Muslims in Global Societies Series Volume 4
Series Editors Gabriele Marranci National University of Singapore, Singapore Bryan S. Turner Wellesley College, Wellesley, USA
For further volumes: http://www.springer.com/series/7863
Christopher M. Joll
Muslim Merit-Making in Thailand’s Far-South
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Christopher M. Joll Muslim Studies Centre Institute of Asian Studies Phyathai Road, Patumwan Bangkok 10330 Thailand
[email protected]
ISBN 978-94-007-2484-6 e-ISBN 978-94-007-2485-3 DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-2485-3 Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg London New York Library of Congress Control Number: 2011939218 © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012 No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)
Acknowledgements
There are many people who have contributed—both directly and indirectly—to the writing this book. Between Waipukurau, Palmerston North, Songkhla, and Chiang mai/Kunming parents and in-laws exemplified support over 10 years of living and working in, and researching and writing about in Pattani. Asante sana to the Hulme-moir clan. Wish Helen was still around to see this book come out! Others in New Zealand deserving a word of thanks are Mick Duncan, Rob and Lois Bellingham, Ray and Paul Windsor, Blayne and Elizabeth, Ron Taylor, Tony Andrews, John Roxborogh, Chris Marshall, and Stephen Pattemore. Others friends living elsewhere that I wish to thank are Doug and Jill, Robert and Ruth, Greg, and Zomia addicts Kaaren and Jeph. Bruce and Dia Taylor’s house in the mountains of Chiangmai—one of the few places in Thailand where one can enjoy sitting by a roaring fire—both a place of welcome rest, and where I had some of my most productive writing retreats. Khoop khun khrap to the following significant people in South Thailand: For Dr Hasan Madmarn’s warm encouragement, Dr Worawit Baru’s ongoing interest, Dr Ruslan Uthai’s help on the Pattani Malay, and Dr Bordin Waelateh’s warm friendship; and Shukri Langputeh who lend me some of the standard works on Islam in Thailand, and introduced me to life-changing mind-mapping software. I also wish to extend a terima kasih to the following people at the National University of Malaysia (UKM). Professor Dr Mohamed Yusoff Ismail graciously took on a very accidental anthropologist. The former director of ATMA, Professor Datuk Dr. Shamsul Amri Baharuddin, was unceasingly welcoming and supportive— as was his successor Professor Dr Che Husna Azhari. While supervising my doctoral dissertation, Professor Che Wan Ahmad Zawawi bin Ibrahim, not only offered hospitality, and encouragement but succeeded in getting me to read less, write more, and to stop asking others to answer questions I should answer myself. Most of the work on this book was completed while a research fellow at the Muslim Studies Centre at Chulalongkorn University’s Institute of Asian Studies, in Bangkok. I wish to thank Muslim Studies Centre’s director, Dr Sarawut Aree, and the director of Institute of Asian Studies, Dr Sunait Chutintaranond. I completed this publication while at a visiting research fellow that the Religious
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Studies Department, School of Art History, Classics and Religious Studies, Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand. Thanks to Professor Paul Morris for his warm welcome. The following colleagues deserve a mention. In 2004, Alexander Horstmann suggested I consider studying at ATMA. A number of South Thailand specialists shared ideas, located articles, and loaned books to me. These include: Francis Bradley, Muhammad Arafat bin Muhammad, Matt Wheeler, Michael Jerryson, Stefan Ruholl, Patrick Jory, Joseph Liow, Saroja Dorarirajoo, Imtiyaz Yusuf, Chaiwat Satha-Anand, Duncan McCargo, and Marlane Guelden. Special thanks to fellow antipodean and Pattani-based anthropologist—and raconteur—Marc Askew for his good company and no nonsense comments on my ideas and methods. Studying Muslim merit-making in Cabetigo has only been possible through its residents being willing to tolerate a fly in their ointment. Special thanks to the families of Ased, Omar, and Abdul Khayum, and our landlord Ali Halabi. Terimo kasih dan maaf zahir batin! Although extensively reworked, this book is based on my doctoral dissertation (Joll 2009). I first articulated some of this monograph’s ideas and arguments in a range of conference papers, book chapters, and journal articles. Material related to the anthropology of Islam were presented in papers at “Voices of Islam in Europe and Southeast Asia”, in Nakhon Si Thammarat (January 19–22, 2006), “The International Conference on Southeast Asia”, University of Malay (December 12 2005), and in a chapter of Social Science and Knowledge in a Globalising World, a book edited by Wan Ahmad Zawawi bin Ibrahim and published by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore. Arguments about the “creole” characteristic of the earliest ambassadors in Patani were presented in a paper presented at “Phantasm in Southern Thailand: Historical Writings on Patani and the Islamic World”, held at Chulalongkorn University, December 11–12, 2009. As well as being published in this conference’s proceedings. Material on Muslim identifications and ethnicization will appear in a forthcoming publication New Directions in Islamic Studies in Southeast Asia: Voices of Young Southeast Asian Scholars, edited by Patrick Jory and Kamaruzzaman Bustamam-Ahmad. My comments relating to Salafism and the Tablighi Jama’at in South Thailand appeared in a paper presented at “An Anatomy of an Insurgency, 2004–2009”, a conference organized by Ian Storey at the Institute of Southeast Asia Studies in Singapore between March 10th and 11th, 2009. This was later published in a special edition of Contemporary Southeast Asia (32:2). There have been a number of people involved in the preparation of this manuscript. I wish to thank the editors of “Muslims in Global Societies” monograph series, Professors Gabriel Marranci and Bryan Turner who walked me through my first book. While I have appreciated the input of both, if straws were drawn been them, Gabriel appears to have drawn the shortest. I received prompt, positive and unceasingly patient replies to my many emails. His patience must have been tested as some of these were sent at times in the publication process that were personally and professionally particularly challenging, Thanks also to Anita Fei van der Linden and her team at Springer. I also wish to thank Jim McInnes and Dr Helen
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Greatrex who both read through and edited my entire manuscript at different times. Any inaccuracies or inconsistencies encountered by readers are, of course, entirely my responsibility. Sandra wins “long-suffering writing widow and solo mother” award as I wrote my way through the doctoral tunnel and preparation of this monograph. Although only rarely physically absent, I am under no illusions that Michaela and Nathan suspected that I was not always completely present—especially as I wrote under the stairs situated in the corner of our kitchen in Pattani. I have dedicated this book to David Matthew Joll, my oldest (and only) brother who died suddenly on July 10th 2005. His estate made it possible for me and my family to live and work in Pattani longer than most. My final thanks are offered to God. Pattani October 2010
Christopher M. Joll
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1 Introduction . . . . . . . . The Tham Bun Conundrum Other Views . . . . . . . . . Approach . . . . . . . . . . Fieldwork . . . . . . . . . . Limits, Structure and Style . References . . . . . . . . .
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2 Indic, Islamic and Thai Influences . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sanskrit Cosmopolis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Circulating Islam and Connected Creoles . . . . . . . . . Initial Adhesion and Adoption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Patani Post-1785: From Malay Kerajaan to Thai Province Assimilation Through Legislation Post-1945 . . . . . . . Revolution and Reform in the Hijaz . . . . . . . . . . . . Mecca’s Patani School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Resident Modernisers, Reformers and Revivalists . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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3 Religious, Ethnic and Linguistic Diversity Omar’s Roti Shop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Traditionalists, Reformists and Revivalists . . Plural and Porous Identifications . . . . . . . Factors Affecting Autonym Selection . . . . Modern Multi-lingualism . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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4 Thai and Malay Merit-Making Rhetoric Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Delineating Merit-Making . . . . . . . . . The Searches for Equivalence . . . . . . .
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Arabic Terms and Islamic Ideation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Potent Words and Sacred Duties . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Qur’an’s Multiple Rewards . . . . . . . The Qur’an and Personal Merit-Making Reading for the Dead . . . . . . . . . . Fardu Prayers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . What Worship Is Worth . . . . . . . . . Funeral Prayers and Fardu Khifayah . . Sunnat Prayers . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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6 Sedekoh and Meritorious Smorgasbords . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Forms of Sedekoh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sedekoh for the Dead and Living . . . . . . . . . . . . Variables Affecting the Amount of Merit . . . . . . . . The Merit-Generating Elements of Feasting Complexes . Funeral Feasts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mawlid Feasts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . House-Warming Feasts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . General Tham Bun Feasts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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7 Ramadan Scales and Meccan Multiplications . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Performance of Ramadan and Its Multiple Rewards . . . Hari Rayo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Poso Sunnat and Rayo Ne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Haj: Prerequisites and Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . Performance of the Haj and Mecca’s Multiplications of Merit Reasons for Repetitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Sunnat Lesser Pilgrimage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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8 Merit-Making Rationales and Motivations . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Obligations to Allah and Preparations for Alam Al-Barzakh Obligations to the Deceased and Merit-Transference . . . . The Efficacy of Merit on Dunio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A Muslim Economy of Merit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Thai Influences and Islamic Credentials Reconsidered . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Appendix: Transcription of Vernacular Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Abstract This chapter introduces readers to the circumstances behind my arrival in the Malay community of Cabetigo. I relate how curiosity at what Thai-speaking Muslims mean by tham bun (Th. merit-making) led to my metamorphosis into an accidental anthropologist. Readers are also introduced to how other anthropologists have sought to explain references by Thai-speaking Muslims to merit-generation, and how past approaches to studying Muslim societies affected the conclusions reached. Details are also supplied about elements of the anthropology of Islam which has informed the conceptualisation of Muslim diversity, assessments of local adat (tradition), and the ethnographic significance of ‘ibadat, (Islam’s globally normative ritual repertoire). Particulars about data collection and the issues encountered during the course of fieldwork are given before addressing the limits, structure and style of this study. This is a study of Muslim merit-making in one of Thailand’s Malay-dominated far-south provinces (Map 1.1). I lived and worked in Pattani between 2000 and 2010, apart from two six-month and one three-month interludes in New Zealand. My Thai-born wife and I had long planned to work in Thailand while our children were young. Her excellent Thai and my English teaching job in Pattani were not only our primary reasons for moving to Thailand, but they also greatly assisted our acceptance by most Cabetigo residents. During our first years in this community, Thai language study was my top priority, before beginning the more challenging task of learning the Pattani Malay dialect. Most of my language was acquired in local coffee/tea shops (PM. keda kopi, Th. raan naam cha).1 Throughout these first years we attended local weddings and funeral feasts whenever invited, and visited neighbours and students over the two Muslim festivals of Hari Rayo (Ar. Id Il-Fitri) and Hari Rayo Haji (Ar. Id al-Adha). While we sought to actively participate in all community activities, our level of involvement in the religious life of the community depended on what was being performed. Another factor was who was present. We soon discovered that there was often no consensus on what non-Muslims could participate in.
1 Throughout this study, I specify the language of all vernacular terms with the following abbreviations: Arabic (Ar.); PM. (Pattani Malay); Th. (Thai); Persian (Pr.); Indonesian (Id.); Standard Malay (SM.); Tamil (Tm.); Urdu (Ur.).
C.M. Joll, Muslim Merit-Making in Thailand’s Far-South, Muslims in Global Societies Series 4, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-2485-3_1, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012
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Introduction
Map 1.1 Pattani province
The community of Cabetigo is located in Pattani town (Th. amphur muang) (see Maps 1.2 and 1.3), which is the capital of Pattani province (Th. jangwat). Cabetigo is one of oldest, largest and most important of Pattani’s Malay communities. It derives its name from the three-way intersection located at its heart. The northern boundary of Cabetigo is marked by the intersection of Cabangtiga Road and Yaring Road that borders Pattani’s main commercial district. The western perimeter of Cabetigo is formed by the Pattani river (Th. khlong, maenam Pattani, PM. Sunga Taning), with its eastern boundary marked by Yarang Road, along which traffic between Pattani and Yala travels. Its southern extremity is the northern border of a community referred to as Ta’lubut on Yarang Road. There are a number of important landmarks on Yarang Road. Pattani’s largest (although not its most important) mosque is the Central Mosque (Th. Masyid Klang, PM. Masyid Baru) (Fig. 1.1) which was constructed by the Thai government. It is located in front of the Pattani Provincial Islamic Council (SM. Majlih Agama Islam, PM. Majlih Ugamo Islam, Th. Khanat Kamakarn Islam). South of the Central Mosque along Yarang Road is Pattani’s largest Muslim cemetery, Kubor Tok Ayoh. Opposite it is the entrance of Masyid Rajo (SM. Masjid Raja) (Fig. 1.2). Constructed as it was by the rajo of Pattani in a traditional Malay style, this is the most important mosque in Cabetigo. Its Arabesque domes were only added when extensions were made 20 years ago. Following the destruction of
The Tham Bun Conundrum
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Map 1.2 Map of Cabetigo
Kruset, the Sultan of Patani constructed a palace (PM. koto) in Cabetigo which is encircled by an impressive three-metre high and two-feet thick brick wall. While Masyid Rajo, Kubor Tok Ayoh and Koto Rajo together represent Cabetigo’s symbolic core, other centres also exist. The official centre for the administration of Islam in the province is the aforementioned Islamic Council, and twice a week on market days (Th. wan nat) Cabetigo’s central three-way intersection becomes the centre of commerce. While Cabetigo’s mosques, prayer rooms and kubors are all important religious centres, its numerous tea shops, restaurants and food stalls function as social centres.
The Tham Bun Conundrum Between 2000 and 2004 I became intrigued at how frequently Thai-speaking Muslims in Cabetigo referred to merit-making (Th. tham bun). Indeed, on the day we shifted into our house our landlady, Hassanah, asked whether we would be making merit (Th. ja tham bun mai). While inviting friends and neighbours to a feast we were holding to celebrate the safe arrival of our son Nathan in October
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Introduction
Map 1.3 Map of the Pattani municipality showing location of Cabangtiga/Cabetigo
2001, we discovered that many in Cabetigo referred to feasts as tham bun. After extending our invitation, we explained that we had delegated the acquisition of the two obligatory goats, preparation of the curry, and the hiring of all the crockery and cutlery to a Muslim friend. As non-Muslim hosts, clarity on such details was crucial, as no one would come if there were any fears that halal food would be served on uncontaminated plates. Almost every neighbour asked whether we were “making merit”. After denying that this was our intention, an answer that created more than a little confusion was that we wished to publicly give thanks to God for our son’s safe arrival. I once returned home to discover a plastic bag hanging on the handle of our grill doors. In it was some freshly made curry that had been sealed with a tightly wound rubber band. A neighbour explained that she had also received a bag, and that this had been left by neighbour who was making merit, so that the dream she had had the previous night would come true. At a friend’s house before my first Ramadan in Cabetigo, I enquired about the significance of the fast month. He replied by itemising the things he must abstain from and apply himself to. He concluded by saying that in the month of Ramadan
The Tham Bun Conundrum
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Fig. 1.1 Pattani’s Central Mosque
Fig. 1.2 Masyid Rajo
Muslims “have to make a lot of merit” (Th. raw tong tham bun hai maak). On the eve of Hari Rayo at the end of Ramadan, I overheard a Thai Buddhist ask a Muslim friend about how he would be making merit the next day. He was told that as well as paying zakat fitroh, Muslims made merit for ancestors at the kubor (PM graveyard). In a similar way, those curious about how I worshipped asked about how I made merit (Th. khun tham bun yang rai). On one occasion when it became apparent that it was not clear about what I had been asked, I was provided an answer template in slow, clear Thai: “Muslims pray at the mosque, and Buddhists go to the temple, but what do you do?”
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Introduction
While I became increasingly interested in studying some aspect of life in Cabetigo after living there for 4 years, my metamorphosis into an accidental anthropologist was primarily connected to my curiosity about this tham bun conundrum. The focus of this study is the merit-making rhetoric, rituals and rationales of Cabetigo’s Muslim residents. Located as it is in a bilingual Muslim community, my treatment of merit-making rhetoric will delineate how Malay-speakers refer to merit (PM. pahalo) and merit-generation. This study is also concerned with how merit is generated through the performance of good deeds and religious rituals. These reveal that questions about what tham bun refers to and how merit is made are important, albeit for different reasons. Finally, the range of rationales that motivate the manufacture of this religious reward by Thai and Malay-speaking Muslims in Cabetigo are delineated.
Other Views Although this is the first substantive study of Muslim merit-making rhetoric, rituals and rationales in Thailand, other anthropologists have described aspects of this merit-making conundrum. The first to do so was Angela Burr, who studied the impact of the Thai cultural milieu on spirit beliefs and practices among Thaispeaking Muslims in Songkhla province (see 1972, 1974, 1984). Burr anticipated aspects of this present study by speculating on the degree to which Muslim communities in the Malay far-south are “Malay culturally and socially”, and the degree to which they are “Thai, both overtly and in terms of underlying forms” (1988, p. 55). According to Burr, tham bun illustrates how Islam in Songkhla had been both locally integrated into, and articulated in terms of, the dominant Buddhist cosmology (1974, p. 67). Like Thomas Fraser in his (now classic) ethnography of the Malay fishing village of Rusembilan on the outskirts of Pattani (1960), and many others who followed Robert Redfield (1956), Burr described village traditions as “little traditions” which were distinct from the “great tradition” of Islam (1974, p. 98). Burr also wrote in the wake of the hugely influential studies by Clifford Geertz (1960, 1968) and Ernest Gellner (1968, 1969). Not surprisingly, she asserted that Islam in Songkhla was a veneer (1974, pp. 74–76). Perhaps following Geertz, who in his study of Javanese Islam dedicated 75 pages to describing feasts, referred to as the slametan but covered normative piety in less than nine pages, only three pages of Burr’s doctoral dissertation was dedicated to Islam’s so-called “great” traditions (1988, pp. 84–87). Raymond Scupin describes Burr’s treatment of merit-making feasts as “structurally imaginative” (1978, p. 88): Muslims who gathered to chant at “prayer group feasts” for the dead, were “mock monks” (1974, p. 96). This explains why women—who might accidentally defile these monks—were absent from these merit-generating occasions (Burr, 1974, pp. 102–103). In his study of Muslim modernism in Bangkok (1978), Scupin considers the effect that the Thai milieu has had on both the rituals the Thai Muslims in Bangkok
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maintain (1978, p. 141) and the terminology that is employed to describe communal feasts.2 He speculates the Buddhist tham bun practices (through which stocks of merit are accrued) may have had an impact on Muslim practices (1978, pp. 145, 146, 149). Although critical of Burr’s analysis of prayer feasts, the variation of the meritmaking feasts that Scupin observed led him to propose that these were essentially structureless (1978, p. 141). Japanese anthropologist, Ryoko Nishii, has provided important insights into Muslim merit-making. Her studies are located in the Thai province of Satun where a high instance of intermarriage has meant that many Thai Buddhists convert to Islam. Nishii highlights the importance of making merit for the deceased. This occasionally leads Thai Buddhist families to steal the corpse of Muslim converts so as to be able to make merit for them (2002). Nishii also reveals that merit is capable of positively influencing those in this world. Thai anthropologist, Saihoo Patya, is the only scholar to have described Malay beliefs concerning religious merit (PM. pahalo) (1974). He recounts that Friday sermons frequently exhorted people to make merit in preparation for the life to come (1974, pp. 177–234). Extra prayers performed by the elderly were motivated by the desire to gain more merit (1974, p. 131). Acts of charity (PM. sedekoh) to the devout or learned were widely regarded as especially meritorious (1974, p. 184), and devout hajis fast an extra 6 days after Hari Raya “for extra merit” (1974, p. 149). Patya also mentions the practice of upah haj, or “posthumous pilgrimage by proxy of a hired service of someone at Mecca” (1974, p. 225). Patya argues that his Malay informants viewed their relation to Allah as defined in terms of merit (PM. pahalo) and sin (PM. doso) (1974, p. 227). Patya also describes a large range of religious feasts (1974, p. 194). These include funerals feasts, the reading of the talqin, and Surah Ya Sin to bless the spirit of the dead. Like Nishii, Patya’s informants insist that pahala positively influences luck in this life. With the noble exception of Patya, these perspectives on Muslim merit-making in Thailand were provided by anthropologists working with mono-lingual Thaispeaking Muslims. Although Patya commented on merit being generated through Islamic rituals, tham bun feasts dominated other descriptions of merit-making rituals. While rightly questioning Burr’s structurally imaginative proposals, Scupin concludes that tham bun feasts in Bangkok were structureless. He was furthermore non-committal about how the Thai milieu has affected both the nature of the rituals that Muslims maintained and how merit is understood to assist merit-makers. As well as being inattentive to normative practices, these studies appear to assume that tham bun rhetoric among Thai Muslims indicates that the rationales which motivate Muslims to generate merit are informed by Theravada Buddhism. While tham bun religious rhetoric has been extensively observed, it has been inadequately explained. 2
Scupin’s most important studies of Islam in Thailand include the following (1980a, 1980b, 1980c, 1982, 1986, 1987, 1988a, 1988b, 1998).
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Introduction
Approach Despite none of these studies having been conducted among bilingual Muslims, which permits Thai terms to be triangulated with Malay correlates, the conclusions reached were also impacted by the approach taken by these anthropologists to the ethnographic task. In recent decades, the academic legacy of Redfield, Geertz and Gellner on how anthropologists study Muslim societies has been extensively critiqued.3 My approach to Muslim merit-making is informed by a discourse concerned with the theoretical and methodological issues confronting anthropologists, commonly referred to as the anthropology of Islam. Important connections are discernable between the emergence of the anthropology of Islam and critiques of Geertz and Gellner. Robert Launay claims Geertz’s Islam Observed birthed the anthropology of Islam (1992, p. 1). This is perhaps a reference to one of the earliest citings of the term being found in Abdul Hamid el-Zein’s response to Geertz (1977). Similarly, Talal Asad (1983) offered his reflections on Geertz before articulating his own ideas on the anthropology of Islam 3 years later (1986). One of Daniel Varisco’s principal concerns in his Islam Obscured: The Rhetoric of Anthropological Representation was that there was a need for anthropologists to move beyond Geertz and Gellner (2005, pp. 21–80). Similarly Gabriel Marranci in his Anthropology of Islam provides a thorough critique of Geertz and Gellner (2008, pp. 31–46), those who followed them, and others who have articulated alternative approaches. A number of anthropologists explicitly refer to the anthropology of Islam4 ; others exemplify that it is the methodological and theoretical approaches it advocates.5 The manner in which the anthropology of Islam has informed my conceptualisation of religious diversity, evaluation of local Islam (SM. adat), and position about the ethnographic significance of Islam’s globally normative ritual repertoire (Ar. ‘ibadat) is described below. William Roff observes that scholars have long unleashed their passion for taxonomy on the living. Like taxidermy, this should never be attempted on the living. Although anthropologists once routinely referred to a plurality of Islams within and between Muslim societies, these run contrary to the insistence by Muslims that there is only one Islam. References to distinct local “Islams” also risks historic connections between Muslim societies being overlooked (Bowen, 1993, p. 7). For instance, Marshall Hodgson noted that some of the abangan practices described by Geertz resembled those of Egyptians peasants (1974, p. 551), which el-Aswad el-Sayed 3 Varisco refers to Geertz’s “symbol-driven reading of Islam-as-a-cultural-system” being “reflexively disenfranchised with the arrest of meta-theorizing” (2005, p. 22). 4 For discussions of the anthropology of Islam see: Bowen (2010), Eickelman (1982), Houston (2009), Kreinath (2011), Lindholm (2002), Lukens-Bull (1999), Marranci (2008), Rutherford (2002), Soares and Osella (2010), Starrett (1997), Tapper (1995), and Varisco (2005). 5 Studies exemplifying the methodological and theoretical concerns of the anthropology of Islam include: Abashin (2007), Buitelaar (1993), Headley (2004), Headley and Parkin (2000), Mahmood (2001, 2005), Parkin (1994, 2000), Woodward (1988, 1989, 2011).
Approach
9
has recently described (2002, p. 158). Martin van Bruinessen argues that contact with the Middle East facilitated the adoption in Southeast Asia of both scripturalist Islam, mysticism and elements of Arabian adat (1999, p. 167). Dichotomising conceptualisations of Muslim diversity—that scripturalist/normative/universalist/formal Islam co-exists with a popular/local/received/folk Islam—are of limited heuristic value. Following Soares, I argue these to be interrelated and should not be analytically separated (1996, p. 7). In place of such binaries, Mark Woodward forwards a “tentative schemata” that ranges from “universalist”, to “essentialist”, “local” and “received” Islams (1988, pp. 87–88). “Universalist” Islam refers to texts and rituals not subject to change and development, but are objects of interpretive programs giving rise to the diverse modes of Islamic piety and thought. “Essentialist” Islam denotes modes of ritual practice that, while not mandated by universalist texts, are nonetheless widely distributed throughout the Muslim world.6 “Received” Islam denotes elements of universalist and essentialist Islam which are locally understood and interpreted. This is distinct from “local” Islam, namely oral, textual and ritual traditions unique to locales that have come out of the distinctive interaction between local culture and received Islam. Woodward points out that with the notable exception of “universalist” Islam, these are subject to change and that a variety of factors are involved in the formulation of “local” Islams. Following Woodward, this study argues that local Islams are not passive recipients of “universalist” and “essentialist” forms, but have come out of an interaction with existing religious and cultural traditions. I refer to elements of “local” Islam in Southeast Asia as adat. This is capable of denoting local (often non-ritualised) customs, and indigenous ceremonies or ritual accretions that have been Islamised and function to establish and maintain local Muslim identities. Most elements of Southeast Asian adat are regarded as synonymous with, or at least benign to, Islam (Muhaimin, 2006, pp. 116–118). James Fox argues that everything not explicitly banned (Ar. haram) may be made Islamic through uttering “bismillah” (Ar. “In the name of God”) or making a statement of intention (Ar. niyat) (2004, p. 8). Ambiguity between what is agama (religion), kebudayaan (culture) and adat (tradition) permits some Southeast Asian Muslims to participate in rituals possessing weak Islamic credentials (Möller, 2005, p. 279). Despite the origins of certain Southeast Asian adat being either uncertain or clearly Indic, van Bruinessen states that these “can not be called anything but Muslim”. Following Hodgson, he also refers to these as part of the “Islamicate cultures of the Archipelago” (1999, p. 167). Although once a fluid, adaptable and changing system of norms and regulations, adat underwent significant changes in the Dutch East Indies. Through a policy promulgated by Snouck Hurgronje, adat was codified for use in the Dutch colonial courts. This led to a number of unexpected outcomes. Not only was the fluid system transformed into a fixed and rigid one, but disaffection with adat laws also
6
These include Mawlid celebrations, Sufi dhikr rites, Shia Muharram celebrations, saint veneration, local pilgrimages, and ritual meals associated with merit and blessing.
10
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Introduction
grew out of suspicions that Dutch authorities aimed to weaken Islam through adat. As a result, while once viewed as complementary to shariah, adat began to be unfavorably compared to it. I have also drawn on insights supplied by the anthropology of Islam about the ethnographic significance of Islam’s globally normative ritual repertoire (Ar. ‘ibadat). The division of labour which once existed between orientalists and anthropologists has been replaced in recent decades by increasing numbers of anthropologists who have cut across the “false dichotomy of orthodox and unorthodox Islam” (Soares, 2005, p. 7). Increasing numbers have undertaken studies of Islamic law courts and preaching (see Antoun, 1989; Bowen, 2003). Following Soares, this study will include Islamic discourses and practices located at the intersection of the local, the supralocal and the translocal (2005, p. 9). The proposition that anthropologists ignored ‘ibadat due to their lack of facility in Arabic and familiarity with Islamic sciences is rejected by Marion Katz who accuses anthropologists of being obsessed with local practices (2005, p. 107). Daniel Varisco refers to anthropology having come to Islam via the exotic, and that ‘ibadat was “too obvious, perhaps too boring, to require explanation” (2005, p. 17). For Katz, the importance of Islam’s globally normative ritual repertoire is its ability to function as a receptacle for the meaning supplied in local contexts. This is made possible by its lack of semantic core (2005, p. 108). John Bowen, in his paradigmatic study of the social meaning of salat in Indonesia, encourages anthropologists to be attentive to how salat takes on “local social meanings” (1989, p. 615).7 In a similar comparative study of Muslim sacrifice between Sumatra and Morocco, John Bowen reveals that Muslims shape a particular set of ritual duties in sharply contrasting ways (1992). This is achieved through adaptations and elaborations that make sense within specific cultural forms (1992, p. 668).
Fieldwork Living in Cabetigo as an educationalist for 4 years before morphing into an accidental anthropologist positively affected my fieldwork experience in a number of ways. By 2005, I had become acquainted with many people in Cabetigo and the community’s ethnic and religious diversity. Most of the people who became key informants were close friends. As I desired that these friendships continued once I had completed my data collection, I occasionally chose not to collect data whenever this might be interpreted as insensitive.8 7 That salat is capable of functioning in this manner has been confirmed by the contributors to Stephen Headley and David Parkin’s Islamic Prayer Across the Indian Ocean: Inside and Outside the Mosque (2000). 8 For instance, on one occasion in the middle of my fieldwork I chose not to interview friends about how they made merit for their son who had tragically died. On another occasion, I accepted the wishes of families in the community who let it be known through an intermediary that they would prefer me not to attend a funeral feast that they were holding.
Fieldwork
11
As well as becoming acquainted with many people, Cabetigo residents had also become accustomed to my presence. Although more a fly in the ointment than a fly on the wall, Cabetigo residents accepted my presence in their day-to-day ointment. As such, their behaviour was only occasionally influenced by it. Finally, my longterm residence in Cabetigo enabled me to become proficient in Thai and the Pattani Malay dialect. As an ethnographic study, I employed a number of data collection methods appropriate to the nature of my research questions. All these required me to interact with my informants. In late 2005, I began attending community events and feasts as a participant observer. I wrote field notes after any event or significant discussions that occurred in the course of a day. During this first phase of data collection I also sought out friends who had been involved in important episodes I had been involved in. All this yielded an enormous amount of empirical data concerning how and why Muslims generate merit. It also generated many questions that would only be answered through an equally extensive regime of interviews. As is well known, interviews yield data that is taken for granted by informants or not amenable to observations, such as the midnight prayers (PM. semaye tahajud). Although I had occasionally conducted informal interviews in the course of participant observation, these were included in my field notes. From late 2006, two types of interviews were conducted. The first were semi-structured interviews that I conducted with 80 Cabangtiga residents. Most of these had been involved with my participant observation and lived less than 100 metres from my house. Other interviewees were friends and acquaintances I had met in the tea shops I regularly patronised. Over half of my interviewees were members of eight extended families. Three of these were Malay, two were Thai Muslims from Nakhon Sri Thammarat, two were Pathans, and one was of Arabic origin. Before commencing these semi-structured interviews I prepared a database of the people who I hoped to interview. This contained their pseudonym (that almost all of them requested I use in lieu of real names) and details about their gender, occupation, educational background, ethnicity, preferred language and reformist or traditionalist orientation. Not only did this enable me to keep a record of who I had interviewed, but also of whether interviewees represented Cabetigo’s linguistic, ethnic and religious diversity. I followed an interview schedule that contained open-ended questions which solicited lengthy answers. I avoided specific questions that might prevent alternative avenues of enquiry. Some interviews required two sessions. Sometimes either the interviewer or interviewee ran out of time. Other interviews were prematurely concluded when the quality of the data was affected. Whenever an important issue or new line of enquiry was raised, I altered the interview schedules for subsequent interviews. These insights were occasionally significant enough for me to conduct additional interviews of people I had already interviewed. As the number of semi-structured interviews increased, so did my understanding of the range of merit-making terms, merit-generating rituals and merit-making
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Introduction
motivations. This resembled a research spiral. As is well known, spirals and circles are distinct by the latter lacking direction. An unproductive circle had replaced a fruitful spiral whenever no new data on a given issue was generated. Whenever this happened, I concluded that sufficient data on an issue had been obtained and that the interview schedules for all subsequent interviews could be adjusted. Such a decision was only made when those I had interviewed represented Cabetigo’s ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity. I initially intended to conduct one-on-one interviews. Whenever interviewing women in their house, I was accompanied by my wife or carried out the interview in a local restaurant when there were relatively few customers. I conducted interviews with married couples provided there were no concerns that one person would dominate the other. Occasionally a one-on-one interview attracted the attention of family members and friends. In many of these group interviews those participating appeared to enjoy themselves more and higher quality data was yielded. As a result, if I suspected an informant lacked confidence, other family members and friends were included which made the interview more enjoyable and productive. Semi-structured interviews were followed by in-depth interviews with key informants that sought to elicit rich, detailed material (Lofland & Lofland, 1995). My key informants were people I had been closely associated with for a number of years, and who were willing to discuss issues with me. As noted they also had to represent Cabetigo’s ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity. These in-depth interviews were more structured and focused. In them, I frequently pressed informants for details and challenged their initial responses. Doing so occasionally revealed information that had not been disclosed in the semi-structured interviews. At the time this regime of interviewing commenced my fluency in Thai was sufficient to not require a research assistant. Like most of my participant observation, the earliest interviews were conducted in Thai. A rough balance of Thai and Malay language data was achieved by conducting more interviews in Malay in later interview cycles. When conducting interviews in Pattani Malay, I invited some capable of clearing up any confusion I encountered to be present. Except for material of no relevance to my research topic, I produced full transcripts of all interviews. In these, I made special note of Thai or Malay terms employed by informants. I also consulted language informants when there was any uncertainty about any terms. Once all my transcripts had been completed, a Malay language informant checked how accurately I had interpreted key Thai, Pattani Malay and Arabic religious terms. There were a number of complications to my fieldwork. This was conducted during the time of considerable social and political tension. Tensions began a year after we arrived as a result of the events of September 11, 2011 and the allied invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. These soon led to widespread anti-Western sentiments, leading Muslim friends to advise me to keep a low profile. I was strongly advised not to participate in an anti-war rally, as I would be suspected as a spy. In 2004, Thailand’s Malay-dominated southern provinces descended into violence. This was caused as much by a new phase of Malay armed resistance, as the responses of the Royal Thai Army and Police that were often inept and brutal. Although a number suggested I leave Pattani, there were comparatively few
Fieldwork
13
bombings and shootings in Pattani town and no one believed that insurgents would begin to target foreigners. The rising violence in villages led me to not pursue a comparative study of merit-making rhetoric, rituals and rationales between urban Malays in Cabetigo and a rural Malay community. Although the vast majority of Cabetigo residents cooperated with my fieldwork, some who I had not been personally acquainted with did not. The greatest difficulties I encountered related to enquiries about the tensions—both past and present— between Cabetigo traditionalists and reformist religious constituents. Nonetheless, my experience of fieldwork was much less complicated than if I had been an English or American anthropologist who had arrived in Cabetigo in 2005 with funds sufficient for 12 months of fieldwork. Although I had a good rapport with dozens of people, and spoke good Thai and passable Pattani Malay, challenges to my fieldwork related to my religious otherness vis-à-vis Islam. Ethnographers have been described as professional strangers adept at negotiating multi-faceted and dynamic “betwixt and between” identities (Agar, 1996). Cabezon and Davaney argue that a number of constituents make up the identity of a scholar of religion. In addition to religious affiliation, gender and ethnicity, one’s researcher identity also consists of innate, elective, manipulated—and even concealed—elements. These move into the foreground or recede to the background depending on the context, interlocutor or topic under discussion (2004, p. 12). For a non-Muslim Western anthropologist studying Muslims in the post-9/11 world at a time when an old insurgency was reigniting, my religious identity effected rapport, trust and access to data. This is far from a new phenomenon. Richard Francis Burton had posed as a pilgrim in order to enter Mecca, and Snouck Hurgronje converted to Islam which permitted him to study the subjects of the Dutch East Indies in that city. Despite Michael Laffan insisting that Snouck Hurgronje’s conversion to Islam was beyond question—that he was a Muslim¯un (Ar. Muslim)—he questions whether he was a true believer (Ar. mu’mim) (2003, p. 52). Anthropologists seeking to build rapport with Muslim informants have employed a number of strategies. Kathryn Kuey (2001) recalls wearing a veil to hide her short hair and donning a wedding band (despite not being married), fearing that as a single woman she would be less mobile. Before commencing his own fieldwork on Islamic boarding schools (Id. pesantren) in Java, Ron Lukens-Bull narrates receiving advice from a European Islamologist. He strongly encouraged Lukens-Bull to unequivocally present himself as a Muslim—although as a new convert (Ar. mu’allaf)—to make his inevitable mistakes easier to understand and forgive. Upon entering his pesantren, he worn Javanese clothes and attended salat. However, he appears to have not followed this advice—offering more nuanced explanations of his religious identity. As his participation in salat confused most informants, Lukens-Bull eventually abandoned attempts at clarifying whether he was a Muslim or not (2007, p. 178). There are a range of positions on the impact that a researcher’s religious identity has on fieldwork. Russell McCutcheon refers to the insider/outsider problem highlighted by feminist, post-modern or post-colonial theorising that is attentive to the situatedness of human discourse. Similar to emic/insider and etic/outsider positions
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Introduction
are epistemological privilege and epistemological optimism. The latter asserts that identity has no impact on knowledge. As such, two scholars possessing distinct identities who investigate the same religious phenomenon are able to reach the same conclusions. Epistemological privilege alleges that a scholar’s identity negatively circumscribes what he or she can know. Propositions that epistemological privilege is a private form of knowing solely on the basis of inborn characteristics is increasingly viewed as incompatible with modern scholarship. This is, after all, a highly public and contestable form of knowledge creation that operates on standardised modes of reason and verification (Cho, 2004, p. 62). Rita Gross calls for researchers of religion to replace their desire for neutrality with an awareness of their influences and identities. This is “less self-delusional than trying to hide our identities from ourselves while coyly pretending to other scholars that our positions and identities are irrelevant to our choices of research topics and our conclusions regarding those topics” (2004, p. 114). Gross also asserts that one’s professional training is capable of being as important as one’s religious affiliation, affecting as it does the questions asked, approaches found compelling and conclusions reached. Delusions about the existence of detached observers or clean slates should be replaced with religious and professional identities being brought to the table (ibid). My experience of explaining my religious identity resembles those encountered by Lukens-Bull in Java. I have been a Christ-follower all my adult life. Although I never knowingly deceived people into thinking that I was a Muslim, I became aware that some in Cabetigo were unclear about my religious allegiance. A European researcher once enquired about my conversion to Islam that someone in Cabetigo had informed him about. A number of factors could have led to those not personally acquainted with me to have reached such a conclusion. For a relatively brief time before September 11, 2001 I had attended the Pakistan mosque. I discontinued this practice soon afterwards so as to quench rumours that I was a spy. Not only did I possess non-Caucasian facial features and had a long beard, but my wife also wore a headscarf, something which our landlord recommended. I also preferred to answer questions by emphasising belief over belonging. These contained references to Allah and spoke of my devotion to Jesus (Ar. Nabi Isa). Although this led to a minority in Cabetigo unequivocally rejecting me as a khafir (Ar. unbeliever), most welcomed me as a God-fearing, although slightly misguided, ahl-al-kitab cousin.9 While my non-Muslim identity complicated my rapport with some informants and access to some data, I had the advantage of facility in both Thai and Pattani Malay. A number of similarities exist between language ability and religious identity. The first is that both are resolvable: the former through a determined attitude to language acquisition, and the later through conversion. Anthony Johns insightfully suggests that the intellectual and sympathetic mastery of a religious tradition resembles aspects of language-learning. In addition to both affecting how one views of the
9
Ar. people of the book, namely Christians and Jews.
Limits, Structure and Style
15
world, but serious students of language and religion are less prone to misinterpret data due to their increased awareness of long established cognitive processes (1975, p. 37).
Limits, Structure and Style This study is specifically concerned with the merit-making rhetoric, rituals and rationales of Muslims in Cabetigo who are predominantly bilingual Malays. Malays in Cabetigo have longer and closer contacts with Thai-style modernity than those residing in the rural communities of the Thailand’s far-south. No claims are made that what I describe can be extrapolated to other Muslims communities. In addition to being an ethnographic study of merit-making in a specific urban Malay community, this study makes no attempts to compare Muslim merit-making with those of Buddhists in Cabetigo, or anywhere else. I have also not addressed the related issues of sin or demerit (Th. baap, PM. pahalo). This study runs the risk of ballooning into a tour de force of Islamic religiosity on account of tham bun occasionally denoting general religious activity that is unrelated to the production of merit. I only consider rituals referred to as tham bun when Muslims view these to yield merit. I make no claims that merit generation, accumulation and transference are the sole concern of Muslims in Cabetigo. The focused nature of this study makes it inevitable that readers will only catch glimpses of other aspects of Muslim spirituality and devotional practices. While I have discussed the religious aspects of the insurgency in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat elsewhere (see Joll, 2010), only occasional references are made to violence in South Thailand in this study. How can this be justified? Not only has this claimed more than 4,500 lives since 2004, but counter-insurgency experts have described this as the most intense insurgency after those currently operating in Iraq and Afghanistan (Kilcullen, 2009, p. 121, cited in McCargo, 2009, p. 55). I do not deny the importance of understanding why Malay in Thailand’s far-south are rebelling (Hafez, 2003). Has the conflict been caused by a crisis over modern Malayness and anxiety over cultural annihilation and language loss? Are insurgents disillusioned with Thai style modernity and democracy? What part has the crisis in political and religious leadership played? The vast majority of studies which have been conducted in Thailand’s far-south have either dealt with the past Malay separatist struggle or the more complicated current insurgency.10 My decision to leave others to answer these questions is that my primary interests are in how southern 10
The following are some of the most important studies of Malay separatism: Dulyakasem (1991), Haemindra (1976, 1977), Pitsuwan (1985), Satha-Anand (1987), Suhrke (1975, 1977), Thomas (1975, 1989), and Wan Kadir Che Man (1990). Those interested in the current insurgency should consult the following: Askew (2007, 2008), Camroux and Pathan (2008), Horstmann (2008), International Crisis Group (2005), Joll (2010), Liow (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009a), Liow and Pathan (2010), McCargo (2005, 2007, 2008), Satha-Anand (2006, 2008, 2009), and Tan-Mullins (2009), Yusuf (2009a, 2009b).
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Introduction
Malays either resist (Scott, 1985) or negotiate with Thai and Islamic influences. This study seeks to contribute to the ethnographic record of Malay communities in Thailand’s far-south that, regrettably, is comparatively thin—especially compared to the burgeoning counter-insurgency corpus.11 The final characteristic of past ethnographic studies in South Thailand is their rural bias. This is the first substantive study of urban Malayness in South Thailand.12 This study begins in this Introduction with a treatment of Patani’s Indic, Islamic and Thai pasts. The Indic past that Pattani shares with the rest of mainland and island Southeast Asia is described. Following a description of the Sanskrit cosmopolis that existed for a millennium before the earliest chapters of Islam’s Southeast Asian expansion, the concept of circulating Islam (which produced cosmopolitan creole communities connected with the Indian Ocean trade) is introduced. The importance of the Indian influence relates to both where these creole ambassadors came from and where they came to. The process through which members of Southeast Asia’s port city-states pragmatically adopted Islam is then reconstructed. Although questioning the extent of Ayutthaya’s influence in Pattani prior to 1785, the process through which the Malay Kerajaan of Pattani was incrementally absorbed by Bangkok following its defeat in the five decades of wars that ended in 1838 is delineated. Before the establishment of the province of Pattani in 1932, Pattani town existed as one of seven huamuang (1815–1902) and one of four monthon (1906– 1932). Pattani’s absorption coincided with a time of revolution and reform in the Hijaz. Islamic movements birthed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries impacted South Thailand through Pattani Malay scholars such as Shaykh Daud b. Abdullah b. Idris al-Fatani (Shaykh Daud al-Fatani) (1740–1847), and Shaykh Wan Ahmad b. Muhammad Zain Mustafa al-Fatani (Shaykh Ahmad al-Fatani) (1856–1908) who emigrated there over this time of crisis. Through a range of legislative initiatives following the Anglo-Siamese treaty of 1909, Bangkok increased its absorption of the newly formed provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat. This coincided with the arrival of Islamic modernism and reformism, locally mediated through Shaykh Muhammad Sulong bin Abdul Kadir bin Muhammad al-Fatani (Haji Sulong) (1895–1954). Having outlined how Bangkok and Mecca impacted on Pattani, Chapter 2 concludes with a description of Salafism and the revivalist activities of Tablighi Jama’at in present-day South Thailand. While Chapter 2 describes the Indic, Thai and Islamic elements in Pattani’s past, Chapter 3 describes how these Thai and Islamic influences impacted the religious, linguistic and ethnic diversity of present-day Cabetigo. All these have had some impact on how urban Malays identify themselves, their proficiency in Thai, and 11 The most important studies in the ethnographic canon of Malay in South Thailand are: Cornish (1997), Dorarirajoo (2002), Fraser (1960) Horstmann (2002), Le Roux (1998), Liow (2009b), Marddent (2005, 2008), Muhammad Arafat Bin Mohamad (2009), Pas-Ong (1990), Prachuabmoh (1980, 1993), Tan-Mullins (2006) and Tsuneda (2006, 2009). 12 The following are recommended to those interested in recent studies of urban Malayness: Baxstrom (2008), Fischer (2008), Frisk (2009), and Thompson (2007).
Limits, Structure and Style
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how Islam is practised. While the vast majority of Cabetigo residents are bilingual Malays who adhere to a traditionalist expression of Islam, Cabetigo also has a significant reformist constituency. I show that while most mono-lingual Thai-speakers in the present-day are Thai Muslim immigrants, there are an increasing numbers of young Malays in Cabetigo incapable of communicating in Malay. Chapter 4 is concerned with Thai and Malay merit-making rhetoric and it begins with a delimitation of this rhetoric. Proposals are put forward about what Thaispeaking informants mean by tham bun. This chapter concludes with reasons for evaluating tham bun as a search for equivalence rather than as a sign of syncretism. This is followed by case studies of Muslims who have been forced to think Islamic thoughts in languages associated with other religious traditions. Chapter 4 concludes by highlighting that Muslim merit-making rhetoric is replete with Islamic ideation. Chapter 5 is the first of three chapters that describe the ritual repertoire through which Cabetigo’s Muslim residents generate, accumulate and transfer religious merit. Merit-generation and transference through Qur’anic readings and recitations and salat are described. These are the first of three discrete merit-making elements present in what I refer to as merit-making complexes. In Chapter 6, I describe acts of charity (PM. sedekoh) and feasting complexes. Sedekoh is the last of three discrete merit-making elements, and feasting complexes are the first of three meritmaking feasting complexes. The final two merit-making complexes that I describe in Chapter 7 are Ramadan and pilgrimages to Mecca. In all three chapters, I pay particular attention to practices contested by Cabetigo’s reformist constituency, and how merit-makers generate merit not only for themselves but for the deceased. The focus of Chapter 8 shifts from the discrete ritual elements and merit-making complexes to the rationales and motivations for generating merit. In it I consider the role of obligations (to Allah and the deceased). I also recount beliefs concerning the efficacious operation of merit in this world (PM. dunio) and the world of the grave (PM. alam al-barzakh) for both the merit-maker and the deceased. Having suggested that these reveal the presence of a Muslim economy of merit, Thai influences and Islamic credentials are also considered. Chapter 9 concludes this study by delineating how Muslims in Cabetigo respond to Islam’s globally normative ritual repertoire in unique ways. Merit generation, accumulation and transference have amplified importance in Cabetigo. Also Muslims conceive ‘ibadat to be the primary means through which merit is accumulated and transferred to the dead. The adoption of tham bun religious rhetoric increases Islam’s local comprehensibility in this Thai cosmopolis—Islam answers questions ordinary Muslims ask and scratch where people are itching. In light of the importance of language in this study, the following comments on style are required. Language is important to this study by virtue of its content (religious rhetoric) and context (multi-lingual Cabetigo). Readers have already encountered a large number of Arabic, Thai and Malay (in what I refer to as the Pattani Malay dialect) terms. I have already commented that I specify which language these vernacular terms are in with abbreviations. A glossary of all vernacular terms is supplied and it is recommended that readers familiarise themselves with this. The system used to transliterate Thai and Malay terms may be found in Appendix.
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Designating some terms as “Arabic” is complicated for the following reasons. Innumerable references are made to Arabic words such as niat, ikhalah, wajib, sunnat, ‘ibadat, salat and sedekoh that have long been embedded in Cabetigo’s religious lexicon. Not only are some of these pronounced in ways that Arabic speakers might find unrecognisable, but conventions of plural and singular suffixes are rarely followed. This sometimes creates confusion: “Did he mean sunnat (Ar. supererogatory) or sunnah (Ar. the practice of the Prophet)? Transcribing descriptions of religious reward occasionally required forcing vernacular terms to conform to English language conventions. This sometimes leads to unconventional capitalisations and neologisms, particularly turning vernacular terms into plurals. My preference for local pronunciation has led me to refer to Cabetigo (not Cabangtiga), ponok schools (not pondok) and pahalo (not pahala) throughout this study. The modern Thai province of Pattani is distinct from the kerajaan, huamuang or monthon of Patani that preceded it. An aspect of Malay names that confuses non-Malays, and (albeit mildly) annoys some Malays, is the absence of surnames. As such, Malays are cited as Syed Hussein Al-Attas, not Attas, S.H.
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Chapter 2
Indic, Islamic and Thai Influences
Abstract This chapter describes Patani’s Indic, Islamic and Thai pasts. The argument is that the Malay kerajaan of Patani was similar to—rather than distinct from—other port city-states on the peninsula and islands of Southeast Asia where a Sanskrit cosmopolis existed for a millennium before the earliest chapters of Islam’s Southeast Asian expansion. Islam also circulated east and west of Patani through trade between the Middle East and China via the Indian Ocean. This created a range of Indian/Arab/Malay creole communities whose members played key roles in the adoption of, or adhesion to, Islam in Southeast Asian port city-states like Patani. India’s importance to the arrival of Islam to the Thai/Malay peninsula relates to what Islam came to, where Islam initially came from, and who Islam came through. Rather than refer to conversion, I refer to an adhesion to, or adoption of, Islam. The impact of Thai and Islamic influences in Patani/Pattani following its defeat in 1785 is described. The details of the process through which the Malay Kingdom (SM. kerajaan) of Patani became the Thai Province of Pattani, including Bangkok’s legislative and administrative initiatives are also provided. A central concern of this chapter is to highlight the fact that these developments coincided with a period of revolution and reform in the Hijaz. I describe how these developments impacted local religious life and thought through local luminaries such as Shaykh Daud Al-Fatani, Shaykh Ahmad Al-Fatani and Haji Sulong. The methodologies and contributions of present-day reformist revivalist movements are also described.
Introduction This chapter describes the Indic, Thai and Islamic influences in the history of Thailand’s southern Malay provinces. In the first half of this chapter that deals with Indic and Islamic influences prior to 1785, I reveal Indic influences to have preceding Islamic ones by over a millennium. Furthermore, there are Indian connections in where Islam came from, what it came to, and who it came through. I introduce Shelton Pollock’s concept of Sanskrit cosmopolis and recent proposals that permit new insights into Islam’s arrival and adoption. These include the notion that Islam “circulated” between Southern Arabia and China through trading networks. These networks created a range of creole communities whose members were among Islam’s earliest ambassadors. All this brings into focus that Southeast Asia C.M. Joll, Muslim Merit-Making in Thailand’s Far-South, Muslims in Global Societies Series 4, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-2485-3_2, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012
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is connected to—rather than separated from—the Middle East via the Indian Ocean trade. I refer to Malay adhesion to, or pragmatic appropriation of, Islam, rather than “conversion”. An Arabic cosmopolis eventually replaced its Sanskrit predecessor. While the first half of this chapter argues that the process through which Islam was adopted in Patani resembled other port city-states, the second half considers an aspect of Patani’s past experienced by few other Malay kerajaan (SM. sultanates, kingdoms). Thai influences grew following Patani’s initial defeat by the first king of the Chakri Dynasty (Rama I) in 1785. The five decades of wars that followed inaugurated a process through which Patani became irrevocably absorbed into Bangkok’s sphere of influence. Both Bangkok’s principal administrative and legislative initiatives—and the range of Malay responses these provoked—are delineated. Special attention is paid to these developments having coincided with a period of revolution and reform in the Hijaz. The speed with some of these religious developments began to affect the practice of Islam in Patani testifies to the role of Patani’s creole ambassadors. The legacies of local luminaries such as Shaykh Daud AlFatani and Shaykh Ahmad Al-Fatani are considered in the context of the revolutions in transport and communication that were occurring across the Indian Ocean at the time. This chapter concludes with a discussion of twentieth century modernist, reformist and revivalist movements.
Sanskrit Cosmopolis Michael Laffan notes that medieval Arab historical accounts frequently locate Southeast Asian toponyms within general descriptions of India. He attributes this to the presence in the predominantly Buddhist kingdoms of Java, Angkor (Cambodia) and Sriwijaya of the cults of divine kingship and the use of Sanskrit for official proclamations (2006, p. 767). Commenting on debates over the connections between South and Southeast Asia, Daud Ali alleges that colonial historians viewed India as an older and superior civilisation. Following the discovery of cultural interactions between these regions, Southeast Asian civilisations were regarded as derivatives. The collapse of colonial empires, and the rise of Southeast Asia nationalists, meant concepts like “Greater India” and “Hindu colonies” (Sastri, 1949; Winstedt, 1966, 1969) were increasingly viewed as outmoded vestiges of a colonial mindset (Ali, 2009, pp. 10, 12). Having rejected the notion that Southeast Asia had been colonised by Hindu kings, Georges Coedès (1971) proposed a theory of Indianisation. Brahmin advisors, ritual specialists and merchants all played important roles in the transplanting of Indic civilisation in Southeast Asia. Far from being a process of political dominion, Indic culture was rather adopted by Southeast Asian elites. For Ali, such cultural contacts followed “commercial interaction between South India and Southeast Asia, which was in turn connected to wider trade networks in the Indian Ocean”. As such, questions about how far Indian influence dominated Southeast Asia are more important than how this influence was achieved. Coedes’ theory of Indianisation was soon viewed as too Indo-centric, assuming as it did that a transplantation of “superior and dynamic Indian ideas on a
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culturally coherent, but relatively inert, local culture”, had occurred. While outside forces shaped Southeast Asia, these were also absorbed, translated and recontexutalised for their own ends. Rather than making things “Indian”, Indianisation consolidated indigenous concepts and practices which already existed (Ali, 2009, pp. 12, 13). Advances in proto-historic archaeology (see Allen, 1998; Jacq-Hergoualc’h, 2002, 1997; Wheatley, 1961) have provided more detail about Southeast Asian societies prior to Indian contact. Rather than Indianisation bringing something new, it contributed to a process that had already begun. Ali suggests that Sheldon Pollock’s theory of “Sanskrit cosmopolis” (2006) should replace previous conceptions of “autonomous” historiographies.1 Pollock has argued that from 300 CE, Southeast Asia had been transformed by a “trans-culturation” through classical Sanskrit having become “the preferred medium for proclamatory political discourse, and aesthetic representation”. The significance of this process was the function and significance that Sanskrit gained vis-à-vis local culture. What motivated the adoption of Sanskrit by Southeast Asian courts was the imperative of participating in the cosmopolitan Sanskrit culture in which “self-identification, representation, and sovereignty were articulated in a common poetic language” (2009, p. 16). The most dramatic examples of South Thailand’s Indic past are the Hindu relics of the Yarang complex located 15 km from present-day Pattani. This is widely regarded to be the capital of the kingdom of Langkasuka. Lape (2005, p. 832) claims that extensive coastal progradation that occurred from the fifteenth century CE considerably altered the coastline of much of the Malay peninsula. As a result, key sites of this period are found further inland (see also Allen, 1991, 1998) (Map 2.1). While Chinese records are replete with references to Langkasuka’s Hindu and Buddhist influences (Jacq-Hergoualc’h, 2002, pp. 326–328, 1997; Wales, 1974; Welch & McNeill, 1989; Wheatley, 1956), the demise and abandonment of the Yarang complex remains a mystery. Krueset was the centre of the Hindu kingdom of Patani (Teeuw & Wyatt, 1970, p. 3). At the time of Islam’s arrival in Patani, a form of Tantric Shivaism was adhered to. The rajas were identified with Shiva (Bougas, 1994, p. 77).2 Hindu (and later Buddhist) conceptions of the universe were expressed architecturally. Being associated with the heavens, the gables of traditional Patani homes possess a sun pattern (phom).
Circulating Islam and Connected Creoles Numerous scenarios about the personalities and processes through which Islam expanded to Southeast Asia have been proposed. Although few fail to provide some insights, many of these inadequately define or deal with issues of discrete 1 2
For an excellent review of Pollock see Gould (2008). Indeed, in local marriages the bridal couple are depicted as Shiva and his consort Uma.
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Map 2.1 Proposed location of the coastline during the Langkasuka kingdom Source: Jacq-Hergoualc’h (2002: Document 17)
geopolitical entities, population movements, diasporic hybridity and the external influences at the time (Ali, 2009, pp. 10, 14, 17). Recent scholarship on Islam’s Southeast Asian expansion has emphasised connections over comparisons (Feener & Sevea, 2009; Tan Ta Sen, 2009). Inappropriate attention to comparisons has often led to misguided searches for origins and developmental convergences. Furthermore, Islam has not infrequently been misconstrued to only be capable of flowing from the Middle East to receptive markets in Southeast Asia. In this process trading guilds and Sufi orders are sometimes surmised to function like supply chains (Feener, 2009, p. xvi). Through paying attention to the connections that existed between the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia since the fifteenth century, the complex and mediated nature of Islamic transmission and networks is brought into focus.
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Southeast Asian port cities did function as conduits in the supply and demand of new ideas that arrived from the West. Rather than unidirectional transmission, Ali proposes multiple circuits of cultural exchange to have existed (Ali, 2009, p. 14). This is referred to by Torsten Tschacher as “circulating Islam”, or the multidirectional movement of ideas, some of which were transformed by the people who transported them (2009, p. 49). Replacing one-way diffusion with multi-directional circulation permits a more nuanced understanding of Islamic traditions in South and Southeast Asia where “shared customs were transformed and inflected in divergent ways in dispersed geographical settings and fed back into the circulatory regime” (Tschacher, 2009, p. 62). New perspectives on Hamzah Fansuri (d.1590) and Nur al-Din al-Raniri (d. 1656)—both of whom are characters of tremendous importance in the history of Southeast Asian Islam—are provided by this concept of Islam having circulated between the Middle East and China. Hamzah Fansuri was a Persian who hailed from Barus (Fansur) in north-west Sumatra, despite being commonly referred to as one of the greatest Sufi poets in the Malay world. Hamzah Fansuri was one of the first to articulate the monism Islamic theosophy of wahdat al-wujud (Ar. the unity of being) in Malay. He traveled widely—both east and west of Sumatra—which explains his fluency in Persian, Malay and Arabic. His travels took him to Ayutthaya where there was a sizable Persian community who referred to their city as Shahr-i Nav (Pr. City of boats and canals).3 The theosophical doctrines that Hamzah Fansuri established (or perhaps continued) in Sumatra became a major focal point of religious teaching and writing in Aceh. These doctrines were rigorously opposed by Nur al-Din Muhammad bin Ali b. Hasanji al-Hamid al-Shafi`i al-Ashari al-‘Aydarusi al-Raniri, a second important personality who I argue was also produced by this circulating Islam. The scarcity of information about Al-Raniri has forced historians to make deductions from the large number of nisba in his name (Azra, 2004, p. 54). A general consensus now exists that Al-Raniri belonged to a diaspora family of the Hamid clan in Ranir (presentday Rander) in India’s state of Gujarat. Riddell notes that, like Hamzah Fansuri, Al-Raniri traveled both east and west of his Indian place of birth. He traveled to Mecca where he performed the haj in 1620–21, before visiting the Hadhramaut. Al-Raniri’s connections to the east were through his uncle, Muhammad Jilani Hamid, who had visited the Sultanate of Aceh in the 1580s. A number of claims about his contact with the Malay world (SM. Dunai Melayu) have been made. The size of the Malay community in Gujarat permitted him to master Malay before living in Aceh between 1637 and 1644. Syed Naguib Al-Attas also asserts that his mother was Malay (Riddell, 2009, p. 176). Al-Raniri is the first case study in Azyumardi Azra’s study of seventeenth and eighteenth century networks (Ar. silsilah) and chains of transmission (Ar. isnad) that laid the foundations of Islamic 3 Although Marcinkowski rigorously argues that Hamzah Fansuri was born in Ayutthaya (2009, p. 397), Martin van Bruinessen argues that Fansuri travelled to Ayutthaya where, through contact with the sizable Persian community, he experienced his profoundest mystical insights (van Bruinessen 1994, p. 114). For more on Hamzah Fansuri see: Braginsky (1999), Brakel (1969).
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reformism in Southeast Asia (2004). Al-Raniri’s mother was a Malay mother, and his father was a Hadrami whose families had long migrated between South and Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, Azra refers to al-Raniri as neither an Arab nor an Indian ‘alim (Ar. religious scholar), but a Malay-Indonesian (2004, p. 54). Although studies by Syed Naguib Al-Attas (1969) and Nilakanta Sastri (1949) established the importance of Arab and Indian Sufis in Islam’s Southeast Asian expansion, the debates between these Arab and Indian scholars and their respective students were highly ethnocised (Shamsul, 2005, p. 164). Despite being an important personality in the development of Malay Islam, Al-Raniri is only inadequately described as either Arab, Indian or Malay. He was the product of a mobile, multilingual, cosmopolitan communities produced by this circulating Islam that might be referred to as “creole” (see Joll, 2009). My reference to creole (over synonyms like “hybrid” or “cosmopolitan”) is related to my interest in developing Michael Laffan’s reference to “Islam’s ‘creole’ ambassadors”. Laffan describes these as individuals born to parents from either shore of the Indian Ocean, who played prominent roles in both Islam’s initial Southeast Asian expansion and subsequent development (2003, pp. 9, 400).4 The cosmopolitan nature of Southeast Asia port city-states like Patani is well known (Gibson, 2007; Reid, 2008, 2009). Ali claims that from the thirteenth century, “Arab” traders and religious leaders active in Southeast Asia hailed not from the traditional Arab heartlands, but from important ports along the Indian Ocean’s trading circuits such as Ranir. Marco Polo’s description of Sumatra in 1291 includes a number of toponyms that suggest the presence of Sino-Muslim sailors. Marco Polo also mentions many Idrîsî’s (Indian Muslim middle-men), that Ibn Battûta (1304– 77) also observed on the Malabar Coast (Laffan, 2005, p. 49).5 The origins of the first Arab/Indian creole communities on the Southwest coast of India were male Hadrami immigrants who married Indian women. These mixed communities were rejuvenated by new arrivals from the Hadhramaut. This dynamic distinguished them from the “Mappila” communities which shifted inland and are viewed as practising a more syncretistic form of Islam. Increased immigration from the thirteenth century caused this population to swell, leading to local Malabari Muslims and Hadrami immigrants moving further east. This explains the adherence to the Shafi`i madhhab (Ar. school of Islamic jurisprudence) in Southern Arabia, South India and Southeast Asia (Forbes, 1981). Southeast Asian coastal settlements were “intermediary communities” where “creative foreigners” receptive to new influences resided. These mobile polyglots also maintained contacts with the countries their forebears had migrated from (van der Putten, 2009, p. 89). Ronit Ricci has recently developed Pollock’s concepts of cosmopolis. She refers to Tamil and “Malay” Muslims having participated in an “Arabic cosmopolis” in which Tamil and Malay vernaculars became linked to each other and the
4
For more on hybridity see Feener (2004). For a recent discussion of the role of Chinese in Islam’s Southeast Asian expansion see Tan Ta Sen (2009) and Geoffrey Wade (2009, 2010). 5
Circulating Islam and Connected Creoles
31
cosmopolitan Arabic (Ricci, 2010, 2011).6 Encounters with Arabic had a number of dynamic effects on language. Tamil was written in a modified Arabic script (referred to as Arwi), similar to its Malay equivalent Jawi. Many of the Arabic loanwords present in Malay were also borrowed from Tamil or Malayalam. Tshacher even suggests that Malay borrowed more Arabic words from Tamil usage than it borrowed actual Tamil words.7 Such dynamics attest to the “importance of the Arabic cosmopolis in the exchange between both vernaculars and vice versa” (Tschacher, 2009, pp. 55–56).8 Past approaches to Islam in Southeast Asia treated Islam as peripheral to Southeast Asia. However, Laffan, Feener and Azra have shown that Islam in Southeast Asia was connected to the Middle East via the Indian Ocean—to which I add that this connection featured a range of creole personalities. Far from bringing the pristine Islam of the Salaf al-Salih, creole ambassadors introduced a range of “Islams” that had previously been “embedded” in their Arab/Indian/Malay communities (Shamsul, 2005). The selective appropriation and application of a range of Islams resulted in many of the major streams of Islamic thought and practice being present in Southeast Asia, although sometimes in a mediated and modified form. While the ummah “below the winds” (Pr. zirbadat) in the bilad al-jawa (Ar. the lands of the Jawa) resembles its Middle Eastern antecedents, it displays distinguishing local features. As a conduit of circulating Islam, Patani was one of Southeast Asia’s many port city-states which both attracted and produced a range of creole personalities. Many of these became influential ambassadors for Islam there. Like its predecessor Langkasuka, Patani became an important commercial hub on the Thai/Malay peninsula where goods, technologies—and ideas—were exchanged. While Patani possessed large quantities of aromatic wood products (King, 2006), her role in the Indian Ocean trade was primarily linked to its harbour. As well as providing protection from the north-eastern and south-western monsoons, Patani’s harbour was also close to a number of trans-peninsula trading routes that were Patani’s westward link to the outside world (Map 2.2). The importance of these trans-peninsula routes increased once sailing technology permitted Chinese ships to reach the Malay peninsula directly from southern Vietnam. Preferring as they did ports closer to China, Patani became the favoured port by Chinese traders. The absence of reliable winds, and the presence of pirates and Portuguese following the capture of Melacca in 1511, led many to abandon the Straits of Melacca. Goods from Arabia or India crossed the Bay of Bengal by the shortest route via northern Sumatra before reaching the Malay peninsula in present-day Kedah where they were transported overland to warehouses in Patani.
6
For more on Arabic cosmopolis see Gould (2008, pp. 540–543). One of the best known is lebai, a Tamil term (leppai or lappai) referring to petty religious functionaries such as those who perform the azan. 8 For an excellent recent study of the multiple linguistic influences on modern Malay see Tham Seong Chee (1990) and James Sneddon (2003). 7
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2 Indic, Islamic and Thai Influences
Map 2.2 Trans-peninsula trade routes Source: Jacq-Hergoualc’h (2002: Document 17)
Well before the fall of Melacca, creole ambassadors had visited Pattani. By far the most famous of these was Sheik Said of Pasai, who was credited with persuading Raja Phaya Tu Antara to accept Islam. The relationship between Pasai and Pattani is corroborated by the earliest known tombstones in Patani, which bear a trope known as Batu Aceh that originated in north Sumatra and was exported to the Malay peninsula in the late 1400s or early 1500s (Bougas, 1986; Othman Yatim, 1988). From the thirteenth century onwards, port city-states like Pasai played pivotal roles in the spread of Islam throughout Southeast Asia (Bradley, 2006, p. 49). Muslims were strongly represented in the emerging merchant classes of Southeast Asian port cities, contributing to regional prosperity. The Muslim domination of international networks meant that business contracts followed Islamic legal imperatives. Muslim communities naturally prospered, which furthered the incremental process of Islamisation (Johns, 1995, p. 172). Hourani and Stern (1970) argue that Islam provided a framework for the blossoming of intellectual and economic activity which facilitated the emergence of a middle-class. In Islamic cities, the mutual interdependence between “bourgeois”
Initial Adhesion and Adoption
33
ulama nexus, merchants and Islamic educational institutions brought about a new culture in which Islam was the cohesive force. By adopting Islam, merchants increased their mobility. This achieved by highly localised Austronesian being replaced by new strategies for navigate the supernatural world as they travelled further afield (Reid, 1999, p. 158). Finally, trade and the Southeast Asian expansion of Islam were both related to the antagonism between Muslim and European merchants. In such a context the adoption of Islam may have represented a form of resistance (Bradley, 2006, p. 85). The relative peace of the fifteenth century dramatically changed with the fall of Melacca in 1511 that led to the revival of the trans-peninsula trade routes (Reid, 1988, p. 59). It is no coincidence that Patani’s prosperity peaked between 1584 and 1688 (Bougas, 1990, p. 115).
Initial Adhesion and Adoption The timing of the Patani Raja’s acceptance of Islam is debated by scholars. Carool Kersten (2004, p. 2), following Alijah Gordon (2001), argues for 1457. Bradley (2006, p. 69) cites Portuguese explorer Juan de Eredia’s claims that Islam had been accepted in Patani before Melacca (1413). Bougas also argues for an earlier acceptance of Islam, in the late 1300s, or early 1400s. He claims that this position is supported by Patani’s role in propagating the faith in other parts of Southeast Asia (1994, p. 77). Shaykh Abdul Wahid Syarit Sulaiman al-Fatani is reputed to have traveled to Buton in Southeast Sulawesi where he taught locals following their recent adoption to Islam (Pelras, 1985, p. 112, cited in Bougas, 1994, p. 34). Hikayat Patani mentions that wandering sages visited Patani in the second half of the sixteenth century. One of these was Mawlana Malik Ibrahim, who reportedly preached and built an Islamic propagation centre in Kruset before proceeding to East Java where he became one of the Wali Sanga (Azra, 2004, pp. 123, 124). The account of Raja Phaya Tu Antara’s acceptance of Islam supplied by Hikayat Patani begins with his pledge to do so as Shaykh Said of Pasai had successfully cured him of a skin disease. After being miraculously cured, the raja reneged. This happened once more before he made good on his word and recited the confession of faith (Ar. shahadah). Following this, Shaykh Said bestowed upon Raja Phaya Tu Antara the new title of Sultan Ismail Syah Zillulah Fil-’Alam. However, Hikayat Patani mentions that, “As for the King himself it is true that he became a Muslim inasmuch as he gave up worshipping idols and eating pork; but apart from that he did not alter a single one of his heathen habits” (Teeuw & Wyatt, 1970, p. 152). Although the raja pragmatically adopted Islam to keep his promise to Sheik Said, he preserved animist traditions such as worshipping trees and stones and making offerings to spirits (Teeuw & Wyatt, 1970 p. 155). Dorarirajoo cites the adoption of Islam by this raja as a form of negotiation with external forces that maximises personal benefit. She argues that this is an important motif in the history of Patani (2002, pp. 11–12). For example, Patani sought to safeguard her prosperity by maintaining tributary relations with both Ayutthaya and Melacca (Bougas, 1994, p. 77; Suwannathat-Pian, 1988, pp. 6–7;
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Wan Kadir Che Man, 1994, p. 117). Such an initial minimalist adoption of Islam— without a rigorous adherence to all its prescriptions—was common during the initial period of Islam’s Southeast Asian expansion. Nehemia Levtzion (1979) refers to this as an adhesion to Islam.9 In Southeast Asia, such adhesions involved taking a Muslim name, forsaking pork, destroying idols, the circumcision of men, and short male hair (Laffan, 2003, p. 12). David Parkin expresses similar sentiments to Levtzion by pointing out that “conversion” erroneously presupposes a shift from one unambiguously defined religion to another. Alternatives such as “acceptance” or “adhesion” (in the sense of joining something bigger) bring into focus that pre-existing cosmologies are not always immediately abandoned (2000, p. 3). Raja Phaya Tu Antara’s religious legitimacy was not derived from his personal expertise in Islam, but from the palace’s circle of “Brahmin-like” ulama (Shamsul, 2005, p. 164). Compatibility between Indo-Persian models of kingship to those in Southeast Asia assisted the adoption of, and adhesion to, Islam in Southeast Asia. Rajas were transformed into “just kings” (Ar. ‘Malik al-Adil’), a title that appears on mas kijang coins minted in the seventeenth century (Bougas, 1994, p. 32).10 The name given to the raja included the Persian terms Shah (Pr. King) and Zillulah Fil‘Alam (Pr. God’s Shadow on Earth) (Bougas, 1994, p. 30). Islam’s support for the institution of kingship developed from its close early contacts with Persian courts. Space here does not permit a treatment of the many claims and counterclaims concerning the role of Sufism in the Islamisation of Southeast Asia.11 The importance of Sufism at the time relates to its unifying function following the fall of the Baghdad caliphate in mid-seventeenth century. As already demonstrated, Islam’s Southeast Asian expansion began soon afterwards. The monistic treatises of Ibn ‘Arabi (d. 1240 CE) are among the earliest extant manuscripts from north Sumatra (Johns, 1995, p. 169). The Arab/Indian creole ambassadors who arrived from South India introduced a form of Islam which had been embedded in their respective communities. Kirk Endicott has argued that the form of Sufism practised during this period had undergone changes through the incorporation of Hindu, Buddhist and animistic elements (1970, p. 43). The circulating Islam therefore produced a form of Islam which was “well-adapted to the culture of Southeast Asia and played a crucial part in Islam’s rapid spread in the sixteenth century” (Bradley, 2006, p. 109).
9
Cited in Laffan (2003, p. 12). Other Persian influences still discernable in Southeast Asian Islam include the Jawi script closely resembling Persian, and the preparation of ashura, which coincides with Shiite commemorates of the martyrdom of Hussein. The hikayat genre is also of Persian origin, although it has long been integrated into the mainland Muslim culture. Although hikayat resembled epic genres which already existed, these begun to be adapted a century after first appearing in Pasai (Bradley 2006, p. 10). For more on the Persian influence see Marrison (1955). 11 Johns (1961) and Syed Naguib Al-Attas (1969) have most famously argued for the importance of the agency of Sufism, specifically the Qadiriyah and Naqshabandiah orders. Johns regards Sufis accompanying merchant trading guilds as missionary preachers active in proselytism (Johns 1961, pp. 33–35). 10
Patani Post-1785: From Malay Kerajaan to Thai Province
35
Lois Golomb comments that while orthodox Sunnis of the Shafiite madhhab are assumed to have come to the Malay world, few Malays could have been considered orthodox Sunnis until the beginning of the twentieth century. Rather most adhered to a form of Islam which was thoroughly infected with elements of Sufi mysticism that “appealed to the Malay common folk” (1985a, p. 9). Farish Noor refers to the connections between the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia as the first wave of Indianisation. In the thirteenth century this was followed by a second that featured Indian teachers, scholars who “happened to be Muslim”. The effect of this was that a further layer of Indianised culture, values and norms were added to an “already cosmopolitan society that was in many respects open to external cultural influences and hybrid in its composition”. Like their Hindu and Buddhist counterparts, Indian Muslims did more than bring a new religion. They gave Southeast Asian Islam its “distinctively fluid, dynamic, and Sufi-inspired character” (Noor, 2007b, pp. 10, 12).
Patani Post-1785: From Malay Kerajaan to Thai Province In this chapter’s second section the process through which the Malay Kingdom of Patani became the Thai provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat in the modern nation-state of Thailand is described (summarised in Table 2.1; Fig. 2.1). The Malay Kingdom (SM. kerajaan) of Patani had for centuries been a vassal of Ayutthaya. Ligor (modern day Nakhon Si Thammarat) represented Ayutthaya’s interests in the south.12 As a vassal of Ayutthaya, Patani sent bunga mas and manpower (Bougas, 1994, p. 77). Suwannathat-Pian describes this as a diplomatic system that regulated interactions between unequal political units. Under these relatively peaceful conditions Patani retained a great deal of religious, cultural and political freedom (1988, pp. 6–7). Apart from records mentioning Sultana Hijau (1584–1616) sending bunga mas to Ayutthaya, Wan Kadir Che Man claims that there is scant evidence of the strength of Ayutthaya’s authority over Patani. Although Davisakd Puaksom insists that Patani was firmly in Ayutthaya’s grasp (2008), the latter undoubtedly experienced periods of independence. When Patani was strong and/or Ayutthaya was weak, subservience was as unnecessary as it was unreasonable (Wan Kadir Che Man, 1994, p. 117). Patani also engaged in tributary relations with Melacca in the mid-1400s. By doing so, was Patani’s recognising Melacca’s hegemony over the Malay peninsula, or seeking to distance herself from Ayutthaya? Bougas suggests that both were motivations (1994, p. 77). The history of the Malay Sultanate of Patani is divided between the Patani and Kelantan dynasties. The former (1547–1688) consisted of five sultans and four
12 For more on Thai influence on the Thai/Malay peninsula which included present-day Kelantan, Terengganu and Kedah see Suwannathat-Pian (1986, 1988).
36
2 Indic, Islamic and Thai Influences Table 2.1 Administrative organisation of Patani/Pattani from 1500
Period 1500–1816
Administrative organisation 1. The Malay Kingdom of Patani 1.1. Patani Dynasty (1500–1686)
1.2. Kelantan Dynasty (1688–1815)
1816–1906
1906–1932 1932-
2. Huamuang Patani (Th. Boriwen Chet Huamuang) 3. Monthon Pattani 4. The Southern Provinces of Thailand
Details
Sultan Ismail Syah (1500–1530) Sultan Muzaffar Syah (1530–1564) Sultan Mansur Syah (1564–1572) Sultan Patik Siam (1572–1573) Sultan Bahadur Syah (1573–1584) Rajah Hijau (1584–1616) Rajah Biru (161.6–1623) Rajah Ungu (1623–1635) Rajah Kuning (1635–1686) Raja Bakal (1688–1690) Raja (E) Mas Kelantan (1690–1707) Raja (E) Mas Jaya (1707–1710) Raja Dewi (1710–1719) Raja Bendang Badan (1719–1723) Raja Laksamana Dajang (1723–1724) Raja (E) Mas Jayam (1724–1726) Along Yunus (1726–1729) Sultan Muhammad (1776–1786) Tengku Lamiddin (1787–1791) Datok Pangkalan (1791–1810) Nhai Khuang Sai (1810–1815) Patani, Nong Cik, Jering, Jalur, Teluban, Reman, Legeh Patani, Yala, Saiburi, Menara Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, Songkhla
Adapted from Mohammad Zamberi Abdul Malek (1993, pp. 169, 170–171)
sultanas.13 Upon the death of the heirless Sultana Kuning, a member of the Kelantan royal family was installed as the first ruler of the Kelantan Dynasty which lasted until 1729 (Wan Kadir Che Man, 1994, p. 117). Patani’s economic demise began in the late 1680s, as a result of ongoing power struggles between members of the mercantile class, or orang kaya, and the new Kelantanese rulers. Not only did the resultant disruptions to trade lead many merchants to choose alternate ports, Portuguese and Dutch ascendancy in the wider region from the 1640s also altered trading patterns that further eroded Patani’s economy.
13 Those interested in Patani’s rajahs are encouraged to consult a recent study by Stefan Amirell (2011).
Patani Post-1785: From Malay Kerajaan to Thai Province
37
Fig. 2.1 Vandalised road sign with the second “t” in Pattani removed
Patani’s vassal relationship with Ayutthaya ceased with Ayutthaya’s defeat by the Burmese in 1767. In 1785, soon after the inauguration of the Bangkok period, the first ruler of the Chakri dynasty (Rama I) annexed Patani. Patani’s palace, main town (PM. bana, SM. bandar) and port located around the present-day Kruset mosque were all completely destroyed (Map 2.3). A 50-year period followed during which a number of brutal campaigns between Patani and Bangkok were waged.14 After brief spells in Kelantan and Pujut, the raja built a palace and mosques were rebuilt in Cabetigo. From 1791, Patani was administered from Songkhla (PM. segoro), but maintained almost total independence. Not only was Songkhla incapable of exerting any real authority, but its ruler also revolted against Bangkok. In 1816, Bangkok eventually divided Patani into seven provinces (Th. huamuang). In 1906, King Chulalongkorn (Rama V) replaced these seven huamuang with the monthon system that was administered through Nakhon Si Thammarat. During Chulalongkorn’s reign, policies of modernisation, centralisation of power, territorial 14
For more on this period see Bradley (2009a, pp. 114–188, 2009b, 2010).
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Map 2.3 Location of palace in Kruset in relation to modern-day Pattani and Cabetigo Source: Bougas (1990)
consolidation, and the bureaucratisation of administration were pursued throughout Siam. This has been described as Chulalongkorn’s policy of “internal colonialism” (Wan Kadir Che Man, 1990a, p. 7), through which he attempted to avoid being colonised by either Britain or France. On March 10, 1909 Chulalongkorn signed the Anglo-Siamese Treaty which ceded Kelantan, Terengganu, Perlis and parts of Kedah to the United Kingdom. In return, the British recognised Siamese authority over the regions situated further north, and parts of Kedah that are parts of Thai provinces of Satun and Trang (see Marks, 1997; Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud, 1988; Suwannathat-Pian, 1988). The political integration of the Siamese Malay-dominated far-south continued in earnest following the signing of the Anglo-Siamese treaty. Many of Bangkok’s initiatives were resisted. Not only did a distinct Malay-Muslim ethno-religious identity and geographic contiguity with the northern Malay states exist, but Thai nationalism also clashed with nascent Malay nationalism across this new border (Pitsuwan, 1985; Roff, 1967). For instance Chulalongkorn’s successor, King Vajiravudh (Rama VI) (1910–1925), formulated a nationalist ideology based on allegiance to the Thai nation, king and Buddhism (Vella, 1978). Although Islamic legal autonomy in matters concerning marriage and inheritance for Muslims in the deep south was established by royal decree in 1911, the most significant initiative during this period was the Compulsory Primary Education Act of 1921. Although unsuccessfully implemented, this required children throughout the kingdom to attend a Siamese primary school for 4 years (Wan Kadir Che Man, 1994, p. 119).
Patani Post-1785: From Malay Kerajaan to Thai Province
39
In 1929, Bangkok ordered that Islamic family and inheritance laws must be translated and codified into Thai. Despite their insistence that this was motivated by the need for unity, this was interpreted as a veiled attempt to replace Malay as the language of Islam. Should Bangkok be successful, many of its other initiatives would be accelerated. Although Bangkok proposed that Islamic judges (PM. tok kodi, Th. dato’ yutitham) who had mastered Thai would sit alongside and co-sign judgements with their Thai counterparts, this never eventuated. Surin Pitsuwan argues that Malay non-cooperation in this mammoth undertaking was primarily motivated by suspicions that through it, Siamese authorities sought to usurp their religious authority, intrude on the sacred ground of the shariah, and establish Thai as the language of Islam (1985, p. 136).15 In 1932, the Thai absolute monarchy was abolished and replaced with a constitutional monarchy. Also abolished in 1932 was the monthon system. Pattani became a province of the Kingdom of Siam. Less vigorous assimilation policies followed until the military takeover by extreme nationalist General Phibul Songkhram in 1938 (Suwannathat-Pian, 1995, 1996). Phibul’s governments (1938–1944 and 1948–1957) promulgated a range of ultra-nationalist initiatives, the effects of which lasted for decades (Kersten, 2004, p. 11). The name of the country was changed to Thailand. This was in large part motivated by a desire to distinguish the Thai race from other ethnic minorities.16 In 1939, the government not only attempted to enforce the Compulsory Primary Education Act, but also promulgated the notorious Thai Custom Decree (Thai Rathaniyom) that attempted to impose Thai and “modern” behaviours and dress. Designations other than “Thai” were banned as part of Bangkok’s attempts to homogenise Thai society through allegiance to the Thai nation, king and Buddhism. Henceforth, Malays were referred to as “Thai Muslims”. There was also renewed promotion of the Thai language, and “modern” and “Thai” behaviours and etiquette. Malays were forbidden to wear traditional clothing, and provisions permitting issues pertaining to marriage and inheritance to be heard in Islamic courts were revoked. Non-Buddhists were discriminated against and there were attempts to proselytise Malays attending government schools. All these amounted to a thoroughgoing intrusion into the private and public lives of the Malays of South Thailand.
15 The Chief Judge of Satun, Luang Prapai Pitayakun, a member of the committee to codify and translate the law, wrote a report to the Ministry of Justice, an extract of which is found below: “When the dato’ yutitham received the instructions from the Chief Judge of the Southern Region [. . .] they explained that they could not possibly finish their assignments in such a short period (5 months). The reason was that the rules applied in the marriage and inheritance cases usually were not taken directly from the Holy Koran. They were rather taken from a collection of the exegeses of the Holy Koran which were called kitab. And there were dozens of authors who wrote scores of kitab with various names and length. Some kitab gave only the principles and others gave details. Some kitab might contain different rules from others” (Pitsuwan, 1985, p. 136). 16 As a result of massive immigration, Chinese were now Thailand’s largest minority, who General Phibul Songkhram infamously compared to the Jews in Germany.
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Assimilation Through Legislation Post-1945 Following World War II, the new constitution of the government led by Pridi Phanomyong repelled aggressive cultural assimilation policies and the Thai Custom Decree. However, the integration of the south continued in 1945 in the form of the Patronage of Islam Act. This established the King of Thailand as the patron of Islam in Thailand, and mandated the creation of a Central Islamic Committee of Thailand headed by the Chularajamontri (or Shaykh al-Islam) under the Ministry of Interior. Based on how successfully Bangkok had managed to control Buddhism through the Sangkharat (Tambiah, 1976), Pitsuwan argues that control—not patronage—was the main objective (1985, p. 103). Southern Malays have historically rejected the legitimacy of the past Chularajamontris. In part, this is due to a preference for local ulama, such as Shaykh Muhammad Sulong bin Abdul Kadir bin Muhammad al-Fatani (Haji Sulong) (1895–1954). Yusuf refers to Haji Sulong as being de facto Shaykh al-lslam during his tenure as head of the Islamic Council of Pattani Province (SM. Majlis Agama Islam) (1998, quoting Pitsuwan, 1985, p. 1145).17 The importance of Pattani’s Malay ulama relates to the marginalisation and eventual removal of the Malay royalty. The son of the last Sultan of Pattani, Abdul Kadir Kamaruddeen (1877–1933), Tengku Mahmud Mahyiddeen (1908–1954), unsuccessfully campaigned with the British during World War II for Pattani’s inclusion into British Malaya (Wilson, 1989, 1992) at the conclusion of the war. While Patani had once derived prosperity, power and pride from its palace, market and mosque, now only the mosque remained. On August 24, 1947 Haji Sulong led his most famous protests against Bangkok’s intervention in Islamic affairs in the form of seven demands.18 Soon afterwards, Muslim leaders in Satun and Narathiwat provinces sent similar petitions. In November 1947, a coup engineered by Phibul Songkhram placed Khuang Aphaivong in the position of Premier. In January 1948, Haji Sulong was arrested, followed soon after by the arrest of his sons. This led to demonstrations, resulting in the temporary banning of the Provincial Islamic Council of Pattani. In April 1948, Field Marshall Phibul Songkhram again became Prime Minister (until 1957). Soon afterwards, the Duson Nyor incident occurred in which at least 400 Malays were
17
Those interested in the history of the Chularajamontri should consult Marcinkowski (2003) and Yusuf (1998, 2010). 18 The demands were: (1) A single individual from the four southern provinces be made responsible for their administration; (2) 80% of government servants in the four southern provinces be Muslims; (3) both Malay and Thai should be the official languages; (4) Malay should be the medium of instruction in primary schools; (5) Muslim law should be both recognised and enforced in separate courts, and that an Islamic judge should also sit as an assessor in civil courts; (6) revenues derived from the four southern provinces should be utilised by them; (7) the formation of all Muslim affairs should be under the authority of the head of the four southern provinces (Farouk Bajunid, 1987, p. 263). For more on Haji Sulong’s seven demands see (Aphornsuvan, 2008).
Assimilation Through Legislation Post-1945
41
killed, and thousands of others fled to Malaysia.19 In 1952, after 4 years in detention, Haji Sulong was released. He disappeared in 1954 at the hands of the police. His body was never found. Legislation promulgated between 1960 and 1971 forced traditional ponok (SM. pondok) schools to register as “Private Schools Teaching Islam” (PSTI) (Th. rongrian soon satsana Islam). These schools taught both the Thai national curriculum and religious subjects.20 The severity of the Malay response to this initiative testifies to the fact that ponok schools were already more than conduits of religious education: they maintained local Malay identity and performed a wide range of social and religious functions (Madmarn, 1989, 1990, 2003; Narongraksakhet, 2005). In the 1960s, the number of southern Malays who pursued Islamic education in the Middle East and South Asia dramatically increased. This ironically resulted in the state having even less control over Islamic education. This exodus coincided with a range of global developments that have often unhelpfully been bundled together as “Islamic resurgence”. The most important of these were the Iranian Islamic revolution and Saudi acquisition of economic power with which Saudi Arabia sought to counter resurgent Shi’ism. In the 1970s, the Thai government built mosques in Satun, Yala and Narathiwat. Not only are Thai flags prominently placed in these, but their minarets resemble lotus flowers which is a Buddhist symbol of the heart (Pitsuwan, 1988). There were also renewed attempts to de-ethicise Malay adherence of Islam in the far-south by referring to Malays as Thais who professed Islam, or “Thai Muslims”. Armed separatism was at its height in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat in the decades before General Prem Tinsulanonda (1980–88) came to power. The Prem governments of the 1980s ceased assimilation policies, and supported Muslim cultural rights and religious freedoms. Amnesties with a range of separatist organisations were negotiated, and an economic development plan for the south implemented. The National Security Policy for the Southern Border Provinces was also established, which proved to be instrumental in dramatic improvements in border security.21 While every Thai parliament since 1932 had included Muslim representation, this representation increased in the 1990s (Farouk Bajunid, 2005, p. 13). Wan Muhammad Nor Mata, a member of parliament from Yala, was the president of the Thai National Assembly from 1996 to 2001 and signed the 1997 Thai Constitution. Duncan McCargo has argued that the political careers of southern Malays such as Wan Muhammad Nor Mata, Muk Sulaiman and Haji Sulong’s son Den Tohmeena are paradigmatic examples of Thai co-option of local Malay elites. This eventually led to a crisis over their political legitimacy following the rise of violence in 2004 in which they were conspicuously absent (2008, pp. 55–87). From the late 1980s, 19
On Duson Nyor see Chaiwat Satha-Anand’s treatment (2006). The most important studies of Islamic education in South Thailand include those by Dulyakasem (1981, 1991), Liow (2005, 2009a, 2009b), Madmarn (1990), Narongraksakhet (2005), Scupin (1989). 21 These developments were intimately connected with the negotiated ending to the Malaysian emergency and surrender of the Malaysian and Thai communist parties. 20
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many concessions were made to Muslims throughout the kingdom: Muslim names could be officially registered; the hijab could be worn in government institutions and public service (Satha-Anand, 1994); Muslim prayer rooms were provided in strategic public places, including the parliament building (Farouk Bajunid, 2005, p. 12); the Haj was sponsored by the government; and permission was given for Islamic banking to be established. Without sacrificing either their commitment to Islam or their Muslim identity, Muslims in Thailand have identified with various expressions of Thai nationalism. A range of Muslim institutions also exist in Thailand. All these are conducted in Thai linguistic and cultural forms through which a Thai Muslim identity has been constructed and maintained. Over and above the office of the Chularajamontri, these include Muslim societies and associations (Prapertchob, 2001; Satha-Anand, 2001), newspapers, radio, TV programs, and websites. Islamic literature in Thai is plentiful, and a number of Thai translations of the Qur’an and hadith also exist.22 The owner of one of Pattani’s Islamic presses informed me that over 70% of the religious literature currently produced is in Thai. Not only does this dramatically demonstrate that Thai has become a second language of Islam for many Malays, but this also contrasts past refusals by Malay ulama to translate Islamic law into Thai. All these changes testify to Islam in Thailand having acquired its own Thai characteristics (see Scupin, 1986, 1988, 1998, 2003). Indeed, some claim Muslims in Thailand enjoy greater religious freedom than in other countries. Although Omar Farouk has claimed that the integration of Thailand’s southern Malays has been achieved without connections been lost with the Malay world (2005, p. 2), as is demonstrated in the following chapter increasing numbers of urban Malays prefer communicating in Thai.
Revolution and Reform in the Hijaz The financial ruin and moral decay that afflicted Patani in the late seventeenth century (Bradley, 2009a) was followed by Patani’s catastrophic defeat in 1785. The late eighteenth century was also a time of religious revolution and reform in the Middle East. As is well known, in the late 1700s Muhammad Ibn Saud (d. 1765) and a Hanbalite scholar inspired by Ibn Taymiyya, Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1787), formed an alliance that is commonly referred to as the Wahhabiyyah movement.23 After a series of victories in the early nineteenth century,
22 Scupin summarises the four extant Thai translations of the Qur’an having been completed by: (1) Direk Kulsiriswasd; (2) Tuan Suannarsard (a former Chularajamontri) patronised and financed by the Thai royal family; (3) Marwan Sama Oon and Barlcat Siamwalla; (4) the Committee of the former Thai students of the Islamic seminaries in the Arab world (Scupin, 1998, p. 252). 23 The most fundamental inadequacies of references to “Wahhabis” is its imprecise employment by most journalists and some academics to describe a range of groups adhering to an austere and puritanical version of Islam.
Revolution and Reform in the Hijaz
43
including occupations of Mecca (1803) and Medina (1805), Wahhabiyyah forces were defeated in 1818 by an Egyptian viceroy sent by the Ottoman Caliph. The speed with which these developments impacted Southeast Asia is illustrated by the Padri wars in West Sumatra. This conflict derives its name from references by Dutch authorities that the protagonists were returning hajis that they referred to as Islamic “padres”. Having witnessed the occupations of Mecca and Medina, attempts were made to assert a puritanical expression of “scripturalist piety over the prevailing social order” in Southeast Asia (Laffan, 2003, p. 399). At the height of colonial power in the Middle East and South Asia in the early twentieth century, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–1898) and Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) birthed Islamic modernism. A protégé of Muhammad Abduh, Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865–1935) became a key figure in the nascent Salafiyyah movement. Although initially concerned with modernisation, religious reform soon became another of Rida’s key concerns. While the Wahhabiyyah—who refer to themselves as Unitarians (Ar. muwahhidun)—have historically been revivalist Hanbalites of the Arabian peninsula, the Salafiyyah drew from all four madhhab (Ar. schools of Islamic jurisprudence). By virtue of its lack of formal organisation, the Salafiyyah might best be referred to as a movement or theological method. Indeed reference to “organisation” is avoided, implying as it does that Islam is deficient in some way. The principal elements of the Salafiyyah method (Ar. manhaj) are the authoritative example of the seventh century salaf al-salih, ijtihad (Ar. independent interpretation) over taqlid (Ar. blind imitation), the eradication of bid’ah (Ar. illegitimate religious innovation), and mentoring (Ar. mulazamah) by Middle Eastern leaders.24 The Egyptian modernist journal al-Manar (The Lighthouse), edited by Rida from 1898, inspired Jawi publications such as al-Imam (The Leader) that was published in Singapore between 1906 and 1908.25 That one of al-Imam goals was the dissemination of al-Manar’s reformist agenda in the Malay world is demonstrated by the fact that many of its articles (sometimes elaborate) were Malay translations of articles from al-Manar. With a circulation that peaked at 5,000, al-Imam was the most widely read journal in the Malay world before World War II. Following its demise in 1908, a number of other modernist publications were produced, such as the alMunir (The Illuminating) which was published in Padang, West Sumatra for 5 years from 1911. The 1920s were a tumultuous decade in the Muslim world which witnessed, among other things, the demise of the Ottoman caliphate and return of the Wahhabiyyah who conquered Mecca and Medina in 1924. Both these developments impacted the entire Islamic world. Javanese traditionalists were deeply disturbed by Wahhabiyyah’s actions. Not only were there many Javanese fatalities in Mecca and
24 Although comparisons have been made between the Salafiyyah Protestantisms, these have recently been criticised by Salafism and Protestantism Syed Farid Al-Attas (2007, p. 515). 25 For more on al-Iman see Abu Bakar Hamzah (1991) and Azra (1999).
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Medina, but the tombs of saints were also destroyed which were the centre of pilgrimages (Ar. ziarah). While reformists hailed the eradication of such bid’ah (Ar. illegitimate innovation), the events led to the exodus of large numbers of Southeast Asian traditionalists. In January 1926, 12 Javanese ‘ulama formed Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) (Id. the awakening of the ulama). NU’s initial goal was the support of refugees and the commissioning of a Javanese delegation to Mecca to express their concerns. NU was established 14 years after Muhammadiyah was established by Kiai Haji Ahmad Dahlan in 1912. The Muhammadiyah sought to propagate Muhammad Abduh’s modernist agenda among Muslims living under colonial rule in the Dutch East Indies. Starting from the Straits Settlements in the late 1800s, modernists and reformists on the Malay peninsula were referred to as the kaum muda (SM. the new group) who opposed the practices of the traditionalist constituency (SM. kaum tua).26 Finally in the 1920s, the Salafiyyah and Wahhabiyyah were joined under the leadership of Rashid Rida. Mark Sedgwick refers to this as Neo-Salafism (2005, p. 232).27 Through what processes and personalities did these developments impact Islamic thought and practice in Patani/Pattani? Summarised below are the contributions of three of the best known mobile Malay polyglots: Shaykh Daud b. Abdullah b. Idris al-Fatani (Shaykh Daud al-Fatani) (1740–1847), Shaykh Wan Ahmad b. Muhammad Zain Mustafa al-Fatani (Shaykh Ahmad al-Fatani) (1856–1908), and Haji Sulong (1895–1954), whose political activism was mentioned above. Although Patani had long been connected to the Middle East through its participation in the Indian Ocean trade, this connection increased in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The replacement of sail boasts with steamers, and scribes with printing presses, revolutionalised transport and communication between Southeast Asia and the Hijaz.
Mecca’s Patani School Shaykh Daud b. Abdullah b. Idris al-Fatani (Shaykh Daud) was born in Kruset in 1769 and died in Ta’if in the Hijaz in 1847.28 Shaykh Daud fled Patani and travelled to Aceh where he studied for 2 years, before eventually arriving in the Hijaz. There he joined other seekers of knowledge and refugees from Patani, all of whom were his seniors. Although his earliest work was not published until 1809, he eventually penned more than 57 works. These covered many Islamic disciplines and
26
On the kaum muda and kaum tua on the Malay peninsula see Roff (1985, 1998). Sedgwick describes the neo-Salafism that developed from the late 1920s was a mixture of the Salafism encountered in Egypt and Damascus with the Wahhabism of the Hijaz (2005, p. 232). 28 Those interested in more details on Shaykh Daud should refer to Bradley (2010, pp. 189–271), Lukmanul Hakim Darusman (2010, pp. 335–405), and the (somewhat hagiographic) biographies written by his grandson, Wan Mohammad Saghir Abdullah (1990, 1992). 27
Mecca’s Patani School
45
were printed in many parts of the Middle East and the Malay-Indonesian world (Azra, 2004, pp. 124, 126; Matheson & Hooker, 1988). He was also instrumental in establishing what Bradley refers to as “The Patani School” (2010). Shaykh Daud’s teachings are acknowledged as having been sustained and extended by his relative Shaykh Wan Ahmad bin Muhammad Zain Mustafa alFatani (Shaykh Ahmad). Sheykh Ahmad was born in 1856 in Kampung Sena Janjar, Patani and died in Mina in 1908.29 Connections between these two ulama besar of the Patani School began when Shaykh Ahmad’s father resettled in Mecca to work as Shaykh Daud al-Fatani’s copyist (Rahimmula, 1990, pp. 194, 258, 313). Rahimmula argues that as Sheykh Ahmad was born a generation after Patani’s final subjugation in 1838, he sought to preserve Patani’s Malay identity, language and culture, initially by reprinting the works of Shaykh Daud (1990, p. 191). For those possessing the financial means to do so, emigration (Ar. hijrah) to a Dar al-Islam (Ar. abode of Islam) was a religious obligation for a number of reasons, including the avoidance of religious persecution. (Ar. wajib) (see Liow, 2009a, p. 118). This explains the timing of the exodus of Shaykh Daud’s and Shaykh Ahmad’s families from Patani, which had become a Dar-al-Harb (Ar. abode of war). Shaykh Daud and Shaykh Ahmad travelled across the Indian Ocean well before the introduction of steamers and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. By the 1890s, smaller sailing vessels no longer took pilgrimages across the Indian Ocean (Laffan, 2003, p. 49). Steamers reduced a once arduous trip to 2 weeks. Steamers and Malay printing presses were crucial to Sheykh Ahmad’s career having the impact that he did. Upon completing his studies at Al-Azhar, Shaykh Ahmad lived with his family in Mecca. He would eventually become one of the leading scholars at Masjid al-Haram (Rahimmula, 1990, p. 309). On countless occasions Islamic scholars in Pattani have drawn my attention to Snouck Hurgronje having referred to Shaykh Ahmad as a “savant of merit” (1970, p. 286). Although less well known than Shaykh Daud, Malays in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat became aware of a range of religious developments in the Middle East through Shaykh Ahmad’s editorial, publishing, writing and teaching careers. In 1859, Shaykh Ahmad worked as a proofreader at a Malay printing press established by the Ottomans near the al-Azhar Mosque. By 1884, he was appointed chief editor of the newly established Malay section of the Ottoman Press (Rahimmula, 1990, p. 321). He also established the Patani ‘Ulama Association, which published Malay religious works. Shaykh Ahmad was a prolific author who wrote up to 160 original and annotated works in both Jawi and Arabic—the first Patani scholar to have done so (Rahimmula, 1990, p. 314). Edwin Wieringa comments that Shaykh Ahmad’s language in his Nur al-Mubin is “deeply imbued with Arabic”, a general characteristic of Kitab Jawi through which Arabic ideation entered the Malay lexicon (2009, p. 191).
29
The two most important studies on Shaykh Ahmad Al-Fatani are Ismail bin Yasmid (2008) and Rahimmula (1990).
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One of Shaykh Ahmad’s most important works is Kitab al-Fatawa alFataniyyah. This is a 220 page collection of judgments (Ar. fatwa) on a range of religious questions posed to him by Southeast Asian Muslims.30 Rahimmula claims that Sheykh Ahmad was the first in Mecca’s Patani School to establish a didactic genre based on answers written to questions received from the Malay peninsula. He also notes that many of the issues that these addressed were those that Siamese authorities had begun to interfere with at the time. Matheson and Hooker mention references in Kitab Al-Fatawa Al-Fataniyyah to the abolishment of the shariah (1988, p. 55). While Bangkok’s imposition of Thai secular law in the far-south did not include cases pertaining to family and inheritance laws cases, Wan Kadir Che Man points out that in these cases the decision of a Muslim judge was not final until it was agreed upon by the sitting Thai judge. While parties had the right to appeal to the Thai Superior Court, its judge was not a Muslim (1990b, p. 256). The development of such exchanges coincided with the distribution of al-Manar and Al-Imam in Southeast Asia. None of these would have occurred without the aforementioned developments in transport and communication across the Indian Ocean. Shaykh Ahmad was also a leading scholar in Mecca, who taught at Masjid alHaram. He was one of the few non-Arab ‘alim to have been appointed by the Sharif of Mecca to represent the Shafi’ite madhhab. One of Shaykh Ahmad’s most influential students, who studied under him for 17 years, was a Malay from Kelantan, Haji Muhammad Yusuf, who was best known as Tok Kenali (1868–1933). On returning to Kelantan in 1908, Tok Kenali became a prominent scholar. As well as a founding member of the Kelantan Religious Council, he also edited its fortnightly journal (Mohammad Redzuan Othman. 1998, p. 151).31 Rahimmula discerned the influence of Muhammad Abduh’s modernist ideas on Shaykh Ahmad’s pedagogy. For instance, he encouraged his students to keep informed about local politics and events by reading newspapers (1990, pp. 259, 344).
Resident Modernisers, Reformers and Revivalists Shaykh Ahmad died in 1908, a year after Haji Sulong arrived in Mecca.32 Unlike Shaykh Daud and Shaykh Ahmad, his most significant contribution to religion and politics in Pattani followed his relocation there in 1927. Haji Sulong’s ability to make a brief visit to Pattani during World War I testifies to the increased ease with which Southeast Asians (possessing the financial means to do so) travelled to and from Mecca. 30 This was the subject of Perayot Rahimmula’s Ph.D. thesis (1990), which is available as a large English translation. Although last printed in 1957, photocopied copies of these are still available in Islamic book shops in Pattani. 31 Those interested in reading more about Tok Kenali should refer to Abdullah al-Qari bin Haji Salleh (1974). 32 Confusingly, Joseph Liow claims that Haji Sulong studied under Shaykh Ahmad following his brief return to Patani in 1916, even though he notes that Shaykh Ahmad died in 1908 (2010, p. 36).
Resident Modernisers, Reformers and Revivalists
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Haji Sulong began teaching in the al-Haram Mosque at the time of the religious and political ferment described above. He was appointed as a junior lecturer in the Malay halaqah of Mecca’s Masjid Al-Haram. Haji Sulong joined the ranks of distinguished ‘alim at a time when some Southeast Asian scholars were leaving Mecca (Fox, 2004; Laffan, 2003, p. 223). James Ockey insists that anyone teaching in Mecca over this period would have been affected should their teachings not conform to the new dogma (2006). Nevertheless, it is unclear about when Wahhabiyyah dogma began to be enforced.33 By the time Haji Sulong returned to Pattani, he had not only witnessed the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, a world war, and the rise of nationalism, but what Ockey describes as the “strongest and most diverse revivalist movement to date” (2006). These appear to be allusions to the puritan, modernist and reformist movements of the Wahhabiyyah, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida. Soon after his return to Pattani, Haji Sulong encountered a religious life which resembled the jahiliyya (Ar. time of ignorance) of pre-Islamic Arabia (Liow 2009a, p. 83). As a travelling preacher (Ar. Tabligh), he travelled throughout the far-south propagating Muhammad Abduh’s project of modernisation and reform. Key elements in his agenda were the modernisation of Islamic education, the reform of religious practice, and the implementation of modern political and legal systems (Yusuf, 1998, p. 286). Despite opposition from the kaum tua, Haji Sulong combined his concern for religious reform and modernisation by establishing Madrasah Al-Ma’arif Al-Wattaniah in 1933. This was the first modern Islamic school in Pattani following an alternative to the well-established traditional pondok model that Pattani was famous for. Haji Sulong strongly advocated ‘alim to possess a mandate for an involvement in more than purely religious matters. They also possessed a mandate to become involved in wider political leadership, as I have outlined above.34 His “abiding interest in political and social activism” preoccupied Haji Sulong for the rest of his life, and “catapulted him to a position of prominence as a leader of southern Thailand’s Malay community” (Liow, 2009a, p. 83). Shaykh Daud, Shaykh Ahmad and Haji Sulong were all mobile, multi-lingual personalities. All played some role in mediating the religious developments of their day. These dynamics are also discernable in present-day transnational revivalist and reformist movements that are now considered. The South Asian Tablighi Jama’at is widely regarded as the largest Muslim missionary and revivalist movement in the world today.35 Farish Noor’s 33
I wish to thank Muhammad Arafat bin Muhammad for drawing my attention to this. Note that these views resemble those of Nik Abdul Aziz bin Haji Nik Mat, the spiritual adviser (SM. Mursyidul Am) of PAS (SM. Parti Islam Se-Malaysia), better known as Nik Aziz. Farish Noor argues that his time at the famous Darul Uloom Madrasah in Deoband, North India convinced him that ‘ulama were the primary vehicles for addressing society s ills and that Islam had to be purified from accretions and innovations (2003, p. 207). 35 Horstmann (2007a, 2007b), Liow (2009c), and Noor (2007b, 2009b, 2009c) have provided the most important treatments of the Tablighi Juma’at in Thailand. 34
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reconstruction of arrival and establishment of the Tablighi Jama’at in Kelantan and South Thailand (2007a, 2009a, 2009b) highlights the role of mobile creole individuals and communities. The presence of South Asian peranakan (SM, mixed race) communities in major Southeast Asian trading cities was pivotal in the Tablighi’s modes of dissemination and network-building that began in the 1950s. These South Asian diasporic networks permitted this first wave of Tablighi missionaries to remain on familiar territory. In addition, they were also able to tap into “primordial ethnic and cultural attachments” that these communities still possessed. Noor considers such “piggy-backing” to have greatly assisted the speed of the Tablighi Jama’at’s entry into the peninsula and islands of Southeast Asia. Read in the context of Islam’s initial acceptance in Patani summarised above, this represents a recent example of a well-established pattern. In the overwhelmingly Malay locales of Kelantan and South Thailand, the liminal status of South Asians in Southeast Asia helped bridge the gap between global and local Islams (Noor 2007a, p. 9). The most important personality in this process was a medical doctor from Kelantan, Dr Haydar Ali Tajuddin bin Fateh Muhammad. Dr Haydar’s family had originally settled in north-east Malaya as cloth merchants during British colonial rule. His father’s business network extended to southern Thailand, where he had contributed to the construction of Pakistan mosques in Sungai Golok and Pattani. In 1974, Dr Haydar and his brothers introduced the Tablighi Jama’at into Kelantan. Soon after this, Masjid Lundang became their first markaz (Ur. centre). Three years later an operational base was set up in Masjid Muhammadiyah in the border town of Sungai Golok in the Thai province of Narathiwat. Upon reaching Yala, it was discovered that members of the Pakistani community at the Pakistan mosque (all of whom were nationalised Thai citizens) had already established the Tabligh there.36 The Pakistan mosque continued to serve as the Tablighi’s base until the construction of the 1.5 acre Masjid al-Nur. Commonly referred to simply as markaz besar, this is the largest Tablighi Markaz in Southeast Asia—and the fourth largest in the world (Noor, 2009c, pp. 9, 11). During the often violent late 1970s and early 1980s, the Tabligh Jama’at established itself in bases throughout South Thailand. Their 36 The Tabligh Juma’at was established in Bangkok in the 1920s through Pakistani immigrants, who in the 1950s also established Jam’ I-yatul-Islam, modelled on the subcontinent’s Jama’ati Islam (Scupin 1998, pp. 245–246). South Asians began to arrive in Thailand following the Bowring Treaty (1855) which granted extraterritorial privileges to British subjects in Thailand. The Anglo-Siamese treaty (1909) permitted British subjects to trade freely in Thailand. During Siam’s period of rapid modernisation, South Asians worked in jobs that indigenous Thais were untrained to do. Owing to their ability at reading English, Arabic, Hindi and Urdu, such jobs included working in Siam’s new postal service (Scupin 1998, pp. 244–245). South Asians in Thailand are also closely associated with the cattle and textile trades (See Sathian, 2004). Similarities in the conditions which facilitated Islamic reformism in Thailand to other parts of the Muslim world are noted by Scupin, who points to Bangkok’s urbanisation providing “the social conditions for the Islamic reform movement in Thailand” that attracted a “young, educated, urban-based social clientele”. Scupin also notes that “steady improvements in communications, especially printing, brought Thai Muslims into closer touch with centers of Islamic reformism in the Middle East, South Asia, and other Islamic areas of South-East Asia” (Scupin, 1998, p. 252).
Resident Modernisers, Reformers and Revivalists
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position was sufficiently consolidated by the time improvements in the security situation in the mid-1980s permitted them to further expand. Joseph Liow describes the Tabligh in South Thailand as mobile, decentralised, and transnational. He also claims that their network there includes 800 mosques and 127 halaqah (Ar. study circles). There are also 21 mosques which organise khuruj (Ur. mission trips) through shura councils which vet candidates. These khuruj range from 3 days to 4 months, and go to places ranging from nearby districts to overseas countries. Liow also claims that the Tablighi regularly travel to most (if not all) villages in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat (2009c, pp. 196, 198). The Tablighi Jama’at’s emphasis on sustained face-to-face oral contact with Muslims communities in South Thailand is not the only reason for its success. As well as being avowedly apolitical, they also avoid religious controversies, something that distinguishes them from local Salafism. Finally, the Tablighi Jama’at have been able to recruit from a massive pool of unemployed or under-employed young people as their involvement significantly bolsters their cultural capital.37 In what ways is the modern Salafiyyah movement in South Thailand similar to, and distinct from, the Tablighi Jama’at? While the Tablighi Jama’at is most active among Muslim minorities, the modern Salafiyyah movement is most active in Muslim-majority contexts. Although Haji Sulong (widely acknowledged as the Salafiyyah movement’s best-known and earliest advocate) initially worked as a Tabligh, or travelling preacher, he did so before the adoption by the modern Salafiyyah movement of a more top-down and capital intensive modus operandi.38 In contrast to the Tablighi Jama’at’s emphasis on face-to-face contact and grassroots activism, local Salafiyyah pursued a policy of co-opting existing educational institutions and establishing new ones. A number of PSTI in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat are firmly Salafiyyah in orientation, as is the PSU’s College of Islamic Studies. A paradigmatic example is the establishment of new institutions is Yala Islamic University, which is Thailand’s first Islamic University.39 Salafiyyah influence has also grown through a range of charities that promote Islamic knowledge, and advocate the elimination of local practices viewed as either shirk (Ar. idolatry) or bid’ah (Ar. illegitimate innovation). The principal articulator and unofficial head of Salafiyyah reformism in South Thailand is the founding rector of Yala Islamic University, Saudi-educated Dr.
37
Alexander Horstmann, in his study of the Tabligh Jama’at in Nakhon Si Thammarat, regards the Tabligh Jama’at as central to the reformist project of eradicating practices of Hindu origin, through pressuring villagers to drop traditions, discontinue rituals and dismiss folk-culture (2005, p. 111). This many be the case in Nakhon Si Thammarat, but this is not the nature of the Tabligh Juma’at’s activities in Cabetigo. 38 Other early Salafiyyah advocates include Jahi Abdullah Benaekebong and Ustaz Abdullah Chinarong, the first known locally as Abdullah India owing to his religious training in Deoband, India (Liow, 2009c, p. 201). 39 The establishment of the Yala Islamic University was sponsored by the Saudi-based Islamic Development Bank, the Saudi Ministry of Religious Affairs, the King of Qatar, the King of Kuwait, as well as private donors from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.
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Ismail Lutfi Japakiya.40 Although Lutfi’s influence is enhanced by his natural charisma, fluency in Arabic and Saudi education, he also benefits from what might be referred to as his babo pedigree. His family owns Bamrong Islam Witthaya School situated in the village of Brao, 15 km south of Pattani. Under the leadership of his father, Babo Abdurrahman Japakiya, Bamrong Islam was a traditionalist PSTI. It is now the principal conduit of Saudi-style reformism in South Thailand. The importance of Brao is demonstrated when Cabetigo residents routinely refer to “Wahhabis” as ore brao. Unlike his traditionalist counterpart, Ismail Sepanjang, Lutfi makes extensive use of modern technology. His regular addresses are recorded and made available on local radio, CDs, Video CDs (VCDs) and even YouTube. Many assessments of Lutfi and the Saudi-style Salafism he has been propagating since returning to Pattani in the early 1990s have been made. He is a vocal opponent of violent separatism. Not only was he the first to refute the Jihadi manual Berjihad di Pattani, but he was the only one to do so in Malay (Ismail Lutfi Japakiya, 2005). Intriguingly, not only did refutations by Thai Islamic authorities follow his, but Lutfi’s, as written in Thai. In it, he addressed what he claims are misperceptions concerning the role of Islam in the conflict. Lutfi has also discussed issues of religious pluralism in Islam, and emphasised that only recognised religious authorities are capable of declaring a jihad, and only after other avenues such as da’wah have been pursued. Although Lutfi has called upon the Thai state to recognise Malay-Islamic identity in the far-south, he is in active dialogue with, and supportive of, the state. For example, he served as a member of the National Reconciliation Commission, was appointed to the Senate following the 2006 coup, and has been an advisor to the Chularajamontri. Opinion is divided about whether Lutfi is an advocate of what Hasan Hanafi has described as conservative or modernising branches of Salafism (2009, p. 120). Liow Lutfi was a moderniser, pointing out that despite being a graduate of “Wahhabi” institutions in Saudi Arabia, most of his influences are not conventional “Wahhabi” ideologues.41 Imtiyaz Yusuf disagrees. He describes Dr. Lufti’s Saudi-style Salafism as, “rigid literalism, intolerance toward differences, insularism, supremacist psychology, restriction of women’s movements, opposition to rationalism, and a hostile attitude towards artistic expression”. As a result, Islam in South Thailand is increasingly Arabicised. This has affected the local religious lexicon, attire (including the full-faced niq¯ab by women), as well as increasing gender segregation (2007, pp. 10, 12). Yusuf also suggests that the parochial and ethnocentric worldview of Lutfi’s “Wahhabism” resembles the ethno-religious Islam of southern Malays.
40 Lutfi has a doctorate in comparative Islamic jurisprudence from the Islamic University of AlImam Mohammad Ibn Saud in Riyadh, an M.A. in comparative fiqh (Ar. Islamic jurisprudence) at the Ibn Saud, and a B.A. in usuluddin (Ar. religious principles) from Madinah University. 41 Liow claims that the most important of these was Shaykh Sa’id Hawwa, Lutfi’s Syrian lecturer, tutor and supervisor (2009a, p. 90). Lutfi’s doctrinal inclinations are also complex. His doctoral dissertation argues for the importance of time, space and context when applying precepts of Islamic law (see 2009a, pp. 113–120).
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Liow argues that Lutfi as “at once reformist, modernist, and fundamentalist”. By acknowledging the limitations of traditional Islamic education, he is a reformist. His modernist credentials relate to his willingness to teach on non-religious subjects that assist Muslims to face the complexities of globalisation and Thai modernity. Finally, by locating “Islam, and in particular the Qur’an and sunnah, at the heart of its understanding of modern knowledge” he might be referred to (albeit inadequately) as a fundamentalist (2009a, p. 180). Like Shaykh Daud, Sheik Ahmad, and Haji Sulong before him, Lutfi’s family is a member of Pattani’s religious establishment. He is one of many present-day reformers building on the foundations established by Shaykh Ahmad’s fatwas and Haji Sulong’s religious and political activism. Lutfi’s capital intensive reformist agenda has benefited from funded by Middle Eastern backers. Although modern Salafism and Tablighi Jama’at possess divergent aims, constituencies and methodologies, their initial arrival and eventual establishment all involved mobile and influential local personalities.
Conclusion A millennium before Islam’s Southeast Asian expansion, a Sanskrit cosmopolis existed in both Patani and its predecessor Langkasuka, as it had throughout mainland and island Southeast Asia. There are a number of Indian connections in the earliest chapters of Islam’s Southeast Asian expansion. A Sanskrit cosmopolis existed before Islam’s arrival. Islam also came from India and through members of Indian/Arab creole communities that were created through the Indian Ocean Trade through which Islam circulated. Patani’s initial adhesion to—or adoption of—Islam is reputed to have begun with the healing of Raja Phaya Tu Antara by Shaykh Said of Pasai. Through its adhesion to Islam Patani’s participation in the Indian Ocean, trade increased and through this it prospered. An Arabic cosmopolis eventually replaced its Sanskrit predecessor in Patani. All these developments reveal Patani to have been more similar to—than distinct from—other port city-states on the Thai/Malay peninsula. While a vassal state of Ayutthaya, I consider Siamese religious influences on Islam in Patani before the twentieth century to have been negligible compared with Indic influences. Tambiah described how Patani was located at the interstices of two galactic polities (1976). Bougas asserted that Patani was unique among Malay states due to her location between the Thai and Malay mandalas of Ayutthaya/Bangkok and Melacca, both of which shaped her history and culture (1994, p. 1). Bougas cites an (unnamed) Dutch source from the 1600s, claiming that Buddhists in Patani comprised 30% of the population who worshipped in their temples (1994, p. 37; see also Bradley 2010, p. 108). Ibrahim Syukri mentions 60 Burmese slaves who were given to the raja by the Thai king, none of whom were forced to convert to Islam (1985, p. 20). Finally, Barbara Andaya cites Buddhist pilgrims to have continued travelling between China and India via Patani (2004, p. 70).
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Bougas insists that this situation was different from other Southeast Asia kerajaan where Islam supplanted and eventually replaced Hindu-Buddhist predecessors. In Patani these faiths not only coexisted—they also interacted with each other. According to Bougas, as a result Islam in Patani was “heavily influenced by Buddhism, acquired a unique character of its own, quite different from that encountered in the rest of the Peninsula and Archipelago” (1994, p. 37). Patani’s oldest mosque, Surau Aur, is designed on Hindu-Buddhist prototypes. However interesting this rectangular building’s three-tiered single ridge roof and serpentine gables typical of Thai Buddhist architecture might be (1992), this phenomenon is far from unique to Patani (see Abdul Halim Nasir, 2004; Dickie, 1978). Bougas also points that it was once a common practice to shave the heads of Malay boys before their circumcision (SM masuk jawi), a practice that mirrors that the heads of Buddhist boys before being ordained as monks (1994, p. 37). Raymond Scupin adds that the status of hajis in southern Malay communities also resembled that of monks (1982). A similar position is taken by Louis Golomb, who warns that the employment of ethno-religious designations such as “Thai-Buddhist” and “Malay-Muslim” runs the risk of misconstruing these are denoting separate socio-cultural traditions or bounded cosmologies.42 Like many others at the time, Golomb referred to Thai and Malay “folk” beliefs as “little” traditions and local components of a “region wide system of multiethnic strategies for harnessing supernatural power” (1985a, p. 1). Milner expresses similar sentiments when he stated that the significance of new “religions” was not that these demanded new allegiances, but that they provided new techniques. As such, Milner cautions against using “isms” such as Buddhism or Hinduism in the way they began to be used in later centuries: that these were integrated, exclusive systems of knowledge (2008, p. 32). Golomb’s proposals predate more recent ones. Suthiwong Phongpaibun claimed that “bonds of brotherhood” existed between Buddhists and Muslims on the Thai/Malay peninsula (2008). Alexander Horstmann refers to a common cosmology existing between Buddhists and Muslims (2004, p. 93). Horstmann describes this “shared cosmology” as a “powerful culture in which the hybridisation of local cosmologies of Buddhist and Muslim communities takes place in a fascinating manner”. In it are shared beliefs about merit-making, ancestors and ghosts, by which “the living and the dead are tied to each other” (2004, pp. 85, 93). Although many assessments of Patani/Pattani’s uniqueness vis-à-vis other port city-states have been forwarded, these have not acknowledged the following. First, although Pattani’s present location represents the northern extremity of the Malay world (SM. dunia Melayu), Siamese influence extended as far south as Kedah and Terengganu. Second, Malay-speaking Muslim communities were present on both coasts of upper South Thailand before 1909. There is no denying that Patani’s subjugation over the five decades of conflict following 1785 inexorably brought it into Bangkok’s sphere of political influence. This was as disastrous for the palace, as the demise of trade a century earlier had 42
Golomb’s outstanding ethnographic work (1978, 1985a, 1985b) has dealt with the healing practices of Buddhists and Muslims in Kelantan, Pattani, Songkhla and Central Thailand.
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been for the market. Nevertheless, the strength of the mosque—Patani’s third most important institution (see Bradley, 2010, pp. 38–110)—increased despite the growing Siamese presence, for the following reasons. While the political turmoil of the early nineteenth century compelled people from central and northern Thai regions to turn to Bangkok as a moral centre, Patani embraced Mecca (Bradley, 2010, p. 12). Although Patani’s incremental political integration began almost immediately, it is highlighted above that no Siamese attempts were made to either interfere with or patronise Islam until the twentieth century. Furthermore, increased connections with Mecca coincided with a time of religious and political revolt and reform. Being comparatively wealthy owners of ponok schools, the families of Shaykh Daud, Shaykh Ahmad and Haji Sulong would have considered it a religious obligatory (Ar. wajib) to immigrate to a Dar al-Islam following Patani becoming a Dar al-Harb. Patani’s ulama besar mediated of the expansion of Middle Eastern reformist and modernist movements into Thailand’s far-south. This would not have been possible had a number of revolutions not taken place. In the second half of the nineteenth century handwritten manuscripts penned by scribes were replaced by printed books. Those travelling across the Indian Ocean no longer used sail boats following the introduction of steamers. As described above, in the twentieth century Bangkok eventually began to concern itself with religious matters, although with only limited success and many unexpected consequences. Renewed attempts to register southern ponoks (transforming them into PSTIs) led to an exodus of students pursuing Islamic education in the Middle East and South Asia. This coincided with the Iranian revolution and Saudi Arabia’s counter-offensive funded by her recently acquired economic clout. The revivalist and reformist movements that continue to affect the religious landscape of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat build on the foundations laid by previous generations of activists. The increased use of the Thai language, and engagement. Thai modernity by Malays in Cabetigo, came after a century of incremental assimilation of the Malay dominated far-south by Bangkok. The range of Thai and Islamic influences delineated above have led to Cabetigo possessing the religious, linguistic and ethnic diversity which are the subject of the following chapter. Indic, Thai and Islamic influences have all shaped in specific ways the ritual repertoire through which merit is made, the rationales motivating their performance, and the nature of the merit-making rhetoric of Cabetigo’s Muslim residents.
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van der Putten, J. (2009). Wayang Parsi, Bangsawan and printing: Commercial cultural exchange between South Asia and the Malay World. In R. M. Feener & T. Sevea (Eds.), Islamic connections: Muslim societies in South and Southeast Asia (pp. 86–108). Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Vella, W. F. (1978). Chaiyo! King Vajiravudh and the development of Thai Nationalism. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii. Wade, G. (2009). The Patani region in Chinese texts from the 6th to the 19th centuries. In P. Jory & J. Saengthong (Eds.), The Phantasm in Southern Thailand: Historical writings on Patani and the Islamic world, Chulalongkorn University, Dec 11–12, 2009. (pp. 499–523): Regional Studies Program (Southeast Asia Studies), School of Liberal Arts, Walailak University. Wade, G. (2010). Early Muslim expansion in South-East Asia, eighth to fifteenth centuries. In D. O. Morgan & A. Reid (Eds.), The New Cambridge history of Islam: Volume 3, The Eastern Islamic world, eleventh to eighteenth centuries (pp. 360–408). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wales, H. G. Q. (1974). Langkasuka and Tambralinga: Some archaeological notes. Journal of the Malaysian Branch Royal Asiatic Society, 47, 15–40. Wan Kadir Che Man. (1990a). Muslim separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand. Singapore: Oxford University Press. Wan Kadir Che Man. (1990b). The Thai Government and Islamic institutions in the four Southern Muslim Provinces of Thailand. Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia, 5(2), 255–282. Wan Kadir Che Man. (1994). Patani: From Sovereign Sultanate to subnation. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 14(1 & 2 January & July), 116–123. Wan Mohammad Saghir Abdullah. (1990). Fatawa Tentang Binatang Hidup Dua Alam Syeikh Ahmad al-Fatani. Kuala Lumpur: Penerbitan Hizbi. Wan Mohammad Saghir Abdullah. (1992). Al Allamah Syeikh Ahmad al-Fathani. Ahli Fikir Islam dan Dunia Melayu. Kuala Lumpur: Khazanah Fathaniyah. Welch, D. J., & McNeill, J. R. (1989). Archaeological investigation of Pattani History. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 19(1 March), 27–41. Wheatley, P. (1956). Langkasuka. T’oung Pao, 44(4/5), 387–412. Wheatley, P. (1961). The golden Khersonese: Studies in the historical geography of the Malay Peninsula before AD 1500. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press. Wieringa, E. (2009). Some light on Ahmad al-Fatani’s Nur al-Mubin. In J. van der Putten & M. Kilcline Coby (Eds.), Lost time and untold tales from the Malay world (pp. 186–197). Singapore: National University of Singapore Press. Wilson, H. E. (1989). Partisan imperialists and Islamic separatism in South Thailand, 1945–49. South East Asian Review, 20(3), 369–391. Wilson, H. E. (1992). Tengku Mahmud Mahyiddeen and the Dilemma of Partisan Duality. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 23(1), 37–59. Winstedt, R. O. (1966). Malaya and its history. London: Hutchinson. Winstedt, R. O. (1969). A history of classical Malay literature. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. Yusuf, I. (1998). Islam and democracy in Thailand: Reforming the office of the Chularajamontri/Shaikh Al-Islam. Journal of Islamic Studies, 9(2), 277–298. Yusuf, I. (2007). Faces of Islam in Southern Thailand. (Working Paper No. 7). Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington. Yusuf, I. (2010). The Role of the Chularajamontri (Shaykh al-Islam) in Resolving Ethno-religious Conflict in Southern Thailand. The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 27(1), 31–53.
Chapter 3
Religious, Ethnic and Linguistic Diversity
Abstract This chapter describes how ethnic identifications, language and religion in present-day Cabetigo have been affected by the Thai and Islamic influences described in previous chapters. While the Muslims in Cabetigo are comfortably bilingual ethnic Malays who adhere to traditionalist expressions of Islam, significant religious, linguistic and ethnic diversity exists. The chapter begins by describing how reformist and revivalist movements dealt with in the previous chapter have increased religious diversity—even division—in Cabetigo. I delineate the various ways in which Muslims identify themselves, but also the factors that affect which strategic identity is chosen at any given time and place. This chapter concludes with an account of how the bilingualism in Cabetigo brought about the widespread adoption of Thai by urban Malays.
Omar’s Roti Shop The best roti chenai in Pattani is sold at a shop in Cabetigo owned by Omar. Not only are his roti softer and less oily that those elsewhere, but they are also served with chicken and lentil curry. These reveal Omar’s Pakistani family origins. Omar makes his roti on a large skillet installed in a trolley without wheels that has been placed on concrete blocks outside the front of his shop-house (Th. hong thaew). In the shop’s far corner is a table where tea and coffee are made. The wall behind this is blackened from years of charcoal fires that economically boil the water and give the tea its aromatic flavor. Another of Omar’s specialties is tea made with goat’s milk, referred to as cha phaki (Figs. 3.1 and 3.2). Omar’s patrons display Cabetigo’s multi-faceted diversity caused by the colliding Thai and Islam influences described in the previous chapter. Consider Pak Mat, a 73-year-old Malay man who dresses every day in his white baju, chequered sarong and white piyo’, and is rarely seen without a village cigarette hanging from the side of his mouth. Like many Malays his age, Pak Mat speaks no Thai and has no contact with Thais. He was educated in traditional ponok schools before they were transformed into PSTIs. After Pak Mat leaves another of Omar’s regulars, Haji Hussein, enters and takes a seat. His bad hearing leads him to choose a table as far away as possible from the television under the stairs. Although the same age as Pak Mat, Haji Hussein is C.M. Joll, Muslim Merit-Making in Thailand’s Far-South, Muslims in Global Societies Series 4, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-2485-3_3, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012
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Fig. 3.1 Omar making his famous roti chena
wealthier and comfortably speaks both Thai and Pattani Malay. While we talk, a group of young men dressed in da’wah garb gather around Omar’s skillet to order roti and tea. Then they sit together at the concrete table and chairs at the front of the shop. Pointing to them with his chin, Haji Hussein comments how good it is that such young men can give their time to religion. He adds, “Da’wah has been good for religion here, but not so good for development”. In a light-hearted turn, we swap suggestions about what Pak Mat might say about Malays dressing up as Indians. As a staunch traditionalist Pak Mat is well known for his diatribes about Malays in Pattani being manipulated by outsiders. He once commented, “The Thais want to make us more Thai, the Arabs and their stooges want to make us Arab, and the now the Tabligh have arrived. If the Americans come they will want us to walk around showing our belly buttons!” Haji Hussein’s son, Be Heng, stumbles upon his father as he is finishing his two roti and a glass of tea. Like all of Haji Hussein’s children Be Heng has done well for himself. He is now enjoying the security and status of a senior position in the Thai civil service. Although Be Heng has never spoken Malay with me, he is bilingual like his father, something he insists his children also master. On this Sunday morning he popped into Omar’s to enjoy a leisurely breakfast with his two friends who he has brought along in his newly purchased pick-up truck. They are planning to attend the weekly religious address given by Dr. Ishmael Lutfi at the Bamrong Islam School.
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The conversation soon turns to Be Heng’s two friends, whose sons will soon complete studies at a private Islamic high school. Decisions about which universities to apply for will soon need to be made. One son has always done well in religious subjects and has applied for scholarships to universities in the Middle East. Another, who is less interested and gifted in Arabic, is considering university options in Malaysia and Thailand. Both these are open to him because of his proficiency in Thai and Malay. Concerns are expressed about how well a ponok boy (PM. dek ponok) like him would handle the temptations that would be encountered in Bangkok’s universities (see Marddent, 2007). Ased is another regular at Omar’s roti shop. Unlike Pak Mat, Haji Hussein and Be Heng, he is neither a Malay nor from Pattani. Born in Songkhla (PM. Sekoro), Ased married a Patani Malay woman and moved to Cabetigo 10 years ago after having lived for many years in Bangkok. The only Malay Ased speaks is what he needs to sell drinks, snacks and daily consumables in his small shop in the front of his house. Like other Muslims from Songkhla and Nakhon Si Thammarat, he speaks the Southern Thai dialect. Ased claims that he has not learnt Malay, as (unlike Thai) this can only be spoken in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat. Ased’s refusal to speak Malay is part of his general disdain for Malays, who he considers backward, stupid and lazy. When he lived in Bangkok he felt that Pattani would be an ideal place to raise a Muslim family. Soon after living in Cabetigo, however, he became disillusioned with many aspects of this overwhelmingly Malay community: few people studied; most were too lazy to work hard enough to earn a decent living; only a handful acted responsibly towards their wives; and he witnessed the widespread neglect of their children by Malay men. One of Ased’s few Malay friends is Razak, with whom he has breakfast at Omar’s once a week. Razak typically arrives with his only daughter, who he takes to school at the demonstration school run by the Prince of Songkhla University (PSU) that is widely acknowledged as the best school in town. Over breakfast Razak mentions his daughter’s inability to speak Malay. Countering Ased’s arguments, Razak points out that a facility in Standard Malay allows Malays from Pattani to work and travel in Malaysia and Indonesia. Despite being bilingual himself Razak prefers to speak Thai, even with comfortably bilingual Malays. His Malay is also marked by the extensive use of Thai technical terms. Razak’s government job (Th. karachakarn) and business interests (which together occupy much of his time and energy) are all conducted in Thai. While he laments his mother’s inability to communicate with her granddaughter, Razak stresses that this is one of the sacrifices that had to be made for his daughter to get ahead. One morning after Razak left, Ased confessed that is increasingly concerned with Razak’s obsession with business interests, rare performance of salat (Ar. ritual prayer) at the local surau, and reluctance to discuss religious issues. While Ased worried that Razak was following the ways of the world too much, he commented that he was one of the few hard-working Malays that he knew. This chapter introduces readers to how the various Thai and Islamic influences described in the previous chapter have impacted upon the religious, ethnic and linguistic diversity of present-day Cabetigo. The nature of Cabetigo’s
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religious diversity brought about by the decades of reformist activism is described. Throughout this study I refer to Cabetigo traditionalist, reformist and revivalist constituents. Cabetigo’s religious diversity resembles that of other Southeast Asian urban Muslim communities where reformist activism co-exists alongside traditionalist recalcitrance. Cabetigo’s uniqueness relates to the fact that the majority of its Malay residents are also Thai-speakers. There are ever increasing numbers of young Malays (like Razak’s daughter) in Cabetigo who are completely incapable of communicating in Malay, or prefer to do so in Thai. Among other things, this has led to changes in how Muslims in Cabetigo identify themselves vis-à-vis the Malay world and Thai nation-state. Discussions of identity (referred to hereafter as “identifications”) are complicated by the plethora of studies written from a range of theoretical positions that discuss this issue. In addition to the nature of Malayness and the reasons for some Malays referring to themselves as Thai Muslims, I also pay attention to the factors affecting how southern Malays employ a range of everyday autonyms and official exonyms to identify themselves with.1 This chapter concludes with a short description of modern multi-lingualism in Cabetigo. An account of the factors which affect which language Cabetigo residents speak—a treatment necessitated by the importance of religious rhetoric in this study—is also provided.
Traditionalists, Reformists and Revivalists This section describes how Islam in Cabetigo has been affected by reformist activism. As a result, a variety of “Islams” are now adhered to in Cabetigo. Following a clarification of what I intend the terms “traditionalist”, “reformist” and “revivalist” to denote, I delineate how these groups are referred to by local Muslims. The majority of Cabetigo residents are traditionalist adherents to Malay customary Islam. This is characterised by ritual elements that are viewed by reformists as containing Indic or Islamic innovations or accretions. All these are referred to as bid’ah. Traditionalists refer to themselves by any one of the following terms: kanaat kaw (Th.); kaum tuo (PM., from kaum tua); ore turut ore tuo (PM. those that follow the old people). They are sometimes derogatively referred to by reformists as ahl bid’ah (Ar. the innovators). What are some of these accretions? Although still present in Cabetigo (and more common in many rural Malay communities), village shamans or ritual specialists (PM. bomo, Th., mo phi) have been extensively marginalised.2 Similarly, since the 1980s the vitality and visibility of traditional Malay performing arts such as silat,
1 A.B. Shamsul refers to these as “everyday-defined” and “authority-defined” identity discourses (1996). 2 On bomos in Pattani see Thomas Fraser’s classic ethnographic work on Rusembilan (1960, 1966, 1975) and the study by Ruth-Inge Heinze (1988).
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dikir hulu, ma’yong and wayang kulit have diminished. One’s traditionalist orientation may also be indicated by the following observations: Are prayer beads (Ar. tasbih) used, or are repetitions counted on knuckles? Is the qunut recited during subuh prayers? What feasts are patronised? Are mawlid feasts held? Is merit made for the dead through posthumous feasts? Are ritual specialist routinely employed? What emphasis is placed on the responsibilities of the deceased’s children (PM. anok soleh) to make merit? Traditionalist Islam in Cabetigo has undergone a number of significant changes since Haji Sulong’s activism in the late 1930s. Traditionalists consider their generation to be better Muslims than preceding generations. They also make unflattering comparisons between themselves and the Muslims of Thailand’s upper south and Malaysia’s Kuala Lumpur. For instance, a friend recounted how shocked he had been by the sight of Malaysian men and women shaking hands. Despite traditionalist pride in such advances, most reformists consider religious reforms to have not gone far enough. Reformists may refer to themselves in any one of the following ways: kanaat mai (Th.), kaum mudo (PM.) or ahl sunnah (Ar. those following the example of the prophet). Traditionalists refer to reformists as ore ngaji mudo (PM. those following the new teaching) or ore brao (PM. people from Brao). I note that terms such as Wahhabi/Wahhabiyah and Salaf/salafiyyah are only occasional employed. When they are, they are used by those with higher education in Islamic Studies. Details concerning reformist thought and practice are important elements in all subsequent chapters. Wedding feasts might be referred to by reformists as walimah (not make pulot). While the names of some feasts have been changed, others have been entirely abandoned. Reformists make merit—both for themselves and the deceased—in distinctive ways and occasionally with different motivations. While numerically in the minority, reformist influence in Cabetigo relates to the prominence of wealthy educated urban professionals who are unable to accept traditionalist taqlid (Ar. blind following). In the previous chapter, a distinction was made between revivalism and reformism. The former refers to the activities of the Tablighi Jama’at. Most active members of the Tablighi Jama’at are easily identified by their white robes (thawb) and long turbans (PM. sarabe). Some also wear black eye-liner, which is regarded as sunnah. Although da’wah is a generic term for a call or invitation to Islam, in Cabetigo da’wah has become synonymous with the missionary activities of Tablighi Jama’at. Indeed while all in Cabetigo have heard about da’wah, some are still unfamiliar with the Tablighi Jama’at. Over and above their divergent methodologies, there are other important differences in South Thailand between Salafism and the Tablighi Jama’at. While relaxing one evening with a Malay ahl sunnah friend, three pick-ups full of Tablighis who had just returned from a khuruj arrived at the tea shop we were in. After taking their seats and ordering drinks, they all began rolling their village cigarettes (PM. daun ro’ko’) before lighting up and relaxing. Speaking to me in English, my friend commented, “These Tablighi guys are very tight knit. This is very good. But they are not very strict like my group. Do you see them all smoking? This is a sin for us”.
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Such attitudes towards the Tablighi Jama’at may be explained by the fact that it is banned in Saudi Arabia (Liow, 2009, p. 198). Interestingly, members of the Tablighi Jama’at in Cabetigo are made up of both traditionalists and reformists, causing some tensions as reformists take a harder line against traditionalist accretions. This is one of a number of challenges to describing Cabetigo’s religious diversity. For instance, on family who routinely make use of amulets (PM. azima’) sent some of their children to avowedly reformist PSTIs that disapprove of such practices. Various assessments of reformist activism in South Thailand have been made. Imtiyaz Yusuf claims that reformist activism has led to significant rifts and “cultural dislocations” within Malay Islam. Traditionalists have sought to protect the “ethno-religious and social features” of Shafi`i Malay Islam against “Wahhabism”. He argues that reformists consider it their religious duty to wean people off traditional interpretations and practices. Traditionalists resist such attempts. These are perceived by many as a threat to their ethnic identity. The resultant debates have not only created confusion about ethnic, cultural and religious identity, but have also precipitated a crisis of religious and socio-political authority. Although (as I showed in the previous chapter) such tensions are not new, the situation has been recently exacerbated by the latest round of conflict between puritans and moderates (2007, pp. 9, 13). While relationships have improved since the late 1990s, Salaf activism and traditionalist resistance have led to unprecedented change, diversity and division in Cabetigo, as in many other communities in the far-south.
Plural and Porous Identifications In his Leaves of the Same Tree: Trade and Ethnicity in the Straits of Melaka (2008), Leonard Andaya’s presents the persuasive argument that although Melayu, Minangkabau, Batak, Acehnese, Orang Asli and Orang Laut are ethnic boundaries that establish difference, they are all leaves of the same tree. These ethnicities emerged as groups encountered each other. This required names to be given and ethnic affiliations to be made. As I have already described, trade in pre-colonial times led to the exchange goods and ideas. This also catalysed the ongoing process of ethnic formation that Andaya refers to as “ethnicization” (2008, pp. 10, 14). Those living along its Straits of Melacca were exposed to new possibilities of ethnic and religious affiliation, a situation that resembled the modern phenomenon of porous borders and the transnational activities of individuals (2008, p. 9). A number of theories of ethnicity exist between the extreme poles of circumstantialism and primordialism.3 Circumstantialism claims that ethnic groups play an ongoing and active role in redefining the cultural elements constituting their identity. Despite this dynamic fluidity of cultures, ethnic groups also possess an
3
Primordialism is associated with the ideas of both Fredrik Barth (1969) and Clifford Geertz (1963), whereas circumstantialism was first argued for by Edmund R. Leach (1954).
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essential core which distinguishes them from others. Thus, there are both primordial constants in ethnicity and fluid, multi-layered dimensions which are continually adjusting to changing circumstances. Primordialist studies of Muslims in Thailand which assert the persistence of ethnic constants include those by Pitsuwan (1985), Suhrke (1977) and Thomas (1982). Those representing a circumstantialist perspective, arguing that identity is altered and reconfigured depending on context, include Dorarirajoo (2002a), Le Roux (1998), Prachuabmoh (1980), Satha-Anand (1993, 2005) and SuwannathatPian (2000). Satha-Anand has emphasised how Thailand’s southern Malays relate to one billion Muslims worldwide, 200 million other Malay-speakers in Southeast Asia, and 62 million Thai citizens. Far from being distinctly compartmentalised, their composite identities are continually being negotiated, steering the difficult path between universal and ethnocentric idioms (2005, p. 3). While the constant intermingling and exchange of biological and cultural elements has led some scholars to reject theories of primordialism, Andaya underscores essential differences between ethnic groups who remain distinct in order to promote group interests (2008, p. 11). International conventions have confined individuals within fixed spaces that has imposed a specific national and legal identity. Precolonial identity, however, was marked by a plurality and porosity in which religion was subordinate to other markers. Decisions to adopt one or more ethnic identities were the privilege of an individual, and in no small way influenced by contact with a range of foreign “others”. In the pre-colonial period, difference could be expressed through any one of the following ethnic markers: what food was eaten, which language(s) were spoken, how hair was cut and what clothes were worn, and how sarongs were tied. During times of rapid change, these could be altered or completely abandoned. This enabled individuals and groups to “strategically deploy one or more identities in different circumstances to maximize advantage” (Andaya, 2008, p. 10). Different communities also adapted to change in different ways. While motivated by a common desire to maximise a group’s current advantage, some detached themselves from a “larger ethnic identity to form smaller and more effective units. Others, saw greater advantage in becoming affiliated with a larger ethnic group” (Andaya, 2008, p. 3). Membership of ethnic groups expanded or contracted depending on the circumstances. As such, ethnicity was “far more than simply a form of identification, [but] also function[ed] to protect the group” (Andaya, 2008, p. 235). These elements of pragmatism and choice in ethnic identification explain my preference for referring to “identifications” rather than “identity”. With respect to the plural and porous nature of pre-nineteenth century “Melayu” identity, Andaya argues that soft boundaries between “Melayu”, “Batak” or “Minang” ethnicity enabled individuals to move between these identities to maximise personal advantage in different circumstances. While ethnic names survived, ethnic boundaries were rarely rigid. Rather, they shifted over time.4 Following their
4
Similar arguments are made by Anthony Milner (2008).
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migration from southern Borneo to south-east Sumatra, the Melayu were the most influential ethnic group in the Straits of Melacca.5 Thus from the seventh century, Melayu dress and customs was adopted in many parts of Sumatra, and Melayu became the language of government and the market place in the polity of Sriwijaya. By the time the Melayu were established on the Thai/Malay peninsula around the fifteenth century, distinct Minangkabau, Acehnese and Batak ethnicities had already emerged in Sumatra. The term “Melayu” was capable of referring to a language, culture, regional group, polity or local community. Andaya considers that this development “spawn[ed] a wide variety of interpretations concerning its meaning and significance” (2008, p. 14). Evidence from excavations on the Malaysian peninsula reveal the presence of Mon-speaking peoples linked to Mon civilisations further north. These are thought to have adopted Islam and became Melayu in the twelfth century (2008, p. 319).6 Andaya proposes that pre-Melaccan inhabitants of the peninsula were divided between the Mon-Khmer-influenced populations from the north and the Austronesian influenced culture from the southern peninsula. This situation changed in the fifteenth century following the foundation of Melacca by Melayu immigrants from Palembang (Andaya, 2004, p. 72). In addition to their later adoption of Islam, northern kingdoms such as Kedah also continued to be subject to both Mon-Khmer rather than Melayu influences. In the following section it is considered how these conceptions of plural and porous pre-colonial identifications assist discussions of the everyday autonyms and official exonyms that are either employed by, or imposed on, Malay Muslims in South Thailand. These are ore melayu/nayu, ore jawi, ore isle, and Thai Muslim. Malay, or Melayu, is an exonym that is avoided by the Thai government. The concept of Malayness has recently been the subject of much debate (see Barnard, 2004a; Milner, 2008). Adrian Vickers considers Melayu a “fraught” term, as this covers a multitude of possible identities formulated in reaction to different waves of migration to the Malay peninsula and colonial intervention (2004, pp. 40, 45). Shamsul adds that non-Muslim groups in the pre-European era were designated “Malay” on the basis of use of the Malay language and their practice of a Malay “way of life”. This referred to their dress, culinary practices and participation in a Malay-speaking trading network (2004, p. 143). Barnard concurs, claiming that in the eighteenth century Melacca Straits region, Malay identity was adopted in Siak before any mass adhesion there to Islam. Furthermore, he claims that although religion constituted an important element of Malayness, this identity was primarily based “on a common trading culture along the Melaka Straits and the South China Sea” (2004b, p. 108). Michael Montesano and Patrick Jory have commented on the rarity with which the approaches to Malayness advocated by Barnard’s contributors inform the study of Thailand’s lower south. They also point to the irony of Barnard’s publication
5 6
For linguistic evidence see Collins (2004). Andaya cites Benjamin (1997, pp. 92–93).
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coinciding with those of local and foreign scholars who appear to “stress the importance of a primordial Patani/Pattani Malay identity” (2008, p. 2). Seni Mudmarn regards “Malay” as a noun that reflects the major traits of a distinctive ethnic group. The double-barrelled “Malay-Muslim” emphasises the inseparability of Islam from Malay ethnicity (1994, p. 32). Despite being Thai citizens, Malay language, customs and religion all distinguish Malays from Thais. Mudmarn also insists that Malayness is inextricably bound to Islam, arguing that no one has heard of “Malay Buddhists” or “Malay Christians” (1994, p. 39). Commenting on the importance of Islam in southern Malayness, Imtiyaz Yusuf criticises the fact that “ritual, mythic/narrative, experiential/emotional, ethical and legal, social, material, and political dimensions of life” are all locally interpreted and perceived through the lenses of ethnic identity” (2007, p. 8). Chaiwat Satha-Anand not only questions Mudmarn’s foreclosure of the possibility of the conversion of Malays to other religions, but the legitimacy of race replacing religion. Islam, after all, is more universal than Malayness, and Malayness is less accommodating than Islam. Thus, rather than a noun, the “Malay” element of the “Malay-Muslim” should be viewed as a subordinate adjective (1992, pp. 30–31). The inseparability of Islam and Malayness is also challenged by Cabetigo residents who describe their drugtaking, computer game addicted, karaoke-singing young people as Malays, but not Muslims. Not only local Malays, but also Thai Buddhists and Thai-speaking Muslims from outside the three southern provinces, refer to the Malay language as phasa islam (Th.) or paso melayu/nayu (PM.). Attitudes in Cabetigo to the importance of the Malay language to modern Malayness in South Thailand range between people like Razak and Pok Mat. Razak and Be Heng illustrate two of the most common positions taken by Cabetigo’s middle-class Malays. Pok Mat is unconcerned by his inability to speak Thai. He holds strong opinions about the link between the rise in Thai influence and the demise of local Malayness. By the time Malays graduate from Thai schools both their Malay language and sense of Malay identity have gradually diluted. Pok Mat and other Malays like him in Cabetigo consider there to be religious connotations in the traditional Thai greeting (Th. wai) (made by bringing one’s hands together to one’s face) that Malay children are forced to perform at school. Furthermore, Pok Mat sees no advantage in his grandchildren attending overcrowded, under-staffed, inadequately-resourced Thai schools where Malay children consistently under-achieve. Such views are part of a deepening disillusionment with successive Thai governments, who are increasingly viewed as erratic, corrupt and violent. Such perceptions only increase with every year Thailand’s political crisis and southern insurgency continues. Malays are commonly referred to as ore nayu, which I view as the Pattani Malay dialect’s truncation of “Melayu”. Nevertheless, others have argued that this represents an important autonym employed by southern Malays. Although first discussed by Chavivun Prachuabmoh (1980, 1989, pp. 130–135), ore nayu has been most extensively discussed by Saroja Dorarirajoo (2002a, 2002b), and has been adopted by Michiko Tsuneda (2009). Dorarirajoo’s study of the adaptation of a Malay fishing community to modern life in the Thai nation state led her to argue that ore nayu
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is an everyday-defined identity term that represents a strategic device in a culture of negotiation.7 Ore nayu distinguished Malays from ore siye (PM. Thai-Buddhists) (2002a, pp. 11, 15). Through their involvement with Thai-Buddhist non-government organisations (NGO) in their fight for equal access to the natural resources (2002a, pp. 110–156), nayu fishermen either learned, or greatly improved, their ability to speak, read and write Thai. This also increased was their awareness of Thai identity, but not at the expense of their “Malayness” (2002a, p. 372). Indeed, all of Dorarirajoo’s informants continued to identify themselves as ore nayu when seeking employment in Malaysian restaurants. This vocation was open to them as Muslims capable of cooking authentic halal Thai cuisine (2002a, pp. 159–233). Malays in Cabetigo also occasionally refer to themselves as ore jawi, which is not an official label of ethnic identity. Neither is it widely used outside the community. Nonetheless, Pierre Le Roux (1998) claims that this is one of the most spontaneous autonyms used in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat. As is well known, Jawi denotes the Malay language written in a modified Arabic script, and is also one of the most common ways of referring to Southeast Asian Muslims in the Middle East. While political independence provided Muslim in Malaysia and Indonesian with exportable nationalities, Malays from South Thailand refer to themselves as “jawi” while they are abroad. Although ore jawi were once subjects of the Malay kerajaan of Patani, they are now inhabitants of Thailand through its territorial absorption. They are Muslims, speaking an Austronesian language, which is a member of the Malayo-Polynesian group—a group distinct from the Thai of the Tai-Kadai language family. Roux comments that they belong to “all of these worlds without fusing with any single one” (1998, p. 233). Le Roux appears to downplay the similarities that Malays in Cabetigo share with those in Kelantan and Terengganu by suggesting the following as being unique to ore jawi: distinctively constructed and painted kolek boats; the breeding of zebra-doves for singing competitions; the production of salty fish sauce (PM. budu). What is unique in South Thailand is the nature of their multi-lingualism and distinct dialect replete with mono-syllabisations and lexical borrowings from Thai. Just as not all Thai-speakers are Buddhists, not all Malay-speakers along the Thai-Malay border are Muslims (see Winzeler, 1985, p. 65). Thai-speaking Muslim communities have long existed in Satun and Kedah (see Banks, 1980, 1983; Nishii, 2000; Suwannathat-Pian, 1994, 2008). Malay-speaking Thais and Chinese communities are found in the Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat, as well as Kelantan (Carstens, 1986; Johnson, 1999, 2008; Mohamed Yusoff Ismail, 1993; Winzeler, 1985). Malays may identify themselves through their dress (by wearing sarong, piyo’, hijab), diet (avoiding pork), jewellery (silver rings for men and no Buddhist amulets), but an ability to speak Malay remains one of their most important identity markers in Cabetigo. Smalley argues that this is intimately connected with the rarity
7
For more on the theme of negotiation refer to Ryoko Nishii (2002).
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with which people in Thailand learn languages that are not their mother tongue and are located lower in the language hierarchy (1994, p. 320). Another common autonym in Cabetigo is ore isle (PM. Muslims). This is similar to references to the Malay language as phasa islam (Th.) or paso melayu/nayu (PM.). While having a cup of tea in a coffee shop, a Malay neighbour passed by and spoke to me in Malay. Upon hearing this, a young woman in the shop commented with a mixture of surprise and delight “Eh bana kecek Isle juko’” (PM. “Heah, you are also good at Malay!”). Overhearing her, another customer rebuked her, pointing out that if an Islamic language existed it was Arabic—not Malay. Differences in the value Heng and Razak place on the Malay language in their homes demonstrate some of the significant shifts that have occurred in Cabetigo over recent decades. Seni Mudmarn’s comparison between Malay language loyalty in Pattani and Satun (1988) revealed that this was considerably stronger in Pattani at the time.8 Indeed, Cabetigo residents born as late as the 1980s recall Thai literature having been banned in Malay households for fear of its corrupting Buddhist influences. Although Thai may not have replaced Malay as the traditional language of Islam in the southern provinces, the increased use of Thai in the Malay-dominated farsouth is an important and under-researched phenomenon (see Kongchatree, 1979; Mudmarn, 1988; Scupin, 1988). Interestingly, Thai Muslim modernists have long emphasised the production of Thai religious literature (Scupin, 1980; Yusuf, 2007, p. 11). Analogous situations exist in Singapore and Malaysia. Virginia Matheson Hooker has noted that in Malaysia among young urban Malays, decreased proficiency in Malay has coinciding with changes in the practice of Malay adat. Both Malay adat and language affects all but one of the three elements of Malayness defined by Malaysia’s 1957 constitution (2004, p. 159). Razak and others like him in Cabetigo resemble Malaysia’s English-speaking urban Malays sometimes referred to as Melayu baru.9 Many Malays like Razak have not objections to being referred to as Thai Muslims. This is the Thai government’s official exonym for all of its Muslim citizens. This designation is rejected by some in Cabetigo, who regard this as sounding oxymoronic, similar to “Buddhist Muslims” (Le Roux, 1998, p. 243). This is a nonissue for Cabetigo’s converts to Islam, immigrants from Thai-speaking provinces (like Ased), and member of Cabetigo’s Arab (PM. ore ara’) and Pakistani (PM. ore Kabul) immigrant community. Most Thai converts in Cabetigo have entered Islam in order to marry Muslim spouses.10 Unlike Bangkok, such conversions are not predominantly Muslim men marrying Buddhist women (Scupin, 1998, p. 248). Also, unlike the situation 8
For recent studies mentioning Malay language use in Satun see Merli (2009) and Parks (2009). Although Melayu baru (SM. new Malay) is associated with the “Vision 2020” initiative launched in 1991 by the Malaysian government under Mahathir, A.B. Shamsul employs this term to describe Malaysia’s emerging middle-class that he suggests is a modern version of its pre-NEP predecessor Orang kaya baru (Shamsul, 1999, p. 60). 10 For recent studies of Muslim and non-Muslim marriage and conversion see Marddent (2008). 9
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in Satun, described by Nishii (1999), intermarriage between Muslims and Thai Buddhists is still relatively rare in Cabetigo. Converts to Islam in Cabetigo vary in their observance of Islam’s most basic ritual obligations. How well they are accepted by the Malay Muslim majority also varies. A Thai-Chinese man, who married a Cabetigo local while living in Bangkok, appeared mildly traumatised when I asked to interview him. His wife, laughed, saying “He doesn’t know a thing!” He still wore gold jewellery, even though this was frowned upon by Muslims. Noticeably absent on the balconies of two households where Thai Buddhist female converts live are the white prayer shawls (PM. kain kana) used by Malay Muslim women when performing salat. Both these women continue to wear dresses with hems just covering their knees, which make them almost indistinguishable from Thai Buddhists. Ased is one of many Thai Muslims who have shifted to Cabetigo. From the 1940s, a number of Thai Muslim immigrants served as role models for a negotiated integration and “Thai-Islam-ness”. Interviews with some of the first Malays to have attended a Thai school indicated that this difficult decision was facilitated by friendships that their parents had with Thai Muslim immigrants from Bangkok. These demonstrated that it was possible to be a Muslim despite attended a Thai school and speaking Thai. Two Thai Muslim extended families from Nakhon Si Thammarat have lived in Cabetigo for 30 years. The heads of these families are Lung (Th. Uncle) Wae and Lung Mat. Their children have married a mixture of local Malays and other Southern Thai Muslims. The presence of Arab (PM. ore ara’) and (mainly Pathan) Pakistani (PM. ore kabul) immigrants further increases Cabetigo’s ethnic diversity. Although relationships between Malays and immigrant families are generally congenial, some tensions do exist. Many immigrants attend the Pakistan mosque (PM. Masyid Pakiste, Masyid Kabul, Th. Masyid Pakistan) located 2 km downstream from Cabetigo. The introduction of hanafi conventions by Pathans was originally controversial. Dramatic reductions in their numbers in the wake of the closure of the British consulate in Songkhla, led to shafi’i norms being adopted in southern Pakistan Mosques. The prosperity of some immigrants is resented by some Malays. Members of these immigrant communities are also critical of Malays for issues ranging from their consumption of uncooked meat products such as budu (PM. fermented fish sauce), to being hyper-suspicious and adverse to difference. Many immigrant families have maintained a sense of ethnic distinctiveness, while still engaging in Thai modernity, and achieving educational and financial success. The heterogeneity of Muslims in Thailand—especially in Bangkok—is well known. Thai Muslims in Bangkok may come from a plurality of cultures and subcultures, but most have long expressed themselves in Thai linguistic forms and are assimilated into the modern Thai nation-state. Some have also retained distinctive elements of their original cultures and continue communalising along their respective sub-ethnic lines. Omar Farouk refers to Thailand’s Thai Muslim and Malay constituencies as its “assimilated” and “unassimilated” populations (1988), which Yusuf refers to as “integrated” and “unintegrated” (2007, p. 4). As a Thai Muslim of Indian background, Chaiwat Satha-Anand comments on having “less in common with the people of Pattani than they have in common with
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people in northern Sumatra let alone Malay Muslims in Kelantan or Terengganu” (2008, p. 102). Farouk suggests that changes in the cultural and linguistic boundaries between Malays and Thai Muslims have permitted the emergence of a new community “decidedly Muslim in faith but recognizably Thai in culture” (2005, p. 4). While it is commonly accepted that to be Malay is to be a Muslim, in Thailand a Muslim need not be Malay (see Albritton, 2010). Most in Cabetigo reject suggestions that Malays become Thai Muslim simply by speaking Thai. Many who have studied or worked in Bangkok speak disparagingly of the knowledge and practice of Islam by most Muslims there. Be Heng once exclaimed in primordialist tones, “The government likes to say to us in Pattani, ‘Look! These guys are Muslims and they speak Thai—you can too!’ But they are not Malays”. Apparently, for some in Bangkok, the feeling is mutual. One of the many legacies of 8 years of violence in South Thailand is rising prejudice against Southern Malays by Bangkok Muslims. A Cabetigo ore meneko (PM. Petty trader) recounted that during a recent business trip to Bangkok, many avoided his stall after hearing him speak Malay. Do Southern Malay and Thai Muslims north of districts in Satun and Songkhla where Malay is still spoken represent the two cultural poles of Thai Muslim society? There are a number of problems with the proposition. The first is that it downplays the Malay origins of many Muslim communities in the upper south and Bangkok (Anderson, 2010; Merli, 2009; Parks, 2009). Those familiar with Malay are stuck by how many place names in the upper south are of Malay origin. The tourist Mecca of Phuket comes from the Malay word for hill (SM. bukit). At the time of his research in Bangkok in the late 1970s, Raymond Scupin claimed that 70% of its 150 mosques were built by the descendants of Malay prisoners of war taken by Kings Rama I and Rama III and 3,000 Malays are estimated to have resided in Bangkok in 1828. This number tripled following the 1832 campaign. Many war prisoners were resettled in Bangkok’s eastern extremities where they provided the labour for the Chakri dynasty’s major projects such as the construction of canals, the most famous of which is the Saen Saep canal. Scupin comments that anyone travelling on this canal discovers that it is “punctuated by mosques which have been erected on both the east and west sides” (1998, p. 239).11 These claims are corroborated in Louis Golomb’s study of multi-ethnic healing between Buddhists and Muslims in Pattani, Songkhla and Bangkok. He notes that the majority of Bangkok’s Muslims continue to share many traits with the Malay communities of the southern border provinces of their ancestors (1985, p. 8).12 Legal rulings of Bangkok’s traditionalist ulama on contested customary practices are oriented towards Islamic legal norms in the Malay-Indonesian world. Indeed, although many controversial practices were abandoned by Malays in South Thailand, these continue in Bangkok (Scupin, 1978, p. 178).
11
Scupin cites Wenk and Stahl (1968). For more on Malay communities in Bangkok see Farouk Bajunid (1992), Tadmor (2004) and Umaiyah Haji Umar (2003).
12
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Factors Affecting Autonym Selection What are the factors that affect which everyday-defined autonyms and authoritydefined exonyms are chosen? Following Le Roux, I argue that the choice is influenced by the interlocutor’s ethnicity, the language in which their identity is articulated, and their status and degree of assimilation (1998, p. 244). The role played by language in the selection of autonyms and exonyms is aptly illustrated by the following anecdote about an incident that happened to a Malay neighbour of mine while entering Kelantan at the Tak Bai border crossing. While processing paper work required for him to drive his Thai registered vehicle in Malaysia, a Malaysian official referred to him as an orang siam. This made my neighbour furious. Although in Standard Malay this might either denote “Thai Buddhists” or “Thai nationals”, in Cabetigo orang siye unequivocally refers to “Thai Buddhists”. It is important to note at this juncture that some Malays in Cabetigo also object to being called (in Thai) “khon Malay”. Although some assume that this is a shortened form of “khon Malaysia” (meant to refer to Malaysian nationals), they insist that while they are Malays, they are also full Thai citizens. Whenever speaking Malay, Malays in Cabetigo refer to themselves as ore taning (“Patanians”), anok taning (“a child of Patani”), ore sining (“a local”), ore Melayu or ore nayu (“Malay”), ore jawi, or ore isle (“Muslims”). When speaking Thai, Malays may use any other the following terms: khon thi ni (“people from here”), khon phuen thin (“a local”), or khon thai muslim (“a Thai Muslim”). Not only would no Malays refer to themselves as khaek (Th. stranger), most are highly offended when someone refers to them in this manner. Among Thai-speaking Muslims from the upper south, khaek is viewed as synonymous with Muslims (Marddent, 2008; Merli, 2009). Also affecting how Malays identity themselves is the degree to which Malay have been exposed to, and assimilated into, Thai modernity. For instance, when forced to deal with Thai officials suspected of holding discriminatory attitudes towards Malays, some accentuate their Thai-ness. Malays may refer to themselves by their Thai name, wear trousers rather than a sarongs, and leave a Muslim hat (PM. piyo’) in their pocket. None of these would be necessary with unthreatening interlocutors. Indeed, Le Roux claims that urban Malays only rarely refer to themselves as ore jawi—carrying as it does the connotations of “hillbilly”. Given the term’s neutrality and its usefulness for avoiding contested exonyms and lengthy neologisms, this is something Le Roux laments (1998, p. 248). Consider the autonyms that might be chosen by a native of Pattani when addressing a Malaysian, friendly Thai, and a less-friendly Thai (in Thai). To a Malay from Malaysia (especially Kelantan), he may refer to himself as ore taning or anak tani. It is immediately obvious that he is a Malay (as he speaks a particular dialect), a Muslim (due to the greeting used), and that he is from Thailand (everyone knows where Patani is situated). To a friendly Thai, Malays may refer to themself in Thai as khon Melayu, since his Thai citizenship is so obvious that it does not warrant being mentioned. To a less friendly Thai, however, he might prefer to use the term “Thai Muslim”.
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Should the dynamics that existed in the pre-colonial Straits of Melacca be viewed as resembling those of present-day Cabetigo, superior alternatives exist to conceiving southern Malays and Thai Muslims as the two poles of Thai Muslim society. I have shown that plural and porous identities exist in present-day Cabetigo. Although Razak moves between Thai and Malay worlds with relative ease, time alone will tell whether his daughter chooses to refer to herself as “Malay”. This is an issue that Be Heng’s children are unlikely to struggle with. Pak Mat’s emphatic rejection of the autonym or exonym Thai Muslim is understandable given his education in the traditional ponok system before the advent of PSTIs. However, this is a position that fewer younger Malays in Cabetigo are committed to. Although Malay bilingualism in South Thailand continues to increase, Razak and Be Heng illustrate that a number of factors affect the strategies employed by Cabetigo’s Malay residents to identify themselves and how well their children will speak Malay. Rather than the two pole of Muslim society in Thailand, the Malays of the far-south and both Thai Muslims of the upper south and Bangkok Muslims descended from Malay prisoners of war, might be conceived as leaves of the same tree.
Modern Multi-lingualism While a number of linguistic observations have already been made, the following discussion of modern multi-lingualism in Cabetigo is necessitated by one of this study’s principal concerns: The rhetorical aspects of Muslim merit-making. However important the rituals through which Muslims make merit are, and the merit-making rationales that motivate their performance, respondents’ explanations about these are all mediated through the agency of language. Informants who have been observed making merit identically may articulate their rationales differently for a number of reasons. While some may relate to reformist or traditionalist orientations, Thai and Malay-speaking Muslims subtly articulate conceptions of merit and merit-making through speech acts specific to the language used. As I argue in the following chapter, Thai and Malay articulations of merit and meritmaking draw from distinct conceptual wells that simultaneously complicates and enriches this study’s portrayal of Muslim merit-making. Language dynamics in Pattani have dramatically changed since Seni Mudmarn (1988) and Narong Kongchatree (1979) conducted their fieldwork. Although some of Cabetigo’s old residents like Pok Mat have never learnt Thai, the majority of Malays in Cabetigo are bilingual. Few Thai Muslims speak Malay, and increasing numbers of younger Malays are functionally monolingual Thai-speakers. Le Roux describes Malay multi-lingualism in the following manner: . . . They submit themselves to incredible intellectual gymnastics . . . by the age of thirty, for example, [they] have undergone hefty instruction. They have studied spoken and written Thai [. . .] as well as written Arabic and the Jawi writing system; they have learned their own dialect and know the nuances of the dialects in the region; they are likely to know some standard Malay [. . .] They are polyglots who jump quickly from one language to the
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3 Religious, Ethnic and Linguistic Diversity other. When they read orang in a text of standard Malay written in Jawi script, they correct automatically and pronounce it ore, which translates to khon in Thai [. . .] depending on the person they are talking with. Most astonishingly, they are capable of thinking ore but writing orang, and pronouncing orang when they know that the listener is Malay or understands Malay but no Jawi. When they meet someone who addresses them in standard Malay, the Jawi respond similarly, as if the language spoken to them were their own proper dialect, and thus they very often distort the inquiries of official linguists with the same ease they handle an imposing series of ethnonyms (Le Roux, 1998, p. 244).
Linguistic diversity in Cabetigo is both audible and visible. In addition to Thai, English and Chinese, some shop signs are also written in Jawi. Indeed, Jawi signs feature prominently in the new Big C department store that opened in 2005. Malay place names are also written on street signs, maps and football team shirts using Thai orthography. Unfortunately, the system used is often as inconsistent as it is inaccurate. Smalley describes the production of primers by the department of Education as “abortive efforts by amateurs” (1994, p. 172) (Fig. 3.2). Although most of my informants are capable of functioning in both languages, not all were able to do so with equal fluency. Bilingualism in Cabetigo exhibits signs of dependent multi-lingualism: where one language is filtered through another. Wherever this exists, over time, discrete linguistic components begin to affect each other in both directions. The result is a Thai-ised Malay, and a Malay-ised Thai, each of which possesses its own “standardised” pronunciation. This is referred to by Smalley as interdependent multi-lingualism (1994, p. 308). The Malay-ised Thai that many in Cabetigo speak lacks clearly defined tones, and is replete with glottal stops and Malay lexical borrowings. Although similar to Kelantanese, the Pattani Malay dialect is replete with long initial consonants (Paramal, 1990). As a result of sustained language contact with Thai, Pattani Malay is also increasingly tonalised. Malay words are pronounced with Thai-like high tones, a distinctive element of Southern Thai. Pattani Malay is also influenced by Thai phonology, such as the replacement of /j/ sounds for /y/ sounds (Jawi, becoming Yawi). There are also extensive lexical borrowings from Thai (see Ahmad
Fig. 3.2 Inventive spelling on a street sign in Cabetigo
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Idris, 1990). As a result, although Standard Malay is comprehensible to Pattani Malay, the reverse is not the case. While Pattani Malay is considered more viable than Thailand’s other minority languages (Smalley, 1994, pp. 313–315), Malay academics express concerns at the shrinking of the local Malay lexicon. Malay consumption of Thai media consumption has also affected Cabetigo’s language ecology of Cabetigo. The most significant is Thai television watched in almost every Malay household. In addition to a mixture of mono-lingual and bilingual individuals residing in Cabetigo, conversations may also be carried out in more than one language. Indeed, extensive language switching sometimes makes it unclear which language is being used—a situation locally referred to as talking bahaso bide. As an example of the dependent and interdependent multi-lingualisms described above, the following anecdotes illustrate how the choice of language is affected by the topic, discussants and location in Cabetigo. This is referred to as situational bilingualism. Jamilah is in her mid-30s and was born, bred, educated and married in Cabetigo. She speaks the Malay-ised Thai and Thai-ised Pattani Malay of most other Cabetigo residents. I have had innumerable conversations with her as a neighbour before beginning to employ her accountancy services. The first time I visited her office, I was astounded to hear her speaking with a client on the phone in impeccable Central Thai, necessitated by (1) where she was at the time, (2) who she was speaking with, and (3) what she was speaking about. Narong Kongchatree’s study of Malay bilingualism (1979) presents a number of findings about what tasks Thai and Malay are used for. Malay was the language in which 75% prayed and 65% dreamt. Also 57% wrote diaries in Thai, and the number who counted in Thai roughly equalled those who did so in Malay (1979, p. 40). Certain topics are associated with specific places. In other words, different localities in Cabetigo possess different default language settings. Many children studying the Qur’an’ between Norib and Iso in Cabetig, do so at Pok Ma’ Gu’s house who speaks absolutely no Thai. The complete absence of Thai in this first chapter of Islamic education explains some of the reasons why Malay became the default language at the Surau Rim Khlong a short walk up the road. While Pok Ma’ Gu’s house and Surau Rim Khlong teach religion, a wide range of topics are discussed in Cabetigo’s keda kopi. This is done in a mixture of Thai and Malay. Furthermore, there are a range of factors that determine which language is chosen. One morning, I arrived as the eight o’clock news was being broadcast in Omar’s roti shop. I took my seat at the completion of a news item analysing the latest developments in Thai politics. This was the topic of discussion thereafter, all of which was conducted in Thai. There followed a special report concerning a fatal bombing in the fresh market in Yala, which everyone immediately turned to watch. People then returned to their roti and tea, and began talking about their reactions to the bombing—this time in Malay. Not long after this, a Thai-speaking friend appreciated for his wit and his eye for the ridiculous joined us. He was invited, in Thai, to add his opinion to those which had just been shared. He obliged by regaling
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us with red-hot intelligence obtained from his mother-in-law, an ore meneko in the fresh market. These anecdotes featuring Jamilah, Pok Ma’ Gu’s house, Surau Rim Khlong and Omar’s roti shop illustrate the influence of the topic, and location on language in Cabetigo. The following vignette about how the presence of an accidental anthropologist in the conversational ointment occasionally affected the language I encountered. On one memorable occasion, a Thai-speaking informant once referred to “Phra Muhammad”. When I said that I had never heard someone use this term, he explained that this was a way of talking about a religious leader in Thai. He continued, “If I was talking to another Muslim, I would say nabi (Ar.) or sasada (Th.) Muhammad, or Rasul-Allah (Ar.). We use this when we are talking about Islam with non-Muslims”.
Conclusion This chapter has delineated how Cabetigo’s religious, ethnic and linguistic diversity have been impacted by the Thai and Islamic influences described in the previous chapter. It is difficult to overstate the importance of this chapter’s portrayal of these aspects the fieldwork context in which this study is situated. For instance, the rituals through which merit is made and what motivates merit-generation are both affected by an individual’s traditionalist or reformist orientation. The following chapter demonstrates that the language in which merit-making rhetoric is articulated affects our understanding of Muslim merit-making. I have shown that as with other urban communities in Muslim Southeast Asia, decades of reformist and revivalist activism in South Thailand have led to unprecedented religious diversity—and occasionally division—in Cabetigo. While traditionalists are the overwhelming majority, the influence of reformism in Cabetigo is disproportionate to their numbers. The vast majority of people in Cabetigo identify themselves as Malay. The presence of the last sultan of Patani/Pattani’s palace, the royal mosque (PM. masyid rajo) and the cemetery (PM. kubor) all remind Cabetigo residents of their Malay heritage. Cabetigo’s residents are more cosmopolitan than most rural communities in the far-south for at least two reasons. First, Cabetigo possesses a sizable population of immigrant Muslims from Yemen, Pakistan, Bangkok or Nakhon Si Thammarat, most of whom comfortably identifying themselves as Thai Muslims. Secondly, most Malays in Cabetigo view their Thai citizenship as complementing— rather than competing—with their sense of belonging to the Malay world. This has made led to increasing numbers of Malays to voluntarily refer to themselves as Thai Muslims. The increase in Malay bilingualism has led to the establishment of a Thai cosmopolis in Cabetigo brought about by the policies of past Thai governments. Some policies, such as the forced registration of ponoks as PSTI were stick-like policies, while the concessions to Muslim demands in the 1980s were more carrot-like. Concluding this chapter with details of modern multi-lingualism prepares readers for the following chapter that is concerned with Thai and Malay merit-making rhetoric.
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