Naming Theatre
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Naming Theatre
Performance Interventions Series Editors: Elaine Aston, University of Lancaster, and Bryan Reynolds, University of California, Irvine Performance Interventions is a series of monographs and essay collections on theatre, performance, and visual culture that share an underlying commitment to the radical and political potential of the arts in our contemporary moment, or give consideration to performance and to visual culture from the past deemed crucial to a social and political present. Performance Interventions moves transversally across artistic and ideological boundaries to publish work that promotes dialogue between practitioners and academics, and interactions between performance communities, educational institutions, and academic disciplines. Titles include: Alan Ackerman and Martin Puchner (editors) AGAINST THEATRE Creative Destructions on the Modernist Stage Elaine Aston and Geraldine Harris (editors) FEMINIST FUTURES? Theatre, Performance, Theory Maaike Bleeker VISUALITY IN THE THEATRE The Locus of Looking James Frieze NAMING THEATRE Demonstrative Diagnosis in Performance Lynette Goddard STAGING BLACK FEMINISMS Identity, Politics, Performance Alison Forsyth and Chris Megson (editors) GET REAL: DOCUMENTARY THEATRE PAST AND PRESENT Leslie Hill and Helen Paris (editors) PERFORMANCE AND PLACE D.J. Hopkins, Shelley Orr and Kim Solga (editors) PERMANCE AND THE CITY Amelia Howe Kritzer POLITICAL THEATRE IN POST-THATCHER BRITAIN New Writing: 1995–2005 Melissa Sihra (editor) WOMEN IN IRISH DRAMA A Century of Authorship and Representation Performance Interventions Series Standing Order ISBN 978–1–4039–4443–6 Hardback 978–1–4039–4444–3 Paperback (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England
Naming Theatre Demonstrative Diagnosis in Performance James Frieze
© James Frieze 2009 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2009 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–0–230–51770–7 hardback ISBN-10: 0–230–51770–6 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne
Contents List of Illustrations
vi
Acknowledgements
vii
1
Introduction: Improper Naming
2
Authorship: A Trick of the I
29
3
Assimilation: Sounding Through the Surface
49
4
Demonstration: Illustrative Irony
73
5
Diagnosis: Putting Medical History Under the Knife
95
6
Programming: The Designated Blueprint
110
7
Disclosure: Transcript and Testimony
128
8
Monstrosity: Branding the Phatic
142
9
Graphting: Plotting the Body as Puzzle
155
Supplement: Naming Critical Acts
167
10
1
Notes
185
Bibliography
199
Index
206
v
Illustrations 1 2 3
4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Two undiscovered Amerindians visit Covent Garden, London, May 1992 (Photo: Peter Barker) Vickilyn Reynolds as Aunt Ethel (Photo: Martha Swope) Spectators pass through the enormous skirt of a 12-foot-tall Medusa to begin their journey through the history of medicine (Photo: Nancy Chu) The Church lifts its 1400 year ban on dissection (Photo: Valerie Arias) The Travels (Photo: Hugo Glendinning) Cage performs at Harvard University (1990) (Photo: Betty Freeman, courtesy of John Cage Trust) George Maciunas, Fluxiosity (Permission courtesy of Ken Friedman) Jon Hough (left) as Sally and David Woods as Kevin (Photo: Chris Tait) ‘Directing chaos with authoritative aplomb’ (Photo: Pau Ros) David Annen as Roland Barthes (Photo: Pau Ros)
vi
76 89
97 108 111 114 127 144 158 164
Acknowledgements This book was generously supported by the Arts and Humanities Research Council. For critical guidance, I thank Elaine Aston and Bryan Reynolds. Thanks also to everyone at Palgrave, including Paula Kennedy, Steven Hall, Christabel Scaife, and Penny Simmons, for making the production of the book such an enjoyable process. Those who provided insights and materials include Theodora Skipitares, Jeanne Harrison, Will Adamsdale, Paula Vogel, Andy Lavender, Dan Rebellato, Ping Chong, Bruce Allardice, Jon Hough, David Woods, Cathriona Burke, and Liz Diamond. Chapter 3 draws on two previous essays: ‘The Mess Behind the Veil: Assimilating Ping Chong’ (Theatre Research International vol. 31 no. 1, Spring 2006); and ‘Imperceptible Mutabilities in the Third Kingdom: SuzanLori Parks and the Shared Struggle to Perceive’ (Modern Drama vol. xli no. 4, Winter 1998). For input on the material concerning postmodernism in Chapter 10, I am grateful to Baz Kershaw and Graham Ley. To members of the Performance and the Body working group of TaPRA, thank you for vital discussion. For their wisdom and inspiring example, I cite Sally Banes, Mary Karen Dahl, Phillip Zarrilli, and Gerry Harris. Colleagues, former colleagues, and students of Liverpool John Moores University who supported this book practically and conceptually include Timothy Ashplant, Dymphna Callery, Ross Dawson, Charlie Dickinson, Oliver Double, Colin Fallows, Martin Griffiths, Colin Harrison, Elli Johnson, Siân Lincoln, Aileen La Tourette, David Llewellyn, Mike McCormack, Ros Merkin, Joe Moran, Jenny Newman, Joanna Price, Berthold Schoene-Harwood, Andrew Sherlock, Mark Smith, Tamsin Spargo, Yannis Tzioumakis, Roger Webster, and Andy Young. People after whom I am named, or who are named like me, must share the blame: my late father Geoffrey, who could sew; my mother Patricia (who, despite performing her final stage role in Strindberg’s Dance of Death when she was pregnant with me, continues to tread the boards of my life); my niece Jessica (whose writing accomplishments have cast a shadow over my efforts since she was five years of age); and the extraordinary Josephine, for whom no-one can stand in.
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1 Introduction: Improper Naming
I began writing this book with a desire to understand what I perceived to be an obsession with naming in recent theatrical performances and texts. The naming in these plays and performances – of characters, settings, events, and phenomena – seemed to interrogate naming itself. How, I found myself asking, did this conspicuous name-play reflect on, and how did it intervene in, social experience of, and critical thinking about, identity, reality, and the mediation of identity and reality? The chapters that follow address this multi-part question through close reading of particular theatre-makers and works. In outlining the book’s argument, this Introduction will contextualize those readings sociopolitically vis-à-vis critical discourse, theatre history, and performance theory. Rich veins of analysis of naming run through philosophy, psychoanalysis, and linguistics. Emphasis within these disciplines has been on the mechanics of how a signifying symbol-set correlates to a signified object: on the relationship between an experience or phenomenon, conceived as singular and discrete, and particular labels that are attached to it. In other words, the focus has been on teasing out how a thing relates to its name. Saul Kripke wants us to think of names as rigid designators, which ‘stick’ due to causal habits amongst a community of speakers. He rejects descriptivist theories of naming propounded by the likes of Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, each of which argue that names emerge from the properties of an object – as a descriptive synonym for, or sum of, those properties. Naming Theatre leaves that debate to linguistics and philosophy, but it is worth noting that, while their functional properties have been hotly debated for centuries, there is general agreement that names hide some ‘things’ (objects, rules, laws) and reveal others. Behind every name there are numerous stories. 1
2 Naming Theatre
The word ‘behind’ is crucial here. Names can stand in the way of, and render invisible, repositories of memory. Names are mnemonic, aiding memory; but they also forget. Names are the shells of stories, that which remains after stories are assimilated; but they are also the glue of the assimilation process, linking the way we absorb stories to our own absorption into society. While analyses of naming have much to contribute to the study of theatre, theatre has much to contribute to the analysis of naming. When critical theorists and philosophers analyse the relationship between naming and identity-formation – what Judith Butler (see Chapter 2) terms ‘the intersubjective relation’ of ‘the linguistic scene’ – they often deploy theatrical metaphors in ways that bracket, or erase, theatrical practice itself. Theatrical practice has direct relevance to everyday speech relations, not least in its history of enacting the dynamics of concealing and making visible integral to naming. My examination of naming traces ways in which acts and rituals of naming that were once part of theatre’s traditionally ‘invisible’ armoury (character names, stage directions, statements by narrators) function as objects of attention along with other ‘invisibles’ such as space and time. In the process, theatre reminds us that naming is spatial/geographical and temporal/ historical. The dynamics of naming are gestaltic: they entail interplay of figure and ground. In naming something, the namer establishes it as a figure against a ground that may or may not be visible before the act of naming occurs, but which is thrown into relief by the act of naming. Naming makes visible a particular configuration of parts, an entity. Other possible entities are overwritten or unwritten. Because naming is always also un-naming, all naming creates, in Coco Fusco’s phrase (see Chapter 4), a ‘zero space’, erasing what was previously in view. Naming shepherds properties into nodes that focus perception. In drawing attention, concentrating the gaze, naming trains seeing to a logic of figure and ground, a perceptual geography in which meaning is clustered, or nodal, and what lies outside the nodes or clusters of meaning formed by naming demands less attention. As the theatre-makers I read remind us, naming, including theatrical naming, structures knowledge most efficiently if its methods remain unnamed. The strongest message propounded in these works is that, for theatre to genuinely engage with and intervene in the re-framing of conceptualization, it must take demonstrable responsibility for its own naming systems. To an extent, such reflexive naming is continuous with, indeed a hallmark of, (varyingly mappable) avant-garde or
Introduction: Improper Naming 3
experimental theatre, previous volleys of which are explicitly invoked in these works. At the same time, I posit these works as a group because they defamiliarize theatre’s systems of enunciability, applying metaphors in ways that unravel metaphor. Citing and re-siting naming rituals and conventions, they interrogate the politics of naming, highlighting the name’s emotive force as well as the mechanics of its operation.
Character and property The vast bulk of character names that populate theatre history tend to perform the positivist function of identifying individuals by personality and locating them by group. This includes allegorical constructs like ‘Everyman’, and similarly metaphorical names like ‘Volpone, or the Foxe’, as Jonson describes his eponymous protagonist. While it is solipsistically easy to see recent practice as richer than that of bygone centuries, it is also true that the twentieth century is marked by radically new kinds of character-naming. Toward and into the twenty-first century, characternaming has become increasingly about the play of difference within, about the alienation of characters from themselves, the detachment of their present(ation) from their history. Character-naming has become ironic and dichotomous, marking desire, failure, and loss while staking out possibility, autonomy, and liberation. A distancing of name from character begins in earnest with the impact of (what is conventionally labelled) expressionism on the stage. Sophie Treadwell’s Machinal (1928), for example, is imbued with expressionist ideas about the effects of spiritually alienating and deindividuating urban industrialization. Building on European plays by the likes of Oscar Kokoschka and George Wedekind, and on American works like Elmer Rice’s The Adding Machine, Treadwell deploys generic nomenclature to show the gap between individual freedom and the position available to a ‘Young Woman’ in a mechanized world. Treadwell draws attention to naming, putting her feminist stamp on the expressionist convention of generic nomenclature. The name ‘Young Woman’ stands in ironic relationship to the character ‘Helen’, who is herself something of a dramatic stand-in for the real-life character Ruth Snyder, the Long Island housewife executed for murdering her husband. In the intensely machinic first scene of the play, at the Office, the name of the boss and his firm is the most repeated of elements, courtesy of the Telephone Girl’s continual, telephone-voice greeting to callers: ‘George H. Jones…, George H. Jones and Company…, George H. Jones…’ (Treadwell, 1993, p. 9). The boss’s name rings in Helen’s ear via dramatized interior monologues in which
4 Naming Theatre
the oppressive prospect of marriage means, as the phrase goes, ‘taking his name’, which really means becoming his acquisition. A man who has made his name for himself, George H. Jones refers to everyone else in the most generic of code: Miss A, Miss B, Mr A, and Mr B. A different kind of play on schematic, coded naming can be found in Beckett. Like so many aspects of his writing, Beckett’s use of names is characterized by richness within simplicity. Come and Go (1965) features three women – Ru, Vi, and Flo – who adopt precisely delineated positions in a sequence of mini-conversations so brief and so tightly orchestrated that the orchestration rises above the substance of the conversation. Monosyllabic, colloquially ordinary, distinctly old-fashioned English names, ‘Ru’, ‘Vi’, and ‘Flo’ are also subject to Beckett’s modernist referentiality, happening to allude to the flowers that adorn Ophelia in Hamlet – though only a few bright sparks or the research-prone might notice the allusion.1 Insofar as Beckett’s naming layers colloquial and classical and Treadwell’s plays positivism against expressionism in a sardonically quotational manner, both are examples that point toward, but stop well short of the play with, and on, character-naming in the examples I discuss from the late 1980s onwards. In schematic, quotational naming more extreme and more generative than that found in Beckett or Treadwell, authors like Suzan-Lori Parks and Paula Vogel extend (in historical terms) the use of name-play to construct and deconstruct identity. Like the name ‘Young Woman’, the name ‘Third Man’ is unspoken in Vogel’s Baltimore Waltz (see Chapter 2). The unspoken status of the Third Man contrasts pointedly with the continual reiteration by him of the names of the play’s other two characters. In the context of a play about the politics of the unspoken in the management of AIDS and homosexuality, the ex-nomination of ‘the Third Man’ is significant. In a different kind of occlusion by naming, ‘Buffy’, ‘Muffy’, and ‘Duffy’ are reiterated so zealously by their young bearers in Parks’s Imperceptible Mutabilities in the Third Kingdom (Chapter 3) that their drilling attains military proportions: like all military drills, the effect is the swallowing of personality through systematic induction. While Treadwell and Beckett are less extreme in their name-play than Vogel or Parks, any historical claims about the distinctiveness of late twentieth-century naming are mitigated by the work of avant-garde authors like Adrienne Kennedy and (earlier still) Gertrude Stein. As in Parks’s, there is something immediately suggestive about naming in Kennedy’s plays. The Owl Answers was first produced in New York in 1965 – the year that Beckett wrote (the first version, in English, of) Come
Introduction: Improper Naming 5
and Go. The Owl Answers proffers characters with names like Bastard’s Black Mother Who is the Reverend’s Wife Who is Anne Boleyn and She Who is Clara Passmore who is the Virgin Mary who is the Bastard who is the Owl. These names advertise the play’s acerbic exploration of quasischizophrenic self-perception. It is an exploration, as her name so vividly suggests, that entails a woman’s obsessive quest to access and express her own history; an exploration that projects, onto our reading of character, a history of metaphor. Kennedy’s note at the start of the play advises that ‘characters change slowly back and forth into and out of themselves, leaving some garment of their previous selves upon them’ (Kennedy, 1988, p. 25). The characters’ severely enunciative names are garments in themselves – garments quilted, in Kennedy’s distinctively uncanny, ritualistic fashion, from the Bible, history books, popular culture, and the contemporary experience of African Americans. As in Parks (see Chapter 3), character names in Kennedy seem to have been regurgitated from subjects who have been fervently but only speciously acculturated. Theatrically enacting acculturation, Parks and Kennedy offer characters who struggle to appear beneath a schema, the systematicity of which seems to keep them in place yet not to accommodate them. The enigmatic nature of these characters and their names poses a seriously playful challenge to the spectator/reader, stealthily bonding us to characters in a shared struggle to perceive. Twenty-first-century audiences are more accustomed to conspicuous, sustained name-play than Stein’s or Kennedy’s (first) audiences were. American playwrights whose work straddles the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries frequently provide names that confront, that draw attention to themselves, that link the naming of character to the interpretation of events and phenomena, and to agency performed and revealed by iteration. Eric Overmyer’s Native Speech (1985), for example, features Belly-Up, Loud Speaker, The Mook, and Hungry Mother, and names its setting as a radio studio ‘constructed in the detritus of Western Civ: appliances, neon tubing, 45s, car parts, Junk’ (Messerli and Wellman, 1998, p. 625). If Native Speech anticipates, and perhaps influences, Parks’s America Play (1993) in its startling mixdown of urbane, literary referentiality and apocalyptic, pre-millennial, end-of-history tension, the characters anticipate another Parks play, Death of the Last Black Man in the Whole Entire World (1992), which offers characters named ‘Before Columbus’, ‘And Bigger And Bigger And Bigger’, ‘Yes, and Greens Black-Eyed Peas Cornbread’. Like those in Native Speech, character names in Death of the Last Black Man sound like text has been untimely plucked from context. They are stridently improper proper names, an insult to the proper, but
6 Naming Theatre
also hint at insult to the characters themselves, characters not afforded a ‘real’ proper name, merely a nickname, parenthetical phrase, or shard of discarded writing. While Parks’s and Overymyer’s naming is, like Kennedy’s, semantically rich even at first glance, it is important to note that for every Owl Answers, in which names are immediately complex, later twentieth- and early twenty-first-century theatre often strips names almost entirely away, as Sarah Kane’s work progressively does,2 or profers speciously simple, apparently unremarkable names like ‘Buzz’ and ‘Annie’. By ‘speciously simple’, I mean that it is the deployment of the names which is decidedly layered, and which contradicts an initial impression of simplicity. Rather than the name itself, it is the deployment of naming in much of Martin Crimp’s work, for instance, that generates meaning. To say that Anne/Anya/Annie/Anny/Anny/Annuska is the central character of Attempts on her Life (1997) is only partly to describe how the metastatic ‘Annie’ signifies in these ‘17 Scenarios for the Theatre’ (as Crimp calls it). In one of the disturbing set-pieces that constitute the play, Annie becomes ‘the new Anny’, a literal and metaphorical vehicle: ‘No one is ever dragged from the Anny by an enraged mob. No child’s pelvis is ever shattered by a chance collision with the new Anny’ (Crimp, 1997, p. 34). Like ‘Annie’, ‘Buzz’ is the name of the central character in Ping Chong’s Kind Ness (1986), but a name whose referential properties (as I discuss in Chapter 3) extend far beyond character. The other children see Buzz as radically removed from them, but Chong maintains ambiguity about what they see and/or pretend to see. At times, it seems that Buzz is a gorilla, at times that the gorilla suit is simply a distancing tool. Buzz and Annie are forcefields as much as characters: they cannot be squarely identified and deciphered; they are that which gets in the way of deciphering. As one character states in the ‘Mum and Dad’ scene of Attempts on her Life: ‘She says she’s not a real character, not a real character like you get in a book or on TV, but a lack of character, an absence, she calls it, doesn’t she, of character.’ Interpretation of the materiality of the self is thematically central to both plays, and, in both, it is the deployment of the name on which the drama of interpretation and the realization of character hinges. Through carefully orchestrated reiterations, the simple name can create a field of signification in which significance lies in the collision/tension between the mutually exclusive nature of different signifieds. Proper names, as Derrida theorizes them, are marks of ownership, of a self-possession that anchors all systems of property. Along with
Introduction: Improper Naming 7
ownership, the exigencies of propriety are competence (the ability to perform according to rules of language) and cleanliness (propreté means: to keep free of contamination). There are several characters who flout propriety in precisely these ways. The Naturalist in IMTK comes to restore propriety to Molly/Mona, who struggles to master English by reciting ‘Mary had a little lamb’ and lives in a house deemed to be filthy and cockroach-infested. Vogel’s Anna’s recurrent failure to master languages (including ‘proper’ AIDS discourse) compounds with the dubiety of her name, and with promiscuous sexual behaviour, to make her a stand-in who stands out as decidedly improper. ‘Anna’ is less a name than a palindromically compact ‘I-position’ within which bustle derivations and associations, the significance of which unfolds incrementally. A shamanic sequence of stand-ins as protean as her antagonist, the Third Man, Anna is an aggregate of the personal, historical, and fictitious. Taking her name from the author’s real life childhood best friend,3 but also modelled on Anna in the 1949 Graham Greene-scripted, Carol Reed-directed film, The Third Man, she is the alter-ego of the author within the play who then stands in for her/the author’s brother in the play-within-the-play. Like Crimp’s Annie, and Ping Chong’s Buzz, she disobeys, in Derrida’s terms, the law of the proper. The names ‘Anna’, ‘Molly/Mona’, ‘Annie (Anne/Anya/Anny/Anny/ Annuska/Ann)’, and ‘Buzz’ cannot hold as names, in the sense of ‘accommodating’ what they designate; but they are theatrically deployed to perform other kinds of holding function, opening fissures within congealed narratives, intervening in historical, geographical, and other disciplinary fields. As I describe in Chapter 3, Parks makes words like ‘accommodate’ function as pivots around which opposing forces wheel: these opposing forces are not resolved, tragically or comically, but are allowed to contend, co-mingling in ways that contaminate the proper. Parks’s strikingly inventive textual archaeology – riffing, in The America Play, on ‘hole/whole’, and on ‘Founding Father/Foundling Father/forefather/foefather/fauxfather’, co-mingles absence and presence, present and past, epic and vernacular, in ways that both remember and incubate new history. Rather than fixing identification, names are used to highlight ephemerality, mutability, and difference. Across the chapters that follow, we will see the propriety of ostensibly proper names rooted out by naming that is provocatively partial/temporary/conditional/provisional, naming that interrogates the law of the proper name as something that, in designating, fixes in perpetuity.
8 Naming Theatre
Getting at language The pitching of the improper into the proper is a formal and thematic tussle in which three major binaries consistently figure: the tonal plays against the designational, the subjective against the objective, and the deconstructive against the constructive. In stressing the tonal, subjective, and deconstructive, the improper naming I find in these works belongs, in Kristeva’s terms, to the semiotic. The subject, in Kristeva’s formulation (after Lacan) of her development, moves under pressure from the preMirror stage of the semiotic, in which language use consists of instinctual play with prosodic elements, into the Symbolic, akin to Derrida’s proper, the phallogocentric order of sense and meaning. The Symbolic has little truck with the semiotic, but the semiotic nonetheless irrupts into the order of the Symbolic. Taking a line he presents as post-McLuhan, and which I would say is also neo-Artaudian, Hans-Thies Lehmann argues in Postdramatic Theatre (2006) that, in travelling through the ‘media age’, we have gone from a theatre in which the word was a privileged conveyor of sense to a paratactic theatre of textscapes in which the ‘sonic’ carries the meaning and language is free to exert itself in all its sensory force. Lehmann’s useful phrase ‘physis of the verbal’ indicates the ways in which words can be re-embodied in performance, as does Kristeva’s definition of the semiotic trace as ‘that memory of being to which the music of the body brings testimony’. While I admire Lehmann’s technical analysis of what (he claims) has happened to words and pictures, the tenor of his conclusions is seriously challenged by the works I read – and, I would argue, by some of the ones he reads. Parataxis allows for the interplay of different attitudes to the word within the theatre space: to claim that the word is rejected or escaped by paratactic textscapes is to draw the wrong conclusion. What Lehmann finds to be exceptional in Müller’s Hamletmachine, a kind of ‘out-of-timeness’ of the theatre itself, a concentration on text that is behind the times, is actually far more common than the paradigm of postdramatic theatre (as he configures it) can allow. Like Robert Wilson, cited by Lehmann as the ur-figure of the postdramatic textscape, Parks’s early works create a theatrical textuality in which, as it tries to assert meaning, focus, and intent, the written word is suspended in a kind of Derridean espacement, a mise- en-scène and soundscape of ‘phonetic materiality […] dispersion in space […] loss of teleology’ (Lehmann, 2006, p. 148). Like Wilson, Parks more or less makes text ‘an exhibited object’ in broad keeping with the example set by Gertrude Stein. In doing so, however, both Parks and Wilson systematically and self-consciously
Introduction: Improper Naming 9
insert other (including logocentric, teleological, ratiocinatory) texts that collide in ways that demand attention, making the formation of text a focal concern. In IMTK (see Chapter 3), these texts include a history of trans-Atlantic slave-trading, a television nature programme, an anthropological treatise, and a dramatic script. The intense intertextuality of Parks’s early works, and that of Wilson’s problematically termed ‘Theatre of Images’,4 are (each for their own artistic and political reasons) as concerned as Stein was with the verbal. Their dispersal and re-contextual collaging of words is not designed to escape the verbal, but with getting at it. As I argue in my discussion of Parks in Chapter 3, this ‘getting at’ the verbal entails reflexive use of the vertical, elaborative axis of language in conjunction with, and opposition to, the horizontal, narrative-forming axis. It is a reflexivity in which the ‘physis of the verbal’ plays a key part. Theories and paradigms of performativity and performance have frequently attended to language and its relationship to matter. Despite, or perhaps because of, the prevalence of such theories within and across academic disciplines and other domains, the relationship of matter to language is more troublesome than ever. The phrase ‘the linguistic turn’ is a nice, academic understatement that helps to situate contemporary awareness of the constitutive role of language as the latest steps along a path bearing the footprints of Wittgenstein and Saussure. Drawing threads not only from analytic philosophy and Saussurean linguistics but also from Darwin on evolution, Marx on social structures, Nietzsche on morality, and Freud on the interior of the self, structuralism and poststructuralism accelerate the linguistic turn. Within that acceleration of the linguistic turn, Lacan shows how the unconscious is structured like language, and Foucault how power works through and inside discourse. ‘Language’ no longer refers to purely linguistic information and exchange, but to behavioural codes that structure the mind (psyche), the body (DNA), and society (culture). Coterminous with the colonization of all spheres by language is the probing of the ways in which language is an unstable system, including Derrida’s explorations of how language systems are predicated on instabilities masked as stabilities. A sense that language is ubiquitous and stealthily constructive grows in tandem with a sense that language is manipulable. As Steven Shaviro puts it in a collection called Posthuman Bodies: ‘it’s not that language doesn’t refer to anything real, but – to the contrary – that language itself has become increasingly real’ (1995, p. 42). Ambivalence about the constitutive power of language, and how to harness it, is integral to the theatre I discuss. On the one hand, the manipulability of what had been seen as innate, the feeling that control
10
Naming Theatre
over language is up in the air and up-for-grabs is an opportunity: if language is appropriable, it serves the kind of rediscovery, repossession, and reclaiming that gets Smith, Wolfe, and others so excited. While naming usually facilitates identification, in these works it is used to explore the legacy of failure to identify, writing (in Parks, Chong, Lightwork, Ridiculusmus and Skipitares) a history of absent realizations that haunt and give the lie to apparent presence. On the other hand, as demonstrated by all the works I explore, language is treacherous in its capacity to disembody or to paper over, serving the interests of those who want to disguise the collateral damage of ethnic assimilation, medical progress, or military operations. Language is a tool used to build a world of ‘sound-bites’ and ‘spin’ – words that marked discussion of politics and news production from the late 1980s, and continue to do so. As I discuss in Chapter 7, ‘verbatim’ and ‘documentary’ are posed as antidotes to a culture of spin and soundbites in the production and interpretation of a significant amount of theatre in the 1990s. Anna Deavere Smith argues in her Introduction to Fires in the Mirror that her work should be seen as an intervention into ‘sound-bite culture’, which divides communities along the lines of what newspapers and tabloid television can perpetuate as lowest common denomination (1993a, p. xxxi). Cornel West’s Foreword to Fires further politicizes Smith’s performance of language, arguing that it recuperates ‘the degradation of the public sphere by conservative elites in the past two decades’. In my final chapter, I discuss an essay by Anne Bogart that similarly calls for language that reclaims the public sphere. Chong, Parks, and Ridiculusmus each use words, interventionally, against themselves to target the neglect of language. The idea of language as a virus, complicit with implosion or dispersal of value – an idea propounded by Baudrillard, and in Jameson’s account of late-capitalism’s printingup of increasingly valueless signifiers – is also theatricalized in The Receipt, where corporate-speak produces RotoPlas and infects all who work within its walls; and in Vogel’s depiction of public ‘education’ agencies, whose alarmist propriety exacerbates rather than manages the onset of AIDS. Whether emanating from corporations or politicians or denounced by academics as a hallmark of the postmodernism they may seek to control or refuse (see Chapter 10), spin is not an imaginary phenomenon, but it is one that preys on crises of perception. Exploiting and magnifying uncertainty, instability, and displacement, spin is both a symptom and a cause of identity crisis. As sociologist Kobena Mercer observes, ‘identity only becomes an issue when it is in crisis, when something assumed to
Introduction: Improper Naming 11
be fixed, coherent, stable is displaced by the experience of doubt and uncertainty’ (1990, p. 43). However reality is recalibrated vis-à-vis crisis, though, global and local factors undoubtedly conjoin in the late 1980s and early 1990s to precipitate intense forms of crisis. These factors are crucial to the critical obsession with naming, re-naming, and un-naming in the works I examine. They include: globalization enabled by the loosening of national, political, and trading boundaries, by changing demographics as migrations proliferate (Kind Ness, Imperceptible Mutabilities in the Third Kingdom), by the rise of Neo-Conservativism in the US and its commitment to ‘market democracy’ (Pugilist Specialist), and by the opportunism of corporations (The Receipt); the breakdown of Communist regimes; the conspicuous softening of binary positions between left and right, communist and capitalist, democratic and republican, socialist and conservative, (Fires in the Mirror, Say Nothing); the impact of the AIDS epidemic (The Baltimore Waltz; Under the Knife); revolutionary developments in cybernetics, genetic science, and DNA technology (Here’s what I did with my body one day); and the spread of postructuralist modes in and beyond academia (The Colored Museum, The World in Pictures). Collectively, these events, trends, and phenomena engender destabilization of the grounds not only of identity, but of conceptualization itself. The transition from identitarian to post-identitarian discourse is marked by the abating of emphasis on difference between selves/ communities and a corresponding pursuit of difference within. In postidentitarian discourse, tropes of mobility hold sway. Post-identitarian perspectives recognize the social operation of – but unchain self and community from – the limits of positioning based on race, ethnicity, gender, and sexuality. While invoking the historical and contemporary effects of these aspects of identity, post-identitarian discourse aims to move before or beyond them, figuring identity as a fluid equation, self and other crossing and re-crossing a permeable boundary. The fluidity of such formulae is depicted as being starkly in contrast with the differencecollapsing effects of the identifications on which both the ego and the theatre are conventionally seen to be founded. Appearing as a character in Smith’s Fires in the Mirror, Angela C. Davis – a Black Panther activist who became Professor of the History of Consciousness at Santa Cruz – explains that ‘[n]owadays’, when she talks of ‘race’, she puts it ‘in quotations’. This reflects her sense of abandoning ‘the old notion of coalition in which we anchor ourselves very solidly in our specific racialized communities’. As Davis sees it, ‘we still anchor ourselves in our communities’, but these communities are more ‘various’ and ‘the rope attached to that
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anchor should be long enough to allow us to move into other communities […] to make more intimate these connections and associations’ (Smith, 1993a, pp. 30–1). By the mid-1980s, race, class, and gender are generally perceived to be unsustainable bases for both social activism and self-definition. The strategic value of an essentialist logic of difference between women and men, or Black and White, continues to be affirmed well into the 1980s, but is gradually eroded by insistence that binary logic cannot account for the experiential and mutable nature of difference. In theory and theatre alike, a form of naming is sought that, rather than suturing identification, holds identifications and investments in view, open to question, and subject to reversal. It is a search on which those whose work I read embark in their own distinctive ways, but with commonalities. Wolfe, Smith, and Parks, for example, all African American, offer formally very different kinds of theatrical experience, but each positions their own work in terms applicable to the other two. Wolfe eschews ‘slogan theatre’, and wants to use the past as a space in which to ‘self-examine’. Smith bemoans the degradation of forums for the consideration of social tensions, the journalistic and televisual tendency toward arranging debate as a pattern of opposing sound-bites around which linking commentary is draped. In an essay sardonically titled ‘An Equation for Black People Onstage’, Parks insists ‘the Klan do not have to be outside the door for Black people to have lives worthy of dramatic literature’ because ‘within the subject is its other’ (1995, p. 19). If identity politics is complex manoeuvring of sameness and difference within arenas such as the home, workplace, or judicial system, post-identitarian logic is equally but differently complex, involving play with binaries, caesuras, third or in-between terms. The shift from identitarian to post-identitarian discourse (on which I will say more in a moment) presents itself as epistemological, as more than a matter of finding new words, as a shift from making points that stake out positions to preparing fields in which positions can traverse and adapt, can be traversed and made to adapt. Davis’s motif of being anchored in a community with a rope that roams typifies concepts of difference circulating in the late 1980s and early 1990s such as Benedict Anderson’s ‘imagined community’ and Maria Lugones’ ‘world travelling’. In such conceptions, entrenchment, nostalgia, and retreat to first principles are the anchor; the roaming entails theoretical play on tropes of mobility and on the mobility of tropes. Play with and on mobility is desirous but also fugue-like, reflecting the extent to which movement, as an imperative of contemporary life, has changed the meaning of journey.
Introduction: Improper Naming 13
While Davis’s rope encapsulates post-identitarian thinking, the ‘new’ binary it constructs is strangely familiar when considered in theatrical terms. While theatre has always entailed going somewhere while going nowhere, attention to that paradox of movement and inertia is prompted (in much theatre of recent decades) by destabilization of grounding concepts in the world at large. Throughout the 1990s, as blocs and movements dissipate, the concern with mapping and taxonomy in theatre continues, often begging the question: has the conceptualization of difference become a more pressing concern than the particular content of difference? My argument is that theatre, over these two decades, does important things to conceptualization. The search for stabilizing concepts, or concepts with which to map instability, yields an obsession with renaming and redefinition, with the reshaping of old kinds of map and the development of new ones. In theatre, as in other domains, as binaries between male/female, Black/White, and left/right soften, great effort is made to theorize the relationship between individuals, and between individuals and their environment, in terms of literal and metaphorical mobility. The agonism of mobility and stasis, which takes many theatrical forms, cuts across distinctions between genre. In Vogel’s The Baltimore Waltz, Skipitares’s Under the Knife (1993–95), and Lightwork’s Here’s what I did with my body one day (2006), a motif of opposing images of death and of dancing evoke ways in which individual and social bodies are read, written, documented, intextuated. In all three cases, a death/dancing opposition theatricalizes Benjamin’s dictum that ‘history decomposes into images, not narratives’ (Benjamin quoted in Diamond, 1997, p. 146). My analysis challenges the view that a shift from opposition based on adherence to social, artistic, and intellectual movements to opposition based on concepts of movement is a retreat from action. The efforts of these theatre-makers to situate desire to act, or to escape inability to act are fertile, and (im)prove theatre’s capacity to stage the conditions of action. In pointing desire to act, and staging conditions of action, these works echo, but also (as I argue in Chapter 10) extend critical theory of the time. A central feature of experimental theatre from the mid-1980s is that, in extending identity politics, it pits mapping, taxonomy, and classification against mobility, transience, and evasion. It is an agonism via which, as playwright Mac Wellman argues, characters and theatre-makers alike pursue ‘grounding in a paradoxical lack of groundedness’.5 Wellman’s phrase speaks to the works I discuss, not least Chong’s Kind Ness and Parks’s Imperceptible Mutabilities (1989), in both of which we see slides
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of ‘made history’ projected (to quote Parks) above characters ‘mutating like hell’ (Solomon, 1990, p.75), and Wolfe’s overhauling of The Colored Museum (1986) by adaptable subject-positions that Wolfe refers to as ‘silhouettes’. Those who bear hope in these three works are, conspicuously, not fully fledged and not properly named, the implication being that proper naming would foreclose the developing subject. Improper naming besuits a process of formation in which the developing subject tests the conditions of their own enunciability.
Systems of enunciability Naming takes place through statements, or acts of designation, but does not simply spring from subjects who utter and perform. It is born of systems of demarcation and enunciability that make statements legible. Naming ordinarily demarcates a subject position, it provides the illusion of the whole, self-same subject, in control of objects on whose status as objects one’s status as a subject, able to control and possess, is predicated. Through strategies such as the detachment of sign from effect, name from thing, shell from substance, attention is drawn in the works I read to the ways in which names construct subjects and objects. The materiality of the subjects and objects we will encounter is frequently mutable; manipulation of names, and strategic decoupling of name from thing, makes identities, spaces, and the reality of events coalesce and disperse before our eyes. To name, as Foucault repeatedly detailed, is to participate in a classificatory schema, a practice of identification. To name is to endorse the rules that make names readable, but also to normalize and thereby conceal those rules. ‘Greeks’, the fourth and final section of Suzan-Lori Parks’s Imperceptible Mutabilities in the Third Kingdom (IMTK) features the Smith family. Daddy, an Army Sergeant, sends countless letters home to a wife and two daughters whose prime activity, like that of their wouldbe hero, is waiting for the Commander to award him a ‘Distinction’. To interpret correspondence with a precision appropriate to military matters, the three female Smiths construct a ledger, with multiple columns, which they fill in as follows: ‘“Subject”: uh letter. Check thuh “non-bill” column ... “Contents?” ... Write – uh – general news ... Slash – “report of duties”.’ Then the final columns: ‘“Mention of Work”: check: “yes”.’ When it comes to the category titled ‘Mention of Family’, an argument ensues, as Buffy was mentioned but Muffy not. Sandwiched in the middle of these formalities is the column ‘Signs of Distinction’. Mrs Smith asks what they put last time. ‘Last letter’s Signs of Distinction were “On
Introduction: Improper Naming 15
the Horizon”’, informs Buffy. ‘Before that?’ asks the mother. ‘Soon’, says Buffy. ‘Before that’, she adds, with exemplary efficiency, ‘he reported his Distinction to be arriving quote “any day now”, unquote’ (Parks, 1995, pp. 62–3). Buffy is the most adept of the female Smiths at co-ordinating the ledger, the one most deeply immersed in the lore of military intelligence. To comfort her sister Muffy, who is upset at not being mentioned, Buffy tells her of a family called the Censors. ‘Mr. Censor’, says Buffy, ‘is a man who won’t let Sergeant Smith say certain things because certain things said may put the Effort in danger.’ She explains that Mr Smith ‘deals in a language of codes – secret signs and signals’ (ibid., p. 64). So zealously does the ledger map the place-into-which-events-can-fall that, akin to the army’s ‘language of codes’, the ‘signs and signals’ of the ledger take on a life of their own. The interpretative codes have become more substantial than the events to which they refer. In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault states that: [t]he archive is not that which, despite its immediate escape, safeguards the event of the statement, and preserves, for future memories, its status as an escapee; it is that which, at the very root of the statement-event, and in that which embodies it, defines at the outset the system of its enunciability. (1972, p. 129) What Foucault suggests is that the contours of the ‘statement’ are not fixed at the moment of its inception but develop over time, in ways that foreclose other ways. This mutability betrays, for Parks as for Foucault, the duplicitous nature of archival history and theology. The exposed face of the archive is that which smothers the fugitive quality of the utterance by recording it. The concealed face is that which attaches itself, unseen, at the moment the statement is born. By so doing, the archive provides an invisible framework within which the statement can be read. This framework – what Foucault calls a ‘system of enunciability’ – inscribes a logic which confines future analysis to a narrow realm of possible interpretations. Mr Smith proclaims to himself: ‘Thuh events of my destiny ssgonna fall untuh place. What events? That I don’t know. But they gonna fall into place all right’ (Parks, 1995, p. 58). The Smiths reflect Parks’s belief that indoctrination is not an instilling of knowledge, but of ways of knowing. She wants her spectators to see that refreshing the perception of identity depends less on redefining particular events than on interrogating the machinery of enunciability that hold identities and events in their proper ‘place’.
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As I argue in Chapter 4, these works might be seen as equivocating with Brecht’s (modelling of epic theatre on) demonstrative techniques that use commentary to name the action represented. Diverse theatrical experiences though they are, there is a similarly conspicuous naming of scenes in works such as Baltimore Waltz, Under the Knife, The Travels, Two Undiscovered Amerindians, and Venus (Suzan-Lori Parks, [1996] 1998), a naming that plays on a tension normally played down in theatre: between commentary and representation; between what we see, hear, and smell, and what we are told we are witnessing. An embedded irony compromises the ability of commentary to manage representation, as in Venus when the continual, ritualistic countdown of scene numbers articulates theatrical anatomy with the textualization of Saartje Baartman’s body, or in Under the Knife when the announcement of the scene name both diagnoses and confers existence, as if the matter represented has no existence prior to diagnosis. Rather than a seamless weaving of representation and commentary that would secure characters and events to their proper place, there is, in all these works, an opposition of statement to proof, set-up to ensuing action. It is an opposition that ‘outs’ the ordinarily invisible, promissory nature of what (in Chapter 5) I call ‘en-scening’: the naming of where and when action is set, and who is performing it, a naming that invisibly shapes what it frames and enters us as spectators into a particular contract. The compromising of that contract ties us to the characters depicted. Without commentary that neatly frames the representation of character, we are left with characters who struggle to signify as we struggle to decode them. They struggle to articulate and disarticulate, to forget and to re-member, to do so in and at the proper, ‘standard’ time. Their efforts are linguistically inventive: they turn words over in their mouths and try embodying them in different ways, unchaining them, piecing them together, breaking them down into parts and reassembling them into new wholes. We find characters in moments of crisis, moments in which they try to remember who they are, to reground themselves. These moments of crisis make registering their private thoughts in the public domain imperative and palpably difficult. Their effortful play with words might be seen as lingering in a semiotic space of possibility. Certainly, characters like Miss Faith, Principal Conklin, the Third Man, to name but three such authority-figure-cum-narrators, have little truck with the struggle of the characters they keep in place, characters whose efforts nonetheless irrupt into their pristine Symbolic Order. Readings of feminist writing by Kristeva, and other second-wave French feminists such as Cixous and Irigaray, show how the pressure on the developing subject to
Introduction: Improper Naming 17
move from semiotic to Symbolic is inscribed in the text. In that respect, such readings are a useful reference point for the interpretation of many of the theatrical characters we encounter in Naming Theatre. Name-sets like ‘Muffy, Duffy, Buffy’ and ‘Mona, Chona, Verona’ seem to ensign the passage from semiotic to Symbolic realms, just as the characters themselves are torn between the improper and the proper. However, they, like all the characters we meet, demand to be seen as their own reference points – a point I make in various chapters and reiterate in the final one. In several chapters (including 4 and 6), I explore the idea that theatre-makers jam, or attempt to jam, the machinery of enunciability. Sometimes, as in The America Play and IMTK, it is verbal naming of characters, places, and events that jams the machinery. Parks’s riffing on proper names exploits in post-Derridean fashion the expectation that the proper name must confer singularity – a singularity (as Derrida theorizes) that is paradoxically translatable and based on correspondences. In tandem with verbal naming structures (character names, stage directions, and so on), other sonic sign-systems, along with visual elements such as costume, props, and lighting, play a crucial role in the naming of scene that is theatre’s machinery of enunciability. Wolfe articulates theatre with museums, Chong with zoos, and performance artist Mimi Goese (whose work I discuss only fleetingly here; see Frieze (1998) for a fuller description) with circuses: all three imply that theatre is no more a mirror up to nature than any of these other arenas that taxonomize and fetishize the subjects they purport to accommodate. If Barthes knelled the death of the author, these pieces are autopsies, inquests, and resurrections. Confusing ‘reader’ and ‘author’ (an opposition that Barthes paradoxically perpetuates), these works reconstruct authorship as the modelling, or enactment, of interpretation.6 At their heart is a desire to use theatre to model the kind of productive reception needed to live in a world in which identity seems increasingly fused with textuality, a world in which, as Stuart Hall argues (see Chapter 2) there is increasing pressure to root identity in ‘the symbolic’, a pressure which always involves ‘displacement’. It is in the struggle to interpret coded systems, these works suggest, that identity forms. Parks’s unwitting archivists, the pilgrims to nowhere in Forced Entertainment’s The Travels (2002), the daydreamers exposed to the public by Vogel and Chong, and the interviewees copied by Anna Deavere Smith (see Chapter 7): they are all, conspicuously (in a Barthesian sense, ‘shockingly’), authored by interpretation. Belying the paradigm shift described by Barthes from ‘writerly’ to ‘readerly’ text, these works enact the futility and danger of separating authorship from reception.
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As I discuss in Chapter 7, Anna Deavere Smith is an influential proponent of a particular brand of theatrical authorship that models reading. Emphasis placed by Smith and some critics on the fact that the only words she uses are those spoken by her interviewees only emphasizes, in the view of many, the intensely authorial work of editing. Smith’s method draws heavily, in ways that have not been investigated by critics of her work, on television editing. She describes herself as having grown up at the same time as television grew up, and she consciously taps into ways of seeing developed through the format of the television programmes of her youth (the 1970s and 1980s), in which a host, or anchor, mediates video clips for the audience. Like the host, or anchor, in the studio, Smith is the home plane; the extracts she performs are ‘foreign’. That Smith does not explicitly position herself as a host (in the manner, according to Barthes, that omniscient authors of novels do) makes her strategies all the more worthy of scrutiny. More explicit positioning occurs in Kind Ness, which begins with the words ‘Good evening’, spoken by an unreliable, official-sounding Narrator. He proceeds to take us, over a loudspeaker, through a series of pairs of images, training us to read difference. Brandishing their ear-trumpets (Lucy in The America Play) and their ledgers (the Smiths in Imperceptible Mutabilities), characters in Parks’s plays are keen receivers, whose obsessed readiness to read is characterized as a pathetic sign of the extent to which they are ‘authored’, their work with texts intextuating them. A form of theatrical authorship emerges in these pieces in which the author is no longer an ‘originator of meaning’ (to quote the OED definition of ‘author’), but rather an editor of systems. In some of the texts, there is a deliberate fusion and/or confusion of authors with performers and/or characters, a renunciation of originary meaning. Goese’s personae seem to be the sum of their interpretation of taped music/spoken words/noise played over a loudspeaker: their actions appear to be driven by the sound tape and by items of clothing that they find themselves wearing. Every now and again, she seems to step out of character, as if to remind us that the whole thing is a product of her imagination – before reminding us again, in ways that remind me of Forced Entertainment (Chapter 6), that her supposed revelations are just performances of authenticity, promises of intimacy that will not be kept. As has increasingly become the case in Forced Entertainment’s (FE) work,7 the detritus of what she has performed a minute or two ago becomes a stationing agent for the present Goese, one that she performs herself trying to escape even as it fascinates her, as if it were alien material. As for Goese’s work, FE’s play with pseudo-found
Introduction: Improper Naming 19
material is periodically interrupted by moments of self-consciousness, explicit reminders of being part of a performance tradition. In reading The Travels in relation to Happenings in the 1950s and 1960s (Chapter 6), I discuss how FE’s self-consciousness plays out within a paradoxically programmed performance of intuitive responses.
Naming failure/failure to name In several of the works I discuss, the key events and phenomena are those pointedly not named. Tension between this ex-nomination and the hyper-nomination of pseudo-events and pseudo-phenomena generates drama in Kind Ness, IMTK, Fires in the Mirror, Say Nothing, and The Baltimore Waltz. No-one mentions that Buzz is a foreigner/gorilla in Kind Ness but they treat him accordingly. No-one mentions AIDS in The Baltimore Waltz, Acquired Toilet Disease standing in for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome and Sexually Transmitted Diseases in a ludicrous ex-nomination that echoes Ronald Reagan’s (see Chapter 2). The scandal of dirty toilets is also discussed ad nauseam in Say Nothing, as is the niceness of traditional Irish breakfasts, but no-one dares mention ‘the Troubles’. There are many examples in the pages that follow of failure to name and failure to perform, examples that collectively point to the breakdown of systems of enunciability. While it is tempting to shepherd these examples into a totalizing paradigm or ethic of failure, I veer toward stressing their diversity. Freud taunts Stein in Pugilist Specialist by accusing her of having ‘FTA’ – Failure to Adapt. Ironically, given the coruscating account of medicine’s visual economy in Under the Knife, an economy in which tools of visualization such as the microscope and the x-ray have paramount value, it is the failure of a device rigged to prevent her from seeing that allows Fanny Burney to view the performance of the mastectomy operation on her: she peers through a cambric handkerchief, a totally inadequate barrier to her observation. In Goese’s pieces, it is usually costume which breaks down. At first busily designating the character she is to perform, the seemingly endless layers of her ceaseless transformation overwhelm our ability to keep up the decoding. Each outfit tells us ‘this is who I am now’, but each layer revealed tells us we were wrong to assume. In Kind Ness, the Stage Hand puts down rocks to mark out the diorama that must be in place before we are allowed to see the gorilla only to be told by the Narrator ‘no, not yet’, making us wonder what, in the play’s narrative of assimilation, is not yet in place. That Chong has the Stage Hand repeatedly move to lay down the rocks
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at the wrong time is his reflexive practise of a philosophy broadly similar to that which underscores the theatres of Meyerhold and Brecht: that glitches in systems make processes more visible, and that when signifying apparati work without glitches, those apparati remain invisible. Chong’s dialogue is geared less to the use of speech as communication, and more to the creation of an unsettling negative space of miscommunication. Like Ridiculusmus in Say Nothing and Adamsdale and Branch in The Receipt, he pushes the phatic function of language to excesses that unravel communication. There is an argument to be made that failure is an ethic. While Anna Deavere Smith herself regards it as a mark of her successful unlocking of ‘American character’, Smith’s framing of her Search for American Character valorizes that negative space of performance, what she calls ‘the gap’, that results from the performer’s failure: ‘[c]haracter lives in the obvious gap between the real person and my attempt to seem like them’ (Smith, 1993a, pp. xxxvii–viii). If failure has hit the United States, where both mainstream and counterculture have tended to be goal-oriented, it is not surprising that it has hit the United Kingdom with a more resounding bang (whimper?). Goat Island (whose Matthew Goulish, along with Tim Etchells, co-founded the Institute of Failure in 2001) reflect on failure, but Etchells’s Forced Entertainment have luxuriated in it, and in an increasingly explicit, focused manner. From 2001’s First Night to 2008’s Spectacular, both of which crucially quote more successful theatrical performances than the one they are able to achieve, Forced Entertainment have not only dwelled on how theatre cannot communicate, but put out press packs and issued spectators with DVDs that strive to pinpoint their focus on effort and failure.8 It is all too easy, though, to talk in blanket terms of an ‘ethic of failure’. Failure may not exactly be the new success, but it in some respects it is the new power. In one of the most frequently cited passages from Foucault, he writes: ‘One needs to be nominalistic, no doubt: power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society’ (1992, p. 93). Judith Butler paraphrases Foucault’s discussion of the word ‘power’: ‘It is the name that one attributes to a complexity which is not easily named’ (1997, p. 95). While the word ‘failure’ serves, or fails, to describe an array of strategies and dispositions, these are even more disparate than the branches identified by Foucault’s formulation of ‘power’. Rather than theorizing an ethic of failure, I have begun, and will continue, to describe how naming is used, in various respects, against itself,
Introduction: Improper Naming 21
that negativity providing a platform for the articulation of ex-nominated connections. My reading is informed by Jon McKenzie’s notion of ‘catachristening’.9 ‘Catachristening (catastrophic naming) engages the interminable death and birth of performative referentiality’ (McKenzie, 2001, p. 212). Via catachristening, the name, as deployed by Chong, Parks, Vogel, Ridiculusmus, Riot Group, and Forced Entertainment, ‘becomes an event’ as its ‘catastrophic effects register the inherent ability of performatives to fail and misfire, and, in misfiring, to link up with other referents, other contents, other performances’ (ibid.). In Chapters 4 and 6, I consider the idea that failure in (particular works of) performance jams the performance machinery of hegemonic culture. In Chapter 8, I extend Noël Carroll’s philosophy of monsters within horror genres to global corporations, arguing that confusion and bluntness are valuable tools of dissimulation that allow corporations to function and to grow. When it comes to creating a company like RotoPlas, evacuation of substance passes as provision. The non-communicative language and non-service services alienated in The Receipt are potent ways for corporations to constrain social channels. Recognizing failure as an engineered part of the corporate machinery of globalization means that any performance of failure in terms of the incorporation of accidents and glitches can as equally be seen to play into the hands of corporate power as to transgress its laws. Even if, making less-activist claims for it, we see failure as a reflection rather than an agent of breakdown, it is still fraught with contradictions as a descriptor. As Jean-Luc Nancy opines in The Inoperative Community (1991), what are traditionally named ‘communities’ in what is conventionally called ‘the West’ have, over centuries, increasingly found themselves united only in a common failure to unite. At its most potent, perhaps, theatre’s engagement with failure, and I would claim this for many of the works I consider here, can articulate something along the lines Nancy draws, and can model a way to deal in and with that common failure to unite, something like Wellman’s ‘grounding in a paradoxical lack of groundedness’.
Making history, making geography This book is about acts of naming that take place in theatrical texts and performances; but the theatrical acts of naming I explore crucially engage with naming practices in domains such as television and print journalism, the justice system, tourism, advertising and brand development, semiotics, cultural theory, anthropology, corporate statutes, urban
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planning, peace and reconciliation fora, military training, cybernetics, genetics, histories of medicine, and histories of nationhood. As well as spilling into one another, some of these domains, such as advertising and cybernetics, push beyond the term ‘domain’: they are naming practices that construct platforms or arenas for naming. Here’s what I did… and The Receipt (see Chapter 8) suggest that naming after (both personal and vocational) has been superseded by what might be called ‘naming across’, in which value, and often a kind of colonial, cross-domain authority, is obtained by the borrowing of names, the extension of naming conventions from one domain to another. ‘Why’, asks Wiley in The Receipt, ‘is technology increasingly named after fruit?’ The conference that David attends in Here’s what I did … is sponsored by multi-national corporation GenTechnica, whose businesses range ‘from genetic engineering to music sales’. GenTechnica represent , in Baudrillard’s terms, the viral, or ‘trans-apparent’ nature of branding.10 In familial ‘naming after’ the logic is one of continuity, and in vocational naming one of attribution: in both cases, naming works to fix the named individual to a particular achievement or family line. In corporate ‘naming across’, naming corporealizes a named entity by unfixing it from achievement, family line, domain. Continuing the work of the twentieth-century’s last, the first decade of the twenty-first century was an era in which it was not just products that were subject to intense branding and re-branding, but concepts and forms of conceptualization. As the grounds of individual and communal identity are called into continuing question, authors of and characters in these works create new names to incubate new phenomena and viewpoints. But they also ‘re-remember’ the referentiality of signs overwritten or rendered dormant by re-branding, histories of signification on which formative identifications and investments were built. Instead of the Aristotelian peripeteia and anagnorisis (reversal and recognition), based on an identification with the protagonist cemented by the unities, these works exert a different kind of identification, based on a shared struggle to perceive. If identification for Aristotle depends on being immersed in the protagonist’s journey, in these pieces it depends on the alternation between being immersed and being distanced. Immersing the spectator in and removing them from the narrative via de- and re-familiarization techniques allows the likes of Ridiculusmus, Lightwork, Vogel, Chong, Parks, and Bobby Baker (see Chapter 4) to effect contextual jolts. The technique highlights the relationship between the way individuals assimilate stories and the way they are themselves assimilated into society through reading.
Introduction: Improper Naming 23
In lieu of Aristotelian dramatic irony, in which we know before s/he does what is coming to the protagonist because it is there all along, naming in these works fosters mnemonic irony, in which we alternately forget and re-remember what is there all along. The latex gloves of the Baltimore doctor are worn by The Third Man throughout Anna’s dream, but tend to become invisible until adjusted. Vogel states that the gloves are not about allowing us to see as if for the first time, but are about noticing our own serial ‘re-remembering’ – forgetting to see; remembering; forgetting again; remembering again – which is the flipside of denial: ‘As cultural animals, we do not forget because something is hidden, we forget because something is in our face and we don’t want to see it anymore. That’s what forgetting is. Forgetting is a way of not looking’ (Savran, 1999, p. 271). Anna’s alternate denial and recognition of her circumstances parallels our own immersion in and detachment from the narrative. The gloves are formalist devices that Burke and Shklovsky would recognize, but are also pieces in a game of re-remembering and denial that is topical in its focus on the politics of cultural memory. For Vogel, as for Chong and Parks, performative restoration brings to life both the remembered events and the instruments of remembrance. It is not just props and costume but, by virtue of their cathectic investment in these objects, characters themselves that are formalist devices. The gorilla suit worn throughout by Buzz, not so much a costume as a signifying game, occasions all kinds of play with dis- and reinvestment in gorilla as signifying metaphor. In a phrase that speaks for Vogel, Parks, and others of the theatre-makers I read, Chong describes his allegorical works of the 1980s as ‘waking public dreams’, in which unmoored figures play at de- and re-attaching themselves to available reality, seeing themselves from a distance as strange figures on familiar ground, or familiar figures on strange ground. The distancing that name-play can engender allows characters to establish a viewing position, they remove themselves in order to see themselves, to recognize or re-remember that they are assimilable beings in a cultural field. Many of the names we encounter – like ‘Founding Father’ (see Chapter 3), ‘Roentgen’ (Chapter 5), or ‘Roland Barthes’ (Chapter 9) – are names that, in Bordieu’s phrase, ‘font date’: they ‘make history’ as time marked by names. Bordieu elucidates how proper names ‘make history’ by figuring history as a canon, establishing canons as timelines marked by names that ‘fait date’.11 In Here’s what I did … (see Chapter 9), Lightwork use Barthes’s writing on name/sign relationships to look at what that traditional figuration of history means for those, like Barthes himself, who make a name for themselves, but whose names outlive them as
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historical signs. In thinking through, and resisting, the construction of history as the marking of time by names, Lightwork, like Skipitares and like Parks, interrogate the role of naming practices that brand people and their labour to institute character and to ‘characterize’ institutions. Interrogation of ‘naming after’ in Here’s what I did…, Under the Knife, IMTK, and The America Play – a son after his father, a disease or a technology after its discover or developer, an impersonator after their subject – links exploration of personal identity to consideration of how museums, archives, and institutions of learning discipline labour. Against the time-honoured tradition of ‘making history’ by ‘making a name for oneself’, the practice that upholds the proper, the works I discuss set the making public of that which does not, within the regime of the proper, make a name for itself. This kind of making public is what documentary theatre often nominates, naming its own naming, as I argue in Chapter 7. Making public in these instances is an intervention into making history, the naming of that which history has excluded from view. Because exclusion from the public realm is maintained by the law of the proper, making public means challenging those laws. Founded as it is on a self-possession that anchors all systems of property, on competence (the ability to perform according to rules of language), and on cleanliness (keeping free of contamination), the proper, as marked by proper names, ex-nominates its own history-making. In contrast, documentary theatre works like My Name is Rachel Corrie, Talking to Terrorists, The Laramie Project, and The Vagina Monologues nominate their portrayal of subjects who trouble propriety. As well as playing up, and playing on, the challengingly contradictory nature of the characters they study, these works, I argue, name their own theatrical questioning of what is regarded as polite, or proper, discussion (often this means, amongst middle, or theatre-frequenting, classes), their transgressing of social and linguistic norms and taboos. Several other chapters indicate, and reflect on, theatre’s tendency to make public, make history, and make geography. While Lightwork allow the intimate (the private thoughts of famous, French, public intellectuals) to undermine the epic (familiar, historical perspectives on these public figures) as they intercede in the making of history, Forced Entertainment set the intimate communication of interior monologue against the public places listed in the A–Z of Britain as they ‘make geography’, in decidedly improper fashion, in The Travels. As in the work of a number of American playwrights, such as Charles Mee and Sarah Ruhl, The Travels pits the classical against the modern in ways that reveal constructions of classicism and modernity.12 Eurydice (2003), an inventive rendition
Introduction: Improper Naming 25
by Ruhl of the story of Eurydice and Orpheus, applies contemporary rhythms, idioms, and preoccupations in a wittily incongruous, playfully unclassical manner. Like Forced Entertainment, Ruhl loves to effect a kind of joyous melancholy via vertiginous oscillation between romantic storytelling and cool, anti-romantic urbanity. Both Eurydice and The Travels recuperate a contemporary sense of disconnection from the past by importing the romantic otherness of the classical. In both cases, names allow play by acting as the stimulus for language games that improperly classicize the modern and modernize the classical. Contriving some doable activities appropriate to the names ‘Oracle’ and ‘Delphi’ in her A–Z, Cathy Naden decides to look for a fortune-teller. Remembering where she is, she worries that ‘getting all this to happen in Salford is going to be hard’ (Forced Entertainment, 2002, p. 15). A lecture by geographer Doreen Massey, whose books (including For Space, 2005) have made an impact on dance and site-specific performance practitioners and theorists, informs several of my readings.13 Massey’s lecture describes how, in globalization, romantic notions of space bolster its commodity value by/while erasing historical differences from present perception. Her ideas about the ways in which globalization over-writes space by trading on romantic ideas of space as possibility, making tourists of us all, resonates with The Travels. The participant-performer-tourists of The Travels enjoy the romantic feeling of exploration while reflecting with a dry, plaintive wit on the obscene discrepancies between exotic, august, expansive place names and the cramped lives to which the actualities of place testify. The title of Massey’s talk, ‘Is the World Really Shrinking?’, reminds me also of watching Say Nothing (see Chapter 8), in which a ridiculously tiny rectangle of turf is the putative, inadequate ‘stage’ on which the characters trade names of places they both might know in a performance of establishing common ground. Forced Entertainment and Ridiculusmus are not alone in exploring the ways in which traditions of naming manage connections between mental and physical space. Several of the theatre-makers I discuss examine how mental and physical compartmentalization work in tandem in material and political ways, and how theatrical metaphors intervene in that compartmentalization. Many of the theatre-makers want to clear space, to create ‘gaps’ – a word iterated many times in the pages that follow. Anna Deavere Smith positions her interview-and-impersonation technique as opening a space in a ‘sound-bite culture’ that forecloses doubt, shepherding difference into seamless divisions. ‘Character’, she suggests, ‘lives in the obvious gap between the real person and my attempt to seem like them’ (Smith, 1993a, pp. xxxvii–viii). I suggest
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(in Chapter 7) that what is most valuably dialogic about Smith’s work, however, is not the ‘gap’ she identifies, but the one between her framing of the work and the work itself. While Smith nominates a lack of space as somehow a cause of a degraded public sphere, Parks takes a step back, implicating metaphors that lead to the experience of a lack of space. In the mini-essays that preface The America Play and Other Works (1995), she touches on some of the ways in which, as the plays in the volume enact, temporal and spatial metaphors intersect to station identity. As I discuss in Chapter 3, several of her plays and comments on them implicate metaphors of linearity and horizontality in serving to train readers/spectators to receive a play as a system according to which events are perceived as eventful only by falling into place. Her characters are readers and spectators of their own time-lines. Mr Smith’s family use the letters he sends home from the army to plot his destiny ‘falling into place’. For Mr Smith, time, which the army has led him to believe is a vista of possibility, runs out. The character of time itself appears, from Mr Smith’s perspective, to have deteriorated: MR SERGEANT SMITH: Time for somethin noble was yesterday. There usta be uh overlap of four hours. Hours in four when I’d say ‘today’ and today it’d be. Them four hours usta happen together, now, they scatter theirselves all throughout thuh day. Usta be uh flap tuh slip through. Flaps gone shut. (Parks, 1995, p. 65) It is not until this point, late in the day of his destiny, that Mr Smith thinks beyond the spatial metaphors in which he has been drilled, beginning to get a grip on his situation by applying his own metaphors. In all the works I discuss, space is a spectral commodity: it often seems to be running out, or to have been degraded or devalued; characters struggle to access real, or pure space, and complain of a cheapened or illusory form. Attempts to regain a sense of space involve refusal or, as in Ping Chong’s allegories, a Martianist/ phenomenological bracketing of accepted ways of naming space, and of naming history via spatial metaphors. Often, there is a desire to start again, to un-write space, to erase its codes, to start again. It is an impulse that informs the rush of documentary theatre at the turn of the millennium, a wave of work that wants to excavate a space before spin. In her ‘Other History of Intercultural Performance’, Coco Fusco describes Two Undiscovered Amerindians as a performance located at the ‘“zero degree” of intercultural relations, in an attempt to find a point of origin for the debates that link “discovery”
Introduction: Improper Naming 27
and “otherness”’ (1994, p.148). A character in Parks’s Death of the Last Black Man in the Whole Entire World expresses a desire to un-map his world, to return it to a state ‘before uh demarcation made it mapped’ (Parks, 1995, p. 114). The problem with ‘zero degree’ discursive space (as I discuss in Chapter 4), is that it entails an erasure (albeit heuristic) of history. One person’s strategy to seek a point of origin is another’s complicity in forgetting. The idea of the performance space as a blank slate, an erased tablet or physicalized mind-space from which knowledge has been wiped clean, has a history beyond the scope of this discussion. More tendentiously than Peter Brook’s Empty Space (1977), the empty spaces on view here are conspicuously constructed in their emptiness, in contra-distinction from, and resistance to, constructions of spatial metaphor that take place within. Though their works are quite diverse in form (including durational pieces, scripted narratives, and interactive web-based environmental works), Forced Entertainment’s brand of performance features a use of space marked by a lack of representational decor invoking a fictional world, and by the presence of sardonically effortful tools for presentational communication (cardboard signs, disco lights, and microphones on stands or on a desk). While the physical and mental geography discussed in The Travels is rich – full of imagined spaces triggered by names in the A–Z, and detailed reporting of actual space – the presentation space itself is a presentation of non-space, a kind of despatialized zone. The utopias (literally, ‘non-places’) presented by Smith, Parks, Forced Entertainment, Ridiculusmus, Wolfe, and Fusco are far more varied than the phrase ‘empty space’ implies. Rather than seeing them as a particular kind of space, I suggest that more coherence lies in what these presentation spaces evince: a desire to free space from, or empty it of, commodification and dead metaphor. Graeme Miller’s site-specific performances and installations (to which, in Chapter 6, I compare The Travels) have often sought to reclaim spaces that have become ‘unnamed’. Of one of his works, The Desire Paths (1993), Miller writes: [The] starting point was that a place does not exist until it is imagined and named and that all of the copses, knolls and paths that have been walked and named are the mark points of human experience and the markstones of lives lived. These real spaces have become ‘unnamed’ with the passing of time, becoming less plausible than the centralised reality of the media and the transitory, frantic nature of living today. The Desire Paths was a theatre work that re-named the city.14
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Pseudo-naming in The Receipt and Say Nothing (Chapter 7) trades on a veneer of efficiency that is the opposite of, and over-writes, those ‘real’ spaces that have become unnamed. It is a kind of pseudo-naming that indicates a shift in late-capitalist societies from a metaphysics of substance to a metastasis of value. Wolfe’s method in The Colored Museum is a post-Brechtian detachment of sign from effect. Rather than offering another form, or shell, The Colored Museum spews calcified forms from the history of African-American self-representation. Having regurgitated these forms, Wolfe ends (in ‘The Party’) by salvaging their shells, which should be seen, he states, not as fossils, but as ‘silhouettes’, reformable.15 The ‘silhouettes’ are the characters themselves, the inhabitants of the museum: they wear the shells of dead iconography like the casing of a Trojan horse, hiding the agency within. The spaces in which the characters hang out are emblems of this subterfugal force. Miss Roj’s Bottomless Pit, like Parks’s Great Hole of History, is a hidden, interior space of un-naming that accommodates an elsewhere beyond the hegemonic gaze – an elsewhere not outside discourse, but in which discourse is materially unpacked and re-figured.
2 Authorship: A Trick of the I
In her Introduction to Excitable Speech, Judith Butler writes that the subject is: brought into social location and time through being named. And one is dependent upon another for one’s name, for the designation that is supposed to confer singularity. Whether the name is shared by others, the name, as a convention, has a generality and a historicity that is in no sense radically singular, even though it is understood to exercise the power of conferring singularity. (1997, p. 29) Naming, and the subjectivity it bolsters, requires ‘an intersubjective context’, states Butler, because ‘the very possibility of naming another requires that one first be named’. To name is not simply to offer oneself up as an individual subject, but to participate in a ‘dyadic relation’ with another who also offers themself up. That is not to say, however, that those who participate in this intersubjective relation are generally aware of how it constitutes them: ‘the time of discourse is not the time of the subject’ (ibid., p. 31). The system of the subject’s enunciability, as Butler portrays it, is a ‘linguistic scene’, a stage whose spatio-temporal frame is ordinarily invisible. In so much theatre of recent decades, it is the condition of ‘being subject to’ that has become the subject. In this chapter, I cast Butler’s metaphorically theatrical scenario of how naming constitutes subjectivity alongside Paula Vogel’s theatrical scenario. The playwright’s brother, Carl, died of AIDS-related illnesses on 9 January 1988. The Baltimore Waltz (BW) is a self-conscious memorializing of Carl’s life and public mourning of his death. Though the siblings it depicts, Anna and Carl, are the 29
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playwright’s alter ego and a version of the playwright’s brother, BW is less an autobiography than a play that explores the limits of autobiography in the theatre circa 1990. Traumatized by the loss of her brother, the playwright attempts to bring him to life. In the course of trying to make Carl present, she gets caught up in the instabilities of (what Vogel refers to as) the ‘postmodern’: ‘the awareness that all texts are battlefields of contradictions and that each work, when examined, implodes’ (Dixon and Smith, 1995, p. 94). These instabilities become the subject of the play. Not just because it is the most clearly autobiographical, BW is Vogel’s most reflexive play. In its meditation on the uses of textual, and specifically theatrical, artifice, the play accords with Herbert Blau’s observations of a theatre in which immersion in fantasy is a way not to escape truth, but to prove that truth exists. Referring to his own theatre practice, Blau reflects: the appearances from which theatre is made and upon which it reflects are conceptually elaborated and in turn reflected upon until there is a denial, or refusal, by means of theater of the distressing and maybe crippling notion that in life there is nothing but theatre. (Benamou and Caramello, 1977, p. 62) Vogel’s Anna exerts the ‘denial, or refusal’, that Blau describes. Wishing to assure herself that she has a past, a centre, Anna throws herself into the ‘conceptual elaboration of appearances’, a whirlwind in which she tosses herself between fantasy and reality. Along the lines of the paradox that Blau elucidates, Paula/Anna strives to situate herself in her reality by constructing a veil of artifice and then dramatizing herself piercing that veil. She feels her past, her remembered experience, to be hers only because it is so artificial that she can lose herself in its luxuriant ‘elaborations’. Vogel’s enmeshing of her projected self in artifice, proceeding from the construction of an alter ego who immerses herself in imaginatively quilted textual worlds, resonates with Foucault’s conceptions of the space of writing. Foucault uses the word ‘écriture’ to designate writing seen not from the standpoint of intended meaning, or of the act of writing, but according to ‘the space across which writing is dispersed and the time in which it unfurls’. In the wake of the death of the author and the death of the subject, ‘the point’ of writing, states Foucault, ‘is not to pin a subject within language; it is rather a question of creating a space
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into which the writing subject constantly disappears’ (Foucault, 1991, pp. 101–20). He describes a scenario acutely applicable to BW, in which writing ‘unfolds like a game (jeu) that invariably goes beyond its own rules and transgresses its limits’ (ibid., p. 102). A series of items precede the printed text of BW: a dedication; an epigram; an autobiographical note from the playwright explaining the circumstances that led her to write the play; and a letter from Carl that she encourages ‘all future productions to reprint’ in their ‘accompanying program’. Though they memorialize the play, these precursors mark the insufficiency of the play as a memorial. The dedication reads: To the memory of Carl – because I cannot sew. (Vogel, 1996, p. 3) The sewing reference is an allusion to the established practice of making quilts to memorialize AIDS victims. The epigram is a quote from actor Ron Vawter, who also died of AIDS-related illness: I always saw myself as a surrogate who, in the absence of anyone else, would stand in for him. (Vogel, 1996, p. 3) The playwright’s note explains that, a year or so before he died, Carl invited her on an ‘excursion to Europe. Due to pressures of time and money, [she] declined, never dreaming that he was HIV positive’. The phrase ‘never dreaming’ is apt. Most of the play stands in for the dream that the playwright did have, waiting in the hospital as her brother lay dying: it is a daydream in which the author’s alter ego imagines an exhilarating trip through ‘a Europe that exists only in the imagination’ (ibid., p. 4). The final item preceding the play, a letter containing Carl’s directions for his funeral, conveys his personality vividly. His taste in music, the hypothetically dead author states, runs ‘to the highbrow: Faure’s ‘Pie Jesu’ from his Requiem, ‘Dance of the Blessed Spirits’ from Orfeo, ‘La vergine degli Angeli’ from Verdi’s Forza’. As for ‘the piece of me I leave behind’, he offers a comprehensive set of options including ‘[o]pen casket, bum up (you’ll know where to place the calla lilies, won’t you?)’. In permitting all productions to reprint Carl’s letter in her capacity as ‘executor of his estate’, Paula explains that she ‘would appreciate letting him speak to us in his own words’ (ibid., p. 5).
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From the moment that the first words of BW are spoken, however, the contingencies of such speech are apparent. The play opens with Anna speaking to the audience/practising a foreign language: ‘Help me please.’ (Anna recites from memory.) Dutch: ‘Kunt U mij helpen, alstublieft?’ ‘There’s nothing I can do’. (Vogel, 1996, p. 7) The ‘I’ of the language lesson is emblematically foreign, a quotational ‘I’. Derrida argues that the self ‘becomes a speaking subject only by making its speech conform to the system of the rules of language as a system of differences’.1 In everyday life, the manoeuvres required for appearance as a speaking subject are not visible: the death of Carl, and the desire to resurrect him, prompts a crisis of subjectivity in which those manoeuvres become the subject. (The language lessons that Mona/Molly fails to grasp in Imperceptible Mutabilities in the Third Kingdom (IMTK) – discussed in the next chapter – work a similarly Derridean insight into the effortful cultural training of a conspicuously unstable identity.) Read in conjunction with the dedication, ‘because I cannot sew’, Anna’s statement, ‘there’s nothing I can do’, might be seen as a symbolic switching over from the playwright ‘I’ to the character ‘I’. The switch seems to be motivated by Paula’s acknowledgement that she can only help Carl vicariously. Moments later, when Carl receives his diagnosis, a second switch occurs: DOCTOR: …And there is usually rapid destruction and metastases. CARL: Anna – ANNA: I’m right here, darling. Right here. CARL: Could you explain it very slowly? DOCTOR: .....Often seen with effusions, either exudate or transudate. ANNA: Carl – CARL: I’m here, darling. Right here. (Vogel, 1996, pp. 9–10) As the Doctor describes the progress of disease through Carl’s body, Vogel/Anna arrests his diagnosis through a quasi-shamanic substitution, Anna becoming the patient. The ‘standing-in’ alluded to in the epigram thus takes on a redemptive quality as Anna takes on Carl’s disease. Carl is diagnosed with Acquired Toilet Disease (ATD), a ludicrous stand-in for Sexually Transmitted Disease (STD) and Acquired Immune Deficiency
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Syndrome (AIDS). Anna switches places with Carl and redeems him textually by taking on the substitute illness. The symbolic switching over from the playwright to the alter ego, from the Paula ‘I’ to the Anna ‘I’, seems to be motivated by Paula’s acknowledgement that she can only ‘help’ Carl vicariously. Already a stand-in for Paula, Anna proceeds to stand in for Carl, performing the role of the patient throughout the play-within-the-play, the palimpsestic ‘treatment’ that constitutes most of BW. All but the first few and last few minutes of the play is an exteriorization of what takes place in Anna’s mind while she waits in the stark wings of Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, where Carl lays dying. In the original published text of the play, Vogel states that it takes place ‘in a hospital (perhaps in a lounge, corridor or waiting room) in Baltimore, Maryland’.2 The ‘lounge, corridor or waiting room’ is a limbo that reflects the state of Anna’s mind. The mental journey she undergoes is an imaginative, quasi-transcendent reflection on Carl’s passing. It is an exhilarating one for siblings and spectators alike: Anna throws herself with abandon into culinary and sexual indulgence, while Carl delights in the paintings and buildings that Western Europe has to offer. Motifs of vicarious presence, and of standing-in, multiply throughout a quiltlike inner narrative fashioned from memories of novels, travel guides, plays, and films.3 The dominant palimpsestic source is the 1949 Graham Greene-scripted, Carol Reed-directed, post-war noir espionage thriller, The Third Man. In trying to cope with death on a personal level, and with the mediation of AIDS on a political level, the author propels her alter ego into a web of textual and performative substitutions in which finding the truth seems to depend on surrender to fantasy. Writing in the year that BW received its New York premiere, Stuart Hall reflects on the ‘expansion of the notion of text and textuality, both as a source of meaning and as that which escapes meaning’; and ‘of textuality and cultural power, of representation itself, as a site of power and regulation; of the symbolic as a source of identity’ (Morley and Chen, 1996, p. 271). Hall identifies a paradox crucial to the drifting of attention within cultural studies away from analysis of social stratification and toward the effects of image-making systems. That paradox can be expressed thus: there is ever more urgency to root and find one’s own and others’ identity in coded systems, in what Hall calls ‘the symbolic’; but to turn to the realm of the symbolic is to turn to discursivity and textuality, which always involves ‘displacement’ (ibid.). In BW, Vogel enacts herself trying to overcome the ‘instabilities’ and the ‘displacement’ that textualizing experience entails. The impulses that led to the
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play are redemptive and compensatory: Paula wants to bring Carl to life. This desire, however, is chased by the need to express, comprehend, and come to terms with the fact that Carl has gone, and cannot be brought to life. The play enacts Paula finding cunning ways to make Carl present by inserting bits of text – from sources such as films and travel guides – into the gaps in her shared experience with, and memories of, her brother. With every wave of invention, though, there is a counter-wave of negativity, a recurrent and inevitable marking of Carl’s absence. The ebb and flow of absence and presence itself marks the ways that subjects can and cannot be animated and constructed in language and in theatre. As she adopts the authority of the playwright to conduct a kind of personal autopsy in public, she finds that, to come to communicative terms with her brother’s death, she must first accommodate the Death of the Author. After Vogel becomes Anna, and Anna stands in for Carl, autobiography increasingly merges with a theatricality infiltrated by film iconography. A third performer plays a myriad of roles, most of them as slippery and duplicitous as the Orson Welles character in The Third Man. Vogel’s Third Man wears the latex gloves of – and, in dream logic, ‘is’ – the Johns Hopkins Doctor, but calls himself Harry Lime (as the Welles character does), as he takes on all the personae the siblings encounter: an Airport Security Guard, a string of fly-by-night lovers, the odd waiter and concierge, and various doctors. In Platonic philosophy, The Third Man is a notional figure, hypothetically placeable between the Ideal Man and the Particular Man. Because The Third Man is a synthesis of the Ideal and the Particular, he is not a concept in the pure sense that the Ideal Man is, nor a concrete entity like the Particular Man. The problem, Plato muses, is that between Third Man and the Particular Man, another man can always be inserted. Plato’s Third Man is as slippery as Vogel’s: he is not real but is not unreal; not apparent, but based on appearances. While it is The Third Man who is most conspicuously duplicitous, Anna herself is an exceedingly slippery central figure. She is interpellated not as a true ‘I’, but as a projection of the playwright that allows her to function. Vogel’s stepping into her own and then her brother’s shoes, propelling her on an imagined version of a journey she wishes she had actually taken with him, is a far cry from the smoothness of conventional autobiography ‘wherein’, as Elin Diamond puts it, ‘past experience is made to testify to the subject’s self-consciousness’ (1997, pp. 148–9). Anna inhabits, in Diamond’s thinking (which draws on Walter Benjamin), ‘an I-position’ that ‘decomposes into dialectical images’ that are ‘trans-historical’ and that ‘help us to read history against
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the grain – and read the body against the grain’ (ibid., p. 154). The I-position allows Paula/Anna to suspend time and consciousness, to transcend the space and the reality of the Hospital, to stand outside herself. Creating an alter-ego allows Paula to ‘produce’ an ‘I’ that is ‘dialectic’ in several senses: Paula is gay, Anna is straight; Anna speaks words that Carl said to his sister in real life; the character Anna is based on Paula’s real-life best friend. The personality that Paula attributes to her friend describes the character of Anna in the play: I decided to model Anna on my best friend – who had been an elementary school teacher, and who, although certainly not naïve, was very alive and appreciative of life – the opposite to blasé.4 The I-position of Anna, then, is, as Vogel puts it, an ‘amalgamation’ – a word used, also, by Butler to describe the process of naming – that is deeply strange but deeply familiar, intensely comforting but intensely unstable. When Anna swaps places with Carl to become the patient, the author function passes to Carl. Carl and The Third Man switch and collude to fix Anna in third-person object position, prizing her from the ‘I-position’ of the image-maker that she occupies at the start of the play. The Third Man’s use of the first-person pronoun emphasizes the fact that ‘I-ness’ is paradoxically mutable in BW: it is the position from which the story is told, but is not fixed to stable subjectivity. On the contrary, Vogel exploits every opportunity to use the I-position as a site of contest, a place in which reading is always ‘against the grain’. It is striking that the first-person pronoun is used in the play precisely at the point where subjectivity is occluded, where the self is silenced, as in the language lessons. As in Under the Knife (see Chapter 5), the ‘I’ is more often than not quotational, often conspicuously so, except in those moments where the subject speaks of being silenced.5 The speaking of being silenced that is so key to the I-positions constructed by Vogel and Skipitares highlights the translations on which theatre’s mechanisms of identification are predicated. As the European journey begins, Anna often regains the author function, but another change of subject-object positioning is always just around the corner. Vogel alternately suspends and reveals evidence of her character’s voice and of her own authorial self-consciousness. Anna, in parallel with her author, tries to free herself from painful consciousness, but finds, in what she thought was escape, a deeper consciousness. Vogel dwells on the development of the ego, the interface of psychic
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and social, the cusp in which thought becomes behaviour and is thereby laid open to interpretation. Scene VIII (early in the daydream that is the play-within-the-play) begins: THE THIRD MAN: At the hotel. (Simultaneously with Carl’s next lines:) Lesson Six: Direct Pronouns. I am tired. And my sister looks at herself in the mirror. CARL: Sixieme Leçon: Pronouns – Complements Directs. Je suis fatigué. Et ma soeur elle se regarde dans la glace. CARL climbs onto a double bed. [...] ANNA stares into a mirror. […] THE THIRD MAN: The first separation – your first sense of loss. (Vogel, 1996, p. 17) The author translates her first-person experience into the hypothetical possessive (‘your first sense of loss’), which makes no distinction between first- and third-person pronomination. Address is in limbo, poised between the shared warmth of identification and a clinically distancing transposition. Naming here is a sea of translation, a compressed, oneiric version of Butler’s quasi-theatrical scenario in which ‘the name is offered, imposed by someone or by some set of someones, and it is attributed to someone else’ so that the ‘subject of speech who is named becomes, potentially, one who might well name another in time’ (Butler, 1997, p. 29). In her unpacking of how naming works, Butler makes a statement that could be a critique of Vogel’s code-switching: ‘This suggests that such a subject in language is positioned as both addressed and addressing, and that the very possibility of naming another requires that one first to be named’ (ibid.). In the next scene, the switching continues as Carl takes on naming duties and The Third Man becomes the demonstrator: CARL: Medical Straight Talk: Part Two. (THE THIRD MAN becomes a Public Health Official) THE THIRD MAN: Here at the Department of Public Health, we are announcing Operation Squat. (Vogel, 1996, p. 18) The re-entry of the sardonically named ‘Medical Straight Talk’ to speed things up, and to distract Anna just at the point where she begins to come to terms with loss, runs parallel to Butler’s account of the importance of time in naming. In Butler’s scenario, the subject never quite attains
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determinate awareness of being constituted by language, which means that ‘the time of discourse is not the time of the subject’. In this sea of translation, in which the baton of the subject’s selfnaming is passed from one stand-in narrator to another, Anna, much like Holly Martins tracking Harry Lime in The Third Man, navigates the serial displacement and conflation of identities as we try to keep up. When Anna forgets to reflect, and immerses herself in the ‘daydreamt’ action, Carl takes over the role of the decoder: CARL: Although he began his career by studying in the classical tradition, his later paintings reveal the influence of the Italian style. ANNA (muffled): Ah! Yes! GARÇON (also muffled): Ah! Oui! CARL: He traveled extensively around the world, and in the salon of 1827 his privately lauded techniques were displayed in public. ANNA: Yes, oh, yes, yes! GARÇON: Mais oui! […] ANNA: Yes – I – I – I – I – ! GARÇON: Je – je! Je!! Je! (Pause.) CARL: In art, as in life, some things need no translation. (Vogel, 1996, pp. 22–3) Anna’s bodily exploits and Carl’s cerebral ones may seem poles apart, but both point to escape, to solace, to forgetting in this typically Vogelian conjunction of farce, genuine passion, and reflexive irony. The motif of ‘the translated I’ frames Anna’s sexual escapades as a metaphor for the play as a whole. Earlier in the play, after diagnosis and before entering the journey of the imagination, Anna announces that she intends ‘to fuck her brains out’ (Vogel, 1996, p. 12). While this is a character’s statement about how she plans to spend her time abroad, it is also a metaphorical statement by the author about the function of the play. The daydream-as-theatre, through which Paula/Anna sublimates her mental turmoil, chimes with Gavin Bolton’s theory that artistic expression is driven by ludic desire that cannot be satisfied in the everyday scheme of life: In a game the pain of life can safely be recaptured, encountered and switched off as required, for […] a game and all other forms of playing including the arts are deliberately created second-order experiences, removed from the rawness of living. (Bolton, 1984, p. 105)
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While they seem to be opposites, Anna’s mindless sex tour and Carl’s erudite critique of Corot both function as sublimations within a bigger ‘game’ in which Vogel generates ‘second-order experiences’ to ‘remove’ herself ‘from the rawness of living’. Vogel explores the idea that theatre is a medium rooted in contingency: it ‘operates in the present tense’ (Bigsby, 1999, p. 310), but ‘there is no you or he or she’ (Savran, 1999, p. 271) fully present.6 Vogel’s public daydream is a fundamentally interrogatory form of theatre, marking rather than closing the gap between personal consciousness and public discourse. As well as enacting the constraints upon subjectivity that the experience of her brother’s diagnosis and treatment brings into critical consciousness, playwriting affords Vogel an opportunity for heteroglossia, Bakhtin’s name for the productive refraction of authorial experiences through another’s language. Vogel turns to playwriting as a refuge within a sound-bite culture in which hyperactive currents of imagery dressed as information seem to answer questions before we have had a chance to form them. Sound-bites in the form of titular clips – ’As children they fought’ and ‘Dolls are for girls’ – are smothered by moments of insight and reflection that establish Anna as the spectator’s partner in perception. She does not really connect with any of the characters played by The Third Man. She does not talk meaningfully to Carl once the daydream has begun. Moments of reflection, in which Anna refers to herself in the second-person pronoun ‘you’, as opposed to the first-person ‘I’, have a testimonial quality that temporarily cuts through the frenzy of the narrative: ANNA: You hear the doctor through a long-distance corridor. Your ears are functioning, but the mind is numb. You try to listen as you swim towards his sentences in the fluorescent light of his office. (Vogel, 1996, p. 12) Occurring in Scene 3, almost immediately after Anna has assumed the role of the patient, this is the first of Anna’s reflective addresses to the audience. Immediately, the focus is on perception, on being connected and disconnected to language and to presence. Though the ‘you’ pronoun and the use of the present tense invite the audience to insert themselves into Anna’s position, they also underline the barriers to intimacy and complicity because they underline the fact that Anna is not fully present, even to herself: the ‘ears are functioning, but the mind is numb’.
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It is to attain a quality of perception that is embodied, rather than merely mechanical (‘ears functioning […] mind numb’), that the play leaves the hospital and enters the imagined world. Like works of the period discussed in other chapters – The Colored Museum, Kind Ness, IMTK, Fires in the Mirror, The Travels, Under the Knife, Pugilist Specialist, The Receipt, Here’s what I di… – BW heuristically pits intuitive, embodied perception against seeing and hearing that are merely mechanical. The play asks: what kind of diagnosis do we, and should we, trust? Vogel’s portrayal of diagnosis and perception assaults the material operation of, but determinedly unchains the self from, the limits of positioning based on race, ethnicity, gender, and sexuality. Carl and Anna’s daydreamt European journey figures the ‘I’ in post-identitarian fashion, as a fluid equation, ‘self’ and ‘other’ crossing and recrossing a permeable boundary. Anna’s daydream casts the spectacle as a dialectic of fixity and movement, between going somewhere and nowhere. The lack of scenery and of scene changes imposes a sense of immobility; this mood is counterpointed by action which travels ceaselessly, taking in a multitude of milieux. The play’s title is an emblem for this counterpoint: ‘Baltimore’ stands for hospital, being an object under observation; ‘Waltz’ signifies the free, highly subjective play of the dream. Interplay between the cold sobriety of truth and the warm airiness of fantasy is the underlying dynamic of a narrative that is brisk and frenzied, but suddenly ‘implodes’ into moments of reflection. Benjamin states that, despite the endless stories that people construct about events, ‘history decomposes into images, not narratives’ (Benjamin quoted in Diamond, 1997, p. 146). In BW, the propulsion of theatrical narrative is set against the stasis of theatrical imagery.7 In a kind of perceptual tug-of-war, the pull of the Baltimore waiting-room and hospital-bed contends with the pull of the imagined journey. Vogel continually points to tension between the stasis, specificity, and grounding of the image and the narrative diversion of travel. It is useful to note that Vogel had never been to Europe when she wrote BW. As the tension inherent in the title suggests, the daydream explores the liberties with actuality that translating images into narratives entails. In the structural interplay of image and narrative, stasis and movement, meaning is palpably constructed. Connections and tensions between juxtaposed images and statements form and dissipate within a structure that edges toward, but never settles into, narrative cohesion. Narrative is an active force, antagonistic to Paula/Anna’s desire to find a cure for Carl’s absence. Never allowed to take the narrative at face value, the spectator is drawn to see character being obscured, rather than heightened, by narratological structuring.
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The conspicuously mysterious Third Man is crucial to the play’s mordantly agonistic schema. The Third Man ‘plays’ (Vogel’s term in her stage directions on p. 6) a string of characters who physically and emotionally come between Anna and Carl in the story: he is the wedge that repeatedly inserts itself between the siblings, the personification of self-concealing authorities that keep them apart. Some of the characters ‘played’ by The Third Man, such as the Johns Hopkins Doctor, try to fix Anna in the object position of diagnosed patient; others, like Harry Lime, try to keep things on the move, the promise of revelation and resolution always just around the corner. The Third Man tries to force events into a narrative, but Vogel repeatedly leaves images hanging as narratives break down. The play’s 30 short scenes each begin with a rhetorical trope of identification or comparison that frames the ensuing action within an ironically authoritarian narrative voice. In the early stages of the play, the generic title phrases are derived from language textbooks: THE THIRD MAN: Basic dialogue. The phone call. Hello. I would like to speak to Mr. Lime, please? CARL: …Wie geht es dir?! …it’s my sister. ATD. THE THIRD MAN: ATD? Jesus, that’s tough, old man. You’ve got to watch where you sit these days. She’s a sweet kid. Yeah. Yeah. Wait a second. (Offstage.) Inge? Inge, baby? Ein Bier, bitte, baby. Ja, ja. You too, baby. (Pause.) Okay. Dr. Todesrocheln? Yeah, you might say I know him. But don’t tell anybody I said that…Do you still have the rabbit? (Vogel, 1996, p. 13) Though the language lesson promises transparency, the use of multiple languages, the background action involving ‘Inge, baby’, and the mysterious allusions to a ‘Dr. Todesrocheln’ and ‘the rabbit’, all raise more questions than they answer. The private and side-references form images that hang. These hanging images counteract The Third Man’s reductive narrative constructions, including the use of titular phrases such as ‘The phone call’, that strive to render Carl and Anna exemplary, normal, typical. While the demonstrative clips that start the scenes promise monologue, Vogel’s strategies conspicuously struggle to foster dialogue: THE THIRD MAN: As children they fought. CARL: We never fought, really. (1996, p. 43)
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As The Third Man claims to fix causes and symptoms in childhood that account for adult behaviour, Vogel disarticulates his formulations. Arresting the momentum of The Third Man’s demonstrative efforts, Carl often takes over the role of narrator, forcing moments of reflection in which linguistic ambiguities undermine the certainty of what is stated: You were not permitted to play with dolls; dolls are for girls. You played with your sister’s dolls until your parents found out. They gave you a stuffed animal – a thin line was drawn. Rabbits were an acceptable surrogate for little boys. (Vogel, 1996, p. 34) For Carl’s parents, rabbits stand in, or are ‘a surrogate’, for ‘dolls’, because normal little boys do not play with dolls. In the context that Vogel builds around it, however, the line ‘[r]abbits were an acceptable surrogate for little boys’ is subversively double-edged. It is a pointedly sententious sentence that exemplifies Vogel’s testing of the rules of, to destabilize the neatness of, binary logic. BW counters the reinforcement of entrenched binary thinking that characterized mediation of the AIDS epidemic in the United States. At a time when binary narratives were being challenged by the breakdown of the Cold War, and by the achievements of (30 or so years of) race- and gender-focused activism, AIDS was an excuse to revive such narratives. Making Anna a first-grade schoolteacher allows the playwright to substitute children, whom society tends to see as innocent, for practices, such as gay sex, and drug use, which are often seen as threatening to society’s moral fabric. In hushed tones, the Doctor explains early on to Anna that ‘[f]ive year-olds can be deadly’ (ibid., p. 11), the play with stereotypes forcing us to read medical authority against the grain. By swapping a gay man living in San Francisco with a straight elementary-school teacher living in Baltimore, the playwright replaces homo- with heterosexuality, and defamiliarizes the paranoia generated by AIDS. Disarticulating promiscuity from particularity of sexual orientation, location, and occupation, her play with opposites conflates the attributes of innocence and corruption that the parents, who draw the line between rabbits and dolls, endeavour to keep separate. Railing against the fervent articulation of AIDS and homosexuality in America’s cultural image bank, Vogel creates her own signifier: the stuffed rabbit. Stuffed only with mystery, the rabbit is speciously important: icon, catalyst, deceptively empty vessel, and red herring masquerading as The Answer that will lead to The Cure. Like so many images
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in the play, it refuses to fit into the narrative while promising to complete it. The connection of the rabbit with the chase for a cure is cemented by the parallels with the chase for Harry Lime in The Third Man, who exploits an underground trade in penicillin. It is Vogel’s Harry Lime – an old friend of Carl’s who remains unseen – who first mentions the rabbit in the telephone call, cited above. The rabbit is then smuggled around Europe by Carl, who keeps fervently arranging to meet Harry. Anna, despite her brother’s best efforts, knows about the rabbit, but has no idea why it is significant. She attaches herself to the sign of the rabbit like a greyhound chasing an effigy of a rabbit around a labyrinthine track. As she chases it, the rabbit multiplies, Carl and The Third Man furtively exchanging rabbits and Anna finding it impossible to determine which is the original one. Confused by the furtive offstage activities of Carl and The Third Man, Anna asks: ‘What is it they do with those rabbits?’ (Vogel, 1996, p. 21). Vogel parodies the prurient paranoia that equates gay men with voracious ‘offstage activities’ such as the clandestine solicitation of sex in public toilets. Her refusal to name satirizes Reagan’s fatal refusal to talk about AIDS in public – long after its magnitude demanded address – not only fostered paranoia and misinformation about AIDS, but revived paranoia and misinformation about gay male sex. The passing through Customs, which completes the substitution of Anna into the role of the patient, is a symbolic switching over into the fantasy world of the daydream. A blast from childhood past, a passport to a potential cure or resolution, the appearance of the rabbit foreshadows the rampant but illusory momentum of Anna’s fantasy – the daydream that takes her everywhere and nowhere. The rabbit is a kind of baton, carriage of which takes Anna out of the mundane time and place of the waiting-room and into the spatial and temporal elasticity of the daydream. Christopher Bigsby observes that fantasy, for Vogel, is ‘not an evasion of the real but an extension of it’ (Bigsby, 1999, p.293). That is particularly true in relation to BW. While Paula/Anna’s daydream is motivated in part by a desire to ‘evade’ the reality of the actual situation, it ‘extends’ that reality in several respects. On a personal level, it takes her beyond the walls of the waiting-room on a vertiginous, interior version of an itinerary that Paula wishes she and Carl had travelled, carrying her backwards to childhood to confront the spectre of a future in which she will have to come to terms with Carl’s death. The daydream’s estrangement devices contextualize Paula/Carl’s particular situation and the specific Johns Hopkins waiting-room within a broader socio-cultural context: analysis of the effects of medical language; attitudes to AIDS; attitudes toward sexual behaviour.
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Early scientific, political, and journalistic mediation of AIDS was characterized by officious discourse that disembodied disease by covering AIDS in rhetoric to avoid dealing with experiential, bodily reality. BW depicts the effects of that discourse, alienating individuals from one another and from themselves. In the face of disembodying and alienating treatment that preys parasitically upon, rather than ameliorating, the symptoms of, disease, the play’s theatrical substitutions reassert connectedness and embodied presence. Look again at the passage quoted earlier: DOCTOR: …And there is usually rapid destruction and metastases. CARL: Anna – ANNA: I’m right here, darling. Right here. CARL: Could you explain it very slowly? DOCTOR: …. Often seen with effusions, either exudate or transudate. ANNA: Carl – CARL: I’m here, darling. Right here. (Vogel, 1996, pp. 9–10) Anna’s escapist strategies – the dream itself, and the sexual and gastronomic binges within it – are a quest for a cure from the effects of the treatment, effects which attach themselves to the disease, exacerbating alienation of patient from carer. Food and sex provide some comfort, but, as finding a cure becomes increasingly unlikely, Anna is forced to find solace in reflection, interpretation, decoding. This pattern resonates with Roland Barthes’s lament that the quest to translate the world into signs, and the experience of individuality as the mastery of those signs, is specific to the late-capitalist era, and compensates for a lack of embodied connectedness between people.8 Wrecked by the disembodying effects of rhetoric and obfuscation, Anna finds paradoxical solace in the only kind of cure available – a semiological journey. The tour of Europe, in which Anna ‘fucks her brains out’, is a quest for a lost sense of wholeness: in that quest, escapist sex is continually juxtaposed with escapist decoding. The process of decoding is not the means to an end for Anna that it purports to be: it is cathartic in and of itself, and as much of a release as the sex. BW depicts a society in which touch is neurotically codified, ‘a thin line drawn’ between acceptable and unacceptable contact. Despite the libertarian rhetoric of his pronouncement that ‘fucking is a revolutionary act’, the Radical Student Activist is a mechanical lover and an equally mechanical thinker. The strict code within which he conducts his sexual activity is violated
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when Anna reveals that she is ‘a schoolteacher from low-income housing’ – a far cry from his fantasy of storming the bourgeoisie. Anna replies, sarcastically, that ‘the missionary position does not a revolution make’ (Vogel, 1996, p. 46). Another neurotic masquerading as a libertine, the Garçon, picks up Anna after waiting on her in a bistro. He is happy to explore and be explored by her, until she trespasses the no-go area: ANNA: And this? GARÇON (Scandalized): Non. There is no word en français. Pas du tout. ANNA: For this? There must be – GARÇON: Non. Only the Germans have a word for that. (Vogel, 1996, p. 25) For the Garçon, the anus is both out of bounds and unnameable. Anna’s hands-on French lesson, a pastiche of the Henry and Katharine scene of intimate royal encounter in Shakespeare’s Henry V, invokes the deep-rooted link within cultural consciousness between disease and foreigners. Noting that dirt is matter out of place, sociologist Mary Douglas asserts that associations between foreignness and contamination are psychically and socially fundamental (Douglas, 1984, p. 36).The link between fear of foreigners and fear of contamination in BW is a reminder of how similar was the mediation of the threat of AIDS to the mediation of potential invasion by foreign ideologies that characterized the preceding Cold War era. AIDS rhetoric and Cold War rhetoric fix vague but abiding fears about innocence and transgression. For nearly half a century, Americans were led to believe by politicians and dominant sections of the media that Soviet Communism was a murky threat to the liberty, democracy, and prosperity fundamental to the identity of the United States. Even into the 1980s, the Iron Curtain of Communism in Eastern Europe acted as a backdrop, against which the United States distinguished itself. In the late 1980s, that Curtain was drawn – and in some sections torn down – at precisely the time that the management of ‘multiculturalism’ within the United States climbed to the top of the political agenda. Multiculturalism, like Communism, like the anti-Vietnam counter-culture of the 1960s, and like AIDS, provokes the biggest fear of all for US hegemony: the fear of losing a generation, the fear that America’s children will be contaminated by foreign bodies. The parodic content of the dream – in which a first-grade schoolteacher beds every waiter she meets, while two men engage in furtive activities with childhood toys that have nothing to do with sex – conspicuously
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estranges such fears. Viewing a slide of Heidelberg, Carl comments: ‘Every cobblestoned street, every alleyway, was so pristine and clean. Wasn’t it, Anna?’ ‘(Deadpan)’, Anna replies: ‘Yes, sterile’ (Vogel, 1996, p. 38). The country which figures prominently in the play, often as a symbol of paranoia and sterility, Germany is also the one that looms largest in the playwright’s own heritage. Germany’s presence is therefore apt in a play about ‘re-remembering’. ‘Vogel’ is German and Dutch for ‘small bird’, yet, when Dutch and German are spoken in the play, Anna cannot comprehend them. Articulating sterility with disembodiment, and playing on her own ‘forgotten’ roots, Vogel analogizes the struggle to learn a lost language with diminution of subjectivity that is the price of security. It is only through the alter ego that she can regain composure in the face of a crisis of subjectivity; but, as Foucault warns, creating space and time involves surrendering, or ‘disappear[ing]’ inside, a textual ‘game’ that annihilates the subjects who play it. As if possessed by an animating spirit, a single piece of furniture transforms in protean fashion throughout the play, to conjure whatever needs to be conjured. This solitary item – a hospital gurney as Vogel imagines it, but a sofa in Anne Bogart’s production – constantly changes but never changes. Like the latex gloves, worn at all times by The Third Man, it is equivocal between stasis and flux, absence and presence.9 Together, the gloves and the gurney maintain the shadow presence of the waiting-room throughout the journey. As Ann Linden observes, they are a quintessentially Vogelian spin on prop-as-formalist device, allowing us to see as if the first time, but are about noticing our own serial ‘re-remembering’ (Linden, 2002, p. 242). They take us on a phantom journey, an anti-escape, in which Anna’s denial of her actual circumstances informs our own immersion in and detachment from the narrative. Vogel’s deployment of stage properties to target denial is rooted in notions of resistance that underlie her attitude to theatre. Several related aspects of the playwright’s thinking about resistance emerge in the course of an interview with David Savran in The Playwright’s Voice. Acknowledging the influence of Theodore Lipps and Vernon Lee – early twentieth-century philosophers of aesthetics – Vogel explains her preference for negative empathy ‘in which we resist the empathy we feel towards the protagonist’ (Savran, 1999, p. 273). Creating tension between identification and moral judgment, negative empathy is essential for the elasticity of perspective on which Vogel insists. Vogel contrasts her paradigm with ‘sensationalism’, based on ‘positive empathy without any resistance’, that leads to ‘avoidance and denial’ (ibid., pp. 273–7).
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The resistance Carl works to his sister’s textualization of him becomes critical in a scene that occurs precisely half-way through the play, and half-way through the journey within the play. The pivotal Dutch Boy episode – in which Anna encounters the Little Dutch Boy of the children’s story, now aged 50 and the worse for wear – is the lacuna, or crest, of the dream, the point at which Anna begins to wake up. Vogel uses the folk tale to brilliantly articulate dreaming with resistance: Here in Noord Brabant there are three walls of defenses against the cruelty of the North Sea. The first dyke is called the Waker – the Watcher; the second dyke is de Slaper – the Sleeper; and the last dyke, which had never before been tested, is known as the Dromer – the Dreamer. (1996, p. 31) The ‘walls of defenses’ correspond to layers of resistance within Anna’s psyche. It is a correspondence made clearer at the end of the scene, when The Dutch Boy At 50 asks about Carl: DUTCH BOY: Wo ist dein bruder? ANNA: Oh, he stayed in Amsterdam... DUTCH BOY: And you did not go? (ibid., p. 32) The exchange refers to the guilt that Vogel feels about the journey she never took with Carl, and to her subconscious realization that, while she daydreams, he is dying. The veil of the daydream is further pierced a couple of scenes later, during a slide presentation that Carl attempts to make to the audience. The images that Carl glosses – of the German countryside – have been mysteriously replaced by images of the hospital and its Baltimore environs, interspersed with images of Disneyland. A couple of scenes after that, the veil is more violently ripped: the visit to Dr Todesrocheln breaches the narrative fantasy once and for all. If the dream is the theatricalization of Carl’s death throes (as perceived by Paula/Anna), then the visit to Dr T is the final throe. In the search for a cure, it is the final throw of the dice. Literally translated, ‘Todesrocheln’ means ‘Deathrattle’ or ‘Deathspluttering’. Todesrocheln specializes in ‘uriposia’, purification through the drinking of one’s own urine. ‘Let us’, he explains, ‘look at the body as an alchemist, taking in straw and mud und schweinefleisch and processing it into liquid gold
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which purifies the body’ (Vogel, 1996, p. 53). The determinate wake-up call for Anna comes as Todesrocheln imbibes her urine with distracted and unbalanced relish: ANNA: I don’t believe that’s your real hair. DR. TODESROCHELN: I will need first of all twenty-four hours of your time for a uronocometry – ANNA (Increasingly scared): You look familiar to me – (ibid., p. 55) A few moments later, his disguise punctured, Dr T ‘takes off his wig and glasses and appears as the Baltimore Doctor from the first scene, peeling off the black gloves to reveal latex gloves underneath’ (ibid., p. 55). In the unmasking of Todesrocheln, Anna is released from the journey back to the waiting-room of Johns Hopkins. Reflexive awareness seems finally to have breached the daydream. By describing Dr T’s specialty as ‘uriposia’ – which, Anna points out, sounds like a form of poetry (ibid., p. 15) – Vogel suggests that the drinking of the urine is a metaphor for the daydream-as-theatre. Anna and the playwright both purify themselves by passing through their own image bank. In writing the play, Paula recycles herself as Anna; in the daydream, Anna recycles herself as Carl. As the daydream gives way to Johns Hopkins, and the Carl/Anna (patient/carer) substitution is reversed, the relationship between alter ego and playwright is reinscribed. Tension between absence and presence, and between fantasy and reality, crystallizes in the play’s final throes. Into the glaring banality of the Baltimore hospital, to which we have only just returned, the frenzy of the dream again irrupts. Anna gives escape one last go. She tries to stir Carl as a Strauss waltz begins to play, but Carl, in his pyjamas, is ‘wooden’. As Anna repeatedly tries to animate him, he becomes manically mechanical, ‘like the doll in E. T. A. Hoffman’ (Vogel, 1996, pp. 55–6). An alarm clock sounds. The Doctor enters, covers Carl with a sheet, and attempts to console Anna. As Anna begins to exit, the Strauss sounds again, this time without the dream-state lighting. Carl, calmly and ‘perfectly well, waits for Anna. He is dressed in Austrian military regalia. They waltz off as the lights dim’ (ibid., p. 57). If the initial attempt to dance is a struggle that Anna cannot control, the final dance is celebratory and funereal. The first attempt seems to symbolize denial-bound and desperate fantasy: it is Anna still locked in her own romanticism. The final waltz is the beginning of learning to live with Carl’s death. Only by learning to live with his death can she
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successfully animate him in her imagination. The literal Baltimore waltz crystallizes the tension between absence and presence, pointedly leaving that tension unresolved. The daydream helps Anna to come to terms with her situation, but is not a real escape. Her imagination, as the playwright’s surrogate, has revealed connections which more mechanistic discourse obscures.
3 Assimilation: Sounding Through the Surface
Writing in 1993, Jill Dolan notes: ‘Numerous play anthologies published recently mark a new geography of American theatre as it hyphenates itself in print – On New Ground (1987), a volume of Hispanic-American plays; Between Worlds (1990), Asian-American; Out Front (1988), gay and lesbian; even Lenora Champagne’s edited collection of women’s performance art pieces, Out from Under (1990), all use metaphors of location to title themselves in conjunction with identity positions crossed by gender, race and sexuality’ (p. 420). She observes that ‘the hyphenates of these anthologized identities also point to a possible recuperation into the fabric of something more recurrently, hegemonically ‘American’, that the ‘hyphens serve as temporary connectors that are bound to either separate or assimilate the terms’ (ibid.). The processual indeterminacy that Dolan associates with ‘hyphenated identities’ is acute in Ping Chong’s Kind Ness and Suzan-Lori Parks’s Imperceptible Mutabilities in the Third Kingdom (IMTK). The name ‘The Third Kingdom’ indicates a desire to place, to map, to particularize; but, also, a recognition of the ineluctable mystery of the universe as a place that is in limbo and in flux. The play is set, insofar as it is ‘set’, between a new world inhabited after the Middle Passage, and an old world left behind. The four sets of characters that inhabit Parks’s Third Kingdom never meet. Structurally, the most explicit link between the four groups lies in verbal echoes, things said in one section repeated by a character in another. Everything in Chong and Parks – including historical events, images of the future, cultural artefacts, and characters – is a ‘shard’ (Parks quoted in Drukman, p. 73) of found culture, detached from any familiar ideological, temporal, and spatial context. Characters bring with them local (geographical and historical) contexts which the authors attach to a sweeping purview 49
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in which the mythical and the vernacular are entwined, so that an epic moment can become startlingly intimate, and vice versa. The characters act as (to use Dolan’s word) ‘connectors’ between the intimate and the epic; but their own perception of connections is fragile at best. Chong and Parks offer cryptic motifs of the failure to recognize oneself. Chong sends Daphne (‘100% American, pure bred’) out star-gazing with Buzz, thinking she recognizes Cassiopeia, a queen of Greek myth thrown into the sky to learn humility, but getting the wrong location. Parks gives us a family of diggers (in The America Play), who appear to have subsumed their own identity in the relics they unearth; and, in IMTK, a startlingly oneiric quintet of Seers – abstractions as much as characters, and paradoxical abstractions at that – visionaries who cannot see. Both authors allude to the attempts of some naturalistic theatre to construct a natural habitat for the viewing of behaviour. By making the living-room of the women in ‘Snails’ into a ‘nature study’, the Naturalist in IMTK purports to ‘accommodate’ his ‘subjects’ (Parks, 1995, pp. 27–9). A third, and then two-thirds of the way through Kind Ness, as Buzz seems to be assimilating, a Stage Hand crosses with foam rocks to set up the diorama for a gorilla. Whether the gorilla is Buzz, or a different gorilla, is deliberately ambiguous, open like the question of whether Buzz really has assimilated. At the end of the play, he is finally given permission by the Narrator to set the rocks down. Buzz, seemingly fully assimilated having married Daphne and with a baby, stares at the gorilla in its natural habitat, poised in the limbo of the hyphenated subject in the process of assimilation. It is a moment, like so many in Kind Ness, and like so many in Parks’s plays, in which an embodied gaze of genuine recognition contends with the cultural gaze of the assimilated subject. (Re)cognition of distance travelled in assimilation sounds through the void of amnesia. It is a sounding through that allows Chong and Parks to play formations of ‘natural’ habitat against what such formations leave out. Chong and Parks figure naming as a mask through which character sounds. ‘Sounding through’, a literal translation of the Greek word ‘persona’, refers to the way that character sounds, or resonates, through the mask. The masked performer uses both the mask itself and the overcoming of the mask to register personality. Drawing explicitly on this use of the mask in Greek theatre, Jung used the term ‘persona’ to denote the outermost part of consciousness, the skin of personality through which inner thoughts and feelings are filtered and presented to the world. The (1980s) allegorical works of Ping Chong and the early works of Suzan-Lori
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Parks bring that Jungian ‘sounding through’ into dialogue with postidentitarian naming of identities. *** From Lazarus in 1972 to Elephant Memories in 1990, Chong produced two dozen allegorical works for the stage. Since 1990, he has produced three series: the stylistically eclectic East/West Quartet (Deshima, Chinoiserie, After Sorrow: Viet Nam, Pojagi), exploring interactions of particular Asian countries with particular European countries and with the United States; a trio of large-scale, multi-media puppetry pieces (Kwaidan, Obon, and Cathay); and the ongoing Undesirable Elements documentary project, each incarnation of which assembles diverse groups whose personal histories catalyse autobiographical ensemble performances following a template that has evolved over two decades. The allegorical works of the first half of Chong’s career (my focus here) betray a range of influences as diverse as postmodern dance (he has collaborated extensively with Meredith Monk) and Peking Opera (in which both his father and grandfather directed and performed), but bear Chong’s signatory style. His storytelling has a dry, grotesque quality of ‘laughter through tears’ that calls to mind European theatre practitioners such as Meyerhold, Brecht, and Dürrenmatt.1 Long-standing interest in the specific vocabularies of a range of visual media – painting, sculpture, and especially cinema – inform what Chong refers to as the visual and thematic ‘plasticity’ of his theatre, which appropriates for live performance the conventions of painting, sculpture, and film. He sounds through technologies of, and obstructions to, seeing. While Nosferatu: A Symphony of Darkness (1985) refers to Murnau, Maraya∼Acts of Nature in Geological Time (1987) alludes to the films of Japanese directors Mizoguchi and Ozu. In both Maraya and Nosferatu, Chong deploys obstructions to the spectator’s gaze to highlight acts and ways of looking. In Maraya, the audience sees the stage through a white wooden grid, a device which, as in Ozu’s films, helps to define the space of the image like squares on a chessboard. In spite, or perhaps because, of this eclectic array of influences, Ping Chong is very much an auteur with a highly distinctive stylistic and thematic signature. There is an elegant economy to his mise-en-scène. Light, in brilliant colours, is used to pick out small, powerful visual details – such as recurrent images of knives in Nuit Blanche (1981) – on a stage free from clutter or complication, more closely resembling a modern dance space than the set of a play. The subtitle of Nuit Blanche, A Select View of Earthlings, aptly conveys the martianist quality of Chong’s
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staging. For the spectator, it can feel like seeing human life stripped bare, looking for the first time at the world and at the tools we use to represent it.2 Despite the spareness of his aesthetic, Chong is fond of, and has a particular way with, things: tools/props, iconographic details such as typefaces, bits of scenery or couture. In remediating ‘things’, he elicits the role of iconography in displaying, and thereby solidifying, culture. Objects of consumption are endowed with a ghostly agency that projects itself onto those who consume. Like Wolfe in The Colored Museum, Chong dramatizes from the outside in, presenting a naïve, pop-culture surface from beneath which there are rumblings and irruptions of the psychologically and socially repressed, evoking the extent to which (in the Parks phrase I cited in my Introduction) ‘within the subject is its other’. Chong’s method might be seen as counter-quotational: he isolates and provocatively de- and re- contextualizes spatial, temporal, and stylistic codes. Quietly, but tendentiously, he estranges culture by distancing its codes: the effect tends to be amusing and disturbing at the same time. His innocent, martianist eye is naïve, not in the Western sense of naïvety as emptiness, but in the Buddhist sense of naïvety as integral to wisdom. He describes the way that he presents himself to experience as a ‘Confucianist ethic, not as aggressive as a Western ethic’ (Chong, 1990a, p. 65). In his late 1980s work, Chong sounds grandiose significance through lighthearted vehicles. By looking naïvely at what is already naïve, Chong creates spectatorial distance and a lonely wisdom. He is drawn to popular texts and images that are resonantly shallow: apparently fatuous, but redolent with acculturation. Elephant Memories (1990) uses a television game show format to ironize the packaging of history as trivia; in Kind Ness (KN), he uses the iconicity of the gorilla suit and the yellow ponchos of the schoolchildren to signify, but also to unravel signification, stripping layers of significance from over-familiar signifiers. Dress, music, and other elements that characterize 1950s and 1960s American suburbia are deployed not to create verisimilitude, but as bits of iconicity laid thickly onto the blank canvas of the stage: costumes are in lurid, primary colours against the white floor and empty space; silence is pierced by loud bursts of popular songs of the day. These bits of iconicity do inform the narrative’s evocation of milieu but do not melt into that evocation: they hang in the air, demanding attention. Like Parks, Chong treats the personal and mythic as embroiled, the distance of the mythic giving insight into the intimate chamber of the personal. The thematic layering of the everyday and epochal plays out visually as a tension between what Misha Berson calls the ‘acrylic surface’
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of Chong’s work and what is conspicuously not fully seen and heard beneath it: shadowy projections, shrouded and silhouetted forms; offstage and loudspeaker sound.3 Thematically and aesthetically, Chong conveys a sense that the self-identical surface of cultural order belies the constant shifting of sedimented texts and performances. In KN, in front of and at each corner of the white (inner) stage floor, there are small, white, upright squares which catch the colours of light projected onto each of the scenes. These blank plaques frame the inner space, and give spatial definition to the stage; they also ‘suggest that the audience is watching human specimens in a zoological environment’. As we observe the characters becoming saturated with culture, the white squares at the corners are saturated with colour. Chong’s articulation of theatre with zoo can be seen to inform many of his works, but is most explicit in KN. The play sketches the coalescence and dissipation of six schoolmates, from second grade to early adulthood. While Chong has dealt elsewhere with growing up, and with this period of history, this is, both thematically and formally, the most strikingly American piece in his oeuvre: it is explicitly about American rites of passage, and is suffused with the lurid, specious innocence of the Archie4 comic books that were an initial stimulus for the devising of the play.5 It consists of 12 scenes that sketch a singular line of action: Scene 1 Scene 2 Scene 3 Scene 4 Scene 5 Scene 6 Scene 7 Scene 8 Scene 9 Scene 10 Scene 11 Scene 12
A slide lecture Daphne’s garden First Day of School Slapstick #1 Chez Buzz Introductions Slapstick #2 Questions and Answers Bus Stop Prom Nite Testimonials At the Zoo
As some of these scene titles indicate (‘First Day of School’; ‘Prom Nite’), a familiar narrative, or at least the idea of a familiar narrative, is a key element of KN. The First Day of School and Prom Nite are landmarks whose contours are cross-cultural, but which are filled with culturally specific detail. As milestones, displaying the progress of the individual, they exhibit a society’s norms as a narrative of growing-up. While
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Chong promises a story, he also compromises it. The play’s interruptions, backtracks, tangents, and ellipses coerce the spectator to ask what theatrical, personal, and cultural narratives leave out, and why. The ludicrous formality of the social rituals which constitute ‘Introductions’ and ‘Prom Nite’ is underscored by the fact that the characters’ movements are severely choreographed. They walk in geometric patterns, often diagonally and/or backwards, in fast motion. Semiological prisms, the characters are mechanically immersed in, but have no psychological purchase on, the culture they are learning to perform. They are ensigns, displaying the codes of 1950s suburban childhood to excess. Speech and movement take on a life of their own – expressing but ultimately transcending the psychology of each character – to directly articulate the culture they are learning to perform. ‘Acculturation’, as Sally Banes comments, ‘becomes palpably physical’,6 each movement, to apply Meyerhold’s language, ‘a hieroglyph with its own peculiar meaning’ (Leach, 1989, p. 56). At the end of ‘Introductions’, in another of the play’s hanging moments, Dot is left behind when her over-excited friends run off. For comfort, she begins to name what she would like to eat: I’d love some pop! And some hot dogs, and some ice cream, and some candy, and some Juju Bees, and some Hum Hums, and some Tic Tacs, and some Snoo Snoos, and some Yo Yos and some Bim Bums… (Chong, 1988, p. 19) Through Dot, Chong equates immersion in culture with a narcoticized, consumptive desire. Like the other children, her speech and movement display to a grotesque extent the consumption that constitutes her cultural training. Naming here, as so frequently in Chong’s work, is conspicuously quotational, used in close relationship to physical objects as a mask of culture through which individuals sound. It is worn rather than mastered, put on like a piece of clothing, and with something of the same materiality. Whether it is the frantic recitation of numbers and cities in Nosferatu, or (as I will discuss) hate terms, lists of countries, or candy in KN, Chong pushes the phatic function of language to excesses that unravel communication. Names are like units of capitalist culture – they establish value, but are never really possessed by those who circulate them. Chong has always been fascinated by the relationship between assimilation and the encoding of meaning into signs. He cites Lévi-Strauss, who states that, ‘[w]hereas concepts aim to be wholly transparent with respect
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to reality, signs allow and even require the interposing and incorporation of a certain amount of human culture into reality’ (Lévi-Strauss, 1966, p. 18). Like many of Chong’s pieces, KN begins with a prologue: here, it is a slide lecture which, in preparation for what is to follow, purports to teach the audience to ‘tell the difference between what is alike and what is not alike, what is harmonious and what is dissonant’ (ibid., p. 1). The Narrator, a male voice heard over a loudspeaker, interprets a series of slides, each of which displays a pair of images side-by-side. Slide One is simple enough: {Red Rectangle | Blue Rectangle}. The Narrator explains: ‘What is alike is that both are vertical rectangles, they are both colours. What is dissimilar is that one is a hot Color, the other is a cool Color.’ As the series progresses, the limited nature of the Narrator’s explanations becomes increasingly evident; the images then become ever-more culturally loaded. The Narrator greets Slide Seventeen {Woman from Este Lauder ad | Woman from Algeria} with the information that the ‘image on the right is of a woman who had to remove her veil in order for this photograph to be taken. The woman on the left did not have to remove her veil at all’ (ibid., pp. 1–5). Seeing this Slide Lecture in a classroom, along with a number of other graduate students, was the first exposure I had to Ping Chong’s work, and I have since shown it to a number of classes myself. I find myself, like the professor who taught me, helping students to ‘tell the difference’ between the prologue and the rest of the play, between this play and the rest of Chong’s ‘oeuvre’, between what they are seeing here and what they would see in the theatre. As KN progresses, it will become clear that Chong sees culture itself as a veil of myths and symbols that cannot itself be seen, but which, for those who are acculturated, normalizes what is seen through it. What Chong refers to as ‘the artifice of human culture’ is a veil, or mask, of normality that we must wear to attain a sense of identity, to feel like cultural insiders.7 That mask is held in place by naming rituals. Chong weaves names – labels, insults, and names of consumer goods – into a veil of artifice that is lifted in fits and starts to reveal complexities beneath. The similarities and glaring differences between the children are foregrounded by Chong, and by the gang themselves, from the start. Dot is a blind, Jewish girl. Rudy and Lulu are both Irish Catholics – he a ‘smart aleck’, she ‘a dumb blonde […] with a Barbie-doll quality’. Daphne, a descendent of a Mayflower family (the original pilgrims), is a WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) who describes herself as ‘American … 100% … pure bred’ (Chong, 1988, p. 25). She revels in her socio-economic superiority over would-be suitor Alvin, a
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French-Canadian whose father struggles to find work as a coal miner. Immediately after the ‘Slide Lecture’, a stichomythic exchange of names ensues: DAPHNE: Let me explicate the situation for you … My mother is a Johnson. ALVIN: My mother is a housewife! DAPHNE: My family is coal in this country, Alvin. ALVIN: My Uncle Emile, he died of black lung! ........................................................................... DAPHNE: I’m afraid my taste runs more to Die Zauberflote and Cosi Fan Tutte! ALVIN: I go for spumoni myself! DAPHNE (finally exasperated): Tennessee Williams ALVIN: Tennessee Ernie Ford! (Chong, 1988, pp. 7–8) The markers of difference weave a veil of easily recognizable opposition. As the characters journey through high school, however, they neglect to perform these identities according to the schema. The catalyst for the disruption is the arrival of a new pupil, Buzz, who – though the children often seem, or pretend, not to notice – happens to be a silverback gorilla, from Rwanda. Hauntingly, Chong never lets us be sure what Buzz’s peers and teachers see when they look at him. Enigmatically, he is at times addressed by other characters as a person, at times as a gorilla. We are never quite sure exactly what the characters see, and whether it is the same as what we see. Is the gorilla suit supposed to alienate ex-nominated racial difference, like the proverbial elephant in the living-room that no-one mentions? Bunny Conklin, the School Principal’s wife, bludgeons diplomatically away as she shoves America (in snack form) down the throats of its youth: ‘Your people don’t eat cheese, do they?’ (Chong, 1988, p. 16). Are we implicated as the subjects of the gaze, or should we regard ourselves as wiser than Buzz’s peers and teachers? Maybe they see things we cannot? For the most part, whether or not Buzz is a gorilla seems irrelevant compared to other factors of difference, such as his fondness for European opera, which his peers find odd. Not to be outdone by Buzz’s reputed opera singing, Dot exhibits her intention to become a rhythm and blues singer ‘like my people: Blind Lemon Jefferson, Blind Willie McTell, Blind Boy Fuller…’ As she bursts into a spirited rendition of ‘John Henry’, Rudy reminds her that these are black rhythm and blues singers and she is ‘a white Jewish
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girl from Scarsdale’ (ibid., p. 35). Sick of being ribbed by her so-called friends, the generally peaceable Dot explodes: ‘what about Buzz?! He’s a fucking monkey and you don’t give him half the shit you give me!’ (ibid., p. 37) The iteration of the name ‘Buzz’ embeds the enigma. Buzz is a not uncommon first name for generations of Americans, not least in the 1950s and 1960s, when KN is set. Like Buzz Lightyear in the CGI blockbuster Toy Story, Chong’s Buzz seems trapped in the 1950s and 1960s of astronaut Buzz Aldrin’s heyday, but our Buzz’s story roams into the future, mocking the effects of nostalgia in normalizing a culture’s sense of itself. Phonetically, the name ‘Buzz’ connotes the desire to be appealing to one’s peers, and the children whose class Buzz joins love saying his name: they do so often, exploiting its sonic force to the max. On another level, though – and the play is all about contrasting layers of awareness, about recognition that lies just out of view – ’Buzz’ is not a proper name at all, and as such signifies the invisible disturbance that the other creates, the pulse of difference, that which needs to be deciphered but which gets in the way of deciphering. The major journey, or through-line, of the play is the transformation of Buzz from object to subject of the gaze. On the First Day of School (Scene 3) and at Principal Conklin’s Party (Scene 6), Buzz is the exotic object, continually introducing himself, an embarrassed figure in a sometimes actual, sometimes metaphorical spotlight. Scenes 4 and 7 are vaudeville-style ‘Slapstick’ scenes in which a white hunter is tricked by the ape that he is trying to poach. These scenes comment on, but are not joined to, the main narrative. They are scenes in which tension between different possible readings of Buzz intensifies: the gorilla is like Buzz, but not like Buzz; the hunter is played by the same actor who plays Alvin. The Slapstick scenes’ partial similarity to and partial difference from the main narrative imbues these scenes with an oneiric feel. They step us out of the time-line of the play just at the points when we are likely to immerse ourselves in identification with Buzz, to suspend disbelief in the fact that he is an actor in a gorilla suit. They stand out from and re-contextualize the foregoing action but are not fully assimilated. In Scene 9, the children, further into their second-grade year, wait after the end of the school day at the ‘Bus Stop’. Movements are less robotic, but still quite mechanized. Clad uniformly in yellow ponchos – costumes that are both faithful to 1950s suburbia and almost archetypal badges of childhood – the group plays games centred on insulting each other along gender lines. The crudity of the insults, and the desperate attempts to
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win the game, make it a light-hearted, only faintly disturbing scene to watch: RUDY: Oh, go blow it out your ass, Daphne. LULU: Oh yeah? Well, your ass looks like my face. (Chong, 1988, p. 28) Each time a teacher walks by, the children form a neat line. Conscious and crafty disobedience is now evident, a rumbling within the neat social order; but it is a subversion that is permissible, part of that order. A deeper rumbling begins when Daphne is called away by an (invisible) teacher. Throughout the scene, she has been trying to hold on to a letter from ‘overseas’ from her brother, clutching it away from her nosey classmates. From offstage (literally beyond the frame) – we hear Daphne screaming as a teacher tells her of her brother’s death. It is revealed that he has been ‘dropping bombs on the gooks’. Neither Korea nor Vietnam are named, but Korea is the war that fits the scene’s place in the play’s timeline. The five visible characters, and Daphne’s scream, freeze as the stage recedes into semi-darkness. The six actors then line up along the cyc. Still wearing their yellow ponchos – but no longer playing children, or playing any obviously matrixed character – they walk and speak, in unison, delivering a litany of (mostly racial) epithets: ‘Yellow belly commies, gooks, pinko chinko, greaseball, Arab wog bastards, honkie, nigger, spear chucker, Irish mackerel snapper, jungle bunny, faggot, jigaboo, red neck, Jew bastard, Turk-’ (ibid., p. 32). The speech and movement is cold and rhythmically emphatic. An irruption of the epochal into the everyday, the litany of hate terms parallels and reflects back on the child’s play and our enjoyment of their game. This kind of contextual jolt typifies Chong’s technique of immersing and removing the spectator, another kind of game that can metastasize from hilarity to horror. Between Scenes 9 and 10 (‘Bus Stop’ and ‘Testimonials’), Buzz enters as the sound of rain and many images of the word ‘RAIN’ are projected through transparent drops, along with the names of nations for whom killing is ‘currently a daily event, like the weather’. These hanging moments, in which Buzz is imaged alone, reflect the fact that Buzz himself is a presence that the narrative does not contain, highlighting what churns beneath its ‘acrylic surface’. If the ‘Slide Lecture’ at the start is a fake reading-lesson, Buzz is a genuine exercise for the spectator: he accommodates so many investments that multiple dis- and reinvestments in the course of the play illuminate the motions
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of signification – how associations, or signified ‘effects’, coalesce and disperse. During the play, Daphne, the ultimate insider, barely interacts with Buzz, the most obvious outsider. At the end of the play, however, Daphne and Buzz appear to be a suburban married couple, familiar and niggly, with a baby in tow. The baby’s name, Chippy, connotes similarity to Buzz (‘a chip off the old block’), but also, and more pointedly, the deep-rooted bitterness of one forcibly assimilated. The final scene takes place at the zoo, where Buzz is momentarily intrigued by a gorilla. He stares at it with a dim cognizance, in the liminal state of the hyphenated subject in the throes of assimilation. Meanwhile, the Stage Hand – who has been trying to put down his (fake) rocks throughout the play and has been repeatedly told by the Narrator ‘not now’ – is finally allowed to install the flimsy ‘natural habitat’. Once the rocks are down, a tyre is lowered for the gorilla to swing on. S/he swings, reluctantly, on the tyre. But the second time s/he does so, the tyre returns and the gorilla has gone. By this point, Daphne and Buzz have also moved on. The play ends with the tyre swinging back and forth from on- to offstage (Chong, 1988, p. 43). Deploying a cinematic metaphor of framed space, Teresa de Lauretis describes ‘the movement in and out of gender’ as ‘a movement between the (represented) discursive space of the positions made available by hegemonic discourses and the space-off, the elsewhere of those discourses’ (de Lauretis, 1987, p. X). Chong schematizes acculturation in a similar manner, also deploying a cinematic frame of reference to figure immersal in, and removal from, the ‘in and out of’ culture, movement between the sanctioned, framed space and the obscured ‘elsewhere’ of ‘hegemonic discourses’. Chong articulates the filtering mechanisms of theatrical production and consumption with the zoo. A scopophilic environment analogous to the theatre, the zoo reflects the place of seeing back on the spectator, leaving the audience with a sense of the interrelatedness of the(ir) gaze and processes of assimilation. Chong reminds us of first principles: that our desire to see things naturalistically is a way to fix the unassimilated subject from the perspective of the insider. Just when we feel competent to view the gorilla and his habitat, he will disappear beyond the frame; all we can see are the meanings and associations we project. In the denouement to KN, it is not Buzz’s assimilation, but rather the relationship between seeing-lessons and social integration, that takes centrestage. Immediately after the Dionysian excesses and purgings of the ritual that is ‘Prom Nite’, we are left in the pathetic restoration of Apollonian order. Just as momentum appears to be building toward a
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resolution of the narrative and the characters’ journey, a chronological sequence of slides is projected, a radically jarring compression of time: The cyclorama and plaque lights come up, gelled blood red. The STAGEHAND, carrying the rock, crosses the stage in silhouette from upstage right to upstage left; he reenters from centerstage left, exits centerstage right. Meanwhile, slides are projected, each one showing a year: 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965,1966, 1967, 1968. STAGEHAND reenters downstage right and is about to put the rock down. NARRATOR: No, not yet. (Chong, 1988, p. 38) As Chong sardonically evoked in the ‘like/not like’ Prologue, slide projections are a medium geared to efficient delineation. Partly through usage in lecture-type presentations, we are trained to see slides as authoritatively deictic. Far from smoothing the jump in time by summarizing what happens to the characters in the intervening years, Chong simply displays a list of dates. It is a deliberately unsatisfactory form of deixis that highlights, rather than accounts for, what is missing. In using a communication tool to delineate that which is lost from view, Chong renders the slides agential, their efficiency a cover for reification. After this slide ‘non-show’, a bookend for the slide-show at the beginning of the play, the characters enter in a line, as for an identity parade, and stand downstage, each in their own box of stark white light, facing out as they are asked to account for the nine ‘missing’ years. The Narrator asks Rudy, Lulu, Dot, and Alvin, now in their late twenties: ‘when was the last time you saw Buzz?’ They take it in turns to answer the question with a story, or set of remarks, about Buzz – each testifier leaving after providing their testimony. The final testifier is Daphne, who we expect will have little to say on the subject. As Daphne thinks about the question, the other characters leave, the stark white squares drop out, and a mottled, evening state comes up to indicate a tranquil evening in the country: DAPHNE: Oh … the last time I saw Buzz. Hmmm. (BUZZ enters. DAPHNE walks over to him, sits on ground next to him, takes off sandals. Looking at night sky, BUZZ sees a shooting star.) Oooh! (Pause. She points.) Buzz … is that Cassiopeia right here overhead? (BUZZ moves her arm over.) (Chong, 1988, p. 40)
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Chong identifies Daphne with what she sees (or thinks she sees): Cassiopeia, a queen of Greek myth thrown into the sky to learn humility. Unfortunately, Daphne gets the wrong location. Having spent the entire play asserting the self-identical purity of her own ‘star’ and subjecting the other characters to her punitive gaze, she is corrected by Buzz, whose view of the world has conspicuously not been portrayed, as he has always been the object of the gaze. In the following and final scene, ‘At the Zoo’, Buzz become the bearer of the gaze. But, as he stares at the gorilla with a distant recognition, we may wonder whether assimilation makes hyphenated subjects of us all. Through the union of Buzz and Daphne, Chong makes spectatorship sound. Like all his work, KN connects the way we absorb stories to the way that we are ourselves absorbed into society. In attempting to absorb the play, we fill in the blanks, the missing links, by projecting our own assimilated stories. In that process, do we recognize the effects of our own projection? From the mythologist’s perspective, identity is in the veil and in the mess behind the veil. *** Like Chong, Parks plays different notions of innocence against one another, espousing a martianist aesthetic that is quasi-phenomenological but which exaggerates the strangeness of certain elements with which we are familiar. She describes her approach as a clearing of pre-conceptions about what the world looks like, and what the form of a play should look like: ‘I’m saying that the inhabitants of Mars do not look like us. Nor should they. I’m also saying that Mars is with us – right on our doorstep and should be explored’ (Parks, 1995, p. 8). Imperceptible Mutabilities in the Third Kingdom (written in stages between 1986 and 1989) and The America Play (written in stages between 1990 and 1993) trace continuities of survival and transformation in an elliptical world, unpicking the idiosyncratic shapes and patterns that events make in the minds of her characters. Born conceptually resourceful, their capacity for conception has been stifled by the institutions – religious, scientific, governmental – on which they depend to know how to interpret themselves and their environment. As the interpretative templates they have come to rely on crumble, they try out new strategies. Slowly, barely perceptibly, they shed their ingrained ways of knowing, analysis of their failures causing them to read back, to question their certainty, their ways of seeing. This retrospective questioning comes to a head in veiled epiphanies and fragmented visions.
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Parks returns identity to its basic meaning: coalescence. The dynamics of dispersal and coalescence with which she engages create interpretative situations in which agency, and causal links, can suddenly become visible. She writes in a mode I will call ‘epic vernacular’, a mode in which the same metaphor or motif figures in, and bridges, macrocosmic (epochal) and microcosmic (everyday) events. The epic and everyday are entwined via physical images and phrases. Parks generates motifs, allowing them to resonate through the text, and uses characters and situations to attach them associatively to recognizable contexts. Like Chong, she peels and chips at layers of discourse that have sedimented into a symbolic order. ‘Snails’, the first section of IMTK, features three roommates named Mona, Chona, and Verona – or rather, they used to be. In the first scene of the play, Chona, now named Charlene, states that ‘[o]nce there was uh robber who would come over and rob us regular’ (Parks, 1995, p. 26). A few lines later, Mona, now Molly, says: ‘[o]nce there was uh me named Mona who wanted to jump ship but didnt’. The third scene of the play begins: MOLLY: Once there was uh me named Mona who wondered what she’d be like if no-one was watchin. You got the Help Wanteds? CHARLENE: Wrapped thuh coffee grinds in em. (ibid., p. 27) Like the ‘coffee grinds’, Mona is a series of residues packaged for urban convenience. Physically and ontologically, the used coffee conjures images of black identity being ground down and wrapped in discourse. From her first appearance – at the very start of the play – Mona herself is symbolically buried beneath language as she recites her enunciation lesson: MONA: ‘S-K’ is /sk/ as in ‘ask.’ The little-lamb-follows-closely-behindat-Marys-heels-as-Mary-boards-the-train. Shit. Failed every test he shoves in my face. He makes me recite my mind goes blank. (ibid., p. 25) After beginning, here, by showing the effects of narrative, Parks goes on to uncover those effects, to peel away accreted discursive layers in search of the sense of ‘me-ness’ that Mona has lost. The Mona/Chona/Verona scenes are interspersed with monologues by a character named The Naturalist, who discusses his strategies for ‘researching’ his subjects with the aid of a ‘fly’ – a device used by anthropologists to study subjects in their natural environment. The Naturalist gains
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entry to the Mona/Chona/Verona household in the guise of ‘Lutzky the PhD exterminator’, who promises the women he will take care of the enormous cockroaches that reside in their living-room. Lutzky’s claims to cleanse the living-room read back on, and are as euphemistic as, the question that the Naturalist (Lutzky’s double) poses in his first appearance in the play: ‘How. Should. We. Best. Accommodate. Our subjects?’ (Parks, 1995, p. 29) The ghettoization of each word makes this a sentence in the sense of a severe pronouncement. Bearing in mind that the human-sized roaches in the living-room are placed there by Lutzky, his equivocation with the word ‘accommodate’ is far from accidental. Parks’s riffing on words, like ‘accommodate’, pregnant with both epic and vernacular resonance, works in tandem with images such as Charlene wrapping coffee grinds in newspaper, which first appear trivial, but become increasingly charged as the play progresses and similar motifs recur. Kin-Seer’s dream, in which he is ‘uh black black speck in thuh middle of thuh sea’ (Parks, 1995, p. 38), links the visions of the Seers – their dreams of sequential ‘swallowin’ and ‘becamin’ that evoke the epochal trauma of the Middle Passage, and the continuing struggle of AfricanAmericans to ‘become’ – back to the wrapped coffee grinds, themselves ‘black speck[s]’, and to Charlene, a ‘real-life’ African-American trying to find a place for herself with the aid of the Help Wanteds. Parks provocatively ties the materialities of urban and suburban life to the archaic and the metaphysical. While the Mona/Chona/Verona scenes grow out of and recede back into domesticity, the Seers inhabit a poetic limbo between the archaic and the urbane. Embodying the turbulent legacy of forced African migration to the United States, the Seers are a bridge – albeit rickety – between domesticity and archaism. Habitants of the ‘Third Kingdom’ of the play’s title, they are interspersed between the three longer sections of the play. They image a form of seeing which is unwittingly poetic, a visionary capacity which is startlingly vivid but horrifyingly incomplete. In Chong’s phrase to describe his own work, Parks gives us ‘waking public dreams’: when director Liz Diamond first read IMTK she ‘felt like it had to be a really wild hallucinogenic, sort of nightmarish event’ (Drukman, 1995, p. 70). In the 1989 production of the play directed by Diamond at BACA Downtown in Brooklyn, the Seers were presented as voices on tape. The stage was dark, except for black-and-white photographic slides projected onto a black screen. Historically aspecific, the first slides featured fragments of bodies, hands and feet in thick mud. Later, more intelligible images are projected.8 As the Shark-Seer (voiceover) recalled his dream of being
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swallowed by a fish, and of ‘uh me that then becamin that fish and […] that fish becamin uh shark and … that shark becamin uhshore’, the slides depicted bejewelled and well-dressed women, lending a concreteness to the social commentary lurking in the text. Over-Seer’s name and authoritative bearing resonate with the slave masters of the Middle Passage, but he might also be a community leader. Us-Seer seems to embody the home body, standing in both for those left behind when slaves depart and those, within the diaspora, who are themselves left behind by practices that divide to conquer. In their disorienting ‘glass-bottomed boat’, Kin-Seer, Shark-Seer, and Soul-Seer ride (‘navigate’ would over-state their command) an ambiguous sea of symbolism which frequently mires them in confusion. All the Seers find it hard to recognize themselves and their environment, but it falls to OverSeer to fill in the gaps in their knowledge. He informs the others that when half the world fell away, a wet place was inscribed between the two worlds called ‘the Third Kingdom’. This topographical narrative is complicated by Over-Seer’s qualification that ‘the second part comes apart in 2 parts’. The compulsion of Kin-Seer and Soul-Seer to read the dynamics of identity mirrors the audience’s pursuit of meaning, a caution against reading things in a mechanically habituated manner. The Seers are out of focus, mangled archetypes, elliptical points of reference. This impression is reinforced by the structural fact that they appear in relatively short bursts in the play, interspersed between the three longer, discrete sections. Parks’s theme-phenomena engage notions of integration, and its structural counterpoint, separation. Like the motifs of enclosure, images of integration and separation accumulate so that they become charged and, fleetingly, coalesce into specific social contexts. Assimilation and its shadow, ghettoization, are highly charged with past and continuing struggles of African-Americans in the United States for, with, and against, social integration. The legacy of these struggles is most explicit during the central ‘Open House’ section, in which Aretha, a freed slave, hangs around an apartment that the children of her former owner are looking to purchase. It is the nature of Aretha’s presence – as a kind of ghost, or, as Parks puts it, a ‘figment’ – that is crucial. As she tries to concretize the reality of what is happening to her by piecing together her fragmented memories and visions, we are able, through Aretha, to piece together the associations that Parks generates. The family to whom Aretha is enslaved are the Saxons: Charles Saxon and his children, Anglor and Blanca. The names are emblematic of contradiction: though they contain clear associations with (Anglo-Saxon) heritage,
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there is a tension between these associations and the name Aretha. For many, the name ‘Aretha’ connotes Aretha Franklin, who began singing as a girl attending black gospel services and who became a mainstream success despite often being seen as too Black to assimilate. Aretha Saxon is far from fully assimilated: she hovers in scenes, and we do not know quite how aware she is of her own situation. She is, like Buzz in Kind Ness, a narrativistically hanging figure, not quite contained by her own signified environment, or by the signifying environment of the play. When Aretha learns that her time as a guardian has come to an end because ‘her lease has expired’, she insists on taking photographs of the family with toothy grins. This task of preservation proves tricky as her subjects are truculent. Aretha is undeterred: ‘Dont matter none at all. You say it’s a cry I say it uh smile. These photographics is for my scrapbook. Scraps uh graphy for my book’ (Parks, 1995, p. 54). The pictures she describes horribly echo pictures of ‘happy’ slaves. Under Miss Faith’s supervision – literally under it, as Miss Faith sits on a high platform overlooking her – Aretha measures space to assess how many slaves they will be able to accommodate. Alluding to the fact that Aretha’s own term as a slave is about to ‘expire’, Miss Faith extracts Aretha’s teeth with a pair of pliers. This diligent dentistry proceeds despite Aretha’s screams. Taking words out of Aretha’s mouth, Miss Faith informs her patient: ‘if we didnt pluck them, we couldnt photograph them’ (ibid., p. 46). While the extractions allude specifically to the use of dental records to identify slaves and corpses, they are also a poetic allusion to the fact that Miss Faith’s archival gathering is a ‘system of enunciability’ that, as in Shark-Seer’s dream, swallows everything Aretha says and does. In a scene prefaced (in the printed text) with the word ‘Dreamtime’, Aretha goes to meet her maker, who turns out to be her earthly master, Charles Saxon. He asks for her papers, which state that her name is also ‘Charles Saxon’. She informs Charles that her husband is dead, but is told that she too is also called Charles. Her proper name is confirmed by Miss Faith, it is after all signed in her book. Signatures are as important for Miss Faith as they are for Derrida, and are equally tied to scriptural truth. Miss Faith insists that Aretha can prove (and continue to remember) who she is by looking at her signature in ‘the book’. Derrida describes how the confusion of proper names derives from the story of Babel. To cut this long story short, God wants the Shems to hear his name and obey his voice (which means translating it into terms they can understand), for he is God. But he also wants them not to understand his name, for he transcends their worldly codes (Derrida, 1985, pp. 100–2). The elusiveness of Aretha’s surname foregrounds the paradoxical nature of
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the proper name on which Derrida dwells: its propriety is predicated on it being both singular/non-translatable and communicable/translatable. But Parks also foregrounds how the ordinarily paradoxical function of the proper name is put into particular crisis by both slavery and socalled ‘emancipation’ proclamations. Male slave-owners routinely used (un-)naming to mark ownership of their ‘favourite’ slaves while trying to cover up evidence of sexual congress with them, robbing slaves and their descendants of autonomous identity. Parks’s naming of systems of enunciability chisels at the culture in which Aretha is entombed. Aretha may have swallowed the rhetoric that valorized slavery, but in digesting she rearranges, so that Miss Faith’s book becomes more ‘scraps uh graphy for [her own] book’. Messy, reflecting the fragmentation of Aretha’s life, Aretha’s book contrasts with Miss Faith’s, which is as pristine and unyielding as the proper must pretend to be, swallowing everything into its system of enunciability. Aretha’s book is falling apart at the seams. While Parks’s plays contain forward-moving narratives, and often feature establishing scenes, middle passages, and denouements, the plays do not arc in an exposition → conflict → catastrophe manner. Rather, they mine the gaps between what has happened and not happened, what is lost in memory and what is over-familiar. Parks’s method is a ritual calling to memory antithetical to Miss Faith’s book, a theatrical means of ‘creating history where it is and always was but has not yet been divined’ (Parks, 1995, p. 5). Her plays are purgatories of (mis)reckoning and (mis)recognition. As commentators including Genevieve Fabre have observed, words in Eurocentric drama are primarily vehicles for logic, units to be laid together horizontally to build meaning. In modern Afrocentric drama, where ties to oral traditions tend to remain stronger, the vertical axis of language – repetition and elaboration – is crucial: in any act of naming (any invocation of ‘Nommo’), emotional investment ‘counts’ as much as rational delineation. Emphasis is on the force with which words are iterated, so that they can attain the incantatory power to conjure previous iterations. A consequence of the decline of orality is the loss of a connection between speech and breath, embodied language. Parks’s plays mourn, and yearn to recuperate, that loss. In IMTK, the opposition between Aretha and Miss Faith is most evident in the language they use: ARETHA: Three two thuuup one n one. Huh. Twenty-one and one and one. And thuh little bit. Thuuup. Thup. Thirty-two and uh half.
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MISS FAITH: Footnote #1: the human cargo capacity of the English slaver, the Brookes, was about 3,250 Square Feet. From James A. Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade, G. J. Mcleod Limited, 1981, page 283. (Parks, 1995, p. 43) Parks sets the physicality of Aretha’s speech against the disembodiment of Miss Faith’s referential insistence on the written word. Parks’s rendering of Aretha’s words bears the marks of bodily expression, whereas Miss Faith’s speech continually points to the act of writing. In interviews, Parks has referred to the spectatorial pleasure of deciphering familial and thematic connections to make meaning as ‘digging’ (see Drukman, 1995; and Jiggets, 1996). As the America Play audience is immersed in the serious fun of semantic digging, a family of ‘real’ diggers ply their trade on stage. In the first of the play’s two acts, the father of the family tells his story of being a black man who makes a meagre living as a fairground attraction in which he impersonates, ad nauseam, Abraham Lincoln being shot by John Wilkes Booth at Ford’s Theatre. Once the money has been paid, the shots fired, the dying performed, and the guest assassin has uttered their version of Booth’s mythical line (‘The South will be avenged’), up gets the ‘Lesser Known’ Lincoln ready for the next customer. In Act 2, we see his wife and child, Lucy and Brazil. While Lucy listens for echoes of her husband’s presence with the aid of an ear-trumpet, Brazil follows in his father’s spade marks, digging up treasures including accoutrements that once belonged to Lincoln. Brazil has also pursued his father’s other occupation – as a designated mourner – wailing, weeping, and gnashing with virtuosity. The America Play is set in a sort of archaeological theme-park ‘out West’, described in the printed text as ‘an exact replica of The Great Hole of History’. To fill the void that is the historical past and their own present, the family excavate tsatskes – bits of costume and other artefacts whose theatrical sheen is authoritative and alluring. Parks has explained that the linguistic friction between the words ‘hole’ and ‘whole’ was the seed for the (w)hole play (Pearce, p. 26). The Great Hole that Brazil mines is a re-creation of the Original Great Hole that his parents discovered on their honeymoon ‘back East’. While his son (the copy of himself), works the Hole (the copy of the original Hole), the Foundling Father relates his original enchantment: THE FOUNDLING FATHER: You could look intuh that Hole and see your entire life pass before you. Not your own life but
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someones life from history … Like you, but not you. You know: Known. (Parks, 1995, p. 197) Mesmerized by spectral, absent celebrity, the Lesser Known becomes a stranger to his own family. Instead of spending time with them, he spends (and re-spends) his life being repeatedly shot by visitors – including honeymooners like he and Lucy once were. Lucy spends her time perambulating the space of the stage, listening with her ear trumpet for echoes of her husband. Brazil bases his life around following in the spade marks of a father he never knew, but regards (much as the father regarded Lincoln) as someone to emulate, to mythologize, a Figure possessive of the sheen of ‘reality’ precisely because he is absent, a historical treasure. The play is full of responses looking pathetically for a call: the Lesser Known looking for a sign from The Greater Known to help him in his calling as an impersonator; Lucy with her ear trumpet listening for echoes. Call and response is a key feature of African ritual and subsequent theatre, in which naming hinges on concepts of possession, of being moved by a force powerful enough to invoke Nommo, the word or seed of god (Fabre, 1983, p. 205). In their display of grief, Brazil and his father fake as if they are possessed, but they seem to be hollow, almost dead; for all their histrionics, no passion passes through them. African-American art is propelled by ascendant visions of the future promising liberation from the difficulties of the past and present. As they dig for evidence of the past, the characters in The America Play seem not to consider the future, so that the present continually slips through their grasp. Their digging, the opposite of transcendence, seems to bury them. Named Foundling Father, a bathetic allusion to the Founding Father of the United States, our impersonator continually refers to himself in the third person, and always explicitly in relation to Lincoln. Lincoln he calls the ‘Great Man’, himself ‘the Lesser Known’, proudly and pathetically implying that all he has is his relationship to Lincoln. Parks writes in signifying echoes and near-echoes, the effect of which is that statements seem not to die, but to resonate with a life of their own. The Foundling’s speech acts implode meaning and agency, burying his identity in an icon of Lincoln and his experience in ‘The Great Man’s’. He refers to himself in the third person (as ‘he’ or ‘The Lesser Known’). In contrast, Parks’s riffing produces accidental associations that work like small explosions across the surface of the characters’ speech. She opposes his antiquating devices with her animating ones. The America Play begins with the following
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four bits of Lincolnesque rhetoric, that are as pompous as the footnotes spouted by Miss Faith in IMTK: THE FOUNDLING FATHER AS ABRAHAM LINCOLN: ‘To stop too fearful and too faint to go.’ (Rest.) ‘He digged the whole and the hole held him.’ (Rest.) ‘I cannot dig, to beg I am ashamed.’ (Rest.) ‘He went to the theatre but home went she.’ (Parks, 1995, p. 198) These pronouncements, invoked by the Foundling to strengthen his connection to the Founding Father, are the agents of depersonalization, the means by which he attaches his own flimsy identity to one that is more ‘Real’. The Foundling Father uses Lincolnesque rhetoric to lay the ground for an authentic rendition – antiquated and varnished – of the Great Man. There is a completeness to each of the Lincolnesque declarations by which the Foundling grounds his performance. Each sentence contains two clauses, separated by a caesura, in perfect balance. ‘Rest[s]’, a musical notation, render every sentence self-contained, and give an air of finality. The overall formality of this series of speech acts is such that pronouns become almost irrelevant: the self becomes a figure of speech. I say ‘almost’ because agency does remain – in the image of the Lesser Known wanting us to confuse him with Lincoln. For Parks, however, language is soil to be turned. Her word play, polemical and whimsical, dis-members and re-members the speech acts and conventions that give the performance its authenticity. As well as ‘The Foundling Father’, the stand-in for Lincoln is referred to, for example, as the ‘faux-father’, a play on ‘forefather’ and on falsity; and as ‘foefather’, connoting animosity (Parks, 1995, p. 184). Parks’s riffing (or in Gates’s terms, discussed in the next chapter, ‘signifying’) on ‘forefather’ un-names the icon of Lincoln named by the Lesser Known. In Act 1, it is the deconstructive, relativist nature of the naming that stands out, the fact that his identity is paradoxically defined by his relationship to Lincoln. For most of Act 2, however, the Foundling Father is absent, referred to by his wife Lucy and son Brazil as ‘daddy’, ‘papa’, ‘the Father’, and ‘your fathuh’. These identifiers give him an identity, albeit one dependent on a role, and on confirmation by a family who provide him with a matrix. As the Act progresses, though, the absence
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of the father deprives him of stable identity – a sense of absentness that only increases when he appears on stage, both ‘live’ and on a television screen that Brazil has excitedly dug up, a screen that is replaying Act 1, ‘The Lincoln Act’, in which the Foundling Father continually replays that shard of history that is the shooting of Lincoln. As his televised image enthrals Brazil, The Foundling Father reappears in live form. He is dead, but has come back to check that Brazil has organized his funeral properly, and ‘to say a few words from the grave’ as his televised self continues to play out. Lucy and Brazil watch the Foundling Father being repeatedly shot and rising up again. Brazil quickly realizes that he is ‘dead but not really’ (Parks, 1995, p. 194). But when the Foundling Father appears in person next to them, Brazil has no idea whether ‘zit him’ and, then, whether ‘he’s dead?’ For Brazil, as for the women in IMTK, television is a safe world that can be read more easily than the world around him. It provides the illusion that the viewer is in control; whereas the truth about his father’s status, and even about his own and his father’s identity, confuses Brazil. Parks has described how theatre helps her bring the dead to life each evening in an act of messy animation; whereas television, as it features in her work, tends to commodify and sanitize, disembodying individuals and neutralizing conflict. Parks’s theatre ‘makes the bones sing’: her digging, and that of the audience, are preparatory phases, the re-membering of the bones. Television, in contrast, entraps what is alive, as betrayed in IMTK by Chona’s lines: ‘Once there was uh woman on thuh lookout. Still trapped. Wild Kingdoms on’ (Parks, 1995, p. 31). Like Brazil, Chona fails to see the connection between what is on TV and what is happening right next to her. On TV, Marlin Perkins is in Africa observing savage beasts; in the living-room, Lutzky, ‘thuh exterminator with a PhD’, is secretly observing the women, whom he refers to as ‘mundus primitivus’. The challenge that Parks sets herself and her spectators is to use theatre in a way that allows history to reverberate. Her plays suggest, though, that before theatre is to liberate the past, she and her spectators must steer theatre clear of theme-park ‘Reconstructed Histories’. In a synthetic analysis of theatre, theory, and architecture, Elinor Fuchs describes ‘postmodern’ buildings in which there is a schematizing of ‘historical into stage, the contemporary into auditorium’ (Fuchs, 1996, p.146). In other words, there is a collapsing of time into space, but a continuation of the association of primitivism with objects, static in time, and of subjects with development, in progression. It is a construction which Parks alludes to throughout IMTK and The America Play. The Naturalist first appears after a few short scenes of interaction between Mona,
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Chona, and Verona. Addressing the audience very directly, his first line – ‘Thus behave our subjects naturally’ – puts him in the narrator position. Though he refers to them as ‘subjects’, he puts the women very much in the object position. When he poses his research imperative, the positioning continues: THE NATURALIST: Having accumulated a wealth of naturally occurring observations knowing now how our subjects occur in their own world (mundus primitivus), the question now arises as to how we of our world (mundus modernus) can best accommodate them. (Parks, 1995, p. 29) The Naturalist aligns himself with the audience, which he equates with the contemporary, which is seen as advanced (‘mundus modernus’). He positions the women as spectacle, which he equates with the past, which is seen as primitive (‘mundus primitivus’). By making him a ‘naturalist’, a word rich in theatrical as well as scientific connotations, Parks draws attention to a relationship that preoccupied theatre scholars in the late 1980s and early 1990s: between the framing devices that induce theatrical spectatorship and (what James Moy, Coco Fusco, and others have referred to as) the anthropological gaze. Moy elucidates an ‘anthropological gaze [that] emerged as the mechanism by which the common man came to participate in national dreams of empire’ (Moy, 1993a, p. 7). The idea of the gaze as an image-conjuring mechanism, creating ‘dreams of empire’ in ‘the common man’, informs Parks’s portrayal of Mr Smith waiting on a foreign island for his Distinction, of the Seers, and of the ‘Reconstructed Histories’ that never leave ‘the minds eye’ of the Foundling Father. Parks uses Our American Cousin (OAC), the play-within-The America Play, to explore the construction of stage and auditorium in relation to the historicization of identity. These scenes, interspersed with the meanderings of Lucy and Brazil, are introduced by the Foundling Father as Host, much like the Masterpiece Theatre Host in The Colored Museum’s pivotal ‘Last Mama-on-the-Couch Play’ (which I will discuss in the next chapter).9 As the first of the two OAC scenes ends, with overblown taped applause, the Foundling Father is left, looking our way, sounding through time: ‘“Helllooooooo!” (Rest. Waves).’ In the second, he takes a role in the action as the cantankerous Mrs Mount, whose daughter Augusta is being wooed by the play’s hapless protagonist, Mr Trenchard. A role markedly different from his own persona in gender and demeanour, the performance creates an almost surreal clash of
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performative idioms – Black Man-as-Abraham Lincoln-as-Mrs Mount. In Diamond’s definitive Yale Repertory production of 1993, the two OAC scenes, each titled ‘Echo’ in the printed text and in the production programme, were performed on a red, raised-platform inner stage. The stage became a surrogate auditorium for a moment, foregrounding the theatrical packaging of ‘history’. Though the play-within-a-play scenes are short, the trope of stage-as-surrogate auditorium hangs over the listening of Lucy, and of Brazil, that occupies much of Act Two. Making Lucy and Brazil function as surrogate spectators is another way in which Parks frames spectatorship. While Lucy and Brazil try to discern signs of communication from beyond their metaphorical island, we too are led to listen for echoes.10
4 Demonstration: Illustrative Irony
In the previous chapter, I discussed performances by Ping Chong that link slide presentation, as an early information technology, to identity formation. Twenty years later, in 2006, Forced Entertainment’s The World in Pictures contains its own set-piece slide-show. Jerry Killick, still wearing his caveman wig from an early phase of the show, clicks on a laptop that emits electronic quacks, keytones not unlike those emitted when performer-technicians in The Wooster Group’s House/Lights (the first version of which was produced in 1997) clicked on their laptops. Both Kind Ness and The World in Pictures embark on an anthropological, historical narrative to undermine it. While the unseen, loudspeaker Narrator in Kind Ness has a cool, scientific detachment, Jerry speaks to his images with pathos in a long aside, or hiatus, in a show full of long asides, breakdowns in which meaning is broken down. Jerry’s slide-show, like his long set-up at the start and reflection at the end of The World in Pictures, has a veneer of sharing, of communality. He thoughtfully suggests, viewing a picture of a pair of shoes: ‘here is a gift you might have bought’. A snow-covered, anonymous perspective view of a road is accompanied by the speculation that ‘here is a street you might have walked down’. Later in the sequence, Jerry seems to struggle, several images bringing the commentary, ‘I don’t know’. His palpable effort and vulnerability is pathetic where the Narrator in Kind Ness is pompously removed, but in both cases the fixity of the image promises some kind of grounding. Each illustrative lesson promises to solidify our sense of what we are seeing and experiencing in the show ‘proper’, the acted storytelling performances. Whereas the slide-show in the Kind Ness prologue purports to prepare us for what is to follow by teaching us ‘what is alike and what is not alike’, Jerry’s comes after the sack of Rome, during the Dark Ages. As narrator Terry O’Connor tells it, with faltering help from the lighting operator, 73
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the Dark Ages are a time of ‘forgetting’, a time where people ‘forget how to read, how to write’, a time when ‘everything leaves the story’, when ‘names leave the story’. Making a connection between his present and the so-called Dark Ages, Jerry’s slide-show is a plaintively hypothetical reading that, like Chong’s Kind Ness and Nosferatu, locates the spectator in Barthes’s ‘purgatory of reading’.1 Demonstrations that ironize their own authority are hardly new to theatre – not least in theatre that ventures into galleries, lofts, warehouses, parks, streets, and other venues without a red velvet theatre seat to be had. Ironic demonstration is integral to genre descriptors like ‘agit-prop’ and ‘street theatre’, and to the work of activist community companies such as Welfare State, Bread and Puppet, and the San Francisco Mime Troupe. It is a key element of much invisible and guerrilla performance, from the AIDS-focused performative activism of ACT UP to the selfstyled anarchism of CIRCA (Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army) to the situationism of the V-Girls holding a ‘fake’ panel discussion on Manet’s Olympia at the CUNY Graduate Center,2 or Adrian Piper giving out calling cards stating ‘Dear Friend, I am black. I am sure you did not realize this when you made/laughed at/agreed with that racist remark’.3 Alongside these paratheatrical examples, ironic demonstration has an important place in ‘proper’ theatre, often reflecting an author’s desire to undermine conventional propriety: Pirandello’s Six Characters in Search of an Author (1921), Wilder’s Our Town (1938) (itself demonstrated by The Wooster Group’s 1984 work, Routes 1 & 9), and Maria Irene Fornes’s Tango Palace (1963), all play ironic demonstration against theatrical matrixing.4 Twentieth-century performance frequently adopts and/or quotes demonstrative techniques from previous decades, often in ways that go unnoticed until critics elucidate them. Michael Kirby observes in 1965 that ‘the Dada distortion of the lecture into a work of art prefigure[s] certain aspects of Cage’s lectures’ (Sandford, 1995, p. 45). More broadly, Cage’s performance pedagogy at Black Mountain College (see Chapter 6) in the 1940s and 1950s, and the Happenings fostered by Cage’s teaching, drew on Dada performances in Europe in earlier decades. ‘A clear progression’, Kirby notes, ‘can be traced from Dada activities to the first New York Happening (ibid., p. 19). In the two decades between Kind Ness and The World in Pictures, 1986–2006, however, experimental theatre has deployed demonstration in a differently quotational fashion, interrogating demonstrative methods and technologies. To cite examples by artists I discuss elsewhere in this book, the United Kingdom has seen the angry farce of Ridiculusmus’s ‘performative demonstration’ of How to be Funny (2005),5 and the acerbic gentility of Bobby Baker teaching us
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how to cook, How to Shop (1993), and How to Live (2004). In the United States, George C. Wolfe’s Colored Museum first displayed itself in 1986, the same year Chong constructed his counter-quotational zoo in Kind Ness. Like Chong, the first images Wolfe presents are slides. As air hostesscum-museum guide Miss Pat invites us to ‘Git on Board’, images described in Wolfe’s stage directions as ones that ‘we’ve all seen before’ are projected, slides ‘of African slaves being captured, loaded onto ships, tortured’. In 1989, The Baltimore Waltz used a slide-show of holiday pictures alongside AIDS-education lessons to alienate the alienation of medical pedagogy, while in Imperceptible Mutabilities in the Third Kingdom (IMTK) Suzan-Lori Parks showed stills from African-American history in front of which real-life African-Americans ‘mutated like hell’. During the 1990s, and into the 2000s, several works pressed scientific and pseudoscientific discourses through theatrical structures: UK examples include Here’s what I did with my body one day, The Receipt, and Tangle6 (2006) by Unlimited Theatre; US examples include Parks’s Venus, Skipitares’s Under the Knife: The History of Medicine, Coco Fusco and Guillermo GómezPeña’s Two Undiscovered Amerindians Visit…. (Pugilist Specialist, as I discuss in Chapter 7, is framed entirely as a demonstration.) Etymologically, ‘demonstration’ comprises ‘de-’, a Latin prefix denoting of/for, and ‘monstrare’, meaning to show, or explain. The ‘of’/‘for’ is crucial here, as it indicates a duality of meanings that haunts, and is exploited by, the theatrical demonstrations I will discuss. To demonstrate is to show, to illustrate; a demonstration is a show, something made for display, made to be shown. On paper, the showing of illustration is only subtly different from illustration itself. The Colored Museum, Two Undiscovered Amerindians, and several of the works of Bobby Baker, show that, theatrically, it can be a vital difference. In their distinct ways, each resists and demands critical response. Play on this paradox is, I will argue, integral to the radical instability of these works, but is habitually resolved by critics, whose supplementation artificially settles that instability. Like Kind Ness, The Colored Museum is at the cusp of the shift, neatly summarized by Marvin Carlson, from ‘the claiming of’ to ‘ironic commentary on’ identity positions. Both works focus on identity, and do so in an anti-hegemonic fashion, but pointedly refuse to follow any orthodox line of critique. While both works have been described as ‘postmodern’ and ‘deconstructive’, their reaction against theatrical and other representational mechanisms that calcify American and hyphenated American identities is nonetheless polemic and constructive. Two Undiscovered Amerindians Visit… (TUAV ) (versions of which evolved 1992–93), Under the Knife (versions of which evolved 1993–95), and Parks’s Venus
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(first staged in 1995) focus only implicitly on theatrical spectatorship, and more squarely on the racial and gendered dimensions of relationships between colonialism and the body. On the face of it, this bucks a trend away from identity politics based on binaries and on headon engagement with race, gender, and class, an engagement often seen as dissipating (in theatre and elsewhere) into and during the 1990s. That Venus, Under the Knife, and TUAV engage firmly with binaries of race, gender, and class marks them as resistant to such dissipation; but they are also works of their time, reflecting a trend toward the situation of raceand gender-based critiques within a broader, anthropologically informed focus on scholarly traditions and the disciplining of the human. As its full title suggests, Two Undiscovered Amerindians Visit…, is a travelling installation that Marvin Carlson describes as ‘probably the best-known performance piece of the 1990s’ (Carlson, 2004, p. 202). Coco Fusco and Guillermo Gómez-Peña exhibited themselves in a golden cage (Figure 1) in museums and commemorative civic spaces across four continents, purporting to be Guatinauis, a tribe of ‘undiscovered Amerindians’ living (if the display of a large map was anything to go by) somewhere or other in the Gulf of Mexico. Barely clad, in grass-skirt fashion, but with ceremonial items (including, in the male’s case, what
Figure 1 Two Undiscovered Amerindians visit Covent Garden, London, May 1992 (Photo: Peter Barker)
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was actually an Aztec breastplate), the male paced around and babbled away in his native tongue (a made-up combination of, predominantly, nonsense sounds and Spanish words), while the female danced and knitted. Items such as a television, Coca-Cola, and Saltine crackers were introduced into the cage, and they took to these readily. For 50 c/ , you could step up to the cage and have a photo taken; for $5, you could see the male’s genitalia, though the penis was tucked behind the legs to leave a feminine pubic tuft. Guards/docents/educators with ‘Ask Me’ badges were on hand to answer spectators’ questions about the caged couple, about what exactly they were doing and why, what their ‘island’ back home was like. While Fusco and Gómez-Peña have stated that they intended it as ‘a satirical comment on the past’, and were surprised how many visitors failed to realize they were professional performance artists, their choice to not print any programme information suggests that they were thinking of the piece, at least in part, as invisible theatre. Gómez-Peña and Fusco first took their golden cage to Columbus Plaza Colón, in Madrid, as part of an event to commemorate the quincentennial of Columbus’s voyage to the New World. The piece had an illustrious two-year exhibition history at various sites, including Covent Garden in London, The National Museum of Natural History at the Smithsonian in Washington DC, The Field Museum in Chicago, the Whitney Museum’s Biennial in New York, the Australian Museum of Natural Science, and the Fundación Banco Patricios in Buenos Aires. In The Archive and the Repertoire, Diana Taylor locates the piece in ‘the museum’, which she theorizes through binaries: live/dead; fixity/transience. ‘Museums’, she notes, ‘have long taken the cultural other out of context and isolated it, reducing the live to a dead object behind glass.’ In so doing, they ‘make spectators discoverers […] separating the transient visitor from the fixed object of display’ (Taylor, 2003, p. 66). Performative treatments of the museum by Wolfe and Skipitares, which I will discuss in this and the following chapter respectively, play against the neatness of these divisions. Their double-voiced theatricality inserts caesuras, alienating and interrupting the spectator’s sensation of discovery, bringing the dead to life and animating objects in ways that trouble the traditional boundaries of the museum.7 Before I discuss in more detail the question of how determinately Wolfe troubles those boundaries in The Colored Museum, I want to ask a similar question of TUAV. ‘Our cage’, asserts Fusco, ‘became a blank screen onto which audiences projected their fantasies of whom and what we are. As we assumed the stereotypical role of the domesticated savage, many audience members felt entitled to assume the role of colonizer, only to find themselves
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uncomfortable with the implications of the game’ (Fusco, 1995, p. 45). Fusco’s written reflection on, and explanation of, the piece targets ‘a substantial number of intellectuals, artists, and cultural bureaucrats [who] have sought to deflect attention from the substance of our experiment to the “moral implications” of our dissimulation, or in their words, our “misinforming the public” about who we are. The literalism implicit in the interpretation of our work by individuals representing the “public interest” bespeaks’, she claims, ‘their investment in positivist notions of “truth”.’ She adds that ‘this “reverse ethnography” of our interactions with the public will, I hope, suggest the culturally specific nature of their tendency toward the literal and moral interpretation’ (ibid., p. 143). The debate within which Fusco centres herself raises important questions for the kind of work I am discussing in this chapter, work she describes as ‘parodically didactic’ (ibid., p. 148). In calling her own critique ‘reverse ethnography’, is Fusco claiming that her interpretation is less ‘culturally specific’? When does ‘ethnography’ qualify as a ‘reverse’ form? Can criticism of ironic demonstration, including self-critique, do anything other than disambiguate it in ‘positivist’ fashion; and is such settling of instability inherently problematic? Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett finds no reversal, only a ‘restaging’ of ‘repudiated modes of ethnographic knowledge and display’ (1998, p. 175). She is angered by the claim that, because the exhibit is contrived by those in the cage, it turns the tables, reflecting the colonial gaze back on the spectator and thereby alienating the history of such exhibitions. She insists that there is no reversal, but rather a continuity with what she calls ‘“othering” practices’. In using the phrase ‘“othering” practices’, she links ironic exhibitions such as the couple in the cage to ‘certain recent writing on primitivism more generally (Marianna Torgovnick’s Gone Primitive [1990] is a case in point)’ (ibid.). Kirshenblatt-Gimblett uses the word ‘writing’ to encompass not just literal writing, but performance itself – that is, not just Fusco’s published analysis of the couple in the cage, but the exhibition itself. In Kirshenblatt-Gimblett’s usage, writing becomes synonymous with a kind of standing-in, a secondary performance that stands in for a primary one. But, rather than recuperating the ‘othering’ of the primary exhibition, the secondary exhibition (Torgovnick’s or Fusco’s writing, or Fusco and Gómez-Peña’s performance) intensifies it, because the putative ‘spirit of repudiation’ that accompanies the standing-in is germane to othering practices, ‘right from the start’. In making this argument, Kirshenblatt-Gimblett cites ‘foreign villages at world fairs’, in which ‘not only performers […] but also college students, immigrants, and other employees […] stood in
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for Turks, Egyptians, Irish, and Germans. Not always, but not infrequently, those who exhibited and those who were exhibited were one and the same. Repudiation, she argues, is ‘constitutive of these othering practices’ (ibid., p. 176). Kirshenblatt-Gimblett’s view that the couple in the cage performance works as a form of writing draws attention to the foundational role of writing in making performance mean, making behaviour visible as performance. Writing restores. In the context of performance that frames itself as invisible reversal, that restorative role of writing is peculiarly problematic. The frequent quotation of the following passage from Fusco’s ‘Other History of Intercultural Performance’ exemplifies how, in the case of itinerant, concept-rich, variable performances, a maker’s description of the work can ‘write’ the work itself: ‘We performed our “traditional tasks”, which ranged from sewing voodoo dolls and lifting weights to watching television and working on a laptop computer. A donation box in front of the cage indicated that, for a small fee, I would dance (to rap music), Guillermo would tell authentic Amerindian stories (in a nonsensical language), and we would pose for Polaroids for visitors’ (Fusco, 1995, p. 39). Commentary like Fusco’s is party to the fraught politics of standing-in and authentic description that the couple in the cage performance analyses. Though notable for the firmness of her opposition to claims (including Fusco’s) that the couple in the cage is subversive, Kirshenblatt-Gimblett is certainly not alone in identifying the problematic grounds on which any such claims can be made. Taylor and Kirshenblatt-Gimblett agree that the filming of the couple in the cage ushers in, or in the latter’s view, ‘rehearses’, the always already assimilating gaze of the camera. They agree that a controlling ideological apparatus adheres to the presence of photography and video cameras in the live performance space, and to the spectatorial conditions of looking at photographic images, and watching the film document, in contexts such as a classroom. In Kirshenblatt-Gimblett’s view, the Couple in the Cage video takes the so-called ‘repudiation’ a stage further, the images and the editing lingering on the gaze of the live spectators in ways that make the video-watcher feel superior to the filmed visitors, detached from the danger of the live but doubly able to enjoy the frisson of the so-called duping.8 An article by film scholar Mary Kate Kelly focuses only on the video. Sharing her experience of screening the video for students, Kelly describes being ‘immediately reminded of the 1934 narrative film Zou Zou’, in which Josephine Baker ‘appears on a stage enclosed in a huge decorated bird cage clothed in little more than the
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few feathers that cover her breasts. Baker (an African-American expatriate) plays the part of Zou Zou, a stage performer originally introduced to the film audience as a Polynesian, who in this particular scene performs the role of an authentic icon of West Indian exoticism’ before being ‘set free by one of the male stage performers’ and leaping ‘from the cage into the performer’s arms, while the film camera pans back to reveal the applauding Parisian theater audience that has been fixated on her’ (Kelly, 1999, p. 113). In comparing it to Zou Zou, Kelly writes that Couple in the Cage ‘reveals’ how ‘this performance piece staged [Fusco and Gómez-Peña] in an ironic, reflexive gesture to the still widespread allure of native authenticity.’ Kelly acknowledges that the methodology and spirit of the performance ‘sought, very self-consciously, to critique and interrogate the fascination with primitivism and authenticity that continues to exist in Western culture’, but worries that Gómez-Peña and Fusco engage only ‘tenuously’ with the complexities that haunt any ‘process of representing the “primitive Other”’ in order to ‘engage a history of objectification and dehumanization’ (ibid.). Kelly’s statement that the film ‘reveals’ the performance’s staging as ‘an ironic, reflexive gesture’ is itself revealing. The film, in disambiguating the more cryptic statements made by the performance, establishes itself, in Derridean terms, as a ‘supplement’. While the relationship between performance and critical commentary is nearly always slippery, commentaries generally preferring not to name their supplementation of what they critique, a particular kind of slipperiness characterizes the couple in the cage performance/film/artists’ written documentation. The French word ‘supplément’ means both replacement and addition. Derrida is (as usual) acutely conscious of the paradoxical nature of supplementarity: to be an addition means to be added to something complete; but that something cannot be complete if it needs an addition. The film of the couple in the cage is a supplement, extending by repeating the premise of the performance, ultimately usurping that premise in its overwriting. The supplementation of performance by film becomes part of the already charged politics of standing-in that envelop the caged couple. While Kirshenblatt-Gimblett’s earnest, historicized repudiation of Fusco and Gómez-Peña’s ironic, ‘postmodern’ repudiation of colonial exhibition is cogent, the irony of TUAV is, as Taylor argues, more seriously considered than Kirshenblatt-Gimblett allows. Calibrating the effectiveness of irony is a tricky thing. My view is that the difficulty of deciding whether the ironic demonstration is regressive or subversive is not an unwanted side-effect, but is essential to the effectiveness of late twentieth-century ironic theatrical demonstration. In Bobby Baker
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performances, the slippage between the naming of an action or list item and her demonstration of that item/action generates a comedic but unsettling ambiguity that Baker exploits to the full. With systematic, idiosyncratic, often sanctifying enthusiasm she ritually performs mundane tasks that bespeak important issues of feminist politics and mental health. In her influential 1991 work, The Kitchen Show, for instance, Baker takes us through her Baker’s dozen of 13 Actions, some of which meditate on the beautiful order of domestic details (‘Action No. 6: Opening a new tub of margarine to see its unsullied perfection’) while others make exuberant mess (‘Action No. 9: Dancing when inspired by operatic music’). Each Action is accompanied by a ‘Mark’, a ceremonial adornment such as the pinning of a spinach leaf to the lapel of her white overall. These marks accumulate ridiculously, making Baker an ensign of the struggle between order and chaos that runs throughout the piece. Like most of her work, The Kitchen Show is full of both integrity and parody, sincerity and absurdity. Spectators less familiar with Baker’s work sometimes find themselves recalibrating the earnestness of her performance as it proceeds. While Baker’s work is strikingly different in tone, and in the identity it performs, from The Colored Museum (CM) and from the couple in the cage, it operates similar kinds of slippage within performance, and raises similar ‘conceptual art’ questions about supplementation by commentary and about the disturbing implications and effects of displaying oneself. Like CM and TUAV, Baker’s work practises her interest in archiving and tradition, but does so through demonstrations that exceed the rationality that archiving, even transgressive archiving, calls for. In reading the commentaries on and critiques of Baker’s work collected in Bobby Baker: Redeeming Features of Daily Life (Barrett and Baker, 2007), I am struck by the particularly contradictory pressures that her work puts on supplementarity. It is not that Baker’s Kitchen Show, Drawing on a Mother’s Experience (1988), and How to … pieces are concept-driven, dependent on commentary and critique, not able to stand alone without the support of explanation. It is more that these pieces simultaneously demand and resist critique. They do so because of the exuberance and surety of Baker’s performance, for which no taxonomy of matrixed and nonmatrixed performance, or speculation about irony, can account. And then there is the tension between neatness and mess, which the interplay of Baker’s performative persona(e) with her script articulates in a way that is commentary, establishing a dialogue of ratiocinatory and ambiguous elements for which the work cannot be made to stand. The work is that dialogue.
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To an extent, of course, most theatre, most art in general, irrespective of how forthcoming the artist is in explaining their own work, resists criticism. But each work of art resists criticism in its own way, its resistance making particular indications and implications. Given how idiosyncratically and acerbically it invokes how ideas of home, in the sense both of domestic space and of being housed within culture, have failed to accommodate, and have been problematized by the creativity of women, it is deliciously strange (and very Bobby Baker) to see her work assimilated into a reader, within which feminist theorists, art-historians, food critics, and psychoanalysts are all keen to claim her as one of their family.9 In one of several densely theoretical sentences in an essay included in the booklet accompanying The Kitchen Show, feminist art theorist Griselda Pollock argues that the piece presents ‘resistances to the domestic as something which threatens women’s hold on a singular identity and yet is also the site of its elaboration’ (Barrett and Baker, 2007, p. 183). Pollock’s identification of the contradictory effects on female identity of ‘the domestic’ – fragmenting, interpellating, ephemerally fulfilling – is insightful. But I cannot help reading it alongside one of the shortest and pithiest sentences in Pollock’s essay: ‘Art uses affect cognitively’ (ibid., p. 178). Baker’s art proves that statement. For me, the joy of reading Redeeming Features of Daily Life is seeing how the unmistakeable Bobby Baker ‘affect’, and the problems it presents to the interpreter, challenges critics as accomplished as Pollock to find a suitable marriage of the affective and cognitive in their criticism of that art. In an essay on food in performance, Helen Iball suggests that both Baker and Karen Finley ‘up-the-staging of’ the body in their use of food, but both suffer the vulnerability of being ‘upstaged by’ the food (Barrett and Baker, 2007, p. 122). Like Finley’s personae, many of the exhibits in CM display themselves manically, as if unable to digest what they have ‘swallowed’, their consumption regurgitated as performance.10 Finley’s personae, like Baker’s, and like many of those in CM, seem to find their voice by participating in an interpellative economy of consumption, raising the question: does their participation allow them to express themselves, or does it masquerade as, or stand in for, self-expression? Unlike Finley’s, whose desires, though troubled, are powerful, Wolfe’s characters appear to have stashed themselves away so deeply that they cannot access their own impulses: they have sold their individuality to buy relief from the pressure of ‘colored contradictions’. Lala L’Amazing Grace is a Josephine Baker-like performer with a twist of Diana Ross, whose vignette is set in front of the skene, called the ‘Closet’, of her private life, containing everything (including an embarrassing
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daughter) that does not fit with her stage persona. In ‘Symbiosis’, a smartly attired Man decides to subtract the items that make him too black. In ‘corporate dress’, he throws objects from ‘a Saks Fifth Avenue bag’ into a trash can, listing the objects as he does so: ‘My first pair of Converse All-stars … My first Afro-comb … My first dashiki … My autographed pictures of Stokley Carmichael, Jomo Kenyatta and Donna Summer’ (Wolfe, 1987, p. 33). The Kid, the self repressed within this identikit economy of addition and subtraction, is dumped into a large trash can. The Kid stays buried until The Man attempts to discard the final reminder of his former self, a Temptations album. Stage directions indicate that The Man ‘pauses, but then crosses to the trash can, lifts the lid, and just as he is about to toss the album in, a hand reaches from inside the can and grabs hold of The Man’s arm’ (ibid., p. 37). Throwing away the record is too much for The Man to cope with, and The Kid rises as if from the dead. The rubbish bin motif chimes with Miss Pat’s warning in ‘Git On Board’, the first of CM’s vignettes, that ‘any baggage you don’t claim, we trash’. Some of the 11 vignettes are sardonic demonstrations, others polemic parody, and others moving monologues. Miss Pat, air hostess transplanted into a museum guide, is an early sign that this is no ordinary ‘museum’: it is one that troubles Taylor’s binary of fixed exhibit/transient spectator. As opposed to a settled space that fixes what it contains, this museum is a chaotic vessel that flies through space. Before we can travel, Miss Pat instructs, we must leave our drums behind. As we fly through time, she points out periods of history following the Middle Passage, including ‘the American Revolution, which will give the US of A. exclusive rights to your life’, and marked by various wars, whose names (‘World War I … World War II … which is not to be confused with the Korean War or the Vietnam War’) keep each period separate, as museums traditionally endeavour to do (Wolfe, 1987, pp. 4–5). Miss Pat’s induction is ambiguous. Who is the ‘you’ she addresses? It is possible for readers who are not African-American to read the printed text with a conscious feeling of being an outsider looking in. The play’s agit-prop, direct-address style, demanding audience participation, makes that kind of detachment less possible in performance. Analysing the responses of a ‘mostly white’ audience at the Mark Taper Forum, Itabari Njeri notes that, although both Wolfe and the production team couch the audience participation bits in savage irony, the audience appeared eager to join in.11 Njeri wonders if some may have missed the irony, or whether they regard it as a duty to join in whenever invited, however ironic the invitation. She watches them ‘falter’ with the spiritual ‘Git On Board’
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led by Miss Pat (Danitra Vance); ‘but when [Vance] gets them started on “Summertime”’ – which Njeri sardonically describes as ‘Gerschwin’s transmutation of black material’ – the audience ‘practically takes over the show’. And when Vickilyn Reynolds snaps out of her downtrodden Mama-on-the Couch persona to lead the cast in a ‘hand-clapping, highstepping musical number’ – the ‘audience doesn’t miss a beat; they’re clapping and swaying with real enthusiasm. They are in minstrel heaven’. Several days after the show, says Njeri, ‘a very thoughtful black man, not quick to make judgments’, asked her: ‘There was so much audience participation in that number, do you think it was because they didn’t get it?’ Like TUAV, and many of Bobby Baker’s works, CM establishes a particular relationship to the audience that quotes viewing environments other than the theatre. The edginess of all the pieces derives in part from the enigmatic overlaying onto theatre of other performative and spectatorial regimes (such as museums, zoos, self-help seminars, and cookery shows) with their associated codes. The a priori imposition of these codes onto ‘characters’ (again, I am using the word to encompass non-matrixed personae) is a platform on which their authors stage friction between free expression and being driven to perform; or, more accurately and more complexly, they stage paradoxically stationed observation of ‘natural’ behaviour in which there is a tension between individuality and typicality. Aware of being widely perceived as non-entity (Jean), expendable (Junie), or freak (Miss Roj), drag queen Miss Roj, Junie ‘Soldier with a Secret’ Robinson, and pregnant teen Normal Jean Reynolds emerge from cracks between the Museum’s other representations, such as Lala, The Man, and the many other exhibits who have assimilated by disconnecting from themselves. Outsiders within, who neither fit nor transcend their environment, they testify quietly, secretly. ‘Permutations’, the penultimate vignette of CM, features Normal Jean Reynolds, a pregnant black teenager who is constantly told how ordinary she is, but who then lays an extraordinary white egg. In explaining the character’s name, Wolfe refers to the fact that black children in the South attended what were called Schools for the Normal. The name also evokes Norma Jean, the often forgotten real name of one of the twentieth-century’s most iconic celebrities, Marilyn Monroe, who was born Norma Jean Mortenson. Normal Jean Reynolds’s mother tells her that God made the exceptional, then the special, then, when he got bored, he made Normal Jean. With her mother at church, however, Jean reveals to the audience her ‘sexual relations with the garbage man’, who
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smelled ‘of all the good things folks shoulda never thrown away’ (Wolfe, 1987, p. 47). When, a few days later, her belly begins to swell, Jean’s mother locks her in a dark room, afraid of what the neighbours will think. Uncomfortable at first, Jean gets used to the dark room. A week later, she experiences massive pain and bleeding, passes out, and wakes to find she has laid a large white egg. She notices that ‘all ’round this egg were thin lines of blood that I could trace to back between my legs’ (ibid., p. 48). When the egg hatches, it is found to contain all the characters we have seen in the previous vignettes. The ‘thin lines of blood’ that Jean traces from the egg to between her legs connect her to the array of foregoing exhibits, while the egg itself is an emblem of the extraordinary potential within the ordinary. Wolfe wants to use theatre to incubate new ‘permutations’ for the representation, and thus formation, of identity. In earlier vignettes, we see characters seizing on packaged forms to bolster their sense of self. Their lack of dimensions indicates that they have relinquished their individuality, swapping it for inclusion by conforming to culturally recognizable, formulaic types. Museums concentrate identity into emblematic clusters of the typical and the special. What is named as ‘special’ in the Museum is not special in the sense of being different, extraordinary, or the opposite of typical; museums tend to construct the special as the apotheosis of the typical. Like the ‘normal’ girl who lays an extraordinary egg, Miss Roj and Junie contravene the Museum’s laws of typicality. Marginalized in different ways, each sees far beyond their immediate milieu. They communicate their insights using their own gestic forms of expression. Miss Roj’s weapon is the ‘Snap!’, which wipes out all who disrespect her. Roj states that s/he comes to The Bottomless Pit ‘to communicate with [her] origins’ (Wolfe, 1987, p. 16). The flashing lights, s/he explains, ‘are signals from my planet way out there’. Junie, a black soldier killed in Vietnam – yet strangely live, unscathed, and on stage – also hears voices from the beyond: God or the Devil one spoke to me and said, ‘Junie, these colored boys ain’t gonna be the same after this war. They ain’t gonna have no kind of happiness.’ (ibid., p. 12) Junie changes the course of history by taking a small needle and shooting air into the veins of Hubert Humphrey and J.F.K. The ‘Pst. Pst’ of the needle is his gesture, and a focal point for ‘The Soldier With a Secret’
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vignette, much as the ‘Snap!’ is for ‘The Gospel According to Miss Roj’. Roj’s ‘Snap!’ and Junie’s ‘Pst’ are, on the face of it, innocuous. Meaning nothing particular in themselves, they are brought to life in the moment and by their owners’ attitude. Junie and Miss Roj are (in Umberto Eco’s phrase) ‘semiotic guerrillas’, perverting conventional lines of discourse from their standpoint. Wolfe’s location of Roj in the Bottomless Pit, and of Junie in a limen between life and death, echoes Eco’s characterization of the semiotic guerrilla lurking in the margins, but hard to contain within a conventional analytical framework. The ‘pst’ and the ‘Snap!’ allow Junie and Roj to go against the grain of convention, and to do so with historical resonance. As well as its connotation of stealth, the ‘pst’ of Junie’s needle resonates, to my mind, with post-Vietnam drug addiction and lethal injections used as a sentence on ‘Death Row’. Gay critic and activist Marlon Riggs points out that the snap has a long-standing subcultural significance for black homosexuals. In the mid-1980s, though, the snap, a gesture ‘as emotionally and politically charged as a clenched fist’, was appropriated by more mainstream black entertainments, such as the television programme In Living Color, and thereby ‘robbed of its full political and cultural dimension’.12 Wolfe, via Miss Roj, reappropriates the gesture. Wolfe often describes CM as the play he had to write first, in order to be able to write whatever he wanted to write afterwards. Wolfe refers wryly to ‘the guardians of black culture’ who raised their eyebrows at CM because ‘they didn’t get it’, but came round when they saw positive responses: [A] lot of black theater that existed at that time was slogan theater. I understand slogans are very important for movements. The Colored Museum is now ‘oh oh it’s great,’ ‘it’s classic,’ and all that sort of stuff, but a lot of the time it was very startling to them because many of the plays that had been done had not dared to self-examine. (1993a, p. 617) Theatre, Wolfe suggests, echoes with voices that were once vivaciously idiosyncratic, but have been sanctified, appropriated, rendered reproducible. It is important to remember that it is not the images and icons themselves that Wolfe assaults but the way that, via cultural arenas such as theatre, they are imposed on, and adopted by, African-Americans as badges of identity. He describes Lorraine Hansberry and Ntozake Shange as ‘wonderful playwrights’ who have become ‘dead, stale, empty icons’ (Elam, 1992, p.300). Nonetheless, according to reviewer Frank Rich,
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‘The Last Mama-on-the-Couch Play’ left its audience ‘devastated’, and the ‘sacred target’ of Lorraine Hansberry’s A Raisin in the Sun ‘in ruins’.13 ‘The Last Mama-on-the-Couch Play’ is a parodically taxonomic demonstration. Characters extrapolated from Raisin and for colored girls are each illustrated by a particular, and particularly parodied, performance style. The parade begins with the earthy realism of the downtrodden Mama; continues with the heightened realism of Walter; rises, with Ruth, to a histrionic, Shange-esque choreopoetic expressionism; and finally, with Beneatha, attains and derides a classical, Attic/Shakespearean Julliard-trained theatricality. The whole ‘show’ is framed, first, as an episode of Masterpiece Theatre (the Sunday night PBS slot hosted by Alistair Cooke in a red leather armchair and usually featuring British actors), then as an Academy Awards-style, show. The Narrator, a tuxedoed Black host, introduces each segment of performance, then prompts the audience to join him in fawning appreciatively: MAMA: Not in my house, my house, will you ever talk that way again! (The NARRATOR, so moved by her performance, erupts in applause and encourages the audience to do so.) NARRATOR: Beautiful. Just stunning. (He reaches into one of the secret compartments of the set and gets an award which he ceremoniously gives to MAMA for her performance. She bows and then returns to the couch.) (Wolfe, 1987, p. 25) The parading of each style/character is punctuated by the presentation of an Award. When, in the moment discussed by Njeri, Mama comments that she should have ‘been born into an all-black musical’, a context has been established in which the audience is under scrutiny. What is our role in creating petrified forms, in transmuting black experience into formulaic theatre? It is an irony not lost on Wolfe that a play attacking the effects of canonicity should itself become canonical. As a Teaching Assistant at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, I taught CM on a large undergraduate theatre survey course that was taken as ‘Intro to Theatre’ not only by all theatre majors, but by students from various other disciplines to fulfil their humanities requirement. Given how frequently it is taught, and how often it has been cited both as a postmodern classic and a landmark of African-American theatre, CM has been the subject of extraordinarily little substantial discussion. Harry Elam and Robert Alexander, Jr. introduce their anthology of experimental black
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playwriting by endorsing Wolfe’s view that CM paves the way for the expression (as the anthology’s title puts it) of Colored Contradictions (1996). They take up Wolfe’s invitation to ‘The Party’ which is the endpoint of CM. Contradictions cling to the play, and are ultimately embraced in this final scene, hosted – in opposition to the host at the start, Miss Pat, who brooks no contradiction – by Topsy Washington, a young woman whose ‘hair and dress are a series of stylistic contradictions which are hip, black and unencumbered’ (Wolfe, 1987, p. 50). Topsy, named after the slave child in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin who Miss Ophelia fails to reform (but who learns instead from her friend Eva), embodies Wolfe’s view that African-Americans need to embrace their contradictory feelings about their own history. ‘Whereas I can’t live inside yesterday’s pain’, says Topsy, ‘I can’t live without it’ (ibid., p. 52). ‘The Party’ contrasts with, and throws into relief, the play’s more confrontational turns. Stage directions describe Topsy as ‘a hurricane of energy’. Capitulating Wolfe’s schema, which opposes containment with release of energy, she dances ‘to the music of the madness in me’, as characters from previous vignettes ‘revolve on, frozen like soft sculptures’, then unfreeze, echoing Topsy’s declaration that she is ‘not what [she was] ten years ago or ten minutes ago’. If Topsy recuperates the characters we have seen before, her Party, the opposite of the Museum, recuperates the play itself. In her reading of CM, Una Chaudhuri argues that Wolfe stages ‘America as a kind of semiotic machine that generates new forms for old experiences but leaves their core intact’, a ‘machine […] that provides new “skins” for old wounds but does nothing to ease their pain’ (Chaudhuri, 1995, p. 121). This reading reminds me of the affinity between the characters in The Colored Museum and in performance art of the era, in which character is often enacted as a succession of skins.14 Characters like the Man in ‘Symbiosis’, who throws away his dashiki and Afro, and dons a business suit from Saks Fifth Avenue, are driven by the desire to hide or reveal themselves as (a particular version of) black. Following Miss Pat, and another kind of hostess, Aunt Ethel ‘stands behind a big black pot and wears a reassuring grin’ (Figure 2). She concocts the elements of her stew bit by formulaic bit: NEXT YA ADD ALL KINDS OF RHYTHMS LOTS OF FEELINGS AND PIZZAZ THEN HUNNY THROW IN SOME RAGE TILL IT CONGEALS AND TURNS TO JAZZ (Wolfe, 1987, p. 7)
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Figure 2 Vickilyn Reynolds as Aunt Ethel (Photo: Martha Swope)
Aunt Ethel’s song is a recipe for black identity. Out of her pot, she pulls (according to the printed text), ‘a handful of Negroes, black dolls’. In the renowned 1986 New York Shakespeare Festival production, however, Vickilyn Reynolds’ Aunt Ethel pulled a row of white origami cut-out figures. The origami row evokes the entrapping iconicity of formulaic representations of African-Americans – however positive the qualities displayed by those representations may be. The row of dolls is a cautionary symbol, hinting at the iconoclasm to come. In contrast to the fixity
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and stasis of dolls, or cut-outs, characters like Junie, Jean, and Miss Roj are what Wolfe calls ‘silhouettes’ (Wolfe, 1993a, p. 605), like multiple outlines of a processual pencil drawing. In dialogue with each other, and susceptible to the pressures of history, geography and aesthetic form, the character ‘silhouettes’ generate traces and after-images that the museum struggles to contain. Wolfe’s use of the word ‘silhouette’ – a term referring to the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century practice of making cut-out portraits, a practice in which African-American artists participated in the caricaturing of themselves – supports the idea that, contrary to those who would see it as a break with historical representations, the play is a dialogue with history.15 Wolfe depicts identity-as-acquisition, the packaging of the self in cultural markers of type. But does he do any more than depict it? Do CM/TUAV /The Kitchen Show jam the ‘semiotic machine’? If they do, it is not by violent anti-critical polemic, but by doing things to received ideas of irony. One such received idea is that the power of irony lies in a lack, or withholding, of explanation to accompany what is said. In terms of allusions and oblique references to people and events, the opposite is also true in Baker’s work, in CM, and in TUAV : they provide too much information. They supplement themselves intensively, not only illustrating and showing themselves illustrating, but promising, recapping, summing up, and evaluating, all way beyond the call of demonstrative duty. Encouraging us to enjoy personae objectifying and abjecting themselves, they delight (in ways that owe much to performance artists such as Karen Finley) in ‘out-fetishing the fetishist’, luring the gaze and mocking it. They are crucially unassimilable: they bristle with impulses that cannot be contained or situated, impulses that are always beyond control. That ‘elsewhere’ should not be named as the gap between an original and a parody, since all these works complicate ideas, and foreground constructions, of origination and subversion. Neither should it be named as that which is excluded from discourse, as naming necessarily places it within discourse.16 While the term ‘Brechtian’ was, in the late twentieth century, often used loosely to describe a presentational directness and lack of illusionary ornament, I use it here to refer to a foundational aspect of Brecht’s epic theatre. Influenced by Piscator’s deployment of contemporary technologies in theatre in ways that framed political struggles, Brecht’s modelling of epic theatre rests on demonstrative techniques for which the street scene demonstration, in which a bystander acts out an accident for those who want to know what happened, is a blueprint.17 The key virtue of the street scene as a basis for demonstrative techniques within epic theatre is
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that it stabilizes spectatorship. By restricting the performer to conveying effects and their immediate causes, the semantic efficiency of the performance, not its aesthetic embellishments or its charisma, is the focus. For Brecht, this is the most reliable way of presenting questions of responsibility and possible answers to those questions,