Muslim Cultures Today: A Reference Guide (Greenwood Guides)

Muslim Cultures Today: A Reference Guide

Edited by Kathryn M. Coughlin

Greenwood Press

Muslim Cultures Today

Muslim Cultures Today A Reference Guide Edited by Kathryn M. Coughlin

GREENWOOD PRESS Westport, Connecticut • London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Muslim cultures today : a reference guide / edited by Kathryn M. Coughlin. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–313–32386–0 1. Islamic countries—Social life and customs—21st century. 2. Muslims—Social life and customs—21st century. 3. Islamic countries—Civilization— 21st century. I. Coughlin, Kathryn M. DS35.62.M88 2006 909’.09767083—dc22 2005037030 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2006 by Kathryn M. Coughlin All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2005037030 ISBN: 0–313–32386–0 First published in 2006 Greenwood Press, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.greenwood.com Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10

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For My Husband

The shaded areas indicate countries discussed in this book. Global Research & Analysis.

The shaded areas indicate countries discussed in this book. Global Research & Analysis.

The shaded areas indicate countries discussed in this book. Global Research & Analysis.

Contents

Acknowledgments Introduction 1. Afghanistan

xi xiii 1

Amin Tarzi

2. Albania

15

Isa Blumi

3. Bosnia and Herzegovina

27

Angelo Georgakis

4. Egypt

39

Kathryn M. Coughlin

5. Ethiopia

53

Dana Leigh Hearn

6. India

65

Phyllis K. Herman

7. Indonesia

77

Nelly van Doorn-Harder and R. Michael Feener

8. Iran

89

Mana Kia

9. Iraq Kathryn M. Coughlin

105

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10.

Nigeria

119

Kathryn M. Coughlin

11.

Pakistan

133

Kathryn M. Coughlin

12.

Russia

147

Galina M. Yemelianova

13.

Saudi Arabia

159

Kathryn M. Coughlin

14.

Sudan

171

Heather J. Sharkey

15.

Turkey

187

Kathryn M. Coughlin

16.

Uzbekistan

199

Kathryn M. Coughlin

Glossary

213

Resource Guide

221

Index

229

About the Editor and Contributors

237

Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge Wendi Schnaufer and Anne Thompson of Greenwood Press for their kind patience in seeing this project come to fruition. Brenda Bickett of the Georgetown University Library was exceedingly helpful in locating Arabic (and other) language-source information for this book. Sal Genovese of the Morse Institute Library (Natick, MA) located and obtained for me a copy of the elusive Ethiopia: The Top 100 People (Paris: Indigo Publications, 1997), one of only three copies that exist in North America. Soumya “Shomo” De proved to be an invaluable researcher and partner. His adept proofreading and editorial skills rendered a much more readable text; all factual errors or omissions are solely my responsibility. Finally, my deepest gratitude is owed to John O. Voll of Georgetown University, a scholar whose unceasing curiosity, prodigious knowledge, and abiding optimism make him an excellent colleague and mentor for the next generation of scholars on the Islamic world.

Introduction

The words Islam or Muslim have been used to describe religion, societies, civilizations, art and architecture, philosophy, history, and political thought. Today, more than 1.1 billion people call themselves Muslim, and in 52 countries they represent the majority of the population. However, most of the world’s Muslims live as minorities in nations throughout North and South America, Europe, Africa, Asia, Australia, and the South Pacific—and the vast majority are non-Arabs who live outside the Middle East. For example, Indonesia is home to the world’s largest Muslim population—and, in population terms, it is the fourth-largest country in the world. The tragic events of September 11, 2001, highlighted a dearth of current, accessible information about Islam and Muslims, especially in the 16 countries presented here. As the 19 hijackers were ethnically Arab, the words Arab and Muslim were subsequently conflated and the image of a violent, terrorizing religion proliferated, much to the distress of the world’s more than one billion Muslims—the vast majority of whom are not Arab and who live at peace with their non-Muslim neighbors. Muslim Cultures Today presents Islam in its diversity: Arab and non-Arab; African, Asian, and European; majority populations and minority populations; conservative societies and progressive. Muslim Cultures Today was written for general readers—students, journalists, religious leaders, and the general public—with little knowledge of Islam as a religion or of its historical context. Sixteen countries are presented here and arranged alphabetically, representing Muslims in Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. These countries were selected for the lack of current, accessible information and for their representative diversity. Each chapter provides a historical overview of

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Islam in that country or region, presenting demographic statistics and general information regarding the Muslim communities there. Each chapter’s demographic research relies heavily on official sources such as those of the United Nations, the Central Intelligence Agency, international aid agencies, and the respective countries’ governments. Other sections include “Culture, Society, and Politics,” “Women and the Family,” “Special Issues in the News,” “Notable People,” and a resource guide. “Women and the Family” offers information regarding the legal, economic, and social status of Muslim women in each country, along with an overview of women’s and family issues generally and as they pertain to Muslim women/ families. “Special Issues in the News” covers matters unique to that country’s Muslim communities today, such as Saudi Arabia’s post-9/11 relationship with the United States, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Indonesia’s and Nigeria’s transition from military rule to democratic governance, Iraq’s and Afghanistan’s new transitional governments, and the practice of female genital mutilation among Muslims (and Christians) in Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Sudan. Significant Muslim personalities are presented in “Notable People,” and although the goal was to include only people who are living and influential, scope dictates that those individuals who made significant contributions to their countries, or who were important to the overall history of Islam, be included. Each chapter is meant to stand alone as an overview of the history, politics, society, and culture of a particular country, but as the histories and cultures of one nation are often intertwined with those of another, it may be helpful to read some of them together. For example, Pakistan and India were both created as nationstates at the same time; both of these countries share a common history and culture as the remnants of first the Mughal and then the British empires. Uzbekistan and Russia were born with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and their histories have been intimately connected since at least the reign of Catherine the Great (1729–1796). Afghanistan and Iraq face many of the same issues, given that their new governments are largely the product of U.S. intervention in the region. At the same time, the section on Shia Islam in the chapter on Iran is useful for anyone seeking background on the interreligious and interethnic conflicts in Iraq. In their “Women and the Family” sections, the African countries represented— Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Sudan—all discuss female circumcision or female genital mutilation (FGM) as it is practiced in their respective societies. This is peculiar to African cultures and is rarely found anywhere else in the Islamic world. Other shared issues for women common to many of the countries presented here include domestic violence or insufficient or unenforced legal rights for women. This is not because Islam condones domestic violence or holds that women are inferior—these are common occurrences in all developing countries, where millennia of patriarchy molded the culture long before the arrival of Islam. The chapter on Indonesia illustrates how a less patriarchal culture received Islam; where women have been educated and part of the elite interpreting the Quran and hadith, a much more egalitarian—though by no means ideal—Islam emerges.

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Most of the countries presented here receive great pressure from the United States to liberalize their economies and political systems. Longtime allies such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt face criticism of their authoritarian rule for the first time in their association with the United States. At the same time, these countries and many others are fighting Islamic insurgencies and cite the “war on terror” as a reason for repressive rule and the suspension of civil liberties. Allies such as Uzbekistan and Russia continue to brutally repress segments of their population—whether truly terrorists or merely political opponents is debatable—testing the United States and the international community. On the other hand, the United States has largely looked askance as Pakistan violates international law (trading nuclear technology

The Al-Aqsa shrine (also known as the Dome of the Rock) is part of a complex of buildings which Muslims call Al-Haram Al-Sharif (The Noble Sanctuary) and which Jews refer to as Har ha-Bayit or the Temple Mount. Built in 750 C.E. on the site of King Solomon’s Second Temple in Jerusalem, it is the third holiest pilgrimage site in Islam, after Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia, and is the oldest Islamic monument still standing. Kathryn M. Coughlin (2000).

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with Iran, Libya, and Korea), ignores the rights of minorities and women, panders to extreme Muslim elements inside its borders, and halfheartedly prosecutes the war on terror on its border with Afghanistan. This inconsistent approach in American foreign policy will continue to dominate debates with (and without) the Muslim world in the coming years and decades. Of particular use for students and educators, each chapter’s resource guide presents a wide range of resources on Islam and Muslims—monographs, articles and other print sources, documentaries, films, and Web sites—to assist the reader in further research on a particular country or region. As only English-language or subtitled videos are included, coverage of this resource varies among country chapters. Special care has been taken to ensure that all resource information— print, video, Web site, or organizational information—is current and representative of mainstream scholarship and includes primary sources. Perhaps most valuable for those with a limited exposure to Islam, the resource guide at the end of the book presents some of the most current and objective scholarship on Islam, broadly defined. Books, articles, and other print media; Web sites; map resources; films and documentaries; and primary sources are listed for those who wish to broaden their understanding of Islam as a religion, culture, civilization, and political phenomenon. These sources were chosen with an eye toward objective scholarship, written or produced for those with a limited knowledge of the topic. Although foreign words and terms are identified and explained when used, a glossary of terms is included for those who seek a more detailed explanation. Arabic and non-Latin script transliteration often present a challenge when providing information intended for the general reader. In this book, all transliteration has been simplified to remove diacriticals and when possible conform to traditional Western spelling (for example, Mecca, not al-Makkah). For consistency, the New York Times has been used as a guide to accepted spelling. When referencing people, an attempt has been made to provide birth and death dates; exceptions based on unavailability of information is noted.

1 Afghanistan Amin Tarzi

OVERVIEW The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan lies at the intersection of three diverse cultural worlds: the Indian subcontinent, the Iranian plateau, and the central Asian steppe. In addition to these three distinct cultural and ethnic influences, Afghanistan is geographically situated at the crossroads of centuries of numerous invasions, all of which contributed to the formation of its multiethnic identity. These same factors account for the fact that few of the ethnic groups in Afghanistan are truly indigenous: the various ethnic groups frequently spill across international boundaries into neighboring states. Although there are several well-researched ethnographic studies on Afghanistan, there is wide disagreement as to the precise numbers and percentages that comprise the different ethno-religious groups. This is partly due to the wars plaguing the country since 1978, rendering any kind of population census impossible. Even before 1978, attempts by Afghan governments and international organizations failed to produce a methodical and accurate census for Afghanistan, partly due to a lack of access to remote villages and partly to sensitive political considerations. The lack of official census information allows leaders of diverse Afghan ethnic groups to inflate their population numbers to support their claims of legitimacy. Four major distinct ethnic groups—Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazarahs, and Uzbeks— inhabit Afghanistan. According to the CIA’s World Factbook 2005, 42 percent of Afghanistan’s population is Pashtun, 27 percent Tajik, 9 percent Hazarah, and 9 percent Uzbek; the other minorities account for the remaining 13 percent.1 These smaller groups include the Aymaqs, usually referred to as the Chahar Aymaq or

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“Four Tribes”; the Turkmen; the Baloch; and the Nuristanis. The Nuristanis were known as the kafirs (infidels) before their conquest and conversion to Islam by Amir Abd al-Rahman Khan (r. 1880–1901) in the 1890s. Other ethnic minorities include the Qirghiz, the Farsiwan, the Qizilbash, and small numbers of Hindus and Sikhs. Before 1979, a few thousand Jews lived in the larger cities of Afghanistan, but most have migrated to the West or to Israel. In addition to the ethnic groups mentioned, the new Afghan constitution adopted in 2004 also recognizes Pashai, Arab, Gujur, Brahui, “and others.”2 Altogether, more than 40 languages and dialects, primarily Dari, Pashtu, and Uzbek, are spoken. Most of the Afghan constitutions throughout its history have recognized only Pashtu and Dari as official languages. The new Afghan constitution, while recognizing Pashtu and Dari as official languages of the state, recognizes languages such as Uzbek, Turkmen, Balochi, Pashai, Nuristani, and Pamiri as official third languages in areas where the majority speaks them. The dialect of Dari spoken in Afghanistan’s capital city, Kabul, is understood by most people living in Afghanistan and has in effect become the country’s lingua franca. Almost all Afghans are Muslim: 80 percent are Sunni and 19 percent are Shiite. Around 150,000–180,000 of the Shiites belong to the minority Ismaili faction. Arrival of Islam By the end of the seventh century, Islam had established a firm presence in the geographical region that would eventually become Afghanistan. Before the emergence of the Afghan state, many Islamic empires and states ruled over the area. The Ghaznavid (997–1186) and Ghurid (early 1100s–1215) dynasties, for example, were based in what is today Afghanistan and contributed to the spread of the religion of Islam to the Indian subcontinent. In the early stages of the formation of the Afghan state, Ahmad Shah Durrani (d. 1772) used Islam as a legitimizing tool for his cross-border attacks on India. His expeditions, which accounted for much of his empire’s financial resources, were supposedly conducted to protect various Muslim rulers in the northeastern part of the Indian subcontinent. Within Afghanistan, Ahmad Shah did not enforce any particular religious policy and allowed the various tribal confederations within his domain to manage their own affairs. By the late nineteenth century, the preservation of Islam rather than territorial defense served as the basis for ruling legitimacy within the Afghan state. With this development, national identity in Afghanistan was interwoven together with the religion of Islam, and specifically the Sunni Hanafi school of jurisprudence ( fiqh). Various Afghan regimes and rulers used this interconnection to foster national unity and/or suppress any internal challenges to their centralized power. Soviet Invasion of 1979 The process of nation building, albeit slow and at times bloody, came to a halt in 1979 when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The process of organizing

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the resistance fighters, known as the mujahidin (holy warriors), against the Soviets and their Afghan allies in Kabul divided the Afghan political scene along ethnosectarian lines. The basis of the Afghan resistance to the Soviets developed along religious lines rather than national ones—the mujahidin were waging a holy war (jihad) against a secular, foreign invader. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the Moscow-backed regime in Kabul three years later, the Afghan resistance groups turned against one another, using religion and ethnicity as means to gain more power and expand their separate territories. This effect transformed the country into a decentralized battleground, where horrific crimes were committed in the name of religion and ethnicity. Yet another legacy of the anti-Soviet resistance was the arrival of foreign fighters who supported the Afghan cause. Mainly from Pakistan and Arab states, these foreigners brought with them new ideologies and interpretations of Islam. The merging of these forces eventually gave birth to the Taliban (the Persian plural form of the Arabic word talib, meaning “seeker” or “student”) regime, which captured between 80 percent and 90 percent of the Afghan territory within four years (1994–98). The Taliban introduced an extremely repressive ruling system based on an imagined, idealized image of the Muslim community in the seventh century, the time during which the Prophet Muhammad lived. CULTURE, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS Afghan culture has deep roots preceding Islam’s emergence in the geographical area where it is situated today. But since Islam served as the tool for building the Afghan nation-state, very few cultural aspects of the Muslim majority in Afghanistan have been secular in the Western sense. To be sure, many aspects of Afghanistan’s cultural heritage are not related to Islam, but even pre-Islamic practices have been given a religious twist. Afghan governments, other than the Marxists (1978–1992), who used cultural events to promote their ideology, did not pay much attention to cultural preservation or promotion. The Soviet invasion and the ensuing wars did much damage to Afghanistan’s cultural heritage. Many historical monuments were utterly destroyed, either from Soviet bombing or wanton shelling by both Afghan and Soviet sides. Those not destroyed in war, such as the ancient treasures in the Kabul Museum, were looted from 1992 to 1996 by various mujahidin parties and sold in international markets. Some of the more zealous parties, such as the Taliban, destroyed pre-Islamic artifacts, as was done in the notorious demolition of two ancient, massive Buddha statues in Bamiyan in 2001. Afghan social norms have developed from a mishmash of customs of various tribal confederations and ethnic groups and Islamic rules and regulations. Strict application of any regulation, including Islamic law, was mostly given currency during political maneuvers by special groups such as the clergy and the Sufis or by the central government. When not enflamed by such circumstances, the people of Afghanistan were generally tolerant toward minority religious groups, as were the larger ethnic groups toward the smaller ones.

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While sixteenth-century Herat was a flourishing center of Islamic learning, since then the area that comprises modern Afghanistan has not been home to many institutions of advanced learning or theological seminaries. The vast majority of the population is illiterate or semiliterate. According to United Nations figures for 2004, the Afghanistan literacy rate stood at 28.7 percent—the third lowest in the world.3 These circumstances have abetted the power of Sufi (Islamic mystics) leaders and clerics (mullas), who rely more on alleged miracles and sanctification than rational religious debate. The mullas have in effect become much more than spiritual guides within their respective communities and within Afghanistan as a whole. In the eyes of the common people, they represent the religion of Islam and, as such, are highly revered and regarded to be sinless and even infallible. Islam and the State At least until the beginning of the twentieth century, Afghans believed in and practiced Islam largely free of governmental control. Amir Abd al-Rahman Khan ruthlessly imposed a single interpretation of Islam that would derive from and be regulated by the central state authority—in this case, the amir himself. As such, he curbed the power of independent clergy and Sufi leaders in Afghanistan by regulating their activities and altering their status by paying those he chose to be civil servants. Abd al-Rahman’s son and successor, Amir Habibullah Khan (r. 1901–19), reversed most of his father’s policies regarding the religious establishment and allowed the Sufi leaders and preachers to remain independent. The new amir allowed a senior member of the Qadiri Sufi order, Sayyid Hasan al-Jailani (or Gailani), to establish himself in eastern Afghanistan.4 Hence, since the first decade of the twentieth century, the two most influential Sufi orders in Afghanistan have been the Naqshbandis,5 represented by the Mujaddidi family originating from India, and the Jailani family, originally from Iraq. Outside of Sufi politics, numerous dwelling places reserved for Muslim mystics (khanaqahs) are found throughout Afghanistan. There is little research on the activities of the khanaqahs, but since the defeat of the Taliban regime in December 2001, there have been reports that the Afghan government is helping to revive these places of religious practice and study. The 1923 constitution granted every inhabitant of Afghanistan the right of citizenship, irrespective of his or her religious beliefs. Article 2 of the constitution established Islam as the religion of the state, but afforded members of other religious minorities, namely Hindus and Jews, protection so long as they did not violate public peace. In article 10, the constitution abolished slavery. The Hazarahs, Shiite Afghans living in the country’s north, had until then constituted most of the slaves in Afghanistan. Until 1964, when King Muhammad Zahir (r. 1933–73) attempted to introduce new reforms and change the absolute monarchal system of governance to a constitutional monarchy, no political parties were permitted to function in Afghanistan. Only after the promulgation of the new constitution, which allowed the formation of political parties and guaranteed partial freedom of speech, did Islamist, nationalist,

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and Marxist parties openly appear on the Afghan political scene. Zahir’s political reforms did, nevertheless, give birth to political Islam in Afghanistan, although the activities of Islamists, similarly to their rival Marxists, were limited to Kabul, and their active membership was very few in numbers. In retrospect, none of these political movements were in touch or in line with the beliefs and aspirations of the ordinary Afghans, although all claimed to champion their cause. Life in Afghanistan under the Taliban (1994–2001) represented a sharp departure from centuries of traditional Afghan social and cultural norms. Led by a group of seminary students under the influence of radical Islamist groups in Pakistan and the Arab world, the Taliban combined an idealized form of Islamic law with Pashtun tribal codes of behavior. They closed all girls’ schools, and women were rarely permitted to leave their homes, even for shopping. Music, television, video games, playing cards, and most games were banned, as they were not deemed authentic to Islam. Hudud (punishments, the penalties for which are prescribed in the Quran or hadith) were imposed, even though they had never been applied in Afghanistan before. After the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, the American-led military campaign drove the Taliban out of Afghanistan and organized a tribal council (loya jirgah) to select a national leader. Hamid Karzai was chosen and, in October 2004, millions of Afghans voted in their first democratic election. They elected Karzai as the first president of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Parliamentary and partial local elections were held in 2005. WOMEN AND THE FAMILY The social and legal status of women in Afghanistan was seldom exemplary and differed greatly between urban and rural areas and between the educated minority and the uneducated masses. In rural areas, girls suffered the most before marriage, as they were considered a commodity of sorts and barred from proper education— a luxury that was rare among boys as well. The first formal attempt to give Afghan women legal status began with legislation in 1921 by King Amanullah, forbidding child marriage by setting the age of majority at 13. However, as a result of opposition by the Hanafi clergy, the age of marriage was subsequently lowered to nine. Amanullah also limited polygamy and the amount of a woman’s dowry (mahr); later, he granted women the right to bring legal suits against abusive husbands. Gradually the king encouraged women to abandon the veil, and by 1928 this became an obligation dictated by state policy. However, the clergy-backed rebellion that toppled Amanullah focused much of its attention on reversing rights granted to women and reinstating the veil, and it would take another three decades before any Afghan ruler addressed the issue of women’s rights. In 1959 Prime Minister Muhammad Daud, backed by Queen Humaira, encouraged voluntary removal of the veil. While this was a very important step toward the emancipation of women, it was essentially symbolic and limited to the capital and other large cities. From 1963 to 1973, again during a period of liberalization policies directed by King Muhammad Zahir, Afghan women gained more rights, including entry into the National Assembly and cabinet.

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Afghan women gained equal rights as Afghan citizens in the 1977 constitution of Afghanistan’s first republican regime, under President Muhammad Daud (r. 1973–78). In article 27 of this document, women are explicitly included as part of the “Afghan people,” and article 29 guarantees the right to vote for all Afghans. During Daud’s rule, a much greater number of Afghan girls were enrolled in schools and institutions of higher education. In addition, if women chose to conduct their daily business without a veil, they did so without any official hindrance. At least in Kabul and other major towns, an understanding evolved that women were a normal part of Afghanistan’s public sphere. When the Afghan Marxists overthrew Muhammad Daud’s republican regime in 1978, the issue of women’s rights took center stage once more in the Afghan political rhetoric. The new regime took hasty and impudent steps without due regard to Afghan customary norms and religious sensitivities, and it pushed for the total emancipation of women. The most controversial legislation was Decree Number 7, which was passed “to do away with unjust, patriarchal and feudal relations between husband and wife and to consolidate sincere family ties.”6 The minimum age for marriage was established at 16 for women and 18 for men. While both the Soviets and later the mujahidin parties systematically killed and raped large numbers of Afghan women, the 1980s and 1990s made them both victims and participants of Afghan politics and war. The first woman to gain fame in resisting the Soviet occupation was a young student named Nahid—popularly known as Nahid-i Shahid, or Nahid the Martyred. She was killed in Kabul in 1980, while marching against the foreign forces. Many nameless Afghan women began actively resisting the Soviet occupation, both inside Afghanistan and in neighboring Iran and Pakistan, where an estimated three million Afghans had taken refuge. Still, most of the mujahidin leaders came from the ranks of conservative Islamist groups, and those with privately moderate ideas tended to publicly espouse more conservative points of view to appease their main constituents from the maledominated, religiously conservative rural areas. As such, these groups did not advocate a secular Afghanistan, where women would have rights similar to those enjoyed in Western countries. An exception to this rule was the left-wing Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) based in Quetta, Pakistan. In contrast to the mujahidin groups, from its inception RAWA advocated democracy and secularism. In 1977, Kishwar Kamal—better known as Mina—founded RAWA in Kabul. Ten years later she was assassinated, allegedly by one of the most radical resistance parties, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar’s Hizb-i Islami. Some Pakistani newspapers claimed that RAWA members were agents for the Marxist Afghan regime in Kabul, a claim denied by members of the association. RAWA was unique in calling for armed struggle by its members to safeguard the rights of females in Afghanistan. However, most of this organization’s ideology was based on a liberal platform, which was either alien to or quite distant from the mind of the average Afghan woman.

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The Taliban When the ultraconservative Taliban captured Kabul in 1996, they made women the first target of their radical policies, by imposing strict rules and regulations that had never been experienced in Afghan history. On September 28, 1996, a day after entering Kabul, the Taliban imposed draconian laws, banning women from work and even from leaving “their homes unless absolutely necessary.”7 The Taliban edicts against women stemmed from a combination of strict tribal codes— Pashtunwali—intermingled and reinforced by a form of Islamic ideology preferred by purists in a number of religious seminaries in Pakistan and by those Arabs who had gathered around leader Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. Before the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the gender policies of the Taliban—not the fact that they were hosting bin Laden and the terrorist group al-Qaida—constituted the central focus of the world’s chastisement of the radical regime. Initially the United States found “nothing objectionable” in the Taliban’s introduction of its version of Islamic law. In fact, Unocal, a U.S. oil company, unsuccessfully lobbied U.S. president Bill Clinton’s administration to recognize the Taliban regime so that the company could proceed with its project to build a natural gas pipeline running through Afghanistan.8 The United States ultimately did not recognize the Taliban regime, and after the August 1998 terrorist attacks against two U.S. embassies in Africa, it focused its attention on the suspected perpetrator, Osama bin Laden, who had been given refuge by Afghanistan’s Taliban government. Today, the new Afghan constitution declares that women and men have equal rights and responsibilities, and one of the candidates in the recent election, Masuda Jalal, was a woman. The Afghan constitution provides that, for the lower house of the National Assembly, at least two women should be chosen from each of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. Equal rights in law do not yield equal rights in practice, however, and the warlords who govern small section of Afghanistan actively discriminate against women. Ismail Khan, a warlord who presides over Herat, bars women from taking taxis or learning to drive. Even in Kabul, conservative religious circles and even the supreme court continue to limit the rights of women through loopholes in the constitution.

SPECIAL ISSUES IN THE NEWS It became evident shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks that the Afghanistan-based al-Qaida terrorist network was responsible. The United States issued an ultimatum to the Taliban regime to deliver the entire leadership of al-Qaida and close its terrorist training camps throughout Afghanistan. The Taliban leadership, closely linked to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida, ignored U.S. demands. Preparation for U.S. military action in Afghanistan began immediately after the terrorist attacks. On October 7, 2001, the United States began the combat phase of the war on terrorism, code-named “Operation Enduring Freedom,” with air attacks

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Afghan women wait patiently to vote in the September 2005, elections. U.S. State Department.

on known al-Qaida targets in Afghanistan. By early December 2001, the Taliban regime collapsed and intra-Afghan agreements reached in Bonn, Germany, established the Afghan Interim Administration. From June 2002 until the national elections of October 2004, Hamid Karzai led the Afghan Transitional Administration in Kabul; the elections confirmed Karzai as president of the new Islamic republic. Parliamentary and local elections took place in 2005, thus completing the final phase of the steps agreed on in Bonn. Afghanistan is experiencing relative peace and stability, which it has not seen in more than two decades, and there is renewed hope for all Afghans, including women, for a better future. Three million Afghans have returned to the country from neighboring Iran and Pakistan with an eye toward investment and resettlement. The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) monitors Kabul as well as areas in northern and western Afghanistan, and their presence has encouraged commerce and the development of business interests. The ISAF is expected to expand its area of responsibility throughout the country. A group of overseas Afghans have confidently invested $25 million in building and operating a new Coca-Cola plant.9 And in 2003—the last year for which reliable economic statistics are available—Afghanistan’s economy grew by an estimated 13 percent. Despite the positive economic news, the nascent Afghan state faces formidable challenges over the coming years. The opium crop in 2004 was the largest in the nation’s history, providing up to two-thirds of the nation’s income. Drug lords rule various parts of the country, and the vast infusion of cash from opiate production, foreign investment, and U.S. aid has produced a notoriously corrupt political system—both on the national and local levels. Security throughout the country is

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precarious at best. In October 2004, Karzai had visited one political rally outside Kabul; his helicopter came under fire while trying to land at the site of a second rally. The security situation has deteriorated to the point that most international aid agencies are unable to work outside of Kabul, slowing the reconstruction efforts to rebuild a country marred by more than 30 years of war. Moreover, most of the top leaders of al-Qaida and the Taliban have likely survived and are hiding either inside Afghanistan or in neighboring Pakistan. These leaders and their followers continue to pose a great danger to the stability of the nascent Afghan administration. The legacies of two decades of internal sectarian violence and foreign interference have yet to be solved, as many of those who perpetuated grave crimes against the civilian population are still locally in charge of significant regions of the country. These warlords are only prevented from plunging Afghanistan back into anarchy by the presence of multinational armed forces, led by the United States. Since 2001, total U.S. reconstruction assistance has surpassed $10 billion, and in January 2006, the U.S. State Department announced that the U.S. government would seek an additional $1.1 billion from Congress in its FY 2007 budget request.10 The new Afghan army is improving under the U.S. aegis, with improved pay and fewer desertions. The Afghan National Army now has 19,000 soldiers.11 The presidential elections held in October 2004 do give hope to outside observers and Afghans alike. The election fielded 17 candidates, including one woman. Predictions before the election noted that most candidates did not feel safe enough to campaign in the south and west of the country; Karzai did not attend a campaign event featuring all of the candidates because he feared assassination. High voter registration before the election raised suspicions that some individuals had registered more than once, and it was likely that children and, in the south, foreigners had registered to vote. The UN-backed body supervising the elections marked indelible ink on the thumb of each voter to prevent fraud, but on election day there were rumors that some people were able to wash off the mark and vote a second or third time. Challengers to Karzai threatened to boycott the election but were mollified when UN representatives running the elections announced that there would be an investigation, and it was highly unlikely that the degree—if any—of voter fraud changed the course of the election. And despite threats of violence from Taliban sympathizers and warlords, the elections passed uneventfully. Afghanistan’s parliamentary and provincial elections in September 2005 were violent, as Taliban sympathizers attacked 19 polling places and a dozen people were killed. But despite the violence, voting irregularities, and reported fraud, election observers pronounced the exercise a success in the country’s first steps towards a functioning democracy. NOTABLE PEOPLE Hikmatyar, Gulbuddin (b. 1947). Descendant of a Pashtun family in the Kunduz province who, along with Ahmad Shah Masud, became a member of the Muslim Youth movement in Afghanistan in the early 1970s and was greatly

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influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. He spent a year in an Afghan jail for murdering a Maoist student leader, but escaped and fled to Pakistan, where in 1976 he formed Hizb-i Islami (Hikmatyar faction). One of the most radical Islamist mujahidin parties, Hizb-i Islami was favored heavily by the Pakistani and U.S. intelligence agencies during the Afghan resistance to the Soviets. In 1993, Hikmatyar was appointed as the Afghan prime minister, but he continued to attack Kabul separately, in his attempt to take full control of the government. After the rise of the Taliban, Pakistan abandoned its former ally, and Hikmatyar went into exile in Iran. Since the establishment of the post-Taliban administration in Afghanistan, Hikmatyar has relocated again to Pakistan and called for resistance to Karzai and his foreign backers, namely the United States. Jailani (or Gailani), Sayyid Ahmed (b. 1932). Hereditary leader of the Qadiri Sufi order in Afghanistan, whose family came from Iraq at the beginning of the twentieth century. The Jailani family traces their lineage to Shaykh Abd al-Qadir, founder of the Qadiri Sufi order, and thus are viewed by their followers as saints and endowed with special spiritual powers. Jailani was very close to the former Afghan king Muhammad Zahir. He did not enter politics until the Marxists took power in the country (1978), at which time he formed the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, one of the seven mujahidin parties based in Pakistan. He initially advocated the return of the former Afghan king to power, but in 2000 formed his own separate camp. After the collapse of the Taliban, Jailani remained on the sidelines of Afghan politics but remains influential, especially among Pashtuns. Karzai, Hamid (b. 1957). Virtually unknown to the outside world before post– September 11 events and the collapse of the Taliban regime, Karzai is currently the best-known Afghan personality. He was selected at the loya jirgah convened in Kabul in June 2002 to lead the Transitional Administration of Afghanistan as president for 18 months. Karzai is a Pashtun but lacks much support among his own people, who view him to be under the influence of the Tajik ethnic group. He holds a graduate degree in political science from India but has no formal religious training. For a decade during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Karzai worked with the National Liberal Front of Afghanistan (NLFA). Karzai is also a former employee of American oil company Unocal and the son of a former Afghan parliament speaker. Masud, Ahmad Shah (1956–2001). A Tajik from the Panjshir Valley, Masud became a member of the Muslim youth movement along with Gulbuddin Hikmatyar; both fled Afghanistan in the mid-1970s to organize activities against the communist regime of Muhammad Daud in Kabul. After the Soviet invasion (December 1979), Masud became one of the most successful and celebrated commanders of the mujahidin as the military leader of the Jamiat-i Islami party, under the leadership of Burhanuddin Rabbani. Masud defeated the Soviets in their attempts to enter the Panjshir Valley, but in 1983 concluded a temporary

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truce with them that allowed him to maintain control of the valley. In 1992 Masud was appointed minister of defense, but gradually became the leading force within his party and one of the most important players during the civil war from 1992 to 1996. He abandoned Kabul when the Taliban took control of the capital city in 1996 but regrouped in the northern part of the country, leading the National Islamic United Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (popularly known as the Northern Alliance). Masud prevented the Taliban from controlling all of Afghanistan and from centralizing their power completely. On September 7, 2001—just four days before the infamous terrorist attacks in the United States—Masud was killed by two Arab terrorists posing as journalists, who were likely members of al-Qaida. In post-Taliban Afghanistan, Masud’s comrades are in control of most levers of power in Karzai’s administration, and he has become a national hero. Umar, Mulla Muhammad (b. 1959). Most likely a Pashtun, Umar was born in the province of Kandahar, Afghanistan, where he later became the local mulla and opened a small religious school. Sometime between 1989 and 1992, Umar joined Hizb-i Islami, Khalis faction (the Islamic Party), another Pakistan-based Islamist political party. He was largely unknown until 1994, when he appeared on the scene of Afghan politics as the leader of a new party, the Taliban. But his background is still shrouded in mystery: he has rarely been photographed and has not met with Western diplomats or journalists. In December 2001, Umar disappeared from Kandahar during the U.S. bombing of al-Qaida and Taliban targets in the region. Although his whereabouts remain unknown, many believe that he is hiding in either Afghanistan or Pakistan. Zahir, Muhammad (b. 1914). Born in Kabul, Zahir became the king of Afghanistan in 1933, after the assassination of his father, King Muhammad Nadir. The first three decades of his reign were mostly ceremonial, with real power resting in the hands of two of his uncles as well as his cousin, Muhammad Daud. After 1963, Zahir tried to introduce a more liberal political system in Afghanistan, through the establishment of a parliamentary system and by allowing relative freedom of speech and political activity. However, he was deposed by Muhammad Daud in 1973 while on a trip to Italy, where he remained until his return to Afghanistan in 2002. While a large segment of the Afghans, especially among the Pashtuns, held hope of seeing the former king assume a leadership role after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, he has simply been given the honorary title of “Father of the Nation,” with no actual political power.

NOTES 1. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook 2005, www.odci.gov/cia/ publications/factbook. 2. For the Afghan constitution in Dari and Pashtu, see http://www.constitution-afg. com/resrouces/1382Constitution.pdf.

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3. See United Nations Development Program, Afghanistan National Development Report 2004, 28. 4. “Qadiri” is alternatively transliterated as Qadiriyya, Kaderi, Kadiri, or Kadiriyya. 5. Alternatively transliterated as Naqshbaniyya, Naqshbendi, or Naksibendi. 6. Quoted in Micheline Centlivres-Demont, “Afghan Women in Peace, War and Exile,” in The Politics of Social Transformation in Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, ed. Myron Weiner and Ali Banuazizi (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1994), 344. Decree Number 7 was promulgated on October 17, 1978. 7. Quoted in Helena Malikyar, “Development of Family Law in Afghanistan: The Roles of the Hanafi Madhhab, Customary Practices and Power Politics,” Central Asian Survey 16, no. 3 (1997): 397. 8. U.S. State Department spokesman G. Davies, quoted by Ishtiaq Ahmad, “How America Courted the Taliban,” Pakistan Observer, October 20, 2001, http://ir.emu.edu.tr/ afghanistan/27.htm. 9. “Voting in Warlord Country,” Economist, October 7, 2004. 10. U.S. Department of State, “Summary of U.S. Assistance—London Conference on Afghanistan,” February 1, 2006, www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/2006/60214.htm. 11. As of February 2005.

RESOURCE GUIDE Suggested Reading Adamec, Ludwig W. Dictionary of Afghanistan. 3rd ed. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2003. Cole, Steve. Ghost Wars. New York: Penguin, 2004. Dupree, Louis. Afghanistan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980. Gregorian, Vartan. The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880–1946. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969. Magnus, Ralph, and Eden Naby. Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002. Maley, William, ed. Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban. New York: New York University Press, 2001. Rashid, Ahmad. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000. Roy, Olivier. Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

Films and Videos Afghan Stories. New York: Wicklow Films, 2002. Documentary on Afghan life after the U.S. invasion of 2001. Sons of Haji Omar. National Film Board of Canada, 1978. Documentary on social and family structures of the Pashtun Afghans. The Victor Weeps: Afghanistan. Fazal Ilahi Sheikh, 2002. Photojournalist Sheikh traveled through Afghanistan documenting the ravages of Soviet occupation.

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Web Sites Afghanistan Peace Organization: http://www.afghanistan.org/ Embassy of Afghanistan, Washington, DC: http://www.afghanistanembassy.org/ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: http://www.af/ Pajhwak News Agency: http://www.pajhwak.com/ Radio Free Afghanistan: http://www.rferl.org/bd/af/ Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA): http://www.rawa.org/ RFE/RL Afghanistan Report: http://www.rferl.org/reports/afghan-report/ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Afghanistan Office: http://www.undp. org.af/ Voluntary Association for the Rehabilitation of Afghanistan (VARA): http://www.vara. czweb.org/information.html

2 Albania Isa Blumi

OVERVIEW As active members of the Orthodox, Catholic, Sunni, Sufi, and Shia traditions, Albanians are unique in the Balkans. Traditionally, Albanians assumed that this religious diversity did not constitute a barrier to their common cultural, economic, and political place in the world. While this is true to an extent, the Albanian population includes significant differences. In the past, one’s region of origin distinguished Albanians—not their faith. The single most important factor distinguishing Albanians today is the international borders that have, since 1913, imposed regionalism on the Albanian-speaking populations. Many ethnic Albanians live outside the Albanian borders in neighboring Kosovo (still considered a province within the defunct Yugoslav Republic of Serbia) and independent Macedonia. Unless noted otherwise, Albanians here refers to the population within the borders of the recognized Albanian state. Albanian Muslims Are a Dispersed People Most sources state that 70 percent of Albania’s 3,563,000 people are Muslim. According to the same outdated data tabulated by Italian occupation forces in 1942, Orthodox Christian Albanians, located mostly in the regions south of the capital Tirana, make up 20 percent of the population, and Catholics, located north of Tirana, are said to make up 10 percent. Before the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo, Albanians were estimated to make up 90 percent of the population in Kosovo, of which 92 percent were Muslim and 8 percent Catholic. According

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to the last census, in 1994, there were 581,203 Muslims in Macedonia—roughly one-fourth of the total population. From those, 441,104 were stated to be Albanians (22.9% of the total population). The census, however, registered only “citizens” (i.e., those who could prove continuous residence for 15 years, something many Albanians could not do as they either sought work or studied abroad during that period). As a result, the Macedonian government officially denied citizenship and did not count more than 100,000 Albanians who were born and live in the country. Today Albanians claim they represent 40 percent of the population.1 The regions in which Albanians live, perhaps the most ethnically homogeneous in the Balkans, do have small groups of ethnic-minority communities. Albania’s southern regions, for example, support small communities of Greek-speaking Christians, Slavic Muslims (Gorans), Roma (Gypsy) Muslims, and Vlachs (speakers of a Latin-based language closely related to modern-day Romanian). In Kosovo, there exists a mosaic of small ethnic communities, in total making up less than 5 percent of the general population after NATO intervention in 1999. Roma, Turks, Gorans, Bosnians, and descendants from Egypt are spread throughout the western and southern regions, living alongside Albanians, while Serb Orthodox Christians are today primarily found along the Serbian border in the north in self-created enclaves. Like Kosovo, Macedonia is a compilation of similar ethnic communities, all composing up to 10 percent of the total population. On the basis of the outdated demographic data, Albanians are widely considered Muslims and part of the Islamic world. This is misleading on a number of fronts. In addition to unreliable and often manipulated data, one must factor the impact of brutal communist repression on the practice of religion inside Albania and the denial of basic human rights of Albanians in the former Yugoslavia. In contrast to the defunct state of Islamic institutions in Albania, there is a clear growth of Orthodox Christian, American evangelical, and to a lesser extent Roman Catholic church activities in the country. The trend suggests Albania is quickly becoming a Christian country, if it was not one before. This is best exhibited in the public hostility toward Islamic institutions in Albania today. Many non-Muslims and southern Albanians claim that its 500-year relationship with Islam is a by-product of foreign invasion (Ottoman) and should be abandoned. This sentiment is articulated by Albanian academics sympathetic to the communist regime. Indeed, since 1997, the ruling Socialist Party has been particularly eager to stress Albania’s non-Islamic identity. Concerns over this hostility toward Islam are compounded by the fact that hundreds of thousands of nominally Albanian Muslim men have migrated to other parts of Europe in search of work. The two most dramatic examples are the more than 400,000 and 500,000 Albanians who have migrated to Italy and Greece, respectively. Among those in Greece, many have elected to change their Muslim names to Greek ones to avoid discrimination. This mass shift in the Albanian population composition’s religious identity inevitably has changed how faith and traditions are passed to the next generation. Such fluid conditions thus make it impossible for the various Sufi (Islamic mystics) orders traditionally based in the south to survive, as their base of support continues to disappear. As recently reported by the grand

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mufti of Albania, Shaykh Hafiz Sabri Koçi (himself of the Tijani2 Sufi order), in an interview, most of the Sufi orders (tekkes) in Albania—Shukriyya, Qadiri, Melani, Shadhili, Helveti, Tijani, and Naqshbandi—have more or less disappeared because a lack of funds and followers.3 Moreover, he notes that the more mainstream Sunni Muslim and Bektashi communities, while having a broader base of faithful to rely on, are not faring much better. This slow demise of local Islam in Albania again points to the legacy of the communist regime. Between 1967 and 1990, the practice of Islam was completely banned when the dictator Enver Hoxha declared Albania the world’s only officially atheist state. As a result, knowledge in the practice of Islam was all but lost as the country’s religious leaders were murdered or arrested by the regime. The consequences of the communist government’s religion policies became glaringly evident when religious services were initially reinstated in 1990. Among those attending the services, it was clear that Islamic practices were virtually unknown to the youth, and only a few elderly actually could recall the formalities of their faith. Islam and Education in the Postcommunist Era This void proved to be an opportunity for many foreign organizations seeking to spread their particular interpretation of Islam. After the fall of communism in 1989, representatives from Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey rushed to the impoverished Albania. Armed with assistance packages and often unstated, long-term intentions of redirecting young Albanians to Islam, these groups were openly welcomed by President Sali Berisha, hoping for an economic windfall from Iran and the wealthy oil-producing countries on the Arabian Peninsula. The consequences of the virtual invasion of Muslim (and Christian) aid organizations were immediate. According to a 1994 study conducted in Tiranan universities, three-fourths of the students asked stated they believed in God, while only one-fourth of the professors who were instructing them claimed to be believers. This religiosity reflects a massive investment in religious institutions and sharply increased attendance in religious-based schools following an influx of foreign investment after the country opened in 1990. Indeed, missionary groups have provided educational services as viable alternatives to the bankrupt state educational system. Consequently, a rigid orthodoxy is being imposed on Albanians who traditionally practiced a tolerant type of Islam. The Islamic schools (madrasas) and seminaries teach fundamentalist theology, according to a number of observers, more in line with the Taliban of Afghanistan than the Islam practiced for centuries in the Balkans. Schools, therefore, may prove an important barometer of the future of Islam in the Albanianspeaking world. Interestingly, as a consequence of the perception that Albanians are in need of religious reintegration, the region has been a point of intense rivalry between competing Islamic traditions. The best example of this may again be seen with the emergence of a Turkish charity group that has monopolized the education of Albanian Muslims since the early 1990s. A self-made maverick named Fethullah Gülen (b. 1938) and his vast economic, pedagogical, and spiritual empire have been very successful

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in exporting his Turkish type of Islam. In Albania, Gülen’s “secular” private schools, known by the name of Mehmet Akif, have emerged throughout the country, serving as an effective counterweight to more radical Arab organizations in Albania. Three factors greatly influence parents’ choosing the Mehmet Akif schools for their children: munificent scholarships for poor students, an English-language education, and the potential for university admission in Turkey. While the message of these schools is strongly religious, students confirm that Gülen’s message is decidedly more liberal than his more orthodox rivals from the Arab world. Gülen’s writings and pronouncements declare that Arab literalism (which he uses interchangeably with Wahhabism or Salafism) does not represent modern Islam, and his schools vociferously denounce it. As a result of their failure to have an impact on Albania, Muslim Arab charities have redirected their money and attention to Kosovo, especially after 1999, leaving Albania to Gülen and the Christians. One may observe the consequences of this trend in Kosovo quite vividly after 1999. Before the wars of 1998–99, many of Kosovo’s rural communities practiced forms of Sufism that actively resisted the Sunni orthodoxy imposed from Belgrade through its centralized Islamic authority (Zajednica) established in Sarajevo. In the 1970s Albanians instigated a revival of popular Sufism in Kosovo through the creation of the Community of Dervish Orders (Bashkësia e Rradhëve Dervishe Islame Alijje) to effect this resistance to Belgrade rule. In many ways, these Sufi orders represented a particular kind of Albanian response to the colonialism organized by Belgrade. Before 1999, one would find functioning Sufi/Dervish lodges of the following orders throughout Kosovo: Helveti, Qadiri, Rufai, Sadi, Shazili, Naqshbandi, Sinani, Melami, and Bektashi, suggesting widespread support among the population. This has dramatically changed, however, since June 1999. Belgrade targeted in particular these religious schools, destroying most of them while leaving Sunni mosques whose leaders (imams) were trained in Sarajevo unscathed. In the postwar recovery, Arab charity groups not interested in helping rebuild these unorthodox practices diverted all their money to establishing mosques and schools that would promote a universalistic rather than local form of Islam. Much as in Albania, therefore, the future of Kosovo’s Sufi heritage is in serious doubt. In Macedonia the Albanian Muslim community is also divided among orders attached to various Sufi lodges—Bektashi, Naqshbandi, Helveti, Rufai, Qadiri, and Melami—and the majority Sunni Muslims (around 80%) who follow the Hanbali tradition of Islamic jurisprudence. The Bektashi in Macedonia, while small in number (they claim 5,000), are particularly important as the western city of Tetovo is the global headquarters for the Bektashi order, which still has a wide following in Turkey and central Asia. The head of the Bektashi order, Baba Tahir Emini, is based in Tetovo, and the tekke is a site of pilgrimage for thousands of Bektashi from around the world as well as a center of Albanian nationalism. Ethnically, most of the Bektashis in Macedonia, Albania, and Kosovo are Albanians, and the order has been particularly active in promoting national unity across sectarian grounds in order to resist Macedonian, Greek, and Serb domination.

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CULTURE, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS Throughout the modern history of Albania and the former Yugoslavia, Islam as a doctrine of political activism has never played a major role. Throughout the struggle against Serbian nationalism in Kosovo and Macedonia, for instance, Albanians never reverted to using their sectarian identity to challenge totalitarian rule, largely because many recognized that Albanians of Orthodox, Catholic, and Muslim faith were collectively being victimized. While today this intersectarian sense of unity exists, the most important reason for a lack of religious parties in Albanian political life is that they are legally banned. Political Islam as it has emerged in other parts of the world, therefore, is still in its infancy in Albania. That said, there are indications that small groups are actively trying to create an Islamic political party in both Kosovo and Albania. In Kosovo, for instance, one can follow in the Islamic Community of Kosovo’s (Bashkesia Islame e Kosovës [BIK]) journal Takvimi, which includes the occasional debate over the merits of an Islamic party in dealing with the political and social issues plaguing Kosovo today. Advocates of the creation of an Islamic party in general reveal a growing sense of political power in Kosovar society, one that is becoming more interventionist when it comes to influencing cultural mores and the education of society. While there is a growing sense of organization among such groups, the promotion of what are perceived as foreign Islamic practices—the forced segregation of women from social activities, imposed dress codes, “Islamic” cultural values—is still viewed with mistrust among the vast majority of Albanians in Kosovo and Albania. Such mistrust has manifested itself in the public confrontation between the Saudi Joint Committee for the Relief of Kosovo and Chechnya (SJCRKC) and local organizations such as the BIK who resent what they perceive as Arab cultural imperialism. Most troubling for locals is that the SJCRKC has been involved in the destruction of much of Kosovo’s Islamic heritage, including some Ottoman-era mosques and grave sites, on the grounds that they encourage “un-Islamic practices” such as praying at the tomb site of local saints. Tensions also arise in the case of the kind of education Arab organizations provide for Kosovo’s children. The Islamic Endowment Foundation (IEF), again under the umbrella of the SJCRKC, supports the more than 30 Holy Quran schools built in Kosovo’s rural areas after 1999. Many locals see these schools as teaching little more than the memorization of the Quran and therefore do not improve the prospects of Kosovo’s needy rural population. While Kosovo appears to be a major battleground between fundamentalist ideals imported from the Arab world and local customs, Albania has been, according to the grand mufti, more or less abandoned by Muslim nations since 1998. Saudi charities initially provided free pilgrimage (hajj) services to Muslim Albanians but did not contribute toward building mosques or schools or paying imams. Consequently, most of the initial efforts to promote the rebuilding of Albanian Islamic traditions, especially in the realms of culture, has been abandoned by the Albanian Islamic Community due to a lack of funds.

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On the contrary, Islam has been politicized in neighboring Macedonia as a result of efforts propagated by the Slav Macedonian government and nationalist parties—not Albanians. Overt nationalist policies have sought to stir up fears among the Christian and non-Albanian population about the “Albanization” of Macedonia through Islam. Albanian political leaders as well as the head of the Islamic Community, Sulejman Rexhepi, have constantly denied these accusations. Despite the realities in local Albanian politics where Rexhepi (and Islam) plays no role, the Skopje government has persistently framed the issue to the outside world, in particular since September 11, as one in which Macedonia faces a wave of political Islamic fundamentalism. This suggests, as was evidenced in Milosevic’s Yugoslavia and recently even in Albania, that the politicization of Islam need not originate with Muslims, but can come from non-Muslim politicians seeking to exploit current perceptions about Islam in the larger world. WOMEN AND THE FAMILY Women have traditionally played a prominent role in urban Albanian history, but a subordinate one in rural areas. Despite this, much has changed in twentieth-century Albanian society as extensive migration pressures, war, and state policies to integrate women into the workforce have transformed the traditional role of even rural women. Urban women are generally well integrated into the secular educational system, seek employment, and live lives much like their western European counterparts. For women in rural Kosovo and Macedonia, the biggest issue in the past few years has been the impact of war on them and their families. Statistics gathered in Kosovo since the war show that 70 percent of the adult rural population are women, a result of the targeted murder of Albanian men by Yugoslav forces. Children in rural areas, therefore, are particularly vulnerable to rural poverty, trauma, and a lack of a stable household as mothers struggle to make ends meet. The plight of rural Kosovo after the war has been something Western international-aid agencies have, in particular, neglected to address. In their absence, Islamic relief groups supported by the Saudi government have assumed responsibility for the education of rural children and their nourishment, and are seen as the trustworthy providers among the population. Education, therefore, is an area of great concern for Albanians eager to keep out Arab Salafi influences. Indigenous Muslim pedagogical traditions still exist but are based mostly in the region’s larger towns. In Kosovo, Rexhep Boja’s BIK has run the Alauddin High School since the 1960s in Kosovo’s capital city, Prishtina. While the school’s staff claim otherwise, there is little incentive for local children to attend this school, as there are many more attractive options. Alauddin therefore draws most of its students from the rural migrant families, who have little or no money to support their children’s education. This leads to a constant money shortage, as traditional donors like Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab states clearly direct their resources toward their own schools based in rural areas, far away from the influence and the inspection of international organizations administrating Kosovo today. In Macedonia, the Isa Beg Medrese network is the only school offering religious instruction for Muslim students. It operates under auspices of the Macedonian

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Islamic Community and has successfully avoided Arab orthodox influences. There were between 250 and 270 students in 1997, as well as some 300 distance-education students. Most of the distance-educated students were girls, traditionally separated from boys, another indication that Albanians in Macedonia live up to their reputation as being the most conservative of the three Albanian societies in the region. In Albania, 10 madrasas were opened in the main cities of Albania within three years of the fall of the communist regime. As of 2000, 1,504 students attended these schools, out of which 148 were girls.4 The reason for the small number of girls may attest to the fact that families in Albania prefer their girls to attend the underfunded state schools or, if they are lucky enough, to send their children to the Turkish Mehmet Akif schools with a scholarship provided by the school. Female students are particularly keen on attending these schools as they usually facilitate entrance into secular Turkish universities later on and do not impose the rigid gender segregation demanded by the more orthodox schools. In Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia, women are legally protected from discrimination, but they are often politically and economically marginalized in their maledominated communities, particularly in rural areas. This marginalization is reinforced by a growing bifurcation between rural and urban women as segregationist ideologies of Saudi-based funding agencies in rural Kosovo pursue conservative agendas limiting women’s access to the outside world. Another controversial aspect of the Salafi groups is the demand for education reform in Kosovo’s secular schools; in public meetings throughout the country, they oppose teaching human biology. Their rhetoric echoes the line of argumentation taken by Christian fundamentalists in the United States. In addition, Salafi-oriented Muslims have called for classroom gender segregation and demanded the required teaching of religious texts. To date, there has been little public support for these initiatives. SPECIAL ISSUES IN THE NEWS Since July 1990, war-ravaged Kosovo has been open to outside influences, much in the way Albania was in the early 1990s. Pressures leveled against local Muslim practices are most evident in the realm of religious orthodoxy. The local Muslim clerics have for the most part reacted with determined, if not successful, resistance to mostly Gulf Arab attempts to redefine Kosovo’s Albanian Muslim identity. Largely as a result of the destructive approach Saudi and United Arab Emirates groups have adopted toward local traditions, a growing sense of communal division, particularly post–September 11, is appearing inside Albanian society. The powerful impact that Saudi-funded schools have on the perceptions of rural communities vis-à-vis the outside world has challenged the traditional harmony between Christian and Muslim Albanians. A visible division has emerged in which radical elements of the Albanian Muslim community, taking their cue from their Arab benefactors, challenge Albanian nationalist sentiments. Salafi groups have declared the Albanian national hero Skanderbeg a “nonbeliever” and denounced the presence of Americans and other corrupting influences in Kosovo.5 Albanians have reacted strongly to these sentiments, in particular with respect to Americans,

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who are well loved among Albanians. In perhaps the most glaring example of Albanian public opinion regarding Saudi-funded organizations, the news agency Kosovapress declared in an editorial in late October 2001, For more than a century civilized countries have separated religion from the state. [However], we now see attempts not only in Kosova but everywhere Albanians live to introduce religion into public schools. . . . Supplemental courses for children have been set up by foreign Islamic organizations who hide behind assistance programs. Some radio stations now offer nightly broadcasts in Arabic, which nobody understands and which lead many to ask, are we in an Arab country? It is time for Albanian mosques to be separated from Arab connections and for Islam to be developed on the basis of Albanian culture and customs.6

The impact of September 11 compounds the ambiguity of Islam in Albanians’ lives and the way in which they perceive their place in the world. Albanians have historically been pro-American, as members of their families have migrated there and many Kosovars consider the United States their savior from Serbian tyranny in 1999. The painful connection with Osama bin Laden on the basis of their shared faith has created a pronounced effort to distance themselves from any hint of fundamentalism. This need to demonstrate their opposition to al-Qaida has led to exaggerated expressions of distrust toward Arabs in particular. The public campaign of hunting down al-Qaida cells has exposed the role many Arab aid agencies played in disseminating bin Laden’s message. This has helped reinforce perceptions among locals that Arabs should not be welcome in their societies. In Albania in particular, more or less all Arab donor organizations and their staffs have been forced to leave. In Kosovo, where the regulation of outside organizations is in the hands of the international community, these Arab-based organizations are more or less free to remain, although they are under constant surveillance by U.S. or NATO forces. The end result is a continued sense of tension in Albanian societies as they are forced to negotiate their Islamic heritage with post–September 11 realities in which they are often seen as sympathizers of al-Qaida solely on account of their faith.

NOTABLE PEOPLE Albani, Nasir al-Din al- (1914–99). Shaykh al-Albani was born in Shkodra and educated by his father, Al-Hajj Nooh Said al-Burhani, the premiere Hanafi scholar of Albania at the time. Under persecution of the interwar ruler of Albania, the family migrated to Syria, where al-Albani established himself as one of the Islamic world’s most important jurists and scholars. Upon moving to Jordan in the 1970s, al-Albani cultivated his following into a veritable empire of scholarship, which was disseminated by affiliated schools in several countries. Until his death, al-Albani attracted students from throughout the Islamic world, including many Albanians from the Balkans. Hundreds of hours of his recorded sermons, teachings, and conversations are sold in Muslim cities throughout the world today, and his dozens of publications are the focus of intense debate among theologians. Al-Albani represented a link between the Middle East and the Balkans that has

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produced a generation of Albanian theologians who may eventually influence the future of Islam in the Balkans. Boja, Rexhep (b. 1947). Born in the period immediately following the reassertion of Serbian domination over Kosovo, Rexhep Boja lived very much in conditions of spiritual deprivation and political oppression, and he left for Medina, Saudi Arabia, to complete his religious education. After receiving his doctorate, Boja returned to Kosovo to begin teaching Islamic jurisprudence at the Alauddin school in Prishtina. In 1992, Boja became dean and later helped administer the school as appointed mufti of Kosovo. Boja’s significance to the Albanian Muslim communities lies in his active struggle to secure autonomy from Serbian controls (1990s), extensive publications reaching large Muslim audiences, and his balancing of Arab money with local desires to remain culturally autonomous. He clashed with Salafis on several occasions over the preservation of locally built mosques and has been active in reasserting local control over education. Boja is decidedly nonantagonistic and has cooperated with the international community, meeting European officials and visiting clergy from the Vatican. Ismaili, Imam Vehbi (1919–2000). Theologian Ismaili became famous while living in exile in Egypt and later played an important role in the Albanian diaspora in the United States. Upon finishing his studies in Shkodra, he continued his studies at al-Azhar University (Cairo) and graduated with a diploma in theology in 1945. Communist rule made his return to Albania impossible, and Ismaili continued his work in Egypt, translating Albanian novels into Arabic and gaining a reputation for his spiritual virtues among the large Albanian diaspora in Cairo. Eventually this reputation led to an invitation by the Albanian-American Muslim Society of Detroit, Michigan, to become the community’s spiritual leader. On February 23, 1963, the Albanian-American Society opened its first mosque, followed by the opening of the Albanian Islamic Center, which has since been the beacon for Albanian-American Muslim thought and a place of pilgrimage for Muslims. Kadare, Ismail (b. 1936). Albanian poet and novelist, born in Gjirokastra. As a young man, Kadare witnessed the oppressive occupations of Albania by Italy, Germany, and the Soviet Union. He studied languages and literature at the Faculty of History and Philology of the University of Tirana and did some graduate work at the Gorky Institute in Moscow. Muslim by parentage, Kadare espoused atheism early on and has publicly equated the reintroduction of Islam into Albania as a step into a backward and ignorant past. Kadare’s first novel, Gjenerali i Ushtrise së Vdekur (The General of the Dead Army) was published in 1963, when he was 27 years old, and gained him international recognition. He is often mentioned in connection with the Nobel Prize in Literature. Kadare lives in self-imposed exile in Paris. Koçi, Hafiz Sabri (b. 1921). Grand mufti of Albania, Koçi is one of a handful of Albanian Muslim intellectuals who survived the communist era. Born on May 14, 1921, he passed his formative years in the northern Albanian city of Shkodra, once the epicenter of Albanian Islamic and Catholic culture. Too poor to continue his

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theological studies, he worked as the imam of the village mosque in Drisht and then as mufti of Kavaja in the south. In 1966, Koçi was arrested and given a sentence of 23 years. Even after his release after two decades of torture and hard labor, the communist regime did not allow him to practice his faith, and Koçi was forced to work in menial jobs to survive. His legacy as a prominent theologian was not forgotten, and in 1990 his former colleagues and followers asked him to return to his spiritual duties. Through tireless lobbying, Koçi secured financial assistance for the building of religious institutions and the training of religious personnel. In recognition of his efforts, Koçi was chosen as honorary chairman of the Islamic Council for East Europe in conjunction with his duties as grand mufti of Albania. A strong believer of religious tolerance, it is believed he will be the last of the Albanian-trained muftis to practice the region’s unique esoteric form.

NOTES 1. International Crisis Group (ICG), “Macedonia: Towards Destabilization?” May 17, 1999. 2. Alternatively transliterated as Tijaniyya. 3. January 2000. 4. Information tabulated from materials available at the Islamic Community Union, located in Tirana. 5. Skanderbeg, also known as Gjergj Kastrioti, was an Albanian military commander who led the Albanian resistance against Ottoman Turkish forces in the fifteenth century. 6. The news agency is universally considered the media arm of the Kosova Liberation Army and the second-largest political party of Kosovo, the Democratic Party of Kosova. Quotation from Stephen Schwartz, “Islamic Fundamentalism in the Balkins,” Partisan Review 67, no. 3 (2000), http://www.bu.edu/partisanreview/archive/2000/3/schwartz.html.

RESOURCE GUIDE Suggested Reading Agai, Bekim. “Fethullah Gülen and His Movement’s Islamic Ethic of Education.” Critique: Journal for Critical Studies of the Middle East 11 (spring 2002): 27–47. Blumi, Isa. “The Commodification of Otherness and the Ethnic Unit in the Balkans: How to Think about Albanians.” East European Politics and Societies 12 (1998): 527–69. Duijzings, Ger. Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. Elsie, Robert. History of Albanian Literature. Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 1995. Gaber, Natasha. “The Muslim Population in FYROM (Macedonia): Public Perceptions.” In Muslim Identity and the Balkan State, ed. Hugh Poulton and Suha Taji-Farouki. London: Hurst and Company, 1996. Malcolm, Noel. Kosovo: A Short History. New York: Harper Perennial, 1999. Norris, H. T. Islam in the Balkans: Religion and Society between Europe and the Arab World. London: Hurst and Company, 1993.

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Trix, Frances. “The Resurfacing of Islam in Albania.” Eastern European Quarterly 28 (1994): 517–33.

Films and Videos Lamerica. New York: New Yorker Video, 1994. Film in Italian and Albanian with English subtitles. The Orphan Masjids of Kosova. New York: Albanian Islamic Centre, 1999. Documentary.

Web Sites Committee for Equal Opportunities (English-language version; government institution that includes information on women and gender equality in Albania): http://www.cwf. gov.al/site/page.shtml Institute for Policy and Legal Studies: http://www.ipls.org/ International Crisis Group (Balkans): http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/sbalkans/reports/ Kosovo Commission: http://www.kosovocommission.org/ Library of Congress Country Report: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/altoc.html Naqshbandi Sufi Order: http://www.naqshbandi.org/ Naqshbandi Sufi Order page on Albania (includes the full text of the interview with the grand mufti of Albania, Shaykh Hafiz Sabri Koçi, on the state of affairs in Albania as well as more general information): http://www.naqshbandi.org/events/globe97/ Albania_Kosova/kosova.htm Shaykh Nasir al-Din al-Albani: http://www.albani.org/ World Press (includes news from Albanian English-language news sources): http://www. theworldpress.com/press/worldpress/albaniapress/albanianews.htm

3 Bosnia and Herzegovina Angelo Georgakis

OVERVIEW Of the 4,025,476 people living in Bosnia and Herzegovina today, at least 40 percent (more than 1.6 million) are Muslim; the Christian population includes Orthodox (31%), Roman Catholic (15%), and Protestant (less than 10%). In terms of ethnic distribution, Bosniaks represent the largest group, with 48 percent of the total population, and Serbs make up approximately 37.1 percent.1 Croats are the smallest ethnic group, with a total population not exceeding 14.3 percent of the population. Regardless of their ethnic derivation, most of the population is conversant in the three major languages of the country, Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian. For centuries Islam has played an important unifying role among the people of Bosnia. It was one of three major religions that, until recently, coexisted peacefully in the region since early modern times. Islam, Eastern Orthodox Christianity, and Roman Catholicism distinguished Bosnian Muslims, Serbs, and Croats from one another and, in turn, influenced each other. Consequently, the character of Islam in Bosnia is less conventional in some ways than that practiced by Arab Muslims. By the twentieth century, industrialization and urbanization helped transform Bosnia from an agricultural area into a pastoral territory with larger towns, industrial areas, and cities. In the urban areas, the process of economic modernization changed the character and practice of Islam. Among many urban Muslims, modernity created new identities no longer dependent chiefly on religion and tradition. During the twentieth century, many Muslims began to marry outside of their faith. In cities like Sarajevo, the largest city and capital of Bosnia, these processes were

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extensive. Nonetheless, even with the trend toward secularization evident among Muslims in Bosnia today, numerous urban residents, along with their rural coreligionists, continue to live according to the doctrines of the Quran, Islam’s holy book, and traditional Muslim culture. Unfortunately for the Muslims of Bosnia, the harmony that characterized their centuries-old relations with Serbs and Croats, with the brief exception of the interethnic violence of World War II, ended in the early 1990s during the wars that tore socialist Yugoslavia apart. In 1992, Bosnian Serb nationalists (Serbian Orthodox Christians) initiated a civil war, pitting Muslim Slavs, Orthodox Serbs, and Roman Catholic Croats against one another. The wars destroyed the country’s roads, bridges, and telecommunications infrastructure and decimated the economy; produced millions of refugees; and introduced the phrase ethnic cleansing into discourse on war and conflict. The specific traditions associated with the practice of Islam in rural Bosnia in particular were the primary targets of genocide propagated primarily, although not exclusively, by Bosnian Serb forces.2 Approximately 215,000 people died in Bosnia during the war from 1992 to 1995, 160,000 of whom were Muslims. Serb forces were responsible for the vast majority—158,000—of these Muslim deaths.3 As a result of the war, the practice of Islam in Bosnia was altered forever. For the first time in modern memory, Islamic leaders (imams) began to tell Bosnian Muslims to avoid marrying non-Muslims. In addition, new efforts were launched to persuade Muslim women to cover their heads in public, and in some Muslim schools instruction in Arabic was introduced. The devastation and cruelty of the war have therefore fundamentally altered the functioning of society in Bosnia. Since the war ended in 1995, increasing numbers of Muslims in Bosnia are redefining their collective identity by identifying with the wider world of Muslims and Islam than ever before.4 Despite the shift in the religious identification of Muslims in Bosnia toward their coreligionists in the Middle East and Asia, Muslim identity in Bosnia today remains tied intimately to the extensive legacy of multicultural coexistence with Catholic and Orthodox Bosnian Croats and Serbs. Nonetheless, before the violence of the recent war, Islamic radicalism did exist in Yugoslavia despite the efforts of the socialist authorities up to the 1980s to deny its existence.5 The recent conflict has led to an increase in the popularity of Islamic radicalism among some Muslims, as the vast majority of Muslims remain fundamentally shaken as a result of being targeted by and nearly exterminated by the cruel Bosnian Serb nationalist war machine less than a decade ago. Many find solace in their faith and continue to revere the sacred morality part of their religious identities in the postwar context without resorting to extremism. The challenge in the years to come will be to reconstruct the discourse and interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims, without whom the followers of Islam in Bosnia would be unable to understand their own unique traditions and cultural practices.6 CULTURE, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS Islam in Bosnia arrived during the early years of the Ottoman period during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when Bosnia was organized into feudal

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military districts under the control of local landlords loyal to the Ottoman sultan in Istanbul. At the time, thousands of Catholics voluntarily chose to convert to Islam. By converting, Bosnian peasants gained economic and social privileges that local Christians did not have. The switch to Islam was made easier by the fact that the institutions of the Catholic Church were weak, disorganized, and scattered throughout Bosnia.7 After the initial wave of conversions, the religious composition of Bosnia began to change further due to the gradual influx of Orthodox Christian settlers from Serbia after 1500. By the nineteenth century, society in Bosnia was a diverse multiethnic mosaic with a common language despite ethnic and religious differences. Culturally, the Muslims of Bosnia identified to a large extent with the Ottoman Turkish Islamic civilization, unlike the Serbs and Croats, who primarily identified with the Byzantine and Roman Catholic traditions, respectively. The Ottoman approach to Islam in provinces like Bosnia sought to teach the spiritual and scholarly disciplines of the faith to local Muslims through the construction of numerous primary and secondary schools, including religious seminaries (medresas). For centuries, the teaching of Islamic culture and ideology flourished among the Muslims population of Bosnia. Alhamijado literature, for example, written in the traditional Islamic Arabic vernacular, flourished throughout the Ottoman period despite the gradual weakening of the power and stature of the Ottoman state in international affairs. In addition to education and literature, the Ottoman authorities also used the urban-planning designs that they used in their Middle Eastern cities in Sarajevo and other Bosnian cities. Today, visitors to Sarajevo can still appreciate remnants of this design strategy as they wander through the markets, the areas of small artisan tradesmen, and some residential areas that still reflect Eastern styles. Islamic culture is also reflected in Bosnia in the traditional use of gravestones, decorative calligraphy in inscriptions, and the distinctly Eastern flair of its famous arched bridges. The Eastern character of Islam in Bosnia began to change, however, after the years of mass uprisings in Bosnia from 1875 to 1878 resulted in the transfer of sovereignty from the Ottoman to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The period of Austrian rule in Bosnia lasted from 1878 to the outbreak of World War I in 1914. This relatively brief interlude of European domination greatly impacted the lives and culture of the Muslim inhabitants of Bosnia. Muslims were exposed to Western philosophy and culture, attended universities in Vienna, witnessed the secularization of their Islamic culture, and experienced economic diversification that led to the formation of a multiethnic middle class. The major reason for the weak position of Bosnian Muslims in Yugoslav society was the dominant role that Croats and especially Serbs enjoyed in the political affairs of the region during and after the Hapsburg interlude. It was only after the legalization of the Muslims of Bosnia as a political nation in the late 1960s that the nature of their community-wide underdevelopment and social poverty came to the fore. The recognition of the Muslims of Bosnia as a distinct political and social entity in socialist Yugoslavia (late 1960s) was a watershed in many respects. In the social arena, for the first time, the communal identity of Bosnian Muslims was officially endorsed by the state. Culturally, the measure had the effect of making secular Muslim nationalism in Bosnia an acceptable ideology. Among the vast majority

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of Muslims living in Bosnia, Islam was understood and often practiced in a modern secular fashion. Islamic fundamentalism did not factor into the campaign for recognition. This did not prevent the authorities from arresting and imprisoning Alija Izetbegovic, a prominent Muslim intellectual in Sarajevo, in 1983 for allegedly distributing fundamentalist propaganda. The Islamic Declaration (Islamska Deklaracija) was written in 1970 but not published and circulated in Bosnia until the early 1980s. This work, hidden for over a decade, advocated pan-Islamic ideas that called for the unification of all Muslims from Morocco to Asia to unite and live in a single political state. Izetbegovic wrote the treatise to revive the spirituality of Bosnia’s Muslims and hopefully stimulate an Islamic patriotism that would not be directed against a group of people or a particular nation-state. The decision to arrest and prosecute Izetbegovic demonstrated the lack of tolerance Yugoslavia had for potentially subversive religious revivals a few years after the founding father of socialist Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980), passed away. The first comprehensive tabulations by Yugoslav census authorities in the 1970s and 1980s established with a fair amount of accuracy the total number of Muslims in Bosnia and the percentage of their numbers in relation to the other ethnic groups of the republic as well. In 1981, the total population of Bosnia was 4,124,008. Of this number, about 1,628,983, or 39.5 percent of the total, were Muslims.8 In the same census, Bosnian Serbs and Croats constituted 32 percent and 18.4 percent of Bosnia’s overall population, respectively.9 In 1991, the final official census conducted in socialist Yugoslavia shortly before the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, 44 percent of the population of Bosnia was Muslim, 31 percent Serb, and 18 percent Croat.10 These statistics all establish that the largest ethnic community of Bosnia in 1991 was Muslim. The tremendous devastation engendered by the war in Bosnia killed 200,000 people and made 2 million other Bosnians (mostly Muslim) into refugees, thus permanently affecting the practice and nature of Bosnian Islam.11 The war ended in late 1995 with the ratification of the Dayton Peace Accords. Muslims and Political Participation The Dayton Accords included a new national constitution, creating a federal democratic republic. Under the new constitution, the chairman of the presidency rotates every eight months among a popularly elected Serb, Croat, and Bosniak (or Muslim), all three of whom serve for a concurrent four-year term. The presidency is responsible for foreign policy, representing Bosnia-Herzegovina abroad, and fiscal and economic affairs. A bicameral parliamentary assembly consists of the National House of Representatives (Predstavnicki Dom) and the House of Peoples (Dom Naroda). The House of Representatives has 42 seats elected by proportional representation, and its members serve four-year terms. The House of Peoples holds 15 seats, which are apportioned according to ethnic group: 5 seats each for Bosniak, Croat, and Serbian candidates. Since 1995, Bosnia has resembled the partitioned, ethnically segregated country the radical nationalists of the region dreamed of creating while waging the wars and fomenting the hatred that destroyed Yugoslavia. The legacy of interethnic solidarity

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and intermarriage was replaced with a country yet to heal from the dislocation and horrors of the war. Some Muslims have found solace in simply being able to return to their homes. Others celebrate the ideology of global Islamic fundamentalism, seeking to remove women completely from the public sphere and defend literal interpretations of the doctrines of their faith. In the coming years perhaps the memory of the war can at least begin to feel more distant for the Muslims of Bosnia, and those thousands who have yet to return to Bosnia can be at least given that opportunity. WOMEN AND THE FAMILY Gender roles in Bosnian Muslim society tend to vary from region to region. However, Muslim women who live in Sarajevo or other major cities in Bosnia are generally more likely to have intermarried before the war and led modern, independent, assertive lives characteristic of women in Europe and the United States. In the villages of Bosnia where Muslims predominate, however, women have tended to adhere to traditional and conservative expectations that have changed little over time. Bosnian Muslim women in the village play the most critical part in sustaining the home, which is their most important duty. Custom says that women make three poles of the house and men only one. Muslim men are expected to construct and maintain the house, including providing for the family. Women, for their part, are expected to determine the moral environment and set the tone for the proper behavior of all of the members of the household. In the rural setting the behavior of Muslim women is highly controlled and fairly limited in the public arena.12 It is the men who are then responsible for regulating and monitoring of this behavior. For many Muslim women, their transformation into adult womanhood is complete after they are married. The courtship process for Bosnian Muslim women can last as long as a few years. Upon completing this ritual, women are expected to immediately change their behavior and outlook on the world. As in other traditional societies, Bosnian women assume an entirely new and different set of responsibilities and expectations after marriage. They must display a new level of vigilance in their behavior and pay special attention to how men perceive them. As a Muslim, a woman in Bosnia is expected to define her status as a woman in terms of Islam. For example, it is vital for mature married Muslim women to engage in ritual washing (gusul) after intercourse, as Muslim tradition dictates. This helps distinguish Muslim girls from Muslim women. Another aspect of the feminine condition in Bosnia is their belief that birth control is the responsibility of men. As a result, many Muslim women become pregnant due to the flawed but preferred method of contraception among Muslim men: withdrawal. Women, despite the advice of village Muslim instructors, prefer abortion as birth control when withdrawal failed. To the dismay of traditional rural clerics, many women concur on the issue of abortion, which they do not perceive as a sin, and abortion lacks the stigma it has elsewhere. Many Muslim women remain part of traditional families. These women are charged with the important duties associated with Ramadan, the main Islamic holy

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month. It is an occasion in which women are able to express their faith as individuals and also seek blessings for the other members of the household. Ramadan is also a practice that is uniquely Muslim, serving as a vehicle for the expression of a distinctive religious identity separate from that of Croats and Serbs. In Bosnia, women have total access to the mosques, which is highly unusual in many Islamic countries. Women are not allowed to attend the important Friday evening prayers, and they do not take part in the selection of the members of local Islamic councils, but women are free to attend many services throughout the week. Some women in Bosnia have even become Islamic leaders (imams), and many others fulfill important roles, such as teaching Islam on the same level as men; both are selected and employed directly by the Islamic Association in Sarajevo. Bosnian Muslim women and the Muslim family have been severely affected by the use of rape as a weapon of war against them by the Serb forces between 1992 and 1995. Serb forces targeted Muslim women in a systematic campaign of rape, physical torture, and psychological intimidation. One scholar argues, Rape is thus used to act out in symbolic terms the subjugation of one nation by another, transmuted to the level of sexual conquest. At the same time, rape affirms the subordination of gender issues to nationalist concerns.13

Rape as a weapon of war by the Serb forces against Muslim women was used to “spread fear and mark a male’s territory.”14 Another analyst writes about rape in war as “neither incidental nor private,” but a deliberate strategy designed to humiliate,

After the war, many people in Sarajevo suffered under- and unemployment, forcing them to set up makeshift vendor stalls in the European-style piazzas (2001). Angelo Georgakis.

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torture, and in the case of Bosnian Muslim women, expel them from their homes.15 The mass rapes humiliated and subjugated between 20,000 and 70,000 Muslim women. Many were rounded up and sent to makeshift rape camps, where they were sexually assaulted repeatedly over many months by Serb forces. Bosnian Muslim families and Muslim women today live with the memory of the specific horrors they were subjected to during the war from 1992 to 1995 and will for many years to come. In 2003, a new law on gender equality was passed, regulating and protecting women’s rights regardless of marital or family status and religion. Although the law applies to all public spheres of social, economic, and political participation, enforcement is spotty at best. According to the Human Rights House Foundation (Oslo), employers in Bosnia-Herzegovina tend to prefer male to female candidates, even when both candidates are equally educated and skilled for the position. Discrimination in the labor market affects issues such as availability of health care and insurance: more than half of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian women live without health insurance. SPECIAL ISSUES IN THE NEWS Since the end of the war in Bosnia, the region has continued to struggle for a number of reasons. Since 1995, the discovery of mass graves has delayed the postwar healing process. The daily presence of tens of thousands of NATO troops and the relatively slow pace of political, economic, and social changes since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords are a constant reminder of the war. As a state divided into ethnic zones and regions, Bosnia’s true multiethnic character has yet to revive itself as it did after World War II, during which internecine violence was as horrific as it was between 1992 and 1995. Bosnian Muslim identity has traditionally defined itself in relation to the other major ethno-religious groups of the country. Today, for the first time, many Bosnian Muslims have begun to identify themselves in relation to other Muslims around the world. The secular identity of Bosnian Muslims has therefore been challenged by the memory of the genocide perpetrated mainly by Serb but also Croat forces against them and by the rise in the popularity of Islamic fundamentalism. The events of September 11 have resulted in a global effort led by the United States to locate and apprehend terrorists associated with al-Qaida and its allies. Since September 11, the continued presence of Muslim fighters from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other countries in Bosnia has come under increased scrutiny by the international community. During the war, Muslims from the Middle East and Asia volunteered to fight for their Bosnian brothers and proved to be vital assets to the outmatched Bosnian Muslim army. According to the Dayton Peace Accords, these foreign fighters were to leave Bosnia. However, some of these men remained in Bosnia after the war, and at least a few have ties to radical global terrorist movements. Many of these foreign Muslims married Bosnian women, and some even took up farming after the war. Western intelligence sources claim that some of the terrorists affiliated with Osama bin Laden allegedly received Bosnian citizenship

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in the years before September 11.16 Local authorities have also taken a closer look at foreign contributors to Bosnian Muslim organizations and charities for any ties they may have to al-Qaida and radical Islam. In late 2001, the Brussels-based think tank the International Crisis Group published a report that stated that the Saudi High Commission for Relief, an organization that assists war widows and orphans, required their “female beneficiaries (in Bosnia) to cover their heads and their children to attend classes in their faith.”17 In this case, concern focused on the alleged efforts of Saudi benefactors to export Wahhabism, widely practiced in Saudi Arabia and involving literal interpretations of the Quran, to Bosnia. Despite suspicions of ulterior motives on the part of some foreign Muslim benefactors, the Muslim community in Bosnia desperately needs their assistance, and some of the financial help received goes to the reconstruction and repair of more than 1,500 mosques destroyed or badly damaged by nonMuslim forces from 1992 to 1995. Some allies and operatives of al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden have surfaced in Bosnia since late 2001. Less than a month after the September 11 attacks, a senior U.S. State Department official had declared Bosnia to be a “staging area and safe haven for terrorists.”18 In the city of Zenica, a major industrial center and a stronghold of foreign Islamic fighters during the war, Bensayah Belkacem, also known as Mejd, was arrested in October 2001 on suspicion of having had phone conversations with Abu al-Maid, a senior bin Laden aide.19 In March of 2002, Bosnian authorities raided a number of charities and organizations in Zenica that were possible fronts for terrorist planning and activity. At the headquarters of one of these Islamic charities, Benevolentia, Bosnian police found weapons, plans for making bombs, booby traps, and a number of false passports.20 In response to these discoveries, the United States decided to close three major embassies and consulates in Sarajevo, Mostar, and Banja Luka. In the coming years, Muslims in Bosnia will face the challenge of upholding their own cherished secular cultural norms as part of a Muslim world that has seen radical terrorist activities proliferate considerably over the past 15 years. The decision of whether to live as their ancestors have lived—largely in harmony with their fellow, non-Muslim Bosnians—or choose to identify with Islamic fundamentalist ideologies is one every Muslim living in Bosnia must now confront. NOTABLE PEOPLE Andric, Ivo (1892–1975). Bosnian-born (near Travnik, in then Austro-Hungariancontrolled Bosnia) novelist of postwar communist Yugoslavia and Nobel laureate. Andric was educated in Zagreb, Vienna, and Kraków before receiving a degree at the University of Graz, Austria. He worked as a diplomat for Yugoslavia until World War II. From the end of the war until his death, Andric worked as an author in Belgrade. He wrote in the Serbo-Croatian vernacular, widely accessible to his countrymen, and much of his work has also been translated into English. His magnum opus was The Bridge on the Drina, written in 1945, and translated and first published in an English-language version in 1959. This novel celebrated the interwoven identities and experiences of the Muslims and non-Muslims of the region. Andric is an emblem

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of the interethnic harmony between Muslims and non-Muslims that characterized much of the history of Bosnia before the recent war. Ceric, Mustafa (b. 1952). Reis ulema (leader of all Muslim scholars and clerics) of Bosnia, supreme spiritual leader of all Muslims in Bosnia. A graduate of the medresa in Sarajevo, Ceric received his master’s degree at al-Azhar University in Cairo. In 1981 he returned to Bosnia and received the title of imam at the Islamic Cultural Center. After settling in the United States, Ceric completed a Ph.D. in Islamic theology at the University of Chicago. In 1987 he returned to Yugoslavia, where he began practicing Islam in a learning center in Zagreb. After the outbreak of war in 1991, he returned to Bosnia to provide spiritual leadership to the Muslims of Bosnia. Ceric is the most important voice of Islam in Bosnia today and stresses the need for greater unity and piety for Bosnia’s Muslims and greater religious tolerance and freedom for all of the faiths of Bosnia. Izetbegovic, Alija (b. 1925). Muslim intellectual and president of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1990–2000). Born in Bosanski Samac in northern Bosnia to a Muslim family, Izetbegovic attended the University of Sarajevo, where he earned a law degree. Throughout the post–World War II period in Yugoslavia, Izetbegovic was a prominent activist for Muslim rights. In the late 1940s the communist authorities arrested him for allegedly advocating “pan-Islam.” In 1983, he was arrested a second time for disseminating “Islamic propaganda” and sentenced to 14 years in prison. This second arrest and imprisonment was in response to the illegal publication and circulation of the Islamic Declaration: A Program for the Islamicization of Muslims and the Muslim Peoples, a treatise written by Izetbegovic in 1970. Many non-Muslims and Yugoslav authorities considered this document to be a call to holy war (jihad), to liberate the Muslims of Bosnia and establish a new global pan-Islamic state. Shortly after being released from prison in 1990, Izetbegovic founded the Party for Democratic Action (PDA). The PDA won the majority of votes in the elections held in November 1990. In late 1995, along with Croatian president Franjo Tudjman and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Izetbegovic signed the Dayton Peace Accords that ended the war in Bosnia (1992–95). In September 1996, Izetbegovic became the chairman of the presidency. In late 2000, he stepped down from his post as the Muslim president of the Bosnian collective presidency. Izetbegovic is the most renowned Muslim politician of the postcommunist era in Bosnia and Herzegovina and remains one of the leading intellectuals and public figures in Bosnian society today. Kusturica, Emir (b. 1955). Born in Sarajevo to a Muslim family, Kusturica is a renowned screenwriter and director. Kusturica is also the bass guitarist for the Bosnian rock band Zabranjeno Pusenje (No Smoking). He began his career in television and later made films, many of which were filmed in Sarajevo and the surrounding region. He gained international acclaim for his film When Father Was Away on Business (1984), nominated for Best Foreign Film at the Academy Awards and winner of the Palme d’Or at the Cannes Film Festival. This film is especially significant because of the director’s casting of members from each of the three largest ethnic groups of Bosnia and Herzegovina—Serbs, Croats, and

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Bosnian Muslims. In 1992, after the war started in Bosnia, Kusturica moved to Belgrade, Serbia, where he continued to write and direct films of substance and consequence. In 1995 he made Underground, considered by many to be his finest film. Underground is one of the few artistic representations of the effects of ethnic and world wars on the peoples of Yugoslavia. Focusing primarily on the experience of a group of idiosyncratic theater actors in Yugoslavia, the film follows them into hiding during the Nazi bombardment of the city in 1941, where they remain until the early 1990s, only to emerge just in time for the civil wars that would tear Yugoslavia apart. It was condemned in Sarajevo for allegedly being sympathetic to the Serb side and is one of the reasons why Kusturica remains in exile from Bosnia today. Spaho, Mehmet (1883–1939). Spaho was leading Bosnian Muslim politician of the interwar years and leader and founder of the Yugoslav Muslim Organization (YMO), a small political party that represented the interests of landholding Muslims in the newly created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Yugoslavia) after 1920. Spaho argued that the overriding goal of the organization should be to preserve the autonomy and unique identity of Bosnia within the new Yugoslav state. In 1935, Spaho was appointed minister of transportation in the newly elected Yugoslav government. This set a precedent for the direct participation of Bosnian Muslims in the Yugoslav government until the country was overrun by Adolf Hitler’s forces in 1941. Spaho’s ability to form coalitions with non-Muslim politicians in interwar Yugoslavia would inspire subsequent generations of Muslim figures, such as former Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic, to seek reconciliation and compromise with other ethnic groups in the political arena. NOTES 1. Bozniak is a relatively new ethnic designation, which replaces the ethnic term Muslim to avoid confusion with the religious term Muslim—one who practices Islam. 2. Genocidal acts were also organized and carried out by Bosnian Croat forces. One need only look at the devastation that occurred in Mostar in the latter phases of the conflict and the vicious counterattack launched by Croatian president Franjo Tudjman against the Serbs of Croatia in 1995. The number of organized atrocities perpetrated by Muslim forces against Serb and Croat troops simply pales in comparison. 3. Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the War for Kosovo, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), 239. 4. Tone Bringa, Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). 5. Alexandre Popovic, “Islamic Movements in Yugoslavia,” in Muslim Communities Reemerge: Historical Perspectives on Nationality, Politics, and Opposition in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, ed. Edward Allworth (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994), 322–40. 6. Bringa, Being Muslim, 230–31. 7. Ivan Lovrenovic, Bosnia: A Cultural History (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 93–94.

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8. Leonard Cohen and Paul Warwick, Political Cohesion in a Fragile Mosaic (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), 164, cited in Glenn E. Curtis, Yugoslavia: A Country Study (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, 1992), 293, table 5. 9. Curtis, Yugoslavia, 293. 10. A number of different sources—Yugoslav, European, and American—all accept these figures as the most accurate available. See CIA, The World Factbook, http://www.cia. gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html. 11. This number is quite staggering considering the total population of Bosnia in 1991 was fewer than 4.5 million. 12. Bringa, Being Muslim, 86–87. 13. Ramet, Balkan Babel, 261. 14. Obrad Kesic, “Women and Gender Imagery in Bosnia: Amazons, Sluts, Victims, Witches, and Wombs,” in Gender Politics in the Western Balkans: Women and Society in Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav Successor States, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 190. 15. Dorothy Q. Thomas and Regan E. Ralph, “Rape in War: The Case of Bosnia,” in Ramet, Gender Politics, 207. 16. Craig Pyes, “Bosnia Seen as Hospitable Base and Sanctuary for Terrorists,” Los Angeles Times, October 7, 2001. 17. Julie Poucher Harbon, “Bosnia: Foreign-Funded Mosques under Scrutiny,” Religioscope, May 10, 2002, http://www.religioscope.com/info/notes/2002_050_islam_bosnia. htm; see also Alix Kroeger, “Police Swoop on Bosnian Charity,” BBC News, March 20, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1883514.stm. 18. Craig Pyes, “Bosnia Seen as Hospitable Base and Sanctuary for Terrorists,” Los Angeles Times, October 7, 2001. 19. Ewen MacAskill, “Astute Bin Laden Raises the Stakes,” Guardian (London), October 9, 2001. 20. “Bosnian Charities Tied to Terror,” Boston Globe, July 2, 2002; see also Christopher Deliso, “Balkan Meltdown: Across the Former Yugoslavias, Tensions Are Rising Spectacularly,” Antiwar.com, March 27, 2002, http://www.antiwar.com/orig/deliso38.html.

RESOURCE GUIDE Suggested Reading Allworth, Edward, ed. Muslim Communities Reemerge: Historical Perspectives on Nationality, Politics, and Opposition in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994. Cigar, Norman. Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of Ethnic Cleansing. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995. Donia, Robert J., and John V. A. Fine Jr. Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. Gutman, Roy. A Witness to Genocide: The 1993 Pulitzer Prize–Winning Dispatches on the Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia. New York: Macmillan, 1993. Honig, Jan Willem, and Norbert Both. Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime. New York: Penguin, 1996. Lovrenovic, Ivan. Bosnia: A Cultural History. New York: New York University Press, 2001.

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Mahmutcehajic, Rusmir. Bosnia the Good: Tolerance and Tradition. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000. Malcolm, Noel. Bosnia: A Short History. New York: New York University Press, 1996. Ramet, Sabrina P. Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milosevic. 4th ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002. ———, ed. Gender Politics in the Western Balkans: Women and Society in Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav Successor States. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999. Sells, Michael A. The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996. Shatzmiller, Maya, ed. Islam and Bosnia: Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multiethnic States. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002. Silber, Laura, and Allan Little. Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation. New York: Penguin, 1996. Stiglmayer, Alexandra, ed. Mass Rape: The War against Women in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Trans. Marion Faber. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994.

Films and Videos No Man’s Land. Santa Monica, CA: Danis Tanovic, 2001. Savrseni Krug [The Perfect Circle]. Sarajevo: Ademir Kenovic, 1996. Srebrenica: A Cry from the Grave. New York: Leslie Woodhead, 1999. http://www.pbs. org/wnet/cryfromthegrave/about/intro.html. Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation. London: Discovery Channel/BBC, Paul Mitchell, 1995.

Web Sites Balkan Academic News: http://www.seep.ceu.hu/balkans/ Bosnia-Herzegovina Federal Office of Statistics: http://www.fzs.ba/Eng/indexe.htm Bosnian Handicrafts: http://www.bosnianhandicrafts.com/ Bosnian Institute: http://www.bosnianinstitute.org/ Center for Peace and Multiethnic Cooperation: http://www.centarzamir.org.ba/eng/ index.html Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina: http://www.ccbh.ba/ Dayton Peace Accord: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/peace/docs/daytonaccord.html Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Washington, DC: http://www. bhembassy.org/ Human Rights Ombudsperson of Bosnia-Herzegovina: http://www.ohro.ba/articles/article. php?lit_id=geninfo International Forum—Bosnia: http://www.ifbosna.org.ba/engleski/pocetna/index.html Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina: http://www.mvp.gov.ba/index_eng.htm National and University Library of Bosnia and Herzegovina: http://www.nub.ba/pages/ FramedPageengl.html University of Sarajevo: http://www.unsa.ba/eng/novosti.php Virginia Tech University Library, Slavic, East European, and Former USSR Resources: http://www.lib.vt.edu/subjects/slav/relig_muslim.html Youth Network of Bosnia-Herzegovina: http://www.omladina-bih.net/eng/englishFrameset. htm

4 Egypt Kathryn M. Coughlin

OVERVIEW The Arab Republic of Egypt’s strategic location at the junction of Africa and Asia, its Suez Canal, its proximity to Europe, and its juxtaposition with Israel have secured it a major role in Middle Eastern geopolitics. Covering approximately 1,001,450 square miles, Egypt’s total land and water is more than three and a half times the size of Texas. The country’s population is the largest among Arab countries, and its high effective birth rate strains the country’s overburdened resources and threatens economic development.1 Despite the geographic size of the country, only 2.85 percent of the land is available for agriculture and settlement. More than 62 percent of the 70.6 million people living in Egypt today are between the ages of 15 and 62, and at least 23 percent of the population lives below the poverty line. Government oppression of the media, violent suppression of political opposition, and strict regulations of other civil rights has led to widespread dissatisfaction with the current political regime.2 Human Rights Watch, as well as other international human-rights organizations, has documented Egypt’s repeated use of torture, arrest and detention of political opponents, and persecution of antiwar activists.3 In the post–September 11 era, Egypt has become one of the United States’ most important allies in its “war on terror” and thus has escaped formal U.S. censure for these and other blatant rights abuses. Recently, however, President George W. Bush has voiced some indirect criticism of President Hosni Mubarak’s tentative and inadequate democratic reforms. Egypt faces complex challenges in the twenty-first century: a rapidly growing population with a paucity of arable land, a corrupt and oppressive government operating a quasi-socialist economy, and political unrest all threaten Egypt’s continued stable presence in the Middle East.

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Modern History Napoléon invaded Egypt in 1798 to impede British trade in the Indian Ocean by taking control of the land and sea routes to India. The French emperor installed a French-style government, revamped the tax system, and established publicworks projects: streets were cleaned of refuse, canals were dredged, and temporary bridges spanned the Nile in Cairo. But the British immediately responded to the French occupation of Egypt by sending Lord Admiral Nelson; Napoléon retreated in 1801, and after a brief power struggle, Muhammad Ali (r. 1805–48) ascended to power. Muhammad Ali, an officer in the Ottoman army, removed Egypt from the sultan’s control and greatly influenced the development of modern Egyptian history. Muhammad Ali sought to modernize Egypt in agriculture, transportation, and education. He introduced one of Egypt’s most successful cash crops, cotton, and developed new irrigation techniques. For the first time since the arrival of Islam, education under Muhammad Ali was removed from the purview of clerics, and secondary and university education was secularized. The latter achievement served to undermine the religious clerics’ power, a process that continued well into the twentieth century. The completion of the Suez Canal (1869) established Egypt’s valuable role in commerce transportation networks. But before the country could realize profit from its newest venture, it defaulted on massive loans held primarily by Great Britain. Britain responded by taking control of the Egyptian government in 1882, although the Ottoman Empire continued to count Egypt as one of its territories. In 1922, Great Britain granted Egypt partial independence, conferring full independence 30 years later.

Twentieth-Century Egypt The Arab Republic of Egypt has experienced considerable changes over the past hundred years. At the beginning of the last century, the Ottoman Empire governed the territory in name only; the British military forces occupying Egypt and Sudan firmly held the reins of power. In the wake of World War I, the British granted Egypt independence, but they appointed a titular monarch who essentially answered to the British occupational governor. King Fuad was of Albanian origin and did not even speak Arabic. After a disastrous defeat in the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 and amid charges of widespread corruption, King Farouk (King Fuad’s son and successor) was overthrown by a group of Egyptian military officers in the Free Officers’ Coup in 1952. Under the leadership of Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, a Revolutionary Command Council developed a modern independent nation-state influenced by Arab nationalism and socialist ideals. By overthrowing the British-supported monarchy and establishing an independent Arab state, Nasser became a champion to the Arab and developing world. But as president, Nasser made several critical errors in judgment. Although he declared Egypt a nonaligned nation in the cold war between the United States

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The Nile flows through the most densely populated sections of Cairo, which includes skyscrapers and modern office buildings (2002). Rick Holmes.

and the Soviet Union, military equipment and financial assistance received from the USSR alienated him from the West and from certain segments of the Egyptian population. Egypt’s colossal defeat in the Six-Day War against Israel (1967) weakened Nasser’s absolute power at home and abroad. Under his successor, Anwar al-Sadat, Egyptian foreign and domestic policies would change dramatically. Sadat became president of Egypt after Nasser’s death in 1971. As a compelling leader, Nasser’s death was mourned by most of the Arab and developing world. Sadat, whose personality was decidedly less charismatic than that of his predecessor, lacked political legitimacy.4 In an attempt to distinguish his presidency from that of his predecessor, Sadat introduced an economic policy called Infitah, or “Open Door,” and used political Islam to legitimate his rule. These two tactics— Infitah and political Islam—marked a radical change from Nasserite rule and are widely accepted as the sources for Egyptian instability today. Sadat’s and his successor Mubarak’s economic and political policies, along with a devalued Egyptian pound, inflation, and widespread corruption, have fueled Islamic-based political opposition. Unlike the secular socialist Nasser, Sadat invoked Islam to garner political and personal legitimacy. He called himself the “believer president,” encouraged television coverage of him praying in Cairene mosques, demanded religious programming on state-run radio and television stations, and mandated religious classes in primary and secondary schools. But the 1971 permanent constitution developed under Sadat represented the most radical

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departure from Nasserite Egypt. This document declared Islamic jurisprudence the principal source of all law and created a presidency with unilateral and widereaching powers. In 1972, Sadat ordered all Soviet advisers to leave Egypt and reestablished ties with Saudi Arabia. The economy was in a shambles—oil revenues from the Sinai were lost to the Israelis in the 1967 war, the Americans would not support Egypt financially, and the Soviets refused to send aid. Sadat prepared the Egyptian army and, in a surprise attack in October 1973, his troops crossed into the Sinai to recover their lost peninsula. Although a clear military defeat, the subsequent peace treaty recovered the Sinai and was therefore considered a triumph. The first Arab country to sign a peace treaty with Israel, Egypt further gained the support of Western countries with his Open Door economic policies. In 1977 Sadat traveled to the newly declared capital of Jerusalem and began the process that eventually became known as the Camp David Accords (1978).5 Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem and the diplomatic recognition of Israel alienated Egypt from almost all Arab, African, and Muslim countries, most of which severed relations with Egypt. The Islamic Conference, the Organization of African Unity, and the League of Arab States revoked Egypt’s membership, with the latter moving its headquarters from Cairo to Tunis. Arab states discontinued all economic aid and called in their loans. But the reaction was not only international: nationalist currents within Egypt openly opposed the Camp David Treaty, and people rioted in the streets. Sadat’s regime lost whatever legitimacy it had gained through its manipulation of Islam. The economic recession, his alliance with the West, and the Camp David Accords brought Sadat’s life and government to a tragic end. On October 6, 1981, Sadat was assassinated by an Islamic extremist as he reviewed a military parade. The killer, an army officer named Khalid Islambuli, became known throughout the world for the assassination and for his statement “I am Khalid Islambuli, I have killed Pharaoh and I do not fear death.” 6 Like Sadat before him, Vice President Hosni Mubarak succeeded the deceased president. Mubarak undertook the arduous task of rebuilding relations with other Arab and African countries while preserving ties to the United States and Europe. By 1987, most Arab, African, and Muslim states had restored diplomatic ties with the country. Two years later, the Arab League extended membership to Egypt once again and moved its offices back to Cairo. In the early to mid-1990s, extremist Islamist organizations sought to overthrow the Mubarak regime, and an assassination attempt in 1995 nearly succeeded. In response, Mubarak detained, imprisoned, and executed hundreds of Muslim men, some of whom represented legitimate political opposition. During the early part of this century, the Egyptian government continued to violently repress radical Islamists and those who actively opposed Mubarak’s rule. Condemning the September 11 attacks, Mubarak used the opportunity to reaffirm the importance of his own war with Islamist groups, justifying his internal crackdowns on both radical Muslims and nascent political opposition. As Mubarak’s fourth six-year term drew to a close in 2005, Egyptians from all political backgrounds joined a movement called Kifaya, or “Enough,”

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demanding that Mubarak step down, legalize political opposition, and allow free and fair elections. The regime permitted a few weak opposition parties to field candidates, and the electoral response was underwhelming: only 25 percent of the eligible voters turned out for a contest marred by corruption and violence. CULTURE, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS Muslims, almost exclusively Sunni, account for 94 percent of Egypt’s more than 74 million people, with 6 percent attributed to Coptic Christians; Evangelical, Protestant, and non-Coptic Christians account for less than 1 percent of the population. Egypt’s Shia community is not subject to specific legally sanctioned discrimination on the part of the majority Sunni government and ruling elites, and there is no restriction on publication or worship. But national and state governments heavily fund Sunni religious organizations and institutions, while overtly neglecting the Shia minority’s needs for places of worship and education.7 Christians—both Coptic and non-Coptic—are frequent targets of persecution in Egypt. While there have been particular historic episodes when Christians faced oppression and discrimination, these events usually coincided with eras of general economic crises and political instability. Christians contend that discrimination is enshrined in laws that proscribe building new churches or non-Muslim places of worship; al-Azhar University is publicly funded but only open to Muslim students, and Christian religious institutions receive no public funding. Although Copts have been the educated elite and served at all levels of government in the postrevolutionary period—and one is a former secretary-general of the United Nations—Christians are woefully underrepresented in most senior posts of Egyptian public life. Although Egypt once boasted a large and prosperous Jewish population, today Egyptian Jewry consists of several hundred elderly men and women. At the beginning of the last century more than 25,000 Jews lived in Cairo and Alexandria; by 1945, the community had tripled. As Egyptian and Israeli relations strained in the early 1950s, Jews began emigrating north. By the end of the 1967 Six-Day War, fewer than 2,500 Jews remained in Egypt. Today, anti-Semitism is on the rise in Egypt, where the press and politicians routinely express rampant anti-Israel and anti-Semitic sentiments in editorials and cartoons. The smallest community of religious minorities in Egypt is the Baha’i, whose total population numbers around 15,000. Baha’i beliefs are not protected in Egypt, and followers are persecuted by the official religious establishment—the clerics at al-Azhar University—which considers them apostates and infidels. In 1960, a presidential decree ordered all Baha’i communities dissolved, their assets confiscated, and their religious rituals banned. Today the Egyptian Baha’i practice secretly. Islamic Opposition Movements Islamic opposition movements have flourished in Egypt since the beginning of the last century and differ in demographics, goals, and philosophies. The Muslim Brotherhood is the largest opposition group, although the government has banned

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the organization and it cannot legally field candidates for political office. Formed in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna (1906–49), a schoolteacher, the Muslim Brotherhood (or Ikhwan al-Muslimin in Arabic) has denounced terrorism and violence as a means to achieve its ends. Hassan al-Banna, a pupil of the Islamic modernist Rashid Rida (1865–1935), initially sought to address the impact of Western imperialism in the Muslim world, but the Muslim Brotherhood eventually articulated a social vision that included critiques of then current events: the disastrous defeat of Arabs in British Palestine and the creation of Israel (1948) and the British occupation of Egypt and the Sudan. Against this backdrop of loss, defeat, poverty, and humiliation, Egyptian intellectuals lost faith in the principles of nationalism as a means by which to solve society’s problems. They, like al-Banna, turned to religion to restore the cultural and political hegemony of the Arab world, as it was during the classical and medieval periods (ca. the seventh through the thirteenth centuries). Like many religious revivalists, Hassan al-Banna saw the decline of the Muslim world as a direct consequence of Muslims’ failing to be religiously observant. At the same time, he believed that the West had become politically and economically powerful by embracing modernization. The Muslim Brotherhood argued that modernization—in addition to a return to religious faithfulness—was important if the Muslim world was to progress and prosper: education systems had to be reformed, and modern communications were needed to spread the message of religious reform. By positing itself as an ideological alternative to Marxism, Western-style capitalism, and Arab nationalism, the Muslim Brotherhood drew thousands of supporters from local mosques, schools, universities, and the middle class. Although the initial primary focus of the Brotherhood was socioeconomic reform, it inevitably turned to politics as a means of effecting reform and thus became a thorn in the side of the Egyptian government. During President Nasser’s tenure, Sayyid Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood openly challenged the government’s socialist programs. It was under Qutb’s leadership that the Brotherhood underwent an ideological schism: one group supported direct confrontation with the government and the other advocated a focus on moral reform and social activism. Qutb and his followers advocated the former approach and were perceived as a direct threat to the newly independent government. In response, Nasser had Qutb executed, detained hundreds of Brotherhood members, arrested all known organizers, and banned the Brotherhood from political participation. By 1965, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt had become effectively dormant. Under Sadat, however, the Muslim Brotherhood experienced a revival. Sadat, who sought political legitimacy through Islamic credentials, actively encouraged the development of Islamic organizations in Egypt. Although the Brotherhood was not permitted to field political candidates, it could still function publicly as a socioreligious organization. Magazines, pamphlets, and newspapers spread the organization’s message of social justice and religious renewal. Its membership swelled to Nasserite levels, drawing primarily from the poor and middle classes at first. The financial support of sympathetic physicians, engineers, businessmen, and lawyers sustained the organization’s activities initially. Later, massive revenue

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influxes from oil-rich countries in the Gulf and Iraq secured the financial independence of the Brotherhood. In the 2000 elections, the Brotherhood was permitted to field opposition candidates, and today more than a dozen parliamentarians are associated with the organization. Despite opening the 2005 presidential election to opposition candidates, Mubarak has banned the Muslim Brotherhood again, and although it is the largest and most powerful opposition political organization in Egypt, no Muslim Brotherhood candidate ran for president against Mubarak for his fifth consecutive six-year term. Two of the largest and most militant Islamist organizations in Egypt today are both offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood. Both the Gamaat Islamiyah, or Islamic Group (GI), and the al-Jihad al-Islamiyah, or Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), have ties to al-Qaida and are illegal in Egypt. The GI initially came to prominence in the 1960s, against the backdrop of religious revivalism espoused by the Muslim Brotherhood. But unlike the Brotherhood, the GI’s ideology was influenced by the Indian subcontinent’s militant Jamaat-i Islami, which was founded by Mawlana Abul Ala Mawdudi in 1941. The GI’s uncompromisingly militant stance sharply distanced it from the Muslim Brotherhood. Today, the GI’s membership is largely drawn from university students, local mosques, and former holy warriors (mujahidin). During the 1980s, the GI recruited young men to fight in the Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union. With the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, many of the more radically Islamist Egyptian mujahidin returned and directed their support to Egyptian Islamist groups, among them the GI. The spiritual leader of the GI is Shaykh Omar Abd al-Rahman, who is serving a life sentence in a U.S. prison for conspiring to bomb the United Nations building, FBI offices, and other prominent New York buildings. Under his leadership, numerous terrorist acts were committed by the GI, including the massacre in Luxor, Egypt (November 1997), in which 62 people were killed by militants who beheaded and disemboweled both tourists and Egyptians. After numerous violent attacks against Christian and government sites in Egypt, the GI has honored a 1999 cease-fire with the government. Exiled members of the GI have joined al-Qaida or al-Qaida-linked groups such as the EIJ. The EIJ is led by Ayman al-Zawahiri (second only to Osama bin Laden in al-Qaida’s power structure) and believed to have merged forces with al-Qaida. Although it has not conducted any attacks on Egyptian soil since 1993 nor targeted foreign tourists, the EIJ is suspected of direct involvement in the September 11 attacks against the United States. U.S. intelligence agencies believe that the EIJ was involved in the 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and that they are responsible for the 1995 suicide attack on the Egyptian embassy in Pakistan. WOMEN AND THE FAMILY The issue of women’s rights and status in Egypt has been part of public debate since the late nineteenth century. In the early 1920s, the Egyptian Feminist Union tied women’s rights to nationalist discourse; suffragettes insisted that, along with

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full Egyptian emancipation from the British, women be granted the vote and access to secondary and higher education. Since independence in 1952, numerous amendments to the national constitution (1971) have legally guaranteed gender equity: article 40 stipulates that citizens are equal in rights and general obligations, with the elimination of all forms of discrimination on the basis of sex, race, beliefs, and convictions.8 Under law, women enjoy equal access to education, employment, and work opportunities; equal pay for equal work; and social security. Women have the right to take up to three maternity leaves for up to three months, and although an employer has no obligation to provide remuneration during this period, the employer must hold her job until her return or resignation. Employers must provide child care if they employ more than 100 women; businesses that employ fewer than 100 women must pay for child care. And nursing women (through 18 months postdelivery) must be paid for one hour for nursing during each eight-hour shift. In reality, however, widespread discrimination exists because of local customs and traditions, a lack of awareness among women of their rights, or lack of strict enforcement of the laws. In rural areas, gender roles have not changed for millennia, and women still suffer as second-class citizens. Women informed of or educated about their rights often cannot seek redress because the investigative and enforcement arms of the judicial system are overwhelmingly occupied by men whose understanding of the law is based more on tradition and custom than constitutional amendments. There are only two female ministers in the president’s 32-member cabinet and fewer than a dozen women in the 454-member parliament. In March 2000, far-reaching reforms in marriage law were passed in Egypt, granting a woman the right to divorce without her husband’s assent. A wife can now seek garnishment of her husband’s wages in the event of his nonsupport; if the husband is unable to adequately provide for his wife, then she will have access to a state fund for support. The proposed changes drew fierce opposition from conservatives, but an alliance of moderate Muslim clerics, women’s organizations, and civil court judges mounted a nationwide public-relations campaign to persuade the opposition that the proposed reforms enshrine in law the Islamic social principle of gender equality.9 The impact of these reforms is difficult to determine, as 1.2 million new divorce cases are filed each year, but overburdened judges only grant 71,000 cases a year.10 And should a woman seek a divorce without her husband’s consent, she must return all property and money given to her upon the marriage (dowry or mahr), a concession for conservative clerics to ensure passage of the reforms. Shortly after these reforms were enacted, a prominent member of the coalition, lawyer Tahani al-Jibali, was appointed as Egypt’s first female judge. Observers of Egyptian society have noted that more women wear headscarves today than in the 1960s or 1970s. Once a girl reaches puberty, she is pressured to cover her hair, if not by her family, then by her peers, classmates, and friends. Women who work in the government or with the public often cover their heads— if not for religious conviction, then to avoid harassment. Even the granddaughter of Huda Shaarawi, an Egyptian feminist and activist who publicly renounced

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the headscarf in 1921, covers her hair. Among university students, some women explain that they cover their hair in protest against the French and Turkish banning of headscarves. Full facial coverings or veils (niqab) are rare in Egypt, although sometimes they are seen in Cairo and other large cities where foreign Muslim women live. Although the government recently passed a law forbidding female excision (or female genital mutilation, FGM), Egyptian girls are still circumcised, a practice more African than Arab, with roots in pre-Islamic societies. Female circumcision is a medical procedure where the clitoris is removed or cut off. According to official estimates, more than 90 percent of Egyptian girls are circumcised, and more than 70 percent of the operations are carried out at home in unsanitary conditions, often leading to infection and sometimes death.11 In September 2003, a young girl died from an operation performed under unhygienic conditions, leading to the government ban of the practice. After Sudan and Somalia, Egypt is considered to have the highest percentage of FGM among its female population—including Christians and non-Muslims. SPECIAL ISSUES IN THE NEWS Egypt’s political system has been undermined by nepotism and corruption. The president, Hosni Mubarak, has used strong-arm tactics to clamp down on his opponents. His ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) has a reputation for crushing the democratic process and ruthlessly eliminating its political opponents, and the regime maintains control with an iron grip, quashing freedom of expression. As a result, most Egyptians have lost confidence in the principles of Egypt’s revolution and in their president, who is increasingly seen as a patsy of foreign donors, especially the United States. Despite a documented record of gross human-rights abuses, arrest and detention of political opponents, persecution of antiwar activists, and widespread religious persecution, Egypt enjoys a close relationship with the United States as a primary ally on its “war on terror.” The issue of Mubarak’s successor galvanized opposition movements of leftists, rightists, secularists, and Islamists. President Mubarak’s fourth six-year term expired in the fall of 2005, and there was little enthusiasm for Mubarak’s fifth six-year term. Under Egypt’s 1971 constitution, presidents are not directly elected but chosen by at least two-thirds of the elected members of the parliament, then confirmed by referendum: essentially, no contest. With a single voice, the opposition demanded direct, contested elections; the abolition of laws that constrain political life; and constitutional reform to redress the current extreme imbalance between the executive and other branches of government. Amid bribery, intimidation, and violence that resulted in 11 deaths, Mubarak’s NDP received a majority of the votes in the 2005 elections. Though the Muslim Brotherhood could not legally field candidates for elected office, many of their members successfully ran as independents. Brotherhood-affiliated candidates polled 40 percent of all votes cast and won at least 90 seats in the 454-seat parliament. Secular opposition candidates fared the worst, winning only a dozen seats. The U.S. government is still prodding

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Mubarak’s government to open its political system more evenly, with the hope that secular, democratic parties will rise to the fore. Even though Egypt’s two largest Islamist groups, the GI and EIJ, have observed a 1999 cease-fire with the Egyptian government, at least 32 people—mostly Israelis on holiday—were killed in a terrorist attack at a Red Sea resort in October 2004. Israeli and Egyptian security services do not believe that either the GI or EIJ are responsible, and two previously unknown groups—the Islamic Tawhid Brigades and World Islamic Group—claimed responsibility. The latter is believed to be affiliated with al-Qaida and to have been behind a 2002 attack on a Mombasa, Kenya, hotel frequented by Israeli tourists. While the government’s strong-arm tactics have largely silenced the domestic Islamist movements, al-Qaida promises future attacks on the Arab state that made peace with Israel first. NOTABLE PEOPLE Abd al-Raziq, Ali (1888–1966). Judge, author, secularist, and academic at al-Azhar University in Cairo. Educated at Oxford University and al-Azhar, Abd alRaziq published his highly controversial book Islam and the Sources of Political Authority (1925), wherein he argued that since Islam does not require a specific form of government, Muslim countries can be democracies. More contentious was his assertion that Muhammad was a religious and spiritual leader, not a political one. Abu al-Majd, Ahmad Kamal (b. 1930). Distinguished Muslim intellectual, writer, and law professor who argues for a moderate and rational Islam responding to the challenge of modern society. In 2002, Abu al-Majd was appointed the Arab League’s commissioner of intercivilizational dialogue. He believes that the media has promoted hostility between Islam and the West and that their differences should be historically contextualized in Europe’s colonization of the Muslim world. Abu al-Majd calls for individual freedoms in a political order characterized by consultation (shura), accountability of rulers, and respect for an individual’s rights. Hanafi, Hasan (b. 1935). Reformist intellectual, writer, and professor of philosophy at Cairo University who advocates an Islamic “revolutionary liberation theology” to form an “Islamic left,” promote a democratic state free from Western domination or Zionist influence, and unify the Arab world. Educated at the Sorbonne in Paris, Hanafi employs the language of liberation theology, arguing that revelation must be reinterpreted continually in light of the issues and questions of the current age. Qaradawi, Yusuf al- (b. 1926). Islamic activist and scholar, al-Qaradawi lives in exile in Qatar and serves as head of the European Council on Fatwa and Research. His extensive writings call for the reestablishment of the Muslim caliphate and promotion of the Islamic ideal that women are equal to men in all spheres. Regarding terrorist attacks, al-Qaradawi approves of suicide bombers in Israel and in Iraq, although he condemns all attacks against civilians and nonmilitary targets. He reasons that Muslims have a right to self-protection but must never be the aggressors. Some of his fatwas are contradictory and, at times, his position on violence

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in Islam is unclear. Although he has harshly criticized the United States for its support of Israel, al-Qaradawi denounced the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States and those in Bali, Indonesia, in October 2002. He further recommended that Muslims donate blood for the injured victims of the terrorist attacks and proclaimed that it is the duty of every Muslim to help apprehend the terrorists responsible for these attacks. Saadawi, Nawal el- (b. 1931). Although trained as a physician, el-Saadawi is known best for her feminist activism and extensive writings, both fiction and nonfiction. Her most popular novel, Woman at Point Zero (1979), has been translated into 28 languages, and her nonfiction work Hidden Face of Eve (1977) is still banned in Egypt. A consistent critic of the patriarchal concepts of family honor and abuse of political power, el-Saadawi was imprisoned without charge by President Sadat for three months in 1981. In 1982, she established the Arab Women’s Solidarity Association, which the Egyptian government outlawed when it criticized the 1991 Gulf War. Zawahiri, Ayman al- (b. 1951). Physician by training and education, prominent leader in al-Qaida, and former head of the EIJ, al-Zawahiri was born to a middleclass family in a suburb of Cairo and was greatly affected by the Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel. At age 14, he joined the Muslim Brotherhood; by 1979, he had joined the more radical EIJ, where he became an effective recruiter and leader. In the 1980s, al-Zawahiri joined the Afghan resistance against the Soviet occupation, where he met Osama bin Laden. In 1998, Zawahiri formerly merged the EIJ group with al-Qaida. An Egyptian court found him guilty and sentenced him to death (in absentia) for his participation in a 1997 terrorist attack in Luxor, Egypt, in which 67 tourists were killed. The United States has issued a $25 million reward for information leading to his capture or death for the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the September 11 attacks.

NOTES 1. Here effective birth rate takes into account infant mortality, and is sometimes called the fertility rate. Egypt’s fertility rate is 2.88 children born to every woman in Egypt, as of July 2005. 2. All geographical and demographical statistical information is from the CIA’s World Factbook 2005, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html. The Egyptian government’s official statistic for 2004 is 69.3 million people; see http://www.idssc.gov. eg/. Also see the U.S. Census Bureau’s International Programs Center (IPC), http://www. census.gov/ipc/www/. 3. Human Rights Watch documented extensive human-rights violations in Egypt in their annual report (2005), including arbitrary arrest and detention, use of torture, and ill treatment resulting in 17 deaths in 2002–3; restrictions on freedom of the press and association; and official tolerance of widespread persecution of religious and ethnic minorities. For more information, see http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/13/egypt9802.htm. Also see Amnesty International’s reports on Egypt’s human-rights violations: http://www.amnesty.

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org/. For information regarding persecution of religious minorities, see http://www.coptic. net/EncyclopediaCoptica. See also http://www.copticpope.org/. 4. Edward Graham, “Islamic Extremism and Modern Egypt,” Middle East Information Network, 2004, http://www.mideastinfo.com/archive/paper4.htm. 5. To review the text of the Camp David Accords, see http://www.usembassy-israel.org.il/ publish/peace/campdav.htm. 6. Quoted in Graham, “Islamic Extremism and Modern Egypt,” under “Introduction.” 7. The statistics from the CIA’s World Factbook are most current (July 2005). Demographic information on Egypt’s Coptic community varies widely depending on the source. 8. Article 40 of the Egyptian constitution (1971) reads, “All citizens are equal before the law. They have equal public rights and duties without discrimination due to sex, ethnic origin, language, religion or creed.” See http://www.egypt.gov.eg/english/laws/constitution/ default.asp. 9. Howard Schneider, “Women in Egypt Gain Broader Divorce Rights,” Washington Post, April 14, 2000. 10. Author’s interview with Egyptian lawyer and human-rights activist Huda al-Sonboli, April 2004. 11. U.S. Department of State, “Egypt: Report on Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) or Female Genital Cutting (FGC),” 2001, http://www.state.gov/g/wi/rls/rep/crfgm/10096. htm.

RESOURCE GUIDE Suggested Reading Aburish, Said K. Nasser: The Last Arab. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2004. Al-Ali, Nadje, Roger Owen, and Judith Tucker, eds. Secularism, Gender and the State in the Middle East: The Egyptian Women’s Movement. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Baron, Beth. “The Making and Breaking of Marital Bonds in Modern Egypt.” In Women, the Family and Divorce Laws in Islamic History, ed. Amira El Azhary Sonbol. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996. Danielson, Virginia. “Artists and Entrepreneurs: Female Singers in Cairo during the 1920s.” In Women, the Family and Divorce Laws in Islamic History, ed. Amira El Azhary Sonbol. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996. Hatem, Mervat. “Secularist and Islamist Discourses on Modernity in Egypt and the Evolution of the Postcolonial Nation-State.” In Islam, Gender and Social Change, ed. Yvonne Yazbeck and John L. Esposito. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Herrera, Linda. “Islamicization and Education: Between Politics, Culture and the Market.” In Modernizing Islam: Religion in the Public Sphere in the Middle East and Europe. Eds. John Esposito and Fracois Burgat. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2003. Karam, Azza, ed. Transnational Political Islam: Religion, Ideology and Power. Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2004. Kassam, Maye. Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004. Kepel, Gilles. Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharoah. Berkeley: University of California, 1986.

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Sonbol, Amira El Azhary. “Law and Gender Violence in Ottoman and Modern Egypt.” In Women, the Family and Divorce Laws in Islamic History, ed. Amira El Azhary Sonbol. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996. Zayyat, Muntasir. The Road to al-Qaeda: The Story of Bin Laden’s Right-Hand Man. Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2004.

Films and Videos Documentaries Authority and Change. Princeton, NJ: Films for the Humanities and Sciences, 1994. Egypt’s foremost legal authority, Shaykh Sayyed Tantawi, discusses fatwas and the role of traditional Islamic legal scholars in the world today. El Moulid: Egyptian Religious Festival. Seattle, WA: Arab Film Distribution, 1990. Depicts some of the events of the Islamic religious festival of El Moulid in October 1987, including circumcision of young boys, parades, and Friday prayers. Nasser: A Personal View. Cairo: Luxorfilm, 1988. Examines Gamal Abdel Nasser and his impact on Egypt, the Arab world, and the anticolonial revolution of the developing world. The Suez Crisis: 1956. Princeton, NJ: Films for the Humanities, 1993. Examines the 1956 Suez canal crisis through British and French colonial aspirations. Using old Pathe and Movietone newsreels, the film explains British interests in the region. Umm Kulthum: A Voice like Egypt. Waltham, MA: Filmmakers Collaborative, 1996. A documentary about Umm Kulthum, Egypt’s most famous musical performer, who became a powerful symbol of the aspirations of modern Egypt. A Veiled Revolution. New York: Icarus Films, 1982. Dated but valuable look at dilemmas facing the modern Egyptian woman, including veiling, proper public roles, and the struggle for women’s rights.

Films Al Badayah wal-Nihayah [The Beginning and the End]. San Francisco, CA: August Light Productions, 1997. Originally released as a motion picture in 1960, this film is based on the novel by Naguib Mafouz and stars Omar Sharif. Fi Bayt al-Rajul [There’s a Man in the House]. Seattle, WA: Arab Film Distribution, 2003. Originally released as a motion picture in 1961, the film stars Omar Sharif, who plays a member of the underground resistance seeking refuge from the authorities. Set prior to the 1952 revolution. Four Women of Egypt. New York: Women Make Movies, 2001. Four Egyptian women— all friends—seek human dignity and social justice from four distinctly different approaches: Muslim, Jewish, Christian, and nonreligious. See http://www.arabfilm. com/index.html.

Web Sites American Research Center in Egypt: http://www.arce.org/aboutarce/aboutarce.html Arab Organization for Human Rights: http://aohr.org/ Centre for Development and Population Activities: http://www.cedpa.org/egypt/

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Coptic Orthodox Patriarch: http://www.copticpope.org/ Egypt’s National Council for Women: http://www.ncwegypt.com/new-ncw/english/index.jsp Egyptian Organization for Human Rights: http://www.eohr.org/ Government of Egypt (English): http://www.egypt.gov.eg/english/default.asp Minister of Foreign Trade and Industry: http://www.mfti.gov.eg/e_index.htm Muslim Brotherhood: http://www.ummah.org.uk/ikhwan/ Office of the President: http://www.presidency.gov.eg/ People’s Assembly: http://www.assembly.gov.eg/ Shura (Senate) Assembly: http://www.senate.gov.eg/english_version.htm State Information Service: http://www.sis.gov.eg/ UN Development Program in Egypt: http://www.undp.org.eg/default.asp USAID: http://www.usaid-eg.org/

5 Ethiopia Dana Leigh Hearn

OVERVIEW Considered one of the world’s oldest Christian civilizations, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia is a nation whose past and present are entwined with the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Even today, when its constitution mandates the separation of religion and state and prohibits a state religion, Ethiopia has not shed its predominately Christian identity—whether on a national or international level. Its Christian heritage and reputation notwithstanding, the country has a rich Islamic history as well and is home to a large, dynamic Muslim community. The issue of religious percentages in Ethiopia is a contentious one, and estimates vary depending on the source and, most likely, a source’s affiliation and agenda. Although a 1994 census conducted by the state Central Statistical Authority placed the number of Ethiopian Muslims at 32.8 percent of the total population, many Muslims contend that the percentage is higher.1 The U.S. Department of State estimates that, of a total population of approximately 71 million, 45 percent are Muslim, 40–50 percent are Ethiopian Orthodox, and more than 10 percent are Evangelical and Pentecostal Protestants.2 Other religious communities include Ethiopian Catholics, Jews, animists, and practitioners of other indigenous faiths. Regardless of the precise percentages, Muslims unquestionably constitute a large segment of the population and rival the Ethiopian Orthodox in number. The Christian character that the state has long sought to project thus belies a strong Islamic presence in contemporary society. Ethiopia’s population is extremely complex in terms of ethnicity and language. There are numerous ethnic groups, and the lines dividing them are neither clear

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nor static. Moreover, classification on the basis of ethnicity does not neatly overlap that based on languages—at least 70 of which are spoken as mother tongues. Adding religion to this demographic picture complicates matters further, particularly in the absence of authoritative data on religious, ethnic, or linguistic percentages. However, certain general patterns in the demographic and geographic distribution of religious affiliation can be discerned. The Amhara and Tigray ethnic groups, which together make up more than 40 percent of the population, are almost entirely Orthodox Christian. The Muslim community is dispersed among a number of other ethnic groups, the largest of which is the Somali; others include the Afar, Argobba, Hareri, and Saho. The community is dispersed geographically as well, although significant numbers inhabit the provinces of Bale to the south, Harerge to the east, and Welo to the north. Both historically and at present, this demographic and geographic dispersal has inhibited the creation of a centralized, national Muslim consciousness. At the same time, however, it attests to the Islamic dimension of Ethiopian identity. Accounts of Ethiopia’s history often ignore the indigenous character of Ethiopian Islam, portraying it instead as an alien—and generally antagonistic—force. Although the centuries that witnessed the arrival and expansion of Islam were indeed marred by bloody Muslim-Christian wars, to reduce the country’s Islamic history to a catalog of conflicts or record of hostilities would be a misleading simplification. The periods of conflict notwithstanding, Muslim and Christian communities passed through centuries of peaceful coexistence. History of Islam in Ethiopia According to Islamic traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (hadith), Muhammad sent a group of his followers to Ethiopia in 615 so that they might escape persecution in Arabia. These early Muslims sought refuge in what was then Aksum, a powerful kingdom that reached its zenith between the third and sixth centuries. Although Aksum’s rulers had adopted Christianity as the state religion during the fourth century, the Christian kingdom granted Muhammad’s followers asylum and received them with hospitality. These early refugees eventually returned to Arabia once they could do so without fear of persecution. During the following centuries, other Muslim immigrants began to arrive. These new immigrants entered Ethiopia as individuals or families rather than as large, organized collectives. Prominent among them were traders and scholars (ulama), immigrants who laid the foundations for mercantile and religious expansion, particularly in areas along the Red Sea coast but also spreading into the interior. Commercial settlements as well as Islamic teaching and practice served as points of religious dissemination and provided an impetus for Islamic conversion within local communities. This early phase of Islamic history in Ethiopia stretched from around the seventh to the eleventh century and was generally characterized by amicable Christian-Muslim relations. During the early twelfth century, Aksum’s position of political and commercial dominance deteriorated rapidly and was soon usurped by the Zagwe dynasty, another Christian power that reigned until 1270. As the strength of Aksum rapidly

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declined and ultimately collapsed, that of Muslim communities expanded and deepened, albeit in a decentralized fashion. The years leading up to the fifteenth century witnessed the consolidation of a number of Muslim ministates as well as the introduction of Islam into other, preexisting states or principalities. It was during this period that commercial, political, and territorial competition began to blemish Christian-Muslim relations, ushering in an era of conflict and confrontation that stretched through the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. These conflicts were a harbinger of things to come; the early sixteenth century was characterized by a series of violent, costly Christian-Muslim wars. Perhaps the most famous of these wars was that waged by Ahmad ibn Ibrihim al-Ghazi, nicknamed Ahmad “Gran” (the “left-handed”), against Emperor Lebna Dengel and his successor, Galawedos. Lebna Dengel carried the mantle of the Solomonic dynasty, a Christian state that had risen to power upon the Zagwe dynasty’s decline. Intermittent tension and conflict characterized his empire’s relations with the Muslim ministates, and when Ahmad, as ruler of the Muslim state of Adal, refused to pay tribute to the Solomonic empire, Lebna Dengel launched an invasion. Ahmad’s forces repelled the imperial troops, and he declared a jihad against the Christian state. By 1535, much of eastern and southern Ethiopia was under his control, and Lebna Dengel appealed to Portugal in an effort to save his imperiled empire. Portuguese help arrived in 1541, after the death of Lebna Dengel had brought Galawedos to the throne. Although Ahmad won a major battle against the Portuguese troops and captured and killed the Portuguese commander, his fortunes quickly turned. In 1543, the reorganized imperial forces of Galawedos defeated and killed Ahmad. The Solomonic state thus survived, but the Christian-Muslim wars had claimed thousands of lives. Its religious dimension notwithstanding, this period of confrontation and tension can be traced to other, nonreligious factors as well. Existing commercial, political, and territorial competition between Christians and Muslims was exacerbated by the mass migration of Oromos, a Cushitic people from the south, into Ethiopia’s highlands. Taking advantage of the Solomonic dynasty’s weakened state during and in the wake of the Christian-Muslim wars, the Oromos overtook more and more territory. In the process, many Oromos adopted or borrowed from the lifestyles, customs, and beliefs of the areas where they settled. With regard to religion, some continued to adhere to their traditional indigenous beliefs, others became Orthodox Christians, and still others became Muslims. Despite this new source of converts, the expansion of the Oromos also inhibited large-scale Muslim conversions. An Islamic state of the sort sought by Ahmad during the sixteenth century did not materialize, but the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were a time of Islamic expansion on local and regional levels. With the Christian monarchy beset by internal problems, Muslim dynasties commanded political power in certain regions. This period of expansion was followed by another—that of the nineteenth-century reformist movements and mystical Sufi orders. During the latter half of the century, however, Islam suffered yet another reversal in political fortunes; the Christian monarchy regained its strength and sought to consolidate its own power by curbing that of Ethiopian Muslims.

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CULTURE, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS Ethiopian Muslims are Sunni, belonging to the largest branch of Islam; no Shiite groups are among their ranks. This point of commonality notwithstanding, Islam in Ethiopia has historically been decentralized rather than characterized by the presence of “a national Islamic community transcending ethnic and regional loyalties and interests.”3 In the centuries since Islam’s arrival and early expansion, Ethiopian Muslims have incorporated indigenous, pre-Islamic beliefs and practices into their understanding and practice of Sunni Islam. The result has been regional variation reflecting localized adaptation of tribal, Semitic, and Cushitic cultures.4 This is not to say, however, that religion is simply subsumed by local custom. For Muslims in Ethiopia, as for Orthodox Christians, religious belief and affiliation play a prominent role in daily life and culture. Moreover, the Quran, the sharia, and rites such as prayer and fasting provide a shared foundation that transcends localized divisions. Of the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence, three are represented in Ethiopia. The Shafii madhhab was the first to be introduced into the country and boasts the largest number of adherents. Its followers are concentrated around Ifat, Harar, Bale, Arsi, and Wallo as well as in the southwestern Afar and Oromo regions. The Hanafi madhhab is the next-largest school of jurisprudence; its followers are found in Bagemder, Gojjam, Harar, Jimma, and Wallo as well as among the Saho. Adherents to the third and smallest school, the Maliki madhhab, live in northwestern Eritrea and along the Ethiopian-Sudanese border. Whereas the Shafii and Hanafi schools were introduced into Ethiopia by travelers from the Hijaz and Yemen, the Maliki school arrived through the Sudan.5 In addition to three schools of jurisprudence, a number of Sufi orders are found within the community, and many Muslims are associated with these orders informally even if they are not formal members. The Qadiri order, the oldest and most widespread in Ethiopia, was introduced in the city of Harar during the sixteenth century. Other orders arrived during or after the eighteenth century and include the Ahmadiyya, Mirghaniyya, Sammaniyya, and Tijani. Less prominent orders such as the Haddadiyya, Rifaiyya, and Shadhiliyya are also represented. The orders of today are built upon a legacy of scholarship and popular religion. As in other regions, Sufism in Ethiopia has led to the establishment of centers of learning as well as the adoption of mystical rites such as dhikr recitation, saint worship, and pilgrimage to revered shrines. Although the spiritual leader, or shaykh, of each order resides outside of Ethiopia, regional leaders assume local authority and, usually, the title of shaykh. These leaders are widely believed to have the power to intercede with God on behalf of their followers. A counterbalance to the legalistic influence of the schools of jurisprudence, Sufism thus lends a personal dimension to traditional Islam and provides an organic link to popular belief and culture. Its decentralization and variation notwithstanding, Ethiopia’s Muslim community has historically been characterized by peaceful “coexistence of diverse Islamic legal and mystical traditions.”6 Moreover, Islam in Ethiopia has been a source of “inter-regional cultural linkages and scholarly (and commercial) networks [that] have transcended ethnic and political allegiances.”7 Islamic belief then, in

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its various manifestations, has long been an integral component of indigenous identity and culture. Since the 1991 overthrow of the repressive socialist regime of Mengistu Haile Miriam (an Ethiopian Orthodox Christian), political power has been concentrated within the Central Committee of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Officially, the TPLF is only one of a number of ethnically based parties comprising the ruling coalition, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). In reality, however, the TPLF dominates the political scene from within and outside of formal government structures.8 TPLF leader Meles Zenawi assumed stewardship of Ethiopia’s four-year interim legislature in 1991 and went on to become prime minister of the newly proclaimed Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in 1995; he was elected to a second term as prime minister in May 2000. Although Zenawi’s cabinet includes representatives of various ethnic groups and the executive branch is theoretically checked by a bicameral legislature, a minority Tigrayan government is at the helm. The Tigray, who made up approximately 14 percent of the population in 1970, are overwhelmingly Ethiopian Orthodox Christians. Religious identity is thus a central component of state identity— albeit unofficially. Based on this ethno-religious configuration of the ruling elite, Muslims remain at the margins of political power. Although one segment of the Orthodox Christian community dominates executive authority, the Ethiopian constitution guarantees freedom of religion, mandates the separation of state and religion, and prohibits a state religion. The government upholds these provisions in practice; they provide a legal and policy framework for its relations with religious bodies. In accordance with this framework, religious institutions must register with the Ministry of Justice and renew their registration annually. The state, in turn, provides them with free land for places of worship, cemeteries, hospitals, and schools, although it retains the right to reclaim property not used for places of worship or cemeteries. Under this system, Ethiopia’s Supreme Islamic Council is subject to the same procedures and regulations as all other religious bodies. According to the U.S. Department of State, the council “has complained that it has more difficulty obtaining land from the government bureaucracy than the EOC [Ethiopian Orthodox Church].”9 On the other hand, Evangelical Christian groups have asserted that, in matters of land allocation, both the Orthodox Church and the Supreme Islamic Council hold an advantage over other religious bodies. In upholding its interpretation of separation of religion and state, Zenawi’s government prohibits the teaching of religion in schools, including those that are private and run by Christian or Muslim religious groups. Formal, institutionalized instruction in the Quran is thus confined to the mosque, although public-school students may form extracurricular religious clubs. Muslim leaders have complained that certain public-school teachers and administrators prohibit or discourage female Muslim students from wearing religious head coverings, and in at least one instance, in the Amhara region during 1999, students staged a boycott over the issue. With regard to holidays and religious observance, by contrast, the government takes a more inclusive approach; it officially recognizes Christian

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and Muslim holidays and decreed a two-hour Friday lunch period so that Muslims could attend Friday prayers. Further, Muslim students of Addis Ababa Commercial College successfully petitioned the government to schedule afternoon classes so as to allow them enough time to pray at a local mosque. In terms of the judicial system, sharia courts operate alongside civil courts and have jurisdiction over Islamic family law. Overall, the dynamics of state-religious relations appear subject to ongoing negotiation and flux; given the short history of the present-day republic and ruling government, this is hardly surprising. WOMEN AND THE FAMILY If Muslim males are marginalized in the political arena, then Muslim women are doubly so. On an official level, the Ethiopian constitution guarantees women’s rights, and the government ratified the international Convention to Eliminate Discrimination against Women. In practice, however, women are generally excluded from formal positions of power. This holds true not only within state institutions and systems, but also within the narrower Muslim community. The Supreme Islamic Council registered with the Ministry of Justice has no female members, and women do not serve as judges in Ethiopia’s sharia courts. The sharia courts themselves, while gaining in prominence alongside state secular courts, have not, on the whole, taken up women’s rights issues. Moreover, many women lack knowledge of their rights and the means of redressing rights violations. Groups seeking to remedy this situation are not guaranteed free reign; in 2001, the Ministry of Justice temporarily suspended the charter and froze the bank accounts of the Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association after the organization launched a campaign to strengthen rape laws and their enforcement.10 This particular case was perhaps exceptional since the campaign censured the Justice Ministry for failing to prosecute a prominent figure accused of sexual assault. Nonetheless, it undoubtedly served as a warning to other groups seeking progress in women’s rights and status. In this area, Ethiopia’s Muslim community does not appear to be an exception to the wider population. Female genital mutilation (FGM) is a common indigenous practice in parts of Africa among Muslim, Christian, Jewish, and animist communities, and Ethiopia is no exception. In its least intrusive form, a midwife or doctor nicks or excises the skin covering a girl’s clitoris. In infibulation—the most severe practice— a girl’s external genitalia are cut away and her vagina is sewn up. Accurate numbers and demographics are exceedingly difficult to obtain, in large part because some 13 African countries have made the practice illegal and surveys are difficult to come by. The timing and type of FGM practiced vary according to factors such as rural/urban localities, ethnic group, religious community, and country. Amnesty International estimates that between 25 percent and 60 percent of Nigerian women undergo FGM, while some 90 percent of Ethiopian women have been subject to clitoridectomies and excisions; Ethiopian women who live along the Sudanese and Somalian borders frequently are subject to infibulation.11 FGM is practiced among most of Ethiopia’s seventy ethnic groups, including among Muslim, Christian, and Jewish minority communities.

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Amnesty International, the International Conference on Population and Development, and the World Health Organization all have made the elimination of FGM a top priority among world health issues. The obvious complications—such as infection and bleeding, transmission of AIDS and other blood-borne diseases through use of unsterile knives, and urinary retention—render FGM a serious health issue for entire communities and not just women. The sexual experiences of women who have undergone some forms of FGM range from numbing to painful. The more radical practices can cause potentially lethal complications during childbirth. Cultural and religious justifications of FGM vary; many Muslims claim the practice is religiously mandated. In actuality, FGM is indigenous to Africa and some parts of Asia, predating Islam by thousands of years. In the 10 years since the International Conference on Population and Development, much attention has been devoted to educating women on the health hazards of FGM; it is difficult to determine whether education has impacted the frequency of practice. One result is that many women now resort to physicians instead of midwives, alleviating some of the more common complications. Eradicating FGM is a very slow process. Many societies believe that a noncircumcised woman will become insolent, arrogant, and sexually insatiable—and so unmarriageable—unless her clitoris is controlled. Or, as one woman in Ejere, a village in southern Ethiopia, explained, “I had my daughter circumcised so she wouldn’t break the dishes.”12 SPECIAL ISSUES IN THE NEWS As early as the mid-1990s, Prime Minister Zenawi warned that Islamist extremism posed a dangerous threat to Ethiopia’s national security. Indeed, an ethnic Somali Islamist group, al-Itihaad al-Islamiyya (Islamic Unity), claimed responsibility for two bombings in 1996: the first in a government-owned hotel in the capital city of Addis Ababa and the second in another hotel in the city of Dire Dawa.13 At the time, these bombings and Zenawi’s warnings garnered negligible U.S. interest. In the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, however, Ethiopia was suddenly yanked from the margins of global geopolitics. The Bush administration, in launching its so-called war on terror, vowed to seek out and destroy al-Qaida members and affiliates wherever they lurked; convinced that a dangerous contingent was well entrenched in Somalia, it accorded neighboring Ethiopia a prominent role in its new geostrategic framework. Ethiopia’s leaders eagerly accepted this role, joining various other states (for example, Israel, the Philippines, Russia, and Uzbekistan) in depicting its own fight against domestic and regional terrorists as part and parcel of the wider U.S.-led campaign. During the months that followed, there were reports of U.S. teams working with Ethiopian officers to conduct investigative missions inside Somalia, and U.S. officials indicated that the country was a possible target for future military action. Analysts have suggested that the United States may use Ethiopian troops as proxies should such action take place. In Ethiopia, as elsewhere in the world, these new geopolitical realities and heightened preoccupation with Islamists have significant implications for the country’s

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Muslim population as well as for particular ethnic and political groups. Informed analysis of these implications is only possible, however, by looking beyond (or perhaps beneath) the new global environment and considering local and regional contexts. The Ethiopian state’s relations with ethnic minority populations within its borders and with the governments and populations of neighboring countries are key to understanding its international policies and posturing in the post-9/11 milieu. Further, they offer insight as to how the U.S. war on terror will play out in the domestic arena and how it will impact Ethiopian Muslims’ relationship with the state and with other religious communities. Soon after September 11, Abd al-Rahman Husayn Musa, chairman of Ethiopia’s Supreme Islamic Council, condemned the attacks on the United States and described them as being in violation of the tenets of Islam.14 Further, the general Muslim population in Ethiopia is considered a rather decentralized and unthreatening entity, and domestic Islamic opposition groups have been uncommon in recent decades. In warning of an Islamist threat—both in the mid-1990s and today—the state defines this threat along ethnic and national (rather than strictly religious) lines. It points in particular to al-Itihaad al-Islamiyya, the group behind the 1996 bombings. Established in the 1990s by Somalis who fought against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, al-Itihaad is based in southern Somalia and has been active in Ethiopia’s ethnic Somali Ogaden region. The Ethiopian government’s efforts to contain the group are not new; in 1997, its forces entered Somalia to destroy several al-Itihaad bases. Somalia, which shares a 1,000-mile border with Ethiopia and occupied Ogaden in 1977 and 1978, has historically posed a threat to Ethiopia’s territorial integrity.15 Ethiopia thus has a vested interest in perpetuating the status quo inside its neighbor’s borders, where microstates are rife with clan-based factionalism and warlords vie for power and territory. The Ogaden National Liberation Front, an Ethiopian group with ties to al-Itihaad, has long been a source of armed opposition to the Ethiopian state.16 Ethiopia’s efforts to crush these rebels, along with their allies in Somalia, predated 9/11—what has changed is how these efforts have been recast as part of the global war against Islamist terrorists. Urgent warnings by Ethiopian officials aside, the Somalia-based al-Itihaad has a primarily domestic agenda.17 In general, alliances within Somalia are shifting and based on local politics (rather than on global networks such as that purportedly coordinated by al-Qaida). Moreover, even within the local arena, al-Itihaad has shifted toward a less confrontational stance in recent years, opting to promote Islamic education and expand its presence and power within political and business systems. The Ethiopian state’s portrayal of al-Itihaad as a terrorist organization with a global agenda and links to Osama bin Laden thus warrants close scrutiny; at the very least, it must be viewed with an eye toward local and regional contexts. In addition to threats from ethnic Somali groups based in the Ogaden region and neighboring Somalia, Zenawi’s government must contend with other sources of internal and external opposition. Internally, its relationship with the Oromos, Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group, is characterized by ongoing tension and intermittent conflict. Oromos, in spite of their numbers, remain on the political margins. One

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opposition group, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), has engaged in a decade-long struggle to win autonomy for Oromiya, a state inhabited primarily by Oromos. In response, federal and local authorities have taken a harsh (and occasionally lethal) line against all forms of Oromo protest; by way of example, in 2002 local police opened fire on high-school students staging peaceful protests against land and education policies, resulting in the deaths of at least two protestors. Even beyond this dramatic show of force, Oromos are subject to repressive measures more generally and are thus a potential source of domestic unrest. What are the implications of state-Oromo relations for Ethiopia’s Muslim community? Although religion among Oromos varies, Muslim Oromos are a significant proportion of the overall Muslim population, and Islam is the main religion in parts of Oromiya. Given that the ruling elites are Orthodox Christian, the antagonistic state-Oromo relationship—like the state-Somali relationship—threatens to take on a sectarian dimension. This is particularly true in a post-9/11 setting, where Islamist terrorist has become a catchphrase for describing enemies of the state in an effort to win international backing for domestic and regional struggles. Although the main branch of the OLF is made up of Christians as well as Muslims and does not have ties to al-Itihaad, one smaller Oromo group, the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromiya (IFLO), does.18 Likewise, a coalition of other groups, the Oromo, Somali, and Afar Liberation Alliance (OSALA), has pledged to overthrow Judeo-Christian dominance in Ethiopia and Eritrea (although it has not assumed an active, visible role since its formation in 1997).19 While the IFLO and OSALA have been of negligible importance in the Oromo liberation movement, the very existence of such organizations makes it easier for state and nonstate actors to frame domestic conflicts in religious terms. The Ethiopian state faces yet another source of opposition from the north, along its border with Eritrea. Eritrea won independence from Ethiopia in 1993 but occupied an area of territory claimed by Ethiopia in 1998, setting off two years of armed conflict that culminated in a final, crushing Ethiopian offensive in 2000.20 The sides signed a UN-backed peace agreement in 2000, providing for the establishment of an international commission to demarcate the border between them. Since April 2002, when the commission presented its decision, the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) has been working to ensure its implementation and to encourage bilateral measures such as territory transfer and prisoners-of-war exchange.21 Although both nations have moved to comply with UNMEE directives, relations between them remain strained. Ethiopia’s relations with Eritrea, like its relations with Somalia, are bound up with internal domestic dynamics as well as with wider regional and international issues. Internally, Zenawi’s government has pursued policies with an eye toward domestic politics; by portraying Eritrea as an external threat, it has sought to bolster its own popular support and divert attention from Ethiopia’s high poverty levels and civil and political inequities. Indeed, when Zenawi decided to change track and sign the 2000 peace agreement, he encountered opposition from within the ruling TPLF coalition and even within his own Tigray-dominated Central Committee.22 Regionally, the conflict has forced Ethiopia to devote attention and resources to its

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border with Eritrea; this, in turn, has left less time and fewer resources to deal with Somalia. In what is perhaps a deliberate effort to conflate the two conflicts and win international assistance on both fronts, Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of collaborating with al-Itihaad and other Somalia-based forces deemed hostile to the Ethiopian state.23 At the very least, international assistance and cooperation combating alleged Islamist terrorists in Somalia would shore up the Ethiopian state on one of its fronts and allow it to devote more resources to its border with Eritrea. Exactly how these regional relations and calculations will impact interethnic and interreligious dynamics in Ethiopia is far from clear. It is unclear how the post-9/11 emphasis on Islamist threats to national security and territorial integrity (whether directly, as in the case of the Somalia’s al-Itihaad, or indirectly, as in Eritrea’s alleged links to al-Itihaad) will impact Ethiopia’s Muslim community. NOTABLE PEOPLE Hussein, Abdulmejid (1945–2004). Prominent politician and Ethiopia’s ambassador to the United Nations until his death in early 2004. Hussein served in a number of high-ranking international positions, such as UN ambassador, deputy director of UNICEF in Geneva, and senior personnel officer at United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Switzerland and Sudan. At home in Ethiopia, Hussein served as a member of Parliament, cabinet minister, and party chairman. Freedom of speech and expression were the roots of a well-functioning democracy, according to Hussein, and his extensive public writings and speeches encouraged the entire Ethiopian community—and not merely its Muslims—to promote a society of tolerance and pluralism. Ibn Rabah, Bilal (dates unknown). Tradition states that Bilal ibn Rabah, a slave and the first muezzin (one who calls Muslims to prayer) in Islam, was an Ethiopian. The seventh person to accept Islam, Bilal was a slave in the home of one of Muhammad’s enemies. Abu Bakr, one of the companions of Muhammad, purchased Bilal from his master and granted him manumission. Muhammad chose Bilal to call the faithful to prayer; he died in Aleppo, Syria at the age of 64. Ibrahim, Mohammed Ali (b. 1951). Academic, political leader, and diplomat, Ibrahim was born in Asbe Teferi, 156 miles east of Addis Ababa. Ibrahim graduated from the American Field Service program in 1973 and in 1979 from Addis Ababa University (AAU) with a bachelor’s degree in government affairs. A master’s degree in international affairs soon followed (1986). He became a senior lecturer at AAU’s Department of Political Science and International Relations until 1991, when his career in government service began. Ali served as the director general for North Africa and the Middle East in the Ministry of Foreign Service and then entered the diplomatic corps, first as ambassador to South Africa (1994–96) and then as ambassador to Saudi Arabia, where he is the current representative of the Ethiopian government.

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Mirah, Hanfareh Ali (b. 1951). One of the sons of Sultan Ali Mirah, the spiritual chief of the Afars and founder of the Afar Liberation Front. Mirah fought in the guerrilla war against Mengistu Haile Miriam and later joined forces with the EPRDF coalition, dominated by the TPLF, which came to power in 1991. When the new Afar region was set up in 1992, Mirah served as an administrator and later president of the Afar Regional State (1995–96). He has been the leader of a faction of the Afar Liberation Front since 1996. NOTES 1. Hussein Ahmed, Islam in Nineteenth-Century Wallo, Ethiopia: Revival, Reform, and Reaction (Boston: Brill, 2001), 188. 2. U.S. Department of State, Annual Religious Freedom Report: Ethiopia, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, September 15, 2004, http://www. state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2004/35355.htm. 3. Ahmed, Islam, 64. 4. David Shinn, remarks at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Africa, Islam, and Terrorism,” November 27, 2001. 5. Ibid. 6. Ahmed, Islam, 192. 7. Ibid., 193. 8. “Ethiopia: Post-victory Turmoil,” Economist, May 14, 2001. 9. U.S. Department of State, Annual Religious Freedom Report. 10. Human Rights Watch, Country Report: Ethiopia, http://hrw.org/doc/?t=africa&c= ethiop. 11. Amnesty International, “Female Genital Mutilation in Africa: Information by Country,” October 16, 2004, http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/femgen/fgm9.htm. 12. “The Unkindest Cut for a Woman,” Economist, September 2, 2004. 13. David Shinn, “Coping with Islamic Fundamentalism before and after September 11,” Addis Tribune, March 15, 2002. 14. IRIN News Organization (United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks), “Muslims and Christians Condemn Terror Attacks on US,” September 26, 2001, http://www. irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=11742. 15. Shinn, “Coping with Islamic Fundamentalism.” 16. Amnesty International, Annual Report: Ethiopia, http://web.amnesty.org/report2004/ eth-summary-eng/. 17. Ken Menkhaus, remarks at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Africa, Islam, and Terrorism,” November 27, 2001. 18. Shinn, “Coping with Islamic Fundamentalism.” 19. Ibid. 20. “Ethiopia, Eritrea at Odds over Border Ruling: Both Sides Claim International Commission’s Support for Their Land Claims,” Washington Post, April 14, 2002. 21. “Security Council Adjusts UN’s Ethiopia-Eritrea Mission to Carry Out Boundary Work,” UN News Service, August 14, 2002, http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr. asp?NewsID=4463. 22. “Ethiopia: Post-victory Turmoil.” 23. Shinn, “Coping with Islamic Fundamentalism.”

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RESOURCE GUIDE Suggested Reading Abir, Mordecai. Ethiopia, the Era of Princes: The Challenge of Islam and the Reunification of the Christian Empire, 1769–1855. New York: Longmans, 1968. Ahmed, Hussein. Islam in Nineteenth-Century Wallo, Ethiopia: Revival, Reform, and Reaction. Boston: Brill, 2001. Kapteijns, Lidwien. “Islam in Ethiopia and the Horn.” In The History of Islam in Africa, ed. Nehemia Levtzion and Randall L. Pouwels. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000. Le Monde diplomatique. “Ethiopia-Eritrea: Background to the Conflict.” Trans. Lorna Dale. July 1998, online English edition, http://mondediplo.com/1998/07/07. Levine, Donald. Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution of a Multiethnic Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. Leymarie, Philippe. “Washington Sets Out to Conquer ‘Virgin Territory.’” Trans. Lorna Dale. Le Monde diplomatique, March 1998, online English edition, http:mondediplo. com/1998/03/12. Marcus, Harold G. A History of Ethiopia. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994. Peninou, Jean-Louis. “Horn of Africa: Al-Qaida Regroups?” Trans. Lorna Dale. Le Monde diplomatique, December 2001, online English edition, http://mondediplo. com/2001/12/06. Trimingham, J. Spencer. Islam in Ethiopia. New ed. London: Frank Cass, 1965. Verdier, Isabelle. Ethiopia: The Top 100 People. Paris: Indigo Publications, 1997.

Films and Videos The Father, Surrender and the Barber’s Wisdom. California Newsreel, 2000. Three films depicting fathers and their children in contemporary Africa as metaphors for Ethiopian governments and their relationships with the people in the last century.

Web Sites Addis Ababa Tribune: http://www.addistribune.com/ Amnesty International: Ethiopia (2004): http://web.amnesty.org/report2004/eth-summary-eng/ BBC News Country Profile: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/country_profiles/ 1072164.stm Embassy of Ethiopia in the United States: http://www.ethiopianembassy.org/newsarchive. shtml Ethiopian News Agency: http://www.telecom.net.et/~ena/index.html Library of Congress Country Study: http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/ettoc.html Political Reference Almanac: Ethiopia: http://www.polisci.com/almanac/nations/nation/ ET.htm UN Integrated Regional Information Network: http://www.irinnews.org/ USAID in Africa—Country Profiles: Ethiopia: http://www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/country_ info/ethiopia.html World Bank Country Information: http://www.worldbank.com/html/extdr/regions.htm

6 India Phyllis K. Herman

OVERVIEW The Republic of India is home to the third-largest Muslim population in the world. Although only sections of the 2001 Indian census have been released, the Muslim community is estimated at over 130 million people, or about 12–13% of the population. Most of these Muslims are Sunni, and 1 out of 13 is Shiite. More than half of the Indo-Muslims live in the states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and West Bengal. Muslims in India represent diverse economic and political sectors of the population; however, as a whole, they are have not fared well since the partition of India in 1947. Anti-Muslim sentiment in India has grown during the last century and is sporadically manifested in communal violence between Hindus and Muslims. It is difficult to obtain accurate statistics on the general Muslim population and its socioeconomic status in India: census figures released to date do not reflect economic statistics by religious community. In some rural and urban areas of India, the Muslim population of India parallels the economic success or failure of Hindus, but in states like Gujarat, where communal conflict continues to be rampant, the Muslim population has suffered severe setbacks economically and politically. Islam entered the subcontinent in 711, when Arab forces invaded the Sind (now in modern-day Pakistan). In 997, Muslim raiders began to conquer a larger area of the subcontinent; Mahmud of Ghazni (Afghanistan) invaded 17 times. Mahmud’s descendants extended the Muslim hold on Indian territory into the Punjab, and the city of Lahore (also in modern-day Pakistan) became the capital of the Ghaznavid Empire. From the mid-eleventh century to the beginning of the thirteenth century,

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Lahore attracted cultural leaders from many other areas of Muslim rule, such as Egypt and Persia. Another major Islamic invasion pressed further into India during the late twelfth century, and territory held and controlled by Muslims extended to Delhi and Bengal. Delhi became the capital of Muslim political control in the subcontinent; during the sultanate, Muslim power would stretch into parts of central and southern India. The sultanate was the first major attempt to build an Indo-Muslim state and society on the subcontinent, and the Delhi sultans ruled over both Muslims and non-Muslims. Non-Muslims were generally left to their own religious laws and traditions. By the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the power of the Delhi sultanate had begun to dissipate, but Muslim rule in India revived under the leadership of Muhammad Zahiruddin Babur (1483–1530), who founded the greatest Muslim dynasty in Indian history, the Mughals. His grandson, Jalaluddin Muhammad Akbar (1542–1605) inaugurated a glorious and relatively peaceful period of Indo-Muslim history. Akbar solidified Mughal rule and expanded the territory under its control, incorporating the diverse Indian ruling elite into the administrative system. Akbar was an avid patron of both the Muslim and Hindu arts. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, internecine and interreligious wars, invasions, and the gradual loss of administrative competence finally undermined the power of the Mughal emperors. The rulers’ weaknesses were further exploited by a new and powerful presence in India: the British, in the form of the East India Trading Company. Through force, economics, and political machinations, the

Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan (1592–1666) commissioned the Taj Mahal in Agra, India, to house the remains of his favorite wife Mumtaz Mahal. Kathryn M. Coughlin (2005).

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company managed to gain control first over Mughal administrators and, by the end of the eighteenth century, over much of northwest India itself. The British arrived in droves to educate, Westernize, proselytize, and profit on the goods and cheap labor India provided. The Muslims in India became a minority in power, as they had always been in numbers. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Muslim intellectuals sought to remedy the loss of Islamic political support by serving as leaders in the educational, social, and religious life of the Indo-Muslim community. One of the most influential was the reformer Shah Wali Allah (1703–63) of Delhi. Studying and teaching first in India, he performed the pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj) and continued his education in Arabia. He opposed the idea that Islam should compromise its essential purity by associating with or assimilating practices of other religions. Another reformer, Sayyid Ahmad Barelvi (1786–1831) continued to press for purification of non-Muslim ideas from Indian Islam and practices. The philosophy of both these scholars paralleled that of their Arabian contemporary Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–92), who advocated a strict return to the literal teachings of the Quran and the sunna. In 1857, gathering resentment toward British policies inspired numerous rebellions; most insurgents were Muslim. In response, British troops quelled “the Mutiny” and took their revenge, mostly on Indo-Muslims. One major result of the rebellion, however, was that Delhi and any real vestige of Mughal power was reduced to ruins. In 1858, the British parliament passed the Government of India Act, transferring the authority of the East India Company to the Crown. A series of viceroys would govern the subcontinent, and the British Raj, or rule in India, would last until 1947. During the latter half of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, Indo-Islam, though without any real political power, enjoyed a period of reform, revival, and renaissance. These Muslim reformers, unlike those of the eighteenth century, had been exposed to British education. The Modernists emerged, supporting a rational interpretation of the Quran, Islam’s holy text. One leading scholar, Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–98), encouraged cooperation with the British and especially stressed the importance of education. Another movement, the Deobandi, named after a school founded in 1886 in Deoband, India, sought to counter the influence of Modernists like Khan by inculcating a much more orthodox approach to Islam. The Deobandis opposed independent reasoning and interpretation (ijtihad ) and advocated an adherence to the old interpretations of the texts (taqlid ). After the Mutiny of 1857, Muslim youths flocked to both the Aligarh College and the Deobandi Islamic religious schools (madrasas), and these schools would become a breeding ground for many reformist and revivalist movements. In 1906, reformers and scholars joined together with Muslim leaders to constitute the first Muslim political party in India. The primary intention of the All India Muslim League was to safeguard the rights of Muslims under the British regime; as the struggle for Indian independence intensified, the League began to seek independence as well. Mohammed Ali Jinnah (1876–1948) was a Britishtrained lawyer who sought communal unity and became the head of the retitled

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Muslim League in 1924. By the late 1920s, Jinnah would reorganize the group to address wider Indo-Muslim concerns. The ultimate goal of Jinnah’s Muslim League was the division of India into two autonomous states—one for Muslims, one for Hindus. On August 15, 1947, India gained independence from Britain and divided itself into Pakistan, for the Indo-Muslims, and India—a secular country dominated by the Hindus. Lahore, the centuries-old stronghold of Muslim culture and activity, became the capital of the newly created country of Pakistan. The partition of India and Pakistan resulted in one of the great holocausts of the twentieth century. More than 10 million people changed lands and more than 1 million died in this reshifting of borders. The brutality of partition included the rape and/or abduction of hundreds of thousands of women, Muslim and Hindu. The issues surrounding these injured and missing women and their children continue to plague Indo-Pakistani relations. Postpartition, the last half of the twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first has been marked by continuing tensions between Pakistan and India, including three wars fought between those nations, as well as communal conflicts between Hindus and Muslims in India. In 2001, after the September 11 attacks on the United States and its “war on terrorism” began, tensions mounted between Pakistan and India. India was dismayed by the American response to Pakistani nuclear scientists’ providing nuclear technology to Iran and North Korea and by Pakistan’s failure to dismantle Kashmiri militants’ training camps along the Indian border. Pakistanis blamed the stalled peace talks on India’s refusal to place Kashmir as a priority issue. A standoff display of nuclear arms and weapons is underway between Pakistan and India but has not yet produced war. The growth of Islam in India came about through conquest, conversion, and immigration. India became an anomaly in the history of Islam: a country ruled by Muslims that did not convert the indigenous population in very large numbers. One of the major factors in the Islamization was the state’s emphasis on translating Muslim texts into local languages. Sufi orders, which had been established in India during the early centuries, also served as grassroots transmitters of Muslim culture. Mosques, religious schools, and religious orders were continually built by Indo-Muslims, sustaining community life in general and contributing to the expansion of the tradition. The interactions between Hinduism and Islam especially mark the particular evolution and development of Indo-Muslim beliefs. In the early centuries, the caste system, so much a part of Hinduism, influenced Islam in a number of ways. Some Hindus at lower caste levels converted voluntarily to Islam, hoping for a more egalitarian future. Indeed, over the centuries, the “untouchables” caste has accounted for many of the conversions from Hinduism. Indian Islam was influenced by the Hindu caste notion of a higher priestly authority. The religious scholars (ulama) in India came to be regarded as having a higher status, much like the Brahmans (priests) in Hinduism. And as the Brahmans favored Sanskrit, the ancient language of Indian scriptures, so Arabic and Persian became the privileged languages among the Muslim elite. Much of Muslim history in India is linked with the presence and activities of Sufi orders; they were probably far more effective in the subcontinental spread

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of Islam than either the state or the ulama. The teachers and leaders (shaykhs and pirs) of the orders who lived the ascetic and monastic life struck a common and recognizable chord between Islam and Hinduism. Indigenous Indians had long recognized such figures as holy and treated them as such: the Brahman sages and Buddhist and Jain monks were among many ascetics whose lives were revered in traditional Indian society. As well as the Sufi presence and activity in India, there has also been a small but active community of Shiite Muslims. Shiites in India, as elsewhere, commemorate the martyrdom of Imams Hussain and Ali and revere a number of descendants of the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter Fatima. Evidence supports Shiite presence in India from at least as early as the Delhi sultanate. During the Mughal period, several Shiite states were established in the northwest and played an important role in the spread of Shiism in India. In the shadow of the collapse of Mughal rule, Shiite areas flourished, especially in Bengal and Awadh (Ayodhya). However, with the loss of Muslim state power, internecine clashes arose between Sunni and Shiite adherents in both Bengal and Awadh. The eighteenth century witnessed sectarian clashes between the Sunnis and Shiites, especially in northern India. The Indo-Muslim reformer Shah Wali Allah saw that such clashes within the Muslim community could only marginalize Muslims even further, given the loss of state power. In the British and modern periods, the differences between these two sects did not greatly impact the history of Indo-Muslim society. CULTURE, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS The Indian Muslim minority has greatly contributed to the subcontinent’s culture and arts. Beginning in the sultanate, Muslim craftsmen brought varied foreign architectural elements to bear on the Indo-Muslim buildings. While avoiding the Hindu use of icons, Muslim architecture in India slowly began to reflect a combination of the two styles, resulting in magnificent structures. During the same period, Muslims revived the art of painting in India and produced syntheses of Hindu and Muslim styles. Muslims introduced the art of miniature painting, and while their subjects were, for the most part, secular, the Hindus used the medium to express a variety of religious themes. The Muslims in India developed a literary and spoken language of their own, Urdu. Beginning early in Muslim history on the subcontinent, the language developed as a synthesis of Persian and regional Indian languages, and a rich literature of Urdu prose and poetry has been and still is being produced. Urdu became the polite discourse of the courts and, by the end of the Mughal period, was in common usage by Muslims throughout India. To a large extent, Urdu is similar to Hindi, a regional language of Hindu India, although the origin of the script and alphabet is Persian, not based on Sanskrit. Urdu eventually became the national language of Pakistan. Many of the contemporary political issues involving Muslim society in India have roots in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the struggle for an Muslim Indian identity. While Muslims and Hindus have had a somewhat peaceful

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coexistence on the subcontinent, the British presence and the rise of the modern nation-state became divisive forces between the two groups. Issues of communalism were fueled by the renaissance of theology and the political thinkers of the reform movements in both Islam and Hinduism. Hindu portrayal of Muslims as foreign and invaders on par with the British became much more ubiquitous, especially as leaders of Hindu nationalism perceived British favor to the Muslim community. As Hindu activists sought to present India as a united Hindu country, Indo-Muslims objected. One particular issue that arose in the late nineteenth century and continues into the twenty-first characterizes the direction of Hindu-Muslim conflict: cow protection. Hindus do not kill cows; they are considered sacred and are left to die natural deaths. Muslims, while prohibited from eating pork, eat beef and use the cow as a sacrificial animal in their religious celebrations. The Hindu Cow Protection Movement demanded that the British outlaw cow slaughter; the emphasis on a strictly Hindu cause made clear that, for some, independence meant a Hindu nation, with laws in accordance with Hindu tenets. Riots broke out in 1893 and Hindus attacked Muslims. Much of the agitation centered in the town of Ayodhya, a stronghold of Shiite Islam but also an area sacred to Hindus as the god Rama’s birthplace. Cow protection was not the only early flash point between Hindus and IndoMuslims. The Hindu nationalists, spurred by the renaissance and revival of Hindu thought in the late nineteenth century, began to refer to India as Bharata Mata (Mother India). As with the cow, the primary symbol of Hindu nationhood was figured as female, and Muslims became, in fact, identified not only as cow killers but as foreign males, figuratively raping the pure Hindu woman/nation. The twentieth century saw the major influence of the Hindu nationalist movement on political and public perceptions, and many Hindus began to recast Muslims in this age-old light. The 1947 partition of India only sharpened such discourse and increased intercommunal tensions. The Cow Protection Movement had centered in Ayodhya, where another major communal conflict arose, not unrelated. The issue of early Muslim conquerors’ forced conversions of Hindus and desecrations of Hindu temples has been made a priority by neo-Hindu nationalist and fundamentalists. After riots in Ayodhya, the British fenced off the Babri Masjid, or the Mosque of Babur, which Hindus claimed was built on the ruins of the temple marking the spot where Rama, the great warrior incarnation of Vishnu, had been born. Hindu scholars held that the emperor Babur destroyed the original Hindu temple and replaced it with his mosque. By the late 1940s, tensions about this site and the alleged desecration once more gave rise to conflict, and the issue arose again and again until the 1980s. Then Hindu political parties, joined by Hindu holy men and women, began a vocal campaign to remove the mosque and erect a replacement temple to Rama. In December 1992, a rally in Ayodhya ended in a mob demolishing the Babri Masjid. This action ignited violence by and against Muslims in other parts of India and even had international repercussions, with riots breaking out in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Muslim diaspora. The use of the land on which the destroyed mosque stood has not yet been

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resolved, but as late as 2003, the Bharatiya Janata Parishad or Party (BJP) avowed that a Hindu temple honoring Rama’s birthplace will be rebuilt. In 1965, further conflict broke out between Pakistan and India over Kashmir. It lasted three weeks, but tensions reignited over another contested area, West Pakistan (Bengal). In 1971, Pakistan was itself partitioned into East Pakistan and West Pakistan (Bangladesh), decreasing the size of Pakistan by about one-half. Bangladesh became an autonomous country belonging to neither Pakistan nor India. The Bangladesh war, however, heightened the problems surrounding Jammu and Kashmir; renegotiations on the line of control began again. UN forces attempted to get both Pakistan and Indian military forces to withdraw, but without success. The continuing hostilities caused by Partition, Kashmir, and Bangladesh continued into 1974, when India tested its nuclear weapons, graphically manifesting its military might. Pakistan would follow suit in 30 years, demonstrating that both major powers on the subcontinent had nuclear weapons capabilities. In 1999, in Kargil, near the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir, a brief war broke out yet again between the two nations. Even with internal and international tensions between Muslims and Hindus, the day-to-day social, economic, and cultural interactions are not exercises in prolonged hostility. In most major cities and especially in village life in India, Muslims and Hindus have mostly coexisted peaceably and profitably. A case in point has been graphically depicted on the Internet on the Virtual Village Web site (http://www. colleges.org/~village/): there, in rural India, one can see that members of both communities mingle freely with each other. Certainly, the religious identity of the individual and family allows for a sense of unique community; however, it also allows for common forms of activities that cross religious and communal lines. As the Web site demonstrates, while Muslims and Hindus may know little or nothing about the religious traditions of the other, they avoid conflict because their lives have been and continue to be symbiotically intertwined. Tolerance is far more the norm, and discord becomes the exception. WOMEN AND THE FAMILY In general, the family life and norms of Indo-Muslims do not differ markedly from those of the wider Hindu population. This extends not only to living arrangements (i.e., joint family living), but also to familial interaction, power structure, and customs. Kinship interaction is critical in terms of property relations, the distribution of inheritance, and the regulations regarding marriage. The practices of polygamy and divorce are distinctive of Muslim family life in India, and as such, there are some significant differences in the treatment of issues pertaining to Muslim women. This does not mean that there is a qualitative difference in the status of Hindu women; Indian women have less power than do men in most aspects of life. Among Indo-Muslim women, the difference in status and rights also reflects a fundamental interpretation of Islamic law that is to be found elsewhere in the Muslim world.

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Seclusion of women ( purdah) had been a feature of Islam for centuries. When Islam expanded into India, Muslims duly noted that similar practices were also being observed by some upper-class Hindu women in accordance with Hindu legal codes. From the sultanate through the British periods, Indo-Muslim women of higher status adhered to the veil and seclusion. A poorer class of Muslim women would have to work outside the home and could, at certain points in history and geography, less strictly practice seclusion behind veils and screens. As Muslim power declined under British rule, Muslims sought to reconstruct their distinctiveness in a number of ways, and one in particular was their continuance of purdah. Hindu women were abandoning it, and as such, Indo-Muslim women who practiced purdah were figured as “protecting” the identity of Islam. Modern women’s movements in India see purdah from either of two distinctive viewpoints: as a positive and respectful act that can liberate women or, conversely, as a great hindrance that can only further marginalize Indo-Muslim women as well as serving to stifle their voices and economic prospects. In India, the growth of both Islamic and Hindu fundamentalism has produced religio-political conflict with regard to the postindependence vision of India as a secular, nonsectarian nation. As the Babri Masjid tensions grew in the 1980s, an unrelated case of personal law versus the uniform civil code also became grounds for intercommunal tensions. A Muslim divorcée, Shah Bano Begum, brought a claim against her ex-husband for additional financial support and, as is customary with many Muslims, brought her case before a Muslim judge, who ruled that the husband’s financial duty to his ex-wife had already been met, and therefore he was not responsible for further support. Ignoring the Muslim judge’s ruling, Shah Bano brought the matter before the secular Indian courts, seeking protection under Indian law. In 1985 the Supreme Court of India issued a ruling agreeing with the lower courts in Shah Bano’s favor, stating that as an Indian citizen, she was entitled to the same protections as other Indian (non-Muslim) women. According to Indian interpretations of Muslim personal status laws, Shah Bano’s husband had already discharged his monetary duties to his ex-wife. The Indian courts cited a common, nonsectarian civil court code in making its decision for Shah Bano, superseding the Muslim court’s opinion. Muslims vigorously protested that a Hindu judge could not rule on a case of Muslim personal law. The government responded by passing the Muslim Women’s (Protection of Rights of Divorce) Bill in 1986. This law essentially returned the rights of divorced Muslim women to Muslim control, and in turn provoked non-Muslim protests regarding the secular nature of the Indian state. Hindus and others argued that the constitution protected all citizens, regardless of religion, and that there should not be a connection between religion and law. Moreover, the Shah Bano case underscored the argument, mostly by Hindu fundamentalists, that the government was courting a Muslim constituency—a minority, but a politically useful one. Indo-Muslim women do not have equal legal rights with Muslim men when they appear before Muslim courts: they receive a lesser inheritance than their male counterparts, widows are often not adequately provided for, women cannot be legal guardians for their children, in many cases they do not have the right

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to a monogamous marriage, and divorce laws are not structured in their favor, especially with regard to long-term spousal support. It is in this latter arena that the Shah Bano drama played out against the backdrop of the escalating tensions between Hindu and Muslim communities. As the Shah Bano case demonstrates, the status of Muslim women in India is problematic: they are a minority within a minority. As such, the role of Indo-Muslim women is tied to the fate of the IndoMuslim community as a whole. After partition, India was ruled by a constitution that was deliberately secular, and the outcome of the Shah Bano case, first in her favor and then overturned, is endemic of the lack of consistency in the treatment of Indo-Muslim women. The 1980s rise of neo-Hindu and Muslim fundamentalism and the politics of religious identity in modern India have further served to marginalize Indo-Muslim women. While Muslim women’s groups opposed the passage of the 1986 Muslim Women’s Act, fundamentalist Muslim leaders did not see the protests as representative of the real desires or aims of the “true” Muslim woman. Muslim feminists and reformers are still engaged in an ongoing effort to effect changes: some note that the Quran offers support for women’s rights and that the sharia should be recognized as a male interpretation that conflicts with the original intentions of the text. These ideas are not universally agreed on by Muslim feminists, however, as such close adherence to a fundamental Islam may serve to further separate the Indo-Muslim woman in a predominantly Hindu country. The search for a better situation for the Indo-Muslim woman has consistently been conducted in legislative terms and actions, and at present, most Muslim women simply do not have the power to participate adequately in those processes. SPECIAL ISSUES IN THE NEWS The controversy over the disputed site at the mosque of Ayodhya was the nominal cause for the reignition of violence in February 2002. A train carrying activist Hindus from Ayodhya was set on fire in Gujarat, killing the passengers. AntiMuslim raids were organized in the state and at least a thousand Muslims were killed; thousands were driven from their homes and hundreds of thousands have lost their jobs. The conservative Hindu BJP controls the Gujarat state government, and neither the state nor the national government has been forthcoming in releasing accurate statistics about anti-Muslim campaigns in the area. News reports reveal that sporadic violence still erupts and Muslims have not able to resume their normal lives in Gujarat. Until the Ayodhya mosque/temple controversy is resolved, it will continue to be a flash point in Indian Muslim-Hindu relations. Ongoing international struggles with Pakistan over various issues continue to fuel communal tensions between Muslims and Hindus in India. One of the first points of international conflict resulting from partition was the question of the states of Jammu and Kashmir, which lie on the borders of both Pakistan and India in the northwest. In 1947, the Hindu maharaja who ruled Jammu and Kashmir decided that his territory would remain a part of India, rather than joining the new country of Pakistan, despite the Muslim majority living there. The first war

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over Kashmir occurred almost immediately after partition, wherein a small portion of western Kashmir was annexed by Pakistan. The agriculturally productive area, the Shrinigar Valley, still belonged to India. Pakistan took the issue to the newly formed United Nations, which brokered a cease-fire along a line of control between the area taken by Pakistan and the rest of the state. The largest and most vibrant of democracies, India has long sought a stronger alliance with the United States, pointing to Indian secular and democratic traditions. But the U.S. war on terror has introduced a wrinkle to U.S.-Indian relations. Despite a Pakistani military dictatorship, numerous human-rights violations, alleged support of terrorist activities in Kashmir and Afghanistan, and their official recognition of the Taliban as the legitimate government in Afghanistan, Pakistan emerged as the primary ally of the United States in the region post–September 11. In January 2004, Pakistan admitted to selling nuclear technology, which eventually fell into North Korean, Iranian, and Libyan hands. India immediately condemned its regional rival and expected the United States to do the same. But Pakistan’s cooperation is essential in the search for Osama bin Laden and other former Taliban officials, and the United States has been conspicuously quiet. India continues to accuse Pakistan of harboring terrorists who use Pakistani-occupied Kashmir as a staging ground from which to launch attacks into northern India and Indian-occupied Kashmir. NOTABLE PEOPLE Ali, Nafisa (b. 1957). Social activist, actress, and former Miss India. Born to a Muslim father and Christian mother and married to a Sikh, she embodies India’s rich cultural diversity and is a respected figure in political and activist circles. A former Miss India (1976) and national champion swimmer (1972–74), today Ali is best known for her Care Home for the HIV-infected and AIDS community and her ceaseless work as a social activist. Ali traveled to Gujarat in 2002 to assist the victims of communal violence. Her vocal criticism of the Hindu ruling party resulted in the state filing two lawsuits against her for “inciting communal violence.” Beeri, Selvi M. Fathima (b. 1927). Governor of the Indian state Tamil Nadu from 1997 to 2001. In 1983, Beeri was appointed judge in the Kerala High Court and was the first woman justice appointed to the Supreme Court of India (1989–93). Beeri was removed from the post of governor after appointing Ms. J. Jayalalitha Jayaram as chief minister, despite Jayaram’s conviction for corruption. Kabir, Humayun (1906–69). One of the foremost political and intellectual leaders of the Muslim community in India. Educated both in India and at Oxford, Kabir opposed partitioning India into two states. After independence, he served in India’s parliament, represented India at a variety of United Nations conferences, and served in several cabinet posts. Kabir’s extensive writings and lectures centered around three themes: minority rights, cross-cultural communication, and a religious tolerance in Islam. Kalam, Abdul (b. 1931). President of the Republic of India (2002– ). While the office of president is largely ceremonial, it is significant that at least three

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governments have found it necessary and expedient to appoint Muslim presidents. Fakruddin Ali Ahmad (1905–77), the first Muslim president of India, had been a government official before partition and after independence became active in the Congress party; he served as president from 1974 until his death in 1977. Kalam does not have a civil-service background, although he has served as scientific advisor to India’s defense ministers. Kalam has been a well-respected nuclear scientist for many years; he is often referred to as “the Father of India’s nuclear missile program.” His election in 2002 might be seen as a governmental response to the increase of communal violence and conflict: few Indo-Muslims see him as a partisan voice. Premji, Azim Hasham (b. 1945). Chairman of Wipro Technologies, a global technology-services division of India-based Wipro, Ltd. A former engineering student at Stanford University and a self-made man, Premji is also India’s richest resident, with an estimated net worth of $5.9 billion. After his father’s unexpected death in 1966, 21-year-old Azim returned home to run his family’s vegetable-oil company and subsequently expanded the company’s holdings to include diversified products and technology. His wife, Yasmeen Premji, heads the Feroza Hasham Foundation, which provides medical care and support to India’s poor. RESOURCE GUIDE Suggested Reading Ahmad, Aziz. Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999. Butalia, Urvashi. The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000. Gottschalk, Peter. Beyond Hindu and Muslim: Multiple Identity Narratives from Village India. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Hasan, Zoya. Diversity of Muslim Women’s Lives in India. Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2005. ———. Unequal Citizens: A Study of Muslim Women in India. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Lateef, Shahida. “Muslim Women in India: A Minority within a Minority.” In Women in Muslim Societies, ed. Herbert L. Bodman and Nayereh Tohidi. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. Marks, Tom. Muslims in India: Growth and Influence in the Nations of Asia and Central Asia. Broomall, PA: Mason Crest Publisher, 2005. Metcalfe, Barbara D., and Thomas R. Metcalfe. A Concise History of India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Noorani, A. G. Muslims of India: A Documentary Record. New ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Padamsee, Alex. Representations of Indian Muslims in Colonial Discourse. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Van Der Weer, Peter. Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.

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Films and Videos Hindustani. Mumbai: Shemeroo Video, 2002. Follows a twentieth-century family in India and shows how bribery changes their lives not once, but many times. In Tamil and Hindi with English subtitles. India Invented: An Exploration of Culture and Civilization in Historical Outline. New Delhi: Doordarshan/Asia Pacific Communication Associates, 1999. Jang Aur Aman [War and Peace]. New York: First Run/Icarus Films, 2002. 2 videocassettes. Examines the militarization of India after the 1998 nuclear tests on the Indian subcontinent. In Hindi, Urdu, and Japanese with English subtitles.

Web Sites Association for India’s Development: http://www.aidindia.org/ Child Relief and You: http://www.cry.org/index.asp Department of Education: http://www.education.nic.in/ Government of India: http://www.goidirectory.nic.in/ Indian Literature in English: http://www.library.wwu.edu/ref/subjguides/lit/worldliteng/ specind.htm Indian Parliament: http://www.goidirectory.nic.in/legis.htm Indian Press (newspaper links): http://www.indiapress.org/ President of India: http://www.presidentofindia.nic.in/ The Statesman newspaper (Calcutta): http://www.thestatesman.net/ Virtual Village: http://www.colleges.org/~village/ World Health Organization: http://www.whoindia.org/

7 Indonesia Nelly van Doorn-Harder and R. Michael Feener

OVERVIEW The Republic of Indonesia is an archipelago of thousands of inhabited islands whose peoples contribute to a great linguistic, cultural, and religious diversity in the country. Approximately 87 percent of the population is Muslim, 10 percent Christian, and the remainder Hindu, Buddhist, and adherents of various local traditions. Some parts of Indonesia such as Aceh, South Sumatra, South Sulawesi, and East Java are predominantly Muslim, while Christian concentrations are found in the islands of the Moluccas, North Sumatra, North Sulawesi, and parts of Irian Jaya. The island of Bali is predominantly Hindu. The vast majority of Indonesia’s Muslims are Sunnis, most of whom are, to varying degrees, aligned with one of two large organizations: the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) or the modernist/reformist Muhammadiyah. In principle, any form of religious extremism contradicts the much-touted Indonesian ideal of religious pluralism. Since Indonesia’s independence from Dutch colonial rule (1945), this ideal is enshrined in the official state ideologies of Pancasila, which promotes belief in God while at the same time opposing the sanction of any one faith as the official religion of the state. On October 19, 2002, one week after an attack by extremist Muslims had claimed the lives of more than 200 tourists in a nightclub in Bali, hundreds of Muslim, Christian, Hindu, and Buddhist leaders gathered at the place where the bomb had exploded. There they held an interfaith service that included prayers for peace and sacred Hindu purification rituals to guide the souls of the victims and restore the balance between the physical and spiritual realms. For the living, the ceremonies not only provided an occasion to show support for the families of the deceased, they were

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also a deeply symbolic gathering that confirmed their dedication to Indonesia’s ideals of religious and cultural pluralism. Arrival of Islam The archipelago’s geography contributed to Indonesian Islam’s distinctive character, as the ocean both separated and connected the region to the Middle Eastern heartlands of Islam and to the rest of the world, including China and Europe. Muslim traders, among whom were Sufi leaders and scholars of Islam, introduced Islam to the region around the eighth century c.e. It was not until the thirteenth century that Islam spread to a significant degree among the local populations of the archipelago, starting with the kingdom of Pasai in northern Sumatra, situated on the major maritime route connecting Indonesia to India and the Middle East. Over the centuries that followed, local communities of Muslims sprang up in other port towns on Sumatra and the other islands and courts of Southeast Asia. Between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, Islamic kingdoms gradually came to replace the Hindu-Buddhist states that had previously dominated the region, and Islam began to spread rapidly throughout the Malay world as the archipelago became integrated into an Indian Ocean economic system dominated by Muslim merchants. Indian Muslims from Gujarat and Malabar and Arabs from Hadhramawt carried the message of Islam with them along the main trade routes. As a result, a cosmopolitan complex of trade networks and Islamic religious scholarship developed across the far-flung archipelago. The forms of Islam that developed over this period were generally pluralistic and to various degrees tolerant of other religious traditions, as Islamic teachings were incorporated into earlier established cultural practices. In the ongoing history of the archipelago’s Islamization, this early accommodation served as the basis for the development of a broad range of Muslim traditions, including the study of scripture, Islamic law, and the mystical teachings and practices of various forms of Sufism. Inspired by the works of the great Islamic scholars from the Middle East such as al-Ghazali (d. 1111), traditions of Islamic learning developed in Indonesia that combined aspects of jurisprudence ( fiqh), theology (kalam), and mysticism. Over the course of the nineteenth century, the rural boarding schools called pesantren developed into the central institutions for transmitting Islamic knowledge in the Indonesian archipelago. The system was founded on a close relationship between teacher (kiai) and students (santri), each of whom each followed his own curriculum. Today, the student-teacher relationship is still significant and continues even after the death of an influential teacher. Charismatic teachers are often buried at the pesantren, where, on Thursday nights, one can see the students gather at the grave to pray and recite parts of the Quran “to honor their master.” In the modern period, Islam became a rallying point in local movements of resistance to European colonialism. Resistance arose among reform-seeking Muslims and among the kiai who led the traditional pesantren. The first such movements in the Indonesian archipelago began in nineteenth-century Sumatra. In the early twentieth century a new wave of reformism led to the creation and expansion of the modernist Muhammadiyah organization, which was founded at Yogyakarta in 1912.

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This social-religious organization dedicated itself to purifying Islam from indigenous and Sufi practices. It built schools that combined Islamic and secular curricula and provided an education for the majority of Muslims who were banned from the Dutch school systems. The modernists were also noted for training female preachers and teachers to cater to the spiritual and educational needs of Muslim women and children. Since the 1980s, Indonesian Islam has undergone a remarkable period of religious revival inspired in part by the efforts of young Muslim intellectuals such as Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid. By the 1970s, these and likeminded intellectuals explored sometimes radical ideas in a search for new ways in which Islam could be interpreted and implemented with greater relevance to conditions in contemporary Indonesia. At the same time, many Indonesian Muslims also developed new appreciations of the pesantren tradition of Islamic learning. Through “study circles” (Arabic halqah) organized under the direction of progressive teachers (kiai) some young thinkers reevaluated the methodology of Islamic jurisprudence as a coherent discipline of scholarship and textual analysis. Thus Islamic law came to be explored anew, not as an abstract theoretical discipline, but as an integrated approach to questions important to the community in everyday life. Beyond these intellectual aspects of Islamic revival, there has also been a tremendous amount of activity in the fields of the arts and culture more broadly. The fruits of this have been myriad, ranging from the publication and public recitation of Muslim poetry to significant developments in the fields of painting, calligraphy, music, and Quran recitation. Beliefs Indonesian Muslims cannot be sharply divided into distinct groups according to particular theological beliefs; however, one issue that separates some Indonesian Muslims from others is the degree to which one accepts local cultural practices and the extent to which one supports the formal implementation of Islamic law. Reformists or modernists wish to purify Islam of practices continued from preIslamic indigenous culture. They consider a scripturalist conception of Islam to be complete and self-sufficient and support the use of independent reasoning (ijtihad ) in determining rulings of Islamic law. Muslim reformists reject formal adherence to any particular school of Muslim jurisprudence but accept rulings from the four accepted Sunni schools of Islamic law that they consider beneficial. Many religious leaders of this line of thinking are trained in Muhammadiyah schools. Traditionalists—most of whom are loosely connected under the umbrella of the NU—represent Indonesian Islam in some of its earlier formulations. They are generally more tolerant of local cultural practices as long they do not contradict their understandings of Islamic religious teachings. These traditionalists stress the study of jurisprudence following the established methods of the Shafii school of Islamic law because, in their opinion, this respects the traditions of interpretation established by earlier generations of scholars reaching back ultimately to the Prophet Muhammad. The traditionalists only exercise independent reasoning or ijtihad in

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the context of this historic body of teachings, preferring instead to follow the traditional opinions of the scholars who went before them. The schooling of such traditionalist Muslims most often takes place in the pesantren. Today increasing numbers of Indonesians find themselves somewhere between such idealized poles of “traditionalist” and “reformist.” This means that they combine both an appreciation of modern formulations of Islam and local traditions, especially in rituals connected with birth and death. Together with adherents of Muhammadiyah and the NU, they make up the majority of Indonesian Muslims, who espouse moderate versions of Islam tolerant to religious pluralism and allow for greater roles for women in the public sphere. On the far ends of the spectrum of Indonesian Muslim religiosity are the extremist groups on the one hand and the so-called nominal Muslims, who are more comfortable practicing indigenous rituals, on the other. This latter group, however, is slowly moving toward the middle and joining the ranks of Muslims who faithfully practice the Muslim rituals such as the daily prayers and fasting during the holy month of Ramadan. CULTURE, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS Many Southeast Asian cultures traditionally emphasize the importance of social and religious harmony, respect toward those in positions that demand such, and sincerity in one’s actions. Over the history of the Islamization of the Indonesian archipelago, many Muslims came to integrate aspects of their new religion into such established sets of cultural values. This is not to say, however, that Islam in Indonesia is merely a thin veneer over a mass of local or Hindu-Buddhist cultures. When considering elements of culture and Islam in Indonesia, one must recognize that the past and the present, the local and the global, intersect in a number of complex ways. Nowadays, local cultures are rapidly changing under the influence of modernization and globalization. Through increasingly higher levels of education and knowledge of Western and Middle Eastern cultures transmitted via modern media, rituals held sacred for centuries can die out within one generation. Nevertheless, some of the deep-seated elements of older worldviews persist and continue to exercise influence over local understandings of Islamic teachings. Most Indonesians live within well-defined structures of societal hierarchies stratified according to rank and generation: elders are superior to juniors and bosses are superior to their workers. These hierarchies are often acutely asserted during religious rituals and cultural celebrations. Good relations are also preserved through a meal called slametan on Java and kenduri in other parts of Indonesia and Malaysia. The purpose for holding a slametan is to obtain slamet, a feeling of well-being and safety as well as social and spiritual harmony. Slametan are held for a variety of events ranging from pregnancy and birth, circumcision, marriage, life crises, and death to special occasions such as at the beginning of a long trip, the building of a house, or the successful resolution of a dispute. These ritual meals are subject to a wide range of interpretations. Some believe they please the spirits of deceased ancestors or local spirits (jinn) who are sometimes given special dishes or offerings called sajen. Others stress creating harmony among the living and omit rituals

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for the dead, which critics often decry as “un-Islamic.” Prayers said during the slametan are usually offered in a mix of Arabic and local language. When held in orthodox Muslim families, only Quranic verses are used, and the participants refrain from speech or symbolic acts that refer to spirits. In some traditional households, deceased family members are also part of the ongoing efforts to maintain harmony. Many Indonesians consider death a transition. To assist the deceased on their way in the afterlife, special slametan are held at specified times after the death of a relative. Combined with the meal are recitations from the Quran in the forms of praise, prayers, and requests for forgiveness. It is believed that the foods and prayers offered help the deceased seek forgiveness for outstanding offenses and create merit transferable to the dead that will aid the spirit’s passage from the world of the living to the afterlife. Remembering the dead prior to important events is crucial. Often people gather at graves for prayer and cleaning. Especially at the beginning and end of Ramadan, Islam’s holy month, many people visit graves to include those who passed on in the spiritual and physical purification during the month of fasting. Within the established hierarchies of this world some Indonesian Muslims recognize the spiritual authority of kiai, the leaders and religious teachers of pesantren. Academic study in the pesantren concentrates on the study of Arabic and fiqh, or Islamic jurisprudence. One of the most important foundational subjects of study in pesantren, however, is the memorization and recitation of the Quran. Beyond being the introduction to study of the Islamic religious sciences, recitation of the Quran was sometimes considered to be a powerful medium for healing, protection, or fulfilling a wish. Many Indonesians do not understand the words, as they do not speak Arabic, yet the recitation by itself is considered purifying and uplifting. Recent decades have also seen the development and rise in popularity of competitions for Quranic recitation in Indonesia, with winners moving through a series of levels to compete in international events. Several Indonesian Muslim women have made great accomplishments in this field, including Maria Ulfah, the first woman to gain international acclaim as an accomplished reader of the Quran. In addition to the study of the Quran, another important part of the pesantren curriculum was, and in some places still is, the practice of Sufi mysticism (tariqat). In most pesantren, the study of Sufism was closely connected to legal Islamic learning. Likewise, spiritual and physical strength were often linked together as students trained in fasting, meditation, and the martial arts ( pencak silat). The teachers of a pesantren are considered links in a chain of sacred knowledge that reaches back to the Prophet Muhammad. In this the teachers are not only religious, but also social and political leaders. Kiai can pass their charisma and positions on to their sons or spiritual heirs who are deemed fit. The popular practice of visiting graves of saints to perform rituals of prayer, praise, and meditation is shaped by the idea that the deceased’s exemplary piety brings them closer to God and that this qualifies them to become intermediates for the living. Certain graves of Muslim holy persons are believed by some to be potent enough that visiting them a certain number of times has been considered equal to performing the pilgrimage (hajj) to Mecca—an idea stridently criticized by Muslim modernists and reformists.

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In the postindependence period, Indonesian Muslim organizations such as the NU and Muhammadiyah became instrumental in forming Islamic political parties. The Masyumi political party, for example, was intended as an umbrella organization for Muslim political aspirations on the national level. Aside from Muslim activities in the sphere of party politics, the early years of Indonesian independence also witnessed the rise of armed Islamic rebellions in West Java, Sumatra, and Sulawesi demanding formal Islamization of the state. After suppression of these armed movements, many of the Islamists who had been associated with them disappeared from public life. Some later reemerged following the opening up of the public sphere in the post-Suharto era of “Reformation” (1998 to the present). Thus, some of the Islamists who have come to the fore since the end of the New Order had roots going back to the struggles over Islam and the state reaching back to the early history of the country. Over the course of the later twentieth century, the organizational model of what is now called a nongovernmental organization (NGO) became important to the formation of social blocks that resisted the colonial regime and, after independence, worked to establish civil society under the repressive government of President Suharto. These organizations also provided spaces in which to develop alternative ideas and visions of society. Today NGOs still provide platforms for Muslims where differences of opinions concerning the interpretation of Islam and politics can be articulated and discussed. When the Suharto government fell in 1998, Muslim organizations provided some prominent Muslim politicians advocating reform platforms—among whom were Abdurrahman Wahid and Amien Rais. Wahid, onetime national chair of the NU, became Indonesia’s fourth president (1999–2001) after the short-lived leadership of Suharto’s vice president B. J. Habibie. Amien Rais, Muhammadiyah’s national chair, serves as the Speaker of Parliament (2004– ). These developments toward intellectual and cultural Islamicization in Indonesia progressed steadily through the last decades of Suharto’s regime and in the process prepared the way for a renewed emergence of Islam onto the national political stage in the final years of the twentieth century. Leaders from the NU, Muhammadiyah, and other Muslim organizations have over the past years formed new political parties and elected politicians to prominent public positions. Not all Muslims, however, vote for them as candidates from specifically Islamic parties, and thus they have to compete with those of other, nonreligious parties, including the Golkar party, which used to be the official state party under Suharto’s regime, and the Democratic Party, led by the former president Megawati Sukarnoputri. WOMEN AND THE FAMILY As demonstrated through the presidency of Megawati Sukarnoputri, Muslim women in Indonesia have access to positions of religious and public leadership that might appear unusual compared to other areas of the Islamic world. Indonesian Muslim women are teachers in pesantren and professors of Islamic studies and more than half of the judges in the Indonesian sharia courts. Many have memorized the Quran and recite at public events. Through the influence of Muhammadiyah and the NU, women

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have become active religious leaders in communities across the country. Within both organizations, women have developed women-oriented interpretations of Islam that are acceptable to the rest of society, bringing Islamic scholarship more directly into the service of progressive social agendas. In the face of such developments, some of the country’s Islamist groups have attempted to restrict women’s prominence in public positions and impose restrictions on the activities of women outside the home in the name of enforcing their understandings of Islamic law. Such sentiments were vocally expressed at the time that Megawati Sukarnoputri was poised to become Indonesia’s president, as opposition to her candidacy came to be expressed in terms of supposed Islamic prohibitions against a woman serving as the head of the state. That her inauguration could not be stopped shows that such interpretations of Islam are not widely held, and that women’s participation in religious and public life remains an important living cultural tradition. The legal position of Indonesian Muslim women differs greatly from that of Muslim women in other countries, for example, in the Middle East and even its neighbor Malaysia. This reality is not only due to the Indonesian civil law, but also cultural influences and the significant fact that Indonesian Muslim leaders allowed women to become scholars of religion. Thus women can participate in the process of developing interpretations of the Islamic scriptures and laws that are congenial to women. Equal status of women with men is enshrined in the 1945 constitution. In the same spirit, Indonesia ratified international conventions that guaranteed women equal pay for equal work and pledged to eliminate discrimination against women. The marriage law of 1974 set a minimum age (19 for males, 16 for females), required free consent of the partners, allowed women the same rights to initiate divorce as the men, and forbade men to take a second wife without the consent of the first wife and judicial permission. While in many Muslim countries, a husband can obtain a divorce with ease, even pronouncing it unilaterally, in Indonesia it has to be carried out before a court of law. Indonesian culture does not condone practices found in several Middle Eastern and African countries such as honor killings and invasive, even debilitating female genital mutilation (FGM). Gender segregation as practiced in several Middle Eastern countries is rare in Indonesia. Women can travel without their husbands, drive cars, and vote, and many have reached high positions of leadership, as was testified by Megawati Sukarnoputri’s presidency. Not only are there many female professionals, such as judges in civil courts, university professors, medical doctors, and business managers, but women also are allowed to become judges at the Islamic sharia courts, teach at Islamic universities, and hold positions on fatwa boards where important decisions of religious guidance are made. Legally, women’s rights are protected quite fairly; however, feminists have regularly pointed out that the law is rife with ambiguity and patriarchal values. It considers the husband the head of the household, promotes stereotypical roles for men and women, and ultimately sees the woman as subordinate. Analyzing gender equality from the Islamic perspective, women activists have concluded that a woman’s role in Indonesian society is subordinated. According to them, religion

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greatly contributes to this reality, because many religious interpretations are being taught that are harmful to the position and role of women. Women’s activists also argue that the marriage law is not the only text carrying these stereotypes. Laws regulating conditions of female workers and the entire bureaucracy that enforce such laws see women as nonautonomous domestic creatures, weak and in need of protection. This tendency to domesticate and marginalize women has strongly shaped the Indonesian discourse about women and has led to intense actions from Muslim women feminists. Since the fall of the Suharto regime, the discussion about polygyny has reached the status of front-page news, since conservative Muslims call for the “full restoration of men’s Islamic rights.” This means that some men have started to promote the practice, unrestricted by the injunctions of the marriage law. Since 2000, several networks promoting women’s rights have sprung into action opposing these polygyny advocates with unyielding religious arguments—only possible because they had the religious knowledge required to formulate such arguments. SPECIAL ISSUES IN THE NEWS During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Aceh was one of several regions that strongly resisted the expansion of Dutch colonial rule. Even after Indonesian independence, Aceh continued to press for its own autonomy and sovereignty as part of the Darul Islam rebellions in the 1950s. Many of these long-held aspirations received new life after the fall of President Suharto (1998), as the instability of the reform era allowed for the reemergence of militant campaigns for Acehnese independence. Over the past few years, however, these movements have met with strong retaliation from the Indonesian national government’s forces, and the clashes between these two forces have resulted in considerable bloodshed and suffering throughout Aceh. In May 2004, the government lifted martial law in the province, and there is hope that under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, peace talks will continue. At the time of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, Indonesia’s political, religious, social, and economic life were experiencing a period of great instability. Amid the economic and political chaos following the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the end of Suharto’s rule, new power blocks had formed to fill the political vacuum. In this environment some Muslims began reviewing possibilities for exercising power that had not existed in the country for decades. Following the brief interim term of Suharto’s hand-picked successor B. J. Habibie, elections were held in which the prominent moderate Muslim leader Abdurrahman Wahid won the presidency. However, Wahid was ousted from office in August 2001 and replaced by his vice president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, who took office with her own new vice president, the Muslim politician Hamzah Haz. Much of the opposition to Wahid had come from the Islamist groups who also were vying for political power and expressed many of their critiques in an explicitly moralist tone. Small but vocal groups of Islamists have actively promoted the formal implementation of some form of Islamic law as the ultimate solution to

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Indonesia’s moral and social crises. While there remain considerable differences of opinion among Muslims as to what such a government and legal system would look like, the symbolism of sharia (Islamic law) has proved attractive to those wishing to rid their country of what they perceive to be harmful influences from the West, and especially from the United States. At the same time, some Islamist groups have taken more direct and physical forms of action, ranging from book burnings to attacks on churches, bars, and nightclubs. In Indonesia, a number of such radical groups had risen to national attention after General Suharto stepped down. Suharto’s New Order regime had held power for over three decades (1966–98), during which he had kept a tight lid on all forms of dissent, including that of Islamist groups. During the New Order period some of the leaders of these groups were imprisoned or had fled to neighboring Malaysia and other countries. However, during his last years in power Suharto himself began increasingly courting some of these extremist groups to serve his own agenda. When his oppressive regime was finally replaced by a more democratic government, radical Islamist groups used their newly found freedoms to more openly espouse their views. For example, members of the Laskar Jihad appeared in the streets dressed in white robes, soliciting funds for their jihad in the Moluccan islands in the eastern part of the Indonesian archipelago, and by the spring of 2000, thousands of their armed volunteers were on their way to fight against the Christian populations of the Moluccas. More religious and ethnic violence continued over the years that followed. The Bali bombing of October 2002 in particular shocked many Indonesians, as it revealed the existence of a deep-rooted network of Muslim extremists whose agendas included the establishment of an Islamic state in the archipelago. Some of these groups even appear to have varying degrees of connections to international Islamist organizations. A series of high-profile terrorist attacks followed the Bali bombings, including the August 2003 bombing of the Jakarta Marriott and the September 2004 bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta that left eight dead and more than 100 wounded. In October 2005, three suicide bombers thought to be associated with the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) detonated shrapnel-filled bombs in three restaurants on the island of Bali, killing more than 20 and injuring almost 100 people, mostly Indonesians. A little more than two months later, on New Year’s Eve 2005, a bomb killed seven Christian Indonesians and injured 65 at a market in the capital of central Sulawesi province, Palu. While several Muslim militants were questioned and detained, no one was charged. No one group has claimed responsibility for these attacks, and this has led to a great amount of speculation as to who it was that carried them out and what their motives might be. Some have suggested interpretations parallel to those that have been offered for the Madrid bombings of March 2003—that is, as an attempt to force Australia to withdraw from the coalition of forces fighting in Iraq. Others have seen them as the work of Islamic extremists wanting to avenge the prosecution of Abu Bakar Baasyir, the alleged leader of JI, a Southeast Asian regional terrorist group believed to have ties with al-Qaida. Baasyir denies having any link to the JI, but he has been charged in connection with the 2005 Bali bombings and

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with that of the Jakarta Marriott. Many Indonesian observers were disappointed with the relatively light four-year sentence Baasyir received for the crime of subversion; state prosecutors were unable to successfully connect him to the Bali and Jakarta bombings. November 2004 saw the final round of polls for Indonesia’s first-ever direct presidential elections. These most recent elections in the Muslim world’s most populous nation were held without violence, and Indonesia’s continuing transition from authoritarian rule has become a major case study for observers debating the compatibility of Islam and democracy. The high turnout at the polls for these elections, almost 80 percent, was impressive, and on this measure at least, Indonesia’s recent performance has been one that can put those of more established democracies to shame. Five candidates had run in the scheduled elections in July 2004, but with no clear winner a special runoff election was held the following October between Megawati and her former cabinet minister and retired army general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Yudhoyono emerged as the winner, and in his inaugural remarks committed his government to an ambitious agenda of combating the country’s chronic problem of corruption and fighting the spread of terrorism in the archipelago. Time will tell the extent to which these goals can be reached during his tenure, as Indonesia faces new challenges and opportunities in the years to come. NOTABLE PEOPLE Madjid, Nurcholish (b. 1939). One of the foremost Muslim intellectuals in contemporary Indonesia and advocate of religious pluralism and tolerance. As the leader of the Muslim Students’ Organization, Madjid proposed a program of secularization in which the Muslim community abandon political aspirations to a formal Islamic state in favor of cultivating Islam as a more substantive value system. After receiving his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, he established the Paramadina foundation as a forum for the free and open discussion of various issues connected with Islam and its role in Indonesian society. Rais, Amien (b. 1944). Speaker of the Indonesian People’s Consultative Assembly who formally led the Muhammadiyah organization from 1993 to 1999. Rais promotes himself as a Muslim advocate of social justice and even garnered significant support as part of a coalition with Megawati Sukarnoputri. However, his record of anti-Christian and anti-Chinese remarks has caused considerable concern among some of his potential political constituents, including many Muslim voters. Sukarnoputri, Megawati (b. 1947). President of Indonesia from 2001 to 2004. The second child of the first Indonesian president, Sukarno, Sukarnoputri became a leading opposition figure after Mohammad Suharto engineered her removal as chairman of the Indonesian Democratic Party in 1996. After the fall of Suharto, Megawati’s popularity increased, and her new party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, rose rapidly to prominence. The considered

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favorite in the 1999 presidential election, Megawati lost to Abdurrahman Wahid, who was backed by a coalition of Muslim parties. To appease her supporters, Megawati was selected as vice president and succeeded to the presidency after Wahid left office in 2001. Ulfah, Hajjah Maria (b. 1955). Contemporary Quran reciter and the first woman to win an international Quran recitation competition for her performance at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in 1980. An internationally known figure, Ulfah gave her first recitals in the United States in November 1999 and was then honored at the annual conference of the Middle East Studies Association in Washington, DC. She is a scholar of the history of Quranic recitation in the Indonesian archipelago and a lecturer and teacher at the Institute for Quranic Studies in Jakarta. Ulfah is also the director of the Central Institute for the Development of Quranic Recitation, where some 500 women between the ages of 18 and 20 study the art of reading the Quran. Wahid, Abdurrahman (b. 1940). Also known as Gus Dur. Served as Indonesia’s fourth president (1999–2001). Educated in Javanese pesantren as well as in the Middle East in the 1970s, Wahid discontinued his studies at al-Azhar University (Cairo) to follow a more secular program at the University of Baghdad. Wahid is a prominent voice against Islamic extremism in favor of Islam that takes a more extensive account of local context. In this he has become known as a strong advocate of the indigenous Indonesian Islam, as well as of the Pancasila ideology of the Indonesian state. RESOURCE GUIDE Suggested Reading Barton, Greg. Abdurrahman Wahid: Muslim Democrat, Indonesian President. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002. Bowen, John R. Muslims through Discourse: Religion and Ritual in Gayo Society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993. Dijk, Kees van. A Country in Despair: Indonesia between 1997 and 2000. Leiden, Netherlands: KITLV Press, 2001. Gade, Anna M. Perfection Makes Practice: Learning, Emotion, and the Recited Quran in Indonesia. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004. George, Kenneth M., and Mamannoor. A. D. Pirous: Vision, Faith, and a Journey in Indonesian Art, 1955–2002. Bandung, Indonesia: Yayasan Serambi Pirous, 2002. Hefner, Robert W. Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000. Laffan, Michael F. Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma below the Winds. London: Routledge Curzon, 2003. Ricklefs, M. C. A History of Modern Indonesia, c. 1300 to the Present. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993. Riddell, Peter G. Islam in the Malay-Indonesian World: Transmission and Responses. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001.

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Woodward, Mark R. Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought. Tempe: Arizona State University Program for Southeast Asian Studies, 1996.

Films and Videos Aggression and Self-Determination: Massacre in East Timor. New York: Deep Dish TV, 1992. Miyah: The Life of a Javanese Woman. Watertown, MA: Educational Documentary Resources, 1999. In Javanese with English subtitles. On the Record: Indonesia Literary Figures. Jakarta: Lontar Foundation, 2004. Video documentary on Indonesian literary figures. In Indonesian with English subtitles. Stand van De Maan [Shape of the Moon]. Leiden, Netherlands: Scarabeefilms, 2004. Award-winning Dutch documentary about an Indonesia Christian widow whose sons convert to Islam.

Web Sites Indonesian embassy in Washington, DC: http://www.embassyofindonesia.org/ Indonesian government statistics: http://www.bps.go.id/index.shtml Indonesian People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) (English-language version): http:// www.mpr.go.id/h/index.php?long=English%20Version Indonesia Post (English-language newspaper): http://www.indonesiapost.com/ Inside Indonesia (quarterly publication on politics, news, and culture): http://www. insideindonesia.org/ Jakarta Post (English-language newspaper): http://www.thejakartapost.com/headlines.asp Jakarta Post’s list of foreign and local organizations: http://www.thejakartapost.com/ resources/address_organizations.asp Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/idtoc.html University of Indonesia, Jakarta (English-language): http://www.ui.ac.id/english/main.php U.S. embassy in Jakarta: http://www.usembassyjakarta.org/

Organizations Central Board of Nahdlatul Ulama (PBNU) Jl. Kramat Raya 164 Jakarta Pusat Jakarta, DKI Jakarta 10450 Indonesia Telephone: 62-21-392-7811 Fax: 62-21-392-7811

8 Iran Mana Kia

OVERVIEW The Islamic Republic of Iran’s population is overwhelmingly Muslim—a 99 percent majority of its more than 69 million people. Iran differs from many Muslims countries in that most of its population is Shiite Muslim. Only 10–15 percent of the world’s Muslims are Shiite, most of whom are adherents of the Twelver sect. In Iran, 89 percent of the population is Twelver Shia. The remaining 10 percent of Iranians are Sunni Muslims, while 1 percent are Baha’is, Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians.1 In terms of ethnicity, Iran is much more heterogeneous: 51 percent of the population is Persian; 24 percent Azeri; 8 percent Gilaki and Mazandarani; 7 percent Kurdish; 6 percent Baloch, Lur, and Turkmen tribesmen; and 3 percent Arab, who are primarily from the southwest border area with Iraq and the Persian Gulf.2 Figures for the Kurdish population are generally difficult to obtain and often purposefully underreported by the government. For this same reason, the precise number of Sunni Muslims in Iran is difficult to verify. Ethnic minorities are grouped primarily on the basis of language. While around 58 percent of Iranians speak Persian or a Persian dialect such as Gilaki or Mazandarani, Azeris and Turkmens speak Turkic languages, Kurds speak Kurdish, and Arabs speak Arabic dialects. Iran also has a significant refugee population: more than one million Afghan refugees and several hundred thousand Iraqi Sunni Kurds and Arab Shiites.3 Iran’s Sunni population comprises Kurds and Baloch and Turkmen tribes. The estimated 50,000 Zoroastrians in Iran are Persians; approximately 200,000 Armenians follow the Orthodox Armenian Church, and the Nestorian Assyrians

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and Catholic Chaldeans number approximately 18,000. There are an estimated 5,000–10,000 Christian converts from Islam in Iran. This number is difficult to verify because it is illegal for Muslims to convert to Christianity (or to any other religion). In Iran, one of the conditions for freedom of religion is that religious minorities not proselytize amongst Muslims. About 50,000 Iranian Jews left the country after the 1979 revolution, leaving about 35,000 Jews, who live mostly in urban areas such as Tehran. The Baha’is, a religious group that has been persecuted from its inception in the nineteenth century, number anywhere from 150,000 to 500,000. Because they do not enjoy official recognition as a religious minority, and because of the secrecy of their religious affiliation as a result of persecution, these numbers are difficult to obtain and almost impossible to verify. Shiite orthodoxy does not consider the Baha’i faith a separate monotheistic religion, but a heretical offshoot of Shia Islam subject to persecution. The demographic character of Iran is overwhelmingly young, educated, and urban. According to official Iranian sources, 65 percent of Iran’s population is under the age of 25. An estimated 74 percent of the total population is literate, with a 93 percent literacy rate among the 6–24 age group. Sixty-one percent of Iranians reside in urban areas. Most major cities and town have surged in size. The capital city, Tehran, has grown from 2.5 million in 1978 to nearly 10 million present-day inhabitants. The number of towns with over 100,000 people has doubled, as well as the total number of towns, which swelled from 373 in 1976 to 614 in 1996. The Emergence of Shia Islam Shia Islam has gradually developed in terms of doctrine, ritual, and clerical structure over a period of hundreds of years to acquire its present forms. In the years following the death of the Prophet Muhammad, Arab armies conquered the primarily Zoroastrian Sassanian Empire of Iran. In the decades that followed, Iranians began to convert to Sunni Islam in large numbers. Among its primarily Sunni population, small enclaves of Shia communities lived. For the next 900 years, with the exception of several regional dynasties with Shia sympathies, most of the rulers of Iran were Sunni. In 1500, a Shia Sufi sect raised an army that conquered and united Iran after many centuries of petty rulers and decentralization. The ruler of the order declared himself shah and Twelver Shiism the state religion and set out to convert Iran. With the establishment of the monarchy, the militant, messianic, and heterodox Safavids quickly became status-quo-oriented adherents to orthodox Twelver Shiism. The sectarian split between Sunni and Shia Muslims began as a political dispute over the question of the Prophet Muhammad’s successor. Most Muslims supported the selection of Abu Bakr as political leader (caliph) of the Muslim community. A minority insisted that leadership of the Muslim community should be reserved for the family of the Prophet and the first leader should be Ali, Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law. Supporters of leadership by elite tribal consensus and supporters of divinely designated leadership acted as rival factions for political power; several Abbasid caliphs, before the political primacy of Sunnism around 850, tried unsuccessfully to reconcile the factions. This belief in the hereditary designation of leadership, both spiritual and

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political, to the direct descendants of the Prophet was to have immediate political repercussions and more gradual religious connotations. While Ali did eventually become the fourth Sunni caliph, Shiite Muslims consider him to be the first leader (Imam). The caliph was a political leader, but the Imams were viewed as additionally possessing the spiritual qualities granted by direct descent from the Prophet of God to interpret the Quran. Early Shiites coalesced around the descendents of Muhammad in spiritual matters and occasionally in political revolt. For most of its history, and especially after the death of 11th Imam (874) and the disappearance of the 12th, Shiism stressed political quiescence. The Shia ethos shaped beliefs, conceptions of law, ritual, and an ulama (a general class of religious scholars learned in jurisprudence and theology) whose development eventually placed them in a unique position between religion, the mass of believers, and political power in Iran. Beliefs of Shia Islam At the level of basic belief, differences between Shia and Sunni Islam are minimal. At the level of religious jurisprudence, Shiism developed its own school of law. Shia “traditions” (words and deeds of Muhammad and a select group of other considered to be exemplars of the faith) do not include those of the first three caliphs or any companions of the Prophet who rejected Ali’s right to leadership. They do include the traditions of the Twelve Imams. Shiites pray three times a day, combining two sets of prayers in the afternoon and evening. Two major interrelated concepts distinguish Shia and Sunni Islam. The first is belief in the Imamate, or belief in the twelve direct descendants of Muhammad and their divine right to the spiritual and political leadership of the Muslim community. The last of these Imams went into hiding (ghaibah, or concealment) upon the death of his father, and he will return as the Messiah (Mahdi), bringing justice to the world. This latter tenet is the second of the distinguishing beliefs of Shiism: the return of the Mahdi (or Hidden Imam). There are two implications of this belief that constitute both an activist and a quietest theme. The former is exemplified by the notion that, in the absence of the Imams, no ruler has absolute legitimacy—and, if a ruler is unjust, his authority can be challenged. The quietest strain contends that injustice must be endured, because it is the Mahdi who will restore true justice. The quietest strain is historically dominant, while in the last 150 years the activist strain has at times been used by the ulama for political mobilization against the government. One of the most religiously decisive historical events for Shiites is the death of Muhammad’s grandson Hussain, the third Imam, at Karbala in Iraq in 680. On his way to meet with supporters in preparation for an armed bid for power against the Umayyad caliph Yazid, Hussain and his retinue were intercepted on the desert plain of Karbala. They were under siege for 10 days without water until Hussain and most of his party were killed. This death has a significance of epic proportions for Shiites. It is a dramatic story, retold and reenacted on Ashura, the anniversary of Hussain’s death on the 10th day of the month of Muharram. An entire form of theater (tazieh) and dramatic recital (rawzeh) has grown around this complex central story. The

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symbolic power of this event was evident during the 1979 revolution. Mobilizing mass demonstrations against the shah, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1900–1989) likened the shah to Yazid, the archetype of tyranny and illegitimate authority in Shiism. Conversely, the figure of Hussain is seen as one of ultimate self-sacrifice in the pursuit of a just and right cause. Hussain’s story is also the quiescent example of endurance and steadfastness in the face of hardship and injustice. Sufism was popular in Iran during the political rule of Sunni leaders. Ironically, it was the proto-Shia concepts accepted by many Sufi orders, such as devotion to a charismatic leader, that aided the mass conversion of Iran to Shiism. But after the establishment of the Safavid state (1501–1722), Sufis were considered outside orthodoxy and often violently repressed by both the ulama and the shahs. The decentralized and varied forms of Sufi devotion were seen as threats to the authority of orthodox ulama in devotional and financial matters. Although Shia Sufism does exist in Iran today, its presence and influence are minor. Exact numbers are difficult to establish because of official disapproval. Several orders exist with an estimated several hundred thousand members. The most prominent of these, the Nimatullahi order, has an estimated 300,000 members among its three branches. Jurisprudence in Shia Islam The defining feature of Shia jurisprudence is the use of reason to interpret law (ijtihad ) versus the more restrictive practices used by Sunni ulama to derive law from holy sources. Because of the fledgling nature of Shiism as the state religion, the powerful centralized rule of the Safavid shahs, and their manufactured lineage of descent from the seventh Imam, the ulama remained closely under the state’s control. The Qajar shah who took power in 1796 had no such lineage to fortify his legitimacy, and instead he and his successors sought legitimacy through the ulama. The structure of the Shia ulama and their relationship with the state in Iran underwent radical change during the 70-year interval between Safavid and Qajar rule. The Usuli school, gaining ground in tandem with the twilight and demise of the Safavids, added reason and consensus to the Quran and traditions as sources of law.4 Thus religious scholars trained to use reason to derive law from sacred sources, through intensive study of Aristotelian deductive logic, were granted the status of jurisconsults (mujtahids). This qualification is bestowed by receiving a formal, signed permission by a recognized, high-ranking cleric. It usually takes 15–20 years of study in a seminary school to earn this permission and the title of hojjat al-Islam (“Proof of Islam”). The Usulis also maintained that in matters not explicitly covered by the Quran or traditions, the lay believer should emulate a mujtahid in religious practice, or else their ritual acts of worship were considered invalid. This placed the ulama in a similar position to the Roman Catholic clergy—in a mediating role between the believer and the divine. The Usulis soon developed a sense of unity and hierarchy through the emergence of the position of the Supreme Source of Emulation, or the most learned of the ulama to which all other ulama should defer in questions of doctrine or praxis. Ideally, the collectivity of the ulama guided by the Supreme

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Source should be the source of emulation for all believers. There was to be one Supreme Source, but the rank was often shared by several prominent mujtahids. A believer can only emulate a living mujtahid to keep the application of the law relevant to the present day. Attaining high rank is determined by an informal combination of consensus by ordinary believers and other ulama. A higher-ranking mujtahid is called an ayatollah (eye of God), a now devalued title once reserved for the Supreme Source. By and large, most of the high-ranking ulama continued to be apolitical. From the late nineteenth century, beginning with the increasing helplessness of the Qajar shahs, mujtahids played an active role in resisting political and economic encroachments of European and then American demands on Iranian sovereignty. A significant geopolitical relation of power made this activism possible. In the early nineteenth century, the Shia shrine cities of Iraq, outside the political reach of the Iranian government, became prominent centers of learning. The highest-ranking clerics were located at these schools and were linked, through the administration of religious endowments and dissemination of religious scholarship, to the network of mujtahids in Iran. It was from his exile in Najaf that Ayatollah Khomeini developed, taught, and disseminated his teachings on Islamic government and excoriated the Reza Shah Pahlavi regime (1941–1979) for over a decade. CULTURE, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS The religio-political structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran is a layered entity incorporating institutions of representative and religious government into a theocratic republic. These two sets of institutions draw legitimacy from both the sovereignty of the people and the sovereignty of God. This duality creates multiple sites of power, at times a source of ambiguity and conflict but also allowing flexibility in application and interpretation. Iran has recently gone through three distinct phases: the revolutionary phase, from 1979 to the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989; the reconstruction phase, from 1989 to Sayyed Mohammad Khatami’s (1943– ) election in 1997; and the reform phase, from 1997 to the elections of 2005. The conservative parliamentary victory in the February 2004 elections, although won by dubious means, signals a conservative attempt to regain control over the government. The victory of the conservatives for control of government offices does not, however, correspond to a mandate of political legitimacy, since victory was based on exclusion of reform candidates from parliamentary elections. Time will tell whether the 2005 election of conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad represents a mere interruption of the third reform phase in Iranian politics or the beginning of a fourth phase. Each of these three phases can be characterized according to different interpretations of political Islam. The constitution contains the potential for each of these interpretations—that of radical Islam, pragmatic Islam, and democratic Islam, respectively. Modeled after the constitution of the fifth French republic with considerable alterations, the Iranian constitution was ratified in 1979 and amended in 1989. Three branches of government are provided for in the constitution: executive, judicial, and legislative. Each branch consists of religious and representative institutions.

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The two main organs of representative government are the 290-seat unicameral parliament and the presidency. Both are elected through direct popular vote every four years by universal suffrage of all citizens aged 16 and older. The parliament’s primary powers include approval of ministers, foreign treaties, foreign aid, and declarations of national investigations or states of emergency. Municipal councils are elected by popular vote, and these councils are currently composed largely of conservatives. Although provided for in the constitution, municipal councils were established only in 1999. The Assembly of Experts, responsible for selecting the Supreme Leader and acting as his advisory body, is also elected by popular vote every 10 years. The qualifications for candidacy are so strict that all candidates are part of the regime’s clerical elite. This limited election ensures the authoritarian nature of the assembly, and the selection of the Leader, while granting it limited democratic legitimacy. The executive branch of the government consists of the Supreme Leader, currently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the president of the republic, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (1956– ). The president is charged with implementing the constitution, acting as a link between the three branches of government, selecting a Council of Ministers, exercising executive power that is not explicitly granted to the Leader, and being the official representative of Iran abroad. The powers of the Leader are wider than those of the president, but have shrunk as a result of constitutional modifications, as well as the diminished stature of Khamenei in comparison to his predecessor, Khomeini. The role of the Leader is derived from the Guardianship of the Jurist principle, a major conceptual feature of the Iranian constitution authored by the father of the revolution and the first leader, Ayatollah Khomeini. The Leader is head of the armed forces and has the power to appoint many powerful posts in the various branches of government, and in general terms has supervisory power over all three branches of the government and the Islamic Republic as a whole. Although support for the concept of the Guardianship of the Jurist is tantamount to support for the Islamic Republic, different interpretations of the nature of this position are a point of heated debate. The Guardian Council is a religious body that supervises the legislative powers of the parliament and the electoral process in Iran. Six of its 12 members must be mujtahids, selected by the Supreme Leader, and it is these members who hold the exclusive power of veto over parliamentary legislation if it is found to violate the principles of Islam. The Guardian Council also has the right to supervise parliamentary, presidential, and municipal elections, a vague power that in practice means the disqualification of “unsuitable” candidates. Candidates can be disqualified if they have criminal records or undesirable political beliefs, or lack the proper religious commitment. In the past, members of the Islamic left or dissident mujtahids have been disqualified. The method of vetting candidates is hotly disputed, since the Guardian Council is dominated by conservative clerics who are perceived to exclude candidates based on ideological and political disagreements. The highest court in the judiciary is the five-member Supreme Court, reserved exclusively for mujtahids and currently the stronghold of extreme conservatives. The chief justice of this court is appointed directly by the leader. Islamic law

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delineates the boundaries for all legislation and is the basis for the criminal and civil codes. The two main criminal courts are called the Revolutionary Courts and the Special Court for the Clergy. In 1989, the constitution was amended to ensure the continuation of the Iranian republic after Khomeini, whose absolute authority as Leader was seen as unique to him alone. The amendments altered the executive branch by abolishing the office of prime minister and granting his powers to the largely ceremonial presidency. The Expediency Council was created as an unelected mediating body between the parliament and the Council of Guardians, with the power to break deadlock over legislation. Culture and the Arts Iranian artistic culture has experienced a renaissance in the last 15 years. Artists meld classical Iranian art forms with the heightened Islamic symbols of the revolution and modernist art techniques of Europe and North America. For example, the sculptor Parviz Tanavoli has rendered classical calligraphy into a three-dimensional art form. Hossein Zenderoudi, a painter and collagist, layers his work with Islamic symbols, folk designs, and other stylized systems such as the zodiac. The Iranian art form most gaining international attention is cinema. Iranian films are screened all over the world and have attracted attention at international film festivals. Some of the most well-known filmmakers are Majid Majidi (Rain), Tamineh Milani (Two Women), Mohsen Makhmalbaf (Qandahar), and Abbas Kiarostami (The Wind Will Carry Us). Filmmakers use the tradition of ambiguity between depictions of earthly and divine love in Iranian artistic culture in cinematic depictions of social critique to slip by government censors. Many of these films push ideological limits and explore taboo subjects like suicide, religion, women, and love. Forced to gain the approval of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, the body charged with ensuring that artistic and cultural output meets Islamic standards, filmmakers and artists are actively engaged with their art on ideologically and politically charged levels. WOMEN AND THE FAMILY While legal reforms during the late Pahlavi regime enhanced women’s access to divorce and child custody, restricted polygamy, raised the minimum age of marriage, and barred men’s access to extrajudicial divorce, marriage and personalstatus laws were still inegalitarian. The 1979 revolution resulted in nullification of portions of Pahlavi family law that were seen as violations of the sharia, and family law was restored to the jurisdiction of religious judges in the official family-court system. Women lost many social rights as the early Islamic regime sought to push educated, urbanized women perceived to be overly Westernized out of the workplace. Many fields of study, particularly in the fields of engineering and science, were closed to women in universities. Islamic dress, in different forms according to particular public contexts, was made mandatory. There is a stricter code in shrines than in government offices, and still less strict one in less regulated public places.

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All involve at least a loose-fitting, long-sleeved caftan covering the arms and legs and a headscarf covering most of the hair and neck. Women constantly challenge Islamic dress regulations by pulling their scarves back and showing more hair, or by wearing bright or colorful and more form-fitting robes. The revolutionary government sought to emphasize and Islamize a woman’s role as wife and mother. Yet today, more so than at the height of the Pahlavi regime, Iranian women are socially and politically active. More than half of university students are women, and many enter the workforce as physicians, lawyers, factory workers, and office clerks. Three main factors contributed to the failure of the Islamic republic’s gender ideology to push women out of public life. First, although the ideology that swept through Iran was Islamic, the revolution contained a strongly populist emphasis on the power of the people. Hundreds of thousands of women participated in the mass demonstrations of the 1979 revolution. The populist ideology of the revolution, which promised to include the downtrodden masses, could not ignore women completely. Women retained the right to vote and run for elected office. Second, the government’s desire for a gender-segregated society created the need for some women in the workforce even at the most restrictive of times—for example, women physicians to examine women patients. Also, because of the regime’s gendering of occupation, many men did not want jobs such as nursing or secretarial work, which were considered women’s work. Ironically, one-third of all state employees are women and half work in the fields of health and education. The eight-year war with Iraq and the flight of the educated upper and middle classes resulted in a labor shortage, creating a practical need for women in economic and social life. The economy, never really having recovered from the war due to sanctions and mismanagement, has created a situation where most families cannot survive on one income—women work out of necessity. The initial push for women’s seclusion was replaced by a policy of gender segregation as the regime reconciled economic needs and social realities with its Islamic gender ideology. The population growth rate of Iran is now .86 percent, down from nearly 4 percent in 1986. After the revolution, the new regime encouraged women to have many children. To ensure that women complied, abortion was made illegal and birth control difficult to procure. By 1989, the population had almost doubled. With the economy in shambles after the war with Iraq, the government realized that it did not have the resources to sustain such population growth and radically overhauled its strategy and rhetoric. Today, Iran’s family-planning program has drastically reduced population growth by using mosques to extol the virtues of small families, making family-planning education mandatory to obtain a marriage license, and making birth control readily available free of charge. Although initially repealed, many Pahlavi-era laws regulating personal-status matters such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance are slowly being reinstated. In the last few years, more than 20 laws have been passed improving women’s rights in marriage. Although religious government is often automatically associated with tradition, the Islamic Republic denotes a profound break with tradition and is undeniably a modern state. All legal matters involving personal status must be registered with the Special Civil Court, whether it is a marriage or consensual

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divorce, or a dispute where one of the parties is unwilling to fulfill marital duties or agree to a divorce. A man cannot divorce his wife without her knowledge or outside of the court system. While courts cannot legally deny a man a divorce if the wife is unwilling, they can deploy methods to delay the divorce and ensure that it is granted after the obligations of the marriage have been properly fulfilled. This can include referring the case to arbitration, demanding that overdue maintenance or the bridal gift (mehr) be paid. Courts use these methods to reconcile and preserve the family, while women use the courts to renegotiate the terms of their marriage or shape the outcome of their divorce. The civil code and penal laws are gender-biased. Women are barred from judicial and religious leadership and are not recognized as breadwinners, a status that legally reduces their wages by almost half. Women have limited access to divorce and child custody unless otherwise explicitly stated in the marriage contract. A woman can include a number of terms in her marriage contract: forbidding her husband the right to polygamy, ensuring her right to education and employment, awarding her child custody in the event of divorce, and allowing her to secure a divorce. Although men are clearly privileged in personal status matters, there is a substantial difference between the letter of the law and social realities. For instance, although the legal age of marriage for women is 9, the average age of marriage in Iran for women is 22. Although the terms under which women can seek divorce are limited in actuality, women have various means at their disposal to negotiation the terms of their marriage and divorce. The mehr, or bridal gift, is a part of every woman’s marriage contract and one of the most effective bargaining chips at a woman’s disposal. Most often, the mehr is paid in two parts: half at the time of the wedding and half at a time to be negotiated in the future. A woman can demand payment of this often significant sum at any time during the marriage. The demand for payment of the mehr can be used to avert an unwanted divorce, and the forgoing of her mehr can be used to secure a divorce from an unwilling husband. So while many laws are discriminatory toward women, they do not provide accurate or comprehensive portraits of women’s actual lived experiences. Gender bias in civil law has been religiously justified, and much of women’s-rights discourse is carried out by challenging conservative clerical interpretations of Islam. Women’s seminary schools have been established, and the number of female seminary students is steadily increasing. Women both inside and outside the seminary, in such fields as law, journalism, and education, locate gender equality within interpretations of Islam. The discussion around women’s rights involves a range of voices from clerical, governmental, reformist, secular, and feminist circles. Women’s magazines provide a civic space for these debates, bringing private grievances into the public sphere, engaging with the government, and fostering solidarity and awareness among women. The popularization of these issues also make it impossible for either the government or the clerical establishment to avoid addressing women’s rights. An editor of one of these women’s magazines, Masumeh Ebtekar, was appointed by Khatami as vice president of environmental affairs. Women were instrumental to President Khatami’s election. In an interview given to the popular women’s magazine Zanan a month before the 1997 presidential election,

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Khatami explained the ways in which a flourishing civil society could enable women to mobilize and bring their demands before the government. He criticized patriarchal culture, praised women’s achievements, and stressed the importance of their roles in social and political life. His opponent, Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri, the favorite of the conservative establishment, did not grant the magazine an interview. Nateq-Nuri’s picture was inside the magazine, opposite the list of questions he had refused to answer. Women’s strong support for Khatami makes two points clear: one, that women are a crucial force in society and no candidate seeking election can afford to ignore their electoral power; and two, that because they have been among the first to feel the intrusive restrictions of the Islamic regime, women are some of the most ardent supporters of the reformist platform of rule of law, political pluralism, and human rights. In October 2003, longtime activist and human-rights lawyer Shirin Ebadi was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. SPECIAL ISSUES IN THE NEWS In May 1997, a relatively unknown middle-ranking cleric, Mohammad Khatami, who had declared his intention to run at the eleventh hour, was elected president by an astounding 20 million votes, or 70 percent of the popular vote. The reform movement is a coalition of 18 organizations that span a broad range of interests and ideologies, all of whom advocate democratic reform within the existing constitution. At the far left of this coalition is the Islamic Participation Front, headed by the President Khatami’s brother. The more moderate end of this coalition is headed by the Association of Combatant Clerics, the group to which President Khatami belongs. The coalition is loosely organized, comprising both laypersons and clerics. Many reformers are former revolutionaries who are disillusioned by the new republic. The two most prominent groups of reformers who have sustained the most attacks by the conservative ruling establishment are dissident mujtahids and members of the press. The press plays the role of political parties in Iran, creating a forum for debate, fostering awareness, and mobilizing public opinion. In a society where newspapers are the leading forums of civil activity and political discourse, editors and journalists are targets of conservative repression. The opposition is varied, but many strive to expand the language of critique in Iranian public discourse; encourage social, political, and religious pluralism; promote rule of law; and demand transparency of government. Starting in April 2000 and continuing in waves, dozens of reformist newspapers have been closed and various journalists and activists imprisoned. In November 2004, repression reached the newspapers, blogs, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating through the Internet, seeking to silence what was considered the last relatively unrestricted media outlet.5 Iran has no diplomatic negotiations with the United States; they were broken off with the seizure of the U.S. embassy in 1979 by a group of militant students protesting the sanctuary given the shah by the U.S. government. Iran is also under economic sanctions from the United States, which bars U.S. citizens and corporations from doing business or investing in Iran. In recent years, Khatami has advocated a culturally oriented “dialogue of civilizations” to moderate this alienation. In response

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to these gestures, the economic ban on pistachios, caviar, and carpets from Iran was lifted. This mild détente halted abruptly with the conservative backlash against reform in Iran and the rise to power of the Bush government (2000) in the United States. The Iranian government expressed sympathy for the victims of September 11 but critiqued U.S. military action in Afghanistan, rejecting the United States’ declared right to change the regime of another country. In January 2002, President George W. Bush labeled Iran as part of an “axis of evil,” eliciting outrage from the Iranian government. Conservative forces in the Iranian government seized this opportunity to further curtail the reform movement by calling for unity against the hostility of the U.S. government. A U.S. military presence in Afghanistan and the subsequent invasion of Iraq, coupled with threatening statements against the government of Iran, have put Iran in a precarious position. This sense of threat has prompted some discussion of open relations with the United States as a way to avert a much-feared attack on Iran itself. The question of opening negotiations with the United States has proven divisive among both reform and conservative factions. Iran’s nuclear ambitions have been a cause of concern for the U.S. and European governments. While the Iranian government asserts that its uranium-enrichment program is strictly for energy production, critics remained skeptical due to Iran’s vast stores of oil and natural gas. In a deal reached in mid-November 2004 with France, Germany, and Britain, Iran agreed to suspend all its uranium-enrichment activities in return for negotiations on possible rewards, including economic benefits, political and security cooperation with Europe, and assistance in its nuclear technology. Talks stalled during the spring of 2005, and Iran signaled that it will resume its uranium-related work. In May 2005, Iran’s foreign minister, Kamal Kharrazi, said at the five-year review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that his country had a right under the NPT to all peaceful nuclear technologies and was determined to use them. Iran argues that nuclear inspections should assure Europeans and Americans that its uranium-enrichment program is solely for peaceful purposes; its opponents argue that, given Iran’s history of evasion with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), only a complete cessation of uranium and plutonium work would be an objective safeguard. The election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a radical hard-line populist, to the presidency further complicates negotiations with the IAEA. As part of its bid to acquire domestic political capital, Ahmadinejad’s administration has managed to frame Euro-American efforts to halt Iran’s development of nuclear energy capabilities as a violation of Iran’s national sovereignty and international treaty rights. In January 2006, China, the European Union, Russia, and the United States agreed to report Iran’s nuclear activities to the United Nations Security Council. In the context of the current impasse, the Iranian government is fearful of economic sanctions and military strikes. Ahmadinejad has attempted to position Iran as a champion of regional peoples who have suffered as a result of Israel and the US, two countries that he frames as imperial aggressors. Addressing a domestic audience in October 2005, Ahmadinejad echoed the words of the still-revered Ayatollah Khomeini; the Israeli “occupation regime,” he stated, must “vanish” (this

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statement has been widely mistranslated as Israel “must be wiped off the map”). In a speech delivered to a wider Muslim audience in December 2005, the Iranian president echoed past Arab nationalist declarations that, if Germans perpetrated the Jewish holocaust, Germans rather than Palestinians should have suffered a loss of territory for the establishment of a Jewish state. His speech further inflamed international opinion by calling into question the truth of the Jewish holocaust. Such declarations feed European and American fears that the Iranian government has ill intentions and is secretly building nuclear weapons, despite the Supreme Leader’s religious edict ( fatwa) and the President’s inaugural address, both of which denounce nuclear weapons and mass killing of civilians. The Iranian government is gambling that Chinese and Russian dependence on Iranian oil will lead them to block punitive economic or military measures NOTABLE PEOPLE Ganji, Akbar (dates unknown). The son of an unskilled laborer, Ganji began his career as an intelligence officer in the Revolutionary Guard in the early 1980s. Later he entered journalism, serving as the press attaché at the Iranian embassy in Turkey. Ganji went on to write for the popular and increasingly progressive Tehran daily Hamshari, and then the reformist monthly journal Kian. After Khatami’s election, Ganji wrote for and edited the radical reform press organ The New Path, which grew increasingly critical of clerical conservatism. In 1998, his articles probed the involvement of the Ministry of Intelligence in the killing of several dissident writers and intellectuals, which forced the government to acknowledge extrajudicial killings and conduct an investigation. This investigation implicated many high-ranking officials and contributed to humiliating electoral defeats, such as that of President Rafsanjani in the 2000 parliamentary elections. In 2000, Ganji was arrested on charges of conspiring to overthrow the government. After a defiant trial, Ganji was sentenced to 10 years followed by 5 years of internal exile. He was released from prison in March, 2006. Khatami, Sayyed Mohammad (b. 1943). Khatami was born into a family of clerics in Yazd. In 1961, he entered seminary school in Qom, and over the next two decades he earned the rank of hojjat al-Islam, as well as a BA in philosophy and an MA in education from Isfahan University. At the time of the revolution, he was chair of the Islamic Center in Hamburg, Germany. Upon returning to Iran, he was elected to Parliament representing Yazd. In 1982, Khatami was appointed minister of culture and Islamic guidance and played a role in relaxing restrictions on cultural productions. In 1992, Khatami was appointed head of the Iranian National Library and cultural adviser to President Rafsanjani. During this period he wrote three books on modernity, development, democratic principles, and their roles in Islam. In May 1997, he was elected as the fifth president of the Islamic Republic by 69 percent of an unprecedented 80 percent voter turnout. In June 2001, he was reelected by an even wider margin. Khomeini, Sayyed Ruhollah Musavi (1900–89). Born into a family of religious scholars, Khomeini entered a small-town seminary school and then moved to

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Qom. After the death of his teacher Ayatollah Borujerdi in 1961, Khomeini began to speak out in direct confrontation with the shah. In 1963, Khomeini was arrested and deported to Turkey and then to Iraq, where he settled in Najaf. Until 1978, Khomeini taught at the seminary in Najaf, where he gave a series of lectures on the necessity of Islamic government and the concept of Guardianship of the Jurist. During the revolution, he provided guidance from afar. In 1979, he returned to Iran to preside over the creation and life of the postrevolutionary government. His most lasting imprint on the government is the position of the Supreme Leader, which he held until his death in 1989. He is revered as the founding father of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Sherkat, Shahla (dates unknown). A journalist for more than two decades, Sherkat participated in the Islamization of the press after the revolution. From 1982 to 1991 she was the editor of Today’s Woman and oversaw its transformation from a secular women’s magazine to one acceptable to the new Islamic regime. In February 1992, she founded Zanan (Women), a magazine that presents the link between Islam and patriarchy as artificial. Sherkat defines gender equality as part of Islam. While devoutly religious, she is also staunchly feminist, using Islamic as well as European and North American feminist sources to argue for women’s social, political, and spiritual equality. Her magazine is one of many women’s publications that create a forum for discussion between secular feminists, government officials, and clerics. The magazine has raised the social and political awareness of women and has made a significant impact on the discussion of women’s rights in Iran. Soroush, Abdolkarim (b. 1945). Born to a pious poor family in southern Tehran, Soroush studied pharmacology at Tehran University. Later, in London, he earned an MA in analytical chemistry and a doctorate in the history and philosophy of science. In 1981, Soroush was appointed by Ayatollah Khomeini to the Council for Cultural Revolution, the seven-member body charged with Islamizing the curricula of all higher education in Iran. Three years later, with the universities reopened, he resigned from the council, taught philosophy of science and modern theology at Tehran University, and published a vast corpus of books and articles. Since 1996, conservative vigilante groups have attacked Soroush rhetorically and physically, interfering with his teaching and lecturing. Soroush is a prominent figure in a new wave of Islamic modernists in Iran and has been called the Luther of Islam for challenging the ulama’s monopoly on religious authority. His work provides tools with which reformers challenge conservative religious interpretations.

NOTES 1. Unless otherwise noted, all demographic statistics are from the CIA’s World Factbook 2004 (http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/) and the U.S. State Department Web site (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5314.htm). As with any statistic derived from government sources, one should taken into consideration that official information is often compiled according to ideological understandings and political motives.

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2. Note that Arab countries in the region such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia refer to this body of water as the Arabian Gulf. 3. “Iran’s Afghan Refugees Feel Pressure to Leave,” BBC World News Service, November 1, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3971711.stm. 4. The Shiite Usuli school of law relied on rational processes to derive law, in contradistinction to the traditionalist Akhbaris, who believed in the literal translation of the Quran and the akhbars or traditions of Muhammad and the Twelve Imams as the sole sources of Islamic law. Usulis supported the use of ijtihad, or independent reasoning, in deriving legal rulings by those who were qualified to do so; all others were required to conform to the rulings. 5. Human Rights Watch, “Iran: Web Writers Purge Underway,” November 9, 2004, http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/11/08/iran9631.htm.

RESOURCE GUIDE Suggested Reading Adelkhah, Fariba. Being Modern in Iran. Trans. Jonathan Derrick. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. Beeman, William O. The ‘Great Satan’ vs. the ‘Mad Mullahs’: How the United States and Iran Demonize each Other. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2005. Egan, Eric. The Films of Makhmalbaf: Cinema, Politics and Culture in Iran. Washington, DC: Mage Publishers, 2005. Esposito, John L., and R. K. Ramazani, eds. Iran at the Crossroads. New York: Palgrave, 2001. Hiro, Dilip. The Iranian Labyrinth: Journeys through Theocratic Iran and its Furies. New York: Nation Books, 2005. Hooglund, Eric, ed. Twenty Years of Islamic Revolution: Political and Social Transition in Iran since 1979. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2002. Jahanbakhsh, Forough. Islam, Democracy and Religious Modernism in Iran: From Bazargan to Soroush. Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 2001. Kurzman, Charles. “Critics Within: Islamic Scholars’ Protests against the Islamic State in Iran.” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 15, no. 2 (2001): 341–59. Kurzman, Charles. The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004. Mir Hosseini, Ziba. Islam and Gender: The Religious Debate in Contemporary Iran. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999. Momen, Moojan. An Introduction to Shi’i Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi’ism. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985. Najmabadi, Afsaneh. “Feminism in an Islamic Republic: Years of Hardship, Years of Growth.” In Islam, Gender, and Social Change, ed. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and John L. Esposito. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Paidar, Parvin. “Gender of Democracy: The Encounter between Feminism and Reformism in Contemporary Iran.” Democracy, Governance and Human Rights Programme, Paper No. 6. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2001. Ridgeon, Lloyd. Religion and Politics in Modern Iran: A Reader. International Library of Iranian Studies. New York: I. B. Taurus, 2005.

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Sadri, Ahmad. “The Varieties of Religious Reform: Public Intelligentsia in Iran.” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 15, no. 2 (2001): 271–82. Wright, Robin. The Last Great Revolution: Turmoil and Transformation in Iran. New York: Vintage Books, 2001.

Films and Videos Divorce, Iranian Style. New York: Women Make Movies, 1998. Footage from an Iranian divorce court records both the institutionalized discrimination against women as well as the ways by which these women circumvent the legal system. Interview with Hashemi Rafsanjani. New York: C-SPAN and CBS, 1997 Iran: Past, Present and Future. New York: Permanent Mission of Iran to the United Nations, 1992. Iran, A Revolution Betrayed. London: BBC TV, 1984. Also see http://www.flickerings.com/2002/films/iraniandirectors.htm for a review of contemporary Iranian films.

Web Sites Columbia University’s Gulf 2000 Project: http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/iran.shtml Communist Party of Iran: http://www.cpiran.org/English/English_index.html Constitution: http://www.salamiran.org/IranInfo/State/Constitution/ Iran Cultural Heritage Organization: http://iranmiras.ir/ Iran Heritage Foundation: http://www.iranheritage.com/ Iran Touring and Tourism Organization: http://www.itto.org/ Iranian embassy to Canada: http://www.salamiran.org/index.html Iranian women’s directory: http://www.zan.org/welcome.html Net Iran: http://www.netiran.com/ Women in Iran (English): http://www.womeniniran.net/english/

9 Iraq Kathryn M. Coughlin

OVERVIEW The great ancient civilizations of Sumer, Akkad, Babylon, and Assyria were located in and around present-day Iraq. Fertile river valleys surrounding the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers encouraged settlement as early as 6000 b.c.e. Sumerian kings, who ruled around the same time as the earliest Egyptian dynasties (ca. 3000 b.c.e.), developed the first civilizations; art, culture, agriculture, and law flourished. Hammurabi (1792–1750 b.c.e.), a ruler of Babylon, issued the earliest known code of law to ensure that “justice prevailed” and that the “strong might not oppress the weak.”1 And it is in this context that King Nebuchadnezzar (605–562 b.c.e.) built the Hanging Gardens of Babylon, widely regarded as the seventh wonder of the ancient world. In 637 c.e., Mesopotamia (Greek for “between two rivers”) was conquered by the Arabs, who brought Islam to its inhabitants, most of whom were converted by the sword. Under the Abbasid caliphs (750–1258 c.e.), Baghdad became the intellectual center of the Islamic world, where art, science, and philosophy flourished. Writings of Aristotle and Plato were translated, and advances in medicine, biology, mathematics, and astronomy laid the foundation for modern Western sciences. As the intellectual center of the Islamic world, Baghdad attracted scientists, artists, writers, and philosophers, just as it did during the ancient period. However, modern Iraqi history has not been as peaceful and illustrious as its past. Modern Period through Saddam Hussein From 1638 until World War I, Iraq was ruled from Istanbul by the Ottomans. Britain occupied Iraq during World War I, and in 1920 the League of Nations

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declared Iraq a mandate under British administration. A dozen years later, Iraq was accepted into the League of Nations as an independent country; in reality, Britain had installed a constitutional monarchy and selected the king. In 1958, the monarchy was overthrown by the Free Officers, a nationalist group of military officers led by Brigadier Abdul Karim Qasim. Characteristic of the chronic political instability that was to follow, Qasim was assassinated in 1963 in a Baathist Party–led coup.2 Less than a year later, the Baathists were overthrown, but they succeeding in toppling the government a second time in 1968. In 1979, Saddam Hussein, who had risen through the ranks of the Baath Party to be the vice president, took over the presidency of Iraq and remained in power until the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Baathist (Arab Socialist Renaissance Party) political philosophy espouses a pan-Arab nationalism, is leftist and secular in orientation, and is loosely based on European fascism. In a country sharply divided along diverse ethnic, religious, tribal, and linguistic lines, Baathism and Arab nationalism were supposed to unite the country and produce one identity—Iraqi—for all citizens. Under Hussein, however, Baathism became the means to violently suppress everyone except select Arab Sunnis (a religio-ethnic minority) and brutally crush all political resistance. Through the Baath Party and numerous secret police organizations, Hussein ruled Iraq with an iron fist. By the late 1970s, Hussein had created a textbook totalitarian state: Iraqis were rewarded with munificent state services in return for unquestioning acceptance of his rule. To forestall coup attempts or dissidence within his tight government circle, Hussein violently purged those who were closest to him—including suspect sons-in-law. In the meantime, his state-run propaganda machine ensured that Hussein’s name and face were everywhere, creating a myth of benevolent leadership even as he destroyed the country’s economic infrastructure and imprisoned and tortured many of his actual and perceived opponents. In 1980, Iraq embarked on an expensive and ruinous eight-year war with Iran over a putative border dispute in which both France and the United Kingdom sided with Iraq. “The longest conventional war of the twentieth-century” destroyed much of Iraq’s oil production and refinery system and civilian infrastructure such as roads and telecommunications systems.3 Several hundred thousand Iraqis died; tens of thousands more returned from war permanently handicapped and unable to work for a living. The economic impact of the war was unprecedented in Iraqi history. The Iraqi government had poured all available cash reserves into military spending, depleting funds for social services and infrastructure development. Vast sectors of the Iraqi population were displaced and became refugees in their own country. And the extent of environmental damage is still undetermined 20 years later. But the war did not distract Hussein from his obsession with internal repression. Amid lukewarm protests from the United States and United Kingdom, Hussein commenced a harsh campaign against Kurds in the north. His powerful allies chose to ignore widespread human-rights violations and the use of chemical weapons against the Iranians and his own people.4 Further compounding the financial, environmental, and human costs sustained in the Iraq-Iran war, Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. The United Nations

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immediately imposed economic sanctions, and in late 1990 the UN Security Council authorized military action against Iraq in Resolution 678. A U.S.-led coalition of 34 nations repelled Iraqi forces back to Baghdad in January and February 1991. This conflict caused Iraqi infrastructure losses estimated at $170 billion and incurred significant loss of Iraqi life.5 Most infrastructure damage occurred during a 43-day-long aerial bombardment campaign, one of the longest ever recorded. According to a report commissioned by the U.S. Air Force, an estimated 10,000 to 12,000 Iraqi died in combat during the air campaign and another 10,000 died in the ground war.6 There are no official figures on civilian deaths, although the Iraqi government cited 2,300 civilian deaths during the two-month conflict. After the war, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 687, requiring the destruction of Iraqi chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles and providing for UN verification inspections. In response to pointed criticism that the economic sanctions did not affect Hussein but rather caused the malnutrition and premature deaths of ordinary Iraqis, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 986 in May 1996, which allowed Iraq to sell oil valued at up to $2 billion every six months for the purchase of food and medicine (the Oil-for-Food Program). Two years later, the UN increased the limit to $5.2 billion. Hussein diverted much of the money to build massive compounds and palaces and acquire weapons; the Iraqi people continued to suffer malnutrition, slow starvation, and decreased life expectancies. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the Bush administration argued that Hussein’s regime had aided terrorists and possessed weapons of mass destruction that he could sell to terrorists or other enemies of the United States. These allegations led to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and the ouster of Hussein’s regime. No weapons of mass destruction have been found, nor has a link between Hussein and al-Qaida (the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks) been established. Hussein’s wars and UN economic sanctions have resulted in sharp social fragmentation, an increase in Islamic militancy, and a “brain drain” in which physicians, lawyers, and the educated have fled the country for more stable and prosperous environments. Personal incomes have dropped to less than 1/10 of personal incomes in 1980.7 Humanitarian aid agencies feed most families, and the only jobs available for most Iraqis are with the nascent Iraqi national government or foreign reconstruction companies—two of the most dangerous places to work, as these are the primary targets of the insurgents. The Coalition Provisional Authority transferred sovereignty to the interim government on June 28, 2004, and the elections held in January 2005 resulted in the country’s national parliament, which drafted a new constitution and oversaw new national elections at the end of that year. By mid-January 2006, Iraq’s independent election commission certified the results of the December elections whereby the Shia-led United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) garnered a majority, by winning 128 out of 275 seats, and a Kurdish alliance took 53 seats. In the most significant change from the January 2005 elections, the two main Sunni-led coalitions took 55 seats, up from 17. Chronic violence and lawlessness, the increasing boldness

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Firdous Square is located in the heart of Baghdad, which boasts a population of over 5.7 million. After the city’s liberation in April 2002, a massive statue of Saddam Hussein

of insurgent attacks, and lack of civilian infrastructure are challenges that the new Iraqi government must face in the future. CULTURE, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS Arabs make up the majority of the Iraqi population—at least 75 percent of the 25.4 million people. Ethnic Kurds, living mostly in the north, total approximately 18 percent. The remaining 7 percent is spread among other ethnicities such as Assyrians, Turcomans, and Armenians. Ninety-six percent of the Iraqi people practice Islam, but the statistics on the Sunni-Shia populations vary. Most sources agree that the Shia Muslims, largely found in the country’s south, are the majority, with best estimates of 60–65 percent of the population. While most Kurds are Sunni Muslims, they follow a different legal school (madhhab)—the Shafii—than do the rest of Iraq’s Sunni Muslims, who are Hanafi. And Kurdish Muslim identity is not centered on the orthodox legal schools, like the rest of the Iraqi population. Kurds are historically linked to the Sufi mystical orders of eastern Turkey and central Asia. A small Christian population (3%) is mostly centered around Baghdad. They are represented by numerous sects and denominations: Assyrian, Chaldean or Eastern rite, Greek Orthodox, and Roman Catholic.8 The Iraqi Christian community was not persecuted any more than any other religious group under Saddam Hussein, and a few Christians held prominent posts, such as Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, in

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his regime. Once a considerably larger community, many Iraqi Christians have emigrated since Hussein was overthrown. According to William Warda, a Christian community leader in Baghdad, more than 200 Christians have been kidnapped and at least 60 murdered in post-Hussein Iraq.9 But as the Iraqi Christian community is generally more educated and moneyed, it is unclear whether they are targets because of their religious affiliation or potential ability to post ransom. Christians may also be targeted because they run beauty salons and liquor stores, anathema to Muslim radicals, and because they are perceived to be sympathetic to the Americanled occupation. Jews trace their heritage in Iraq to the birth of Abraham, who was born in the town of Ur, the capital of the ancient civilization of Sumer, less than 200 miles south of Baghdad. Nebuchadnezzar exiled Jews from the kingdom of Judah to Babylon (sixth century b.c.e.) during the famed Babylonian captivities (see Jeremiah 52). Jewish kingdoms flourished in northern Mesopotamia and Baghdad in the first century c.e. Iraqi Jews played an important role in Iraq’s independence from the British, and in 1948 there were approximately 150,000 Jews living in the country.10 Emigration to Israel and increased persecution since the 1950s decimated the Iraqi Jewish population. A significant Kurdish-speaking Jewish population has largely emigrated, and the current Jewish population is estimated at approximately 100. Effect of Wars, Sanctions, and Occupation Hussein’s offensive war with Iran and the invasion of Kuwait resulted in comprehensive economic sanctions against Iraq, the unintended consequences of which included widespread malnutrition, chronic illness, and the eventual starvation of hundreds of Iraqi civilians. During the 1991 Gulf War, the communications grid, infrastructure, and health-care institutions were irreparably damaged. In rebuilding, Hussein had no intention of investing scarce cash in either the north (where dissident Kurds lived) or in the south (where Shias revolted after the first Gulf War). But civilian suffering was widespread throughout the country. Economic sanctions continued to lower the standard of living in Iraq, despite the UN Oil-for-Food Program, largely because Hussein diverted cash to private accounts and the construction of massive palace compounds. The liberation of Iraq in March and April of 2003 damaged most of the country’s remaining infrastructure and destroyed oil refineries and pipelines. In the fall of 2003, a report commissioned by the United Nations and the World Bank estimated that Iraq required approximately $55 billion over the next four years to rebuild the country.11 As of the date of that report, international pledges of economic assistance totaled slightly more than $33 billion.12 As of January 2006, the United States’ Agency for International Development (USAID) has poured more than $4 billion into reconstructing Iraq and, working with Iraq’s interim government, has established programs in education, health care, agriculture, telecommunications, water and sanitation, local governance, and infrastructure development.13 Hundreds of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), along with the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, private

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companies, and coalition country partners are joined in an effort to rebuild the country. Increased attacks by militant insurgents have, however, slowed efforts to distribute food rations, children’s vaccinations, school equipment, and agricultural assistance. Several NGOs, such as Save the Children, CARE, and Doctors without Borders, have temporarily suspended operations until the security situation has stabilized. Kidnapping has become one of the largest private industries in Iraq since its liberation. Most kidnappings are not political but are rather motivated by greed. Privately employed Westerners are ideal targets because many have access to kidnapping/ransom insurance or are able to raise large amounts of cash quickly. Others are kidnapped for political reasons by insurgents or terrorists associated with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s al-Qaida in Iraq. Oftentimes the terrorists demand that the victim’s home country pull out of the U.S.-led coalition, such as the Philippines did in July 2004. Otherwise, victims are publicly executed. WOMEN AND THE FAMILY In theory, women fared no worse than men under Saddam Hussein. Baathist secular philosophy propounded that girls should receive the same education as boys. For the most part women—in particular Sunni Arab women—attended colleges and universities and were free to study in any program. The head of Iraq’s nuclear program and a scientist of weapons of mass destruction was a woman: Huda Salif Mahdi Ammash. She also served as a regional commander of the Baath Party. Iraqi law provided women with five years’ maternity leave, and their employers were required to rehire them at the end of their leave. Equal pay for equal work was enshrined in law and enforced in most urban areas. In reality, women accused of political dissidence were often sent to “rape farms” where they were tortured for years. Many of these women had several children while imprisoned; after the liberation of Iraq, society did not exactly welcome them. Victims of rape serve as a source of embarrassment or shame in traditional Arab society. Often their families reject them, and the women have no legitimate means to support themselves or their children. Even more heinous was the regime’s use of women to torture male detainees. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch documented the Hussein regime’s use of women as leverage—raping sisters, mothers, daughters—in front of the detainees to force confessions or elicit information about other dissidents. The Iran-Iraq War and the first Gulf War claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of young men. Widows and orphans had little means of income, and the fallen soldier’s promised pension rarely materialized. While elementary and secondary education was mandated for both girls and boys, in rural areas families tended to send only the boys to school and keep the girls at home to assist in farming small family plots. When these girls later married and lost their husbands to war or the regime, they had very little to fall back on in terms of education or job skills. Today, the enemy of the Iraqi woman is the Islamist insurgent or terrorist. When the U.S.-led coalition ousted the Baathist regime, they failed to secure the borders.

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Hundreds of foreign holy warriors (jihadists) poured into Iraq with the idea of forcing the American troops out, much as the mujahidin fought the Soviets in Afghanistan for eight years. Their cause is not Iraqi nationalism; it is global jihad and creating an Islamic state in formerly secular Iraq. Women have been attacked in the streets for not veiling, although women rarely wore headscarves in the Kurdish or Sunni areas of Hussein’s Iraq. Some women have taken to wearing a complete abaya or chador—a loose-fitting garment that covers a woman from head to toe—to prevent attacks or unwanted attention. The lack of security after the invasion of Iraq has sent women scurrying beneath the safety of the veil or to self-imposed seclusion indoors, as vigilantes are free to enforce patriarchal social codes. Girls are pulled out of school, men shop at the market, and cafés close before dusk. It has been noted that “far fewer women now drive cars than before the war and the vast majority of female civil servants in ministries run by Shias are now veiled.”14 Whether this is because of the current security situation, personal comfort, or pressure from Shia clerics is unknown.15 In January 2004, Shia clerics on the Governing Council voted to replace Iraq’s secular civil code, which grants women equal rights with men in terms of divorce, marriage contracts, inheritance, and other personal-status issues, with Islamic family law. An important question remains unanswered: Whose Islamic law? Shia legal interpretation gives women many legal rights in marriage and divorce, but it differs substantially from the Sunni Hanafi interpretation of Islam law practiced by most Arab Sunnis. Sunni Kurds, however, follow yet a third interpretation of Islamic law—that of the Shafii school. As the new Iraqi governing structure will likely be a federal democratic republic—the federal government sharing power with the regional governments—it is possible that each autonomous region will write its own laws affecting women. It is unclear what direction Iraq’s new government will take with regard to women’s issues. Most women’s organizations—Kurdish, Sunni, and Shia—in post-Hussein Iraq seek a secular-type permanent constitution that guarantees women’s right to work for equal pay, equal access to education, and some economic support for victims (and their children) of the former regime. The interim constitution currently holds that all Iraqi citizens are equal without regard for gender, among other things, and discrimination based on gender is illegal. The constitution also provides that 25 percent of the elected legislative seats be set aside for women candidates. How these ideals will be translated into reality still remains to be seen. SPECIAL ISSUES IN THE NEWS Oil Production and Gasoline Supplies Since the American-led invasion of 2003, Baghdad has experienced the most severe gasoline shortage ever. When gas-station customers are informed that there is no gasoline, some become enraged and start shooting. How can an oil-producing country run out of fuel? Insurgents and Islamists explain that Americans have been filling their tanks and stealing oil for their vehicles. Others point to the frequent

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sabotage of oil-production facilities and pipelines to explain the shortage. But another and more probable explanation for this conundrum is that the government has fixed the price of gasoline to less than one U.S. cent per liter. Consequently, gas-station owners with access to subsidized gasoline may act legally and sell gas for pennies—or, for profits 10 to 100 times higher, the merchants can sell it illegally on the black market. Given global oil prices and the added cost of refining oil into automobile gasoline, gas-station owners can opt to smuggle fuel out of the country for higher than market rates for oil. Many have chosen the more lucrative options. Iraq faces additional supply constraints in the form of radical insurgents who frequently target the country’s oil-production and supply facilities. In the three-month period between August and October 2004, terrorists and oil thieves cost Iraq $7 billion in lost revenues, according to the petroleum ministry. Gasoline was subsidized during the Hussein regime, but there are two distinct differences between then and now: Iraqis seem to have more cars on the road, and the security situation is far less safe than under Hussein. Neither the coalition nor Iraq’s nascent security forces—many of whom have been targeted for assassination as collaborators—can protect the nearly 4,000 miles of oil pipeline, much of which is aboveground in uninhabited desert regions. Under Hussein, the Iraqi government co-opted the assistance of local tribes, paying them to protect pipelines running across their lands. American and Iraqi officials have tried this strategy, but it has not been successful. If they pay one tribe, another sabotages the line and then tells the Iraqi government that, since the other tribe failed, the second tribe would be more successful guarding the pipelines. Under Hussein, the rival tribe would have been executed. Since the Iraqis and Americans do not have that option, their attempts to secure the pipelines have been undermined. In an attempt to increase domestic gasoline supplies, the Iraqi government has tried to import refined fuel by truck, but terrorists ambush the vehicles and threaten to kill the drivers unless they quit. General Lawlessness A recently arrived aid worker was warned not to stop her car for the Iraqi police unless she sees American or coalition troops alongside.16 Many Iraqi police uniforms have been stolen or sold to insurgents who set up roadblocks for murdering or kidnapping Westerners. Few jobs exist outside of those provided by the Iraqi interim government, coalition forces, or Western aid agencies. But Iraqis found wearing the uniforms of these agencies are targeted for assassination or threatened to force them to quit. NGOs now request budget line items for bodyguards, body armor, and drivers for their workers. Several aid agencies have pulled out of Iraq because of the deteriorating security situation. In 2004 and 2005, Churches were empty for Christmas services—few wanted to risk being open targets. In years past, a usually brisk trade in Christmas trees has kept several Muslim men employed throughout December; in 2004, sales dragged, and a salesman explained that people were fearful of being identified as Christians and did not want to be seen carrying home a tree.

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The single worst attack sustained by American troops since the liberation of Iraq was made more sinister when parts of the suicide bomber’s body were found to be wearing an Iraqi uniform. In December 2004, a suicide bomber infiltrated a U.S. Army mess tent and detonated himself, killing 22 and wounding more than 70 people. The Bush administration and the Pentagon then publicly admitted what aid workers and private contractors had been saying for months: insurgents have infiltrated the Iraqi security forces and interim administration, perhaps to the highest levels. Iraqis run the mess halls and provide other support services on American military bases; many nonmilitary duties are performed by contractors who in turn hire Iraqis. Traditionally, in a war zone, the military builds its own mess halls and handles all of its own support services for security reasons. Troop deployment is currently at a maximum, and many soldiers are serving their second and third tour of duty in Iraq, including thousands of reservists and National Guardsmen. Further exacerbating the shortage of military personnel, numerous coalition countries, including Poland, Spain, Philippines, Bulgaria, and the Ukraine, withdrew their troops from Iraq in 2004 and 2005. Elections and Formation of Iraqi Government The national elections held on January 30, 2005, saw a tremendous turnout, despite numerous attacks on election workers, candidates, and others thought to be participating in organizing the election. The United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) emerged the largest winner (but did not secure an outright majority), garnering 140 seats of the 275-seat parliament. The two main parties in the UIA are Shia Islamist parties: the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), led by cleric Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, and the Daawa party, led by physician Ibrahim al-Jaafari. The Sunni Arabs by and large did not take part in the elections. Many of the Sunnis were fearful of reprisals from the insurgents, who were bitterly opposed to the elections, while other Sunnis voluntarily did not take part, since they questioned the legitimacy of the electoral process. The Kurds enthusiastically took part in the elections and secured large majorities in the northern Kurdish regions. Although the elections were widely viewed as a success because of the high turnout and the failure of the insurgents to mount significant attacks on election day, much of the political momentum of the elections was lost as the winners squabbled for three months about the composition of the government. This gave the insurgents a political opening that they have seized by mounting increasingly destructive and frequent attacks on civilian, coalition, and government targets. Meanwhile a government has been formed with Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, being appointed to the largely ceremonial post of president and Ibrahim al-Jaafari as the prime minister. Both the Shiites and the Kurdish parties have involved some Sunnis in the government and gave the important oil ministry to a Sunni Arab. NOTABLE PEOPLE Alawi, Ayad (b. 1945). Interim prime minister of Iraq and a former neurologist and successful Iraqi businessman, Alawi hails from a wealthy Baghdad family related

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to the royal family that ruled prerevolutionary Iraq. Alawi went to London in 1971 to continue his medical studies; in 1975, he denounced Saddam Hussein and the ruling Baath Party. Alawi worked for more than 10 years to defeat Hussein and served on the U.S.-formed Iraqi Governing Council. To establish his legitimacy as an independent actor, Alawi has distanced himself from his American sponsors and criticized the U.S. decision to dismantle Hussein’s Iraqi army in 2003. Although a strict secularist, Grand Ayatollah Sistani supports Alawi’s political ambitions. Hussein, Saddam (b. 1937). Former ruler of Baathist Iraq. In college in Baghdad, Hussein joined the Baathist party and participated in a failed coup attempt in 1956. After the overthrow of the monarchy, he became involved in an assassination attempt on Brigadier Abdul Karim Qasim and, when discovered, fled the country. When the Baathists rose to power, Hussein returned to Iraq (1963) and married his wife, Sadija. They later had two sons and three daughters. In 1968, he became a member of the Revolutionary Command Council, and for years was the power behind the president, Ahmad Hassan Bakr. In 1979, Hussein became president and murdered almost all of his political rivals. His regime was run through terror, assassination, torture, and imprisonment. Under his rule, the minority Sunni Arabs held most positions of power, and Hussein refused to invest in the infrastructure and development of the Shia south and the Kurdish north. After the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, Hussein was captured on December 15, 2003, while hiding in a dark, narrow passageway under a shack on a sheep farm, in a village 15 kilometers from his ancestral home in Tikrit. He is on trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity (March 2006). Jaafari, Ibrahim al- (b. 1947). Shia and head of Iraq’s Daawa Party; selected by the Iraqi National Assembly as the first prime minister of the new government in 2005. Educated as a medical doctor in Mosul, al-Jaafari participated in an uprising against Saddam Hussein’s government in the 1970s. After the government’s violent subjugation of the protests, al-Jaafari went into exile for two decades in Iran and the United Kingdom. He was vice president of Iraq under Prime Minister Iyad Alawi. Al-Jaafari favors a federal system with regional autonomy, sharia as one of the sources of Iraqi legislation, full and equal rights for all Iraqis irrespective of religion or gender, and a full participatory democratic political system for Iraq. Sistani, Sayyid Ali Husayn (b. 1930). Leading scholar, religious cleric, and one of Iraq’s four grand ayatollahs, although commonly considered the most senior of the four. A devout and quiet man, Sistani’s life revolves around prayer, teaching, and his religious obligations. Saddam Hussein imprisoned the cleric—as he did many other Shiite leaders—after the Shia uprising following the Iraqi defeat in 1991. After Sistani’s release from prison, he was sometimes subject to house arrest but never formally charged with any crimes. Sistani’s quiescent pietism and his careful distancing from separatist Shia groups protected him from the Baathists’ harsh attacks, but these factors were unable to protect him from the sometimes random violence perpetrated by radical Sunnis against Shia Iraqis. In 1997, two unidentified men visited his home under the pretense of wanting to meet the revered cleric.

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Iraqi prime minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari addresses the country’s newly elected parliament

Once they gained access, they murdered two of Sistani’s assistants and wounded several others. Sistani emerged unscathed, but since the attack he has become a recluse. Although he has not professed any interest in public office, the ayatollah has vocally supported the need to free and fair elections in Iraq. Millions of Shia Iraqis revere and respect Sistani. His Web site (http://www.sistani.org/html/eng/) offers religious rulings (fatwas) on a variety of social, economic, and religious matters ranging from questions of ritual purity to the legality of lottery tickets. Talabani, Ala (dates unknown). Cofounder of the Iraqi Women’s High Council (IRWC), which was established in October 2003. Through the IRWC and Women for a Free Iraq, Talabani assisted in drafting policies on the role of women in Iraq’s postconflict reconstruction. In 1986, she joined the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, one of Iraq’s largest opposition parties. Under the Baathist regime, Talabani was fired from engineering and teaching positions for refusing membership in the Baath Party and for being Kurdish. After the 1991 Gulf War, she fled with her family to Iran, Syria, and finally England, where she denounced the policies of Saddam Hussein. After Hussein’s removal, Talabani returned to Iraq, where she was nominated to the Iraqi Governing Council (though never appointed) and became deputy to the minister of social affairs. She consults for World Bank, UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), and the nonpartisan think tank, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Zarqawi, Abu Musab al- (b. 1966). Jordanian citizen and head of the militant terrorist network al-Qaida (formerly known as Tawhid and Jihad) in Iraq. Al-Zarqawi’s real name is Ahmad Fadil an-Nazal al-Khalaylah. In the late 1980s,

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al-Zarqawi left Jordan to join the resistance in Afghanistan. He returned to Jordan and was arrested in 1992 for conspiracy to overthrow the monarchy. After his release from prison in 1999, al-Zarqawi attempted to blow up an international hotel in Amman but failed, and he fled to Pakistan or Afghanistan, where he formed a militant Islamist group. In 2003, the United States accused al-Zarqawi of being one link between al-Qaida and Saddam Hussein, giving legitimacy to the planned U.S.-invasion of Iraq. This accusation was later proven to be based on false intelligence. Al-Zarqawi has appeared on low-quality video films distributed throughout Iraq, in which he threatens and kills hostages. Osama bin Laden has publicly embraced al-Zarqawi as his deputy in Iraq. NOTES 1. The complete Hammurabi code is available at http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/MESO/ CODE.HTM. 2. The Baathists are a political party in Nasserite Egypt, Syria, and Iraq; baath means “rebirth” in Arabic. Baathists ruled Iraq under Saddam Hussein until the 2003 invasion by the coalition forces. Baathist political philosophy is an amalgam of panArabism, Arab socialism, secularism, nationalism, and an ideology of “strength through peace” or militarism. The party’s motto of Wahda, Hurriya, Ishtirrakiya means “Unity, Freedom, and Socialism.” Here “freedom” refers to freedom from Western interference. 3. Global Policy Forum and Save the Children UK, Iraq Sanctions: Humanitarian Implications and Options for the Future (London: Global Policy Forum, 2002). See chapter 4.1, “Causes of Human Suffering: Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War,” http://www.globalpolicy. org/security/sanction/iraq1/2002/paper.htm. 4. “Iraqi forces used chemical weapons in battle approximately 195 times between 1983 and 1988, and also against Iraqi Kurdish civilians, including the notorious case of Halabja, but US military and economic support continued.” Human Rights Watch, Human Rights in Iraq (New Haven, CT: Human Rights Watch, 1990), 113. 5. Ibid. 6. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, “Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report” (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993). 7. “After the War Is Over,” Economist, March 6, 2003. 8. For more information on Iraqi Christians, see http://www.christiansofiraq.com/ index.html/. 9. As of November 16, 2004. 10. “History of the Jews in Iraq,” Wikipedia.com, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jews_ in_Iraq/. 11. Gazeteer of Iraq, http://www.gazeteer.com/countries/iraq.htm. 12. Also see Jawad M. Hashim, “Reconstruction of Iraq Post-Saddam Hussain,” presentation to the Royal Canadian Military Institute, May 22, 2003. 13. See USAID’s report on Iraqi reconstruction at http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/. 14. “Elections or Caucuses?” Economist, January 22, 2004. 15. To review some of Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s legal opinions, see his Web site, http:// www.sistani.org/. 16. Author interview with an American aid worker based in Basra, whose name has been withheld for her protection (January, 2005).

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RESOURCE GUIDE Suggested Reading Abd al-Jabbar, Falih. Shi’ite Movement in Iraq. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. Anderson, Liam D. The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy or Division? New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. Bird, Christiane. A Thousand Signs, a Thousand Revolts. New York: Ballantine Books, 2004. Blix, Hans. Disarming Iraq. New York: Pantheon Books, 2004. Cothran, Helen. National Security: Opposing Viewpoints. San Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press, 2004. Downing, David. Iraq: 1968–2003. Chicago: Raintree, 2004. Moore, Robin. Hunting Down Saddam: The Inside Story of the Search and Capture. New York: St. Martin’s, 2005. Rieff, David. At the Point of a Gun: Democratic Dreams and Armed Intervention. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005. Saleem, Hiner. My Father’s Rifle: A Childhood in Kurdistan. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005. Sasson, Jean P. Mayada, Daughter of Iraq: One Woman’s Survival under Saddam Hussein. New York: Dutton, 2003. Shostak, Arthur B. Turning Point: The Rocky Road to Peace and Reconstruction. New York: Chelsea House, 2005. Sifry, Micah L., and Christopher Cerf. The Iraq War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions. New York: Touchstone Books, 2003. Windawi, Thura al-. Thura’s Diary: My Life in Wartime Iraq. New York: Viking, 2004.

Films and Videos About Baghdad. New York: InCounter Productions, 2004. Sinan Antoon, an Iraqi poet, returns to his native Baghdad after 12 years of exile in the United States. http://www. aboutbaghdad.com/misc/ICPTeam.htm. Control Room. Santa Monica, CA: Lions Gate Home Entertainment, 2004. Documentary directed by Jehane Noujaim covering the Arab news channel al-Jazeera and the second Iraq war. http://www.controlroommovie.com/. Dreaming a Nation: The Kurds. Princeton, NJ: Films for the Humanities and Sciences, 1994. Exploration of Kurds’ fears that they will be the targets of genocide and their desire to form their own Kurdish state. Greetings from Missile Street. Joe Public Films: 2001. Members of the nonprofit organization Voices in the Wilderness (http://www.vitw.org/) campaign in the summer of 2000 to end economic sanctions against Iraq. They went to Basra and stayed with families who survived on humanitarian aid rations and saw the hardships experienced under economic sanctions. http://www.joepublicfilms.com/sfd.htm. Last Letters Home. New York: HBO, New York Times, and Time Life Books, 2004. Fourteen U.S. families talk about family members killed in Iraq. http://www.hbo.com/docs/ programs/lastlettershome/. Uncle Saddam. Anaheim, CA: Iraqi Forum for Democracy, 2002. Documentary on Saddam Hussein’s life. Uncovered: The Whole Truth about the Iraq War. The Disinformation Company and the Center for American Progress, 2003. View of the Bush administration as it prepares to invade Iraq in 2003. http://www.truthuncovered.com/.

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Voices of Iraq. 2004. Iraqis speak about the current situation. http://www.voicesofiraq.com/. Zaman, the Man from the Reeds. Baghdad: Amer Alwan, 2003. A man tries to procure medicine for his wife.

Web Sites All Our Children in Iraq: http://allourchildren.org/ Azzaman.com (English-language press from Baghdad): http://azzaman.com/english/ Baghdad.com (English-language news from Baghdad): http://baghdad.com/ Baghdad Museum: http://www.baghdadmuseum.org/technology/ CIA World Factbook: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html International Women’s Forum on Iraq: http://www.iwf.org/iraq/default.asp Iraq-America Freedom Alliance http://www.untoldiraq.org/ Iraq Memory Foundation: http://www.iraaqmemory.org/ Iraq.net (English-language network on Iraq): http://www.iraq.net/ Iraq War Veterans Organization: http://www.iraqwarveterans.org/ Iraqi Orphan Care Organization: http://www.iraqiorphanscare.org/ioc/ Iraqi Schools: http://www.iraqischools.com/ Kurdistan Observer (Kurdish newspaper in Iraq): http://kurdistanobserver.com/ Library of Congress—Iraq: http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/iqtoc.html Operation Iraqi Children: http://www.operationiraqichildren.org/ USAID in Iraq: http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/ U.S. Department of Defense Iraq map: http://www.defenselink.mil/issues/iraq/maps.html U.S. Department of State—Iraqi Reconstruction: http://www.state.gov/p/nea/ci/c3212.htm U.S. embassy in Iraq: http://baghdad.usembassy.gov/ Women for Iraq: http://www.womenforiraq.org/ Women’s Alliance for a Democratic Iraq: http://www.wafdi.org/about_wafdi/

10 Nigeria Kathryn M. Coughlin

OVERVIEW Nigeria is a federal republic comprised of 30 states and the Federal Capital Territory at Abuja. With one of the highest populations in Africa, Nigeria accounts for almost 20 percent of the total continent’s population. Any population-estimation models for Nigeria must take into account the effects of an excessive mortality rate, lower life expectancy, higher infant mortality, and death rates due to AIDS, all of which are hard to estimate. These factors, coupled with the fact that the last census was carried out in 1991, make it difficult to estimate precise population figures. The U.S. Census Bureau and Central Intelligence Agency both approximate the population of Nigeria at 128,771,998.1 For political reasons, the 1991 Nigerian census did not record statistics of religion, ethnic, or tribal identity, enabling both Muslims and Christians to claim a majority. The U.S. Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report (2004) estimates that Muslims represent about 50 percent of the population and Christians about 40 percent, with the balance composed of animists and those who follow traditional African religions.2 These figures are echoed in United Nations reports and those of international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Of the approximate 64,386,000 Muslims in Nigeria, almost all are Sunnis who follow the Maliki school of jurisprudence; there are no known statistics that reflect a Shia population in Nigeria. Sufi brotherhoods date back to the nineteenth century in west Africa; the Qadiri and Tijani brotherhoods are two of the predominate groups in Nigeria today. There are no known statistics measuring membership in either group.3

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With hundreds of ethnic and language groups, Nigeria’s people are among some of the most diverse in the world. In the northern provinces of the country live the Hausa-Fulani, a predominantly Muslim ethnic group. The Yoruba are found predominantly in the southwest and are traditionally Christian, though about a quarter follow Islam. The Christian Igbo are the most populous ethnicity in the southern and eastern sections of the country; Roman Catholics represent the largest denomination, but Pentecostal and other evangelical groups have made large inroads in the past decade. With hundreds of local languages, English serves as the lingua franca, and most Nigerians speak at least two other languages, one of which is usually Hausa, Yoruba, or Igbo. The modern nation-state of Nigeria is a product of European imperialism. Its modern history begins with the British occupation in 1903 and the subsequent merger of disparate northern and southern states into the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria (1914). Modern Nigerian history can be understood in terms of three primary periods: the irenic spread of Islam during the medieval period, the impact of the Atlantic slave trade on the region in the early modern period, and the European colonization of the lands of present-day Nigeria.4 The spread of Islam in northern (and later southwestern) Nigeria began a thousand years ago when traders, itinerant merchants, Sufis, and Muslim missionaries began to move throughout west Africa. Later, in wars from 1804 to 1808, the Sokoto Caliphate brought most of the northern region and parts of present-day Niger and Cameroon under its control. The remnants of the Sokoto Caliphate explain in part the sharp cultural and religious differences between the north and south.5 The Atlantic and Saharan slave trade profoundly influenced the trajectory of Nigerian history and impacted unrelated areas of life, such as religious conversion and political autonomy. More than 3.5 million people were forcibly deported and sold as slaves in the transatlantic slave trade from approximately 1650 through the early 1860s. The Saharan slave trade lasted much longer—more than 1,000 years, until the early 1900s—and it is nearly impossible to estimate the number of human beings sold and traded. The colonial era, although relatively brief (1903–60), greatly impacted modern Nigeria, as it unleashed rapid social and economic changes. Early on, agricultural exports accounted for much of the national wealth and required huge investments in supporting infrastructure, such as the building of roads, ports, and dams. When a population explosion and subsequent droughts negatively affected food exports, economic growth slowed and foreign capital reserves evaporated. The shift from a largely agricultural society to an industrialized one brought about a rapid transfer of the rural population into urban areas. These widespread social changes required shifting ethnic loyalties that dominate national politics today.6 In the more than four decades since Nigeria’s independence, Nigeria has experienced a number of military coups, the brutal Biafra civil war (1967–70), and successive corrupt governments that looted oil profits from the national treasury. As the most populous country in Africa and the 11th-largest oil producer in the world, modern Nigeria bears scrutiny because of its potential impact on Africa and the world economy.

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CULTURE, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS It is difficult to generalize about Nigerian culture and society because of the high number of different ethnic and religious groups. Traditional art forms include painting, sculpture, wood masks, music, and dancing. But in the United States, the bestknown Nigerian art form lies in its writing, specifically plays, novels, and poetry. Nigeria has a rich history of postcolonial English-language literature. Two of the most celebrated African authors hail from Nigeria: Chinua Achebe and Nobel Prize–winner (1986) Wole Soyinka. Chinua Achebe (b. 1930) is considered “the father of the African novel in English” as well as one of the world’s most acclaimed writers; his works explore the impact of European culture on African (Nigerian Ibo) society.7 His classic novel Things Fall Apart (first published in 1958), has sold more than 10 million copies and has been published in 50 different languages. Achebe, like most Nigeria writers, has been an outspoken critic of the Nigerian military regimes. In 2004, Achebe refused the Commander of the Federal Republic (CFR), Nigeria’s second-highest civilian honor, to draw attention to political corruption and social injustice in Nigeria. Achebe teaches literature at Bard College in upstate New York. Wole Soyinka (b. 1934) is Africa’s most distinguished playwright and the first African to win the Nobel Prize for literature. Soyinka played active roles in Nigeria’s political history and was imprisoned in 1967 during the Nigerian civil war. Like Achebe and other Nigerian writers, he has been an outspoken critic of many Nigerian governments, protesting through his art forms: the novel and play. Soyinka was threatened under the regime of dictator General Sani Abacha (1993–98) and he fled to the United States, where he currently teaches at Emory University in Atlanta. Ben Okri (b. 1959), another distinguished Nigerian writer, won the Booker Prize for fiction in 1991 for his novel The Famished Road; he received an OBE (Most Excellent Order of the British Empire) in 2001. Ken Saro-Wiwa (1941–95), the Nigerian human-rights activist hanged by General Sana Abacha’s military regime, was also an author and television producer. His soap opera Basi & Co. was reputed to be the most-watched television show on the African continent.8 These writers, like other Nigerian authors, have used their novels, plays, and even television scripts to criticize the corruption of successive military regimes and the uneven distribution of resources—especially proceeds from oil exports and human-rights abuses.

Muslim-Christian Relations The Nigerian constitution guarantees freedom of religion and freedom to worship, teach, practice, and observe one’s faith.9 And while the country remained an observer of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, there is no official state religion.10 Christians and other non-Muslims point to the adoption of Islamic law in some of Nigeria’s northern states as evidence of an establishment of a state religion and cite use of state finances for mosque construction and pilgrimages to Mecca (hajj). But several states, including some in the north, use government revenues to fund Christian pilgrimages to Jerusalem as well.11

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The national constitution provides that states may approve Islamic laws and recognize its courts in matters of personal status (family law), where all parties are Muslim.12 Zamfara State adopted an Islamic legal code in 2000. Eleven other northern states have adopted at least parts of traditional Islamic law—Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Jigawa, Niger, Sokoto, and Yobe. Muslims must comply with sharia provisions in some states, while it is optional in others. Non-Muslims are not required to submit to sharia jurisdiction, although they may opt to, especially when the penalty under sharia is less stringent than that under civil law. Defendants have the right to challenge the constitutionality of sharia criminal statutes through the civil courts, but there are no known cases where a sharia provision has been ruled unconstitutional.13 In a particularly devastating show of religious partisanship, the governor of Kano spearheaded opposition to polio-vaccination campaigns throughout 2003, on the grounds that vaccines approved by the World Health Organization were a threat to Muslims’ health and fertility.14 Muslim leaders in hundreds of northern Nigerian towns and villages limited or halted door-to-door immunizations, informing their communities that the U.S. government had tainted the drugs with HIV or infertility drugs.15 Some leaders later admitted that they never believed these allegations, but they remained silent “to stop anything associated with the United States.”16 “People believe that America hates Muslims and so whatever comes from the United States, no matter how good it is, people will reject it,” said Sheikh Muhammed Nasir Muhammed, the chief cleric at the second-largest mosque in Kano.17 In February 2004, Muslims killed more than 75 Christians, at least 48 of them inside a church compound, in the town of Yelwa, in the central Nigerian state of Plateau.18 Then, in May, Christian militias slaughtered about 700 Muslims in revenge; Muslim women were also abducted and raped. In retaliation, Muslims in the northern city of Kano avenged the deaths of their coreligionists by indiscriminately killing around 200 Christians.19 Witnesses reported that police and military personnel deployed in Kano to end the bloodshed took part in the massacres themselves.20 Violence of this sort is not rare. In the state of Plateau, 3,000 people have died due to interreligious violence since 2001.21 This figure does not include the thousands of lives lost in other states. In response to the May 2004 killings, President Olesegun Obasanjo (1937– ) fired the governor and state assembly, accusing them of incompetence in keeping public order.22 Under emergency powers, Obasanjo can also fire the governors of the northern states and dismiss the elected assembly, but he dare not for fear of igniting more interreligious violence: his moves would be seen as those of a Christian ruler oppressing Muslim elected leaders. Some Nigerian state governors actively encouraged interfaith and interethnic dialogue and sought to prevent further violence and tension. The federal government under the leadership of President Obasanjo has encouraged the activities of NGOs such as the Kaduna-based Inter-faith Mediation Center and the Muslim/Christian Dialogue Forum. Cardinal Francis Arinze (1932– ), a conservative Roman Catholic archbishop from Nigeria, was asked to head the Pontifical Council for Interreligious

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Dialogue in 1985; since then, he has traveled throughout his country and extensively around the world promoting dialogue with Muslim and Jewish groups. Implementation of Sharia in the Northern States Over the past hundred years, northern Nigerian jurisprudence had incorporated some elements of Islamic law, but it is the implementation of severe criminal sentences (hudud ) based on a strict interpretation of Islamic law that has garnered both domestic and international attention.23 These sentences include stoning a convict to death, amputation of one or more limbs, and public flogging. Non-Muslims are not subject to these penalties; nevertheless, Christians and animists fear that implementation of hudud punishments normalize different penalties for crime based on one’s religious affiliation—a strong departure from the secular law they have long enjoyed. Although at first welcomed as a more equitable system of justice, many Nigerian Muslims now believe that the sharia court system is as corrupt as the secular ones: the rich and well connected still avoid harsh penalties, and a Muslim defendant challenging his prosecution is often portrayed as questioning Islam and the will of God.24 Throughout northern Nigeria many Muslims believe that the increased implementation of Islamic law has been little but a means of the political elite establishing their religious—and therefore political—legitimacy. The vast majority of Nigerians, Muslim and non-Muslim, long for justice—whether Islamic or otherwise—and a more equitable society. Socially hierarchical and class-stratified Nigeria, however, holds the promise of future tension and unrest as long as justice proves elusive and governments corrupt. WOMEN AND THE FAMILY Nigeria is a male-dominated traditional society. Ethnicity, culture, illiteracy, and religion are some of the factors that bar Nigerian women from fully exercising their rights under law.25 Whether the source of inequality is religious, cultural, or ethnic tradition, Nigerian society does not value women on the same plane as men. The female literacy rate is lower than that of a man’s: 60.6 percent versus 76 percent.26 This situation exists across religious lines. In Muslim, Christian, and animist communities throughout Nigeria, women suffer a de facto and de jure second-class citizenship. For example, Nigerian criminal law characterizes assault on a man as a felony, the penalty for which is up to three years in prison; assaulting a woman is a misdemeanor, the penalty for which yields a maximum sentence of two years.27 This is not based on Islamic law but rather is a codification of gender discrimination inherent in paternalistic, traditional societies. Women in Nigeria are subjected to horrific levels of domestic violence—physical, sexual, and psychological. “On a daily basis, Nigerian women are beaten, raped and even murdered by members of their family for supposed transgressions, which can range from not having meals ready on time to visiting family members without their husband’s permission,” according to Stephane Mikala, Deputy Director of Amnesty International’s Africa Program.28 This violence is not limited to the

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Muslim community and in fact is found throughout Nigeria. As in Pakistan and India, women in Nigeria are subject to “acid baths,” where a husband or mother-inlaw punishes a woman by throwing acid in her face. Gruesome disfigurement and even death follow these attacks, which go largely unprosecuted. In Nigeria, as in many developing countries, domestic violence is considered a private matter not subject to judicial inquiry. In those few cases where a victim accuses her husband, father, or mother-in-law of assault, law enforcement or court officers often refuse to arrest the offender, believing it to be a private matter.29 Female genital mutilation (FGM) is practiced throughout Nigeria in various forms, from clitoridectomies to full infibulation.30 These practices are found across ethnic and tribal lines, in urban and rural areas, and across religious-community lines. Although frequently thought of as an Islamic practice, FGM is really an indigenous African rite found throughout sub-Saharan Africa. It is rarely, if ever, performed in the Levantine or Asian Middle East. The U.S. State Department estimated that,

In addition to their childcare and homemaking duties, Nigerian women often sell fruits and vegetables grown on their home plots, as they do here at the Oshodi Market in Lagos (April 15, 2004). U.S. State Department.

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as of 2001, 25 percent of all Nigerian women had experienced some form of FGM.31 This number is based on a National Population Commission of Nigeria (NPC) survey in 1999, but the data are based only on married women between the ages of 15 and 49. The NPC later acknowledged that the exclusion of girls who were not married but who might have undergone one of the FGM procedures erroneously skewed the data toward a lower national percentage.32 Some organizations estimate that 60–90 percent of all women in Nigeria have undergone some form of FGM.33 Another issue affecting the status of women in Nigeria is the introduction of the Sharia Penal Code in 2000 by Zamfara State, which was later followed by 11 other northern states in Nigeria. The case of Amina Lawal, convicted of adultery and sentenced to death by stoning, brought international attention to the application of sharia in northern Nigeria. A sharia court in Bakori, Katsina State, found her guilty on March 22, 2002, based on the prima facie evidence that she bore a child outside marriage and an alleged confession. Lawal’s conviction was appealed to a lower sharia appeal court, which upheld the conviction. A second appeal to the higher Katsina Sharia Court of Appeal was successful; the court found that the alleged confession and conviction were invalid. Though no executions were carried out in 2004, the sharia courts continue to mete out death sentences for sexually related offenses. In October 2004, the National Study Group on the Death Penalty commissioned by President Obasanjo issued a report recommending a moratorium on executions until the Nigerian justice system could guarantee fair trial and due process. The government has not, to date, scheduled a moratorium, and given interethnic and interreligious tensions in the country, will not impose a cessation for fear of being accused of succumbing to Western (i.e., American) pressures to curb the Islamic courts’ powers or of interfering with the Islamic justice system. SPECIAL ISSUES IN THE NEWS Two of the most troublesome issues plaguing oil-rich Nigeria, in addition to intercommunal hostility and women’s-rights violations, are child labor and human trafficking and the alarming rise of HIV/AIDS infections in both rural and urban Nigeria. Child Labor and Human Trafficking In 2000, the International Labor Organization estimated that 23.5 percent of Nigerian children work in farming, fishing, and animal husbandry. Outside of these occupations, children work in markets and the streets as hawkers, scavengers, mendicants, and shoe shiners.34 Commercial sexual exploitation of children is widespread in urban Nigeria, and according to a U.S. Department of Labor report, the country serves as “a source, transit and destination for trafficking in children.”35 More often than not, girls are pressed into domestic service or wage labor if a family is unable to pay for their education; in Nigerian families, educational priorities are vested with the family’s sons first and, if resources permit, then with daughters.

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The Nigerian government’s labor laws set the minimum age for wage employment at 12 years.36 Extensive regulations ostensibly protect children under age 16 from working in mines, on heavy machinery, and in the evenings; children cannot work more than four hours consecutively or for more than eight hours total each day.37 While the Ministry of Employment, Labor, and Productivity is charged with enforcing legal provisions regarding work conditions, the reality is that there are few inspectors and inspections are limited to the formal work sector, where few children are employed.38 Moreover, many inspectors are sympathetic to the needs of poor families—many would starve but for the meager financial contributions of their children. In July 2003, a comprehensive antitrafficking law—the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act—was passed. This act established a national agency for enforcement and to coordinate countertrafficking work. Section 11 of the act stipulates life prison terms for any persons involved in child trafficking on Nigerian soil.39 The act further provides “for prison terms for any persons who procure, either for themselves or others any children under the age of eighteen or for any persons who commit children in their care to prostitution or indecent assault.”40 One of the most difficult aspects of eliminating child or human trafficking is the lack of moral outrage in Nigerian society. A correspondent for the Economist wrote of a 16-year-old Nigerian girl whose mother sold her into prostitution in Gabon. The girl escaped and returned home to find her mother angry. “She said I didn’t want to make money for her. She said other girls go for three months and buy cars for their parents.”41 The U.S. government currently maintains watch lists on countries that are involved in or susceptible to human trafficking, and each year releases a report detailing specific countries’ responses to the problem as well as an evaluation of those responses. In June 2005, Nigeria was praised by U.S. secretary of state Condoleezza Rice for its efforts during 2004 to enforce its laws against trafficking, and the State Department upgraded Nigeria from the Tier 2 Watch List to the Tier 2 List.42 According to the report, the Nigerian Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) reported more than 40 cases of suspected trafficking, which led to eight prosecutions. In November, 2003, the Nigerian High Court handed down one conviction for human trafficking, which appears to be the only conviction to date under the 2003 antitrafficking law. Perhaps more importantly, NAPTIP began investigating law enforcement officials suspected of trafficking. In 2004, police rescued 35 victims, opened 27 investigations, and arrested 40 suspected traffickers. With only one conviction to date, it would appear that Nigeria’s efforts to eliminate child and human trafficking are lackluster at best. In reading the U.S. State Department’s report, it may be important to remember that Nigeria is the fifth-largest oil supplier to the United States and, had significant progress not been reported, Nigeria risked trade sanctions.43 Lack of legal enforcement, police corruption, and the grinding persistence of poverty ensures that child labor and trafficking will not be eradicated from Nigeria in the near future.

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HIV/AIDS Each minute, a Nigerian man, woman, or child becomes infected with HIV.44 Within a few years, Nigeria will be home to more people living with AIDS than any other country in Africa, based on projected population models. During the first five months of 2005, more than 102,000 people died of AIDS or AIDS-related complications, according to Journalists against AIDS Nigeria.45 Though the national government has undertaken a national program to educate and eliminate AIDS, numerous political, social, cultural, and economic obstacles have prevented a discernible decline in the number of infections. One of the most overwhelming impediments to reducing the HIV/AIDS rate in Nigeria is the continued denial of the existence of an AIDS epidemic. Cultural and religious factors, including myths and misperceptions about sexually transmitted diseases, inhibit the ability of health-care workers to educate the rural populace on the dangers of unsafe sex and using secondhand needles. The cost and availability of high-quality condoms remain out of reach for most Nigerians, and cultural and religious rationales prevent discussion and education about the necessity of condoms, even in a marital relationship. Many Nigerian men live in urban areas, separated from their ruralbased wives for long periods of time. After sexual contact with an infected man or woman, these men bring the virus home to their wives, and then pass it on to their children through the birth process. Nigerian women do not have the social or legal right to require their husbands to use barrier protection, assuming they even have access to condoms. NOTABLE PEOPLE Abacha, Sani (1943–98). General and military dictator of Nigeria from 1993 to 1998. Abacha was prominently involved in two bloodless coups that brought General Muhammadu Buhari to power (1983) and removed him (1985). Abacha seized power in 1993, and his regime’s brutality made it extremely unpopular among the masses. General Abacha’s government perpetrated massive human-rights abuses, the most infamous of which was its hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa. The subsequent government of Obasanjo (1999–) has portrayed Abacha and his family as guilty of widespread looting of national resources and the country’s coffers. He died of a heart attack, allegedly prompted by a Viagra-induced orgy, and was quickly buried the next day, without an autopsy, which has fueled rumors that he was assassinated by one of his political enemies. Arinze, Francis (b. 1932). John Paul II appointed Arinze the prefect of the Congregation for Divine Worship and Discipline of the Sacraments for the Vatican in Rome (2002), where he currently serves. In 1985, the cardinal was called to Rome to become president of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue; he has traveled extensively around the world promoting dialogue with Muslim and Jewish groups. He was elevated to the College of Cardinals in 1985 and was widely discussed as a successor to Pope John Paul II after his death in 2005.

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Imam, Ayesha Mje-Tei (b. 1960). A self-identified Muslim feminist, teacher, and activist, Imam holds advanced degrees in sociology and social anthropology (from the School of African and Asian Studies, University of Sussex, Great Britain) and has been working in the field of women’s and human rights for more than 20 years. Since 1992, Imam has served as coordinator of the Women Living under Muslim Laws (http://www.wluml.org/english/index.shtml) and is a founding director of BAOBAB for Women’s Rights (http://www.baobabwomen.org/). In 2002, Imam received the John Humphrey Freedom Award (Canada). She is an adviser to the United Nations’ African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IEDP) and has published widely on Muslim women’s rights broadly and in northern Nigeria. Obasanjo, Olesegun (b. 1937). President of Nigeria since 1999. A Yoruban, Obasanjo was a career soldier before serving twice as the Nigerian head of state: once as a military ruler (from 1976 to 1979) and currently as the elected president. Obasanjo protested the human-rights violations of Sani Abacha’s regime and was imprisoned until Abacha’s death in 1998. After release from prison, Abasanjo announced that he was a born-again Christian, which has increased his popularity in southern Nigeria, where Christianity is predominant; in the 1999 elections, however, he fared well in the northern Muslim states as well. Running against Muslim and former military ruler General Muhammadu Buhari in the 2003 elections, Obasanjo did not poll as well in the Muslim north, and the country continues to polarize largely along religious lines. Saro-Wiwa, Ken (1941–95). Well-known Nigeria author and television producer and president of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), an organization to defend the environmental and human rights of the people who live in the Niger River delta region. Saro-Wiwa led a peaceful campaign against the oil contracts secured by Royal Dutch Shell, arguing that the company had inflicted environmental damage in the Niger Delta region; he was captured by the Nigerian military and imprisoned. A military tribunal found Saro-Wiwa—a staunch pacifist—guilty of the murder of four Ogoni leaders. Governments and humanrights organizations worldwide condemned the trial as fraudulent and urged the dictator Sani Abacha to spare Saro-Wiwa’s life. They also called upon Shell to intervene. Saro-Wiwa was executed in November 1995. NOTES 1. CIA, World Factbook 2005, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ ni.html. 2. U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report, September 15, 2004. For the section on Nigeria, see http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2004/35376.htm. The CIA’s estimates for 2005 provide the same religious breakdown: http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/ factbook/geos/ni.html#People. Also see National Population Commission (Nigeria), Nigeria: Demographic and Health Survey, 2003 (Calverton, MD: ORC Macro, 2003), chap. 1. 3. John Paden, “Islam and Democratic Federalism in Nigeria,” Africa Notes, no. 8 (March 2002), 3, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/anotes_0203.pdf.

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4. For this historical division, the author is indebted to World66.com (beta version), which features an overview of Nigerian history: http://www.world66.com/africa/nigeria/ history/. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. See his profile: http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Chinua-Achebe/. 8. “Ken Saro-Wiwa,” Wikipedia, http://www.answers.com/Ken%20Saro-Wiwa/. 9. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999), chap. 2, pt. 4, sec. 38. 10. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999), chap. 1, pt. 2, sec. 10. 11. U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report. 12. Paden, “Islam,” 6. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. Glenn McKenzie, “In Nigeria, Religion and Politics Threaten Global Polio Campaign,” Science and Theology News, April 2004, http://www.stnews.org/News-877.htm. 16. John Donnelly, “Muslims’ Fears Pose Barrier to Fighting Polio,” Boston Globe, January 11, 2004. 17. Ibid. 18. Human Rights Watch, Revenge in the Name of Religion: The Cycle of Violence in Plateau and Kano States, May 2005. 19. “Nigerian Politicians ‘Fuel Unrest,’” BBCNews On-Line, May 25, 2005, http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4578081.stm. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. “Falling Out, but Not Yet Apart: Timid Moves to Curb fighting between Christians and Muslims,” Economist, May 20, 2004. 23. Hudud are punishments for six crimes against the rights of God, the penalties for which are prescribed in the Quran or in the hadith. They are theft (amputation of the hand), illicit sexual relations (death by stoning or 100 lashes), accusations of illicit sex (80 lashes), drinking alcohol (80 lashes), apostasy (death or banishment), and highway robbery (death). 24. Dan Isaacs, “Islam in Nigeria: Simmering Tensions,” BBC News, September 24, 2003. 25 For a thorough discussion of the social, economic and political status of women in Nigeria, see the Canadian International Development Agency’s Industrial Cooperation Program’s report “Gender Profile: Nigeria,” June 2002. 26. CIA, World Factbook 2005. 27. Nigerian criminal code, secs. 353 and 360. 28. “Nigeria: Level of Violence against Women in the Home Shockingly High,” Amnesty International press release, May 31, 2005, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ ENGAFR440122005/. 29. See Amnesty International, “Nigeria: Unheard Voices,” May 31, 2005, AI Index: AFR 44/004/2005. 30. For more information on female genital mutilation, see chapters on Egypt and Ethiopia. 31. U.S. Department of State, Nigeria Report on Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) or Female Genital Cutting (FGC), June 1, 2001. This report was released by the senior coordinator for international women’s issues.

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32. Noted by the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board, “Country of Origin Research,” November 27, 2003, http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/research/ndp/ref/ ?action=view&doc=nga41705e. 33. Afrol News, June 19, 2005, http://www.afrol.com/Categories/Women/FGM/ msindex.htm. 34. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2002: Nigeria, March 31, 2003, sec. 6d, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18220.htm. Accurate statistics on children in exploitative or hazardous work are unavailable. Anthony Hodges, Children’s and Women’s Rights in Nigeria: A Wake-up Call, Situation Assessment and Analysis 2001 (Lagos: UNICEF and the Nigeria National Planning Commission, 2001), 204, cites a 1999 estimate of no less than eight million children engaged in wage labor in Nigeria. 35. U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: Nigeria, June 2003, http:// www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2003/21276.htm. See also International Labor Organization, Combating the Trafficking of Children for Labour Exploitation in West and Central Africa (Phase I), RAF/01/P53/USA, Geneva, July 1999, 2. 36. Nigeria Labour Act, arts. 49 and 59. 37. Ibid., arts. 59 and 60. 38. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports, sec. 6d. 39. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Affairs, “Nigeria: Government Policies and Programs to Eliminate the Worst Forms of Child Labor” (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005), http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/iclp/ tda2003/nigeria.htm. 40. Ibid. Also see Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act, 2003 (July 2003), secs. 11–19, 21, 25–26, 36–38; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: Nigeria. 41. “Nigeria’s Other Export,” Economist, April 22, 2004. 42. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Government Praises Nigeria on Fight against Trafficking in Persons,” press release, June 6, 2005, http://usembassy.state.gov/nigeria/ wwwhp060605a.html. 43. As of April 2005. Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, “Crude Oil and Total Petroleum Imports,” June 16, 2005, http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_ gas/petroleum/data_publications/company_level_imports/current/import.html. 44. Based on a rate of approximately 526,000 infections per year. 45. Journalists against AIDS Nigeria, May 31, 2005, http://www.nigeria-aids.org/.

RESOURCE GUIDE Suggested Reading Achebe, Chinua. Things Fall Apart. New York: Penguin Books, 2001. Adeyi, Olusoji, Phyllis J. Kanki, Oluwole Odutolu, and John Idoko, eds. AIDS in Nigeria: A Nation on the Threshold. Harvard Series on Population and International Health. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005. Apter, Andrew H. The Pan-African Nation: Oil and the Spectacle of Culture in Nigeria. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005. Griswold, Wendy. Bearing Witness: Readers, Writers, and the Novel in Nigeria. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.

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Jeyifo, Biodun, and Abiola Irele, eds. Wole Soyinka: Politics, Poetics and Postcolonialism. Cambridge Studies in African and Caribbean Literature. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Mathews, Martin P. Nigeria: Current Issues and Historical Background. Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2002. Maier, Karl. This House Has Fallen: Midnight in Nigeria. Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 2000. Nwagwu, ‘Emeka O. Cyprian. Taming the Tiger: Civil-Military Relations Reform and the Search for Stability in Nigeria. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2002. Nwankwo, Arthur Agwuncha. Political Danger Signals: The Politics of Federalism, Census, Blanket Ban and National Integration. Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co., 1991. Ogundiran, Akinwumi, ed. People, Polities and Societies in Pre-colonial Nigeria. Lawrenceville, NJ: Africa World Press, 2005. Oguntomisin, G. O., and S. A. Ajayi. Readings in Nigerian History and Culture: Essays in Memory of Professor J. A. Atanda. Ibadan, Nigeria: Hope Publications, 2002. Osaaghae, Eghosa E. Crippled Giant: Nigeria since Independence. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998. Uwazie, Ernest E., Isaac O. Albert, and Godfrey N. Uzoigwe, eds. Inter-ethnic and Religious Conflict in Nigeria. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 1999.

Films and Videos Desired Number. New York: Women Make Movies, 1995. Examines the Nigeria cultural attitude where a woman’s worth is determined according to the number of children she bears. 28 mins. The Right to Choose. Oley, PA: Bullfrog Films, 2000. Explores mandatory child marriage practices in northern (Muslim) Nigeria. 24 mins. Thunderbolt. San Francisco, CA: California Newsreel, 2000. Reworks Shakespeare’s Othello in a distinctly West African setting; explores the tensions between two of the main tribes in Nigeria. 105 mins. Til Death Do Us Part. Oley, PA: Bullfrog Films, 1999. Investigates the practice of withholding inheritance proceeds to Nigerians widows. 27 mins.

Web Sites Access to Justice: http://www.humanrightsnigeria.org/ Africa Action: http://www.africaaction.org/index.php BAOBAB for Women’s Human Rights: http://www.baobabwomen.org/ Citizens for Constitutional Reform: http://www.cdd.org.uk/cfcr/ Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria: http://nigeriaworld.com/focus/constitution/ Constitutional Rights Project: http://www.crp.org.ng/ Democratic Socialist Movement: http://www.socialistnigeria.org/ Guardian News: http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/ International Centre for Nigerian Law: http://www.nigeria-law.org/ International Foundation for Nigerian Children (IFNC): http://www.ifnc.org/ Johns Hopkins University/Center for Communication Programs (JHU/CCP Lagos): http://www.jhuccp.org/pubs/ci/8/

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Journalists against AIDS Nigeria: http://www.nigeria-aids.org/ Nigeria Daily (English-language newspaper): http://www.nigeriadaily.com/ Nigeria World (portal of Nigerian national sites): http://nigeriaworld.com/ Nigerian Congress: http://www.nigeriancongress.org/ Nigerian languages map: http://www.ethnologue.com/show_country.asp?name=Nigeria Office of the vice president: http://www.atikuabubakar.net/ Public Health and Education in Nigeria: http://www.phenig.org/ Vanguard Nigeria (English-language newspaper): http://www.vanguardngr.com/ Voice of Nigeria (Nigerian and English-language broadcasts): http://www.voiceofnigeria.org/

11 Pakistan Kathryn M. Coughlin

OVERVIEW The story of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is inextricably linked with the arrival and rise of Islam on the Indian subcontinent.1 Islam arrived in India in 711 with the Arab invasion of Sind (a province in present-day Pakistan). Thereafter, Muslims lived in India as a ruling minority for more than 800 years, until the advent of British rule in India. During these 800 years, Muslim invaders, traders, merchants, and itinerant religious leaders settled throughout the subcontinent, but there were also significant conversions of Hindus to Islam—especially among those who were of the lower castes. Under British rule in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Muslims were systematically deprived of both their power and material wealth as they were marginalized from mainstream Indian culture and politics. After World War II, when the British agreed to Indian demands for independence, the Muslim minority feared that under an independent India, they would merely exchange British domination for Hindu domination. The promise of Hindu leaders like Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948) and Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) that an independent India would be a secular democracy with full equality for all of its citizens did not assuage their fears. These fears were articulated most forcefully by the All India Muslim League party under the leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948). Jinnah, a charismatic British-educated lawyer, demanded a separate homeland for Muslims in the areas of the subcontinent where Muslims formed a majority. Although some Muslim leaders like Maulana Azad (1888–1958) believed in the promise of a democratic and secular India and opted to stay there, Jinnah’s view prevailed, and the Hindu leaders of the Indian independence movement agreed to a partition of India.

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Partition of the Indian Subcontinent and Its Aftermath The last British viceroy and governor-general of India, Lord Louis Mountbatten (1900–1979), drafted a plan for partition that was accepted by both the Muslim League and the Indian Congress Party, which represented the Hindu-dominated Indian independence movement. The proposed new state of Pakistan covered all of modern-day Pakistan and modern-day Bangladesh, which at the time was called East Pakistan; these two sections of the country were separated by more than 1,000 miles of Indian territory. Under the British, these territories had a Muslim majority. States like Jammu and Kashmir, which had a Muslim majority but were nominally independent from British rule (also known as “The Princely States”) were left to choose whether they wanted to join India or Pakistan or remain independent. Jinnah and other Muslim League leaders proposed partition as a means to prevent a civil war between Muslims and Hindus and proceed with the peaceful development of two new independent states: India and Pakistan. No large population transfers were envisaged, as both states swore to uphold the rights of minorities. After independence, full-fledged violence broke out among the religious communities as Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs crossed the borders of the new states to what they hoped would be the safety of religious majorities. More than 13 million people left their homes and crossed the new borders between the Hindu-majority India and the Muslim-majority Pakistan. The estimates of the death toll vary immensely, with most mainstream sources citing anywhere from 500,000 to 1.5 million deaths; scholarly sources routinely cite approximately 1 million deaths.2 In recent years, the scholarly literature on the partition demonstrates a greater awareness of the manner in which women were affected by the partition and its violence. It has been noted that “the scholarship of several women scholars and writers in particular has focused on the abduction of women, the agreements forged between the Governments of India and Pakistan for the recovery of these women and the underlying assumptions—that women could scarcely speak for themselves, that they constituted a form of exchange between men and states, that the honor and dignity of the nation was invested in its women, among others—behind these arrangements.”3 The painful memories of the partition and the ambiguous status of the Princely States destroyed any hope for the two new nations to live in peace with each other. Shortly after independence, a Pakistan-initiated invasion of Kashmir brought the two new nations to war with each other. Although Kashmir had a Muslim majority, its ruler was a Hindu. When the Pakistani forces attacked the kingdom, the Hindu monarch agreed to join India. The resulting war left Kashmir divided and is the principal source of tension between the two countries today. In addition to the conflict in 1947, India and Pakistan have fought two other wars: one in 1965 and the other in 1971, which resulted in India assisting East Pakistan to establish a new independent state called Bangladesh. Their joint status as nuclear states, combined with their history of conflict and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, put Pakistan on the observer list for most U.S. foreign-policy experts.

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Indo-Pakistan Wars in the Twentieth Century Another war between the two states began in April 1965, when fighting broke out in a desolate region along the West Pakistan–India border. By late summer Kashmir and the Punjab were involved, and in September Pakistani and Indian troops began air raids against targets across the border. After China’s threats of intervention were met with strong recriminations from the United States and Great Britain, Pakistan and India agreed to a United Nations–sponsored cease-fire. Indian and Pakistani troops returned to the pre–August 1965 lines of engagement. In January of 1966, Indian prime minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani president Ayub Khan signed an agreement pledging continued negotiations and respect for the cease-fire conditions (the Tashkent Declaration). Another period of peace between the subcontinent nations lasted until 1971.4 In 1971, Bengali East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh) increased demands for greater autonomy from Punjab-dominated Islamabad, bringing about a civil war. Eventually, 10 million East Pakistanis were forced to flee to Indian states along the border, overwhelming the already impoverished local Indian governments. In response, India sent troops to quell the violence in East Pakistan, which declared its independence as Bangladesh on December 6, 1971. The United Nations stepped in again, negotiating a cease-fire and a peace agreement in which Pakistan relinquished its eastern lands and more than 100,000 military personnel to the new nation. On July 2, 1972, India and Pakistan signed the Simla Accords, which laid the basis for future Indo-Pakistani relations. Although the Simla Accords paved the way for Pakistan’s recognition of Bangladesh in 1974, tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir continue to erupt.5 Along with the historical tensions, the rivalry between the two countries took on a new and dangerous turn when both countries tested nuclear weapons in 1998. The world held its breath when the two countries almost came to armed conflict over Kashmir in 1999. Although the two countries pulled back from the brink of war and relations have significantly improved since then, the two countries continue to treat each other warily, with India blaming Pakistan for supporting an insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir while Pakistan holds India responsible for occupying Kashmir. Pakistan, unlike its neighbor India, has not been able to establish the institutions and structures of a stable democracy. Since independence in 1947, it has had to endure a number of military coups, the most recent of which occurred in October of 1999. General Pervez Musharraf (b. 1942) overthrew the democratically elected government of Nawaz Sharif (b. 1949) in a bloodless military coup and still holds the reigns of power. CULTURE, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS Ninety-seven percent of Pakistan’s 162.5 million people are Muslims; the rest of the population are Hindus, Christians, and Sikhs. A tiny Jewish community lives in Karachi.6 About 79 percent of the Muslims are Sunni, while 21 percent follow

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Shia Islam. Most Pakistanis belong to the five primary ethnic groups: Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtun (Pathan), Baloch, and Mohajir, although distinct subgroups exist within these major communities. Overall, ethnic identity is multilayered and may be based on a combination of tribe, language, and religion. Of the five major ethnic groups, the relatively affluent Punjabis constitute 58 percent of the population and dominate the military and government. The Sindhis constitute 13 percent of the population and mostly hail from the Sindh province. The fiercely proud Pashtuns make up 12.5 percent of the population and are divided into multiple tribes. They follow a strict code of conduct known as Pashtunwali (Pashtun Way) and are mainly farmers, herders, traders, and soldiers in the Pakistani army. Pashtun tribes can also be found in Afghanistan, and tribes may span the borders between the two countries. As a result, many Pashtuns profess loyalty to their tribes as opposed to the nation-states of Afghanistan or Pakistan, regularly crossing the border and giving shelter to their tribesmen fleeing persecution or trouble with the law. The rest of the Pakistani population is made up of the Baloch, who are tribesmen from the western region called Balochistan, and the Mohajirs, who are Indian Muslims and their descendants who migrated to Pakistan as a result of the partition. Pakistan and Islamic Fundamentalism Pakistan’s political history has been marred by military coups to overthrow democratically elected governments and the emergence of extremist Islamic parties. When General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq (1924–88) staged a coup in 1977, he announced an “Islamic system” for Pakistan. This involved laws that banned the consumption and sale of alcohol (which had been allowed thus far, reflecting Pakistan’s relatively nonreligious traditions), laws against adultery and fornication, and the establishment of “sharia benches” that would supposedly render verdicts according to the Muslim sharia law. But these laws coexist alongside other civil laws that are utterly contradictory. For example, Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamic laws include one that states that the testimony of a woman is worth half that of a man’s testimony. At the same time, the Pakistani constitution clearly states that there “shall be no discrimination on the basis of sex alone.”7 This ambiguity between non-sharia law (based upon British common law) and sharia law creates an environment that is neither Islamic nor secular and permits law enforcement personnel and judges loopholes by which they can (and do) institutionalize discrimination. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 posed a new challenge to the Pakistani military. Not only did millions of Afghan refugees stream across the border into Pakistan, but Zia-ul-Haq felt encircled by the Soviets on his western border and India (which had a close relationship with the Soviet Union during the cold war) to his east. Under Zia-ul-Haq, Pakistan made a strategic decision to ally itself with the United States and support the Afghan freedom fighters (mujahidin) in their struggle against the Soviets. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan outraged the Islamic world and prompted non-Afghan Muslims like Saudis, Chechens, and Egyptians to pour into Pakistan and Afghanistan to join the struggle to rid Afghanistan of the

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“godless” communists. One such person was Saudi millionaire Osama bin Laden, who donated vast sums of his money and expertise to oust the Soviets. As money, arms, and men poured into Afghanistan, the western border areas of Pakistan were turned into a massive arms market. Radical Islamic groups with the aim of defeating the Soviets crossed back and forth between Pakistan and Afghanistan with the overt support of the Pakistani intelligence forces. Many of these groups formed alliances and relations with the indigenous people of the border areas of Pakistan like the Pashtuns and the Baloch. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, many of these radical Muslims involved themselves in the ensuing civil war in Afghanistan. The Pakistani intelligence service (ISI) had increasingly come under the influence of radical Islamic ideology from the mujahidin, and the Pakistani political and intelligence establishment, at the behest of the ISI, decided to back the Taliban in the Afghan civil war. Eventually, Pakistan was one of only three nations to establish diplomatic ties with the Taliban regime (1996–2001); the other two were Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The ISI was also responsible for coordinating the insurgency against the Indian administration in Kashmir. After the Taliban were established in power, many of the mujahidin left Afghanistan to fight in Kashmir against what they saw as yet another occupation of a Muslim land by non-Muslims.8 The role of the ISI in supporting the mujahidin’s move to Kashmir is unclear.9 After the September 11 attacks, General Musharraf was faced with an offer he could not refuse: assist the United States in ousting the Taliban and catching Osama bin Laden or face the possibility of a U.S.-led invasion and international opprobrium. Joining Pakistan to the war on terror put Musharraf in open conflict with the radical forces that supported the September 11 attacks against the United States and held the mastermind of the attacks, Osama bin Laden, in high regard. Indeed, the support of these extremist elements is one reason why some policy analysts think that bin Laden and other prominent members of al-Qaida have not yet been caught. Pakistan’s backing of the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Kashmir and its subsequent backing of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan had its costs. Although this policy achieved some of Pakistan’s foreign-policy goals—overthrowing the Soviets in Afghanistan and consuming Indian military resources in Kashmir—it has also weakened Pakistan’s social fabric. The Afghan war produced an environment in which Muslim radicals and mujahidin stayed in Pakistan after the Soviets were ousted, preaching their version of firebrand Islam. Many of these radicals— mostly Sunnis preaching a particularly conservative brand of Islam known as Wahhabism—sponsored the opening of religious schools (madrasas) where young Pakistanis are instilled with an intense hatred of the West and any government not conforming to their strict interpretation of Islam. Now many Pakistanis who either fought in Afghanistan or were educated in these madrasas have formed religious parties with a view toward establishing an “authentic” Islamic state in Pakistan. These extremists are highly critical of the Musharraf regime and its closeness to the United States.

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Sectarian Violence Another consequence of the rise of the fundamentalist Sunni Islamic parties in Pakistan is the increase in sectarian violence between the Sunni majority and the Shiites. The Shiites, as the minorities in Pakistan, have largely been the victims of the fundamentalist Sunni groups. Groups such as Sipah-i-Sahaba and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi are virulently anti-Shia and responsible for many of the attacks on Shiites and their religious institutions.10 General Musharraf has attempted to reign in some of these extremist forces. However, the Islamic radicals have powerful supporters in the Pakistani army and the ISI. Although the West and no doubt the majority of the Pakistani people would like the restoration of democratic rule in Pakistan, it is unclear whether General Musharraf will allow this to happen in the near future. He argues that a return to democracy will allow an opening for the fundamentalist forces to seize control of key institutions and that his rule is necessary to fight the extremists and corruption in the government. Many Pakistanis have a less charitable view of the general’s arguments against restoring democracy. His critics argue that he is but one in a long succession of military rulers who is anti-democratic and has no intention of relinquishing the reigns of power. They point out that Pakistanis have never had the opportunity to vote out a government—all government changes since the birth of the country have been via military coups. Moreover, they argue that the general is doing the minimum needed to keep the West and the United States content by capturing key al-Qaida figures, but he has no intention of stamping out most of the extremist elements since they have been invaluable in fostering the insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir.

WOMEN AND THE FAMILY Unlike the United States and many other Western countries, Pakistan has had a woman serve as prime minister, as have other Muslim countries, such as Turkey, Bangladesh, and Indonesia. This presents a conundrum that cannot easily be explained. The social, political, and economic status of women in Pakistan is abysmally low. Women’s literacy rate is half that of men (30.6% of women versus 59.8% of men) and the infant mortality rate is more than 72 per 1,000 live births. By comparison, almost half of the women in neighboring India are literate and the infant mortality rate is 56 deaths per 1,000 live births.11 Violence against women and girls such as honor killings, acid attacks, sex trafficking, and rape has escalated since General Musharraf has been in power (1999). According to Pakistan’s Interior Ministry, more than 4,000 women and girls were killed in the name of “honor” from 1999 to 2004; more than 1,300 women were killed in 2003 alone.12 Not included in these figures are those women who are murdered as a result of domestic abuse or slain because they violate a community norm such as that against self-assertion.13 Violent domestic abuse and murder as a result of a perceived slight to honor occur in many cultures and countries. But in Pakistan, like many developing Muslim countries, most women are illiterate

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and uneducated about their rights. But even when Pakistani women are educated about their rights, they frequently meet with conservative male law enforcement and a judiciary whose understanding of a woman’s rights and place in society is informed by culture and tradition, not national legal standards. Complicating the situation are conflicting laws and legal norms. Article 25 of the Pakistani constitution provides that “all citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection of law. There shall be no discrimination on the basis of sex alone.” At the same time, Pakistan’s Hudood (hudud) Ordinance requires that prosecutions for rape have either four adult male witnesses or a confession by the accused. A woman who alleges rape but cannot prove it runs the risk of being murdered for violating her family’s honor (as she has had sex with a man not her husband); if she does not report the rape but finds herself pregnant and unmarried, she potentially faces the same penalty: honor killing. Even if she escapes being murdered by her male relatives, a raped woman may still be prosecuted for adultery or fornication, the penalties for which are long jail sentences, public whippings, and/or stonings (though this last penalty is rare).14 In their Pakistan country summary (2005), Human Rights Watch states that there are currently more than 200,000 hudud cases in the criminal justice system. Institutional and widespread judicial prejudice, along with extremely conservative cultural norms and a lack of political or economic power, makes justice for women chimerical and almost impossible to obtain. On the other hand, the Pakistan Air Force Academy has announced that women have been admitted to its aerospace-engineering and fighter-pilot programs; 10 women are training as fighter pilots and many more are studying in the engineering and aerospace wing.15 Due to cultural and religious considerations, women candidates are segregated from the male students during physical exercises, but are still expected to meet the same physical and intellectual standards as the men. It is unclear how women fighter pilots, should they graduate from the academy, will be integrated into Pakistan’s all-male military. This stark contrast between quotidian institutionalized discrimination and Pakistani women fighter pilots or prime ministers can be explained in part by education, class, and power. Pakistani women who rise to the top of the political establishment or business community come from wealthy, Westernized families who educate their daughters much as they would their sons. A daughter from a powerful family has a much better chance of fulfilling her dreams as fighter pilot than one from a rural, poverty-stricken family. While education plays a part, there is also the sociocultural context to consider. Even urban-based poor families are not likely to approve of their daughters’ foray into nontraditional employment or educational environments. Benazir Bhutto, the Muslim world’s first woman head of state, was the daughter of former Pakistani prime minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and was educated at Oxford and Harvard—hardly a typical Pakistani woman. It may take several years to accomplish the legal reform necessary to level the playing field between the genders; more important for gender equality will be creating a culture less hostile to woman and girls. This, however, may take decades or even generations.

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Pakistani girls sitting in a classroom outside the capital, Islamabad. Primary and secondary education is customarily segregated by gender, especially in the rural areas. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) (2002).

SPECIAL ISSUES IN THE NEWS Pakistan-U.S. relations are precarious. The United States needs Pakistan’s military and intelligence assistance in capturing Osama bin Laden and many of the al-Qaida and Taliban leaders who have sought shelter in the desolate mountain region bordering Afghanistan. But Pakistan’s intelligence services are riddled with radical supporters of al-Qaida, as is the Pakistani military, the group responsible for keeping Musharraf in power. There is evidence that some of the more mainstream political groups have ties to al-Qaida. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, an organizer of the September 11 attacks on the United States and the operational leader of al-Qaida, was captured by Pakistani intelligence services on March 1, 2003.16 Mohammed was found in the house of the son of a local leader of Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami, a major political party. This capture did not take place in the Northwest Frontier Province or along the Afghan-Pakistan border—Mohammed was found in Rawalpindi, the headquarters of the Pakistan army and the home of General Musharraf. Some policy experts question whether Pakistan is a reliable partner in the war on terror.17 Until the September 11 attacks, Pakistan’s relations with the United States were chilly because of a number of factors: Pakistan’s nuclear-weapons buildup and nuclear tests in 1998; the sponsoring of anti-Indian jihads in Kashmir; General Musharraf’s military coup despite American warnings; Pakistani military support of terrorists attacks against India in Kargil in 1999, bringing the two nuclear nations

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to the brink of war; and the providing of sanctuaries, training, consular assistance, and free flights for Osama bin Laden, al-Qaida, and the Taliban. After the September 11 attacks, General Musharraf was given an ultimatum to submit without delay to the following American demands: provide bases for U.S. military forces in the war to oust the Taliban from Afghanistan, dismantle all Pakistani terrorist training camps on the Afghan border, and launch military operations to seal the borders to prevent the escape of Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. General Musharraf had no real choice but to comply, and justified it to his nation by arguing that the Quran sanctioned temporary commitments under pressure and Pakistan’s survival was at stake. Since 2001, Pakistan has captured two top al-Qaida figures: Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Farraj al-Libbi, whom it seized on May 4, 2005. George W. Bush praised Pakistan’s government for the capture of al-Libbi, saying, “I applaud the Pakistani government for their strong cooperation in the war on terror.”18 Critics of General Musharraf argue that Pakistan selectively hands over top al-Qaida terrorists “at carefully crafted intervals to extract political mileage” from the United States.19 Moreover, Pakistan has been unable or unwilling to locate Osama bin Laden or more than two of his top lieutenants and has not fulfilled repeated promises to stop crossborder terrorism against India or Afghanistan. The United States officially maintains that Pakistan is a partner in the global war on terror and that General Musharraf is a courageous fighter against terrorism; the reality is far more complex. NOTABLE PEOPLE Bhutto, Benazir (b. 1953). Daughter of former Pakistani prime minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto was the first female head of state in the Muslim world. Educated at Harvard and Oxford Universities, she was twice elected to the premiership of Pakistan (1988, 1993) and on both occasions her government was dismissed by the president on charges of corruption. She is also the “chairperson for life” of the Pakistan People’s Party, one of the country’s main political parties. Benazir is married to former Pakistani senator Asif Ali Zardari and is also a mother of three. Jinnah, Mohammed Ali (1876–1948). Popularly referred to among Pakistanis as Qaid-i-Azam (Great Leader), Mohammed Ali Jinnah was the founder of Pakistan as well as its first governor-general. From 1935 onward Jinnah was also the chief of the All India Muslim League, the group that led the Pakistan Movement. A lawyer by training, Jinnah proved to be a skillful and charismatic political leader. Khan, Abdul Qadeer (b. 1935). Engineer and widely regarded as the father of Pakistan’s nuclear-weapons program. In January 2004, Khan confessed to providing Libya, Iran, and North Korea with nuclear-weapons technology. In response to his request for clemency, General Musharraf pardoned him. Khan is widely popular with the Pakistani public, who would have seen any punishment as “caving in” to American pressure. Musharraf, Pervez (b. 1943). Pakistani general and leader of the 1999 military coup that unseated Prime Minister Nawaz Sherif, whom he then charged with

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corruption. Musharraf promised to eliminate corruption, stabilize the country politically and economically, and restore democracy upon completion of his reforms. In addition to the title of president, Musharraf continues to hold the office of chief of the army staff and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, despite promises he would leave the military while serving as president. Zia-ul-Haq, Mohammed (1924–88). Pakistan’s third military ruler, Zia-ul-Haq came to power by overthrowing the government led by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1977. He is remembered for his ill-fated Islamization program instituted in 1979. His regime was a close ally of the United States during the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1988. He remained in power as both the chief of the army staff as well as president until he died in a transport-plane crash on August 17, 1988, which also claimed the lives of Pakistan’s top military brass and the then U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Arnold Raphael. NOTES 1. For a more comprehensive review of Islam in the region of present-day Pakistan, see chapter 6, on India. 2. Vinay Lal, professor of history, University of California–Los Angeles, telephone interview with author, May 17, 2005. 3. Taken from “The Partition of India,” http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/southasia/History/ Independent/partition.html. Also see, for example, Urvashi Butalia, ed., The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India (New Delhi: Penguin, 1998); Ritu Menon and Kamla Bhasin, Borders and Boundaries: Women in India’s Partition (New Delhi: Kali for Women, 1998); Ritu Menon, No Women’s Land: Women from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh Write on the Partition of India (New Delhi: Women Unlimited, 2004); and Bimal Prasad, Pathway to India’s Partition: The Foundation of Muslim Nationalism (New Delhi: Manohar Books, 1999). 4. Sumit Ganguly, Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflicts since 1947 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986). 5. Richard Sisson, War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). 6. See the Jewish Virtual Library, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/vjw/ Pakistan.html. 7. Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/ constitution/. 8. Altaf Gauhar, “How Intelligence Agencies Run Our Politics,” The Nation, August 17, 1997, 4. Also see Bindanda Chengappa, “The ISI Role in Pakistan’s Politics,” Strategic Analysis 12, no. 11 (2000): 1857–78; and James Risen and Judith Miller, “Pakistani Intelligence Has Ties to al-Qaeda, U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times, October 29, 2001. 9. Chengappa, “ISI Role,” 1859. 10. Sipah-i-Sahaba (Association of the Companions of the Defenders of the Prophet, or SSP) is a Sunni group that follows the Deobandi school (see chapter 6, on India, for a discussion of the Deobandi school of thought). General Musharraf banned SSP in January 2002. Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (Army of Jhangvi, or LJ) is a militant offshoot of SSP, banned by Musharraf in August 2001. Also see entries in the glossary.

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11. All figures are estimated as of 2003. CIA, World Factbook 2005, http://www.odci. gov/cia/publications/factbook/. 12. Human Rights Watch, Pakistan Country Summary 2005, http://hrw.org/wr2k5/pdf/ pakist.pdf. Comparatively, the Pakistan Human Rights Organization reported more than 850 honor killings in 1998 and 1999. See Pamela Constable, “In Pakistan, Women Pay the Price of ‘Honor,’” Washington Post, May 8, 2000. 13. For instance, a woman named Yasmeen Kanwal was raped and murdered when six months pregnant because she “boldly” asked her male neighbors not to visit her roof because they could see into her bathroom from there. Farooq Tariq, “Women’s Rights Activist Murdered,” Green Left Weekly, April 13, 2005. Farooq Tariq is the general secretary of the Labour Party in Pakistan. 14. National Commission on the Status of Women (Pakistan), Report on Hudood Ordinances, 1979–2003. Islamabad: 2003. 15. See Zaffar Abbass, “Pakistan’s First Women Fighter Pilots,” BBC News Service, May 11, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4533367.stm. 16. The 9/11 Commission Report (The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, http://911.gnu-designs.com/) calls him the “principal architect of the 9/11 attacks.” 17. See reports on Pakistan from Courcy’s Intelligence Review (http://www.courcyint. com/ ), the South Asia Analysis Group (http://www.saag.org/), the International Institute for Strategic Studies (http://www.iiss.org/), and the Center for International and Strategic Studies (http://www.csis.org/ ), for example. 18. Katherine Shrader, “Bush: Pakistan Arrest Critical Victory,” Associated Press wire report, May 4, 2005, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=727565. 19. See, for example, Subhash Kapila, “United States’ Policy Predicaments in Pakistan,” South Asia Analysis Group, paper no. 812, http://www.saag.org/papers9/ paper812.html.

RESOURCE GUIDE Suggested Reading Abbas, Hassan. Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and America’s War on Terrorism. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2005. Abou Zahab, Mariam. Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection. London: Hurst, 2004. Ahmed, Akbar S. Resistance and Control in Pakistan. New York: Routledge, 2004. Burney, Samya. Crime or Custom? Violence against Women in Pakistan. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999. Chaudhary, Ehsan-ul-Haq. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. Lahore, Pakistan: Punjab Law Book House, 2004. Cohen, Stephen Philip. The Idea of Pakistan. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2004. Hussain, Rizwan. Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005. Jaffrelot, Christophe, and Gillian Beaumont. A History of Pakistan and Its Origins. Anthem South Asian Studies. London: Anthem Press, 2002. Patel, Rashida. Woman versus Man: Socio-Legal Gender Inequality in Pakistan. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

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Talbot, Ian. Pakistan: A Modern History. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999. Wirsing, Robert G. India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict and Its Resolution. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1994.

Films and Videos Frontline: In Search of Al-Qaeda. Boston, MA: PBS Productions, 2002. Examines the search to find Osama bin Laden, following al-Qaida’s trail from Afghanistan to Pakistan. 60 mins. India and Pakistan: The Expanding Nuclear Threat. Princeton, NJ: Films for the Humanities, 2004. Explores how close Pakistan and India came to nuclear-weapons use during the Kargil conflict (1999). 57 mins. Pakistan: Ally or Enemy? New York: ABC News Productions, 2004. Discusses Pakistan’s role as an ally in the war on terror, complicated by domestic Islamic fundamentalism and its nuclear capabilities. 23 mins. Rock Star and the Mullahs. London: October Films, 2003. Documentary about Salman Ahmed, Asia’s leading rock star and lead singer of Junoon, who travels to Pakistan and confronts his own Muslim faith and that of the fundamentalists who seek to impose their interpretation of Islam on the rest of the country. 50 mins.

Web Sites Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan: http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/ constitution/ Dawn (English-language daily): http://www.dawn.com/ Government of Pakistan, Statistics Division: http://www.statpak.gov.pk/ Institute of Regional Studies: http://www.irs.org.pk/startup.htm/ The Nation (English-language daily): http://www.nation.com.pk/ National Commission on the Status of Women: http://new.ncsw.gov.pk/index.php Pakistan Daily: http://www.pakistandaily.com/ Pakistan Link (newspaper): http://www.pakistanlink.com/ Pakistan’s official government site: http://www.infopak.gov.pk/ Pakistan Today (daily newspaper): http://www.paktoday.com/ Radio Pakistan: http://www.radio.gov.pk/ United Nations in Pakistan: http://www.un.org.pk/

Organizations All Pakistan Women’s Association (APWA) 67B Garden Road Karachi 74400, Pakistan Telephone: 92-21-721-2991 Fax: 92-21-722-1965 E-mail: [email protected] Also see the United Nation’s Web page on APWA: http://www.un.org.pk/unic/ apwa.htm

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Pakistan Women Lawyer’s Association Legal Aid Centre, Room 710, Kashif Centre Shahrah-e-Faisal, Karachi, Pakistan Telephone: 92-021-513-533 Fax: 92-021-567-3286 E-mail: [email protected]

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12 Russia Galina M. Yemelianova

OVERVIEW The Russian Federation has a population of 143.4 million living in a land 1.8 times larger than the territory of the United States; by comparison, the U.S. population totals 295.7 million. More than 80 percent of the population are ethnically Russian and belong to the Russian Orthodox Church. More than 100 different ethnic and religious groups can be found in Russia. Its Muslim population approaches 15 million, the largest Muslim population in any one European country. In fact, estimates of the size of the Muslim population vary from around 12 million to more than 20 million—the difficulty in calculating the exact number arises from the challenge of defining Muslim in a postatheistic society. The figure of 15 million reflects the number of Russian citizens belonging to ethnic groups professing Islam rather than actively practicing Muslims. In accordance with Russia’s Law on Religion (1997), Islam is one of the four traditional religions of Russia, alongside Orthodox Christianity, Buddhism, and Judaism. Russia’s major Muslim enclaves are situated in the Volga-Urals, the North Caucasus, and central Russia; Muslims are concentrated in the eight autonomous republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (both in the Volga Urals) and Adygea, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Ingushetia, Dagestan, and Chechnya (all in the North Caucasus). Tatars are the largest Muslim ethnic group, with over five million people (3.4% of the country’s population), followed by the Bashkirs and the Chechens, each with a million or somewhat more. Russia’s Muslims belong to three major ethno-linguistic groups: the Turkic, the Ibero-Caucasian, and the Iranian. Among the first are the Azeris, the Balkars, the

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Bashkirs, the Karachay, the Kazakhs, the Kumyks, the Kyrgyz, the Meskhetian Turks, the Nogay, the Tatars, the Turkmen, and the Uzbeks. The Ibero-Caucasian ethno-linguistic family comprises the Abazsins, the Adygeans, the Aguls, the Avars, the Chechens, the Cherkess, the Ingush, the Kabardinians, the Lezgins, the Laks, the Rutuls, and the Tabasarans. Linguistically speaking, the Ossetians, Tajiks, and Tats represent the Iranian peoples. Islam’s Arrival in Russia Islam came to Russia from the south in the seventh century. In 654, the Arabs occupied the city of Derbend in what is now Dagestan and Islamized its population. It was in the Khazarian lands that proto-Russians for the first time met Muslims, both Khazars and Arabs. In 922, the Volga Bulgarians adopted Islam and began to Islamize other peoples inhabiting their country, especially the Finno-Ugric tribes, as well as the Oguz Turks of central Asia. With the demise of Khazaria in the tenth century, Volga Bulgaria became the main intermediary between ancient Russia, which adopted Orthodox Christianity in 988, and the Muslim world. From the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries, Russia, alongside Muslim Volga Bulgaria, the Caucasus, and central Asia, was subjugated by the powerful Muslim Golden Horde, which constituted the Eurasian domain of the Genghizid Empire. The Russian conquest in 1552 of the Genghizid Islamic Khanate of Kazan (formerly Volga Bulgaria) reversed the balance of power in Eurasia in favor of Orthodox Christian Russia. By the end of the seventeenth century Russia incorporated most of the Golden Horde’s land and had turned into a polyconfessional state with a substantial Muslim population in the Volga-Urals and Siberia. During the nineteenth century, the Russian Empire absorbed the Islamic Caucasus and central Asia. Official Russian policy toward its Muslim subjects alternated between harsh suppression in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and liberal accommodation in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In 1788, the Russian tsarina Catherine the Great (1729–96) institutionalized Islam in Russia by creating an Islamic administration—a muftiate in the city of Ufa in the Volga-Urals— as a medium of state control over her Muslim subjects. The various Muslim peoples reacted differently to the Russian conquest. By the nineteenth century the Muslims of the Volga-Urals and central Russia, primarily Tatars, submitted to it and were partially integrated within the socioeconomic and political fabric of the Russian Empire. Islamic Tatar intellectuals generated Islamic modernism, known as jadidism, which promoted ijtihad (Islamic critical thinking and use of reason) and sought to accommodate Islamic values within the Russian version of modernity. By contrast, the bulk of the Muslims of the North Caucasus remained attached to the rigid principles of traditionalist Sufi Islam and fiercely resisted Orthodox Russian domination. The Sufis of the Naqshbandi order were among most active participants in the Caucasian war (1824–59), which acquired the form of an Islamic holy war by the local Islamic population against Russian expansion.

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Islam and the Soviet Period The Soviet period (1917–91) had an ambivalent impact on Russia’s Muslims. After the 1917 Bolshevik revolution they were subjected, like all the peoples of the former Russian Empire, to Sovietization, central elements of which were communist indoctrination and atheization. Under the Soviet regime thousands of Muslim clerics perished; almost all mosques, Islamic primary schools (maktabs), Islamic secondary schools (madrasas), and other Islam-related institutions were either destroyed, closed, or converted into various mundane premises. The script changes (first from Arabic to Latin in 1927 and later from Latin to Cyrillic in 1937) cut off the Muslims from their Islamic heritage. From 1943 to 1944, Muslim Chechens, Karachay, Balkars, Meskhetian Turks, and Crimean Tatars were deported to central Asia and their land and property were distributed among their neighbors. In the 1950s and 1960s the Avars, Dargins, Laks, and some other Muslim Caucasian peoples were resettled from the mountains to the Caspian lowlands, which was the traditional habitat of Kumyks, Nogay, and other Muslim Turkic peoples. As a result of Moscow’s policy of constructing larger national entities out of numerically smaller ethnic groups, many Muslim peoples, especially in the North Caucasus, were officially stripped of their distinctive ethnic identity. These and other oppressive and arbitrary polices seriously aggravated the interethnic and religious relations in Russia’s Muslim enclaves. On the positive side, Soviet rule enhanced the significant economic and societal modernization of Russia’s Muslims. Among the obvious gains were the eradication of widespread illiteracy, the elimination of numerous deadly diseases, and the emancipation of Muslim women, who at least legally acquired economic and social equality with men. With comprehensive free secondary education, the accessibility of free higher education for Muslims in Russia greatly excelled that of many of their coreligionists abroad. Overall, despite the officially proclaimed triumph of atheism, Islam and customary law (adat) survived, although in a disguised and popular form, and remained essential regulators of social and family life in rural Muslim communities and partially even among urban Muslims. Furthermore, in some parts of the North Caucasus, the Soviet and Communist Party structures remarkably converged in a strange marriage with the traditional social networks and hierarchies and produced a specific Sovietized version of Islamic traditionalism. This could explain why most of Russia’s Muslim regions (with the exception of Chechnya and Tatarstan) were the least enthusiastic about the collapse of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 and clung to the Soviet and Communist Party structures longer than other parts of the country. The disintegration of Communist Party and Soviet hierarchies and ideology, as well as the Soviet institutions of socialization, had a twofold impact on the Russian Muslim community. It pushed the traditional social network, with its customary and religious norms, to the forefront of local Muslim societies. Clan, ethnic, and regional ties gained precedence over more modern forms of social organization that were now associated with the failed Soviet system. In the North Caucasus the growth of ethnic and ethno-religious nationalisms upset the fragile ethno-political status quo.

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In particular, conflict has characterized the relations between Ingush and Ossetians on the border between the two autonomies, between Adygea (Kabardinians, Cherkess, and Abazins) and Turkic peoples (Balkars, Karachay, and Nogay) within the republics of Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia, between Chechens and various Dagestani peoples in western Dagestan and in the border area between the two republics, between Adygeans and Russians in the republic of Adygea, and between orthodox Christian Cossacks and their Muslim neighbors in northern Dagestan, Karachay-Cherkessia, and Adygea. The situation in Dagestan has been further complicated by conflict over arable land between the Avars and Dargins on the one side and the Kumyks on the other, as well as by the drive for political and administrative reunion into one autonomous unit by the Nogay, who since 1957 have been split between Dagestan, Chechnya, and Stavropol. The other major consequence of the collapse of communism was Islamic revivalism. Its juridical basis was the decree on Freedom of Religious Persuasions that was adopted by the Russian parliament on October 25, 1990. Among its manifestations were the extensive construction of mosques and other Islamic institutions. Russia’s Muslims were able to openly observe Islamic rituals such as the annual pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, celebrate Islamic holidays, and conduct and participate in major Islamic festivals. Russia’s Muslims also restored their links with their coreligionists abroad. Muslim regions opened themselves to intense political, ideological, and economic activity by official and nonofficial representatives of such Muslim countries as Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Among the implications of such foreign involvement was the proliferation of nontraditional forms of Islam, including those of a fundamentalist nature. The advance of Islamic fundamentalism, known as Salafism and Wahhabism, divided local Muslim communities along political and doctrinal lines. In Dagestan the conflict between Islamic traditionalists and fundamentalists escalated into military confrontation. The Russian-Chechen conflict also acquired a religious overtone. CULTURE, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS The vast majority of Russia’s Muslims belong to the Hanafi juridical school (madhhab) of Sunni Islam, although Dagestani, Chechen, and Ingush Muslims adhere to the Shafii madhhab. Most Azeris profess Shia Islam and therefore follow an interpretation of the Jafari school of jurisprudence. In the past Sufism was strong among Russia’s Muslims. During the Soviet period the Sufi network in the Volga-Urals was irreversibly destroyed, but in the North Caucasus it survived, although it was seriously damaged. At present there are many Sufis among the Dagestanis, Chechens, and Ingush. According to some estimates Sufism is professed by 60 percent of Dagestani Muslims and by 80 percent of Chechens and Ingush. Sufis are affiliated with between 40 and 50 Sufi branches that have preserved their clandestine structure and affiliation to specific kinship and subkinship local formations. In Dagestan, the biggest are the Naqshbandi and Shadhiliyya tariqat; there are also substantial numbers of followers of the Djazuliyya tariqa, which split from the Shadhiliyya. In Chechnya the Naqshbandi and Qadiri are

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the most prominent, particularly the Qadiri branch of Kunta-haji. Most Dagestan tariqatists are Avars, who are considered the most religious ethnic group. There are also many Sufis among the Dargins and Kumyks, who have the reputation for being moderately religious people. According to Dagestan muftiate (DUMD), there are 23 living Sufi shaykhs there, and Sayid-efendi Aytseev (Chirkeevskii, b. 1939) is the supreme Naqshbandi shaykh. (Dagestani Sufis, Islamic scholars [ulama], and foreign Sufis of Dagestani origins who fled the country in the late nineteenth century reject this position. They hold that there have been no genuine Sufi shaykhs in the North Caucasus since the Caucasian war). Unlike Dagestani Sufis, Chechen and Ingush Sufis do not have living shaykhs and teachers. The Sufis believe that Sufism represents a superior form of Islam because of a Sufi’s direct interaction with God (Allah) through a Sufi shaykh or teacher. A central element of Sufism is dhikr, which represents a ritual repetition of certain phrases either aloud or in the mind accompanied by particular breathing and physical movements. Dhikr is aimed at gaining the presence of Allah through one’s being. The authority of a Sufi shaykh derives from a mystical permission (barakat), which was presumably transferred from the founder of the order to successive shaykhs. Each shaykh has his specific transmission chain of instruction from Sufi shaykh to shaykh. An important characteristic of a shaykh is his alleged ability to perform miracles. The Sufis attribute supernatural characteristics to the graves of Sufi shaykhs and other shrines, endorse the practice of visiting the shrines of well-known saints, read the Quran at cemeteries, and use amulets and talismans. Compared with mainstream Sufism, in tariqatism the emphasis is placed on the times and forms of dhikr, participation in other forms of devotion, and fulfillment of the tariqa’s material obligations rather than on mysticism and spiritual perfection. During the Soviet period, the Sufis had a deeply secretive existence. The thaw during Mikhail Gorbachev’s leadership (1986–91) enabled them to emerge from underground and champion the grassroots movement for Islamic revival. In the North Caucasus between 1989 and 1992, tariqatists joined with other Islamic traditionalists, fundamentalists, and members of the dissident democratic intelligentsia to make up the core of the Islamic-democratic movement that opposed the existing Soviet system generally and the collaborationist Muftiate of the North Caucasus (DUMSK) in particular. Since 1992 tariqatists have established their control over muftiates in Dagestan, Chechnya, and Ingushetia, which emerged after the disintegration of the DUMSK. A characteristic feature of the postcommunist Islamic revival has been the emergence of dozens of new muftiates headed by “young imams.” The latter rose against the authority of the Soviet-era “old imams,” whom they charged with being antidemocratic and corrupt and collaborating with the Communist Party and the KGB. In terms of status and geography the new muftis could be grouped into three distinct categories. The first and most influential group comprises the muftis of the all-Russian and supraregional level, such as the mufti of All-Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (TsDUM), the mufti of European Russia (DUMER), the mufti of Asian Russia (DUMAChR), the mufti of the Volga region, the mufti of Siberia and the Far East, and the mufti of St. Petersburg and

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the northwestern part of Russia. The second group includes the muftis of Russia’s autonomies. The third group is made up of the muftis of Russia’s various regions with substantial Muslim populations. In fact, the second and third groups of muftiates represent the upgraded former provincial structures of the mufti of European Russia and Siberia (DUMES) and the DUMSK. The muftiates of the third group are a post-Soviet phenomenon. Russia’s Eurasian location accounts for its special relations with the world of Islam compared with the relations between the West and Islam. With its lengthy and productive interaction with the Muslim world, the Russian polity and society share some similarities with those in the Islamic East. Islamic and Islamo-Arabic influence can be identified in Russian architecture, design, costumes, popular epics, music, and the Russian language itself. The collapse of communism, which was a Western construct, has revived the old “Russian question” about Russia’s sociocultural essence and place in the world. As in the past, Russian academic and political discourse has been dominated by the arguments between the advocates of three differing perspectives: the neo-Westernizers, the neo-Slavophiles, and the neo-Eurasianists. The neo-Westernizers have regarded Western influence as crucial in Russian history and argue for Russia’s future development along the lines of the Western market economy and political democracy. They have consequently shared the Western ambiguity toward Islam and favored Russia’s gradual disengagement from it. Their opponents, the neo-Slavophiles, have emphasized the eastern Slavic dimension of Russia’s cultural and political identity and opposed its rapprochement with both the West and the Muslim world. The policy of the early Yeltsin government (1990–94) implemented a neo-Westernized approach that had disastrous consequences for the Russian state and society in general and Russian-Islamic relations in particular. Its tragic manifestation was the Russian-Chechen war. Since the mid-1990s Russian politics have been defined by competing neo-Slavophiles and neo-Eurasianists. The former have viewed Russia’s future as a unitary and authoritarian state of ethnic Russians, while the latter have advocated Russia’s transformation into a democratic federation, or even confederation, which would reflect its ethno-religious and cultural pluralism. The advent of Vladimir Putin as Russia’s new president in 2000 reflected the neo-Slavophile shift, which might well have an unfavorable impact on relations between Russia and Islam. In postcommunist Russia Islam has reemerged as an important factor of cultural and national self-assertion among Russia’s Muslims. In the conditions of ideological void, weak civil society, and vague national identity, the ethnic nationalist movements among some of Russia’s Muslims acquired an Islamic dimension; Islam became an important ideological component of the republican irredentism in the Muslim autonomies, specifically in Chechnya. Yet another important consequence of the post-Soviet Islamic renaissance has been a proliferation in the Muslim-populated regions of Russia of nontraditional, radical forms of Islam, and of Wahhabism in particular. This has split Islamic communities in the North Caucasus, and to a lesser extent in the Volga-Urals, along doctrinal and political lines.

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WOMEN AND THE FAMILY The partial reinstatement of Islamic values as the guiding ethic for postSoviet Muslim communities has inevitably impacted the parameters of gender relations and the status of women. The Islam that is being returned to in Russia’s umma tends to stress patriarchal society as part of the revival of the Muslim tradition. This involves a major transformation from the sexual egalitarianism that was a central theme of Soviet ideology. Some women and girls have taken up Islamic education at various levels. A few women’s Muslim organizations came into being, none of which, however, was active for any long period. At the same time, women have asserted their choice for an Islamic way of life in other, more conventional ways. Some schoolgirls and university students have begun to wear the full veil (hijab) or face veil (niqab). For the most part, the women do not know their rights in Islamic law and are therefore unable to argue their case on those grounds. It is often the men who decide whether women should be allowed to attend mosque or play an active role in other religious activity outside the home. In some Muslim regions there are women Islamists, for example Fauzia Bayramova (b. 1950), the leader of the Ittifaq party in Tatarstan, who hopes to play a central role in the re-Islamization of the female population. On the whole, Muslim women have been positive about the revival of Islam, which they perceive as a viable moral and spiritual foundation in the post-Soviet crisis of values. They would therefore welcome the gradual strengthening of Islamic ethics and morality in family life and the incorporation of Islamic social norms (related to intergender and intergenerational relations, communalism, charity for the poor and care for the disadvantaged, the dress code, attitudes toward alcohol, drugs, theft, and so on) in public life. Interestingly, after 70 years of emancipation the available evidence suggests that many Muslim women would favor the return to their traditional role as housewives and mothers.1

SPECIAL ISSUES IN THE NEWS In contrast with the other Muslim regions of Russia, Islamic principles have actually been translated into political and military action in post-Soviet Chechnya. In 1989, Chechen nationalists under the leadership of Major General Dzhokhar Dudayev (1944–96), the former commander of the Soviet air force in Tartu, began the movement for Chechnya’s sovereignty. In 1991, the AllNational Congress of the Chechen People, which emerged as a viable alternative to the dysfunctional parliament of Russia’s Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Republic, proclaimed General Dudayev president of independent Chechnya. In August 1994, Russian president Boris Yeltsin (b. 1931) declared war on breakaway Chechnya that was suspended in May 1996 as a result of the Khasavyurt agreements. In May 1997, President Yeltsin and Chechen president Maskhadov (1951–2005) signed a cease-fire agreement that left the political status of Chechnya indefinite. As in its previous history, the war has become a powerful force

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for unification and has encouraged Chechen Islamization, which has occurred in Sufi and fundamentalist forms. During 1996–97 the Chechen government abolished the secular courts of justice, created the Supreme Shariat Court with its regional branches, and introduced sharia norms in the Chechen legislature. The new constitution of Chechnya proclaimed Islam as the state religion and the legal basis for the Chechen legislature, incompatible with the Russian legal system. The Chechen leadership regarded Sudan and Afghanistan under the Taliban as models for a Chechen Islamic state. Its Islamist leaders began to claim the role of saviors of their Muslim neighbors from the rule of the Russian kafirs (nonbelievers in Allah). An important factor in Chechen Wahhabization was the substantial financial, material, and military assistance provided by Islamic fundamentalist organizations, based in Saudi Arabia and some other countries of the Middle East. In August 1999, the Chechens unleashed an abortive military campaign for the Islamic unification of Chechnya and Dagestan and invaded western Dagestan. Moscow responded to this invasion, thus sparking the second Chechen war (1999–2000). In spite of the nominal termination of the conflict, it continues to claim numerous victims on both sides. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon evoked immediate and wholehearted condemnation by Russian politicians as well as widespread empathy with the American people. President Putin expressed Russia’s solidarity with the West against the new common threat represented by international terrorism and Islamic extremism. The Russian leadership was quick to declare rebellious Chechnya a safe haven for the al-Qaida organization and to present Russian military actions there as a part of a global war against international terrorism. In the new political reality, the U.S. government dropped its previous concern over Russia’s handling of the Chechen conflict and offered President Putin its unconditional support for his policy in Chechnya. The war has been accompanied by an official nationwide military, administrative, and propaganda crackdown on real and imagined Islamic fundamentalists. As a result, most foreign Muslims have been deported and their offices closed. Any Islam-related activities and even the simple manifestation of Islamic belief have been rendered suspicious. It is significant that the ruling elites of Russia’s Muslim autonomies have exploited Moscow’s harsh line on Islamic extremism to suppress any political opposition. Compared with the official Moscow line, the reaction of Russia’s Muslim leaders and wider Muslim public to these events was ambivalent. The prevailing view was that the United States and the West in general had reaped the harvest it had sown in arming the Muslim fighters (mujahidin) in Afghanistan in the first place and in allowing transnational Islamic organizations to act as fronts for terrorist groups. It is widely believed among Russia’s public at large that the rise of Islamic extremism was one of the consequences of the victory of the West against communism. The ongoing war of the “civilized” world against international terrorism and Islamic extremism is therefore perceived as being designed to reshape the world order in the interests of the United States government and the West.

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NOTABLE PEOPLE Abdulatipov, Ramazan Gadzhimuradovich (b. 1946). Deputy of the Council Federation of the Russian parliament and chairman of the Assembly of Peoples of Russia. Abdulatipov is one of the high-profile politicians who has advocated genuine ethno-territorial federation and opposed a military solution to the Chechen conflict. Abdulatipov is an Avar and holds an MA and a Ph.D. in history from Makhachkala State University in Dagestan. He has served as a member of Parliament from Dagestan (1990–93) and was deputy of the minister of nationalities and regional politics (1994–97) and a deputy chairman of the Council of Federation (the upper chamber) of the Russian parliament. Abdulatipov has also served as deputy of the Council Federation of the Russian Parliament and chairman of the Assembly of Peoples of Russia. Gaynutdinov, Ravil Ismagilovich (b. 1959). Mufti of European Russia and the chairman of the Council of Muftis of Russia. Gaynutdinov is a Kazan Tatar. Between 1980 and 1984, Gaynutdinov studied at the madrasa of Mir-i-Arab, which was one of the two Islamic higher schools in the Soviet Union. In 1988, Ravil was promoted to the prestigious post of imam-khatyb (abbot) of the Cathedral Mosque in Moscow. In the early 1990s, Gaynutdinov began a swift ascendance in Moscow political and business circles. He developed good relations with the powerful mayor of Moscow, Yurii Luzhkov, whose political and financial assistance has enhanced Gaynutdinov’s ambition to turn Moscow into the Islamic capital of Russia. He also established independent relations with the embassy of Saudi Arabia in Moscow, which granted him substantial financial assistance. In return Gaynutdinov welcomed the arrival of a Wahhabi interpretation of fundamentalist Islam. Kadyrov, Ahmad (b. 1951). Head of the pro-Russian administration of Chechnya and former mufti of Chechnya. Kadyrov is a Chechen, born into a deeply religious family, all the members of which belong to the Qadiri tariqa. In 1957 Kadyrov and his family returned from deportation and settled in the village of Tsentoroy, in Checheno-Ingushetia. Kadyrov graduated from the madrasa of Miri-Arab in Bukhara and from the Islamic Institute in Tashkent. In 1989, he created and headed the first Islamic Institute in Grozny. Following the Russian invasion into Chechnya, he supported the Chechen resistance, although by 1996 he backed the Khasavyurt peace agreements. Since 2000 Kadyrov has been in charge of the pro-Russian administration of Chechnya. Maskhadov, Aslan (1951–2005). President of Chechnya since 1997. Maskhadov is Chechen with a distinguished career in the Soviet army and extensive military education. In 1994 he was promoted to commander of the Supreme Headquarters of Chechnya, and he played an important role in the defeat of the Russian troops during the first Chechen war in 1994–96. In 1996, he signed a peace agreement in Khasavyurt with Russian general Lebed and was elected president of Chechnya after the assassination of President Dudayev in 1996. With the renewal of Russian military operations against Chechnya in 1999, Maskhadov headed the Chechen Islamo-nationalist opposition to the Russians and the pro-Russian Chechen administration under Ahmad Kadyrov.

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Shaimiev, Mintimir (b. 1937). President of the Republic of Tatarstan of the Russian Federation. Shaimiev is a Kazan Tatar educated as an engineer who made his career within the Communist Party and Soviet nomenklatura. From 1990 to 1991 he was chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar Autonomous Republic and since June 1991 has been president of Tatarstan. He was reelected for a second term in March 1996 and a third term in 2001. Shaimiev was one of a few of Russia’s regional leaders who in 1992 refused to sign the Federal Treaty with Moscow and proposed to replace the structure of the Russian Federation with a looser asymmetrical federation. Within postcommunist Russia and internationally, President Shaimiev’s initiative has been termed the Tatarstan model. In 1994, the Tatarstan model was legitimized as a result of a power-sharing treaty between Kazan and Moscow, which ensured Tatarstan’s special status within the Russian Federation. Since 1999, the Tatarstan model has been under increasing threat as a result of President Putin’s centralization project. Tadzhuddinov, Talgat Safich (b. 1948). Since 1990, shaykh al-Islam (supreme Islamic authority) of Russia’s umma and mufti of central and European Russia. Tadzhuddinov is a Kazan Tatar who studied in the madrasa of Mir-i-Arab in Bukhara. After graduation he became the second imam-khatyb of the Mardjani mosque in Kazan. In 1978, he graduated from the al-Azhar Islamic University in Cairo, Egypt. After the break-up of the Soviet Union and subsequent fragmentation of the Islamic administration, Tadzhuddinov refused to recognize the legitimacy of the numerous new muftis and continued to nominate his representatives in various regions of Russia and the former Soviet Union. Unlike Moscow mufti Gaynutdinov, Tadzhuddinov adheres to the traditional Hanafi madhhab of Sunni Islam and rejects Wahhabism. The 1990s were characterized by the intense rivalry between Tadzhuddinov and Ravil Gaynutdinov for the role of main mufti of Russia. Since the election of Vladimir Putin as the Russian president in March 2000, Tadzhuddinov’s authority has increased. NOTE 1. See Galina Yemelianova, Russia and Islam: A Historical Survey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), especially chapter 6.

RESOURCE GUIDE Suggested Reading Akiner, Shirin. “Between Tradition and Modernity: The Dilemma Facing Contemporary Central Asian Women.” In Post-Soviet Women: From the Baltic to Central Asia, ed. Mary Buckley. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Bukharaev, Ravil. Islam in Russia. New York: Taylor Francis, 2000. Eichelman, Dale F. Russia’s Muslim Frontiers: New Directions in Cross-Cultural Analysis. Indiana Series in Arab and Islamic Studies. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993.

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Fowkes, Ben, ed. Russia and Chechnia: The Permanent Crisis. New York: Macmillan, 1998. Murphy, Paul J. The Wolves of Islam: Russia and the Faces of Chechen Terror. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005. Pilkington, Hilary, and Galina Yemelianova, eds. Islam in Post-Soviet Russia: Public and Private Faces. New York: Routledge, 2002. Roi, Yaacov. Democracy and Pluralism in Muslim Eurasia. London: Frank Cass, 2004. Schamiloglu, UIi. Muslims in Russia: The Growth and Influence of Islam in the Nations of Asia and Central Asia. Broomall, PA: Mason Crest Publishers, 2005. Trenin, Dmitrii. Russia’s Restless Frontier: The Chechnya Factor in Post-Soviet Russia. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004. Yemelianova, Galina. Russia and Islam: A Historical Survey. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Zelkina, Anna. In Quest for God and Freedom: Sufi Responses to the Russian Advance in the North Caucasus. New York: New York University Press, 2000.

Films and Videos Chechen Lullaby. 2002. Human tragedy of the Chechen portrayed through the eyes of four veteran reporters. Deadlock: Russia’s Forgotten War. 2002. Documentary on the brutal, decade-long struggle in Chechnya. The Deserter. 2002. Fighter in Chechnya who committed a crime and then dreams of redemption and forgiveness. Mountain Men and Holy Wars. 2003. Journeyman Pictures. Directed by Taran Davies. Life and legacy of Imam Shamil, a warrior who led Chechnya’s first rebellion against Russia and who today is the inspiration for Chechnya’s. The move and transcript can be downloaded at http://www.journeyman.tv/?lid=10989.

Web Sites Chechnya News: http://www.chechnyanews.com/ Eurasianet: http://www.eurasianet.org/ Free Chechnya: http://www.chechnyafree.ru/index.php?lng=eng/ Islam.ru—Independent Islamic Information Channel: http://eng.islam.ru/ Kavkaz Center for News and Analysis: http://www.kavkazcenter.com/ Republic of Tatarstan official Web site: http://www.tatar.ru/english/

13 Saudi Arabia Kathryn M. Coughlin

OVERVIEW The kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Islam and, for Muslims, the Holy Land. It is here that many of Islam’s most historic events took place: the birth of the Prophet Muhammad; the revelation of the Quran, Islam’s holy book; and Muhammad’s flight from Mecca to Medina, which marks the start of the Muslim calendar. The birthplace of Islam confers to the kingdom a unique status among Muslim countries. The ruling family derives its legitimacy from serving as the defenders and protectors of the holy places and from its historic association with Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, an eighteenth-century reformer who teachings continue to influence a Saudi interpretation of Islam. With the exception of small numbers of temporary foreign workers who are not included in statistical analyses, all 26.4 million people living in Saudi Arabia are Muslim. Between 8 percent and 15 percent of Saudis are Shiite (living mostly on the east coast), including a small community of Ismaili Muslims living in Najran. More than 90 percent of the population is of Arab descent, with the balance being of Afro-Asian descent. The nation holds 25 percent of the world’s known oil reserves and is the most influential player in the world oil market. The Gulf Cooperation Council, the United Nations, the U.S. Department of State, and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency maintain various statistics on Saudi Arabia; however, these all vary somewhat. The Saudi government does not release statistics that it considers of a sensitive nature, such as Shia population figures, numbers of foreign guest workers, and unemployment statistics.

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However, the available numbers tell a great deal about the unique characteristics of the population and the difficulties that Saudi society faces in the twentyfirst century. Saudi Arabia has a population growth rate of 2.31 percent, and the median age is 21 years old.1 These Saudis live in an atmosphere of decreasing oil revenues, heavy demands on government services, and cutbacks due to austerity measures. As this population ages, they will further stress the kingdom’s generous entitlement system. Saudi Arabia is also experiencing increasing unemployment, particularly in the government sector (where previously large numbers of Saudis easily found jobs). Despite decreasing employment opportunities, half of all jobs are filled by expatriates who tend to be either highly educated and trained employees or unskilled workers who choose to work in trades and industries that most Saudis avoid.2 Before the 1970s, thousands of Muslim immigrants came to Saudi Arabia. In the past, immigration often followed from trade, the pilgrimage (hajj), and tumult in other areas of the Muslim world (such as central Asia, west Africa, provinces of the former Ottoman Empire, and Palestine), providing a new supply of residents. Since the 1970s, it has been much more difficult for non-Saudi Muslims to obtain citizenship, even though they may have lived and worked in the kingdom for decades; non-Muslims cannot gain citizenship, even if they are born in the kingdom. Since the first Gulf War (1990), the government has emphasized a program of “Saudiization” designed to reduce government services and jobs for foreigners and to create more employment opportunities for Saudis. This has not affected Western expatriate workers as much as foreign Muslims and has become a source of tension and hardship for them. Furthermore, the Saudi government enforces strict residency requirements to avoid the significant problem of unskilled illegal aliens. The history of Saudi Arabia’s formation as a modern nation-state is greatly informed by its premodern history. While there are aspects of Saudi culture that resemble those of other Arab Muslim countries in the Gulf region, there are peculiar characteristics that belong to Saudi Arabia alone. Saudi Arabia is a country where the beginning of the history of the nation remains an important basis for its continuation and where the ultraconservative and traditional lives with the most recent technological and high material standards. Premodern History Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–92) of the Najd (the central province) studied the Hanbali school of thought in Arabia and later in Medina, Iraq, and Iran. A literalist interpreter of the Quran and records and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad (hadith), Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was angered by Muslims’ conducting rituals he deemed un-Islamic, such as praying to local saints and visiting their tombs. He became convinced of the need to teach a purified Islam throughout the Arabian peninsula, emphasizing the oneness and unity of God (tawhid) and the importance of correct worship and doctrine. This unitarian ideal is why his followers call themselves muwahhidun (literally “those who believe in the oneness of God”). They also became known as Wahhabis (“followers of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab”)—a term his

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followers reject to this day. In 1736, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab wrote his treatise Kitab al-Tawhid (Book on Monotheism), which became the authoritative reference for Wahhabi Islam.3 Ibn Abd al-Wahhab saw himself as a reformer who had come to renew and revitalize the message of Islam. His desire to enforce Islamic law required political support, which he obtained from Muhammad ibn Saud (d. 1765), the local tribal leader of Dirayah. In 1744, Ibn Saud and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab formed an alliance to establish a state run according to their interpretation of Sunni Islamic principles. The association between the descendants of Ibn Saud and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab continues until today. According to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s teachings, Muslims must swear an oath of loyalty to their Muslim ruler, obeying him completely unless he disobeys the Islamic law (sharia). Ibn Abd al-Wahhab presented three other principles for a proper Islamic government and society, which are emphasized in Saudi Arabia today: to believe in Allah (God), to enjoin or require virtue, and to forbid evil. Thus, a theocratic state was established and political ideology became religious obligation. Ibn Saud expanded his territory through military campaigns and gathered his growing army from the villages in the Najd, destroying local shrines and evidence of Shia and other “deviant” practices. His forces had established the Wahhabi way of life and al-Saud’s control over much of the area by his death in 1765.4 His hometown, Dirayah, became a mission center from where preachers would train according to Wahhabi precepts and then proselytize other parts of the peninsula. After Ibn Saud died, his son Abd al-Aziz carried on with his mission to conquer the whole peninsula. In 1801, his armies attacked and sacked Karbala, the site of the tomb of Muhammad’s grandson Hussain, who is revered in Shia Islam. Shiites consider Karbala second to Mecca as a holy place. In 1803, they captured Sunni towns in the Hijaz and entered Mecca and Medina. In the process, they destroyed monuments and grave markers of early pious Muslims, which were visited by Sunni and Shia penitents and used as a place for prayer. The Wahhabis caught the eye of the Ottomans, who were responsible for the safety of pilgrims performing the annual pilgrimage (hajj) to Mecca, so the sultan commanded his subordinate Muhammad Ali (d. 1849, then ruling Egypt) to defeat the Wahhabis, which his military did in 1818. Despite this crushing military defeat, the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam remained a unifying force in creating the modern state of Saudi Arabia. Desiring to maintain what they saw as a perfect and pristine Islam, Wahhabi religious scholars (ulama) followed the strictest interpretations of the most conservative legal school of Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780–855) and accepted only the authority of the Quran and hadith as authentic sources of knowledge, rejecting much of the scholarship of jurists and theologians. This put them at direct odds with other Muslim reform movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that sought guidance from Islam in the light of the rapidly developing modern world and contemporary Muslim scholars. The Wahhabi interpretations of the Quran and hadith were literal and reified local practices from the Najd region of the peninsula. Several decades later, Ibn Saud’s great-grandson Abd al-Aziz bin Abdul Rahman ibn Faisal al-Saud (1899–1953, also known as Ibn Saud) managed to defeat other

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tribal leaders with British support and consolidate his rule over the contiguous provinces that made up Saudi Arabia. The country was recognized as a sovereign nation in 1932. Under Ibn Saud’s rule, the government strictly enforced compliance with Islamic laws and Wahhabi interpretations of Islam. In the first quarter of the twentieth century, Ibn Saud used Wahhabism to create cohesion among the diverse tribes and peoples of the peninsula. Loyalty and conformity to the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam provided a common identity that transcended local loyal ties. The House of Saud’s oligarchy, the ulama, and the tribal notables or leaders (umara), formed a ruling elite that used political culture as a legitimizing tool. This historic alliance, along with the intermarriage of regional and local elite families, has created an expansive class of ruling elites that are integrated into every aspect of society and the state. CULTURE, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS In 1992, the Basic Law declared Saudi Arabia a monarchy and stated that the Quran and the sunna form the constitution of the country, which is governed on the basis of law derived from these two revealed and thus infallible sources (which is the Wahhabi interpretation of sharia).5 Political parties are banned and there have never been national elections for representative governance. The king’s decrees must fall within the sharia and other Saudi traditions and are subject to review by the Saudi royal family and the ruling clerics (ulama). The succession line to the monarchy is largely predetermined by leading men of the royal family; each monarch must be approved by the clerics. Laws are promulgated by the Council of Ministers and then ratified by the monarchy, and again must not contradict the clerics’ interpretation of sharia. A system of religious courts governs the administration of justice. These judges are installed by the king on the recommendation of the Supreme Judicial Council.6 The king is the final court of appeal and may pardon Saudis convicted of criminal offenses; ordinary citizens may petition government officials or the king through a traditional public audience (majlis). In response to pressure from the West and Saudi opposition groups, reforms have been initiated that delineate the basic statutes of government, codify the rules of succession, and establish a national Consultative Council that can advise but not make laws. The size and responsibilities of this council have been gradually expanded. Western culture has inundated Saudi Arabia from several sources: Western and other expatriate workers, Saudis who have traveled and lived overseas (for education, work, or leisure), and consumer culture. The latest technology from Asia (often before its appearance in the United States), luxury goods from Europe, fashionable clothing, fast-food restaurants, and Western department stores are ubiquitous in the larger cities (Kentucky Fried Chicken sits next to the Haram—the Holiest Sanctuary—in Mecca).7 In the kingdom, the primary form of entertainment is visiting the local mall and shopping. One can buy Coach purses, Polo and Ralph Lauren clothing, Tiffany diamonds, and slinky lingerie from Victoria’s Secret. Afterward, a Saudi might have lunch at the McDonald’s or Chuck E. Cheese’s nearby and then pick up some groceries from the local Safeway on the way home.8

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Saudi Arabian boys joke together after school in Jeddah. Rick Holmes.

The experience is not completely Western, however. Celine Dion’s latest compact disc features her sleeveless blouse covered with a black smock, courtesy of the country’s censors. Kentucky Fried Chicken, Starbucks, and Burger King all have segregated dining areas—one for single men and one for women or families, with separate ordering counters and entrances. Billionaire Saudi investor Shaykh Waleed bin Talal recently opened Kingdom Mall in Riyahd, which features a complete floor devoted solely to women. Here all of the salesclerks and security guards are female, and no male—not even the general manager of the mall—can visit. Women can leave their veils and long black outer garments in a coatroom and are free to walk about in jeans or other Western wear.9 Wahhabism dictates one’s appearance in public. For men, this can include wearing a long beard and white, ankle-length robe with long sleeves (thobe). Women must cover themselves with the black enveloping cloak worn on the top of the head (abaya), face veil, and perhaps even gloves. Behavior is expected to be sober, and entertainment such as music or dancing is frowned on. Particular to Saudi society

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are the presence of morals’ enforcers known as mutawwiin (“those who obey or volunteer”).10 Part public employee, part eager volunteer, members of the hayya committee (to propagate virtue and prevent vice), as they are known by Saudis, ensure that shops are closed for prayer and that public decorum is maintained. On March 11, 2002, 15 girls died in a blaze at al-Hindawaya girl’s middle school in Mecca.11 Saudi newspapers openly accused the mutawwiin of interfering with rescue attempts and directly contributing to the girls’ deaths. According to al-Iqtisaadiyyah (The Economist), Saudi Arabia’s leading business newspaper, members of the mutawwiin beat young girls trying to leave the school without their abayas on and stopped men who tried to help the girls, warning that it was a sin to approach the girls uncovered. It was noted that “the father of one of the dead girls said that the school watchman even refused to open the gates to let the girls out.”12 Public outrage was vented through the Saudi and other Arab press, although Interior Minister Prince Naif bin Abdulaziz cleared the religious police of any wrongdoing in the fire.13 Another enforced precept of Wahhabi society is a strict segregation of the sexes. Schools, banks, government, and medical facilities are usually segregated, including waiting areas. Censorship is prevalent and magazines and newspapers can be purchased with pictures blocked out or pages missing. The censors look for pictures of a sexual nature (real or implied), pictures of or suggesting alcohol, and articles critical of the kingdom’s government, Saudi culture, or society. The Internet is widely available, and despite serious attempts at censoring content, technically savvy users have figured out ways to get around it. WOMEN AND THE FAMILY Western commentators on women and Islam frequently cite the political, social, and economic status of women in Saudi Arabia as proof of Islam’s regressive stance on women’s rights. While there is no doubt that Saudi Arabia’s legal and social subjugation of women is one of the most repressive in history, the reality is somewhat more complex than usually noted. In the seventh century, Islam granted women far more economic, political, and social rights than was the norm in both the West and the Middle East at that time. During a period when female infants were often buried alive and women were little more than chattel, Islam’s message of equality was revolutionary. Women became legally entitled to inherit and bequeath property, holding their wealth in their names even after marriage, without any obligation to contribute that wealth to the household. They gained the right and duty to obtain an education, receive sexual satisfaction from their husbands, and receive equal reward for equal deeds rendered. Saudi society today does not reflect much of the theoretical egalitarianism in Islam. While they are unmarried, girls and women are wards of their fathers. When married, they are wards of their husbands, and when divorced or widowed, they are wards of their sons (or their father’s family if they have no sons). A Saudi woman is unable to buy a mobile phone, register for college classes, or accept a marriage

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proposal without male approval. She is unable to attend court hearings, even when she is being prosecuted for adultery or murder.14 On the other hand, women have the legal and customary right to own and retain property and wealth in their own names, and at the same time, their husbands or families are required to support them irrespective of the woman’s own personal means. While the law allows women to own real and personal property independently, social, familial, and cultural factors can keep women from exercising their rights. Roughly 20–25 percent of the business registrations in Saudi Arabia are by women.15 Despite inheritance laws that require that daughters receive only half the inheritance awarded to sons, Saudi women inherit a large portion of the kingdom’s wealth. Saudi women enjoy free primary, secondary, and college education, although they are segregated from male teachers and other male students. In 2000, women made up 58 percent of all university graduates, although they are excluded from college faculties in engineering and architecture.16 Saudi men frequently study abroad; in theory, Saudi women may do so if accompanied by a male relative, although some young women are escorted to a university outside the kingdom and left to study on their own. Until recently, the traditional interpretation of women’s roles has been that they should remain in the home, raising their children. However, because of the increasing emphasis on the importance of education and the large numbers of foreigners working in the country, government policies have shifted. Now it is not working outside the home or going to school that is objectionable, but the consequent mixing of men and women. If schools and places of employment are segregated by gender, the Saudi interpretation of Islamic law allows women to attend school or work outside the home. In an effort to retain Saudi women in the government school system, teachers are given generous salaries, medical insurance, and retirement benefits to encourage them to continue working even while having children. They are also given generous maternity leaves, on-site nurseries, and the opportunity to obtain live-in maids, nannies, and drivers (as they cannot drive themselves to work). These benefits are standard at most places where Saudi women are employed. But liberal employment benefits tell only part of the story. In Saudi Arabia, a woman cannot rent a hotel room without a male relative; she cannot drive, but neither can she be alone in a car with a man not her relative. Saudi women do not have birth certificates and cannot obtain a passport or other government identification without their father’s or husband’s permission.17 In the first municipal elections ever held in the kingdom, in February 2005, Saudi women could not vote or participate.18 The election law passed in October 2004 did not forbid women from voting, and the Associated Press quoted an unnamed election official who attributed the exclusion of women to an administrative problem: “There were not enough women electoral staff to run women-only voter registration centres, while only a fraction of women in Saudi Arabia had photo identity cards.”19 In Saudi Arabia, a woman cannot obtain an identification card without permission of her male guardian, whether that be her father, husband, or son.

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SPECIAL ISSUES IN THE NEWS Political stability in the kingdom depends on public perception of the ruling regime’s commitment to Islam. The only serious political challenge to Saudi rule hails from a minority of violent religious extremists who perceive the Saudi family as religiously and politically corrupt.20 These militants are radically anti-Shiite, condemn the practices and beliefs of many Sunni Muslims outside the kingdom, and believe in a vast Judeo-Christian conspiracy against Islam. To such extremists, the United States is a coconspirator with Zionist enemies who have seized the third holiest site in Islam—the Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem—and whose military occupies the Holy Land (Arabia). Most Islamic Extremism Is Not Wahhabism Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, almost all Islamic radical, extremist, or fundamentalist groups are lumped under the term Wahhabi, whether their doctrine or practice has any connection with the teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Most extremism is not based on the Saudi interpretation of Islam, but rather is part of broader religious and social movements to re-create the environment of seventhcentury Arabia in an effort to return to Islam’s original (and thus pure) state. This is more accurately known as a Salafi interpretation and is informed by Islam’s long history of calls for reform (islah) and renewal (tajdid ). Thousands of missionaries funded in part by Saudi charities and aid organizations have built schools, orphanages, and other social service institutions throughout

Throughout Saudi Arabia, crumbling old forts sharply contrast with gleaming skyscrapers. Rick Holmes (2002).

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the Muslim world in postconflict areas such as Afghanistan, Albania, Bosnia, Chechnya, Gaza and the West Bank, and Sudan. Their teachings tend to be literalist, and they encourage social models such as zealous gender segregation that are otherwise foreign to the preconflict Muslim society. Because funding for these projects comes from Islam’s Holy Land, there tends to be an imprimatur on these teachings, and these movements are consequently called Wahhabi. Lumping all of these movements, organizations, and extremists under the Wahhabi umbrella is similar to calling all Protestants Baptists. Saudi Arabia is a major donor to Muslim causes throughout the world, although other Gulf and oil-rich Muslim nations have been equally prolific in donating to Muslim causes. As tithing (or giving 10% of one’s income) is an important part of Protestant Christianity, zakat or charitable giving is one of the five pillars (mandatory acts) of Islam. Sunnis are required to give about 2.5 percent of their wealth (not income) each year to charitable causes, and most frequently give 10 percent or more.21 The kingdom has a long tradition of philanthropy, and public figures (including members of the royal family) are frequently presented with requests for patronage. Little, if any, investigation is usually undertaken to determine the actual use of funds raised. It was not until 1998 that the Saudi government investigated the movement of funds to the Taliban and other extremist organizations. Before that, even donations to reputable Muslim organizations such as the Saudi Red Crescent were siphoned off to extremist causes.22 At the same time, some Saudi businessmen did fund organizations fully knowing that their doctrine was extremist or that their tactics were terroristic. So although many Muslim charitable organizations have been funded through Saudi sources, it is incorrect to assume that they are in fact Wahhabi or Saudi-sponsored. Further complicating understanding of the role of Saudi finance in international terrorism is funding for Palestinian causes. For most Arabs and Muslims, violent Palestinian tactics including suicide bombers are legitimate measures in self-defense; Israel is seen as an illegal occupying force killing Palestinians and dispossessing them of their land. This inevitably means that most Arabs and Muslims—including Saudis—do not consider movements like Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Fatah, or (Lebanese) Hizbullah terrorists, but rather defensive military groups. With this issue aside, Saudi government officials have been actively cooperating with American and European security analysts in tracing Saudioriginating funds for worldwide terrorist networks. The kingdom has a vested interest in shutting down extremist cells and international terrorist networks, as many of them seek to oust the al-Saud family from power. NOTABLE PEOPLE bin Laden, Osama (b. 1957). One of approximately 50 children in a prominent Saudi family whose fortune derives from the construction industry. Bin Laden joined the Afghan resistance during the war with the Soviets (1979–89), which seems to have radicalized his interpretation of Islam. He became critical of the United States’ involvement in the Gulf War (1990), and specifically the presence of non-Muslim troops in Saudi Arabia, the home to Islam’s two holiest sites. After the

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Gulf War, he devoted his considerable personal and financial resources to cofounding (with Ayman al-Zawahiri) the terrorist organization al-Qaida (the Base).23 Saudi Arabia stripped bin Laden of his citizenship in 1994, citing his opposition to the king and the Saudi government. Ibn Abd al-Aziz, Fahd (1922–2005). Late king of Saudi Arabia and a son of Ibn Saud, the founder of Saudi Arabia. Fahd slowly introduced Saudi Arabia to the twentieth century but described the government as an absolute monarchy in the new constitution (1992). In 1995, the king suffered a debilitating stroke that placed de facto authority in the hands of his successor, Crown Prince Abdullah, his half brother, who is now king. Ibn Abd al-Aziz, Talal (b. 1931). Minor prince in the Saudi royal family who served as finance minister from 1960 to 1962. He formed and led a liberal opposition movement called “the free princes,” which sought to create an elected assembly to check the power of the al-Saud monarchy. This movement was one of the earliest expressions of dissent in the royal kingdom and resulted in his exile to Egypt in 1962. Talal continues to be a harsh critic of the Saudi monarchy. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad (1703–1791). Founder of the Wahhabi religious movement, which seeks to restore the Muslim community as it was during the time of the Prophet Muhammad. He and his descendants formed military and political alliances with the al-Saud family, which has ensured a continuation of Wahhab’s conservative philosophy. Saud, Abdullah ibn Abu al-Aziz al- (b. 1924). First deputy prime minister of Saudi Arabia and king of Saudi Arabia after King Fahd’s death in 2005. Abdullah does not speak English and has a reputation of leading a simple, pious life in contradistinction to other prominent Saudi royal family members. He is considered to be less open to the West than King Fahd was. NOTES 1. CIA, World Factbook 2005, http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/. 2. The Central Department of Statistics, a Saudi government agency, provides economic figures, population and vital statistics, and other statistical information, but these numbers may not be reliable and are often quoted in conjunction with non-Saudi source information in scholarly surveys and academic assessments. See http://www.planning.gov. sa/indexe.htm. 3. The Kitab al-Tawhid has been translated into English: http://www.usc.edu/dept/ MSA/fundamentals/tawheed/abdulwahab/. 4. See the Army Area Handbook program country profile on Saudi Arabia at http:// www.mongabay.com/reference/country_profiles/2004–2005/Saudi_Arabia.html. 5. The Saudi Arabian constitution can be viewed at http://www.saudinf.com/main/ c541.htm. 6. For an introduction to the Saudi court system and government, see the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs’ Electronic Information and Publications Office Web site: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3584.htm.

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7. Salma Nawwab, Saudi undergraduate, conversation with author, Georgetown University, 2000. 8. Susan Taylor Martin, “Hanging Out at the Mall, Saudi Style,” St. Petersburg Times, July 24, 2002; also see Ellen Ratner, “Give Saudi Arabia a Chance,” WorldNetDaily.com, April 26, 2002, http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=27403. 9. Martin, “Hanging Out.” 10. Sometimes known by popular name of the Committees for Public Morality or, more formally, as the Committees for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice. 11. See testimony of Ali al-Ahmed, director of the Saudi Institute, before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus: “Human Rights in Saudi Arabia: the Role of Women,” Washington, DC, June 4,2002. 12. “Saudi Police ‘Stopped’ Fire Rescue,” BBC News, March 15, 2002, http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/187447.stm. 13. Testimony of Ali al-Ahmed. 14. Ibid. 15. Anthony Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century: Politics, Economics and Energy (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2002), 20–22. An article in the Christian Science Monitor states that Saudi women cannot legally own businesses in their own names; they must have a male relative or agent. Faye Bowers, “Saudi Women, Long Silent, Gain a Quiet Voice,” Christian Science Monitor, January 13, 2004. 16. Bowers, “Saudi Women.” 17. Faiza Saleh Ambah, “In Rare Public Dialogue, Saudi Women Talk about Rights,” Christian Science Monitor, June 14, 2004. 18. “Saudi Women Barred from Voting,” BBC News, October 11, 2004, http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3734420.stm. 19. Ibid. 20. Anthony H. Cordesman, “Saudi Arabia: Opposition, Islamic Extremism and Terrorism,” occasional paper (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2002), http://www.saudi-american-forum.org/Library/SAF_Library_18.htm. 21. See Cordesman, Saudi Arabia, 6–8. The Saudi government also levies a zakat tax against Saudis and Gulf Cooperative Council nationals and on companies entirely owned by them, in the amount of 2.5 percent. See Info-Prod Research (Middle East), http://www. infoprod.co.il/country/saudia2e.htm. 22. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia. 23. For biographical information on Ayman al-Zawahiri, see the “Notable People” section of chapter 5, on Egypt.

RESOURCE GUIDE Suggested Reading Abou El Fadl, Khalid. Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority and Women. Oxford: OneWorld Books, 2001. Algar, Hamid. Wahhabism: A Critical Essay. North Haledon, NJ: Islamic Publications International, 2002. Amnesty International. Saudi Arabia: A Justice System without Justice. London: Amnesty International, 2005.

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Arebi, Siddika. Women and Words in Saudi Arabia: The Politics of Literary Discourse. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. Doumato, Eleanor. Women, Islam, and Healing in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. Economist Intelligence Unit. Time Travellers: A Survey of the Gulf. London: Economist, 2002. Fandy, Mamoun. Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Discontent. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999. Kechichian, Joseph A. Succession in Saudi Arabia. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001. Lippman, Thomas W. Inside the Mirage: America’s Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004. Rasheed, Madawi al-. A History of Saudi Arabia. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Yamani, Mai. Changed Identities: The Challenge of the New Generation in Saudi Arabia. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000. ———.“Health, Education, Gender and the Security of the Gulf in the Twenty-first Century.” In Gulf Security in the Twenty-first Century, ed. David E. Long and Christian Koch. Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates: Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, 1997. ———. “Muslim Women and Human Rights: The New Generation in Saudi Arabia.” In Democracy, the Rule of Law and Islam, ed. Eugene Cotran and Adel Sherif. London: Kluwer Law International, 1999.

Films and Videos Hajj: The Pilgrimage. Princeton, NJ: Films for the Humanities and Sciences, 2000. 52 mins. Day-to-day events of a pilgrimage to Mecca; includes background on Islam and Muhammad. House of Saud. Boston: Frontline Productions, 2005. Interviews with members of the royal family, officials, and activists; discusses prospects for reform and depicts events in the U.S.-Saudi alliance and the region’s geopolitics. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ frontline/shows/saud/. The Saudi Question. New York: Wide Angle Productions, 2004. Challenges Saudi Arabia faces on road to reform and in combating domestic terrorism and extremism.

Web Sites Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA) (Saudi opposition group): http://www. islahi.net/index.php?/english/about/ Reporters without Borders’ 2005 report on Saudi Arabia: http://www.rsf.org/article. php3?id_article=13312&Valider=OK Saudi Arabia Information Resource: http://www.saudinf.com/main/c541.htm Saudi embassy to the United States: http://www.saudiembassy.net/ Saudi Institute (organization for human-rights reform in Saudi Arabia, sponsored by Saudi Shiites): http://www.saudiinstitute.org/ Saudi Islamic Affairs Organization of the Saudi Arabian embassy to the United States: http://www.iad.org/

14 Sudan Heather J. Sharkey

OVERVIEW The Republic of Sudan has a population of 36 million people so diverse that scholars often struggle to categorize its peoples and make demographic assessments about them. For example, estimates of the number of languages spoken within the country can range from a few dozen to several hundred. Certain general demographic patterns are nonetheless clear. In religious terms, Muslims are an outright majority of Sudanese peoples, representing about two-thirds of the population. Perhaps a quarter of the population still practices traditional local religions, while the remainder follows Christianity—a faith that has grown markedly in recent years among war-displaced southern peoples. Arabic, spoken by nearly half the population, is the most widely used language in Sudan. It is also the country’s official language, although it is a mother tongue only in parts of the northern region. Otherwise, the country boasts a remarkable level of linguistic diversity, with the greatest number of languages spoken in the south and Nuba Mountains. According to the 1956 census, the last for which ethnic data was collected, only 39 percent of Sudanese identified themselves as Arab—a term that by local convention implies Muslim status, residence in the north, fluency in the Arabic language, and often a claimed Arab pedigree. In fact, besides Arab, there are other social categories to which Sudanese Muslims belong. They include indigenous non-Arab (and by extension, non-Arabic-speaking) northern groups such as the Fur, Beja, and Nubians; well-established immigrant groups, for example, of Hausa-speaking west Africans; and Nuba and southern communities that converted to Islam only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

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Two millennia before the birth of Islam, Sudan had strong trading connections to pharaonic Egypt and boasted a distinctive civilization in Nubia, the region stretching northward beyond present-day Khartoum, up to and including the Nile cataracts. In the sixth century, Christianity arrived in Nubia and became the religion of political elites before dwindling and disappearing entirely several centuries later. The presence of Christianity in Sudan today is largely a twentieth-century phenomenon—the outgrowth of missionary initiatives to convert non-Muslims of southern and Nuba Mountain societies. Arrival of Islam in the Seventh Century Islam’s first encounter with Sudan occurred in the mid-seventh century when Muslim Arab armies reached the fringes of Nubia and signed a peace treaty with its rulers. In centuries ahead, Muslim Arabic-speaking nomads and traders trickled into northern Sudan and contributed to a process of Arabization and cultural assimilation through intermarriage with local peoples. The spread of Islam accelerated in the early fourteenth century after the demise of the last Nubian Christian kingdom; by the late fifteenth century, conversions increasingly occurred through the efforts of itinerant Sufis. The consolidation of Sudanese Islamic culture followed the establishment of two Muslim states, the Funj sultanate (ca. 1500–1820) based at Sennar, near the junction of the Niles; and the Kayra sultanate (ca. 1600–1874), based in Darfur, along the trans-Saharan trade route connecting Lake Chad to Cairo. In 1820, armies of the Muhammad Ali dynasty of Egypt invaded northern Sudan and overthrew the remnants of the Funj sultanate. They went on to establish a regime led by military men from the wider Ottoman Empire, thereby initiating what historians call the Turco-Egyptian era—a period of Egyptian imperialism in Sudan. A new chapter of Sudanese Islamic history began in 1881 when a local Arab scholar named Muhammad Ahmad declared himself to be al-Mahdi—the Rightly Guided One, or Messiah—whose arrival, according to prevailing millenarian beliefs, would herald the end of time and Judgment Day. Attracting many followers, the Mahdi mobilized armies and declared jihad on the Turco-Egyptian regime. When the capital, Khartoum, fell to his forces in 1885, the Mahdists founded an Islamic state in nearby Omdurman. The Mahdi himself died soon thereafter, but his successor, Khalifa Abdullahi, continued to rule until 1898, when British and Egyptian forces invaded Sudan and initiated a new period of colonial domination. Sudanese Muslims have long debated the wider significance of the Mahdist period. Some have seen the Mahdi and his successor as early champions of national liberation in the struggle against foreign oppression and have applauded their efforts to promote religious uniformity among Muslims through the promulgation and enforcement of Islamic laws and decrees. Others have pointed to Mahdist state policies of political repression, ethnic discrimination, and nepotism to question the movement’s universalist claims. Modern Period By the late nineteenth century Islamic culture had become deeply rooted in the northern parts of Sudan. But in remote and peripheral regions, notably the

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southern swamplands and the Nuba Mountains of southern Kordofan, populations continued to practice local traditional religions. These non-Muslims seldom enjoyed peaceful relations with northern Muslim societies, having become targets for an intense nineteenth-century slave trade that catered to markets in Egypt, Arabia, and northern Sudan itself. When the British conquered Sudan in 1898 (at a time when the European powers were engaging in the territorial race known as the Scramble for Africa), they justified their action on two grounds. First, they promised to end the slave trade and thereby protect non-Muslim communities, and second, they claimed to be restoring Egypt’s nineteenth-century (Turco-Egyptian-era) claims to the region. To maintain the latter fiction, they constructed their regime as a British and Egyptian “condominium” or joint mastership and, until decolonization, called the territory the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Sudan thereby became a British colony in practice but not in name. Meanwhile, and ostensibly to protect southern peoples from northern Muslims, the British went on to divide Sudan into separate administrative spheres of North and South—an administrative policy that deepened social and regional schisms in the long run. In 1956 Sudan gained independence under the leadership of Arabic-speaking Muslim nationalists. Factionalism and sectarianism soon weakened the parliament and in 1958 precipitated a military coup that brought General Ibrahim Abboud (1900–1983) to power. Eventually bowing to popular protests in northern cities, Abboud stepped down in 1964. Another period of parliamentary rule followed, lasting for five years. Then, in 1969, Sudan witnessed another military coup that marked the ascent of Jafar Nimeiri (r. 1969–85), a young officer inspired by the socialist and pan-Arabist policies of the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser. By the early 1980s, Nimeiri’s political ideology had shifted away from secular socialism and toward Islamism—a trend confirmed by his 1983 declaration of sharia (Islamic) penal laws. Popular discontentment mounted and culminated in Nimeiri’s overthrow in 1985. Sudan then entered its third period of parliamentary government, but succumbed again to a military coup in 1989. The 1989 coup marked the rise of General Omar Hasan Beshir (b. 1945), who forged a strong alliance with the Islamist ideologue Hasan al-Turabi (b. 1932) and his organization, the National Islamic Front. Regimes and leaders have changed many times since Sudan gained independence in 1956. However, one fixture throughout most of this postcolonial period has been the country’s civil wars—fought first from 1955 to 1972 and again after 1983— as non-Arab Sudanese and especially southerners have resisted the uneven countrywide distribution of wealth and power. The financial (not to mention human) costs of this chronic war have been high and have only deepened the country’s economic woes in the postcolonial period. Meanwhile, and in spite of political vicissitudes, Islam continued to spread among Sudanese peoples throughout the twentieth century. In southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains, Islam made particular headway in towns, around military encampments, and in villages to which army veterans returned. At the start of the new millennium, some analysts were suggesting that Muslims and Christians had

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reached parity in the south but that both groups still remained minorities in the region relative to practitioners of traditional religions. CULTURE, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS Sudan owes a deep cultural debt to Sufism, an approach to Muslim faith and worship rooted in personal piety that draws inspiration from exemplary leaders. Indeed, Sufism helped to spread and consolidate Islam in Sudan’s northern region over the course of several centuries. During the period of the Funj sultanate (ca. 1500–1820), Sufis of the Shadhiliyya and Qadiri orders helped cultivate Sunni Islam among the settled peoples of the Nile River and its Blue Nile branch. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, other well-established transregional orders entered Sudan from abroad, notably the Tijaniyya and Sammaniyya. New orders were also founded locally by disciples of the Moroccan scholar Ahmad ibn Idris (ca. 1750–1837), including the Majdhubiyya, Rashidiyya, Idrisiyya, and Khatmiyya. Distinguished by a centralized structure of authority that has been described as neo-Sufi, the new orders showed a tendency to pass leadership through family succession. For the leaders of some Sufi orders the concentration of spiritual authority, prestige, and wealth translated into political power. Here, the case of the Khatmiyya stands out, because its founder, Muhammad Uthman al-Mirghani (1793–1852) and his heirs proved to be particularly adept in securing social and political influence that they preserved over several generations. In the early nineteenth century, the Mirghani family won support from Islamic scholars (local exemplars of Sunni orthodoxy) and from the Funj and later Turco-Egyptian ruling classes. At the same time, they attracted a large following among humble believers, in part by tolerating popular Muslim practices such as the use of protective amulets. A century later, the Mirghani family enjoyed some favor with the British, maintained a popular support base, and wielded influence in nationalist politics. In the late nineteenth century the first major Sudanese alternative to Sufism emerged in the Mahdist movement of Muhammad Ahmad, who proclaimed himself Mahdi in 1881 and thereafter declared Sufism superfluous. His assertion about Sufism undoubtedly had some political motivation, as he perceived the Sufi orders (and especially the Khatmiyya) as rivals for power and popular leadership. The Mahdi and his successor, Khalifa Abdullahi, proclaimed Islamic laws and issued pronouncements on everything from dowries to dancing; in the long run, both men promoted social practices that brought Sudanese Muslims closer to a normative and more legalistic Sunni Islam. Even after the Anglo-Egyptian conquest that destroyed the Mahdist state, many of the Mahdi’s original supporters, their children, and later their descendants—a group collectively known as the Ansar (in tacit reference to the Prophet Muhammad’s companions)—maintained their faith in the Mahdi’s teachings and ideals. Under the astute leadership of the Mahdi’s descendants, the Mahdist movement in the twentieth century assumed a nonmilitant, socially adaptable, and yet still politically engaged form, thus earning the name neo-Mahdism. While the neo-Mahdist movement was not (and still is not)

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conceived as a Sufi order, it closely resembles one in its collective organization and emphasis on individual piety. In the mid-twentieth century, two Islamic organizations proved to be especially attractive to the young Sudanese Muslim intelligentsia: the Republican Brothers and the Muslim Brothers. Notwithstanding their masculine names, both had male and female membership components. Both, too, combined religious faith with political activism. The engineer Mahmoud Mohamed Taha (ca. 1909–85) founded the Republican Brothers in 1945. In one of his first leadership actions, he staged a protest against a British policy that sought to ban radical female genital cutting (also called pharaonic circumcision or infibulation) and to punish those who performed it. Taha argued that this government policy was excessive, culturally invasive, and counterproductive. Imprisoned for two years after this protest, he emerged in 1948 with a religious and social message for his followers. Arguing that the Quran and Islam more generally must be continually reinterpreted to meet the needs of changing times, he promoted a pacifist, egalitarian, and socialist ethos and shared a vision of Islamic society based on gender equality and tolerance of other religions. In an extreme action that shocked many Sudanese, the Nimeiri regime executed Taha on a charge of apostasy in 1986. The organization of the Muslim Brothers was founded in Egypt in 1928 by the schoolteacher Hasan al-Banna (1906–49) and developed a Sudanese branch in 1954. Recast in 1965 as the Islamic Charter Front, the Sudanese organization changed its name again, in the mid-1980s, to the National Islamic Front (NIF). Like other national branches of the Muslim Brothers, the Sudanese organization has retained a commitment to some common Islamist ideals—notably the promotion and full application of Islamic legal and social codes—while working within the political framework of the individual nation-state. The Sudanese movement’s leading ideologue has been the legal scholar Hasan al-Turabi, who advocated a strong role for the central government in promoting Islamic agendas, years before he gained substantial political influence in the wake of the 1989 military-Islamist coup. The Sudanese Muslim Brothers have had an ambivalent relationship to Sufism: on the one hand they have recognized its historical centrality to Sudanese Muslim culture, and on the other they have been skeptical of its record of tolerance toward local customs and beliefs, notwithstanding the adherence of many modern Sudanese Sufi leaders to rigorous standards of Muslim worship. For more than a century many Sudanese Muslim leaders have had a strong reformist tendency. That is, they have been trying to pull Sudanese believers more closely into the normative culture and practice of urban, global, Sunni Islam, relying at times on the legal and administrative powers of the central government. Their aim has been to eliminate what they regard as un-Islamic folk practice and syncretistic belief (as represented, for example, by spirit-possession cults, known as zar or bori, which are still maintained by some Sudanese Muslims in poor and socially marginalized urban communities). Yet despite past and present attempts by Muslim reformists to promote uniformity in Muslim practice, substantial diversity has continued to distinguish the culture of Sudanese Islam—a culture that has been

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evolving and expanding constantly since the earliest introduction of Islam in the region several centuries ago. Since Sudan achieved independence from Britain in 1956, Arabic-speaking, Muslim, northern Sudanese men have completely dominated national political life. They have set political agendas, controlled the highest government offices, and steered major institutions from universities to hospitals and printing presses. Their dominance derives from historical advantages that Arabic-speaking men enjoyed, namely involvement in state formation and statecraft since the sixteenth century, access to Arabic literacy in a region where no other language groups had writing systems, and strong mercantile and religious connections to Muslim centers of power abroad. During the Anglo-Egyptian period, British authorities reinforced the privileges of the Arabic-speaking Muslim elite by reserving the best educational and professional opportunities for its members, who went on to become leaders of the early nationalist movement and inherit control of the government at independence in 1956. Despite their power as a group, Arabic-speaking Sudanese Muslims have always been divided among themselves. They have been riven by differences of sect (based on adherence to Sufi or other religious organizations), ethnicity (based on regional and kin-group origins), class (separating elites from nonelites), and ideology (for example, between Sudanese Marxists and Islamists). During periods of parliamentary rule (1956–58, 1964–69, 1986–89), when political parties functioned freely, intense rivalries developed along these lines of difference. Indeed, many analysts argue that Sudan’s three postcolonial coups occurred when they did, in 1958, 1969, and 1989, because rampant factionalism among ruling elites led to conditions of political paralysis that favored the emergence of military strongmen. Their internal differences notwithstanding, northern Sudanese politicians have generally agreed on Islam and Arabic as major platforms of national identity, and since decolonization have promoted Arabic as the country’s sole official language. To varying degrees, successive governments have also worked to promote Islamic culture and, in the predominantly non-Muslim south, to minimize Christian influence—for example, by nationalizing Christian missionary schools in 1957 and later by expelling foreign missionaries. Since the resumption of civil war in 1983, southern and Nuba Sudanese in particular have registered stiff opposition to these national Arabization and Islamization agendas. Among Arabic-speaking Muslims, several political parties have played important roles in the postcolonial national arena. Some of these are now defunct, others are dormant, and a few have functioned as opposition groups in exile since the 1989 coup. The oldest continuing party is the Umma Party, founded in 1945 by Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi (the Mahdi’s posthumous son) at a time when nationalists were still demanding independence from Britain. The Umma traditionally attracted members from the Ansar or neo-Mahdists. Its current leader is Sadiq al-Mahdi, an Oxford graduate and former prime minister who is a great-grandson of the Mahdi. Affiliates of the Khatmiyya Sufi order or of its leading Mirghani family also began to play prominent roles in the 1940s. In 1943 they founded the now-defunct

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Ashiqqa (Blood Brothers) party, which supported the notion of some form of Sudanese unity with Egypt in contrast to the Umma Party’s bid for absolute independence. At different times and with slightly different agendas, three parties evolved from the Khatmiyya/Mirghanist camp: first the National Unionist Party (NUP); later the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), with Nasserite pan-Arabist leanings; and finally the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which has survived since 1989 as an opposition group in exile. Sudan also had a vibrant communist party that emerged in the late 1940s along with the northern Sudanese labor movement. Members of the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) became actively involved in trade unions, university student unions, and early feminist associations. After 1957, when the SCP joined the International Communist Movement, many members won scholarships to study for advanced degrees in the Soviet Union and its satellite countries and returned to bolster the Sudanese intelligentsia. The decline of the SCP began in the early 1970s when the party fell afoul of Nimeiri; some members subsequently split off to join Nimeiri’s single-party Socialist Union. Drawing upon the historic antipathy of Sudanese Islamists toward the SCP, the Beshir regime tried to crush the remnants of Sudanese communism after the 1989 coup, although some of its supporters regrouped while in exile. In 1954 a group of Khartoum University students founded a Sudanese branch of the Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood) that they relaunched in 1964 as the Islamic Charter Front (ICF)—an Islamist party that called for an Islamic constitution and full implementation of Islamic law. When Nimeiri declared a set of draconian sharia (Islamic) laws in 1983, the group, led by Hasan al-Turabi, lent its support to this enterprise. Later the group revamped itself into the National Islamic Front (NIF) and worked behind the scenes to help engineer the 1989 coup of General Beshir. Turabi thenceforth retained a high degree of influence in national politics until his relations with Beshir deteriorated in 1999. Just as all of these northern parties have been rivals with each other, many have also been occasional allies. After 1989, for example, Umma and the DUP joined as partners in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) to resist the Beshir coup and the Islamist regime. In 1990 both NDA partners went one step further and signed an agreement with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), the major southern- and Nuba-based opposition force in the civil war. It was a marriage of convenience, joining two traditional competitors with strong Islamic roots (Umma and the DUP) with a predominantly non-Muslim organization calling for a secular multicultural state (the SPLM). In this case, however, internal power struggles weakened the NDA and the opposition in general, enabling the Beshir regime to stand firm. After the 1989 coup, many observers argued that the Beshir-NIF government had a very small support base. Nevertheless, aspects of their Islamist agenda seem to have had popular resonance, in part because many Sudanese Muslims appeared to hope that the ideals and ethics of Islamic law could promote social order and security. At the same time, however, many Muslims privately differed over what total application of Islamic law could and should mean in practice, while others

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worried that political power holders were exploiting or subverting the system for their own personal and political gains. WOMEN AND THE FAMILY In the past century, economic roles and social expectations varied dramatically for Sudanese Muslim women depending on their social class. Whereas affluent, high-status women traditionally experienced a high degree of gender segregation and rarely appeared in public, poor women, by contrast, remained active members of the workforce and were involved in domestic, agricultural, and manual labor. In the 1920s, for example, many women worked in the construction crews that built the Sennar Dam. As educational opportunities expanded, Sudanese women across the social spectrum began to pursue a new range of careers. In the second quarter of the twentieth century (during the Anglo-Egyptian colonial period), women became licensed midwives, nurses, and schoolteachers. In the third quarter of the century (that is, the early independence era), women entered professions as doctors, lawyers, and journalists and assumed greater public visibility in service professions, for example, as flight attendants and bank clerks. Meanwhile, groups such as the Sudanese Women’s Union (founded 1952) promoted female literacy and worked on behalf of women workers. Years later, in 1972, its members hailed passage of the Public Service Act, which guaranteed women equal pay for equal work, pension rights, and better terms of service. Sudanese Muslim women made great strides in literacy during the past century, reflecting the steady growth of schooling for girls. Whereas less than one percent of northern Sudanese females were literate in Arabic a hundred years ago, an estimated four percent could read and write by independence in 1956. At the end of the twentieth century, more than a third of adult Sudanese women were literate, while rates were twice as high among females between the ages of 15 and 24. Today Sudanese women still lag behind their male counterparts in educational attainments, but they are steadily catching up. Some observers argue that the rise of the Islamist Beshir regime proved detrimental to women’s mobility. After 1989, new laws barred women from traveling alone without permission from husbands or male guardians and imposed sex-segregation policies in cinemas, at weddings, and in various public spaces. The regime also issued dictates on women’s dress: insisting that the traditional tobe (a cotton, sari-like garment) was insufficiently modest, it required Muslim women to cover their hair tightly under headscarves and wear loose long skirts, with trousers expressly forbidden. Women also lost important leadership positions in the government and in academia. A United Nations report counted no Sudanese women in decisionmaking, ministerial, or subministerial government positions by 1998, although several women were serving in the regime’s national assembly. These trends notwithstanding, the Islamist leader Hasan al-Turabi is firmly on record supporting strong roles for women within the public sphere. Set out in a treatise translated into English as Women in Islam and Muslim Society, his views

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attracted many educated Muslim women to the Islamist cause. Some of these women went on to articulate feminist models that assert separate but important roles for women and men within an Islamic order. While the Beshir regime after 1989 promoted some new Islamic agendas, Islamic law itself was not a new force in twentieth-century Sudanese Muslim society. In both the colonial and postcolonial periods, a system of Islamic courts had regulated law in the spheres of family, inheritance, and charitable trust (waqf ) affairs, drawing upon both Maliki and Hanafi legal traditions. Women often sought legal redress in these courts in cases of divorce, child custody, marital discord, and financial-support claims made against absentee husbands. Divorce cases alone were relatively common (since indeed, according to one estimate, divorce terminated one-third of Muslim marriages in the greater Khartoum area in the 1970s). Whereas Islamic law afforded men the right of unilaterally repudiating their wives, women wanting to initiate a divorce were obliged to seek intervention from the courts. During the twentieth century, Islamic family law was never static in practice but was steadily reinterpreted and reformed against the context of changing conditions. A legal ruling in 1915, for example, recognized cruelty as grounds for granting women divorces, while another in 1932 gave women greater rights in child custody. Such revisions continued into the postcolonial period, attesting to the flexibility of the system. One of the most controversial issues relating to Sudanese Muslim women is female genital cutting, which in northern Sudan typically goes beyond clitoridectomy to entail a more radical form of excision known as infibulation or pharaonic circumcision. According to a demographic and health survey conducted in the early 1990s, 89 percent of married or divorced Sudanese women had undergone genital cutting (generally during childhood). While the practice was most common among Muslims, 47 percent of Sudanese Christian women had also experienced some form of the operation. Despite various attempts to reform or eliminate the practice of female genital cutting in the past 75 years, and notwithstanding predictions that it would disappear through educational campaigns, the custom remains as widespread as ever, largely because Sudanese Muslims associate it so closely with female chastity, Islamic propriety, and cleanliness. Even Sudanese opponents and critics of the practice acknowledge the complex social pressures and gender-role expectations that contribute to its endurance. Meanwhile, medical experts remain concerned about the operation’s consequences for women’s sexual and reproductive health. In the past 50 years, Sudanese feminism has taken many ideological forms, actively involving women who range from communists to Islamists. Yet if there is one common cause that unites Sudanese feminists across the political spectrum, it is the struggle to assert a public presence and maintain respect while combining professional and family roles. Today, various institutions of higher learning— among them Ahfad University for Women, Khartoum University, the women’s branch of Omdurman Islamic University, and Omdurman Ahlia University—are educating a new generation of Sudanese women who exemplify the diversity of the country in their social origins, aspirations, and outlooks.

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SPECIAL ISSUES IN THE NEWS Civil Wars Since 1983, Sudan has been locked in a brutal civil war with the south and Nuba Mountains as its battlegrounds. Analysts estimate that over two million have died and four million more have been displaced as refugees, internally or in neighboring countries. The Sudanese civil war is often portrayed as a conflict between Arab Muslim peoples of the north and African Christians of the south, with one side backing the central government in Khartoum and the other supporting rebel organizations—notably, since 1983, the SPLM and Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). While there are definitely ethnic, religious, and regional dimensions to this ongoing conflict, the civil war has increasingly become a battle to commandeer natural resources. In short, the south has important supplies of water and petroleum oil that the northern-based government wants to exploit. Other parties interested in these resources include Egypt, which has been eager to tap into Sudanese White Nile tributaries to increase its own water supply, and international oil companies—notably firms from Canada and China that formed consortiums with the Sudan government to extract oil and, since 1999, to export it. The current conflict is actually the country’s second round of civil war, the first having occurred from 1955 to 1972 when southern rebels battled the northernbased government. At the time, these rebels objected primarily to the uneven distribution of political and economic power that had disproportionately benefited northern Arabic-speaking Muslims in the postcolonial period. They also resented the efforts of northern politicians to promote a uniform Arabic-Islamic culture without regard to, or respect for, the country’s multiplicity of cultures. In fact, most leaders of this southern opposition were Christians who had been educated in English-speaking schools; many of them wanted the government to recognize English as a second official language (besides Arabic) and to implement policies of religious neutrality. The first civil war ended in 1972 when Jafar Nimeiri brokered the Addis Ababa Accord, promising southern regional autonomy, funds for southern development, and respect for ethnic pluralism. This peace collapsed in 1983 after the Nimeiri government reneged on its various promises and declared the countrywide application of sharia (Islamic) penal laws. Southerners (including mainly Christians but also some Muslims) rallied to establish the SPLM/SPLA and were joined from the mid-1980s by many inhabitants of the Nuba Mountains, a non-Arab but largely Muslim region within the northern zone of Kordofan where bitterness had been mounting over the government’s attempts to erase or Arabize local culture. Since then, the SPLM/SPLA has made demands for a secular, multicultural Sudan one of its central agendas. Peace Agreement and Darfur Despite various attempts at negotiations, a solution to the war eluded the country for years, while even the SPLA was prone to fission and internal fighting. Nevertheless, from 2002 to 2004 peace talks occurred between the Khartoum

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government and the SPLA and culminated in an agreement that called for a permanent cease-fire, the division of government jobs and oil revenues, and a referendum in six years. This referendum will theoretically determine whether Sudan should remain one country, or split to allow southern secession. Notwithstanding the 2004 agreement, Sudan specialists are pessimistic about the country’s prospects for long-term peace. Moreover, some suggest that the civil war in the south merely moved in 2003 to Darfur, the westernmost region of Sudan, where pastoralist Janjaweed—a term referring to horse-riding Arab marauders— carried out attacks on non-Arab Muslim agrarian communities, by engaging in widespread rape, murder, and destruction. In 2004 and 2005, as death tolls rose and refugee movements escalated (both within Darfur and into neighboring Chad), the United Nations, United States, African Union, and other organizations debated whether the Darfur attacks constituted ethnic cleansing, genocide, or war crimes and what policy responses they warranted. Authorities in Khartoum denied any connection to or responsibility for the Janjaweed attacks, but foreign journalists and aid workers relayed reports that identified the Janjaweed as government-armed proxy fighters. Analysts suggested that the Sudan government was using the Darfur conflict to accomplish two things: first, to crush two rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), which had attacked government targets in 2003; and second, to maintain the military machine

Abu Shouk refugee camp is located on the outskirts of El Fasher, the capital city of North Darfur, Sudan. Established in April 2004, the camp is home to over 50,000 refugees, including a large number of women and children. U.S. State Department (June 30, 2004).

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that had kept the Beshir regime afloat since the 1989 coup, particularly given that the war in the south appeared to be closing. The Darfur conflict represents another episode in Sudan’s long-running civil war, albeit in a western rather than southern theater. At root, this war has been a struggle over the unequal division of national power, wealth, and resources and has pitted dominant northern elites (all Arabic-speaking Muslims based in Khartoum) against ethnically heterogeneous Muslim and non-Muslim groups who identify with the country’s rural peripheries. Human Rights Various international organizations called Sudan under the Beshir regime (1989–present) a human-rights disaster. Many reports confirmed the revival of a de facto slave trade, by which Arab militias from Kordofan seized and abducted southern and Nuba women and children, exploiting them for labor and sex. After oil exports began in 1999, other sources reported government attempts to uproot or annihilate civilian populations living around southern oil fields and suggested that foreign oil workers had ignored or in some cases even colluded in the violence. In one particularly graphic report, Amnesty International described mass executions as well as horrific acts of torture perpetrated by government forces on residents living near the oil fields of Bentiu. Both government and SPLA forces drafted children as soldiers, while a succession of war-induced famines devastated southern and Nuba communities. Finally, the northern regime routinely tortured dissidents and allowed its courts to hand out draconian sentences to criminals—as in one case in the Darfur region in 2002, when a group of highway robbers were sentenced to death by crucifixion. Terrorism and Relations with the United States Meanwhile, the Beshir regime helped to make Sudan a pariah state during the 1990s. By supporting Iraq in the Gulf War, it alienated the United States (which eventually closed its embassy in Khartoum in 1996). By allegedly abetting an assassination attempt on the Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak during his visit to Ethiopia in 1995, the regime alienated both Egypt and Ethiopia, its neighbors to the north and southeast. By providing haven to an assortment of transnational Islamic militants (as well as to veteran non-Muslim terrorists such as the Venezuelan known as Carlos the Jackal), the regime earned a place alongside Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and North Korea on the U.S. State Department’s blacklist of terrorist-sponsoring countries. Perhaps the regime’s most prominent guest in the first half of the 1990s was the Saudi-born Osama bin Laden, who established guerrilla training camps in the country before relocating to Afghanistan in 1995. Analysts believe that bin Laden’s Sudan-based training camps were the precursor to the al-Qaida network, whose members executed the September 11 attacks in the United States. By 2001, the Beshir regime was showing some signs of moderation. Delighted by its newfound oil income, eager to expand its international clientele, and anxious to

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attract foreign investment, the government sought to shed its radical image abroad. It even stood poised to mend relations with the United States, which had bombed a Khartoum-area pharmaceutical plant in 1998, having accused its owners (in an unproven allegation) of manufacturing a nerve-gas agent for the purpose of terrorist bomb-making. After September 11, 2001, the Beshir regime took the opportunity to begin patching up its American connections: it extended rapid condolences to the U.S. government, condemned the hijackers outright, and promised to cooperate in the struggle to extirpate terrorism. While this rapprochement is indisputably good news for U.S.-Sudanese relations, human-rights organizations have sounded notes of caution. Pointing out that the Beshir regime has used its oil profits to buy weapons and accelerate the war on the south, they are concerned that the United States may overlook wartime atrocities in its desire to secure an oil-rich ally and that it may ignore the grievances of southerners and Nubas. NOTABLE PEOPLE An-Na’im, Abdullahi Ahmed (dates unknown). Legal scholar, lawyer, and human-rights advocate who calls for a reformed Islamic public law that is neither secularist nor fundamentalist but that draws on reinterpretations of the Quran, the holy scripture of Islam, to meet the needs of contemporary life. As a student in Khartoum in the mid-1960s, An-Na’im encountered the Muslim pacifist and activist Mahmoud Mohamed Taha and joined the Republican Brothers. He earned advanced degrees from Cambridge and Edinburgh and became a law professor at Khartoum University in the early 1970s. After protesting against Nimeiri’s Islamization policies in 1983, he and many colleagues spent time in prison; his mentor Taha was later executed and the Republican Brothers were disbanded. Currently a professor of law at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia, he is the author of books including Toward an Islamic Reformation. Beshir, Omar Hasan (b. 1945). Graduate of Sudan Military Academy who fought with Egyptian forces in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Later, in the 1980s during the second Sudanese civil war, Beshir coordinated government offensives against the SPLA. In 1989, he led a coup to overthrow the parliamentary government and forged an alliance with the National Islamic Front of Hasan al-Turabi: the result was an Islamist military regime that has been ruling Sudan ever since. Under Beshir’s leadership, the regime dissolved political parties, suppressed critics, and rigorously pursued the civil war that it characterized as a jihad. Although his regime alienated many important allies and aid donors, it built stronger connections to Iraq, Iran, and China and for a time allowed transnational Islamic militants to operate camps on Sudanese terrain. Beshir introduced a limited national assembly in 1992 and constitutional reforms in 1998. In 1999, Beshir’s relations with Turabi deteriorated after a power struggle. Since then, Sudan began exporting oil while Beshir made moves to forge or repair international contacts. Ibrahim, Fatima Ahmed (dates unknown). Leading member of the Sudanese Communist Party and a founder in 1952 of the feminist Sudanese Women’s Union,

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Ibrahim promoted rights for women workers, led campaigns to spread female literacy, and initiated the first Sudanese Arabic periodical for women. In 1965 as a Communist Party candidate, she became the first woman elected to Parliament. She spent some time in prison as a dissident during the Nimeiri regime and sought asylum in Britain after the 1989 coup. Ibrahim later became president of the International Democratic Federation of Women and in 1993 won a United Nations Human Rights Award. She describes herself as a believer in communism, Islam, and democracy. Mahdi, Sadiq al- (b. 1935). Oxford-educated politician and religious leader who derives his prestige from his family status: he is the great-grandson of the Sudanese Mahdi, who staged a jihadist revolution in the early 1880s and established an Islamic state that ruled northern Sudan until the Anglo-Egyptian colonial conquest of 1898. His father, Siddiq al-Mahdi, and his grandfather, Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, were important religious and political leaders before him, commanding allegiance from the Ansar, or neo-Mahdists. In 1961 Sadiq became head of the Umma Party and later served for two periods as the country’s prime minister, in 1966–67 and 1986–89. Since the 1989 coup he has been a prominent opposition leader. He is also the brother-in-law of the Islamist leader Hasan al-Turabi, who has been one of his long-standing political adversaries. Turabi, Hasan al- (b. 1932). Sorbonne-educated legal scholar and former Khartoum University law professor, Turabi has been the most dynamic leader and ideologue of Sudanese Islamism since the early 1950s. He was a founding member of the Sudanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1952 and later of a political party, the Islamic Charter Front. Beginning in the 1960s he advocated the framing of a national Islamic constitution based on sharia (Islamic) law. From 1979 to 1982 he served as attorney general under Nimeiri, whose Islamization decrees he later supported. As leader of the National Islamic Front, he provided the major ideological backing for the 1989 coup of General Beshir and helped to frame Sudan as an Islamist state—an effort that culminated in the drafting of the 1998 constitution. He is admired among Islamist thinkers internationally for writings that emphasize the need for constant renewal in Islamic practice. He has also earned praise among Islamist women for endorsing active public roles for females and for underlining the fundamental equality of the sexes. RESOURCE GUIDE Suggested Reading Abusharaf, Rogaia Mustafa. “Revisiting Feminist Discourses on Infibulation: Responses from Sudanese Feminists.” In Female “Circumcision” in Africa: Culture, Controversy, and Change, ed. Bettina Shell-Duncan and Ylva Hernlund. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000. Esposito, John L., and John O. Voll. Makers of Contemporary Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Fluehr-Lobban, Carolyn. Islamic Law and Society in the Sudan. London: Frank Cass, 1987.

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Hamdi, Mohamed Elhachmi, ed. The Making of an Islamic Political Leader: Conversations with Hasan al-Turabi. Trans. Ashur A. Shamis. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998. Holt, P. M., and M. W. Daly. A History of the Sudan. 5th ed. London: Longman, 2000. Johnson, Douglas Hamilton. The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. African Issues. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003. Jok, Jok Madut. War and Slavery in Sudan. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001. Lesch, Ann Mosely. The Sudan: Contested National Identities. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998. Lobban, Richard A., Robert S. Kramer, and Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, eds. Historical Dictionary of the Sudan. 3rd ed. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2002. O’Ballance, Edgar. Sudan, Civil War, and Terrorism, 1956–1999. Houndmills, UK: Macmillan, 2000. Petterson, Donald. Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict and Catastrophe. Philadelphia, PA: Westview Press, 2003. Taha, Mahmoud Mohamed. The Second Message of Islam. Trans. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1987.

Films and Videos Lost Boys of Sudan. New York: PBS Productions, 2004. Follows two teenaged Sudanese refugees from Africa to resettlement in the United States.

Web Sites AllAfrica.com (general news): http://allafrica.com/sudan/ Government of Sudan: http://www.sudan.gov.sd/english.htm Sudan.Net: http://www.sudan.net Sudanese Online: http://www.sudaneseonline.com/ Sudan Tribune: http://www.sudantribune.com/sommaire.php3

15 Turkey Kathryn M. Coughlin

OVERVIEW The Republic of Turkey was established as a nation-state amid a radical secularization process in the 1920s and 1930s. Yet the relationship of the Turkish state to religion has been a peculiar one, unfolding in a variety of ways over the course of the twentieth century, primarily around attempts of the state to exercise control over and accommodation of what the political elite saw as modern expressions of religiosity. In the initial decades of the republic, the political elite undertook an extensive secularization program, targeted specifically to curtail the influence of Islam on society, thereby preventing the rise of Islam as an alternative political power. With the onset of a multiparty political system in late 1940s, religiously conservative parties began to more freely advocate incorporating Islam in Turkish political discourse. Eventually, specific pro-Islam parties were established, and beginning in 1970s they participated in coalition governments. Three military coups and other less overt interventions from 1960 onward would further impact the political fabric of the country. In recent years, the place of Islam in politics has raised a number of controversies that find the military, secularists, and Islamists clashing with one another. The government has banned several Islamist political parties from political activities. Government rulings declared that any woman wearing a headscarf or covering her hair could not work in government offices, attend university exit examinations, or be sworn in as a duly elected member of Parliament. Another development of the current era is the emergence of a highly articulate group of Islamist intellectuals, voicing alternative visions of modernity and gaining a significant political

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following. At seeming odds with these developments are the provisions of the last constitution, in force since 1982, that Turkey is a secular, democratic, and parliamentary republic. In a survey conducted in 2000 by TESEV, a respected Turkish think tank, 97 percent of Turks questioned identified themselves as Muslim, 92 percent said they fasted during Ramadan, and 46 percent said they prayed five times a day. At the same time, 91 percent voiced respect for others’ religious beliefs, and clear majorities did not find acts such as consumption of alcohol, failure to fast or pray, or failure of women to cover their heads problematic.1 These figures reflect a largely secular Muslim population—a legacy of the Kemalist revolution—even in the rural Asiatic areas. Currently, the population of the country (over 69.6 million people) is estimated to be 99 percent Muslim, of which approximately 66 percent are Sunnis and 33 percent belong to various sects of Shia Islam.2 The Sunni population tends to refer to all Shiites in the country as Alevi, but the latter is only the largest one of the four Shiite sects in Turkey. The main sects of Shia present are, in order of number of adherents, Alevi, Twelvers, Ahl-i Haf, and Bektashi. The defining feature of Islam at the social level has historically been Sufi orders, which have incorporated some Shia tenets to varying extents. The history of these brotherhoods goes back to the beginning of twelfth century when new Turkic migrants from central Asia began to be attracted to them. Since then most Sufis have established various orders commonly called tariqat under particular Sufi masters. Two of today’s largest Sufi brotherhoods are the Naksibendi3 and the Kadiri4 orders. In contemporary Turkey there also exists a plethora of Islamist organizations that are active in areas such as education, communications, health centers, publications, financial institutions, and consumer cooperatives. CULTURE, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS At the turn of the twentieth century, the Ottoman Empire, once a multiethnic, Islamic, imperial empire on three continents, faced utter disintegration after a series of military defeats, the last of which was World War I. Despite modernization efforts to save the Ottoman state that had begun in the early nineteenth century, the Mudros (1918) and Sevres (1920) Treaties oversaw its end by 1920. After World War I and its disastrous treaties, a Turkish national liberation war was fought against Western powers and the forces of the last Ottoman sultan or caliph, a title held by the sultan since sixteenth century. After declaring a republic in 1923, the new political elite, led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, undertook a massive modernization program to reform the entire structure of the country after what they saw to be a desirable Western model, changing the alphabet, clothing, and the call to prayer, and even closing saint’s tombs and banning religious radio broadcasts. Six Fundamental and Unchanging Principles Kemalism, or the ideology of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, was based on six fundamental principles: republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism, and

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revolutionism. Chief among these was laicism or secularism, and the vast majority of the Kemalist reforms dramatically altered or even eliminated centuries of religious and cultural practices. The first significant secular reform was the abolishment of the caliphate. Immediately following an international incident in which the Agha Khan of British India stressed the importance of the institution of caliphate for the Islamic world and the last caliph Abdulmecit’s insistence on retaining his title, the National Assembly deposed the caliph, abolished the caliphate, and banished the Ottoman dynasty from Turkey in March 1924. Another amendment abolished the Ministry of Religious Law and Foundations and established the Directorate of Religious Affairs, whose responsibility would be to conduct the affairs of Islam. Henceforth religious leaders (imams), preachers, and Islamic legal scholars (muftis) would be officials of the state. Thus, the state elite could control Islamic discourse and permit only a “modern” interpretation of religion. In this context, Islam could not rise as an alternative political power, which was the primary intent of the secular elite. From 1925 through 1929, the Kemalist government took extraordinary measures to eliminate Islam from public life. Institutions of popular Islam such as Sufi brother hoods and saint’s tombs were abolished in November 1925 and fortune-telling and magic were declared illegal. A symbol of Muslim identity, the fez, was banned, and men were required to wear brimmed hats like their Western counter parts. On January 1, 1926, the lunar hijri calendar, which dates from Muhammad’s emigration from Mecca to Medina in 622, was abolished in favor of the solar Gregorian calendar. On November 1, 1928, a new Turkish alphabet with Latin script replaced the Arabic-Persian script of Ottoman Turkish. The Swiss civil code, with some adaptations, replaced the Islamic law (sharia) and thus removed the ulema’s traditional source of influence and power. Women were strongly encouraged to throw off their veils, join the wage-earning workforce, and go to school. Also in 1928, the explicit recognition of Islam as the state religion and the task of implementing the divine law of Islam were removed from the constitution. Another uprising by the followers of the Sufi Naksibendi order in 1930 induced the political elite to take even more stringent measures against Islam as political opposition: the Islamic Family Code and courts were abolished and replaced with modern legislative codes based on relevant Swiss and Italian legislation. The objective was to modernize at all costs. History was perceived to be full of groups abusing religion to prevent progress. Namely, it was not religion itself that was rejected but those who used it to further political interests or as a source of political legitimacy. In this context, secularism emerged as a bulwark against those who would abuse religion for private motives and threaten the newly established political order. What was the “right” religion, then? In its simplest form, it was said to be the one purified of all kinds of superstitions and detrimental traditions that may have the potential to curb modernization. And this cleansing would naturally be carried out by the state. Religion polluted with “bigoted” beliefs and superstitions posed a serious threat to the success of the reforms necessary to build a modern

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nation-state. Nevertheless, Kemalist laicism did not mean being without religion or morality based on Islam. The “right” Islam, assumed to be in harmony with science, would continue to exist under the custody of the state. As a result, Kemalist laicism of the 1920s and 1930s is not a full separation between the authority spheres of the state and religion, as some interpret secularism in the United States. The regime was an authoritarian one, differing from others that sprang up in southern Europe around the same time in that, unlike Spain and Italy, Turkey attempted to distance itself from religious conservatism as far as possible. In this process, secularization was carried out on more than one front. Not only was the state, education, and legal infrastructure changed to offset the potential impact of inherited Islamic institutions and traditions, but popular religious symbols and brotherhoods were abolished to undermine their strong influence over social life. Despite all these changes in the formal structures of Turkish society, religion continues to be a strong element in society. Modern History and Politics The 1940s witnessed a transition to a multiparty government with the establishment of the Democratic Party (DP) in 1946. In the 1950 elections, the DP won an overwhelming majority of the seats in the parliament, reflecting widespread discontent with the economic policies of the ruling Republican People’s Party (RPP).The RPP also suffered from the perception that the party was fundamentally hostile to Islam. The RPP’s response was to develop more inclusive and liberal policies. For example, religion classes that were removed from public school curricula in 1940 were reintroduced as electives in 1949 as part of an attempt to preempt the DP’s promises to reintroduce religion in the public sphere. After the DP came to power, liberalization continued. The call to prayer in Arabic was legalized, religious classes were expanded, and parents were obliged to opt out of them instead of opting in. Additionally, preacher (imam-hatip) schools were opened, and the number of mosques increased dramatically. The government also acknowledged the existence of autonomous religious organizations. At the same time, however, the DP’s policy toward the secularist stance of the country was not significantly different from its predecessor. The preachers remained civil servants under the Directorate of Religious Affairs and the government took severe measures against the Ticani religious order (dervish) order whose activists smashed the busts of Ataturk in celebration of the DP’s victory in the 1950 elections. Nevertheless, the apparent relaxation from the revolutionary secular position of the early republic did arouse negative reaction in Kemalist wings of the military as well as among the educated elite. After the 1960 military coup, the DP was closed but the newly established Justice Party (JP) inherited the former’s constituency and won a clear majority in the 1965 elections. Similar to the DP, the JP never rejected the principle of Kemalist secularism but upheld a more tolerant attitude toward expressions of Islam. Two other parties that would eventually gain significance in the political history of Turkey emerged during the 1960s: the Nationalist Action Party,

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advocating an ideology of extreme nationalism and attracting militant rightists, especially under the leadership of Alpaslan Turkes, and the National Order Party, an Islamic-oriented party, which would be shut down after the 1971 coup. Its constituents would establish the National Salvation Party (NSP) in 1972. The latter was initially supported actively by several religious orders who withdrew their support in 1974 when the party formed a coalition with the Kemalist RPP. As the 1960s drew to an end, the JP’s majority in Parliament began to wane, partly due to the formation of other parties and to the massive societal dislocation in the face of rapid growth and industrialization with its concomitant inequitable distribution. Acts of violence against the government escalated, and in March 1971 the military ordered the president to assign a new, more credible government in place of the existing one. What followed was a series of weak coalitions until the 1973 elections. In 1973, Necmettin Erbakan’s NSP and the new DP increased their share of the votes such that together they would be critical to the balance of power in Parliament. After a nine-month coalition from which the NSP withdrew, a minority coalition among the JP, NSP, Nationalist Action Party, and RPP called the National Front was established in late 1974 and stayed in power for two years. These are the first two instances when an openly Islamist party or coalition governed Turkey since the establishment of the republic. The remaining years of the 1970s would be crisis-ridden, with the Kurdish uprising in the southeast, declaration of martial law in this region, escalating violence between the leftist factions and paramilitary wings of the NSP, and unstable coalitions that collapsed one after another. In September 1980, Turkey experienced yet another military coup. Universal martial law was declared, all trade unions abolished, strikes banned, and student activists arrested; the military closed the parliament and several members were banned from political activity for periods of up to 10 years. In 1982, a new constitution that tremendously curtailed civil liberties was passed. The military leaders and their puppet politicians believed leftist political organizations were the main instigators of the civil disturbances that had escalated before the coup. As a result, a new national identity called the Turkish-Islamic synthesis was formulated. One important manifestation of this policy shift was seen to be in the introduction of compulsory and unified religion classes in primary, middle, and high schools. These classes, which had been removed from public school curricula in 1940 only to be reintroduced in 1949 as electives, were being made compulsory for the first time. In more general terms, this new policy would allow the Islamic movement to survive while destroying the left. The winner of the first elections after the coup in 1983 was Turgut Ozal’s Motherland Party. It attracted the followers of the now-outlawed JP, NSP, and Nationalist Action Party, as well as receiving support from a number of Sufi brotherhoods, including Naksibendi, Suleymanci, and Nurcus. Their public involvement in supporting the Motherland Party provided the orders with semiofficial recognition and increased their political effectiveness. After the 1986 elections, Ozal was pressured to alter the constitutional ban on politicians active in the pre-1980 period. Thereafter, familiar faces such as Suleyman Demirel, Bulent Ecevit, and Necmettin Erbakan would reemerge in the political scene. Erbakan’s Welfare Party,

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popularly seen as a continuation of the NSP, was part of a coalition government, with Erbakan as the prime minister from June 1996 onward. Before this, in the 1994 mayoral elections, the two largest cities in Turkey—Istanbul and Ankara— boasted Islamic-oriented Welfare Party winners (Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Melih Gokcek, respectively). In August 1996, the armed forces first declared that Islamic fundamentalism was a vital threat to national security and that the controversy around women’s headscarves was a question of ideology. In February 1997, the National Security Council published a comprehensive statement on the increase of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey and the threats it posed to national security, and reiterated the basic principles of the republic constitutionally endowed in the six principles of Kemalism. The statement further set forth reforms that were to be put in place immediately. In the aftermath of this declaration, Erbakan, pressured by the military, was forced to resign in June 1997. The following January, the Constitutional Court closed down the Welfare Party and prohibited Erbakan from political activity for five years. Within a month, the Virtue Party was formed in the place of the Welfare Party, and it too was closed by the Constitutional Court in summer 2001, on the grounds that, like its predecessor, it had become a center for antisecular activities. In the last elections (November 2002), the Islamic right was represented by the Justice and Development Party (in Turkish, AKP) under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, which won handily with 34.3 percent of the national vote, followed by the RPP with 19.4 percent of the vote. In the local elections of 2004, the AKP won an unprecedented 44 percent of the vote, defeating the secular nationalist RPP and the Kurdish nationalists in southeast Turkey. On domestic issues, the AKP considers itself conservative and moderately Islamist. Despite its self-characterization as conservative, the AKP has implemented effective social programs for the poor, which explains in part its strong showing in the 2004 local elections. WOMEN AND THE FAMILY One of the most significant arenas of reform undertaken by the Kemalists was in the field of women’s issues. The implementation of the 1926 Civil Code, which read virtually the same as the Swiss Civil Code, was part of the herculean efforts to distance itself from the Ottomans. With this law, polygamy was prohibited, women and men were given equal rights to divorce and child custody, and religious marriage was declared to be an option only after a civil marriage was formalized. The project of Westernization checked by Islamic and pre-Islamic legacy relied significantly on women both in symbolic and strategic terms because, in the context of this predominantly Muslim society, relations between the sexes defined identity and the social order. Ataturk’s speeches were preoccupied with the need to “reform” Turkish women, and this became part of the RPP’s obsession with presenting a “modern face” to the West. One of the manifestations of this fixation was the emphasis on dress codes for women. Although veiling was never legally banned, a powerful campaign led by

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Ataturk promoted Western styles of dressing. Ataturk feared that Westerners would interpret a Turkish women’s excessive covering as backward and unmodern. The Turkish woman with her modern attire was promoted as a symbol for mobilizing nationalist pride for a modern Turkey. In 1925, Ataturk declared, In some places I see women who hide their faces and eyes by throwing a piece of fabric, a scarf, or something like that over their heads, and when a man passes by, they turn their backs to him or close up by sitting on the ground. What is the meaning and explanation of this behavior? Gentlemen, would the mothers and daughters of a civilized nation assume such an absurd and vulgar pose? This is a situation that ridicules our nation. It has to be corrected immediately.5

In other words, Westernization was an objective that was intensely emphasized with the belief in its power for undercutting collective loyalties to the Ottoman and Islamic legacy. Women were seen as an oppressed group par excellence under the previous regime, so modernizing their lives came to signal a significant aspect of change and reconstruction. In sharp contrast to the frequently noted postcolonial practice of separating the domestic realm as a sphere of national identity preservation, Turkey started redefining itself through the home and the women in it. Despite their comprehensiveness, the efforts of modernization were not fully accepted at the social level. The Islamic reaction to Kemalism can be situated as part of the reaction to the top-down approach of this era. The contemporary rise of Islamic movements and the significance of Islamist women in them can be attributed to the formation of newly urbanized social groups that are eager to participate in the public sphere. These Islamist women have urban origins, are educated, and are professionally active—presenting a stark contrast with the Kemalist ideology that associates the headscarf (hijab) with backwardness. Thus Islamic attire is no longer an issue that can be discussed in binary opposites, such as modern versus traditional/backward. Another significant distinction between earlier movements and the contemporary one is the latter’s articulation of an Islamic modernity in place of the secular one advocated by the republican elite. In this context Islamist women have been challenging the state-led modernization projects that largely aimed at confining religion to the private sphere. To this end, there have been numerous demonstrations backed by Islamic parties protesting the prohibition of Islamic attire in public institutions. In Turkey, it is currently illegal to wear a headscarf in public buildings, including the houses of Parliament, universities, and government offices. Turkey received much unwanted international attention in 1999 when Merve Safa Kavakci was elected as deputy of the Virtue Party. She appeared to be sworn in as a member of Parliament while wearing a headscarf. Members of Parliament booed her and some physically threatened her. She was ultimately stripped of her Turkish citizenship and was never allowed to take her seat in Parliament, despite having been duly elected. In part as a result of her actions, the Virtue Party was ultimately banned as a threat to the nation’s secularist principles. Kavakci’s critics point out that she lost her Turkish citizenship because she took dual citizenship from the United States without prior permission from the Turkish republic; this is

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why, they say, she lost her seat in Parliament as well. Proponents of the law banning headscarves in public buildings state that men and women have the right to choose their dress, as in any secular democracy, but that state offices, including Parliament, are not an extension of an individual’s private space. They point out that other women MPs who choose to wear headscarves privately remove them during parliamentary sessions in respect for Turkish law. As of January 1, 2002, amendments to the Turkish Civil Code made women, along with their husbands, coheads of household. Before the amendments, a woman had no say in decisions concerning the home or children. Property and assets are now to be divided equally in a divorce, and men can file for alimony. Women can now sue for divorce if their husbands commit adultery and can secure employment without their husband’s permission. Before the amendments’ enactment, the law required a woman to obtain her husband’s permission to work for wages outside the home. Perpetrators of so-called honor killings are no longer eligible for reduced sentences.6 And women are now entitled to continue using their maiden names, a practice prevalent throughout the Muslim world. Turkish women have been prime ministers (Tansu Ciller), members of Parliament, cabinet ministers, physicians, and lawyers. However, in the rural areas of Turkey, these legal reforms will take years to be enforced. SPECIAL ISSUES IN THE NEWS Much of the recent press on Turkey revolves around two issues, both of which are interrelated: Turkey’s accession to the European Union and its human-rights record. In 1999, the EU announced that Turkey was a candidate for membership to the union, 12 years after Turkey had applied. This was a prescient move on the part of Europe, given that the 1990s were marked by “civil war, secular-Islamic polarization, authoritarian proclivities, economic crisis and systemic corruption.”7 In October 2005, the European Union entered open negotiations with Turkey for membership, provided that Turkey meets several preconditions: implementing an amended penal code that removes the death penalty as a possible sentence (among other reforms), and extending its customs-union agreement with all members of the European Union, including Cyprus. In June 2005 Turkey applied a new penal code, and they have extended their customs agreements with Cyprus, though they have refused to meet Cypriot demands for access to Turkish air and water ports. Cyprus has been a sticking point in Turkish-European relations since Turkey illegally invaded the island and occupied the northern part in 1974. The island nation joined the European Union in 2004, despite the illegal partition, and there is hope for a UN-brokered peace agreement with Turkey. One of Turkey’s staunchest allies in Europe, former German chancellor Gerhard Schröder, said recently that the country’s human-rights abuses against women and minorities and its limits on freedom of speech were “incompatible with [Europe’s] common values.”8 In 2001, the Turkish government commissioned a study on human rights and identity in Turkey. The highly controversial report, issued in November 2004, argues that constitutional provisions that protect non-Muslim minorities have

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been interpreted too narrowly: in addition to Jews, Armenians, and Greeks, the law should have protected Syrian Orthodox Christians. Much more controversial was the suggestion that the government replace the term Turk as a designation of citizenship with the word Turkiyeli or “of Turkey.” Some politicians have called for a military coup, the commission members have been physically threatened, and federal prosecutors are investigating whether the report’s findings fall under the laws against treason. An article approved in the new penal code (September 2004) recommends a maximum 10-year sentence on those whose activities violate “the national interest.”9 A footnote defines such activities as advocating the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus or calling the 1915 Armenian massacre “genocide.”

NOTABLE PEOPLE Erbakan, Necmettin (b. 1926). Well-known founder of a series of pro-Islamic parties, the first of which was National Order Party. Erbakan has served as vice premier, minister of state, and prime minister (1996–97) in his political life, which extends over more than three decades. Erbakan’s political parties have been banned, and he was expelled from politics several times. He was the first Islamist prime minister in the history of the republic, although the military, which saw him as a threat to Turkish secularism, pressured him to resign in 1997. His Welfare Party was shut down in 1997, again due to the pressure of the military. Erdogan, Recep Tayyip (b. 1954). Erdogan is the prime minister of Turkey (since March 2003) and leader of the current Justice and Development Party, one of the two offshoots of the Welfare Party, constituted by the more younger and moderate members. He was involved in politics from an early age, when he was elected the head of the youth organizations of the National Salvation party led by Necmettin Erbakan. While serving as mayor of Istanbul, Erdogan was prosecuted and jailed for four months for “inciting religious hatred” by publicly reading from a Ziya Gokalp poem, which stated, “Mosques are our barracks, domes our helmets, minarets our bayonets believers our soldiers.” He was the first Turkish prime minister to visit Greece and has maintained strong relations with the United States and Israel. Gülen, Fethullah (b. 1938). Turkish Muslim scholar known for his liberal reform ideas and establishment of educational and charitable institutions. Gülen believes that justice is dependent on the existence of an adequate universal education. With donations from prominent businessmen, the social elite, and community leaders, Gülen has established educational trusts throughout eastern Europe and western Asia. He argues for the necessity of interfaith and interethnic understanding and tolerance and believes that democracy is the only viable political system. Kuris, Konca (1960–98). Feminist whose candid perspectives on women and Islam led to her capture and murder by Turkish Hezbollah in 1998. Kuris came from an urban middle-class family whose secular and leftist leaning formed the

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basis of her early political beliefs. Married at the age of 17, Kuris was drawn into the religiosity of her husband’s family. She joined the Naksibendi Sufis and Hezbollah for brief, consecutive periods, but quit both groups when her own perception of Islam (especially the role of women in Islam) diverged from theirs. In 1997, she joined the Mersin Independent Women Association, a secular feminist association. She argued that wearing the headscarf (hijab) should be a woman’s own choice, urged public prayers to be conducted in Turkish, and questioned the practice of sex segregation at funerals. Her body was found with that of other victims of the Turkish Hezbollah in a mass grave in 1998. Ozturk, Yasar Nuri (b. 1945). Dean of the Faculty of Theology at Istanbul University and the author of dozens of books on Islam, some of which have become national best sellers. He has been called “the religious face of secularism,” and he declines to describe himself as an Islamist.10 His writings, including a twice-weekly column in Istanbul’s Star Gazette, call for a separation of religion and politics: “The distinction between the secular and the religious is the product of political Islam. You can be a Muslim and secular. You cannot take secularism as opposed to Islam, nor to any religion.”11 Turkish Islamists, those who call for a more public role of Islam in political life, find his writings anathema. Senlikoglu, Emine (b. 1953). Islamist feminist known for her best-selling novels on women and religion and her criticism of the civil Turkish government. She founded and has been the editor of the journal Mektup (The Letter) since 1985. Senlikoglu served a prison sentence of two and a half years for publishing her first book on freedom of speech. In late 2001, Senlikoglu was tried for her opposition to the ban of hijab in public institutions. An appeals court recently upheld a criminal conviction against her because she proposed an independent judiciary and for her opposition to the hijab ban. NOTES 1. “Fundamental Separation,” Economist, June 8, 2000. 2. See Library of Congress Federal Research Division’s country study on Turkey, http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/trtoc.html, and the CIA’s World Factbook 2005, http://www. odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook for additional statistical data. 3. Alternatively transliterated as Naqshbaniyya, Naqshbendi, and Naqshbandi. 4. Alternatively transliterated as Qadiriyya, Qadiri, Kaderi, or Kadiriyya. 5. Zehra Arat, ed., Deconstructing Images of the Turkish Woman (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1994), 61. 6. “Discrimination Rules,” Economist, November 6, 2003. 7. “Too Big to Handle? Turkey’s Application to Join the EU Is Causing Anxiety on Both Sides,” Economist, June 23, 2005. 8. Ibid. 9. “Haunted by the Past,” Economist, November 11, 2004. 10. Margot Badran, “The Religious Face of Secularism,” Al-Ahram Weekly On-line, February 1, 2001, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2001/519/intrvw.htm. 11. Ibid.

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RESOURCE GUIDE Suggested Reading Ahmad, Feroz. Turkey: A Short History. Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2004. Arat, Yesim. “Gender and Citizenship in Turkey.” In Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East, ed. Suad Joseph. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000. Bozdogan, Sibel, and Resat Kasaba, eds. Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997. Daldal, Asli. Art, Politics and Society: Social Realism in Italian and Turkish Cinema. Istanbul: Isis Press, 2003. Howe, Marvine. Turkey Today: A Nation Divided over Islam’s Revival. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000. Kalaycioglu, Ersin. Turkish Dynamics: Bridge across Troubled Lands. Middle East in Focus Series. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Mango, Andrew. Ataturk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey. New York: Overlook Press, 2002. Saktanber, Ayse. Living Islam: Women, Religion and the Politicization of Culture in Turkey. New York: I. B. Taurus, 2002. White, Jenny B. Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics. Studies in Modernity and National Identity. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003. Yavuz, M. Hakan. Islamic Political Identity in Turkey. Religion and Global Politics Series. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Yildiz, Kerim. The Kurds in Turkey: EU Accession and Human Rights. London: Pluto Press, 2005.

Films and Videos Ararat. Burbank, CA: Miramax Home Entertainment, 2003. Touches on the Armenian massacres of 1915–23. It won a Genii Award for best motion picture in 2003. Ecstatic Circle. New York and Montpelier, VT: Lyrichord Discs and Multicultural Media, 2003. Presents life in Istanbul, village folk dancing and music, and the ceremonial dance and music of dervishes. Portraits of Ordinary Muslims: Turkey. Boston: Frontline Productions, n.d. Discusses the tensions in Turkey between secularism and Islamism, with particular attention to the ban on headscarves. The Turkish embassy has a number of short film clips and videos on Ataturk, Turkish history, fine arts, and Turkish architecture, which are downloadable and free: http:// www.turkishembassy.org/video/index.htm.

Web Sites Ataturk Society of America: http://www.ataturksociety.org/ European commission on Turkey’s EU accession: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/ turkey/ Fethullah Gülen: http://www.fethullahgulen.org/ Institute of Turkish Studies in Washington, DC: http://www.turkishstudies.org/ National Library of Turkey: http://www.mkutup.gov.tr/index-eng.html Turkish Cultural Foundation: http://www.turkishculture.org/

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Turkish Daily News (Turkey’s first English daily newspaper): http://www.turkishdailynews. com.tr/ Turkish embassy in the United States: http://www.turkishembassy.org/intro.html Turkish Press: http://www.turkishpress.com/ Turkish terrorism Web site: http://www.teror.gen.tr/english/index.html Turkish News Network: http://www.turkishnews.com/NewsNetwork/ Zaman (online news service): http://www.zaman.com/

16 Uzbekistan Kathryn M. Coughlin

OVERVIEW Lying at the heart of central Asia, the Republic of Uzbekistan is the region’s most populous country. Its land mass is slightly larger than the state of California and borders Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. As a dry, land-locked country, Uzbekistan faces enormous challenges in the twenty-first century meeting water needs for both agriculture and its populace. More than 60 percent of its population lives in densely populated rural areas. Uzbekistan is the world’s second-largest exporter of cotton and a large producer of gold, oil, and natural gas. Although the government accepted the obligations of the International Monetary Fund to allow its currency to be freely traded at market rates, strict currency controls and often-sealed borders have lessened the potential liberalizing effects of conversion, stifling economic activity and artificially raising prices.1 Today’s Uzbeks live under authoritarian rule without basic rights like freedom of speech and the right to assemble.2 The government’s iron-fisted approach to political opposition has strengthened the appeal of Islamic fundamentalist groups such as the nonviolent Hizb ut-Tahrir (Liberation Party) and the more radical Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The stability of the country is further threatened by regional tensions arising from the import and export of energy and water, border issues, and cross-border terrorism. Arrival of Islam Islam first arrived in central Asia through traveling merchants from the Middle East. Central Eurasia was a natural avenue for Islamic expansion, since the Silk

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Road—the major east–west trade route connecting Islamic civilization with that of the Chinese—went directly through the lands of central Asia and the Caucasus. Controlling the region meant one controlled trade and gained wealth through taxes. Eventually, Islam spread among the local peoples and the city of Bukhara became a prominent center for Islamic learning and scholarship. The trade routes were also a popular avenue for conquest from the east. In the thirteenth century, the Mongols subjugated almost the entire Asian landmass, sacking Baghdad in 1266. Although the earliest Mongols were not Muslims, many Mongol leaders eventually converted to Islam and the region retained its Muslim character. Some later conquerors who traced their lineage to the Mongols left central Eurasia to conquer Anatolia (Tamerlane, d. 1405) and northern India (Babur, d. 1530, founder of the Mughul empire). More recent invaders or conquerors include Britain, France, Russia, and China in the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries’ “Great Game,” where colonial powers sought to control parts of Asia and Africa.3 All of what is now Uzbekistan came under Russian domination during the second half of the nineteenth century, although the Bukhara Khanate maintained some independence until the fall of the Russian Empire during the 1917 revolution. The region was carved into republics during the 1920s, and the ensuing political entities (of the former Soviet Union) were not based on previous political borders. Even the concept of the “ethnic unity” of any one republic had to be created. Uzbekistan wound up with most of the natural resources, controlling both the major rivers (the Amu and the Syr) and much of the arable land. Uzbekistan, with its capital in Tashkent (the capital of Turkestan, the former political entity under the Russian Empire), became the wealthy intellectual center for the “Muslim republics.” The Soviet Period The social and economic experiment that was the Soviet Union tremendously impacted Uzbekistan. The industrialization of the region, though far behind European Russia, pushed forward, converting Uzbekistan’s farmlands into cotton farms without developing much of a locally diversified economy. Cotton became, under the Russian tsars and later the Soviets, the “white gold” of the region. The Soviet Union’s atheist ideology forced Islamic education underground as repeated purges in the late 1920s and 1930s decimated the intellectual ranks of every part of the Soviet Union. But perhaps the most tragic change during this period was the repeated and forced change of script for the written languages. Before the Russian Revolution, the Arabic script had been used for all the local dialects—Persian and Turkic alike. But in the late 1920s and early 1930s, language reform created numerous scripts, in both Latin and Cyrillic letters. The rationale was that the Arabic script was premodern and foreign, although no more so than the various Cyrillic and Latin scripts. Eventually, each of the titular regions was given its own Cyrillic-based alphabet; some letters pronounced the same cross-dialect became represented by different characters in the various scripts. Languages that had been mutually comprehensible became much more difficult to understand.

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Within a generation, this single event severed the local peoples from their own history and literature, since they could no longer read the centuries of writings produced in their own Arabic-script-based language. Thus there was a rich tradition of historical and literary production that could only be accessed when it was finally transliterated into the new script. Under the Soviets, the Russian language and literature served as a unifying force for Soviet culture, and the government disparaged religious literature. It is hardly surprising that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, central Asian peoples sought to rediscover their pre-Soviet regional histories and literatures. Today, most of the republics have shifted their alphabets again, this time to a Latin-based alphabet, and there is tremendous need to transliterate the vast body of pre-Soviet literature yet again. CULTURE, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS Eighty-eight percent of the population in Uzbekistan, estimated in July 2005 to be 26.8 million people, is Muslim, predominantly Sunnis who follow the Hanafi school of jurisprudence. About nine percent of the population is Russian Orthodox; the remaining three percent includes Catholics, Protestants, and Jews. In Uzbekistan, the words Muslim or Orthodox refer to the community to which an individual belongs, not to a person’s religious beliefs. An Uzbek-speaking woman of Russian ethnic origin

Two Uzbek schoolgirls study alongside their male counterparts in the Ferghana Valley, Uzbekistan, where gender-segregated classrooms are found mostly in religious schools funded by outside Muslim organizations. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) (2004).

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may self-identify as Orthodox and wear a crucifix around her neck, even if she has not been inside a church since her baptism. Years of Soviet domination drove religious Muslims, Christians, and Jews underground, and those who were caught not abiding the prescribed state religion of atheism could be jailed, tortured, exiled, or killed. The current Uzbek government’s practice of identifying any pious Muslim or political opposition figure as a terrorist further makes it difficult to assess what percentage of the Uzbek population actively follows Islam. Statistics that purport to accurately reflect ethnicity or language groups must be treated with some skepticism. At least a century of intermarriage under Soviet rule, along with the forced migration of Koreans, Tatars, and other Caucasian peoples under Stalin in the 1940s, makes it difficult to determine an individual’s heritage as definitively Uzbek or Tatar. Statistics commonly accepted depict Uzbeks as the primary ethnic group, with 88 percent of the population, with Russians representing 5.5 percent and Tajiks 5 percent.4 Most people in Uzbekistan are at least bilingual, speaking both Uzbek and Russian. Identity in the Post-Soviet Era A passport application in Uzbekistan requires one to self-identify in terms of ethnicity or nationality. Politically now, as during the Soviet Union, it is preferable in Uzbekistan to cite Uzbek as one’s nationality rather than Tajik or one of the other titular nationalities. One must choose only one category, so most choose whichever would be most useful. Thus, in present-day Uzbekistan, the overwhelming majority of the non-Russian population self-identifies as Uzbek, distorting the population statistics. In many parts of Uzbekistan, however, Tajiks have historically been more numerous. Colloquially, an individual’s ethnicity is based on the language spoken in that person’s home. But even language makes a poor indicator of ethnicity: some Uzbeks are at least as trilingual (Uzbek, Tajik, and Russian) as any Tajik, and some who are half Tajik understand or speak Tajik only poorly (President Islam Karimov is a good example). Equally, the ethnic maps that are so popular for the region (and have been for centuries) also poorly describe the distribution of ethnicities— centuries of intermarriage and the Russification of the local peoples over the twentieth centuries render these maps useless. Even for those who describe themselves as Russian, there are complications. Many of them, while often viewed as outsiders, have 100-year-old roots in the country, with several generations of ancestors. These complexities are common in multiethnic societies. During the Soviet era, Russian was the universal language—those educated were expected to speak it and most higher education was taught in Russian. However, in postindependence Uzbekistan, Russian as the common language has begun to decline; government documents are usually produced only in Uzbek (and as late as 2002, most of these documents were still written in Cyrillic-based Uzbek, not the new governmentmandated Latin-based Uzbek). Speaking Uzbek is a point of cultural pride. Uzbeks who fail to speak Uzbek to one another are disparaged. Jewelry and clothing are

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often a means for proclaiming one’s identity, declaring birth origin (the hats that Uzbek and Tajik men wear vary by region), religious affiliation, and so on. Religious Practice Determining the practices of a typical Muslim in Uzbekistan is somewhat difficult. Decades of Soviet domination created an environment where the religious were harassed and jailed for following religious practices considered normal in other parts of the Muslim world. After almost 80 years of being disconnected from the larger Muslim world, Uzbekistani Muslims have developed some practices and beliefs that are peculiar to the region—some of which are developments of centuries of popular and folk Islam. In addition, the identification of virtually all forms of political dissent with religious fanaticism has the government attributing “fundamentalism” to those who merely follow ordinary Islamic practices. With independence, and the renovation and construction of mosques, religiosity has become more open, although tentatively given the political climate. Observance of the five pillars of Islam—stating the profession of belief (shahada) giving tithes (zakat); performing the five daily prayers (salah or namaz); observing fasting during the holy month of atonement, Ramadan; and taking the pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj)—are one way to measure religiosity. But in a society where public information is strictly controlled by the government, this kind of information, were it to be available, would not likely be based on observable data but on what the government would like people to believe. Much of what is known about religious practices in Uzbekistan is unscientific and anecdotal: American, European, and Russian scholars travel to Uzbekistan to conduct research and return with observations about the culture and society in which they lived. The five daily prayers are rarely performed by even those who consider themselves somewhat religious. While there are many, particularly outside Tashkent, who strive to perform them, for most adult men, jobs and the fundamental lack of knowledge make this practice difficult. Women still more rarely perform them, largely because in many households prayers are a male preserve; women are generally not allowed in active mosques. Zakat is not collected by the government in Uzbekistan; the government-run social system is thought to take its place, although the poor typically beg door to door in the cities. The hajj is rarely undertaken by Uzbekistan’s pious Muslims: the means to make the trip is often beyond the reach of those who would most like to, and those who have the means are unlikely to be sufficiently pious to make it a priority. Keeping Ramadan (or, as pronounced in Uzbekistan, Ramazan) is one public display of piety that is acceptable, perhaps because of its emphasis on atonement. Even those who do nothing else will strive to observe the fast—not smoking, drinking, or eating from before sunrise until after sunset—and entire families will arise to eat together in the morning and come together in the evening to break the fast with prayers in Arabic. Schedules are adjusted during Ramadan, with offices and businesses opening and closing earlier where possible. Children, who typically do

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not fast, have their own tradition very much like trick-or-treating: they go door to door, asking for money or sweets, usually in their own neighborhoods or buildings. They receive small change or some candy and return nightly to sing a song and receive their treat. Fried bread is used with water to break the fast in the evening and a traditional meal with pilov (a rice dish) is usually served. There are many shrines dedicated to local saints or Sufi figures throughout Uzbekistan. Sufism, the mystical interpretation of Islam, has deep roots in central Eurasia. Following the Mongol invasions, Sufism developed in the eastern Islamic world into brotherhoods (tariqat), usually named after someone who is thought of as its founder. These are not sects—the beliefs of most Sufis fall well within those considered orthodox by most Muslims. But Sufis seek to experience a unity with God that cannot be found merely by orthopraxy—correctly practicing the legally prescribed rituals. Three Sufi brotherhoods have traditionally been linked with central Eurasian Islam: the Yasaviyya, the Naqshbandiyya,5 and the Kubraviyya. Each developed in different areas and times. The Naqshbandiyya spread out from its origins just outside of Bukhara all over the world; it now claims millions of adherents, although there are different branches of the Naqshbandiyya, all of which do not necessarily follow the same practices. These Sufi affiliations are a point of great pride for many Muslims, particularly among those from Bukhara. Human Rights Record Islam Karimov has ruled the country ruthlessly since the Soviet period and had his first term extended, by referendum, from 1995 to 2000. In the 2000 elections, he won a second five-year term with an overwhelming majority in an election widely regarded as being neither free nor fair. In January 2002, a highly implausible 91 percent of voters supported extending the president’s term from five years to seven. Thousands of opponents have been jailed, most of them accused of belonging to a banned opposition group or terrorist organizations. Uzbekistan has no independent press, and journalists are routinely harassed and jailed. Opposition parties bravely meet illegally, despite official government persecution. Most of them have dutifully submitted applications for registration, only to face repeated denial. In the December 2004 parliamentary elections, the government did not allow opposition candidates to run, instead only fielding candidates from approved political parties. Karimov’s administration refuses to allow nonapproved political parties access to foreign-funded democracy training.6 The U.S. State Department’s Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S. Record, 2004–2005 indicates that “Uzbekistan took some notable steps to combat torture, and U.S. support for efforts to investigate suspicious deaths in custody bolstered the principle of accountability.”7 Without supporting details, it is difficult to assess this claim. In a scene eerily reminiscent of Tiananmen Square, Karimov’s troops massacred peaceful demonstrators in Andijan (Ferghana Valley) in May 2005. After the Rose Revolution in Georgia (November 2003), the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (November 2004–early 2005), and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan (February

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and March 2005), many Uzbekistan-watchers were hopeful that nonviolent demonstrations could bring about democratic change. Those hopes were dashed when Uzbek police and soldiers massacred at least 745 peacefully demonstrating the trial of 23 businessmen in the eastern Uzbek city of Andijan on May 12, 2005. Uzbek officials set the death toll at 169, but some observers have cited casualties in the thousands. The state accused the businessmen of Islamic radicalism and alleged that they were members of Akramiya, an offshoot of Hizb ut-Tahrir.8 The businessmen pleaded not guilty to all charges. Supporters of the local businessmen say that the protesters attacked a police station and a military garrison, seized weapons, and stormed the prison. After freeing the defendants and other inmates, they captured a regional government building and were repelled by security forces in their attempt to take the local office of the National Security Service. Afterward, a crowd of about 20,000 assembled in the town’s central square. Troops arrived in Andijan by evening and began shooting demonstrators randomly and at will. Karamov claims that the dissidents were Islamic radicals, and the United States was slow to criticize the massacre. The long-term response of the United States to this event will likely foreshadow U.S.-Uzbek relations over the next 5–10 years. It will also have ramifications for the watching Muslim world, largely skeptical of the U.S. mission to spread democracy. WOMEN AND THE FAMILY Although Uzbekistan’s social structure is patriarchal, the reverence shown to age often trumps that for masculinity, and since women often live longer than their husbands, matriarchs dominate families, approving or disapproving of marriages and deciding on household matters, such as dress, for their daughters-in-law. As in many developing countries, life for women in urban Uzbekistan greatly differs from that of their sisters living in rural parts of the country. Tashkent, a city of a million people, is the most Westernized, and a large number of nonlocal ethnicities and foreigners live there. Visitors to Tashkent may find many women in brightly colored scarves covering their hair, but very few wear a more conservative head covering as might be found in other parts of the Muslim world. A visitor would also see thousands of women of every ethnicity wearing no head covering at all, along with jeans, skirts, and a variety of fashion-conscious clothing. In Tashkent, only women from the surrounding villages wear the traditional headscarf. A fuller, longer scarf in rural Uzbekistan would be considered religious. Most Uzbeks consider appropriate dress for a woman to be loose pants over which a short-sleeved (long-sleeved in the winter) dress is worn; this would be considered adequate at most religious shrines, for instance. Outside Tashkent, one might see a variety of other forms of covering. In the Fergana valley, women often wear an additional scarf over the headscarf and pull this across their face (sometimes tucking it in their mouth to keep their hands free) on the street. Although the government banned religious dress in 1998, it can be readily found outside Tashkent. Because of government crackdowns on those who appear to be religious, it is extremely rare to find the more conservative head coverings in Tashkent.

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For men, there are also clothing standards. As in most of the Muslim world— Cairo, Nairobi, Karachi, and Jakarta, for example—it is highly unusual to see men in shorts, despite temperatures that reach past 100 degrees. Beards on men under retirement age are also extremely rare; the government has interpreted them as a symbol of religious fanaticism and has outlawed them. For younger men, going unshaven for a few days can result in a police inquiry. Divorce in Uzbek society carries severe social stigma; for children of divorced parents, it can be difficult to find a spouse. Despite its illegality, it is not uncommon for men to take more than one wife, each with her own home. This is accomplished through a religious ceremony with a mulla (called nikah). Under the Hanafi interpretation of Islamic law, the first wife must approve of the second marriage before its occurrence, although this is often overlooked, and the stigma of divorcing is a heavy burden should the first wife decide to extricate herself from her marriage. Domestic violence is also rampant, and law enforcement agencies typically consider allegations of abuse to be a private matter. A recent report on the sharp increase in suicides among Uzbek women in 2002 attributes this primarily to domestic abuse—not economic deprivation.9 According to the authors of the report, 322 women committed suicide in the first four months of 2002. More comprehensive statistics are difficult to come by, as government officials consider suicide and domestic abuse to be internal affairs.10 Moreover, underreporting is a chronic problem, as wives fear their husbands will divorce them if they file a formal complaint and local law enforcement tend to ignore less “dramatic” incidents. Without hard statistical evidence, it is difficult to draw a causal link between domestic violence and suicide. But extensive research undertaken by Human Rights Watch in 2001 suggests that there is a strong correlation between victims of domestic abuse and those who commit suicide.11 Women have often been considered the preservers of culture and religiosity in central Eurasian society. In Uzbekistan’s patriarchal society, they have also typically fallen under the government radar as far as prosecution is concerned. But recently the government has stepped up prosecutions of women protesting the imprisonment of their husbands, fathers, and sons; female human-rights defenders have been imprisoned and tortured. On July 1, 2005, a pregnant journalist was threatened and beaten by unidentified assailants after interviewing opposition leaders. Lobar Qaynarova, a reporter for U.S.-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, was attacked in the provincial capital Gulistan, about 75 miles south of Tashkent.12 Qaynarova was beaten in the stomach, sustained a broken nose, and was hospitalized. Although there is no proof that the government was behind the attack, Qaynarova was warned “not to mess with politics” and her tape recorder was stolen in the attack.13 SPECIAL ISSUES IN THE NEWS Given the Bush administration’s current policy objective to democratize the Middle East and the Muslim world, it will be interesting to see how it reacts to

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Uzbekistan’s increasing authoritarianism. Uzbekistan has been one of the United States’ most important allies in its war on terror; without its air bases and those in Kyrgyzstan, the United States would have found it difficult to prosecute the war in Afghanistan in 2001. Under domestic pressure, the United States’ longtime ally Turkey refused to allow coalition forces to enter Iraq through Turkey. Karamov’s decision to assist the United States was likely motivated by the promise of vast sums of military and humanitarian aid. Tension between the United States’ prosecution of the war on terror and its policy “to spread democracy” will govern the debate about U.S.-Uzbek relations in the coming years. In July 2005, a regional alliance of Russia, China, and central Asian countries called for a measured withdrawal of coalition troops from Afghanistan. Although Russia did not object to the placement of American forces in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan after the September 11 attacks, it has grown increasingly concerned about the buildup of American military and intelligence personnel in what historically has been its sphere of influence. At a regional summit, Russian leader Vladimir Putin referenced issues of regional stability and terrorism seeking to undermine central Asian governments. Withdrawal of troops from the coalition in Afghanistan would free up resources to combat cross-border terrorism in Russia and central Asia, Putin argued.14 As central Asia’s most populous country, Uzbekistan’s neighbors consider it something of a “regional bully.”15 In January 2000, the Uzbek military unilaterally redrew the border between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan 38 miles to Uzbekistan’s favor. The country routinely mines its borders to prevent insurgents or terrorists from infiltrating, but refuses to tell Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan where it planted the mines. Civilians have been injured or killed legally crossing the border. And Uzbek security police regularly arrest political opponents inside Kyrgyzstan, bypassing normal diplomatic channels. Regional tensions will continue to dominate headlines over the next 5–10 years. Djoomart Otorbaev, Kyrgyzstan’s deputy prime minister, says that after Islamic fundamentalism, tensions over water and energy constitute the biggest threat to stability in the region.16 By an agreement from the Soviet era, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are supposed to store water from the Syr Dar river in the Toktogul and Kairakkum reservoirs during the winter and release it later in the year to irrigate cotton fields in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. But by doing so, both countries miss out on the opportunity to generate valuable hydroelectric energy when they most need it—during the winter. In return, energy-rich Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are supposed to give coal and gas to their energystrapped neighbors to the north in payment. Not surprisingly, these agreements often fall short. If Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan need less water in a particular year, they then send less gas and coal north. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan retaliate the following winter by releasing more water and generating more hydroelectric energy, threatening to overflow reservoirs down river.17 Without the Soviet army enforcing compliance with the complex water and energy agreements, it seems unlikely that the four republics will be able to meet their energy and water needs without incident.

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NOTABLE PEOPLE Bukharbaeva, Galima (b. 1976). Project director of the Institute for War and Peace in Uzbekistan (2000–2005), Bukharbaeva also worked as a journalist, publishing with Agence France Presse. As the project director, she was responsible for training and mentoring promising young journalists in a country in which many writers are imprisoned, tortured, and jailed. While covering the May 13, 2005 massacre in Andijan, Bukharbaeva was hit by a bullet when troops opened fire on demonstrators. As a result of her reporting, the government accused her of “conducting open information warfare against the state,” and she was forced to flee the country.18 A recipient of the Committee to Protect Journalists International Press Freedom Award (2005), Bukharbaeva lives in New York City, where she studies journalism at Columbia University. She graduated from the Journalism Faculty of Tashkent State University in 1997. Karimov, Islam (or Islom) (b. 1938). Born in Samarkand of a Tajik mother and an Uzbek father, Karimov was raised in poverty (or an orphanage—the stories vary), studied engineering, and eventually became an economist. He became the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan in 1989 and then named himself president of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic in 1991. In December of the same year, Karimov was “elected” president of the newly independent Uzbek Republic and has been reelected ever since, his term extended by referendum. Rasulov, Yuldash (dates unknown). Member of the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan (an unregistered and therefore illegal organization), Rasulov was sentenced in 2002 to seven years for spreading “antigovernment ideas.”19 Arrested for allegedly belonging to an illegal organization (Hizb ut-Tahrir) and being a religious extremist, Rasulov was sentenced to time in a hard labor prison despite the government’s main witness retracting his testimony and stating that he had been tortured. Rasulov confessed only to being a practicing Muslim and praying five times a day. Solih, Muhammad (b. 1949). Pen name of Salai Madaminov, exiled chairman of the banned opposition party the Erk (Freedom) Party. In the 1991 elections, Solih was the only presidential candidate to run against Karamov, garnering 12.3 percent of the vote. Norway granted him political asylum after he fled Uzbekistan amid death threats. In 2000, Solih was sentenced in absentia to 15 1/2 years in prison in connection with a Tashkent bombing that killed 16 people in 1999. Solih has adamantly denied the charges, insisting that the charges were fabricated by the authorities to punish him for opposition activities. Solih recently petitioned the United States and other Western governments to increase their support for democratic reform in Uzbekistan. Usman, Emin (1945–2001). Well-known Uighur (Muslim Turkic person from the traditionally Chinese western provinces) writer killed in 2001 while being held by the Interior Ministry for investigation of alleged criminal activities. Author of more than 20 books in Russia, Uzbek, and Uighur, Usman was arrested on

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February 11, 2001, for violation of Uzbek Criminal Code Article 244-1 (dissemination of documents threatening to social security). The Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan believes he was suspected of translating documents for the illegal Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir, a charge they find not credible. On February 28, 2001, the authorities delivered his body to his relatives, explaining that Usman had committed suicide. His relatives observed a deep gash in the back of his head and numerous bruises about the body. No funeral was permitted, and the Uzbek militia buried him. NOTES 1. Statistical data gleaned from the CIA’s World Factbook 2005, http://www.odci.gov/ cia/publications/factbook. 2. Some of the in-country sources for this chapter are anonymous to protect the individual(s) from harassment from government officials. 3. For an excellent concise overview of the preindependence (1991) history of Uzbekistan, see “Islam in Central Asia and the Caucasus” and “Uzbekistan,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of Islam, ed. John L. Esposito et al., New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, 1:271–75, 4:301–3. 4. The United Nations, the U.S. Bureau of the Census (International Division), and the CIA all accept these figures as accurate; however, it may simply be that they each “confirm” the others’ figures. 5. Alternatively transliterated as Naksibendi, Naqshbendi, and Naqshbandi. 6. Michael Kozak, acting assistant secretary for democracy, human rights, and labor, “Challenges to Democratization in the Middle East and Central Asia,” testimony before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia of the House International Relations Committee, May 4, 2005, 109th Congress, 1st Session, http://wwwc.house.gov/ international_relations/109/koz050405.pdf. 7. U.S. Department of State, Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S. Record 2004–2005, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/shrd/2004. 8. Hizb ut-Tahrir has been accused of terrors attacks in Uzbekistan in 2004 that killed 50 people. Hizb ut-Tahrir denies any involvement in the attacks. 9. Bobomurod Abdullaev and Kamiljon Ashurov, “Uzbekistan: Women Driven to Despair,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, May 10, 2002. 10. Ibid. 11. Human Rights Watch, Sacrificing Women to Save the Family? Domestic Violence in Uzbekistan, July 2001. 12. “Radio Free Europe Scribe Beaten in Uzbekistan,” The Hindu, July 4, 2005, http:// www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/003200507041611.htm. 13. “Pregnant Journalist of Radio Free Europe Beaten in Uzbekistan,” Muslim Uzbekistan, July 4, 2005, http://www.muslimuzbekistan.com/eng/ennews/2005/07/ennews04072005_ 1.html. 14. “Alliance Calls for Coalition Withdrawal,” New York Times, July 5, 2005. 15. “Day of the Bully: Uzbekistan’s New Role Worries Its Neighbors,” Economist, October 25, 2001. 16. “Hanging Separately,” Economist, July 24, 2003. Also see “Liquid Dominos,” Economist, March 4, 2004; and “Tajikistan’s Water Politics,” Economist, July 2, 1998.

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17. “Liquid Dominos.” 18. Committee to Protect Journalists, International Press Freedom Awards (2005), http://www.cpj.org/awards05/galima.html. 19. David Filipov, “Terror Crackdown May Push More to Extremism,” Boston Globe, October 27, 2002.

RESOURCE GUIDE Suggested Reading Abramson, David. “Identity Counts: The Soviet Legacy and the Census in Uzbekistan.” In Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity and Language in National Censuses, ed. David I. Kertzer and Dominique Arel. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Akbarzadeh, Shahram. Uzbekistan and the United States: Authoritarianism, Islamism and Washington’s New Security Agenda. London: Zed Books, 2005. Amnesty International. Unfair Trials and Secret Executions. London: International Secretariat, 2004. Burghart, Daniel L., and Theresa Sabonis-Helf. In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia’s Path to the Twenty-first Century. Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2004. Luong, Pauline Jones, ed. The Transformation of Central Asia: States and Societies from Soviet Rule to Independence. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003. Naumkin, Vitaly V. Radical Islam in Central Asia: Between Pen and Rifle. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005. Rashid, Ahmed. Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia. New York: Penguin Books, 2003. Roi, Yaacov, ed. Democracy and Pluralism in Muslim Eurasia. New York: Frank Cass, 2004. Roy, Olivier. The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations. New York: New York University Press, 2000. Shields, Acacia. Creating Enemies of the State: Religious Persecution in Uzbekistan. New York: Human Rights Watch, 2004. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Uzbekistan: The Key to Success in Central Asia? Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia. 108th Cong., 2nd sess., June 15, 2004.

Films and Videos Central Asia: Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Lonely Planet, 1997. Revolt of the Daughters-in-Law. Pre-1991. In Uzbek with English subtitles. Warm-hearted story depicting women and gender issues as well as generational differences through a new daughter-in-law and a patriarchal grandmother. Uzbekistan: Islamic Repression. Derry, NH: Chip Taylor Communications, 2004. 20 mins. Video clips from the Andijan massacre in May 2005 can be seen at http://gatewaypundit. blogspot.com/.

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Web Sites Academy of Arts of Uzbekistan: http://www.arts-academy.uz/eng/index.html Amnesty International’s 2004 report: http://web.amnesty.org/report2004/uzb-summary-eng/ Center for Social and Political Studies (Sweden): http://www.ca-c.org/indexe.shtml Committee to Protect Journalists: http://www.cpj.org/cases05/europe_cases05/uzbek.html Eurasia.org’s news portal: http://eurasia.org.ru/index_en.shtml Eurasianet.org: http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/uzbekistan/index.shtml Harvard’s Program on Central Asia and the Causasus: http://centasia.fas.harvard.edu/ Internews Uzbekistan: http://www.internews.uz/ Maps of Uzbekistan: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/uzbekistan.html Muslim Uzbekistan’s News Agency: http://www.muslimuzbekistan.com/eng/english.html Republic of Uzbekistan’s Web site: http://www.gov.uz/ Silk Road Dance Company: http://www.silkroaddance.com/ Tashkent: http://www.tashkent.org/ UNESCO History of Civilizations in Central Asia: http://www.unesco.org/culture/asia/ U.S. Department of State’s Country Report on Human Rights Practices, 2004: http://www. state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41717.htm Uzbek constitution: http://www.umid.uz/Main/Uzbekistan/Constitution/constitution.html Uzbekistani embassy to the United States: http://www.uzbekistan.org/

Glossary

abaya. Loose, usually black robe worn by Muslim women, especially in Arabic-speaking regions, covering the body from head to toe. See also chador. adat. Local custom or accepted practice assimilated into Islam as it is practiced locally. Examples include visits to local saints’ tombs, wedding and birth rituals, and integration of local Christian, animist, or other religious practices, myths, or ideas. Many conservative Muslims find these customs or practices non-Islamic and actively discourage their practice. akhbar. In Shia Islam, the words and deeds of Muhammad and the Twelve Imams. Also called traditions. See also sunna, hadith. Allah. amir.

God. Prince or ruler.

Ashura. Tenth day of the month of Muharram, one of the months of the Muslim lunar calendar. Commemoration of the death of Muhammad’s grandson Hussain on the plains of Karbala, Iraq, in 680. ayatollah. Persian from Arabic Ayat-u Allah, or Sign of God. Honorific title in Shia Islam but seldom used outside of Iran. In Iraq, the term is used only by clerics of Iranian origin. An ayatollah must be a trained legal scholar (mujtahid). Baath Party. Political party in Syria, Iraq, and Nasserite Egypt (under Gamal Abdel Nasser, 1956–70); baath means “rebirth” in Arabic. Baathists ruled Iraq under Saddam Hussein until the 2003 invasion by coalition forces. Baathist political philosophy is an amalgam of pan-Arabism, Arab socialism, secularism, nationalism, and an ideology of “strength through peace” or militarism.

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Baha’i. Follower of the Iranian Mirza Hussayn Ali Nuri (d. 1892), also known as Baha Allah or “Glory of God.” The Baha’i believe in progressive revelation and accept Muhammad as the most recent prophet. They believe in one God, the harmony of religion and science, equality of men and women, and social and economic justice. Most Muslims consider them a heretical sect. There are about five million Baha’i, with the largest community in India. caliph. Political-military ruler in the Muslim world; successor to the Prophet Muhammad. The first four caliphs were chosen by consensus of the Muslim community and seen as leaders of the Muslim world; afterward, the title became hereditary. Ottoman sultans were widely considered the last caliphs until the abolition of the caliphate in 1924 by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and the establishment of a secular republican government. caliphate.

Ruled by a caliph.

chador. Persian for “veil.” Full-length outer garment covering a woman from head to toe, typically black. Its use is not mandated in the Quran, although it is widely worn in Iran and Saudi Arabia, where it is called an abaya. Some Muslim women wear it while traveling for protection from unwanted attention; others choose to wear it as a symbol of their belief in Islam. Saudi Arabia and Iran require women to wear some version of this garment in public. Deoband Movement, Deobandi (1866–1947). Indian-Pakistani reformist movement of Muslim clerics and scholars centered in the institution of the Dar al-Ulum of Deoband, present-day India. This school was founded by scholars associated with the thought of Sayyid Ahmad Reza Khan Barelwi to safeguard the teachings of Islam while under nonMuslim rule (British and Hindu). Deobandis emphasized orthopraxy or “correct practice,” study of the words and deeds of Muhammad (hadith), and the Hanafi school of jurisprudence. They established thousands of schools throughout Pakistan. Originally not a political movement, although by the 1960s, it had transformed into transnational Muslim movements influencing Pakistan’s Jamiatul Ulama-I Islam and Afghanistan’s Taliban. dervish.

Members of an ascetic religious order in Islam; Sufis.

dhikr. Arabic for “remembering” or “reminding.” In Sufi devotions, repeated recitation of litanies or prayers. Can refer to individual acts of devotion, but usually refers to groups of worshippers uttering prayers or the 99 names of God in rapid succession. fatwa. Authoritative, nonbinding legal opinion offered by learned jurists or muftis. Some Shia sects hold that fatwas are binding. fiqh. Islamic jurisprudence; human (and thus fallible) interpretations of Islamic law (sharia). ghusl. Major purification ritual in Islam (to be contrasted with wudu), which consists of washing hands and sexual organs and pouring water over the entire body, starting with the right side. Necessary before all forms of worship and after sexual relations, ejaculation, and menstrual or postpartum bleeding. For Shiites, ghusl is necessary after washing a corpse. gusul. Albanian variant of ghusl. hadd, hudud (pl.). Arabic for “limit” or “prohibition.” Punishments for six crimes against the rights of God, the penalties for which are prescribed in the Quran or in the hadith. They are theft (amputation of the hand), illicit sexual relations (death by stoning or 100 lashes),

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accusations of illicit sex (80 lashes), drinking alcohol (80 lashes), apostasy (death or banishment), and highway robbery (death). These punishments are rarely applied in the Muslim world except in Saudi Arabia and under the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan, although some Muslim radicals have attempted to impose mandatory hudud punishments in local courts against Muslim defendants in Nigeria, Sudan, Iran, and parts of Pakistan. hadith. Record of the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad and other early Muslims; considered an authentic source of revelation second only to the Quran. A source of Islamic law. Called akhbar in Shia Islam and refers to the words and deeds of Muhammad and the Twelve Imams. See also sunna. hajj. Pilgrimage to Mecca, which is mandated at least once in their lifetime for all Muslims who are able to afford the journey and can physically perform the pilgrimage rituals. One who completes a hajj is often called hajji, a deferential title (or hajjia, fem.) Hanafi. One of the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence, the origins of which are traced to eighth-century Iraq. It is the most widely accepted school of law, followed by almost one-third of the world’s Muslims. Legal doctrines are relatively liberal with regard to women’s rights in contracting marriages and individual freedoms. hijab. Generally refers to a scarf covering the head and neck. Sometimes incorrectly referred to as a veil. hijri. Muslim calendar based on a lunar year, which dates from the Prophet Muhammad’s emigration (hijra) from Mecca to Medina (July 15, 622 C.E.). hudud.

See hadd.

ijtihad. “Independent reasoning” in Islamic law, as opposed to conformance or adherence to precedent; one of the four sources of Sunni law. Interpretation of a legal issue using analogical or syllogistic reasoning. Compare taqlid. imam. Arabic for “one who stands in front,” a religious leader in the Muslim community who leads the mosque in congregational prayer. Sunni Muslims also use the title to denote someone of specialized theological training. In Shia Islam, these are the divinely appointed successors to Muhammad and are regarded as infallible. In the United States and Canada, the title is used by religious leaders to indicate their standing in the Muslim community. Imamate. Shiite belief in the 12 direct descendants of Muhammad and their divine right to the spiritual and political leadership of the Muslim community. Jamaat-i Islami (JI). Arabic for “Islamic community” or “Islamic organization” and the name of political parties found throughout the Muslim world, including Indonesia, India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. Despite having the same or a similar name, these parties are not necessarily related, nor are their goals and philosophies the same. In the Afghan resistance (1980s), the JI played an important role, but it is best known as the largest political party in Pakistan. Jemaah Islamiyah. Arabic for “Islamic organization.” Militant Islamist group active in Southeast Asia seeking to establish a pan-Islamic state. jihad. From the Arabic meaning “to strive,” “to exert oneself,” “to fight.” Used to express one’s struggle against temptation, attempts to convert non-Muslims, or the Muslim community’s struggle to build a better community. Today most often used as a synonym of “crusade.”

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Jihad is the only type of legal warfare in Islamic jurisprudence, and its use is strictly governed by Islamic law. Extremists, terrorists, and radical Muslims frequently invoke the concept of jihad in any conflict with non-Muslims, although most often when used in this context, jihad is an extralegal offensive. jinn. Mythical noncorporeal creatures or spirits known in pre-Islamic Arabia and mentioned in the Quran. Like humans, they are endowed with the ability to choose between good and evil. In popular Islam, jinn are invoked for magical purposes and are often credited for miraculous or unusual events, as well as a wide range of illnesses and their cures. kafir.

Nonbeliever.

kalam. Arabic for “disputations”; Islamic theology. khalifa.

See caliph.

khanaqa. Word of Persian origin referring to Sufi meeting houses, which appeared as early as the ninth century. Synonyms used in different geographic and historical contexts include ribat, sumaa, tekke, and zawiya. Koran.

See Quran.

Lashkar-i-Jhangvi. Jhangvi’s Army, the militant offshoot of Sipah-i-Sahaba (Pakistan). The group focuses primarily on anti-Shia attacks and was banned by Pakistani president Musharraf in August 2001. Many of its members have strong ties to al-Qaida and the Taliban. loya jirgah. Traditional tribal councils; word used to describe modern democratic assemblies in Afghanistan. madhhab. School of jurisprudential thought. The Hanafi, Maliki, Hanbali, and Shafii are the four schools of legal thought in Sunni Islam; Jafari is the Shia school. madrasa. Arabic for “school”; religious seminaries where law, philosophy, theology, the Quran, hadith, and Arabic, among other subjects, are taught from an Islamic standpoint. Generally refers to any school below the university level with an Islamic-based curriculum. In Iran, frequently called maktab or hozeh; Indonesian Islamic schools are called pesantren. Mahdi. Arabic for “Divinely Guided One.” Messianic figure in Islamic eschatology who will bring an era of justice and abundance just before the end of time. The term is not mentioned in the Quran and the concept developed differently in Sunni and Shia Islam. Both believe the Mahdi will be a descendant of Muhammad and will usher in a period of prosperity and justice, while defeating the enemies of Islam. In Shiism, the Mahdi is the Twelfth Imam, who is currently in occultation or is hidden or unknown. mahr. Dowry given by a groom and his family to his bride, which legally becomes the property of the woman to dispose of as she pleases. In reality, more conservative, rural, or uneducated communities frequently infringe on the bride’s right of ownership. Dowries are required by Islamic law to render the marriage legal. majlis. Arabic for council or tribal council. In the twentieth century, it commonly refers to parliamentary institutions endowed with legislative authority or deliberative functions, except in Saudi Arabia, where a majlis is a public audience before a member of the royal family where one presents a petition.

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maktab.

See madrasa.

masjid.

Mosque.

medrese.

See madrasa.

mehr. Farsi for “wedding dowry” or “marriage gift”; gift from groom and his family to a bride. See also mahr. mufti.

Scholar trained in Islamic law who is qualified to issue legal opinions (fatwas).

muftiate.

Political rule by a mufti.

Muhammadiyah (Indonesia). Javanese Muslim reformist movement founded by Kiyal Hadji Ahmad Dahlan in 1912. Most powerful reformist group in Muslim south Asia, the Muhammadiyah draws its membership largely from the middle classes. It operates thousands of clinics, poorhouses, hospitals, labor unions, factories, farms, and schools. mujahid, mujahidin (pl.). One who wages holy war ( jihad); does not necessarily connote war or fighting and can refer to one who struggles against sinful desires. It is not one group but refers to Muslims in a wide range of contexts, from the Afghan struggle against the Soviets to fighters in conflicts in Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir, Kosovo, and the Philippines, among others. mujtahid. decisions.

One trained to use independent reasoning (ijtihad ) in formulating legal

mulla. From Persian through Arabic for “lord,” “master,” or “leader.” Title of a religious cleric, learned man, or intellectual. Mullas are also the principal interpreters of law in Shia Islam. Muslim Brotherhood. Also known as the Ikhwan al-Muslimin. Organization founded in 1928 in Egypt by Hasan al-Banna and a main source of inspiration for Islamic organizations throughout the Arab and Islamic world. mutawwiin. Arabic for “those who volunteer or obey”; sometimes known by the popular name of Committees for Public Morality, or, more formally, as the Committees for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice. Institution in Saudi Arabia with men patrolling public places to ensure that the Saudi interpretation of Islamic law is kept. muwahhidun. Arabic, literally “those who believe in the oneness of God.” Most fundamentalist or revivalist Muslims call themselves muwahhidun or Salafis as opposed to Wahhabis. See also Salafism. Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). One of the two largest Islamic grassroots social organizations and political parties in Indonesia. Founded in 1926 amid nationalist and Islamic reformist demands. With more than 6,000 traditional schools of Islamic learning ( pesantren ), the NU boasts more than one million students spread throughout rural Indonesia. The NU run schools, mosques, prayer houses, student dormitories, orphanages, and poorhouses. namaz. niqab.

Persian for the five daily prayers required of Muslims. See also salat. Face veil.

Pancasila. Indonesian political philosophy that espouses belief in God but opposing the sanction of any one faith as the official religion of the state.

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pesantren. Traditional schools of Islamic learning in Indonesia. See also madrasa. pillars of Islam. Five acts considered obligatory for all Muslims: stating a declaration of the oneness of God and that Muhammad is his Prophet (shahada), regular observance of the five prescribed daily prayers (salat), giving alms to the poor (zakat), fasting during the holy month of Ramadan (sawm), and performance of the pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in one’s lifetime, if circumstances and means permit (hajj). pir. From Persian for “respected elder,” also known in Arabic as murshid or “one who guides.” Sufi master who teaches or guides novices toward the mystical knowledge of God. purdah. Gender-based segregation; seclusion of women from unrelated men. Term used widely Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan for the seclusion of women. qadi. Arabic for “judge” in an Islamic legal system. Quran. Arabic for “recitations.” Book of Islamic revelation; scripture believed to have been transmitted from God to the angel Gabriel through the Prophet Muhammad, and the ultimate source of the knowledge of God and law for Muslims. Ramadan. Ninth month of the lunar calendar in Islam, during which fasting and abstaining from drinking and smoking from dawn to dusk is required of all Muslims physically able. Exceptions are made for menstruating and pregnant women, travelers, the aged, and infirm. salah, salat (pl.). Arabic for “prayer” or “worship.” The second pillar of Islam requires prayers five times a day: dawn (salat al-fajr), noon (salat al-duhr), midafternoon (salat al-asr), sunset (salat al-maghreb), and evening (salat al-isha). The exact times for prayers are determined by the position of the sun. Muslims are called to prayer by a muezzin who sings or chants a formulaic call beginning with “God is great.” Prayer may be performed in any clean place, although custom in most places requires men to attend Friday prayers at a mosque. To be valid, one must perform ablutions (wudu) and declare proper intentions. The prayers consist of recitations from the Quran and formulations in praise of God; prayers are performed facing Mecca. Some Persianate cultures call these prayers namaz. Salafi, Salafism. From the Arabic salaf, meaning ancestors or predecessors. Early twentieth-century reform movements led by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh that emphasized a return to the earliest practices of Islam. Today it refers to those who espouse a particularly conservative, exclusively Arab interpretation of Islamic thought and practice; often incorrectly referred to as Wahhabis. Salafis reject the term Wahhabi and tend to refer to themselves as “traditionalist reformers.” shahada. Profession of faith in Islam consisting of two declarations: “There is only one God and Muhammad is his Prophet.” This is the only requirement for conversion. sharia. Islamic law based on the Quran and the words and the deeds of Muhammad as recorded in the hadith; these two sources are immutable, unchanging, and infallible, though the interpretation of them is not. The balance of Islamic law is fiqh or the human interpretation of sharia. shaykh (or sheikh). Pre-Islamic honorific meaning leader, notable, elder, or chief, according to local usage. Shia. Arabic meaning “followers” or “partisans” of Ali ibn Abi Talib, the son-in-law and cousin of the Prophet Muhammad. Shiites believe that Muhammad’s religious authority and

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spiritual guidance were passed on to his descendants through Muhammad’s daughter Fatima, her husband Ali, and their two sons Hassan and Hussain, and that Muhammad specifically designated Ali as his successor. Others (eventually Sunnis) held that Muhammad’s successor was to be chosen from the Muslim community. This difference led to the first Muslim civil war (656–61). Hussain’s death (and the death of many of his male family members) at the hands of the Umayyads (Sunnis) led to an irrevocable split in Islam. Approximately 10 percent of the world’s 1.2 billion Muslims are Shiite, with large distributions in Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Yemen. There are three main branches of Shiism—the Zaydis, Ismailis (Seveners), and Ithna Asharis (Twelvers)—and numerous sects within each main branch. Some offshoots of Shiism include the Druze, Alawites, and Baha’i. Shiite.

One who follows Shia Islam.

Sikh. Punjabi from Sanskrit for “disciple.” Follower of the religion founded by Guru Nanak (b. 1469) in Punjab, India, who subscribes to an amalgam of Hindu and Muslim beliefs. Sikhs follow the teachings of the Ten Gurus and the teachings in the Sikhs’ holy book, Sri Guru Granth Sahib. Sipah-i-Sahaba. Association of the Companions of the Defenders of the Prophet. Radical Sunni extremist group in Pakistan that follows an interpretation of the Deobandi school and is determined to make Pakistan a Sunni state. It is violently anti-Shia and emerged in Punjab in the 1980s in partial response to the Iranian revolution. They declare Shias to be non-Muslim and have called for the assassination of prominent Shia clerics. Sufi, Sufism. Islamic mysticism; internalization of Islamic faith and practice. Sufis stress contemplation over deeds, spiritual growth over observing religious law, and the salvation of one’s soul over social interaction. Sufism is independent of the Shia /Sunni split, the different schools of jurisprudence (madhhab), social class, national origin, or gender. Throughout history, it has been both supported and condemned by the religious authorities. sunna. Collection of sayings and deeds of Muhammad and some of the earliest leaders of the Muslim community. See also akhbar and hadith. Sunni. “Traditions.” Arabic from sunna, or the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad. Those who espouse that Muhammad’s religious authority, spiritual guidance, and line of succession were vested in a member of the Muslim community (as opposed to Muhammad’s descendants), said member to be chosen from among his followers. Approximately 85–90 percent of the world’s 1.2 billion Muslims are Sunni. Sunni Islam is not “mainstream” or “orthodox” in contradistinction to Shia Islam—both are normative. Both Shiites and Sunnis share at least three major beliefs: oneness of God, the divine revelation of the Quran, and the day of resurrection and judgment. Taliban. From the Arabic for “students” or “seekers of Islam.” Former government of Afghanistan, 1996–2001. taqlid. Arabic for “imitation”; adherence to legal precedent and traditional doctrines. Often incorrectly juxtaposed with ijtihad, as modern reformers seek to introduce new interpretations of Islam. tariqa, tariqat (pl.). Sufi

brotherhood or order.

tekke. In Albania, Sufi orders or prayer houses. Synonyms include ribat, sumaa, khanaqa, and zawiya.

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See hadith and sunna.

Uighur (or Uygur, Weiwer, Uigur). Muslim Turkic ethnic group living in northwestern China, mainly in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, where they are the dominant ethnic group. Uighurs also live in Taoyuan county of the Hunan province in south-central China. ulama (or ulema), alim (sing.). Arabic for “men of knowledge.” In Sunni Islam, refers to those trained in the Islamic sciences (Quran, hadith, jurisprudence, Arabic, and so on). In Shia Islam, these are the professional, though unofficial, clergy. Alim can also refer to a scientist in the secular sense. umma. Arabic for “community.” Worldwide Islamic community; also used for “nation.” Usulis. Followers of the Shiite Usuli school of law, which relied on rational processes to derive law, in contradistinction to the traditionalist Akhbaris, who believed in the literal translation of the Quran and the traditions (akhbars) of Muhammad and the Twelve Imams as the sole sources of Islamic law. Usulis supported the use of independent reasoning (ijtihad) in deriving legal rulings by those who were qualified to do so; all others were required to conform to the rulings. Wahhabi, Wahhabism. Eighteenth-century reform movement promoting a reconstruction of society based on early Islamic principles and proclaiming the oneness of God as its primary doctrine. Named for Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, an Arabian scholar who rejected most Muslim theology developed in the medieval era and all non-Islamic cultural practices such as tomb visitations and adoration of saints. Today, many fundamentalist or revivalist groups are often incorrectly described as Wahhabi, but their doctrine or practice may have little to do with Abd al-Wahhab’s teachings and may more correctly be termed Salafi. wudu. Obligatory cleansing rituals performed prior to prayer by both men and women consisting of washing one’s hands, mouth, face, arms, and feet and pouring water over one’s head. zakat. Islamic system of social welfare based on an alms tax on wealth held more than one year. Most Sunnis agree on giving a minimum of 2.5 percent of one’s wealth; most Muslims donate around 10 percent. In some Muslim countries, zakat is levied by the state. In Shia Islam, some interpretations hold that one must give the 2.5 percent as zakat and an additional 20 percent known as khums. The 20 percent is calculated on the savings or profit held at the end of a year.

Resource Guide

Since the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo of 1973–74, numerous headlines and events have brought Islam to the fore of American consciousness and via the media into the living rooms of Middle America: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (1948–), the Iranian revolution and hostage crisis (1979–80), the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon (1982), the Iran-Iraq war (1980–88), two Gulf Wars (1990 and 2001), the insurgency in Iraq (2001–), and the tragedies of September 11, 2001. These events have served to reinforce an image of a monolithic, violent, and terrorist Islam. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, a plethora of books, Web sites, and videos have appeared, all purporting to explain the attacks, Islam, or terrorism. For those who wish to broaden their understanding of Islam as a religion, culture, civilization, and political phenomenon, there are hundreds of books from which to choose. For this reason, Muslim Cultures Today offers a brief resource guide of suggested reading materials, Web sites, and films or videos. All of them have been reviewed to ensure that they reflect mainstream scholarship and a wide variety of views and are representative of the literature available. All of these sources are readily available either online, at Amazon. com, or in a local bookstore. Beginning with a succinct and accessible general history of Islam, along with a concise explanation of the religion’s main tenets, renders the Quran and its commentary much more approachable for a beginner. One of the best places to begin is with John Esposito’s Islam: The Straight Path. Esposito provides an up-to-date survey of Islam as a historical phenomenon, giving readers a solid understanding of the faith, belief, and practice of Islam from its origins to the present. He traces the emergence of this dynamic faith and its impact on world history, covering the

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formation of Islamic belief and practice in law, theology, philosophy, and mysticism. Equally important, Esposito broadens the study of Islam in his revised third edition to include the Muslim presence in the United States and the impact of such figures as Malcolm X and Louis Farrakhan. In the final chapter, Esposito presents contemporary Muslim thinking on religious pluralism, democracy, and human rights. For an excellent survey of Islamic thought, see Seyyed Hossein Nasr’s Islam: Religion, History and Civilization. The first half of this volume examines the doctrines and beliefs of Islam as a religion, covering some of the same ground as Esposito’s Islam: The Straight Path. Chapter 5 sets forth the ethics and institutions of Islam as they developed over time; chapters 6–8 are particularly helpful in understanding the historical development of the different schools of thought in Islam. Like Esposito, Nasr writes for a general audience and beautifully illustrates the complexity of Islamic intellectual life and civilization. Tanya Gulevich’s Understanding Islam and Muslim Traditions is a remarkable work in its scope and its contribution to the literature on lived Islam. In one volume, a reader can traverse the customs and rituals of Muslims from around the globe. Breathing life into the theoretical underpinnings of Islam, one sees the diversity of Islam as it is lived. Last, The Oxford Dictionary of Islam is indispensable to those wishing to further explore some of the ideas, terms, and concepts presented in the above or other works on Islam. There are many translations of the Quran into English, but believing Muslims will emphasize that once translated, it is no longer the Quran: it is an interpretation. Long before the postmodern theories of form and content or the modern sciences of hermeneutics, semantics, and exegesis, Muslim intellectuals understood that translation necessarily involves one’s interpretation of the shade of meaning in a word. Unlike the Bible or the Talmud, the Quran is sometimes listed by libraries or book lists under the translator’s name. Muslims believe that the Quran was transmitted to humanity in a chain starting from God to the angel Gabriel to the Prophet Muhammad. This message was given to Muhammad in sections over a period spanning approximately 23 years (610–22 C.E.). In the academic world, two of the most respected translations of the Quran are Abdullah Yusuf Ali’s The Meaning of the Holy Quran and Muhammad M. Pickthall’s The Meaning of the Glorious Koran: Text and Explanation. Many Muslims recommend reading two or three translations at the same time to compare how the text has been interpreted, and several Web sites offer multiple translations for this purpose. Unlike Protestant and Catholic versions of scripture, both Sunnis and Shiites accept the exact same text—chapters and verses—believing the Quran to be the complete, literal revelation from God. But the Quran is only one part of two that form the basis of Muslim belief and practice. The second part is the sunna—Arabic for “established custom, precedent, traditions,” usually based on Muhammad’s example. The deeds and words of Muhammad are believed to complement the revealed scripture and comprise a source for establishing norms for living one’s life. In Islamic jurisprudence, the sunna stands alongside the Quran as a primary source of legislation. Shiism

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augments the deeds and words of Muhammad with those of the Twelve Imams; here, the sunna is commonly referred to as akhbar or “reports.” These collections are also called the hadith (conventionally used for singular and plural). Each hadith contains a chain of transmission or authority (isnad) that records the identity of the witness (to Muhammad’s or a religious leader’s [imam’s] words or deed) and the line of transmitters through whom the hadith has been preserved. Various hadith have more reputable chains of transmission than others. An entire branch of Islamic science was developed in determining the validity of each saying. Since there are numerous collections of hadith, one of the best places to begin is online. Many online collections offer commentary, explain the sources, and provide information about the authors and the transmitters. Among explanations of the history and science of hadith is the one at Wikipedia.com: http://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/hadith/. In addition to providing information on the types of hadith, the online encyclopedia article explains how the collections are viewed by Muslims and non-Muslim scholars, and it sets forth the collections accepted by Sunni, Shia, and Ibadi Muslims. This article is part of a larger Wikipedia piece on Islam; it is well written, easy to understand, and accurate. A reputable site for reviewing collections is http://www.hadith.net/english/index.htm. And an online searchable database of hadith is available through the University of Southern California’s Muslim Students Association Web site: http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/reference/ searchhadith.html. The usual caveat applies for those accessing Internet-based information on Islam and Muslims: critically evaluate Web resources before accepting the information presented as valid or accurate. While the Web is an excellent source of knowledge and data on the Islamic world, not all Web sites are equally reliable or valuable. The college library of the University of California–Los Angeles offers a checklist of questions to keep in mind when appraising resources on the Web: http://www.library.ucla.edu/libraries/college/help/critical/discipline.htm. Among video resources, Public Broadcasting Service’s Islam: Empire of Faith (2002) is an exceptional three-hour film on the history of Islam from its origins in the seventh-century Arabian peninsula to its civilizational height in the Ottoman Empire a thousand years later. After September 11, the Saudi Arabian embassy in the United States distributed thousands of these videos in press packets to news outlets across the country. Muslim and non-Muslim scholars consulted on the project, and it has been hailed as one of PBS’s more extraordinary productions. This bibliography is not meant to be comprehensive, but rather to offer a place to start when seeking additional works on Islam. Most of the volumes presented have comprehensive bibliographies, should one wish to more delve more deeply into a particular topic. The list of videos and films are provided primarily for educators, though many of them are available for viewing at university libraries. All are available for purchase online. The Internet addresses provided are some of the hundreds of thousands available on Islam. Most of the Web sites listed are by Muslims for both Muslims and non-Muslims and have dozens of other links to explore.

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SUGGESTED READING Introduction to Islam Ahmed, Akbar A. Islam Today: A Short Introduction to the Muslim World. New York: I. B. Taurus, 1999. Ali, Abdullah Yusuf. The Meaning of the Holy Quran. 10th ed. Beltsville, MD: Amana Publications, 1999. Armstrong, Karen. Islam: A Short History. New York: Modern Library Chronicles, 2000. ———. Muhammad: A Biography of the Prophet. San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1993. Esposito, John. Islam: The Straight Path. Rev. 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. ———. Islamic World, Past and Present. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. ———. Oxford Dictionary of Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. ———. What Everyone Needs to Know about Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Gulevich, Tanya. Understanding Islam and Muslim Traditions. Detroit, MI: Omnigraphics, 2004. Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. Islam: Religion, History and Civilization. San Francisco: HarperCollins, 2003. Pickthall, Muhammad M. The Meaning of the Glorious Quran: Text and Explanation. 2nd U.S. ed. Elmhurst, NY: Tahrike Tarsile Qu’ran, 1999.

Works by or on Contemporary Muslim Intellectuals Aboul-Enein, Youssef H. Ayman al-Zawahiri: The Ideologue of Modern Muslim Militancy. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Counterproliferation Center, Air University, 2004. Cooper, John, Ronald L. Nettler, and Mohamed Mahmoud, eds. Islam and Modernity: Muslim Intellectuals Respond. New York: I. B. Taurus, 1998. Esposito, John, and John Voll. Makers of Contemporary Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Kurzman, Charles. Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Mahmood, Iftekar. Islam Beyond Terrorists and Terrorism: Biographies of the Most Influential Muslims in History. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2002. Safi, Omid, ed. Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender and Pluralism. Oxford, UK: OneWorld Publications, 2003. Taher, H. Tarmizi. Aspiring for the Middle Path: Religious Harmony in Indonesia. Jakarta: Center for the Study of Islam and Society, 1997. Wadud, Amina. Quran and Woman: Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Works of Contemporary Muslim Figures Engineer, Asghar Ali. Islam, Women and Gender Justice: What Men Owe to Women. Ed. John C. Raines and Daniel C. McGuire. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002. Khatami, Mohammad. Islam, Liberty and Development. Binghamton: State University of New York at Binghamton, 1998.

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Qutb, Sayyid. Social Justice in Islam. Trans. John B. Hardie. Rev. ed. Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International, 2000. Soroush, Abd al-Karim. Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam: The Essential Writings of Abd al-Karim Soroush. Ed. and trans. Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Political Islam Abou El-Fadl, Khaled. Islam and the Challenge of Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004. Abou Zahab, Mariam, and Olivier Roy. Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection. London: Hurst, 2004. AbuKhalil, Asad. Bin Laden, Islam and America’s New “War on Terrorism.” New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002. Barton, Greg. Indonesia’s Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam. Sydney: University of New South Wales, 2004. Buckley, Mary, and Rick Fawn. Global Responses to Terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan, and Beyond. New York: Routledge, 2003. Burgat, Francois, and John L. Esposito. Modernizing Islam: Religion in the Public Sphere in the Middle East and Europe. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2003. Crotty, William, ed. Democratic Development and Political Terrorism: The Global Perspective. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2005. Diouf, Sylviane. Servants of Allah: African Muslims Enslaved in the Americas. New York: New York University Press, 1998. Esposito, John. Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Fuller, Graham. The Future of Political Islam. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Geaves, Ron, ed. Islam and the West Post 9/11. Burlington, VT: Aldershot, 2004. Kepel, Gilles. The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2004. Khatami, Mohammad. Islam, Liberty and Development. Binghamton: State University of New York at Binghamton, 1998. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Culture and Information. Saudi Arabia’s Stance on Terrorism. Riyadh: Al-Qimam Multimedia, 2004. Qutb, Sayyid. Social Justice in Islam. Trans. John B. Hardie. Rev. ed. Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International, 2000. Rashid, Ahmed. Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002. ———. Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia. New ed. London: I. B. Taurus, 2002. Rouse, Carolyn Moxley. Engaged Surrender: African American Women and Islam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004. Soroush, Abd al-Karim. Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam: The Essential Writings of Abd al-Karim Soroush. Ed. and trans. Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Webb, Gisela, ed. Windows of Faith: Muslim Women Scholar-Activists in North America. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000.

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Islam and Muslims in the United States and the West Aswad, Barbara C., and Barbara Bilge. Family and Gender among American Muslims: Issues Facing Middle Eastern Immigrants and Their Descendants. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1996. Engineer, Asghar Ali. Islam, Women and Gender Justice: What Men Owe to Women. Ed. John C. Raines and Daniel C. McGuire. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002. Haddad, Yvonne. Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. ———. Muslims of America. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. ———. Muslims on the Americanization Path? New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Kepel, Gilles. The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2004. Lo, Mbaye. Muslims in America: Race, Politics and Community Building. Beltsville, MD: Amana Publications, 2004. Ramadan, Tariq. Western Muslims and the Future of Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Shia Islam Fuller, Graham, and Rend Rahim Francke. The Arab Shia: The Forgotten Muslims. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001. Momen, Moojan. An Introduction to Shi’a Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shiism. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987. Sobhani, Ayatollah Jafar. Doctrines of Shia Islam: A Compendium of Imami Beliefs and Practices. New York: I. B. Taurus, 2001. Walbridge, Linda S., ed. The Most Learned of the Shia: The Institution of the Marja Taqlid. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Sufism Baldick, Julian. Mystical Islam: An Introduction to Sufism. Studies in Near East Civilization. New York: New York University, 1990. Ernst, Carl W. Eternal Garden: Mysticism, History and Politics at a South Asian Sufi Center. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Kabbani, Muhammad Hisham. Classical Islam and the Naqshbandi Sufi Tradition. 2nd ed. Washington, DC: Islamic Supreme Council of America, 2004. Renard, John. Knowledge of God in Classical Sufism: Foundations of Islamic Mystical Theology. New York: Paulist Press, 2004. Rumi, Jalal al-Din Maulana. Light upon Light: Inspirations from Rumi. Trans. Andrew Harvey. New York: Penguin, 2004. Trimingham, J. Spencer. The Sufi Orders in Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Women and Islam Abu Lughod, Lila. Remaking Women: Feminism and Modernity in the Middle East. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998.

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Afzal-Khan, Fawzia, ed. Shattering the Stereotypes: Muslim Women Speak Out. Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2005. Ali, Syed Mohammed. The Position of Women in Islam: A Progressive View. Albany: State University of New York, 2004. Barlas, Asma. Believing Women in Islam: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the Quran. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002. Falah, Ghazi-Walid, and Caroline Nagel, eds. Geographies of Muslim Women: Gender, Religion and Space. New York: Guilford Press, 2005. Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck, and John L. Esposito, eds. Islam, Gender and Social Change. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Mahmoud, Saba. Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005. Nashat, Guity, and Judith Tucker. Women in the Middle East and North Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999. Rizzo, Helen Mary. Islam, Democracy and the Status of Women: The Case of Kuwait. New York: Routledge, 2005. Sonbol, Amira El-Azhary. Women of Jordan: Islam, Labor and the Law. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2003. ———, ed. Women, the Family, and Divorce Laws in Islamic History. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996.

Films and Videos About Baghdad. New York: InCounter Productions, 2003. 90 mins. 11th of September, Moyers in Conversation. New York: New Video Group, 2002. 121 mins. Islam and America: Through the Eyes of Imran Khan. Surrey, U.K.: Journeyman Pictures, 2001. 25 mins. Islam: Empire of Faith. New York: PBS Video, 2002. 180 mins. Islamic Fundamentalism and Democracy. New York: Middle East Studies Association, 1994. 57 mins. Le Grande Voyage. Film Movement, 2005. 108 mins. My Journey, My Islam. Australia: Women Make Movies (http://wmm.com/), 1999. 56 mins. Nazrah: A Muslim Woman’s Perspective. ArabFilm.com, 2003. 55 mins. Sudan: The Harsher Face of Islam. Journeyman Pictures, 1995. 40 mins. Women and Islam: Islam Unveiled. New York: Filmmaker’s Library, 2004. 2 parts, 49 mins. each.

Websites Human Rights Amnesty International: http://www.amnesty.org/ Human Rights Watch: http://www.hrw.org/

Islam Internet Islamic History Sourcebook: http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/islam/islamsbook.html

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Introduction to the Science of Hadith: http://www.witness-pioneer.org/vil/hadeeth/sh_ish/ index.htm Islam 101: http://www.islam101.com/ Islam.com: http://www.Islam.com/ Islam for Today: http://www.islamfortoday.com/ Islam Online: http://www.islamonline.net/ Liberal Islam Network: http://islamlib.com/en/ Muslim WakeUp: http://www.muslimwakeup.org/ Nation of Islam: http://www.noi.org/ Quran: http://web.umr.edu/~msaumr/Quran/ Quran: http://www.quran.org.uk/

News African Intelligence: http://www.africanintelligence.com/ AllAfrica Global Media: http://www.allAfrica.com/ Arabic News: http://www.arabicnews.com/ BBC News Country Profiles: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/country_profiles/default.stm UN Integrated Regional Information Network: http://www.irinnews.org/

Reference Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html Middle East Report and Information Project (MERIP): http://www.merip.org/ Middle East Studies Association (MESA): http://fp.arizona.edu/mesassoc/

Index

Abacha, Sani, 127 Abbasids, 90–91, 105 Abboud, Ibrahim, 173 Abd al-Rahman, Omar, 45 Abd al-Raziq, Ali, 48 Abdulatipov, Ramazan Gadzhimuradovich, 155 Abortion, 31, 96 Abu al-Majd, Ahmad Kamal, 48 Aceh, 84 Achebe, Chinua, 121; Things Fall Apart, 121, 128 Afghanistan: elections, 9; ethnic and linguistic groups in, 1–2; literacy and education, 4; Soviet invasion, 2–3; Taliban, 3, 5, 7–11; U.S. invasion, 7–8; women in, 5–7, 8 Ahl-i Haf, 188 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 93 Ahmadiyya Sufi order, 56 AIDS/HIV, 119, 127 Akbar, Jalaluddin Muhammad, 66 Alawi, Ayad, 113–14 Albani, Nasir al-Din al-, 22–23, 25 Albania: education, 17–19, 20–21; ethnic and religious communities in, 15–16;

Kosovar Albanians, 15–16, 19–20, 21–22; Sufis in, 16–17, 18; women in, 20–21 Alevis, 188 Ali, Muhammad, 40, 161, 172 Ali, Nafisa, 74 Allah, Shah Wali, 67, 69 All India Muslim League, 67–68, 133 Andijan Massacre, 204–5 Andric, Ivo, 34–35 An-Naim, Abdullahi Ahmed, 183 Arab Socialist Renaissance Party, 106 Arinze, Cardinal Frances, 122, 127 Armenians, 89 Assyrian Christians, 108 Ataturk, Mustafa Kemal, 188, 192–93 Aymaqs, 1–2 Ayodhya, 70, 73 Azad, Maulana, 133 Azeris, 89, 147, 150 Baasyir, Abu Bakar, 85–86 Baathism ideology, 106 Baathist Party (Arab Socialist Renaissance Party), 106, 114 Babur, Muhammad Zahiruddin, 66, 70, 200

230

Baha’i, 43, 89, 90 Baloch: in Afghanistan, 2; in Iran, 89; in Pakistan, 136, 137 Bangladesh, 71, 134–35 Banna, Hassan, al-, 44, 175 Barelvi, Sayyid Ahmad, 67 Beeri, Selvi M. Fathima, 74 Bektashis, 17, 18, 188 Beshir, Omar Hasan, 173, 183 Bhutto, Benazir, 139, 141 Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali, 139 bin Laden, Osama, 7, 34, 45, 49, 116, 137, 140–41, 167, 182 Birth control, 31, 96 Boja, Rexhep, 20, 23 Bosnia and Herzegovina: civil war, 28; Dayton Peace Accords, 30, 33, 37; ethnic and religious communities in, 27–28, 30; European influence in, 29; political structures, 30–31; women in, 31–33 Bukhara Khanate, 200 Bukharbaeva, Galima, 208 Caliphate, 189 Camp David Accords, 42 Caste system, 68 Catherine the Great, 148 Ceric, Mustafa, 35 Chaldean Christians, 90, 108 Chechnya, 147, 149, 153–54 Christians: in Albania, 15–16; in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 27–29; in Egypt, 43, 47; in Ethiopia, 53–54, 57–58; in Indonesia, 77; in Iran, 89–90; in Iraq, 108, 112; in Nigeria, 119–20, 121–23; in Pakistan, 135; in Russia, 147; in Sudan, 172; in Uzbekistan, 201 Circumcision, female, 58–59, 124–25, 131nn30–31, 175, 179 Congress Party (India), 134 Contraception, 31, 96 Croats, 27–28 Daawa Party (Iraq), 113, 114 Dagestan, 148, 150 Darfur, 180–82 Daud, Muhammad, 6, 11

INDEX

Dayton Peace Accords, 30, 33, 37 Demirel, Suleyman, 191 Democratic Party (Turkey), 190–91 Dengel, Lebna, 55 Deobandi, 67 Divorce. See Marriage and divorce Domestic violence, 123–24, 131nn28–29, 138, 206 Dowry, 5, 46 Durrani, Ahmad Shad, 2 Dutch colonial rule, 77 Ebadi, Shirin, 98 Ecevit, Bulent, 191 Education: in Albania, 17–19, 20–21; in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 29; in Egypt, 40; in Ethiopia, 57–58; in India, 67; in Indonesia, 78–79, 81; in Russia, 149, 178. See also under Women Egypt: education in, 40; ethnic and religious communities in, 43; French rule, 40; human rights and, 39, 42–43, 47; independence, 40; Islamic opposition movements, 43–44; women in, 45–47 Egyptian Islamic Jihad, 45, 48, 49 Emini, Baba Tahir, 18 Erbakan, Necmettin, 191–92, 195 Erdogan, Recep Tayyip, 192, 195 Eritrea, 61–62 Ethiopia: arrival of Islam, 54–55; Eritrea, relations with, 61–62; ethnic and religious communities in, 53–54, 56; linguistic diversity in, 54; Somalia, relations with, 59–61; Sufism in, 56; women in, 58–59 Female genital mutilation (FGM): in Egypt, 47, 52n11; in Ethiopia, 58–59; in Indonesia, 83; in Nigeria, 124–25, 131nn30–31; in Sudan, 175, 179 Funj Sultanate, 172, 174 Gamaat Islamiyah (Egypt), 45, 48 Gandhi, Mahatma, 133 Ganji, Akbar, 100 Gaynutdinov, Ravil Ismagilovich, 155 Genghizid Empire, 148 Ghazi, Ahmad ibn Ibrihim al-, 55

INDEX

Ghaznavid dynasty, 2, 65 Ghurid dynasty, 2 Gilakis, 89 Gorans, 16 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 151 Gujurat riots, 73 Gulen, Fethullah, 17–18, 195 Gypsy Muslims (Roma), 16 Haddadiyya Sufi order, 56 Hakim, Abdul Aziz al-, 113 Hanafi, Hasan, 48 Hanafi school of law: in Afghanistan, 2, 5; in Ethiopia, 56; in Iraq, 108; in Russia, 150; in Sudan, 179; in Uzbekistan, 201, 206 Hanbali school of law, 18, 160–61 Hazarah (ethnic group), in Afghanistan, 1–2, 4 Helveti Sufi order, 18 Hijab. See Veil and head covering Hikmatyar, Gulbuddin, 6, 9–10 Hindu Cow Protection Movement, 70 Hindu nationalism, 70–72, 73–74 Hindus, 68, 69–71; in Afghanistan, 2, 4, 77–78; in Pakistan, 133–34, 135 HIV/AIDS, 119, 127 Hizb-i Islami (Afghanistan), 6, 10 Hizb ut-Tahrir (Uzbekistan), 199, 205, 210n8 Honor killings, 138–39, 194 Hoxha, Enver, 17 Hudud punishments, 5, 123, 131n23, 139 Human rights: in Egypt, 39, 42–43, 47, 51, 51n3; in Iraq, 106, 110; in Nigeria, 121, 139; in Sudan, 182; in Uzbekistan, 204–5, 206 Hussein, Abdulmejid, 62 Hussein, Saddam, 105, 109, 114; human rights violations, 106, 110 Ibn Abd al-Aziz, Fahd, 168 Ibn Abd al-Aziz, Talal, 168 Ibn Hanbal, Ahmad, 161 Ibn Rabah, Bilal, 62 Ibn Saud, Muhammad (d. 1765), 161 Ibn Saud, Muhammad (d. 1953), 161 Ibrahim, Fatima Ahmed, 183–84

231

Ibrahim, Mohammed Ali, 62 Idrisiyya Sufi order, 174 ijtihad, 67, 79, 148; in Shia Islam, 92 Imam, Ayesha Mje-Tei, 128 Imamate, 91 India: art and architecture, 69; independence, 67–68, 71; Pakistan, relations with, 68–69, 71, 73–74, 134–35; partition of, 65, 68, 134–35; Sufis in, 68–69; women in, 71–73 Indonesia: pluralism, 77–78; political parties, 82; reform movements, 78–79; religious and ethnic communities in, 77; rites and rituals, 77–78, 80–82; terrorist attacks in, 77, 85–86; women in, 82–84 Iran: art and culture, 95; ethnic and religious communities in, 89–90; Islamic law in, 92–93; linguistic groups, 89; political structure, 93–95; reform movements, 98; religious beliefs in, 91–92; United States and, 98–100; war with Iraq, 106; women in, 95–98 Iraq: ancient, 105; elections in, 113; invasion of Kuwait, 106–7, 109; religious and ethnic communities in, 108; terrorism in, 110–11, 112–13, 115–16; United Nations and, 107, 109; U.S. invasion of, 107; war with Iran, 106; women in, 110–11 Isa Beg Medrese network, 20–21 Islambuli, Khalid, 42 Islamic Charter Front, 175, 177 Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromiya, 61 Islamic Group (Egypt), 45, 48 Islamic law, 79, 83, 121–23; in Shia Islam, 92–93; and women, 111 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, 199 Islamic Tawhid Brigades (Egypt), 48 Ismaili, Imam Vehbi, 23 Ismailis, 2, 159 Israel, 42, 43, 44, 48 Ittihad al-Islamiyya, al- (Somalia), 59, 60 Izetbegovic, Alija, 35 Jaafari, Ibrahim al-, 114 Jadidism, 148 Jafari school of law, 150

232

Jailani, Sayyid Ahmed al-, 4, 10 Jamaat-i Islami (Pakistan) 45 Jamiat-i Islami party (Afghanistan), 10 Jemaah Islamiyah (Indonesia), 85 Jews and Judaism: in Afghanistan, 2, 4; in Egypt, 43; in Ethiopia, 53, 58, 89, 90; in Iraq, 109; in Pakistan, 135; in Uzbekistan, 201, 202 Jihad al-Islamiyah, al- (Egyptian Islamic Jihad), 45, 48, 49 Jinnah, Mohammed Ali, 67–68, 133–34, 141 Justice and Development Party (AKP, Turkey), 192 Justice and Equality Movement (Sudan), 181 Justice Party (Turkey), 190–91 Kabir, Humayun, 74 Kadare, Ismail, 23 Kadiri Sufi order. See Qadiri Sufi order Kadyrov, Ahmad, 155 Kalam, Abdul, 74–75 Kamal, Kishwar, 6 Karimov, Islam, 204, 208 Karzai, Hamid, 5, 8–10, 11 Kashmir, 68, 71, 73–74, 134–35, 137–38, 140–41 Kavakci, Merve Safa, 193 Kayra Sultanate, 172 Kemalism, 188–89, 192–93 Khamenei, Ayatollah Ali, 94 Khan, Abdul Qadeer, 141 Khan, Amir Abd Al-Rahman, 2, 4 Khan, Amir Habibullah, 4 Khan, Ismail, 7 Khan, Sayyid Ahmad, 67 Kharazia, 148 Khatami, Sayyed Mohammad, 93, 94, 98, 100 Khatmiyya Sufi order, 174, 176 Khomeini, Ruhollah Ayatollah, 92–93, 94, 100–101 Koçi, Hafiz Sabri, 17, 23–24 Kosovo, 15, 18–19, 20–21 Kurds, 89, 108 Kuris, Konca, 195–96 Kusturica, Emir, 35–36

INDEX

Kuwait, 106–7, 109 Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (Pakistan), 138, 144n10 Laskar Jihad (Indonesia), 85 League of Nations, 105–6 Libbi, Abu Farraj al, 141 Loya jirgah, 5, 10 Lur tribesmen, 89 Macedonia, 16, 19–20 Madjid, Nurcholish, 79, 86 Mahdi, al-, 91, 172, 174 Mahdi, Sadiq al-, 176, 184 Mahdi, Sayyid Abd Al-Rahman al-, 176 Mahr, mehr. See Dowry Majdhubiyya Sufi order, 174 Maliki school of law, 56, 119, 179 Marriage and divorce: in Afghanistan, 5–6; in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 31; child marriage, 5; in Egypt, 46; in India, 71–72; in Indonesia, 83; in Iran, 95, 96–97; in Saudi Arabia, 164–65; in Sudan, 179; in Turkey, 194; in Uzbekistan, 205–6. See also Polygamy Maskhadov, Aslan, 155 Masud, Ahmad Shah, 9–10 Mawdudi, Mawlana Abul Ala, 45 Mazandaranis, 89 Mehmet Akif, 18, 21 Mirah, Hanfareh Ali, 62–63 Mirghani, Muhammad Uthman al-, 174 Mirghaniyya Sufi order, 56, 176 Miriam, Mengistu Haile, 57 Mohajirs, 136 Mohammed, Khalid Sheikh, 140–41 Motherland Party (Turkey), 191 Mubarak, Hosni, 39, 41–43, 47, 182 Mughal Empire, 66–67, 68, 69, 200 Muhammadiyah (Indonesia), 78–79 Mujahidin: in Afghanistan, 3, 6, 10; Egypt and, 45 Musharraf, Pervez, 135, 140–41 Muslim Brotherhood, 10, 43–45, 47–48, 175, 177 Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), 77, 79, 88 Nakshibendi Sufi order. See Naqshbandi Sufi order

INDEX

Naqshbandi Sufi order: in Afghanistan, 4, 12n5; in Albania, 17, 18, 25; in Russia, 148, 150; in Turkey, 188, 191; in Uzbekistan, 204 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 40–41, 44, 173 National Action Party (Turkey), 190 National Front (Turkey), 191 National Islamic Front (Sudan), 173, 175 National Salvation Party (Turkey), 191 NATO, 8, 15–16, 33 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 133 Nestorian Assyrians, 89 Nigeria: AIDS in, 119, 127; child labor in, 125–26; colonial era, 120; female genital mutilation, 124–25, 131nn30–31; human trafficking and, 125–26; linguistic diversity in, 120; literature of, 121; Muslim-Christian relations in, 121–23; religious and ethnic communities, 119– 20; Sufism in, 119; women in, 123–25 Nimatullahi Sufi order, 92 Nimeiri, Jafar, 173, 180 Northern Alliance (Afghanistan), 11 Nubia, 172 Nubians, 171 Nuclear technology and weapons, 68, 74, 99, 110 Nuristanis, 2 Obasanjo, Olesegun, 122, 128 Ogaden National Liberation Front, 60 Okri, Ben, 121 Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), 61 Oromos, 55, 60–61 Oromo, Somali, and Afar Liberation Alliance (OSALA), 61 Ottoman Empire, 16, 28–29, 40, 105, 161, 172, 188–90 Ozal, Turgut, 191 Ozturk, Yasar Nuri, 196 Pahlavi, Reza Shah, 93 Pakistan: arrival of Islam in, 133; creation of, 133; military coups in, 135, 136; Islamic fundamentalism and, 136–38; relations with India, 68–69, 71, 73–74, 134–35; sectarian violence in, 138; Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and,

233

136–37; and U.S. relations, 140–41; women in, 138–39 Pashtu (language), 2 Pashtun (ethnic group): in Afghanistan, 1–2, 136; in Pakistan, 136, 137 Pashtunwali, 136 polygamy: in Afghanistan, 5, 71, 83, 95, 97; abolished in Turkey, 192; in Uzbekistan, 206 Premji, Azim Hasham, 75 Punjabi (ethnic group), 136 Purdah, 72 Qadiri Sufi order: in Afghanistan, 4, 12n4; in Albania, 17, 18; in Ethiopia, 56; in Nigeria, 119; in Russia, 150; in Sudan, 174; in Uzbekistan, 188 Qaida, al-: in Afghanistan, 7–11; Albania and, 21–22; Bosnia and, 33–34; Egypt and, 45, 48; Ethiopia and, 59–60; Indonesia and, 85; Iraq and, 107, 110, 115–16; Pakistan and, 140–41, 154 Qajar dynasty, 92 Qaradawi, Yusuf al-, 48–49 Qirghiz, 2 Qizilbash, 2 Qutb, Sayyid, 44 Rabbani, Burhanuddin, 10 Rais, Amien, 82, 86 Ramadan, 31–32, 81, 203–4 Rashidiyya Sufi order, 174 Rasulov, Yuldash, 208 Republican Brothers (Sudan), 175 Republican People’s Party (Turkey), 190–91 Revivalism, 79, 150, 161–62 Revolutionary Association of Women of Afghanistan (RAWA), 6, 12 Rexhepi, Sulejman, 20 Rida, Rashid, 44 Rifaiyya Sufi order, 56 Roma Muslims, 16 Russia: arrival of Islam in, 148; Christians in, 147; ethnic and religious communities, 147–48, 149–50; Islam during the Soviet period, 149–50; Sufis in, 148, 150–51; women in, 153

234

Saadawi, Nawal el, 49 Sadat, Anwar, 41, 44 Safavids, 90, 92 Salifi(ism), 18, 20–21, 161–62, 166–67. See also Wahhabism Sammaniyya Sufi order, 56, 174 Saro-Wiwa, Ken, 121, 128, 130n8 Sassanian Empire, 90 Saud, Abdullah ibn Abu al-Aziz al-, 168 Saudi Arabia: constitution and political structure, 162; Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and, 160–62; premodern history of, 160–62; Shiite population, 159; terrorism and, 166–67; women in, 163, 164–65 Senlikoglu, Emine, 196 September 11, impact of: Afghanistan and, 5, 7; Albania and, 22; Bosnia and Herzegovina and, 33; Egypt and, 39, 42, 45, 49; Ethiopia and, 59–60; India and, 68, 74; Indonesia and, 84, 99; Iraq and, 107; Pakistan and, 137, 140–41; Russia and, 154 Serbs, 27–29, 32–33 Shadhiliyya Sufi order, 56, 150, 174 Shafii school of law, 55, 56, 79, 108, 150 Shaimiev, Mintimir, 156 Sharif, Nawaz, 135 Sherkat, Shahla, 101 Shia Islam: beliefs, 91–92; early history, 90–91; jurisprudence, 92–93; Twelver Shiism, 90, 188 Shiites: in Afghanistan, 2, 69, 89–90; in India, 65, 69; in Iraqi politics, 113; in Pakistan, 138; in Russia, 150; in Saudi Arabia, 159; in Turkey, 188 Sikhs, 2 Simla Accords, 135 Sindhi (ethnic group), 136 Sipah-i-Sahaba (Pakistan), 138, 144n10 Sistani, Sayyid Ali Husayn, 114–15 Slavery, 4, 119–20, 173, 182 Sokoto Caliphate, 120 Solih, Muhammad, 208 Somalia, 59–62 Soroush, Abdolkarim, 101 Soviet Union: in Afghanistan, 2–3; Egypt and, 41–42, 45; Ethiopia and, 60; Russia and, 149–50; Uzbekistan and, 200

INDEX

Soyinka, Wole, 121 Spaho, Mehmet, 36 Sudan: arrival of Islam in, 172; civil wars in, 180; human rights and, 182; linguistic diversity, 171; Mahdist period, 172, 174; military coups, 173; modern history, 172–73; political parties, 176–78; Sufis in, 172, 174; United States and, 182–83; women in, 178–79 Sudanese Communist Party, 177, 183 Sudanese Women’s Union, 178, 183–84 Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), 181 Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), 180 Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), 177, 180 Suez Canal, 40 Sufis and Sufi orders: in Afghanistan, 4; in Albania, 16–18, 21; in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 34; in Ethiopia, 56; in India, 68–69; in Indonesia, 78, 81; in Iran, 92; in Iraq, 108; in Nigeria, 119–20; and politics, 191; in Russia, 148, 150–51; in Sudan, 172, 174; in Turkey, 188. See also specific Sufi orders Suharto, Mohammad, 82, 85 Sukarnoputri, Megawati, 82–83, 84, 86–87 Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), 113 Tadzhuddinov, Talgat Safich, 155–56 Taha, Mahmoud Mohamed, 175; The Second Message of Islam, 185 Taj Mahal, 66 Talabani, Ala, 115 Talabani, Jalal, 113 Taliban, 3, 5, 7–11, 137 Tashkent Declaration, 135 Tatars, 147–48 Tigray, 57 Tijani Sufi order, 17, 25n2, 56, 119, 174 Tito, Josip Broz, 30 Turabi, Hasan al-, 173, 175, 177–78, 184 Turkey: ethnic and religious communities, 188; European Union and, 194–95; human rights, 194; Kemalism, 188–89, 192–93; military coups, 190– 91; political parties, 190–91; secular-

INDEX

ism, 189–90; Sufis in, 188; women in, 192–94 Turkmen, 2, 89 Ulfah, Maria, 81, 87 Umar, Mulla Muhammad, 11 Ummayads, 91 United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), 113 Usman, Emin, 208–9 Usuli school of law, 92–93 Uzbek (language), 2 Uzbekistan: arrival of Islam, 199–200; ethnic and religious communities, 201–2; human rights, 204–5, 206; identity in post-Soviet era, 202–3; religious practices, 203–4; Soviet rule of, 200; Sufism, 204; United States and, 206–7; women in, 205–6 Uzbeks (ethnic group), 1 Veil and head covering: in Afghanistan, 5, 6; in Egypt, 46–47; in Ethiopia, 57; in India, 72; in Iran, 96; in Iraq, 111; in Russia, 153; in Saudi Arabia, 163; in Sudan, 178; in Turkey, 187, 192–94; in Uzbekistan, 205–6 Virtue Party (Turkey), 192, 193 Vlachs, 16 Wahhab, Muhammad Ibn Abd al-, 67, 159, 160–61, 168; Kitab al-Tawhid (Book on Monotheism), 160, 170n3

235

Wahhabi, Wahhabism, 18, 137, 161–62, 166–67. See also Salafi(ism) Wahid, Abdurrahman, 79, 82, 84, 87 Welfare Party (Turkey), 191–92 Women: in Afghanistan, 5–7; in Albania, 20–21; in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 31–33; education and, 5–6, 20–21, 178, 179; in Egypt, 45–47; employment and, 7, 20, 32–33, 46, 96, 178; in Ethiopia, 58–59; health care and, 33; in India, 71–73; in Indonesia, 82–84; in Iran, 95– 98; in Iraq, 110–11; in Nigeria, 123–25; in Pakistan, 138–39; political rights of, 5–6, 7; rape and, 6, 32–33, 58, 68, 134, 138–39, 181; religious practice and, 203; in Russia, 149, 153; in Saudi Arabia, 163, 164–65; in Sudan, 178–79; in Turkey, 192–94; in Uzbekistan, 205–6. See also dowry, female genital mutilation, marriage and divorce, polygamy, purdah, veil and head covering World Islamic Group (Egypt), 48 Yeltsin, Boris, 153 Yugoslavia, 16, 19–20, 28–30, 34–36 Zahir, Muhammad, 4, 11 Zarqawi, Abu Musab al-, 110, 115–16 Zawahiri, Ayman al-, 45, 49 Zenawi, Meles, 57, 59–60, 61 Zia-ul-Haq, Mohammed, 136, 142 Zoroastrians, 89

About the Editor and Contributors

ISA BLUMI is Visiting Assistant Professor of International Studies at the American University of Sharjah (United Arab Emirates) and is conducting a two-year comparative study on transregional migration and its impact on host societies. KATHRYN M. COUGHLIN is president of Global Research Group, Inc., a nonprofit organization dedicated to research and analysis on the broader Islamic world and projects that promote social justice in the developing world’s transition to market economies and global integration. She has taught, lectured, and given papers in North America, Europe, and Asia on a wide range of subjects, including religion and gender, Islamic law, religion and modernity, and U.S. foreign policy and the Middle East. She has served as a consultant to National Geographic, the U.S. Census Bureau (International Division), and the Human Rights Association in Nazareth, Israel, on issues pertaining to the Arab and Muslim worlds. R. MICHAEL FEENER teaches in the Religious Studies Department and the Southeast Asia Program at the University of California–Riverside. He has published articles on topics ranging from Arabic biographical literature to Indonesian Muslim jurisprudence, as well as the recent book Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives (2004). ANGELO GEORGAKIS is a visiting assistant professor at Westmont College in Santa Barbara, California. His areas of academic interest include the Balkans, central Europe, and Russia.

238

ABOUT THE EDITOR AND CONTRIBUTORS

DANA LEIGH HEARN is a freelance writer, editor, and Arabic-to-English translator. She also serves as an independent consultant for Johns Hopkins University’s Center for Technology in Education. PHYLLIS K. HERMAN is an associate professor of religious studies at California State University–Northridge. She has published extensively on Sita Rasoi—Sita’s Kitchen Shrine—as well as on the religio-political implementations of the Ramayana. MANA KIA is a graduate student in the joint doctoral program in Middle East Studies and History at Harvard University. Her primary academic interests are modern Iranian history, Indian Ocean migration, and feminist historiography. HEATHER J. SHARKEY is assistant professor of Middle Eastern studies in the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations at the University of Pennsylvania. She is the author of Living with Colonialism: Nationalism and Culture in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (2003). AMIN TARZI is the Iraq and Afghanistan analyst at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. He is currently co-editing a volume on the Taliban. Tarzi has worked on Afghan affairs as an activist, scholar, diplomat, political advisor, and researcher for twenty-five years. NELLY VAN DOORN-HARDER is associate professor of Islam and world religions at Valparaiso University. Her most recent book is Women Shaping Islam: Indonesian Muslim Women Reading the Quran (2006), and she is also the author of Contemporary Coptic Nuns (1995). GALINA M. YEMELIANOVA is Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham (United Kingdom). She has published extensively on history and contemporary ethno-political, religious, and human-rights issues in the Middle East and the Muslim regions of the Russian/Soviet empire. Her most recent publications are Russia and Islam: A Historical Survey (2002) and Islam in Post-Soviet Russia: Private and Public Faces, co-edited with Hilary Pilkington (2003).