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Libmry ami Ardlh'es Canada Cataloguing in Publication Rollinson" And[C!'l, 1>.L (!mdrew ;-',jackenl.ie.I,. 1966· 1',·[I.,1itlcuttllraii5.m imel Ihe !foundations [)f meaningflillifl': [L"I:onciling iluLonumy, id1:'l1J7iL)', and Cl)mmunity ... I\.ndww M. Hobimon.
[nchKlcs biblio,;mphicill ref(!rel1c'~s and index. [SB:-.l978·l)·7748-13B·6 ! MldLacu!1uwlism 2. MlIltindll.lIaliSIll - CH~.i? sir.ld5('s. :{. :\'lulticuJtumtism - Cimad.:J . ~. 1o.'ILlL'icllll'llTagi~m Canada - Case slutli~s. L Title. 11:\11 271. Rli:-\ 2007
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of all cultures people hLiW created, can pwvide no [''Jsis. for critiquing the way communities treat their members. On the oLher hand, liberal universalism, if based on an interpreLHion o! equal respecllhatregllir'cs identical treatment for all imlividuais, closes off the pOSSibility of adjllSling rights and privileges to aco:J1nlll{)(iate differences bd'Necn communities. Thcse competing ten·· siems are iHmtr<'lteLl by Desmond Clarke Lind CharJ·es Jones:
Ubcral 50deUes are commltted, In principle, to the IdeaJ of equal opportunltk:s for all citizens. \Nhen apparentl}' fall procedures
The liberal Culturalist COluensu5 The broad libcral clJ.lllmailst comensm on advocacy positions c<.In be SlJll1lmarize,d in six claims, which I describe in fairly general language, ,is Lhe
The final twu claims com.:ern intergroup relations and the bases of social lmity" The fifth is that inteKulLural dialugue is huLll an appropriate means for making anti resolving claims for recognition and illTOmm()Ljation anti the vehicle ttmm,9b which social unity is to he fostered and sustained. Sixth, it is suggested thal accommodating legitimate claims {and the dialogue through v.'hic11 this is to OCCUlr) is likdy to enhance social Ulnity, while denying legitimate claims is likely lo undennine it. Liberal clIlturalists generally claim lbill a[1Y Ltm:ats recognizing diversity may p·os~ to .stat~ unity cannot be any vwrs.;: thiln those mising from attempts to im()ose uniformity, ·1 he outcome of intercultllral dialogue, it is often suggesteil., will be the de\'elupment of a shared identity that can sustain the strong "sense of common pmpos.e and mutual solkllarity" tha~ no mere mod LIS vivendi between gWli]JS ever could;' Twu things are striking about ahis consensus. One is lha! it has not been accompanied by .<1 similar consensm at th~ level of foundiltlonal a.ssllmplions. The other is the lilek of interest some liberal ·culturali.sLs b;we shown in aHempti!l8 to address these disagreemenh by focming on fOLlndational assumptions. FDr example, Kymlicka ha5 written that he In'IS doubts. about
the uselulm.'S5 of "a more hi£h-level abs.tract llteory that starts from first premises about tl1·E! nature of f'~,lSOn, knowledge, ami p~rsonhood,"'" ilnd Joseph C.lI"ens /la.s written a yery in teres ling book that considers how the ideals or fairness as I1Cuh,llily imd fairness as even-handEdness might be m.:ol1ciit'll in practice desplte having ,"'["Jot yet worked out
applying them. Overview of the Book
The book is divided inUo three parts, In Part 1, Inspecting the FOllndations, [ disulss important contributions to the mlillicullmaHsm debate ami idel1lify it number of issues and questions that, I belic'ye, necessitate .a return lo foundational questions about the nature of identity,
munity, Ihe chLipter is orgimjz~d acnmJiing to thest' issut's and questions. My aim is not so much to critiqLle or evaluate the argLlments I dis.clISS as to suggest ,",'lly ~W2 are pressed towards these fundamental questions. The
reasom vary. Sometimes they are found in dis.agreements ben ween particul,lr Juthors, sometimes in the difierent \'I.'ays in \"'hich authors address the S-ame issues. Al other times, lhe reas.{)J1S are suggesled oy loose ends within the vwrk of a single author. Ihe overall aim is 10 justify a return 10 founda· tional assumptions and to identify issues thill sHeha return should enable lIS to address. These ismes include the nature and value of the relatiomhip between individuals and communities; ho\',' communities are dlefill1ed; the role of socialization; lhe social uni1s with Vdlich cultural inlerests. should be associated; whal 10 make of the distinction beh,veen modern and premodern or trad.itional cultures: and finally, the relatiombip beh·veen state borders, sociill unity, and intercultural dialogue. In Part 2., Tile Foundations of ll:teaningful Life, I suggest that by placing meaningful life, deHm.>d as the pursl1it of subjectively significant purposes, at the centre of a theory of justice, delinitions of identity, autonomy, and community can be reconflgmed in ways that permit their theoretical reconciliation. The approach I adopt, \vhich owes much to those theorists r mmider in l'art I, involves three major moves, The first, which I make here, is to place the inquiry in a broadly liberal context by stating [Vll0 axiomatic assumptions: one, <111 individuals have e-qual moral worth and, thus, must be lreated with equal respect: and two, the only inlerests that should matter in a theory of justice are (liose of individuals, The second move, which is made in Part 2, is the development and defence of a conception of the I}crson 'who has an essential interest all me,mingful life. The rderence 10 meaning or meaningful life, as anyone familiar wUh the authors canvassed in Part n will know, is nothing nt",v. VVhat is different is the way 1 position this vallie as underlying and explaining the signilicance 01' other key normative vallles. !'.·Iost important, this use of meaningful life allows the development of a conception of the person that s~l.ggests how we might integrate., without ranking, om beliefs in the imporlance of personal autonomy and. idenlilkation with commllnity, To achieve this, J utilize a distinction drawn by John R,'H'I'ls between a 1':eneral concept and particular conceptions d that concepl.'1 This permits the development and explirillion of conceptions of personal autonomy and community that, while being reconftgmetl in ways that reveal how they rna}' he mutually supportive, remain true to their general concepts. [n S{) doing, I hope to demonstrate lhe usefLllness oi shifting discussion from advocacy positions tu fOLlndational assumptions: while many partimlar conceptions of personal autonomy and identifICation with community milY be irrecono:.ilable, lhe com:epts of personal autonomy and idenliflcillion with communiay need nol be. Since the term "meaningfLlllife" means different things to differenl people, Chapter 2 begins by defining it. [ arglle that defmed asa life characterized by the pursuit of subjectively significant purposes, meaningful life is general enough to be {~ompalible with many different ways of life hllt stHhstantive
in Queil"':c, Vv'elsh speakers in Vv'ales), imligenOlls peGplesf.the Pueblo of l'\ew r. .[exico, the Coast Salish of British Columbia), non-indigenollS premodern communities Hhe Amish in Wisconsin), amI ethnic immigrant groups n.,.luslims in Ontario!. Chapter 6 sug~ests principles to govem the design of communal acmmmotiation. Four key principles are identified, and the cases introduced in Cililpter .s are lIsed to illustrate how they might apply in pilrtirular circumsLances. The ch,lpter concludes by considering the case of Pueblo Indians v.-lm converted to I'rotesL<mtism in order to illmtrate how these prim-ipies might tll!lp address issues raised by conl1ict within communities. Finally, Chapter 7 completes the development of advocacy positions by considering the implications of the foundations of meaningful life fur statecommunity relations. It considers two key aspects of state-community relations that a theory of liheral multiclllturalism must address. One concerns tbe initiation and evaluation of claims for special accommodation. The case of 1vri"kmaq demands for iog,::;ing ;md fishing rights, is introduced to demonstrate how the prinCiples devel{)J)(!cl here might apply in practice as well as how they might help us sort Dllt conllicts hetween communities. [0 the course of discllssing these claims, the potential benefits and drawbacks oi international adjudication are also a.ssessed. The second aspect of state-community relations concerns slale intervention in the internal praclic(:':> of communilies. Principles to guide practice ,ire suggested,. and their mefull1{,ss ilIustr,tk'd through case studies. of Ihe Amish in \OVisconsin and ~1uslims in Ontario. The book concludes by summarizing its milin contributions to the wider debilte: ahat a return to ontologkal assumptions is a llselul way to advanc{' thinking about liberal multicultura.lism; lhat the immdations of meaningful life provide a mmpelling account of the relationship beh·\,eeo individLlals and communities; and that the theory of liberal multiculturalism erected on thes{' foundations Gin provide a cogent response to those who believe that communal accommodati()J1s are never jtlstilied.
To bulld ;) wHntry for everY(}J1":, Canada would have to ;l~low [or sewnd-Ie\'eI OJ "'d,eep'" diversity,. bn which a pIUIaltt~' of ways of belonging would also be acknow!etlged and accepted. Some,one of, say, [tLilliJIl1 extraction in Toronto Of Ukrainian extraction in Edmonton might Indeed feel CllnadlilEl ilS a lJemer of Individual rights In a mtlltkultural mosaIc. His or her belongIng would not "lxisS through'" SDme other community, although the ethnic Identity might be Important to hUn or her In varlou:,; ways. But this person might nevertlleless accept that a Quebecois or a Cree OJ a Dene mIght belong in a very different way, that these persons were Canadian through being members ot thelr tllltlonal communWes, Reciprocrdly, the QlIebecobs, Cree, or Dene would accept the perfet~l le,giUmacy of tile "'mo:l
r",lm:h has been accompli5hed! since '\oViII Kymlicka suggested! in his Liberalism, ami Cul/ure that the interests of ethnocultLlral minorities could be reconciled within a liberal themy of justice. in fact" as noted in tile Introduction, the positions of a nllmber of prominent themists have converged on a general set ofadvocaq' positions that I am calling the liberal cultllralist consensus, !v[y aim in this chapter is to demomtrate three claims I made in the In troduction: lila t the emerging consensus on advocacy posit ions is not accompanied by a similar consemus on foundational assumptions, tbat these underlying differen{:es have signifl<.:ant implications for matters of practical policy, ami thllS, that a return to ontological or foundational ilssumptions is warranted!. To establish these claims, I consider the ''''orl:: of a l1llm!>er of prominent theorists who have taken positions in the ongoing conversation on liberal multiculturalism, [n disll.lssing their contributions, C01/Ummit.)'~
50 mm:il to critique or evaluate theifargumcnts LIS to desrCril>e the implications they have for tjJuestiom of foundatioml aSSlImpLiom. Somelime~ this involves considering disagreements belween authors; at other times, it il1'l/oh,'l':S comparing how diHerellt authors i.l{ldress the same issl1e~,: .imd at 01bel Limes sUll, ia involv(:'s fm:using on loose eml5 within the work of a single author. As the purpose of lhis cllapter is to raise quesLions that open up a sPJce fm the argument of the rest 01 the book, no linear argument nms through its vario'lls sectio/1S, Each stands alone, unUeUi only by a common purpose, "\ihile more bsues could probably hilve been raised, [ have cliosen to foem on six: the ll
conceptualizing the Individual·Communal Nexus It is irnpos~ible to discuss obligations of the state '",itll respect to mltmal mmrmmiLie.s without making assumptions, implicit or explicit, about the nature ami value of the relationship between individuals and communities. 'I·Vitho'llt some signiiiGmt rdaliomhip between individuals and communities, it is diHicllit to jLlSUry accommod;'lting comnnmilies within a liberal stale. 0111.:12 tbis is aliowed, hOv,'12\,ef, basic questions present themselves; l,Vhal is the nature of the relalionsilip between individual and community, ami why is the relallionship vwrtil preserving'l How these questions ,LIfe ansl,'l,'ered 'lI'ilI determine, in paut, the policies advocated to ,I(commouate such communities, Fo! example, wi1i1~ no' liberal cultUlalist would advocat'", pulici~s tiMt I,vollid dis.rllpt the relationship between individuals and communities Of umlermine the values that make (;ommunities worlhy of protection, \",'l1at comtitutes sucb policies will depend on how the relationship and its value are conceived. 111 this section 1 canvass three such nll1ceptions under the bmatl headings of cultl1ral monism" radically Huid self"identil)" and []Juid idenliliesicOllslituth'e colTlrnlinitie~, These conceptions r
Cultural 1\,·funisnl CuitLllaJ monism refers to the ;'lSSumption Ihat" urader mmt cin.:umslances, indivi,\.luLils have Ll signifLGlI1l rel<.ltiomhip "vith only one cultural community, and that. untie, nDTlTIal circUlTIstallces, this \".m be the cultural community in \"'hich tbey were born Llnd initially socialized. I discms this assumption
as illustrated in the work of \Vm Kymlicka and Charles Taylor. '·Vhile these theorists sl1are a similar CLIltural monist view on the natme of the relationship, they differ in their <1IssumptioDS about its vLlttle: for Kymtkka., its vallie lies in its contribution to personal autonomy; for Taylor, in Us contribution to collective goods. that inform personal idenmy. !loth the cultural monist account itseH and the comparison 01 Kymlirka's and Taylor's accounts of it.s v,llue raise questions 111<11t lead us back to foundational '[SSlImptiom. The Ii!peral-communitarian debate of the 19~Os provided the context within 'rvhich Kymlicka located his seminal work, Llbeml1sm., Commwrlly, LIIui Oiltllre. \'Vhile no doubt an oversimplHication, Ihis debate Gin be viewed as pitting liberals, 'Nhose commitment to individual choice and personal ,llltonomy did not permit adeqLlate recognition of community, against commllnitiLriaDS, whose assumption of a constitutive relatiomhip hetween the individual and his or her ,community did not allow for adequate recognition of personal aut.onomy. Just how was the relatiomhip behoveen individuals and communities conceived from these perspectives·! Ronald Dworkin provides an example of a liberalism tbal provides little or no basis for accommo{baing communities, cultural or otherwise. For Dworkin" whether any end or conception of tbe good wilt have enough of a sociely':; resources to be viable is simply a maLter oi luck:'
the implications of this quite starkly when, after entertaining the possibility lIut a !H:~rson's p~rsoni.l1i1y may '''disintegrat'i:~'' iJ it bewmes "detached from rcmnerJy unquestioned convictions," he asks, "Why should people riot be able to reassemble Lheir sense of identity"'?'; liD avoid ,his rdllsal to accommodate commllnities" Kymlicka must adopt a COHo.option of the nature oJ the relationship between individuals and communities that Gin set limits to the individual's capacity for choiceandJ thus explailf1'Nhy it is not always reas{mable to expect people to reas~emble their identities, \Vhile the commLmitarian conception of this relationship offers to circumscribe choice in lhe way that Kymlh.:ka requires, it is not available to him ror other reason.s. r.,.[ichael Sandel's l'mnstit'llUve community" is reprt'smtative of tbis cOl11l.mmitarian approach, [t suggests that the sell is situated or emix::dtled in inbel1ted commLlnal social practices that pia}' an inextricably constilULive £ole nn conslructing lhl.' imlivklll~l's identity. This self is ftypicall~' defmed in cornEast to the liberal sdl, which Sandel describes itS radically disembodied (thilt is, not determined by its circumstances; free to become Wh,L~~Ve[ it ci10{)S'..?s)} The self who finds 11im- or herself situated ill constitutive community presllpposes a col1ception of human agency that is mare
,I
in the way that communities can embody important collective goods that contriiJllte 10 their members' identities. Indeed, he thinks this is so valliable tllat it can jll:Stify placing limits. 011 individuals' pemmal autonomy. This is exemplified in his diiscussion 01 the lav.'s in Quebec that restrict the me of languages other than french on commercial signs. Taylor says that while such laws limit individual freedom, the Ql1ebec government can legitimately pass such leghlation because it. is designed to preserve and promote the French langu
nadlcatly Fluid Self.ldentity Chandran Kukatha~ presents a very dUferent conception of the nature and v,lllle of the relationship belwe-en individual and community. He is no advocate of the liberal cultmalisl wmenslls, but his work raises important questions, especially about the relationship between group identity and poliLical context Kl1kathas says his aim in making his argument i5 not to deny that people have interests in grollP~ ntDt to argue that they can be an:ommotialed without
l,egitimizing spedi,\J group lighls. Thus, h'E says it o'Ils nol t1la~ ,groups do not maller but rather lha~ Uww is no need to depart from the liberal language of i!1li'il'idllLll rights w do jmtice to them." All that lhis requires, he sllg,gest5, is respect [or freedom of association - the freedom "Ito form communities and lo live by '.lie terms 01' those ;'Issodations," This L1Jlvt.'iliingnes.s to recognize anything :special in the H.!l;'llionship between individuals and communities rdlecls a deeper L1.55umpllon thal self-identity is radically Uuid in nature. Observing tha~ group itlentmes appear to mlltate over time,. he suggests lhat ~his "ret1ed:;. lheir nature as associations of individuals with difierent inter('sls,'" As HlCh, cLlltufs. In particular, is it possible to maintain that the relationship betw!.!en individuals and communities is ~ulTident.ly important and enduring to \.,.arrant speCial recognition "lIhile alw recognizing that group identities appear lo mutate over Um~ am.I across contexts, ,md lhat som!.! individJuals app(.!af to b~ able to exercise more choke over their communal idJentiflcatiol1S ~hiln ot:llhural monism assllm~s?
Fluid Identity/Constitutive Community A lhird possibility [or underslanding the relatiomhip betwe('!11 indivith.li.1ls and communities retains both i1 conception of iluid seif-idenLUy am.I <~ con-
slitutive role for communities. An example of this is found in Iris r.,'tariol1 Young's idea of social groups.'" Contrary to Kukatllas' radically i1uid s.eU-identiLy, VOLmg's idea of social groups sugges.ts a relationship between self-identity and groups or communities thal could jllstify special accommodation, This is illustrated when she distingllishes s.ocial groups from "aggregates" and "associations," Unlike aggregates, which consist of individuals WllO share etive pllblic policy'?
delined as social irnaginaries., lhe main threals concern their ability to sustain the collective g(}ocis that oJntribute 10 members' identities. The threats posed to communities defmcd! (is SOCiil1 groups are sometimcs those th,L~ challenge communities' ability tf} sustain ways of life and, at other Urnes, where members do not accept how others have identilied them, it is group membership itself that appears to be the problem and exit the solution;'" Which of these characterizations is lrl~ated as authoritative will have important implications for puhlic policy. How should 'Ne cielilne the substance and membership of communities'? W'hile the answer is not clear, two things arc: the al!1Swer will have significant implications for the policy posilions we advocate, and Iinding it will involve considering tbe nature and value of community lIseli,
lV)Il' Rdllnl to FrJwJ
authenticity" recognition, and, most important, popular sovereignty, T,ly!or Sell's tile ideal of eluthenlicitl' - "the idea that each of us has ,m original way of being human" with wbicb ,,"'e mllst live in accordance U we me to "'be true ami lull hllman beings'" - developed in the wake of the "collaps-e of social hierarchies." Disemiledded from the socia] positions that (Me-tined idenlity in premodern .societies, each person's identity became "individualized": v.:ithout a socially defmed identlty, the individual had to. defme her identity for herself. Vv'hiJ.e personal identity is individualized in modernity, it does not, Taylor SilIYS, develop in isolation, bul rather it develops dialogically in communication with "Significant otbers."''' Tilis is where authenticity connects with identity and recognition: equal respect for individuals requires eXlending equal recognition to the identities they ha\'e donned. As [ undersland il, the emphasis on dialogical relalions has two important consequences. The first ties back lo authenticity: for an individual to lead an authentic me, others must reco;gnize, and not misn:~c ognize, the identily the individual hibS actually formed." Second, if we care about the authenticitty of individual identities, and if authentic identities are formed and sLlstained in dialogical relationships with Significant others, we should also care abouU the communities and cultures that foster ami slIstain the5e relations, Thus, an ,lCceptable account of justice must pmve "willing to weigh the importance 01 certain forms of uniform treaLment against Lhe importance of cultural survival, and opt sometimes in favor o! the lauer.""~ For Taylor,. liberal concern for individual freedom and equality meets concern for identity, authenticit}'., and recognition in the ideal of popUlar sovereignty, which he says reqUires the realization of "the government of fill the people."':' This can be the GhSe only where the people share ,a political identity that can act ,lS Ihe basis of a collenive agency. Under conditions of cultural diverSity, if the amhenticity of each (itizen's idenLUy is to he given equal recognition, the sla~e Gmnot define this collective agency in terms o.f just one, even if the largest, of its wltmal groups. for if it does, members of its cultural minorities may come Lo believe that Lhey are "'being mled by some agency tllat need take no accmmL of [theml," Those who ,ue excluded will feel alienated; "'Lhe mle of Ittle] government [v"ilI seem] illegillmate in tile eyes of the rejecters" as we see in coLlntless cases with {jisaffectoo national minori ties. "4. For the government to be the government of all the people, the state's political identity - whio::h Taylor deftnes variomly as "some strong common pm pose or value'" and "the generally an:epted answer to tbe "Vhal/whom [is a cOLlntryl for'? qllestion" - mmt be shared." Thus, 'laylor suggests, the state balances its needs lo recognize its citizens' different identities and to generate a colledive identity capillble o( acting as a sovereign penple, through the pmce5S of "sharing identity space": "Political identilles have to be ",Iorkecl out, negotiated, creatively compromised between peoples who h"".e to or ,,,"'ant
Robinson, Andrew M Multiculturalism and the Foundations of Meaningful Life Autonomy, Identity, and Community. Vancouver, BC, CAN: UBC Press, 2007, p 34. http://site.ebrary . com/lib/bilgilDoc?id=1 0214451 &ppg=34
lo live Logdher Lll1der tilt! S,tlIll' politkal roof:" Sharing identity space requires more than a nationalism lllal simply leaves room for minorities to exist." ",'Vhen identity span:! is shared prop['rl}~, it seems., tbe core goals oj the minorilit:!s Lontribme to the political identity that exercis.es popular s.over-eignty}" The practical outcomc of sllch sharing of identity space is the accommodation of ellmk .and immigr<m~ minorities. This, as the chapter's epigraph lIIustrates., is rellecte{.i in what Taylor has (amollSl}, called "'deep" diversity. The secondary and uerivative flatllfe of the claims of e[hnic and irmnigrimt groups is not emildy escajJL'd, however: "r. .lodern nationalist poHUes," 'lilyDor writes, "is spi:.'Cies of idenliLy ~}o!itics. lndeed, the original species: l1aUonal struggles are tile sile from which the mmlel comes to be applied 10 ferninism, to :struggles of cullmaJ minorities, t.o '.he gay mm'ement, et cetera. r.·".
cultures. ," A jllst constitution for Tully" then, 'N(Juld emphasize popular sovereignly by giving "H"cognition to the legitimate demamis of the members 01 diverse t1.1ltures in a manner that renders everyone their due, so that all v~'tmld freely coment to this form of conslitlltional associalion."',· This has the effect that no type of cullurJJI group has a privileged position in Tully's accoHnt; the nghts of nations, he writes, N are
Smmn;.u,.. As one of the main mnCi.~ms of [ilis book is to determine whether the cultural accommodations 01 the liberal culturalist consensus can be justified in a '\lay that does not leave them VUlnerable to charges of being unprincipled or arbitrary, it is of supreme imp'ortance that the ques.tion of the sociat units with which cultural interests are properly associated be res.olved.
Modern versus Premodern or Traditional Cultures A different set oi questions comes to the fore when ,ve consider how different aLlthors deal with tlle fad that many communities lhat demand cultural ,lccommuQations are not modern, or not liberal, or neither. [n this section [ discuss (our approilches to ,l{'COlmting for the distinction belween modem and premodern cultur,es. '""ithin broadly liberal theories of justice, noting questions sLl&.~ested by each approa<.:h as weil as impliC<11ions for hm...,. ,md ,,~'hether certain advocacy pos.itions of the liberal cultmalist consensus can be justified.
Modernity as Inescapable The lirst account treaLs the advance of a particular conception of a liberal modernity,. and thllS the dedine of traditional or prem(xlem cultures, as inevitable. Kymlicka and Taylor" both of \.,'hom work with conceptions of a liberal modernity inlluenced by the work of Ernest Gellner" exemplUy this approach. The types of comrmmities that are the primary loci of Kymlid:.a's imd TtIylor's theories relle<:t iI panicular conception of modernity: 1hey ilre committed to the liberal ideals oi equality and rights, they are diemocratic, they ,ue organized into bureaucratic welfare staH.':S, their ecol1omiesare industrial, aml they" tend to be national nlltures. "'" hHther, and signilicantly,. both characterize the progress of this modernity ami the partimlar kinds of cultural {:ommllnity it privileges as, in 'nlylor's words, IIbecomin,g nnescapable. or" This renders the status of certain indigenous and premodern <md traditional communities problematic.
One approach that has been adopted to :;;quare this ilssmnption with the libera! cliltmalisl commitment to accommmialing such communities assumes, more often ttadlly tthan expressly, that ali cultures ·will eventually modernize. Taylor is most clear in his attempl to lind space fur a defence of mlturill diversity within a framework thilt presumes the inescapahility of modernity. This is re.lk'Cted in his discussion of the '''subtraction' a<:COllnt of lhe rise of modernity," which he describes as suggesting thal, for modernity to emerge, we "fuslneeded to liberale ourselves hom the old horizuns."'" As ( understand it, the problem wHh the SLlblrllclion account i.s that it encourages the view thattbe individual,. as represented in mock~m societies, reflects what is Llniversal in humannillure
0"
Distinct i\·joral Foundations A dHferent LK{Ul1nt of the relationship between mod~rn and premO'dem cLlltures a\'oids privilegin~ mndemity by defending traditional cultures on a ~epar.ate basis from ahat which supports liberal modernity and its rights. This approadl can standi on its (}'Nn or,. as employed by Kymlid~, can act to supplement the modernily~s inescapable account The approach is impli(il in Kymlicka's discmsioll 01 how to deal with illiberal traditional groups sLlch as the Amish and HllUerites, Whil~ he believes the;.' should be tolerated, he does-n't try tu jmti~y lhis wilhin his
liberal frame,.,.ork of justiCE". Imlead, he appeals 10 principles external to his autonomy-based fr,tmework, such as honouring historic agreements, and to prilgmatic consideralions, such as the concern that "attempts to impose liberal principles by force are often perceived ... as a form of aggression or paternalistic colonialism" ,md often "lJiKkflre."o' V'I'hile this approach supplements Kymlkka's theOl)" it rests at the core of Joseph Carens'. Although Carens says that "liberal democracy is the on!y jllst political order, at least under modem political conditions,"" his general appmach is to trealliberal rights and membership in cultural communities as having distinct moral foundations. He does so by assuming that traditional ami illiberal cultures may embody genUine human gnods.'·!· Where mnflicts arise betv\'een these two distinct moral foundations, C'.arens says remnciliation requires a "{'ontextllal" approach that involves a play bad:: and forth between 11,...0 conceptions of justice: justice as neutrality, "the idea of.\ common set of liberal democratic principles" that can be used to assess "claims about the respect due cultural difference"; and justice as even-handedness, the idea that under .some conditions "'context is morally decisive . that our mora] judgements should tum on our lImlerstanding of the histmy ami wlture of a particular political community."" He says that whether a group can justify a claim for special accommodation depends on the balancing of .t variety of factor.s, including "who tmembers of the group] are imd what tbey care about", the degree of compatibility between their demands and tbe principle of equal respect, and "'political il1dgement~ difierentiaUng more fundamental interests from less fundamental ones. "" ~Vhen we ask 1,·\'bat principles are to govern the invocation and adjudication of these different sets of principles, however, the allS\',,'ers we receive are not satisfactory. For instance, it i~ not clearwbat principles govern Kymlkka"s invocation of historic agreemenls and pragmatic considerations. Similarly, C;uem is explicit about the kinds of factors tbat should be at play in a contextual analysis ailned at resolving such coni1ict, but he says little about the calculus that is to be applied to these factors to reach a resolution. In fact, he insists that "there is no master principle that enables llS to determine when V,ie should respect daims advanced in the name of culture and identity and v.'hen we should deny them."'" If we accept the general thrust nf this approach, then, we are pressedi to raise questions about the underlying moral assumptions that are to gUide evalllatiom when conclusions drawn from distinct moral foundations conllicL If concerns about moralarbilrarines5 are to be addressed, we must a~k whether it is possible to develop a principled approach to resolving conflicts between sLlch foundatiolloS . .lwd, this, it seems, reqUires us to ask qllestions about lhe nature 01' the relationsbip between lhese diHerent moral foundations. lim\' are they related? Are they commensurable? Incommensurable'? VO,rhich takes precedence under which drmmstilnces?
h{)m()genou~ nor static; they are a duster of intercultural relations negolii.1ted imd [ellegolia~ed over lime."'" !'roperly understood, he argues, V.,.'eslern civilization embodies "'tv.'o dissimilar (constitutionall languages: a dominant" 'modern' language and a subordinate., 'common-law' or simply 'common' limguage""'" The dominant modem language embodies key elements largely shared by the approaches of Ri.1\v]s and Dworkin, la)rlm and Kymlicka: "ll. mlturally homogenous and sovereign !}eople ".. ftwho e~tablish a co nstil u lion thatl founds an independent .md self-governing I!11.Uion stale with a set of uniform legal and representative polilical institutions in which all citizem are trealed equally.'·m Theori~ts in
bounJed,
llIe traditiol1~ of modem cO.mtilulionalism, he says., respond to demands for recognition on' cultural diversity either by as~imiialing th{)~e demands "to llle prevailing forms {)f recognition'" or by judgillg them ····lDllv.mranted. or,. Tlle second, or common c{)osmutionall,lOguage, reflects Ii-tilly's anti-monist account of cultur·es. W'ithill: each culture there are competin.~ vi-cws on many malt·ers, inclm.ling comtitutionalism; some overlap with perspectives fuund in other eLlllures, some do noL Tully describes the overlap as representing a "common langliage of (omtiluUonalism'" that is spoken un the "intermllmal common grounds." Tbis diovelails with his UlOL~gbts O'n freedom ;.md popul~hr sovereignty: lhe only view of consLHlItionalism to' whkh all might freely consml is Lhv one arliculatl'll on lhis ,ocommon' grollnd.'··" An implk:aUon of this idea of an inlercultural common ground is that it blurs the di!;tinction between modem ami premodem cultures. It suggests lh~ll the contempmary \·Vest nil! recognize the demands of traditional mIlures lJeGILlSe it shares many of lheir vlions. \'Vhal is the content of this common ground ",;nd how Cillll we kilO,',' we\:e discovered it:! AmI even if we can kIm\'; it., \'\'hat, besides its commonality ,md its fit wilha certain conccption of popular sovereignty, should mnvim:e liS to prefer it to other conceptions of jllstke"!
modernity should be applil'tll to all cultures and communities, or they should
not If not, then we nms.t ask how our morill universe must be constructed ir hoth modern and trJditional cultures should be respected within their m"'!1 spheres, And f1ni.11!y we mmt ask if any mom] basis can generate a principled and non-arbitrary approach to adjudicating conl1icts across these spheres. If not, then our choice may really be beh...·een liberal universalism and! moral relativism.
In situ,Uions such as Quehec in Canada" .scotland in the United Kingdom. and Catalonia in Spain, state borders and intercultllral dialoglle cannot be justHietl by appeals to the impos~ibility of secession. Instead" 1 think we must accept '''''itil -laylor lhat in slIch GJ6eS the coextstence of different peoples in the same ~tate is "'always grm,mded in some mixture of necessity ami choice."'"'' Once we accept this, different qllestionsarise. I;or example, if we accept the moral and historical arbitrariness of existing state borders and their uneven effects on the interests of cllitural communmes" are there any W}()d reasom to insist on sustaining such political <.nmmuni~ies where :secession is a vi"lllie option'l And, ;15sHming an answer can be fOLlnd to the first question, are there any means by which intercultural relations. in :;uc!1 states might be matle more jmt?
2 Meani11gful Life and the Conception of the Person
A labbk from Eastern Eumpe turned to me and told me his. story. He had lost his J1rst wile and their six cllllLlJen In the concentmtlon
camp of Auschwll:z ._. f made il 11I5t ,lttempt to help him by ~nqulrlng whether l1e did not hOlPe to see his children llgain in Heaven. However, my questlon \'i,lS follov,:ed by an olltburst of tellrs, lind now the true Jeil~On for his despllll Glme to the fore: he explllined that his children, since they dk'd as innocent maltyrs, were thus rOllnd worthy of the hIghest plllee in Hellvcn . btlt as for himself he could not expect, as an old, s~nflll mall, to be assigned to the same pI lice.
This chapter begins the process of developing a set of foundational assumptions - wha~ I call the foundations of meaningful me - that can form tile basi:; on \I,:hich the principles of it politiCS of liberal multkultllfalism can be developed. At the core 01 these asmmptiol1S is a conception of the person who has an essential interest in meitninglullife. ;\s "le shall see, this conception of the person will b~ developed in a way Ih;.tt incmpor;.des insights. (rom the approaches diS1:U5sed in Chapter L first, by iOQising on the meaningful lives of indiViduals, ia retlects Carens" and Tully's approach of associating cultural concerns .vHIl individl1als, and not groLlp5, thus avoiding the extreme of communLlarian constitutive community. Second, it reflects an account of the relationship between individuals and communities similar to the approach that \\'as d~scribL'{j as
fluid identity/constitutive commllnity. Third, personal on John ceptions
this fm..-us on meaningful life facilitates reVisiting the meaning of aLltonomy and identification with com mllnity. This relies in part Rawls" distinction between a general concept and particular conof that concept.' The arguments in ParI 2 tllrn on a distinction
One, meaning as intrinsic meaningfulness, sets as its standard conne{:tion with "objective meaning ... in iL:self, apart from any connections to anything el~e." This suggests an lImelenting, C.:artesian, approach to meaning: one must reject an}'thing that has me;ming only by reference to something else. Another type, meaning as objective meaningfulness" sets a less exacting standard. It suggests that meaning re{111ires only connection with s{)mething that is impmtant" non-trivial, or significanL There are good reasons for preferring objective to intrinsic meaningfulness. \·\,,11ile the standard of intrinsic meaningfulness is intUitively appealing" it has inherent dr;n... backs that justify setting it aside. A fundamental problem is that it requires us to accept nothing less than that ,,,,l1i(11 has intrinsic meaning. This threatens an infinite regress that would leave the question of meaning forever in dOllbt: "'However \'\'idely we connect and link" however far our v,'eb of meaningfulness extends, we can imagine dra\'\'ing a boundary around all tllat" stamUng outside looking at the totality of it, and asking 'but what is ahe mt:'aning of th
'
b stopped,"11 Objet~live meaningfulness can em.! the regress by a1.:l--epting limited tiiIl1Sn!lRlence: "'The trallscending of om limits 50 as to connl'"Cl with a wider O:.mtexl nl' value which itself is limited." '111is, l\'ozick says, "does give L1'ur lives me.aning - but a limited one."" In iecommending objective meilningilllne:5s as our stand'lrd [am not sLiggestlng that tbere is some objective standard by 'Nhich ~m imj:klltial observer could ~udge a life meaningful or meaningless hut rather tli,lt fwm the individual's own perspective the values that Sllslain me.ming in his tlf her life have 11 justification independem of his ar hel preferences. The importance of tbis approach is suggested ,vhell Jl.em;ud VVilJiams wlites that where the meaningfulness or a person's life is not seemed outskle uf herself (that is,. where it is comlillonal on her exi:'>tellce) . 511'': could havl.:! no reason for choosing ~lsaiBsl s.L1ickk.,11 NOlo\', olle may ask, how can achieving iI limited transcendence tiJycormecting ,vllll non-trivial things m valtH:'S beyond oneself inius(' one's Iiie lNith meaning:' The ::1tivdy signiftcant pmposes, tbe Significance of '""hicb is derived from and ~ecllred by connections wilh conte.xts of value locat~~d beyond the self. I now want to SUg,gi5l tbat lhe enjoyment of such a llife is intrinsically valuable. Hmv can this be"t Vlihile [ don't think [ can offer 11 lmock-out argument fOn this pwposilion, I will suggest two reasons for laking it seriously. The firsl is that] believe this c](Lim rcsonates at some deep level with our experil.:!nce as human beings. The second is found in ahe appeal of the con· ('cptiom oj' ;mtonomy and idcntification that this conception of meaningful life inspires. Ld's consider hmv this (ol1u!ption of meaningful life' resonates, with Imman experil.:!fKI.:!. think (.If the idea of value, Something that Is valuable has '·... orlh.: it is desirable. Anything that makes being alive dt"Sirable for 11 human, then . constitutes a human value, Surely thi:; b also true {or anything that by its ahsence In.. kes being ';'llive undesilable. Something Us an intrinsic human v(Lllle if its Pws('llce or ab~eIKe, in ami of itself and not jus,t the consequences of its. presence or absence, mak(!s being alive desirable or lmtlesirable. I propose tilL'lt sLlbjectively signifkant purpos(:'S are this sort of intrinsic human value, To support this. proposition 1 present an admittedly eclectic
and imprl!ssionislic colll!ction of obsl!rvalions that bear i't.'itm'5S to the nega· tiVl! proposition that a life without purpose is intrinsically worthless. I leave it to Ihe wader to judge if tbese observations make lithe most sense of human life.""· \/iklor Frankl" ;; psycholhl!rapist and concentration camp survivor, emphasizl!s the importance of purpose when he writes of those who perished in Ihe N;IZi death camps: "\>\'ne to him who saw no more sense in his life. no aim, no purpose, ,md therdore no point in carrying on."" John Stuart ]o,'lilt, in his autobiograpby. dra,.,·s a simil,lf conne<:tion bet\Neen pmpos.e and the value of a life: "All my happiness 'Nas to have bi..'en found in the continual pursuit of this end Ireforming the world according to ulilitari,m principlesl. lhe end had ceased to charm, and how could there ever again be any interest in tlll! means? I seemed to have nothing to live for."'" A similar connection is drawn by Leo 'llJlstoy in his amobiographical writings: "'r.,'ly Iiie came to a standstill. I could breathe, eat, drink, and sleep, and could not help breathing, eating, drinking, and sleeping; but there was no life. becam.e there were no desires the gratification of which I might lind reasonable."" In a less personal tone, Emile Dmkheim draws this connection in his. account of ",momic suicide": ""All man's pleasure in acting. moving, .md exerting himself implies the sense that his efforts are not in vain and! ~hat by ,,,,alking he has ;Klvanced. Howe . . . er, one does not advance when one walks tm>\'ards no goal, or - which is the same thing - 'Nhen his goal is. infinity."'" for John Hawls, this connecUon is. made in the ide,! that Self-respect includes one's "secure conviction than his. conception of his good, his plan of life is ,\lmth carrying out ... vVhen we feel that om plans are of little . . . alue ... all desire and activity ben;mes empty and vLlin, and 'Ne sink into apathy and cynici~m."l' While these observations do not amount to anargumenl,. they (iraw strength to llle extent that the)' r(''5onale with human experience. \Vllen [ speak of a meaningflll life, then, I refer to a Hie characterized by the pursuit of subjectively significant purposes, the meaning of which is drJ.'lvn [rom some context oi vallIe secured beyond the self. Conversely, a meaningless life lacks Significant purposes or is experienoL'd in a context '''''ithin which the pursllit of such purposes is impos.sible. \'Vhile this com~ep tion of a meaningful life obviously attests to the influence of Kymlicka's work, there is a key difference: ''''here Kymliclds account iLssoci,~tes meaning ''>'ith meaningful choice and contexts of chOice, this account associiLtes it with meaningful lives and! contexts of value. Another i-e,tture oi this conception of meLiningful Hie is that it is antiperfectionist,; it only descrjbe~ the general features of a life, not its particular substance. Thus, we can accept that the purposes that smtain meaning in one person's life might be experienc-ed as meaningless. in another's. This prevents lIS from illdging the meaningfulness of a person"s life by assessing its substance, but it does enable LIS to judge it by its form, facilitated by the conceptions of autonomy and identiftcation it generates.
Somcone for ,vhom heing a Catholic liberal is ,1uthorilative might rcspDnd to abortion as a Catholic, a liheral, or both. Finall}', a person could treat the same identifications as authoritative in similar situations and still come to dHierent conclusions. lhe limiting efiect of icicntiflcalions, at least over llle short term, is ilIlistrated hy the smprise \,"'C would feel if this person were to suddcnly adopt ahe purposes of a IJcJlynesian, a Huddhist, or a "'·formon . I ha\'e suggested that lives are meaningful when they are characterized by lhe pursuit of subjectively signiftcant purposes. The signifiGmce of ptnrposes, in tum, is defmed by rderence to contexts of vallie secured outside of tile self. Individuals access such contexts of value by' identifying with communitiesas-contexts-of-value thai embody purposive or moral traditions. Self-identity emerges from it person's LHKhosen situiltion when the person distinguishes the elements of her situation that define who she is from those which she merely has; those eDements that she is comlilute her self-identity. Thos.e elements 01 her self-identity that she refers to when determining her subjectively signilllCill11 ptirposc"S are her governing assumptions.
llli~aningfulnes:s or a person's life ;.md 'L:an lead, ullilTl
or
' ' as
A~
long a~ I retaltlti:dil pelsp~cthve of poiitks which WllS utKl11estionably British that ten:;.lon ne,,{'( reolly surfaced. Nothing was easier than fm me to [lve out my Welsh existence, to speak the ILlngllnge in the home, In
evelyday c(Hwersatlon in th", \'Illa,g~ ,md Ilsten to \'Velsh sermons In chapel on Sundays. Hut it stopped tnlNe. l'olltlcs, W,LS, after ;LI1,. dl~feJenL S.odallsm mntalned tlUl! transcendent qllaII ty Wllich welded the snuggle of industrial south Wales to the same strug.gle whlch WQS taking place in other pa~ts of Brltam, from London's East End,. to Tyncside and tbe west of Scotland!. Loyaltles needed to be !lung far beyond tile conflnes. of \'Vales. A sOllrce of dissonance in his life was the realization that in doing nothing to prevent the decline of the Vlj'elsh community, he was losing a part of his. seliidentity: "II hadl exp~riel1ces accumulated on retLlrning to ',Vales at periodic intervals and srL"eing a community, my own community, dying ... land] the realisation that the ·decline of this community was not something extram'{lUS to myself but was becoming incre
Situated Autonomy As has been noted, the general concept of personal autonomy as the ability to pursue one's ends free fmm coercion and m,mipulation is consistent 'Niail a \.,'ide variely of parUiclllar, and often conflicting, conceptioflS. The conception of personal autonomy sugges.ted by the conception of the person vl'ho has an essential interest in meaningfllilife I call situated autonomy. I discLiss it in terms of Ihree key aspects of agency: the pursuit of purposes, the formalion of purposes, iU1d the nature of governing assumptions. The pmsllit of pmpmes necessitates the freedom to lead our lh'es, as
Kymlicka has said, from lhc inside. This faises the matt,er of positivc and ncgative liberly. Letison could nol be self-governing ill alL This is lel1ected in om ideLl of guveming assumption:;. Those \vllo lack governing 1.1s,sllmplions are nol autonomous. lhe}1 ,are 115ually desuib""d in one 01 two ways. One typ·e of non-alltollomOllS person is like iknn"s irma-impel/cd \\'110 lacks autonomy became Ill' behaves like an automalon, r;2spomling "uncomprehendingly to[) drives or attrLlclions" lbat he cannol control. lilts pelS-Df] suffers from "natural" d.eficiencies in lhe skills reql1ired to self-govern (ior example" neurosis or psychosis)." A second type is Jik'~ Harry l'r;:lI1kfurt'5 11'(/1110/1$ and Berm's l1Iwmic choosers who pursue whicbever CO'l.lfSe o( ;:[(lion they ,are 1110S,t strongly inclined to follow at the time. SlKh a person "does not care \'\'hich or his inciinatiollS is the strongesl;"" he l11;lkes rw aLtempt to live consistently and acts on "impulse nul beGlUSe he is impelled! but because he acknowledges nothing as a reason rOli doing otherwise."·' .. , \·Vantc.ms simply do nol govern themselves. Su('h people are im:apillble of determining and pursuing signiflranl pLJrpDSeS, am! lhus canllol !cLld meLlningful lives.
All hough people mu~t be able to form second-·order preferences to exerci~e situatecl autonomy, there is no presumption that these governing assumptions must be so clear and consistent that their self-idlentities become '\mined., free" and self-made," as Iris ~'larion Young suggests,. or than their lives are "ordered according to a pl,m or conception which iully expresses one's will," as Robert Young prop·mes.;' In fael, situated autonomy can provide a jllstification for sdf-governance where pe{)pie's governing assumptions are not unmeet and even where they conflict. The reason: only the person himor hersell is likely to have the self-knm''!ledge necessarY' to Slnstain meaning while managing multiple and conllicUng identifications . '" The semnd issue ',\lith the formation 01 purposes through the exercise of normal agency concerns the coml.itiom under which this occurs . Situated ilutonomy reqUires the processes by ",'hich people form their purposes to he free of lIndue external int1uences_ This condition is not respected where, as GerLild Dworkin has sllggested, people are influenced by hypnotic sLlgges,· lion, manipulation, coercive persuasion, or subliminal influence:" This is ais.n tme 01 anyinlluences that, a~ Christman ~tlggests, "'i'olere the agent to be made aware of their presence and inf1uence, she would be moved to revise Iler desir~ set'"'' This condition rdlects concern for meaningllli lives in two ",Iays, First, purposes based 011 false, incomplete, or misleading information, or that do not reflect a person's own governing assumptions, are more likely to fail or prove meJ:ningiess because of these inf111ences, Second, those who exert such inl1uences f3BI to s11m...' respect for meaning in the lives of tbose they manipulate. The third key a~pl'Ct of agency concerns the nature of governing assumptions. This raises the issue of the impact of socialization identitied in Chapter I: Are the governing assumptions from which purposes are formed the person's own'? \Ve can di~tinguish two cases in which people develop governing 3ssumptions: When adults exercise meta-agency, ilnd when children are s,ociLilized to form moml s,t,lrting pOints. The first {:ase is fairly straighlforward; respect for meLiningful life requires thilt people not be subjected to the kinds of illegitimate inHlIences noted above. In the case of children, two matters mllst be address.ed: the nj]ture of the processes by which socialiZLItion OCC1IfS and how the chileJren should respond to their socialization as they mature. Om model of agency suggests that the socialil'..Lltion of children must be treated differently from meta-agency in adults. \Vhile, as a general mle, coercion and m,mipulalion (Ire illconsi~tent with personal autonomy, the formation of the secme i(jenlilications on which situated autonomy depends may be consistent with some coercion and manipulation to steer children away from certain inl1l1enccs and towards others. Nevertheless, distinclions must be made between iegitimate socialization that respects meaningful lives and iUegitimLite socialization that does not.. This ,viII be taken IIp more fully in Chapter 7 b~.· developing a principled alternative to the dkhotomy
110 signHicimt ~)L1rpose.s. l'urUlef" since no self-identity,set of governing J:sslimptiom, or contexl of value is likely lo be Sl"'cme from dissunance. situated aUlonomy actually supporls identifications became it is through exercnsing meLa-ilgcncy thal people shape and reshape their identiflCaliom and prevent their self-identities irom losing meaning. Thus, when conceived 0/1 tlle basis a conception oflhe person who has all essential interest in meaningfL1J me, ;mtonomy amll idenliflGllion work togelher to enable people to form amI pursm signiftcant pmpos,es, Neither Gem do lilis on its own. Chapters :1 ami 4 pill/sue in further tletail issues raised in tilts chapter. Chapter 3 demomlr.jjJte.s hm\' the foundations of meaningful life can be U5-'Cd to justify sp~'Ciall accommodations for communi Lies, even ,,',here this requires imposing bLmlem 011 non-membeRS, Unlike other approaches lhilL jllStHy slich protection on the spedal nature of culLural communities, lluweyer, ours is based on i1 characteristic LhaL culLuml and other types of mmmlmilic:s share - their status as communities that embody contexts of VtLllle Lh.~t mpport meaning in their members' Jives. Chapter 4 completes Lhe ('Omiden~Linn of iotlndationaJi.l.smmpLiom by disl1.lssing the relationship ()eLi·,>,een situaled autonomy .md socialization and dd-ending the' association of situated ilutonomy with the life of open-minded conviction.
Justifying Cultural Accolllnl0dation: Identification, Co llllllunities, a11d Contexts of Value
Here! :'>tand, I cannelt do ?vlartJn Luther, Diet
otherwise,
or 1,'...'orm:5,
1521 lattrihuted}
In mnsidering 11m.... the extension of cultural accommodations to sub-state mmmunities migbt be justifled, we mmt distingllisb between acmmmodalions that impose burdens on other members of the wider polmcaJ community and accommodations that either do not impose burdens. or that impos.e negligible burdeIlS. The chapter begins by brielly discussing cultural accommodations that do not require imposing burdens on citiLens who do not belong to the community in question (non-memhers:l. It then turns lG Lhe more complex wpk elf accommodations lbat reqUire appreciable burdens, Any justification of this type of accommodation mllst address two qllestions: em the extension of special treatment to particular COmlnL1l1ities be jl1stified" and ,.,.Ily should non-members ,Kcept the burdens tbis may require'? [ attempt to answer these questions by applying the conception 01 Lhe person developed in C:hapter 2, of partiwiar relev;mce is the description of self-identity as capable of being bolh lluid and fragile. The argument bEgins by explaining how the conu~ption of the person can explain continuity in individual identity. The resulting "'narrative account of selfhood" is used to explain why it may be unreasonable, in certain circumstances, Lo expect individuals to give up their idenliticalions with particular communities. Hnally" the burdens that may be imposed on non-members to help sllstain valmble communities for others are instilled by suggesting that the wider community should be understood as embodying a moral lradUion that SU5tains the many purposive traditions on which all citizens rely, The chapter concludes by discus-sing tum: Lhis compares with other approaches.
Accommodations That Impose Negligible Burdens [ do not have a Bol Lo ~ay about the f'llslification of communal ao::mnmo<..lations Hlat impose ne-gligibBe burdem. Only the imposilion oU appreciaLJlf2 l)llcdem gives fl(J
n
or
Continuity and Change' in
Self~ldentity
Things are mLllh more complicated, hO\'1'e\"er, where -i.Kcommodalious require imposing appreciable burdens. The burden in itseif gh.'es non-members an intereslln lhe outcome, ilS it will impacl their ability to pursue their mvn significant purposes. \,\rhy and when may such accommodations be justified? !'irsl,. wmider the impHGltions of the foundations of meaningfUl life lor lh'e processes by which tralliliul15 and indiVidual self-identities change over time. H is cummon to speak of traLiiliom and c0l11lmmilies as having members. I wish lo reverse this perspective and consider individuals as having comm'lmities amltraditiom.lhe exact way this is omcepluaiized is not important. V\<'c can imagine the imlividLlal lo be iike a crossroads at which ll.adilioIl5 ;.md communities in~ersecl m a nodal poinl in a ,,-~ornplex web of criss-crossing traditions and communities. The key IHJina is tl1.11 we reject the
image suggested by culturdl monism of eacb indiviclll3d belonging to only ol1e t:ultmal community. As noted in Chapler 2, in such cases the exercis.e 01 situated autonomy resemhles a struggle to maintain a me;mingful eqlliIibrimn hetween one's. various identll1cations, not an attempt to transcend one's situation or to create a coherent and unitied self.identity. Tile iOlmdalions of meaningful life can facilitate all exploratiol1 of the relationship between continuity and change in traditions ami sell-identity. This suggests. that the vitality of traditions depends upon a reciprocal relationship between individllals and the traditions with \.,.hich they identify: the individual is shaped in part by the dktates of his or her ~radition~s)., and tr'iditions are shaped in part by tbe interpretations they are given by each of tbeir members. Traditions evolve through their members' personal struggles to sustain meaning by trying to reconcile their various traditions with ead. other and with changing cir'rllmstances. Thus, each exerdse of meta-agency by an individual has. the potential to transform a tradition for present and future members . 1>.·lartin Luther and Albert [in.stein, for example, changed the meaning of Christian and scientific traditions for the generatiOns that folimved ltH~m. Silll'lted autonomy, as expressed in meta-agency, then, should not bl! St't'l1 as a lhrl!at to traditions but as essential to their vitality. Transformations in the French-Canadian identity proVide a good example 01' this. Allholigh many individuals. who constituted the community defined by this identity continue to pursue the hench-speaking Jives that originally united them, changes in the Canadian political context have k>d them to express this underlying identil1calion in new ways. As the strug,gle for the survival of their community has shifted from the federal to the provincial sphere, the r;rel1ch Canadian expression of this identity that had united those who resist,ed English Canadians, the Hritisli colonial 'ldministralion, and the Durham Report, has transformed into Quebecois, Franco}"[anilobal1, Franco-Ontilri.m, and Acadian idenlilies. Despite these changes, the continuity belwe-en the French Canadian and the newer identities can be traced through the variotn5 transitions. '111is allows llS to suggest" contrary 10 Kukati1as (Chapter 1/ p. lO), that changes in the expression of an identity do not necessarily relled a change in the underlying nature of lh,lt identity. What is rel1ect,ed are changes in the salience of identities, rather than in the identities themselves. 1n this regard,. I like Iris Marion Young's suggestion thai "a person's grmlp identities may be for the most part only a background or horizon to his or her life, becoming salient only in specifiC intera<:tive contexts."" Similar processes explain the continuity of personal self.identity. Much as the continuity of a tradition persists, though some of its char'lCleristics change, a person with self-idenlity,~ (containing idenliliGitions Of values 3, h. and c) at time t, is the same person ilS a person with self-identityJ ", at time t, j( self-identities at times t, and t, can be linked by a narrative that explains
how sel!-idcntiLr persists. through these changes.. SlKi1 explanation wuuld present a series of lr.;ans(ormations in which at least OIle idenlilicatioIl \. .·as taken as "given" and therefore retained from one time point to the next. 1 This [ call . borrowing from 11aclnlyre, a mmalive aCcoLlnt of seifBwo<.li:' I am the same persoll [ w·as len ~'eufrer a loss of itllenlity, from, lor example, bfi.'lin dam;age. More important, the reverse is alsu true: the content of r.me'·s present idenlifit'aliom may reslrict the idenWications that one can meaningrully make at any point in time. This imight forms tbe basis for the justifIcation lor communal accommodations.
rights, and to recognize that P;UtiCU!;li communities may have spedal significance for some individuals, without reqL1iring us to accept the mitmal monist as~;umption that people citn rarely or never reject inherited id{'l1tifications. In place of these Llssumptions, il allows us to claim that cuitmalaccommodation may be w,m,mted hecause, in the partinllaf circumstances,. certain identity transformations are contingently impossible. The starting point ot ahis argument is the claim that meaningfUl lives always depend on having ,iccess to some community and its context of value. There are at least two reasons for this. First, while a pemm may be aware that he treats an identLficalion with a particular community as authoritative for making certain kinds of decisions, he may have incomplete knowledge of its context of vallie and so be L1nLlhle to determine its implications by himself. [n exercising normal agency, for instance, he may ask himself, "Iiow should [, as a W'ebhman, act in this situation'?" Having never considered the situation before, he rna}' lind! he lacks the cullmal resouwes to respond ao it and must COI1SLllt other community memhers, Deprived of this resource, he may fed, he nr she
Robinson, Andrew M .. Multiculturalism and the Foundationsof Meaningful Life Autonomy. Identity, and Community Vancouver, BC, CAN: UBC Press, 2007. p 68. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/bilgilDoc?id=10214451&ppg=68
from identifying wit II ~my of the alternative communities available to them. W'here the Joss of identiflCations. i.s significant enough, people may be unable to reconstruct self-identities lint can smtain meaning irom what remains, Unable to cope" they may lose their {:apaclty for situated autonomy and thLls lead anomie or other similarly meaningless lives. An example of hm." this might play out at the communal level is found in Halph Linton"s discussion of directed culture {:hange. \Vhere members 01 a community change their ways .tS a result of the persuasion or prestige 01 another commL1nity, "no element of mltme 'Nill be eiiminated lIntii a satisfactory 5Llbslilute ha.s been found, In other words, there will be no point in the pwcess of culture lramfer v.'IJere techniques for satisfying .lll the group's needs are not present." \Vhere changes are im'oluntary (Linton considers only coerced dlanges., bm 11is p{)ints apply Lllso to chLinges that OCC1ir as unintended cons~qlleneesl. "the results for the subjects are often catastrophic": "Under o::1ultme change which is both directed and enforced, tile normal process of retention of old! elements until satisfactory subsHtlltes ha\'e iJeen fount! is inhibiled. The result is a series ot losses without adequate replacements. This leaves certain of the group's needs unsatisfleti, produces derangements in illl som oi social and economic relationships and results in profound discomfort for the indi .... idtlills involved."" The point which is as tme Df individual self-identities as it is of whole cultmes, is that involuntary changes can result in the lms of valuLible identifications without securing ildequate replacements. Tllis suggests two case.s in which the extension of accommociations to mmmunities-as-contexts-of-value can be jllStililed. The remedial case occurs ''1'here there is an obvious connection between the 1055 ur deterioration of speciflc communities, tile inability of lTlembers to make the transition to other commtmilies,. and a l{)Ss of me;millg in their lives. A literary example is that of the savage in Huxley's BnH't' Nt'1v a'(J'rld who" removed from his community, eventuall~t' kilis himself rather than continue to live in a utilitarian dystopia that makes no sense to him. A contemporary example is that 01 many Native people in North America who, being involuntarily dleprived of access to their communities, are unable to make the transition to the ">'ider SOCiety, Lind whose lives ,lfe characterized by high rLites of poverty, alcoholism, and suicide,'" \o\'here this point is reacht>d, tile ease for special accommodation is dear. The se·cond,. preventative, Glse is more controversial. It concerns situations v.'here accommodations are requested to sustain a valuable community. It is controversial because it involves two collnterfactllal claims: that ahe commllnity reqUires the requested a(TOmmooation to survive, and t11,lt many community members ,,,'mIld be unable to remnstmcl meaningfllllives \vere they to lose access to the community. Respect for meaningful life requires such claims to be taken seriotlSly for two reasons. The first is prt>dictive
capacity to generate principles to guide the extension of cL1ltmal accommodation. In this case we hLive identifwd lhH.""e: the comnnmit}' mllst conned its members with ,\ context of value that supports their ci.1pacity for situated autonomy Lind thus meaningful liie; members mmt be threatened with the involuntary loss or access to the community; and members \.,.ould be unable to make aitemaaive identiiications with the comlmmHies presently available to them. Justifying Burdens on Non-Members Thi.s brings us to the chapter's second question: VI"hy should non-members accept the burdens cultural ,lCCOnU110uation may require? This question is raist!d in the knowledge that the kind of iKcommotiatiom being advocated will likely result in a society chara{:terized hy 'Jaylor's "'dc't'p" diversity', as describoL"d in aile epigraph to Chaplt!r ], in which some citizens connect with tile state directly i.1S individuals while others connect through their membership in minority national communities. Such differentiated citizenship fan~s many criticisms,. including that it will undermine the shared identity that hinds the society together, that it will reduce citizens' willingness to make "mutual sanitlces Lind accommodations.""' and that it \·,.ill undermine a country's sense oS unity lhat can be achieved only with uniform dtizen· ship.'" These are important clli.1l1enges; Wt! mllst be able to provide ,mSlvers. Let us consider argumenls found in David !\·:Iiller's 011 Nalirmalily and W'ill Kymlicka's A1JIilhu!tllfa{ CiUzcmlIip. 1\.·ly response to lhe challenges posed above does not disfJUlt! Miller's and Kymlicka's arguments so much as i[ut!mpt to expand and build on them. Both theorists believe that the level of commitmt!nt and s.acrifice modern states rc{~lIjre cannot be inspired by appeals to jmtke alone; instead, the stability and unity of liberal democracies dt!pend on citizens sharing an identity. For Kymlicl.:<\, "'n is not enough ... to show that minoriLy rights are consistenL in prindple with fret!dom and justice" because Riberal democracies rely on a "sense of shared civic purpose and solidarity."!.! For MilIer, "Schemes of social i:mtice, particularly schemes involving redistriht:Jtion to thme not able to provide for their needs through market tri.1ns'lctions," " .'ill be supportt'tl only where members trllst one another. Thus, be says. it is "virtually sell-eVident that ties of community land shared identityl are an im!}ort,mt sOllrce of such tl1lst bt!hwen individu· als.";; [ share this belief thLiI Ihe ability to appeal to such shared idenmy is essential to legitimizing the kinds of C1ccommodations advocated here. "Vhen comidering unity anti special rights, bolh Kymlicka and Miller drav,' a distinction betwet!11 national minorities, and multicultural or polyetlmic groups. Both argue thaL, contrary to popular Wisdom,. special rights for such minorities bolster national unity. Multicultural rights, stich as the gener,tl right to working and shopping hours l1exible enol1gh to accommodate competing Sahbaths and fe~tivals, or the particular right oB Sikhs in the
Royal C:.a.I1<1dian i\.'[ounl·ed Polke to wear turbans, enable nu~mbers of ethnic minorities to integrate into tbe wider community. "lh1l5, buth call for the reform of the wider national identity and its institutions to accommodate slicil differences." 1J1is .is certainly consistent with the requirements of Inl!aningful nre. l'vty concern lies elsewhere. [I.·laUers are more complicated with ,groups thilt refuse to acknowledge membersbip in. or the hill autbority of, the political cormmmity ((or exam· pJe, someindigenom groups and seclusionist religious groups). These groups differ lrom multicLlltural minorities. be·came they do no~ wanU to int'~grate into the wider cmmlH.mily; rather. they often challenge the authority lhat tile 5t;.~h.' preSLmws t.o exerche over lheir commullities and reie'Ll the wider (ivit: id'..:'n1ily that ,wLl1{l provide a bond to jusLtfy mlllu~ll sacrifices across culwral communities.!O hlrthel, as ~v1ilJer notes, when malking claims for accommodations, tbese groups often forget that "much more rests on the majority's sense of fairne~s than Itlley/ appreciate, and that sense of fairness is liable to be contracted if groups issuillg demands reject the idenUly by virt ue of which tlley be)ung in the same com munll y ilS the majorH y."" Miller believes t11ese problems ,Ire so seriolls thal, lNhere possible, secession is the best solution.'!" Further, where sl"Lessiol1 is not practical and [v,'o naHonal comrmmities must share one state, he s,ays that systems of rJis~fiblltnve )usLice lannol be legitimated "in the eyes of the populace." This leav~" the state only nl.V{) opliom: . . Either [tlle stilte] restricts the s,[ope of its operaHons, providing only bilSic gc}{)ds 5lIch ,IS the protection of rights and lllltinl1al defence; or it embraces a form of federalism, making each consli.tuent nlltionality responsible for promoting social justice within its own area. "!' Neither oU' tllese altematnves can SLlpport the kind of accommodations for which I have been .,uguing. If there are no others, then the present argument must fail,. lor it requires all citizens to be willing to participate in the very kinds of redistributions bet'Neen cormmmmes that "mler thinks cannot be legitimized. Fmt'llnatdr, piadkal experience pHwides evidence that the trust and solidarity reqUired to support cros~commtll1al redistributions v"'ili1in wider polilical com[mmilies can he generated. Consider rvllller"s examples of situaliollS where he suggests that the best outcome is I'partial self.-determination"; thal is, a "constitutional semement which creates a representillive instill!· lion for the people in question and assigns to illegislative and policy-making ]Jo'Ners over matters that Jire essential to their identity and material welfare." One of his examples is groups "where the naUol1alUy in question and/or the territory it (Lspires to control is verF sm'll!. 'Imlso could no~ realistkally (unction as an independent state." He refers, tor instance, to the success of Native gmups in North America that have negotiated '"forms of seUgovernment that give ~hem control over land use, health and social services, dc." Although he not·cs that many of these groups "'fall short of (!(,(JJ1omic
dialogue from an 'iHlli-monist perspective in his discussion of mil Reid's scul pftUire 'J 'Ill' Spirit ulliniefa ,0:; wail. The scul pture depicts tlli rteen :;piri t creat mes representing diiferent cultmes and icientities engaged in dialogue while ]JLH.ldJing a boat. Tully, too, describes their relationship as a "'co nve rsil lion,'" which, like om "wider society as mOfill tra<.llition," is partly constitutive oj their identities: "They exist as th'~)' are, in all their distinctiveness, not in spite 01, but in virtue of, their interdependency over time and history. These as,peets are embodied in the endless '',o'a),s in which the~1 overlap .md crisscross without losing their identities."'- [ suspect Tully likes this image precisely LJe-cause it cballenges the cultural monist's mneeplioll of the problem oi s{Jciallinity as lhat of justifying ttl(! coex.lstt'll!ce of separilte and distim.:a cultmes. Viewed irom Tully's Haida (iwaii perspecUve, the basis for unity exists not in the COlwersation bet''rl!en cultures but in the relationsbips beh'>'c'C'n the individual members of the various groups within aile poliUcal (lllllmunit y~ I '2XPl!Ct that in leillily, the alternatives arc not nearly so stark; some individuals conncct with the state·level mor.it tradition directly lhrough complex relationships with other groups and their members, while o~hers cmmecl as passive observers oi these conversations, In either GlSe, lhe mOlal t['HUtion forms.in pre-existing and I..:Omtilulive basis of socialllnU)'~ Thisj,lpproach i1LLS many promising featulCs, First. by associ' ' .... ilh an existing moral tradition, it presents the bases of shared political idemily as independenl of any auempts to ioster it. Second, it sll,g.~ests ,il reas.on for maintaining the borders of existing states, even , ... heEe secession is '11 identities, they may "'lind the prospl!ct of stopping the conversation unacceptable:"" That said, we n1L1st consider the nature of the moral tradition that supports lbis. ShLli\:d identity, Here OllT intuitions are Hkl!ly to' pull .in opposite direcLioll5, On the one hand, reillizing that national majorities have as,l1IllKh light ilS an)' minority no expect the state to sustain their \'ililled communities and traditiom, 'Ne accept that stille-level moral traditions will likely reflect their hiswry il[1'd vallEE'S. On the otht;!r hand., we realize that tbe existing mor.,l tradition is the result of a historical conversation between majority and minorities. "\s wiall any relation where power is shared unevenly, we recognize that these mural Haditiol1s may embody what Carens call1!d, in discussing the situilt.ion o~ Afric;m-Americam, "relations of domination and subordination,r,'" '1IlesE' concerns are bl!stilddressed by following tbe earlier reo;:ommendo!ttion: tleat the political community as a social union of individuals united lo facilil~lte tbe pursuit oJ meallingful lives., equal r{'spt'[~ nor the interests of all individuil!s in pursuing meaningfLll lives will
require the reform of moral lraditions lhal renect relations of domination and subordination. (As I sllggesl in Chapter 7., pp. 141-44/ the lISI.! of intl.!rnational adjudication may also encourage this pmcess.) The remit will be lbat Iimi~attons are pliKed on the majority's ability to usc the wider political community to promote its purposes.. " [n practice it will likely mean, as others have suggested, that the account of this moral tradition will be fairly thin. For I.!xample, as values Canadians share at the nalional level, Taylor suggests: "law imd or,der, collective provision, regional ~quality, and mutual self-help."11 As for more substantive gnDtls Ihat m~mbers of the marority may wish to sustain, these would have to be pursued as members of particular communities-a5·conlexls·of-value within lhe wider pnlilical community.
Conclusion Sp".?cial accommodations for particular communities, as well as any burdel15 this may pliKe on non-members" can be jlistilied. [ wil! conclude by emphasizing the important roles the com:epts that constitute the fotlndatiom of meaningful life play in this argument. The COl1cl.!ption of a Ill1id.yet.fragile self-identity is important because it helps-explain why th-ere may be circumstances in which the threatefwd loss of a particular comrmmity may jmtify cultural accommmiatioll5, even though it is tme in gen~rallhal individuals can reject and replace identifications with communities . ThisiilJlmlis lIS to rejecl the cultural communitllrnan"s claim tlut p'eople should be treated as if they ,'!.'ere permanently constituted by communities of birth, without accepting, Kukathas' condmion that identity is 50 fiuid that cultural rip:hts afe never jllStified. roCUS on communities as embodying traditions allows. us to diisag,gregate sllch entities as Kymlicka's societal cultures and Hals encompaSSing groups into the communities-as-contexts-{)f-value that exist within and acrm.s tbem. This has two effl.!cts. First. it aJllwl/s liS, to focus 011 lhe actual communities that Slipport meaning in people's lives - those that connen them with contexts of value - whether ther constitute national communities or not. Another effeel of disa&t:regating such communities is that it enables liS to recognize that m,l11Y people sustain valllable identifications with several communities at the same time. In particular" it allows liS to recognize that p~ople can simultaneously identify with mora) traditions embodied in national communiiie5 and the wider political community" as well as 'Nith purposive traditions embodied in communities existing within .me! ,[cross such communDlies. Illis compares well with (:l.Iltural monist approaches tha1 have difficulty identilying a basis for a shared state-level identity became tbey associate cultural inlerest5 with parlimlar types of groups or communities, Tbl.! present appruLich does not face tl1is problem becausl.! it associates cultural interests wilh indIviduals amI so can suggest that social unity may lind a basis in people's idenHlic;}tions with the \.\fider political community
".... ilhoul having to tlEny that they may also identif}' with other communities. Finally, when the wider political community is recogniv..'d as embodying il moral ti"adilion requiring a commitment to eqLlilJ re:spect for all individuals' inter'l'sts in pursuing meaningful lives, accommodaUon for particular communities no longer appears anomalo'll5 or unprincipled.
'10 'H..Idress the probJem of the autonomy of second-order preferences and avoid inIinite regre~s, we musl explain how ~ecoml-OJder preferences mar become one's m',ln "in some way oilJt'1' than that of critical assessment in accord with a higher principle."'· lIe1me developing m)' ovm re5pome, [ mLlst consider and relect two possible solutions: the existentialist life and the examined Jill'. W'hile the existentialist claim that the autonomous agent mmt "invent the law for hims,eJr"" would certainly establish the autonomy of second-order prderences , it is inconsislent with the value of meaningful life as expre~sl'd in the narrative aCC(JlIn~ of se1fllood. As Henn notes, priKtiGd rationality requires "uileria., rules of inference, and a conceptual scheme Hor grasping options" lhal are deVeloped, in the Jirst instam:e., through socialization. To deny lhi~ \.... ould result in sHcl1 a "desocializing independellOl' of mind that the autonomOllS person IW(Jukl be] endowed with a capiKity to live acnmling to il law he prescribes to himself but bereft of any resources with ,o\'hieh to fa'bricale sticha la\,,',"'" The existentialist position i:> unan:eptatJle precisely because situated autonomy reqUires the p~rson to- have reasons for
Autonomy itS the Idealization of a Conception of Agency Unlike the radically free choice of the existentialist., proponents nf autonomy as the examined sllggesl that people make their second·order preferences their own by considering ami nitically rdlecting on alternative preferences.
me
Agency as Choice .mel Critical Reflection The first of t.wo versions of this !)()sitiol1 treah personal autonomy as the ideal realization oj a conception of agency as choice and critical rellection. Here the person is conceived as /I,m illitialor 01 events which will go differently, somelimes at leas1, if [he decides I to do this rather than that."'" Such autonomy, Thomas Hurka s.llggest~, is an ideal of agency as Mcallsal efl'icaqr, oi making a causal impact on the \'I.'orld and determining facts about it."" Ivl}' concern with this conception is not that it emphasizes the person as an initiator of events. [t is that choice ami critical reHecliollJ, which certainly can playa role in the aulonomolls life, are misreproC~nted as DIs essence. This can be demonstrated by comparing situated autonomy with the approaches of Hmka, who emphasizes choice" and Benn, who emphasizes. Hitieal reflection. CJw/c{' On I-lurka's act:oul1l. autDnomy is intrinsically linked to choice: '''[I.,fany of liS. think that autonmnr is intrinsically g(}od. VI/hen we imagine an ideal human life we thinlk th,L~ its leadin,g features mmt he chosen by the agent
chooser is not enough for autonomy"; the autonomous chooser must atso chome his standardis of cboice. lie appraises "not only his periormance, but als{J the very standardi5 he lI~es tor the appraisal." His. standards tx'Come his own through "a still-continuin,g process of criticis.m and re-evaluation." He "emerges ,IS the author of his own persClnality, ... his ovm calise, his own handiwork."'" Ilenn's suggestion that government policy require the development of cilizens' Gipacity for such autonomy faces two major problems." Tbe fIrst b that, where comp·elled. criHcal relll'<.-tiol1 can undermine otherwise meanin,gful lives. The second is thallreating critical reflection as a necessary component of ;lutonomous lives takes. a valuable insight too lar. Tb see this second point, consider how Ilenn conceives people making their standards their own. He reiects existential cboice, but he says the autonomous agent, while socialized into traditions like other people, searches for coherence and! "dlcJ<E's not res.t on the unexamined jf fashionable conventions of his sub-culture wben they lead to palpable inconsistencies.. " I. It is in working through such inconsistencies, he suggests, that the agent makes his standards his 0'.'1'11. This is troubling because it sugges.ts that people can become autonomous oniy by choosing their own standards, \,,.hich, it seems, retJIuires. that they experience the kind of "palpable jm:ollSislencies" we have i:alled dis5{)I1'il1ce.'" It is LIlKlear why anyone \<\'ould ,...'ant to become autonomous if il ft'ill1jrf:'.~ them to experience diss.onance. This might seem a tragic but unavoidable aspect of the human ftH1clitioli, were alternativ{' nmceptiom of amonomy not availilble. As it is, hm\lever, situated autonomy, by relying on the liie of open-minded! conViction, sug.gests that people can make their standards their own \·\,ithou1Ieading Jives of critical reflection. Il}' focusing on meaningful lives, situated autonomy recognizes the pain and angst thai often accompany "palpable inconsistencies" as an unqualified tragedy that amonGlny shOUld redress., not H.'quire. As wiah choice, then, critical rel1ection is best treated as. an important component of autonommlS and mealliin,gflillives, but no1 as its essence.
The Examined Ufe as the Best Possible Ufe An alternative way of defining autonomy in terms of tile eXi:1min{'d life links tile examined life to the best possible life. This is rel1ected in John Stuart !o.Hll"'s iamolls claim that "it is better to be a human being liissa1isfleli limn a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool salislut'd."JI This approach differs frmn that advocated by situated autonomy in tv>'O key
ways. rirsa, although situated autonomy treah choice (lnd nitical rdleclion as only contingently and lmtmmentally valuable, this approach treats them as a necessary condition of the good life. '1l1is takes t\'\'o forms. For ~·till, the exercise of critical reileclion to- evaluate one's mnception of the good life is an element of the good lile itself Choice ill1d critical rel1ection enter his accOlmt through
amI Shapiro, ,.,.110 trei.1t the following descriptions of lives as synonymous, I believe they repr~s~nl two distincl alternatives: the life Lhal places "a positive yalue on ~ngagem!2nt in crDUcal thinking about one's fundamental values'" and lh!2 life in . . vhich 011(; is ',villing "'to step back from those of our current beliefs that 1r1f'.'c bCfIl ri.'ndered p,[oblemali[ ilr I"omc WI/} , and to lhink critically about them. "n \Vhile tbe lir~t alternative is consislent with defining and promoting autonomy in terms of the examined life, the latter 5tlIpports 0111y tbe Inore mut:.1est claim that people should nol be prevented hom engaging in critical re[]ecUon if they 5(} dmose. If my defence of this second alternaliv!2 LlS rdlecled in the life of open-minded conviction sLKceeds, then the move from nol prohibiting re-examination of one's values to enhancing the capacity to do so requires justiftcation, and, I will suggest below, there are good reasons to resist this, As lor the Sf2coml cJLlim" lhat most people are "likel)' to benefit lrom su-ch ('xen:ise of criticill reasoning skills," I believe it Ls wrong, Hy fo[(ing ali people - nol just those experiendn,g dissonancl' - to develop the capacity to critiGllIy rdlect on Iheir way of life" the promotion of autonomy as the examine<.llife may
' ' 'ill
Another danger with the coerced development of a capacity for critical rellectlr.:m through liberal edllc,ition is that it may actuall}' prevent children from developing seoue idenlit1calions that can inform autonomous choice. [t is diflimlt 10 develop such identifications where the values, beliefs, and conceptions of the good life of one's community are pres.ented in a neutral fashion along with the contradictory beliefs of others.'" for people so educated . the identifications that situated autonomy presupposes may be undermined or may n(Ner develop in the first place.···· For example, in the lVf.\·(ml.~11I \, H.lder decision, ChierJustice Burger wrote: "Compulsory school attendance to the age of sixteen for Amish children carries with it a very real threat of Ulldermining Amish community and religious practices as the}.' exislloday."" For some, especially those who begin with no clear givens, the strain of sllch comp,L[ison, rdlectioll, and choice may prove overwhelming: "Preferring even a negatively vailled identity to a bundle or contmdictinns, they become delinquents and dropouts ,.. [or they may] prefer to mbmerge tbemselve5 totally in a single role commitment '" For these people, the alternative to heteronomy that they fear is not alltonomy, which they lack tbe strength and confidence to aspire to,. but an intolerable anomie .~ a mora) I.a\vlessness, in which there is no freedom, but ollly a total lack of orientation."" This appears likely to have been the case with the residential schools to which many Native children v,lere removed in Canada during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Hoyal Commission on Aboriginal P.eoples rq}Dfled: "At almost every hearing intervenors raised the issue of residential schools and spoke of their impact on AbtJriginal language and culture, and of the chain of abme, violence, suicide and problems with the lilW that the experience of these srho·ols had generated in Aboriginal communities."J" Thus, there are good reasons to believe that using the state to reqUire pe\'e let people decide for themselves if the~' 1/,'ant to risk undermining othen\'ise meaningful lives on
tile dt~rtce thilt the)' mighU develop better ones. TiD suffer ~nomie is terrible wIlen unavoidable. [t is much more so where it could have been avoided but for the actions of the state. [f proponenb or tile examined life could guarantee its success, this argument would lose mllch of its force. As it stands, those \".-]10 defim~ tile autonomous life as the examined life should! refrain hom imposing their vie,.,'s on others and restrict themselves to proselytizing on tbe basis of their iirgmnents abmlt its desirability.~1 ScientifiC Prindples and '!rue Selves "J Ilis last uiliLism - tha.l defining the good or alltonomous life as Lhe examined life is dangerous becallse its proponenls cannot gUiJlrantore that people v.'ilI he ablor to rorplace any SOlJ[ces or givem Lhey might lose in the pro,cess - ,'.'c,uld lose mm:11 its strength if it could be demonstraaed that people will always be able replace secure identifications. Some who defll1e autonomy LIS tbe e,,"amined life appear to attempt this by a5suming that people will always have sourccs of givens _. sucll as scientilic principles and lhe person's "true self" - availaclle to them. neliance on such givens, I argue, isllawed ami only reinforces the criticism that critical reflection in and of its.elf is iUGlp~lble of generalirtg 111;2 secure identiflcatiom on which autonomy depends.
tbe mother '",ho i'is a fundamentalist prea<:her's poorly educated daughter who has never been exposed to jess benighted theologkal doctrines. and who has never questioned her faith" ~lcts heteronomouslr (that is, not autonomously) when she protests a teacher's dismiss.al of creaUonism." As Katberine Addds.on notes, l\·1eyers does not apply the term '·'heteronomollS." consistently: "The Illndamentalist mother is faulted for ac<:epting creationism uncritically, but we do not ask itbout the schoolteacher's acceptance of Darwin - evolutionary theory is true" is. it not?"'" Similarly, Henley says. of religioLls teaching in private education: "Surely nO' school could be licemed which refuscs. to teOlcll s.o:."ienlilic theories on the grounds that they contradict religious revelation. It is a cliflicLlla question 'Nhether religious objections to scientitlc theories should be dis.cms.ed in schools; sLlch diStrussiom w(}uld tend to be partisan and would encourage 11 view that science and religion are competitors,""" Hut Vl'll}' this inconsistency? "Vhy are proponents of the examinL!d life so shy about examining scientific beliefs'~ A possible reason is that" consciously or not. they realize Lhat without some ground on which to stand" without snme givens to base deliberation (such as scientific tmllls)" it would be impossible fen people to act autonomously at aIL This reliance on sclentHit: beliefs may be interpreteD, then, as an unintended acknowledgment lhat autonomoLls deliberation presupposes second-mder preferences that crilkal reflection alone cannot generate. AmOll0lTIY conceived in terms of the life or open-minded conviction avoids these problems by not requiring people to critically reflect unless they encounter dissonance. This does noL commit it to accept relativism of truth, or to reject the idea 01 progress, So long as there is no perfect paradigm, we mllst accept thai traditions (including scientific traditions) are all we hilVe and that people Girl begin only where they arc, starting their sear<:h for Lmth or the best tife from 'NHhin traditions. Rather than rejecting the idea oi progress towards trllth, this approach claims that progress can be made only within or across traditions. Even :/vlill" a ddender of progress, acknOWledged that "it would be absurd to pretend LbaL people ought to live as if nothing v,,'halever bad been kno'NI1 in the \.,'ortd before they came into it," .. Progress is not impeded by people who identify ''''ith Lr,ldilions but hy those who refllSe In allow their trOlditions to evolve. [lather than promnting progress, training in neutral facts and exposure to various ways of life may simpl}' lIndermine people's identifications and leave them '",ithout access to tbe traditions on which real progress depends.
'Irut'Seil'f.'s Hesides scientific principles. another source of givens that has been defended by proponents oi autonomy as the examined life i5 the idea of a true self - that a persoll has a true self that can be distinguished born those aspects of his. or her character th,at society has imposed. ror example, Lindley writes:
Diana r.,'[eyers develops an account of a true S{!]f that seems to address the problem of IHwr' one's tme self might hecome one's own. This ,l(COlmt of autonomy competency ami tll{, authentic self. The authentic self "ls the repertory of s.kills that make up autonomy competency along with the cnllocatlcm of and needs and that their lives match tlJeir ~X'rsonal ideals and life plans."''''
Although I have much sympathy for .tvl~yeis.' approach, 1 believe its reliance true selves, leaves it unable, like all approaches emphasizing critical reneclion, to
\Nhy Autonomy ilS the Examined Life? Those who define persomd autonomy ·ilS the eXilmined life extend the reasonable insighl that people IIwr need to question" revise, ami trarm.:end received beliefs (in our words, to exercise meta"ilgencr~ lo lhl! unreasonable
com:-iusion thalautonomy /i:'q/ll'res critical reflection and choice. The danger, [ have argued" is that requiring people to develop this capacity may undermine the secure identifications on whkh autonomous delibeTillion and meaningful lives depend. If my argument is correct, then it might be asked why anyone would {..'ver l1ave defll1ed autonomy in terms of the examined life? I believe thal at least pari of the explanation lies in the almosl exdmive fOCllS that adlv(Jcatc.':S 01 this approach often plaet:! on modern plural societies. People in s~Kh societies oiten lind themselves timJWIl into many varied, often cont1i<:ting and irreconcilable,. communities and traditions. This creates a potential for dissommce unknown in well-functioning traditional societies. In such circumstances" crilical reHeclion ami mela-agenqr will often Ileed to be eXercis,ed, The danger in fOCUSing on such s[)cieties is tl1at one may assume that this is tme for but (0 define autonomy in lerms of the life of open-minded conviction. This allnws l1S to recognize the valLli~hle contribution that choice and critical rel1e<:tion can make to IneaningfuJ live'S, without assLlming thal they are equally valuable to all penple livin~ in every kind 01 society.
dogmatic lives canllol.'" The ahility to articulate sllch accounts gives LilOs.e who lead Jives of open-minded conviction "'good reasons" for continuing to adhere to their identifications and, in their capacity to articulate these good reasons" they make their governing assumption:; their own. Nmv, this raises;> further question: What can it mean to ha\re good reasons for continuing to a(fihere to a tradition or an identiflcation? At a minimum, it means that an identit'ioration mLlSt do what we value it for: it must connect the person with a context of valLIe that informs and supports the pmsuit of subjectively Significant purposes. \'\Ihat counts as evidence in this case is that the context of value exhibits wnsis1ency, both internally and externally" wiah objective reality. An example 01 this is David O. Brink"s moral coherentism, which suggests that conlimICd adherenc-e to "one's moral belief p is justifled insoiar LIS p is part oi a colJerent system 01 heliefs" both moral and non~moral, and p's coherence al least pelrli}' explaim why one holds p."" Tlms, one's reasons for continuing to adhere to a tradition are beller the more consistel1t Ihe tradition is with om"s other belids, both moral and non-mOTal. When sllch consistency is present, those who adhere to a tradition fmd it provides a Llseful map for navigating what they see as objt"Ctive reality and so doe~ not lead th~m into in~scapable contradictions. Now, some may slISpect. thai I am merely reintroducing the requirements of the examined life through the back dOOL Tilis is nol the case. To offer sllch an account of good reasom, a person neither needs to have experienced dissonance nor, especially, to hilve stood b \.,.110 engage in dialogue Wilh them."" Thlls, evideJ1Ce of the absence of contradictiol1S may be drawn from the tr,idition"s own history, vl.'hich may show thai it has survived sporadic dissonancegenerating experiences without proving self-defeating," Thi~ need not require any comparative evaluation of other traditiol1S or comexts 01 value. A key ,Idl/anlage of conceiving the relationship between autonomy ami socialization in terms oi ~lie life of open-minded conviction is that it allows us to avoid the problem oi infinite regress associated with other conceptions of autonomy tlla t rely on higher-order preferences. In appeal ing 10 good reasons, we set a standard hy which people make their governing assumptions Iheir
own amI. so put all eml. to tBle "'potentially em.lless sequem:e of evaILJa.liom'" involved in justifying principles by appeal tOo increasingly higher orders Oof principles, 'such decisive identiticatiol1, however, is not arbitrary treat fellow priSOll'.~rs'" with that of the chJ:rader of .stepan Mki.ld~r{'viLch in 'lblstoy\Amw KarmiJ!jl, whD absorbed his principles from his favomHl' newspaper, neither rellecting on them nor being .aware tbat they chan&ed ".... iLh those of the paper.'" l,Vl1lle neither Arkadyevitch nor the W'itne-ss('S (rrom \"'hat \','e auc told) ever stoud back {rom li1eir villu{'s, and ways of Jiie .and crHically {'\·'allliJJled them in comp;uison with other ways of liie, ltw \'VitrH:"SS(:"S appear to be in a position to defend their continued adherence to L11'2ir tradition in a v,'ay luk, more or less, aUained llle results they expedcd. Arkatl}'eYitch, nut even aware uf lhlC source 01' his prillciples, tould offer no 511ch ,H.:counl. "10 thlC exten~ that tht:! 'I,oVitness.es are able to DUe. OIlC, their priflCipk'S arc lheir own, while to the extent that Arkadyevitch cannot, his principles are merely his. This example illustrates
how· situaled autonomy can apply the standard of open-minded conviction to liistinguish autonomous from non-autonomOllS lives, by providing iln ilccount of how peop.le mayor may not make their governing assumptions their own that does. not reqUire tile kinli of critical reHeclion associated with the examined life, Vv'hat are the potentia I niticisms of the relationship that has been suggested between situated amonomy ilnd identifications resulting (rom socialization'? One likely criticism is that this account relies on a radical reLativism that cannot support the kind of intercultural judgment and evaluation a liberal account of justice ff.:,quire:s. For instance, it may he asked. does this account require LIS to tolerate the racist who finds her purposes worthwhile and can successfully execute them"? The suspicion of radkal rela~ivism results from the ultimately subjective n'L!me of the test of whether someone has good reasons ior continued adherence to a tradition: the lesl turns on whether the tradition actually slIStains meaning!ul lives ior its members, not whether it :should according to an objective standard. This follO\". s. from Ihe rejection of the C.arlesian scepticism associated with intrinsic meaning: even if a tradition could be inv,llidatt"d on the hasis of facts or beliefs of which its. ildherents are not aware or do n01 understand or accept, this cannot determine whether their reasons for continued adherence are good., as reasonable evaluations must, as a general rllle, GlrfY ,,,eight within the tradition. \-Vilile the test 01 meaningfulness is ultimately Stliljeclive, we are not Ihereby compelled W accept a radiGkl felath'ism that wouLd leave us with nothing to say to the raeist. The ide,1 of meaningful life, respect for which is the very reasl..m 'Vi.' e:taend such deference to the judgments of others" has other requirements that can jllStify not extending tolerance to the racist. Respect for meaningful life also requires respect tor situated autonomy, for coJ1]rmmities that embody contexts of value, and for meaningful life itself. As I argue in Chapter 7., thes.e vallles sllpport a very thin account 01 universal values that can jllstify state interference with the internai practices of comml1nities. llnls." for example, ",,'e do not need to tolerate the person who linds rmaning in racist valLles, because slIch values are irreconcilable with equal respect for meaningfuillfe. Another criticism of the position Ihat good reasons need to carry weight \'l.'ilhin a trildition is that allis doe~ not allow us to protect people Imm oppres.sion that hilS been accepted through lalse consciousness. For illiStam:e, Susan fvloller Okin writes that "oppressed people have often internalized their oppression 50 well that they Imy!:' no sense of what they are jL1slly entitled to as human beings."'''' The concern here is not so much with cases sLlch as tile Dink'l, where the spear-mas.ters \,,110 allow themselve~ to be killed appear to be in a position of privilege within their community, but with cases where ti1o.se who act against their interests do so in a way that clearly serves. the interests of others within tile sociely. A good example is that of
"... omen in MricJn cuilmes thaL condone polygamous marriage. it s'.:'ems cle.u, at le3st ao mimy who do not belong Lo these cultures, LhillL this really s~rves Lhe inL'2rests of men" although of course there is diversity in opinion ,lmung the women il1volved, For example, a husband is quoled 35 s3ying, "one TNii'e on her owrn is Lrouble. \'Vhen Lhere are severilL the'}' are forced to be polite ami well behiilved. If they misbeJ1<1ve, you threaLen that you'll take ,trlOUWf wife."" rhe criticism, then, is. that 3ny aCCOlln~ of autonomy thillt v>'Ould include p!:!ople who S'2em so clearly to be 3CtiOg from false conscious-· ness must be wrong. CLlrens ilIu5tr3Les this concern whel1 he 351\:; TNhether pl'()pk's 3cceplam:e of the "legitimaC}' of 'lraditional' aulhorities ... is not jllst the product of a manipulative s.ystem of socializalionr"'" In answering lhis. criticism, [ do 110t seek to deny that false consciousness caplures some trulh aboLll reality,. fm I think it probably do(;'S, but to indicate how \'ve should address it in light of concern 1'01 meal1iogfullife. in general Vlo't,; should rdr3in from Llsing COercion or the 13W to enforce our judgments about the goodm:'Ss of other people's reas.ons for accepting LIlt' authority of their tr3ditiom, even \"'here we believe om eV31uations ilre right in iln objective S'2me. ('0 do otherwi~e is. inconsistent with respect for meaningful life. This is true ill at least two ways. First" even ,-".here fal:>\! conscim.lSlless is at play, it is ill the nalme of false wnsduusness that its vklims comkier their practkl;!s to form their own signifICant pturIJoses. To prevent them fro,m pursuing them is to interfere with their IJllrsuit of meaningful lives . .second, it may be lilal we and those whom we observe simply do not share tile same understimcling of interests. 1;01' example,. while the feminist may f:Onsider the ChrisUiHl housewife to have been deceh'ed into denying ller Hnlerest ill purs.uing a career, thl;! Chrislian housewife l113Y mnsiaer the feminist to have mistakenl~' rejl'Clctfi her interest in motherho(,d and eternal salv3tion. \,Vl1o is right? From om perspective, it does nol maller. Again, to be dear, 1 am not adopting a radical relativist position here; in rdllsing to enforce olt[ c\"alu;.»tions of the goodnes5 of others.' reasons, we do not have to ~ib;'H11.km them to ",;hal we consider false beliefs, j{.tther, \.,'e limit ourselves lo trying to f}ersllade them W see things our '\lay by engaging them on their own terms, OJ on telms tb~t we Cim convince them to share l.... ith us. In this ,·vay" if they come to 3ccepL om position, it is for reaSDns that make sense to them, nol beGlUSe we happened to be in a position of pO\·\,'er that enabled us to impose our evaluations. 'j he reverse' is also true: we insist that they behave in the same wa}' with res-pect 10 their evaluations of OllT reasom, Another pOSSible crUicis.m is that the life of open-minded conviction involves sdu-decepUcl!li. This may 3ppear to be SD becallse siluale<.l JJ'llwnom~', recognizing that no tradition comprehends objective realHr in its totality, <.10125 [Jut require I}eople to be abJ.e to defend every last detilil of' llwir tradilions. The criticism, [ suggest, conruses t11is fad with s.elf.·deception. Real sC'lf-dec,rption is inconsistent with situated autonomy because, by its very
nature, ~eH-decepli()n disregards the requirement ahJ.l our beliefs. 5ustain meJ.ningful lives hy bridging the gap between the world of values. and the world of hlind causes. A behaviour that may sl'.>em like self.deception is a person's deliherate avoidam:e of injlllences she helieves may lead her to rerect her present commitments. Some religious sects, for instance, may avoid higher e{.Iucaticm or television because they believe that if exposed to these for too long, they wOllld reject their present way of life. l\·!any people avoid participation in nllts and experimentation \.,.ilh eigilf(."ttes. or dmg5 for similar reasons. Unlike self-deception, hm....ever, this is seU-govermmce. As l;rankfurt says of "volilionalnecessity," "not only does la person I care about folloWing the particular course of ,lction which he is comlrained to follow. He also cares about caring about it. Therefore, he gUides himself a\vay from heing critically affected by anything ~ in the outside 'rlforld or within himself - which might divert him or disStiade him either from following that comse or from caring a~ much as he does about follOWing it,'·,,·· such behaviour is self-deceptive only ii what is, avoided are 110t llndesirableinlluences but dissonance-generating evidence based in objective reality.
Defining C0l11munities and Justifying Accolnlnodation
The thJngs you value, tllat \"hich mLlI,es life meaningf~11 to YOli are not the same w~th LIS in many respects. But we respec~ your beliefs, \/Y'e expect nothing more In return. Henny Atencio, s.anto Domlngo Puebto,. in Amc'UdIJJe'flt.;; to Ole' Jl!dl~!!l HIli o(RIXilJs, US Senate, I ~)(:i9
Gm be justifuxl. Sinc<£! acc{)mmodatiom lor members of one group often limit the resourc~s and opportunilies available for non-members 10 pursue tbeir purposes, equal respel:l for meaningfLll lives requiH.'S that only llwse claims for aCCOmnH.1.uaUons which are n(:'Cessary t{) sllstain rneaningfullives slicceed. This second seclion intro.uuces the case studies explored fmiller in Chapters 6 imd 7.
Communal Definition Communities DDay contribute to the meaningiulness oK their members' lives in threc' W'here' protection is 'NaITanted, to determine the extent oi legilirnale protection; iln.u lhird, to ddine membership - that is, who has a right to enjoy lhe accommmlations. The ve~}' process of defmition, however, is fraught with dillicultics. Problems wUh Communal Oe1'inition The problem comlmmai definition has impJicatiom thau p('rmeate all major asp('cts of policy involving communal LlccommmlatimL 'li:,) exten.u protection to II mmmlmiLy, ' . . 'e need to have some idea oj its nature and its membership. The problem, as I noted in Chapter 1 (p. 22), is that tbese two aspect:> - tile community's nalme (lOti its members.hip - are so interrelated that it is ullcleaT where to begin. On the olle halld, if Vie begin with the commullity's natLlre, a likel}' strategy toO discover it is to see what the cumrmmily's members have in common; this., {)f course, presumes ''''e kmH'" who it.s members are. On the other hand., if we begirl by stLldying the memhers, we need to know the natLlr't' of the community ill or.uel to identify tbem, Hence the drt1.s1arily. i !}[)int out lhis clrcularit}' nol to sLlggest that it is impossible to define communities
or
the complexity ami potential sources of conllid to vl'llich il is ~usceplible. As Parekh writes of ",\sian vallles," the "Iact that some [citizens 01 Asian COUIltries] do not share these is immaterial. Aiter all,. tile racists, sexists and many conservative members of weslem societies do not share Ul!e \'aille 01 equality, yet these societies rightly consider it central to their self-umlerslanding ami impose it on them without the slightest hesitaticm. "0 Thus, awareness or the potential negative effecls of defining communities requires that we attempt to minimize such effe.cts, not that we abandon Ihe project altogether. Communal deiinitiol1 matters because how a community is defmed has important implkations for liberal multiculturalism. One is that it will affect who is recognized as a memberof the commLlnity. Allothe[ is that it will affect \·vhich measures, if all)" are reql1ired to sustain the commLlnity. Combined v.:jth the problem of circularity, the implication is that communal definition is always likely to be contentious because pe{)ple's stakes in the outcome can he high ([nti because ai1ere will rarely be clear ([ml ul1CQntes~ed principles available for resolving the issues. Now, who has a slake in the outcome: The answer is everyone in the polilical community" but" of course, to varying degree~, We can best discuss the stakeholders b}' dividing dlizellS of the wieler political community inlo two groups: those who claim membership in the col11nmnity requesting accommndatiol1, and those who do not - that is, n{)n-members. Those who daim membership have several interests in how the community is defmed, including that the community be defined in such a war that they qualify 'lS members. If a permn actua.lIy depends on access to the community to secure meaning in his Jill', it is vilal from hi:; persp".:-clive that he gain the recognition necessary w participate in Ihe community. The potentially undesirable effeds of this are noted by Rorty: "A liberal state attempting to preserve a culture must 01 course, specify the identity of the culture. But cultural desniptions arc politically and ideologically laden .. , The implicit cultmal essentialism of a good deal of celebratory multiculturalism disguises Ihe powerful inlracuitural politicS of determining the right of authoritative description.'" Thus,. communal definition can affe.ct people's ability to sustain meaningful lives since it can res.ult il1 people heing excluded from the community. Such prohll.~ms GUl arise if a community is delined so narrowly that its membership criteri.a are too exclusive. This can refit"Ct a contliet between the members" colleclive need to protect the community and individual members' need to exe-rdse normal and meta-agency. This usually pits tbose who impose exclusive or essentialist c1eflnitions of membership that threaten the "more complex understanding 01" multiple identities thai change both over lime aml according to the context or I against those who identify ,,;'iib tbe community and rely on it, but \.\,110, often through the exercise of silu,Lted autonomy, have come to challenge sl1<:h essentialist defLnitiom. SeriotlS harm
values Ihat ar~ central to lh identity."" SimilLlrly, Harrison Buli wLlrned of the effect of returnees to Canadian Indian reservations under Bill C-31 (which returned legal Indian status to women who had married non-Indians); "'HilI c-:n will accelerate the Joss of the Cree language and cultme beC1tllSe of the permitting 01 non-Cree-sp€aking persons into [the reservel ... J\'fLlny of tht' reinstatees and their children no longer speak Cree, and many have little appreciation of Cree culture. Bill C-JI undermines the cllstoms and vil:ltles oi traditional Indian families ,md communities,"'" Emory Sekaquaptecco .If. described Plleblo returnees as· "Indiam who have experienced life away from the reservation for extended perinds and have become habitual Islc] in the indlvidmll rights concepts of their economic and !>ocial surroundings.""" A second interest 01 those who daim membership is that the nature of the community be defined such that it receives the prote'etion it needs to survive in a form thal will allow it to perform the functions 1m which they rely on it. fOT example, if an ethnic community is defLned and preserved purely in its lingUistic characteristics but religiOUS aspects that many of its members iKtually valued were ther'eby allowed to he lIndermim,d, this intercst w{ll1ld not h.hVt' been satisfied. Third, il:nd tlnally, those who claim membersbip in a community have ,in inlere:st in the community being del1ned so as to exdude those whose beliefs and purposes are im:onsistent with the comnnmily"ssurvival. Non-members have reciprocal stakes in the definition of communities that receive protection where such protection imposes burdens on them. Such burdens may be monetary Jfm example, taxes to fLnance subsidies) or may involve lost liberties or opportunities (for example, denial of the right to 1I5·e cerlain parcels of land or to post signs in one's, language), Also, as the defmition of a community affects the size of its membership, non-mcmbers have an interest in it being less inclusive rather than more inclusive, Similarly', as the definition of the community affects the type of protection it needs, non-members have an interest in it being del1ned so that the protection is least burdensome. Another concern for non-members is that overly broad membership criteria may lead t{) their being treated as members of communities with which LIley do T1otidentit~tr, People Gm be involuntarily included in a community's membership in two. ways: community members who reiecl their membership in a {:omnmnity may be denied Ireedom of exit, ,md communities may impose membership duties and obligations on pe{)ple who tin not identify ''''ilh the community. The danger in both cas~s is that involuntary members may be {oreed to fulfil obligations or participil:te in practices tbey either fmd meaningless or that frustrate the purposes they have set for themselves. So far I have suggesaed that the definition of the nature of a community bas implications for who can belong to the community, the nature of the prolection it receives., and the weight oltlJe burden thi!> ,viii place on nonmembers, I have also suggested that arriving ill sllch definition is Dikel}' to be
JilHClIIl. Let\ nOi'\' tum brielly to a Lase that made its way to the Canadian Supreme Coma. to illmtrate how complicated this «iii be in p'Llciice.
ComplcxHil'S of Communal Udinltion in I)ract!ce: R. v. Powler R. I'. l'o\\'le.v COlKl'med lwo hunters from northern Ontario '",ho claimed their righb a5 0,,1etis were vioklted when they were charged for hunting m(}()se \'\'iUlOlit a licence." The Supreme Court of Canada beJd that this did in fact comtitute" viohlLion of tbe "right to hL1nt tor food in the environs o~ Sault Ste. "lv!arie" (19~. t\'~y conc'ern is not with the question of ""hether lhe r.,·leLis should have been entitled to this right. Instead, [ wish to diist:1lss it be caLIse it illmtra.h!s how comrntma.1 definition affeds colmnmlal membership, tile l1i.1tme of protection, and the burdem placed on l1orl-member5, as well as how even fairly precise defmitions will always be O(J<'211 to contestation. INe can begin b~r noting how the comt defimd the community: II Aboriginal rights are communal rights.: Ihe~' must be grounded in the existence of il historic and present community" 1241. The specifH.: "historic and pre'sent" community '.vas uescribed as the l\,fetis community "Iin and around Si.lult Ste. rvlarie," whicb pR'tlaled the signing of the Robins.on-Huron Treaty in 1850 (24.1. This spl'cilic1.~tion of the community had important implications. first, while it does l1olllmllnbiguomly delermim which indivi,uuals be found to belong to the cmmmmity, it does set clear parameters ior who can and who Gmnot be recognized as members, lhe court suggested three factors for making this determination. The first was self-identification i .H.1. The secoml, ancestral connection., followed from the definition of the community as historic
''''ill
indicated lhat only those aspects of the present community that reflect this hislmkal continuity qualify for protection. The right to hunt was deemed suitable becLluse lhe "!I,'ietis continued 10 live in much the same manner as they had in tile past - fishing, hunting, trapping and harvesting other resources lor their livelihood" (25). The implication is lhat elements of the present community for \,,.hich no similar continuity could be demonstrated could nm jusLily protection. Had the community been detlned purely in terms of it~ present nature, this \-"ould not have placed such limitations. on tile kinds of protection that could be jLlstified. The implicalions of thi:; case for burdens. on non-members are dear enough. As.sllming thal the amount of moose ami other wildlife to be l1arvested is limited, as the Ilumber of people ,.,.110 are recognized as n,embers of this community - and therdore as having privileged access to hunt and fish - increases, the resources available to others decreases. Had the community been delined so as to create CJ, larger membership, this bmden Vo.'Ollid have heen heavier: had the mmmunily been defined to neate a smaller membership, it would have been smaller. I~nally, further consider,llion of the factors. the court suggested for determining membership illustrates. how even fairly precise definitions can be op--en to contestation. The best example concerns community acceptance. All the examples the courL gives of how we might determine if an individual is a member turn on nhe presumption that we eLm identify at le.Lst some of the community's members, How else are we to know if the cmtoms, traditions, and activities in which the person petitioning for membership says she participated v,'ere 111me of that community and not some other? What is the usc of testimony of witnesses unless we can verify that the witnesses are themselves members of the community (33:i? ] suspect thi~ problem is generalizable beyoncllhis case. R. t'. I'o1l"1c,' indicates the importance and complexity of defming principles for determining the nature oi communities that receive protection. (-[mv comnnmities are deHlned affects who is recognized as a member and so allowed to parlicipate in the community; what protection the community ,·vill receive and thus which purpos.es will be protected and promoted and which discouraged or prohihited; and the extent of the burdens that will be placed on non-members. It also illustrates why any approach lor recognizing communities must re/lect the fact that definitions will always be open to contestation.
y.,·:leaningful Life, Contexts of Value, and Communal Definition The foundations of meaningful life developed in Part 2 Gin inform a practicable and defensible clpproach to definlng the nature of commllnities for the purposes of extending cultmal accommodations. The line of reasoning is fairly straightiorward.
The arguI1H:n.q hq~iJ!1S, from the foundational villue of me,mingful life. Chapter 2 suggests ~hat meaningful lives involve the p'lIfsuH of signiflcant purposes. These purposes, in tum" dlepend on the person being able to exercise SHlILllt:d autonomy, Situated autonomy fequlres having access to communities lllilt support the governing assumptions informing autonomous decision making. Finally, commLHliLies 5tIpport governing as.sumpUom by allolvin,g (}Eople 10 access contexts of valut: embodied in their traditions. Thus . it is mgm.''(.l.. ' of these umdiliom arc explored in tile next sec Lion of this chapter. Principles to gUide tbe design of cullural accommodation are developed in Chapter 6, In sum,. in defming a wmrmmily we must aim to strike a balance between several interests: those of people who rely on the commL1nity as a context on wllm.:, those of individual members' in preserving the fluid and multiple nature of their self-identities and idenliflGltioDS, and those of non-members in foNaining the ability to pursue their own purposes.
ComnnmHie.s as Contexts of Vallie 'I he f1rsl criterion for ftLSlifying special protection is that the community contrihutes to the me;mil!1gfulness of its members' lives. An interesting fealme oi the tirst {ase, nile naaional community of \Vclsh speakers in WaLes, is that lhere appears. 10 be no one 1,VeLsh-speaking purposive trmlition. Borland, Fevre., and Denne~" have suggested that \Velsh-speaking ',·Vales contains four comnmnitie.s, each of which fits our description of communities embOLlying purpo~ive traditions. Membership in the open community is available to anyone willing to share Ihe community's pllrp{)ses Lind embrace and promote lile \'\fclsh ILlngua.~e and cl1Lture" "peace, ecology., freedom from nuclear conta.minatiol1, and ... [the defence of! \Velsh crmllllllIlilies in both north and sOllth Wales."" The cultmally closed, religiousl}' based community is described as "llle Congregation bdore God,. those who speak \Velsh and lhose who share the Christian v,liues of toleran«,", freedom, democracy and family life." Membership in Ihis community is open only to Ihose ethnic Welsh who will share obligations tn follow Go·d's will in their liVes, "'lo support family life, to be tolerant and respectful of others,. to give everyone in Wales lbe opportunity to reclaim tbeir heritage and to seek political change. "LJ rvlembership in the cullur,LlIy closed, se(:ularly based community, which is characterized by a commitment to language and community, is reslricled to "those \>\'110 speak \Ve)sh ami will promote the language" ami obliges people "w speak the language, promote its development, defend hOllses, jobs. ami the community's resources.."" Flnaily, the racially dosed community is. nnLy o~}ell tn ethnic 1Nelsh in whom ClIdrlf~lt'lh, the "Spirit nf the People," llmvs. Obligations of membership include guarding ami defending Welsh ci .... ilil-,ltion" dr,lwing nearer to the tme Welsh of the countrYSide, and rejecling outside, especially English, indluences." l,.Vhile tbese competing definitions of the \o\'elsh-speaking community may appear lo unseltle our projert, this complexity at the level of pmpo:sive traditions actually suggests a shared identlilcation with tile '.vider Welsh-speaking community as a moral tradition. This moral tradition aims lo preserve the lingUistic environment that smtains all of these sllb-comm~mitit'S. A shared vallie of the community so-conceived is the mainlemmce of a \Velshspeaking linguistic community. By fOCUSing 011 tile lingUistic community, we are able to describe the comrmmity in a way lhal both includes everyone who relies on it and enables it to be protected. The franmphol1e national community in Quebec poses. another imercs.tlng problem, Here one might question whether the communUy's declared shared value of promoting the French language - as "a means by which a people rnay express its culllll'al identity" and "'by which the individual expresses his or her ~mmal identity and sen:se of imlividuaJit)""" - is substantive enough to contribute meaning 10 lives. This concern is rdlected in Rorty's claim that "'multiCllllmal though they mily be, the citizens oj most EuropeallJ and
American slales "" are signiflcailtly motivah.>d by ~imilaJ eumomic pmctices ". °lYrically, their shared klentity-ddining motives - and tbe vast fange of interpretive habits lhey carry with them - permeate ami often OLltweigh their cultural tliHer'cnces. "D This >Criticism needs to be addressed beGlUSe it reflects a sHength of our conception of the persall. \tort)"s claim is directed at defences on ulltmal rights tbat rely on tbe cultllfal monist assumption that cultural comrmmilies have a specic:ratic r.• form of government or ".. helher some other de[i nil ion is pOSSible, This \vas maniksled in'l conflict abollt v"hether individuals who mmidered themselves Puehlo bllt who bad! converted to Protestantism should be ,,-'xcluded from membership. This conflict is addressed in Chapter 6, vVhat can be s.akl about a Pueblo context of value;'llaving been in almost continuous contact '.vitll Europe;.ms in one hmn ur .anotller ~Spanish, Mexicans, Americans) since lirsl encoLlntering the Spanish in 1540,'" the Pueblo have developed a cl.lltme that. altl10ugh inJused with man}' European values and ideals. H.'ITl'lins recognizable. tn terms of contexts of wilue, I believe the wider Pueblo community can be viewed as embodying a broad Pueblo moral tradition that sus.t.ilins. a context within which co-'Cxist several
communities defined hy purposive traditions: Native spiritual, Spanish Catholic, and American or Anglo.'" Tile Plleblo moral tradiUion appears to be at odds with tile values of vVestem individualism. lhe traditional Pueblo spiritualism of the pre-contact community encOllra.ged the values 01 hannony, llnimimity, and dUly while dO\'\'nplaying individual freedom. These aspetis were fmther engrained by innovations that evolved in the iace of Spanish attempts to impose Catholicism and Spanish civil government. The origin of these values appears to lie in the Pueblos' being a sedentary people in an arid part of the world ''>'hose surViV<'11 depended on complex irrigation systetns and Ihe ,,,hims of nature. [n such circllmstances it is not surprising that they developed a markedly non-personal commL1nal religion that focused on the reciprocal relationship between the communily and nature in which "man performs rites and ceremonies and nature responds with the essentials of life, withholding tile bad."'" \'Vilen this is combined \·"ith the "conviction that it is the responsibility of all to work together in secular and religioLlS activities to keep the universe functioning smoothly." it is understandable that the Pueblo would develop conceptions of virtue and vice SUlch as those traditionally heid by the Tewi.I Pueblos, according to whom "negative allribules such as uneo-operativeness,. moodiness, Jiggressiveness, ami lJllconlmlled anger are considered violations of the ideal of unanimity concept. whereas generosily, hOSpit,llity, deference ao the oldl, and a mild and conforming deme.mm are accorded high \'alue,"" The emphasis the I~Eeblo place on unanimity and harmon~' appears to have been reinforced by their experience 01 the Spanish. ll!fany Pueblo found no inherent conlfildiclion in sincere adherence to Ca.tholicism while continuing to practi<:e their Native religion. Each religion addressed different concerns: Pueblo religion dealt with the here and now (rainfall, illness, v,lariare, communal relations); Catholicism dealt with life after death. TillIS, both the church and the kiva {lhe Pueblo religiolls building) arc important religious structures "'where the worship of two sets 01 deities are conducted separately.'··'~
However., the refllsal of the Spanish aUlhorities to accept dual religioL1s loyalties necessitate>::1 a colle<:tive response th,lt could not have sllcceeded vtiithout rigid commlmal compliance. In pa.rticular" it reqUired a strict compartmentalizing of religious life: "Those dances and rites that aroused no opposition ordispleil5ure fwmlile non-Indian population were given openly and irthquently, indeed as if these activities ,vere all tl1at remained 01 their indigenous cultme. Hut behind dosed doors, in heavily guarded areas,. there was the performance of another set of complex rites shorn of all borrowed elements from the intmding cllltllfe. These were the ceremonies that in all their pagan glory offended Spanish civil and church allthorities."·" Survival 01 the Pueblo religion required that compartmentalization be extended to
Sp,mish civil imliauliom. The lradiliol1all'ueblo social organizatioll, which required civil inslitlltlons lo control religious as well as dvil functions, had been sListained h}' the practice of having secular officers oJ the civil government mask "the klemi1ie~ and activities of the native oiflcers ".'110 are addilionally cOIH:emed with ceremonial maLters." In effect, they canif.':'{1 out the decisions of a (Ide facW governing group'" of ceremonial leaders constituted by "a hierarch), 01" native 'priesls."''' This has been t\esuiued as "lheoCTilC)"" or "'quasi-tbeocr,lCies."'·· r...Iaintaining such iI compartmentaliled existence could unly hL1 ....e reinforced the tTildiUonal valm.'s of harmony and unanimity ami vl'Ould have left little room for the tolerance and individualism chanKLeristk of the wider Aml!rium cormmmity. Thb expelfi'~l1ce has resulled in the development ot a distinctive Pueblo comnnmil y ',"'itll its own "vay of life L1nd its own context of valLie. lk,pill! imernal diversity - the l'ueulo community "encompL1sses some forty tholl· sand peopif.." spe.~king six mutually unintelligible languages and occupying thirty-()dd villages s~letched along a rough Gescent of rnor~ Lhan four 11l.mdreJ miles':" - a reasonable account of the values that characterize this moral trL1dition wmlkl nel!u to include L1 sense of communal dllty, a desir(! for h,lrmony, identification with the land, and a keen seml! of Pl.lebloness. TIl'.~5e values ;'lre l!mLJedded in the social forms comtihlting tb~ PLleblo community. The sense of dutj' and preference for communal harmon}, over individual i.lchievem~nt and 1I.g,grandiz(!mentare reflected in l'ueblu practices,. instill!lions,. iHlti way's of thinking. The traditionall'ueblo special events calendar, 1m instance, contains no days to commellwrate individuals' accomplish· ments since, as SLlina and Smolkin explain, in Lhis "group-oriented SOciety ... indIvidual status has been of minimal importance."" Institutionally, this is expressed in the ft"t]lIirement thaL in lieu of taxation, .all tribal members "p'~rform certain comrmmil y fUl1clions which will ueneflt the vdlUle tribe,"" [t is abo expressed in 'I;'t'ays of thinking: the belief that making om:'seJl llseful to . . lI]e l:H2ople thaU J l.:afC auoLlt and lo my lommLlnit]','" and making "a commitment to your group of people" is "what Zuni is all abollt";·'" in the rhetorical question "V.,'hat is the goal of every so'COetr or government? is it not Inrmonyi"'; and in the fear that "one man, one vote'" majority rule is incompatible 'NUll the pradice o! consensus seeking.'" Regi:mling identUicalionwith the land, Ortiz suggest.s that the f;'let that the l'ueblo have never been displaced from their humelands has contributed to tbeir culluml survival because "the Pueblos only believe in '''I'hat they see ami expericnl.:c, and in their homeland they can see what they believe."11 For example, for the 'fi'ewa Pueblo, tbis means having~1 religioL1s shrine ]ocah;\J t....o'o miles nor~h of t{)\·. . IV~ l'or the Taos,. it means the return of Blue l.akl! (the "sacred piclCe in which life began") to Native control after a seventyyear struggle!"
commUl13i values for both d!ancer and observer: personal autonomy ("The dancer's relations wilh the supernatural arc direcl, singular, and imml~di ate. There can be no interference between iI person ami 'what he bas."'}; kin solidarity (" A person's vision is his alone, but be cannot really develop alllli relilliol15hip with his vision unless his. kin support him during the initiation process"); and dHferential social r;mk (10 attain prestige, one mmL do things right, which "includes knowing hovv to behave, knowing how 10 reply when caJled ;15 a '>"fitness, knmving what to do in the event of an ;lcciclenLal (,,11 or lo~s of part 01 a costume, as well as being able to pay I'm things.'')'" The inclusion of kil15hip in the definition of the Coast Salish community draws aUention to a ,amtroversial issue. Some 'It.'ilI nol be comfortable with the inclusion of ascriptive elements s.uch as kinship, race., and! eUmkity in delinitiom. of membership. For example, Kymlicka rejects ra{:e and descent as bases for membership in societal cullures be{:ause Lhey "have obviolls radst overtones." Instead, he recommends defining "'national membership in terms oi integration into a cultmal communiL)'t" which he spedlies as a willingness ,Ito learn the language and history of the s.ociety and participate in its social and poli lica I imtilutiom. fI, J ,'\ s.econd concern is that s.uch criteria might exclude people who identify lNith a nnnnml1ily's context of value bllt fail 10 saLisfy .such ascriptive criteria, A third and final concern is that community members mLly f.ail to respect individuals' autonomy and selfidentilication by treating everyone who fits an asniptive description as. members, inc1mling those who do not suhjectively identify 'Nith Ihe community. A case involving the initiation of a British ColLlmbia Salish spirit dancer is a good example of this last concern. Two of the traditional pmcess.es by \.,'hich one can hecome a spirit d,mcer are consistent with vulllI1lary membership (seeking one's vision on a solitary journey and having one's dream come unsought While suffering grieO, but the third, inducing a person's spirit song "by meam of a rituil! abduction and isolation," is not." In the British C{)lumbia case" a man was grabbed and initiated into the s.pirit -dance tradiLion even Ihough he clearly did not identify with the community; "He never authorized anyone to have him initiated into the SOCiety, and he did not ,,,'ant to be a member of it. He knev,' very little about the religion of the Coast Somel1os people. He was not, and is not, really interested in learning about Lheir culture. He was not hrought up in it and lived orf the Reserve most of Lhe time."IJ Imposing this process on a person who did nol identify with the community demonstrilted a lack of respect for the self-identiLy he had constructed for himself. Although these concerns. are serious, the suggestion that memberShip in communities be open to anyone willing to learniJnd partidpale in its cultme also has considerabJe probJ.t~ms. One is that a key element in the self-umlerstanding of many ethnic ilnd cultural communities is the belief that membt'rs of the community sh,lre a common ancestry, Another is thilt one of the core
the much-disulSS.ed case of IVisamsif/ v. HHh provide an eXi1mpie of ,1 nonindigenous tr.aditional community. Ami.sh communities provide another example of a context of vaiue emhodied in a niHrm\, pllrposive tradition. Their tradition emphasizes rejection of imtltutionalized chmches,. a "'return to the eelrl}" simple, Christian life de-empilasi7jng materiell SUCG_'SS, rejecting the competitive spirit" and seeking to imulate themselves from the modem \It.'orld ... a fundamental belielthat salvation reqUires life in a church community separate and apart from the world and worldly influence ... landl devotion to a Iile in harmony with nature and the 5;()il."'·" Given the narrow focus of the community's shared purposes, there aplK'ars to be no 'Nay to deline it such Ih<1:1 those '11'110 did not share these convictions could be included in its de1inilkm 01 membership. This is not especially problematic, though . since anyone excluded on this basis would not seem to be harmed in their pursllit of a meaningfllllife. [ r,eturn to the discussion of Ule Amish, and \'Vi_\((Nr.~iJr 1'. 14Jde.r:, in Chapter 7. The final case involves LIn ethnic immigrant group, r.,,[uslims in Ont'lrio. A subgroup, the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice (Hq), ''''antee! to establish arbitration panels under t:Jntario's then Arbitration Act to i.Kljudikate disputes according to Sharia Oshllnic la\,(I.'" Tbe Arbitration Act alJm.,,'eG parties to sign an agreement to authorize 11 lhird person to adjudicate their disputes ,ibout some mallers of family and inheritance law according to an agreed-on set of principles or legal system. Such agreements UHlld cover division of property upDn disw]ution of marriLlge, spousal support, and matters concerning children, sllch as cllstody, a((.:ess" support, ami moral and religious education." i-iere the context of value is clear enough: it is broadly embedded in Islam as a purposive tradition, The partimlar community that would be (ormed iifOll11d the IICl's demand, however, would be more narrm\'ly based, constituted by those who shared llC) head Syed tvlumtaz Ali's understanding olt11e ShariJi of minorities. Natasha Hakht summarizes Ali's position:
tviuslJms In nOl1-t...rusllm countrIes are eXp1..~tl'LI to follow tile Sharla to the extent tl1i1t it Is pmctJcal. According to All, llmH recent cl1angl'S to the Arhltmtlon Act, Canadian tvfusllms have heen excused from appl}'lng SlwrJa In the-Ir legal disputes. Now that arbitration .tgreements :ue considered fin,1l ;ma binding., "tbe- concession gl'i.ren by Shi:lfJil b 110 longer ,lvallable to us becLluse the iInpracttcallt)' has been removed. In settling cJvll disputes, there Is no choke jndeed but t(~ h,lVI': an arbitration bOlmti" I think it is dear that tor those who share Ali's interpretation of their obligations under Islam, the creation and use of stich an arbitration board would constitute a case of volitional necessity. Further benefits of making such accommodation have been noted by ""{arion lloyd in her report to the provincial government on the matter, One
is that . ··arbilrilh!d dt!cisions may be more il(;ceptable to the parties, and more rdlecUvt' of some dements 01 lhe parties' slJared values." Other personal benefits include conducting the arbitration in one's O\...·n language and Iespecn I'm privacy', Allowing groups to apply their own personal law may ;", demomtrate the practicality of the fUst criterion for justifying eullUral accommodation by shOWing that it is p'ossible to identify communities' cont'exts of value. In the process it has also demonstrated ,HI important strengLh of this approach. Unlike /1l,my of the approad1es disc'llSsed in Chapk'r l, a foumla lion al approach is able to discuss the nature of all of tttl! lypes of cullmal community reprt!5enL'2d in the liberal cultural COn5l'I1SUS Inational,. indigl'nom illld traditional, and immigrilnt LInd ethnic) without straying from its core normative language of meaningful liie, comnlunitics-,ls-conl-exLs . ·of-value, and sitLlated a'lltonom},. Threah to Communal Viability Tlle sccond criterion for justifying ctlilural protection is that the community reasonably <.k'illonstrates lha.t its viability will be threatened Vl'iltlOUt it. In Chapter .j, Si?Vi2r.l1 dislinctions were drav>'I1 lhal are reli?vant here. One \...'as I)d,vcen mCi,lsuri?S th,u impose bmdens on non-fnembers and those that do not Accommodations th.tt do not impose burdens do not need to meet this Lest. hx instame, the Sharia ,HbiLralion panels S.{)me ]".lll5lims in OnLario aHempted lo eslablish under the province's Arbitration ;\(\ 'Nouid £101 have to meel lhis te,l bl'catlsi?, if ,mylhing, lhey ,,,,ould reduce burdens on non . membels. by relieving pressure on the court system:" A scmml distinction was dr;n'r'll betl''I'een remedial GISeS where communities are dearly being undermined ,Iml prevenl.tQive cases where cultural dccommmlations art! requested on the asstlmptioll: that the community will become LlI1viable without them. Remedial cases are fairly straightforward. An example is Lhe [nnu community in Labrador that recently gained national notoriety for its high rates of drug abuse, alcohol abuse, and slIicide:" Preventative cases, Lhe rrxm of this section, are more challenging, because they neces!>arily rely on cmmte,faclui.ll assumptions. Yd, de~pUe tl1is hypothetical aspect, reasonable and pi aLl sible conclllsiol1S are possible. 111 Ford 'I'~ (.).lIcbec, the evidence presented was sufficient to convince lbe Suprl!me Cour~ or Cmada thaL J.l!gisialion designed to preserve and! promote Lhe place oi Lilt! French language in Quebec represented "i! H.':SI}onsc to a sllbsl~mLial am.l pressing nlt.'Cd." Evidell(;e indLHkd the declining (rilnwphone birth rall!, the ,l5similatilm of fwncopi1ones outside Qllebec, lhe prderence 01 immigrants lo assimilale into the anglophone community, ami the "dominance of English al the higher levels Df the economic sector,"'··'
be marshalled to demonstrale the preGHiOlIS status ',Vales. The !}()J)lliation 01 Welsh speakers ha:s sLeadily declined in hoth absolute and rdative terms over the last centmy:" The inability Lo nei.1!e suitable employment has resulted in signilkant outmigration. DeindusLrialization lUIs undermined the "'coalfield communities ... where the largest 111l111bers of \·Vebh speakers in Wales were to be found. "." Amllhe immigration oi non-\'1.'elsh speakers, especially English r~tirees, has compounded the effects. oj emigration by reducing available housing stock ,md forcing prices lip"·' The cumulative eflect has been a dlilution of concentrations of Welsh speakers to the point where it is increasingl)' diflkl.llt for them to pursue Iheir purpo5es. in vVel:sh. As. Gareth Elvt.'yn Jones. noles, "The health of lhe language lies. not only in the actual nll1nber of s.peakers but aho in the conlexts in which it is spoken ... '111e numbers of communities in which Welsb is the normallimguage of communication, so recenll}' contiguous over the whole length of wes~ VI·'ales, continued to contract in the I,LSt decade [to 19941."'" The Pueblo and Coast Salish already receive accommodation in the form oJ" communal m ...·nership oi land and limill"<.l self-government. Ii we ask cmmteriactllally whether Ihe perpetuation of sllch protection is necessary to preserve their communities, the lamentahle experience of American Indian tribes lhat lost protection through allotment and termination policies suggests lhaL it is." Speciflc 10 the Coast Salish practice of spirit dancing, a threat s·eems to have come from a judicial mling that the practice of "'grabbing" is unlawful became iI inv{)lvcs the illegal use of "forcc, assault, injur~1 and confinemenL"o. While [ htlw ,lrgued that spirit dancing is oi cenui.1l impmlancc to the comml1nity's context of value, this does not appear to be true of the practice of grabbing inititl~es. That there exbt alternative non-coercive and VOluntary wa}'s to initiate dancers appears lo make grabbing inddensihle. 7" If s.omehow it could be shown that grabbing was so integral 10 the community that its prohibition wOllld m.llr::e the mmmunlty ul1viable, provisions wOllld to he needed 10 ensure only those \'\'ho subiectively identified as. community members could be grabbed and that all community members agree on Lhe possibility of heing grabbed as an obligation of membership. Finally, as Chapter 7 disG.1SSes, it seems a rea~onable supposition that Lhe aLJiliLy of the Amish 10 socialize their ·children into their way of life would be endangered if the}' were not proVided accommodations such as ~he ability to keep their children Ollt of urban high schools. A corollary to this. second criterion rel1ecb concern iLbout the tmrticns that sllch accommo{]atiol15 rna}' place on non-members. ln addition to demonstrating LhaL Lhey will be threatened vl'ith destruction if they do not receive the requesled accommodation, communities must also demonstrate that SHcll protection ciln re,mmably be expected to make tile community viable. As Raz suggests, in delermining whether to salisfy a Olmmlll1ity's
Similarly, the Puehlo spiritual community and the wider Pueblo community requirespeciftc communal forms or political, social, and 0Conomic organization that would be difficult., if not impossible, to sllstain and express in the main available alternative - the wider American society. 1\·fr",aning in lives v.'l1ose purposes presllppose the importance 01 values sl1ch i:1S hi:1rmony and communal obligation 1>\'ol1ld be ciifficult to sustain if communal land ownerShip were abandoned and the Pueblo were to integrate into the competitive political .tnti e'Conomic systems of tbe Anglo community. The GIse is clearer 1'1'ith lingUistic communities such as the francophones in Quebec and '\1\lelsh speakers in \Vales. "[{j the ex lent that their members have cOl1Stmcled lives in the context of these linguistiC communities, the surrounding angiophone comnnmitie.s do not constitute reasonilble alternatives. Of course, the members of many communities could not establish similar claims. A fairly s.traightforward case might involve congregants of a shrinking church community or parents of a linguistic minority community 'Nbose church or school WilS facin;g dosllrc in a city in whkh there were othcr viable churches m schools of the same denomination or language for them to jOin. This case, hov•.'ever, would be made morc ambiguous i! their institulion ,>\'as the onl}' one of that particular natme 'Nithin a reasonable driving distam:e. Another case difflCult to justify i~ that or illl isolated, resouKe-based community in which ~he s.ole industry was dosing. \'Vhile it is likely that people would have comtnlCted identities based on the way of life the town provided, the strength of any daim they might make \-"ol1ld be weakened by the existence of other cclmmLlI1ities sharing the same national mlture in whkh they might employ their skills and pursue their pmposes, and it being well knovm that resollrce towns don't last fmever.
Conclusion '111is chapter begim the process of developing a politics or liberal multiculturalism by translating the underlying asmmptlons that constitute the foundations of meaningrul life into principles to gUide practical polk}' decisions ..'\s we have seen, creating cLJlturalaccommodiitions necessitates <Jelining the nature of communities and their membership, and the interests various groups hi\\le in the olltcome are such that the process will almost always be complex and mnl1ictual. The best way to addres5 thIs is to adopt the principle of deftning mmmlinities in terms of the contexts or vallie they embody that support meaning in their memftJeis' lives. Corollary principles ma}, help determine when membership criteria might legitimately include ascriptive characteristics. While practical application of the general principles for identifying legitimate claims will vary with contr.;oxts, tbe principles provide :sufftcient guidance to ensure that the room for variation is highly constrained.
Imdltlol1, there Is the pIlnclple thilt when one parl}' benellts and tbe other Pl'IJtl' loses little or nothing, the fim party shmll he permlw:'il to proceed ... Sure l!"s;lbsurd to [lnd lnatlomd to twllevc that yom life 1s gol.ng to be changed by tlle prescncc oj a wire, hut It's cven morc Ilbsmd and hmHonal to oppmc It OUJ
[melltm Chief Rabhl Lord Jakobovits, quoted 1n Calvin Trillen, "Dm'.vlng the Unc . '1 TIll' New nllkt'l~ 1994
on com muni ly-a5-con text-of-va Ille rea Ill' demomtra tes its usefulness. As contexts of value, communities cannot be protected directly heGhtlse they have no independent exis~el1ce oj their own: they exi.st in the minds of those who share them, and they are reflected in the proi0Cts, practices, and institutions tlley inspire. Sim.:e they cannot be protected directly, contexts of valllc must he protected indirerlly by preserving the unclerlying conditions thilt sustain them. This focus on underlying conditions is crudal lleCilUse it encourages the development of general principles to govern communal accommodation that can generate creative tensions that, I believe . offer the best hope for reconciling sllared and personal interests within communities. This chapter addresse5 the topic of designing accommodations by discussing rom areas of concern. Two involve the design 01 communal accommodation itsel{: the ex!ent of protenion i:md the duration of protection. The other two concern the defi.nition oi communal member.ship: the cost of prott"Clion and limitations on protection.
minimal: that protection be extended only to the minimal Uayes of communities, and that it he impermilnent. tI,·[inimal pIUit.::"l.:tkm sLtslaim a 5pilt:e v,'ithin which tbe traditiom of a (omrmmily can be Gmied on withoul predeterHlining which particulaK interprl.'tations or plIfposes will be favoured over the long nm. Demands inspired by a con text of value, but which do nol relate dired!y 10 its survival, do not ftgme in determining minimal protection and must be left to fend! for themselves. ~vlinjmal protection is intended to strike a balance between individuals' shared interest in protecting the comrrlLlnity a5-il conLext of value on wiJich illl rely ilml each irH.livkluaJ's person;.!] interest in safegu;.uding his or her capacity for lluid s.elr-identity and! multiple identiftcatioliS. lhl.' emphasis placed on milximizing span: fm individuals to exercise situated autonomy may appear similar to Kymlkka's appmach, but there are signilkarH clifferem:es. One is that coHlrmmily as conlext of value applie's to a nmel1 wider range on wmmunities than does societal culture. /Hlother is 111<1t,. unlike Kymlkka, for whom attempts to protect elemenls of a community's character are 'lh""ityS. suspect, om foclIs 011 protecting commlmilie ,lS contexts of value will often justify i.KcOITIDnodaLio!1S designed to protect jJarliClllill as]x'ds of a Lommunilr's Lharacter. In short, while om theory of Ii bl.' ral n:llIllicullmiillism sb;u'es Kymlkka's desire to promote illdivitllu;.lls' interests ill illlWIHJmy, it diHers in that it promotes a much more substantive conception ot cmnrrmnity ami applies it to a Wider range 01 commllnities.. ProtL'CUon of Minimal Bases The exact natme of appropriate measures of protection will vary 'viLl! con Lext and circurmlances. lll! the itlleal case, protection need be exlended only Lo lhe minimal haS<es of communities. The i,dea of minimal bases can be underslood by comparing the relationship between a community's minirnill bases and its context of value to the relationship Iris tvlarion Young describes, borruwing fwm Je;.m-I'aul S;'lrlre, tJe~ween series and group, A series i:s 'fa social colleclive 'Nhme memlJt:'rs -ine uniJied passively by lhe objeds aroLlnd which their acliollSa[e orimted or by the Objectified resulls of lh~ material effe(ts of the actions or others," The classic example is thal of people ·wailing for a bus. l'lwy constitute a series in their "rel.ation to a material obje'Ct, ahe bm, ami the sociill practices of public transportatiorL"" The bus . and the sodal practit:es emociated with it . resulL hom human action bu~ each particular individual experi(!llces them ..IS something be or s.he (annot chauge, at leils1 110t over the short term. Unlike members oj a series, who have no common gOills, only a similar relatitmship to particular material objects and practices, Sartre's. group "is a collection or persons ..... 110 recognize themselves and one another as in a unilied re!ation with one another. [\"iembers of q/1e group HllJlually acknovdedge tll;.,t together they undertake a common project." The relatiomiltp behveen
group llntl series is iIluslrah..>(j il1 Ibe bus example: 1I'Ille latent polential of tllis series to organize il:self as a group will become manifest ... it the bus rails to come; Ithe ridersl ''1'i11 complain to one another about the lousy bus service, share horror stories of lateness and breakdo'!ivns, perhaps assign one oi their number to go call the company, or discllss sharing a taxi."~ 'Ib work tile metaphor, if communities embod}'ing contexls of value are Ilke series, amI those whu share particular inlerpretations of tbe meaning ami substance or the community's context nf vallie are like groups, then the minimal bases of (ommunities are like the material objff~s and pwctices that define the series (that is, the bus and the social practices of public transportation). The value of limiting protet:iion to minimal bases is that it allows LIS 10 protect a community's context of values while shm,\,ing maximal resped for the l111idity of individual memhers' self-identities and the multiplicity of their identifications, This allows communities to be preserved while minimizing opportunities tor communal factions to (!erme membership in ",,rays that marginalize those who do not sbare their understanding of the community or its traditions. The same point can be put another wa), by considering ]'an~kh's claim of nullures that I"it is rare, even impossible, for the entire system of meaning to become a subject of contestation and dispute. The contestation is limited to some areas, ami is onl}' possible because of a broad consensus on others.'" VVi! might think or protectong minimal bases as trying to preserve the basis of this broad consensus while trying to avoid privtJe~ing the competil1~ positions to the contestations. Tb return 10 the bus metaphor, this suggests two ways of protectlng the grollps lilal arise out of the series of bus riders: we can tailor special protection to Ihe specific char,Lcterislics of one particular group of bus riders, or "r'e can make sure the bus keeps fLlnning and shore up ahe social practices of public transportation. W'hile the flISt approach privileges one particular group of bus riders and likely excludes or marginalizes other members of the series, the y,:wml approach smlains the conditions for the survival of groups with many diflerent interprelaUol1S of the meaning of Ihe series without necessarily privileging anyone of them. Applying this appmach to identifying the minimalIJases or communities suggests the possihiliny of protecting substantive communities ''''hile maintaining maximal space for expression of situated autonomy. A necessary corollary is that onc-e slich space has been provided, indiViduals will 11.\ve to fmet a way to live in the community soconstituted or leave. To provid-e fmtber flexibility for them would r6quire jeopardizing the viability of the community for others. Th-e examples of the Irancophone Quebecois and W'elsh speakers illustrate the conlexl-dependent nature of minimal protection. }\lthough both communities tr-eat the ability to conduct life in their communal language as a cemral value, ancH thus. bave similar minimal bases (the abillty to live, work, and raise children in the communal languageJ, the Welsh speakers'
v,'ithin the l'ueb~o community - in effect, denying that semi-theocral}' is essential to the community's description - \'J.'OLIld not undermine it as a (,{)Iltexl 01 choice since it "wouldn't make the l'lleblo V'l.llnelflble to being outbid or out vok'd on cnIcial issues by the non-Pueblo population ... ; nm \·... ould il cr-e,Ue internal disintegration." This allm\'s him to condud-e that tbe i.kci~ion by the community to exp.d dissidents represents an llflljLlsliliable restriction on religious freedom: "If the goal is to ensure that each person is equallr able to lead their d10sen life within their own cu1tmal community, then restricting religion in no way pwrl'lotes ah;lt. V,,'eIe the theocracy ended, eLKh majority ITwmbe-r of tile Pueblo ,..,,'(.mld have as [mKh ability to use and interpret aheir own cultural experiences as the dissidenn 11linority, or, indeed, as memhers of the non-Indian community."'" From our perspective, h01.'t'ever, tili.s raises two quesLions, First, how can we delermine 'Nhether gran Ling religious. fr-eedom v.:ill CLluse the j'Lleblo to be outvoted on crucial is:me5 vdlilout first determining whethE"r the I'rolest.ants ace still members of the l'ueblo cOlmmmiay'? Second, how can we know thaI the I'm:blos' abil· ity to il m.l , and interprel their cultural expelicm:es'" has been preserved if we rduse to deftne those experiences! To answer either questiun \'1'e need a tlefinition of lile Pueblo community amI its minimallxlses. .svensson proposes .[ dHferenl solution., one refleding her presumption tll,~l cuHural c{)mmullilies have intrinsic vallie as a natmal and e'nduring aspeH of every Imm.m's experience. She describl5 the cultural community as a multidimensional gH.mp that has "many inter]{)cking dimemiom or facets shan:~d by its melnbers - ill an ideal case, for example, language, religion,. ethnicity., rLlce . 111111 historical experience, U is 1:omprehensive, in that membe'fs express virlually all oi their social identities through the group."'>' Given the culwrLlI monist .assumptions underlying multidimensional groups, Svensson yjews the I'ro~estams not .so much LlS individual deviants but as bearers of the values of a foreign cuitlm~. In other words., the conllict tbey create is not viewed as occmring within the Pucblo community but between representalives of llle "lmerican ulltmal community and the Pueblo cuilur
there ["{'mains an "appeaV' of last 1"es01t, an outlet for them - melge~ with the dominant sodety, 11 the Itlles off the -dominant soclety ,He im!M1Sed upon the mInority comnlUlI1itF across the b11iUd., the mlnorlty communtty has no ptLlce left to go, no Jefuge In which Its values tlml pllmlties Gm be recognized. Of h'w possttJJe ~nlmtlces, the fOrIller appears to he more acceptable tl,;m the
latter, sInce It pn~serves the J1le Pueblo governments whose authority is derived from trLlditional religiol1s
Robinson. Andrew M .. Multiculturalism and the Foundations of Meaningful Life Autonomy, Identity. and Community. Vancouver, BC, CAN UBC Press. 2007. P 134. http://site.ebrary.comllib/bilgi/Doc?id=10214451&ppg=134
pr('serve the community i.l~ i.l context of value and where the community's IlH!mbers rely on it to sll5tain meaning, accommodation can be jLlslifLed only for so long as these cundiliom apply. This will smeiy disappoint those who believ,l' ,communal i.Kcomm(l(iatiom should ensme the survival of cmmmmilies "through inLlefinite futme generalions:'" The impermanence principle simply rdlects the assumplion that in exercising meta-agency to sllstain me;ming in theil ti',res" people may re'je'Cl their inherited i<.\entiflCaliooJ1S, Respect for this capacity reqUires lhat the ability of individuals to ensure L11l!ir community's survival be limited 10 ttwir efforls to reproduce this desire in their young. Thus,. for imtallce, if, as recent books have suggested, "~orlh Anm.'rica's Je',vs, ,lS a whole, simply don'l care enollgh to imbibe Judahm themselves and convey it to tlleir children," lhe state should not empowel lhe commwlity to plcvenl this:c', How impl!rmanence is incorporated into protection will depend on cirCLllnstanc!:'s, H might he made explicil by (e,guiring communUy members to express periodic ~llpport for the prolection. I'm exampie, the continuation oi commllnal ~aB1C.1 ownership or Village self-governmenl for the I'ueblo or liJIllgLl;lge 1,]lNS in QlIehec could be made subject to approval thmLlgh elec· lions or through reierenda laken peIimlically or perhaps on the signing of enough Tl.lm-es on an initial!v!:'. This would allow a majority of community member~ to chome not to renew the pmtection if lhey found it lmneces,sary or t(}D tmrdensolllt:!. In other ca.S(,'5, impermanenG: may be only implicit; in lhe W'elsh 1.:as(', we[e people simply' lo slop purchasing subsidized Giltural products" or to fail to, qualify as competent ~Vdsh speakers for pllblic employment,. tllese protections wuuld simply fade away. Similarly, in the case of Shariil civil mbitration, wbile Ute Arbitration Act may remain in lorce, privale civil arbitration as a form of cultural ID<.IDntenance wOLlld last only so longiJIs imih'idllah chos'e lo invoke it by signing privilte agreements,
Principles Related to the Definition of Membership Chapter 5 noled titan tC) l!xtcnd protection to a comrmmity WIi? must be able to define its nature 50 that ,,,'e- can dete-rmine who belongs (;p. 96;. '~Vithollt :some ddinilion of membe[5hip it wmlld be irnpmsible to knmv" for instance, ".:110 shDuld have acceS5 lo lhe accommodations or \,... 810 has a right to parlicipal~ in decisions aboul retaining th~m. Such defmitioTl, it was suggested, Cilll be achieved consi:s~ent with om conception or the person by defining communities in le'rm5 of tbeir context of value. lv.'o principles - freedom of exit and obligations ,md rights of membership - are 5L1ggestt'd rOlf governing lhe dcl!nitkm oj membership criteria consistent with lbe fOLlndatiolliS of meaningful life.
Freedom of Exit The first j1ifinciple related to membership definition is that individual members
mmt he free to exit lhe mmmunily. Like the impermanence principle that makes communal membership collectively impennanem, Ihe freedom ~o exit makes membership impermanent for inJiividuals. Unlike the impermanence principle, though, ffL"C([om of exit must be respected by communities thal do not receive special accommodations as well as by those that do. Freeliom o[ exit is valuable for several reasons. (Its natme is considered [mtller in Chapter 7.) Hm, it reflects the JX)tentiai fluidity of self-identity - respect [or meaninglulliie requires that people be free to leave communities with which they no longer identify. A practical example of this is provided in Marion Boyd's recommendation that the Ontario Arbitration Ad be amended "S{) that if a -co-habitation agreement or marriage contract contains an arbitration agreement, that arbitration agreement is not binding unless it is remnllrmed in writing at the time of the dispme and before fhe ariJilraliol1 OCC11fS.".;· If a person's. identiflCatiol1S have changed since he or she entered the relationship such that religioLlS arbitration is no longer meaningful for them, this rule would al!mv them to rdlect this change. Se·cond, Dreedom of exit allows resp·ect for Huidity without undermining the ability of the community 10 s.ustain a comext of value for others who continue to identify with it. This reJ1ects thaq the decision by one individual to leave a cOImnunity does not in itself prove tl1,l1 the community is no longer valuable. ThLlS, the possibility of exit need not undermine the community's ability to survive as a context of value. A third reason for v.lluing freedom of exit is that, when taken together with the impermanence principle., it provides a measure of community memhers' prderence for their wal' of life - if they reall)' didn't like it" they were free, both individually or collectively, to renounce il."' The case of :\Hriam V\,i1ngal, as reported in the l()ronto Grolle and Ma/{, illustrates the Significance of this freedom.'" lvls V.'ilngal chose to leave her tribe in Papua New Guinea for the capital of Port l\·foresby after she hold been off.;:red toanother tribe as compensation for a killing, in accordance with tribal tradition. I\.'h VVilngal, it turned out, wanted to finish higb school, become (l typist, .mtl have her own money so she would not have to depend on a man. Se .... eral things are notable \,omen may choose to exercise this ireedom may have ,b lramformative efiect on the community,2. if the community is not .subjecte'!.j to involuntary clIltme change from outside,. it should be able ~o respond to this pressure in ways meaningful to its members. This is re~leded in the comments of Dr. ,Iohn Mtnlke, a professor of archaeology and a member of \15 \Vilngal's dan: "There are n~rtain changes that we have no choice hut to accept, like women"s rights and notions of equality. nut there are (:ertain things that we have to hold on to."'"
sUlvival of thl! Native spiritLl, amI allowin;~ the dissidenls 10 stay ' . . ·ilhoul renoLlnLin,g their nev,' commitrnenls. and in SG doing altering the character of the wider PLleblo communily in a way the dominant group believes \.,.iJl endanger it and the Nalive spiritual cmmmmit)f it supports. Rather than accepting this either-or characterization, Ollr appi"oach mggesls a different quesaion: Can protection be extended to the wider PLleblo comnmnily in a way that shows equal Il'Sjll'ct 10 all indivklll ..,ls· intl~resLs in leading meaningfLlI live.. ? Or, more pr,lCticaliy, how can till' col1ummily be preserved
'
requirement of formalized membership codes that make oflkial ccmcepliom 01 the community transparent-and open to criticism and debate, Criticism is especially Uk•.:!y to be generatl'<.l where community members .see friends ami family being lreated unfairly, or worse, being forced to lea .... e the community because they' cannot comply with its obligations. rrom what I understaml of the PLleblo case, the obligations Umt might result could include a duty to respect the form of government presenlly in place (this obligation, of course, cannot be unlimited - see pp, lSD-55), as \,,'ell as chilies directly related to sustaining the wider community, sLlch as tile duty to contribute lo the mainlenance of communal pastures and dikes. r...finimal rights of membership might indude the righl to partiCipate un the observ,mce of communal practices; the right to participate in the me of communal property sllch as pastllfesand equipment,: the right tn use one's sbare of communal lands ,1I1d resources in ways lhal dlo not threaten the wider community: and, of necessity, the right to participate in public discussions about the rights and obligations of membership. Similarly, the principle~ of minimal and impermanent prote£:lion should place pressures on the dissidents to moderate their demands. If the accommodations that have been made to pmte'Ct the community are truDy minimal - and thus the space created for them lo exercise situated aUlonomy by developing new idemiflcations and pursuing new purposes is truly maximal - then the Protestants' interest in having {:ontinuillg an:ess to the community" if it is sincere, should motivate them to avoid taking actions that would put those minimal bases at risk. As ,'t.'el!, the impermanence of protection should encourage them not to attempt to change the communit)' so rapidly or so radically thal the majority finds the community's continued existem~e to have lost any value for them. I helieve these and similar pressures, and the principles that generate them, provide the best hope for ;:m optimal practical s.olution. Pressure from non-members in the wider stale-level community - those who will also be expe,Lted lo shoulder burdens ,tssodaled with accornmodaUol1S - should ensure th,lt accommodations are minimal but, one hopes, not inslltlicienl. Tile need \0 win support from the membership of the i'ueblo community at large ,md the fear of drilling too many members away will put pressure on community leaders to create membership obligations lbat are not excessive. \Vith s.uch obligations of membership in place, the actions of both the majority and dissidents \'1'ill be conslrained in highly beneficial ways. lhe establishment of clearly defined membership criteria shows respect for ahe meaningfulness of the dissidents' lives. by providing lhe maximLlm mom for them to exercise situaled autonomy consistent with equal respect for other members of the ,community; s.n long lIS the dissidenb comply with these obligations, tribal officials 'Notuld be unable lo expellhem. If lhis space proved insufl1cient for tile dissidents to pursue the
purposes tlIey had estilbHshcd for themst!!ves" resp'ect for the meaningfulness of the other members' lives. requires them to exercise meta-ilgeIiC} to resolve ilny resulting dlissonill1ce. They would face a choice that would be llleirs alone to make: [,emain in the cmnmunity, comply with obligilitio[1S believed necessary to sustain it, exercise situated autcmomy to the extent consistent with the smvi'.'al of the community, ami work to change the membership obligations over time; or leave the 'community" enjoy less constraints on the pursuit of their purpose" (lnd" perhaps, enjoy limited privileges to pa.ticipilte in the community. This strikes me a~ more satisfactory than Svensson's i.lpproach of simply allowing. the oJlmmmiL), lo expt!! dissidenb or Kymlicka's posiliull thal the (ommunity should an.:ommouale almosl any new-found idenUfkalion, The key advant;lg;.:s lierating their understamlings oj the community in tbe interest of sustaining it as a context of \"aJue. [ra 189~ the Indian Agency in Santa Fe remgnized ,t comelv..dive /action as the (,j12 facto government. This was opposed by .a progrc~sive faction Ul1.li.. among other things, WilS agaimt involuntary participation in communal dances, refused to participate in the repLlir of dikes wbere it bcnelited on])' a few, LInd judged some Native customs by Catholic moral standards. Uespite their diiferences, however" the dissidents continued to act in ways cunsistent willI the preservation 01 the comrmmity. [n piillilllJar, tlIey silO'.ved resp-eel for tile I'ueblo "vailies of unanimity and lhe 11eed to express SL1ch vi'lllle~ through ceremonial activity." Hather than exit, the dissidents chose, as Dozier quotes Ht Aitken, to "be in the pueblo bLll not of it." In practice, this meLlnl that they participated in publk ,',;arks \'\'11en they found them acceptable ami openl:il de-licd the governing faction when lhey did not. Overall. while their actions. dismpled the [undioniug of the community, 11l{,Y weTe careful not 10 completely tmdermine it. The schism Wi:1S repLlired in EUS, when the fLlctions agreed ''1'ith i:1n Indian Agency proposal to adopt
J. \'r'ritlen constitulion and Lin elective form of government. Ihe H:'Sult ,,"'as a de iacto separation of church and state,;7 Even though the viDI~ge ended lip in'i situation similar to that advocated by liberals such as Kymlicka, the mule by which the community arrived at it allm"lred for the exercise of situated autonomy. Instead of moving immediately tcJ a liberal compromise, a period {forty-nne years) elapsed during which individuals could reorient their self-identities and reinterpret their identifications" and as weil, a fair amount of generational replacement could ocmr. This enabled the villagers to make radical changes to their community Vllilhout destroying it or themselves. Despil~ its imperfedio!15, this eX
Conclusion This chapter has continued the process of translating the foundations of meaningful life into the principles of a politicS of liberal multiculturalism. Four principles have been suggested to govern the design o! communal accommmjations: protection oi minimal bases, impermanence, freedom of exit, ana the definition oi obligations and rights of membership. Discussion of these principles sbed two key insights. By encouraging 115 to think in terms of protecting the minimal bases of mmmllllities, we h,we seen hO\l,,' accommnuatio!lS for communities can be sensitive to the complexity of selfidentity and thus able 10 reduce the risks of marginaliwtion by maximizing space for the exercise of situated autonomy. \Ve have also seen that the space
Robinson, Andrew M. Multiculturalism and the Foundations of Meaningful Life Autonomy, Identity, and Community. Vancouver, BC, CAN: UBC Press, 2007. p 144 http://site.ebrary . comllib/bilgilDoc?id=10214451&ppg=144
1\'Vhen .some :pueblos-adopted 1l1i!llorlty-mle elections . ] tbey dId so of tlll'lr own free will _.. IWben tbe}'1 felt prepared for tbe chilnge, they freely ,ldopted their own constitutIons, designed to meet thelK own needs ._. But It'lt](' chimges ilre forced upon us. wtthOllt our aH1s.ent - and! before our people Llre leady for them - they wlll drastLcally lmdenmne our
AJJJt'lIdmt'lIt.1
To complete the development of the politicS of liberal multiculturalism, lwo questions, about slate-community relations must be considered: How are claims 1m accommodations to be initiated and "'va Il1ated., and on wh,Lt grounds may the state intervene in tlle internal practices of communities.·' The chapter opens with a disclission of the initiation of claims and! the possihility of introducing an element of international adjudication, highlighted by a case study of the recent !itrug.gles of tbe ~H'kmaq pe{)pie oi Atlantic Cmada lor recognition of logging and fishing rights. I'rinciph:.':'5 to govern stale intefvt!nliol1 in the internal praclict!s of cOImmmilit..!s are tht!B slIggestt"C1., .\lith the cases of lVi.l'COII.~lll \~ ruiler and S,l1aria Llrbittration in Ontiuio illustrating how they might vl.'Orik in practice.
Initiating Claims for Communal Accommodations One key aspect of slate-community relaliollS involvt!s communities' appeal to tilt! state for accommodations. Chapter 5 establishes the leasibility of the lbree conditions under which the extension of special accommodation is consistent with respect for meaningiullife. But who should make the claims'? To vl'llOm should lhey be made? Hm',. should Lhey be dealt with] [s tilere a role lor international ,tdjudicaUon'?
\Vho Should Make Claims for Accoullnodation:"! !nconsidering wtlC) should memblies. Two of the most obvimls meli1ll'ds [or achieVing this - arJirmalive gerrymandering {r['drawing electoralLJollmlaries t(} increase the voting pO'Ner of a t['rritoridicaUy. This is problematic because com nmnilie5 given prote-ction loday may !lot need it tomonow, and communities that did not need it ~odily may have difficull}' aLlaining it lomorww,
Another problem is that sllch mechanisms tend to create a hierarchy of in-groups illJld out-groups. This can create incentives for groups to engage in zero-sum ccmHicts over the distribution of privileged! statUis.' This \'v'iI! ensure neither that groups really needing protection will receive it nor that group leadership will t,Lke a favourable attitude towards Uheir members' participation in cross-cutting groups. Instead . by permanently institutionalizing identity groups, we risk granting excess.ive power to group leaders over their members. This increases the possibility of group closure, \>\'l1ich could block development and change within communities. Thus,. ] ihgree wUh Phillips' dismissal of arguments "'for the extreme reversal of current liberal demm:ratic practice that 'NOllld substDtute group representation for the more gener;l! representation by political parties.'" if groLlps are not to receive special representation vdthin the state, how are tlley to be identifled? This, to quote [ris :/t,,'larion Yotlng, "pose Is] a paradox of polH leal origins. "" \Vhile we are fairly (Xunfortable dealing \vilh membership issues in communities th"t have already been organized, it i~ another question altogetllcr how communities not presently rt'Cognized should become Sil. The answer, 1 suggest, is that communities that make claims for special accommodations .should fmd their origins in sell-generation. People who believe they belong to a valuable community that is in need of accommodation should exercise their freedom of association 10 organiz.e their members and enter the politkal arena to make their case. This may reqUire creating entirely ne.v groups (rom scriHch, or it may involve reorienting existing groups to pursue tbis goal. In SLIm., claims lor ao[ommodation should be initiated by groups. that find their origins in the shared perception of a threat to the viability of a valuable community. This principle will not be popUlar '",,!l1l mmmunities presently enjoying LI special role in policy processes. It does, however, promise to ensure that communities receive the protection they reqUire, while reducing incentives to engage in the zero-slim games often a~sociate{j with 5chemes of permanent group representation.
To \"'hom Should Claims for Accommotlation Be Made? The question "To whom should claims for at'commodation be milder has sl10rt anS\',!er Llml a slightly longer answer. The short al1S\',.-er is implicit in many of lhe cases discussed. Claims ior an:ommodalion shOUld be made to tile stale institutions that have the constitlltiOl1
it
unaLJll! to make alternative iclerHiflCations with the communities available to them. Second., those making I.he claim mllst describe the specific meLlsures they are demam.ling. Ih:}' also mllst oifer a jtlStil1cation for the measures in tenns of their accoLint of the community's context of value and the nature of the thr-eats to its viability. Third, and finally, th{)~e making the claim I11mt transliLte their claim and their account of their commLmily as ,L context of vLllue into
A Role for International Adjudication? There is good reason to be concerned about the principle that the decisiol1s
amI foullu tllc InClfority's
1>n"kma<1 logging and fishing Rights The recent struggles of the :\1i'kmaq people of At),mtic Canada to achieve recognition or logging am.! fishing rights p[O\ridc an eXrt:ellent opportunity to iilu:!>lrale What this cl.i~lm-mJ;king pn.Kess might look like in practice ilIld to dis.cuss issues to which it r:.l!raw5 our attention. Tile r\.'[j'kma·q an: an Aboriginal people who l1 ..ve lived in wh.u are nm,,"' Cimada's Atlanlk province.s since before the first .. rrival of EmopealiS, At present they COrlSi~t oi less than 24,000 people, approXimately t\....o-thirds ol1..,.hom fiive ol1-re~en'e." Their story is a familiar one of first being treated ,15 tradlng parlrwrs ,tnt! military alli(;'S, then slowly being margil1aHzer:.l!, p'llsl1l!d on to small unplOdllctive plots of land, and generally excluded from lhe milinstrl!am economy, Rela.tiom between the Cilnadian state and th{' rvU'kmaq have typi·cally been {:haracterized by domination and sLlbordination ami not {'quoll respect of any sort for aL least ISO years, ·as witnessed by a petition sent to the Ikutenant governor of Nova s,mtia in 1849," At pre'sent, conditions on [cserves in /I,Uantk Canada are deplorable compared wiltl those of the m,Linstream Canadian communit}', .lI1d unemployment amon,~ Aboriginal people has nm at over twice the regional av{'rnge. ,n In this context it not surprising Ihallhe Mi'kmaq ha\,{' attempted to attain accommodations to proll!cl and promote their (.'omnmnities. The claims that lie 1l1~llind thi.s case study were initiated indep·endently by individuals ~uT'.~sled fm logging ~mtl fLshing vliilhout proll'er licences, [n both GISeS, these individuals daim~d the alTests were llnl;nvful b~came, as l.,,[i'kmaq, their rigilt to l!ngage in these activiti{'s ,.,.as secllrl!d under centmies.old1 treaties with the British Crown.
The defcnce 01 liberal multiculturalism developed in this book is intended neither 10 Sllpplement nor to fI..'placc treaty-hased arguments [or Aboriginal rights.. Each shollld be viewed as a distinct and independent basis lor justifying cullural accommodations. '·Vhile 1 recognize the importance of treaties to Ihe conlemporilry s~mggHes of Ahoriginal peoples in Canad" and I bclieve that treaty commitments .ShOlild be 11Onomed, this has no bearing on the present consideration of the Mi'kmaq case. Hilther., my interest is to examine the an:ommodatiom being claimed and the context in which they arise in order to consider how the claims the J..H'kmaq have made on the basis of treaties 'Nouie! proceed if made instead on the basis of respect for meaningful life. Vie,,,ed from this perspective, the treaties tilke on il different importance: they represenl a catalyst for dragging iI sometime.s ,veIl-meaning but almost ahva}'s complacent majority into negotiations. I have already identHled the three featmes th'lt a cL'lim should include. The ftrst is that the group making the claim provide evidence lh'lt it satisfies the three conditions for r,mlifying a claim {or special accommodation. The r.,.n'kmaq appear to hDple'··; "!1.·{i'km~lq pl"-ople continlle to view their present and their futme in local and regional tenm"; and i"milny 01 the communal v,lllIes ilnd assllmpHons that underpin indigenous cuhure [emain in evidence." As for the second condition, that members are threatened \.,.ilh the involuntary lms of access, to their community, economic and social conditions on reserves clearly pose a chalJenge to the long-term viability o! these mmmunities. Thm there is at least the basis for a preventative, if not a remedial, case for protective measures. Finillly, the third condition, tllat members are unable to make alternative identifLcations with the communities availabDe to them, is supported by the reiusal of many Mi'kmaq to abandon their communities "despite year~ of hardship and discouraging results from their negotiations and protests."'" While the evidence presented here is insufficient in itself to justify a claim, il indicates what a slIccessful claim might look like. Tile st'Cond feature il claim should include is a description oi the protective measures being demanded Lind a jllstitlcalion oi these measlIres in terms of the community's context oi vallIe and the threats it faces. [n this case, the ?...Ii'kmaq are demanding the right to engage in lislling and forestry in their traditional lands on a commercial hasis. These measures appear 'Nell suited to the communities the)' arc intended to protect. One of the greatest threats to tbe viability of these communities is their lack of e"Conomic opportunity ami their rel'llive isolation from other communities in which resident members could fund ' . . 'ork. Access [0 fishing and forestry could address this threat because many of 11le jobs they provide can be mastered by people without
reseifve communities, UlIi.' norH\hioriginal fishers are in .a betler position to sustain meaningfL11 lives if forced to leave their communities. 1 say this on lIw pre~Llmptionthal m{)~l of tile non-Akioriginallishers. ami loggers identify tiilecUy with the Canadian moral tradition as wdl as with olher commul1i~ies whosl' purposes could he pms.lled in many other Canildian or l'ven English-speilking comm~milies. A iO'luth set on interests includes those of non-members ilt large who might have to bear less diret.:t bmdens 'LS. a resuH of an ilccommodalkm. In matter of fact, these interests were predominantl), represented by busines.s ,,:orporalions and cons'2ivationisl gmup5. They had legitimate interests in pres.suring tile government 10 ensure thal an]' accommodatiom. extended to the },'1i"kmaq claims did not place excessive bLJrdem. on their pmp·Dses. The rifth and final 5e~ of interests is represented by lhe federal and pmvinciLlI govemments. Both governments were implk:aled becaus.e of tbe (omWution
1J1e initbli{)n of claims for cllltural accommodation consistent with tbe fOl1ndations 01' meaningful life involves several key factors. Claims should be initiated by groups that self-organize in response to perc{'ived tl1reats. Such
claims SllOUkl explLlin hDw their situation satisfies lhe three nmclitiom I'm jllstifying accommodation; they ShOllld d(!Scribe the speci[i<: accmnmoda· lions being sought,: and they should include a proposed set of commulial rights and obligations. [n evaluatlng claims, the stale should consider input [rom all interested parties,; it silould be guided by the principle of equal respe,et for meaningful lives in reaching its de,cision;
Intervention in the Internal Affairs of Cultural Communities A second aspect of stale-community relations involves state intervention in the inlernal aHairs of sub-Slate communities. The foundalions of meaningfullife can be applied t{) fom aspects of slate-{:ommunity relations: reasons for refraining from coerci\'c inlervention, intervcntion Lo proll"Ct "minimal conditions oi meanin,gful life," intervention to enfc}f{:e obligations to the state-'Nide community's moral tradition, and principles to govern the process of intervention. In this discL1ssinn I try to illustrate that the tmmdatinl1S of meaningful life do nol nced to be suppiemented to defend positions on these matters. A I)reference for Persuasion Given tbe foundational role that respect for meaningful life plays in our lheory,. any decisi{)n to intervene in the internal practices of cOlmmmilies c;mnol be takm lightly. Only in eases where meaningful life ils.elf is at risk can coerdve inten'ention be justifiedi otherwise,< it is 115ually cmmterprodllctive and cannot be nmntenam:ed. There are several reasons for such caution . One is simply respect {or the {act that penple mily lind me,ming in their present way of doing things and see no reason to change. A second, as argued in Cl1apler 4" is that intervention might actually threaten meaning in pe{)ple's.lives by preventing them from pursuing their signil1cant purposes or by undermining communities on \\'hich they rely for meaning. Third, lhe desire lo engage in coercive intervention may iJ-e more rellective of differences in power between communities th'1I1 of real threats to meaning. Being in Ll position to effect change makes it mllch easier to convince oneself that aspet:ts of another community that one 5mb oHensive are actually dangerOllS. Thus, '",here meanin,gful life is not at stake, tolerance is in order. Respect lormeaningfulHfe is ahvays consistent, however,'Nith non-coercive
forms. of inl;':'l"venlion such as. ,lrgumenl. exhortation, and p-erslIasion. ks long as Lho:>e .,.vito objecl to a comrrllmity's practices do not jorce anyone to listen Lo their arguments and no one inskle the community is, compelled to ignore Lhem, allY resulting c!1imges should reih::'ct the appeal oJ arguments to the lis Lener's governing ass,umplions and not diHelences in ' . . 'ealth or pmvel.
l\·1inimal Conditions of [I,·jeanillgful tife One on Ule grounds, on which the foundations of meaningful life can jllSlify intervention is re;pect fm the minimal conditions of meaningful life. Ihese cuntlilions ale illsti!ied iilS iil limilalion on the relationship be1\·...een comImmilies ;.md lll'eir memb~r5 since communi lies an~ \'aluable only lo lhe extern thaq lll.;;), suppmt imd promote HH~,mingfLllli\'l.'s. If, and lo th.;:· exlent LllilL., communities impede the enjoyment of meaningful lives, they have no value. On Lhis bLlsis, I. identify minimal conditions that all communities must resp.;:cL !II thinking aboLlL minimal conditions \""e mmt be cognizant of the didferem:e betw';:<2!1 tlw inLeres15 of children and adults that \,;'as first noted in Chilpk'f 2. Thi, is rellE'Lled in HUcbard Arneson's observation that, unlike adll Ititcl'od, childhood occurs "before the individual has much expe·rience of Lile world and.ill fullr !'orm.;:d sel of preferences in respons~ Lo iL.'··'" Meaningful lives presllppu:;e situated auwnomy ami itlelltilkaliom with wmmunilies Lhal connect people 'with conLexts of value., v,lhich together enable them to fmm and pur5lle Significant puwmes. In terms of this conception of meaningflll life, it is meful Lo think of childhood as the time when people's greatest inLerest is in developing secure identifICations and adulthood as a Lime when people"s greaLest interest is in exercising situated autonomy. tviinimal condition:; 01 meaningful life will vary according to this. tlislilK· Lion. 1\·f
The relationship between the pLlrsuit of meaningful iives by adtllb and the development of signilicanL identifications by LlH'ir children is geneualljr nOIlcoercive ,mel indivisible. Kenneth Henley illustrates this in his discussion of reli,gioL1S socialization:
[11 the early ye,m, of the child's. sociallZAltlol1, 1110' will be smrmmded by tile rdlglolls Hfe ot hi, parents. Since tbe parents have a light to live such re!jglom 1I\'es, and on the assumption that cblldren li\'i11 normally be raiSt"tli by tbelr pilrents" parentallntluence on the chUd's religious lite Is both legitimate ilnd! unavoidable .,. at such ,m emly stage It Gill hmdly IJ.;: said tbat coercion h Involved; the ehl!d simply llves in the midst of a religious ,'ray ()~ llfe ilnd comes to shale In Jr."
The value or sil1u;~w ~Udillliz,ltilll1 cannot be that it eTl:SUJCS that the contexts of value with whicll children identify will embody true rcpre5<entations or "ul*,'clive reaHI}'." Imtead,. i~ lies in the respect it shm\'s for meaningful life. By ensuring that childrelfl receive the besL account of ubjective reality ,ronsistent wiLl1 the development of secure identificatiollJS. children are protected [rom the pain of discovering not only that their conLexts of valr.te generate dissonalKe or le
of their ba~ic lights or fear of plIni:;lllnents (or offenses thJt do not exist." Il W'hile children I1l"fd not be "exposed" to other ways of life, as proponents of the eXlimined life and some theories at liberat education sllgge:;t, they must learn that other ways of lile exist in the wider comml1nity and that ahey are free to leave lile comrmmily to pms.ue Jny of them. This does not reqllire tbal their education prepare them to pursue those ways of life or that it "'require or strongly invite ILhemlto become sKeptical or critical of their own ways of lile."·' This is also consistent ' .... ith informing them (hJt if they do leave the community tlley may not be aliowed to rejoin it in the future. \OVhere 5ocialiwlion is verJcious, liol1-expJoitiw, capable of beil1g rel1ollnced. and forthright abollt alternatives, socializers help childlren develop seGue identifications 'NHhollt, in their zeal for their own purposes, undermining Iheir children's capacity for meaningfllllives. ,""'here these conditions are not met, onterv{'ntion by the wider community may be jllstifted.
internal allairs of sub-state communities. These include the obligations to ensure that children practice toleration, that they develop a capacity for jllstiflcatory reciprocity, that they learn to value the wider community as a "almble moral tradition, and that tbey develop the capacity to act as citizens of a demo·cratk policy. Illustrative Case Studil'S State intervention in the internal affairs of communHie.s can be justified in keeping with our {:ore value oi meaningful life where it is reqUired to sLlstain respect for the minimal conditions of meaningful life and to enion.:e obligations arising from the wider political community's status as a moral tradition. Let LIS now consider two cases and how it would apply in each. lVisn1fl.\·in v. Hula is a GL5e where intervention would not be justified. The demand for Silaria arbitration in Ontario is a case where it could be.
lVhnmsin 1'. ihda The lbd4!f ,case arose 'Nhen the state of \Visconsin decided to require all children, including those hom Amish communities, to attend school to age sixteen rather than age fomteen. Hesides the two extra years of educa o, tion, thi5 would reqUire the Amish children to be bUS5ed to larger urban schools. The Amish argued against this pOlicy, saying that high scllool education "lends to emphasize intellectual ami scientific acmmplishments, self-elis,tinction, competitiveness, worldly SlIccess, ami social life with other students." This, they suggested, made high school t'{hlCation inconsistent with "Amish .societyl, whichj emphasizes informal leaming-thmugh-doing; a life of 'goodness,' rather than a life of intellect; wisdom rather than teclmical knov,.'ledge, community welfare, rather lhan comp€tilion; and! separation from" rather than integration with, conlemporary society.'" Testimony at lhe hearing suggested that "compulsory high school attendance could nol only result in great psychological harm to Amish children, becaus,e of lhe conllicts it would produce, but would! als.o ... ultimately result in the destruction of the Icommunityj."'7 Om interc'Sl in this case concerns whether \Viscomin's intervenllon in the Amish community could be iluslified. We Cim begin om analysis by identifying the variolls interests at play. This approach allm'':s liS, to ackJ1(w,ledge and sl1pplement the interests ,joel Feinberg identified in his disclIssion of the case. l;einberg's analysis focl1ses on one of the key valUi.;os "ve derived trom the core vallie ot meaningful Iiie: personal autonomy. I-lie argues that the goal of autonomoLis selves should be to achieve selfofullilment hy developing "one's chief apLitlldes inlo genUine talents in a life that gives them scope ... and an active realiZation of the universal human propensities to pl,m" design and make order." This is the basis 01 his claim that children have it righl-in-trust to an "open future." Vie,.,.ed through Feinberg's lens, roder is about balancing autonomy interests: those
Llun a fifth of the children leave the community before 'H.lullhood."·'" Thm, as Amish socialization doe~ not appear to violate the minimal [ondHiom of meaningful life, intuvenlion could not be legitimized on this basis. The ca~e is much the same for the obligations arising from membership in the 'Nilier cnmmLlI1itty. Amish socialization is compatible '<\'ith respect for other p,,-'ople's pursuit 01 meaningflillives. Children are not raised to be intolerant of outsiders' ways of life. Further,. Amish beliefs appear compatible ,·"ith fustiflcatory reciprocity: one of the reasons they are said to v.due public education is that it prepares children 'ito be able to deal with non-Amish people ""hen necessary in the course of daily affairs,""·1 Compatibility with justificatory reciprocity is also suggested by tbe HJLier case ibelf: the Amish demollStrated their ability to sllccessfull},' collch their position in terms of the First Amendment right to free exercise of religious beliefs. Finally, their commitment In Ille ''''ider community as a <:Ol1text of value is suggested by their willingness to work through the American jlldicial system and to have tbeir children educated in its pLlblic s.chools. The only minimal condition of meaningiul lives the Amish may iail to meet is the requirement that children be prepared to act politkally as citizens. This, however, does not appear to be the case, Eight years of public school education should! be enough to emUfe that Amish children are aware oi their political righls, and the principles, workings, and history of the polilkal institutions of lhe wider political community. Although their values discomage active participation in \'\'orklly politics, the Amish do seem to accept the necessity to be good citizens. As was noted in lhe Voder decision, the Amish "do not objet"t to elementary l't!ucation throLlgh the first eight grades as Ll general proposition heGlUse they agree that their children must have basic skills in lbe 'lhree R's' in order to read the Hlble, land] to be good farmers and citizens.".'nI Besides demonstrating how om principles might apply in practice, this analYSis olltJiler illustrates tthe capacity of ollr approach to address diffinllt practical issues without invoking pIinciples or vall1es external to the theoreticaliramework'" Sherrill ArbitmlhJlJ 1,1 OIl/ario
Chapters S ami (] sugge~t lhat the claim by some Ontarian !\,fimlims for Sharia arbitration in mallers of family and inheritance law i~ compatihle \...·ilh concern ior meaningful life. Concerns have been raised about this accommodation that, [ argue, could justify state intervention. The most serious foclIS on the types of decisions that could be made by SLKh tribunals and the qualily of the coment of tllOS/c, primarily women, who agree to be governed hy them. In discL1ssing this, [ wish to illustrate tbree points: that tllese are seriolls concems, that the pril1ciplc..'S suggested here for governing inlervention prcwide a l1sefullangllage ior assessing such concerns" and that
support their ex-wi\'cs (Jonly "(or three memtmLli (}'cles or until the birth 01 a child already conceivedal the time of the divorce." As Bloyd notes, in collntries such as CmLlda where the state provid(:'S social assistance to the destitute, this principle 'N{Juld probably have the effect of placing an unfair burden on non-members, V..'110 will have to !lear this cost through their taxes.'" In this case, state intenrcntion could be justilied to reconcile the equally Legitimate interests of members and non-members in being able to pursue their signilicant purposes. I say mu!!! because i suspecl that the mml1lali\"e impact of such seHlements,. were they to be made, ,.,.ould L>e negligible and certainly flO more signilkant than the monetary impact of many other personal decisions we feel people are entitled to make. [n considering concerns about the quality of women's consent to use Sharia arbitration, ,ve fimll three bases for questioning the tegUimacy of this consent: the pOSSibility of spousal abuse, communal pressure to consent, and the ~pedal case of !1C'W immi£rants.'" The concern that vl'Omen may consent to the me of unfair amitralion principles because they are being abused by their spouses is reasonabBe but nol one thin should be limited tn I'v1mlims. Where women mnsent because they are being abused,. this clearly represents a failme 01 respect for situated autonomy. As such, ~tate intervention is jllstified. l'Iere <'tgain, though, intervention does not require abandoning the accommodation; it can take the form of the introduction of a s.;.,feguarcl to the procedure, Boyd, ior example, recommends that arbitrators be trained and reqUired to sC[{'C'n parties w identify issues of power imbalance ami domestic '\Iiolence~'J The pOSSibility that women may sign Sharia arbitration O:l£reements in response to communal pressure raises more complex issues. The concern here is not so mucll with the stmcture of Sharia arbitration as a cultural accommndation but \\lith the uses to which this. accommodation might be put within certain segments of the !\,fuslim community. For example, vo.'Omen \'\')10 refllse to sign such agreements may be threatened \·... itb excltD5ion from the Jill' and institutions of the community. This concern has been described succinctly by HO~'d: "/1. woman may be told that it is her religiOUS or community dUly to accept \vhichever adiudicalive rollte is chmen for her. Her fear oj isolation from her comnumity, the possible negative impact on her children, ami concerns of being considered an aposlate in her faith may force her inlo sllbmitting to one lonn 01' dispute resolution over another. ">1 This situation is especially troubling because the source of the pressure is not derived from some raw coercive force sllch as spousal abuse. [{,htber, it emanates from indivkllllais exercising their right to freely Clssociate or not associate with whomever they choose, and from religious institutions, as VOluntary associations without the support of criminallilw" exercising their right to delineate "who is inside and V>'l1O is ol1tside the cOimmmity according to the community's own norms."'"
Tl!i~ pr~:>el1Lsa genuine dilemma. Oil the one hand, ahe religiom com· Illunity is iii a position to exerlthis pressure on its members only because the slate has created the ilibitration process. This suggests repeal of the legislation as
or
The Hider and Sila[ia ca:s€ studies demonstratl.! the ability of om approach to facilitate principled discussions of difficult issues" all within the theoretical framework derived from the foundations of meani nglll I life. \'Vhile, as thes,e CiiSes. make dear, this approach cannot promise to prevent all dilemmas and difJicull choices, its conception of personal autonomy and itlentiflcalion with community as mutually reinforting values allows us to address conflicts in ways sensitive to imerests derived fmm both values, The Process of Intervention Ttl complete the elaboration of this accmmt of Iiber'il mullicullllfali5m sOl11l.!thing must be said about the process lJY which intervention should bl.! carried oul. :\'Iosl of the same principles ",.'i11 apply here as applied to the initiatiun of clLlims. As fur the initiation uf intervention, it is. likely to have various sOLlfces. For adults, we would exped the initiative to usually rest with the individuals themselves by appealing to ll.!gislatmes or COllTts when they helieve a community is nol respecting their righls. [n extreme CLlses, such as torture, murder, or unlawful conl1nement. the initiative may lie "vith organs. of the state such police forres or witb non-governmental organizations. Regarding the interes.ts oi children, concerned relatives or neighhours or any of a variety of institutions, including social services agencies, legislatures, Llnd school inspectors, could initiate intervmtion. Five principles seem 'lpplicable to the process. of intervention, First, equal respect for meLlningful lives reqllires that when the slate conslders inten'ening in the inlernal affairs of Ll community, it mllst give community members an opportunity to explain "vhy they believe intervention is llIl\-varranled Of indeed they do). There are good reasons to believe that 5Uch interaction may be more than symbolic. Given the \·. . ide range of traditions and contexts of value likely to exist ''.'ithin diverse societies, the meaning and purpose 01 a community's practices and institutions often will not be transparent to state actors., [n slIch cases, dialogue Gill be mutually edllcalive and! may lead Ihe state to change its views. The other fOllr principles are simply carried over from the discussion of the initiation of claims (pp, 14D-44). In deciding whether 10 proceed with intervention, state actors. should consult all affected interests and be guided by the principle of equal respect for individual interests in meaningful liie. Although the authority to make binding decisions in these matters should rest with relev;.IIll state institutions,. aggrieved communilies ~holild be 'ible to appeal to international ,adjuclkators to receive non-binding but morally potent opinions. Summar}"
As ,'\'e have seen,. the theory of multiculturalism derived from the fmmdalions
of meaningh.J life has the cap,lCity to inform principles th,i~ Gln help alliswer practical policy questiom. Resplhcl for meaningful life pmvitlles a range of rmsons bolh for amI agaimt interlt'enlion that can usefully be invoked v,'hen considering what to do in il pi.1rtiwliu case. Thes.e includL! chiklren's imerest in developing thL! ,capacity to lead meaningful lives,. adults' interests in maintaining the ability to lead me;mingful lives, and the slale's inlerest in enfordng obligatiDns associated with its moral lradition. rhe Amish in Whcol1Sin <md Sharia adjudication in Ontario GlSeS tlemonslrah~ the practical .·fi'kmaq logging and fishing righ ts ilillstra~c:s tile import of lbese principles. Tilis chapter ,llso addressed state intervention in the internal affairs of communities. '!,"hile respe·ct [m me;mingfullife is more comislenl with the me of persuasion than cm;'rcion" u}E!rcive intervention can be jU5lilied in cases. where communities rail to respecl the minimal conditions of meaningful life (lhese differ between dealings with children ilml those 'NUh adlills} or to respect obligatiollS to the Wider community ".s a.lTImal tradition. With thl':Se considerations, the development of a politics oi liberal mullicuBLuraliSllil derived from the ioundaliol15 of meaningfUl life is nm.". complete.
You don't undelslamllt, you won't undelstanu It, and, quite honestly, YOll don't ne-ed to IImh:rstand it. The point hs that we want It, we consider It kmportnnt, and v.'e as/.: you to respect th:H. Rabbi Klmcbe, quoted b}' Cal\rln ']) men, "Drawing the Unc," nIt' New l'iJJ1~t'li B99-!
?>,-ly inlervention in the Ilberal multiculturalism debate
Gin be summarized thus: by returning to first principles to develop the Immdlations of meaningluJ life . I aim to develop a model of jllSt relations in CllllllfalJ~r diverse states . a set of principles for realizing this, and a vocabulary for advocating its implementation. \>I,rhat are the m.ilin accomplishments of this intervention? As the very appeal to the fOllndational value of meaninglullife stlggests, this hook's nmtrihlltion is. more in the nature of innovation or reconfigmation than of invention. [t clearly stands on the shuulders of thuse who have gone before it, but in standing on many shoulders, I like to think it has. achieved a novel and lISdlll per5ptl.>ctive. Of the insighb thal have been revealed, I sLress four, Starting with the most theoretical ami moving towards. the most practical. these are that it is. lISei'll) to return to first principles Lo address concerns ,tbOllt liberal ml1lticuhurali~m, that the foundations of meaningful life offer a credible and compelling account of the relationship between individuals and communities, that these same foundations can provide a coherent justification for the claims of the liberal culluralist consensus, and that the Lerminology developed here is of practical importance to- the realization of just relations in cuhuraUy diverse states.
The Importance of First Principles A key supposition of this book is that much is to be gained by foeming on first principles or foundational assumptions. This proposition is supported
in t'NO ways. Chapter 1 presents th(! case mgatively b}' demonstrating how concerns with other theories raises questions Lhat could b(! answered only by returning to fOllmlational assumptions. The rest of the book presents the case positively by developing such il set of first principles in B'art 2 and demomtrilting their pr,l(liGtl applicability in I'art 3.
Relationship between Individuals and Communities The account of tIle relationship between individuah and ;communities embodied in the foundations. of meaningful life represents .1ft second contriblltiUl1. Hs impDrtalKC Lan b(! demonstrated in two ' .... ays: by its ability to ".'xplain why ~l!'.;rs{)nal autonomy and identifH:alion with comnnmity should b(! uml(!rstoud as mutLlally suppmtiv(!, rather than inh(!rentJ}' contlictual, values; and by th(! way it enables m to address key issues identified in Chapter I. The fmt key move in lhe devdopmenl oi the foundations of meaning. lui life v..'as W identify im underlying value that might explain hm\' varioll5 conflicts and tensions - oeh',ieen individu.ll and community, autonomy and idemilRcation . modem (md premodern ·cultures - could be reo:mciled. That value, o~ course, 1'1'aS meaningful life, defined as the pursuit of subjectively signHicanUy pmposes. Once identifled and brought to the fore, tbis comeplioll of meaningful was used to transform [Om:eptions of personal a'lllOnomy and idenLilkalion with community such that we could see how they iJ'ct~lally work together in suppDr1 of meaningful life. Situated autonomy presumes identifications with communities·,as,-con1ex1s-a(-values that can provide individuals with slLmdards to inform their dlOices. At the same time, communities-as-contexls-Of-value depend for their vitality on the I"x·ercise of sitLlate'd autonomy by which their members, through metaagency" constantly del1ne and redefine those contexts in response to changing circumstances. So ·conceived, autonomy and identification work together to (!nable people 10 ~orm, pmsue. ami Stlstain signifLcant purposes. Neither ciJln do this by itself. The foundations of meaningful JHe also infmm clear and consistent posilions on many of the issues identified in Chapter il. The general conception of the r-eb1ionship bet'Neen individuals and communities is rdll!cted in the idea on self-identity as flUid-yet-fragile. The fragile aspecl sLlggest5o, contrary to KukatJns and Ronald DV\'orkin, why some commLmitics 5ohould not be lr-eatcd as merely voluntary associations. The conception of self-identity as !luid and potenti.aJlr en1.:ompassing identifications with multiple communities pruvides a more c{)fIlpelling conception of the relationship bl!t\veen individuals and communities lil,m that suggested by cultural monism. In fact, the conception of the relationship beh... een individuals alfld communiti.e~ is most similar ~o the fluid identity/constitutive community conceptiolfl
me
The association of the value of commllnities with their ability to function as contexts of value helps clarify other issues. First, it clearly associates. cultural intl!fests with individuals., not groups. Second, the emphasis. 0111 communitya5-context-{)f-value has implications for the lypes of community that can warr,mt accommodation. The poinl is not that n,uiom or societal cultures cannot warrant accommodation - for they may where they embody v,lhmble contexts of value - but that there is nothing special about thdr capacity in this regard: other types of communities - ethnic., religioLls, indigenoll5; modem, premodern, traditional- may perform tbe very same iUl1ctiom. Finally, this SlIggests that valuable commtmi1ies should be recognized, defmed, and protected in terms of the quality for which they are valued: the context of value which they embody. This approach suggl!sts that connkts, both intra- ancl intercommunal, are best addrl!ssed by adnpting principles rellectillg equal respect for meaningfullife. [n particular, we should ensure that protection is minimal - that is, impl!rmanl!nt ami focused Oil the community's minimal b.tses - and th.. t Immbersl1ip is defined to allmN freedom of exit and according to membership codes th .. t clearly detine members' rights and obJigatinns. \:'I/here the tensions these prindples induce pmve insuflicienl to prevent conflicts, resolution is to be gUided by direct appeal to the value of meaningful life. Within communities, those who \vish to exercise aLltonomy in ways that threaten the minimal mnditio!'lS necessary to sustain the community as a context of value must moderat,e their claims or leave the mmmllnity. Between communities, resolution reqUires identifying conditions that \·\lil1 show equal resped for all citizens' interests in meaningful life. \Vhere no commllnity can demonstrate that meaningful life is at stake, however, resoilltion should be left to normal political processes. This approad1 is not intended 10 emure identical OlltCOlTI(.''S .lcmss different contexts but to apply consistent and comprehensive principles so that resolutions neither are nor appear to be arbitrary or capriciOUS. Finally. the fOLlndations of meaningful life infonn a cleaf and principled approach to socialization. Unlike those wl1n would treat socializ,;tion as sometl1ing to be overcome, this approach views it as an essential process by which imlividu.tis develop the identifications essential to their capacity to act alltonomous adults. That this approach recognil.es that chiidren have an interest in socialization does not mean they must be left to the mercy of th~ir socializers; the vallie of meaningllli life that counsels rl"Spect for processes of s(}cialization also informs principles that cern justify legitimate state intervention in these very same proce~ses.
The Uberal Culturalist Consensus Besides informing a credible accollnt of the relationship between individuals and communities, the fOllndations of me,mingi"ul life ctln justify the six
presume the moral (listimJivcness of mooem nations? Conversc]y, how can II1m.e who ;weep! these dominanl Iheories no! view the accommodiltion of Ifaditional, premodern, or illiberal groups as arbitrary and un ili~t? \1y glliding intuition has been that the way ahead, if inoeed there is a way ahead, mtlst involve appeaJ to s.omc valuc thaI can be acccpted without compromise from ''>'ilhin cach of these perspectivcs. I believe the foundations of meaningful life conslitute this way ahead for two reasons: the assmnptions on which tiley are based do not necessarily deny the legitimacy of any way of life - modem or premodern; liberal or illiberal; national. ethnic, or indigenous - ami, as the quotation of Rabbi Kimche in the epigraph 10 tlli~ ConclLlsion sll1,;gests, 10 act on them we do 110t need to undersland,. accept. or celebrate other people's colltext.s of values. W'e need only recognize that they value lbem and lbat they differ from our own.
final Word: Liberal Multiculturalism [ belicve that Ihe theory of mlliticulturalism developed here represents the most extensive recognition thal can be given to cliiturat diversity while maintaining a commitment to the moral universalism that underlies the very idea of human rights. Ht is a liberal ami universalist theory of multiculturalism, not an an}'thing-goes cultural relativism, because the very s.ame principle of respect for meaningflillife Ihat jusUlles the accommooation of ClIlturally diverse communHies also provides a basis for judging,. and al times intervening in, the internal practices of Ihese communities. As such, I believe it strike'S the halance implkit in C:arem.' call for Ji a -critical perspeclive which is at the same time open to the pOSSibility of genuine differences among people's "alLies amI commitments" and Eis.enberg's call for "an approach that systematically and fairly incorporates the cullmal ancH historical circumstances oi different people into analysis, withollt giving everything away to context."! Only stich a theory, or another that achieves similar olltcomes by different means, call iustify the hope of achieving a non-coerced consenslls on the nature of jLlstice in relations among the cLiitmally diverse peoples ",.ho inhabit the world loday.
limitE'\.1 liy lliltat b al'ailabll! in LIllI ~OLil!t}·,~ I~l,. Till' MImi/iIi' o{ I-'fl"l·,IIt.'llI, :~9.f. Similarly, JlL' ha~ ti!!sl1iited a~ '(ilUm!?; ui sudalil.a'lio£l·T 111(
