NATO in the ''New Europe'': The Politics of International Socialization After the Cold War

NATO in the “New Europe”: The Politics of International Socialization after the Cold War

Alexandra Gheciu

Stanford University Press

NATO in the “New Europe”

NATO in the “New Europe” The Politics of International Socialization after the Cold War

Alexandra Gheciu

stanford university press stanford, california 2005

Stanford University Press Stanford, California © 2005 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system without the prior written permission of Stanford University Press. Printed in the United States of America on acid-free, archival-quality paper Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gheciu, Alexandra. NATO in the “new Europe” : the politics of international socialization after the Cold War / Alexandra Gheciu. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 0-8047-5161-7 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization—History. 2. Europe—Defenses. 3. Europe—Politics and government—1989– I. Title. UA646.3.G53 2005 355’.031’091821—dc22 2005002883 Original Printing 2005 Last figure below indicates year of this printing: 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05

To my parents, Mariana and Dan, with my deepest love and gratitude

Contents

Acknowledgments

ix

1 Overview

1

2 NATO’s History: The Politics of Securing the West since 1949

34

3 NATO’s Socialization Practices in the Post–Cold War Period

77

4 The Czech Republic: Becoming a NATO Member State

102

5 Romania: Between the Eastern Past and a Western Future?

157

6 Thinking About NATO from Different IR Perspectives

210

7 Conclusion

233

Appendix: Interviews, 1999–2000

253

Notes Bibliography

259 311

Index

343

Acknowledgments

In writing this book, I benefited greatly from the assistance and encouragement of many individuals and institutions. I would like to thank in particular the members of my dissertation committee for their unwavering support during the researching and the writing of the dissertation on which this book is based. Their commitment to excellence in teaching and research is humbling. From the genesis of this project to its completion, Peter Katzenstein has inspired and supported me every step of the way. For his guidance, wisdom, and extraordinary generosity, he has my deepest gratitude. I am also greatly indebted to Matthew Evangelista and Henry Shue, who provided a wealth of knowledge and offered invaluable assistance in the long process of weeding out the weaknesses and honing the analytical arguments of my dissertation, and subsequently of my book manuscript. As a graduate student at Cornell University, I learned a great deal from Professors Valerie Bunce, Mary Katzenstein, Rose McDermott, J. J. Suh, Chris Way, and David Wippman. I thank them all. I would also like to express my gratitude to my colleagues in the Government Department for their friendship and their enthusiasm for this project. Over the years, I have learned a lot from—and have been inspired by—Mike Williams. For his wise advice and constant support he has my special thanks. Amongst other scholars, Don Abenheim, Rodney Hall, Yuen Foong Khong, Andrew Hurrell, Keith Krause, Jennifer Milliken, Thomas Risse, Adam Roberts, Jeff Simon, Kathryn Sikkink, Jack Snyder, and especially R. B. J. Walker all took time from their busy schedules to discuss my work. I am indebted to them all. In conducting my field research at the NATO headquarters, SHAPE, and in Prague and Bucharest, I benefited from the friendship and knowledge of many more individuals than I am able to mention here. Special thanks go to Mihai Carp, Viktor Dobal, Chris Donnelly, Iulian Fota, Oana Hangan, Rick Kirby, Rob McRae, Johnny Rollins, Ionel Nicu Sava,

x

Acknowledgments

Gordon Smith, and Mihai Razvan Ungureanu. For helping me understand Czech society and politics, I am indebted to my friends Linda Stucbartova and Josefine Wallat. Special thanks go to the two reviewers at Stanford University Press, who provided extremely valuable comments on an earlier draft of this book. The editorial team at Stanford University Press, particularly Amanda Moran, Tim Roberts, and Ruth Steinberg have my gratitude for their enthusiasm and wonderful support. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support provided by the Cornell University Graduate School, the Mellon Foundation, and the SSRC/ MacArthur Foundation—Program on Peace and Security in a Changing World. Their generosity enabled me to conduct the field research without which this book could not have been written. I would also like to thank the Oxford Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War (CCW) for its support. Most authors agree that the process of finishing a book tends to absorb incredible amounts of time and energy. In my case, the support provided by the CCW meant that I was able to devote the past few months to this book. Last but most certainly not least, I am extremely grateful to my family for their love, constant encouragement, and intellectual stimulation. Above all, I wish to thank them for believing in me during those moments when I had little idea as to where my work was taking me. This book could not have been written without the support provided by so many individuals and institutions. Needless to say, however, the final product is entirely my responsibility.

chapter one

Overview

introduction Shortly after Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Revolution, Manfred Wörner, then Secretary General of NATO, reportedly asked President Vaclav Havel what was the most urgent problem of the post-revolutionary period. Havel allegedly replied: “I do not know how we are going to run this country. We have two options: we can rely on Communists, who do have some useful experience but are not politically reliable; or we can entrust key positions to former dissidents, who are reliable but lack the knowledge necessary in order to lead the country. If we opt for the second solution, we are going to need a lot of help and advice from Western experts.”1 Today, more than a decade after the end of the Cold War, we tend to assume that the former Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe “naturally” adopted Western-style liberal democratic norms and institutions following their liberation from Soviet influence. That image, however, overlooks the complexity of the process of (re)building postCommunist polities, and marginalizes—or at least provides an excessively simplified view of—the role played by international institutions in that process. In this book, I analyze the practices enacted by NATO in Central/Eastern Europe, and demonstrate the alliance’s systematic involvement in the construction of Western-defined liberal democratic norms and institutions in former Communist countries. This is important because it reveals that the social relationships created in the process of interaction between NATO and actors from Central/Eastern Europe were significantly different from our conventional wisdom regarding the behavior of a military alliance vis-à-vis potential new allies. It also demonstrates that the nature and dynamics of power exercised by NATO departed significantly from the prevailing conception of (coercive) power characteristic of international relations. Contrary to the view of an essentially domestic process of reform,

2

Overview

NATO was involved in the politics of shaping legal and institutional arrangements in countries of the former Communist bloc, particularly in the area of defense. Through systematic interactions with political elites from Central and Eastern Europe, NATO helped shape definitions of appropriate liberal democratic identity in those states. The organization was involved in disseminating a particular set of norms governing civilmilitary relations, and contributed to the construction of corresponding institutions in former Communist countries. NATO representatives participated, on several occasions, in the drafting of liberal defense legislation aimed at redefining the mandates of each security institution and establishing a new set of relations between the military establishment, the executive power, and the legislature. They also acted as guides in the process of restructuring the defense and interior ministries of several exCommunist states, and provided advice regarding the establishment of institutional arrangements that allow for greater civilian involvement in the process of decision making in the area of defense. In some cases, the liberal, pro-West elites of Central and Eastern European countries encountered domestic opposition as they were trying to implement NATO-prescribed reforms. Particularly problematic were the bureaucratic structures of key ministries and a series of conservative parliamentary groups, which opposed some of those reforms, fearing that change would undermine their power. There were several instances in which, when faced with such obstacles, Eastern European decision makers appealed to NATO for help, asking the alliance to exercise pressure on reluctant domestic actors to abandon their opposition to reform. Furthermore, in some cases at the request of Central and Eastern European decision makers, NATO advisers came to be involved in the formulation of the Annual National Plans that are at the heart of the program called Membership Action Plan (MAP). Created in the aftermath of the Washington Summit of 1999, MAP requires aspirants to a potential second wave of NATO enlargement to present to the organization detailed evaluations of their situation, as well as future programs of reform in the political, economic, and defense areas. Within the framework of MAP, NATO officials have guided Eastern European decision makers in the process of identifying necessary reforms and formulating specific plans to carry out those reforms. How are we to make sense of NATO’s involvement in such activities? For many theorists and practitioners of international relations, the name “NATO” is synonymous with a military alliance.2 But how can an alliance participate in what is essentially a process of crafting key domestic arrangements in former Communist states? This book’s central claim is that, far from acting as a mere geostrategic arrangement, NATO has been involved in a broad set of activities aimed at promoting the construction

Overview

3

of a particular kind of liberal state identity in Central and Eastern Europe. The idea that NATO promotes liberal values in the former Communist states of Europe is explicitly recognized by the allies. Its key decisionmaking body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), has repeatedly argued that NATO represents “an agent of change,” which plays an important part in building “structures of security and stability on the continent.” 3 To this end, NATO acts to “spread the values of freedom and democracy” to Eastern Europe by “encouraging former socialist states” to make “the right decisions” concerning the values, norms, and institutions they adopt in the post–Cold War era.4 But this overlooks the comprehensive way in which the organization has interacted with Central and Eastern European political actors. The notion that NATO “encourages Eastern Europeans to choose the right institutions” suggests that decisions concerning the nature of future state identities are made entirely in the domestic arenas of those states. On this view, while NATO may encourage or discourage certain political outcomes, it is essentially external to processes through which such outcomes are decided. With particular emphasis on the first decade of the post–Cold War period, I argue that NATO has been deeply involved in the process of constructing domestic choices. The organization has systematically sought to socialize Central and Eastern European political, military, and functional elites into adopting Western-defined liberal-democratic norms and building corresponding institutions in their states.5 This process of state-crafting via the socialization of Central/Eastern European actors constitutes the problem focus of this book. I explain the conditions that enabled this process; I analyze its main features, focusing in particular on specific types of socialization practices used by the organization, and then I examine the impact of NATO’s involvement in Central and Eastern European states. Through an empirical analysis of NATO’s involvement in Central and Eastern Europe, this study demonstrates that the alliance has performed important tasks conventionally attributed to domestic actors. Through its involvement in the identification and promotion of “correct” domestic legal and institutional arrangements, and the education of Central and Eastern European elites—and sometimes even publics—into accepting those arrangements, NATO played an important role in post-Communist efforts in Central and Eastern Europe to (re)draw boundaries between reasonable/unacceptable definitions of national identity and interests. Critical political theorists have convincingly argued that the construction and reproduction of liberal democratic polities involves a series of activities aimed at socializing citizens into adopting a particular set of norms and institutions and embracing a particular understanding of national identity, while simultaneously rejecting alternative norms and institutions

4

Overview

as inherently flawed.6 In this book, I analyze some of these socialization practices associated with attempts at building liberal democracies—in this context, in the former Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe—and I show that, contrary to conventional International Relations theory, an international security organization like NATO has been deeply involved in such practices. A study of NATO’s involvement in the process of state-crafting is especially important given that the effort to promote liberal democratic norms and participate in the construction of new laws and institutions in ex-Communist states is central to the way in which NATO pursues security and stability in post–Cold War Europe. Therefore, a close analysis of this process enables us to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the nature and role of NATO in the contemporary world. nato and the ‘inside’ mode of pursuing international se curity To understand the involvement of NATO in the process of state-crafting, it is important to examine the context in which the organization came to play this role. I argue that several conditions were particularly relevant to the movement of NATO decision-makers toward identity-building practices in the former Communist states of Europe. In a broad perspective, there is the constitutive structure of the international system, which provides a menu of two possible modes of pursuing international security. The main principle of international organization, sovereignty, enables an outside set of solutions that involve geostrategic arrangements (e.g., power balancing) among sovereign entities that inhabit the international system. But the principle of sovereignty also enables an inside mode of pursuing security, according to which, stability in the world is to be achieved primarily by promoting (what are perceived to be) “good,” stable, and peaceful institutions within states. Rather than place sovereign entities within restrictive international structures, the inside solution aims at promoting rational and ethical institutions and political processes within sovereign entities. The notion involved here is that states that embody such institutions are, at once, a source of domestic stability and international peace. Within this repertoire of options, following the end of the Cold War, NATO came to place a special emphasis on the inside mode of pursuing security in the Euro-Atlantic area. To understand this strategy, one needs to take into account the particular set of understandings regarding the new security environment that came to prevail within the Atlantic al-

Overview

5

liance. From the perspective of NATO decision makers, the specific dangers to allied security characteristic of the post–Cold War period rendered the first (geostrategic) option largely ineffective and required a heavy reliance on a particular instantiation of the inside solution. This is not to say that the outside option has completely disappeared from the repertoire of NATO. But at the end of the Cold War, Western leaders agreed that the main source of danger was not a conventional type of military confrontation with an enemy state. Rather, it was a new and far more diffuse set of threats that was causing anxiety among NATO decision makers. The awareness of the new set of dangers was reflected in The Alliance’s Strategic Concept: “Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe.”7 The end of the Cold War generated a dramatic disruption of the established politics of international security. Instead of a clearly defined enemy that could be contained within spatial structures, the West was now confronted with a plurality of transitional states, which were seen as, at once, potential friends and possible sources of threat to the Atlantic community. In the new European environment it was no longer possible to contain the enemy in the outside realm, for there were no fixed inimical states. Depending on the structure of their polities, all of the former Communist states were regarded as partners and possible members of—or, conversely, sources of instability to—the Western world. Linked to this, as we shall see in the next chapters, was a prevailing view within NATO that Eastern Bloc countries could become Western-style liberal democratic polities, that elites and publics in those countries could be socialized into adopting liberal norms and institutions. Accordingly, an approach that stressed the international socialization of Central/Eastern Europeans into Western-based liberal democratic norms appeared reasonable to NATO decision makers.8 In brief, at the end of the Cold War, the international promotion of Western-based liberal democratic norms in Central/Eastern Europe was regarded within NATO as both an important recipe for enhancing EuroAtlantic security and as a viable project (given the view of changeable Central/Eastern European polities). Furthermore, NATO was regarded by its decision makers as an expert guide in the process of international norm projection, by virtue of its identity as not just a military alliance but also an institutional embodiment of the Western community founded upon liberal democratic norms and values. NATO officials repeatedly re-

6

Overview

ferred to the organization’s founding charter, and to a series of Cold War documents and activities, to not only guide its own process of renewal but also to justify its involvement in the promotion of Western-based liberal democratic ideas into the former Communist space.9 Indeed, soon after the end of the Cold War, NATO initiated a series of practices designed to project Western-defined liberal democratic norms of governance into Central and Eastern Europe. Before going any further, it might be useful to explain who are the actors involved in the formulation of NATO policies. The key decisions concerning NATO policies are made in the North Atlantic Council. The continuity of the Atlantic Council is ensured by weekly meetings of national Permanent Representatives (Ambassadors) and Deputy Permanent Representatives; these meetings are chaired by NATO’s Secretary General. From time to time, the Atlantic Council also meets at the level of heads of government, or at the level of defense and foreign ministers. In addition, there are preparatory meetings as well as a series of informal interactions among various members of national delegations and between national delegates and the international staff, which, in many cases, shape the agendas of council meetings. The Permanent Representatives act on the basis of instructions from national governments, but as they regularly inform their leaders of developments within NATO they participate in shaping the latter’s understandings of possibilities for action as well as constraints generated by the prevailing trends of thinking within the Atlantic Council. The national delegations work in close cooperation with senior members of the international staff, who provide analyses of relevant political and military developments, as well as advice on appropriate policies and ways to implement those policies. Extensive interviews in Brussels reveal that national delegates to NATO, together with senior international staff, form a community of speakers: they share a broad set of views that help them to make sense of the world and decide how to act in pursuit of international stability and security.10 This is not to say that there are no disagreements among decision makers concerning what should be done and how it should be done. Political actors do disagree, and they do occasionally try to manipulate those understandings so as to justify a particular solution. But those actions occur within a framework of shared interpretations of reality, which enables agreement among allied policymakers on reasonable goals and acceptable strategies for pursuing those goals. Those same collective meanings enable various NATO actors to define the boundaries of acceptable arguments, and thus to structure their debates and articulate their grievances in a manner conducive to arguing and seeking a consensus.11 For example, debates and decision-making processes concerning en-

Overview

7

largement occurred within the framework of shared understandings about the importance of protecting and promoting the constitutive norms of the Western community of liberal-democratic values embodied in NATO: democracy, liberal human rights, and the rule of law. 12 NATO actors also shared an understanding of the complex, diffuse dangers to that community, and a view that only states that respected its constitutive norms were entitled to join the organization.13 Within the framework of such understandings, however, allied decision makers did, in several instances, disagree over the question of whether particular candidates were sufficiently committed to liberal democratic norms to be eligible for admission in NATO. the double logic of international security In exploring the way in which both the inside and outside modes of pursuing international security are embodied in NATO, let us start with the international constitutive structure that enables these solutions. As constructivist International Relations theorists have argued, the principle of sovereignty plays a key constitutive role in the modern international system.14 As the principle of differentiation between the units populating the modern world, sovereignty conveys special connotations of exclusiveness and possessiveness.15 The emergence of sovereignty as the key principle of international organization meant that states—as the main politico-administrative units of the modern world—came to embody particular forms of property and authority.16 Most importantly, within clearly demarcated territorial boundaries, sovereigns acquired the right to issue and enforce definitions and rules regarding the proper organization of the political community.17 Those rules, which applied universally to individuals inhabiting the state, effectively drew the boundaries between normal and unacceptable principles of political and socioeconomic life. As a consequence of the triumph of sovereignty, the modern period gave rise to the promise of peace, order, and progress within political communities where everyone was subject to sovereign rule. But the creation of pacified political communities simultaneously re-created the problem of insecurity at the level of the state system, since there was no overarching authority to enforce order among the sovereigns endowed with particular—sometimes competing—wills and interests. The problem revolved around the tension between the universal system (the world) and the particular entities (sovereign states) inhabiting it.

8

Overview

The principle of sovereignty entails two possible solutions to this problem, both of which are reflected in modern political thought and practice.18 There is an outside solution, which emphasizes geostrategic arrangements among sovereign units operating in an arena devoid of central authority. This solution is often presented—particularly in neorealist theories of international relations—as the only possible way of pursuing international security. In their view, given the tragic but inescapable verities of international relations, sovereigns have little freedom of choice in their interactions. The notion that underlies this solution is that anarchy is less intolerable at the level of states than it is at the level of individuals in a “state of nature.”19 At the international level, freedom combines with the inevitable inequality of states to give rise to such spatial arrangements as international domination by powerful state(s) and balances of power. The international system will, by necessity, be the arena where alliances form, break down, and re-form on the basis of new configurations of material power. Particular geostrategic arrangements come and go, but the dynamic governing their formation remains unchanged in a realm that lacks an overarching authority.20 But the principle of sovereignty, which constitutes particular units in a universal system, enables yet another mode of pursuing international security. It might be possible to achieve orderly and peaceful interaction among particular sovereign states if a way could be found to (re)shape entities in such a way that they would become peaceful, predictable, and trustworthy participants in international interactions. The tension between a universal system and entities endowed with particular wills would thus be resolved by having those particular states internalize a universally valid set of rules. This solution assumes that particular domestic structures—those that are built around “good” values and institutions— will generate stability and peace among states that possess such structures. Accordingly, it sets out to create conditions under which states would come to be governed by such rational and ethical values and norms.21 At the same time as it constitutes the possibility of pursuing the inside approach, the principle of sovereignty also has regulative effects on its implementation.22 Through its injunction regarding non-intervention by external actors in the domestic affairs of states, this principle was designed to protect the right of sovereigns to build “good” institutions of governance. In the theory of international relations, the inside mode of pursuing security and world order is particularly associated with the work of Immanuel Kant.23 The Kantian solution to international insecurity takes the form of a peaceful federation of states. But that federation can only be achieved via inside politics, for members of the pacific federation must become liberal republics.24

Overview

9

In modern international politics, state policymakers have used both modes of pursuing security. The inside approach, while sometimes forgotten by theorists of international relations, has played an important role by providing decision makers with an additional option on the menu of possible ways of pursuing security. This approach, involving the construction and protection of domestic institutions regarded as progressive and peace generating, found expression in the activities of NATO throughout its history. But the inside, Kantian-inspired mode of pursuing security has acquired unprecedented importance to the organization in the particular context of the post–Cold War world. In establishing, enlarging, and transforming NATO, Western decision makers were enacting a particular conception of the identity of their community and the historically specific nature of threats to that community. In that context, the politics of inside—aimed at the protection and promotion of a community of liberal democratic values—was always an important dimension of NATO, and placed limitations on the geostrategic policies acceptable to the alliance. As the next chapter shows, historical records of the Cold War period refute potential claims that the inside dimension only mattered when NATO did not have any serious outside concerns. Norms of appropriate processes of decision making in the Euro-Atlantic community also enabled the European allies to exercise a degree of influence within NATO that cannot be accounted for by reference to the material capabilities that West European states possessed.25 Contrary to Waltz’s expectations, on several issues that the U.S. regarded as key to international security, “weak” European allies successfully mobilized the rules of consultation and consensual decision making to persuade decision makers in Washington to give up, or modify, their preferred solutions. In the post–Cold War period, again, particular understandings shared by NATO’s decision makers regarding the nature of the new security environment shaped the inside policies adopted by the institution. North Atlantic Council decision makers formulated security policies with reference to an intersubjective framework that included definitions of the identity of friends to the Western community as well as potentially dangerous states. Danger was associated not with the possession of material resources by given states but with their “inappropriate” political identity. The following chapters examine the ways in which the collective normative framework of allied representatives shaped their definitions of the appropriate role of NATO vis-à-vis the states of Central and Eastern Europe. Those understandings enabled NATO decision makers to agree on a particular set of liberal democratic norms that the organization was to project into the former Communist countries through a wide set of socialization practices.

10

Overview

international norm projection and the politics of socialization Drawing on insights from sociologists and social psychologists, I understand socialization as the process of inducting newcomers into the norms and rules governing a given community or social group.26 From the constructivist perspective adopted in this book, successful socialization results in the adoption of new norms, and the (re)definition of identity and interest in conformity to those norms. The new norms come to be taken for granted—accepted because they are recognized as “normal.”27 I argue that NATO has been especially involved in socializing Central/Eastern Europeans into Western-defined norms in the area of security, including norms governing the relationships among different branches of the state involved in the formulation and implementation of defense policies, and the relationship between the state and civil society. This occurred in a situation in which NATO decision makers regarded the principle and institutions of democratic control over the military, and, more broadly, liberal-democratic civil-military relations, as key to the rebuilding of ex-Communist polities—and as an issue area in which NATO possessed considerable expertise.28 In assessing the eligibility of candidates to enlargement, NATO did consider normative performance in other areas (e.g., market reform and the protection of national minorities). But it tended to rely on the monitoring and socialization practices conducted by other institutions—for instance, relying on OSCE and Council of Europe reports to assess the legislative and institutional evolution of candidates in protecting the rights of individuals belonging to national minorities—and on information derived from the EU assessments to evaluate the progress made by the Central and Eastern Europeans in establishing functioning market economies.29 By contrast, in the field of security, there was agreement among NATO decision makers that their organization was key for the education of Central and Eastern Europeans. As we shall see, NATO has been involved in systematic, often successful, efforts at projecting a series of security-related norms into the former Communist states of Europe. These included: Transparency and accountability in the area of defense, involving effective parliamentary oversight of the military, media scrutiny, the definition of members of security forces as “citizens in uniform” endowed with civic rights and responsibilities, and the formation of a community of civilian defense experts. The division of powers within the state, involving checks and balances designed to limit the power of any particular agency in the formulation of defense policies.

Overview

11

Peacetime government oversight of general staffs and military commanders through civilian defense ministries.

In addition, NATO has sought to project into Central and Eastern European countries liberal norms and rules of international behavior, in particular involving peaceful settlement of disputes, multilateralism, and democracy and human rights promotion in the international arena. By virtue of its involvement in the eastern projection of these norms, NATO is a particularly interesting case for a study on international socialization. Thus, what is involved here is the role played by an international institution in drawing the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable modes of behavior, and establishing legal and institutional arrangements that protect and reinforce that symbolic boundary in an area (security) conventionally regarded as key to the survival and freedom of the state, and, hence, as the exclusive domain of sovereign authorities. As noted above, modern sovereignty works by affirming an ontology of separation, of inclusion and exclusion (inside and outside) that enables a capacity to draw the boundary between the normal and the exceptional, the acceptable and the unacceptable in the life of the polity. In the modern era, a key power of the state is the power to make a certain interpretation of reality count. Thus, a key role in the production of domestic order is played by the reification of meaning through the state’s capacity to issue interpretations of reality that are recognized as legitimate by its citizens. The power to reify meaning involves not only the capacity to define what is acceptable and unacceptable, but also to implement that definition by embedding it in a series of laws and institutions and by socializing citizens to take those categories for granted—in other words, by constructing the common sense of citizens. In that sense, by virtue of its ability to make certain interpretations of reality count, the modern state can be said to be the holder of a monopoly of symbolic violence.30 The modern state produces official classifications of reality; it produces and institutionalizes an “official point of view” which performs several key functions in society. To begin with, the official discourse performs a diagnostic, “an act of knowledge that begets recognition,” and that assigns particular identities to individuals and defines the key characteristics of different objects. Second, at the administrative level, the official discourse works via rules and prescriptions that instruct people what to do given who they are. Finally, the official discourse also interprets and records what people have actually done (e.g., via police records).31 These classifications of reality are embedded in institutions and reproduced through the practices of individuals that have been socialized into a particular set of dispositions for thinking and acting (habi-

12

Overview

tus) within the boundaries of the “official point of view” in different fields of society. In the long term, habitus, which is cultivated in individuals through systematic pedagogic practices, contributes to the reproduction of a specific social order through processes of self-censorship and self-limitation on the part of individuals. Thus, the system of meanings and dispositions associated with a particular habitus becomes part of the taken-for-granted “rules of the game” by which everyone else in a given social context acts. A group habitus has the effect of producing among those who share it a “common-sense world, whose immediate self-evidence is accompanied by the objectivity provided by consensus on the meaning of practices and the world.”32 In the context of liberal democratic societies, habitus is especially important for maintaining and reproducing social order, for the norms of democracy and extensive individual freedoms require the formation of self-disciplined individuals able and willing to exercise those freedoms in a “responsible” way which does not undermine the key institutions of their society. As Mitchell Dean has explained, “Liberalism is as much concerned with the appropriate normalizing practices to shape the exercise of the citizens’ political freedom as it is with guaranteeing their rights and liberties.”33 In most of the Central and Eastern European countries, the revolutions of 1989 brought about a breakdown of old structures of authority and de-legitimized the Communist “official point of view” and the institutions in which that point of view was embedded. In turn, this led to debates and political struggles over the redefinition of reality, as various groups sought to make different interpretations of reality count. As we shall see in Chapters 4 and 5, while it might be tempting to think that the Central and Eastern Europeans simply adopted Western norms and rules and built a new official discourse around those norms, the situation was more ambiguous, not least because in the post–Cold War era there persisted numerous—and fairly strong—groups, in particular, Communists and nationalists, who refused to identify with the values and institutions of the West and put forward different interpretations of the identity of their countries. On that basis, they proposed different symbolic boundaries between the normal and the exceptional, the acceptable and unacceptable ways of governing their polity, gave different diagnostics of the problems, priorities, aims, and strategies of post-Communist reconstruction, and provided different interpretations of the “normal” relationships of their countries with the outside world. Moreover, even the groups and parties that advocated the construction of liberal democratic polities often defined liberal democracy in ways that were seen as incorrect and unacceptable by the NATO allies. In that context of fluidity, NATO became involved in re-constituting

Overview

13

Central and Eastern European polities through its efforts of promoting a liberal democratic set of classifications of reality, involving a particular, Western-defined boundary between acceptable and unacceptable modes of thinking and acting, elevating those classifications to the status of the “official point of view” and building new legal and institutional arrangements aimed at protecting and reproducing it. This systematic involvement in the (re)construction of Central and East European polities was facilitated by the fact that many pro-liberal elites in the former Communist bloc recognized NATO as a key institution of the Western community with which they identified, and, as such, as an authoritative, trustworthy source of expertise in the area of security. NATO carried out systematic practices of socialization of Central and Eastern European elites and societal actors into a particular set of norms associated with the liberal democratic identity, guiding them in the process of institutionalizing those norms, and helping them gain precedence over alternative (nationalist and communist) norms put forward by different domestic groups. In essence, NATO has played an important role in crafting liberal democratic polities in the former Eastern Bloc of Europe. There were several types of socialization practices—teaching, persuasion, and role-playing—that played important roles in the process of international state-crafting carried out by NATO. Although it is useful to treat these as analytically distinct categories, it is also important to pay attention to the ways in which they often overlap in practice. Chapter 3 explains the meaning and dynamics of those types of socialization practices, and Chapters 4 and 5 examine their actual application and effects in post–Cold War interactions between NATO and Central and Eastern Europeans. As we shall see, in many cases—though not always—those practices of socialization did affect definitions of state identity and interests held by Central and Eastern European socializees. In this book, state identities refer to prevailing national ideas of collective distinctiveness and purpose.34 These ideas, by defining the key characteristics of a given polity, shape both its domestic politics (since they are tied to a particular set of norms and principles of governance that are recognized as consistent with “who we are”) and its foreign policy (since through an identification of national distinctiveness vis-à-vis other states in the international system, definitions of state identity position the self relative to other countries and enable decision makers to identify friends and enemies in the international arena). Useful indicators of change in the definition of national identity include the emergence of new intersubjective ideas about the key characteristics of the given polity (e.g., new understandings of the collective self, the purpose of its basic institutions, and the nature of “correct” norms of governance) and a new

14

Overview

conception of the relationship between the national self and the outside world (such as a rearticulation of the self’s particular position—identification with, similarity to, difference from, or even opposition to various international others, and the purpose of the self in the context of interactions with those different others). the context of nato’s socialization practices NATO became involved in the socialization of Central/Eastern European actors in a special historical context, marked by what could be defined as the hegemonic power of liberal democratic norms. At the end of the Cold War, Western-based liberal democratic norms were enjoying growing—and increasingly institutionalized—recognition in the international arena as the universally valid model of governance. In fact, as Chris Reus-Smit has pointed out, the past decades have witnessed the progressive embedding of “modern ideals of legitimate statehood in the normative fabric of international society, extending the influence of such values from the constitution of basic institutional practices to the prescription of state–society relations.”35 From this perspective, the end of the Cold War was important as a moment that further strengthened principles of (liberal) human rights and democracy as central to the definition of legitimate statehood.36 As Ian Clark, among others, has argued, principles of international legitimacy that revolve around liberal human rights, democracy, and a commitment to economic liberalism and collective security were substantially reaffirmed following the collapse of Communism.37 At the end of the Cold War, those norms became “agents of admission to the inner international society, justifying the changes that had been made via the post–Cold War settlement.”38 In the post–Cold War period, the vision of legitimate governance revolving around norms of democracy, individual rights, and the rule of law came to be enshrined in U.N. documents, as well as in declarations and charters adopted by various regional organizations (e.g., the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States). Under these circumstances, one might argue that given the normative and material power of liberal democracy, it was predictable that decision makers of transitional Central and Eastern European states would adopt those norms, not least because they were interested in avoiding the sanctions and reaping the benefits offered by the international actors promoting Western-based, liberal democratic norms.39 In a similar vein, it could

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be argued, following a realist logic, that NATO was important to Central/Eastern Europeans because, after the end of the Cold War, it represented the key forum for organizing their relations to the only remaining superpower, the United States. Those countries, it could further be argued, needed American military protection and economic support. On this view, by virtue of its freedom to offer—or withhold the offer of— membership, NATO had the power to shape the behavior of those candidates to enlargement. Theo Farrell succinctly captured this perspective when he argued: “Power and interests, in the form of coercion and inducement, can play a particularly important role in international norm diffusion. A contemporary example of this is the adoption of Western norms of military professionalism by post communist states desperate to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.”40 However, a close analysis of the political situation in countries of the former Eastern Bloc shows that in the area of security a surprisingly large number of domestic actors did not want to build Western-style liberal democracy, and were far from being convinced that NATO membership would be beneficial to their countries. Interestingly, even those Central and Eastern European actors that did set out to build liberal democracy in their countries initially departed from Western understandings of what liberal democracy meant. The following chapters demonstrate that there was a tension between the definitions of the identity of the liberal democratic polity—and hence the views of correct norms, institutions, and reform goals in the area of defense—put forward by NATO on the one hand, and, on the other hand, by pro-liberal actors from Central and Eastern Europe, specifically from the Czech Republic and Romania. As we shall see, in many cases, definitions of identity and interest held by Czech and Romanian actors changed in important ways following interactions with NATO representatives. NATO’s response to that situation consisted of a complex mix of pedagogic practices, often conducted in cooperation with domestic reformers, aimed at redefining the definitions of identity and otherness as well as the conceptions of interests (by reconceptualizing the “self” in “self-interest”) held by the citizens of ex-Communist countries. As a result, NATO often played an important, albeit almost always invisible, role in shaping domestic debates concerning the desirable future trajectory of those countries and their “normal” relationships vis-à-vis the Euro-Atlantic community. Those pedagogic practices were sometimes accompanied by instrumental incentives targeting the most convinced opponents to Western-prescribed reforms—that is, those actors regarded as too deeply embedded in alternative communities of values to be (re)socialized by NATO.

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The complexity of social relationships between NATO and Central/ Eastern Europeans suggests that, to understand the role played by the organization in the former Communist countries, one needs to examine the power of the organization to act as a legitimate normative guide regarding modes of being and acting that are consistent with the norms of liberal democracy.41 In this case, a study of the influence exercised by NATO over Central and Eastern Europeans has to consider not simply resources but the particular way in which the alliance mobilized those resources in the exercise of a subtle but persistent form of power. 42 Key here is an understanding of power not in individualist terms (defined as resources distributed among various units) but from the intersubjective perspective of power as competence. On the competence model, the ability to exercise social influence is not inherently attributed to the resources possessed by a given entity. Rather, the power of actors depends on the recognition of their role of influence by other participants in social interactions.43 NATO’s ability to provide authoritative definitions of the legitimate meaning of liberal democratic identity, and more specifically, the correct norms and institutions of security that corresponded to that definition, was a reflection of the substantial symbolic power exercised by NATO vis-à-vis the pro-West elites of Central and Eastern Europe. That power was grounded in the latter’s recognition of NATO as not just a military alliance but a key institution of the Western community with which Central/Eastern European reformers identified. As such, NATO was recognized as an authoritative source of knowledge about, and a forum for the recognition of, liberal democratic identity. As an expression of that recognition, in several cases, Central and Eastern European actors relied on NATO’s normative guidance to an extent that went beyond the requirements, and, indeed, the expectations, of the organization. The nature of the relationship between NATO and Central/Eastern European actors departed in important ways from the realist logic outlined above. What was key to this relationship was not so much the material power yielded by the allies—either collectively, or by the United States within the framework of the alliance. Rather, it was a powerful sense of identification with the Western community that informed the prevailing interpretation of NATO’s material strength in the Czech Republic and Romania. From the point of view of Czech and Romanian elites, the view of NATO as an institution of the community of values with which they identified made it seem inconceivable that the allies would use their material strength to exploit the relatively weak former Communist states. This made the allied material power appear friendly, rather than a source of threat. It was by virtue of their recognition of

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NATO as an institutional expression of the West that pro-reform Central and Eastern European decision makers and societal actors trusted the organization not to abuse its power, but, rather, to provide appropriate normative guidance in helping them to become Western-style liberal democratic leaders and to build liberal democratic polities. To see that the material strength of NATO allies is not always regarded as benign, let us consider the way in which other countries (e.g., many Arab states) would have reacted to NATO’s guidance, the presence of American and other Western troops on their territory, or requests to support wars waged by NATO countries. By contrast, many Central and Eastern Europeans accepted extensive NATO guidance in the post-Communist reconstruction of their countries, in some cases transferring to the alliance key sovereign functions, such as the formulation of defense policies. Vis-à-vis a series of Central and Eastern European actors, NATO benefited from substantial authority by virtue of its identity. That, however, meant that in order to maintain that authority the organization could not violate fundamental liberal democratic norms around which it defined itself. For instance, NATO could not impose its choices upon the democratically elected governments of Central/Eastern European countries, and it could not adopt a “closed-door policy” vis-à-vis candidates that demonstrated compliance with Western-defined liberal democratic norms. Looking at the socializees’ side of the equation, what was involved in interactions with NATO went far beyond the instrumental pursuit of a predefined goal—membership in the organization. In particular, centrist, pro-reform political actors from several Central/Eastern European countries regarded themselves as the leaders of a process of building a particular state identity and “returning” their countries to Europe.44 Reformers from countries like the Czech Republic and Romania wanted to gain NATO membership, it is true, but they wanted this not simply as an instrumental reward per se (e.g., as a security guarantee against Russia). In fact, as we shall see in the next chapters, those actors who sought most actively to gain NATO membership for their countries were, often, also those who were least worried about conventional security threats. Accession to NATO, however, was regarded by Central and Eastern European reformers as part of a broader process of “returning” to Europe and taking “their place in the Euro-Atlantic community.” That was an essentially social, dialogical process of identity (re)construction in which, as the key security institution of the Western community, NATO was able to influence Central/Eastern European reformers’ definitions of correct liberal democratic norms and to change their ideas regarding the goals of the reform process in their countries. In other words, in the particular cases

18

Overview

studied in this book, international socialization was a process with constitutive effects, affecting the identity of subjects being socialized.45 Interestingly, NATO was able to exercise that kind of influence over actors from the former Communist bloc even in some instances in which it could not use significant carrots or sticks. toward an understanding of the socialization practices enacted by nato It is perhaps reasonable to assume that any study about the international projection of ideas and norms is bound to raise questions about the extent to which ideational factors can “cause” targeted actors to behave in particular ways. I suggest that it is not impossible to provide explanations of the ways in which ideas influence choices and actual behavior. In order to do so, however, we need to depart from the mechanical model of causality that was, for so long, applied not only in the natural sciences but also in the social sciences. Placing itself in the constructivist camp, this book understands the social world as an intersubjective universe in which actors define their identities and interests in relation to others and operate as members of social groups within the framework of shared understandings that enable them to make sense of the world, identify reasonable courses of actions, and justify those actions in terms intelligible to their community. As Friedrich Kratochwil has argued, analyses of the social world must start from a recognition that “no hammer hitting a lever, no springs, no billiard balls are involved here.”46 Rather, building on Weber’s account of the differences between the natural and the social domains, the search for causality entails “building a bridge which allows us to get from ‘here’ to ‘there.’”47 One does that by providing an analysis in terms of purposes and goals, or by invoking “the relevant rule that provides the missing element,” showing the reasons which motivated actors to act in a certain way.48 An account of causes for action in the social world involves reconstructing the situation, seeking to view it from the point of view of the actors, and imputing purposes and values in an attempt to arrive at the motives that informed a particular cause of action. From this perspective, it is possible to argue that practices of international socialization can have an impact on the definitions of identity and interest of socializees, providing them with reasons to act in certain ways and to reject alternative courses of action. Thus, if successful, the socializing agency (in this case, NATO) will provide targeted subjects with new rules of appropriate action consistent with the liberal democratic identity.

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More broadly, it will provide them with a new worldview according to which a particular set of goals are reasonable, whereas alternative rules of governance and definitions of the goals of post-Communist reconstruction appear inherently flawed and potentially dangerous. For instance, according to NATO teachings, the establishment of a certain set of Western-prescribed liberal norms and institutions in the area of defense is “the right thing to do”—it is part of becoming a modern democracy, hence it is what emerging democratic polities like the former Communist states must do. By contrast, from the point of view of NATO representatives, defining the goals of reconstruction in terms of building an independent military power, that is, strengthening the army and placing it outside political checks and constraints (say, in the name of strengthening the state) would be wrong. On this view, such norms, policies, and institutions are inconsistent with the liberal democratic identity, and any attempt to promote them can only mean the move toward an— allegedly inferior—state identity, reminiscent of the authoritarian past of countries from the former Communist bloc. As a conceptual starting point for the analysis of NATO’s involvement in the process of identity building via practices of socialization in Central/Eastern Europe, I rely on insights into symbolic interactionism developed by social psychologists and sociologists and recently borrowed by constructivist International Relations scholars, most notably Alexander Wendt.49 Starting from the assumption that identity construction occurs within historically specific cultures and has an inherently relational dimension, Wendt sets out to explain the process through which actors acquire definitions of identity in interactions with specific significant others. Key to his account is the process through which actors learn to see themselves as a reflection of how they are appraised by those significant others. Building on Wendt’s use of the social psychology of symbolic interactions, I suggest that, in exploring social processes of identity formation, particularly in the cases of “novices” joining an existing community, it is useful to mobilize George Herbert Mead’s concept of generalized other. The notion involved here is that novices—in my case, actors of the former Communist countries—must be educated into adopting the perspective and norms of a certain generalized other.50 The generalized other represents the organized structure of attitudes—incorporating a particular set of intersubjective understandings—prevailing in a given social context. This is the structure of attitudes that actors in that community adopt in the course of engaging in social behavior. It is the point of view of the generalized other that provides actors with a perspective on the world and a definition of social problems, as well as possible solutions to those problems. In the social universe, a particular generalized

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other embodies just one viewpoint; but that viewpoint is often presented as universally valid. The generalized other becomes an instrument through which society influences the behavior of its individual members. This influence is, in part, exercised in the course of processes of identity formation, where an important role is often played by reference groups. These are the agents that embody the viewpoint of the generalized other and convey to novices normal ways of understanding and behaving in the world. In our case, it is useful to speak of the generalized other in reference to the Western liberal perspective of the world that prevails within NATO and informs collective views held by its decision makers. NATO can be seen as an institutionalized Western reference group seeking to socialize Central and Eastern Europeans into adopting Western-defined “normal” ways of thinking and acting consistent with the identity of liberal democratic actors. Wendt’s account of symbolic interactions provides us with important insights into the relational aspects of identity construction. It helps us understand that in many situations the decisions and actual behavior of actors reflects not utilitarian cost/benefit analyses of individuals whose identities and interests are defined in abstraction from social interactions, but broader concerns related to the enactment of identity according to the norms that prevail in a given social environment. Yet this is also an account that tends to marginalize some important aspects of the self/other interactions in international politics. Wendt does not explore the processes, and the power involved in those processes, through which a particular generalized other and its corresponding normative framework come to be accepted by international “novices” as the relevant generalized other. Relatedly, he does not extend his analysis to encompass actual practices through which a socializing agency (or a reference group acting on behalf of the generalized other) disseminates norms of appropriate behavior to targeted subjects. As Friedrich Kratochwil argued, “to show the mechanisms at work” in such processes of international socialization, one needs to look at the “hidden power” operating in those specific contexts.51 Kratochwil suggests that, to examine that power, it might be useful to draw either on Foucault’s concept of disciplinary power or on Bourdieu’s analysis of the construction of habitus. This book seeks to take Wendt’s analysis of international socialization a step further, by explaining types of socialization practices and the power involved in them. I argue that, to understand the role played by NATO in Central and Eastern Europe it is useful to examine its power to construct the “common sense” of Central and Eastern European actors.52 This power relies on the ability of the organization to act as legitimate teacher of modes of being and acting that are consistent with the identity of “true” liberal democracies.

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The analysis developed here builds on the argument put forward by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett in their analysis of security communities. According to them, power cannot be reduced to an understanding of the ability of a strong state to “nudge and occasionally coerce others to maintain a collective stance.” It must also be understood “as the authority to determine shared meaning that constitutes the ‘we-feeling’ and practices of states.”53 And, in Adler’s words, “The ability to create the underlying rules of the game, to define what constitutes acceptable play, and to get other players to commit themselves to those rules, because [those] rules are now part of the self-understandings of the players, is, perhaps, the most subtle and effective form of power.”54 More broadly, to use Barnett and Duvall’s analytical categories, this book shows that, far from simply applying power through behavioral relations (in interactions with preconstituted subjects), NATO has also exercised power via the social relations of constitution of Central and East European subjectivity.55 International organizations, Adler and Barnett have argued, play an important role in the process of social learning. In fact, “organizations, in this important respect, are sites of socialization and learning, places where political actors learn and perhaps even ‘teach’ others what their interpretations of the situation and normative understandings are. Because identities are created and reproduced on the basis of knowledge that people have of themselves and others, learning processes that occur within and are promoted by institutions can lead actors to develop positive reciprocal expectations and thus identify with each other.”56 In my study of practices enacted by NATO, I build on Adler and Barnett’s account by analyzing the socialization practices through which international education is carried out, examining the conditions that facilitate the success of those practices and exploring some of their implications. selection of cases Historical Aspect of Case Selection Two aspects of case selection are relevant to my study. First, there is a historical dimension: to explain the contemporary role of NATO, it is necessary to pay close attention to its evolution during the Cold War. I argue that since it was founded NATO has never been merely an alliance. From its creation, the organization has always been involved in processes aimed at promoting liberal values and institutions in the Euro-Atlantic area. This historical dimension is examined in Chapter 2, which analyzes the concern with the inside mode of pursuing security that was shared by

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Overview

NATO’s “founding fathers.” It then examines the interaction between the inside and outside solutions in the course of activities carried out by NATO during the Cold War period. In the context of the increasingly militarized confrontation with the Soviet Union, the inside dimension came to be subordinated to the demands of outside security arrangements, but it never completely disappeared. At the end of the Cold War, NATO relied on its history of pursuing security at the level of inside to reinvent itself and to justify its continued relevance in the new context. In the early 1990s, there was widespread agreement among NATO decision makers that this was a time of rapid change, a time marked by the emergence of new, more diffuse sets of threats that could not be effectively dealt with through a strategy of containment. In a situation in which they needed to improvise responses to that fluid security environment, NATO decision makers returned to the organization’s past as a guide to the future. In particular, they invoked and built on principles that were present in the Preamble and Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as well as ideas developed in various Cold War Reports on the Atlantic Community in order to formulate a new strategic concept. In the collective voice of the alliance: “We reaffirm that security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension and we intend to enhance the political component of our Alliance as provided for by Article 2 of our Treaty.”57 To examine the double role of NATO in European security, I begin by examining several aspects of the historical evolution of the organization. First, there is the foundational period (1947–early 1949), which is important for analyzing the collective intentions of the founders of the institution. In establishing NATO, Western decision makers were seeking to create a security system that would protect Western states from within and would contribute to the construction of a Western security community, at the same time as it secured those states against Soviet military threats. Second, this book explores some of the actual activities in which NATO was involved during the Cold War. Particularly relevant are the dynamics of Cold War enlargement of the organization: to Greece and Turkey (1952), Germany (1955), and Spain (1982). A comparative analysis of Cold War and post–Cold War dynamics of enlargement reveals an interesting evolution in the nature of considerations that led NATO decision makers to embark on a policy of expansion. During the Cold War, decisions to enlarge were primarily motivated by outside, geostrategic considerations. It was a concern with the strategic value of Greece and Turkey, Germany, and Spain that led the allies to decide that it was desirable to grant NATO membership to those countries. However, even in a context marked by the prevalence of geostrategic considerations, inside security concerns continued to play a significant

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role in the process of decision making related to Cold War enlargements of NATO. In the case of both Germany and Spain, their geostrategic potential was the necessary but not the sufficient condition for attaining membership in the Atlantic alliance. In both cases, what made accession acceptable to all NATO allies was the fact that the candidates were countries whose regimes showed a commitment to the values and principles of liberalism and democracy. More problematic was the case of Greece and Turkey, which were widely seen as “outsiders” to the Euro-Atlantic community of values. Their inclusion into the structures of NATO in 1952 was widely regarded as a compromise demanded by the value of their geographic location in the confrontation with the Soviet Union. Yet, this was a compromise that, as many NATO members pointed out at the time, threatened to undermine the Euro-Atlantic community of liberal democratic values embodied in NATO. As a way to compensate for the increasing importance of the geostrategic dimension of the organization, its decision makers initiated a series of activities meant to contribute to the consolidation of a liberal democratic community throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. The Post–Cold War Period: NATO’s Assessments of New Problems and Possible Solutions In Chapter 3, I focus on events and processes that reveal the evolution of NATO’s reliance on the inside solution relative to the outside mode of pursuing security. This part of the book begins with a study of the conditions in which this evolution occurred. As mentioned above, NATO’s growing involvement in identity-building practices cannot be understood in abstraction from collective understandings of allied decision makers regarding the nature of the post–Cold War world. Particularly relevant is the moment immediately following the end of the Cold War (1990–91) and the period associated with the formulation of security objectives at the time when the issue of enlargement first appeared on NATO’s political agenda (1994). In both moments, NATO decision makers collectively regarded the establishment of liberal democratic institutions in Central and Eastern Europe as key to European stability and peace in the new era. The new set of shared views of the nature of the European security environment was reflected in the formulation of a new strategy for NATO. This was coupled with plans for a restructuring of the alliance’s armed forces so as to render them more flexible and mobile—in a situation in which such qualities were perceived as crucial if NATO was to deal effectively with problems of internal instability.

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Practices of Socialization: The Czech Republic and Romania To help construct liberal democratic state identities in the former Communist bloc, NATO decision makers initiated a series of socialization practices. From the moment that the issue of enlargement first appeared on the political agenda of NATO, there has been a dramatic proliferation of interactions between the organization and Central and Eastern European actors, which was justified by NATO by reference to the goal of improving cooperation between the West and the former East and preparing candidates for potential future admission to the alliance. This is an important development, for it provides an opportunity to study a large number of activities involving NATO actors and Central and Eastern European political, military, and functional elites.58 These occurred within forums as diverse as the Partnership for Peace, the EuroAtlantic Partnership Council, the North Atlantic Assembly, and individual accession dialogues between NATO and Central and Eastern European representatives. The wealth of interactions between NATO officials and actors from Central and Eastern Europe makes it easier to enrich this study by examining a variety of activities, carried out in diverse settings and involving different sets of actors.59 On the basis of empirical evidence, I hope to demonstrate that NATO has, indeed, carried out socialization processes in a variety of forums. Many of the consultations, legal instruments, seminars, and workshops organized within the framework of NATO involved representatives from all Central and Eastern European states. Accordingly, by examining the dynamics of those activities, one can gain important insights into the nature of interaction between NATO and actors from the ex-Communist states in general. Certain consultations, educational activities, and legal instruments, however, involved only NATO and individual Eastern European states. With respect to those kinds of interactions, some choices had to be made. In analyzing the socialization practices enacted by NATO, my empirical focus, in Chapters 4 and 5, is on two cases: the Czech Republic and Romania, respectively, in the first decade of the post–Cold War era. This allows me to compare NATO’s interaction with a country (the Czech Republic) that was granted membership in the organization in the first round of enlargement, and its interaction with a state (Romania) that was excluded from the first wave of enlargement. It is important to include more than just one country in order to avoid the potential criticism that NATO’s socialization practices were an isolated occurrence, possi-

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bly due to a special relationship with the country involved. At the same time, a comparative study enables me to examine the extent to which NATO took seriously its self-definition as an institution that is open only to states committed to the norms of liberal democracy. Thus, through an analysis of the North Atlantic Council’s evaluations of the Czech Republic and Romania it is easier to assess the extent to which NATO focused on the enactment of liberal democratic reforms in setting conditions for, and subsequently evaluating the eligibility of, particular candidate states. Finally, a comparative analysis involving a country that was included in the first wave of enlargement and one that was excluded enables us to examine the evolution of NATO’s involvement in the former Communist bloc. In light of the lessons learned in the process of incorporating the first wave of newcomers (when it became clear to NATO officials that the process of transition to Western-style democracy in Central Europe was much more complex and, in some ways, more difficult than anticipated, and that the Central European elites were in need of even more guidance than the allies had expected to provide), NATO changed its policy vis-à-vis second-wave candidates. In the first wave, many of the liberal democratic reforms prescribed by the allies were carried out—under NATO guidance—after the decision to take in the three countries, regarded as the most advanced from the former Eastern Bloc, had been made. By contrast, with respect to second-wave candidates, the allies established a comprehensive system of monitoring and guidance aimed at promoting change and assessing the candidates’ records prior to inviting them to join NATO. Under these circumstances, second-wave countries faced the dilemma of having to carry out comprehensive reforms and adopt a series of costly courses of action (e.g., support for NATO missions and wars abroad) without any guarantee that they would receive the reward of membership. The differences in the structure of rewards for first-wave and second-wave admissions notwithstanding, NATO carried out similar socialization practices in both the Czech Republic and Romania, and those practices did have a powerful impact on both countries. The Czech Republic is a revealing choice from among the three countries admitted to NATO in 1999. When discussions of NATO enlargement began, Vaclav Havel’s country was widely regarded as one of the most advanced on the road to liberalization and democratization. It is useful to examine some of those pedagogical practices carried out within the framework of NATO enlargement because they reveal that, even in the apparently unproblematic case of the Western-like Czech Republic, there was a significant Western effort to teach Czech actors to be “good” liberal actors. One could easily argue—and, indeed, it has been argued—

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that the interaction between NATO and the Czech Republic was minimal: the Western alliance simply rewarded the Czechs for their domestic choices by including them in the Euro-Atlantic club. As we shall see, however, that was not the case. NATO was systematically involved in the promotion of a particular set of liberal democratic norms and institutions in the Czech Republic, and in the projection of a particular view of the Czech role in the world. One might further assume that no socialization was possible after the Czech Republic received the main “carrot” that the allies could offer: membership in the NATO club. Contrary to this view, as we shall see, NATO representatives continued to carry out socialization practices—in many instances, with a significant degree of success. From the second group of candidates to NATO membership, my focus is on Romania. Of all the countries excluded at the Madrid Summit, Romania was one of the countries, if not the country, that came the closest to being admitted. It is thus valuable to examine the reasons for the exclusion of this controversial candidate, and to analyze the nature of interaction between NATO and Romanian actors both before and after the Madrid Summit. As we shall see, NATO carried out a comprehensive set of socialization practices, and enjoyed a reasonable degree of success. In many cases, Romanian actors accepted, even proactively sought, NATO’s guidance in reforming their country, even though, as mentioned above, they had no guarantee that Romania would be included in NATO as a reward for their reform efforts. Linked to this, Romania is an interesting case because, as a frontline state during the Kosovo crisis, it was adversely affected by the Western blockade on the Danube and by a series of other measures taken by NATO in the course of the conflict. Yet, in spite of the obvious and very tangible costs associated with that course of action, the Romanian government supported Western military action and continued to consult and work very closely with NATO officials, both during and after the Kosovo war. I show that, to understand that course of action, it is important to take into account the identity politics in which Romanian decision makers were involved and, as part of that, the role played by NATO in the reconstitution of Romanian state identity. Regarding the selection of episodes of interaction between NATO and Czech and Romanian actors, I have focused on issues that were particularly problematic from the point of view of NATO—hence, areas in which change was perceived as necessary. A close analysis of those issues should shed light on the nature (and intensity) of NATO’s efforts to promote change in Central/Eastern Europe.

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data and methods of analysis I seek to avoid serious biases in my data by following a strategy of empirical “triangulation.”60 The idea behind triangulation is to balance various evidentiary sources obtained through a combination of methods in an effort to obtain a systematic corroboration of the arguments.61 The particular combination that I use in my study involves in-depth, semistructured interviews with a variety of NATO actors—both members of national delegations and the international staff, as well as Czechs and Romanians who interacted with NATO officials; participant-observation in a couple of educational practices organized by NATO; and an analysis of a series of documents both from the Cold War and the post–Cold War periods. To analyze the texts, I relied on discourse analysis—a systematic method of analysis that uses techniques developed mainly by students of literary criticism in order to examine the relevant actors’ understandings of the problems they were facing and of the possible solutions to those problems.62 As mentioned above, this book conceptualizes the social world as an intersubjective universe, in which the search for causality involves an analysis of the reasons that motivated actors—qua members of social groups operating within a given framework of shared meanings— to act in a certain way. It is therefore important to capture the nature of shared understandings that shape the actors’ understandings of the world and inform their definition of reasonable actions in particular circumstances. As Mark Lichbach has pointed out, this means that we need to read the discourses formulated by the actors we are interested in, in an attempt to capture the intersubjective culture in which they are moving. 63 This is why the method of discourse analysis is important.64 Discourse analysis sheds light on the ways in which political actors identify and differentiate various objects and subjects inhabiting the environment in which they act, the attributes and qualities that actors associate with those subjects, and the ways in which they relate them to other subjects and objects.65 That is, through discourse analysis, we learn how particular subjects and objects are defined within given intersubjective contexts, and how particular sets of relationships are established between those subjects and objects, making certain attitudes and actions vis-à-vis certain subjects seem appropriate while others appear inconceivable. 66 For instance, in examining the establishment and evolution of NATO during the Cold War, discourse analysis can help us shed light on the allies’ shared understanding of themselves as members of a community of values, which informed the decision to establish a security organization that

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was more than a conventional alliance and proscribed certain kinds of actions within NATO. Similarly, in the post–Cold War era, discourse analysis can help us understand how NATO actors and the Central and Eastern Europeans interpreted the world, and defined themselves and each other in a way that made it seem reasonable, even normal, for them to participate in activities of learning and persuasion versus merely providing and responding to a set of instrumental incentives. I rely in particular on techniques such as narrative and predicate analysis to examine different texts (written or verbal) that instantiate a particular discourse. Predicate analysis involves a study of the verbs, adverbs, and adjectives that attach to nouns.67 Predications of a noun construct different objects and subjects, defining them as a particular kind of thing/actor, with specific features and capacities. In addition, one also needs to pay attention to subject positioning in a given set of texts. Thus, discourses do not just endow subjects/objects with particular attributes; they also establish relationships between these subjects, as defined by the qualities attributed to them. Drawing on the linguistic theory of de Saussure, students of discourse analysis often point out that what defines a particular kind of subject is, in large part, the relationships (e.g., similarity, opposition, or identity) which position that subject in relation to other kinds of subjects. Drawing on the work of Bruce Lincoln, I also rely on narrative analysis to examine the way in which the boundaries of communities are legitimized so that such communities are symbolically brought into existence through the invocation of selected moments of the past. By referring to particular sets of ancestors common to all the members of the community being invoked, and through recounting allegedly formative moments of the past, stories legitimize a specific evolution of certain actors; they make that evolution seem natural.68 I also examine the way in which, through presuppositions, a discourse acts to create background knowledge and in so doing constructs a particular kind of world in which certain things are recognized as true. One can use a syntagmatic analysis to capture what seems to be a key microtechnique of presupposition: the repetition of lexical terms.69 Repetition of certain lexical terms is sometimes used to create discourse coherence in a text and/or to show that various speakers endorse a particular representation of reality. As a complement to presupposition, there is also, at the level of the sentence, naturalization, which examines the way in which texts represent reality as a given that speaks for itself and “naturally” gives rise to certain consequences.70 In selecting the texts to which I applied discourse analysis, I follow Barry Buzan’s advice that analysis should be conducted on central texts,

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for, as he pointed out, “if a discourse is operative in a given community, it is expected to materialize in those texts whenever the debate is sufficiently important.”71 I have tried to use three broad criteria for text selection. To begin with, I sought to use texts issued by actors with authority to define a situation and to identify problems and challenges (e.g., texts that capture the views of NATO’s decision makers about the nature of post–Cold War security threats in the Euro-Atlantic area). In addition, I examined texts characterized by a clear definition of identities and reasonable courses of action given those identities. Finally, I looked for texts issued in politically significant contexts (i.e., moments likely to have important implications in terms of interpreting the world and formulating strategies for shaping that world).72 In an attempt to capture the discursive categories through which the actors I am interested in interpreted the world, defined themselves and others, and identified reasonable courses of action, I sought to include in my analysis not only texts that might be seen as instances of “cheap talk” (e.g., press statements), but also units of discourse that were formulated in more private venues (e.g., semi-confidential or confidential documents), and/or in situations that carried clear political implications (e.g., strategic documents). Some texts fulfill all criteria—such as, for instance, the (now declassified) NATO confidential reports issued during the Cold War. In several of those reports the representatives of member states articulated their vision of the alliance as the institutional expression of a community of values, identified the enemy the allies were confronting, and stressed the importance of policies aimed at strengthening that community and protecting it from inside as well as outside threats. Other texts, however, do not meet all these criteria of text selection. For example, some of the pieces of legislation prescribed by NATO to the Central/East European candidates do not contain clear statements of identity. Nevertheless, these are important texts because they were issued by authoritative actors, clearly identified reasonable courses of action, and played an important role in (re)constituting the Central/East European polities around liberal democratic norms. By combining an analysis of these documents with other texts, which contain clearer definitions of identity, we gain a broader understanding of the ways in which NATO has been involved in defining and helping to implement a liberal democratic identity in post-Communist polities. Regarding interviewing, I am aware that this method raises questions about the reliability of interviewers and interviewees. To reduce these problems, I interviewed actors that played different roles in the interactions between NATO and Central/Eastern Europeans. I treated statements as evidence only when the information they contained was cor-

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roborated by at least one other source occupying a different position in practices of socialization (e.g., for statements regarding the nature and impact of NATO teachings on actors from the Czech Republic and Romania, I only took into account statements made by at least one NATO teacher and confirmed by at least a couple of Czech and Romanian students). Regarding the problem of the reliability of the interviewer, I tried to import as little as possible of any particular discursive framing into the questions. The data for the historical chapter come from archival records of debates among NATO founders surrounding the proposed role of the new organization (1948–49), as well as debates within the Atlantic Council and private exchanges among Western leaders on the issue of admission of new members to NATO during the Cold War. I supplemented this information with data drawn from books on NATO written by historians. For the first analytical moment of my post–Cold War analysis, which focuses on NATO’s assessments of new security risks in Europe, I combine a discourse analysis of North Atlantic Council documents with interviews with participants in council debates (both NATO officials and memberstate representatives). Moving on to conditions of admission to NATO, I gathered the evidence for this section from documents issued by the North Atlantic Council and from some reports of discussions among NATO decision makers on the conditions that candidate states ought to fulfill in order to be considered eligible for admission to the organization. This textual evidence was combined with data obtained from interviews with NATO officials who were involved in the process of deciding the conditions of accession to the organization. For an analysis of actual processes of socialization carried out within NATO-sponsored forums, I needed to gather data about various formal and informal consultations, seminars, and workshops in order to shed light on the norms and principles prescribed in the course of those activities. Also relevant are the techniques used to prescribe them, as well as the conditions that enabled the use of those tactics. To gather this kind of data, I used: in-depth, semi-structured interviews with a sample of students and teachers in NATO seminars as well as participants in formal accession dialogues and informal consultations between NATO and representatives of the Czech Republic and Romania; participant-observation in a couple of seminars and symposia organized within the framework of the Partnership for Peace and the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO; and analysis of the reports of a few seminars and consultations. A study that examines the process of state-crafting through socialization is more interesting if it also pays attention to some of the effects of socialization. The question is, does this process matter at all? Does it have

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an impact on Central and Eastern European socializees? One can think of different dimensions and degrees of success of socialization practices. 73 To begin with, one can speak of success to the extent that socializees consistently inscribe international norms in their political discourse. In that case, subjects (re)formulate their political programs so as to conform to all or some of the normative prescriptions formulated by the socializing agency. I suggest that a change in political discourse can be used as a useful indicator of change in the definitions of identity and interests held by socializees.74 This is particularly the case in situations in which, following socialization practices, socializees inscribe the norms prescribed by international institutions in their political discourse, reformulate their goals accordingly, and then articulate the new discourse vis-à-vis diverse audiences in different contexts, including contexts with significant policy implications (e.g., parliamentary debates). Critics might argue that this is not enough to demonstrate that a significant change has occurred at the level of the private beliefs/attitudes of socializees. Yet, as it has already been argued, using different methods to obtain evidence about the views articulated by the relevant political actors in various public and private contexts is an important step toward shedding light on their ideas regarding their identity and goals. 75 After all, the rationalist argument of cheap talk revolves around the problem of inconsistency in the views put forward vis-à-vis different audiences. Therefore, a demonstration of consistency should help establish that a change in political discourse reflects more than “cheap talk.” It is impossible to establish with certainty the nature of private beliefs held by people, but I suggest that this is less of a problem than it may first appear to be. Since this is a study in political science rather than psychology, what we are interested in are the ideas held and promoted by people qua political actors. While it remains impossible to absolutely refute the potential argument that a study such as this one does not “get inside individuals’ heads” to establish whether belief change has occurred, one can point out that accessing the private beliefs of individuals is not needed in order to establish that, in their enactment of political identity, NATO socializees did change their beliefs and attitudes. At the very least, in order to maintain their legitimacy and credibility both in the domestic and international arenas, those actors had to articulate a political discourse and identify and pursue policies that did not contradict the basic norms and principles of those redefined identities. One can take this assessment of the success of socialization a step further and examine the extent to which socializees who redefined their views regarding proper goals to be pursued in the reform process also acted on these new ideas. It is reasonable to argue that, to the extent that

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socialization is successful and the socializees internalize the new norms, coming to take them for granted, there will be a certain consistency between their speech and their actions. Thus, not only would socializees redefine their views of proper norms and institutions to govern civil-military relations, but they would also try to promote those norms. For instance, in the case of socializees that have decision-making power, they would seek to embed the new norms in the legal and institutional fabrics of their societies. As a first indicator of the results of socialization, I examine shifts in the political discourse of elites in the Czech Republic and Romania. The goal is to capture possible shifts in that discourse in the direction of (or away from) conformity with norms prescribed by NATO and to examine some of the reasons for those transformations. As a second indicator of the success of international political socialization, I examine efforts by Czech and Romanian political elites to institutionalize the norms prescribed by NATO. For this part of my research project, I engage in a reading of the text of pieces of defense and security legislation and the institutional reforms promoted by those actors. Also, through interviews and media reports, I shed light on the general context, particularly the expected costs and benefits, in which the political elites of the two countries sought to enact liberal changes. In a broader perspective, the effect of socialization practices can be studied not only by looking at the socializees themselves but also analyzing the extent to which the impact on those socializees translated into changes at the level of state policies and institutions. Chapters 4 and 5 of this book show that in some instances the successful socialization of Czech/Romanian actors translated into changes in the constitution of their states (e.g., in some cases, Czech/Romanian policymakers succeeded in embedding NATO’s normative prescriptions into the legal and institutional fabric of their societies). But one should not assume that successful socialization of elites and selected societal actors necessarily translates into changes at the level of the state. As noted above, it is reasonable to argue that successfully socialized actors would try to promote the internationally prescribed norms in their societies. But there is no reason to believe that such attempts are always successful. Cortell and Davis have argued that a series of domestic factors affect the degree to which domestic actors’ appropriation of international norms leads to changes in state behavior. 76 Particularly important are the domestic salience of norms (i.e., the degree to which an international norm is perceived as legitimate in the domestic arena) and the organization of decision-making authority within the state (the degree of centralization of decision-making processes and the relationship be-

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tween state and civil society). In the context of this study, the fact that the executives tended to be quite influential in the field of security meant that, in several instances, NATO-socialized decision makers were able to carry out a series of reforms aimed at implementing internationally prescribed norms in the area of defense. Indeed, in the case of Romania in particular, the pro-reform government that came to power in 1996 resorted to so many executive orders in an attempt to bypass domestic opponents and pass the legislation prescribed by NATO that they were often accused of governing in a non-democratic manner. There were, however, a series of instances, both in the Czech Republic and in Romania, where the implementation of international norms was delayed or obstructed by strong domestic opponents. As regards the domestic salience of norms, we shall see that the persistence of attitudes and practices inherited from the Communist era in certain Czech and Romanian circles obstructed the implementation of new norms. For instance, although Romanian and Czech reformers passed a series of laws aimed at improving civilian-military cooperation in the formulation of defense policies, a persisting culture of mistrust between the military and civilian defense experts meant that actual defense practices continued, for a long time, to be inconsistent with the new laws. The problems of norm implementation experienced by the Czech Republic and Romania are powerful reminders that the transmission of international ideas to particular states is always mediated by the domestic politics and structures of those states.

chapter two

NATO’s History: The Politics of Securing the West since 1949

introduction From its foundation, NATO was designed not simply as a conventional alliance against the Soviet military threat, but also as an institution aimed at countering the inside risk of potential loss of Western liberal democratic values and norms within the Euro-Atlantic area.1 The double (inside/outside) logic of international security found expression in the discourse and community-building practices carried out by NATO during the Cold War. It was also reflected in debates around the question of NATO enlargement to Greece and Turkey, Germany, and Spain. In the context of the increasingly militarized confrontation with the Soviet Union, the geostrategic (outside) dimension of NATO came to the fore and informed a series of decisions regarding the definition of strategic concepts of the organization, as well as the process of enlargement. However, I argue below that even in situations when it was subordinated to outside requirements, the inside dimension did not disappear from NATO’s repertoire. In fact, the liberal community-building aspect of NATO was reflected in a set of activities that sought to compensate for decisions, such as the enlargement of the organization, based primarily on geostrategic grounds. At the end of the Cold War, NATO’s decision makers shared the view that with the disappearance of the Soviet threat and the emergence of a new, more diffuse set of threats, it was essential to develop security arrangements that could project Western-style liberal democracy into the potentially unstable states of Central and Eastern Europe. In that context, NATO formulated a new strategy that effectively placed the emphasis upon an enhanced inside dimension of its logic for pursuing international security. The post–Cold War focus on domestic sources of international (in)stability, coupled with an understanding of the former Communist

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countries as states that had to undergo radical, Western-guided transformation, informed NATO’s decision to become involved in systematic, unprecedented practices of socialization aimed at building the institutions of liberal democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. It also enabled decision makers of the North Atlantic Council to reach consensus around the idea that candidates to membership in the organization had to demonstrate their commitment to the shared norms and values of the transatlantic community before they could be considered for admission. Interestingly, the intersubjective understandings within NATO regarding the nature of the organization, as an institutional embodiment of the Western community, and its role in projecting the liberal democratic norms of that community to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, provided representatives of the former Communist states with a normative framework within which they were able to claim a right to be included in NATO if they showed commitment to its norms and values. the foundation of nato Since its creation in 1949, NATO was designed to embody the double logic of international security. Historical evidence indicates that the founders of NATO—policymaking elites from the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, France, and the Benelux states—shared the view that their countries needed an international system that would secure the world of Western liberal democracy against a complex set of challenges. In the intergovernmental debates leading up to the establishment of NATO, the threat of military confrontation with the Soviet Union was regarded as less worrisome than the danger of Communist subversion within the weakened societies of Western European states. The first formal step in the process of establishing the North Atlantic Treaty was taken by the British government in January 1948. In their confidential messages to the American and Canadian governments, British policymakers stressed the danger of a “further encroachment of the Soviet tide,” resulting from a “constantly increasing pressure” from the Soviets, which “threatens the whole fabric of the West.”2 In records of private communications carried out in the spring of 1948, the governments of the United States, Britain, and France expressed their belief that the Soviet government did “not want war at this time,” that it did not intend to “push things to the extreme of war,” and that, at least for the time being, “there was no clear indication that the U.S.S.R. is now prepared to make war.”3 The first statement is attributed to the then U.S. secretary of state, George Marshall, the second to the British foreign sec-

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retary, Ernest Bevin, and the third to the French foreign minister, Georges Bidault.4 For the proponents of NATO, the danger of military confrontation with the Soviet Union could not be ignored. Indeed, the governments which took part in the negotiations on the North Atlantic Treaty in 1948—representing the United States, Britain, France, Canada, and the Benelux countries—did not rule out the possibility of war with the Soviet Union in the coming years. In September 1948 the negotiating group in Washington, composed of representatives of these governments, stated in a top-secret report to their governments that the Soviet Union was strategically capable of dominating Europe and that its armed forces could take the initiative at short notice. This supported “the Kremlin program of intimidation designed to attain the domination of Europe.”5 But military confrontation was regarded as less imminent than the risk of Communist takeover within West European states. To the NATO supporters, “the piecemeal collapse of one Western bastion after another” was a real and tragic possibility, one that would lead to a “Communist sweep of Europe” even in the absence of military conflict.6 At the level of top Western political elites, the fear of Communism inspired a collective (re)definition of political identity in the Euro-Atlantic area. The “specter of Communism,” to use Melvin Leffler’s terminology, provided the defining other against which decision makers on both sides of the Atlantic were able to subordinate their differences to a collective definition of a community that had its roots in Western civilization and whose mark was a set of shared values of individual (liberal) freedoms, the rule of law, and democracy.7 Assessments of the Communist threat came to be accompanied by statements affirming the contrast between Communism and the West, portrayed as “the only civilization worth living in.”8 It was not that differences among Western states did not exist. Rather, national specificities and differences—or even disagreements— among those states were perceived as differences that existed against the background of common values and ideals.9 To decision makers locked in a competition with forces representing Communist otherness, West European states, together with North America, appeared first and foremost as the same Western world—the only civilization that held the promise of progress and freedom. In the words of one of the Canadian actors involved in the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty, “As we became more aware of the evils of the society which had been created in the Soviet Union and imposed by the Union on the peoples of Eastern Europe, we also became more conscious of the virtues and values of our own civilization. . . . We realized that the things which divided us in the western world were as nothing compared with the gulf

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which separated us from the Soviet Union.”10 Yet, as noted above, it was precisely that perceived Western civilizational essence, consisting of shared norms of liberal democracy, which was at risk, given the domestic weakness of European states. In essence, the North Atlantic Treaty emerged in the context of a shared view among Atlantic leaders that if the Western world was to survive the Communist challenge, its leaders had to act swiftly and decisively to secure the survival and further development of Western civilization within the states of the Atlantic basin. In that historical context, one powerful expression of the concern to strengthen the West from within against potential Communist takeovers was the Marshall Plan. But the same concern also informed the creation of a particular kind of security system—which came to be embodied in NATO. As explained by Louis St. Laurent, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs and a key proponent of NATO, the best way to prevent a third world war was by confronting “the forces of Communist expansion with an overwhelming preponderance of moral, economic and military force on the side of freedom.” Accordingly, St. Laurent wrote, the treaty “seeks to restrain Soviet expansion not by a Maginot line, but by building up in these liberal democratic states a dynamic counter-attraction to the degrading tenets of totalitarian and materialistic Communism.”11 This view was echoed in the messages sent by the British government to the United States and Canada in the course of consultations regarding the nature of NATO. An Atlantic security system, it was pointed out, should play an important role in the reinforcement of the “ethical and spiritual values inherent in this Western civilization.” NATO was to “consolidate the West against Soviet infiltration,” and at the same time, “inspire the Soviet government with enough respect for the West to remove temptation from them.”12 In the final stages of negotiations to establish NATO, R. A. Lovett, then Under-Secretary of State of the United States, reaffirmed the idea that the North Atlantic Treaty should give rise to a system that would be at once a manifestation of the shared values of Western nations and a vehicle for protecting those values. After all, the essential element of the treaty “was not the Soviet threat, but the common Western approach and that Western attachment to the worth of the individual would be the best cement.”13 In the course of debates in the U.S. Senate, Arthur Vandenberg, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, echoed the arguments made by a group of officials from the State Department (led by Lovett and including J. D. Hickerson and T. C. Achilles) when he insisted that “unless this treaty becomes far more than a military alliance, it will be at the mercy of the first plausible Soviet peace initiative.”14 In essence,

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the hope that the Western values shared by its member states would provide the cement to the treaty was accompanied by a fear that the bond might be lost and its foundational values endangered, as West European societies were in danger of succumbing to the temptations of Communism. It is interesting to note that even actors like Dean Acheson, who during the negotiation of the treaty was seen as the supporter of a primarily military alliance, in the end subscribed to the view that NATO had to be a far more complex organization. When, in his capacity as secretary of state, Acheson briefed Eisenhower on his appointment as the first commander of North Atlantic Forces in Europe, he told him that the treaty “was more than a purely military treaty,” as it embodied economic and political dimensions. In essence, he argued, it was an instrument for building “closer political, economic and security co-operation with Western Europe” and for strengthening the Atlantic World.15 In a broader geographical context, this view was shared by political actors beyond the inner circle of American, British, and Canadian decision makers that were primarily responsible for formulating the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty. According to top Norwegian politicians, participants in the pact “are all members of a more significant and essential community—the Atlantic Community,” which was based on shared democratic values.16 This collective view of an international arrangement that was far more complex than a conventional military alliance found expression in key provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty. Thus, in the Preamble, signatory states declared the protection of their common values rather than just the preservation of national autonomy and territorial integrity as the basic purpose of NATO. They were “determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.” Furthermore, Article 2 of the treaty seems to summarize the precepts of the democratic peace theory, as it stipulates: “The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.”17 The treaty was meant to embody the double logic of international security, to achieve a synthesis of the inside and outside security needs of the Euro-Atlantic area. As we have seen, it was supposed to secure the norms and institutions of Western liberal democracy within member states and to cultivate a sense of collective identity among them, while at the same time establishing the necessary geostrategic arrangement against

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a potential military threat by the Soviet Union. Yet, in practice, that harmony was undermined on several occasions when the two dimensions came into tension. In fact, problems began to emerge even before 1949, as the allies had to define the boundaries of the Euro-Atlantic realm to be covered by the new treaty. Particularly problematic was the case of Portugal (then governed by Antonio de Oliveira Salazar’s anti-democratic government). In discussions regarding the fate of Portugal, several allies objected to the idea of including in the institutional expression of the liberal democratic community a state that was so clearly violating the basic norms of democracy and human rights. The strongest opposition came from Canada, which reminded the other parties to the Atlantic Treaty that the idea behind the Pact was “the spiritual mobilization of the liberal democracies as well as being a basis for economic and military cooperation against Soviet threats. . . . It would be difficult, if not impossible to say that the present regime in Portugal embodies these principles.”18 The argument was that the treaty could be dangerously weakened by the inclusion of a state whose political values and institutions clashed with those that the treaty was meant to uphold. The function of revitalization of liberal democratic norms and institutions, and the construction of a sense of collective identity in the Euro-Atlantic area, might then be undermined by the strategic dimension of the treaty. At the same time, however, all the allies—including Canada—were aware of the strategic value of Portugal. From the early days of negotiation of the treaty, the inclusion of Portugal into Western security arrangements was recognized as a strategic necessity.19 Portugal was regarded as one of the “stepping-stone” countries (together with Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and Ireland) whose geostrategic position meant that without them a Euro-Atlantic system of defense against possible Soviet attack could not work. In the case of Portugal, its adherence was seen as key to securing Atlantic lines of communication in the event of a war. In the early days of treaty negotiations, countries opposed to Portugal’s inclusion into the community of liberal democratic states, yet aware of the strategic value of the country, had hoped to find a way around this dilemma through an arrangement that would have allowed graduated membership in NATO. In those early days, the idea was to establish a concentric circle of signatories to the treaty, with unequal rights and duties associated with different positions. This would have allowed states like Portugal, whose strategic position made adherence a necessity but which did not share some of the key values of the treaty, to receive a territorial guarantee in exchange for minimal responsibilities but also minimal decision-making

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power within the association.20 That plan, reflected in the Washington Paper of September 1948, proposed that states like Greece and Turkey, which did not fit the terms of North Atlantic liberal democracy on either strategic or political grounds, but which were, nevertheless, important to the defense of Western Europe, be excluded from the treaty. However, the full members “would make a declaration to the effect.”21 It was hoped that such a tiered arrangement would reflect the fact that parties to the treaty were linked not just by common security concerns but also “by a common civilization and a common conception of life.” At the same time, it would ensure that there would be no gaps that “might compromise the security of the whole area.”22 In the end, however, the negotiating governments concluded that a graduated membership was not feasible, not least because it would have entailed unclear commitments from the states situated on the outer circles of the association.23 The collapse of that plan meant that the only form of inclusion into the North Atlantic Treaty was by granting full membership to countries like Portugal. Under those circumstances, it was generally recognized by the governments that were key to shaping the new security system that the damage done to the treaty by excluding Portugal would be so severe that, in spite of all their political concerns, such an outcome had to be avoided. Even countries previously opposed to the Portuguese accession came to accept the idea that the inclusion of Portugal, even though it was led by Salazar’s government, was justified on the grounds that it was vital to the defense of the Euro-Atlantic area, and they expressed the hope that it would not undermine the broader goal of liberal community-building embedded in the treaty. Thus, by November 1948, even Canada had agreed: “Portugal should be given the chance of joining if she wants to do so.”24 This marked the triumph of outside logic over inside concerns—although Western leaders tried to play down the tension between the two sets of considerations by drawing a line between Portugal’s regime and “true” totalitarianism. When U.S. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge asked in executive session how “we could square the common heritage of freedom with the Portuguese tradition,” Theodore Achilles reportedly responded, “Although its government is not the same form of democracy as we have it, it is authoritarian, but not totalitarian. . . . If it is a dictatorship, it is because the people freely voted for it.”25 the process of nato enlargement during the cold war The interaction between the inside and outside logics also informed the NATO enlargements that occurred during the Cold War. From the point

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of view of the inside dimension, concerned with the construction of a Western community of values in the Euro-Atlantic area, particularly problematic was the case of Greece and Turkey, which acceded to NATO in 1952. From the very beginning of discussions and debates on the issue of membership, those two Mediterranean countries were treated as one category—there could be no enlargement to Greece without Turkey, or vice versa—apparently because of a view that a solution for one country that did not include the other would not work.26 In the course of the intergovernmental consultations leading up to the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty, Greece and Turkey were not considered as eligible candidates, on the grounds that they did not qualify as North Atlantic liberal democracies.27 The opposition seems to have been particularly strong with respect to Turkey, given its Ottoman heritage and perceived ongoing anti-liberal democratic domestic practices. Yet, given Greece’s lack of commitment to the values of liberalism and democracy, as reflected, for instance, in the civil war between Communist forces and conservative royalist (and largely anti-democratic) forces, that country, too, was regarded as politically, economically, as well as geographically, unfit to join the Western association.28 In the vision of Western leaders, Turkey and Greece appeared to have been relegated to the category of “border” states (Greece, Turkey, and Iran were seen as having played “a collective historical role of dividing East and West”29). In the early 1950s, however, in a situation in which NATO, under the leadership of the United States, was adopting the strategy of forward defense, the two Mediterranean countries were becoming increasingly important, at least from a strategic perspective, in the eyes of the allies. In the United States, thinking about international security was being shaped by the NSC-68 document—according to which the policy of containing the Soviet power acquired global dimensions, as a defeat of free institutions anywhere represented “a defeat everywhere.”30 Under these circumstances, areas defined as the “periphery” of Europe acquired an unprecedented importance, and Washington now began to advocate the inclusion of Greece and Turkey into NATO.31 At the same time, within NATO itself, the adoption of a forward defense strategy, in September 1950, required that Turkey and Greece, which now represented the southern flank of such a strategy, be explicitly committed to the alliance.32 As the United States, a key proponent of the forward defense strategy, started to lobby for NATO enlargement to Greece and Turkey, it came up against significant opposition mounted by its European and Canadian allies. At a meeting of NATO’s Council of Deputies in September 1950, Canada, Norway, and the Netherlands led the opposition movement, arguing that the admission of Greece and Turkey would change NATO

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from “a closely knit community to a widespread anti-Soviet alliance.”33 At the same time, however, proponents and opponents of enlargement alike were increasingly committed to the view of the strategic importance of folding Greece and Turkey into Western security arrangements. 34 Therefore, as a compromise solution, they agreed (in late 1950) on a plan to grant the two Mediterranean countries associate membership in NATO. In essence, the concept of associate membership, first formulated during the initial treaty negotiations as a way of reconciling the two logics embodied in NATO but later discarded as unfeasible, re-emerged as the solution to the perceived problem posed by Greek and Turkish accession to the organization. The solution represented an effort to protect the legitimacy of the claim that NATO embodied a community of shared values and norms, while at the same time securing the geostrategic advantages needed for the defense of that community. The compromise, however, was short-lived. In 1951, with growing pressure from Turkey and Greece for full admission, support for Greek and Turkish inclusion was also mounting within NATO. The United States was clearly in favor of full membership, and the militaries within other allied states (particularly Britain) were also stressing the strategic advantages of accession.35 However, political opposition remained strong. At the Anglo-Canadian meeting of April 1951, for instance, participants expressed a common view that Greece and Turkey bore little political relation to the NATO members.36 Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands, too, were strongly opposed to the idea of granting full membership to the two Mediterranean states. In the course of NATO meetings aimed at reaching a consensus on this issue, they repeatedly argued that, since Greece and particularly Turkey were not part of the “like-minded group of Atlantic liberal democracies,” their admission was inconsistent with the idea of political homogeneity within NATO. According to a British Foreign Office Minute of a June 1951 meeting, the political objectors “clearly regard Turkey and Greece as completely alien to the present character of the Alliance.”37 In the course of 1951, a tripartite consensus (parlayed by the United States, Britain, and France) emerged that the geostrategic advantages of Greek and Turkish membership in NATO clearly outweighed the disadvantages.38 At the same time, the military report produced by the NATO Standing Group reinforced the view that effective defense of the West required closer association with Greece and Turkey. Although the other allies continued to have political reservations regarding the desirability of granting the two states full membership, they shared the view that, from a geostrategic perspective, Greece and Turkey were key to the security of the West. Moreover, the opponents were unwilling to block a proposal

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that had the support of the key allies. Norway and the Netherlands, for instance, indicated prior to the September 1951 Ottawa meeting of the North Atlantic Council, when this issue was to be decided, that they would be “open to persuasion,” citing their reluctance to go against the majority and an awareness of the strategic importance of NATO’s flanks.39 The accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO, which was completed in 1952, reflects the power exercised by the key allies—the United States, in particular, but also Britain and France—vis-à-vis the other member states. The fact that the United States, as the most consistent advocate of enlargement, obtained the support of Britain and France effectively transformed the question of if into one of when and how the two Mediterranean states would be granted full membership. At the same time, the U.S. tried to persuade its allies to accept this course of action, rather than impose its position on them.40 The argument put forward by the U.S. and other proponents of enlargement seems to have been that the inclusion of Greece and Turkey was a rational course of action from the point of view of all NATO members, as it represented an important step in enhancing their collective ability to protect the Euro-Atlantic community from the Communist threat. On this logic, the accession of the two Mediterranean countries was not, as it might have appeared on the surface, inconsistent with the normative commitments of NATO members. Rather, it represented a necessary compromise made precisely in the name of protecting those values and norms—and the entire community that embodied them. In the end, the proponents of enlargement managed to persuade the other allies to accept the accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO. The shared concern of the allies regarding the situation in the Mediterranean, coupled with the unwillingness of most members to trigger a crisis within NATO, led opponents of enlargement to support—or at least not to veto—a course of action that they regarded as a substantial compromise.41 Thus, consensus was eventually reached within NATO, Greece and Turkey were invited to join the alliance, and there is no indication that the United States and other proponents of enlargement resorted to coercion to obtain that agreement. On the contrary, as noted above, NATO members that opposed the accession of the two Mediterranean states had already indicated in 1951 that they were “open to persuasion,” as they recognized the importance of the reasons invoked by the other camp. The decision-making process regarding Cold War enlargement shows that the allies were willing to accept political compromises for geostrategic reasons. There was, however, a limit to that willingness to compromise. Thus, NATO members were far more reluctant to take in a state

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whose political regime was not merely inconsistent with the Western values and norms that the organization claimed to embody and promote, but also a real danger to those values. That was the case of Spain, which was denied NATO membership because of its domestic political orientation. During the era of Francisco Franco, vociferous opposition by the European allies—particularly the smaller states—led the United States to abandon its plan to include Spain in the alliance. In the late 1940s and the 1950s Spain was widely regarded as a pariah state. The persistence of Franco’s regime after the end of the Second World War generated an international view of Spain as the last pro-Nazi state in Europe. The importance of its strategic position in the Mediterranean had been acknowledged by the Western allies from the early days of consultation leading up to the North Atlantic Treaty. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that the militaries of the U.S., Britain, and France were keen to have Spain in NATO.42 But in discussions around the establishment of NATO, Spain was regarded merely as a potential future member, to be admitted only after the dismantling of the Franco regime.43 In the meantime, the country’s strategic adherence to the West was secured outside of the NATO framework, through the bilateral Madrid Pacts, agreed upon with the U.S in 1953.44 At that time, the Spanish government was hoping to use the agreements to secure international legitimacy, but the United States, in recognition of the strong opposition by its NATO allies to Franco’s regime, endeavored to avoid giving that impression. The pacts provided for an exchange: the U.S. was allowed to use naval and air bases in Spanish territory in exchange for providing economic aid to Spain.45 The American desire to quell allied concerns that it was legitimizing Franco’s policies was reflected in the peculiar nature of the pacts. Thus, in addition to military coordination, in case of armed conflict the United States was obliged only to take such actions as it deemed appropriate to defend its own facilities and personnel, but not to defend Spain itself. Although it is difficult to envisage a situation in which that distinction could have been maintained in practice, the American government consistently pointed out to its allies that the pacts did not amount to a security guarantee to Spain.46 It is also important to note that, from the U.S. perspective, the pacts were a compromise: they were inferior to NATO membership, not least because they required renewal and hence involved a certain degree of uncertainty. According to analysts of the allied debates on this issue, the preferred option of the United States regarding Spain was the same as in the case of Turkey: membership in NATO.47 However, that option remained unacceptable to the other allies and, as a result, was abandoned by the United States.48 This opposition, which remained strong during the Franco years,

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revolved around the idea that the inclusion of a country with that kind of domestic regime would have had very dangerous implications for NATO. Norway, Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands emerged as the most vocal opponents to Spanish membership, but Britain, Canada, and France were also unhappy with the idea of admitting Spain into an organization that was supposed to embody and promote liberal democratic values.49 As discussed above, compromises in the name of geostrategic considerations were not new to NATO. Portugal’s inclusion from the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty as a “stepping-stone state” was needed for the defense of core West European allies. Moreover, in the context of growing concern with the military aspect of confrontation with the Soviet Union, countries like Greece and Turkey, although perceived as far from being liberal democratic, had been invited to join the organization. In those cases, compromise was acceptable because the countries being included were regarded as noncompliant but not inevitably dangerous to the norms of the transatlantic community of values that NATO was supposed to embody and further develop. By contrast, Franco’s Spain was seen as not just a departure from those values, but also, and more importantly, as a permanent active threat to the liberal democratic community of values and norms. As Mark Smith argues in his study of Cold War enlargement: “Turkey could be accommodated, and Portugal’s dictatorship had less Fascistic origins than Spain’s. Significantly, neither had a history of active antagonism toward West European liberalism. Admitting Franco would be admitting a regime of the very sort that had overturned European democracy in the 1930s and 1940s, and as such was wholly unacceptable.”50 The importance of political considerations in rejecting the idea of Spanish membership was confirmed by the fact that, following the end of Franco’s regime and the subsequent process of democratization in Spain, the opposition that had kept Spain out in the 1950s quickly vanished. Evidence suggests that consensus within the alliance regarding the acceptability and desirability of NATO membership emerged at a very early stage of the post-Franco era.51 Already in July 1977 the opposition within NATO was almost gone, and after June 1980, when the Spanish foreign minister, Marcelino Oreja, announced that his country would seek membership in NATO, it was noted by analysts that approval by the allies would be a formality since all the NATO countries wanted Spain to join.52 Indeed, the process of approval was completed very quickly and Spain joined the organization in May 1982.53 In the early 1980s, Spain’s inclusion in NATO was regarded by the allies as very important on two sets of grounds: not only would Spain bring

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in strategic advantages on the southern flank of the alliance, but its inclusion would give new impetus to—and enhance the credibility of— NATO as the institutional embodiment of the liberal democratic community. During that time, concerns were beginning to emerge within NATO’s decision-making circles regarding the political cohesion of the alliance. In the context of perceived uncertainty caused by pro-Left domestic political changes that occurred in 1974 in Greece and Portugal, the allies thought that the admission of a democratic Spain might be a positive influence on political developments within the other southern NATO member states.54 From the perspective of member states, the accession of a new member with a minimum degree of internal debate and delay may also have been regarded as a symbolic signal to the Communist bloc that the allies were still sufficiently united to reach agreement on key decisions, and sufficiently meaningful to be attractive to new candidates. This set of concerns is consistent with the rationale uncovered by Mark Smith: the concept of a new democracy joining the organization lent added weight to the claim that NATO was a democratic community.55 From this perspective, the very reason for Franco’s exclusion from the alliance—his regime’s lack of democratic credentials—became the reason for including a democratized, post-Franco Spain. In the context of NATO’s ongoing effort to maintain its image as the embodiment of democratic values, the more democracies in Western Europe chose to stay out of the alliance, the weaker that image would be. The Spanish case illustrates a scenario of enlargement in which the (outside) logic of security, demanding the admission of the country on geostrategic grounds, came into tension with the requirements of the liberal community-building dimension of NATO. In contrast to the politics of inclusion of Greece and Turkey, however, geostrategic considerations were subordinated to political concerns regarding the nature of the Spanish polity. Therefore, the project of NATO enlargement could only be pursued following substantial domestic transformation in the post-Franco era. Finally, the other instance of NATO enlargement—the inclusion of West Germany in 1955—also reveals an interesting interaction between the geostrategic (outside) and the liberal community-building (inside) logic of international security. The emergence of the West German state in 1949, along with NATO’s move in September 1950 to adopt the forward strategy that called for the defense of Europe as far to the east as possible and no further west than the Rhine River, put the German question firmly on the agenda of Western decision makers. Since the forward strategy meant that the front line, in the event of armed conflict, would be in Germany, and since it was a strategy that called for the deployment

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of large numbers of conventional troops, it was clear that Germany would have to be incorporated into Western security arrangements. Moreover, Germany would have to make some kind of contribution to the collective military buildup. The allies were increasingly aware that if Germany was to become a participant in the defense of the Western world, it would have to become stronger and be granted a different political status. In the case of a war on German soil, the cooperation of German civil authorities would be needed; and, as a precondition for successfully mobilizing German energies, the new German state could not be discredited in the eyes of its own citizens.56 The idea was beginning to emerge, particularly within U.S. decision-making circles, that a solution had to be found so that Western troops could remain on German soil, not to occupy it, but—together with the Germans—to defend Western civilization.57 That is, Germany had to be transformed from an occupied state into a “willing participant” and “partner” in “the concert of democratic powers.”58 The problem was that the prospect of a stronger, more independent Germany was still unacceptable to many West European states. Furthermore, the issue of participation in the Western defense effort raised the question of German rearmament, which continued to generate suspicion and anxiety in European capitals. While the Western Europeans were increasingly aware that “we cannot build up the necessary strength to ensure the defense of the NATO powers without the participation of Germany,” they remained convinced that the German state could not be trusted to acquire armed forces of its own.59 In the face of this ambivalent European position, the tactic used by the United States—the strongest advocate of German rehabilitation and participation in the defense of the West—was first to secure recognition of the importance of Germany and then to propose the potential solution. Intense negotiations among the members of the North Atlantic Council resulted, in the fall of 1950, in a consensus, with the exception of France, that NATO was the optimum vehicle for the implementation of German rearmament.60 This meant that while Germany would acquire the right and the ability to contribute to the defense of the West, it would be firmly integrated into the institutions of, and hence under the control of, the allied states. Yet, even as the other allies were reaching agreement on NATO as the tool of German integration into Western defense arrangements, France was insisting on a European solution. The Pleven Plan for a European Defense Community (EDC), unveiled in October 1950, provided for the integration of German troops into a single European army, under the control of a European Defense Minister. The notion behind this plan, proposed by the French premier, Rene Pleven, was to discount the possi-

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bility of independent German military action and to ensure a permanent West European vocation for Germany’s defense policy.61 In contrast to its initial firm opposition to the French proposal, the U.S. government gradually came to accept the EDC plan. Analysts of American foreign policy during the Cold War point to several factors: a recognition that France would not accept any plan for German rearmament other than the EDC; a “genuine change of mind regarding the practicability of that plan,” prompted in large part by the unexpected support of SACEUR Eisenhower, who had been persuaded that the plan could work; and, finally, domestic isolationist tendencies, which signaled to the government that the U.S. might have to opt for the line of least resistance in rearming Germany.62 In other words, in addition to domestic pressure, international persuasion also seems to have been responsible for the shift in the American position on the EDC issue. The U.S. engaged in consultations with its allies on this issue (rather than simply impose its vision on the other states), and, furthermore, the European members of NATO were apparently able to play a role in persuading American decision makers to support their preferred scenario for German integration into international security arrangements. In response to this evolution in the U.S. position, Britain and other member states also came to support the EDC scenario for Germany. For them, the decision to support the French proposal was informed, in part, by a recognition (shared with the U.S.) that France would veto any other scenario, but also to a large extent by the change in Washington.63 Ironically, in the end, it was the French Parliament that rejected the EDC proposal, in a move that ultimately led to the resuscitation of the proposal to include Germany into NATO. It was primarily through British, rather than American efforts that the NATO option once again assumed center stage in plans for the integration of Germany into Western security structures. At the early post-EDC stage, in early September 1954, there is no evidence of a clear NATO option as such. However, in a situation in which France, the most consistent opponent to the NATO solution, was isolated and weakened by the fact of its having rejected its own solution, and in which the other allies had always preferred a NATO-based scenario for Germany, the British government began to think that a return to the alliance might be feasible. In that context, it was through the efforts of decision makers in London that the idea of including Germany in the Atlantic alliance was resuscitated.64 The allies agreed upon the NATO option in a very short period of time (between September 28 and October 3, 1954), at a Nine-Power Conference attended by the U.S., Canada, Britain, France, Italy, the Benelux

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states, and Germany.65 The solution agreed upon represented an effort to satisfy both Europeanists (particularly France) and Atlanticists.66 Thus, it provided for the accession of Germany to the Brussels Treaty (later known under the name of the Western European Union, WEU). The treaty would set a ceiling on German armed capacity, since it was argued that it would be difficult for NATO to act as an organization that at once builds up and holds down German military potential. The task of overseeing the rearmament of a German army went to NATO, under its new Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) command. This agreement on the question of German rearmament cleared the way for ending the political status of the Federal Republic of Germany as an occupied state. With the Paris Agreements (signed on October 23, 1954), Germany regained its formal sovereignty, albeit a sovereignty which was, in effect, limited by its inclusion in the Western bloc.67 As we have seen, the accession of Germany to NATO was, to a large extent, motivated by geostrategic considerations, that is, by the outside logic of security. The new, forward defense strategy of the alliance required German military participation, and given European suspicions of German rearmament, this was only possible by placing Germany under firm Western control within the framework of NATO. However, the process of including the new West German state in the organization also involved a dimension of liberal democratic community-building. Historical evidence indicates that the pro-West, pro-liberal orientation of the Adenauer government influenced the way in which Germany was perceived by the allies, facilitating the emergence of a shared view that with the right allied support but also supervision, Germany could be (re)turned into a Western liberal democracy. A special partnership relationship was established between Western policymakers and Chancellor Adenauer, whose pro-West orientation was, according to historical analysts, far more pronounced than that of the German people as a whole.68 The chancellor’s goal was to turn Germany into a Western country: by tying it to the West economically and militarily, it was believed, the country would “be absorbed into the Western world, and would absorb Western values.”69 With Adenauer in charge of German policymaking, the Western powers apparently felt “more comfortable” about treating the Federal Republic as “a full, or nearly full, partner.”70 NATO’s decision makers shared Adenauer’s vision for Germany. According to Cold War historians, Western policymakers sought to address the problem of the Federal Republic of Germany by reforming the country from within, by helping to build Western-style liberal democratic domestic institutions. A key vehicle for achieving that was, in fact, the Adenauer government. That awareness generated a commitment among the

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allies to do everything in their power to protect that government against what were regarded as potential Communist challenges within the German political arena.71 Under these circumstances, the formal occupying powers acquired a sense of special responsibility toward Adenauer.72 Accordingly, in an effort to enhance domestic support for the chancellor, the West accelerated the process of granting Germany political rights.73 The sense of shared values and norms with the pro-West government of the Federal Republic, and the importance attached by the allies to the success of Adenauer’s policy of the Westernization of Germany, was also reflected in the position taken by the allies on the occasion of German accession to NATO. Thus, at the London Conference of the Nine Powers (October 3, 1954), the leaders of the NATO member states stressed the importance that they attached to the inclusion of a democratic German state into the Atlantic community of values. Both the representatives of NATO member states and Chancellor Adenauer pointed to the harmony between the objectives of NATO and the desire for freedom and democracy felt by the German people.74 In essence, the process of NATO enlargement during the Cold War was informed not just by geostrategic considerations regarding the needs of the military alliance, but also by the inside logic of liberal communitybuilding in the transatlantic area. Even in the case of the Greek and Turkish accession, where the outside logic most clearly dominated the agenda, the other dimension still played a role in shaping the inter-allied debates, generating a temporary compromise solution (associate membership) and delaying the process of full inclusion of the two Mediterranean countries into NATO. nato and community-building practices during the cold war In several instances during the Cold War NATO engaged in practices aimed at securing domestic liberal institutions against “subversive” Communist challenges and building a sense of collective identity in the transatlantic area. NATO’s decision, in the early 1950s, to include Greece and Turkey continued to be regarded by many allies as problematic, since they were perceived as countries that did not share a strong commitment to the values of individual rights, the rule of law, and democracy. That, together with other developments such as the adoption of the forward defense strategy and the increasing militarization of NATO led to a growing concern, particularly among the European allies and Canada, that the organization was moving away from its initial

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commitment to be more than a military alliance and to embody and further develop the Western community of liberal democratic values and norms.75 Canadian Foreign Minister Lester Pearson, for instance, voiced those concerns when he argued, at the NATO meeting in the summer of 1951, that the immediate focus on defense should not undermine the further horizon of NATO, which was the creation of a community of free nations in the Atlantic area.76 Pearson, together with political leaders from Britain, Norway, the Netherlands, and Denmark, began to advocate changes that would enhance the “community aspect of NATO” in conformity with the principles expressed in the Preamble and Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty.77 The idea behind this seems to have been that, although historical circumstances required strategic compromises—such as the inclusion of states that did not really share Western ideals and values—such compromises should at least be made within the framework of a broader community-building effort leading to the eventual realization of a greater and stronger Atlantic community.78 In the face of growing anxiety among its allies regarding the future of NATO, American officials also became more open to the idea of finding ways to strengthen the non-military side of NATO. As State Department officials noted in an early June 1951 communication, a new emphasis on the “community” aspect of NATO might “inspire confidence and hope” among the allies, and might also make the entry of Turkey and Greece “more acceptable” to NATO governments by enhancing the perception that this was a compromise made in the name of a greater Western community.79 Under these circumstances, policymakers from the NATO states began to look for ways of translating into practice the principles embedded in the Preamble and Article 2 of the Atlantic Treaty. The concern to find ways to implement Article 2 inspired, in September 1951, the creation of a Ministerial Committee on the North Atlantic Community, under the leadership of Lester Pearson. The committee, also consisting of the Belgian, Italian, and Dutch foreign ministers, was charged with the task of examining and recommending ways in which NATO might coordinate and build up consultation on foreign policy and cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, and public information areas.80 At the same time, a series of proposals were being discussed that concerned the greater involvement of NATO in the process of Western cooperation and possible integration through establishing closer contacts with the Paris-based Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and setting up a possible relationship of complementarity between the two organizations. Some allies, particularly Britain, also nurtured the hope that, by enhancing its role in the area of Western eco-

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nomic cooperation and coordination, NATO might one day take the place of the OEEC.81 The work of this Committee of Five fueled an increasing interest in Washington and other alliance capitals in moving NATO headquarters from London to Paris, to allow for closer cooperation between the two organizations. Despite opposition from the U.K., which wanted to retain alliance headquarters and see NATO take over from, rather than work with, the OEEC, the idea was accepted at the February 1952 NATO ministerial meeting. This was followed by an agreement at the March OEEC ministerial meeting that the work of the two organizations would be more closely coordinated.82 Debates regarding the specific relationship between the OEEC and NATO continued through 1951 and early 1952. The option favored by the U.K. was eventually dismissed, in part because of a concern, expressed particularly by France and the United States but also shared by other European allies, that the OEEC contained many of Europe’s neutral states, which would be marginalized in the case of a transfer of the economic dimension of Western cooperation to NATO.83 The solution that emerged in the end (and was given formal expression at the 1952 Lisbon meeting of NATO representatives) was one of close cooperation and coordination between the two organizations. In concrete terms, however, a general view that the work of economic cooperation within the West could be better done by the OEEC, rather than NATO, coupled with a concern to avoid duplicating tasks—and thus potentially undermining the former—led to the identification of a minimal role for NATO in the economic area. From that point onward, it was clear that NATO was not going to play a major role in the economic development of the West.84 In addition to the economic dimension, however, the Committee of Five identified other areas of cooperation and community-building within NATO. A series of working groups were established in the fall of 1952 to examine potential NATO involvement in the fields of labor mobility and the creation of alliancewide cultural and information programs. In the area of labor mobility, the working group, composed of the Italian, Greek, and American permanent representatives, set out to find solutions to the increasingly severe problems of manpower shortages and surpluses within the Atlantic community. In establishing the section dealing with labor mobility, the Committee of Five had expressed the hope that a NATO initiative might produce results, even though other international bodies had already considered the question.85 The problem that the working group identified was that the strains of rearmament had caused shortages of labor in some NATO countries, especially in the United States, while others, principally Italy, had large surpluses. Given that high

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unemployment was threatening to destabilize the internal political situation in countries with a labor surplus, greater migration opportunities were needed. As it was trying to find the best ways to address these concerns, the working group ran into more obstacles than it had anticipated, because member states, while supportive of the idea of NATO involvement in this field, expressed reservations vis-à-vis the prospect of the working group formulating a comprehensive immigration scheme that would require them to take large numbers of foreigners.86 Furthermore, there was a tendency to move from the initial goal of the committee, which provided for the involvement of NATO in the regulation of migration issues in general, toward a practice of focusing particularly on labor-mobility issues concerning manpower in defense-related production (albeit broadly defined). However, the members of the working group believed that even such a circumscribed role for the organization in this realm was important because NATO’s involvement would cause the subject to be considered at the highest levels within national governments and could facilitate broader agreement on issues of migration.87 Indeed, the working group succeeded in generating sufficient consensus among the allies to sponsor some important actions. For instance, through its efforts, in 1953 the United States committed to accepting 214,000 additional immigrants over the following three years, most of them from West European countries.88 But, all in all, NATO never came to play the central role in the area of migration that some of the members of the Committee of Five had hoped for. As the NATO Secretary General argued, in the 1950s there was a general agreement that NATO could not and “should not become an executive agency in the field of labor mobility and migration,” where several other specialized international organizations were already operating. At the same time, Lord Ismay pointed out that the Council had agreed that the NATO Secretariat should review the trends in employment, labor mobility and migration, and the action taken by member governments and international organizations. In his words: “The Council will continue . . . to remind their member governments of the dangers to the Atlantic Community, and to its defence effort, resulting from the existence of large surplus populations in more than one member country.”89 From that point forward, NATO’s role in the area of immigration and labor mobility would be primarily one of collecting data, presenting statistical reports, and preparing to address labor needs in various member states in cases of emergency.90 In essence, the role played by NATO in the areas of economic development and migration was much more limited than had been originally anticipated by the members of the Committee of Five, not least because a growing involvement in those areas was regarded by member states as duplicating—and

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potentially undermining—the work of other international organizations. Nevertheless, the fact remains that in the early 1950s, in response to criticism that it was becoming an increasingly militarized organization, NATO did become involved in a series of non-military activities aimed at the further development of liberal norms and institutions within the Western world. A very interesting non-military role was played by the organization in the cultural field. As we have seen, the establishment of NATO was informed by a sense of common Western values and ideals among the elites of the Euro-Atlantic area, and was accompanied by statements that the new organization would at once embody and further develop an Atlantic value-based community. Yet, such claims of Western commonality, as they were articulated just a few years after the end of World War II, only made sense if their proponents were willing to engage in a collective reinterpretation, and a selective forgetting, of the recent past. After all, the newly identified enemy, the Communist Soviet Union, had emerged from the war as a hero in the eyes of many people from Western states. By contrast, Italy, which was a founding member of NATO, and Germany, which was invited to join in 1954, had only recently been “the enemy” to many Western allies. Even within core allied states, the Western identity that was supposed to be embodied in NATO was far from being unproblematic. Just as they were expressing their shared belief in a common Western identity, NATO’s founders also articulated their fears that the norms and institutions of liberalism, which in their eyes constituted the essence of Western-ness, might not survive the challenge posed by domestic proCommunist forces.91 Under those circumstances, it was thought that if pro-Communist groups were to be successfully delegitimized and weakened, they had to be perceived by the publics of NATO member states as exponents of ideas that were alien and inherently dangerous to their (shared) Western identity. The citizens of NATO states had to learn to identify one another as natural allies and friends, by virtue of their common membership in the transatlantic community. Simultaneously, they had to define both the internal and international forces of Communism as dangerous enemies.92 The view of the “West as one” that was articulated by NATO’s founders in 1948 and 1949 became central to a collective (re)reading of Western history, in which representatives of the organization engaged after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. The effort to reinterpret the West intensified in the context of emerging tensions within the alliance in the 1950s, when NATO’s decision makers were at pains to reassure allied elites and publics that, in spite of all the differences among the allies,

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there really was a Western community of shared values and norms, and that NATO was the embodiment of that community. Collective efforts at history (re)writing found expression not only within the public discourse articulated by NATO at that time, but also in confidential documents. Recently declassified documents from the early 1950s reveal a set of shared understandings among NATO’s decision makers regarding the way in which the historical evolution of member states should be interpreted. Those documents point to the explicit political guidance provided by the secretary general and approved by the North Atlantic Council. The documents, which depict the evolution of a “natural” Western community embodied in NATO, were formulated in 1954–55, just at the time that West Germany was joining the organization. In other words, the allies engaged in a discursive construction of the Western community in an effort to minimize the importance of (or even erase) conflicts and differences between NATO member states, by affirming and disseminating to Euro-Atlantic publics the idea of a common civilizational heritage and a sense of belonging to a community of values. To understand the dynamics and significance of NATO’s symbolic construction of a Western community, it is useful to resort to discourse analysis— specifically, in this case, an analysis of the narratives through which the transatlantic community embodied in NATO was presented as a given. This was important because it made close cooperation in the name of protecting and promoting shared values seem natural; it helped enhance the authority of the security institution that, presumably, embodied those values; and it aided in delegitimizing opposition to NATO actions and programs aimed at securing the Western community. In developing this analysis, I draw in particular on the work of Bruce Lincoln, who examined the discursive construction of communities through stories that invoke selected moments of the past. Through reference to a particular set of ancestors common to all the members of the community being invoked, and through recounting formative moments of the past, stories legitimize a specific evolution of certain actors; they make that evolution seem natural.93 In our case, a close analysis of NATO texts dating from the early years of the alliance show a similar discursive construction of the Western world, which was depicted as an obvious community of peoples united by a shared past and a common future. The discursive construction of the Euro-Atlantic community embodied in NATO was not coincidental. Rather, the story of the Western community can be found in key documents formulated by the allies in those early years. The texts examined here are interesting because they were issued by actors who had the authority to interpret the world in which NATO was acting, and to define

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the role of the alliance in that world. These texts contain clear definitions of the identity of NATO and of its enemies, and identify reasonable courses of action by reference to those identities. They include documents produced and used by NATO Working Groups in interpreting the world and identifying the alliance’s goals and priorities, as well as educational documents produced in different NATO forums and explicitly aimed at instilling in Western elites and publics a particular understanding of the world, and more specifically, of the Euro-Atlantic community, and the role of NATO as an institutional expression of that community. In other words, this particular discursive construction of the Western world and its security institution, NATO, was not a mere rhetorical exercise. Rather, it was inscribed in documents with serious political significance and implications, texts that reflected, (re)produced, and sought to implement shared NATO understandings of itself and the world in which it was operating. For instance, the 1955 NATO Confidential Report depicted a common transatlantic community, “naturally” united on the basis of shared historical origins and participation in a unique, superior, historical project. The report stressed that, “though widely different in their geography and strategic exposure, the peoples of Europe and North America are the offspring of the same family, united by common historical bonds and ideals.”94 In other words, recent conflicts among the members of the alleged Atlantic community were played down through their placement in a broad, longue durée historical perspective. Within that perspective, such conflicts, including armed conflicts, appeared as feuds among family members rather than confrontations among different communities.95 According to the report, “In addition to its defense aspect, it is the common heritage of political and cultural ideas of member nations that is making possible the continuing collaboration for the development of the Atlantic Community of free peoples.”96 Those values, which appeared to derive from the joint participation of Western states in the Enlightenment project, included “freedom of the individual, the rule of law, democracy, and other principles reflected in the Preamble and Article II of the Atlantic Treaty.”97 In a move simultaneous with the identification of a collective Western identity grounded in common origins and shared values, the report firmly defined danger and the enemy as those forces that seek to “weaken the defenses of free peoples,” not only through military conflict but also through political, social, and economic initiatives. According to the report, in order to address those dangers, NATO members had to overcome their differences and act in accordance with their common identity. Appropriate behavior, in that context, included “frank discussions and

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mutual consultation” in the Atlantic Council, which would enable the development of national policies on the basis of “common principles.” In a broader perspective, it also required the education of citizens of member states into the spirit of Atlantic solidarity. Thus, “great care” was needed vis-à-vis the “public morale in member states.” People needed to become more aware of their common transatlantic identity based on shared origins and ideals. Accordingly, in their conduct of domestic politics, leaders of Atlantic states had to keep in mind that “derogatory references [to other NATO states] or invidious comparisons would be most harmful,” and therefore unacceptable.98 This discourse, depicting a unique, value-based Western community was accompanied by a characterization of the West as being in a position of hierarchical dichotomy vis-à-vis the Communist world.99 Even a cursory analysis of the attributes associated with the key subjects (the Atlantic community and the Communist world) of the narrative reveals the relations of opposition being set up within these documents. Thus, the Atlantic community is defined by attributes of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. It is, in essence, a progressive civilization that is contrasted sharply with the Communist “enemies of the free peoples.” The latter are portrayed as inherently aggressive in nature: they are seeking— not just by military aggression but also through political and cultural attacks—to “weaken the defenses of the free peoples.” In this context, failure to recognize and uphold the shared values of the Euro-Atlantic community entailed the risk of losing the advantages of the superior civilization—losing “the only civilization worth living in.” This particular reading of the West as a natural community of values and norms was then diffused to the elites and peoples of the North Atlantic area through a variety of cultural and educational activities that emerged in the 1950s. The Working Group on Social and Cultural Cooperation, also set up by the Committee of Five, merged in July 1953 with the Working Group on Information Policy, and recommended in March 1953 that a series of cultural and educational projects aimed at enhancing the community aspect of NATO be instituted. Specifically, the Working Group on Information and Cultural Cooperation, working together with the NATO Secretariat, sought to identify activities that would enhance the commitment of political elites and publics of member states to the shared values of the Euro-Atlantic community and to NATO as the embodiment of that community.100 At the same time, the working group was charged with identifying the messages that should be diffused to the citizens of member states and the best methods for achieving that diffusion. Among the projects developed in the area of culture and information was a regular newsletter entitled the NATO Letter (that began to cir-

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culate in 1953) and a series of films, on themes such as “The Atlantic Community—Know Your Allies,” which stressed the commonalities shared by member states and which were made available to educational groups throughout the alliance. There was also a mobile exhibit on NATO, “The Caravan of Peace,” which toured member countries, disseminating the same message. Summer camps for the young people of the North Atlantic were organized, as were a series of programs for “information officers” (government officials involved in public relations and information programs) to coordinate and improve alliance publicity. The NATO Secretariat was also entrusted with the task of encouraging and maintaining close contact with various parliamentary organizations concerned with the “community-building” dimension of NATO. Several pro-NATO organizations were created following the signing of the Atlantic Treaty in various member states, and their representatives were brought together for a series of conferences in 1952 and 1953.101 As a result of those conferences, the new non-governmental organization, the Atlantic Treaty Association, was established in 1954.102 The explicit task of the ATA, which continues to exist and has national associations in every member state, is to educate and inform the public about the missions and the role of NATO; to promote democracy in member states; and through a series of educational activities including seminars, lectures, debates, and publishing, to cultivate solidarity among the peoples of the North Atlantic community. These national associations were designed to help promote a sense of community among the Atlantic peoples and to revitalize their commitment to Western values and institutions. For instance, as part of its activities, the Atlantic Treaty Association sponsored the publication, in several languages, of recommendations concerning “the treatment of the Atlantic civilization” to be used in civic education carried out in NATO countries. In an effort to facilitate the distribution of uniform knowledge about the Western world, and NATO as an expression of that world, the educational material was distributed to teachers of all allied states. According to the NATO Letter and the Report on the Spirit of the Atlantic Community, the brochures emphasized the importance of teaching younger generations that NATO represents one instantiation of the unique Western world, designed to protect them against all threats “from the enemies of the Atlantic civilization.”103 The narrative depicts NATO as the “bulwark of the West,” which must work to ensure “an overwhelming preponderance of moral, economic and military force on the side of freedom” if it is to be assured of victory against “the forces of Communist expansionism.” From this perspective, “internal degeneration,” such as that caused by public apathy toward, or, worse, deviation from the val-

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ues of the Western world could be just as serious a threat to the transatlantic community as the danger of military aggression.104 More generally, a series of conferences of the Atlantic Assembly, and seminars with civic education teachers from member states admitted in the mid-1950s, repeatedly argued that “the community of Atlantic nations is based upon a common heritage of moral and cultural values, and it is the primary purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty itself to safeguard it. It is the task of the Atlantic Treaty Association to arouse and sustain in all sections of national life the consciousness of the values which we share in common.”105 It is necessary for the Atlantic Community to “strengthen its defenses not just against military aggression, but also against ideological penetration from the East.”106 Accordingly, the Atlantic Treaty Association has “to create and maintain a climate of public opinion in the member countries which would make it possible, where necessary, to sacrifice certain national interests for the good of the Atlantic community as a whole.”107 Another aspect of the effort to build a sense of collective identity within the transatlantic area, to build popular support for the idea of NATO as an expression of a Western community, and for the policies of a presumably unique West involved the creation of a parliamentary forum of NATO. Thus, in 1955, the North Atlantic Assembly was created, as a reflection of this same vision of NATO as an expression and tool for the further development of an Atlantic community.108 The founders of the assembly “believed that the tensions of the Cold War demanded parliamentary attention and involvement, and wished to demonstrate that NATO was more than a purely military organization.109 The task of the assembly was to foster mutual understanding and a sense of common identity among Parliamentarians, to encourage consensus, and to stimulate shared legislative thinking on key security issues within NATO member states. Initially, that took the form of an annual conference of NATO Parliamentarians, but in 1968 the assembly was institutionalized, becoming a full-fledged interparliamentary organization with international status and a variety of meetings and activities. The assembly, bringing together delegations reflecting the political composition of the Parliaments of member states, was designed to generate a collective parliamentary voice for the alliance, which would not only reflect prevailing views within members’ respective domestic arenas, but also help shape those views. In the words of a former secretary general of the Atlantic Assembly: “As the natural link between governments and the societies they serve, Parliamentarians represent an essential bridge to public opinion. This proximity to the electorate implies a dual responsibility. Legislators have to reflect the views and concerns of their

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constituents but also have the task of influencing these views. They must listen as well as persuade.”110 The analysis developed above does not argue that Cold War NATO was only a community-building institution. Indeed, the geostrategic logic was central to a series of key decisions taken by NATO during that time. It informed the Cold War strategic concepts adopted by the organization and had a significant impact on the process of decision making regarding enlargement.111 Nevertheless, NATO was always more than a military alliance: as we have seen, practices governed by the inside logic of security have always been part of the repertoire of the organization. The importance that NATO decision makers attributed to the inside logic of the organization, and of the shared Western interpretation of the development of the international security environment, grew to unprecedented levels at end of the Cold War. nato and the politics of international security in the post–cold war period The end of the Cold War was accompanied by a shared view among Western decision makers that a new security environment was emerging in Europe. The period 1990–91 was a time when several scenarios were being discussed in the West regarding the role of different security institutions in Europe. But debates regarding the relative value of those scenarios occurred against a framework of common understandings regarding the dramatic decline in the risk of military confrontation between the West and enemy state(s). While conventional dangers were declining, there was a corresponding increase in the probability of a different, multifaceted, and hard to contain type of risk. In the European context, security was becoming indivisible. The spotlight was now turning to existent or potential domestic problems, particularly those associated with the former Communist countries. It was argued that domestic instability, along with problems of transition to post-Communist institutions, threatened to be one of the key—if not the key—sources of instability in Europe.112In a situation in which there was no clearly identified enemy state but in which developments within the transient and (potentially) unstable former Communist countries threatened to undermine international security, a consensus emerged that the promotion of “good” liberal democratic norms and institutions within those states would be vital for security in the new era. The emerging Western consensus around the importance of this inside logic, involving the pursuit of international security through the con-

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struction of particular types of institutions within the potentially problematic states of Central/Eastern Europe, found expression in the early 1990s in the key documents, conventions, and charters of European reconstruction. In a situation in which Western decision makers regarded the liberal democratic values of the transatlantic community as universally valid, the concept of promotion of “good” institutions of domestic governance came to be synonymous with the projection of liberal democracy into the former Communist countries of Europe. The Western discourse on international security articulated in the early 1990s depicted the triumph of liberal democracy (particularly against “flawed,” “dangerous” pro-Communist projects) as the source of progress, freedom, and stability in and among Euro-Atlantic states. By extension, it presented the projection of the same values in the former Eastern Bloc as a solution to the problems of ex-Communist states, and, at the same time, as a key to broader European security. The Kantian ideas that found expression in the prevailing Western discourse at the end of the Cold War reflect a particular understanding of human nature. Kantian liberalism relies upon liberal selves as actors who are committed to the struggle to discipline the irrational, violent sides of themselves, and to govern their lives in accordance with the universal moral precepts revealed by reason. Self-discipline, from this liberal perspective, is the basis of respect and admiration of self and others, as well as a central element in the process of identity definition. From the point of view of liberal democratic polities, only those self-disciplined communities who live according to the same moral precepts—embodied in liberal democratic norms and institutions—are entitled to full respect and to be recognized as trustworthy, like-minded polities. As such, they are to be included in relations of community.113 Key to this liberal definition of subjectivity is a refusal of essentialist determinism, by which, by virtue of their capacity for reason, all humans are seen as capable of grasping the moral law and hence of having the potential to evolve into the kinds of actors who understand and accept the self-disciplinary duties of “correct” subjectivity.114 Within international relations, this view of subjectivity translates into the argument that even people of deviant (anti-liberal) polities can, through the use of reason, come to accept the responsibility of learning to conform to liberal democratic norms. In other words, all polities embody the potential to evolve into “good,” rational, and ethical communities, entitled to the full respect and benefits accorded to liberal democracies in international society. The view of a changeable, fluid human nature renders practices of socialization reasonable, for it entails the idea that even citizens of previously anti-liberal polities (e.g., ex-Communist states) can learn the norms and institutions of liberalism.

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Powerful expressions of the post–Cold War Western consensus around the inside logic of security can be found not only in declarations issued by individual Western leaders at the time, but also in collective statements embedded in the basic documents of all the important European institutional forums, from the Council of Europe to the European Community/Union and the Conference/Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE), as well as NATO. As Gregory Flynn and Henry Farrell argued, the early 1990s witnessed the process of a collective writing of Europe’s “new Constitution,” which established democratic pluralism, human rights, and the rule of law as the key pillars of legitimate domestic governance.115 With the series of treaties, conventions, and other agreements signed in the early 1990s, the establishment or maintenance of a political system that does not respect these principles is delegitimized as incompatible with the normative foundation of the new Europe.116 Thus, the heads-of-state members of the CSCE agreed in the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe to “undertake to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government for our nations,” and argued that “full respect for human rights is the bedrock on which we will seek to construct the new Europe.” In a similar vein, in documents issued in 1991 and 1992, and culminating with a declaration of principles at their summit meeting in Vienna is 1993, the members of the Council of Europe stated: “All our countries are committed to pluralist and parliamentary democracy, the indivisibility and universality of human rights, the rule of law and a common cultural heritage enriched by its diversity. Europe can thus become a vast area of democratic security. . . . We intend to render the Council of Europe fully capable of contributing to democratic security.”117 Within the context of this prevailing view regarding the nature and merits of “good” institutions of domestic governance and the need for international agencies to become involved in the promotion of such institutions, Western decision makers argued that if NATO was to survive and remain relevant in the new security environment, it, too, had to develop its ability to promote democratic stability within the former Communist states of Europe. In proposals put forward in 1990, then U.S. Secretary of State James Baker advocated the enhancement of the political dimension of NATO, for “as military threats fade, the political dimension of NATO’s work—always there but seldom noticed—becomes more prominent.” As part of its new mission, NATO should “build political and economic ties with the East, promote respect for human rights [and] help build democratic institutions.”118 In the early 1990s Western policymakers agreed that a post–Cold War NATO would need an enhanced

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and more complex political dimension, but a series of European officials argued that the organization was not going to be able to develop the kinds of political mechanisms required in the new era. From their perspective, NATO was not the best vehicle for dealing with the intrastate instabilities of the new world. Indeed, according to some Western leaders (particularly the French president, Mitterrand), given that NATO had been so closely associated with the Cold War military confrontation with the Soviet Union, it did not represent the best option for the fulfillment of the specific security needs of the new Europe.119 Accordingly, the West should, in time, move away from a security arrangement centered around NATO and toward a pan-European system of cooperative security, in which the CSCE would play a key role. In the context of those debates, proponents of a NATO scenario, both senior officials from the organization’s international staff and national decision makers (particularly from the United States and Britain, but also groups of policymakers from other allied countries) sought to secure recognition for the legitimacy and expertise of NATO as an institution capable of rising to the challenge of the new security dangers, by invoking the complexity of practices enacted by NATO during the Cold War. To counter criticism that the key security organization of the Cold War period was outdated, supporters invoked the continuity of NATO’s role, as described in the Preamble and Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty.120 Proponents of the NATO scenario agreed that the organization had to change, but they portrayed this change as evolutionary, involving the enhancement of ideas and practices of community-building envisaged by NATO’s founders and developed, at least to some extent, during the Cold War. In statements advocating the persistence of NATO, there was a tendency to play up the “community-building” dimension of the organization and to present its military aspect as secondary in importance. NATO was portrayed as an institution whose essential identity and history needed to be understood with reference to its embodiment and promotion of the Euro-Atlantic community of values. The fact that, during the Cold War, it had evolved into a military alliance was just an expression of NATO’s ability to adapt to given circumstances, not an expression of its primary identity as a conventional alliance.121 In other words, following the end of the Cold War, NATO mobilized its security community discourse and practices to make sense of a changed environment. Representations of NATO as the key security institution that embodied Western values became central to the alliance’s definition of its role in the new era and informed the formulation of new goals and priorities in a changing security environment. Those same representations were relied upon to deflect criticism that NATO, as a Cold War alliance, had become obsolete.

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In his argument about the ongoing relevance of NATO, then Secretary General Manfred Wörner argued: “The Treaty of Washington of 1949 nowhere mentions the Soviet Union but stresses instead the need for a permanent community of Western democracies to make each other stronger through cooperation, and to work for more peaceful international relations. The Alliance has played a major role in reconciling former adversaries, in counteracting neo-isolationism within the world’s greatest power and in promoting new standards of consultation and cooperation among its members. All these elements would still have been fundamental to security and prosperity in Europe even in the absence of the post-war Soviet threat.”122 In the new context in which one key task of international institutions, including institutions of security, was to promote values and norms of liberal democracy in the former Communist states of Europe, NATO proponents argued that, by virtue of its experience and its ability to build upon ideas embodied in it, the organization could be trusted to perform the necessary task. According to then U.S. President George Bush (Sr.), by building up its political dimension NATO could play a key role in the transformation of Europe. By working in cooperation with Central and Eastern European governments, NATO could find ways “to encourage further peaceful democratic change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.”123 In a similar vein, the alliance’s secretary general, Manfred Wörner, argued that NATO could and should contribute to the process of “building a new Europe . . . whole and free.”124 In this new context, NATO “must play its part alongside other Western institutions in extending the security and stability we enjoy to all European nations.” With the end of the confrontational security structure of the Cold War, “NATO has a new, even more valuable role to play as a supporting pillar of a new and more peaceful order of cooperation in Europe.”125 According to Wörner, far from being irrelevant, NATO was “needed more than ever—to sustain the trans-Atlantic link, to prevent Europe from sliding back into nationalism, and to address new conflicts beyond NATO’s borders.” In the new context, the alliance’s principal mission should be “to project stability to the East.”126 By the end of 1991, debates surrounding the nature of the future EuroAtlantic security architecture had given way to a broad consensus that NATO was going to be a key institutional pillar of the new order.127 Even CSCE policy statements issued in late 1991, culminating with the Helsinki Declaration, reveal a retreat from a scenario involving the primacy of the CSCE and an acceptance of NATO leadership in the new Europe.128 Under those circumstances, as NATO’s decision makers were

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meeting to define the role of the organization in the new era, they expressed their collective will to use NATO as an instrument for spreading the values of freedom and democracy to the former Communist countries of Europe. That view was at the heart of NATO’s post–Cold War strategic concept—the first such concept ever to be aired in public. The New Strategic Concept linked the promotion of liberal democratic institutions to certain defined threats in the new era. Accordingly, while the capacity to act effectively against overt aggression remains important, NATO must now focus primarily on addressing nonconventional risks. Thus, an inside approach to the pursuit of international security was vital in a situation in which “risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The tensions which may result . . . could lead to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having direct effect on the security of the Alliance.”129 Having emerged as the key institution of Euro-Atlantic security in the post–Cold War period, and having assumed the task of promoting the norms of liberal democracy in the former Communist states of Europe, NATO now faced new problems. Thus, it had to improvise solutions in a novel, uncertain, and rapidly changing environment. Top NATO officials who were involved in debates regarding the future relationship between the organization and the former East recall that the early 1990s continued to be a time of confusion and fluidity. Things had changed— and continued change—so much and at such a fast pace that, in the words of one official, “We did not know what to do. . . . We were not sure where we were going.” Under these circumstances, finding answers to the questions that were arising in the early 1990s, and responding to the growing pressure from the former Communist countries to be integrated to a greater extent in Western structures, involved a lot of “improvisation.”130 In this process, NATO relied, in part, on some of the ideas that had been formulated during the Cold War. As we have seen above, as early as the 1950s the allies had agreed that NATO should engage in practices aimed at building the commitment of Euro-Atlantic elites and publics to the values and norms of liberal democracy, and at constructing a sense of collective identity on the basis of those values. That idea, and some of its corresponding practices, was now mobilized as a way to bring Central and Eastern Europeans closer to the culture of the transatlantic community.

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For instance, NATO’s North Atlantic Assembly (NAA—now known as the Parliamentary Assembly) was one of the first Western forums to open its doors to the Central and Eastern Europeans and to the republics of the former Soviet Union (except for those in Central Asia), inviting them as early as 1990 to become associate members. The rationale was that political actors from the former Communist states should not feel excluded from the West.131 NAA officials argued that the assembly had already assisted Parliamentarians from NATO member states in scrutinizing and holding their governments responsible for defense-related decision-making, and that the assembly could build on that experience to assist in the democratic transformation of the former Communist states.132 Through participation in ongoing NAA activities, but also in seminars/educational activities organized especially for them, Central and Eastern European elites could learn the “normal way of doing things within the alliance” and eventually, it was assumed, would come to share the norms and principles taken for granted among Westerners. In addition to their involvement in all assembly activities, actors from the former Eastern Bloc participated in programs as part of the RoseRoth initiative (which was created in 1991 and grew considerably in the following decade). Rose-Roth includes educational activities targeted to Members of Parliament (MPs), parliamentary staff, and graduate students in emerging democracies, in an effort to give existing and future elites “practical experience and expertise that would assist them in developing appropriate practices and procedures in their own Parliaments.”133 Associate branches of the Atlantic Treaty Association were also established in Central and Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union, with the same goal of “educating public opinion” through a variety of publications, meetings, and conferences, as well as different pedagogical activities. Particular attention was also paid to expanding the work of the Atlantic Education Committee (established within the framework of the ATA to coordinate the work of national education committees) into the former Communist bloc. According to the secretary general of the ATA, the Atlantic Education Committee and the ATA more generally have the task of “promot[ing] democratic values, liberty and freedom of speech through the medium of education.”134 Building on the idea of education and the construction of a sense of collective identity, in 1994 NATO launched the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, whose members include NATO member states, neutral states (e.g., Austria, Switzerland, and Sweden), and most of the Central and Eastern European states that emerged after the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Paragraph 2 of the PfP framework document explicitly describes the program as (yet another) initiative aimed at supporting the values of liberal democracy. Thus:

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“Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace through democracy are shared values fundamental to the Partnership. In joining the Partnership, the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other states subscribing to this Document recall that they are committed to the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of international law.”135 The PfP supports a wide range of joint NATO/partner activities, ranging from workshops and seminars, to consultation on policies and practices of domestic governance in the former Communist states, to the pursuit of international stability, military training, and search and rescue missions, as well as peacekeeping operations (e.g., the multinational Military Implementation Force, IFOR, and the Kosovo Force, KFOR).136 The goal of the PfP was to teach military officers as well as civilians from the ex-Communist countries the basic norms, practices, and procedures of NATO, to help them strengthen the democratic control of their defense forces, and through ongoing joint activities, to build trust and create a sense of community among all partners.137 In a broader perspective, the PfP was a solution to what NATO decision makers regarded as the double task faced by the organization in the early 1990s. Thus, the PfP was designed as a key venue for the socialization of partners into the liberal democratic norms and procedures of the alliance. Simultaneously, the PfP was to act as a forum for evaluating the Central and Eastern European partners’ commitment to those norms and procedures.138 This, in fact, was explicitly stated in the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement: “Through PfP planning, joint exercises and other PfP activities, including seminars, workshops and day-to-day representation in Brussels and Mons, possible new members will increasingly become acquainted with the functioning of the Alliance.” At the same time, “possible new members’ commitment to the shared principles and values of the Alliance will be indicated by their international behavior and adherence to relevant OSCE principles; however, their participation in PfP will provide a further important means to demonstrate such commitment as well as their ability to contribute to common defense. For possible new members, PfP will contribute to their preparation both politically and militarily.”139 Since its creation, the PfP has evolved from an improvised, ad hoc organization established in the context of the uncertainty and fluidity of the early 1990s to a complex institution whose importance exceeds the expectations of its founders. Hundreds of NATO/PfP exercises, workshops, and training activities, plus bilateral “in-the-spirit-of” PfP exercises between partner states and NATO members have been conducted since 1994. To help organize these activities, the Partnership Coordination Cell

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(PCC) was created in 1994, in a building adjacent to SHAPE, NATO’s command headquarters, and consisting of an international staff and liaison staff from partner and member teams. In an effort to build up the political dimension of the PfP initiative, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) was established in 1997 and entrusted with the function of consultation, cooperation, and development of common partner/member views regarding the problem of European security. Although the educational programs created by NATO in the 1990s followed and built upon some of the concepts and practices that had emerged within the organization during the Cold War, the post–Cold War period also witnessed an unprecedented growth in the scope, number, and intensity of pedagogical practices. The concern during the Cold War had been to strengthen existing liberal democratic values and norms in the Euro-Atlantic area, to secure them against domestic challenges and build a sense of transatlantic collective identity around those norms. One of the key assumptions underlying all those efforts was that, for all their problems and weaknesses, those societies were essentially Western: the norms and institutions of liberal democracy were already in place—they needed reinforcement and further development but not construction ab initio. There were, of course, some exceptions: Turkey, for example, which had been included in NATO for geostrategic reasons, was not regarded by the other allies as a true Western liberal democracy. But the situation of Turkey was regarded precisely as a special compromise necessary under the particular circumstances of the Cold War confrontation. Although there may well have been an assumption that, over time, some of the norms and practices of the Euro-Atlantic community would trickle into Turkey, there is no evidence of special “educational” programs or any type of systematic effort by NATO to socialize that country into becoming a liberal democracy. The assumption seems to have been that, even if Turkey remained a quasi-stranger to the Euro-Atlantic community of values (or a second-tier member state, as some of the allies thought), its inclusion in NATO was nevertheless acceptable by virtue of the value it held for the defense of the core Western states.140 The one Cold War example of serious NATO efforts to shape the domestic policies and practices of a state involved West Germany. But that occurred within the much broader context of Euro-Atlantic efforts to resolve the “German problem” in the post–World War II era, and in a situation in which the international community had extraordinary powers vis-à-vis defeated Germany. By contrast, the post–Cold War period called for a different approach to the question of norm projection. The emergence of a shared understanding among NATO decision makers that the main source of danger

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to European security was not conventional military confrontation but risks associated with domestic instability had a powerful impact on the organization’s interaction with Central and Eastern European countries. The task of “spread[ing] the values of freedom and democracy that are at the heart of our transatlantic partnership” became a key aspect of the post–Cold War role of NATO. Moreover, in a situation in which it was believed that liberal democratic norms were secure in the Euro-Atlantic area, the priority was now the projection of liberal norms beyond the borders of the organization. But as NATO embarked upon its new mission to promote the values of liberal democracy in Central/Eastern Europe, it faced a novel situation. Thus, far from being countries that needed to strengthen existing liberal institutions, the states of the former Communist bloc had inherited a non-Western set of domestic institutions and norms. As NATO decision makers concluded in the early 1990s, even the most progressive countries of the former Eastern Bloc had been deeply affected, institutionally and culturally, by their Communist legacy.141 Accordingly, the educational activities aimed at promoting the norms and institutions of liberal democratic governance had to be more extensive and more intensive. Through activities organized within the framework of the Atlantic Assembly, the Partnership for Peace, informal consultations, as well as various other programs, NATO was to become heavily involved in the promotion of norms and their corresponding institutions of democratic control over defense and security institutions. NATO documents, such as the PfP framework document, indicate a special focus in that area, but also state the organization’s interest in the promotion of liberal rights and freedoms, the rule of law, and democracy in all areas of society. However, a tacit agreement apparently emerged among decision makers in the North Atlantic Council that international agencies other than NATO were better equipped to promote domestic reforms in non-security-related areas such as democratic elections, the independence of the judiciary as a key feature of a state of law, reform of judicial systems, privatization and restitution of property nationalized under Communism, and so forth. According to officials from the Political Affairs Division of NATO, as well as national representatives and representatives of other institutions, particularly the EC/EU, the Council of Europe and the OSCE “had more resources and expertise” to become systematically involved in monitoring and shaping practices of the former Communist states in those spheres.142 Therefore, NATO would encourage Central/Eastern Europeans to cooperate with various international organizations in the implementation of liberal democratic norms. It would also rely on reports from those institutions (including the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and the EU, as well

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as international NGOs) in monitoring the evolution of reforms in different socioeconomic and political areas, and would take all these aspects into account in considerations of eligibility for membership. But NATO would assume the leading role among international institutions in promoting the process of reform related to the relationship state/society in the area of security. While institutions like the EU and the OSCE did carry out some workshops and consultations regarding appropriate civilmilitary relations in a democratic society, those were very limited and largely designed as complements to, rather than substitutes for, activities carried out within the framework of NATO/Partnership for Peace. For instance, it is revealing that in accession dialogues between the European Union and candidate states from Central and Eastern Europe, the issue of democratic control of the military does not seem to be on the agenda.143 If NATO’s decision makers agreed relatively early in the post–Cold War period that the organization had to become involved in projecting liberal democratic norms into Central and Eastern European countries, it took them much longer to decide the question of enlargement. In fact, the initial reluctance of NATO to consider enlargement has led some international relations scholars to argue that, in response to demands for membership that began to be articulated in late 1990, Western allies sought only to promote their egoistic interests. According to Frank Schimmelfennig, NATO’s members “were not in need of expanding the alliance but rather feared that Eastern enlargement would weaken the cohesion and effectiveness of the alliance,” as well as create new financial burdens at a time when member states expected a peace dividend.144 Egoistic reasons may have played an important part in the reluctance of NATO member states to embark upon enlargement in the early 1990s. But I suggest that more than just egoism was involved. Before its members could even engage in calculations of political, military, and economic costs of enlargement, that policy had to be seen as a plausible option on the menu of choices available to NATO. Empirical evidence suggests, however, that in the early 1990s that was not the case. As discussed above, in the first couple of years following the end of the Cold War, the prevailing view among decision makers of the North Atlantic Council was that none of the former Communist states really shared the values of Western liberal democracy. As a senior NATO official put it, in interactions with the pro-reform political leadership of Central/Eastern European states members of the North Atlantic Council concluded that, while those political actors were “anti-Communist,” they were far from being “democratic.”145 Moreover, although some of the Central European countries had begun the process of dismantling Communist institutions and had carried out some reforms, it was still far from clear that they

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would become Western-like liberal democracies. And, from the perspective of decision makers in the Atlantic Council, until and unless those countries demonstrated their commitment to the Western norms and values of the transatlantic community, they could not be considered eligible for accession to NATO.146 In the new security environment in which there was no threat of military confrontation in the foreseeable future, geostrategic compromises like the ones that had allowed Greece and Turkey to enter were no longer justified. By the end of 1994 the fact that the question of enlargement had emerged on NATO’s agenda reflected the development of a shared set of understandings among Western political actors that at least some of the Central European states had undergone substantial processes of democratization and liberalization.147 That is, at least some of the candidates had become the kinds of states that might conceivably be included in an institution like NATO, embodying the values of the transatlantic community. It was within this framework of collective understandings that debates regarding the desirability and potential costs of enlargement, as well as questions regarding the boundaries of the new NATO and the best procedure for the integration of new members, could then be articulated.148 The view that eventually emerged within NATO regarding the admission of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland had a strong normative dimension.149 The idea that NATO had a special duty toward those states that had embraced the values of Western liberal democracy was stressed by then NATO Secretary General Javier Solana when he argued that the allies had “a moral obligation to help them fulfill their legitimate aspirations.”150 This concept of a “special duty” to enlarge NATO was accompanied by an insistence that only those countries that showed a commitment to the norms of liberal democracy should be eligible. According to the Study on NATO Enlargement and the subsequent key document of enlargement (the “Membership Action Plan,” approved in 1999), candidate states must have a strong record of conformity with “basic principles embodied in the Washington Treaty such as democracy, individual liberty and other relevant provisions set out in its Preamble.” Only states with “demonstrated commitment to the rule of law and human rights,” those who have shown their willingness to settle ethnic and other disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles, who have established “appropriate democratic and civilian control of their armed forces,” and who “promot[e] stability and well-being by economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility” will be seriously considered for admission.151 Summarizing the expectations of NATO allies, then President of the United States Bill Clinton argued:

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“Countries with repressive political systems, countries with designs on their neighbors, countries with militaries unchecked by civilian control, or with closed economic systems need not apply.”152 In explaining their decision to take in the three Visegrad states (the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland—all admitted in 1999), representatives of the member states and NATO’s international staff repeatedly invoked the impressive evolution of those states on the road to becoming “like us.”153 The priority accorded by NATO to the issue of including “like” liberal democracies in their organization was reflected in the fact that the decision to grant membership to the three Visegrad states was taken primarily on the basis of the shared view within NATO that, politically and economically, those states had demonstrated their commitment to the norms of the Western community.154 In fact, according to a senior official from the Defense Planning Division, if the allies had placed a priority on geostrategic considerations they would have taken in Poland and Romania, not a small, militarily insignificant country like the Czech Republic—particularly since Slovakia was excluded.155 It was this focus on liberalization and democratization that had disqualified Slovakia. In the initial discussions on NATO membership, Slovakia (the fourth Visegrad state) had been regarded as one of the privileged candidates for membership. However, the anti-democratic practices of the Meciar government, systematic delays in the process of economic liberalization, and lack of regard for human rights resulted in the exclusion of Slovakia from the first wave of enlargement.156 According to one analyst, “During 1993–1995 most observers considered Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia front-runners for NATO membership. But as a result of domestic politics that have gone sour, [after 1995] Slovakia . . . effectively excluded itself from active consideration in NATO’s first enlargement tranche.”157 In the course of individual accession dialogues conducted in 1996 with all the candidate states, NATO representatives told Slovak officials that far more domestic reforms needed to take place before their country would be considered for admission.158 The normative framework shared by NATO decision makers, comprising intersubjective understandings about the nature of the organization and its post–Cold War role and about the changing identities of (some) former Communist countries enabled the emergence, in the mid1990s, of a discourse on rights and corresponding duties in relation to enlargement.159 In the words of NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, NATO enlargement was “a means of reinforcing the new democracies with a confidence in their destiny and giving them a new sense of belonging.” Vis-à-vis the countries that had demonstrated their determination to

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transcend the Communist legacy and join the Western community of values, the NATO allies had a “moral obligation to help them fulfil their legitimate aspirations.”160 The debates about enlargement, articulated within a discourse on rights and duties, have had broad implications for NATO attitudes and policies in post–Cold War Europe. It has been argued that the Central and Eastern Europeans successfully manipulated the norms around which NATO defined itself to rhetorically entrap the allies, delegitimizing their opposition to enlargement.161 This is a powerful argument, but it does not capture the full story of NATO enlargement. As we shall see in the following chapters, what was involved on the part of the Central and Eastern Europeans was more than a rhetorical manipulation of norms. Thus, the countries of the former Communist bloc had to undergo real change, and to convince the allies that they were committed to the norms and values of NATO (i.e., that they had become sufficiently “likeminded” states) so as to deserve inclusion in this key security institution. NATO’s post–Cold War discourse on rights and duties also shaped the attitudes and behaviors adopted by the allies toward those countries that had been excluded from the first wave of enlargement. For instance, in the case of the Baltic states, despite significant democratization, the allies feared that incorporation of these states would be unacceptable to Russia and thus they were denied entrance.162 In inter-allied debates regarding the Baltic republics, the prevailing view seems to have been that the inclusion of even one of those states would be a grave blow to—what was regarded as—the pro-liberal democratic government of Boris Yeltsin. More generally, on this logic, it would have weakened progressive ideas and political forces within the Russian Federation. The allies were not willing to take risks enabling the ascension to power of Russian Communists and/or nationalists.163 At the Madrid Summit no other states beyond the three Visegrad countries received a membership invitation.164 It is fair to argue that instrumental considerations of cost and concerns about the impact of a “big bang” enlargement on NATO’s effectiveness were, to a significant extent, responsible for the reluctance of many allies to admit additional countries in the first wave of enlargement.165 At the same time, however, one should not minimize the impact that the normative framework shared by NATO’s decision makers had on the dynamics of exclusion of those states. The collective understanding of special duties toward successfully reformed countries led to a series of compromise solutions vis-à-vis democracies excluded from the first tranche, and informed a commitment by NATO to keep “its door open” for future enlargements. What is especially interesting about this position

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is that the allied states have never been bound by any formal obligation to take in former Communist states—even successfully reformed ones. Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, governing the question of enlargement, provides that, to qualify for admission, a state must not only subscribe to the principles of the treaty but also contribute to the security of the Atlantic area as a whole. This, in fact, represents a significant loophole, for it allows the existing allies to decide whether a particular state will enhance or, on the contrary, undermine Euro-Atlantic security. The same loophole was maintained in the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement and the more recent “Membership Action Plan.” That provision absolves NATO of any formal duty of enlargement by stipulating that, in making decisions about enlargement, the allies must consider the impact on the security of the Euro-Atlantic area as a whole. According to Paragraph 10, new risks are “hard to predict and assess”; in this context, as Paragraph 75 explains, “the ability of prospective members to contribute to the alliance’s new missions will be a factor in deciding whether to invite them to join the alliance.” Given that the new allied definition of security stressed the development of democracy within the former Communist states as key to European security, and that it was argued by many that NATO expansion, particularly to the Baltics, would undermine democratic forces and strengthen nationalism in Russia, Western decision makers could have simply rejected their applications on the grounds that enlargement to the Baltic states was inconsistent with the alliance’s commitment to protect its members. Yet, in practice, NATO decision makers found it very difficult to simply rely on that loophole to justify exclusions. Their normative commitment, their acceptance of a special duty to the reformed states of the former Communist bloc, meant that NATO members regarded a simple rejection of liberalized and democratized candidates as inappropriate. This articulation of debates about enlargement within a normative discourse of appropriate action, rights, and corresponding duties created a situation in which democratic candidates could not simply be turned down by invoking the formal prerogative of NATO to unilaterally decide the boundaries of membership. Rather, the allies accepted that each rejection had to be justified on the basis of arguments that fell within the framework of norms around which NATO decision makers defined the identity of the organization. In the case of significantly democratized candidates, NATO had to find at least some alternative rewards, so that rejection in the context of the first wave of enlargement would not amount to complete exclusion from NATO. In the case of Romania and Slovenia, a substantial part of the debate was formulated in terms of an argument regarding the status of the re-

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form process in those countries. Thus, even those who opposed their application were at pains to demonstrate both to their colleagues and to the candidates themselves that they were not rejecting successfully reformed states. Romania and Slovenia were told that they had made progress toward democratization and liberalization, but that their reform records were not strong enough to entitle them to NATO membership.166 Romania, with a reform track record of only seven months—after a very long period of Communist and neo-Communist rule—was “not yet ready for NATO.” As to Slovenia, its poor performance in reforming its defense sector was particularly worrisome. In addition, the allies were not convinced that Slovenia was truly committed to the NATO goal of projecting stability in the region. Indeed, there was a sense within the alliance that Slovenia was “shunning its regional responsibility in the Balkans,” which suggested that the country was not ready to assume the duties of NATO membership.167 At the same time, however, NATO encouraged Romania and Slovenia to continue their reform processes, promising that if they did so they would be frontrunners for consideration in later rounds of expansion. In its Madrid Declaration, NATO specifically recognized the progress achieved in Romania, Slovenia, and the Baltic countries. The commitment to reward the emerging liberal democracies in Central and Eastern Europe was not confined to the public discourse of NATO officials. With respect to the Baltics, in January 1998 the United States also signed a special Charter of Partnership with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The charter, designed to facilitate cooperation on the basis of shared values and goals, also declares that the integration of the Baltic states into European and transatlantic political, economic, security, and defense institutions is a common goal of all the parties. In a broader perspective, the discourse articulated by members of the North Atlantic Council in their regular meetings also seems to have been shaped by the shared understanding that, given the nature and role of NATO and its special duties toward successfully reformed states of the former Communist bloc, it would be unacceptable for NATO to close its doors to emerging European liberal democracies. Already in early 2000 the prevailing understanding seemed to be that NATO should not postpone launching a new wave of enlargement beyond 2002–2003. Thus, the relevant questions, at the beginning of 2000, were “who” would accede to NATO in the next round and “when” that round would take place, not whether or not a next round should occur at all. Linked to this, debates among members of the North Atlantic Council seemed to concern, to a large extent, the relative merits of different candidates by reference to their progress in the reform process. Disagreements regarding the status of various appli-

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cants persisted, but they were articulated within a normative framework that defined the content of liberal democratic identity expected of new members. conclusion This chapter has traced the emergence and evolution of NATO, arguing that, since its creation the organization has embodied both the inside and outside dimensions of the double logic of international security. In the context of the increasingly militarized confrontation with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the outside, geostrategic dimension came to the fore—as reflected, for instance, in the adoption of the forward strategy and decisions regarding NATO enlargement in the early 1950s. However, even in that situation, the inside aspect continued to be part of the organization and informed a series of community-building practices in the Euro-Atlantic area, aimed precisely at compensating for decisions that responded to the military needs of NATO. At the end of the Cold War, shared understandings among NATO’s decision makers regarding the disappearance of conventional threats and the emergence of a far more diffuse set of risks led them to place the inside dimension at the heart of the definition of the organization’s role in the new era. In that context, concepts and practices of community-building developed during the Cold War served as justifications of the ongoing relevance of NATO in the new era. They also served as a source of inspiration for the organization in the process of improvising responses in a radically new and still fluid environment. However, Western decision makers were facing an unprecedented situation: instead of just having to strengthen and stabilize already existing liberal democratic values and institutions, the challenge in the new period was to help construct those institutions in states emerging from a long period of Communist rule. The challenge, now, was no longer to secure and stabilize Western state identities, but to help build them from scratch. Under these circumstances, NATO became involved in a systematic, comprehensive practice of socialization of Central and Eastern European actors. In the next chapter, we shall place the socialization practices enacted by NATO in a broader analytical framework, preparing the ground for a close empirical analysis of those practices in Chapters 4 and 5.

chapter three

NATO’s Socialization Practices in the Post–Cold War Period

international socialization in ir theory Having examined the role of NATO in the Cold War era and the redefinition of its mission following the collapse of Communism, we can now turn to an analysis of the alliance’s involvement in countries of the former Eastern Bloc. As we shall see, NATO has carried out systematic practices of socialization in an attempt to promote a particular set of liberal democratic norms in those countries, and thus to extend the EuroAtlantic community into a region that, up until 1989, was associated with the inimical other of the Western world. As a prelude to the empirical study of NATO’s involvement in Central and Eastern Europe, this chapter places international socialization practices in a broader analytical perspective. Drawing on the work of sociologists and social psychologists, it analyzes the dynamics of teaching, persuasion, and role-playing practices, then proceeds to explain the instantiation of those types of practices in NATO’s interactions with Central/Eastern European (specifically Czech and Romanian) political actors. In a broader perspective, through a close analysis of the practices of teaching, persuasion, and role-playing enacted by an international security institution, this study contributes to efforts within the field of International Relations (IR) to understand the processes through which international norms are transmitted to the domestic arenas of states. For a long time—particularly following the rise to prominence of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism—mainstream IR scholars had little to say about such processes. Within neorealism, Ken Waltz did use the term socialization, but he referred to it as an almost mechanical process of selection, where states have to emulate the balancing behavior of the most successful actors in the international system if they are to survive in a hostile, anarchical environment.1 The basic ontological assumptions of

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neorealism leave no room for an analysis of the connection between the shared (allegedly realist) traits of states and the social interactions of these states occurring in a historically specific international environment. For their part, neoliberal institutionalists have largely steered away from studies of international socialization, norm internalization, and preference shifts as a result of social interactions.2 Traditionally, studies of social interactions and socialization in the international arena have occupied a more important place in the English School of International Relations than among American scholars. Indeed, the concept of an international society is at the heart of English School analyses, with scholars like Hedley Bull depicting the international arena as a highly social setting in which state socialization occurs. 3 However, English School theorists paid relatively little attention to the actual dynamics and impact of socialization (the ways in which socialization occurs, the conditions that enable or inhibit it, and the effect of norm internalization).4 More recently, studies of international social processes, including socialization, have enjoyed something of a renaissance in the field of International Relations. In particular, within the constructivist camp a host of theorists have analyzed the role of international actors (including international institutions) in transmitting norms into national arenas, often shaping definitions of identity and interest of socializees.5 These studies take the English School arguments regarding the socialization effects of international society a step further, often providing very interesting accounts of how and when such effects occur. And yet, as regards conceptualizing the pathways through which international socialization takes place, far more needs to be done. A particularly relevant example in this sense is the volume edited by Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink. On the basis of rich empirical evidence, the contributors to The Power of Human Rights trace the process through which international human rights norms have effects at the national level, providing a—theoretically generalizable—analytical model of international socialization. Through its process tracing of norm transmission, the book addresses in important ways a long-standing criticism of constructivism, namely that scholars within this camp make broad claims about the role of international norms but do not develop strong analytical models and empirical evidence to back up their claims.6 However, as Jeffrey Checkel has pointed out, because it relies heavily on the work of social movement theorists, the analytical model of norm transmission offered in The Power of Human Rights is incomplete. According to the model emphasized by Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, in the initial stage of socialization, national elites react in a strategic manner to the

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social movement pressure. Yet, this need not be the only way by which international socialization takes place. As Checkel put it, socialization “can also begin via a process of social learning, where state agents learn new roles and interests from the start and in the absence of social mobilization. While the model [developed by Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink] hints at this latter pathway, with the role it attributes to persuasion and arguing at certain points, it is never fully developed.”7 More broadly, from the point of view of IR scholars interested in the role of international norms, there is a persisting need to develop stronger analytical models that capture the dynamics and implications of socialization processes through which these norms are transmitted to the domestic arenas of states.8 The analysis developed in the next three chapters of this book seeks to take a step in this direction, examining the different types of socialization practices through which NATO has sought to project liberal democratic norms into Central and Eastern Europe, exploring the conditions that have facilitated or impeded international socialization, and shedding some light on the nature (and limitations) of internalization of international norms in countries of the former Communist bloc. nato and the politics of norm projection In the post–Cold War era, NATO’s explicit commitment to the projection of liberal democratic norms into Central and Eastern Europe generated a debate among International Relations scholars regarding the actual role played by the organization in former Communist countries. For some authors, the argument that NATO can play a role in promoting democratic control of the military in former Communist countries does not carry much weight.9 Rather, democratization is the product of domestic conditions, such as the level of prosperity and the presence of a middle class. Thus, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary “became democratic before they expressed interest in NATO membership”— hence, on this logic, long before they actually acceded to the organization.10 Furthermore, the effectiveness of NATO membership as a “carrot” to secure compliance with democratic norms is diminished by the fact that “NATO has no means by which to eject states that backslide away from democracy.” The essential impossibility of ejection means that “states could make democratic reforms, acquire admission, and then revert to autocracy without fear of removal from NATO.”11 Other International Relations scholars have argued that NATO’s involvement in projecting Western-defined liberal democratic norms in

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Central and Eastern Europe is real and significant. To explain that process of norm projection, they adopt a rationalist perspective, stressing cost/benefit calculations by actors whose identities and interests are defined prior to, and independent from, social interactions.12 From this perspective, many Central and Eastern European countries desired Western rewards—including NATO membership—and, to reach that goal, they adopted international norms of state behavior. This view leads rationalists to a series of specific expectations regarding the process and effect of the socialization of Central and Eastern Europe by international institutions. For instance, NATO is expected to operate as an egoistic agency, seeking to reduce the costs of projecting Western norms into the former Communist states.13 Thus, for instance, the stance adopted by NATO is a reactive rather than a proactive one and only involves state decision makers from target states. NATO provides information about the “carrots” (particularly membership in the organization) to be gained for compliance with Western norms, but then lets domestic actors decide whether or not they are willing to pay the price of compliance. Even when socialization is successful, it is expected to be the result of “self-socialization,” in the absence of explicit Western pressure or influence. As to Central and Eastern European decision makers, as selfish actors, they only adopt international norms when it is in their interest to do so—and will not adopt those norms when they risk losing political power.14 In situations when decision makers are inclined—by virtue of their pre-given ideology—to adopt Western norms, they will seek to minimize the costs of compliance by manipulating those norms.15 Thus, we can anticipate that in instances where compliance would come at a high cost to rational decision makers, they will engage in the rhetoric of compliance but avoid carrying out costly domestic reforms. In cases of tension between domestic and international norms, “state actors act strategically in order to maximize their political utility under the circumstances. At each level, they will use different arguments based on different grounds . . . to persuade their heterogeneous audiences, and they will seek to exploit information asymmetries.”16 Compliance with norms, in those situations, will depend primarily on the strength of sanctioning mechanisms supporting the two sets of rules, and the degree of transparency between the two levels. In other words, egoistic decision makers from Eastern states are expected to manipulate norms by (1) trying to limit the information that international institutions have about the evolution of the domestic reform process, in order to facilitate “rhetorical action” as opposed to real, potentially costly compliance with international norms; or (2) in situations when they perceive a significant threat of punishment by dissatisfied constituents, by refusing to adopt Western-prescribed norms.

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However, as we shall see in the following chapter, the relationships between NATO and Central/Eastern Europeans were more complex than they first appeared—and that meant that the Atlantic organization’s involvement in the former Communist countries often departed from the above-mentioned assumptions of instrumental rationality. Contrary to the popular perception that the small, weak Czech Republic would desire the military protection offered by the Atlantic Alliance, neither the political elites nor the public in that country were particularly worried about conventional security threats. Public opinion polls conducted in 1994–95 revealed that about 70 percent of the Czech people regarded domestic crime and international terrorism—as opposed to the threat of military aggression—as the main sources of insecurity.17 Moreover, the Czech public was largely against NATO membership. Yet, by early 1997, there was a widespread belief both among allied decision makers and in Prague that, if they wished, the Czechs would be included in the first wave of enlargement.18 Subsequently, although NATO representatives sometimes expressed concern and even dissatisfaction regarding particular Czech policies, there is no evidence that they linked those concerns to explicit or implicit threats that the Czechs might be denied membership in 1999. In essence, NATO membership was (1) ambiguous in terms of instrumental benefits; and (2) (reasonably) guaranteed to be granted to the Czech Republic. Accordingly, one might have expected a very limited Czech willingness to be socialized by NATO. In Romania’s case, the political actors who were most seriously interested in NATO membership (the pro-West reformers) were also those least concerned about a possible threat of military aggression against their country. It was, thus, not obvious why they should seek membership in the Atlantic organization, particularly when that step entailed some costly reforms, which, given the country’s poor economic condition, also threatened to generate resentment among the voters. By contrast, those parties and groups (e.g., the Greater Romania Party) who focused more on conventional military threats were also those who were de facto opposed to NATO membership. Additionally, while opinion polls indicated that an overwhelming number of Romanians were, in principle, in favor of joining NATO, other polls showed that over 50 percent of the same people were against some of the actions prescribed by NATO. Moreover, proWest reformers could not take public support for granted: a large number of Romanians systematically supported the nationalist/conservative socialist parties that wanted to limit Western influence in their country. To look at the question of NATO membership from a different perspective, it might be argued that, rather than looking for security, Czech and Romanian reformers were seeking to accede to the organization as part of their search for foreign capital and, more generally, international

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support for the liberalization of their economies. On this logic, Central/Eastern European governments sought NATO membership, and implemented the reforms expected of candidates, because they were instrumentally interested in Western investment in their countries and regarded membership in the organization as a step toward Western capital. True, in the mid- and late 1990s, some Central/Eastern European political actors were interested in building capitalism in their countries, and regarded Western support as an important element in that process. However, the very interest of Central and Eastern Europeans in rewards such as foreign direct investment was more ambivalent than we might think. Moreover, the link between liberal economic growth and NATO membership was regarded by some Central and Eastern Europeans as problematic. To understand how and why so many of the centrist decision makers from the former Communist bloc subscribed to the view of accession to NATO as consistent with (liberal) economic growth in their countries, we need to take into account the identity-based trust that led those actors to believe that, as the security institution of the Euro-Atlantic community of values, the Atlantic organization would not exploit its weaker members. As we shall see in the next chapters, Czech and Romanian political elites who advocated NATO membership were not simply in pursuit of specific instrumental rewards from the West. They were, rather, involved in the process of transcending the stigma of Communism and building a liberal democratic state identity. As part of that process, they accepted Western guidance regarding the appropriate normative content of liberal democracy, and sought to learn and implement corresponding norms. Building capitalist economies was widely accepted as one aspect of becoming Western-like liberal democracies, and thus regarded as desirable. But the goal of capitalist development was regarded as a flawed interpretation of national interest by Czech and Romanian actors who subscribed to alternative definitions of national identity. Empirical evidence shows that, at least in the period covered by this study, Western-defined liberal democracy was certainly not the only model discussed in political debates in either Romania or the Czech Republic. As we shall see in the next two chapters, those years were marked by normative fluidity in both countries, as various parties and political groups articulated diverging definitions of national identity and, on this basis, identified different interests and priorities for their polities. Or, according to some definitions (especially those of nationalist and Communist parties, but also factions of Social Democratic parties), joining Western institutions and opening the doors to foreign capital amounted to an unacceptable loss of sovereignty. To look at the relationship between capitalist development and NATO

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membership from a different angle, accounts focusing on the predefined objective of economic liberalization might lead us to think that accession to the organization was regarded as a good strategy for achieving that objective. But the question is: Why? The link between the pursuit of NATO membership and liberal economic gains is not as simple and clear as it might appear at a first glance. Particularly in the case of the more affluent Czech Republic, the question arises as to why should the Czechs choose NATO membership when there were other examples of countries—most obviously, perhaps, neighboring Austria—that had built liberal economies without joining NATO? In fact, some opponents of Czech membership in NATO argued that accession to the organization would have a negative impact on the process of liberal economic reform. According to them, the cost of accession threatened to delay reform in other areas, and entailed the risk of having the country “dragged” into regional conflicts and peacemaking efforts that might drain Czech resources.19 On the other hand, by the mid-1990s, the view of liberalization as consistent with NATO membership had come to be widely accepted among governing Czech elites. That acceptance cannot be understood in abstraction from a set of understandings shared by Czech reformers regarding the identity of the organization and the relationship between their country and the community of values embodied in NATO. In response to the Western definition of NATO as a key institutional expression of the Euro-Atlantic community, Czech decision makers came to define membership in the organization as a necessary part of the journey of moving away from a foreign-imposed political system and building a new kind of polity. Linked to this, there was a sense of trust in NATO, a view that, as an institution of the Western community of liberal democratic norms, NATO would not impose excessive demands on the Czech Republic, nor would it send allied troops into aggressive conflicts. That trust in—and, indeed, identification with—the Euro-Atlantic community and its key security organization was repeatedly stressed by Czech political actors who participated in the process of accession to NATO.20 At the same time, through its educational practices targeting young civilian defense experts and military personnel, as well as the Czech public, NATO sought to extend that sense of trust into the broader Czech society, to project the image of a clear link between participation in the Western alliance and the construction, and protection, of a free and progressive Czech polity. Similarly, one cannot make sense of the relationship between NATO and pro-reform Romanian elites without taking into account the issue of identity-based trust. It is reasonable to argue that many of Romania’s decision makers regarded access to Western capital as an important part of

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the process of post-Communist reconstruction. But, particularly given the very precarious economic situation of their country, it is not immediately obvious why Romanians would accept the idea of a connection between membership in NATO and economic growth via the influx of Western capital. Why, for instance, did they not fear that accession to NATO would entail unacceptable economic—and potentially military—costs, which might undermine the Romanian process of economic recovery? Here, again, to understand the logic behind this connection we need to consider the identity-based trust that Romanians placed in NATO—their confidence that the organization would not impose too heavy an economic burden on Romania, and that it would not become unreasonably involved in costly conflicts. That trust was essentially linked to a prevailing view among Romania’s reformers that, as an institution of the Western world, NATO would not make any unreasonable demands upon their country. The logic behind that position was that the alliance could be relied upon to promote and protect the key values of the community it embodied—and that meant that NATO was bound to act in the name of the very liberal democratic values around which pro-reform elites in Bucharest were seeking to rebuild their country.21 As in the case of the Czech Republic, one cannot speak of the same kind of trust on the part of nationalist and socialist Romanian actors. In general, those actors regarded the practices and institutions of the Western world—including NATO, but also international financial institutions, as well as practices of foreign direct investment—as likely sources of threat to the identity and sovereignty of their country. What is especially interesting about NATO’s socialization of Central/Eastern European actors is that an international security institution participated in functions of creating domestic order traditionally associated with state agencies. As prominent political and legal theorists have explained, in modern polities the pull for compliance with a particular set of norms is grounded not simply in a system of instrumental incentives, but also in internalized mechanisms that lead members of a given polity to discipline themselves.22 In this sense, a key function of modern states is to “fashion” rational subjects—to deeply transform social life by defining reasonable worldviews, drawing the boundaries between appropriate/inappropriate behavior, and educating citizens into regarding those boundaries as “normal,” “rational,” and, hence, unproblematic. With particular reference to the Czech and Romanian cases, I argue that in the post–Cold War period NATO became involved precisely in such a pedagogic project aimed at socializing Central/Eastern Europeans into thinking about the world—and, hence, identifying reasonable courses of action—within the framework of Western-based liberal demo-

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cratic norms. In enacting practices of socialization aimed at “fashioning rational subjects,” NATO participated in what Pierre Bourdieu would call habitus-building in the area of defense. In his theory, Bourdieu placed a special emphasis on the concept of “fields,” understood as differentiated social subsystems in which specific sets of practices take place.23 In every particular field (e.g., the field of defense, the economic field, the legal field, academia), agents engage in competent action—and resort to different types of capital to advance their positions—within the framework of a shared system of meanings. Each field is governed by a given habitus. As Stefano Guzzini explained, “[Habitus] guarantees the active presence of past experiences through providing schemas of perception, thought and action which tend to reproduce practices in conformity with the field throughout time. Habitus functions like the materialization of collective memory. Comparable to Kuhn’s paradigm, it is a disposition to act, perceive and think in particular ways.”24 The dispositions governing each field, although arbitrary cultural products, are perceived by social actors as the “normal” way of thinking about and acting in a particular area. Habitus-building is regarded by critical sociologists like Bourdieu as key to the establishment and reproduction of liberal societies, for the principles of democratic participation and individual freedoms require the existence of citizens who are able and willing to exercise those freedoms in accordance with liberal democratic principles. In the context of NATO’s relations with the former Communist countries, the importance of habitus-building was informed by the prevailing view within the organization that the best way to promote the construction and maintenance of peaceful, predictable, and stable Western-style liberal democratic polities in that part of the world was by ensuring that Central/ Eastern Europeans themselves “owned” the norms and principles of liberal democracy. As Bourdieu argued, habitus is inculcated in individuals through ongoing educational processes through which pedagogic authorities disseminate certain sets of meanings, presenting them as the objective truth, while at the same time excluding other ideas as unthinkable. Pedagogic work must last long enough to produce “durable training” in the subjects being educated. Thus, successfully educated individuals are those who acquire the dispositions associated with a given habitus, and tend to think and act accordingly even when the pedagogic action has ceased. In the long term, pedagogic work has the function of maintaining and reproducing a specific social order through processes of self-limitation and selfcensorship on the part of individuals.25 In arguing that NATO participated in a form of habitus-building in

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Central/Eastern Europe, I depart from the popular view that depicts the socialization practices enacted by the organization as an instance of manipulation of instrumental incentives aimed at altering the behavior of policymakers from former Communist countries. I suggest that NATO attempted not simply to constrain the behavior of Central/Eastern Europeans, but also to “fashion” liberal democratic actors by reshaping their definitions of identity and understandings of acceptable courses of action. Moreover, that effort targeted not simply the governing political elites, but also “next generation” leaders and selected societal actors. As we shall see in the next two chapters, NATO’s attempts at socializing Central/Eastern Europeans into adopting a particular set of Western-defined norms were not always successful. Nevertheless, in many cases, the Atlantic Organization was able to influence Czech and Romanian actors in ways that went beyond the expectations of strategic interaction among instrumental actors with predefined identities and interests. On several occasions, Czech and Romanian socializees accepted NATO’s guidance even after the most significant “carrot” had been offered, or, conversely, even in situations when NATO did not promise any significant rewards in exchange for compliance with Western norms. Moreover, particularly in highly symbolic situations, internationally defined as markers of the identities of their countries, those socializees enacted Western-defined appropriate liberal democratic norms, even if this course of action ran counter to what should have been their basic egoistic interests (e.g., ensuring the continued support of their constituents). In enacting an identity as the avant-garde of liberal democracy, Central and Eastern European reformers socialized by NATO acted not in conformity to, but often against existing domestic orientations. As part of their effort to construct a liberal-state identity, those reformers—under the guidance and with the help of Western actors—acted to promote a particular definition of national identity. In the Czech Republic, and especially in Romania, reformers were worried about the strength and popularity of domestic groups that advocated nonliberal norms and values. From the perspective of pro-West Czech and Romanian reformers, those groups had to be defeated and their ideas about national identity had to be delegitimized if their countries were to successfully “resume their natural place” in Europe. We noted earlier that the process of identity definition is a relational process; as we shall see through a study of the Czech Republic and Romania, the definition of national identity involves not only the articulation of a particular set of relationships vis-à-vis external others, but also the identification of a series of domestic others.26 Thus, Czech and Romanian political elites were seeking to escape a historical other (Commu-

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nism), and, simultaneously, they were defining themselves in opposition to—and were seeking to defeat—a series of domestic others, in particular nationalist and socialist groups, who represented alternative definitions of national identity and had different visions of the future of their polities. Those domestic others remained a strong political force throughout the 1990s even in the more advanced countries of the former Eastern Bloc (surprisingly, a public opinion poll conducted in November 1999 in the Czech Republic revealed that the Communist Party was the most popular party).27 The situation was even more serious in Romania, where the socialists formed the first post-Communist government, and where the ultranationalist Vadim Tudor almost became president in 2000. In the post-1989 process of identity definition, Czech and Romanian pro-West reformers often cooperated with NATO in an attempt to delegitimize and defeat those domestic others. We shall examine below several cases of intervention by networks of Czech/Romanian reformers and NATO representatives, who sought to influence domestic debates and attitudes by portraying a certain, Western definition of national identity as natural, and rejecting alternative definitions, which entailed a certain dissociation from the values and norms of the West. One of the most important implications to be drawn from a Bourdieuinspired analysis of NATO’s socialization practices is that the organization’s involvement in Central/Eastern Europe through the 1990s was not characterized by drift. At the same time, that was not a time when power was marginalized. It is worth repeating that the virtual absence of coercion vis-à-vis countries like the Czech Republic and Romania, and the allies’ heavy reliance on the inside logic of a security community rather than the outside logic of geostrategic confrontation, does not mean that NATO did not exercise power in its interactions with actors from those countries. Rather, its ability to define itself—and secure recognition—as a key institution of the Western community of values was key in enabling NATO to exercise significant power in the (re)construction of post-Communist polities. It was that recognition that informed the reliance of many Czech/Romanian actors on NATO as an authoritative, legitimate source of expertise in the process of post-Communist reform, and in reconstitution of their countries’ into polities that could “return to Europe.” In that context, NATO was able to play a surprisingly large role in crafting Western-prescribed institutions and laws, particularly in the area of defense, and in fashioning what it regarded as “rational” actors, with the right liberal democratic ideas and attitudes, in the Czech Republic and Romania. Ironically, in that exercise of power, its material resources both enabled and constrained NATO. On the one hand, the military force, and,

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more generally, the material capabilities possessed by the allies enhanced the credibility of NATO as a security organization that had the ability to protect the Western security community against a variety of threats, should such threats ever arise in the future. On the other hand, however, in order to maintain its credibility as the institution of the Euro-Atlantic community of values, NATO had to exercise significant self-restraint in the use of its superior material capabilities. The particular, liberal democratic identity around which NATO defined itself was inconsistent with the use of force/coercion aimed at securing the compliance of democratically elected Central/Eastern European governments with Western expectations. It was also inconsistent with the language—and with any policies—of permanent exclusion from the organization. As a liberal democratic club, NATO had to maintain a credible commitment to the “open door” policy vis-à-vis candidates that embraced the norms and institutions of the Western community—even if that commitment entailed significant costs to the allies. toward an understanding of practices of socialization enacted by nato In its socialization of Central/Eastern Europeans, NATO became systematically involved in practices of teaching, persuasion, and role-playing. Teaching occurs in educational activities where, as part of a process of habitus-building, an agency endowed with pedagogic authority cultivates classificatory schemas (incorporating particular sets of intersubjective understandings), on the basis of which socializees are to perceive the world, think, and act.28 The schemas disseminated by pedagogic agencies are not themselves perceived as the contingent product of a particular history; rather, they are the expression of a shared “common sense” that contains—what appear to be—the “natural” way of thinking and acting. A significant although subtle form of power is involved in practices of teaching because, if pedagogical work is effective—that is, if is successfully inculcated—it leads subjects to accept those sets of meanings as objective and unproblematic.29 Accordingly, socialized subjects will reject interpretations of the world—and modes of acting in that world— that do not conform to the ideas and principles into which they have been educated. Following Bourdieu, I argue that NATO acted as a socializing agency, which disseminated particular sets of meanings aimed at enabling targeted Central and Eastern European actors to make sense of the world, define subjects and objects that populate the world, and identify presumably normal relations vis-à-vis those objects and subjects.

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A careful reading of interactions between Czech/Romanian actors and NATO representatives reveals that, within the framework of various educational activities, the latter were involved in a systematic effort to teach Central and Eastern Europeans a particular set of ideas for making sense of the world, understanding the “correct” meanings of liberal democracy, and acting both in the domestic and international arenas. Within NATO’s decision-making circles, that process of teaching was regarded as especially important in a situation in which even the progressive forces of the former Eastern Bloc were—it was thought—still affected by Communist mentalities, and who, as a consequence, had flawed understandings of liberal democracy. Just as Bourdieu would have expected, teaching practices contained a significant element of depoliticization (or naturalization). Thus, norms taught by NATO reflected intersubjective understandings prevailing among the organization’s decision makers regarding the proper meanings of liberal democracy. This is not to say that all the prescriptions formulated by NATO representatives were identical, or even consistent with one another. However, although in some situations different Western experts acting within the framework of NATO programs had different views of how particular principles should be translated into practice, there was significant consistency in terms of the underlying norms regarded as appropriate. For instance, there was a shared understanding among NATO representatives that democratic—rather than just civilian—control of the military was a key pillar of a normal modern democracy. In accordance with such shared understandings, advisers affiliated with NATO presented the ideas they were conveying to Central/Eastern Europeans as objectively true meanings of liberal democracy. The model they were prescribing was depicted as universally valid, the rational and ethical outcome of a teleological historical evolution, rather than one particular version of liberal democracy, selected through contingent political processes. At the heart of many of those teachings was a discourse of identity—the identity of NATO but also of the relevant Central/Eastern European countries. As we shall see, that discourse contained constitutive stories, depicting the evolution of the Western community embodied in NATO, as well as the former Communist polities, as following the same trajectory of “rational” evolution toward a universally valid set of (liberal democratic) norms and principles. That discourse enabled NATO, qua the institution representing countries that were more advanced on that rational historical trajectory, to define itself as the source of authoritative knowledge regarding true liberal democratic norms. Hence, it enabled the organization to claim the authority to teach those norms to the polities that were less advanced on that same historical trajectory.

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One potential problem with the concept of teaching in international politics is that it may seem very vague.30 In other words, one might wonder, how do we recognize instances of teaching when we see them? To answer that question, in the context of the present study, I suggest that we should pay attention to several dynamics of interactions between NATO and Czech/Romanian actors. Teaching, we noted earlier, involves a systematic effort to spread the same ideas about correct ways of interpreting and acting in the world. To support the claim that NATO has acted like a Bourdieuan pedagogic agency, we need to show that it has tried to disseminate to different Central and Eastern European actors a particular (Western-defined) set of meanings for interpreting the world, and broad norms of appropriate (liberal democratic) action in that world. For instance, in the case of civilmilitary relations, an analysis of several types of activities carried out by different NATO representatives over the past few years should reveal a consistent attempt to cultivate in socializees the same definitions of “appropriate” norms of democratic control of security institutions. It is reasonable to expect that this normative framework would focus on establishing a relationship between the state and society in the area of defense-related decision making governed by the norms of transparency, accountability, the rule of law, protection of human rights, and empowerment of civil society. Teaching of this kind necessarily continues beyond particular instances in which NATO seeks to convince socializees to promote a certain reform. In essence, we would find a significant continuity in efforts to spread the same sets of ideas and norms over a relatively long period of time, and even in forums and situations that are not designed to generate specific changes in the policies and practices of targeted states. If, however, we were to find that different NATO representatives spread different norms, or that they changed their normative prescriptions depending on the context of interactions with Central/Eastern Europeans, then it would be more doubtful that what was involved in NATO Central and Eastern European interactions was the kind of sociological teaching outlined above. For instance, if we were to find that NATO representatives talked about the importance of promoting liberal democratic norms in public forums (e.g., in press statements), but, in more private settings, advocated the departure from those norms in the name, say, of greater efficiency, then one could conclude that NATO simply manipulated and made rhetorical reference to those norms to enhance its public image but did not make a serious attempt to transmit them to the Central and Eastern European elites. Furthermore, if NATO did carry out socialization practices aimed at spreading a new habitus in the field of security in Central and Eastern Eu-

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rope, then we would find that practices of socialization went beyond attempts to influence the behavior of a few decision makers, and involved attempts at educating a broad set of military officers and civilian defense experts, including tomorrow’s elites. The idea would be to turn these actors into “responsible,” “self-disciplined,” present and future leaders and defense experts—that is, people who would act like good, self-disciplined liberal democrats, taking the new norms for granted and acting accordingly, even in the absence of international guidance. In other words, if NATO was, indeed, engaged in a kind of Bourdieuan teaching, we should find that, rather than limiting itself to a minimal involvement in the former Eastern Bloc, providing instrumental incentives and instructions concerning the conditions attached to those incentives to a few individuals with decision-making power, representatives of the alliance would be systematically involved in pedagogic practices aimed at spreading the same liberal democratic norms at many levels and targeting many different types of Central and Eastern European actors. Many of those actors might not have decision-making power at the time of interaction with NATO, but would be expected to become, at some point in the future, participants in a changed security field, who would need to know, operate within, and in so doing reproduce a new set of (Western-based, liberal democratic) conceptual and practical dispositions. Indeed, as we shall see, empirical evidence reveals that, since the end of the Cold War, in the course of seminars, workshops, accession dialogues, and various instances of consultation, different NATO representatives consistently sought to teach various groups of Central and Eastern European actors the “correct” ideas and norms of liberal democracy, particularly those pertaining to the field of security. NATO representatives inserted definitions of liberal democratic norms into narratives about a teleological evolution of Western liberal democracy toward ever more rational forms of organization. The organization then used those narratives as a framework for defining its prescriptions, not as arbitrary ideas put forward by international agencies but as the “normal” thing to do for a modern, progressive European state. In addition to—and sometimes against the background of—systematic teachings, NATO officials also engaged in a series of specific attempts to persuade Central and Eastern European socializees to carry out particular liberal democratic reforms.31 Persuasion involves “changing minds, opinions and attitudes about causality and affect . . . in the absence of overtly material or mental coercion.”32 Typically, persuasion occurs in social interactions between actors who have drawn different conclusions regarding the nature, merits, and/or implications of “X” action or policy, and in which one or more of those parties attempt, through arguments,

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to get their interlocutors to rethink their conclusions.33 In the case of persuasion, socializees need not accept the role of students in the process of learning from authoritative teachers broad schemes for making sense of the world. They must, however, recognize the other parties as legitimate partners in a process of (international) communication. In their recent work, constructivist scholars like Jeffrey Checkel and Thomas Risse point out that persuasion is more successful when the actors involved act within the framework of a Habermasian “common lifeworld,” consisting of a shared system of understandings and norms perceived as legitimate.34 This is an important finding. But I suggest that, particularly in situations when “novices” are involved, it is useful to start analyses of international socialization at an earlier stage—that in which socializees are brought into a given cultural framework. In the context of the present study, NATO-sponsored persuasion complemented—and sometimes relied on—pedagogical practices through which representatives of the organization sought to teach Central and Eastern Europeans a particular set of (Western defined) ideas, norms, and principles. From this perspective, teaching can be seen as an attempt to project into Central and Eastern Europe the common lifeworld of the Euro-Atlantic community, consisting of shared liberal ideas and norms.35 If successful, this pedagogic effort will lead to a situation in which Central/Eastern Europeans come to share the collective interpretations of the world, and of legitimate norms and rules that prevail among NATO’s members. In turn, this should facilitate subsequent arguing between NATO members and Central/Eastern European partners, by providing them with a repertoire of collective understandings within which they can articulate truth claims. I argue that, particularly in interactions with pro-reform Czech and Romanian political elites, NATO officials often sought to teach liberal norms, then tried to persuade socializees to enact particular institutional and legislative reforms by portraying those reforms as the right way of translating the new norms into practice. Yet, teaching and persuasion need not, and do not, always occur in combination. In the context of this study, as we shall see, in interactions with “next generation” elites or other actors who did not have decisionmaking power, NATO teachers sought to disseminate Western-defined liberal norms of governance, and to delegitimize alternative norms by portraying them as incorrect and potentially dangerous. In the education of those Central/Eastern European “students,” the focus was on conveying a specific kind of knowledge aimed at shaping the way in which they think about liberal democracy. That is, NATO was much more involved in teaching than in persuading those actors to support a specific policy change advocated by the organization. There were also cases in which

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NATO’s Czech or Romanian interlocutors did not accept the legitimacy of NATO as a teacher of norms, nor did they define themselves as “novices” in the process of learning liberal democracy. Vis-à-vis those actors, NATO relied more on persuasion than teaching. In other words, Western officials tried to alter the attitude of their interlocutors concerning a particular policy via arguments stressing that the prescriptions put forward by NATO were not inconsistent with the specific norms to which their (conservative) Czech/Romanian interlocutors were committed. For instance, in conversations with actors whose political platforms placed particular emphasis on the protection of the unique national character and on sovereignty—often defined in opposition to excessive Western influence on their countries—NATO representatives relied especially on persuasive appeals stressing the idea that their prescriptions did not entail an unacceptable loss of control over key defense-related decisions. In such instances, NATO did not—indeed, could not—teach socializees new, “appropriate” norms for governing their polity. Once again, the question arises as to how we can recognize instances of persuasion in international politics.36 As a series of IR scholars have pointed out, interactions governed by the logic of persuasion involve several specific dynamics. Actors that engage in persuasion do not mobilize coercion vis-à-vis their interlocutors. Similarly, they do not rely on the promise of direct instrumental benefits as a way of getting subjects to enact prescribed reforms. Rather, actors engaged in persuasion try to present a given course of action as “the right thing to do” in the given circumstances. In our case, if NATO was, indeed, engaged in attempts to persuade rather than manipulate Central/Eastern European actors, it would seek to persuade them that “X” or “Y” reforms should be carried out even if they do not have any direct international rewards attached to them. Such reforms would be portrayed as desirable, even necessary in themselves, rather than constituting merely the means for obtaining a particular international “carrot.” Again, the lack of coercion does not mean that no power is involved in interactions governed by the logic of argumentation. As mentioned above, such interactions occur within a socially constructed framework of ideas, which reflects the power of particular actors to define the “common lifeworld” within which certain arguments are seen as legitimate, while others (that violate the established collective interpretations of the world) are not. Finally, the logic of persuasion suggests that the interactions between the different participants in a given dialogue cannot be a one-way street. We noted above that one of the defining characteristics of interactions governed by the logic of argumentation is that the parties recognize each other as legitimate partners in a process of communication. If that is the case, they must take each

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other’s arguments seriously, they must listen to each other (rather than dismiss, ab initio, the arguments of the poorer actors), and must be prepared to change their position if the course of debate so suggests.37 Applying that logic to our case, it would lead us to expect that, in interactions between NATO and Central/Eastern European socializees, the latter would also argue with the allies, and, by formulating arguments within the framework of shared norms, would, in some instances, be able to influence NATO’s position. In other words, rather than being confined to a position of absolute weakness, reflecting the discrepancy between their poverty and the wealth and strength of NATO allies, Central and Eastern European actors would actually have a certain degree of power vis-à-vis the allies.38 Among the techniques of persuasion—or types of persuasive appeals— used by NATO actors, particularly important were combinations of consistency, authority, and social proof.39 Consistency was used as a way of linking prescribed reforms to the norms and principles that are accepted by socializees as legitimate, unproblematic. A common argument in those cases was that the only way of implementing the norms to which actors being socialized were committed was by enacting “X” or “Y” reforms. For instance, I show that, in discussions with Czech/Romanian liberal elites who accepted Western norms of democratic control of the military, NATO officials often argued that only the specific legal and institutional arrangements prescribed by the organization were consistent with appropriate liberal democratic civil-military relations. Anything else, it was claimed, would be a departure from the “correct” norms, and might generate problems, or even destabilize the process of constructing a liberal democratic state identity. In addition, there was also the technique of authority, which involved efforts at persuading targeted subjects to adopt the NATO-prescribed reforms by invoking the legitimacy of the organization as reliable expert on the issue of “good” domestic institutions. For instance, in interactions with liberal elites, one argument was that Central and Eastern Europeans should trust NATO to identify goals and strategies of the reform process because the organization, by virtue of its expertise, knows what kinds of institutions best embody the norms of democratic control of the military, and is familiar with the steps required in the process of building such institutions. Or, as was the case in debates about Operation Allied Force, NATO was presented as an authoritative—effective as well as legitimate—agency of intervention. NATO representatives engaged in a campaign of persuasion that stressed that the principles embodied in the institution guaranteed a “war over values,” rather than one of territorial conquest. Also, it was argued that, because of its overwhelming techno-

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logical superiority, NATO could be trusted to put a quick end to the crisis. Finally, NATO officials have often resorted to social proof, seeking to convince socializees to implement particular reforms because, in a similar situation, significant other actor(s) followed a similar course of action and, the argument goes, if those actors with similar identities and values followed that course of action, then it must be the right thing to do. Finally, another type of socialization practice enacted by NATO involved role-playing, and targeted in particular the “next generation” elites of Central and Eastern Europe. As social psychologists have explained, role-playing seeks to alter the behavior of targeted individuals by having them adopt actively the role of another person.40 Although different in their dynamics, teaching and persuasion are similar in that they seek to directly affect the understandings, attitudes, and desires of socializees. By contrast, role-playing works primarily by changing the overt behavior of socializees: it is aimed at leading socializees to adopt new behavioral dispositions by fulfilling the particular pattern of behavior associated with a given social position.41 It is true that the effect of roleplaying can sometimes transcend behavioral dispositions and include a change in the belief systems of socializees. However, that effect is only indirect, and it usually involves a form of self-persuasion (i.e., individuals convince themselves to change their opinion regarding a situation). The assumption is that, by first learning to behave like—and fulfill the duties associated with—particular roles, for instance, “good” liberal leaders, it is likely that subjects who participate in role-playing will, in time, also accept the basic principles and norms associated with those roles. Role-playing, I suggest, can be seen as part of a process of habitusbuilding, for, as Bourdieu explained, habitus is not simply a set of conceptual categories. Rather, as a set of dispositions which are acquired through a process of inculcation that incline agents to act and react in certain ways, habitus refers to a whole set of relations to the world, from conceptual frameworks, to bodily expressions (bodily hexis, incorporating specific ways of speaking, moving, etc.), to behavioral dispositions and ethical principles. The acquisition of new behavioral dispositions— in this case, I argue, via role-playing—is an important part of the socialization of individuals into the culture of a given community or social group. As Bourdieu argued, the behavioral dispositions inculcated in people lead them to act or react in specific ways—as if those ways were simply natural. In his examination of Bourdieu’s habitus, John Thompson pointed out that it is “because the body has become a repository of ingrained dispositions that certain actions, certain ways of behaving and responding, seem altogether natural.”42 Social psychologists have long argued that role-playing is one of the

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most effective ways through which society influences the behavior, but ultimately also the attitudes and self-images of its members.43 According to analysts of religious conversion, for instance, people often “act themselves” into roles prescribed by particular religious beliefs. 44 The explanation provided by social psychologists is that individuals’ own behavior will be used by them as a source of evidence of their beliefs and attitudes. By engaging in activities typically associated with a certain social role, people will come to identify with the role and will tend to accept the “duties” and appropriate norms of behavior prescribed for that role. A surprising finding of social psychology is that even people whose initial worldview is in tension with the ideas underlying the roles they enact may, in the aftermath of role-playing, change the way in which they perceive themselves and understand others. For instance, marriage counselors and mediators in labor-management disputes commonly advise parties to a dispute to play the role of those with whom they are in conflict. The idea is that, by doing the things that other actors habitually do, participants in role-playing will change their perceptions of those others, and, on this basis, also re-evaluate themselves.45 Although, to date, theorists of world politics have not shown great interest in it, I suggest that role-playing plays an interesting role in international socialization practices. In our case, we can talk of the occurrence of role-playing in situations in which NATO places Central and Eastern European actors in positions in which they have to act as if they were members of the alliance, emulating allied attitudes and behavior, performing the tasks that allied officers and civilian officials are expected to carry out. In the case of post–Cold War NATO, a close analysis of activities involving Central and Eastern European actors—particularly young military and civilian experts—reveals a repeated use of role-playing aimed at conveying to those actors the “Western way of doing things” in civil-military relations and, more broadly, in security-related matters. Particularly in the context of Partnership for Peace (PfP) courses, IFOR and KFOR operations in the Balkans, and NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly seminars, Central/Eastern Europeans were required to adopt actively the role of liberal democratic decision makers or military officers. Role-playing enacted in the framework of PfP programs was carried out in pursuit of NATO’s goal of extending “to others in Europe what NATO has achieved among its member nations—a common defense culture and the elimination of war as an accepted instrument of national policy.” 46 Indeed, organizers of PfP courses and other programs pointed out that they placed special emphasis on cultivating in partners the kind of behavior associated with the NATO way of doing things, and “eventually establishing the same kind of habits of cooperation with partners that have long existed among the allies.”47

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Role-playing exercises often occurred in the context of simulated crises or other situations calling for extensive cooperation between political and military authorities, and between those authorities and society. Typically, Central/Eastern European socializees were asked to (pretend to) make decisions and act in accordance with liberal democratic principles of the rule of law, democratic control of security/defense institutions, and respect for the basic human rights of the individuals involved in, or affected by, the presumed “crises.” For instance, they were asked to emulate their Western peers in finding and implementing solutions that respected a constitutional framework of inviolable liberal rights of civilians (as opposed to, for instance, arbitrary suspension of the right to freedom and property). Such instances of role-playing were designed to cultivate in Central/Eastern European socializees the habit of acting in accordance with Western-prescribed norms, and, hence, indirectly, to cultivate in them the “right” dispositions in terms of normative references used as guidelines in decision-making and implementation. I suggested earlier that, to the extent that socialization is effective, it will lead socializees to internalize the new norms—that is, to take them for granted, regard compliance with them as the right thing to do, and reject alternative norms as unacceptable. From this (constructivist) perspective, norm internalization means that the socializees will (re)define their identity and interests in accordance to those norms, and will reject interpretations of interests that involve violations of those norms.48 If the new norms have been internalized, the socializees will uphold them consistently, in various forums and in diverse circumstances, even at the risk of incurring material costs. They will promote the new norms as the right thing to do, rather than engage in a cost-benefit analysis in each decisionmaking instance in order to decide whether or not a certain norm should be accepted or rejected—which is what they should do if they were no more than strategic manipulators of those norms. Again, however, it is important to keep in mind that the internalization of international norms by domestic actors need not always translate into changes at the level of state policies and practices. Even when the relevant socializees are powerful decision makers, their efforts at reform might be delayed, even blocked by reluctant Parliaments, or the implementation of the norms might be obstructed by a conservative bureaucracy and/or an adverse societal culture. When norm internalization at the level of the state does take place, it occurs in different stages. 49 To begin with, the new norms are inscribed in the official foreign and domestic discourse of the state: in its official statements, the government states its country’s commitment to the promotion of those norms and condemns behavior that violates them. In our case, this stage of state socialization would be reflected in the Czech and Romanian governments’ official commitment

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to respect and promote the liberal democratic norms promoted by NATO, and in their rejection of alternative sets of norms. A deeper stage of appropriation of international norms involves their institutionalization: through a series of legislative changes and institutional reforms, the new norms are embedded in the legal and institutional fabric of the state being socialized. For instance, in our case, this would involve new legislation and institutional reforms aimed at implementing NATO’s prescriptions regarding democratic control of the military (e.g., the civilianization of ministries of defense, the creation of new checks and balances in the area of defense, the creation of new laws and new institutional channels linking the state to civil society, etc.). At the level of institutionalization, there is also the creation of new bureaucratic rules and new bureaucratic actors to implement those rules, leading, one can assume, to the spread of the internationally prescribed habitus to more strata of society. As Kai Alderson has explained, this is a key stage of state socialization: once this stage is reached, norms are more likely to “stick” because the new boundaries of acceptable/unacceptable behavior are now legally enforceable, new obligations and rights have been established, and new sets of bureaucratic actors have been created whose main task is to promote the new norms.50 Last but not least, the third stage of internalization involves changes at the level of state behavior; in other words, it is not enough for the new norms to govern a given polity in principle, they must also be effectively implemented in practice. In our case, we noted above, bureaucratic inertia and/or an adverse culture (in part caused by a gap between the cognitive and practical dispositions of actors who have already been socialized into the new norms, and their more conservative colleagues, who are still operating within the old culture) might mean that actual practices are not always consistent with the new norms that should govern the field of security. At this point, it is useful to relate the three types of socialization practices examined in this book to a mode of socialization defined by Iain Johnston as “social influence.” According to Johnston, social influence involves the distribution of social rewards (e.g., sense of belonging, sense of well-being) and punishments (e.g., shaming or shunning) in an attempt to elicit pro-norm behavior.51 In comparing social influence to persuasion, Johnston explained that persuasion “has been called ‘mediated informational influence’ (e.g., ‘I thought the answer was X . . . but everybody else said Y, so it really must be Y’). Social influence can, instead, come in the form of ‘mediated normative influence’ (e.g., ‘I believe the answer is X, but others said Y, and I don’t want to rock the boat, so I’ll say Y’).”52 The concept of social influence can be usefully applied to some in-

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stances of interaction between NATO and Central/Eastern European actors. As we shall see in the following chapters, there were certain cases in which NATO representatives resorted to shaming to alter the behavior of conservative Czech and Romanian bureaucratic actors, as well as policymakers (e.g., Czech Social-Democrats in 1998) that were opposed to NATO’s normative prescriptions. However, in the context of the present study, the category of social influence is of limited relevance, for to a large extent NATO’s socialization practices were informed by a collective view among the organization’s officials that they could and should do more than secure behavioral compliance. Public and semi-confidential documents, as well as interviewing data, point to a collective understanding within NATO that the establishment and long-term survival of liberal democratic polities required that the citizens of those polities “own” the norms prescribed by the West rather than simply comply with them for the sake of external instrumental rewards. And, as we have seen, the construction of—what were defined as—rational and ethical, that is, liberal democratic, polities in Central and Eastern Europe was regarded as a key source of post–Cold War stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. conditions that facilitated teaching, persuasion, and role-playing Drawing on the work developed by social psychologists and sociologists, I expected to find that several interrelated conditions facilitated/inhibited the success of efforts by NATO to teach Czech/Romanian socializees a given set of meanings. To begin with, a pedagogic agent is more likely to be successful when the parties involved recognize their respective roles as “teacher” and “students.” Two subconditions are relevant in my case. Regarding the socializer, NATO would have to regard Central/Eastern Europeans as responsible, non-essentialized, and thus teachable, subjects.53 Teaching would most likely not be a reasonable option vis-à-vis those subjects if they were seen as essentialized, say, inherently nationalistic subjects with no significant capacity for change. Actors that subscribed to the view of essentialized subjects would probably limit their socialization activities to instrumental manipulation or negotiation with an actor with fixed preferences. At the same time, teaching would be facilitated by Central/Eastern Europeans’ self-definition as “students” (or novices) engaged in the process of learning new norms of governance. In the context of institutional transformations and broad normative debates, one can expect political actors from transition states to be, in general, open to learning new mod-

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els of governance.54 Notice that this condition of “noviceness” implies that international pedagogic agents are more likely to be successful in the early stages of the reform process, when socializees are especially in need of learning new norms/institutions for their societies. The “novice factor” should be even more important when socializees recognize a given international socializer as representative of a given social group, or community, with which they identify.55 Another condition affecting international teaching involves systematic interactions with targeted subjects. As anthropologists and sociologists of culture have argued, to succeed in constructing the “common sense” of targeted subjects, educational practices must be carried out over a relatively long period of time.56 Therefore, I expect that NATO was particularly successful in teaching those actors who were intensely and extensively (rather than sporadically) exposed to the ideas promoted by the organization. An examination of educational practices using analytical tools developed by sociologists like Bourdieu and Passeron enables us to nuance the time/contact hypothesis, which argues that socialization is more likely to be effective if socializers and socializees meet repeatedly over a long period of time. Applying sociological arguments to my own domain of analysis, I expected that extensive use of a particular mechanism of socialization (teaching) could make a difference particularly when the nature of social interactions met certain conditions—in this case, mutual recognition of their social roles as teacher/students. In other words, what matters is not just the amount of socialization that occurs, but also its qualities—that is, the actual dynamics of interaction in a given context. As to persuasion, I anticipate that two sets of conditions would affect the ability of NATO to persuade Czech and Romanian socializees. Following Thomas Risse, Jeffrey Checkel, and others, I suggest that persuasion is facilitated by the existence of a common “lifeworld,” which enables participants in a given instance of communication to debate and reach consensus on the definition of the situation, to claim rights and invoke duties. In addition, persuasion should be easier to achieve when the socializees trust the persuader’s (i.e., NATO’s) competence and intentions.57 Given these conditions, it is reasonable to argue that persuasion is facilitated by successful educational practices. To the extent that Czech/Romanian socializees adopt the worldview taught by the pedagogic institution, further social communication will occur within a shared normative framework. In our case, this would enable NATO to formulate arguments within a set of—Western-defined—interpretations of the world that its Central/Eastern European interlocutors also accept as correct.58

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However, one should not assume that prior teaching guarantees the success of particular attempts at persuasion. For instance, Central or Eastern European socializees may come to subscribe to norms taught by NATO regarding transparency, accountability, and civil society empowerment in the area of defense/security. Yet, they might also challenge NATO’s specific prescriptions, arguing for a different interpretation regarding the correct application of those new norms in a particular case. I suggest that NATO’s attempts at persuasion are more likely to fail when the persuadees perceive an inconsistency in the logic of the persuaders’ arguments (e.g., in cases of apparent tension between the liberal democratic norms to which NATO is explicitly committed and the particular courses of action prescribed by a representative of the organization in a given situation). More generally, one can expect persuasion to fail in cases of breakdown of trust, when particular NATO representatives are not—or are no longer—regarded as trustworthy participants in debates about post-Communist reforms. A breakdown of trust can occur if the persuaders appear insufficiently knowledgeable about, or interested in, the issue at stake, or when they depart from the norms of arguing (e.g., they dictate solutions rather than seek to convince their interlocutors of the merits of the prescribed course of action).59 Finally, as regards role-playing, social psychologists have demonstrated that it is more successful in inculcating new attitudes and behavioral patterns in targeted subjects in situations in which it involves active immersion in the prescribed role. In other words, role-playing tends to be especially successful in cases when actors have to construct and improvise their role, as opposed to being in a passive position (e.g., by simply listening— and being asked to respond to—to speeches prepared by others).60 Drawing on those insights, I expected to find that role-playing exercises conducted by NATO were especially successful in situations when (1) they did not involve subjects being asked to enact roles that contradicted deeply ingrained habits (e.g., role-playing should be less successful when it involves older actors with deeply ingrained Communist habits); and (2) when in the course of their training actors being socialized had to repeatedly and actively enact NATO-prescribed roles while at the same time not having to perform conflicting roles (e.g., in their domestic arenas). Having introduced these different types of socialization practices, and having explored some of the conditions likely to facilitate their success, it is now time to examine their application in the context of interactions between NATO and Czech/Romanian actors.

chapter four

The Czech Republic: Becoming a NATO Member State

overview As we have seen, at the end of the Cold War NATO extended “a hand of friendship” to the Czech Republic and other former Communist states—for example, via the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, aimed at improving communication and cooperation between the allies and Central/Eastern Europeans. But the interactions between NATO and Central/Eastern European countries became especially intensive and systematic starting in 1994. That year witnessed the launch of the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP), designed as a means to improve cooperation between NATO members and Central and Eastern European states, and to prepare candidates for a possible accession to NATO. At the same time, the issue of NATO enlargement was placed on the agenda of allied decision makers. The organization’s growing focus on—and involvement in—Central and Eastern Europe found expression in the emergence of new forms of interaction, ranging from a broad set of educational activities organized within the framework of the PfP, to “collective briefings” and dialogues at the newly established Central and Eastern European missions in Brussels, as well as consultations between NATO representatives and key political actors from the former Communist states. In 1996, those consultations became more frequent and comprehensive in scope, and came to be organized in rounds of “accession dialogues,” held with all potential candidates to NATO membership. With specific reference to the Czech Republic, this chapter argues that all these various forms of interaction carried out after the end of the Cold War reflect a systematic effort by NATO to build a particular type of state-identity in the former Communist bloc of Europe. The collapse of communism and the dissolution of Czechoslovakia led

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to the emergence of two new states, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which embarked on a process of defining their identity, choosing new norms for governing themselves, and establishing new relations with the outside world. In the Czech Republic, the rejection of Soviet-inspired communism, and the delegitimization of the norms and institutions associated with the pre-1989 era made possible a new type of engagement with the West, which had ceased to be seen as the defining enemy. In turn, this new engagement with the Western community subsequently shaped the process of (re)constitution of the post-Communist Czech polity. As the key security institution of the Western community, NATO was recognized by decision makers in Prague as an authoritative expert in the area of defense, and as such, came to play an important role in reforming the Czech Republic and preparing its “return” to the West. Thus, NATO was able to play an important role in teaching Czech elites the norms associated with the liberal democratic identity in the area of defense (and helping to delegitimize alternative normative models), and in providing systematic guidance in the process of embedding those norms in the legislative and institutional fabric of the Czech Republic. As NATO was embarking upon the process of enlargement, its relationship to the Czech Republic was peculiar. Contrary to what one might have expected, the organization had few “carrots” or “sticks” that it could use against Prague. In contrast to a country like Poland, Czech political elites as well as the public had limited security fears. While concerns about uncertainty and the fragility of democracy in the region persisted, according to public opinion polls conducted in 1994 and 1995, about 70 percent of the Czech people thought that domestic crime and international terrorism, rather than the threat of a military confrontation, were the main sources of insecurity.1 The political elites who supported membership in NATO did so primarily for political and symbolic reasons—as part of a process of “return to the West”—rather than out of immediate geostrategic concerns. In a 1993 meeting with President Clinton, Vaclav Havel reportedly argued: “The issue is not that we are faced with imminent threats. Rather, we are in the process of undergoing an image transformation—a reshaping of our identity. . . . Entry into NATO and the EC is central to expanding democracy, not just to Central Europe but also to the NIS.”2 In addition, Czech advocates of accession to NATO did not have to wait very long for confirmation that their country would be a successful candidate. By early 1997, there was a widespread belief both among NATO’s decision makers and in Prague that the Czech Republic would be included in the first wave of NATO enlargement.3 Czech leaders had been repeatedly reassured that their country would accede to the organi-

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zation no later than 1999.4 The perception shared in NATO’s decisionmaking circles was that the Czech Republic had carried out sufficient liberal democratic reforms to qualify for membership. In the words of a senior NATO official, the country had become “sufficiently like us” that it deserved to be included in the Euro-Atlantic community embodied in NATO.5 Furthermore, the Czech Republic was regarded as a very strong candidate because, according to NATO decision makers, it did not have any serious border or minority problems.6 At the same time, however, a lot still needed to be accomplished, including in the area of defense and security, if the Czechs were to evolve into a true, mature liberal democracy. Under these circumstances, NATO became heavily involved in the promotion of liberal democratic norms in the area of security, with a special emphasis on the reconstitution of civil-military relations. This process of norm-projection involved systematic practices of socialization of Czech decision makers and various societal groups, by means of teaching, persuasion, and role-playing. Socialization practices continued following the official invitation to join the alliance (issued at the Madrid Summit of 1997). They even continued—albeit within the framework of consultations rather than official accession dialogues—after Czech accession to NATO in 1999. czech definitions of democratic control of the military in the first years of the republic Following the “velvet divorce” from Slovakia and its emergence as a new state in 1993, the Czech Republic was governed by Center-Right political forces until mid-1998. In the aftermath of the 1992 elections, Vaclav Klaus (prime minister from 1992 to 1997) formed a Center-Right government for the Czech Republic, which included the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), and the Christian Democratic Union-Czech People’s Party (KDU-CSL).7 This Center-Right coalition ruled smoothly until the 1996 elections, when they failed by one seat to gain an absolute majority. But Vaclav Klaus concluded a deal with Milos Zeman, the leader of the opposition Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD), which allowed Zeman to become chairman of Parliament in exchange for his agreement not to vote against the installation of the Klaus government. In November 1997, however, following a series of scandals revolving around ODS party financing, the Christian Democrats pulled out of the coalition, effectively bringing the government down. President Vaclav

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Havel asked the KDU-CSL chairman, Josef Lux, to suggest potential leaders who could form an interim government. Of the three names on Lux’s list, Havel chose the governor of the National Bank, Josef Tosovsky. The new cabinet was formed at the beginning of January 1998 and included nine non-party members (several of them, however, were former members of the ODA), five from the Center-Right Freedom Union party (the US—formed by dissidents of the ODS), and three from the KDU-CSL. The interim government ruled until the June 1998 elections, when the Social Democrats won 74 of the 200 seats in Parliament, compared to 63 seats obtained by the ODS, 24 seats for the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (or KSCM), and 20 seats gained by the KDUCSL. The 1998 elections gave rise to the Opposition Agreement, between the ODS and the CSSD, according to which the ODS would tolerate a CSSD minority government under certain conditions. In exchange for not supporting votes of no confidence, the ODS was promised the chairmanship of both houses of Parliament, as well as leadership of essential parliamentary oversight commissions. Each party was bound to consult the other on any foreign or domestic policy issue before debate in Parliament if the other side so requested, and both parties were forbidden to enter into coalitions with anyone else. In effect, the Opposition Agreement meant that Center-Right forces continued to control key political positions in the state. In the context of this study, that particular configuration of Czech political forces meant that Center-Right groups were the main interlocutors with NATO leading up to the Czech Republic’s accession. Thus, the various formal and informal consultations and workshops, as well as the collective briefings and individual accession dialogues (which ended before June 1998) were conducted between NATO officials and representatives of the ODA, ODS, KDU, and Freedom Union. Even following the formation of the Social Democratic government in 1998, the Opposition Agreement enabled members of Center-Right parties to continue to play key roles in representing their country in consultations with NATO. In spite of their disagreements and personal animosities, the CenterRight parties were united in their vision of the Czech Republic as an emerging Western-style liberal democracy, which would resume its “natural place” in the Euro-Atlantic community.8 According to Czech reformers, their country belonged to the West by virtue of common historical roots, shared values, and traditions.9 Their definition of the Czech Republic as a (re)emerging Euro-Atlantic liberal democracy, and of themselves as a liberal avant-garde within their own country, led them to selfidentify as actors who still had to learn how to build liberal democracy, and who therefore needed advice from NATO and other Western institu-

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tions. Moreover, if their efforts at reform were to be regarded, both domestically and internationally, as leading to the establishment of a modern liberal democratic polity, they needed the approval and recognition of the established (Western) liberal democratic community that they were, indeed, on the right track toward building that kind of polity. By the time NATO became systematically involved in interactions with Czech political actors—within the framework of consultations and various PfP educational activities, and then, beginning in 1996, within the institutionalized “accession dialogues”—decision makers in Prague were no longer quite so willing to readily admit their role as “novices.” Rather, because of the growing popularity of left-wing political movements, they preferred to present a public image of confidence in their own knowledge and ability to build a liberal democracy in their country. However, in discussions with various NATO officials, both from the international secretariat and from different national delegations, and in more private settings, they continued to acknowledge their position as actors who were still in the process of learning Western-style liberal democracy.10 Revealingly, after the second round of accession dialogues with NATO, Deputy Defense Minister Jiri Payne acknowledged the Czechs’ position as novices in the area of security, as he pointed out that they still had a lot to learn in the area of planning, programming, and budgeting for security. According to Payne: “Planning security is something we never really did. It used to be made in Moscow and we only received instructions.”11 And in November 1997, following a Defense Planning Questionnaire exercise (when NATO examined the Czech Defense Planning Questionnaire), Deputy Defense Minister Jaromir Novotny noted that the Czechs “learned a great deal and discovered a number of [their country’s] shortcomings.”12 Against this background, however, there were areas in which Czech decision makers had very early on identified—what they regarded as— appropriate liberal democratic norms and institutions. In the sphere of civil-military relations, less than a year after the “velvet divorce” from Slovakia, there was a widespread view within Prague’s policymaking circles that the key reforms had already been carried out. Thus, the Czech Republic was regarded by its own decision makers as being quite advanced in the process of becoming a country with democratic control over defense and security institutions.13 Many Czech reformers repeatedly pointed out that, unlike other Central and Eastern European countries, the Czech Republic already had a civilian in the position of Minister of Defense.14 Moreover, as one of the first steps following the split from Slovakia, the Czech Ministry of Defense had carried out large-scale political screenings (aimed at identifying Communist hard-liners and ex-

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informers and removing them from office), and had initiated a series of organizational reforms, including significant personnel cuts.15 These institutional changes were accompanied by legislative acts aimed at enhancing civilian control of the military. The constitution that entered into force in January 1993 entrusted the president with formal control of the military, and assigned him the role of supreme commander of the military forces.16 But the reforms promoted by Czech leaders in the area of defense in the early 1990s departed in important ways from NATO’s definition of correct norms for governing a liberal democracy. In this respect, the Czech vision of state-society relations in a liberal democratic polity departed from the view held within NATO. The organization’s international staff, particularly members of the Office of the Secretary General, the Political Affairs Division, and especially the Division of Planning and Operations, but also members of national delegations to the organization, became increasingly worried as they began to learn more about the Czech model of civil-military relations. The problems that began to come to light in the course of dialogues with the Czech mission in Brussels, and in the workshops conducted within the framework of the Partnership for Peace and the North Atlantic Assembly, became more obvious in the more comprehensive collective briefings and individual accession dialogues initiated in 1996. In the words of a top NATO official, “We came to realize that, although they were more advanced than their counterparts in other former Communist states, these people [Czech decision makers] did not know how to rule the military except in a rigid, Sovietstyle, top-down way. They did not necessarily have the democratic convictions that we had expected.”17 According to another member of the organization’s international staff, “In essence, what they were setting up was a system of civilian, but not truly democratic control of defense institutions.”18 NATO representatives pointed, for instance, to the 1995 White Paper on Defense, which defines civilian, not democratic control as the crux of the relationship between society and defense institutions. The White Paper states that civilian control is “a feedback in the overall process of management of the military, and it is affected by Czech constitutional authorities. It is a process of open communication between the supreme authorities in the country and the topmost leadership of the Czech military.”19 In Brussels, institutional and legislative arrangements supported by Czech reformers were regarded as based on a flawed conception of the relationship between the state and society, a misunderstanding of the role of different domestic institutions in the area of defense, and an inadequate understanding of the domestic and international duties associated

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with the liberal democratic identity. The model that Czech reformers were trying to set up in the post-Communist period was one of formal checks by “the supreme country authorities,” but it did not include institutional arrangements to ensure real transparency of the defense budget and extend control to societal actors such as the mass media, non-governmental organizations, and the public in general.20 In addition to the democratic deficit, NATO officials pointed out, legislative acts governing security (in particular the legal confusion over the division of emergency powers) posed the risk of potential arbitrary suspensions of some of the basic rights of Czech citizens—for instance, through the invocation of an alleged national emergency.21 In addition, from NATO’s point of view, the pro-West Czech political elites also had an inadequate understanding of what would constitute an appropriate relationship with the other countries of the former Eastern Bloc. Thus, the tendency to depict the Czech Republic in opposition to its eastern neighbors (and, in particular, to the Balkans and the former Soviet republics), and the reluctance to cooperate with the latter was regarded by NATO as inconsistent with the duty of established and emerging liberal democracies to participate in multilateral initiatives and to help other countries in their transition to democracy.22 The growing concern within NATO decision-making circles over the situation in the Czech Republic was accompanied by a shared view that the organization had to act to change that situation. Decision makers in Brussels conceived of the organization as an agency whose mission encompassed a significant educational dimension: they were to “lead Central Europeans by the hand” in the process of setting up good domestic institutions and learning the international duties of NATO states.23 As a top NATO official argued, “It was important to get Czech and other Central and Eastern European leaders to rethink their role, to get them to think of themselves as decision makers who work with societal actors.”24 In other words, NATO was to become involved in the (re)construction of key Czech institutions around the Western-defined norms of liberal democracy, but it was to promote that kind of change by socializing Czech actors into “owning” the new norms and to regarding corresponding institutions as objectively good. As Chris Donnelly, Special Adviser to NATO’s Secretary General, put it, what was particularly important to NATO was “changing the way in which the armed forces [and their civilian leaders] think.”25 And shortly before he was appointed Secretary General of NATO, the then British Defense Secretary George Robertson referred to the Czech Army as still having to do a lot of work to completely transcend old habits and Communist attitudes.26 According to a senior NATO official, the challenge was to turn people who had “lived

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under a highly repressive and rigidly hierarchical system into members of an alliance of free states, based on consensus, shared values, and the norms of consultation.”27 The promotion of change at the normative level was regarded by NATO as especially important in helping build liberal democracy in the Czech Republic, and in preparing the country for future membership in the organization. It was, in fact, more important than achieving Czech technological compatibility with NATO allies prior to or right after accession. For example, when NATO defense ministers endorsed target force goals for the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary at a Defense Planning Committee session in June 1998, the emphasis was put on “the human factor” rather than on technological upgrading.28 During the defense planning process, representatives of the alliance explained to the candidate states that the real priority was changing the ways in which the armed forces and political elites thought about defense.29 Linked to this, and contrary to a prevalent myth that tied enlargement to the opening of Eastern markets to Western arms industries, NATO explicitly discouraged Central/Eastern Europeans from buying expensive defense equipment from the West. Moreover, NATO explicitly debunked the myth that had been spread by representatives of Western defense industries, according to which the acquisition of equipment from the allied states would be a prerequisite of accession to the organization.30 When new military equipment was deemed absolutely necessary, NATO agreed that, for political as well as economic reasons, most orders should go to the domestic arms industry.31 If, according to NATO, it was reasonable to allow Czechs to lag behind the allies in the area of defense-related technology, change at the level of norms and institutions governing civil-military relations was imperative—and NATO itself was to play an important role in promoting that change. As we shall see, the Atlantic organization did become systematically involved in the projection of Western-based liberal democratic norms in the area of defense in the Czech Republic. Through a complex set of socialization practices, NATO contributed to the (re)formulation of the prevailing Czech view of national security, and to the (re)definition of goals and priorities of the reform process in the area of defense. More broadly, NATO became involved in the socialization of the Czech public around a particular definition of national identity and interest, thus contributing to the process of structuring domestic debates and narrowing the repertoire of courses of actions deemed acceptable by political actors in the Czech Republic. At the same time, the allies worked with pro-West, often NATO-coached, elites to overcome the passivity or

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resistance to reforms of conservative Czech actors. As we shall see, NATO formed informal transnational networks with Czech reformers and combined persuasion with instrumental incentives in an attempt to change the attitudes and behavior of conservative Czech actors in areas ranging from debates about Czech membership in NATO to legislative and institutional reforms in the area of defense. In essence, NATO exercised considerable power in the Czech Republic, including in areas that are conventionally regarded as the exclusive domain of sovereign authorities (the definition of desirable relations with the outside world, the identification of key goals and priorities as well as the nature of desirable laws and institutions in the area of national defense, and the definition of threats to security). To understand the sources and the dynamics—as well as the limitations—of that power, we need to examine the complex social relationships established between NATO and various actors from the Czech Republic, and the systematic practices of socialization that were enabled by and carried out within the framework of those relationships. practices of socialization enacted by nato: teaching According to NATO officials involved in interactions with Czech actors (and other Central/Eastern Europeans), it was not enough for the latter to carry out reforms and set up new legal and institutional arrangements in the area of defense in conformity with Western-based norms of liberal democracy. Rather, the process of reform had to occur within the framework of a broader cultural change: Czech socializees had to learn new conceptual categories—categories within which NATO-prescribed norms would appear “normal,” objectively rational and ethical.32 In the words of a German NATO official who participated in consultations with Czech decision makers: “Our objective was not limited to identifying specific problems and suggesting solutions. Rather, we thought it was important for them to understand why we were pointing to those problems in the first place. It was important for them to understand the bigger picture, things like what does modern democracy look like, and how does it work?”33 Under those circumstances, NATO carried out a series of practices of teaching, aimed at shaping the Czech socializees’ “common-sense understandings” of appropriate norms of conduct in the domestic and international arenas for a modern liberal democracy. In so doing, the organization became involved in a function conventionally attributed to the sovereign state—that of interpreting the world, identifying and classify-

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ing objects and subjects populating the world, and on this basis drawing the boundaries between appropriate and unacceptable behavior toward those objects and subjects. As political theorists and sociologists have argued, this process of definition and classification involves significant power, for it entails the ability to shape political definitions of self/otherness. In this case, NATO played an important role in shaping Czech reformers’ definitions of the liberal democratic polity they were building, appropriate norms for governing that polity, and its correct relationships with the outside world.34 The process of teaching Czechs proper liberal democratic norms in the area of civil-military relations occurred within a variety of forums established by NATO. Beginning in 1994, the “enhanced cooperation” between the organization and the countries of the former Communist bloc translated into a set of consultations with Central and Eastern European decision makers, both at the NATO headquarters and in the national capitals. Those consultations became more systematic in 1996, when the collective briefings and individual accession dialogues with potential candidates to NATO membership were launched. Empirical evidence suggests that teaching was particularly facilitated by several conditions: the mutual recognition of Czech socializees and NATO socializers as, respectively, novices and masters, and intensive as well as extensive exposure of the socializees to the ideas promoted by the socializing agency. In the following pages, I document the key role of each of these scope conditions. In addition to collective briefings (organized by the International Secretariat on April 18 and May 31, 1996), NATO conducted several rounds of individual accession dialogues with each candidate state. In the case of the Czech Republic, the latter were held in beginning in spring 1996 and continuing until late 1997. Six rounds of individual dialogues conducted between May 1996 and April 1997, in which the Czech delegation, led by then First Deputy Foreign Minister Alexandr Vondra, met with an international team of NATO officials led by Gebhardt von Moltke, then Deputy Secretary General for Political Affairs. The agenda for the meetings covered issues ranging from defense policies, legislation and programs, and structures of the army, to civilian aspects of membership in NATO. These were followed, from September to November 1997, by five rounds of “intensified accession talks,” in which several of the same issues were revisited, with the explicit aim of preparing the Czech Republic for membership in the organization. While these talks addressed a series of technical issues (e.g., computer safety and procedures for security clearance for Czech personnel in Brussels), necessary if the country was to be able to function as a new NATO member, they also addressed significant substantive issues involving broad principles,

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norms, and institutions within the Czech Republic. The Czech team, led by Karel Kovanda, then Deputy Foreign Minister (and currently Czech Ambassador to NATO), engaged in discussions with another international team, led by the new Deputy Secretary General, Klaus-Peter Klaiber. These formal dialogues were complemented by a series of meetings between Czech decision makers and then NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana, and with members of, and advisers to, national delegations to the alliance (particularly the American, British, and German delegations). Interestingly, there was a substantial degree of consistency in the norms and principles taught by the various NATO representatives within the framework of the different interactions with Czech actors. As noted above, from the point of view of NATO officials, the problem with centrist Czech elites was that, although they accepted the right idea of building a liberal democratic polity and returning to Europe, their definitions of the content of liberal democracy were incorrect. Accordingly, during the course of the formal individual dialogues, as well as in more informal meetings and consultations with Czech political actors, NATO representatives set out to “correct” what they perceived to be flawed understandings of liberal democracy. NATO’s attempts to teach political elites “the right way of thinking” about liberal democracy also extended to Czech delegates to NATO. The assumption was that, through repeated exposure to the ideas embodied in NATO teachings, Czech actors would eventually adopt those ideas, rely on them to interpret different situations, and identify the “right thing to do.” In turn, it was assumed that this would dispose Czechs to act as “normal” NATO members. NATO’s self-defined mission vis-à-vis the Czechs, and more broadly, vis-à-vis people from the former Communist bloc, was succinctly expressed by a senior official from the alliance’s Political Affairs Division: “This has been a step-by-step process of introducing Central and East Europeans to the culture of NATO.”35 Interpretations of appropriate institutions for the Czech Republic were built into a discourse about the historical evolution of Euro-Atlantic liberal democracies. NATO used that discourse as a framework for defining its prescriptions regarding institutional and legislative arrangements governing the relation between different branches of the state and society, not as arbitrary ideas dictated by international actors, but as “the normal” thing to do for a society that aspires to the status of modern European liberal democracy. As a corollary to this, NATO advisers were trying to depoliticize their role, by identifying their position as that of experts of an objectively superior model of societal organization. Pierre Bourdieu captured well this apparently apolitical role of teachers. As he explained, in situations in

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which the educational agency is perceived as legitimate, pedagogical action, which involves the exclusion of certain ideas as unthinkable and the positive inculcation of an alternative set of meanings, is experienced by its subjects as neutral.36 Thus, pedagogic agents seek to portray their role as one of transfer of technical expertise rather than the dissemination of a particular normative model which embodies specific—highly political— choices about which arrangements are to be regarded as acceptable and which are to be rejected as “inherently flawed.” A close reading of the advice issued by various NATO representatives in the context of informal consultations with Czech decision makers, both prior to and after the 1997 Madrid Summit, as well as collective briefings and individual dialogues conducted between 1996 and late 1997, reveals a common discourse that was being put forward by different representatives of the organization. Discourse analysis of key texts reveals that, through the use of particular predicates (verbs and adjectives that attach to nouns), the NATO narrative defined a coherent subject, the West, defined by superior attributes of freedom, stability, and progress.37 These texts are important because they fulfill all the criteria of text selection identified in Chapter 1: they were issued by actors who had authority to interpret the reality of the Czech situation; they are characterized by clear definitions of identities and reasonable courses of action given those identities; and, finally, they were formulated in politically significant contexts. For the most part, the texts I relied on were reportedly issued in the context of collective briefings, individual consultations, and accession dialogues. In other words, they were texts issued in contexts with very real political implications, by which NATO representatives conveyed to the Central/East European officials the collective expectations of the allies, their interpretation of the situation in the former Eastern Bloc, and their prescriptions for reform. The discursive categories used by NATO representatives were not coincidental; rather, their consistent use reveals a consistent definition of the world in terms of the opposition between the Western community, as a collective subject endowed with attributes of superior morality and rationality, and an inferior, oppressive historical other (Communism and its embodiment, the Soviet bloc and its institutions). In reference to that oppositional axis, the Central and Eastern European countries were depicted in a position of becoming, of evolution from the position of association with the historical other toward a position of identification with and, eventually, (potential) full membership in the superior self. That evolution, however, was seen as contingent upon the full transcendence of the norms and institutions associated with the past, and the complete appropriation of liberal democratic norms. In representations of the West,

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the idea was that “differences and national variations” occurred against the background of “common Western values.”38 Categories of time and space were combined in that discourse, as the Western world was defined in opposition to attributes of oppression, the absence of democracy, and socioeconomic backwardness—attributes associated with the era of Communism from which Central/Eastern European states were emerging. In the discourse articulated by NATO officials during collective briefings and accession dialogues, the alliance was depicted as an essentially Western institution, which, above and beyond securing its members from military threats, had been designed to defend the values of freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and liberal individual rights. The “freedomloving” West in general, and NATO in particular, were portrayed in a relation of opposition to the authoritarian (“repressive,” “rigidly hierarchical,” “fear-based”) Communist system created by the Soviet Union. In other words, through the use of particular predicates (verbs and adjectives attached to nouns, such as “freedom-loving” versus “repressive,” “based on consensus and the norms of consultation” versus “fear-based” and “rigidly hierarchical”), the NATO discourse defined a coherent subject, the West, defined by superior attributes of freedom, stability, and progress. It was in its capacity as the embodiment of a—presumably superior—community of values that NATO was now engaged in teaching Central/Eastern Europeans “objectively correct” norms of liberal democracy.39 A British NATO official, who was also closely involved in discussions with Czech policymakers both within and outside the framework of accession dialogues, pointed out that, from the perspective of NATO teams a lot of education had to be carried out. According to him: “We had to explain to them that we, in the West, had learned to take very seriously fundamental freedoms of individuals, as well as principles of transparency and accountability to society. We had learned that nothing else would do. The problem was, we did not see the same commitment in [the Czech policymakers] that we were talking to. If they were to become like us, this had to change.”40 As it was identifying a united, superior Western world of liberal freedoms, stability, and democracy, the discourse articulated by NATO representatives was also placing the Czech Republic in a temporarily inferior position vis-à-vis the West. Czech political actors were told that their country had achieved a lot on the road toward becoming a Western-style liberal democracy. In the area of democratic control of the military, it was argued, the country had moved toward abolishing some of the key institutional features of the Communist period, and—in contrast to Poland,

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for instance—it had removed from office senior military officers associated with the pre-1989 era.41 However, in the eyes of NATO, Czech reformers had failed to learn an important lesson: that defense-related policies and institutions were not a matter of exclusive concern to the Ministry of Defense and other top civilian authorities. Rather, national security was important to, and hence required the involvement of, society as a whole.42 From that perspective, Czech reformers had misinterpreted the norm of democratic control of defense and security institutions to mean primarily civilian oversight of the military. According to NATO, the hierarchical institutional arrangements being built in the Czech Republic did not represent a particular interpretation of the liberal model, but a deviation from that model.43 As NATO officials explained to their Czech interlocutors, the institutions emerging in the Czech Republic simply could not be seen as the expression of a sui generis version of democracy. From the perspective of the teleological evolution toward the rational, “good,” and peaceful institutions of modern liberal democracy, the only appropriate destination was the one prescribed by NATO.44 Efforts to adopt norms and build institutions different from that model of polity would not lead to a different, perhaps unique set of institutions that still protected basic individual freedoms as well as democratic ideals. Rather, such a normative deviation could allegedly only lead to a relapse into some of the problems of the country’s authoritarian past, thus threatening to revive elements of the historical “other” (Communism) that the Czech reformers were so keen to leave behind. The diffusion of broad sets of ideas regarding the nature of liberal democratic polities and NATO’s role in representing and promoting them was accompanied by the dissemination of specific ideas about the nature of threats in the post–Cold War period. In particular, according to NATO’s teachings, security was synonymous with the existence of domestic norms and institutions of liberal democracy, held to be the common foundation of the Euro-Atlantic community embodied in NATO. On this logic, “No state that has embraced democracy can be a threat to NATO.”45 The notion of security as primarily the product of “good” domestic institutions was coupled with the idea that no state was, by virtue of its nature, incapable of building such institutions. Finally, NATO’s teachings also encompassed the norms that were regarded within the organization’s decision-making circles as key in enabling NATO to function as an institution of the liberal democratic community. In their daily interactions at the NATO headquarters, members of the Czech delegation—together with other Central European actors—

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were taught the norms and procedures designed to facilitate consensusbuilding within the Atlantic Council.46 In the course of formal meetings with the international staff, as well as members of various national delegations, but also during informal social events, Czech actors—together with other Central Europeans—were introduced to the habitus governing interactions within the council. This encompasses broad conceptual schemes within which problems are identified, arguments are formulated, and solutions are debated among the allies (e.g., collective understandings regarding the role of NATO as a liberal democratic security institution that does not seek to threaten anyone, not even its former enemy, Russia). It also encompasses explicit practical rules and procedures for conducting NATO business (e.g., rules of extensive networking and persuasion in friendly contexts).47 In many cases, different national representatives, as well as the international staff, take advantage of informal meetings to persuade their friends or potential allies to support them in introducing proposals for certain courses of action in official council meetings. At other times, they try to convince dissenters that their opposition is ill-founded, that the policy supported by the majority really is the best response to a given security problem, and therefore those who initially opposed it should withdraw their opposition.48 In addition, the North Atlantic Assembly (now called NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly—the PA) organized more than a hundred seminars and workshops with actors from the former Communist bloc, including the Czech Republic. The workshops were aimed at diffusing knowledge about the normal functions of parliamentary defense and security committees, and procedures for ensuring democratic control of the military, to members of parliamentary staff as well as members of Parliament (MPs) from Central and Eastern European states. Together with ongoing interactions between the permanent (NATO) members and associate delegations (from PfP countries), those educational activities created venues in which Parliamentarians from NATO states and those from partner countries could interact. The goal was to provide the latter with ample opportunity to learn about some of the challenges of Parliamentarians in democratic societies, and common ways of dealing with those challenges. Within the PA framework, the Rose-Roth program of cooperation with the Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe was initiated in 1990, with the explicit aim of strengthening the development of parliamentary democracy in the former Communist countries. The Rose-Roth Initiative consists of a series of seminars designed to “promote the development of appropriate civil-military relations, including the democratic control of the armed forces,” to “familiarize legislators with key security

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and defense issues,” to “share expertise and experience in parliamentary practice and procedures,” and “to help the development of a parliamentary staff structure in the CEE Parliaments” and thus provide CEE parliamentarians with administrative assistance comparable to their Western counterparts.49 In essence, the Rose-Roth Initiative is aimed at promoting a sense of identification and improving understanding among the new and established members of the assembly, leading the Central and Eastern European novices to interpret security challenges in a manner consistent with the norms of the Euro-Atlantic community, while at the same time teaching them the specific skills associated with the identity of Parliamentarians/security experts in a liberal democracy (e.g., teaching them how to act as members of defense committees in their countries). Thus, NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly can be seen as a forum for diffusing a new, Western-based habitus, teaching Central and Eastern Europeans new ways of thinking and acting in the area of security. As Trine Flockhart has shown, in the PA social learning also takes place through seminar presentations and committee work, in which the assembly presents a common Euro-Atlantic interpretation of key foreign and security issues, teaching Central and Eastern European actors to interpret the situation, identify problems, and formulate solutions within the framework of that Euro-Atlantic interpretation.50 In addition, in order to secure recognition as members of the in-group (within the assembly and in the wider Euro-Atlantic community), the Central and Eastern European socializees must learn a series of norms and behavioral rules involving the use of the in-group’s norms and standards for evaluating performance and interpreting key foreign and security issues, and they must adopt rules and procedures in plenary and committee work.51 The Parliamentary Assembly’s socialization work is carried out in the absence of material incentives: as Flockhart has pointed out, the assembly does not have any specific material rewards to give to the Central/Eastern European socializees; full membership in the assembly is a function of NATO membership; and there is little difference between full members and associate members, in any case.52 Teaching “Next Generation” Elites In addition to teaching Czech decision makers and representatives in Brussels, NATO was also concerned to cultivate in future Czech elites a habitus that would dispose them to act in accordance with NATOdefined liberal democratic norms. In the field of security, this translated into an effort to teach young Czech’s particular security-related schemas

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that would enable them to be interoperable with the allies. This, it was thought, would also prevent a return to old, Communist practices in the area of defense. NATO has also been concerned to cultivate a specific set of understandings of Western-defined liberal democracy as the only appropriate mode of governance. In the view of NATO decision makers, the socialization of future political, military, and administrative elites into Western norms of liberal democracy was the best way to ensure that, in the future, the Czech Republic would act as a “normal” Western state.53 The format of most socializing activities targeting future leaders was different from those involving Czech policymakers. Interactions with members of the policymaking apparatus and with military elites involved significant elements of socialization, but NATO was concerned to maintain the image of the alliance’s respect for the freedom of the democratically elected government of the Czech Republic. As a result, most of the Czech–NATO interactions at the level of decision makers took the form of meetings among partners, and the terms “debate,” “consultations,” and “dialogue” were systematically invoked in reporting those meetings, both to the Czech public and to the international community. For their part, in conversations with NATO advisers Czech elites recognized that they are, in many regards, novices. But outside of that context, out of their concern to maintain credibility vis-à-vis their constituents and to avoid being labeled as “poodles” of the West by some of their constituents, politicians were reluctant to admit that NATO was helping them define some of the key goals and priorities of the post-Communist reform process. By contrast, in the socialization of future elites, the format of interaction was much more governed by the logic of overt pedagogical practices, in which the roles of teachers and students, as well as the hierarchical implications of this relationship, were clearly identified. Since the end of the Cold War, hundreds of courses for young military officers and civilians from ministries of defense and foreign affairs have been set up within the Partnership for Peace. These involve long-term courses at the Partnership training centers in partner countries (including Romania); at the Partnership Coordination Cell (in Mons, Belgium); at the Geneva Center for Security Policy; and at various defense institutions in NATO member states. Preexisting NATO educational establishments, such as the NATO Defense College or the Marshall Center for Security Studies, were adapted so as to respond to new security needs, and to an audience that included numerous students from partner countries. Yearlong (or longer) courses were combined with shorter seminars and exercises, which brought together officers from the armies of PfP and NATO

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countries as well as civilian personnel from ministries of defense and foreign affairs. They were aimed at achieving “mental interoperability” as well as practical cooperation in addressing various problems of domestic and international instability. To get a sense of the extent of NATO’s involvement in the education of young military and civilian experts from the former Eastern Bloc, it is worth noting that in 1997 alone—the year when the allies decided to enhance and further develop the PfP program—sixty-three courses/workshops were organized in the area of democratic control of forces and defense structures within the framework of the Partnership for Peace. The average attendance for each course was around forty people—military and civilians—from Central and Eastern Europe, including the Czech Republic. It is also worth noting that the number of PfP educational activities for 1997 nearly doubles if we take into account not only the courses that explicitly addressed the question of democratic control of the military, but also activities grouped under the heading of “civil emergency planning.” While civil emergency planning did include a series of technical subjects, such as warning and detection systems, it also encompassed subjects such as civil-military cooperation, civil aspects of crisis management, cultural heritage protection, the role of the media in informing the population in crisis situations, and legal aspects of exercise planning. Nor does that include all of the courses/training sessions that incorporated particular, Western-defined norms regarding appropriate civil-military relations and correct legislation in a liberal democracy.54 It is also worth pointing out that the number of courses/training sessions in the areas of democratic control of the military and civil emergency planning increased in 1998, 1999, and 2000. With respect to long-term courses (one year or more) organized at the NATO Defense College, the Marshall Center, and various military academies from allied states, by 1999 the number of Czech graduates exceeded 1,000.55 American, British, and German NATO officers involved in teaching Central and Eastern Europeans within the framework of PfP courses pointed to a growing allied concern regarding the persistence of Communist ideas and attitudes in many of the countries of the former Eastern Bloc, and about the strength of domestic groups who were opposed to the transformation of those countries into Western-style liberal democracies.56 Starting from the view that the long-term survival and strength of democracy in Central/Eastern Europe depended on the cultivation of Western-style liberal democratic elites, NATO teachers set out to teach the young Central and Eastern Europeans the proper norms of liberal democratic governance in the area of security. Though diversity within the shared norms was acknowledged, as NATO teachers from different

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allied states explained the particularities and the merits of their national models (e.g., the specific constitutional provisions designed to ensure democratic control over the military), they were all in agreement in explaining to their Central/Eastern European students that building democracy did not entail a choice between different sets of norms. Rather, it required the full adoption and implementation of a unique set of norms—the liberal democratic norms promoted by the alliance. Within the various NATO/PfP educational activities, Central European students, including Czechs, were introduced to “common-sense” ways of defining the world and appropriate types of responses under different circumstances. In spite of course-specific differences, there was a significant consistency in the representation of reality to which these students were introduced in the course of their NATO-sponsored education.57 Participants in PfP courses and graduates of the Marshall Center spoke of a certain degree of initial distrust on the part of their instructors and Western colleagues. One analogy that repeatedly came up in their narratives was that of the poor relative whose rich, sophisticated relatives invite him to dinner but never let him forget the social and economic gap between them.58 The Central and Eastern Europeans were, apparently, constantly reminded that they still had a lot to learn if they wanted to evolve into Western-like liberal democracies. NATO instructors did reportedly acknowledge the progress made by the Central and Eastern Europeans in overthrowing Communism, but at the same time they constantly pointed to the complexities (and incompleteness) of the reform process, and reiterated the importance of completing the break with the past. References were made to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and in some of the former Soviet republics, as reminders of the danger of collapse into an authoritarian, nationalist, and violent mode of being that threatened the countries that did not complete the reform process and did not embrace the liberal democratic project. By contrast, often by analogy to the NATO allies’ history, and particularly the reinvention of West Germany as a progressive liberal democracy after World War II, the Central and Eastern Europeans were reassured that they had the potential to evolve into full members of the Euro-Atlantic community of values.59 This, however, required the abandonment of all attitudes, mentalities, and practices inherited from the Communist era and the taking on of the duties associated with the liberal democratic identity—that is, complying with liberal democratic norms in the domestic as well as the international arenas. General teachings of broad principles (the rule of law, human rights, democracy) were accompanied by more specific efforts to teach a partic-

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ular mode of thinking and acting (i.e., a particular habitus) in the area of security. Most of the courses, workshops, seminars, and other pedagogic activities carried out within the PfP framework were centered on one or more of the core security-related liberal norms. Thus, NATO teachers introduced their Central and Eastern European students to norms of democratic control over the military, multilateralism, and peaceful conflict resolution, presenting those norms as defining features of modern democracy and thus as norms that must be adopted by all those seeking to build democracy. This was often achieved by stressing the contrast between the Western democracies, who took those norms for granted, and others (both historical and contemporary)—that is, polities that did not accept those norms and as a result experienced a series of problems generated by the lack of accountability of the military, or by the arbitrary use of the military by authoritarian civilian authorities. NATO teachers often explained the origins of those norms, presenting them as the result of a process of historical evolution toward more rational and ethical modes of governance, and explained their meaning and implications (e.g., the norm of parliamentary oversight of the military means that the military must work with civilian bodies to ensure the transparency of the defense budget; accountability of the armed forces means that soldiers have the right, even the duty, to disobey illegal orders). In other words, many of NATO’s interactions with Czech socializees followed the sociological pedagogic logic outlined above. Thus, those activities were explicitly aimed at teaching students to regard Western-defined norms as the correct foundation of a free, democratic polity; they did not simply provide information about the conditions attached to NATO membership. Nor did NATO teachers simply seek to convince Czech decision makers to change their minds about “X” or “Y” policy or course of action. As we have seen, far more about a particular action was involved in the educational activities examined above, which involved the diffusion of a broad set of conceptual categories for making sense of the world, and practical dispositions for acting in that world. Within the framework of the NATO/PfP educational programs, Central/Eastern European participants occupied the role of students being exposed to a new culture, to new ways of understanding the world and thinking about building post-Communist polities. The courses and workshops organized within the PfP Consortium, at the Marshall Center, at the NATO Defense College, or by the North Atlantic Assembly, were not about promising instrumental rewards to Central/Eastern European socializees in exchange for their compliance with NATO-prescribed rules and norms. In fact, it is difficult to see how a system of incentives might have operated within the framework of those programs, which targeted

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a plethora of actors, many of whom had no decision-making power— hence, no power, at that point in time, to carry out the reforms expected of NATO candidates. In other words, to a significant extent, NATO’s socialization practices seem to have involved the creation of a key condition of the possibility of construction and reproduction of liberal democracy in the Czech Republic and other countries of the former Eastern Bloc. Thus, the statements as well as the actions of NATO representatives indicate an effort to educate a reliable, self-disciplined set of actors, who, in the future, will think and act within the framework of the liberal democratic habitus even in the absence of international supervision. practices of socialization enacted by nato: persuasion Against the background of systematic teachings, NATO representatives also engaged in persuasion. As in the case of teaching, this type of socialization practice was facilitated by a series of conditions. To begin with, persuasion was facilitated by the existence of a common “lifeworld” (i.e., a common set of values and shared interpretations of reality), enabling the participants in particular instances of communication to debate and reach consensus on the definition of the situation, to claim rights and invoke duties. In addition, persuasion was easier when the persuadees trusted the persuader’s competence and intentions. This means that persuasion was facilitated by successful educational practices. Thus, to the extent that the Czech socializees had already adopted the worldview taught by NATO, further social communication occurred within a shared normative framework, enabling allied representatives to formulate arguments within a set of Western-defined interpretations of the world that their Czech interlocutors also accepted as correct. In addition, that group of socializees had already accepted the authority of NATO as a legitimate normative guide in the process of reconstruction of their polity. As a result, NATO representatives engaged in attempts at persuasion found it easier to be recognized as trustworthy, knowledgeable participants in debates regarding the desirability of particular actions. However, one should not assume that successful prior teaching guaranteed the success of particular attempts at persuasion. As we shall see, in some instances Czech socializees adopted the norms taught by NATO regarding the proper norms for governing a liberal democracy, but challenged the specific allied prescriptions, arguing for a different interpretation of those norms. There have been instances in which persuasion occurred separate from

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teaching. In some instances, the subjects that NATO representatives were seeking to persuade did not accept their role as “students,” or the authority of the organization as a legitimate teacher of norms. Under those circumstances, attempts at persuasion involved convincing those Czech actors that “X” reform was consistent with their own normative framework, and that, in the special case under consideration, NATO could be trusted to give correct advice. Acase in point involves NATO’s interaction with the Czech Social Democratic government on the question of membership in the alliance. Shortly before the invitation to membership was to be issued, NATO was facing the potentially embarrassing situation of inviting a country whose recently elected Social Democratic government had expressed doubts about—and was calling for a referendum on—the question of NATO membership. Worse, from the allies’ point of view, according to public opinion polls, as late as 1997 a referendum on this question would have resulted in a clear “No.” Under those circumstances, senior NATO officials joined efforts with Czech liberals to try and persuade the conservative leadership of the Social Democratic Party to reconsider the implications of NATO membership.60 Thus, NATO Secretary General Solana apparently tried to convince the Social Democratic leadership that there was no inconsistency between the Social Democrats’ priorities of protecting the Czech national “uniqueness” and sovereignty, and integration in NATO. In other words, rather than try to teach Social Democratic decision makers new norms of appropriate behavior, NATO’s secretary general formulated persuasive appeals within the socializees’ own normative framework. Secretary General Solana argued that the Czech Republic, like any other member, would have effective veto power within the organization. Moreover, he reportedly pointed out, nothing would prevent the country from leaving NATO at a later point in time if it so chose to do. By implicitly invoking his special authority as the official entitled to speak on behalf of NATO, Solana explained NATO’s modus operandi, its long-established rules of consultation, as he sought to convince his interlocutors that membership in that kind of organization was not inconsistent with the vision that the Czech Social Democrats had of their country. There are, however, indications, especially in dialogues with the more conservative leaders of the Social Democratic Party, that NATO, acting together with pro-Western domestic forces, also resorted to more coercive instruments of influence. In agreement with Czech reformers, in informal conversations with Social Democratic leaders held in early 1998, senior NATO officials pointed out that there was a danger that continued insistence on a referendum might send a signal to the West that the Czech

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Republic still did not understand the role and nature of NATO, that it was still affected by the Communist mentality. They argued that this might, in turn, undermine the international prestige of the Czech Republic, and possibly have an adverse impact on its relationship with NATO.61 This type of attempt to change the Social Democrats’ position seems to fall into Iain Johnston’s category of social influence—particularly, shaming. As Johnston has explained, social influence works in the form of mediated normative influence: “I believe the answer was X [i.e., referendum], but others said Y, and I don’t want to rock the boat, so I’ll say Y.”62 The idea, in our case, seems to have been to shame conservative Social Democrats into reconsidering their position vis-à-vis the referendum by presenting the referendum as a course of action that was unreasonable— and regarded as such by all progressive actors in the Czech Republic. From that perspective, support for the referendum appeared as a negative marker, an indicator of old (stigmatized) Communist mentalities. Following those interventions, at a parliamentary meeting held on March 20, 1998, the Social Democrats dropped their demand for a referendum and expressed their unconditional support for NATO membership. Interview-based evidence suggests that both persuasion and social influence contributed to this outcome. In the case of younger, more moderate Social Democrats, persuasion seems to have led them to regard the referendum as unnecessary.63 For the more conservative members of the party, including Prime Minister Zeman, it is not clear that persuasion had any substantial effect. Rather, it is reasonable to argue that the shift in their position was influenced by the more coercive “shaming”—that is, by the concern that they might appear, internationally and domestically, as actors with Communist mentalities who threatened to “rock the boat” of Czech integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.64 In interactions with pro-liberal Czech reformers, however, NATO’s attempts at persuasion frequently occurred against the background of teaching. In those cases, NATO representatives typically taught liberal democratic norms to their Czech socializees, then tried to persuade the latter to enact particular legislative and institutional reforms by portraying those reforms as the right way of translating the new norms into practice. As we noted earlier, from NATO’s point of view the problem was that even those Czech political actors who had come to subscribe to Western-based norms of liberal democratic civil-military relations had failed to promote a series of reforms deemed, in the West, as key to a liberal democracy. Under those circumstances, in a series of—mainly private—consultations, NATO sought to persuade Czechs to (re)think their definitions of desirable domestic arrangements in the area of defense. 65

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instances of persuasion: legal and institutional changes One of the key issues that was the object of NATO’s persuasive efforts was the redefinition of the national strategic concept of the Czech Republic. In the course of individual accession dialogues (1996–97), as well as informal consultations with NATO advisers, which began in 1994 and continued even after the Madrid Summit of July 1997, Czech decision makers were told that the strategic concept embodied in the 1994 national defense documents was inadequate.66 The view of the Czech Republic and its “correct” relationship to the world that was inscribed in those documents was, it was argued, in tension with the norms characteristic of the type of state that reformers in Prague wanted to build.67 For instance, the strategic concept was based on the identification of a pre-given adversary. Although that adversary, Russia, was not portrayed as a military threat, it continued to be a source of risk to the Czech Republic because it was engaged in “an effort to recreate its political and economic influence in Central Europe.”68 Under these circumstances, NATO advisers resorted to appeals about consistency in an effort to convince Czech decision makers to rethink their strategic concept, to come closer to the allied view regarding the nature of security and the proper relationship between an emerging liberal democracy like the Czech Republic and the outside world, including Russia. The argument was that the old Czech strategic concept reflected an inappropriate interpretation of liberal democratic norms. NATO had already established, in 1990–91 (at the time of the formulation of the first post–Cold War strategic concept), that, in the new context, commitment to the norms of liberal democracy required participation in international efforts to promote democracy, and precluded the identification of a pregiven, fixed enemy. Under these circumstances, the Czech failure to adopt that approach reflected a divergence between the norms of liberal democracy, which reformers from Prague claimed to embrace, and actual foreign-policy principles and practices.69 The argument put forward by the allies went beyond the logic of instrumental incentives, which would have involved telling decision makers in Prague that their accession to NATO might be endangered by failure to formulate a coherent, NATO-approved national strategic concept.70 The invitation to accede to the organization had already been issued, and there is no indication of allied second thoughts on that subject between 1997 and 1999. NATO’s efforts to persuade Czech reformers to promote legislative changes were not limited to the national strategic concept. In the period

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leading up to, but also following, the Madrid Summit, Western advisers who participated in individual accession dialogues, as well as in private consultations in Prague, sought to persuade Czech decision makers to change key legislative acts governing national emergencies, as well the legislation on conscription. The problem, from NATO’s perspective, was that many aspects of defense were still governed by old Communist legislation.71 According to a senior NATO official, in their interactions with Czech decision makers, Western advisers had to be increasingly specific in their guidance. In his words, “We started from broad guidelines, but, as we proceeded, we became increasingly aware of the limitations in their [the Czechs’] conception of correct legislation in this area. Therefore, we realized that we would have to give them detailed advice if we wanted to see significant legislative change.”72 A key technique of persuasion used by NATO representatives in this area was, again, consistency: Czech decision makers were told that the lack of legislative change in the area of national emergency generated ambiguity in the definition of jurisdiction held by different branches of government, and, hence, created not only problems of efficiency and transparency in the case of an emergency but also, very importantly, entailed the potential for abusive suspension of the basic rights of citizens. Further threats to the individual rights of Czechs came from the absence of new, post-Communist legislation governing conscription. And, such threats to the basic rights and freedoms of citizens were incompatible with the norms of liberalism and democracy that the Czech Republic claimed to embrace.73 According to NATO representatives, the promotion of new legislation in this area was the right thing to do, in a normative sense. Simultaneously, it served the true interests of the Czech Republic, as it helped to consolidate democracy, eliminating the risk that, at some future point in time, some political leaders might take advantage of a legal loophole to violate the rights of their citizens. In addition, NATO advisers also mobilized the technique of authority: the argument was that Czech decision makers should trust the advice that was being provided by officials from NATO countries. After all, the representatives of the alliance pointed out, they had significant expertise in that area because in their own (established liberal democratic) countries they had had to learn how to balance the requirements of legislation that ensured effective military responses to crises, while also protecting basic principles of individual rights and freedoms, transparency, and democracy that are at the heart of a liberal democratic society.74 Linked to that, NATO representatives sought to change the definition held by Czech decision makers regarding the proper relationship of state/society in the area of defense. In the 1996–97 accession dialogues,

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and in separate consultations conducted in Prague in 1997, advisers from NATO member states sought to persuade Czech political actors to set up new institutions in order to empower civil society in the realm of defense. They argued that it was normal to create a new body within the ministry that would ensure communication and cooperation with the public, thereby ending the isolation and lack of transparency that still characterized the relationship between the minister of defense and society.75 In their effort to lead Czech decision makers to change their policies and institutional arrangements governing the relationship between the state and society in the area of defense, NATO representatives relied in particular on the technique of consistency. Thus, they repeatedly pointed out that a country that aspired to the status of a modern, Euro-Atlantic, liberal democracy could not afford to maintain arrangements that effectively excluded societal actors from debates and decision making related to national defense. Czech actors had already learned that the correct model of civil-military relations in a liberal democracy involved democratic control, not just civilian oversight of the military. But, the problem was, although reformers from Prague now seemed to accept that definition of civil-military relations, they continued to maintain institutional arrangements that precluded democratic involvement in defense issues. As American and German advisers, acting within the framework of NATO accession dialogues, pointed out, failure to reform those defenserelated institutional arrangements indicated the persistence of socialiststyle mentalities and modes of governance.76 In turn, the inconsistency between the norms of liberal democracy and this type of behavior posed obstacles to the process on which Czech reformers had embarked, that of building a Western-style state identity for their country. targeting the public: the public relations campaign to secure support for nato A complex case of persuasion and teaching through which NATO sought to influence the definition of Czech national identity and goals was the public relations campaign related to the issue of accession to NATO. Contrary to common perceptions held by Western publics regarding the desire of all Central Europeans to join NATO, in the Czech Republic, as late as 1997, the level of public support for membership in the organization was quite low. Public opinion polls reveal that in June 1997 only 37 percent of Czechs were in favor of entry into NATO, as compared to 31 percent against membership and 32 percent undecided.77 Following the Madrid Summit of July 1997, when the Czech Republic received a

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membership invitation, the level of public support was still under 50 percent (a poll taken in August 1997 showed 45 percent support, compared to 27 percent against and 28 percent undecided).78 This split in public opinion reflected disagreements among key political parties—and their respective supporters—regarding the desirability of joining NATO. In turn, these divisions were founded upon different conceptions of Czech national identity. For the liberal coalition (the Civic Democratic Party, Freedom Union, and Civic Democratic Alliance), the issue of membership in NATO was tied to the idea of a “return” of their country to the Euro-Atlantic world, where it “naturally” belonged. From this perspective, common historical roots, values, and ideals that the Czech Republic shared with the Western world rendered integration into the institutional structures of that world as “normal.”79 According to the liberal position, one of the key Western institutions that the Czech Republic had to join was NATO. Czech reformers did not anticipate the threat of the military confrontation in the foreseeable future. Rather, they regarded accession to the Euro-Atlantic organization as a symbol of acceptance by the West, and a source for the further progress of military reforms in the domestic arena.80 Another argument put forward by the liberals—albeit an argument that was rarely used in public following the individual accession dialogues—was that integration into NATO would not only consolidate democratic reforms, it would also diminish the power of pro-Russian forces in the Czech Republic, and would limit the international political and economic influence of Russia.81 In essence, accession to NATO would play an important role in the process of (re)asserting the Western identity of the Czech Republic, thereby ending the “unnatural” ambivalence in definitions of national identity that had been caused by the socialist experience of the country. In contrast to the position articulated by the liberal coalition, Communist and nationalist groups, united around the Communist Party of Czech and Moravia and the Association for the Republic–Czech Republican Party, stressed the importance of cultivating the uniqueness of Czech culture and society. From this perspective, the international others with whom the Czech Republic had historical, linguistic, and cultural affinities were not primarily Western states but other Slavic nations. These were the ties that had to be encouraged in the new Czech Republic, while at the same time ensuring that the sovereignty of the country would not be undermined by international arrangements. From the point of view of Communist and nationalist groups, entry into NATO would entail a substantial loss of sovereignty, opening up the country to Western interests.82 One version of this argument can be found in the words of Oskar Marek—associated with the Communist Party of Bohemia and

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Moravia—who portrayed NATO “as a force which is intended to protect and widen the domination of capital groups and their elites.”83 Between those extreme poles, the Social Democratic Party proposed the country’s integration into Western structures in a way that would not endanger the “unique national character” of the Czech Republic. Milos Zeman’s Social Democratic Party subscribed to the idea that, given Czech cultural affinities and historical connections with the Euro-Atlantic world, a partial “Westernization” of the country was the appropriate thing to do. However, rather than arguing in favor of turning their country into a fully Western state, the Social Democrats were in favor of building a set of institutions that included certain (albeit reformed) economic and sociopolitical arrangements that were drawn from the “positive” aspects of the recent past of the country. In the context of the debate surrounding NATO’s enlargement, the Social Democrats’ vision of Western integration in a way that preserved a unique position for the Czech Republic translated into proposals for a “Scandinavian status” which would, presumably, limit the loss of sovereignty and help the country protect its national character and goals against excessive Western interference.84 In concrete terms, this would translate into a ban on the stationing of NATO troops or nuclear weapons on Czech territory, and the submission of the question of membership in the alliance to a referendum. The Social Democratic Party argued that, since membership in NATO was an issue bound to affect the sovereignty of the Czech Republic, it was a constitutional requirement to submit the question to a referendum.85 The idea of a referendum was rejected by the liberal coalition, who argued that no loss of sovereignty would result from accession to the Euro-Atlantic alliance. After all, they pointed out, NATO is an alliance of sovereign states, where every decision is made by the rule of consensus.86 Initially, the low public support for NATO membership was not regarded as a major problem in Prague. The position of liberal Czech decision makers was that the public lacked sufficient information about the nature and the role of NATO. Holding a referendum under those circumstances posed the risk of signaling to the West that the Czech population was still deeply affected by socialist mentalities and hence not “sufficiently Western” to deserve inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic institution.87 While senior NATO officials agreed that it was not advisable to hold a referendum that might result in a rejection of the idea of Czech membership in the organization, they regarded the lack of public support as a very problematic issue.88 The widespread perception in Brussels was that this reaction on the part of ordinary Czechs revealed the failure of their decision makers to perform their leadership functions. Czech reformers

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should have explained to the public why the liberal democratic norms and values of the Euro-Atlantic community represented the correct, “good” model of governance, and why, far from undermining state sovereignty, joining NATO could only protect and help promote those norms.89 The issue of low public support for Czech membership in NATO was raised in the course of individual accession dialogues, when senior officials representing the organization persuaded Czech decision makers that they had to remedy that problem.90 Empirical evidence indicates that NATO representatives resorted to persuasion via the technique of consistency. Thus, they pointed out that there was a serious inconsistency between the Czech reformers’ self-defined identity as the avant-garde of modern liberal democracy in their country, and their actual relationship with the public.91 According to NATO representatives, it was the duty of leaders to “lead the citizens,” to explain to them why a certain course of action was in the national interest of the country. Having gained the Czech delegation’s acceptance that a public relations campaign was needed to educate the public about the alliance, NATO offered its support in the management of such an educational campaign. The organization’s media office, together with other advisers from the international staff, worked with policymakers and media representatives from Prague to manage an intensive campaign that was aimed at bringing the level of public support for NATO to over 50 percent.92 In that case, NATO helped organize an educational campaign aimed not only at persuading the Czech public to support membership in NATO, but also at legitimizing a particular definition of the relationship between the republic and the rest of the world, and delegitimizing alternative visions of national identity. As we have seen, Czech domestic debates on NATO concerned not just the issue of membership in an alliance, but also the broader question of definition of the collective distinctiveness and international role of the country. In that context, NATO’s intervention sought—and succeeded in—affecting processes of national-identity construction, which are often regarded by International Relations experts as essentially domestic. As part of the process of integration in NATO, in June 1997 the liberal government had created a special Intergovernmental Committee for Integration in NATO. The committee, which consisted of representatives of the foreign, defense, finance, industry, and trade ministries, was expected to coordinate all activities regarding Czech integration into NATO, and to formulate a national plan of compatibility with the organization.93 The question of public education in the spirit of NATO was raised within this committee, and resulted in the Ministry of Defense being asked to

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formulate a plan for communication with the public, and, on this basis, collaborating with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in preparing an extensive public relations campaign. NATO’s Office of the Press and Information was closely, albeit informally, involved in providing ongoing guidance in identifying strategies for the effective management of the campaign.94 This educational effort found expression in an intensive media campaign, which ran from the end of 1997 until March 1998, and included TV and radio programs as well as newspaper articles and speeches by political leaders, all of which sought to project a particular interpretation of the meaning of NATO membership within the broader context of the Czech Republic’s relationship to the Euro-Atlantic community. As we shall see through an analysis of some of the key texts and images circulated in 1997–98, the pro-NATO campaign revolved around a discourse that linked the question of membership to the broader theme of Czech belonging in the West, and thus sought to portray all opposition to the country’s accession to the alliance as inappropriate and irrational. The texts selected here are important because they were issued by actors with authority to define the world (since this was a government-sponsored campaign), and contain a clear statement of the identity of the Czech Republic and of the Western community embodied in NATO. Moreover, these texts had important political implications in terms of structuring domestic views of NATO. Some Czechs did not regard NATO as a legitimate teacher of norms, and certain groups (particularly the nationalists and the socialists) associated the organization with Western imperialism and with an American conspiracy to master the world.95 Reformers in Prague transcended this problem of legitimacy by having domestic actors with substantial political authority as builders of the post-Communist Czech Republic (e.g., President Havel) convey the message to ordinary Czechs. Also, during the public relations campaign, popular Czech actors and musicians provided “flashy pro-NATO testimonials, arguing that “NATO will boost our independence and help us gain international respect.”96 The campaign consisted of daily prime-time programs in the government-controlled media, which included not just explicit informational bulletins, but also more informal endorsements by popular artists, and which systematically excluded any statement of doubt on the desirability of joining NATO.97 The meaning of this campaign was concisely espoused by a senior official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who pointed out: “In a situation in which the public was so ill-informed about NATO, it was important to present the question of membership in the organization as not a partisan, but a national issue, with serious implica-

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tions for the future evolution of the Czech Republic.”98 A series of publications were issued by domestic NGOs (especially the Prague-based Center for Democracy and the Czech Atlantic Commission) which have close links to NATO. For instance, the Center for Democracy established a NATO Information and Documentation Center in Prague, whose explicit objective was to educate targeted Czech groups. The center issued publications aimed at politicians, journalists, teachers, and students, and convened several discussions on NATO issues with prominent politicians (including President Havel). In addition, it also produced, in close cooperation with the Ministry of Defense and the NATO Office for Press and Information, popular educational films on the accession to NATO, and organized seminars with Czech “opinion-shapers” on the question of the relationship between their country and the community of values embodied in NATO—depicting the Czech Republic as a natural member of Western structures.99 Following NATO’s prescriptions, the educational campaign did not present the alliance as being in opposition to Russia. Rather, NATO was presented as a source of security and stability in a complex context of uncertainty. Though different in form and in the kind of audience that they were targeting, all those activities sought to legitimize a certain interpretation of Czech national identity: by virtue of its history, the Czech Republic belonged in the Euro-Atlantic community. Several pro-NATO television infomercials featured a chessboard with the Czech Republic as a pawn, subject to a long history of international aggression, Great Power manipulation, and domestic oppression (under Soviet-sponsored Communism). Against this background of historical tragedies, voice-overs presented NATO as a trustworthy source of stability, progress, and security. This was achieved by narrating NATO’s history—presented as a story of strength against Communism, cooperation and respect among the allies united around shared values, and successful protection of Western civilization against a multitude of threats.100 Discourse analysis of some of the main statements issued in that context reveals that the story of NATO put forward during that public relations campaign placed emphasis on what were presented as natural connections to the West. The discourse put forward by the pro-NATO team invoked a natural affinity with the Western world, depicted as a “messianic” figure, which “will help us achieve political stability.” 101 The Czech Republic’s return to that messianic entity was justified by reference to history and basic shared values. President Havel’s statements remain particularly powerful expressions of this view of Czech identity as inextricably linked to the West and as an integral part of Western Europe. In his words, “NATO entry meant the acceptance of principles of human

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rights, parliamentary democracy, and free market economy.”102 In response to the widespread public reluctance to take on the obligations entailed by the Washington Treaty, President Havel sought to present those as duties that were inherent in the identity of the Czech Republic as a member of Western civilization. In his words, in a situation in which NATO is “an alliance which protects a certain civilization circle with its cultural tradition and responsibility,” acceptance of the duties of membership represented nothing less than the Republic’s “determination to meet its share of responsibility for the freedom of nations, human rights, democratic values and peace in Europe.”103 In essence, the pro-NATO team sought to redefine the issue of NATO membership as not simply a choice to join a defensive alliance, but as a defining moment in Czech history—the moment when the Czech people would have the responsibility to affirm their true identity (as members of Western civilization) and to take on the duties associated with that identity. The discourse underlying the messages presented in various forms in the public relations campaign placed the Czech Republic in a position of ambivalence vis-à-vis the Western world. An analysis of those texts reveals a reiteration of the discursive categories we identified earlier in NATO teachings targeting Czech elites as well as the next generation of leaders and defense experts. More broadly, the pro-NATO campaign reiterated representations of the alliance formulated by the allies during the Cold War. It also built upon images that were popular among Czech dissidents during the Cold War, particularly the image of the Czech Republic as European in essence but alienated from Europe due to the imposition of a foreign-inspired political regime. Here, again, we find a discourse organized around an oppositional axis; the opposition is that between the West, identified as a coherent subject and defined by attributes of ethical and rational superiority, and, as a more diffuse subject position, the nationalist and socialist forces, both within and outside of the Czech Republic, represented as the legacy of the Communist past and, as such, the enemy of democracy and freedom. As an analyst of the Czech mass media put it: “Such slogans [used in the campaign for NATO membership] call up a common feature of Czech political culture, the messianic concept.” Having finally escaped from Soviet influence, “we must hide under the umbrella of a strong power, who will help us achieve political stability.”104 In the context of that opposition, the Czech Republic was defined as a subject characterized by attributes of weakness by virtue of its recent history (the “pawn” finally recovering its freedom and needing a “messianic” figure to protect it), yet also by the potential to transcend that weakness and assume the rights and duties associated with the community in which it truly belonged. Milan Kundera’s well-known met-

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aphor of the “kidnapped West” was implicitly reiterated in this presentation of the Czech Republic as a country that had been forced for a long time to live in isolation from its natural community, the West. Its historical membership in the Western civilization meant, however, that the Czech Republic had both the potential and the duty to complete the process of return to “normality,” to join the Euro-Atlantic community and accept its duties as well as its corresponding rights. According to the media discourse formulated by Czech reformers and NATO advisers, failure to support the integration of the country into the West could only be seen as a failure to affirm the true identity of the country and threatened to strengthen the power of conservative (nationalist and socialist) forces over the country. That course of action was seen as unacceptable. In a similar vein, it was pointed out that, while the Czech Republic could and should maintain friendly ties with other Slavic nations, it should not forget that its main connection, grounded in shared values and ideals, was the connection to the Western world.105 The educational discourse sought to delegitimize the idea of potential Czech neutrality, of a unique position between East and West. The notion involved was that, given the historical and geographical characteristics of the country, such a solution would actually entail a relapse into the undemocratic past. As messages disseminated to the Czech public on a daily basis argued, “‘We’ [the Czech Republic] are a small state,” and a state that has only recently escaped Communism; as such, “we need a strong partner promoting democracy.”106 That is, through the technique of naturalization, the discourse put forward by Czech reformers in cooperation with NATO advisers portrayed the choice of joining the alliance as an obvious course of action—indeed, the only conceivable course of action given the country’s identity. Thus, a particular situation was presented as a given (i.e., the Czech Republic’s identification with the Western community) that “naturally” gave rise to certain consequences (the need to return to the West and the move to join Western institutions) and made other consequences seem inconceivable. In other words, the public relations campaign was tied to a broader process of promoting a particular definition of national identity structured around a specific set of relationships with the outside world (in particular, a strong identification with the West) and involving also an effort to delegitimize alternative domestic visions of national identity. Within the framework of these teachings about the relationship between the Czech Republic and the Euro-Atlantic world, Czech reformers, working with NATO advisers, sought to persuade the public to support Czech membership in the alliance. The discourse that identified a natural affinity between the Czech Republic and the Western world also depicted NATO as the institutional embodiment of that world. Accordingly, join-

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ing NATO was portrayed as the normal, obviously appropriate thing to do for a country that shared the values of the Euro-Atlantic community. In the context of a traditional mistrust among the Czechs for the military, the managers of the public relations campaign stressed that NATO was far more than a military alliance, and completely different from the Warsaw Pact. In contrast to the pact, which had been a tool of Central and Eastern European oppression in the hands of the Soviet Union, NATO was a defender of human rights, parliamentary democracy, and free-market economies.107 Efforts at persuading the public to support NATO membership relied heavily on the technique of consistency. In media articles and television and radio programs, as well as in public workshops and movies organized by the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs in cooperation with NATO-sponsored Czech NGOs and NATO’s Office of Information and the Press, Czech citizens were told that there was an inconsistency between their commitment to the norms of democracy and human rights and their failure to support membership in the organization that embodied and promoted those norms.108 practices of socialization enacted by nato: role-playing In addition to teaching and persuasion, practices of socialization carried out by NATO also encompassed role-playing (or role-enactment), which targeted in particular the “next generation” military and civilian elites of Central/Eastern Europe, including the Czech Republic. The idea behind role-playing was that, to operate effectively in NATO activities and international peace-building missions, Czech actors had to share the organization’s culture and adopt its rules of behavior. That is, the dissemination of the principles of “good behavior” was carried out, to a significant degree, by having selected Czech actors play the roles expected of NATO military and civilian experts. Drawing on the work of social psychologists, I suggested in the previous chapter that role-playing would be more successful in inculcating new attitudes and behavioral patterns in a given set of socializees in situations in which it involved active immersion in the prescribed role. Consistent with those findings, we shall see that roleplaying exercises conducted by NATO were especially successful in situations (1) when they did not involve subjects being asked to enact roles that contradicted deeply ingrained habits; and (2) when, in the course of their training, the socializees repeatedly and actively enacted NATO-prescribed roles without having to simultaneously perform conflicting roles (e.g., in their domestic arenas).

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In some cases, role-playing was used in conjunction with teaching. Particularly—but not exclusively—in long-term courses organized within the Partnership for Peace framework, the North Atlantic Assembly, and other NATO/PfP-related institutions (e.g., the Geneva Center for Security Policy), the combination of teaching and role-playing was used in an attempt to shape, directly and indirectly, the socializees’ understanding of appropriate norms of liberal democratic governance. In those cases, students participated in overt pedagogical activities such as lectures and seminars, in the course of which specific knowledge about the “proper” norms of civil-military relations was conveyed to them. They learned, for instance, about the norms of democratic control of defense-related decision making; about constitutional limitations on the power of the military; transparency and accountability and the role of the media and parliamentary committees in implementing those principles, and so forth. A second stage in their education involved role-playing, in which students from the Czech Republic and other former Communist countries received guidance on how to translate those norms of liberal democracy in practice. This involved having them participate in NATO exercises where they had to fulfill duties expected of actors from the allied states. We noted earlier that hundreds of courses/training sessions were conducted within the framework of the Partnership for Peace between 1994 and 2000. Of those, more than half encompassed not just teaching but also some form of role-playing. Given the limitations of time as well as logistics associated with my research, it was impossible to do more than examine a few examples within the space of this study. However, NATO officials and Czech representatives to NATO confirmed that the patterns of interaction analyzed below were fairly typical of role-playing practices conducted within the PfP framework.109 For example, a series of seminars on issues of civilian control of the military in a democratic society took place between 1997 and 1999. Those seminars, conducted by Western representatives, and particularly by officers of the German armed forces (Bundeswehr) involved military officers and civilians as well as NGOs from the Czech Republic and were aimed at leading Czech students to understand “what is going on in the process of democratic control of the military, and to familiarize them, in practical terms, with the major instruments of this control.”110 In that case, role-playing was combined with teaching: Czech socializees learned about the principles and mechanisms of democratic civil-military relations, and then, during practical exercises, had to act in accordance with the principles they had learned. This was similar to the dynamics of a PfP workshop on civil emergency planning carried out within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in April 1999. The aim of the workshop was to in-

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troduce partners from emerging democracies to the practice of appropriate interaction between civilian and military officials in national emergencies, when tensions might arise between the requirements for military efficiency and the protection of basic rights and freedoms of citizens. The description offered by participants in the workshop indicates that this was, primarily, a role-playing exercise.111 True, there was a general theoretical introduction to the liberal democratic norms of civil-military relations—again, presented as the normal way of governing a democratic polity in the area of security—but most of the workshop involved more practical exercises. In the course of those exercises, Western teachers had the Central and Eastern Europeans work with their colleagues from allied states in mock decision-making situations in which they had to act in accordance with principles of constitutional, inviolable human rights, and had to adopt the NATO language rules of behavior in interacting with each other. Activities carried out within established educational institutions such as the NATO Defense College (Italy), the Marshall Center (Germany), and the Geneva Center for Security Studies have also involved role-playing as well as teaching. Czech students, together with representatives from other Central and Eastern European countries, were taught specific principles governing the relationship between states and society in the formulation of defense-related policies; the role of journalists and MPs in controlling the actions of the defense establishment; the normative framework within which the military must act in addressing civil strife and other emergencies; the inviolable rights of conscripts, and so forth. They were then asked to act out those principles: instances of role-playing occurred when “students” from former Communist countries were asked to work together with their teachers, as well as their Western colleagues, to find solutions to a series of potential problems of domestic and international instability facing them. The scenarios ranged from hypothetical situations in which the military must find a balance between efficiency and respect for the supremacy of civilian authorities in dealing with a domestic emergency situation, to situations in which parliamentary defense committees must restore control over abusive military establishments, to those in which officers must respect humanitarian laws in a situation of ethnic conflict, even when they run counter to direct orders.112 Within the framework of teams involving both allies and partners, Czech socializees were asked to emulate their Western peers in finding and implementing solutions that respected a constitutional framework of the inviolable liberal rights of civilians (versus, say, arbitrary suspension of the right to freedom and property). Such instances of role-playing were designed to cultivate in Central/Eastern European socializees the habit of

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acting in accordance with Western-prescribed norms, and, hence, indirectly, to cultivate in them the right dispositions in terms of normative references used as guidelines in decision making and implementation. A second purpose of role-playing concerned the creation of a transnational community based on shared ways of thinking about—and acting in—the world, but also on personal relations of friendship. As an expression of this, NATO-sponsored educational activities sought to create a comprehensive network of contacts among participants in these courses, who would, presumably, be the future leaders of NATO and Eastern European countries.113 In this context, the process of role-playing was extended—albeit in a more diffuse way—to the informal but systematic social activities that invariably accompany NATO courses and workshops. By encouraging repeated identification with the group within the framework of a broad array of activities, NATO sought to create an enduring sense of “oneness” among Western and Eastern civilians and military officers. This was accompanied by a similarly systematic effort to perpetuate the sense of collective identity through extensive alumni networks, which facilitate contact among the graduates of those courses, seminars, and conferences.114 This, it was assumed, would lead students to promote those same norms and values in the future, and to work with their transnational contacts to overcome domestic obstacles to change. Systematic practices of role-playing were also carried out within the framework of the IFOR/KFOR missions in Bosnia. In fact, those missions were regarded by many NATO officials and Central/Eastern European socializees as a key forum for “on-the-ground” socialization. As Czech— and other Central European—contingents were integrated into larger allied units, they had to act “as if” they were already NATO members, and had to learn allied behavioral patterns and rules of conduct. Thus, for instance, they had to learn the NATO-defined proper norms governing the relationships between officers and soldiers, the relationships between the military and political authorities, as well as proper modes of interaction with the civilian population from the host country.115 In other words, to borrow Bourdieu’s terminology, role-playing exercises involved systematic attempts at diffusing the allied habitus to Czech and other Central/Eastern European participants in NATO/PfP missions and educational activities by inculcating in them not only a particular set of conceptual categories for analyzing the world, but also specific behavioral dispositions for speaking and acting in a recognizably NATO-like manner. Those exercises were aimed at turning the actors from the former Eastern Bloc into interoperable NATO partners, that is, partners who would interpret problems and security threats—and respond to those threats—on the basis of the same conceptual and practical dispositions used by the allies.

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effects of socialization Socialization activities carried out by NATO had a significant impact on the ideas and attitudes of Czech socializees, as well as on the policies and defense-related practices enacted in Prague. By examining the different levels of socialization effects, this study seeks to take a step in the direction of addressing a problem of earlier research in this area, which did not connect (possible) changes in the attitudes and beliefs of individual socializees to actual changes in state policy and behavior.116 I am not suggesting that all the efforts made by NATO representatives to influence Czech policymaking were successful. As I discuss in the next section, the organization failed to effect change in several important issue areas. However, a set of important changes did occur after the organization began its socialization efforts, and it is reasonable to argue that they would not have taken place had it not been for NATO’s involvement. In the domestic arena, the Center-Right political coalition that the organization sought to influence was the political force with the most serious commitment to the idea of implementing Western-style liberal democratic reforms in the country. Yet, as we have seen, the model of civil-military relations that Czech reformers were proposing prior to their interactions with NATO was very different from, and in some ways in tension with, Western expectations of appropriate democratic control of the Czech military. In a situation in which there was no other political party or movement to push those actors in the direction of further Westernprescribed reform in the area of defense and security, it is reasonable to argue that, left to their own devices, reformers from Prague would have promoted norms and institutional arrangements that differed from those proposed by Brussels. In the international arena, NATO was by far the agency with the greatest involvement in the reform of Czech defense institutions. It is revealing, for instance, that in accession dialogues with the EU, there was no significant emphasis on civil-military relations. The EU indicated several areas in which the Czech Republic needed to carry out reforms if it was to qualify for membership, but these did not include democratic control of defense institutions. The implicit assumption seems to have been that this issue area had been taken care of by NATO.117 It is true that both the EU and the OSCE organized some seminars and workshops in this area (for instance, the PHARE seminars on the role of officers in a democratic society, held in 1999). However, those were designed as complements to, rather than substitutes for, the more systematic, wide-reaching NATO/PfP educational activities.118 Following educational activities carried out by NATO, there was a sig-

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nificant shift in the definitions of liberal democratic norms governing defense and security put forward by Czech reformers. The idea of becoming democratic and returning to Europe may have been the same as it was in the early and mid-1990s, but the content that Czech liberal elites ascribed to appropriate liberal democratic identity changed. For instance, the Czech reformers came to redefine the proper relationship between state and society, and to reconceptualize the respective roles of various state agencies and civil society actors in the area of defense. Contrary to the initial definition of civil-military relations, in terms of oversight of the military exclusively by top civilian authorities, Czech elites came to regard democratic accountability and transparency as crucial aspects of the control of the military in a liberal democratic society. The top-down vision of relations between political leaders and the defense establishment was replaced by a collective understanding among Czech decision makers that institutional arrangements in an area as important as national defense needed to include societal actors. At that same level of collective understandings among policymakers, there has been a shift in the definition of threat, away from a predefined (potential) enemy, Russia, and toward a more diffuse set of risks. These conceptual transformations are reflected in a new discourse on national defense and security. The new discourse on defense was articulated vis-à-vis different audiences and in diverse forums. These ranged from official declarations on the reform of the armed forces (where the democratic control of the military and the integration of the armed forces into society were declared the key governing principles), to statements issued in the course of workshops and seminars aimed at teaching schoolchildren, university students, and the public at large the new norms of defense.119 There is a revealing consistency between definitions of appropriate defense-related institutional arrangements articulated in public and those put forward by Czech reformers in more private contexts. In interviews conducted by the author in spring 2000, defense and foreign affairs officials, as well as their assistants and Czech political scientists, all stressed that transparency and societal involvement are a “normal” and “necessary” aspect of democratic control of the military.120 The changed discourse on defense and security was no mere rhetoric. Not only did Czech pro-reform political actors advocate the new norms in a consistent manner, both in public and in more private contexts, but, taking advantage of their decision-making power, they also incorporated the new defense norms in a series of key documents formulated in 1999, including “Security Strategy of the Czech Republic” and “Military Strategy of the Czech Republic.” Contrary to the 1995 White Paper on the Defense of the Czech Republic, which, as noted above, identified Russia

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as a potential adversary on the political and economic fronts, the 1999 “Security Strategy of the Czech Republic” marked the move away from the identification of a particular, predefined adversary or enemy, and a shift toward the variegated definition of “risks” embodied in NATO’s strategic concept.121 As a corollary to this, the Czech perception of Russia has moved from one of a predatory adversary to one of potential partner.122 The new conception regarding appropriate arrangements in the area of security found expression in a set of legislative changes, most of which were passed in 1998 and 1999, and included a new Constitutional Act on the Security of the Czech Republic, and a package of laws to complement the Constitutional Act. The legislative drafts, approved by the government in February 1999, were passed in Parliament on September 14, 1999, and began to be put into practical application during 1999– 2001.123 The new legislative package was designed to redress problems identified by Western advisers in the course of NATO accession dialogues and private consultations in Prague and Brussels. For instance, the Constitutional Act defined the terms of a “state of emergency” and, together with subsequent defense-related legislation, sought to regulate the conditions under which military and security forces operate in times of crisis. The 1999 Conscription Act (Act No. 2 18/1999) was designed to regulate compulsory military service and to allow for alternative service in cases in which conscripts’ beliefs run counter to the duties of a soldier. In a similar vein, Act No. 220/1999 on the Progress of the Basic Military Training and Substitute Service clarified the rights and duties of citizens with respect to the fulfillment of conscription duties. Also important was Act. No. 2 19/1999 (on the Armed Forces), which specified the legal status of soldiers and reservists and defined the responsibilities and powers of the agencies that exercise control over the armed forces. Thus, in contrast to previous legislation, which had been characterized by confusion and lack of transparency, “for the first time in history, the new act defines in a uniform and comprehensive manner the powers of the President, the Government, the Ministry of Defense, the Minister of Defense, the Chief of the Presidential Military Office, and the Chief of the General Staff.”124 It is also worth pointing out that the new legislative package sought to limit the threat of abusive suspension of basic individual rights (such as the right to property or freedom of movement) in situations when a state of national emergency is declared.125 The process of approving new legislation in the area of defense provides interesting evidence of the work of networks consisting of NATO advisers and Czech reformers to promote domestic reforms. We noted above that in the course of NATO accession dialogues and private con-

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sultations in Prague and Brussels, Western advisers sought to persuade Czech governmental officials to promote particular legislative changes. Subsequently, NATO advisers helped Czech socializees to secure domestic support for those changes. Thus, even though they had come to subscribe to NATO’s view of desirable legislative reforms, Czech officials were facing the challenge of securing parliamentary approval for the new legislation. That threatened to become a problem due to the fact that many MPs (particularly those associated with the Social Democratic Party, but also some of the liberals) were either not interested in passing defense-related legislation or objected to some of the provisions of the new laws. The ability of Czech reformers to avoid long delays—or, worse, rejection—in Parliament was facilitated by the fact that, working in agreement and with the aid of NATO, they were able to present the new legislation as “a central requirement of membership.”126 Consequently, they effectively shamed MPs into supporting the legislation by presenting the situation as one in which parliamentary delays or opposition to the adoption of the new laws was synonymous with “rocking the boat” of smooth Czech integration into NATO—and those responsible for that outcome would bear the guilt of diminishing the prestige of their country and making it “look bad” within the alliance. Another important area of change concerns the role of societal actors, particularly NGOs, in the formulation of defense policies. Following practices of teaching and persuasion in which NATO representatives stressed the importance of empowering civil society in the area of defense, Czech reformers initiated a series of institutional changes with the aim of enhancing the role of societal actors in the area of defense. For instance, at the end of 1997 the Defense Ministry approved the “Conception of Relations and Communication of the Defense Department with the Public,” which led to the creation of a public relations department within the Ministry, and institutionalized consultations between the Ministry and Czech NGOs.127 And in 1999 the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs identified as an important goal the creation of a defense community consisting of societal actors who would cooperate with governmental agencies in formulating and monitoring the enactment of defense and security-related reforms. Importantly, legislative and institutional reforms aimed at implementing liberal democratic norms in the field of security—some of them seeking to redress the specific problems identified by NATO—continued after the Czech Republic had received “the carrot” of membership and in spite of the fact that the alliance does not have significant “sticks” for dealing with problem members. For example, at its session on August 29, 2001, the Czech government approved documents on the preparation of the re-

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form of the armed forces, and stated that the key governing principle of the armed forces would continue to be civilian management and democratic control. Thus, “the integration of the Armed Forces into the democratic society will go on and become more profound.”128 Among other things, the reform documents provide for further improvements in communication and consultation with the public, continuation of the process of civilianization of the Ministry of Defense, establishment of a more efficient and transparent (liberal) economic management of the defense sector, and adoption of more legislative acts to reflect the new (liberal democratic) identity of the Czech Republic and its new role as a NATO member. However, while the reform process in the area of defense continued after the Czech Republic’s accession to NATO, it is also worth pointing out that, in the months following the Washington Summit, NATO officials also became increasingly aware that the completion of the process of establishing Western-prescribed liberal democratic institutions would take longer than expected. That was due to the fact that both NATO and—to some extent at least—Czech reformers had underestimated the complexity of the problems involved in the transformation of defense and security institutions.129 As regards the impact of NATO-led educational practices that targeted the Czech public, it is revealing that, as a result of the 1997–98 public relations campaign managed by Czech reformers at the advice and under the guidance of NATO, the public became more supportive of the Republic’s accession to NATO. Depending on the opinion poll one takes into account, the level of public support reached between 55 percent and 65 percent in March 1998.130 Importantly, this signified a shift to over 50 percent support, which enhanced the image of legitimacy of the government’s decision to take the country into NATO. Thus, leaders acting from Prague Castle could legitimately claim that, far from making an important decision in abstraction from, or, worse, against the wishes of their people, they were acting on behalf of the majority of Czech citizens. From NATO’s point of view, one of the problems associated with the Czech accession to the organization had been transcended.131 In the domestic arena, this evolution marked the growth in popular support for the view that the Czech Republic belonged in the Euro-Atlantic community, and should therefore join Western institutional structures rather than maintain a unique position between the West and the East. The campaign managers succeeded, at least in part, in portraying the “return” to the Euro-Atlantic world as the only appropriate course of action given the history and values held by Czechs, and in representing membership in NATO as one “normal” aspect of that civilizational reintegration. At the same time, the campaign undermined the popularity of

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alternative (particularly nationalist and Communist) visions of Czech national identity, which would have entailed a more limited embrace of the West. Joining NATO would have been an unacceptable, irrational course of action from within the perspective that identified the organization as the tool of Western imperialism, bent on exploiting the Czech Republic and undermining its unique national character. As a result of socialization practices systematically conducted over the course of a few months, significant numbers of people who had previously supported some special status for the Czech Republic came to accept the vision of full integration into the institutional structures of the West. For instance, from among the supporters of the Social Democratic Party, over 53 percent were in favor of NATO membership in March 1998, as compared to approximately 44 percent in September 1997. Among the supporters of the Communist Party of Czech and Moravia, the number of proponents of the “Yes” position on NATO membership doubled in the same period of time (although it remained low, in absolute numbers, evolving from 7 percent to 14 percent). Increased support for NATO was also registered among people who backed the nationalist Republic Party, and it became even stronger among those who expressed solidarity with the Civic Democratic Alliance (moving from 90 percent to over 93 percent in March 1998).132 It is too early to talk about the effects of socialization on the young civilian and military experts who graduated from NATO courses/workshops. After all, many of them are subjects who, as they do not occupy decision-making positions yet, have not had the chance of translating their ideas into visible actions. Nor have they had the opportunity to articulate a political discourse on the basis of—or contrary to—the ideas promoted by their teachers. However, on the basis of interviews with a few NATO teachers, as well as some of the former alumni and students of those educational activities, it is possible to explore some of the preliminary effects of NATO-sponsored socialization. It seems that, in many cases, the practice of teaching and role-playing did make a difference. In the Czech Republic, former students and their colleagues, as well as Western advisers, talk of a significant difference between those actors and their non-Western socialized counterparts.133 Former Western students tend to define particular problems in ways consistent with the principles into which they were socialized, and seek to gather institutional support for solutions that are consistent with Western-defined norms of appropriate action. In military circles, both NATO officials and Czech socializees and analysts talked about the emergence of “common understandings of problems and possible solutions” and a greater sense of community with the

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allies in the aftermath of NATO’s socialization practices.134 Similarly, graduates of courses and other educational activities carried out by the North Atlantic Assembly seem to have been changed by their Western training. Reportedly, there has been a significant change in the attitudes of those members of the Defense and Security Committees in both houses of Parliament who returned to the Czech Republic following a training period in Brussels. There has been a change in the self-definition of appropriate roles of special parliamentary committees, coupled with an increased—and qualitatively different—participation in the monitoring of policies proposed by the Ministry of Defense. Members of the Defense and security committees—often trained in NATO forums such as the Parliamentary Assembly—have become more critical of proposals made by defense officials, more concerned to promote the principles of transparency and accountability with respect to the formulation of the defense budget.135 In essence, far from simply providing information regarding the condition attached to membership in the alliance, in interactions with a multitude of Czech actors NATO carried out systematic socialization practices aimed at teaching those actors a new conceptual framework and new practical dispositions for making sense of, and acting in, the world. In many cases, those practices of socialization did have a powerful impact on the Czech socializees. Contrary to what conventional wisdom about the Atlantic alliance might have led us to expect, NATO affected the definitions of national identity and interest held by Czech actors, leading them to adopt Western-based norms of governance in the area of security, to redefine the purpose of key state institutions and their proper relationship with society, and to reconceptualize the relationship between the Czech Republic and the outside world (e.g., toward a transformed strategic concept reflecting a new conception of security threats, and away from old definitions of the enemy). the power to educate and its limits: conditions that facilitated or impeded socialization We noted above that teaching is typically facilitated by mutual recognition of the actors’ respective roles as “teachers” and “students.” In the present case, as we have seen, there was a shared understanding among NATO officials involved in interactions with Czech actors that they had to educate the latter—to lead them to understand and adopt appropriate, NATO-based norms in the area of defense. For their part, in private if not in public, most Czechs who represented their country in the dia-

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logues, workshops, and consultations with NATO accepted their role as actors who still had to learn about the process of building liberal democracy. This was important because it placed those actors in a learning position, which, by definition, entailed the possibility that some other actor(s) would occupy the position of teacher.136 It is true that, prior to their systematic socialization by NATO, Czech reformers had already formed an idea of the kinds of legal and institutional arrangements to be established in the area of defense. As we have seen, however, there were substantial differences between the Czech reformers’ vision of what a liberal democratic polity should look like and the views that prevailed within NATO decision-making circles. Under these circumstances, their basic acceptance of their “learning position” rendered reformers from Prague open to criticisms articulated by NATO representatives. Although rarely acknowledged in public, the vision they had of themselves as still engaged in a process of learning the norms and institutions of liberal democracy meant that Czech reformers were receptive to Western advice—even after they had obtained the promise that their country would be included in the first wave of NATO enlargement. As they were learning a new role, that of builders of Western-style liberal democratic institutions in their country, Czech reformers needed the guidance, as well as the recognition, of the existing international liberal democratic community that the reforms being carried out in the Czech Republic were the right ones. That is, the dialogical formation of state identity occurred against the background of a recognition among liberal decision makers that, by virtue of its identity, the Euro-Atlantic world was the relevant generalized other—the international social group by which the Czech Republic had to be recognized as “one of us.” Under these circumstances, Czech leaders accepted the guidance of “teachers” from within that community in the process of constructing a new national identity for their country. By contrast, it was much more difficult for NATO to teach the “reformed socialist” actors who had joined the Social Democratic Party, or Communist or nationalist parties. From the perspective of those socialist or nationalist groups, the issue at stake was not the complete (re)construction of Czech society on a Western model. Rather, the process was one of reasserting the unique elements of Czech national character, albeit in a manner different from the pre-1989 forms of expressing that character.137 As a consequence, they did not regard Western institutions as the relevant generalized other in that identity-building process.138 Nationalists and Communists have repeatedly argued that integration into EuroAtlantic structures threatens to bring the Czech Republic under the exploitative influence of Western imperialism. From this perspective,

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Western institutions appear as potential threats to the Czech identity rather than as authoritative guides in the process of state-crafting. A related condition that facilitated teaching involved the ability of NATO to secure recognition in the eyes of Czech decision makers as a legitimate teacher of liberal democracy, as the kind of agency that had the expert knowledge to teach appropriate norms of behavior. That is, not only did Czech decision makers regard the Euro-Atlantic community as the relevant generalized other, they also came to rely specifically on NATO as a legitimate institutional expression of that generalized other. At the heart of this was their acceptance of the Western discourse that NATO was not just an alliance, but, at a deeper level, embodied the Euro-Atlantic community of values. As President Havel pointed out in several speeches addressed to the Czech public, NATO represented “a key democratic structure” of the West.139 That acceptance of NATO’s identity as more than a military arrangement led Czech policymakers to be open to NATO teachings and to invite representatives of the organization to play important roles in processes conventionally associated with sovereign authority. As we have seen, NATO became involved in several aspects of the process of reform, ranging from the organization of public relations campaigns regarding the proper role of the Czech Republic in the world, to guidance on legislative and institutional reforms designed to establish proper relationships between state and society in the realm of defense, and to the identification of national security priorities in key strategic documents. These conditions of mutual recognition also seem to have facilitated education in the case of “next generation” elites. Evidence suggests that it mattered that some subjects of socialization identified themselves as “novices” who had to learn new norms of behavior. Similarly, it mattered that they recognized Western organizations, particularly NATO, as a legitimate teacher of norms. Interviews with Czech graduates of NATO courses and with some of their teachers indicates that there was a strong tendency among students who accepted the educational authority of the organization to adopt the ideas and norms taught within NATO forums, and to rely on them as “schemas of classification” through which they could interpret the world and define the boundaries of “normal” ways of being and behaving.140 It is revealing that several attempts to educate Czech actors, that occurred in the absence of those conditions of recognition, failed. For instance, although NATO’s main focus of education has been on the younger generation, there have been cases when older civilians and officers were invited to participate in NATO-sponsored courses. But, for the most part, there was little affect on those subjects who had been thor-

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oughly socialized under the Communist regime. Those “students” did not define themselves as novices and did not have the openness associated with that role. At the same time, those of the younger students who strongly identified with nationalist or Communist parties and had strong political opinions running counter to liberal ideas, did not recognize the authority of NATO as a teacher, and tended not to be very influenced by that training.141 Another condition that facilitated teaching involved ongoing, systematic interaction between NATO representatives and subjects being socialized. As we have seen, the Euro-Atlantic organization has taken advantage of its numerous forums, ranging from collective briefings and individual accession dialogues to PfP and Atlantic Assembly educational activities and informal consultations in Brussels and Prague, to guide the evolution of Czech reformers. As Pierre Bourdieu argued, in order to be successful, educational practices need to be carried out over a relatively long period of time so that students come to take certain ideas and principles for granted. That kind of systematic teaching could not have taken place if NATO had limited its involvement to a few discussions and consultations with Czech decision makers. Both NATO officials and Czech actors, including political analysts, government officials, and graduates of NATO/PfP courses, argued that even within the category of pro-reformers, there is a significant difference between those who were systematically educated into Western ideas and those who only participated in a few short sessions of socialization. The former tend to subscribe to norms taught by NATO and to define problems and identify solutions within the framework of those norms to a greater degree than the latter.142 In the case of younger students (e.g., graduates of PfP courses), there is, reportedly, a similar difference between those who graduated from long-term educational programs and those who only attended a couple of seminars/workshops. One problem with the evidence on systematic interactions is that it does not enable one to assess the importance of intensive—relative to extensive—exposure to socialization. Thus, instances of intensive socialization also tended to be extensive in duration. For instance, actors deeply involved in dialogues and consultations, or in the case of “next generation elites,” various courses, were exposed to NATO ideas over a long period of time (months, sometimes years). For others, socialization was limited both in intensity and in duration. As far as practices of role-playing were concerned, we noted earlier that they were more likely to be successful in situations where they did not involve subjects being asked to enact roles that contradicted deeply ingrained habits, and where, in the course of their training, the socializees

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had to repeatedly and actively enact the NATO-prescribed roles while at the same time not enacting alternative (potentially conflicting) roles. Indeed, those actors who actively participated in repeated instances of roleplaying are reported to have adopted behavioral patterns conforming to the expectations of the given role to a greater extent than their counterparts whose involvement was limited to one or two role-playing instances.143 The most successful cases of socialization appear to be those that involved long-term teaching and repeated role-playing for actors removed from their domestic context and trained abroad. For instance, students who spent one year or more at PfP/NATO-related educational institutions and participated in systematic teachings and “active” role-playing (i.e., had to act repeatedly “as if” they were NATO members) appear to have significantly altered their behavior and attitudes.144 But recurring and active role-playing also seems to have played an important role in changing the behavior and even reshaping the attitudes of actors who had either not been exposed to teaching or had resisted learning because they did not recognize the legitimacy of NATO/PfP teachers. For instance, officials form the Czech Ministry of Defense, as well as Czech delegates to NATO, argued that soldiers and civilians who participated in IFOR/KFOR missions, hence, had to actively enact NATO-defined roles for a significant period of time, returned home with different behavior patterns. Sometimes they even sought to teach their colleagues NATO’s norms and ways of doing things, for example, in the area of civil-military cooperation and soldier-officer relations.145 There were a few cases in which the mechanism of role-playing worked so well, and students initially opposed to liberal ideas identified so well with the role they were playing, that eventually they came to be aware of a serious inconsistency between the principles and norms that they held and the principles on which they were “playing.” As a way of dealing with that inconsistency, they ended up attributing to themselves the principles of the role they were playing. In other words, they persuaded themselves of the ideas expressed in the role and simultaneously moved away from their old, anti-liberal ideas. For instance, there were several young officers from the Ministry of Defense and staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs whose political orientations tended toward a “reformed” version of socialism.146 At the start of the socialization process, they did not accept NATO as a legitimate teacher and they did not regard the norms and principles that the organization was prescribing as “normal” and unproblematic. Rather, they were suspicious of an institution that they perceived as the tool of the Western world seeking to gain an unacceptable degree of influence in Central and Eastern Europe. It seems that, in their cases, they agreed to participate in NATO-sponsored edu-

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cational activities for narrow, instrumental reasons (e.g., they liked the idea of taking time off from work and spending time in Western capitals). However, that participation required role-playing in accordance with the liberal democratic norms promoted by NATO. Social psychologists argue that actors in such a situation will seek to reduce the tension between the ideas embodied in the role and the principles they held prior to engagement in role-playing through a technique of self-attribution.147 That is, they will come to convince themselves that they participated in role-playing because they believed in the ideas of the role in the first place. In so doing, they abandon the ideas previously held. In the cases that I examined, where role-playing lasted over a few months, such an ideological change through self-attribution is exactly what happened. Actors who had been previously opposed to the West, and to NATO and its teaching as a “tool” of the West, came to accept Western norms of liberal democracy as a superior, rational, and ethical model of governance, and NATO as a helpful guide in the process of implementing such a model in the Czech Republic. Regarding persuasion, as expected, in interactions with Czech actors who had learned Western-defined norms of civil-military relations, NATO’s attempts to shape attitudes regarding particular courses of action were often successful. In those situations, NATO representatives had the advantage of a common lifeworld, or common normative framework, within which rights/duties could be invoked and appropriate action—by reference to shared normative standards—could be defined. Moreover, those Czech socializees had already accepted the idea that, in principle, NATO was an authoritative voice in the area of norms and principles of governing civil-military relations. As we have seen, through persuasive appeals formulated in the context of those shared understandings, NATO succeeded on several occasions in getting Czech actors to change their views regarding particular reforms/courses of action. However, while prior teaching facilitated persuasion, it did not guarantee its success. In some situations, although subscribing to the liberal democratic norms taught by NATO, Czech officials questioned the validity of the argument according to which a given norm translated into the specific policy that the organization was advocating. One relevant case was the failure of a British adviser acting as a consultant to the Czech Ministry of Defense to persuade the officials with whom he was interacting to set up an integrated emergency security system. In late 1996 and early 1997, there was a growing perception among NATO advisers who were monitoring defense-related reform in the Czech Republic that the country’s different security services designed to

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deal with emergency situations were too decentralized, that they had unacceptably weak institutional links to one another.148 The British adviser sought—unsuccessfully—to convince his interlocutors to abandon what he perceived as the “excessively decentralized” institutional model of crisis management that had been chosen in Prague. Yet, Czech reformers challenged the validity of the argument, reportedly arguing that, while a centralized system designed to deal with emergencies might be a good solution in established liberal democracies of the Euro-Atlantic world, it was inappropriate in the particular case of the Czech Republic. According to them, given the particular history and persisting Communist mentality in those institutions, re-centralization would recreate some of the authoritarian bureaucratic tendencies of the past.149 In that case, the problem was one of breakdown of authority in a situation in which the persuadees perceived a tension between the liberal principles to which NATO was formally committed and the particular solution prescribed in response to a given problem—a solution which appeared to the Czech reformers to involve a return to Communist-style arrangements. Accordingly, Czech actors argued for a particular application of norms of liberal democracy that differed from NATO’s interpretation of the same norms. In brief, while Czech reformers were receptive to the criticism that they were not doing enough to overcome the Communist legacy, they were less open to NATO’s suggestions that, in some areas, they had taken the reform process further—for instance, NATO’s argument that their efforts to overcome Communist centralization had gone so far as to become almost irrational. In that context, they rejected advice that appeared to them to create institutional features that resembled past Communist arrangements, and that, it was argued, threatened to bring back problems characteristic of the pre-1989 era.150 The British adviser was unable to persuade them that centralization in that particular area was needed, and his attempt at persuasion failed. Interestingly, in the end the Czechs did come to recognize the need for a state mechanism for emergency planning—but this occurred only after the 1997 floods, which made it painfully clear that the lack of a coordinated approach, and more broadly, the lack of a clear definition of the duties and powers of state bodies, was undermining the country’s ability to respond effectively to crises. Following the floods, the government finally established a State Security Council to make decisions concerning which orders to the army would be signed by the president. Also, the State Security Council was to be consulted in making decisions on army tenders, thus bringing a national perspective to such orders. As Jeffrey Simon has argued, “This was a major step forward and filled an important Czech institutional vacuum.”151

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the problem of limited effects of socialization The successful socialization of particular sets of Czech actors did not always translate into significant changes at the level of state policy, or into new legal and institutional arrangements. The problems experienced by Czech socializees are powerful reminders that the transmission of international norms to particular states is mediated by the domestic structures and politics of those states. This needs to be reflected in analyses of international socialization to a greater extent than has been the case so far. Thus, the complex reality of international norm transmission suggests that we need to move away from the tendency to focus exclusively on the socialization of particular decision makers, just as we need to avoid the opposite problem of jumping to conclusions about state socialization, with little attention to the actual processes through which socialization takes place. In this case, one of the problems encountered by Czech socializees was their professional and political marginalization. This affected in particular young military and civilian experts who had graduated from the NATO Defense College, the Marshall Center, or from the various defense academies of allied states. Upon returning home, those actors tried to teach their colleagues Western norms and patterns of behavior, only to find themselves opposed by conservative defense bureaucracies and/or older military officers. In many cases, Western-trained soldiers and civilian experts are reported to have been professionally marginalized, and in some cases ended up resigning.152 Another set of problems occurs at the level of implementation of new, NATO-prescribed norms. As examined above, in those issue areas in which they enjoyed relative autonomy in the decision-making process, NATO-socialized Czech actors were able to enact important changes (e.g., in reformulating the national strategic concept, and, in the case of the Ministry of Defense, in deciding the establishment of institutional arrangements aimed at further involving civil society in consultations regarding defense issues). In other cases, the transnational networks of NATO officials and Czech reformers succeeded in overcoming domestic obstacles to reform (e.g., in the case of the defense laws initiated by reformers and approved by Parliament in 1999). However, that coordinated action was not always sufficient. Problems occurred especially in situations in which successful implementation required significant changes in the attitudes of a broad set of actors. As several NATO officials involved in consultations with Czech actors, as well as Czech liberal decision makers pointed out, the difficulty of implementing new norms

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lies in an apparent cultural gap between pro-reform, Western-socialized elites and more conservative political actors, defense bureaucracies, and societal groups.153 We noted in the previous chapter that the domestic salience of international norms is one of the key factors affecting the ability of domestic actors who have adopted those norms to translate them into changes at the level of the state. In this case, what seems to be involved is the persistence of old attitudes, mentalities, and ways of doing things in many bureaucratic circles, leading to problems and delays in the implementation of the new norms in the area of security. One NATO official explained that “those exposed to NATO ideas have generally learned to think and act differently, but there is a significant difference between them and many of their co-nationals.”154 One relevant case concerns the relationships between the Ministry of Defense, Parliament, and the General Staff. In response to the problem, repeatedly stressed by NATO, of insufficient transparency and accountability to Parliament in the formulation of defense policy, Czech decision makers initiated legislative and institutional reforms aimed at enhancing consultation and cooperation among those different bodies. These are important developments, for they create the institutional basis for ending the past practice of isolation and secrecy shrouding the formulation of defense policies. However, as of mid-2000, the practice of inter-institutional cooperation in this area continued to be filled with difficulties, particularly at the “working level” (below top-level contacts), where old attitudes and habits continued to dominate daily practices. One of the main problems seemed to be a persisting culture of mistrust on the part of civilians vis-à-vis military officers and vice versa, with many military officers still uncomfortable with the idea of having civilians in oversight positions, just as many civilians continued to display a certain lack of trust in the military. As a result, each party tended to withhold information in the course of institutional exchanges, and to delay consultations or create practical problems that prevented the smooth, effective functioning of the cooperation that recent reforms were designed to create. As a result, officers in the field have complained of the frequent receipt of conflicting guidance from the General Staff and the MoD due to problems of coordination between these bodies.155 In addition, the lack of communication between the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense, coupled with problems of organization and communication between different sections of the MoD (not to mention alleged criminal activities within the Ministry) resulted in a series of poor acquisition decisions and personnel and property management problems.156 Finally, another obstacle to successful socialization revolved around the issue of conflicting normative demands. The most important case in

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this category occurred in the context of the Kosovo crisis. As we have seen, a systematic educational campaign organized by Czech reformers in cooperation with and under the guidance of NATO’s media office succeeded in enhancing public support for a vision of the Czech Republic as “naturally” belonging in Western institutional structures, including NATO. However, that gain in the level of public support for NATO was lost in the course of the allied intervention in Kosovo. Not only did most Czech citizens disagree with allied attacks on Yugoslavia, but support for the country’s membership in NATO also dropped to levels below the 50 percent threshold that had been superseded following the pro-West 1997–98 educational campaign.157 In the context of the Kosovo crisis, members of the Czech delegation to NATO and liberal political actors in Prague subscribed to the view of NATO as the institutional embodiment of the Western community of liberal democratic values, whose mandate included intervention in support of human rights and democracy.158 By contrast, as the military action in Kosovo was launched, the Social Democratic government expressed reservations about a military solution to the crisis, and opposed the idea of Czech participation in a forceful intervention against Belgrade. Even more dramatic was the opposition expressed by Communist and nationalist political groups, who criticized promises of support to NATO that were made by President Havel and his allies, including the Czech delegation in Brussels, in the absence of parliamentary debates, and labeled the intervention as a clear case of “NATO imperialism.”159 In the end, the liberal coalition (including the ODS, the Freedom Union, and the Christian Democrats) succeeded in persuading a sufficient number of Social Democratic MPs that opposition to the military intervention could be interpreted in the West as a sign that the Czech Republic was not really committed to the values of modern, advanced European states, and this might undermine the relations of the country with its most important Western friends. As a result, in the second half of April 1999, the Parliament approved a series of measures in support of the intervention.160 In spite of this official support, many Social Democrats, and especially Communist and nationalist parties, continued to express opposition to military intervention, and the level of public support for NATO remained below 50 percent throughout the crisis. I suggest that this shift in public attitudes vis-à-vis NATO reveals the problem of conflicting normative demands associated with situations as complex as the Kosovo crisis. NATO’s involvement in Kosovo brought to the fore a tension between the organization’s claims that membership was compatible with autonomy (which, as we have seen, had been central to the public relations campaign of 1997–98), and the need to protect the

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norm of allied conformity in dealing with a crisis like the one in Yugoslavia in 1999. In addition, the allied claims that they were protecting the basic human rights of Kosovars were challenged by critics who argued that Operation Allied Force involved unacceptable violations of the basic human rights of the Serb people and the sovereignty of Yugoslavia. As a result, they succeeded in generating emotional solidarity with the Serbs (as opposed to Kosovar Albanians).161 In that context, there was no agreement in the Czech Republic as to the identity of the victims of the conflict—and, perhaps surprisingly, there was little effort by pro-West Czech politicians to justify the particular normative hierarchy that was being prescribed by NATO. Without making any claims regarding the moral implications of that position, it is interesting to note that, from the point of view of the pro-intervention camp, during the Kosovo crisis there was no systematic campaign to refocus public attention on the national identity of the Czech Republic (as a state whose “natural” generalized other was the Euro-Atlantic community, rather than the Slavic world), and its role, together with its Western allies, in upholding “correct” values of human rights. Nor was there a real effort to persuade citizens that the true victims in that context were the Albanian Kosovars. conclusion I started this chapter by pointing to a state of affairs that did not conform to widespread public perceptions of the relationship between NATO and the Czech Republic. Contrary to what many believed, the organization had few “carrots” or “sticks” that it could use to secure Czech compliance with given Western normative prescriptions. In spite of that situation, in the course of accession dialogues, workshops, consultations, and various educational activities related to NATO/ Partnership for Peace programs, Western advisers and experts played an important role in affecting the definitions of identity and interest articulated by various sets of Czech actors. They did so, I argued, through complex sets of socialization practices that involved, in particular, teaching, persuasion, and role-playing. Those practices were mobilized in the name of projecting norms of liberal democracy into the arena of a former Communist state. In important aspects of civil-military relations, they did, indeed, contribute to enhancing transparency and democratic accountability in the area of security. But this was not a completely democratic story. To a large extent, the process of norm transmission involved non-democratic means: for instance, some of the reforms were promoted by transnational networks

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consisting of Western-socialized elites and representatives of NATO. In addition, as revealed in the 1997–98 public relations campaign, those transnational elites engaged in efforts at shaping public definitions of national identity that had the effect of marginalizing a series of political voices. As a longer-term consequence, the lack of a genuine public debate in the decision to join the alliance generated a certain degree of ambivalence in Czech attitudes vis-à-vis NATO. On the basis of a rich empirical study, Ivan Gabal, Lenka Helsusova, and Thomas Szayna have concluded that, while the Czech people are, in general, supportive of NATO, their main source of hesitation is the perception of the low level of influence that the public has on the formulation of key decisions in the area of security. The lack of a public debate in the Czech decision to join NATO played an important role in generating that perception.162 It was not the purpose of this chapter to judge the value of NATO-sponsored liberal democratic norms promotion; yet, one cannot help but notice that international practices of norm transmission are often more complicated—arguably, more problematic—than they may appear at first glance.

chapter five

Romania: Between the Eastern Past and a Western Future?

overview When, at the July 1997 Madrid Summit, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland were invited to join NATO, there was a shared view among Western decision makers that those Central European countries were the political and economic avant-garde of the former Eastern Bloc. Yet, as the previous chapter showed, systematic interactions with Central European political elites in the 1997–99 period of intensified accession dialogues led NATO representatives to discover a series of unanticipated problems, even in the Czech Republic—a country regarded as more advanced than other former Communist states. That realization translated into a growing effort to socialize Czech political, military, and administrative elites into adopting the norms of liberal democracy. Meanwhile, Romania was excluded from the first wave of enlargement— though the allies sought to soften the blow by indicating that, should the country continue its reform process, it would have a good chance of securing NATO membership at some point in the future. Several allies— most notably, the United States and the U.K.—argued that, although Romania had carried out important reforms under the leadership of President Constantinescu, it still had a long way to go before it could be seen as sufficiently Western-like, that is, liberal democratic, to be eligible for admission into the Euro-Atlantic security community. Up until the last moment, France, which claimed a special relationship with Romania by virtue of their shared Latin identity and a long history of French cultural influence in Bucharest, did try to persuade the allies to include the country in the first wave of enlargement, arguing that Romania had already done enough to deserve inclusion in the NATO club. According to President Chirac, Romania was “naturally” among the first countries that should join NATO and “had the right” to receive an invitation at

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the alliance’s 1999 summit.1 In the end, however, the French failed to convince the other allies to take in a country that, with a reform track record of only seven months, “was not ready for NATO.”2 On the basis of lessons learned in the course of its involvement in the Czech Republic (and the other countries of the first wave of enlargement), NATO resolved to provide even more systematic guidance to the other countries of the former Eastern Bloc, particularly to candidates for a second wave of enlargement.3 Under these circumstances, the allies changed their approach to the enlargement process: rather than engage in a serious detailed assessment of the candidates and promote reforms after the invitation to join NATO had been issued, they established a comprehensive system of guidance and monitoring aimed at promoting change and evaluating the candidates’ performance prior to, and as a precondition for, extending membership invitations to them. At the same time, the second-wave candidates were repeatedly told that the process of democratization and liberalization was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for admission; for each of the candidates, the allies also had to be convinced that their inclusion would not dilute or undermine NATO.4 As a result, Romanian decision makers had to face a problem that the Visegrad states included in the first wave of enlargement had never confronted: they had to carry out a systematic set of reforms without any guarantee that by doing so they would secure NATO membership for their country. Yet, the Romanians did just that: they accepted—indeed, they actively sought—allied guidance in the process of post-Communist reconstruction, and they acted like good NATO members in the alliance’s international missions and wars, even when that entailed significant costs and few tangible benefits. In a comparative analysis of NATO’s interactions with first- and second-wave candidates, it is also worth recalling that the latter completed their accession to the alliance only after the terrorist attacks of September 11th. The unprecedented importance attached to threats posed by actors like Al Qaeda led the allies to rethink the balance between freedom and security within the Euro-Atlantic security community, and to accept new limits on individual liberty in the name of protecting the West from this new, highly elusive terrorist threat. In order to protect the values of the Western community embodied in NATO, it was argued, the allies and their partners would have to limit some of the individual freedoms that enabled terrorists to act with impunity. Under these circumstances, second-wave candidates like Romania were also allowed—in some instances, even advised—to tighten state control over citizens and to promote norms that entailed significant limits on individual freedom. The irony of this situation is that, had such measures been taken prior to Sep-

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tember 11th, they would have been regarded by NATO as a regrettable regression in the process of post-Communist transition—that is, as precisely the kinds of steps that would undermine Romania’s eligibility for membership in the alliance. NATO’s resolution to become more deeply involved in interactions with Central and Eastern European countries found expression in a series of institutional arrangements that were established—or strengthened—in the aftermath of the Washington Summit. These included an expanded Planning and Review Process, aimed at enhancing the interoperability of partner forces in PfP activities; a more comprehensive and institutionalized Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council; and, especially, the Membership Action Plan.5 The MAP program was specifically designed to incorporate lessons learned in the process of accession of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary. The MAP includes submission of a tailored Annual National Plan (ANP) that covers political, economic, defense, resource, security, and legal aspects of membership; assessment meetings in the North Atlantic Council in the 19 + 1 format (including Russia); and systematic consultation and workshops between candidates and NATO teams in each of the five areas. MAP also provides for the establishment of a clearinghouse for coordinating security assistance, and enhanced defense planning that establishes and reviews agreed-upon planning targets.6 The management of the defense chapter of MAP is based on the PfP, but builds upon the Planning and Review Process by including a survey that is identical to the Defense Planning Questionnaire submitted by the allies. Within these various institutional forums, NATO conducted a systematic socialization of actors from candidate states into the Western norms of liberal democracy, particularly in the area of civil-military relations. This chapter analyzes those practices of socialization with particular emphasis on the Romanian case. As in the case of the Czech Republic, NATO did pay attention to liberal democratic reforms in the political, economic, and social spheres in assessing the status of Romania as a potential “like-minded” state who could qualify as an eligible candidate to NATO. However—also as in the Czech case—NATO was more actively involved in socialization practices in the defense/security area, and relied on other international institutions to monitor and socialize Romanians in other areas. NATO’s socialization practices targeted not just political elites but also next-generation leaders in civilian as well as military circles. Regarding political elites, NATO was particularly concerned to mold the pro-liberal actors that came to power in November 1996 into a set of actors sharing a recognizably Western set of ideas and attitudes. A second dimension of

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socialization involved educational practices that targeted “next generation” elites in political, military, and administrative circles. The types of socialization practices enacted by NATO were the same as in the case of the Czech Republic. But the establishment of MAP and the emergence of a new practice of appointing permanent Western advisers to key ministries in target states provided NATO with forums where teaching, persuasion, and role-playing could occur on an almost daily basis. Also, in the case of “less advanced” states like Romania, socialization practices were extended to areas largely downplayed in interactions with actors from the Visegrad countries (e.g., the reform of the Ministry of Interior). As a consequence, NATO became even more involved in performing functions conventionally regarded as being within the purview of sovereign authorities. romania at the point of transition In the months leading up to the 1997 Madrid Summit, NATO decision makers engaged in detailed evaluations of the reform process in candidate states. The prevailing view on Romania was that, after seven years of delays under the socialist government of Ion Iliescu, the country had finally taken serious steps toward liberalization and democratization.7 However, substantial reforms had yet to take place before Romania could be a serious candidate for admission to NATO.8 The socialists’ electoral defeat in 1996 and the establishment of a pro-Western government opened a new chapter in the process of redefining Romania’s postCommunist identity and made possible a new type of engagement with Western institutions, including NATO. As a voice of the Western community with which Romania now identified, NATO was able to play an important role in reconstituting Romania on the basis of Western liberal democratic norms and in delegitimizing alternative norms and values. In the early and mid-1990s, in the area of democratic control over defense and security institutions, Romania was one of the least advanced of the former Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe. It is true that under the two consecutive administrations of Ion Iliescu (a former member of the Communist Party), Romania had enforced a new Constitution ( 1991), which provided for the subordination of the army to “the will of the people,” and prohibited its involvement in political activities.9 The Constitution also entrusted Parliament with providing the legal framework for the functioning of the relevant defense agencies.10 In practice, however, the power to regulate defense matters by means of legislation was undermined by delays in passing necessary additional legisla-

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tion—such as laws to determine the division of responsibilities between the executive power and the legislature. Another set of problems revolved around the civilianization of the Ministry of National Defense, as well as the Ministry of the Interior. In contrast to most of the other former Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe, the position of defense minister continued to be a military appointment until 1994. Through a law on the organization of the Ministry of Defense passed in 1994, that situation changed: the law stipulated that a civilian was to head the Ministry.11 According to the 1994 legislation, the senior military commander of the armed forces is the State Secretary and Chief of the General Staff. He is responsible to the president and the defense minister for the peacetime direction of the armed forces. The appointment of a civilian minister, after many years of delays, was an important step toward democratization. But the problem was that for appointments below the ministerial level, the Ministry of Defense was burdened by a conservative bureaucracy and remained almost inaccessible to civilians. Similarly, the Ministry of the Interior, which had played a key role in the dictatorial regime of Nicolae Ceausescu, remained militarized and removed from effective democratic control.12 NATO officials were well aware of these obstacles to the reform process. At the same time, Romania was perceived as problematic because of the ethnic tensions in Transylvania, and, in part as a result of that, the country’s tense relationship with Hungary. Even under these circumstances, the allies tried to socialize Romanian leaders into carrying out a comprehensive process of reform aimed at transcending the main institutional and legislative problems of democratization, particularly in the field of security. But in the political conditions that prevailed in Romania until 1996, the process of socialization was limited and had little effect on the attitudes and beliefs of Romanian decision makers. Up until November 1996, the main Romanian political actors were of socialist and nationalist political orientation. The 1992 elections had placed political power in the hands of the Party of Social Democracy of Romania, whose support for liberalization and democratization was more rhetorical than real. In addition, since the party had not secured the majority necessary to govern, it came to rely on a bloc of extreme nationalist parties, most of whom were led by former Communist activists. Parties and political groups with anti-liberal, anti-democratic political platforms, such as the Greater Romania Party (PRM), the Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR), and the Socialist Labor Party (PSM) thus enjoyed substantial political power in the early and mid1990s. Representatives of those political parties, and especially members of

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the executive branch and of the legislature, often stated their support for liberal democratic reforms and, in the foreign policy area, for integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.13 But a closer analysis of their discourse, as well as their actions, reveals substantive limitations in that support. Statements about the objective of integration into NATO were mixed with declarations, especially pronounced in situations where no foreigners were present, concerning the need to preserve the sovereignty of Romania.14 Nationalist ideas, revolving around the alleged Hungarian threat to Romanian integrity, and portrayals of Western institutions as potential sources of danger to Romanian sovereignty, were part of the discourse of the PMR, PUNR, and even, albeit to a lesser extent, the Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR). In a similar vein, the commitment of those political actors to the liberal democratic reforms prescribed in the Study on NATO Enlargement was minimal. There is evidence that NATO decision makers tried to persuade those elites to subscribe to liberal democratic norms and principles and alter their political practices accordingly. Witnesses to informal meetings between senior members of NATO’s Political Affairs Division and members of the Romanian government recall that the former tried to convince the latter that building democratic institutions was the only way of achieving domestic prosperity, stability, and freedom. But, in addition to persuasion, the organization also mobilized significant instrumental incentives. For instance, NATO, together with the EU, exercised pressure on Romania and Hungary to put an end to their squabbles and sign a bilateral treaty committing themselves to the peaceful resolution of all their disputes (including territorial issues and the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Romania).15 In turn, on several occasions the socialist and nationalist leaders of Romania resorted to a strategy identified by Frank Schimmelfennig as “rhetorical manipulation.”16 In dialogues with the West, President Iliescu and senior members of the government adopted aspects of the NATO discourse on liberal democracy and tried to portray Romania as a country that was already committed to human rights, democracy, economic reform, and so forth. In their domestic discourse, however, they often stressed the norm of sovereignty and the idea of an “original democracy” to be built in Romania.17 Under these circumstances, Western actors soon scaled down their efforts at persuading the socialist and nationalist political elites of Romania. In the words of a senior NATO official, “We realized that those people were too imbued with socialist and nationalist ideas.” To achieve substantial change, “we had to wait for that generation of politicians to ‘die’—at least, politically speaking. In the meantime, we would concentrate on educating ‘baby generals’ and ‘baby politicians.’” 18 In other

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words, NATO did not abandon its effort to teach Romanians modes of being and acting that are consistent with international liberal democratic norms. However, the organization shifted the focus of that effort toward—what NATO called—the “next generation” leaders. NATO member states opened their national defense academies to young Romanian officers and civilians (especially to people from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to journalists), seeking to teach them the principles of democratic control of the military. The North Atlantic Assembly (NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly), the NATO Defense College, and the Marshall Center also joined in this educational effort, organizing a series of courses and workshops for the parliamentary staff, aimed at training them in the procedures of a democratic legislature.19 The political situation in Romania changed radically with the national elections of November 1996. Emil Constantinescu’s Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR) and Petre Roman’s Social Democratic Union (USD) obtained a majority in both houses of Parliament with 31.0 percent and 13.4 percent of the vote, respectively. The Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania (UDMR), the ethnic Hungarian party, was also included in the governing coalition. In the run-off presidential elections, Constantinescu unseated Iliescu with 54.4 percent of the vote. The consensus among international observers and domestic actors (with the exception of the unseated socialists) was that the November/December elections of 1996 marked the first democratic and peaceful change in government and in the office of president since 1937.20 The Democratic Convention, the largest political force after 1996, clearly identified itself, both prior to and after the elections, as a liberal democratic force whose mission was to complete the 1989 anti-Communist revolution and return Romania to its “natural place” in the European world.21 In the words of the then Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea, “Historically and culturally, [Romania] belongs in the West,” even if it was alienated from that world by its Communist experience.22 Therefore, it was the duty of the new government to lead Romania in the process of (re)becoming a Western type of state and in joining Euro-Atlantic institutions. The new political elites identified themselves in opposition to the socialist party (the PDSR they had just unseated). The claim that they represented the political force with the will and energy to take—and stay on— the “road to Europe” and to true liberal democracy was at the very heart of the CDR platform.23 But, although they avoided public statements on the issue, the pro-West elites that had just been elected to power tended to recognize their position as actors who, in the process of rebuilding their polity, needed to learn from—and secure the recognition of—Western institutions, including NATO.

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In conversations with officials of international institutions, members of domestic non-governmental organizations, and even in the course of interviews with the author, they often pointed out that they still had much to learn about the roles of liberal democratic leaders that they had promised to take on.24 According to NATO officials involved in interactions with Central/Eastern Europeans, the problem with Romanian reformers was that in many areas they held views and advocated policies that deviated from norms regarded by the Western allies as key pillars of a true liberal democratic polity. For instance, in the area of defense, their conception of the relationship between state and society was a heavily hierarchical, top-down vision. This was reflected in the reformers’ reluctance to problematize issues related to the involvement of society in debates and decision-making processes, and their failure to carry out reforms aimed at enhancing accountability and protecting the rule of law in the sphere of civil-military relations.25 Under those circumstances, NATO representatives concluded that, in order for the process of reform in the area of defense and security to succeed, Romanian elites needed more than just advice on particular desirable actions. Given that they were still “trapped in some of the Communist ways of thinking,”26 NATO had to teach them to think in the same way as political actors from NATO member states presumably did. 27 Consequently, in the course of interactions with Romanian political elites, NATO officials focused on introducing Romanians to “correct” ways of doing things in the established democracies of the West. As a senior official from the German Ministry of Defense who participated in those consultations put it, “We wanted them to grasp the basic principles of those institutional arrangements [of democratic control over defense and security] in our countries, and we wanted them to understand why and how those principles were working for us.”28 It was by reference to these “correct ways” that specific advice on desirable reforms was given. It is interesting to note that, as was the case in interactions with Czech actors, NATO representatives regarded normative change in Romania as more important than achieving technological compatibility with the allies. Thus, NATO placed particular emphasis on changing the ways in which military and political elites thought about appropriate norms of governance in a liberal democracy.29 Indeed, contrary to the popular perception that the allied interest in Central/Eastern Europe was primarily linked to the search for markets for Western arms industries, NATO advised Romanian reformers against the purchase of “big ticket” items from the West.30 In so doing, NATO sought to counter the influence of some representatives of Western, particularly American, defense industries, who had tried to convince Romanian decision makers that the pur-

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chase of Western military equipment would help them gain NATO membership.31 Similarly, as discussed below, Western advisers who provided guidance on the formulation of the MAP Annual National Plan worked with the Romanians to formulate a reform plan according to which technological upgrading was to be postponed in favor of other defense reforms (e.g., education and the creation of new social programs for soldiers). In the following pages I document practices of socialization involving NATO representatives and different sets of Romanian actors, and show that the conditions that facilitated teaching, persuasion, and role-playing in the Czech case had similar effects in Romania. practices of socialization enacted by nato: teaching Teaching Romanian Political Elites As in the Czech case, NATO enacted a series of practices of teaching in the socialization of Romanian actors. Those practices were carried out within a series of forums: accession dialogues that took place in late 1996 and 1997; ongoing consultations between Romanian leaders and NATO officials, both in Bucharest and Brussels (between late 1996 and 2000); debates and consultations with advisers from NATO countries based at the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (after 1997); workshops with NATO teams working within the framework of the Membership Action Plan; and interactions between Romanian MPs and their Western counterparts gathered at the North Atlantic Assembly (currently, NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly). Within those various forums, NATO sought to convey to Romanians a particular, Westerndefined set of understandings that would enable them to make sense of the world and define the position of their country both on a synchronic axis (vis-à-vis other states) and a diachronic one (indicating the point reached in a historical process of becoming). One example reveals the dynamic of the teaching that occurred in the course of consultations conducted through 1997 between a team of British advisers and senior Romanian defense and foreign affairs officials. Those consultations were aimed at assessing the problems and potential solutions associated with the process of adopting liberal democratic policies and building NATO-prescribed liberal democratic institutions in Romania. Reportedly, a key concern of the allied officials was to correct the

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vision of top-down rule and lead Romanian officials to understand liberal democracy as a political model involving numerous channels of communication between civil society and the government. In contrast to the previous practice of exclusion, the advisers wanted to get Romanians to recognize the importance of systematically training actors from civil society, including allowing them to attend Western educational institutions and then use their expertise in domestic decision making.32 The discourse inscribed in the British report and, reportedly, articulated by British advisers in the course of consultations with Romanian officials was also put forward during other consultations and in NATO’s collective briefings and accession dialogues. To understand the role played by that discourse in legitimizing a particular interpretation of reality, it is useful to resort to a brief analysis, exploring the way in which a particular historical trajectory was “naturalized” via the invocation of selected moments from the past. That is, it is useful to examine the ways in which, through the invocation of selected historical events, stories told by political actors naturalized and legitimized a specific historical trajectory.33 The texts I selected for this analysis fulfill the criteria of key texts examined in Chapter 1: they were issued by actors with recognized authority to define the situation; they contain clear definitions of identity and reasonable courses of action given that identity; and they were formulated in a politically significant context. Far from representing instances of potential “cheap talk” in inconsequential situations, these episodes reflect the guidance provided by allied officials (often behind closed doors) as they helped Romanian elites to interpret their situation, define the goals and priorities of reform, and formulate reasonable strategies for achieving those goals. In the course of the ongoing dialogue of NATO advisers with Romanian officials, advice regarding the post-Communist reform process was placed within the framework of a broader discourse about the identity of the Western community embodied in NATO, and about the nature of the process of becoming a member of that community. For example, a brief predicate analysis reveals that the British report depicted the Euro-Atlantic world as not just a collection of societies participating in a military alliance, but rather as a community endowed with superior attributes. Thus, the key adjectives used to characterize that community were “democratic,” “transparent,” “open,” and “free.”34 In the course of their meetings with Romanian defense and foreign affairs officials, NATO advisers reportedly reiterated the same discursive categories, as they invoked the processes that, according to them, had enabled the Western world to create institutions that embody such superior attributes (again, the key adjectives were “democratic,” “transparent,”

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“accountable”) in all fields of society, including the field of security. They were also concerned to explain to the Romanians that, far from being a lucky coincidence, this was the result of a long history of commitment to the norms of democracy and human rights, and of a process of learning how to implement these norms. In the words of one of the advisers, these institutions “did not emerge overnight”; rather, “it took us a very long time to get where we are today.”35 NATO advisers stressed the idea that the Euro-Atlantic community, which Romania desired to join, was characterized by the full accountability of decision makers to lawmakers and society. For instance, it was argued, in contrast to the still prevailing Romanian practice of societal exclusion, the Euro-Atlantic model required that the Ministry of Defense work together with other ministries in the formulation of defense legislation, and that it take advantage of the expertise of societal agencies.36 This, NATO representatives pointed out, was not a contingent state of affairs. Rather, it was the result of a historical evolution of the Euro-Atlantic community toward ever more rational and free institutions which truly protect the principles and ideals of liberal democracy.37 This was important because it served as a reminder of the complexities of the process of building liberal democratic polities, and hence, of the challenges that a country like Romania would have to face in its transition from Communism to democracy. As senior advisers pointed out, given that Romania would have to do in a few years what the West had achieved over a much longer period of time, its transition process would be particularly tricky. On this logic, it was especially important for the Romanians to pay attention to, and learn from, the West, because, after all, “Romania had barely escaped one of the most vicious forms of Communism.”38 As one of the NATO advisers argued, “We were there to help the Romanians avoid some of the dangers of change, to help them build a truly democratic society and move away, once and for all, from its long history of oppression and violence.”39 The NATO discourse established a clear relationship of hierarchy between the allies and the Romanians. In contrast with the allied community, endowed with superior attributes of being “free,” “democratic,” and “transparent,” Romania was depicted as a subject characterized by attributes of weakness and vulnerability. The predicates used in the case of Romania point to a subject that had limited capacity for action and that was in serious need of help to transcend a particularly difficult legacy. Thus, according to the NATO discourse, Romania was a country that had inherited “a long history of oppression and violence” and therefore needed to “catch up after many years of waste.” As such, the country occupied an ambivalent position in terms of its identity. The Romani-

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ans had “made substantive progress toward democracy” and, since 1996, had had the courage to make “the right decisions.”40 At the same time, however, the discourse articulated by NATO representatives stressed the precarious position of Romania as a country that had yet to develop all the features of a stable, free, truly democratic society. Several NATO representatives reportedly pointed out that Romania had begun its ascension toward becoming a Western-like (i.e., superior) society, but, due to persisting problems inherited from the Communist era and made worse by the persistence, in some circles, of old ideas and attitudes, it was still in danger of relapsing into its past—that is, of returning to a mode of governance characterized by heavy centralization, the absence of transparency, and a general lack of freedom. 41 Not only did NATO advisers emphasize the importance of leaving behind all the ideas, attitudes, and practices associated with the Communist past, they also, repeatedly, stressed the importance of defeating all alternative, antiliberal visions of national identity. The strength of Romania’s (negative) domestic others—in particular, the nationalist parties and groups that rejected liberal democratic values and put forward a vision of Romanian “greatness” that involved the restoration of the country’s presumably glorious past, and, in some instances, advocated the recapturing of territory said to belong to Romania—was seen as a source of grave danger to Romania. Both in formal dialogues and in more private settings, NATO representatives reportedly pointed out that failure to defeat those alternative visions of national identity threatened to push the country “into a dark era of authoritarianism” and to exclude it from the Euro-Atlantic community of values.42 Given this hierarchical relationship between the NATO community and Romania, it seemed the latter needed the former’s help to reach the level of development characteristic of the Western world. In the words of a senior allied officer who participated in consultations with Romanians within the framework of NATO accession dialogues, representatives of the alliance sought to explain to Romanians that “commitment to principles of liberal democracy helped us to leave behind problems we had had for centuries. We are living proof that if you do the right things, and if you work hard enough, you will win.”43 In essence, a close analysis of the discourse articulated by NATO advisers reveals that, beyond the specific prescriptions for reforms, the alliance defined “normal” categories for understanding the situation confronting Romania and the possible courses of action. The discourse “naturalized” a complex political reality, presenting as unproblematic the existence of a Euro-Atlantic community of societies defined by ethical and rational attributes. In the context of the apparently rational historical evolution, NATO was presented as a normal occurrence, as an or-

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ganization that emerged as the embodiment and protector of liberal democratic values.44 By contrast, Romania was depicted as a weak and vulnerable subject (as a country that had just escaped a vicious form of Communism)—but one that, with the proper guidance and a strong commitment to discipline itself and learn the true values of democracy and liberalism, could evolve into a member of the Euro-Atlantic community. The attributes with which these different subjects were endowed, and the hierarchical relationship between them, made it seem natural that NATO—the key security institution of the Western community—should guide the Romanians in the process of post-Communist transition. Teaching Future Elites The effort to cultivate in decision makers a specific set of collective understandings about appropriate liberal democratic identity was accompanied by NATO’s consistent concern to disseminate to future Romanian elites a particular liberal democratic habitus in the field of security. As in the Czech case, the pedagogic practices targeting young military personnel and civilian defense experts were informed by the idea that the socialization of future political, military, and administrative elites into Western norms of liberal democracy was the best way to ensure that, in the future, Romania would be firmly anchored in the Euro-Atlantic community.45 Accordingly, NATO organized a series of educational programs aimed at shaping the ways in which tomorrow’s Romanian leaders would interpret the world, and, as a corollary, how they would define “normal” ways of being and behaving both in the domestic and the international arenas. In this respect, the educational practices targeting future elites are similar to those involving existing, pro-reform political elites from Romania. Like their Czech counterparts, Romanian civilian experts and military officers participated in a series of programs organized within the framework of the Partnership for Peace. These involved long-term courses held at Partnership training centers, at the Partnership Coordination Cell (in Mons, Belgium), at the Geneva Center for Security Policy, and at various defense institutions within NATO member states. Romanians were also included in programs run by NATO educational establishments, such as the NATO Defense College and the Marshall Center for Security Studies. Within the framework of those institutions, one-year-long (or longer) courses were combined with shorter seminars and exercises, which brought together officers from the armies of PfP and NATO countries, as well as civilian personnel from Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs.

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They were designed to promote “mental interoperability” as well as practical cooperation in addressing various problems of domestic and international instability. In the case of Romania, between the end of the Cold War and early 2000, over eight hundred military officers and civilians graduated from long-term NATO courses, and thousands more attended shorter seminars, workshops, and conferences. According to allied officers from the Partnership Coordination Cell, NATO understood that, as far as technology was concerned, it would take the Eastern Europeans—including the Romanians—a very long time to catch up with the allies. But, they suggested, that was not necessarily a huge problem so long as interoperability at the level of ideas and attitudes could be achieved.46 NATO officials also argued in favor of sending more Romanian officers and civilian defense experts to PfP courses. Again, it is interesting to note that even apparently apolitical courses, for instance, English-language classes, were seen as important for cultivating in the young Romanians the values, norms, and procedures of the alliance. In the words of a senior NATO official from the Political Affairs Division, language training is not a purely technical exercise, for, in learning a language, one also learns key concepts and principles (e.g., a particular definition of civil society, the concept of citizens in uniform, etc.). Moreover, language training, it was assumed, brought the Romanians into a Western environment where they would have the opportunity to learn NATO doctrines and codes of conduct for allied officers, and to enact roles of military officers/civilian experts in accordance with NATOprescribed norms and standards.47 A couple of Romanian officers who attended PfP language courses in Canada in the late 1990s confirmed that their learning experience went far beyond the acquisition of linguistic skills. In the words of those graduates, those courses also “made it easier to understand NATO, what it stands for and how it functions,” and “opened up a new way of thinking about security.”48 One of the important developments in the sphere of education that occurred in the late 1990s was the creation of PfP training centers in partner countries, including Romania. The idea behind this was that it was important to educate “a critical mass” of young military and civilian experts who think about the world in the Western-defined terms of liberal democratic norms, and who act in a manner consistent with NATO norms and procedures. A key strategy toward achieving that goal came to be that of training the trainers and then helping them organize long-term educational programs targeting more and more people, in military as well as civilian circles.49 Following Romania’s unsuccessful attempt to join NATO at the Madrid Summit, a request was made to the British government to assist the Ministry of National Defense in the

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wider dissemination of NATO doctrine and procedures within the Romanian Army. The outcome of the resulting bilateral venture was the establishment (in 1997) of the Regional Training Center in Bucharest, which was accredited as a PfP Training Centre on April 20, 1999. It has since organized courses aimed at providing a broad understanding of defense matters and NATO/PfP doctrines and procedures, as well as teaching the norms of good governance in defense and the effective management of defense resources by a democratically elected accountable government. Between 1997 and 2002, 1,120 students from Romania as well as other partner countries attended the courses run by the new PfP training center.50 In addition, just like their Czech counterparts, delegations of Romanian MPs and parliamentary staff participated in seminars and workshops, as well as regular consultations and debates organized by the North Atlantic Assembly. As we noted in the previous chapter, a key goal of the assembly was to teach Central/Eastern European actors the norms of civilmilitary cooperation, the proper functions of parliamentary defense and security committees, and procedures for ensuring democratic control of the military. Linked to this, within ongoing interactions between the permanent (NATO) members and associate delegations (from PfP countries), the assembly sought to provide the latter with ample opportunity to learn about some of the challenges of parliamentarians in democratic societies, and common ways of dealing with those challenges within the framework of Western norms of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights.51 In essence, within various forums, Romanian students were introduced to the NATO-defined, “common-sense” way of defining the world. They were taught to identify the main subjects and objects inhabiting the world, position them vis-à-vis one another, and discover normal ways of acting given who and what those subjects are. The idea, as in the case of educating political elites, was to teach those actors not simply how to deal with specific situations, but, more broadly, how to think about problems and how to identify the repertoire of potential solutions (i.e., within the framework of liberal democratic norms). Those teachings presupposed that there was a normal way of being liberal-democratic. The format of most of socializing activities targeting future leaders was different from that involving Romanian policymakers. As in the case of the Czech Republic, in interactions with members of the Romanian policymaking apparatus, NATO was concerned to project an image of partnership and consultation that fully recognized and protected the autonomy of a democratically elected government. Accordingly, the format of those interactions—dialogues and consultations—consistently suggested that the Romanian officials and NATO representatives were work-

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ing together as partners, not as teachers and students. For their part, in conversations with NATO advisers, Romanian elites recognized that they were, in many regards, novices in the process of building a Western-style, liberal democratic polity. But outside of that context, to maintain credibility vis-à-vis their constituents, political actors in Bucharest were anxious to avoid appearing as “poodles of the West”; they were, therefore, reluctant to admit that NATO was helping them define the main goals and priorities of the reform process.52 By contrast, in the socialization of future elites, the format of interaction was much more governed by the logic of overt pedagogical practices, in which the roles of teachers and students, as well as the hierarchical implications of this relationship, were clearly identified. This happened in PfP courses, and in activities organized within the framework of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, where interactions were structured around a master/novice relationship between the allies and the Central/Eastern Europeans. As noted above, educational practices targeting pro-reform policymakers did not focus too much on delegitimizing alternative principles of governance. Rather, in a situation in which their students were already committed, in theory at least, to the idea of building liberal democracy, NATO officials focused more on teaching the correct meaning of liberal norms. By contrast, in instances of teachings that targeted subjects whose political orientation was less clear, there was a greater effort to delegitimize nationalist and socialist principles, as well as domestic and foreign policies based on those principles. NATO teachers sought to portray those ideas as irrational and unacceptable, as obstacles to progress, and as an inherent source of instability and insecurity.53 In essence, in the case of young Romanian military officers and civilian defense experts, NATO participated systematically in a process traditionally attributed to sovereign authorities—one of shaping the rationality, or, in Bourdieu’s terminology, constructing “the common sense” of the younger generation. This, as explained in an earlier chapter, involves a significant—albeit subtle—exercise of power, in that it facilitates the (re)production of a given, in this case, liberal democratic domestic order. Successful pedagogic practices help create a situation in which particular political options (e.g., nationalist scenarios) come to be seen as unreasonable and unacceptable. By contrast, to the successfully socialized students, the model of normative order (in this case, Western-defined liberal democratic norms and institutions) prescribed by agents endowed with pedagogic authority appears as the natural, objectively rational, and ethical model—as the universally correct way of governing a polity—rather than as a particular, contingent political product.

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practices of socialization enacted by nato: persuasion In addition to teaching, NATO representatives also conducted a series of specific instances of persuasion, aimed at convincing Romanian elites to adopt particular courses of action and to carry out particular liberal democratic reforms. In some instances, persuasion occurred separately from teaching. For example, in some cases the Romanian actors targeted by NATO did not regard themselves as “students” in the process of learning liberal democracy from Western institutions. In that context, attempts at persuasion involved arguments that “Y” actions (prescribed by the organization) were consistent with the specific normative framework accepted by the persuadees. For instance, as noted above, in the pre-1996 period, leaders of the organization tried to persuade Romanian socialists to enact a set of reforms related to defense and security. In that context, NATO used instrumental incentives, but also resorted to persuasion in an attempt to get the ruling PSDR to civilianize, at least in part, the Ministry of Defense. The organization also used persuasion as it sought to convince the Romanian government to sign Good Neighborhood treaties, which were aimed, among other things, at providing special rights to national minorities. In the case of Ministry of Defense reform, Western officials argued that the proposed changes would not undermine Romania’s ability to protect state secrets due to supposedly excessive transparency. And in discussions about the above-mentioned treaties, the argument used to convince socialist leaders was that participation in such legal instruments would not undermine the integrity of Romania by giving minorities free license to secede.54 In essence, NATO representatives sought to persuade conservative Romanian elites that the Western-advocated reforms were consistent with the norms accepted by the latter. Arguments put forward by the organization did not stress that MoD reform and Good Neighborhood treaties were the “correct” way of building Western-style liberal democracy. Rather, in its interaction with Romanian socialists who did not accept the role of students of Western democracy, NATO sought to present those courses of action as compatible with a normative framework stressing national security and sovereignty (versus, for instance, excessive minority rights). At the same time, however, allied officials also relied on instrumental incentives—in particular, the threat of exclusion from NATO—to get the Romanian authorities to improve the state’s treatment of minorities and to sign Good Neighborhood treaties with Hungary and other countries from the region.55

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International pressure coupled with persuasion—also exercised, in the case of treaties, by the OSCE, the EU, and the Council of Europe—led the Romanian leaders to take steps such as the appointment of the first civilian Minister of Defense (1994) and the conclusion of a Good Neighborhood treaty with Hungary (1996). In those cases, however, it is not exactly clear to what extent the results obtained were the outcome of persuasion rather than of instrumental incentives. Reportedly, the more moderate decision makers were—at least to some degree—affected by attempts at persuasion, but their more conservative counterparts were especially affected by the threat of international sanctions.56 All in all, it seems that, had it not been for the threat of exclusion from NATO coupled with the threat of social and material sanctions by other international organizations, particularly the EU, little would have changed in Romania’s compliance with international prescriptions regarding the reasonable treatment of its minorities and relations with its neighbors.57 In interaction with Romanian reformers associated with the Democratic Convention, however, NATO’s attempts at persuasion were very frequent, and often occurred against the background of teaching. In that set of instances, persuasion was used as a way of extending NATO’s influence: not only did the organization teach Romanians appropriate norms, but it also sought to shape the interpretation of the political implications of those norms. NATO representatives employed the same techniques of persuasion—consistency, authority, and social proof—as were used in interactions with Czech actors. One issue that was discussed by NATO representatives in the course of consultations, debates, and workshops with Romanian political elites was that of legislative and institutional reform in the area of defense. For instance, the British team that participated in 1997–98 in the formulation of the Report, “A Strategic Analysis of the Evolution of Romanian Politics of Security and of Governmental Mechanisms,” emphasized the need to broaden the law on defense planning in order to provide a framework for the entire spectrum of security planning. According to the British advisers, the new law should reflect the changes in the nature of the security environment, specifically the decline of military threats and the growing importance of non-military risks, including transnational organized crime and domestic socioeconomic instability.58 Members of the British team praised the new assessments of security risks identified in the existing legislative draft as being accurate reflections of reality. This definition is significantly different from the view of national security put forward by Romanian nationalist and extremist parties, who stressed threats to territorial integrity as a persisting problem for their country.59 By contrast, according to the law on national defense proposed by the reformers of the Democratic Convention, the key risks to national security are the same ones identified in NATO’s strategic concept.

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Beyond this, however, NATO representatives argued that the legislative draft reflected and sought to reproduce a flawed conception of the relationship among branches of government and between government and society.60 The problem was that Romanian reformers thought it both appropriate and more efficient to engage only a limited number of governmental agencies in debates about national security and defense policies.61 NATO representatives relied heavily on arguments about consistency in order to persuade Romanian policymakers to change that position. They pointed out that there was a serious divergence between the principles articulated in the draft legislation on defense reform and the institutional arrangements that would emerge from that legislation. If, as the Romanians recognized in the proposed legislation, key security risks included potential internal socioeconomic instability, as well as international organized crime and terrorism, then a whole set of ministries, including the Ministries of Labor, Interior, Industry, Transportation, and Finance, had to cooperate with the Ministry of Defense in addressing these issues of national security.62 Several other legislative changes were also supported by advisers from NATO countries, as well as by members of the organization’s international staff. In fact, as an official from NATO’s Office of the Secretary General pointed out, in interactions with Central and Eastern European decision makers, including Romanians, “we started from broad guidelines regarding desirable legislative changes, but then had to become increasingly specific in our advice, because those broad guidelines were often not enough.”63 In consultations that took place in 1997–98 with Romanian defense and foreign affairs officials, NATO advisers recommended the formulation of a law on the state of emergency. Furthermore, in order to avoid possible abuse of power by the president, there had to be a specific definition of the respective mandates of the executive and the legislature governing the maintenance and lifting of a state of emergency.64 This was yet another case in which NATO advisers relied heavily on the technique of consistency to persuade their Romanian interlocutors to enact legislative change. The notion involved was that there was a basic tension between the principles of liberal democracy and the lack of a legislative framework that would place constraints on the presidential power to establish and maintain a state of emergency, thereby suspending the basic rights of citizens.65 A new law for states of emergency was needed, one that would establish a balance between the different branches of power in the state, and that would give Parliament the authority to oversee the actions of the president. Also, NATO officials who participated in dialogues with Romanian decision makers in Brussels and Bucharest advocated a new law for the

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organization of the Ministry of Defense. Western voices became even more involved in domestic debates about this legal reform, with the appointment of permanent advisers from NATO member states to the Ministry of Defense in Bucharest. Those advisers resorted to a combination of techniques of consistency and authority to persuade Romanians to promote a new law on the organization of the ministry. An analyst from the Romanian MoD who used to work with a British counselor based in Bucharest pointed out that one of the arguments used in 1998 to get decision makers to act faster on this legislative reform revolved around the problem of inconsistency. The British adviser insisted that there was a tension between the principle of civilianization of the Ministry and the ongoing practices of failing to ensure benefits for the civilian staff that were comparable to those for the military staff and the misuse of human resources through a heavily politicized system of selection and promotion. In the words of that MoD analyst, the British counselor “tried to point out to them that this was a serious problem, because they were trying to combine a practice of the past with a principle designed to take them into the future. That had to change.”66 In addition, the argument put forward in this context also invoked the authority of NATO advisers to identify necessary reforms. Key here was the issue of expertise: whereas Romanian actors had little experience in the area of setting up institutions that were, at once, effective and democratic, advisers from NATO states were very familiar with the right procedures.67 In prescribing institutional and legislative changes, NATO officials argued that carrying out those reforms was the right thing to do for an emerging liberal democratic polity, as they would help bring Romania into greater conformity with the norms of the community the country was seeking to join. On this logic, failure to comply with NATO’s normative prescriptions was not only wrong from a purely normative point of view, but also contrary to the true interest of Romania—a progressive, forward-looking Romania—for it made it very difficult to consolidate democratic gains and threatened to revive some of the problems associated with Romania’s past authoritarian identity (such as a lack of transparency and accountability, the abuse of power, and potential human rights violations).68 Similarly, officials from allied states that worked with the Romanian Ministry of Defense, together with NATO representatives who interacted with Romanian decision makers within the framework of MAP, repeatedly resorted to authority appeals as they sought to convince Romanian officials to carry out NATO-prescribed reforms.69 There was a double dynamic involved in those authority appeals. To begin with, Western advisers invoked their expertise, their knowledge of the universal liberal dem-

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ocratic norms and principles that Romanians were trying to implement. As a basis for that expertise, advisers relied on their institutional affiliation with NATO—recognized as an institution that was the embodiment and protector of the liberal democratic community.70 In addition, NATO advisers also justified their knowledge by reference to their national experience in allied states. Thus, they repeatedly pointed out that, in their capacity as actors with experience in countries built on liberal democratic principles and norms, they understood what those principles required.71 But beyond the element of expertise based on a general knowledge of relevant principles, there was also a more personal dimension of authority. NATO advisers sought to legitimize their advice by referencing their personal involvement in the Romanian case. The reasoning behind this was that not only were they experts in the universal aspects of liberal democratic norm-promotion, but they also had knowledge relevant to the application of those principles in the particular situation of Romania. Moreover, NATO representatives tried to cultivate the image that they were personally involved in, and devoted to, the Romanian case. As one of the Western officials involved in providing advice on reform issues to the Romanian government pointed out, “I knew from the first that, if they were to trust me and follow my advice, I would have to persuade them that my loyalty, in that context, was primarily to their cause, that I was a devoted ‘honorary citizen’ of Romania.”72 In the area of institutional reforms, one of the major problems that, in NATO’s eyes, had to be addressed without delay was the lack of reform in the Ministry of the Interior. This issue was raised in several consultations between NATO representatives (the international staff) and top Romanian policymakers in the area of defense. Starting in 1999, the issue of reform of the Ministry of Interior also became a subject of discussion within the framework of the feedback process of MAP. NATO officials pointed out to their Romanian interlocutors that a militarized, unaccountable Ministry of Interior was undermining Romania’s claim that it was acting in a manner consistent with the norms of democratic control over security institutions. This was especially the case because the Ministry had been systematically used as an instrument of repression during the Communist years.73 In other words, Western advisers resorted to appeals about consistency as they argued that it was imperative that Romanian politicians initiate legislative and institutional reforms to restructure the Interior Ministry and bring it into line with the principles of a democratic society. Another issue that was the focus of allied–Romanian debates and consultations within the framework of NATO’s collective briefings, accession dialogues, and MAP meetings was the role of civil society within the

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sphere of defense. British advisers, in their 1998 report, made it clear they were disappointed by the slow pace of legal and institutional reform aimed at including NGOs in debates and decision-making in the area of defense.74 Both in their dialogue with Romanian interlocutors and in their report they resorted to persuasion through the technique of consistency, invoking the tension between democratic principles and the exclusion of societal actors. The Romanian conception of appropriate and efficient governance through such exclusionary practices was unacceptable. The argument was that continued delays in that area were a reflection of the Communist legacy, which precluded democracy and transparency, that still affected Romanian society.75 socialization practices enacted by nato: role-playing As in the case of socialization practices targeting Czech actors, the education of Romanians also included role-playing, which was used particularly in interactions with those expected to become future leaders in civilian and military circles. I explained above the difference between teaching and persuasion, on the one hand, both of which directly affect understanding, attitudes, and desires, and, on the other hand, role-playing. This third type of socialization practice targets primarily the overt behavior of socializees.76 The logic of role-playing activities organized by NATO appears to have been that, by having to enact Western-defined roles of liberal democratic civilian and military elites, Romanians would acquire the right behavioral dispositions. Therefore, they would come to act as liberal democratic actors in the areas of security; they would do “the right thing” in practice, even though, in the initial phase, they might not yet have learned the norms underpinning that behavior. But, in time, role-playing could also lead socializees to attribute to themselves— hence, adopt—the liberal democratic norms underlying “the right thing” that they had been doing. In some cases, role-playing was used in conjunction with teaching. As in the Czech case, this happened particularly—though not exclusively— in the long-term courses organized within the Partnership for Peace framework, the North Atlantic Assembly, and in other NATO/PfP-related institutions (e.g., the Geneva Center for Security Policy). Used together, teaching and role-playing became a popular formula for shaping Romanians’ behavior and—in the long term, it was hoped—their understanding of appropriate norms of liberal democratic governance. In those cases, students participated in overt pedagogical activities, such as lec-

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tures and seminars, designed to teach them specific knowledge about the proper norms of civil-military relations. They learned, for instance, about norms of democratic control of defense-related decision-making; constitutional limitations on the power of the military; transparency and accountability; and the role of the media and parliamentary committees in implementing those principles, among others. Their socialization continued with a series of role-playing activities, in which Romanian actors became involved in activities during which they were required to enact the norms they had learned—to act as if they were political or military leaders who had to protect and promote that normative framework. It is revealing that both NATO/PfP officials and senior, Western-trained Romanian reformers argued that a key goal of PfP educational programs was to expose as many young officers and civilians as possible to the NATO culture, to the institution’s ways of doing things.77 Educational activities involving combinations of teaching and roleplaying increased in number after the Washington Summit of 1999. Thus, a key priority stressed by NATO in recent years has been greater attention to bridging the cultural gap between an elite educated by NATO/PfP and the rest of the soldiers and civilian experts who retained many of the old, Communist-style attitudes and patterns of behavior. In other workshops and exercises, and within IFOR/KFOR missions, the focus was almost exclusively on role-playing. Rather than go through the stage of learning the “correct” norms of liberal democratic governance, Romanian participants in those activities became directly involved in role-playing, being asked to emulate the behavior of their teachers and Western colleagues. As an example of the combination of teaching and role-playing, let us examine a PfP course on military support to civilian authorities which took place in Vienna in November 1999. The course brought together officers and young officials from the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs of participating countries. NATO/PfP teachers sought to shape the behavioral patterns but also the beliefs of Central/Eastern European students (including Romanians). A first stage of socialization (teaching) involved lectures aimed at disseminating Western-defined norms of appropriate civil-military relations and legitimizing those norms by presenting them as the rational product of a long historical evolution.78 Having been exposed to those norms of democratic control of the military, Central/Eastern European students were then asked to enact scenarios in which they would have to put into practice the new norms. They were split into small decision-making groups and presented with various mock crises in which the military had acted in violation of its constitutional mandate. In that context, the socializees were asked to assume the roles

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of decision makers of a Western-style liberal democratic polity as they had to respond to the crisis and restore a state of democratic normality. This, of course, is just one example of a pedagogic activity targeting military officers and civilian experts from Central/Eastern European states. Nevertheless, it remains an important illustration of the kinds of dynamics that occurred during NATO/PfP educational programs. According to several Romanian students of such programs, the course on military support to civilian authorities exemplifies a frequent pattern of combining teaching and role-playing that occurred in many other courses, workshops, and seminars organized within the PfP framework.79 The combination of teaching and role-playing also occurred within the framework of programs run by the NATO Defense College (in Italy), the Marshall Center (in Germany), and the Geneva Center for Security Studies.80 Reportedly, in those forums, Romanian and other Eastern European students were taught Western-defined norms regarding the relationship between the defense establishment, the executive and legislative branches, and society as a whole. Subsequently (at the role-playing stage), the students were also asked to practice implementing those norms. Thus, they worked with NATO/PfP teachers, as well as their colleagues from allied states, to find solutions to a series of hypothetical crises of domestic and international instability. In recent years, these have involved scenarios in which the military must efficiently respond to national crises without violating the principle of the supremacy of democratic civilian authorities; or in which parliamentary defense committees must restore control over abusive military establishments; or in which military officers must respect humanitarian laws in a situation of ethnic conflict, even when those laws run counter to their direct orders. Reportedly, Romanian socializees, like other Eastern Europeans, participated in study groups or teams that also included a substantial number of Western participants and that were usually led by Western teachers, whether British, German, American, or citizens of other NATO states.81 The group would be asked to reach a consensus on the best way to address a crisis situation. The framework within which the problem was to be solved was that of liberal democratic ideas and norms. Those norms governed the definition of a rational or appropriate solution and ruled out alternative options as unacceptable. For instance, the group of mock decision makers had to respect the norm stipulating that certain basic rights of citizens could not be arbitrarily suspended in the name of national security or some type of alleged collective good. Even in times of crisis, solutions had to be found that respected that norm. Similarly, Romanian students (and other Eastern European actors) were taught that it was illegal—and morally wrong—to obey an order that involved viola-

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tions of the Constitution. Western teachers, who defined the parameters of acceptable solutions, sought to ensure that, in their resolution of the hypothetical crisis, Eastern European students did not deviate from the particular (liberal democratic) set of principles and norms which they had been taught. The socialization of Romanians was not always carried out within formalized educational settings. For instance, a special case of socialization, involving a combination of teaching and role-playing, occurred through the direct participation of Romanian troops and civilian personnel in IFOR/SFOR (Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina) and KFOR missions in the Balkans. Between 1996 and 2000, Romanians contributed one detachment of 401 people in Albania, one division of 200 people to IFOR, and several detachments consisting of over 800 people to SFOR in Bosnia, as well as a military police contingent to KFOR in Kosovo. With respect to these units, NATO applied the same technique noted in the previous chapter: it integrated smaller Romanian contingents into larger allied units. One of the main goals pursued through this strategy concerned precisely the socialization of the former. As noted above, the term used in NATO/PfP decision-making circles is the deceptively simple “interoperability.” But the term refers not only to the technical ability of personnel from different participating states to coordinate their moves; it also involves training people so that they will all adopt—and behave in accordance with—the normative expectations of a given role (e.g., comply with the same set of rules in interacting with Bosnian/Kosovar civilians). According to a senior official from the International Coordination Center of SHAPE, by bringing people from the former Communist countries into permanent contact with allied officers, by having them perform the normal tasks of allied soldiers and civilians deployed in the former Yugoslavia, NATO hoped to promote a significant change in the behavior of Central/Eastern Europeans.82 Most of the Romanian participants in SFOR/KFOR were exposed to little—if any—explicit teaching, but they did interact with allied officers and civilian personnel on a permanent basis, and, according to senior officers from SHAPE and the Partnership Coordination Cell, the assumption was that, through such interactions, ideas would travel from the allies to the partners and the latter would come to understand, and identify with, the key norms and values of NATO.83 As the allied and partner officers were briefed on the situation on the ground and received orders to carry out particular missions in Kosovo and Bosnia, norms of correct interaction with local civilians and with civilian bodies (including international organizations) involved in reconstruction efforts in the former Yugoslavia were repeatedly stressed, and boundaries between acceptable

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and unacceptable behavior for NATO officers were constantly reiterated. In addition, Romanian participants in SFOR and KFOR missions were the subjects of systematic role-playing, for their incorporation in allied units meant that they had to act as if they were already members of the alliance, performing the activities of allied military and civilian personnel on a daily basis.84 As noted in the Czech case, NATO officials also expected various instances of role-playing to give rise to a transnational community based on shared ways of thinking about—and acting in—the world, but also on personal relations of friendship.85 By encouraging repeated identification with the group within the framework of a broad array of activities, NATO worked toward the creation of an enduring sense of “oneness” among Western and Eastern civilians and military officers. This was accompanied by a similarly systematic effort to perpetuate a sense of collective identity through extensive alumni networks which would facilitate contact among the graduates of those courses, seminars, and conferences.86 effects of socialization practices Socialization practices enacted by NATO had an important impact on the way in which Romanian reformers defined appropriate liberal democratic identity, and, by reference to that definition, identified the goals and priorities of post-Communist reconstruction. This is not to suggest that Romania is now a fully Westernized country, nor is it to argue that all of NATO’s attempts at socialization were successful. Rather, the point is that some important discursive, legislative, and institutional changes have occurred in recent years in that country, and that those changes would probably not have occurred—at least not in the same manner—if NATO had not been involved. Acting under the guidance of NATO, Romanian reformers created new legal and institutional arrangements, and introduced political practices that changed key aspects of the Romanian state in the sphere of defense. One question that arises at this point is, how can we know that it was NATO’s influence, rather than some other factor, that led to those changes? To begin with, there is the systematic similarity between ideas and types of action advocated by NATO and actual changes enacted by Romanians. Furthermore, I selected issue areas in which the Romanian policymaking elites were either opposed to reform or ambivalent in their position when they took office. Given that the policymaking apparatus, grouped within the CDR, was the most pro-West, pro-liberal political force in Romania, it is reasonable to argue that the growing Westernization of their position did not come from interactions with other domestic actors.

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What about other international institutions? Up until the time when the field research for this study was completed (in early 2000), NATO was the key international institution systematically involved in the process of democratization of civil-military relations. Thus, not only NATO representatives but also senior Romanian defense and foreign affairs officials, members of the delegation to NATO, and political analysts argued that Western guidance provided within the framework of NATO/PfP— whether in multilateral format or through consultations with advisers from a particular allied state—were essential to this process of change.87 The situation may change somewhat in the future; as Romania becomes more systematically involved in the process of negotiating its accession to the EU, it may be required to carry out substantial changes, particularly in the structure and function of the Ministry of the Interior. In that case, we might witness a synergy effect (or, conversely, a case of “inter-blocking institutions”) as NATO and the EU work toward the promotion of Western-based liberal democratic principles in areas such as the further demilitarization and democratization of the Ministry of Interior. But, as some authors have explained, if the EU is to play a greater role in the promotion of defense and security-related reforms, it needs to rethink its approach to these issues areas. During the period covered in this study, in contrast to the complex EU requirements for prospective members in a whole range of political, economic, and social areas, no significant acquis existed in the field of foreign and defense policy and little effort was made to link the enlargement process to the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the process of EU enlargement.88 An analysis of the political discourse of Romanian decision makers reveals that they adopted the categories for defining reality taught by NATO. Critics might argue that, in order to gain the various rewards that NATO might have offered, socializees may have adopted the rhetoric of international norms in their public discourse but were far more reluctant to change their position in situations where their discourse was likely to have significant consequences. To show that more than rhetoric is involved, I combined public statements by policymakers with interview data and with a textual analysis of documents such as the 1999 Strategia de securitate nationala a Romaniei [National Security Strategy of Romania]; “Romanian Armed Forces in 2010,” published by the Romania Ministry of National Defense; and the “White Book on Romania and NATO,” published by Romania’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Such documents cannot be suspected of being mere talk, for they have wide-ranging policy implications. Interviews conducted in 1999–2000, as well as the new documents on national security, reveal that Romanian reformers have come to adopt the definition of their country’s situation in conformity with the logic of a

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teleological evolution that was at the heart of the NATO discourse. Statements issued by Romanian reformers in different contexts in late 1998 and 1999 reveal the adoption in Romania of the Western vision of a unique historical trajectory toward the free, democratic, transparent institutions of the Euro-Atlantic community. Contrary to their initial position, Romanians now define “appropriate” norms and institutions of liberal democracy in the same way as NATO advisers. In essence, socialization practices enacted by NATO had the effect of legitimizing the particular meanings of liberal democratic practices and institutions put forward by the organization, and delegitimized alternative interpretations, which now appear as incorrect or inappropriate. By teaching Romanian reformers the meaning of the appropriate norms and institutions they had to build if they wanted to turn their country into a democratic, progressive, and stable state, NATO exercised a significant, albeit often subtle, power. This, in Bourdieuan terminology, is the power of constructing a particular type of common-sense understanding of the world—that is, NATO was able to shape the Romanian socializees’ vision of appropriate state-society civil-military relations, and their understanding of the normal Romanian role in the international arena (e.g., as reflected in the new national security concepts). Following their interaction with NATO representatives, Romanians adopted interpretations of reality and definitions of the true identity of a liberal democratic polity provided by the organization. According to the 1999 political discourse, as embodied in key government documents, an intrinsic aspect of democratic consolidation was the establishment of full democratic control of defense and security institutions. It is revealing that, in conformity with NATO’s definition of democratic control, and contrary to the view previously held by Romanian policymakers, the 1999 definition broadened proposed democratic control to include institutions governing the domestic order, particularly the Ministry of the Interior. The new understanding is that, in a democratic society it is appropriate for this Ministry to be further civilianized, to become transparent, and to take on new goals, such as the protection of the environment.89 Another area of change in the Romanian definition of desirable institutions concerns the creation of a system that would enable societal actors, particularly NGOs, to become more deeply involved in policymaking and policy implementation in the area of defense and security. Contrary to their initial reluctance to commit themselves to a broader involvement of different departments and societal actors in the area of defense, in 1999 Romanian policymakers argued that it was essential to set up new arrangements in order to give a stronger voice to civil society.90 The reasons given by the Romanian government for the creation of the

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intergovernmental commission amount to a reiteration of the arguments put forward by NATO advisers. The notion involved is that in a democratic, transparent society, the formulation of goals in the area of national security, as well as strategies for achieving them, should be the business of the entire society. Romanian reformers echoed NATO’s arguments when they explained to their compatriots that, through interactions with Western actors, Romanian NGOs had accumulated important expertise which sometimes surpassed that of governmental advisers. Under these circumstances, isolation of those societal actors would be not only inconsistent with the norms of democracy but would also be irrational.91 As an expression of their recognition of NATO experts as legitimate teachers, in 1999 Romanian decision makers asked Western advisers to become directly involved in identifying national priorities in the area of defense and security, and to formulate strategies for the achievement of those priorities. Specifically, they invited advisers from NATO countries to help them formulate the 1999 Annual National Plan (ANP). In early 1999, a retired general from an allied state became, de facto, the main author of the ANP chapter that dealt with security issues. Moreover, he was the one who, speaking on behalf of Romania, presented the plan to NATO’s North Atlantic Council in the spring of 1999 and received feedback—again, on behalf of Romania.92 This case is an interesting reflection of the extent to which the boundary between domestic and international actors became blurred in the Romanian process of post-Communist state-crafting. The adviser involved in the formulation of the ANP assumed a role traditionally attributed to sovereign authorities—that of formulating the goals and strategies of the reform process in the highly sensitive area of national security. The Annual National Plan, approved by the Atlantic Council, is also interesting because it reveals a concern with identifying reform goals— and strategies for achieving them—in such a way as not to endanger the overall process of democratization and liberalization in Romania.93 As noted above, this runs counter to the prevalent myth, according to which NATO’s primary interest in that region was the stimulation of Central/Eastern European acquisitions of Western military equipment. The defense chapter of the 1999 ANP outlines a two-stage process of restructuring of the Romanian armed forces. The first stage of reform, covering the period 2000–2003, was aimed at downsizing (from 230,000 people to 140,000, of which 112,000 are military personnel) and restructuring the armed forces according to the NATO model.94 During this stage, significant socioeconomic costs were anticipated, associated with the demobilization and reintegration into civilian life of a large number of officers. To mitigate these costs, most of the supplement to the defense

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budget for 2000–2003 was to be devoted to the creation of social programs for demobilized military personnel. According to the ANP, for the first phase of reform, acquisition of new military equipment was to occur only to the extent that extra resources became available after these programs had been funded.95 The problem of modernization and the acquisition of new equipment for the army is to be addressed during the second stage of reform, between 2004 and 2007.96 Even then, the principle to be followed is that of efficiency, from the Romanian point of view, rather than one of acquisition from particular suppliers. In addition to adopting NATO-prescribed categories for defining the meaning of appropriate institutions and formulating policies on the basis of those definitions, Romanian reformers were also persuaded by representatives of the alliance to implement a series of reforms. This is further proof that their adoption of international norms was not mere rhetoric. For instance, through governmental decrees issued in early 1999, new laws on the organization and functioning of the Ministry of Defense, as well as on the state of emergency, came into effect. The new laws sought to bring about the kinds of changes that had been recommended by NATO actors. There was an interesting means/ends paradox involved in the promotion of NATO-prescribed reforms. Thus, though the reforms were aimed at creating arrangements that would enhance the role of civil society in the realm of defense, they tended to be carried out through executive action rather than through Parliament-approved legislation. In other words, change aimed at the democratization of defense-related institutions in Romania was promoted in a way that marginalized a key democratic forum—the Parliament. This occurred in a situation in which Romanian reformers thought that, given the views of opposition parties, Parliament might delay—or fail to approve—many of those reforms.97 For instance, an emergency governmental ordinance of January 1999 defines clear mandates for the different branches of the government in a state of national emergency; establishes Western-style procedures for the declaration, continuation, and end of such a state of emergency; and limits the right of the authorities to suspend the rights of individuals even in that special context.98 According to the new legislation, the president must seek parliamentary approval within five days of the declaration of the state of emergency. If the Parliament refuses to consent, the president must revoke his decree and the state of emergency will come to an end.99 Also, although the authorities have the right to suspend certain individual rights during a state of emergency, they cannot arrest a person unless they have a specific mandate issued by a prosecutor. Even then, suspects can only be detained for a maximum of twenty-four hours, after which time they must be either charged or released.100

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In addition, the governmental Ordinance of August 1999 provided for a series of changes in the organization and function of the Ministry of National Defense. In an effort to end the isolation of the Ministry from society, the ordinance required the Ministry to inform and cooperate on a permanent basis with other Ministries and departments, as well as with non-governmental organizations.101 In relation to a particular NGO, that of reserve military personnel, the Ministry must provide ongoing material and financial assistance.102 Furthermore, one of the Ministry’s secretaries of state was entrusted with ensuring communication with Parliament. The new Department of Public Relations must provide information about the activities of the Ministry to the media and must work to enhance the MoD’s links to civil society.103 In order to further civilianize the Ministry, and to protect the rights of civilian personnel, the ordinance provides that civilians employed by the MoD have the right to participate in professional associations and are entitled to social benefits previously extended only to military personnel.104 The Romanian policymakers also carried out a series of significant institutional reforms that had been prescribed by NATO. For instance, continuing the efforts to restructure the Ministry of Defense, reformers in Bucharest adopted a Western-based “scientific basis” for personnel management.105 The rationale was to establish new selection, training, and promotion criteria for career management in accordance with NATO practices and standards.106 Some of the new steps, introduced in 1999 at the advice of Western advisers working within the Romanian MoD, include a system of promotion based on “blind evaluations,” to replace the biased and politicized practices of the past; the hiring of more civilians, with the aim of reaching a percentage of 40 percent civilian staff within the Ministry by 2004; and the creation of an ombudsman. A new system of recruitment was also established, following the recommendations of British advisers.107 In addition, Romanian policymakers initiated a reform aimed at civilianizing the Ministry of Interior and turning it into a more transparent, more accountable institution. According to the program formulated in the 1999 Annual National Plan, the police and “gendarmerie” were to be restructured and its members retrained, so as to make these institutions compatible with their Western counterparts and to enable Romanians to take on broader tasks (e.g., addressing problems of illegal migration, transnational crime, and drug trafficking) in the European context. A new national structure, “Europol,” was to be created in order to facilitate the participation of the Romanian police in activities carried out by NATO and the EU.108 Another important institutional step was the creation, in 1999, of the

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Interdepartmental Commission for NATO Integration. The commission is comprised of representatives of all relevant executive structures—the presidency, the ministries, departments in the prime minister’s office, and various other agencies. It also consults with military and civilian NGOs, such as the Euro-Atlantic Association on the civilian side, and the Association of Reserve and Retired Officers on the military side. Every institution represented on the commission had a special department within its structure dedicated exclusively to NATO-related activities. Through those departments, the various institutions of the commission participate in NATO and PfP activities.109 The creation of the commission was an important step, in that it provided a forum for building consensus around the reforms advocated by NATO advisers. The interaction between NATO/PfP and departments from various ministries has the double function of exposing a wide set of Romanian officials to Western ideas and principles, and enabling NATO to monitor developments in key Romanian institutions, well beyond the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.110 Moreover, it allows NATO to act within the framework of transnational networks formed with Romanian reformers to affect change in some of those institutions. International Relations scholars who work in the area of transnational relations explain that transnational actors can, and sometimes do, affect domestic politics by providing reformers in a particular country with new thematic ideas and technical information.111 In the Romanian case, just as in the Czech case examined in the previous chapter, what we see emerging is an interesting variation of the boomerang mechanism of transnational cooperation. Specialists in transnational politics have revealed processes through which domestic actors have mobilized international norms provided by transnational actors to strengthen their position vis-à-vis opponents in the national arena.112 Transnational coalitions, it is argued, have sometimes been able to obtain domestic change by using internationally legitimized ideas to put pressure on governments to enact change. But in this case the boomerang mechanism involved reformers within the policymaking apparatus and pro-West societal groups (e.g., NGOs) who had established transnational networks with allied officials, and used those networks to overcome obstacles to change posed by conservative domestic actors. Policymakers associated with the CDR, the principal political force for change in Romania, had succeeded in placing their supporters in key positions (as ministers, deputy ministers, secretaries, and sub-secretaries of state) within different Ministries. The problem was been that these reformers, acting by themselves, were often unable to carry out substantial reform in their respective ministries because they

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were operating within conservative bureaucracies. Under those circumstances, interactions with NATO officials within the framework of the Commission for NATO Integration provided proreform Romanian officials with explicit statements of international support for their liberal programs. In the context of debates and workshops within the commission, which included pro-reform officials but also their more conservative colleagues, this endorsement helped legitimize their ideas. Simultaneously, it helped delegitimize conservative ideas, which were increasingly at odds with the growing consensus within the commission regarding “appropriate” or “correct” courses of action. International endorsement enhanced the credibility of truth-claims concerning ideas that Romanian reformers were proposing. It was more difficult to challenge those ideas in situations in which they appeared not as the particular opinions of one set of actors among many, but as principles and norms that were recognized as valid by a host of internationally recognized experts. Moreover, as in the Czech case, NATO helped domestic reformers to “shame” conservative actors into compliance with Western norms. It did so by publicly portraying opposition to reform as a symbolic marker of the stigmatized mentalities and behavior of the Communist past. According to Romanian pro-reform political actors, this type of shaming was helpful in overcoming the opposition of conservative members of the defense establishment to NATO-prescribed changes such as the civilianization of the Ministry of Defense and the restructuring of the armed forces.113 The process of foreign policy making in the context of the Kosovo crisis is yet another revealing case of the socialization of Romanian policymakers by NATO. One cannot explain the Romanian decision to provide unquestioning support for the allied intervention in Kosovo without taking into account the role played by the organization in defining support for Operation Allied Hope as the only appropriate thing to do for a country committed to the norms of liberal democracy. NATO provided an authoritative interpretation of the crisis according to which the position adopted by Romania was a symbolic marker of its identity. This argument relied on the interpretation of the Western intervention that prevailed within NATO decision-making circles, and within most of its member states. According to that interpretation, the crisis involved a conflict between the progressive, modern values of liberal democracy and the barbarity embodied in the Milosevic regime. As the institutional embodiment of the Euro-Atlantic community, NATO was acting in a civilized (“surgical”) manner to protect Kosovar civilians against the authoritarian, undemocratic government of Slobodan Milo-

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sevic. That reading of the crisis, as a conflict between the superior values of liberal democracy and the barbarity of Milosevic, did not simply legitimize Western action; it also constituted the range of possible responses on the part of non-NATO states. According to NATO’s representation of the situation, only a country that was not truly committed to the norms of liberal democracy could fail to support the Western military intervention. Indeed, senior NATO representatives resorted to techniques of consistency and social proof to argue that anything other than full support for international intervention in Kosovo would constitute a serious deviation from the norms associated with the kind of state identity Romanians were trying to build. According to NATO officials, “it was time for Romania and its neighbors to show whether its political reorientation toward Western liberal democracy was real or merely rhetorical. It is now time for [non-NATO] frontline states to decide if they are, together with decent people from around the world, rallied against the barbarity of Milosevic’s regime. This is a difficult moment for . . . [your] countries, but if you really believe in the values of democracy and human rights, now is the time to stand up and act in the name of those values.”114 In response to this discourse articulated by NATO, the Romanian government accepted the material costs that the Romanian public had to endure as a consequence of compliance with Western expectations, as well as the likely costs to their political popularity. If one had examined this instance of foreign-policy making by reference to the requirements of instrumental rationality, the prediction would probably have been that Romania would not have gotten involved in the conflict. From the perspective of instrumental individuals, it was irrational for Romanian decision makers to support Operation Allied Hope. For Romania, a frontline state in the crisis, there were serious costs associated with the Western military campaign in Kosovo. The Romanian economy, already fragile, was handicapped by the Western blockade on the Danube, losing over 850 million dollars.115 In addition, the government was concerned about the potential implications for tens of thousands of ethnic Romanians living in Yugoslavia if Romania was to turn against the Belgrade government. There was also a perceived threat, at least among some policymakers, that action against Yugoslavia might trigger military retaliation.116 In addition, Russia was exercising considerable pressure on Bucharest, warning Romanian leaders that alignment with the West would have adverse consequences for relations between the two countries. As for positive incentives (“carrots”) exercised by the West, these were too limited and uncertain to offset the costs. While NATO promised future economic assistance, and stated “it would take very seriously threats to the territorial integrity of Romania and other

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frontline states,” those promises were rather vague.117 No specific dates or amounts were mentioned with respect to economic aid. As for the military threat, there was no formal commitment on the part of the alliance, no extension of Article 5 to cover Romania in case of aggression by Belgrade.118 On the public opinion front, Romanian leaders were facing stiff opposition: about 78 percent of the population was opposed to the Western military operation.119 According to the prevailing public discourse during the crisis, the Serbian population was a victim of Milosevic’s dictatorial regime. It was, therefore, wrong to punish it for the crimes of its leader. Throughout the Kosovo conflict, the population continued to be critical of Western action—and of the position of its government vis-à-vis that action. In a similar vein, the political opposition—consisting of the socialist PDSR led by Iliescu and the nationalist PRM—expressed in no uncertain terms their opposition to the NATO campaign. Through their actions in Parliament the opposition parties also tried to prevent the government from supporting the alliance—and also sought to discredit the government for its support for NATO.120 It is, therefore, reasonable to argue that the combination of all those factors should have led instrumentally rational decision makers to refuse Western requests for support. Yet, Romanian decision makers were consistent in their support, both discursive and practical, for the NATO intervention in the Yugoslav province. In justifying their unqualified support for NATO intervention to Parliament, Romanian decision makers framed their response precisely in terms of the value-based confrontation depicted in the Western discourse. They subscribed to the Western representation of reality, adopting the same definitions of who and what was involved in the crisis, and in so doing, embracing the NATO view that inaction was unacceptable. The idea stressed by Romanian decision makers in the context of the crisis was that it was time for their country to decide whether it wanted to side with the West or with neo-Communism and the ethnic nationalism promoted by Milosevic.121 When the Romanian leaders explained to Parliament why they wanted to grant NATO unrestricted access to Romanian airspace, and to do so for an unlimited period of time, they pointed out that “the Kosovo crisis represents a conflict between democracy and barbarism. Failure to cooperate with NATO might lead the West to place us in the camp of non-civilized people, for only they would not be opposed to what Milosevic is doing to Kosovar Albanians.”122 In addition, Romania took a series of concrete steps in support of the West. In order to relieve pressure on Macedonia and Albania, Romania volunteered to accept up to six thousand refugees from Kosovo. Moreover, the leaders in Bucharest granted NATO unlimited use of Romanian

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airspace while at the same time denying access to Russian planes. The conclusion of the bombing brought NATO requests for further backing. The alliance suggested that Romania, as a member of the Partnership for Peace, should take part in a post-conflict peacekeeping force in Kosovo, organized in a similar fashion to the one in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bucharest consented and immediately sent troops to the Yugoslav province. To understand the position adopted by Romanian leaders, it is necessary to take into account NATO’s role in representing the Kosovo crisis as a symbolic marker of the identity of Central/Eastern European countries. In interactions with Romanian decision makers, NATO representatives launched persuasive appeals that revolved around the idea of consistency: the argument was that a true commitment to liberal democratic norms would be inconsistent with a failure to act in support of the West. This was combined with the technique of social proof, as NATO leaders argued that other democratic nations supported the allied action. The fact that societies governed by principles of transparency and democratic debates were in agreement regarding appropriate action in the crisis was further proof, if such proof was needed, that Operation Allied Hope was the only appropriate course of action under the circumstances. In a broader perspective, the Kosovo case also provides an interesting example of transnational networks in action: as it was becoming increasingly clear that the Romanian government and pro-West societal actors were encountering significant domestic opposition, allied officials sought to help them improve their image vis-à-vis the Romanian public. NATO representatives resorted to symbolic actions (by stating publicly that support for the intervention in Kosovo was the only ethical course of action) and to a strategy of shaming the opposition (by presenting opposition to the Kosovo campaign as an indication of support for “barbarity”). For instance, British Prime Minister Tony Blair pointed out in his address to the Romanian Parliament, on May 4, 1999, that the only appropriate course of action for an emerging democracy was to take a firm stand against the actions of the Milosevic regime. In Blair’s words, “This is a test for countries like Romania, on the front-line. . . . This is a time for democracies, old and new, to stand up and be counted.”123 In addition, some allied officials sought to create a link between compliance with NATO’s expectations and instrumental rewards. Thus, in that same speech to the Romanian Parliament, Tony Blair promised that the U.K. would support the start of accession dialogues between the EU and Bucharest.124 It might be tempting to argue that, in fact, Romanian political actors were never really persuaded by the arguments put forward by NATO ad-

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visers to redefine their goals and carry out Western-prescribed reforms. Rather, they acted in response to a covert form of coercion, according to which the organization used a veiled threat that unless Romania conformed to Western expectations regarding the reform of defense and security institutions their country would never be accepted into NATO. It is difficult to bring compelling evidence to bear that Romanian reformers adopted NATO’s normative prescriptions out of considerations that went beyond a fear that, given the organization’s insistence on liberal democratic reforms, failure to carry out such reforms would disqualify Romania from NATO membership. However, a close reading of the empirical record points to a dynamic of interaction between Romanian reformers and NATO that is hard to explain exclusively by reference to that fear of exclusion. Even in situations in which they adopted a critical stance, NATO officials continued to exercise a mode of social influence that relied heavily on persuasion, and sought to do far more than affect Romanian behavior through the manipulation of instrumental incentives. Thus, NATO’s warnings were formulated as identity arguments. Advisers sought to persuade Romanian reformers that a failure to reform entailed a serious danger. But that danger was not simply one of the sanctions that NATO or other international institutions might impose on their country. Rather, what was involved was a threat to the kind of state identity that those reformers were seeking to build. The threat was that, if they did not act quickly, Romanian policymakers ran the risk that they would fail in their mission to build a liberal democratic state identity and would thus fail to bring Romania “back” to Western civilization. Western experts affiliated with NATO reminded Romanians of their ambivalent position in the evolution toward becoming a Western-style liberal democracy and argued that Romania’s past must not be allowed to undermine, or worse, (re)become, its future.125 In that context, again, the specific position that NATO occupied—as an institutional expression of the West and hence as the source of knowledge about, and forum of recognition for, liberal democratic identity, was crucial. That special position conferred upon NATO a special authority to formulate credible assessments of Romania’s evolution toward becoming a true liberal democratic polity, and to secure the trust of Romanian reformers in the ability and willingness of allied advisers to prescribe correct reforms (as opposed, say, to formulating reforms aimed at weakening Romania and advancing the selfish interests of Western powers). For their part, having accepted Western definitions of appropriate norms of liberal democracy, actors affiliated with the liberal coalition that ruled Romania between 1996 and 2000 systematically advocated

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those norms, and did so in various circumstances.126 As we have seen, rather than engage in rhetorical manipulation by supporting different norms for different audiences in an effort to avoid being punished by their constituents, Romanian liberals were consistent in their normative position, regardless of the audience they were addressing. They upheld NATO-prescribed norms not only in conversations with Western officials, but also in parliamentary debates, in informal meetings with Romanian students, and in discussions with their assistants. In addition, the explanation that stresses a mode of influence that went beyond coercion is consistent with the tendency of Romanians to go above and beyond the call of duty in accepting the advice of NATO representatives, even in situations in which there were no rewards linked to that behavior. Romanian reformers relied on Western advisers to such an extent that they surrendered to them substantial control in areas conventionally considered to be key to the country’s sovereignty. Thus, NATO representatives were invited to formulate the Annual National Plan, which covered national priorities in the area of defense and security. That surrender of control was not a condition of NATO membership, and it went beyond the degree of guidance that Brussels expected to provide. Thus, the alliance was able to participate in the post-Communist reconstruction of the Romanian polity even in a situation in which it did not promise NATO membership in exchange for Romanian adoption of Western norms of good governance. Furthermore, this explanation is also consistent with the behavior of Romanian decision makers in the context of the Kosovo crisis, in which, rather than remain neutral, Romanians supported the Western military intervention because they regarded it as the appropriate thing to do. The Romanian government sided with the West even in a situation in which it was risking punishment by its constituents. Regarding the effects of socialization on “next-generation” elites, my study suffers from the same problems discussed in the chapter on the Czech Republic. It is too early to talk about the effects of socialization in the case of subjects who, as they do not yet occupy positions of power, have not had the chance of translating their ideas into visible actions. Nor have they had the opportunity to articulate a political discourse on the basis of—or contrary to—the ideas promoted by their teachers. Nevertheless, there would seem to be a significant difference between NATO/PfP-educated people who returned to work for the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs and other state agencies, and those without that kind of training. According to Western (MAP) advisers to Romanian Ministry of Defense officials, and in the view of those actors themselves, graduates of Western institutions behave and think differently from their

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colleagues.127 Former Western students tend to define particular problems in ways consistent with the principles into which they were socialized, and seek to gather institutional support for solutions that are consistent with Western-defined norms of appropriate action. They are also far more comfortable around NATO advisers than their colleagues, and tend to appeal to those advisers for guidance and support when they encounter bureaucratic obstacles in the implementation of reforms. In other words, what emerges in that context is yet another element of transnational networking: the domestic partners of international institutions are not just members of the reform-oriented policymaking apparatus, but also former students of Western educational forums. In examining NATO’s involvement in Romania, one may be surprised to find that one of the most powerful alliances in history relied very little on coercion to secure Romanian compliance with Western prescriptions. But the complexity of the social relationships that were created between NATO and Romanian actors, and the former’s limited use of sanctions within the framework of those relationships, should not lead us to overlook the significant power involved there. By taking advantage of its special authority, NATO was able to not simply alter Romanian behavior but to socialize Romanian reformers into a new set of (allegedly) common-sense understandings of reality, and into a particular collection of liberal democratic norms of appropriate action. In so doing, the organization contributed to the (re)formulation of the prevailing Romanian discourse on national identity—involving a particular definition of the collective self and its relations to the outside world—and played a key role in the (re)definition of goals and priorities of the reform process in the area of security. More broadly, NATO became involved in the socialization of various sets of societal actors around a particular definition of Romanian national identity and interest. Simultaneously, it contributed to the delegitimization of alternative (nationalist or Communist) views of Romanian national interest by portraying them as inherently irrational and inconsistent with the identity of a modern, democratic polity. In essence, NATO came to play a significant role in the process of structuring domestic debates and narrowing the repertoire of courses of actions available to pro-reform Romanian political actors. At the same time, NATO worked with pro-West elites—often the same people that had been coached by the alliance—to overcome the passivity or resistance of conservative Romanian actors to reform. NATO formed informal transnational networks with Romanian reformers and combined persuasion with instrumental incentives in an attempt to change the attitudes and behavior of conservative Romanian actors in areas ranging from debates about Romania’s involvement in the Kosovo crisis

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to legislative and institutional reforms in the area of defense. In essence, the power exercised by NATO over Romanian actors extended to areas that are conventionally regarded as the exclusive domain of sovereign authorities (the definition of “normal” relations with the outside world, the identification of key national security goals and of the actions required to pursue those goals, and the definition of threats to security). the power to “educate” and its limits: conditions that facilitated or impeded socialization The conditions that facilitated or impeded socialization were similar to those revealed in the Czech case. With respect to teaching, a key condition was the mutual recognition of the actors’ respective roles as “teachers” and “students.” In NATO’s case, as we saw, there was a shared understanding among the organization’s officials that it was both possible and highly desirable to educate a “critical mass” of Romanian political and military elites into adopting a particular set of Western-defined liberal democratic norms. On the Romanian side, in the case of political elites associated with the liberal coalition that governed the country between 1996 and 2000, their self-definition as actors who were still learning to build a liberal democratic polity placed them in a position in which it was possible for other actors to play the role of the expert(s).128 By contrast, as noted above, NATO encountered difficulties in socializing conservative members of the socialist government that ruled until 1996, who did not see the need to learn new modes of behavior. In that instance, the allies concluded that those elites were too closely associated with an alternative set of values and norms, and, hence, their ideas and attitudes were unlikely to change as a result practices of socialization carried out by NATO. By contrast, when they took power at the end of 1996, the Romanian reformers defined their political identity as a liberal democratic avantgarde that could and would turn their country into a Western-style liberal democracy. The new policymakers were united around the idea of building liberal democratic institutions in their country and thus returning Romania to the Euro-Atlantic community where it presumably belonged. In that context, the Romanians’ actions were motivated by their desire to learn the roles of liberal democratic decision makers, to act in a manner consistent with the obligations and the standards of the community in which they wanted to include their country.

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In the process of learning the meaning of liberal democracy, pro-reform Romanian decision makers needed the recognition of the established international liberal democratic community that their definitions of appropriate norms were the right ones. In the process of dialogical formation of state identity, Romanian leaders defined the Euro-Atlantic community as the relevant generalized other: the international social group which Romania wanted to join and by which it had to be recognized as “one of us.” As a corollary to this, Romanian reformers relied on “teachers” from within that community. This may seem to be a trivial observation; however, it is worth noting that there were, and continue to be, many Romanian political groups who would not regard Western actors as the relevant generalized other in the process of (re)constructing the identity of their country. The nationalist forces grouped around the PUNR, for instance, claimed to accept the goal of Romanian integration into Europe. But a closer look at their political discourse and practice reveals that their understanding of European integration is in tension with the anti-liberal elements of their political program. The nationalists consistently argued, both in public statements and in parliamentary debates, and in private meetings with foreign officials that such integration should only be carried out if it respected and promoted the unique national identity of Romania.129 In concrete terms, this translated into a heavy reliance on particular (nationalist) readings of the Romanian past as a blueprint for (re)building the country. From this perspective, Western institutions appeared as sources of danger to Romanian identity rather than as legitimate guides in the process of state-crafting. A second condition that facilitated teaching concerned the ability of NATO to secure recognition in the eyes of Romanian policymakers as an agent that had the knowledge and authority to provide reliable guidance in the process of building a liberal democratic polity. In other words, in addition to regarding the Euro-Atlantic community as the relevant generalized other, pro-reform political elites also came to rely on NATO in particular as an authoritative expression of that generalized other. This involved the Romanians’ acceptance of the Western discourse that portrayed NATO as not just an alliance but also as the embodiment of the Western community of values and norms. In the words of a senior member of the Romanian delegation to NATO, Romanian reformers trusted NATO to provide guidance in the (re)construction of state-society relations in the area of defense because the organization represented the “mature democracies” and embodied “the shared values” of the Euro-Atlantic world with which the Romanians identified. As such, NATO was seen as an institution that could be relied upon because it had both the necessary expertise and the “right intentions” (versus, for instance, pur-

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suing a hidden agenda of domination in Central/Eastern Europe).130 It was their acceptance of the role of NATO in promoting liberal values and institutions that led Romanians to recognize, in principle, that the organization had the legitimacy to act as their educator. It led them to invite NATO officials to play key—arguably, very intrusive—roles in the process of Western-style democratization of defense and security institutions. As a consequence, NATO acquired the power to participate in crafting basic institutions of the Romanian state, even in a situation in which it did not promise rewards (i.e., NATO membership) for compliance with Western norms. The same conditions seem to have facilitated teaching in the case of young civilian experts and military officers that participated in NATO courses/workshops. It would seem that there were significant differences in terms of the outcomes of socialization, depending on whether or not subjects placed in the position of students actually accepted that role and regarded themselves as actors involved in a process of learning appropriate modes of behavior. Similarly, there was a difference in outcomes depending on whether or not socializees recognized NATO as a legitimate normative guide in the reconstruction of their polity. Romanian graduates of NATO courses and some of their teachers indicated that there was a strong tendency among students who accepted the educational authority of the organization to adopt the ideas and norms taught within NATO forums. In general, the socializees that met the above-mentioned conditions stated their support for the new, NATO-prescribed norms. Furthermore, they also came to rely on those norms as a framework for interpreting various problems and defining the menu of reasonable responses to such problems (e.g., by identifying the difficulties of the defense-related reform process as requiring better implementation of the kinds of policies and institutional reforms prescribed by NATO as opposed to interpreting them as an indication of the necessity to abandon reliance on Western guidance). NATO representatives acting as teachers to the Central and Eastern Europeans encountered problems in instances of education that occurred in the absence of those conditions. For instance, NATO’s socialization efforts had a very limited impact on older civilians and military officers who had been systematically socialized under the Communist regime. Those “students” did not define themselves as learners of new, appropriate norms, and did not have the openness associated with that role. Even in the case of younger actors, those who, at the outset of their NATO training, had strong nationalist or socialist ideas were, apparently, much less influenced by that process of education.131 An additional condition that facilitated NATO’s teaching practices was the ongoing, systematic interaction with socializees. The institutional

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innovations of the last decade have created numerous forums within which NATO has ample opportunity to teach Romanian reformers the appropriate meanings of liberal democracy. In the previous chapter, we saw that the sociologists’ and social psychologists’ argument—that, to be successful, educational practices need to be carried out over a relatively long period of time—was confirmed in the case of the Czech Republic. Similarly, in Romania, empirical evidence suggests that, even within the category of reformers who accepted the legitimacy of NATO as a teacher of norms, those actors who were exposed to systematic teachings tended to be especially prone to adopt Western-defined schemas for understanding the world. They also relied on the new principles as the normative framework within which “reasonable actions” could be defined. It is still too early to draw any final conclusions on this topic, but systematic teaching appears to be making a difference at the time of the writing of this study. Western-socialized liberal reformers who occupied key positions in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense under the liberal government appear to have maintained their normative commitment to the principles of liberal democracy—although their decision-making power has been, in many cases, substantially reduced.132 In the case of next-generation elites, the condition of systematic interaction also seems to hold. Thus, individuals trained in long-term courses have been more successfully socialized, have adopted Western norms and ways of seeing reality, to a far greater extent than those whose only exposure to Western ideas was in the course of a few short seminars or conferences.133 As for role-playing, the conditions identified in the Czech case also appear to have affected the socialization of Romanian actors. Thus, role-playing was particularly effective in cases where socializees were actively and repeatedly involved in enacting NATO-prescribed roles. Romanian actors who participated in role-playing activities that met those conditions are reported to have adopted behavioral patterns conforming to expectations of the prescribed roles to a greater extent than actors whose socialization was limited to one or two instances of role-playing.134 The most successful cases of socialization appear to have been those involving long-term teaching coupled with repeated role-playing. For instance, many Romanians who attended long-term courses at the Marshall Center, NATO Defense College, and other PfP-related educational institutions took part in systematic combinations of teaching and role-playing. In those instances, teaching (i.e., the stage when NATO taught them defense-related liberal democratic norms) was accompanied by role-playing activities (e.g., joint exercises) where the socializees had to act “as if” they were already political or military actors in a Western-style liberal democratic polity. Such combinations of teaching and role-playing seem to have significantly affected the behavior and attitudes of the given sets of socializees.135

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But even in the absence of direct, explicit teaching, recurrent and active role-playing did, reportedly, make a significant difference. The most dramatic case involved Romanians who participated in SFOR/KFOR. High-ranking Romanian officers and officials from the Ministry of Defense were in agreement that there was a significant difference between participants in those missions and the other officers/soldiers and civilian personnel involved in defense matters. In the course of their missions in the former Yugoslavia, Romanians apparently assumed their roles and behaved well as members of a NATO/PfP force expected to comply with certain Western-defined normative standards.136 In addition, when they returned home, many of those individuals brought with them new modes of behavior as well as new ideas and attitudes. For instance, through what was arguably a process of indirect learning of new ideas via practical experience, they came to be more inclined to accept the definition of the Euro-Atlantic community as the entity which, by virtue of its superior values, had the duty and ability to play a role in protecting human rights and democracy. Moreover, many Romanian participants in PfP missions are reported to have developed a sense of sameness with that community: they acquired a view of themselves as acting together with people from allied states in the name of a shared set of superior values. From this perspective, they, too, were part of the ethical and rational community that had a duty to act in defense of human rights in the “inferior” realm of the former Yugoslavia. In some instances, role-playing was also effective in reshaping not only the behavior but also the worldview of actors who had resisted direct learning from NATO because they did not recognize the legitimacy of the organization as a teacher of norms. There were a few cases in which students initially opposed to liberal ideas identified so well with the role they were playing that they eventually came to be aware of a serious inconsistency between the principles and norms that they held and the principles on which they were “playing.” As a way of escaping that cognitive dissonance, they apparently attributed to themselves the norms underlying the roles they had been enacting.137 In other words, they persuaded themselves of the ideas expressed in the role and simultaneously moved away from their old, anti-liberal ideas.138 With respect to persuasion, it was easier for NATO to successfully carry out persuasion vis-à-vis Romanian actors who had learned the Western-defined norms of civil-military relations. In those cases, NATO advisers had the advantage of a shared normative framework within which they could collectively identify the menu of reasonable courses of action and could invoke duties to one another. Within such frameworks of collective understandings, it was easier to formulate persuasive argu-

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ments regarding the particular action called for by a given problem. Furthermore, those Romanians had already accepted the idea that NATO was a source of authoritative expertise regarding the definition of appropriate domestic institutions of governance in the area of defense. Indeed, as we have seen, in several instances Western officials acting in NATO’s name succeeded in persuading their Romanian interlocutors that, contrary to the latter’s position, liberal democratic norms required the implementation of “X” or “Y” reforms. But prior teaching, while facilitating persuasion, did not always guarantee its success. There were cases in which Romanian leaders challenged arguments put forward by NATO according to which collectively accepted norms necessarily called for “X” course of action. In some cases, while accepting in principle that NATO had the authority to act as a normative guide, Romanian socializees did not regard the particular representatives involved in a given instance of consultation/dialogue/workshop as having sufficient expertise about the specific Romanian context in which the prescribed norms were to be applied. In those situations, the initial Romanian recognition of the authority of particular advisers, by virtue of their affiliation with an institution that embodied liberal democratic expertise, was undermined by the behavior of those individuals. Thus, interviews with pro-NATO defense and foreign affairs officials, as well as with members of the delegation to the Partnership Coordination Cell, reveal that Romanian persuadees tended not to be convinced by those NATO advisers who appeared uninterested in Romania’s fate. Conversely, persuasion was especially successful in situations in which NATO representatives demonstrated significant knowledge about, and interest in, Romania, and were willing to listen to the concerns of their Romanian interlocutors.139 In other instances, problems occurred in the course of attempts at persuasion because Romanian socializees did not accept the validity of the argument that associated liberal democratic norms with the specific policies prescribed by the organization. One such limitation concerned NATO efforts to persuade Romanian policymakers to restructure the Ministry of the Interior. As noted above, using arguments of consistency, Western advisers did convince their Romanian interlocutors that they had to civilianize and increase the transparency and accountability of that Ministry. This generated important reforms, particularly with respect to the reorganization of the police and the creation of EUROPOL, a program designed to enable the integration of Romanian law enforcement agencies with crisis management operations that take place under the command of international organizations. This area of reform was not included in the platform presented by the Romanian reformers when they

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took office, nor did other domestic political actors advocate it. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that it would not have happened had it not been for the Western involvement, specifically within the framework of NATO activities. But this was not a completely successful story. Western arguments about appropriate courses of action ran counter to the views of Romanian policymakers regarding the particularity of their society. Romanians accepted the idea that consistency with the norms and principles of liberalism and democracy, which they had embraced, required action to transform the Ministry of the Interior. At the same time, however, they thought that the specificity of the Romanian case placed necessary constraints on those reforms. In other words, Bucharest’s position was that the exceptionality of the Romanian case called for a special application of the liberal norm—an application that was different from what NATO had prescribed. Western advisers were unable to persuade Romanian policymakers to further democratize the Ministry, in part due to the perception among Romanians that the Westerners’ expertise on that issue was limited. Thus, the Romanians thought that there were issues in which they rather than Western advisers were the most qualified experts. For instance, given the perceived vulnerability of Romania to subversive activities of foreign spies, especially those with connections to the KGB, Romanian policymakers sought to maintain an element of military control within the Ministry. The problem, according to Romanian reformers, was that NATO representatives did not understand that particular situation in which the country found itself. Therefore, they could not be fully trusted to provide correct advice in this area. As a result, the plan for reform that was formulated in 1999 provided for the modernization and partial civilianization of the Ministry of Interior, but also stated that the Ministry would retain some military components in its structure. Military control was to be maintained in the areas of passport control and relations with foreigners, as well as in the gendarmerie.140 problems of limited effects of socialization It is important to keep in mind that the successful socialization of particular Romanian actors did not always translate into corresponding changes at the level of the Romanian polity as a whole. In part, the problem was that as Romanian reformers sought to embed the new norms into the legislative and institutional fabric of their society, they often encountered significant domestic obstacles. One such obstacle was that

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of political and professional marginalization. This was even more problematic than in the Czech case because of the return to power of a socialist government following the November 2000 elections. In elections for the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, the Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR), referred to by one of the most eminent analysts of Romanian politics as “the unreformed ‘successor’ party to the Communists,” received 37.0 percent and 36.6 percent of the vote, respectively, followed by the extremist Greater Romania Party (PRM).141 In the December 10 presidential run-off elections, Iliescu defeated the PRM leader by a margin of two-to-one. In June 2001, as part of their quest to join the Socialist International that had rejected them in the past, the PDSR merged with the Social Democratic Party of Romania (PSDR) to become the Social Democratic Party (PSD). At the level of political elites, that change meant that many of the reformers who had promoted liberal democratic reforms were politically marginalized. In a similar vein, the problem of marginalization has also affected young Romanian officers and civilian experts who have graduated from NATO/PfP courses but who, upon their return home, have either been demoted or assigned to inferior posts, where they cannot make use of their expertise.142 Another set of problems occurred in the process of implementing new, NATO-prescribed liberal democratic norms. Implementation was especially problematic in situations in which it depended not just on a limited set of reluctant bureaucratic actors who could be influenced by targeted instrumental incentives, if not by persuasion, but also in situations involving a broad array of conservative institutional and societal actors. Under those circumstances, pro-reform actors of the policymaking apparatus often have difficulty in mustering the level of support required for norm implementation. One case in point was the involvement of societal actors, particularly NGOs, in policymaking debates in the area of defense and security. Under the influence of NATO advisers, the liberal political elites of Romania passed new legislation on the organization and functioning of the Ministry of Defense, which requires the Ministry to inform and cooperate with NGOs in the formulation of proposals for legislation as well as in various other activities.143 Similarly, they created the InterDepartmental Commission for Integration into NATO, designed to include various institutions and societal actors, including NGOs, in the formulation and implementation of a program of reforms aimed at preparing the country for possible NATO membership. These were important development2, for, in contrast to past practices of exclusion, they gave societal actors a legitimate voice in policymaking debates. But in or-

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der for that voice to be effective, new legal and institutional measures needed to be accompanied by ongoing practices of cooperation between ministries, various departments and governmental agencies, and NGOs and other representatives of civil society. That was where the implementation of the new norms became especially problematic. In spite of the new legislative and institutional arrangements, the NGOs were often not informed in a timely manner of important developments, and there was a tendency on the part of the bureaucracies of ministries and governmental agencies to pay little, if any, attention to the points of view expressed by non-governmental organizations. In part, the problem appeared to be related to Romanian political culture, which assigns a minimal role to non-governmental organizations. This was coupled with a perception, which continued to prevail in Romanian society, that the military were the most qualified decision makers in the area of defense. There was, in essence, a significant dissonance between the norms and ideas promoted by Western actors and embraced by Romanian reformers, and the ideas that still prevailed in the broader society.144 In some instances, problems of norm implementation occurred even at the level of pro-reform, liberal political elites. For instance, we noted above that under NATO’s advice the Romanian Ministry of Defense adopted a new system of professional promotion. The new system, based on Western-style criteria of performance and training, was aimed at transcending the long-standing practice of political appointments within the Ministry. According to Western advisers who worked with Romanian defense officials for a long time, this change did have an important effect in terms of limiting corruption and bringing MoD procedures of staff selection and promotion into greater conformity with Western normative expectations.145 Nevertheless, the Romanian government did not succeed in completing the reform process in the MoD, and, more broadly, in the area of defense.146 For instance, in several cases the appointment of MoD staff appeared to be informed more by political considerations than by the objective professional criteria that the Romanians had, officially, adopted. epilogue As explained from the outset, this study of interactions between NATO and various Romanian actors focused on the period ending in 2000. However, by way of conclusion, it is interesting to take a brief look at the evolution of NATO–Romania relations after that point in time. Two sets of developments are especially relevant to my analysis. Most impor-

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tantly, the inside approach to international stability has remained key to NATO’s strategy. In Romania’s case, the allies have continued to use the MAP as a framework for providing guidance in the reform process—and they have continued to focus their attention not simply on geostrategic considerations and questions of military power but on the adoption of liberal democratic norms in a broad set of economic, political, social, and defense-related areas.147 In fact, even following the September 11th attacks, senior NATO representatives pointed out to decision makers in Bucharest that Romania risked exclusion from the list of eligible candidates if it failed to take more decisive action to deal with the problems of political and administrative corruption, to accelerate economic reform, and to remove threats to the independence of the judiciary.148 On the Romanian side, it is interesting to note that, in contrast to the position held by the Iliescu administration during 1990–96, after their return to power following the 2000 elections, the socialists adopted a position of full support for NATO membership. Even President Iliescu abandoned the defensive attitude that had characterized his first mandate. In 1995, when American and other allied officials informed Bucharest that in the absence of serious domestic reforms and improvement in its relations with Hungary, Romania could not qualify for admission to NATO, Iliescu had accused the allies of discriminating against Romania. 149 By contrast, after 2000, both President Iliescu and Prime Minister Nastase acknowledged the need for further liberal democratic reforms, and identified corruption and other problems pointed out by NATO officials as key priorities of the government.150 During his first presidency, Iliescu (a graduate of a Soviet university) advocated a pro-Eastern posture, and particularly the establishment of a close relationship with the USSR/Russia. This policy position was concretized in a basic treaty with the former Soviet Union (in April 1991) and in a military cooperation agreement with that nation (in December 1991). By contrast, during his second presidency, Iliescu became the supporter of a Western-oriented foreign policy. In the same vein, rather than advocate a sui generis model of democracy, the Iliescu administration formulated a new political discourse stressing the importance of establishing a (Western-style) liberal democracy. A full analysis of this evolution is beyond the scope of this chapter, but I suggest that three sets of factors were especially important in producing the change. The pro-West, pro-NATO discourse as formulated by the 1996–2000 administration was widely disseminated through the media and embedded in strategic documents and a series of laws that portrayed Romania’s “return to Europe” and its integration into Euro-Atlantic structures as the only course of action consistent with the true identity of the country. From that perspective, anything other than the creation of a

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Western-style polity and its integration into the Euro-Atlantic community would constitute a threat to Romanian progress and freedom. That discourse appears to have shaped subsequent domestic political debates, making it difficult to advocate a different kind of future for Romania without appearing to favor a relapse into an anti-democratic past. At the same time, in the international arena, the increasingly popular image of a polarization between, on the one hand, countries that subscribed to the goal of building Western-defined liberal democracy, and, on the other hand, those who engaged in (often violent) nationalist politics, made it difficult for a government to retain international credibility and support while refusing to make a commitment to conform to liberal democratic norms and values. Finally, some of the younger, often Western-trained officials of, and advisers to, the socialist Romanian government seemed to subscribe to a vision of a Western-style, liberal democratic future for their country—and they seemed to be trying to get the government to move in the direction of greater compliance with Western norms and full Romanian integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. Whatever the reasons for this evolution, the change at the level of political discourse articulated by the last Iliescu administration is clear. At the level of practice, however, the record was a little more ambivalent. True, the government that came to power following the 2000 elections did promote the adoption of a series of Western-prescribed laws and institutional practices, including in the area of civil-military relations. For instance, it is interesting to note that a series of reforms advocated and/or initiated by the Democratic Convention under the leadership of President Constantinescu were completed by the PSD government. Indeed, in several instances, and in spite of the personal animosities among many of the members of the two governments, the Nastase government completed many of the reforms initiated by its predecessors. In 2001 the Ministry of Defense took the difficult but necessary step of reducing the officer corps by making more than three thousand officers redundant, and established military selection boards in order to make the promotion system more transparent and objective. Other achievements in the area of defense include the introduction of a new human resource management system, the implementation of joint defense planning, and the establishment of a new acquisitions and management framework that meets NATO criteria. 151 At the same time, however, it was not always clear that the Romanian government did everything it could to promote the actual implementation of these new laws. Furthermore, in some cases, the socialist government resorted to strategies of manipulation of the international community— for example, by promoting laws that appeared to conform to Western norms but that also contained serious loopholes likely to undermine their

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effectiveness. For instance, following Western—and particularly, NATO —advice, Romanian decision makers adopted a new law on the demilitarization of the Ministry of Interior and various security forces (Law No. 212/2002). The law is important, but in the final analysis its power to achieve substantial reform was minimized by the limitations of its scope—in particular, it does not apply to some the top officials of the Ministry of Interior.152 For all of these limitations, however, the fact remains that the Nastase government carried out a series of reforms in an attempt to redress some of the key problems identified by the allies in the areas of security, economy, and judicial independence, among others.153 In a report published in April 2002, NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly recommended that Romania be admitted into NATO in the second wave of enlargement, arguing that the country had made sufficient progress in the military domain (e.g., toward the establishment of democratic and civilian control of the military, the adoption of a new definition of threat, and the continuation of NATO-prescribed military restructuring). Similarly, according to the assembly, while its record is by no means perfect, Romania has nevertheless witnessed a significant evolution in the non-military field (including the application of human rights and the protection of national minorities and progress toward the establishment of a functioning market economy).154 Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Romania has also become a valuable contributor to the “war on terror,” sending troops and civilian experts to Afghanistan in spite of the significant economic costs associated with participation in that war—costs that Romania could ill afford.155 More controversial was Romania’s support for, and participation in, the war in Iraq, along with a host of other “new European” countries from the former Eastern Bloc. By adopting this course of action, Bucharest earned the praise of the United States and the U.K., but incurred the resentment of France and other West European states, prompting President Chirac of France to argue that Romania might be excluded from the list of eligible candidates for EU membership.156 To put this in a broader perspective, it is interesting to note that while the allies have continued to insist that the adoption of a set of Western liberal democratic norms is a precondition for NATO membership, the 9/ 11 terrorist attacks have led them to rethink the balance between the various norms associated with the Western community, and to broaden the definition of acceptable strategies for protecting the Euro-Atlantic world. In particular, there has been a redefinition of the proper balance between freedom and security, leading the NATO allies to invoke the new terrorist threat to tighten the control of the state over its citizens, and to extend practices of surveillance—and sometimes suspension of

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certain rights—of particular individuals to a degree that would have seemed unacceptable in the previous decade.157 There is an interesting parallel between the post-9/11 period and the Cold War era in terms of the mobilization of all fields of society to fight the elusive, internal enemy—to strengthen and protect Western societies from threats posed by hidden others operating both within and outside allied territory and, allegedly, seeking to undermine the key values of the Western world.158 From the point of view of candidates for the second wave of enlargement, including Romania, the new focus on securing the West against a multitude of elusive enemies (especially various terrorist groups supported by so-called rogue states) has translated into a new tolerance for a series of laws and practices that, prior to 9/11, would have seemed unacceptably authoritarian. After September 11th, the Romanian government has placed a heavy emphasis on the importance of working in the domestic as well as international arenas in order to respond effectively to the threat posed by transnational networks of terrorism/organized crime allying with states that possess weapons of mass destruction.159 Partly in response to Western demands, Romania has carried out a series of legislative and institutional reforms in the name of tackling domestic organized crime and its possible links to international terrorism. These include measures designed to improve the cooperation between various domestic and international security agencies, to enhance the country’s power of surveillance at its borders, to monitor domestic groups and individuals suspected of involvement in organized crime and/or possible links to international terrorism, and to increase its ability to contribute to the international war on terror—via involvement in military operations and through law enforcement actions—within the framework of institutions like EUROPOL and NATO/Partnership for Peace. To take just one example, in March 2001 Romania passed a new Law on State Secrets, which has been criticized by human rights organizations as an infringement on the freedom of speech of Romanian citizens. However, the government consulted with NATO, and having secured the latter’s approval, the legislation came into force in May 2002.160 The search for the right balance between freedom and security in the new international context is a very complicated one and certainly falls outside the scope of this chapter, but one cannot help but notice that a new democracy like Romania, with its long history of authoritarianism, could easily fall into the trap of doing too much in the name of strengthening the state for the “war on terror,” and thereby endangering some of the key individual freedoms that a liberal democratic polity should protect. Ironically, in some instances at least, it would seem that in the post-

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9/11 context, NATO is prepared to tolerate such deviations, provided they are carried out in the name of the presumably greater good of securing the West from the threat of terrorism. Be that as it may, Romania’s efforts were rewarded at the Prague Summit of November 2002, when the allies invited it, together with six other states, to join NATO. While NATO members continued to regard Romania as a country that has still not fully completed its post-Communist reform process, the decision was made that Bucharest had done enough to deserve membership in the Euro-Atlantic club. In 2004 Romania finally fulfilled its dream of acceding to NATO.

chapter six

Thinking About NATO from Different IR Perspectives

This chapter places the study of NATO’s involvement in the politics of state-crafting in Central/Eastern Europe within the broader context of International Relations theories of the roles of alliances, international institutions, and international norms. It examines the different accounts of the Atlantic alliance provided by some of the most influential theorists in the discipline and analyzes the ways in which the present study might advance our understanding of NATO. nato and the conventional wisdom about international relations Neorealism The analysis developed in this book departs from conventional alliance thinking in International Relations. For a long time, studies in international security were dominated by the neorealist approach. Neorealism relies on a fundamental dichotomy between the domestic and international arenas, a dichotomy in which different spatial categories denote completely different types of interactions. From this perspective, politics—as the realm of progress where freedom and the good life can be pursued—is confined to the domestic arena of states. In the absence of an overarching political authority in the international arena, the international domain remains the realm of mere relations among states engaged in an eternal competition for power.1 In contrast to the potential for progress within states, the international arena remains dominated by a different, cyclical temporality: change, in that world, is confined to shifts among different geostrategic arrangements.2 Thus, particular multipolar, unipolar, and—as exemplified during the Cold War—bipolar configura-

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tions come and go, but the logic that governs their emergence remains the same. According to the neorealist logic, the specific domestic constitution of different states is irrelevant. Whatever their political systems, states are condemned to respond to the logic of anarchy, balancing in response to shifts in the distribution of material power in the system. Alliances form because states band together against great powers, regardless of who those powers are. As a corollary to this, alliance patterns change simply because the international distribution of material resources changes over time.3 The neorealist conception of international security translated into an interpretation of NATO as a conventional alliance which emerged in the post–World War II era in response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union.4 As we have seen, however, NATO’s establishment and evolution did not conform to neorealist expectations. Rather than emerge as the mechanical response to the objective distribution of material power in the late 1940s, NATO’s creation was informed by intersubjective understandings among Western leaders regarding the nature of their security environment and, hence, the need to set up a security arrangement that would embody both the inside and outside logics of international security. The founders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were seeking to set up a complex security organization, one that would not only respond to potential geostrategic challenges but would also build up a collective Western identity and prevent a possible loss of liberal ideas and norms in the Euro-Atlantic area. One of the key roles that NATO played during the Cold War involved countering the danger of political and cultural Communist subversion within the societies of the West. Neorealist analyses of NATO encounter even more problems when they focus on the post–Cold War period. The disappearance of the common enemy that had, presumably, led Western states to band together should have triggered the collapse of the Atlantic alliance.5 In Waltz’s 1990 words, “NATO is a disappearing thing. It is a question of how long it is going to remain as a significant institution even though its name may linger on.”6 Contrary to neorealist predictions, however, NATO continued to exist. Moreover, following the end of the Cold War, NATO enlarged and, contradicting conventional wisdom regarding the behavior of military alliances, it became heavily involved in the (re)construction of key domestic institutions and the reformulation of definitions of national identity in the former Communist countries of Europe.7 Extending the logic of conventional wisdom about international security, one might argue that, although it may be true that in times of peace NATO did not (have to) act like a military organization, during the first

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real crisis in Europe—the Kosovo crisis of 1999—the alliance resorted precisely to the kind of behavior that mainstream international security experts expected. On this logic, NATO went to war in 1999 to militarily defeat a clearly defined enemy state, Yugoslavia, and thus to contain the violence that was threatening to spill over Yugoslav borders and undermine European stability. Given the space constraints of this chapter, I cannot engage here in a full account of the Western involvement in the Kosovo crisis. However, even a cursory analysis of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo reveals that, rather than representing a military confrontation in pursuit of conventional strategic goals, this was a case in which military power was exercised in support of NATO’s post–Cold War agenda of building Westerndefined institutions of good governance in Central and Eastern Europe. Operation Allied Force, launched by NATO in the spring of 1999, was an instantiation of the inside mode of pursuing international stability. NATO’s goal was not to defeat an enemy state or alliance of states, nor was it to (re)establish a particular international balance of power. Rather, the bombing campaign was conceived of as a limited application of force, in effect, an instance of coercive diplomacy designed to bring President Milosevic back to the negotiating table.8 This, in turn, was regarded as a step that would enable a more comprehensive international operation aimed at rebuilding the province in accordance with Western norms of liberal democracy and socializing Kosovars into accepting those norms as the correct foundation for their polity.9 In essence, far from limiting its actions to a military operation, NATO sought to establish stability in the region through the projection of a particular set of Western-defined liberal democratic norms of governance in Kosovo. Thus, the conditions imposed by NATO on the Milosevic regime—and subsequently reiterated in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, adopted in the summer of 1999—involved far more than a ceasefire coupled with disarmament of the warring factions and the insertion of an international security force. In effect, NATO’s humanitarian intervention in Kosovo led to the establishment of an international protectorate in the province. Within the framework of the international administration created to govern Kosovo, NATO came to cooperate in unprecedented ways with the U.N., OSCE, and NGOs in a long-term project aimed at the construction of new domestic arrangements on the basis of liberal democratic principles—in essence, the constitution of a Western-defined rational and ethical polity. Proponents of another branch of structural realism—hegemonic stability theory—have argued that the persistence of NATO under conditions of unipolarity should come as no surprise. Hegemonic stability the-

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orists retain the structuralist assumption that underlies neorealism: the behavior of states, defined as unified rationalist entities, is dictated by the international structure in which they operate and in which the defining factor is the distribution of material power. But the two theoretical schools tend to disagree on the implications of unipolarity for the stability of the international system.10 In the view of hegemonic stability theorists, the dominant state (hegemon), by virtue of its “preponderance of power” establishes an order that promotes its own interests but also provides international stability. But, in an effort to maintain its dominant position, the hegemon is bound to overstretch itself, and differential rates of growth ensure that challengers will arise. A declining hegemon will then try to limit the costs of its dominance by changing the rules of the game to its advantage or by resorting to preventive war. In the post–Cold War historical context, some hegemonic theorists have warned of signs of the decline in American power and the imminent rise of challengers. Others, however, have argued that, given its persisting overwhelming power vis-à-vis all other states, the United States will continue to be able to maintain an international system that protects its interests. According to William Wohlforth, for example, the present unipolarity “is prone to peace. The raw power advantage of the United States means that an important source of conflict in previous systems is absent: hegemonic rivalry over leadership of the international system. No other major power is in a position to follow any policy that depends for its success on prevailing against the United States in a war or an extended rivalry.”11 From this perspective, the current American preponderance within NATO is an exacerbation of the Cold War situation. In spite of the rhetoric of consultation and cooperation, NATO is—and has always been— the site of unilateralism. In fact, in accounting for inter-allied behavior during the Cold War, hegemonic stability theorists and neorealists alike stress the domination of the United States. According to Waltz, for instance, NATO may have brought together states concerned to contain a common threat posed by the Soviet Union, but only one of the allies was particularly responsible for deciding how that threat should be dealt with. As neorealists see it, the contributions of small states to alliances “are useful even in a bipolar world, but they are not indispensable. Because they are not, the policies and strategies of alliance leaders are ultimately made according to their own calculations and interests.” 12 In a similar vein, Glenn Snyder argues, “It is abundantly clear that [the European allies] have little positive influence over U.S. policy.”13 But the nature of inter-allied politics both during and in the first decade following the end of the Cold War was significantly different from

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those expectations of American dominance. The evidence presented in the history chapter of this study corroborates Thomas Risse’s argument that, given the norms embodied in NATO, the asymmetry in the distribution of resources did not translate into the imposition of U.S. points of view upon the other member states.14 Systematic consultation and cooperation among the allies was the rule both in the process of establishment of NATO and in the course of its Cold War history. The creation of NATO was not the unilateral initiative of the United States. Rather, a transnational elite network acted on a shared vision of building a transatlantic liberal community embodied in, and, in part, developed through, a complex international security organization. That transnational network worked together both internationally and in their respective domestic arenas to secure support for their vision and to translate that vision into practice. Once NATO was established, key decisions regarding its evolution were also taken on the basis of consultation. The U.S. often played a catalytic role—for instance, in placing the issue of Greek and Turkish, and later German, accession on NATO’s agenda—but instead of acting coercively, American decision makers sought to persuade the European allies that those enlargements were in the interest of the alliance as a whole. In cases where it met with strong European opposition (for instance, regarding the accession of Franco’s Spain or the inclusion of Germany in the early 1950s), the U.S. abandoned its plans, although it considered them important for its national security. Finally, on the basis of shared understandings regarding the role of NATO as more than an alliance, American representatives worked with officials from the other member states in their collective enactment of community-building practices within the Euro-Atlantic area. Analyses that focus on American preponderance within NATO argue that unilateral politics grew even stronger following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of a unipolar world. In an effort to respond to the obvious criticism of their predictions regarding the demise of NATO and the imminent shift to multipolarity, some prominent neorealist theorists have adopted a hegemonic stability stance. In a recent article, for example, Kenneth Waltz argued: “I expected NATO to dwindle at the Cold War’s end and ultimately to disappear. In a basic sense, that expectation has been borne out. NATO is no longer even a treaty of guarantee . . . because one cannot answer the question, guarantee against whom?”15 From his perspective, having lost its purpose as an alliance due to the emergence of a unipolar world, NATO is being used as the hegemonic tool through which the U.S. projects its egoistic interests in Europe.16 For instance, actions taken in the name of “nurturing democracy” in Eastern Europe reflect the interests of the American military-industrial complex

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in securing access to the markets of the former socialist states. In essence, “the explanation of NATO’s expansion is not found in NATO as an institution but in America’s power and purpose.”17 But in many important respects predictions of U.S. unilateralism in NATO were not borne out in the practice of the organization’s enlargement to, and involvement in, Central and Eastern Europe. Rather than representing the unilateral American agenda imposed upon the other allies, the process of deciding the future shape and role of NATO involved significant consultation and inter-allied instances of persuasion. Moreover, it occurred within a framework of collective understandings among the members regarding the post–Cold War function of NATO and the conditions of its enlargement into the former Eastern Bloc. 18 Those shared ideas led NATO members to exclude from the first wave of enlargement states that might have brought important strategic advantages to the alliance but that were regarded as unsuitable candidates due to their poor domestic records in the area of democratization and liberalization (e.g., Romania and Slovakia). The same normative framework that prevailed within the North Atlantic Council enabled Central and Eastern European political actors to articulate a set of claims concerning the special duties of the Euro-Atlantic community of values to include in its structures democratized countries of the former socialist bloc. To argue that interactions between NATO and representatives of former Communist countries were dominated by American officials in pursuit of egoistic U.S. goals would be to provide an overly simplified, and in important respects inaccurate, picture of reality. Individual accession dialogues, collective briefings, seminars, and workshops, as well as the various formal and informal consultations that took place in Brussels and in national capitals, were conducted by international teams which included—and were often led by—officials from other allied states. Furthermore, in the cases of the Czech Republic and Romania, some of the key advisers to the ministries of defense, who sought to promote NATOprescribed reforms, were non-Americans. In addition, there was a permanent concern on the part of NATO representatives to avoid giving the impression that it was reenacting the Warsaw Pact, which simply imposed policies on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In that context, it was important that NATO prescriptions be accepted and actively supported by decision makers from the former Communist states. Interestingly, some of those prescriptions went against what have been regarded by some structuralist realists as key hegemonic interests (e.g., the Central/Eastern European procurement of American military equipment).19 In essence, the normative framework within which NATO was acting enabled the organization to secure recognition as an authoritative

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normative guide in key processes of state-crafting in the Czech Republic and Romania, and thus to exercise a significant degree of power in those countries. At the same time, however, that normative framework also limited the repertoire of acceptable policies that NATO could adopt in its interactions with Central/Eastern Europeans. For instance, those norms ruled out the exercise of military power against democratically elected governments (again, Iliescu’s Romania and Meciar’s Slovakia are interesting examples), even when those governments were seen as obstacles to pursuit of NATO’s goal of promoting liberal democratic norms in the former Communist bloc. Neoliberal Institutionalism Proponents of neoliberal institutionalism challenge neorealist assumptions regarding the prevalence of conflict under conditions of anarchy. They do not, however, question either the existence of anarchy or the key ontological assumptions regarding the nature of actors that underlie the neorealist theory. Thus, international regimes and the norms of which they consist are still regarded as the voluntary creations of instrumental actors: they are tools designed to increase the utility of actors with pregiven preferences. From this perspective, institutions affect state strategies by “reducing transaction costs” of international interactions and thus altering the costs associated with different courses of action.20 Neoliberal institutionalist assumptions about international institutions have found expression in a series of influential accounts of NATO. Most notably, Robert Keohane and Celeste Wallander have argued that there is a difference between alliances, defined as exclusive coalitions that respond to threats, and security management institutions, which are designed to address a variety of risks.21 From this perspective, NATO needs to be understood as a security management institution which has always sought to deal not only with external threats but also with problems of mistrust and misunderstanding among its members. Keohane and Wallander identified an important dimension of NATO when they argued that the organization has always been more than an alliance. The North Atlantic Council and other NATO bodies did, indeed, attach importance to the development of practices of cooperation and consultation among representatives of member states. As Wallander has argued, NATO played a key role in addressing the problem of mistrust, particularly in relations between Germany and other West European states.22 As we have seen, reconstructing the Federal Republic and reintegrating it into Europe—yet doing so in a way that did not appear threat-

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ening to NATO’s member states—was a key issue on the organization’s agenda in the 1950s. Yet the norms and practices of cooperation developed by NATO cannot be fully accounted for within the logic of economic rationalism embraced by neoliberal institutionalists. One cannot explain the emergence of particular norms of cooperation and the specific resolution of the German problem that the allies adopted unless one moves away from the logic of efficiency and toward the logic of appropriate action. In fact, Wallander implicitly subscribes to the concept of legitimacy, and thus imports into her explanation elements of intersubjective ontology that depart from her individualist (rationalist) assumptions. From the perspective of economic rationalism, which she explicitly adopts, norms and practices of cooperation within the Atlantic Council were developed by a collection of individual decision makers pursuing predefined instrumental national interests.23 Later on in her analysis, however, she moves away from the individualist position and discusses practices of consultation and cooperation with the Atlantic Council that developed on the basis of considerations of legitimacy rather than efficiency.24 This argument, however, is problematic for her theoretical position because it falls under the category of appropriate action rather than efficient behavior. In turn, this involves a move away from the rationalist assumption of atomized agents and an implicit reliance on a sociological definition of socially defined agents engaged in the enactment of particular obligations associated with historically and culturally specific roles.25 Similarly, Wallander’s account of NATO’s approach to the German problem implicitly relies on sociological assumptions. Her argument is that many of the features of the alliance were a result of the organization’s “more subtle purpose of preventing a cycle of mistrust, competition and instability in security relations among its members. NATO, therefore, developed specific assets for coping with risks among its members— primarily but not exclusively with Germany in mind. These features include mechanisms for political-military integration, multinationality of alliance structures, supranational defense policy, and the principles and procedures of civilian democratic control of defense affairs.”26 In other words, Wallander subscribes to the view that NATO allies were trying to address the problem of mistrust in relation to Germany by building a particular type of liberal polity for the Federal Republic. The key words here are precisely that—a particular type of polity (which involved, for instance, the defeat of what were perceived as pro-Communist and nationalist forces and ideas). But the construction of specific domestic institutions in the name of international stability cannot be accounted for within the logic of economic

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rationality and atomized agency. Allied views regarding those desirable institutions were informed not by objective assessments of efficient institutions of trust-building, but by shared understandings among NATO’s leaders regarding the essential values of the Western world and the kinds of appropriate political projects, defined by reference to those values. In accordance with a vision of Germany as an essential member of Western civilization, the allies sought to help (re)constitute the Federal Republic as a polity based on the values of the transatlantic liberal democratic community. The type of polity being promoted in the Federal Republic was going to be trustworthy not because of some objective features (for instance, it did not appear trustworthy to East Germany and its allies), but by virtue of it becoming a state that conformed with images of Western identity held by allied decision makers. Furthermore, the argument regarding Germany’s integration into NATO—defined as part of an effort to establish principles and procedures of democratic control of defense affairs and supranational defense policy—implicitly departs from a rationalist, utilitarian conception of the relationship between agents and structures. From a utilitarian perspective, agents (in this case defined as states) participate in international institutional arrangements that subsequently shape their behavior, facilitating cooperation. Structures, however, do not affect the nature of agents: by definition, the latter are entities whose identities are formed prior to and in abstraction from the social structures in which they participate. In accordance with rationalist assumptions, neoliberal institutionalists argue that, by enmeshing states in a complex web of relations, international institutions change their patterns of interaction rather than the very identities of states. Yet, Wallander implicitly moves away from the rationalist conception of the relationship between agency/structure when she discusses the role of NATO in changing key properties of the West German polity. That argument falls within the framework of sociological approaches, which argue that the structures within which agents exist affect their identities and interests. For the post–Cold War period, neoliberal institutionalists also need to import sociological concepts to explain inter-allied decision making and practices enacted by NATO vis-à-vis countries of the former Communist bloc. For instance, one influential institutionalist argument is that, in the context of a shift in security priorities from the containment of the Soviet threat to the management of security risks, NATO was able to transfer risk management practices developed during the Cold War to the new situation.27 For economic reasons of institutional costs, it was more efficient for member states to rely on NATO to address the new problems rather than set up new organizations. In explaining NATO enlargement, insti-

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tutionalists argue that, in an environment dominated by instability, the organization’s experience in cooperation, trust building, and integration among members could be expanded.28 However, just as in the case of Cold War developments, it is important to pay attention to the fact that NATO’s post–Cold War ideas regarding trust-generating institutional arrangements did not reflect objective calculations of efficient mechanisms of cooperation and trust building. Rather, as argued above, those ideas were informed by shared understandings among allied decision makers about who could be trusted in international politics—and why. Those understandings involved conceptions of self-identity of the transatlantic community, and, as a corollary, specific ideas about the identities of those who can become “our” friends. Moreover, NATO efforts at norm-projection involved more than just enmeshing ex-Communist states in institutional structures designed to affect their international behavior. In essence, the organization has been involved in systematic practices of state-crafting aimed at constructing particular kinds of identities for those states. At the same time, shared ideas regarding appropriate forms of interaction between the Western community and the free states of Eastern Europe meant that norm-projection in the post–Cold War era had to be carried out in a way that respected—formally, at least—the sovereignty of states being socialized.29 With respect to decisions regarding enlargement, the neoliberal institutionalist argument is indeterminate: if the allies had adopted the neoliberal institutionalist logic, they could just as easily have selected “problem states” from the former Eastern Bloc instead of extending membership invitations to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. As an instrument designed to promote stability in Europe by incorporating in its institutional structures the unpredictable states of Central/Eastern Europe, it would have made perfect sense for NATO to focus primarily on those countries most likely to generate instability. That is, according to the institutionalist logic, NATO would have had strong reason to admit states that, due to their domestic problems and risky foreign policies, threatened to undermine European security. In that case, Romania—with its minority problems and long history of tensions with Hungary—as well as Slovakia, again, plagued with problems related to its minorities and, more generally, a difficult post-Communist transition, should have been strong candidates for the first-wave enlargement. Yet, as we have seen, both those states were excluded from that first round because they were not sufficiently reformed, not sufficiently “like us” to qualify for inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic community embodied in NATO. Regarding the interactions with actors from candidate states, neoliberal institutionalists are right to point out that NATO encouraged trans-

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parency and cultivated transnational links and inter-operability as strategies for trust-building among Central and Eastern European countries.30 Indeed, the organization invited members of the former Communist bloc to participate in PfP meetings and various other activities designed to improve communication among partners regarding their defense policies. But practices of socialization carried out by NATO were designed not simply to facilitate information exchange about existing policies and institutions of Central/Eastern European states. They were, more fundamentally, aimed at shaping domestic policies and institutions in accordance with Western-defined norms of liberal democracy.31 An important aspect of the process of cultivating transnational networks concerned the construction of a shared identity: representatives of partner and allied states were to relate to one another not as atomized individuals but as actors sharing a set of collective understandings about the world and a sense of sameness. In brief, the process of change that NATO sought to promote concerned not simply the inclusion of pregiven Central/Eastern European states in arrangements that place external constraints on their behavior, and, by reducing transaction costs, facilitate their cooperation with partner and allied countries. Rather, the organization was engaged in processes of international socialization designed to (re)construct the very identity of those polities. This was a process in which the relationship between agency/structure conformed to views of socially constructed agents. This is different from rationalist expectations of social structures that shape the strategies of voluntary actors but do not alter the actors themselves. Linked to this, in explaining the specific processes through which NATO sought to shape the norms and domestic institutions of the Czech Republic and Romania, we have seen that one needs to depart from accounts of objective efficiency and bring in arguments about standards of legitimacy and the logic of appropriate action. In interactions with Czech and Romanian political actors, NATO decision makers were informed by shared understandings of what was acceptable and required given the allied collective identity. That set of understandings shaped the dynamics of the process through which they sought to shape the political systems of the countries of the former Eastern Bloc: given the liberal democratic norms that NATO claimed to embody, the only legitimate influence on the reform process in targeted countries was one in which the principles and policies prescribed by the organization were “owned” by domestic political actors. Furthermore, intersubjective understandings regarding the identity of the Euro-Atlantic community informed the nature of NATO prescriptions. As we have seen, speaking in their NATO voice, both the international staff and

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members of national delegations repeatedly pointed out that the former Communist countries had to become “like us” if they wanted to join the organization. This ruled out institutions and practices that, within a different mode of reasoning, might have been seen as efficient, but which were inconsistent with the collective ideas of the allies regarding the democratic requirements of “our” world. For example, from the point of view of achieving reliability and transparency, it is reasonable to argue that it might have been an equally good—perhaps an even more efficient—option to set up institutional arrangements that gave exclusive control of the military to a narrow set of trustworthy Central/Eastern European elites who were educated in the West and were friends with decision makers from NATO member states. Yet, from the perspective of the self-defined Euro-Atlantic community of liberal democratic values, that option was not acceptable. rationalist and constructivist views of nato and international socialization In recent years, a series of rationalist scholars have focused more specifically on processes of international socialization in an attempt to explain the projection of Western norms into post–Cold War Central/Eastern Europe. Rationalists’ accounts of socialization are formulated within the analytical framework of methodological individualism: the behavior of both socializing agencies and socializees is explained in terms of cost/ benefit calculations by actors whose identities and interests are defined prior to, and independent from, social interactions.32 An interesting expression of this rationalist perspective can be found in Frank Schimmelfennig’s analysis of international socialization in the new Europe.33 Schimmelfennig adopts a strategic conception of rules, which assumes that norms are potential resources or constraints to be manipulated by instrumentally rational actors. Both international institutions and Central/Eastern European decision makers are defined as actors who are “at best weakly socialized: they know the rules, but they also know how to manipulate them. They use the rules but they do not necessarily follow them. The strategic conception of rules thus shares the assumption of instrumentalism and rationalism. Actors are assumed to choose the behavioral option which promises to maximize their own utility under these circumstances.”34 From a rationalist perspective, teaching and learning are extrinsically motivated by incentives that can influence behavior but cannot affect definitions of interests and identities of preconstituted, autonomous actors.

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Rational, egoistic political actors confront the standard of international legitimacy as an external institutional or cultural fact that can be both a resource of support for legitimate action and a constraint that imposes costs on illegitimate action.35 In his words, “both socializers and states to be socialized weigh up the costs and benefits of socialization and internalization in light of their predefined political goals and decide, on this basis, whether to engage in socialization (socializers), or to adopt the community norms and transform them into domestic rules (the socializees).”36 From the point of view of decision makers of Central/Eastern European states, their preparedness to internalize the community norms will mainly depend on domestic factors, including the strength of Western orientations in society. From a rationalist perspective, the process of interaction between the socializing agency and subjects being socialized is very limited. The dynamics of socialization involve contractual types of relations: promises to offer specific rewards for compliance with norms; information on what compliance entails; and the threat of sanctions in response to deviance from prescribed normative standards. Actors being socialized only agree to adapt their behavior to international norms to the extent that the egoistic benefits of compliance—benefits defined in terms of fulfilling interests formulated in abstraction from social interactions—are greater than the corresponding costs. The logic of rationalist socialization leaves little room for processes of social learning through which the actors being socialized may redefine their ideas and attitudes. In a similar vein, the rationalist argument does not enable us to conceptualize the concern of social actors to do the “right thing”—to enact the norms recognized within their community as consistent with a particular identity. How, then, does the constructivist view of socialization compare to the rationalist argument? As James Caporaso, Jeffrey Checkel, and Joseph Jupille have recently argued, at the basic ontological level rationalism and constructivism are irreconcilable, for constructivism questions the materialism and methodological individualism on which rationalist approaches are based.37 Constructivists hold that material structures are given meaning only within the social context in which they are interpreted. In other words, the objects/subjects that populate the world—and changes in their nature and in relationships between them—acquire meaning within the framework of intersubjective ideas of a given group/community. Members of those groups/communities rely on those intersubjective ideas to make sense of the world and of themselves, to interpret changes, and to identify reasonable responses to changes. More broadly, constructivists challenge the rationalist view of the relationship between agents and structures. From a constructivist perspective, the on-

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tology is one of mutual constitution: agents and structures constitute each other, and neither unit of analysis is made “ontologically primitive.” Linked to this, rationalists and constructivists tend to adopt different theories of action. The former stress strategic choice and consequentialist behavior driven by means-ends calculation by methodological individualists. By contrast, the latter often emphasize communicative action and appropriate behavior driven by complex learning and the dynamics of socialization.38 The logic of constructivism is not inconsistent with strategic behavior; indeed, more recently, constructivists have explained that socially constituted actors can and do, in some instances, engage in strategic behavior. But a constructivist account of strategic action departs from the assumptions of methodological individualism. From a constructivist perspective, actors behave strategically in pursuit of interests associated with a particular (socially constructed) identity, and on the basis of intersubjective understandings about connections between cause and effect that help them identify “rational” courses of action. In addition, their strategies have to fit their community’s norms of what is appropriate in a given set of conditions.39 Starting from these key assumptions about the nature of agency and its relationship to social structures, constructivists have been keen to show that processes of socialization, through which newcomers are inducted into the norms and rules of a particular community, can have important constitutive effects, altering the definitions of identity and interest held by those newcomers. In that sense, the analysis developed in this book falls neatly within the constructivist camp, as it examines the social construction and reproduction of identity in and through interactions with a set of significant international and domestic others. With particular emphasis on the international socialization of Central/Eastern Europeans after the end of the Cold War, the argument developed in this book stresses the social process of (re)constitution of the Czech and Romanian polities and the complex role played by the generalized other embodied in NATO in this process of reconstitution. To a large extent, the socialization practices enacted by NATO have been enabled by a mutually recognized relationship of master/novice, grounded in the Czech/Romanian socializees’ identification with, and hence, trust in NATO. Empowered by this recognition, NATO has been quite successful in projecting into the Czech Republic and Romania a particular definition of liberal democratic identity associated with a specific set of norms, including in the area of security. Those norms have redrawn the boundary of appropriate definition of interest and appropriate action in the domestic and international arenas (e.g., given who “we are,” it is unacceptable to engage in authoritarian practices in the area of

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civil-military relations, just as it is inappropriate to define interest in terms of territorial expansion, or to resort to violence to solve old regional disputes). Rationalists tend to regard the standards of legitimacy of the community that a given set of actors seeks to join as external constraints upon those actors. By contrast, in the constructivist definition, those standards are central to the process of the (re)constitution of the self. In our case, the Czech/Romanian socializees have sought to rebuild their polities around Western normative standards, working to embed them in the legal and institutional fabrics of their respective societies. Regarding the specific dynamics and implications of socialization practices enacted by NATO in the Czech Republic and Romania, the previous chapters have demonstrated that they often went beyond rationalist expectations. To begin with, as a socializing institution seeking to do more than just negotiate with or manipulate Central/Eastern Europeans, NATO did not limit itself to a minimal, reactive role involving the manipulation of instrumental incentives and “self-socialization” by targeted actors. A close reading of interactions between NATO representatives and Czech and Romanian actors revealed the occurrence of systematic practices of teaching, persuasion, and role-playing. Directly and indirectly, NATO sought to promote a particular definition of liberal democratic identity associated with a specific set of appropriate norms of domestic governance and international behavior. What was involved in the socialization practices carried out by different NATO actors was an effort to lead the socializees to take Western-defined norms for granted, to accept the allied normative prescriptions as correct and valuable in themselves—even when they did not come with tangible instrumental rewards. Under these circumstances, the socialization of Czech and Romanian actors was very different from rationalist expectations of socializing processes as nothing more than the provision of rewards designed to alter calculations of costs associated with normative compliance. For their part, in interactions with NATO representatives, pro-reform Czech and Romanian decision makers did not act as individuals whose identities and interests were constituted in abstraction from social interactions, constantly weighing the rewards and sanctions associated with compliance with Western norms. Rather, their political identity was essentially relational: vis-à-vis other domestic forces, they defined themselves as the liberal avant-garde, whose task was to construct a Westernlike state identity. Accordingly, they sought to shape society and often acted not in conformity with domestic political orientations but against them. In the case of the Czech Republic, we saw that in two important instances, accession to NATO and the military intervention in Kosovo, Czech liberal policymakers decided to follow the course of action re-

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garded as appropriate in the Western world in spite of the fact that the public was largely against those actions. Similarly, in Romania, the proliberal political and military elites adopted the discourse of moral conflict put forward by NATO, defined failure to take military action in support of the Kosovars as inconsistent with the norms of a liberal democratic polity, and supported the alliance because that was the “normal thing to do for a modern liberal democracy.” Romanian elites maintained their support even in a situation in which they recognized that their position threatened to generate substantial political and economic costs. Czech and Romanian reformers identified themselves as actors engaged in the process of learning the norms of liberal democracy from the institutions of the Western generalized other, including NATO. Accordingly, they accepted NATO’s guidance in the formulation of national goals and priorities, as embodied in basic strategic documents, constitutional laws and related defense legislation, and institutional arrangements governing the relationship between the state and civil society in the realm of national security. A rationalist critic might argue that NATO’s pedagogic practices reflect no more than a case of instrumental learning on the basis of pre-given identity: Czech and Romanian pro-reform elites had decided they wanted to build liberalism, so it was a sensible thing for them to learn how to be “good liberals” from the institutions of the Western world. This is a powerful argument, but it tends to misrepresent the dynamics of the process of learning that was involved in this case, the competition between different interpretations of the correct model of democracy, and the role of identity-based trust and authority involved in the selection of a particular model. Initially, as we have seen, Czech and Romanian reformers understood democracy in ways that were inconsistent with some of the key liberal democratic norms prescribed by NATO. The change in the definition of the true meaning of liberal democracy was not automatic, and the Czechs and Romanians did not simply “adjust” to objective changes in their environment. Rather, Czech and Romanian actors learned a new set of norms in the context of social communications in which the teachers—recognized as such and trusted by virtue of their identity—played a key role. Moreover, Czech reformers that accepted the legitimacy of NATO as a teacher of norms were also, generally speaking, inclined to regard representatives of the organization as trustworthy persuaders—as advisers from “our” Euro-Atlantic community who, on the basis of shared values and their liberal democratic expertise, could be regarded as authoritative participants in debates regarding the construction of the Czech liberal democratic polity. Although, as noted above, there were specific instances in which persuasion failed, NATO was nevertheless more persuasive vis-

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à-vis Czech decision makers than rationalists would have expected. The organization was able to exercise its power of persuasion even after its most significant “carrot”—membership—had already been promised. Conversely, it was extremely difficult for NATO to persuade those Czech actors (e.g., nationalists and Communists) who not only did not regard the organization as a legitimate teacher of norms, but also viewed it as the tool of Western imperialism. As such, by definition, NATO could not be trusted to participate in debates regarding proper ways of governing the Czech Republic, or regarding the country’s desirable behavior in the international arena. In a similar vein, there was a tendency on the part of pro-reform Romanian elites to go above and beyond the call of duty in accepting the advice of NATO representatives, even in situations in which there were no rewards directly linked to that behavior. Romanian reformers relied on Western advisers to such an extent that they surrendered to them substantial control in areas conventionally considered as key aspects of sovereignty. Thus, NATO representatives were invited to play an important role in the formulation of the Annual National Plan, covering national priorities in the area of defense. That surrender of control was not a condition of NATO membership, and it went beyond the degree of guidance that Brussels expected to provide to Romania. Such actions cannot be regarded as trivial gestures of compliance with Western norms. On the contrary, they involve an unusual ceding of sovereign decision-making power in an area traditionally regarded as essential to the survival and freedom of the state. That transfer of sovereign decision-making power was seen as reasonable, indeed, desirable, by the Romanian reformers because of the trust they placed in NATO as the key security institution of the community of values with which they identified. It is not difficult to see that, in the absence of such trust, the act of transferring decision-making power in the key area of defense to an international institution would have seemed irrational, potentially even suicidal. Having examined some of the differences between a rationalist analysis of socialization and the constructivist argument developed in this book, I suggest that a dialogue between the two views is not impossible. In my case, it is particularly interesting to explore a potential dialogue with “soft rationalists” like Schimmelfennig, who pays attention to the ways in which community norms affect strategic action. This can be achieved, for instance, by adopting a “domain of application” approach, looking at the particular conditions under which a particular type of socialization occurred (i.e., a constructivist socialization involving teaching/learning new ideas and redefining identity and interest, or a rationalist manipulation of incentives to secure behavioral compliance with a

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given set of norms).40 In this book I did just that by examining the scope conditions under which a constructivist type of socialization was successfully carried out, and by explaining that, when those conditions were not present, both NATO and Central/Eastern European actors often engaged in forms of norm manipulation and use of instrumental incentives aimed at affecting the behavior of targeted actors. For instance, as we have seen, in pre-1996 Romania NATO relied primarily on the threat of sanctions to secure a limited degree of compliance with democratic norms by the conservative (socialist) Romanian government. In that context, the allies regarded the key senior members of that government as actors that were too closely associated with an alternative community of values to be socialized into the norms of the Western world. In addition, in some cases NATO sought to accelerate the domestic pace of reform through the provision of instrumental incentives to conservative actors. For instance, working in cooperation with Czech liberals, senior representatives of the organization implicitly invoked the threat of “sticks” to lead conservative Social Democrats to abandon their policy on a referendum to decide the question of NATO membership. But the organization tended to resort to such instruments at the request of Czech reformers in situations in which the latter accepted the courses of action/reforms prescribed by the organization as correct. In the Romanian case, an interesting example of transnational networking can be found in the attempts by domestic political elites and NATO actors to overcome opposition to Romanian support for Operation Allied Force. As it was becoming increasingly clear that the Romanian government and pro-West societal actors were encountering significant domestic opposition, allied officials sought to help them improve their image with the Romanian public. NATO representatives resorted to symbolic actions (by public statements that support for the intervention in Kosovo was the only ethical course of action), and to a strategy of shaming the opposition (by presenting opposition to the Kosovo campaign as an indication of support for “barbarity”).41 In addition, some allied officials sought to project the image of a link between compliance with NATO’s expectations and Western instrumental rewards. For instance, in May 1999, during a speech in support of NATO given to the Romanian Parliament, British Prime Minister Blair promised to support the start of the accession dialogues between the EU and Bucharest.42 Regarding the transnational networks consisting of Czech/Romanian reformers and NATO representatives, however, it is interesting to note that while a rationalist analysis is useful in explaining the role of instrumental incentives in altering the behavior of certain domestic actors, it does not enable us to conceptualize the nature of the agent that employed

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those incentives. In other words, the transnational networks examined in this study were different from the type of agency theorized by rationalist thinkers. What was involved there was not an interaction between predefined, equally egoistic international institutions on the one hand, and domestic leaders on the other. Rather, transnational networks united by shared understandings of appropriate social roles and norms of behavior identified a set of national goals and priorities. Together, Czech/Romanian reformers and NATO representatives then resorted to a series of strategies aimed at overcoming the resistance of conservative domestic actors to the implementation of those objectives. That, in essence, was a socially constructed agency—defined around a specific set of norms—that employed instrumental incentives in pursuit of a specific vision of society and in accordance with shared expectations of what was desirable and acceptable for a Western-style liberal democratic polity. To put this in a broader perspective, a constructivist approach also enables us to capture another important dimension of NATO’s interaction with Central and Eastern Europeans. According to neoliberal institutionalism, as well as rationalist approaches to socialization, the interaction between the organization and Central European candidates to membership seems to be unidirectional: the former shapes the behavior of the latter. There is no doubt that NATO did, indeed, affect Central/Eastern Europeans much more than the latter could ever have affected the organization. Yet, there were also ways in which social practices governed by the logic of appropriate action also provided some power to the actors who, from alternative perspectives, appeared to be the powerless parties in interaction. One case in point concerns the relationships, between 1997 and 1999, between NATO, Russia, and the three Central European states that had been invited to join the organization. Following the 1997 Madrid Summit, when membership invitations were issued, one of the main concerns of the organization was to strengthen the relationship with Russia and allay its fears that enlargement would constitute a threat to the Russian Federation. This translated into the signing of a special charter with Russia ( 1997) and increased consultations aimed at trust-building within the Permanent Joint Council. There was a shared understanding among NATO decision makers that the organization should be as open with the Federation as possible, and that it should seek to support and gain the confidence of what was seen as the pro-democracy, pro-West Yeltsin administration.43 It was in that context that Russian delegates in Brussels asked that Russia be invited to participate in NATO meetings in which the ascending members were to provide information about their infrastructure. The allies saw no reason to decline that request and were ready to invite Rus-

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sia to attend those meetings. At that point, however, representatives of the three Central European states found out about the arrangement and mobilized NATO norms to persuade the allies to withdraw their invitation to Russia. They argued that although they accepted that NATO was not directed against Russia, and they had redefined their national strategic concepts to leave out any reference to that country as a potential enemy, they were not ready to reveal detailed information about their infrastructures to Russia. If NATO was an organization based on the norms of consultation and consensual decision making among sovereign member states, they argued, then in the name of consistency the organization should also apply those norms for states to which it had already extended membership invitations. It was not acceptable to ignore the concerns of future members and, bypassing them, to consult with Russia on how much information on this issue should be revealed. Moreover, the ambassadors of those states argued that in joining an organization based on respect for sovereignty and the norm of consensual decision making, they expected to feel a significant difference from the old days of the exploitative Warsaw Pact, in which they did not have a right to refuse to reveal information to the Soviet Union. Those arguments were perceived as legitimate by NATO decision makers, who subsequently refused to invite Russia to those meetings and respected the desire of Central Europeans to reveal that information only to members of the organization. In that situation, their ability to formulate arguments within the normative framework shared by NATO decision makers enabled representatives of the apparently powerless Visegrad states to exercise significant social influence on the North Atlantic Council. Another interesting case revealing the enabling power of norms involved the very process of NATO enlargement. The ability of Central Europeans to invoke liberal democratic norms and put the issue of enlargement on NATO’s agenda in the early 1990s has already been documented and need not be rehearsed here. But a similar instance of normative empowerment occurred in the late 1990s and concerned the candidates to the second wave of NATO enlargement. At the Madrid Summit of 1997, and even at the Washington reunion of 1999, NATO claimed that as institutional embodiment of a community of values rather than just an alliance, its door remained open to states that chose to embrace liberal democracy. However, the organization was not willing to make specific commitments as to when and how the door might open again.44 It was clear that NATO decision makers preferred to retain the freedom to decide when and how a new wave of enlargement might be launched. Under those circumstances, Romanian leaders together with liberal policymakers from other Eastern European states were able to use the norms

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and ideas contained in the NATO discourse to help keep the issue of enlargement on the organization’s agenda and to generate among Western leaders a collective understanding that it was not acceptable to postpone enlargement for too long. Rather, the only reasonable thing to do was to formulate a more specific timetable of enlargement and to act on it sooner rather than later. Eastern Europeans articulated their argument within the framework of the particular representation of the organization and of its position vis-àvis partner states that was at the heart of the NATO discourse. Within this framework of shared understandings, the Eastern Europeans portrayed the option of a second wave of enlargement in the near future as the only course of action consistent with the role that NATO claimed for itself. To persuade NATO leaders to adopt this option, decision makers from MAP countries invoked the identity of NATO as the institutional expression of the liberal democratic community. They also repeated the Western argument about the importance of extending that community into the former Communist bloc of Europe as a way to achieve domestic freedom and stability as well as international security. The Eastern Europeans argued that there was a serious tension between the claim that NATO embodied, protected, and promoted the norms of liberal democracy and the failure to take specific action in recognition of the commitment of other countries to those norms.45 That appeal to consistency in an attempt to persuade NATO allies to redefine their position on the issue of the second wave of enlargement yielded positive results. In spite of their initial reluctance to make a commitment to a timetable of future enlargement, and in spite of ongoing concerns within several NATO states (including the U.S.) that it might have been too early—and too costly—to initiate a second wave of enlargement, there emerged a consensus around the need to issue new invitations in 2002. In the period following the Washington Summit of 1999, the main questions within the Atlantic Council were who should receive invitations in 2002 and how should the organization deal with those excluded from a second wave of enlargement. According to the prevailing NATO discourse, barring exceptional events, it was not acceptable to delay a second wave of enlargement. In essence, by mobilizing the particular representations of the world put forward by NATO, including principles and norms depicted as “appropriate” in the context of that world, the Eastern Europeans were able to delegitimize particular courses of action by the alliance. In a different example, by invoking NATO’s norms of consultation, transparency, and democratic decision making, Romanian actors and representatives of other partner states reportedly contributed to a redefi-

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nition of their role within the Partnership for Peace. 46 Following criticisms formulated within the framework of shared norms, NATO sought to establish new procedures of joint “decision-shaping” regarding common allied/partner operations. Also noteworthy is the growing practice of sharing sensitive military information with Central/Eastern European PfP partners—a practice that is now increasingly defined as reasonable within allied decision-making circles, but that would have been inconceivable a decade ago. In these cases, appeals to norms of consultation, transparency, and cooperation were apparently rendered more powerful by the growing authority of Central/Eastern European partners.47 In turn, that authority was reportedly fueled by a sense among the allies that Romania and other partner states are, albeit slowly, emerging as members of the Euro-Atlantic security community. As increasingly “like-minded” states that subscribe to the same values and ideas as the allies, those states deserved to be included in relations of community with NATO. Thus, in an interview conducted in early 2000, NATO officials pointed out that changed ways of thinking and acting demonstrated by Romanians—for example, in their interactions with the Partnership Coordination Cell and in PfP educational activities, but also in NATO-led missions in the Balkans—helped build allied trust in that country. That trust was grounded in a growing sense within the alliance that the Romanians were “increasingly like us.” Accordingly, they deserved to be treated with a corresponding degree of respect—as reflected, for instance, in enhanced consultations, sharing of allied information, and even an informal allied duty to protect Romania should the need arise.48 One might argue that such instances of persuasion merely reflect the successful manipulation of NATO’s norms by the Central/Eastern Europeans.49 On this view, the latter entrapped allied decision makers in their own rhetoric to get them to act in accordance with the Central/Eastern Europeans’ preferences. The argument about rhetorical action is powerful, but in this case it tends to overlook the fact that the Central/Eastern Europeans themselves had to carry out significant normative changes to demonstrate a move away from their Communist legacy and toward liberal democratic norms before they could credibly invoke the same norms to successfully challenge NATO policies. Arguments about rhetorical action also downplay the change in NATO’s view of the Central/Eastern Europeans and an emerging sense of shared identity with the former members of the Communist bloc. And that evolution is not simply the result of rhetoric; rather, it is a transformation that has occurred in response to—what the allies perceive as—significant liberal democratic transformations in those states.

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conclusion In conclusion, a close analysis of its origins, evolution, and practices reveals that NATO does not conform to conventional International Relations assumptions about the nature and purpose of alliances. Far from being a mere geostrategic arrangement designed to counter the threat posed by the military might of the Soviet Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has always been an institution that combines the inside and outside logics of security. The founders of NATO were keen to set up a complex security organization that would not only respond to potential geostrategic challenges but would also build up a collective Western identity and prevent the loss of liberal norms in the Euro-Atlantic area. Following the end of the Cold War, NATO has continued to exist and has embarked on a complex process of projecting liberal democratic norms—thus extending the Western community—into Central and Eastern Europe. Through a series of socialization practices, the allies have done far more than facilitate information exchanges about existing policies and institutions in the former Communist states, and/or provide instrumental incentives in an attempt to alter the behavior of the Central and Eastern Europeans (as rationalist accounts of NATO might lead us to expect). As we have seen in the Czech and Romanian cases, NATO has contributed in important ways to the reconstruction of exCommunist countries around Western-defined liberal democratic norms. By adopting a constructivist approach, this book has tried to demonstrate that we can explain some of these complex aspects of NATO— aspects that tend to be undertheorized, if not altogether ignored—using alternative International Relations approaches.

chapter seven

Conclusion

I hope this book has demonstrated that, contrary to the conventional wisdom about its nature and role, NATO has always embodied the inside logic of security, involving the pursuit of a stable, progressive international order through the construction of “good” domestic institutions. This Kantian mode of pursuing security acquired unprecedented importance in the first decade of the post–Cold War period. The end of the Cold War was accompanied by a shared understanding among NATO’s decision makers that in the new European environment dangers to the allies’ security could only be addressed through the construction of Western-defined liberal democratic institutions within potentially problematic states. At the end of the Cold War, Western leaders agreed that the main source of danger was not traditional military confrontation with an enemy state or alliance of states. Rather, it was a new and far more diffuse set of threats that caused anxiety among NATO decision makers. In the new Europe, instead of a clearly defined enemy that could be contained within spatial structures, the West was confronted with a plurality of rapidly changing states, which were seen as, at once, potential friends and possible sources of threat to the Atlantic community. Following the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, it was no longer possible to contain the enemy in the outside realm, for there were no fixed inimical states. Depending on the structure of their polities, all of the former Communist states were regarded as partners and possible members of—or, on the contrary, sources of instability to—the Western world. On the basis of this interpretation of the new world, NATO carried out a series of practices aimed at promoting Western-defined norms of governance in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In the context of ever more extensive interactions between NATO and Central/Eastern European actors, the alliance became systematically involved in socializing the latter into adopting a particular definition of liberal democracy and building specific, Western-prescribed institutions in their polities.

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who deserves to be a nato member: “appropriate” western identity over time The post–Cold War process of NATO enlargement was marked by greater focus on the identity of polities that were applying for membership than had been the case during the Cold War. In the first decades of NATO’s existence, the decision-making process related to enlargement involved important compromises motivated by geostrategic considerations. This led to the inclusion, among others, of Turkey, which was not considered by the other allies to be a true Western liberal democracy. Nevertheless, even in the Cold War context, there was a strong sense that NATO brought together states with a shared liberal democratic identity, and that, in principle, it should not expand to incorporate states that did not share that identity. As shown in Chapter 2, the fact that enlargement motivated primarily by geostrategic considerations was considered a compromise reveals the existence of a shared view that the inclusion of countries with inappropriate identity ought to be the exception motivated by unusual circumstances, not the rule of NATO expansion. The issue of appropriate liberal democratic identity brings up interesting questions about the content of that identity and about its variations from the Cold War to the post–Cold War period. A full examination of this issue is well beyond the scope of this section, but I will try to briefly highlight a few interesting aspects of this evolution in the meaning of appropriate liberal democratic identity. Documents from the Cold War period reveal a collective understanding among the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty that the new security arrangement being created was the expression of a community of values. The then Under-Secretary of State of the United States, R. A. Lovett, allegedly argued in the final stages of negotiating the treaty that the essential bond among states entering the association was not the Soviet threat but a shared Western commitment to the value of the individual. Similarly, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin reportedly insisted: “We must invent a kind of Western-democratic system . . . a sort of spiritual federation of the West.”1 The French Foreign Minister reiterated the idea of a treaty meant to represent and protect the West as the “only civilization worth living in,” and the Chairman of Norway’s Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs declared: “We are all members of a more significant and essential community—the Atlantic Community.”2 This shared understanding of a Western community of values being represented in NATO was formalized in the Preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty. Signatory states were “determined to safe-

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guard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.” Public and private statements issued by representatives of member states point to a shared view of a Western community united on the basis of liberal democratic values and norms. But, according to the same collective view, the Euro-Atlantic world appeared to involve more than just abstract political ideas. The norms of democracy, respect for individual rights, and the rule of law appeared to be grounded in a shared civilizational foundation. It seemed, in fact, that it was the common historical legacy of “Western civilization” that enabled the people of the Euro-Atlantic area to establish polities based on those allegedly superior political principles. The notion of “common heritage” stressed in the Preamble points in this direction. And as we saw in Chapter 2, officials involved in negotiating the treaty linked the world of freedom with the special “virtues and values” of Western civilization. One of the clearest expressions of the shared belief in a common civilizational foundation can be found in statements issued at the Bruges Conference on the North Atlantic Community (September 8–14, 1957), where participants, including top officials from member states as well as then NATO Secretary General, Paul-Henri Spaak, explicitly defined the “specific values cherished by the Atlantic Community.” According to the Committee on Religion and Spiritual Values, it was not even necessary “to reaffirm their origin in Greco-Roman civilization and Christianity, their flowering in Medieval times, and sudden wide expansion of selfconfidence during Enlightenment.” This, after all, was widely “accepted.”3 The key principles of the Atlantic community were identified as a respect for the intrinsic value of the human being, the liberty of morally responsible individuals, tolerance, and awareness of the permanent need for critical self-examination and evaluation of the dangers that threatened the survival of those principles.4 True, according to the collective view of NATO members, Western civilizational heritage was not, by itself, a guarantee of the emergence of political identity expected of members in the Atlantic community. By virtue of their historical legacy, Western states had the potential for being the superior liberal democratic polities. But they had to fulfill that potential by acting in accordance with the values and norms of their civilization. While there were no specific criteria in terms of particular legislative and institutional arrangements needed, there was a general sense that authoritarian regimes that clearly violated the values of human rights, rule of law, and democratic elections were to be regarded as deviations from the appropriate liberal democratic identity associated with membership in

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NATO. As we have seen, in debates surrounding Spanish membership in NATO there was a sense that, while a Western security organization was, in the long term, incomplete without Spain, that country could not be included in the community of liberal democracies so long as it remained under Franco’s rule. Following the death of Franco and an extensive process of democratization, the process of Spanish accession to NATO proceeded extremely smoothly and quickly—at least as far as acceptance by the allies was concerned. The idea of a civilizational identity shared by members of the Euro-Atlantic community had significant exclusionary implications. As is always the case when pre-given essences are key attributes of a particular identity, the notion that certain inherited features were in part responsible for giving rise to liberal democratic polities suggested that membership in the community of values embodied in NATO was not entirely a matter of choice. It suggested that, no matter how hard certain states desired inclusion in the organization, their lack of appropriate essence made it highly unlikely that they would ever become the kinds of liberal democracies that qualified for membership in NATO. This view was reflected in allied debates regarding Turkey’s accession to the organization. The European allies as well as Canada resisted for a long time the idea of opening NATO’s door to Turkey, in spite of the widely recognized strategic value of that country and of U.S. lobbying in its favor. When it was finally admitted in 1952, Turkey was still not regarded as a true Western democracy. Rather, its inclusion was a compromise made possible by a growing acceptance among the allies that evolving geostrategic circumstances called for NATO enlargement. Analysts of the Cold War period argue that the opposition to Turkish membership was primarily grounded in a widespread view that the country was not part of the Atlantic family of nations.5 To a certain extent, this opposition appears to have been linked to limitations in the Turkish enactment of liberal democratic principles. But it would also appear that, underlying the view regarding problematic domestic political practices, there was a sense that, due to its civilizational essence—its Ottoman heritage and Muslim traditions—Turkey could not become the kind of Western democracy that had a place in NATO.6 This interpretation is also supported by the fact that, historically speaking, Turkey was for a long time associated with civilizational otherness in Western definitions of identity.7 It is debatable whether civilizational otherness, as defined by NATO’s leaders in the late 1940s– 1950s, included even Eastern Christian societies. For example, in analyzing the accession of Greece to NATO, historians point out that it, too, was regarded as a country that did not fit the description of a “like-minded” state. But it is not entirely clear whether this view was based purely on an assessment of the political situation of

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the country or whether it was also related to its Orthodox religion and the broader cultural implications of admitting a member with non-Western religious traditions.8 The meaning of Western liberal democratic identity that rendered a state eligible for consideration for admission in NATO underwent a dramatic transformation in the post–Cold War period. Following the 1989 mass movements and revolutions carried out in the name of traditional Western ideals of human rights and democracy, many Central/Eastern European countries (including former parts of the Ottoman Empire) witnessed the emergence of new governments that declared their intention to build liberal democracies and “return” to Europe. This was also a time when the Western political discourse was reformulated. The meaning of appropriate liberal democratic identity shifted away from pre-given, fixed civilizational essences, and toward greater attention to specifying the political implications of liberal democratic values. In brief, the discourse about Western liberal democracy became less about Christian civilizational legacy and more about the specific legislative and institutional frameworks that a country needed to have before it could be considered a true liberal democracy. In the case of NATO, the shift in the definition of Western liberal democracy was reflected in the “open door” policy articulated in 1994 and reiterated ever since. Following enlargement to the three Visegrad states, the allies issued a statement stressing “the door to NATO membership remains open to other European countries that are ready and willing to undertake the commitments and obligations of membership.”9 Just as they were affirming the open door principle, NATO’s decision makers defined the specific content of the appropriate liberal democratic identity that candidates had to build before they could be considered for admission. In contrast to the general statements of principles of liberal human rights, rule of law, and democracy enunciated during the Cold War, the specific legal and political implications of those principles were now spelled out in much greater detail. As defined in the Study on NATO Enlargement in 1995 and reiterated in the “Membership Action Plan” of 1999, candidate states must demonstrate commitment to the rule of law and respect extensive, clearly specified human rights (including special rights of national/ethnic minorities); comply with OSCE principles of democratic elections and peaceful resolution of disputes; be committed to civilian and democratic control of the armed forces; and promote stability and well-being by ensuring economic liberty, social justice, and environmental responsibility. The redefinition of the appropriate identity of Euro-Atlantic commu-

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nity members in terms of commitment to—more carefully specified—political norms and principles of liberal democracy has meant that according to the post–Cold War NATO discourse there is no essential difference between allied and non-allied states. In principle, there are no rigid, impossible-to-transcend dividing lines between members of the Euro-Atlantic community and those who have not yet been included. There are no fixed adversaries, no predefined civilizational otherness within Europe, and all states, regardless of their “civilizational history” are potential members of the community of values embodied in NATO. From this perspective, the ex-Communist states that carry out substantial reforms can transform themselves into Western-like liberal democratic polities— the only kind of polities that can obtain membership in NATO. There is an important implication of this argument—a logical conclusion that the allies do not seem to have really accepted. If no European state can be told that due to a pre-given essence it can never aspire to NATO membership, then even the former enemy, Russia, could one day become a member of the organization. If Euro-Atlantic sameness is defined exclusively with reference to shared norms—rather than to either geostrategic considerations or particular historical heritage—it follows that if Russia were to emerge as a polity with an appropriate liberal democratic identity, the allies would have a duty to consider it as a serious candidate.10 While the inclusion of Russia into NATO is not likely to happen in the near future, there are voices within NATO that remind the allies that, according to their own logic, future Russian membership in the organization cannot be ruled out.11 nato before and after september 11th In the first decade after the end of the Cold War, NATO defined itself— and secured international recognition—as not just a military alliance but also the institutional expression of the Western community of liberal democratic values and norms. As we have seen, that translated into a particularly heavy reliance on the inside logic of international security— specifically on NATO’s definition of its role in terms of the protection and Eastern projection of Western-based liberal democratic norms and principles. That particular logic, rather than the logic of geostrategic confrontation with a particular, territorially defined enemy, shaped NATO’s definition of the nature and priorities of the enlargement process and informed its involvement in Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, NATO’s self-definition as an institutional expression of the Euro-Atlantic liberal democratic community rather than just a mil-

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itary alliance was key in securing its recognition by Central and Eastern European actors—and more specifically, in our case, by Czech and Romanian elites—as a legitimate normative guide in the reconstruction of their polities. On the basis of that recognition, NATO was able to exercise significant, albeit subtle power, effectively participating in defining the goals of the reform process in the area of defense, shaping post-Communist national security concepts, influencing the kinds of defense-related institutional and legislative reforms that were carried out, and even contributing to the process of structuring domestic debates about Czech/Romanian national identity and interests. It is also worth recalling that NATO’s key European military operation in the post–Cold War period, the 1999 Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, conformed in important ways to the inside logic of security. Even a cursory analysis of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo reveals that rather than representing a military confrontation in pursuit of conventional strategic goals, this was a case in which military power was exercised in support of NATO’s post–Cold War agenda of building institutions of good governance in Central and Eastern Europe. Operation Allied Force, launched by NATO in the spring of 1999 in response to the humanitarian crisis generated by policies of ethnic cleansing reflected and promoted the inside mode of pursuing international stability. NATO’s goal was not to defeat an enemy state or alliance of states, nor was it to (re)establish a particular international balance of power. Rather, the bombing campaign was conceived as a limited application of force, in effect, an instance of coercive diplomacy designed to bring President Milosevic back to the negotiating table.12 This, in turn, was perceived as a step that would enable a more comprehensive international operation aimed at rebuilding the province in accordance with Western norms of liberal democracy and educating Kosovars into accepting those norms as the correct foundation for their polity.13 In starting Operation Allied Force, the allies were united by a shared understanding that NATO was acting in conformity with its liberal democratic values—indeed, that given the massive humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, failure to act forcefully would have been inconsistent with the identity of the liberal democratic alliance. At the same time, there was a shared view among the NATO members that the resolution of that crisis and the reconstruction of Kosovo was an important part of European stability. Far from limiting its actions to a military operation, NATO sought to establish stability in the region through the projection of a particular set of norms of governance in Kosovo. The conditions imposed by NATO on the Milosevic regime—and subsequently reiterated in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 in the summer of 1999—involved far more

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than a cease-fire coupled with disarmament of the warring factions and the insertion of an international security force. In effect, the NATO-led humanitarian intervention in Kosovo led to the establishment of an international protectorate in the province. Within the framework of the international administration created to govern Kosovo, NATO began to cooperate in unprecedented ways with the U.N., OSCE, and NGOs in a long-term project aimed at the construction of new domestic arrangements on the basis of liberal democratic principles—that is, the constitution of a Western-defined rational, “good” polity. Following the September 11th terrorist attacks, NATO again invoked its identity as the key security institution of the Western community, pointing to its foundation upon key liberal democratic norms and values in an attempt to ward off challenges to its relevance in the context of the “war on terror.” Speaking in New York on behalf of NATO, Secretary General George Robertson argued in early 2002: “Tragedy in this city and Washington reinforces the bonds between us. As Le Monde uncharacteristically put it on 12 September, ‘We are all Americans.’ . . . September 11th was an enormous tragedy. But it has revealed many truths. That the bond between the United States and Europe is as strong as ever. . . . That NATO is and will continue to be the essential pillar of Euro-Atlantic security and cooperation between the two sides of the Atlantic. So ignore the merchants of doom. September 11th was not a blow to NATO. It was further proof of its enduring value.”14 Yet it is not difficult to see that Lord Robertson’s affirmation of the continued unity and relevance of the Western community of values—and of NATO as an expression of that community—is in tension with some of the recent developments related to the Iraqi crisis. Space constraints, as well as problems related to the examination of an ongoing set of international events, make it impossible to engage in a comprehensive analysis of this issue. However, I would like to venture a few thoughts on these developments. I suggest that to a significant extent recent disagreements within the alliance (particularly with respect to the provisions for the defense of Turkey against a potential attack from Iraq15) stem from the attempt by some of the allies to assert a more aggressive role for Western military power. The problem is that, in contrast to the Kosovo crisis, the Iraqi conflict has generated a tension between the logic of military force and the logic of protection of liberal democratic norms by a community of values. Again, in Operation Allied Force the application of military force was successfully reconciled with the logic of liberal democratic norm protection because NATO members were able to portray their intervention in Kosovo as an expression of their commitment to the basic principles of human rights. In that case, military intervention allowed

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NATO to portray itself as a relevant institution which was able and willing to act in response to a humanitarian disaster where no other international organization did. Moreover, in the Kosovo context NATO was able to present itself as an institution that was willing to exercise self-discipline in spite of its overwhelming military power. The idea was that allied selfrestraint was a reflection of its normative foundation, which prevented, for instance, the military occupation of the entire Yugoslavia and the use of massive, indiscriminate military power against Yugoslav civilians. By contrast, the March 2003 crisis surrounding Iraq created a tension between the logic of military force and the security community identity of NATO. The problem was that several allies perceived the exercise of military force against Iraq as an act of aggression which was inconsistent with the key constitutive principles of the liberal democratic Euro-Atlantic community.16 This was informed by a view shared by several NATO members that the link between Iraq and the actors responsible for the September 11th attacks was, at best, very weak, and that at the time when it was attacked by the U.S.-led force, Iraq was not in a position to launch an imminent attack on its neighbors or on the United States. Under those circumstances, many NATO members disputed the claim that an attack against Iraq could be justified under the principle of self-defense. The problem was compounded by numerous statements, including one by the U.N. Secretary General, that an armed attack on Iraq that was not sanctioned by the Security Council would constitute a violation of the U.N. Charter. Finally, there was the additional concern—supported by U.N. estimates of the humanitarian costs of war—that any act of aggression designed to remove Saddam Hussein would very likely cause high numbers of civilian casualties. Under these circumstances, NATO had to face a bleak dilemma. The alliance’s involvement in a U.S.-led invasion of Iraq would have entailed a very high risk of violating some of its most fundamental constitutive principles. Conversely, by acting—as it did in the event—outside the framework of the alliance, the U.S. placed NATO in the unenviable position of having its credibility as the key security forum of the West severely challenged. The Iraqi crisis generated real tensions among NATO members, and it is still too early to assess its final impact on inter-allied relations. However, at this stage, it is interesting to note that contrary to the gloomy predictions of some analysts, and in spite of all the disagreements that came to light in the context of the war in Iraq, the allies have continued to work together in many areas within the framework of NATO. Paradoxically, questions regarding the correct interpretation of and responses to the new “war on terror” seem to have been, at once, the basis of renewed unity within NATO and the cause of the most serious dis-

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agreement among the allies in the twenty-first century. Thus, in spite of their disagreement over the merits of resorting to military action in the name of combating terrorism and its “sponsor states” (most notably in Iraq), NATO members were in agreement in identifying terrorism as a key source of threat to the Euro-Atlantic world. The North Atlantic Council affirmed at its June 2003 meeting in Madrid its commitment to the war on terrorism, understood to be a key source of international insecurity. It is worth quoting the council’s statement, for it represents a clear expression of NATO’s approach to international security: Terrorism continues to pose a grave threat to alliance populations, forces and territory, as well as to international peace and security. It also poses a threat to the development and functioning of democratic institutions, the territorial integrity of states, and to peaceful relations between them. . . . We are implementing a military concept for defense against terrorism, improving civil preparedness, and working closely with our Partner countries in this area. . . . To fight terrorism effectively, our response must be multi-faceted and comprehensive.17

NATO officials have pointed out that the organization could and should adapt to a new environment—an environment in which “many threats come from non-conventional sources” (e.g., non-state actors operating across national boundaries) and in which “it is no longer possible to draw a clear distinction between internal and external security.”18 The alliance’s post-9/11 defense agenda revolves around a definition of the enemy as a highly elusive network of actors, often hidden among the ordinary citizens of the allied states and taking advantage of the transnational flows of a globalizing world to operate both within and outside of the Euro-Atlantic area. The notion involved here is that, in this new context NATO must be prepared to deal with an enemy that is “like [a] cancer,” operating anywhere and potentially everywhere, simultaneously attacking the West in different ways and on multiple fronts. The “enemy,” in other words, consists of groups that threaten “our social order,” blurring the boundaries between war and non-war.19 Since September 11th, NATO leaders have endorsed a whole package of measures and initiatives, most of which can be considered designed to combat terrorism. In reforming NATO to address the new challenges of the twenty-first century, the allies have placed particular emphasis on the need to improve intelligence sharing both within and outside of the EuroAtlantic area, to build up new capabilities in the area of surveillance of potential enemies and in the area of crisis response management. The allies have committed themselves to improved intelligence sharing through a review of current intelligence structures at NATO and through the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit at NATO headquarters in Brussels. This

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unit, which was created after September 11th, has now become permanent and will analyze general terrorist threats as well as threats more specifically aimed at NATO. Allied leaders have also agreed to develop a package of high-tech capabilities to protect civilians and military forces from terrorist attacks. More broadly, NATO has streamlined its military command structure with a view to meeting the operational requirements for the full range of contemporary missions, including the fight against terrorism. Furthermore, the new NATO Response Force—a highly flexible force consisting of 21,000 NATO troops that brings together elite forces from both sides of the Atlantic—is scheduled to reach full operational capability no later than October 2006.20 Also, whatever one may think about the merits of the intervention in Afghanistan, we cannot ignore the fact that NATO members from both sides of the Atlantic have worked together in removing a government linked to Al Qaeda (the Taliban) through Operation Enduring Freedom. In August 2003 NATO assumed command and control of the U.N.-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), designed to support the Afghan Transitional Authority in expanding its authority in the country and in providing a safe and secure environment conducive to free elections, the spread of the rule of law, and more broadly, the postwar reconstruction of Afghanistan. In addition, the allies have agreed to implement a series of policies aimed at enhancing their collective ability to monitor and act against individuals and groups with alleged links to organized crime and terrorist organizations. In effect, NATO has taken a series of steps designed to enable it to assume some of the functions traditionally attributed to domestic law enforcement agencies, thereby further blurring the boundary between the inside and outside realms. To give just one example, at NATO’s June 2004 Istanbul Summit the allies agreed on a Policy on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings. Describing human trafficking as a “flagrant violation of human rights,” a “modern day slave trade” that “fuels corruption and organized crime” and has the potential to weaken and destabilize fragile governments and hence runs counter to NATO’s objectives, the allies made a commitment to ratify and accept the U.N. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, to review national legislation and report on national efforts to meet all obligations under the Convention and relevant Protocol, to exchange information and cooperate with the EU and other international institutions in order to ensure maximum effectiveness of the new policy, and to identify and punish all those responsible for organized crime.21 In formulating strategies for dealing with the challenges to allied security in the twenty-first century, NATO envisages closer cooperation with

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its partners. For example, at the Prague Summit of 2002 the members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council endorsed a Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism, which foresees the promotion and facilitation of cooperation among the signatory states through political cooperation and practical programs under the auspices of the EAPC and the Partnership for Peace.22 Consistent with the view that the fight against terrorism requires a multifaceted approach combining military and non-military elements, the practical programs established within the framework of this action plan range from political consultation on concerns related to terrorism, to the provision of support to allied operations via facilitating their access to military bases located in partner countries, to the development of an EAPC/PfP Intelligence Liaison Unit designed to enhance information sharing and improve cooperation among the intelligence agencies of EAPC countries and to facilitate the surveillance of groups deemed as dangerous. The alliance’s move to redefine security in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks appears to involve the securitization of Euro-Atlantic societies in particular ways. The new security environment, it is argued, requires the unprecedented participation of societal groups, including the corporate sector, in matters of security; it creates special duties of citizenship for actors who used to be relatively uninvolved in public affairs. Chris Donnelly’s analysis of this development is particularly revealing: Security today takes in social development and it demands the involvement of all elements of society in a way in which security in the Cold War days did not. . . . The change in the nature of security, however, has created a new imperative: the need to break down the barriers not only between government agencies but between those agencies and the corporate world. . . . Today, business can provide governments with intelligence that they cannot easily get from other sources.23

In essence, NATO’s new defense agenda and the initiatives launched in the twenty-first century suggest that, in continuing to enact the inside logic of security the alliance has sought to adapt its strategies and tools in response to the perceived rise to prominence of nonconventional threats, particularly international terrorism. It is not difficult to identify certain similarities between NATO’s contemporary security discourse and the anti-Communist discourse articulated by the Western allies during the Cold War. In both cases, the image conveyed is that of an existential struggle between the world of freedom and democracy on the one hand, and the unprincipled, morally inferior enemies of the Euro-Atlantic community of values on the other. That existential threat allegedly justifies a certain degree of constraint on indi-

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vidual liberties in the name of the greater good of protecting the Western community from the military and non-military threats posed by unprincipled others. In the new context, for all the variations in national approaches to terrorism there has been a general tendency in the NATO area to legitimize a broad set of state powers that limit the rights of citizens in the name of fighting a powerful, elusive enemy—terrorism. In a relatively short period of time, a broad set of new powers has emerged to offer political leaders in European NATO states, as well as in the United States, a legislative framework for acting outside normal constitutional and representative institutions. Carl Schmitt’s concept of exception is, arguably, one of the most useful analytical tools for understanding the present situation. “Exception,” according to Schmitt, is the capacity of the sovereign to make decisions based on its political will rather than be constrained by normal legislation. Schmitt portrays this type of exception as something that can be characterized as a state of peril, a danger to the existence of the state; the exception cannot be circumscribed factually or made to conform to preestablished law.24 A Schmittian concept of exception, justified by reference to the threat of terrorism, has already found expression in the policies and practices of countries of the Euro-Atlantic area. Reports issued by human rights organizations point to a significant rise in American and European practices of arbitrary detention, unlawful violations of individual freedom of speech and association, and violations of international human rights standards concerning the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers.25 It could, of course, be argued that all these constraints imposed upon individual freedoms are reasonable in light of the threat posed by Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. Questions about the balance between freedom and security, as well as questions about the extent to which such impositions on freedom can in fact achieve security, are too complex to be addressed in just a few lines. What is especially important for our purposes is that whatever the variations from one member state to the other, there has been a tendency in the NATO area to justify, condone, and even engage in a series of practices aimed at strengthening the power of the state vis-à-vis individuals—and to do so to a degree that would probably have seemed unacceptable a decade ago. Linked to this, and again similar to the Cold War era, in the post-9/11 environment the prevailing assumption among NATO members seems to be that the enemy operates both within and outside the territories of the free, democratic countries. Therefore, the democratic community needs to mobilize not only its military but also its political, economic, social, and cultural resources to combat that existential threat. Moreover, on this logic, what is needed is a long-term mobilization of the allies and

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their partners—as was the case in the struggle against Communism. In the words of then NATO Secretary General, George Robertson: “We have not yet won our war. The civilized world must now follow the example of previous generations in their battles against totalitarianism and be prepared for a long haul. In the face of terror, we must preserve our new found unity and protect the values which the terrorists seek to destroy.”26 During the Cold War, the “internal enemies” tended to be regarded as threats that could be known, at least to some extent, by virtue of their link to the clearly identified outside enemy. By contrast, in the present context such enemies are seen as more elusive. In this new world, we are told, different groups of organized criminals and terrorist networks, which may or may not be interconnected, can operate everywhere and anywhere, pursuing different sets of goals even as they are united in their commitment to inflict damage on the West. Thus, according to NATO, in addition to religious terrorism, the allies also need to be aware of (and prepared for) the potential rise of terrorism motivated by economic, social, political, or demographic reasons. Furthermore, “although state sponsorship of terrorism is currently in decline, political circumstances could lead to its rise, providing terrorists with safe havens and considerable resources.”27 Another difference between the contemporary situation and Cold War anti-Communist discourse and practices is that in the struggle against terrorism it is not clear what a decisive victory might mean—or even how one might establish that such a victory has been achieved. The highly visible collapse of the Communist enemy is not likely to be followed by an equally visible disappearance of the terrorist threat, for terrorists are by definition invisible and highly elusive. No matter how much evidence politicians and security experts might bring to bear in support of the claim that Al Qaeda, for instance, has been eradicated, critics could still argue that other terrorist groups/networks are lurking in the background waiting for a moment of weakness to strike against democratic societies. As noted in Chapter 5, NATO’s new emphasis on securing the West from the elusive threat of terrorism also has had an impact on the second wave of enlargement. The allies have continued to emphasize the importance of adopting the liberal democratic norms of the Western community as a precondition of NATO membership. At the same time, there has been a tendency to reconsider the relative weight of different Western norms, assigning more value to security and accepting greater constraints on individual freedoms, all in the name of protecting the Euro-Atlantic world from the nonconventional threats of the twenty-first century. As part of its effort to adapt to the post-9/11 environment, NATO has also reached a number of agreements of cooperation with the EU.28 An

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important development in this area was the NATO–EU Agreement on Security of Information, signed by Lord Robertson and Greece’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou (on behalf of the EU presidency). This agreement, which was the result of discussions between NATO and the EU on how to deal with classified information, establishes common security standards designed to enable the two organizations to share sensitive information and consult and cooperate on security issues, including terrorism and organized crime.29 And as we noted in reference to the new policy on human trafficking, NATO and the EU have continued to take steps to enhance their cooperation in general and to strengthen their joint ability to carry out effective surveillance and control of persons suspected of involvement in organized crime and terrorism.30 Moreover, there has been an effort on the part of both organizations to extend their role in fighting organized crime and terrorism beyond the boundaries of the EU and NATO. For instance, in July 2003 the EU and NATO agreed on a concerted approach to security and stability in the Balkans. Starting from the assumption that stability in the Balkans is essential not only for the well-being of the people inhabiting that region but also for the broader stability of Europe, NATO and the EU expressed their shared determination to help (re)build the region around the norms of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and a viable market economy. To this end, the two organizations have launched a series of initiatives aimed at enhancing their crisis management capacity in the region, promoting defense and security-sector reform (including police reform and governance issues), and, importantly, strengthening the rule of law by combating organized crime, illegal migration, and the trafficking in human beings, as well as building an independent judiciary.31 In a broader perspective, however, all these new measures designed to adapt NATO to the twenty-first century, including the joint NATO–EU initiatives, cannot dispel a certain sense of uncertainty over the future of the alliance. The disagreements that came to light so poignantly during the Iraq crisis have refueled speculation that its members may no longer have the political will needed to preserve NATO. For many analysts and political actors in Western Europe, this was further proof that the EU should assume a greater role in the area of security, even if that means a corresponding weakening of the role of NATO. At the same time, other European voices have insisted that when it comes to the provision of Euro-Atlantic security, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) should always represent a “Plan B,” to be used only if NATO as a whole cannot or does not want to be involved.32 In the context of these debates about the future of the two security institutions, NATO, as we have seen, has been keen to enhance its cooper-

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ation with the EU but also to claim a privileged position vis-à-vis the latter. According to the alliance’s discourse, the EU lacks the capacity to operate on a global level and to combine the extensive military and political assets required in the struggle against the new security challenges—including the struggle against terrorism. Particularly relevant in this sense is Lord Robertson’s statement that should NATO be weakened and turned into a purely political organization the Euro-Atlantic community would lose a key—irreplaceable—security arrangement.33 In a similar vein, it has been argued that the ESDP cannot in the foreseeable future provide an alternative to NATO because most EU members have not reformed their armed forces to provide credible expeditionary capability. In addition, for independent actions, the EU will have to develop intelligence and logistics capabilities it does not currently have.34 In essence, NATO representatives have been engaged in an attempt to secure the trust of Western publics in the alliance’s (presumably unique) ability to act as an efficient provider of security in the post-9/11 context. This effort at trust-building involves a two-dimensional move by NATO: in its quest to justify its ongoing relevance and to secure a privileged position in the new security field, the alliance has invoked not only its material resources but also its symbolic capital. Particularly revealing in this sense is the attempt by NATO’s senior officials to dismiss criticism of the organization as an outdated military alliance and to portray the material capabilities of the alliance as well suited to respond to the new threats to allied security. According to NATO’s former Secretary General, Lord Robertson, there is an ongoing need to focus on material capabilities: In Kosovo, we learned the . . . lesson [that] our military competence was essential in preventing a humanitarian tragedy. Today, in Afghanistan, military capabilities are once again demonstrating their importance. Military prowess has not only crushed Al Qaeda. It has also crushed the myth of invulnerability that surrounded Osama Bin Laden and his henchmen.35

On this view, NATO is particularly well equipped to protect and enhance the ability of its members to apply military force—not least because it provides an established forum with established norms and rules that enable the allies to articulate their concerns, collectively identify enemies, and define threats, as well as to combine their efforts and secure political legitimacy in dealing with those threats. In this sense, the material capabilities embodied in NATO are not the only important element in the new security equation; to understand the full value of the organization in protecting the allies one has also to take into account the whole normative framework within which the allies act to project their combined might in the name of defending their community of values.

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Again, Lord Robertson’s statement on this issue is particularly revealing: There can also be no doubt that military force is best applied in a coalition. If you have allies, you can maximize your political impact, while sharing costs and risks. You also increase the political legitimacy of an operation. And the collective sharing of responsibility can make things easier if something goes wrong. . . . NATO is the world’s largest permanent coalition. It remains the most effective way to organize our security.36

In addition to invoking the alliance’s material capabilities, NATO officials have also invoked its symbolic capital, portraying the latter as a key asset that enables the alliance to act as an effective security institution in the new century. By virtue of its special history of building trust among the allies since 1949, it is claimed, NATO is uniquely able to build up the kind of network of domestic and international agencies across the EuroAtlantic area that is needed in the comprehensive struggle against the new enemies to Western values and way of life. NATO, it has been argued, can be an effective agency in the struggle against terrorism precisely by virtue of its ability to generate the kind of trust among the various organizations that need to join forces if the terrorist groups are to be defeated. Thus, NATO could have a unique role to play. NATO is the international institution par excellence for developing networks of trust between individuals from different countries and different agencies. It is precisely on the basis of trust that information and intelligence is most readily shared. It is pointless for governments to legislate for information exchange if the basis of mutual trust is absent. It is now very important that we evaluate how to develop and enhance the model of trustgenerating mechanisms of the NATO system so that we can improve the capability for information exchange.37

Debates about the role of NATO vis-à-vis the EU are, of course, linked to broader discussions about the evolution of U.S.–European relations. There are some who claim that the two sides of the Atlantic are moving in opposite directions and attempts to revive a sense of community between them are doomed. Meanwhile, other analysts and political actors are more optimistic, suggesting that existing differences can be transcended and the Euro-Atlantic community (together with its institutions) can indeed be saved, provided both the Americans and the Europeans give up their radical rhetoric and stances that have recently generated so much animosity.38 Interestingly, both the Central and Eastern European states and some of the established members of NATO have suggested that the alliance’s Eastern enlargement might be just the recipe for reviving the Euro-At-

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lantic community and enhancing NATO-EU cooperation. In the context of the Iraqi crisis, most of the former Communist states provided both symbolic and material support to the U.S.-led war, arguing that it was morally imperative to act against the genocidal regime of Saddam Hussein and, moreover, that it was important not to let that crisis generate a schism between the members of the Euro-Atlantic community of values. That stance, and the broader Atlanticist orientation of the former Communist states, led the U.S. and the U.K. in particular to argue that the Central and Eastern Europeans (the “new Europeans”) could play a key role in strengthening the ties between NATO and the EU, counterbalancing the tendencies of some of the “old Europeans” to move away from the United States and to develop the ESDP as a competitor to NATO.39 For their part, the Central and Eastern Europeans have defined their task in transatlantic relations in terms of preventing the transformation of the EU into a “counterweight to the U.S.”40 Reverting to our examples, the Czech Republic and Romania have repeatedly claimed that former Communist countries understand the importance of transatlantic solidarity much better than their West European counterparts. In an interesting symbolic reversal of roles vis-à-vis Western Europe (the “Old Europeans”), in the context of the Iraqi crisis, the Czechs and Romanians claimed the need to “teach” Old Europe hard truths about the preservation of liberal democracy—lessons allegedly forgotten by the “Old Europeans” but all too present in the minds of people from the former Communist bloc. For instance, in justifying the Czech support for the United States, Czech leaders repeatedly referred to the importance of preserving the unity of the Western community, and of the dangers of provoking a rift between the United States and Europe. This point of view was succinctly captured by the president of the Czech Senate, Petr Pithart, who argued: “It’s the experience of the two totalitarian regimes—the Nazis and the Communists. We’re conscious of the fragility of democracy. That sense doesn’t exist in Western Europe.”41 The Romanian government adopted a similar position, stressing that in the interest of security Saddam Hussein could not be allowed to generate a schism between America and Europe. According to then Prime Minister Nastase and Foreign Minister Geoana, a strong transatlantic partnership is vital for the longterm security and freedom of North America and Europe and for stability and freedom throughout the world.42 In other words, in the context of the war in Iraq, the Central and East Europeans seem to have engaged in a re-reading of the implications of their Communist past. Following the end of the Cold War, both in the Central and East Europeans’ self-definitions and in the main discourse articulated in the West, the Communist past was seen as a cause of weakness—leading to the temporary loss of European identity. According to

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the prevailing Central and East European discourses at the end of the Cold War, Communism was responsible for the ethical weakness and political immaturity of their polities. The conclusion of those discourses was that, as countries that were burdened by a difficult Communist legacy, the Central and East Europeans had to follow the guidance of the West, in a way to quickly “grow up” under the supervision of the West in order to recapture that lost European identity. By contrast, in the context of the Iraqi war and the transatlantic divide caused by it, the Communist past was reinterpreted as almost a source of strength—the negative experience through which the Central/East Europeans had learned about the fragility of democracy, the importance of protecting the Euro-Atlantic community of values against all its enemies, and the importance of taking decisive action against tyrants. On this view, having learned from their experience, the people of the former Eastern Bloc are more mature than their West European counterparts, and have a sophisticated understanding of the dangers to the Euro-Atlantic community—an understanding lacking in Western Europe. On the basis of this image, the Central/East Europeans have tried to redefine their role in Europe, to present themselves as not simply novices, but in important ways as teachers of liberal democratic norms, reminding the established members of the Western community that they have special duties to protect and promote freedom in Europe and, more broadly, in the world, and seeking to prevent the emergence of—or at least control—the political forces that might undermine the Euro-Atlantic community. Whether or not the new NATO allies will actually be able to play such an important role in strengthening the relationship between NATO and the EU and revitalizing the Euro-Atlantic community remains to be seen. Whatever may happen in this area, one thing seems reasonably clear: the relatively poor and weak countries of the former Communist bloc have already had a greater impact on transatlantic relations than many analysts would have expected. It is not easy to write a conclusion for what continues to be an unfolding chapter in international politics. For students of international security these are extremely interesting times. But they are times in which we ought to recall that for the most part we are looking at ongoing processes rather than fixed outcomes. The final impact of NATO’s politics of state-crafting carried out in the name of the double goal of the promotion of democracy and international stability will not be known for some time to come. Perhaps one of the lessons that our discipline has to learn from the practice of international politics is patience with—and willingness to pay attention to—long-lasting processes through which social actors constantly create and re-create their world. I hope this book has shown that, in explaining at least some of these

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processes, we need to question conventional wisdom about international security. In a broader theoretical perspective, we need to question assumptions of international relations as interactions among pre-given agents who rely on instrumental rationality to pursue goals defined in abstraction from their social environment. Similarly, rather than conceive of power simply in terms of coercion or positive incentives made possible by material resources, it is useful for students of International Relations to learn from political theory, social psychology, and sociological analyses of various, often hidden forms of social power that affect the identity and practices of subjects. Admittedly, such studies of complex social processes entail the risk of leading us away from simple explanations of international relations. But we cannot forget the lesson taught to our discipline by the end of the Cold War: approaches that focus on a few variables and overlook a wide set of complex social processes are often misleading. The world of international politics may be messier and more complicated than some of us would like it to be. But it is, after all, the world that we set out to study.

appendix

Interviews, 1999–2000

nato Burak Akcapar, Senior Official, Defense Partnership and Cooperation Directorate, Defense Planning and Operations Division John Barrett, Head, Policy Planning Section, Political Affairs Division, NATO HQ Lt. Col. Volker Bescht, Director, International Coordination Center, SHAPE Frank Boland, Deputy Director of Force Planning, Defense Planning and Operations Division, NATO HQ Lt. Col. Peter Braunstein, Deputy Chief, Civil-Military Cooperation Division (CIMIC), German Ministry of Defense Marco Carnovale, Adviser, Political Affairs Division, NATO International Staff Mihai Carp, Senior Official, Eastern European Partners and Political Crisis Management Section, Political Affairs Division, NATO HQ Bruce Cleghorn, Deputy Permanent Representative, British Mission to NATO Chris Donnelly, Special Adviser for Central and Eastern Europe, Office of the Secretary General, NATO HQ Ray Eiriz, Captain, U.S. Army, Joint Operations Center, SHAPE John Feeley, Office of the Defense Adviser, U.S. Mission to NATO Catherine Guicherd, Deputy Policy Coordinator, NATO Parliamentary Assembly John Hoag, Senior Adviser, U.S. Mission to NATO David Hobbs, Deputy Secretary General, NATO Parliamentary Assembly George Katsirdakis, Senior Officer, Defense Partnership and Cooperation Directorate, Defense Planning and Operations Division, NATO International Staff, NATO HQ Maj. Walter Kessey, Public Information Office, SHAPE Rick Kirby, Head, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) Section, Political Affairs Division, NATO HQ

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Maj. Gen. Ton Kolsteren, Director, Partnership Coordination Cell, Mons David Lightburn, Head, NATO Balkans Task Force, Defense Planning and Operations Division, NATO HQ John Lough, Senior Information Officer, Central and Eastern Europe, NATO HQ Maggie Macdonald, Assistant Legal Adviser, SHAPE Karen McDonald, Political Adviser, Canadian Delegation to NATO Charles Parker, Staff Member, Political-Military Framework, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) Section, Political Affairs Division, NATO HQ Rob McRae, Deputy Permanent Representative, Canadian Delegation to NATO Ambassador Von Moltke, German Permanent Representative to NATO; former Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs Tom Norring, Deputy Permanent Representative, Norwegian Mission to NATO Jean Pierre Ollivier, Head, Planning and Publications, Office of Information and Press, NATO HQ Charles Parker, Adviser, Political Affairs Division, NATO HQ Eric Povel, Senior Official, Office of Information and Press, NATO HQ Col. Yordan Pountchev, Chief, Education and Training Branch, Partnership Coordination Cell, Mons Lt. Col. John Rollins, Deputy Chief, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Section, SHAPE Horst Siedschlag, Defense Partnership and Cooperation Directorate, NATO HQ Chris Shapardanov, Senior Adviser (former Yugoslavia and Russia), Eastern European Partners and Political Crisis Management Section, Political Affairs Division, NATO HQ Jillian Stirk, Political Adviser, Canadian Delegation to NATO Istvan Szabo, Deputy Ambassador, Hungarian Delegation to NATO Col. Nick Szasz, Director, Programmes and Analysis Branch, Partnership Coordination Cell, Mons Rob Weaver, Staff Member, Political-Military Framework, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) Section, Political Affairs Division, NATO HQ Pol de Witte, Senior Official, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) Section, Political Affairs Division, NATO HQ

czech interviwees Col. Zdeneth Borkovec, Senior Military Adviser, Czech Mission to NATO

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Pavel Bratinka, former Minister without portfolio (1996–97); member of Governmental Committee for NATO Integration; and Deputy Foreign Minister (1992–96) Viktor Dobal, former Deputy Minister without portfolio (1996–97) Vladimir Dlouhy, former Minister of Trade; member of Governmental Committee for NATO Integration Katerina Fialkova, Senior Political Adviser, Czech Delegation to NATO Zdenek Hanacek, Retired Soldier Maj. Josef Hlava, Czech Armed Forces Roman Joch, Political Analyst, Fellow, Civic Institute Radek Khol, Research Fellow, Czech Institute of International Relations Martin Lukas, former Staff Member (1997–99), Office of the President Maj. Imrich Luky, Czech Representative, NATO Working Group on CivilMilitary Relations Ladislav Mravec, former Deputy Foreign Minister (1996–97) Frank Novak, Journalist, Political Analyst, and former Dissident Martin Palous, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Jan Prochazka, Retired Soldier Milan Repka, former Member of Parliament (ODA) Jiri Sedivy, Director, Institute of International Relations and Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague Maj. Josef Suta, Czech Representative to the Partnership Coordination Cell, Mons Antonin Sverak, Retired Soldier Josefine Wallat, former Staff Member, Office of the President of the Czech Republic Marian Zajicek, Parliamentary Staff Michael Zantovsky, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Security, Czech Senate

romanian interviewees Cdr. Hariton Bucur, Romanian Representative, Partnership Coordination Cell Jacqueline Callcut, Adviser, Romanian Ministry of National Defense Gabrielle Cantacuzino, Founder, Modrogan Foundation Capt. Ion Chiritiu, Staff Member, NATO Integration Directorate, Ministry of National Defense

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Costel Dediu, Legal Adviser, International Relations Directorate, Ministry of National Defense Ovidiu Dranga, Political Adviser, Romanian Mission to NATO Mihai Dobre, Adviser, NATO/EU Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Iulian Fota, Head of Defense Section, Romanian Mission to NATO Gen. Ioan Gavril Ghitas, Military Representative, Romanian Mission to NATO Oana Hangan, Executive Director, Euro-Atlantic Association Gen. Mihail Ionescu, Head of NATO Integration Directorate, Ministry of National Defense Daniel Ionita, Chief of NATO/EU Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Alexandru Irimia, Senior Official, Ministry of National Defense Cristian Istrate, Director, NATO Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Maj. Cristina Magurean, Ministry of National Defense Gen. Mihail Orezeata, Deputy Chief of J-5 Directorate, Ministry of Defense Ion Popescu, Member, Parliamentary Staff Ionel Nicu-Sava, Director, Euro-Atlantic Association Mihai-Razvan Ungureanu, Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sorin Varzan, Retired Soldier Michael Walma, First Secretary (Political), Canadian Embassy to Romania

others Professor Donald Abenheim, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California Alyson Bailes, Political Director, WEU Gregg Calkin, Director, North American and Euro-Atlantic Security and Defense Relations Division, Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade; former member of Canadian Mission to NATO Paul Charlton, North American and Euro-Atlantic Security and Defense Relations Division, Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Lori Gronich, Director, Office of Education and the Successor Generations, Atlantic Council of the U.S. Col. Plamen Halachev, Deputy Chief of Department of NATO Integration, Bulgarian Ministry of Defense Ulrich Hundt, Secretary General, European Organization of Military Associations, Brussels

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Col. Piero Luccheti, Italian Ministry of Defense, Chief of Civil-Military Cooperation Division Col. Albert Moinard, French Ministry of Defense Dieter Ose, Faculty Member, NATO Defense College; and former member of the German Delegation to NATO Sven Sakkov, Policy Adviser, Estonian Mission to NATO Jeffrey Simon, U.S. Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University Tia Sommer, Military Adviser, Estonian Mission to NATO Fred Tanner, Deputy Director, Geneva Center for Security Policy

Notes

chapter 1 1. Interview with senior NATO official, International Staff, October 12, 1999, Brussels, confirmed by senior official, NATO Defense Planning and Operations Division, November 23, 1999, Brussels. 2. For analyses of alliances as geostrategic arrangements set up by preconstituted states concerned with survival in an anarchic environment, see, e.g., Langer, European Alliances and Alignments; Liska, Nations in Alliance; Snyder, Alliance Politics; and Walt, The Origins of Alliances. 3. See NATO, “London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance,” sec. 2. 4. NATO, “Final Communiqué.” This view concerning the role of the Atlantic Organization was reiterated in NATO, Study on NATO Enlargement. 5. My understanding of norms is informed by analyses developed by constructivist international relations (IR) scholars. Thus, norms refer to collective understandings regarding the proper behavior of actors with given identities (see Katzenstein, Introduction to The Culture of National Security, 5). Those collective understandings incorporate explicit rule-like prescriptions for action but also broader shared cultural schemas that provide filters for interpretation of both situations and oneself, out of which a course of action is constructed. Such shared cultural schemas do not just constrain options: they establish the very criteria by which actors discover their preferences and provide recipes for action aimed at pursuing those preferences. On this, see also Powell and DiMaggio, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, 11. 6. On this, see, e.g., the contributions in Barry, Osborne, and Rose, Foucault and Political Reason. 7. NATO, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept (1991), para. 10. This understanding of post–Cold War security was repeatedly expressed by various members of national delegations to NATO, as well as the alliance’s international staff that I interviewed in Fall 1999–Spring 2000. Especially relevant were the inter-

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views with senior officials from the American, British, Canadian, and Norwegian delegations to NATO (October 18, 1999, and November 23 and 26, 1999, Brussels), and interviews with senior officials from the Defense Planning Division (December 6, 1999), Brussels. 8. Such an approach would have seemed irrational—a waste of Western resources—if the collective view within NATO had been one of predetermined essences that either led to liberal democracy or, conversely, prevented a certain state becoming a liberal democratic polity. For an illustration of such a view, see Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” For an analysis of the impact that given views of human nature can have—and have had—on Western politics of democracy-promotion in other countries, see Schmitter and Brouwer, Conceptualizing, Researching and Evaluating Democracy Promotion and Protection. 9. See Williams and Neumann, “From Alliance to Security Community.” 10. For an analysis of the meaning and importance of communities of speakers, see Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations.” See also Michael Baxandall’s analysis of the term “to brief,” which shapes collective perceptions of problems and possible solutions to those problems within a social group (Baxandall, Patterns of Intention, especially chaps. 1–2). 11. On the logic of international arguing within a given set of norms, see Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions. More recently, see Risse, “Let’s Argue!” 12. For an analysis of the constitutive norms of the Western community, and the ways in which those norms are embedded in the institutions of the Western community, see also Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe. 13. This is not to say that the boundaries of the group that shares these intersubjective understandings regarding the nature of post–Cold War European security are rigid. Indeed, especially given the above-mentioned prevalence of the liberal democratic discourse on the nature and merits of “good” domestic institutions, one can expect to find similar collective understandings shaping social interactions both among Western political actors themselves and between them and actors outside the Euro-Atlantic world. But, as this study focuses on practices enacted by NATO in and vis-à-vis Central and Eastern Europe, a study of the broader Western sociological context in which officials acting on behalf of NATO operate is beyond the scope of my analysis. 14. See, e.g., Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in World Polity”; Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions; Onuf, World of Our Making. 15. This argument was developed by John Ruggie in “Continuity and Transformation in World Polity”; see, especially, 141–46. 16. Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation,” 143. For a different account of sovereignty, see Krasner, Sovereignty.

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17. For discussions on the role of the principle of sovereignty in the modern world, see Onuf, The Republican Legacy in International Thought; and Walker, Inside/Outside. 18. This is not to suggest that no change has occurred in the application of the norm since the early modern days. For instance, even though states continue to be the most important international actors, their sovereign powers have been reduced due to a series of developments such as the development of global capital and global communications. There is also the pooling of certain attributes of sovereignty at the regional level, particularly associated with the creation of supranational authorities within the EU. But such developments mark an evolution rather than the transcendence of the principle of sovereignty as a constitutive international norm. What appears to be involved is a move toward the creation of non-state sovereign authorities in certain areas of life. Those authorities complement, and in part compete with, state sovereigns, rather than completely replace them. For a discussion of this, see Waever, “European Security Identities.” 19. This argument is espoused by Hobbes in the Leviathan, and accepted by scholars within the neorealist school of international relations. 20. It is possible that outside security arrangements may evolve over time so as to include more cooperative modes of interaction, such as arms control or measures of crisis management. But these remain, essentially, arrangements concerning relations between constituent units of an anarchic international system; they aim at building trust and facilitating cooperation among sovereign entities with given domestic structures. As such, they are different from the far more interventionist sets of practices that are specifically designed to bring about changes inside those entities. 21. For many IR theorists, however, this inside solution to international security is bound to be unstable; accordingly, they suggest that practitioners of international relations have no choice but to rely on the outside option (see, e.g., Waltz, Man, the State, and War). 22. For a concise discussion of the relationship between the constitutive and the regulative effects of norms, see Katzenstein, Introduction to The Culture of National Security, 5. 23. The Kantian project, espoused in his famous essay on “Perpetual Peace,” revolves around the progressive realization of universal reason/ethics within particular states. On this logic, the growth of rational universalism holds the promise of an eventual realization of the universal kingdom of ends, in which all subjects exist as free and moral selves. In the context of international relations, by virtue of the rational capacities of their members, nations have a duty to pass from their state of nature to a condition analogous to civil society—and thus form universally rational liberal republics. 24. Within the discipline of International Relations, the Kantian solution to

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international peace was recaptured by democratic peace theorists (see, e.g., Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace). 25. On this issue, my argument builds on Thomas Risse-Kappen’s analysis in “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community”; see also Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies. 26. See Lauer and Handel, Social Psychology, especially 16 and 54–56; also relevant are Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, especially pt. 3, chap. 1; and, within the field of International Relations, Alexander Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics. I shall return to Wendt’s book in my theoretical chapter, where I explain how I draw on, but also depart from, his analysis of symbolic interactions. 27. On international socialization and norm internalization, see also Checkel, “‘Going Native’ in Europe?” 28. In the Study on NATO Enlargement, this principle was listed several times among the conditions for liberalization and democratization. This view was reiterated by senior officials from the Political Affairs Division and the Defence Planning Division, NATO HQ (interviewed on October 25, 1999, and November 9, 1999, Brussels). The same interviews point to the decision taken by NATO to establish an informal division of labor with other international institutions, which were better equipped to monitor the evolution of human rights, minorities, or economic liberalization. 29. On this, see also Szayna, NATO Enlargement, 2000–2015. 30. See Bourdieu, “Social Space and Symbolic Power.” More broadly, see Bourdieu and Passeron, Reproduction in Education, Society, and Culture. 31. Bourdieu, “Social Space and Symbolic Power,” 241. 32. Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, 58. 33. Dean, Governmentality, 122. 34. See Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” 59. 35. Reus-Smit, “Human Rights and the Social Construction of Sovereignty,” 531. 36. For an interesting argument regarding the growing power of the norm of democratic entitlement since the end of the Cold War, see Fox and Roth, “Democracy and International Law.” For an analysis of liberal democratic norms as constitutive norms in contemporary Europe, see Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe, 62–63. 37. Clark, “Another ‘Double Movement’”; see also Clark, The Post–Cold War Order. 38. Clark, The Post–Cold War Order, 239. 39. See Schimmelfennig, “International Socialization in the New Europe.” 40. Farrell, “Constructivist Security Studies.” 41. For a similar analysis of the institutional construction of common sense, see Williams and Neumann, “From Alliance to Security Community.”

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42. My account of power builds on the argument developed by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities,” in ibid., Security Communities, 39–41. 43. For a very interesting analysis of the ways in which power is embedded in particular socially constructed structures of identity and interests, see also Hall, “Moral Authority as a Power Source.” 44. On this, see, e.g., Durandin, “Occidentalistes et nationalistes en Europe Centrale et Orientale”; Roper, Romania, 113; and Vaclav Havel’s collection of essays and speeches, in Havel, The Art of the Impossible. 45. On the need to study the constitutive effects of socialization, see Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 170. 46. Kratochwil, “How Do Norms Matter?” 66. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid. 49. See Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, especially the chapter on “Process and Structural Change,” 313–69. 50. See, e.g., Mead, The Philosophy of the Act; and Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality. 51. Kratochwil, “Constructing a New Orthodoxy?” 88. 52. This analysis regarding the power exercised by NATO in post–Cold War Central and Eastern Europe is similar to the argument developed by Michael Williams and Iver Neumann in “From Alliance to Security Community.” 53. Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, 39–40. 54. Adler, “Imagined (Security) Communities,” 261. 55. Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics.” 56. Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, 43. 57. NATO, “London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance,” para. 2. 58. These activities have involved a wide range of elites: top policymakers (especially in the course of individual accession dialogues); parliamentarians and lower-level key politicians, but also top parliamentary functionaries (within activities organized by the Atlantic Assembly—now entitled NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council); high- but also lower-ranking military officers (involved in seminars and exercises within Partnership for Peace programs); and even legal experts and top journalists who were invited to various presentations and seminars at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels, as well as—in the case of legal experts—seminars organized by the Atlantic Assembly. 59. I revisit the issue of variation in my empirical chapters. 60. On the concept of triangulation, see Miles and Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis. 61. See Checkel, “Why Comply?” For a similar research design, see Lewis, “Diplomacy in Europe’s Polity.”

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62. On the importance of collective understandings in shaping definitions of problems and the repertoire of reasonable solutions to those problems faced by a given set of actors, see, e.g., Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory; and Baxandall, Patterns of Intentions, especially chaps. 1 and 2. 63. Mark Lichbach, Is Rational Choice Theory All of Social Science? 88. 64. For an analysis of the role of intersubjective understandings in shaping the interpretations of the world and hence the policies formulated by decision makers, and the role of textual analysis in capturing those understandings, see also Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics. 65. For a discussion of applications of discourse analysis to international relations, see Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations.” For a broader discussion of discourse analysis, see Phillips and Hardy, Discourse Analysis. 66. For a very interesting analysis of the ways in which discursive structures condition possible policies, see Waever, “Identity, Communities, and Foreign Policy.” 67. See Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations,” especially 232. 68. See Lincoln, Discourse and the Construction of Society. 69. See Stubbs, Discourse Analysis, 27. 70. See Torode, Text and Talk as Social Practice. 71. Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, Security, 177. 72. These criteria are similar to the criteria of text selection used in Hansen, Security as Practice. 73. Here, my argument is similar to that in Cortell and Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms”; see also Alderson, “Making Sense of State Socialization.” 74. See Checkel and Moravcsik, “A Constructivist Research Program in EU Studies?” 75. Ibid. 76. Cortell and Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms.”

chapter 2 1. In analyzing NATO as an institution based on a shared vision of a EuroAtlantic community of values, I build on Thomas Risse-Kappen’s extremely interesting account (see his “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community,” and Cooperation among Democracies). But I regard NATO as not so much the expression of a preconstituted Western community, as Risse’s analysis tends to suggest, but rather as part of a project aimed at constructing a Western identity and, following the end of the Cold War, also shaping former Communist polities in accordance with that identity.

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2. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, 3:4–6; also cited in Milloy, “Article 2 and the Non-Military Development of NATO,” 11. 3. The three quotations are from Escott Reid’s Time of Fear and Hope, pt. 1, 13. In 1948–49, Reid was the second-in-charge at the Canadian Department of External Affairs and participated in all the negotiations surrounding the establishment of NATO. 4. In the late 1940s several scenarios for possible international security arrangements illustrating different visions of the best way to secure the Western world were being discussed. Given space limitations, this chapter does not engage in an analysis of those visions, or of the politics through which the NATO scenario came to triumph. For the purposes of this chapter, what is especially important is that, as it was being created, NATO was designed to address both the inside and the outside logics of international security, given a shared understanding among its founders that a purely military arrangement could not successfully address all the dangers to the Western world. For analyses of the debates that took place in the late 1940s regarding possible international security arrangements, see, e.g., Baylis, “Britain and the Formation of NATO”; Henderson, The Birth of NATO; and Reid, Time of Fear and Hope. On the domestic debates on the post–World War II foreign policy in the United States, particularly with respect to its commitment to the security of Western Europe, see Leffler, The Specter of Communism; and Mayers, George Kennan and the Dilemmas of U.S. Foreign Policy. 5. The report was analyzed by Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, 14. 6. This fear appears to have been shared by all the parties to the intergovernmental debates that occurred in 1948 and 1949. See, e.g., Heuser, “Transatlantic Relations in the Past,” in her Transatlantic Relations, 5–33; and Kaplan, The Long Entanglement, particularly pt. 1, 7–64. 7. For a discussion of the role of the other in the constitution of identity in international relations, see Neumann, “Collective Identity Formation and the Other in International Relations”; and Campbell, Writing Security. For a variety of views on the relationship between the Soviet other and the politics of NATO identity, see Klein, “How the West Was One”; Mutimer, “Making Enemies”; and Nathanson, “The Social Construction of the Soviet Threat.” 8. The French foreign minister, Georges Bidault, is quoted in Woyke, “The Foundation and History of NATO,” 254. 9. One of the most powerful statements of the perceived incompatibility between the basic liberal values of the Western world and Communist ideology was given by President Truman in his inaugural address in 1949. In his words, “Communism subjects the individual to arrest without lawful cause, punishment without trial, and forced labor as the chattel of the state. It decrees that information he shall receive, what art he shall produce, what leaders he shall follow, and what thoughts he shall think” (Truman quoted in Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, 267).

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10. Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, 25. One gets a similar sense of the growing awareness of Western sameness among the leaders confronted with the Communist challenge by reading Kennan, Memoirs; Acheson, Present at the Creation; and Henderson, The Birth of NATO. 11. Debates of the House of Commons of Canada, Parliament of Canada (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 1948), 3:2303. 12. Extracts from the messages sent by British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin to Washington and Ottawa in March 1948 (quoted in Best, Co-operation with Like-Minded Peoples, 150–53). 13. Lovett, cited in Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, 133. 14. Vandenberg, cited in ibid., 179 (emphasis added). 15. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 493. 16. See Riste, “Norway’s Attitude to Military Integration,” 192. The French government, in signing the treaty, deflected domestic criticism that it was abandoning its European idea by arguing that such an association “of democratic states” from both sides of the Atlantic was a guarantee for the future of the values of Western civilization (see Guillen, “France and the Defence of Western Europe, 125–48). 17. For analyses of the key constitutive norms embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty, see Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community”; and Schimmelfennig, “NATO’s Eastern Enlargement.” 18. Canada Department of External Affairs, Documents on Canadian External Relations, 14:436 (hereafter cited as DCER). 19. For an analysis of allied debates on the relationship between NATO and Portugal, see, e.g., Kaplan, The Long Entanglement, 29–35. For a Portuguese perspective, see Nogueira, “The Making of the Alliance.” 20. See Smith, NATO Enlargement during the Cold War, 26–27. 21. Ibid. 22. See DCER, 14:436. 23. On this, see Smith, NATO Enlargement during the Cold War, 28. 24. DCER, 14:649. 25. Achilles quoted in Kaplan, The United States and NATO, 110. 26. In his analysis of Greece and Turkey in the post–World War II era, Theodore Couloumbis argues that the two countries “were slipped into the oven” together because that “seemed to be the surest way to cook a tough bird” (see Couloumbis, The United States, Greece, and Turkey, 14). 27. See Smith, NATO Enlargement during the Cold War, 67. 28. Because of its violent civil war of 1946–49, Greece was regarded, particularly by the United States, as an arena of international conflict rather than an ally in the struggle. In 1949 there appeared to be a shared view among the allies that Greece and Turkey were strategic outposts of a region critical to Europe, but not intrinsic to what constituted Europe. In contrast to Turkey, prior to the out-

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break of the Korean War there was little enthusiasm for NATO membership within Greece. On Greece and NATO, see, e.g., Jeffrey, Ambiguous Commitments and Uncertain Policies, particularly chaps. 8–10. On the difficult political relationship between Greece and NATO, see also Heuser, Transatlantic Relations, 29–30. 29. Kuniholm, Origins of the Cold War; also cited by Best, Co-operation with Like-Minded Peoples, 131–32. 30. On this, see Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, especially 93–98. 31. See Kaplan, The Long Entanglement, 21. 32. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, 424–25. 33. Smith, NATO Enlargement, 77. 34. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, 424–25. 35. On the American position, see particularly Acheson, Present at the Creation, 279. For an analysis of the situation of Greece and Turkey in the early 1950s, see also Ismay, Five Years of NATO, 37–45. Also relevant are Papacosma, “Greece and NATO”; and Kuniholm, “Turkey and NATO.” 36. See Smith, NATO Enlargement, 80–81. 37. Cited in ibid., 79. 38. On the growing allied consensus on the need to grant full membership to Greece and Turkey, see Brown, Delicately Poised Allies, 1–17. 39. See Smith, NATO Enlargement, 85. 40. On efforts by the U.S. administration to persuade its allies that the inclusion of Greece and Turkey was in their collective interest, see also Leffler, A Preponderance of Power (e.g., p. 425). 41. See also Brown, Delicately Poised Allies. 42. On this, see particularly Klepak, Spain, 81–120. 43. See, e.g., Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, chap. 3. 44. Klepak, Spain, 82–84. On the significance of the Madrid Pacts, see also Whitaker, Spain and the Defense of the West, 45–49. 45. Klepak, Spain, 82–84. 46. On the U.S. concern that its support of Spain might antagonize European allies, see Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, 417. 47. Smith, NATO Enlargement, 131. 48. On this, see Klepak, Spain, 116–17. 49. Ibid. 50. Smith, NATO Enlargement, 133. 51. On the widespread allied support for Spanish membership, see Preston and Smyth, Spain, the EEC, and NATO, 1–2. Preston and Smyth point out that the situation was almost the reverse of the Cold War position. See also Tusell, “The Transition to Democracy and Spain’s Membership in NATO.” 52. Preston and Smyth, Spain, the EEC, and NATO, 1–2. 53. The process of gaining support for NATO membership was longer and

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more complicated within Spain (see Marks, “The NATO Dilemma in Spanish Foreign Policy”). Marks argues that, in the aftermath of an international process of learning, the Spanish Communist Party, initially opposed to NATO membership, changed its perceptions of national defense interests and came to support its country’s participation in the Atlantic alliance. In the national elections of October 1982, the Spanish Communist Party had won a landslide victory, and had promised a national referendum on the question of membership (in contrast to the center-right Union of the Democratic Center, which had taken Spain into NATO without consulting the public). The referendum was conducted in 1986, and the Communists—by then, supporters of NATO—carefully worded the question to secure broad popular support. The referendum question, which would have given the government significant room to maneuver in the event of a negative result, indicated that 52 percent of Spanish voters were in favor of NATO membership. For analyses of domestic politics related to the Spanish referendum, see also Pollack and Hunter, The Paradox of Spanish Foreign Policy, 112–21. 54. See Smith, NATO Enlargement during the Cold War, 138–39. 55. Ibid., 141. On the accession of Spain to NATO, see also Robles Piquer, “Spain in NATO”; and Heiberg, The Sixteenth Nation. 56. See Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 95–103. Also relevant is Lord Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years:1949–1954. 57. See Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 103. On the evolution of the U.S. position on Germany and American attempts to persuade Europeans to accept German rearmament under the control of international institutions, see, e.g., Kaplan, The United States and NATO, 154–64; Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, 408–16, 453–63; and Powaski, The Entangling Alliance, 6–9. 58. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 106 (citing confidential U.S. documents from that period). 59. On this ambivalent position (Germany was needed, but could not be fully trusted), see Leffler, Preponderance of Power, 409. 60. For an account of those negotiations, see McGeehan, The German ReArmament Question, particularly 49–62. 61. See Osgood, NATO, 55. 62. On this, see especially Smith, NATO Enlargement during the Cold War, 109–11. See also Acheson, Present at the Creation, 490–92; and Kaplan, NATO and the United States, especially 149–53. 63. See Smith, NATO Enlargement, 110–11. 64. See Sowden, The German Question, 158. 65. The negotiations occurred outside of the institutional framework of NATO, which was not regarded as the best venue for reaching a solution to the German problem. This was because the collapse of the EDC did not leave enough time for NATO’s bodies to be properly utilized (and the allies wanted to com-

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plete accession as soon as possible), and because the NATO committees could not handle the end of the occupation, which had to be addressed at that time. Another reason seems to have been the desire to have Germany attend the meeting and the fact that German representatives could not be allowed to sit on NATO committees. But the NATO members who did not participate in the conference were assured that any solution reached there would be submitted to the North Atlantic Council for approval. On this, see DCER, 20:624–42. 66. On this, see Smith, NATO Enlargement during the Cold War, 115–16. 67. See Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 125. Trachtenberg points out that although in theory Germany was to regain the full authority of a sovereign state, in practice the allies retained important legal rights that placed serious limitations on the sovereignty of the German state. For instance, the Western powers retained the right to intervene forcefully in the domestic affairs of Germany in extreme cases in which the democratic system being built in the Federal Republic was threatened. For an in-depth analysis of the domestic semi-sovereignty of West Germany after World War II, see Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in West Germany. 68. See Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, 453; and Richardson, Germany and the Atlantic Alliance, 11–38. 69. See Sowden, The German Question, 164. 70. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 134. 71. In the early 1950s Adenauer favored integration into Western structures over possible unification under condition of neutrality. There is a good deal of controversy among historians of the Cold War period regarding the 1952 Soviet offer to allow the creation of a reunited and neutral German state. At the time, the Western refusal to negotiate on the basis of the Soviet offer was criticized by the German SDP as a “lost opportunity” and defended by the Adenauer government, which regarded the Soviet proposal as merely a tactical maneuver to prevent the ratification of the EDC and later the Paris Treaties. For concise discussions of the historical debate, see Powaski, The Entangling Alliance, 26–27; and Richardson, Germany and the Atlantic Alliance, 27–34. See also Kolko and Kolko, The Limits of Power, 672; and Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, 30. 72. See also Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, 458–59. 73. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 134. 74. NATO, “Final Act of the London Conference (3rd October 1954).” 75. See Milloy, Article 2 and the Non-Military Development of NATO, particularly chap. 3. 76. Lester Pearson is quoted in Statements and Speeches (Canadian Department of External Affairs, Information Division) 51, no. 30 (June 25, 1951). 77. See Milloy, Article 2 and the Non-Military Development of NATO, 120–21. 78. It is not clear whether in the context of the accession of Greece and Turkey

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advocates of the community-building aspect of NATO thought that, in the end, (some of) the Western values and norms might also extend to those states, or whether the alliance should implicitly accept a return to a concentric model of membership, according to which a strong and united Atlantic community would emerge in the “core” states, whereas countries like Greece and Turkey would be formally admitted to NATO because of their geostrategic value but would forever remain outsiders vis-à-vis the Western community of values. In the case of Canada, for instance—as one of the key proponents of Article 2 practices—historical evidence leads to ambivalent conclusions. On the one hand, there are statements regarding the “greater” Atlantic community, which seem to indicate a spatial extension of the community in the future (see Lester Pearson’s remarks in Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Statements and Speeches, no. 51/30 June 25, 1951). On the other hand, in several specific instances, such as debates regarding the involvement of NATO in the regulation of labor migration among NATO states, the Canadian opposition to schemes that would result in a significant influx of Turkish émigrés would seem to support the view that Canadian decision makers at the time still did not accept Turkey as a full member of the Western community. The latter position seems to support the view that Turkey was essentially a “stranger” to the West. 79. Milloy’s analysis tends to portray a highly instrumental attitude of American decision makers on this issue. Other accounts, however, present a more balanced picture, in which the idea of developing the non-military side of NATO was accepted, at least by some U.S. policymakers, as important in itself (see, e.g., Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, especially 25–28). I do not seek to establish which of these accounts is closer to reality. What is especially important for the purposes of this chapter, however, is the emergence of a shared inter-allied understanding, in the early 1950s, that it was important to build up the community dimension of NATO. 80. On the establishment and task of the Committee of Five, as it came to be known, see, e.g., Ismay, NATO’s First Five Years, 201–2. 81. See Milloy, Article 2 and the Non-Military Development of NATO, 2. One of the key reasons for this preference was the British belief that it was desirable to shift their dealings with the U.S. as far away as possible from the OEEC, where they felt inferior to the U.S., and to NATO, where they felt they were equal partners. 82. Ibid., 147–50. 83. Ibid. On the position of other allies, most of whom favored the OEEC over NATO, see also Milward, “NATO, the OEEC, and the Integration of Europe.” 84. For instance, it was decided that future OEEC economic reviews would be done in such a way as to provide the basis for NATO studies—a decision that effectively made the alliance dependent on the OEEC for key information (see

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Milloy, Article 2 and the Non-Military Development of NATO, 150). 85. “Interim Report by the Committee on the North Atlantic Community,” NATO Document C8–D/6, November 26, 1951, NATO Civil Organisation Records, 1949–1952, NATO Archives. 86. In some of those discussions the question of Turkey—and its status as outsider vis-à-vis the Western community—resurfaced. Thus, even some of the ardent advocates of NATO’s involvement in non-alliance activities were reluctant to agree to an immigration plan that would allow large numbers of Turkish émigrés into their countries. A case in point is the Canadian position on this issue, which was, in some instances, very far from the liberal democratic principles that Canada was espousing (see Milloy, Article 2 and the Non-Military Development of NATO, especially 135–36). 87. Milloy, Article 2 and the Non-Military Development of NATO, 138–40. 88. Ibid., 154. 89. Lord Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years, chap. 14, 4. 90. Milloy, Article 2 and the Non-Military Development of NATO. 91. See the section on the foundation of NATO above. As we have seen, the view informing the creation of NATO was one of a “gulf separating us [the West] from the Soviet Union,” which, through propaganda and other forms of support to the pro-Communist forces within Western states, might lead to a “piecemeal collapse of one Western bastion after another,” even in the absence of military confrontation (Ernest Bevin, quoted in Best, Co-operation with Like-Minded Peoples, 152). It was therefore important to deal with the “internal fifth column,” and to ensure that Communist parties did not accede to power. (The idea of “internal fifth column aggression” was stressed by J. Hickerson, director of the Office of European Affairs in the U.S. State Department, in a memorandum he sent to George Marshall in 1948. On this, see Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, 19). 92. The argument that I develop here, though different in empirical focus, is theoretically similar to Bradley Klein’s analysis of the “anti-Western” modes of life that were delegitimized in the process of building the Euro-Atlantic community (see his “How the West Was One”). 93. See Lincoln, Discourse and the Construction of Society, especially chaps. 1 and 8. 94. North Atlantic Council Memorandum, no. C-M(55)69, 1955, NATO Civil Organisation Records, 1952–1965, NATO Archives (emphasis added). This document, which aims at providing political guidance to NATO officials, both civilian and military, and which was diffused to national as well as international staff, restated and built upon ideas presented in document no. C-M-54/51 (1954), which it superseded. 95. This is similar to the processes of collective forgetting and selective remembrance, which emphasizes a “family link” among the parties involved, that are analyzed by Benedict Anderson in his study on nationalism. Anderson

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explains that, in processes of nation formation, whatever conflicts may have taken place in the past are portrayed by state authorities as acrimony among “kinsmen.” The family link ensured that “after a certain period of acrimony had passed, close cultural, political and economic links could be established between former enemies” (see Anderson, Imagined Communities, 191–92). 96. NATO Report, C-M(55)69, 1955, NATO Civil Organisation Records, 1952–1965, NATO Archives. 97. Ibid. 98. Ibid. 99. For an analysis of relations of opposition among subjects that are often set up within particular discourses, see Milliken, “Discourse Study.” 100. For a broad overview of NATO’s information and cultural activities in the early and mid-1950s, see the NATO Letter statements of 1953–54, reprinted in Jordan, The NATO International Staff/Secretariat, 173–97. 101. On these conferences, see British Society for International Understanding, Report of the First International Study Conference on the Atlantic Community; and International Atlantic Committee, NATO and the Peoples. 102. For a brief history of the organization, see Cahen, “The Role of the NonGovernmental Organizations.” 103. For discussions of this, see NATO Letter 5 (May 1957). 104. These ideas were put forward, e.g., in the booklet The Bulwark of the West, produced by the Canadian Atlantic Committee in the mid-1950s and distributed to Canadian schools; and in the manual The Atlantic Community, published by the British Atlantic Committee and distributed to most British secondary-level (“grammar”) schools beginning in 1957. The same ideas appeared in material diffused by the Atlantic Council of the U.S., which used publications, radio programs, posters, and films about NATO to promote the “Atlantic idea” of a community of values and NATO as the expression of that community (see, e.g., the reports on the activities of the American Atlantic Council in the 1956–57 issues of the NATO Letter). 105. See, e.g., Atlantic Treaty Association, “Declaration by the Third Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association.” 106. Ibid. 107. Ibid. 108. For a short account of the North Atlantic Assembly (which in early 2000 acquired the name Parliamentary Assembly), see Lunn, “The Collective Parliamentary Voice of the Alliance,” 143–46. 109. Ibid., 143. 110. Ibid. 111. Regarding the strategic concept of NATO, it should be noted that it was modified several times in accordance with evolving allied perceptions of their

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needs and assets. Nevertheless, throughout the Cold War period there was a significant element of continuity in that NATO strategic concepts remained focused on the problem of confrontation between two clearly defined blocs (see, e.g., Pedlow, NATO Strategic Documents). 112. For different visions of desirable security scenarios that were being articulated at that time and their shared focus on the need to strengthen political and cooperative solutions, rather than military/confrontational ones, see, e.g., Mutimer, “Chaos and Constitution in the European Security Order”; and Peters, New Security Challenges. For the U.S. perspective, see also Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 232. On the pro-CSCE scenario, particularly as seen from the French perspective, see Mitterrand’s biography by Alain Genestar, Les peches du prince. For a view of a CSCE-centered security system articulated on the other side of the former divide, see Gorbachev, Memoirs. 113. On the difference between full respect and negative respect (to be left alone), which liberal individuals and polities ought to extend to everyone by virtue of their potential for living up to their humanity, see Williams, “The Discipline of the Democratic Peace,” 535–36. 114. Ibid., especially 538–39. 115. Flynn and Farrell, “Piecing Together the Democratic Peace.” 116. Ibid. 117. On liberal democratic constitutive norms and principles and the way in which they were embedded in key documents on post–Cold War reconstruction, see, e.g., Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe. 118. James Baker, “A New Europe, A New Atlanticism: Architecture for a New Era,” address to the Berlin Press Club, December 12, 1989, cited in Honig, “NATO: An Institution Under Threat?” 4–5. 119. Mitterrand, cited in Le Monde, July 7, 1990. 120. On this narrative of NATO as an organization whose relevance in the post–Cold War period was ensured by its complex essence, my account draws on Williams and Neumann, “From Alliance to Security Community.” 121. For an analysis that stresses this view of NATO as primarily an institutional expression of the Western community of values and only secondarily an alliance, see also Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community.” 122. Wörner, “The Atlantic Alliance in a New Era,” 5; also cited in Williams and Neumann, “From Alliance to Security Community,” 368. 123. “NATO and the U.S. Commitment to Europe,” address given by President George H. W. Bush at the Oklahoma State University Commencement, Stillwater, Oklahoma, May 4, 1990 (cited in Honig, “NATO: An Institution Under Threat?” 5). This view was also presented by James Baker at a meeting of NATO foreign ministers on May 3, 1990 (see Financial Times, May 4, 1990). 124. Wörner, “Opening Statement to the NATO Summit Meeting.”

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125. Ibid. 126. NATO Secretary General, cited in Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door, 42. 127. Due to space limitations, this chapter does not provide a causal analysis of the emergence of NATO as the key security institution after the end of the Cold War. For the purposes of this chapter, the most important thing is that by the end of 1991 there was a shared understanding among Western political leaders around the idea of NATO as the key security institution of the new era and the fact that NATO was to be involved in the promotion of good domestic institutions in the former Communist states. 128. Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, “Helsinki Summit Declaration.” On this evolution toward the acceptance of a NATO-based architecture, see also Mutimer, “Chaos and Constitution in The European Security Order,” 409–59. 129. NATO, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept” (1991), para. 10. This view of security was restated in the new Strategic Concept published in 1999 (see “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept [approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999]”), which states that a largescale, conventional aggression against the allies is “highly unlikely,” but that “the security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of military and non-military risks which are multi-directional and often difficult to predict. These risks include uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance, which could evolve rapidly. Some countries in and around the Euro-Atlantic area face serious economic, social and political difficulties. Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights and the dissolution of states can lead to local and even regional instability. The resulting tensions could lead to crises affecting Euro-Atlantic stability.” (para. 20). 130. Interview with official from the Office of the Secretary General of NATO, April 28, 2000, Brussels. The idea that NATO had to engage in a lot of improvisation in interaction with the former Communist states was confirmed by an American official from SHAPE (interviewed February 17, 2000, in Mons), by a senior official from the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (interviewed December 10, 1999, Brussels), and by a senior member of the Defense Planning and Operations Division (interviewed December 7, 1999). 131. Lunn, “The Collective Parliamentary Voice of the Alliance,” 145. 132. Ibid. 133. Ibid. (emphasis added). The focus placed by the North Atlantic Assembly (now called NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly) on teaching actors from the former Communist states “appropriate practices” and on building a sense of shared identity between representatives of the West and actors from the former

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“East” was confirmed by senior officials of the Assembly, whom I interviewed on February 9, 2000, in Brussels. For a similar analysis of the role of the Parliamentary Assembly, see Flockhart, “‘Masters and Novices.’” 134. Cahen, “The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations,” 148. 135. The text of the framework document is available on-line at http://www.nato.int/docu/ext-sec/s-pfp.htm. 136. On activities undertaken within the PfP framework, see Simon, “Partnership for Peace: Guaranteeing Success,” Strategic Forum, no. 44, 1995. 137. These goals are not only described in documents and accounts of the PfP (see previous note), but were also stressed by senior officials from the Political Affairs Division, Office of Information and Press, NATO HQ, and the Partnership Coordination Cell, Mons, whom I interviewed between October 1999 and April 2000. 138. For a similar interpretation of the PfP, see Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe, 93. 139. NATO, Study on NATO Enlargement, para. 38–39. 140. Turkey’s status within the organization remains peculiar. NATO’s decision makers seem to share a view that Turkey is still far from being fully committed to the norms of liberal democracy, including in the area of civil-military relations. NATO’s officials appear to regard Turkey as the “stranger” within the community embodied in the organization—a state who would never have been included if it had not been for the geostrategic requirements of the Cold War period. But apart from informal discussions, when officials from member states express discontent with certain domestic policies and (what are reported to be) a few voices arguing that the organization should develop a procedure for disciplining “deviant” members, there does not seem to be a systematic effort to (re)shape the Turkish polity. A full explanation of the Turkish exception within NATO would require significant additional research. But the (limited) interview evidence gathered for this book points to what appears to be a collective view that the organization is not very well equipped to deal with Turkey. The implicit logic appears to be that, in contrast to the more fluid, more open-to-learning, post-Communist states, Turkish society is still, in many respects, set in the “old” (non-Western, non-democratic) ways. To address the problem of civil-military relations would require profound transformations at the level of mentalities, institutional structures, and legal framework. It would involve a change of magnitude and scope that NATO alone cannot produce—particularly when Turkey’s willingness to “learn” is perceived as, at best, limited, and when the organization does not have significant “sticks” to wield against its own members. This line of argument also contains an important pragmatic element: as a candidate for EU membership, Turkey is required to implement thousands of legislative statutes, and to significantly alter its practices in the areas of democracy and human rights. NATO’s “strategic” calculation appears to be that the process of EU

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accession holds, arguably, the best chance for Turkey’s normative transformation. 141. This assessment came from many of the top officials that I interviewed, from among the NATO international staff, the Political Affairs Division, and the Office of the Secretary General (interviews on October 12, 1999; November 29, 1999; April 28, 2000, respectively), and from members of the American, British, Canadian, German, and Norwegian delegations to NATO (interviews on October 12, 1999—Canada; November 23, 1999—U.S.; November 23, 1999— U.K.; and November 26, 1999—Germany and Norway). 142. See previous note. Also relevant was an interview with a senior EAPC official, December 10, 1999, at NATO HQ, Brussels; and an official from the Force Planning Section, Defense Planning and Operations Division, February 2, 2000, Brussels. 143. This is the case at least with reference to the two countries studied in this book: the Czech Republic and Romania. The EU carried out a systematic analysis of developments in the economic, environmental, and human rights areas, and required candidates to carry out a series of changes (more extensive in the case of Romania than that of the Czech Republic). The EU provided expertise, guided and monitored reforms in those areas over the past few years. However, in the case of the Czech Republic, already a member of NATO, there was no effort to systematically assess the level of democratic control of the military, apparently on the assumption that NATO had already taken care of that. In the case of Romania, the EU has paid attention to the reform of the Ministry of Interior, but even there, most of the proposals for reform—and changes that have already been enacted—occurred under the guidance of NATO. 144. Schimmelfennig, “NATO Enlargement to the East,” EAPC-NATO Fellowship Report, 1998–2000, 23–24 (Brussels: NATO Library, 2000); see also Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe. 145. Interviews with senior officials, Political Affairs Division, and members of the Canadian delegation to NATO, October 12, 1999–November 26, 1999, Brussels. 146. Ibid. 147. Ibid. 148. For rich empirical analyses of inter-allied consultation and decision making regarding enlargement, see Goldgeier, Not Whether But When. 149. See also Schimmelfennig, “NATO Enlargement.” 150. Solana, “Preparing for the Madrid Summit,” 3. 151. See NATO, Study on NATO Enlargement; and NATO, “Membership Action Plan,” 73–80. 152. President Clinton cited by Schimmelfennig, “NATO Enlargement,” 225. 153. Author’s interviews with the international staff and members of the American, British, Canadian, German, and Norwegian delegations to NATO. 154. For an analysis of NATO’s evaluation of liberal democratic reforms in

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candidate states, see Schimmelfennig, “NATO Enlargement to the East, 11–15; and Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe, especially chap. 5. 155. Interviews with senior officials from the Defense Planning and Operations Division, NATO HQ, December 7, 1999, and February 28, 2000, Brussels. 156. On this, see also Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door, 216. 157. Simon, “Slovakia and NATO,” 1. 158. Interview with American defense expert who participated in numerous NATO/PfP workshops, seminars, and other activities targeting Central and East Europeans (October 30, 2000, Washington, D.C.). 159. For an analysis of similar developments in the EU’s interaction with Central/East Europeans, see Ulrich Sedelmeier, “The Path to Eastern Enlargement.” Sedelmeier argues that through the centrality of the notion of responsibility in the EU policy discourse, West European policymakers constructed a specific role for the EU vis-à-vis Central and Eastern Europe, which worked to delegitimize their opposition to enlargement. Thus, although formal EU documents did not specifically acknowledge enlargement as an objective of the Union, its leaders have nevertheless found it increasingly difficult to refuse it. 160. Solana, “Preparing for the Madrid Summit,” 3. 161. For an interesting argument about rhetorical entrapment in that context, see Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe, especially chap. 10; and Fierke, “Dialogues of Manoeuvre and Entanglement.” 162. For a discussion of these objections, see Fierke, “Dialogues of Manoeuvre and Entanglement”; and Schimmelfennig, “NATO Enlargement,” 230. 163. This concern came to light in the course of interviews with NATO officials (October 12, 1999, and April 25, 2000, Brussels). It also came to light during a Bundeswehr conference that took place on January 25–27, 2000, in Berlin, when two German generals involved in the process of reform of civil-military relations in the Baltic republics angrily accused NATO members of trying to nurture an obviously weak and corrupt, but nevertheless regarded as democratic, Yeltsin regime at the expense of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. On the concern of the allies to maintain good relations with Russia and to avoid taking actions that might indirectly strengthen Russian nationalists and communists, see also Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door. 164. At the Madrid Summit of 1997 the allies could not reach agreement beyond the three Visegrad states. The United States, Norway, Iceland, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Spain supported only a limited enlargement; Britain supported early entry also for Slovenia (but preferred limited enlargement to the accession of Romania in addition to Slovenia). Germany, France, Italy, Turkey, Greece, Portugal, Belgium, and Luxembourg supported the applications of both Slovenia and Romania in addition to the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary.

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On the positions adopted by the different allies, see, e.g., Mattox, “NATO Enlargement and the United States”; Letourneau and Hebert, “NATO Enlargement”; Donneur and Bourgeois, “Canada and the Enlargement of NATO”; Sharp, “British Views on NATO Enlargement”; and Boniface, “The NATO Debate in France.” For a very rich empirical analysis of the decision-making process in the United States, see Goldgeier, Not Whether But When; and Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door. 165. On this, see Schimmelfennig, “NATO Enlargement to the East.” 166. This issue came up in the author’s interviews with senior NATO officials in the Political Affairs Division and the Office of the Secretary General (October 12, 1999–November 26, 1999); and with members of the team representing Romania in the individual accession dialogues with NATO (interviewed February 17, 2000, and April 21, 2000, in Brussels). 167. On the allies’ objections to the inclusion of Romania and Slovenia in the first wave of enlargement, see Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door, (e.g., p. 217).

chapter 3 1. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 127–29. For an interesting analysis of Waltz’s conception of socialization, see Harrison, The Post–Cold War International System. 2. See Martin and Simmons, “Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions.” 3. Bull, The Anarchical Society. 4. On this, see also Alderson, “Making Sense of State Socialization.” 5. See, e.g., Finnemore, National Interests in International Society; Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”; Adler, “Seeds of Peaceful Change”; Checkel, “Why Comply?”; and Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights. 6. For an analysis of the strengths of this book, see Checkel, Review of The Power of Human Rights. 7. Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe.” 8. Important recent contributions include Checkel, “Why Comply?”; Caporaso, Checkel, and Jupille, “Integrating Institutions”; and Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments.” 9. For a recent example, see Reiter, “Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy.” 10. See Reiter, “The Author Replies.” 11. Ibid., 230. In response to Reiter’s argument, Waterman and Zagorcheva pointed out that NATO’s involvement in the projection of liberal democratic norms into Central and Eastern European countries as part of the process of NATO enlargement did matter, that the organization could and did affect domes-

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tic arrangements in the area of civil-military relations. According to Waterman, “Institutions co-opt, and the co-opted may change how they think and behave” (224). In a similar vein, Dessie Zagorcheva argued that in post-Communist countries the problems of civil-military relations revolve around the issue of providing effective public administration and direction to the armed forces. Consequently, she pointed out, the programs established by NATO after the Cold War are good instruments for providing the know-how that these countries need to strengthen the democratic, civilian control of their militaries (227–30). Waterman and Zagorcheva are right that NATO has been involved in an effort to teach Central and Eastern Europeans “how things are done if you are Western,” but they do not—indeed, given the limited space of the Correspondence Section of the journal, cannot—tell us very much about the actual dynamics of the socialization process conducted by NATO nor about the conditions that facilitated or prevented its success. 12. See, e.g., Schimmelfennig, “International Socialization in the New Europe.” 13. Schimmelfennig, “International Socialization in Central and Eastern Europe,” 12. See, also, his The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe. 14. The assumption of egoism is explicitly put forward in the pieces that focus on mechanisms of socialization (Schimmelfennig, “International Socialization in the New Europe,”116–17). Since my discussion in this section focuses on Schimmelfennig’s mechanisms of socialization, I accept that assumption. However, it is worth pointing out that, in his account of the collective decisionmaking process related to NATO enlargement, he seems to relax that assumption. He argues that strategic actors may pursue idealistic goals; they may identify with the values of a given community and pursue its ideas (see The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe, 198). But this, it seems to me, sits uncomfortably with the previous claim, in the same work, that the strategic action perspective assumes “weak socialization,” according to which actors’ goals are not shaped by collective culture and rules. Yet the notion of identification with the values and ideas of a community, and the possible inclusion of alter in definitions of self implies a reconfiguration of self-identity—as the self ceases to be self-contained (or autonomous) and becomes extended into a particular social environment. 15. Schimmelfennig, “International Socialization in Central and Eastern Europe,” 7. 16. Ibid., 5–6. 17. Sˇedivy, “Czech-NATO Relations.” 18. Author’s interviews with senior officials from NATO’s Political Affairs Division (October 12, 1999, and April 28, 2000, Brussels). 19. See Sarvasˇ, “One Past, Two Futures?” 7–10. 20. The centrist political actors, as well as the political analysts that I inter-

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viewed in the Czech Republic, argued that it was absurd to think that NATO membership would undermine the economic development of the Czech Republic, or that it might irrationally drag the country into regional conflicts. From their perspective, an alliance of liberal democracies simply would not, and could not, do such things (interviews with Czech MPs and fellows of the Civic Institute, April 2000, Prague). 21. In interviews with the author, members of the Romanian delegation to NATO, as well as senior foreign affairs and defense officials in Bucharest, repeatedly expressed their confidence that, as an institution of the Western community NATO would respect liberal democratic values—that it would not become involved in aggressive conflicts and that it would not try to exploit their country or other Central/Eastern European countries (e.g., by asking new members to spend unreasonable amounts of money on expensive military equipment). 22. On this, see, e.g., Dean, Governmentality. 23. See Bourdieu, particularly his Outline of a Theory of Practice. 24. Stefano Guzzini, on Bourdieu, in “A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations,” 166. 25. On this, see also Jenkins, Pierre Bourdieu. 26. On the role of domestic others in national definitions of identity and interest, see also Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics. 27. See Simon, NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republics, 90. 28. See Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, especially 164. For other applications of Bourdieu to international relations, see Guzzini, “A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations,” 162–69; and Williams, “The Institutions of Security.” Bourdieu also employs the concept of habitus to refer to the cultivation of particular schemas for understanding reality. However, in the context of my discussion here, the concept may be confusing because it may appear similar to behavioral habit, which is different from teaching/learning. 29. See Bourdieu and Passeron, Reproduction in Education, Society, and Culture, especially 31–39. 30. Martha Finnemore was one of the first International Relations scholars to examine the role of teaching in international relations; see her National Interests in International Society. 31. In examining persuasion, I relied primarily on insights developed in Cialdini, Influence; Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren, “A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct”; Searing, “The Psychology of Political Authority”; Zanna, Advances in Experimental Social Psychology; and Terry and Hogg, Attitudes, Behavior, and Social Context. 32. See Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” 496. 33. See, e.g., Cialdini, Influence; Zanna, Olson, and Herman, Social

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Influence; and Zimbardo and Leippe, The Psychology of Attitude Change and Social Influence. See also, for examples of political scientists’ accounts, Checkel, “Why Comply?”; Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments; Mutz, Sniderman, and Brody, Political Persuasion and Attitude Change; and Risse, “Let’s Argue!” 34. See Checkel, “Why Comply?”; and Risse, “Let’s Argue!” 35. On this, see Risse, “Let’s Argue!” especially 15. 36. See Checkel, “Why Comply?” and his contribution, with Andrew Moravcsik, to the Forum Debate, “A Constructivist Research Program in EU Studies?” See also Lynch, State Interests and Public Spheres, especially chap. 1. 37. On this, see also Müller, “Arguing, Bargaining, and All That.” 38. On these features of persuasion, see Risse, “Let’s Argue!”; and Checkel, “Why Comply?” 39. On the various techniques of persuasion, see, in particular, Cialdini, Influence. 40. See, e.g., Zimbardo and Leippe, “Influencing Attitudes through Behavior.” 41. See Lauer and Handel, Social Psychoogy, 64. 42. Thompson, Introduction to Language and Symbolic Power, 13. 43. See, e.g., Zimbardo and Leippe, The Psychology of Attitude Change, chap. 3. Also relevant is Bem, “Self-Perception Theory.” See also Zanna et al., Consistency in Social Behavior. 44. Zimbardo and Leippe, “Influencing Attitudes through Behavior.” 45. Ibid. 46. Manfred Wörner, the late NATO Secretary General, explained the role of the PfP in “Partnership with NATO—The Political Dimension.” 47. See Les Aspin, “New Europe, New NATO.” This was confirmed in interviews with senior NATO officials in the Political Affairs Division and in the Office of the Secretary General (interviews conducted October 1999–April 2000). On this, see also Howard and Nemo, “Norms of Denationalized Security in the New NATO.” 48. This is different from rationalist conceptualizations of norm compliance following international socialization. Rationalists tend to associate successful socialization with a conscious change in the behavior of socializees (motivated by the desire to avoid sanctions and obtain material or social rewards) without a redefinition of identity and interests, and, more broadly, with no necessary acceptance of compliance with the new norms as the right thing to do. See, in particular, Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe. For a comparison of rationalist and constructivist conceptions of international socialization and its impact, see Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe.” 49. On this, see Cortell and Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms.”

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50. Alderson, “Making Sense of State Socialization.” 51. Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” 499. 52. Ibid. 53. I owe this point to Michael C. Williams. 54. See Checkel and Moravcsik, “A Constructivist Research Program in EU Studies?” especially 219–37. 55. On identity in social communications, see, especially, Checkel, “Why Comply?”; and Checkel and Moravcsik, “A Constructivist Research Program in EU Studies?” 56. See, e.g., Bourdieu and Passeron, Reproduction in Education, especially 31–39. 57. On this, see the discussion in Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” 498. 58. See Risse, “Let’s Argue!” especially 10–11, 14–16. 59. On arguing versus dictating, see, in particular, Jeffrey Checkel’s contribution to the Checkel and Moravcsik debate, “A Constructivist Research Program.” 60. See, e.g., Zimbardo and Leippe, The Psychology of Attitude Change, 100.

chapter 4 1. Data cited in Sˇedivy, “Czech-NATO Relations—A Dynamic Process.” 2. Vaclav Havel quoted in Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door, 24 (NIS stands for Newly Independent States). 3. On this, see also Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe, 94. 4. Reassurances apparently came from senior members of NATO’s international staff, including then Secretary General Solana, as well as top allied decision makers, particularly from Germany and the United States (author’s interviews with senior NATO officials in the Office of the Secretary General and the Political Affairs Division, October 12, 1999, and April 28, 2000, Brussels). See also the CTK (Czech News Agency) Press Release of October 10, 1997. 5. Interview with senior NATO official, international staff, October 12, 1999, Brussels. 6. See Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door, 148. 7. The ODA and ODS are factions that emerged from the split of the Czechoslovak Civic Forum, which had been the major political force after the fall of Communism in 1989. In 1992, when the Forum collapsed, a few of the former ministers joined the Social Democrats (CSSD). For clear and concise analyses of the evolution of political life in the Czech Republic, see Stroehlein et al., “The Czech Republic”; and Fawn, The Czech Republic, chaps. 1 and 2.

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8. Most of these tensions revolved around clashing personalities (with many ODA, KDU, and even dissident ODS members accusing Vaclav Klaus of arrogance and authoritarian leadership). When substantive issues were involved, they concerned primarily the economic policies of the Klaus government, which were regarded by critics as unacceptable “laissez-faire” capitalism. 9. President Havel is reported to have repeatedly argued in conversations with Western leaders that “Prague is West of Vienna.” The idea of a “natural return” of liberal democracy to the Western community was widely shared by the various center-right formations (author’s interviews with two senior members of the Czech delegation to NATO, April 11, 2000, Brussels; and with a senior fellow of the Civic Institute, Prague, and a former MP, April 18–19, 2000, Prague). 10. This was pointed out by two former MPs and a member of the Czech delegation to NATO in interviews with the author (see previous note). 11. Payne quoted in Simon, NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republics, 56. 12. Deputy Defense Minister Jaromir Novotny quoted in Simon, NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republics, 55. 13. A few voices (particularly those associated with the ODA and its leader, Michael Zantovsky, the head of the Czech Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Security) disagreed with this view, but they were in the minority. 14. The first defense minister of the Czech Republic was Antonin Baudys, a university professor with no military expertise. 15. See Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries, 85–86. 16. However, decisions taken by the president in his capacity as supreme commander of the armed forces require the approval of the prime minister. On the civil-military implications of the 1993 Constitution, see Hoskova, “Civilian Control of the Military and Security Structures of the Czech Republic.” 17. Interview with a senior NATO official, international staff, and confirmed by an EAPC official, October 12, 1999 and November 26, 1999, Brussels. 18. Interviews with two NATO officials involved in teaching PfP courses and seminars targeting Central and Eastern Europeans, November 16, 1999, Vienna, and November 26, 1999, Brussels. 19. Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, White Paper on Defense of the Czech Republic, 56. 20. Interview with a senior NATO official from the international staff, April 28, 2000, Brussels. On this, see also Vlachova and Sarvasˇ, “Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in the Czech Republic,” 44–63. 21. On this, see also Simon, NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republics, chaps. 5–8. 22. Interview with NATO officials (international staff from the Office of the Secretary General, October 12, 1999, and the Defense Planning Division, February 2, 2000, Brussels).

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23. Interviews with NATO officials (international staff from the Political Affairs Division and the Office of the Secretary General), and with a member of the Canadian delegation to NATO (October 12, 1999, Brussels; November 16, 1999, Vienna; and April 28, 2000, Brussels). 24. Chris Donnelly quoted in Dragsdahl, “NATO Resists Pressures to Militarise Central Europe.” 25. See the script of the March 11, 1999, Radio Praha program, “NATO Membership: Will There Be a Language Barrier?” Radio http://archiv.radio.cz/ nato/english5.html. 26. Interview with senior NATO official, Brussels, April 24, 2000. 27. Interview with senior official, NATO international staff, April 28, 2000, Brussels. 28. On this, see Dragsdahl, “NATO Resists Pressures to Militarise Central Europe.” This was confirmed in my interviews with NATO officials and members of the Czech delegation to NATO, October–November 1999. 29. See Chris Donnelly, special advisor to the NATO Secretary General, quoted in Dragsdahl, “NATO Resists Pressures to Militarise Central Europe,” 1. 30. Ibid. This was also confirmed by Czech officials who participated in the individual accession dialogues (interviews, April 14, 2000, Prague). 31. Dragsdahl, “NATO Resists Pressures to Militarise Central Europe,” 1. 32. Confirmed in the author’s interviews with members of the American, British, Canadian, and Norwegian delegations to NATO, as well as senior officials from the international staff, NATO (October 1999–May 2000). 33. Interview, February 22, 2000, Brussels. 34. Interview with NATO official, Political Affairs Division, October 12, 1999, Brussels. 35. On the importance of interpreting and classifying reality as applied to the study of international politics, see, e.g., Barnett and Finnemore, “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations”; Guillaume, “Foreign Policy and the Politics of Alterity”; and Williams, “The Institutions of Security.” 36. Bourdieu and Passeron, Reproduction in Education, Society, and Culture, 10. 37. This idea of diversity within a fundamental Western unity was expressed by all the NATO officials that I interviewed in Brussels and Prague. 38. Interviews with NATO officials, Political Affairs Division and Office of the Secretary General, October 12, 1999. 39. On this, see Williams and Neumann, “From Alliance to Security Community.” 40. Interview, October 12, 1999. 41. Interviews with members of the Czech delegation to NATO, April 11, 2000, Brussels. 42. According to my interviewees, including both NATO representatives and former members of the Czech delegations that participated in interactions with

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the organization between 1996 and late 1997, this issue was stressed in the context of informal meetings with Czech decision makers at the NATO HQ, both prior to and after the July 1997 NATO summit, as well as in the institutionalized collective briefings and accession dialogues between 1996 and late 1997 (interviews conducted on March 9–10, 2000, Brussels [NATO representatives]; April 11, 2000, Brussels [current members of the Czech delegation to NATO]; and April 13 and 14, 2000, Prague [members of the Czech delegation during the initial rounds of collective briefings and accession dialogues]). 43. Interview with a NATO official involved in Czech accession dialogues, April 28, 2000, Brussels; confirmed by a member of the American delegation to NATO, November 23, 1999, Brussels. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid. 46. Interviews with members of the Czech delegation to NATO, April 11, 2000, Brussels. 47. The socialization carried out by NATO in this context seems to be similar to the socialization of newcomers to the rules of decision making in EU bodies, as analyzed by Lewis, “Diplomacy in Europe’s Polity.” 48. For information about the dynamics of interaction in and around the Atlantic Council that were taught to the Czech delegation, I relied, in particular, on interviews with members of the Czech delegation to NATO, April 11, 2000, Brussels; and with a NATO official from the Defense Partnership and Cooperation Directorate, February 22, 2000, Brussels. 49. See the statement concerning the mission of the Rose-Roth program, which was initiated in 1990 by then President of the Assembly, Congressman Charlie Rose, and Senator Bill Roth (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “RoseRoth Mission Statement”). 50. See Flockhart, “Socialisation in NATO’s P.A.”; and Flockhart, “‘Masters and Novices.’” 51. Flockhart, “‘Masters and Novices.’” 52. Ibid. 53. This view, concerning the education not only of Czechs but also of “nextgeneration elites” from all Central and Eastern European countries, was expressed by all of the NATO officials that I interviewed in Brussels and Prague, as well as Bucharest. 54. See NATO, “Partnership Work Programme for 1997–1999.” 55. See Vlachova and Sarvasˇ, “Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in the Czech Republic,” 56. 56. Interviews with German, British, and American NATO officers who were involved in PfP seminars, workshops, and other educational activities, November 1999, Vienna, and February 2000, Brussels and Mons. 57. In my field work, I reconstituted the teleological narrative that I had dis-

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covered through participant-observation in a PfP course held in Vienna, in November 1999, and further developed on the basis of information gathered from NATO/PfP teachers (interviews, November 16–19, 1999, Vienna). I then presented this narrative to Czech students in PfP activities (interviews, November 17, 1999, Vienna, and April 20–21, 2000, Prague) and alumni of the Marshall Center (interviews, April 24, Prague). They all confirmed that this was the “story,” the interpretation of reality that had been presented to them in the course of the various educational activities carried out by NATO. 58. Interviews with Czech, Romanian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian graduates of PfP courses, February 2000, Brussels and Mons. 59. These analogies and the historical narrative presented in this paragraph were noticed by the author in the course of observation of PfP seminars and workshops conducted in Vienna, November 1999, and Bucharest, April 2000. They were confirmed by Czech and Romanian participants in other PfP courses carried out between 1998 and 2000. 60. Interviews with a Czech foreign affairs official, and with members of the Czech delegation to NATO, March–April, 1999. 61. Interviews with officials from the NATO Office of the Press and Information (November 29, 1999, Brussels), and with Czech foreign affairs officials (April 20, 1999, Prague). Interestingly, as happened in other situations both in the Czech Republic and Romania, there was coordination among NATO and domestic reformers, and even unofficial requests from certain reformers, in applying pressure on conservative political actors that NATO intervene to constrain those politicians who were blocking change or convince them to abandon their opposition. 62. Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” 499. 63. This explanation was provided by a Czech political analyst and a former Czech minister, April 18–20, 2000, Prague. 64. Ibid. 65. Especially revealing were the interviews with two members of the Czech delegation to NATO (April 11, 2000, Brussels), and with an American defense expert involved in numerous PfP seminars as well as private consultations with Czech officials prior to the country’s accession to NATO (October 30, 2000, Washington). 66. See Czech Ministry of Defense, “National Military Strategy of the Czech Republic”; and Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “White Paper on Defense of the Czech Republic.” 67. Several NATO representatives, both from the international staff and from the British, German, and Canadian delegations who were involved in individual accession dialogues and informal consultations in Brussels and Prague, talked about the organization’s efforts to convince Czech decision makers to reformu-

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late the national strategic concept (interviews, October 12, 1999, Brussels; April 28, 2000, Brussels; and October 30, 2000, Washington). 68. The 1995 White Paper is analyzed in Sˇedivy, “The Security of the Czech Republic,” 2. 69. Several NATO representatives talked about the importance of abandoning the old strategic concept if Czechs were to avoid serious inconsistencies between the principles they claimed to embrace and their actual behavior (see note 63 above). 70. In fact, official statements issued by NATO after July 1997 indicated that the process of preparing the Czech Republic for membership was not encountering any serious obstacles (see, e.g., the statement released by the CTK [Czech News Agency] on October 10, 1997). On this, see also Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door, 147. For their part, already in early 1997, on the basis of reassurances from the West, all key Czech decision makers were convinced that their country would be “chosen” as a new member of the organization at the Madrid Summit. On this, see Tesar, Security Diplomacy, Policy-Making, and Planning in Post–Cold War Prague, 49. 71. For a brief analysis of the legislative problems in the area of defense that the Czech Republic was facing in 1997, see Sarvasˇ, “The Shift from the Transitional to the Democratic Agenda.” 72. Interview with a senior NATO official, international staff, who was closely involved in debates and decision-making processes regarding the Central and Eastern European states, April 28, 2000, Brussels. 73. Interview with a member of the Czech delegation to NATO, April 11, 2000, Brussels; and with a Czech MoD official, April 24, 2000, Prague. 74. Interview with NATO official, international staff, April 28, 2000, Brussels. 75. Interview with a member of the Czech delegation to NATO, April 11, 2000, Brussels; and with a Czech MoD official, April 24, 2000, Prague. 76. Interviews with NATO/PfP teachers, November 16–November 18, 1999, Vienna. 77. The data are taken from Sarvas, “One Past, Two Futures?” 18. 78. Ibid. 79. Ibid., 7–8. 80. Ibid., 9. 81. Ibid., 8. 82. Ibid. 83. General (Ret.) Oskar Marek, as quoted in Halo Noviny (Prague), January 28, 1998, and cited in Sarvasˇ, “One Past, Two Futures?” 8. 84. The proposal for a Scandinavian status for the Czech Republic was outlined in the Social Democrats’ election program, The Alternative for Our Country, which was adopted on March 15, 1997.

288

Notes

85. The 1993 Constitution stipulates that issues that affect Czech sovereignty have to be submitted to a referendum. 86. See, e.g., Alexander Vondra, Czech Ambassador to the United States, in Tesar, “Security Diplomacy, Policy-Making, and Planning in Post–Cold War Prague,” 15. 87. Interviews with a Czech official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and with former liberal ministers, April 12–20, 2000, Prague. 88. On March 13, 1997, during a visit in Prague, NATO Secretary General Solana argued that a referendum that would result in public rejection of NATO could send a negative message to the West, as it might be read as an indication that Czechs were not sufficiently committed to the protection of the liberal democratic values embodied in NATO (CTK Press Release, March 13, 1997). 89. Interviews with a member of the Czech delegation to NATO, and with a senior NATO official, April 28, 2000, Brussels. 90. Interviews with a member of the Czech delegation to NATO, and with members of the German and Canadian delegations to NATO, October 12–November 26, 1999, Brussels. 91. Ibid. 92. Interview with an official from NATO’s Press and Information Office, November 29, 1999, Brussels, and with a public relations officer from the Czech Ministry of Defense, April 20, 2000, Prague. 93. See Sarvasˇ, “One Past, Two Futures?” 11–12. I also relied on a report from the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, formulated in consultation with other ministries, “Update on Progress in Domestic Preparations for NATO Membership.” 94. Interview with an official from the Ministry of Defense, April 20, 2000, Prague. 95. See Culik, “Ten Years after Communism”; and Sarvasˇ, “One Past, Two Futures?” 30–33. 96. Obereigner, “Czech Republic.” 97. On the exclusion of negative points of view from the media campaign organized in 1997–early 1998, see Zajacova, “The Czech Media Demythified.” 98. Interview with a Czech official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 20, 2000, Prague. 99. For a discussion of the role of NGOs in supporting the public relations campaign in favor of NATO, see Balaban, “The Position and Task of NonGovernmental Organizations.” 100. See Obereigner, “Czech Republic”; see also Thomas Pecina (“Arranged Marriage with Aborted Honeymoon?”) on the presentation of NATO membership as a “winning lottery ticket” in the Czech media. 101. Zajacova, “Czech Media Demythified.” 102. See Stroehlein, “Promising Paradise.”

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103. Havel quoted in Naegele, “NATO: Havel Backs Continued RFE/RL Broadcasts from Prague.” 104. Zajacova, “Czech Media Demythified.” 105. There was a revealing correspondence between this claim and the tendency of Czech liberal governments to limit their association with their Slavic neighbors, and to argue, in dialogues with Western leaders, that their country was far more “Western” than those countries to the east of its borders. For an analysis of this, see Tesar, Security Diplomacy, Policy-Making, and Planning in Post–Cold War Prague, especially 35–43. 106. Zajacova, “Czech Media Demythified,” 4–5. 107. On the representation of NATO in the course of the public relations campaign, see, e.g., Stroehlein, “Promising Paradise.” Stroehlein, a critic of the lack of actual debate about NATO enlargement, complained that the image presented in the media suggested that entry into NATO was the equivalent of paradise. NATO, it appears, “cleans your cat’s litter box, waxes your car and makes a delicious cup of coffee every time.” 108. Information about this aspect of the public relations campaign came from interviews with a Czech political scientist and an official from the media office of the Czech Ministry of Defense, April 17–20, 2000, Prague. 109. Particularly relevant were the interviews with NATO/PfP teachers (November 17, 1999, Vienna) and with an MoD official (April 20, 2000, Prague). 110. Interview with Ministry of Defense official, April 20, 2000, Prague. 111. Interviews with two Czech graduates of PfP courses, February 17, 2000, Brussels. 112. These were some of the issues stressed by Western teachers, and Czech as well as Hungarian, Lithuanian, and Romanian participants in those activities (interviews conducted between November 16, 1999, and August 16, 2000, in Brussels, Vienna, and Geneva). 113. This expectation was explicitly invoked by several NATO/PfP teachers (interviews, February 14–17, 2000, Brussels and Mons). 114. Kennedy, “Educating Leaders for the 21st Century,” 31. 115. Interview with senior official from SHAPE who was involved in coordinating the integration of partner contingents into allied forces in NATO’s missions in the Balkans, February 21, 2000, Mons. 116. On this, see, in particular, Martin and Simmons, “Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions.” 117. This implicit division of labor between the EU and NATO was pointed out both by a senior member of NATO’s international staff (interview, October 12, 1999, Brussels) and by a foreign affairs official from Prague (interview, April 19, 2000, Prague). 118. Interview with Czech MoD officials, April 20–24, 2000, Prague.

290

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119. For details on the principles of reform of the armed forces, see the Czech Defense Ministry’s website, http://www.army.cz/reforma/english/docs/ reforma.htm (accessed June 15, 2003). The workshops, seminars, and briefing tours on defense issues in the context of Czech integration into NATO are often organized by the Public Relations Department of the Czech Ministry of Defense in cooperation with the Public Information Office of SHAPE, or by Czech NGOs working in cooperation with various branches of NATO or the Atlantic Treaty Association. For more information on these activities, see Hybner, “The Significance of the Washington Summit for Strengthening the Membership of the Czech Republic in NATO,” 35–40, and visit the Czech MoD website, http://www.army.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=823. 120. Interviews with foreign affairs officials, April 12–19, 2000, Prague; with officials from the Ministry of Defense, April 20, 2000, Prague; and with a Czech political analyst, April 14, 2000, Prague. 121. On this, see Sˇedivy, Security in Central and Eastern Europe. 122. Gabal, Helsusova, and Szayna, “The Impact of NATO Membership in the Czech Republic: Changing Czech Views of Security, Military and Defence.” 123. See Vlachova, “Legal Framework of Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in the Czech Republic.” 124. Ibid., 14. 125. Hoskova, “Civilian Control of Military and Security Structures in the Czech Republic,” 8. 126. This was confirmed by a Czech political analyst and two former Czech MPs (interviews, April 13–17, 2000, Prague). 127. See Balaban, “The Position and Task of Non-Governmental Organ-izations,” 24. 128. See “Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic: Objectives and Principles,” http://www.army.cz/reforma/english/docs/reforma.htm (accessed January 23, 2003). 129. These problems were highlighted by a senior NATO official from the international staff in an interview with the author, April 28, 2000, Brussels. For instance, one problem involved the failure to effectively reform the Ministry of Interior and to deal with the problem of corruption within the police force. For a long time, the prevailing assumption among NATO officials involved in accession dialogues and various other interactions with Czech decision makers had been that those were areas that had already been successfully reformed and would no longer pose problems. Yet, as a series of problems occurred in the late 1990s involving the Ministry of Interior and the police, NATO came to the conclusion, contrary to their initial assumption, that reform of those institutions was not complete. In addition, there was the problem of budgetary constraints: the Czechs were unable to implement several force goals to which they had committed themselves prior to accession. In part, this was caused by unanticipated financial diffi-

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culties, but in part the problem also consisted in the fact that the Czech Social Democratic government tended to prioritize other issues at the expense of defense. On this, see also Simon, NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republics, pt. 2. 130. Interview with an official from the Office of the Media, Ministry of Defense, April 20, 2000, Prague. 131. This view was stressed by several NATO officials and international staff, including members from the Political Affairs Division (interviews, October 12, 1999, and April 28, 2000, Brussels). 132. The data are taken from Sarvasˇ, “One Past, Two Futures?” 18. 133. Interviews with Western advisers who worked with those Czechs within the framework of NATO/PfP activities, November 16–18, 1999, Vienna; and an interview with an American adviser who was closely involved in guiding the evolution of reforms in the Czech Defense Ministry, October 30, 2000, Washington. 134. Ibid. 135. Interview with member of the Czech Senate Committee for Defense and Security, April 19, 2000, Prague. This was confirmed by a Czech political analyst whose research covers the practices of parliament in the area of foreign affairs and defense (interview, April 18, 2000, Prague). For a broader analysis of the impact of socialization practices enacted by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly on MPs and parliamentary staff from Central and Eastern Europe, see Flockhart, “‘Masters and Novices.’” 136. This is similar to the condition of uncertainty that, according to Thomas Risse, is likely to lead to interactions governed by the logic of argumentative rationality (Risse, “Let’s Argue!”). 137. I presented this hypothesis to two Czech political analysts and they agreed with my interpretation of the influence that different conceptions of national identity—and the position of political groups vis-à-vis that identity— had on their openness to learning (interviews, April 14 and April 18, 2000, Prague). 138. It is also important to note that these are not isolated elements of the Czech political arena. In fact, opinion polls taken in the spring and summer of 2000 revealed that Communists were the second most popular political force, after the ODS. 139. President Havel quoted in Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries, 79. As noted above, this interpretation of NATO represented a shared understanding among Czech reformers. 140. Interviews with British, German, and American officers acting as teachers within the framework of NATO/PfP courses, November 16–18, 1999, Vienna, and October 30, 2000, Washington; and with Czech students of PfP courses, November 17, 1999, Vienna, and April 24, 2000, Brussels. 141. Interview with a Czech political analyst, April 14, 2000, Prague; and with an official from the Ministry of Defense, April 21, 2000, Prague.

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Notes

142. Confirmed by NATO advisers who participated in accession dialogues and consultations at the Ministries of Defense in Prague and Bucharest (interviews, April 5, 2000, Bucharest). 143. This difference was pointed out by NATO/PfP officials who interacted with the same set of Czech actors over the years (interviews, November 16, 1999, Vienna; February 17, 2000, Brussels; and October 30, 2000, Washington). It was confirmed by Czech graduates of PfP courses (interviews, April 24, 2000, Brussels). 144. Ibid. 145. Interviews with members of the Czech delegation to NATO, April 11, 2000, Brussels; and the Czech MoD, April 20, 2000, Prague. 146. Czech defense officials noticed changes in the attitudes and positions taken by such socializees in the aftermath of repeated role-playing (interviews, April 21 and 24, 2000, Prague); and NATO teachers insisted that there were many cases in which this happened (interviews, November 18, 1999, Vienna; and August 16, 2000, Geneva). 147. On this, see Bem, “Self-Perception Theory”; and Zimbardo and Leippe, The Psychology of Attitude Change and Social Influence, 115–17. 148. This was pointed out to the author by a former minister (interview, April 13, 2000) and a Czech political analyst (interview, April 18, 2000, Prague). 149. Mentioned by several Czech foreign affairs and defense officials in interviews on April 19–20, 2000, Prague. 150. Interestingly, Czech decision makers did, eventually, take steps in the direction of creating an Integrated Security System (following the guidelines of Western advisers), but this was only after severe floods in the summer of 1997 and the problems of crisis management caused by institutional decentralization made them aware of the need to change the system. 151. Simon, NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republics, 59. 152. Interviews with NATO officials from the Partnership Coordination Cell, February 16–17, 2000, Mons. 153. Interviews with a Czech political analyst and with former Czech MPs, April 14–20, 2000, Prague. 154. Interview with a NATO official from the Political Affairs Division, November 23, 1999, Brussels. 155. On this, see also Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries, 87. 156. For a detailed analysis, see Simon, NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republics, especially chaps. 8 and 9. 157. See Sˇedivy, “The Kosovo Test: Are the Czechs Out?” 3. 158. One surprise during the Kosovo crisis was the Civic Democratic Party leader, Vaclav Klaus, who criticized the bombing campaign and advocated a diplomatic solution instead. However, his own party (the ODS), together with the Christian Democrats, the center-right Freedom Union, the Civic Democratic

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Alliance, and even some moderate Social Democrats, distanced itself from Klaus and supported the decision to launch the attacks. 159. On Czech reactions to the military intervention, see Stroehlein, “Czech Republic.” 160. See “Czechs Shaken by Kosovo Crisis after NATO Entry,” CTK Press Release, December 21, 1999.. 161. In an interview conducted by the author on April 20, 2000, an official from the Media Office of the Czech MoD complained about the lack of a systematic “pro-Kosovo” public relations campaign in the Republic. Interestingly, President Havel is credited as the author of one of the most important international speeches in favor of NATO intervention, delivered in front of a joint session of the Canadian Parliament on April 29, 1999. President Havel argued that the military intervention heralded a new international era, in which national sovereignty could be violated to protect the basic rights of people (see Stroehlein, “Czech Republic,” 2). 162. Gabal, Helsusova, and Szayna, “The Impact of NATO Membership in the Czech Republic, especially 41–42.

chapter 5 1. Interview with Jacques Chirac, in Adevarul (Bucharest), June 14, 2001. 2. For an analysis of the role played by France in debates surrounding the first wave of NATO enlargement, see, e.g., Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door, especially 214–17. 3. Interviews with NATO officials from the Political Affairs Division, and with members of the American and Canadian delegations to NATO, October 12, 1999, Brussels, and April 28, 2000, Brussels. 4. See, e.g., Ronald Asmus’s account of the shared view within NATO that good performance in the area of democratization and liberalization was a necessary but not sufficient condition for entry (Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door, 147). 5. See the Washington Summit communiqué issued by the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., on April 24, 1999, reprinted in NATO, The Reader’s Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington, 13–23. 6. See NATO, “Membership Action Plan,” 73–79. 7. See, e.g., U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Report on Human Rights and the Process of NATO Enlargement, 59–62. This view was confirmed in the author’s interviews with officials from the Romanian Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 30, 2000–April 2, 2000, Bucharest; and with a member of the Romanian delegation to NATO, April 24, 2000, Brussels. 8. See, e.g., Harrington and Karns, “Romania’s Ouestpolitik,” 37.

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9. “Constitution of Romania,” Article 37, sec. 3. 10. Ibid., Article 62, sec. 2. 11. See Evenimentul Zilei (Bucharest), May 25, 1995, 2. 12. Interview with a Romanian NGO official, March 31, 2000, Bucharest; and interview with a member of the Romanian delegation to NATO, April 5, 2000, Bucharest. 13. See Ardeleanu, “Romania’s Candidacy to NATO.” See also Roman, “Building a Government–Opposition Consensus in the Field of Security Policy” (Petre Roman was president of the Romanian Senate). 14. Interviews with Romanian MoD officials, March 30, 2000–April 6, 2000, Bucharest. 15. Linden, “Putting on their Sunday Best.” 16. Schimmelfennig, “International Socialization in the New Europe,” 109–39. 17. Interview with a Romanian Foreign Affairs official, April 5, 2000, Bucharest. 18. Interview with member of the American delegation to NATO, November 3, 1999. This view was confirmed in an interview with a senior member, NATO international staff, October 12, 1999, Brussels; and from the Romanian side, with an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 6, 2000, Bucharest, as well as with a senior military officer interviewed on April 10, 2000. 19. These educational practices were organized on the same principles as those that were organized post-1996. Therefore, I will analyze them together in the section devoted to the second phase of the socialization process. 20. See, e.g., the analysis developed by Simon and Binnendjik, “Romania and NATO,” 14–15. Also relevant is Harrington and Karns, “Romania’s Ouestpolitik,” 36–37. 21. The political program of the Democratic Convention was available at http://pntcd.elite.ro (accessed June 24, 2002). 22. Prime Minister Ciorbea, in an interview given shortly after President Clinton’s visit to Bucharest. The interview was reproduced, in part, in the Washington Post, July 12, 1997, A1. 23. “The Road to Europe” (Political Declaration of the CDR), http://pntcd.elite.ro (accessed June 24, 2002), 1–2. 24. One of the most dramatic statements of this recognition can be found in the words of a senior diplomat, currently a member of the Romanian delegation to NATO: “After all, we were not born free, nor did we grow up in freedom. And then, after years of slavery, we were suddenly in charge of building a country on the basis of free institutions. But how is one to know what to do when one has never experienced those institutions?” (interview conducted on April 21, 2000, Brussels). Similarly, in the words of a former member of the Constantinescu administration, “We are grateful to Radio Free Europe and The Voice of America

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for teaching us something about democracy in those dark years. If it had not been for them, how could we have even known what democracy means? After 1989, we had more opportunities to travel abroad, to see how things are done in the West, and to talk to people from all over the world. But that was still not enough” (interview with a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, April 6, 2000, Bucharest). 25. Interviews with a Romanian political analyst, March 31, 2000, Bucharest; and with a senior NATO official from the Political Affairs Division, November 29, 1999, Brussels. 26. Interview with a member of the Canadian delegation to NATO, October 12, 1999, Brussels; and with two members of the Romanian delegation to NATO, April 28, 2000, Brusssels. 27. Interview with a senior member, NATO international staff, April 28, 2000, Brussels. 28. Interview with an allied defense official involved in consultations with the Romanian government and in teaching numerous NATO/PfP workshops, seminars, and other educational activities targeting Central and East European actors (April 5, 2000, Bucharest). 29. Interview with senior NATO member, international staff, October 12, 1999. On this, see also Dragsdahl, “NATO Resists Pressures to Militarise Central Europe.” 30. See Dragsdahl’s study, “NATO Resists Pressures to Militarise Central Europe.” This was confirmed in my interview with a senior NATO official, international staff (April 28, 2000, Brussels); and on the Romanian side, with an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (April 6, 2000, Bucharest). 31. Ibid. 32. Interviews with an adviser to the Romanian Ministry of Defense, March 30, 2000, Bucharest; and with a member of the Romanian delegation to NATO, April 21, Brussels. The report formulated by the allied team (at the request of the Romanian Minister of Defense) became available for internal use within the Romanian Ministry of Defense in 1998 (see Romanian Ministry of National Defense, “A Strategic Analysis of the Evolution of Romanian Politics of Security and of Governmental Mechanisms”). 33. Lincoln, Discourse and the Construction of Society, especially chaps. 1 and 8. 34. Romanian Ministry of National Defense, “A Strategic Analysis of the Evolution of Romanian Politics of Security and of Governmental Mechanisms,” 6–8. 35. Interviews with senior NATO officials from the Political Affairs and Defense Planning divisions who participated in consultations with Romanian officials, November 1999–January 2000, Brussels; and confirmed by two officials from the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 6, 2000, Bucharest.

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36. Romanian Ministry of National Defense, “A Strategic Analysis of the Evolution of Romanian Politics of Security and of Governmental Mechanisms,” 15–17. 37. This appears to have been especially present in informal conversations with Romanian decision makers (interviews with two Romanian MoD officials, March 30, 2000, Bucharest; and with an adviser to the Romanian MoD, April 5, Bucharest). The final report does not explicitly talk about this, but it presupposes the existence of a universally valid model of liberal democracy. Furthermore, it assumes that the authors are familiar with that model—in fact, that they are its representatives—and can teach it to Romanians. The language is not that of advice to adopt a particular measure in a state of flux. Rather, the report is full of truth claims: “A democratic society is about inter-governmental cooperation and societal involvement” (1 and 4); “Democratization requires providing more education and more channels of communication with NGOs” (25, emphasis added). And on page 6 the report adopts the vantage point of the expert to point out that a truly democratic environment “requires full transparency” in relations between defense forces, the government, parliament, and society. 38. Interview with NATO official from the Defense Planning Division, April 28, 2000, Brussels. 39. Interview with NATO official, Political Affairs Division, November 5, 1999. 40. Romanian Ministry of National Defense, “A Strategic Analysis of the Evolution of Romanian Politics of Security and of Governmental Mechanisms,” 1. 41. Reportedly, this was an issue that was repeatedly stressed by NATO advisers in consultations with Romanian decision makers (information obtained during interviews with Romanian MFA and MoD officials, April 6–10, 2000, Bucharest; and with a senior NATO official, international staff, April 28, 2000, Brussels). 42. Ibid. 43. Interview with a senior NATO officer, NATO HQ, November 5, 1999, Brussels. 44. This view was also present in briefings of Romanian officials by NATO representatives, which took place as part of the accession dialogues of early 1997. The idea was that NATO expresses and defends Western values and a vision of a Europe that is free, democratic, and at peace (interviews with a Romanian official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 7, 2000, Bucharest; and with a NATO official, Defense Partnership Directorate, February 2, 2000, Brussels. 45. This view was expressed by all of the NATO officials that I interviewed, as well as by Romanian policymakers associated with the Democratic Convention. 46. Interviews with Partnership Coordination Cell officers, February 17,

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2000, Mons. This view echoed the statement made by a senior member of NATO’s international staff when I interviewed him in Brussels on October 12, 1999. 47. This was pointed out by a NATO official, international staff, Political Affairs Division (interview, November 24, 1999, Brussels), and by a senior official involved in teaching Central and East Europeans at the Marshall Center and the NATO Defense College (interview, January 22, 2000, Berlin). 48. Interviews with Romanian graduates of language courses organized within the framework of the PfP (June 2000, Ottawa). 49. On this strategy, see also Kazocins, “Professionalisation and Military Training in Central and Eastern Europe.” 50. See Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, “Annual Status Report of the PfP Training Centres.” For more details about the courses organized by the Centre, visit the site of the Romanian National Defense Ministry PfP Regional Training Center, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/wgcd/curricula/Romanian_PfP_CentreInfoPage.html. 51. Interviews with two officials from NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly, January 27, 2000, Brussels. For a more detailed account of activities organized by the assembly, see Chapter 4 in this book. 52. Interview with a Romanian NGO official, March 28, 2000, Bucharest; and with a Romanian MoD official, April 5, 2000, Bucharest. Also relevant is the fact that while Romanian policymakers have accepted most of the recommendations made by Western advisers, they have tended to present them as the result of their own efforts. The role of international institutions is sometimes acknowledged in their public discourse, but it is presented as one of assistance rather than as the more comprehensive education that actually takes place. 53. Interviews with Romanian MoD officials, April 10, 2000, Bucharest. 54. Interview with member of the American delegation to NATO, November 3, 1999. This view was confirmed in an interview with a senior member, NATO international staff, October 12, 1999, Brussels; and from the Romanian side, by an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 6, 2000, Bucharest, and by a senior military officer, interviewed on April 10, 2000. 55. See Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door, 147–49. 56. Interview with a Romanian NGO official, March 31, 2000, Bucharest. 57. Linden, “Putting on Their Sunday Best.” 58. Romanian Ministry of National Defense, “A Strategic Analysis of the Evolution of Romanian Politics of Security and of Governmental Mechanisms,” 6. 59. The Greater Romania Party, for instance, speaks of the need to cultivate the patriotic spirit, “to protect Romania’s national vigor,” and to be prepared to defend the unity and territorial integrity of the state against possible foreign aggression. The threat of aggression is, implicitly if not explicitly, identified as coming from Hungary, in relation to the status of Transylvania.

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60. Interview with an adviser to the Romanian MoD, April 5, 2000, Bucharest; and with NATO official, Political Affairs Division, November 26, 1999, Brussels. 61. Ibid. Also relevant was an interview with a senior Romanian MoD official, April 6, 2000, Bucharest. 62. Romania Ministry of National Defense, “A Strategic Analysis of the Evolution of Romanian Politics of Security and of Governmental Mechanisms,” 10, 16–17, 26. 63. Interview with senior NATO official, international staff, April 28, 2000, Brussels. 64. Interviews with an MoD official, March 30, 2000, Bucharest; and with an official from NATO’s Defense Planning and Operations Division, February 28, 2000, Brussels. This advice was linked to a growing perception among some NATO decision makers that one of the serious challenges to be met in democratizing Romanian society was the risk that the strength of the presidential institution could produce a “Constantinescu Regime.” 65. Interview with an official from NATO’s Defense Planning Division (see n. 64). 66. Interview with an MoD official, March 30, 2000, Bucharest. 67. Ibid. 68. All the allied officials I interviewed pointed out that they had tried to convince the Romanians that compliance with NATO’s prescriptions was not only normatively correct but also beneficial to Romania—a democratic Romania. 69. This information comes from my interviews with five advisers. One of them was systematically involved in advising the Romanian MoD on reform issues; the others—two senior NATO officers, a member of NATO’s international staff, and an American adviser—were involved in consultations and short-term workshops with Romanian MPs, advisers to political leaders, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The interviews took place from November 9, 1999–April 10, 2000, in Bucharest, Vienna, and Brussels. 70. The Western advisers I interviewed, as well as their Romanian students, acknowledged that this source of authority was invoked in consultations and workshops in which the former tried to persuade the latter to adopt a particular measure. Particularly relevant were interviews with Western officers and civilian defense experts at SHAPE, January 27–28, 2000, Mons; with an adviser to the Romanian MoD, April 5, 2000, Bucharest; with a NATO official from the EuroAtlantic Partnership and Cooperation Section, March 23, 2000; and with members of the Romanian delegation to the Partnership Coordination Cell, February 23, 2000, Mons. 71. Interview with senior SHAPE official, January 28, 2000, Mons; and with an allied defense adviser involved in consultations with the Romanian government and in PfP training, April 10, 2000, Bucharest.

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72. Interview with an allied official involved in advising the Romanian government on reform issues, April 5, 2000, Bucharest. 73. Interview with a member of the Romanian delegation to NATO, February 17, 2000, Brussels; and with a Romanian NGO official, March 31, 2000, Bucharest. 74. Romanian Ministry of Defense, “A Strategic Analysis of the Evolution of Romanian Politics of Security and of Governmental Mechanisms,” 27. 75. Ibid., 14. 76. In examining role-playing, I relied especially on the analytical tools developed in Bem, “Self-Perception Theory”; Lauer and Handel, Social Psychology; and Zimbardo and Leippe, The Psychology of Attitude Chance and Social Influence (see Chapter 3). 77. Interviews with officials from the Romanian delegation to the Partnership Coordination Cell, February 17, 2000, Mons; and with NATO/PfP teachers, November 16, 1999, Vienna, and August 16, 2000, Geneva. 78. Data about that educational activity was collected through participantobservation, November 16–19, 1999, Vienna. 79. Interviews with two Romanian graduates of PfP courses (a military officer and a civilian working for the MoD), March 28–30, 2000, Bucharest. 80. Interviews with Romanian and allied officials conducted at the Partnership Coordination Cell, January 27–28, 2000, Mons. 81. More recently, a new practice has been adopted whereby the leaders of those teams or study groups are Central and East Europeans who have been socialized in the West for a long time (examples include activities organized by the Partnership Coordination Cell and the Marshall Center). So far, there seems to be no substantial difference between the teachings and attitude of the new East European teachers and their Western counterparts. 82. Interview with a senior officer, SHAPE, February 16, 2000, Mons. 83. Interviews with senior officers from SHAPE and the PCC, February 16–18, 2000, Mons. 84. This is not to say that there was always perfect agreement among the allies on the best solution to particular problems. Disagreement and conflicting views on how to implement a given norm in specific situations did occur, but, again, those were disagreements within the framework of shared allied norms. 85. This expectation was explicitly invoked by several NATO officials, both those directly involved in educating future elites and those whose attributions did not include pedagogical practices. Especially relevant were the interviews with SHAPE officials (see n. 83), plus interviews with a senior EAPC official (March 6, 2000, Brussels), and with members of the Romanian delegation to NATO (February 17, 2000, Brussels). 86. Kennedy, “Educating Leaders for the 21st Century,” 31. The same view was expressed by the deputy director of the NATO Defense College at a confer-

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ence organized by the Romanian Euro-Atlantic Foundation in Bucharest, April 5–6, 2000; and by a teacher at the Geneva Center for Security Policy (interview, August 9, 2000, Geneva). 87. Particularly relevant were interviews conducted at SHAPE and the Partnership Coordination Cell, January 27–28, and February 16, 2000, Mons; interviews conducted with Romanian defense and foreign affairs officials, March 30–April 10, 2000, Bucharest; and an interview with a senior NATO official, international staff, April 28, 2000, Brussels. 88. See, e.g., Blackwell, “Reform and Institutional Cooperation.” 89. See Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “White Book on Romania and NATO”; also Romania Ministry of National Defense, “Romanian Armed Forces in 2010.” The same view was reiterated in another “internal” context in which there could not have been any rhetorical manipulation through signaling to Western institutions. Thus, in talks with university students, senior Romanian defense officials pointed out that it was unacceptable for a society that claims to be following democratic principles to still have an Interior Ministry that, through its lack of accountability, is a vestige of the Communist era (interview with MoD official, March 30, 2000, Bucharest). 90. See Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “White Book on Romania and NATO.” This view led to the governmental decision regarding the organization of an interdepartmental commission for integration into NATO, which was submitted to various ministries for approval in 1999 (see Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Programul National Annual de Pregatire a Integrarii in NATO Conform Planului the Actiune Pentru Aderare [MAP],” 61). 91. Interview with Romanian Foreign Affairs official, April 6, 2000, Bucharest. 92. Interview with member of the Romanian delegation to NATO, February 17, 2000, Brussels. This was confirmed in the course of interviews with Romanian MoD officials, March 30, 2000, Bucharest. 93. Interviews with NATO officers involved in PfP training and consultations with the Romanian government, April 5, 2000, Bucharest. 94. See Romanian Ministry of National Defense, The Romanian Armed Forces, 10. 95. See Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Programul National Annual de Pregatire a Integrarii in NATO,” 16–18. 96. Ibid. 97. On the Romanian government’s reliance on executive acts versus parliamentary action in the promotion of defense-related reforms, see Watts, “The Crisis in Romanian Civil-Military Relations.” 98. “Ordonanta de Urgenta 1/21.01.1999 privind regimul starii de asediu si regimul de urgenta” [Emergency Ordinance regarding the state of siege and the state of emergency], in Monitorul official al Romaniei, 22 (1999). 99. Ibid., Articles 12 and 13.

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100. Ibid., Article 25(H). 101. “Ordonanta 41/11.08.1999 privind organizarea si functionarea Ministerului Apararii Nationale,” in Monitorul oficial al Romaniei, 388 (1999), Article 2. 102. Ibid., Article 273. 103. Ibid., Articles 7 and 23A(g). 104. Ibid., Articles 20(2) and 20(5). 105. See Babiuc, “Reform of the Romanian Armed Forces,” 124. 106. Ibid. 107. Interviews with British adviser to the Romanian MoD and a Romanian MoD official, April 5, 2000, Bucharest. On the recent changes within the Ministry of Defense, see also Babiuc, “Reform of the Romanian Armed Forces,” 120–32. 108. See Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Programul National Annual de Pregatire a Integrarii in NATO,” 48–49. 109. A detailed description of the structure and functions of the commission can be found in a recent study (see Romania Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Romania’s Integration into NATO,” chap. 4). 110. Romanian decision makers as well as NATO officials were in agreement that in order to accelerate and consolidate reforms, it is important to begin educating people beyond the relatively narrow circle of reform-oriented policymakers. In this sense, the creation of the commission was regarded as an important step in the outreach program. This was confirmed in interviews with Romanian Foreign Affairs officials, April 6, 2000, Bucharest; and a with a NATO official, international staff, April 28, 2000, Brussels. 111. See Evangelista, Unarmed Forces, 382. 112. For an analysis of the “boomerang effect,” see Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders. See also Evangelista, Unarmed Forces, and the articles in Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights, 205–33. 113. Interviews with officials from the Euro-Atlantic Integration Section, Romanian Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 30–April 7, 1999, Bucharest. 114. Interviews with senior NATO officials, international staff, Brussels, October 12, 1999, and April 25, 2000. 115. See Gousseff, “L’effet Kosovo sur les nouveaux partenaires de l’OTAN.” 116. Interview with an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bucharest, April 6, 2000. 117. Ibid.; confirmed by another MFA official, April 7, 2000. 118. See also Lovatt, “Waiting for the Pay-back.” 119. See Gousseff, “L’effet Kosovo sur les nouveaux partenaires de l’OTAN,” 12. The same numbers appeared in the Romania Libera (Bucharest) issues that covered the crisis.

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120. A useful account of Iliescu’s position can be found in the transcript of the common session of the Romania Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, http://www.cdep.ro:22April1999. In fact, in May 1998, Iliescu had publicly expressed his support for the Belgrade government’s actions in Kosovo. 121. See Gousseff, “L’effet Kosovo sur les nouveaux partenaires de l’OTAN,” 12. 122. Speech by liberal Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, April 22, 1999, Bucharest, printed in Adevarul (Bucharest), April 23, 1999. 123. Romania Libera (Bucharest), May 5, 1999. 124. Ibid. 125. Interview with member of the Romanian delegation to NATO, April 21, 2000, Brussels. 126. Interviews with two Romanian graduates of PfP courses, based at the MoD, March 30, 2000; and with a Foreign Affairs official, April 6, 2000, Bucharest. 127. Ibid. Also relevant were the interviews with British and German advisers and PfP teachers, April 5, 2000, Bucharest. 128. This is similar to a condition of socialization identified by Jeffrey Checkel in “Why Comply?” It is also similar to the condition of uncertainty that, according to Thomas Risse, is likely to lead to interactions governed by the logic of argumentative rationality (see “Let’s Argue!”). 129. This is clearly expressed in the current political platforms of the PUNR and the Greater Romania Party, available at http://www.romare.ro/partid/doctrina. 130. This was confirmed by members of the Romanian delegation to NATO, and by officials from the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (interviews, March 30–April 28, 2000, Bucharest and Brussels). 131. Interviews with a German and an American defense adviser who participated in NATO/PfP seminars involving Romanians, and in consultations with Romanian officials, April 10, 2000, Bucharest. 132. Telephone interview with a former assistant to a senior foreign affairs official under the liberal government of 1996–2000. 133. Interviews with two Romanian PfP graduates based at the Ministry of Defense, March 28, 2000, Bucharest. 134. Interviews with German and American defense advisers and PfP teachers, April 5, 2000, Bucharest. 135. Interviews with Romanian and Western officers, February 16–17, 2000, Partnership Coordination Cell, Mons. 136. This was confirmed by a senior SHAPE official (interviewed on February 16, 2000, Mons). 137. Interview with senior SHAPE official, February 16, 2000, Mons. Also relevant was an interview with an official from the Romanian Ministry of Defense, March 30, 2000, Bucharest. 138. Interviews with one Romanian officer who changed his views as a result

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of self-persuasion (April 10, 2000, Bucharest), and with NATO teachers, who insisted that there were many cases in which this happened (April 5–10, 2000, Bucharest). Such transformations apparently occurred not only among Romanians but also among Czechs, Bulgarians, Slovaks, etc. E.g., there are reports of several officers and defense officials whose political sympathies allied with the reformed socialists, not the Democratic Convention. At the start of the socialization processes they did not accept NATO as a legitimate teacher, and they did not regard the norms and principles that the organization was prescribing as “normal” and unproblematic. Their participation in NATO-sponsored educational activities appeared to be almost exclusively motivated by narrow instrumental reasons (e.g., they thought it might help them careerwise). However, that participation required role-playing in accordance with the liberal democratic norms promoted by NATO. In the aftermath of those activities, and —arguably, as a result of a process of self-attribution and cognitive-dissonance reduction, the reluctant socializees reportedly altered not only their behavior but also their ideas—moving closer to accepting NATO’s prescriptions regarding what would qualify as a correct normative foundation for their country. 139. Interviews with members of the Romanian delegation to the Partnership Coordination Cell, February 16–17, 2000, Mons; and with Romanian officials from the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, March 30–April 7, 2000, Bucharest. 140. Romania Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Programul National Annual de Pregatire a Integrarii in NATO Conform Planului the Actiune Pentru Aderare (MAP),” 48. 141. Michael Shafir quoted in Barany, The Future of NATO Expansion, 129. 142. See Donnelly, “Reform Realities.” 143. “Ordonanta 41/11.08.1999 privind organizarea si functionarea Ministerului Apararii Nationale” [Ordinance regarding the organization and functioning of the Ministry of National Defense], Monitorul oficial al Romanieie, no. 388 (1999), Article 2. 144. This is similar to the problem of “cultural mismatch” identified by Jeffrey Checkel in his articles “International Norms and Domestic Politics” and “Why Comply?” Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink reach a similar conclusion with respect to the ability of transnational networks to promote norm compliance. Such networks “are more likely to be influential if they fit well with existing ideas and ideologies in a particular historical setting” (Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, 204). 145. Interview with an adviser to the Romanian Ministry of Defense, April 5, 2000, Bucharest. 146. See Watts, “The Crisis in Romanian Civil-Military Relations.” 147. Interview with senior NATO official, international staff, June 10, 2002, Brussels.

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148. See “Dilema Anului 2002: A fi sau a nu fi membri NATO,” in Monitorul de Cluj, December 20, 2001, http://www.monitorulcluj.ro/arhiva/2001/2001. 12.20/national2.html. 149. See Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door, 149. 150. See Woehrel et al., NATO Applicant States, 25–30. 151. On this, see Barany, The Future of NATO Expansion, chap. 4. 152. See Niteanu, “Falsa Demilitarizare.” 153. For a more detailed analysis, see Woehrel, Kim, and Ek, NATO Applicant States, 24–30. 154. NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Defense and Security Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defense Capabilities, “Draft Report AV 96DSC/ FC(02)4.” See also Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association, “Tenth Report”; and the MEDIAFAX Report on the Parliamentary Assembly’s findings, “Romania and Bulgaria Should Be Admitted into NATO” (Romanian Tribune [Niles, Ill.], May 31, 2002, 10). 155. Romanian MoD officials estimated the cost of participation in the fighting against the Taliban at approximately $25 million (in a country where millions of people continue to earn less than $80 a month) (see Barany, The Future of NATO Expansion, 150). 156. For an analysis of the Romanian role in Iraq, see Gheciu, “When the ‘New Europeans’ Encountered the ‘Old Continent.’” 157. This new approach seems to be widely shared by the allies. Reports issued by human rights organizations point to a significant rise in American and European practices of arbitrary detention, unlawful violations of individual freedom of speech and association, and violations of international human rights standards concerning the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers—many of these abuses carried out in the name of fighting terrorism and organized crime (see, e.g., International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, “Anti-terrorism Measures, Security, and Human Rights”). 158. This issue will be revisited in the final chapter of the book. 159. Geoana, “Reshaping the Transatlantic Relationship,” 3. For details of the Romanian activities in the “war on terror,” see also Romania Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Romania’s Participation in the International Campaign against Terrorism.” 160. Woehrel et al., NATO Applicant States, 30.

chapter 6 1. On this, see, especially, Walker, Inside/Outside. 2. For well-known statements of the alliance theory, which regard alliances as geostrategic arrangements set up by preconstituted states concerned with survival in an anarchic environment, see, e.g., Langer, European Alliances and

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Alignments; Liska, Nations in Alliance; Snyder, Alliance Politics; and Walt, The Origins of Alliances. 3. Some neorealist scholars have tried to enrich Waltz’s sparse model by introducing a “balance-of-threat” concept to account for state behavior in the international arena (see, most notably, Walt, The Origins of Alliances). However, as constructivist theorists have argued, modified neorealist analyses often rely on unacknowledged ideational factors, such as the role of culture, in generating threat perceptions (see, e.g., Barnett, “Identity and Alliances in the Middle East”; and Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security.” 4. For critiques of the neorealist argument concerning the Western response to the offensive military threat posed by the Soviet Union, see, e.g., Evangelista, “Stalin’s Postwar Army Reappraised”; and Gaddis, The Long Peace, especially 41. 5. See, particularly, Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future.” 6. Kenneth Waltz’s statement at a U.S. Senate hearing in November 1990, quoted in Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community,” 363. 7. On the problems encountered by neorealists in explaining the persistence of NATO, see, e.g., Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community”; and Williams and Neumann, “From Alliance to Security Community,” particularly 357–58. 8. For analyses of the Kosovo conflict, see, e.g., Booth, The Kosovo Tragedy; Ignatieff, Virtual War; and Judah, Kosovo. 9. This approach is confirmed in NATO, OSCE, and U.N. documents on Kosovo, many available online (see http://www.osce.org/kosovo; http://www.nato.int/kfor/welcome.html; and http://www.unmikonline.org). 10. For a discussion regarding the implications of unipolarity, see Sheetz and Mastanduno, “Debating the Unipolar Moment.” There are two variants of hegemonic stability theory. In the liberal version, a benevolent hegemon cannot exclude other states from the benefits of public goods nor compel them to share in their costs (see Kindleberger, The World in Depression; and Keohane, “The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes”). In the realist version, which is the one usually applied to international security, a “coercive” hegemon has the ability to exclude others and force them to support part of the costs of public goods through the use of incentives, (see Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics). 11. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World.” 12. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 169–70. 13. Snyder, “Alliance Theory,” 121. 14. See Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community.” 15. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the End of the Cold War,” 19. 16. Ibid., 24–26. 17. Kenneth Waltz, quoted in in Keohane and Waltz, “Correspondence,” 204–5.

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18. See Chapter 3 above. 19. See Dragsdahl, NATO Resists Pressures to Militarize Central Europe. 20. Keohane, “Neoliberal Institutionalism,” 2. In a similar vein, another institutionalist theorist, Celeste Wallander, explicitly excluded questions of identity from her studies of international interactions (see, e.g., Wallander, Mortal Friends, Best Enemies, 205). 21. Wallander and Keohane, “Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions.” 22. See Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability.” 23. See Wallander’s self-identified theoretical position within the camp of economic rationalism in “Institutional Assets and Adaptability,” 707–8. 24. See, e.g., Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability,” 727. 25. For a constructivist argument that international institutions embody the standards of legitimacy of the community they represent more than the utilitarian requirements of efficient problem solving, see Katzenstein, “United Germany in an Integrating Europe,” 12. 26. Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability,” 716. 27. Keohane and Wallander, “Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions,” 42–45. 28. Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability,” 720–21. 29. For instance, NATO could not forcefully intervene against democratically elected governments even if those governments rejected Western norms of liberal democracy (as was the case, in the past decade, in numerous countries of the former socialist bloc). By contrast, as noted above, after the end of World War II NATO allies retained the legal right to intervene in the (semi-sovereign) Federal Republic of Germany to prevent a possible ascension to power of socialist forces. 30. Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability,” 720–21, 728–29. 31. My argument here is similar to Adler’s critique of the neoliberal analysis of the role of Western institutions in the former Communist bloc. With particular reference to the OSCE, Adler has demonstrated that international institutions have played an important role in former Communist countries, not only by increasing interstate coordination and reducing transaction costs, as the neoliberals suggest, but also by community-building socialization practices that have had the effect of changing the intersubjective knowledge through which identities and interests are defined (see, in particular, Adler, “Seeds of Peaceful Change”). 32. See, e.g., Schimmelfennig, “International Socialization in the New Europe”; and Andrew Moravcsik’s comments in Checkel and Moravcsik, “A Constructivist Research Program in EU Studies?” Another very interesting rationalist account—albeit one that does not focus on NATO—is Kelley, “International Actors on the Domestic Scene.” 33. See, in particular, Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe.

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34. Schimmelfennig, “International Socialization in Central and Eastern Europe,” 3. 35. See Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe. 36. Schimmelfennig, “International Socialization in Central and Eastern Europe,” 3. 37. Caporaso, Checkel, and Jupille, “Integrating Institutions.” See also Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner, “International Organization and the Study of World Politics.” 38. See, in particular, Caporaso, Checkel, and Jupille, “Integrating Institutions”; Checkel, “Why Comply?”; Checkel, “‘Going Native’ in Europe?”; and Risse, “Let’s Argue!” 39. On this, see in particular the work of Pierre Bourdieu: “Social Space and Symbolic Power”; “From Rules to Strategies”; “La representation politique”; and Outline of a Theory of Practice. 40. On models of theoretical dialogue between constructivists and rationalists, see Caporaso, Checkel, and Jupille, “Integrating Institutions,” especially 21–22. 41. Romania Libera (Bucharest), May 5, 1999. 42. Ibid. 43. This concern was embedded in NATO’s public statements prior to, during, and following the Madrid Summit; see Chapters 2, 4, and 5 above. The same concern was articulated by the senior NATO officials from the Political Affairs Division, Defense Planning Division, and Office of the Secretary General (interviews, October 12, 1999–April 28, 2000, Brussels). 44. See, e.g., “The Washington Declaration,” in NATO, The Reader’s Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington, 12. 45. See, e.g., the texts that contain information about high-level conferences between NATO and partner states, such as the statements of heads of state and other top officials participating in the conference on “NATO’s Role in the Changing Security Environment in Europe,” in Vilnius, Lithuania, May 18–19, 2000, available at http://www.fas.org/man/nato/national. See also the statements of Romanian officials following the Kosovo crisis, in Lovatt, “Waiting for the Pay-back.” 46. Interviews with high-level officials from the EAPC, the International Coordination Center (SHAPE), and the Partnership Coordination Cell, January 27–February 17, 2000, Brussels and Mons. 47. Ibid. 48. A few officials from SHAPE and NATO’s Political Affairs Division, referring to the emergence of a shared understanding among the allies, said that the allies had been bound by an implicit extension of Article 5 to Romania and some of the other partner states (interviews, February 16–17 and April 28, 2002, Mons and Brussels). 49. See Schimmelfennig, “International Socialization in the New Europe”;

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Notes

and Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe, particularly chap. 10.

chapter 7 1. Bevin quoted in Woyke, “The Foundation and History of NATO,” 252. 2. Finn Moe quoted in Riste, “Norway and Military Integration,” 192. 3. NATO, “Statement by Committee One on Religion and Spiritual Values,” 1. 4. Ibid. 5. See, e.g., Couloumbis, The United States, Greece, and Turkey, 15. 6. See Smith, NATO Enlargement during the Cold War, 80–81. 7. On the role of Turks and Turkey as a negative mirror against which a superior (West) European identity could be juxtaposed, see Neumann, “Making Europe: The Turkish Other,” in his Uses of Other, 39–64. 8. In the late 1940s Greece was still embroiled in a civil war between conservative nationalists and communists; this was concluded with the victory of conservative forces—whose democratic credentials were not very strong. On the allied opposition to Greek membership in NATO, based on the view that Greece, like Turkey, albeit apparently to a lesser extent, was not a member of the Western family of nations, see, e.g., Jeffrey, Ambiguous Commitments and Uncertain Policies, 201. The irony, of course, is that the West was held to have originated with the Greco-Roman civilization. But arguments regarding the otherness of Greece invoke its subsequent evolution, particularly its Orthodox religion and the development of an Eastern culture, as explanations for the (partial) loss of Westerness and Greek failure to develop appropriate norms of governance. 9. Both statements can be found in the declaration, “NATO’s Open Door Policy,” in NATO, The Reader’s Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington, 83. 10. Though I cannot do justice to this debate here, I should point out that the nature and implications of Russia’s “civilizational heritage” has long been the object of significant controversy. For an interesting and concise treatment, see Neumann, “Making Europe,” 65–112. 11. Interview with senior NATO official, international staff, April 28, 2000, Brussels. For an analysis of the relationship between NATO and Russia, with particular emphasis on the ways in which the present discourse of the organization entails inclusion/exclusion by reference to the evolution of the Russian polity, see Williams and Neumann, “From Alliance to Security Community,” 372–87. Within Russia itself, disagreements on the question of whether to aspire to be Western have been a defining feature of the politics of identity. 12. For analyses of the Kosovo conflict, see, e.g., Booth, The Kosovo Tragedy; Ignatieff, Virtual War; and Roberts, “NATO’s ‘Humanitarian War’ Over Kosovo.” 13. This approach is confirmed in NATO, OSCE, and U.N. documents on Kosovo (see http://www.osce.org/kosovo; http://www.nato.int/kfor/welcome.

Notes

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html, and http://www.unmikonline.org). 14. Robertson, “NATO After September 11th.” 15. Those disagreements were eventually resolved within the framework of NATO, but it took the allies some time—and quite a few bitter arguments—to reach a compromise. 16. For an analysis of the tension between the U.S. foreign policy discourse and actions in Iraq, and the constitutive norms of the transatlantic security community, see also Risse, “Beyond Iraq.” 17. NATO, “Final Communiqué: Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held in Madrid on 3 June 2003,” para. 11. 18. See Donnelly, “Security in the 21st Century.” 19. Ibid. 20. For a detailed analysis of post-September 11th changes in the structure and mission of NATO, see NATO, “NATO and the Scourge of Terrorism.” 21. See NATO, “NATO Policy on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings”; and NATO, “Istanbul Summit Communiqué.” 22. See Yavuzalp, “Working with Partners to Fight Terrorism.” 23. Donnelly, “Security in the 21st Century.” 24. Schmitt, Political Theology. 25. See, e.g., International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, “Anti-terrorism Measures, Security, and Human Rights.” 26. Robertson, “Speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, at the September 11th Commemoration.” 27. NATO, “NATO Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism.” 28. For a broader analysis of NATO-EU cooperation, see NATO, “NATOEU: A Strategic Partnership.” 29. NATO, “NATO-EU Cooperation Taken to a New Level.” 30. The Security of Information Agreement was followed, a few days later, by a more comprehensive “Berlin-Plus” package on NATO-EU cooperation. The “Berlin-Plus” arrangements seek to avoid unnecessary duplication of resources and includes four elements: assured EU access to NATO operational planning; availability to the EU of NATO capabilities and common assets; NATO European Command options for EU-led operations; and adaptation of the NATO defense planning system to incorporate the availability of forces for EU operations. The measures decided within the framework of the “Berlin-Plus” agreement were subsequently put into practice in Operation Concordia, the EU’s first military deployment, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In addition, daily EU-NATO operational coordination is taking place both in Bosnia and in Kosovo, and on July 25, 2003, the EU and NATO agreed on a joint approach to stabilizing the Western Balkans, emphasizing the common values and vision of the two organizations, as well as their shared determination to bring lasting stability to the region. 31. See NATO, “NATO-EU: A Strategic Partnership.”

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32. On this, see also Valasek, “The Meaning of Enlargement.” 33. Robertson, “Defense and Security in an Uncertain World.” 34. Donnelly, “Security in the 21st Century.” 35. Robertson, “Defense and Security in an Uncertain World.” 36. Ibid. (emphasis added). 37. Donnelly, “Security in the 21st Century.” 38. Interesting analyses of the Euro-Atlantic crisis can be found in Coker, Empires in Conflict; and Daalder and Lindsay, America Unbound. More specifically, on NATO and the EU, see Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community; and Howorth and Keeler, Defending Europe. 39. For an analysis of the role of the “new Europeans” in the Iraqi crisis, see Alexandra Gheciu, “When the ‘New Europeans’ Encountered the ‘Old Continent.’” 40. On this, see also Wood, “There is No Clear Line Between ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Europe.” 41. Petr Pithart, quoted in Darnton, “Union, But Not Unanimity, as Europe’s East Joins West.” 42. Geoana, “Reshaping the Transatlantic Relationship.”

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Index

accession dialogues, 157, 215; EU, 70, 183, 192, 227; NATO-Czech, 102–4, 105, 106, 107, 111–14, 123–24, 125–27, 130, 141–42, 148, 157, 286–87n67; NATO-Romanian, 165, 168, 171–72, 177–78. See also collective briefings; consultations accountability, norms of, 10, 90, 101, 114; Czechs and, 121, 136, 140, 145, 153, 155; Romanians and, 164, 167, 176, 179, 201, 300n89 Acheson, Dean, 38 Achilles, Theodore C., 37, 40 Adenauer, Konrad, 49–50, 269n71 Adler, Emanuel, 21, 306n31 Afghanistan, 243, 248, 304n155 Albanian Kosovars, 155, 191 Alderson, Kai, 98 alliances: vs. security management institutions, 216. See also European Union (EU); NATO The Alliance’s Strategic Concept (NATO), 5, 274n129 Al Qaeda, 158, 243, 245, 246, 248 anarchy, 8, 211, 216 Annual National Plan (ANP), 2; Romanian, 159, 165, 185–86, 187, 194, 226 appropriate behavior, 27–28, 96, 223–24, 234–38, 274–75n133; for NATO decision makers, 6, 9, 74; between NATO members, 56–57. See also appropriate liberal democratic behavior; habitus; norms appropriate liberal democratic behavior, 2, 12, 17–20, 90, 93, 217–24, 228, 230–31, 234–38; civil-military

relations, 70, 71, 89, 90, 94, 116–17, 119, 137, 140–41, 145–46, 150, 164–65, 169, 179–80, 275n140; Czech, 82, 86, 94, 106–37, 140–47, 150, 151, 224–25; Greek, 308n8; vs. inappropriate, 9, 19, 84, 125, 131, 151, 178, 184, 189, 308n8; joining NATO, 134–35, 143–44, 234–38; Kosovo crisis, 189, 192, 194, 224–25; NATO legitimacy in prescribing, 147, 217, 220–21; in Parliaments, 66, 145; Romanian, 82, 86, 94, 164–65, 169, 174, 178–80, 182, 184, 186, 189, 192–202, 225. See also liberal democratic norms and institutions, Western-style argumentation: argumentative rationality, 291n136, 302n128; norms of, 93–94, 101 armed forces, NATO, 23, 38, 87–88, 129, 243, 248. See also militarization, NATO; Operation Allied Force/Kosovo crisis (1999) Association for the Republic—Czech Republican Party, 128, 144 Atlantic Council. See North Atlantic Council (NAC) Atlantic Education Committee, 66 Atlanticism, 49, 57, 250 Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA), 58–59, 66 attitudes: socialization effects on, 31–33, 95–96, 135, 139–45, 149; structure of, 19–20. See also attitudes and practices persisting from Communist era; habitus; interpretations of reality; private beliefs

344

Index

attitudes and practices persisting from Communist era, 89; Czech, 1, 33, 107, 114–15, 120, 123–26, 128–31, 150, 153; Romanian, 33, 161, 164, 168, 177–78, 189, 196–99, 202–3, 300n89 authority: to determine shared meanings, 21, 89, 131, 189–90; in persuasion, 94–95, 176–77, 201. See also legitimacy; power; sovereignty Baker, James, 62 Balkans, 75, 96, 181, 247, 309n30. See also Greece; Romanians; Turkey; Yugoslavia Baltics, 73, 75, 277n163 Barnett, Michael, 21 Belgium: and NATO communitybuilding, 51; and NATO enlargement, 45, 277n164. See also Brussels; Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) beliefs. See interpretations of reality; private beliefs; values Benelux states: and NATO enlargement, 41–43, 45, 48–49, 277n164; NATO founders from, 35, 36. See also Belgium; Netherlands Bevin, Ernest, 35–36, 234 Bidault, Georges, 35–36 Blair, Tony, 192, 227 Bosnia, 138, 181–82, 192, 200, 309n30 Bourdieu, Pierre, 87; on habitus, 20, 85, 95, 138, 280n28; on teaching, 88–91, 100, 112–13, 148, 172, 184 Britain: and Iraq war, 207; and Kosovo crisis, 192; and NATO communitybuilding, 51; and NATO enlargement, 42–43, 44, 45, 48–49, 277n164; NATO founders from, 35–36, 37, 38; and U.S., 270n81. See also London Brussels: CEE missions, 102, 107–8, 145; NATO headquarters, 111, 242–43, 263n58; Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit, 242–43 Brussels Treaty, 49 Bull, Hedley, 78 Bush, George (Sr.), 64 Buzan, Barry, 28–29 Canada: and NATO enlargement, 39, 41–42, 45, 48–49, 236, 270n78, 271n86; NATO founders from, 35, 36, 37, 38, 265n3; and NATO militarization, 50–51

capitalism, CEE, 82–84, 283n8 Caporaso, James, 222 carrots and sticks, 18, 93, 275; for Czechs, 86, 103, 142, 155, 226, 227; NATO membership, 26, 79, 80, 86, 142, 226; for Romanians, 86, 190–91 case selection, 21–26 causality, 18, 27 Ceausescu, Nicolae, 161 CEE. See Central/Eastern Europeans Center-Right politics, Czech, 104–5, 128, 139, 279–80n20, 283n9, 292–93n158 Central/Eastern Europeans (CEE): missions in Brussels, 102, 107–8, 145; returning to Europe, 17–18, 103, 128, 143–44, 163, 205, 237, 283n9; social relations with NATO, 1–33, 65–69, 77–101, 110, 195. See also Balkans; Baltics; liberal democratic norms and institutions, Western-style; NATO socialization practices; new Europe; Russia; Visegrad states Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990), 62 Charter of Partnership with Baltic states, U.S., 75 Checkel, Jeffrey, 78–79, 92, 100, 222 Chirac, French President, 157–58, 207 Christian Democratic UnionCzechoslovak People’s Party (KDUCSL), Czech, 104–5, 283n8, 292–93n158 Ciorbea, Victor, 163 Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), Czech, 104–5, 128, 144, 282n7, 283nn8,13 Civic Democratic Party (ODS), Czech, 104–5, 128, 154, 282n7, 283n8, 291n138, 292–93n158 civilizational otherness, 236–37, 308n8 civil-military relations: appropriate, 70, 71, 89, 90, 94, 116–17, 119, 137, 140–41, 145–46, 150, 164–65, 169, 179–80, 275n140. See also defense arrangements, national Clark, Ian, 14 Clinton, Bill, 71–72, 103 coercive power, 252; hegemonic stability theory, 213, 305n10; Kosovo crisis, 212, 239; NATO enlargement and, 15, 43; NATO power dynamics vs., 1, 87, 88; persuasion vs., 91, 93,

Index 192–95, 214; PfP and, 67; shaming, 123–24. See also military; threats Cold War, 213–14, 246; NATO community-building during, 34, 40, 46, 49, 50–60, 76, 234–35, 269–70n78; NATO confidential reports issued during, 29, 36, 56–57; NATO enlargement during, 22, 39–50, 76, 214, 234, 236; NATO evolution during, 21–23, 27–28, 30, 34; neorealism on, 210–11. See also Cold War end; Soviet military threat Cold War end, 1, 14–15, 61–62, 211, 213–14; inside mode, 4–6, 22, 34–35, 60–62, 65, 76, 87, 233, 238–39; NATO evolution, 22, 23, 24–25, 28, 34–35, 60–76, 274n127; NATO immediately following (1990–91), 23, 60–65. See also NATO enlargement after Cold War; NATO socialization practices collective briefings, 215; NATO-Czech, 102, 105, 107, 111, 113–14, 148; NATO-Romanian, 177–78. See also accession dialogues; consultations collective identity: within NATO, 138, 182, 220–21, 232, 279n14. See also collective meanings; communitybuilding, NATO; nationalists; state identities collective meanings, 21; authority to determine, 21, 89, 131, 189–90; NATO, 6–7, 22, 36–38, 54–57, 89, 215, 220, 234; state identities, 13–14. See also collective identity; intersubjectivity; norms; values Committee of Five, 51–53, 57 common lifeworld, 92, 93, 100, 122, 150 common sense construction, 20, 88, 100; with Czechs, 110–11, 120; with Romanians, 171, 172, 184 Communists: Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM), 105, 128–29, 144; community-building vs., 50, 57; Czech, 1, 87, 102–7, 114–15, 120, 128, 131, 144, 146, 148, 150, 154, 250–51, 291n138; German, 50; Greek, 41, 308n8; Romanian, 177–78, 191, 195, 203, 250–51, 300n89; Spanish, 268n53; terrorist threat compared with, 244–46; threat of Western European subversion by,

345

35–38, 50, 54, 211, 244–45, 271n91; Western norms opposed by, 12, 15, 33, 54, 73, 82, 87, 128–29, 131, 144, 146–48, 226, 265n9. See also attitudes and practices persisting from Communist era; socialists; Soviet Union community-building, NATO: during Cold War, 34, 40, 46, 49, 50–60, 76, 234–35, 269–70n78; following Cold War, 63, 65–67, 76; discursive, 55–57; and economic cooperation, 51–52, 53–54; intersubjective knowledge changed by, 306n41; labor mobility, 52–54; U.S. and, 51, 52, 53, 214. See also educational programs; liberal democratic norms and institutions; naturalization of Western community and norms Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 62–65. See also OSCE conflict resolution, 56–57, 121. See also war consistency, norm, 31–33, 94, 101, 230; Czech, 33, 112, 120, 124, 125–26, 130, 135; Romanian, 33, 175–76, 178, 193–94, 201 Constantinescu, Emil, 157, 163, 206, 294–95n24, 298n64 constitutions: Czech, 32, 107, 141, 288n85; Europe’s “new Constitution,” 62; Romanian, 32, 160, 180–81 constructivist International Relations theory, 7, 10, 18–19, 78, 92, 97, 221–31, 259n5 consultations: EAPC and, 68; in NAC, 216–17; NATO-Czech, 102, 104, 105, 111, 113–14, 118, 123, 125–27, 141–42, 286–87n67; NATORomanian, 164, 165–66, 171–72, 175, 177–78, 183; norms of, 64, 153, 213, 214, 216–17, 231. See also accession dialogues; collective briefings cooperation, 24, 39, 51, 52, 55, 102; civilian-military, 33, 119, 149, 171; EAPC and, 68; economic, 51–52, 53–54; NATO-EU, 243, 246–51, 309n30; norms of, 64, 153–54, 171, 213, 214, 216–17, 231; PfP, 96–97, 119, 170

346

Index

Cortell, Andrew, 32 Council of Europe, 10, 62, 69, 174 courses/workshops/seminars, 215; with Czechs, 107, 116–17, 118–21, 132, 136–39, 145; PfP, 67–68, 96, 118–21, 136–39, 169–72, 178–80, 199–200; PHARE, 139; with Romanians, 163, 165, 169–72, 178–80, 199–200, 207; Rose-Roth, 116–17. See also NAA/PA seminars/workshops; teaching crime: Czech domestic, 81, 103; Romanian domestic, 208; transnational organized, 174, 175, 208, 243, 247, 304n157. See also terrorism CSCE (Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe), 62–65. See also OSCE Czechs, 16, 72, 102–56; accession dialogues, 102–4, 105, 106, 107, 111–14, 123–24, 125–27, 130, 141–42, 148, 157, 286–87n67; defense arrangements, 33, 103–53, 156, 215, 283n14, 290–93; domestic crime, 81, 103; domestic politics, 1, 31–33, 81–87, 102–56, 220–21, 227, 250–51, 279–83, 287n84, 291–93; emergency planning, 119, 126, 136–37, 141, 150–51, 292n150; EU and, 139, 276n143; Iraq war support, 250–51; liberal democratic norms and institutions, 25–26, 32–33, 79, 82, 86, 94, 97–98, 103–57, 220–32, 239, 250–51, 280n20, 283n9, 288n88; Madrid Summit invitation (1997), 73, 104, 113, 125–28, 157, 277n164, 287n70; NATO membership motivations, 17, 81–83, 103, 128; NATO socialization practices, 24–26, 31–33, 81–151, 155, 199, 223–32, 292n146; opposition to liberal democratic norms and institutions, 15, 33, 82, 87, 99, 128–30, 131, 144, 146–54, 173, 226, 286n61; opposition to NATO membership, 81, 123–24, 127–29, 135, 142–43, 155–56, 226, 279–80n20; public relations campaign for NATO, 127–35, 147, 156, 289n107; referendum on NATO membership, 123–24, 129, 227, 288nn85,88; returning to Europe, 17, 103, 128, 143–44, 283n9; “Scandinavian

status,” 129, 287n84; security concerns, 81, 103, 125, 128, 140–41; sovereignty, 82, 84, 93, 110–11, 123, 128–30, 147, 162, 288n85; state identity, 82, 86–87, 102–3, 109–10, 128–35, 145–47, 156, 220, 224–25, 291n137; strategic concept, 125, 145, 152, 286–87nn67,69; Velvet Revolution, 1, 102–3, 104, 106 Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD). See Social Democratic parties danger: dangerous states, 9; NATOdefined, 5, 54, 56–57, 68–69. See also emergency planning; enemies; threats Danube, Western blockade on, 26, 190 Davis, James, 32 Dean, Mitchell, 12 decision makers, NATO, 6–7, 9, 22, 36–38, 54–57, 89. See also intersubjectivity; North Atlantic Council (NAC) defense arrangements, national, 1–2, 10–11, 15, 84–85, 90–91; appropriate civil-military relations, 70, 71, 89, 90, 94, 116–17, 119, 137, 140–41, 145–46, 150, 164–65, 169, 179–80, 275n140; consistency problems, 33, 124, 125–26, 175–76, 178; Czech, 33, 103–53, 156, 215, 283n14, 290–93; Germany, 47–48, 49; labor mobility and, 53; NATO Parliamentarians and, 66; PfP and, 67, 96, 231; Romanian, 160–89, 194–207, 215, 226, 304n155; sovereignty and, 17, 293n161. See also democratic control of military; international security; military; Ministry of Defense; security concerns; strategic concepts Defense Planning Division, NATO, 72, 109, 262n28 Defense Planning Questionnaire, NATO, 106, 159 democracy. See values, liberal democratic (democracy/human rights/rule of law) democratic control of military, 15, 278–79n11; Czech, 103–10, 114–19, 121, 126, 136–43, 150, 153, 276n143; EU accession dialogues and, 70; NATO socialization in, 79, 89, 90–91, 94, 98, 104–10, 114–19;

Index Romanian, 160–64, 171, 177–80, 184–85, 207. See also defense arrangements, national Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR), 163, 174, 182, 188, 206, 303n138 Denmark: and NATO communitybuilding, 51; and NATO enlargement, 42, 45, 277n164 de Saussure, Ferdinand, 28 discourse analysis, 27–33, 55–57, 113–15, 132–33 domestic others, 13, 86–87, 168, 195, 223, 228. See also Communists; nationalists domestic politics, 8, 210–11, 233; Communist subversion threat, 35–38, 50, 54, 211, 244–45, 271n91; Czech, 1, 31–33, 81–87, 102–56, 220–21, 227, 250–51, 279–83, 287n84, 291–93; domestic others, 13, 86–87, 168, 195, 223, 228; German, 217–18; Greek, 41, 266n28, 308n8; IR theory on international norms transmitted to, 77, 79–80, 130, 219–20; vs. liberal democratic norms and institutions, 2, 12, 15, 33, 54, 73, 81–87, 99, 128–31, 144, 146–54, 173, 182, 226–28, 286n61; NATO enlargement and, 23, 25–26, 34–35, 70–72; NATO projection of norms into, 10–14, 31–33, 79, 84–101, 104–56, 160–78, 219–31, 278–79n11; vs. other NATO states, 57; Romanian, 31–33, 81–87, 99, 157, 160–207, 215, 220–21, 226, 227, 294–95n24, 298n64. See also Communists; defense arrangements, national; liberal democratic norms and institutions; nationalists; socialists; sovereignty; state identities Donnelly, Chris, 108, 244 double logic of international security, 7–9, 22, 34–35, 38–39, 76. See also inside mode of pursuing international security; outside mode of pursuing international security Duvall, Raymond, 21 EAPC (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council), 24, 68, 136–37, 159, 244, 263n58 EC (European Community), 62, 69, 103. See also European Union (EU)

347

economics: capitalist, 82–84, 283n8; Czech, 81–83, 280n20, 283n8; liberal, 14, 81–83; market, 10, 82; NATO role, 52, 53–54, 82–83, 214–15; rationalist, 217–18; Romanian, 81–82, 83–84, 190–91, 207, 304n155; Western alliances, 51–52, 270nn81,84 educational programs, NATO, 58–59, 66–68. See also courses/workshops/seminars; NATO socialization practices; Partnership Coordination Cell; Partnership for Peace; teaching Eisenhower, D. D., 38, 48 emergency planning: Czech, 119, 126, 136–37, 141, 150–51, 292n150; Romanian, 175, 186. See also danger; threats enemies, 5, 211, 233, 244–48; Czechidentified, 125, 140–41; Germany and Italy as, 54; NATO confidential reports, 29; NATO-defined, 54, 56–57, 242; Romanian-identified, 206–9; state identities and, 13, 125; terrorist, 208, 242, 245–46. See also threats enlargement, NATO: during Cold War, 22, 39–50, 76, 214, 234, 236; and outside mode, 40–50, 72, 76, 215, 234, 236. See also NATO enlargement after Cold War; NATO membership Enlightenment, 56, 235 Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), 24, 68, 136–37, 159, 244, 263n58 Europe: CEE returning to, 17–18, 103, 128, 143–44, 163, 205, 237, 283n9. See also Central/Eastern Europeans (CEE); Western Europe European Community (EC), 62, 69, 103 European Defense Community (EDC), 47–48, 268–69nn65,71 European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), 247–48, 250 European Union (EU), 10, 62, 69–70, 277n159; and Czechs, 139, 276n143; NATO cooperation with, 243, 246–51, 309n30; and Romanians, 174, 183, 187, 192, 207, 227, 276n143; and state sovereignty, 261n18; and Turkey, 275–76n140. See also EC (European Community) EUROPOL, 187, 201–2, 208

348

Index

Farrell, Henry, 62 Farrell, Theo, 15 Finnemore, Martha, 280n30 Flockhart, Trine, 117 floods, Czech (1997), 151, 292n150 forward defense strategy, 41, 46–47, 49, 50, 76 Foucault, M., 20 France: and NATO enlargement, 42–43, 44, 45, 47–49, 277n164; NATO founders from, 35–36, 234, 266n16; and Romania, 157–58, 207. See also Paris Franco, Francisco, 44–45, 46, 214, 236 Freedom Union Party (US), 105, 128, 292–93n158 Geoana, Romanian Foreign Minister, 250 generalized other, 19–20, 146–47, 155, 197, 223, 225 Geneva Center for Security Policy/Studies, 118, 136, 137, 169, 178, 180 geostrategic arrangements. See outside mode of pursuing international security Germany, 54, 120, 268–69, 306n29; Marshall Center, 137, 180; military, 47–48, 49, 136; NATO entry (1955), 22, 23, 34, 46–50, 214; NATO socialization practices, 68, 216–18 Good Neighborhood treaties, Romanian, 173, 174 Greater Romania Party (PRM), 81, 161, 162, 191, 203, 297n59 Greece, 247; civil war, 41, 266n28, 308n8; and NATO communitybuilding, 52; NATO entry (1952), 22, 23, 34, 40–46, 50, 51, 71, 214, 236–37, 266–70 Guzzini, Stefano, 85 habitus, 11–12, 85–86, 95; Bourdieu on, 20, 85, 95, 138, 280n28; NATO socialization in, 85–91, 95, 98, 116–22, 138, 169. See also appropriate behavior; attitudes Havel, Vaclav, 1, 25, 103, 283n9; and Kosovo crisis, 154, 293n161; public relations campaign, 131, 132–33, 147 hegemonic stability theory, 212–15, 305n10 Helsinki Declaration (1992), 64

historical evolution: of liberal democratic norms and institutions, 14, 112, 166–67; NATO (since 1949), 9, 21–30, 34–76. See also Cold War human rights, 78, 97; Czech, 108, 126, 137–38, 141, 155; human trafficking, 243; Kosovo crisis and, 155, 200, 239–41, 293n161; Portugal violating, 39; Romanian, 180, 186, 207, 208; Slovakia violating, 72; terrorism and, 245, 304n157; Turkish, 275n140. See also values, liberal democratic (democracy/human rights/rule of law) human trafficking, 243, 247 Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania (UDMR), 163 Hungary, 71, 79, 109, 219; Madrid Summit invitation (1997), 73, 157, 277n164; NATO admission (1999), 26, 72; Romanians and, 162, 174, 297n59 Hussein, Saddam, 241, 250 identity: discourse of, 89; formation of, 19–20; trust based on, 82–84, 225. See also collective identity; norms; state identities IFOR. See Military Implementation Force Iliescu, Ion, 160–63, 191, 203–6, 215 immigration: labor, 53; Turkish, 271n86 individualism, 15, 217, 222. See also rationalist perspective inside mode of pursuing international security, 4–11, 21–23, 29, 211, 232, 261n20, 265n4; and Afghanistan, 243; after Cold War, 4–6, 22, 34–35, 60–62, 65, 76, 87, 233, 238–39; Kantian, 8, 9, 61, 233; Kosovo crisis, 212, 239; and NATO enlargement during Cold War, 39–50, 76; North Atlantic Treaty, 22, 38–40; over outside logic, 44–45, 46, 87; outside logic over, 22–23, 39–44, 45, 50–51, 68, 71, 236; with Romania, 205; and terrorism, 244. See also communitybuilding, NATO; domestic politics instrumental rationality, 80–81, 190, 221, 252 intelligence sharing, anti-terrorist, 242–44 International Relations (IR) theory, 79–80, 210–32, 252, 261n21; constructivist, 7, 10, 18–19, 78, 92,

Index 97, 221–31, 259n5; conventional, 4, 210–21, 232, 252; English School, 78; and international socialization practices, 4, 14–16, 77–80, 92, 93, 210–32, 280n30; Kantian, 61, 261–62n24; national identity construction, 130, 211, 218–20; neoliberal institutionalism, 77–78, 216–21, 306n31; neorealism, 8, 14–16, 77–78, 210–16, 305nn3,10; rationalist, 31, 80–81, 217–18, 221–31, 261n23, 281n48; and sovereignty principle, 7, 219; transnational networks, 188, 220, 227–28, 303n144 international security, 7–9, 11, 14, 60–76, 210–11; EDC, 47–48, 268–69nn65,71; ESDP, 247–48, 250. See also double logic of international security; military; NATO; terrorism; war International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Afghanistan, 243 international socialization, 10; dynamics, 222; identity formation, 19–20; interpretations of reality, 11–13; IR theory, 4, 14–16, 77–80, 92, 93, 210–32, 280n30; norm projection, 10–14, 18, 31, 61, 68–69, 77, 79–101, 104–56, 160–78, 219–31, 278–79n11; OSCE, 306n31; successful, 10, 281n48; view of human nature and, 61. See also NATO socialization practices interoperability, 119, 159, 169–70, 181, 220 interpretations of reality, 11–13, 113; common lifeworld, 92, 93, 100, 122, 150. See also meanings; naturalization of Western community and norms; realism; worldview intersubjectivity: discourse analysis and, 27–28, 55–56; and generalized other, 19; in national identities, 13; NATO decision makers’ framework, 9, 54–55, 89, 211, 217; within NATO on its nature, 27–28, 35, 54–56, 72–73, 219; within NATO on norms of liberal democracy, 7, 89, 260n13; power as competence, 16; social world as universe of, 18, 27. See also collective meanings Iraq, war, 207, 240–42, 247, 250–51

349

Ismay, Lord (Hastings Lionel Ismay), 53 Istanbul Summit (June 2004), 243 Italy, 54; and NATO communitybuilding, 51, 52; NATO Defense College, 137, 180; and NATO enlargement, 48–49, 277n164 Johnston, Iain, 98, 124 Jupille, Joseph, 222 Kant, Immanuel, 8, 9, 61, 233, 261–62nn23–24 Keohane, Robert, 216 Klaiber, Klaus-Peter, 112 Klaus, Vaclav, 104, 283n8, 292–93n158 Kosovo, 212, 239–40, 248; Albanian Kosovars, 155, 191; NATO-EU cooperation, 309n30; Serbs, 155, 191. See also Operation Allied Force/Kosovo crisis (1999) Kosovo Force (KFOR), 67; role-playing, 96, 138, 149, 179, 181–82, 200 Kovanda, Karel, 112 Kratochwil, Friedrich, 18, 20 Kundera, Milan, 133–34 labor mobility, 52–54 legal and institutional changes, 1–3, 11, 13, 32, 98; Czech, 94, 110, 125–27, 146, 152, 224; Romanian, 94, 178, 182, 203–4, 224 legitimacy: Kosovo intervention, 189–90, 224–25; NAC cooperation and, 217; NATO socialization, 94, 131, 147, 149, 185, 198–99, 222–25. See also authority; sovereignty liberal democratic norms and institutions, Western-style, 1–46, 60–88, 215, 232–39, 265n9, 306n29; Canadian, 271n86; Czech, 25–26, 32–33, 79, 82, 86, 94, 97–98, 103–57, 220–32, 239, 250–51, 280n20, 283n9, 288n88; domestic opposition to, 2, 12, 15, 33, 54, 73, 81–87, 99, 128–31, 144, 146–54, 173, 182, 226–28, 286n61; German, 217–18, 269n67; Greece and, 23, 40–46, 50, 71, 236–37; historical evolution of, 14, 112, 166–67; and Iraq war, 241, 250–51; Kantian, 8, 61, 261n23; Kosovo, 212, 239–41; NATO enlargement and, 23, 25–26, 34–35, 39–46, 49–50, 70–76,

350

Index

134–35, 143–44, 157–58, 215, 229–30, 234–38, 246, 278–79n11; NATO members not qualified in, 23, 39–46, 49, 71, 234, 236; NATO socialization practices, 2–35, 49–50, 65–70, 76, 77, 79–101, 104–56, 159–202, 216–31, 233; neoliberal institutionalism, 77–78, 216–21, 306n31; Romanian, 32–33, 82, 86, 94, 97–98, 157, 159–209, 215, 216, 220–32, 239, 250–51, 280n21, 294–95n24, 296n37; Russia, 73, 277n163; Slovakia and, 72, 215, 216; Turkey and, 23, 40–46, 50, 68, 71, 234, 236, 275–76n140. See also appropriate liberal democratic behavior; community-building, NATO; democratic control of military; naturalization of Western community and norms; values, liberal democratic Lichbach, Mark, 27 lifeworld, common, 92, 93, 100, 122, 150 Lincoln, Bruce, 28, 55 Lithuania, 75, 277n163 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 40 London: Conference of the Nine Powers (1954), 48–49, 50; NATO headquarters, 52 Madrid Summit (1997), 73–75, 229–30, 277n164; Czechs, 73, 104, 113, 125–28, 157, 277n164, 287n70; Romanians, 26, 75, 157, 160, 170; and Russia, 228 MAP. See Membership Action Plan marginalization, socializees, 152, 202–3 Marshall, George, 35–36 Marshall Center, 299n81; Czechs, 118, 120, 121, 137, 152; Romanians, 163, 169, 180, 199 Marshall Plan, 37 material strength: NATO, 16–17, 87–88, 211, 248–50; neorealism and, 211, 213. See also armed forces, NATO Mead, George Herbert, 19 meanings: state-interpreted reality, 11–13; teaching, 88–89. See also collective meanings; interpretations of reality Meciar government, Slovakia, 72, 216 Membership Action Plan (MAP), 2, 71,

74, 230, 237; Romanians and, 159–60, 165, 176–78, 194–95, 205 militarization, NATO, 50, 54, 63. See also armed forces, NATO; outside mode of pursuing international security military: conscription, 126, 141, 152; Czech, 108–9, 114–15, 125–27, 136–37, 140–41, 152–53; EU, 248, 309n30; German, 47–48, 49, 136; Romanian, 160, 164–65, 170–71, 180, 185–86, 189, 202–3, 206; technology, 109, 164–65, 170, 185–86, 208, 215. See also armed forces, NATO; defense arrangements, national; democratic control of military; international security; military threats Military Implementation Force (IFOR), 67; role-playing, 96, 138, 149, 179, 181, 182 military threats, 233; Czechs and, 81, 103, 128, 140–41; Romanians and, 81, 174. See also Soviet military threat; terrorism; war Milosevic, Slobodan, 189–90, 191, 212, 239–40 Ministerial Committee on the North Atlantic Community (Committee of Five), 51–53, 57 Ministry of Defense, 2, 11; Czech, 106, 115, 130–32, 141–53, 215, 283n14, 290n119, 293n161; European, 47; German, 164; Romanian, 161, 165–76, 183, 186–89, 194–206, 215, 304n155 Ministry of the Interior, 2; Czech, 290n129; Romanian, 160–61, 175, 177, 183–84, 187, 201–2, 207, 276n143, 300n89 minority rights, 10, 173, 207, 219 Mitterrand, François, 63 Moltke, Gebhardt von, 111 NAA/PA seminars/workshops, 30, 59–60, 69, 96, 263n58, 274–75n133; Czechs, 107, 116–17, 121, 136, 145; Romanians, 163, 165, 171, 172, 178, 207 NAC. See North Atlantic Council (NAC) Nastase, Romanian Prime Minister, 205, 206, 207, 250

Index nationalists, 12, 13, 64, 86, 271–72n95; Czech, 82, 84, 87, 128–29, 131, 144, 146, 148, 154; Greek, 308n8; Romanian, 81, 82, 84, 87, 99, 161, 162, 174, 191, 195–98, 206; Russian, 73, 74. See also state identities NATO: confidential reports, 29, 36, 56–57; foundational period (1947–early 1949), 21–22, 30, 35–40, 211, 234, 266n16, 271n91; headquarters, 52, 111, 242–43, 263n58; historical evolution (since 1949), 9, 21–30, 34–76; material strength, 16–17, 87–88, 211, 248–50; militarization, 50, 54, 63; power dynamics, 1, 14–17, 20, 87, 93, 110–11, 184, 189–96, 215; SHAPE, 49, 68, 181, 290n119, 307n48; strategic concepts, 5, 22, 34, 60, 65, 141, 174, 272–73n111, 274n129; Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit, 242–43; U.S. unilateralism, 213–15. See also armed forces, NATO; decision makers, NATO; double logic of international security; enlargement, NATO; NATO socialization practices; Secretariat, NATO NATO Defense College: Czechs, 118, 119, 121, 137, 152; Romanians, 163, 169, 180, 199 NATO enlargement after Cold War, 70–76, 102, 218–19; and appropriate Western identity, 134–35, 143–44, 234–38; and EU enlargement, 183; first wave, 23–25, 30, 34–35, 72–74, 81, 103–4, 146, 157–58, 215, 219; and liberal democratic norms and institutions, 23, 25–26, 34–35, 70–76, 157–58, 215, 229–30, 246, 278–79n11; and post-9/11, 249–50; second wave, 2, 25, 158–59, 207–8, 209, 229–30, 246; U.S. unilateralism and, 215. See also Madrid Summit (1997); NATO membership NATO membership, 70–76; associate, 42; as carrot, 26, 79, 80, 86, 142, 226; Czech (1999), 26, 72, 104; Czech motivations, 17, 81–83, 103, 128; Czech opposition to, 81, 123–24, 127–29, 135, 142–43, 155–56, 226, 279–80n20; Czech public relations campaign for, 127–35, 147, 156, 289n107; Czech

351

referendum on, 123–24, 129, 227, 288nn85,88; Germany (1955), 22, 23, 34, 46–50, 214; graduated, 39–40; Greece (1952), 22, 23, 34, 40–46, 50, 51, 71, 214, 236–37, 266–67nn26,28, 269–70n78; Hungary (1999), 26, 72; Poland (1999), 26, 72; Portugal, 39–40, 45; Romanian motivations, 81–84, 162; Romanian opposition to, 81, 84, 205; Spain (1982), 22, 23, 34, 45–46, 236, 267–68n53; Turkey (1952), 22, 23, 34, 40–46, 50, 51, 71, 214, 234, 236, 266–67nn26,28, 269–70n78, 275n140. See also enlargement, NATO; Madrid Summit (1997); Membership Action Plan (MAP) NATO socialization practices, 2–35; conditions facilitating/impeding, 196–202; context, 14–18; with Czechs, 24–26, 31–33, 81–151, 155, 199, 223–32, 292n146; effects, 30–33, 97, 99–101, 122, 135, 138–45, 149, 152–55, 182–204; Germany, 68, 216–18; in habitus, 85–91, 95, 98, 116–22, 138, 169; international norm projection, 10–14, 18, 31, 61, 68–69, 77, 79–101, 104–56, 160–78, 219–31, 278–79n11; IR theory, 4, 14–16, 77–80, 92, 93, 210–32, 280n30; liberal democratic norms and institutions, 2–35, 49–50, 65–70, 76, 77–101, 104–56, 159–202, 216–31, 233; limited effects, 152–55, 198–99, 202–4; methods of analysis, 27–33; with Romanians, 24–26, 31–33, 84–101, 159–204, 223–32, 302–3n138; toward an understanding of, 18–21, 88–99. See also community-building; next generation’s socialization by NATO; persuasion; role-playing; state-crafting; teaching naturalization of Western community and norms, 1, 28, 54–57, 86; Czechs, 87, 105, 128, 132–35, 154, 155, 283n9; Parliamentarian, 59–60; Romanians, 87, 157–58, 163, 166, 168–69, 172; teaching, 88, 89, 97, 132–33, 166, 168–69 neoliberal institutionalism, 77–78, 216–21, 306n31 neorealism, 8, 14–16, 77–78, 210–16, 305nn3,10

352

Index

Netherlands, 41–43, 45, 51, 277n164 new Europe: Iraq war supported by, 207, 250–51; and NATO-EU cooperation, 250–51; NATO leadership in, 64–65; normative foundation of, 62. See also Central/Eastern Europeans (CEE) next generation’s socialization by NATO, 92, 95; Czech, 86, 117–22, 133, 135, 144–45, 147–48; Romanian, 86, 159–60, 162–63, 169–72, 194–95, 198–99, 203 Nine-Power Conference (1954), 48–49, 50 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 58–59, 69–70; Czech, 132, 135, 142; Kosovo, 212, 240; Romanian, 178, 184–85, 187, 188, 203–4 norms, 259n5; generalized other, 20, 146–47, 155, 197, 223, 225; internalization of new, 97–98; international projection of, 10–14, 18, 31, 61, 68–69, 77, 79–101, 104–56, 160–78, 219–31, 278–79n11. See also accountability; appropriate behavior; collective meanings; consistency, norm; consultations; cooperation; habitus; liberal democratic norms and institutions; naturalization of Western community and norms; transparency norms; values, liberal democratic North Atlantic Assembly (NAA)/Parliamentary Assembly (PA), 24, 66. See also NAA/PA seminars/workshops North Atlantic Council (NAC), 3, 6, 56–57, 69, 216–17; assessment meetings, 159; consensus-building within, 115–16; documents, 30; intersubjectivity, 9, 55; and NATO enlargement, 25, 35, 43, 47, 70–71, 75–76, 102, 215, 230; naturalization of Western community, 55; and Romania’s ANP, 185; Visegrad states’ social influence on, 229. See also Secretariat, NATO North Atlantic Forces. See armed forces, NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization. See NATO North Atlantic Treaty/Washington Treaty (1949), 35–45, 54, 64, 133;

Article 2, 22, 38, 51, 56, 63, 270n78; Article 5, 307n48; Article 10, 74; community-building and, 58–59, 234–35; Preamble, 22, 38, 51, 56, 63, 71, 234–35 Norway: and NATO communitybuilding, 51, 234; and NATO enlargement, 38, 41–43, 45, 277n164 novices, in international socialization practices, 19–20, 92–93, 99–100, 106, 111, 118, 145–48, 172, 223 Novotny, Jaromir, 106 Office for Press and Information, NATO, 131, 132, 135 Office of the Secretary General. See Secretariat, NATO old Europe, 250. See also Western Europe Operation Allied Force/Kosovo crisis (1999), 94, 212; Czechs and, 154–55, 224–25, 292–93nn158,161; and human rights, 155, 200, 239–41, 293n161; IFOR, 67, 96, 138, 149, 179, 181, 182; as inside mode, 212, 239–40; KFOR, 67, 96, 138, 149, 179, 181–82, 200; Romanians and, 26, 181–82, 189–94, 200, 227; SFOR, 181–82, 192, 200 Operation Enduring Freedom, 243 Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), 51–52, 270nn81,84 OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), 139, 212, 237, 240, 306n31; inside logic, 62; Kosovo, 212, 240; monitoring and socialization, 10, 69–70; NATO enlargement and, 71; PfP and, 67; and Romanians, 174. See also CSCE otherness: civilizational, 236–37, 308n8; domestic others, 13, 86–87, 168, 195, 223, 228; generalized other, 19–20, 146–47, 155, 197, 223, 225; teaching, 111 Ottoman heritage, Turkish, 41, 236 outside mode of pursuing international security (geostrategic arrangements), 4–11, 29, 210–11, 232–33, 265n4; and Afghanistan, 243; communitybuilding and, 60; cooperative, 261n20; forward defense strategy, 41, 46–47, 49, 50, 76; over inside logic,

Index 22–23, 39–44, 45, 50–51, 68, 71, 236; inside logic over, 44–45, 46, 87; and NATO enlargement, 40–50, 72, 76, 215, 234, 236, 270n78, 275n140; vs. Soviet military threat, 22–23, 34, 38–39, 76, 232. See also strategic concepts; threats Paris: Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990), 62; NATO headquarters, 52; OEEC based in, 51–52; Paris Agreements (1954), 49, 269n71 Parliament, 66, 116–17; Czech, 104–5, 116–17, 141, 142, 145, 153; Romanian, 160, 163, 175, 186, 187, 192 Parliamentarians, NATO, 59–60, 66, 116–17 Parliamentary Assembly (PA)/North Atlantic Assembly (NAA), 24, 66. See also NAA/PA seminars/workshops participant-observation, 27, 30, 285–86n57 Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism, 244 Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC), 67–68, 299n81; Czechs, 118; Romanians, 169, 170, 181, 201, 231 Partnership for Peace (PfP), 24, 30, 66–70, 208, 220, 244, 281n46; courses/workshops, 67–68, 96, 118–21, 136–39, 169–72, 178–80, 199–200; Czechs, 106, 107, 116, 118–21, 136–39, 148–50; and EAPC, 68, 136–37, 244; interoperability, 119, 159, 169–70, 181; launched (1994), 66–67, 102; participantobservation, 30, 285–86n57; roleplaying in courses, 96, 136–38, 149, 178–80, 199–200; Romanians, 169–72, 178–83, 188, 192, 194, 199–200, 203, 208, 230–31 Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR), 161, 162, 197 Party of Social Democracy of Romania (PDSR), 161, 162, 163, 191, 203 Payne, Jiri, 106 peacekeeping operations: Kosovo, 192. See also armed forces, NATO Pearson, Lester, 51 persuasion, 13, 28, 79, 88, 99–101; Czechs, 92–93, 100, 104, 110, 116, 122–35, 142, 150–51, 155, 224–26;

353

described, 91–95; IR theory, 77, 92, 93, 215, 224–26, 231; and NATO enlargement, 43, 48, 214, 215; Romanians, 92–93, 99, 100, 160, 162, 165, 173–78, 189, 192–96, 200–201, 203, 302–3n138; social influence compared to, 98, 124 PfP. See Partnership for Peace PHARE seminars, 139 Pithart, Petr, 250 Poland, 71, 79, 109, 114–15; Madrid Summit (1997) invitation, 73, 157, 277n164; NATO admission (1999), 26, 72 police: Czech, 290n129; Romanian, 187, 201–2, 208 Political Affairs Division, NATO, 69, 262n28; and Czechs, 107, 112; and Romanians, 162, 170, 307n48 politics, 18, 31–33, 210; NATO (since 1949), 34–76; norm projection, 10–14, 79–101, 104–56; terrorism supported by, 246; U.S. unilateral, 213–15. See also domestic politics; international security Portugal, 39–40, 45, 52 power: as competence, 15–17; disciplinary, 20; in hegemonic stability theory, 213, 305n10; hidden, 20; in individualist terms, 15; material, 14–17, 87–88, 211, 213, 248–50; NATO dynamics, 1, 14–17, 20, 87, 93, 110–11, 184, 189–96, 215; neorealism on, 210–11; and persuasion, 93–94; symbolic, 15–17; teaching, 88, 111. See also authority; coercive power; military Prague Summit (November 2002), 209, 244 predicate analysis, 28 presuppositions, 28 private beliefs: norm change in, 31–33; religious, 96, 235, 236–37, 246, 308n8; role-playing and, 96. See also attitudes; interpretations of reality; values public opinion polls: Czech, 81, 103, 123, 127–28, 143, 291n138; Romanian, 191 public relations campaigning for NATO, 58; Czech, 127–35, 147, 156, 289n107

354

Index

rationalist perspective, 221–31, 261n23, 281n48; argumentative rationality, 291n136, 302n128; cheap talk, 31; economic, 217–18; instrumental rationality, 80–81, 190, 221, 252; norm projection, 80–81, 221–31. See also individualism realism: neorealism, 8, 14–16, 77–78, 210–16, 305nn3,10; structural, 212–13, 215 reality. See interpretations of reality referendum on NATO membership: Czech, 123–24, 129, 227, 288nn85,88; Spanish, 268n53 religion, 235; Greek Orthodox, 236–37, 308n8; role-playing, 96; terrorism based on, 246 Republican Party, Czech (SPR-RSC), 128, 144 Reus-Smit, Chris, 14 rhetorical manipulation, 73, 162, 194, 300n89 rights: minority, 10, 173, 207, 219; war on terrorism limiting, 158–59, 208–9, 245, 304n157. See also human rights; values, liberal democratic Risse, Thomas, 78–79, 92, 100, 214, 264n1, 291n136, 302n128 Robertson, George, 108, 240, 246, 247, 248, 249 role-playing, 13, 88, 99–101, 104; Czechs, 135–38, 144, 148–50, 155, 224, 292n146; described, 95–97, 101, 135–38, 148–50, 178; especially successful, 101, 135; IFOR/KFOR/SFOR, 96, 138, 149, 179, 181–82, 200; IR theory, 77; in PfP courses, 96, 136–38, 149, 178–80, 199–200; Romanians, 160, 165, 178–82, 199–200, 303n138; worldview affected by, 96, 200 Roman, Petre, 163 Romanians, 16, 72, 74–75, 157–209, 219, 277n164, 307n48; ANP, 159, 165, 185–86, 187, 194, 226; defense arrangements, 160–89, 194–207, 215, 226, 304n155; domestic politics, 31–33, 81–87, 99, 157, 160–207, 215, 220–21, 226, 227, 294–95n24, 298n64; EU and, 174, 183, 187, 192, 207, 227, 276n143; interviews with, 27, 29–30, 183–84; Iraq war support, 207, 250–51; liberal democratic

norms and institutions, 32–33, 86, 97–98, 157, 159–209, 215, 216, 220–21, 223–32, 239, 250–51, 280n21, 294–95n24, 296n37; Madrid Summit (1997), 26, 75, 157, 160, 170; NATO membership motivations, 81–84, 162; NATO socialization practices, 24–26, 31–33, 84–101, 159–204, 223–32, 302–3n138; opposition to liberal democratic norms and institutions, 15, 33, 82, 84, 87, 99, 173, 182, 227, 286n61; opposition to NATO membership, 81, 84, 205; pro-reform government (1996–2000)/Constantinescu, 33, 157, 163, 206, 294–95n24, 298n64; returning to Europe, 17, 163, 205; security concerns, 81, 174, 206; state identity, 17, 26, 82, 86–87, 168, 192, 195, 197, 205–6, 220 Ropp, Stephen, 78–79 Rose-Roth Initiative, 66, 116–17 rule of law. See values, liberal democratic (democracy/human rights/rule of law) Russia, 228–29, 238; Czechs and, 125, 132, 140–41; and Romanians, 159, 190, 205; special charter with (1997), 228; Yeltsin regime, 73, 228, 277n163. See also Russian Federation; Soviet Union Russian Federation: Atlantic Treaty Association branches, 66; NATO enlargement and, 73, 228; Romanian treaty (1991), 205; U.S. unilateralism in NATO and, 214 Saddam Hussein, 241, 250 “Scandinavian status,” Czech, 129, 287n84 Schimmelfennig, Frank, 162, 221, 226, 279n14 Schmitt, Carl, 245 Secretariat, NATO, 6, 55; and community-building, 57, 58; and Czechs, 1, 107–9, 111, 112, 123, 282n4, 288n88; and Iraq war, 241; Lord Ismay on labor mobility, 53; on Parliamentarians, 59–60; Robertson, 108, 240, 246, 247, 248, 249; and Romanians, 175; Solana, 71–73, 112, 123, 282n4, 288n88; Spaak, 235; Wörner, 1, 64, 281n46

Index security. See defense arrangements, national; international security; strategic concepts security concerns: Czech, 81, 103, 125, 128, 140–41; Romanian, 81, 174, 206. See also danger; threats security management institutions: alliances vs., 216. See also NATO Security of Information Agreement, NATO-EU, 246–47, 309n30 seminars. See courses/workshops/seminars September 11, 158–59, 205, 207–9, 238–52 Serbs, 155, 191. See also Kosovo SFOR (Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina), 181–82, 192, 200 shaming, 99, 123–24, 142, 189, 192, 227 SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe), 49, 68, 181, 290n119, 307n48 Sikkink, Kathryn, 78–79, 303n144 Slovakia, 219; Czech velvet divorce from, 102–3, 104, 106; and liberal democratic norms and institutions, 72, 215, 216; Meciar government, 72, 216 Slovenia, 74–75, 277n164 Smith, Mark, 45 Snyder, Glenn, 213 Social Democratic parties, 82; Czech, 99, 104–5, 123–24, 129, 142, 144, 146, 154, 227, 282n7, 287n84, 291n129, 293n158; German, 269n71; Romanian, 161, 162, 163, 173, 191, 203, 206 Social Democratic Party (PSD), Romanian, 203, 206 Social Democratic Party of Romania (PSDR), 173, 203 Social Democratic Union (USD), Romanian, 163 social influence, 98–99, 124, 229 Socialist Labor Party (PSM), Romanian, 161 socialists, Romanian conservative, 87, 188–89, 196, 198, 227; Iliescu administrations, 160–63, 191, 203–7, 215; opposition to NATO membership, 81, 84, 205; persuasion used with, 99, 173, 189. See also Communists

355

social learning, 21, 79, 117, 222. See also international socialization; teaching social proof, in persuasion, 94, 95 social psychology, 10, 77, 99, 252; on role-playing, 95–96, 101, 135, 150; and socialization effects, 135, 199; symbolic interactionism, 19–20. See also sociology social relations, NATO-CEE, 1–33, 65–69, 77–101, 110, 195. See also NATO socialization practices; social learning social world, as intersubjective universe, 18, 27 sociology, 10, 77, 217–18, 252, 260n13; on habitus, 85; on socialization effects, 199; symbolic interactionism, 19–20; on teaching, 90, 99, 100, 111, 121. See also Bourdieu, Pierre Solana, Javier, 71–73, 112, 123, 282n4, 288n88 sovereignty, 17, 219, 229, 245, 261nn18,20; Czech, 82, 84, 110–11, 123, 128–30, 147, 162, 288n85; German, 49, 269n67, 306n29; inside and outside modes and, 4, 7–8, 11; Kosovo crisis and, 155, 293n161; Romanian, 82, 84, 93, 160, 162, 172, 173, 185, 194, 196, 226; terrorism defense and, 293n161 Soviet military threat: Communist subversion worse than, 35–37; Czechs and, 140–41; hegemonic stability theory and, 213, 214; NATO community-building and, 63–64; NATO enlargement and, 41–43, 45; outside mode vs., 22–23, 34, 38–39, 76, 232. See also Cold War Soviet Union: and Germany reunification, 269n71; World War II heroism, 54. See also Russia; Soviet military threat Spain: Franco years, 44–45, 46, 214, 236; NATO membership (1982), 22, 23, 34, 45–46, 236, 267–68n53. See also Madrid Summit (1997) Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR), 181–82, 192, 200 state-crafting: by NATO, 2–4, 12–13, 30–31, 197–98, 210–19, 251. See also liberal democratic norms and

356

Index

institutions, Western-style; NATO socialization practices; state identities state identities, 13–14, 15; appropriate liberal democratic, 2, 18–20, 66, 82, 86, 140, 219, 234–38; Czech, 82, 86–87, 102–3, 109–10, 128–35, 145–47, 156, 220, 224–25, 291n137; vs. domestic others, 13, 86–87, 168, 195, 223, 228; inappropriate, 9, 19, 223–24; NATO helping construct, 2–4, 11–13, 24–26, 86, 103, 108–10, 130–35, 145, 168, 195, 211, 218–20, 222–24, 264n1; returning to Europe, 17–18, 103, 128, 143–44, 163, 205, 237, 283n9; Romanian, 17, 26, 82, 86–87, 168, 192, 195, 197, 205–6, 220. See also appropriate liberal democratic behavior; nationalists; sovereignty strategic concepts, 229; Czech, 125, 145, 152, 286–87nn67,69; NATO, 5, 22, 34, 60, 65, 141, 174, 272–73n111, 274n129. See also defense arrangements, national; outside mode of pursuing international security structural realism, 212–13, 215. See also neorealism Study on NATO Enlargement (1995), 67, 71, 74, 162, 237, 262n28 Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE), 49, 68, 181, 290n119, 307n48 symbolic capital, 248–50. See also trust symbolic interactionism, 19–20 symbolic power, 15–17 symbolic violence, state’s, 11 Taliban, 243, 304n155 teaching, 13, 21, 39, 67, 92–101, 299n81; Czechs, 103, 104, 110–37, 140, 142, 144–51, 155, 199, 224; described, 88–91; discourse analysis and, 28; IR theory, 77, 92, 130, 221, 280n30; next generation, 92, 117–22, 144–45, 147–48, 159–60, 169–72, 198–99; public relations campaigning, 58, 127–35, 147, 156, 289n107; Romanians, 159–60, 165–72, 178–81, 196, 198–99. See also courses/workshops/seminars; social learning technology: anti-terrorist, 243; military,

109, 164–65, 170, 185–86, 208, 215 terrorism, 238–52; Czech security concerns about, 81; rights limited in war on, 158–59, 208–9, 245, 304n157; Romanian contribution to war on, 207; September 11 and, 158–59, 205, 207–9, 238–52 Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit, NATO, 242–43 threats, 233, 305n3; of Communist subversion in West, 35–38, 50, 54, 211, 244–45, 271n91; to Czechs, 81, 103, 125, 128, 140–41; to Romanians, 81, 174, 206, 297n59. See also danger; domestic others; enemies; international security; military threats; security concerns; terrorism; war transnational networks: Czech, 110, 138, 152, 155–56, 227–28; IR theory, 188, 220, 227–28, 303n144; Kosovo crisis, 192; NATO allies, 213–14; organized crime, 174, 175, 208, 243, 247, 304n157; Romanian, 182, 188, 192, 195–96, 227–28 transparency norms, 10, 80, 90, 101, 114, 221, 230–31; Czechs and, 121, 136, 140, 145, 153, 155; Romanians and, 176, 179, 192, 201, 296n37 treaties: Brussels, 49; Romanian Good Neighborhood, 173, 174; RomanianRussian Federation (1991), 205. See also North Atlantic Treaty/Washington Treaty (1949) triangulation, empirical, 27 trust: identity-based, 82–84, 225; in NATO (by socializees), 13, 17, 64, 82–84, 100, 101, 223, 226, 280n21; between NATO members, 216–20; NATO post-9/11, 248–49; Permanent Joint Council, 228; PfP and, 67, 220. See also threats Turkey, 240, 271n86; Istanbul Summit (June 2004), 243; and liberal democratic norms and institutions, 23, 40–46, 50, 68, 71, 234, 236, 275–76n140; NATO entry (1952), 22, 23, 34, 40–46, 50, 51, 71, 214, 234, 236, 266–70, 275n140 unilateralism, U.S. in NATO, 213–15 unipolarity, hegemonic stability theory and, 212–14, 305n10 United Kingdom (U.K.). See Britain

Index United Nations (U.N.): Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 243; and Iraq war, 241; and Kosovo, 212, 240; liberal democratic norms, 14 United States, 9, 15, 51, 250; Britain and, 270n81; Charter of Partnership with Baltic states, 75; domestic isolationist tendencies, 48; forward defense strategy, 41; and Greece, 266n28; hegemonic stability theory and, 212, 213–15; immigrant labor, 53; Iraq war, 207, 241, 250; and NATO community-building, 51, 52, 53, 214; and NATO enlargement, 42–43, 44, 47–49, 277n164; NATO founders from, 35–36, 37, 38; unilateralism in NATO, 213–15 values, liberal democratic (democracy/human rights/rule of law), 6–7, 62, 235; during Cold War, 36–38, 56–59, 65–67, 237; following Cold War, 14, 64–76, 237. See also human rights; liberal democratic norms and institutions; norms; worldview Velvet Revolution, Czech, 1, 102–3, 104, 106 Visegrad states, 72, 73, 158, 160, 229, 277n164. See also Czechs; Hungary; Poland Vondra, Alexandr, 111 Wallander, Celeste, 216–18, 306n20 Waltz, Kenneth, 9, 77, 211, 213, 214, 305n3 war: Greek civil, 41, 266n28, 308n8; Iraq, 207, 240–42, 247, 250–51; with

357

Soviet Union, 36; third world, 37. See also Cold War; Operation Allied Force/Kosovo crisis (1999); terrorism Warsaw Pact, 135, 215, 229 Washington Summit (1999), 2, 143, 159, 179, 229, 230 Washington Treaty. See North Atlantic Treaty/Washington Treaty (1949) Weber, Max, 18 Wendt, Alexander, 19, 20 West: Czechs and, 1, 25–26, 128–29, 131–35; Danube blockade, 26, 190; norms defined by, 10–14, 79–101; as one, 54–55; Romanians and, 81, 163. See also liberal democratic norms and institutions, Western-style; NATO; United States; Western Europe Western Europe: Communist subversion threat, 35–38, 50, 54, 211, 244–45, 271n91. See also Benelux states; Britain; France Western European Union (WEU), 49 Wohlforth, William, 213 workshops. See courses/workshops/seminars worldview, NATO socialization of, 55–56, 84–85; common lifeworld, 92, 93, 100, 122, 150; role-playing affecting, 96, 200; socializees’ new, 19–20, 100–101, 122, 200. See also attitudes; interpretations of reality; norms; values Wörner, Manfred, 1, 64, 281n46 Yeltsin, Boris, 73, 228, 277n163 Yugoslavia, 120, 190–92, 211, 241, 309n30. See also Bosnia; Kosovo Zeman, Milos, 104, 124, 129