Muslim Identity and the Balkan State

HUGH POULTON SUHA TAJI-FAROUKI editors

Muslim Identity and the

Balkan State

I.B.U. LIBRARY i.B.O. KUTUPHANESi

HURST & COMPANY, LONDON in association with the Islamic Council

First published in the United Kingdom by C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 38 King Street, London WC2E 8JZ © Hugh Poulton and Suha Taji-Farouki, 1997 All rIghts reserved. Printed and bound in Great Brita1l1 by BiddIes Ltd, GuiIdford and King's Lynn ISBNs 1-85065-276-7 (cased) 1-85065-348-8 (paper)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The editors would like to thank all those whose efforts or support contributed to the production of this book. Special thanks are due to the various authors; to H.R.H. Crown Prince EI-Hassan bin Talal of Jordan; to Saleha Mahmoud-Abedin, editor of the IMMA book series, of which this is the third publication; to Christopher Hurst and Michael Dwyer of Hurst and Co., the publishers, and to Professor Harry Norris for his comments. The editors, of course, accept full responsibility for the opinions expressed, and for any errors. April 1997

S.T.-F. H.P.

v

CONTENTS

Acknowledgemmts

page v

TtlC Contributors

IX

Suha Tclji-Pal'Ouki and HU,lSh Poulton 1 Islam. EthmClty and State m the Contemporary Balkans Hugh Poulton 13 Strategies for Sustaimng a Vulnerable Identity: The ~ Case of the Bulgarian Pomaks Yulian Konstantilwv '~ From Religious Identity to Ethnic Mobilisation: The Turks of Bulgana before, under and smce Communism Wo!&al1g Hiipkel1 ~~ Changing Notions of National Identity among Muslims in Thrace and Macedonia: Turks, Pomaks and Roma Hugh Poulton 82 The Muslim Population in FYROM (Macedonia): Public PerceptIOns Natasha Gaber 103 Islam, State and Society in Post-COlmnunist Albania Nathalie Clayer 115 The Kosovo Albanians: Ethnic 'Confrontation with the Slav State Hugh Poultol1 and Miral1da Vickers 139 The SandZak: A PerspectIve of Serb-Muslim Relations Milan Al1drejevich 170 Turkey as Kin-State: Turkish Foreign Policy towards Turkish and Muslim Communities m the Balkans Hugh Poulton 194 Sustaming Turkish-Islamic Loyalties: The DiyQ11et in Western Europe Nico Umdl1lal1 214 After Dayton HU,lSh Poultol1 232

1. Introduction

J 2. 3. 4.

J 5.

J 6.

e

j 8. 9.

rl0.

11. 12.

243

Index VB

THE CONTRIBUTORS

Milan Andrejevich, formerly a research analyst and special assistant to the director of Radio Free Europe for Southeast European affairs, Munich, is currently an international affairs and media consultant specialising in Southeastern Europe in Washington DC. Nathalie Clayer is on the staff of the Centre d'Histoire du Domaine Turc, Ecole des Halltes Etudes en SCIences Sociales, Paris. Natasha Gaber is deputy director of the Centre for Inter-Ethnic Relations at the Institute for SocIOlogical and Political Research, SkoPJe, FYROM. WO![f?allg Hopken is professor of Balkan History at the University of Leipzig.

Yuliall K011St(//1tillov is head of the Bulgarian Society for RegIonal Cultural Studies, Sofia. Nico Lam/mm/ IS a specialist on Muslim religious affairs in Turkey and Western Europe at the speCIal group on oriental languages and cultures in the Faculty of Letters, UniversIty of Lei den, Netherlands. Hugh Poultol1 is the author of IiVho are the Macedonians? (1995) and Top Hat, Grey fMJlf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the 1hrkish Republic (1997). He is a consultant on the Balkans to the Minority Rights Group. Suha Taji-Farouki is lecturer in Modern Islam at the Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, University of Durham, England. Miranda Vickers IS co-author (with James Pettifer) of Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity (1997); her Between Serb (//1d Albanian: A History of Kosol/a is due for publication in 1988. IX

1 INTRODUCTION Suha Taji-Farouki and Hugh Poulton Following the collapse of the former Yugoslav state, the conflict there focused world attention on the Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina, which Norris 1 has described as 'the historical heartland of the world of Islam in the Balkans'. Significant among the causes of the tragedy was the collapse into war of the states in which they lived - both the former Yugoslav state and the incipient Bosnian one. The Bosnian tragedy has made very clear the importance of examining the relationship between the Balkan Muslim communities and the states in which they live, as well as their self-definition in relation to these states. This forms the primary focus of this study. The appalling bloodshed and destruction in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the impact of which was felt throughout Europe and beyond, graphically illustrated the potential for conflict in the Balkans involving Muslim populations. Before the Dayton settlement there were clear indications that the war there might spread to other predominantly Muslim regions, such as the Sandzak or Kosovo, or erupt into a wider Balkan war. While the settlement has brought a peace of sorts, continuing evidence of conflict between the region's ethnically and religiously diverse populations presses home the need for vigilance and the importance of a serious academic focus on this complex ethnic and sectarian mosaic. The Muslim communities of the Balkan states have rarely been the subject of comprehensive scholarly research, and only at infrequent intervals have the world's media taken an interest in bringing their circumstances to the attention of the general public. While the Bosnian Muslims have for understandable reasons attracted much attention,2 many of the other Muslim population 1 H. T, Norris. Islam ill Ihe Balkalls: Religioll and Society belWeetz Europe and tile Ami, T¥orld. London: Hurst. 1993. p. 254. 2 For a comprehensive discussion of the history and circumstances of the Bosnian Muslims see Mark Pinson. The Muslims I!f BOSllia-HcrccgoIJina. Cambridge. MA:

1

3

Sulra Taji-Farouki ami Hugh Poulton

Introduction

groups in the Balkans have not been examined in such great detail, a gap this volume aspires to fill. However, it does not address the Bosnian Muslims because its focus IS on the relations between Balkan Muslim communities and the states 111 which they live, and the nature of the state in wl1lch the Bosnian Muslims live IS uncertain. In contrast the SandZak Muslims, also SerboCroat-speaking, are discussed since theIr position in relation to the state in which they live (i.e. in Serbia and Montenegro 111 rump YugoslaVIa) can be predicted more easily. The Muslim commUl1lties ofKosovo, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Greece, Bulgaria and Albania are included within the volume but not that of Romania - a country traditionally counted as within the Balkan region but whose Muslim population IS numerIcally small. Islam in the Balkans has never been monolithic, having always had a broad varIety of forms and expressions. While the book provides detailed studies of less well-known groups, like the Pomaks, it also examines the situation oflarger more visible groups such as the Muslim Albanians. This serves to hIghlight the diversity among the Balkan Muslim populations. However, the chapters are mainly concerned WIth minority Muslim communities, because Muslims 111 the Balkans live predominantly as minOrItIes in Orthodox Christian states, each of wl1lch is seen as the national territory of a particular ethnic group to which they often do not belong. In such situations the Muslim communities face a compounded problem by virtue of their presence as a m1110rity that is defined in both ethnic and religious terms. Even in Albania, where the Muslims form a majonty, their presence in what till the fall of Communism was a militantly atheistIC state where all religious communities were severely repressed makes their position comparable to that of Musiim commuI1lties 111 potentially hostile states. Furthermore, as a l11~oritarian Muslim country Albania is central to the ethl1lc dynamics of the region - for example, with its impact on FYROM and Kosovo. In addition to a chapter on Albama, there are also two chapters

relating to Turkey. Of several reasons for this the most important is that the presence of about one million Muslims in the Balkans creates a responsibility for Turkey as a neighbourmg Muslim country compounded by the historical legacy of Ottoman rule in the region. There has been considerable evidence since the 1980s of an attempt by Turkey to strengthen its role and extend its political and economic influence 111 the Balkans. This includes, for example, the conclusion of military agreements with Albania 111 1991 - under which Ankara agreed to help train and modernise the Albanian armed forces - and FYROM in 1995; preparatIOns for a parallel agreeinent with Bosnia (a Turkish consulate was opened in Sarajevo in 1991); and the East-West corridor project, which aims to link Turkey with Bosnia and FYROM, and through them with Western Europe. In addition, there has been a warming of relations with Bulgaria, Ankara's arch-enemy during the Cold War. Turkey casts a paternal eye over ethnic Turkish communities in Bulgaria, Greece and FYROM, and a large number of other Muslims who are not ethnic Turks look to it as a kin-state for histOrIcal, relif,>1ous and other reasons. And it is illuminating by way of comparISon and contrast to examine Turkey's relationship not only with these but also with ethnic Turkish Muslim communities in Western Europe. Turkey's interest in Turkish Muslim communities beyond its borders brings to the fore the Issue - cruCIally important in the Balkans and highlighted throughout this book - of the relationship between religion and ethl1lcity. Before exploring this it IS necessary to define what we mean here by the term 'Muslim'. Where the indiVIdual is concerned, it includes any persons who believe in or practise some form oflslam, consIder themselves to be culturally Muslim whether or not they practise Islam, or one of Muslim ancestry. The definition of Muslim communities raises certain complications. The long period of Ottoman rule and the millet system - whereby religIOn defined communal identity rather than ethnicity or language - nurtured a strong sense of bel 0 ng111g which was determined exclusively by religIOn. The coheSIve nature of Islam as a social force emphasising the notion of a universal Islamic community or ul11ma re111forces this. At the local level the teachings and daily practICe of the faIth, and the aSSOCiated customs, serve to create a consolidated sense of commul1lty; these customs and the dis-

2

Harvard University Press, 1994; Robert J. Donia, Islalll IIllder tlze DOllble Eagle Boulder. CO: Westview Press, 1981. Alcxandrc Popovic, L' Is la III I)(/Ikatliql/(~. Lcs 1I11ISSIIIIIUlI1S dll Slid-est ellropeet! dat/5 la J)(:riode post-ottO/llalle, Osteuropa-Institut an cler Freicn Universitat Berlin. 1986; R.J. Doma and John V.A. Fine, BOSlllil[-[ercegol';/lil: .II Traditioll Betrayed, London: Hurst, 1994.

4

SlIha Taji-Farollki and Hugh Poulton

11ltroductioll

tinctive way of the life that goes with them separate Muslims from their non-Muslim neighbours even where faith has been eroded. The erosion of religious belief in Balkan societies can be attributed to a number of forces; these include the penetration of competing ideologies such as nationalism, Commumsm with its attendant secularising influence, and the transfonllation of traditional Balkan socIal structures. A particularly important consequence of such intrusions and the accompanyll1g changes has been the emergence of new perceptions of Identity defined according to ethnic and nationalist constructs. These have both been adopted by Balkan Muslim communities and imposed upon them. Self-identification as Muslim bv Balkan Muslim communities themselves takes on a meaning n~arkedly different from that intended when the label is applied by their foes and those who see them as sectarian survivals from the Ottoman age who pose an intractable problem for the successor-states. Taking this into account, thIS volume views the Muslim communities of the Balkans as groups that can be defined socially and ethmcally on the one hand, but also as specific religious groups on the other, characterised by distinct inner lives centred upon specific religious conVIctions, practices and ll1stitutions. While the importance of this inner Islamic life is accorded due recognition It is not the focus of this study, and thus there is no attempt to offer a systematic overview of Islamic conVIctions and rituals among Muslims in the Balkans, or to discuss specifically Islamic institutions and administration, religious education, Islamic publications, or the celebration of religious events. While these issues are adequately addressed 111 existing literature,3 they all need further research, which should aim particularly to document and analyse the impact of Communist

rule and secularisation on individual and collective religious life in terms of both belief and practice, as well as developments in these areas since the collapse of Communism. This raises a question WIth sIgnificant and diverse implications: what does it mean to be a Muslim in the contemporary Balkans? The impact of CommUI1lst rule and secularisation both on the ability to practice Islam and on the vitality of Islamic belief and faIth must be taken ll1to consideration: in former Yugoslavia, for example, after fifty years under a very secular and secularising state, one must ask how deeply religious could the Muslim populations remain? On comll1g to power in 1946, the Communist regime in Bulgaria eradicated all Muslim holidays, prohibited the celebration offeasts and festivals and fast111g during the month of Ramazan and introduced restrictions on the perfonllance of the hajj and various religious rites. Under the Zhivkov regime the call to prayer was also restricted. In Albama the Enver Hoxha regIme severely undermined the foundations of Islamic society, Thus 111 these areas the Impact of the Communist period continues to be felt, despite positive changes since 1989-90. Concern has been voiced by several Islamic actors, including the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC): a report on the situation of Muslim communities and m1110rities in non-member states subnutted by the OIC Secretary-General to the Twenty-second Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers 111 December 19944 includes detailed references to the communities 111 the Sandzak, Kosovo and FYROM (artIcles 61-3), Greece (articles 53-60) and Bulgaria. s As for the former Yugoslavia, the Secretary-General noted with satisclCtion the benefits reaped by Muslim populations from the widespread changes that had swept Eastern Europe since 1989. These included official recognition of freedom of religious expression, making it possible for Islamic schools and 111stitutions to reopen, and the creation of political frameworks providing channels for the lobbying of parliaments. Calling on the OIC's member-states to fulfil their duties to these communities, especially by improving their social and religious conditions, providing ap-

See III particular A. Popovic, VIslmll Balkmziqllc; Ahmed Sm;ulovic, 'Muslims in Yugoslavia', jIMMA (Jollrlwl. tire Illstitlite C?f Muslilll MitlOrity /1ffairs, Jeddah) 2:1, 1980, Pl'. 132-44; M. Ali Kettani, 'Muslims in Southern Europe', jiMMA, 2:1, 1980, Pl'. 145-57; M.l. Qureshi, World Mllslim Millorities, World Muslim Congress, Islamabad, 1993. For more general diSCUSSIOns of Islam and Muslims in the Balkans see the works of Ivo Banac, Smail Balie, Antonia Zhelyazkova, Nathalie Clayer, Ivo Lederer, Petar-Emil Mitev; see alsojIJ\1MA; the contributors here are often Muslim, including Smail13alic, M. Ali Ketta11l, Ahmed Sm;ulovic and Khalid Duran. It should also be noted here that there IS no attcmpt in this study to tracc the historical IslamisatlOn of the communities discussed. 3

5

ICFM122-94/MM/D .1. s Report of the Secretary-General on the Plight of the Turkish Muslim MinOrity in Bulgaria: ICFM122-94/MM/D,3.

4

6

Suha Taji-Farouki and HU,l!,h Poulton

Introduction

propriate religious matenal translated into local languages, and initiating activities among women, he argued that these Muslims,

the latter throughout the Muslim world drew considerable media attention, especially when it was manifested in the forn1 of war volunteers. Western fears of a reassertion of Islam in the region fuelled local prejudices in this respect . The prospect of a Muslim-dominated state in Euro e, which the CrISIS 111 osnia rought to the fore, l~roduced substantial unease in some Western circles, while a ri~ing new 1Sramic factor' figures prominently in emerg~g debates within the Balkans on Balkan and European security. <;::oncern has also been exprew over the potential for a 'Muslim axis' consis~.of.~y=the .I::!Qiilljan ~~> Alballii' Against this background a sens,e ~~ggl~_h~.~er~d. agEn~,J?erceived Muslim threat; this iS~...!10table i!l.9ree~ aI~_~~_~!:,~ has 6~¢com.e~~§t'fal to the perception held by certain circles in thOse countries of t11eIr"roTe'lll em. Wllik.~

.... who have begun to realise anew their belonging to this great religion, look forward with optImism and hope to the Islamic world. They need assistance from every Muslim in the world in order to give them direction and compensate them for the years of repression and deprivation. We have to open our hearts and mmds to these Muslims. They are desperate. to go back to theIr real roots. It is not enough to sympathise wIth them through the media but we have to support them, ideol~gically and materially, and increase the scope of cooperation with them.) >

>

>

>

>

>

The Secretary-General alerted his colleagues to the increasingly widespread notIOn of Islam as a threat to be contained, and acknowledged the contribution whIch the recent political upheavals and economic difficulties in the region had made to the growth of tIllS opimon. Citing hostile anti-Muslim campaigns orchestrated by radical nationalists and constructions of 'Muslim extremism', which have been upheld as a pretext to object to the presence of Muslim representatives in the new parliamentary bodies, he 111sIsted that Muslims in the Sandzak, Kosovo and FYROM face a senous threat of annihilation comparable to that faced by the Muslims in Bosnia. Similarly he highlighted efforts to obliterate Muslim identIty in Western Thrace, and registered concern at the rise of ethnic nationalist sentiment in post-Zhivkov Bulgaria, threatening an anti-Muslim backlash. In particular, he expressed disappointment at the £'lilure of this regime to return lands once owned by Islamic institutIons that had been confiscated by the Conununist regime. The OIC Secretary-General's position on the Muslim minorities of the Balkans, summed up in his urgent call to member-states to be active in protecting them, was echoed in the stance adopted by many governments of Muslim countries during the Bosnian crisis. To distance themselves from Western policy and avoid accusations of not doing enough to help their fellow Muslims, especially over the ending of the arms embargo, many of them joined international IslamIC organisations and Islamist political movements in providing generous aid to the Bosnian Muslims. Support for (, Report ICFMI22-94/MM/D.1. p. 17.

n~-SerbS'-to

7

:X ~:.~..~~::':~ ~:,,_~.!: ~;£.:.?S2>~?~I.;>t,",,~..>.~~,~s.....»!~lg~E~ans

ha~~2~~~E3J?P!~1!~n~!g.!1L~J2.2.\t~>!!:lE~~11,::~~,~ among theI~~OrtQQ.Q9.1LMaceE.£nians'L.Jaced~tl:L!hs:>••tapigI}:".,grQ~in{LE!>::~!>im

.~lbanian.J22Put~!i2!.1..AJ1~~~_~~m~1,!;F.$J~~~~w.For, i art is .a widespr~'ld E.erc~;p.t~Ol~th uslim world th Ire '%'acteffectiVery orpromp~_£1~..~~n!.?3,:,"~~~••_~~9 ~~1Ce to acce t a nce 111 tr~~~l1tt~rd ate e .crt to remove t e ast vestig~s or1Sr~fuEu~~l?i:·- 11 e t11tt;~~trb;1·(}[;l11~rrcr~lng~C'(;~;;fIt(;t bef~siai~'?and 'the West' IS frequently applied to the Balkan case, it is important to look more closely at the two categories counterpoised here. IQ!!!1derstand fears ofIslam and 'IslamIC fundamentalism' among thLC:]1riStIan populations of th~Ui~!§.!.1_. sta~~"L!!....lL!!!cejliJl!y to ~s.iA~_the.J~g~.~.L2.~~~~;an~.:;:l~: For some 400 years, Islam was encountered by these popu1atIOns,~he Jeligion ~1e .~ ~~~ as disadvantaged citizens, Barkanenrrstianswere left with suspicion and dislike of the Turks and Islam. Referring to developments during the Yugoslav Imbroglio, Donia and Fine argue: Though these feelings had greatly decreased over the past century, recent demagogues and media propaganda have made use of colored descriptions of these years, linking the various abuses of that time with Islam. Propagandists can use these themes successfully, because fear ofIslam (encouraged by the way the Turkish period IS depicted 111 school books and folklore)

8

SlIlra Taji-l'arouki and Hugh Pouitcm

Illtroduction

lics just bclow thc Sur£1CC in many semi-educated Christians' minds. . , . TIm legacy IS not a rctaincd centurics-old hatred, but somcthing that can bc played upon and grcatly distorted by publicists.7

world. By contrast, it is characterISed as liberal and tolerant. Many authors note that B~nia's Muslims see no inherent conflict between

~gac~ of the ?,£Uy'sten!.jn~~ BalkaIl§..jL~...Y_t,~~~f2~ !iI11c

~!?al~~_M,!15J~~,,:,g~~ll:!~_ of integra'don wit!liil ~~~~! ~~As the head of Bosnian Islam put it in 1989, 'Those who adopted the Islamic faith m these regions have the good fortune to belong to the long established European inhabitants and to participate in the finest achievements of European culture'.10 In spite of the signing of the Dayton Peace Treaty for BosniaHercegovina in December 1995, aImed at halting Europe's most bloody conflict after the Second World War, the future of Muslims in the Balkans cannot be predicted. Building on US Secretary of State Warren Christopher's comment that the Dayton Agreement would pave the way for other problems 111 the Balkans to be solved, the Kosovo leader Ibrahim Rugova reminded the US State Department that the crisis in the former Yugoslavia had started in Kosovo, and that everythmg must be done to prevent the final tragedy from taking place there. 11 Flashpo111ts in the Balkans involvmg Muslim minoritIes remain. J~[<:>~ara .j;SJ.-pro~~~~~ol~~,e

L

b.e~C;;!!ill.QlLi!!L.~!llil!gl,y-. TraditlOnally, the Orthodox churches have been intimately linked with particular states, nations and ethnic groups. It is generally recognised that they played a central role in the various Balkan nationalist movements and as a result the religious [;lctor became particularly prominent in the construction of.modern national identities in the region, confusing concepts of relIgIon, ethnicity and cItizenship. Forces of ethnic n~Q!~sm have been unleashed in the Balkans ~~of tl:lJ~-..GQ1(L~ra~'{liS1i1tegr:1t:To;;-OftT~~·s9Vit UlitQ!b and the conflict between the various ethno-nationalist groups has proceeded largely along confessional lines. NatlOnaliSllLh~.1l~en dOll,Un;m.~...i!-:. ,E.!~,~~ ~!~,£J?,~li. £~.s,~l,..!:l~,!ieoL<21lL~~L~~2.i£J;;f£_~y_,~!~e .~rg.li!'Ql~
.

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II:LiLXaPJ~.£h;)Jlgmg.,.\!,nI,L!1Q.t"iQii.!:?.9..~~l1.tly~~~ile env~!:ent MamfestatIOns of an Islamic renaissance have been eVIdent throughout the Balkans in recent years. Best documented is the case of Bosnia, where there have been clear SIgns since 1990. Sarajevo, long the spiritual centre of East European Islam, became from the ,1970s an important locus for the translation and publication of Islamic literature. H While Serbian extremists and mass media have energetically circulated reports that Bosnian Muslims -and by extension Muslims throughout the Balkans - are fundamentalists and fanatics, Muslim authors insist that Balkan Islam has none of the attitudes that define 'Islamic fundament'arlSIn' in the Arab

th~~usJllstOLy~'U:t~t~h~ir E~roE~dentity, .anifSh~r~ii£12

t~~i!!1~~-Qy~~J:!lg~_~J!d, S~;§~'!9

~lQ,fk).~.R.~L0.l:l.s:f.Iur!cl;~i.Q~~~~ with potentiilly fearful

'unpTlcatIOns for local Muslim. populations. ~~.2f dem9_Ctatl1iilti~lU!UEe J?2~~n~:~1Umst states of the Bal~:.!;~,,!:~,~

,~e~!L~he2tic_~~~gj~E.2!::E~~MS':W~~~r~r'1i~~~IE~¥~~~~~gIOn

whidL's]Jffers..."fr,QU1""'1"wll':,~~.,,,Ql"",1!I!r,,<;;§,glX,~g:00!1l,.l<;,t~'MLJ:\::'\!.~~nJJ:l.g

~~llJllllbs~_tQ...".e.l.:JJ.llt-..

The following chapters address the various Issues raised here, pivoting on the central question of Muslim identity. Throughout the contributions there is an attempt to examine the interaction between religIOUS, ethnic and natIOnal identities in the complex ethnic and sectanan fabric of the Balkans, focusing on the place of predominantly minority Muslim communities within the region's states. While the discussions are set within the historical perspective, emphasis IS placed on the contemporary, especially Norris. 01'. cit., p. 275. Quoted 111 Balic. op. cit .. , p. 386. 11 Kos(wa COlllllllmicatioll: Blllletill of the Millistry of b!forlllatioll of the Republic '!f KosOIJa, no. 245, 12 December 1995.

<)

7

Donia and Fine. op. Cit., p. 69.

Smail Balic. 'A Nation with a most irritating Name'. jIMMA, 13:2, July 1992, pp. 384-9.

H

9

10

10

11

511ha Taji-Farollki and Hugh Poultotl

Introduction

since the collapse of Communjsm and the crisis in former Yugoslavia. Several authors map the changing relationship between the various components on which Muslim identity is constructed in the communities discussed from the Conm1Unist period to the present. In Chapter 2, Hugh Poulton sets the scene with an overview of developments in the Balkans following the disintegration of the Ottoman empire and the emergence of national states. Concentrating on the position of minorities within these new states, he contrasts the case of Muslim minorities, often seen as alien remnants of the former empire, and minorities who shared the Orthodox faith of the new majorities and tended to become assiiTlilated into the relevant nations. The author also contrasts with this the SItuatIOn of Muslims who temporarily escaped the fate of their mmority co-religionists as the territories in which they lived ~rom Ottoman t.
culminating in the traumatic events of the 1980s and the consequent mass migration to Turkey. The situation since the collapse of Communism and the emergence of an ethnic Turkish political party, which has taken part in successive coalitions, IS also examined. In Chapter 5, Hugh Poulton explores the identIty of smaller Muslim groups, in Greece and FYROM, and points to a gradual attraction and assimilation to the dominant Muslim group m each area. In Western Thrace in Greece the ethnic Turks are the dominant Muslim group, in FYROM the ethnic Albanians. FYROM is also the focus of Chapter 6, where Natasha Gaber studies perceptIons of the Muslim population among the various population groups within the country. She highlights the endemic tension between the Slav Orthodox majority and the ethnic Albanians, the second largest population group in FYROM, who are predominantly Muslim. In contrast with the Albanian Muslims, the ethnic Turks, who are all Muslim, appear content with the status qllo. It thus emerges that the tension between Albal1lans and Slavs in FYROM is rooted more in ethnicity than in religIOn pCI' SC. This is further illustrated by the case of the two largest Albal1lan communities in the Balkans, in Albama itself and in neighbouring Kosovo. In Chapter 7, Nathalie Clayer details the re-emergence in Albama of open IslamIC practise after the long period of Communist prohibition, and contrasts the situatIon of the Sunm Muslims WIth that of the large and formerly influential Bektaslll community. She also exammes the role of Muslim countries such as Turkey and internatIOnal Islamic organisations like the Orgal1lsation of the IslamIC Conference in the revitalisation of Muslim life there and assesses the extent to which Islam may function as a component of future Albanian national Identity. The Kosovo Albamans, who are predominantly Muslim, have not experienced a comparable religious repression, but on the other hand, as Hugh Poulton and Miranda Vickers demonstrate 111 Chapter 8, they have been subjected to repeated pressures from a hostile Slav state, due primarily to their ethniClty. This chapter chronicles the history of tIllS community from its incorporation mto SerbIa and thereafter the successive Yugoslav states, and the confrontation with the Serbs over posseSSIOn of a territory wlllch both population groups hold essentIal to their particular construction ofidentity. The Sandzak Muslims, like those in Bosma, are Serbo-Croat-speaking Muslim Slavs, hence theIr relationship

12

Suha Taji-Farollki (/wi Hugh Poulton

with the Slav state (whether Serbia or Yugoslavia in its various hIstorical forms) is velY different from that of the Kosovo Albanians. In Chapter 9, Milan Andrejevich maps the polarisation of relations between them and the Orthodox Serbs, but shows too that facile comparisons with the Bosnian tragedy are premature. The final two chapters examine the role of Turkey, itself part of the Balkans, as the main Muslim power with an interest in the region. As noted earlier, its ll1terest is reinforced by the presence of sizeable Turkish minorities and other Muslim. groups who look to it as a kll1-state. In Chapter 10, Hugh Poulton examines both the histoncal links between these communities and Turkey, as well as Turkey's policy towards them, which has varied from case to case. In Chapter 11, Nico Landman discusses the way in which the Turkish state has attempted to sustain the loyalties of Turkish Muslims livll1g in Western Europe. It has achieved this by consolidating among them an Islamic identity, in a form. clearly subordinated to TurkIsh state ideology through official Turkish Islamic instItutions - tI1lS in the face of competition from rival Turkish IslamIC groups who propagate an alternative identity constructed on a more stnctly Islamic basis.

2 ISLAM, ETHNICITY AND STATE IN THE CONTEMPORARY BALKANS Hugh Poulton During the nineteenth century, the Ottoman empire retreated from the Balkans and underwent a steady decline, culminating in its final demise in the early 1920s. Sizeable commumties of Muslims, derived both from those who had arrived with the Ottomans and indigenous inhabitants who had converted to Islam, remained in the new successor-states of Southeastern Europe. Except for Albania, where the Muslims fornled the majority, these communities became established as minorities within the new states. Upheld as ethnic states, each based on one dominant nation, the new states suffered from irredentism on the one hand and internal tension between majority and minority populations on the other. Tension was particularly evident in the relatIOns between the new Orthodox Christian rulers and their Muslim minority populations, which were seen as undesirable relics from the Ottoman past. However, inspite of such attitudes and the continumg waves of emigration, these Muslim communities remain an integral part of the present-day Balkans. Although they face significant challenges and renewed problems, the dynal11lcs that govern the relations between them and the states where they live have received little thorough or sustained scrutiny by scholars. The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the tragedies of Bosnia-Hercegovina in the early 1990s have underlined the potential for acute conflict involving Muslim conununities in the Balkans. Indeed, the conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina has threatened to spill over into Serbia's predominantly Muslim regions, the Sandzak and Kosovo, and even to engulf the region. In the light of these events, this chapter seeks to elucidate the position of these communities, and consider how their minority status has im.pinged on their human rights, how their ethnic, religious, and national identities have developed and interacted historically, and finally their relationship with the states in which they reside.

13

14

HtI}?h Poulton

Islam, Etlmicity and State ill the Contemporary Balkat1s

In spIte of claims to the contrary, 1 all the Balkan states are new states, the earliest of which only appeared in the 1830s. The nationalist ideology which penetrated the Balkans from Western and Central Europe in the course of the nineteenth century and continued up till the demise of the Ottoman empire, was essentially secular. However, the close correlation between religion and identity in the Balkan context, which can be seen as a legacy of the Ottoman millet system, issued in an entwining of nationalism and religion, and of national and religious identities. This was especIally tme of Orthodox Christianity, and is apparent even today in Greece, where Orthodox religion, ethnicity and citizenship are 2 often confused. Furthermore, the Balkan peninsula is mountainous and communications have in the past been difficult. This geography has historically contributed to a situation where communities tend to be inward-looking and compartmentalised rather than outward-looking and unified. The Balkan Muslim communities are predom111ately Sunm. However, the essentially Shiite Bektashi Sufi sece has been

WIdespread among Albanians, and the associated Klzlbashl sect 4 has been evident in the DobmdZa - the area south of the Danube delta from Tulcea in Romania to Varna in Bulgaria. While the penetration of Islam had already begun before the Ottoman 111vasion,5 this brought into the Balkans large numbers of Muslims from Anatolia and other parts of the empire. While most of these were Turkish-speakers, they also included Circassians and other Turkic and Muslim groups. Traces of these groups remain, but on the whole they have gradually become assimilated into the three main linguistic branches of Balkan Islam: the Turkish, Albaman and Serbo-Croat speaking concentrations. Following the Ottoman invasion, SIzeable groups of indigenous inhabitants converted to the religion of their new rulers. These included the majority of the Albanians, the Pomaks (IslamiClsed Slavs) of the Rhodope mountains and Serbo Croat-speaking Slavs in Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Sandzak. In addition, many Greeks, Slavs and Vlachs 6 in what is present-day Greece converted to Islam, but were expelled to the new Turkey during the 1920s following the Greek defeat by Atatiirk's forces in 1922. Ottoman rule m the Balkans was essentially non-assimilative and 'multinational' in spirit; it also lacked the technological and institutional £1cilities for integratmg and unifYing subject peoples. As a result, the peoples of the Balkans were able to retain their separate identities and cultures. Many were also able to keep alive a sense of a an age of former glory when they controlled a particular territorial area. Dunng the national awakenings of the nineteenth century such claIms were reVived, often at the expense of neighbours who made similar histoncal claims to the same territory.7

1 For example Greece's claims to cont1l1uity with ancient Greece, and Bulgaria's to

1,300 years of existence.

2 In Greece the Muslim populations are regarded as suspect and not to be tme

citizens of the state. TIm applies also to non-Orthodox Christian groups like Baptists, Roman Catholics and Tehovah's Witnesses. A statement like that of the public prosecutor of Naxo;' who described Roman Catholic Greeks as 'foreIgners gcttmg their orders from the Pope', makes this clear. A large number of Jehovah's Witnesses were alTested for proselytising: sixty-seven were sentenced to between 4 and 6 months' imprisonment dUring the decade after 1983. See D. Kunz, 'Greece accused on minorities' rights'. Le MOllde, 14 December 1994. Bektashism IS a Sufi order (named after its founder HaC! Bekta~) which was widespread in the Balkans during Ottoman rule. Sufi organisations tended to absorb popular movements. and the Shiites within the Sunni Ottoman Empire 111 particular were forced to seek asylum within them. The heterodox Bektashi order gave tim phenomenon Its fullest expression: Bektashis are indeed essentially Shiite. TI1Is situation also applied in relation to Christian communities in the l3alkans who adopted Islam. The Sufi orders or tarikats indeed 6cilitated the conversion of non-Islamic peoples by allowing a certain symbiosis between IslamIC and other religious beliefs and practices: the wandering dervishes who accompanied or followed III the. wake of conquering Ottoman troops were thus a cruCIal component in the conversion of large sections of the ChristIan Anatolian and Balkall populatIons. The Bektashi order was especially prominent ill Albania, which became the second Bektashi area after Anatolia -a process aIded by the patronage of local power boss Ali Pa~a of Jannina. In 1925 the World Bektashi Community headquarters was transferred to Tirana after the 3

15

suppressIOn of the Sufi tarikats by Ataturk. Sec J.K. Birge, The Bektllshi Order oj'Dl'wtshl's, London: Hartford. 1937, pp. 84-5. The Shiite Kizilbashls. literally 'red-heads'. were so named after their distlllctivc headwear.

-I

5

See Noms, Islllltt ill the Balkatts, OJ'. cit.

() Vlachs were a pastoral people living south of the Danube who practIsed transhumancc and spoke a form of Romaman. While some were Islamiclsed. most remained Orthodox and many were promlllent supporters of Hellelllsm. They remain III evidence especially III the Pindus mountallls of Greece and III southern AlbamJ. Sec H. Poulton. The Blllklltts: Mitwrittes attd Stlltl'S ill COttf/ict, London: MRG, 1993. 7

TIllS was most notICeable in the competitIOn ti.lr Macedol1la at the end of

16

Hugh Port/torz

The millet system Because the Ottoman empire was ruled by Islamic precepts for most of its existence, the arrival of Islam in the Balkans through the Ottoman conquest was of particular significance. In line with these precepts, the empire was divided not along ethno-linguistic lines but by religious affiliation - the rnillet system,S which remained in place till changes beginning with the T'arzzimat reforms in the mid-mneteenth century. In accordance with traditional Islamic beliefs wluch uphold them as 'Peoples of the Book', the Christian and Jewish populations were readily accepted: Muslim tolerance was manifested by the acceptance oflarge numbers ofJews, notably the Ladino-speaking Sephardim expelled from Spain at the end of the fifteenth century, many of whom settled in Salonika, which thus became and long remained a predominatelyJewish city. Within the IslamIC Ottoman state the millet system achieved a separation of the different relit,>1ous groups, with specific regulations governing, for example, the colour and type of clothing Jewish and Christian subjects were permitted to wear. Leaders of the various millets enjoyed wide jurisdiction over their members, who were bound by their own regulations rather

the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. For a full study of the 'Macedonian question' see I-l. Poulton. Who arc the l\;facedollialls?, London: Hurst, 1995. The origins of this system remain uncertain. Many trace it back to the appOintment by Mchmed II, conqueror of Istanbul, of Patriarch Gennadias, Bishop Y ovakim of Bursa and Rabbi Capsali as presumed hereditary leaders of the Greek, Armenian and Jewish communities respectively. Other scholars (including Benjanun Braude) maintain that the term 'millet' was used to refer to various mainly local arrangements which diftcred from one place to another. They POll1t to the substantial evidence snggesting that the authority vested 1Il the millet leaders was personal rather than hereditary!institutionalised, and varied significantly in its territorial extent. Thus the Greek patrIarchates of Jerusalem, Alexandria and AntIOch retained their autonomy at least 1Il canon law, while for the Armenians the see of Istanbul became 'over the centUrIes ... a sort of de (acto patriarchates, but its ecclesiastical legitimacy was grudgingly recognized, if ';t all> See Beqiamlll Braude and Bernard LeWIS, ChristiallS allii Jews itl the OttOtllim Empire, New York: Hohnes and Meier, 1982, pp. 72-82, and the revIew article 'Remembering the Minorities' by Andrew Mango in Middle Eastem Sturiies, vol. 21. no. 4, October 1985, pp. 18-40. The Jews never had a smgle patrIarchal leader throughout the temtorics of the empIre. 8

Islam, Etlmicity alld State in the Contemporary Balkans

17

than by the Shariat (Islamic law). The Ottoman state treated the millets like corporate bodies. I t encouraged the perpetuatIon of their internal structures and hIerarchies by dealing exclusively with theIr leaders and not individual members. These structures included educatIOnal systems specific to each religious community. The Inillet became established as the prime focus of identity outside family and locality, bequeathll1g a legacy of confUSIOn in modern times between concepts of citizenship, religion and ethnicity. Furthermore, as the millet system placed control of education and much of their internal affaIrS in the hands of the millet hIerarchy, and hence beyond official state control, it proved ideally suited to the transmission of the new ideology of nationalism intruding from the West - especially in the case of the Christian millets, despite fi'equent tensIOn between the traditional millet leaders and the new nationalist radicals. The Greek patriarchate in Istanbul controlled the millet into whIch the Orthodox Balkan populatIOns were orgamsed. Until the nll1eteenth century, when the Bulganan Exarchate Church was finally established, only the Serbs escaped Greek spIritual tutelage for most of the period of Ottoman rule due to the granting of the autocephalous patriarchate in Pec in 1557. The autocephalous archbishopric ofOhrid, demoted from a patnarchate followll1g Samuil's defeat by Basil II, had become a Greek 1l1stitution, ceasing to be head of an autocephalous church in 1772. For centuries the Phananot Greeks utilised the Istanbul patriarchate to hellenise the non-Greek Orthodox populations under their control (i.e. Slavs, Albanians, Vlachs, Roma). The Bulgarian case illustrates clearly the Implications of the £1Ct that the millet system permItted control of Chnstian populations by a specific church. Following the Ottoman lI1VaSlOn, the separate BulgarIan church and its corresponding educatIOnal system were placed under the control of the Greek Orthodox Church and the Greek patriarch in Istanbul. It can thus be argued that before their national reVIval in the nmeteenth century the Bulgarians faced as serious a threat of assimilation from the Greeks, who controlled religious services and educatIon, both of which were in Greek, as they did from the Ottoman Turks. TIllS IS illustrated by an old Bulgarian proverb: 'Save us, Lord, from the Bulganan who becomes a Greek, and hom the Gypsy who becomes a Turk.' While the first part of the proverb refers to Christian Bulganans, the second reveals the

Hugh Poulton

Islam, Etlmicity and State in the Contemporary Balkans

extent to which Islamised Roma became assimilated into the mass of Turkish-speaking people. As for the Chnstian Bulgarians, the illiterate peasants in the countryside spoke the Slav vernacular, while the educated people in the towns became hellenised and spoke Greek. While Christian populations therefore faced a threat of ethnic assimilation arising out of the nature of the millet system itself, Muslim populations in the Ottoman empire clearly faced a parallel threat of Turkification. However, it is important to note that the Ottoman state recognised no official differentiation by language or ethnicity among its Muslim citizens: till the end of the nineteenth century the modern notion of being a 'Turk' was alien to the Ottoman elites, who regarded themselves as Ottomans (Osmanlz). In fact the tenn 'Turk' had the connotation of uneducated peasant. Ottoman Turkish, the lanb'Uage of state, was not the vernacular of the Turkish-speaking masses, and along with being a Muslim, knowledge of It was a requirement of high office in the Ottoman state. 9 In this, ethnicity per se was not a factor, and many Grand VezlrS and high officials were originally from Albanian, Muslim Slav or other Ottoman Muslim. populations. In spIte of this, vernacular Turkish became widespread as the mother-tongue among the Muslim and even Christian populations of Anatolia. However, this process was less pronounced in the Balkans.

joined later by Romania, Bulgaria and Montenegro. All these new states followed policies of aggressive expansion to enlarge themselves and incorporate their perceived fellow-nationals. Initially, this expansion was at the expense of the decaying Ottoman empire, but by the early twentieth century Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia were directly competing with each other for some regions - notably Macedol1la. After the establishment of the new Bulgaria following the RussoTurkish War of 1877-8, a large number of Muslims emigrated to the rump Ottoman empire. This process, which was not confined to Bulgaria, has continued, with sizeable groups (Slavs and Albal1lans as well as Turks) later emigrating to what became the new Turkey. After 1953 Tito's YugoslaVia permitted the extensive emigration to Turkey of 'Turks' -a term extending in practice to Muslim Albanians and Slavs as well as ethl1lc Turks. Non-Turkish elements in this ongoing stream of migrants quickly became assimilated into the new Turkish identity propagated since the establishment of the Kemalist regime in Turkey. Turks in Greece have continuously emigrated to Turkey, a process facilitated by Article 19 of the current Greek Nationality Law which the Greek state has used to deny re-entry of Turks and to deprive ethnic Turks who leave the country, even for temporary periods, of their Greek citizenship.1O There are evidently close connections between Turkey and Muslim communities in the Balkans, many of them made up of ethl1lc Turks. However, Turkey also has an interest in mamtaming close ties with Turkish Muslims who have emIgrated from Turkey to Western Europe. 11 In spite of tIus emigration, SIzeable Muslim communities remained in the new states. In Bulgaria, for example, there are a large number of Turks m the southern part of the country around Ktlrdzhali, as well as in the north-east. 12 Large numbers of Turks also remained in what became Yugoslavia, concentrated

18

The break-up if the Ottoman empire: Muslims Orthodox Christian national states

111

The gradual loss ofOttoman control in the Balkans in the nineteenth century led to the emergence of small Orthodox Christian national states at the periphery of the peninsula. First to break away were Serbia in the north and Greece in the south, but these were

At least where AnatoJia is concerned. modern scholarship gives credit to the Karamanids for the first establishment of Turkish as the basis of the official language. In the thirteenth century the Karamanids created a strong polity on the ruins of the Seljuk Sultanate. See M. Onder, 'Tiirkl'enin Devlet Dili Ilanini Yildoniimii', m Tiirk DiU, vol. X, 1961, p. 507, quoted in DaVId Kushner, '17lC Rise (~r Turkish NatiollalislII, 1876-1908, London: Frank Cass, 1977, ff. to p. 90. However, this was not the same as demotic Turkish as spoken by the mass of the populatIOn. 9

19

10 ArtIcle 19 states: 'A person who IS of foreIgn origm leavmg Greek temtones WIthout the ll1tention of returning may be deprived of Greek citIzenship.' I-I. Poulton, op. CIt., p. 1R5.

II The role of Turkey as a potentIal 'kin-state' for Muslims of diflerent ethmc groups 1II the Balkans and Cyprus is discussed 111 Chapter 10, while the relationship between Muslim Turkish workers 1II Western Europe and Turkey is discussed in Chapter 11. 12 Sec Chapter 4.

20

Hugh Poulton

Islam, EtlUlicity and State ill the COl1temporal}, Balkans

predominantly in Macedonia as well as in Western Thrace. The latter were exempted from the forced population transfers (of Christians to Greece from Asia Minor and Muslims from Greece to Turkey) following the Greek debacle in Anatolia in 1922. Alongside Turks, Albanians also formed a significant Muslim group. There were also regional concentrations of Slavs who had been Islamicised, most notably 111 Bosnia-Hercegovina but also in the SandZak, plus the Pomaks of the Rhodope mountains in what became Bulgaria and Greece. Other Pomaks lived in Macedonia. Finally, a large percentage of the numerous Roma (Gypsy) population, orit,>1nally from northern India and dispersed throughout the peninsula, were also Muslim. The new successor states were essentially ethnic states based on one dom111ant nation. Consequently, they suffered from the associated problems of irredentism on the one hand and of how to treat their minorities on the other, and these problems have continued to the present. Together with the relative 'newness' of these states, their subsequent turbulent history of internecine wars with neighbours over disputed territory, and the resulting expansion and contraction of borders has prolonged feelings of insecurity. These feelings have 111tensified with the ending of the stagnant stability of the Cold War, plus the bloody wars in former Yugoslavia. In many ways the legacy of the Ottoman millet system has endured, as religion continues to be an important differentIating factor among people. Minorities sharing the Orthodox religion of the new state have tended to be more easily assimilated into the mass of the new nation. This was especially so for 'nonterritorial' minorities - i.e. those whose nation did not have its own 'mother' state to provide support. Such minorities were the Vlachs and the Roma: Orthodox ChrIStian Vlachs and Roma tended to join the relevant majority group - Bulgarians in Bulgaria, Greeks in Greece and so on. In some cases, even if a 'mother' state did exist, Orthodox minonties were assimilated on a large scale: this happened to the Orthodox Albamans in Greece whose 'mother' state, Albania, was especially weak. In contrast, it was much more difficult for the Orthodox m;uonties to assimilate Muslilll minorities. 13 There was, however, a tendency for smaller

Muslim groups to be assimilated by the dom1l1ant Muslim minority within a particular country. This phenomenon was clearly aSSIsted by the legacy of the millet system, as well as the concept of Islam as a trans-national community of believers. In Bulgaria and northeast Greece, for example, small Muslim groups, mcluding especially Turkic-speaking and CaucaSIan groups who arrived during the Ottoman penod, tended to be drawn mto the mass of Muslim Turks. Similarly, small Muslim minorities in Macedonia tended to be drawn into the great Albaman mass. While ArabIC is the language of the Quran, the language used by lwdzhas and in mosque schools has no doubt facilitated tim process. 14

13

The same was true of JeWish minorities: many of the Jews in the 13alkans

21

Muslinls in multi-national states: the MlIslim Slavs (?f Bosnia-Herce,govina and the Sandiak The expenence of Serbo-Croat-speaking Muslims in BosniaHercegovina and the Sandzak has been different from that of Muslim communities in the Orthodox Christian national states. Serb statesmen in the mid-nineteenth century considered Bosma-Hercegovina and the SandZak to be areas into wluch the new SerbIan state would naturally expand, with the aim of achieving union with perceIved Serbian co-nationals. The Sandhk, for example, separated Serbia from what it perceived as the fellow Serbian state of Montenegro. However, Russia's defeat of the Ottoman empire in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8 was followed by a RUSSIan attempt to construct a large Bulgaria made up of all Orthodox Christian parishes wluch had opted by a two-thIrds adult male m~jority for the Bulganan Exarchate Church: tim was had fled to the Ottoman empire from persecutIOn by II1tolerant regnlles 111 Western Europe. While Jews had lived 1Il the 13alkans since antiquity, Yiddishspeaklllg Ashkenazi fled there fi-om persecution III Central anel Western Europe even before the Ottoman period. These new amvals tended to overwhelm the anCIent onglIlal element. They in turn were overwhelmed after 1492 by Ladino-speakers expelled fi-om Spain who made Thessaloniki the spiritual and economIC metropolis of the Jews III south-eastern Europe: see Poulton, l;flho ill'C Ihc }\;[ilccaOllial/S?, pp. 22-3. 14 See Chapter 3 for the Pomaks of Bulgaria. and Chapter 5 for the pressures on the smaller Islamic groups, like the Pomaks of Greece. the Muslim Roma and non-Albal1lan Muslim groups 111 Maccdollla to asslll1ilatc into larger cohabIting M uslil1l groups.

22

Hllgh Poulton

Islam, Etllllicity and State ill the COlltemporary Balkalls

'San Ste£1no' Bulgaria,15 so called after the treaty of that name. This attempt was aborted due to pressure from the other Great Powers, notably Britain and Austria-Hungary, which feared that such a Russian client-state with areas on both the Black Sea and Aegean would dommate the Balkans, and instead a severely truncated Bulgaria emerged as a result of the Treaty of Berlin (1878). This treaty established the administration of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the garrisoning of the Sandjak of Novi Pazar (the Sandzak) by Austria-Hungary. Although theoretically still subjects of the Ottoman Sultan, the Serbo-Croat-speaking Muslims of BosniaHercegovina and the Sandzak experienced a transfer from the control of the multi-ethnic and multi-denominational Ottoman empire to the similarly multi-ethnic and multi-denominatIonal Habsburg monarchy. In spite of fierce Muslim resistance to the new rulers, the Habsburg government did not dispossess the Bosnian Muslim elites, allowing them to retain many of their former privileges, and mdeed co-opting them. Bosnia-Hercegovma came under the administration of the Joint Ministry of Finance, which was one of the three mInistries which owed allegiance to the Habsburg crown rather than to either of the two halves of the empire. 16 The Muslims of Bosnia quickly established that their survival depended on mal11tal11ing good relations with the central authorities, and they continued with this strategy after the collapse of the Habsburg empire in 1918 and the incorporatIon of Bosma-Hercegovina and the Sandzak into royalist Yugoslavia (1918-41) - effectively another multi-national, multi-ethnic and multi-denominational state (albeit one actually dominated by Serbs). In royalist Yugoslavia the Muslim elites continued with their efforts to be co-opted by the central authorities. The main SerboCroat Muslim political organisation, the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation (JMO) led by Mehmed Spaho, was a regular coalition partner throughout the life of this first Yugoslav state. The Serbs considered the Serbo-Croat-speaking Muslims to be ethnically Serbs, while the Croats viewed them as ethmcally Croat. Con-

sequently they were not c0IlSldered as aliens in the state. 17 The survIval strategy was continued in the post-Second World War era. From the 1960s onwards the Tito regIme attempted to end the competition between Serbs and Croats over the ethnic ownership of the Bosnian Muslims by using the term 'Muslim' to refer to a separate ethl1lc group. In the census of 1971 the Serbo-Croatspeakmg Muslims were officially recognised as one of the 'Nations of Yugoslavia'.IH The formerly somewhat poorly established feelings of a separate national Identity among the Muslims ofBosnia-Hercegovma were cemented by the tragic events of the early 1990s. War and bloodshed often breed nationalistic sentiment~, and the Bosman war saw a shift among an mfluential section of the ruling Muslim political groupmg, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), from championing a multInational, multi-denominational agenda to a narrower Muslim one. I')

15 This comprised modern Bulgaria together with what became Yugoslav Macedonia. large parts of Greek Macedonia and Thrace. It even extended into modern Albania. 16

Doma and Fine, BaSilia alld HercegolJilla. p. 96.

23

17 TIllS did not apply as much to other Muslim groups in royalist Yugoslavia. The Slavs of Macedonia. who included both ChrIStIans and a smaller Muslim comnlllllity. were regarded as Southern Serbs. and a policy of forced assnnilatlOn was employed against them. The Muslim Albamans. who of course are not Slavs. were VIewed with acute distrust by the first Yugoslav state (,Yugoslavia' of course means 'land of the South Slavs'). lH In post-Second World War Yugoslavia the Communist authoritIes' nationality policy. whIch always officially espoused the slogan 'brotherhood and U11lty', evolved 6'om upholding a Serb-oriented polity dUrIng the perIod when Aleksander Rankovie headed the all-powerful secunty apparatus. to a three-tier system of natIOnal rights which was enshrined III the 1,)74 ConstItution. TIllS system divided the population in descending order of recognised 'rIghts' into: (Ill the six 'Nations of Yugoslavia' - Croats. Macedonians. Montenegrins. Muslims. Serbs and Slovenes - each WIth a natIOnal home based in one of the republics; (b) the 'Nationalities ofY ugoslaVIa' - the largest belllg the AlbamallS (more numerous than some of the 'nations', but whose 'natIOnal home' was outSIde the country and so were not eligible for the status of a 'nation' of YugoslavIa) Bulganans. Czechs. Hungarians. Italians Roma. Romamans. Ruthelllans, Slovaks and Turks - which were legally allowed a variety of language and cultural lights; and (r) 'Other nationalitIes and Ethnic Groups': Austrians. Germans. Greeks. Jews. Poles. RUSSIans. Ukrainians. Vlachs and others who classified themselves as 'Yugoslavs',

Examples of this arc the RCls-ul-ulema Mustapha eerie's remarks III late 1994 CrItlCISlllg mIxed marriages. f'urthermore. renowned journalists who were considered to be unsupportrve of the new line were removed from the state teleVIsion. TV BiH by the SDA executIve member Amila Omersoftic. Omersoftie also led an attack on the Pl1me Minister I-laris Sil;udzie. who is seen by many as a symbol of multI-natIOnal Bosnia-Hercegovina. Sec Milica Pesie and AIM Sarajevo. 'Battle for Bosnia's Sou]', 111 Balkarl H1a,. Repo,./; Billie/iII (!f /ire 1')

tB.U. LIBRARY

tH.O. KOTUPHANESi

24

Hllgh Poultol1

Islam, Btlmicity ami State in the COl/temporary BalkallS

Such exclusive natIOnalism mirrors that embraced by Serb and Croat nationalists, which led to widespread slaughter and atrocities in which the Muslims were the main victims?)

by the Greeks, who have consistently attempted to assimilate all minorities. However the Muslim Chams 111 northern Greece remained a distinct group, their £l1th preventing them from absorption in the Greek Identity to which Orthodoxy is central. Following the Second World War. they were expelled ell masse fi'om Greece and their mosques were destroyed. The large mass of Muslim Albanians (and some Roman Catholics) remaining outside the new Albania found themselves not in Greece but in Serbia or Montenebrro, 111 what became royalist Yugoslavia. The m;~ority resided 111 Kosovo which, under the Tito system as it evolved through the 1960s and early 1970s, developed mto a separate federal unit of the Yugoslav state. This was destroyed by the Milosevic regllne, which embarked on an acute repression of the Kosovo Albanians. 22 In addition to Kosovo, many Albanians also resided 111 western and north-western Yugoslav Macedonia, where they made up compact regIOnal m;lJorities. 23

Muslims as the mqjorit}' - the Alhanian case

25

Albama's 'late arrival' in the nineteenth-century race for territory of the ailing Ottoman empire resulted from the filCt that the m;~ority of the population shared the filith of their Ottoman rulers and hence were imtially less drawn to the new ideolo6'Y of nationalism, or to external benefilctors who were Western and ChrIStian. Indeed, it can be argued that the impetus for the Albanian national awakening, which significantly was led at first by Christian Albanians, arose from a realisatIOn that unless the Albanians claimed their own state they were 111 danger of being swallowed up by Greece from the south and Serbia and Montenegro from the north. The first Albaman state, which emerged 111 1913, was politically very weak. Indeed, It was barely a functioning state at alL and came 111creasingly under Italian control. Following the Second World War the Communist authorities under Enver Hoxha instituted an anti-religion campaign, severely persecuting all religious activity. Following tlm period of darkness, there appears today to be a significant level of multi-religious tolerance in Albania; a rantv in the Balkan context, tim can be attributed partlv to the sil;1ple £c'lCt that all religious groups suffered equally undel~ the Communist dictatorship.21 While all the new Balkan states had sizeable minorities outside their borders - clear lines of demarcatIOn between different population groups had failed to emerge - Albania's late arrival issued in a situation where there were almost as many Albanians outside the new state as within It. To the south in the new Greece many were Orthodox Christians; these tended to become assimilated

The claSSIC Balkan state emerg111g from the Ottoman empire was essentially an ethnic state based on one dominant nationality .. Within these states minorities were inevitably considered alien and objects of SuspICion. The t;lct that all these states, with the exception of Albania, were baSICally Christian made the position of Muslim communities wlth111 them espeCIally problematic. The differentiation of these commumtles fi'om the majority along ethnolingUIstic as well as religIOUS lines 111 certain cases merely mtensified perceptions of otherness. As the only Balkan state with a Muslim m;~Jority,2.j Albal11a stands out as an exception, characterised by a very low level of antagonism between ItS different religious commUl1ltIes. In a hostile Balkan environment the demands of 'Albal1lal1lsm' apparently produced a llluted fi-ont out of the different

Illstitllte for f;Vllr mId PCllCC Reportillg, no. 3 I. February 1995, p. 7. London.

22

20 As this volume deals primarily with the relations between Muslim communities

23

and the Balkan states in which they reside and the fate of the Bosman state remains unclear and problematic. the current situatIon of Serbo-Croat-speakmg Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina IS not addressed. Those of Serbia and Montenegro in the Sandzak arc examined in Chapter 9_ 21

See Chapter 7 fi)r the Muslims in Albania.

Millorities and the Balkal1 state

See Chapter R.

Their relationship with the new Macedolll:lll state, the Fonner Yugoslav Republic of Macedoma (FYROM), IS explored in Chapter 6. This state IS Itself based on the relatively new concept of a separate Macedolllan natIon fostered by the Tito regIme. 2·1 It is likely that what rem;tms of Bosma-Hercegovina will also have a Muslim m:ljonty if the Serb areas remain outside.

27

Hllgh POllltoll

Islam, Etlmicity and State ill the COII/el1lpormy Balkans

Albanian religIOus groups, helped along by the sense of solidarity engendered by Enver Hoxha's blanket repression. However, even here where the religious divide coincIdes with an ethnic one as with the wholly Orthodox Greek mmonty"5 which resides in the south of the country, the same problems arise as elsewhere in the Balkans. These problems have been worsened by the emergence of the classic Balkan state Ideology that the state is the natural territory of one dommant national group. This has resulted in power being exclusIvely wielded by that dominant group wIthin a centralised state, wIth little decision-making being devolved to the regions where the mmorities tend to reside. The exception to this Balkan centralist model IS the post-Second World War Communist Yugoslav state, although even here one can detect a swing from centralisatIon (e.g. during the Rankovic penod) to decentralisation (e.g. the 1974 Constitutlon). In this context, centralisation tended to be equated with dominant Serb nationalism. The break-up of the state can mdeed be seen as a reactlon to the return to acute centralisation, led this time by Slobodan Milosevic, who rode to power on a wave of aggrieved SerbIan natIonalism over Kosovo. The successor states to Tito's YugoslaVIa have generally tended to revert to the classic Balkan Inodel of centralisatIon, leading to an ineVItable exacerbation of the frictions with mmoriues - evident in both FranJo Tudjman's CroatIa and the new Macedoman state (FYROM). In the latter the large Muslim Albanian minority, whICh predominates m the western and north-western areas, points with some justificatIOn to the filCt that its regional democratIC m;~orities mean little more than the power to sweep the streets, since all crucial decisions are made at the centre.:Y'

This model stresses in particular the role of culture and education, distmgmshing in pre-modern societies between the official 'high' culture of the state and its rulers, and the 'low' cultures of the general population, which were often very local m nature and vaned considerably. Gellner argues that a modern economy depends both on mobility and on commumcatlOn between individuals, which can be realised only if they have been socialised into the same high culture. Only a relatIvely monolithic education system can achIeve this socialisatlOn. 2H Thus, for Gellner, 'nationalism IS essentially the general imposition ofa high culture on society, where preVIOusly low cultures had taken up the lives of the I11~onty, and in some cases the totality of the populatIon.' This necessitates the 'generalised diffusion of a school-mediated, academy-supervised idiom.' Because mobility oflabour is essential in a modern society, wIth individuals required if necessary to move from one occupatIOn to another withm a smgle lifespan due to constant innovation etc., what IS needed IS the 'establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society, with mutually substitutable atomised individuals held together by a shared culture of this [high] kind, in place of a previous complex structure of local groups, sustamed by folk cultures reproduced locally and idiosyncratically by the mICro-groups themselves. ,29 In contrast, nationalists usually claim the reverse, maintaimng that they are acting in the name of a putative folk culturewhIch is often imagillal}', TI11S account~ for the ransack1l1g of history in which natIOnalists tend to indulge; I11deed, Gellner sees the 1I1telligentsia as the prime movers. often I11ventl11g the past completely. However, such 'inventIOns' and distortIOns are not the prerogative of nationalists alone: Hobsbawm et al. 30 show how SImilar methods have been used by a variety of people and mterest groups to help forge or strengthen a common Identity or allegIance. In the Ottoman context the 'real' commumty for the mass of the population was the village, whose inhabItants one personally knew, while the 'imag!l1ed,31 one was the religIOUS

Balkan natiol1alislll al1d the creation

4

the 'l1Iodern state'

The dynamICs of natIOnalism in the Balkans appear to correspond to the paradigm of change fi'om pre-modern agrarian systems to those based on Idealised 'nation states' put forward by Ernest Gellner.~7

2H

It should be noted that while the Greek 1111110nty III Alballla is solidly Orthodox, there arc many Olthodox Christians 111 Albania who are ethnically Alballl:Jn,

25

2(,

I-I, Poulton, HI/w arc the J\I[a[CdOllicllls?, p. 187 .

27

Emest Gellner, Natiolls

iIIld

NatiOlllllislll. Oxford: Blackwell. 1983.

2()

fhid .. p. 140, Ihid .. p. 57

Sec EriC Hohshawm and T Ranger (eds). Thl' flllJl'lItioll ,,(Thlliiti(lIl. Camhndge Ulllversity Press, 1983. 31 The term 'imagllled' refers to the 'imagllled COllll1lUlllty' as cOllled by Benedict ,111

28

Hllgh POlllton

Islalll, Et/micit}' amI State ill the COil temporal}' Balkans

community as per the millet system. In the post-Ottoman penod the 'nation' (however defined) competed for allegiance as the 'imagmed' community. Gellner posits the high cultures of the agrarIan age as the minority accomplishments of privileged specialists. Diflerentiated from fragmented, uncodified, m;uority folk-cultures, they tended and indeed ail1led to be trans-ethmc and trans-political, frequently employmg a dead or archaic idiom, with no mterest whatever in ensuring contmuity of commu11lcation with the majority. In contrast with the privileged specialists, the mass of the people were excluded hom power and the high culture, being tied to a faith and a ~ church rather than to a state and a pervaSIve culture:- The case of the Ottoman empire fits well with this view. As shown above, the population was divIded by religion, and the language of the state elite was sharply differentiated from that of the masses by bell1g a mixture of demotic Turkish, Arabic and PerSIan that was diflicult to understand and use. By contrast, an industrial high culture is no longer linked - whatever Its histOlY - to a (1ith or a church, and it requires 'the resources of a state co-extenSIve with society rather than merely those of a church superimposed on It.,33 However, as indicated above, in states like modern Greece the Orthodox Church has tended to become intimately intertwined with the idea of the 'nation', and thus the pre-modern 'imagined' community has become confused with the modern one - i.e. the natIOn. The entire period fi~om the break-up of the Ottoman empire to the present can be seen as one where Gellner's model has been in progress in the Balkans. As demonstrated earlier, minorities wIthll1 the state who share the religion of the dominant nation have mainly been aSSImilated, most evidently where that religion is Orthodox Christiamty. Mass educatIon has been used by state elites to mstil a unified 11lgh culture based on what is perceived as the essence of the dommant natIon (and thus almost by definition wIth hIgh nationalist content). Tim has been partIcularly marked in the region's countries since the Second World War, as mass

educatIOn has become a reality.34 A crucial aspect m the success of this process has been the state's monopoly over the means for propagatll1g the relevant 'high culture'. Till recently the state in the Balkans has been virtually the exclUSIve actor. not only in educatIOn but also m radio and televiSIOn. It has also made exclusive and effective use of censorship and other pressures. However, this situation is changing due to the profound eHects of the 'communications rJ:~volutIOn' of recent years particularly the expansion of satellite TV sets and other means of transnatIOnal communication. For example, Greece and Bulgaria are no longer able to Isolate themselves from the outSIde world or pursue policies of forced assllnilation of their ml11onties, mcluding Turks and other Muslims and, 111 the Greek case, Orthodox Slav Macedonians also. Zlllvkov's Bulgaria attempted to seal off from outside influences completely the areas inhabited by Muslims and Turks during the Il1famous forced assimilation campaign of 1984-9, but the advent of glasllost 111 the Soviet Union made this policy unfeasible. The ethmc Turks made use of the meagre opportunities afforded by the new climate, including 111 particular the unJammmg of foreign radio stations like Radio Free Europe which could now broadcast to Bulgaria. The use of such media by the ethnic Turks to co-ordinate their OppOSItIOn to the assimilation campaign led directly to its defeat. 35 Moreover, satellite teleVision broadcasts from Turkey help to preserve and develop Turkish culture among Muslims Il1 Greece (see Chapter 5). This demonstrates how, far fi'om creating a unified 'world culture,,3(l the 'global revolution'

.

Anderson; sec his I/1I(/gil/(~d COIlllllflllilies: Refleeliolls IIl1liO//(//iSIII. London: Verso. 1,)R3. 32 33

Gellner. op. cil .• p. 141. Ibid.

Oil

Ihe

or(~ill

mill sprelld or

29

in Greece. for example. anthropolog1sts studying the Slav Macedonian minority in the north of the country have noted that the rate of assimilat10n has accelerated sharply since the Second World War. (Personal communication w1th Anastas1a Karakasidou.) 34

35

See 1-1. Poulton. '!71C B(/lkallS. p. 155.

This view rests on the argument that there is a general tendency for differing states/cultures to copy a particular model of what 1S perce1ved as modern. Tim can be seen in the apparently universal appeal of blue Jeans and tramers and Western pop mUS1C (Michael Jackson. Madonna el a/.) III youth culture. along with the penetratJon of domestic economies by multll1atJonals so that even eatmg and drinking habits become homogel1lsed, with the growing universality of brands like MacDonalds and Coca-Cola. Such 'cultural invasions' go hand in hand with a parallel unification of modern architectural styles. regardless of indigenous cultures, so that. for example. most modern a1rports and hotels tend to look alike. In this view the rise of 'global culture'. f.1cilitated by the ongoing 3(,

Hugh Poultoll

Islam, Etllllicity and State ill the COlltemporary Balkatls

can actually play a crucial role 111 preserving and strengthening cultural differences. l~urthermore, the world COITUllumty has finally become aware of m1l10rity problems. While the inter-war League of Nations had a number of provisIOns regarding the nghts of minoritIes 111 Eastern and South-eastern Europe, these were largely ignored by the states concerned, WIth little or no sanctIOn from outside. The explOSIOn of German nationalism under Hitler which led to the appalling destruction of the Second World War produced revulsion against all forms of nationalism, which even extended to proviSIOns for minorities. In the post-war period m1l10nty rights were generally ignored in filvour of individual human rights. The dynamics of the Cold War Issued 111 a further emphasis on indiVIdual rights as both sides used different aspects of these 111 the Ideological struggle, with the Soviet camp stressing economic and social nghts while the West stressed civil and politIcal ones. In the late 1980s, with the ending of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet bloc, m1l10rity rights returned to the human nghts agenda. Since then the 1I1ternational community has moved towards standardisation and codification of minority nghts, leading to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons belong1l1g to National or Ethmc, Religious and LingUIstic Minonties, adopted by the UN General Assembly Resolution 47/135 of 18 December 1992. TI1lS has been followed by various regional declarations. While there remains little real sanction against offenders, and even a European Union member like Greece can apparently continue to deny the existence of any minonties within its borders apart from religious ones,37 it can at least be said that no European country appreciates being accused by its peers of trampling on minority rights. It

seems likely that ;)1 country's minonty record will increasingly come under scrutiny, and offenders will face censure in the internatIOnal arena. Hence there is reason to argue that the attempt in the Balkans - and elsewhere - to create homogenised 'nation states' - i.e. monocultural, mono-ethnic and mono-religious, all based on the attributes of the dominant natIOn - is finally runmng its course. Indeed the tragedy 111 Bosnia-Hercegovina can be interpreted as the final attempt at such forced homogenisation in the Balkans, located there because up till the break-up of Yugoslavia, BosniaHercegovina had belonged to mlliti-llatiollal polities, from the Ottoman empire through Austria-Hungary to the two Yugoslav states, and had thus avoided the classic route of the Balkan state. This, it must be stressed, does not mean that nationalism is a dimimshing force in the Balkans. On the contrary, the break-up of Yugoslavia has seen an intensification of various nationalisms throughout the region. What it does perhaps show IS that the idealised nation state can now be created only by genOCIde or by mass expulsion. Total assimilation is a thing of the past as the state no longer monopolises the means of propagat1l1g culture. While the process of homogemsatIOn 111 the Balkans has been markedly successful, e.g. in transforming multi-ethnic peasants in Greece 1I1to Greek CitIzens, it has £liled mIserably when £Iced with the need to bridge the gulf between orthodox Christian and Muslim communitIes. Even with the Orthodox Slavs 111 northern Greece this policy has come up against a militant 1111110nty who refuse to abandon their perceIved ethnicity in order to merge 1I1to the m;~Jority Greek one. The more pressure the Greek state applies to thIS nunority, the more the policy proves counter-productive. 3H While hItherto, and in accordance With Gellner's analysis, an attempt was made to obliterate 'low' peasant cultures and replace them WIth a unified 'Iugh' culture, tl1lS situation may well be changing. The new possibilitIes created by mass commul1lcations and satellite dishes, plus the growll1g ability of the pnvate sphere to efiectively challenge central dominance as a result of a general trend of economIC pnvatlsatlon, appear to permit some erstwhile 'low' cultures to develop into sustamable 'middle' cultures, and even into rival regIOnal 'hIgh' cultures. That thIS process is taking

30

revolution in electronics and the media (especially satellite broadcasts), Signals the end of classic natIOnalism as a drivlllg force on the world stage. 37 LikeWise France, which represent, the classic model of 'territorial' or 'Civic'

nationalism as opposed to the German 'ethnic' model (see Anthony Smith, Theories of Nlltio/la/islII. London: Duckworth, 1971), also refilses to recogI1lse minoritie~ within its borders and even refused to sanction Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and PolitIcal Rights, which deals with guaranteeing minority rights (which Greece too has not ratified). However. citizens in France do not tlce the same penaltIes for declanng themselves separate from the majority as they do in Greece. For a discussion of minority rights in Europe sce Hugh Miall (cd.), Millorit)' R(~hts ill Elll'Ol'c: The Scope/or II Tra/ls/UltlO/lIl/ R(:~i/IIC, London: Pinter/Chatham House Papers, 1994.

3H

Scc H. Poulton. IVho Ilre the N[II(('(iolliIlIlS?, pp. 165-71.

31

32

HI/gh POl/ltoll

place in an atmosphere of heightened nationalist feeling followmg the collapse of Yugoslavia increases the possibilities of further violence. In the light of these developments, and given its proven historIcal success as a 'civilisation building' religion, Islam appears destined to remain a m;uor component m the Balkan mosaic. This IS already evident in the increasing number of new contacts being established between Balkan Muslim communities and Muslim countries beyond the Balkans. One big questIOn remains, namely how these commumtIes will develop politically. A consistent thread in this book is the change from Muslim identity based solely on Islam to one where an ethnic content has become important. It is noticeable that the new Muslim political elites mainly couch theIr programmes in terms and language which are in essence secular. This surely results from the peculiar history of these communities in the last two centuries and their relatIOnship with the Balkan state. Whether this will continue or there will be a return to a more rigidly IslamIC mode of political discourse remains to be seen. The events in Bosnia-Hercegovma perhaps show that £1Ced with a contmuation of the traditional Balkan state model of intolerance to minorities, and the attendant homogenisatIon, Muslims will be forced to revert to the latter line. In the long term, however, continual confrontation cannot be the optimum solution.

3 STRATEGIES FOR SUSTAINING A VULNERABLE IDENTITY: THE CASE OF THE BULGARIAN POMAKS Yulian Konstantinov The Pomaks, known ofilcially in Bulgana as Bulgarian Muhammadans or Bulgarian Muslims, are an ethno-confessional minority at present nmnbenng about 220,000 people. 1 Most field researchers today would agree that this was 11lstoncally a Balkan population (in the sense of bel11g pre-Ottoman) which converted to Islam mal11ly during the centunes (15th-19th) of Ottoman rule in the region? If one agrees with such a VIew, the Pomaks' identity has been formed on the same principle as that of the Bosnian Muslims. The very attempt to define the Pomaks raIses the main points of controversy in what may be called 'the Pomak debate'. These can be summansed as: (a) who are the Pomaks in historical terms - an 'autochtonous' or an 'immIgrant' (i.e. Turkic) population? (lJ) how did they convert to Islam -voluntarily or by force? and (c) should they be considered as an ethnic Bulgarian populatIOn which is thus mtimately connected with Bulgarian history, or discussed alongSIde other IslamIC Balkan populations, I.e. in the same cultural discussion which embraces the Turks, the 'Turkish' Gypsies,3 the Muslim Albamans, the Bosnian Muslims and others? 1 A figure of 268,971 was produced by the Mil1lstry of the Interior onl January 1989, as received fromlocalmulllcipal authorities. The National Census conducted in December 1992 does not include the Pomaks in the list of ethnic ml11orities, but if we accept that a realistic figure for the Turks IS 500,000 and for the 'Turkish' Gypsies around 300,000, then the figure for the POl11aks can be estimated at around 220,000 on the basis of the overall Sunn! Muslim figure for Bulgana (1,026,000); (cf. Rl'zotl/tati 01 prc/JroYIlII(ltIcto 11Il11llSr/Cllil'to: Dl'lI/ograt:"~i 11Ilraktcristiki, vol. 1, Sofia: Republika Bulgana, Nationalcn Statisticheski Institout, 1994, PI'. 341-4).

2 Cf. Antonina Zhelyaskova, Razl'l'Ostflllll'lIie lUI is{all/aya If S~fia: zapalldo{m{ka/lSkitc z(,llIi pod oSlIultIska If/ast. XV-XVIII lIck. Sofia: Izdatelstvo na BAN. 1990. 3

For the tenn see BirgIt 19b, Yulian Konstantinov and Gulbrand Alhaug,

33

Ylllian KOl/stantil1Ol)

Stratc,!zicsfor SlIstai/1in}.~ a VlIll/craMc !dcl/lity

This chapter is mainly concerned with vernacular perceptions of communal identity which have been generated and fuelled by a debate in the terms outlined above. The terms of tl1lS debate have been imposed by nation-state ideology and government policy, together with its academic and educational implementations. This has taken place mainly smce the second half of the nmeteenth century, as the Balkan states re-emerged during and after the demise of the Ottoman empire. As models of natlOnalistic debate and general discourse the Balkan cases are predOluinantly borrowings from various European nationalisms, particularly those of the German Romantic nationalist movement of the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. With tll1S as a vantage point, the present chapter argues first that in essence the identity debate which has enmeshed the Pomaks is based on direct borrowings from European nationalisms and, secondly, that vernacular models of identity tend to be composed of two main and somewhat contradictory layers. On the one hand, there IS a vernacular imitation of official nation-state academiC and adm111lstratlve discourse. On the other, there is a real-life enactment of identity m terms not officially sanctionable, 1.e. demographic and occupational behaviour. Of these two layers the second has increased in importance since the end of the 1980s. The Pomaks can easily be attacked on the basis of the pnmary nation-state categories and semiotic codes that express ethnic identity. These essentially relate to languages, names, religlOn and traditions. Having been attacked by the state in tl1IS way during at least four major campaigns in the twentieth century, the Pomaks have evolved an identity-sustaming strategy which relies on less Visible categories that are connected with demographic behavlOur: residential patterns, ['ll11ily and kinship structure, and employment patterns. The Pomaks have also managed to employ for ldentitypreservation purposes originally hostile measures imposed upon them by the totalitarian state during the post-Second World War penod. The most important of these has been the management of the strategic border between Bulgaria and Greece/Turkey. We examine here how the Pomaks' 'clandestine ethmcity' was

sustained during the totalitanan period, and explore too the very precarious situation this Identity has [1Ced 111 the post-1989 years of transition. No longer attacked along the classical nation-state lines, a pnmary support of the Pomaks' 'clandestine ethmClty' has disappeared with the collapse of the totalitarian economy, thereby placmg the community in what IS perhaps ItS most critical state during the twentieth century.

34

'Some preliminary comments on the language and names of the Gy~)SJes of Zlataritsa (Bulgaria)" Tromso University Working Papers on Language and Linguistics. no. 17. 1991, pp. 120-2.

35

Who arc the Pomaks? The Issue of the origm of the Pomaks 111 genetic and other objectively measurable terms (e.g. language, traditions and folksong) has been central to the Pomak debate in Bulgaria throughout the last century. Indeed the whole 'objective versus subjective' approach has been central to the broader mmority debate as a whole. In a purely pragmatic perspective, a nation state and its academiC apparatus (the University and Academy of SClences) have a clear advantage over the controversial minority because of their virtual monopoly over 'sClence' and all things 'objective' and 'true' (i.e. 'sClentific'). This advantage extends to accessing and managing the medium of discourse itself, as well as its transmisslOn by use of the educational system, the mass media, popular literature etc. ThiS monopoly on 'truth' reached extreme proportions in Bulgana when it was put into practical effect by administrative and eventually repressive measures. It nilminated in the so-called Process of Rebirth (1972-89), which aflected the whole mass of what can be termed the 'problematic' m1l10ritles of Bulgaria - the Turks, Pomaks and 'Turkish' Gypsies - as well as the smaller and disappeanng Tatar, Cherkez and Alevl mmonties. Much has been written on the history and practice of the Process of Rebirth. 4 Here it should be pomted out that the nation state not only pretends to a monopoly of 'truth', but is also interested 111 the 'substantial' (as opposed to 'formal') reading of cultural essence. Cf. Krustyu Petkov and Georgi Fotev (cds), Etllichcskiyat kOl!/likt I' HII(t;aria 1989, Sofia: Sotsiologicheski arlllv Insutut po sotslOlogiya pri BAN, 1990; Hugh Poulton. nil' Balkalls: Mi//o,.itics IIlld Stlltes ill COIlfliet, London: MRG, 1991: Daniel Nelson, Balkllll Imbroglio; Politics Illld Sew,.it)' ill SOllt/wllstem Ellrope, Boulder, CO: Westvlew Press 1991, pp. 55-66; Y ulian Konstantmov, Gulbrand Alhaug and Briglt Igla, 'Names of the Bulganan Pomaks', Tromso UniverSlty Worklllg Papers on Language and Linguistics, no. 17, 1991, pp. 23-33.

4

37

Yllliall [(ollSlal1lillOll

Strategies Jor Sustaining a Vlllnerable Identity

Hence the insistence on 'provmg' and providing 'proofs' of true and undisputed origin. In this way each Balkan natIon state has 'proved beyond doubt' that the Pomaks are in filCt part of theIr majority population - this applies equally to other problematIC minorities. Thus they have become an object of nation-state conflictS, havmg been proclaimed by the Greeks to be hellenised Thracians(', by the Turks to be Turkic pre-Ottoman nomadic tribes7 , by the BulgarIans to be Bulganans and so on. In some cases It has been found more expedient to declare the Pomaks H Turks. TI1lS was done III Greece, but subsequently abandoned. In Bulgaria the attempt by Pomaks to pass as Turks was one of the most controversial Issues surrounding the census-takmg of December 1992. The inconstencies of nation-state governments have thus been answered eIther by hIding within a 'clandestine ethnicity' or assimilating into another IslamIC mass, such as the Turkish.

This vital point is revealed by a passionate search for 'proofs' which are better than those of the ofircial academy; theIr nature and presentation deserve a separate study. In brief. however, the main sources of 'proofs' are arte£,cts, documents and books which have either been found ('while repairing the mosque in the village') or provided by an authority of much !:,'Teater standing than the local m;uority ones (a 'cunous English or American scientist'). Another source of ultimate pro06; in identity matters is connected with the pronouncements (real or imaginary) of Turkish scholars or, more generally, Islamic scholarshIp. The search for material proofs of true identIty generally serves the purpose of not only establishing the invalidity of Bulganan nation-state academic pronouncements, but of also compensating for the lower place occupied by Pomaks in the minority hierarchy of relative prestige, mainly in relation to the Turkish group. The indetermmate state of the Pomaks' IdentIty SItuation makes it necessary to seek and find 'proofs' which establish both 'own' identity and 'better' identity than that of the chIef IslamIC filCtor in the universe of Pomak discourse ~ the Turks. The tokens used by this vernacular debate answer to the usual technique establishing what Signe Howell calls 'access to ancestors', I.e. reification of unbroken lineage.? The material fonn of the proof is usually a 'book', a 'document', an 'inscription', a 'camel's skull' etc. The description of such an object proves to the audience that the Pomaks converted to Islam earlier than the Turks - due to the work of Arab missionaries (traders), that they are descendants of exiled Arab sectarian leaders - in short, that they can claim an earlier access to Islamic ancestors than the Turks. ThIS part of the Pomaks' vernacular identity discourse is illustrated by the following excerpt from an interVIew.

36

Access to al/cestors One important minority-centred layer of reaction against natlonstate monopoly over identity-affaIrs is the creatIOn of what may be called a 'vernacular academy'. Its pronouncements are for ingroup consumption, and 111 this sense only rarely become part of a more extended natIOnal minOrIty debate. The 'vernacular academy' borrows exclusively from the ofIicial natIon-state academic discourse 111 tenns of general categories and analytical tools, remterpret1l1g these f:(Jr its own needs. Thus, in essence, it also clings to the premIse that ethnic identIty IS a matter of unbroken genetic lineage rather than cultural event or chOICe. Elllmanuel Sarides, Etllllisrhe l\;filldcrhcit fllld Zll'isrifellStaatliches Strcitobject. Die POlllakclI ill NOf{(!!riechwlm/(l, Berlin, 1987: Ta~Jana Seyppel, 'Poll1aks III Northeastern Greece: An Endangered Balkan Population', }lJ'v[!I'[A, vol. 10, no. 1, 1989, pp 41-9; T Seyppel. 'Das Interesse an der ll1uslill1ischen Minderheit in Westthrakien (Griechenland), 1945-1990' in Gerhard Seewan (cd.), Nlillllcrlfcitell/i'agCll ill Siidostclll'Ol'a, MUl1lch: Oldenbourg/Siidost-Instltut, 1992, pp. 377-93. (, eianni Magkrioti, 'Pomakoi i Rhodopaioj' l1'oll1aks or Rhociopians?I', T'lfrakika, srim de/iera, 1980-1. pp. 42-64. 7 T Seyppel, 'Polllaks in Northeastern Greece', p. 42. x Cf Sandes, op. cit., pp. 15-20; sec also Chapter 5.

Q: Where in the world do the Pomaks come from? Tell me theIr stOly. A: LIsten now. The Pomaks are from the origin of the Bulgarians. This is not a lie, and no one should deny it. Then they were turned fi'om Bulgarians into Mus1jms: that happened eighty years before the f) Signe Howell, 'Access to Ancestors: ReCollstnIctlons of the Past in NOIlLiterate Society' in Reldar Gronhaug, Gunnar Haaland and Georg Henriksen (cds), Thc Ecole;!!y qf Choice allli Symbol: Essays ill hOllOlIr of Fredrik Barth, Bergen: Alma Mater Forlag, 1991, pp. 225-44.

Ylllian /(OllstalltiIlOI!

Stratcgicsfor SIIstai1lillg a VlIlncrablc Idclltit}'

Turks. There was a delegation from the Prophet to tell the people labout Islaml - not forcefully but by persuasIOn! - with jlro(!j5: evelything is done

The identity-enactment behaVIOur of the Bulgarian Pomaks proVides a clear illustration of the phenomenon of enactll1g identity. TIllS appears to be largely due to the extremely weak identity position in which they have found themselves throughout the last century, espeCially dUrIng the years of totalitarian rule (1944-89). This weakness stems from what IS percelVed on the local scene as an 'absence of one's own ethl1lClty' -I.e. the perceptIOns of Pomaks not havmg the well-defined ethniclty of either the Bulgarians or the Turks. It also derives from the policy of the Bulgarian authorIties over the last century. The controversIal character of this policy has been exammed elsewhere,13 but we can summarIse its essential features here. The policy has fluctuated between two primary positions. The first of these IS a 'nationalistic one', wherely the Pomaks are Bulgarians who were converted to Islam by fc)rce, and should therefore become BulgarIans once again.14 The second position can be described as a 'democratic' one. According to this, the Pomaks are an ethno-confessIOnal minonty, and should be helped to

38

thm/(,!h jJro(!j5.

Q: SO when the Turks came to Bulgana, the Pomaks had already embraced Islam? Is that right? 11: Yes, they were lalready] Muslims. The others came to bring the language. This is the only reason they came here. To transfer the < 10 language, the TurkIsh language. .

Another central feature of such attempts at access to ancestors particularly concerns the value of archaeological discoveries. The discourse here is very sllnilar to that of the nation state where Issues such as the 'possession of history' anse. There IS a typical example of this in the controversy over the name 'Macedoma', and Macedonian (FYROM) and Greek positions on it, particularly m relation to the archaeologICal discovenes at the village of Vergina. ll Another feature of the debate IS that it largely takes the form of a monologue. Both the nation state and the mll10rity in questIOn talk largely to themselves, without anyone else really listening. Thus official BulgarIan discourse on the sensitIve question of ' Who are the Macedonians?' tends to ignore international opinion totally, while choosing at the same tllne to quote selectively from outSide opll1ions represented by this or that 'Cll110US' scholar, proVIded they agree with the doctnne upheld.

E11acting idcntity Apart from the vernacular imitations of offiCial nation-state discourse, there exists a layer which is more significant than the nationalistic rhetoric whICh mterested parties address to each other. This layer can be tell11ed 'enactment~ of identity'. With the Pomaks It has, with rare exceptions, been the most neglected P;U1: of the story.12 10 Interview with Bai Shevket, August 19') 1: Yulian Konstantinov, 'Three Pomak Stories', Hadzhiyska Field Study 1')')1, p. 54 (unpubl. MS., BSRCS Archives).

The royal tombs of the Macedonian kings; cf. Yulian Konstantinov, 'Namlllg of Countries - Rights to a name: The Case with the Name "Macedonia"', [1/11O/J(/lioll: '17Il' EIlI·OJll·tIIl JOlIl'lwIJ()f' Social Scicllces. vol. fl, no. 2. Vienna: ICCR (f()rthcoming) . II

12 Assen Baliksi is currently engaged

111

a visual anthropolob'Y field-study of

39

the I'omak village ofBrezllltsa (municipality ofGotse Delchev). He has recorded material with a prImary focus OIl tobacco groWll1g, and the preservation of a community IdentIty through a mother-daughter link enacted by the preparatIOn and transfer of the daughter's dowry. 13 Yulian Konstantinov, 'An Account of I'omak ConversIons III Bulgaria .( 1')1 2- 1')')0), 111 Gerhard Seewann (ed.), op. cil., PI'. 343-5,); Yulian Konstantmov, 'Minority Name Studies in the Balkans - The Pomaks'. Folia Lillgllisliw, vol. XXVI. nos 3-4 Berlin: Mouton/De Gruyter, 1')')2, pp. 403-33; Yulian Konstantinov, '''Nation-state'' and" MinOrIty" Types of Discourse - Problems of Communication between the MajOrIty and the Islamic MinOrIties III Contempor;llY Bulgaria', ltlllO/Jalioll: The Elll'Ol'eallJoli/'l/a/.fol' Social Sciellccs, Vienna: CCR, 1')92, pp. 75-90; Yulian Konstantinov, 'MinOrIty Problems of SelfDefinition: ConventIOnal and Minority Representations' in Jon Anson, Elka Todorova, Gideon Kressel and Nikolai Genov (cds), Ellllliril)' !/I/{l Polilics ill BII(~al'ia alld Israel, Avebury, 1993, pp. 66-flO; Yulian Konstantinov, 'The Bulgarian Pomaks: Names and Problems of Self-DefinitIOn' m Silvo Devetak, SergeJ Here and Gerhard Seewann (cds), Sl/1al/ Naliolls alld ElllIIic lvlillol'ilies ill till EI/I('/gillg Ell rope, MUlllch: Siavica Verlag Dr Anton Kovac, 1993. PI'. 33fl-45. 14 The Pomaks themselves waiver between the two extremes of on the one hand convertlllg to Christianity, and on the other adhering to IslamiC fimdamentalist values. The recent mass conversIOns of Pomaks to Christlamty, perf()l'lncd by Father Saruev III the central Rhodope mountains, is. a case III POlllt (cf. 'Father Boyan Saruev - Leader of the Movement for Christianity and Progress', Slat/{/(/I'I, Sofia, 23 September 1')94, p. 32).

Yrtlian KOllstal1tillOv

Strategiesfor Stlstail1illg a Vrilnerable Identity

preserve their communal identity. While at the present stage we are seemg a 'democratic' policy, there are already signs that this IS eroding, and that the state's policy may swing back to the other position. 15 The possibility of such repeated policy swings has developed mto a lasting concern for Bulgarian Pomaks. A vernacular illustratIOn of the their collective anxiety arises in the following comment: 'How many times have they [the Bulgarian authorities] changed our names? Now [March 1990] they are giving our names back, but will It be long before they take them away again?,lC1 The unpredictable and often aggreSSIve attitude of the authoritIes has mevItably focussed on Identity semiotics, whIch the natIOn state consIders of major relevance. Such a semiotics is structured out of codes 'VIsible' to the nation state in the sense that It perceives them to be somehow 'naturally' connected with, and expressive of, ethnic identIty. Through the various conversion cycles implemented by the authorities in relation to the Pomaks between 1912 and 1990,17 the codes pertaining to names, both personal and 10catIOnal; language; religIOn; clothing; religious rituals connected with m~or life events (birth, cIrcumcision, marnage, death), and religious holidays and observances have all been subJected to manipulation. In their nationalistIC stages the various conversion cycles have eIther attacked all of these codes or concentrated on some of them only. Thanks to the contradictory nature of the various converSIOn cycles (i.e. 'Now we forbid the use of Islamic names, now we don't'), the Pomaks, along with other Islamic commtlI1itIes, have perceived the sensitivity of the nation state towards these 'visible' identity codes. This 'visibility' is due to the £,ct that expreSSIOns of nationalism have been borrowed from Western perceptions of

national identity -i.e. a 'oneness' of 'blood', 'soil', religion and language. Hence the extreme importance of ethnogenesIs (nation-building), indivisibility of natIOnal terntOly, and 'oneness' of cultural practices. Feeling easily vulnerable when attacked in relation to the 'correct' usage of these codes, the Pomak (and generally Islamic) tactIC 111 Bulgana has been to leave them alone for public purposes. The quasi-academIC rhetoric mentIOned above in relation to 'access to ancestors' presents a contrary attitude, but it is the less significant phenomenon; what is more relevant IS the way in which an identity structure IS lived and transmItted to posterIty. This can be done successfully by avoiding nation-state models, because they are generally of an alien nature and especially because they make the minority vulnerable. We devote the remainder of this chapter to the most significant identIty codes used during the totalitanan penod (1944-89), together With their recent reinterpretations.

40

15 The announcement of the creation of paramilitary squads named' Pall SiarJ/(/' can be construed as indicating a possible nationalistic backlash. These reportedly consist of f(ml1er Uulgarian volunteers who fought in Uosnia and who intend to Ilght against 'racketeers, Turkish illegal formatIOns. and Gypsy criminal gangs' (' Armed" Pan Slavla" Squads will Cleanse CrIminals', Slilluiarl, Solla, 23 September 1994, p. I). 16 Shivachevo, July 1990, Konstantinov £'1 ai., 'Names of the UulgarIan Pomaks'. p.45.

17 Cf Konstantinov, 'An Account of Pomak ConversIOns in Uulgana (19121990)'.

41

T1lC demographic code TI1lS has been the most significant and decisive instrument in maintaining a sense of identity among the Pomak and other Islamic populations in Bulgana. The most telling aspect is that more than 90 per cent of the Pomak community of Bulgaria live in a single ueooTaF1hicai area - the Rhodone - and more than 80 tner cent of b b t the TurkIsh community live in two main zones of almost compact Turkish population - the north-east Tnangle (Razgrad-SilistraVarna) and the south-east one, centred on Haskovo- Kt'hdzhali but actually extending over the whole south-east corner of the country.1H The demographic behaviour of the Pomaks -and of the Islamic population generally - has difFered sharply from that of the l11;uonty I H Ethl11c statIstics produced by Balkan natl011 states arc notonously unreliable: maps reflecting natural and mechalllcal growth of the populatIon arc f:1r better indicators of ethmc numbers and distribution. The diHcrent types of population growth patterns immediately set the areas of Pomak and Turktsh concentration very sharply apart from the majorIty parts of the country. It is also a telling f:1Ct that when snch a map was produced in 1972 by the Geographical Department of the Umversity of Solla it was instantly declared secret by Party authorities (personal commtl11ication).

42

Yllliall KOlIstalltillolJ

Strategies for SlIstaillillJ? a VII III crab Ie /delltity

population and of what may be termed 'unproblematic minorities': primarily the Danube Vlachs, the Aromamans, the Karakachans, the RUSSIans, Arme11lans, Gagauz, Jews, Albanians and other small groups. The difference became most pronounced during the decades of massive mIgration fi-om villages to towns, which began in the mid-1950s and peaked m the nml-1970s. In contrast to this movement, the Islamic population not only stayed m their home villages or small provmcial towns, but mcreased their density there by attracting IslamIC lTllgration from other parts of the country. For the Pomaks an mitial Impetus m this direction was provided by the resettlement campaIgn of 1949-51 (of whICh more below), II) and the maSSIve Bulganan-Turkish mIgratIOn to Turkey m 19501 20 In essence, when Bulganan Turks moved to Turkey, they preferred to sell property to Pomaks rather than to Bulgarians, or SImply gIve it away to people of their own ~lith whom they trusted. As a result, many former Turkish villages became Pomak ones m the area around Veliko Tihnovo.:?'1 By staymg in compact Pomak villages and assisted by a tightlyknit ~lIllily and kinshIp structure, the Pomaks managed to extract maXImum efficiency out of the generally inefficient co-operative Emn system, and thereby created a specific 'Islamic economy' within the Socialist one.:?'2 This was essentially a 'peasant-worker' economy (well observed by Lockwood m connection with SImilar developments in Bosnia23 ). The ~llnily, typically with three or four children and the grandparents' generation attached to it, worked in co-operation with a well-preserved kinship network, and accumulated mcome fi·om a variety of sources: salaned jobs, daily or seasonal migration, old-age pensions, work on co-operative and pnvate land, intensive crops (tobacco), and the sale of milk and milk products. Among salaried Jobs the workshop system

employed by large industrial enterprises (especially the armaments and textile industries) was especially Important; it preferred to go to the labour, by building workshops m the villages, rather than making the labour come to It and thus increase the housing shortage and infrastructural deficiencies of the big towns. Moving forward to the present day, the community has been hit the hardest in relatIon specifically to the Islamic 'peasant-worker' economy, and the preservation of its identity structure has consequently become precarious. With the closing down of large mdustnal enterprises (espeCIally in armaments, textiles and mining), the highly unsatis£:1ctory arrangements imposed by the tobacco monopoly, and the liquidation of the co-operative £:1rms WIth the cnsumg controversial restitutIOn of land, the hitherto efficient IslamiC economy has virtually collapsed, espeCIally 111 the Rhodope. The Pomaks - traditionally one of the poorest sectors of the population have been hit hardest. They have no traditional land holdings and hence are now adversely afiected by restitution. The area where they live - the Rhodope - is geot,rrahically difficult and they are heavily dependent on tobacco grow111g, while having little or no control over it beyond the stage of basic production. These Elctors have brought the Pomaks today to one of the lowest POll1ts 111 theIr history.

It) Cf. also Konstantlnov, 'An Account of Pomak Conversions in Bulgaria (1912-1990)'.

20 Cf. Wolfi;ang Hl)pken. 'EmigratIon und IntegratIon von Bulganen-Turken seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg' in Seewan (eeL), OJ'. cil., Pl'. 359-77.

21 Konstantinov

cI

al., 'Names of the Bulgarian Pomaks', pp. 28-33.

Post-1989 llemamlar

43

rcli~f proJIramnlcs

These programmes have run largely contrary to strategIes which the Pomaks have evolved for economic survIval and the preservation of a distinct but 'clandestll1e' communal Identlty.24 Because of the cntIcal SItuatIOn in Bulgaria there have been many internationally-funded attempts to Implement aid programmes, but none of this aId has reached its professed target groups, least of all the Pomaks. The absence of any beneficial effects from such programmes and the virtual collapse of the national economy have compelled the lower layers of society to evolve their own relief programmes for survival. In this, the way chosen and led mainly and more or less spontaneously by the l~oma (Gypsy)

2:? Cf. Krustyu Petkov (ee\.) , 'Chetvi'Irto ckspresno Izsledvane: Obshtinskata

ikonomika v eksremalna situatsiya'

111

Petko v and Potev (cds), OJ'. cil., pp. 229-91.

William Lockwood, 'The Peasant-Worker in Yugoslavia', Studies in Sociel)'. vo\. I, no. I. 1973, pp. 91-111.

23

El//'OpCllII

2·1 Konstantinov. '''Nation-state'' and "MinOrIty" Types of Discourse', p. 78; Dalllel Bates. 'What's 111 a Name: Minonties, IdentIty and Politics JdCIIlili('s. vol. 1, no. 2.

ill

Bulgana',

44

YlIliall KOllstalltillofJ

StrategiesJor SlIstaillill,f[ a VlIlllera[,[e idelility

community has been small-scale trading or 'trader-tourism'. This is a phenomenon of massive proportions met with all over the former SovIet Bloc. 25 Trader-tourism IS a form of informal economic activity in which a person travels as a tourist to another country and buys goods to be sold at home, usually in second-hand markets or street stalls. Tounsts are not supposed to carry goods in bulk, which would be subject to customs duty, Border customs barners are overcome by the simple expedient of bribes. As a result, the trader-tounst may gain more than 40 profit on the initial investment 111 a tnp. In 1994 It was estimated that 111 Bulgaria alone at least 100,000 people had operated as trader-tOUrISts in each year since 1989, with a total value of imported goods estimated at some US$100 million annually.2(, A remarkable feature of trader-tourism in our context is the ethnic dimension of inclusIOn or engagement 111 it. In the BulgarIan case the spearhead of this form of entrepreneurship conSIsts of the various Roma groups, notably the 'TurkIsh' Gypsies. Proportionately, the majority Bulgarian populatIOn is included to an equal extent, followed by the Bulgarian Turks. However, the group that seems to be entirely absent IS the Pomaks. Even in areas where the Pomaks are the main constituent of the village population, such as the Chech region around the town of Gotse Delchev (Western Rhodopes), Pomak traders only appear exceptionally 111 the town market. Trader-tourism has evolved as a maSSIve collective enterprise aimed at somewhat relieving the burden on the lower social strata

of the population. People have been hit hard by rismg unemployment (which has reached 20 per cent as a national average), and galloping mflation (which reached 120 per cent in 1994). Furthermore, unemployment IS much higher for certain eth11lc groups than the national average. For the Roma it tends to exceed 38 per cent; It is even hIgher for the Pomaks. In many villages m the Rhodopes all the available labour force is out of work and has come to depend exclusively on growing tobacco and potatoes, and on goat and sheep herding. While more than 80 per cent of the Roma populatIOn have engaged actIvely in trader-tOUrISm, thereby compensating amply for the disappearance of employment and the meagre forms of social security, Pomak participation in this 'relief programme' IS nearly nil. Herein lies one strong empirical proof of what constitutes Pomak identity and moreover what it constitutes in a way which is immune to attack from the vantage points adopted by the nation state, such as language, religion and traditions. For while one can refram publicly from outward expressions of 'incorrect' usage in all these domams (or ostensibly demonstrate 'correct' usage by, for example, declaring m front of TV cameras that 'one feels Bulgarian deep 111 one's heart'), the minority ethnicity contmues to be lived and sustamed by non-inclUSIOn in m~~ority activities that may lead to dispersion of the commumty, and especially to the cutting of ties between children and parents. Here the transmISSIOn of cultural values from mother to daughter appears pivotal, as has been convincingly shown by Assen Baliksi m his visual anthropological work in the village of Brezmtsa. 27

25 For the term and the phenomenon see Chris HanIl and Ildiko I-Iann, 'Samovars and Sex OIl Turkey's Russian Markets', Alltitropology Today, vol. 8, no. 4, August 1992, pp. 3-0; Y ulian Konstantmov, 'Small-scale trading 111 Bulgaria in the context of Post-Totalitarian Changes', report First InternatIonal Seminar on Sl1Iall-scale trading in the Balkans, Varna, 6-8 August, 1993, BSRCS; Yuliall Konstantlllov, Gideon Kressel and Trond Thuen, 'The Merits of Dishonour: Engagement in Petty-Trading in Varna', 1994 (BSRCS, unpubl. MS.); Henrik Egbert, 'Dubal (UAE) as a CommerCIal Centre between S.E. ASia and Bulgana: Ethnic Interaction in Town-l1Iarket Trading', IIIIIOIl(lticlll: Tlll' EllrOpl'(II1 JOImlll1 (or Social Sciwces, vol. 7. no. 4, Vienna: ICCR.

Konstantinov. 'Small-scale Trading in Bulgaria In the Context of Post-Totalitarian Changes'; Yulian Konstantinov, 'Patterns of Reinterpretation: Enactments of 'Norl1l" and 'Deviance" in ini()fmai EconomIC ActivitIes (Bulgaria)', report, Second International Seminar on Sl1Iall-scale Trading in the Balkans, Varna, 8- J() August 1994, BSRCS.

45

171c ann}'

Typically when a Pomak to moves away from his home village it IS on a temporary basis as seasonal or day labour, and it applies exclusively to men. Curiously, this pattern was reinforced by the totalitarian regime through the mechanism of conscrIption into the so-called Construction Corps.2H Here military service consisted

2(,

27

Municipality of Gotse Dclchev, cf note 12 above.

For the army see Daniel Nelson, 'PolitICal Dynamics and the Bulgarian Military', Bcriclitc des Bllluiesillstitilts .Ii·ir ostlflisSl'IIsclilljiliclil' I/Ild illtematiollale Stlldiw (Cologne), no. 43, 1990, p. 19; Nelson, Blllkllll IlIIbro,~lio, p. 59.

2H

simply. of labou.riI~g in some of the heaviest jobs: mming, road and raIlway bmldmg, and work on various construction sites in~luding those of houses and villas being built for the highe:' mIlitary and civilian n011lellklatllra. InclusIOn in the Construction Corps is related mainly to ethniClty, as well as to mental and physical disability. I t is also linked to the conscript's political and police record. While the issue of conscnpt.ion into this Corps is surrounded by a degree of secrecy, It IS possIble to say that certain mmorities (Roma, Turks and, to a much smaller extent, Pomaks) are conscripted exclusively into the Construction Corps. The ratio of 1I1clusion in it corresponds proportIOnately to the ratIo of exclusion from the commissioned ranks 111 both the army and the police. It is sIgnificant in terms of the ambivalent situation of the Pomaks - wedged between the Bulgarians and the Turks - that among the 'problematic minorities' (Roma, .Turks and Pomaks) they are perceIved by the military and polIce authonties as the most reliable and loyal element. Hence theIr lowest conscription ratIO 111 the Construction Corps, and hIghest 111 the army and police officers' ranks. In spite of their proportIOnately lower inclusion in the ConstructIOn Corps, this 1I1stitution has nevertheless played an identIty-strengthening role for the Pomak community, and even more so for the Turkish community, Although demanding heavy and arduous work 111 conditions closely resembling forced labour, the Construction Corps eql1lpped conscripts with skills such as brickIaY1l1g, mosaIc-laying, exterior and 1I1terior decoration, heavvvehIcle driving and electric wIring. These skills tended not ~o disperse the minonty by finding them permanent town Jobs but rather to bring them back in to the home commumty, with its worker-peasant pattern. 29 With the collapse of the worker-peasant economy in the Islamic villages and the failure of their populations to be mcluded in mformal economIC activities of the trader-tourism type, seasonal migration has increased, especially in the construction industry because, despite the economic crisis, there is an unprecedented boom 111 the construction of private houses and flats in Bulgaria. A large part of the workforce on these sites is provIded by the IslamIc villages from the large Pomak and Turkish enclaves, as well as by the various Roma groups. 2')

Strate,gies for Sustaimllg a Vulnerable IdClltity

Yuliall KonstalltltlOl!

46

C[ Petkov, op, cit.

47

Borders To complete any discussion of the use of borrowed and often enforced majority categories in the endeavour by Pomaks to mana ere and sustain a distinct identity, the border £lctor must be considered. This vast and largely unexplored topic has special relevance to the Pomak predicament. Bulgaria's borders with Greece and Turkey were Warsaw Pact/NATO borders throughout the Cold War period, and many of those features were reta1l1ed after it ended. 30 For more than 90 per cent of the entire Pomak community, the geographIcal area where they live coincides along its southern rim with the border between Bulgana and Greece. When the establishment of tl115 border began on the lines of the Soviet border doctrine m 1946-8, the Bulgarian authorities found it necessary to forcibly relocate a sIzeable part of the Pomak population from the border villages, especially those of them wIth contacts or relatives on the other side. Consequently, the transhumant pastoralist economy of the Pomaks was radically disrupted, and links with the Greek part of the community were completely severed. Thereafter the two parts of the Pomak community (the larger Bulganan and the smaller Greek part) became the object of nation-state conflict. Each country, with academic support, tried to make the case that the Pomaks are not an ethno-confessionalm1l10nty but a somewhat mIsgUIded part of the majority population. Any attempt to argue otherwIse was subsequently treated as an attempted to destroy the country's umty and autonomy, and vIrtually as an act oflllgh treason. The Pomak relocation campaign between 1949 and 1951 C01l1cided wIth other major ethmc shifts. This period witnessed the emigratIon of more than 80 per cent of the Bulgarian Jewish population to the newly-founded state of Israel (1949) and more than 150,000 Bulgarian Turks (including Pomaks) to Turkey (J 9501).31 During this penod the policy of the Bulgarian state was thus Por the border betwccn Bulgaria and Greecc see Michael Drury, The Boulldary BU(I!(/ria {lIld Creece, International Boundary Research Unit, Boundary Bnetlllg, UIllversIty of Durham, 1991; Ivan Vangclov 1'1 al. (cds), Strazh 11(/ lJt1(I!(/skilc gy{//litsi, Sofia. OupraVlel1lC gralllchlll voiski pn MVR, Voenno Izdatclstvo, 1982; Konstantlllov. 'TransItion and Boundaries: Essays in the Anthropology of Post-Totalitarian Changes', BSRCS 1994 (unpub!. MS.).

30

/Jetll'~:"

31

C[ Hopkcn, 'EmIgration und Integration' in Seewann (eel.), op. cit., Pl'.

49

Yulian KOl1stantin01J

Stratcgicsfor Sustaining a Vull/crablc Idcntity

to 'let the people go', or at least to remove them from sensitive areas like the southern borders with Greece and Turkey. The enforced resettlement of the Pomaks ended in 1951, and by the spring of 1952 many who had been resettled to villages in the in tenor of the country were allowed to return. Some did so, but others emigrated to Turkey; yet others migrated in a secondary manner further into the Turkish north-east massif, or occupied deserted Turkish villages, as with the small Hadzhiyska enclave near Zlataritsa. 32 Whether migration was enforced or voluntary, It was done collectively, not indiVIdually, and was directed towards Islamic P01l1ts of f:,'Tavity - Pomak or Turkish ones. Ultimately it aimed at preserving the compactness of the community, and drawing a sharp ethnic boundary between it and the quickly urbanising Bulganan majority.33 In the mean time, construction of the southern border area was completed, not only as a piece of military technology but also as a demographIC shIeld. By the mid-1950s the latter included a partitioning into three border zones with a total depth (inwards trom the frontier) of 30-50 km. This meant that a large part of the Pomak population became sealed offfrom the Bulgarian population to the north. The Pomak border population was furthermore expected to aSSIst the border troops by reporting any suspicious movement of people who might be intending to flee south, and even to take individual or collective action to apprehend such

'border violators'. Accordingly the Pomaks of this area not only lived in a compact IslamIC concentratton, but were also in a position to defend theIr ethmc boundary by usmg theIr 'duty' to protect the state boundary. This is another example of how 1111positions enforced by the lutton-state authonties can be interpreted by the receiving population as something not merely unobjectionable but actually deSIrable. Thus, m tl1lS partIcular case, a classic divide-and-rule approach receIves an identIty- strengthening twist. With the presumed end of the bipolar age after the events of 1989, certam m;uor changes took place along the borders. One of the first measures adopted by the post-1989 Bulgarian governments was to dismantle the demographIC shIeld, thus opening the area to mfluxes from the north. In addition, there have been discussions m Parliament of the possibility of dismantling the actual border-fence, an expenSIve electrol1lc device built over decades. There was a general expectatton that the Greeks would also begm to ease restrictions on theIr SIde; Greek governments promised to open up new check-pOInts, and a grand plan was announced for a north-south motorway. However, events have increasmgly tended in the direction of makmg the border more rigid rather than more porous and even ultimately symbolic. Thus while the NATO/Warsaw Pact border has disappeared as a strategic concept, It appears to have been replaced by a border of economic asymmetry between the ailluent West European countrIes, theIr poorer Eastern neIgbours, and the even poorer populations pressing in from the less developed Asian and African countrIes. There have been increasing attempts on the Bulgarian/Greek border at illegal crossings into Greece - mainly by Bulgarian Roma groups - for the purpose of immigratIon to the West. or in search of seasonal employment m Greece. Thus the problem is very SImilar to the Greek problem with the Albamans, and is being dealt WIth in a similar way, often involvmg harsh measures. Additionally, there has been increasmg pressure on the border hom potentIal emigrants from varIOUS countrIes in the Middle East and e~;pecially Afnca who seek to enter Greece through BulgarIa and from there travel to the ailluent countries of Western Europe. On top of thIs the complicatIons surrounding the embargo between SerbIa and the rest of the Balkans, as well as that between Greece and FYROM, add to the pressure on the border through a varIety

48

359-77; Boyan Gyuzelev. 'B(Jlgarite mohamedal11 v Turtsiya'. Istorichcski /J/'l:<;/cd. vol. 56 110. 10. 1990. pp. 17-32. 32

Konstantmov ct ill .. 'Names of the Bulgarian Pomaks', pp. 44-9

33 A POl11ak infimnant describes the move to a Turkish-populated village in

north-eastern Bulgaria as a secondary migratioll following the resettlement of 1949-51 m these terms: 'In 1951 It was decided-by the first resettlers here [in Northern Bulgaria]-that they couldn't go on living in those villages. There IS one village - Stevrek - and they deCIded to go to the Turks there. because they were keen to live. . to tell you the truth we are said to be such [Bulganans]. but we are hardened into that f:lith. the Muslim f.·11th. and our older people said: "There is no [Muslim] cemetery here. what shall we do?" They had lived Olle year among the BulgarIans [in Northern Bulgaria]. but that couldn't go on. Exhausted. worn out. they set otf - 20-30 t.1milies. They gathered together and went there. to Stevrek, [and settled] in one small part of the village. with the only aim to get away from there, from the Bulgarians. from that f:lith. They didn't want it, they couldn't stand it!' Interview with Ali. August 1991: Yulian Konstantinov. 'Three Pomak Stories', p. 11.

50

Yuliall KOl1stalltillOI!

Strategies for SlIstaillillg a Vltllierable Identity

of illegal operations (e.g. the export of Greek oil to BulgarIa, whence it IS transported to Macedoma and on to Serbia). For all these reasons the southern border area with Greece is slowly recoverIng its pre-1989 shape. The Pomaks feel this regressIon adversely, as many of the previous border-related benefits they enjoyed have disappeared. Before 1989 there were various incentives to encourage settlement in the border area: higher pay, easy loan schemes for house building, lower taxatIOn, provision of defiCIt goods and materials, quotas for higher education in the universItIes and so on. 34 All these benefits have ceased. The Pomaks in Bulgaria today are perhaps the community that feels the greatest pressure as the result of the 1989 reforms. Having managed to preserve themselves and their identity f:1irly successfully, even under the impact of an often harsh totalitarian regime, they [1Ce the dilemma of endangerIng this communal identity by engagl11g in programmes like small-scale trading and trader-tourIsm, or alternatively £'lCl11g extremely bleak economic conditions. Many, espeCIally the younger ones, choose the 'reform' option, to the point of converting to Christianity,35 However, a more traditional method of escape 111 such CIrcumstances has always been emigration to Turkey.

of 1912-13, and much later with the great Turkish emigration of 1950-1 and in subsequent regulated emIgrations to Turkey,37 The most recent large-scale emigratIOn of Pomaks was a subsidiary element in the mass exodus of Bulgarian Turks to Turkey 111 June-July 1989, an event which preCIpitated the [;111 of the Zhivkov regime in November that year. 3H Of more than 300,000 people who left for Turkey 111 the eventful summer of 1989 It is difficult to say what proportion were Pomaks, since many attempted to pass as Turks, feanng that they might otherwIse be turned back at the border. In September 1989 some 100,000 of the emigrants returned to Bulgana, mdicating that for both Bulganan Turks and Pomaks integrative processes 111 the 'mother country' were not as easy as 111 1950-1, for reasons best explained by Hopken. 39 While in 1950-1 the Turkish state could provide both land and some form of social security to the 1I1coming Balkan Turks and Pomaks, 111 1989 (and ever since) there has been a growing reluctance to spend the restricted security funds that exist on Immigrants hom Bulgaria. Against a socIal background of fear oflosing employment due to the influx of cheap Bulganan labour, the situatIOn for the 1I111111grant IS often rather grim. This is exacerbated by £'lctors connected wIth religious observance and models of propriety, which are found largely lacking in the incommg Immigrants, espeCIally when they arrive in rural Anatolia wIth ItS greater Islamic onentatlon. Boys of conscript age fear ending up in Kurdish-populated areas dunng their military servICe. These reasons all contribute to the construction of a pattern whereby emigration occurs on the baSIS of a simple geographical transfer from the home village in BulgarIa to an analogous one in Turkey - if the latter exists. The 11111111grant who goes directly to such an analogous village and IS met and taken care of there by close k111 and friends, feels relatively secure. This natural impulse to seek securIty 111 a foreIgn country is catered for by Bulgarian prIvate bus C0111pames whIch run direct lines between Pomak villages in the Rhodopes and theIr twin villages in Turkey. The contmuing emigratIOn to Turkey bears witness to the [lCt that many Pomaks 111 Bulgaria conSIder the economic problems

Em(r;ration to 'TlIrkey This form of emigration has been an escape route for the Pomaks ever since the Turkish troops began to retreat before the advancing Russian army in the 1877 -8 Russo-Turkish war, which effectively liberated BulgarIa from Ottoman rule after four centuries. Pomaks had taken part m the bloody paramilitary pumtlve campaIgns agamst BulgarIans during the unsuccessful uprISing of 1876 (the 'Bulgarian Atrocities'), and had reason to believe that they would become victims of retaliatory measuresY' Thereafter more massive waves of emigration took place followmg the First Balkan War

Economic incentives for the border areas were provided for by Decrees of the Coullcil of Ministers, e.g. PMS no. 31/ 19RR for lower taxatIOn, Credits f()r building houses and supply of foodstufls, 35 Cf. note 14 above. 3(, Gyuzelev, of'. cit. 34

37 Cf. i-I6pken,

of'. cit., pp. 374-5, tables 1 and 2.

Cf. Nelsoll. Balkllll [lIlbro.~lio. pp. 55-66. 3') H6pken. of'. dt.

3K

51

53

Yllliall /(ollSlanII1Wl!

Sirale,(fics for Slistaillillg a VIIll/crablc Idcnlity

whIch would £lce them if they decide to stay as lI1surmountable. The reaffirmation of religious expressIOn, manifested in the building and renovation of mosques, the resurrection of religious schooling, the teaching of Turkish at school and the readoptIOn of TurkicArabic names (which fuelled much of the Christian-Islamic political controversy durmg the early 1990s) has provided progressively less consolatIon. Agamst this background all sorts of escape routes have been sought - even taking refuge in a 'superchurch' represented by evangelical missions from the West (mainly the United States). These varied attempts to find some form of escape in ChristIan Evangelicalism or devout Islamism, by moving physically to Turkey, or as a Gaslar/ieiler force 111 Bulgarian towns and abroad (e.g. Libya) bear witness to the heIghtened tension the community has experienced since 19R9 together WIth an often desperate search for redress.

in its semIOtic aspect. Thus, maintaining It now £lces dangers that are swiftly reaching a critical point. The expedient of emib'TatlOn to Turkey has so £1r been a rather unsatisfactory answer to the problem, and is largely resorted to 111 desperation. It remains to be seen whether the Pomak community will agam manage to reinterpret creatIvely categories imposed upon it by the circumstances of the new post-bIpolar world and at the same time keep its communal Identity and improve Its economic fortunes. The increased compleXIty of this task and the cntical period which the Pomaks in Bulgaria £lce reqUIre that the issue receives most serious attention.

52

We have given less attentIOn here to the more semiotic (e.g. anthroponymic) dimension, givmg greater emphasis to the more substantial part, connected with the communal economy. The author has shown elsewhere how arbItrarily such semiotics can be exploited; the best examples of this are furnished by correlatIOns between name and electoral behaviour. 40 The thesis has all along been that the Pomaks have successfully evolved what may be termed a 'clandestine identity' since the late nineteenth century and espeCIally during the recent Communist period. This 'clandestine IdentIty' adopts and employs for the sake of its own inner stability forms of social orgamsation borrowed from, or even enforced by, the m~~Jority administration. As for the surface semIotics that are claSSIcally open to attack -language, religion, names, rituals, traditions - these can be approached qUIte arbitrarily. Thus the Pomak rnodel of identIty maintenance and preservatIon can be said to be adaptive and creatively remterpretative, relymg mainly on surtlce expression whIch can not be approached in classic nation-state terms. In the mid-1990s, however, 111 contrast WIth the situatIon under the Communist regIme, the Pomak (and other Islamic) Identity base is under pressure 111 its substance rather than .jO Konstantinov, 'The Bulgarian Pomaks: Names and Problems ofSelf-dcfinitioll', p. 341.

From Religious Identity to Ethnic Mobilisation

4 FROM ItELIGIOUS IDENTITY TO ETHNIC MOBILISATION: THE TURKS OF BULGARIA BEFORE, UNDER AND SINCE COMMUNISM Wo[[fzal1g Hop/:zen 'Without doubt the Turks are leaving and the Christians are coming.' I ThIs quotation from the mId-nineteenth century reflects an opinion widespread among the European public of the time, as the Ottoman empIre was ll1creasingly compelled to retreat fi'om its European conquests. It was generally expected that there would be a rapId emIgration of more or less all the Turkish and even non-Turkish Muslim populatIOn, 'probably in no more than fifty years', once Ottoman rule in the Balkans had come to an end. Almost no one from the 'European' public could envisage a long-term co-existence between Muslims and ChristIans in the post-Ottoman Balkan states; their religious and cultural differences were thought too antagonistic, and it was generally believed that Muslims would not be willing to submit to non-Muslim rule. According to the Czech historian Constantin Jirecek, one of the main Balkans experts of his time, even benevolent treatment by the new ChrIstian states could not win the hearts and ml11ds of the Muslims and prevent them from emigrating. 2 These predictions proved both right and wrong. Ottoman retreat from the Balkans was generally accompanied by large-scale emigration of Turks and other Muslims. From Bulgaria such emigration had already begun immediately after the outbreak of the RussoTurkish war in 1877, which led to the formation of the modern Bulgarian state. It only ceased when wars prevented mass el11lgradon, and when the Bulgarian Communists prohibIted unrestrIcted Betl'arllwll,
1 2

C. Jirecek, Das FiiLltelltllllll1 BII(
54

55

emigration after the Second World War. 3 Leaving aside emigration caused by wars (in 1878 and during the Balkan wars of 1912-13 and the First World War), for which undisputed data are hardly available, and taking into account only figures which are relatively reliable, it is possible to demonstrate that well over 1 million Turks have left Bulgaria Sl11ce the modern Bulgarian state came I11to being in 1878. 4 Having said that, however, even this large-scale and almost continuous emigration has not substantially affected the existence and absolute number of the Turkish and Muslim populations in Bulgaria. According to the latest BulgarIan census (1992), winch for the first time in almost thirty years published statistics relating to ethnic minorities, the Muslim population remains approximately 1 million strong (12.7 per cent of the entire population), despite the various waves of emigration. Of this million, 822,000 identified 3 Emigration of Turks and Muslims from Bulgaria is described in further detail in Wolfgang Hopken, Die Ullgeliebte Mil/daheit. Die Tiirknz BtI(\?ariws, 1878-1993 (The Unloved Minority: The Turks of Bulgaria, 187R-1(93), MUl1lch, 1994; sec also D. Vasileva, 'Bulgarian Turkish Emigration and Retum', Itltmlatiollal M(~ratiol/ Relliefll, vol. 26 no. 2 1992, pp, 342-52; B. ~im~ir, BtI(
Relatively undisputed figures for Turkish and Muslim emigration from Bulgaria can be gIven as follows. According to a Bulgarian estImate, approximately 350,000 left between 1RRO and 1911 (K. Popov, La BII(
56

Wo!frtang Hopkcn

Turks (9.8 per cent), 143,000 Pomaks (i.e. Bulgarian-speaking Muslims) (2.0 per cent) and 113,000 Roma (Gypsies) (1.5 per cent) out of a total of 257,000 combined Muslim and Christian Roma. 5

Rcl({{ious identity versus national b~fore Communism

COI1SciOIlSl'lfSS

Identity among Bulgaria's Turkish minority has undergone considerable changes s1l1ce the end of Ottoman rule. In the preCommunist period the identity of the Turkish population (and of the Bulgarian Muslims as well) was largely focused on religIOn. Up to the Second World War the Turkish community lived as a closed ethnic and religIOUS group, mainly agrarian with only about 15 per cent living in urban centres.(' By all social criteria the community was under-developed: illiteracy was almost the norm, reaching in the 19305 81 per cent among men and 91 per cent among women. 7 The community's schools were 'prIvate', governed and mostly financed by the community itself Except for very few urban 'riisdiyc' they were almost exclusively religious schools with little secular education, and before 1918 there were no secondary schools at all. Their financial situation was extremely poor; per capita expenditure for Muslim schools was usually five to six times lower than for state-run BulgarIan schools. H Teachers, who especially till the 1920s were mostly hodzhas without any 5 Quoted by the preliminary results of the census in Pari, Sofia, 9 April 1993. The yet unpublished final data appear to show a slightly different result, with 1,110,295 Muslims (13.1 'X, of the entire population), among whom 800,052 are Turks (9A%). Figures quoted from the unpublished records in Bii. Gjuvelev, 'Minderheiten in Bulganen unter Beriicksichtigung der letzten Volkszahlung', Sadosteuropa, vol. 43, nos 6-7,1994. pp. 362. 372. (, The most detailed and serious analysis of the demographic development of the Turkish and Muslim population ofBulgana before the Second World War remains G. Danailov. lzlctill(ltliya lIr1rk/1II dClllografiyata Ira BI1{<;ariya. Sofia, 1930; see p. 38. 7 N. Mihajlov,'Naradnodtnite maltsinstva u nas', Ad,i" za stopallska i sotsiailla poUtika. vol. VIII. no. 5, 1993. Sofia. p. 401.

For example. while in 1907-8 the pcr capita expenditure for a Bulgarian pupil was 31.8 Leva. It was just 5.4 Leva for a pupil in a Muslim school. See Statistika /la oimlzollallicta II Tsarstllo BI1{<;ariya, Uchdma godilla 1907-8. Sofia. 1911. pp. 244. 250.

R

From

Rel~(!ious

Idcntity to Etlmic Mobilisation

57

secular training, received much lower salaries than Bulgarian teachers, and accommodation and equipment were far below the average Bulgarian standard.') State support for the schools was so irregular and limited in quantity that it was l11capable of improving the quality of education. 10 Despite this, the Turkish and Muslim populations sent their children almost exclusively to their 'own' schools, and made almost no use of Bulgarian state schools. Around 1930 there were only seventy-four Turkish pupils among the 40,000 children attending secondary schools. ll In these circumstances the social and educational preconditions for the emergence of a secular elite as a kind of'nationalleadershIp' could almost be said not to exist. Up to the Second World War representatives from the Turkish and Muslim commumty were found in parliament as members of different 'BulgarIan' parties. They usually numbered fewer than fifteen and never attained a number m proportion to the percentage of Turkish and Muslim people m the population as a whole. Furthermore, they never really participated in political power, at least not on the national level. While there were some possibilities to express specific Muslim mterests, mainly in the field of school support, they had only limited room to monoeuvre for genume 'ethnic bargaming'. Selforganisation began with an organisation of Muslim teachers 111 1897 (BII{\{aristan MuaUimlt1-I Islamiyc Dzhcl1liyctl), and clearly achIeved little, and a benevolent organisation in 1911 (Iftifak-i- Islam) was based on religion and not mtended to promote ethnic interests. 12 State policy towards the Turkish population dUrIng this period was characterised more by social ignorance than by interference in the minority's internal afL1Irs. or suppression. The right to religious and educational autonomy was guaranteed by international treaties, BulgarIa's constitution of 1878 and Bulgarian law. In 9 N. Iv. Vankov, 'Chastnite osnovni lIchilishta v Bulgariya', Uchilishtcll pre.~lcd. XII. vol. 1907. pp. 695-716; cf. also the reports of the school lI1spectors on the conditions of schools in MlIslim-lI1hablted areas 111 Tsclltraietl D,1rzlulilclI Istorichcski Arhill (CDIA) fOlld 371: Dircktsiyata lIa obshtillitc. op. 3. a.e. 110. L. 213-14. 10 III 1905. for example. the Bulgarian state gave twice as much finanCIal support to the Bulgarian Drama Theatre than to all the [. 1.000 Muslim schools. CDlA fOlld 173: NarodllO sl1brallie. op. 2. a.e. 449. a.e. 798. a.e. 1541. 11 12

Uc/lilishtCII JlYl:~lcd. vol. 31. no. 5. 1932. p. 40. A. Popovic. L'Islmll balkalliqllc. Berlin. 1986. p. 77.

Wo!&ary! Hiipken

From Religious Identity to Ethnic Mobilisation

matters of inheritance and family law Turks and Muslims were placed under their own religious jurisdiction. I3 For a certain period many Muslims regarded military service in the Bulgarian Christian army as discrimination, and this often led to friction and even emif,'Tation. However, tensions surrounding tlUs issue relaxed during the late 1880s, when it became possible for Muslims to obtain release from military service through payment of an extra tax. The army also tried to improve conditions for Muslims by showing more respect for their customs and religion, especially after a substantial number of Turks and Muslims volunteered to fight during the Serbian-Bulgarian war of 1885. 14 Overt tensions and even violent conflicts had flared up between Bulgarians and Turks particularly from 1878 to the early 1880s, when the repatriation of Muslims who had escaped during the war, and Turkish claims concerning the restitution of property rights, gave frequent cause for complaint. Acts of repression and violence against Turks and Muslims in certain provinces during this period provoked repeated questions from the international powers.15 From the mid-1880s, however, the situation improved, and ethnic clashes became an exception,11i at least till the Balkan wars of1912-13, when Bulgarian conquests of what today is southern Bulgaria and parts of Thrace

were accompanied by heavy repression of Turkish and Muslim civilian populations. In general, Bulgaria's Greek population seems to have suffered much more frequent tensions and hostilitIes at this time than the Turks. Rather than any 'political oppressiOn' or legal discrimination, what most affected the Turkish and Muslim community at this tIme was the general trend of social change in Bulgaria with the establishment of the national state. Following the pattern of 'Westernisation', the political elite immediately adopted a policy of 'wiping out' visible elements of the Islamic religion and Ottoman culture wherever possible. Urban planning in accordance with 'western' standards often altered or destroyed the previous character of towns, which was tuuiliar to the Muslim population and forn1ed part of their cultural environment. Mosques were put to nonreligious purposes and sometimes destroyed; cemeteries were transferred to the outskirts of towns; Turkish geographical names were replaced by Bulgarian ones, and so on 17. While this policy was more a result of the Bulgarian elite's understanding of'lTlOdernity' and what a 'European state' should look like than a case of deliberate ethnic and religious discrimination, it nevertheless had an immediate impact on the livmg conditions of the Turkish and Muslim population, and on perceptions of their identity. It showed that they were now 'aliens' in the new state, which encouraged them either to emigrate or to 'encapsulate' themselves further within their religious group-solidarity. From the end of the First Wodd War up to the late 1920s little changed in the Turkish minority's social and political situation: as a mmonty their rights in legal tenns were relatively well respected. 1H Their religious and cultural autonomy was not challenged, their own legal competences were retained, and they had theIr own press and parliamentarians. I') This was an achievement

58

13 For the nonnative regulation of the minority status of Turks and Muslims

between 1878 and 1944 cf. G.P. Genov. Pravnoto polozhcnic na lIlaltsitlStlJata. Sofia. 1929. On the conditions of Muslims within the Bulgarian am1Y see an Interesting German report from 1889 in Politisches ArcJriv des AIlSUJiirt(f(c/r Amtcs (PA-AA [Political Archives of the Foreign Office]), Gesandtschaft Sofia no. 8: Politische Erlasse und Berichte 1889. Bd. 2 (Bericht no. 68. 31 August 1889). 15 A series of documents relating to such conflicts have been collected from International archives: see B. ~il11~ir (cd.), Rllllleli'den TUrk COfleri, Be{lJcler. 3 vols. Ankara. 1989. The editor set out to prove that the Bulgarian state adopted a policy of expulsion of Turks after 1878. This is hardly supported by the sources. See also Gennan diplomatic report'i on such tensions in PA-AA. R 4547-4549: Acta betr. die Grausamkeiten der Bulgaren gegen die Muhamedaner. 1880-1883 ['Acta' concerning the Violence of BulgarIans against Muslims. 1880-1883]. 14

I Ii The most severe ethnic dash of this period, causing some casualties, occurred In 1910 in the ethnically mixed town of Ruse. followmg an aff.,ir between a Christian man and a Muslim girl. The case was not handled effectively by the police: cf. I. Stojanov, Villolmitsite na katastrqfata v Ruse. Sofia. 1910; G. Dimitrov. KriticJrcski o/Jzor sluchkata v,f(r. Ruse. Ruse. 191 O.

59

17 For an analysis of this process of ,de-Ottoman is ation' and 'de-Islamisation' see B. Lory. Le sort de l'lrh-it
IH In contrast with neIghbOUrIng Romania and Yugosiavia, Bulgaria did not heSItate to sign the minority obligations of the Paris peace treaties and League of Nations after 1919. Of course these must be seen in the light of Bulgaria's own interest concerning the 'Bulgarian minorities' in the neighbOUring countries and its revisionist goals relating to the peace treaty. 1'1

These sometimes displayed an exaggerated sympathy for Bulgarian policy,

60

Wo!&ang Hopkell

Froln ReligioHs Identity to Ethnic Mobilisatioll

given the general climate in post-war Eastern Europe, where national tensions and restnctions of minority rights tended to be the rule. Neutral observers such as the Bntish Foreign Office concluded in 1920 that 'in general religious toleration prevails [in Bulgana] to a greater extent than m any other state in Eastern Europe.'20 When visiting Bulgana on a tour of inspection m 1931 the League of Nations secretary for Minority Questions, Pablo de Azcarate, also found little to complain of.21 At the same time, however, the Bulgarian state's attitude of ignorance towards the minority and the social backwardness of the mmority itself did not change much. Efforts to improve educational conditions for the Turkish and Muslim population by developing secular channels for this through Turkish secondary schools and a teachers' college, introduced in particular during the rule of the Agranan Party in the early 1920s, proved short-lived and had little substantial effect. 22 To summarise, between 1878 and the 1920s state-minority relations were based on a compromise of sorts between the minority's religious elite and the government. While the religious elite confined their efforts to the consolidatiOn of a religious idemty without aspiratiOns for secular ethnic mobilisation, the govern-

ment rewarded this ethnic self-restriction with non-interference. I t was natural that this state of affairS should be challenged by the rise of Kemalism in Turkey, The real impact of Kemalism among the Turks and Muslims of Bulgana is still unclear, due to the lack of systematic and unbiased research on tl1lS matter. In the author's opinion, its mfluence has been exaggerated by both Bulgarian and Turkish historiography. The latter typically endeavours to demonstrate that Bulgarian Turks adjusted rapidly and profoundly to Kemalism, which transformed them into an 'ethnically conscious Turkish minority', having discovered their close ties with the new secular Turkey. Bulgarian historiography, often based on anti-Kemalist religlOus sources, points to the exaggerated mfluence of Kemalism as evidence of a 'Panturkist' policy transforming the Turks of Bulgaria into Ankara's political tools.23 Certainly Kemalism found some reflex among the small group of mamly urban Turkish teachers and the very few intellectuals, especially in the Turkish communities of north-eastern towns like Varna or Shumen, in contrast with the almost totally agrarian Turks and Muslims of south-eastern Bulgaria. At the end of the 1920s, followmg the example of nineteenth-century Slavic national self-organisation, a small group of secular-minded Turks founded the first secular Turkish organisation. Officially a youth orgamsation dealing in sports and culture, 'Turan' was clearly under Kemalist influence. Its goal was to transform the Turkish population into a 'national Turkish minority' .24 However, the small size of the secular elite, the high rate of illiteracy and the promment role of religious leaders withm the community provided less fertile ground for the spread of Kemalism than in Turkey itself. Furthermore, the Bulgarian government itself was not eager to promote Kemalist secularism: the religious law was retained

however. See A. Girard. 'Les minorites ethniql1es et religiel1ses en 13ulgarie', doctoral thesis in law. Paris. 1932.

20 Halldbook prepared under the directIOn of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office. no. 22. BII\lIaria. London, 1920, p. 61.

21 Natiollal Archillcs Waslzillgtoll (NA Waslzil/.lltoll) 874.4016125 (LegatIon Sofia, March 7. 1931. no. 204; Subject: ViSIt of Mr Pablo de Azcarate y Florez). There were very few petitions to the League of Nations concernmg the violation of mmonty nghts of 13ulgarian Turks and Muslims. and these were generally not well founded. Cf. Arc/lillc of Ilzc Lcagllc of Natiol/s. Geneva: R 1663 (Minoritcs Musulmans en 13ulgarie. 10 September 1921) and UN R 3936 (Minoritcs Musulmans en 13ulgarie. 31 May 1934). Indeed at the same time also the RCI/IIC des Etlldes Islamiqllcs. typIcally sensitive to religious discrimll1ation against Muslims. spoke of a 'politique empremtc d'un trcs grand libcralisme vis-a-vis de Ia minoritc musulmane' in 13ulgaria: 'Les Musulmans de 13ulgane'. RCIIIIC des Ellldcs Islmlliqllcs, vol. 1, 1932, p. 88. For an example of a more critical view from 1932, whIch refers to the first mCldents of violence. cf. A. Popovic. 01'. cit .. pp. 82£[ For educational policy in the 1920s sec St. Omarchevski, ZClIlcdclskiya S,IY"Z i llcililislzlcto, Sofia. 1920; D. Conkov. lI1.alcriali za iZIIWlla/lC lUI I/cize/moto dela II BII(lIa";ya: KI/('ta VII: Razllilic na OSllollllOIo oiJrazOIlatlic II BII\lIariya ot 1878-1928 .lIod.• Sofia. 1928. 22

61

For the Turkish view cf. 13. ~il11~ir. BI/(II
62

Wo!fS:ang Hapken

till 1938, much longer than in Turkey.25 An attempt in the late 1920s to replace the Arabic alphabet with the Latin one met with resistance among the religious community, and this was implemented only in the late 1930s. 26 The government supported forces within the Turkish and Muslim community that were essentially anti-Kemalist. These mcluded the newspaper Meder/iyet which, thanks to financial support from the state, was the Muslim newspaper that appeared most frequently in Bulgaria during the interwar period. 27 Anti-Kemalist 'refugees' from Turkey were occasionally granted residence in Bulgaria, causing some tension with Turkey.28 All attempts to turn 'Turan' into a secular political representation for Bulgarian Turks met with state resistance, and following the authoritarian COllP d'etat in 1934 it was banned, along with other Bulgarian organisations and parties. The Bulgarian government clearly had little political interest m encouragmg a secular natIOnal consciousness among its Turkish m111ority, which would have made it much more difficult to deal with. However, there IS also truth 111 the argument that the government 'could not Kemalize the Turkish and Muslim population against its Will.'29 For the majority of Turks and Muslims religious identity still prevailed over secular national consciousness. Of much greater Importance for the Turkish and Muslim m1110rity than the impact ofKemalism was a noticeable deterioration in Its general situation, especially from the mid-1930s. Bulgarian frustration at repeated unsuccessful attempts to revise the 1919 25 In '1938 the JunsdictlOn of the religious courts was restricted to religious aff.1irs, with other matters transferred to cIvil courts. Sec 'Zakon za ogranichavane kompetentnostta na myuftiyskite sudilista " Dl1rzl/(lllell Vcstllik, no. '156, 20 july '1938 p. 1,357. 26 Oriellte ModenlO, no. 8, 1928, p. 7; 18, 1928. p. 2.

27 The Issue of govemment support of antl-Kemalist forces reqUIres further research. For a partial treatment see I. Tatarli, 'Myuslyumanskoto duhovenstvo pri kapitalizma i fashizma v Bulgariya'. Atcistic/Illo tribullo, no. 3, 198'1. p. 55; K. Manchev and E. Doychinova, 'MyuslyumallSoto nasclenie', p. 70.

N.A. JiVasllillgtoll: Department of State Records reo Political relations of Turkey, Greece and the Balkan states 1930-1939, 774.00174 (Legation of the U.S.A .. Sofia, March 24. '1934. no. 862; Subject: Mr Mooshanoff before the ForeIgn AfIairs Commission). 2') N.A. Woshi,Woll 874.4016140 (Embassy Ankara. no. 497. january 24. 1938; Subject: Treatment of Turkish Minority in Bulgaria).

2H

From

Rel(~ious

Identity to Ethnic Mobilisatio1t

63

peace settlement and improve the status of the so-called 'Bulgarian minorities' in Macedonia, Thrace and Dobrudzha had contributed to a growing nationalist self-conSCIOusness among the Bulgarian public. Nationalist organisatIOns entered the state, introducing antiTurkish and anti-Muslim Ideologies and prejudices. For decades there had been virtually no violence against Turks and Muslims, but it now began to increase, especially from the early 1930s.3o Government policy did not become entirely hostile to the minonty, but certain minority rights, which S111ce the 1880s had been undisputed, began to disappear after the authoritarian coup d'etat in 1934. The number of Turkish newspapers decreased substiantially, due partly to state support for the anti-Kemalist Medeniyet journal. Turkish schools were reduced by a proportion that could hardly be justified by emigration figures. Within only a few years there ceased to be any Turkish parliamentarians altogether, and local Turkish mayors were replaced under such pretexts as a lack of sufficient ability in the Bulgarian language. 31 In addition, relations between Bulgaria and Turkey immediately before the Second World War were at times stressed, adding a further unfavourable dimension to the SItuatIon of the minonty. Partly in response to this deterioration but also because of Turkey's policy of active repatriation from the early 1930s, which had resulted 111 emigration agreements not merely with Bulgaria but also with Romania and Yugoslavia,32 there was a substantial rise in Turkish and Muslim emIgration from Bulgaria during the 1930s. In 1939 Rendel, the British envoy in Bulgaria infonned his colleague in Ankara that there was no general or systematic discnmmatIOn agamst the Turkish population. 33 While he was An inCIdent which drew considerable reactions in the press and caused tensIOn with Turkey centred on the replacement of a Muslim cemetery in the town of Razgrad. See Public Record QlJice, For(,(~1l QlJicc (PRO FO), 371/16/C 4050 (British Embassy, Ankara. April 27. 1933: 'InCIdent at Turkish Cemetery in Razgrad'). 31 The number of Turkish journals, which had been about sixty between 1920 and 1934. went down to seven after 1934; the number of Turkish schools decreased fi'om 605 in 1936 to 367 in 1941. Cf. A. POpOVIC. L'Islam iJolka/liquc. p. 85. on the press. On the replacement of mayors see V Marinov. Deli-Ormall. ¥uzlwa ellast. Sofia. 1941. p. 74. 32 Cf j. Schechtman, Europcan POl'ulatiOll Tro/l~rcr. London. 1946. p. 341. 33 PRO FO 371/23 732/R 10 180 (Telegram Rendcl to Ankara Embassy. 28

30

64 probably correct, the long-standing compromise between the Bulgarian government and the Turkish community had undoubtedly been weakened by the appearance of the first traces of secular ethmc consciousness among the Turks, and an increased nationalism among the Bulgarians.

From 'Communist secularisation J to national assimilation It was the Communist rise to power which accelerated the shift in identity among Bulgarian Turks from a religious to a secular ethnic consciousness. The Bulgarian Commumsts first created, or at least significantly enhanced, Turkish national identity among the Turkish population. However, from the late 1950s they attempted step by step to reduce it, and during the mid-1980s endeavoured to eliminate it completely. The goal of the Communists after gaining power in 1944 was first to create a 'socialist Turkish minority'. Follow111g the Stalinist pattern the ethnic identity and rights of this minority would be respected within the general limits of a Soviet-modelled system. The Communist Party thus attempted to create a secular elite among the Turks, which would work towards the achievement of the party's ideological and socIal goals. To achieve this it adopted a strategy well-tried in the Soviet nationalities policy. One of the first steps was to improve educational and cultural conditions. Illiteracy was addressed, and after slow progress in the 1940s it was substantially reduced during the 1950s. Turkish secondary schools were established, albeit WIth a larger proportion of subjects taught in the Bulgarian language than before the war. Teachers' colleges were set up to improve the qualifications of Turkish teachers, who often had no formal academic training. A privileged access to the university was introduced to hasten the elnergence of a socialist Turkish intellectual elite. 34 Theatres and libraries were established, and the press - which during the last few years before the war had more or less disappeared November 1939). 34 On educational matters see Y. Markov. 'Razvitie na obrJzovanieto sred turskoto naselenie v Bulgariya 1944-1952', Istoricheski pn,~led. vol. 37. no. I, 1971. pp. 69-79; M. Beytullov. 'Kulturniyat vuzkhod na bulgarskite turtsi pri uslovlyata na sotsializma', IzvestiYll till illstitlltll po istoriYll 1111 BKP, 40, 1979. pp. 197-228; C. Monov, 'Prosvetnoto delo sred bUlgarite s mohamedanska vyara v Rodopsb kray prez godinite na narodnata vlast'. Rociol'ski sbomik. no. 3, 1972. pp. 9-48.

From Rel~~iolls Identity to Ethllic Mobilisation

65

- was revived, subject to strict ideolot,>1cal censorship. Turkish literature deemed ideologically acceptable was published, an example being Nazim Hikmet's poetry.35 The other side of the coin was a concerted effort to underm111e the religious affilitation of the Turkish and Muslim population, and to transform the traditional elements in their daily cultural life and their Islamic customs. The finanCIal base of their faith was shaken by the nationalisation of vak~f property, and its institutional base was shaken by a substantial reduction in the number of hodzhas, which fell from 15,000 before 1944 to a mere 2,400 at the end of the 1950s. Secularisation of the former theological high school 'Njuvvab' in the city of Shumen threatened the provision of theological education: students now mostly had to complete this 111 the Islamic republics of the Soviet Union. Teaching of the Quran was banned only in 1952. 36 Nevertheless, these measures were not a direct attack on Islam as a religion, which would have endangered the attempt to win the Turkish minority for the socialist cause. For example, Western visitors to Bulgaria in the early 19505 could not report any fundamental endangenng of Islam, or any stance towards it that went beyond the general policy of discrimination against religion, directed equally at all religious communities. 37 However, a continuous attempt was undoubtedly under way to undenmne religious affinity among the Turks and Muslims. Alongside these political measures, the fate of the Turkish minority was also influenced by the social changes implemented 35 For theatres and libranes see C. Monov, 'Razvitie I deynost na narodnite chitalishta, kmota, muzeyite i drugite kulturm institutl v rodopskiya kray 1944-1973', Rodopski slJOmik. no. 4. 1976. pp. 9-39: on the press see Bt1(~llrski periociichCII prchat J 944-1969: BibliogYl!fSki IIkazate/. vol. II, Sofia, 1975, pp. 430-6. For Turkish literature, see A. Cengiz, BII(~aristall' da Tiirk DiU, Tiirk Kaltiirii (1967), p. 852: St Velikov, 'NaZtll11 Hib11et v BfIlgarija -prevodi i vlijanjc', Studia Balkatzika. 8, 1974, pp. 239-59, 36 A. Cebeci, 'Bulgaristan' da Islam dininc YapJlan ba~ki', Tiirk Kiiltiirii, vol. 8, no. 87. 1970. pp. 209-11; St. Trifonov, 'Strogo poverlyivo!' II, Po,~lcd, no. 17.29 April 1991. p. 10. 37 Cf. British, Amencan and Turkish diplomatic opinions from the early 1950s, PRO FO 371.87 544 R. 1018/5 (Mr Mason to Mr McNeil, 26 January 1950); N.A. Washillgtoll, Records C!f till' Departmellt Ilf State relatillg to Itltemal Affairs Ilf BJj(~arta 1950-1954, 86941317-2654 (ReligIOUS Conditions in Bulgaria); PRO FO 371.111 485 NG 178113 (The State of Churches in Bulgaria).

66

WO![f;atlg Hopkc11

in Bulgaria after the Communists' rise to power. The most SIgnificant of these was collectlvisation. Resistance to this in Turkishinhablted areas resulted in a substantial delay in its implementation there, compared with Bulganan-mhabited areas. 3H Not only was collectivisation an attack on small peasant property, but it had a much greater impact on the day-to-day life and customs of Turks than of Bulgarians. For example, the integration of women mto work bngades was seriously at odds with their traditional role. In ('lct it was deliberately used to shake up 'conservative behaviour' within the Turkish community. The Party's attitude the Turkish mmority in the first decade after the Second World War was thus directed less towards a restriction of ethnic rights than an undernllning of traditional, mainly religtously-based identity m Gtvour of an identity that was secular and socialist. TIm policy enjoyed only limited success. Turks (and other Muslims) entertained serious reservations about the process of 'socialist modenllSation', and reacted to it accordingly. Their religIOUS affiliatIOn was consequently affected only marginally.39 In spite of many incentives, Turks were much less mclined to join the Party and Its associated political organisations than ethnic Bulgarians: even in the early 1950s, after a massive campaIgn for membership, they made up Just 5 per cent of Party members, well below their representation m the population. 40 Most of those who demonstrated their loyalty by Joimng political organisations obviously refused to break with traditional Islamic customs, a phenomenon repeatedly criticised in the press during the 1950s:1 1 3H This resistance is acknowledged in Marxist Bulgarian literature: see D. Genov. Bratskata dwzhiw IIIczizdll /J,1(\Iarskoto i turskoto llase/wic I' NR BI1(\Iariya. Sofia, 1961. p. 42; N. Mizov. IslYillllt1t " B,1(\?ariya. Sofia, 1965, p. 172; y, Mell11Sev. ZlIdmzllllo ZII sotsialistic!lcskoto stroite/st"o 1/(/ rodillllta. Prio/Jsta"'lIIc lla IJt1(\?arskitc TlIrtsi " sotsialistic!lcskoto o/Jsiztcs(tJo, Sofia. 1985. p. 94. Similar hll1ts arISe also ll1 a statement by a Turkish embassy representative in 1950: PRO FO 371/88 7111RK 1825/6. 39 Sec. for example cnticisms in the Trade Union daily Twd [Work], 15 January 1955; also N. Kurtev. 'Deveti septemvri i natsionall1lte maltsll1stva'. Godisllllik 1111 S~fiskiyll UllillCYzitct. Idcologic!teski katedri. vol. LII (1958), p. 358; A. Aliev. Fortllirrlllcto 1111 IlilrIc!1II0-ateisticlICII mirogled 1/ BI1(\?arskitc T'lrtsi. Sofia. 1980. p. 142. 40 Memisev. ZadYllzllllo. pp. 22. 25. 68ft~ 80. For indications of a reluctance to Join the youth organisation. see the party daily RalJOtllichesko dc/o. 5 January 1945. 41 See fix example the daily newspaper from the Muslim-lIlhabited Rhodope

From Rel((!iolls Idcntity to Ethl1ic Mobilisatiol1

67

The Turks contmued to live as 'a very close-knit and clannish group ... clinging to their own religion, custom and lang~lage'42 as a British War Office report observed in 1951. The lmuted success of 'socialist secularisation' is likely to have been one of the main reasons behind the sudden enllgration of 155,000 Turks to Turkey in the summer of 1950, forced upon the Turkish government as an unexpectedJait accompli by the Bulganan governInent. 43 The policy of encouragmg secular rights at the price of curtailing traditional customs and religious affiliation had only limited effect. Against this background, the Bulgarian party began to reVIse its policy towards the country's Turkish and Muslim m!nority from the late 1950S 44 as part of a gradual shift towards CommUI1lst nationalism'. Policy was now directed at a gradual but continuous underminmg not merely of religious affiliation but also of the separate ethnic identity of Turks and Muslims. This policy, first implemented in the 1960s, gathered momentum and purpose dunng the 1970s, and reached its peak in 1984-5, with the so-called 'rebirth-campaign', i.e. the forceful changing of names among Turks. The first phase of this policy was conducted under the slogan 'priobstaval1c' or 'inclUSIOn', wInch declared the Turkish minority to be 'an integral part of the Bulgarian socialist nation', having nothing to do WIth Turks in the Turkish motherland. Adopting parallel Soviet approaches revolving around a 'superiority' of 'class' over mountains: Rodopska IJOr/;a, 27 October 1954. p. 2; 17 March 1956. p. 2; 9 January 1957, p. 2. 42 PRO FO 371.95 313 (The War Office M.l. 3 Special Report: Repatriation of Turks from Bulgana). For a detailed discussion of the emigration of 1950-1 see H.L. Kostanick. Tllrkisiz Resclliell/cllt of BU(\Iarillll Tllrks, Berkeley. 1957; E Zl13mierowska-Rakk. 'Sprawa przesiedlem; obywatcli Bulgarsklch tureckicgo pochodzenia do Turcji po drugieJ WO.JIlle swiatowej·. Z dziejolll Poisko-radzicckicil. vol. XV. Warsaw 1977; and W, Hopken. 'Emigration und IntegratIOn von Bulganen-Turken. Ein Verglelch dcr Auswanderungswellen von 1950-51 und 1989' in G. Seewann (cd.), Milldcrizcitcl!fra,\?l'II ill Siidostellropa. Mumch. 1992. pp. 359-72. 44 The watershed was marked by a session of the Central Committee in 1958. which set the tone for the reVIsed policy towards Turks: see Y. Menusev. Zadrtlzllllo, p. 128ff For an overvIew of changes in nationality policy sec St. Troebst. 'Partei, Staat und Tiirkishe Minderheit in Bulgarien 1956-1985' III R Schonfeld (cd.), NatiolwlitiitCllproblmlc ill Sadosteuropa. Munich, 1987, pp. 231-54. 43

From Rel(l!,iolls Identity to Ethnic Mobilisation

68 'nation', Bulgarian party ideologues argued that history would inevitably lead to a 'socialist nation', in which ethnic and religIOUS differences would disappear in favour of a common Socialist iden- . tity.45 While the existence of a Turkish and Muslim minority in Bulgaria was not questioned in principle at the time, such a policy already meant little else in practice but silent assimilation. The first step III the policy was the closing of Turkish schools from 1958. This reduced Turkish-language instruction first to a minimum of optional teachlllg: III the late 1970s all education in TurkIsh was finally forbidden. 46 So-called 'patriotic' education was introduced, which aimed to establish among Turks and Muslims a feeling of solidarity and loyalty with Bulgaria, ItS largely Christian culture, and its partly anti-Ottoman history.47 Anti-religious propaganda was intensified and the number of hodzhas further reduced, leaving only some 460 in the early 1960s. 4H Considerable efforts were made in an attempt to change the Turkish community's everyday customs and rites based on Islamic religious and cultural traditions. Women weanng traditional clothes were the object of special campaigns. 49 Festivities and ntes of passage such as funerals were 'restructured' in order to remove religious elements from 45 With particular reference to Turks. see S. Tahlrov, 'Bfllgarskite turtS! po pihya na sot~ializma', Sofia. 1975, pp. 14-35; Id .. Edilletlieto, Sofia. 1981.

46 Y. Memisev. Zadmzlltlo. p. 180; M. Beytullov. ZlIifJotllt wrskiya I'roizkhod

II

1111 ltasclenieto ot NRB. Sofia, 1975. p. 89. For the justification of this policy

see comments by the Deputy Mimster of Education Avramova 111 the daily Zemedelsko Zllnlne, 21 March 1964. 47 This frequently resulted in anomolous situations. For example, both the Bulgarians' 'heroic fight' against the Ottomans. and the SlaVIC miSSIOnaries Saints Cyril and Methodius were declared to be part of the histoncal and cultural heritage of the Turks of Bulgaria, of which they were expected to be proud. X KOlIgrcs till BKP, Sofia, 1971, p. 601; Tahirov, Edillellido. p. 172. Cf the decisions on atheist propaganda 111 1957 and 1962, BKP II rezolYlltsii i rcslumiya Ita kOllgresite, lin plemlllli i Ita Po/itbYliro Ita TsK Ita BKP 1957-1962, vol. V, Sofia 1965, pp. 166-70, 680; N. Mizov, [sljnlnat, p. 181. 48

S. Neykova, 'Rolyata na Otechestveniya front revolyutsiya V Bfllgariya prez perioda 1956-1966', DimitrOl) pri CK Ilil BKP: Nallcllllc (/'tIdal/e, vol. 40, Nurieva, 'Islyamflt-duhovno oruzhdie za socialno

49

za razvitieto na kulturnata

Visslta partij/liZ skala Stanke

Sofia, 1970, pp. 31-83; Z. porobvane na Turkmyata'. Vissllll partiY/1ll sit kola Stanke Di/l/;trofJ pri TSk //(/ BKP: Nalicillle twdOlJel, vol. 41, Sofia, 1971. pp. 245-71; I. Dzambasov, 'Sporflt no. na oblektloto na myuslyumankata', Ateistiellt/a trilJlma, 4, 1982, p. 54.

69

them. 50 Bulgarian-speaking Muslims and Muslim Roma were the first to have their traditional names changed into Bulganan ones in the 1970s, and they thus became a testing ground for the similar measures which were taken agamst the Turkish community a decade later. The results of this whole policy were ambivalent. Inevitably, 'socialist secularisation', social change, propaganda and the Party's administrative 'identity management' had a certain impact on the Turkish community's everyday life and identity. Clothing, housing and customs to some extent lost their traditional affinity to the Islamic religIOn and culture, which themselves lost ground. However, it is doubtful whether tillS resulted in a substantial loss of separate ethmc identity, or led to 'a Bulgarian national consciousness [developing] among not a small part of the Muslim population', as clauned by Bulgarian sources;5J the same sources mdicated the limited results achieved by the process. Despite the reduction m the number of Turkish schools and the contraction of the Turkish press, language continued to be an element of distinction between Turks and Bulgarians. 52 Even surveys conducted under Communist conditions in the 1970s and early 1980s confinned that religious affiliatIOn among Turks was twice as high as that among among Bulgarians. In 1985 only 23 per cent of ethnic Bulgarians declared that they were religious, in contrast with 55 per cent of Turks. 53 While certain family celebrations. such as blrthdays, were adapted in a secular manner among Turks and Muslims, others - particularly funerals -lost their religious character nlUch more slowly. In spite 50 Cf. a Politburo decision of 1974 in R.abotlllellesko dela, 14-15 February 1974, p. 1. A whole branch of so-called 'ethnopedagogical literature' appeared to publicisc these forms of 'socialist rites' among the people. Cf. especially S. Tahirov, 'Illtegnrast funktsii na sotsialistlcheskata, prazniochno-obredna sistema', AtcisticlllUl tribu/I(/ no. 4, 1981. pp. 16-24; id.: Satsi(//isticllk(/ alJred/lost i d'IIzOlJllo cdi/lstl/o, Sofia, 1987.

Cf. the results of a survey from the mid and late 1980s, published only after the [111 of Zhivkov: Etllielleskiyat kO/!flikt " Bll(~(/riya 1989, Sofia, 1990, p. 28. 52 Ibid. pp. 78, 82. 5J

Survey conducted in 1985 and referred to by one of the architects of the 'rebirth-campaIgn" St. Mikhaylov, Vllzrozlzdellskiyat pratses II Bll(~(/ri)'a, Sofia, 1992, p. 108. Similar results were obtained for the 1970s: see S. Savoy, 'Ateistlchna isledvane', Ateistielllla trilJlI/I(/, 3 110., 1974, pp. 15-28; M. Beytullov, 'Izmcnenic V religlOznata praktika na btllgarksite Turtsi', AtcistielllUl trilll/IUI, 4 no. 1976, pp. 16-29 53

70

Wo![rtal1g Hopkell

From Religiotls Jdmtily to Ethnic MoiJilisatiol1

of numerous administrative obstacles bell1g lI1troduced to discourage religious forms offunerals, along with incentives for secular forms, up to the early 1980s 30-50 per cent of all funerals were celebrated in a traditional, 'ethnically specific' way. 54 Similarly the most proml11ent Islamic festivities (the feasts of Bayram and Ramazan) were still observed by a large part of the Muslim population, at least in pnvate. 55 New 'SOCIalist festivities', like that marking admission to the youth organisation, were observed by only a very small minority of Turks. 56 Even after long years of schooling in which the idea of the 'dark past of the Turkish Yoke' was propagated among children, only half of the Turkish population were prepared to accept tl1lS stereotype, the other half retaining a historical consciousness associating them positively with the Ottoman past. Thus, in spite of measures to reduce minority rights and attempts to change the people's conSClOusness, it was evident that customs, religion and language persisted as an element of 'ethnic differentiation'. The common 'socialist Bulgarian natIOn' was clearly yet to be achieved. At the end of 1984 the Party launched a frontal attack on the identity of the Turkish population. It forcefully changed their names to Bulgarian ones, banned public use of the Turkish language, and established further obstacles to religious practice. This was the result of two (contradictory) realisations: that the 'integration' of Turks into the 'socialist nation' had progressed so [,r that it should be brought to a conclusion, and that, in spite of this progress, separate ethnic identity had not disappeared. The so-called 'rebirth-process' of 1984-5 was the final episode

in a policy begun during the 1960s and '70s. To begin with, the Party had attempted to undermine religious identity without touching ethnic identity. Thereafter It attempted to build up a kind of ' double identity', i.e. ethnic Turk and member of the 'Bulgarian socialist nation'. With the 're-birth process', its aim was to destroy any separate Turkish identity simply by declaring that the Turkish community was Bulgarian. The details of the Party's repressive policy of assimilation between 1985 and 1989, which contributed to the decline of the regime of Todor Zhivkov (who proved increasingly unable to cope with the winds of change blowing from Gorbachev's perestroika), are well known. This policy brought Bulgaria into conflict with Western and Middle Eastern states, some of which were important for Buigaria's shaken economy. Furthennore, It also isolated Bulgaria among its Eastern European 'brothers'. As foreign pressure and internal demands for change mounted in 1989, Zhivkov moved to 'let off steam' by opening the borders to the Turkish Ininority. TI1lS resulted in a tremendous emigration of some 370,000 Turks to Turkey within a few weeks. Half of them returned later, mostly because their aspirations could not be fulfilled in the currently tough climate of Turkey's capitalist economy and social conditions. 57 The so-called 'great excursion', as the mass emigration was dubbed in a cynical and yet unchallenged Party press, served as one of the final blows to the Conununist regime, as It further destabilised the country both internally and externally.

5·\ S. Tahirov, 'SotsialistIcheska obrcdnost', p. 89; L Ivanov. 'Vnedryavanc na osnovnitc sotsialisticheskite grazhdanskt ntuali v Rusensktya oknlg', Godislmik lIa I1Il/zeile of severt/a BI1((!ariya, vol. VI (1981), pp. 173-93; Skcnderov, 'Preodolyavane na rcligioznite otzluvcltsl s Shu1l1enski okrug', Afe/sficima fri/JllIla, 6. 1977, p. 89; E. Mitkova, 'Vliyameto na sotsialnite protsesi za utvurzhdavane na grazhdanskata pogrebalna. obrcdnost v vclikotllrnovski okrug', BII(~arska ef/w,Qnq/i),a, vol. III, no. 1. 1977, pp. 57-66. 55 S. Savoy. 'Praznichno-ritualno izsledvane', Afeisficima fri/JllI/a, no. 2, 1980, p. 65; iliid. 'Se1l1eyniyat bit ateistichnoto vuzpitanie na detsata', Afeislicima trilm/Ul, no. 2, 1977, pp. 57-65. According to a survey from 1980, 50% of the Muslim popuiatlOn continued to celebrate 13ayra1l1 and Ramazan: Etl1icitcski),al ko/!/likt I) BIJ(!!ariya, p. 83. 5(, S. Tahirov, 'Etnokulturni protsesi sred bulgarsktte turtsi', BII(~(lYSka cillo.!!rq/i),a, vol. V, no. 4, 1980. pp. 6-9.

71

From assimilation to ethnic mobilisation: the Turkish minority since the end if Commu11ism The 'rebirth-process' had almost the opposite effect on the identity of the Turkish and Muslim population to that intended. The experience of repression and the mass emigratIOn in 1989 shaped and strengthened ethnic identity and group solidarity among the Turks. After Zhivkov's down£,ll in November 1989 the assimilation measures of his penod of rule were brought to a halt. This allowed On the problem of the integration of these emigrants in Turkey see the report by the European Council: Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Doc. no. 6267, 'Report on the Reception and Settlement of Refugees 111 Turkey', 18 January 1991. and Ef/licilcski),at kO/lf/ikt f} BI1{!!ari),a. p. 142.

57

72

From Religious Identity to Ethnic Mobilisation

73

room for revitalisation of the religious and cultural elements of Turkish and Muslim identity. In addition, the transition to democracy opened the arena for political mobilisation to serve ethnic interests. Immediately after the tall of Communism the Turkish community began to re-establish signs of ethnic and religious identity that had prevIOusly been forbidden. By March 1991 more than 600,000 Turks, Bulgarian Muslims and Roma had already applied for reappropriation of their old 'Islamic-Arabic' names. 5H The Turkish language, banned under Zhivkov, was once more established as the undisputed means of communication among the Turkish population. Although the m~ority are fluent in Bulgarian, less than one-third said that they also spoke Bulgarian, as well as Turkish, at home. 59 Anthropologlcal field research during 1990-1 brought to light evidence of a deliberate demonstration of elements of ethnic and religious identlty, such as listening to Turkish music. oo Most important, the Turkish population soon established its own party, the 'Movement for Rights and Freedom' (MRF). It found its voters almost exclusively among Turks, parts of the Bulgarian Muslim or Pomak cOITunul11ty, and to a smaller extent the Muslim Roma population. With great speed this became the almost undisputed representative of the Turkish minority, being well organised and capable of a high degree of mobilisatIOn. 61 According to its own sources (which, in relation to Bulgarian parties, should generally be regarded with some caution), the party already had about 100,000 members by the beginning of 1991, making it the second-largest party after the Bulgarian Socialist

Party (BSP - the fonner ConU11Unists).62 In the 1991 elections the MRF won 6-7 per cent of the vote across the country concentrating most of the Turkish, approximately half the Pomak, and some of the Roma vote. 63 In regIOns like the Kurdzhali, heavily mhabited by Turks, it won up to 65 per cent of the vote. In parliament the party gained twenty-four seats, and about 1,000 local representatives and 650 local and communal mayors gave the party an unchallenged base in Turkish and many areas inhabited by Muslims. However, the MRF was faced with splits - five deputies left the parliamentary faction in 1994 - and erosion of support due partly to emigration and partly to supporting unpopular econ01111C policies in coalition governments (see below). In the 1994 elections the party won 5.4 per cent of the vote and was represented in by fir. . 64 · par1lament llteen deputles. Between 1991 and 1994 the party twice played the role of a 'third force' between the two great blocs of the BSP and the former opposltion alliance of the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF). Between October 1991 and October 1992 the MRF supported the UDF minority government, and in the latter month it contributed to the down£'tll of this government, due partly to disappointment in its policy but also to personal frictions. After this, together with the Socialists and a dissldent fraction of the UDF, it supported a so-called non-partlsan expert government. 65 The party made effecttve use of its role as a 'third force', but was generally cautIOUS. It restricted its political asptrations in both its programme and policy (but not the public statements of some of its leaders), so as to avoid providing any excuses for uproar from Bulgarian nationalist forces. In spite of its decisive role m establishing the government, the

See Aspckti tla etimokllltllrtlata sitrliltsiya v Bll(!;ariya i Ita Balkanite, vol. II. Sofia. 1992. p. 19. 5') Nyakoy rezultati ot izsledvaneto 'Etnokulotumata sltuatsiya v Bulgariya 1992'. [The Ethnocultural Situation in Bulgaria 1992J, Sotsiologicheski preglcd [Sociological Review], 3. 1993, p. 55. 60 C. Georgieva, 'Telldent~ii v etmcheskite i konfeslOnalni otnosheniya v malkIte gradove na Istochnite Rodopi'. Aspekti lla etllOkllllrmlafa sifllatsiya. vol. II. p. 60.

62 MRF leader Ahmed Dogan, in the daily DClllokratsiya [DemocracyJ, 12

5H

61 See the field report on the party's electoral behaviour in the Shumen area: Daniel Bates. 'The EthI1lc Turks and Bulgarian ElectIOns of October 1991: Observations from Shumen', Tllrkislr Review l!f Balkan Stlltiies 1 (1993), pp. 193-204.

February 1991; Kjell Engkelbrecht, 'The Movement for Rights and Freedom', RFE Reporf OIl Easfcm Ell rope, 31 May 1992. pp. 5-8. 63

For the results see Fax, 22 October 1991, Sofia.

In spite of the MRF's past participatIon 111 coalition governments, Joining a BSP-Ied cabinet after the 1994 elections was ruled out due to MRF protests over the nomination as Minister of Education, SCIence and Technology of Ilcho Dinl1trov, a former key figure in the 'Re-birth Process',

(,4

For the MRF's policy 111 parliament see Sabine RIedel. 'Die tiirkische Minderheit in parlamentarischen System Bulgariens', Siidostellropa. vol. 42, no. 2, 1993. pp. 100-24.

(,5

I r

I' 74

WO!&a11g Hopken

MRF took only one ministerial seat, which it filled with one of its very few ethnic Bulgarian members. The party has consistently distanced itself from all ideas of territorial autonomy and federalisation, thereby avoiding conflict with the Bulganan Constitution. It has also repeatedly stressed Its secular character. Demands for cultural rights were limited to the optIonal teaching of the Turkish language in schools; however, certain leaders have occasionally made in public the more radical demand for a compulsory Turkish school. In an attempt to represent the interests of the entire Turkish and Muslim population it has avoided adopting a clear ideological position over many crucial issues, and over the economic transition from a planned to a market economy66 it has assumed a generally conservative tone, which enabled it to 'bargain' between political forces ranging from the Socialist to the anti-Communist opposition. Alongside this re-establishment of ethnic identity and political mobilisation, religious affinity has once more become an issue for the Turkish m1110rity, as indeed for the remainder of the Muslim population. Religious sentiments and activities among Turks and Pomaks (mostly Sunni Muslims, except for a minority of 7.5 per cent, the so-called Aliani and Kzalbashi [Klztlbaslll]' i.e. Shiite Muslims) have become more visible. However, there is nothing in common here with what some nationalist Bulgarian papers and politiCIans label 'fundamentalist tendencies', In Bulgaria as in all post-Communist SOCIeties, religIOn offers values in times of economic, social and moral crisis. Accordingly, positive attitudes towards religion 111 general 111creased from 49 per cent in 1992, to 60 per cent in 1994. Enforced restrictions on the practice of Islam among Bulgarian Turks and Muslims from 1985 have actIvely encouraged feelings ofaffinity towards the Faith. Therefore religious feelings are much more strongly anchored among Turks and Muslims than among Christians; this in fact was also the case throughout the period of Communist rule. According to a survey from 1992, the relationship between a sense of religious commitment and ethnic identity is as follows: 67 66 Sec thc party programmc in Jlressltlzba ktlrir, no. 57/58, 21-2 March 1991; on its attitude towards 'fundamentalism' sce Ahmed Dogan in DClIlokrafsiya, 29 August 1991. The following survey data are takcn from the results of several opinion polls conducted bctween 1991 and 1994. See I. TOlllova, 'Etnicheski stereotipi i predrazsudi'ttsl y biHgaritc', ASJlckti lla ctllOktllttlrtlata sitllatsra II Br1(<;ariya, vol. l, (,7

I

Prom Rel((!iolls Identity to Ethnic Mobilisation

75

Table 4.1 RELIGIOUS FEELINGS AMONG MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS, 1992 (%) Chnstians Turks Pomaks Gypsics

Yes 37 73 66 59

No

Ullcerfaill

35

28

13 15 22

14 19 19

Anthropological observations have revealed an increase in prestige associated with posseSSIOn ofIslamIc knowledge and education in villages; this confers status on older people as well as the very young, who can now educate themselves in religious matters. 6H However, everyday religIOUS actIVIties are observed much less strictly; this accords with established patterns. About a third of those claiming to be 'believers' among the Turkish population pray five times a day; 15 per cent do so only on religious holidays, and 16 per cent never. Perhaps as a result of decades of 'socialist secularisatIOn', only 40 per cent of Turks adhere to Quranic inJunctIOns on drinking and eating. Younger and middle-aged Turks and Muslims in particular are 111 many ways more influenced by 'Central European' and urban attitudes than by religious regulations and IslamIC norms and values. For example, in all age groups up to 40-50, Turks and Muslims show a positive or at least tolerant attitude towards pre-marital sex or abortion -little different from that of ethnic Bulganans. The more traditional attitudes to these questions shown by the Turkish and Muslim population generally come from the older age-groups, who form a higher proportion of the agrarian population. The re-establishment of ethmc IdentIty among Turks, and their successful political ·mobilisation, have also had an impact on the other Muslim groups in Bulgaria, notably the Pomaks. This Muslim, Sofia, 1992, pp. 77-88; SotsiologicheskI pregled, no. 3, 1993, pp. 55-80; International Ccntre for Minority Studies and Intcrcultural Relations. Sofia. 'Relations of Com pat ability and Incompatability Bctween Christians and Muslims in BulgarIa'. Sofia. 1994, unpubl. 111S. pp. 179-209; K. Kunev. 'Mezhduetnicheskitc naglasi 1 obrazut na druglya', unpubl. paper, Sofia, 1994. C. Gcorgicva. 'Strukturata na vlastta v tradit~ionnata obshtnost na p0111atsitc v royona 11a Chech (zapadnite Rodopi)', EtlliciIeskata kart;,ra rJ Btl{<;ariya, Sofia. 1993, p. 67,

6R

76

Bulgarian-speaking population experienced significant violation of its rights as a minority at the hands offormer governments, including non-Communist ones. It has always oscillated somewhat in relation to its identity, swmging between a Turkish identity based on religious solidarity (language barriers notwithstanding) and an identlty based on a Bulgarian national consciousness. Both the general termination of ethnic and religious discnminatlOn and the growing ethnic and political self-consciousness of the Turkish minority have had an impact on the Pomak community.69 Where Pomaks live m close contact with Bulgarians or in compact settlements, they have tended to show an affinity for Turkish identity. During the 1992 census for example, about 30,000 from the Rhodope area called themselves Turks, despite not speaking a word of Turkish. This caused the Bulgarian press to accuse the MRF of a 'forcible Turkification' of Bulgarian-speaking citizens. In other areas ethnic prejudices eXlst between Turkish and Pomak communities, which occaslOnally break out ll1to actual friction, which can be at least partly attributed to the Pomaks' feeling of being manipulated by the Turkish population. Consequently, where Pomaks live in compact settlements they have often voted for the MRF, but where they live in close contact with Turks they have voted for the Socialists. Furthermore, tendencies have recently developed to seek self-definition in terms not only of tl1lS or that religious minority but as a distinct ethnic group - along similar lines to those adopted by, for example, the Bosnian Muslims. In support of such a distinct identity Pomaks at times claim to have adopted Islam before the Ottoman conquest, making them one of the oldest adherents of the (,ith in the Balkans (for a full discussion of Pomak identity seen Chapter 3). Increasing ethnic and religious self-confidence and political mobilisation among Bulgarian Turks have contributed to a significant distance developing between ethnic Turks and ethnic Bulgarians. This is particularly apparent in the attitude ofBulganans towards Turks. Anthropological field studies today glve the impression of a day-to-day interaction between the ethnic groups (,9 Cf. empIrical results in S()fsi()lo.~ichcski problcm, no. 3, 1993, pp. 56. For ethnic confusion especially among Pomak children cf. D. Mikhalyova, 'Za nyakoi osobenosti na etnicheskata idcntifikaciya pri pomashkitc detsa v Iztoclmite Rodopi', Aspckti, vol. 1. p. 174.

From Rel(<:ious Identity to Ethllic Mobilisatioll

77

that is largely intact, bemg based on a centuries-old tradition of pragmatlc rules and regulations for organising life in ethnically mixed areas. 70 By contrast, several soclOloglcal surveys indicate a considerable level of mutual hostility and prejudice. Although this has subsided somewhat, undercurrents of ethnic prejudice remain strong as indicated in the followmg table, whlch records Bulganan attitudes towards Turks m 1992 and then in 1994: Table 42 ETHNIC PREJUDICES AMONG BULGARIANS . . TOWAI"tDS TUR.KS (){,)71 1992

1994

I belicvc that 'Turks are religious f.1natics

83.8

72.3

I refusc to ... marry be friends WIth work WIth livc in the samc neIghbourhood as live 1lI the same district as live in the same country as

80.8 38.7 17.6 41.2 31.4 26.5

82.9 41.0 22.1 31.2 20.3 13.4

..• :1

Turk

In 1994, 72 per cent of Bulgarians still regarded Turks as 'relif:,rious (,natics', an opinion which is clearly not substantiated by the data on the religious behaviour of Turks mentioned earlier. Bulgarians tend to ascribe negative charactenstics to Turks much more readily than Vlce versa. In Bulgarian eyes only Roma have a worse image than Turks. Although at the time there was only one MRF minister, who was not even a Turk, 61 per cent of the Bulgarian population believed that Turks had too much political power, over 50 per cent even considered that they threatened the country's security. Significant parts of the Bulgarian population did not accept Turkish parliamentarians (50%), a Turkish ethnic party (25%), any Turkish school teaching (67'1('») or even a Turkish mmister (88%). Widely diffenng pictures clearly emerge from the results of ethnological observatlOns, which stress pragmattc forms of cohabita70 71

RdatiotlS, pp. 115-64 (sec notc 67). For source see notc 670

From Rel(i?iol/s Iderrtity to Ethnic Mobilisation

78 tion, and the empirical surveys cited above. These differences can be explained partly by the fact that ethnic prejudices are largely the product of an urban political culture, promoted by mass media and political elites, and are much less relevant 111 day-to-day practice in ethnically mixed areas. Even taking this into account, the data presented above clearly suggests that a substantial part of Bulgarian society still finds the reality of an ethnically and politically selfconfident Turkish minority hard to accept. Although there is indisputable evidence of hostile perceptions, the gulf between ethnic groups has not yet caused any substantial violence between Turks and Bulgarians. Compared not only with former Yugoslavia but also with Romama, this must be upheld as a genuine success story in the endeavour to cope with ethmc tensions in post-Communist Eastern Europe. In 1990 when the first post-Zhivkov government reversed former violations of the rights of the Turkish and Muslim communities, ethnic tensions 111 Bulgaria appeared at first to be heading towards overt conflict. 72 Among the £ictors which seemed potentially liable to lead to ViOlent clashes were restoration to Turks of their onginal names, the restoration of property rights to those who had emigrated to Turkey in 1989, and diSCUSSiOns on teaching Turkish in schools as an optional subject. Added to this, after the first free elections, was the Bulgarian loss to Turks (in Turkish-majority areas) of positions of political power. Antagomsms were reduced before reaching the level of large-scale ViOlence, thanks partly to the MRF's practice of political self-restraint (even though it did engage in a few questionable political activities, 111cluding a boycott of schools to try and establish the teaching of Turkish). On the whole, however, the MRF's policy resulted 111 a somewhat limited Turkish nationalism. Matters were also helped by the moderate political influence of the Bulgarian president, and, possibly, by the worrying developments 111 neighbounng Yugoslavia. Consequently the situation does not, at the time of writing, appear dangerous. However, the Turkish minority's legal status remains unsatis£'lctory. Unlike nlost other post-Commumst constitutions in Eastern Europe, that of Bulgaria does not mention collective minority rights, and they do not appear 111 any legislation. This upholds the fiction of a single Bulgarian natioll state rather 72

Cf. the reports in the daily RalJOtllicllcsko dela, 6 January 1990.

79

than a mu[ti,wtio,Wl one. Although the constitution guarantees cultural rights and freedom from discrimination for all ethnic and religious groups, it bans anythmg that might be interpreted as collective political nghts for minorities. Territorial autonomy is prohibited, as are political parties with an ethnic or religious basis. The Law on Parties furthermore stipulates that all parties must execute their activities in the Bulganan language. 73 Although the right to receive educatlOn in the Turkish mother tongue, albeit on an optional basis, is recognised, its actualisation depends on the parents' application, and a mimmum level of demand. In practlCe tIllS right is often obstructed either by a lack of teachers (many Turkish teachers emigrated in 1989), or because the mmunum level of demand is not met. In 1993 applications for Turkish mother-tongue education were made for 92,166 children, but among these it could not be provided for 17,000. 74 On the basis of such data, Western minority rights experts critiCise the Bulgarian legal system for falling short of international norms and the recommendations of the Conference on Security and Co-operation 111 Europe (CSCE) and the European Counci1. 75 Legislation on the establishment of 'ethnic parties' has 111deed already threatened the MRF's participation in elections twice,7(, and under changing political conditions could easily be used against it. However, the minority's actual status is much more favorable in political than 111 legal terms one. For the first time in at least four decades Turks and other Muslim groups can live and organise themselves as undisputed ethnic and religious groups, and for the first time since the emergence of the modern Bulgarian state in 1878 they are in a position to articuiate their mterests eflectively. Cf Artlcles 2, 11.4 and 54.1 of the Constitution: Art. 3.3 and Art. 5 of the Law on politlcal Parties: Dt1rz//(/IIClI pcstllik [State 13ulletinJ, no. 29, 10 April 1990, p. 5 and no. H7, 30 October 1990. 74 13ulgarian Hclsmkl COl11mlttee, 'Human Rlghts m13ulgaria 111 1993', unpnnted paper, p. 5. 75 Cf Georg 13runner, Natiollalitiitcllprob/clllc 1l11l1/v/illdcr/lcitCllkolljliktc ill Ostcllropa, Giitersloh, 1993, p. 79. 73

The final decision of the Constitutional Court to allow the MRF to take part in the election was passed m April 1992: DI1rZIlIJCII pcstlllk, no. 35, 21 April 1992. In the event the ConstltutlOnal Court split 6 votes for and 6 votes against bannmg the MRF as unconstitutional. 13ecause a simple I11;Uority is needed. the ruling went in the MRFs f.wour by the narrowest of margins.

7(,

Wo!&all.!? Hopkerl

From Rcl(ftlollS Identity to Etlmic Mobilisation

Nevertheless, there rema1l1S the latent danger posed by Bulgarian nationalism, which resIdes less in the existence of ultra-nationalist groups (which have £liled to enter parliament) than in the temptation for either the Socialists or the anti-Communist alliance to play the 'anti-Turkish' card. An even greater immediate danger to the Turkish minority lies in its constantly deteriorating economIC situation. While economic reform in post-Communist Bulgaria has been far from radical, the results have been much more unfavourable for the Turkish than the Bulgarian population. Having possessed little land before collectivisation, Turks have suffered particularly from the dissolution of co-operatives and the restoration of former property, which have frequently left them without any land. In southern Bulgarian partIcularly, they have traditionally been employed in the tobacco 1l1dustry, which has suffered a profound economic crisis following the loss of Eastern European and former Soviet markets, together with the fall in tobacc'o prices. 7 ? Furthermore, a number of industrial 'whIte elephants', which had been built up in the 1960s in the Turkish-inhabited areas of southern Bulgaria, have more or less collapsed, contributing to an unemployment rate among Turks £1r above the average. While the present Bulgarian unemployment rate is 16 per cent, among Turks and Pomaks in some areas it reaches 40 per cent, and even 60-80 per cent among the Roma. Since Turks are generally much less highly qualified than Bulgarians, and have twice as many labourers and agricultural workers and only half as many whitecollar workers, theIr future prospects do not look bright. The dramatic social decline among the Turks has already resulted 111 a new wave of emigration to Turkey which, according to Bulgarian figures, reached 50,000 in 1991-2 alone (Turkish immigration figures are even higher). From 1990 to 1994 more than 120,000 emigrated. 7H Since then Turkey has revised its policy of admitting Bulgarians without visas. Alongside thIS, the countly's deteriorating economIC climate has contributed to a decline in

migratIon. Nevertheless substantial numbers of Turks still leave Bulgaria as 'tourists', mainly for economic reasons. The economic problems and emigration of Turks also directly undermine the MRF's political influence. Obviously emIgration diminishes the party's electoral base, while its inability to improve the Turkish minority's economic and social conditions has led to the first 1I1dicatIOns of frustration among voters, and even fnctIOn inside the party itself This reduces the chance of electoral successes matchmg those of past elections - a feature illustrated in the 1994 elections, when the MRF vote dropped to 5.4 per cent. The danger of increasing social and economic instability is the ma1l1 threat to the eXIsting state of ethnic relations in Bulgana. Although for Turks and Muslims this state is £11' from ideal It has at least offered hitherto some chance for a consensus, and relatively stable development. While ethnic stability is still not a reality in Bulgaria, compared with other Balkan countnes its record in ethnic co-existence is relatively successful.

80

On the impact of the agricultural and tobacco crisis on the Turks see Sabine Riedel. '13ulgariens Landwirtschaft in der Transformation'. Siidostcuropa. vol. 43. nos 6-7, 1994, p. 399.

77

7H Figures from still unpublished data of the National 130ard for Statistics. as quoted in B. Gjuzelev, MilldcrhcitclI. p. 367.

81

Changing Notions

5 CHANGING NOTIONS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY AMONG MUSLIMS IN THRACE AND MACEDONIA: TURKS, POMAKS AND ROMA Hugh Poulton Thrace and Macedoma were among the last areas in the Balkans to undergo the transition from Ottoman control to incorporation into successor states. Consequently many Muslims - Turks and others - moved to those areas, escaping from the encroaching new states which saw them. as an alien remnant from the old regime, and Joining those Muslims already living there. Thus both areas had sizeable Muslim populations, which now became religious minorities within essentially Orthodox Christian states. These populations are £11' from ethnically homogeneous, in contrast with the Muslim populations elsewhere in the Balkans. Overwhelmingly the Muslim population is Albanian in Albania and Kosovo, and Slav in Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Sandzak. However in both Thrace and Macedonia, despite this heterogeneity, one particular community within the Muslim population is numerically superior, and has a higher profile where the state is concerned: in Thrace this is the Turkish community, and in Macedonia the Muslim Albanians. Taking this into account, this chapter examines the relationship of the various smaller Muslim groups in Thrace and Macedonia to each other, to the state in wll1ch they reside, and to the 'dominant' Muslim group. It also looks at how notions of national identity among these groups continually change.

Greece Turks and Pomaks. The modern Greek state established in the first half of the nineteenth centurv was at first centred around Athens and the Peloponnese, but ;oon expanded at the expense of the retreating Ottoman empire. From the outset, as a legacy

82

if NatiO/wi IdC11tity among Muslims

83

of the millet system, 'Greekness' and citizenship in the new state were intricately connected with membership of the Greek Orthodox Church, and so it has endured to the present. As the new state expanded with the contraction of the empire, its Muslim inhabitants were seen as foreign and effectively ineligible for citizenship. They included ethnic Turks; those, like Circassians, who had come from other parts of the empire; and 'indigenous' 111habitants like Albanians, Slavs, Vlachs and Greeks who had embraced Islam and thus become equal members in the Muslim community.1 Faced with this hostility, most Muslims left the territories which the new state progressively acquired. While many moved to Anatolia, others migrated to areas in the Balkans still under Ottoman control- notably Macedonia and Thrace. Ottoman control over these areas came to an end with the Balkan wars. The First W arid War and the ensuing war between Greece and what was to become transformed into modern Turkey resulted in a long period of uncertainty over the future shape of the Balkans. However, Atatiirk's victory over the Greek forces in 1922 settled matters. Mass population exchanges took place between Greece and Turkey, regulated by a convention and protocol of 30 January 1923 signed by the two countries. While this convention refers to 'Turks' in Greece and 'Greeks' in Turkev rei(rtion and not ethmcity - as so often in the Balkans - was th~ criterion used to define who was a Turk and who a Greek. Hence, in the transfers many non-Turkish-speaking Muslims?reeks, Slavs, Vlachs and Albanians - were among the 390,000 Turks' sent to Turkey. Conversely, many Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christians were among the 1,200,000 'Greeks' transferred to Greece. Exempted from these transfers were the Orthodox populations of Istanbul and of two Turkish islands, Gokfeada and Bozcaada. In exchange, the Muslim population of Western Thrace in Greece was pennitted to remain. The subsequent Lausanne Treaty of 24 July 1923 laid down further guarantees concerning the rights of these minorities. This treaty makes no mention of 'Turks' in Greece, but merely of 'Muslims'. The rights of the Muslim community in Western Thrace continue in theory to be guaranteed by Article 45 of the Lausanne Treaty. Consequently, 1 A similar situation evolved in Bulgaria after the emergence of the modern Bulgarian state in the second half of the I1meteenth century (see Chapter 4).

84

Turkey considers itself to have a say in the community's affairs (see Chapter 10). While there are some Klzzlbaslu 2 villages, the Muslim community in Thrace which remained after the transfers consisted mainlv of ethnic Turks, Pomaks (Islamicised Slavs)3 and Roma (Gypsies), and is predominately Sunni. This community has changed substantially since the Lausanne treaty. Since Greece does not officially differentiate between its cItizens on the basis either of ethnicity or mother tongue, reliable figures for the various minorities are difficult to obtain. According to most observers, the total figure for all Muslims in Western Thrace has remained relatively stable since the 1920s at 11 0,000, 4 but they note that the composition of this number has changed. Whereas in the 1920s Pomaks made up about one-tenth of the total, they now account for a quarter, maybe even one-third. However, such observations require qualification, because the number of Pomaks who identify themselves as Turks appears to be rising. The main reason for the decline in ethnic Turks in this area IS theIr continual emigration to Turkey, Some 250,000 Muslims have left Western Thrace S1l1ce the 1920s, and the majority of these have been ethnic Turks. Although many non-ethnic Turks from the Balkans have emigrated to Turkey and quickly become 2

Heterodox Shiite groups similar to the Bektashis - see Chapter 2.

The Pomaks of the southem Rhodope converted to Islam between the 15th and 19th centuries, especially in the 17th. Most observers accept that they are Islamicised Slavs who speak a variant of Bulgarian. Some Greek sources claim they are descended from ancient Thracian tribes, while Turks tend to see them as Turks -see Chapter 3. 4 While also using the figure of 110,000, Yannis Frangopoulos notes the lower figure of some 90,000 in 1971 out of a total population in Thrace of 329,582 (see Frangopoulos, 'Islam et ethnisl11e', Calliers d'ctudes SIIr la MCditermllee orielltale ct Ie lIIollde turco-iralliall. no. 17. January-June 1994. pp. 152-66). The latter figures derive fi'om A. Kettani. 'Muslims in Southern Europe', Jourtlal ~r the Itlstitute C!f Muslim Miuorily A.Dairs. vol 2. no. 1, 1980. pp. 145-7. Kettani divides this number between 70.000 Turks and 20.000 Pomaks. These figures do not include the Muslim Roma (see below). Frangopoulos also quotes K.G. Andreadis. who put their number at 5.116 according to the 1951 census (Turks numbered 67.099 and Pomaks 26.592) (sec K.G. Andreadis, La lIlillorite III/lsu/llla/le de la Thracc oceidelltal. Thessaloniki, 1956). Assessing the true number of the Roma is problematic throughout the Balkans due to the stigma attached to their identity. and the consequent unwillingness of many Roma to identifY themselves as such.

3

Changing Notions

Hugh Poulton


85

Turkicised, the Pomaks of the southern Rhodope have tended to live 111 areas where freedom of movement is restricted. The border between Greece and Bulgaria was for many years the front line of NATO/Warsaw Pact confrontation and heavilv fortified for many kilometers on both SIdes. Foreigners were denied access to the region, and the freedom of movement of the indigenous population was hampered. As part of this population, the Pomaks in Greece remained 111 their mountain villages north of Xanthi and north-east of Kato N evrokopIon, their way of life to some extent frozen by the Cold War. In the 1930s the larger ethnic Turkish community considered the Pomaks to be somewhat inferior to them, but there was l11termarriage between the two groups, WIth such U1110ns tending to opt for the Turkish identity. Such intermarriages were more common in the Komotini area, where the ethnic Turkish populations overlapped WIth the Pomak ones to the north and north-west of the town, wl11ch is the centre of the Turks of Western Thrace. 5 There has never been intenl1arriage between either of these groups and the Muslim Roma, who always live in separate communities, subject to discriminatIOn and hostile attitudes from all other groups. In the 1950s with the Cold War at its height, Greece regarded Bulgaria as a major enemy and the Pomaks, who spoke Bulgarian, were seen as a potential threat. (, At this time Greece was enjoyl11g a rapprochement with its traditional enemy, Turkey, now a fellow member of NATO. Consequently, in 1954 the Greek government relaxed its traditIOnal antipathy towards the use of ethnic labels to refer to ethnic minorities in Western Thrace and upheld the entire Pomak/Turk/Muslim m1110nty as 'TurkIsh'. It also embarked on a state-sponsored policy of assl111ilating the Pomaks into the Turkish population: compulsory schooling in Turkish for Pomaks was introduced, and they were now forced to declare themselves as Turks, a policy supported by Turkey, Thus at this juncture For a detailed description of the relevant areas of Pomak and ethnic Turk inhabitations in Western Thrace see M.P. Drury. 'The Boundary Between Bulgaria and Greece'. BOlllldmy Brit:fillg. International13oundaries Research Unit. Ul1lversity of Durham. 1991. (, During the Bulgarian occupation of Thrace in the Second World War. there had been somc collaboration by the Pomaks of Grcece. As a result the post-war Greek government tended to view them as a potential fifth column for CommuI11st Bulgaria.

5

Hllgh Poultotl

Chattging Notions qf National Identity among Muslims

the Pomak/Turkish Muslim community of Western Thrace was regarded as a national Turkish commuI1lty. However, this policy was not to last, and Greece soon reverted to its traditional distrust of Turkey and the Turkish minority in Western Thrace. In 1964 the Greek government Implemented a secret decision to hinder the purchase ofland by Turks in retaliation for the forcing out of ethnic Greeks living in Istanbul.? This policy of reciprocation became open during the Colonels' regime of 1967-74. Moreover, in an attempt to sever links between the minority and Turkey, in 1968 a special teacher-training centre for Turks was set up in Thessaloniki to replace the teachers who had come from Turkey. With the military coup in 1967 by the Colonels, active discrimination against the Muslim minonty became the non11;8 this has continued since their tell. Despite the return to democracy in 1974, the democratic practices vouchsafed to the Muslim minority under former legislation were not resumed. Thus, while legislatIOn provides for the election of the minority community boards and regional muftis, government appointees continue to occupy these cruCIal posts.? In addition, the Greek authorities later attempted to reverse policies whereby Pomaks have been encouraged by state pressure to become Turks. Against a background dominated by the notion of Turkey as the enemy, the repressive policies have now resulted in a radicalisation of the ethnic Turkish n1.inority, resulting in a number of incidents in the area, some violent. The disturbances in Komotini in January 1990 prompted a secret agreement between the Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis and his arch-rival, the PASOK leader Andreas Papandreou, to try and defuse the detenorating inter-communal situation in Western Thrace. The strategy adopted

included measures such as greater econonuc development, the settlement of Pontic Greeks arriving from the Soviet Union, and the elimination of some of the pettier details of discrimination. It also included attempts to split the Muslim population into its component parts. This was to be achieved by encouraging the Pomaks (and the Muslim Roma) to distinguish themselves from the ethnic Turks and to create rival political centres to the firmly established leaders of the Turkish commuI1lty. These leaders were at odds with the Greek authorities, and in spIte of bemg elected to parliament they were tried and convIcted for campaigning as · , 1y 'T urk'IS h' can d'd exp1IClt 1 ates. 10 Continuing distrust by Greece of its Muslim population was illustrated in the nationwide municipal elections on 16 October 1994. For the first time nomarchs or prefects were elected, as a gradual step in the devolution of power from the centre. Whereas in the rest of the country (except for the capital Athens) each prefecture elected one nomarch, in Thrace there were plans for a 'supernomarch' who would preside over the activities of local nomarchs. The three prefectures of Western Thrace (where the ethnic Turks predominate), and the two of Eastern Thrace (where the Pomaks predonunate), will hence be subordinated to a supernomarch. 11 The authoritIes claimed that this structure was needed in Thrace in order to co-ordinate badly-needed development policy, but while this may have been true, Greek distrust of the Muslim population was clearly in evidence - even more so in January 1995 when the elected 12 mufti of Xanthi (Mehmet

86

7 A consistent feature of this distmst has been the relationship between events concerning the Orthodox Greek minority in Istanbul and its treatment by Turkey. and the Turkish Cypriot community and its treatment by the m;uority Greek Cypriots up till the 1974 invasion. Reciprocal measures have frequently been used by both sides. resulting in a vicious CIrcle. H For more details on discnminatlOns concerning building, driving licences. land purchase. education. and closing of the elected Turktsh minority community boards and their replacement with government-appointed officials. see H. Poulton. The BalkallS; Mi/lodtics and States iI' COI!/lict. London: MRG. pp. 182-8. <) Ibid., p. 184.

87

See 'Nea politiki gia tous mousoulmanous', Elciferolipia. Athens. 2 March 1990. for a full breakdown of the Mitsotakis-Papandreou agreement. 11 Followmg adverse press comment on tillS move. the Greek authonties claimed that supernomarchs were to be introduced all over the country and not merely in Thrace and Athens. However. it appears that the only other area where this was to happen was the Aegean. where a group of Islands were to have an assembly of nomarchs. I am indebted to Robert McDonald of the Economist Intelligence Unit (London) for this information. 12 The muftis are nominated by a consensus of the IIlcllla but are dependent on central government in the shape of the Ministry for Education and Cults other than Orthodoxy and are paid by the state. Under the provisions of Decree 2345/1920. the Muslim community elected its own representatives. However. the military dictatorship of1967 -7 4 ended this, and despite the return to democracy government appointees continued in office. See H. Poulton, op. dt .. p. 184. The current dispute over Aga's position IS one more in a long line of disagreements 10

Hugh Poulto11

Cha11ging NotiorlS of National Idmtity among Muslims

Emin Aga) was sentenced to ten months' imprisonment for usurping his title. 13 This local politician was the son of the former mufti of Xanthi, Mustafa Hilmi Effendi. Even though Musta£'l was himself a Pomak who reportedly did not speak Turkish fluently, in the years before his death in 1990 he had become a key figure m the struggle for Greek recognition of the right of its Muslim inhabitants to identify themselves as Turkish if they so wished. The mtroduction of a supernomarch in Thrace and the impnsonment of Mehmet Aga showed the growing identification of the Pomaks with the ethnic Turkish community, in addition to the role played by Islam. Although the Muslim community in Greece looks to Turkey, whIch IS ostensibly a secular republic, It has always been mainiy a religIOusly conservative community. 14 Along with the minority schools where TurkIsh is used (see below), the community has two I1lcdrcscs: one at Echinos in the Pomak zone, and the other in Komotim. In these schools Islamic functionaries like imams and mueZZl11S are trained, and some of the pupils continue their studies at the special academy in Thessaloniki. 15 In contrast with the Bulgarian case, the process of Pomak assimilation into the Turkish community would appear not to be wholly dependent on the mal11tenance of Islamic religious belief. In the summer of 1994, for example, it was noted that the more secular the young Pomaks, the more they tended to assert their new Turkish identity.l() Furthermore, even since the

Kemalist revolution in Turkey, there have been sccularand Turkish nationalist forces, as opposed to more conservative Islamic ones, workl11g within the Greek Muslim community; both groups have theIr own assoCIations and publications. 17 The Greek policy of attempting to split the Pomaks from the Turks has so far been a failure. In Bulgaria the Pomaks share the same language as the majority, in Greece they do not. Indeed the Bulgarian/Greek Pomak community effectively forms a single unit over the central Rhodope, no longer divided as it was for many years by the Cold War front. Consequently, while attemptl11g to divide the large hostile Turkish mass, the Greek authorities are also wary of contributing to the creation of a minority wl1lch would potentially look to Bulgaria. In an effort to overcome this, they have encouraged the line that the Pomaks are actually descendants of the original Thracians, who lived 111 the area before the arrival of the Slavs in the seventh century. Accordingly, the Greeks contend, the Pomaks have more in common with Greeks than WItI1 any otI1er group. IH TI1lS disingenuous attempt to create a Pomak Identity close to

88

over many years between the central authOrities and the local Muslim population concermng who should be nom1l1ated to key posts. It illustrates well the alienation of the Muslim community from the central organs. 13 TRT TV. Ankara. 24 January 1995. 14 In this it is similar to the ethnic Turkish community north of the border in the BulgarIan Rhodope and centred around Kurdzhali. which is also religiously conservative. This is 111 contrast with the other ma1l1 Turkish concentration 111 the north-cast of Bulgaria. where the current MRF leadership has Its power-base. 15 Frangopoulos. op. cit. The author puts the number of Muslim religious tlmctionaries operating in Thrace at 298: 110 in the departlnent of Xanthi. 170 in Komotini and 18 in Evros. There are two mam muftis -one in Xanthi and one in Komotini. plus a minor one in Dludllllnotikhon; they arc paid by the state (sec note 12 above). The academy in Thessaloniki was set up in 1968 to train teachers in the minority schools and thus end the need for teachers from Turkey or the Arab world - see Poulton. op. cit p. 185. 16

Kyril Drezov of Keele University kindly proVided tim II1forinatlon.

89

>

For more inforlnation on these sec A. POpOVIC. VIs/alii {Ja/katliqlle. Ll'sIIIIISIIf//lIlIIS dll Slid-cst cllropce/l dam /0 JJ,:"iode post-oltolllone. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz. 1986. pp. 157-81. IH This links into the great debate over whether Philip and Alexander the Great were Greeks or of a different people. A recent publication in London goes so f.1r as to assert that the Pomaks and Torbe~i of Macedonia were also descendants of the original pre-Slav people. from the same stock as Alexander. TIllS IS 'proven' by the f.1ct that their womenfolk continue to wear traditional purple clothes. based on those worn by the Royal House of Macedon some 23 centuries earlier. The article claims that Alexander was 111 f.1ct 'a Pomak' Such f.1nciful theories echo that of the Greeks regarding the Pomaks in Western Thrace. If the original inhabitants wcre not Greeks. then they were a very similar people. ancl after Alexander's f.1ll the rapid spread of koi/le (a dialect of Greek based on Attic Greek) made any distll1ctlOn between Greek and the everyday language of the ancient Macedonians an academic OIlC. Either way the Pomaks would. in accordance with these ideas, be ethnically closer to Greeks than to Bulgarians or Turks. See East Ellropea/l Nellis/etter, vol. 8. no. 7. supplement. London. 29 March 1994. For Greek attcmpts to 'prove' that Pomaks have different blood groups from Turks see N.I. Xirotyrl. 'ldiai paratlriseis epi tis katanomis ton sychnotiton ton omadon tou aimotos CIS tous Pomakous', unpubl. Ph. D. thesis. Thessaloniki. 1971. quotcd in T. Seyppel. 'The Pomaks of North Western Greece: An Endangered Balkan PopulatIOn'. jIMMA. vol. 10. no.1. 1989. pp. 41-9. 17

90

Hugh Poulton

Changing NOtiotlS if National Identity among Muslims

Greek yet separate from the ethnic Turkish and ethnic Bulgarian in Western Thrace has so far been an abject failure. Politically the Pomaks continued to support the radicalised Turks led by Sadik Ahmet and Ahmet Faikoglu, who considered them to be part of Greece's Turkish community. And it is noticeable that, if anything, the younger Pomaks appear now to identify more with the ethnic Turkish community than their parents did. In Xanthi many Pomaks, perhaps the majority, now have Turkish as their everyday language, while the middle-aged and the elderly (especially women) continue to use Bulgarian. The young people appear to understand Bulgarian well but are less and less able to converse in it, preferring Turkish; 19 quite how they have learned it, given the Greek authorities' opposition its being taught, is an interesting question. There has been a drastic reduction in the number of pupils at the two Turkish mmority secondary schools (in Komotini and in Xanthi) since the stipulation by the authorities in March 1984 that final examinations there must be conducted in Greek. 20 The 300 or so Turkish primary schools are apparently cmcial to the teaching and learmng of Turkish. So too are the mosques, and the educational activities attached to them. Thus although Arabic is the language of the Quran, the everyday language used in mosques in the area is Turkish; likewise in the Quran schools, it is the lanl-:,Yuage of instmction and conversation. In the Pomak mountain villages satellite televislOns are common, and since 1991 villagers have been able to receive six Turkish television channels. In contrast they receive only three Greek ones, and the surrounding mountains make reception of these poor.21 The incorporation of many Pomaks mto the German labour market, where they merge with the large number of ethnic Turks from Turkey, possibly provides a further channel in the process of Turkish language acquisition and, more broadly, Turkification: this requires further investigation. However, this is achieved, it appears mcontestable that the

Pomak community of Western Thrace is becoming Turkified; hence the Greek government's mmority policy seems to have £liled.

19 Haramiev notes that the elderly still speak a very pure form of Bulgarian which he. a native Bulgarian. found no trouble in understanding.

20 As a result of the new measures, the number of pupils 111 the schools dropped from 305 in Komotini and 227 in Xanthi in the year 1983-4, to 42 and 85 respectively for 1986-7 -see H. Poulton, The Balkalls. p. 186. 21 Frangopoulos. op. cit.

91

Roma (Gypsies). Relatively few Muslims are allowed to mhabit the sensltive region bordering on Turkey: thus only some 7 per cent of the actual border region population are Muslim. Mostly these are Muslim Roma,22 and as noted above they are firmly established at the bottom end of the social scale and there is little mixing between them and other Muslim groups in Greece. Although estimating numbers is always hazardous, outside estimates put the number of Roma in Greece as high as 140,000, which includes both Orthodox Christians and Muslims. Some 45,000 of these are nomadic or were forn1erly so - these tend to be Muslims. 23 Greek observers put the figure of Muslim Roma in Thrace at 14-17,000, the latter figure representing over 15 per cent of the officially estimated Muslim total there. 24 The Muslim Roma, who speak Turkish, Greek and the regional Romany dialect, live predonunantly in distinct peripheral quarters ofXanthi, Komotini and Alexandroupolis, essentially excluded from the main areas of economic activity (agriculture or services), and coerced into forming a pool of occasional labourers or small-scale semilegal marketeers. 25 The Minority Rights Group (MRG) have reported on the plight of Muslim Roma in Greece, many of whom have no citizenship, and hence no basic civil rights. 26 A law passed in 1976 led to the closure of all unofficial campsites, and this was particularly problematic for nomadic Muslim Roma, since the official campsites were almost exclusively for tourists. A law passed in 1979 to enable nomadic Muslim Roma to obtain ldentification cards had little effect due to most of them not having birth certificates. There has been some improvement in their conditions since the 1980s: for example, houses were built in certain areas 22 GypsIes in Greece are also called 'Y!fti' or 'Katsive/i', 23

See G. Puxton. Roma: Ellrope's Gypsies, London: MRG. 1987,

24

Sec Frangopoulos. op. cit. Ibid.

25

26 Pllxton. op. cit.

Hugh POlllton

Changing Notiom oj National Identity a111011,(t Muslims

specially for them, and in 1996 the government unveiled a 3 billion-drachma plan to improve the conditions of the Roma. However, Muslim Roma have in practice been accepted as Greek citizens only after baptism and admission to the Orthodox Church. The Bishop of Flonna in Greek Macedonia has adopted an active role in this, and has led a church mission to convert Muslilu Roma to Orthodox Chnstianity.27 According to some observers, they are not especially religIOUS: their communities are organised on patriarchal or matriarchal lines, and Islam, according to such views, does not functIon as a strong cohesive element as it does among other Muslim groupS.2H Because of the close association in Greece between citizenship, ethnictty and religion, many Muslim Roma have changed their identity in an effort to become Greek and thus integrate into Greek society. A similar phenomenon is observable in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) except that there, due perhaps to the authorities' official espousal of multinationalism, b'Teater possibilities are afforded to small Muslim groups in the matter of national identity.

Turkish minorities. The Muslims were recognised as a 'nationality' of Yugoslavia in 1961, and as a separate 'nation' in 1971. 29 Although a large m;uority of these Muslims spoke Serbo-Croat and lived mamly in Bosma-Hercegovina or the SandZak area on the Serbian/Montenegrin border, there were some 40,000 Muslims in Yugoslav Macedonia, who mostly spoke Macedonian. These were descendants of the Slav population of Macedonia who had converted to Islam in the Ottoman period and thus should perhaps have been differentiated from the Serbo-Croat-speaking Muslim Slavs. To complicate the issue further, Muslim sources in the Sandzak clallu that many of the Torbesi are recent Serbo-Croatspeaking arrivals: taking advantage of the emigration agreement in the 1950s with Turkey, they left SandZak for Turkey and on their way there settled in Macedonia. 30 In the past, like the Pomaks in Bulgana, the Torbdi have often Identified closely WIth fellow Muslims and especially with Turks. However, the authoritIes, both of former Yugoslavia and FYROM, have been worried by the penetration of Albanian nationalism among them by way of, among other things, Albanianspeaking hodzhas. The numbers of the Muslim Slavs have fluctuated greatly in past censuses: 1,591 in 1953; 3,002 in 1961; 1,248 in 1971; and a dramatic rise to 39,555 in 1981. This last figure presumably includes many who had preVIOusly declared themselves Turks (see below).

92

PYR OM (Macedonia) The situation in Macedonia remains perhaps the most complex of anywhere in the Balkans. The national self-identification of by £,r the largest Muslim group in Macedonia, the Albanians, has remained solid, except for a bnef period in the 1950s. In contrast, that of smaller groups contmues to fluctuate. The apparent confusion over the identity of different Muslim groups ll1 the case of FYROM demonstrates further that in the Balkans religion has often been of paramount importance in ethnic differentiation.

Toybesi and 'Muslims'. The Muslim Slav Macedonians are known as Torbdi, Pomaks, or Poturs and will be referred to in this chapter as T orbesi. In former Yugoslavia the term 'Muslim' was used to describe descendants of Slavs who converted to Islam during the Ottoman period; it should be stressed that it was not applied to the mostly Muslim Albanians or the wholly Muslim 27

Ibid.

28

Frangopoulos, oJ!. cit.

93

In former Yugoslavia the nationality policy of the Communist authoritIes was always offiCIally to espouse the slogan 'brotherhood and unity'. In reality. however, it evolved from a Serb-oriented polity under Aleksander RankovlC's control of the all-powerful security apparatus, to a three-tier system of national rights, which was enshrined in the 1974 Constitution (see Chapter 2). For the genesIs and development of official recognition of the Muslims as a separate 'Nation', see Poulton, T11C Balkalls, chapter 4.

2')

The 1950s emigration agreement which lasted till Rankovic's (1ll in 1966 in theory referred only to Turks. Due to the /IIillct system and the strength of Islam as a bmding (1ctor Il1 identificatIOn cuttmg across natIOnal boundanes, however. many non-Turkish Muslims took advantage of the agreement and went to Turkey, They have become peacefully assJInilated into the Turkish majOrity there. The SandZak Muslims claJIn that some twenty-nme villages m Macedonia are completely settled by Muslims from SandZak -see 'State Terror agamst the Muslims in Sanpk'. paper presented to the Vienna Conference on I-Iuman Rights. June 1993, p. 6. They appear to be Muslims who were caught in transit when the agreement ended and remained in Macedonia. 30

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Changil~r;

Hugh Poultot!

In 1970, the Torbesi formed themselves into an association, the Republican Community for Cultural and Scientific Events of Macedonian Muslims, and held their first cultural meeting at the monastery of Saint Jovan Bigorski in Western Macedonia. The orgamsation, set up with the bless111g of the authorities, claimed that since the war more than 70,000 of their number had been assimilated by other Muslim groups, espeCIally the Albanians. 31 If this was indeed the case, the rise 111 their numbers reflected in the 1981 census demonstrates that the founding of the association and its subsequent propagation of a specifically Macedonian Muslim Slav identity was a great success. Despite this apparent success, there persisted indicatIOns that the Torbesi rema111ed susceptible to assimilation into the Muslim (Albanian) majonty in the Yugoslav republic of Macedonia; here we see that in the Balkan context Islam is often a more powerful unifYing factor than ethnicity. The fears of the Torbesi community came mto the open 111 1990 when united Yugoslavia was in its final phase. On 13 August 1990 Riza Memedovski, chairman of the Torbesi organisation, sent an open letter to the Chairman of the Party for Democratic Prosperity of Macedonia (PDP: the predominantly ethnic-Albanian party based in Tetovo) on the subject of this 'quiet assimilation'. He accused the PDP of abusing religion for political ends through the attempted 'Kosovoisation and Albamanisation of western Macedonia'.32 The same concern was voiced by the Council of Elders of the Islamic Community of Macedom a, on 6 November 1990. 33 This tendency for Torbdi to lean towards the ethnic Albanians was underlined by apparent support for the PDP among Slav Muslims. In the second round of elections in Macedonia on 25 November 1990, the PDP complained that in Slav Muslim villages in western Macedonia inhabitants were prevented from voting for the PDP by members of the nationalist parties in the Front for Macedonian National Unity, the militIa organs, and even members of the electoral c0111n1J.ssions?4 The tensions felt by the authorities 111 the Yugoslav republic 31 DII.
Belgrade. 8 May 1982.

32 Tanjug (the official Yugoslav news agency), Belgrade. 13 August 1990. 33

TaI"Uug, 6 November 1990.

34

T,lI"UUg, 27 November 1990.

Notions C!f National Identity among Muslims

95

of Macedonia over possible assimilation of the Torbdi by nonSlav groups like the Albanians or the Turks has continued since FYROM's emergence as an independent state. Most recently, tensions have risen in relation to Torbdi and Muslim refugees from Bosnia-Hercegovina. While the Yugoslav Macedonian authonties actively encouraged smaller Muslim groups (like the Turks and the Torbdi) to Identify themselves as such out of a fear that these groups were becoming Albanianised, the FYROM authonties now appear nervous of possible leverage by Turkey, currently the main regional power. A number of Torbesi in the Debar region have indeed requested schooling in Turkish rather 35 than Macedonian, but the authorities turned the request down. In early January 1993 the presidium of the official Torbesi state body, the Republican Community of Islamicised Macedonians, stated that the Democratic Party of Turks in Macedonia (DPTM) was behind the 'pan-Turkish ideas' exhibited in the Mosa Pijade school, which was at the centre of the controversy and was demolished on 28-29 December 1992. 3(, The DPTM for Its part told the missIOn of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in January 1993 that the status of the Turkish minonty was under threat. 37 Construction of a refugee village in the Skopje suburb of DJorce Petrov, with the help of finance from Germany, to house the 1l1flux of Muslims fleeing BosniaHercegov1l1a was halted after protests and demonstrations by local inhabItants in February 1993. 38 The present authonties appear wary of recognis1l1g the Serbo-Croat Muslims as a distinct people, and in spite of the old legacy they rema1l1 unrecognised. Attempts to set up a branch of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA: the party ofBosnian President Alija Izetbegovic) have met wIth obstruction from the FYROM security forces?) Thus, the authorities, warned at the assImilation of the Muslim Slavs by the Albamans, set up a Torbesi organisation in 1970 specifically to counter tIus threat. In spite of the apparent success 35

TanJug, 30 September and 29 December 1992.

3C.

Tanjug, 4 January 1993. Tanjug, 22 January 1993.

37

Tanjug, 20 and 22 February 1993. A. Sebestyen. 'Walking the tightrope in the Balkans', Nt'll' Statcslllall alld Societ)', London. 9 September 1994.

3H

39

96

Hugh POllltOIl

Changing Notio11S of National Identity among Muslims

measured in the rising number of those who identified themselves as 'Muslims' in succeeding censuses, the threat of assimilation remained, and continued after the break-up of YugoslavIa and the emergence ofan independent Macedonia. The picture is further complicated by the presence of Serbo-Croat-speaking Muslims (as opposed to the Macedonian-speaking Torbdi), whose numbers have increased with the arrival of refugees from Bosnia. The FYROM authorities appear reluctant to recognise these 'Muslims' as a distinct people separate from the Torbdi. As 1Il Bulgana, the crucial question is: to whom, in natIOnal terms, do these relatively small groups of Slav Muslims belong? Is theIr sense of separateness sufficiently developed to reSIst the attractions of the shared Islamic faith oflarger, well-defined, national Muslim groups like the Albanians or Turks? Is it strong enough, in the case of the Torbesi, to resist the pull towards the m~ority Slav Macedonians arising out of the shared language? Can they 111deed survive as a separate 'national group'?

Macedonian as their native tongue and 27,086 gave Albanian. The number of declared Albanians fell from 179,389 in 1948 to 165,524 1Il 1953. The period from 1953 to 1966 also witnessed the extensive emigration of Turks from Yugoslavia to Turkey. According to figures from Yugoslavia's statistical yearbooks, some 80,000 emigrated but some Turkish sources put the figure above 150,000. Some of these emigrant<; were unable to speak any Turkish, and were in fact Muslim Albanians or Slavs claiming to be Turks to escape from Communist Yugoslavia:1O In the 1971 census there were 108,552 declared Turks, but by the census of 1981 this had dropped to 86,690 - the more surprising given the high birth-rate of ethnic Turks in Macedonia, which would have been expected to result in an increase rather than a decrease of some 20,000 during that decade. It appeared that many who had previously declared themselves Turks were now claiming to be Muslims, while others declared themselves Albanians or Roma. 41 The Communist authonties, worried by the rise of Albanian nationalism 111 the 1980s asserted that many Turks in Macedonia had been Albanianised under pressure. According to the director of the Macedonian Republic Bureau of Statistics in Skopje,42 this was especially pronounced in Tetovo, Gostivar, Struga and Kicevo regions. In September 1987 the Macedoman League ofCon1lTlunists Central C0I1lITlittee Presidium saw the expansion of Albanian nationalism as one of the main reasons behind the emigration of Turkish families from the Gostivar municipality,43 The Albanians apparently claimed that 'these were not Turks', but 'Illyrians turned

Turks. The Turks of former Yugoslavia were remnants from the long Ottoman occupation. The census of 1981 put their number at 101,292 of whom 86,691 lived in the republic of Macedonia, where they constituted 4 per cent of the population. In the census of April 1991 they numbered 97,416, or 4.79 per cent of the population of the new republic (FYROM). Assessing the true number of minOrities like the Turks and others in Macedonia continues to be problematic. The census of 1948 gave a figure of 95,940 Turks and that of 1953 the vastly 111creased figure of 203,938; however, by the next census seven years later the number had £l11en to 131,481. These m;~or fluctuations were due essentially to external events. In the immediate post-war penod, the Turks were regarded as suspect, because of Turkey's friendship with the West. In January 1948 seventeen Macedonian Turks were accused of being members of 'Judzel', ostensibly a terrorist/espionage organisation, in a trial which received extensive publiCIty within Macedonia in order to 111timidate the Turkish mlIlority. As a result, many Turks declared themselves Albamans in the 1948 census. However by 1953, following the break with Albania after the Tito-Stalin split, it was the Albamans' turn to be seen as suspect, and consequently many Albamans declared themselves to be Turks. Of the 203,938 in the 1953 census, 32,392 gave

97

Paul Shoup. COllIIHlmislH alld tlrc Yugoslav Natiollill QllcStiol'. New York, 1968, pp. 181-2; Stephen Palmer and Robert King, Yugoslav COllllllllllislII alld tlrc Maccdolliatz Qucstioll. Hamden. CT: Archon Books. 1971. p. 178.

40

41 [n the April 1991 census the figure had risen slightly to 97,416 or 4.79% of the populatIOn. A further complicating t:,ctor in assessing the numbers of small minority groups in Yugoslav Macedol11a was the rise from 3.652 to 14.240 between 1971 and 1981 of those declaring themselves as 'Yugoslavs' rather than as belonging to a particular ethmc group (although the percentage of such people was still relatively low in comparison With other republics in former YugoslaVia). 42

Dllgll. Belgrade, 8 May 1982.

43

Tat~ug, 21 September 1987,

98

Hugh Poulton

into Turks' who were now 'returning to their flock', i.e. rt:joining the Albanian mother nation. 44 Likewise Nevzat Halili, then leader of the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP: the main Albanian politlcal grouping in Macedonia), called on Torbesi and Roma to declare themselves Albanians. 45

Chal1gil1,1t Notiol1S

if National IdCl1tity among Muslims

99

45 M. Andrejevich. 'Resurgent Nationalism in Macedonia: A Challenge to Pluralism' in RFEIRep0l't all Eas(em Europe, Munich, 17 May 1991. Unofficially 98% of Albanians in Macedonia arc Muslim -1l1 the April 1991 census, households were asked to declare their religious as well as national affiliation.

Muslim and as such constitute a slgnificant Muslim commumty. It is instructive to conslder briefly the situation of the Roma within Yugoslavla as a whole before concentrating on that in Yugoslav Macedonia and subsequently FYROM. At first the estimated 850,000 Roma of Yugoslavia were largely ignored as a group by the authorities throughout Communist Yugoslavia. This is illustrated by the 1944 manifesto issued by the Communists urging the people of Macedonia to join Tito's partisans. It called on Slavs, Albanians, Turks and Vlachs to Join the struggle, but made no mention of the numerous Roma, who remained firn11y rooted at the bottom of the social scale. This began to change in the 1970s as Yugoslavia evolved its complicated system of national rights entrenched in the 1974 Constitution. From 1981 they had (in theory) nationality status on an equal footing with other national minorities like the Albanians, Turks or Hungarians, but this status was not uniformly applied by the Yugoslav republics: while Bosnia-Hercegovina and Montenegro granted them 'national minority status', the other republics (including Macedonia) placed them in the lower category of an 'ethnic group.' However, in spite of this there were advances. Yugoslavia was in the vanguard of the movement to introduce Romani education, with the breakthrough occurring first in the Albanian-populated region of Kosovo in the 1980s; from 1983 Romam has been used in some state schools as the teaching medium for the first four grades and Romani programmes have been regularly broadcast. A modified version of the 32-letter Ronum alphabet was used so that it could be widely understood,'17 and in May 1980 the Nasa Kniga publishmg house of Skopje brought out the first grammar entirely in the Romani scnpt and orthography.4H The most slgnificant development was in Macedonia after the devastating earthquake of 1962, when the Romam town of Suto Onzari was established just outside SkopJe. This has some 35,000 inhabitants, its own elected council and a member of parliament. In splte of these advances, the maJonty of Rom a have continued to live well below the economic average. There has been discrimination in the workplace, with many Roma men unemployed and the women employed in the most menial occupations. Only

46 R. Kantardziev and L. Lazaroski 'Schools and Education' in M. Apostoloski and H. Plenkovich (cds). TIIC Socialist Repulilic of Macedollia, Skopje: Macdonian Review, 1974, p. 110.

47 Tal~ug, 12 January 1980. 4H Tanjug, 30 May 1980.

Like the Albamans, the Turks were a recognised 'nationality' offormer Yugoslavla, and from the out~et were allowed educational and cultural rights. In the first school year under the new Yugoslav republic of Macedonia in 1944/5, there were sixty primary schools, with 3,334 pupils, using Turkish as the language of instruction. In 1950/1 there were over 100 such schools with more than 12,000 pupils and 267 teachers. As a result of emigratIOn to Turkey, the number had dropped by 1958/9 to twenty-seven schools (twenty-slx primary and one secondary), with Just over 6,000 pupils and 219 teachers. While the number of primary schools had increased to fifty-three by the end of 1988, the number of pupils remained more or less the same. 46 As for the Albanians of Macedonia, the Turks had thelr own television and radio programmes and a newspaper (Birlik), as well as vanous cultural organisations. The main political movement for the Turks in Yugoslav Macedonia was the Communist-controlled Democratic Alliance of Turks in Macedonia. With the advent of democracy m Yugoslavia in 1990, its break-up, and the subsequent emergence of independent Macedoma, this organisation was superseded by the DPTM.

The Rama (Gypsies). Yugoslavia had one of the largest Roma populations in Europe, with important links with emigrant Roma groups in France, Germany, the United States, Australia and elsewhere. As elsewhere in the Balkans, the Roma community comprises both Muslims and Christians, although in areas like Macedonia, where Ottoman rule lasted longest, the majority of Roma are 44 Dtlga, Belgrade. 8 May 1982. The Albal1lans hold that the Illynans arc the forerunners of the Albanians.

100

I-IUp)l Poultoll

a few have received university education and entered the professions. In former Yugoslavia half the Roma earners were industrial workers, and 20 per cent were farmers, many owning their land. The rest were self-employed artisans and small-scale traders. Even though they had thus gained substantial recognition, the Roma continued to be unwilling to identifY themselves as such due to persistent stigma. This appears in the pejorative term' cigane,49 by which they continue to be widely known. In Macedonia the number of Roma in the various censuses remained more or less static till 1981, when it rose dramatically from 24,505 in 1971 to 43,223. This reflected their more developed official status and a consequent relatIve decline in the stigma. The census of April 1991 recorded 55,575 Roma in Macedonia, i.e. some 2.73 per cent of the total population of just over 2 million. However, the real figure IS certainly much higher, and Roma leaders themselves claim some 200,000 in Macedonia. Many Roma have declared themselves to be Macedonians or Turks, but for a long time the former Communist authorities alleged that they were being subjected to Albanianisationespecially the Muslim Roma (the vast majority). This was consistent with the view of many Macedonians that the Albanians were the main internal threat. The claim of Albaniamsation was made again on 1 August 1990 by the presidium of the Republican Comm.ittee for Nurtunng the Ethnic and Cultural Traditions of Roma in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia (an official body set up by the Communist authorities), which accused the PDP of persistently manipulating Roma in relation to Islam. On 1 September 1990 the Macedonian Romani community called on Roma to stop declaring themselves Alba11lans merely because of their shared Islamic t'lith, and decided to celebrate 11 October (a Macedonian public day) with the first republican festival of the cultural achievements of Roma in Macedonia. 50 This illustrates the contlI1uing tendency for Balkan Muslim communities like the Muslim Roma to be drawn towards larger Muslim groups with a more developed national identity; also that the authorities have made efforts to prevent such assimilation, viewing it as strengthening the most This tenn has negative connotations comparable to the use of the word 'nigger' to refer to coloured people. 50 Tanjug, 1 September 1990. 49

Chall,~ing

Notions

if National Ide11tity among Mllslims

101

'problematic' Muslim minonty. This has happened in the case of the Albanians in Yugoslav Macedonia and later in FYROM, and in Greece in the case of the Turks.

'Egyptians'. Given the problems faced by the Roma and the ethnic uncertainty of many Muslim citizens (a legacy from Ottoman tunes, when religion and not ethnicity was the main t'lctor of differentiation), especially in areas dominated by highly organised and nationalistic Muslim Albamans, it is perhaps not surprising that unusual natIOnal claims appear from tune to time. In Macedonia in 1990 the 'Egipcani' Association of Citizens was set up in Ohrid under the leadership of Nazim Arifi,51 with the support of approxImately 4,000 inhabitants of Ohrid and neighbouring Struga, who renounced Roma identity in twour of being Egyptian. 52 A sister association was soon established in Kosovo, and by September 1990 the associations claimed 100,000 'descendants of the Pharaohs' in Kosovo, and 20-30,000 in Macedonia. The associations petitioned the fonner Yugoslav Federal Assembly and the Serbian and Macedonian national assemblies to include the separate category of'Egyptian' in the 1991 population census,53 and this was achieved in the 1991 Macedonian census. The phenomenon of Roma claiming to be Egyptians has not become widespread and is unlikely to develop, despite claims of recently discovered documents in the Vatican Library showing that Egyptians came to Macedoma between AD 306 and 337 in the shape of 150,000 infantry troops and 150,000 horsemen, who are claimed to be the forerunners ' 'E; gyptlans ' ,.'54 o f t1le M ace d oman The two main Muslim b'Toupings in Thrace and Macedonia - the Turks lI1 the east and the Albanians in the west - thus remain relatively stable in their national self-identification. In contrast, 51 For a full discussion of the phenomenon of 'Egyptians' in Macedonia and Kosovo see Ger Duijzmgs. 'The Egyptians m Kosovo and Macedonia' [forthcoming) which expands and revIses his article on the tOpIC first published in Dutch in AlIIsfadallls Sociologiscll Tijdsclllift. no. 18. 1992. pp. 24-38. 52

Taqjug, 6 August 1990.

53 Taqjug, 24 September 1990. 54 Talljug, April 1991 in BBC SWB EE/1043 B/17, 11 April 1991.

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Hugh Poulton

other smaller Muslim minorities continue to experience a variety of changes, varying from one country to another. In Greece the Pomak community is progressively becoming TurkIsh, while directly across the border in Bulgana the same commul11ty is splitting, with a small radical segment becomll1g Turkish while the rest leans towards incorporation ll1to mainstream Bulgarian identity. In Macedonia the situation in further complicated by the additional presence of Serbo-Croat-speaking Muslim Slavs. Throughout the Roma remain at the bottom of the scale and hence are unwilling to identify themselves as such, with some in Macedonia even claiming to be Egyptian. Often they identifY with either the relevant majority people, or one of the two main Muslim communities. There has been substantial emigration of all Muslim groups throughout the area to Turkey, where those who are not ethnically Turkish have quickly become subsumed into the m~ority.

6 THE MUSLIM POPULATION IN FYROM (MACEDONIA): PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS Natasha Gaber The Muslim population in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) makes up about one-third of the total. It IS not ethnically homogeneous, comprising four main groups: the Albal11ans, the Turks, the Roma (GypsIes) and the Muslim. Slavs. The Albanians are the largest group making up over 20 per cent of the total population of FYROM. They are overwhelmingly Muslim; there are only a few Orthodox villages around Lake Ohrid and Struga, and some Roman Catholics in SkoPJe, of whom Mother Teresa is the best known. The actual number of Albanians in FYROM has been the subject of much controversy. In the Yugoslav census of1981 there were 377,726 in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia (which in 1991 became the independent FYROM), comprising 19.8 per cent of the total population of the republic. This ll1dicated a 36 per cent ll1crease from the previous ,census in 1971, due presumably in large part to the Albanians f high birthrate. With the creation of the independent state of FYROM in 1991, the Albanians demonstrated their ambivalence to the new state by boycotting the referendum on independence, the census and the vote on the constitution. The decision not to take part in the last-named was by a majority of 13-10 in the leadership of the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP - the main Albanian political grouping).! The boycott of the 1991 census led to endless polemics about the numbers of Albanians in the new state; the authorities maintained that they were no more than 21 per cent of the total, while the Albal11ans claimed anything between 35 and 48 per cent. A further census carried out under international supervision in late June-early July 1994 put the number of Albanians in the ! For a full discussIOn of the Albanians' ambivalence to the new state see H. Poulton. Who are the Macedollimls?, London: Hurst. 1995. pp. 125-36. 182-9 L

103

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Natasha Gaber

The Muslim Population in FYROM: Public Perceptions

republic at 442,914, or 22.9 per cent of the total. However, some 150,000 people, predominantly Albanians, were not counted since they had failed to meet the requirements of citizenship in the new state, which stipulated that to qualify one must provide proof of one's own birth or that of both parents in the territory of the present republic, or alternatively at least fifteen years' continuous residence there. 2 Many Albanians interpreted this stipulation as a deliberate policy to prevent them from gaining enough parliamentary seats to veto any constitutional changes. 3 The Turks, who are exclusively Muslim, are the next largest Muslim community in FYROM, comprising 97,416, or 4.7 per cent of the total population. The third group IS that of the Roma, a mixed community of Muslims and Orthodox Christians with a Muslim m;uonty; estimating their number is problematIc because of the stigma attached to this identity throughout the Balkans, which has induced many Roma to identifY themselves as members of other groups. There are also sizeable numbers of Slav Muslims. 4 M;uor differences exist between the four ethnic groups within the Muslim population in FYROM. Coupled with the OrthodoxMuslim divide, this has contributed to a situation where there are sharp feelings of distinctiveness and distance among all the c()lll1try's various ethnic and religious groups. Research conducted since 1991 by the Centre for Ethnic Relations in Skopje has revealed much prejudice and lack of communication between them, and although this may be a by-product of the complicated Yugoslav three-tier system of classifying people with attendant 'rights' (see Chapter 2), it is also notable that there were traditionally

few m.ixed marriages in Yugoslav Macedonia, which recorded one of the lowest rates in the former Yugoslavia. A studl of the Macedonian, Albanian and Turkish populations of the area around Tetovo and Gostivar, published in 1974, showed that 95 per cent of Macedonian and Albanian and 84 per cent of Turkish heads of households would not allow their sons to marry a girl of different nationality; for daughters the percentages were even higher. Mixed marriages between Muslim Albamans and Turks on the one hand, and Orthodox Macedonians on the other, were simply non-existent. The report stated: 'religious isolation stands behind the deceptive impression of national, ethnic cleavages.' The research by the Centre for Ethnic Relations found that the Roma were the only group that mixed freely with other groups, which may be explained by the tendency among Roma not to identify themselves as such. As far as the attitudes of smaller groups towards the state are concerned, It is notable that the Orthodox Vlachs and the maJonty of Muslim Roma appeared to be content with the current level of rights, often replying along the lines of 'We do not want more; we are not Albanians.' This hIghlights a crucial difference between the numerous Albanians and the other, smaller, groups (Muslim and otherwise) in FYROM. The smaller groups like the Vlachs and Roma are content to be officially included as participants in the state on a level constitutIOnally similar to that of the Albamans: thev consider their status to have risen since the founding ofFYROM. 6 Conversely, the Albanians feel insulted at having been classified on the same level as the likes of the Vlachs, of whom about half cannot even speak the Vlachs language (a variant of Romanian) properly. Furthermore, the rise ofSlobodan Milosevic in the late 1980s during the death-throes of former Yugoslavia was accompanied by a substantial contraction 111 the role of the Albamans in the Yugoslav state (state Chapter 8). Coupled with their numerical strength, this has meant that the Albanians are unwilling to accept classification as a mere 'nationality'

2 In June 1994 the Interior Ministry confinned that some 150.000 people who actually had identity papers from the fonner Yugoslav state. and even in some cases from the Socialist Republic ofMacedonia. had failed to meet the requirements of citizenship and that most of these were Albanians - Macedonian Infonnation Centre. Skopje n.d. reported in BBC SWB EE12023 C/13. 16 June 1994.

3 Albanian TV. Tirana. 7 April 1994. Albanian attitudes towards the stipulations

105

on citizenship are examined further below. 4 For a full discussion of the changes in perceptions of national identity among

these smaller Muslim groups see Chapter 5. The Macedoman Slav Muslim population lives mainly around the regions of Debar and Struga. This group has not yet been included in the polls carried out by the Centre for Ethnic Relations. Skopje. on which the public opinion aspects of this chapter are based.

I1ijaJosifovski. OpslzlcstlfcllilC Promclli lIa Sdo: Makcdouskoto Alballskoto i Tllrskolo Nasc/CIlie 1111 Sclo 110 Polog. Sosioloslzka Slttdija. Institute of SOciological Political and Juridical Research, SkopJe. 1974. (, This is especially so with the Roma -sec H. Poulton. Wilo are tile Maccdollimls?, pp. 191-5.

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of the new state of FYROM, and claim treatment on an equal footing to the Macedonians. 7 Despite the religious cleavages noted above, religion was not seen 111 FYROM as a major destabilising £'lctor, nor was religious mtolerance a serious problem. However, in 1992-3 some changes became evident. Observers8 attributed this to external factors and influences, especially from neighbouring Serbia. With the Macedonians being Orthodox Christian by persuasion there were attempts from Serbia to appeal to them as fellow believers faced with a COImnon enemy in the Muslim Albanians. 9 These appeals, based on the myth of a Muslim 'invasion', appeared to strike a chord within the republic, resulting in a rise in ethnic and religious tenslOns. But they gradually subsided, and these elements did not prove a major factor in the November 1994 elections. A possible explanation for tIllS was the example of Bosnia-Hercegovina: the bloody Bosman quagmire illustrated graphically both that civil war would be disastrous for all concerned, and that intervention by the international community to solve problems was a myth.

In spite of modifications made to comply with the recommendations of the Badinter Commission (set up by the European Union in 1991 to oversee the constitutional and legal systems of the successor states to former Yugoslavia), the constItutIon of FYROM states in Its preamble: 'Macedonia IS constituted as the national state of the Macedonian people. , .' Here the term 'Macedonian people' refers to et/lIIic Macedonians; 'Alba111ans, Turks, Vlachs, Roma and the othcr natIonalities who live I1l the Republic of Macedonia' are mentioned separately. Also Artlclc 19 of the COnStitutIOn, while guaranteeing freedom of conscIence and religious practice, refers explicitly only to the Macedonian Orthodox Church. Hence constItutionally FYROM IS the state of ethnic Maced0111ans, WIth Alba111ans seen as a mmority within It on a par with other minoritIes like Turks, Roma and Vlachs. 7

H Emilja Simoska, 'Ethnic Hanllony and Ethnic Tolerance: Minorities and Ethnic Relations in Macedonia', papcrpresented at international conference on Minorities and Related Problems in the Balkans, Bilkent UniverSIty, Ankara, 27-9 October 1994. 9 T~1~s position was apparent m spite of the SerbIan Orthodox Church's continuing hostIlIty towards the Macedonian Orthodox Church. The latter only gained fl;1l I11dependence from the Serbian Orthodox. community's control in July 1967, and IS still not recog111sed by the SerbIan Church or by any other Orthodox community -see H. Poulton, Who are the MocedotJiotlS?, pp. 118, 180-2.

171e Muslim Populatiol1 itl FYROM: PI/blic Perceptiol1s

Public opinion polls

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PYROM, 1993 and 1994

Two major polls have been carried out to determine attitudes among the different ethnic and religious groups towards each other and towards the state. The first, in 1993, which questioned a sample of 500 Orthodox Christian Slav Macedonians and 500 Muslims, of whom the vast majority were ethnic Albanians, focused on inter-ethnic and inter-confessional questions. The second poll a year later, which questioned 1,200 citizens drawn from all the major ethmc groups in the republic - Macedonians, Albanians, Vlachs, Serbs, Turks and Roma - aimed to develop a clearer picture of the loyalty of citizens from these different groups towards the Macedol11an state (FYROM). The questions asked in the polls were constructed to highlight the differences in attitude among the various groups towards current political problems. One question asked was what should be the mil11mum number of years of continuous residence to qualify for obtaining FYROM citizenship.lO The vast m~onty of Albal11ans questioned (90%) considered the period of fifteen years too long: only 1() per cent found it acceptable. Withi11 the Albanian sample, a quarter of the youngest respondents (between eighteen and twenty years old) considered the fifteen-year period acceptable, and of the relatively small number of Albanians not affiliated to any political party, or who are partners in ethnically mixed mar10 As noted above, this was a contentious issue in the new state. The PDP insisted on a three year period. On the other hand, the Macedonian natIOnalist Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Orga11lsation - Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) wanted the period to be thirty years. The government's final decision, which was passed by the Assembly, stIpulated a mmimU111 of fifteen years 'continuous reSIdence', 111 the republic for in-comcrs to qualifY for Macedonian cltlzenship. Following the violent upheavals wInch began in the early 1980s in Kosovo (the Alba11lan-dominated provl11ce offonner Yugoslavia -see Chapter 8), large numbers of ethnic Albanians had moved from Kosovo to Macedonia. The fifteen year period was thus a means of c1ifferentiatmg between the Albanians of Macedoma who had lived in the area b~rorc the turmoil in Kosovo and those who had arrived since. Critics of the fifteen year period pointed out that in fonner Yugoslavia many Albanians from regions like Macedoma had moved temporarily to Kosovo to take advantage of opportunities available there. From the 1970s under the Tito system, eth111c Albanians had controlled the provmcc. The rise of Slobodan Milosevlc in the late 1980s resulted in the region bCl11g stripped of all autonomy, and brought firmly under Serbian control.

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rIages, 35% also found it acceptable. Another question posed related to the current political problem surrounding the language used on personal identity cards. Three-quarters of the Albanians questioned preferred to have identity cards only in the bearer's mother tongue; the remaining quarter responded that it was acceptable for theIr names to be written in the Macedonian language and script, with the ITlother tongue version in brackets. 11 One of the most controversial political questions at this time concerned the official language of FYROM. In the 1993 poll a majority of the Albanian respondents (84%) felt that all the different mother tongues in the republic should enjoy equal status, and only 16% considered the current constitutional arrangement acceptable. 12 The same question was asked in the 1994 poll, issuing in a similar response from the Albanians. However the Turks questioned preferred the constitutional solution by a large majority (82%). Of the Roma questioned, 40% approved of the constitutional position on languages while 33% felt that Macedonian should be the sole official language. The remaining Roma thought that Macedonian should be obligatory, with the optional possibility of using another language. Knowledge of the language of another ethnic group mhabiting the same area was considered necessary by only very few Albanians (4.2%), no Turks 13 and almost half (44%) of the Roma. Similarly, in 1993 three-quarters of the Albanian respondents would not allow a teacher of a different nationalitv to teach their children: only a quarter considered this acceptable. 14 Albanians

from the youngest group of respondents as well as from the oldest group were more flexible on this issue than the average; of these two groups 36% responded that they would not mind a teacher with a different nationality, rISing to 60% among Albanians in ethnically mixed marriages and whose political OrIentations leant towards the ruling Social Democratic Union (SDU)15 and its close associates in government. Poll results from the next year showed a small drop m the number of Alba11lan respondents who would reject teachers of a different nationality from 75 to 69%. The Turks also showed a majority 59% against having such teachers, but 98% of the Roma respondents had no problems with teachers of different nationality. Similar results were evident with questions about sending children to school in neighbourhoods where there was no school using the respondents' mother tongue. For the Albanians 88% preferred to send their children to a school using Albaman, regardless of distance. The Turks were divided, with a majority (59%) in favour of using the nearest school regardless of the language of instruction, while 72% of the Roma respondents favoured thIS course. There was much common ground evident in the polls between the various groups over economIC factors, especially in VIew of the problems of the transitional economic period. 16 In the 1993 poll three-quarters of both the Macedonian and Albanian respondents said they would accept employment in a private company where the employer was of a different natIOnality. Both groups evinced similar perceptions of the mfluence on the inter-ethnic issue of state and government institutions: 80<% of both groups VIewed the President pOSItively; 45% viewed the government positively, and in contrast 77% VIewed the parliament negatively. Over a quarter of all groups polled in 1994 expressed an interest in living in another country; the Turks polled the highest in this category with 71%. As for which was the preferred country for relocation, all respondents cited Western Europe, the United States

11 This fonnula has recently been put to the Assembly for a vote. 12 Article 7 of the Constitution states: 'The Macedonian language, wntten using its Cyrillic alphabet, IS the official language 111 the Republic of Macedollla. In the units of local self-government where the m;uority of the inhabitants belong to one of the natIOnalities [in the preamble to the Constitution these arc referred to as 'Albanians, Turks. Vlachs, Roma and other nationalities who live in the Republic of Macedonia'], in additIon to the Macedoman language and the Cyrillic alphabet, their language and alphabet can also be used officially in a manner determined by law. In the umts of local self-government where there arc significant numbers of inhabitants from the nationalities, III addition to the Macedonian language and the Cyrillic alphabet. theIr language and alphabet can also be used officially under conditions and 111 a manner determined by law. 13 It should be noted here that the Turks usc Macedonian with great facility. 14

This question refers only to the teacher's nationality, and not to the language

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in which pupils would be taught. 15 Tim party was one of the three fornled from the remains of the prevIOus Communist authorities. It was formerly the League of Communists of Maced om a - Party for Democratic Renewal (SKM-PDP). 16 The current privatisation programme is c1osl11g many state-owned £1ctones and leading to high unemployment levels, especially among the young.

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or Australia - such feelings, shared by all groups, showing that economic £1ctors often predominate over inter-ethnic or interdenominational ones; this could be interpreted as an encouraging sign for the future mtegration and cohesion of the state. Responses on perceptions of one's own ethnic group as econ0!11lcally disadvantaged compared to other ethnic groups yielded particularly interestmg results. Of the Roma respondents 85% showed such perceptions, as did 75% of Albanians and 52% of Macedonians. Somewhat surprismgly, the most positive were the Turks, with only 8% of respondents considering themselves thus disadvantaged. In 1993 the Macedonian and the Albanian respondents displayed similar perceptions of how the other group's wider religious community handled inter-ethnic relations. Of the Macedonians polled, 64% thought that the FYROM Islamic religious comllmnity as a whole played a negative role and hindered an improvement in relations while the same percentage of Albanian respondents felt that the role of the Macedonian Orthodox Church was negative. The results for these two groups were the same in 1994, but the Roma returned a high level of positive opinion regarding both religious communities, with 80% polling positively on the role of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, and 78% on that of the Islamic religious community. In contrast the Turks appeared ignorant on the role of these two communities; 88% answered 'Don't know' on the Macedonian Orthodox Church, and 78% the same on the Islamic religious community. When asked to list in order of importance factors which would most worsen mter-ethnic relations in the country, the result from 17 i both Albaman and Macedonian respondents in 1993 was as fol'lows: (1) the social and economic crisis; (2) the nationalism of the other group (i.e. Albamans or Macedomans); (3) the nonrecognition of Macedonia; (4) politIcal parties; (5) the influx from i neighbourmg states; and (6) the underdeveloped political culture . of CItizens. In 1994 the trend was more or less the same, and again the socioeconomic crisis was cited as the most important factor (by 64% of Roma, 47% of Turks, and 27°/0 of Albanians).

The Muslim Populatioll in FYROM: Public Perceptiolls

111

A quarter of Albanians stressed the danger of Macedonian nationalism, while a quarter of the Macedonians made the same observation of Albaman natIOnalism. On this the other two Muslim groups (Turks and Roma) expressed little concern; only 2% were worried about Macedonian or Albanian nationalism. However, their concern over the negative mfluence of political parties and the underdeveloped level of political culture of all groups was far greater. In 1993, 86% of the Albanians polled considered themselves second-class citizens. Among the youngest age-group 25% a quarter rejected this notion, as did those who voted for parties other than the PDP. By 1994 this figure had fallen significantly: only 42% of the Albanians saw themselves as second-class citizens. For the Roma the figure was 35%, while the Turks did not consider this an issue at all. On the other hand, respondents were much more aware of the misuse of ethnic questions by political groups: 89% of Macedoman and 96% of Albanian respondents made this observation explicitly. How did different groups perceive their relationship to state institutions? Did they feel discrimmated agamst in political or legal practice? Here the 1994 results again indicate that the Albanians ' in particular feel themselves more at odds with the state than the I) other Muslim b'TOUPS. Of Albanian respondents, 87% felt themselves discriminated against, compared to half the Roma respondents and only 4% of the Turks. On state protectIOn of the varIOUS nationalitles, 35% of the Albanians and Turks, and half of the Roma, felt that it had increased since the state became independent. Conversely, a quarter of the Albanians thought that the state was disloyal to them on educational issues,lH and 35% felt the same on foreign policy Issues. Roma and Turks were more concerned

i

17 At the time of this poll Macedonia still experienced many difficulties in gaining recognition from the international community - for many an added source of frustrations and anxiety.

1R It should be noted that the poll was conducted before the vexed question of an 'Albanian University' ll1 Tetovo which the authorities declared illegal. had come to the fore (late 1994-early 1995). The authOrities reacted to the attempted establishment of this uIllversity by forcibly closing it, resulting in the death of 1 Albaman protester and the arrest, trial and impnsonment on charges of incitement to violence of some leading Albanian academICS, including the would-be 'rector' of the univerSIty. The 'university' has continued in pnvate houses. along the lines of the 'underground' Kosovo parallel Albanian educational system -sec Chapter 8. It seems certain in the afterll1ath of these events that more Albanians feel that the state discriminates against them 111 educational matters.

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about local government (65 and 56% respectively had grievances concerning state discrimination). They also paid more attention to the mechanisms of rights protection. Three-quarters of both Albanian and Turkish respondents and 96% of Roma held the state to be the most important institution for protecting their rights. In the 1993 poll, Macedonians expressed preference for the following political parties: 19(Yc) for VMRO-DPMNE; 22% for the SDU; 7% for the Liberal Party; 4% for the Socialist party, and 4% for the League for Democracy. Many (28%) expressed no particular preference, and the remainder supported other, smaller parties. The number of politically undecided Macedonians rose sharply in 1994 to 42%, while support for the smaller insignificant parties dropped away completely. Only VMRO-DPMNE and the SDS recorded the same levels of support 111 1994 as in 1993. The Liberals dropped to 5% while the newly-appeared Democratic Party recorded 12%.19 The Albanians showed much greater homogeneity in their political afEliatlOns, especially in 1993 when 91 % supported the PDP, with 7% politically undecided and only 1.2% supporting the Social-Democrats. In 1994 PDP support dropped slightly to 77%, while the politically undecided grew to 13%. The Liberal Union of Albanians (the other ma111 Albanian party 111 Macedonia before the oplit in the PDP in 1994) was supported by 6%, and the Social Democrats and Liberals by 2% each. Half of the Turks supported the Turkish Democratic Party, 38% were undecided, 8% supported the SOCIal Democrats, and the Liberal and Democratic parties were supported by 2% each. Of the Roma 46% supported the main Roma party - the Party for Complete Emancipation of Roma; 10% supported the smaller Roma Democratic Party, 4% supported the Social Democrats, and 40% were politically undecided. No groups felt the need to create informal citizens' associatIOns to protect their community members. The Turks and Roma (95% of each) were most emphatic in this view; of the Albanians three19 This party was fonned on 17 May 1993 by fonner Pmne Minister Petar Goshev. who left the SDS, and was joined by the veteran human rights legal expert Georgi MarijanovlC's League of Democracy. and the Green Party. The new party was expected to do much better in the November 1994 electIOns (which came after the 1994 opinion poll) than it actually did. The November 1994 elections were boycotted by VMRO-DPMNE.

171e Mtlslim Populatioll in FYROM: Public Perceptions

113

quarters thought there was no such need, a view not shared by a quarter. In considering the Albanian population in FYROM, one must always bear in mind the crucial and determining role of the PDP, With which the Albamans show more solidarity than other groups do with their respective ma111 political grOUp111gS. Thus 111 exam111111g the Albanians attitudes on a particular issue one should first determine the PDP party opinion, which is likely to be their overwhelm111g majority opinion. However, tl11S state of affairs has changed somewhat since the splitting off of a radical section of the PDP 111 February 1994. 20 The 'national homogeneity' shown by the Albanians has not been as pronounced among the Turks or the Roma. For the Albanians the ethmc question - their position as a group within the state - overrides most others, and there is still no real ideological differentiation among the Albanian political groupings. These see themselves as the political representatives of Albanians from all walks of life, regardless of class or circumstances. 21 In addition, the situatIOn of Albamans in neighbouring Albania and Serbia (Kosovo) has a significant influence and impact on the PDP's strategic and political demands. In tim the youngest Albanian respondents, as well as those in mixed marriages or who support mainstream political groupings other than the solely Albanian ones (and to some extent also those who live in urban areas), seem to have begun to accommodate more with FYROM than the rema111111g majority of Macedonia's Albanians. This is reflected in their readier acceptance of fifteen years continuous residence as a conditIOn for citizenship and identity cards made out in Macedonian with Albaman forms 111 brackets, and a greater sympathy for the state institutions. However, as , might be expected, those who live 111 villages are less open to I " the Idea of full integration with the new state. One of the aims of the polls and the research based on them was to find out how far religious feeling can modifY significant inherited ethnic attitudes. As the widely varying results show, Islalu appears incapable at present of fully overcoming the primary 111fluence of ethnicity. Albanians feel aggrieved and discnminated 20

See H. Poulton, Who lire the Macedolllillls? pp. 189-90.

TIllS IS nurrored in Kosovo, where the Democratic League ofKosovo (LDK) plays a SImilar 'umbrella' role for Albanians -see Chapter 8.

21

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Natasha Gaber

against because they are ethnically Albanian. In contrast the Turks, being more homogeneously Islamic than the Albanians, feel least sense of discrim1l1ation against them - considerably less than even the majority Macedolllans. The results also show no dear demarcation of attitudes between Orthodox Christian and Muslim Roma; thus their feelings of discrimination are based not on religious factors but primarily on ethnic ones. Similarly, the main political groupings of all the Islamic communities in FYROM couch their programmes and demands in purely secular terms; ethnicity rather than religIOn is seen as the major £1ctOr. Hence, one cannot speak of the Muslim population in FYROM as a coherent whole contrasted with the Orthodox Christian community, which is itself ethlllcally divided between Macedolllans, Serbs and Vlachs, all of whom have widely differIng views on the basic political questions £1cing the new state.

7 ISLAM, STATE AND SOCIETY IN POST-COMMUNIST ALBANIA Nathalie Clayer Albania stands out among all the Balkan countries for two reasons. First, the Muslims there form a majority, and secondly, for an entire generation from 1967 to 1991 it was the only atheistic state in the world. 1 By the end of approximately half a millennium of Ottoman occupation, some 70 per cent of the population of Albania - within its present boundaries - had embraced Islam. 2 However, only four-fifths of these adopted the Sunni faith; the rema1l11l1g fifth belonged to the heterodox and syncretic Bektashi order of dervishes,3 which in the twentieth century became a 1 The situation in China, where religious activities were banned in 1957-77, was not very different from that in Albania. However. from 1967 Albania was officially the only country upholding a constitution that actually proclaimed atheism. 2 As far as the conversion proccss is concemed. It IS important to note that it was not completed immediately aftcr the conquest of thesc regions as is often supposed. In fact the process continued until the end of the Ottoman occupation. with most conversions taking place during the 17th. 18th and 19th centuries (cf. Halil tnalclk, 'Amavutluk', Encyclopaedia cif Islalll. 2nd edn, s.v.J.

Bektashism is not an offshoot of Shiism. as is often suggested. but a Sufi order (an Islamic mystical brotherhood). Its saint-founder was Haci Bckta~ (d.c. 1270 in Central Anatolia), but the order's organiser was Balim Sultan (d. 1516), who introduced the rule of celibacy adopted by a part of the 'clergy'. Bektashism is a syncretic doctrine based on the Turcoman hctcrdox faith and influenced by Kalendarism (a movement inspired by the Indian and Iranian mystics) and by Melamctism. the doctrine of blame. At the beginning of the 16th ccntury under Sa£wid influence. Bektashism adopted a new and strongly Shiite and Sufi character. With the passage of time and according to regions where it sprcad, Bektashism also incorporated other element~ (see John Kingsley Birge. The Bektashi Order of Dervishes. London: Luzac, 1956: Frederick De Jong, 'The iconography of Bektashiism: A survey of themes and symbolism in clerical costume. liturgical objects and pictorial art'. MatlHscripts of tile Middle East. 4. Leiden: Ter Lugt Press. 1989. pp. 7-29: and more particularly. on Bektashism in Albania. F.W, Hasluck. Christianity and Islam IInder the Sultans. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1929: Baba Rexhebi. MisticizlIla lslallle dlle Bektasllizllla. New York: Walden Press:

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Nathalie Clayer

Islam, state alld society ill ]lost-Commullist Alba/lia

significant rival to the Albanian Sunni community. This is an important particularity of Albanian Islam. Since the end of 1990, following the collapse of the Communist regime, relit,>1on has reappeared in this small and long isolated country, drawing the attention of many observers in neighbounng countries as well as more distant ones, and attracting nUlnerous missionaries of various persuasions. It has also created a debate within Albanian society over the country's place in Europe and the Muslim world, and the internal question of the relationship between religious and national identities. . This chapter first considers briefly the main characteristics of Islam in the Albanian state before 1967. Thereafter, it reviews the material and spiritual reconstmction of the Muslim Communities 4 since 1990, focusing finally on (i) the relationslup between these Communitles and the state, and (ii) the relationship between religious and national identities.

Albanian society experienced no profound change after the end of Ottoman domination until the Commul1lst take-over. Ethnically Albania is homogeneous, with more than 95 per cent of the population ethnic Albanians. The officially recognised Ininorities are the Greeks concentrated in the south (approximately 60,000 strong\ Macedonians, Serbs and Montenegrins. In addition there are Vlachs and Roma. 6 However, this apparent ethnic uniformity is complicated by the two ethnic sub-groups to which Albanians actually belong: the Ghegs in the north and the Tosks in the south, the approximate line of demarcation between them being the Shkumbi river, which flows through Elbasan. The Ghegs and the Tosks differ from each other in linguistic, historical-cultural and socio-religious characteristics. 7 The religious composition of post-Ottoman Albania is often asserted to have been 70 per cent Muslims (dispersed throughout the country), 20 per cent Orthodox Christians living in the south of the country and 10 per cent Catholics in the north. H However,

117

Islam in the Albania/1 state up to 1967 To understand the case of Albania it is necessary to highlight aspects of its history in the twentieth century, as well as features of its soclety and the organisation of the Muslim Communities up to the time of their banning 111 1967. Established only in 1912-13, the Albanian state rema111S young. In the 1920s it acqmred a fragile stability, which was later consolidated in the Commul1lst period after the Second Word War. Since 1990 the Albanian people have been emerging from one of the most Stalil1lst of the Communist regimes, with almost no experience of democracy. After the mpture with China in 1978, the country became isolated politically and economically. Unlike the other Balkan countries, which implemented agrarian reforms immediately after their emancipation from the Ottoman empire, such reforms were implemented only with the introduction of CommUl1lst collectivisation. Hence

and Nathalie Clayer, L'Albatlie, pa),s des dcnJ/ches, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1990, pp. 35 tI). " I use 'Community' (with a capital letter) for the organisational II1frastructure of a community (With a small letter), mcanmg here a group of people of the same belief.

5 The figures given by some Greek sources are much higher (up to 400,000 persons). Such figures also include Orthodox Albanians who are claimed to be Greek because of their religIOn. (, Peter llartl. 'Die Albaner' in Micheal Weithmann (cd.), Der Yflhelosc Balkall Munich: DTV, 1993, p. 180. According to some estimates, the Vlachs are more numerous than the Greeks (Nicolas Trifon, 'Les Aroumains, un cas de figure national atypique dans les llalkans' in Mate! Cazacu and Nicolas Trifon (eds), La Moldarlic cx-soflietiql/C, Paris: Acratie, Collection Cahier d'Iztok, nos 2-3, 1992, p. 214.)

See, for example, Georg Stadtmiiller, 'Landschaft und Geschichte im albanisch-eplrotischen Raum', Rcvuc ltltematiollale des Etf/des Balkalliqflcs,llelgrade, 1938, year 3, vol. II (6), pp. 345-70. Arshi Pipa, in his Albatliall Stalillislll; idco-political aspccts (East European Monographs, lloulder, CO, 1990, p. 43), writes: 'The distll1ction between Ghegs and Tosks has some importance 111 Albanian hIstory, dating back to the time when the dividing line between the Roman and llyzantine empires passed through the country. This, more than the religIOUS difference, explains why there has always been some friction between the Ghegs and Tosks.' 8 In ['lct the last statistics for the distribution of the Albanian population by religion date from 1942. Exact figures are given in Stavro Skendi (ed.), AI/Jania, New York: Praeger, 1956, p. 58; and Alexandre Popovic, L'islam iJlllkalliqllc, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1986, p. 38. llesides the Muslims, Orthodox Christians and Catholics, there were also a few Jews (200-300) who left Albania for Israel in 1990-1, and a few Protestants (c. 1.000) (see P. llartl. 'Religionsgemeinschaften und Kirchen' in Klaus-Devlet Grothausen (ed.), Allianieu,

7

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Islam, state and society ill post-Communist Albania

these percentages do not reflect the distinction between Sunnis and Bektashis among the Muslims. Considering the profound differences between them, it would be more accurate to say that the population of post-Ottoman Albania comprised about 55 per cent Sunni Muslims, 20 per cent Orthodox Christians, 15 per cent Bektashis and 10 per cent Catholics. Hence just over half were Sunni Muslims. An analysis of the population's religious composition by ethnic sub-group reveals that in the north the Ghegs were predominantly Sunm Muslims and Catholics, while in the south the two main religious affiliations of the Tosks were Bektashism and Orthodox Christianity. Besides Bektashism, it should be noted that other Sufi orders (in particular the Halvetiyya, but also the Kadiriyya, Ri£,'iyya, Sa'diyya and Tijaniyya) were represented throughout the country, giving Albanian Islam a distinctive 'colour', most notably 111 the north-east (Tropoje, Kukes, Lume) and south.') Two important factors arise in relation to the organisation of the religious Communities in the newly constituted Albania. First, the new state opted to have no proclaimed official religion. Secondly, the civil code was adopted in 1928. In this context three 'national churches', independent of the state but increasingly controlled by it, were instItuted: the Christian Orthodox Church, which proclaimed itself autocephalous in 1922 but was not recognised by the Istanbul Patriarchate till 1937; the Sunni Muslim Community, which declared itself independent of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1923; and the Bektashis, who were driven towards independence by the abolition of the dervish orders in Turkey 111 1925. Uniquely, the Albanian Catholic Church mainta111ed close ties abroad, with the VatIcan. lO Where the Muslims are concerned, two important developments should be noted. First, leadership of the Sunni Muslim Community from the end of the

1920s was prOVIded by reformers,ll and secondly, the Bektashi Order acquired de facto the status of a full-fledged and distinct religious Community with its own statutes and organisation, despite remaining officially attached to the Sunni Muslim Community till 1945. 12 Finally, the additional dervish orders referred to above held several congresses in the new Albanian state, establishing two distinct organisations within the Muslim Conmmnity around 1936.13 The Communist take-over of Albania at the end of 1944 produced serious consequences for the religious conununities. While all religious activities were banned in 1967 during the so-called 'cultural revolutIOn', the authorities had been fighting against them since 1944. Many clerics from all religious persuasions were sent to jailor killed, lands and goods belonging to the communities were confiscated, many religious schools were closed, and the liberty of the press was suppressed. Under these conditions

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Gottingen. 1993 (Siidostcllropa-HalldIJllch voL VII), p. 587; and DOCtlIltClltatiollr4fi~l!ies) Supplement an no. 151, 27 June!6 July 1991). <) See Nathalie Clayer. L'Albatlie. p. 124 ff.; and concerning the Halvetiyya m particular. N. Clayer. Mystiques. etat et societe. Lcs Halvetis dilllS I'"irc balkatliqlle de la Jill dtl XVe sieele a IlOS jours. Leiden: EJ. Brill. 1994. 10 C( Roberto Morozzo della Rocca. Naz;ollC c rd(\IioIIC ill Alballia (1920-1944), Bologna: II Mulino. 1990; P, Bartl. 'Religionsgemeinschaften·. p. 587 ff.; A. POPOVIC. Vis/alii valka/l;quc. p. 11 ff.; and N. Clayer, L'AllJlluic. p. 178.

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11 The refonll or reformIst trend. which called for a restructuring of the Community. reform of the tIlcdrcscs and abolition of the veil. IS clearly eVIdent in the pages of the Community's journals: Zani i llillti' (The Supreme Voice. 1923-1939) and Kllltlira Islillltc (Islamic Culture. 1939-1946). The influence of the Ahmadiyya Society (Ahmadiyya Andjuman). based in Lahore. was particularly important in this respect: some of the young Muslim leaders of the 1940s had studied III Lahore after completing their course at Tirana's tIlcdrcsc. Prior to the Second World War. tillS Society reflected a stance that was quite different from that of the more numerous Ahmadiyya Community ofKadiyan (the Kadiyanis). Under the leadership of Mawlana Muhammad Ali. the Andjuman regarded the movement's founder, Ghulam Ahmad. as a revIver of the f.lith (1IlIijilddid) , and f.1Voured promotion of modern intellectual liberalism in Islam. In contrast. the Kadiyanis regarded the founder as a prophet. and were more traditionalists and devouts (see W. Cantel! Smith. 'Ahmadiyya'. Ellcyclopcdia cif Islalll. 2nd edn. s.v.). It should be noted that two Albanian students who wished to pursue their studies at the Al-Azhar University in Cairo were temporarily expelled in 1939 on account of their Ahmadiyya beliefs: see A. Popovic. L'Islallt l)(/Ikalliqllc. p.39. 12 The Bektashl order naturally became established as a religious community at the beginning of the 20th century. insofar as children of Bektashi people were automatically becommg Bektaslus. Today people with Bektashi parents or grandparents indeed consider themselves to be of Bektashl origin.

13 The first one was called Drita HyjlLOrc (The Divine Light), and brought together the Kadiris. the Rifa·is. the Sa'dis and the Tijanis. The second one was under the leadership of the Krycsija c ScktCflc AICflijml (DirectIOn of the Alevi Orders), but encompassed only the powerful order of the Halvetis together with two other 'very small' orders: the Djelvetis and the Giilshenis.

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it was only at home and in secret that the religious traditions - Muslim as well as ChrIStian - could be preserved and transmItted. With the death of Enver Hoxha 111 1985, indications of a degree of relaxation in the government's fight aga1l1st religion began to appear,14 notably in 1988-9 when several Albaman Catholic pnests, the head of the Albanian Muslim Comumnity in the United States and Mother Teresa were all allowed to visit the country. IS In November 1990, responding to external and internal pressures, President Ramiz Alia finally granted liberty of religion, along with certain other reforms. In the same month the first Catholic church and the first mosque were reopened in the northern city of Shkoder. Thus began a period of material and spiritual reconstruction for all religious communities in Albania, and for the Muslim ones in particular.

and the Community itself was reconstituted 111 February 1991 under the leadership of the seventy-year-old Hafiz Sabri Kor;:i, Attempts were immediately made to establish contact WIth Muslim organisations abroad, in the hope of obtaining matenal and spiritual assistance .16 At the time of writing, thanks to the efforts of the early 1990s, and the assistance of the Muslim world, several hundred mosques - restored or newly built - function across the country. Ten medreses (Muslim schools) have been opened, accommodating some 1,500 pupils; a body of religiOUS personnel has been reconstitued; some 300 young Albanians are studying abroad in various Muslim countries; several hundred thousand copies of the Quran have been distributed; two or three Muslim newspapers have been established; and a network of associations for Muslim youth, women and intellectuals has been created. Superficially the picture appears positive, especially given the difficult economIC and social context. However, certain significant realitles must he taken into account. First and foremost is near-total financial dependence of the Albanian Sunni Muslim Community on the Muslim world. 17 Earlier sources of income such as vakJ revenues, government allocations and gifts or donations 18 are either nonexistent or negligible. The confiscated vakJ properties have not yet been returned since there has still been no vote on the law concerning religious communities (see below), and the state itself is too poor to subsidise the religious communities. Consequently, during the first two years of resumed actIvity, 90 per cent of the budget, came from external help, while only 10 per cent was provIded by the Albanian Sunni

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The Muslim communities in Albania since 1990: material and spiritual recol'lstruction Since 1990 all the religious communities in Albania have confronted the same problems: rebuilding or restonng places of worship; installing qualified functionaries; winmng the population back to religlOn and reviving theIr £'uth. Among the Muslim population the Sunni Muslims, the Bektashi and other dervish brotherhoods must be considered separately, since their circumstances and positions on the twofold Issue of matenal and spiritual reconstruction are very dissimilar.

The Stll111i Muslim Community. The reopening of the Xhal1lija e plu/nhit (Leader Mosque) 111 Shkoder on 16 November 1990 marked the start of the revival of Sunni Islam in Albania, Soon afterwards, two other mosques reopened in Shijak and Berat. On 18 January 1991, the one of Edhem Beu in the centre of Tirana was restored to service 111 the presence of several thousand people Louis Zanga, 'Albania'. Radio Free Europe Research, RAD 13R/139, 1 October 1986. 15 Cf. Bull. AFP 101347 March 1989; Fmlces Tnx, 'The resurf.'1cing of Islam in Albania', East Europcall Quartcrly, vol. XXVIII, no. 4, January 1995, pp. 533-49 (see p. 538). Mother Teresa, an Albaman born in Skopje (Macedonia), even met Enver Hoxha's widow and other offiCials. 14

1(, On 15 February 1991 a letter was sent by the lcaders of thc Commumty to the Gencral Secretary of thc Organisation of the Islamic Confercnce (OIC), asking whether Albama might join. In the letter Hafiz Sabri KO\,I, Salih Ferhati (the Great Mufti) and Salih Tivari (the secretary of the Community) also thanked a Dubai busll1cssman and a Palestllllan who had been livll1g in Albania for twenty years 'for the great efforts they have made for several years and arc still maklllg in order to spread and restore the IslamiC religIOn as well as to unite and organise the Muslims in our country', In the late 1980s attempts had already been made to establish relations between the Muslim Community and the Arab countries (cf. Gyorgy Lederer, 'Islam in Albania', Central Asiatl Survey, vol. 133, 19'i4, p. 347-8.) 17 The phenomenon of dependency on external sources is also tme for the Orthodox and the Catholic Churches 111 Albama. IH C[ A. PopOVic, Cislalll lwlkcllliqlle, p. 66.

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Muslim population itsel(19 External help, which has typically been earmarked for specific uses, came from a variety ofsources, including Muslim states (mainly Arab countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Libya, but also Turkey and Malaysia); Muslim Communities of these and other states (particularly those of Maced om a, Kosovo and Turkey and the Albanian Muslim Community of the United States); private individuals, especially of Albanian origin, living abroad; and national or international Muslim organisations and associations generally based in Arab countries -including the OIC, the Gami'tyat al-islah alKuwaittya, Rabitat al- 'A lam al-Islanzi, al-l1Iajlis al-' alami /ida'wa alislfimtya based in Tripoli, and the International Islamic Relief Organisation (Hay' at al-{r;atha al-islal1ltya al-' alamtya) based in Saudi ArabIa - but also in Turkey (some valifs) and in Europe and in the United States. The last group included the predominantly Turkish Muslim Association of Frankfurt in Germany, the Stichting Alouakf Islami in the Netherlands, the Islamic Relief Association of Birmingham, England, and the International Islamic Charity Project of the United States. By the beginning of 1993 fourteen such associations had opened offices in Tirana. 20 Their contributions generally take the form of financial support for the building of mosques, grants for Albanian students, gifts of Qurans and Islamic literature, and the provision of religious functIOnaries and officials for mosques, medreses and the central organs of the Community. In addition, humanitarian and cultural dimensions also represent an important feature of the aid to Albania provided by Muslim countries. Since 1990 It has become clear that the multiplicity of parties involved can lead to difficulties in achieving an effective organisation of the Community's activities. Time has also revealed a preference in the assIgnment of personnel for Albanians from Kosov0 21 and Macedonia, largely because of their linguistic compatibility. While practical considerations such as language are taken into account, potential donors, involved as they are in the process of

'reconstmction', still lack a complete and precise picture of the Albanian situation. For example, are the numerous new mosques actually being used? What is the level of qualification of theIr functionaries? What IS the standard of education given in the new medreses? Can all the students sent abroad be expected to join the ranks of the religious personnel in the future? And so , on. The reopening of mosques does not necessarily imply large congregations, and after the enthusiasm of the first months, mosque attendance has generally been quite low. As for the other religious communities, the main problem faced by the Sunni Muslim CommUI1lty has been to remobilise the population. After fifty years of Communist mle (during twenty of which religion could not be practised openly), significant numbers are either atheist or, while retaining their faith, do not attend places of worship. Only people over sixty and certain families have kept the tradition alive. 22 Some analysts aq,'11e that one should expect a hIgher percentage of atheists among people of Muslim origin than of Christian origin, both Orthodox and Catholic, and while this assertion is difficult to verify it appears to be tme. The mufti of Kavaje, Muhamed Hoxha (an Albaman from Kosovo), commented in an interview reported 111 the journal of the Muslim Community of Kosovo:

19 Cf. Drifa /slamc, no. 7 (32), May 1993, p.

1. The total budget for this period (between 14 February 1991 and 15 May 1993) amounted to about $157,000. 20 Illid.

By June 1995 Albania had three muftis from Kosovo, in Kavaje, Girokaster and Vlora. 21

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The situation in Albania today is exactly like that 111 the tIme of the Prophet: most of the so-called Muslims are practIcally pagan, havmg believed in idols, like Enver and the Party. A strong will and continuous effort are required to get them out of this period of idolatry.23

Consequently the young - a very high percentage of the population 24 - are now targeted by all the religious missions. Through the l1ledreses it is intended not so much to produce the religious personnel needed in the country but to create active members oflocal Muslim communities (djemaats). The standard of education See for example the article by Muhamed Xhoi (Drifa /slame, no. 11 (54), August 1994. pp. 1-4). The author also mentions the problem of competition in the field of religiOUS propaganda. acknowledging the greater efficiency of the Christian misslOnanes. 22

Dill/ria Islallle. Pnstma. XI. no. 69. June 1995. p. 47, At the end of the 1980s more than half of the Albanian population was under twenty-four years old.

23 24

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and the material conditions in these schools, are often poor. And among the young boys and girls sent to Muslim countries on educational programmes about 70 per cent are unable to pursue their religious studies because of lack of motIvation. Thus the creation and successful preparation ofindigenous religious personnel appears a distant prospect. Since 1990 the revival of Albaman Sunni Islam has shown certain significant geographical disparities, in contrast with preCommunist Albania. For example, the process of mosque and medrese open111g appears to have been initiated and is now strongest in the city of Shkoder in the north and in the Tirana-DurresKavaje triangle in the centre of the country - in other regions It IS proceeding much more slowly. In addition, more than half of the 3,000 copies of the Community's newspaper Drita Islal11e (The Islamic Light) are distributed in Shkocier, where the inauguration in the mid-1990s of one of the largest mosques 111 the Balkans provIdes confirmation that it has become the country's leading centre of Sunm Islam. TIllS leading position has consequences for the character of revived Albanian Sunni Islam as a whole, which appears to tend towards a conservative and orthodox line under the guidance of certain IIlellla of the Shkoder 'school'. However, before the Second World War reform tendencies had predominated within the Muslim Community as a whole. Hafiz Sabri Ko~i, the incumbent Great Mufti and himself a product of the conservative Shkoder school, recently commented to an English newspaper:

contacts with representatives of strongly orthodox trends in the Muslim world. TIllS is shown 111 a problem that arose over the distribution of an edition of the Quran in 1992. Its foreword by Ahmed Raif in Cairo contained the following passage:

'Shkoder is also famous for its Islamic scholarship. Indeed it was the only institution in Albal1la wll1ch provided high-level education in Arabic and Islamic Studies. There was no question; if ~ou wanted to be a s scholar of Islam, Shkoder was the place to be.-

This perspective remains partial, however, especially gIven that the main Islamic educational institution 111 Albama was the General Medrese in Tirana. When Hafiz Sabri Ko~i was a student, this medrese was under the influence of a more modermst and reformIst group, and thus was not hIghly regarded by the conservative Islamic school of Shkoder. This conservative Shkoder line is currently reinforced through

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The Albanians have got rid of the communists. Then came another Wicked devil, the devil of [Chnstianl evangelisatlOn ItalJshir]. It IS 111dispensable for us, along With our brothers among the sons of the Muslim peoples, to offer stout and serious resistance to tIl1S. It is the duty of evelY Muslim to be active in produc1l1g Islamic books, publications and copies of the Koran 111 order to link the people's present With their glOriOUS past so that one day the believers could rejoice in God's trIump I1. 26 >

Public op111ion in Albania thought these comments too aggressive and as a result the Muslim Community leaders felt obliged to tear out the ofrending page. The orthodox trend now 111 the ascendant naturally has significant repercussions for the Bektashi Community and the other dervish brotherhoods in Albama. Sufi Islam IS currently seen negatively by most of the Sunni Community's religious personnel, who would like to see a unified homogeneous Muslim community. In spIte of this, the Sufi brotherhoods are making efforts to reorganise themselves.

The Bektashi COll1l11rmity. Albanian Bektashis encounter more difficulties than the Sunnis 111 their efforts to reorganise themselves. Unlike the latter, they do not enjoy the benefits of material and spmtual support from abroad, largely because of the situation of Bektashism globally. A few Bektashi groups survive among the Albanians in Kosovo, Macedonia, the United States and Turkey where they form a small section of the larger Turkish Bektashi community together with an Important community of Alevis who share many belie£~ and practices with them. However, since the end of the nineteenth century Albanian BektashlSIu has pursued 26 G. Ledcrcr. 'Islam', p. 349, aftcr KtI,.'a/l-i, Pi;,.kthilll IIIC kOlllclltilll (Perkthcu dhe KomcntOl: H. Shcrif Ahmcti), EI-Zahra per informacionin Arab. In the European press the passagc was often mistranslated as follows: 'You have fought against COll1muIl1sm. You have now to pursue the jihad against the Christians' Hcnce it was takcn as a call to jihad agamst Christians (cf. L'C/l~'1CIIIC/lt dtl jctldi, Paris, 25 Novembcr-1 Dcccmber 1993. p. 50.) >

Cf. Q IWWS. 3-10 December 1993, p. 5. I am grateful to Prof. H.T. Norris for providing a copy of this article. 25

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its own path, which is qUIte different from that of Bektashism in Turkey.27 Hence, the leaders of the Community in Albania can rely only on the contributions of private individuals or collectivities among Albanian Bektasllls at home, in Kosovo, Macedonia and Turkey, and in the Albanian diaspora in America or Australia. 2H However, assistance has been offered by Iran. While it would be unthinkable for the Arab countries or Turkey (which does not favour its Alevi minority) to provide aid to as unorthodox an expression of Islam as Bektashism, Iran's attempt to win over Bektashis and members of other dervish orders is unsurpnsing. At the end of 1993 and early in 1994, the representative of Albania's communities were invited to visit Iran. During their short stay Dede Reshat Bardhi (the new head of the Bektasl1lS) and Baba B3Jram (another Bektaslu baba residing 111 Tirana) obta111ed grants for students and probably some financial aid for their Community as a whole from the Iraman authorities.2~ Nevertheless this aid appears to have been limited, since no significant change is observable in the Community's situation. Its leaders continue to demand the long-awilited restitution of the Community's confiscated properties, which in the past were its main source of income. 3o As a consequence of this lack of material and spiritual resources,

few Bektashi tekkes are functIOning; of some SIxty which existed in the past, only five or six have reopened. The first of these was the main tekke (or Krye,giyshata) in Tirana, the opening of which was celebrated on 22 March 1992 (four months after the inauguration of the first mosque in Shkoder). The few SurVIV111g babas (who, along with dedes, are the leaders and instructors of derVIshes) and dervishes were assigned to other tekkes - in FusheKruje, Elbasan, Kors;e, Koshtan (in the Mallakastra regIOn), Girokaster, and later also 111 Kruje Kulmak (Mount Tomor), Martanesh and Nepravishte. However, the requirement for religious personnel continues to be a grave problem. The remaining 'clergy' are not hIghly qualified. Baba Rexhebi, the most learned of the babas and Honorary Head of the Community, died in the summer of 1995 111 his tekke near Detroit. To complicate matters, the initiation and traimng of new dervishes reqUIre a nlll1lmum of three years. AspIrants, who to date have been few, must serve in a tekke for years before they may become dervishes, celibate derVIshes (myxheret) and then babas. 31 Such difficulties notwithstanding, the Albanian Bektaslll Community took an important step towards reorganisation by convening the 'Sixth World Bektaslll Congress' in Tirana on 19-20 July 1993,32 Albanian delegates from all regions of the country, as well as from Kosovo, Macedonia, Turkey and the United States confirmed the revival of Albanian Bektashism. New statutes were elaborated,33 but the main subject of discussion was the defil1ltion ofBektashism: should it be considered a Commul1lty ('ko/1lunitet' in Albanian), i,e. an organisation independent of the Sunni Muslim Community, or simply a dervish order ('sekte') withil1 the Sunni Muslim Community? In line with historical traditIOn, the first optIon was adopted by the vast n1aJonty of the assembly. This outcome certainly has important implications for the future of Islam 111 Albania. Estimates of how many of the Bektashi population throughout the country have been re-mobilised are difficult to obtain. In

27 At the end of the nineteenth century the Albanian Bektashis integrated a nationalist component Il1to their doctrine while the Turkish Bektashis were close to the Young Turk movement. On this subject sec Nathalie Clayer, 'Bektachisme et natlonalisme albanais' in A. Popovic and G. Veinstein (cds), Bektclliyya. Istanbul: ISIS. 1995. pp. 277-307. The new leaders of the Albal1lan Bektashi Commul1lty have made contact with Bedri Noyan. head of the Bektasl1ls in Turkey and even vIsited him there to receive a llil
30 Evidence of the poor material means of the Bektashi Community lies in

the f:lCt that the 13ektashi journal Urti'sia (The Wisdom), which was launched December 1993, had to stop after its third issue (April 1994).

U1

127

These arc 3 of the successive degrees of the Bektashi hierarchy (sec N. Clayer. 'L'Albal1le', p. 47 fn. 32 The 5th congress was held in Tirana in 1950. 31

33 These have been published under the title Statllti

i KO//IIlllitctit Bektaslziall. Tirana: Shtyp. 'Gjergj Fishta', 1993.28 pp. Internal regulations were also published at the same time (Rn:~lIlorc c brclldcslllllC c KO//Ill/litctit Bcktaslziml, Tirana: Shtyp. 'GjergJ Fishta', 1993. 28 pp.).

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many places, Uirbes (tombs of saints) are being restored or rebuilt34 and comnl1ttees of lay members have been formed to assume responsibility for future activities of this nature. However, it is notable that Bektashi activities are more intense 111 the north of the country, and there is a slight predominance of northerners among the leaders; the Commul1lty's two main figures are Dede Reshat Bardhi (the overall head or Krye,gjysh) and Baba Selim (the baba of Fushe-Kruje), both of whom are from the north. This IS significant because in the past Bektasl1lSm was always dom111ated by the southern Tosks. As for relations between the Bektashi Community and the other dervish orders, the new statutes contain an article stipulating that the Bektashi Community can accept 111 ItS bosom other dervIsh orders, like the Halvetis, Rifa'is and Kadiris. However, this clearly does not hinder these orders from attempting to reorganise themselves separately.

opportunity to acquire the necessary knowledge and experience. Furthermore the Sufi orders, much more than the Sunni and Bektashi communities, have sufl:ered and continue to suffer from the upheavals experienced by Albanian society as a whole. Wherever they settled, the dervish brotherhoods assumed an important role not only in the religious life of the people but also in theIr social, economic and at times even political life. The emergence of new powers and social forces makes it unlikely that they will soon regain the social position they occupied in the past. Even though numerous tr:irbes are being at least partly rebuilt throughout Albania by the families ofshaikhs, and some descendants of former shaikhs have declared themselves shaikhs, are producing amulets and have sent one of their children to study in a medrese at home or abroad, the activity of the dervIsh brotherhoods remains limited. The Halvetiyya, which in the past was the most widespread among the Albanian dervish orders with about 150 tekkes in the north-east, central region and south, is vIrtually without any establishment where the ritual (zikr) can be performed. The head of this order in Tirana attempted to re-establish an organisation such as existed in the past to assemble all the dervish orders, but the attempt failed because of a clash of interests. The Rifa'iyya is much more active. This order expanded relatively late - I l l the 1920s -111 the west of Albania from Shkoder to Vlore. Its current revival is due largely to the efforts of the enterprising Sheh Xhemali, the Albanian Rifa'i shaikh of Prizren (in Kosovo) and head of the ZIDRA (Community of the Dervish Orders of Yugoslavia), who has appointed shaikhs in Tirana, Shkoder and elsewhere. The Kadiriyya, which had about twenty-five tekkes 111 central Albania, notably in Tirana and the Peshkopi-Zerqan region, is barely active. The Sa'diyya, which had only a few tekkes in the southern region of Tepelen and in the extreme northern Tropoje region, has succeeded in re-establishing some representatives in the latter area; these are connected with the Sa' dis of Djakovica in Kosovo. The Tijaniyya, the order closest to the ulel1la before the Second World War, is represented today by the mufti of Shkoder, Faik Hoxha, son of the former head of the Tijaniyya order, Qazim Hoxha. As the case of the Ri£1'iyya demonstrates, the only real chance for the dervIsh brotherhoods to reconStitute their networks comes

The dervish brotherhoods In the past the derVIsh orders or derVIsh brotherhoods were much in evidence and enjoyed a widespread presence in the daily life of many Albanian Muslims. Today these orders, and especially the Halvetiyya, Kadiriyya, Ri£1'iyya, Sa'diyya and Tijaniyya, face a difficult situatIon. Like other religious Communitles, the orders experience economic problems in their endeavours to restore and rebuild theIr places of worshIp (tekkes and tiirbes).35 They also confront a grave problem over the creation of future leaders, i.e. new shaikhs. Transmission of the mystical tradition was almost universally broken in the Communist period,36 and as a result the descendants of former shaikhs have had no 34 The restoratIon of the two main Uektashi pilgrimages sites. Sari Saltik on

the top of the Kruja Mountam and that of Abbas Ali on the top of the Tomor (south of Uerat) constitutes a significant action aiming at the re-mobilisation of the Uektashis around the two symbolically most important sites for their community. A reference was made above to the viSIt to Iran of several members of vanous dervish orders. along with the Uektashi representatives. Although it IS probable that they did receive some financial help. it seems that as for the Uektashis. it was not large. 35

Certain of the most prominent shaikhs were killed at the beginning of the Communist period. sometimes simultaneously with their eldest sons and potential successors. 36

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from out~ide the country. The impetus may come not only from the Albanian milieux of Kosovo and Macedonia but also from other Sufi networks in Turkey and elsewhere, especially through the medium of young Albanian students in Istanbul, Cairo and other Muslim centres. It cannot be predicted exactly which of the Sufi orders will be 're-imported' or newly imported in this way in the coming years. 37 The revival ofIslam in Albania must be seen within the broader political and social framework of the country since 1990. To this end we focus on the relatIOnship between the newly reorganised Muslim communities, the state and society at large.

Islam, state and society Since 1990, or more precisely since the victory of the Democratic Party in 1992, political power 111 Albania has conducted a complex game with the country's various religious communities, notably with the Sunm Muslim Community, in the service of both domestic and foreign policy. On the domestic front the pressing issue IS the need to secure the political support of the populatIOn of Muslim origin, who theoretically represent 70 per cent of the total (55 per cent if only Sunm are taken into account). From an early date the future President Sali Berisha (himself of Muslim origin) established contact with the Sunni Muslim Community's leaders. On 18 April 1991 he received Hafiz Sabri Ko~i together with the head of the Muslim Community of Kosovo, Rexheb Boja. 38 Inspired by its strongly anti-Communist line, the Sunni leaders support the President's Democratic Party.3') Albania's two most fiercely anti-Communist cities are Kavaje and Shkoder, also Its bastions of traditionalist 37 Two clues have come to light to date concerning the possible IlltroductlOn of new Turkish Sufi networks into Albania. First is the circulation in Albama of a Nakshbandi opuscule. published in Istanbul by the Waqf Ikhlas (Mevlana Halid-i Bagdadi. Besillli dlle Is[,1l1li. Istanbul. 1992). Second is the afliliation of an Albanian student to a Kadiri shaikh in Istanbul. 38 Drifa Is/alllc. no. 1. 10 January 1992. p. 4.

As observers the Albanian members of the Sunni Muslim Community of Macedonia also supported the Democratic Party (sec for example Agron Rexha. 'Nen ankthin e vetedemaskunit'. Hbw e Re (SkOPJe), IX. no. 111-112. 15 November 1995. p. 9).

39

Islam, state and society in post-Communist Albania

131

Sunni Islam (Shkoder is also a bastion of the strongly anti-CommUl1lst Albanian Catholicism). The results of the referendum on the Constitution in November 1994 revealed that support for Berisha was much stronger in the north among people of the Sunni and Catholic traditions, than in the south (which is generally considered to have brought Commul1lsm to the country) among people of Orthodox and Bektashi tradition. In the districts of Tropoje (Berisha's birthplace), Has, Kavaje, Shkoder, Malsi e Madhe (the mountains above Shkoder), Kukes, Lezhe and Durres - all in the north - a majority voted for the Constitution proposed by Berisha. 40 Of course for precise analysis of these electoral results other factors need to be taken into account, such as the opposition between town and countrYside and and the traditional north-south duality within Albanian' society. Nevertheless, it is clear that religious composition is also a factor in Albanian politics. 41 Although the Democratic Party may attempt to use the Sunni Muslim Community because of the electoral power it represents, relations between the two are to some extent conditioned by the political reflexes of the ruling class - which, as 111 other ex-Communist countries, emanate for the most part from the former ruling Communist and atheistic elite. This is evident in the problems surrounding the still un-promulgated law on religious communities, especially two of its main points: namely, possible restrictions on the heads of all the religious communities,42 Muslim and Christian alike, and - of paramount importance - the restitution of their goods and properties. Another facet of the relationship between the Sunni Muslim Community and the state revolves around the diplomatic and economic opening of the country to the Muslim world. To this end the government has clearly made use of the fact that Albania is considered to have a Muslim majority. The most significant step in this direction was when Albania joined the OIC at the 40 Petro Dhimltri. Jo. KlIllder KOlllllllizmi!, cdlre Berislres!. Tirana. 1995, pp. 193-4. Many Orthodox Christians voted agalllst the Constitution because It would forbid the possibility for a foreigner to be head of an Albanian religiOUS commumty. which is now the case for the head of the Orthodox Church. 41 For example. it is possible to hear Chnstlans saymg: 'We are governed by Muslims.'

42 Specifically, only people of Albanian natIOnality could head the large religious commumties.

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end of 1992. The Muslim Community's role was essential to the success of this move - as mentioned earlier the 111itiative actually came from its leaders."3 Also in 1992, a project was launched to create an Arab-Albanian Islamic Development Bank. This was realised when the Bank opened its first office 111 the centre of Tirana in 1995. Such widespread contacts with the Arab world notwithstanding, Turkey is the Muslim country with which Albania has the closest ties. Its Prime Minister, Siileyman Demirel, visited the country in June 1992, followed by the late President Turgut Ozal, 111 February 1993. Turkey has established not only economIC but also military co-operation with Albania wIth the ab'Teement of NAT044 and under the supervIsion of the United States, with which Albania has also signed a military agreement. Alongside these economic and military connections are parallel ones in religious affairs, between the Diyanet i§len Ba§kanhgJ (Turkish Ministry of ReligIOUS Affairs) and the Albaman Sunni Muslim Community. In October 1995 a Euro-Aslatic Islamic Council was created in Ankara under the aegis of the Diyanet, with the participation of the Muslim Communities of the Balkans (Albania included) and the Caucasus. 45 Unlike the Sunni Community, the Bektashi Community appears so far not to have played an important political role except perhaps in the context of Greek-Albanian relations and the problem of Northern Epirus. In the south, where histoncally Bektashism has been widespread, Albaman Bektashi identity, with its strong

nationalist connotations, can be used as a response to the claims of the Greek Orthodox. 46 Albania's opening to the Muslim world, and above all itsJo111111g the OIC, have provoked varied reactions in Albanian society, together with a debate on the religious revIval and the country's position both in Europe and the Muslim world. Every Albanian has been affected, eIther directly or indirectly, by the Islamic reVIval. and indeed by the religious revival generally. This has come about through such events as membership of the OIC, the Pope's visit, the nomination of a Greek as head of the Albanian Orthodox Church, and the presence of mIssionaries of all persuasions who are active in the humanitanan field. This debate is intensified because all religIOUS communities in Albania today are in a phase of reconquest, and even sometimes of acquiring fresh conquests, endeavouring to conV111ce people to rejoin, or join, their particular 'church'. There IS tough competition between them over the building of places of worship and over humanitarian activities. On another level, the cultural and ideological competition between them revolves around issues of 'traditIOn versus lTlOdernity', the integration of Albania into Europe and more generally the country's position between East and West, ties with Albanians in neighbouring countries, and the preservation of national identity. Christians, joined by some intellectuals of Muslim origin who are more or less atheist, including the famous writer Ismail Kadare, argue that an opening to Europe requires the population of Muslim origin to give up Islam, and maybe even to convert to Christianity.47 Predictably, Catholics argue that because their faith is predominant in Western Europe, conversion to Catholicism IS preferable to conversion to Orthodoxy. The Christians are not eager for a Uluon with Albanians living in neIghbouring countries because these are mainly Muslim and the percentage of Christians in a united entity would be lower than it is today in Albania. Muslims

43 See note 16 above. The Muslim leaders, request for Albania's membership of the Orgamsations of the Islamic Conference was formulated b~forc Sali Berish'a camc to powcr. Albanian officials also contacted Muslim countries and Muslim organisations bcfore thc e1cction of March 1992. Hcnce thc opcn1l1g towards the Muslim world was confirmcd, but not initiated, by Sali Berisha.

Albania was thc first of the ex-Communist countries to apply for NATO membership. Its application was refuscd. Howcver, contacts werc established betwecn thc organisation and Albania (see Odile Dame! and Edith Lhomcl. 'L'Albanie en 1993', Notes et Cllldes dOCl//IIclltaircs, no. 5006-7, Paris, 1995, p. 60). 44

45 See B. Shehapl, 'U theme!ua "Shura Islamc Evroaziatike"', Hc//(/ c rc, IX, no. 111-12, 15 November 1995, p. 5. The establishment of this council provides evidence of the will of Turkish Muslim Icaders to help the Islamic revival in neighbouring ex-Communist countries, but also where possible to control the development of Islamic institutions there.

133

See Frances Trix ('The resurf.'lcing', p. 545), who observes that some of the peoplc of Muslim origin who have gone to Greece for work 'have come back strengthened in their Albanian identity and eager to reclaim their Muslim identity as well'. 47 See for example 'Islam unistava Albance', DlIga, Belgrade, 1.627. 28 October - 10 November 1995. pp. 42-3. This is an interview with Prof. Zef Mirdita. a historian of the Albanian Catholic Church, and a member of that church. 4(,

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tend to refer more often to the tradition which makes Albania a bridge between Europe and the Muslim world, and Islam is upheld as a bond linking Albamans with their brothers and sisters in Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro. However, the ma111 issue for the leaders of the Muslim Communities (and especially the Sunni Community) is the national one.

of the Albaman people.'50 In it Hasan Kaleshi questioned and opposed traditional Albanian 11lStonography, according to which the Ottoman period was a thoroughly negative one. He argued that the Ottoman conquest, the subsequent Islamisation of part of the population and the restoration of tribalism in the northern areas actually stopped the process of assImilation to which Albanians were being subjected by Slavs, Greeks and Latins through the churches and the influence of great landlords. A further result of the Ottoman expansion was the extensIOn of the Albanian settlement area, through either the movement of Albanian populations or the Albanianisation of other Muslim elements. 51 This thesis has become distorted in recent years, and it is now often said that Albanians adopted Islam with the deliberate ailll of preserving theIr ethnic and national identity, rather than that their identity was preserved due to their Islan1lSation and various other consequences of Ottoman domination. In thIs perspective the preservation of national identity was the cause rather than the consequence of Islamisation -an inversion of Hasan Kaleshi's ar5' f,'ument.·The amalgamation of religIOus with ethnic and national identitIes is not an argument which can readily be applied in Albania itself, where there is no direct confrontation with non-Albanian elements and about 30 per cent of the population are of Christian origin. It is much more readily applicable in Kosovo and Macedonia, where the Albanians -mostly Muslims - have to face Orthodox SlavS. 53 Nevertheless, the Muslim leaders 111 Albania do resort to

Rel(r;iaus and l1atianal identities In the discourse ofAlbanian Muslim leaders the notions of 'national' and 'religious' are already becoming increas111gly amalgamated with those of 'Albanian' and 'Muslim'. For these leaders national and religious identity tend to coincide. The comments of Abdi Baleta, former Albanian ambassador to the United Nations, and subsequently deputy and leader of the nationalist Party of the Democratic Right, illustrate this trend. His artIcle entitled 'Albania: neither an island nor an ammunition dump, but a garden of religious harmony', originally published in his party newspaper E djadhta (The Right), was republished in the Journals of the Muslim Communities of Albania and Kosovo. He argued: Islamisation ensued as a natural historical process. wIth indelible histoncal. religious and ethnological. but also national consequences for the Albanians. Islam has become an inner characteristic of the psychological formation of the Muslim Albanians and of all Albanian national identity.48

Similarly, the head of the Society of Albanian Muslim Intellectuals, Prof Bedri Bylyku, commented in an interview: 'The idea of creating the Society, , , emerged from a group of Albanian intellectuals who were profoundly convlI1ced of the positive role of the Islamic faith in the fOl1nation of the individual and collective identity of the Albanian people throughout 11lStOry',49

Such views are typically supported by the theory that Islam has played a crucial role in the preservation of Albanian identity, formulated by an Albanian scholar from Yugoslavia in 1975 in a paper entitled 'Turkish penetration 111 the Balkans and Islamisation: Factors in the preservation of the ethnic and national eXIstence 48 Drilll Islllllle. Tirana, VI. no. 2 (63), p. 4; Dill/ria Islallle, Ptistina, XI. no. 71. August 1995, p. 39.

4~ Dill/ria Is/allle. Pristina, XI, no. 72. September 1995, p. 2.

135

Hasan Kaleshi. 'Das Tiirkische Vordringen auf dem Balkan und die Islamisierung. Faktoren fUr die Erhaltung der ethl1lschen und nationalen Existenz des Albanischen Volkes' in Peter Bartl-Horst Glassl. Siidoslel/ropa Imler dCIII Hall!llllllld. MUl1lch: Rudolf Trofenik, 1975, pp. 125-38. 51 An interesting text was published at the very begmnmg of the 20th centmy entitled 'What has Islam brought for us. Albanians'. in which the author, 'a Christian from Kor~c'. outlined the £1Vourable results of the Islamisation of part of the Albanian people. The aim here was of course to convmce the Albanian Christians to unite With their Muslim brothers m a natIOnal movement (cf '<;:'na ben ne shqipctarcve islamismi?'. Kalmdari KOIIII)!ar, Sofia, 1902, pp. 61-72). 52 See for example the statements of Abdi Baleta published in Dr!ta Islmlle, no. 7, 3 April 1992. p. 2, and in Dill/ria Islallle XI. no. 72. September 1995. p. 42. 53 Cf N. Clayer. 'Identite nationale et identitc religieuse dans Ie discours des dirigeants musulmans albanais (Albanie. Maccdollle. Y ougoslavie)'. TI/rkish RCflil'11' 50

Nathalie Clayer

Islam, state alld society ill post-Col1ll1lrmist Albania

this amalgamation, highlighting the danger of the 'Orthodox fundamentalism' of the Serbs and the Greeks which, they allege, menaces Albania. 54 This is part of their endeavour to legitimise the revival of Islam and the place they wish it to occupy in the newly democratic republic. This endeavour is addressed to those rulers and intellectuals still frightened by the revival of religion in general, or those who want to see a Christian Albania. It is also addressed to the population of Muslim origin: their love for the 6therland is now held to depend on the degree of their devotion and £'lith. 55 Nevertheless it has become clear that in spite of early enthusiasm for the newly recovered religious freedom, the revival of the different forms of Islam in Albania has . herto been somewhat limited and has faced vanous problems. A relatively low percentage of people of Muslim origin have rediscovered the road to the mosque or the tekke and, as noted earlier, the rate of atheism can be expected to be proportionally higher within the 'Muslim' population than within the 'Christian' one. This may explain why the Sunni Muslim COll1l11Unity objects to a census that takes account of religious affiliation. 56

predict how Albanian Islam will develop in the future. Over a long period it will probably depend more on the influence of external Islamic networks, combined with certain local components than on a pure Albanian Islamic tradition. Nevertheless, some of the trends winch appeared at the start of the religious revival may prove significant for later developments. In particular, these first years have been much more favourable for the Sunni Community, which is dominated by a traditionalist trend, than for the Bektashis and the dervish orders. This IS mainly because of the massive help from the Sunni Muslim world, but may also be partly because the religious revival has been stronger in the northern half of the country, where Islam has historically been predominantly Sunm. However, even for the Sunni Community the situation in Albania has been less favourable than that experienced by the Muslim Community in Bosnia-Hercegov1l1a, Kosovo and Macedonia. In all these three cases Muslim leaders can resort to ethno-natlOnalism to stIr up religious fervour by identifying national with religious identities. In Albania, where there is no ethnoreligiously-based confrontation within the country, this strategy does not appear so fruitful. Furthermore, in what might be called the sphere of purely religious 'confrontation', Christian propaganda appears stronger and has greater advantages, especially among those indiVIduals attracted by the West. 57 'Material', 'cultural', and 'spIritual' competition between the various religious personnel has worsened despite continuous references to the so-called 'tradi5H tlOnal tolerance' of Albanian religious communities. TIllS competItion is symbolised by the case of the national

136

On the basis of a five-year period which has been chaotic politically and economically for post-Communist Albania, it is difficult to C?f Balkan StIIt/ics. Istanbul. 2, 1994-5, pp. 1-9. See also Chapters 6 and 8. Once again. the discourse of the nationalist Abdi Baleta on this subject is welcome in Islamic Journals (see for example. Dill/ria Islmllc. XI. no. 69. June 1995, p. 17). The term 'Orthodox fundamentalism' is of course used in response to the tenn 'Islamic fundamentalism'. which. according to Abdi Baleta. does not exist.

54

C( Drila Islalllc. no. 7. April 1992. p. l. Similar fonnulae arise in the Bektashi literature (see for example Urli'sia. no. 1. December 1993. p. 1.) 55

56 C( Vatan Islami. 'Perse turbulloni lurat e qeta. shoku Toz;U·. Drila [slallle. 3 (64), February 1995. p. 2. In this article the author asserts that Neshat Toz;U - to whom he is replying - is in (wour of holding a a census so that the category of atheists appears clearly. It should be noted that at present each religious Community gives figures slightly higher than the last official figures of 1942 for their own community: the Catholics give 15 or 20')1,; the Orthodox 25')1, and the Sunni Muslims 75 or 80%. Furthermore. the Muslim leaders do not WIsh the Bektashis to be counted separately. These speculations of course fonn part of the competition engaged in the religious field. A census will rule out such speculation.

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57 For Muslim perceptIOns of Christian propaganda. see for example Tasim Ramadani. 'Nc atdheun tim tc ndarc·. Dill/ria Islalllc. VIII. no. 45. January 1993. p. 32. Muslims frequently refer to 'a new crusade', comparable to the Spanish 'rccollqlliSIIl' in Europe. Those attracted by the West are mostly young and educated town-dwellers and intellectuals. One of the advantages eruoyed by the ChrIStian churches IS that many Albanians have had to travel to Italy. Germany and Greece for work or study. In Albania Itself. Christian propaganda is not only the work of the Catholic and Orthodox churches but also of a multitude of Protestant groups. Besides Christian competItion. the Muslim Commul1lty also has to ('lce the actIve presence of the Bahais. and the attempt of the Ahmadis to prosclytise. 5H The numerous 'reply' artIcles in Drilll [slall1c proVIde eVIdence of thIS illcreasmgly competitive situation.

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hero Gjergj Kastriot Skanderbeg, who was upheld during the Communist period as the hero of the Albanian struggle against the Turks. Since the collapse of Communism he has come to present vanous faces, according to the different religious groups that have adopted him. For Catholics and Orthodox Christians he has become the champion of Christianity, whereas for Sunm Muslims and Bektashls he remains the champion of Albanianism. 59 Indeed each community seeks to adopt hinl as one of its own: Catholic, Orthodox Christian, Sunni Muslim or Bektashi!

8 THE KOSOVO ALBANIANS: ETHNIC CONFRONTATION WITH THE SLAV STATE 1 Hugh Poulton and Miranda Vickers Albanians altd Serbs - trul1cated ltatiol1s? The crux of the issue of Albanian identity in Kosovo is the relationship between Albanians and Serbs, and their competing nationalist aspirations vis-a-vis the territory ofKosovo. It is therefore pertinent to begm by contrasting and comparing their cases. From an Albanian national viewpoint, the modern Albanian state was a tmncated one from its inception in November 1912, and this problem was not rectified in the post-First World War settlements. The prevailing ethos was that state boundaries should, if possible, be drawn along ethnic lines - the programme associated with President Woodrow Wilson's famous' 'Fourteen Points' - but in the Albanian case this did not happen. It can similarly be argued that the Serbs also represented a 'truncated natIon', with roughly 25 per cent of their population remaimng outside Serbia in the large concentrations of Western Bosnia and the Kr~ina in Croatia, as well as Montenegro. The wars in former Yugoslavia were a direct result of the feelings of many Serbs that they lost out in the creation of national states following the collapse of the Ottoman empire, and can be seen as the expression of their desire for national unity. However, there are important differences between the two cases. First, while large concentrations of Serbs remained outside

59 See: the assertions of Prof Zef Mirdita in 'Islam uniiitava Albance', Dt\~a, Belgrade, 1,627, 28 October 1995-10 November 1995, p. 43; the report of January 1995 for the celebration of the hero in Lezhe, in the journal of the Albanian Orthodox Church, Ngjallja, Tirana. no. (29), February 1995, pp. 1 and 3; an evocation of the role of Skanderbeg in the journal of the Bektashi Community (U,.tcsia, no. 3. April 1994, pp. 14-15); and a reply by Abdi Baleta addressing 'speculations on religion and history aiming to destroy the TurkIsh-Albanian friendship', republished in the journal of the Sunl1l Muslim Community (Dn'ta Is/all/c, no. 5 (66), March 1995, p. 4).

1 The geographic tenl1 'Kosovo' (known by the Albanians as 'Kosova') has changed depending on politics. For the purposes of this chapter it refers to the area defincd as SAP Kosovo in the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution. This includes most of what was known officially as Kosovo-Metohija by the first Yugoslav state -Serbian tcnninology, whIch the post-Sccond World War Communist rcgimc initially used and which the Milosevic regime has reverted to along with thc old tactic of redrawing 1I1ternal admll1istrativc boundaries for political reasons.

(139 \

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and IVliranda Vickers

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Serbia (Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Sandzak in 1878 was crucial 111 blocking its expansion and uniting with Montenegro), Serbia did to some degree succeed in expanding its territory and incorporating co-nationals. Albania has hItherto never done tIlls except temporarily under the Nazi aegis in the Second World War. Secondly, and more Important, the first Yugoslav state was essentIally dominated by Serbia, and tll' ':he post-First World War settlement, rather than be111g to the dis;dvantage of the Serbs, can be seen as representing the fullest expressIOn of panSerbianism. Indeed, many Serb intellectuals saw the new state in t11lS light and expected to assimilate theIr fellow South Slavs with relative ease. While Tito's Communist Yugoslavia was less overtly Serb dominated, the over-representation of Serbs 111 the crucial areas of the army,. the police and the party (most notably in areas outside SerbIa proper 111 the cases of the police and the party) highlights theIr position of power within the Communist federation. Many Serbs deny this, and with some JustificatIOn view the creation by the Tito regIme of the separate categorIes of 'Montenegrins' and 'Muslims' as Yugoslav national groups as a deliberate policy to divide them and dilute their power. On the other hand, their position in the Communist federation was at least one of a m;~or component of the state. In former Yugoslavia - the prewar royalist state as much as the post-war Communist one - there was no question of the Serbs being seen as second-class CItizens. This, as we see below, was not the case for the Albanians. Thirdly, in many areas of the Balkans attempts at drawing borders to include all members of a national group were doomed to Glilure because of the intricate mix of natIonal b'TOUPS, and, as shown recently by the Serbs, can perhaps only be achIeved by forced population transfers and widespread atrocities - the so-called 'ethnic cleansing'. However the areas of solidly ethnic Albanian settlement bordered on the new Albanian state and could thus, quite easily be included. Despite this and the professed philosophy behind PreSIdent Wilson's 'Fourteen Points', they were not 111corporated mto Albania.

Albanian state was that in spite of its demographic composition in the early twentieth century, it was the heartland of the medieval Serbian kingdom, and many of the greatest monuments of the Serbian Orthodox Church are located there. This polity was defeated by the Ottomans in 1389 at the battle of Kosovo Polje in Kosovo. The Serbs portray this event as an exclusively Serb -Turk struggle (in (let the 'Serbian' side comprised Serbs, Albanians, Magyars and other local forces while the 'Turks' were a similar mIxture of different ethnic groups), and the battle became shrouded in an elaborate web of heroic folklore, myth and legend which helped keep alive the spark of Serbian national consciousness for move than five centuries of Ottoman rule (a mass northward migration of Serbs took place in 1690). The conflict between Christianity and Islam emerged as a m;~or theme in Serbian folk poetry, and the Kosovo legend enhanced the ideology of Serbian rebellion aga1l1st foreign rule. The Balkan wars and the 'liberatIOn' ofKosovo Polje 111 1913 inVIgorated the Kosovo myth even more among the Serbs. Thus the Serbs claimed the area for historical reasons, and Kosovo, which by now was solidly Albanian, was not included in the new Albanian state. There were also large Albanian populations in Macedonia, Montenegro and Greece. Probably almost as many Albanians lived outside the new state as Inside it. The real reason for t11lS was the 'late arrival' of the Albanians in the great nationalist race of the nineteenth century. Along with many other indigenous Balkan peoples, the majorIty of Albanians accepted Islam and thus became 'first-class' subjects in the Ottoman empIre. Others remained Orthodox, while in the more mountainous and tribal north many became Roman Catholic. While to observers like Edith Durham, writing in the early twentieth century, the strength of Albanian nationalism overrode the religious divides - indeed she and others point to the Albanian habit of switching faIths to SUIt temporary expediency - this appears to have been more frequent in the north. 2 The Albanians of Kosovo showed a far greater readiness to accept Islam than those in other Albanian lands, perhaps due to pressure from the Serbs, who in the early mneteenth century had achieved

Historical background

2 For example see E. Durham, H(~h AlbaHia, London: Edward Arnold, 1909, The majority of Albanian converts to Islam were men. but many women, while mamed to M llslims, retained theIr Christian belieE.

One of the reasons why Kosovo was kept separate from the

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171e Kosovo Albanians

their own state and were aiming for expansion southwarc into the region. On the other hand, the process of Hellen isation of the Orthodox population through the millet system had a !,,'Teat effect on the Albanians in the south and the process has continued throughout the twentieth century. In the first quarter of the century, there were many Albanian-speaking cItizens in areas of Greece like Attica, Boeotia southern Euboea (EVVOIa) and Hydra, while the Plaka district in Athens close to the Acropolis was the city's Albanian quarter, with its own law courts using the Albanian language. Such people have tended to become hellenised due to the millet heritage, magnified by Greece's continuing denial of any natIOnal minorities within its borders, and a resolute statedirected assimilation policy.3 The continual confusion by the modern Greek state of the concepts of ethnicity, religion and citizenship remain and can be seen in claims of some 400,000 'Greeks' -i.e. all those who are of Orthodox heritage whether ethnically Albanian, Slav, Roma (Gypsy) or Vlach as well as Greek - in southern Albania today. There were also Muslim Albanians III the Greek state - the northern Chams. Due to the state's confusion of religion and citizenship, they were seen as potentially disloyal, and attempts by the Italian occupIers to harness them against the Greeks in the Second W orId War led to a post-war backlash with many being driven into Albania and their mosques burnt.

threat of Albanian lands belllg partitioned between Serbia and Greece and possibly Bulgaria. In the early 1880s, under the guidance of intellectuals like Naim Frasheri, a number of schools were opened III southern Albania using the Albanian language as medium of lllstructIOn. While this movement was still confined to some intellectual circles and not a mass movement it was still an important new factor. Sultan Abdiilhamid II clamped down on this and pushed panIslamic solidarity instead. Anyone III possession of written matenal in Albanian faced pumshment, and the Greek Patriarchate backed this up by threatening any Orthodox believer so convicted with excommunication. The League of Prizren was banned and its leaders fled abroad. However, the pressure for greater cultural recognition continued within the empIre. In 1896 Christian and Muslim Albanians combined to send a Joint appeal to the Great Powers: they demanded a single administrative unit of Albanianinhabited lands WIth its capital at Monastir (Bitola), as well as the establishment of Albaman schools. Generally the Muslim Albanians in the north, faced with Serbian expansion, were the most prominent in this, with clashes between the two during the GrecoTurkish war, while the Orthodox Albanians to the south in Kor~e and Kastoria regions remained faithful to the Greek cause. 4 The first Albanian f,'1.lerrilla movement with a political motIvatIOn (actually reSIstance against the activities of Bulgarian revolutionary groups) was founded in 1899 by H~i Mulla Zeka. By 1905 so-called Albanian Revolutionary Committees were being formed in numerous towns with the aim of staging an uprising against the Ottoman authorities. In the run-up to the 1908 Young Turk revolution, contacts had been established between some members of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP -the organisation which led the rebellion) in Macedonia and theIr opposite numbers in the Albaman Revolutionary Committees. In Debar the two actually amalgamated. In SkOPJe the CUP consisted largely of Albanians, and Midhat Frasheri in Thessaloniki issued an appeal for all Albamans to support the revolution. Indeed, the Albanian Muslims were to the fore in the initial period of the Young Turk

The beginnil1
cif Albanian

l1atiol1alism

The Ottoman empire regarded the Muslim Albanians as especially loyal, and many senior Ottoman officials were of Albanian descent. However, the expansion of the Greek state to the south and of the SerbIan state to the north aroused fears among the Muslim Albanian community that the Ottoman empire might not prove strong enough to protect their interests from their rapacious neighbours. In 1878 a group of Albanian intellectuals founded the League of PriZren, aimed at asserting national conSCIousness by promoting the use of the Albanian language, and to combat the See H. Poulton. The Balkalls: l\;fiIlOlitics and States ill COllfliet. London: MRG. 1993, chapter 13. .

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4 N. Vlachos. To Makcdollikos as fasis tOll Alwtolikoll Zitimatos. Athens. 1935. pp. 202-6. and Wayne S. Vucinich. SeriJia betwcclI East ami r.vest. Stanford Umversity Press. 1968. p. 27.

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revolt, with Ahmad Niyazi Bey's flight fi-om Resen into the mountains on 3 July 1908 with 200 men seen as the first real move. Under his influence Albanian groups around Lake Ohnd all joined the movement, although in Kon;e support was only forthcoming on the condition that Albania be granted autonomy after the revolution. Contrarily, the more conservative religious Albanian Muslims of Kosovo would only support the revolt if the Sultan remained and was not deposed - thus highlighting the problems of nationalism in Islamic communities. s Thus for a short period the growing Albanian national movement was allied with, and essential for, the CUP. However, when it became apparent that the true agenda of the Young Turks was to promote Turkish natlOnalism, Albanian nationalism was further stimulated. The Albamans came out ll1 open rebellion, centred in Kosovo, demanding their own educational facilitIes. A further rebellion broke out ll1 May 1912, and before the outbreak of the Balkan wars the Albaman revolts were the biggest problem for the Young Turk governments. By the beginning of August the rebels had installed themselves as far east as Skopje; the government met many of theIr demands and in consequence an amnesty was declared on 19 August 1912. The change in consciousness brought about by the influence of Western nationalism on the Albanians is graphically illustrated by m~or contemporary figures like Ismail Kemal Bey. In his memoirs he moves almost effortlessly from seeing himself primarily as an Ottoman and a Muslim to prImarily an Albaman - in no small part due to the CUP emphasis on Turkishness. 6 A result of this nationalist growth was the creation of an independent Albaman state in November 1912 which the Treaty of London recognised in 1913.

Kosovo Albanians in royalist Yugoslavia The Albanian state was a truncated one, with a great number of 5 Islam being essentially a trans-national community of believers. Indeed the role of religion, and of Islam in particular, III delaying the advent of Albanian nationalism was used by Enver Hoxha as one justification for his ban on religIOn in Albania in 1967 (sec Chapter 7). Ismail Kemal Bey, Memoirs, London: Constable, 1920. For more details on the Albanian movement see Stavro Skendi, The Albatliall llatiotlai AlI'aketlitlg, "/878-19"12, Princeton University Press, 1967.

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ethnic Albanians living outside the state on its borders. Their position in Greece has already been noted. Huge numbers of mostly Muslim Albanians (but with some Catholics in Kosovo) remamed m the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes -later known as Yugoslavia - mostly in Kosovo but also in southern Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro. From the start, as was demonstrated by both Its names (Yugoslavia means the land of the South Slavs and thus tacitly excludes Albanians and other non-Slavs), the Albanians were not seen as mtegral members of the new state. This first monarchist Yugoslav state, which last~d till the. NazI.lnv~lsr~n . irl~AprifT9Lj.~1~·5V;isd9ifiiliaf~apViIie·S·erbs. In this period an estimated 40,000 Orthodox Slav peasants (mostly Serbs and Serbian-speaking Montenegrins 7) moved into Kosovo as settlers. At the same time, a large number of ethnic Albamans emigrated from Kosovo. The new settlers receIved good land and benefits from the authorities and this resulted in two separate communities: a small, relatively prosperous community of H Serb/Montenegnn settlers and a mass ofless well-to-do Albanians. The Serbo-Croat language was compulsory in all schools and for official purposes, and Irregular Serbian troops, the Chetniks, were mobilised to ensure that SerbIan dom1l1ance was ma1l1ta1l1ed. AIbamans were forced to adopt Serbian name suffixes such as '-vic'. Similar pressures were mounted in Montenegro and Macedonia against the Albanians (and also agamst the Slav inhabItants. of Macedonia, who were seen as Serbs despite speak1l1g a Bulganan dialect and their obvIOUS pro-Bulgarian sympathies'\ The extreme antipathy of the first Yugoslav state towards Albanians seems to have been more ethnic than religious in character. That the Kosovo Albanians were predominantly Muslim as opposed to the Orthodox Serbs certainly played a part in this, but the real struggle was ethl1lc. This can be seen by contrasting the political 7 Montenegro, was an independent kingdom before joining the first Yugoslav state at it~ inception 111 1918. In Tito's YugoslavIa Montencgrins were recognised as a separate 'nation of YugoslavIa', although many: perhaps ,even a majority, viewed this as an attempt to divide the SerbIan nation artifiCIally. H E. Biberaj, 'Kosovo: the Stmggle for Recognition', and S.K. PavlOWltch 'Kosovo: An Analysis of Yugoslavia's Albanian Problem', both in COllflict Studies. no 137/138, 1982. 9 For a detailed discussion of the whole 'Macedonian Question' see H. Poulton, f;VIIO arc tlte MacedolliallS?, London: Hurst, 1995.

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The Kosovo Alballialls

involvement of Serbo-Croat-speaking Muslims with the lack of any similar Albanian orgal11sation. The Muslim Slav political organisation - the Yugoslav Muslim Orgal1lsation GMO) -was a member in succeeding coalition governments of royalist YugoslavIa. However, the Albanians remained firmly opposed to the Yugoslav state, and unlike the Bosnian Muslims were not co-opted. It can be argued that the Kosovo Albanians at this time lacked a sufficiently numerous intellectual elite, and thus comparison with the Bosnian Muslims is inappropriate. Another short-lived Muslim organisation was set up to represent the Muslims of 'the southern regions' i.e. the SandZak and Macedonian Muslims, the Muslim Albanians and the Turks. TIllS was the Islam Mu/uifazai Hukuk Cemiyet (usually referred to as the Cemiyet). Very similar in both organisatIOn and aims, to the ]MO, it was led by sections of the Muslimland-ownmg elite who often appeared ambivalent towards Albanian grIevances. TIllS changed somewhat after Ferat Bej Draga took control of the orgal1lsation and more radical factions aiding Albal1lan irredentism emerged. This naturally provoked official pressure, and in 1925 the Cemiyet folded. 10 Thus Serb nationalists saw the Albanians as ethmc competitors for Kosovo in contrast to the Serbo-Croat-speaking Muslims, whom they tended to see as ethnically Serb and thus part of their own nation - albeit a part which, due to being Muslim rather than Orthodox, was of lesser quality.11 The official state policy was one of assimilation or expulsion. Initially the state tried to asslll1ilate the Albanians through the Serbian-language education system. To aid tillS Bosnian Serbo-Croat-speaking Muslim teachers were used, again illustrating that for the state ethnicity, rather than religion, was of paramount importance. 12

However, after it became apparent that the policy, instead of aiding assimilatIOn, was educating a potential opposition elite, it was changed to one of deliberate under-education to keep the Albanians backward and ignorant. If it was hoped this would suppress Albanian oppositional feeling, it was also a failure. Despite only constituting some 2 per cent of the state high school population in Kosovo and Metohija, the Albanians turned the so-called 'Turkish' schools, where the only official languages of instruction were the Arabic of the Quran and Turkish, into centres of Albal1lan opposition to the state, and ran an underground parallel Albanian education. 13 This recourse to the setting-up of a parallel education system in times of crisis has remained a recurring feature of Albal1lan national resistance to Serb oppression. 14 Faced with failure to achieve their aims in Kosovo with the education system, the Serbs pursued the more successful policy of 'colonisation' and pressure to make Albanians emigrate.

146

10 1. Banac, Thc Natiollal Qllcstioll ;11 Y/~!;oslavia; or~~ills. History, Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992, pp. 377-8.

11 The ethnic nature of this claim is also shown by Serb claims to Yugoslav Macedonia, which saw perseclltion and assimilatIon of Orthodox Macedol1l:ln Slaves as well as Albanians -see H. Poulton, op. cit., pp. 89-94. The war in Bosnia-Hercegovina has resulted in its Muslim population being seen by Serbs as a more direct threat to their claims. Those in the SandZak remain less of a threat, although there is change here as well (see Chapter 9). 12 Banac, op. cit., p. 299. Some Serb nationalists claimed that many of the Alb:ll1lans (including the legendary hero Skanderbeg. who defied the Ottomans) were really Serbs anyway. and that this policy was one of a re-SerbianisatlOn

Kosovo duril1g the Second World War Not unnaturally, the Albanians resented this blatant Serbian oppression, and this generated support for the brief incor~oration ofKosovo and western Macedonia into the Italian puppet kmgdom of Albania in 1941. The Italians capitalised on .thiss.ul?E2~.t~.£·t.> establishing an Albanian-Iariguilg~ ~dn~Ais!!'ation as w~!l~~~~~.a,c::!an scl100TSaiid rriedi~During this period the Serbs suffered harS11" treatment from the embittered Kosovo Albanians, who now put pressure on them to leave. The Albanian SS Division 'Skanderbeg' was created, indiscriminately killing Serbs and Montenegnns and helping to expel up to 10,000 Slav families from Kosovo. New Albanian colonists arrived from the poorer regions of northern Albania. As Axis forces withdrew from Kosovo at the end of 1944 Tito'sPartisans moved in ..His previous attempts to ';U;:'l~i:-i{~s~-~;J\lb;~li~;si~t~- ih~j)artisan-f;rces had not of ' den ation ali sed brothers' - ibid., p. 295.

Ibid .. p. 299. The Macedonian AlbaI1lans also resorted to setting up private education after the Slav Macedonian authonties forbade the opening 111 February 1995 of an Albanian university 111 Tetovo 111 FYROM -see Nova Makcdollija, Skopje, 28 February 1995, for report~ of classes held clandestinely, e.g. in local mosques.

13

14

148

Hugh Poulton and Miranda Vickers

,"",~Jlccceeclecc!,1,5 and he therefore realised that only by retaining Kosovo within Serbia could he hope to win over the Serbs to support Communism. The Partisans launched a large-scale military campaign in Kosovo to consolidate their rule and the Albanians reacted with a general insurrectIOn, that forced the new authorities to declare martial law in the region in 1945. Because of their cooperation with the Axis, the Kosovo Albanians were seen as politically unreliable and thus a possible threat to the stability and territorial integrIty of Communist Yugoslavia. Thus, Kosovo enlerged from the war in a state of SIege, with Its population seen as a threat rather than as an asset.

Kosovo Albanians il1 Communist Yugoslavia -from repression to autonomy The post-war period saw improvements in the official status of ethnic Albanians 111 Yugoslavia as a whole, although a large number, claiming to be Turks and thus taking advantage of emigration agreements, emIgrated to Turkey (see Chapter 10). For the first time Albanians in Yugoslavia were recognised as a distinct national group, use of their language was allowed at local level and they gained the right to vernacular primary education. However, these gains were undermined by the repressive pro-Serb policies of the security forces headed by the Serb politician Aleksander Rankovic. In addition, under the/1246~011~titntion, Kosovo (or KosovoMetohija as it was then styled) joined the new federatloncas an c_ 'Autonomous Region', which In practice meant it was~;;;~~~­ appellcElgeofSei'bia:J6 rTH:e 1953 Constitution and aboJiflollof the Chamber of Nationalities saw a further reduction of powers for both Kosovo and the Vojvodina, which both became ordinary districts of Serbia. However, tillS was the penod when Rankovic 15 For a detailed account of Kosovo during the Second World War see Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, The Strtlgglc for the Balklllls. London: Merlin Press. 1990, and Reginald Hibbert. AI/Wllill's Natiollal LiIJeratioll; n,c Bitter Victory, London: Pinter. 1991. 16 Under this constitution, the Vojvodina (which later had the same status as Kosovo) was granted the higher status of 'Autonomous Province', Because Kosovo-Metohija had the lower status of 'Autonomous Region' it was denied even a modicum of independent decision-making within the centralised Communist system of the time in its local administratIve U11lts.

The Kosovo Albania/IS

149

was in the ascendant and even republics like Croatia enjoyed little real autonomy in the higly centralised Yugoslav state. y~t ;inother constitlltion jl1.1963 gave the republi(;s cth~righLf()l'ct.he firsttime to establish autonomousunltsiI1dependentlYI~IThe status of the Vojvodina was restored to that of 1946, and that ofKosovoMetohija was upgraded to the same level. Kosovo is rich 111 m.ineral resources, but economic decisions made in Belgrade had an essentially political motivation. Follow1l1g the Tito-Stalin rupture of 1948, Kosovo was considered too vulnerable a site for major industrial projects. Instead it was to be essentially a supplier of raw materials for other (wealthier) parts of Yugoslavia. Economic development saw regIOnal interests becoming increasingly identified with the national interests of each republic's nominative nation (see Chapter 2). To counter this, the authorities launched a campaign of 'Brotherhood and Umty' to encourage patriotic Yugoslavism. This was followed by a review of the minority question by the Executive Committee of the Serbian Communist Party in 1959, after which the official status of 'minorities' was upgraded to that of 'natIOnalities'. Despite these cosmetic changes, the display of any Albanian national symbol or flag in Kosovo and the commemoration of Albanian national holidays were prohibited, and the teaching of Albanian history, traditions and literature was considered a 'natIOnalist deviation' .17 Thus the Albanians remained discontented. The downfall of Rankovlc in 1966 allowed Albanian dissatisfaction to be voiced more openly, and there were large-scale demonstrations in November 1968 calling for Kosovo to be granted republican status within the Yugoslav federation. As a result, constitutional amendments in 1968 granted the regions of Kosovo and the Vojvodina some republican prerogatives and Kosovo was also allowed to fly the Albaman flag. TIllS compromise was confin11.ed 111 constitutional amendments in 1971 and the 1974 Co I1.::> stitution, which made Kosovo an. aut;.Dl2Ji1QYsj;rovlnce·Viithin the SerbianRepublic with a preJ~n{ii15iltly AI~anl~n C9il11n:~~ist . leadership and" de facto, many of the powers of a republic. within the federation./,bevelopment of cultural contacts with the Albanian 17 A. Hadri, The Naltolwl IIIld Political Delle/oplllellt 4 AI/WI/jails ill Yugoslm,;a, Zagreb, 1970, vol. 1, p. 551. See also A. SI11;UIOVIC, 'Muslims in Yugoslavia', JIMMA, 2.1, 1980, pp. 132-44.

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state was encouraged so, that Kosovo might serve as a 'bridge' ~etween the two countnes. The adoption of the basically Tosk hterary Albaman by the Gheg-speaking Kosovo Albanians 18 in 1968 paved the way for Albanian cultural penetration into Kosovo, with textbooks and publications being imported from across the border. This helped to encourage the Kosovo Albanians to rediscover their national identity through the study of Albanian history: tl1IS enhanced theIr self-perceptions as they discovered the leading role theIr forefathers had played in the Albanian national awakening m the late Ottoman period. At the same time Kosovo went through significant demographic, changes due, to the extremdy high birth-rate of the Albanians'; / combmed WIth the emigration of more than 30,000 Serbs ancv' Montenegnns between 1971 and 1981. 19 The high birthrate saw~) the Albanians' number virtually double between 1961 and 1981, ! while that of the Serb/Montenegrins slightly declined. The 1981/ census results showed that Albanians made up 77.5 per cent or! Kosovo's population while the percentage of Serbs and Mon) tenegrins had slightly declined. In this period there was also a large increase in the number of ,Muslims' (meaning Muslim Slavs, who had been recogmsed as a separate nationality since 1961) from 0.8 per cent in 1961 to 3.7 per cent in 1981, while the nu~nber of Turks fell from 2.7 to 0.8 per cent. There were no relIable figures f~r the other main group -the Roma (Gypsies) - dt~e. to the stIgma, of bemg a Rom and the corresponding tlllwIllmgness to self-IdentIfy as such (with some even preferring to call themselves 'Egyptians' -see Chapter 5). The 1991 census for Serbia, boycotted by the Albamans, estimated some 1,607,000 Albamans 111 Kosovo, although this figure is almost certainly too low - the Albamans clalln a figure of over 2 million (although there has been large-scale emigration due to Serb pressure -see below). It is certa1l1 that by the end of the 1980s tl;ey made up over 85 per cent o~ the population of Kosovo, although there v.:as a Serb m~onty 111 the north-east of the province in Leposavic dIstnct. 18 There are two main Albanian dialects. Tosk. which predominates in the literary Alb"nl' an. an d central and' southern "regions and which is the basis "'I . of . ." v lCg, which predommatcs m the northern regIOns, including Kosovo. 19 01JS ·II/ ' Ul , B I de, nos 8-9. August-September 1983. e gra

17/e Kosovo Albanians

151

The rise of Albanian 11ationalisII1 in Kosol/o Despite the upgrading of Kosovo in the 1974 Constitution and the corresponding increase in Albanian control, albeit within Tito's Communist system, Albanian demands for greater control increased. Though naturally rich in resources, Kosovo remains economically one of fonner Yugoslavia's most backward regions, and the economic problems exacerbated nationalist unrest. The setting-up of an Albaman university in Pristina in 1968 compounded this: a large number of Albanians enrolled as a way of avoiding unemployment, and the University helped for the first time to create a large Albanian intelligentsia, but one with few career opportunities commensurate WIth their qualifications. In 1984 unemployment in Kosovo was 29.1 per cent compared with a national average of 12.7 per cent and only 1.8 per cent in Slovenia, the most advanced region of former Yugoslavia. Of those unemployed in Kosovo 70 per cent were twenty-five years old or younger?) Albaman nationalist discontent simmered throughout the 1970s, with Pristina University becoming a breeding ground for nationalists. 21 The situatIOn exploded in 1981 with a massive wave of unrest in Kosovo sparked off by umversity students. The main demand quickly became for Kosovo to be granted republican status within the Yugoslav federation, with some calling for outright unification with neighbouring Albania. The demonstrations were put down by the army and many were killed,z2 Nationalist discontent continued throughout the 1980s with thousands ofKosovo Albanians - mainly male students and young school teachers but also many schoolchildren - being lInprisoned for actively supporting republican status for KosovO. 23 There was also a severe purge 20 Rilitldia, 21

Pristina, 25 June 1984.

See Poulton, The Balkatls. p. 61.

Ofllcial sources stated that nine or cleven had died but the Central Comnuttee of the League of Communists of Serbia was reportedly told that over 300 had been killed -see YII.I!0slm;;a: PriSOIlCfS 0/ COllscicllCC, Amnesty International. AI Index EUIl", 48120/85. 23 Amnesty Internattonal reported in 1989 that over 7,000 Albanians had been arrested 111 Kosovo in the 1980s. with many given prison sentences of 6 years or more for nationalist activity - see YlIgoslmJia: Reccllt Evellts ill lite AutollolllOlIS provillce ~f KOSOIJO, Amnesty International. EUR/48120/85. For full details of both the nationalist forces and the state repreSSIOn in this penod see Poulton, OJ!. cit., pp. 61-6. 22

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Hugh Poultoll alld Miranda Vickers

Trw Kosovo Albal1imlS

of university lecturers and school teachers who did not actively oppose the call for Kosovo to become a republic. However, in the early 1980s the Kosovo Albanians were not suffering cultural repression. Kosovo was in effect an Albanian polity with the Albanian language in official use, Albanian television, radio and press, and an ethnic Albanian government leadership. Even the courts which were used to persecute those calling for a republic of Kosovo had ethnic Albanian judges. However, the system was still ostensibly a Commumst one in which open religious attachment among party officials was suspect. Thus, while mosques were open and IslamiC religious practice was not banned, there were pressures against overt religious attachment. None the less, dunng thiS period from the 1970s till the rISe ofSlobodan Milosevic in the 19805, the Albanians of Kosovo enjoyed a better situation in terms of representation and cultural autonomy than at any tune since the collapse of the Ottoman empire. However, the refusal to give them republican status, despite their numerical supenority over other less numerous Slav 'Nations of Yugoslavia' who did have their own republic within the federation, illustrated that they remamed second-class citizens in the Yugoslav state. The young, frustrated Albanian intelligentsia was well aware of this; hence the continuing nationalist activity and the contmuing repreSSIOn. The essence of this dissatisfaction remained ethnic rather than religious. Indeed the Albanian hodzhas in Kosovo were conspicuous by their absence from the natIOnalist struggles of the early 1980s. 24 By the end of the decade this was changing with the (ethnically Slav) Yugoslav IslamiC leadership pointing out that the victims of the repression were Muslims, and petitioning both the federal government and the collective Yugoslav PreSidency over the continuing State of Emergency in KosovO. 25

and Serbs and Montenegrins began to complain of physical attacks and intimidation bv Albanians, and that the Albamans were creating 'ethnically pure z~nes' by a combination of pressure on Serbs to emigrate and their high natural birth-rate. Many Albanians were also emigrating, reflecting the region's dire economic situation - surely a major factor also in Serb/Montenegrin emigration. Despite this, the position of the Serbs in the region had began to come to the fore in mainstream Serbian public opinion by 26 the end of 1985, helping to fuel rISmg Serbian nationalism. Slobodan Milosevic rode tI11S upsurge of aggneved Serbian feeling and took power in Belgrade, Signalling a fundamental shift in policy. This was that the position of Kosovo and Vojvodina as effective republics within the Serbian republic as laid out in the 1974 Constitution was anomalous and should be changed. In October 1988 the VOJvodina party leadership was overthrown and replaced by Milosevic appointees. Next in 1989, Kosovo's autonomy was stripped away by constitutional changes, and troops were agam sent into Kosovo to deal with the resulting protests. The Kosovo Albanian leadership was purged, special measures were imposed by the federal presidency, and the federal authorities took over public security. It should be noted that despite Milosevic and the Serbs' leading role, the other members of the collective leadership acquiesced in this blatant demolitIon of the 1974 constitutional set-up and the ensumg military occupatIOn in KOSOVO,z7

152

The Serbian backlash - the rise if Milosevic and the reassertion if Serbian he,gemony The events of the 1980s exacerbated ethnic relations in Kosovo, 24 OffiCIal reports stated that not a single Muslim teacher or religious student participated in the 1981 demonstratIOns. but that they rather worked to resolve the problems-BM!Ja. Belgrade. 14-15 December 1985. 25

r1eSllik. Zagreb. 24 March 1990.

The best example of this was the ]anualY 1986 petition on behalf of the Kosovo Serbs which was was sent by 200 prominent Belgrade mtellectualsrepresentmg a wide range of opinion from fOrIner leading Marxists to Orthodox prIests - alleging 'genocidc' agamst the Serbs by the Albal1lans. In 1987 another such petition was signed by 60.000 Kosovo Serbs -see Poulton. op. nt., pp.

2(,

66-8. 27 Even the leading Yugoslav (and Serbian) diSSIdent Milovan Djilas, WIth his international reputation as a 'liberal'. supported Milosevic. m thIS stating: 'I agree with the policy of sorting out the relations of Serbia with her Province [Kos()vo]. I think he IS right in this respect and the mass meetmgs [Milosevlc organised a number of mass street demonstrations by his supporters to fo:ce the pace of his changes] were a positive tlung. " He went 011 to underlme the importance of Kosovo to the Serbs. saymg: 'Wipe away Kosovo from the Serb mind and soul and we are no more. .if there had been no battle at Kosovo. the Serbs would have mvented It for its suffering and heroism.' Unpublishcd mterview WIth Milovan Djilas by G. Cirjamc. Belgrade. February 1989.

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The Ser?ian Orthodox Church was especially delighted by the new polIcy 111 Kosovo. Speaking of Milosevic, whose father was an Orthodox priest, a Serbian bishop told a foreign journalist: 'At last we have a leader who fills the need of the Serbian nation. Now our culture can revive, for this younger generation of Communists in Serbia have more respect for the glory of medieval Serbia than their predecessors. . . ,28 ' Early in 1990 a further wave of demonstrations and violent clashes caused the deaths of thirty-two Albanians killed by the end of February. In April the federal authorities lifted the 'special measures' and removed most of the federal troops, leaving the Serbian republican authorities to take over direct police control. M~re than 200 members of the erstwhile mainly Albanian provincial polIce force were suspended and some 2,500 Serbian policemen 29 were drafted in. By Mayall ethnic Albanian members ofKosovo's government had resigned in protest at the Serbian take-over and the Kosovo Assembly, still with an Albanian n1aJority, was in deadlock. The Albaman deputies attempted to hinder Serb moves to end what remained ofKosovo's autonomy, and inJuly declared Kosovo an independent republic. In retaliation the Serbian Assembly on 5 July suspended the Kosovo Assembly and took control of local government as well as some sixty leading economic enterprises, sacking more than 15,000 Albanian functionaries by 30 September. Also in September, a two-thirds majority of exKosovo Assembly delegates, meeting 111 secret in Kacanik, adopted a new constitution for a republic of Kosovo and formed an underground government and legislature. 31 This was the basis of the continuing underground government body which attempted to fulfil the requirement of a 'normal' government, even claiming to take in the roles of defence and police matters. 32 It also discussed

economic co-operation and even signed a protocol of agreement on legal matters with Albania. 33 In October. 1991 tl!t!~A.1J?.ani:l!l~h~lc1.:1r~rerendum, despite official censure -a11d harassm.ent, onHthe issue .. o{i.k()uf of a possible 1,051,357 took part. with over 99 per cent voting )n favour. A proviSIOnal government was elected with BUJar Bukoslp as prime minister and Ibrahim RUf:SovaasVV()tIl~~b~pr~si:" dent. 34 \ In May 1992 they held further underground elections using a system of proportional representation with a 3 per cent threshold vote. The distribution of seats was 96 for Rugova's Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) , 5 for members of the Muslim nationality (i.e. Muslim Slavs) deputies, 29 for other Albanian parties and independent candidates; and 14 seats which were kept open for the Serbs and Montenegrins who of course did not take part. 35 This underground assembly tried to meet in an Islamic seminary in Pristina 111 June, but the police stopped this by occupying the building and arresting delegates and seminary stafer, The Kosovo Albanians led by Rugova displayed an impressive cohesion37 and sem.blance of democracy, with a multi-party system and elections. However, as with many other nationalist independence struggles, Rugova was leading a movement rather than a political party and, due perhaps to the inability to operate openly, this did not develop a genuinely democratic structure. Its main aim was independence for Kosovo, but there were currents calling for the unity of all Albanians in a 'Greater Albania' which would

28

TIle Independellt. London. 9 January 1989,

29 Radio Free Europe Weekly Record C!f Ellellts. Munich. April 1990. 30 Helsinki Watch. YI/,lt0slavia: HI/mall R"fthts Abuses Washington. DC. Octobcr 1992. p. 58.

ill

KosoIJo, 1990-1992.

31 Thc 'Kacanik Constitution' described thc republic ofKosovo as 'a democratic statc of the Albanian people and of mcmbers of other nations and national minorities who are its citizcns: Scrbs, Muslims. Montenegrins, Croats. Turks. Romamcs and others living in Kosovo.' TanJug, Belgrade, 13 September 1990, 32 Croatian Radio. Zagreb. 8 February 1992,

155

Albanian Radio. Tirana, 14 July 1992. and Albanian Telegraph Agency. Tirana. 25 Septcmber 1992.

33

34

Croatian Radio. Zagreb. 19 October 199L

35

Albaman Radio, Tirana. 7 June 1992.

36

Albanian Radio. Tirana, 23 and 25 June 1992.

There were, however. a few instances of ethnic Albanian Kosovars partakmg in political activity within the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and other pro-Serb and pro-Yugoslav political formatIOns. One of these was Basri Plan. who headed an assocIation of Serbs. Montenegrms. ethnic Albanians. Turb and Roma for a common Yugoslav state -Tal~ug, 14 January 1996. Another report claimed that 70 ethnic Albanians had joined the SPS. but this was denied by the Albaman news agency ATA-ATA, 13 January 1996. However, these few Albal11ans. seen as traitors by their compatriots. were numerically insignificant. 37

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The Kosovo Alba/lians

include Kosovo and parts of Macedonia. Montenegro and even southern Serbia proper;3H in tillS set-up, Albania would be seen less as a senior partner than as an equal. The Kosovo Albaman movement's methods took tile form of non-violent boycotting of official elections and withdrawing from the state apparatus the survivors of the purges mentlOned above. It sought internatlOnal recogmtion for Kosovo as a unit separate from Serbia according to the 1974 Constitution. Another relevant £1ctor was the attitude of Tirana. On 22 March 1992 the DemocratIc Party (DP) led by Sali Berisha swept to power, and DP leaders in theIr statements made a number of references to impending Alb;mian umty with Kosovo. Once in office. Bensha toned down such rhetonc smce, with Its economic, military and political weaknesses Albania was in no position to back it up. Apparently Berisha also came under US pressure not to encourages aspirations for Albanian unity and attendant border changes. In spite of this. Berisha's attitude to the Issue remained ambivalent. 3 '1 It became possible that if Rugova's strategy on non-violence continued to £1il, already existl11g radical elements. espeCially in Pee in the shape of Reshat NurboJa's regrouped Party of Kosovo. would come to the fore; so. too, might moderates calling for dialogue with the Serbs. Signs of such radicalisation were becoming apparent with grenade attacks on centres for incommg Serb refugees from other parts of former Yugoslavia on 11 February 1996. 40 More serious were the widespread attacks in late April on Serbs, civilians and police. leaving five Serbs dead and a number wounded. after an Albaman was shot dead by a Serb in Pnstina. 41

There are already visible splits within the Albanian camp. In early 1993 Veton Surroi and other moderates resigned from the Parliamentary Party due to Its being too radically anti-Serb. 42 and in 1994 he advocated Albanian participation in the rump Yugoslav electlOns:B The Christian Democratic Party was also rent asunder by l11ternal strife in mid-1993, and the long period that had elapsed since the declaration of a republic m 1990 WIthout the possibility of functlOnl11g openly precipItated great strains, which , an d ' government'mem bers to emIgrate. '44 caused some deputIes A number of leading LDK moderates reSIgned 111 October 1994, and it appeared that a split had developed between Rugova and Bukoshl, who left Kosovo for Germany.45 Furthermore. in 1997 the former long-term political pnsoner Adem Demac,:i appeared as a contender to Rugora calling for a more active policy. On the other hand radical splinter groups were also emerging;16 and

Examples of this trend are found 111 the speeches of the leader of the forum of Kosovo Albanian mtellectuals. Rexhep Qosja -see Koso"a Co III III II lIicatioll: '171C BlIlIetil/ oj" the Mil/istry of itlj"orlllatiol/ oj" thc Rcpublic of Kosolla. no. 150. 20 December 1993. QO~Ja also directly crItiCIsed Albanian President Berisha after he told NATO that 'the idea of a Greater Albania has absolutely no support among senous Albanian political forces'. sec Qosja's open letter to Zeri. Pristina. reported by Tal~ug, Belgrade. 20 January 1993. 3H

3() For example he and the DP strongly supported the radical breakaway f:lction in the PDP. the main Macedolllan Albanian political party. See H. Poulton. 1,V/1O arc the lI;[acedollialls?, pp. 189-90. and M. Vickers and J. Pettifer, AlIulIlia: 171'0111 Allarchy to a Balkall [delltity. London: Hurst. 1997,

40 The attacks took place in refugee camps in Vucitern. Pristina. Kosovska Mitrovica. Pee and Suva Reka without loss of life - T;lI~ug, 12 February 1996.

41 The initial incident started when Zlatko JovanovIc shot dead Annen Daci.

a 20-year-old Albanian student, whom he suspected of breaking into IllS car

157

on 21 April. A series of reprisal attacks on Serbs by gunfire and bombs resulted in Pee. Stnnlje and Decani - Na§a Borba. Belgrade. 25 April 1996. and Serb Radio. Belgrade. 23 April 1996. 42 Tal~jug, Belgrade. quoting BlIjkll, Pristllla. 22 April 1993, about Surroi's

resignation some months earlier. 43 East Ellropcall NClI'sletter. vol. 8, no. 21. 18 October 1994. The Albal1lans appeared to have no real strategy other than continuing with the boycotts and hoping for Western recognition. which seemed to be unforthcomlllg. Of course the Albanian boycott allowed the election of extreme SerbJall natIOnalists lIke the notorious 'Arkan' and others III Kosovo. which can be seen as havll1g helped Milosevic to remalll in power. However those Albanian leaders who advocated takll1g part III the elections admitted that the psychological barner of persuading Albanians to take part in the electoral process - i.e. take an active part in the political process - was too great. even if the boycott actually helped Milosevic. Things were not helped by the f.1Ct that the main Serbian opposition force ofVuk Draskovic was even more nationalistic than Milosevic in its rhetOriC. Albanians 111 southern Serbia. however, did take part in the January 1994 elections. and the Democratic Party of Albanians in coalition WIth the Party for Democratic ActiVity won 2 seats 111 Leskovac for the 250-seat Serb parliament - Tanjug, Belgrade. 8 January 1994. 'H See Zenun Celaj in BlIjktl. Pristina, 7 September 1993. 45 IiJid., which reported that Bukoshi's man 111 the Kosovo 'embassy' 111 Tirana, Skender Zog;U, had been replaced by LDK Vice-Premlent Anton Kol;U, who sharply critiCIsed Bukoshi for bemg willing to accept autonomy within FRY,

46 A new organisation called 'The Popular Front of the Republic of Kosovo' in early 1993 distributedlea£lets urging the removal ofleaders who had abandoned the goal of a Greater Albania (Tal~ug, Belgrade, 1 March 1993), and in April

159

Hugh Poulton and Mirmlda Vickers

The Kosovo Albanians

it seemed that if the Serbs in Bosnia and Krajina succeed in uniting with Serbia, it was likely that the call for Albanian unity, embracing not only Kosovo and Albania but also possibly western Macedonia, would intensi£Y.47 At the same time the worsening situation in Kosovo, combined wIth the UN blockade against rump Yugoslavia, greatly restricted communications between the Albaman cOlTunul1lties of former Yugoslavia. This was iromc, since for almost fifty years there had been free communication between all Albanians in Yugoslavia, while contact with Albania itself was impossible. The Macedonian Albanians had given crucial material and moral support to Kosovo, not least in aid for the underground education system (see below). The restrictions on contact between them by the Serbian and Macedonian authorities was viewed with great alarm by both communities. 4H The Serbian constitutional amendments of September 1990 vested all effective control of political, economic, judicial and security institutions in Belgrade, leaving only cultural and educational institutions under the control of local Serbs and Montenegrins. Apart from this, in all branches of the administration the combmation of Serbian purges and Albanian non-violent resistance resulted in the almost complete removal of Albanians from decision-making and executive functions. In Judicial matters the Supreme Court, Public Prosecutor's Office and other courts of Kosovo were abolished and some 200 Albaman judges, district and public attorneys were discharged and replaced by seventy-five Serbs and Montenegrins. 49 Replymg to the UN SpeCial Rapporteur

Mazowiecki's report of 1992 on human rights in rump Yugoslavia, the authorities stated that only ninety out of 284 employees in the provincial state administration were Albanian, 50 and these mostly in menial positions. Arnly units withdrawn from Macedonia were stationed in Kosovo from February 1992. 51 Being severely harassed by the authorities became a way of life for Kosovo Albanians: it was estimated that in 1981-95 more than half of the Albanian population of Kosovo were subjected to police harassment in some form, with such cases becoming more frequent in the 1990s. In 1994, for example, some 19,000 cases of police harassment of Albanians were reported by the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF) based in Pristina. Only one year later the CDHRF figure had risen to over 27,000 cases of which at least 11,000 allegedly involved torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. 52 Virtually no Serb police were ever prosecuted for ill-treatment or worse of ethnic Albanians. s3 A draft (rump) Federal Republic ofY ugoslavia (FRY) cittzenship bill, which at the time of writing was stillm course of preparation, reportedly discriminated against all those (ethnic Albanians) who left the FRY after it was declared in 1992. Article 12 of the draft bill envisaged citizenship being conditional on loyalty to the FRY while Article 35 adversely affected Albanian 1111l11lgrants from Al-

158

it was reported that 'the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo' had distributed leaflets calling for an Albanian upnsing in Kosovo - Tanjug, 2 April 1993. Another ofl,ldIlIsation, the Kosova Liberation Anny, appeared IJ1 1996.

47 Rugova himself warned that if the West accepted the diVIsion of BosniaHercegovina then the Kosovo Albanians would seek umon with Albania - TanJug, 21 July 1993. 4X For example the introductIOn of SerbIan exit visas of 10 DM per person and 30 DM per vehicle. and the complaints that Macedonian border guards arbitrarily confiscated large sums of foreign currency from Albanians at the Kosovo border (see Albanian Radio, Tirana, 22 May 1993) and the confiscation of copies of the review Jelzolla. printed in Skopje and destllled for Albanians in southern Serbia (see ATA. Tirana, 8 January 1994). 4')

A.A. Gashi (ed.), The Dwial ~(

HIIIIIIIII

alld Natiollal Rights q( AlhalliallS ii'

Koso '10. New York: Illyria, 1992, p. 106. TanJug, Belgrade, 20 November 1992. 51 Albanian Radio, Tirana, 18 February 1992. 52 The CDHRF is a human nghts monitoring body in Pristina which is widely respected by SImilar international bodies as wen as by the Serb Helsinki Committee in Belgrade. The CDHRF obtains documentary evidence on each case it reports and thus the actual figure is almost certainly much higher - the LDK, which does not investigate each indiVIdual case, gave the figure for incidents of harassment of ethnic Albal1lans in Kosovo by the authonties 111 1994 to be just under 25,000. Many incidents occurred in remote villages and thus were not reported. Figures quoted in Repatriate the Expellees? report by the Organisation Suisse d' Aide aux Refugies (OSAR) Delegation 11-20 January 1995 to Kosovo, Zurich. 6 February 1995. The 1995 figures come from the CDI-IRF, 53 A Serb policeman, Boban Krstic, was sentenced in April 1996 to a year's imprisonment for killing a slx-year-old Albanian boy and wounding his mother on 27 July 1994. This was apparently the first time such a sentence had occurred. More typical was the fact that after the incident. Krstic was promoted to deputy commander of Kacanik police station - HINA, Zagreb, 3 April 1996.

50

Hugh POllltoll a/ld Miranda Vickers

The KOSOllO Albanians

bania and theIr children who had previously gained Yugoslav citizenship.54 The ethnic aspect of the proposed citizenship law IS apparent from the ('lct that ethnic Serbs from all over former Yugoslavia, for instance Bosma or the Krajina region in Croatia, were not only eligible for FRY citizenship but were also offered a number of mducements to settle in Kosovo so as to alter the ethnic balance. In addition, the FRY Inheritance Law of December 1995 depnved the right of inheritance to persons who had not fulfilled the obligations of citizenship such as military serVIce. Property bequeathed to such people passes to the state instead. 55

publicity with accusations of Albanian 'terror' against Serbian policemen,5H Serbian residents in Kosovo 5C) and 'loyal' Albanians. 60 Despite these counter-accusations, it is clear that the Kosovo Albanians were ('lced with acute repression wl1lch resulted in the loss of many lives,61 and that their response was largely non-violent. An illuminating aspect of the confrontation of the Albanians with the Slav state was their refusal to report crilnes committed by other Albanians to the police, who are seen as agents of the occupying state. 62 Similarly, there was a widespread mistrust of other state organs - even the medical services. In early 1993 it was reported that over 90 per cent of Kosovo children were not bemg llnmul1lsed against illnesses like measles because of a fear that 'Belgrade' vaccines were intended to cause sterility.63

160

At the same tllne as the harassment of ethnic Albamans by the state, there was wide-spread arming ofKosovo's Serb/Montenegrin populatIOn by the authorities, resultmg in the presence of wellarmed Serb paramilitanes associated with extreme Serbian national groups. The boycotts of all official elections by the m~ority AIba111ans even resulted in the notonous extreme Serb nationalist Zeljko Raznatovic (,Arkan') bemg elected by the Serbs as a Kosovo deputy m the January 1994 elections. How well-arIned the Albanians were by contrast is hard to assess accurately. The Serbs repeatedly arrested leading members of the former Albanian Kosovo security apparatus, and of the underground Kosovo administration on charges of planning msurrection. 56 However, this appeared to be merely part of a wider pattern of mass arrests and repression. 57 The Serbs countered the resulting adverse 54

ATA, Tirana. 21 Octobcr 1995.

55 I am lI1debted to John Hodgson for this information. E.g. the underground 'Defence Mimster' Hajzer Hajzeraj and 30 others including the 'Chief of General Staff' Zanll Bcrisha arrested on 1 October 1993 - Serb TV. Belgrade. 1 October 1993 - of whom 19 were charged with prepanng an armed uprising - Tanjug, Belgrade. 28 October 1993 - while another 34 Albanians, mostly former Yugoslav army officials were charged with trying to establish a Kosovo Ministry ofDefcnce -Croatian Radio. Zagreb. 27 October <1993. Chargcs wcre also brought agamst 44 Albaman former securiry officials in Febmary 1995 - KosOfJO COlllllltlllicaliollS no< 208. 20 February 1995. UN Rapporteur Mazowiecki's report to thc UN j-juman Rights Commission notcd: 'The recent arrest of some 130 former employees of the Ministry of Intcrnal AfElirs. all of Albanian descent. <' K050110 COll11ll1l1licllliollS no. 206. 6 February 1995. 56

57

foOl' example the LDK reported that almost 800 Albanians fi'om Djakovo. Pee and Decam were detained in a 2-month period at the beginning of 1993. with police threatening to burn down their homes unless they handed over

161

weapoIlS - Croatian Radio. Zagreb. 22 February 1993. The Pristma based Council It)!' the Defence of Human Right~ and Freedoms reported that over 5.600 Albanians had been maltreated in the period August 1992 to August 1993AT A. Tirana 26 October 1993. 5H Alleging some 140 'terrorISt' attacks 1I1 1992 and the first half of 1993 - Tanjug, Belgrade. 27 July 1993. 5') Serb TV, Belgrade. 15 October 1993.

60 FRY Mimster of j-Iuman Kights. Margit Savovle alleged that Albanians loyal to the FRY were bemg subjected to rape. intimidation and even murder by radicals - Tanjug, Belgrade. 12 October 1993.

61 Albanian Radio. Tirana. 13 May 1993. reported that 19 Kosovo Albanian school childrcn aged between 11 and 18 had been killed in the previous 4 years along with 1 school principal and 3 parents in the struggles over the education system. While there were occaSIOnal cases ofSerb police being sentenced for deaths in detention - e.g. the 2 policeman accused of causing grievous bodily harm received three years' imprisonment for beatmg a forty-two-ycar-old Albanian to death III PriZren police station (Tal~ug, Belgrade. 2 Dccember 1993), the seCUrIty forces appeared immune to prosection for ill-treatment of Albanians. 62 LDK Deputy Chair. Fehmi Agam, raIsed this point over the spate of such CrImes - noticeably robbenes and the kidnapplllg and ransom of wealthy Albanians by other Albanians -and stated that the LDK had never advised anyone not to report crimes - Tanjug, Belgrade. 22 January 1993.

63 Tal~ug, Belgrade. 13 January 1993. Actually the vaccmc was of old fon11er Yugoslav stock and manuf.,ctured m Zagreb. Such boycotts aided the 11Igh death-rate of very young children in Kosovo - a rate I11flated by the dismIssal of many Albaman doctors and their replacement by Serbs. which agam fuelled nationalist paranOIa. Faced with such boycotts, the LDK-supporting Blljkll. Pristina. 19 January 1993. called on Albaman parents to have their children vaccinated<

162

Hugh Poulton al1d Miral1da Vickers

Education Under the 1974 Constitution Kosovo's education system was placed firmly under Albanian control and some textbooks used even orIginated from the neighbourIng state of Albania. The Serb authorities viewed this system with deep SuspicIOn, and as a primary cause and vehIcle of Albaman secessionism. In September 1990 a new curriculum was issued which made the education system uniform with the rest of Serbia; in particular, the emphasis on Serbian history and culture was increased. There was the option of receiving Albanian-language instructIOn in elementary schools, but most subjects had to be taught 111 Serbian. A higher percentage of secondary school classes could be held in Albanian,64 but in March 1992 the Serbian authorities ruled that henceforth secondary school teaching had to be exclusively 111 Serbian. Only in exceptional mstances and wIth the Mimster of Education's approval could a part or the whole of the curriculum be taught in a minority language. 65 The number of Serb students at Pristina University was 111creased,66 and in February 1991 the vice-presIdent of the Serbian Assembly announced that the teachmg of Albanian in Kosovo schools was to be dramatically reduced so that the number of Albanians allowed to attend secondary schools would become equal to the number of Serbs and Montenegrins attending.(,7 At Pristina UniversIty the Rector stated that Albanian would only be studied there as a foreign language. 6H Thousands of Albanian professors and teachers who refused to teach the new curriculum or who lectured in Albanian were sacked and replaced by Serbs, or had theIr schools closed. 69 The entire system was purged, the publication of basic textbooks serving nearly 500,000 pupils was suspended, with forty-two basic books being withdrawn, authors were sacked, and the distribution of Albanian textbooks to 200 cit., p. 45. 65 Hungalian Radio, Budapest, 31 March 1992. 64 Helsinki Watch, 01'.

66 East Ellropeall News/etter, vol. 4, no 1R, London, 10 September 1990. 67 T;1I~jUg, Belgrade, 6 February 1991. 6H

Radio Belgrade, 25 August 1992.

In August 1992 the Albanians stated that 6,870 Albanian teachers had been dismissed - AT A, Tirana, 19 August 1992. (,<)

The Kosovo Albal1ians

163

libraries was suspended.70 In reply the Albanians boycotted classes and again turned to parallel underground teaching. Despite threats from the authorities, these classes continued in private homes when the police occupied schools. 71 As a result of these measures and the ensuing boycott, Serbs and Montenegrins made up the vast majority of umversity students as well as elementary and secondary school pupils,72 and a stalemate ensued. 73 Finally, on 1 September 1996 an agreement 70 Director of Text and Didactic Means of Establishment of the Republic of Kosova, Sabit ]aupi, 111 a letter to UNESCO of 31 March 1992.

Croatian Radio, Zagreb, 28 January 1992. There was criticism from Albanian quarters (sec Blljkll, Priiitina, 29 September 1991) of the owners of large private houses who received DM 100 or more for each underground student every month. This raises the issue of the financing of the huge underground operations apparently organised mainly by the levying of'taxes' by the underground republic, reflecting the remarkable solidarity of the Kosovo Albanians. The employed, owners of private businesses and emigrant workers reportedly paid 30% of their earnings while £1nllers paid in kind - Tal~ug, Belgrade, 24 September 1993. However, there were reports of growmg unrest among Albanians about this 'republic funding', with increasing numbers reportedly refusing to pay the 'taxes' - see Bor/Ia, Belgrade, 4 November 1992, which wrote that at the start of that academic year, approximately 30,000 Albanian teachers in 'illegal' elementary schools were no longer ready to work without pay as they had 111 the previous 2 years. The article also noted the worse pOSitIOn of an estimated 50,000 ml11ers, workers and craftsmen, who, the article stated, had left their Jobs for political reasons (the Albanians claim they were sacked) after being promised that they would be paid by the underground authorities but who in the months prior to the articles' bemg published had received nothing. The article also stated that it was an 'open secret' in Kosovo that some 200,000 (some say nearer 400,(00) young Kosovo Albanians were 'sent' into temporary employment in foreign countrIes (the Albanians claim that they have been forced to seek work outside the country due to the repressive state measures) to finance the 'illegal republic' from their earnmgs, and that there were now indications that some were refusing to carry on with this funding. Despite such dire warnings, the underground republic continued to function. However, Rugova did seck donations fi'om Albanian emlgrant~ in Germany - Bujkll, Prii
72 Helsinki Watch,

01'. cit., p. 45.

1993, 320,000 primary and 90,000 secondary school pupils were bejng educated in the prIvate parallel schools - Blljkll Priiitina, 1 February 1993. The 1993-4 academiC year began with almost 20,000 Albanian students, 850 university teachers and some 60,000 high school students operatmg 73 At the beginning of

164

Hugh Poulton and Miranda Vickers

The Kosovo Albanians

for the unconditional return of students and staff to all levels of schools in Kosovo was signed by Milosevlc and Rugova. Other education- related issues were to be addressed by a sIx-person f,'TOup - three from the Serb side and three from the Kosovo Albanians.

total ofsixteen hours. 76 Belgrade also resorted to jamming broadcasts from Albania. 77 In August 1990 Rilindja was banned indefinitely and all its 200 journalists were fired. Efforts to resurrect it as a stock-sharing company were blocked by the Serbian government, which claimed ownership. In March 1991 the Kosovo Supreme Court passed a ruling to reinstate to reinstate the paper, but the authorities refused to comply unless the managers SIgned a declaration pledging allegiance to Serbian rule and that the paper would not criticise the Serbian government. ThIS was not accepted and the paper remained closed. 7H It eventually resumed as an em~1tre publication in Switzerland in May 1992.7'1 Private Albanian media outlets appeared to fill the gap, but unlike SerbIan or Turkish-language papers they did not benefit from government subsidies. Ho The independent Albanian-language press was repeatedly interfered with by the autll0rities, with short-tenn arrests of joumalists and editors and ba11l1ings for publishing 'hostile' information. The authorities also hindered the media by creating government-controlled monopolies and manipulating printing costs. H1

'The media The provll1cial assembly of Kosovo is the founder of Radio and Television (R TV) Pristina and the m~or Albanian, Serbian and Turkish-language dailies. In tandem with the political confrontation following MiloseviC's rise to power, the Albanian-language media came under severe pressure. ThIrty Journalists from Rililldja, the main Albanian daily, were suspended for reporting a political strike in Stari Trg by ethnic Albanians in February 1989, and in just over a year it had five editors. 74 When the Albanian-language media reported the Kosovo Assembly's declaration of a Kosovo republic in July 1989, police units closed down the Albanianlanguage broadcasting on R TV Pristina and most of the Albanian television workers were sacked or, like the director, fled to escape arrest. According to the former editor-in-chief Sali Kelmendi, some 1,300 people, predominantly Albanians, who were deemed unsupportive of the Serbian government lost their Jobs. R TV Pristina, like other Kosovo institutions, lost its autonomv and became a subsidiary of R TV Belgrade, with most of i~, employees Serbian or Montenegrin and most of its matenal transmitted in Serbian. 75 There was a steady ll1crease in Albanian-language broadcasting from this low point, and in December 1993 Pristina Radio extended its daily Albanian-language broadcasts - mere translations of former Serbian ones - by two hours to a

in private homes - Croatian Radio, Zagreb, 1 October 1993. This continued into the 1994-5 academic year, with demands from the Congress of Norwegian Teachers Union that the situation of more than 400,000 Albanian pupils and students and the 22,000 tcachcrs in all levels of education be normalisedKOSOIJO COlllllltlllicatiotl: Bulletin I!f tlte Millistry of ltifOmtalioll (!f tlte Republic (!f KOSO/hI, no. 192, 24 October 1994.

74 Jndex 011 Censorship, London, August 1990. Helsinki Watch, op. cit., p 29, which stated that there were then only two daily Albanian-language programmes, of 20 minutes and 5 minutes long. 75

165

Belgrade, 1 December 1993. The Serbs claimed that pressure by the Albanians on other Albanians not to work for what was perceived as the Serb state organs hampered progress. WIth only 20 employees working at the Albal1lan department due to tl1IS pressure - Serbian Radio, Belgrade, 26 November 1993. 77 AT/!, Tirana. 11 December 1993.

76 TtlI!;t(iZ,

78 7<)

Helsinki Watch, 01'. cit., p. 30. Croatian Radio, Zagreb, 6 May 1992.

Helsinki Watch. op. cit .• p. 30. The UN Special Rapporteur on fonner Yugoslavia at the 51 st UN Commission on I-Iuman RIghts reported: 'Before the break-up of former YugoslaVia. the Albanian-language press published over 20 Journals regularly. Now, there arc f.~r fewer. The largest Albaman journal Blljku. which appears twice a week, is reported to be under the influence of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo [LDKJ. There are some weekly Albanian publications including Kolw. FOrt/III;, Fjala, Shke/ldija and Zeri. The Serbian government has created an effective monopoly on the printing and distributIOn network in Kosovo. Through the establishment of the enterprise Panorama in May 1993 (a forced merger of three printing and publishing companies - Rilindja [Albanian), Jedinstvo [Serbian] and Tan [Turkish]), the government gained complete control over the printing facilities of certain publications. In addition, the bank accounts of journals preVIOusly published by these houses were taken over by Panorama. As a result of the take-over, Bujkll at one time had to pay printing costs that were ten times higher than those paid by the Serb-language Journal Jedillstvo. It has been HO

H1

J66

HtlJ;h Poultol1 al1d Miratlda Vickers

Employ/nenl Even under the Albanian-dominated 1974 system, but after its demtse thousands of Albanians were disn1lSsed from their jobs in all fields of employment. HZ Many were sacked because their alle~tance to Belgrade was in question. Participants in a general ~tnke 111 Septem~er 1990, protesting against the imposition of spectal measures 111 Kosovo, were sacked and proprietors who clo,sed thetr shops 111 sympathy ~ere. fined, some being refused perm.1SSlOn to reopen for one year. Thts pressure on small Albanian shops continued, and 111 August 1993 it was reported that more than 90 per cent of the private shops Pri§tina had been closed due to Serbian 'confiscation' in an apparent attempt to close down the Albaman-owned private food economy. H4 While manv workers were dismissed due to a claimed labour surplus, others wer~ replaced by Serbs and Montenegrins and, despite the acute employment problem, the authonttes managed to find jobs to tempt Serbs and Montenegrins into migrat1l1g to Kosovo. The Serbs seemed to have reverted to the inter-war policy of on the one hand trymg to colonise Kosovo with Serbs and Montenegnns while on the other putting pressure on Albanians to reported that the persecution of journalists has becn the most severe 111 Kosovo. Almost all former editors of Albanian ongm have becn persecuted by the police.' Repru~ted m KosOIJa COIIIIIIIIIlicatlOlI, Blllletill i!f tlze /Vlillistry of Itlformatioll of tlze ReplIblzc of Kosolla, no. 203, 16 January 1995. . . The Union of Independent Tr;lde Unions of Kosovo in Fcbntary 1992 stated that 84,848 Albaman workers had been dismissed by the Serbian authorities -:- the greatest I~umber being in education, science and culture (21.570); then 8,110 m the mll1mg mdustry; 7,804 in the constructIon industry; 5,666 in the metallIc mdustry, etc. It estimated the number of f.1milies without anybody employed I.n Kosovo at 62,500, of which 21,000 needed permanent social aid - AT A, TIrana, 8 February 1992. By October 1992 the figure claimed for those sacked had reached 107,371 while from 1990 to May 1995 some 400 economIc enterprIses had been put under Serbian control, with Albanians dismissed and Serbs brought in - AT A, 22 May 1993. The US humanitarian organisation Mercy Corps International distributed over 1,000 heaters and stoves, 1.100 tons offlour and 20,000 food packages etc. -ATA, 5 December 1993. The subSIStence ~~on~my be~ame the norm, WIth reports that some had even opened up small scale prIvate coal nllnes on state land without pernllSsion - Tal~ug Belgrade 4 March 1993. ' ' HZ

H3

Helsinki Watch, 01" cit .. p. 38.

H4

ATA, Tirana, 25 August 1993.

The Kosovo Albal1iaHS

167

emigrate, and the Albanians countered Serb claims of enforced emigration of Serbs with their own claims that almost 500,000 Albanians had left the province in recent years due to the Serbian repression. H5 At the same time they p01l1ted to a programme of Serb colonisation, the espoused aim of the Milosevic regime. Although the exodus of Serbs continued 111 1991, official figures showed that for the first time in decades more Serbs were moving 1I1to the province than out. H6 At the time of wnting, despite the huge numbers of Serbian refugees from the Yugoslav wars (some half a million in Serbia, mostly from Bosnia and Croatta), incentives and the official policy of settling 100,000 Serbs in Kosovo by 1999, relattvely few have moved there, although the number appears to be growing. H7 The failure to attract Serbs in numbers 250,000 leaving between 1981 and 1988 while in the fi)lIowing two years another 200,000, mostly aged between twenty and forty, also emigrated-see Pristina seminar reported by Albanian Radio, Tirana, 20 January 1992. Albanian emigration continued, especIally of young men of conscript age so as to avoid servmg 111 the rump Yugoslav army. AT A, Tirana, 11 December 1993, reported that the bodies of over twenty Albanian soldiers with marks of torture had been returned on the eve of completll1g their conscription and that a UNHCR report called for Kosovo Albanians fleeing recruItment and seeking asylum to be treated a speCIal cases. This exodus of Albanian males when they reach recruitment age was highly advantageous to the Serbs m three ways: the Serbs did not want to have (let alone arm and tram) Albanians m theIr army: it removed a potential opposition anny from Kosovo; and it greatly aided the emigratIOn of AlbamallS - see Veton Surroi, 'Kosova: Blues for '78' in Billkilll War Report: BIIlIetill i!f tlte Illstitllte for TVar a/ld Peace Reportillg, no. 23, March 1995, London. . H6 Tal\Jug, Belgrade, 6 March 1992. OHicial statistics for 1991 stated that 5.129 people left the province while 2,563 moved 111. Of those leaving 2,000 were Albanians, 1,257 Serbs, about 700 Muslims, and the rest Montenegrins, Turks and Roma - Tartiug, 6 May 1992. H7 The UNHCR stated that there were 3,748 SerbIan refugees m Kosovo from Bosma and Croatia while the Pristlna-based Forum of Albanian Intellectuals claimed that the figure was nearer 6,000 when Muslims from Bosnia and Serbs from Albania were taken into account - KosOIJ{/ COllllllllllicatioll: BIIlletill of tlte Millistr), of hiforlllatiOlI of tlze ReplliJlic of Ko.HlIJa, no. 207, 13 February 1995. The Serbian ComnllSsioner for Refugees said on 17 March 1995 about 1,100 refugees from former Yugoslavia (Croatia, Slovenia and Bosma-Hercegovma) and 1.300 Serbs who had fled Albania were currently reSIding in Pee district and that there was no money available for new refugee homes. It was reported that the Greek government would in 1995 start building homes for 40 refugee f.1milies in Djakovica - TanJug, 17 March 1995. Either way, the figures for Serbs settling 111 Kosovo remained small. However, 111 February data from the Serb Economy

H5 The Albamans clau11 a figure of

169

Hugh Poulton alld Mira/1da Vickers

The Kosovo Albaniarls

enough to replace the sacked Albanian workforce saw the Serbs trying to woo back Albanian engineers and managers and other workers in areas vital to the Serbian war effort like the metallurgical and minmg industnes. SH

when Kosovo effectively became an Albanian polity within the Yugoslav Communist federation/confederation, but this severely antagonised SerbIan sensibilities and directly aIded Milosevic in his rise to power. Thus the 1974 constitutional order came to an end, and the traditional Serb method of attempted colonisation and pressure on Albal1lans to emigrate was resumed. The Kosovo Albanians responded to this reassertion of traditional Serbian state hegemony with their own traditional methods of underground politics and an underground educational system - which, it must be emphasised, remains secular and not overtly Islamic. The situation of the Kosovo Albanians m neighbourmg Macedonia IS rather different. There too the mainly Muslim Albal1lans have £tced antagonism from Orthodox Slavs, but the Islamic component of Alb;nian identity is more to the fore than in Kosovo - although again the programmes of the leading Albanian partIes are couc~ed in secular terms. Maybe the difference is due to the Albal1lans in Kosovo being an overwhelming majority while there is also a sizeable Roman Catholic Albanian mmority. In Macedonia the Albanians may constitute regIOnal majontles in the north-west but in areas without a history as separate units like Kosovo under the 1974 Constitution; thus they remam a n1.inority. In Kosovo the conflict remains essentIally ethmc rather than religious.

168

Most of the Kosovo Albanians are Muslim, with some 50,000 Roman Catholics especially in Binac in Vitina Opstina and around Prizren. Kosovo had the highest percentage of believers of all the regions of former Yugoslavia. 89 There have been hIstorically good relations between the Muslim and Roman Catholic Albanian communities m Kosovo, and there appears to be no overt persecution on religious grounds, despite the prominent role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in alleging 'genocide' by the Albanians against Serbs and Its role m whippmg up Serbian nationalism. The building of Serbian Orthodox churches in the grounds of Pristina University and elsewhere90 was undoubtedly a deliberate policy of Serbian natIOnalism and much of the seemingly endemic hostility between Serbs/Montenegrins and Albanians is seen by some to be symptomatIc of a larger religious divide in the Balkans between Muslims and ChrIStians. However, the Kosovo Albanians' politIcal demands are all couched in secular terms without Islamic religious connotation. Moreover, the Muslim and Roman Catholic Albanians put up a united front against the Slav oppression, even if this oppression had a strong Orthodox component. The post-war Yugoslav Communist state saw a brief period Chamber in Kosovo reported over 20,000 Serb refugees in Kosovo - ATA. 28 February 1996. quoting Tanjug. InfoI1nation from Shkelzen Maliqi. chief editor of Telllo, Pristina, 28 March 1995.

HS

An opinion poll on religIOUS beliefin all the Yugoslav republics and autonomous provinces earned out in November 1985 gave the following results for percentages of believers: Kosovo 44'y.,; Croatia 33%; SloveI1la 26%; Macedonia 19'%; Bosnia-HercegovlIla 17%; Serbia 11 %; VOJvodina 10'y.,; and Montenegro 10% - [/ltenljll. Belgrade, 28 March 1986. 'JO The church withm the university was begun 1Il December 1992. The restoratIOn of Serbian Orthodox churches 111 DjakovlCa and other places provoked Albanian protest-see ATA, Tirana, 16 and 18 March and 30 June 1993. The building at the univerSity was halted for lack of finance but in March 1995 the Serbian press reported that work would start again - Kosollo COIllIllIlt/irafio/l, no. 212. 20 March 1995. 89

The Sandiak: A Perspective of Serb-Muslim Relations

9 THE SANDZAK: A PERSPECTIVE OF SERB-MUSLIM RELATIONS Milan Andre:ievich As the conflict raged in Bosnia-Hercegovina, another potential battleground emerged -namely, the Sandzak. Straddling Serbia and Montenegro, and bordering Kosovo, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Albania, this area links Serbia with Montenegro and provides it with its only direct access route to the Adriatic Sea. It is thus of great strategic importance to Serbia. However, the mhabitants of the Sandzak are largely Muslim (see Table 8.1) and regard the Serbian and Montenegrin administration as repressive. Accordingly they are seeking independence from the rump Yugoslavia as well as integration with the Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1 with whom they identify closely. Such ambitions, of course, directly threaten Serbian interests and would undoubtedly be met with force should an attempt be made to realise them. Developments in the Sandzak since the beginnmg of the 1990s have similarities to those which involved ethnic Serbs in both Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. In October 1991 the Sandzak Muslims held a referendum on increased political and cultural autonomy, as was done earlier that year by Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina and again like the latter, they sought to pave the way for eventual secession by forming self-proclaimed governments and assemblies through which they could declare their independence and freely decide whether to unite with neighbouring states. However, the Serbian government has argued that Muslim moves toward independence are contrary to the Helsinki Accords, which stress the inviolability of borders. While Belgrade aided and abetted Serbian bids for autonomy 111 Croatia and BosniaHercegovina, it denies the same rights to the Muslims of the Sandzak and the Province of Kosovo. 1 For the situation regarding the Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina see note 2 of the Introduction.

170

171

Table 8.1. THE POPULATION OF THE SANDzAK S.D.A. estilllates Mllslim % Total Serbian mUllicipalitics Nova Varos Novi Pazar Priboj Prijcpoljc Sjcnica Tutin Montenegrm l11umcipalitics*

258,164 21.812 85,700 35,888 46.516 33,584 34,664

156.115 1,857 65.079 10,828 19,935 25.628 32.788

60.5 8.5 75.9 30.2 42.9 76.3 94.6

165,828 2,000 69,000 10.828 22,000 28,000 34,000

Bijclo Poljc Ivangrad Plav Pljevlja ROZale

182.625 55.145 45.662 19.313 39.628 22.877

73.045 22.970 11.782 11.250 6.999 20,044

40 41.7 25.8 58.3 17.7 87.6

85.000 24.000 15.000 16.000 12.000 18.000

Combined totalt

440.789

229.160

52

250.828

Notc' Since the outbreak of war in neighbounng Bosnia-Hercegovina, the size and cthnic com;Josition of the Sandzak's population have undoubtedly altered. Although no relIable recent figures arc available, three developments mdicate that changes havc taken place: First. Serbian paramilitary forces arc reportedl~ pursu,mg a polIcy 0: ·cthmc cleansm g_ that closely resembles that of 'purging' areas or non-Serbs 111 both CroatIa and Bosma Hercegovina. Second. mostly Muslim refugces from Bosllla-I-Ie:cegovma. arc 'p0unng mto the region. Third. federal and republican militia have moved mto the Sand1.ak, bnngmg hardware with them.

* The municipality of Plav has never been part of the administrative district of the Bosnian and Hercegovmian Sand1.ak; the SDA, however. claIms that It once was part of ~llls region. Ivangrad and Roz'\ie were also not part of the Autonomous RegIOn of Sandz~k: wllich eXIsted from 1943 to 1945. However, both mt1l11ClpalIucs fell wlthm the adnlllllstraUvc boundarics of the Sandzak of Hercegovina from the seventeenth to mneteenth centuries (see Slavenko Terl.i';. Politika, 1 Septembcr 1992). t According to the federal census of April 1991, which did not take into account ivangrad, Plav. and Roi.'\ie, the population of the Sandi.ak (both the SerbIan and the Montenegrin part') totals 352.937, of which 186,084 (52.7%) arc MuslIms.

SOllrecs: Federal Yugoslav census of April 1991, published 1992; and Polljcda, 26 October and 3 November 1991.

Il1

jllgOSlOlJCI1Ski l'r~~led, no. 1.

172

The Sat/diak: A Perspectille if Serb-Muslim RelatlOlls

Milan Alldr~iellich

At stake here is not so much the Issue of what constitutes an ethnic or national entity as the future disposition of a territory that is especially dear to the Serbs. Serbia is unwilling to relinquish eIther the Sandzak or the predominantly Albanian province of Kosovo - both at the centre of medieval Serbia. It also refuses to recognise the aspIrations of Muslims in the Sandzak, claiming that an independent SandZak would pose a threat to SerbIan territory. This claIm has turned the questIOn of an independent Sandzak into one of the key Balkan political and security issues. Amid reports that Muslim paramilitary groups have formed for the purpose of self-defense and to prevent the 'loss' of the SandZak, Serbian nationalist parties and their paramilitalY arms have mcreased their presence in the regIOn.

Historical iJack,e:rolll1d In the nineteenth and early twentIeth centuries the Sandzak was known as the Sandjak of N ovi Pazar - the name of the old Serbian region of Raska, which, in the early eleventh century, was the centre of the first Serbian state. From the late fourteenth century to the 1870s the area was under Ottoman Jurisdiction. In 1878 the Habsburg monarchy of Austria-Hungary was granted admil11strative control over Bosnia-Hercegovma and occupied the Sandjak of Novi Pazar. Serbian nationalists had hoped to gam the Sandzak and parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina after their battles against the Ottoman empire because, although still under Ottoman suzerainty, the areas were no longer subject to the direct control of Constantinople. In 1881 Prince Milan of Serbia mfonned the European powers that Serbia would not tolerate any opposition to the dual monarchy, but the Serbian nationalists saw it as standing m the way of two of their long-cherished goals: the unification of all Serbs and the economic advancement of theIr countly. As for ethnic unification, not only had the Habsburg empire been home to a major part of the Serbian nation, but it had also extended its influence over the Serbs m the late nineteenth century by occupying Bosl11aHercegovina and the Sandbk. According to SerbIan natlonalists, Serbia could never become a modern, developed nation as long as it was economically dependent on Austria-Hungary which, by the first decade of the twentieth century, hemmed Serbia in on

173

three sides - north, west and south. This view gained in strength 2 WIth its occupation of the SandZak. In October 1908 Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Hercegovina, but in an attempt to soften the blow -whIch at the time shook Europe and particularly Serbia - simultaneously renounced its right to occupy the SandZak, over which the Ottomans regained control 111 return for their acquiescence in the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. In October 1912, during the First Balkan War Serbian and Montenegrin forces occupied the Sandzak and divided it between them; thus, after 523 years Serbia regained control over it as well as over the Kosovo region. In the Treaty of Bucharest concluded at the end of the Second Balkan War in August 1913, Serbia and Montenegro divided the Sandzak and thus secured a common border, which exists to this day. More important, landlocked SerbIa had finally gained direct access to the Adriatic through Montenegro. In 1913 no Orthodox Serbs were under Ottoman rule and many non-Serbs could be found on Serbian territory: Macedol11an Slavs, Turks, Vlachs, Albanians and others. Serbian policy at the tnne was to regard the Macedonian Slavs as Serbs and to look upon the rest as l11terlopers 3 who would eventually be assimilated. Between 1913 and 1943 the region (referred to as Raska) remained part of SerbIa and Montenegro. In 1943 Tito's AntiFascist Council for the Liberation of Yugoslavia declared the Sandzak an autonomous region;4 then, in 1945, it was again divided between Serbia and Montenegro but was not granted autonomous status under the Yugoslav, Serbian or Montenegnn constitutions. As indicated in Chapter 2, the Serbo-Croat-speaking Muslims of Yugoslavia pursued a survival strategy of co-operation with Sec Andrej Mitrovic (cd.). Istorija Srpskog tlllroda (History of the Serbian People). vol. 1, no. 6. Belgrade: Srpska Knjizev11I Zadruga, 1983. 3 It is estimated that the Sandzak's Turkish Muslim populatIOn accounted for nearly 80%, of the region's population II1 1913. According to Muslim leaders, a policY of forced migration resulted in the exodus of some 300,000 Muslnns to Turkey and parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina between 1913 and 1941. AccordlI1g to SIavenko Terzic, the director of the HistOrIcal Institute of the SerbIan Academy of Arts and Sciences in Belgrade. YugoslavIa and Turkey signed an agreement in 1938 under which more than 40,000 cthmc Turkish f;ullilies were allowed to mIgrate to Turkey - Politika, Belgrade, 1 September 1992.

2

4

Ibid.

174

Milan A/ldrejevich

the powers at the centre of the state. From the 1960s onwards the Tito regime attempted to end the competition between Serbs and Croats over the ethnic ownership of the Bosnian Muslims by introducing the concept of a separate 'Muslim' ethnic group. In the census of1971 the Bosnian Muslims were ofrlcially recognised as one of the 'Nations of YugoslavIa' but in spite of this official sanction the notion of the Muslims constituting a separate 'nation' remamed weak until the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The SerboCroat-speaking Slav Muslims continued to have mixed feelings towards the Yugoslav state: on the one hand they were a religious mll10nty m a non-Muslim state, but on the other they were part of the Serbo-Croat-speaking Slav maJonty. The rise in assertive SerbIan nationalism propagated by the Serbian state elites from the mid-1980s helped to crystallise a stronger separate Muslim national conSCIOusness. The Sandzak region resembles the province of Kosovo, in that it is poor and economically underdeveloped. Industrial development smce 1945 has centred on textiles, but agriculture remams the mam economic activity. There are good grazing lands as well as mdigenous hardwood forests. Much of the region is outstandingly beautIful, but so far no mfrastructure exists for a tourist industry. SandZak Muslims have the reputation of being good businessmen and craftsmen and are consIdered more sympathetic toward European than 'Turkish' attitudes. s

T71e struggle Jor autonolnY Soon after a referendum held on 25-27 October 1991, Muslims in the Sandzak declared their autonomy in an attempt to counterbalance the Bosman Serbs' similar declarations and in the hope of deternng Belgrade from annexing the Serbian autonomous regions in Bosnia-Hercegovina. They emphasised that they felt t~1reatened by the Serbs and that as a nationality they had the nght to declare themselves autonomous, just as the S€rbs had done in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. The SandZak Milslim leadership hopes that ultimately theIr region will be reunited wIth

5 See comment by Sand:l'.1k Muslim leader SulcJll1an Ugljanin, Os/o/Jodjctljc, Sar~evo. 9 September 1990, and M/aditl(/, Ljubljana, 4 March 1992. ..

The Satldiak: A Perspective of Serb-MlIslim Relations

175

the 'motherland' which, it claims, is Bosnia-Hercegovina. 6 Sandzak and Bosnian Muslim leaders also maintain that there are strong cultural and lingusitic links between their communities. The Sandzak Muslims, according to their intellectuals, are neither Turks nor Serbs who have converted to Islam, but Muslims who speak neIther Albanian nor a pure Ekavijatt (the dialect spoken by the m~ority of Serbia's citizens). In the October 1991 referendum the SandZak Muslims were asked whether they were m favour of the regIOn's 'full political and territorial autonomy' and its 'right to [integration with] one of the sovereib'11 republics' - presumably Bosnia-Hercegovina. 7 The referendum was organised by the Muslim National Councilcomposed of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Muslim Bosnian Orgamsation, the RenaIssance Society, the Merhamed AssocIation, the local branches of the Reform. Forces of Plav and Bijelo Polje, and the Association of Sandzak Writers. s Muslims in five municipalities in the Serbian part of the Sandzak voted overwhelmingly in LWOur of autonomy. Only one Serbian municipality, Nova Varos, where the SDA had not been politically active, failed to set up polling stations. According to the final results, 70.2 per cent of eligible voters in the Sandzak (185,437 out 264,156) went to the polls, and of these 98.9 per cent (183,301) voted for autonomy.') Serbian officIals disputed those figures, saymg that the number of eligible Muslim voters was too high. 1O They also described the referendum. as 'illegal, unnecessary, and senseless,' (, Sandzak Muslim leaders who [wour autonomy use the term 'reunificatIOn" clalll11ng that the Sandhk was part of Bosma-Hercegovina II1 the 14th century: but at that time Bosnia was part of the Serbian empire. The term 'motherland' IS used mainly by the Sandzak's main opposjtlon party, the Party of DemocratIc Action. which stresses that the regIOn was once a part of the Ottoman district of the Sandjak. VCi'en!ii list. Zagreb, 25 October 1991, The council was founded 011 19 May 1991 in Novj Pazar. The Serbian SDA. a branch of the SDA of Bosnja-Hercegovjna. was founded there on 11 August 1990. There is also a branch of the SDA III Montenegro. which was founded shortly after the Serbian branch and wlllch co-operates closely with its Serbian counterpart.

7

H

\) Os/obodjClljc, 31 October 1991. 10 Vci'l'fIlje /lovosti. Belgrade. 4 November 1991. Sandzak Muslims living in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina also voted in polling stations set up in mosques jn those republics (Vci'cmji list. 31 October 1991).

176

Milal1 A/1drejevicl/

The Satldiak: A PerspectilJe of Serb-Mllslim Relatiolls

stressing that it was the Serbs in the reglOn who were threatened. 11 The referendum was not widely supported among the Muslims 111 the Montenegnn part of the SandZak, according to several reports, because 1I1ter-ethnic relations in these parts of Montenegro 12 are good. However, between October 1991 and early 1995, there were some thirty attacks involving explosIves on hotels, stores, restaurants and other Muslim-owned property. Serbian and Montenegrin republican leaders had tned to prevent ~he plebiscite, first by mounting a propaganda campaign against It and then by ordering the police to dismpt the actual voting. The Serbian government argued that the referendum was unconstitutIonal because it was aImed at changing Serbia's and Montenegro's borders and severing Serbia's links with Montenegro. It had also ma111tained that having never existed as a unified political entity 111 the past, the SandZak could make no historical claim that would justify the establishment of an autonomous 13 reglOn. A Serbian National Assembly resolutlOn asserted that because the Sandzak was spread over two republics and did not constitute a 'legal terntorial entity', It could not be granted autonomy.14 Although Belgrade had said it would take tough measures to prevent the balloting, no clashes were reported. Serbian police units closed down some polling statlOns on 25 October, forcing Muslims to vote clandestinely in private homes; 15 Montenegrin ofIi.cials confiscated 'large quantities ofelection documents' and subsequently arrested several of the organisers. If> After the referendum the Montenegrin police force 111 B~ielo Polje detained nearly all SDA leaders, searched their homes and harassed members of their £llnilies. 17 DespIte Muslim protestations to the contrary, the tuning of the referendum and the close ties between Bosman and Sandzak Muslim leaders suggested that Bosman Muslims had played a part

in organising the vote. It was scheduled soon after SandZak leaders, prompted by the declaration of several SerbIan autonomous regions in Bosnia-Hercegovina in September 1991, had reiterated their long-standing threat that 'if the map of Bosma-Hercegovina is redrawn' at the expense of the Muslims, they would declare the Sandzak autonomous. 1H Although they ll1slsted that the Bosman leadershIp was not involved 111 organising the referendum, the Belgrade daily Politika claimed that the move had been sponsored by the leadership of the Bosnian SDA and pOll1ted out that referendum posters had been printed in the Bosman capital, SaraJevo. I!) The mdependent Belgrade daily Borba also claimed that the referendum had been conducted under Sar~evo's auspices,zo In late November 1991 the Muslim NatlOnal Council established a 'shadow government.' However, its actiVIties receIved scarcely any publicity till shortly before the conference on the fonner Yugoslavia in London from 26 to 27 August 1992.21 The Sandzak Muslim leader and SerbIan SDA chaIrman SuleJman Ugljanm, announcing that the Council's representatives would attend the London conference, saId that it would suspend all contacts with the Serbian, Montenegrin and rump Yugoslav authorities until 'terror agamst Muslims stops and the status of the Muslim people is resolved.' The SDA Secretary Rasnn LJ~i6, also the self-styled prime minister of SandZak, said that the reglOn mIght secede and establish a republic if the new rump Yugoslavia received international recognition. Lj~i6 also noted that the invitation to attend the London conference indicated recognition of the Council as 'the legitimate representative of Muslims and the region'.22 However, by mid-November 1993 Ugljanm announced that he was not seeking 'the separatlOn of the Sandzak provided that Bosnia-Hercegovina remains united within its [internationally

II

Vecem;i list. 31 October 1991.

12 See Milan AndreJcvich. 'Montenegro follows It~ own course', RFE Report Eastem Ellrope, no. 47, 22 November 1991. 13 Politika, 24 October 1991. 14 Ibid.

011

15 Vci'l'mje 1I(0)osli. 27 October 1991. If> 17

Pobjeda, Titograd, 29 and 30 October 1991. VjcSIIik, Zagreb, 30 October 1991.

177

lH Radio Serbia, 26 September 1991, 3.00 p.m. In early 1991 Ugljanll1 commented that 'Muslims can no longer vegetate as Milosevic presses on with his hooligan behaviour' (Vci'ertyc tlOIJOSti, 8 April 1991); in the summer of 1990 130snian President and SDA chairman Alija Izetbegovlc openly advocated cultural and possibly political autonomy for the Sand7A1k (Dlltws. Zagreb, 14 August 1990).

Po/itika and Os/o/JOnjeuie, 24 October 1991. BoriJa, 29 October 1991. 21 Polilika, 8 November 1991; and VjcS/lik. 8 and 19 November 1991. 22 Radio SerbIa, 31 August 1992. 19

20

178

Milan Alldrejevich

recognised] frontiers. m The SDA and the Muslim National Council defined their concept of autonomy in the Memorandum 011 the Special Status
Deteriorathl,!! ethnic relations In early 1989 ethnic relations m the Serbian part of the Sandzak began to worsen after nearly four decades of relative quiet and toleratlOn (the situation in the Montenegrm part is discussed below). The Serbian press suggested at the time that this, combmed with the SandZak's depressed economy, resembled the situation in the neighbouring province of Kosovo. The Belgrade biweekly Svet

The Sandiak: A Perspective of Serb-Muslim Relations

referred to the Sandzak as 'a second Kosovo', pointing to the growing aspiratIOns for a greater Albania among Albanian nationalists and radical Islamists as the reason for the migration 26 of ethnic Serbs and Montenegrins from KoSOVO. The Serbian government supported this media campaign both to reinforce the impression that the Muslims were the cause of the nugration, and to conceal the fact that most Serbs were leaving the Sandzak for economic reasons - e.g. in search of higher-paid jobs. The media also reported the Immigration of Muslims from Bosnia and Kosovo. It was alleged that the Serbs were becoming poorer while the Muslims were accumulating wealth at their expense. Serbian officials were quoted as saying that non-Serbian children attending Islamic schools in the Sandzak were being taught in Albanian as well as receiving instruction on the Quran. Most of Belgrade's tactics only increased fears that clashes similar to those in Kosovo would take place between the region's Serbian and Muslim inhabitants. 27 Svet also reported that the Serbian population of Novi Pazar - the largest city in the SandZak, located in the Serbian part of the region - feared provocation by Albanian irredentists as well as the latter's open alliance with local Muslim and Albanian mtellectuals. The Serbs argued that this alliance sought to create 2H either a greater Albanian state or a Muslim one. Muslims responded by disputing Serbian clallns comparing t~~e> SandZak .to Kosovo, and Novi Pazar to the Kosovo CIty of Pnstma. Mushm and numerous local Serbian leaders denied that Novi Pazar was ethnically divided between Muslims and Serbs?} Muharem Hodzic, chairman of the Socialist Alliance of Novi Pazar (a branch of the League of Communists' mass front organisation), claimed that his city was one of ' brotherhood and unity' and implied that Albamans 30 and Serbs in Pristma were bitterly divIded. Svet, citing official Serbian figures, also reported on the migration Sllet. 12 July 1989 For the situatIOn in Kosovo see Chapter 8. Intcrvicws conductcd by thc author 111 August 1989 with a Iargc number of Scrbs. Albanians. and Muslims in Novi Pazar and Bijelo Polje suggestcd that although cthlllc tension cxistcd. thc Belgrade mcdia had cxaggerated the SItuation.

26

27

23 Vest!. Frankfurt. 21 Novcmber 1993. 24 Nedjclj/1a dalmacija. Split. 21 July 1993. Policc in Novi Pazar confiscated all 3.070 printcd copies on the grounds of'incitement to hatred and cncouragcmcnt of national and religious mtolcrancc' and prohibitcd its further publication. 25 Ibid.

179

29

26 July 1989. Intervicws conducted by the author in Novi Pazar.

3()

Ibid.

2H Siler.

Milan Alldrejevich

The Sal1diak: A Perspective if Serb-Muslim Relatiotls

of Serbs from Novi Pazar to other parts of Serbia; the figures quoted in Svet suggested that the city's SerbIan population fell from 39 per cent in 1978 to 29.5 per cent in 1988, whereas its Muslim population had increased from 58 to 67 per cent in the 3 same period. ! But these latter figures probably reflect a change in how local Muslims declared themselves in censuses, as well as a higher birth-rate among Muslims. In the census of 1961 most Muslims declared themselves either Serbs of Turks, but bv 1971 they were recognised as a nation and most accordingly d~clared themselves Muslims in the 1971 and 1981 censuses. However, Belgrade also released figures on the 'forced' migration of Muslims and Serbs. In the 1960s some 30,000 Muslims left NOVI Pazar for Turkey (this was the last such mass exodus). Between 1968 and 1982 about 10,000 Serbs left the city and between 1983 and 1987 only 321. 32 Thus, as the SOCIalist Alliance of Novi Pazar has pOl11ted out, the figures quoted by Svet, though seenungly accurate, were deliberately reported 111 a misleading way to support Belgrade's clalI11S that Muslims were pursuing a policy of 'ethnic cleansing' against Serbs. Also supporting the SerbIan government's claims were reports that Serbs were being forced fi'om their jobs 111 Novi Pazar's industrial and business sectors and local government in the process of 'ethmc cleansing'. 33 According to figures released by the SocIalist Alliance of Novi Pazar in 1989, of the 16,339 people employed in the industrial and business sectors 11,826 (72.3%) were Muslim and 4,284 (26.2%) Serbian; of the 2,886 workers in the better-paid social sector (education and other public services) 1,642 were Muslim (56.8%) and 1,184 Serbian (41.8%). Of the 157 top managers in the mdustrial and business sectors 111 (71 %) were Muslim and forty-six (29%) Serbian. Of the eIghty-two directors in the non-economic sector, forty-two were Muslim (51 %) and forty (49().{1) Serbian. The population of Novi Pazar was reported to be 71 % Muslim and 29% Serb. 34 Thus, contrary to the arguments emanating from Belgrade, the number of Serbs employed in the

industnal, business and SOCIal sectors was in proportion to the city's Serbian populatIOn and in some cases - notably in management - even disproportionately high, probably because of better training and greater political influence. The Zagreb magazine Start characterISed the Belgrade media's distortion of the situation m the Sandzak as part of Serbian President Slobodan MiloseviC's attempts to consolidate his political power by encouraging Serbian nationalism. Start noted that it could also be interpreted as an effort to turn Serbian public opinion against the Muslims in the Sandzak and to portray them negatively.35 Sandzak leaders, including Serbian businessmen, described the reports of discrimination against the Serbs and a possible outbreak of violence in the Sandzak as £1bncatIons, saying that to believe such reports was to play into the hands of Milosevic. They also again commented that to compare the Sandzak to Kosovo was unjust and did not represent the true situation there. 36 Unemployment, wluch had doubled aITlong Muslims in the Sandzak since 1989, was estimated in 1995 at 25 per cent among Muslims livmg in Novi Pazar; leaders there claimed that what was happening in the SandZak was a repeat of Kosovo 111 1990, when the province's self-governing autonomy was revoked and thousands of Albanians were fired as a political action. SDA leaders claimed that Serbs were practising ethnic cleansing through a combinatIOn of intimidation, achieved by a heavy army-police presence, and tampering with local administrative boundaries to dilute the Muslim vote. One Serbian daily paper suggested that the municipality of Novi Pazar be subsumed in that of Raska (20 km. to the north), because the latter city had been the capital of Serbia from the twelfth century till shortly after the Serbian defeat 111 1389 at Kosovo Polje. 37 The violence accompanying the break-up of Yugoslavia changed the complexion of ethnic relations in the SandZak. The Muslims there openly accused Serbian nationalists of threatening to create a greater SerbIan state devoid of any ml110rities 'hostile' to Serbia. Between 1993 and 1995 the SDA repeatedly claimed that Serbia was violating the rights of citizens of the SandZak; most charges

180

31 The figures for 1978 were based on the 1971 census; those for 1988. on the 1981 census and subsequent local government estimates. 32 Start (Zagreb), 28 October 1989. 33 Sflct. 26 July 1989.

34

Start. 28 October 1989.

35

36

Ibid. Ibid.

37 Political cksprcs. Belgrade. 10 April 1992.

181

182

Milan Alldnjevich

made before the outbreak of violence in Croatia in the summer of 1991 involved allegations of Serbia's efi:orts to keep the region's level of prospenty low by discouraging investment - charges which the Serbs denied, claiming that the government had encouraged investment and pOll1tll1g to the establishment of some 3,000 Muslim-owned private businesses and shops since the late 1980s?H

COI?fiictinJ! reports In September 1992 it began to be reported that tens of thousands ofSandZak Muslims were fleeing Serbian 'terror' and that detention camps had been hastily set up for both Muslim refugees and local residents. 39 According to a letter from the Muslim NatIOnal Council to the conference on the former Yugoslavia in Geneva, about 70,000 Muslims fled the Sandzak -from conscription in the army and 'Serbian military terror':10 Ugljanin, chairman of the Council, claimed that the Sandzak had been occupied by the federal Yugoslav army (the former Yugoslav People's Anny) and that 29,000 reserve troops had been sent to the area between early February and June 1992. By this account, both the terror to which the Muslims were subjected and the display of military might and combat hardware had been stepped up since the London conference on the former Yugoslavia, and there was no sign of either letting Up.41 Previously, however, Ugljanin had cautioned that everything happening was essentially 'an awakenmg of the people's historical menlOry' and warned that 'it is too late to seek reconciliation with the Serbs' -who had been 'blinded by the SerbIan national programme, which provides for the ethnic cleansl11g of those areas of the former Yugoslavia that [they] want for themselves. ,42 Serbian and Montenegrin officials at the republican and local 38 Politika, 21 and 22 September 1992. The Serbs also deny that Muslims are discriminated against. arguing that few. if any. traffic signs III the region arc in Cyrillic. The Sandzak Muslims. for their part. are Irritated by Serbia's refusal to permit the establishment of a Muslim uI1lversity in Novi Pazar. 39 Radio Croatia, 8 September 1992.


41 [Md. 42 Mladi,Ja. 4 August 1992.

The Sal1diak: A Perspective

cif Serb-Muslim Relatiolls

183

levels denied the existence of detention camps in the Sandzak. 43 Moreover, a delegation from the Peace Movement of Bavaria that toured the region in late September 1992 and interviewed an unspecified number of refugees reported that there had been no SIgn of the existence of detention camps then or previously, or evidence of widespread human rights abuses. According to it~ leader, Barbara Nolman, resIdents m the Sandzak were living peacefully and refugees from Bosnia-Hercegovina had been offered shelter in private homes, hotels and youth centres. 44 A three-member United Nations human rights group also visited the Sandzak in mid-October 1992. According to a report in the independent daily Borba, the delegation was informed by Ugljanin's SDA of ethnic hatred, murders and ethmc cleansing, but was surprised to find Serbs and Muslims sitting together in cafes. It was met by the mayor of No vi Pazar, KostaJovanovic; the SerbIan National Assembly deputy Mahmut MeI11lc, a fonner leader of the SDA and chairman of the Green Party and, till January 1993, assistant federal minister for minority nghts; the police chief Mirko Rakonjac; and the head of the mUI1lcipal court, Nufo Mehovic. The four officials told the delegation that, despite the existing tensIOn, efforts had been made to mamtain peace and stability in the region. On the other hand the SDA secretalY, Lj~ic, said that the Sandzak was occupied by the Serbian militia, that Muslims lived in fear of police and army terror, and that there had been many clashes between Serbian security forces and Muslims. Borba countered by reporting that the worst thing the UN observers had experienced was being kept awake by the noise of traffic outside their hotel. Whereas the observers had expected to see army convoys and buses filled with armed Serbs, the paper continued, the buses had been filled with shoppers from many areas of Serbia. The daily reported that Novi Pazar was well stocked WIth food, household goods and spare parts for electncal appliances and automobiles, and that Serbs from Belf.,'Tade went there to buv items that were unobtamable elsewhere in Serbia. Sandzak M~lslims, for their part, were able to travel to Turkey via Bulgaria and return with goods, ununpeded by customs. 45 43 Politika. 12 August 1992; and Pol1}cdll. 10 August 1992. 44 Barllll. 25 October 1992. 45 [bid., 20 October 1992. Memic is a leading human-rights actIvist and Ugljanin's

185

Milm1 Andrejellich

The Smldfak: A Perspective of Serb-Muslim Relatiol1s

Serbian politicians generally continued to counter SDA charges of ethnic cleansing, accused Muslim leaders of exaggerating the problems for political ends, and critiCISed the SDA leadership for their ingratitude after Serbia had taken in thousands of mainly Muslim refugees from the fighting in Bosnia-Hercegovma. Jovanovic, for example, said: 'the situation is normal in NOVI Pazar and it can remain stable, but the situation could be politIcally abused, if someone wants to use It.'46 Federal military officials noted in November 1993 that 'the general security situation in the Sandzak IS fir better than it was a year and a half ago. '47 Serbian government and security officials also claimed that fear and extremism had subsided in 1993, and mter-ethnic tolerance lI1creased - an opmion that appeared to be shared by Muslims employed in Serbia's state administrative structure, such as the deputy mayor of Sjenica, Mustafa Cigal (Cigal has done no more than occasIOnally state that government bodies, local and federal, have made nlistakes in their dealings with the public.)4H Countenng SerbIan denials and the initial findings of lI1ternational observers in 1992, a report that year by a Helsinki Watch representative corroborated claims by the SDA that there was a heavy military presence in Novi Pazar, noting an unspecified number of tanks positioned in the outskirts of the city with their guns pOll1ted at the city centre. The tanks did not seem to serve a military purpose, and there was a heavy military presence in

other cities and towns in Serbia and along the Serbian-Bosnian border. The report concluded that the presence of tanks 'appeared · popu latIOn. ' ,49 aimed at intimidating the local and re £iugee Mus 11m However, in April 1993 Western diplomats who visited the region were cautious and only observed that they knew 'of no evidence of systematic human nghts abuses in the area, although groups of Serbs from inside or outside SandZak were guilty of crimes agall1st the regIOn's Muslims.' They added that some Muslim leaders 'had not helped matters by fanning tensions and apparently . to mCIte . . 1latre d'~ tryll1g .'

184

main critic. Hc has rCJcctcd thc SDA's steps toward crcating an indcpendcnt SandZak and Il1stcad advocatcs that thc Sandzak rcmain within a democratically rcformcd federal Yugoslav framcwork.

46 Reuters, 29 April 1993. Onc of many examples occurred on 13 October 1993. Radio SerbIa rcported that a clash bctwccn f.lns during a socccr match Novi Pazar worried some Scrblan ofilcials about thc broadcr conscquenccs that might worsen relations betwcen local Muslims and Scrbs. Violence cruptcd at a match bctween thc Novi Pazar and Pristina clubs on 10 Octobcr. A large group of Novi Pazar f.lns, mostly Muslims, chantcd anti-Serb slogans - 'This Is Turkcy' , 'Jihad, Jihad' and 'We Will Cut Arkan's Throat' -and unttlrlcd thc flags of Turkcy and thc SDA. Local SDA ofilcials said that the presencc of the Pristina club's presidcnt, thc fcdcral parliamentary deputy and paramilitary lcader Zcljko Raznatovic, alias Arkan, was a provocation. A rcport by the Yugoslav Socccr Association, which Arkan denied, saId that thc trouble was caused by Serb fans of thc Pristina club, some thirty of whom were arrested. 47 Polifika. 26 November 1993. 4H Ibid.

111

The role


and Muslim paramilitary groups

Despite the initial findings of the human rights groups, media reports in Belgrade in 1992 ll1dicated that the situation was becoming increasingly unstable because of the ll1creased activity of Serbian and, to less extent, of Muslim paramilitary groups. Media reports made the SItuation seem bleak, but they were not confinl1ed by ll1dependent sources. Information then, as through 1994, was largely provided by the leaders of both SerbIan and Muslim parties and it was thus difficult to separate truth from propaganda. Most reports asserted that gunfire could be heard every night in both Serbian and Muslim villages, others that the town of Pljevlja was filled with ultranationalist Serbian Chetnik paramilitary units; that Muslim Green Berets loyal to Ugljanin were training in the countryside around Tutin and Sjenica; and that a Chetnik brigade was making its presence felt in the forests near Novi Varos and preparing an offensive against NOVI PazarY Another report claImed that the Green Berets had launched two small-scale attacks on Priboj in early October - which may partly explain why on 22 October Serbian militia abducted and according to unconfinned reports, executed - some twenty Muslims travelling from the Bosnian town ofRudo to their workplace at PriboJ in the SandZak. Milan Panic, the prime minister of the rlllnp Yugoslavia 111 1992, ordered an investigation and said that War Crimes ill Bos/1ia-Hera~~ovilla, New York: I-Iull1an Rights Watch. 1992. p.88. 50 VjcSIlik. 29 April 1993. 51 Bodla, 15 October 1992.

49

Milan Alldrejevich

The Sandiak: A Perspective if Serb-Muslim Relations

every effort would be made to reduce tension in the region. Panic also met military officials and ordered that border patrols along the border between the Priboj region and BosniaHercegovina be stepped Up.52 Ugljanin's claim that 29,000 Serbian soldiers and reservists had been sent into the Sandzak and had been terrorising local Muslims was rejected by federal military officials in early October as 'pure nonsense'. The federal commander of the Uzice Corps issued a statement that at the end of September 1992, there were some 10,500 armed Muslims in the Sandzak, some units being equipped with mortars. But at that time the federal chief of staff, Colonel General Zivota Pal1lC (no relation to Milan Panic), claimed that the number of armed Muslims m the Sandzak was nearly 15,000. 53 SDA secretary Lj~ic rejected General Panic's figure, saying it was part of SerbIa's campaign to make such claims so as to justify heavily arming local Serbs and sending in more troops. Ljajic challenged Panic to reveal his sources and identifY those areas alleged to be Muslim strongholds and trail1lng camps. Lj~ic underscored that SandZak Muslims were unprepared and unarmed and did not have the necessary equipment to fight the Yugoslav army and paramilitary groups. 54 Instead of focusing on the disbanding of both Serbian and Muslim paramilitary groups, local and federal enforcement orgal1lsations focused most of their attention on the Sandzak's SDA leadership. In one of the most dramatic incidents, security forces on 14 September 1993 launched an extensive operation to arrest SDA leaders, mcluding Ugljanin, who was then in Turkey and at the time of writing had still not returned to Serbia. In his absence his position as head of the SDA in Serbia was taken over by his Montenegrin counterpart, Harun Hadzic. Four days into the police action, some fifty additional SDA members had been arrested, which the authorities 111 Novi Pazar justified on the grounds that they had found weapons and detailed sabotage plans

hidden in their homes. 55 In February 1994 HadZic and at least seven other members of the Muslim NatIOnal Council were arrested on charges of planning an anned uprising -large quantities of 5fi weapons were allegedly found in HadZic's yard. Despite the police actions, local Serbian leaders were perturbed by what they called Belgrade's lack of interest in, and mishandling of, the situation in the Sandzak. Radenko Jokovic, chaIrman of the Sandhk branch of the opposition Serbian Renewal Movement, remarked that Ugljanin had succeeded in wmning international sympathy for the Muslims because Belgrade's Socialist-dominated regime had Ignored the issue of the SandZak's political status, hopmg to provoke a conflict between Serbs and Muslims. Jokovic also accused Belgrade of consulting only the Muslims over SandZak issues and ignoring local Serbian opposition leaders. Another local Serbian leader, Dobroslav Nikodinovic complained: 'Belgrade has done nothing for us. It has only sent troops to keep the peace. They know what is going on down here but do nothing. That is why they have not arrested people who are working against the state. The people have lost theIr confidence in the government and can hardly Walt for it to be replaced. ,57

186

187

Tel'lSion in Montme,gro Relations between Montenegro's Muslims and Orthodox Slavs remained essentially good till the October 1991 referendum on independence. After the vote, in addition to the above-mentioned attacks there were repeated incidents of Muslims in Pljevlja be1l1g mIstreated and forced to flee their homes and witness the destruction of their property. The SandZak's Muslims were particularly concerned because these 1I1cidents took place at the same time as the Serbs were carry1l1g out the 'ethl1lc cleansmg' of neighbouring . 58 . H ercegovma. B osmaIn late July and early August 1992. Pljevlja experienced an unprecedented wave of violence. Montenegrin officials quickly

52 Politika. 24 and 27 October 1992.

55 Radio Serbia. 13 and 17 September 1993; Borba. 24 September 1993.

IlJid .• citing an interview in Vojska. l3e1grade, 1 October 1992. Panic provided a breakdown of this figure: 5,000 Muslim militia in Novi Pazar; 4.000 111 Prijepolju; 3,000 in Sjel11ca; 2.000 in Tutin and Priboj; and 200 in Novi Varos. 54 Borba. 15 October 1992.

56 Politika. 4 Febmary 1994. 57 Ibid. S!! Wilr Crimes ill Bomia-Hercc,<;ollilza, New York: Helsinki Rights Watch. 1992. pp. 60 and 87-8.

53

Milal1 Al1dnjevicll

Tile Saruliak: A Perspective if Serb-Muslim RelatiollS

issued demals of reports that the attacks were well-organised acts of 'political terrorism' and that Serbian-Montenegnn paramilitary forces were 'waging wars for holy [i.e. religious] objectives.' But after Dobrica COSIC, President of mmp Yugoslavia, and M01111r Bulatovic, PresIdent of Montenegro, visited the city on 7 August, the police reported that local Slavs and Muslims were continuing to arm, that the local police force was dismissing employees to cut down its SIze, and that the remaining policemen were either sweanng loyalty to extremist groups or SImply preferring to remal11 uninvolved for fear of retaliation by paramilitary bands. 5') However, the 7 August visit by Bulatovic and Cosic did eventually confinn that the Montenegrin Internal Affairs Ministry was not protectl11g the rights of all citizens in the region. Bulatovic, who before the visit had denied the eXIstence of paramilitary groups, admitted that they were operatl11g in Montenegro. 6o Both leaders guaranteed the safety oflocal reSIdents, espeCIally Muslims. However, they demanded loyalty fi'om the Muslims and a guarantee on theIr side that they would never seek 'Muslim autonomy', although during theIr talks with the two presidents no Muslim leader in Pljevlja had ventured to request autonomy. Cosic also pledged that umts of the Yugoslav army and the Montenegrin Internal AffaIrS Ministry would patrol the area and co-ordinate all actions to disarm the paramilitary groupS.61 Following the visit by Cosic and BulatovIc, the situation in Pljevlja became even more tense. Serbian paramilitary groups, ignoring warnl11gs from local secunty forces, stepped up their activities: the offices of the independent newspaper Sa/1diak were repeatedly vandalised, reporters were beaten up, and both the property and the lives of Muslims were threatened, as were those of ethnic Montenegrins who had spoken out against the presence of SerbIan and Muslim paramilitary groups. The Montenegrin authonties were accused of closing their eyes to the terror unfolding in the republic. A local Serbian Cbetnik paramilitary commander,

'M~~or' Ceko Dacevic, explained that the violence had been 'perpetrated by Muslims who wanted to avoid paying taxes,.62 The mayor of Pljevlja, Momcilo BOJovic, claimed that some media wished to 'misrepresent' the town by depicting it as consumed with hatred for its Muslim populatIOn whereas its residents 'deSIre only peace and good-neighbourly relatIOns.'(13 In July 1992 Hamn Hadzic, the chamnan of the Montenegrin SDA, called on Bulatovic in a letter to take measures to protect Muslims in the republic, who since May 1992 had been the target of terrorist attacks by irregular Serbian Inilitia in Pljevlja, Bijelo Polje, Podgorica and Berane. He wrote: 'Extremists disguised 111 uniforms of the Yugoslav army reserves have been killing Muslims and have been mining their apartments, busl11esses, houses and cars. [... ] Neither religIOUS buildings nor the Muslim clergy have been spared.'M Serbian and Montenef:,'T1n paramilitary and local police offiCIals countered by accusing the Muslims of committing such actIOns themselves and of having armed themselves heavily with weapons supplied by Islamic countnes. However, according to the influential Belgrade weekly NIN, Muslims had only recently organised armed patrols for self-protection, and the head of Montenegro's main oppOSItion People's Party, Novak Kilibarda, accused some officers of the Yugoslav army of supporting the 'Serbian paramilitary gangs of bandits' .65 The Belgrade independent weekly Vreme described the situation in the regIOn as follows: 'Everyone has his own authority and law and applies [them] as he sees fit. All hopes are disappearing 111 waves of anarchy, as has been the case elsewhere [Bosnia and Croatia].' It added that the question was not whether violence would break out but who would be the first to start it.oO There was a deterioration 111 the period 1994 to 1996 with Montenegrin SDA leaders suffering senous political harassment and mistreatment in prison. Hamn Hadzic himself spent 18 months in prison for alleged 'anti-state activity'. The Muslim Slavs and Albanians in Montenegro had entered into an electoral coalition

188

5')

Borba. 10 August 1992.

(,() According to the Supreme Defense Council of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. paramilitary forces were threatenmg people and promoting mter-ethnic intolerance. The council identified the Serbian group White Eagles (an elite Chetnik unit) and the Muslim Green 13erets as the chief instigators of unrest in the region. 61 Borba. 10 August 1992.

(,2 NOlla Makcdollija. Skopje. 9 August 1992. 63 (,4

05 (,6

Politika, 27 July 1992. Ibid .. 23 July 1992; and Nelije/ja dallllacija. Split. 9 September 1992. NIN. 13clgracle. 21 August 1992. Vremc. 13elgrade. 24 August 1992.

189

Milan Al1drejevich

171e Sal1dzak: A Perspective ~f Serb-Muslim Relatiolls

in 1990. This was repeated when the Montenegrin SDA and the Albanian Democratic Union for Montenegro announced another electoral coalitIOn to contest the republican elections in November 1996.67

posed his own embargo against the Bosnian Serbs in August 1994 after they repeatedly rejected an internatIOnal peace plan. The move angered nationalists 111 Serbia, including the Orthodox Church, which resulted in the latter supporting the Bosman Serb leadership. Although analysts and diplomats in Belgrade believe the possibility of civil war 111 SerbIa remains remote, Milosevic has repeatedly warned the West that sanctions are prodding nationalists to call for an all-out war in former Yugoslavia. And finally, some analysts were beginning to point out in June 1994 that Milosevlc, unwilling to share authOrIty, was also preoccupied with curtailing the expanding power of the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan KaradZic. According to one analyst, any union between Serbia and the self-proclauned Serb republics 111 Bosma and Croatia is 'politically impossible because MiloseviC's Serbia is socialist, whereas KaradziC's state IS clerical, rightist and ultranationalist.'6H Diplomats feared that another trouble-spot was the Serb-occupied Krajina region encompassing one third of Croatia. Milosevlc could make peace WIth Zagreb, at the expense of the Kr;uina Serbs' independence, by recognismg CroatIa, and in return Yugoslavia would secure a lifting of sanctIOns. Serbian nationalists described MiloseviC's acceptance of terms laid down by the United Nations, which ll1volved eas111g some sanctions against Belgrade while block111g fuel supplies to Serbs in CroatIa and Bosma, as 'humiliating'. In addition, the nationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS) repeatedly stated that if Milosevic did not declare a unified Serb state soon he would be perceived as having betrayed the Serb people and theIr desire to create a Greater Serbia, and that his concessions to the West had been met with few rewards. Serbia's oppOSItion parties, notably the Democratic Party (DS) and Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), in addition to the SRS, have frequently supported Radovan KaradZic, notably in his pre-Dayton decision to reject an international peace plan for Bosma-Hercegovina which would surrender control of 49 per cent of the country to the Bosnian Serbs. While Milosevic and the SPS endorsed tlm plan, the opposition parties' decision to SIde with KaradZic did little to change both the regional

190

Prospects At the time of writing, and despite the above, the difficulties in the Sandzak have less to do with the suppression of the Muslims' fights than with the fear among the population as a whole of SerbIa's nationalistic policIes, which are characterised by the seemingly unchecked proliferation of paramilitary groups intent on terronsing the local population. The uncertainty 111 Serbia itself has added to ti1lS tension S111ce 1992 111 four ways. First, there has been the unabated contest of wills between the then federal President COS1(;' the federal Prime Minister Panic and Serbia's President Milosevic. Cosic and Pamc were perceived as moderates in [wour of Serbian peace initiatIves, while Milosevlc was widely regarded as one of the chief perpetuators of warfare. The war of words and clash of personalities between the two camps divided rather than unified Serbia. Secondly, in the summer of 1993 there was serious discussion in Serbian and Montenegrin political cIrcles of a possible new type of constitutional order in which there would no longer be just two federal umts (Serbia and Montenegro) but probably five: Serbia, VOJvodina, Kosovo, Montenegro, and the Raska region (the SandZak). Eventually, the ruling Socialists and major opposition parties were in dispute over the future status of the Bosman Serb Republic and the Republic of SerbIan Kr;Uina. Most parties have been agreed that mternatIOnal developments would determine the [,te of the two self-proclaimed Serb republics. However, Milosevic and major opposition partIes have differing views and sympathies. Thirdly, after blunting Western efforts to punish him for 1m role in whipping up the war in Croatia and Bosma, Milosevic is cracking down on his domestic opponents who repeatedly accuse him. of pushing Serbia to the brink of civil war. In additIon to internationally-imposed sanctIOns on Yugoslavia, Milosevic imDrasko Djuranovic, 'Unlikely Allies 1IJ Podgorica', War Report: BlIlIetitl f!f tile J/lstitllte for vVar a/ld Peace RCPOItitlg, no. 45, London, September 1996, p. 14.

67

191

('H Jovan Teokarevlc, research fellow at the Institute for European Studies in 13elgrade, made tim observation in an interview with the author on 13 June 1994.

Milan Andrejevich

The Sandiak: A Perspective cif Serb-Muslim Relations

and Serbian balance of political power. At the same time several £'lctors remain unchanged. The opposItion is too weak and disunited to influence decision-making policies in Serbia. Also, with an 80,OOO-member police force and the army under his control, most observers are convmced that Milosevlc has a firm grip on power. But the opposition adheres just as steadfastly to it~ perceptions of Serbian national interests. Unfortunately, Serbia's attempt to carve out a state based on self-determination before and after the collapse of the Yugoslav state created in 1945 has resulted in brutal acts, both aggressive and defensive, at the expense of the Croatians, Muslims and Albanians, as well as the Serbs themselves. Sand:zak Muslim leaders are not willing to wait for the outcome of the contest among Serbs. They fear that war will eventually break out between the advocates of peaceful reconciliation and the hard-line natIOnalists on Serbian territory, particularly in the predominantly Albanian Province ofKosovo and the predominantly Muslim. SandZak. Muslims are also divided on how to resolve their concerns over self-determination. Some advocate aggression through the activities of paramilitary forces which they helped to create, as a means to become separate from Yugoslavia. Many advocate mternational mediation, mainly because they fear the fruits that divisions in the Serbian camp might bnng forth. Some leaders, such as Ljajic, are opposed to secession as advocated by Ugljanin, and Ljajic has offered to resign from all of his functions in the SDA. At tnnes SandZak Muslim leaders have obscured the £'lcts by intentionally over-inflating the already tense sItuation in the Sand:zak. The Serbs' unwillingness to relinquish their claIms to territory that they regard as theirs by birthright or vital to uniting all Serbs in one state may push Muslims into using violence. The Sandzak Muslims are probably hoping that their moves towards autonomy will help deter Belgrade from seeking to expand Its territory, but it is unlikely that the Serbs will be persuaded to abandon their plans to create a Greater Serbia. Given MilosevIC's long-standing determination to maintam SerbIan hegemony over Kosovo (despIte far stronger resistance among the province's Albanian majority than that hitherto shown by the Muslim population of the Sandzak) it is likely that he would be willing to use force to prevent an autonomous SandZak from dividing Serbia and Montenegro.

Meanwhile, the charges and countercharges continue on a daily basis. Each side accuses the other of arming itself in preparation for war, and each pleads innocence of any wrongdoing. Meanwhile those whose fingers are on the triggers become increasingly nervous.

192

193

Turkey as Kill-State

10 TURKEY AS KIN-STATE: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS TURKISH AND MUSLIM COMMUNITIES IN THE BALKANS 1 Hugh Poulton The intricate problem of mixed commumties and the iIupossibility of drawing 'ethnic boundaries' in the Eastern Mediterranean area IS one ofimmediate relevance, with the events in fonner Yugoslavia demonstrating the potential for acute inter-communal violence. Minority problems in the area have indeed attracted greater attention following the armed conflict in the territory of former Yugoslavia. However, while there has been some literature on the ~ubject,2 relatively little attentIOn has been given to the question of kin-states and how they relate to 'kin' outside their boundaries. The term 'kin-state' IS used in this chapter of a state wl1lch has perceived kin - however defined - outside its borders. When such kin reside in communities on or near its borders (as in Albania or Hungary) a fear of potential irredentism often arises m the state or states in which these kin reside. The events of the early 1990s in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, where compact Serbian communities engaged in armed conflict and perpetrated atrocities against other communities in an attempt to unite with I This chapter lS based upon the author's artlcie 'Ethnic Turks and Muslims in the Balkans and Cyprus: Turkey as a "kill- state" in the Eastern Mediterranean' in Richard Gillespie (cd.), Mediterralleall Politics, vol. 2, London: Pinter, 1995 and is reproduced by permission of Pinter Publishers. All right~ reserved. 2 See: I.D. Duchacek, 17,e territorial dimellsioll of politics withill, all/oll,li, allil across lIatiolls, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986; I.D. Duchacek and D. Larouche (cds), Perforated sovereigllties alld illtert/atiO//(/1 rclatiollS: TratlSSol1cre(lill colltacts c:f slliJ-l/(/tio,;al,ltol/enHllCllts, New York: Greenwood Press. 1988; G. Sheffer, 'Ethnonational diasporas and security~ SlInJiI"z!, 36 (2), 1994, pp. 60-79; M. Wemer (cd.), [lltert/atiollal II/(liratiofl alld seCllrity, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 1993. chapters 1, 2, and 10; T. Szayna, Etllllic col~flict ill mItral Ellrope mId the Balkatls: a frall/ework alld US policy options. Rand for US Army. 1994.

194

195

the kin-state, have reinforced such fears. Croat communities in south-western Bosnia have shown similar tendenCies, though on a lesser scale. In both cases the attitude of the kin-state has been a major factor in the VIOlence. While this illustrates how the actions of kin-states can be destructive, the behaviour of a kin-state can also help to dispel fears and alleviate tensions. As noted below, the potential kin for Turkey is vast. This chapter is concerned with the communities in the Balkans and Cyprus, both ethnic and non-ethnic Turkish, who look to Turk~y as a kin-state, and how Turkey has responded to them. WhIle this encompasses communities in former YugoslaVIa and in Romania, which is home to some 80,000 Turks and Tatars, we concentrate on those in Cyprus, 3 Greece, and Bulgaria, which make up the 'front line' of communities that look to the kin-state.

Turkey as a kin-state We are immediately faced with the questions of who is a Turk?, winch groups are regarded by Turkey as 'kin', and which grou~s regard Turkey as their kin-state. When the Turkish republic emerged in the 1920s a large number of Turkish speakers who had previously lived within the Ottoman empIre were excluded from the new state. Those who were Muslims naturally looked to Turkey as their kin-state, and because of the long asce~dancy of the Ottoman empire and the heritage of the IslamIC Caliphate, manv Muslims from its former terri tones, though not ethmc Turks, wer~ inspired to do likewise, especially in the Bal~ans. This IS amply reflected in the great number of non~ Turkish-speakmg Muslims who have emigrated to Turkey (and earlIer to the Ottoman empire) from Russia, the Caucasus and the Balkans. . The Ottoman empire was ruled for most .of Its history, by Islamic precepts according to wl1lch it ,:as divided not al~ng ethno-linguistic lines but by religious affilIatIOn, under the 111111et system, until changes were attempted m the mld-l1lneteenth cenAlthough Cyprus lS not geographically part of the Balkans. it is mciuded 111 this chapter because of illummatll1g slll1ilantles to the. Balkan case. Moreover. Cyprus lS oftell cited by Greece as an example of actloll Turkey may .take .l~l relatlOll to the plight of ethmc Turks 1Il Western Thrace. Sec also Small Balle, 'Muslims III Eastern and South Eastern Europe'. JIMMA. vol. 6. no. 2, 1985. pp. 361-74.

3

Hugh Poullatl

Turkey as Kin-State

tury, beginning with the Tcmzimat reforms. All Muslims were consIdered as equal citizens, and the elite was multi-ethnic (see Chapter 2). In the early twentieth century a distinct Turkish nationalism developed within the empire. Imtially led by Turkicspeaking emigres from Russia, it gained momentum and became the driving force behind the Young Turk regimes of 1908-18. The steady collapse of the Ottoman empire both fuelled this movement and raised new ideas of a union of all ethnic Turkic groups in one state - the dream of 'Turan'<\ - stretching from the Balkans to China. The First World War gave a fleeting hope that this dream could be accomplished, but the empire's defeat ended such fantasies. The new authoritIes led by Mustafa Kemal (Atatiirk) resolutely turned their backs on any notions of'Turan' Or expansion from the Anatolian core, which was now designated the indivisible territory of'the Turkish nation'. But who constituted ti1lS 'Turkish nation'? After some ambivalence (he himself originated from Macedonia), Kemal defined the Turkish nation as essentially comprising the Muslim population of Anatolia. Greek Orthodox Christians were expelled en masse in exchange for Muslims from Greece. Religion was once more the operative criterion as Turkishspeaking Christians were sent to Greece and non-Turkish- speaking Muslims were brought to Turkey. The Muslim community of Western Thrace and the Orthodox communities of Istanbul and two small islands were exempted from this population exchange. 5 Thus, in spite of the strong terri tonal model that underlay Kemalist nationalism, based on the notion of common citizenshIp as reflected in Article 66 of the current Constitution (which states: 'Everyone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk'), there were elements from the very beginning both of perceived aliens within and of kin outside. The conscious policy of propagating a cohesive sense of national identity and creating a widespread national consciousness m Turkey resulted in a great emphasis on the ethnic Turks and their language at the expense of other groups like the Kurds, whose separate identity

and language were denied. But in spite of Atatiirk's insistence on abandoning the dream of Turan (summ.ed up in his slogan 'Peace at home, peace m the world'), the new state-propagated nationalism strongly stressed Central Asia as the Turks' original fatherland. It also stressed their affinity to other Turkic peoples. ThIs has led to a continuing sense of 'kin' in Central Asia. As illustrated by school textbooks, the potential ethmc kin of Turks is enormous. h Combined with this, the religIOUS factor has led to many non-ethnic Turkish Balkan Muslims lookmg to Turkey as a potential kin-state. The collapse of the Soviet Umon occasioned new opportunities for contact with Turkic-speaking f,'TOUpS in Central Asia. It IS debatable whether the new relations formed can be placed within the current 'kin-state' discussion. Certainly the pan-Turkist currents within and outside Turkey view the Turkic-speaking peoples of 7 Central Asia as kin and aspire to ultimate union with them. Long years under Soviet rule which mcluded the deliberate attempt to create new nations (such as the Uzbeks and Turkmen) have resulted in a natIOnal consciousness among these Turkic-speaking peoples separate from that of the Turks. Nationalism is a modern phenomenon, and in certain circumstances nations can be created (and can disappear). Turkey has sought to portray itself as a model for the Turkic republics, and it has watched events in the Azerbaijan-Armeman conflict with an attitude which certainly reflects strong feelings of kmship for the Azeris. H

196

<\ Although the terms 'Turan' and 'Turanism' orIginally referred to union with all 'Tural11c' peoples and thus included Hungarians. Finns and Estol11ans. they gradually came to be used of the pan-Turkist dream of unifYing the Turkic peoples only. 5 This was stipulated in the Convention and Protocol on the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations of 30 January 1923.

197

(, For example Soysill Bi(~il('r printed by the Minister of Education. 4th edn, '1993 (300,000 copies), gives the numbers of Turks 111 neighbouring countries as: Greece 150,000; Bulgaria 1.5 million; Azerbaijan - the majority of the 7 million population (,the Azerbaijan Turks are connected to the Turks of Turkey by strong bonds'); Georgia 500,000 'Azeri Turks' (undefined); Iran 18 million Turks; Iraq 1 million; Syria 150.000; Northern Cyprus 170,000; as well as the 'Turkish republics' of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan and Kirgizia, and the Turks in R.ussia (Tatars. Bashkirs ct Ill.). China (Uigurs), Afghanistan and Yugoslavia. Interestingly this list does not include the Christian Gagauz Turkish speakers. illustrating again that despite Kemal's secularism. which sought to relegate religion to the private sphere, Islam remains a component of Turkish identity. However the Gagauz are now seen as 'Turks', 7 See J.M. Landau. PIlIl- TurkislII ill Tllrkey: A Study ill IrredCtltislII. London: Hurst. 1981. and its revised versIon Pan- TurkislII: From Irrcdetltism to Cooperatioll, London: Hurst, 1995. H The fight1l1g in Nagorno-Karabakh aided the rise of Turkish nationalism and

198

HUJ!h Poulton

Turkey as Kilt-State

However, there is acceptance (outside pan-Turkist circles) that while there are many shared cultural values resulting from shared religious, linguistic and historical factors, the Uzbeks and other Central Asian Turkic-speaking groups are separate peoples differentiated from the Turks of Turkev. In the Balkans, however, this does not appear to be the cas~.'! Except for Albania, the communities there are minorities within essentIally Orthodox Christian states; they are also remnants of the Ottoman empire. Probably as a result of this, they have retamed a strong identification as 'Turks' rather than 'Turkic' peoples. This posItion is mirrored in the perception of these communities in Turkey. The crucial aspect appears to be that of minority status. Where the perceived km outsIde Turkey form a m~onty and have constructed (or been encouraged to construct) a separate national consciousness (the Uzbeks or the Azeris, for example), the Turkish state and the Turks perceive them very differently from the minontiesabove all, minoritIes in essentIally Christian states. If the latter were once part of the Ottoman empire, this perception is heightened. lo The criterion of being Muslim minorities wIthin

non-Muslim states is not exclusive, however. For example, the Turkic minorities in Iraq are also considered to fall within the rubric of Turkey's kin abroad, of whom Turkey sees itself as a potential protector. II Furthermore, the Turkish authorities have recently come to regard the Christiall Turkic people of Moldova - the Gagauz - as falling within this category.12 In additIOn, on the fringes of the Balkans in Romama live some 80,000 Turks and Tatars, and there are now sizeable numbers of Turks from Turkey who have migrated to Western Europe (especially Germany) for work and remained there. 13 Before turning to each of the three specific contexts in turn, we offer a general overVIew of the WIder context. The Muslim community m Western Thrace, whIch is made up mainly of ethnic Turks, Islamicised Slavs (Pomaks) and some Roma (Gypsies),

the fortunes of politicians like Tiirkes, Erbakan and Ecevit who play the nationalist card -albeit in diflcrent perspectives. Even a 'liberal' like Mesut Yilmaz could state at a press conference that Turkey had some kmd of nght to protect Azerbaijan under mternatlOnal law (Bri~fi/lg, Issue 879, 9 March 1992). Such statements from politIcians must be treated with caution bccause of thc inevitable gap betwecn rhetoric and rcality when they are trylllg to woo popular scntiment. There were large-scale dcmonstratlons throughout Turkey and TRNC (Northern Cyprus) over the Nagorno-Karabakh war. It is intercstlllg that evcn ethnically non-Turkish student~ from the 13alkans, like Albanians, appear to have less problems adapting to life in Turkey than Azeris. who both geographically and linguistically are the closest of the Turkic peoples to the Anatolian Turks (see below).

'!

This vicw was confinl1ed to me on 12 August 1994 by irf.1n Acar, a senior ofTicial at the Turkish Foreign Ministry. Thus not only thc minoritics within the 13alkans (wlllch are detailed below) f.1ll into this category but also the Cnmean Tatars. Their leader Mustaf.1 Abdul Cemil Kanmoglu visIted Turkey in February 1992 and met Demirel, who pledged support for their struggle to regalll their land, wlllch was taken fi'om them by Stalin as pUlllshment for alleged collaboration with the Nazis in the Second World War. More than 200.000 have returned to theIr ancestral homeland, but almost SOO,OOO remall1 in Uzbekistan and Turkmelllstan (TurkIsh TV, Ankara, 7 February 1992). In August 1994 Denllrel stated that the Ukralluan government had agreed to Turkey providing material help to build houses and for other humallltanan aId to help 10

199

resettle the Crimean Tatars ('Russia' TV channel, Moscow, 24 August 1994) - there arc of course many Turkish citizens of Crimean-Tatar origm. II Of coursc Mosul formed part of the ongmal 'National Pact' of Atatlirk and thus holds a special place in the national psyche. Miimtaz Soysal, later briefly Foreign Minister, claimcd that PreSIdent ()zal canvassed opmion of the Turkish clitc on the idca of a fedcral post-Gulf War Iraq in which Turkey would dominatc the Turkoman and Kurdish Autonomous provinces, and TurkIsh journalists claIm cd Ozal was studying government docunlents on Turkey's claims to oil-nch Mosul (H. Pope, 'Iraq land claim behmd Ozal's pledge to Kurds', Tile Itldepelldenr. London, 28 january 199'1). Thc Turkish prcss also takcs an interest in the f.1tc of Iraq's TurkIc population. c.g. Hiirriyer, 23 january 1991, wlllch rcported that 13aghdad had ordcrcd the execution of twenty-fivc Iraqi Turks and was pressuring Turks in Kirkuk to migrate to Kurdish regions. Furthermore thc 'IraqI National Turkoman Party' based 111 Ankarajoincd forces with 13ulgarian Turk Associations to protest at incidents against cthnic Turks m Xantlll in Greece forccs with Bulgarian Turk Associations to protest at incidcnts agamst ethmc Turks 111 Xanthi in Greece (see below) (Allarolia, 30 August 1993).

12 Dcmirel vlsitcd the lSO,OOO-strong ChnstJan Gagauz commul1lty in southcentral Moldova in carly junc 1994 and underlined Turkish concern for their welf.1re and for that of the 30,000 or so Gagauz 111 Romal1la (mostly in Constant,a) (East Ellropeall Nellls[eller. vol. 8, no. 12, 8 june 1994). 13 These are specifically referred to in the 1982 Constitution by ArtIcle 62, which statcs: 'The State shall take the neccssary measures to cnsure the f.1mily unity. the education of thc children, the cultural nceds. and the SOCIal security of TurkIsh natIOnals working abroad, and shall take thc necessary mcasures to safeguard theIr ties WIth thc country, and to help them on thclr return homc.' In line with tillS thc Turkish state scnds teachers and imams to operate in German schools, and pays their salaries. In addition. IslamIC activists m Turkey have set up rIval organisations in the disapora -sce Chapter 11.

200

201

Hugh Poulton

Turkey as Kin-State

has remained as a unit looking to Turkey as its km-state. In Bulgaria, despite large scale emigration encouraged by the authorities since the establishment of the modern state in the nineteenth century, a sIzeable ethnic Turkish Muslim community remall1ed, as did other Muslim groups. Similarly, in what became Yugoslav Macedonia Turkish-speaking Muslim groups remained along with other Muslims. Although an Albanian state had emerged from the Ottoman empire, many Muslim Albanians took advantage of vanous emigration agreements between Yugoslavia and Turkey, and seell1g Turkey rather than Albania as their kin-state, moved there: tI1lS could be explained largely by Enver Hoxha's post-war fortress mentality and militant atheism. Silnilarly, many Slav Muslims from Yugoslavia emigrated to Turkey. While they quickly and voluntarily assimilated into the Turkish majority, their large number has led to a consolidation of feelings of kinship with fellow group members who remall1ed in the Balkans. Groups originating from the Caucasus who moved to the Ottoman empIre/Turkey have experienced a similar situation. A crucial factor in all this is the hentage of the millet system whereby people were classified in the Ottoman empire by relit,>1on rather than by ethnicity or language (see Chapter 2). This religious link is well illustrated by Turkey's reactions to the Bosnian con£lict. 14 With the exception of Cyprus, Turkish policy towards these groups has been characterised by caution. This is in line with Atatiirk's dictum of 'peace at home, peace in the world', which IS still referred to in the preamble to the 1982 Constitution. The general line has been that although emigration is allowed at various times and Turkey continues as a potential home for kin-groups in times of extreme hardship, it would be better if they remained

as citizens of their respective states and act as a link to Turkey.ls Military circles in Turkey have probably considered Turkish minorities (especially in southern Bulgana and Western Thrace) 16 as having potential strategic or military use. Up till the mid-1980s, - while Turkish public opinion was influential at times, especially during the campaign against ethnic Turks in Bulgaria in the late 1980s (see below) - Turkish policy was dictated almost entirely by the Turkish state/government. However, this has to some extent been changed by the growth of Islamic movements within Turkey which have taken full advantage of the possibilities afforded by the growth of privatisation, by the end of the state's monopoly on information and communications (see Chapter 2), and by the new possibilities afforded by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. As well as the Turkish state/government, there are now other mfluential Turkish 'kin-state' actors.

An example of this 'solidarity' was the conference on Bosnia-Hercegovina Il1 Ankara on 20-23 October 1994, with speeches from leading dignatones and high officials from Sar;uevo and Turkey, which began with a recitation of the Quran followed by the Bosnian and Turkish national anthems. More concretely, it was announced by the former TurkIsh Chief of General Staff, General Dogan Glires, that Turkey had been breaking the UN arms embargo on fonner Yugoslavia by supplying arms to the beleaguered Bosnian government (BBC World Service, 4 December 1994) although thIs was later denied (see The Illdepelldcllt, 6 December 1994). Similarly Sandzak Muslim politicians like S. Ugljanin who were in opposition to Belgrade (see Chapter 9) held a widely publicised meeting in Ankara on 27-30 July 1994. 14

Cy)JrtlS

Turkey was a guarantor power in Cyprus under the London agreement of 1960 and subsequent treaties. These allowed the right of intervention by Britain (the former colonial powe:-), Greece and Turkey to protect the constitutional settlement. PublIc opmIOn in Turkey was outraged at what were perceIved as Greek threats against the Turkish population on the Island, and in 1974 the Ecevit government finally upheld Article 4 of the Cyprus Tre~ty of Guarantee as a justification for unilateral interventIOn. WIth massive popular backing 111 Turkey, it sent the anny into Cyprus IS The two components in this policy were well illustrated by reactions to the riots in Komotini in early 1990 (see below). Then Foreign Minister Mesut YIlmaz argued that ethmc Turks should stay in the country of their reSIdence with full citizenship rights of the relevant states in which they reSIde, and Ankara's help to protect their interests, while then Prime Minister Akbulut stated that Turkev's borders were open, and invited ethnic Turks from Greece to come to Turkey and 'share our soup' (Mideast Mirror, 20 February 1990). 16 A Turkish observer at the BBC rejected such notions. However, event~ in the Yugoslav war-where the ]NA/Serb anny perfonned so badly m areas where Serbs were not present (especially Slovenia) as compared to those where they were able to operate 111 t1ndem with local Serbs - have shown that such an 'old fashioned' military view does have some substance.

203

Hugh Pot/lton

Turkey as Kill-State

and effected maSSIve population transfers. From this followed the establishment in November 1983 of the ethnically homogeneous 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' (TRNC), which remains unrecognised by the international community. Since then a number of Turks from Turkey have moved into It.17 This interventlOn ran counter to Turkey's general foreign policy practice, and gave rise to fears, especially 111 Greece, of SImilar action in areas like Western Thrace. 1H Cyprus has remained partitioned and despite repeated efforts by the mternational community there has been little progress in resolving the stalemate. In June 1994 the fonner Prime Minister Ecevlt suggested that the TRNC should be an autonomous umt internally, but integrated with Turkey for matters of defence and foreIgn policy; tim suggestion was supported by the TRNC leader Rauf Denkta~.19 Miimtaz Soysal, who became Turkish Foreign Mimster in August 1994 and who was an adVIser to Denkta~ and something of a 'nationalist hawk', also moved closer to this line. On a visit to the TRNC in August 1994 he backed its rejection of a federalist solutIOn, and while ruling out formal annexation

i' r d to ' autonOlnous t'Ies.,20 Th ese or um' f IcatlOn, nevertIle Iess reterre statements were backed up by Turkey's Foreign Ministry and Mimstry of National Defence which stated: 'South Cyprus has moved to integrate with Greece. Naturally, the Turkish Cypnots wIsh to establish similar co-operation and integration with Turkey.' It appeared that Soysal had cleared tlm policy with both Prime Minister <;iller and President Demirel, despite objections from Western ambassadors,21 and that Soysal's appointment heralded a more aggressive approach by Turkey on foreIgn policy issues. The Islamic Wel£lre Party (RP) , which has made spectacular gains in Turkey in recent years, adopted a yet more aggressIve 22 ~tance, and called for outright annexation. Soysal resigned at the end of November 1994, apparently after intense disagreements with <;iller over a number of Issues, to be replaced by the Deputy Prime Minister, Murat Karayalr;m, who appeared less nationalistic than his predecessor. But while Ankara reverted to a more cautious role, annexation of the TRNC contmued to be threatened if Cyprus Joined the European Union before a settlement on the island's states had been agreed by Turkey and the TRNC. 23 Leading TRNC politiClans enjoy considerable influence in Ankara, and Denkta~ has addressed the Turkish parliament several times to rapturous approval. Thus 111 spite of reports of alienation between the two comnlUnities, there remains a strong feeling of 'kinship' among Turks in Turkey towards Cypriot Turks.

202

17 The figures remain contentious. While the 1992 census gave the total populatIOn of the TRNC as 176.127. there are no offiCIal figures for imnugrants li'om Turkey_ Greek Cypriot sources claim 60-70.000. while Turkish sources eStimate 15-16.000. Turkish newspapers record a figure of 46.000. In vIew of these differing figures a safe estimate could be 30.000. The forced population transfers of 1974 saw some 180.000 Greek-speakll1g Cypriots fleeing the TRNC. while some 60.000 Turkish-speaking Cypriots moved fr0111 the south to the north. For further details see Behrooz Morvandi. 'Demographic Change. Resettlement and Resource use' in C. Dodd (ed.), The Political Soda/mId Ecollomic Dl'/Jdopmcllt ~f Northcm CYfJrIIS, Huntingdon (England), Eothen Press. 1993. In 1988 the UN reported that there were 29.000 Turkish soldiers 111 the TRNC but the TRNC le;lder. Rauf ])enkta~, main tamed that the actual figure was 21-22.000. See A. Foreman. T11c Guardiall, 10 June 1988. who also alleged that the Turkish Cypriots had grown weary of the special ties WIth Turkey, and looked forward to reunification. They argued that there was little contact between the two communities; the mall1land Turks had 'little in common with us .. , .They're ASIans; they don't know our European way oflife.' The standard of livll1g IS Glr higher in the south. and mamlanders tend to look down on TurkIsh Cypriots as descendants of settlers forcibly sent there by various Sultans. Other observers contradict this vIew. IX Huge billboards in Western Thrace showed a bleeding partitioned Cyprus with appropriate captions for both domestic and foreign consumption. 19

Bricjing, Issue 1.005. 5 October 1994. Ankara.

Greece The Muslim community 111 Western Thrace well illustrates the problems of trying to differentiate between groups that look to Turkey as a kin-state through ties of ethnicity plus religion, or by virtue of ties of religIOn alone. In the population exchanges 111 20

Radio Bayrak. Lcfko~a (Nicosia), and A/liltolia. Ankara 31 August 1994.

21 See Hiirriyct. Istanbul. 31 August 1994. The RP secretary-general Oguzhan ASlltlirk saId that the TRNC decision to withdraw from negotiations must be supported and the TRNC annexed to Turkey. arguing that southern Cyprus would be annexed by Greece. In any confrontation WIth the south. the TRNC would be f.1ced by Greece and the entire EU, and Turkey would lose its status as guarantor (TRT TV, Ankara. 30 August 1994). 23 See THrkey Briefing, vol. 9. no. 1. London. 1995. 22

205

HtIgh Potllton

Turkey as Kin-State

1922, religion and not ethmcity or language was the criterion, and many Muslim Slavs and other Muslims who were not ethnic Turks were expelled to Turkey. Similarly many Muslim Slavs (Pomaks) and Roma remained as part of the Muslim community of Western Thrace, especially in villages in the Rhodope mountains. Since the 1920s there has been a steady and continuing emigration of Turkish-speakers to Turkey: the total has reached 250,000. As a result, while the number of 'Muslims' in Western Thrace has remained £'lirly constant at about 120,000, the proportion of Turkish-speakers, as opposed to Bulgarian-speakers (Pomaks), has declined. In the 1920s perhaps 10 per cent were Pomaks; now they are estimated to be about a quarter of the Muslim community, i.e. about 30,000 people. The rights of the Muslim community of Western Thrace are in theory guaranteed under Article 45 of the Lausanne Treaty of July 1923, and accordingly Turkey sees itself as having a f,'Teater say in its afE'llrs than, for example, in Bulgaria, with which it has no such specific treaty, but less than in Cyprus, where it was a guarantor power. In the mitial post-treaty period a number of anti-Kemalist Turks, mostly religious leaders, moved to Western Thrace, but Greece bowed to Turkish pressure and finally expelled some 150 religious conservatives. Thus Turkey's influence over the afElirs of the community remained apparent. In the early post-Second World War years Greece had a rare rapprochement with its traditional enemy, which it now saw as an ally in NATO agamst a more serious threat from Communist Bulgaria - which mIght try to use the Bulganan-speaking Pomaks as a fifth column. Accordingly the Pomaks were actively encouraged to become Turks. Compulsory Turkish education was introduced for them, and in 1954 the whole Muslim community was decreed to be 'Turkish' rather than 'Muslim'. However, with the military coup of the 'Colonels' m1967, the Greek authorities soon reverted to the traditional anti-Turkish line and denial of the existence of any ethnic m1110rities inside the country. In recent times this policy has been taken so £'lr that anyone who tries to organise on an explicitly Turkish platform is prosecuted, mcluding members of parliament. 24 The Greek authorities are worned by the rise of

ethnic Turkish assertiveness in the region,25 which led to serious intercommunal rioting in 1990 and 1991, and which they appear to be seeking to reverse. Subsequently some of the more petty measures against the Muslim population have been relaxedapparently as the result of an agreement in January 1990 between the then Prime Minister Mitsotakis and the opposition leader Andreas Papandreou after the imtial disturbances in Komotini. This agreement proposed economic lInprovement 111 the area, certain concessions to the minonty, a greater state presence, and the settlement of ethnic Greeks from the fonner Soviet Umon to strengthen the Greek presence there. 26 It also envisaged attempts to split the Muslim community into its component parts, and to divide the Pomaks and Roma from the ethnic Turks. However, this policy and the accompanying attempts to portray the Pomaks as the pre-Slav inhabitants of Thrace, who as such would be 'closer' to the Greeks than the Turks, has been an abject failure. The Pomak community cont111ues to identify itself strongly with 27 the Turkish community and is becoming solidly Turkicised. A consistent feature of relations between Greece, Turkey and the Muslims of Western Thrace has been the Greek government's policy, adopted since the early 1960s, of reciprocating treatment meted out by the Turkish authorities to the Greek Orthodox cOlnmunity who remained in Istanbul under the conditions of the Lausanne Treaty. This community has declined 111 numbers drastically as the result of the Turkish government's policies of denial and distrust of minorities, which parallel those of Greek

204

24 E.g. the prosecutions of Sadik Ahmet and Ibrahim ~erif. Greece remains obdurate in its denial of any minorities except religIOUS ones WIthin the country.

Signs of the nse of this assertiveness arc the reported statements by the formcr mufti of Xantlu - himself a Pomak - that 'Muslim Turks ...111 W cstem Thracc are autonomous' (on 21 January 1982) and 'the declaration of the Turkish Rcpublic of Northern Cyprus for us means that one more star ~las been added to the Islamic flag' (on 16 Deccmber 1983). I-lis son, local polItICIan Mehmct Aga (who III 1995 was sentellced to 10 months' imprisonment for 'usurpin~' the ofllce of mufti - see below), reportedly said on 12 March 1984 that If Greecc was not able to solve thc mmonty's problem, 'we will resort to the mother country Turkey in order to give a satIsfactory solutIOlI.' All quotes from A. AlexandrlS, 'Political Expediency and Human Right~: Minority issues between Grecce and Turkey'. papcr gIven at the confcrcnce 'Minority RIghts - PoliCIes and Practice 111 South-East Europe' (Copenhagen, 30 March-1 April 1990, p. 9).

25

26

'Nea politiki gia tous mousoulmanous' Elciferotipill, 2 March 1990.

27 See Chapter 5.

206

Hllgh Poulton

2H governments. The legacy of the homogeneous nation-state ideolof,'Y has thus severely hampered relations between the two countries. In 1964 the Greek government implemented a secret decision to hinder purchase ofland by Turks, in retaliation for the eviction of ethnic Greeks from Istanbul. 29 The Greek policy of reciprocatIOn came into the open during the Colonels' regime, 1967-74. Whereas teachers had previously come from Turkey, in 1968 a special teacher-training centre for Turks was set up 111 Thessaloniki. While the Muslims compla1l1 of a number of repressive measures, those relating to education throw particular light on this policy, and are espeCIally relevant to the issue of kin-state ambitIOns. The Greek authorities have tried to keep contacts between the Muslims and the Turkish kinstate as limited as possible. The training of 'native' teachers who, the Turks claull, teach an outdated and backward curriculum WIth little connection with developments in Turkey, appears to have been a key part of this. In spite of the 1968 Greek-Turkish protocol on education, there remain severe problems over providing adequate textbooks for the Turks in Western Thrace; the Greek authorities are accused of deliberately holding back books sent from Turkey. The passing of the May 1984 law stipulating that Greek should be adopted as the language of entrance and graduation exams 111 the two secondary Turkish-minority schools in Komotini and Xanthi 30 led to a dramatic decline in numbers of pupils from 227 111 Xantlu and 305 in Komotini in 1983-4, to 85 and 42 respectively in 1986-7. The Turkish authorities reacted to the deteriorating situatIon and concomitant rise of inter-communal tension m Western Thrace with the traditional openings for those who wanted to leave and emigrate to Turkey. Like the local leaders, they view the Pomaks as Turks and hence eligible for emIgration to Turkey,31 and as InitIally some 100,000, there were less than 10,000 by 1974 and the figure has declined further since.

2H

29

30

I am I11debted to R. Meinardus of ])eut~che Welle lor this information. There are some 300 Turkish prImary schools in the area.

31 The Muslim Roma arc evidently seen as diflcn:nt and are looked down upon by all groups. While the Pomaks tended to be seen as lower than the ethnic Turks, there was and is intermarriage between them especially 111 mixed areas north and north-west of Komotllll. Intermarriage by both groups with Roma appears almost non-existent despite the strong common bond of Islam.

Turkey as Kill-State

207

noted earlier, they also attempted - hitherto unsuccessfully - to integrate the education of the minority with mainstream Turkish education through the use of approprIate textbooks. On the other hand the traditional Turkish policy of caution was evident. For example, there were reports that the Ozal government was alarmed by the pre-eminence of Sadik Ahmet (elected in 1989 to the Greek parliament as an mdependent Turkish candidate, and later prosecuted for campaigning on an explicitly Turkish programme32) among the Muslims of Western Thrace and the general rise in tension there. There are even reports that the Turkish government contemplated a deal with the incumbent Greek Prime Mil1lster Mitsotakis in 1989 to remove Ahmet from the politIcal scene. 33 Tensions between the two countries intensified again in early 1995 when Mehmet Emin Aga, the elected Mufti in Xanthi, was sentenced to ten months' imprIsonment by a court m Larissa for usurpmg his title. This drew sharp criticism fron1. Turkey, whose Foreign Ministry accused the Greek authoritIes of hmdering the Xanthi and Komotini muftis 111 the performance of their duties, even though they had been duly elected by the community in accordance with the 1913 Athens agreement and the 1923 Lausanne Treaty (see Chapter 5). Foreign Mil1lster Karayal~ll1 warned that unless Mehmet Aga was immediately released Turkey would 'take steps' over this issue. 34

BU{flal'ia During the 1920s and 1930s, emigration of Turks to Turkey from Bulgaria continued, and Turkish schools (espeCIally primary) were closed. The advent of the dictatorshIp m 1934 brought bans on the use of the new Latm script, and the reinstatement of the Arabic script, for all Turkish publications. This was apparently an attempt to dissuade mother-tongue expression, since the Arabic script IS both difficult to learn and inapproprIate for Turkish, and to hinder links with Atatiirk's Turkey, which at the time did not actively portray itself as a protector of ethl1lc Turkish mmorities Sec H. Poulton, The Balkatls: Milluritil's atld States ill COI!llict, London: MRG, 1992, p. 187. Ahmet died in a motor accident 111 1995.

32

33 Date/illc, London, 28 October 1989. 34

TRT TV, Ankara, 24 January 1995.

208

Ht/gh POlilton

Turkey as Kill-State

outside Turkey, being preoccupied with nation-building within the new state. The post-war penod saw a change in Bulgarian policy. As IS related in Chapter 3, the Bulganan Communist authorities at first enhanced Turkish national Identity among the BulgarIan Turks, and later tried to eradicate it completely. The traditional pattern of emigration to Turkey resumed m 1950-1 but was replaced by the severe restrictIOns on fi'eedol11 of movement which were common" to all Soviet-bloc Communist states. From the 19505, however, the Zivkov regime launched a long-term policy of repression and forced aSSImilation whIch was progreSSIvely applied to all the country's main minority populations, with the exception (for propaganda reasons) of the small Jewish and Armeman ones. This policy came to a head with the violent campaign against the ethnic Turkish nunorIty (some 10 per cent of the population) in late 1984. The TurkIsh state and public reacted WIth outrage. Mass rallies were allowed for the first time since the military coup of 1980 and huge crowds filled Taksim Square in Istanbul, cheering Ozal's empty threats of marching on Sofia. More concretely, Turkey declared a willingness to open its borders. In 1989 the Zivkov regime, panicking at the rismg tide of organised resistance among Turks to the policy of ethnic denial, allowed them to leave. Some 300,000 fled the country, of whom half subsequently returned. 35 In contrast to much of the Balkans, post Zivkov Bulgaria has, on the whole become a beacon of hope in inter-ethnic relations (except where Roma are concerned). In the October

1991 elections the ethnic Turkish party, the Movement For Rights and freedoms (MRF), gamed twenty-four members of parliament, over 650 village mayors, 1,000 councillors and twenty municipal mayors, and held the balance of power between the former CommUl11sts and the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF). As such the MRF played a crucial role in supporting vanous governments both inside and outside formal coalitions till the elections of late 1994 (see below and Chapter 4). However, although as many as half of those who left during the great exodus of 1989 later returned, emigration to Turkey has continued, spurred on by a severe decline in the economy of many minonty regions, especially tobacco-grow111g ones 111 the south. Again the question 'Who IS a Turk?' has cropped up, as the Bulgarian Pomak community is experiencing pressures similar to those applied to the Pomaks in Greece. The Cold War period resulted in both Bulgarian and Greek Pomak communities, living in the militarised mountainous frontier region, becoming subject to severe limitations on their freedom of movement. As a result, they continued to live in the way of pre-modern traditional societies, where the modern notion of belonging to a natIonal group is less dominant than that of belonging to a religious group. Since the end of the Cold War tlm has been changing. Whereas in Greece the entire Pomak commumty appears to be becoming rapidly TurkIcised, m Bulgaria, where the Pomaks' mother tongue is that of the majority, they identifY themselves mainly as Bulgarians, while a mmority are declaring themselves to be Turks and demanding Turkish education for their children. 36 In early 1990 the Turkish embassy in Sofia was giving out some 6,000 visas a month. The cnterion for obtaining a visa was the ability to speak Turkish, although in rare cases the Turkish authorities would issue a visa to a Pomak if they were convinced that he was so determined to go to Turkey that he would arrive via another country if necessary, The ethnic Turks themselves have been experiencing a country-to-town shift similar to that of the Slav Bulgarians in the 1950s and '60s. However, with the greater freedom of transborder movement they have been choosing if possible to move to cities in Turkey rather than Bulgarian ones like Sofia. In October 1992 Turkey announced tougher immigration

35 The emotional response of Turks to these events is well illustrated by Bilal ~im~ir. author and diplomat. who wrote: 'They [the Bulgarian Turks] were

taken to Bulgaria from Anatolia, now they want to return there, where most of their close relatives have already returned. It IS their right to return to Anatolia. And it is Turkey's duty to make tim return possible by accepting all the Turks in Bulgaria; it is a lllStollcal duty, a contractual duty, a duty owed to Turbshness, and a humanitanan duty. The Turk 111 Bulgaria suffered a lot in the hands of the Bulgarian. Let tillS suffering end.' n,C Tllrks of Bll({!aria (1878-1985), Nicosia and London: K. Ri.istem, 1988, p. 316. More widespread reactIOns were the mass rallies 111 Istanbul and Bursa led by BAL-GOC; emigrant aSSOCiations, at one of which Prime Minister Ozal threatened action similar to that taken by Turkey 111 Cyprus in 1974 (sec H. Poulton, op cit.• p. 161). Sec also Ali Eminov, 'The status of Islam and Muslims 111 Bulgaria', jIMMA. vol. 8, no. 2, 1987, pp. 278-301.

36 See Chapters

3 and 5 respectively.

209

210

Hugh Poulton

Turkey as Kill-State

measures to try to stem the flood. 37 In 1993 only some 70-80 'divided £,mily' cases were allowed to emigrate to Turkey.3H Many have continued to emIgrate clandestinely on tourist visas, and various socIetIes for emigrants from the Balkans3? have petitioned the government to allow children of these 'tourists' to attend Turkish schools. Agreement with the Turkish Education Ministry on this was reported in September 1993:10 but it was reversed in December the same year. 41 At the time of writ111g the MRF is £,ced with serious problems of splits and erosion of support, due partly to emigration and partly to their hav111g supported unpopular economIC policies in the last coalition government. It seemed possible that in the late 1994 elections the MRF would not even clear the 4 per cent hurdle necessary for representation 111 parliament. This could have led to radicalisation among Turks, and possibly a deterIoration 111 inter-communal relations, but in the event the MRF won 5.4 per cent of the vote, which translated 111tO fifteen seats in parliament. 42

Balkans. The presence oflarge Muslim m1110rities in Bulgaria and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), together wIth the majorIty Muslim identity of ethnic Albamans, has resulted in a belt of Turkish influence extending across the south-central Balkans; its concrete expressIOn is the proposed east-west Balkan route - the new Via Egnatia -linking Durres, Skopje, Sofia and Istanbu1. 43 The belt of Turkish lI1fluence extends northwards through the Serbo-Croat-speaking Muslims of the Sandzak and on to the Muslim Bosnians, and is further expressed in the setting up of schools under Turkish aegIS in various Balkan countries, as well as 111 the policy of encouraging students from the countrIes within the belt of influence to study in Turkey. In 1994, while there were no schools sponsored directly by the Turkish government, one religious school 111 SkOPJe, three 111 Bulgaria (in Sofia, Shumen and Momchilgrad) and one each in Albania and Romania were sponsored by private foundations 111 Turkey.44 In addition, during the three years to 1996 a number of stipends were paid by the Turkish authorities for students from the Balkans to study in Turkey. This scheme was set up by Demirel, and students from Bosnia-Hercegovina, Greece, Bulgaria, Macedonia and rump Yugoslavia (FRY) have as a result entered various levels of the Turkish education system. Over the three years there have been 300 students at religious schools, 250 in high schools and techmcal high schools, 12,000 at universities as undergraduates, and twenty postgraduates. Students have also entered theologIcal schools. For students from Bosnia-Hercegovll1a, the Bosnian government decides who is to travel to Turkey, but for the others local community organisations decide. 45 As an estimated 2 lTlillion

The Balkans gcncrally As noted earlier, the Ottoman legacy has resulted in an affinity between Turkey and many non-Turkish Muslim groups in the

37

13TA. Sofia. 28 September 1992.

38

Figures £i'om Turkish Foreign Ministry, August 1994.

39 Like the BAL-GO!; organisatiOns. which are especially strong in Istanbul and Bursa. where many Balkan emigrants have settled. and winch have been in operation m Turkey for many years.

40

13;';::;1/1 i/l(:~O/. 17 September 1993.

41 Interview with Professor Mustaf.1 KahramanyoI. adviser on Balkan aff.1irs to the Turkish Prime Minister, September 1994. 42 Despite their past record of being partners in coalition governments, their possible participation in a cabinet led by Zhan Videnov of the BSP -the Bulgarian Socialist (formerly Communist Party) - was mled out due to the nomination of !lcho Dimitrov as Mimster of Education. Science and Technology. He had been minister of education and chair of the co-ordinating con1ll1lttee on the 'rebirth process' - the official euphen1lSm for the brutal forced aSSimilation of the ethnic Turks by the Zivkov regime - operating With the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences in 1986-9 (BTA. Sofia. 24 January 1995).

211

43 On 9 May 1993 in Ohrid. a protocol between Albama. FYROM and Bulgana over the road-rail link was signed. with Turkey and Italy (which is expected possibly to extend the link on to North Afnca) to join later. Reportedly Albania will receive credits from the mternatlonal community at f.wourable rates to build its sector of the road. See H. Poulton Who Are The Macedoniatls?, London: Hurst. 1995. p. 198.

Interview Wltll Kahramanyol. September 1994. Correspondingly. in Central Asia there were 55 such schools - figures from Turkish Foreign Mimstry. August 1994. 45 InfonnatlOn from Kahramanyol, who intercstmgly pomts out that there have been less problems of adaptmg to life in Turkey with these students than WIth the 7.000 or so who have similarly come form the Turkic Central Asian republics. 44

212

Hugh Poulton

Turkey as Kill-State

descendants of Slav Muslims from the Balkans live in Turkey, a number of refugees from the Bosnian tragedy have also come to Turkey. While officially 7,000 refugees have arrived, unofficial estimates reach up to 30,000, as many more are staying wIth relatives and have not registered. The Turkish government is attempting to cont111ue with the education of Bosnian refugee children in their own language (i.e. Serbo-Croat). The issue of the schools set up under Turkish aegis in the Balkans raises the question of the exact identity of 'kin-state' actors. As noted above, the main actor till recently was the Turkish government, with a subsidiary role played by emigrant assocIations, concentrated mainly in Istanbul and Bursa. However, the latter tended to be short of finances and political muscle. The recent growth of Islamic groups, which have taken great advantage of opportunities created by Ozal's pnvatisation, has added another [lctOr. Well-financed and 111creasingly influential Islamic groups are now nUJor 'kin-state' actors with their own agenda, which is often at odds with the government line. 46

reflected 111 the continual emigratIOn to Turkey of ethnic Turks and other Muslims, as well as waves of Turkish emotion and solidarity feelings with, for example, Bosnian Muslims. Turkish policy towards 'front-line' groups has varied from direct military involvement in Cyprus, to agreements on education in Greece and declarations on the oppreSSIOn of Turks in Bulgana. In the post-Communist set-up there have been great chances and new opportunities for Turkey, now a major regional power faced with smaller and weaker emerging countries like Bulgana, FYROM (Macedonia) and Albania. At the same tl1ne the Turkish government's monopoly positIOn as the sole effective kin-state actor has been challenged by powerful IslamIC groups within Turkey itself There have been signs that Turkey may move towards a more hardline nationalistic policy over Cyprus and a more antagonistic policy towards the West. 47 Whether this will be translated into tougher activity in Western Thrace, where the other most serious problems continue, and even possibly 111 Bulgaria if the currently positive sItuation of the ethnic Turks changes for the worse, remains to be seen.

213

There are a variety of groups in the Balkans and elsewhere that look towards Turkey as a kin-state in some form. This has been 4(, This is especially noticeable among the Turkish communities in Western Europe. where the organisations of the religious life of Turkish citizens abroad as foreseen III Article 62 of the Constitution. IS mainly channelled through the Turkish Directorate of Religious AfI:lirs. However in the late 1970s and early '80s radical Islamists set up their own rival organisations. including the 'Milli Clirii" . movement. which competes with the state ones (see Chapter 11). There are indications that the Turkish government IS likewise wary of a growth of Islamic Turkism whIch they cannot control in the Balkans. and view. for example. some of the MRF leader Ahmet Dogan's contacts WIth mild susplCJOn. The 'government line' here applies more to the traditional Kemalist approach. although it can be argued that Islamic penetration into key ministnes m the 1980s has seen this 'traditJOnal' approach radically altered. Despite this. there remams a sizeable difference between the aims of the Turkish government and. for example. the powerful Zaman group. wl1lch propagates Its distinctly Islamic vIsIon to perceived 'kin' outside Turkey in Europe and Central ASIa. Za/1/al/ publishes daily in Azerbaijan and Bulgaria and is distributed free of charge (E. Gokalp of Turkish Daily News in Mideast Mirror. 1 March 1993. who also details the plethora of pnvate Islamic radio stations/etc.). These unauthorised broadcasting companies also operate WIdely in Bulgaria. which has repeatedly sought a solution to these Turkish radio and TV broadcasts (see BTA. Sofia. 7 September 1994).

47 Conversely Turkey has shown a willingness to move closer to the European Community with the SIgning of a customs m1lon with it on 6 March 1995.

Sustailling Turkish-Islamic Loyalties

11 SUSTAINING TURKISH-ISLAMIC LOYALTIES: THE DIYANET IN WESTERN EUROPE Nico Landman Among Muslims 111 Westem Europe, those of Turkish origin form ~:me of tl:e largest ethnic groups. Since the 1960s they have establIshed relIgIOus organisations whose structures and cultural orientatIOn are shaped by both the European context and the Turkish background. More than other countries in the Muslim world, the Turkish republic is built on secular principles, yet paradOXIcally It IS 111~lOlved more than any other Muslim country 111 orgams111g the relIgIOUS life of its citizens who live in Westem Europe - mainly through the actiVIties of the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet i~leri Ba~kallhgl, shortened as Diyallet). We examl11e how this organisation has contributed, and continues to do so, to the institutionalisation of Islam in Westem Europe, focusl11g partIcularly on the relationship between Turkish national and Muslim religIOUS identities in the message conveyed by the Diyanet to Turkish immigrants. The problems arising from the Diyands efforts to transplant its norms and structures of authority into the West European context are also assessed.

T11e position

if the

Diyanet in the Turkish republic

In the years after the First World War, major political and cultural changes took place in Anatolia. After a war of independence, a repubiican form of govemment was adopted and the first president, Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk, embarked on a radical refonn programme. 1 The Kemalist reforms 111 Turkey were secularist in the sense that they restructured several social instItutions, and placed these on See I3emard Lewis. I1w El1Ie~!!£'Ilce of Modem Turkey. Oxford University Press. 1961; Niyazi I3erkes. I1w De!Je/apllle/ll t!f SeCtllarislII ilt Turkey. Montreal: McGill University Press. 1964; repr. London: Hurst. 1977. chapters 15-17, 1

214

215

a non-religious base, but they did not separate the spheres of state and religion entirely. They led rather to state l11tervention in religious affairs, and even to state hegemony over the religious establishment. The state's main instrument was the 'Diyal1et', set up in 1924 as a department for the administration of mosques and the appo111tment of imams and preachers. 2 Alongside its purely admimstratlve tasks, the Diyat1Ct also seeks to enlighten the Turkish public about Islam. It pursues this function by for example, distributing religious publications, orgamsing Quran courses, and issuingJatwas. With almost 90,000 employees the Di)'a/let is today one of the larger bodies 111 the Turkish state. Its position is anchored in the Constitution of 1982: the article in question underlines its loyalty to the principle of secularism (laiklik), and its contribution to national unity. Accordingly, it is possible to say that the Diyanet represents the 'official' Islam of the Turkish republic. The nature and positIOn of the Diyanet have been criticised by secularists and Islamists alike. Some secularists have argued that its very existence contradicts the principle of seculansm: whIch they interpret as the state's non-involvement in religious affairs, or at least Its equal treatment of different communities, religious or otherwise. The Diyanet has also been under attack not only because of Its mere eXIstence, but because of the way it fulfils its tasks, especially since the so-called 'Rabita affaIr', when a Turkish Joumalist discovered that the Saudi-based Muslim World League was paying the salaries of some of the Diya/1et imams. 3 Leftist authors see the Diyal1et not as a protector of the secular principles on which the state is built but as a conservative religious force within Turkish society. This pOSItion is shared by most Alevis (Turkey's Shiite population, who are estimated to make up 10-20 per cent of the total populatIOn), who add to the criticisms mentioned above the £1Ct that the Diyallet support Sunni Islam, but not altemative interpretatIOns, mcluding Alevi Islam, on any comparable scale. Referring to the pnnciple of equal treatment See GotthardJaschke. 'Der Islam in der nellen Tiirkei. Eine recht~geschichliche Untersllchllng', Die Welt des Isla/Its. 1 (1951), pp. 5-174. esp, pp. 88-110; I3innaz Toprak. 'Die Instltutionalisierung des Lalzismlls in der tiirklschcn Republik'; J. I31aschke and M. van I3ruinessen (eds), Islant !lIId Palilik ill der Tiirk~i, I3erlin: I3erliner Inst. fiir Vergl. Sozialforschung, 1989. pp. 95-108. 3 U, Mumcu. Raldla. 2nd edn. Istanbul: Tekin Yaymevl. 2nd edn, 1987. 2

216

Nico Lamlman

for different religious groups, such critics of the Diyanet have argued either that it should be abolished or that parallel institutions should be established for other religious communities, with a fair distribution offunds among them. 4 From another angle, the DiYallet has been attacked by Isiamist groups, who see it as an instrument of the secular and, according to some, unbelieving or Kafir state, propagating an interpretation of Islam that is 111 harmony with the state ideology. Like secularist groups, Islamists have thus also argued for a clearer separation between state and religIOn, and for abolition of the Diyanet, which they see as part of the system which they seek to overthrow. 5 Nevertheless, the Diyanet's opponents have never been able to pose a serious threat to its position. The military regime of the early 1980s and the subsequent CIvilian governments have tended to view Islamic religIOn as an Important element in the identity of the Turkish people which can contribute positively to social integratIOn. Consequently, the Diyanet has been enabled not only to continue its activities, but even to increase the number of Its employees from 53,000 in 1980 to almost 90,000 in 1995 - indicating a considerable 111vestment 111 the Diyatlet by the Turkish republic. In addition, many Kemalists concerned at the growing role of religion in Turkish society argue that the Diyanet represents an 'enlightened', modern interpretation of Islam which functions as an important counterbalance to obscurantist and ultra-conservative religIOUS groups. They argue that Turkey, a secular state with a Muslim society, cannot afford to permit such conservatives to exploit the religIOUS feelings of the population for their own -1 See the declaration' Alevilik Bildirgesi' published in Cllllliztlriyct, 6 May 1990, in whIch both Alcvl and non-Alevi intellectuals criticise the establishment of (Sunni) mosques in Alevl villages and demand an end to the huge financial support for Diya/lct. This declaration generated a lively discussion among Alevi authors, like R. Zelyut. Oz Kaynaklart Core Alcvilik. Istanbul: Anadolu IGiltiir Yaymlan. 1990; L. Kaleli. Kimliglli Haykl/"atl AlcllWk, Istanbul: Habora Kitabevi Yaymlan. 1990; and B. Pehlivan. Alcvilcr IIC Diy
Sustairling Turkish-Islamic Loyalties

217

political ends. 6

Turkish Muslim otganisations in Western Europe The Diyatlet was somewhat slow in extending its actIvities to the migrant Turkish commumtles established in Western Europe as a result of the ITligration of Turkish workers there. A subdepartment for religious services abroad was founded 111 1971, but it was not till 1978, when ten counsellors for religious affaIrS were sent to Turkish embassies and consulates in Europe that a concerted effort was made to establish a Diyanet-linked organisation among the Turkish migrants there.? The Diyanet thereby entered a field in which several other partIes were active, representing a variety of attitudes towards Islam, Turkish national identity and the Turkish state. Local Turkish communities had established prayer halls and Quran schools, but in addition a number of Turkish-IslamIc movements had emerged during the 1970s and early '80s, all of which tried to control the mosques and the Islamic aSSOCIations in Gertnany, France, the Netherlands and Belgium. AnlOng these, the followers of SiHeyman Hilmi Tunahan, a Naqshbandi shaikh who died in 1960, played a significant role. This branch of the Naqshbandiyya IS a major force in the parallel Islam of Turkey, i.e. Islam organised outside the control of the Diyal1et. In the 1970s Tunahan's followers built a network of Turkish Islamic Centres in Western Europe, whose ll1fluence extended far beyond the core group of Sufis, through the Quran courses they offered for the children of Turkish migrants. Only fragments of their esoteric doctrine, which is of an esch:>tologlcal nature, are known to the outside world. The movement is critical of secular reforms that restrict the freedom of religious organisatIOn, but it opposes these reforms not by politIcal activism but through educational activities. Their leaders defend Turkish natIOnal identity and the use of national symbols like the TurkIsh flag and national (, Especially the parties at the centre and right of the political spectmm have supported the Diyallct. In the IslanllSt W clf.'lre Party (R~f(/Iz P(/rtisl) the issue of state support for the Diymlct is being discussed at the time of writing.

J. den Exter. DiY(/lIct. Em rcis door dc kCllkcll Peregrinus, 1990. p. 46.

7

11(1Il

dc '?fficiiile ;slalll, Beverwijk:

Nico Landl1la/1

Sustainil1g Turkish-Islamic Loyalties

anthem, and part of the rank and file sympathise with the extreme nationalist ideas of Alparslan Ti.irke§ (died April 1997). A more explicitly Turkish nationalist tendency was introduced among Turkish migrants in Western Europe by the so-called 'idealist' assoCIatIons. In 1978 they established the Federation of Turkish-Democratic Idealist Associations in Europe (Avmpa Demokratik Ulkr:icu Tiirk Dernekleri Federasyonu), which accepted Ti.irke§ as its leader. Although these pan-Turkists controlled a number of mosques, their main focus was not religlOn but Turkish ethnic identity. In the early 1980s the ideology of the Turkish Islamic Synthesis gained momentum in this movement. This ideology upholds Islam as a religious system which does not deny the Identity of natlOn but strengthens and guides it. The distinctions between vanous nations are God-given and do not become irrelevant as a result of adherence to a common religious faith. According to Synthesis ideolof,'Y, the Turks were monotheists even in the pre-Islamjc period, and when they embraced Islam they did so in theIr own unique fashion, as Turks. Turkish Islamic civilisation, developed from the time of the Seljuks in the eleventh century, was a blessing for the entire Muslim world. s Attempts to confer Islamic legitImation on a nationalist ideology led to tenslOns within the Idealist Federation over the relationship between Turkish and Islamic identities. In 1988 supporters of the TurkIsh IslamIC Synthesis finally broke away and established the Union of Turkish Islamic Cultural Associations, wl1lch has local departments in various European countnes. A rather different attitude towards the relationship between religious and national IdentitIes was represented by the Islamist 'Milli Gijrr~§' (National Viewpomt) movement. In the late 1970s and early '80s this movement established a strong position among migrants. The Milli-Golii.~ organisation in Europe, which has branches in all European countnes WIth a Turkish migrant community, is associated with the R~falz Partisi (Welfare Party) of

Necmettin Erbakan. This IS a Turkish political party which aims at a just social system based on IslamIC ideals. Leaders of this party are prominent guests and speakers at events organised by the movement in Western Europe. The movement is Turkish 111 the sense that ItS leaders are Turks, it expresses itself in the Turkish language, and its orientations are shaped by modern Turkish society. In speeches the history of the Turkish people, especially in the period of the Ottoman empIre, IS often referred to with especial pride, and national symbols, like the flag and the anthem, are used at meetings. However, the emphasis on the Turkish national Identity is much less than that of the nationalists, and this identity is clearly subordinate to the religious one. Adherents of the Milli Gorr:i§ in Europe tend to refer to themselves as Muslims of Turkish o rig111 , rather than as Turks. A radical wing of the movement which broke away in 1983 openly challenged the legitimacy of the secular republic of Turkey. The leader of this group, Cemalettin Kaplan (died 14 May 1995), rejected the idea of refonn from within the system, and called instead for the complete abolition of Kemalism and all that it stands for. Kaplan's method for overthrowing the Turkish regime and establish111g an Islamic state in Anatolia conSIsts of a propaganda cam.paign ('tebl(~~ that is intended to prepare the way for a successful use of force in the future. At a demonstratlOn 111 Koblenz on 18 April 1992, Kaplan proclaimed what he called the Federal Islamic State. Although thIS state is for the present situated in Anatolia with Istanbul as its capital, the whole world is regarded as its territory and all Muslims as its citizens. As for the relationship between TurkIsh and Muslim identities, Kaplan in his pamphlets sometimes addresses the 'Muslim people of the Turks', but on the whole the concept of nationality is irrelevant to his ideology, which recognises only one distinction between peoples, i.e. that between Muslims and non-Muslims. 9 It is not surprising that he condemns the role of the Diyanet, although he was himself a Diymlet offiCIal before his migration to Germany in 1980. All these Turkish Islamic organisations have been able to conduct their activities and spread their views about Islam and Turkish society with a freedom they never enjoyed 111 Turkey itself Their

218

For the Turkish IslamIC SyntheSIS see B. Toprak, 'Religion as state Ideology in a secular setting: the Turkish-Islamic synthesis' in M. Wagstaff (cd.), Aspects o( Rcli.~iotl ill Scwlar Turkey, Durham: Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, Occasional Papers no. 40,1990, pp. 10-15; B. Gliven~, G. ~aylan, L Tckc! and ~. Turan, Dosya: Tiirk-Islalll Swtczi. Istanbul: Sannal Yaymcvi,1991; I Kafesoglu. Tiirk-Islalll SClltczi, Istanbul: Aydmlar Ocagi, 1985; S. Arvasi, Tiirk-Islalll Olkiisii, Istanbul: Burak Yaynevi, 5th ecln, 1989. 3 Veils.

H

219

A sociological study about the movement of Kaplan IS F. Atacan, Klltsai COl;. Radikal islatlli Bir GmiJlltl Allatomisi. Istanbul: Baglam, 1993.

9

220

Nico Landmal1

Sustainil1,r; Turkish-Islamic Loyalties

European sections have not only been important for the migrants in Western Europe, but have affected the position of their mother or sister organisations 111 Turkey - the West European branch serving as a base for recruitment and fundraising, and a means of escap111g state supervision.

Tt:irk-islam Birligi (DiTiB-Turkish-Islamic ASSOCIation of Religious .Affuirs) controls between half and two-thirds of the Turkish mosques, many of which were fom1erly connected to other Turkish Muslim organisations. DiTiB is also linked formally to the Diy aile t. 12 Similar organisational structures have been developed in Belgium 13 and, on a more modest scale, in other West European countries. These structures can be described as centralist in a number of different ways. First is the role of the imams and their supervisors, who work 111 the embassies and consulates. Secondly, most of the local organisations which co-operate with the Diyal1et have transferred their mosques, given up their local autonomy and been restructured as subdepartments of the national Diyanet-linked organisation. In the Netherlands the situation IS complicated by the existence of an independent federation or umbrella orgamsation of those Turkish mosques that co-operate with the Diyanet (the Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation in the Netherlands), led by representatives chosen by the local orgamsations. This implies that the Diyanet-linked mosque organisations are represented at the national level by two organisations, one structured hIerarchically and linked directly to the Diyal1et, and the other structured democratically and linked to it indirectly. This gives local leadershIp in the Netherlands a stronger position vis-a-vis the top Diyanet officials than in other European countries. As a result of these developments, the Diya/let-linked organisations form the largest clusters of mosques in Germany and the Netherlands, where Turks are the dominant Muslim group. In these countries they are among the strongest and most stable Muslim organisations. In Belgium their influence within the Islamic camp was till recently checked by the strong ll1stitutional position of the Islamic Cultural Centre 111 Brussels, controlled by the Muslim

11ze Diyanet network in Western EI/rope In competition with these organisations, the Diyal1et started to build up its own European network, which could be seen as an effort to prevent opposition forces from exploiting the religious needs of Turkish migrants and mobilising them against the interests of the Turkish republic. On several occasions Diyanet officials in West European countries have claimed to be the only legitimate representatives of the TurkIsh Muslims, and have insisted that the other organisations should be considered illegal. Although their attempts to monopolise the field have failed, they have succeeded in establishing a strong positIOn institutionally. The first move to this end was the appointment by the DiYallet of its own imams in the Turkish mosques established by migrants and the number of Its imams in Europe grew from eighty in 1981 to more than 600 in 1989. Their work is supervised by the counsellors for religious affairs and other co-ordinators at the Turkish consulates. Mostly they are replaced after four years, although sometimes their tenll is extended to SIX years. to A second initiative was the establishment of foundations in various European countries that function there as semi-official representatives of the Diyanet in those countries, and have taken over the administration of many Turkish mosques. An example is the Islamic Foundation in the Netherlands, which is linked to the Diyanet by its statutes, which stipulate that the President of the Diym1et, or a person appointed by him, is the chainllan of the Foundation's General Board. This Foundation admimsters about 70 per cent of the 160 Turkish mosques in the Netherlands. 11 In Gennany the Diyanet i?leri 10 DiymlCt officials in the Netherlands explained to me that this system is caused by general regulations concerning Turkish civil servants working abroad. to which no exception could be made in f.wour of one category. namely the imams. 11

A more detailed discussion of it~ stnlcture IS given in N. Landman. Vall ilia!

221

to minaret. De institutlOnalisering van de islam 111 Nederland. Amsterdam. 1992. l05fI 12 J. Nielsen. Muslims ill Westcm Europc. Edinburgh. 1992. p. 31. M.S. Abdullah gIves more informatIOn about this organisation 111 I¥as lI'il/ dcl' Islal/J ill DClitscll/and? Gutersloh. 1993. pp. 57-61. A more detailled. but very hostile presentation of DITIB is given by K. Binswanger and F, Sipahioglu. Tiirkisch-islamischc Vercille tlls Fllktor deHtsch-tarkiselzer Kocxistcllz. Benediktbeuren: Riess. 1988. pp. 73-88. 13 See F, Dassetto. and A. Bastenicr. Vislmll tramplallte. Vic l't o~I!a/I;satiolls des

millorites /l1I/sHlma/lcs de BC(l!iqllc. Brussels. p. 186. and Berchem. 1988. p. 144.

LeIJCII

als mos/illl ill BC(l!ie.

Nico Landman

SlIstail1itlg Turkish-Islamic Loyalties

World League. Elsewhere the Diyanet organisations are a major force among the Turkish Muslims. The strong position enjoyed by the Diyanet in Western Europe has been achieved through the financial and organisational power of the Turkish state, whIch pays the imams' salaries. Diplomatic channels have sometimes been used to strengthen the Diyanet's position in Europe, as 111 the case of the agreement by the Federal German authorities to bind residence permits for Turkish imams to a diploma issued by the Diyanet (1984).14

Anti-secular', 'Left-Right' and 'Sunni-Alevi', representing the main antitheses 111 contemporary Turkish society. The sheets are marked with the footsteps of a crowd of people who have apparently walked over them, and the footsteps point towards a shining horizon. The message was clear: let us leave all our differences behind and celebrate our unity and solidarity. In his introductory remarks to this issue the president of the Diyanet called for unity, and blamed unspecified 'external forces' for trying to diVIde and destroy the Turkish Muslim. nation.](' His introduction illustrates another feature of the ideological formulations propagated by the Diyanet, namely Turkish nationalism expressed in an Islamic vocabulary. The unity advocated by the Diyanet is primarily a unity of Turks. NatIOnalist ideals such as patriotism, love of the £1therland and martyrdom for its sake are represented as Islamic values. In some of its recent issues the Diyanet magazine has come close to the Ideas of the Turkish Islamic Synthesis discussed above. l7 A strong nationalist tendency can also be observed 111 articles that deal with Ottoman and TurkIsh history. In 1993-5 the magazine's August Issues paid attentIOn to the many battles won by the Turks during that month throughout their history. Thus we find extensIve discussions of the battle of Manzikert in Eastern Anatolia in 1071, in which the Seljuk Turks defeated the Byzantine army, enabling Turkic tribal groups from northern Persia and Central Asia to settle 111 Anatolia and thus lay the foundation for the Turcification of Asia Minor. l8 The war of 1I1dependence in 191823, led by Mustafa Kemal, was also covered, as some major events in this war took place in the month of August.1~ What interests us here is the presentation and mterpretation of these events m the magazine, which calls them 'our victories', evoking a sense of pride in the glorious past of the Turkish people. In a more

222

The Diyanet: ideological position As is to be expected from a representative of official Islam in Turkey, the interpretation of Islam propagated by the Diyanet is of a loyalist and quietist nature. The organisation's officials claim that, unlike rival groups in Turkey which misuse religion for political ends, their organisation is apolitical, concentrating on purely religious themes. Consistent with this claim, the main focus of Diyanet publications is on the ritual and moral duties of individual Muslims and Muslim conununities, which are presented according to the rules of the Hanafi school of law. The Diyanet is careful to stay within the boundaries of the secular princIples of the Turkish state, and where possible, to avoid sensitive issues arising out of the state's application of these principles, as with the ban on Sufi orders dating from 1925 and never repealed. 15 Its publications address the Turkish people as a religious community, between whose members love and solidarity prevail. Social harmony and unity are emphasised and political tensions in Turkish society are either ignored or referred to as the work of destructive elements trying to undermine national unity. For example in 1994 an issue of the Directorate's monthly magazine Diyanet Ayltk De~([i, appeared bearing the general title 'Today is the day of Unity'. The front page showed sheets of paper lying on the floor, carrying the words 'Turk-Kurd', 'Secular14 H. Vocking 'Die Prasenz des Islam 111 der Bundcsrepublik Dcutschland IV',

CIBEDO-Dokumclltatioll. 23, Dec. 1984.

In an analysis of fa/was given in reactIOn to questions of Turkish workers in Europe. den Exter shows that some sensitive questions, e.g. about the Sufi orders. remained unanswered, OJl. cit .• 37, 15

223

16 M.N. Yllmaz, 'Bawazl. Birlik ve Beraberligimiz', Diyatlet Ayllk DC~l!i, 44. August 1994. 17 See c.g. Diytllwt Aylzk DC~l!i. 25. January 1993. 18 See Claude Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkel': A Cetleral Sunley qf thc Matcrial and Spiritual Culfllre and History, c. '/071-1330. London: Sidgwick and Jackson. 1968, espeCIally pp. 64-84. 1~ See Bemard Lewis, The Emc~l!cllcc q( Modem Turkel', Oxford University Press. 1961, pp. 238-56; Stanford Jay Shaw and Ezel Kural. History '?f thc Ottoman Empirc tIIld Modcm Turkcy, vol. II: Rtform. Rcvolution and RCJlublic: the Risc qf Modem Turkcy. 1808-1975, Cambridge University Press, 1976-7, pp. 340-72.

224

Nico Landman

implicit manner, these same nationalist feelings are to be found throughout the magazine, in the use of expressions like' our nation', 'our people' and 'our country'. The Diyanct-linked organisations in Europe have barely started to produce their own publications, but distribute (at times in translation) material published in Ankara either by the Diya//et itself or by the TI~rkiye Diyal1et Vakif (Diya//et Foundation of Turkey), a non-governmental organisation that works in close co-operation with it. Both the hierarclucal structure in wluch the Diyallet imams in Europe operate and the system of regular replacement guarantee that the ideas they disseminate will not deviate too much from those of the centre m Ankara. When the European context IS explicitly discussed in the Diyal1et's publicatIOns or speeches by its officials, the discourse is that of a peaceful cohabitation of two peoples: the Dutch or German p~ople and the Turkish Muslim immigrants. This is the substance of a videotape issued by the Islamic Foundation in the Netherlands, which describes to the Dutch public its activities as a contribution to cordial relations between the TurkIsh and Dutch peoples. At events attended by non-Muslim guests the same idea is often symbolised by two flags: those of Turkey and the host country. Thus it would appear that in the conceptions of the Diyanct leadership in Europe the religIOus and ethmc Ident~~Ies of Muslims of Turkish origin are closely mtertwmed. Thus, lIke some other Muslims organisations of Turkish ongin, the Diyanet contributes to the maintenance not only of an Islamic religious identIty but also of Turkish natIOnal feelings and loyalties.

Weak points il1 the positioll

if the

Diyanet in Europe

Although the financial and organisational support of the Turkish state gives It in Western Europe a strength and stability which other Muslim organisations can only envy, the Diyallet faces problems over its public image and long-term prospects m Europe. The leaders of its organisatIOns in Europe present themselves as a modern, tolerant and open group, endorsmg dialogue with non-Muslims and integration l11to Europe. 2o It cannot be denied See e.g. a pamphlet of DiTiB, in K. 13inswanger and F, SipahlOglu, op. cit., p.77.

20

Sustaining Turkish-Islamic Loyalties

225

that these organisations try their hardest to build friendly relations with their non-Muslim, environment and encourage their communities to do likewise. This accords with their quietist interpretation of Islam as a religion of harmony and peace. Some European observers indeed appreciate the moderate position adopted by the Diyallct and the positive role it plays.21 Its officials have also generally succeeded in their efforts to portray rival TurkIsh orgamsatIOns as radical and fundamentalist, and as mIsusing the Muslim faith for political ends. However, a w'eak point 111 the public Image of Diyanct organisations in Europe anses from the perfectly correct perceptIOn that they belong to a body controlled by a foreIgn state. The press tends to be critical of the £'lct that theIr imams are sent from Turkey by the Turkish authorities. Diym/ct leaders 111 the Netherlands show that they are aware of this criticism by attempting to play down the Turkish state's influence on their organisations. They call the DiYa//ct a body which 'operates with complete mdependence from the Turkish authonties, because of the separation of church and state 111 Turkey', 22 and claIm that the local member organisations are autonomous. Because the wording of statutes often give the opposite impression this claim is not very convincl11g. Some authors argue that the state's control of religious affairs in Turkey is a contradiction of seculansm as that term is properly understood, and the transplantation of this control to Western Europe is held to be even more undeSIrable because it prevents the development of autonomous mIgrant Muslim organisations. The oppression of religIOUS movements in the countries o~ origin is, according to tillS analYSIS, being exported to Europe.- 3 ThIS analysis over-simplifies the role of the Diymlct in Western Europe, but the structure of its orgamsations is nonetheless incompatible with prevalent ideas on the relationship between state and church 21 C. Elsas, 'Turkish Islamic Ideals of Education: Their Possible Function for IslamIC Identity and integration in Europe' in W.A.R Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld (eds), The Integratioll of Is/am and HindI/ism ill Wcstem Ellrope, Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1991. pp. 174-85; and J. den Exter, 01'. cit., pp. 7-8. 22 Stichting Turks-Islamitischc Culturclc Federatle, BlIl/etin, no. 20H, p. 4.

23 See W.A.R. Shadid and P.S. van Koningsvcld. Dc Illy the Ilatl het is/tllllitisc/lc ,((ellaar, Kampen: Kok Pharos. 1992. p. 180. Another condemnation is K. 13inswangcr and F. Sipahioglu. op. cil .• 73-88.

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in the host countries, and thus impedes the host environment's acceptance of the communities they control. Furthermore, the intertwining of national and religious identities in the Diyanct's message raises important questions about the longterm prospects of this organisation. While the videotape of the Islamic Foundation in the Netherlands stresses the cordial relations between Turkish Muslims and the Dutch people, it also characterises this group of Muslims as a foreIgn community which lives in the Netherlands but truly belongs elsewhere. The sustaimng of loyalties to the Turkish nation and state, symbolised by its flag and national anthem, underlines the alien character of the Turkish Muslim presence, and for new generations growing up in Western Europe this aspect of the Diyanct's message could become increasingly problematical. With its organisation and ideology so firmly rooted in the Turkish republic, the Diyanct nsks growing out of touch with the Muslim communities developing in the West European context. One particular aspect of the Diyallct's present role in Western Europe that is frequently singled out for criticism IS the system it employs for recruiting imams and, above all, its policy of replacing them after a relatively short term, so that they are not able - and mostly are not even motivated - to learn the local language. Leaders of the Diyanet-linked orgamsations are themselves finally coming to realise the problem of Diyanct imams being madequately equipped to guide their communities in the European context. A report issued m 1993 by the Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation in the Netherlands (the umbrella orgamsation of mosques that co-operate with the Diymlct) claimed that imams of the present generation increasingly face demands they cannot meet. They are expected to provide spiritual guidance on problems arising from the mteraction between theIr communitIes and the non-Muslim society around them, but their knowledge of this society is madequate. Moreover, not speaking the local language, they cannot cultivate active contacts WIth other religious communities, such as the churches. In this document, the Turkish Federation clearly recognises the negative implications of a system which gIves the Diyal1ct-imams contracts of limited duration. Moreover, the continued use of Turkish as the predominant language for sermons and religious education in the mosques is mcreasingly felt to hinder the communication of Islamic knowledge to the second and third

generations: realistically, the Federation recognises that these generations qUIckly lose their knowledge of their parents' mother tongue. 24

226

Trainiflg bicultural Imams: a realistic option? An mteresting response to the changing situation of the Turkish Muslim communities in Europe arises in an initiatIve developed by the DiyaHct-orgamsations in the Netherlands to design a training programme to produce bicultural imams. The essential principle is that Turkish boys growing up 111 the Netherlands are sent to Turkey to receive religious training at a secondary school in which the Dutch language and culture are part of the programme. The idea was approved by the Turkish Ministry of Education and in 1993 an imam-hatip school (a Muslim religious school) for Turkish boys from the Netherlands was opened in Boyazi near the town of Anamur. imal1l-hatip schools in Turkey combine a religious training with the teaching of mathematics, science, history and other non-religious subjects, and are the obligatory preparation for theological studies. In November 1993 the Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation in the Netherlands explained its intentions in a document called 'Education Project: Turkish-Islamic Clergy', which presented the school in Anam.ur as the second-best option for meeting the need for imams able to guide Turkish children and young people, and shape their identity as 'Dutch Muslims of Turkish origin' - the best option bemg to train them in the Netherlands. This option IS consIdered impossible for the time being, at least in the form that the Federation wishes to establish, i.e. with training beginning at the secondary level, with eleven- or twelve-year olds. The belief is that trainee imams who do not start their training till after secondary school will not be able to reach the desired level of knowledge in Arabic, the Quran and the Islamic religion. Although the Federation presents the Anamur project as its second-best option, it maintains all the same that most of its Turks-Islamitischc Culturclc Federatlc. Opleidi/\~sJ1roject Turksc lslalllitische Geestdijke/I. Rottcrdam. 1993. paragraphs 1 and 4. Thc proJcct is also presented and defended by K. Wagtendonk and A. Karagul. De IIll(ll1ls. HIm taak, hUll .!i/llctie e/I IIIIIl opleidillg, Thc Haguc: Islanlltischc Raad Nederland. 1994. pp. 19-20. 24

229

Nico Ltmdmall

Sustaining Tllrkisl!- Islamic Loyalties

member organisations prefer to train imams in Turkey on the grounds that imams should be familiar with the background and ideas of first-generation Turkish Muslims in Europe. Moreover, member organisations hold that training should be in harmony -:ith the 'theological principals and traditions of Islam in Turkey (I.e. the H~nafi school of law, and separation of [religious] belief and state)'.-s 'Islam in Turkey' clearly signifies the religious interpretations and structures of official Turkish Islam. Finally, there is a belief that in Turkey the quality of religious training is higher than anything that can be obtained in the Netherlands. In the coming years the imtiators of this project will try to involve the Dutch authorities in it, in order to strengthen the traming with courses in the Netherlands - e.g. during sunmler holidays. Another idea is to appoint Dutch teachers in Anamur who will give lessons in Dutch language and society. The document of the Turkish Federation suggests that the project could be transferred gradually to the Netherlands. Part of this process could be the introduction of theological studies at the level of higher education in one of the existing Faculties of Divinity in the Netherlands, designed as a follow-up to the imal1l-l!atip school in Turkey. The Federation suggests that the Diyal1et could be involved in preparation of the curriculum. 26 A more thorough analysIs of the project requires comparison with other proposals to establish traming for imams put forward by rIval Muslim organisatIOns in the Netherlands. The timmg of the Anamur project suggests that it is a reaction to attempts by these organisations and by individuals to establish Islamic religious training at the level of higher education with sponsorship by the Dutch authorities, and offered at an existing (Christian) academy by Dutch-speaking Muslim teachers. What distinguishes the Anamur project from rival proposals for trammg Islamic religious leaders is not only its location, but also the idea of beginning training at the secondary level: the programmes proposed by other groups do not start till after secondary school. 27 Other differences concern the cultural setting, supervision and control. The structure

of the Anamur project provides opportunities for susta111111g a combined Turkish national and Islamic identity. These do not eXIst in the alternative proposals, which are designed for Muslim youngsters from different national backgrounds. It also enables the TurkIsh authorities to supervise the progranune directly. There are many unanswered questions relating to the new school in Anamur. The first is whether it IS really possible to train bicultural and bilingual imams 111 this way, or if the young men trained there will remain inadequately qualified in, for example, their language abilities. A related question concerns the future prospects of these young men in the Dutch labour market if they choose not to study theology and become imams. Since the school only started in 1993 and is still developing its curriculum, it is too early to answer such questions. A further issue is how this programme, if it succeeds, will affect the position of the DiYmlet in Western Europe. Obviously, the advantages of the project for the Diyal1et are great. Naturally, the emergence of a group of trainee imams who are more or less specialised for work in a particular foreign country (in this case the Netherlands) calls for adaptations to Its current policy of replacing imams in Western Europe every four years. The project will enable the Diyanet to send to Europe imams who are better equipped for their task than the present generation, and this will strengthen their position among the different Turkish Muslim organisations. The Anamur project must be regarded as an attempt to secure the ties between official Turkish Islam and the Muslim community of Turkish origin living in Europe. Whether it will succeed rema111S to be seen.

228

25 26

Turks-Islamitische Culturele Federatie. 01'. cit .• paragraph 4. Ibid .. paragraph 7.5.

27 TIllS position is defended by S. Abdus Sattar. Bcgrip Moslillls ChrisfCllCtt, vol.

20. no. 119. 1994. p. 13.

To conclude, it can be argued that since the 1970s the Turkish government has pursued a consistent policy of both instilling and nurturing a sense of Turkish national conSCIOusness among Turks living in Western Europe, and taking great care that this develops along approved lines. While it has a constitutionally defined duty to support its fellows citizens working abroad, the adoption of an actiVIst policy towards Turkish workers living in Western Europe can perhaps also be explained in ternlS of their feelings of national attachment, especially when compared with Muslim conmmnities 111 the Balkans. There appears little danger of the Balkan Muslim

Nico Landman

Sustain in,!! Turkish-Islamic Loyalties

communities becoming assimilated into the Christian majority, and the aggressive policies implemented by the Balkan states have proved counter-productive with the Muslim communities. Far from their national identity bel11g endangered, the Turks in the Balkans appear to have become more assertive, even assimilating other groups, such as the Pomaks, to themselves, and so mducl11g them too to look to Turkey as a kin-state (see Chapter 10). The situatIOn in Western Europe is different, and many second-generation Turks are becoming assimilated to the host society, and look less to Turkev as a kl11-state and more to their host states. This differ~nce can be explained by two £'lctors. First, the ethnic Turks and Muslims in the Balkans are populations that have been indigenous to the area for centunes, and have tended historically to resort to Turkish natIOnalism as a means of defence agamst overt assimilatory pressures fi-om the successor states of the Ottoman empire. That these successor states (wIth the exception of Albania) saw themselves essentially as Christian states made the position of Muslim minorities (Turkish and non-Turkish) especially problematic. In contrast, the Turkish minorities in Western Europe are basically groups who have recently migrated voluntarily to a foreIgn country where, whether for economIC or political reasons, the situation is felt to be preferable to that in Turkey. Hence the sense of identity loss with the passmg of the generations IS held to be less of a threat. The second point concerns the character of the dominant nationalist ideology m the West European states (also essentially Christian), and the contrast between this and the Balkan national ideologies. Since the Second World War there has generally been less emphasis in Western Europe on overt nationalism and a growing awareness of the need to develop the conception of a genuinely multi-cultural and multi-faith denominational society.2H There are of course clear exceptions to thIS trend, whIch are by no estimates unusual. For example, the German

state insists that would-be citizens embrace a perceived 'pure' German culture. Consonant with the underlying assumptions, extreme nationalist and racist attitudes are much in evidence, especially in parts of the former G.D.R. (East Gennany), often issuing in nationalist reactions on the part of Turkish immigrants. However, in spite of cases such as these there is a significant difference here between the West European and Balkan contexts. A comparison between France and Greece, and even Turkey, is instructive. All three countries are reluctant to recognise the existence of ethnic minorities within their borders. However, while Greece and Turkey persecuted their citizens through the courts for claiming to belong to a minority or insisting on the existence of minorities, France does not. While the general climate in Western Europe may thus appear relatively favourable for sustaining a separate identity, the absence of a threat such as eXIsts m the Balkans can work against this since It demotlvates Turks whose attachment to their country of origin is already weakened. For the Turkish government the dommant feature of the West European context IS the danger of aSSImilation. Faced with this possibility as well as competition from competing M~slim groups, some of them hostile to the current Turkish state Ideology, the Turkish government has embarked on an ambitIOUS attempt to m£luence and control communities living far beyond Its borders through projects such as Anamur. How successful it .will be in fostering a continuing sense of Turkish national identIty 111 S~lC­ cessive aenerations born in Western Europe, and m contro1ll11g o the course of t1llS identity, is unpredictable.

230

2R Western Europe has of course exhibited considerable intolerance in the past. While some argue that the specific Balkan paradigm has arisen from the Orthodox Chnstian state religion tim is open to dispute (see, for example, S.P, Huntingdon, 'The Clash of Civilisations?', Foreigll Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3. Summer 1993; A. Pollis. 'Eastern Orthodoxy and Human Rights'. HUlllall R(~hts Quarter/y, 1993). There are, of course. xenophobiC sectors in all societies: the POll1t here IS whether xenophol1Ja is merely a passing extremIst reaction. or whether justification for it is rooted in aspects of the state national Ideolo!,'Y'

231

After Dayton

12 AFTER DAYTON Hugh Poulton Since most of this volume was completed, a number of key events have taken place in the Balkans which are closely related to the issues it discusses. There have been national elections in Turkey (December 1995), Albania (May 1996), Greece (September 1996) and Bosnia-Hercegovina (September 1996), and significant developments in Kosovo and Albania. But perhaps the most important developnlents in the region where the subject of our volume is concerned are those in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Although we have not directly discussed the situation of the Muslims there, recent events have continued to be a major concern for the future of Muslims throughout the Balkans. In this concluding chapter the most recent developments in the region are surveyed and their implications for the Balkan Muslims examined. The survey begtns with a close look at the 1996 elections 111 Bosnia-Hercegovina including the events leading up to them, their outcome, and the significance of these and related developments 111 the broader regional context. During the bloody war which broke out in earnest in Bosnia in 1992 the Muslims - who now refer to themselves as 'Bosniaks' - emerged as the principal victims, mainly of the Serbs who were mitially better armed, but also during 1993 of nationalist Croats m Hercegovina and central Bosnia in particular. At times even the contmued eXlstence of the state and of the Muslims, its largest constituent people representing m 1991 44 per cent of the population, seemed in doubt. People livmg side by side, speaking the same language! and sharing a common Slav ancestry who had I I.e. Serbo-Croat. Although many Croat~ have for some time insisted that Croatian is a language separate from SerbIan, linguistically this claim has been somewhat tenuous because even the main 'Ijekavian' dialect used by Croats (as distinct from the 'Ekavlan' one which was more prevalent in the eastern part of former Yugoslavia) is shared by many Serb areas. The Croatian state has encouraged the use of 'pure' Croatian words at the expense of the fornler vocabulary in an attempt to distance 'Croatian' from 'Serbian'. There is now a similar attempt by the 'Bosniaks' to create a 'Bosnian' language distinct from

232

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intermarried in the large cities like Sarajevo and Tuzla, engaged in large-scale mutual slaughter while the outside world wfimg its hands and argued over its proper course of action. The Spring of1993 represented a crucial juncture. Over a short period between April and May the Bosnian Serbs rejected the Vance-Owen plan,2 Croat-Muslim hostilities broke out in earnest, and Srebrenica, the large Muslim enclave in eastern Bosnia which had been declared a UN 'safe area', fell to the Serbs, who proceeded to massacre thousands of Muslims. At this moment it appears that the Muslims finally decided that they could no longer look to outside intervention to guarantee even their physical survival, and that their only chance was to fight back seriously. A number of new brigades were forn1ed, many recruited from those who had survived the Serb concentration camps. These were to prove effective in military terms, the most notable and notorious bemg the 7th Muslim Brigade, set up in Zenica m the centre of the Muslim lands and seen from the start as a specifically Muslim rather than Bosman force. The new recruits were men who had been 'cleansed' from their homes, and understandably they did not pay lip-service to the concept of a multinational or multi-ethnic Bosnia. For the first time a strident Muslim nationalism appeared on the scene, rivalling that of the Serbs and the Croats. The brigade's officers sported Islamic insignia and beards, and adopted anti-Western positions. Their wives and daughters increasingly adopted Islamic dress and head covering. Shops selling alcohol, were attacked, and pigs were slaughtered and their carcasses destroyed. 3 As noted in Chapter 2, such developments were nllrrored in the political sphere during 1994. Hence the reis-ul-ulel1la criticised mixed marriages, renowned journalists considered not to be supportive of the new line were removed from the state television, and there were attacks on then Prime Minister Hans Silajdzic, seen by many to symbolise the multinational Bosnia-Hercegovina. both 'Croatian' and 'Serbian'. WIth the introduction (or reintroduction) of TurkoArabic word forms. 2 Cyrus Vance was the UN-sponsored peacemaker appointed by SecretaryGeneral Boutros Boutros-Ghali. while Lord Owen took over from Lord Carrington as the EU peace envoy in 1992.

3 Laura Silber and Allan Little, 71,C Dcath I!f Y'\f!oslav;a, London: Pengulll. 1995. pp.331-2.

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After Dayton

However, there were serious divisions within the Muslim camp, in particular over the growing rivalry between the Bosnian President Izetbegovic and local power boss Fikret Abdic, who operated from his power-base at Velika Kladusa in the Bihac pocket on the northwestern corner of the republic. 4 In 1994 Abdic declared the creation of his own quasi-state, the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia, and was consequently expelled from the Bosnian government. Bitter inter- Muslim fighting ensued; the 5th Brigade, loyal to Sarajevo, defeated Abdie's 'rebels', many of whom fled to Croatia. The personal dimensIOn aside, the Abdie affair can be seen as a conflict between two different viewpoints on the future of the Bosnian state. Izetbegovie's position, nominally supported by the international community, was that BosniaHercegovina constituted an indivisible independent state. In contrast, Abdic seemed prepared to have dealings with Serbia and Croatia, and to countenance the Muslims remaimng in some form of Yugoslavia. For example, in November 1994 when the Muslim 5th Brigade broke out of the Bihae pocket and achieved notable vIctories over the Serbs, the mevitable Serb counter-attack was aided not only by Serbs from Croatia but also by some 5,000 of Abdie's supporters. s But in spite of this inter-Muslim fighting, the government side was boosted during the early part of1994 by a surprise development. Although the Croatian President Tudjman had in the past made overtures to Milosevic to partition Bosnia-Hercegovina between them, US pressure was now brought to bear on Croatia, which had about 30,000 troops fighting alongside the Bosnian Croats

in Bosnia against the Muslims, with the result that on 2 March a Croat-Muslim federation was announced in Washington which ostensibly aimed to end the Croat-Muslim fighting and strengthen the Bosnian government. Nevertheless the war dragged on, with peace proposals being routinely turned down by the Bosnian Serb side despite obvious signs and the prompting of theIr erstwhile mentor, the Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, that they had achieved as much as they could hope for by military means, and that their thousands of kilometres of indefensible borders were vulnerable to counter-attack. However, the tide was turning. The West finally lost patience with the Bosman Serbs and began to make effective use of Its superior fire and air power m NATO attacks on Serb positions. In August 1995 the CroatIan army, now well eqUIpped, launched a lightning attack on the Serb-held 'Krajina' regIOn of Croatia, effectively driving the Serbs out. The end of 1995 saw the Croatian and Muslim forces pushing the Serbs back in the western half of the country so successfully that at one point the fall of Banja Luka, the Bosnian Serbs' main town, appeared imminent. At this point the United States again stepped in and the Dayton peace plan was finally signed in November 1995 by Presidents IzetbegovIc, MilosevIc and Tudjman, and a peace of sorts was acllleved. According to the Dayton agreement the country was split into two units: one, comprising 49 per cent of it, was the Serbian Republic (RS) and the remaining 51 per cent was the Croat-Muslim Federation. Although the agreement called for the return of all refugees, ideally to their original homes, and stressed that the state was intact and would so remam, the emerging reality was significantly different. The Serbs in the RS regarded that entity as their own state and, despite at times paying grud!:,>1ng lipservice to the Dayton agreement6 , plainly read into it an acceptance

234

4 The controversial Fikret Abdic was a leading figure in the A6'Tokomerc financial scandal. Agrokomerc was a huge agro-industnal combine which had greatly enriched the I3ihac area and helped to make Abdic extremely popular. He was jailed for his part in the f.1ll of Agrokomerc, although his supporters claimed he had been framed by opponents m the Communist hierarchy Jealous of his success. In the 1991 elections he was a candidate for the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and polled the largest number of votes -1,010.618 -compared to Izetbegovic. who polled 847.386. However his position in the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) was relatively weak and he allowed Izetbegovic to become Head of the Presidency of I3osnia-Hercegovina. The I3ihac pocket was surrounded by Serb-held pOSitions in both Croatia and I3osnia, but It, topography between rivers and Abdie's manoeuvrings, and deals struck With both the Serbs and Croats, enabled it to survive. S

Silber and Little. op. cit .. p. 339.

(, In the September elections, all parties and candidates were obliged to adhere to the Dayton principles. However. all the Serb parties in the RS openly state that their aim was UJllon with Serbia, while the hard-line Serb nationalist I3iljana Plavsic, who won the competition for RS PreSident with 64.9 per cent of the vote, was made by the OSCE (the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which was overseeing the elections) to read out a statement on I30snlan Serb TV regretting that she had questioned the Dayton agreement and openly called for the dissolution of I3osnia-Hercegovma. I30snian Serb TV,

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Hllgh POllltotl

After Day tOil

of the reality of their own 'state'. Any Muslim or Croatian refugees who tried to cross the inter-ethnic border line (IEBL), separating the two UI1lts, into the RS risked attack and harassment. Telephone communications across the line were all but non-existent. The currency in use in the RS was the Yugoslav dinar (or the Deutschmark), while the money of the Federation was unacceptable. Similar problems arose in the south 111 Hercegovina where the Croats, encouraged by Zagreb, had also set up their own mini-state: Herceg-Bosna. Here virulently nationalistic Croats turned to Croatia rather than to Sarajevo; they too, like the Serbs, did their utmost to obstruct the return of Muslim refugees. To a lesser degree, Muslim authorities in central Bosnia also harassed Croats attempting to return to their homes. Given these realities, the elections date of 14 September 1996 designated by the Dayton agreement, which had used the 1991 electoral lists and envIsaged the return of refugees to their original homes to vote, was problematic in the extreme. However, as US presidential elections were to be held in November and President Clinton, to appease the US electorate, had announced that he would withdraw US forces from the peacekeeping force (IFOR) by the end of 1996 the Bosnian elections went ahead. However, local elections, originally to have been held at the same time as national ones, were postponed due to widespread manipulation of voter registration - mainly by the Serbs, who took advantage of proVIsions whIch, while envisaging the return of most refugees to their original homes, nevertheless allowed voting either where refugees now resided or where they would like to reside (the latter provision 1I1tended as the exception rather than the rule). Exploiting these provisions, the Serbs registered thousands of Serb refugees who had onginated olltside the RS in cmcial areas withill it - i.e. those areas which did not have Serb majorities before 1992 - and at the same time registered almost none to vote in the Federation. 7 In addition, the election process itself, which

was extremely complicated, tended to reinforce separation: only those from within the RS could vote for the Serb member of the three··person State Presidency while in a compl~mentary w~y, only those in the Federation could vote for the Mushm or Croatian candidates. In the event few people crossed the IEBL,H and there were allegations of massive vote-rigging, especially over refugee voters outside the country in Europe. There were discrepancies all over the country, and the Bosnian Prime Minister Hasan Muratovlc alleged that the turnout in some areas in the RS was 120 p~r centY It appeared that there were serious irregulanties also 111 mainly Muslim areas, with 30,000 votes purporting to be c~st by Muslims in central Sarajevo who were actually dead or nussmg, and a suspiciously high turnout around Bihac where Fikret Abdic stood for election. 1O As expected, Izetbegovic won the hIghest

Pale, 13 September 1996. E.g. 31,278 Serb refugees from rump Yugoslavia (FRY) registered with the so-called Fon11 2 to vote mBrcko, 19,746 in Srebrenica and 12,365 in Zvomik -all places previously with Muslim majorities -while only five registered for Sar~Jevo Central and cleven in Novi Grad in the Federation where many Serbs had previously lived. Independent observers alleged that Serb refugees were obliged to vote in this way on pain of forfeiting refugee benefits - I am indebted 7

to Anna Husarska of the International Crisis Group for this information. In the event, however, Bosnian Serb sources said that only some 6.000 Serb refugees out of those registered to vote in Brcko actually voted there -SRNA (Serbian Republic News Agency), Pale, 15 September 1996. However, tim was blatant gerrymandering because many (perhaps all) of these refugees bussed m from FRY had never lived there, were not living there then, and would not do so in the future. Such refugees were obliged to have a form stating that they had voted stamped by the polling station committee before be1l1g allowed to board the bus back to FRY, The OSCE had the power to prevent such mampulatlOn of the use of Form 2 but did nothing. H Some 13,500 Muslims crossed mto RS while 1,200 Serbs crossed into the Federation- FillalJcial Times, London. 17 September 1996. However, large numbers of Muslims did use Form 2 to vote in RS where the SDA Muslim candidates for the RS preSidency and vice-presidency polled 96,752 votes. or 10.27 per cent of the vote. and the SDA won 14 seats compared to the rulmg SDS's 45 in the RS parliament resultll1g in the SDA capturing a further 3 seats from the 14 allocated to RS in the House of Representatives of Bosl11aHercegovina. Figures from the OSCE's 'final preliminary' results - HINA, Zagreb, 24 September 1996. 9 HINA, Zagreb. 17 September 1996. However, there was widespread criticism of the lists used, which were often inaccurate and omitted people who had always lived III a neighbourhood. Personal observation by author. 10 Julian Border, 'Massive vote-riggmg taints Bosnia election', Gllardian Weekly. London, 29 September 1996. Border says that the worst fraud appeared to be in Muslim areas and casts doubt on whether Izctbegovlc actually gamed more votes than Krajisnik. However, it is noticeable that wh.en the total number of Serb votes are added up. this comes to over 1 mlll10n (the mall1 rival to Kr~isnik in the Serb camp. Mladen Ivanie of the Milosevlc-backed Alliance

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Hugh

POlllt011

number of votes as the Muslim candidate for the tripartite Presidency with 731,024 votes (some 80 per cent of the vote for the Muslim candidate), while the winning Serb candidate Momcilo Krajisnik of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) won 690,130 votes (67 per cent of the Serb vote). The Croatian candidate Kresimir Zubak of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), wo~ ?29,891 (89 per cent ofthe Croatian vote). Despite the irregularities, ~t was ~lear that the election results would be accepted by the l11ternatlonal community for a number of reasons, not the least being the inuninence of the US presidential election, and the fact that if Krajisnik were declared the overall winner and thus chair of the presidency in place of Izetbegovic, it would be disastrous, gIven that he had been one of those responsible for the division in the first place. What the elections convincingly demonstrated, despite the irregularItIes, was that the nationalist leaders dominated in their respective camps as they had done in 1991, and that despite the avowed 1l1tentIOns division appeared unavoidable. Shortly after the electIOns, the government daily Oslobodjetlje in Sarajevo commented that in sItuations comparable to that of Bosnia, some 70-75 per cent of refugees never return home, and that the vote encouraged division of the country because voters had overwhelml11gly voted for nationalist or perceived nationalist leaders. The paper also remarked that although Izetbegovic talked of a return to the prewar situation, the intervening years 'had been filled wit!: imme1~se hat~ed' and the country was firmly on the path to dI~IsIOn. To t!1lS It mIght be added that the 'marriage' between MuslIms and Croats remains at best a rocky one, with a potential for further large-scale hostilities, both between the Federation and the RS, and inter-Federation. Clearly, parties which attempted to appeal across the ethnic/religIOus diVIdes fared poorly in the voting. Izetbegovic was seen overwhelnungly as the Muslim leader while his main rival former PrIme Mil1lster Haris SilajdZic of the Party for Bosnia~ Hercegovina, was seen by many as the symbol of a united multiethnic Bosnia. Silajdzic received only 123,696 votes (13.6 per for Peace and Progress coalition, won some 306,000 votes) while the total ' Muslim vote comes to less than 900,000. 11

OslollOdjetzje, Sarajevo, 20 September 1996.

After Dayton

239

cent of the Muslim vote) in the election for the tripartite presidency while his party won only eleven seats in the 140 seat Federation assembly, compared with 78 won by the SDA and 35 by the HDZ. Perhaps more revealing was the actual election campaign. The SDA exhibited the same pattern of manipulation and mtimidatIOn of the Muslim electorate as the Serb and CroatIan natIonalist partIes did with their respective electorates. Furthermore, a televIsion station funded by Western sources and mtended for free use by all candidates was prevented from operating by the Bosnian government. 12 In mid-June, when SilJjdzic went to address an election rally in Cazin, SDA supporters beat him up and threatened to kill him if he ever returned: tI1lS was by no means an isolated inCIdent of intimidation by SDA supporters of those they conSIdered rIvals. 13 Increasingly the SDA has adopted Islamic insignia and symbols, and there has been a steady drift towards Islam as a basic source of IdentIty in place of the more citizenoriented multi-ethnic multI-denominational approach represented by SilajdZic. Before the war m 1992, observers had often conunented on the lack ofovert religIOUS practice among the former Yugoslavia's 'Muslims' .14 However, the collapse of Communism and the ensuing war have brought about a change mirroring a parallel Orthodox revival among Serbs. For example, at a SDA rally near Sarajevo on 10 September 1996, speakers stressed three elements of'Bosniak' identity, with Islam and faith as the most Important, followed by Bosman land and the umty of the Bosnian people. 15 The change in terminology from 'Muslim' to 'Bosniak' whIch has come to the fore (and been adopted by international observers) now effectively demes non-Muslims the right to identification as 'Bosniaks'. Before 1992 such a term had a more territorially defined reference and could be used by all groups who saw their allegiance 12 Jonathan Eyal, 'Bitter reality exposes Bosma's poll charade', GlIardiall 11leekly, London, 29 September 1996. 13 See Mensur Camo, 'Bosnians Intimidated' in TlIar Report: Blilletill (!f the IlIStitlite for 11Ia,. alld Peace Reportillg, no. 45, London, September 1996, p. 5. 14 An opmion poll 111 19R5 noted that the percentage of religious believers 111 Bosnia-Hercegovma was only 17'J{, -lower than in Kosovo (44'Yc,), Croatia (33%), Slovenia (26%) and Macedonia (19%). Quoted in H. Poulton, The Balkalls: Milwrities alld States ill COI!flict, London: MRG, 1993, p. 43. 15 Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina, Sarajevo, 10 September 1996.

24()

Hligh Poulton

After Dayto11

to the state or territory as taking precedence over sectarian considerations. In its present usage the term not only denies nonMuslims inclusion, but confines them to their own respective ethnic camps whether they like it or not, thereby remforcmg the exclusive xenophobic nationalisms which tore apart the former Yugoslavia and Bosma-Hercegovina. War has often been the engine of nation-building and It seems that tins once more has been the case in Bosnia. While the nationalist Serb (and Croatian) bogey of an Islamic republic in the Balkans remains merely inflammatory propaganda,16 the revival ofIslamic (1ith and practice as a central pillar of Muslim Identity in Bosnia-Hercegovina is a reality and will have ramifications for Muslims throughout the Balkans. This is true too of other developments outside Bosnia-Hercegovina. While in Kosovo the stalemate contl11ues, the failure of Rugova's approach of relying on the international conullunity to recognise the terntory Kosovo as an mdependent state has seen his position challenged by Adem Dema<;i as well as stimulating more radical approaches by some small groups. The grenade attacks on Serb refugee centres in February 1996, and the violent attacks on Serb civilians and policemen in April in reaction to the killing of an Albanian by a Serb (see Chapter 8, p. 158) pomt to potential future dangers if the Serb/Albanian conflict over Kosovo remains unresolved.

It cannot have escaped the notice of some radical Albanians that, as with the Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina, seeking assistance from the West has so far proved less effectIve than direct action on the ground, although the Kosovars, despite their numerical superiority in Kosovo, remain at a severe disadva~ltage milita~ily compared to the Serbs; this again evokes parallels With the MuslIms in Bosnia. In contrast, the agreement of 1 September 1996 between the Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians whereby Albaman pupils and staff will be allowed back into educational premises might be interpreted as a potentially momentous move towards compromise. Whether any form of compromise such as autonomy for Kosovo within rump Yugoslavia remains feasible after the ruthless stripping of Albanian control in the region by Milosevic remains an open question. In Albania, the election victory of Sali Berisha and the Democratic Party m May 1996 demonstrated that democratic practices and attitudes may reqUIre some time to become the established norm. Blatant police intimidation of the main opposition, who boycotted the poll in protest, to a large extent exposed Berisha's questionable democratic credentials. However, as With the electIOns 111 Bosnia-Hercegovina, the West preferred to overlook these excesses and accept Berisha as the democratically elected leader. It seemed likely that Berisha would continue to look to the Sunm Muslim community and especially to traditional IslamiC CIrcles 111 Kavaje and Shkoder as a basis for support. It IS reasonable to suppose. This policy was linked with Albania's close ties to Turkey, where the Islamic Welfare Party (RP) won the largest share of the vote in December 1995 (21.4 per cent) and went on to form a coalition government with the RP leader Necmettin Erbakan as Prime Ml11ister. Moreover, Albania's descent into anarchy in March 1997 made the situatIOn there increasingly unclear. The victorv of the RP in Turkey could be seen as marking another turl1ll;g point for Muslims in the Balkans. Turkey, itself partly a BaIkal; state with an expanding popula~lOn of over 60 million, has balanced its simultaneous but confllctmg roles as a Muslim kin-state for many Balkan Muslim groups and as a secular Muslim state. Despite the large-scale penetration of Sunni Islam as a major influence in many of the Turkish state's key ministnes, as well as its gradual acceptance by many - indeed probably the

16 Much of this propaganda refers back to the trial and prosecution ofIzetbegovic and twelve other leading Muslims in Sar;uevo on charges of wanting to create an ethnically pure Muslim state out of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Kosovo and other Muslim areas 111 the then Yugoslavia like the Sandzak. Much of the prosecution was based on a treatise by Izetbegovic 111 1970 entitled 'The Islan1lc Declaration', Izetbegovic dellled the charges and stressed that the treatise (parts of which had been legally published m Yugoslavia in the 1970s) was concerned with the general emancipation of Muslims. not with Yugoslavia or Bosnia in particular. and was meant to apply to countries where the overwhelming majority of the population was Muslim. Ironically this latter situation is more applicable in the current Federation than It was in the past, due primarily to actions by the Serbs. Izetbegovic, who along with three of the others on tnal had been imprisoned ill the late 1940s for membership of the 'Young Muslim' organisation which was proscribed as antl-CommUl1lst and 'terronst' by the authorities. was sentenced to fourteen years' imprisonment. reduced on appeal to eleven years. He was released early in November 1988 due to the general political relaxation of that tl1ne and founded the SDA in May 1990. For more details of the trial see H. Poulton. op. cit., pp. 42-4. For a full text of the Declaration, see the SOlltll Slatl JOllmal. London, spring 1983.

241

242

Hugh PoultOl1

m~ority17 -as a key pillar of Turkish identity, the foreign ministry has tended to remain a bastion ofKemalist secularism. Any change in this orientation resulting from the RP victory will have profound implications for all Muslims in the Balkans. In Greece, Turkey's traditional enemy 111 the Balkans, the prolonged illness and finally the death of Andreas Papandreou, for so long a major force in Greek politics, resulted in the leadership of his ruling PASOK party passing to Costas Simi tis, who won the national electlOns in September 1996. Simitis promised to improve his country's relations with its neighbours, but tensions with Turkey over the Muslim population in Western Thrace have continued. The events in the Balkans discussed in this chapter and their implications for the region's Muslim populations do not modify our conclusion that Muslim identity in the region continues to be multi-faceted and responsive to pressures both from within its component states and from outside. As noted in Chapter 2, there has been a general evolution since the end of the nineteenth century of an identIty based solely on Islam to one where ethnicity has become an important [lctOl". Conversely, the war in BosniaHercegovina between groups that are ethnically homogeneous but differentiated by religion and religious custom has seen Islam re-emerge as a pillar of identity. Between Muslims, whatever their religious or cultural configuration, and people from a Christian and, more specifically, Orthodox milieu, the poles of confrontation or coexistence remain.

17 See H. Poulton. Top Hat, Grey Wolf alld Cresceot: Tllrkish NatiotwliSIll IIl1d ,ile Tllrkisll Rcpll[;tic. London: Hurst, 1997. chapter 6.

INDEX

Azerbaijan and Azeris. 197. 198 Abdi". F., 234, 237 Atatiirk (Mustafa Kemal) and Abdiilhamid II. 143 Kemalism: 15. 19. 62. 83. 89, 61. Afghanistan. 197ff 200. 207. 214. 216. 219. 223. 242; Africa. 49 views on what is Turkish nation. Aga. M.E .• 87-8. 205ff. 207 196-7 Agani. F .. 161 Australia. 98. 110. 126 Agrarian Party. 60 Austria-Hungary. see Habsburgs Ahmet, S.. 90. 207 Akbulut. Y .. 201ff Albania and Albanians: 2. 3. 5. 7. 11. 13adinter Con1I11Ission. 106ff 15.17.18,19,33.42.82.83.113. 13ajram. 13 .. 126 117.118.120.131. 140, 141. 145. 13aleta. A.. 134 149-50, 168, 169, 179, 192, 198. 13aJiksi, A .• 45 200. 211; Orthodox Albanians, 20. Balkan wars, 50. 55. 140. 173 24, 117, 118, 133. 138; Albanians 13ardhi. D.R., 126. 128 in Macedonia, 21. 26, 92-8, 99, 13ashkirs. 197ff 100-1, 101-2. 103-4; Albanians and Basil II. 17 Torbesi. 94-6; Albamans and Turks. 13ektashis: 14; in Albania. 115-16. 118. 119, 120, 125-8. 132. 137. 138 96-8; Albanians and Roma, 100-1; birth of Albanian state. 24; Chams, Belgium. 217. 221-2 25; Roman Catholic Albanians. 25; BerlSha. S .. 130. 131. 156. 241 Islamic communities (Sunnis. 13ek- Berisha. Z.. 160ff taslus and other Sufis) within, 115- Birtik. 98 38; 1996 elections, 232. 241; sec Boja. R .. 130 BoloVJc. M.. 189 also Kosovo and FYROM Albanian Democratic Union for Borba. 177. 183 Bosma-Hercegovina and Muslims of: Monetcngro, 189 1. 2. 3. 6-7. 9.13.15.20.21,31. 'Albanian Revolutionary Committees'. 32. 33. 42. 76. 82. 93. 99. 106. 143 137,139. 140. 150. 155, 157. 160. Alia. R .. 120 167. 170. 172-3. 174-5. 177, 183. Alevis. 35. 125. 215-16. 223; see also 184.190.191. 194. 195.200.211. 13ektashis and Shiities 212. 213; under Habsburgs and in Anamur project. 227-9 successive Yugoslavias, 22-3; as sepaAnti-Fascist Council for the Liberation rate nation. 23-4; refugees from. 95, of Yugoslavia, 173 96; war, Dayton and elections. 232Armenia and Armenians. 42, 197.208 41. 242; see also Sand'lak Aromanians. 42; see also Vlachs 13osniaks. 232. 239-40; see also Arabs. 37. 132 13 0 snia-Hcrcegovma 'Arkan'. see Raznatovic. Z. Britain. 60. 63 Asia. 49; see also Central Asia BSP (Bulgarian Socialist Party), 72-3 Association of SanclZak Writers. 175

243

244

I/1dex

Index

Bukoshi, B., 155, 157 Bulatovic, M., 188 Bulgaria and Bulganans: 2, 3, 5, 10, 15, 17, 18, 1920,21,29,85,90, 143, 145, 183. 'San Stef.1no' Bulgaria, 22; Pomaks in, 33-58, 102; Turks in and Bulgarians' reaction to, 54-81; l3ulganan Turks and Turkey, 195, I 97fI 200, 204, 20710,211, 213 Bylyku, B., 134 Byzantines, 223 Caliphate, 195 Caucasus, 132, 195, 200 Cell/iyel (Islall/ Mllluyaz; I-Itlkllk Cellliyel)' 146 Central Asia, 197-8, 223; see also, Uzebekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan Centre for Ethnic Relations (Skopje), 104, 104 Cene, M., 23ff, 233 Chams, 142 Cherkez,35 Chetniks, 145. 185 China, 116, 196, 197ff Christian Democratic Party, 157 Christopher, W., 9 Cigal. M., 184 (:iIIer T., 203 Circassians. 15. 83 Clinton, B., 236 Cold War, 3, 7, 8. 10,20,30, 47, 85, 89, 201, 209 Colonels' regime in Greece. 86. 204. 206 Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), 143-4 COlllmunity of Dervish Orders of Yugoslavia lZIDRA), 129 Cosie. ]).. 18H. 190 Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF), 159 Council of Elders of the IslamIC Community of Macedonia. 94 Croat-Muslim Federation. 235-40

Croatia and Croats: 26. 145. 149, 160. 167,170. 190.191. 192. 194. 232ff, 234. 235. 236. 240; in BosniaHercegovina. 22. 23. 195. 233-8. 240 Croation Democratic Union (HDZ), 238. 239 CSCE (Conference on SecurIty and Co-opperation in Europe). 79. 95 Cyprus. 195. 200. 201-3. 204 Dacevic. C.. 188 Daci. A .. 157f1' Dayton Agreement. 1. 9. 191, 235-6 de Azcarate. P .. 60 Demayi. A .. 157,240 Demirel. S .. 132. 203 Democratic Alliance of Turks in Macedonia. 98 Democratic Leaguc of Kosovo. see LDK Democratic Party (DP -of Albania). 130. 131, 156.241 Dcmocratic Party (DS - of Serbia), 191 Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS). 191 Democratic Party of Turks in Macedonia (DPTM), 95. 98 Denkta~. R .. 202-3 Diya/let islai Baskll1zllgl (Diya/let): 132. 212£1; position in Turkey. 214-17; organisations in Western Europe. 217-20; network 111 Western Europe 220-2; ideological position. 222-4; weak points in Europe. 2247; training bicultural imams. 2279 DiYilllel Ayllk De~~i. 222-3 Djilas. M. 153ff Dobrudzha, 15. 63 Dogan. A .. 212ff Donia. R.].. 7 Draga. F.I3 .. 146 Drila Islal1le. 124 Durham. E.. 141

E djadhla. 134 Ecebit. B .. 201. 202 Egypt. 122

'Egyptians'. 101, 102. 150 Erbakan, N .. 241 Euro-Asiatic Islamic Council. 132 European Union. 203 Faikoglu, A .. 90 Federation of Turkish-Democratic Idealist Associations in Europe. 21H Ferhati. S .. 121£1Fine. J.V.A .. 7 First World War. 55. 59, 83.139.140. 196. 214 France: 98. 217. 231 Frasheri. M .. 143 Frasheri. N .. 143 Front for Macedonian National Unity. 94 FRY. see Yugoslavia rump FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia): 2. 3. 5. 6. 11. 26. 38.49.92; 211. 213. Torbesi and Muslims 111. 92-6; Turks in. 98; Roma 111. 101; public l;erceptions of ethnic question. 103-14; see also Macedonia and Yugoslavia (former) Gagauz. 42. 197ff, 199ff Gall/i'iyat al-islall al-Ktlwoiiliyo. 122 Gellner. E .. 26-8. 31 Georgia. 197ff Germany and Germans: 30. 34. 90. 98. 122; Turks in. 199.217.219.

220-1.222.231 Ghegs. 117. 118. 150 Gorbachev. M .. 71 Greece and Greeks: 2. 3. 5. 15. 17. 18; Nationality Law. 19; 20. 24-5. 26.29.30.31,34.38; Pomak border area with Bulgaria. 47-50; Turks and Pomaks 111. 82-91. 102. 195. 196.201.202.203-7.209.211. 213; Roma in. 91-2; Pontic Greeks. 87; Greeks 111 Albania. 117. 132-3. 135.136; 141,142.143.145; population exchanges With Turkey. 196. 203-4.231; 1996 elections. 232. 242 Green Party. 183 GYPSies. see Roma

245

Habsburgs. 10.31. 140. 172-3 HaclZic. H., 186-7. 189 izajj. 5 Ha.Jzer.u, H .. 160ff Halili. N .. 98 Halvettyya. 118.128-30 I-Ianafi school of law. 222. 228 Helsmki Watch. 184 Herceg-l3osna. 236 Hikmet. N .. 65 Hilmi M. (Effendi). 88 Hitler. A .. 30 Hobsbawm. E., 27 Hod"ic. M .. 179 Howell. S.. 37 I-Ioxha. E .. 5. 24. 26. 120. 123. 200 Hoxha, F.. 129 Hoxha. M .. 123 Hoxha. Q .. 129 Hungarians. 99 IEBL (inter-ethnic border line in 130snia-Hercegovina post-Dayton). 236. 237 IFOR (UN peacekeeping force in Bosnia-Hercegovina). 236 India. 20 International Islamic Charity Project of the United States. 122 International Islamic Relief Organisation. 122 Iran, 126. 197ff. 223 Iraq. 197ff, 199 Islanllc Conference of Foreign Ministers. 5 Islamic Foundation in the Netherlands. 220. 224 Islamic Relief Association of I3inningham. 122 Israel. 47 Italy and Italians. 147 Izetbegovic. A .. 95. 234. 235. 237-8. 240ff Jirecek. C .. 54 Jews. 16. 42, 47, 208 JMO (Yugoslav Muslim Organisation). 22. 146

246

Index

John Paul II. 133 Jokovic. R .. 187 Jovanovic K .. 183 Jovanovic. Z .. 157ff '}lIdzd'. 96 Kadare, r.. 133 Kadiriyya. 118, 128-30 Kaleshi. H .. 134-5 Kaplan, C .. 219 KaradZic. R., 191 Karakachans. 42 Karayaiytn, M .. 203, 207 Karimoglu. M.A.C.. 198ff Kazakhstan, 197f1" Kemal. I.. 144 Kemal, M., see Atatlirk Kilibarda. N .. 189 K,ztfbas/Ils. 15, 74. 84; see also Bektashis Ko,:i, H.S .. 121, 124, 130 Kol;ti, A., 157ft" Kosova Liberation Army, 158ff Kosovo and Kosovars: 2, 5. 6. 9, 11, 13, 25, 26. 82. 99, 113, 122, 125, 126.129,130.134,135,137.170, 173, 178. 179. 190, 232, 240-1; historical background. 139-42; beginnings of Albanian nationalism, 1424; in royalist Yugoslavla, 144-7; in Second World War, 147-8; in Communist Yugoslavla, 148-50; risc ofAlbanian nationalism, 151-2; Serbian backlash and the underground republic, 152-61; education. 162-4, 241; thc media. 164-5; cmployment. 166-8. 168-9: see also Albam;t Kr;tiina. 139. 160, 191. 235 Krajisnik. M .. 238 Krstic, B., 159ff Kurds. 51, 196. 199ff. 223 Kuwait. 122 Latins. 135 Lausannc Treaty. 83. 204, 205 LDK (Dcmocratic Leaguc ofKosovo), 155, 157 Leaguc of Democracy (of FYROM), 112

League of Nations. 30. 60 Lcague of Prizren. 142-2 Liberal Party (of FYROM). 112 Liberal Union of Albanians. 112 Libya. 52. 122 LJ~ic. R .. 177, 183. 186. 192 Lockwood. W .. 42 Macedonia: 19. 20. 25. 38. 50, 63. 82.83.99-102.103-114.122.125. 126. 130. 134, 135. 137. 145. 146. 147,156.158.196.200.211: Torbesi in. 92-6. 103; Turks in, 96-8. 103-14; see also FYROM and Greece and Yugoslavia Macedonian Orthodox Church. 106ff. 109 Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation - Dcmocratic Party of Maccdonian Unity. sec VMRODPMNE Macedonians (as national group): 7. 29. 31.38.103-14,117;secalsoFYROM and Grecce Magyars. 141 Malaysia. 122 Mazowiccki. T.. 159 Medetliyet. 62. 63 Mehovic. N.. 183 Memcdovsb, R .. 94 Memic, M.. 183 l\1emor{l/ldlll1l all the Special Statlls (if Salldzak. 178 Merhamcd Association. 175 millet system. 3. 8. 14, 16-18. 20. 21. 83. 142. 195. 200 Milli Gihiis (National Viewpoint) movement. 212ff. 218-19 Milosevic. S.. lOS. 107ff. 152-4, 164, 167, 169. 190-2. 234-5, 241 Minority Rights Group (MRG) , 91 Mitsotakis, c., 86. 205. 207 Moldova, 199 Montcncgro and Montenegrins, 2, 19. 21. 24, 25. 93, 99, 117, 134. 139. 140,141.145,147.153,155.156, 158. 160, 162, 163. 166; see also Sandzak and Yugoslavia

Index

247

Papandreou. A., 86. 205. 242 PaUtika. 177 Parliamentary Party. 157 Party of Kosovo. 156 Party of the Democratic Right. 134 Party for Bosnia-Hercegovina, 238 Party for Democratic Prosperity. see PDP Party for the Complete Emancipation of Roma. 112 Party of Democratic Action see SDA PASOK, 86, 242 PDP (Party for Democratic Prosperity), 94. 98. 100, 103. 107ff. 112. 113 Nagorno-Karabakh, 197ff Peace Movement of Bavaria. 182-3 Nakshbanidiyya, 130ff. 217-18 National Movemcnt for the Liberation People's Party, 189 Persia. see Iran of Kosovo, 158ff NATO (North Atlantic Trcaty Organisa- Plavsic. B., 235ff Pomaks: 10. 15. 20. 52-3. 56. 72, 74, tion), 47. 49. 85. 132. 204. 235 80; origin and definitions. 33-6. 76; Netherlands, 217. 220-1. 224. 226. 227. access to ancestors. 36-8; enacting 228, 229 identity, 38-41; demographic code. Nikodinovic, D .. 187 41-3; post-1989 and 'trader tourism', NIN.189 43-5; in the army and the ConNiyazi. A.. 144 structlon Corps. 45-6; in relation Nolman. B .. 183 to border areas. 47-50, 85; emigration Norris. H.T .. 1 to Turkey. 50-2; Turkification of. Nurboja. R .. 156 75-6.85-91; in Greece, 82-91, 199, 204-5; see also Western Thrace. BulObrenovlc. M .. 172 garia and Torbesi OIC (Organiisation of the Islamic Conference), 5-6. 121ff. 122. 131. 133 Popular Front oftlle Republic ofKosovo. 157Er Omersoftic. A.. 23ff Organisation of the Islamic Conference. Poturs. see Torbcsi Poulton, H., 10. 11. 12 see OIC Orthodox Christianity. 7-8.11. 13. 14. 24. 28. 54. 82. 135; see also Al- Qosja, R.. 156ff banians. Greeks. Scrbs. Mace'Rabita aff.1ir·. 215 donians and Bulgarians RalJitat al- 'A lam al-Ilsami, al-majlis alOslobadjel!;e. 238 'Illami lidll'lI'll al-isillmiya. 122 Ottoman empire and Ottomans: 3. 10. 13,14.15.22.23.25.27.28.33. Radio Free Europe. 29 34, 54. 56, 59. 68. 82-3. 98. 116. Raif. A.. 125 118.135.139.141,172.173.195-6, Ramazan, 5. 70 200. 210, 219. 223; break-up of. Rankovic. A.. 148, 149 Raznatovic. Z. (' Arkan'), 157ff. 160. 18-21; Albanians in. 142-4 184ff Ozal. T., 132, 199ff. 207. 208. 212 Reform Forces of Piav and Bijelo Polje, 175 Panic. M., 185-6. 190 Renaissance Society. 175 Panic. Z., 186

MRF (Movement for Rights and Freedom): 72-4, 76. 77. 78. 79, 81. 209.210 Muratovic. H., 237 Muslim Bosnian Organisation. 175 Muslim Green Berets. 185 Muslim National Council. 175, 177-8. 182. 186 Muslim World League, 222 Muslims as national group, see BosniaHercegovina and Sandzak

248

Index

Rendel. 63 SDS (Serbian Democratic Party), 238 Republican Community for Cultural SDU (Social Democratic Union), 109. and Scientific Events of Mace112 donian Muslims, 94 Second World War: 24. 25, 28. 55. Republican Committee for Nurturing 64.140.142.230: Kosovo in. 147-8 the Ethnic and Cultural Traditions Selim. B .. 128 of Rom a in the Socialist Republic Seljuks. 218. 223 of Macedonia, 100 Serbia. 2. 11. 18. 24. 25. 49. 50. 106. Republican Community ofIslanucised 113. 134; sec also Yugoslavia and Macedonians. 95 Sandzak Rexhebi. B .• 127 Serbian DemocratIc Party (SDS), 238 Rhodope. 15, 20. 41. 43. 44. 51. 76. Serbian Radical Party (SRS) , 191 85. 89. 204 Serbian Renewal Movement. 187 Rif.'l'yya. 118. 128-30 Serbs: 7. 8. 21. 22. 23. 26. 117. 136. Rilil/(lja, 164. 165 235; relationship with Albanians over Roma (GypsIes): 17.18.20,117.142. Kosovo. 139-69.241-2: re. Sandzak. 150; in Bulgaria. 18. 33, 35. 43-4. 170-93: 194. 201 ff; in Bosnia45. 46. 49. 56, 69, 72. 73. 75. 77, Hercegovina. 8. 21. 194. 232-41 80. 208; in Greece. 84. 87. 91-3. Sililriat. 16 199.204.205; in Yugoslav Mace- Shiites: 14, 74: 51'1' also Bektashis donia and FYROM. 97. 98-101. Sil;Udzic. H. 23ff, 233. 238-9 102. 103-14: as 'Egyptians'. 101. Simitis, c.. 242 102 Skanderbeg, G.K.. 138 Romania. 2.15.19.63.78.195.211 Slovenes. 145 RP (Rlfah Partisi - We!fal'l~ Party), 203. Social Democratic Union. see SDU 218-19 Socialist Alliance of Novi Pazar. 179 RS (RI1Jt1blikl/ Srpskl/ -Serbian Republic), Society of Albanian Muslim Intellec235-8 tuals. 134 Rugova. 1.. 9. 155-7. 164, 240 Socialist Party (of FYROM), 112 Russia and Russians. 21. 22. 42. 195. Soviet Union: 29. 44. 47. 64. 65. 67. 196: sec 11150 Soviet Union 87. 197. 201; sec also Russia Russo-Turkish War of1877-8. 19.21. Soysal. M .. 199ff, 202-3 54 Spaho, M .. 22 Stalin,J.V. and Stalinism. 64.149. 198ff Sa'diyya. 118. 128-30 Stiehtit!\! Alouak! Islallli. 122 Sandzak: 1. 2. 5, 6. 11. 13. 15. 20. Sufis: 14. 118. 125. 128-30. 137,217-8. 21. 22. 82. 93. 146. 170. 241ff; 222; sec 11150 Bektashis population figures, 171: historical Surroi. V. 157 background, 172-4: struggle for Stllrt. 181 autonomy, 174-8: deteriorating Sll et. 178-80 ethnic relations, 178-85: paramilitary Syria. 197ff groups. 185-7: Montenegro situation. 187-90: prospects. 190-3 Tllllzilllilt reforms. 16. 196 SlIlIIlillk. 188 Tatars: 35. 195, 197f( 199: Crimean Saudi Arabia. 122. 215 Tatars. 198ff SDA (Party of Democratic Action): 23. Teresa (Mother). 103. 120 95.175-7; in Sandzak. 181,183-7. Tetovo 'Umversity'. I11ff 189. 192; 234ff, 239 Thrace. sec Western Thrace

Index Tijaniyya. 118. 128-30 Tito. J.B .• 19.25. 140. 147. 148. 149. 151. 173 Tivari. S.. 121ff Torbesi. 92-6. 103 Tosks. 117. 118. 150 Treaty of Berlin. 22 TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus), sec Cyprus Tudjman. F.. 26, 234. 235 Tulcea. 15 Tunahan. S.H .. 217 'Turan', 196. 197 Ti.irke~, A .. 218 Turkey and Turks: 3. 7. 9, 10. 11. 12.15. 18.44.46; Turks in Bulgaria. 10. 19. 21. 29. 54-81: Turks in Western Europe. 12. 19. 122. 199. 214.217-31; Turks in Greece. 1920. 21. 29. 82-91. 203-7. 242; Turks in Yugoslavia/Macedonia. 19-20. 96-8: 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 96-8. 102, 103-14; Turks and Pomaks. 39. 42. 47-8. 50-2. 53: Turks and Torbesi, 93-6; Turkey and Albania, 122. 125. 126. 130. 13212~1. 14.8"JA9, 129, 173. 175. 180:~.1J. 83; Turks in Balkansrelationship WIth Turkey. 61. 194213: comparisons between Turks in Western Europe and in the Balkans. 229-31; 1996 elections. 232. 241-2; sec also Western Thrace. Bulgaria and Ottoman empire. Turkish Democratic Party. 112 Turkish-Islamic Association of Religious Affairs (DITIB) , 221 Turkish Islamic Centres. 217 Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation in the Netherlands. 221. 226. 227-9 Turkish Islamic Synthesis. 218. 223 Turkish Muslim Association ofFreankfurt. 122 Tiirkiyc Diyatlet Vak!f, 224 Turkmenistan and Turkmen. 197. 198ff UDF (Union of Democratic Forces). 73. 209

249

Ugljanin. S.. 177-8, 182-7. 192 Uigurs. 197ff Ukraine. 198ff UN (United Nations), 30. 134. 158, 183. 233 Union of Democratic Forces sec UDF Union ofTurbsh Islamic Cultural Associations. 218 United Arab EmIrates. 122 United States: 52, 98. 109. 120. 122. 125,126.127.132; re. Bosnia-Hercegovina. 235. 236. 238 Uzbekistan and Uzbeks. 197-8 Vance-Owen plan. 233 Vatican. 118 Via Egllatia. 211 Videnov. Z .. 210 Vlachs. 15. 17. 20, 42. 83. 105. 107. 117.142.173 VMRO-DPMNE, 107ff, 112 VOJvodina. 148. 149. 153. 190 VrclIle. 189 Warsaw Pact, 47. 49. 85 We1£'lre Party. sec flllder RP Western Europe: 3.12.49. 109; Turks 111. 199.214.217-231 Western Thrace. 6. 11. 20. 63. 82. 84-92. 196. 199.201.202.203-7, 242; sec also Turks in Greece Wilson. W .. 139. 140 World Bektashi Congress (Sixth), 127 Xhemali. S.. 129 Xhotl. M., 123ff Yilmaz. M .. 198ff, 201ff Young Turks. 143-4. 196 Yugoslavia (former states of): 1. 5. 10, 11,13,20.22,26.31.63.78. 104. 105, 200, 240; Roma in. 98-101; Albanians in, 139-55 Yugoslavia (rump state-FRY), 158. 170. 191. 197ff, 211 Yugoslav Muslim Organisation. sec JM 0 Zilmall. 212ff