflicts. After each such

258——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

death, the campus is officially closed for days, thus disrupting education. For example, institutions were closed forty-one times during 1992 as a direct result of a series of conflicts between student activists; fifty-seven violent incidents were recorded at Dhaka University alone, where five students and two outsiders were killed and forty-four were wounded. In some instances, political groupism among the faculty erupts into violence as well. To exacerbate an already volatile situation, campus dormitories (hostels) sometimes provide shelter to nonstudent activists and hooligans. According to some estimates, there are more than 100,000 illegal arms in the country, with 50,000 being concentrated in Dhaka. Political use of criminals has been so endemic that gangsters and armed criminals have been glorified by their respective political party patrons as “armed cadres” and their crimes justified. Since the mid-1990s, there has been an increase in the incidents of bomb explosions in processions and in public meetings by rival political groups. Six explosions claimed about eighty lives in a recent thirty-month period. At least 350 people were injured in these acts of terrorism, many of them disabled for life. A foreign panel report recently identified Bangladesh’s lawenforcement agencies as the most corrupt in the world. Transparency International–Bangladesh (TIB) also found those agencies and senior government officials among the most corrupt. But the boundary of corruption reaches far beyond law-enforcement agencies and other government officials and politicians. Even educational and medical institutions are not immune. TIB’s analysis of corruption trends confirms both the general public impression and concerns raised by such multilateral agencies as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and Amnesty International. The TIB study points to the staggering loss of at least $160 million during the last half of the year 2000 due to corruption. Similarly, a World Bank analysis has suggested how GDP growth in Bangladesh would be markedly higher, at least by 2 percent, if corruption could be contained.

Gender Violence Sporadic gender violence has a long history in Bangladesh, similar to other South Asian countries. However, it was generally limited to some verbal and physical abuse; deliberate murders of women

——Bangladeshi Society and Contemporary Issues——259

Bangladeshi women shout slogans during a demonstration in Dhaka in 2000 demanding the end to violence committed against women. In Bangladesh violence against women takes many forms including wife beating, maiming by acid and rape, and physical and verbal harassment. (AFP/CORBIS)

260——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

were rarely carried out. Now violence against women has taken a new twist and reached a new height. Deaths of women due to unnatural causes have gone up dramatically in recent years (Hashmi 2000, 3). Divorce and desertion by men, sexual abuse, and psychological violence of women have also seen a steady ascent. Two major contemporary trends of gender violence in Bangladesh are acid incidents and international trafficking of women and girls. Acid Violence. Acid violence refers to vicious attacks on women whereby acid is thrown or poured at a woman’s face, causing disfiguration. This type of violence is quite new and has increased at an alarming proportion. Accurate statistics of acid violence are difficult to obtain, but it was recently reported that nearly 250 incidents occur every year in Bangladesh. Available information suggests that most victims of acid violence are unmarried women under twenty years of age from poor to middle-class rural families. Perpetrators are usually jilted or unrequited lovers and frustrated dowry-seekers, though some are husbands who, failing to get enough dowry from their wives’ parents, pour acid on their faces. Sometimes daughters are disfigured by their parents for marrying against their fathers’ wishes. Laws in Bangladesh have been specifically established to curb escalating acid violence. For example, if found guilty, an offender may be sentenced to death or life imprisonment together with a substantial monetary penalty for the offender and his family. In reality, however, the perpetrators of acid attacks invariably go unpunished due to the lack of initiative on the part of the police in pursuing investigations and making arrests. Such an absence of conviction is attributed to the fact that attackers often come from wealthy families and bribe concerned authorities. In addition, some criminals receive protection from their political parties, while others take advantage of loopholes in the existing laws. Some escape punishment because no witnesses exist. The end result is that convictions for acid violence are rare. Female Trafficking and Sexual Bondage. Bangladeshi women and girls are being increasingly trafficked to neighboring or Middle Eastern countries with the false promise of employment (Paul and Hasnath 2000). Trafficking refers to the illegal exportation of women and girls from their homes primarily for the purpose of

——Bangladeshi Society and Contemporary Issues——261

forced labor, domestic servitude, or sexual exploitation. The oil boom created a large demand for labor in many Middle Eastern countries with relatively low populations. The labor demand in these countries extended to domestic servants for wealthy households. Legal and illegal female migrants from Bangladesh turned out to be a cheap and convenient response to this demand. Largescale migration of both male and female Bangladeshi laborers to Middle Eastern countries started in 1976. Estimating the number of women and girls involved in trafficking is difficult because little accurate information is available. A recent report claims that, annually, some 15,000 Bangladeshi women and girls are taken out of the country by traffickers, and thousands more leave voluntarily in an attempt to escape abject poverty each year. Although a vast majority of girls and women are promised employment in the Middle East, large numbers of them actually end up in India and Pakistan. According to Pakistan’s Lawyers for Human Rights and Legal Aid (PLHRLA), more than 200,000 Bangladeshi women and girls are being held in sexual bondage in Pakistan. Some 14,000 are thought to be working in the brothels of Calcutta, and more in Mumbai (Bombay), India’s two largest cities. Many of those who end up in the Middle East are sexually exploited and physically abused by their employers.

Other Violence The road to democracy in Bangladesh—that is, responsible and mutually respectful exercise of democratic rights—seems to be paved with thorns. On the one hand, newspapers have come under growing attack as their offices are ransacked and journalists assaulted and arrested. Some of these attacks are orchestrated not only by mobs but also by political and fundamentalist organizations. They rely more on violence than public debates to settle ideological disputes, to defend their views or to counter opposing views. On the other hand, ethnic minorities of Bangladesh continue to struggle for realization of their rights (CCHRB 1995). They are victims of various forms of oppression, violence, and even killing by nonminority groups who settle in areas predominantly inhabited by ethnic minorities. The situation of religious minorities is hardly any better. Migration of minority Hindus from

262——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Bangladesh to India continues precisely because of discrimination and violence, sometimes perceived and other times real. It is no wonder, therefore, that the Hindu population in Bangladesh has declined from about a million in the 1970s to about 600,000 in the early 1990s.

WOMEN’S STATUS IN SOCIETY The preceding discussion reveals that in Bangladesh, women’s fate is still largely left in the hands of their male counterparts and that their overall status is low. This does not mean that there has been no improvement in women’s status in recent years. To begin with, the country has been governed by women since 1991, first by Prime Minister Khaleda Zia (1991–1996) and then by Sheikh Hasina Wajid (1996–2001). Now Mrs. Zia is back in power again. This is a political feat that not too many advanced countries can boast. Furthermore, in 1997, the government held elections to elect women to occupy seats reserved for women in the local councils. This step has led to women’s political empowerment. And, legally, the Constitution grants equal rights to women in all spheres of public life. Despite these advances, women’s overall status remains low. As they still bear a disproportionately large share of poverty, women generally suffer from malnutrition and poor health. Other development indicators such as educational levels and employment status are hardly any better, as women are often relegated to work as domestic maids, secretaries, or in some other role of lowly employment. Almost 90 percent of the laborers in the garment industry are women. In short, women are still viewed mainly in terms of their reproductive and domestic roles, and their status in society is closely associated with the purdah, which is deeply rooted in Islamic dogmas. The word literally means a curtain or veil, and the practice epitomizes the exclusion of women from public male spaces. Their activities are, therefore, mostly confined to the domestic front. The purdah is often seen as a symbol of the patriarchal family structure that enables men to dominate women, particularly those who live in rural areas. Men usually exert power and authority over women because the former controls property and income, and

——Bangladeshi Society and Contemporary Issues——263

The status of Bangladeshi women remains low, and they are commonly relegated to serving domestic roles. This women is cooking outdoors, which is usually done over a coal or firewood stove. (Courtesy of Bimal K. Paul)

because husbands generally are five to fifteen years older than their wives (Paul 1992). The purdah and patriarchal family structure have produced a relatively rigid division of labor by gender and a system of social stratification that makes women dependent on husbands or other male relatives. The women’s apparent insurance against such potential risks is having children, especially sons, who confer some status and autonomy on a young woman. Unlike Muslim women, Hindu women do not practice purdah. Similarly, tribal women are also free from it. In this sense, nonMuslim women are less constrained than their Muslim counterparts in Bangladesh. Bangladesh has witnessed a gradual erosion of the purdah practice over the years. Two factors are mainly responsible for its decline. First, the growing pressure of poverty in the midst of deepening consumerism has forced women to seek employment outside the domestic parameters to support their families. For example, the garment, electronic, and fish-processing industries are all dominated by female labor, a situation that leads them to shed

264——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

their veils, for it is difficult to perform any of these tasks while covered in a veil. Second, the growing current of modernization and Dhallywood’s popular cultural influence have made the purdah look like an inimical symbol of women’s confinement and the denial of their freedom and progress. As a result, the purdah is not as common in urban areas and among the educated segment of the female population. In some cases in the country, female adulterers have been stoned to death in spite of the existence of formal laws against such violence. And husbands abandon their wives. This is a trend that has become particularly noticeable in recent years among the married male migrants who go overseas; some of them simply abandon their wives to remarry women from families with higher social status and wealth so they can collect more dowries from new wives’ parents.

CHILD LABOR In 1999, a documentary film entitled That’s Why I’m Working revealed the extent of child labor in Bangladesh and showed how it is a by-product of pervasive poverty and globalization (Schmidt and Doebele 1999). The film begins by showing a young boy, perhaps twelve years old, rummaging through a small field of scattered garbage in front of a high-rise slum dwelling complex in Dhaka. With this backdrop, the documentary quickly moves on to its central theme, in which young boys and girls—most of whom seem to be between the ages of seven and twelve—tell their personal stories, each with a little variation but all deeply seeped in a poverty that follows them like their own shadows from rural fringes to urban trenches. As the scenes unfold, children are seen making incense, wrapping candies, and producing plumbing parts in a makeshift backyard foundry. In one segment, a girl is breaking rocks into small pieces with a hammer, perhaps for some road construction project. Besides working as a stone breaker, she is responsible for taking care of her younger siblings and for household chores in the evenings. At the end of her story, she says, “I break stones because I am poor.” Then she suddenly goes quiet, and her face looks blank, as if her blood stopped flowing. In another equally touching segment, a young boy talks about his family. With tears flowing down his cheeks, he details his

——Bangladeshi Society and Contemporary Issues——265

A nine-year-old candy vendor waits for customers in front of a school in Dhaka. Thousands of Bangladeshi children who live near the capital are not able to attend school because they must earn supplemental income for their families. Vending is a common way for children to earn money. (AFP/CORBIS)

father’s prolonged illness and how it has inflicted tremendous hardship on his family. As his father’s health deteriorates, both he and his mother have to work hard to pay for his father’s treatment and to survive. On top of that, he has to look after his baby brother while his mother goes to work. At one point, the two brothers are shown at home. The baby is crying hard because of hunger, but there is scant food to soothe him. The boy soaks some rice in water, pours it into a bottle, and feeds the baby. The baby stops crying, his hunger temporarily abated. He does not get enough food these days, the boy says, because his father can’t work. Such is the grim picture of child labor and its imperatives. Child labor is not a matter of choice—it is a survival necessity. And it is a national feature of Bangladesh. Child labor has a distinct class character, for it is particularly common among the poor. By the time children are six or seven years old, they are required to do various family chores, from fetching water and fodder to cleaning ani-

266——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

mal sheds to taking care of their younger siblings—and doing whatever else needs to be done around the home. Similar to Nepal and other parts of South Asia, child labor is a vital part of family survival. These children have no time to play and frolic carefree like most Western and rich children do. For them, childhood is merely a biological phase, not a social one. Their maturing process begins very early in their lifecycle and proceeds at a fairly rapid pace as they are routinely burdened with increasing family responsibilities. Although the extensive use of child labor within the household is nothing new to Bangladesh, a new trend is emerging. Now children are being increasingly used as a source of profit, driven by the forces of globalization. They are found within the service sector, including in restaurants and hotels and as domestic help. In addition, they are increasingly found in certain labor-intensive manufacturing operations, such as garment and textile production and even in leather factories. Their use is expanding because they are cheaper to hire and easier to exploit, a situation that serves as a modern day reminder of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century England, following the Industrial Revolution in the 1760s. In recent years there have been international outcries against child labor in Bangladesh and elsewhere. In fact, a couple of years ago, a leading American discount retail company was involved in having some of its apparel products made in a Bangladesh factory that employed children to make them. But, despite international outcries, there has been little progress toward abating this problem. The problem is compounded by the fact that children are routinely verbally and physically abused and are deprived of their basic rights. Whether justified or not, most employers believe that without child labor, they lose their competitive advantage in terms of pricing and attracting foreign investments. As child labor increasingly becomes an integral part of business imperatives rather than a social concern, it continues in Bangladesh without concerted effort to eliminate it.

POPULAR CULTURE AND RECREATION Bangladesh is usually called a new nation in an ancient land with a long and rich cultural heritage. Its long, turbulent history is replete with the epic saga of invasions and subjugation that

——Bangladeshi Society and Contemporary Issues——267

resulted in a great deal of cultural fusion and transfusion. The long chain of Buddhist and Hindu rules was broken by the advent of the Muslims from West Asia in the thirteenth century. Following the Muslim rule, Bangladesh was subjected to British rule for almost two centuries. Between 1947 and 1971, it was part of Pakistan. Each ruling body added elements of its culture to the indigenous culture of Bangladesh. In essence, the cultural diversity of the past has been replaced by a cultural homogeneity in contemporary times. What is more, in recent years Bangladesh has increasingly witnessed parallel trends of Islamic fundamentalism on the one hand and popular culture on the other. Although fundamentalism in Bangladesh is, as noted earlier, relatively tempered by the standards of some Middle Eastern countries, popular culture is spreading widely—and perhaps wildly. One can illustrate the deepening trend of popular culture dominated by movies and TV with a simple example of the visible change that has taken place in village life. In rural Bangladesh, cultural life and entertainment used to be characterized by folk music and dances, performed in simple forms and in natural settings. That was until the advent of movie theaters initially and now videocassette recorders (VCRs) and satellite TV. Cinematic films have been shown throughout Bangladesh for a long time (Raju 2002). TV is a more recent introduction; blackand-white television was introduced in 1965, and color television in 1980. Now TV is quite prevalent, especially in urban areas. Typical villagers in Bangladesh live with their large extended families in simple huts with thatch roofs and mud walls. They till whatever land they have and raise a few domestic animals. Some may do some fishing to supplement food supplies if they live near a river. They mostly consume what they produce although some may sell some produce in the market to generate cash income for family needs. Some are engaged in wage laboring. The traditional form of entertainment for many villagers is sitting around with family members and friends, talking about the day’s events and problems. They may occasionally share folk tales and participate in religious ceremonies. Although such rudimentary entertainment is still alive to some extent, times are certainly changing. Television is a prime driver of this change, leading villagers toward a new form of entertainment and popular culture. Nowadays after dinner, neighbors

268——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

For many Bangladeshis home is a thatch-roofed house with mud walls. Such houses are usually found in settlements that feature a courtyard that serves several purposes—a playground for children, an open space to dry crops or other items, or a place to perform village ceremonies and festivals. (Courtesy of Bimal K. Paul)

will gather in the homes of villagers with TV sets and VCRs to watch their favorite shows. Some villagers return home earlier than usual from their fields, work, or outings to view popular programs. As soon as the TV is turned on, silence descends in the room. In urban areas, many households have their own satellite TV. Two facts characterize TV in Bangladesh. First, the number of domestic and foreign television channels and the duration of programs have both increased markedly in recent years. Second, TV has emerged as the most dominant medium of popular cultural consumption as well as cultural entertainment within Bangladesh. Transnational satellite broadcasting made its debut in the early 1990s. Since then CNN, Star TV, and Zee TV have offered various entertainment programs in numerous languages. Although the most popular foreign TV program is Indian movies, broadcast both domestically and from India, Hollywood shows are also featured, including MTV. Domestic television programming was initially

——Bangladeshi Society and Contemporary Issues——269

kept under tight government control in terms of the amount and content of broadcasting. Initially, it was significantly used for the purpose of adult and general education and as an avenue of agricultural extension, offering advice and information about various farm-related issues. What is common now are commercial shows and commercialization, serving a staple and steady diet of popular culture, emanating from both India and America. As Japan has become an important source of popular culture in East and Southeast Asia, India (i.e., Indian movies) has served as a similar source for South Asia. India’s influence actually extends as far as East and South Africa, Southeast Asia, certain parts of the Middle East, England, and the West Indies—wherever there is a relatively large enclave of Indians who gravitate to Indian movies, especially the first generation Indian immigrants. In the late 1970s, not even 5 percent of the households in Bangladesh had television sets. Most of these sets were owned by urban dwellers. By the late 1990s, over 15 percent of the households owned television sets. Nearly half of all television sets available in Bangladesh are now used in rural areas, a development that has greatly opened the rural frontier for popular culture and consumerism. As TV becomes increasingly accessible as a result of reduced costs and greatly advanced means of transportation and communication, the barometer of popular culture rises on the scale of mass consumption. Its influence has been all encompassing, affecting virtually every aspect of life—dress styles, music, food, mannerism, gender relations, religious outlooks, educational priorities, and even the course of politics as well as the nature and forms of violence. And now, the Internet has added a new dimension to this rapidly expanding vista of popular culture in Bangladesh.

CONCLUSION What we see from the preceding discussion is a Bangladesh that is both entrenched in tradition, characterized by gender violence and women’s low status, and undergoing fairly remarkable changes in its cultural landscape. Although some of these changes have certainly engendered a sense of freedom and progress for women, other changes have made their status worse, with increased insecurity. A deepening trend toward both increased gender violence

270——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

and international trafficking of Bangladeshi women and girls hardly bodes well for their improved standing. The country has a long way to go before it can free itself from these burdens, which currently sap its energy and hinder its social and economic progress. Hopefully, its growing links to countries across the world and its ongoing trend of economic development and political democratization will loosen the grip of its age-old order and usher in a new era, one in which people are free from the fetters of feudalistic arrangements. References Bangladesh Showbiz. 2002. “Face to Face: Kobori: The Sweet Girl of Sixties.” http://www.bangladeshshowbiz.com, accessed January 6. Baxter, Craig. 1984. Bangladesh: A New Nation in an Old Setting. Boulder: Westview Press. Baxter, Craig, and Rahman Syedur. 1989. Historical Dictionary of Bangladesh. Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press. Blood, Peter R. 1989. “Historical Setting.” Pp. 1–41 in Bangladesh: A Country Study, James Heitzman and Robert L. Worden, eds. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress. CCHRB (Coordinating Council for Human Rights in Bangladesh). 1995. State of Human Rights 1994 Bangladesh. Dhaka: CCHRB. Hashmi, Taj I. 2000. Women and Islam in Bangladesh: Beyond Subjection and Tyranny. London: Macmillan Press. Heitzman, James. 1989. “Government and Politics.” Pp. 152–199 in Bangladesh: A Country Study, James Heitzman and Robert L. Worden, eds. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress.. Hossain, Golam.1995. “Bangladesh in 1994: Democracy at Risk.” Asian Survey 35: 171–178. Kochanek, Stanley A. 1998. “Bangladesh in 1997: The Honeymoon Is over.” Asian Survey 38: 135–141. Norton, James H. K. 2001. India and South Asia. Guilford, Conn.: Dushkin/McGraw-Hill. Paul, Bimal K., and Syed A. Hasnath. 2000. “Trafficking in Bangladeshi Women and Girls.” Geographical Review 90: 268–276. Rahman, Mohammad H. 2000. “Human Rights in Bangladesh: Diversity in Civil Society and NGO Action.” Asian Affairs 22: 5–28. Raju, Zkir H. 2002 “National Cinema and the Beginning of Film History of Bangladesh.” www.bangladeshshowbiz.com, accessed January 6. Rashiduzzaman, M. 2001. “Bangladesh in 2000: Searching for Better Governance?” Asian Survey 41: 122–130. Schmidt, Maarten, and Thomas Doebele. 1999. That’s Why I’m Working (documentary film). New York: First Run/Icarus Films.

PART TWO

REFERENCE MATERIALS

Key Events in Bangledeshi History 563–1000 B.C. Arrival and settlement of Bang tribe (Dravidians) 273–232 B.C. Mauryan empire, reign of Emperor Ashok (Asoka) A.D. 320–540

Gupta dynasty 606–647 Rule of Harsha 750–1150 Pala dynasty 1001–1030 Turkish invasion into the Indian subcontinent and the coming of Islam 1206 Establishment of Delhi sultanate 1517 Arrival of Portuguese in Chittagong 1526–1858 The Mughal (Moghul, Mogul) Period. The Mughal period is begun with the foundation laid by Babur and consolidation of Islam. 1556–1605 Mughal Emperor Akbar expands and reforms the empire. 1576 Bengal is conquered by the Mughals. 1608 Dhaka is established as capital of the Mughal empire’s Bengal Province. 1650 Arrival of the British in Bengal

273

274——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

1658–1707 Reign of Aurangzeb, the last renowned Mughal ruler 1707–1858 Decline of the Mughal empire on the subcontinent and the rise of the British East India Company 1757–1947 The British Period. The British period begins with their victory over the Mughal forces in Bengal during the battle of Plassey. 1793 The British impose the Permanent Settlement Act on Bengal. 1857–1858 Sepoy Mutiny (soldiers’ uprising) 1858 British East India Company is dissolved; rule of India under the British crown is initiated. This is the beginning of the British Raj (empire) and the formal end of the Mughal empire. 1905 Partition of Bengal into East Bengal and West Bengal (East Bengal roughly constitutes today’s Bangladesh). 1947 With the partition of India and Pakistan by the British Raj on August 15, the British period ends. India and Pakistan quickly emerge as two independent nations separated by religious nationalism: India is identified largely as a Hindu state, and Pakistan as Muslim. Pakistan is further divided into two separate territorial parts: West Pakistan (where the central government is based) and East Bengal (today’s Bangladesh). 1947–1971 The Pakistani Period. During these years West Pakistan rules East Pakistan (previously East Bengal and now Bangladesh). 1949 The Awami (People’s) Muslim League (later renamed Awami League) political party is founded in June by Husain Shahid Suhrawardy.

——Key Events in Bangladeshi History——275

1952 On February 21, students are killed in a pro-Bengali-language demonstration in Dhaka. The date is now celebrated annually as Martyrs’ Day in Bangladesh. 1955 East Bengal is renamed East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). 1970 General elections are held on December 7 to form a parliamentary government in Pakistan. The Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur (Mujib) Rahman of East Pakistan secures an absolute majority with 160 seats in the new National Assembly but is denied the right to form a government. 1971 In late March, West Pakistani military forces launch massive assaults on Bengal freedom fighters and the general public. They arrest Mujibur Rahman and send him to prison in West Pakistan. The war for independence officially begins. April 17. East Pakistan formally declares its independence as the nation of Bangladesh. The war for independence intensifies. December 3. Pakistan launches a preemptive strike against India. December 4. India strikes back and invades East Pakistan, thus giving a military boost to freedom fighters trying to establish a free Bangladesh. December 6. India formally recognizes Bangladesh as an independent nation. December 16. Pakistani military forces in East Pakistan surrender to India, and freedom fighters take over Dhaka, thus marking the independence of Bangladesh. 1971–present Independent Bangladesh. With the dawn of independence, a new era begins in the history of Bangladesh. 1972 Mujib Rahman, jailed in Pakistan and regarded as the father of the new nation, returns to Bangladesh on January 10. The new constitution of Bangladesh is promulgated on December 16, marking the first-year anniversary of liberation.

276——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

1973 The first general elections of independent Bangladesh are held. Mujib’s Awami League wins 282 out of 300 parliamentary seats and forms a government. 1974 On February 22, Pakistan formally recognizes Bangladesh. On September 17, the new nation is admitted to the United Nations. 1975 Mujib Rahman is assassinated on August 15, along with twentythree of his family members and associates. 1977 General Ziaur (Zia) Rahman becomes president. 1981 President Zia is assassinated on March 30; Abdus Sattar is appointed and later elected president. 1982 Sattar is overthrown in a military coup orchestrated by Hussain Muhammad Ershad, who becomes president 1990 Ershad resigns the presidency on December 4. 1991 General elections are held in March, giving the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) a plurality; under the prime ministership of Khaleda Zia (Zia Rahman’s widow), the BNP forms a new government. 1996 General elections are held in June, resulting in a plurality for the Awami League led by Sheikh Hasina Wajid (Wazed), the late president Mujib Rahman’s daughter. With Hasina Wajid as prime minister, the Awami League forms a new government. 2001 General elections are held in October, returning power to the BNP. Khaleda Zia is again prime minister.

Significant People, Places, and Events Abu Taher, Colonel (1938–1976) Recipient of the Bir Uttam award for bravery during the war of liberation, he was executed by Ziaur (Zia) Rahman’s regime for his radical leftist beliefs. August Coup (August 15, 1975) The first coup in independent Bangladesh led by the army that ended the country’s democratic government. During this coup, Sheik Mujibur (Mujib) Rahman was assassinated, along with most of his family members. This was followed by another coup on November 3 and a counter coup on November 7, during which Khalid Musharif was killed. Awami League Established in June 1949 as the Awami (People’s) Muslim League party. It is the first party to win the first general elections and form the first elected government of independent Bangladesh under the leadership of Sheik Mujibur Rahman. This party is now led by his daughter, Sheikh Hasina Wajid. Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) Formed in 1978 by the late President Ziaur Rahman as a political vehicle of his rule. It is now headed by his widow, Khaleda Zia. Biswas, Abdur Rahman (1926–) Served as president of Bangladesh during the Khaleda Zia regime (1991–1996). Biswas was elected president following the change of the governmental system of Bangladesh from the presidential rule to parliamentary governance whereby the prime minister would be the head of the government. Chowdhury, Abu Sayeed (1921–1987) President of Bangladesh from January 1972 to December 1973. Earlier, he had been a justice of the Dhaka High Court and a vice chancellor of Dhaka University. He played a key role as a roving ambassador in Europe and the United States on behalf of emerging Bangladesh.

277

278——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Chowdhury, Anwar Bahar (1918–1987) A leading figure in women’s education, both before partition in Calcutta and after partition in Dhaka. She was a cofounder of the Bulbul Academy of Fine Arts, and also began schools for dance and music. Dhaka Founded in 1608 as the seat of the imperial Mughal viceroys of Bengal and renowned for its fine silk and muslin, today Dhaka is the capital and largest city of Bangladesh and home to more than 4 million people. One of the enduring qualities of Dhaka to this day is the preeminent role that three-wheeled, mandriven rickshaws play in its urban transportation system. But rickshaws are more than merely a mode of transportation in Dhaka; they are a way of life and means of survival for countless rural migrants who pour into the city year after year and in large numbers. As many fail to find other jobs, they quickly join the ranks of rickshaw drivers. Competing with rickshaws are thela gaari, or push/pull (thela) carts (gaari), heavily loaded with coconuts or other goods shoving their way to the bazaar through the dense traffic of Dhaka. Unlike rickshaws that are individually operated, the thela gaari may involve just one individual or several pushers and pullers working together. Dhaka has several historical sites. Suhrawardy Uddyan, formerly known as the Race Course, the popular park of the city where the oath for independence of Bangladesh was taken on March 7, 1971, and where the commander of the West Pakistani occupation forces surrendered on December 16, 1971, thus giving birth to Bangladesh; Shahid Minar, a martyr monument; Lalbagh Fort, built in A.D. 1678 by Emperor Aurangazeb’s son Mohammed Azam; the National Assembly Complex, or Jatyo Sangsad, an architectural wonder designed by genius architect Luis Kahn; the National Memorial, or Jatyo Sritee Shoudhow, built to honor all those who were killed during the war for independence; and the National Museum. East Pakistan Official name for today’s Bangladesh when it remained annexed to Pakistan following the partition of the British Raj in 1947 until December 1971 Ershad, Hussain Muhammad (1930–) As lieutenant general,

——Significant People, Places, and Events——279

Ershad led a military coup against the elected government of Abdus Sattar in March 1982 and became president in December 1984. Later, he formed his own Jatiya Dal Party. He was pressured to resign in December 1990. He was later jailed by the first Khaleda Zia regime (1991–1996). Grameen Bank Outcome of an experimental project launched by Professor Muhammad Yunus to empower the poor through micro credit for entrepreneurship. It offers collateral-free loans to the poor to engage in small-scale commercial ventures. It has now emerged as a creative model of rural poverty reduction programs in many underdeveloped countries. Hasina Wajid (Wazed), Sheikh (1947–) The late President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s daughter, who survived the presidential massacre during the August Coup, merely because she was in Germany at the time. She assumed the leadership of the Awami League party following her return to the country in May 1981. When her party won a plurality of the parliamentary seats during the June 1996 elections, she was able to form the Awami League government for the first time since her father’s assassination. However, her party suffered a major defeat during the October 2001 elections and relinquished the office of prime minister to her archrival Khaleda Zia, whom she had replaced five years earlier. Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 By-product of the war for independence (liberation) between West Pakistan and what was then East Pakistan. In early December 1971, India intervened by engaging in a war with Pakistan and helped the Mukti Bahini (liberation army) defeat the West Pakistani military forces. Interestingly, the opening for India’s intervention was provided by Pakistan when it preemptively attacked India on December 3. As a result, Bangladesh was born. Khaleda Zia (1945–) Widow of the late President Ziaur Rahman. She later assumed the leadership of her husband’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in May 1984. Following the BNP’s victory in the February 1991 elections, she formed a popularly elected government, thus paving the way for a renewed democratic experiment in

280——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Bangladesh since the assassination of President Mujibur Rahman in 1975. Her party lost the June 1996 election, handing the government over to the Awami League under the prime ministership of Sheikh Hasina Wajid. However, she is back in power as prime minister, following her party’s victory in the October 2001 elections. Language Movement A defining chapter in Bangladesh’s liberation history as it set the stage for independence. The language movement of 1952 had its origin in 1948, when Urdu was announced as the only national language of Pakistan. At that time, Dhaka University students demanded that Bengali be declared the official language of East Pakistan. When the central government introduced the Urdu script for Bengali in 1952, violent reactions erupted. A number of people, including university students, were killed by the police. A monument named the Shahid Minar was erected to commemorate the martyrs (shahid) of the movement, thus laying the foundation of independence. Mainamati About 5 miles to the west of Comilla town lie low hills known as the Mainamati-Lalmai range. This area was once an important seat of Buddhist culture. Large-scale excavations have revealed valuable facts about Buddhist rulers during the seventh and eighth centuries. It is believed that the area contains more than fifty Buddhist archaeological sites. Comilla is also famous for khadi (cotton dress) and bamboo products. Mujibur Rahman, Sheik (1920–1975) Regarded as the father of the nation of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman—or simply Mujib as he was fondly called—was one of the most charismatic leaders that Asia has ever seen rise from its fertile soil. His life is truly a story of Bangladesh as this great leader turned people power into a national revolution that brought liberation to a nation suffering from years of external domination and subjugation. The birth of the sovereign state of Bangladesh in December 1971, after a heroic war against the Pakistani rule, marked a marvelous milestone in Mujib’s storied political career. It is no accident of history that in a society marred with militarism and dictatorship, Mujib attained power through elections and mass movement; he ushered in an era of democracy and human rights.

——Significant People, Places, and Events——281

On that historic day of March 7, 1971, nearly 2 million freedom-loving people gathered at the Ramna Race Course, later renamed Suhrawardy Uddyan, to hear Mujib’s command for the battle for liberation. He proclaimed: “Our struggle this time is for freedom. Our struggle this time is for independence.” On March 25, the Pakistani military arrested Mujib and whisked him away to West Pakistan for imprisonment. Subsequently, the West Pakistani military went on a genocidal rampage, killing, by some accounts, almost 3 million men, women, and children as well as raping girls and women. As West Pakistan lost the war for independence following India’s intervention and eventually surrendered on December 16, 1971, East Pakistan was freed. That was the birth of Bangladesh. Mujib was released from the West Pakistani jail. On January 10, 1972, the triumphant leader returned to his beloved land. His life was cut short when he was brutally assassinated by military officers. His regime and democracy ended suddenly in one swift, bloody predawn coup on August 15, 1975. Along with him, twenty-three of his family members and close associates were murdered. Even his ten-year old son Russel’s life was not spared by the assassins. The only survivors were his two daughters, Sheikh Hasina Wajid and her younger sister Sheikh Rehana, who were then away on a visit to Germany. Musharif, Khalid (?–1975) A supporter of President Mujibur Rahman, who led a counter coup on November 3, 1975, that ousted the majors who orchestrated the August Coup of 1975, he was killed by the army on November 7, an event (another coup) that led to the rise of General Ziaur Rahman to presidency. Mushtaque Ahmed, Khondakar (1918–1996) President of Bangladesh from August to November 1975, following Mujib’s assassination. As a conservative member of Mujib’s cabinet, it is believed that he played a role in Mujib’s murder by betraying him. A founding member of the Awami League, he was very outspoken during the language movement. He gave up the presidency when a counter coup led by Khalid Musharif took place. Nazrul, Islam Syed (1925–1975) Head of the Bangladesh govern-

282——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

ment in exile in 1971 during the war for independence when Mujibur Rahman was in West Pakistani jail, he was assassinated during the Dhaka jail killing on November 3, 1975. As a student leader, he actively participated in the language movement. He joined the Awami League in 1953 and rose to be its senior vice president. Sattar, Abdus (1906–1985) President of Bangladesh from May 30, 1981, to March 24, 1982, when he was dismissed following the coup led by Hussain Muhammad Ershad. He had a career both in politics and law. In 1975 he was a special assistant to President Abu Sadat Muhammad Sayem; he became law minister in 1977, a post he retained until he was appointed vice president the same year by President Zia. Sayem, Abu Sadat Muhammad (1916–) President of Bangladesh from November 1975 to April 1977. He was appointed president as part of the compromise between Khalid Musharif and Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmed over who should lead Bangladesh. At the time he was chosen to be president, he was the nation’s chief justice. Trained as a lawyer, he was essentially dismissed by General Zia, who took over presidency. Suhrawardy, Husain Shahid (1893–1963) A member of a prominent Bengali family, he was the founder of the Awami League in 1949. Educated at Oxford, he was first elected to the Bengal Legislative Council in 1921. Subsequently, he held several other positions at various times. In 1949, when he took residency in India, he floated the idea of a Muslim party that would include nonMuslims and founded the Awami League, a party that never gained any foothold in West Pakistan. He died in Beirut on December 5, 1963. Sundarban(s) Fascinating tropical forests of deltaic swamp, the Sundarban is flanked by the coastal fringe of southwestern Bangladesh. Its location is adjacent to West Bengal. The Sundarban is a natural wildlife habitat rife with crocodiles, dotted deer, pythons, wild bears, monkeys, and, of course, the world-famous Bengal tigers, unparalleled in their beauty and elegance. The lit-

——Significant People, Places, and Events——283

eral translation for the Sundarban is “the beautiful (sundar) forest (ban).” Adorned by many mangroves, it is a virgin forest that spans 1,400 square miles and until recently owed nothing to human endeavor. Sylhet Nestled in the picturesque Surma Valley, fed by two rivers, the Sylhet is the land of scenic tea gardens. It is a prime attraction for tourists visiting Bangladesh as well as a playground for naturalists and game watchers. Lying between the Khasia and Jaintia Hills on the north and the Tripura Hills on the south, the Sylhet breaks the monotony of the flatness of Bangladesh with a multitude of terraced tea gardens and rolling countryside. In addition, here the thick tropical forests abound with many species of wildlife; scented orange groves and luxuriant pineapple plantations spread their aroma across the valley and around the typical hearth and homes of the Manipuri tribal maidens, famous for their exotic dance. The Manipur dance is based on allegorical love themes of the ancient mythology. It is a true cultural experience. Tagore, Rabindranath (1861–1941) The most noted poet of South Asia, who is claimed by both India and Bangladesh. It is no wonder that his works are equally admired and accepted by both the Muslims and Hindus. He is a great source of pride in both countries. When his literary works were banned from Pakistani radio in 1965, the artificial glue that loosely held East and West Pakistan together came apart, paving the path of eventual separation. A Bengali by ethnicity, he is the first Asian to win a Nobel Prize for literature (in 1913). His famous and nationalistic poem entitled “Sonar Bangla” (Golden Bengal) is the national anthem of Bangladesh, and another of his poems is the national anthem of India. In addition to poems, he wrote novels and plays. Such was the universality or cross-cultural and cross-national appeal of Tagore, the literary giant of Asia. Ziaur (Zia) Rahman (1936–1981) Although he officially assumed the country’s presidency in April 1977, his effective leadership began in 1975 following the coup of November 7, 1975, when Khalid Musharif was killed. In 1978, he founded the Bangladesh Nationalist Party as his political armament, and it has since

284——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

emerged as the leading party in the nation. He was instrumental in the formation of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1983. Dhaka was the site of SAARC’s inauguration in December 1985. Zia was assassinated on May 30, 1981.

Bangladeshi Language, Food, and Etiquette LANGUAGE With 98 percent of its population speaking Bangla or Bengali, Bangladesh is basically an unilingual country. The only exceptions are the tribal population and Biharis. Bengali is not only the official language of the country, it has also served as a source of nationalism and national pride. As noted earlier, the initial refusal of the Pakistani government to treat Bengali as equal to Urdu as the national language of Pakistan was one of the principal sparks of the 1971 war for independence. Bengali is a member of the Indo-European linguistic family and is derived from Sanskrit. It evolved through Prakrit. It is written in script that is a modification of the Devanagari or Sanskrit writing system. As such, it is akin to Hindi and Nepali scripts, but not exactly the same. There are, however, several regional dialects in Bengali. Most dominant of these are the dialects of Sylhet, Noakhali, and Chittagong. Bengali has a distinguished history in literature, music, and poetry. At least two Bengali poets are well known in the West—Rabindranath Tagore, a 1913 Nobel laureate in literature, and Kazi Nazrul Islam. Ill-advised attempts to stifle Tagore’s writings by the Pakistani government added fuel to the fire burning for a continuation of the Bengali heritage. Despite Bengalization of all official activities after independence in 1971, English remains important, however, as it almost acts as a second national language. In English the sentence (grammar) order is subject-verb-object, but in Bengali the sequence is subject-object-verb. For instance, “I go home” in English would be “I home go” in Bengali. It is, nonetheless, important to bear in mind that there is enough flexibility in the sentence formation both in speaking and writing. Casual conversational Bengali can be even more flexible. It is com-

285

286——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

mon for people to converse in single words rather than in complete sentences, yet be quite clear in communicating messages and meanings. Most English-speaking people may find spoken Bengali to be very fast, especially when Bengalis converse with each other. The following are some useful survival Bengali expressions: Kamon aachho? or Kamon aachhen? (latter more polite; both are similar to something like “How are you?”) Greetings! Aabar dekha hobey. (see you later) Goodbye! Ki hochhey? What’s going on? Kamon cholchhey? How are things going? Dhonnobaad. Thank you. Kothai . . .? Where is...? (as in “boi kothai,” Where is the book?) Ektu dakhan. Please show me. Ak minet. Just a moment. Ektu opekha koroon. Please wait. Boshoon. Please sit down. Khaan. Please eat. Bhalo achhey. It’s good; it’s nice. Bas. Enough. Ha(n). Yes. Na. No. Maaph korain. Please pardon me. Aabaar dain. Give me one more, please. Bhalo lagay na. Don’t like it. Ki holo? What happened? Eta ki? What is this?

FOOD AND BEVERAGES There are noticeable similarities between Bangladesh and Nepal or India regarding the culture of food and eating. Even words and phrases are sometimes the same. Similar to Nepal and India, sharing food and drinks with guests is a time-honored cultural practice among Bengalis regardless of their class status, social ranks, and geographical backgrounds. This cultural practice at times seems

——Bangladeshi Language, Food, and Etiquette——287

like a social obligation in that one is expected to provide food and drink whenever relatives or guests visit. In other words, if an individual happens to visit a family during lunch or dinner hours, the visitor is normally offered a full meal. Furthermore, with the possible exception of young children and elderly members, the host family is expected to refrain from eating until the visitors are served. In terms of family hierarchies, senior male members are fed before female and junior members, except for school-age children. In this hierarchical eating structure, daughters-in-law or wives are usually the last ones to eat, and the cook rarely eats until every member of the family is served. In group settings also, seniority, which is defined in terms of either social rank, relationship, or age, takes precedence. That is, the senior member of the group generally initiates and signals others to begin eating. Such eating order and etiquette are closely observed across Bengali society. Most people sit on the floor, usually on a small carpet or mat spread on the floor, while eating. As in India and Nepal, Bangladeshis traditionally eat everything with their fingers. What, after all, could be a better instrument to pick out treacherous fish bones than fingers?

Common Bangladeshi Dishes Rice. Similar to most countries in monsoon Asia, in Bangladesh rice is king. Although wheat also is commonly consumed, nothing can take the place of rice. Its prominence in Bengali society is clearly reflected in the fact that nearly 75 percent of the nation’s crop land is devoted to growing rice. Furthermore, it constitutes almost 90 percent of all cereal production. Thanks to its conducive climatic conditions, Bangladeshi farmers grow up to three crops of rice per annum. Although it is consumed in various forms, boiled rice often constitutes the main dish. It is an integral part of the daily diet, some eating it as many as three times a day. However, in Bangladesh (as in Nepal), rice is rarely consumed by itself but rather is served with other foods, such as cooked dal (lentils) and vegetables. If a family can afford fish or meat, it will also be served. The higher the economic position of a household, the greater the variety of side dishes to complement the rice.

288——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Dal. Made from yellow, red, or black lentils or, on occasion, mung beans, dal is a soupy accompaniment to most meals in Bangladesh. As in Nepal and India, rice is rarely served without this common—and almost essential—source of protein. Dal is the most affordable protein among Bangladesh’s poor. Fish and Meat. Fish is probably the most preferred source of animal protein among Bangladeshis (and Bengalis in general). It is often stereotyped that when Bengalis see fish, they drool. They love fish. Given its extensive river systems and ready access to the sea, Bangladesh is a leading producer of fish, especially freshwater fish. Meat is also common—much more so than in neighboring Nepal. Unlike the restrictions against beef and other meats among certain caste groups in Nepal’s Hindu society, Bangladeshis tend to allow all kinds of meat to be consumed. The only exception is pork, which is prohibited also among high-caste Hindus. However, as in other Muslim societies, meats have to be processed in specific ways that follow religious practices so that they are considered pure and acceptable. Fish cookery is one of the betterknown features of the country’s cuisine. Bangladeshis prepare fish in innumerable ways—steamed or braised, stewed with greens or other vegetables, and with sauces that are mustard based or thickened with poppy seeds. Some of the Bengali fish dishes are truly indigenous to the region. Vegetables. As in Nepal, vegetables are an important part of diets in Bangladesh, and it is common for farming families to grow some vegetables to supplement their food supply. Many types of vegetables are grown in the country, and they are consumed widely across the nation. Most Bangladeshis prepare vegetables with curry, in a style called tarkari. Sometimes the word tarkari, which technically means garden vegetables, is used generically to mean anything cooked in a curried fashion. Curry. Not a particular dish or ingredient, curry is largely a method of food preparation that involves using certain spices and cooking on a stove. Most common among these spices are turmeric, cumin, coriander, garlic, ginger, hot chili pepper, and salt. Most vegetable and meat dishes are cooked as curry dishes.

——Bangladeshi Language, Food, and Etiquette——289

In this respect, most of the curry dishes in Bangladesh are quite similar in tastes and forms to those found in northern India, although some local variations may be observed. Roti. Flat, round dough bread, called roti, is often cooked in an iron pan on top of the oven and made out of wheat flour. Its texture is similar to pita bread, although it is often somewhat thinner. It is sometimes substituted for rice or used as a supplement to rice, eaten with some dal and a vegetable dish and fish or meat, if available. It is a common dish throughout the country. The word is also used generically to mean any type of bread. Rossogola. A sweet dish made from flour and other ingredients, rossogola is first browned in hot oil, preferably ghee (purified butter), and then dipped in sugar syrup. In fact, it is left in the syrup until eaten. It literally means something round (gola) and juicy (ross or rus). It is one of the most popular sweet dishes in Bangladesh and India. In fact, the Bengal region is quite renowned for sweet dishes.

Common Bangladeshi Beverages Beer. As a Muslim nation, Bangladesh limits the purchase and use of alcoholic beverages. With the sweeping tide of Westernization, however, beer has made tremendous inroads in Bangladesh over the past 15–20 years. It is now a popular drink and a status symbol among the upwardly mobile and upscale urbanites and educated crowds. Tea. As in India and Nepal, tea is the most common drink served in both rural and urban areas of Bangladesh. Guests are invariably served a cup of hot black tea, often mixed with milk and sugar, along with a light snack. An average Bangladeshi drinks several cups of tea a day, starting in the morning. Tea in Bangladesh is both imported and exported. Soft Drinks. Soft drinks have become quite popular within Bangladesh and are now widely available. Although they have become increasingly common, they are still considered luxury

290——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

drinks in most parts of Bangladesh, although not to the same extent as beer. Soft drinks are both produced domestically and imported.

ETIQUETTE Bangladesh can be thought of as a very structured and reserved society, and there are certain expectations with regard to etiquette and manners. Although etiquette and manners change over time, some seem timeless in terms of their practice. Some examples follow. Taking Shoes Off. Removing one’s footwear at the main entryway into a house, temple, or mosque is required throughout Bangladesh. As in Nepal, this tradition is rooted in the country’s agrarian structure and stems from farmers’ desire to keep dirt from their shoes out of their homes. It also has its roots in the religious belief system and practice. Social Hierarchy and Respect. Elders and higher ranking individuals within Bangladesh are always treated with deference and respect. Age, social status, or one’s official title can be used to determine the social hierarchy. Despite some breakdown in the practice of social hierarchy in recent years, younger or lower-ranking members of society are expected to show respect to others in terms of their behavior and demeanor. Some examples of this are not eating until others have begun to eat and not speaking first when elders and higher-ranking individuals are present. In addition, one should not be direct and opinionated or look directly into the eyes of elders and those of higher rank or status. Prolonged eye contact between seniors and juniors should be avoided. Compliments. Compliments are not commonly paid to one another in Bangladesh. One must be careful to avoid excessive praise of another individual, lest he or she be construed as phony and insincere. Furthermore, compliments may not always be reciprocated openly. Reciprocity is usually displayed in subtle forms. Modesty and Humbleness. As in Nepal, a sense of modesty and humbleness about one’s achievements when interacting with sen-

——Bangladeshi Language, Food, and Etiquette——291

iors and strangers is expected behavior throughout Bangladesh. Self-congratulatory statements of the kind that Westerners often engage in is seen as boasting and is viewed as tremendously impolite and uncultured by most Bangladeshis. Public Display of Affection between Opposite Sexes. Physical displays of affection in public are viewed as immoral, particularly as it concerns unmarried females, who are perceived as having a loose character that would bring disgrace to the family. Even husbands and wives should not kiss or hug in public in Bangladesh. Such norms apply to both Muslim and Hindu populations as well as other groups. Sitting. Most Bangladeshis sit on the floor, usually on mats or small carpets spread on the floor. The cross-legged or squatting position is the most common way to sit. However, modern and wealthy houses are equipped with chairs. Nose Blowing. As in Nepal, blowing one’s nose during meals is considered extremely unsocial. One is expected to excuse oneself from the table if it becomes necessary to use a handkerchief or tissue. Burping. Burping immediately after dinner is viewed as normal and common. It is even thought to display satisfaction with the meal served and so is not a social stigma as in the West. Bargaining. Bargaining, or haggling, is expected and common throughout Bangladesh. Few items have fixed prices in Bangladesh’s open markets. Sellers and buyers, therefore, are encouraged to engage in some back-and-forthing over price until agreement is mutually obtained. Business Cards. In formal settings (e.g., business meetings or official visits), exchanging business cards is becoming quite common. Clothes. Given Bangladesh’s subtropical climate, its residents frequently wear light and white clothes. In most office and formal settings they dress formally, avoiding shorts and short skirts as

292——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

well as exposure of thighs and cleavage. In addition, excessive exposure of female arms is generally discouraged. Thus, women often wear a shawl or scarf on top of their blouse. Use of western clothing styles, except for skirts among school-age girls, is rare. As a result, few women are seen in pants. Though sandals are acceptable, most men wear shoes and socks during formal occasions.

Bangladesh-Related Organizations BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS The following is a list of various Bangladeshi organizations related to trade and commerce. Telephone calls to Bangladesh from outside the country require use of the country code, 880. The city code for telephone numbers within Dhaka is 2. American Chamber of Commerce in Bangladesh (AmCham) Dhaka Sheraton Hotel Dhaka, Bangladesh Phone: (880-2) 8613391 or 8611191 Fax: (880-2) 8312915 or 8312975 E-mail: [email protected] http://www.amchambd.org The American Chamber of Commerce in Bangladesh (AmCham) was formally established in 1996, having been duly registered with the Joint Stock Companies of Bangladesh. Its primary purpose is to promote the economic relationships between Bangladesh and the United States. AmCham used to operate as the American Bangladesh Economic Forum. The membership of the AmCham includes U.S. companies doing business in Bangladesh; Bangladesh companies whose primary business is representing U.S.-produced goods and services; and nonprofit organizations of U.S. origin. Bangladesh Bank Dhaka, Bangladesh Phone: (880-2) 7120106 The Bangladesh Bank is the central bank of Bangladesh. Its broad functions are to regulate the issue of the currency and the keeping of reserves; manage the monetary and credit system of Bangladesh; preserve the par value of the Bangladesh Taka (unit of currency); and promote and maintain a high level of production, employment, and real income in Bangladesh. 293

294——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Bangladesh Finished Leather & Leather Goods Exporters Association Dhanmondi R/A Dhaka, Bangladesh Phone: (880-2) 815529 Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers & Exporters Association 7–9 Karwanbazar, BTMC Bhaban Dhaka 1215, Bangladesh Phone: (880-2) 8115597 or 8115751 Fax: (880-2) 8113951 E-mail: [email protected] Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) 10 Dilkusha C/A (15th and 16th Floors) Dhaka–1000, Bangladesh Phone: (880-2) 95688101 Fax: (880-2) 9563721 E-mail: [email protected] http://www.dsebd.org The DSE was incorporated on April 28, 1954, as the East Pakistan Stock Exchange Association Limited. On June 23, 1962, it was renamed the Dhaka Stock Exchange Limited. Formal trading began in 1956. Its major functions include listing of companies (as per listing regulations); providing the screen-based automated trading of listed securities; settlement of trading (as per settlement of transaction regulations); market administration and control; market surveillance; publication of the Monthly Review; and monitoring the activities of listed companies (as per listing regulations). Export Promotion Bureau 122–124, Motijheel C/A Dhaka, Bangladesh Phone: (880-2) 9552245 or 9560787 Fax: (880-2) 9568000 E-mail: [email protected] http://www.epbbd.com The main purpose of this organization is to promote exports of

——Bangladesh-Related Organizations——295

Bangladeshi products. Its Web site is a good source of information on matters related to business and economics. Foreign Investors Chamber of Commerce and Industry 35/1, Purana Paltan Lane Inner Circular Road Dhaka, Bangladesh Phone: (880-2) 839448 or 839449 Fax: (880-2) 839449 International Chamber of Commerce in Bangladesh 65-66 Motijheel C/A Dhaka 1000, Bangladesh Phone: (880-2) 9557478 Fax: (880-2) 9557429 U.S.-Bangladesh Business Council 1615 H Street NW Washington, D.C. 20062-2000 Phone: (202) 463-5732 Fax: (202) 463-3173 http://www.usbbc.com The main purpose of the U.S.-Bangladesh Business Council is to promote trade and business transactions between the two nations. It offers advice and business-related information to American and Bangladeshi companies doing or planning to do cross-national business in these countries. In a way, its functions overlap with those of the American Chamber of Commerce in Bangladesh.

CULTURE, EDUCATION, AND EXCHANGE American Club Dhaka, Bangladesh The American Club is an American enclave—a Little America—in Dhaka where one can participate in various sports such as swimming, tennis, squash, volleyball, and basketball. It is equipped with a restaurant serving a typical American menu. As

296——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

an exclusive club, its membership is restricted to Americans and their families. Bangladesh Showbiz http://www.bangladeshshowbiz.com “These days, you’re nobody in Dhaka ShowBiz until you have a secret lover and a remarkable marriage coverage in publications.” This is the opening remark of this Web site. It clearly reveals the deepening influence of the movie or celebrity culture that mesmerizes Bangladesh’s urban youth—both males and females. Dhaka University (University of Dhaka) www.univdhaka.edu This is the oldest and most prominent university in Bangladesh. Fulbright Program http://exchanges.state.gov/education/fulbright Although there is no Fulbright Commission set up in Bangladesh, the program does offer educational or scholarly exchange opportunities between Bangladesh and the United States. Three types of Fulbright grants are available to Americans to study/research in Bangladesh and to Bangladeshis for similar opportunities in the United States: for scholars and professionals; for students, usually master’s degree level and above; and for teachers and administrators. International University of Business, Agriculture, and Technology (IUBAT) Dhaka 1000, Bangladesh Phone: (880-2) 9124226 or 9124201 Fax: (880-2) 8110494 http://www.iubat.edu IUBAT has cooperation agreements with many institutions in the United States, Canada, England, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Thailand, and Australia. Islamic University www.ugc.org

——Bangladesh-Related Organizations——297

Established in1985 and located in Dhaka, the Islamic University combines different branches of humanities and modern science with Islamic education and utilizes a curriculum of modern education based on the ethical and moral values of Islam. Matchmaking Services Marriages among Bangladeshis usually are arranged marriages. And marriage in Bangladesh is as much a cultural phenomenon as it is a biological and social imperative. The institution of arranged marriages seems to be getting further entrenched because of the large and increasing volume of Bangladeshi workers leaving the country to work in foreign countries. Many of these workers still prefer to marry Bangladeshi women because of cultural compatibility and preference. This preference is further reinforced by the fact that they often encounter difficulty finding marriage partners in the countries where they work as foreign migrant workers, some legally and others illegally. In order to meet this growing demand, online matchmaking services have sprouted as a modern cultural institution of arranged marriages, replacing the family as an immediate agent of marriage negotiations. In other words, while the institution of arranged marriage itself remains intact, its medium has changed. The online service is basically the e-version of the “picture bride” that is still common in East and Southeast Asia. Two Web sites offering such services are: http://www.badhon.com (Badhon is the largest matchmaking agency based in Bangladesh); and www.bangla-marriage.co.uk (based in England, it offers a wider range of choices). North South University (NSU) 12 Kemal Ataturk Avenue Banani, Dhaka 1213, Bangladesh Phone: (880-2) 9885611 or 8812951 Fax: (880-2) 8823030 http://www.northsouth.edu Established in 1992, NSU is a private university. It attracts foreign students from China, Malaysia, Thailand, Sudan, and Nigeria, along with those from other South Asian countries. Under the Study Abroad and Group Exchange Program, students come from

298——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

many North American universities, such as Brown University, University of Illinois, Smith College, Windsor University, and York University to attend classes in Bangladesh. NSU also brings in quality faculty from leading U.S., Canadian, and Australian universities.

BANGLADESH’S GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES Bangladesh Embassy 2201 Wisconsin Avenue NW, Suite 300–325 Washington, DC 20007 Phone: (202) 342- 8372 or 342-8376 Consulate General of Bangladesh Los Angeles 10850 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1250 Los Angeles, CA 90024 Phone: (310) 441-9399 Fax: (310) 441-4458 http://www.bangladeshconsulatela.com New York 211 East 43rd Street, Suite 502 New York, NY 10017 Phone: (212) 599-6767 or 599-6850 United Nations Permanent Mission of Bangladesh 821 United Nations Plaza, 8th Floor New York, NY 10017 Phone: (212) 867-3434 Fax: (212) 972-4038 E-mail: [email protected]

TOURISM In the Western popular imagination, Bangladesh is hardly considered to be a famed and enchanting destination. There are few exotic images, eye-popping landscapes, or mystical qualities and aura affiliated with Bangladesh that are popularized in the West to

——Bangladesh-Related Organizations——299

allure Western tourists. But behind this generally obscure image of the country lies a relatively relaxed and enchantingly beautiful land with a rich cultural history. One can visit a variety of marvelous sites from the bucolic hill tea gardens of Sylhet to the world-renowned steamy Sundarbans and to the relaxing white sandy beaches along the coast. Wherever one goes, there is no shortage of good food and fabulous Bengali hospitality to satisfy anybody’s appetite. American Embassy http://www.usembassy-dhaka.org The U.S. Embassy provides valuable information to American tourists and travelers planning to visit Bangladesh, along with travel tips and alerts. Also included is plenty of information on the business climate, investment opportunities, and trade rules and regulations. Bangladesh Homepage http://www.bangladesh.freehomepage.com This site provides useful information on a variety of topics and issues related to Bangladesh, including travel and tourism. http://www.betelco.com/bd This site, hosted by the Bengal Telecommunication and Electric Corporation, is a good source of extensive information on some popular tourist sites in Bangladesh. Lonely Planet Online http://www.lonelyplanet.com A good Web site to visit for travel information on Bangladesh.

Travel Agencies and Associations Anjali Tours & Travel 587 Main Street, Suite 104 New Rochelle, NY 10801 Phone: (914) 636-3333 Fax: (914) 636-3375 E-mail: [email protected]

300——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Association of Travel Agents of Bangladesh 5/A Eskaton Garden Road Dhaka, Bangladesh Phone: (880-2) 415987 The association’s purpose is to ensure that travel agents provide high-quality service to tourists and travelers to and from Bangladesh. Bangladesh Ecotours Adventure Tour & Trek Specialists 263 Jubilee Road, Chittagong, Bangladesh Phone: (880-1) 8318345 E-mail: [email protected] http://www.bangladeshecotours.com Tourist Office Bangladesh Parjatan Corporation 233 Airport Road, Tejgaon Dhaka 1215, Bangladesh Phone: (880-2) 325155 or 325159 The tourist office’s main function is to assist tourists with pertinent services and information with respect to their visit to Bangladesh.

Annotated Bibliography of Recommended Works on Bangladesh GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY OF BANGLADESH Baxter, Craig. 1984. Bangladesh: A New Nation in an Old Setting. Boulder: Westview Press. Although somewhat outdated, this is a good source of information about the history and political development of Bangladesh. Baxter, Craig, and Syedur Rahman. 1989. Historical Dictionary of Bangladesh. Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press. This is a comprehensive source of historical, biographical, and bibliographical information about key events and prominent figures of Bangladesh, both before and after independence. Haque, C. E. 1997. Hazards in a Fickle Environment: Bangladesh. Dordrecht, Neth.: Kluwer Academic Publishers. This book clearly reveals the nature and danger of natural hazards that Bangladeshis face on a routine basis. Johnson, B. L. C. 1975. Bangladesh. New York: Barnes & Noble Books. A comprehensive source of information on Bangladesh, but it is quite outdated. Mitra, S. N., et al. 1997. Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey: 1996–1997. Dhaka: Mitra and Associates. This book is quite revealing about the demographic trends and health situations in Bangladesh. The data and information are based on a survey. Upreti, B. C. 1993. Politics of Himalayan River Waters: An Analy-

301

302——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

sis of the River Water Issues of Nepal, India and Bangladesh. New Delhi: Nirala Publications. This is an important book that clearly shows the complicated nature of water sharing among Nepal, India, and Bangladesh as well as many other issues related to the river systems that traverse through these countries.

THE ECONOMY OF BANGLADESH Ahsan, M. B., ed. 1996. Grameen Bank and Muhammad Yunus. Dhaka: Mowla Brothers. This book makes an important contribution to our understanding of the way the Grameen Bank operates in terms of providing micro credits to poor farmers for launching small entrepreneurial businesses in villages. It includes a profile of Professor Yunus, the creative genius who founded the bank. Hossain, Akhtar M. 1995. Inflation, Economic Growth and the Balance of Payments in Bangladesh: A Macroeconomic Study. Delhi: Oxford University Press. This book constitutes a macro economic treatment of the national economy of Bangladesh. Turner, Barry, ed. 2000. The Statesman’s Yearbook 2001. New York: St. Martin’s Press. A good source of overall economic/statistical information. World Bank and BCAS (Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies). 1998. Bangladesh 2020: A Long-Run Perspective Study. Dhaka: University Press Limited. A good source of information in terms of gaining a long-range perspective on where the economy of Bangladesh is headed and what steps the government ought to take to further its goal of national and local development.

BANGLADESHI INSTITUTIONS Hashmi, Taj I. 2000. Women and Islam in Bangladesh: Beyond Subjection and Tyranny. London: MacMillan Press.

Annotated Bibliography of Recommended Works on Bangladesh——

This book is filled with valuable information about the oppressive role of Islam in women’s lives and women’s status in Bangladesh society. It is quite revealing. Heitzman, James, and Robert L. Worden, eds. 1989. Bangladesh: A Country Study. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress. Perhaps the most comprehensive volume on Bangladesh, this book covers a wide range of topics and issues concerning Bangladesh—geography, history, social systems and institutions, government and politics, and economic condition and outlooks. It is a very thorough and readily accessible source of information on Bangladesh. Rahman, Mohammad H. 2000. “Human Rights in Bangladesh: Diversity in Civil Society and NGO Action.” Asian Affairs 22: 5–28. Although limited to contemporary events and conditions, Rahman’s article provides a picture of what is going on in the country in the arena of human rights and how nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can curb human rights violations by fostering civil society. Rashiduzzaman, M. 2001. “Bangladesh in 2000: Searching for Better Governance?” Asian Survey 41: 122–130. The coverage in this article is basically limited to the events of 2000, but it clearly shows a grim picture of Bangladesh that remains mired in the arbitrariness of governance, or rather the lack of civil governance despite the practice of electoral politics.

BANGLADESHI SOCIETY AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES Bangladesh Showbiz http://www.bangladeshshowbiz.com A very good Web site for those who are interested in Bangladesh’s celebrity and popular culture—everything one wants to find out about the country’s movie actors and actresses. Bangla2000 http://www.bangla2000.com

304——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

A relatively comprehensive source of information on different issues regarding Bangladesh, including daily news and views. Paul, Bimal K., and Syed A. Hasnath. 2000. “Trafficking in Bangladeshi Women and Girls.” Geographical Review 90: 268–276. Reveals the intensity and tragedy of international female trafficking out of Bangladesh. Schmidt, Maarten, and Thomas Doebele. 1999. That’s Why I’m Working (documentary film). New York: First Run/Icarus Films. A very moving documentary film that portrays the daily life of Bangladeshi children as well as the gravity and prevalence of child labor in the country.

Index Abhiman Singh, General, 33 Abraham (Ibrahim), 247 Abu Taher, Colonel, 277 Acharya, Baburam, 137 Acharya, Bhanu Bhakta, 137 Acharya, Tanka Prasad, 137 Acid violence, 260 Adhikari, Man Mohan (Manmohan), 39, 75, 81, 137, 139, 145 Agricultural Development Bank, 67 Agricultural Tools Factory, 50 Agricultural University, 251 Agriculture, 22, 269 in Bangladesh, 185 (photo), 200, 212, 213–218, 227, 230, 250 dependence on, 55 dominance of, 51 growth for, 52, 217 Indo-Nepali, 87 literacy and, 252 modernization in, 216–217 in Nepal, 50–55, 67, 70 self-sufficiency in, 55 settlements, 15, 87 Ahmad, Khondakar Mushtaque, 233, 282 Akbar, Emperor, 200, 273 AL. See Awami League Ali, Chaudhuri Rahmat, 203 Allende, Salvador, 81 All-India Muslim League, 202 Altitude, 8 American Chamber of Commerce in Bangladesh (AmCham), 293 American Club, 295–296 American Embassy, 168, 299 American Express, 68 Amnesty International, Bangladesh and, 258 Amsuvarman, 24

Anglo-Nepal War (1814–1816), 132, 136–137, 149 Aniko (Arniko), 26, 138 Anjali Tours & Travel, 299 Annapurna, 10 (photo), 138, 144 Annapurna Hotel, 62 Antipanchayat movement, 79 Anti-Rana movements, 75, 103 Ari Malla (Arimalla), 26, 131 Aruna Lama, 138 Aryans, 18, 198 Ashok (Asoka), 199, 273 Asian Development Bank, Bangladesh and, 258 Asian Regional Team for Employment Production (ARTEP), 43 Assam, 202, 206 Association of Travel Agents of Bangladesh, 300 August Coup, 277, 279, 281 Aurangzeb, 200, 274 Avatars, 98, 99 Awami League (AL), 205, 208, 235, 274, 275, 276, 279, 282 BNP and, 236, 237 described, 277 looting, 206 provisional government and, 207 support for, 233 Badhon, 297 Bagmati River, battle over, 5 Baise, 28 Balaju Textile Industry, 50 Baluchistan, 203 Bananas, selling, 53 (photo) Banaras Hindu University, 103 Bang, 199, 273 Bangabandhu Bridge, 237

305

306——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Bangla (language), 183, 192, 194, 285 Bangla2000, 303–304 Bangladesh independence for, 206–208, 229, 231–232, 240, 242–243, 275–276 Indian recognition of, 275 Pakistani recognition of, 276 size of, 184 Bangladesh Bank, 293 Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies (BCAS), 227, 302 Bangladesh constitution, 275 Bangladesh Ecotours, 300 Bangladesh Embassy, 298 Bangladesh Finished Leather & Leather Goods Exporters Association, 294 Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers & Exporters Association, 294 Bangladesh Homepage, 299 Bangladesh Madrasa Education Board, 252 Bangladesh National Legislature, 208, 234, 235 Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), 208, 276, 277, 279, 283 AL and, 236, 237 boycott by, 234 crimes by, 238 election of, 237 Islamic fundamentalists and, 256 supporters of, 236 (photo) vote rigging by, 235 Bangladesh Showbiz, 255, 296, 303 Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology, 251 Bangladeshi boys, 253 (photo) Bank of Kathmandu, 67 Banking, 50, 164, 224–225, 258, 279, 293, 302 Nepali, 66, 67–68 Bansbari Leather and Shoe Factory, 50 Bargaining, 161, 291 Bari, 243, 244

Barind region, 187, 192, 242 Battle of Buxar (1764), 201 Battle of Plassey, 274 Bay of Bengal, 10, 11, 16, 184, 186 cyclones and, 190 forests along, 191 Seventh Fleet at, 241 BBC. See British Broadcasting Corporation Beer, 158, 289 Begum Khaleda Zia, 234–235, 238 (photo), 276, 277, 279–280 BNP and, 208, 236, 256 rule of, 235, 237–238 women’s status and, 262 Bengal, 201, 239, 273 migration to, 199 partition of, 274 Turkish conquest of, 246 Bengal Telecommunication and Electric Corporation, 299 Bengali (language), 192, 194, 205, 232, 285 expressions, listed, 286 Bengalis, 183, 192, 241–242 civil war and, 206 culture of, 243 Beverages, 59, 154–159, 286–290 Bhadgaun (Bhaktapur), 26, 27, 30, 132 Bhaktapur (Bhadgaon), 12, 69 (photo), 175 Bhardars, 31, 133 Bhattarai, Baburam, 138 Bhattarai, Krishna Prasad, 20, 80, 138–139, 146 constitution and, 39, 134 Bhimsen Thapa. See Thapa Bhimsen Bhojpuri, 151 Bhote, 90, 97 Bhrikuti Paper Mill, 50 Bhutan, 7, 157 Bhutto, Zulfakir Ali, 205, 206 Bihari (language), 242 Biharis, 19, 194, 201, 202, 285 migration of, 242–243

——Index——307

Bijaya Dashami, 101, 139 Biratnagar, high school in, 102 Biratnagar Jute Mill, 57–58 Birendra, King, 77, 133 challenge to, 38–39, 80 death of, 73, 81, 134 panchayat system and, 37, 134 Birganj, roads in, 65 Birth rate, crude, for Bangladesh, 195 Biswas, Abdur Rahman, 277 BNP. See Bangladesh Nationalist Party Bollywood, 255 Bombay brothels in, 261 showbiz world of, 255 Boycotts, 80, 85, 203 B. P. Koirala. See Koirala, Bishweshwar Prasad Brahmans, 18, 87, 88, 92, 95, 98, 151, 174 meat and, 156 revival of, 200 Brahmaputra River, 184–185, 189 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 66, 171 British East India Company, 132, 274 Mughal governors and, 201 Sepoy Mutiny and, 202 British Empire, 82–83, 201, 239, 267 British India, 32, 133 partition of, 204, 239 trade with, 56, 57 British Raj, 14, 82, 118, 239, 274 Sepoy Mutiny and, 202 Brothels, 115, 261 Buddha. See Gautama, Siddhartha Buddha Jayanti, 101 Buddha yuga, 99 Buddhism, 23, 199, 248 in Bangladesh, 192, 245, 267 Hindus and, 97 in Nepal, 18, 99–100 Tantric version of, 93 Buddhist temples, 29 (photo), 97, 100 (photo)

Buffalo, 217, 225 (photo) Bureaucracy, Nepali, 78, 87 Burping, 161, 291 Business cards, 161, 291 Bustees, 198 Butwal Power Company, 50 Calcutta, 84 British in, 200, 201 brothels in, 261 provisional government in, 207 Candy vendors, 265 (photo) Carpet industry, 46–47, 59, 61, 66–67, 78 child labor for, 116 Castes, 27, 43, 95, 156, 175, 192, 245 described, 90, 92–93 education and, 102, 103, 115 Nepali, 85, 87–88, 90, 92–93, 95 purity of, 92–93, 98 Catmando.com, 168 Central Carpet Industries Association, 163 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), guerrilla bands and, 11 Cereals, 213, 287 Chakmas, 243 Chandra Shamsher Rana, 34, 149 education and, 101–102 Chandragupta, 199 Char khose jhari, 14 Chaubise, 28, 30 Chhetris, 87, 88, 92, 95, 174 meat and, 156 Chhwa-la, 157 Child labor in Bangladesh, 256, 264–266, 304 class character of, 265–266 in Nepal, 116–117, 126 protesting, 117, 266 Children Bangladeshi, 224 (photo), 304 education and, 114, 252 health issues and, 265 poverty and, 117 street, 117

308——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Chili peppers, drying, 69 (photo) China Bangladesh and, 241 Nepal and, 82, 83–84 China South West Airlines, 65 Chittagong, 194, 200, 208, 219, 273 export zone in, 221 Chittagong dialect, 285 Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), 186–187, 191, 192, 243 Chitwan, 48, 118 (photo) Chowdhury, Abu Sayeed, 277 Chowdhury, A. F. M. Ahsanuddin, 234 Chowdhury, Anwar Bahar, 278 Christ yuga, 99 Christianity, 99, 248 in Bangladesh, 192, 245, 247 in Nepal, 101 Chure Hills, 14 Chutney, 155 CIA. See Central Intelligence Agency Citibank, 68 Civil disorder, 37 Civil liberties, 134, 183 Civil service, 87, 88, 109, 204 Civil society, 78, 303 Civil war, 206 Class structures, feudalistic, 104 Climate, 8, 9, 187–191 Clinton, Bill, in Bangladesh, 241 Clothing, 161, 291–292 CNN, 7, 66, 268 Coca-Cola, 43, 45, 159 Cold war, Nepal and, 83 Colonialism, 45–46, 183 education and, 249 Comilla, 187, 199 Commercialization, 78, 120, 269 Communication, 47, 48, 87, 126 in Bangladesh, 235, 240, 269 in Nepal, 50, 65 Communist Party of Nepal (CPN), 38, 39, 75, 79, 80, 136, 139, 145, 148 Compliments, 160, 290

Confucian system, women/social status and, 112 Congress Party, 202, 203 Constituent Assembly, 275 Consulate General of Bangladesh, 298 Consulate General of Nepal, 167 Consumerism, 7, 43, 120, 263 Contraception, 196 Corruption, 37–39, 40, 237 in Bangladesh, 209, 227, 229, 253, 256–258 culture of, 256–258, 260–262 Cottage industries, 219 Cow, 139 CPN. See Communist Party of Nepal Crematorium, 5 Crime, in Bangladesh, 238 Cultivated land, Nepali, 20 (table) Cultural diversity, 126, 267 Cultural history, 176, 266 Cultural landscape, 7, 62, 66, 125, 126, 267, 269 Cultural practice, Nepali, 119, 154 Cultural values, 118, 109 Culture Bengali, 243 Nepali, 12, 107, 155 Curry, 157, 288–289 Curzon, Lord, 202 Cyclones, 188, 189, 190, 237 Dal (lentils), 155, 156, 287, 288 Damai man, 91 (photo) Dance, women and, 115 Dang, Maoists in, 135 Dashain, 101, 110, 139–140, 149 Daughters-in-law, 113, 154 Daulah, Siraj ud, defeat of, 201 Death rate, crude, for Bangladesh, 195 Deepawali, 101 Delhi sultanate, 273 Deltas, 186 Democracy in Bangladesh, 232, 235, 238, 261, 270

——Index——309

dawn of, 75–80 death of, 37, 75–80, 133 demand for, 77, 80 in Nepal, 35, 49, 79 return of, 38–40, 80–82, 104, 134, 139, 146, 147 Demography, Nepali, 15, 17, 175 Deuba, Sher Bahadur, 39, 81 Dev Shamsher Rana, Durbar High School and, 102 Devanagari, 151, 285 Development consultant firms, 95 Devkota, Laxmi Prasad, 140 Dhaka, 199, 200, 202, 206, 207, 219, 255, 273, 278 child labor in, 264 demonstration in, 205, 259 (photo), 275 export zone in, 220 freedom fighters in, 275 illegal arms in, 258 industrial decline for, 201 photo of, 193, 224, 236, 265 population of, 198 university in, 251 Dhaka ShowBiz, 255 Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE), 294 Dhaka University (University of Dhaka), 296 violence at, 258 Dhallywood, 255, 264 Dharma, 98 Dhimals, 85 Dinajpur, 187 Dipendra, Crown Prince, death of, 73, 74, 134 Diplomatic relations, 25 Bangladeshi, 239–240, 241 Nepali, 82, 83, 85 Dishes Bangladeshi, 241, 287–289 Nepali, 155–158 Newari, 157–158 Divide and rule policy, 201, 231 Division of labor, 263 Divorce, 197, 260

Diwali, 101 Diwani, 201 Dolpos, 18 Dowries, 195, 245, 264 Dravidians, 192, 198–200, 241–242, 273 Dravya Shah, 28 Droughts, 183, 188, 190 Drug culture, 121, 198 Durbar High School, 102 Durbar Square, 124 (photo) Durga, 110 East Bengal, 183, 202, 274 independence for, 204 renaming of, 275 East Pakistan, 206, 278 civil disturbances in, 205 independence for, 183, 204, 275 Indian invasion of, 275 linguistic/cultural issues in, 231 second-class status for, 204 East Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (EPIDC), 218 East-West Highway, 65 Eating structure, hierarchical, 154, 287 Economic development, 7–8 in Bangladesh, 183, 196, 197, 204–205, 211–213, 221, 224–225, 226, 227–230, 241, 253, 270, 303 in Nepal, 10, 20, 43, 45–63, 65–68, 70, 75, 78, 82, 83, 95, 104, 173, 174 Economic embargo, 7, 13, 38, 84, 240 Economic planning, 47, 50–63, 65–68, 75 foreign aid and, 45–46 Ecotourism, 63 Education, 48, 269 in Bangladesh, 198, 249–252, 256, 258 castes and, 102, 103, 114, 115 children and, 114, 252

310——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

colonialism and, 249 English, 102 in Nepal, 101–104 postsecondary, 250 primary, 102, 103, 252 problems in, 251, 258 religious, 252–253 Sanskritic, 102 scientific, 253 secondary, 250 women and, 104, 113–114, 115 Eightfold Path, 101 Elders, respect for, 290 Electricity, export of, 68 Elites, 203 education and, 249 Kathmandu, 14 Nepali, 48, 118 Energy development, 67, 68 English, 102 replacing, 232 Entertainment, 126, 267 Environmental issues, 5, 8–9, 63, 70, 191–192 Ershad, Husain Muhammad, 208, 234–235, 276, 278–279, 282 Ethnic groups attacks on, 261 Bangladeshi, 241–245 Nepali, 17, 85, 87–88, 90, 92–93, 95 Tibeto-Nepali, 88, 90 Etiquette, 159–160, 290–292 Everest Bank, 67 Export Promotion Bureau, 294–295 Exports, 59 agricultural, 217, 218 Bangladeshi, 215, 220 duties on, 135 industrial, 220 Nepali, 57, 60, 66–67 Eye contact, 160, 290 Fakirs, 248 Family networks Bangladeshi, 244, 287 Nepali, 107–110, 126

Family planning, in Bangladesh, 195–196, 256 Farming, 51 (photo), 212 (photo) Bangladeshi, 183, 215–217, 287 dependence on, 55 geographical limitations on, 9 monsoons and, 11 Nepali, 12, 108, 109–110 technology, 19 tenant, 216 women, 16 (photo) Farming People’s Party, 203 Farmland, 6 (photo), 12 (photo), 13 Federation of Nepali Chambers of Commerce and Industry, 163 Festivals, 101, 110, 124 (photo) Feudalism, 76, 104, 107, 113, 270 Films, 264 Hindi, 85, 118–119, 120 Hollywood, 115 Indian, 269 Financial sector, 68, 230 Fish, 288 Fishery sector, Bangladeshi, 217–218 Fishing, 211 (photo) Bangladeshis and, 211 freshwater/marine, 218 Floods, 17, 190, 218, 237 damage from, 188–189 women and, 188 (photo) Fodors, 168 Food, 17 Bangladeshi, 286–290 Nepali, 154–159 production of, 53–54, 229 shortages of, 13, 52, 195 Food-for-Work (FFW) program, 224 Foreign affairs, Bangladesh and, 239–241 Foreign aid Bangladesh and, 220, 226, 227, 228, 240 dependency on, 226, 227–228 economic planning and, 45–46 Nepal and, 47, 48–49 Foreign debt, Nepali, 48–49

——Index——311

Foreign direct investment (FDI), 66–67, 219, 229, 230 Foreign Investors Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 295 Forest Department, 191 Forests, 14, 187, 191–192 Four Noble Truths, human condition and, 99, 101 Freedom fighters, 239, 275 Fulbright Program, 166–167, 296 Fundamentalist organizations, 256, 261, 267 Gagan Singh, murder of, 33 Gaine, 122 (photo) Gandaki, 14 Ganges River, 14, 185, 186, 189, 190, 198 battle on, 201 forests along, 191 treaty over, 237 Garment industry in Bangladesh, 219–220, 229 child labor for, 266 exporting, 66–67 women and, 220, 262 Gas reserves, 220 Gautama, Siddhartha, 99, 131, 140 human condition and, 99, 101 GDP. See Gross domestic product Gender relations, 114–116, 126, 176, 258, 260–261, 269 Geography Bangladeshi, 184 Nepali, 15, 21, 25, 70, 83, 171, 172 Geopolitics, 82 Ghee, 289 Globalization, 60, 120, 264, 266 Golden Age, 131 Gopala, 199 Gopalavamshi, 22 Gorkha, 28, 82, 90, 132, 136 military power of, 30, 82, 103 Gorkhapatra, 140 Government Bangladeshi, 232–241, 303

Nepali, 74–85 Grameen Bank (GB), 224–225, 279, 302 Green Revolution, 213, 214, 223 Gross domestic product (GDP) agriculture, 218 Bangladeshi, 212, 213, 218, 221 Nepali, 49, 51 tourism and, 61 Guerrilla operations, 11, 81, 233 Gundruk, 157 Gupta dynasty, 199, 273 Gurkha. See Gorkha Gurungs, 17, 90, 97, 114–115, 151 Gyanendra, King, 73 corruption and, 74 state of emergency and, 134, 183–184 Hagen, Toni, on ironworks, 57 Hajj, 248 Handicraft Association of Nepal, 163 Handicraft industry, Nepali, 61, 163 Hanuman Dhoka, 124 (photo) Haq, Fazlul, 203, 204 Hardwood forests, 187, 191 Harisidhi Brick and Tile Factory, 50 Harsha, 199, 273 Hartals, 221, 227, 235 Harvesting, 17, 113, 212 (photo), 214 (photo) rituals of, 101 women and, 112 Hasina Wajid (Wazed), Sheikh, 240, 276, 277, 279, 280 AL and, 208, 235 rule of, 236–237 women’s status and, 262 Health issues, 63, 195, 198, 223–224 children and, 265 women and, 262 Heitzman, 26, 30 Hierarchies caste, 93 eating structure, 154, 287 social, 159–160, 290

312——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

socioeconomic class, 93 High-yielding varieties (HYV) seeds, 213 Hill man, 44 (photo) Hill Region, 11–12 Himalayan Bank, 67 Himalayan Buddhist Education Foundation, 165 Himalayas, 8, 9, 185, 190 crossing, 18 functions of, 10–11 tourism and, 63 Hindi (language), 151, 194, 285 Hinduism, 18, 85, 87, 93, 95 in Bangladesh, 192, 202, 245, 262, 267 Buddhists and, 97 Indo-Nepalis and, 92 looting, 206 low-caste, 246, 247 meat and, 156, 288 migration and, 261–262 Moslems and, 201 in Nepal, 97–99 theological/philosophical precepts of, 97–98 Turkish invasion and, 246 Hippies, popular culture and, 120 History Bangladeshi, 198–208, 301 Nepali, 21–28, 30–39, 171, 172 Hotels, 62 Nepali, 61 (photo) House of Gorkha, 28, 30 Houses, Bangladeshi, 189 (photo), 268 (photo) Human geography Bangladeshi, 184–192, 194–198 Nepali, 7–21 Human rights, 303 Human-development relations, Nepali, 176 Humbleness, 160, 290–291 Hydro-electric power, 57, 68 Id al Fitr, 248

Identity national, 82 Nepali, 174–175 Immigrants, Indian, 19, 269 Imports, 60, 220, 228 duties on, 135 protection against, 56 Independence, 45–46, 82, 83, 183, 204, 206–208, 229, 231–232, 240, 242–243, 275–276 India Bangladesh and, 240 independence for, 204, 231 Nepal and, 66, 82, 84 Pakistan and, 207, 231 partition of, 274 India Independence Act (1947), 204 Indian Embassy, 35 Indian National Congress, Muslims and, 202 Indian National Congress Party, 202 Indo-Aryans, 18, 192, 241, 243 Indo-Nepalis, 85, 87, 88, 151 Newars and, 93 Indo-Pakistan War (1971), 279 Indus Valley, 198 Industrial development, 21, 48, 54–55, 78, 173 in Bangladesh, 218–221, 230 child labor and, 266 domestically oriented/export based, 59 erosion of, 57 growth of, 55, 59 nationalization of, 219 in Nepal, 50, 55–60, 66 private investment in, 219 Shah dynasty and, 56 Infrastructure, 229 industrial, 56, 57 social, 60 International Chamber of Commerce in Bangladesh, 295 International University of Business, Agriculture, and Technology (IUBAT), 296

——Index——313

Internet, 65, 119, 125–126, 269 popular culture and, 126 Iqbal, Sir Muhammad, 203 Ironworks, 57 Irrigation, 54, 213, 214 Islam, 192, 246–249, 273 Hinduism and, 201 origin of, 247–248 sects of, 192, 248, 256, 257 Islam, Kazi Nazrul, 194, 285 Islam, Syed Nazrul, 207 Islamic fundamentalism, 256, 267 Islamic University, 296–297 Isolation, 7–8, 82 Jafar, Mir, 201 Jahangar, land taxes and, 200 Jakat, 248 Jamaat e Islami, 208, 232, 235, 256 Jamuna River, 185, 187, 237 Janakpur, 140–141, 145 Jang Bahadur Rana (Kunwar), 32, 33, 133, 142, 145 economic policy of, 56 English education and, 102 power/authority for, 34 Jatiya Dal party, 235 Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini, Mujib and, 233 Jatyo Sangsad, 278 Jatyo Sritee Shoudhow, 278 Jayasthiti Malla, 26, 27 Jhum, cultivation of, 186 Jinnah, Mohammad Ali, Muslim League and, 203–204 Joint ventures, 58, 67 Judaism, 247 Juddha Match Factory, 58 Jute, 204–205, 214–215, 219, 220 Kachi-la, 157–158 Kali, 110 Kali Gandaki River, 90 Kalkin (Kalki), 99 Kangra, 31 Karma, 98, 101 Karnali, 14

Kathmandu, 5, 12, 19, 27, 57, 61 (photo), 84, 120, 141, 175 air service to, 65 British residency in, 83, 150 as capital city, 132 Christmas in, 101 cultural landscape of, 66 high school in, 102–103 Indo-Nepali population of, 87 kingdom of, 132 roads in, 65 shutdown of, 136 tourism in, 62–63 Kathmandu Valley, 5, 11, 21, 23, 24, 70, 79, 118, 120, 175, 176 attacks on, 26, 30, 32, 131, 135 Buddhism in, 97 centrality of, 12 cultural landscape of, 62 development consultant firms in, 95 drugs in, 121 environmental problems in, 63 external dependency of, 13 Malla kingdom of, 28, 132 Newari communities in, 26–27, 157 origin of, 22, 85 pastoral dynasties in, 131 urban areas in, 54 western influences on, 121 Kathmandu-Kodari Highway, 65 Kathmandu-Pokhara Highway, 65 Khagrachhari, 243 Khalji dynasty, 200 Khan, Muhammad Ayub, 205 Khan, Tikka, 206, 207 Khans, 24 Khatri, Mohan Singh, 135 Kinship networks, 18, 107–110, 244 Kipat system, 18, 19 Kirata dynasty, 17, 22, 23, 131 Koirala, Bishweshwar Prasad (B. P.), 35, 36, 39, 75, 80, 141, 143 coup against, 37, 76, 133 Koirala, Girjia Prasad (G. P.), 39, 80, 134, 141–142

314——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Kosi, 14 Kot Massacre, 32, 33–34 Kot Parba, 32–38, 133, 142, 145 Krishak Praja Party (KPP), 203 Kublai Khan, 26 Kumari, 96 (photo), 142 Kunwar clan, 33 Labor, 267 division of, 263 excess, 54 female, 263 household, 110, 116 Indian, 58 productivity, 218 sharing, 109–110 shortages, 50 skilled, 197, 221 See also Child labor; Strikes Lahore Resolution, 203–204 Lakshmidevi, Queen, 33 Lalbagh Fort, 278 Lalitpur (Patan), 12, 175 Lalmai Hill, 187 Land productivity, Nepali, 53, 54, 70 Land resources, 50, 52, 218 population growth and, 54 productivity of, 53, 54, 70 Landholdings, 93, 108, 215–218 in Bangladesh, 216 (table) Language Bangladeshi, 285–286 Nepali, 151–153 official/vernacular, 87 Language Movement, 280 Lawlessness, in Bangladesh, 256–258 Lawyers for Human Rights and Legal Aid (PLHRLA), 261 Laxmi, 110 Laxmi puja, 110 Leisure time, in Nepal, 121, 123, 125 Lepchas, 18 Licchavi monarchy, 23–25, 82, 131 Limbus, 17, 22, 23, 88, 90, 97 Literacy, 103, 227, 251–252 agricultural development and, 252

for women, 113–114, 252 Lonely Planet Online, 168, 299 Lumbini, 99, 142 Machhapuchhre, 10 (photo), 142–143, 144 Madhesi, 87 Madhupur Tract, 187 Madrasas, 252, 253 (photo) Magars, 18, 88, 90, 97 Mahabharat Range, 11 Mahabharata, 23 Mahendra, King, 35–36, 38 death of, 77, 133 democracy and, 80 manipulation by, 36, 76 panchayat system and, 133 Mahisapalavamshi, 22 Mainamati, 280 Maithili, 151 Majhi, 211–212 Makwanpur, battles in, 32 Malla kingdom, 25, 26–28, 131, 132 Malnutrition, 225 women and, 113, 262 Mamluk dynasty, 200 Manadeva I, 23–24, 27 Manadeva IV, 25, 131 Manjusri, 22 Manufacturing sector, 59, 67, 198, 221 Maoists, 40, 135 revolutionary movement of, 81 strike and, 136 Marathas, 200 Market liberalization, 68, 219 Marmas, 243 Marriages arranged, 244–245, 297 in Bangladesh, 195, 197, 243, 244, 255, 260 caste, 27 contraception and, 196 intercaste, 92, 93 love, 244 in Nepal, 107–108, 114

——Index——315

parental families and, 113 social status and, 264 Martyrs’ Day, 205, 275 Martyrs’ Memorial, 205, 278 Matchmaking services, 297 Mauryan empire, 199, 273 Maya, 98–99, 101 Meat, 155–156, 288 gender/consumption and, 156 taboos against, 156 Meghna River, 184–185, 186 mosque on, 246 (photo) Merchants, 10, 23, 83–84 Micro entrepreneurship, 224, 229 Middle class, 95, 125 Middle East countries, Bangladesh and, 241 Migrants, 18 Bangladeshi, 197 female, 112, 261 foreign, 196–197 Hindu, 261–262 household economic strategy and, 109 male, 195 Nepali, 17, 19, 88, 109 rural-to-urban, 108, 109, 197 social status and, 264 Mineral resources, 67 Mini gangs, 117 Minorities, attacks on, 261 Mirza, Iskandar, constitution and, 205 Mobility, women and, 112–113 Modernization, 5, 117, 125, 175 agricultural, 216–217, 230 Bangladesh and, 255, 256, 264 Nepal and, 28, 46, 120, 132, 176 women and, 114 Modesty, 160, 290–291 Mohan Shamsher Rana, 34, 35 Moksha, 99 Momocha, 157, 158 Monarchical system, 39, 73, 135 Monghyr, 199 Mongoloid people, 17, 18, 19, 28,

192, 243 Monsoon, 11, 15–17, 51, 187, 188–189, 190 Morang Electricity Supply Company, 58 Morang Sugar Mill, 58 Mosque, 246 (photo) Mothers-in-law, control by, 112 Motorcycle, as status symbol, 94 (photo) Mt. Everest. See Sagarmatha Mountbatten, Lord Louis, 204 Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, 38, 79 Mros, 243 Mughal (Moghul, Mogul) Period, 200–201, 204, 239, 273, 274 Muhammad, Prophet, 247, 248 Mujibism, 232 Mujibur (Mujib) Rahman, Sheikh, 275, 277, 279, 282 assassination of, 276 described, 280–281 rule of, 232–233 Mukti Bahini, 206, 207 Muktinath, 143 Multiparty system, Nepali, 80–82 Musharif, Khalid, 277, 281, 282, 283 Mushtaque Ahmed, Khondakar, 281 Music, Bengali, 194 Muslim League, 202, 203–204 Muslims, 200 in Bangladesh, 192, 202, 231, 241, 245, 247 (photo), 267 Indian, 202, 203 meat and, 156 in Nepal, 97 Punjabi, 204 Myanmar, 184, 186, 191 Namaste (Namaskar), 159 Narayanghat, 118 (photo) Narendradeva, 24–25 National Assembly Complex, 278 National Defense Force, 233 National development, 77, 302

316——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

National Planning Commission, 48 Nationalism, 151, 219, 232 Natural disasters, 227, 301 Natural gas, 227, 229 Nazrul, Islam Syed, 281–282 Ne Muni (Nemuni), 22 Neoliberalism, 49, 70 Nepal Arab Bank, 67 Nepal Association of Travel Agents, 168 Nepal Bangladesh Bank, 67 Nepal Bank, 50, 67 Nepal Bank of Ceylon, 67 Nepal Chamber of Commerce, 163–164 Nepal Education Foundation, 165 Nepal Garment Association, 164 Nepal Grindlays Bank, 67 Nepal Home Page, 164, 169, 171–172 Nepal Industrial and Commercial Bank, 164 Nepal Plywood and Bobbin Company, 58 Nepal Press Digest, 88 Nepal Rastra Bank, 67, 164 Nepal SBI Bank, 67 Nepal Stock Exchange Limited, 164–165 Nepal Tea Development Corporation, 50 Nepal Telecommunication Authority, 66 Nepal Telecommunications Corporation, 50 Ne-pala, 22 Nepal-Anglo War (1814–1816), 32 Nepal-China War (1792), 132 Nepali Chamber of Commerce— USA, 165 Nepali Congress Party, 36, 37, 75, 79, 80, 133, 134, 139, 143, 148 division within, 39 election of, 76 formation of, 38 Nepali constitution, 39, 134 Nepali Embassy, 167

Nepali House of Representatives, 80 Nepal Indo-Suez Bank, 67 Nepali (language), 151–153, 194, 285 expressions in (listed), 153 social class and, 152 Nepal-USA Chamber of Commerce & Industry, 165 Networks building, 154 commerce, 25, 66 family, 107–110, 126, 244, 287 kinship, 18, 107–110, 244 social, 154, 155 New Delhi, British in, 201 Newari, 26–27, 86, 151, 152, 157–158, 175 Buddhism and, 97 Indo-Nepalis and, 93 Vaisya and, 92 women, 112 NGOs. See Nongovernmental organizations Niazi, A. A. K., 207 Nightclub culture, 115–116, 125 Nirvana, 99, 101 Noakhali, 194, 285 Nonalignment Movement, 83 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 223, 225–226, 303 family planning, 196 North Bengal, 242 drought in, 190 North Bengal Alluvial Fan, 187 North South University (NSU), 297–298 Northwest Frontier Province (NFP), 203 Nose blowing, 161, 291 Nyatapola (pagoda) temple, 29 (photo) Oil boom, 261 Orissa, 201, 202 Padma River, 184–185, 186 Pahar, 11, 12, 13, 112

——Index——317

Paharis, 95, 112 domination by, 87–88 resettlement by, 15 Pakistan Bangladesh and, 183, 241, 274 East Pakistan and, 204–206 independence for, 231 India and, 231 naming, 203 Pakistan constitution, 205 Pakistan National Assembly, Yahya and, 206 Pakistan People’s Party, 205 Pakistan Resolution, 203–204 Pala dynasty, 199, 273 Palace Massacre, 143, 146, 147 Panchayat system, 76, 77, 133, 140, 146, 147 demise of, 37–38, 79, 80, 134 described, 143–144 Pande, Damodar, 31 Pande faction, 33 Paras, 74, 244 Paribar, 107, 243, 244 Parijat, 144 Parma, 110 Pashupati (Temple), 5, 125, 144 Patan, 12, 27, 30, 175 high school in, 102 kingdom of, 132 shutdown of, 136 Patna University, 103 Patriarchal families, 107, 113, 244 purdah and, 262–263 Peace Corps volunteers (PCVs), 61, 120 Peacock window, 13 (photo) Peasantry, 183 rebellion by, 47 People’s War, 135, 136 Permanent Settlement Act (1793), 274 Physical geography Bangladeshi, 184–192, 194–198 Nepali, 7–21 Pirs, 248

Poetry, Bengali, 194 Pokhara, 11, 120, 138, 144 roads in, 65 Pokhara-Sunauli Highway, 65 Politics, 40, 48, 176, 261 in Bangladesh, 183, 209, 229, 230, 232–241, 253, 301, 303 in Nepal, 74–85, 93, 95, 171, 172 women and, 104 Pollution, 7, 64, 159 social, 92–93 water, 218 Polyandry, 110 Polygamy, 110 Popular culture in Bangladesh, 239, 255, 264, 266–269 Internet and, 126 Japan and, 269 in Nepal, 117–121, 123, 125–126 Population Bangladeshi, 184, 192, 194–198, 213, 227, 243 economic resources and, 20 land resources and, 54 Nepali, 19–20, 20 (table), 50, 52, 95 rural, 52, 55, 95 urban, 197, 198 Poverty, 198 alleviating, 45, 47, 223–226, 256 in Bangladesh, 197, 212, 223–224, 226, 227, 229, 231, 250, 256, 263, 264 children and, 117 in Nepal, 43, 46, 68, 70 rural, 21, 43, 223, 229 women and, 113 Powell, Colin, 135 Pradhan, Sahana, 144–145, 148 Prithvi Narayan (Prithvinarayana) Shah, 73, 147 leadership of, 28, 75 Malla kingdoms and, 132 motives of, 30–31 trade policy of, 56

318——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Privatization, 49–50, 58–59, 67, 70, 219 Pro-democracy movement, 38–39, 79, 134 Production domestic, 56 food, 53–54, 229 social relations of, 93 Prostitution, 7, 63, 115–116, 198 Protests, 79, 259 (photo) Public displays of affection, 160–161, 291 Purdah, 262–263, 264 Raghavadeva, 25, 131 Rahman, Mujibur (Mujib), 205, 206, 207, 208 assassination of, 219, 233, 240 rule of, 232–233 Rainfall, 187–191 Rais, 17, 22, 23, 88, 90, 97 Rajputs, 18 Raksi, 155, 158 Ramadan, 248 Ramayana, 145 Rana, Chandra Shamsher. See Chandra Shamsher Rana Rana, Jang Bahadur. See Jang Bahadur Rana (Kunwar) Rana regime, 58, 82, 83, 145, 147, 149 British India and, 56–57 corruption of, 37–38 economic development and, 46 education under, 101–102 end of, 46, 75, 76, 102, 103, 133 opposition to, 35, 133 pro-democracy revolution against, 133 rise of, 32–38 Shah system and, 38 Westernization and, 117–118 Rangamati, 243 Rangpur, 187 Rapti Valley, settlement of, 48 Rastriya Banijya Bank, 67

Reciprocity, 160, 290 Recreation, 121, 123, 125, 266–269 Refugees, 240 Regmi, Dilli Daman, 87, 145 Religion in Bangladesh, 192, 194, 245–249 in Nepal, 95, 97–99, 101, 123, 175 Remittances, 226 Resettlement, 15, 48 Respect, 159–160, 290 Restaurants, 123, 125, 154, 158 Rice, 155, 287–288 cultivating, 16, 16 (photo), 186 drought and, 190 harvesting, 101, 212 (photo), 214 (photo) high-yielding varieties (HYV), 213 husking, 111 (photo) planting, 16–17, 248 transporting, 215 (photo) Rickshaw, photo of, 64, 193, 222 Roads, 65 constructing, 48, 63 repairing, 228 (photo) Rodi ghar, 115 Rossogola, 289 Roti, 289 Royal massacre, 73–74 Rubber plantations, 191 Rudeness, 160 Sagarmatha, 8, 146 Sake, 155 Sakya (Shakya) dynasty, 131 Sal forests, 187, 191 Salat, 248 Salt Trading Corporation, 50 Samaj, 244 Samatata, 199 San Miguel (beer company), 158 Sanskrit, 92, 102, 151, 194, 285 Santals, 192, 242 Sarangi, 122 (photo) Saraswoti, 110 Saskyapa Lama, 26 Satellite culture, 255

——Index——319

Sati, 34 Satlej (Sutlej) River, 132 Sattar, Abdus, 234, 276, 279, 282 Sawm, 248 Sayem, Abu Sadat Muhammad, 233–234, 282 School of International Training, 165–166 Senas, 199–200, 246 Sepoy Mutiny (1857–1858), 201–202, 274 Service sector, 95, 212, 221–223 Seventh Fleet, 241 Sex ratio, 195 Sexual bondage, 260, 261 Shah, Birendra Bir Bikram, 133, 146–147 Shah dynasty, 30–32, 132 political environment of, 34, 35, 73, 77–78 Rana system and, 38 revitalization of, 34–38, 75–76, 133 rule of, 33–34 trade/industrial infrastructure and, 56 Shah, Gyanendra Bir Bikram, 147 Shah, Mahendra Bir Bikram, 133, 144 Shah, Prithvi Narayan. See Prithvi Narayan (Prithvinarayana) Shah Shah, Tribhuvan Bir Bikram. See Tribhuvan Bir Bikram Shah Shahabuddin Ahmed, Justice, 208, 235 Shahadah, 248 Shaheed Minar, 205, 278 Shams ud-din Ilyas, Sultan, 131 Sharecropping, 216–217, 223 Sherchan, Bhupi, 147–148 Sherpa, Tenzing Norgay, 146, 148 Sherpas, 18, 88 Shiva, 98 Shrestha, Marichman Singh, 77, 148 Shrestha, Puspa Lal, 35, 75, 136, 139, 144, 148 Silent Cry, The (Stiller), 32 Singapore, 194, 213

Singh, Ganeshman, 37, 75, 143, 148 Sitting, 161, 291 Sivadeva I, 24 Siwalik Range, 14 Slave dynasty, 200 Slavery, 148–149 Slums, 198, 223 Slusser, Mary, 26 Social change, 23, 28, 104, 174, 175, 176 Social classes, 85, 87–88, 90, 92–93, 95, 152, 245 Social conflicts, 36, 46, 174 Social institutions, 104, 174, 232 Social landscapes, 46, 232 Social obligation, 154, 287 Social order, 7, 76, 79, 108 Social problems, 119, 229, 253 Social services, 48 Social status, 93, 287 marriage and, 264 migrants and, 264 Nepali, 90, 95, 155 women and, 263 Social systems, 126, 241–245 Socialism, 232 Socialization, 123, 154 male/female, 114, 115, 119 middle class and, 125 Society in Bangladesh, 245–249 interdependencies of, 109 in Nepal, 95, 97–99, 101, 107, 175 women and, 126 Sociocultural bonds, 107, 117 Soft drinks, 158–159, 289–290 Songs, Hindi, 119, 120 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), 83, 135, 146, 240 South-Asia.com, 172 Squatters, 198, 223 Sri Lanka, 199 Standard Chartered Bank, 68 Standard of living, Bangladeshi, 223, 227

320——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

Star TV, 268 State of emergency, 76, 135, 183–184 Stone sculpture, Hindu, 86 (photo) Stratification, Nepali, 93, 95 Strikes, 136, 221, 227, 235 Sudra, 92 Sufism, 248, 249 Suhrawardy, Husain Shahid, 203, 274, 282 united Bengal and, 204 Suhrawardy Uddyan, 278 Sundarbans, 186, 191, 282–283 Surendra, King, 34 Swadeshi movement, 203 Swayambhu, 149 Syeds, 245 Sylhet, 186, 187, 192, 194, 243, 283, 285 Ta, 153 Taboos, cultural/religious, 115, 156 Tagore, Rabindranath, 194, 283, 285 Taking shoes off, 159, 290 Tamang, 88, 151 Tarai region, 9, 10, 12–15, 19, 48, 58, 85, 99, 118 (photo), 131, 175 Buddhism in, 97 farming in, 16 (photo), 52, 70 immigration to, 19 Indo-Nepali population of, 87 paharization of, 15 population growth in, 20 resettlement scheme for, 15 road networks in, 63, 65 sociopolitical standing of, 14 Tarkari, 288 Tea, 158–159, 219, 289 Tea stalls, 125 Technology, 28, 47, 218, 250 agricultural, 21, 54 Television, 115, 119, 267–268, 269 Temples, 5, 29 (photo), 97, 100 (photo), 125, 144 visiting, 125 Terraces, 12 (photo), 13

Terrorism, 257, 258 Textiles, 50, 219 child labor for, 266 Thakali, 88, 90, 97, 174 Thakuri dynasty, 24 Thapa, Amar Singh 132 Thapa, Bhimsen, 31, 32, 132, 133, 149 Tharu, 85, 151, 175 That’s Why I’m Working (film), 264 Those, infrastructure of, 57 Tibet, 9, 84 Tibetan guerrilla bands, 11 Tibetan plateau, 8, 9, 18 Tibeto-Burman language family, 152 Tibeto-Himalayans, 18 Tibeto-Nepali, 85, 89 (photo), 93, 114–115, 151, 152 agro-pastoralism of, 90 Buddhism and, 97 subethnic groups of, 88, 90 women, 110 Tihar, 101, 110, 149 Tipperas, 243 Tista River, 31 Tourism, 48, 120, 175 air transportation and, 65 Bangladesh and, 221, 298–300 Coca-Cola and, 45 GDP and, 61 Nepal and, 50, 60–63, 66, 67, 70, 115, 123, 126, 176, 177 Tourist Office Bangladesh Parjatan Corporation, 300 Trade, 9 Bangladesh and, 200, 229, 240 embargo on, 7 entrepôt, 25, 27 foreign aid and, 226 long-distance, 23 Nepal and, 56, 57, 66–67, 83–84, 121, 174 Shah dynasty and, 56 trans-Himalayan, 173 Trade and Transit Treaty (1989), 84 Traditionalists, 7, 176, 256

——Index——321

environmentalists and, 5 Trafficking, female, 216, 260–261, 304 Transformation, 115 economic, 23, 28 Transparency InternationalBangladesh (TIB), 258 Transportation air, 65, 197 in Bangladesh, 197, 218, 235, 240, 269 in Nepal, 50, 57, 60, 63, 65–66, 84 Treaty of Commerce (1792), 132 Treaty of Sagauli (Sugauli) (1816), 32, 83, 133, 138, 149–150 Tribhuvan Bir Bikram Shah, 35, 75–76, 133, 147 Tri-Chandra College, 101–102 Tripura, 186, 206 Turkish invasion, 245, 273 Two-Nation Theory, 203 Udayadeva, 24 Ulemas, 248–249 UML. See United Marxist-Leninist party Unemployment, 197, 227 Union European de CIC, 68 United Marxist-Leninist Party (UML), 39, 80, 81 United Nations Bangladesh and, 240–241 Nepal and, 83 status of women and, 110 United Nations Permanent Mission of Bangladesh, 298 United Nations Permanent Mission of Nepal, 167 United States Agency for International Aid (USAID), Nepal and, 49 Universities in Bangladesh, 250, 251, 258, 296–298 in Nepal, 103 Untouchables, 43, 92, 192, 245, 246 meat and, 156

Muslims as, 247 Upreti, Lok Raj, 135 Urban family, 94 (photo) Urbanization, 21, 197–198 Urdu (language), 194, 203, 205, 243, 285 U.S.-Bangladesh Business Council, 295 USEF/NEPAL—The Fulbright Commission, 166–167 Vaisya, Newars and, 92 Vedas, 5, 97–98, 151 Vegetables, 156–157, 287, 288 Vendor, 62 (photo) Vikrampur, 199 Violence, 260–262 acid, 260 campus, 256, 257–258 gender, 258, 260–261, 269 political, 237, 253, 257 Vishnu, 24, 35, 98, 99 Visit Nepal.com Travel Information Network, 169 Vrasadeva, 131 War for Independence (1971), 206–207, 285 Water, 66, 68, 198 arsenic in, 190–191 bottled, 159 pollution, 218 sharing, 302 waiting for, 224 (photo) West Bengal, 19, 202, 206, 274 early history of, 199 West Pakistan, 204, 206, 274 Westernization, 5, 7 Bangladesh and, 255 Nepal and, 107, 115, 121 Ranas and, 117–118 Wheat, high-yielding varieties (HYV), 213 Women Bangladeshi, 212 (photo), 263 (photo)

322——NEPAL AND BANGLADESH: A Global Studies Handbook

domination of, 262–263, 264 economic contribution of, 104, 113 education and, 113–114, 115 equal rights for, 262 farming by, 16 (photo) floods and, 188 (photo) garment industry and, 220 in government, 237 health issues and, 113, 262 literacy rates for, 113–114 migration and, 112–113, 261 modernization and, 114 Newari, 112 poverty and, 113 protest by, 259 (photo) status of, 110, 112–114, 256, 262–264, 269, 303 Tibeto-Nepali, 110 trafficking of, 260–261, 270, 304 World Bank, 227, 302 Bangladesh and, 258 Nepal and, 43, 51, 83 on poverty, 223

World Congregation of Islamic Preachers, 247 (photo) World Health Organization (WHO), 190 Yahya Khan, General, 205, 206, 207 Yaksha Malla, 27 Yellung Kirata, 22, 131 Yuga, 99 Yunus, Muhammad, 224–225, 302 Z Force, 208 Zakat, 248 Zamindar class, 200 Zee TV, 268 Zhou (Chou) Enlai, on British Empire, 231 Zhu Rongji, in Bangladesh, 241 Ziaur (Zia) Rahman, 235, 276, 277, 279, 281, 283–284 Mujib’s murder and, 233 rule of, 208, 233–234

About the Author Nanda R. Shrestha was born and raised in Nepal. With the help of Jon Magnuson, who served as a Peace Corps volunteer in Nepal, Shrestha received a scholarship from Gustavus Adolphus College (Minnesota), where he earned a B.A. in 1974. He completed an M.A. at Temple University in 1976 and received a Ph.D. in geography with an emphasis on population and development from Indiana University in 1982. He is currently professor of resource and cultural management in the School of Business & Industry at Florida A & M University (FAMU). Prior to joining FAMU, he was an associate professor of geography at the University of Wisconsin– Whitewater and a lecturer at Georgia State University. In addition to his personal knowledge of and experience with Nepal, Shrestha has conducted extensive field research in Nepal funded by research grants from the National Science Foundation and the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations. He has published numerous articles in geography and economic development journals, including World Development, Economic Development and Cultural Change, and Annals of the Association of American Geographers. His books include The Political Economy of Land, Landlessness, and Migration in Nepal (2001; first published under the title Landlessness and Migration in Nepal, 1990) and In the Name of Development: A Reflection on Nepal (1997; 1999).

323