Moldova: A Romanian Province Under Russian Rule : Diplomatic History from the Archives of the Great Powers

MOLDOVA: A ROMANIAN PROVINCE UNDER RUSSIAN RULE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE GREAT POWERS MARCEL MITRAS...

Author: Marcel Mitrasca

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MOLDOVA: A ROMANIAN PROVINCE UNDER RUSSIAN RULE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE GREAT POWERS

MARCEL MITRASCA

Algora Publishing New York

© 2002 by Algora Publishing. All Rights Reserved. www.algora.com No portion of this book (beyond what is permitted by Sections 107 or 108 of the United States Copyright Act of 1976) may be reproduced by any process, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, without the express written permission of the publisher. ISBN: 1-892941-86-4 (softcover) ISBN: 1-892941-87-2 (hardcover) Library of Congress Card Number: 2002-005746 Mitrasca, Marcel. Moldova : a Romanian province under Russian rule : diplomatic history from the archives of the great powers / by Marcel Mitrasca. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-892941-86-4 (alk. paper) 1. World War, 1914-1918—Territorial questions—Bessarabia (Moldova and Ukraine) 2. Romania—Foreign relations—1914-1944. 3. Allied and Associated Powers (1914-1920) Treaties, etc. 4. Bessarabia (Moldova and Ukraine)—History—20th century. I. Title. D651.B4 M55 2002 940.3'22—dc21 2002005746

Front Cover: Romania (1918—1940)

Printed in the United States

CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGIES: 1. Bessarabia until 1919 2. The Paris Peace Conference and the Bessarabian Question 3. The Bessarabian Question since 1920

1 3 6

INTRODUCTION Opportunity from Crisis Strategies Terminology Author’s Purpose Resources

9 9 10 10 12 14

PART ONE - BESSARABIA AND THE UNION WITH ROMANIA

17

CHAPTER 1. A BRIEF HISTORY OF BESSARABIA

17

CHAPTER 2. THE MAKING OF THE UNION Background Making the Union Delays in Romania’s Ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty The Aftermath of the Union Comments Annex: Decree of the People’s Commissars, Breaking Relations

27 27 31 39 40 43

CHAPTER 3. THE MAKING OF THE BESSARABIAN TREATY Shifting Positions in the First World War Success at the Paris Peace Conference The Paris Peace Conference and the Bessarabian Question A Chronology Annexes: Bratianu and the Council of Ten, February 10, 1919 Bratianu and the Council of Five, July 2, 1919 The Council of Ten and the Bessarabian Question, August 1, 1919

53 54 60 66 68

46

85 86 89

The Romanian Action in Bessarabia at the Council of Heads of Delegations, October 11, 1919 Al. Vaida-Voevod and the International Council of Premiers The declaration adopted by the Representatives of The Principal Allied Powers on March 3, 1920

92 93 96

PART TWO - THE GREAT POWERS AND THE BESSARABIAN TREATY

105

CHAPTER 4. THE SOVIET UNION The Bessarabian Question and Soviet-Romanian Relations Bilateral Relations Before and During the Paris Peace Conference The Warsaw and Vienna Conferences From 1924 to the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations From the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations to the 1940 Crisis The White Russians and the Bessarabian Question Annex: Memorandum of the Bessarabian Delegates, August 1919

105 105 107 114 123 132 142 153

CHAPTER 5. THE UNITED KINGDOM During the Paris Peace Conference The UK’s Role in the Signing of the Bessarabian Treaty Motivation Reasons Negotiations The Ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty The UK Position after the Ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty Annex: Report, Frank Rattigan (Bucharest) to Lord Curzon

167 167 170 170 172 174 186 190 197

CHAPTER 6. FRANCE Romanian-French Relations during the Peace Conference The French Ratification Conclusion — The French Position after Ratification

203 205 214 226

CHAPTER 7. ITALY Romanian-Italian Relations Before and During the Peace Conference The Ratification Question. First Phase, 1920-1926 The Ratification Question. Second Phase, 1926-1927 The Aftermath of the Ratification

237 237 240 251 260

CHAPTER 8. JAPAN First Period: 1920 to 1927 Signing the Bessarabian Treaty The “Passive” Period The Ishii Note The Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between Japan and the Soviet Union From the Exchange of Letters to the Italian Ratification Second Period: 1927 to 1932 The Ratification Question and the Fishery Negotiations The Romanian Campaign for Ratification during the Ministry of Ion Aurel Vassiliu

269 270 270 272 276 280 287 289 292 300

The Romanian Campaign for the Ratification during the Ministry of G.G. Stoicescu The Nakamura Interpellations Charles Davila and the Japanese Ratification Question The End of the Romanian Campaign for the Japanese Ratification The Third Period: 1933 to 1940 The Mass Media and the Japanese Ratification Question The Romanian Press The Japanese Press Conclusions Romania’s Diplomatic Actions Japan’s Relations with the Soviet Union

309 310 312 314 316 321 321 326 331 331 334

CHAPTER 9. THE UNITED STATES Romanian-US relations during the War Romanian-US relations during the Peace Conference The Russian Question and the US Position on Bessarabia Romanian-US Relations during the 1920s Davila’s Campaign for US Recognition of the Bessarabian Union Conclusions

345 346 352 361 366 372 389

PART THREE - TO CONCLUDE. . .

401

CHAPTER 10. SUMMARY The Great Powers and the Bessarabian Treaty Consequences of the Failure to Bring the Treaty to Force

401 401 411

APPENDICES The Bessarabian Treaty of October 28, 1920 Bibliography Index

417 421 437

IX

Acknowledgements Many persons and institutions kindly supported me in my work, and I would like to express my gratitude. First among them is the Japanese Ministry of Education, who provided me the necessary scholarship funding to conduct my research. Dumitru Preda, the director of the Romanian Foreign Ministry Archives, was unfailingly helpful both in granting me access to the files and in giving me advice in my work, and his distinguished colleagues in the Archives were gracious in their support for my research. Mrs. Georgeta Anghel and her colleagues at the Romanian National Archives gave me access to the microfilm collections of documents dealing with Romania that had been identified in the French and British Archives. I also enjoyed the privilege and pleasure of conducting research in the Archives of the Japanese Foreign Minister in Tokyo, where I was accorded access to all the files that were of interest to me and received guidance whenever needed. I have received invaluable advice from my professors in Aoyama Gakuin University of Tokyo, whom it is a great pleasure to thank here: Shigeki Hakamada, and Akio Watanabe. The first is among the best-known Japanese scholars in Russian affairs and was of great help to me especially for the chapters regarding the Soviet-Romanian and Japanese-Romanian relations. Professor Akio Watanabe, a scholar in international relations, pinpointed the correlations between the Bessarabian Treaty and the international context. Taizo Watanabe, a former high-ranked Japanese diplomat, was kind enough to give me insights into the workings of Japanese diplomacy. Also, my deepest gratitude goes to my professors at Babes-Bolyai University of Cluj Napoca for their professional guidance and advice regarding not only the present work but also, generally speaking, my preparation as a historian. Among them Nicolae Bocsan, Vasile Vesa, Marcel Stirban, George Cipaianu, Liviu Tarau, Nicolae Edroiu and Alexandru Diaconescu, to mention only a few. Professor Gheorghe Iancu of the same university played an important role in the making of the present book. I would like to thank Miss Keiko Ito for her help in translating the Japanese documents, and Algora Publishing for skilful editorial aid. Last, but not least, great thanks to my wife, Delia, for her invaluable assistance in every phase of the work. Marcel Mitrasca Japan, April 22, 2002

CHRONOLOGIES Bessarabia until 1919 DATE (parens. = Old Calendar) AD 101-102, 105-106 271-274 14th century 1511 1775, May 7 (18) 1812, May 16 (28) 1818, April 29 (May 11) 1828, Feb. 29 (March 12) 1856, March 18 (30) 1859, Jan. 24 (Feb. 5) 1871 1877, April 4 (16) 1877, May 9 (21) 1878, July 1 (13) 1883, October 18 (30) 1913, July 28 (Aug 10) 1905-1906 1912 1914, July 22 (Aug. 3) 1914, Sept. 18 (Oct. 1) 1916, Aug. 4 (17) 1916, Aug. 14 (27) 1917, March 12 (25) 1917, March 20 (April 2) 1917, May 1 (14) 1917, May 21-24 (June 3-6) 1917, Aug. 27-31 (Sept. 9-11) 1917, Sept. 8-14 (21-27) 1917, Sept. 20-25 (Oct. 3-8) 1917, Oct. 20-27 (Nov. 2-9) 1917, Oct. 25 (Nov. 7)

EVENT Roman Empire wars against Dacia Evacuation of Dacia by the Roman Empire The making of the Romanian Principalities Moldavian first ahidnames Annexation of Bukovina by the Habsburg Empire Annexation of Bessarabia by Russia Bessarabian autonomy proclaimed Revocation of Bessarabia autonomy Paris Peace Treaty gives southern Bessarabia back to Moldavia Unification of Moldavia and Wallachia Transformation of the Bessarabian oblast into a Gubernija within Russia Russo-Romanian Convention signed in Bucharest Romanian declaration of independence Berlin Peace Treaty gives southern Bessarabia back to Russia Romania joins the Triple Alliance Bucharest Peace Treaty – Romania acquires the Cadrilater from Bulgaria The Revolution in Russia – first nationalistic manifestations in Bessarabia Festivities all over Bessarabia celebrating 100 years since her annexation Romania proclaims her neutrality Convention between Romania and Russia Convention between Romania and Entente regarding Romania’s entry into war in exchange for territorial compensations Romania declares war on Austria-Hungary Formation of a workers’ soviet in Chisinau The making of the Moldavian National Party Gathering in Odessa of Moldavian officers and soldiers First Congress of Bessarabian peasants Second Congress of Bessarabian peasants Kiev, Congress of the peoples living in Russia Bessarabian Congress of workers’ and soldiers’ soviets Congress of the Moldavian soldiers October Revolution in Russia (Continued)

Bessarabia until 1919 (continuation) 1917, Nov. 2 (15) 1917, Nov. 21 (Dec. 4) 1917, Nov. 22 (Dec. 5) 1917, Nov. 26 (Dec. 9) 1917 Nov. 28-30 (Dec. 11-13) 1917, Dec. 2 (15h) 1917, Dec. 10-23 (Dec. 23-Jan. 5) 1917, Dec. 28 (1918, Jan. 10) 1917, Dec. 31 (1918, Jan. 13) 1918, Jan. 1 (14) 1918, Jan. 2 (15) 1918, Jan. 6 (19) 1918, Jan. 7 (20) 1918, Jan. 10 (23) 1918, Jan. 13 (26) 1918, Jan. 24 (Feb. 5) 1918, Jan. 27 (Feb. 9) 1918, Feb. 18 (March 3) 1918, Feb. 20-24 (March 5-9) 1918, Feb. 20 (March 5) 1918, March 27 (April 9) 1918, April 4 (17) 1918, April 5 (18) 1918, April 24 (May 7) 1918, April 18 (May 1) 1918, Oct. 28 (Nov. 10) 1918, Nov. 15 (28) 1918, Nov. 18 (Dec. 1) 1918, Nov. 27 (Dec. 10) 1919, Dec. 20

Declaration regarding the rights of the peoples living in Russia First session of the Sfatul Tserii Brest Armistice between Russia and Germany Focsani Armistice between Romania and the Central Powers Conference of Bolsheviks on the Romanian front Proclamation of the Autonomous Moldavian Republic Second Congress of the Rumcerod Arrival in Chisinau of Rumcerod’s Frontotdel The Bolsheviks arrest the Romanian Minister to Russia, Constantin Diamandi Attempted Soviet coup in Bessarabia Written guarantee by the Allied representatives in Jassy for the Bessarabian authorities regarding Romanian military intervention Romanian government decides to send Transylvanian troops to Bessarabia The Bolshevik “insurrection” starts in Chisinau Romanian army advances into Bessarabia The Bolsheviks break off relations with Romania Declaration of independence of the Moldavian Republic Ukrainian Rada signs peace with the Central Powers Brest Litovsk Peace Treaty between Russia and the Central Powers Averescu-Rakovsky Treaty Buftea, preliminary Peace Treaty between Romania and the Central Powers Sfatul Tserii proclaims the conditioned Union of Bessarabia with Romania King Ferdinand ratifies the Union of Bessarabia with Romania Bolshevik Note of Protest against the incorporation of Bessarabia into Romania Bucharest Peace Treaty between Romania and the Central Powers President Woodrow Wilson analyzes the Bessarabian issue for the first time Romania decides to re-enter the war on the Entente’s side The Union of Bukovina with Romania The Union of Transylvania, Banat, and Crisana with Romania Sfatul Tserii proclaims the unconditional union of Bessarabia with Romania The Romanian Parliament ratifies the Union of Bessarabia with Romania

The Paris Peace Conference and the Bessarabian Question DATE

COMMISSION

Jan. 27, 1919

Council of Ten

Feb. 1

Council of Ten

Feb. 8

Commission on Romanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs

March 5 March 11 March 28 April 6 April 11 May 8 May 16

Commission on Romanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs Commission on Romanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs Commission on Romanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs Commission on Romanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs Paris Council of Foreign Ministers Council of Foreign Ministers

May 17

Paris

May 27

Council of Four

May-June

Bolshevik Government

July 1

Council of Heads of Delegations

July 2

Council of Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers

July 23 July 26 Aug. 1 Aug. 13 Sept. 3 Sept. 5

Meetings of the US Commissioners Meeting of the Steering Committee Council of Heads of Delegations Meetings of the US Commissioners Meetings of the US Commissioners Council of Heads of delegations

TOPIC Bessarabian representation at the Prince’s Island (Prinkipo Conference) Presentation of Romanian territorial claims During its first meeting, the Commissions considers that Bessarabia is Romanian territory on of Bessarabia Draft Article on Bessarabia – it should belong to Romania Decision recommending the attachment of Bessarabia to Romania Final meeting of the Commission The final report of the Commission is sent to the Supreme Council Meeting between President Wilson and Queen Marie of Romania American opposition to the attribution of Bessarabia to Romania It is decided to postpone a solution to the Bessarabian question The “Bratianu guarantees” regarding the US investments in the exploitation of Romanian oil Bessarabian question in the dispatch sent to Admiral Kolchak Notes of Protest and ultimatums sent by the Bolsheviks to Romania, demanding the withdrawal of Romanian troops from Bessarabia Bessarabia on the agenda for future meetings Question of Bessarabia – the hearing of the Report prepared by the Territorial Commission and of the Russian and Romanian representatives Elections to be held in Bessarabia Dobrudja and Bessarabia – a possible territorial exchange Debate over the Bessarabian Question The European borders of Russia The frontier of Bulgaria in Dobrudja Dobrudja and Bessarabia (Continued)

The Paris Peace Conference and the Bessarabian Question (continuation) Date Sept. 8 Oct. 8 Oct. 10 Oct. 11 Oct. 30 Nov. 11 Nov. 13 Jan. 20, 1920 March 3

Commission

Topic

Council of Heads of Delegations Meetings of the US Commissioners Council of Heads of Delegations Council of Heads of Delegations Council of Heads of Delegations Council of Heads of Delegations Council of Heads of Delegations The International Council of Premiers The International Council of Premiers

Italian proposal for a territorial exchange Dobrudja for Bessarabia The question of Romanian elections to be held in Bessarabia The question of Romanian elections to be held in Bessarabia The question of Roumanian elections in Bessarabia US opposition to settling the Bessarabian question. British insistence that Bessarabia should go to Romania French attempt to bring the Bessarabian question into the Council’s debate Romanian affairs – the hearing of the Romanian Prime Minister, Al. Vaida-Voevod The Council declares itself in favor of Bessarabia’s union with Romania The Commission prepared a final Draft Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Romania concerning Bessarabia (with 9 articles) The Secretariat General asked for the American opinion regarding the draft Bessarabian Treaty Negotiations Titulescu – Alan Leeper regarding the Draft Treaty British proposal to send the draft Treaty to the Conference of Ambassadors for final discussions Negotiations between Frank Rattigan (British minister) and the Romanian government regarding the Bessarabian Treaty Negotiations Titulescu-Laroche regarding the draft Treaty The US refuse to join in the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty The Romanian Government agrees with the British and French conditions for the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty The British government asks for the ratification of the Minorities Treaty before the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty – Romania does so in a matter of days The Colby Note on Russia French attempts to postpone indefinitely the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty, blocked by the British. Increasing British and Romanian pressure on France for the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty

April 15

Commission on Romanian Affairs

April 15

Secretariat General of the Peace Conference

April

London

April 25

Supreme Council

April - May

Bucharest

June 7

Paris

June 19

Conference of Ambassadors

June 28

Bucharest

Aug.

London

Aug. 10

Washington

Aug. 18 and Sept. 16

Paris

Sept.

Paris

(Continued)

The Paris Peace Conference and the Bessarabian Question (continuation) Date

Commission

Topic

Sept. 17 (Oct. 27)

Paris

Sept. 29

Conference of Ambassadors

Exchange of notes between Romania and France (Great Britain) regarding the payment by the Romanian government of increased compensations to the French (British) landowners expropriated in Bessarabia British pressure for urging the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty

Sept. 8

Council of Heads of Delegations

Italian proposal for a territorial exchange, Dobrudja for Bessarabia

Oct. 8

Meetings of the US British pressure for urging the signing of the Commissioners Bessarabian Treaty

Oct. 2

Conference of Ambassadors

Oct. 5

Bucharest

Oct. 8 Oct. 11

Conference of Ambassadors Conference of Ambassadors

Oct. 18

London

Oct. 20

London

Oct. 21

London Conference of Ambassadors Conference of Ambassadors

Oct. 27 Oct. 28

Increased British pressure for signing of the Bessarabian Treaty – Romania is asked by the Conference to sign two more treaties as a precondition to the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty The Italians announced their readiness to sign the Bessarabian Treaty The US Ambassador expressed his view with regard to the Bessarabian Treaty. The Romanian reply to the Draft Treaty regarding Bessarabia Meetings Titulescu – Leeper regarding the Romanian proposed modifications to the Draft Treaty Meeting Titulescu – Earl Curzon, pressure for the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty Meeting Take Ionescu – Earl Curzon The last modifications to the Draft Treaty are agreed upon The signing of the Bessarabian Treaty

The Bessarabian Question since 1920 Feb. 1920 Oct. 28, 1920 June 8, 1921 Sept. – Oct. 1921 Sept. – Oct. 1921 Nov.-Dec. 1921 Feb. 1922 Feb. 1922 March 14, 1922 March 15, 1922 April 3, 1922 April 7, 1922 April 13, 1922 April 14, 1922 May 19, 1922 April-May 1922 July 7, 1922 Dec. 14, 1922 Dec. 19, 1922 Jan. – March 1923 March-April 1923 June 1923 Oct. 1923 Nov. -Dec. 1923 Nov. 1923

Copenhagen, Romanian-Bolshevik negotiations The signing of the Bessarabian Treaty British insistence for the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty, arguing that they have already ratified the Treaty, during the meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors Russian-Romanian Conference in Warsaw Memorandums by the Bessarabian Russians to the League of Nations regarding the rights of the Russian minority in Bessarabia Romanian Foreign Ministry’s first attempt to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty Romania decides to close her Legation in Japan Intensified British pressure for the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty The French Government sends the Bessarabian Treaty to the Parliament for ratification Conference of the Ambassadors (Paris) – the British and French representatives asked Italy and Japan to take the necessary steps for the ratification The Romanian Senate ratifies the Bessarabian Treaty The Romanian Chamber ratifies the Bessarabian Treaty King Ferdinand signs the Law for the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty Great Britain deposits the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty (in Paris) Romania deposits the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty (in Paris) The Genoa Conference French Parliamentary Commission on Foreign Affairs debates the Project of Law for the Ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty Note by the Romanian government to the British and French Legations regarding the payment of indemnities to the British and French landowners expropriated in Bessarabia Talks between Cicerin and C. Diamandi regarding a possible solution of the pending questions in the bilateral relations Romanian pressure for the French ratification (negotiations Victor Antonescu – Peretti dela Rocca) Romanian-US negotiations regarding the Bessarabian immigration quota The US Government decides to incorporate the Bessarabian immigration quota into the general Russian quota and to administer it from Riga Internal memorandum of the Romanian Foreign Ministry urging for pressure in order to bring the Bessarabian Treaty into force British pressure on France, Italy and Japan for the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty Japanese government states that it considers the Bessarabian treaty ratification a European matter and, consequently, that it has no intention to ratify at that moment (Continued)

The Bessarabian Question since 1920 (continuation) Nov. 20, 1923 Nov. 1923 Jan. -July 1924 Feb. 1924 March 11, 1924

Romanian-Soviet Agreement regarding navigation on Dniestr and border incidents The French government decides to increase the pressure on the Parliament for the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty. Worsening US-Romanian relations due to the US policy on immigration and to Romanian economic policy Italy recognizes the Soviet Government – secret verbal agreement on Bessarabia French Chamber ratifies the Bessarabian Treaty

March 16, 1924

French Senate ratifies the Bessarabian Treaty Mussolini provokes a diplomatic incident with Romania by suggestMarch 1924 ing the postponement of the Romanian Royal Family’s visit to Italy March-April 1924 Soviet-Romanian Conference in Vienna April 2-4, 1924

Prince Naruhiko Higashi Kuni visits Romania

May 8, 1924

France deposits the instruments for the ratification

May 31, 1924

The Ishii Note

May 1924

Verbal statement by Yoshizawa (to Karakhan) on ratification The ratification question is debated during the Yoshizawa-Karakhan Aug. -Oct. 1924 negotiations Romanian attempt to improve relations with Italy (the ConstanSept 1924 tinescu mission) Oct. 12, 1924 The establishment of the Moldavian Autonomous SSR Controversy in Italian press regarding the ratification of the BessaraOct. - Nov. 1924 bian Treaty The establishment of Soviets-Japanese diplomatic relations – the Jan. 20, 1925 Karakhan–Yoshizawa exchange of letters on the ratification question Feb. – March Worsening Italian-Romanian relations as a result of a new peak in 1925 the press campaign pro and contra ratification Oct. 1925 Kopp-Shidehara negotiations in Tokyo regarding the ratification Feb. 1926

Italia suggests to Romania the signing of a bilateral Alliance Treaty

June 10, 1926

The French-Romanian Friendship Treaty

Sept. 1926

Romanian-Italian negotiations for the ratification

Sept. 16, 1926

The Romanian-Italian Friendship Treaty

Oct. – Nov. 1926

Improvement in the Romanian-Italian relations

March 8, 1927

Italian Chamber ratifies the Bessarabian Treaty King Victor Emmanuel and Mussolini sign the Royal Decree-Law for the ratification The Debuchi-Bessedovskii negotiations on the ratification resulting in a verbal agreement for the postponement of the ratification The Italian Senate ratifies the Bessarabian Treaty

March 9, 1927 March 1927 April 3, 1927

(Continued)

The Bessarabian Question since 1920 (continuation) May 23, 1927

Italy deposits the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty

May-July 1927

Soviet concessions to the Japanese regarding the Fishery talks going on in Moscow, in exchange for the postponement of the Japanese ratification

Dec. 1927-Jan. 1928 Aug. 1928

Romanian-Japanese negotiations for the ratification (Tokyo) Romania signs the Briand-Kelloq Pact

Feb. 1929

The “Litvinov Protocol”

Dec. 1929

Tokyo, Romanian-Japanese negotiations for ratification

Feb. 1930

The start of the Davila campaign for the US de facto recognition of Bessarabia’s union

Feb. 3, 1931

The second Nakamura interpellation on Bessarabia

June 1931 July 1931

The US Government decides to take the Bessarabian immigration quota out of the Russian quota and to move its administration from Riga to Bucharest Charles Davila suggests a new approach in order to obtain the Japanese ratification

Jan. 1932

Riga, Romanian-Soviet negotiation for a non-aggression treaty

Feb.-May 1932

New round of Romanian-US negotiations in Washington regarding the US de facto recognition of Bessarabia’s Union

Sept. 1932

Geneva, Romanian-Soviet negotiation for a non-aggression treaty

1932

The end of the Romanian campaign for the Japanese ratification

March 1933

Davila starts once more the campaign for the US de facto recognition

June 16, 1933 July 1933 July 1933 June 9, 1934 Dec. 1934

By the Presidential Proclamation establishing immigration quotas for the coming year the Bessarabian quota area has been merged with the Romanian quota area Romanian-US Draft Declaration regarding the implications of the decision on the Bessarabian immigration quota Convention for the Definition of Aggression The establishment of diplomatic relations between Romania and the Soviet Union The first Romanian Minister to the Soviet Union presents his letters of accreditation

Feb. 8, 1935

Railway Convention between Romania and the Soviets

July 21, 1936

Montreaux, the Titulescu-Litvinov Draft of a Mutual Assistance Pact between Romania and the Soviet Union

Aug. 29, 1936

Titulescu’s dismissal as Romanian Foreign Minister

Feb. 15 and July 30, 1938

Mamoru Shigemitsu suggests to the Romanians that Japan is ready to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty

Aug. 23, 1939

The Ribbentrop - Molotov Pact

June 1940

The Soviet Union takes Bessarabia and northern Bukovina from Romania

INTRODUCTION

Opportunity from Crisis The world that came into being after the First World War was profoundly different from the one that had existed before. Two of the most important changes were the formation of the first communist state, and the use of the nationality principle as the basis for the creation of new states (or for the enlargement of states already in existence). The invocation of American idealism, with the famous Wilsonian points, provoked such a revolution in international relations that even the United States refused to approve the peace settlement, and in the end that “settlement” resulted in another world war. Of course, there are many different theories regarding the evolution of international relations during the interwar period; this book will focus on the Bessarabian Treaty and how the intricacies of the shifting international climate influenced Romania. After the First World War, the Romanians saw their dreams becoming reality through the creation of Greater Romania, by the union of Bessarabia, Bukovina, Transylvania, Crisana, Maramures and Banat with the Old Kingdom. By these acquisitions Romania more than doubled in size and emerged from the war with a population of over 17,000,000 people (as against about 7,000,000 pre-war) and a territory of 295,049 square km (as compared to 137,000 before the war).1 Romania was transformed almost overnight from a small country into the second largest state in eastern Central Europe. The newly acquired territories transformed Romania from a nationstate into a nationalities state, in which ethnic Romanians made up only 72% of the population. The largest minority groups were the Hungarians, Jews, Germans, Russians, Ukrainians and Gypsies. These other nationalities posed serious problems, especially in those parts of Romania where they outnumbered the Romanians (for example, in southern Bessarabia or in some parts of Transylvania). Interwar Romania had to face the severe challenge of forging extremely diverse regions (economically as well as culturally) into a unified and centralized state.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province

Strategies Therefore, after obtaining international recognition of its new borders, in all its foreign policy Romania was dedicated to maintaining the territorial status quo. Romanian foreign policy pursued three main strategies. The first was based on the idea of collective security, promulgated by prominent Romanian diplomat Take Ionescu (more or less as a result of French influence2) and continued by one of his disciples, Nicolae Titulescu. An Eastern European bloc made of five states (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia and Greece) was intended to forestall any aggression from the west (Germany, Hungary, Austria), the east (the Soviet Union), or the south (Bulgaria or Turkey) and help to maintain peace in Eastern Europe. Unfortunately, because of the multiple contradictions existing in the Central European and Balkan area, this plan partially failed. What was finally achieved in the 1920s was the Little Entente, between Yugoslavia, Romania and Czechoslovakia. The Little Entente was intended to contain Hungary and Bulgaria (revisionist States), and to present a unified voice for the three countries in order to strengthen their stature before the Great Powers. Through a system of bilateral treaties, Romania also sought to forge an alliance with Poland against their communist neighbor and, in the 1930s, Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey founded the Balkan Entente, with the more or less direct aim of controlling Bulgaria. The second broad strategy was related to the League of Nations. Because one of the League’s main purposes was to maintain the territorial status quo, Romania became actively involved. International recognition of Romania’s new frontiers was of critical importance and it is here that the Bessarabian Treaty shows its value for Romania, justifying the efforts made by the Romanian diplomacy in order to bring it into force. Third, Romania sought to forge an alliance with at least one of the Great Powers, an alliance that should contain a clear commitment from the Great Power in case of an attack on Bessarabia. In this sense, Romania’s diplomatic success was only partial (at best). Terminology First, what is Bessarabia? Second, what is Moldavia (or, in Romanian, Moldova)? Chapter 1 presents a brief history of the region. Essentially, Moldavia, one of the three Romanian Principalities, came into being during the 14th century, between the Carpathian Mountains and the Dniestr River. Over time, most of the this territory stayed together under the control of the Moldavian Voevods, with just a few parts being taken away by the Ottomans. The southernmost of those was called Bessarabia. Towards the end of the 18th century (1775), the Habsburgs took away the northern part of Moldavia, called Bukovina; the Russians decided to follow suit and,

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Introduction by 1812, they carved off that piece of Moldavia between the Pruth and Dniestr Rivers, and extended the name of Bessarabia over all this territory. By 1859, what remained of Moldavia managed to effect a union with Walachia, forming what came to be called the Old Kingdom, and laid the foundation of the present Romania. By 1918, events in Russia allowed Bessarabia to unite with Romania. But the union did not last long; by 1940, the Soviets already took back Bessarabia. In the aftermath of World War II, the Soviets also took Bessarabia’s southern and most of its northern parts, where the Romanians were not a substantial majority, and incorporated them into Ukraine. Today’s republic of Moldavia, with its capital in Chisinau, occupies only what was left of Bessarabia after these territorial modifications.3 But the people in the part of Moldavia that united with Walachia in 1859 to form the Romanian Kingdom continued to call themselves Moldovans, and that region of Romania continues to be known as Moldova. Therefore, to a Romanian (or to anyone living before World War I), the name Moldavia pertains to an integral part of the Romanian territory and not to the former Soviet republic. Conversely, a person whose frame of reference is the former Soviet Union will think of Soviet Moldavia, currently the Moldovan Republic. In order to avoid confusion, and given the fact that the treaty that is the focus of this book relates specifically to that region in its interwar territorial limits (when it was known mainly as Bessarabia), the name of Bessarabia will be mostly used. During the entire interwar period, Bessarabia was the weakest point in Romanian foreign policy. No Great Power was willing to defend Romania in case of a Russian attack on Bessarabia, and even among the small or secondary powers there was only one possible ally, Poland. Because of the Soviet Union’s growing influence in international affairs, as well as its continually growing military potential, Romania stood alone on the Bessarabian issue. Romanian diplomats had three options, each of them entailing serious risk: (1) to ignore the Soviet Union in the hope that a non-Bolshevik government would take power, sooner or later; (2) to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union; (3) to alternate between the first two with the hope of securing the backing of a Great Power before it was too late. It must be said that all the three approaches were tried, but each of them fell short. Even today, when we have the perspective of many decades, it is difficult to say what would have been the best approach for Romania. Bessarabia was one of the less-known territories in Eastern Europe. Since the fall of communism, things have started to change and gradually more and more papers have been published on various aspects of the region. Unfortunately, many of these papers (including those published outside Romania or the former Soviet Union) still show the influence of political partisanship. Simply said, each side presents its own version of the story, insisting on whatever arguments they may think of, seeking to prove that their version is the only real or the most plausible one.4 After the collapse of communism, there was a publishing “boom” regarding the

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Moldova, a Romanian Province history of Bessarabia, which had ceased to be taboo for historians both in Romania and in the new Moldavian Republic. On one hand, Romanian historiography stands by the old line, arguing that Bessarabia was (and still is) Romanian territory, that the Union decision taken by the Sfatul Tserii (the Council of the Country — the representative political body of all the people living in Bessarabia, discussed in Chapter 1), was a genuine expression of the national movement and that it was normal for the Bessarabians to live together with their Romanian brothers. On the other hand, some historians in the new created Moldavian republic follow the lead opened by a number of Soviet scholars in the 1920s, trying to demonstrate that, in fact, the Moldavians are a distinct population5 with their own Moldavian language.6 Continuing the communist historiography, they refer to the interwar period as one of fierce exploitation of the people by the Romanian bureaucracy (this complaint may have some justification, but that is true for any administration, anywhere in the world). Their main purpose is to give a historical background to the newly proclaimed State, in order to achieve a certain national cohesion in Bessarabia; the same phenomenon can be observed in all the other post-Soviet republics. 7 Thus, “Moldavia” is the spelling most often used in English to designate what the local people know as Moldova. Comparing the Romanians and the Moldavians (or Moldovans), it becomes clear that there is no distinct literature, no separate language, no history apart from that of the states and empires of which they have been a part. Yet most Moldovans do feel themselves to be something other than simply Romanians, and since 1991, they have had their own state to show for it.8 It should also be pointed out that, while the Moldavians did not show themselves to be in much hurry to get back together with Romania, preferring to have a state of their own, neither have the Romanians made a concerted effort to convince them to unify. And, as time passes, there is no sign of a change in Romanian public opinion that would lead to stronger insistence on a union of Bessarabia with Romania. As for the Romanian leadership, it seems to be so lost in the difficulties of the post-Ceausescu transition that it barely has the time and the will to work for such a union.9 In fact, it is difficult to distinguish what exactly is the actual position of the Romanians regarding a possible union of Moldavia with Romania: have they given up, or they are simply respecting the wish of the Moldavians? Author’s Purpose The aim of this book is to analyze the entire problem of the Bessarabian Treaty of October 28, 1920,10 and through this analysis to offer a glimpse of Romanian foreign policy in the 1920s. The Treaty was signed between Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, on one hand, and Romania on the other. Under that Treaty, the Great Powers gave, two years after its de facto realization, an official recognition to the unification of Bessarabia with Romania. The signing of the Treaty was a great success for Romania; because of this de jure recognition of the union, Bessarabia was to be considered Romanian territory, not a territory under the military occupation of Romania.

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Introduction But one of the five powers that signed the Treaty failed to ratify it, namely Japan. And because Japan failed to ratify the Treaty, it never came into force. Why did the Romanian government fail to bring the Bessarabian Treaty into force? How did they allow this foreign policy success to slide into failure? Was it because Romania stood no chance, in the long run, against a Great Power like the Soviet Union? Was it because the Romanian government was unwilling to pay everything the signatory Great Powers asked in exchange for the ratification? Was it a reflection of the more general failure in Romania’s relations with the Soviet Union during the interwar period, or a reflection of the Great Powers’ reluctance to upset the Soviet Union? Did Romania mismanage the ratification process, or were they simply undone by a very well organized Soviet campaign against the Treaty? Did the Great Powers worry that, once the Treaty came into power, it would trigger a new war in the Balkans? Romanian historiography gives an oversimplified answer to our question: the Treaty did not come into force because Japan failed to ratify it. This answer has two major flows: it lays all the blame on Japan (failing to show what exactly was behind Japan’s decision), and it makes no mention of the US position regarding Bessarabia. Of course, it was as a result of Japan’s failure to ratify that the Bessarabian Treaty did not come into force — but we cannot overlook the fact that the Treaty required five ratifications and that in every case with the possible exception of Britain, the Romanian government handled the situation in a poor manner. It took a year and a half to finalize even the Romanian ratification, and seven years to convince Italy to ratify. Even without the Japanese abstention, and as proven by the US position, the Romanian campaign for the ratification was exceptionally lethargic, particularly if we consider that the Treaty imposed no concrete obligations on its signatories (except for Romania), so that they had nothing to lose by ratifying. The Japanese failure to ratify came, in this author’s view, not only (or even principally) as a result of Soviet pressure but also as a result of Romania’s feeble effort to secure the ratifications in general. In order to find out why the Bessarabian Treaty failed to come into force, we must analyze the entire campaign for ratification and not simply blame it on Japan. The international context evolved rapidly after the War, with Soviet Russia quickly getting back on its feet; Romania proved unable to fully appreciate the full significance of this recovery and, instead of hurrying to secure the ratifications, it entered into complicated negotiations regarding the concessions to be granted in exchange. Romania gave the Soviets exactly what they needed most in their conflict with Romania over Bessarabia: time. Romania also went on dreaming that it would be possible to convince one of the Great Powers (most likely France) to offer military guarantees against a possible Soviet attack. Even worse, they failed to comprehend the changing realities in the international arena and neglected the two nonEuropean Great Powers, the US and Japan, who were both won over by the Soviets in their conflict with Romania. The sad fact is that, in the end, Romania paid almost everything the Great Powers asked for in exchange for the Bessarabian Treaty, and invested resources in

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Moldova, a Romanian Province the ratification campaign, but never could use the Treaty. Romanian historiography continues to argue in favor of the “great excuse” cherished by Romanian diplomacy during the interwar period: although the Treaty had not actually come into force, the States that had ratified it had a moral obligation towards Romania in case of a Soviet attack. The situation was quite different and this book will show the real state of affairs, with both the British and Italians arguing that the Bessarabian Treaty was not binding on them until ratified by all the signatories and dismissing any so-called “moral obligation”. The same historiography continues to praise Romania for its successes in convincing France and Italy to ratify, without recognizing that, in fact, apart from the concessions Romania gave in exchange for those ratifications, a hidden price was paid: the loss of Japan’s ratification. None of the scholars analyzing different aspects of the negotiations for the Bessarabian Treaty makes the connection between the time lost in order to achieve the French or Italian ratification and the change in Japan’s position towards the Soviets. As one Romanian scholar has said: “As long as the final score was 3-1 for Romania, we could not consider the ratification campaign a failure”. This is simply not so: the final score was 3-1, but Romania needed a 4-0 in order to qualify. This book will focus especially on the ratification process. Two Great Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, were not among the five signatories — but they played significant roles in the Bessarabian Treaty question due to their influences on those who were. Against the backdrop of a general description of Romanian foreign policy, the book attempts to offer insight into the workings of diplomacy, and especially Romanian diplomacy. Its purpose is to present a more realistic image of this process by highlighting the different opinions expressed by those involved, by analyzing the multitude of approaches open to each player in the field, by presenting behind-thescene events, and by demonstrating the extraordinary importance of the international context. To achieve this deeper perspective, it was necessary to abandon the analysis of the Bessarabian question in its entirety and to focus instead on the Treaty — a topic not so vast, but sufficiently suggestive for the entire matter. The saga of the Bessarabian Treaty shows the evolution of the Romanian approach to the issue and the policies of each of the interested Great Powers (except for Germany). It also illustrates the increasingly global ramifications of every international policy issue, as far back as the 1920’s, with two non-European Powers taking active part in European matters despite their proclaimed isolationism (the USA) or neutrality (Japan). To our knowledge, this book is the most comprehensive treatment of the Bessarabian Treaty, analyzing the implications for Romania of both the signing and the ratification. Resources The book is based mainly on information provided by primary sources, especially documents, many of which have never before been published. The main

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Introduction sources for the unpublished documents are the Japanese and Romanian Foreign Ministry Archives. The Romanian orthography has been retained for most people and place names. Footnotes are in abbreviated format; for full citations, please refer to the Bibliography at the back of the book. The author has lived in Japan for five years and thus has had the opportunity to conduct extensive research in the Japanese as well as the Romanian Archives. Nearly all the relevant French and British documents (yet unpublished) were available on microfilm in Bucharest, due to an arrangement spearheaded in the late 1970s by the Romanian National Archives. The author also attempted to search for documents in the former Soviet Archives, but was unable to secure the necessary support to access unpublished documents. As for Italian and US documents, his research was based on published collections of documents and other secondary sources. The ideal work, from the standpoint of “archive equilibrium”, would be one in which all the subchapters follow the model of the one on the Japanese ratification. Published collections, including Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Documents on British Foreign Policy, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Documents Diplomatiques Français, I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, and Romanian-Soviet Relations: Documents. 19181934, provided further valuable information. Key portions of the citations will be italicized to indicate this author’s emphasis. The published documents are not necessarily complete, and they may also be used (as will be shown) as propaganda tools. In recognition of this difficulty, the author has sought to provide the reader with as complete a description of the events as possible by comparing the documents published outside Romania with those found in the Romanian Archives. On a different level, another source of information was the mass media, especially the newspapers, from Romania but also from the major capitals of the world. One of the problems specific to the Bessarabian question is that anyone who voices an opinion on historical, linguistic, demographic, or cultural developments in Bessarabia (or Moldavia) inevitably becomes a party in the conflict. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to find a neutral stand and the only alternative is to present as many documents as possible. A middle ground could be, at least theoretically, illustrated by the documents, which in the aggregate cannot be accused of being politicized — even though, it is true, the selection process might be liable to charges of subjectivity. The author has therefore relied to the greatest extent possible on official documents rather than on papers written by various scholars. The author hopes that, at some time in the future, he will have the opportunity to continue his work in the other archives in order to round out the discussion.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Notes

1

Vlad Georgescu, The Romanians; A History, p. 189. Six months before the end of the war Philippe Berthelot had envisaged an “anti-German barrier” composed of Romania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, and Italy. Nicole Jordan, The Popular Front and Central Europe, p. 15. 3 As for Moldavia’s population, the 1989 census shows that out of the about 4.5 million people, roughly 65 % are Romanians, whilst the Russians represent 13 %, the Ukrainians 13 %, the rest being made by other minorities, some of which still leave in compact areas (like the Gagauz minority). Helen Fedor, William E. Crowther, Belarus and Moldova: Country Studies, p. 99. 4 The relatively recent book published by Wim Van Meurs, The Bessarabian Question in Communist Historyography: Nationalist and Communist Politics and History-Writing, offers some excellent references to many of those papers. Also, another interesting analyses of the existing bibliography on Bessarabia is presented in Gheorghe I. Florescu, “Bessarabia: a topic of the American historiography, 1945-1995”, Anuarul Institutului AD Xenopol, Iasi, 1996. 5 An excellent presentation of this tendency is made by one of the leading scholars in the field on Bessarabian history, Michael Bruchis, in his article “Moldavian National History – Ancient and Modern – as Presented in the Moldavian Soviet Encyclopedia,” published in Studies in Moldovan …, p. 3-28. 6 For a concise comparison of the phonology, morphology and syntax of the “Moldavian” language and the Romanian, see Donald L Dyer, “The Making of the Moldavian Language” in Studies in Moldavian…, p. 92-101. 7 A good analysis of this “policy” of creating a Moldavian nation, both during the interwar period and also for the period after 1989 is presented in Charles King, The Moldavans, passim. 8 Charles King, The Moldovans, p. 7. 9 The only notable exception in this sense comes from the well-thought educational program for Moldavians willing to come and study in Romania, which includes a high number of scholarships and which seems to target the future Moldavian intellectual elite. 10 As a technical matter, it should be mentioned that historians and diplomats used many terms for the act signed on October 28: Convention, Protocol, and Treaty. In fact, some scholars even use two terms in one work (such as, for example, the “so-called Bessarabia convention” and the “so-called Bessarabian protocol” in Magda Adam, The Little Entente …, p. 212, 304). To avoid confusion, the term “treaty” will be used exclusively in this book. 2

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PART ONE - BESSARABIA AND THE UNION WITH ROMANIA

CHAPTER 1. A BRIEF HISTORY OF BESSARABIA

This chapter presents a short history of Bessarabia until 1918, including the decision to unite with Romania. Some Romanian historians argue that there is no history of Bessarabia before 1812 — only a history of Moldavia, of which Bessarabia was part. Generally speaking, they are right. However, from the viewpoint of local history we can identify a Bessarabian history and even find some small differences with the general history of Moldavia. There are several theories regarding the name of Bessarabia and the territory associated with it. We will consider it to encompass the territory bounded by the Black Sea on the south, the Pruth River on the west, and the Dniestr River to the east and north. The Moldavian republic of today occupies this territory, minus certain portions that came to be assigned to Ukraine. Significant factors that determined the history of Bessarabia include its agricultural potential and the importance of control over the northern parts of the Danube estuary. The Danube was one of the most important commercial routes in Europe (and will be again, after somebody cleans up the mess NATO made of it). During the Middle Ages and later, Bessarabia also had considerable influence over navigation on the Dniestr River which, as the main link between Poland and Ukraine and the Black Sea, was also an important commercial route. The first people to realize the commercial importance of the Bessarabian territories were the Greeks, who established a number of colonies along the Black Sea during the 7th century BC; the largest in the Bessarabia lands was Tyras. At about the middle of the 1st century BC, one of the local tribal chiefs, Burebista, unified all the Daco-Gaetic populations situated north of the Danube into the Kingdom of Dacia. He extended his domination from Bukovina and Pannonia to the Bug River, covering both Bessarabia and Transdniestria. Some three centuries later, the Roman Empire

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Moldova, a Romanian Province defeated the Kingdom of Dacia and transformed it into a colony. The southern part of Bessarabia was incorporated into the Moesian province even before the defeat of Dacia. People from all over the Roman Empire had come to colonize these rich territories. About two centuries later, however, because of pressure from neighboring barbarian tribes, Emperor Aurelian decided to abandon the northern Danube provinces in order to secure a defensive line on the Danube River. He ordered the retreat of the army and administration, which was done during AD 271-274. However, a good part of the Daco-Roman population preferred to stay. The Roman Empire continued to keep close relations with this population and maintained its influence over it; but the great migrations precluded the creation of an organized Daco-Roman state for more than a millennium. During the 14th century, the descendants of the Daco-Romans, the Romanians, organized themselves into two states, Walachia and Moldavia. They also made up the majority population of the Transylvanian principality, which was under the domination of the Hungarian Kingdom. Moldavia was created, according to Hungarian sources, by Romanians who left the northern parts of Transylvania (Maramures), during the sixth and seventh decades of the 14th century. They unified the people living in Moldavia and organized that territory as a state. Soon after their formation, both Walachia and Moldavia had to fight for their independence, first against Hungary and later against the Turks and the Poles. Moldavia was situated on the principal commercial route that linked the Baltic Sea with the Black Sea. The Great Powers’ rivalry over Moldavia is best illustrated during the reigns of Moldavia’s most hallowed voevods, Alexander the Good (1400-1433) and Stephen the Great (1457-1504). After many battles, a negotiated agreement was reached; both Walachia (1422) and Moldavia (1512, 1529, 1634) agreed to pay tribute5 to the Sultan and to assist him in time of war, but they were allowed to continue to elect their own prince — and no Turks were to be permitted to settle in the principalities.6 This understanding was established through special conventions (called hatisherifs or ahidnames7) with the Ottoman Empire, by which the Sultan promised that “the Moldavian borders would remain entirely intact.” Officially, the Romanian principalities were under Ottoman suzerainty,8 and these treaties regarding Ottoman-Romanian relations were still in force as late as 1812. For the next two centuries, the Romanian principalities enjoyed a special status within the Ottoman Empire. At no point in time were they entirely subjugated and transformed into a pasalic (like Serbia, Hungary and Bulgaria). It was only during the 18th century that the Turks eliminated some of their privileges, such as the right to elect their own “voevod” (or Hospodar); now the Sultan named a leader for them from among the Greeks living in Istanbul. The principalities had always been distinguished from the other Balkan provinces by the survival of a powerful native aristocracy. While in Serbia the nobles were exterminated and in Bosnia they saved their property by surrendering their faith, in Romania they were able to retain both. In accordance with Islamic law, the Ottomans regarded the principalities as somewhere between conquered territories (subject to direct Muslim rule) and areas outside the boundaries of Islam (hostile to the Muslim state, and with whom there

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CHAPTER 1. BESSARABIA AND THE UNION WITH ROMANIA

could be only temporary peace). Moldavia and Walachia were thus ahd (treaty) territories and lay in the intermediate zone of peace (dar alsulh), since they had not been occupied by Ottoman armies and had not been incorporated into the Ottoman state.9 Consequently, since they were not Ottoman territories, the Sultan had no right to give them away. The Moldavian voevods and the boyars played on the international situation: any time the position of the Ottoman Empire was weakened, they sought to increase their privileges and independence, either by fighting or by paying off corrupt Ottoman officials in Istanbul. The large fortress and the Black Sea ports Chilia and Cetatea Alba (Tiraspol), on Moldavian territory, were the first to be conquered and taken from Moldavia by the Ottoman Empire. During the sultanate of Suleiman the Magnificent (mid-16th century), a part of the territory in southern Bessarabia (at that time, incontestably part of Moldavia), was taken away by the Turks and transformed into the Bugeac raia or sanjak (Turkish-controlled province);10 it was colonized with Tatars, in order to keep better control over any initiatives the Romanian principalities might take. After a number of years, the Moldavian boyars succeeded in recovering a part of that territory, albeit a small one.11 It was this territory in the south that initially had been known as Bessarabia. That was not the only case of Moldavian territory transformed into a Turkish province. Practically the same thing happened to the territories around Tighina and, almost two centuries later, around the Hotin fortress.12 After transforming this part into a raia, the Sultan colonized it with Bulgarian and Tartar families. There were no more territorial losses for Moldavia until the 18th century. The 18th century is characterized in Central and Eastern Europe by the socalled “Oriental problem”: the contest to fill the power vacuum left by the weakness (or decadence) of the Ottoman Empire. The Romanian principalities were caught in the middle. All the wars taking place between the three Great Powers in the area (Austria, Russia and Turkey) directly affected Romanian territory; military occupation of the principalities became almost a rule and the Romanians lost some of their own territory. In May 1775, as a result of the Russo-Turkish war of 1768-1774, Moldavia lost its northern part, Bukovina (with a territory of 4,000 square miles and a population of 70,000 people — of whom 56,000 were Romanians)13 to the Habsburg Empire, with the silent approval of Russia, who considerably improved her position in the principalities after the war. The Habsburgs managed to secure both Ottoman and Russian acceptance of their new territorial acquisition.14 But, at least from the juridical standpoint, according to the ahidnames or hatisherifs, the Ottoman Empire had no right to give away parts of Moldavia.15 By the Sistov Peace of 1791, Russia gained from the Ottoman Empire the territory situated between the Dniepr and Dniestr Rivers, thus for the first time establishing a common border with Moldavia. After a few years of war and negotiations (1806-1812)16 between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, the Sultan decided to pay the price for making peace with Russia, and on May 28, 1812, a peace treaty was signed in Bucharest. By that treaty, Rus-

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Moldova, a Romanian Province sia incorporated the territory belonging to Moldavia situated between the Pruth and the Dniestr Rivers, known as Bessarabia: around 17,350 square miles and almost half a million people, the majority of them Romanians (about 85%).17 Although at the beginning of the war the Russians had asked for both the Romanian principalities, in the end, they also failed to establish the Siret River as the border, and had to settle for just the territory between the Pruth and the Dniestr.18 This was not so much a loss for the Ottoman Empire as for the future Romania. Considering the events of 1812, many historians argue that the Ottoman Empire’s cession had been illegal: the Turks could not cede something that did not belong to them, and the Ottoman Empire had never ruled the Romanian principalities.19 In Karl Marx’s opinion, even the Turks had acknowledged this fact.20 When pressed by the Poles at Karlowitz21 to cede Moldavia and Walachia, they responded that the Ottoman Empire did not believe itself to be entitled to make any cessions of territories since the capitulations (hatisherifs) conferred upon it only the right to suzerainty (which is quite different from sovereignty). At the beginning of Russia’s domination over Bessarabia, what with great numbers of peasants fleeing over the Pruth, a war going on with France, the territory’s great distance from the capital, and the Empire’s inadequate finances, the Russian government decided to grant Bessarabia a privileged status; this meant a certain autonomy, which included the continuation of former privileges and the application of traditional Moldavian laws.22 Tsar Alexander’s attitude was a combination of liberal sentiment and tactical calculation: he hoped that Bessarabia was but a foretaste of future annexation and he desired to win over the inhabitants. He instructed the first head of the provisional Bessarabian government, Romanian boyar Scarlat Sturdza: You must endeavor to lay the foundation for a larger building. Protect property and its owners: make it as easy as possible for those who settle there to acquire property. The public burdens must be equally distributed; the honesty of the administrative officials must make the inhabitants forget the lack of a regular system of laws. Let the inhabitants feel the advantage of a fatherly and liberal administration. Draw the attention of neighboring people to this province by making it happy.23 Unfortunately, only those parts of the program that were unfavorable to the Moldavians were applied in practice. Even so, this policy of respect for the Bessarabians lasted only for a few years, until 1828. A policy of colonization (with Bulgarians,24 Germans, Jews, Greeks and others)25 and Russification started soon after 1812, and was continued for the next several decades with the purpose of increasing the population26 and weakening the Romanian element in the province. From the Russian standpoint, Bessarabia was just another Christian territory to be “liberated” from the Turks, while advancing Russia’s influence a step closer to the Straits and securing control over the Danube estuary. Russian historiography during the 19th and 20th centuries presented the 1812 act as a liberation of the Christian population

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CHAPTER 1. BESSARABIA AND THE UNION WITH ROMANIA

from the Turks, justified by the brotherhood of religion. As early as 1828, Bessarabian autonomy was replaced by the implementation of Russian practices in the administration and a new constitution, ending most aspects of the province’s privileged position inside the Russian Empire and aiming to establish a centralized administration for the province. The privileges of Bessarabia and the Bessarabians were gradually limited and finally, in 1871, all vestiges of their previous special position were abolished. Bessarabia became a regular gubernija (province). There was no more official bilingualism; the use of the Romanian language in administration and education was forbidden and Russification clearly became the key word for the administration.27 Romanian language speakers represented the bulk of the Bessarabian population, as proved by Russian statistics. The 1856 official census shows a total population of 990,000, of which 74% were Romanians. By comparison, in 1897, another official statistic shows a total population of 1,935,000, of which 56% were Romanians. It has been approximated that in 1918 the Bessarabian population was 2,725,000, 66.5% Romanian, 12% Russian, 10% Jewish, 7.7% Bulgarian and Gagauz, plus smaller numbers of Germans, Greeks, Armenians and other nationalities.28 The ethnic mix was different in the rural and urban areas. While the cities were almost entirely populated by Russians and Jews, with a strong anti-Romanian tendency (which continued long after 1918), it was mainly Romanians who populated the villages. The rural character of the Romanian population explains the failure of the Russification process: Russian literature and education were never able to reach the illiterate rural masses, which remained loyal to their folk culture and language.29 This was an important factor in the 1917-1918 national movement and the decision in favor of union, because the new administrators, Romanians, spoke the same language as the villagers and thus were able to reach the rural areas and sway the peasants with their propaganda effort. The Crimean War of 1853-1856 opened a new chapter for the Romanian national movement.30 During the Paris peace negotiations the Romanians had, for the first time, the opportunity to ask the Great Powers to intervene in their favor. They asked for a political and institutional internationalization of their status as the principalities of Moldavia and Walachia and for the retrocession of Bessarabia to Moldavia by Russia. And indeed, their wishes were partially granted by the Great Powers. It was decided that the principalities should be placed under the common guarantee of the Great Powers — a decision which practically gave them independence, as it was almost impossible for the seven Powers to come a complete agreement — but the union between the two principalities was not approved. As for Bessarabia, after prolonged negotiations, it was decided that Russia should return to Moldavia only the southern part of that territory, plus the Danube Delta. But, as a result of the Ottoman intervention, the Danube Delta (which had been under Russian domination before the war) was included in the Ottoman territory and not incorporated to Moldavia.31 In the end, a territory of about 2000 square miles, with modest economical importance, was returned to Moldavia. Therefore, as a result of the Crimean War, in 1856 Russia lost the southern part

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Moldova, a Romanian Province of Bessarabia to the principality of Moldavia, because the Great Powers wished to remove the Russian Empire from the mouth of the Danube and to give the Ottoman Empire greater protection against an aggressive Russia. By an irony of fate, the three southern districts which were now reunited with Moldavia were the very districts where the Romanian population was the least numerous.32 This territory was later incorporated into the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, after the Second World War, and has not been recovered by the Moldavian republic. In 1859, Moldavia and Walachia both managed to elect Alexandru Ioan Cuza as its domn (Hospodar), and a rapid process of unification of the two Principalities ensued. By 1866, unhappy with some of the democratic reforms initiated by Cuza, the political leadership decided to replace him. Still, they decided to keep the union and, as the Ottomans had previously stated that they would admit the union only during Cuza’s tenure as domn, they decided to replace him with a foreign prince. Carol of Hohenzollern accepted the invitation, and became King. Their decision was motivated by the need to avoid internal controversies regarding Cuza’s successor, which could have endangered the union, by the need to have a neutral element arbitrating over internal politics, as well as in order to enhance the Principalities’ international status (since Carol had family ties with both the German Imperial House and Emperor Napoleon III). In 1877, as a result of the war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, Romania became an independent state. During the 1877-1878 war, Bessarabia came into the spotlight again. Before the war started, the Romanian Prime Minister, Ion C. Bratianu, had worked hard to negotiate a military convention with Russia. Prolonged negotiations ended with the signing of the Russo-Romanian Convention on April 4-16, 1877, by which the Russian Army was given permission to cross through Romanian territory but the Russian government explicitly agreed to defend the existing integrity of Romania. There was great enthusiasm in Romania for the war and this was one of the best moments in Romanian-Russian relations, with both countries fighting together against their old enemy, the Ottoman Empire. Although, at the beginning of the military operations, the Russians rejected Romania’s offer of military assistance, just a few months later they became very keen to get it. The Romanian army fought with the aim of gaining complete independence from the Ottoman Empire.33 The Serbs, for various reasons, declined to declare war on the Ottomans, but Romania’s participation was valuable especially at Plevna.34 However, even before Russia entered the war against the Ottoman Empire, the fate of southern Bessarabia had already been decided. Through secret agreements with Austria-Hungary (at the Reichstadt, June 26, 1876 and in Budapest, January 3, 1877), Russia was to take back southern Bessarabia.35 The Romanians had no idea about those agreements and they understood that they stood to benefit from the upcoming war both by gaining independence from the Turks and also by acquiring some territory in Dobrudja.36 As soon as the outcome of the war was decided, the Russians officially asked the Romanian government for the retrocession of southern Bessarabia, in January 1878. This came as a shock to the Romanians, who had served Russia as an ally

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CHAPTER 1. BESSARABIA AND THE UNION WITH ROMANIA

throughout this conflict in return for the guarantee of safeguarding its territorial integrity. The demand was presented as representing a matter of prestige for the Czar.37 In order to make it easier for the Romanians to swallow the bitter pill, the Russians offered to Romania the Danube Delta and a part of Dobrudja in exchange for southern Bessarabia. Official (and unofficial) Romanian protest had no effect.38 Russia simply failed to keep her promise, access to Danube and the Czar’s pride being more important than Romania’s alliance. This was the first time that Bessarabia became the most contentious issue between Russia and Romania (as a state).39 It was also the first time that the Romanians, through the voice of Foreign Minister Mihail Kogalniceanu (who was both a Moldavian and a historian), officially protested against the previous seizure of all of Bessarabia as a result of the 1812 Treaty.40 Thus both the San Stefano and later the Berlin Peace Treaties stated that southern Bessarabia should revert to Russia, and offered to Romania “in exchange” Dobrudja and the Danube Delta (which she had taken from the Ottoman Empire as war compensation).41 Romania could do nothing but accept the deal proposed by the Russians; there was no Great Power willing to back up Romania, and the Russian Army was still on Romanian territory — making any resistance impossible. However, in fairness to Russia it should be mentioned that the Romanian leaders welcomed the acquisition of the Danube Delta and Dobrudja, although at the time it was not considered that these territories were a fair exchange for southern Bessarabia.42 This Russian action had a great impact on Romanian foreign policy. Actually, the Russian move was really a great success for the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who was able to kill two birds with one stone during the Berlin Conference: Romania’s alliance (an important country for his policy in the Balkan area), and Bulgaria’s alliance too (there had been a dispute between Romania and Bulgaria over the city of Silistra, in southern Dobrudja; in 1880 it went to Bulgaria as a result of Russian insistence and German approval).43 Bismarck also tried to obtain Russia’s gratitude by supporting her claim to Bessarabia, but due to the other stipulations in the Berlin Treaty, Russian public opinion — considering Germany the main responsible for the Berlin Treaty — turned against him. Romanian distrust and fear of the pan-Slav expansion only grew as a result of the Berlin Peace Treaty,44 and ended up driving Romania away from Russia and into the arms of Austria-Hungary and Germany. In 1913, Romania took part in the Second Balkan War and, by the Peace signed in Bucharest in 1913, acquired southern Dobrudja (Cadrilater) from Bulgaria.45 In 1916 Romania entered the war against Germany and the Austria-Hungarian Empire with the purpose of unification with the Romanian territories controlled by the former (Banat, Transylvania, Bukovina). In 1918, upon the unification of Bessarabia (April 9, 1918), Bukovina (November 28, 1918) Transylvania, Banat, Crisana and Maramures (December 1, 1918) with the Old Kingdom, Romania became the state of all Romanians.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Notes 1 Stefan Ciobanu, Basarabia. Populatia. Istoria. Cultura, p. 47; also A. Karetki, A. Pricop, Lacrima Basarabiei, p. 7. 2 For historical details on the name “Bessarabia” see Mihai Eminescu, “Basarabia. Numele si intinderea ei” in Basarabia Romana. Antologie, p. 3-6. Also, Dennis Deletant, “Language Policy and Linguistic Trends in the Republic of Moldavia, 1924-1992” in Studies in Moldavian . . . . p. 54-55. For a different opinion, much closer to the reality, see Charles King, The Moldovans, p. 20-21. 3 For details on Bessarabia under the rule of the Roman Empire, see A. Boldur, Istoria Basarabiei, p. 48, 53-61. 4 Most Romanian historians agree that these people were none other than the descendants of the Daco-Romanian population, who never abandoned their territories; the same language, customs and religion were prevalent all over the northern Danube territory. A somewhat different viewpoint is presented in Boldur’s Istoria Basarabiei, p. 98-110, arguing that, in fact, the descendants of the DacoRomanian populations had already been politically organized, in the 11th and 12th centuries, into what was known as the Countries of the Brodnics, and the Bolohovens. After the great Mongol invasion, some of these people migrated southward, and made up the bulk of the population in the northern parts of Moldavia, and had the main role in the making of the Moldavian state, p.124, 138145. 5 The economic and financial obligations of the Romanian principalities towards the Ottoman Empire gradually grew, reaching their highest level during the 18th century. For a concise account of these obligations, see Keith Hitchins, The Romanians. 1774-1866, p. 12-17. 6 The 1634 Treaty between Vasile Lupu, voevod of Moldavia, and the Ottoman Empire, states clearly that Moldavia was to be recognized as an independent state; that any interference of the Turks in the administration of the principality was forbidden; that the Moldavian borders would be kept intact entirely. C.U. Clark, “Basarabia, Rusia . . .” in Basarabia romana. Antologie, p. 88. 7 The hatisherifs were rescripts issued by the Sultan, for example after the conclusion of the 1774 peace or in 1802, in response to Russian demands, which imposed drastic limits on Ottoman political suzerainty and economic privileges, established through the earlier ahidnames. K. Hitchins, The Romanians. 1774-1866, p. 15. 8 Tomasso Tittoni, “Basarabia, Romania si Italia”, in Convorbiri Literare, 1927, p.16. Tittoni presents a good definition of suzerainty, which he correctly considers as being different from sovereignty. 9 K. Hitchins, The Romanians. 1774-1866, p. 7. 10 For details regarding the organization of a Turkish raia see K Hitchins, The Romanians. 1774-1866, p. 9-10. 11 I. Scurtu et. al., Istoria Basarabiei, p. 23. 12 Still, the Turks did not try to denationalize the population living in those territories being satisfied to only exploit it economically. S. Ciobanu, Basarabia . . ., p. 49. 13 Paul Cernovodeanu, Basarabia. Drama unei provincii romanesti in context politic international, 1806-1920, p. 9. Also, R.W. Seton-Watson, The History of the Romanians, p. 555-560. 14 For details on the faith of Bukovina under the Austrian rule, see Ioan Capreanu, Bucovina. Isotrie si cultura romaneasca, passim. 15 T. Tittoni, “Basarabia, Romania si Italia” in Convorbiri Literare, p.15 16 The complicated Franco-Russian and Franco-Ottoman negotiations during the first decade of the 19th century regarding the future position of the Romanian principalities are very clearly presented in P. Cernovodeanu, Basarabia . . . , p. 12-63. Also, I. Scurtu et. al., Istoria Basarabiei, p. 29-32, or A. Boldur, Istoria Basarabiei, p. 281-288. 17 Ion Gherman, Istoria tragica a Bucovinei, Basarabiei si tinutul Hertei, p. 109. 18 P. Cernovodeanu, Basarabia . . . , p. 38-40. 19 F.C. Nanu, Politica externa a Romaniei, 1919-1933, p.106.

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CHAPTER 1. BESSARABIA AND THE UNION WITH ROMANIA 20

Van Meurs, The Bessarabian Question . . . , p. 235-242. Van Meurs makes a very good analyze of the political motivations behind the publishing by the Romanians of Marx’s comments in 1964. 21 By the Karlowitz Peace of January 1699 between the Poles and the Ottomans, although the former applied pressure on the Ottomans to cede the northern parts of Moldavia to them, they received only the territory of Podolia. The Ottomans argued that Moldova was independent and not theirs; therefore they could not give it away. I. Frunza, The rights of the Romanians upon Bessarabia, p. 13. Unfortunately they were not able to maintain that position a century later. 22 Van Meurs, The Bessarabian Question . . . , p. 47. Also, George F. Jewsburry, The Russian Annexation of Bessarabia, p. 55. 23 Quoted in R.W. Seton-Watson, The History of the Romanians, p. 561. 24 For details on the Bulgarian colonization see Th. Holban, “Numarul bulgarilor din Basarabia” in Basarabia Romana. Antologie, p. 527-532. 25 Irina Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania, p.93-94; also I. Scurtu et. al., Istoria Basarabiei, p. 46-47. 26 The colonization was initially generated by the necessity to fill Bessarabia with people, in order to make possible a better exploitation of the newly acquired territory, and not for depriving it of its Romanian character. The Russian Empire appealed not only to people inside the Russian Empire but also to any other people willing to work and live under its authority in exchange for a piece of land. It was in this area that “the Russians registered their greatest success.” G.F. Jewsburry, The Russian . . . , p. 66-74. Also, A. Boldur, Istoria Basarabiei, p. 276. 27 For a fair and concise description of Bessarabia’s situation under the Russian administration see K Hitchins, Romania, 1866-1947, p. 239-250. 28 I. Scurtu, et. al., Istoria Basarabiei, p. 57, 88. 29 Van Meurs, The Bessarabian Question . . . , p. 48. 30 For a concise presentation of the Romanian Principalities during the Crimean War see P. Cernovodeanu, Basarabia … , p. 64-70. 31 P Cernovodeanu, “Basarabia . . .”, p. 71-78. Although P. Cernovodeanu considers that the retrocession of the southern part of Bessarabia to Moldavia meant a partial international recognition of the illegality done in 1812 when Bessarabia went under Russian rule, the author of the present paper considers that the retrocession came as a result of strategic reasons and had little to do with the 1812 Bucharest Peace Treaty. 32 R.W. Seton-Watson, The History of the Romanians, p. 562. 33 The war also offered the opportunity of a first contact between the Bessarabian and the Romanian soldiers fighting together. Nicolae Ciachir, Basarabia sub stapanire tarista, 1812-1917, p. 57. 34 David MacKenzie, “Russia’s Balkan policies Under Alexander II” in Imperial Russian Foreign Policy, p. 239. 35 P. Cernovodeanu, Basarabia . . . , p. 87, 90. 36 For details regarding the position of Romania before the start of the 1877 and of her difficult negotiations with Russia and the other Great Powers see B. Jelavich, Russia and the Formation of the Romanian National State, 1821-1878, p. 227-259. 37 P. Cernovodeanu, Basarabia . . . , p. 96. 38 The Russian action in southern Bessarabia did not come as much a surprise to the leading Romanian political circles. During the bilateral negotiations in 1876-1877 Ion C. Bratianu had been told by the Russians that they do intend to take back southern Bessarabia but, having no other available options, he decided to go on the Russian’s hand, hoping probably in a more happier outcome. When the things cleared and the Russians took southern Bessarabia the focus of the entire Romanian propaganda was on the Russian betrayal and not at all on the territory offered in exchange to Romania. Pamfil Seicaru, Romania in marele razboi, p. 57. Also B. Jelavich, Russia and the Formation . . . , p. 242244. 39 Xenia J. Eudin, Harold H. Fischer, Soviet Russia and the West, 1920-1927, p. XXIV.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province 40

B. Jelavich, Russia and the Formation . . . , p. 273-274. For details on the Romanian position at the Berlin Peace Treaty negotiations see P. Cernovodeanu, Basarabia . . . , p. 103-107; Also, B. Jelavich, Russia and the Formation . . . , p. 277-286. 42 B. Jelavich, Russia and the Formation . . . , p. 285. Still, on the other hand, Romanian public opinion showed little enthusiasm for the acquisition of Dobrudja and thought it an unfair exchange for southern Bessarabia. It was only in time and as a direct result of Romanian investments that the area brought economic benefits to Romania. 43 B. Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National States, p. 178. 44 Andrew Rossos, Russia and the Balkans, p. 134. 45 More information on the Romanian implication in the First and Second Balkan Wars is available in Andrew Rossos, Russia and the Balkans, p. 134-152. For the Romanian account of events see the memoirs of the Romanian prime minister at that time, Titu Maiorescu, in his book Romania, razboaiele balcanice si Cadrilaterul, passim. 41

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CHAPTER 2. THE MAKING OF THE UNION BETWEEN BESSARABIA AND ROMANIA

Background There are two different viewpoints regarding the 1918 Union between Bessarabia and Romania. Romanian historiography places the event in the context of the long expected Union of all the Romanians into one state, a Greater Romania. Soviet historiography considers it a military annexation of Bessarabia by Romania, achieved through military means and by taking advantage of the situation in Russia at the end of the First World War. The Romanians argue that historically and demographically Bessarabia is Romanian territory — that the Bessarabian population was made up mainly of Romanians; and that the Ottoman Empire had no right to give it away to any other country. The Russians simply consider that Bessarabia was taken (liberated) from the Ottoman Empire and had become a Russian territory; in 1812 Romania did not exist as a state and therefore could not have controlled Bessarabia. During the Soviet years, a third viewpoint came into being, which is still promulgated today by some scholars in the new Moldavian Republic. They consider that the Moldavians are neither Romanians nor Russians but Moldavians, and they (the historians) are working hard to combine the first two theories in order to build a history and a national feeling for their people. In the view of the post-1990 events in Moldavia it must be admitted that “the Soviet attempt to create the most artificial nationality of the USSR, the Moldavians, and thus to hide the fact that over 2.8 million Romanians lived under Soviet rule in a territory that once was part of the ethnic Romanian principality of Moldavia”1 was, indeed, quite successful. A description of the events in Bessarabia during 1917-1918 cannot be given without referring to the events happening in the other parts of the Russian Empire, and especially in Russia and Ukraine. The Bessarabians were not the only nationality under strict Russian rule. All the nationalities had great hopes for their future and, as

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Moldova, a Romanian Province the Empire entered the 20th century, its cohesion was decreasing because of the spread of new ideas and the development of non-Russian national consciences amidst all these populations. It became more and more difficult for the Empire to maintain its unity and cohesion. Bessarabia’s evolution was in many respects similar to that of other provinces; the only difference that it decided in favor of unification with a state that had already existed before the war. In fact, the decision for Union is the point most hotly contested by Soviet, Russian (and, today, by Moldavian) historiography. They do not contest Bessarabia’s right to autonomy within the Russian Empire, or even its decision for independence, achieved on January 24, 1918 (the anniversary of the Union of Walachia and Moldavia, 59 years earlier), but they draw the line when it comes to the Union with Romania. The main question is who, or what force, was behind the political events of 1917-1918 in Bessarabia, and how it affected those events. One underlying factor was the awakening of national movements all over the Russian Empire, starting more or less at the beginning of the 20th century. Scholars agree that without the events in Russia there would have been no national awakening in Bessarabia. A second and more complex factor is that of the national movement in Bessarabia. What kind of nationalism was instigating the “hostilities” in Bessarabia — a Bessarabian, a Romanian, a Moldavian, a Moldovan, or a Moldovan-Romanian nationalism?2 What was the evolution of this nationalism and what were the factors that influenced it (and in what degree)? To these questions it is difficult, if not impossible, to find an answer accepted by all the scholars in the field; in the chapters to come, we will try to present all the factors leading to the Union, while refraining from the attempt to conduct another exhaustive analysis of them. A third factor is the role played by the quite sudden contact between Bessarabians and the Romanians living in Romania and in Austria-Hungary during 1917-1918, a contact that had a significant influence over the course of events in Bessarabia. Nationality in the Bessarabian province is difficult to label. The descendants of the Daco-Romanian population, the Romanians, populated the territory north of the Danube River, including Bessarabia; they spoke the same language and shared the same religion and customs, but they were divided into different political formations or geographical regions. Before the development of the Romanian national conscience, during the 19th century, the Romanians used to characterize themselves first and foremost by using the regional denomination (such as “Moldovan”, “Regateni”, “Olteni”, or “Ardeleni”). Local subdivisions also exist within these regions. Even today, they continue to proudly call themselves by these regional names, but they do consider themselves Romanians. Until 1812, Bessarabia was a part of Moldavia and, since at that time the Romanian national conscience was only in its nascent stages, it was quite normal for the people living in Bessarabia to call themselves Moldavians and not Romanians. Because of their isolation from the other Romanian territories, due to Russian policy, they called themselves Moldavians until 1918.

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CHAPTER 2. THE MAKING OF THE UNION BETWEEN BESSARABIA AND ROMANIA

The controversy over the degree to which the Romanian-speaking people living in Bessarabia are Moldavians and the degree to which they are Romanians is far more recent.3 During the Russification process, the most powerful ally of the administration was the community (or identity) of religion, which was fully exploited. Due to Russia’s control over the province, some differences did evolve between Bessarabia and the other Romanian-populated territories, such as the continued use of the old Orthodox calendar.4 At the local level, among the peasants (the majority of the population), there had been no interest — at least before 1917 — in political or national matters and whatever came from the official propaganda, including that from the Church, was accepted as true. Both the Russian and Soviet propaganda exaggerated the differences between the Moldavians and the Romanians, to the point that they finally managed to convince some Moldavians that they are, indeed, a distinct people. Therefore, the main difference between the Bessarabian Romanians and the Romanians in other provinces can be ascribed to the Russian control over Bessarabia for more than a century. Nobody can argue convincingly that there was a great difference between the people living on the left and on the right sides of the Pruth River before 1812. During the 19th century, the survival of the Moldavian identity was ensured by traditionalism, plus the isolation, backwardness, repressive character and Russification policies of the Tsarist Empire.5 While during the first years after the annexation there were no notable differences, by about the middle of the 19th century the situation started to change, due to the increasing Western, and especially French, influence over the Romanian principalities — an influence that brought about reforms and development, a new ideology, new customs and, finally, a state of all the Romanians.6 At the same time, Bessarabia was kept inside the Russian sphere and away from Western influences. This gave the Bessarabians both advantages and disadvantages. While in Romania there was a conflict between the government and the Church, caused by the secularization of the land belonging to the churches and monasteries, there was no such conflict in Bessarabia, and the Bessarabian priests were more than happy with their situation. Russian propaganda was very successful in convincing the Bessarabians that, in fact, they had a much better life under the rule of the Czars than the peasants had in Romania.7 Before the beginning of the 20th century, there were manifestations of national conscience among the Romanians living in Bessarabia — perhaps not very widespread, but interestingly diverse: the Bessarabian boyars’ fight to maintaining their privileges and autonomy during the first years after annexation;8 the books printed in Romanian by Iacob Hanculov and by Ioan Doncev;9 the Moldavian boyars’ creation of a small political party during 1862-1863;10 the presentations made all over Bessarabia by Romanian-language theatre groups; the movement of Bessarabian students in Dorpat (1898-1902);11 the publication in Chisinau of a Romanian-language newspaper called Mesajerul Basarabiei (The Bessarabian Messenger) in 1884;12 the smuggling of Romanian-language books and publications into Bessarabia; and, no less

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Moldova, a Romanian Province significant, the printing of religious books in Romanian.13 Still, the most important manifestation was the continuing usage of Romanian, not only in the administration, schools (until 1867, when the official use of Romanian language was forbidden)14 and Church, but also in the daily life, especially by the peasants. Directly connected to this last factor was the enormous distance separating the intellectuals from the mass of the people all over the Russian Empire, and Bessarabia was no exception. The very low level of education in Bessarabia made the peasants incapable of receiving the Russian culture, which thus had no influence over them.15 All these manifestations, and the failure of the Russification process, point to the existence in Bessarabia at the turn of the century of a pre-modern mass proto-nationalism.16 The 1905 Revolution in Russia signaled the awakening of all the nationalities in the Empire. Political programs were launched all over the Empire, at first with the idea of federalization of the nationalities in Russia and later with the idea of autonomy. The nascent Moldavian intelligentsia started to stir.17 Unfortunately there was only a very small group of them fighting for the rights of the Romanians in Bessarabia. The most representative parts of the society (the boyars, the clergy, and the peasants), for different reasons, had neither the interest nor the will to fight for national rights. The first open manifestations of Bessarabian nationalism came in the form of the Romanian-language press. A first such newspaper, significantly called Bessarabia and using Latin, not Cyrillic, characters, was printed during 1905 in Switzerland by Zamfir Arbore and Petre Cazacu, representing the views of the Romanian National Party in Bessarabia.18 Although its focus was on universal suffrage and land reform, it also called for the use of the Moldavian language in administration, education and churches, and went as far as to ask for Bessarabian autonomy.19 A new step was taken in 1906 through the publication in Chisinau of a Romanian newspaper called Bessarabia, edited by a group of Moldavian students and intellectuals, under the leadership of E. Gavrilita. Their demands were, again, mostly of a social character, but they also asked for the provincial autonomy of Bessarabia (as it had enjoyed before 1869), and for the use of the Moldavian (actually Romanian) language in schools, church, and administration. But the newspaper was published only for a few months. During that time, the newspaper served as the basis for the formation of a small Democratic Moldavian Party, founded by the same E. Gavrilita.20 On a different level, but in connection with the revolution in Russia, comes the movement to encourage the use of Moldavian language in churches. This was initiated from within the Church, surprisingly, by the Russian high clergymen who realized that, in fact, most of the Moldavian peasants were quite unable to understand their sermons in Russian. Therefore, they took a number of measures to have their message penetrate the minds of the peasants, allowing the local priests to use the Moldavian language in churches and reopening the Eparchial Typography, which started publishing religious literature translated into Romanian.21 It is important to note that this movement continued after 1907 and had a certain influence over the great mass of Bessarabian peasants (which was almost indifferent to appeals coming

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CHAPTER 2. THE MAKING OF THE UNION BETWEEN BESSARABIA AND ROMANIA

from the intelligentsia), preparing it for the 1917-1918 events. Overall, the Bessarabian national movement during the 1905-1907 revolution in Russia can be characterized, at best, as a weak one both in its manifestations (only a few newspapers) and its adherence (limited to a very small number of intellectuals and not including the boyars, the priests and the peasants — with some notable exceptions).22 It was also more social or cultural in nature rather than political.23 And, although there are not many Romanian scholars stressing this point, it had a very weak echo in Romania itself, where few intellectuals or political leaders expressed any interest in the fate of the Bessarabians. The weakness and lack of support for Bessarabian nationalism is best illustrated by the fact that no Moldavian (or Romanian) was among those elected in 1906 to the new Imperial Duma.24 Needless to say, after 1906 the Russian reaction destroyed any national movement inside the Empire, and in a very short time Bessarabian nationalism became only a distant dream as many of its promoters had to move to Jassy, in Romania.25 The festivities the Russian administration organized in Bessarabia in 1912 to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the annexation were full of pomp and very few (in Bessarabia or in Romania) people could have had the courage to raise the national flag for the Bessarabians. Then, during the war and until the peak of the 1917 Revolution, there were no new manifestations of Bessarabian nationalism,26 everybody being far more concerned with the fate of Great Russia than with that of Romania or of the Bessarabians. Even in Romania, almost everybody was looking towards the west (Transylvania) and not to the east.27 Only after the beginning of the World War were any voices heard in Romania (the best known of them was that of Constantin Stere), and in some European capitals,28 arguing that the main objective of Romania’s policy should be the recovery of Bessarabia. One of the best descriptions of the Bessarabian national conscience is to be found on Emmanuel De Martonne’s Report on Bessarabia, presented to the French Committee of Study in July 1919: It is not possible to deny that the national conscience was numb in Bessarabia in 1914. One could think that it was the right time for Romania’s intervention if she did not want to lose all the hopes of recovering a territory that seemed to be lost definitively. Still, the events proved that it was not too late.29 Making the Union One Romanian historian, Stefan Ciobanu, in The Union of Bessarabia, distinguishes two phases in the nationalities movement inside the Russian Empire, with different particularities: national romanticism and national realism — which existed both generally in Russia and in Bessarabia. The first phase was the moment when different nationalities came to believe in the Revolution and in the Provisional Government. People from all over the Empire started to claim some national rights, as they had done in 1905; this was limited to provincial autonomy, cultural autonomy, and use of their mother tongues in educa-

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Moldova, a Romanian Province tion, church and administration. They held congresses and organized themselves into political parties and societies. Unfortunately, the Provisional Government had a radical tendency in resolving social problems and continued the policy of centralization and Russification. The second phase started when the different nationalities that made up the Empire, disappointed by the Provisional Government’s policy, made the transition from the idea of federalization to the idea of “self determination” or separation from Russia through the creation of new independent states and/or unification with other states. Although not all scholars agree,30 it is generally considered that in Bessarabia the Moldavian National Party, founded on March 20 (April 2), 1917 under the leadership of Bessarabian boyar Vasile Stroescu, guided the national movement. The press was the favored tool for communicating with the people and for propaganda, especially the Moldavian Word (Cuvant Moldovenesc) newspaper, which was printed as early as 1913.31 In the beginning they asked only for social, economical and political rights. Their program was published on April 2 (15), 1917, in Moldavian Word, with the National Moldavian Party specifying its objectives: Bessarabia’s autonomy, which meant having their own government (self-government); use of the Moldavian language in schools, church, and administration; and the right to live a Moldavian life, with their own customs. Later, other objectives were included, like the national and citizens’ rights established by the Russian revolution, for example universal suffrage, and freedom of speech, printing, assembly and religion.32 More or less simultaneously with the founding of the Moldavian National Party, local Soviets of soldiers, peasants, and workers were formed, initially in the Russian garrisons of major Bessarabian cities and later in smaller towns as well. On May 1 (14), 1917, a gathering of some 10,000 Moldavian officers and soldiers in Odessa demanded political autonomy for Bessarabia and announced the formation of separate Moldavian army units to maintain public order.33 Also, the Bessarabian students and soldiers in Odessa and Kiev organized into groups and started working in favor of the Bessarabian cause, editing Moldavian-language publications addressed to the Bessarabian soldiers.34 One of the most important factors at this beginning was the contact between the Bessarabians and the Transylvanian Romanians who, because of the war, were present in great numbers all over the Russian Empire. It seems that under their impulse and taking advantage of their experience in fighting for national rights, the Bessarabian nationalist propaganda began to reach the masses.35 The first manifestation of Bessarabian nationalism among the peasants came during the first meeting of the Soviet of Deputies of the Peasants in Chisinau, May 21-24 (June 3-6). After insisting on the right to speak their own language, and on Bessarabian autonomy, the Moldavian deputies decided to leave the Congress and to organize their own Moldavian Congress.36 It was an important step for the national movement, although in the end the Moldavian peasants were brought back together with the representatives of the other nationalities in Bessarabia (through the efforts

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of I.D. Sokolov, the representative of the Petrograd Soviet of Soldiers and Workers) and approved the Petrograd-made decisions regarding Bessarabia.37 During the first months of the Revolution propaganda played a very important role. Because there were so many political and national orientations, there was a real “boom” of publications printed in Bessarabia and, most important, in the Romanian language. This proves that all the parties involved realized the importance of the great mass represented by the Moldavian peasants and soldiers in the “sudden” birth of Bessarabian nationalism. The use of Moldavian language in publications (even in those published by the enemies of Bessarabian nationalism)38 and more and more often in schools, church, army and even the administration, was a real boost for the Bessarabian national feelings. Therefore, unlike during 1905-1907, the propaganda was able to penetrate the masses. The first enemy of Bessarabia’s autonomy was the Ukrainian Republic, which was created in June 1917. Ukraine took the view that Bessarabia was part of Ukraine and was especially opposed to the inclusion of the Hotin (in the north) and Ackerman (south) districts within the Bessarabian territory.39 One by one, other organizations, like the National Peasants’ Party, the Moldavian Progressive Party, and professional leagues, were brought into existence and they too argued in favor of the two main ideas of the Revolution — land reform and autonomy — especially among the army and the intellectuals. It was not always a fair fight, and intimidation by force and political assassinations were often used.40 The evolution toward autonomy was partially influenced by the Congress of the Peoples Living in Russia, held in Kiev, September 8-14 (21-27); a Bessarabian delegation leaded by Teofil Iancu and Vasile Cijevski took part. The Congress decided in the favor of national autonomy for the nations living inside the Russian Empire. It offered a good tribune for the Bessarabians to express their nationalist feelings.41 Between October 20 and 27 (November 2-9), 1917, the “Congress of Moldavian Soldiers” was held in Chisinau; about 900 delegates representing more than 250,000 people took part (including both officers and soldiers). The Congress took a number of decisions, the most important being autonomy, the nationalization of the Moldavian army (fighting under the command of Russian general Scerbacev, together with troops from other parts of the Empire), land reform and especially the convening of a National Assembly.42 It should be mentioned that they considered as part of Bessarabia those territories east of Dniestr that were populated by Moldavians, and accorded those Moldavians the right to send ten representatives to the future National Assembly. On November 2 (15), the Bolsheviks published the famous Declaration regarding the rights of all the peoples in Russia, which was, together with the similar Proclamation made by the Kerensky Government on September 25 (October 8), the legal basis for the national movements all over the Russian Empire. After the elections,43 the Sfatul Tserii (the Council of the Country), opened its debates at Chisinau on November 21 (December 4), 1917. The Sfatul Tserii was an in-

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Moldova, a Romanian Province stitution created and organized like an ordinary provincial Diet, with the duties of coordinating the political and administrative life and, most important, preparing for autonomy. There were 150 deputies in the newly made Council (105 Romanians, 15 Ukrainians, 14 Jewish, 7 Russians, 2 Germans, 2 Bulgarians, 2 Gagauz, 1 Polish, 1 Armenian, 1 Greek). The Sfatul Tserii was proclaimed the highest institution in Bessarabia and then an executive body was elected from its members. The executive body was named “The Council of the General Directors” and was composed of a President Director and ten General Directors; it had the basic attributes of a government. It also took a number of important decisions regarding other questions of immediate interest, such as agrarian reform, universal suffrage, human rights, minorities’ rights, workers’ rights, the national army, the death penalty and so on.44 The government in Petrograd recognized the newly elected body as representative for Bessarabia. Politically, in the new Parliament all the political forces were represented: the National Moldavian Bloc (with about 47%), the Peasant Faction (20%), the social democrats, the social-revolutionaries, and the landowners.45 A dispute regarding the constitutionality of the Sfatul Tserii was generated by Soviet historiography.46 But their arguments led to the conclusion that almost all the other similarly constituted assemblies (the Ukrainian Rada, for example) on Russian territory were unconstitutional. Given that the Sfatul Tserii was elected on a fair basis, representing not only the existing political groups but all the nationalities and all the professions in Bessarabia, its constitutionality is beyond doubt. On December 2, (15) 1917, in Chisinau, the Sfatul Tserii proclaimed the autonomy of the Moldavian Democratic Republic. Bessarabia is proclaimed from today the Democratic Republic of Moldavia, as a member with equal rights inside the Russian Federative Democratic Republic.47 On the basis of national self-determination, both the Petrograd Soviet and the Council of People’s Commissars recognized the new Moldavian Republic, its government, and its Assembly.48 On December 8 (21), a delegation of the Sfatul Tserii went to Jassy to seek military help from the Entente against the armed groups of cashiered soldiers. All they received were promises. Another important element in the equation was the state of war. In 1916, the Russian and Romanian Armies were fighting together on the eastern front. Because of events in Moscow, the problems inside the Russian Army deepened more and more in 1917. There had been numerous riots and desertions caused by the lack of provisions and the lack of will to fight. Soldiers started stealing food from the peasants. Disorder was gaining in proportion along the eastern front (which crossed Romanian territory). The Romanian authorities, with the approval of the Allied representatives in Jassy, decided to take action against Bolshevik troops on Romanian territory, at first by gradually arresting the members of the soldiers’ leading “Soviets”

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and later by disarming the troops and preventing them from reaching the capital city of Jassy.49 As a consequence, fighting broke out between the two armies that were supposed to be collaborating against the Germans (as when the Russian attacked Galatz, a Romanian city50). Unfortunately, Russian soldiers (or deserters) fleeing the Romanians had to cross through Bessarabia, where they went on with their robbing and pillaging. The reaction in Moscow to the Romanian Army’s action against Russian troops was very prompt. The entire personnel of the Romanian Legation in Moscow was arrested and jailed on December 31, 1917 (January 13, 1918). As a result of the intervention organized by other diplomats in Moscow, the Romanian representatives were liberated after three days and were ejected from the country.51 Ten days later, on January 13 (26), as a direct result of the Romanian Army entering Bessarabia, the People’s Commissars decided to break off diplomatic relations with Romania (see Annex No. 1). The only effective action it could take in this sense, due to its conflict with the White Russians, was to seize the Romanian National Treasury in Moscow (transported there for safekeeping during 1917), which it duly confiscated and sealed on the same day. In fact, the Bolsheviks were so weak that, as one scholar presents it, “Romania, herself defeated by Germany, still felt strong enough to encroach upon Russian territory, a situation which would have seemed fantastic before 1917 or after 1921”.52 The Romanians argue that the Petrograd Government had no right to confiscate the Treasury in retaliation for their intervention in Bessarabia, after having solemnly proclaimed that each of the nationalities living in the former Russian Empire had the right to separate itself from the Russian Empire. Moreover, at Brest Litovsk, they did not express any claims over Bessarabia.53 The situation in Bessarabia was worse than in Romania. The civil war between the different military groups was bringing the population to a state of terror. Armed robberies became a constant threat. The situation was such that, in mid-December, in Chisinau there were no fewer than nine different committees, each one rejecting the authority of the Sfatul Tserii.54 There was almost complete anarchy, fueled by the Bolshevik propaganda and actions and by the Sfatul Tserii’s lack of the human and material resources necessary to end the violence. At the second congress of the RUMCEROD (the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of the Romanian Front, the Black Sea Fleet, and the Odessa Region — a communist organization claiming control over southern Ukraine), a resolution condemning the Sfatul Tserii was adopted and it was decided to take action against it (December 27-January 9). The Front Section (Frontotdel), made up of hard-line Bolsheviks, was sent to Chisinau. On January 1 (14), 1918, the Frontotdel captured strategic locations and buildings in the city and proclaimed itself in command of the Russian troops on the Romanian front and in Bessarabia, challenging the authority of the Sfatul Tserii.55 The Bolsheviks attempted to take power for themselves by abolishing the Sfatul Tserii and arresting the elected deputies, replacing it with a self-proclaimed Molda-

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Moldova, a Romanian Province vian Soviet. None of its members were ethnic Moldavian; and this ethnic pattern would repeat itself later, when the leadership of the Bessarabian communist party mostly consisted of non-Moldavian individuals.56 However, the Bolshevik plan failed when the Romanian Army intervened, at the request of the Sfatul Tserii. The leaders of the Sfatul Tserii twice sent to Jassy for military assistance against the Bolsheviks, but the Allies could do nothing and the only force able to intervene efficiently in Bessarabia was the Romanian Army. At the time, as a result of both the Russian and the Bolshevik propaganda, there were some reservations in Bessarabia regarding the implication of a possible intervention by the Romanian Army. That was seen as a potential first step towards union with Romania.57 In order to avoid such a situation in the future, the Allied representatives in Jassy gave, on January 2 (15), a written guarantee to the Bessarabian authorities regarding Romanian military intervention: This is purely a military measure, as its only object is to guarantee the normal functioning of service for the Russo-Romanian front, in conformity with the rules established in the belligerent countries. Thus, this cannot affect in any way the actual or future politics of Bessarabia.58 On January 6 (19), 1918, the Romanian government decided that a group of Transylvanian former war prisoners in Russia, arriving from Kiev, should take up positions in Chisinau in order to defend the storage houses from looting.59 As soon as they arrived there, the Bolsheviks, who had launched their insurrection on January 7, seized their guns and sent them back where they came from. On that insurrectional day the Bolsheviks, under the leadership of Caabac, cracked down on the Sfatul Tserii, arresting its deputies and all the Romanian officers they found in Chisinau.60 In order to stop the disorder, at the request of both the Bessarabian authorities and the Entente Powers, with a written request from General Scerbacev, the Romanian Army crossed the border into Bessarabia on January 10 (23).61 In a matter of days, it had liberated Chisinau, and it defeated all the Bolshevik troops during the following weeks, establishing peace (actually, the end of looting) in Bessarabia. The military intervention was supposed to be temporary and was expected to end as soon as the mission (defending the railway and the depots) was completed. But in the larger scheme of things, Romania’s decision to intervene militarily in Bessarabia is justified for another reason: during the 19th century, neither Bismarck nor Cavour had hesitated to use military action as a complement to their diplomatic sallies in order to achieve the unification of their states. It does not seem extraordinary that the Romanians should do the same. They simply seized an opportunity and did what other nations had done, trying to repeat their success. Petrograd’s reaction to the Romanian action came the same day; the Russian Government broke off diplomatic relations with Romania. It should be mentioned that, although at the beginning the Romanian Army was not very welcome in Bessarabia, the advantages of a return to relative peace and order, plus the continuing

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assurances from the Romanian generals that they had no intention of interfering in Bessarabia’s political life (and the Allied representatives’ assurances that it was only a temporary intervention), made many Bessarabians — including Ion Inculet, the president of the Sfatul Tserii — change their opinion.62 The Ukrainian Rada raised no claims over Bessarabia before or after the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty with the Central Powers on January 27, which was understood by both the Bessarabians and the Romanians as a confirmation that it did not consider Bessarabia to be a part of Ukraine.63 A new step was made on January 1918, the date when Ukraine was proclaimed an independent state, breaking any direct connections between Bessarabia and Petrograd. On January 24 (February 5), 1918 (a date chosen for its special significance, as it was the date of the union between Moldavia and Walachia), the Sfatul Tserii proclaimed, not without an intense debate between the pro-independence and pro-autonomy groups, the independence of Moldavia.64 During the following weeks, the question of unification with Romania became one of the most urgent topics of debate. The Sfatul Tserii realized that it was less and less able to control the situation and to organize itself as a real administration (it could not levy taxes or organize an army), so it decided to convene the People’s Assembly to decide the “union” question. During February, the situation of the Romanian refugees in Odessa worsened considerably as a result of aactions initiated by the Rumcerod, under the leadership of Christian Rakovsky. A large number of Romanian refugees had been arrested, at Rakovsky’s orders, and were being detained together with the Romanian officials arrested in Chisinau at the beginning of January, in miserable conditions, in Odessa. The Rumcerod sent a number of notes to the Romanian Government, asking for the withdrawal of its Army from Bessarabia and for the Allies’ mediation in the conflict between Romania and the Rumcerod.65 On February 18, 1918, Russia signed the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty with the Central Powers. As a direct consequence, Romania remained alone on the eastern front. Important to our subject, because it was used as one of the main arguments in favor of Soviet claims to Bessarabia, is the treaty regarding the end of the RussoRomanian conflict, signed on February 20 (March 5), 1918. By this treaty, Romania undertook to evacuate Bessarabia during the following two months. Russian historiography insists that Romania failed to respect this treaty by refusing to withdraw its army and that, in order to find a justification to the continuous presence of the Romanian Army in Bessarabia, the Romanian Government influenced the Sfatul Tserii to declare the union of Bessarabia with Romania. The Romanian Prime Minister at that time, General Al. Averescu, opened negotiations with the Rumcerod through the offices of Italy’s representative in Jassy, Fasciotti, who was the dean of the diplomatic missions. His aim was to improve the general situation of Romania (by having peace at east), to secure the Romanian

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Moldova, a Romanian Province army’s depots of materials and food in Bessarabia, and especially to help a great number of Romanian deputies and officers66 detained in Odessa by the Rumcerod. Averescu accepted almost all of the conditions presented by Rakovsky, adding as a preliminary condition the liberation of the Romanian prisoners.67 In addition to the main agreement three protocols were signed, referring to an exchange of prisoners, the return of Russian soldiers in Romania in case of Romania making peace, a general political amnesty for Romanian political emigrants and deserters, and the evacuation of the Ackerman district.68 But because the Rumcerod had to flee Odessa, as soon as February 27, the exchange of prisoners did not take place and the treaty was never applied.69 Adding to the controversy over this unimplemented agreement is the fact that the independent Moldavian Republic was not invited to sign it.70 Therefore, the agreement was not binding on the Moldavian Republic, which was free to decide her own future. On March 27 (April 9), 1918, the Sfatul Tserii proclaimed, in a very festive atmosphere,70 the Union of Moldavia with Romania — but with conditions such as provincial autonomy for Bessarabia after incorporation, agrarian reform, and universal suffrage, as well as a number of other political and social reforms.71 Some scholars argue that the new relationship with Romania, as the Moldavians saw it, was to be based upon federalist principles.72 The result of the vote for the Union was: in favor, 86 votes; against, 3 votes; abstentions, 36; and absentees 13 (of the 138 members). The March 27 (April 9) resolution of the Sfatul Tserii that decided upon the union with Romania stated: In the name of and on behalf of the people of Bessarabia, the Country’s Council [Sfatul Tserii] declares that the Moldavian Democratic Republic [Bessarabia] — within her boundaries formed by the Pruth, the Dniestr, the Black Sea and the old frontiers with Austria — which had been cut off by Russia more than one hundred years ago from the body of old Moldavia — in keeping with her historical national rights, and on the principle that one nation alone should decide upon her fate, decides to unite from now on with the motherland — Romania.73 On April 4 (17) 1918, Ferdinand, the King of Romania, ratified the unification of Bessarabia with Romania. The reasons for including the conditions were related to both the situation in Bessarabia (where a land reform was underway, while in Romania it was still only theoretical) and the dissatisfaction with the pro-German orientation of the Romanian Government leaded by Alexandru Marghiloman. Although the Transylvanian, Bukovina and Bessarabian nationalisms developed on different coordinates they came to have a significant common feature: they made ratification of their own rights and execution of the land reform (promised in the Old Kingdom in 1917) a prerequisite for union into a Greater Romania.74 However, on November 27 (December 10), after implementing the land reform and because the war had ended, the Sfatul Tserii

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renounced to these conditions and proclaimed the Union without conditions.75 When the Union was proclaimed, the Ukrainian government sent a number of notes to Romania, asking at first for a plebiscite in those Bessarabian territories that were populated mainly by Ukrainians, and then for the incorporation of the entire Bessarabia to Ukraine.76 However, in just a few months, the Ukrainian government ceased sending notes of protest, and its relations with Romania improved. Russian Foreign Commissar Gheorghi Cicerin also sent a note to the Romanian authorities to protest the incorporation of Bessarabia, accusing them of not respecting the will of the masses and of acting in the interests of the landowners (it is interesting that he mentions the same landowners who were permanently fighting against the Union).77 Nevertheless, both the Central Powers and the Entente Powers gave their approval to the Union. The last internal action regarding the Union was its ratification, on December 20, 1919, by the newly-elected Romanian Parliament, which was made up of deputies representing all the regions of Greater Romania, including Bessarabia. International recognition of Bessarabia’s union with Romania came on October 28, 1920 when Romania, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan signed the Bessarabian Treaty. That document and the maneuverings that took place before and after its signing form the central focus of the chapters to come. Delays in Romania’s Ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty Although the Bessarabian Treaty signified the much-desired international recognition of the union, the Romanian government was slow in ratifying it, and was, in fact, not even the first of the signatories to do so. The first attempt to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty was made on November 22, 1921, when the Romanian Foreign Minister, Take Ionescu, sent a report to the Council of Ministers asking for the Council’s agreement for the draft law regarding ratification. The Council decided, on December 2, 1921, that the draft should be sent to the Parliament for the necessary debates. On the same day, King Ferdinand also approved the sending of the draft to the Parliament, together with a Message in which the reasons for ratification were presented. After underscoring the historical arguments and the way in which the union had been made, the Message presents the Treaty itself, stating, “Through this Convention the international side of Bessarabia’s union with Romania has been closed definitively . . . the Bessarabian question exists no more for the Romanian government”.78 But due to political events in Romania — the fall of the Averescu government, followed a short time later by that of the Take Ionescu government — the first ratification attempt failed. In January 1922, the Liberal Party came back to power in Romania. Among the actions they took in an effort to boost their image, they ratified the Bessarabian Treaty. Unfortunately, their action came only after the British government announced that it had already ratified theTreaty and, most probably, as a direct result of the French and British insistence for the ratification by all the signatories during

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Moldova, a Romanian Province the meetings of the Conference of Ambassadors (March 15). On March 27, 1922, I.G. Duca, the new Foreign Minister, sent the draft law to the Council of Ministers and the King, asking for the requisite approval before sending the draft to the Parliament. The very next day his request was approved and the draft law, together with a Message, was sent to the Parliament.79 On April 3 and 7 respectively, the Senate and the Chamber unanimously adopted the law for the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty.80 On April 13, King Ferdinand gave his approval. The last step was taken in the second half of May, when the ratification was officially deposited in Paris. The Romanian minister to France, Victor Antonescu, signed the procès verbal regarding the deposit of the Romanian ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty on May 19, 1922.81 After the deposit of the ratification in Paris, the Treaty was published in the Official Monitor on August 8, 1922. The question is why, when it would only take two weeks to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty, and when all the political parties were in agreement that it must be ratified, did it take so long to do so? And even then, to what extent did the ratification come about as a normal action for Romania? Was it a result of her finally understanding the need to have the Treaty brought into force before the Genoa Conference? Or was it actually triggered by the British ratification? For unknown reasons, Romanian historiography carefully avoids mentioning the fact that Great Britain was the first signatory state to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty. The only reason that could have justified the delay of the Romanian ratification is the controversy between Romania and the Great Powers, during 1921, regarding the status of the Danube. As the Bessarabian Treaty weakened the Romanian position regarding the control of navigation on the Danube, the government might have postponed its ratification in order to be in a better position during the negotiations over the future status of Danube. Another possible reason (but one that does not justify the delay) might be related to the internal political situation in Romania — especially with regard to the policy of the Liberal Party, which was more than willing to use anything that might have a positive influence over public opinion (including ratification) in order to boost its electoral chances. The Aftermath of the Union Not everyone in Bessarabia was happy about the Union. A number of groups opposed it, the most important of them being that of the former Russian civil servants. They could not imagine relinquishing their jobs and privileges; and many of them only spoke the Russian language. On the other hand, they were afraid of communism, which probably would have had a similar effect on their jobs. They hoped that the White Army would succeed in its fight against the communists, and they kept close relations with General Denikin, offering him considerable financial support. They disliked the Romanian State and refused to be sworn in for Romania, but they did not resign from their administrative positions (a good job is always hard to

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find). They continued to use theRussian language in their official activity. The old administrative system, based on the zemstvo system, was still working and tried to take on some of the government’s powers by imposing special taxes. The great landowners were another category. The General Land Committee was overseeing the nationalization of the great estates, including Church properties, and of the Moldavians’ wealth. The landowners later started a powerful action against the Romanian State, requesting compensation for the land. While they were grateful to the Romanian Army for saving their lives, they were also unhappy because they did not receive back their land. In the beginning, the Romanian government did not intervene directly in Bessarabia’s administration, because of the war. However, the situation changed in October 1918. Without too much noise, the zemstva were abolished. In just a few weeks, the administrative powers were transferred from zemstvo to government, and the old Russian civil servants were dismissed, with the exception of those who chose to be sworn in for Romania. The economic situation of Bessarabia was very difficult. Because of the war, there was inflation and many goods were unavailable. Speculation in goods and money became the norm. The Romanian currency (called the “leu”) was refused in many places and the ruble-leu exchange rate was arbitrarily established. The central authorities tried to stop the speculation, but it was very difficult. The local authorities were constantly asking for more money from the Romanian government (and not from the Russian representatives), but they were very nervous when Romanian public servants made inquiries about how it was being spent. Still, it should be acknowledged that, because of the war, the first months of the Romanian administration in Bessarabia (where the agricultural base had not suffered as it had in Romania proper), were not very “liberating” for the new province. Requisitions by the Army (which was forced, in conformity with the Bucharest Treaty, to make requisitions for the Germans) and some measures taken by the proGerman government in Bucharest, were not received well at all in Bessarabia.82 The situation was complicated by the German-sponsored Ukrainian propaganda that emphasized that, unlike the Romanian Army, the German Army intended to pay something in exchange for the requisitions, and that the Bessarabians would fare better under German occupation. The Romanian government did not impose its own legislation and administration on Bessarabia at once. Bessarabia was integrated into Romania step by step. The administrative integration was completed in June 1925, when the Romanian Parliament voted the “Law of Administrative Unification”. Within a few years, Romanian public servants filled the vacuum created by resignation of the former Russian civil servants. However, their corruption and the fact that they were named from Bucharest (some of them considered this assignment a punishment, and tried to take revenge on the Bessarabian population), and the difficulty for Bessarabians to obtain jobs in the civil administration, certainly displeased the local population. Some scholars consider that, for the Romanian administration, Bessarabia was quite the

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Moldova, a Romanian Province opposite of Transylvania: a particularly backward, refractory, and incendiary region, whose problems were then compounded by its use as a bureaucratic exile for incompetent, corrupt or politically out-of-favor administrators.83 They also argue that the province had been perhaps the worst governed of all Romanian provinces in the interwar years, which is to say that it was very badly governed indeed.84 Still, in fairness to the Romanians, it should be noted that even with such bad administration, the results were incomparably positive compared to those of the Russian administration. The Bessarabians’ living standard improved — and there had been plenty of corruption in the Bessarabian administration even before 1918. But not only the Bessarabians were not pleased with the new administration. The Transylvanian leaders too were disappointed by the attitude of those from the Old Kingdom.85 The army, the high administrative positions, and the Foreign Service remained strongholds of the Walachians and Moldavians, with some notable exceptions.86 In a sense, it was the same situation as in the new Serbo-Croato-Sloven Kingdom, with the “Regateni” (individuals from the Old Kingdom) playing the role of the Serbs.87 The central government’s treatment of the new, and sometimes more highly developed, provinces (like Transylvania) was one of the reasons behind the permanent discontent in the newly acquired territories. Certainly, the root of the problem lay not only the Romanian government’s attitude toward the newly acquired territories but also in the expectations of the people living in those territories regarding the changes the union would bring. Of course, those changes came at a very slow pace and did not always coincide with what was expected. Today’s Romania, in which is not at all difficult to find people arguing that life was better during the communist rule, offers an excellent example in this sense. At the same time, the fear of communist propaganda spread by laborers influenced the economic policy of the Romanian ruling circles. That policy had a deleterious effect on Bessarabia’s economic development and led to the stagnation of its industry and its agriculture.88 During the economic crisis of 1929-1933, which affected agriculture especially, Bessarabia suffered more than Walachia and Transylvania, contributing to the Bessarabians’ dissatisfaction with the Romanian administration. The corruption and abuses, some of which had been remarked even by the Great Powers’ representatives in Romania, were still present in Bessarabians’ memory (of course, with a little help from communist propaganda) even as late as 1990. In fairness to the Romanian Administration, it should be said that during the fifty years of communism, Russia fully utilized the realm of propaganda to deter Bessarabia from any possible future union with Romania, by exaggerating the negative aspects of the Romanian Administration during the interwar period. Any possible comparison with the situation in the aftermath of the 1812 Russian occupation of Bessarabia was carefully avoided, and there was never any mention of the fact that the first Russian officials, both military and civil, were incompetent and corrupt. As Count Kiselev describes the situation: “Everything is for sale, and the prefects are obliged to steal more than the rest, as they have paid 20,000 or 30,000 rubles apiece for their nomination”.89 The Soviet propaganda also constantly avoided mentioning

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the progress made during the new administration in many fields, especially in education and transportation,90 and that, precisely because of this Romanian Administration, no Bessarabian peasant died of starvation during the great Soviet famine of 1929-1931. In 1940, the situation of Bessarabia changed. On August 23, 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed the famous Non-Aggression Pact and Secret Protocol, by which the former received Germany’s “blessing” or neutrality regarding her claims over Bessarabia. After a concerted military preparation, and taking advantage of the disruptions in Europe at that time (France had been defeated by Germany), on June 26, 1940, Molotov gave Romania an ultimatum, demanding the total withdrawal of the Romanian army and administration from Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. It was only the German intervention that made the Russians stop short of taking all of Bukovina. In the end, the Romanian government gave up Bessarabia and northern Bukovina (plus the Herta territory, taken by the Russian army “by mistake”) without fight. A very painful evacuation followed. One year later, Bessarabia was the motive for Romania to enter the war against the Soviet Union; and it was liberated in a short time by the Romanian and German armies. But in 1944, the Soviets reoccupied Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. During the Paris peace negotiations after the Second World War, no voice in the international community rose to contest the “rights” of the Soviet Union over these territories acquired from Romania. Comments Russian historians have found it easy to explain the vote in favor of union according to the old official line (military aggression, oppression of the will of the people); but, as previously stated, curiously enough they contested only the Union, not the idea of autonomy within the Russian federation. Perhaps the new communist government would have accepted (at least temporarily) independence for the Bessarabian territory, as it did for the Baltic States; but a union of that territory with Romania was something else altogether. For a big power like Russia to lose territory to a little country like Romania was unthinkable. And the more powerful the Bolshevik government became, the more the Bessarabian problem rankled. The Bessarabian situation went against everything in the Russian tradition of foreign policy, a tradition in which Russia accepted the loss of territory only when it was defeated by a coalition of great powers, and even then only as a “temporary” setback. It was also a matter of international image for the Russians. The best proof of this attitude was given to the Romanians in 1878, when the Russians took back southern Bessarabia, even though they had an alliance with Romania (in a sense, Romania did the same to them in 1918). And they expressed this point of view during the 1924 negotiations between the Soviets and Romania: There is not the slightest analogy between the formation of new States on the territory of the former Russian Empire [referring to the Baltic States] and the

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Moldova, a Romanian Province seizure of Bessarabia by Romania. In the former case the Soviet Government, in a number of peace treaties, voluntarily sanctioned the creation of these new states and yielded to them a part of its own territory. In the latter case, a neighboring State seized a part of Soviet territory by arms. . . 91 Russian Imperial pride was not abandoned or forgotten by the Soviets; indeed, they went on developing their country until it became a superpower. The consequences of their policy of territorial enlargement has impacted many of their neighboring states. Romanian historiography has analyzed the Union many times. The historical and demographic arguments appear to offer the best background: before 1812, Bessarabia belonged to the principality of Moldavia (which had a special status inside the Ottoman Empire), and the majority of the Bessarabian population were Moldavian and spoke Romanian. Nonetheless, experts agree that without the Russian Revolution, the Union never would have been possible. Events in Bessarabia paralleled those in Russia, and each phase of the Revolution had a similar phase in Bessarabia. Early on, the revolution in Russia was social in nature, and later it became, in part, a nationalities’ revolution: a revolution against Russian domination by nonRussian peoples that had been incorporated into the Russian Empire. To some extent it was the same force that acted toward the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s. Another important reason for the movement toward independence was the fear of communism. The Bessarabian leaders were landowners and intellectuals, not “workers”. Because industry was weak in Bessarabia, there was no working class. The fearful image of a communist takeover had a certain influence over the Bessarabians’ decisions. The communist threat was one of the strongest impetuses for the Romanian government to ask the Great Powers for help in making the Soviet Union accept the Union. Still, the most important factor to analyze is the national movement in Bessarabia. The transition from the pre-existing proto-nationalism to a modern nationalism in such a short period of time requires some explaining. The factors driving the transition are clear enough; the challenge lies in establishing which were the dominant factors and what role each of them played. The existence of pre-modern protonationalism, fueled especially by the continuing use of Romanian language and customs92 in large parts of the society, is definitely a starting point. The roles of the other factors have been analyzed at length, elsewhere, and for the present we will simply enumerate them once again: 1. 2. 3.

The failure of the Russification process;93 The fact that Romanian and Bessarabian soldiers fought side by side during the First World War; The development of a national conscience among the Bessarabian soldiers;94

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CHAPTER 2. THE MAKING OF THE UNION BETWEEN BESSARABIA AND ROMANIA

4. 5.

6. 7.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

13.

The example of nationalist successes in other parts of the Russian Empire; The activity in favor of the Romanian national cause, on the part of Transylvanians and Bukovinians acting in Bessarabia and in other parts of the Russian Empire;95 Actions that favored the Bessarabian cause, in Romania, by personalities like Nicolae Iorga and Constantin Stere. The Bessarabian intelligentsia. Romanian intellectuals came from rural areas and they were still strongly connected to the rural reality; this connection proved to be their greatest advantage in promoting the national idea. These “rural intellectuals” undertook to initiate the agrarian reform. They understood that, for the peasants, land was the biggest issue; they sought to implement agrarian reform, knowing that the peasants would side with whoever gave them land. The peasants — the majority of the Bessarabian people;96 Contact with the Romanian army and administration during 1918;97 The Bessarabian clergy and the movement within the Church; Progressive ideas, coming from the Russian Revolution, which reverberated strongly with the Bessarabian masses; The “general mood” of the times, in which union was the ideal not only of the Romanians but also of many other nations in the Central and Eastern European area. Finally, the notion that there was just an inkling of a national movement at the time, and that Romania’s military intervention was the main factor behind the events that took place.98

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Moldova, a Romanian Province ANNEX Decree of the People’s Commissars Breaking Relations With Romania January 26, 1918 The Romanian monarchy tried to save itself, its landowners and its bankers by seizing Bessarabia and turning it into a rampart against the powerful torrent of the Russian Revolution . . . In all these bloody crimes the Commander-in-Chief of the Romanian front, General Scerbacev, takes one of the leading roles. As a protest and a warning, the Council of People’s Commissars ordered the short-term arrest of the Romanian Ambassador; this step proved ineffective. 1. All diplomatic relations with Romania are severed, and the Romanian representatives are to leave the country by the shortest route. 2. The Romanian gold reserve held in Moscow is not to be touched by the Romanian oligarchy. The Soviet Government assumes responsibility for the safekeeping of this reserve and will hand it over to the Romanian nation. 3. The former Commander-in-Chief of the Romanian front, General Scerbacev, who has risen against the Revolution, is declared an enemy of the people and an outlaw.99

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Notes 1 Dennis Deletant, “Language Policy and Linguistic Trends in the Republic of Moldavia, 1924-1992” in Studies in Moldovan . . . , p. 53-54. 2 The difficulties generated by the use of each of the mentioned terms are well illustrated by Dennis Deletant in his article “Language Policy and Linguistic Trends in the Republic of Moldavia, 19241992” in Studies in Moldovan . . . , p. 53. For technical reasons, during the following pages, the author of the present paper will use the notion of Bessarabian nationalism in order to label what is known as both Romanian or Moldavian nationalism in Bessarabia. 3 On the Romanian-Moldavian “controversy” see C.U. Clark, “Basarabia, Russia . . .” in Basarabia romana. Antologie, p. 99-100. Also, for a more recent and excellent illustration of the role played by the Moldavian language in this context see Donald L. Dyer, “The making of the Moldavian Language” in Studies in Moldovan . . ., p. 91-107. 4 For a concise account of the policy of Russification and centralization in the Bessarabian church and the Moldavian answer to this tendencies see K. Hitchins, Romania, 1866-1947, p. 244-248. 5 Ionas Aurelian Rus, “The Roots and Early Development of Moldovan-Romanian Nationalism in Bessarabia, 1900-1917” in Anuarul Institutului A.D. Xenopol, Iasi, no. 33, 1996, p. 288. 6 For a good comparison, although expressing a different opinion from that of the majority of Romanian scholars, between the development of the national ideology in Moldavia, Walachia, Transylvania and Bukovina (unfortunately with almost no reference to Bessarabia) see Stephen Fischer Galati, “Romanian Nationalism” in Nationalism in Eastern Europe, p. 373-395. 7 Onisifor Ghibu, “De la Basarabia ruseasca la Basarabia romaneasca” in Basarabia romana. Antologie, p. 239. Ghibu also describes quite convincingly what were the main differences between Bessarabia and Romania, concluding that there was almost no space for a “Bessarabian problem” both in Bessarabia and in Romania, p. 226-230. 8 S. Ciobanu, Basarabia. Populatia . . . , p. 52-55. 9 The first one published a Romanian Chrestomathy in St. Petersburg in 1848; the second one published A Primary Course of Romanian Language and The Romanian Primer in Chisinau (in Romanian) during 18641866. O Ghibu, “De la Basarabia ruseasca . . .” in Basarabia romana. Antologie, p. 230. 10 A. Boldur, Istoria Basarabiei, p. 386-387. 11 I. Scurtu et. al., Istoria Basarabiei, p. 66-67. 12 N. Ciachir, Basarabia sub stapanire tarista, p. 69. 13 Paul Mihail, Marturii de spiritualitate romaneasca in Basarabia, p. 25-37, 142-152. 14 S. Ciobanu stresses that the continuing use of Romanian language in administration and schools was, at least partially, the result of the Bessarabians’ efforts and not a gift from the Russian administration. S. Ciobanu, Basarabia. Populatia . . . , p. 55-57. 15 The high rate of illiteracy among the Bessarabian peasants, over 90%, was the direct result of the educational policy promoted by the administration. For details on the cultural aspects of the Russian administration see C.U. Clark, “Basarabia, Rusia . . .” in Basarabia romana. Antologie, p. 102-104. For a comparison with the measures in the same field taken during the Romanian administration see S. Ciobanu, Basarabia. Populatia . . . , p. 73-83. 16 I.A. Rus, “The Roots and . . .” in Anuarul … , p. 293. 17 Van Meurs, The Bessarabian Question, p 53. 18 I. Scurtu et. al., Istoria Basarabiei, p. 68-69. 19 In fact, the main orientation of the newspaper was of a social rather than national character, and the idea of a possible union with Romania was inexistent. O. Ghibu, “De la Basarabia ruseasca . . .” in Basarabia romana. Antologie, p. 236-237. 20 I.A. Rus, “The Roots and . . .” in Anuarul … , p. 290. 21 P. Mihail, Marturii de spiritualitate … , p. 154-157. Also O. Ghibu, “De la Basarabia ruseasca …” in Basarabia romana. Antologie, p. 240-246. 22 Some scholars consider that the 1905-1907 had a more powerful impact over the development of

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Moldova, a Romanian Province the national movement. S. Ciobanu, Basarabia. Populatia . . . , p. 62-63. 23 Although O Ghibu argues (quite convincingly) that Bessarabian nationalism at 1905-1907 was clearly a social one, of Russian inspiration, fighting for social desiderata and not for nationalistic aims, and considers that its failure to penetrate the masses was due to its lack of understanding that the first thing to be done is to raise the cultural level of the peasants. On the other hand, Ionas Aurelian Rus considers that it was actually a cultural nationalism. 24 K. Hitchins, Romania, 1866-1947, p. 250. 25 C. King, The Moldovans, p. 29. 26 With the exception of a few pamphlets published by the League for the Liberation of Bessarabia, acting in Romania, among which we mention Zamfir C. Arbore, Liberarea Basarabiei; A. Frunza, Romania Mare; Gh. Dighis, Sub jug strain. To this list, the books published by Dimitrie C. Moruzi should also be added: Basarabia si viitorul ei, Instrainatii, and Pribegi in tara rapita. 27 Romanian historian Nicolae Iorga makes a notable exception; some of his pre-war articles on Bessarabia have been re-published in Basarabia romana. Antologie, p. 27-70. A different view on the activity of the Bessarabians living in Romania is presented in I. Scurtu et. al., Istoria Basarabiei, p. 76-78. 28 One of the very few Romanians arguing for Romanian rights over Bessarabia, although he agreed that Romania should join the Entente Powers, was Nicolae Basilescu. In an article entitled “The Romanian claims” published in Journal de Genève, on July 1, 1915, he openly stated that “Russia should return to Romania the entire Bessarabia up to the Dniestr River, that it took from the Turks in 1812”. The article is published in Basilescu’s book, Romania during the War and Peace, p. 131-135. 29 Quoted in Jacques Bariety, “Le Comité d’Etudes du Quai d’Orsay et les frontières de la Grande Romanie, 1918-1919” in Revue Roumaine d’Histoire, Bucharest, 1996, no. 1, p. 51. 30 One of the scholars belonging to the new generation argues, based on the data regarding the elections for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly held in November 1917, and on some other arguments, that the influence of the MNP was not quite as high as it is largely believed, and that the Soviet of the Deputies of the Peasants had a greater influence over the Moldavians. I.A. Rus, “The Roots and . . .” in Anuarul … , p. 293-295. 31 The importance of printing the “Moldavian Word” and its influence over the masses is best described in O. Ghibu, “De la Basarabia ruseasca . . .” in Basarabia romana. Antologie, p. 247-248. 32 Petre Cazacu, Moldova dintre Prut si Nistru, p. 255-258. 33 K. Hitchins, Romania, 1866-1947, p. 271. 34 P. Cernovodeanu, Basarabia … , p. 138-139. 35 O. Ghibu, “De la Basarabia ruseasca . . .” in Basarabia romana. Antologie, p. 264-266. Also, I. Scurtu et. al., Istoria Basarabiei, p. 81. 36 For the events related to the Congress see P. Cazacu, “Moldova . . .”, p. 251-253. 37 The main decision was that of nationalizing the land, the forests, and the subsoil in order to give it back to those who worked it, without any compensation. C.U. Clark, “Basarabia, Rusia, . . .” in Basarabia romana. Antologie, p. 115. 38 A list, together with short commentaries on those pamphlets, are presented in O. Ghibu, “De la Basarabia ruseasca . . .” in Basarabia romana. Antologie, p. 268-276. 39 The best description of the reactions to Ukraine’s claims is presented in P. Cazacu, Moldova … , p. 276-281. 40 For example, on the evening of August 20 under the leadership of some Bolsheviks, two of the most prominent Bessarabian leaders, A Hodorogea and S Murafa, were killed. C.U. Clark, “Basarabia, Rusia . . .” in Basarabia romana. Antologie, p. 119. 41 P. Cazacu, Moldova . . . , p. 281-287. Also, P. Cernovodeanu, Basarabia . . . , p. 144-145. 42 A. Boldur, Istoria Basarabiei, p. 499. 43 For details on the structure of the electoral process and of the elected members of the Council, see C.U. Clark, “Basarabia, Rusia . . .” in Basarabia romana. Antologie, p. 120-123. 44 I. Scurtu, et. al., Istoria Basarabiei, p. 82. Also C.U. Clark, “Basarabia, Rusia . . .” in Basarabia … , p. 124. 45 A. Boldur, Istoria Basarabiei, p. 502.

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A good discussion regarding the controversy over the constitutionality of the Sfatul Tserii may be found in Van Meurs, The Bessarabian Question, p. 354-360. 47 The text of the Resolution adopted on December 2 is published in A. Karetki, A. Pricop, Lacrima Basarabiei, p. 105-108. 48 Van Meurs, The Bessarabian Question, p 61. 49 DDI, Serie 5, Vol. 9, p. 553, Telegram addressed by the Ministers of United Kingdom, United States, France and Italy, December 24, 1917. Also Glenn F. Torrey, General Henri Berthelot and Romania, p. 133-137. 50 The Galatz battle was followed by the Reiney battle, in Bessarabia, both won by the Romanian Army. Gogu Negulesco, Romania’s Sacrifice, p. 128. 51 An excellent account of the events related to Diamandy’s arrest and also of the harsh antiRomanian atmosphere in Moscow is presented in George F. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, vol. 1, p. 330-343. For details regarding the meeting between the foreign diplomats acting in Moscow and the communist authorities, including Lenin, see Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 10-13. 52 Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence . . . , p. 80. 53 F.C. Nanu, Politica externa a Romaniei, p. 107. 54 P. Cazacu, Moldova . . . , p. 336. 55 Details on the attempted coup by the Bolsheviks and on the Frontotdel’s activity are presented in M. Bruchis, A. Chiriac, Rusia, Romania si Basarabia, p. 176-179, 186-191. Also P. Cazacu, Moldova … , p. 343-345. 56 M. Bruchis, A. Chiriac, Rusia, Romania . . . , p. 200-205. 57 The Sfatul Tserii was actually divided regarding this matter. While Ion Inculet and Pantelimon Erhan were negotiating with the Russian Chief of Staff in Odessa for the sending of two Kazakhs Divisions in Bessarabia, Ion Pelivan and Vasile Cristi were negotiating in Jassy with general Scerbacev, the Entente representatives and the Romanian government. P. Cazacu, Moldova . . . , p. 338-343. 58 Charles Vopicka, Secrets of the Balkans, p. 159-160. 59 V.F. Dobrinescu, Batalia diplomatica pentru Basarabia, p. 75. 60 K Hitchins considers that the Bolshevik forces already dispersed the Sfatul Tserii as soon as January 4. K. Hitchins, Romania, 1866-1947, p. 273. 61 F.C. Nanu, Politica externa … , p. 59. Also FRUS, 1918, Russia, Vol. 2, p 708-710. 62 Of course, not all of the Bessarabians accepted the Romanian occupation without complains. As soon as the end of January there had already been a number of complains against the policy of General Brosteanu, the commander of the Romanian troops in Bessarabia, of systematically replacing the Russian officials and officers in Bessarabia’s administration. Glenn F. Torrey, General Henry Berthelot . . . , p. 149. 63 DDI, Serie 5, Vol. 10, Telegram Tomasi to Sonnino, January 27 1918, p. 115. 64 For the Declaration of Independence see Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 17-19. 65 M. Musat, I. Ardeleanu, “Viata politica in Romania”, p 35 66 A very vivid description of the situation among the Romanian prisoners in Odessa is presented in the report sent to the Foreign Ministry by George Lucasievicz, one of those who had to go through this painful experience. RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 20, p. 80-84. 67 There are some controversies regarding Averescu’s agreement for the treaty. While some historians affirm that he only agreed with the exchange of prisoners and not with the withdrawal of the Romanian army, others are of the opinion that, indeed, Averescu agreed to the Treaty. However, in Romania this subject was kept out of the history books during the communist period and the majority of the Romanian historians writing on Bessarabian history, until quite recently, either simply remind it or avoid mentioning it at all. For more on this topic see Van Meurs, “The Bessarabian Question”, p. 68; or Marin C. Stanescu, “Acordul Averescu-Rakovsky”, in Revista de Istorie Militara, 1993, No. 2. 68 Robert M. Slusser, A Calendar of Soviet Treaties, 1917-1957, p. 4-5. 69 All the official documents illustrating the Romanian stand regarding the Averescu-Rakovsky Agreement are published, together with some very useful commentaries, in Relatii romano-sovietice.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Documente, p. 19-27. The Agreement itself is also published in Jane Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Vol. I, p. 65-67. 70 The opinion of Romanian diplomacy regarding the Rakovsky-Averescu treaty is best presented in the Geblescu memorandum. The Romanian arguments are: (1) the revolutionary organizations have dissolved themselves before the expiration of the period shown by the Agreement; (2) with the exception of the Armistice, no other clause was executed; (3) the Agreement was of purely military and not political nature; (4) by refusing to evacuate Tighina, the Romanian government implicitly refused to evacuate the entire Bessarabia; (5) the Romanian troops did not go into Bessarabia with the purpose of annexation, the Union was done by itself; (6) the revolutionary organizations in Odessa had no right to deal in the name of those interested, whom clearly expressed their attitude. RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 20 bis, p. 29-36. 70 A very vivid description of the debates and of the enthusiastic atmosphere on March 27 1918 is presented in M. Stefan, “Basarabia. Ziua intai a marii Uniri” in Magazin Istoric, 1991, No. 3. For the other side of the story “with Romanian troops already in Chisinau, Romanian planes circling above the meeting hall, and with the Romanian Prime Minister waiting in the foyer” [King forgot to say that Marghiloman was waiting for no less than six hours outside the building of the Sfatul Tserii] see Charles King, The Moldovans, p. 35. 71 Bessarabia’s union with Romania was proclaimed on March (April) 1918 and not on December 1918, as mistakenly is stated in British Encyclopedia, p. 1024. 72 Keith Hitchins, Romania, 1866-1947, p. 277. 73 Dinu C. Giurescu, Romania. A Historic Perspective, p. 275-276. 74 Stephen Fischer Galati, “Romanian Nationalism” in Nationalism in Eastern Europe, p. 390. 75 Again, this is a controversial issue; the legality of that vote was a really debated matter because there were only a quarter of the deputies attending the session. For more, see C.U. Clark, “Basarabia, Rusia, …” in Basarabia … , p. 134-145; also, Van Meurs, The Bessarabian Question . . . , p. 70-71. A “Declaration of Ten Deputies Against the Decision to Renounce to Bessarabia’s Autonomy” offering details over the manner of the voting are published in Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 36-39. 76 V.F. Dobrinescu, Batalia diplomatica . . . , p. 79. 77 F.C. Nanu, Politica externa . . . , p. 111. 78 For the entire Message see RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, p. 116-121. 79 In fact, it was the draft law prepared by Take Ionescu, only the signature was changed, and the Message was cut short (from three pages to only half a page). RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, p. 141-160. 80 The law and the Treaty have been recently published in A. Karetki, A. Pricop, Lacrima Basarabiei, p. 125-129. 81 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Antonescu to Duca, May 21, 1921. It was only on April 20 that the Romanian Legation in Paris was instructed to deposit the ratification instruments and, somehow strangely (because the deposit was made on May 19) a report from the mentioned Legation states that the deposit has been made by May 1. RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Stoicescu to Duca, May 1, 1922. While a number of Romanian scholars give the date of April 11 or 14 for the deposit of the ratification, which are clearly mistaken (there was no way that the Decree law signed by King Ferdinand on April 13 could have reached Paris in the morning of April 14), in order to “cover-up” the fact that the UK was the first State that ratified the Bessarabian Treaty, British and Japanese sources consider May 19, 1922, as the date when the deposit of the Romanian ratification took place. DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 24, p. 168; or Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, Fifth Series, vol. 235, p. 2277. 82 Again, one of the few Romanian scholars expressing these unpopular aspects is O. Ghibu. He also observes that, in fact, the decision of the Union taken by the Sfatul Tserii on March 27 was not the best solution from the standpoint of the development of Romanian nationalism in Bessarabia and that the best solution would have been a development similar with that of Transylvania and Bukovina’s union. But on this later point it can be easily argued that there was no way to know the direction of the events in March 1918 and that the Union was seen by the majority of the Romanians

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CHAPTER 2. THE MAKING OF THE UNION BETWEEN BESSARABIA AND ROMANIA as the best solution. O. Ghibu, “De la Basarabia ruseasca . . .” in Basarabia … , p. 294-295, 300-301. 83 Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars, p. 286. 84 Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, p. 145. Also, C. King, The Moldovans, p. 42-45. Still, both of them, while deploring the situation of Bessarabia under Romanian administration, fail to compare it to the situation under the previous Russian administration. For more details regarding the instauration of Russian administration in Bessarabia, presented in a fairly manner, and in which the similarities with the 1918 instauration of Romanian administration are quite easy to spot, see George F. Jewsburry, The Russian Annexation . . . , p. 58-60, 155-161. 85 Stefan Fischer Galati, Twentieth Century Romania, p. 31. 86 The correspondence between Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, one of the best known representatives of the Transylvanian Romanians, a member in the Romanian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, and Iuliu Maniu, the leader of the Transylvanian Romanians, gives a good illustration of this frustration, especially during the first months of 1919. For example, the letter sent by Vaida-Voevod on April 7, 1919, clearly points to his unhappiness regarding some of the practices used by the Regateni; in 1920. Un act de justitie. Documente, p. 141-146. 87 B. Jelavich, The Establishment … , p.310. 88 M. Bruchis, A. Chiriac, Rusia, Romania . . . , p. 16. 89 R.W. Seton-Watson, The History of the Romanians, p. 561. 90 A. Boldur, Istoria Basarabiei, p. 507-512. 91 Jane Degras, Soviet Documents . . . , Vol. I, p. 440. 92 One of the most notable examples in this sense is the continuing practice of the Romanian local civil law for the entire period of Russian administration. And not only was it kept but it was also translated into Russian. A. Boldur, Istoria Basarabiei, p. 485-487. 93 The main factors behind this failure are presented in Petre Cazacu, Moldova . . . , p. 11-12. 94 A good account on the evolution and the importance of the national movement inside the army is presented in P. Cazacu, Moldova . . . , p. 262-276. 95 While this influence is broadly considered to be of incontestable importance, O. Ghibu (a Transylvanian himself, who played an important role during the events in Bessarabia) considers it the most important one in reviving and organizing the national movement in Bessarabia. 96 At that time, laborers were an insignificant number of Bessarabia’s population, while people of different ethnic origins, especially the Jews, made up the bourgeoisie — who had no interest in the Bessarabian national movement. As for the landowners, they were negatively affected by the land reform and, with few exceptions, all their efforts were directed at keeping their properties and not toward nationalism. 97 A. Boldur considers the moment when the Romanian Army and the Bessarabian political society interconnected, and the Bessarabian realized that there was no need to organize a new army because there already was an Army — the army of all the Romanians — the most serious psychological step taken towards the making of the Union. A. Boldur, Istoria Basarabiei, p. 505. 98 C. King argues that “the presence of the Romanian troops unquestionably augmented the power of those groups looking to Romania for deliverance from the triple peril of Bolshevism, Ukrainian expansionism, and political anarchy”. C. King, The Moldovans, p. 33. 99 Jane Degras, “Soviet Documents . . .”, Vol. 1, p. 40

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The 1919-1920 Paris Peace Conference had the difficult mission of creating a new order, one in which wars should come to an end. After the War, there was indeed a great deal of change; unfortunately, not all of it was in the desired direction. The Treaty of Versailles, nominally made with the aim of establishing an everlasting peace, was dead on arrival because most of the states that were supposed to protect and defend the Treaty recognized it as unfair. US President Woodrow Wilson was unable to convince his own fellow countrymen to ratify his work — the Paris Peace Treaties. Add in the fact that the defeated bloc (or, at least, Germany) and Russia (the greatest power in Europe) were left out of the negotiation process, and it is easy to understand why such a brief period of peace ensued. This situation has been well expressed by Carole Fink: It is by now a truism that the Paris Peace Settlement lacked mechanisms for adjustment and proper enforcement, because the victors in World War I had neither the strength nor the cohesion to rule the postwar world and the defeated were still strong and unrepentant.1 When the peace negotiations began, a number of bases (often, mutually contradictory) for the future settlement were already in place: secret treaties, the principle of self-determination of peoples, geo-strategic and economical factors. The defeated powers (and sometimes Woodrow Wilson, too) defended the selfdetermination principle and the concept of justice.2 Romania and Italy tended to favor the secret treaties and a policy of maximum territorial enlargement. One of the biggest problems for the Peace Conference was that of arbitrating the territorial disputes between the victorious or allied states in Eastern Europe, to the detriment of

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Moldova, a Romanian Province the other interested parties; a prime example is that of dividing the territory of Banat between Romania and Yugoslavia. The Western Powers, France and Britain, were equally concerned about the restoration of the balance of power, but they wished to go about it by different means. While France had the idea of replacing the former Russian alliance with a frontier of eastern states, and to use them to control Germany, the UK wished to restore a balance of power and to avoid, in pure British tradition, a hegemonic position for France on the continent. Romania went to the Peace Conference with the aim of obtaining international recognition of its new borders — difficult as that goal might be. Romania was the only state that, during the war, acquired territories from both the defeated and the Allied Powers. Shifting Positions in the First World War Since 1883, Romania had been a secret member of the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy). During the Balkan crisis of 1912-1913, AustriaHungary acted against Romanian interests (by supporting Bulgaria), while the Russians expressed their support for Romania.3 Therefore, at the beginning of what became the World War, Romania stayed neutral for a while and used the time to improve its military preparedness and shore up its international position. The main role in directing Romania’s foreign policy was played by Ion I.C. Bratianu, the Romanian Prime Minister. As it is not the purpose of the present book to deal exhaustively with Romania’s implication into the war, especially as there are some very good studies on the matter, the author will simply point the facts, without much insistence on details.4 The first dilemma for the Romanian government was that, because of its membership in the Triple Alliance, it should have backed the Triple Alliance’s decision to declare war on the Entente, but, because of the situation facing the Romanians living in Austria-Hungary (a very intense policy of denationalization) Austria-Hungary was seen as an enemy more than as a friend or ally. The dilemma was complicated by the pro-German orientation of King Carol, who not only was honor-bound to respect his signature but also was convinced that victory would be on Germany’s side.5 At the same time, sensing the direction of the Romanian public opinion, the Russians started an intense process of restoring friendly relations with Romania in 1913.6 First, Bratianu had to convince King Carol that neutrality was the best solution for Romania. Then, during the July 22 (August 3), 1914 Crown Council, to which all the political leaders were invited, the great majority voted in favor of neutrality; it was justified on the same basis as Italy’s neutrality — the principle of casus foederis was not valid in case of unprovoked aggression.7 This was a first victory for Bratianu’s policy. In fact, in promoting this policy Bratianu gradually found himself isolated, because of the increasingly powerful mood in favor of, and pressure for, in-

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tervention in the war. But he was able to resist those pressures and to avoid engaging the country until he had the necessary written guaranties regarding future territorial gains for Romania. After proclaiming neutrality, Bratianu launched intense negotiations with both sides while, at the same time, he tried to improve the readiness of the Romanian Army. During these negotiations Austria-Hungary offered to Romania “all of Bessarabia and Odessa” if it would enter the war, but refused to make any concessions toward improving life for the Romanians living in Transylvania.8 The Allied Powers (in fact, Russia) were more generous, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sazonov, promising Transylvania in exchange only for Romania’s continued neutrality.9 Gradually, Bratianu obtained written agreements on that from the Allied Powers. A first such Agreement was signed in St. Petersburg on October 1, 1914, confirming Russia’s willingness to recognize Romanian rights over Transylvania and part of Bukovina in exchange only for neutrality.10 In other words, “Sazonov promised Romania all that she could hope to gain from Russia — Transylvania and an ‘ethnic frontier’ in Bukovina — in return for Romanian neutrality. After this is was impossible to push Bucharest into intervention without paying an exorbitant price for it.”11 Bratianu also had to face strong pressure from Romanian public opinion in favor of an alliance with the Entente. As suggested by Nicolae Basilescu, a member of the Romanian Parliament, in a book published in 1919: Yes, of course, Bessarabia is a Romanian land, essentially Romanian, and never, never did the Romanian people renounce its duty to break her chains and bring her back to the Mother Country. But the most urgent danger is not coming from this direction: the Russians, rude and uneducated, were not able to denationalize Moldavian life in Bessarabia; even today they are still using the language of Stephen the Great, the language they spoke in 1812, and they totally ignore the Russian language. Therefore, the claim to Bessarabia could be postponed, without danger, for other times. The immediate danger, which must be faced with no delay, comes from the excessive denationalization process carried on by the Hungarians against the emancipation of the Romanians living in Transylvania.12 For the next two years, Bratianu continued to negotiate with both sides while maintaining friendly neutrality toward the Allied Powers. This was a delicate position, and Bratianu’s conduct was read differently by different camps. In the Balkans, everything was inextricably intertwined, and the situation was such that if one country were to enter the war on one side, automatically one of her neighbors would enter the war on the other side. The real issue for Romania was not which side to join, or when, but under which conditions and with what guarantees. Bratianu had every reason to ask for credible and secure guarantees.13 However, his caution and secrecy caused him to be misunderstood by both groups of belligerents, and it infuriated the Romanian interventionists.14 One of the best descriptions of Bratianu’s position comes from the British representatives:

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Moldova, a Romanian Province

The enigma of the situation is Bratianu himself. His caution is so excessive as to render him suspect in many quarters. . . . It is fairly certain, however, that Bratianu believes in our ultimate success, and as long as he maintains that opinion the position would seem to be negatively safe. . . . It is the general opinion here that, should Bratianu resign, the military situation, being as it is, a position dangerous to the Allies might well ensue. The King would probably send for Marghiloman or Maiorescu. . . . Neither Take Ionescu nor Filipescu have sufficient power in the country . . . Under the circumstances there appears nothing for it but to make the best of Bratianu. With him at least we are on a rock, although an uncomfortable one. In the alternative we might find ourselves on dangerous quicksands.15 Still, the Allied Powers failed to act decisively in order to influence the Romanians to join the war in the autumn of 1915 when, after Italy entered the war, the chances were better to convince the Romanian leadership that it was time to start a military offensive.16 In fact, the Romanian leadership was divided into three camps: immediate intervention on the Entente side, continued neutrality, or intervention on the Central Powers’ side. The main problem for Bratianu was to avoid fighting on two fronts, one in Transylvania or Bessarabia and one in Dobrudja (after the Second Balkan War, in 1913, Romania took the southern part of Dobrudja from Bulgaria), and to get written guarantees of Romania’s territorial gains after the war. He negotiated stubbornly, insisting on a few matters that were of great importance and that would prove essential during the peace conference: a no-separate-peace clause (a separate peace between the Entente and Austria-Hungary could have allowed Austria-Hungary to keep Transylvania, rendering Romania’s engagement in the war pointless), equal status at the future peace conference, Russian military assistance against Bulgaria, an Allied offensive in the direction of Bulgaria, and the regular sending of Allied war supplies.17 On August 17, 1916, as a result of a shift in the Entente’s position,18 Romania and the Allied Powers signed the Political and Military Conventions, which were to be kept secret; by these conventions, Romania undertook to enter the war against the Central Powers. Article No. 1 stated that the four Allied Powers would defend the territorial integrity of Romania (including southern Dobrudja). Article No. 2 stated that Romania would enter the war. No. 3 recognized Romania’s right to Transylvania and the Banat (up to the Theiss River, as far as Szeged) and Bukovina. Of great importance was Article No. 5, by which Romania undertook not to sign a separate peace with the enemy. Article No. 6 was interesting — here, the Allied Powers promised Romania that during the peace negotiations after the war Romania would have the same rights as themselves. In other words, Romania was to be on an equal footing with the Great Powers. The fact that the Entente accepted Article No. 6, which made Romania theoretically their equal, proves how badly they needed the

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Romanian intervention.19 The Military Convention signed the same day stipulated that France and England should start an offensive against Bulgaria and Turkey no later than August;20 that Russia would send troops into Dobrudja; that the Allies would send Romania at least 300 tons of provisions on a daily basis; that the Romanian Army would not be subordinated to the Russian Army.21 During the war, most of these clauses, with the exception of those imposed on Romania, failed to be respected. The August 27 Crown Council decided Romania’s entry into the war against Austria-Hungary but the Romanian military campaign ended in disaster.22 Indeed, the Romanians had had to fight on two fronts. In fact, Romania’s position was virtually indefensible without foreign aid: surrounded on three sides by mortal enemies, with over 1,000 miles of frontier to defend, and linked to its allies only by an overburdened railroad through Russia, the chances for victory were slim.23 In fact, caught between the Falkenhayn hammer and the Mackensen anvil, they were forced to flee for their lives. The failure of the Allies to keep their promise and start an offensive against Bulgaria left the Romanian southern front open to the latter’s attacks. At the same time, the Russians failed to send the promised troops to fight the Bulgarians in Dobrudja. The Romanian Army badly lacked arms and ammunition, and had no viable war plan.24 One more cause of the Romanian defeat (one which the Romanians carefully avoid mentioning) was their prolonged negotiations with the Allies. Had they intervened at the height of the Russian offensive, the impact could have been immense, but by August it was toolate.25 On the other hand, from the Romanian standpoint, as stated by General Rudeanu at the time, “if it is regrettable that Romanian intervention came late, it is also regrettable that the Allied Powers failed to prepare the Romanian Army for the war any time earlier”.26 By the end of 1916, the Romanian government had to abandon more than half of its territory and retreat into Moldavia, where the front was stabilized with the help of the Russian Army. During the winter, the Romanians had to face not only the Austrian-German-Bulgarian enemy but also a fierce frost, famine, and typhus (which took more victims than the fighting), plus the attitude of the so-called Russian ally.27 Still, seemingly against the odds, the French Military Mission under the leadership of General Berthelot was able to reorganize the Romanian Army so that, in the summer of 1917, with the help of a number of units of Transylvanian Romanian POWs from Russia, it was able to stop the German counter-offensive in the direction of Moldavia. The revolution in Russia generated new problems for Romania. The Provisional Government decided to continue fighting while the Bolsheviks favored peace with the Central Powers. In just a few months, Romania’s position deteriorated to the point at which any resistance against the Central Powers became almost impossible.28 Russian troops on the Romanian front started deserting and looting, their only goal being to get home. The Romanian Army found itself alone to defend the eastern front. Charles Vopicka, the US Minister in Jassy, gives an account of the Russian troops’ action:

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Moldova, a Romanian Province “They are delivering their war material to our enemies in exchange for alcohol, and they are committing murder, arson, robbery and unspeakable crimes against women. Having used a great part of the resources of their country, they are extending famine conditions by wantonly destroying food depots in Moldavia and Bessarabia.”29 The Allied Powers asked Romania to continue fighting and suggested that, if defeated, the government and the Romanian Army should withdraw through southern Russia in order to make contact with the British troops in Mesopotamia. But even in 1917 this plan was considered too hazardous by the Romanian government, who realized that it would be impossible to cross through Russia because of the incertitude and the fighting that was taking place between the Bolsheviks and the White Russians. The Allies realized quickly that, in order to keep the Romanian Army in the field, it was essential to have free access to the food supplies of Ukraine and have friendly forces at its rear.30 At the same time, due mainly to events in Russia which added to the isolation of Romania, a pacifist campaign was initiated by certain political and military circles who quaked at Romania’s position between an vicious enemy and an ally who behaved even worse.31 On December 9, 1917, with the approval of the Allied ministers in Jassy, the Romanians signed, in Focsani, a three-month armistice with the Central Powers, stopping any fighting in the area. The Allies acknowledged that it was not a separate peace and decided to give Bratianu a grace period.32 The strongest opponent of the Romanian armistice (and later separate peace) was the French Prime Minister, George Clemenceau. Previously, he had clearly instructed both Berthelot and SaintAulaire to do all in their power in order to keep Romania on the active front.33 During the next months, the situation worsened. The Allies insisted that the Romanian Army should continue fighting and then withdraw through Russia, even as the reports from some of their representatives in Romania argued for the contrary.34 Of course, the continuing fighting on the Romanian front would have kept a sizeable number of Central Powers troops away from the western front, making the Allies’ efforts easier. But the option of a retreat through Russia was definitively lost when Romania intervened against the Soviets of soldiers leading the Russian Army in Romania, and later by the occupation of Bessarabia. During the armistice period, Romanian political circles had fiercely debated an eventual separate peace. There were strong arguments in favor of it: it was impossible to get more direct help from the Allies; Walachia would be recovered from the Central Powers; Bessarabia would be recognized as a Romanian territory by the Central Powers; Wilson refused to recognize the 1916 Treaty with Romania; Russia imminent exit from the war, illustrated by the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations with the Germans; and the fear that without a separate peace, all the country would be occupied by the Central Powers. On the other hand, there was increased pressure, both officially and through the mass media, from the Western Allies, to keep Romania fighting.35 Those who favored continued fighting were grouped around Take Ionescu, who preferred ca-

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pitulation to negotiations with the enemy, arguing that only by continuing fighting could Romania keep her mortgage over the Entente. General Berthelot was the only Allied representative in Jassy who steadfastly opposed any negotiations between Romania and the Central Powers, for either an armistice or a separate peace;36 his opposition was based both on Clemenceau’s instructions and on military reasons (the Germans, taking advantage of the armistice, had transferred a great part of their military units to the western front, so they were far from having the necessary resources to start a new offensive against the Romanians, and the heavy winter was clearly on Romania’s side).37 At one point, due to the failure of the Allied action in Ukraine and with the hope of increasing their influence over Ukraine, the British leaders changed their position on the issue of a Romanian separate peace, and opposed it based on reasons similar to those of General Berthelot.38 Lloyd George’s speech of January 5, 1918, which mentioned reassessing the secret treaties and stated, “the breakup of Austria-Hungary is not part of our war aims”, together with President Wilson’s 14 Principles expressed on January 8, 1918 (which said the same thing regarding Austria-Hungary), had a serious impact on the Romanians.39 The two statements gave a powerful argument to those favoring peace. Bratianu argued, “There is no use for Romania to keep on fighting because, according to the speeches of President Wilson and Lloyd George, even if the Allies win Romania is not to get any additional territory.”40 The Central Powers also understood that, in order to soften the Romanians’ attitude, they should reassure King Ferdinand that his abdication would not be demanded as a peace condition, and they offered assurances to King Ferdinand in this sense at the beginning of February.41 The final decision was taken after the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty was signed (March 3, 1918). A preliminary Peace Treaty was signed in Buftea, on March 5 and, two months later, on May 7, 1918, the new pro-German Romanian government headed by Alexandru Marghiloman signed the Peace Treaty in Bucharest.42 It was a very difficult moment for Romania, which had to cede all of Dobrudja (but to the Central Powers, and not directly to Bulgaria, as the latter had expected),43 and some territories in the Carpathian Mountains (2,200 sq. miles with some 150,000 inhabitants); and harsh economic conditions were imposed on Romania. Furthermore, Romania was required to improve the status of the Jews living in Romania (this same point had been on the agenda of the Paris Peace Conference, in the form of the Minorities Treaty). The only good outcome, one which no one had foreseen in 1914 or 1916, was that the Bucharest Treaty awarded Bessarabia to the Romanians by giving them permission to occupy the area, in a move that was intended to avoid a possible new Russo-Romanian alliance. This Treaty had a very short life, lasting only a few months.44 In fairness to King Ferdinand and the liberal party, it should be mentioned that they did everything possible in order to oppose the German pressure to ratify the Bucharest Treaty, although ratifying it would have brought quite important material (an end to the requisitions and to the unlimited issue of paper money authorized by the Germans) and strategical (a confirmation of their position in Bessarabia) bene-

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Moldova, a Romanian Province fits. Even as the newly elected Parliament, under the control of Marghiloman’s conservative pro-German party, ratified the Treaty, the King stubbornly refused to sign it, preventing it from becoming a valid title.45 “By its human and material sacrifices, as well as by its aspirations, Romania never considered itself outside the Entente, but waited for the favorable time to rejoin it, in order to fight for a common cause”.46 The evolution of the military operations during 1918 changed the balance in favor of the Allied Powers. On November 10, 1918 Romania declared war on the Central Powers, reentering the war before the general armistice was signed, and announced the reopening of diplomatic relations with the Allies. Success at the Paris Peace Conference Sound analyses have already been published on the relations between Romania and the Great Powers during the Paris Peace Conference;47 therefore, in this subchapter we will merely outline the general problems related to Romania during the Paris negotiations, and in the next subchapter we will focus on the making of the Bessarabian Treaty, seeking to examine the Bessarabian question within, and outside of, the general context of Romania. Generally speaking, relations between Romania and the leadership of the Peace Conference had been far from positive and during 1919 only grew worse. At one point even Saint Aulaire, the French Minister to Romania, expressed his disappointment with the attitude of the Conference: “At the Supreme Council in Paris, this Areopagus which, under the presidency of Clemenceau and Wilson’s inspiration, promulgated the new chart of humanity, all the favors are for the Soviets and all the rigors are for Romania, their main victim.”48 What the Romanian delegation was hoping to gain from the Conference was international recognition that the newly unified territories belonged to Romania, who was entitled to them according to the 1916 Treaty with the Entente. The main difficulty lay in the fact that Romania had signed the Bucharest Peace Treaty with the Central Powers, against the stipulations of the 1916 Treaty; the Romanian propaganda therefore focused on justifying the need to sign a separate peace, pointing to the Allies’ failure to keep their commitments towards Romania and making much of what was called “the Russian betrayal” in Dobrudja.49 They based their action on the following points: the validity of the 1916 Treaty with the Entente; the free will expressed by the majority of the people living in the newly acquired territories for a union with Romania; and the great efforts made by the Romanians during their fight against the Central Powers. The Delegation emphasized these points in a different manner towards each of the Powers. Seeking to obtain US backing for their territorial claims, the Romanians relied on the nationality principle.50 When they had to deal with the Italians, they always insisted on the validity of the 1916 Treaty. However, during the last month of the war, the Romanians had sent mixed signals to the Entente Powers, due to Take Ionescu’s activity in Paris — he had said that he considered the 1916 Treaty not valid,

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and had tried to reach an agreement with the Yugoslav representatives, over the head of the Romanian authorities.51 The biggest problem facing Romania at the beginning of the negotiations was the Great Powers’ attitude toward the 1916 Treaty and the Bucharest Peace Treaty, an attitude that would color everything regarding Romania. Both France and Great Britain seemed to be signaling that they did not consider the Treaty valid, while the US clearly stated that it did not recognize any of the secret treaties; Bratianu tried to make use of it nonetheless. However, Romania had two big advantages on her side: Romanian armies were occupying many of the claimed territories (including all of Transylvania, by April 1919); and the Allies were divided on at least some of the Romanian demands. Another circumstance that worked in Romania’s favor was that the Allies, tired after the war, could not or would not commit sufficient troops to Central Europe to control the situation that had resulted from the disintegration of AustriaHungary. This allowed the Romanians, encouraged by the French government (more or less openly), to extend progressively over the territory of Transylvania. First, there was the question of Romania’s status at the Paris Peace Conference. Before the Conference began, a few debates were generated by the fact that Romania had signed a peace treaty with the Central Powers; still, Romania was allowed to participate as an Allied Power.52 Second (and this proved to be one of the most painful questions for Romania) was the question of the role Romania would play during the negotiations. Based on Article No. 6 of the 1916 Treaty and the position Romania had held inside the Triple Alliance, before the war, Bratianu had imagined some good could come out of the Peace Conference. On the other hand, he knew that Romania would not be welcomed warmly. And indeed, the Great Powers decided that the 1916 Treaty had been broken because Romania made a separate peace with the enemy (no matter what the reasons for that), so that Article No. 6 did not apply. Therefore, events shaped up quite contrary to Romania’s interests. It was decided that Romania should have only two plenipotentiaries at the Conference, the same number as the newly created kingdoms of Hedjaz and Siam (the Serbs and Belgians each had three). Bratianu felt betrayed by the Great Powers — they considered Romania a “Power” with limited interests — and he decided to do everything he could in order to obtain their recognition for the new Romanian boundaries by adopting a policy of no compromise.53 This did not enhance his popularity at the Conference (particularly with the Big Four). Even some Romanian politicians criticized his position, too, but it proved to be quite effective.54 The most intense debates during the peace conference were related to territorial issues. Romania was involved in five of them: Banat, Bukovina, Transylvania (including Crisana and Maramures), Dobrudja and Bessarabia. Another problem, directly connected to the territorial questions, was that of protecting the rights of the national minorities existing in the newly acquired territories. The Banat: The territory of Banat (formerly under Hungarian rule) was claimed by both Romania and Serbia (in addition to Hungary). The Banat had around 11,000

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Moldova, a Romanian Province square miles and a population of about 1.5 million, 600,000 of them Romanians, 385,000 Germans, 358,000 Serbians, and 240,000 Hungarians. During 1915, SerbianRomanian relations had been excellent, primarily because Romania had permitted transit of supplies destined for Serbia.55 The Romanians asked for all the Banat territory, as the 1916 Treaty stipulated, arguing that the German population would prefer Romanian rule, while the Serbs insisted that the territory should be divided. The Serbs invoked the presence of a great Serbian majority in the western parts of the Banat and the area’s strategic importance for the defense of Belgrade; they asked for two thirds of the territory. The Serbs had the advantage of controlling the area militarily, for a period, and they had the Allies’ sympathy for their heroic fighting. The first misunderstandings between Romania and Serbia took place at the end of 1918, but it was believed that these differenced could be solved. As the US Minister to Romania, Charles J. Vopicka, put it on January 10, 1919: “I am sure that this question can be settled between the Romanians and the Serbians if the Romanians will receive a free hand regarding the northern portion of Bukovina and Bessarabia.”56 Finally, after strenuous negotiations, the Great Powers divided the Banat between Romania (two thirds), and Serbia (the western third). Neither Romania nor Serbia was satisfied, but they had to accept it.57 This left a shadow over RomanianYugoslav relations so that, although both countries avoided open antagonism, they still hoped to modify the new frontier in the Banat. Bukovina (a former Romanian territory, occupied by the Habsburgs in 1775): Apart from Romania and Ukraine, there was no other state to ask for this territory; yet the Americans intended to create a Ruthenian state that would control the northern part of Bukovina too. When the Americans realized that there was no support for the notion of a Ruthenian state (another blow to President Wilson’s principle of national self-determination), they agreed to consider Bukovina Romanian territory, with the exception of a small part in the north, which was given to Poland. Southern Dobrudja: One of the most controversial sections along the Romanian border was that of southern Dobrudja. In 1913, at the end of the second Balkan War, Romania acquired from Bulgaria a territory at the south of Dobrudja (Cadrilater). The Bulgarians made up a good part of the Cadrilater’s population. During the First World War, Bulgaria entered the war against Romania with the purpose of taking back not only the Cadrilater but also all off Dobrudja. Based on ethnic criteria, the American representatives considered that Bulgaria should have her frontier in southern Dobrudja as it had been before the second Balkan War. Because of the American interference the Cadrilater became a territorial question. The problem for the Americans was that the Cadrilater belonged to an Allied state (Romania) and none of the other Great Powers accepted the idea of a defeated state receiving territory that, before the war, had belonged to an Allied state. The Americans tried in vain to convince the other representatives of their point, arguing that Dobrudja would be a factor of destabilization in the Balkan area. Romania eventually was to keep all of Dobrudja, including the Cadrilater.

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Transylvania: It was this question that generated the biggest problems between Romania and the Great Powers. All of them agreed that Transylvania should belong to Romania, but there were two problems: where to draw its western boundary, and what to do with the Hungarian and German minorities in the region. The western boundary of Transylvania would divide the territory called Crisana, between Romania and Hungary, which actually was not part of Transylvania proper but had a Romanian majority. The territory bordering Transylvania to the north, Maramures, was also populated by a Romanian majority in its central and southern parts; it belonged to Hungary before 1918, but the Peace Conference divided it between Romania and Czechoslovakia. Making the situation more complicated was the Armistice signed on November 13, 1918, between the Allied Powers and Hungary (known as the D’Esperey Armistice, after the name of General Franchet D’Esperey, at that time the Supreme Commander of the Allied Army in the Orient), which established a demarcation line between the Hungarian and Allied troops that divided Transylvania in two. The Hungarians considered this line recognition of their rights to Transylvania; the Romanians, of course, considered it temporary and did everything they could to erase it. The main problem with Transylvania was (as it continues to be to this day) that the Hungarian population is concentrated in the east central part of the territory. To the west, nearer the border with Hungary, the inhabitants are predominantly Romanian; and the main groups of Hungarians in Transylvania are thus cut off from Hungary proper, making any partition of Transylvania on ethnic grounds impossible. In the words of Winston Churchill: The problem of Transylvania was insoluble by the principle of selfdetermination. It presented the feature of a considerable Hungarian population isolated within a Romanian border belt. The peoples of the Romanian zone wished to join Romania; those of the Magyar nucleus [wished] to adhere to their kinsmen in Hungary. Either decision would have conflicted with selfdetermination.58 Another controversy developed over the lands in the west (Crisana), where the Hungarian and Romanian population lived together, along the line formed by the cities of Arad, Oradea, Carei and Satu Mare. Generally, the cities were predominantly Hungarian while the countryside (as in Bessarabia) was Romanian. An important railroad connected these cities; control of the railroads was a decisive economic and strategic advantage. The problem was that a true ethnic line (requested by the Americans) would bisect the rail line in several places, making it almost inoperable, so the solution pushed (especially by the French representatives) was to give the entire railroad area to Romania. But even so, the borderline was about 40 miles east of the one promised to Romania by the 1916 Treaty. Bratianu’s main advantage in solving the Transylvania problem proved to be the communist regime that came to power in Hungary; that was none too welcome to the Great Powers.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province The Territorial Commission on Romanian and Yugoslav Affairs was the scene where the representatives of the Big Four presented their proposals and decided Romania’s territorial future.59 (Clive Day and Charles Seymour represented the USA; Sir Eyre Crow and Alan Leeper, Britain; André Tardieu and Guy Laroche, France; Giacomo de Martino and Count Luigi Vannutelli Rey, Italy.) There were two camps: the Americans, sometimes allied with the British representatives (as illustrated by the February 1 Anglo-American Conference), and the French and Italians.60 Bessarabia was the only issue related to Romania that everyone had agreed upon since the beginning of the Commission’s work; it was decided that Bessarabia should belong to Romania. Controversy was sharp over all the other territories. In regard to Bukovina, the Americans advocated the creation of a Ruthenian state; on Banat, they (together with the French) were in favor of a cession of territory to Serbia; and the same for Dobrudja. The most heated dispute by far was that of Transylvania’s western boundary. In April, the Territorial Commission decided to give all of Transylvania to Romania, but the new borders were slightly smaller than what the 1916 Treaty promised. Still, this partially contradicted the ethnic principle, because sizable urban centers populated mainly by the Magyars were given to Romania — a decision based on strategic and economic grounds. After some debate, the Supreme Council decided to establish a neutral zone between the Romanian and Hungarian troops in Transylvania, but the communist takeover of Hungary complicated the situation. Romania exploited the new situation by playing up the Bolshevik danger. President Wilson adopted a conciliatory attitude toward the Hungarian communist government, but Bratianu was not about to tolerate another communist threat at Romania’s borders. Bratianu had the moral backing of the French military leaders. On April 16, the Romanian Army launched an offensive, intending to occupy all those Transylvanian territories that had voted in favor of the union with Romania on December 1, 1918; the goal was achieved in a matter of weeks.61 The Great Powers were not at all satisfied with the Romanian move and asked Bratianu to withdraw these forces behind the Arad-Oradea-Satu Mare line; they made the mistake of not telling Bratianu that that line was actually the newly-established border. Bratianu refused to withdraw. This was the beginning of a fierce confrontation between the Supreme Council and Bratianu. Thus, in May, while the Supreme Council was deciding (in secret) the new Romanian border in Transylvania, Bratianu threatened to continue the offensive — to capture Budapest and to establish a government favorable to Romania. The Great Powers, and especially the Americans, were appalled, and demanded that the Romanian army withdraw from Hungary. However, they were not disposed to send troops to back up this demand. By the end of May the situation worsened. The projected Treaty with Austria provoked the bitter response of Romania and some other small states as well, especially on economic grounds. The Minorities Treaty was another irritant;62 elaborated by the Great Powers, as a result of the Jewish influence, it allowed them to intervene in favor of ethnic minorities. Ostensibly, the Treaty was prepared especially in order

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to protect the Jewish minority, and it had the same purpose as the Bucharest Peace Treaty between Romania and the Central Powers in this respect. Bratianu considered the Minorities Treaty a form of foreign intervention into the internal matters of an independent state, and refused to sign it. It was not easy for the Romanians to understand why they, in the victorious camp, had to accept the same conditions as in the camp of the defeated. Bratianu argued that, when the Romanian representative in the Commission of the League had proposed inserting into the statutes of the League some general clauses aimed at guaranteeing the rights of minorities, the representatives of the Great Powers had opposed him, with the fatuous argument that they were civilized states in which the rights of everyone are respected. Bratianu objected to this discrimination against Romania and refused to accept different treatment. Bratianu also observed that Germany, the “enemy”, had not been obliged to sign a minorities’ treaty.63 This was one of the numerous reasons behind Bratianu’s decision to leave Paris on July 2,64 and the Romanians’ refusal to sign the Austrian Treaty on September 10. Unfortunately, all the other interested States (except for Yugoslavia), being in no position to upset their powerful allies, agreed to sign the Minorities and the Austrian Treaties; and Bratianu was almost alone against the Big Four on this matter. The Big Four countered Bratianu’s argument on May 31, deciding against any possible Romanian occupation of Budapest and asking him to withdraw the army from Hungary. Bratianu asked, in return, for some guarantee from the Great Powers against a possible attack from Hungary. The guarantees were not forthcoming, and President Wilson demanded immediate withdrawal. The Romanians (with unofficial French backing) refused, conditioning any such move on the disarmament of the Hungarian Army. For, although the representatives of the Great Powers were preoccupied with finding a way to eliminate the communist regime in Hungary, none of them was disposed to send her own troops in and the Hungarians took the opportunity to reorganize their army. On July 20, Bela Kun (the communist leader of Hungary), encouraged by his success against the Czechoslovaks, took a fatal decision and ordered an attack on the Romanian Army. The Hungarian Army was defeated in just a few weeks. This time the Romanian Army took Budapest, and eliminated the communist regime. The Romanian occupation of Budapest created another nuisance for the Supreme Council, who, during the next six months, would have to use everything in its power (including even the threat of refusing Transylvania or other territories to Romania) to induce the Romanians to withdraw from Hungary. Romanian requisitions in Hungary aggravated the situation.65 At the same time, the scission within the Supreme Council — with France adopting a pro Romanian stand and with the American influence diminishing — worked in favor of Romania. The climax came when the Supreme Council sent an ultimatum in the form of a Note to Romania on November 15, threatening to cut off diplomatic relations if Romania refused to comply with the Supreme Council’s demands. Romania accepted the ultimatum. The new Romanian government, led by Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, signed the

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Minorities Treaty (with modifications made at the insistence of the Romanians), the Austrian Treaty and the Bulgarian Treaty on December 10, 1919. Since November, the Romanians had gradually been withdrawing their army from Hungary. However, Romanian troops were still kept on the Theiss line — not quite in accordance with the Council’s expectations. In January 1920, Vaida-Voevod made a visit to Paris and was received by the Supreme Council. The January 20 meeting, which will be discussed in the next subchapter, ended with the Romanian promise to withdraw its army from Hungary, which actually happened during the following two months. Overall, it should be stated that the Romanian occupation of Hungary lasted much longer than necessary and that it failed to bring any service to Romania in doing so. On June 4, 1920, the Treaty with Hungary was signed. The Paris Peace Conference proved to be a great success for Romanian diplomacy, even though not all the Romanian territorial demands were met. These achievements came as a result of a number of objective factors and not at all as a gift from the Great Powers. Of course, there were some imperfections, such as the small quota of war reparations to be paid, or the status of the Danube (given that some portions of the River were entirely on Romanian territory, the Romanians expected to have more control over its navigation, meaning the right to levy taxes; but the Great Powers were unwilling to lose control over the Danube and insisted that it should have an international status, giving Romania little voice on such matters) but, on the whole, the Romanians had every reason to be satisfied with the results. In the following years, Romanian diplomacy would focus mainly on the need to guarantee that the decisions taken by the Peace Conference were respected, and to prevent any possible revision of the borders established by those treaties. It is interesting to note that, while in Paris many of the representatives of the Great Powers had been against Romania, the same could not be said about the Great Powers’ representatives in Bucharest (Charles J. Vopicka for the US, Saint-Aulaire for France, Frank Rattigan for the UK, T. Franklin for Italy). Their superiors, in fact, considered each of the four ministers to be too much in favor of the Romanian cause. Their reports during the crises between Romania and the Supreme Council highlight the differences in view from Bucharest and from Paris. Frank Rattigan showed by far the clearest understanding of the Romanian situation. His reports remain to this day valuable descriptions not only of Romanian affairs but also of the Romanian people. This difference is really striking because each of the Ministers represented the interests of his own country, which one would suppose were the same whether seen from Paris or Bucharest, and yet the ministers in Bucharest each fought, as much as possible, against the decisions taken by their superiors to the detriment of Romanian interests. The Paris Peace Conference and The Bessarabian Question To bring some clarity to a complex situation as it unfolded, a chronological presentation follows, outlining the evolution of the Bessarabian question during the Paris Peace Conference. Clearly, events were taking place on two levels — an official

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level (meaning everything that was presented during the meetings of the Peace Conference) and an unofficial one (meaning the under-the-table direct negotiations between Romania and the Great Powers). The present chapter will analyze the Conference as a whole, on only the official level; the role played by each Great Power in the making of the Treaty, and their particular interests regarding the Treaty, representing the unofficial level, will be presented in subsequent chapters. Since the US had been the biggest opponent to the Bessarabian treaty, and expressed their opposition officially, we will also go into a bit more detail on their position (the real motivation behind their attitude will be analyzed in Chapter 9). At the end of this chapter, we present the Foreign Relations of the United States collection (FRUS) record of the conversations whenever the Bessarabian question was the subject of an intense debate in one of the Conference’s commissions. An intense propaganda campaign was undertaken at the Conference by the Romanian government, both at the official and the unofficial levels, to convince the public and the deciding Powers of the rightfulness of Romania’s territorial and economic claims. Memorandums were sent to the various commissions of the Peace Conference, unofficial contacts were made with the delegates to the Conference, pamphlets were printed and articles and interviews were published in the mass media. Although the Paris Peace Conference officially started in January 1919, its beginnings should be traced to January of the prior year, when the famous 14 Wilsonian Points had been presented before the American Congress. The European situation changed considerably between the day the 14 Points were proclaimed and the day the war ended; the points needed to be adjusted to the new situation. The CobbLippmann memorandum of October 29, 1918 achieved that task. In regard to Romania, the memorandum states: The 6th point, referring to Russia, only makes indirect reference to Bessarabia. The only reference made to Romania is that the Bucharest Peace Treaty must be canceled as palpably fraudulent. The 10th point, referring to the peoples of Austria-Hungary, states, “Transylvania will undoubtedly join Romania, but provisions must be made for the protection of Magyars, Szeckelers and Germans who constitute a large minority”. The 11th point, referring to Romania and Serbia, states, “the relations of the several Balkan states to one another should be determined by friendly counsel along the historically established lines of allegiance and nationality . . . Romania will have acquired the Dobrudja, Bessarabia and probably Transylvania . . . Bulgaria should clearly have her frontier in the southern Dobrudja as it stood before the second Balkan War”.66

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Moldova, a Romanian Province A Chronology February 1, 1919 – During the Council of Ten discussions of Romanian territorial claims, Romanian Prime Minister Ion I.C. Bratianu, seeking to justify the armistice Romania signed with the Central Powers, observed: At the demand of the representatives of the Entente, who declared in writing that this operation was the last military cooperation that they were entitled to expect from Romania, the Romanian army commenced open hostilities with the Bolshevist troops and then occupied the whole territory of Moldavia and Bessarabia. It was thought that this supreme effort would at least ensure the existence of an Ukraine friendly to the Allies.67 Bratianu presented, in an official manner for the first time, the justice of Romania’s claims to Bessarabia. In answer to a question from Lloyd George, he also maintained that “In Bessarabia, elections had taken place under the Russian Republican government, and the Assembly thus elected had proclaimed the Union with Romania, subject to certain reservations which the Assembly had since withdrawn, on condition that it should be granted a special Agrarian Law.”68 After the withdrawal of the Romanian representatives, the Council decided that the Romanian Treaty of August 1916 should be considered annulled due to Romania’s signing the Bucharest Peace. However, they acknowledged that Romania should have proper representation at the Peace Conference. After further deliberations, the Council decided, “the Romanian territorial interests should be referred for examination in the first instance by an expert committee, composed of two representatives each of the USA, the British Empire, France and Italy.”69 Bratianu’s introductory remarks, made before presenting his report, were indicative of his relationship with the other leaders, and characteristic of his personality; they were clearly directed against at least some of those in the room: “This is the second time I have to take an oral examination in Paris. The first time was when I took my engineering license; at that time, my examiners knew more than me.”70 February 8 – The first meeting of the Commission on Romanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs.71 The Commission was the first of five territorial commissions that came into being and the immediate reason for its creation was the Romanian-Yugoslav conflict over the Banat. Much of its work would be focused on the Banat border and the border between Romania and Hungary. The Commission had no competence to pronounce judgment on the validity or non-validity of the 1916 Treaty. Like the other territorial commissions, its mandate was not to decide what the frontiers of Romania were to be, but to recommend to the Council of Ten what, in their opinion (based on ethnic, geographic, and necessary economic grounds), those frontiers ought to be. Strategic reasons, arising from temporary political exigencies, were not permitted to influence their decision.72

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André Tardieu was supposed to preside over this first meeting of the committee, but he suddenly left the meeting and Giacomo de Martino therefore led the discussion. This change altered the course of the debates, because Martino requested that the discussion should start by discussing the validity of all the treaties invoked by the Romanians in their favor (with a view to Italy’s own secret treaty with the Entente). Although the French representatives agreed, the Americans flatly refused to take into account any treaty of which they had no official knowledge; the British considered that, if the cited treaties had still been valid, then they simply would have been implemented by the Conference.73 As for Bessarabia, both the British (Eyre Crow) and American (Clive Day) representatives asked that the ethnic and national principles be included in the future treaty of Bessarabia. The French representative (Laroche) insisted on the ethnic and historical arguments, which were the basis for the Union and for its international recognition. Clive Day also raised the possibility of future difficulties with Russia due to the Union’s recognition.74 In the end, Laroche, with the agreement of all the other members in the Commission (including the Americans), stated that: Of all the territories under discussion by the Committee, Bessarabia is . . . the only one which, at a recent period, belonged to Romania, and to which Romania is able to make not only a national but a real historical claim. Bessarabia is a definite province that has been removed from a definite State. As a result, its return to this State could not create difficulties in the future with Russia.”75 The Commission met again, a number of times (the most important meetings took place on February 11, 17, and 22), the main point of debate being that of Romania’s future western border, and there were some unofficial meetings as well. During none of these meetings was Bessarabia mentioned, which would indicate that it was not seen as a problem and that it was clearly accepted as Romanian territory. March 5 – Meeting of the Commission on Romanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs. The Romanian Commission took up the Bessarabian problem in order to prepare a draft for the final decision of the Commission. In agreement with Laroche’s proposal, the Commission decided in favor of the Union between Bessarabia and Romania. March 11 – Meeting of the Commission on Romanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs. The Commission in unanimity adopted its final decision on Bessarabia. The decision reads: The Commission, taking into consideration the general aspirations of the Bessarabian populations, the Moldavian character of that region, both geographically and ethnographically, as well as the economic and historic arguments, favors the attachment of Bessarabia to Romania. It believes that this attribution should take place under a form that will safeguard the general interests of Bessarabia, notably as regards its relations with the neighboring countries, and

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Moldova, a Romanian Province which will guarantee the rights of the minorities in accordance with the provisions of the League of Nations.76 In fact, it was not only the Commission but also the “official” historians of the Peace Conference who considered that Bessarabia rightfully belonged to Romania: Geographically and historically a Romanian province with a predominantly Romanian population, Bessarabia was clearly marked out for reunion with Romania. It was considered that any discontent that might have arisen during the past year of Romanian occupation was due to personal mistakes or the general hard times rather than to any deep distaste for union with Romania, in which, it was felt, lay Bessarabia’s (and Romania’s) best hope of progress and peace. Diplomatically, however, there was the difficulty of Russian susceptibilities, and it was attempted to salve these by phrasing the decision in the most tactful words.77 March 28 – Final meeting of the Commission on Romanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs. This time, expert international jurists took part, in order to examine the legality of the articles included in the treaties establishing the future frontiers. The final report of the Commission, together with a number of annexes, had been sent to the Central Territorial Commission, which approved it and then sent it to the Council of Foreign Ministers. As for the Bessarabian border, the American representative Charles Seymour stated, privately, “it is rather embarrassing because part of the frontiers abut on Russia and the Ukraine, but there is no one there with whom we can sign a treaty.”78 April 6 – The final Report of the Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions Relating to Romania and Yugoslavia was presented to the Supreme Council. After presenting a general outline of the future Romanian frontiers, including Bessarabia, the Report presented six draft articles to be inserted in a treaty with Russia. These articles would form the basis of the future Bessarabian treaty.79 On April 15, the Central Committee on Territorial Questions approved the Report and sent it to the Supreme Council. May 8 – Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The recommendations of the Romanian Territorial Commission, approved by the Central Territorial Commission, had been handed over to the Council of Foreign Ministers for debate. At this meeting, the new American policy regarding Bessarabia was presented for the first time by Secretary of State Robert Lansing: After a short discussion it was decided not to consider the boundary of Romania on the Russian side, but only to deal with its boundary on the Hungarian side. Mr. Lansing said that in his opinion when the delimitation of Romania and Russia was made, it would be necessary that Russia should be represented. The Peace Conference could not adjudicate on territory belonging to a state with whom the Powers represented were not at war.”80

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The proximate reason for this declaration was President Wilson’s intention to recognize the White Russian Government headed by Admiral Kolchak as the official government of Russia; Kolchak seemed willing to allow a plebiscite to take place in the central parts of Bessarabia.81 And indeed, the change in US policy came at the height of the Kolchak campaign when, as presented by Lloyd George on May 7, “we are witnessing the veritable collapse of Bolshevism . . . according to our information Kolchak is about to join his forces with those at Archangel; it is also possible that he will arrive in Moscow soon and establish a new government”.82 The problem here is that, even after Kolchak’s defeat, the US position remained the same as expressed on May 7. Lansing also asked for a plebiscite to be held in Bessarabia, knowing that it would be unacceptable to the Romanian authorities (or to any other state in a similar situation) — because the plebiscite would have meant choosing between democracy and communism, and even if the plebiscite should be in favor of union, the Russians would not accept it. Therefore, the only result of a plebiscite for Romania would have been intensified communist propaganda and the possibility of losing its military control in Bessarabia. Bratianu presented these arguments clearly, later on. In fact, it was not only Bratianu who was concerned about the danger posed by Bolshevism. The Allies themselves considered the spread of Bolshevism toward Central Europe as a real danger and took steps to counterbalance it.83 As early as May 1919, US Secretary Robert Lansing expressed a new position toward the Bessarabian question, a position different from that expressed by the American representatives in the Romanian and Central Territorial Commissions. May 16 – The Council of the Foreign Ministers. During the debate over the future Bulgarian frontier and in connection with the situation in Dobrudja, it was pointed out that, “Romania’s frontier in Bessarabia had been left undecided, by reason of Mr. Lansing’s remark that this frontier could not be decided in the absence of Russia . . . Mr. Balfour observed that the objection to settling the frontier in Bessarabia, as involving a partial dealing with the Russian problem, was a sound one”.84 The British sided with the Americans, clearly as a result of Kolchak’s military success, but it was only temporary. May 27 – The Council of Four. It was pointed that the question of Bessarabia had been omitted from the dispatch to Admiral Kolchak, and that this would probably cause difficulties with Romania when the dispatch was eventually published. After some discussions, the following addition to the dispatch was approved: “Sixthly, the right of the Peace Conference to determine the future of the Romanian part of Bessarabia shall be recognized.”85 In some diplomatic circles it was considered that, by this article, the Great Powers undertook to recognize Romanian rights in Bessarabia. July 1 – The Council of the Heads of Delegations. After some debate it was decided, at Clemenceau’s suggestion, to take up the Bessarabian question. The American (Paul Eugene Dutasta) and British (Lord Balfour) representatives opposed dis-

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Moldova, a Romanian Province cussing the Bessarabian problem on the grounds that “as this subject concerned Russia, no decision has been made” and that “no treaty has to be made either with Russia or with Romania”. But the Italian (Tittoni) and French representatives argued that “the Council should make an effort to eliminate elements of disturbance and [that] the area in question was very disturbed”. The final decision was that the next day the Council should hear a report from André Tardieu (the President of the Commission on Romanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs) and that Maklakoff and a Romanian delegate would be heard separately on the same subject. 86 July 2 – The Council of the Heads of Delegations. The Bessarabian question was discussed in the most official manner and at the highest level. Both the Russian and Romanian opinions were heard, plus the conclusions reached by the Commission on Romanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs. Very important for the Bessarabian question is the report presented by Tardieu, which reads: The Committee had been unanimous in their wish to grant Bessarabia to Romania, but the Council had sent a telegram to Admiral Kolchak, which appeared inconsistent with that decision. In the telegram in question the council had only stated that the Romanians rights in Bessarabia should be preserved in favor of that country. 87 It was only the American representative, Secretary of State Lansing, who objected to discussing the Bessarabian question, arguing that, as it was a conflict between two friendly states (toward the Entente), he did not have the necessary powers to deal with it. Still, the conflict between Romania and Yugoslavia was also one between friendly States, but this did not stop the US representatives from directly intervening. Because of the importance of both the Russian and the Romanian reports, we will present them entirely, as an Annex to the present chapter. The main points in Bratianu’s presentation were the Sfatul Tserii’s decision for union, and the plebiscite. Lansing had asked for a plebiscite in Bessarabia; that was adamantly rejected by Bratianu, who said that neither now nor in the future would he accept the organization of a plebiscite in Bessarabia. His reason was clear and simple: it would lead to an onslaught of revolutionary and Bolshevik propaganda that could have a dire effect on the future of Bessarabia and Romania. July 23 – Meeting of the US Commissioners. The discussion started with the problem of the elections to be held in all the Romanian territories, including Transylvania and Bessarabia, and the fact that the Bessarabian representatives, Kroupenski (one of the richest Bessarabian landowners) and Schmidt (former mayor of Chisinau), had protested that the Romanians were preparing to hold an election in Bessarabia for members to the Romanian Parliament. The entire meeting shows how much the US “specialists” relied on unverified information. In Prof. Coolidge’s words: “There was to be an election in all the Romanian territories, but in the new territories no one had a right to vote until he was

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forty years of age, which seemed to be an ingenious way of giving a majority to the people in the older territories”.88 This is dead wrong; the Romanian electoral law stipulated that the 40 years age limit referred only to the Senate, and was valid all over Romania. The Romanians (and not only the minorities) living in the newly acquired territories would hardly have sat still for such an arrangement as Coolidge had dreamed up. In reality, this episode says much about Romania’s image with the US delegates, who were ready to believe any such story without checking their sources. Allen W. Dulles opposed sending the matter to the Committee on Minorities, arguing that it was not a problem of minorities’ protection, as the minorities were able to vote on the same conditions as the Romanians. Then, they remembered that nothing was to be done in any of the territories that formed part of Russia, as Secretary Lansing had previously stated. The discussion continued on the general situation of Bessarabia, simply describing the positions previously expressed by Bratianu and Lansing on July 2. July 26 – Meeting of the American Steering Committee.89 This meeting is important because it was one of the few moments when some of the US representatives seemed eager to “solve” the Bessarabian question. The Committee discussed the situation of Dobrudja and Bessarabia. Dr. Johnson suggested that the two questions might be taken up with Romania at the same time, with the idea that Romania’s aspirations in Bessarabia might be satisfied in case she would consent to certain concessions in the Dobrudja.90 The suggestion was later abandoned, as the British position regarding Dobrudja was opposed to that of the Americans, the British clearly favoring the Romanians. August 1 – Council of Heads of Delegations. Again, it was the French representative who reopened the Bessarabian question, saying that “it would be difficult to settle the Romanian question as a whole, and to make that country accept clauses in the Peace Treaty on the subject of minorities if, at the same time, its frontiers had not been notified to it”. 91 Answering questions, Tardieu pointed out twice that the Committee had been unanimous in their wish to grant Bessarabia to Romania, but admitted that some delegations (referring to the Americans) had altered their opinions after the lapse of a few months. After more debate (presented in the Annex) it was decided, in the same manner as before, to postpone the discussion on Bessarabia (together with Bukovina and Dobrudja), this time the postponement being justified by the need to wait until the formation of a new Romanian government. August 13 – Meeting of the US Commissioners. During discussions regarding Poland’s frontier with Russia, Bessarabia was mentioned. Again White pointed out, “We have laid down the rule that we do not think that any of the territory that we formerly called Russian territory should be disposed of until we know what the Russian situation will be.” The problem was that Lansing had admitted some exceptions to this rule in regard to Finland and Poland; such exceptions might or might not apply to Bessarabia. Dr. Lord: The nearest to a thoroughly official act is the note of the Council of Four to Admiral Kolchak, in which they make a distinction between Bes-

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Moldova, a Romanian Province sarabia and other parts of the former Russian Empire. They expressly reserve the right of the Peace Conference here to settle the Bessarabian question. . . . Colonel Grant: The Bessarabian question deserves a special settlement, for it is very much mixed up by the Romanian situation at the present time.92 September 3 – Meeting of the US Commissioners. The main point of the discussion was the Bulgarian frontier in Dobrudja, and in that context the Bessarabian question was mentioned. The American representatives had their own ideas regarding Dobrudja and they went so far as to use the Transylvanian question in order to strong-arm the Romanians. The following fragments illustrate that discussion: Mr. Polk: Now the Dobrudja question is a question to be settled with a friendly state — that is Romania — and therefore that could properly be in a separate treaty. It is obvious at the present moment that Romania would not discuss that question unless she were given compensations in Bessarabia (author’s emphasis). Now, I understand the position of the Delegation has been that we could promise them nothing in Bessarabia; that that is a part of Russia, and that therefore we would not be a party to the disintegration of Russia. . . Dr. Johnson: The position of the American Delegation on the Territorial Commission was — and it was supported by Mr. Lansing and later by the President — that although Romania was a friendly state we had a right to require the cession of the Bulgarian portion of the Dobrudja to Bulgaria, in view of the fact that we were giving Romania very large areas of territory which were acquired as the result of the common victory of the Allies, not by the Romanians’ own efforts. The British and the Italians did not support that point of view, and took the position that, Romania being a friendly state, we could require no cession of territory. But our position has been that while we may not require outright cession of territory, we will say “we will give you this territory if you cede that”. Mr. Polk: Aren’t we more or less blocked? We cannot give them Bessarabia. Dr. Johnson: But even outside the question of Bessarabia, there is Transylvania. Mr. Polk: There is Transylvania, of course. . . . Mr. Polk (concluding): Now, in view of the present attitude of Romania, it would be a waste of time to attempt to draw the line (in Dobrudja).93 Still, Frank Polk did the opposite, and took the first opportunity to reopen the Dobrudja question. September 5 – Council of Heads of Delegations. Frank Polk insisted that the Dobrudja question should be mentioned in the treaty withBulgaria, but the British and French representatives were clearly opposed to this idea, only the Italian representative trying to somehow back the US proposal. Lord Balfour: [He] was ready to state that the attribution of southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria would be conducive to a lasting peace in the Balkans. But he

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thought that it was impossible, as long as Romania remained an Allied Power, or, at worst, a neutral, to insert any clause in the Treaty with Bulgaria requiring a surrender of Romanian territory. Mr. Polk: According to the future provisions of the Treaty with Hungary, Romania stood a chance of receiving considerable accessions of territory in Transylvania and Bukovina. Her acquisition of these territories might be made contingent on her yielding ground in the Dobrudja. Mr. Balfour: The frontiers in Transylvania and Bukovina were drawn on ethnological lines. It would be difficult to alter these frontiers without violating the principles of the Conference. Mr. Pichon: A serious question of principle was involved. The Conference, hitherto, had never attempted to revise Treaties anterior to the war. . . . Mr. Tittoni: The question of Dobrudja could not be made corollary to the question of Transylvania or Bukovina. The matter of Bessarabia, however, remained. [He] would be inclined to ask Romania to make a concession in the Dobrudja as a condition of obtaining what the Commission recommended in Bessarabia. . . . Mr. Polk: Nothing [he] said had committed him to an offer of Bessarabia to Romania in exchange for southern Dobrudja.94 The Americans were not willing at that time to make any compromise in regard to Bessarabia but they were disposed to do so regarding Transylvania. This is interesting, because for everybody (including the Americans) it was not only quite clear but also already agreed (based on a series of demographic, ethnic, historical, economic and strategic facts) that all of Transylvania belonged to Romania. So, Polk was willing to encroach upon at least few of the principles used as the basis for the building of a new world by the Paris Peace Conference in order to achieve his aim regarding southern Dobrudja. The question is, why did he use the Transylvanian question and not the Bessarabian one, on which nothing had yet been decided? And, in the first place, what was the reason behind the American insistence in the cession of southern Dobrudja? The whole matter shows that Polk had clear instructions from his superiors in Washington that the Bessarabian question was untouchable, whatever the circumstances. This comes to support the view that, for his superiors, Bessarabia had a different significance, as presented in a following chapter, seemingly being considered as more important than the Transylvanian question. September 8 – Council of Heads of Delegations. During the discussions over the Peace Treaty with Austria, one of the main objections the Romanians had raised was in regard to the national minorities (Article 60). The Bessarabian question came into discussion as the representatives were analyzing the implications of Romania’s refusal to sign the Austrian Treaty. Mr. Tittoni said that Romania might be satisfied with actual possession of the Bukovina and Transylvania without a title de jure to either, because she

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Moldova, a Romanian Province might argue that neither Austria nor Hungary would be able for a long time to dispute her possessions. But in the case of Bessarabia, unless treaty rights were acquired, it must be clear to Romania that Russia, once restored to power, would certainly wish to regain the country. In this instance, Romania would see that it required the assistance of the Allied and Associated Powers or the League of Nations. This might be pointed out to Romania, perhaps becoming influenced by this argument. Mr. Polk said that he was not prepared to bribe Romania into good behavior. He did not think that the Council had fallen so low as to be forced to resort to such tactics. [Interesting, just a few days earlier, he had been willing to use the Transylvanian question in order to obtain Romania’s cession of southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria.] Mr. Tittoni pointed out that he would not have made his proposal unless he had regarded Romania as having a good title to Bessarabia. Mr. Balfour said that he thought the proper course was to make no mention of Bessarabia at all.95 October 7 – Meetings of the US Commissioners. It was decided to bring the matter of the parliamentary elections to be held in Bessarabia to the attention of the Supreme Council.96 October 10 – Council of Heads of Delegations. Frank Polk raised the problem of the Romanian action in Bessarabian. He told the Council: He wished to say that the conduct of the Romanians in Bessarabia had called for strong adverse comment. He was informed that the Romanian authorities were holding elections and enforcing conscription. He thought that the action of the Romanian government in Bessarabia should be considered by the Council.97 In fact, Polk was acting as a result of a new note sent by the so-called Bessarabian representatives in Paris, Kroupenski and Schmidt, in which they complained once more against the Romanian authorities, proving quite successful in obtaining the backing of the US delegates. October 11 – Council of Heads of Delegations. The Bessarabian question had been placed on the agenda by the American delegation on the previous day. At first, the Council read a note (the same, or similar to, the one cited above). The point expressed by Mr. Polk was that: He did not intend to ask the Council to take a decision. . . the fact that the Romanians were exercising rights of sovereignty in Bessarabia, and that the silence of the Conference in regard to this matter might give the Romanians grounds for believing that the Council consented to their having assumed this sovereignty.98

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He was afraid that the Romanians would present this as a fait accompli and, as this policy was counter to his instructions regarding Bessarabia, he had to use anything at hand in order to counter the Romanian move. October 30 – Council of Heads of Delegations. The Americans tried again to obtain the agreement of the other representatives for a settling of the southern Dobrudja problem in favor of Bulgaria. Once more, the French representatives clearly opposed any solution contemplating the transfer of parts of Dobrudja to Bulgaria and tried to bring the Bessarabian question into discussion. But Polk argued again that the question of Bessarabia should not be discussed at the present moment particularly on account of the situation in Russia. He also stated, “The chief trouble was that Romania had been given everything she wanted in a territorial way without any equivalent being demanded. The time to bargain would have been when Romania’s territorial requests had been freely granted.”99 The question is, was Polk referring to the 1914 negotiations, when Romania decided to stay neutral, although it was a member of the Triple Alliance, or to 1916, when Romania decided, under intense pressure from the Entente, to enter the war against its former allies, placing all her resources in the Entente’s service? November 11 – Council of Heads of Delegations. The British representative, Sir Eyre Crowe, tried to bring the Bessarabian question into the Council’s debate, but was opposed by Frank Polk, who argued that, in his opinion, it was not possible for the matter to be settled at that time. Notwithstanding Polk’s opposition, Sir Eyre Crowe stated, “they were clearly of the opinion that Bessarabia should go to Romania”.100 The British position is significant for at least four reasons: (1) they clearly backed the Romanian position regarding Bessarabia, even at a time when the relations between the Conference and Romania were really strained; (2) they understood the influence that a solution in favor of Romania would have over the latter’s cooperation with the Peace Conference; (3) it was the beginning of the British pressure in favor of the Bessarabian Treaty, a pressure targeting at first the US but soon the French representatives, too; (4) the British statement also shows the weakening of the US delegation’s influence over the Conference. November 13 – Council of Heads of Delegations. During the discussions regarding the ultimate note to be sent to Romania, the French representative (Charles Berthelot) opened the debate regarding Bessarabia: “The question certainly had been discussed by a Commission which had come to the unanimous decision to give the whole of Bessarabia to Romania, but the Council had not taken any decision to that effect, and its liberty of action remained unimpaired”.101 It is interesting that at any time when the Bessarabian question was discussed, the French kept reminding the Americans about the unanimous decision (which means that the American representatives too agreed on the matter) taken by the Commission on Romanian and YugoSlav Affairs. January 20 – The International Council of Premiers. The main difference is that now the Americans have no power to influence directly the decision on Bessarabia as

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Moldova, a Romanian Province they decided to leave the Peace Conference. Still, the US Ambassador in Paris, Andrew Wallace, was assisting the works of the Peace Conference. The new Romanian Prime Minister, Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, had been invited to justify the Romanian policy towards the Peace Conference, with a special accent on the Hungarian situation. The main point of the discussions regarding the Bessarabian question, (presented in detail in the Annex), was the verbal agreement that the Conference would give official recognition to the Romanian rights in Bessarabia as soon as the Romanian Army will be withdrawn from Hungary. This deal is excellently expressed by Lloyd George: We are convinced of your intention to evacuate Hungary, but we think you may be faced by certain difficulties from the military party and we think the military party would be more willing to obey the order of the Conference to evacuate Hungary immediately if you said to them: ‘The Conference is awaiting our evacuation of Hungary before deciding that Bessarabia shall be definitely Romanian’. . . The Council took note of the statement made by Vaida-Voevod; it acknowledged that, although it had as yet come to no decision as to the attribution of Bessarabia and could not do so until Romania had carried out the orders of the Conference in Hungary, the Commission on Romanian Affairs was unanimously of the opinion that this territory should be attributed to Romania.102 Still, it should be noted that the connection between the Bessarabian question and the withdrawal of the Romanian Army from Hungary was only a temporary one. After this meeting, Vaida-Voevod would continue his official visit in Paris and London in order to influence the two Great Powers for signing a treaty regarding Bessarabia.103 He also complied with the Conference’s request and ordered the complete withdrawal of Romanian troops from Hungary. In fact, as soon as the communist regime was defeated and as it became clear that the new Hungarian government had neither the will nor the necessary military power to attack Romania, plus the fact that the Conference had clearly decided the new frontier in Transylvania, the presence of the Romanian Army on Hungarian territory did not exactly help the Romanian cause in Paris. At the same time, Vaida-Voevod started direct negotiations with the Soviets, in order to solve the existing conflicts on a peaceful manner. March 3 – The International Council of Premiers. The Romanians asked the Supreme Council for its opinion about the opening of direct negotiations with the Bolsheviks and obtained the approval. Vaida-Voevod asked the Council to take a definitive decision in the Bessarabian question, which was, in his opinion, the only problem between Romania and Russia. The Council decided to make a declaration in this sense (presented in the Annex), which stipulates: The Principal Allied Powers pronounce themselves in favor of the reunion of Bessarabia with Romania . . . and it is their desire to conclude a treaty for the recognition . . . The Allied Powers consider that by this annexation the general

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and particular interests of Bessarabia are protected, especially those regarding its reports with the neighboring states, and that the minorities rights must be guaranteed.104 April 15 – The Commission on Romanian Affairs examined the Draft Treaty prepared by the Drafting Committee to give effect to the Supreme Council’s recognition of Romania’s sovereignty over Bessarabia. To the initial six articles in the Draft three others were added; two of them (Articles No. 7 and 9) were proposed by the British delegate, Alan Leeper, while the third one (Article No. 8) came from the French delegation. Although the French also insisted that a special clause regarding the indemnification of the French subjects expropriated in Bessarabia by the new agrarian law (amounting to about 10 million French francs) should be inserted in the Draft Treaty, the British opposed this, considering that “it would be inconvenient to introduce in a Treaty of this nature a clause relating to certain temporary private interests and that it would be preferable for the French delegation to negotiate it privately with the Romanian delegation”. 105 Two points should be made, here. Article No. 9 failed to mention that the Treaty would come into force only after all its signatories ratified it; and second, it was drafted in the name of the US too, with the hope that, in the end, the US government would sign the Treaty. 106 April 15 – The Secretariat General of the Peace Conference forwarded the draft Bessarabian Treaty to the American Ambassador in Paris, Andrew Wallace, asking him to verify his government’s position regarding the Draft Treaty.107 April 25 – The British Secretary of foreign Affairs, Lord Curzon, proposed during the San Remo meeting of the Supreme Council that the Bessarabian Treaty, which was drafted already, should be referred to the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris, which should be authorized to discuss and approve it finally. The Supreme Council accepted in unanimity the British proposal.108 June 19 – The Conference of Ambassadors. Ambassador Wallace explained to the Conference the official position of the US government regarding the Bessarabian question, as it was expressed in the instructions received from his government: This government has steadily refused to become involved in the discussion of Romania’s claims in the province of Bessarabia, and at the meetings of Supreme Council last autumn the attitude of the US was made entirely clear . . . the US must again decline to become a party to any treaty tending to Russia’s dismemberment.109 The Romanians understood that the Conference was not yet prepared to sign the Bessarabian treaty and they decided to increase their pressure. In this sense, and bearing in mind their previous negotiations with the British representatives, they took a decisive step to meet the British and French demands regarding the signing of the Treaty. By a telegram sent to the Romanian Legation in Paris in June 1920, Take

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Ionescu acknowledged the agreement of the Romanian government to pay equitable compensations to 13 landowners in Bessarabia (9 French, 2 British, 2 Americans) in exchange for their expropriated land. More concretely, the Romanian government undertook to pay an amount of compensation higher than the one established by the land reform law, an amount that was to be established through collaboration between the Romanian and the interested governments.110 Finally, after making a general estimate regarding the amount of compensations to be paid,111 the Romanian government undertook to embody in an exchange of letters the requested assurances regarding the compensations. The Romanian Agrarian Reform expropriated the lands of foreigners in order to give them to the peasants in exchange for an amount of money to be paid during the following 10-15 years. It was feared that the Romanian government would not pay a satisfactory amount of money to the former landowners. The exchange of notes took place on September 17 with France and on October 27 with the UK, and stated: The Romanian government undertakes to pay directly to the British [and respectively French] government on behalf of the British [and respectively French] landowners in Bessarabia whose property has been expropriated by virtue of the Romanian expropriation law, compensation which shall represent the real value of the expropriated property. The amount of this compensation shall be fixed by common agreement and without taking into account the rules laid down by Romanian expropriation law.112 The Romanian government made a real concession in offering to pay foreign citizens a different amount than it was paying its own citizens. But this was one of the conditions set by both France and the UK in order to sign the Bessarabian treaty, and it did not seem to be such a high price to pay. Of course, there were not many British or French landowners in Bessarabia. The problem was to keep this arrangement secret from the Romanian landowners, and in this aspect the Romanian government assumed a certain risk. The Romanian government made the mistake of offering this advantage only to France and the UK, and not to the other Signatory Powers too. Of course, Japan had neither knowledge of nor interest (there were no Japanese citizens living in Bessarabia) in the mentioned exchange of notes; however, in a sense the Japanese could have used it later in order to justify their failure to ratify, arguing that they had been “humiliated” or “discriminated against” by not receiving the same treatment as the other Powers. The Italian government, though, took real offense. Even though there were few Italians in Bessarabia, the Italian pride as a Great Power was at stake. Therefore, one of the obstacles invoked by the Italian government when the Romanians pressed for the Italian ratification was this exchange of notes. Meanwhile, Romania stepped up its propaganda in Paris, London and Rome, urging the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty. However, the French were waiting to

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see how the Polish-Russo war developed, while the British seemed to be waiting for the results of the negotiations between Lloyd George and the Soviets’ representative, Krassin. Each government blamed the other for the delay in signing the Bessarabian Treaty.113 The stabilization of the Russo-Polish front toward the end of September also worked in favor of Romania. Both Britain and France were afraid that, due to the end of the war with Poland, Bolshevik troops would become available for deployment against the Romanians in Bessarabia. In order to boost the Romanian position and to avoid the start of a new war in Eastern Europe, they understood that the international recognition of Bessarabia’s union would provide a powerful deterrence against any military action of the Bolsheviks regarding Bessarabia.114 Still, the Great Powers, and especially the British, wanted to use the Bessarabian question as leverage to induce the Romanian government to ratify the Minorities Treaty. Once Romania ratified it, the ethnic and religious minorities living in Bessarabia would automatically be under its protection. The Powers clearly stated to the Romanians that the Bessarabian Treaty would be signed only after Romania ratified the Minorities Treaty,115 which Romania actually did in August 1920. September 29 – After sending a memorandum to the Secretary General of the Conference of Ambassadors, stating that there were no more reasons for postponing the signature,116 the British representative urged his counterparts to sign the Bessarabian Treaty. As Lord Derby presented his action: I must insist on being allowed to sign the Bessarabian Treaty without delay, and that I could not agree to further postponement pending discussion on the subject with the United States government. My colleagues all agreed on principle to immediate signature, but Mr. Laroche, speaking on behalf of the French government, urged that the Conference should ask the US Ambassador to make a last appeal to his government in the hope that they might be induced to sign with the other Powers. Mr. Wallace also urged that he should be given time to consult his government after the Treaty was formally communicated to the Romanian government. I objected to any such delay, and it was finally agreed that the Treaty should be communicated officially on Monday next (October 4) to the Romanian government, and that all arrangements should be made for it to be signed on October 11, or as soon as possible after that date. These dates will give sufficient time for Mr. Wallace to consult his government, as he wishes to do, but it is understood that whatever the reply he receives the signature of the Treaty will be proceeded with.117 That same day, Ambassador Wallace sent a telegram to his government, asking for instructions regarding the Bessarabian question.118 Secretary of State Colby’s answer came after a few days and was in line with the previous instructions:

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Moldova, a Romanian Province In view of the consistent refusal of this government to approve a policy which tended toward the dismemberment of Russia, as so recently emphasized in the note to the Italian Ambassador, you should inform your colleagues that you have been instructed not to sign at this time any treaty disposing of Bessarabia. You should add that it is the Department’s opinion that hasty action in this matter would only tend to give the Bolsheviks another pretense for arousing national spirit on the ground that the Allies were disposing of Russian territory at a time when a representative Russian government could not be heard.119 In fact, the Romanians already knew, prior to the Conference meeting, that the French and British governments had decided to make a common appeal to Washington for signing the Bessarabian Treaty. They understood the reasons behind the new postponement but had to agree with it as they were promised that the Treaty would be signed no latter than October 25.120 October 2 – Conference of Ambassadors. The British pressure for signing the Bessarabian Treaty continues. As Lord Derby reports, The Secretariat General, having failed to report the resolution taken at the last meeting with regard to the Bessarabian treaty, I thought it well to insist that the Treaty was to be presented on the 4 instant to the Romanian government, no matter whether the US, Japanese and the Italian Ambassadors were still awaiting instructions from their governments or not. If necessary the treaty will be presented in the name of Great Britain and France instead of in the name of the Conference of Ambassadors. It was decided to take the opportunity of requesting the Romanian government at the same time to sign the two treaties regarding (1) Central European frontiers and (2) the obligations taken over by the inheriting States of the ex-Austria-Hungarian monarchy, which were signed at Sevres on August 10.121 October 5 – The Italian Legation in Bucharest announced that the Italian government had already given the necessary instructions to his Ambassador in Paris in order to sign the Bessarabian Treaty.122 October 8 – During the 78 meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors the American Ambassador, Andrew Wallace presented his government’s view regarding the Bessarabian problem, insisting that it was not opportune to sign the treaty at that moment because of the bolstering effect that it would have for the Bolsheviks’ cause. But the Americans not at all impressed the British representative. As Ambassadors Wallace reported, Derby, however, reiterated that he hoped the treaty could be signed at earliest possible moment and that he was prepared to sign even if he was only one of my colleagues who could do so. It appeared that he was only one of my colleagues who was not concerned over the statement made by me pursuant to Department’s instructions. 123

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Britain’s position towards the Treaty is detailed in Lord Derby’s report regarding the meeting: The Italian Ambassador stated that he had meanwhile received authority to sign the Bessarabian Treaty but, in view of Mr. Wallace’s statement, he suggests that the actual signature should be postponed until the Allied governments had time to express an opinion on the view held by the US government. I objected to any postponement, insisting that I must sign on October 11 or as soon as possible afterwards. As a matter of fact it is unlikely that the Treaty can be signed on 11 instant as the Romanian government have not yet replied to the note addressed to them by the Conference, still less have they appointed their plenipotentiaries. I made it clear to the Conference that the Bessarabian Treaty is to be signed even if the Romanian government refuses to sign the New States Treaty and the Central European Frontiers Treaty.124 October 11 – The Romanian answer to the proposed Draft Treaty asked for two modifications. First one referred to the first paragraph of Article No. 7 regarding the Chilia arm of the Danube, which they wanted to be omitted and to be referred to the Conference on the status of Danube. The second one was referring to the Article No. 9, asking for the addition of words “non prévus” after the words “details”,125 according to the agreement reached by Titulescu in London in May 1920. At the same time, the Romanians announced their decision to sign the other two Treaties. While for the first demand there had been no concession from the Great Powers, the second one was met by them. In the final form, the Article 9 included the sentence “It is well understood that the boundaries in the present Treaty and the sovereignty of Romania over those territories are not included in this right.” October 27 – The Conference of Ambassadors discussed again the Bessarabian Treaty. The British Ambassador informed the Conference that, after negotiations in London, the Romanian government agreed to withdraw his objections to Article No. 7 and also that the new amendment to Article No. 9 had been accepted. The Conference approved the amendment and decided that the treaty should be signed on the next day. Significantly, it was “stipulated that subject to necessary deposit of ratification, treaty is to come into force simultaneous to Romanian minorities treaty. Such a stipulation appears to be necessary in view of fact that Minorities treaty is referred to in Article 3.” 126 In order to have the treaty signed by all the members in the Conference, it was decided that the treaty should also contain a clause allowing for an extension, namely until December 15, during which contracting parties could sign. The main reasons behind the mentioned clause, which was not unusual, was a request from the representatives of the British Dominions, who were not yet familiar with the ex-

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Moldova, a Romanian Province act content of the Draft Treaty, as well as the fact that the Japanese Ambassador at the Conference was not in Paris at that time. October 28 – The Bessarabian Treaty was signed on behalf of the British Empire, France, Italy and Romania. The Japanese Ambassador and the representatives of the British Commonwealth signed a few days later. The Romanian plenipotentiaries also signed act of adhesion to the New States Treaty and the Central European Frontiers Treaty, made on August 10, 1920, in Sèvres. Toward the end of the Peace Conference, Romania managed to obtain the Great Powers’ official recognition of Bessarabia’s union with Romania. It was not easy; the Great Powers still thought of Russia as the Ally that, for more than three years, had fought for their cause; and they felt some compunction over giving away territories that had belonged to the Russian Empire. On the other hand, they were also worried about Russia’s potential renascence as a power and wanted to limit its impact as much as possible. Thus, they resorted to the so-called “peeling the orange” approach while, at the same time, keeping a door open for a future rapprochement with Russia. The delicate phrasing of the Bessarabian Treaty is a reflection of this desire to keep the door open and to avoid future conflicts with Russia: while recognizing the union of Bessarabia with Romania, the Treaty omits any obligation on the part of its signatories to intervene in favor of Romania in case of a Russian attack on Bessarabia. Romania seized the moment, and moved to keep Bessarabia for herself. Few Romanian leaders at that time could foresee that Russia would regain its position as a Great Power. All warnings coming from different parts of Europe were left unanswered by the Romanian leaders.

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Annex No. 1 Bratianu and the Council of Ten, February 1, 1919 In FRUS, PPC, Vol.3, p. 847-848 As regards Bessarabia, there were at the present moment some 500,000 Romanians on the other side of the Dniestr, more than 100,000 in Bulgaria, more than 3000,000 in Serbia, and several hundred thousand in Macedonia, but they did not form groups sufficiently compact for Romania to be able to claim them at present. It was otherwise in Bessarabia, which was severed from Moldavia in 1812. Part of the province was restored to Romania after the Crimean War, but after the war of 1878, Russia took back this province, although admitting the integrity of Romania by a formal treaty. The Romanian claims had always extended to Bessarabia, but they would probably not have been allowed if a great political event had not occurred; Tsarist Russia collapsed and Bessarabia constituted itself an autonomous Republic, recognized by the Russian Government under the presidency of Mr. Kerenski. The Bolshevist disturbances created a serious situation in Bessarabia, and the Government there applied to Romania for help in maintaining order. Romania had refused until she received similar requests from Jassy. The military occupation of Bessarabia by Romanian troops only took place, therefore, with the consent of the local Government and at the request of the Ukraine and the representatives of the Entente. Subsequently, Bessarabia separated itself completely from Russia and, later, the Bessarabian Government declared its desire to unite with Romania, and united itself once more to Moldavia, from which it had been severed in 1812. Such was the history of the reunion of Bessarabia and Romania. A great injustice had thus been righted. More than 72% of the inhabitants are Romanians, the remainders are Slavs, Bulgarians, or Germans, and they did not represent even 15% of the populations; therefore from every point of view Bessarabia was a Romanian country. The incorporation of Bessarabia with Russia was an anachronism which could no longer be allowed to exist. Whatever may be the fate of Russia, she could and must no longer exercise supremacy in the Balkans. This dream was perhaps cherished by the Russian Government at the beginning of the 19th century, and the occupation of Bessarabia was doubtless a first step towards the occupation of Moldavia, Bulgaria and Constantinople, but it was a false political move. Bessarabia was, moreover, of the importance to Russia, for there was scarcely a Russian in the country. But after having once seized the country, it was difficult for Russia to restore it. As soon as circumstances allowed, it returned to Romania who was able to prevent the work of destruction, which the Bolsheviks had begun. It was far more advantageous to have a friendly country as neighbor than a country foreign in her ideas and ways of life. Now Bessarabia would possess community of ideas with Romanian national consciousness.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province For all these reasons, Romania believed that the Peace Conference would not question the justification of the union of Bessarabia with Romania.

Annex No. 2 Bratianu and the Council of Five, July 2, 1919 FRUS, PPC, 1919, vol.7, p. 9-14 Mr. Tardieu said he had been asked to open the discussion on Bessarabia by explaining the views of the Committee which had studied the question. He read the Report made by the Committee: “The Committee, after taking into consideration the general aspirations of the population of Bessarabia and the Moldavian character of that region from the geographical and ethnical points of view, as well as the historical and economic arguments, pronounces itself in favor of joining Bessarabia to Romania. “It considers that this measure should be effected in a form which will safeguard the general interests of Bessarabia, more especially as concerns its relations with the neighboring countries, and which will guarantee the rights of minorities in conformity with the provisions of the League of Nations”. Since the Committee had reported, a protest had been received from Mr. Tchaikowsky1 on behalf of the Russian Committees in Paris, protesting against any annexation by Romania, and stating that Russia could not recognize any such act, and further alleging that the Romanian troops had behaved in a very arbitrary manner in the country. Mr. Tchaikowsky ended by demanding a free plebiscite. Mr. Lansing said that the practical question was to know whether a decision regarding Bessarabia could find a place in any of the Treaties of Peace. Mr. Balfour pointed out that he had made the same remark on the previous day. He had thought it was important to do all that was necessary to complete the Treaties first. Mr. Clemenceau, however, had thought the Bessarabian question pressing and had therefore urged that it be taken up. Mr. Lansing, however, had pointed out that no resolution could be adopted on the subject, and this statement had not been met by any dissent. Mr. Lansing observed that the powers accorded to him as plenipotentiary were limited to the negotiation of Peace. They did not enable him to deal with a conflict between two friendly powers. President Wilson, no doubt, might have been able to deal with such a question. He himself was not in that position. Mr. Tardieu said that it had been decided on the previous day to hear a Russian and a Romanian representative. They had been asked to come, and each would doubtless say what he thought should be the frontier line in Bessarabia. Should the two agree, which he admitted was not likely, Mr. Lansing would not be placed in the difficulty to which he alluded. Should they not agree, the Council would then be forced to see what further action could be taken. He would point out, however, that

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it was difficult to make a Treaty with Romania if one of her frontiers were left gaping. He suggested that Mr. Maklakoff should be heard. Mr. Lansing agreed to this, but pointed out, however, that if any resolution were asked for, he could not take any share in it. He had given this warning in order that no false impression should be produced. (At this stage, Mr. Maklakoff entered the room, and was asked by Mr. Tardieu to express his views of Bessarabia.) Mr. Maklakoff said that two memoranda had already been sent to the Peace Conference on the subject of Bessarabia: he would endeavor to give a gist of the arguments. In the first place, he must point out that no portion of the domains of the Russian State could be disposed of by third parties without the consent of that State. Not even the Peace Conference could assume that power. He and his friends had no authority to speak for any constituted Government of Russia. He wished to make this point quite clear at the outset. As to the merits of the question, he would observe that there had never been any agreement between Romania and Russia, authorizing the former to demand Bessarabia. Romania had entered the war on certain terms. Those terms had not touched the question of Bessarabia. Romania could therefore base no claim on the right of conquest. . . . It was the very statement that Bessarabia desired to join Romania that he challenged. Bessarabia was not a Romanian country as a whole. . . . He would point out that the word Bessarabia was often wrongly used. He would not go back to remote antiquity. In the eighteen century, Bessarabia had been part of Moldavia, which was a Turkish province. The Christians in those parts had always been under the moral protection of Russia. In 1812, a few months before the Napoleonic invasion, Bessarabia became a Russian province, captured from Turkey. There were at that time some 300,000 inhabitants. At the present time there were some three millions. . . . Ethnographically, the last census had not established a Moldavian majority in the country. There was no reason to allege that the statistics had been falsified in any manner. Parts of the country were completely Russian. There were, however, four districts in the center that were mainly Moldavian. It was only in these districts that the question of a referendum arose. These districts might be united to Romania should the population really wish it. He would not, in principle, raise any objection. The Romanians, however, declared that Bessarabia had already expressed its will. This he denied. Immediately after the Russian revolution, municipalities elected by universal suffrage had been set up. They were the best organs for the expression of the popular will. They had not asked to be annexed to Romania. These municipalities had since been dissolved by the Romanians, and their representatives had protested against the Romanian desire to annex the country. The vote, however, had since been secured from the Sfatul Tserii, which was an emanation of the Council of Workmen and Soldiers, the latter largely composed of Moldavian deserters. . . . It was a matter for surprise that a revolutionary assembly should have voted in favor of its inclusion in a Monarchy. The whole vote, he submitted, was open to sus-

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Moldova, a Romanian Province picion. It had been given during a military occupation of the country, and it was a minority vote of an arbitrarily self-appointed body. If he believed that the people backed this vote, he might be disposed to acquiesce in it, but he felt quite sure that a free plebiscite would yield a completely different result. . . . Romania had got all she had fought for and all she had asked for before the War. Therefore, he protested with the greatest force against the claim now made by Romania, especially as it was not founded, as alleged, on the desire of the majority of the population. Finally, he would say that if there were districts showing a small Moldavian majority, wishing to join Romania, he would be disposed to let them go. As it was, he constantly received complaints even from Moldavians in Bessarabia, of the treatment they received at the hand of the Romanians. The vote of the Sfatul Tserii was being used quite fallaciously to justify what a reasonable conducted plebiscite would undoubtedly upset. He pointed out that similar votes had been obtained in Lithuania and in Latvia, in favor of annexation by Germany. Any decision annexing Bessarabia to Romania would be source of permanent grievance, and would do harm to Romania, which would not be in a position to absorb an unwilling population. The most he could admit was a plebiscite in the district in which the Moldavian population was predominant. . . . Mr. Tardieu suggested that Mr. Bratianu2 should only be questioned regarding the vote alluded to by Mr. Maklakoff. Mr. Tittoni said that the Council was in full possession of ethnical statistics and that it was unnecessary to hear Mr. Bratianu on that subject. (At the stage Mr. Bratianu, Mr. Misu3, Mr. Diamandy4 and Mr. Pellivan5 entered the room). Mr. Tardieu addressing Mr. Bratianu said that the members of the Council had studied the ethnological question thoroughly. They would like to know what degree of sincerity and authority Mr. Bratianu attributed to the vote obtained in the Sfatul Tserii. Mr. Lansing interposed that it mattered little how the vote had been obtained. It was more important to know how the consultation of the people could be carried out in the future. Mr. Balfour said that he thought the question put by Mr. Tardieu arose from the statement made by Mr. Maklakoff. Mr. Tardieu said that there was a connection between the two. He therefore asked Mr. Bratianu to reply. Mr. Bratianu said that he believed the vote alluded to did express the will of the people and had been given in full freedom. He admitted the assembly was a revolutionary assembly but similar assemblies had expressed the will of the people in Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and elsewhere. The Romanian occupation had found that assembly in power and in control of the country. Its authority had resulted from the various successive developments that had taken place in Russia since the downfall of Czarism. Mr. Lansing suggested a plebiscite. Bessarabia, he would point out, was a Romanian country attached by force to the Russian throne for over 100 years. When

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Russian autocracy felt, Bessarabia had come back to Romania. The Romanians had been called in by the people and even by the only recognized Russian authority at the time, namely, the Ukrainian Government. Difficulties did not arise on the question of nationality. It was the social question that caused all the trouble. The Bolsheviks were dissatisfied with the Romanian Government merely because it established Governmental order. The agrarian reform introduced made the peasant pay for the land obtained by the expropriation of the landowners. The landowners on their side grumbled because they were expropriated. Mr. Lansing said that he wished to put a plain question to Mr. Bratianu. Would he object to a plebiscite? Mr. Bratianu replied that he did. He did so because the choice offered the people would be that between Bolshevism and order. It was dangerous to offer such a choice to a country on the border of disturbed Russia. Should the Romanians withdraw their troops there would be endless tumult in the country. Mr. Lansing asked whether Mr. Bratianu, if given possession of the country, would agree to a plebiscite in two years. Mr. Bratianu said thatwould not as only revolutionary agitation would result from the knowledge that a plebiscite would take place in that period. Mr. Lansing asked whether Mr. Bratianu would object to a plebiscite at any other specified time in the future. Mr. Bratianu said that he would object still more strongly, as it would only prolong the agitation. He further begged to be allowed to state that the possession of Bessarabia by Russia was now an anachronism. It had been for the Russian Empire a march on the road to Constantinople. It could no longer serve that purpose. Russia owed Romania a great debt as being largely responsible for her misfortune. Circumstances pointed very clearly to the best way in which Russia could discharge that debt. It would be by the cession of Bessarabia.

Annex No. 3 The Council of Ten and the Bessarabian Question, August 1, 1919 FRUS, PPC, 1919, VOL. 7, P. 457-459 Mr. Tardieu said he wished to draw attention to a question not on the order of the day, but one demanding an early solution; the problem was that of Bessarabia, on which the Council had taken no decision. Mr. Maklakoff and Mr. Bratianu had expressed Russian and Romanian points of view. After they had been heard, the Council had discussed the matter briefly without coming to a decision. It remained to be known what solution the Council would adopt, for it was difficult to settle the Romanian questions a whole, and to make that country accept clauses in the Peace Treaty on the subject of minorities, if, at same time, its frontiers had not been notified to it.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Mr. Pichon said that the question was particularly important, in that the minorities question would arise in Bessarabia. Mr. Tardieu said that the Committee had been unanimous in their wish to grant Bessarabia to Romania, but the Council had sent a telegram to Admiral Kolchak, which appeared inconsistent with that decision. In the telegram in question the council had only stated that the Romanian rights in Bessarabia should be preserved in favor of that country. Mr. Clemenceau said that it was evidently important to be able to inform Romania what its frontiers exactly were. Mr. Balfour asked whether Mr. Tardieu thought that the Committee would remain of the same opinion if the question were referred back to it for a further report. Mr. Tardieu said that the Committee had been unanimous when it had studied the problem. But they knew that certain Delegations had altered their opinions after the lapse of a few months. The difficult point was the telegram sent to Admiral Kolchak. Mr. Pichon said that he did not think that the Council had been inconsistent, since it had not stated to Admiral Kolchak that Bessarabia, as a whole, would be granted to Romania. Mr. Balfour asked whether M. Pichon thought the telegram to Admiral Kolchak was not binding on the Council. Mr. Pichon said that Admiral Kolchak’s attention had only been drawn to the fact that the Council upheld Romanian rights in Bessarabia. Mr. Tittoni said that he wished to draw the attention of the Council to an important point, which was, that the Committee had justified its proposals by saying that it wished to maintain the administrative and geographical unity of Bessarabia, and that it would give to Romania, in compensation, a strip of territory in the Dobrudja, which belonged properly to the Bulgarians. By such a measure Romania would be compensated for the Northern portion of Bessarabia left to Russia.. Mr. Balfour said he did not think he could admit compensations, which consisted in balancing the cession of groups of human beings, by the cession of others to foreign sovereignties, as a matter of principle. Mr. Tittoni remarked that the question had therefore still to be examined. Mr. Clemenceau said that the problem ought to be solved rapidly, and he proposed to put it on the Agenda for the following day. Mr. Balfour said that he ought to call attention to the fact that Romania was actually protesting strongly against the minority clauses. It would therefore be sufficient to tell that country, that it would not receive the territory now being considered, unless it accepted the minority clauses and signed the Treaty. In addition to this, Romanian Statesmen did not really deny that the Southern part of Dobrudja should be granted to Bulgaria. Had Romania been our enemy during the war she would have been obliged to cede the territory. By the fact that she had been our Ally,

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she could only be persuaded to accept our solution. Was it therefore possible to say to that country, that it was going to receive a great extension of territory, but only under the condition that it would be willing to consent to the cession of the Dobrudja, which had been seized in 1913, and which, if left in her hands, would be a ceaseless cause of friction. The Romanians were difficult people to deal with, and Mr. Bratianu was no exception. Mr. Tittoni said that he had heard that a new ministry had been set up in Romania, and that the President of the High Court had been instructed to form it. Mr. Balfour said that he had also heart that, but the Cabinet had not been formed, and the Bessarabian question was so important that he hoped that each one of his colleagues would give it his consideration. Mr. Polk said the policy of the United States had been to oppose the division of Russia. Admiral Kolchak in his reply had protested against his country being divided. He thought that dividing Russia would have a bad effect in that country, and was therefore of the opinion that it would be better not to settle the question straight away, but to await the return of ordered government in Russia. Mr. Tittoni remarked that Russia’s point of view had been presented to the Council. Mr. Polk said that the Romanians opposed any idea of a plebiscite in Bessarabia. Mr. Tittoni said that that was so, because the result of a plebiscite would be the establishment of Bolshevism. Mr. Balfour said he did not desire to settle the question on that day, but that he would be willing that it should be taken up again in a few days’ time, if it were possible to settle it then. He did not, however, believe that it would be. In his opinion, he thought it better not to consider Russia, and to regard our hands as free. He was willing to wait for the formation of the new Romanian Cabinet in the hope that it would be possible to negotiate with it and to settle outstanding problems. Mr. Tardieu said that it would undoubtedly be better to wait for the formation of the new Government, but even if it were favorable to our point of view, we should have to inform it of our opinions on the Bukovina, Bessarabian and Dobrudja problems. It was not possible to do this at present. Mr. Balfour said that if the new Romanian Government proved satisfactory, it would send a representative to the Conference with whom the Council could negotiate. It would then be possible to tell this new representative that the Council was favorably disposed towards territorial concessions advantageous to Romania, on the condition that the Romanians themselves should give evidence of goodwill in the discussion of problems not yet solved. Mr. Clemenceau said that it should be remembered that the Bulgarian Delegation was now actually waiting for the Conditions of Peace at Neuilly. Mr. Balfour said that the Peace Treaty with the Bulgarians could be discussed and settled whilst the present question remained open. (It was decided to postpone the discussion on Bukovina, Bessarabia and the

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Dobrudja until the formation of the new Romanian Government. It was further decided that the above questions should be put on the Agenda as soon as the new Government had been formed.)

Annex No. 4 The Romanian Action in Bessarabia at the Council of Heads of Delegations, October 11, 1919 FRUS, PPC, 1919, Vol. 8, p 578-579 Mr. Berthelot said the question had been placed on the agenda by the American delegation. Mr. Polk said that Mr. Misu had informed him on the previous day that the Romanian Government was about to hold elections in Bessarabia. Sir Eyre Crowe said that the Bessarabian question had not yet been settled. He thought that the note of the Bessarabian delegates could be examined at the time that the question of Bessarabia was discussed. Mr. Polk pointed out that the question was somewhat important in view of the fact that according to the information that he had received, the Romanians were holding elections, applying conscription and confiscating large properties. Mr. Laroche said that the Bessarabian question was somewhat peculiar. It was at the request of the Russian General Scerbacev that the Romanians had been asked, at the beginning of the Russian debacle, to occupy the country. In order to stop the development of Bolshevism, it had appeared to be the simplest method to favor the autonomist element in Bessarabia. Soon afterwards Bessarabia had declared herself independent. Later the National Assembly pronounced itself in favor of a union with Romania. The Council were now faced with the wish expressed by the population. The Conference had not yet decided the Bessarabian question, but it should take account of all that had occurred, for there was no doubt that “the journey which Mr. de Martonne recently made in Bessarabia had brought new proofs” to show that the country was really a Romanian land. As far as the agrarian question was concerned, the matter was most important. The distribution of landed property was particularly unequal in Bessarabia, and the majority of the population was in favor of the necessary reform. The persons who protested were Russified landowners, whose interests were menaced. Mr. Polk said that he did not intend to ask the Council to take a decision. He had simply wished to bring to the attention of the Council the fact that the Romanians were exercising rights of sovereignty in Bessarabia, and that the silence of the Conference in regard to this matter might give the Romanians grounds for believing that the Council consented to their having assumed this sovereignty. In a conversation which he had had with Mr. Misu on the preceding day, he had pointed out the possible danger to Romania, if Romania tried to make a fait accompli. He had asked him what would hap-

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pen when Russia was reconstituted and when she claimed Bessarabia. Romania would have to rely upon a position of fact. In order to retain Bessarabia, Romania depended upon the good will of the League of Nations and of the Conference. Romania should be discouraged from making any attempt, apart from the decision of the Conference, to annex Bessarabia definitely. He thought that Mr. Misu would, in all probability, transmit a communication to the Conference on this subject.

Annex No. 5 Al. Vaida-Voevod and the International Council of Premiers January 20, 1920 FRUS, PPC, 1919, Vol. 9, 915-917 ... If it is the desire of the Council, the incident shall be considered closed, and the Romanian President of the Council shall speak to us on the subject of Bessarabia. I will now ask him to speak, but he must not forget that the Conference has already come to a decision on that subject. Mr. Vaida-Voevod: The Conference has in theory come to decision on this subject, which I have not forgotten; it has recognized Romania’s right to annex Bessarabia, but, without desiring to weary you a long statement, I should like to ask the Conference to ensure the realization of that decision. Mr. Clemenceau: Yes, but you must understand that your position is a false one: you do not carry out certain decisions of the Conference while you ask it to carry out others. I know you are not personally responsible for this. I have explained to you the state of mind of the Conference. Mr. Vaida-Voevod: After the ratification of the Treaty of Peace, the frontiers of Romania on the Bessarabian side will be finally determined. The population of Bessarabia has decided to join Romania, a decision which was proclaimed for the third time by the deputies appointed at the last elections, without distinction of speech, race or nationality; on December 29, 1919, they all voted for union with the mother country. The Conference has virtually recognized this state of affairs, but it has not actually proclaimed it, and our position is difficult in consequence since we are neighbors of the Bolsheviks and have to live, not to philosophize. Bolshevist ideas were spread among us, especially recently, by Russians who fled from Odessa when the Bolsheviks again approached that town. We offered them generous hospitality, but we could not distinguish among the refugees those who were Bolsheviks and those who were not. The Conference has not yet fully granted us Bessarabia and, if the Russians advance still more, the population will be in a state of great uncertainty. Some people among them are in favor of the Bolsheviks because they hope to render impossible the execution of the agrarian reform begun by us. Moreover, there are Romanian priests who were brought up at Kiev and who long for the old regime

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Moldova, a Romanian Province which gave them a position privileged in comparison with that which they now have: they are pro-Russian agents. Such a state of affairs cannot come to an end until you recognize that Bessarabia must be joined to Romania; until then it will be impossible to restore order in that part of our territory. Mr. Clemenceau: Will you kindly summarize what you ask of us? Mr.Vaida-Voevod: We have summarized our requests in a note that I have ventured to transmit to the Conference. We want the Conference to recognize the union of Bessarabia with Romania de jure. Mr. Clemenceau: Have we not already done so? Mr. Vaida-Voevod: Yes, but that was at the time when it was still hoped that Kolchak would defeat the Bolsheviks. That was some time ago, but if now the Conference would proclaim the union of Bessarabia with Romania, the result would be a legal position on which we could base the restoration of order. Mr. Clemenceau: It is not the defeat of Kolchak which prevents us from giving you satisfaction, but it is your disobedience of the unanimous wishes of the Conference. First of all we want the evacuation of those territories which are not given to you by the Treaty of Peace and you talk of postponing the evacuation of Hungary once more for a month or six weeks. That is what troubles us, although we are in agreement in principle. Mr. Vaida-Voevod: We will carry out that evacuation in the shortest possible time. Mr. Clemenceau: You say so, but we have been awaiting your evacuation for months: I am explaining to you the difficulty by which we are confronted. Mr. Vaida-Voevod: The two questions should not be connected, since the Magyars attacked us. Mr. Clemenceau: But you disobeyed the Conference from the very beginning. I know that is not in the least your fault and I should like to satisfy you. Only a short time ago we agreed not to give you Bessarabia because you constantly disobeyed the Conference. Now your opinions are different, but we cannot reply unconditionally to your request; we are obliged to defer our reply because you yourselves deferred evacuation. Mr. Vaida-Voevod: Sir, I undertake to wire this very day ordering evacuation as soon as possible. Mr. Clemenceau: Please believe that I am not hostile to you – quite the contrary. Mr. Lloyd George: We cannot grant you what you ask if, when we take a decision in your favor, you accept it, but when we take a decision which is not beneficial to Romania, Romania resists. Mr. Vaida-Voevod: The engagement which we have taken to carry out the decision of the Conference shall, I assure you, be fulfilled. The present Romanian Government cannot be punished for the faults of the former regimes. Mr. Clemenceau: We want to help, not to punish you. Mr. Vaida-Voevod: I will give the order for the evacuation in conditions which are considered practicable by the Conference, but I cannot give a promise which I

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might be unable to keep. Mr. Clemenceau: The Conference is in sympathy with your cause, but it has been hindered by your predecessor for two years. Mr. Lloyd George: We are convinced of your intention to evacuate Hungary, but we think you may be faced by certain difficulties from the military party and we think the military party would be more willing to obey the order of the Conference to evacuate Hungary immediately if you said to them: “The Conference is waiting our evacuation of Hungary before deciding that Bessarabia shall be definitely Romanian.” Mr. Vaida-Voevod: I thank you with all my heart. From that I conclude that the Conference will acknowledge our claim to Bessarabia from the day evacuation is affected. I may say that? Mr. Clemenceau: Yes. Mr. Lloyd George: We cannot now say that we undertake to recognize your right: we can only say that we are going to discuss it as soon as you have evacuated Hungary. Mr. Vaida-Voevod: That does not give me the moral support which I require. Mr. Clemenceau: I would willingly go further than Mr. Lloyd George: in my name, and I think I can say in the name of France, I can state that we are prepared to recognize Romania’s right to Bessarabia. (Mr. Millerand made a sign of assent). Mr. Lloyd George: As Mr. Berthelot pointed out, the Commission on Romanian Affairs, on which all the Powers are represented, has unanimously decided to attribute Bessarabia to Romania. That is the actual position. Mr. Clemenceau: We are all sincere in this matter. Mr. Vaida-Voevod: Gentlemen, I thank you for the great concession you have granted me; I will do my best to ensure the evacuation of Hungarian territories as soon as possible and also the settlement of the question of Bessarabia. (Mr. Vaida-Voevod and Mr. Cantacuzens withdrew.) The Council took note of the statement of Mr. Vaida-Voevod; it acknowledged that, although it had as yet come to no decision as to the attribution of Bessarabia and could not do so until Romania had carried out the orders of the Conference in Hungary, the Commission on Romanian Affairs was unanimously of opinion that this territory should be attributed to Romania.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Annex No. 6 The Declaration Adopted by the Representatives of The Principal Allied Powers on March 3, 1920 FRUS, 1920, Vol. 3, p. 430-431 The Principal Allied Powers have hitherto found themselves unable to make any definite decision on the Bessarabian question both because they considered it a part of the general Romanian question on which difficulties with the former Romanian Government had impeded a settlement and because they had hoped that it would be found possible to bring about a friendly arrangement between Romanian and Russia. There appears to the Principal Allied Powers no reason any further to delay a settlement. The Romanian Government have shown proof of their desire to settle in the interest of Romania and Europe generally the outstanding questions at issue and have submitted to the ruling of the Supreme Council on the question of the withdrawal of their troops from Hungary, relying on the assurance of the Principal Allied Powers. The Allied Governments moreover feel that in the best interest both of the Romania and neighboring countries the Bessarabian questions should no longer be left undecided. After taking into full consideration the general aspiration of the population of Bessarabia and the Moldavian character of that region from the geographical and ethnographical points of view, as well as the historic and economic arguments, the Principal Allied Powers pronounce themselves therefore, in favor of the reunion of Bessarabia with Romania which has now been formally declared by the Bessarabian representatives and are desirous to conclude a treaty in recognition of this as soon as the conditions stated have been carried out. They consider that in this reunion the general and particular interest of Bessarabia should be safeguarded, more especially as regards its relations with the neighboring countries and that the rights of minorities in it should be guaranteed on the same terms as those residing in other parts of the Romanian Kingdom. The Principal Allied Powers reserve the right to refer any future difficulties that might arise from either of these two questions to the arbitration of the League of Nations. The President of the London Conference (Lloyd George) To the Romanian Prime Minister (Vaida-Voevod) London, March 3, 1920 Your Excellency: I have the honor to inform you, on behalf of the Peace Conference, that the Supreme Council have today considered the demands addressed to them by Your Excellency touching the recognition by the Conference of the reunion of Bessarabia with Romania. I take this opportunity of reminding Your Excellency that the decision of this question by the Peace Conference was adjourned till the Romanian government had carried out the evacuation of Hungary. The Supreme

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Council have, however, taken note of the pledge given them by Your Excellency on the February 26 that the evacuation of the Romanian troops should not be delayed beyond the dates fixed by the Inter-Allied Mission to be dispatched on the spot. The Council, therefore, in consideration of this, have agreed on the annexed formula [the Draft Treaty concerning Bessarabia] in recognition of the reunion of Bessarabia with Romania. This recognition cannot, however, be embodied into the legal form of the treaty till such time as Romanian troops have completely evacuated Hungary. In this connection I have to refer to the question raised by the Romanian Government of making peace with the Soviet Government of Russia. The Supreme Council would refer in reply to the statement contained in their communiqué of the February 24. From this will observe that the Supreme Council are agreed that they cannot accept the responsibility of advising Romania to continue a war which may be injurious to their interests. Still less could they advise Romania to adopt a policy of aggression towards Russia. Should, however, Soviet Russia attack Romania within its legitimate frontiers the Allies will give her every possible support. The Conference consider that the present recognition by themselves of the reunion of Bessarabia with Romania should remove the chief obstacle to any such negotiations between the Government of Russia and Romania as the Government of Romania may consider advisable.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Notes

1

Carole Fink, “1922-1923 From Illusion to Disillusion” in A Missed Opportunity … , p. 28. B. Jelavich, The Establishment … , p. 299. 3 K. Hitchins, Romania, 1866-1947, p. 150-154. 4 For a bibliography of the main papers dealing with Romania’s policy during the war, see Dumitru Preda, Romania si Antanta, p. 97-99. 5 HWV Temperley & Co, “History of the Paris Peace Conference”, Vol. 4, p. 214 6 P Seicaru, “Romania in marele razboi”, p. 62-64 7 Bratianu argued that Romania had been relieved of her treaty obligation to come to the aid of Austria-Hungary by the latter’s failure to consult the Romanian government before delivering its ultimatum to Serbia and by the character of the ultimatum itself, which had been formulated in such a way as to force a war upon Serbia. K. Hitchins, Romania, 1866-1947, p. 252-253. 8 A. Boldur, Istoria Basarabiei, p.512. Also, Georges Castellan, A History of the Romanians, p. 153. Still, there was one exception: on September 7, 1914, Ottokar Czernin was ready to also offer Bukovina to Romania and Transylvania’s autonomy in return for Romania’s neutrality and possible future alliance. Both the Romanian and Hungarian leaders rejected his proposal. Gheorghe Iancu, The Ruling Council, p. 11. 9 It is argued, at least by the British scholars, that in Romania the British let the Russians to do the bidding, British and French efforts being limited to the offers of financial assistance made in September 1914. Therefore, they blame Sazonov’s eagerness to obtain a signed assurance of Romanian neutrality for minimizing the chances of enlisting her into the war. L.H. Curtright, Muddle, Indecision … , p. 39-41. 10 While the Romanian sources consider the date of the agreement as being on October 1, some other scholars use the date of October 2 (C.J. Lowe, M.L. Dockrill, British Foreign Policy, p. 186) or September 29 (L.H. Curtright, Muddle, Indecision … , p. 40). 11 C.J. Lowe, M.L. Dockrill, British Foreign Policy, p. 190. 12 Nicolae Basilescu, La Roumaine dans la Guerre et dans la Paix, p. 101. 13 George Cipaianu, “Dillemes, options et risques dans le relations internationals de la Romanie pendant la Premiere Guerre mondiale” in La fin de la Premiere Guerre Mondiale … , p. 16-17. 14 At one point in 1915 the Russians and French even agreed to support the Serbian claims in the Banat if Romania remained neutral throughout the war. Ivo J. Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference, p. 18. 15 Telegram A.P. Bennett to T. Russell, November 6, 1915, FO 800/71, quoted in C.J. Lowe, M.L. Dockrill, British Foreign Policy, p. 518-520. 16 C.J. Lowe, M.L. Dockrill, British Foreign Policy, p. 202. 17 For a detailed account of the negotiations between Bratianu and the Entente, presenting the Romanian view, see D. Preda, Romania si Antanta, p. 12-96. 18 At the beginning of July 1916 the Entente representatives declared to Bratianu that, in order for the Romanian offensive to be of value for them it should start immediately. If Romania fails to intervene, it is risking the withdrawal of all the advantages promised her by the Entente. Comte de Saint Aulaire, Confession d’un vieux diplomate, p. 334. 19 What Bratianu failed to find out was that, on August 11, 1916, Sturmer (for Russia) and Briand (for France) agreed privately that the gains promised to Romania would be conceded, “only to the extent allowed by the general situation at the end of the war”. In particular, the Russian representative reserved the right for his country to raise the question of the Serbs in the Banat should future circumstances require it. R.H. Johnston, Tradition versus Revolution, Russia and the Balkans in 1917, p. 71. 20 For details regarding the political, military and diplomatic implications for Romania of the pro2

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CHAPTER 3. THE MAKING OF THE BESSARABIAN TREATY jected Salonique offensive see David Dutton, The Politics of Diplomacy … , p. 100-107. 21 S.D. Spector, Romania la Conferinta de Pace … , p. 31-32. 22 Interesting details regarding the situation of Romania during the first months of fighting are presented in Charles Vopicka, Secrets of the Balkans, p. 89-97. Also Comte de Saint Aulaire, Confession d’un … , p. 338-346. 23 G.E. Torrey, “The First World War and the Union of 1918” in Romania. A Historic Perspective, p. 284. 24 Keith Hitchins has a different opinion regarding the causes of the Romanian disaster, considering that the Russian and Allied failure to keep the promises made to Romania were not the main cause of the defeat, as it is considered by the majority of Romanian scholars and participants. “The main causes of the defeat of the Romanian army were the industrial underdevelopment of the country and the lack of adequate equipment for the army. In addition, the Romanian general staff had not prepared a sufficiently comprehensive and detailed plan of operations, which was essential for the coordination of forces dispersed over such a far-flung battlefront. As events showed, the improvised shifting of units from one front to another weakened the offensive and defensive capabilities of the army as a whole.” K. Hitchins, Romania, 1866-1947, p. 262-265. 25 Ivo J. Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference, p. 22. Also “the Romanian action coincided with beginning of Brusilov’s retreat and proved to be more of a liability than Alekseev had originally feared” in C.J. Lowe, M.L. Dockrill, British … , p. 204-205. On the other hand, it is argued that “the six weeks it took to negotiate the details of the Treaty does not appear unreasonable, given that it involved both a political and military convention.” G.E. Torrey, “The First World War …” in Romania … , p. 284. 26 General Vasile Rudeanu, at that time a colonel, was representing the Roumanian Army in Paris. Quoted in D. Preda, Romania si Antanta, p. 152. 27 Saint Aulaire was so unpleased with the attitude of the Russians that he believed that there was a secret understanding between Russia and the Central Powers with the aim of dividing Romania between Russia and Austro-Hungary. Comte de Saint Aulaire, Confession d’un … , p. 349-353. General Berthelot too was very disappointed (read displeased) with the fighting tactics of the Russian Army and shared Saint Aulaire’s fears. Thierry Sarmat, “La desintegration de l’armee russe sur le front roumaine d’apres les rapports du general Berthelot, 1917-1918” in La fin de la Premiere Guerre mondiale … , p. 231-249. 28 For details see G.E. Torrey, General Henri Berthelot and Romania, p. 105-165. The title of the subchapter dealing with the September 1917 – March 1918 period is significant: “The Russian Betrayal”. 29 G.E. Torrey, The Diplomatic Career of Charles J. Vopicka in Romania, 1913-1920, in Romania between East and West, p. 327. For more details see C. Vopicka, Secrets of the Balkans, p. 137-139, 144-145. 30 Richard Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, vol. 1, p. 40. 31 In fact, General Berthelot was very unpleased by this campaign, attributed by him to Romanian General Alexandru Averescu, whom he accused of coward ness and mismanagement in leading the Romanian Army. Berthelot tried all he could to counter-balance this propaganda but with no success in the end. G.E. Torrey, General Henri Berthelot … , p. 116. 32 DDI, Serie 5, Vol. 9, Telegram Sonnino to Bonin, Fasciotti and Catalani, December 11, 1917, p. 467. 33 As soon as November 1917 Clemenceau adopted a very decided position towards the Romanian plans of signing a separate peace, arguing that there is no way for the Romanian Army, reorganized with so many sacrifices, to be dismantled, even if the events in Russia worked in Romania’s disadvantage. G.E. Torrey, General Henri Berthelot … , p. 121-122. 34 C. Vopicka, Secrets of the Balkans, p. 150-151. 35 For a good selection of French press regarding the pressure on Romania to keep fighting, around February 10-11, see Gogu Negulesco, Romania’s Sacrifice, p. 129-136. 36 According to the view of general Barter, the British military representative in Jassy, it would have been impossible to continue fighting on the Romanian front, due mainly to the great difficulty of sending supplies to the area in conditions of incertitude regarding Ukraine’s position. In fact, the

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Moldova, a Romanian Province British War Cabinet agreed on December 10 that the situation of the Romanian Army was so helpless that Romania should be allowed to make a separate peace. Michael Kettle, The Allies and the Russian Collapse: March 1917-March 1918, p. 169, 183. 37 Berthelot insisted repeatedly that Mackensen, the commander of the Central Powers armies on the Romanian front, was simply bluffing, but his opinion had little echo with the Romanians. G.E. Torrey, General Henri Berthelot … , p. 139-141, 151-154 As time passed, Berthelot’s position regarding the Romanian separate peace became more and more radical, blaming the Romanian leadership (excepting the King) and mainly Averescu for their weakness in dealing with the enemy. 38 The January 7 meeting of the British War Cabinet decided that all the measures necessary for keeping Romania into war should be taken together with France and that Romania should be informed of the British position. If during the next month the British would support Clemenceau’s policy, as soon as February 11 it was clear for them that Romania was doomed. Michael Kettle, The Allies and … , p. 183, 225, 229. 39 DDI, Serie 5, Vol. 10, Telegram Fasciotti to Sonnino, January 16, 1918, p. 62. 40 FRUS, 1918, Supplement I, Telegram Vopicka to the Secretary of State, February 9, 1918, p. 757. 41 V. Mamatey, The United States … , p. 206. 42 For the text of the Treaty see FRUS, 1918, Supplement I, p. 771-777. 43 The effects for Romania coming from the loss of Dobrudja, including no direct access to the sea, are best presented in Gogu Negulesco, Romania’s Sacrifice, p. 141-145. 44 Pamfil Seicaru, one of Romania’s best known journalists argues that, in fact, the Romanians, convinced that the Central Powers will finally loose the war and that they will have to justify the separate peace, intentionally accepted the harshest conditions in order to point to Romania’s desperate situation at the time. P. Seicaru, Romania in marele razboi, p. 333. Somehow arguing in favor of his opinion is General Berthelot, who points that Romania could have obtained much better conditions if it would have been willing to do so (by making use of her Army). G.E. Torrey, General Henri Berthelot … , p. 160-165. 45 The matter of the ratification is a disputed one. A number of historians (like H.W.V. Temperley) argue that, in fact, the Treaty was not ratified by the Parliament. Others (like Keith Hitchins) correctly argue that the Romanian Parliament ratified the treaty. However, due to the King’s attitude, the Bucharest Treaty failed to come into power. 46 G. Iancu, The Ruling Council, p. 14. 47 The best such book, although a bit “old”, is Sherman David Spector, Romania at the Paris Peace Conference. A Study of the Diplomacy of Ioan IC Bratianu, New York: Bookman, 1962. 48 Comte de Saint Aulaire, Confession d’un … , p. 484. 49 A number of papers on Romania during 1918-1920, especially those written by Romanians and the Frenchmen were blaming the Russian passivity during the Bulgarian offensive in Dobrudja as the main cause of Romania’s defeat, considering it as the Russian betrayal. 50 Boris Ranghet, Relatii romano-americane … , p. 181. 51 Eugene Boia, Romania’s Diplomatic … , p. 29-30. For details on the controversy between Take Ionescu and Ion I.C. Bratianu and especially for the viewpoint of those defending Bratianu’s actions see best Ghe. I. Bratianu, Actiunea politica si militara a Romaniei in lumina corespondentei diplomatice a lui Ion I.C. Bratianu, passim. 52 D. Preda, In apararea Romaniei Mari … , p. 120-122. 53 A. Iordache, “Ion I.C. Bratianu la ...” in Revista istorica, 1993, No 9, p. 3. 54 The only territories the Romanians were entitled to, according to the 1916 Treaty, and were not recognized to them were the Western Banat and a strip of territory about 60 km west of the actual Hungarian-Romanian border. But in exchange Romania got the entire Bukovina, although it was supposed to receive only two thirds of it, and Bessarabia. 55 E. Boia, Romania’s Diplomatic Relations with Yugoslavia, p. 23. 56 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 2, Telegram Vopicka to the Secretary of State, January 10 1919, p. 405.

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CHAPTER 3. THE MAKING OF THE BESSARABIAN TREATY 57

For a concise presentation of the Romanian-Yugoslav controversy over the Banat ,see Ivo J. Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference, p. 97-100, 142-144, 172-182, 234-236. 58 Winston S. Churchill, “The World Crisis; the Territorial Settlements of 1919-1920” in The Versailles Settlement: Was it Foredoomed to Failure?, p. 83. 59 A casual and interesting description of the atmosphere in the Commission and of its activity is presented by one of its members, a number of years later. Charles Seymour, Letters from the Paris Peace Conference, passim. 60 Ivo Lederer has a different theory “During its existence, the committee split into two factions, with the French, British, and Americans constituting one and Italians the other. The Americans, however, did not really act as part of a given bloc but pursued an independent line.” Ivo J. Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference, p. 179. 61 For details regarding the Romanian military operations against Hungary see D. Preda, In apararea Romaniei Mari … , passim. 62 See the Draft Treaty in FRUS, PPC, Vol. 7, p. 579-585. 63 S.D. Spector, Romania la … , p.180. 64 Bratianu’s decision to leave Paris remains controversial. On one hand, it is considered that he did so in order to place more pressure on the Great Powers and to influence their decisions regarding Romania. On the other hand, it might also be argued that, by doing so, he simply abandoned the fight for Romania’s interests. 65 As for the Romanian requisitions there are mainly two different stories, first one belonging to the Inter-Allied Military Commission acting in Budapest and representing the interests of the four Great Powers, which describes the requisitions in a very negative color. The second one belongs to the Romanian representatives and, whilst admitting that there had been requisitions argues that, in fact, the Romanian Army did nothing else than to recover what was taken from Romania during the 19171918 occupation and which things (especially the railway material, like wagons and engines) belonged clearly to Romania and had to be taken back. It also points that the stories presented by the Commission are exaggerated and that, in fact, the Romanian Army used its provisions in order the feet the Hungarian population in Budapest and other cities. 66 FRUS, 1918, Supplement I, The Cobb-Lippman Memorandum, p. 409-411. 67 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 3, p. 843. 68 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 3, p. 849. For the entire debate see Annex no. 1. 69 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 3, p. 855. 70 S.D. Spector, Romania la … , p. 105. 71 A good description of the meeting, including a confirmation of the understanding between the British and US representatives is presented in Charles Seymour, Letters from the Paris Peace Conference, p. 157-159. Very interesting is his remark referring to the viability of the 1916 Romanian Treaty: “the only trouble was that I had to represent our side of the case and it was a side of which I personally disapproved, but had been over persuaded by Day, Johnson, and Lord”. 72 H.W.V. Temperley et. al., The History of the Paris Peace Conference, Vol. 4, p. 227. 73 B. Ranghet, Relatii romano-americane … , p. 184-185. 74 V.F. Dobrinescu, Batalia diplomatica … , p. 79-80. 75 V.F. Dobrinescu, Ion Patroiu, “American Opinion on Bessarabia at the Paris Peace Conference”, in “…” p. 7. 76 V.F. Dobrinescu, Ion Patroiu, “American Opinion …” in Revista de Istorie a Moldovei, 1991, p. 8. 77 H.W.V. Temperley, The History of the Paris Peace Conference, Vol. 4, p. 228-229. 78 C. Seymour, Letters from the Paris Peace Conference, p. 192. 79 For the Draft Articles see V.F. Dobrinescu, I. Patroiu, “American Opinion …” in … , p. 17-18 80 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 4, p. 672. 81 V.F. Dobrinescu, Batalia diplomatica … , p. 80. 82 Quoted in Louis Fischer, Russia’s Road from Peace to War, p. 38-39.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province 83

The immediate threat of revolutionary Bolshevism was on the French and British agenda even before the war ended. In the spring of 1918 the Red Army existed only on paper or in the imagination of L.D. Trotsky. The following autumn, it was becoming a formidable force, one that could spread revolution into Europe. In these conditions, stopping the expansion of bolshevism became the principal concern of the French government. M.J. Carley, Revolution and Intervention … , p. 110. 84 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 4, p. 719. 85 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 6, p. 72. It might be interesting to find out what exactly was meant by using the formulation “the Romanian part of Bessarabia” instead of simply using Bessarabia. 86 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 7, p. 5. 87 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 7, p. 9. 88 For the entire debate, see FRUS, PPC, Vol. 11, p. 340-341. 89 The participants were Leland Harrison, Dr. James Brown Scott, Col. U.S. Grant, Douglas Johnson, John Dulles, and Alan Foster Dulles. V.F. Dobrinescu, Batalia diplomatica … , p. 81. 90 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 11, p. 470. 91 For the entire debate see FRUS, PPC, Vol. 7, p. 457-459. 92 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 11, p. 382-383. 93 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 11, p. 406-407. 94 DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 1, p. 634-635. 95 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 8, p. 136. 96 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 11, p. 445. 97 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 8, p. 542. 98 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 8, p. 579. See the Annex for the entire debate. 99 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 8, p. 838. 100 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 9, p. 101. 101 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 9, p. 145-146. 102 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 9, p. 917. 103 V.F. Dobrinescu, Batalia diplomatica … , p. 83. 104 FRUS, 1920, Vol. 3, p. 430-431. 105 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 394, Telegram Lord Derby to Lord Curzon, April 15, 1920, c. 368. 106 In this sense, it is important to note that Lord Derby, the British Ambassador to Paris, considered (in the previously quoted telegram) that, even as the US delegation failed to respect their promise of sending a representative to the Commission’s meeting, the US would sign the Treaty. 107 FRUS, 1920, Vol. 3, Telegram Wallace to the Secretary of State, April 15, p. 427. 108 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 394, Note by Lord Curzon, April 26, 1920, c. 386. 109 FRUS, 1920, Vol. 3, Telegram Secretary of State (Colby) to Wallace, June 12, 1920, p. 432. 110 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 20, Telegram Take Ionescu to Ghika, June 28, 1920. For more on this problem see the chapter on the UK and the Bessarabian Treaty. 111 According to Ghika, the compensations to be paid to the French landowners were in amount of around 20,000 crowns. RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Ghika to Averescu, June 19, 1920. 112 DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 12, Telegram Lord Derby to Lord Curzon, October 14, 1920, p. 491. 113 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Ghika to Averescu, July 19, 1920. 114 T. Sandu, “La France et la Bessarabie roumaine de 1918 a 1920 …” in The Establishment of … , p. 381. 115 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Titulescu to Take Ionescu, August 5, 1920. 116 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, British Memorandum to Secretary General, September 14, 1920, c. 703. 117 DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 12, Telegram Lord Derby to Lord Curzon, September 29, 1920, p. 477. 118 FRUS, 1920, Vol. 3, Telegram Wallace to the Secretary of State, September 29, 1920, p. 432. 119 FRUS, 1920, Vol. 3, Telegram Colby to Wallace, October 5, 1920, p. 433. 120 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Ghika to Averescu, September 25, 1920. 121 DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 12, Telegram Lord Derby to Lord Curzon, October 2, 1920, p. 479. 122 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Note from the Italian Legation to the RFM, October 5, 1920.

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FRUS, 1920, Vol. 3, Telegram Wallace to Secretary of State, October 11, 1920, p. 434. RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, Telegram Lord Derby to Lord Curzon, October 8, 1920, c. 107. 125 V.F. Dobrinescu, Batalia diplomatica … , p. 88. For the details see the chapter on the UK. 126 DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 12, Telegram Lord Derby to Lord Curzon, October 27, 1920, p. 499. 124

Annex Notes 1

N. V. Tchaikowsky, President of the Russian Provisional Government of the Northern Region (Archangel) and a member of the Russian political Conference at Paris 2 Jean J. C. Bratiano, President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affair of Romania; plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference 3 Nicolae Misu, Romanian Minister at London, plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference 4 Constantin Diamandy, Romanian Minister at Petrograd; plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference 5 Jean Pellivan, Director of Justice in Bessarabia

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PART TWO - THE GREAT POWERS AND THE BESSARABIAN QUESTION CHAPTER 4. THE SOVIET UNION

The Bessarabian Question and Soviet-Romanian Relations Over the last two centuries, Romanian-Russian relations have gone through every possible permutation: good, bad, worst, excellent, and almost normal. What is clear is that only when Russian interests conflict with those of a stronger coalition of powers are manifestations of Romanian nationalism allowed to appear. This statement is equally true for the events of 1856, 1918, 1941, 1964, the mid-1980s and 1990. Romanian historiography, especially after the Second World War, gave a special status to the two countries’ relationship. Although during the first years after the war Romanian historiography was under Moscow’s control, and the accent was placed on moments that illustrated good relations between the two States, starting in the 1960s the situation changed and the much publicized “historical friendship” between the two nations disappeared. Of course, the reason behind this disappearance had to do with the emancipation of the Romanian communist regime from Soviet dominance. Since 1989, an increased number of papers dealing with bilateral relations have been published in Romania, including a very important, very solid volume of documents regarding Romanian-Soviet relations. The present work will only present the most important moments in Russo-Romanian relations and will attempt to deal with a subject which has received almost no attention, that is, the connection between the White Russians and the Bessarabian question. It should be mentioned that there has been a unity in the views expressed by different Romanian historians regarding bilateral relations, a unity which originated from the fact that they all relied on the extant Romanian documents (official documents and the memoirs of Romanian diplomats) as their main source of information.1 A look into the Russian documents might confirm many of the viewpoints expressed in Romanian historiography, but might also remodel some of them. For example, one of the points most strongly emphasized in Romanian historiography regarding is the “deal” proposed by Lev Karakhan during the Warsaw Conference: the Romanian

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Moldova, a Romanian Province National Treasury in exchange for recognition of Bessarabia’s union with Romania. Although on the basis of reports made by Filality (the Romanian representative at the Conference) most Romanian scholars take this deal for granted, one could not but express some doubt — not necessarily as to the existence of such a proposal, but as to Russia’s readiness to actually back it (it could have been just a trial balloon to test the Romanians’ reaction, the Russians having no intention of pursuing it). Understanding this, a number of Romanian historians have undertaken the difficult task of sorting through the relevant documents in the Russian (former Soviet) Archives.2 But, for various reasons (such as the secrecy still maintained by the Russians with regard to their documents,3 the large number of documents to be reviewed, the scarcity of financial resources) they have been only partially successful in their attempt. The relations between the two countries during the interwar period could be characterized most simply by words like mistrust, fear, and suspicion on the Romanian side and enmity and aggressiveness (to varying extents), on the Soviet side. Neither one trusted the other and each tried to lay the blame for the situation at the other’s door. There are two explanations for this: the Bessarabian question, and the fact that the Romanian ruling class deeply feared and hated communism.4 From the Soviet viewpoint, “Our relations with Romania are in a class by themselves. They are connected with the question of Bessarabia”.5 At every occasion, they contested (directly or indirectly) the Union of Bessarabia. While Moscow recognized the independence of the newly proclaimed republics and even accepted the inclusion into Poland of some Russian territories, the case of Bessarabia was different. “[The] Soviet doctrine of self-determination simply did not apply to this clearly non-Russian and non-Slavic land. . . . Moreover, Soviet behavior toward Romania during the interwar period was characterized by a strange arrogance that was not, on the surface at least, directed toward other governments then administering ‘lost provinces’ of the Russian Empire.”6 On the other hand, the Romanians wanted the impossible: Russia’s blessing for the Union. That was impossible because of two reasons. First, Romania was in no position to deal on an equal footing with her giant neighbor. Second, the Russians never would have accepted losing to a small State a territory that had belonged to them for more than a century. That would have gone against all their history, traditions and, of course, pride — and the best proof in this sense is the Russian attitude after the imposed cession of southern Bessarabia to Romania in 1856; the tension reached a peak during the 1877-1878 War with the Ottoman Empire, with the Czar mentioning repeatedly that the retrocession of that area was, more than anything else, a question of Russia’s pride.7 In a sense, it can be argued that the interwar period simply repeated the 1856-1877 epoch and that there was no difference between the foreign policy of the communists and that of the Czars when it came to territorial matters. Any treaty or agreement the Soviets were disposed to sign would only have been of temporary value because it became clear to everybody, as time passed, that it

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CHAPTER 4. THE SOVIET UNION

was out of the question for the Soviets to agree that Bessarabia should remain Romanian territory. Of course, in hindsight it is patently clear; but nobody anticipated in 1918 that the communists not only would stay in power but would transform the old Russian Empire in just a few decades into a superpower. In 1918 Romania saw a great opportunity, a chance too good to turn down. At the same time it was a great risk, and the stakes were not clear until it was too late to adjust or seek a compromise solution. In 1940, Romania paid for taking this risk by losing half of Bukovina (instead of only one third, as stipulated in the common agreements signed during the war) and the Herta region (which had belonged to Romania before the World War I) to the Soviet Union, plus a great part of Transylvania to Hungary (recovered after World War II, as a result of the Soviets’ insistence at the Peace Conference) and the southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria. And if we add to this the Romanian National Treasury, moved to Moscow in 1916 for “safe-keeping” during the war and only partially returned, we have a good sense of the scope of Romania’s losses (even after the fall of communism, the Russians still refuse to return the Treasury to Romania, at least the part of it still identifiable, as the gold and jewels vanished during the Russian Revolution).8 Regarding diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the Romanian governments adopted an attitude based on the following principles: Romania was not at war with the Soviet Union;9 there was no territorial dispute between the two, because Bessarabia was an old Romanian territory that had decided to unite with Romania; the Great Powers recognized the Union by the Bessarabian Treaty of October 28, 1920; the Romanian National Treasury should be returned intact to Romania; and a policy of non-intervention in the political matters of another state. On the other side, the Soviet government still contested the Romanian border and refused to recognize the Union of Bessarabia, sometimes attacking the attitude of the Romanian government in a very “noisy” and propagandistic manner, at other times trying to reach an agreement with Romania regarding Bessarabia. For example, at the beginning of 1920, they made efforts to avoid a common Polish-Romanian offensive against the Soviet Union and were disposed to make concessions to Romania regarding the Bessarabian question. Still, it is difficult to support the claim that they were actually ready to sign an agreement regarding Bessarabia at any point during the interwar period,10 and even more difficult to speculate what would have been the validity of such an agreement in 1940. Bilateral Relations Before and During the Paris Peace Conference In 1916 Romania decided to enter the war on the Entente side. After a short, victorious offensive, the Romanian Army was defeated, a great part of the country including Bucharest was occupied, and the government relocated itself to Jassy, the old capital of Moldavia. The front was stabilized in the Carpathian Mountains, and in the summer of 1917 the Romanian Army was able to resist the German offensive toward Moldavia. Still, relations between the Russians and the Romanians were far

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Moldova, a Romanian Province from friendly: mutual suspicion was at its height. On the one hand, the Romanians blamed Russia for their defeat while, on the other, the Russians were quite unhappy with Romania’s hard bargaining.11 In this situation, it was quite difficult for the two countries to support each other as reliable allies. The situation became worse after the revolutionary events in Moscow, and the Romanian Army found itself almost alone to defend its positions. This was the moment when the first armed incidents took place between Romanian authorities and groups of Russian soldiers. The communist propaganda inside the Russian Army was disturbing to the Romanian authorities, for two reasons: the troops became unwilling to continue fighting against the Central Powers; and communist ideas could also spread among the Romanian soldiers. As Romania was forced to exit the war in May 1918, the Germans encouraged the actions of the Romanian Army in Bessarabia (seen as a territory to be taken by Romania in exchange for the territories lost through the Bucharest Peace Treaty). In fact, since 1914 the German leadership had been offering Bessarabia to Romania — in order to win over Romania to their side and to weaken Russia. As previously mentioned, in January 1918 the communists broke off diplomatic relations with Romania as a result of the Romanian Army entering Bessarabian territory. During the following weeks the Bolsheviks in southern Ukraine (organized as RUMCEROD) sent a number of ultimatums to the Romanian government demanding the immediate withdrawal of the Romanian Army from Bessarabia. The situation was temporarily pacified by the March 5-9, 1918 Treaty between the two sides, by which Romania undertook to withdraw its troops in the following two months. But at the end of March, Sfatul Tserii voted the Union of Bessarabia with Romania, so there was no withdrawal of Romanians troops from Bessarabia; it then became Romanian territory. Due at first to the German occupation and later to the civil war and the war with Poland, the Russians could not deploy their army to take back Bessarabia. Inside the Russian leadership during the first years of communism there had been three orientations regarding the Bessarabian question.12 Leon Trotsky and Maksim Litvinov, who were prepared to give up Bessarabia and recognize Romanian sovereignty in exchange for certain conditions, illustrate the first position. The second, illustrated by the military men such as generals Mihail Frunse (born in Bessarabia) and Kliment Vorosilov, argued in favor of reconquering Bessarabia by military force.13 Somewhere in the middle were Christian Rakovsky,14 the influential leader of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, and Gheorghi Cicerin, who constantly reminded the Romanian Government of the Russian (later Soviet) view regarding Bessarabia through diplomatic notes of protest, international and internal propaganda, military maneuvers and border incidents staged along the Dniestr River. In other words, they took a wait and see attitude, in which no major risks were taken but also no real concessions were made. Not only did the last orientation prevail (although not quite from the beginning)15 but it proved, over time, to be the best way of protecting Soviet interests and weakening Romania’s international position.16 Romania was among the few States towards which the Soviets adopted this strategy of opposing

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as much as possible economic-financial development and national consolidation by means of propaganda and military threat. This strategy made Romania more vulnerable in its relations with the other neighbors as well. As for the Romanian policy towards Russia, there were at least three tendencies: to negotiate with the Soviets in the hope of reaching some sort of agreement regarding the Bessarabian question; to postpone any negotiations with the Soviets in the hope that the communist regime would soon fail; to wait and see, while combining the previous two options. Alexandru Vaida-Voevod (Prime Minister during the first months of 1920) best exemplified the first one, while Take Ionescu (Foreign Minister during the second part of 1920 and 1921) the second. In the end, after using each of the first two approaches, the Romanian side decided in favor of a compromise solution: that it should continue negotiations but only at an unofficial or semiofficial level while opposing any discussion regarding the fate of Bessarabia. It was finally on this line that an agreement, although a very limited one, was reached with the Soviets and the bilateral relations restored in 1934. On April 18, 1918, Gheorghi Cicerin, the Russian Commissar for Foreign Affairs, sent the Romanian Prime Minister a note of protest against the incorporation of Bessarabia into Romania.17 This formal protest, contesting especially the way in which the union was proclaimed, was the only one to come as an immediate result of the union. During the following period there were no more official threats ultimatum notes from the Soviet power, and the reason for that is related to the internal power struggle in Russia. At the same time, there were numerous border incidents in Bessarabia between the Romanian troops and the Red Army. It was only during the Paris Peace Conference that Cicerin sent a new telegram on Bessarabia to the Romanian authorities, on May 1, 1919. This time the note was sent in the name of Ukraine, too. The telegram is indicative of the Russian viewpoint regarding events in Bessarabia: that it had been liberated from the Turks in 1812; that it had been under Romanian military occupation since 1918; and that both the Sfatul Tserii and the Union decision were non-representative in nature. The position expressed in the telegram has remained unchanged until today and those ideas still form the basis of any Russian attempt to deal with the Bessarabian question. After amply criticizing the Romanian position on Bessarabia, in very strong words, the ultimatum demanded: 1. The immediate withdrawal of Romanian troops, officials, and agents from the whole of Bessarabia, and full liberty for the workers and peasants of Bessarabia freely to organize their own government. 2. That all those responsible for crimes against the Bessarabia workers and peasants and against the entire population of Bessarabia be brought before public tribunals. 3. The restitution of Russian arms and war material taken by Romania as plunder. 4. The restitution to the inhabitants of Bessarabia of all the property of which they have been deprived by plunder and confiscation.18

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Moldova, a Romanian Province The last request is peculiar at best, as the inhabitants of Bessarabia who were deprived of their property were the landowners, the same landowners against whom the communist revolution was directed and who were accused of being behind Bessarabia’s decision to unite with Romania. Soon after this telegram, a new ultimatum came from Christian Rakovsky, the exiled leader of the Romanian communist movement and at that time the communist leader of Ukraine, asking for the withdrawal of the Romanian Army from Bessarabia in forty-eight hours. The exchange of notes between the Ukrainian and the Romanian governments went on until June 19, 1919, each side arguing its thesis along the lines already described. The sudden reawakening of Russian interest in Bessarabia should be seen in relation to Romania’s action against the Hungarian communist government. The Moscow government tried to take advantage of Romania’s military conflict with Hungary while, at the same time, offering brotherly help to the Hungarian communists in their fight against Romania. The development of events in Russia (the combined White Army offensives) and the defeat of the Hungarian Army lay behind the Bolshevik decision to stop threatening the Romanian government, given the risk that Romania might join the offensive against them. Instead, they decided to try a more conciliatory approach that might win some precious time, and starting in the late summer 1919 they left aside any strong words — at least for a while. As has been stressed by many scholars, time was what the Bolshevik government needed most in order to consolidate its grip on power. To the Bolsheviks, that was what mattered most during the first years. And, to obtain this precious time, they were disposed to make all sorts of concessions — the best example being that of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with the Central Powers. Through that Treaty they bought breathing space that, in the circumstances, was worth more than any amount of territory lost to the Germans.19 Their relations with Romania followed a somewhat similar pattern for, as long as they needed time, they carefully avoided provoking the Romanians; on the contrary, they tried to bribe them with the promise of concessions. On the other hand, the Romanian diplomacy failed to take advantage of the Bolsheviks’ weakness and their indecision simply played on the Bolsheviks’ hands. Alexandru Vaida-Voevod’s advent as leader of the Romanian Government brought about a change in the Romanian foreign policy. Not only was he able to obtain a number of concessions from the Peace Conference but he also agreed to institute direct negotiations with the communist Russians, which he believed would be the best way to improve Romania’s relations with that nation. As a result, in February 1920, the first negotiations between Romania and the Bolshevik government took place in Copenhagen (after the break in diplomatic relations, January 13-26, 1918), with the purpose of normalizing bilateral relations.20 The representatives were D.N. Ciotori for Romania and Maxim Litvinov for the communists. The main aim of the negotiations was to prepare the basis for a future conference on the re-establishment of bilateral relations. The principal Romanian requests

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were the recognition of Bessarabia’s union; the restitution of the Romanian National Treasury; and the liberation of the Romanian prisoners of war still held in Russia.21 Litvinov acknowledged that it was possible for Russia to recognize the Union of Bessarabia and to resolve the problem of the Romanian National Treasury (although, as far as the Treasury, the Russians were only prepared to propose that the Romanians forgo their claim, as compensation for the military and other materials taken by Romania in 1917-1918).22 As noted above, this sudden Russian readiness to resolve her problems with Romania was due to the conflict with Poland and the fear that Romania might join Poland in a military campaign against Russia. The Bolshevik fears were amplified by the fact that the Romanian Army, withdrawn by now from Hungary, was free to be employed against them. But when the government of Alexandru Vaida-Voevod resigned in March 1920, the new government terminated the negotiations. The war against Poland offered Russian diplomacy the best incentive to continue pressing for an agreement with Romania.23 And, in order to convince Romania not to side with Poland, the Russians showed themselves ready to come to a resolution on all the points raised by the Romanians: the recognition of Bessarabia’s union; the repatriation of the Romanian POW held in Russia; the restitution of the Romanian National Treasury.24 Starting in July 1920, Cicerin made new proposals to the Romanian government in order to restart the bilateral negotiations, but Take Ionescu (Romanian Foreign Minister at the time) considered them inopportune and insignificant compared to the official recognition of the Great Powers. Although Romanian-Russian historiography argues that he believed that the communists would be defeated and that, under these conditions, an agreement with them would compromise Romania, it seems that French opposition to the Russian-Romanian negotiations was another major reason for his temporization or postponement of the negotiations.25 He adopted a policy of wait and see, postponing under various pretexts any bilateral negotiations while the exchange of notes between Cicerin and Alexandru Averescu, the Romanian Prime Minister, continued. Toward the end of October the Soviets’ tone towards Romania changed, for a number of reasons: their discontent over the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty (especially as they were not consulted); the end of the Polish war; and the fact that the remnants of General Wrangel’s Army found refuge in Romania. As regards the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty, Cicerin and Rakovsky sent a note to Romania on November 1, 1920, in the name of both Ukraine and Russia, declaring that they: . . . could not recognize the validity of a treaty concerning Bessarabia, signed without their participation, and [that they] were not bound in any way by an agreement on this subject which was signed by foreign governments.26 However, it should be noted that, if this were true, the efforts and concessions made by the Soviets to preclude the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty would

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Moldova, a Romanian Province have been unnecessary. On the other hand, during 1919 and 1920 the Romanian Government was firm in its decision not to intervene against the Bolsheviks, even as France, a friend of Romania, insisted repeatedly that Romania join the war against Bolshevism (either at the time of the French occupation of Odessa, or during the Polish-Russian war). Romania refused to give any kind of military assistance to the White Russians despite France’s pressure.27 Even the French promise of Odessa in exchange for Romanian help could not convince the Romanian Government to open hostilities against the Bolsheviks. Romania’s only intervention in the war was indirect: it hosted the French military command in Bucharest, as well as some French troops directed to fight against the Bolsheviks, and provided Petliura’s Army with modest military supplies.28 In fact, at least during 1919 the Romanian government had no real ability to intervene militarily in Russia due to its war with Hungary. During 1920, the Army was free to act in Russia but the scarcity of resources hampered any such initiative in any case. The Romanians tried throughout this period to maintain an attitude of neutrality towards the Soviets, although they won nothing by it and received only accusations in exchange from the Russians. In fact, this neutrality became one of the leitmotifs of Romanian diplomacy whenever they were dealing with the Soviets: There had been so many situations in which Russia found herself implicated in internal and external fights, but still Romania kept the same loyal attitude of today. If we had had hostile intentions against you, we could have pursued them at that time . . . 29 In the end, the Romanian neutrality (which was justified on economic grounds, if not necessarily on moral or strategic grounds) only boosted the Russian position and it proved to be quite a success for Russian diplomacy, as they did not have to pay anything to secure Romania’s non-intervention in either the Civil War or the war against Poland. The hypothesis that a show of power, even as a bluff, might have had a certain influence on the Bolshevik leaders should not be excluded. But by adopting a policy of neutrality instead of aggression (presumably more in words than in practice, as the necessary resources were missing) the Romanian leadership missed this chance, failing to understand one of the main characteristics of Russian behavior: that the only argument they care about is force. During 1920-1921, the communists were prepared for direct negotiations with Romania and, in the view of many Romanian diplomats and scholars, were ready to make certain concessions.30 The main question is how far they were prepared to go.31 The impetus included not only their war with Poland but their fear of an Western military campaign against communism. Russia’s aims were to avoid an alliance (and especially a military campaign) between Romania and Poland against them; to escape the diplomatic isolation which had enveloped them; to win some precious time to consolidate their power both internally and internationally; and to avoid the

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transformation of Romania into a training base for counter-revolutionary groups. The communist government hoped to achieve their purposes by using the Bessarabian question. Finally, even as the military alliance between Romania and Poland came into being in March 1921, they still insisted on negotiations with Romania. On the other side, the Romanian government expressed its intentions for the negotiations: to obtain the recognition of the Union as a fait accompli and to discuss only matters regarding the transfer of sovereignty between the two states; also, to resolve the financial questions pending between the two states. During the preparation period prior to these direct negotiations (August 1920September 1921), illustrated best by the Cicerin-Averescu correspondence, the dispute between the two parties centered at first on where the negotiations should take place and then on the topics that should or should not be discussed — especially, what questions should be avoided.32 The communists intended to have all the existing problems between the two parties, including that of Bessarabia, on the negotiation table: The Russian Government sees no reason to persuade it to reduce the number of questions which should be dealt with by Russia and Romania, to limit discussions to those which are clearly defined and to exclude others. Your wireless of 10 November suggests that the Romanian Government will propose the limitation of discussions to a certain group of questions. The Russian Government, on the contrary, is of the opinion that in order to be able to establish lasting pacific and friendly relations between the two countries, it is necessary to submit to the consideration of the conference proposed by us all questions of interest to Romania and Russia without exception.”33 On January 15, 1921, a new note came from Cicerin, with a more conciliatory tone that would characterize Russian correspondence with Romania until the end of the Warsaw negotiations: The Russian Republic is firmly determined not to permit the peaceful relations now existing between Russia and Romania to be disturbed. In the opinion of the Russian Government it would be highly desirable to enter into negotiations with Romania for the purpose of establishing between our two countries relations solidly based on a formal treaty. . . . We are ready, in the higher interests of peace, to limit the agenda of the future conference to those practical questions whose solution is the most urgent, such as the re-establishment of commercial relations and the regulation of navigation on the Dniestr.”34 What made the Russian side abandon its initial proposals and accept the Romanian ones? The answer lies in the strengthening Romanian-Polish relations. In 1921 the Russians had four main objectives in negotiating a treaty with Romania: to regulate navigation on the Dniestr; to oblige Romania to respect maximum neutrality towards Russia; to provide for exchanges of goods; and to exchange repre-

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Moldova, a Romanian Province sentatives (in order to use Bucharest as an observation point for the Balkans). To these principal objectives should be added other less important ones, including an exchange of war prisoners and the signing of sanitary, postal and railroads conventions. However, any mention or suggestion in the treaty that Bessarabia was Romanian territory had to be avoided, meaning that the articles of the treaty referring to the common border were to be given only a provisory character.35 The Romanians centered their efforts, apart from seeking Russian recognition of Bessarabia’s union with Romania, on resolving a number of outstanding financial matters: the Romanian National Treasury in Moscow; the Romanian deposits of munitions, armament, and effects that were on Russian territory; the goods belonging to the former Romanian Legation in Petrograd; the cash deposits belonging to the Romanian Commission of Provisioning in Russia, moneys which were still in Russian banks; and compensation for the damages done by the Russian troops during their retreat from the Romanian territory.36 The Warsaw and Vienna Conferences As a result of the exchange of notes between the Russians and the Romanians during the beginning of 1921, it was decided that a preliminary conference between the two states should take place in Reval, the two parties being represented by Maxim Litvinov (initially, but replaced by Lev Karakhan) and Gheorghe Filality.37 But the Russians delayed the planned conference, focusing instead on a minor aspect of the relationship, namely navigation and fishing on the Dniestr Liman. And, indeed, a number of bilateral meetings took place between the two parties in July 1921, in Cetatea Alba, but with no results.38 In September-October 1921, a preliminary conference between Russia and Romania took place in Warsaw with the aim of fixing the program of a future bilateral conference having as its purpose the normalization of relations. There were six official meetings, but with no result.39 The first two meetings were of a general nature, both sides expressing their views regarding the future negotiations for the treaty. At the end of the second meeting Lev Mikhailovici Karakhan, the Russian representative, privately proposed to Filality a very interesting compromise solution between the two States. Justifying it as a way to speed up the negotiations, Karakhan proposed, in his personal name: Let’s take out of the next Conference’s program Bessarabia and the minorities and, as compensation, you should agree not to include the question of the financial matters between us. In this way we could explain to the masses that these questions have remained en suspens. . . . This question of financial matters is the most boring and it took us about six months to resolve these issues during our negotiations with the Poles … If we do so, we would agree easily on the other points and in 15 days we may even sign the agreement and re-establish diplomatic relations.40

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At Filality’s insistence on the National Treasury, Karakhan declared that as soon as diplomatic relations were re-established, the papers included in it would be returned to Romania — but that he could not guarantee the same for the gold. Although many Romanian historians seem to lay particular emphasis on the kind of “bribe” implicit in Karakhan’s proposal, this author considers that it had a different significance. The proposal simply expressed the Russians’ main goal at the conference: to come to some agreement with the Romanians without saying anything that could result in a claim being made that they had recognized Bessarabia as Romanian territory. From their viewpoint, they were not so much renouncing Bessarabia as deferring the question (they were still playing desperately for time, in 1921). Karakhan wanted, according to his instructions, to avoid the negative influence of the Bessarabian question over the bilateral relationship, but he also wished to make it look as though his side were making a great concession, and therefore he asked the Romanians to defer their financial requests in exchange. In other words, he was hoping to hit two rabbits with a single shot. In these conditions, it is not surprising that the Romanians, having nothing to win from the Russian proposal, rejected it. It was only a few years later that certain Romanian diplomats and scholars started arguing that Take Ionescu should have accepted the deal. One other possible explanation for Karakhan’s proposal is that, realizing after the first meetings that the negotiations would produce no results, he simply used the “Bessarabia for the Treasury” deal as a trial balloon, in order to see what the Romanian reaction would be. Arguing in favor of this reading is the fact that Karakhan knew all too well that, while the Romanians would not agree with it, such a proposal might win some time for him. Filality declined the Russian offer at the insistence of the Romanian Foreign Minister, Take Ionescu. The description of the main points of the debate and also Take Ionescu’s views regarding relations with Russia are best expressed in the instructions he sent to Filality on October 17: I never thought that our Treasury would be returned to us, just as I knew that the Soviet Government has no other purpose than to re-establish diplomatic relations with Romania in order to poison our country with revolutionary propaganda, under the protection of diplomatic immunity. It is clear that we would be making the gravest error to agree to such a proposal, in which we would lose everything without gaining anything. Karakhan’s claim that the Romanian state would have any interest whatsoever in getting the recognition of the Union from the Bolshevik government is entirely groundless. . . . Moscow’s recognition of Bessarabia today could only damage Romania’s interests vis-à-vis tomorrow’s Russia. The Bessarabian question would become an internal affair for Russia instead of remaining within the compass of international law. My view is that, whatever the consequences, the Bessarabian question

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Moldova, a Romanian Province should not be included as a discussion point between the two governments. The same is valid for the Romanian-Ukrainian border and the minorities’ question. . . . We will never agree to first have diplomatic or even commercial relations and only later to have the question of returning the Treasury negotiated with our minister in Moscow. . . . The frightening responsibility of having a number of Bolshevik officials in Romania. . . . I hope that Karakhan did not ask you in writing for the famous declaration of neutrality he requested from us, in case Russia came under attack.41 In fact, we have decided to abstain from any attack against Russia, except for the stipulations existing in our treaty of alliance with Poland, which is a defensive alliance. But, to stipulate through a convention with a state that you would be neutral, indifferent the circumstances, is a way of signing a small alliance with it. And, it is against both Romania’s interest and dignity to have the honor of being the second country after Kemal’s Turkey in a sui-generis alliance with the Soviets. This request is inadmissible. We must necessarily obtain the freedom of our hostages in Russia, who are being kept through an abuse of power unknown in relations between civilized states.42 If the Russians can point out any Russian citizens in our prisons we will free them immediately. But the thought of talking about Romanian citizens, condemned by our justice system, whom we would set free or send to Russia at Moscow’s request seems to me so cynical that I could not honor it with any response. . . . We must stand by our position that we are not at war and, therefore, we do not have to sign a peace treaty. . . . During these negotiations it must not be forgotten that Romania has no interest except for that of keeping the promise made by Prime Minister Vaida in February 1920, while the Soviets have not only the interest of re-establishing diplomatic relations with us but also to negotiate and sign something with an organized State that has such a considerable past as ours.”43 In these circumstances, to which should be added the French opposition to the re-establishment of Russo-Romanian relations, it is clear why the Warsaw Conference ended without any gain for the Romanians. For the Russians, on the other hand, the Conference was not a complete failure because they were able to gain precious time. Time was on their side, and they took full advantage of it so that, more than a decade later, the Romanians had to agree to many of the same points they had opposed in 1921, in exchange for much less. The best example would be Titulescu’s agreement to open diplomatic relations first and only later to negotiate the return of any parts of the Treasury. One other point characterizing the relationship before and after the Warsaw Conference was the question of the White Russians who had found refuge on Roma-

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nian soil. The Russians continuously protested the Romanian attitude towards those fighting against the Red Army, people like General Wrangel’s or Petliura’s supporters. In a telegram sent on November 11, 1921, Cicerin asked again for Romania to take measures against the activity of White Guards on Romanian territory, as proof of Romania’s willingness to have peace with Russia and Ukraine. In fact, these continuous demands were made in order to justify a possible military intervention. By this device, public opinion (and especially international opinion) would be led to accept that Russian troops were entering Romania only in order to stop the bandits based there from making incursions into Soviet territory, and not in order to retrieve Bessarabia. Still, the Romanians always claimed that the border incidents were evidence of Bolshevik attempts to penetrate into the Romanian territory.44 The telegram mentioned above points up one more characteristic of the bilateral negotiations: We were no less surprised to note in your statement that you appear to believe that our consenting to discuss the question of navigation on the Dniestr implied recognition of the incorporation of Bessarabia into Romania. On the contrary, in a whole series of statements made by the Russo-Ukrainian delegation we made it clear in precise and unambiguous terms that the object of the conference was not to fix the frontier between the two countries, but solely to establish a demarcation line, having regard to the de facto occupation of Bessarabia by Romanian troops.45 At every point when an agreement was reached between the two States, or some negotiations took place, or when both of them were signing a multinational treaty, the Romanians considered it a diplomatic victory signifying Russian recognition of Bessarabia’s union. They argued that, by agreeing to deal on an equal footing with Romania as a state, the Soviets recognized its authority over all the territories it controlled. The fact that their interpretation was a mistake is proven plainly by the attitude of the US towards the Bessarabian question: the US had diplomatic relations and even signed a number of treaties with Romania without de facto recognizing her rights over Bessarabia. Of course, soon after the Romanian declarations, the Russian side would make the necessary corrections, specifying that its position towards Bessarabia remained unchanged, and the Romanians would argue back.46 The same thing happened after the Briand-Kellogg pact was signed in 1928, and after the London “Convention for the Definition of the Aggression” was signed in July 1933. The moment when the Soviets’ international position clearly began to improve came in 1922, as a result of signing the Rapallo Treaty with Germany (April 16, 1922), by which the latter officially recognized the Soviet government and undertook to help it reorganize its military and economic capacities. From then on, the Soviets were no longer an isolated and unrecognized Government. The new Russian position was apparent during the Genoa Conference (April-May 1922) that had been called in order to address relations between the Soviets and the European Powers,

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Moldova, a Romanian Province relations that had been poisoned by the difficult problem of recovering the goods that belonged to Westerners in Russia and had been nationalized by the Soviets (and the issue of responsibility for the public debt of the former Russian Empire). The Rapallo Treaty was a slap in the face of the Great Powers and a great success for both Germany and the Soviets, and it resulted in the failure of the Genoa Conference to reach any agreement. Just a few weeks after Rapallo, the Russians made it known to Romania that their position regarding bilateral relations had changed. During the Genoa Conference, Cicerin openly expressed Russia’s policy toward Bessarabia. In connection with the Romanian attempt to insert into the common memorandum of the Powers negotiating with Russia the principle regarding the necessity of respecting the political and territorial status quo of the states involved, (May 17), Cicerin stated that: “respect for the status quo between Ukraine and Romania, for example, does not at all mean for Russia the recognition of the Romanian status quo and particularly, the recognition of the present Romanian occupation of Bessarabia.”47 The same day, the Romanian Prime Minister Ion I. C. Bratianu expressed Romania’s readiness to sign a permanent non-aggression pact with Bolshevik Russia, based on respect for the existing status quo. As the Bolshevik representatives refused the Romanian proposal, Bratianu undertook a unilateral obligation of non-aggression, stating that Romania would abstain from any military operations directed against Bolshevik Russia. Although their international position was improving, the Russians were still cautious and preferred to continue the dialogue with the Romanians. A few weeks later, during the Hague Conference (June-July 1922), the Russians indicated that they were still inclined toward a compromise with Romania.48 The new element that came out during the negotiations was a Russian proposal for a conference on disarmament, in Moscow, at which all the states bordering Russia in Europe should take part. The Romanians conditioned their attendance, as they had the signing of any pact of non-aggression, on the recognition of the existing frontiers; as the Bolsheviks rejected their conditions, Romania was the only European state bordering Russia that refused to send representatives to the Conference.49 The Conference on disarmament was a good propaganda move from the communists and the Romanian refusal, which they probably anticipated, gave them new propaganda material — especially with regard to international public opinion. In September, Cicerin again suggested the exchange Karakhan had proposed earlier: Bessarabia in exchange for the Treasury.50 During the Lausanne Conference (December 1922), Cicerin proposed to the Romanian Minister in Paris, Constantin Diamandi, the signing of a non-aggression pact for two or five years. Insisting that it was only an exploratory proposal made by him and not yet approved by his government, Cicerin suggested that the Pact should be based on “the recognition of Bessarabia in exchange for the Romanian National Treasury and the Crown Jewels, the complete liquidation of reciprocal debts and the resolution of all the other pending matters”.51 The Romanian government rejected the Russian proposal.

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An important moment, and probably the only remarkable step in RussoRomanian relations during the first part of the 1920s, was the signing, after a few months of negotiations in Tyraspol, on November 20, 1923, of a border agreement between the two States, called “Statutes on Ways and Means for Prevention and Solution of Conflicts that May Arise along the Dniestr River”.52 The agreement stipulated the resolution of border incidents by a joint Soviet-Romanian commission which, indeed, had held a number of meetings.53 Although initially the Romanians had great hopes for the negotiations, in the end they had to accept only a very limited agreement, far less than they had expected. Cicerin presented the new position of the Soviet government towards Romania: In the portfolio of diplomatic instructions, approved by the Central Committee, it is shown that, for the moment, we must restrain our action to mollifying Romania through commercial negotiations, without signing a final treaty with her. Signing a navigation agreement on the Dniestr with the Romanians would be equivalent, in fact, to recognizing the Dniestr as the border. At our request, chief-commander Kamenev has shown that exactly for this reason he considers a navigation agreement on the Dniestr to be undesirable. Continuing the border negotiations, we will avoid anything that could be understood as recognition of the Dniestr as the border. But, the initiation of commercial relations, in a prudent and limited form, is possible without these negative consequences. While a complete and definitive commercial treaty would help the consolidation of Bessarabia inside Romania, a limited and provisory commercial agreement, with the amendment that it is not resolving the question of the border regulation, might be useful to us. This agreement would reduce the intensity of relations between Romania and Poland and, in this way, would weaken the international position of the latter. Such a step would be in conformity with the line approved by the Central Committee. For this reason, we propose to use now the existing contact points with Romania in order to start the negotiation of the provisory agreement regarding limited commercial relations between Romania and USSR.54 The negotiations should go forward without any haste.55 As a result of the improvement in the bilateral relations after the Tyraspol negotiations it was decided that a new conference between Romania and the Soviet Union should be called, the parties agreeing on Vienna as the host city.56 Constantin Langa-Rascanu headed the Romanian delegation and Nikolai Nikolaievich Krestinsky the Soviets’. The objectives of the two parties, as presented in the instructions sent by Bratianu and Cicerin, show the great distance separating the two sides and the practical impossibility of reaching an agreement. Russia’s broad objectives regarding relations with Romania were in no way different from those already presented, except for the insistence on the idea of a plebiscite:

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During the conference, the word plebiscite must be heard. It is probable that as soon as you mention Bessarabia the Romanians will leave, therefore among your first words in mentioning Bessarabia you should use plebiscite. Use this word even in your first phrase.57 As for the Romanian aims at the conference, Ion I.C. Bratianu stated: Your leading principle would be the separation of the Bessarabian question from that of the Treasury, following our talks in Lausanne. You should show, from the beginning, that in order to establish good neighborly relations between the two countries such relations cannot exist without the border being regulated; and, regulating the border means recognition of the union of Bessarabia, which is and must be ours, so that there can be no discussion on this question. The positive part for us would be to obtain the recognition of Bessarabia and the return of the Treasury, at least the non-metallic part, meaning the private deposits and the archives. You must remember that the Soviets have returned numerous and valuable art works to the Poles . . . if the Bessarabian question is untouchable, that of the metallic Treasury is touchable, in the sense that it could be renounced but only after a prior liquidation of all the financial matters between us. . . . The Russian representatives should be shown that Bessarabia represents an anachronism in Russian history: captured with a view toward conquering Constantinople, which for Russia meant controlling the keys to the Black Sea, Bessarabia was the first step towards the realization of this plan. But when the Czars realized that it was impossible to make this dream of conquest come true, they could only renounce Bessarabia. . . . No economic interest justifies ties between Bessarabia and Russia.58 To respond to Soviet claims over Bessarabia, Bratianu also instructed LangaRascanu to insist on all the known arguments, including the Bessarabian Treaty, and especially on the national and economic points. Although Bratianu agreed with the idea of signing a non-aggression pact with the Soviets, he clearly rejected any plebiscite in Bessarabia, as he was aware the Soviets might propose.59 Between March 27 and April 2, 1924, four meetings between the two delegations took place.60 But after a few consistent “theoretical” exchanges in which each part demolished the other's arguments as to its rights over Bessarabia, the two proved unable to reach a consensus over the Bessarabian question. The Soviets were unwilling to make any real concessions; the only matter they were prepared to address was that of a plebiscite in Bessarabia. Their thesis was that a plebiscite would be the only way to resolve the Bessarabian problem once and for all. Of course, they had not thought that way a few years earlier, regarding Georgia. More surprisingly,

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they did not even mention a plebiscite as a way of resolving the Bessarabian question in 1940 or after the Second World War. But in 1924 they were the most fervent partisans of the plebiscite solution, and the reason was clear: propaganda. They wanted to show the world that they are willing to resolve the Bessarabian question but that the Romanian Government was opposed to any possible agreement. And indeed, they were partly successful in propagating that view, as the international press did pay attention to the negotiations, publishing almost daily dispatches from Vienna.61 The Vienna Conference was the last attempt of the two parties to settle the Bessarabian dispute through negotiation, ending the bilateral negotiations that started in February 1920. It was the last act in the bilateral On the Romanian side, some voices had criticized the idea of participating in a conference in which the Bessarabian question was to be discussed, considering that the best policy would have been to keep quiet on the matter.62 The failure to reach an agreement, expected by the Soviets, only gave them more reason to intensify their actions against Romania, especially at the propaganda level. Border incidents in Bessarabia and the concentration of troops at the border were two other methods the Soviets used against Romania during the inter-war period. Any time the Soviets needed propaganda material, a new border incident took place in Bessarabia. In view of recently published Russian documents (in Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, 1917-1934), it can be clearly stated (and not only speculated, as has been the case until now) that, in fact, the Soviet representatives came to the conference knowing from the beginning that it would be impossible to reach an agreement, and not only that, but with precise instructions against signing anything more than a provisory commercial agreement. In 1924, as the communists consolidated their grip on power as well as shoring up their international position, they were no more in particular need of time; and as a result, they are not looking for a compromise agreement with Romania, but for a chance to clearly state their position on Bessarabia as territory belonging to the “Soviet peoples”. Their main intention for the conference was propaganda-related and they plainly used the opportunity well, bringing the Bessarabian question to the attention of the international public in a manner that was as favorable to the Soviets as possible. Soviet diplomats placed great emphasis at the time on the French ratification, presenting it as the main obstacle to a Romanian-Soviet agreement (it had encouraged the Romanian hopes that France would come to their help in a possible conflict with the Soviets) — although the situation was clearly very different. Propaganda is one of the most powerful weapons of any government, and the Soviets knew very well how to use it in their conflict with Romania. The Soviets used propaganda directed at international public opinion to justify their claim to Bessarabia not only from the historical viewpoint (which could have been easily contested by the Romanians) but from the viewpoint of self-determination.63 They knew that the self-determination principle (based on statistical data that might easily be manipulated) is more popular in public opinion than historical considerations, and so offered them a better position for anti-Romanian propaganda. The Soviets

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Moldova, a Romanian Province insisted that the Romanian authorities were abusing the Bessarabians because they refused to obey to Bucharest’s orders and that the only way to resolve the RomanianSoviet conflict over Bessarabia would be by organizing a plebiscite. The reaction in some Western circles against the Romanian action in Bessarabia during the TatarBunar episode proves that the Soviet propaganda was quite effective. It was even more successful in the case of Romania’s allies: in the aftermath of the Vienna Conference, some Yugoslav and Czechoslovak newspapers argued that Romania should return control over Bessarabia to Soviet Russia or at least accept the Soviet request for a plebiscite in the region.64 Another way the Soviets acted against the Romanian authorities was through communist organizations and infiltrators. These actions, planned even before the start of the Vienna Conference, aimed at provoking land revolts in Bessarabia as a way of boosting the Soviet position. But the Romanian authorities were prepared, and acted to avoid that eventuality by outlawing the Communist Party in April 1924. Still, those members of the Romanian Communist Party who were not in prison received instructions from Moscow to organize peasant riots in Bessarabia and Bukovina against the Romanian Government and thus to offer a rationale for a possible intervention by the Red Army. The more dramatic the riots, the more the West would doubt the Romanian character of Bessarabia and the more they would support Soviet intervention. Such riots had taken place before, in January 1919 near Hotin and May 1919 in Tighina, but had no lasting effects.65 In September 1924 Communist agents made a successful attempt to start a riot in Bessarabia, at Tatar-Bunar, instating a self-proclaimed Moldavian Soviet Republic. But the Romanian Army quickly quelled the uprising, supported by the German population in the area. A few hundred people were arrested.66 The Russian propagandists used the occasion to mobilize the communist parties from all over the world and public opinion in general against imperialist Romania. As a follow-up to the September events in Bessarabia, the Moscow government established the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, on the left bank of the Dniestr River, on October 12, 1924. The newly created republic had an area of about 3,000 square miles, with a population of more than 500,000 people, of which the Moldavians (Romanians) represented 60%.67 The capital was initially at Balta but in 1929 it was moved to Tyraspol. Thus, a territory that had never before been called Moldavia nor had ever been part of the medieval principality of Moldavia (although it was populated by Moldavians) was created, in an effort to lend credibility to the Soviet government’s claim to Bessarabia and to provide a catalyst for the “reunification” of the Moldavians on the left bank of the Dniestr with those on the right bank.68 In 1940, the eastern part of the MASSR was returned to the Ukrainian SSR, while the rest was incorporated into the new Moldavian SSR. Nowadays part of this territory makes up the self-proclaimed Transdniester Republic, with which the Moldavian Republic had to fight a fierce war in recent years. Of great importance was the fact that the Western frontier of the newly created republic was set at the Pruth River, considerably farther west than the Dniestr. This action was considered to be an open declaration of Soviet intentions towards Bessarabia.69

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There are two other possible reasons for the Soviet decision to create a Moldavian Autonomous SSR. Its creation coincided with the advent of a number of other autonomous republics (Turkmen, Uzbek) and it fit very well with the Kremlin’s campaign against Ukrainian nationalism.70 Furthermore, it can be seen as an element of the broader Soviet policy of using the logic of national liberation to draw border regions away from neighboring states, illustrated by the formation of two other republics in especially contentious border regions: the Karelian autonomous republic (targeting Finland) in 1920 and the Buriat-Mongol autonomous republic (targeting Mongolia) in 1923.71 The Romanians were puzzled by this action. Bratianu declared in the Romanian Parliament that: “We can only be happy because one of our neighbors has admitted that in our territorial claims we did not go as far as necessary”.72 In other words, this could have been used, under certain conditions, by Romania as a pretext for new territorial gains from Russia, or in order to counterbalance Ukraine’s claims over the Bessarabian areas of Hotin and Ackerman.73 From 1924 to the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations For the Soviet Government, 1924 was a year of great successes in the international arena. Finally, the Government was officially recognized by Italy, Great Britain, France and, in January 1925, Japan. The same forward motion was not enjoyed by Romania: apart from worsening relations with Italy, in the aftermath of the Vienna Conference, during the Prague Conference of the Little Entente (July 11-12, 1924), both Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia refused to promise any active support over Bessarabia.74 Even more, while Czechoslovakia signed a Friendship Treaty with France in 1924, Romania’s attempt had to be postponed until 1926. After 1924, there was a period of relative silence regarding Bessarabia. From 1926, the Romanian position became somewhat stronger because of the treaty signed with France and the improvement in her relations with Italy. The Soviets took a wait-and-see approach to the Bessarabian question during the years after the Vienna Conference, as illustrated by Maxim Litvinov: In conditions of peace, an agreement should always be based on reciprocal advantage; therefore when the Romanian government is proposing an agreement based on our renunciation to Bessarabia it should ask itself: what is such agreement offering to the other part? Romania has almost one third of its borders unrecognized neither by us nor at the international level. Our recognition of the Bessarabian border would certainly be of great advantage to Romania but, for us, it would mean the renunciation to one of our foreign policy basic principles and at the revolutionary slogans regarding the self-determination of the peoples. Considering the great length of the USSR borders, the non-regulation of the border question on a relatively small sector for us is not as important as it is for Romania; even from the economic viewpoint we are only at a small loss

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Moldova, a Romanian Province by having no relations with Romania. For these reasons, if the Romanian government is unwilling or unable to bring up acceptable proposals, we prefer to keep the situation unchanged.75 And, as long as the Romanians did not come forward with any new proposal, Soviet diplomacy held her course. It was only because of the German and Japanese dangers a few years later that the Soviets became more malleable, so that a compromise could be agreed with Romania. However, it is possible that there was one departure from this Soviet policy. According to Gregorij Bessedovskii, a high-ranking Soviet diplomat who defected in 1931, Stalin was ready in October 1927 to adopt a more conciliatory position with regard to Bessarabia in order to both improve the Soviets’ international standing (by overcoming the recent difficulties with Great Britain and France) and to boost his internal position with a foreign policy success. Stalin’s purported attempt to initiate negotiations was hampered by the intervention of the Commissariat on Foreign Affairs against the initiative (of course, Stalin denied any involvement) and the Romanians’ unwillingness to agree to Bessedovskii’s proposal. Indeed, the Romanians were justified in rejecting the proposal, for it fell far short of what they were prepared to accept: Bessedovskii mentioned not only the Romanian National Treasury but also territorial modifications in northern Bessarabia as the price to be paid by the Romanians.76 Still, as there are no other proofs to support Bessedovskii’s story and as he has been found to have sometimes exaggerated, in his book and in the articles published in various newspapers after his defection, it is difficult to assess what role, if any, Stalin played in this context. During 1928, in an effort to strengthen relations between the Little Entente and the Soviets, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Eduard Benes, attempted to jumpstart the Soviet-Romanian negotiations.77 But because neither of the two parties seemed ready to move away from the positions expressed during the Vienna Conference, the proposed negotiations failed to materialize. In August 1928 Romania signed the Briand-Kellogg Pact, renouncing war as a means of exercising national policy. After a few months, in February 1929, Romania, Poland, Estonia and Latvia signed the Moscow Protocol with the USSR, also known as the Litvinov Protocol, for the application of the Briand-Kellogg Pact.78 Later, Lithuania, Turkey and Iran signed the Litvinov Protocol too. Once again, the Romanian Government considered that the problem of Bessarabia finally had been resolved; but Litvinov stated that while the signature eliminated the legal possibility of resolving the Bessarabian dispute by force, neither the Pact nor the Protocol prejudiced Soviet claims in any way. As stated by Litvinov, “the renunciation to war can not mean a renunciation to our rights over the territory occupied by the Romanians”.79 With the exception of Romania, USSR signed bilateral treaties with all its European neighbors. After the signing of the Protocol, a meeting that was to be the beginning of a new round of bilateral negotiations took place between Litvinov and the Romanian representative, Charles A. Davila. Litvinov concluded the following, regarding the meeting:

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Although the war danger has been deferred to some extent through the signing of the Protocol and the Briand-Kellogg Pact, Romania is still willing to come to an agreement with us. The division of Bessarabia would be refused as the basis for an agreement. Contrary to the Bratianu government, which clearly rejected even a discussion on the plebiscite, the actual government, through Davila’s person, raised the question of plebiscite without theoretically rejecting it.80 In fact, Litvinov was so sure that the Romanians were ready to change their position that he even proposed concrete ways for organizing the plebiscite. He argued to Stalin that a reopening of the bilateral negotiations might be used in order to dissuade Romania from the Polish plan to transform the Polish-Romanian defensive military alliance into an offensive one. He considered the main conditions for starting the negotiations to be: the plebiscite question, which should materialize in actual fact; the reciprocal renunciation of all financial and material claims, with the exception of returning the cultural assets still kept by one side (meaning the nonmetallic part of the Romanian National Treasury); the signing of a pact for nonaggression and non-participation in hostile combination, following the example of the Turkish-Soviets Treaty.81 During 1931, the two countries did re-open negotiations, in the hope of signing a non-aggression pact. This new initiative was related mainly to European politics. Because of the increase in German revisionism, the Poles expressed their wish to have a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union (who welcomed the initiative, being pressed in her turn by the Japanese action in Manchuria). France too was ready to sign a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, but she was tied to Poland by a mutual assistance treaty. The problem was that Poland had an alliance with Romania that requested her to consult Romania before making any shift in her policy toward the Soviets (and of course Romania had no interest in seeing Poland tied with the Soviets). At the end of 1930, as a result of secret talks between Poland and the Soviet Union, the Poles took the initiative of mediating a non-aggression pact between the Soviets and Romania. At first, Litvinov was opposed to any Romanian-Soviet negotiations, one of the reasons being Poland’s alliance with Romania. However, as the Japanese advance in Manchuria became more menacing, Litvinov became more amenable and in October 1931 he agreed to negotiate with the Romanians.82 More or less as a result of Polish mediation,83 as well as French pressure, both parts agreed to start a new round of talks, this time with the purpose of signing a non-aggression pact; but there was a clear lack of enthusiasm, as neither of them expected any worthwhile results. In January 1932, the negotiations opened in Riga, but things went much the same as on previous occasions and no agreement was reached.84 Mihail Sturdza, the Romanian representative, was instructed not to allow any mention of Bessarabia and to propose a Romanian draft of the non-aggression pact

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Moldova, a Romanian Province based mainly on the Briand-Kellogg Pact. At the same time the Soviet representative, Boris Spiridonovici Stomoniakov, asked that terms like integrity, inviolability, and sovereignty be excluded from the Treaty but that the existence of a litigious question between the two States (that of Bessarabia) should be mentioned. Sturdza asked that no mention be made of a territorial controversy between the two states. After six sessions in January 1932, the talks ended in failure. Mihail Sturdza tried to alert those in Romanian diplomatic circles who believed that the Soviets might yet be willing to renounce, in time, Bessarabia in exchange for whatever Romania was prepared to offer: The most elementary perspicacity, the lowest political sense should prove to any Romanian in direct contact with the Soviet representatives that Bessarabia is for them neither a simple question of prestige nor a minimal territorial question. Bessarabia has remained until today for the Soviets one of the most important accessories, the first reserve of the drama that they are preparing in detail.85 The Romanian Foreign Ministry’s readiness to negotiate with the Soviets was amply criticized by Nicolae Titulescu: It was a mistake to accept the opening of negotiations with the Soviets without taking advantage of the precious occasion offered by the Soviet interest to have the signature of our allies, France and Poland, in order to ask, in the common interest of all the parties implied, the definitive regulation of the Bessarabian question in our favor. I remind you especially of Romania’s mistake in accepting negotiations with the Soviets without having at least the certainty that Poland would not sign without us.86 In the meanwhile, on July 25, 1932, the Polish-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was concluded, but the Poles continued to promise Romania that they would not ratify it until the completion of the Romanian-Soviet pact. The French were in a similar situation, promising Romania that they would not sign their pact with the Soviets before the achievement of a Romanian-Soviet accord.87 In exchange for these promises, they asked the Romanians to make some concessions to the Soviets and insisted on the re-opening of Romanian-Soviet negotiations for a non-aggression pact. This time Titulescu, who tried via French and Polish mediation to come to an agreement with the Russians, played the leading role for the Romanians. But the Soviets were unwilling to give up their main condition for signing such a pact: an explicit mention of the existence of a litigious question between the two states.88 Their position was clearly boosted by the Polish decision to go ahead and ratify the non-aggression pact that November without waiting for a similar pact between Romania and the Soviets. In fact, the Polish move came as an immediate result of a change in the Polish foreign policy leadership (Joseph Beck replaced Auguste Zaleski as Foreign Minister),

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which brought into place a new policy of preferring good relations with Poland’s neighbors over its existing alliances.89 Thus, the new Polish Government signed the Polish-Soviet non-aggression Pact while continuing to press, together with the French Government, for a similar Romanian-Soviet pact. The Polish-Soviet Pact was a real blow to the Romanian security system, and many in Romania believed that the Romanian-Polish alliance had collapsed. Although the Romanian government published a declaration stating that Romania and Poland would go on working together with regard to foreign policy and that the Polish government would not ratify the pact until the Romanians sign a similar one, it was quite clear that the Soviets were able to provoke serious damage to the Polish-Romanian alliance.90 And this was not the only problem for Romania during 1932. Another major blow to Romania’s security network was the failure of the League of Nations to cope with the Japanese invasion in the Far East; the League was severely discredited. Then, on November 29, 1932, France signed a non-aggression pact with the Soviets, which led to the signing of the Mutual Assistance Treaty of May 1935 between the two. Trying to take advantage of the new French interest, the Soviets insisted that the Soviet-French pact and the Romanian-Soviet pact should definitely not be presented as being interconnected.91 The improvement in French-Soviet relations was not at all in Romania’s interest, and left Romania with three practical choices: to replace France with Germany as her best ally (the only Power able and willing to fight against the Soviets); to continue her relationship with France while working diligently to reach an agreement with the Soviets; or to pursue a policy of neutrality. Under the leadership of Nicolae Titulescu it was decided that the second course was best;92 thus, they ignored not only the German card (Germany had made a number of attempts to achieve closer relations with Romania) but also the Italian one (due to the mistakes made by the same Titulescu during the Italo-Abyssinian conflict).93 In September 1932 the negotiations began again in Geneva, and again failed.94 Litvinov and Victor Cadere, the Romanian representative, reached agreement on every point except the protocol of signature, almost exactly as Sturdza and Stomoniakov had in January 1932. The debate centered around the word “existing” (the Soviet proposed Draft stated “The establishment of such relations does not bring any prejudice to the existing litigation between the two Contracting Parties about Bessarabia”).95 Although at one point it seemed that the two parties had found a middle course, using the word “conflicts” (referring to present and future conflicts) but omitting “existing”, in the end the Romanians backed off from the new wording, which the Soviets accepted, and no pact was signed.96 The Soviets’ main aim during the 1932 negotiations was to obtain Romanian recognition of the existence of a conflict between them, and they were ready to offer a number of different formulas in this sense, all with the same meaning. Conversely, the Romanians refused to sign anything that used words like conflict, litigation, or dispute — with one notable exception, justified by Romanian internal political ma-

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Moldova, a Romanian Province neuvers.97 At the same time, in response to French and Polish pressure for an agreement, both sides blamed each other for the failure to reach agreement. Litvinov released a polemical press account of the talks, charging that Bucharest had reneged on an acceptable formula and was responsible for the failure. In an interview published by Izvestia on October 16, 1932, he characterized the negotiations as follows: Romania proposed formulas for the non-aggression undertaking which might be interpreted as implicit recognition by the Soviet government of the occupation of Bessarabia. We emphatically rejected these formulas, and for our part proposed others in which it was clearly stated that the USSR undertakes that in any circumstances would not resort to force to settle any question in dispute.98 Still, the truth was somewhat different, as presented by Jiri Hochman: Nothing shows that at any point of these negotiations between July 1931 and September 1932 the Soviets professed their willingness to sign with Romania a pact similar to those signed with other countries, and no one can seriously blame the Romanian government for striving for the same guarantees that were not missing in other contemporary treaties of nonaggression”.99 In a certain sense, the 1931-1932 negotiations could be characterized as a “war of words”. The main task of each side was to either avoid the inclusion of certain words or to press for the inclusion of certain words. At least it was not a war of guns. By the beginning of 1933, Romanian Foreign Minister Nicolae Titulescu was already considering that, in order to Romania’s improve her international position, and to counter-balance her isolation in the Bessarabian question, it would be necessary to improve relations with the Soviet Union. One reason was his fear of fascism — not only in Europe (he clearly foresaw the danger that fascism and Nazism posed to the Versailles Peace system) but also at home (represented by the Iron Guard). He was quite concerned about the Romanian fascists, who considered him among the persons most responsible for Romania’s crises; and it seems that this fear influenced his policy of rapprochement with the Soviets: the only ones who could counterbalance fascism. In a well-known remark, Titulescu said: “A telegram sent to him by Litvinov, saying that the Soviet Union and Romania reciprocally guarantee their borders by military means, would suffice to end fascism in Romania”.100 However, Titulescu (like many other leaders in his day) failed to take into account the possibility of a Soviet-German alliance, which later materialized — proving that ideology is much weaker than strategic needs or opportunities. Titulescu was a famous Romanian diplomat and, because of his involvement with the League of Nations (he had twice been its President), a first class international personality. His approach to the Bessarabian question had been based, at least

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theoretically, on staunch opposition to any political act by which the Romanians would recognize the existence of a conflict between their country and the Soviet Union. But this position did not mean that he was opposed to an agreement with the Soviets, quite to the contrary. He knew that the international status of Bessarabia was questionable because of the Soviets’ refusal to recognize the Union but also for other reasons (he was not completely satisfied with the legality of Bessarabia’s decision for union, and the 1920 Treaty did not enter into force because Japan had not ratified it).101 Understanding that a Soviet blessing of the union was not likely to come without concessions from Romania, Titulescu tried to normalize relations with the hope of at least limiting the Soviet propaganda. It is also possible that Titulescu had a much greater aim in normalizing SovietRomanian relations, namely that of fostering the alliance between France and the Soviets against Germany. The main problem with such an alliance was that, in case of a German attack against France, the Soviet troops had to cross through either Poland or Romania in order to effectively help France, but neither of the two was willing to risk having the Red Army on her territory. This situation made the FrenchSoviet alliance practically ineffective for the French, who could not benefit from Soviet military aid (even if the Soviets were indeed willing to provide such aid). Still, as a terrain for massive Soviet military movements westward to engage Germany in the case of a Franco-German war, Romania was, for purely geographical reasons, of rather limited importance. On the other hand, the Romanian territory would be very important if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia, as it would provide an easy route for Soviet troops going to support the Czechoslovaks.102 The normalization of Soviet-Romanian relations might be seen as an important step in solving this problem, although there was still a long way before convincing the Romanians, whom did not forget the experience of 1877-1878, to agree to the transit of Soviet troops through Romanian territory.103 One of the elements in Titulescu’s strategy for reaching an agreement with the Soviets was to rely on the collective weight of the Little Entente, to whom he proposed a common recognition of the Soviet Union, hoping to receive from the Soviets (in exchange for greatly improving their security) certain concessions regarding Bessarabia. He believed that he could take advantage of the new international situation, which was not very favorable for the Soviet Union. The way for the Soviet Union to improve its position in the world was to bolster her position in Europe. At the same time, Czechoslovakia’s position also played an important role in the SovietRomanian negotiations. Because of her conflict with Germany, Czechoslovakia realized that normalizing relations with the Soviets had become more and more a necessity. For that to happen, she needed the approval of both Romania and Yugoslavia, the other two members of the Little Entente. The main obstacles were the Bessarabian question, in the case of Romania, and the help given to the White Russians, in the case of Yugoslavia. The need for the Little Entente to show real solidarity regarding her members’ foreign policy prevailed for a while over the Czechoslovak wish to establish normal relations with the Soviets.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province The first occasion Titulescu found for reaching any sort of agreement with the Soviets was during the Geneva disarmament conference, in May 1933. The bridge between the two sides had been the definition of aggression, where Titulescu and Litvinov reached a compromise: Titulescu backed the Russian proposal after the Russians agreed to his suggestion that “the territory covered by the new criteria of aggression should be understood to be that over which a state exercised his de facto authority”.104 On July 3, 1933 the Soviet Union and seven of her neighbors, including Romania, signed the “Convention for the Definition of Aggression” in London. The following formula was adopted: “The act of invading the territory of a state constitutes essentially an act of aggression, independently of any declaration of war. Territory must be understood here to mean the territory over which a state exercises its authority in fact.”105 According to the Conventions106 and based on the definition of aggression agreed in Geneva, the violation of the Bessarabian frontier by the Soviets was to be considered an act of aggression. Romanian scholars consider that, during the negotiations leading up to the signing of the Convention, the Soviets agreed not to use force against Romania.107 At the same time, Titulescu and Litvinov came to a verbal agreement — a gentlemen’s agreement — by which they undertook not to raise publicly, in any form, the question of Bessarabia. Titulescu describes the signification of the Convention: I want to let you know what Litvinov repeatedly declared to me during the negotiations in London and in the presence of the Turkish Foreign Minister. “I know that by signing this convention we gave you Bessarabia. It is only because of the difficulties I would have to face with the public opinion in my country, and especially in Ukraine, that I cannot recognize this fact officially. But when I am obliging myself to never commit an aggressive act over Bessarabia and when I could not ask for a revision, and this is not only because the Soviet Union is not a member of the League of Nations but also because we are, in principle, opposed to revisionism, which means war, then what means could I possibly still use to get Bessarabia back?” I answered to Litvinov that Bessarabia was given to us by God and not by him. Then we both agreed that the best solution is to avoid any discussions on Bessarabia.108 The events of July 1940 show how much such a promise was worth. Litvinov also confirmed the existence of the gentlemen’s agreement, although for him it had a slightly different meaning: During the talks for the re-establishment of relations, Titulescu asked for our pledge that we would never raise the Bessarabian question by diplomatic means, which would be equivalent to our unequivocal recognition of Bessarabia’s annexation. In my turn, I proposed him an amendment regarding the ex-

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isting problems, which are still open. We both agreed to make no kind of pledges regarding Bessarabia.109 Almost all of Romanian historiography has praised Titulescu for obtaining the Soviets’ implicit recognition of the territorial integrity of Romania,110 but the situation was not that simple, as proved by the following two arguments. Firstly, during the following period the Soviets stubbornly avoided any mention of the Dniestr as the border between the two countries, indicating that, given the possibility of acting in order to retrieve Bessarabia at a later stage, they had no intention of officially recognizing Romanian sovereignty over Bessarabia. The entire business was more a matter of throwing dust in the eyes of the Romanian public (successfully, to be sure), as the Soviets proved fully in 1940. Secondly, the US example raises serious doubts over the Romanian thesis that, by recognizing as Romanian territory the entire area over which Romania exercised its administration, the Soviets would have to recognize Bessarabia as properly Romanian territory, as well. The diplomatic, political and economic relations existing between Romania and the US did not prevent the US government from considering Bessarabia as territory under Romanian occupation (rather than Romanian territory) and from avoiding any action that might have been interpreted as de facto recognition of Bessarabia’s union with Romania. In January 1934, during the Zagreb meeting of the Little Entente, the three member states decided that it would be opportune to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union as soon as the interests of each Member State, and especially of Romania, were met. The decision was a normal development along the lines that had been proposed during the Belgrade meeting and that had been followed closely in Titulescu’s policy towards the Soviets; it was also a result of the pressure coming from the French, and of the Hungarians’ eagerness to establish relations with the Soviets.111 After a number of preparatory meetings between Romanian and Soviet diplomats, Titulescu and Litvinov met in May 1934 with the purpose of reaching an agreement regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations between USSR and Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. Referring to these negotiations, Titulescu later wrote: I talked with Litvinov about all the questions related to the establishment of diplomatic relations. First, Bessarabia: “It is a question that you do not have to raise; this is because of the non-aggression Convention, which defines the territory of each signatory as being the territory presently under its authority,” said Litvinov. Then I went further, asking “But what shall I do if the Soviet minister comes into my office for a peaceful discussion regarding the return of Bessarabia?” “You should simply kick him out.”112 Although Titulescu’s possible reaction to the Soviet ultimatum of June 26, 1940, remains simple speculation, it is patently clear that he could not have simply “kicked out” the Soviet representative.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province The negotiations between the two diplomats were not limited to the normalization of diplomatic relations. They also discussed the accession of the Soviet Union into the League of Nations and a mutual assistance pact between the Soviet Union, Romania and Poland. Titulescu also had to handle certain sensibilities coming from the Little Entente: Czechoslovakia was pressing for the immediate opening of diplomatic relations with the Soviets, while Yugoslavia was still opposed to establishing such relations at all. Finally, on June 9, 1934 the official exchange of letters between Titulescu and Litvinov regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations took place in Geneva, including also a commitment to nonintervention in each other’s internal affairs and an undertaking not to engage in propaganda activities counter to each other’s interests.113 Thus, the Romanians fell short of the goal of trading their recognition of the Soviet Union for formal Soviet renunciation of Bessarabia, which they had been hoping for since the early 1920s. In the end, Titulescu had to abandon his April 1933 position that “there could be no question of an exchange of diplomatic representatives between Bucharest and Moscow until the Soviet government formally acquiesced in Romania’s possession of Bessarabia”.114 On the other hand, a number of scholars consider that the Soviets did have to make at least one important concession regarding Bessarabia: according to Litvinov’s own interpretation, the Soviet passing over in silence of the Bessarabian question constituted a de facto recognition of the province’s possession by Romania.115 Still, as proved by later events, it was only a temporary solution, giving a sort of win-win perspective to the deal. The Soviets, pressed between Germany and Japan, were able to improve their position in Europe by establishing diplomatic relations with Romania and Czechoslovakia, without making any important concessions. Although they failed to get Romania’s official agreement regarding the existence of a territorial conflict between the two, they only had to agree to keep silent over the Bessarabian question and not to recognize Bessarabia’s union with Romania. On the other hand, all the Romanians achieved was a temporary let up in the Soviet propaganda regarding Bessarabia. As happens so many times in diplomacy, neither state fully achieved its objectives and they had to come to a compromise, one that each of them presented to the domestic audience in a different manner. The fact is that the Soviets proved able, a few years later, to take full advantage of the standoff regarding Bessarabia, while the Romanians went through the bitter experience of losing it once again. The final step in the establishment of diplomatic relations between Romania and the Soviet Union took place in December 1934, when the first Romanian minister to Moscow officially presented his letters of accreditation. From the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations to the 1940 Crisis During the ensuing period, relations between the two states diversified and improved. Leaving aside the Bessarabian question, papered over in diplomatic si-

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lence, there was real progress in bilateral relations. The Romanians were able to recover a part of the National Treasury from the Soviet authorities (the Archives, not the gold reserves), and the border skirmishes along the Dniestr and the Soviet propaganda offensives regarding Bessarabia came to an end. The Soviet aims in Romania are best described in the instructions sent to Mihail Semionovici Ostrovski, the Soviets’ first representative in Bucharest: We will be awaiting from you characterizations of the political leaders and information on the movements inside the political structure of certain parties and groups. Here, we are working hard for the re-establishment of direct railroad and telegraphic connections with Romania. . . . We have not yet taken a definitive official solution regarding the return of the Archives, but the general mood in our People’s Soviet is that it should not take too long for the Archives to be returned. Ciuntu insists on the re-establishment of connections with Romania over the Dniestr. He wishes to settle this question before the complete reconstruction of the bridge over the Dniestr. We have no objections regarding the establishment of connections over the Dniestr. I foresee that, when this happens, the denomination of the Dniestr will become a problem. The Romanians would insist that the Dniestr is the border between Romania and the Soviet Union. We would not agree to call it border. The Romanians would not accept any other denomination, as a demarcation line or administrative line. For this reason, I think that in our documents we would simply use “the course of the Dniestr River” and “the right and the left bank of the Dniestr River”. . . . In principle, we are connected with Romania by certain common objectives regarding foreign affairs. Friendly relations might be established through these common objectives and hopefully, the two parties will do their best in order not to exaggerate or to aggravate the divergences regarding the regulation of the pending matters.”116 The above instructions are among the best proofs that the Soviets were only postponing the Bessarabian question and that they were not only far from recognizing Bessarabia as a Romanian territory but also from signing anything that the Romanians might use in this sense, even after the re-establishment of diplomatic relations. In September 1934, the USSR became a member of the League of Nations. The famous Article No. 10 in the Status of the League of Nations (which refers to the recognition of the territorial integrity and political independence of all members) underscored the implied Russian recognition of the Romanian border. But, as will be shown later, the same Article No. 10 could be understood in the case of Romania as covering all her borders with the exception of Bessarabia.117 As early as February 8, 1935, a Railroad Convention for the re-establishment of

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Moldova, a Romanian Province direct connections through Tighina and Tyraspol was signed in Moscow between Romania and the Soviets.118 As a gesture of friendship, the Soviets on two occasions returned to Romania (in February and May 1935) parts of the National Treasury, namely the National and some private Archives, some of the documents and manuscripts belonging to the Romanian Academy, and the remains of Dimitrie Cantemir, one of the most famous Romanian voevods, who had died two centuries earlier while under forced exile to Russia.119 Also along the lines of collaboration, a Payment Agreement was signed between the two states in Bucharest, on February 15, 1936. The next step Titulescu took was to negotiate a Mutual Assistance Treaty (MAT) with the Soviets, following the French example.120 Opposition to a Romanian-Soviet pact was great, not only at the international level (Germany, Hungary and Italy) but domestically, too. And, although Romanian scholars have avoided stressing this point, the necessity of such a treaty for Romania remains doubtful: against whom was it supposed to be directed, when the Soviet Union was Romania’s principal enemy? Analyzing both Romania’s position and Titulescu’s possible goals, Anthony Komjathy states: Realistic political considerations thus deny that changes in the demands of Romania’s security necessitated a mutual assistance treaty with the Soviet Union, unless Titulescu hoped that he could incorporate into the treaty Soviet guarantees for Romania’s territorial integrity [which the Soviets clearly opposed]. The words “mutual assistance” are misleading, “non-aggression” truly describes the purpose of the Titulescu-Litvinov negotiations. . . . If Titulescu could have incorporated Soviet guarantees into any kind of treaty, he would have done the greatest service to his country . . . He tried and failed.”121 The signing of the French-Soviet Mutual Assistance Treaty on May 2, 1935, boosted Titulescu’s position.122 After long negotiations (i.e., internal political maneuvers) and pressure on the Romanian political establishment, on July 15, 1935 Titulescu received from the government (i.e., King Carol II) a first mandate to negotiate and sign a Mutual Assistance Treaty with the Soviets, based on recognition of the territorial status quo. Titulescu hoped for a French-sponsored accommodation with the Soviets, so that he sought to underwrite his negotiations with Litvinov by a precise French commitment that would replace explicit Soviet recognition of the disputed Bessarabian frontier.123 Still, in the end he achieved neither objective. As soon as September 1935, during a series of meetings with Litvinov in Geneva, he expressed Romania’s readiness to sign a MAT with the Soviets; but Litvinov not only gave him a negative answer but also made a public statement to that effect on October 24, placing Titulescu in a very awkward position at home.124 However, Litvinov’s refusal was not due to the fact that, for him, the main obstacle in bilateral relations was Romanian internal politics (meaning the growing popularity of the extreme right, which openly criticized the communism),125 but a result of the general Soviet policy towards Romania.

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Although Titulescu was able to convince the King of the necessity of signing an MAT with the Soviets, he did not persuade the Romanian public, which was aware of the danger inherent in allowing the Red Army to cross through Romania. In order to satisfy the public, the Romanian government had to issue a statement officially declaring that there were no negotiations going on to that effect. By the same token we have the answer Titulescu gave during the debates of the Romanian Parliament, on December 13, 1935, to the interpellations made by Gheorghe Bratianu: he denied the existence of any secret negotiations with the Soviets but insisted very convincingly on the necessity to maintain good relations with them.126 Still, it must have been difficult indeed, even for a person of Titulescu’s abilities, to find any wriggle room between the promises made to the French and to the Romanian public. It is strange at the very least that Titulescu seemed inclined to trust the Soviets’ word while most Romanians were against such a deal. Probably he was thinking of a Soviet-Romanian alliance, which would be highly advantageous to Romania and was quite possible at that time — if we omit the Bessarabian question. Speculating, of course, the big question is: was he ready to give up Bessarabia (or at least, a part of it) in order to greatly enhance Romania’s security? If so, could he really be blamed for this initiative? And, first and foremost, could the Soviets be trusted to desist in their claims over the rest of Bessarabia, once they had received part of it (either in the south or north)? During 1935 Titulescu took one more initiative that triggered a strong reaction against him both at home and in Europe’s capitals: he pushed Romania into the forefront of the Ethiopian debate, becoming the greatest defender of the authority of the League and promoting sanctions against Italy, although Romania had nothing to gain from such a policy.127 It was one of the moments when Titulescu proved to be too great an asset for Romanian foreign policy, indeed too heavy a one, simply pulling her down. Another element greatly complicating Romania’s situation was the possibility that the Red Army would cross through Romanian territory without the agreement of the Romanian government, in order to back Czechoslovakia or France. That would place Romania in a very awkward position: to attack the Soviets would mean to help Germany against France while, conversely, giving free access to the Red Army would mean risking the loss of Bessarabia. In the words of the Czech foreign minister, Kamil Krofta (on April 15, 1936), “The USSR made known to Prague that in case of an attack on Czechoslovakia, the Russian Army would come to help, through Romania, with or without the consent of the Cabinet in Bucharest”.128 The main question for the Romanians was whether the Soviets were indeed prepared to offer military support to France or Czechoslovakia, or if they were simply bluffing. Adding to Romania’s woes was France’s failure to react to Germany’s remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936 (in violation of the stipulation against remilitarization in the Versailles Peace Treaty — France was neither prepared nor willing to start a war with Germany). This failure to react caused deep concern in East Central Europe and raised questions in Romania regarding the French ability to intervene in her favor in case of war.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province In order to have the solid support of the government in his negotiations with the Soviets, Titulescu went to Bucharest in July 1936. After a meeting of the leading ministers, on July 14, his mandate to negotiate the MAT with the Soviets was reconfirmed. A number of other decisions were also taken, expressing the solidarity of the entire government with the foreign policy promoted by Titulescu: the press attacks against the Soviet Union should stop and articles favorable to the Soviet-Romanian alliance should be published; the alliance would be officially backed at the meetings of the National Liberal Party; and the influence of foreign representatives in Bucharest over Romanian public opinion should be limited.129 It was more than enough for Titulescu, and he went back to Montreaux to meet Litvinov and present him with a concrete draft of the MAT. On July 21, 1936, Titulescu and Litvinov (taking advantage of both countries’ participation in the Black Sea Straits Conference) signed a protocol containing the basic principles of a mutual assistance pact. Romanian historiography considers that, by this document, for the first time a Soviet official recognized explicitly that the Romanian border was on the Dniestr, and considers it one of the greatest achievements in Titulescu’s policy.130 The Soviet Government recognizes that by virtue of the these different obligations for assistance, the Soviet troops may never cross the Dniestr without a formal request from the Romanian Royal Government and, at the same time, the Romanian Government recognizes that Romanian troops may never cross the Dniestr against the USSR without a formal request from the Soviet Government. At the request of the Romanian Royal Government, Soviet troops would be obliged to retreat immediately from the Romanian territory East of the Dniestr, the same as, at the request of the Soviet Government, Romanian troops would have to retreat immediately from the Russian territory West of the Dniestr. 131 Still, can we consider that the agreement provided for a Soviet guarantee to Romania against any aggressor and settled the question of Soviet military presence on Romanian territory in a manner compatible with Romania’s sovereignty? On the one hand, the biggest threat to Romania was posed by the Soviet Union. Although some scholars consider it “a great diplomatic victory for Romania”,132 it should be clear that, in order to obtain satisfaction on these points, Titulescu again dropped the demand for explicit Russian recognition of Bessarabia. On the other hand, the Soviets kept to their course of signing nothing that might be interpreted as recognition of Bessarabia’s belonging to Romania. Words like border, frontier, integrity, sovereignty are not to be found in the Draft. Litvinov simply decided to use the word Dniestr, as suggested by Krestinsky after the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, with reference to the East and West banks of the Dniestr. He clearly did so in order to avoid allowing the Romanians to claim that they had secured the Soviet recognition of Bessarabia’s union.

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After signing the draft, Litvinov asked for the necessary time to get the approval of his superiors for the Pact, and the two agreed that the actual Pact should be signed in September. When everything seemed to be on the right track, a sudden modification in Romanian internal policy changed the situation: Titulescu was dismissed as foreign minister on August 29 and replaced by Victor Antonescu.133 It seems that those who orchestrated his dismissal had no idea, at the time, of the existence of the aforementioned Draft and it would be interesting to speculate what their position would have been, had they known about the Montreaux agreement. As soon as Litvinov learned of Titulescu’s dismissal, he considered the MAT to be a lost cause and canceled any new discussions, not only on the specific Draft but also on the general idea of a Soviet-Romanian MAT. It may be that he thought he’d gone too far in the Montreaux Draft and so took advantage of Titulescu’s dismissal in order to save face in Moscow. It might also be that he considered Victor Antonescu’s replacement of Titulescu as Foreign Minister (a replacement decided in Titulescu’s absence) as the beginning of a new Romanian foreign policy (or as the end of the new Romanian policy of promoting closer relations with the Soviets).134 After Titulescu’s replacement as foreign minister, the Romanians tried, or so they claimed, to continue Titulescu’s orientation towards closer relations with the Soviets, but without success.135 In practical terms, Romanian foreign policy took a new direction: that of neutrality. Victor Antonescu tried to revive the old project of a non-aggression pact between the two countries but the Soviets refused. Less than one year after the Montreaux convention, the Russian representatives reopened the discussion of the Bessarabian problem. During the Paris International Exposition, inside the Soviet pavilion two big maps were presented on which Bessarabia was shown not as a part of Romania but as separate territory. At the same time, Litvinov publicly stated in July 1937 that: We have to defend ourselves against the agreements Titulescu made us sign. We want Bessarabia’s potential to become Russian, not German. I would also like to let you know that we will try to retrieve Bessarabia by using every juridical and military means possible.136 The Soviet press broke its silence on Bessarabia, referring again to the existence of a territorial conflict. Significantly, the first border incidents in a long period were again occurring along the Dniestr. It was definitely the end of Titulescu and Litvinov’s gentlemen’s agreement. Still, in the following years the Soviets refrained from putting out too much propaganda on the Bessarabian question, waiting to see how the European events developed. The Romanians were, if not satisfied, at least resigned to the situation along Bessarabia’s border and hoped that the situation would remain fundamentally unchanged. They were mistaken. Relations continued to oscillate during 1938. The main impetus for worsening relations, apart from the Bessarabian question, was the anti-communist propaganda of the Romanian Iron Guard, which was none too welcome to the Soviets. Another

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Moldova, a Romanian Province event that had negative consequences was the Butenko affair, when the Soviet representative in Bucharest defected and the Soviet government blamed the Romanian authorities. However, due to the issue of Soviet aid to Czechoslovakia against Germany, negotiations between Romania and the Soviet Union did take place and the chances of reaching an agreement on the Bessarabian issue appeared to have improved. France and Czechoslovakia pressed both parties to come to an agreement.137 On the other hand, they were both keen to avoid openly acting against Germany. Romania’s position was even more complicated due to her alliance with Poland, which was clearly opposed to any Romanian-Soviet rapprochement. The Poles endeavored to exact a promise from King Carol that he would never permit a Russian crossing, even if Czechoslovakia might be vitally endangered.138 Meanwhile, an agreement had practically been achieved to allow the crossing through Romanian aerial space, during spring and summer 1938, of a number of Soviet military airplanes that had been bought by the Czechs (it is unclear how many such airplanes there were, in total; estimates range from 50 to 300). A critical episode in Soviet-Romanian relations occurred in September 1938, on the eve of the Munich Conference. Czechoslovakia was one of Romania’s allies and the Romanian government tried to help her resist the German claims to a part of its territory (the Sudeten region). As the Little Entente was not directed against Germany, Romania was not committed to militarily helping Czechoslovakia in case of a German attack but could offer protection in the event of a Hungarian attack (which seemed probable), and that allowed the Czechs to concentrate their efforts on one front. Romania also sought to ascertain the Yugoslav position regarding any potential aggression against Czechoslovakia (a position that was clearly more reserved, due to the “real politik” promoted by the Yugoslav leaders), hoping not to find herself alone against Germany.139 Still, at that time what seemed to be the biggest help Romania could offer Czechoslovakia was to allow the transit of Soviet troops through its territory. Granting passage to the Red Army posed a great threat to Bessarabia; it undoubtedly would have made Romania a target of the German air force and would have incurred the risk of her involvement in the war much sooner than would happen otherwise.140 And, even worse, in case of a German victory on the Czechoslovak front, Romania would have become a war theater as the Red Army retreated through Romania with the Germans in close pursuit. Although all previous negotiations between the Soviets and Romania on this topic had failed due to the conflict over Bessarabia, in the summer of 1938 the Romanian position changed considerably. By the end of August, Litvinov had information regarding a possible change in the Romanian attitude towards the transit of Soviet troops through her territory. During a meeting between Litvinov and von Schulenburg, on August 27, the former said, “Poland and Romania are unlikely to grant transit rights to Soviet troops”, but Litvinov replied that Romania was “very greatly worried about the future, as she was afraid of being next on the list”.141 In fact, Litvinov was not mistaken; during the Little Entente Foreign Ministers Conference at Bled on August 22 the Romanian

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Petrescu-Comnen told his Czech counterpart, Kamil Krofta, that he had decided to inform Litvinov that Romania would not interfere with Soviet aircraft flying high over her territory into Czechoslovakia.142 This was already a clear concession from Romania, as the ramifications of Soviet military transit through Romanian air space were many (supposing a Soviet airplane hit by the Germans landed on Romanian territory; or supposing a dozen Soviet planes landed in Bessarabia, citing technical failures). In early September the Romanian government offered, during the talks in Geneva between Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen and Litvinov, free passage for Soviet military planes going to support the Czechoslovak army in case of a German attack.143 However, Litvinov insisted that he needed official Romanian consent for the transit of Soviet troops, too. Also, in order to hamper the Czech and French efforts to soften the Romanian position regarding the transit issue, Litvinov stated that Russia would come in only after France did so, and that she would then request the League of Nations Council to “recommend” Romania allow the passage of Russian planes and troops.144 According to one source, it seems that, when the situation deteriorated for the Czechs, Romania took the final step, agreeing on September 24 to the transit of Soviet troops both via the Romanian railway system and its air space, and even more, explicitly renouncing all conditions and Soviet guarantees.145 The Romanian proposal confirms Louis Fischer’s statement that, “clearly neither Poland nor Romania would make an ‘anticipatory’ engagement, but Romania might have consented at the moment of the crisis by closing her eyes without an ‘engagement’”.146 However, during September 1938, Moscow made no effort to open serious negotiations with Romania regarding troop transit, thus proving her disinterest in Czechoslovakia’s fate and ignoring as well an opportunity of finding a diplomatic solution for the Bessarabian question.147 The main question is, why was Romania willing to allow transit for Soviet planes and possibly troops? There was, of course, French and Czechoslovak pressure on the Romanian government to do so, but this pressure had been in place for several years, with no results. Besides, there was German and Polish pressure against such a move. More probably, the Romanian leaders understood the danger of having Czechoslovakia divided by the Germans and considered that, if this were permitted, Romania would become next on the list, sooner or later. One more possibility, at least theoretically, is that the Romanian leaders were simply bluffing in order to please their allies, knowing that the Soviets were unwilling to go to war with Germany on Czechoslovakia’s behalf. However, if we consider the Soviet propaganda machine and the previous threats that the Soviet Army would cross through Romania with or without her agreement, seems unlikely that the Romanian leaders were bluffing. Still, there were no reports of massive troop concentrations at the Soviet western borders and Romanian anti-aerial artillery was scarce (if not non-existent), so that that they could not effectively stop Soviet planes from crossing Romanian territory in any event. Whatever the reasons behind the Romanian move and the

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Moldova, a Romanian Province secrecy that surrounded it, one fact is clear: whatever the risks, the Romanian government was willing and ready to help their Czechoslovak ally in its conflict with Germany.148 In 1939 Viaceslav Molotov, the new chief of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, reaffirmed publicly the Russians’ claims over Bessarabia but this time he also took decisive action. The famous Ribbentrop-Molotov Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939 was a great success for the Soviets and it meant the first firm step toward retrieving Bessarabia.149 The additional Secret Protocol clearly stated the Soviet “interest” in Bessarabia, meaning that when the Soviets moved to occupy it the Germans would do nothing to stop them.150 As an immediate result of the Pact, Romania found herself in almost complete isolation, and what allies she had were in no position to help her against a Soviet attack. In only a few days time, Romania’s position became even worse, as Poland was attacked by Germany. The ensuing division of Poland between Germany and the Soviets clearly indicated the future of Romania, which was considered the next victim on the list. As the war went on, it became more and more clear that Romania’s hopes for Western intervention in case of a Soviet attack on Bessarabia were vain. The only Western power still fighting, Great Britain, was more interested in provoking a war between Germany and the Soviets over Romania than in defending Romania’s integrity, and so they tried to boost and to bolster the Soviet territorial claims over Romanian land. The Romanian government tried two approaches to counter-balance the Soviet move. The first was to initiate closer relations with Germany, which they finally realized was the only European power with the motivation and the ability to defend Romanian interests at that time.151 However, because of the existing good relations with France and Britain, the notion of a rapprochement with Germany was still considered with some restraint by many in the Foreign Ministry and by King Carol II; therefore, there could be only a gradual rapprochement, built on a number of economic, geopolitical and strategic factors.152 The second approach was to continue the earlier policy of achieving a position of neutrality between the Great Powers, with the risk of having no back-up in case of a possible Soviet attack. In the aftermath of the French defeat, the Soviets took decisive action regarding the Baltic States and Romania. The Soviets, after a series of negotiations with the Germans regarding their territorial claims over Romania (which included not only Bessarabia but also the entire Bukovina), received Germany’s blessing (with the notable exception of southern Bukovina, the Germans considering that only its northern parts should go to the Soviets). On June 26, 1940, Molotov handed over to Gheorghe Davidescu, the Romanian minister to Moscow, an ultimatum demanding the evacuation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. After two Crown Councils, in which all of Romania’s possible alternatives were analyzed, the Romanians decided to accept the Soviet conditions and to withdraw their army and administration from Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, beginning on June 29. This was a profoundly painful experience for Roma-

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nia, and the Red Army did everything possible to hinder the Romanian retreat in order to capture as much matériel and as many people as possible.153 They also occupied the Herta region (about 200 sq. miles, and a population of about 50,000 people in 1940),154 which belonged to Romania long before 1918. This seemed to close the Bessarabian question. Some scholars argue that, in fact, the Soviets asked for more than Bessarabia in order to force a Romanian-Soviet war that the Soviets could not lose, and at the end of which they could have won control not only over Bessarabia and Bukovina but also over the Danube Delta and probably gained a common border with Bulgaria too.155 Over the years many Romanians have asked themselves how it was possible for Romania to give up Bessarabia, and a few weeks later, northwestern Transylvania and southern Dobrudja, without a single gunshot.156 Many of them blame the former playboy King Carol II (and the Royal camarilla, or private cabinet) for this situation. And not without reason, as he did destroy the entire Romanian political system by subordinating and later outlawing the political parties. Still, it was not only the King’s fault. Although it was clear to everyone in the political establishment that Carol lacked the skills and inclinations necessary to promote Romania’s interests (although he seemed resourceful enough at promoting his own), it was the political infighting that had allowed him to come back from exile and then promoted him to the top rank in the country’s political and economic life. Thus, the political parties and especially their leaders, with very few exceptions after the mid 1930’s,157 also played a part in bringing Romania to disaster; instead of fighting for the well-being of the country they focused on currying favor with the King and closed their eyes to the illicit deals being made by the royal camarilla, deals that left the Romanian Army in a deplorable state in 1940.158 In 1941 Romania declared war against the Soviet Union, in order to retrieve the territories lost in June 1940 and to avenge the excessive harshness of Bessarabia’s evacuation. (Even Hungary’s takeover of northwestern Transylvania and Bulgaria’s of southern Dobrudja, painful as they were for the Romanians, were clearly less barbarous in execution.) The Romanians were shocked to find that their country’s “powerful” or “stable” international position had been nothing but empty words from the political leadership, and the Soviets amplified the Romanians’ bitterness. They charged in, in advance of the agreed plan of deployment, and took or destroyed everything they could. And, although not many scholars stress this point, the humiliation and wish for revenge they inspired (along with military and political reasons) fueled the Romanians’ drive forward in 1941, prompting them to cross the Dniestr after liberating Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. Thus in 1941, after the Germans attacked the Soviet Union, Romania recovered the territories lost in June 1940; then, in 1944, she lost them again, but this time for a much longer period. In conclusion it should be said that, although most Romanian historians consider that it would have been possible to obtain Russian recognition of the Union in 1920-1921 in exchange for neutrality and recognition of the communist government,

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Moldova, a Romanian Province or in exchange for a Treaty of Neutrality and the renunciation of Romanian financial claims on the National Treasury in Moscow, this was never the case.159 The Soviets had no intention, at any point, of relinquishing Bessarabia. All their suggestions of a compromise during the early 1920s were simply efforts to stall for time, and they succeeded. While the Soviets gradually consolidated their international position, the Romanians were unable to keep the pace with them and failed to make the necessary adjustments to their policy towards the Soviets. However, in fairness to the Romanian government it should be said that, in fact, keeping pace with the Soviet Union proved difficult even for the US some years later. The Bessarabian Treaty, the only international document recognizing Romania’s rights over Bessarabia, offers one of the best illustrations of Romanian policy towards the Soviets. It was a real diplomatic coup when it was signed, but Soviet diplomatic successes prevented the Treaty from coming into force, so that the Romanians were unable to use it. While the Romanian representatives had a great advantage over the Soviets in 1919, some twenty years later the situation had changed completely. The only attempt to improve bilateral relations came from Titulescu, but it was already too late to make a difference. Even if Romania had signed a special Treaty with the Soviets for the recognition of the Bessarabian Union, or had accepted and won a plebiscite, for how long would that have been respected? Stalin proved many times that there was no treaty he could not break, and a treaty with Romania would not have been any different. As for the plebiscite question, and the possibility of Romania voluntarily accepting a partition of Bessarabia, this author’s opinion is that the Soviets almost certainly would have contested the results of such a plebiscite in Bessarabia and would have considered the division to be only temporary, taking advantage of the first opportunity to retrieve all of Bessarabia plus a part of Bukovina. The White Russians and the Bessarabian Question One aspect that has been dealt with only tangentially, both in Romanian and Soviet historiography, is the impact of the White Russians on the Bessarabian question.160 During the period immediately following the union of Bessarabia and especially during the Paris Peace Conference, there was an intense lobbying and propaganda campaign regarding Bessarabia waged by the White Russians. From their viewpoint, Bessarabia was Russian territory and they almost completely agreed with Moscow’s thesis. The White Russians had a number of other factors working against them: at certain times, they needed Romania’s help in fighting the communists (and so they had to make concessions regarding Bessarabia); Bolshevik propaganda underscored their non-representative status at Paris; and the great rivalry within their own ranks. For a better understanding of the activity of White Russians regarding Bessarabia a distinction should be made between those originating from Bessarabia itself (for which the term “Bessarabian White Russians” will be used) and the others.

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The former were, of course, the more active, especially at the propaganda level, having clearly greater interests in Bessarabia and therefore more reason to be unhappy with the Romanian administration. It should also be specified that the Bessarabian White Russians and their comrades (those fighting the communists) was made up not only of Russians but also of Ukrainians, Jews and, during 1918, even Romanians. As for their social status, they were almost identical with those of the White Russians based in the other provinces of the former Russian Empire. As already mentioned, after the Union and especially after the two very important reforms that followed (the administrative and the land reform), the Russian aristocracy and intellectuals living in Bessarabia had been hit hard and were left with very few options: they could go back to Russia (and some of the intellectuals actually did that); or accept the Romanian administration while retaining some of their privileges and land properties; or fight together with the other White Russians against the communist regime; or fight against the Romanian administration in Bessarabia. While the majority chose to stay and tried to build a life under the Romanian administration, accepting it at least theoretically, a number of them decided to contest the Romanian administration in Bessarabia. At first they used the same arguments as the Soviets but, at some point, understanding the international climate and the special attention given to minorities, they switched to the rights of the Russian minority living in Bessarabia, basing their action on the provisions inserted in the Bessarabian Treaty. As long as there was still some hope of defeating the communists, the White Russians’ efforts to retrieve Bessarabia were both powerful and numerous. As soon as it became clear that the Soviet regime could not be defeated, their actions (and their international standing) decreased. As soon as the Romanian troops entered Bessarabia in January 1918 and the idea of a union with Romania began to gain ground, the Bessarabian White Russians’ actions against the Romanian administration began. In order to counterbalance the Romanian intervention, many of them decided at first to collaborate either with the communists or with the White Armies fighting against the communists. As time passed and it became clear that the Romanians were intent on installing their administration in Bessarabia, the Bessarabian White Russians shifted their action from the local to the international level. Their first complaints were directed to General Scerbacev, the commander of the Russian troops on the Romanian front. He was asked to represent their interests with the Romanian government, and to the Allied representatives in Jassy, but without much success.161 Next, they acted in the leading European capitals, organizing in March 1918 in Geneva a society for propaganda against the Romanian annexation of Bessarabia. The founders of the Society were M. Gassenko and Ukrainian Baron Tichkevitch, both considered by French diplomats to be agents paid by Austria. They claimed the Society had about 100 members, all Ukrainians, and asked for an Austrian occupation of Bessarabia.162 The biggest move made by the Bessarabian White Russians in Romania took place on November 28, 1918, after the Sfatul Tserii voted for an unconditioned union

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Moldova, a Romanian Province with Romania. First came a Declaration of 10 deputies, limited to criticizing the manner of voting.163 Next, 40 deputies in the Sfatul Tserii, under the leadership of Vladimir Tsiganko, Ion Pascaluta and Nicolae Alexandru, sent a memorandum to the Romanian government contesting the legality of the vote expressed by the Sfatul Tserii and demanding the complete restoration of Bessarabia’s autonomy in ten days’ time.164 Their action, however justified it may have been, found no echo within the Romanian government — which decided that the November 27 decision for unconditioned union was legal. This response by the Romanian government meant the end of the very short-lived attempt to influence the fate of Bessarabia from within the Romanian political establishment. The opposition of the Bessarabian deputies, among whom were some Romanians, to the unconditioned union is normal and understandable. The Romanians in Transylvania felt the same way and held onto their autonomy for a period of time, understanding that union with Romania was one way in which they could preserve their values and choose the most suitable approach toward the process of legislative and institutional unification.165 But the government defeated them, albeit more gradually that was the case in Bessarabia. The main impetus driving the Bucharest government in this action was its fear (still relevant) that any form of autonomy for Transylvania or Bessarabia would harm the process of integrating the new provinces into Greater Romania and undermine the unity of the state. At the same time, those who were unhappy with the new Romanian administration in Bessarabia took refuge on Russian territory and organized themselves into a Committee for the Salvation of Bessarabia (CSB), with its headquarters in Odessa and under the leadership of Kroupenski, Schmidt, and Ion Pascaluta. Among the members of the CSB, one was accorded the status of Governor of Bessarabia and figured on the salary list for General Denikin’s staff.166 While maintaining close contacts with the deputies in the Sfatul Tserii who were unhappy with the workings of the Romanian administration, they also kept close relations with General Denikin’s army. They even organized a volunteer-based military CSB, financed by the landowners expropriated in Bessarabia, with the purpose of attacking Tyraspol.167 Due to the military operations in southern Russia, the CSB was short-lived and its leaders moved to Paris, hoping to better support their cause there. As soon as the military situation changed in favor of the White Army, during 1919, the CSB surfaced again in Odessa. The Bessarabian White Russians suffered from the same weakness as the rest of the White Russians’ movement: no unity in action. They were divided into protsarist and irredentist camps, some of them helping Petliura while others sided with Denikin, and so on. They were also divided over what should be the fate of Bessarabia, some of them wishing a return to the prewar situation while others wanted an autonomous Bessarabia within Russia. The Bessarabian Russians’ best-known action took place during the Paris Peace Conference and its main protagonists were Alexander N. Kroupenski, former marshal of the Bessarabian aristocracy,168 Alexander C. Schmidt, former mayor of

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Chisinau, and Vladimir Tsiganko, former deputy in the Sfatul Tserii. During the Conference, the Bessarabian White Russians and other White Russians (led by personalities like Maklakov, Sazonov, Ceaikovski, Count Lvov) who claimed to represent the interests of Russia, acted together in reference to the Bessarabian question. While the former were mainly in charge of anti-Romanian propaganda, writing a number of articles, pamphlets and memoranda designed to sway public opinion, the latter acted more in the direction of lobbying the representatives of the Great Powers taking part in the Conference. At the same time, the Bessarabian White Russians kept pressuring the French and British representatives in Odessa, constantly complaining about the Romanian treatment of Bessarabians. The two representatives became the target for a number of petitions, memoranda and complaints by all those unsatisfied with the Romanian administration in Bessarabia: landowners, postal workers, officials in the administration. Their accusations went as far as to state that their experience during the past months had done more for the Russification of Bessarabia than all the Russian government’s efforts over the years.169 And indeed, their activity proved quite successful in influencing the British representatives in Odessa, who were quick to blame the Romanian administration for the difficult situation in Bessarabia.170 The Romanian government needed the support of Frank Rattigan, the British Minister to Bucharest, to offset at least a part of this negative image.171 The White Russians succeeded in directing the attention of the Great Powers to the Bessarabian question, but only during 1919, by stressing that the decision by the Sfatul Tserii to unite with Romania had been non-representative. Further arguments they used to shore up their thesis were the points that Bessarabia was Russian territory liberated from the Turks in 1812, when Romania did not exist as a state (an argument making them unpopular with the Italians, who were claiming some former Italian territories from Austria-Hungary, and whose claims could have been rejected based on a similar argument); that Bessarabia became Russian territory according to an internationally recognized Treaty between the Sultan and the Czar; that the Romanians made up less than 50% of Bessarabia’s population; that the vote for unconditioned union on November 27 was dubious in nature; that Romania’s military occupation of Bessarabia was the only thing that made Bessarabia a part of Romania; and that under Romanian rule, the Russian minority were oppressed. As early as mid-January 1919, Sazonov, former Russian Foreign Minister, sent a first memorandum to the French government announcing an anti-Romanian insurrection;172 this was followed by another one on February 2, 1919, in which he clearly rejected the possibility of Romania taking part in the fight against the Bolsheviks in exchange for Bessarabia.173 The representatives of the so-called Russian Conference sent a new memorandum on Bessarabia to the Peace Conference on March 22, insisting on historical and demographic arguments, while asking for the unlimited postponement of a final decision regarding the fate of Bessarabia and defining as “necessary” the consultation of the people living in that region before any decision would be taken.174 Their position had been greatly improved by the successful begin-

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Moldova, a Romanian Province nings of the Kolchak offensive in April 1919, which brought about a change in the Great Powers’ attitude towards Bessarabia. Both France and the US became less willing to settle Bessarabia’s fate definitively. In fact, the French position moved from argumentation on ethnical and historical grounds to de facto negotiations with the White Russians, making Bessarabia a counter-partite of the Western aid for them.175 Even so, the decision by the Council of Four on May 27, 1919, to add a point to the dispatch sent to Admiral Kolchak (considered to be the authorized representative of the Russian people) was none too welcome: “Sixthly, the right of the Peace Conference to determine the future of the Romanian part of Bessarabia shall be recognized.”176 Still, this decision might be seen as both a win and a defeat for the Russians: a win because it referred to “the Romanian part of Bessarabia” instead of Bessarabia, which seems to suggest agreement with the Russian theory that Bessarabia was not entirely Romanian and that only a number of districts had a Romanian majority,177 and also because the fate of Bessarabia was to be decided by the Conference and not by Romania, which would have offered little chance of overturning the union. But at the same time it was a defeat, because the fate of Bessarabia was to be decided by the Peace Conference and not by its former holder, Russia. The next and the most important action taken by the White Russians regarding Bessarabia came on July 2, 1919, when one of their representatives (Maklakov) was given the opportunity to officially present to the Council of Five (the highest authority at the Conference) their view on Bessarabia.178 The biggest concession he was willing to make in order to resolve the Bessarabian question was a plebiscite in the districts in which the Moldavian population was predominant; these were identified in a later memorandum (July 24, 1919) as the four districts in the center of Bessarabia. As for the rest of the territory, he considered that it should belong to Russia. This compromise project was designed to satisfy the Western Allies, especially France, in order to continue benefiting from their assistance. Later, the Soviets would also use the idea of a plebiscite but they attached a slightly different meaning to it. Understanding that the US representatives were on their side and against the Romanians, the White Russians tried to take full advantage of the situation by targeting the American delegation (the only one willing to take action against the Romanian administration in Bessarabia) with an increased number of written and verbal protests. As an immediate result of one such protest, made by Kroupenski and Schmidt, the US Commissioners debated the problem of the upcoming election in Bessarabia for members to the Romanian Parliament; it was regarded as an act of sovereignty over a territory that did not belong yet, at least officially, to Romania.179 Likewise the Hungarians living in Transylvania, while preferring to abstain from voting altogether, tried to use the elections in the same sense. In fact, the problem of holding Romanian Parliamentary elections in Bessarabia was used as a propaganda tool not only in Paris but also in London, although with little success. As a result of this propaganda, an interpellation took place in the House of Commons on August 5,

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1919, by Sir Samuel Hoare, who observed that the British position of allowing the elections to take place actually meant that Romanian elections would take place in a country that was not yet ceded to Romania. The same Sir Hoare spoke out on November 27, 1919, but his initiative failed again to bear fruit.180 On July 24, 1919, the Russian delegation sent a new Note to the Peace Conference. After protesting once more against the actions of the Romanian government in Bessarabia, they proposed a compromise solution: that a plebiscite should be held in Bessarabia, but only in the four districts in which the Moldavian population made up the majority (the other parts clearly belonging to Russia). In order for the plebiscite to be held, a special Commission should be organized which should install a provisory regime in Bessarabia and which should oversee the execution of the plebiscite in the four districts.181 The greatest enemy of the White Russians’ diplomatic campaign was the defeat of their troops by the Bolsheviks. As soon as the Great Powers, and especially France and Great Britain, understood that the White Russians’ fight against the Bolsheviks was a lost cause, they shifted again towards Romania. In July 1919, as a result of the White Russians’ military defeat, France switched back to a more proRomanian position, avoiding any opposition to the projected Romanian elections in Bessarabia.182 However, it was not until the end of 1919, when their military situation worsened considerably, that some of the White Russians expressed a willingness to cede Bessarabia to Romania (albeit not for free). On September 29, 1919, through British intermediaries, Denikin transmitted to Bratianu that he was ready to accept the decision on Bessarabia taken by the Conference but that, in exchange, he required the Romanians’ help, as they had helped Petliura. Bratianu expressed his willingness to provide that help, but conditioned it on a formal agreement to that effect.183 However, due to the Red Army’s offensive, as well as the reticence of certain White Russian leaders (like General Wrangel) towards any deal that would exchange Bessarabia for Romanian military help, together with the Romanians’ unwillingness to involve themselves directly in the Russian Civil War, it was impossible to reach a formal agreement. The Russians continued to send notes to the Peace Conference, directed mostly to the American delegation, insisting on the danger posed by the upcoming elections in Romania. As has been noted, their activity was not in vain. The American delegation appeared to take at face value every word in the Russian notes and they brought the matter before the Peace Conference on October 10 and 11. (As an illustration of the White Russian actions, one of the Notes they sent at the end of August 1919 is presented at the end of this chapter as Annex No. 1.) It should be mentioned that during 1919 the Russian delegation, together with the Bessarabian Russians, sent some ten such notes or memoranda to the Peace Conference (the last one on November 15) and were more or less successful in their efforts as long as the American delegation was in Paris. Once the Americans left, the Bessarabian question found a quick solution and the White Russian machinations in favor of a Russian

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Bessarabia came to a clear failure. Of course, the events in Russia and the defeat of the White Armies also greatly diminished the White Russians’ influence in Paris. The most active party regarding the Bessarabian question during and after the Peace Conference had been the Bessarabian White Russians. Not only did they publish a number of articles and pamphlets on the topic but they also took on the difficult task of addressing the Conference when the other representative of the White Russians abandoned the Bessarabian cause. For example, only days after the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty, they sent a comprehensive Memorandum to the Japanese representatives at the Conference, entitled “Bessarabia; some thoughts on the occasion of its attribution to Romania”. The memorandum presented all the known arguments, and made much of the notion that Bessarabia had been given to Romania as recompense for Prime Minister Vaida-Voevod’s docility in heeding the Conference’s demands (in contrast to Bratianu), and asked for a plebiscite.184 Among the papers they printed, the best known are “Summary of Events in Bessarabia 1917-1918” and “Bessarabia and Romania”, both written by Kroupenski and Schmidt.185 Their main aim was to bring the Bessarabian question before the court of international public opinion in order to contest Romania’s rights. They did succeed in part, by laying down the foundation for future (more organized) propaganda activities orchestrated from Moscow. They also maintained close ties with the White Russians fighting in southern Russia, especially with General Denikin, through the same CSB that was still active in Odessa. During the military campaigns of 1919 and 1920, both Great Britain and France tried to persuade the Romanian government to intervene militarily against the Soviets. The Romanians refused, since Romania already controlled Bessarabia and had no other territorial claims in Russia; that disappointed the French, in particular. The White Russians’ attitude towards Romania, considering it more as an enemy than a potential ally, was one factor that influenced the latter to avoid any military intervention. The Romanians understood clearly that, in the event of the White Russians’ victory, they would still have to fight for Bessarabia. It was only as a result of French influence that the retreating White Russians found refuge in Romania against the Red Army at the end of 1919. The Romanians were not at all happy to have them on Romanian soil, and especially in Bessarabia. The Russian military refugees were disarmed and interned in special camps near the towns of Brasov and Oradea, some 300 miles from Bessarabia’s border, in order to keep them away from the fighting. It was more difficult for the Romanian government to deal with those White Russians who found refuge within Bessarabian territory. Not only were the Romanians subjected to the provocations of the Red Army during 1919-1921, but they also had to avoid any attempt by the White Russians living in Bessarabia to organize internal riots against the new administration. This task proved so difficult that, at one point, the Romanian Minister of War, charged with the internal security of Bessarabia, proposed that all foreigners be expelled — as there was no practical way to organize new camps for the refugees (approximately 16,000 people).186 The request was rejected, since there was also no way to send the

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refugees back to the east side of the Dniestr; and many of them either continued to live in Bessarabia or left to seek refuge in other countries (mainly in Yugoslavia). At the end of 1920, even after the Peace Conference took the final decision regarding the Bessarabian question and the White Russians were clearly defeated on the battlefront, the Bessarabian White Russians decided to carry on their actions in favor of a Russian Bessarabia. They organized secret societies and groups all across Europe and tried to keep the Bessarabian matter at the forefront of the public discourse and with the League of Nations. Still, as time passed, their material resources evaporated and their action weakened more and more. The most important and successful action they were able to organize, apart from publishing articles and books on Bessarabia, was to bring the Bessarabian matter into the debates at the League of Nations (late 1921). What is interesting is that, unlike the Soviets, the Bessarabian White Russians centered their propaganda efforts on the Romanian authorities’ treatment of the ethnic minorities in Bessarabia. In other words, instead of contesting the possession of Bessarabia, they focused on a more limited objective after 1920: that of improving the conditions of Russians living in Bessarabia. Without deigning to recognize the validity of the Bessarabian Treaty, they decided to take advantage of the stipulations in it. In fact, the idea of involving the League of Nations in matters regarding the treatment of minorities in Eastern Europe was picked up especially by the German (in the case of Poland) and Hungarian (in the case of Romania) minorities,187 and its usage by the Bessarabian White Russians was minor by comparison. On September 25 and October 27, 1921, Kroupenski sent two memoranda to the Secretary General of the League of Nations in Geneva. Calling himself president of the Bessarabian delegation, Kroupenski tried to show that the Romanian government was not respecting the stipulations of the Bessarabian and the Minorities Treaties, and asked for the League’s intervention: Romania actually takes advantage of all the stipulations included in the Bessarabian Treaty, considering Bessarabia as Romanian territory, as results from the vote of the Romanian Parliament in favor of Bessarabia’s annexation. In these conditions it is clear that Romania is bound by all the stipulations included in the Bessarabian treaty. By contrast, if Romania, taking advantage of the non-ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty, considers that its stipulations are not binding on her, all the humanitarian intentions of the Main Allied and Associated Powers are reduced to nothing. . . . Before the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty, the Bessarabian population should have been consulted through plebiscite. . . . As a result of the fact that there is no recognized and authorized representative of Russia in Romania, the interests of the Russians living in Bessarabia cannot be protected, no one being authorized to intervene in favor of the Russian nationals. The Russian minority is deprived of any rights stipulated for her in Art. No 3 of the Bessarabian Treaty. . . .

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Moldova, a Romanian Province The language used in school is mainly Romanian and there is only one Russian secondary school. By the same token, only the Romanian language is used in church, and only two Russian churches have been allowed to function in Chisinau. . . . Although the Russian nationals have the right to choose another citizenship and to keep their real estate, in reality they are forced to accept Romanian citizenship. The fact that the land reform was more radical in Bessarabia than in the other Romanian provinces (the compensation to be paid to the expropriated landowners is lower than in other provinces) is a means of discrimination against the Russians and is contrary to the stipulations of Art. No 5. . . . The League’s efforts should center on: the usage of Russian language in schools and church; halting the sending of young men as military recruits until they take their option for a citizenship; bringing an end to Romanian government’s action directed at confiscating real estate properties belonging to the Russian nationals and the return of those already expropriated.188 The two memoranda received a quick response from the League. Due to the formulation of the memoranda (Kroupenski insisted that he was appealing to the League only in order to find out if Romania had ratified the Bessarabian and the Minorities Treaties, in other words more on juridical than humanitarian grounds), he received an answer in a matter of days. Erik Colban answered the first memo on October 3, 1921, simply stating that the Bessarabian Treaty had not yet been ratified. As a result, Kroupenski slightly changed the argumentation in his second memorandum, focusing on the Minorities instead of the Bessarabian Treaty. On November 1, 1921, his second memorandum was answered, this time by Helmer Rosting, stating that Romania had ratified the Minorities Treaty. The action initiated by Kroupenski did have some consequences. On November 10, 1921, Helmer Rosting gave notice of the Russian action to the Romanian minister at the League, stating that he had not yet submitted the matter to the members of the League Council because he was waiting for the Romanians’ opinion regarding the matter. And indeed, on December 5, 1921, the Romanian government answered Rosting’s inquiry by sending a letter to Sir Eric Drummond, the Secretary General of the League. The letter expresses the viewpoint of the Romanian government, focusing on answers to Kroupenski’s accusations: Even though the Romanian government has not yet ratified the Bessarabian Treaty, it is scrupulously applying its provisions. . . . Kroupenski represents nobody; he is self-appointed as the representative of the Bessarabian people in Paris. . . . Kroupenski refuses to recognize the validity of the March 1920 decision of the Conference of Ambassadors and of the Bessarabian Treaty but he attempts to make use of them. . . . Not only the Russians but also all the other national minorities living in

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Romania cannot be defended (protected) by the representatives of other states accredited in Bucharest. . . . The Bessarabian Treaty does not oblige the Romanian government to sponsor Russian-language schools, and the said government has nothing against private schools. Still, at this time seven secondary schools for Russians and Ukrainians are functioning (with grants from the government), plus a number of secondary schools for Bulgarian, German, Armenian and Jewish students, as well as a considerable number of such primary schools. . . . As for the land reform, Romania could not treat representatives of an ethnic minority differently than Romanian subjects. [The land reform in Bessarabia was made by the Bessarabians and not by the Romanian government and this is why it was more radical than in other parts of Romania] . . . Why is Kroupenski complaining that the two Russian churches in Chisinau are not enough, when everybody knows that the Jewish people make up the majority of the city’s population? . . .189 The Secretary General of the League decided to address the matter and created a committee of three with the purpose of analyzing the memoranda sent by Kroupenski; the Chinese and Spanish representatives to the League’s Council, as well as one of his secretaries, were appointed. After further studying the matter during March 1922 the committee had been unanimous in deciding that there are no reasons to send the case to the League’s Council.190 Kroupenski’s action could be considered the last initiative of the Bessarabian White Russians that was not influenced by the Moscow government. Not only did the communists contest the Bessarabian Treaty but they considered it an unacceptable foreign intervention into Russian matters; therefore they did not consider, at any time, the possibility of using it the way Kroupenski did. The exploitation of the Bessarabian Treaty in order to make propaganda in favor of an autonomous Bessarabia, together with the desire to improve the existing situation of the Russians living in Bessarabia, were the main differences that set the White Russian propaganda apart from that of the Soviets. In the end Kroupenski’s actions felt short of achieving their purpose; the Bessarabian White Russians kept on publishing articles and pamphlets and sending memoranda to anyone they thought might help their cause, but with less and less response.191 Even as the Soviets (more resourceful and better orchestrated) gradually overshadowed their propaganda activities, they went on organizing Bessarabian societies in various European cities with the purpose of contesting Romanian authority in Bessarabia. Those societies, generally speaking, did not have much impact, and the only ones who paid them much heed were the representatives of the Romanian government. For example, in order to respond to the actions of the so-called Union of Bessarabian Emigrants, the Romanian government decided to organize a Bessarabian Club in Paris, on December 30, 1926. The Bessarabian question continued to be a topic for all the White Russians

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Moldova, a Romanian Province who found refuge in Europe or America. They insisted that Bessarabia was not Romanian territory and that “once the Soviet regime [fell], the first duty of the new Russia would be to modify the borders with Poland and to occupy Bessarabia, the Russian province stolen by the Romanians”.192 Similar signals came from Prague,193 Berlin, Paris, Bucharest and Chisinau. The trend of Bessarabian emigration went through a significant change during 1925, caused by the events related to the Tatar-Bunar uprising and the trial of those who took part in it, and by a more decisive and better organized infiltration of the White Russians by the communist machine (using money and political activists). A number of societies were organized under names like the Czecho-Bessarabian or Belgian-Bessarabian Friendship Society, made up mainly of Bessarabian students who kept in close contact with the developing events at home. They acted mainly by organizing congresses all over Europe, and at each one they demanded Bessarabia’s autonomy, while keeping up a steady stream of publications complaining about Bessarabia’s plight under Romanian administration.194 Their targets were the same as those of the Soviet propaganda: left-wing politicians, especially in France (Paris was where they were best organized), the intellectuals, and the workers. Such congresses took place in Luxembourg (June 1927), Paris (December 6, 1928), and Seraing, in Belgium (December 9, 1928).195 Although there had been countless misunderstandings between the White and the Red Russians, they generally agreed on the Bessarabian question. The only difference comes in their attitude towards the Bessarabian Treaty, even as they both denied its validity. While the Bessarabian White Russians used it, even while contesting its legitimacy, the Soviets officially considered it a res inter alia treaty having no value whatsoever, and unofficially they worked hard to prevent the Treaty from coming into force. Since they agreed that Bessarabia belonged to Russia, be it communist or czarist, the gradual takeover of the Bessarabian White Russian emigré movement by the Soviet propaganda machine should not come as a surprise. And there were a number of other factors that gave Soviet propaganda the advantage: the Bessarabian White Russians’ lack of material resources; the public’s gradual loss of interest in the White Russians and the rapid waning of their influence — while the public interest in (and sometimes admiration of) the new communist regime constantly grew; the sizable Bessarabian emigration inside the Soviet Union, which was very easy for the communists to exploit for propagandistic purposes. The gradual takeover ensued without much opposition from the Bessarabian White Russians. The Soviet activists understood the importance and the influence of the emigré movement and successfully subordinated it to their interests.196 The decision to establish the Moldavian Autonomous Republic on the left bank of the Dniestr in 1924 might also be understood as an attempt to tighten the control over Bessarabian emigration. Soon after this decision was made, a Society of Bessarabian Refugees was organized in Moscow, with the aim of representing not only the Bessarabians living in the Soviet Union but also the refugees living in other

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foreign countries.197 According to Romanian sources, by 1927 they were able to infiltrate the organizations of Bessarabians living overseas, taking on the coordinating role in the actions initiated by the Bessarabian emigrés.198 As instruments of propaganda they used two publications: Red Bessarabia (Moscow) and The Red Ploughman (Odessa). Concluding this attempt to bring to light one aspect of the Bessarabian question, closely connected to the Bessarabian Treaty question, it must be stated that the purpose of the present subchapter was not to treat this aspect in great detail but simply to highlight its existence by presenting the main actions initiated by the Bessarabian White Russians. A future study would be useful in giving a complete presentation of their activity regarding Bessarabia.

ANNEX NO. 1 Memorandum of the Bessarabian Delegates, August 1919 FRUS, PPC, 1919, Vol. 8, p. 587-589 The delegates of Bessarabia for the President of the Peace Conference In the official statement of the organ of the Romanian Government in Bessarabia, the Casa Noastra, published in the newspapers of Kishinev of August 10, 1919, the Bessarabian landowners are informed that a time limit of one month has been fixed to obtain their subjection to Romania, as well as to name Chargés d’Affaires to replace them to assist in the work of the Commission on the expropriation of their lands. The Bessarabian Delegation has already once before protested on this subject before the Peace Conference on April 15, 1919. The Russian Political Conference addressed on April 20, 1919, a memorandum on this subject to the Peace Conference. At the present moment we are forced to make another plea to the Peace Conference in the hope of obtaining its support in the just cause which we are defending. It is to be observed that the official statement, a translation of which is attached, clearly indicates that those landowners who accept Romanian subjection will be treated differently from those who refuse. The difference will evidently be in favor of those who bow to the demands of the Romanian Government. Speaking in the name of all our mandatories, we consider the exactions of the Romanian Government as tending to force the landowners in Bessarabia to swear an oath of allegiance to the King of Romania, an act profoundly unjust and outraging their dignity of citizens of a country that does not form part of the Kingdom of Romania. It is also an outrage to international law as well as to the respect due to the decisions of the Peace Conference that Romania has not been accorded the possession of this Russian province. The regime established by the Romanian Government in Bessarabia is truly intolerable for the population, and if the Peace Conference does not raise its voice against the Romanian abuses of power in the name of justice and with the authority

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Moldova, a Romanian Province that it alone possesses, bloody uprisings in the Bessarabian population will be inevitable. In defiance of all justice and rights of peoples, the Romanian Government forces all the population, under the penalty of heavy fines, to take part in the parliamentary elections of Romania, that is to say of a country which, until today, was foreign to her. Through you, Mr. President, we ask the Peace Conference to condemn the illegal and unjust acts of the Romanian Government and to declare them as such before the civilized world.

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Notes 1

Mihail Sturdza, a former Romanian diplomat and member of the Iron Guard, in his memoirs Romania si sfarsitul Europei, makes a notable exception from this orientation, especially for the fourth decade. He blames Nicolae Titulescu and his followers for re-establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviets; he considers that Titulescu had offered transit through Romanian territory to the Russian Army and that his pro-Soviets and anti-German policy was very damaging to Romania. Although the results for Romania of Titulescu’s policy, not to mention his personality, speak for themselves many Romanian scholars are still quite far from criticizing him or his policies. 2 For details regarding the results of their research see Gheorghe Buzatu, Romanii in Arhivele Kremlinului, passim. However, the best presentation of documents existing in the former Soviet Archives and referring to Romania has been published recently as a result of a collaboration project between the Romanian and Russian Foreign Ministry Archives, in Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente 1917-1934. The collaboration is supposed to continue so that, in the near future, two similar volumes of documents are expected to be published, dealing with the 1935-1940 and 1941-1947 periods. 3 I experienced this closed-door policy myself when, during my attempts to study the Soviet documents on foreign policy, I was granted permission to study only those already published and kept in the former Soviet Foreign Ministry’s Archives, and not the “confidential” (and more interesting) ones, to which I could not gain access. 4 Dov B. Lungu, Romania and the Great Powers, 1933-1940, p. 53. 5 J. Degras, Soviet Documents . . ., Vol. 2, p. 378. 6 Jiri Hochman, The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, p. 62. 7 B. Jelavich, Russia and the Formation of the Romanian National State, p. 62. 8 Michael Kettle argues, “Hill and Boyle somehow managed to take the Romanian gold reserve and the Crown Jewels, which had been kept in the Kremlin since the fall of Bucharest, back to Romania”. M. Kettle, The Road to Intervention: March-November 1918, p. 23. If this were so, then what sense would there be in Karakhan’s proposed deal (Bessarabia for the National Treasury). In fact Kettle makes a great mistake: what Colonel Boyle brought back to Romania by train was the paper money printed in Moscow by the Romanian National Bank and not at all parts of the gold reserve or the Crown Jewels; they have remained in the Kremlin. 9 This particular Romanian stand is arguable. The Russian Government was of the opposite opinion, considering that, given the role played by Romania as the center of the counter-revolution in the south, Russia was still at war with Romania. G Buzatu, Romanii in Arhivele Kremlinului, p. 107. 10 Charles King, along with a number of other scholars, asserts that it would have been both profitable and possible for Romania, in the early 1920s, to resolve the Bessarabian issue by reaching an agreement with the Soviets, but it was because of Romania’s alliances with France and Poland (both promoting an anti-Soviet policy) that Romania failed and was forced to normalize relations with the Soviets at a less propitious juncture (in the mid 1930s). C King, The Moldovans, p. 40. In fact, things were not that simple; even in the early 1920s the Soviets were not prepared, as this author will show during the following pages, to give up Bessarabia and neither were the Romanians prepared to come to a compromise regarding Bessarabia. However, the fact is that the theory regarding the possibility of resolving the Soviet-Romanian dispute in the early 1920s came into being in the second half of the 1930s and was used in order to pass the blame for Romania’s difficult international situation onto those who were unable to defend themselves. 11 Russia’s displeasure with Romania is presented in detail in R.H. Johnston, Tradition Versus Revolution . . ., p. 69-75. He argues, “Of all Russia’s allies it was Romania who bargained the hardest, was promised the most, delivered the least and collapsed the quickest.” 12 Van Meurs, The Bessarabian Question . . ., p.74. 13 On November 27, 1924, the Politburo of the Communist Party discussed a Memorandum prepared by Frunse, in which it was argued that “the best solution to the present situation is to force a regu-

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Moldova, a Romanian Province larization of the Bessarabian question by sending the Red Army into Bessarabia during May-August 1925”. Although the Memorandum was approved and the Politburo asked the Military General Headquarters to prepare a plan accordingly, Frunse’s proposal was to be applied only 15 years later. C. Iordan, Romania si relatiile internationale din sud estul European: modelul Locarno, p. 92. 14 A good discussion on Rakovsky’s opinion on Bessarabia, as expressed in his broadside on Bessarabia published in 1925, is presented in Van Meurs, The Bessarabian Question . . ., p. 157-160. 15 In January 1919 the Bolshevik Ukraine launched a series of attacks along the Dniestr line, which were stopped by the Romanian Army. For details regarding the military operations at the Bessarabian border during January-April 1919, see D. Preda, In apararea Romaniei Mari, p. 259-290. 16 For a glimpse of the struggle for influence between the different groups in charge of Soviet foreign policy, and especially the Cicerin-Litvinov conflict, see G. Bessedovskii, The revelations . . ., passim. 17 J. Degras, Soviet Documents …, Vol. 1, p. 70. 18 J. Degras, Soviet Documents …, Vol. 1, p. 155-157. 19 Richard Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, Vol. 1, p. 331. 20 V.F. Dobrinescu, Batalia diplomatica . . ., p. 86. Also M. Musat, I. Ardeleanu, Political Life in Romania, p. 36. 21 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 20 bis, The Geblescu Memorandum on Russo-Romanian Relations, f. 37-38. During the second part of the 1930s Dan Geblescu was secretary of the Romanian Legation in Belgrade. 22 Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente. 1917-1934, Telegram D.N. Ciotori to Vaida-Voevod, March 4, 1920, p. 49. For the Romanian account of the negotiations see Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 43-51. Also F.C. Nanu, Politica externa … , p. 113. 23 According to Giorgio Petracchi, the Polish attack on Ukraine in April 1920 only interrupted the Soviets’ March preparations for an all-out offensive in the direction of Berlin. Giorgio Petracchi, “La Russie Sovietique et L’Europe Occidentale” in A Missed Opportunity . . . , p. 284. In this context of course they were interested in obtaining Romanian neutrality, and this justifies their readiness to negotiate with the Romanians but also points to the fact that they were only playing for time, and not ready for real concessions. A successful offensive on Berlin no doubt would have changed the situation in Bessarabia. 24 Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Report D.N. Ciotori to Alexandru Averescu on his unofficial meetings with the Russian representatives, Krassin and Klisco, July 1, 1920, p. 53-54. 25 In his instructions to the French representative in Bucharest, George Leygues expresses his total opposition to the Soviet-Romanian negotiations and especially to a possible recognition of the Soviets, which would jeopardize the projected Polish-Romanian alliance. RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 189, Telegram Leygues to Daeschner, December 21, 1920, c 345. 26 Quoted in Alfred L.P. Dennis, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, p. 171. Also M. Musat, I. Ardeleanu, Political Life . . . , p. 37. 27 Alexandru Cretzianu, “Politica de pace a Romaniei fata de Uniunea Sovietica”, in Ocazia pierduta, p. 202. Still, the Romanian government delivered some military supplies to the Ukrainians who, led by Petliura, were fighting the Bolsheviks and were willing to recognize Bessarabia as Romanian territory. 28 During October 1919, General Denikin, one of the White Army’s leaders, tried to use British mediation in order to obtain Romanian help against the Bolsheviks. Bratianu’s position was that, if Denikin officially agreed to accept the decision on Bessarabia taken by the Conference, he would consider Denikin an ally and stop the armament transports for Petliura in case of a conflict between the two armies. In the end, no agreement was reached. The Romanians were also worried about the fighting capability of Denikin’s army, which they considered to be clearly inferior to that of Petliura. RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Telegram Pichon to Magras, October 18, 1919, c. 651; also Report on visit by Antonescu to Laroche, November 18, 1919, c. 660. 29 Telegram Take Ionescu to Cicerin, March 27, 1921, quoted in A. Cretzianu, “Politica de pace . . .”, in

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CHAPTER 4. THE SOVIET UNION G. Buzatu, Romania cu si fara Antonescu, p. 54. 30 F.C. Nanu, Politica externa . . . , p. 116-117. 31 According to Kalervo Hovi, the Bolsheviks’ position at the beginning of 1920 had been strengthening both at the international and the domestic level. The governments of England and Italy were inclined to strive for practical, primarily economic relations with Soviet Russia. The return of peace in the Baltic region, which made the blockade of Soviet Russia even more difficult to impose and the Soviet-German negotiations in 1920 also point to the same fact. K. Hovi, Alliances de Revers . . . , p. 3540. In this situation, of course the Bolsheviks were not as ready to make concessions to the Romanians as is assumed by the majority of Romanian scholars. 32 For details regarding Russo-Romanian correspondence see Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 5782. Also F.C. Nanu, Politica externa . . . , p. 117. 33 J. Degras, Soviet Documents . . . , Vol. 1, Telegram Cicerin to Take Ionescu, December 14, 1920, p. 224. 34 J. Degras, Soviet Documents . . . , Vol. 1, Telegram Cicerin to Take Ionescu, January 15, 1921, p. 230. 35 Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Telegram Rakovsky to Cicerin, February 17, 1921, p. 87-88. 36 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, R 1, Vol. 43, Telegram Diamandy to Filality, February 25, 1921. 37 Filality, the Romanian minister in Constantinople, was chosen only after a number of more qualified personalities refused this task. Therefore, he was given very limited power and strict instructions. RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 189, Telegram Daeschner for Paris, March 20, 1921, c. 396. 38 The minutes of the meetings are published in French in Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 104127. For more details see RFMA, Fond 71/1920-1944, Special Files, R 1, Vol. 44, passim. 39 F.C. Nanu, Politica externa … , p. 119-121. For the necessary details on the Warsaw Conference see Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 135-169. 40 Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Report Filality to Averescu, September 26, 1921, p. 140. 41 He was referring to one of Karakhan’s proposals, that Romania should also sign a declaration of neutrality towards Russia as a condition for signing a common treaty. Karakhan said “with such a declaration we could go before the masses and explain why we gave away Bessarabia without discussion”. RFMA, Fond 71/1920-1944, Special Files, R 1, Vol. 43, Telegram Filality to Ionescu, October 7, 1921. 42 A description of the conditions in which the Romanian POW (mainly Transylvanians) were living in Russia is presented by Vasile Suciu, the Bishop of Alba Iulia, in an attempt to sensitize the Romanian government, asking for rapid intervention in their favor. RFMA, Fond 71/1920-1944, Special Files, R 1, Vol. 45, Letter Vasile Suciu to Take Ionescu, February 1921. For a later account see G. Iancu, “Dor de tara. Scrisoarea unui prizonier roman din Uniunea Sovietica din anul 1926” in Tribuna, July 2000, p. 22. 43 Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Telegram, Take Ionescu to Filality, October 17, 1921, p. 155-159. 44 For the Romanian account of the border incidents during 1921 see the Reports prepared by the Romanian Ministry of War to the Foreign Ministry in RFMA, Fond 71/1920-1924, Special Files, R 1, Vol. 45, passim. 45 J. Degras, Soviet Documents . . . , Vol. 1, Telegram Cicerin to Take Ionescu, November 11, 1921, p. 275. 46 Still, in the case presented, Ionescu correctly argued, as even the Russians acknowledged later, that it would not be possible for Romania to regulate the navigation on the Dniestr if she was not considered to be a riparian State, which she became only as a result of Bessarabia’s union. Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Telegram Take Ionescu to Cicerin, November 16, 1921, p. 174. 47 V. Moisuc, Premisele isolarii . . . , p. 132. 48 During the Hague Conference a private meeting between Litvinov and Diamandi took place on July 19, 1922. The tone of the discussion was still conciliatory. Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Telegram Diamandy to Duca, July 20, 1922, p. 184. 49 Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Telegram IG Duca to Constantin G. Nanu, August 8, 1922, p. 186. 50 F.C. Nanu, Politica externa . . . , p. 123. 51 I. Scurtu et. al., Istoria Basarabiei . . . , p. 183; also, Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Telegram I.G. Duca

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Moldova, a Romanian Province to George Marzescu, December 20, 1922, p. 197-198. Still, it should be mentioned that these were not actually Cicerin’s words but the interpretation given to them by I.G. Duca. 52 The 19 articles agreement is published in French in Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 207-212. 53 M. Bruchis, The Republic of Moldavia, p. 18 54 And indeed, in November 1923 negotiations for the signing of a commercial agreement between the two states started in Tyraspol, but with no results. Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 212-218. 55 Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Letter Cicerin to the Political Bureau, September 3, 1922, p. 203204. 56 Therefore, the Vienna Conference came as a normal continuation of previous negotiations and not, as argued by Magda Adam, “in spring 1924 … after long hesitation, even Romania began talks, not least because of Hungary’s negotiations with the Soviet representatives about the development of economic contacts and the establishment of diplomatic relations” or as a result of the pressure coming from Czechoslovakia for the recognition of the Soviet Union. Magda Adam, The Little Entente … , p. 226. 57 Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Letter Cicerin to Krestinsky, March 24, 1924, p. 219-220. 58 Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Verbal instructions by Ion IC Bratianu to the Romanian delegation at the Vienna Conference, p. 220-223. Still, judging by the last argument, one that Bratianu also used during the Peace Conference, he was somewhat out of touch with reality. His line of argument would have been unacceptable to any state in the world, especially to a proud state like the Soviet Union. Bratianu also seems to forget the importance of controlling the Danube Estuary and the Bessarabian agricultural potential when he insists on this idea. 59 He opposed the plebiscite for the following reasons: it would be harmful to the existing peace and order in Bessarabia; it would mean a self-contradiction of Romania’s policy towards its allies, who had admitted through a treaty that Bessarabia belonged to Romania; and of all the new states bordering the Soviet Union, a plebiscite was requested only in the case of Bessarabia. 60 The protocols of the four meetings are published in French in Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 225-255. 61 The best such presentations were made in Times, on March 27, March 31, April 1, and April 3, 1924. 62 Such was the opinion of Nicolae Titulescu, mentioned by Ion M. Oprea, “Basarabia la conferinta romano-sovietica de la Vienna, 1924”, in Revista istorica, 1992, No. 1, p. 5. 63 In his memorandum, while presenting a detailed account of the Vienna Conference, Geblescu points up the Soviets renunciation of the historical claims over Bessarabia and their appeal instead to the principle of self-determination as one of the main characteristics of the Soviet diplomatic approach during and in the aftermath of the Vienna Conference. RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 20 bis, The Geblescu Memorandum on Russo-Romanian Relations, f. 78-104. 64 E. Boia, Romania’s Diplomatic . . . , p. 116. 65 Van Meurs, The Bessarabian Question … , p. 76-77, 289-293. Also, for the Hotin riot, see General M.C. Schina, “Basarabia, ianuarie 1918 - iunie 1919”, in Basarabia romana. Antologie, p. 203-204. 66 The great majority of them were not Moldavians, but belonged to other nationalities. M. Bruchis, A. Chiriac, Rusia, Romania si Basarabia, p. 221-222. For the Romanian account of the events related to the Tatar-Bunar episode see best Gheorghe Tatarescu, Marturii pentru istorie, p. 75-109. 67 A. Boldur, Istoria Basarabiei, p. 515; Also I Scurtu et. al., Istoria Basarabiei, p. 185-187. 68 Denis Deletant, “Language Policy and Linguistic Trends in the Republic of Moldavia, 1924-1992”, in Studies in Moldovan . . . , p. 56. 69 Also, according to Charles King, “the establishment of MASSR signalized the crystallization of a new argument against the Romanian occupation of Bessarabia that had began to develop shortly after the end of the Russian civil war: the notion that the majority population in Bessarabia constituted an ethno-national group separate from the Romanians and that, therefore, their incorporation into a unitary Romanian state had usurped their right to national self-determination”. C. King, The Moldovans, p. 57.

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Van Meurs, The Bessarabian Question … , p. 38. C. King, The Moldovans, p. 55. 72 A. Boldur, “Istoria Basarabiei”, p. 516. 73 F.C. Nanu, “Politica externa . . .”, p. 124. 74 E. Boia, “Romania’s . . .”, p. 119-120. 75 Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Report by Litvinov on Meeting with Charles Davila, February 9, 1928, p. 283. 76 G. Bessedovskii, Revelations . . . , p. 192, 212-216. 77 In fact it was with a view to open diplomatic relations between the Soviets and the Little Entente member states at the same time. On the Romanian side, this idea (later used by Titulescu) seems to have been expressed first by the Romanian minister in Prague, Theodor Emandi, who understood that both Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia would have to open diplomatic relations with the Soviets in the not too distant future, and believed that Romania might take advantage of the situation and finally gain the Soviet recognition of Bessarabia’s union. Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Report T. Emandi to G.G. Mironescu, May 8, 1929, p. 293-296 and August 26, 1930, p. 303-307. 78 Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 278-281. Also Ion M. Oprea, “O etapa rodnica . . .”, p. 92. 79 I. Scurtu et. al., Istoria Basarabiei … , p. 189. Also, Walter M. Bacon, Behind Closed Doors, p. 7. 80 Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Litvinov’s Journal, February 9, 1929, p. 284. As for the plebiscite, Davila states that he raised the question of the plebiscite only in order to prove to the Russians the practical impossibility of holding a plebiscite in Bessarabia (for example, it would be very difficult to find a neutral party to supervise the integrity of the plebiscite). Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Report Davila to Mironescu, February 13, 1929, p. 286-290. However, Davila’s action was clearly disapproved at home and he paid for it. 81 Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Letter Litvinov to Stalin, March 23, 1929, p. 291-292. 82 W.M. Bacon, Behind Closed Doors, p. 9. 83 In fact the Russians were keen to avoid Polish mediation and, as a result, they preferred to negotiate, in December 1931, with the Romanian representative in Turkey regarding the time and place of the future round of negotiations. Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 315-320. 84 Unlike the other rounds of bilateral negotiations, there are plenty of published materials regarding the Riga negotiations. For this reason the present work will only summarily present the Riga negotiations. For both the Romanian and Russian accounts see Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 319371; for the Romanian account, based mainly on documents belonging to Nicolae Titulescu, see W. M. Bacon, Behind Closed Doors, p. 54-93; also for Sturdza’s account, together with some very interesting comments on Romanian diplomats, see Romania si sfirsitul Europei, p. 65-77. 85 Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Report Sturdza to N. Iorga, January 30, 1932, p. 370. 86 Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Letter Titulescu to King Carol, July 24, 1932, p. 383-384. Although Titulescu expressed this position during the summer of 1932 (and he was right about that), only one year later he was ready to sign an agreement with the Soviets, in conditions that had not greatly improved. Still, this seems to have been only one of Titulescu’s intrigues; he was upset that he was not consulted about the negotiations, and he used the Soviet card only with the intent of becoming Foreign Minister. 87 W.M. Bacon, Behind Closed Doors, p. 14. 88 For details on Titulescu’s attempts see Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 375-388. 89 David E. Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy and . . . , p. 103. 90 Dov B. Lungu, Romania and the Great Powers, 1933-1940, p. 12. 91 Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Telegram Litvinov to Dovgalevski, August 20, 1932, p. 389. 92 Due to Titulescu’s influence, before signing the non-aggression pact with the Soviets, the French government insisted that the Soviets give them a letter in which they undertook not to resolve their conflict with Romania by force. In fact, it was a non-aggression pledge taken by the Soviets with the advantage that the word “conflict” was not mentioned in a document addressed to Romania (which 71

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Moldova, a Romanian Province could not accept such a wording). RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 20 bis, The Geblescu Memorandum, p. 289. 93 For Titulescu’s position regarding Romania’s relations with Germany, see M. Sturdza, Romania . . . , p. 79-99. Although Sturdza’s view towards Titulescu and other Romanian leaders is animated by personal feelings generated by his membership in the Iron Guard, the fate of Romania during 1940 proves that his judgment of Titulescu’s policy was not far from the truth, and that Titulescu played an important role in bringing on the bulk of the disaster that befell Romania in 1940. For a more objective and fair presentation of Titulescu’s policy, without the exaggerations that still characterizes many Romanian scholars, see Anthony Komjathy, The Crises of France’s . . . , p. 143-172. 94 After a preliminary meeting between Litvinov and Cadere on September 17 in Warsaw, it was decided that the negotiations should take place in Geneva (September 26-October 8). V.F. Dobrinescu, Batalia diplomatica . . . , p. 104-105; also F.C. Nanu, Politica externa . . . , p. 157-158. 95 For details on the Geneva negotiations, see Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 394-402. 96 W.M. Bacon, Behind Closed Doors, p. 22. 97 It was almost a desperate attempt by Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, the Romanian Prime Minister, to boost his position by reaching an agreement with the Soviets, which failed as a result of both Titulescu’s and the French intervention. 98 J. Degras, Soviet Documents . . . , Vol. 2, p. 546; also, Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 402-405. 99 J. Hochman, The Soviet Union and . . . , p. 65. 100 Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Note by M.I. Rozenberg (Soviet Chargé d’Affaires in Paris) regarding a conversation with Titulescu, April 18, 1934, p. 423. Still, the question remains: as the Soviet Union was the main threat to Romania, against whom the Soviets were supposed to guarantee the Romanian border, especially as the Little and Balkan Ententes protected her against Hungary and Bulgaria while Germany was too far to pose a threat to Romanian territory? 101 Dov B. Lungu, Romania and . . . , p. 24-25. 102 J. Hochman, The Soviet Union and . . . , p. 60. 103 M. Sturdza argues that, in fact, the French-Soviet alliance was of greater importance to Titulescu than the safety of Romania and that he was planning to offer access through Romania for the Soviet troops. M. Sturdza, Romania si . . . , p. 103-107. 104 Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 409; also, V.F. Dobrinescu, Batalia diplomatica . . . , p. 106-109. 105 A. Cretzianu, Captive Romania, p. 11. For the entire text of the Convention, see Relatii romanosovietice. Documente, p. 411-414. 106 In fact, two almost identical Conventions had been signed: the first one on July 3 by the USSR, Romania, Poland, Afghanistan, Latvia, Estonia, Persia, Turkey, and ratified by Romania on October 16, 1933; the second one on July 4 between Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Turkey and the USSR, ratified by Romania on February 17, 1934. The second had one more article indicating that it remained open to any other state that would like to sign it. 107 V.F. Dobrinescu, Batalia diplomatica . . . , p. 108-109. Also I.M. Oprea, “O etapa . . . ”, p. 93-94. 108 Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Telegram Titulescu to Ion Lugosianu, July 19, 1933, p. 414-415. Also Ion Constantin, Romania, marile puteri si problema Basarabiei, p. 31. 109 Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Telegram Litvinov to Potemkin, June 27, 1934, p. 430-431. 110 See, for example, A. Karetki, A. Pricop, Lacrima Basarabiei, p. 48. 111 Dov B. Lungu, Romania and . . . , p. 53. 112 I. Scurtu et. al., Istoria Basarabiei, p. 190. 113 V.F. Dobrinescu, Batalia diplomatica . . . , p. 110. For details, see Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 428-430. However, Yugoslavia decided to postpone official recognition of the Soviet Union for a period, but gave a free hand to Romania and Czechoslovakia in recognizing the Soviets. 114 J. Hochman, The Soviet Union and . . . , p. 66. 115 Dov B. Lungu, Romania and . . . , p. 56.

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Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Letter Krestinsky to Ostrovski, December 26, 1934, p. 433-434. For many Romanian scholars, there is no arguing that Art. No. 10 extends over Romania’s Bessarabian border too. See best A. Boldur, Istoria Basarabiei, p. 518-521; or V.F. Dobrinescu, Batalia diplomatica … , p. 112. But because the Bessarabian Treaty failed to come into force, it might be argued that there was no valid international treaty recognizing the union of Bessarabia with Romania; consequently Art. No. 10 did not cover the Bessarabian border. 118 Many Romanian historians fail to mention the Railroad Convention, which could have been interpreted as a real improvement in the bilateral relations. M. Sturdza gives a possible reason for this omission, considering that the wording of the Convention was clearly unsatisfactory to Romanian interests. M. Sturdza, Romania si … , p. 107. 119 A. Karetki, A. Pricop, Lacrima Basarabiei, p. 50. 120 For the French-Soviet negotiation for a MAT see Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, Vol. 1, p. 138-161. 121 A. Komjathy, The Crises of France’s … , p. 146-149. 122 It seems that Titulescu played an important role in the signing of the mentioned Pact. In fact, according to M. Sturdza, Titulescu used to pride himself with effectively preparing the Draft Treaty (as a specialist in international law), in exchange for a considerable amount of money from the French government. M. Sturdza, Romania si … , p. 103-106. On the other hand, as previously explained, the French-Soviets pact was of no use to France as long as the Soviet troops could not cross through either Poland or Romania, and Titulescu’s involvement meant that he would try to get the agreement of his government in this sense. 123 Nicole Jordan, The Popular Front and Central Europe, p. 189. 124 Jiri Hochman attributes a special signification to the Soviet refuse, considering that it shows a clear lack of interest from the Soviets in a course of action that would significantly facilitate the resolution of the geographical asymmetry of the alliances with France and Czechoslovakia; he also connects it to an improvement in Soviet-German relations. J. Hochman, The Soviet Union … , p. 67-69. 125 N. Jordan, The Popular Front … , p. 193. 126 I. Scurtu et. al., Istoria Basarabiei, p. 193. 127 A good analyses of Romania’s options during the Italian-Abyssinian conflict and of the effects of Titulescu’s actions is presented in A. Komjathy, The Crises of France’s … , p. 154. 128 Quoted in J. Hochman, The Soviet Union … , p. 70. 129 Politica externa a Romaniei. Dictionar cronologic, p. 214-215. 130 For example V.F. Dobrinescu, Batalia diplomatica … , p. 114-115; A. Karetki, A. Pricop, Lacrima Basarabiei, p. 50-51; I. Scurtu et. al. , Istoria Basarabiei, p. 195. 131 A copy of the Draft is published in A. Karetki, A. Pricop, Lacrima Basarabiei, p. 143-144. 132 V.F. Dobrinescu, Batalia diplomatica … , p. 114. 133 Although there were quite a number of reasons behind Titulescu’s replacement, the proximate cause was his intervention regarding the Spanish Civil War; he chose to disregard his instructions in late August: “Deciding that Romania did not need the one hundred cannons and fifty airplanes which she had ordered from France and were now ready for delivery, Titulescu directed this war material to be transported to the Spanish republicans”. A. Komjathy, The Crises of France’s … , p. 170171. 134 Dov B. Lungu considers that, in fact, the Romanians were no longer interested to sign a MAT with the Soviet Union. Dov B. Lungu, Roumania and … , p. 99. 135 Although Victor Antonescu took advantage of the first opportunity he had, on September 19, to personally reassure Litvinov that there was no change in the Romanian foreign policy, he could not convince Litvinov. 136 Quoted in I. Constantin, Romania, marile puteri …, p. 33. 137 As French General Gamelin recalls, “King Carol had told him [in 1937] that France could count on 117

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Moldova, a Romanian Province his secret permission to let the Soviet troops pass”. Quoted in John Lukacs, The Great Powers … , p. 100. 138 J. Lukacs, The Great Powers … , p. 99-100. 139 For details see E. Boia, Roumania’s … , 242-245. 140 A. Komjathy, The Crises of France’s … , p. 219. 141 Quoted in Louis Fischer, Russia’s Road … , p. 312-313. 142 J. Lukacs, The Great Powers … , p. 144, 178-179. 143 Politica externa a Romaniei. Dictionar cronologic, p. 222-223. 144 J. Lukacs, The Great Powers … , p. 180. 145 Jiri Hochman published “Text of a Note from the Romanian Government to the Government of the Soviet Union, September 24, 1938”, sent from Bucharest to Litvinov in Geneva, which he asserts to have found in the RFMA (No. 71/1938 – C/8, vol. 3), a note that I was unable to find in the mentioned place and which is mentioned by no other Romanian scholar (raising some doubts as to its existence). The Note shows the Romanian government offering transit through its territory for 100,000 Soviet troops (by land) and un unlimited number by aerial means, explicitly renouncing all previous Soviet guarantees referring to the border in Bessarabia. It also presents a very detailed plan of operations for the transit of Soviet troops. J. Hochman, The Soviet Union … , p. 194-201. 146 L. Fischer, Russia’s Road … , p. 312. 147 A good analysis of the Soviets ‘willingness’ or ‘unwillingness’ to go at war for Czechoslovakia is presented in J. Lukacs, The Great Powers … , p. 172-182. 148 Even if we consider the document presented by Jiri Hochman as false (footnote 145), the Romanians’ offer to grant passage for Soviet military aircraft and her action in order to restrain Hungary’s intervention against Czechoslovakia should be enough proof in raising question marks over the veracity of some comments made by Rebecca Haynes, in her attempt to analyze Romanian foreign policy at the end of the 1930’s. For example: “in reality, the 1938 Czechoslovak crisis was marked by a desperate attempt by Romania to evade her treaty obligations toward Czechoslovakia in order to avoid the possibility of finding herself at war with Germany. … the Romanian government made every effort to deny the right of passage through Romania to the Red Army to aid its Czechoslovak ally … in mid-September, as the Sudeten crisis reached its climax, the Soviet Union was still pressuring Romania to allow her right of passage … it was by now quite clear that the Romanians would not allow Soviet right of passage … Romania has refused to bow to Soviet pressure to grant right of passage”. Rebecca Haynes, Romanian Policy towards Germany, 1936-40, p. 52-54. Haynes seems to forget that the treaty obligations have been directed against Hungary and not against Germany and that, with respect to a possible Hungarian military intervention against Czechoslovakia it was clearly stated that it would bring Romania into the war. Just as the Little Entente treaties did not oblige Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia to intervene in favor of Romania in case of a Soviet attack in Bessarabia neither was Romania obliged to intervene in case of a German attack on Czechoslovakia. And, as previously presented, the transit of Soviet troops through Romanian territory signified war with Germany, who most probably would have sent its airplanes to destroy the Romanian railway network. 149 For a concise presentation of the Pact’s origins see R.H. Haigh, D.S. Morris, A.R. Peters, Soviet Foreign Policy, the League of Nations and Europe, 1917-1939, p. 98-120. Also Edward H. Carr, “The NaziSoviet Pact”, in Readings in Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 155-160. 150 Romanian historiography dealt in detail with the Pact’s consequences for Romania. See, for example, I. Scurtu et. al., Istoria Basarabiei, p. 202-204; also A. Karetki, A. Pricop, Lacrima Basarabiei, p. 5862, 304-305. It should be mentioned that even nowadays the Russian leadership still refuses to denounce the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and especially the Secret Protocol, although Romania repeatedly asked for this action, arguing that Hitler denounced the Pact on June 22, 1941. 151 Wishing to make full use of Romania’s resources, especially her petroleum and grains, the Germans started a powerful economic and diplomatic offensive in order to bring Romania into their camp. Although they had a number of successes in the economic field, the same was not true in the

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CHAPTER 4. THE SOVIET UNION diplomatic field. For details on the German economic penetration of Romania see, best, William S. Grenzebach, Germany’s Informal Empire in East-Central Europe, p. 69-95, 173-208. Also, David E. Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy … , p. 144-145, 158-159, 264-267. 152 R. Haynes considers that this shift also had ‘partly ideological’ reasons, pointing to antibolshevism, anti-Semitism and fear of pan-Slavism common to both Nazism and Romanian right wing. R. Haynes, Romanian policy … , p. 176. Still, if one compares the Carlist dictatorship with that of Hitler what is striking is not the ideological similarities (supposed to foster a rapprochement between the two states), but the differences: one was characterized by order, planning and fuhrerprinzip, the other by corruption, self-interest and leading by a mistress; one sought territorial expansion while the other was simply trying to defend its territory; one sent the Jewish people to gas chambers, the other kept them in influential positions, and so on. 153 For a glimpse at the events surrounding the evacuation of Bessarabia see A. Karetki, A. Pricop, Lacrima Basarabiei, p. 70-86; also, I. Scurtu et. al., Istoria Basarabiei, p. 202-224. 154 Ion Gherman, Istoria tragica a Bucovinei, Basarabiei si tinutul Hertei, p. 110. 155 J. Lukacs, The Great Powers … , p. 307. 156 With the notable exception of the resistance by the Romanian troops led by colonel Bota, at about 11 km from the city of Herta, which opposed the Red Army’s marching into a territory that belonged to Romania before 1918 and that was supposed to remain under Romanian rule. I. Scurtu et. al., Istoria Basarabiei, p. 216. 157 One of the very few Romanian officials who openly expressed his opposition to King Carol Second was Charles A Davila, one of the best Romanian diplomats, and for that action he lost his Romanian citizenship. Corvin Lupu, Relatii diplomatice … , p. 150. 158 A good attempt to sort out who is to blame for the 1940 cession of Bessarabia is done by historian Dinu C. Giurescu. Although he avoids clearly pointing the finger to the guilty ones, he mentions some of the reasons behind the Bessarabian tragedy: the failure of the Bucharest government to take the most elementary measures (like a limited evacuation or plans for a forced evacuation of Bessarabia), the underestimation of Soviet plans until September 1939, the poor material state of the Romanian Army, the continuing internal political fight, and the influence of France’s collapse. Dinu C. Giurescu, Romania in the Second World War, p. 24-33. 159 It is difficult to say who was the first diplomat or historian to present this opinion in writing: probably Dan Geblescu or Frederic C. Nanu. However, this represents the opinion of an important group in the Romanian Foreign Ministry and is to be found also in some of the more recent papers on Romanian-Soviet relations. 160 The best description of the activity of the Bessarabian Russians, although limited to the Peace Conference, is presented in Petre Cazacu, “Moldova dintre Prut si Nistru”, p. 425-433. 161 G.E. Torrey, General Henri Berthelot … , p. 149-150. 162 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Telegram from Geneva, May 19, 1918, c. 561. 163 For the memorandum, called “Declaration of Ten Deputies Against the Decision to Renounce to Bessarabia’s Autonomy”, see Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 36-39. 164 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 29, Report by the General Police and Safety Inspectorate in Bessarabia regarding the evolution of the Russian and pro-Russian groups in Bessarabia, February 23, 1923, p. 145. 165 For details on the Transylvanian’s attempt to maintain autonomy inside Romania see, best, Gheorghe Iancu, The Ruling Council; the Integration of Transylvania into Romania, 1918-1922, passim. 166 P. Cazacu, Moldova dintre Prut si Nistru, p. 425. The CSB is also known as the League for the Liberation of Bessarabia. G. Buzatu, Romanii in Arhivele Kremlinului, p. 102. 167 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 29, Report of the General Police and Safety Inspectorate in Bessarabia regarding the evolution of the Russian and pro-Russian groups in Bessarabia, February 23, 1923, p. 146.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province 168

The influence of the Kroupenski family was so all pervading in Bessarabia at the beginning of the 20th century that liberal publicists gave Bessarabia the nickname of “the Kroupenskian Province”. R. W. Seton Watson, The History of the Roumanians, p. 564. 169 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 394, Telegram Cooke (Odessa) to Lord Curzon, January 20, 1919, c. 36. 170 The best example in this sense comes from a report prepared by Major Barrat, in which he criticizes almost everything done by the Romanian administration in Bessarabia. RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 394, Report on Bessarabia, January 1919, c. 40-46. 171 Rattigan reported home of the high number of telegrams sent to him by Bessarabian peasants from different counties, in order to reaffirm the desire of the districts concerned for the incorporation of Bessarabia in Great Roumania. RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 394, Telegram Rattigan to Lord Curzon, August 6, 1919, c. 110. 172 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Memorandum by Sazonov, January 18, 1919, c. 580. 173 Traian Sandu, “La France et la Bessarabie roumaine de 1918 a 1920…” in The Establishment …, p. 373. 174 P. Cazacu, Moldova dintre … , p. 425-427. For the memorandum see RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 25, p. 32-37. 175 T. Sandu, “La France et la Bessarabie roumaine de 1918 a 1920 …”, in The Establishment … , p. 376. 176 FRUS, PPC, vol. 6, p. 72. 177 And, indeed, in a later Memorandum, the White Russians stressed that the formula “the Romanian part of Bessarabia” implied the existence of non-Romanian parts. RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Memorandum by Sazonov, Lwow, and Maklakov, September 24, 1919, c. 644. 178 For his speech see “The Making of the Bessarabian Treaty” chapter, Annex No 2. 179 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 11, p. 278. 180 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 119, p. 141-142 and Vol. 121, p. 1883. Lloyd George’s answer to the second interpellation was very laconic “the question of Bessarabia has still to be discussed by the Peace Conference”. 181 P. Cazacu, Moldova dintre Prut si Nistru, p. 427-428. 182 T. Sandu, “La France et la Bessarabie roumaine de 1918 a 1920 …”, in The Establishment … , p. 377. 183 Anne Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff, Les Relations Franco-Sovietique, p. 146. 184 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 1, Letter Ishii to Uchida, containing 17 pages Memorandum on Bessarabia, November 5, 1920. 185 Until July 15, 1921, Kroupenski and Schmidt published a number of ten propagandistic brochures in English and French. Among them: “The ‘Parliament’ of Bessarabia”, “Memoire sur la situation de le Bessarabie” (the most comprehensive of all), “La question de la Bessarabie devant la conference de la paix” (by Vladimir Tsiganko), and “Lettre de Bessarabie …”. To these should be added “The Case for Bessarabia”, published by the Russian Liberation Committee, with a preface by historian Paul Milioukow. 186 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, R 1, Vol. 45, p. 47-49. 187 On this topic see Gheorghe Iancu, “Problema minoritatilor etnice din Romania reflectata in documente ale Societatii Natiunilor” in Relatii interetnice … , p. 176-199. 188 For the two memorandums see. RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, p. 88-100. 189 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Letter Romanian Government to the Secretary General of the League, December 5, 1921. 190 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Lahovary to I.G. Duca, April 28, 1922. The letter through which Hymans informed the Romanian government of the events regarding the Bessarabian question is also to be found in the same file, p. 169-170. 191 One example in this sense is the memorandum sent to the Italian Embassy in Vienna on April 1924, called “Questione della Bessarabia”, signed by a certain Filippani Poltoratzki, which found no echo with the Italian authorities. RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 29, p. 157-162. 192 The quotation is from a description made by Georges Picot, the French representative in Sofia, after a meeting with the White Russians. RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 29, Telegram Langa Ras-

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CHAPTER 4. THE SOVIET UNION canu to Take Ionescu, April 19, 1922. 193 In Prague, the Russian students were able to organize during 1921-1922 a society called “Oreste” and to publish a newspaper called “The Student”, which, among other matters related to Russia, took a decided stand against the Romanian administration of Bessarabia. RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 29, Note on the Activity of the Bessarabian Emigration, December 1928, p. 207-208. 194 For example, in 1927 a brochure called “La probleme Bessarabien; memorandum” was published in Paris by “The Conference of the Associations of Bessarabian Emigrants in France, Belgium, Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia”. They also printed some magazines, with significant titles, like “The Voice of Bessarabia” or “The Oppressed Bessarabia” during 1928. 195 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 29, Note on Activities Initiated by the Bessarabian Emigration, December 1928, p. 207-208. 196 G. Buzatu argues that, in fact, the Kremlin used the documents belonging to the White Russians as very powerful arguments in order to support its claims over Bessarabia. He also points out that all such existing documents in the Archives of the former Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs were filed and organized in June 1940, just before the ultimatum sent to the Romanian government for the evacuation of Bessarabia, and that this was by no means a mere coincidence. G. Buzatu, Romanii in arhivele Kremlinului, p. 103. 197 The Society was conceived as a ‘reserve tool’ that was to be used only when necessary - this happened in 1938, when the Society was revived by the communists. Vitalie Varatic, Preliminarii la raptul Basarabiei si Nordului Bucovinei, p. 51-54, 216-217. 198 The best available resources for the activity of Bessarabian emigration are those existing in the RFMA, consisting on notes and reports regarding their activity. The reports cover the entire interwar period, sometimes (like the October 28, 1936, Report) providing detailed information on the amounts of money and the strategy used by the communists for their propaganda, and also on the people involved in these actions. RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 29, passim. Some of the documents available in the RFMA and dealing with the activity of the Bessarabian emigration during 1938-1940 have been recently published in V. Varatic, Preliminarii la raptul Basarabiei si Nordului Bucovinei. Another source of information on the activity of the Bessarabian emigration are the Russian archives, and the existence of an organized and reach inventory of such information is confirmed in G. Buzatu, Romanii in Arhivele Kremlinului, p. 102-103.

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CHAPTER 5. THE UNITED KINGDOM

The United Kingdom was the Great Power that insisted the most on signing the Bessarabian Treaty and was the first of the five signatory countries to ratify it, depositing the necessary instruments for ratification in Paris, on April 14, 1922. There were two main reasons for the British position: (1) improving BritishRomanian relations; and (2) the general policy of the British Empire, and especially of Lloyd George, towards Russia. One of the best presentations of this policy is found in Richard Ullman’s comprehensive analysis of Anglo-Soviet relations: In talking with Frank L. Polk [on November 24, 1919], Lloyd George did not hide his strong feeling that a unified Russia would be a danger to Europe. He hoped, he said, for Georgia, Azerbaijan, Bessarabia, the Ukraine, the Baltic provinces, Finland, and perhaps even Siberia, all to be independent. Here was the Prime Minister’s answer to Disraeli’s fear of ‘a great, gigantic, colossal, growing Russia’. To John W. Davis, the American Ambassador in London, he later [December 3] made the same statement: he favored the ultimate division of Russia into a number of independent states, leaving none large enough to threaten the peace; and he was not adverse to treating with the Soviet government to achieve this goal.1 By contrast, France and the USA saw a powerful Russia as a necessity for their foreign policy aims. In these conditions it comes as no surprise that the British leaders were the friendliest toward the Romanian cause in Bessarabia, at least during the Peace Conference and the first years thereafter. During the Paris Peace Conference During the war the UK’s attitude toward Romania underwent several changes. At the beginning, it backed all the Romanian territorial claims by signing the 1916 Treaty. But by January 5, 1918, Lloyd George was insisting that the UK’s purpose was

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Moldova, a Romanian Province not the dismemberment of the Habsburg Monarchy, but only to see that more rights were given to the Romanians and other minorities living within the Empire. The idea of autonomy for the Romanians in Transylvania, expressed in his speech, was considered incompatible with the 1916 Treaty between Romania and the Entente.2 This idea was expressed once more in a telegram Lloyd George sent to Bratianu on January 24, 1918, which encouraged the Romanians to keep on fighting ¾ while making no mention of their aspirations for national unification.3 Toward the end of the war, when the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire became evident, the UK’s attitude shifted back to supporting the Romanian territorial claims. Published in 1920 as the Peace Manuals, the final recommendations made by the Department of Political Information in the Foreign Office (the British equivalent of the Inquiry Commission) stated that: Transylvania should belong to Romania; the Banat should be divided between Romania and Serbia;4 Bukovina should be divided between Romania and a Ruthenian State; Romania should cede some territories to Bulgaria in southern Dobrudja; the traffic on the Danube River should be placed under the supervision of an international commission; and that Bessarabia should belong to Romania.5 As can be seen, the territorial recommendations were not that different from those stipulated in the 1916 Treaty. Still, as for Bessarabia, not all the British officials agreed (at least, not during the first months after the end of the war) that it should go to Romania. Some argued that Bessarabia should be taken under the protection of an international commission for a number of years until a plebiscite could be held in the province;6 others that only a part of the province should go to Romania: It is therefore suggested that in the final settlement with Russia the whole of Bessarabia should be acknowledged as Romanian, except for the Czernovitz-Kiev railway, which, together with the strip of Bessarabia north of it, should be given to Russia.7 During the Peace Conference the UK’s position toward Romania was somewhere in the middle, oscillating between the strong demands of the US and the compromise policy favored by France and Italy. The British diplomats took a wait-andsee approach, skillfully maneuvering between the French and American proposals on Romania.8 Their main purposes during the Peace Conference were to continue protecting British interests all over the world, and to temper the French influence on the Continent, ruling out a possible French hegemony in Europe. As a result, they sought both to reduce France’s influence in Romania and to increase their own. As it did in France, the Romanian propaganda in London played a role in the decisions taken by the UK Government: the Romanians attracted the sympathy of some influential figures in London. Robert W. Seton-Watson published numerous articles in favor of the Romanian claims in his influential weekly journal The New Europe. A special mention should also be made of the role played by the British Minister in Romania, Frank Rattigan, one of those who really understood Romanian realities and politics.

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CHAPTER 5. THE UNITED KINGDOM

The main controversies between Romania and the UK during the Peace Conference were related to the situation in Hungary, the status of Bukovina, and the Danube, with Hungary proving to be the most important. The British representatives, like the US representatives, spoke in favor of Hungary and they had been on the US side during the conflict over the withdrawal of Romanian troops, arguing in favor of decisive measures against Romania. However, when it came to Bessarabia, the UK representatives were on Romania’s side from beginning to the end, and it was a direct result of their insistence in 1920 that the Bessarabian Treaty was signed. The misadventures between Romania and the Peace Conference having been presented in the previous chapter, we will not go into them again. The British policy towards Romania is clear from the reports presented by George Clerk and Alain Leeper at the end of their September 1919 mission to Romania. The latter presented a very insightful “Memorandum on the Romanian Situation”, which reads: Mr. Bratianu makes no secret of the fact that he expects to win in his policy of resistance. Both in Paris and Bucharest he [Bratianu] continues to argue that the great danger of the future is pan Slavism, and that it is necessary for Romania and for Romania’s allies to take every step to prevent the resuscitation of Russia. For this quadruple alliance [Romania, Poland, Ukraine, Hungary] Mr. Bratianu confidently relies on securing the support of Italy and, less confidently, that of France. Britain he regards as more or less disinterestedly neutral, and the US he frankly considers Romania’s worst enemy. The Government press at Bucharest is full every day of the differences of opinion between the Great Powers at the Conference. . . . In conclusion I would venture to urge that the only method of maintaining Romania in the alliance, of preventing her from entering on a course of foreign policy calamitous to herself and prejudicial to us, and of securing her a reform of the present corrupt and inefficient administration which encumbers her, is prompt and unequivocal action by the Peace Conference. I would venture to urge that the best course would be that at such a moment as the Conference considers opportune ¾ and the sooner that moment is chosen the more decisive and beneficial will be the effect ¾ a firm but friendly demand should be addressed to the Romanian Government calling on them within a delay of a few days to decide whether or not they will sign the Treaty with Austria, including the famous minority clause. In the same communication the Romanian Government should be informed that the Conference would welcome a discussion as to the exact wording and application of the Treaty. . .9 The course suggested in the Leeper Memorandum was adopted not only by the British representatives but also by the other representatives at the Peace Conference towards the end of 1919, and proved to be a success.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Regarding the Bessarabian question, since the beginning of the Peace Conference the British representatives had expressed the opinion that, based on ethnic, economical, geographical, historical and political reasons, the province should belong to Romania. In the first phase, the British diplomatic team concluded that, in order for the Union to be officially recognized, Romania should fulfill three conditions: Bessarabia’s separation from Russia would be on the basis of the ethnic principle and not a military occupation of the province in favor of Romania; nothing should be done that could impinge on Russia’s economic or other vital interests in Romania; the national minorities living in the area should receive internationally guaranteed cultural and local autonomy.10 The British position on Bessarabia was presented officially during an interpellation in the House of Commons, on December 4, 1919. Asked by Captain Moreing whether HMG would regard with sympathy the desire of the inhabitants of Bessarabia to be reunited with Romania, Lloyd George answered “It had been the policy of HMG, throughout the Peace Conference, to endeavour to unite national majorities where ever it is practicable to do so. They will approach the consideration of Bessarabia in this spirit.”11 The UK’s Role in the Signing of the Bessarabian Treaty Motivation In 1920, the UK was the Great Power pushing hardest for the official recognition of the union between Bessarabia and Romania. Why did they take such a “friendly” attitude, why were the British so active in a matter that was not of any direct interest to the British Empire? A “Memorandum on Bessarabia”, prepared at the Foreign Office in January 1920, might give us a head start. The Memorandum reads: In June 1919 Admiral Kolchak’s Government declared that the principle of ratification of covenants regarding national groups by a Russian Constituent Assembly must be applied to the question of Bessarabia . . . Mr. Bratianu invariably replied that the one deciding factor in his Russian policy was the question of Bessarabia. Ukraine acknowledged the Romanian claim to this province, while Denikin did not; therefore, until the latter did so, Romania would withhold all real support from him and assist Ukraine. During the last few days of November and the early part of December Petliura seems to have been eliminated from Ukraine. General Denikin has since been defeated everywhere and may lose Odessa. Before he does so the moment seems appropriate for reaching a decision at Paris in regard to Bessarabia. The Peace Conference noted on December 11 that this question has still to be discussed. . . . At the Bessarabian frontier trouble may arise in an acute form owing to the insecurity of the Vaida government in Romania and General Denikin’s incapacity to hold the situation in South Russia.

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CHAPTER 5. THE UNITED KINGDOM

It is suggested therefore that in addition to the encouragement of effective cooperation between Poland, Romania and South Russia . . . a definite decision should be reached by the Conference of Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries in Paris as to the boundaries and sovereignty over Bessarabia. It is important to strengthen the Vaida Government and at the same time to remove the principal obstacle to the co-operation of Romania in the regeneration of Russia.12 As can be seen, by January 1920 one of the main reasons behind the UK’s intention to settle the Bessarabian question was the situation in Russia and the hope of having Romania act in a more positive manner for the “regeneration of Russia”, whatever was to be understood by this formula. On January 20, as previously shown, according to the suggestion presented in the Memorandum, Lloyd George took a decisive step regarding the Bessarabian question by promising the Conference’s official recognition of its union with Romania. However, the Russian-Polish War brought about a change in the British position by dimming their enthusiasm regarding that regeneration of Russia. The person who seems to have had the greatest influence over the formulation of the British policy on Bessarabia, namely Alan W.A. Leeper, was a high-ranking official in the Foreign Office. Whenever a matter regarding Bessarabia came up for debate, his opinion was asked. The Report he prepared on February 28, 1920, offers an example; his suggestions were clearly followed by Lloyd George during the March 3, 1920, meeting of the Peace Conference: The Romanian Prime Minister, who has been urgently summoned by the Romanian King, is most anxious to obtain from the Peace Conference a consideration of the Bessarabian question. . . . It is therefore a question whether the consideration of the recognition of Bessarabia’s reunion with Romania should be postponed until the Romanian troops have finally left Hungarian territory completely. If this is done it means that Vaida-Voevod will return to Bucharest empty handed, his position becoming impossible from the view of Romanian internal politics. In view of the fact that Vaida-Voevod represents and agrees with precisely the policy of close alliance and friendship with this country, the result of his defeat could not fail to be disastrous from the view of BritishRomanian relations. I venture therefore to submit that Mr. Vaida-Voevod might be given an opportunity of stating briefly his proposals and that on condition of his accepting and abiding by absolutely the ruling of the Allied Military Commission, as to the stages of evacuating Hungary, the Supreme Council might furnish him with a decision on the Bessarabian question in accordance with the terms of the draft that I venture to annex hereto [presented as Annex No. 6 of Chapter 2]. It may be added that, if the reported offer of the Soviets to make peace with Romania is authentic, the case for an immediate decision on the Bessarabian

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Moldova, a Romanian Province question is strengthened. There is no doubt, alike in the interests of the Bessarabian people themselves, who have already fully accepted union with Romania and in the interest of peace and order throughout Romania and neighboring countries, that a settlement of the Bessarabian question on the lines indicated is urgently needed.13 Reasons The British insistence on the making of the Bessarabian Treaty was driven by many factors. (1) Preventing Russia from playing too important a role in European policy, from becoming “a menace” to Europe, was a major British concern. The British government had no interest in seeing a powerful Russia. Similarly, they had no interest in seeing France achieve a hegemonic position in Europe; and consequently the British chose to assist the revival of Germany. However perilous this policy proved to be some two decades later, it was the choice of the British leadership; they had no use for a strong Russia, one that would open the door to the French by keeping Germany on her knees. The Bessarabian question was part and parcel of this policy, as expressed by Lloyd George during a parliamentary interpellation (March 1, 1920): Lt-commander Kenworthy asked the Prime Minister whether any decision had been reached at the Peace Conference with regard to Bessarabia; whether the Royal Romanian Government has been approached by the Soviet Government with a view to the settlement of this question and the making of peace; what advice has been tendered by HMG on this question; and whether we have entered into any agreement with Romania to support it if peace with Russia is not concluded. The Prime Minister: . . . the future of Bessarabia has been subject of discussion between the Supreme Council and the Romanian Prime Minister. The answer to the second part is in the affirmative. As for the third and fourth parts, HMG have adopted the same attitude in this regard toward Romania as they had already taken towards Poland and the Baltic States.14 What is important here is the fact that Bessarabia is considered to be in the same category as the Baltic States and the Russian parts of Poland. This position was exactly the opposite of that adopted by the US government, which clearly considered Bessarabia to be a special case, as shown in the Colby Note of August 10, 1920. (2) The British government wanted to keep Romania out of the Polish-Russian War.15 Of course, as Bessarabia was the main reason for Romania to intervene in the war, offering the necessary international guarantees regarding her possession of Bessarabia seemed to be the best option. As stated by Frank Rattigan: In the view of Mr. Lloyd George . . . His Majesty’s Government were in no sense prepared to advise Romania to take any action which would involve her

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in active hostilities with the Bolsheviks. If she took such action, she must clearly understand that she did so on her own responsibility and could not expect any assistance from Great Britain.16 Indeed, throughout the interwar period, one of the main aims of British foreign policy was to avoid any new war; the fear of seeing the British Empire embroiled in a new conflict in Europe was acute. The British leadership was active during the third and fourth decades in seeking to resolve all conflicts at the negotiating table. (3) Negatively influencing Romanian-British relations was the question of the future status of the Danube. In accordance with its longstanding policy of controlling the principal navigable waterways, the UK had imposed, together with France, the internationalization of the Danube and the establishment of a European Commission on the Mouths of the Danube. The Danube River flows into the Black Sea through a delta where it divides itself into three arms with the northernmost, the Chilia Arm, being the most suited to navigation. The Chilia Arm had previously been the border between Romania and Russia (and, therefore, had been considered international waters — or, under international control) but, as a result of the union, it became exclusively Romanian territory. In order to preclude Romanian control of the main navigable arm of the Danube (and to answer the propaganda campaign initiated by the Liberal Party, at that time in opposition, against the acceptance of the decision taken by the Peace Conference on the status of Danube), the British government decided to “weaken” the Romanian position. In April 1920, they added to the initial draft of the Bessarabian Treaty a special article regarding navigation on the Chilia Arm and control over the mouth of the Chilia (Article No. 7), protecting their interests from any possibly costly Romanian decision (for example, the Romanians could have imposed a new tax on navigation through the Danube Delta).17 (4) The British sought to consolidate the non-Bratianist Government (at that time the Liberal Party, controlled by the Bratianu family, was the best-organized political party in Romania) and to increase the British influence in Romania. With no more US representatives in attendance to be blamed, and because of the Danube question and certain other economic and political matters, Great Britain became “the bête noire of the Bratianists”.18 As previously shown, the British intervened in favor of the Romanian cause in Bessarabia during the January 20 and March 3, 1920 meetings of the Peace Conference in part due to the need to strengthen the Vaida-Voevod government. Even after that government was replaced with the one headed by Alexandru Averescu, they continued their support, with a view not only to counterbalancing the anti-British propaganda initiated by the Liberals but also to increasing their general influence in Romania. (5) Conceivably, another reason would be the fact that Bessarabia was Romanian territory according to the ethnographical and historical data. However, it is difficult to ascertain how much that argument may have influenced the British position on Bessarabia. The same point had no influence whatsoever on the US government, which considered its strategic interests more important than any historical or

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Moldova, a Romanian Province demographic realities. In the case of France, opinion was divided, some French scholars arguing that economically Bessarabia would fare much better under Russian administration, which offered a huge market for its products, compared to Romania, which produced more or less the same goods as Bessarabia. Officially, the British representatives stressed that their main reason for backing the union of Bessarabia with Romania was based on clear demographical and historical realities, but in British secret documents regarding Bessarabia there is almost no allusion to that. (6) The Bessarabian Treaty stipulated no concrete obligations for its signatories in case of a Russian-Romanian War over Bessarabia. Therefore, even when the Treaty came into force, the signatory Great Powers would have only a moral obligation towards Romania, and even this obligation was not a direct one — it was the League of Nations and not the signatory Powers that would be responsible for taking whatever measures were considered necessary in case of a Russian attack on Bessarabia. This situation was clearly in agreement with the British policy of avoiding any concrete obligations on the Continent. During 1920, British interest in the Treaty shifted its accent from the negotiations between Romania and the Conference of the Ambassadors to the bilateral Romanian-British negotiations, the former simply confirming the agreements reached by the latter. As a result, British diplomacy played the decisive role during the final stages in the making of the Bessarabian Treaty. However, while the British government had reason enough to act in favor of the international recognition of Bessarabia’s union, it took the opportunity to link it to other seemingly minor questions on which Romania seemed unwilling to listen to British and French “advice”. There were at least three such questions: the withdrawal of the Romanian Army from Hungarian territory; Romania’s signing and ratification of the Minorities Treaty and other treaties; and increased compensations to be paid by Romania to the foreign landowners expropriated in Bessarabia. It should be noted that none of those matters was of long-term importance to the British; they all came into play as a result of combined French-British pressure. Involvement British-Romanian negotiations regarding the Draft of the future Bessarabian Treaty started in April 1920. The Romanian Prime Minister, Alexandru Averescu, first named Take Ionescu as his representative in London but, the latter refusing the assignment due to his being nominated as foreign minister, the task of negotiating the new treaty passed to Nicolae Titulescu. Therefore, before becoming Finance Minister (June 1920), Titulescu was responsible for negotiating, both in London and Paris, the Draft Treaty.19 Years later he described the negotiations: When, as a delegate of the Averescu Government at the Peace Conference, I had to discuss the draft of the Treaty recognizing the union of Bessarabia to Romania, obtained by the Vaida Government, the Allies proposed a formula

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which was totally unacceptable and which admitted the Soviets’ right to make appeal at the League of Nations against the decision of the Great Powers to recognize the political union of Bessarabia with Romania. I had to fight for the entire month of May in London in order to empty the proposed formulation of any substance, clearly stipulating that the Romanian sovereignty over Bessarabia and her borders are exempted from the right to make appeal recognized to the Soviets.20 The British government backed the French in insisting that the Romanian government offer substantial compensation to the foreign landowners who were expropriated in Bessarabia. Although there were only three (initially two) such British landowners, HMG did whatever it could in order to offer them satisfaction. While it opposed the French proposal to insert the matter into the draft of the Treaty itself, considering that it would be inappropriate to introduce into a treaty of this nature a clause related to temporary private interests,21 it clearly insisted on reaching another type of agreement with the Romanian government in order to resolve the matter. Frank Rattigan informed his Government of the need to make certain reservations in the application to British subjects of the Bessarabian agrarian law, before signing the Bessarabian Treaty, but he considered it unnecessary to make any such stipulation a part of the agreement itself.22 After all, it would have been unusual to condition a treaty of such importance on a private financial matter that offered no material advantages whatsoever to the British government. Therefore the British government instructed him to approach the Romanian government and request the necessary assurances, stating that the British delegation could not sign an agreement on Bessarabia until these assurances were obtained.23 On the surface this instruction, as well as the ensuing negotiations, clearly shows the “materialistic” side of the British foreign policy: British interests, however minor they might be, must be protected in any situation and at any price. On the other hand, when we consider the reasons motivating the British to press for the Bessarabian Treaty, the same instructions take on a different light: they were either trying to please the French (who were not very happy with this solution) or they were “playing tough” with the Romanians. A few days later, Rattigan reported home of his attempt to act, together with the French minister in Bucharest, in order to resolve the matter of foreign subjects expropriated in Bessarabia — an attempt that was motivated by the need to avoid inspiring anti-British feelings but that failed as a result of the prolonged French delays. Rattigan decided to send a separate note to the Romanian Foreign Affairs Ministry: I have asked the Romanian Government. 1. To indemnify expropriated British subjects on the same basis as in force in Old Kingdom.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province 2. To accord fair compensation for expropriation of rights in forests, town property, quarries, fisheries etc. 3. To repay to proprietors all arrears of rent etc. collected by Romanian authorities up to date of definitive expropriation.24 In Paris, the French were also negotiating with the matter of foreign subjects expropriated in Bessarabia. Titulescu having expressed to Guy Laroche (under Secretary for Europe in the French Foreign Ministry) his objections regarding Articles 7 and 9 in the draft treaty, articles added to the initial draft on Britain’s insistence, Laroche expressed his discontent with the fact that the agrarian law was damaging for the French subjects in Bessarabia. Titulescu answered that his government was ready to indemnify the mentioned subjects and promised to study a procedure that might confirm this undertaking.25 The British government was the first to be informed of the Romanian agreement to resolve the matter. As reported by Rattigan after a meeting with Foreign Minister Take Ionescu: “He gave me assurances that arrears of rent would be paid to British proprietors and that they would be compensated for the rights confiscated”.26 The British government considered the assurances satisfactory, but insisted they be put in writing as soon as possible in order to have the Bessarabian Treaty discussed at an early date.27 The Romanian minister in France, Dimitrie Ion Ghika, also pressed the French government into signing the Bessarabian Treaty.28 As soon as he received word of his government’s resolution regarding the French interests in Bessarabia, he presented it to the French government: nine French subjects had been identified and their requests sent to the Public Works Ministry; also, as Titulescu had been named Finance Minister, there would be no problem with the payment, Titulescu having all the necessary elements in order to ascertain the amounts and the modalities of payment.29 On June 28, 1920, the Romanian Government agreed to offer written assurances to the British and French governments regarding the payment of increased indemnities for their subjects expropriated in Bessarabia as a result of the agrarian law. The modality proposed was an exchange of notes, embodying the assurances required, between the Romanian Minister in Paris and the Conference of Ambassadors.30 Why did the Romanian government then change its decision, so that instead of an exchange of notes with the Conference, there was an exchange of notes only with France and Britain? Was it in order to keep the matter secret from the Romanian or Russian landowners, who might have asked for the same increased compensations? Or was it simply because the Romanians understood that the British-French Entente was the main engine behind the Peace Conference, and no real influence was discernable from the other Great Powers? It is true that, as it turned out, the French and British agreement was sufficient for the signing of the Treaty. Consequently, when the Romanians decided to take the first practical steps in this direction, they did not call on the Conference but on the British government:

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The Romanian government will allow an indemnity to the 13 foreign landowners in Bessarabia. The Romanian government will fix the increase in allowance, but we request the Foreign Office to ascertain from owners the value of their properties. The Romanian government has taken this engagement hoping that the treaty relating to Bessarabia will soon be signed.31 Satisfied with the proposal, the British government asked Rattigan to offer the necessary information to the Romanian government, observing, “They are anxious to push on with signature of treaty; such is also the desire of HMG”.32 Three weeks later, Rattigan was able to report home that the Romanian government fully agreed to the British demands: they would pay the two landowners for the expropriated land, at a value to be established together by the two governments, and the money would be paid directly to the British government; they would also pay the rent arrears due to the landowners, starting at the moment of expropriation.33 The Romanian willingness to resolve the matter so agreeably can be ascribed to their wish to see the Bessarabian Treaty signed as soon as possible and the relatively limited amount of money to be paid. Anton Bibescu, the Romanian chargé d’affaires in London, continued to press for the signing of the Treaty, as soon as possible. To strengthen his case and to overcome the foot-dragging of the French, Bibescu insisted that postponing the Bessarabian question or linking it to the general peace negotiations to be opened eventually with the Soviet government (as suggested by the French), would be considered by the Romanian government as harmful to the preservation of order in Romania. The last argument seemed to be convincing for the British: “There is great force in the Romanian argument about the situation in the East, as the Soviet government may at any moment make extravagant decisions about Bessarabia”.34 However, although the Romanians agreed to indemnify the British subjects expropriated in Bessarabia and with all due consideration of the danger posed by the Soviets, the British government still considered that the Bessarabian Treaty might prove useful in settling another matter that had been left in suspense by the Romanians: the Minorities Treaty. Therefore, by early August, Bucharest was informed that: There is another question which obviously affects the Bessarabian settlement, the Minorities Treaty. It is clearly desirable that Romania should facilitate the conclusion of the arrangement for the Bessarabian Treaty by ratifying the Minorities Treaty as soon as possible.35 On August 4, 1920, Titulescu had a meeting with Harold Nicholson (of the British Foreign Ministry) in which he presented the Romanian solution to the expropriation question (the exchange of letters). He also tried to play on the BritishFrench competition for influence in Romania, by arguing that, when he visited Paris, the French government had been very anxious to sign the Bessarabian Treaty but

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Moldova, a Romanian Province told him that the British government was largely responsible for the continuing postponement.36 As it was highly unlikely that the French had blamed the British for the postponement, Titulescu’s argument was seen as a transparent diplomatic attempt to intensify the pressure for ratification, and it seems to have failed to impress the British. As stated by British officials: If we give way over Bessarabia before the ratification of the Minorities Treaty by Romania we lose a powerful lever without which she will probably never ratify. I would suggest that the note to Mr. Boerescu [Romanian Minister to UK] should go forward despite any capital that our French allies may make out of this at Bucharest. . . . If the immediate solution of the Bessarabian question is so important to the Romanians, they have it in their own hands to obtain it. If they will frankly explain to their Chamber that the ratification of the Minorities Treaty is a condition of obtaining the cession of Bessarabia, they ought to be able to have the ratification voted at once.37 It should be admitted that, although the idea of tying the ratification of the Minorities Treaty to the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty came up rather late, it was immediately embraced by the British. This time, unlike in the case of compensation for expropriated landowners, the British government, with the French government immediately backing it, initiated the new condition imposed on the Romanians in exchange for signing the Bessarabian Treaty. On August 8, 1920, another meeting took place between Titulescu, Boerescu and Lord Curzon, with the Romanians stating that the Senate had ratified the Minorities Treaty unanimously and asking for the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty.38 The Romanian government had proven once again how much value it placed on the Bessarabian Treaty, fulfilling the British condition in a matter of days. It is true the law for the ratification of the Minorities Treaty (a part of the Peace Treaty with Austria) had already been slated for debate by the Romanian Parliament. In fact, most probably the British insistence on the ratification of the Minorities Treaty came as a result of Romanian internal politics, as the Liberal Party tried to use the Minorities Treaty as a weapon against the Averescu government. The Romanians having complied with both British demands, Lord Derby was instructed to take the necessary action for the official recognition of Bessarabia’s union with Romania: His Majesty’s Government were unwilling to sign the Bessarabian Treaty before Romania had: a. Given certain assurances in regard to British property in Bessarabia; b. Ratified the Minorities Treaty. [Point] (a) has now been complied with and in regard to (b) the Romanian Senate has ratified the Minorities Treaty.

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Please, therefore, arrange with French Government for signature of Bessarabian Treaty directly authoritative information is received as to ratification by Romanian Chamber, which is daily expected. 39 It should also be noted that, in matters regarding the Bessarabian Treaty, the British representatives were supposed to consult only their French counterparts and not the Italians or the Japanese representatives, who were also members of the Conference. The Romanians understood that the British government was on their side and they kept up the pressure, informing them of developments regarding the ratification of the Minorities Treaty and asking for a quick resolution to the Bessarabian question.40 Their efforts were successful: Minister Boerescu was informed that the British government had already instructed his Ambassador in Paris to arrange for the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty with the least possible delay.41 According to his instructions, Lord Derby asked the French government when they would be ready to sign, presenting the British view on the matter and dismissing the French “official” reason for the postponement: As soon as the Romanians ratify the Minorities Treaty, the British Government will be ready to sign the Bessarabian Treaty . . . HMG is of the opinion that the adherence of the US government to the Treaty is of little real importance, since the Treaty contains reference to the League, which would make it practically impossible to secure the ratification of the US. While regretting therefore that the US government are unable to be a party to the Treaty, HMG do not feel that their abstention can be adduced as a reason against the prompt signature and ratification of the Treaty by the Principal Allied Powers.42 The British argument failed to impress the French, who tried to temporize, maintaining that there was no urgency. They argued that between the ratification of the Minorities Treaty by Romania and the deposit of that ratification in Paris there would be a period of a few weeks during which they could easily analyze the situation. And, in order to completely dissipate the British pressure, after insisting again on the US adhesion to the treaty, the French proposed waiting until the Soviets should officially recognize Bessarabia’s union with Romania: “Do the HMG believe that the Soviet government will accept the cession of Bessarabia and, if so, should we not wait until the end of the Romanian-Soviet negotiations?43 Notwithstanding the French opposition, as soon as news of the Romanian ratification of the Minorities Treaty reached Paris, Lord Derby insisted again on the signing, suggesting the first week of September for this action. As he received no answer from the French government, Lord Derby sent a new Note on September 8, 1920,44 only in order to receive an answer one week later, along the same lines as previously: we should wait for the US government’s agreement.45 The Romanian Crown Prince Carol visited the UK, and he met the Prime Min-

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Moldova, a Romanian Province ister on September 11. During the meeting, Romanian foreign policy was among the topics, with the Romanians insisting that they could not enter any negotiations with the Soviets before the Bessarabian Treaty was signed. Lloyd George: Romania should defend her own frontiers. If she limited herself to this she would receive the sympathy of Western Europe and, if attacked, would probably receive such help as could be spared . . . [T]he difficulty with the Poles was that they had so far antagonized public opinion that Parliament had shown itself indisposed to help them . . . it was peace that the world wanted. It would be an advantage to Romania to get a treaty conferring Bessarabia upon her, signed by some de facto Russian Government. Once Romania had got Bessarabia in this way it was unlikely that anyone would attack her. M. Boerescu stated that the Bessarabian Treaty agreed to by the Powers had not yet been signed. Lord Hardinge told him that the British Ambassador in Paris had been given full powers to sign, and that there were no difficulties as regards the British government. He was somewhat puzzled to know why the signature had not taken place. The Prime Minister undertook to make inquiries on this point, and instructed Sir Maurice Hankey to take the necessary action.46 M. Boerescu thanked the Prime Minister and stated that the Minorities Treaty had been ratified and all formalities complied with, so that no obstacle to the Bessarabian Treaty was to be found there.47 Lord Derby made the necessary inquiries again and presented the French position, as well as his personal views, to his government: Even as they did not change their position towards the Bessarabian Treaty, they still believe it necessary to have the US signature and also to ensure Romania against troubles in the future with Russia . . . by having the recognition of both the Soviets and the Southern Russian government for Bessarabia’s cession. As this is practically tantamount to an indefinite postponement of the Treaty, I should be glad to know if HMG attach particular importance to its early signature and if so on what grounds. The first thing to do is to induce the US government to withdraw their objection and I venture to suggest that the best way of doing this would be by direct representation at Washington.48 The French position, arguing that the treaty should be postponed for the spring 1921 in view of the need to wait for the recognition of the union by the Soviets as well as by the Southern Russian government, received a dim reception in London. The British displeasure is clearly presented by Alan Leeper: This new move on the part of the French is as dishonest as it is easily explicable. They are anxious to stand well with General Wrangel and have obvi-

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ously given him some assurances in regard to Bessarabia. To postpone signature of Bessarabian Treaty till Americans, Bolsheviks, General Wrangel’s consent have been obtained is to postpone it till the Greek Calends. I have discussed this with Mr. Harrison, of the US Embassy in Paris, from every angle and it is clear that the American consent is unattainable [it would contradict the Colby Note]. If cession will be made dependent on their consent (Soviets, General Wrangel) they will naturally attempt all sorts of blackmail at Romania’s expense (in the Copenhagen conversations, Litvinov agreed to cession). The Romanians have loyally fulfilled the two preliminary conditions laid down by HMG; our word is therefore pledged. Lord Derby should be informed that in the opinion of HMG the Treaty should be signed at once and that in the event of the Allied governments withholding their signature, HMG will have no course open but to attach their signature alone.49 Following the line suggested by Leeper, Lord Derby received the necessary instructions: . . . French attitude, which is presumably affected by obligations undertaken towards General Wrangel, cannot be allowed to influence position of HMG explained to you in my telegrams. On August 19 I informed Romanian Chargé d’Affaires that I had “instructed HMG Ambassador at Paris to arrange for the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty with the least possible delay”. I cannot therefore agree to the indefinite postponement that would be required in order to obtain American consent and that of the Soviet Government and General Wrangel. Please therefore at next meeting propose to Ambassador’s Conference that treaty should be signed next week and inform your colleagues that while strongly hoping that they will sign the treaty you have instructions to attach your own signature to it in any case.50 As can be seen, the British position was a decisive factor in signing the Bessarabian Treaty during 1920. The British pressure was very influential in convincing the French that the time had come to sign the Bessarabian Treaty, even as they insisted on further postponements — as they needed time to see how the things would evolve in the Russian-Polish war. The British representatives found the best means to modify this policy, by insisting that they were prepared to be the only Power to sign the treaty. The last argument proved to make the difference for France, who was unwilling to risk seeing all her influence in Romania disappear over night. The French were also aware that, with the UK being the only Great Power pressing for signature, the view from Bucharest could not be to France’s advantage.51 Therefore, the French government finally came up with a time frame for the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty: they insisted that the US government should be asked once more to

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Moldova, a Romanian Province sign, but this time in common by all the members of the Conference, with October 25 as the deadline for their answer.52 Following his instructions, Lord Derby kept pressing the French government, informing it that his government opposed any new postponement and that he was quite prepared to be the only Ambassador to sign.53 The British held firm to their decision to sign the Bessarabian Treaty as soon as possible. Just a few days later, the Ambassadors Conference suggested that, as a condition for signing the Bessarabian Treaty, the Romanian Government should be asked to sign two other treaties (Central European Frontiers Treaty and the Treaty regarding the obligations taken over by the inheriting States of the ex-AustriaHungarian monarchy, signed at Sèvres on August 10, 1920), but the British government opposed this suggestion as a new postponement. As noted by Alan Leeper: “I submit that the willingness of HMG to sign the Bessarabian Treaty at once should not be made conditional on Romania’s will to sign the other two treaties, although it is well to press them to do so”.54 Once again, Lord Curzon entirely followed Leeper’s opinion: “Desirable though it be that Romanian signature of other two treaties be obtained now, it cannot be made a condition sine qua non of your signature of the Bessarabian treaty to which . . . HMG are now unconditionally pledged.”55 Apart from pressuring the French, the British government was also taking steps in order to obtain the adhesion of the British Dominions to the Bessarabian Treaty. Although the representatives for the Dominions agreed in principle to sign the Treaty, they asked for the Treaty to be left open for signature by them for a month, as had been done in other cases. Their motivation was simple: they had not been supplied with copies of the draft. The Dominions’ request was quickly approved by the Conference, and a protocol was drafted allowing the Dominions to sign up to one month after the principal signatories.56 After the Romanian answer to the proposed Draft Treaty was received in Paris (October 11), negotiations regarding the modification requested by the Romanian Government took place in London, during the visit of the Romanian Foreign Minister, Take Ionescu. In Paris, Lord Derby considered the Romanian amendments inconvenient and asked for instructions: Failing agreement regarding Chilia mouth at the Danube Conference which Romanians could block, the status quo would, according to new Romanian draft, be maintained; i.e. the Romanian Government would evade the obligation which they contracted as a result of discussions in May which virtually assured the placing of the Chilia mouth under the Danube Commission.57 Alan Leeper, who was in charge of negotiating the proposed modifications with Romania, best expresses the British position: This is most unfortunate as it may invoke further delay. The Romanian proposal to omit paragraph 1 of Article 7 and simply to leave

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the question to the general Danube Conference, without undertaking necessarily to accept its decision, is quite unsatisfactory. The Romanian delegates are quite incorrect in saying that when the question was discussed in London in May 1920 it was laid down that the question of the Chilia Branch should be settled by the Danube Conference. It was in fact agreed in the conversation between Titulescu, General Mance and myself, and was afterwards approved, that in any case the Chilia Branch should pass under the same regime as the other mouths of the Danube, unless the Danube Conference took another decision. At the time the Romanians hoped that they might be able at the Conference to secure the merging of the European Commission of the Mouths of Danube into the new international Commission for controlling the general course of the river. This they failed to do and the European Commission remains in existence according to the Treaty of Versailles. I do not see any way out of this except to remind Titulescu of the agreement we made and to tell him that the present formula suggested by the Romanian delegation is not at all the same thing. Secondly, the Romanian delegation proposes the addition in line 5 of Article 9 of words “not provided for” (non prevus) after “details”. This entirely changes the character of the article, which was deliberately drafted in order to safeguard under the control of the signatory parties the rights of Russia to state her case on the subject with regard to any violation of her interest, which may have been committed owing to the fact that she has not been represented in the negotiations. Still, this could be arranged somehow.58 The fact that the Romanians understood that their proposed amendments would be negotiated in London and not in Paris might be considered as one more proof of the leading role played by the UK in the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty. On the other hand, as it was the British government that added Articles 7 and 9 to the initial draft, it was normal for the Romanians to discuss them in London and not in Paris. In fact, the Danube question played an important role in the British decision not only to sign but also to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty. It was this specific problem in the Bessarabian Treaty that triggered the intervention of the British ambassadors in Japan, France and Italy in asking for ratification at the end of 1923. Article No. 7 of the Treaty in fact transferred the Mouth of Chilia Branch to the jurisdiction of the European Commission.59 This proves once again the pragmatist British policy: while they were against any French postponement in signing the treaty, they were unwilling to sign a treaty in which their interests would be impinged. In fact the Romanians were more concerned with the territorial questions and did not consider the Danube a vital question during the Peace Conference; it was only later that they started a forceful campaign to resolve the question in Romania’s favor.60 On October 18, 1920, Titulescu and Leeper met twice, focusing on the proposed Romanian modifications to the draft treaty. Leeper said,

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Titulescu willingly agreed to drop the words “non prevus” and to insert instead of them, between “present treaty” and “as well as any difficulties”, the words “with the exception of matters regarding the frontiers as defined by the present Treaty and of Romania’s sovereignty”. I submit that this formula should be accepted. The Chilia question is much more difficult. Titulescu declared that he had no intention, and I believe that this is true, of altering the agreement made in London in May, except in so far as the Danube Conference has already altered the position. All he wishes is to reserve the right to discuss the Chilia question at the Conference, to whose decision, whatever it might be, he will bow. I could not offer him any assurances, as we prefer the May 1920 formula. I do not think we could accept Mr. Titulescu’s proposal without obtaining Colonel Baldwin’s views first, for everything depends on whether we can feel sure of the Danube Conference supporting our view. This means further delay, as it is clear from Lord Derby’s telegram that General Mance is not satisfied. The proposed note on the subject of compensations for British interests seems quite satisfactory. . . . Titulescu, in a further conversation with me yesterday evening agreed to go a step further and add the words “and Romania will accept the decision of the Conference”. If then we can rely on the Conference deciding in favor of our viewpoint, there should be no further obstacle to signing.61 Describing the same meetings some 20 years later, Titulescu had a somewhat different view of the proceedings. While making no mention of the Chilia question, in which he failed, he stressed the opposition of the British diplomats to modifying Article 9, as they considered the Russians to have an inalienable right to appeal in questions regarding their former province, and presented the compromise formula that had been reached for Article No 9: The right to make appeal should be maintained but it must not extend to the Romanian sovereignty over Bessarabia and to her borders. And the Englishmen agreed with this last formula, as it would not have been equivalent to refusing the right to appeal.62 Based on a letter written by Nicolae Titulescu to King Carol II in August 1939, A. Karetki and A. Pricop consider that in fact it was Titulescu who initiated the proposed modifications because he was dissatisfied with the wordings of Articles No. 7 and 9, and they praise him for defending Romanian interests.63 However, the matter was not that simple. Whereas the above may be true for Article 9, the situation regarding Article 7 was quite different, as is shown by the British documents. Titulescu had already agreed in May 1920 with the British condition regarding the Chilia Branch of Danube and, in October, he offered once again a compromise solution by offering Romania’s acceptance of the decision taken by the Danube Confer-

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ence in Paris regarding the Chilia Branch. This compromise solution was already a step back from the initial amendment asked by the Romanians for Article 7. The question is, who or what was behind the proposed modification of Article 7, since neither Titulescu nor Ionescu seemed too keen to back it up? Was it suggested in order to increase the chances for acceptance of the proposed modification to Article 9, or only in order to quiet those among the political opposition who were critical of their handling of the Danube question? The question remains particularly opaque as the British government seemed willing to come to a compromise solution regarding Article 7 on the line suggested by Titulescu during his second meeting with Leeper on October 18, and was quite surprised when the Romanians decided to entirely drop that proposed modification.64 Lord Derby received new instructions outlining the agreement that was reached: the modification agreed with regard to Article 9, and the new solution found for Article 7 (with the Draft Note prepared by Malkin); and the agreement of the British Board of Trade for the proposed formula for indemnification of British subjects in Bessarabia.65 A new conversation between Take Ionescu and Lord Curzon took place in London on October 21, 1920. Although the main topic was the future Balkan Entente, with the British favoring the creation of a Little Entente whereas the Romanians wanted a larger one, the question of Bessarabia was also taken into discussion. The Romanians asked the British opinion of the Romanian-Russian negotiations, and Lord Curzon insisted again that an arrangement should be concluded without delay. He also considered, unlike the Romanians or the French, that any agreement on Bessarabia signed with the Soviet Government would in all probability have, after the fall of the Soviets, a sort of binding force upon its successors and would not be detrimental to Romania’s long-term interests.66 The British insistence that the Romanians secure an agreement with the Soviets was exactly the opposite of the French position, with Take Ionescu clearly favoring the later. The final British-Romanian negotiations regarding the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty took place in Paris, on October 26-27, 1920. The Romanian Minister to France, Dimitrie Ion Ghika, handed over to Lord Derby the Note regarding the special indemnification for British subjects expropriated in Bessarabia, on October 26, to which Lord Derby answered on October 27. Then, as a result of a conversation between Lord Derby and Take Ionescu, the latter agreed to withdraw the Romanians’ proposed amendment to Article 7 of the Treaty.67 On October 28, 1920, Lord Derby was able to report to his Government that the Bessarabian Treaty had been signed by the representatives of all the Great Powers with the exception of the Japanese Ambassador, who was not in Paris. He also mentioned the only voice that raised objections to the signing of the Treaty: “The US Ambassador took the opportunity to protest against what he described as the inopportune dismemberment of Russia”.68

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Moldova, a Romanian Province The Ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty And so the Bessarabian Treaty was signed. In the period that followed, BritishRomanian relations were not very different from before. Most of the diplomatic correspondence between the two states was related to economic matters, the most important being those regarding the exploitation of Romanian petroleum, the reparations by the UK and France for the destruction of the Romanian oil fields in 1916,69 Romania’s war and pre-war debt, the conditions for obtaining new loans in the UK, and the negative consequences for British capital of the Romanian policy of economic self-sufficiency, prin noi insine, or “doing it by ourselves”. In the field of politics, the British government observed the relations between Romania and her neighbors, the creation of the Little Entente, and the special relationship between Romania and Poland. Among the differences between the two states were questions related to the evolution of the newly unified territories, and especially Transylvania. The British Government had been quite open to the complaints expressed by the ethnic Hungarians living in Romania (they even set out to call the attention of the League of Nations to what appeared to be a violation of the Minorities Treaty by Romania, in February 1923, but French opposition stopped them), and public opinion in the UK slowly shifted in favor of Hungary in its conflict with Romania.70 Regarding Bessarabia, the British Government continued to observe and analyze the situation in the region. Herbert G. Dering, the UK Minister to Romania, sent this report in late February 1922: There was probably a moment in the earlier days of the Averescu Administration when the menacing telegrams sent here by Cicerin were considered by the Foreign Minister to be more formidable than he decided them to be later [referring to the ultimatums sent to Romania during the summer of 1920]. For that reason he studiously avoided their publication for fear of alarming the Romanian public in regard to Bessarabia, where the internal conditions were, and still remain, far from satisfactory. It is difficult to see how they could be otherwise, with a population of so many of Russian origin, and when the Dniestr frontier is as laxly guarded by the Romanian troops as it is known to be. Propaganda is freely disseminated there by Jewish Bolshevik agents, who cross the river by means of bribery, and the people are far from content with Romanian rule.71 The UK had been the first of the signatory countries to both ask for the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty and to deposit the necessary instruments for the ratification. As soon as June 8, 1921, during a meeting of the Ambassadors Conference, the British Ambassador suggested that it would be wise to have all the ratifications deposited at the same moment, informing the Conference that his government had already taken the necessary steps for the ratification.72 The British government’s ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty was not wel-

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come news to the British representatives in Romania. As they had to deal with the question of Romanian indemnification for the British landowners expropriated in Bessarabia (and with their complaints), they were afraid that ratification prior to the fulfillment of the obligations assumed by the exchange of letters would result in Romania’s refusal to pay. Millington Drake, one of the British Legation’s secretaries, sent the following telegram on August 1921: I understand that we have ratified the Bessarabian Treaty. Have we deposited the ratification? If so, does the Protocol refer to the exchange of notes in Paris on October 26? Or, if the protocol of the ratification has not yet been drawn up, is it intended that, when drawn up, it shall contain a reference to this stipulation as a condition of ratification? I have been going thoroughly into cases under this guarantee and they have received practically no satisfaction. One of the lawyers of the “sinistres” has hinted that it is doubtful whether this exchange of notes could not be repudiated on the ground that, though it involves payment, it has not received sanction from the Romanian Chamber.73 After three weeks Drake received a reply from London: The last we heard as to ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty is that on the 8th June last the Conference decided to invite the Allied Powers signatory of the Treaty to proceed to immediate ratification. We are asking the Parliament how the matter stands and requesting them to expedite ratification if the deposit has not yet taken place. As regarding your suggestion that some conditions should be attached to the deposit of the ratification providing for a reaffirmation of the Romanian undertaking as to Bessarabian claims, we consider that as these notes were sufficiently explicit, and as Mr. Take Ionescu has recently emphasized to you his recognition of the fact, it would not be necessary to adopt so abnormal a proceeding as to include in the final protocol a reference to this exchange of notes.74 The answer to Drake’s telegram is interesting for two reasons: it indicates where the ratification process stood in August 1921; and it shows that there were always differences in how that matter looked from Bucharest and from London. The last comment shows that the suggestions coming from the British representatives overseas were not always welcome in London. The whole matter shows how much Romania’s image with the members of the British Legation in Bucharest had changed since Frank Rattigan was recalled. In this sense, it seems that at least Drake was completely under the influence of the three expropriated landowners, and gave no credit to the Romanian government. His distrust of Romania’s willingness to meet its international obligations was, as proven by the final settlement of the matter, quite unjustified, especially as a quite limited amount of money was at stake (some 300,000 Pounds Sterling). The British government had been quite keen from the beginning to avoid inserting any mention of im-

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Moldova, a Romanian Province mediate private interests into the Bessarabian Treaty; Drake’s suggestion was exactly the opposite of this position. Trying to justify his mistake, and further illustrating his distrust of the Romanians, Drake sent a new letter home arguing his case: My letter of August 10 was written just a few days before I saw Take Ionescu at Sinaia, when he repeated his assurance that they would keep to their bargain. There had been some rather disquieting indications and I must say I was pleasantly surprised at the earnestness with which he said that they would carry out their undertaking. All the same he then immediately tried to put off the first step towards its fulfillment, regarding the counter-evaluation. But what I had in mind in my letter to Malkin was the possible attitude of another government or another Foreign Minister; say a year or two years hence. The successors would probably be the Liberals and they are distinctly ill disposed, especially as regards any obligations undertaken by Romania in Paris. I quite understand that, as you say, mention of the exchange of notes in the ratification would be abnormal, but then it is also unusual that the signing of a treaty should be so entirely conditional on an agreement contained in an exchange of notes, as was the Bessarabian Treaty. At least, so I understood. We have seen that there is a long distance between Take Ionescu’s undertaking and fulfillment of it by him. But the distance between Ionescu’s undertaking and fulfillment by his successors would, I think, be infinite. My own feeling is that once the Bessarabian Treaty is ratified in the ordinary way, our chances of getting anything substantial out of the Romanian government would be very thin. . . . In any case, when the case comes for the deposit of ratification it would perhaps be well that there should be a pause to see how far the Romanian government have, at that moment, fulfilled their obligation. If little or no further progress has been made by then, ratification might perhaps be suspended for a while; or it might be worth while your consulting French government whether any stipulation could be put into the ratification.75 Notwithstanding Drake’s suggestions, the British government took the necessary steps for the deposit of ratification and instructed Hardinge of Penhurst, the new British Ambassador in Paris, in this sense: My Lord, with reference to paragraph 8 of Your Excellency’s telegram of June 8, I should be glad to learn whether the Protocol for the ratification of Bessarabian Treaty has yet been deposited. Should this not be the case, I would suggest that the French government might be asked to expedite the process of this ratification.76 Lord Hardinge answered as follows, giving the reasons for the British postponement in depositing the ratification:

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The French do not regard the matter as one of particular urgency, especially in view of the fact that none of the Signatories other than HMG are yet ready to deposit their ratification, not even the Romanian government itself, the only party which can have any special interest in the matter.77 In February 1922, with an eye on the upcoming Genoa Conference, the British government decided to take the final step and to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty. A memorandum on Bessarabia was prepared by the Foreign Office, presenting a review of the main phases in the making of the treaty as well as some comments regarding its actual situation: The presence of a Russian delegation at the Genoa Conference will presumably entail the recognition of the Soviet government, provided they are prepared to give satisfactory assurances regarding Russia’s debts . . . and a simple way out of any difficulty would be to make their acceptance of the Bessarabian Treaty one of the conditions for recognition. They will then under Article No. 9 be at liberty to appeal to the League of Nations in any smaller point they might wish to raise. The Soviets have apparently tried to strike a bargain with Romania on this question . . . Romania would probably be wise to conclude a bargain on these lines, as the gold is almost certainly spent, but I admit that we can scarcely ask her to do so. The US will probably maintain their attitude and France, provided she gets assurances regarding Russian debts, will almost certainly be unwilling to risk them for Romania by insisting on Russia’s adherence to the Treaty if the Soviets show great opposition.78 As anticipated at the Foreign Office, during the March 15, 1922 Conference of the Ambassadors in Paris, the Bessarabian Treaty came again under debate: Mr. Cambon [Jules Cambon, the French representative] pointed out the desirability of bringing the Bessarabian Treaty into force before the meeting of the Genoa Conference, so as to prevent any discussion at Genoa as regards the validity of the transfer of Bessarabia to Romania. At present HMG alone has ratified this treaty. The French Government are now taking measures to ratify it in their turn, and it was decided to invite the Italian and Japanese Embassies to urge their Governments to do likewise.79 In order to answer the French proposal, the British government instructed Lord Hardinge as follows: There may be some delay in depositing the King’s ratification of this instrument, owing to the necessity of making arrangements to meet the position of

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Moldova, a Romanian Province the Irish Free State. HMG have, however, no intention or desire to postpone the deposit on its merits; on the contrary, they are of the opinion that the treaty should, if possible, be ratified by all concerned before the opening of the Genoa Conference.80 On March 28, 1922, Lord Curzon informed Lord Hardinge that there was no longer any reason why the King’s ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty should not be deposited.81 As a result, on April 14, a few days after the beginning of the Genoa Conference, Hardinge of Penhurst, the British Ambassador in Paris, deposited the necessary instruments for the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty. There was no immediate reaction from the Soviet Union. In fact, the British ratification received little space in the press at the time, passing almost unobserved. The fact that the UK was the first signatory state to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty (even while there were still some complaints regarding the property of British citizens in Bessarabia, as was the case with France) as well as the first state to ask for ratification, shows that at least one of the four signatory Great Powers honored her signature without linking it to other new matters. The ratification was even more significant if we consider that it comes from a State that was understood by the Romanians as neutral towards them and not from France, whom the Romanians had perceived as the friendliest Great Power. And more, although its deposit was delayed, the British ratification preceded by almost one year the ratification of the state with the greatest interest in the Treaty — namely, Romania. One of the interesting aspects of the British ratification is that it was followed by almost no reaction in the mass media, neither British nor Romanian nor Soviet. There are three possible reasons for this silence: (1) the British were in the middle of a new round of negotiations with the Soviets and they had no interest to advertise their deposit of the ratification, as it would have influenced the mentioned negotiations; (2) the Romanians avoided any publicity due to the fact that the British ratification came ahead of theirs and it might have had a negative effect over the image of the Romanian government; (3) the French and the Italians also had no interest in advertising the British ratification, since the only result would have been to increase the pressure for their ratification. The UK Position after Ratifying the Bessarabian Treaty

Ratifying the Bessarabian Treaty did not mean that the British Government would stop following the Bessarabian situation closely in the coming years. Any time the Romanian Government was afraid of a possible communist invasion from the East, the British representatives were informed and asked for their opinion. In the reports prepared after such meetings, they usually made a careful analysis of the situation, which proves that they were still collecting important information in the area. Herbert Dering sent this report from Bucharest, in May 1922:

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M. Duca [Romanian Foreign Minister] called on me . . . on the subject of the concentration of Soviet troops which was alleged to be in progress in the neighborhood of the Bessarabian frontier . . . I am of the opinion that the Romanian authorities are quite capable of dealing with local disturbances in that province, but that it is as well that they should take in good time any military precautions which they consider necessary, in view of limited means of transport, especially in Bessarabia . . . 82 On October 13, 1925, Dering presented another report after a meeting with Walter Collins, an Intelligence officer who had just visited Bessarabia, describing the situation in the province: He could not report conditions in Bessarabia to be satisfactory, although admitting that there had been no frontier disturbances during his tour. The Romanian gendarmeries were, as everywhere, highly unpopular. The Moldavian peasants in Bessarabia proclaimed themselves dissatisfied with conditions under Romanian rule and many complaints were heard of corrupt tax collectors, but the Romanian military authorities were, on the other hand, he reported, popular now on all sides . . . He had gathered that a great amount of Bolshevist propaganda was carried out and money distributed by resident Jews and that arms could be smuggled across the Dniestr without much difficulty . . . there was no particular cause to anticipate active unrest. It might therefore be concluded that unless active encouragement were afforded by the Soviet military aggression in Bessarabia there is not at present much likelihood of disturbances in that province, which is subject to military law, apparently rendered with good intent acceptable to the inhabitants.83 On the other hand, the British government continued pursuing the matter of compensations for the British landowners expropriated in Bessarabia. In October 1922 an agreement was reached between the Romanian and British governments regarding the amount to be paid and the mode of payment: 332,306 Sterling Lira payable in consolidation bonds (made out in Sterling) and carrying 4% interest.84 On December 14, 1922, the Romanian government sent a Note to the British and French Legations by which they agreed to include the indemnities due by the Romanian government to the French and British landowners expropriated in Bessarabia in the law for consolidation of Romanian external debt, as suggested by the British and French governments.85 This was quite the opposite of what Millington Drake had envisaged one year earlier. As the compensation issue seemed to be coming to an end, the British government proved to be a very good manager of its resources and instructed Dering to “ . . . ensure that the expenditure incurred in connection with the evaluation of the properties is repaid by the claimants as soon as they receive payment from the Romanian government.”86

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Moldova, a Romanian Province In November-December 1923, the British Government took a last initiative in order to bring the Bessarabian Treaty into force. This time it directly asked the Japanese, French and Italian Governments to take the necessary steps for the ratification, indicating that: Difficulties have arisen with the Romanian representatives at the European Commission of the Danube as to the application of Article No. 7 of the Treaty regarding Bessarabia signed in Paris on October 28, 1920. The Romanian Government has declined to be bound by this Article so long as the Treaty is not ratified by all its signatories.87 This initiative clearly shows one of the main reasons for Britain’s insistence on bringing the Bessarabian Treaty into force. More or less coincidentally, at the end of October a controversy came up between Romania and the other members in the Danube Commission, and the Romanians decided to block navigation on the Chilia. They argued that, as the Bessarabian Treaty had not been ratified, the Commission could not use Article No. 7 regarding the Chilia mouth, at least not until France and Italy had ratified. The Commission argued back that the Romanian position might be presented to France or Italy, signatories of the Bessarabian Treaty, but not to the Commission, which had a neutral status.88 However, the British government realized that there was still a long way to go until that would happen, and they set out to resolve the question of the status of the Danube by other means. The British stance on Bessarabia seemed about to change in February 1924, when the UK officially recognized the Soviet Union. At that time there was a small diplomatic controversy around the Bessarabian question. The Soviet Government considered that: The British government has accorded de jure recognition to the Government of the USSR, whose authority extends over the entire territory of the former Russian Empire, with the exception of territories that have seceded by agreement with it and have formed independent states. By accepting this wording, Britain recognized the sovereignty of the Soviet Government over the entire territory of the USSR as well as over territories whose seizure had not been recognized by the Soviet Union, for example Bessarabia.89 The British thesis was different; while de jure recognizing the Soviet government, the British government was very keen to note that it was referring to the “former Russian territories that have accepted its authority”.90 In so doing, the British, even as they were making a “friendly” gesture towards the Soviets, did not hesitate to confirm Bessarabia’s possession by Romania; the independent Moldavian republic was clearly a territory that refused to accept the Soviet authority. The Bessarabian question continued to be scrutinized not only by the officials of the Foreign Office but by British politicians as well. The Parliamentary interpellations are significant in that they represent the official position of the British Government towards the Bessarabian question. While the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty by the British government

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went almost unobserved by the British Parliament,91 the French ratification provoked a number of interpellations in both Houses of the Parliament. One took place on March 10, 1924: Sir Archibald Sinclair: [asked] whether the Bessarabian Treaty has been deposited with the League and, if not, when it is proposed to do so; and what has been the cause of the delay? The Prime Minister: The treaty has not yet been deposited with the League, because the deposit of the ratification by all the signatory Powers has not yet been completed in Paris, in accordance with Article No. 9 of the Treaty. The only signatory powers which have ratified the Treaty so far are Great Britain and Romania.92 On April 29, 1924 the Ormsby-Gore interpellation regarding the present stage of negotiations between Romania and Russia, also touching the Bessarabian Treaty question, took place in the House of Commons: Ormsby-Gore: [asked] which other countries have ratified the Bessarabian Treaty, and whether, both as a member of the League and on account of our other treaty obligations, we are bound to support Romania in resisting any attempt on the part of Russia to violate the frontier of Bessarabia? Mr. Ponsonby: . . . only Great Britain and Romania have ratified. . . . As regards the last part of the question, the Treaty is not yet in force, and therefore HMG is not bound by its terms. Whether HMG would, as a member of the League of Nations, be bound to take action in the event specified must naturally depend upon the circumstances of the case.93 The British position was clearly expressed: until all the signatory Powers ratified the Bessarabian Treaty, the treaty was not binding on the UK. This thesis is definitely different from the one developed later by the Romanians, who considered that the importance of the Bessarabian Treaty resides in the fact that three European Great Powers had recognized de jure the union of Bessarabia with Romania. Unfortunately, as the interpellation proves, the British government failed to consider its ratification of the Treaty as sufficient to create specific obligations towards Romania in case of a Russian attack, unless the Treaty came into force. However, even then, as the League of Nations was supposed to deal with all matters related to the Treaty, there were no special obligations stipulated in it for any of the signatory Great Powers individually in case of a Soviet attack on Bessarabia. That things were not in fact as the Romanians described them is proved by a new interpellation in the House of Commons, on May 7, 1924: Sir Archibald Sinclair: [asked] whether this Treaty is legally binding upon those countries which have ratified it, or whether it will have to be ratified by all the signatories before it will become binding upon those who have already ratified?

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Mr. Ponsonby: . . . The Treaty becomes binding when all the signatories have ratified.94 The British position clearly shows that, as a direct consequence of the Japanese failure to ratify, not even the UK government felt that the Bessarabian Treaty should be binding on them despite their own efforts to have it signed and ratified. The indirect consequence was that after the Second World War the UK and France had a free hand in handling the Bessarabian problem, and neither of them took any step against the Soviet seizure of the province. The Japanese government, in deciding not to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty, were fully aware of the interpretation given by the HMG to the ratification question, and in 1927 realized full well how important its ratification (or, better said, non-ratification) was to the Soviet Union. Another interpellation regarding Bessarabia took place in the House of Commons on May 26, 1924, at the initiative of Lt-commander Kenworthy. This time the British position on the Bessarabian Treaty was questioned from a different perspective, that of the Rakovsky-Averescu Treaty of March 1918. When Kenworthy asked whether HMG was aware of this treaty when it agreed to recognize the Romanian annexation of Bessarabia, he simply received an affirmative answer but nothing more. Although Kenworthy insisted on more information regarding the actual British position towards the Bessarabian treaty he was denied an answer. Another member of the Chamber, Sir Harry Britain, tried to respond, reminding him that the British position on Bessarabia when the treaty was signed was based on sound geographical and ethnic data proving that Bessarabia is Romanian territory.95 One week after this interpellation, on June 2, 1924, Kenworthy stood up again: Kenworthy: [asked] what obligations HMG has entered into with regard to the Romanian annexation of Bessarabia; whether this country guarantees that annexation in any way; whether a treaty has been drawn up; whether it has been ratified by HMG and by the other governments concerned; whether it is now in operation; and whether it has been or will be laid before Parliament. The Prime Minister: . . . the entire question of Bessarabia is to be found in the treaties; that the Bessarabian Treaty had been ratified by Great Britain, France and Romania but not by the Italian and Japanese governments and it is therefore not yet in force. . . . In order to answer the point regarding the British ratification, I would refer you to Command Paper 1747 of 1922. . . . I think that it has been laid before Parliament. If it has been laid at all, it has been in the ordinary form. Captain Berkeley: . . . the attention drawn by the press to the very serious situation on the Bessarabian border, and may we have an undertaking that no obligations will be undertaken by this country in that connection without the approval of the Parliament? The Prime Minister: There are no obligations involved in the treaty.96

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On June 18, 1924, Sir Harry Britain reopened the Bessarabian Treaty question, asking again for information on the actual situation on the Bessarabian border, but he too received no answer. However, unlike the previous cases, this time the initiative was made in order to help the Romanian cause in Bessarabia: Sir H. Britain: [stated that] in view of the fact that, with the exception of the period of Russian occupation, Bessarabia has been for centuries Romanian territory, that the majority of population is of Romanian stock speaking the Romanian tongue, and seeing that any suggestion of a plebiscite at this date would be both useless and dangerous, [he would] urge that no step in this direction would be taken without the approval of the League of Nations. M. Ponsonby: No, Sir. HMG are not directly concerned in this question, and could not properly take the action suggested. Sir H. Britain: Will they agree not to remain supine if the question develops, because it will have a most serious effect on the whole of the Balkans?97 Not one to give up easily, Sir Harry Britain asked again on June 23, 1924, for official information regarding the situation on the Bessarabian border; but he was once more denied an answer.98 As for the Bessarabian Treaty itself there had been two more interpellations, on July 7, 1924 (Sir John Simon), and April 1, 1925 (Harry Britain), but with no particular significance since they only asked what was the actual status of the Treaty, and received the answer that nothing had changed.99 One of the most curious things about the Bessarabian Treaty is that so few of those who, at one point or another, referred to it had actually read the Treaty itself (which they could easily have done, as the Treaty was not secret). There were not only diplomats and political leaders but also journalists who had no idea of the stipulations included in the Bessarabian Treaty and who simply fell victim to either the Romanian or the Soviet propaganda. There can scarcely be any other explanation for the failure of so many persons to understand that the treaty would come into force only when all the signatories had ratified it. The mentioned exchanges in the British Parliament, and the reaction of the press in the aftermath of the Italian ratification, are illustrative. In 1927, when Italy ratified the Treaty, the British government received the ratification with pleasure. Still, that pleasure was caused more by the possibility of drawing Italy much closer into its conflict with the Soviet Union and not by the ratification itself. It was hoped that Mussolini’s decision to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty meant a step toward a British-Italian alliance against the Soviets. For the last time the Bessarabian Treaty came to the attention of the Chamber on February 5 and 26, 1930. The first interpellation read:

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Mr. Allen: [asked] whether, in accordance with Article No. 9 of the Bessarabian Treaty, HMG, having recognized the government of the USSR, proposes to consult with the other High Contracting Parties to the Treaty who have pursued the same course with a view to inviting Russia to adhere to the Treaty? A. Henderson: No, Sir, this question does not arise, since the Treaty is not yet in force.100 The second interpellation shows that not all of those with an interest in the Bessarabian Treaty had failed to do their homework: Mr. Allen: [asked] whether, in view of the ratification of the treaty respecting Bessarabia, signed in Paris on October 28, 1920, by the governments of Great Britain on April 14, 1922, Romania on May 19, 1922, France on April 30, 1924, and by Italy on March 8, 1927, HMG have received any communication from the Japanese government stating the reasons for the non-ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty. A. Henderson: No, Sir, HMG have received no communication on this subject from the Japanese government.101 Although there had been a good number of reasons behind the British decision to push for the signing and ratifying of the Bessarabian Treaty, by 1940, due to strategic considerations, the British position on Bessarabia had changed radically. The British government tried to back the Soviet claims to Bessarabia, with a view to provoking a conflict between Germany and the Soviets over Romania in order to take the “German heat” off the British Isles. This plan failed, the Bessarabian question having already been settled by the Soviet-German Pact of August 23, 1939, but during the war the British government was clearly on the Soviets’ side regarding the conflict over Bessarabia. With the Soviets emerging as a world power, the strategic situation changed as much as it had when the peace was negotiated at the end of World War Two. There were no British (or French) calls now for a Romanian Bessarabia, nor even for a plebiscite in Bessarabia.

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Annex Report, Frank Rattigan (Bucharest) to Lord Curzon DBFP, Series 1, Vol. 6, p.280-283 Bucharest, October 8, 1919 My Lord, The relations between this country and the Allies appear to me to be reaching so serious a state that I venture to draw the attention of your Lordship to certain aspects of the situation which are perhaps easier to comprehend here than abroad. I cannot help thinking that an atmosphere has been created by a chain of extraneous circumstances which is obscuring the main issue. It would seem that the first question we should ask ourselves in deciding upon our policy in the Near East is “What are the chief elements of order upon which we can rely to carry out that policy?” Romania is in my opinion the first of such elements, if not the only real one. The fact that the country has for some time past been exploited by a gang of unscrupulous politicians is apt to blind the eyes of the average foreign observer to the real qualities of this people. The mass of the population, and especially the peasant classes, are simple primitive people, with many of the virtues one would expect to find in such conditions as exist here. They are, for example, sober, hard working, easily contented, fairly honest, and above all orderly. These characteristics of the population make Romania very unfruitful soil for the propagation of the new communo-socialism. In fact the peasants are fiercely hostile to the idea and will oppose with all their power any attempt to pool their small properties. In these circumstances there is little doubt that Romania may be relied on to resist any Bolshevist wave which may advance from either East or West. A glance at the map will show that she stands as a rock in a sea of actual or potential Bolshevism. If therefore it is once admitted that Romania may be regarded as the most reliable weapon to our hand for the carrying out of a policy of law and order, based on such ideas as the League of Nations, as opposed to the Bolshevist tendencies of the surrounding Slav — and possibly Magyar — races, then it seems to me that we should attempt to do all in our power to conciliate her and bring her back into the fold from which she is in danger of being severed. She will then inevitably develop into the outpost of western civilization against the disruptive tendencies of Bolshevism. I do not for a moment suggest that Romania has not brought upon herself much of the treatment with which she has met. Her choice of representatives at the Paris Conference was undoubtedly unfortunate. Mr. Bratianu is certainly a patriot, but his character lacks the pliancy necessary for such work, and apparently succeeded in exasperating all those with whom he came in contact by the excessive nature of these claims and the somewhat arrogant and unbending manner in which they were presented. Naturally this state of things reacted very unfavorably upon the Romanians’ case. Moreover it created an atmosphere of suspicion, in the light of

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Moldova, a Romanian Province which the action of Romania, even when possibly of an innocent character, was looked upon — not unnaturally — with grave mistrust. To take a case in point, presumably no reasonable man would now maintain that her action in resisting the Hungarian Bolshevists’ wanton attack upon her, defeating it, and pursuing the remnants of the beaten enemy to Budapest, was anything but justifiable. Yet it must be admitted that at first, at any rate, the Conference was inclined to take the view that she was entirely at fault, and that she was openly flaunting the Allies. Surely nothing could have been further from the truth. She was in fact accused of disregarding an armistice in which she had taken no part, which had not protected her from attack, and which the Allies themselves could not have regarded as still in existence by the fact that they had asked for Romanian cooperation in the event of an Allied advance on Budapest. . . . From the moment of the Romanian entry into Hungary proper the question entered on a new phase. Anyone with knowledge of the Romanian character could not but be aware of the fact that there would be abuses. . . . Thus the elements of discord and suspicion were sown at the very outset. It must be remembered that there is much of the naughty child in the Romanian character. Conscious that he is doing wrong, and frightened at the impending punishment, he becomes almost impossible to deal with. In such conditions there is need of the greatest tact to prevent the situation developing along fatal lines. Unfortunately this tact has been throughout conspicuous by its absence. The Allied generals, with all their many qualities, are necessarily inexperienced in diplomacy or statecraft. . . . But I cannot help thinking that more could have been done to combat these by a spirit of friendly advice and cooperation than by the methods employed. I had the honor to recommend in my dispatch No. 168 that, in view of the above circumstances, it might be advisable to replace the four Allied generals by one high civil functionary representing the Conference. This would have the advantage of making the Romanians understand that the Allies have one single policy. At present it cannot be said that the four Allied generals are entirely “solidaires”, and the Romanians are consequently inclined to try and play off one group against the other. As your Lordship is aware, the French are really on their side, but are obliged to yield to Anglo-American pressure. . . . Whatever the real rights and wrongs of all these questions may be, they would appear capable of adjustment if handled with tact and goodwill on both sides. In Budapest, however, at present these qualities are, as I have said above, conspicuous by their absence. I do not suggest that firmness is not also needed in our relations with the Romanians. On the contrary, I consider that in dealing with them it is essential to exercise great firmness so as to make them understand that no nonsense will be tolerated. But it should be possible to combine firmness with an attitude of friendliness and goodwill.

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Notes 1

Richard Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, Vol. 2, p. 311. S.D. Spector, Romania la Conferinta de Pace, p. 43. 3 Telegram Lloyd George to Ion IC Bratianu, January 24, 1918, in 1920. Un act de justitie. Documente, p. 33. 4 During the debate in the territorial committee regarding the division of Banat between Romania and Serbia the British representatives were actually more pro-Romanian than the French representatives. Ivo J. Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference, p. 173-174. 5 S.D. Spector, Romania la . . . , p. 127. 6 In a comprehensive Report on Bessarabia found in the Foreign Office Archives, signed by a Captain Hill, while criticizing the Romanian administration of Bessarabia its author comes up with three proposals regarding the future of the province: an International Commission; Bessarabia to be given by the Conference to Russia but only when a Russian government would be able to take it under its protection, offering the widest form of local autonomy and protection of national interests in the province; Romania to receive a protectorate over Bessarabia, for a number of years, under the condition that it totally change its policy in the province and name as Governor General a figure that all the Bessarabians would agree on (e.g., General Averescu or Prince Carol). RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 394, Report on Bessarabia, August 20, 1919, c. 111-320. 7 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 394, Report “Notes on the Frontiers of Bessarabia”, prepared by the War Office for the Russian Department of Foreign Office, December 20, 1918, c. 5. 8 D. Preda, In apararea Romaniei Mari, p. 121. 9 DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 6, Memorandum on the Romanian Situation, September 1919, p. 271-278. 10 V.F. Dobrinescu, Batalia diplomatica . . . , p. 79. 11 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Fifth Series, Vol. 122, p. 562. 12 DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 12, Memorandum on Bessarabia, January 14, 1920, p. 364-365. 13 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 394, Memorandum on Bessarabia by Alan Leeper, February 28, 1920, c. 347-349. 14 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 196, p. 19. 15 Ozer Carmi, La Grande Bretagne et la Petite Entente, p. 29. 16 DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 12, Telegram Rattigan to Lord Curzon, June 24, 1920, p. 422. 17 In 1920 England founded the Danube Navigation Company, with a capital of 1,200,000 pounds. Spiridon G. Focas, The Lower Danube River, p. 439. 18 DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 12, Telegram Rattigan to Lord Curzon, July 20, 1920, p. 435. 19 A. Karetki, A. Pricop, Lacrima Basarabiei, p. 31. 20 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Bessarabia 1917-1932, Vol. 20 bis, Telegram sent from Lausanne by N. Titulescu, July 7, 1932. 21 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 394, Telegram Lord Derby to Lord Curzon, April 15, 1920, c. 368. 22 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 394, Telegrams Rattigan to Lord Curzon, April 15 and 23, 1920, c. 368, 380. 23 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 394, Telegram Lord Curzon to Rattigan, April 27, 1920, c 382. 24 DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 12, Telegram Rattigan to Lord Curzon, May 11, 1920, p. 393. 25 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Note by Laroche, June 7, 1920, c. 683. 26 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 394, Telegram Rattigan to Lord Curzon, June 13, 1920, c 423. 27 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 394, Telegram Lord Curzon to Rattigan, June 21, 1920, c 425. 28 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Ghika to Take Ionescu, June 19, 1920. 29 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Letter Ghika to Laroche, June 21, 1920, c. 685. 30 DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 12, Telegram Rattigan to Lord Curzon, June 28, 1920, p. 425. 31 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, Letter Anton Bibescu to Lord Curzon, July 2, 1920, c 32. 32 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, Telegram Lord Curzon to Rattigan, July 3, 1920, c. 33. 33 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, Note Take Ionescu to Rattigan, July 26, 1920, c. 47. 2

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Moldova, a Romanian Province 34

RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, ad noted (July 31) on Note Bibescu to Lord Curzon, July 29, 1920, c. 42. 35 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, Note Lord Curzon to Bibescu, August 2, 1920, c. 40. 36 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, Note of Conversation between H. Nicholson and Titulescu, August 2, 1920, c. 50. 37 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, ad noted by Leeper (August 2) and by Earl Curzon (August 5) on Note of Conversation between H. Nicholson and Titulescu, August 2, 1920, c. 50. 38 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, Minutes of Discussions, August 8, 1920, c. 55. 39 DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 12, Telegram Lord Curzon to Lord Derby, August 14, 1920, p. 443. 40 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, Telegrams Boerescu to Lord Curzon, August 9 and 19, 1920, c. 60-63. 41 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, Telegram Lord Curzon to Boerescu, August 19, 1920, c. 67. Two weeks later, Boerescu’s insistence received one more answer: “You asked me today about the position of the Bessarabian Treaty. I am sorry to say that we have heard nothing more since the instructions to Lord Derby. We are inquiring the reasons for the delay.” RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, Note Hardinge of Penhurst to Boerescu, September 9, 1920, c. 68. 42 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Letter Lord Derby to Clemenceau, August 16, 1920, c. 690. 43 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Letter Clemenceau to Lord Derby, August 18, 1920, c. 692. 44 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Notes Lord Derby to Millerand, August 21 and September 8, 1920, c. 696-698. 45 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Note Millerand to Derby, September 14, 1920, c. 699. 46 Which he actually did the same day: “a telegram should be sent to Lord Derby asking him why the Treaty has not yet been signed and when he anticipates signature will take place”. RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, Note Hankey to Hardinge of Penhurst, September 11, 1920, c. 72. 47 DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 12, Telegram Lord Curzon to Rattigan, September 17, 1920, p. 465. 48 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, Telegram Lord Derby to Lord Curzon, September 16, 1920, c. 78-79. 49 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, ad noted by Leeper on Telegram Lord Derby to Lord Curzon, September 16, 1920, c. 78-79. 50 DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 12, Telegram Earl Curzon to Earl of Derby, September 19th 1920, p. 472-473. 51 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Telegram Daeschner to Millerand, September 23, 1920, c. 706. In order to avoid such a situation, Daeschner was instructed to clearly explain to the Romanians that the French decision to postpone the signature was the result of her wish to spare the US and not at all subordinated to Wrangel’s agreement. RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Telegram Millerand to Daeschner, October 2, 1920, c. 713. 52 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Note Millerand to Lord Derby, September 22, 1920, c. 705. 53 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Note Lord Derby to Millerand, September 23, 1920, c. 710. 54 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, ad noted by Leeper on Telegram Lord Derby to Lord Curzon, October 2, 1920, c. 85. 55 DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 12, Telegram Lord Curzon to Lord Derby, October 6, 1920, p. 482. 56 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, Telegram Lord Curzon to Lord Derby, October 7, and Telegram Lord Derby to Lord Curzon, October 8, 1920, c. 101-103. 57 DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 12, Telegram Lord Derby to Lord Curzon, October 14, 1920, p. 491. 58 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, ad noted by Leeper on Telegram Lord Derby to Lord Curzon, October 14, 1920, c. 118. 59 S. Focas, The Lower Danube River, p. 443. 60 Richard C. Frucht, Dunarea noastra. Romania, the Great Powers and the Danube Question, p. 46. Also V.F. Dobrinescu, Relatii romano-engleze, 1914-1933, p. 108-110. 61 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, Meetings between Leeper and Titulescu, October 18 and 19, 1920, c. 119-120. 62 Letter Titulescu to King Carol, August 1939, in A. Karetki, A. Pricop, Lacrima Basarabiei, p. 31.

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CHAPTER 5. THE UNITED KINGDOM 63

A Karetki, A Pricop, “Lacrima Basarabiei”, p. 31 They prepared a Note to be addressed by the Romanian Plenipotentiary while signing the Bessarabian Treaty: “the Romanian government agrees that the regime to be applied to the Chilia mouth of Danube shall be determined by the Danube Conference now sitting in Paris, and hereby undertakes to accept the decision of the said Conference, taken if need by a majority, in this respect.” RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, Draft Note by Malkin, c. 122. When news of the Romanian decision to withdraw their objection to Article 7 reached London, Leeper considered that “this is most surprising but, of course, very satisfactory”. RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, ad noted by Leeper on Telegram Lord Derby to Lord Curzon, October 27, 1920, c. 159. 65 DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 12, Telegram Lord Curzon to Lord Derby, October 20th 1920, p. 493 66 DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 12, Telegram Lord Curzon to H. Dering, October 21, 1920, p. 494. For details regarding the British policy towards the creation of the Little Entente see Ozer Carmi, La Grande Bretagne et la Petite Entente, p. 28-32. 67 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, Telegram Lord Derby to Lord Curzon, October 27, 1920, c. 160. 68 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, Telegram Lord Derby to Lord Curzon, October 28, 1920, c. 165. 69 The crux of the whole question for Romania was whether there would be a cancellation of war debts . . . the Romanians were insistent in claiming that a debt that which was ‘liquide’ (compensation claims) could not be rightly set off against a debt which was not ‘liquide’ (war debts). DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 12, p. 418-420, 752. 70 DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 24, Telegram Lord Crewe to Marquis of Curzon, February 3, 1923, p. 498-450, and Memorandum on the Hungarian Minority in Transylvania, April 9, 1923, p. 575-579. 71 DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 24, Report Dering to Marquis of Curzon, February 24, 1922, p. 155. 72 JFMA, Fond B 760.2, Vol. 1, Telegram Ishii to Uchida, June 8, 1921. 73 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 210, Telegram Millington Drake to Malkin, August 10, 1920, c. 33. 74 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 210, Telegram Harold Nicholson to Drake, August 30, 1920, c. 31. 75 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 210, Telegram Drake to Nicholson, September 7, 1921, c. 36-37. 76 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 210, Draft Telegram (signed by SP Waterlow) Secretary of State to Lord Hardinge, August 30, 1921, c. 35. 77 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 210, Telegram Lord Hardinge to Lord Curzon, September 9, 1921, c. 39. 78 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 213, “Bessarabia” – memorandum prepared for Mr. Leeper, February 22, 1922, c. 159. 79 DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 24, Telegram Lord Hardinge to Lord Curzon, March 15, 1922, p. 168. 80 DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 24, Telegram Lord Curzon to Lord Hardinge, March 22, 1922, p. 168. 81 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 213, Draft Telegram Lord Curzon to Lord Hardinge, March 28, 1922, c. 172. 82 DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 24, Report Dering to Lord Curzon, May 2, 1922, p. 197. 83 DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 27, Telegram Dering to Chamberlain, October 13, 1925, p. 253-254. 84 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 213, Note on Compensations for the Landowners Expropriated in Bessarabia, October 1922, c. 1-20. 85 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 213, Telegram Drake to Lord Curzon, December 17, 1922, c. 76-78. 86 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 213, Telegram Secretary of State (signed Miles W. Lampson) to Dering, November 29, 1922, c. 27. 87 JFMA, Fond B 760.2, Vol. 1, Letter British Embassy to Japanese Foreign Ministry, November 1923. 88 A. Gromyko, V. Ponomarenko, History of Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 206. 89 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Note for the President of the Council, February 2, 1924, c. 787. 90 There is no mention of the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty by the British Government in the 64

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Moldova, a Romanian Province “Parliamentary Debates” of 1921 or 1922. In 1924 there was a reference to a certain Command Paper 1747 of 1922 with regard to the ratification but nothing more. 91 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 170, p. 1944 92 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 172, p. 1580. The interpellation is presented in a special Report sent to Tokyo by the Japanese representative in London, proving the Japanese interest in anything related to the Bessarabian Treaty Question. JFMA, Fond B 760.2, Vol. 1, Telegram from London, May 1924. 93 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 173, p. 397. 94 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 174, p. 18 95 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 174, p. 856 Also, RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, June 6th 1924 96 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 174, p. 2092. 97 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 175, p. 68-69. 98 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 175, p. 1793 and Vol. 182, p. 1288. 99 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 173, p. 397. Also RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, February 1930 100 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 235, p. 2277.

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CHAPTER 6. FRANCE

During the creation of the Romanian state in the mid-19th century, France was the most influential and helpful of the Great Powers towards the Romanian cause.1 However, due to her defeat in the 1871 war against Germany, before the Great War France found herself playing second fiddle within Romania both economically and politically. Then, during and after the war, France’s position in Romania improved again considerably. The Romanians were grateful for France’s wartime help, particularly the radical reorganization of Romanian Army under the leadership of the French Military Mission, and at the same time developed bitter feelings against Germany. Soon after the war, the proportion of French capital invested in the Romanian economy, and French political influence, grew. Between 1922 and 1937 the Romanians borrowed more than twice as much from Paris than from London, while Berlin’s loans were negligible. As Romania’s first creditor, second investor, and third trade partner, France played a considerable role in the economic life of the country.2 Indeed, Romania served well not only the economic interest of France, but the political and strategic interests too. Her strategic position at the Black Sea made it possible to establish good communication/transport links; she was rich in natural resources, including the petroleum that France sorely lacked; and she had a vast reservoir of peasant soldiery.3 The French government thought that Romania could play a useful role in Eastern Europe and be an important partner in opposing their rivals, namely Germany (now defeated) and Italy. And such was the case. During the inter-war period Romania and France were among the countries most actively fighting against any revisionist tendencies. Still, France had to skillfully weigh the Romanian request for immediate recognition of the Bessarabian union against Russian sensibilities. On the other hand, Romania had to compete with the other states in Central Europe, especially Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, for French “benevolence”.4 This competition was intensified by France’s paucity of resources in

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Moldova, a Romanian Province the immediate and not so immediate aftermath of the war.5 While all the states vied with each other over economic concessions, the Romanians’ “unique” propaganda tool in this competition was the common Latin origins of the two nations. However, shared cultural origins faded in significance compared to their competitors’ main argument: a common border with Germany. Two years of difficult negotiations with Romania (1914-1916) had proven that it is not easy to convince Romanians to go to war, even when they are directly interested (unless something quite tangible is offered as inducement). And, in the case of a French-German war there was nothing territorially that could be offered to Romania to entice her to join the fray. Thus the French policy towards Poland and Czechoslovakia was clearly friendlier and there were times when Romania was seen only as a possible back up in the defense of the two. The fact is that, during the Peace Conference, when Clemenceau talked of surrounding Russia with a barbed wire entanglement, he was really only concerned with building up Poland.6 The main enemy of improving French-Romanian relations during the interwar period was the Soviet Union. Choosing between Romania — a faithful ally ready (at least theoretically) to back up France in case of a war with Germany but lacking the necessary material resources to make a difference, and the Soviet Union — a former ally that had the resources but not necessarily the will to defend France, and who still owed France a great deal of money: this was one of the biggest dilemmas facing French policy makers. The economic aspects were clearly in favor of the Soviets.7 In a sense, Romania’s case was similar to Poland’s, with one big difference: Romania had neither a common border with nor a territorial conflict with Germany. The only apparent solution would be to end the Soviet-Romanian conflict over Bessarabia; then the French would avoid having to choose, and would be able to use both of them at the same time. During Titulescu’s tenure as Foreign Minister in the 1930s, the French government seriously tried to mediate the Romanian-Soviet conflict, but without much success. However, during the 1920s, there was no solution in sight that would be satisfactory to both parties, and French policy constantly shifted between a pro-Romanian and a pro-Russian (later pro-Soviet) stance. In the end, the French leadership’s failure to choose (and either forge a powerful alliance with the Soviet regime at the expense of its neighboring states, or offer full guarantees to those states against a Soviet attack), or to achieve a settlement of the territorial questions between the Soviets and their neighbors, contributed to the French disaster in 1941. As described by Kalervo Hovi: The greatest practical problem . . . seemed to have been the fact that while waiting for this new Russia (which would acknowledge France’s economic claims and which could be used as an ally against Germany), it could not get along without the new states springing up on its periphery. On the other hand, they could not be fully supported, since their core national goals were in conflict with all possible Russian governments.8

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CHAPTER 6. FRANCE

The French leaders understood the importance of having Romania in the French sphere of interest at the end of the war. The idea was to make Romania an outpost of “Latin” civilization, a bulwark against German and Slav expansionism, while providing a counterweight to the growing Italian influence in the area. It was considered that, “Romania, which was the last to join the Latin family and which, through its geographic position, is also the most endangered branch, sought to attach itself exclusively to the most illustrious member of the family”.9 The French representatives in Bucharest understood, as presented by Edouard Tavernier, that if Romania entered the war it would be necessary to gear French propaganda towards having France take the place of the Central Powers in the postwar Romanian market and to make France’s future political influence a function of French economic influence.10 One more reason for France’s desire to increase her influence in Romania was, most definitely, her need of petroleum. With petroleum consumption increasing at high speed, the French Government had been looking for a dependable source of oil, independent of the British and American companies.11 Although Romania could not supply all the French needs, it was an important target in the French quest for oil supplies. However, the French were not the only ones aiming at the Romanian oil; the British, the Americans and the Italians were competing as well. Romanian-French Relations during the Peace Conference The French Government prepared intensively for the Peace Conference. As early as February 1917 (some might find that a little bit premature) the “Comité d’Etudes” was created at the initiative of Aristide Briand, at that time the Prime Minister of France. Its purpose was to reflect on the problems that might arise after the war and to offer the necessary informational background to guide French diplomacy during the future peace settlements. Among its members were mainly university professors such as Charles Benoist, Ernest Lavisse, Charles Seignobos, Paul Vidal de la Blanche and Emmanuel de Martonne.12 The latter was in charge of preparing the reports regarding new frontiers for Romania, and he did it in a way that was generous towards the Romanians. Needless to say, there was some friction between this ivory tower Committee and the “old hands” at the Foreign Ministry, who resented the notion that academics would provide a more objective and accurate view of various territorial matters (a similar dynamic was at work in the US). During the Paris Peace Conference, France had been the friendliest Great Power toward Romania, for reasons ranging from culture to security. The French policy makers opposed President Wilson’s idealism as much as possible, giving priority to strategic and economical interests instead of ethnic reasons wherever a new border was being drawn up. Romania was one of the countries that would benefit from that approach. However, not everything France did at the Peace Conference was in Romania’s favor. It was impossible for France to influence every decision taken by the Confer-

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Moldova, a Romanian Province ence with regard to Romania; besides, she was there to protect her own interests and those were not always advantageous to Romania. Then there was the rivalry between the French and the Romanian Prime Ministers, George Clemenceau and Ion I. C. Bratianu, which played its part not only during the Peace Conference but also during the war.13 As for the Bessarabian question, while they were helping the White Russians against the Bolsheviks, the French leaders dangled it alternately before the Romanians and the Russians — a policy which perhaps did not make anyone very happy. Romanian propaganda in Paris was clearly the best propaganda Romania had abroad. Ion Pelivan, a former deputy in the Sfatul Tserii, coordinated the propaganda on Bessarabia, skillfully counterbalancing the Russian propaganda against the union.14 Even if Clemenceau was somewhat reticent with regard to Romania, Romania had numerous friends within the French Foreign Ministry, at high levels of the French Army, and in the French media. 15 Her best friends in Paris were inside the French General Military Headquarters, from where they contributed to policy decisions on Romania both during the Peace Conference and later.16 French-Romanian relations during the war are best described by two of those who had leading roles in improving them: General Henri Berthelot, head of the French Military Mission to Romania, and Count Auguste Felix de Saint Aulaire, French minister to Romania during 1916-1919.17 Their accounts are excellent presentations of both the French policy towards Romania and the difficult situation of Romania during the war. As long as Romania remained neutral, France was one of the countries that insisted most vehemently that she enter the war on the Allied side, and promised in exchange to help Romania acquire the territories that were populated by Romanians but situated under Austria-Hungarian domination. As a result of Romania’s prolonged negotiations, in 1916 France decided to replace her Minister to Romania, Camille Blondel, with the more experienced Count de Saint Aulaire, whose main task was to bring Romania into the war by any possible means. He succeeded.18 During the winter of 1916-1917, the French Military Mission in Romania led by General Berthelot helped reorganize the Romanian Army, preparing it for the victories of 1917. Although Clemenceau was the staunchest opponent of Romania’s decision to make a separate peace with the Central Powers, France was the only Allied Power to acknowledge Romania’s sacrifices during the war and to promise, when the Bucharest Peace with the Central Powers was signed, that all the engagements taken towards Romania when it entered war would be respected.19 As for the French policy on Bessarabia’s union with Romania, the opinion expressed by the end of January 1918 by General Berthelot, one of Romania’s supporters, is suggestive: As for Bessarabia I am not too happy about the manner in which General Brosteanu acts. It is not anymore an operation of military police but a political

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enterprise, which comes before its time. It is certain that the bulk of the population is Moldavian and that it seems to be oriented toward Romania, but there is a risk of compromising the harvest by collecting it too soon.20 Saint Aulaire shared Berthelot’s opinion. He prepared a very objective report on Bessarabia (June 1918), presenting all the good and the bad points of the Romanian administration and indicating the main reasons behind the French acceptance of the union: I advised them that the Union is the best solution against the Russian anarchy but that it could not be definitive without the Entente’s official approval. . . . The Allies must ratify the Union for a clear reason; Romania will always offer them more certain guarantees than Russia. The Union is in conformity with the general interest of order and equilibrium and the positive influence of France in Romania will extend to Bessarabia too.21 This effort to stake out a middle way position between Romania and Russia (or, this faint-hearted irresolution) comes to light once more during the Hotin riot in February 1919, when, as argued by Michael Jabara Carley: The Quai d’Orsay hastened to block the use of French troops in the suppression of this uprising. Pichon observed to Clemenceau that although the French government could not oppose Romanian territorial aspirations “without risking the ruin of its influence” in that country, neither did it want to alienate Russian elements sympathetic to France who opposed the cession of Bessarabia to Romania. “Our situation in this regard” commented Pichon “is particularly delicate in the view of our long alliance with Russia”.22 The Romanians’ intransigence towards the Russians, particularly after the start of the Peace Conference, irritated the French leaders; they felt that at least those Russians fighting against the Bolsheviks deserved some consideration.23 Some of them went so far as to suggest that the Romanian refusal to intervene in the Russian Civil War stemmed from the fact that the Romanian government preferred the Bolshevik solution, which seemed to be less dangerous vis-à-vis Bessarabia than the establishment of a conservative military regime. 24 The French dilemma of discerning which of the two possible allies (the Romanians or the White Russians) would be the stronger at the end of the day, together with that of choosing between the multiple factions representing the White movement, was steadily growing more complex. In fact, between January 1918 and October 1920 the French position regarding Bessarabia had been continuously shifting, tied as it was to the situation in Russia.25 Whenever the White Russians had the upper hand in their conflict with the Bolsheviks, the French diplomats expressed “neutrality” regarding Bessarabia, whereas when the Bolsheviks defeated them the

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Moldova, a Romanian Province French expressed their “agreement” that Bessarabia should belong to Romania. During 1918 the French government tried to stay away from any direct implication into the Russo-Romanian conflict, ordering to all its representatives overseas to avoid discussing it and to maintain clear neutrality.26 In December 1918, the French received green light for Bessarabia, considered to be a part of the French “sphere of action” in Russia; the British left all initiatives in the area in the hands of France. By June 1919, some French diplomats were already arguing that the Peace Conference should recognize Bessarabia’s union with Romania: In my Department’s opinion, Bessarabia is totally Romanian; she is nothing else than a part of Moldavia; the only convenient frontier on its territory is the Dniestr; in short, ethnically, historically and demographically this territory must belong to Romania; at the same time, we are against a plebiscite, which is unnecessary in view of the up-coming general elections.27 Still, the French aim in 1918 was to offer the province to that Ally most ready to recommence the fight against the Central Powers and, after the end of the war, to that Ally most willing to defend France against possible German revenge. Regarding Romanian territorial claims, the biggest help came from two influential French personalities, André Tardieu (president of the Central Territorial Commission) and Emmanuel de Martonne. While André Tardieu was in charge with the diplomatic aspects of establishing the new Romanian borders, de Martonne's task was to offer the necessary historical, geographical and ethnic background regarding the future borders of Romania.28 De Martonne, like the other French leaders, preferred a division of the Banat, but was 100% on Romania’s side regarding Transylvania, Crisana, Maramures and the southern Dobrudja (he calculated a 55% Romanian majority in that region, a figure that differs substantially from the US experts’ claim of about 1%). Regarding Bessarabia, his opinion (which became the French official position), was that the entire Bessarabia should belong to Romania, based on the majority of the Romanian population in the area (72% in his opinion) and based on the Romanians’ heroism during the war (both the Americans and the British failed to take this factor into consideration in their recommendations). In De Martonne’s own words: Romania had never raised any official claims to Bessarabia. She entered the war in order to realize her national unity, without saying a word about Bessarabia. Bessarabia had been given to Romania in a moment when she was conquered, suffocated by the enemy and forced to sign a shameful peace, at a time when it seemed to her that will have to renounce for ever to Transylvania, the land for which Romania decided to take up arms.29 The only point on which France did not support Romania’s territorial claims was the Banat. The heroism of the Serbian Army during the war was still fresh in the

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French imagination and many considered Bratianu’s demand of the entire Banat to be exaggerated. Of course, Bratianu intended to have all the Banat for Romania and was unwilling to make any compromise, knowing that, in any case, Italy would back him on that question. On the other hand, France had been 100% on Romania’s side on the question of the southern Dobrudja, French representatives blocking all contrary American proposals for a cession of territory to Bulgaria. With all the sympathy for Romania expressed at so many different levels, it has been argued that France had to bow before the pressures coming from her American and British allies. Clemenceau continuously maintained a reserved attitude towards Romania, pleasing the Americans but seriously disappointing the Romanians. Many of the French diplomats posed as “victims” of American pressure: “Because of America’s intransigence towards us, France had to carry on this unfair policy towards Romania. They are so powerful and we need them so much.”30 However, although there were times when the French had to give in to the US, it should be said that, in fact, the French took advantage of America’s inexperience in world affairs and used them as a scapegoat to justify some of their own actions. As the French intended to retain their influence over Romania, whenever a contentious matter came up, they cleverly allowed the US representatives to come to the fore, all too happy to pose as defenders of whatever rights. They also blamed some of the decisions on the British or Italian representatives. At times, the British and Italians used the same tactic. To these pressures, however powerful they may have been, we must add the personal antipathy Clemenceau felt for Bratianu, the influence of Hungarian and Jewish propaganda in some political circles in France, and the Russian question, when we seek an explanation for the French oscillations during 1918-1920. The French policy towards Romania is presented in the Note sent by the French Ambassador in the US (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State, indicating that on December 26, 1918, the Romanians had published a Decree-Law uniting Transylvania to Romania. He asked the Secretary of State to instruct the American Ambassador in Bucharest to remind the Romanians that the Congress of Peace alone could decide on such matters, and would do so taking into account the general situation and the wishes of the populace. They asked the same from the British and Italians, so that they were able to organize a common front of the Entente against territorial modifications unilaterally made by the Romanians. This French request is considered to be the Allies’ first official sign of disapproval of the actions taken by Romania to legalize the territorial unions.31 For the Great Powers it was more of a formal gesture, aiming to show Romania that she would not be given a free hand in the mentioned territories. Although the idea of opposing the de facto territorial policy of the Romanians came from the French, they were very keen to avoid being perceived as enemies of Romania’s territorial unification and, as described above, tried to have others appear to be the ones acting against the Romanians. The main question was not French recognition of Romanian territorial expansion, but how that expansion would be achieved. In order to boost her position in Romania, France was very keen to show herself as Romania’s best ally and to keep

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Moldova, a Romanian Province reminding the Romanians of her enormous support during the peace negotiations — as long as the Romanians were confident they could do it by themselves, they would have no need to make “under-the-table” concessions to win French support. Therefore, while keeping quiet about Jusserand’s Note against her territorial moves, the French insisted that Romania had been granted the status of an Ally during the Peace Conference mainly as a result of their initiative and of their insistence with the other Great Powers, at the end of December 1918.32 The Great Powers intended, after all, to keep the so-called Small Powers subordinated, and the territorial questions were the best tools at hand. The French realized that once Romania’s territorial claims were officially approved there would be no more leverage with which to persuade Romania to heed French advice or, indeed, the recommendations or decisions taken by the Conference. Also, it would have provided a very important basis for French propaganda in Romania if they could always remind the Romanians that international recognition of the Union came only as a result of France’s long efforts on her behalf. France had little to win by simply approving the Romanian territorial demands from the outset. Fighting Bolshevism was one of the common goals of Romania and France; and Marshal Foch considered Romania an important piece in his chess game for the elimination of Bolshevism in Europe. In view of the French military withdrawal from Odessa, he thought the Romanian Army would be a more reliable bulwark against the Bolsheviks than Denikin’s army was proving to be.33 During the late March 1919 crises in Hungary, France therefore supported the Romanian view, and declared that the Conference should not deal with Bela Kun (as proposed by US representatives). They wanted to see Romania fighting, directly or indirectly, against the Bolsheviks in Russia. However, Bratianu had two very good reasons to avoid any military adventure in Russia: Romania already had control over the entire territory that it was claiming from Russia; and the Romanian Army was in no condition to fight on two fronts simultaneously. Although few Romanian scholars stress this point, the French military planners were realistic enough to drop the idea of involving Romanian troops in the planned intervention in southern Russia almost from the moment when they were forced to whittle down the scale of the intervention, as they realized that it would be almost impossible to convince the Romanians to cross the Dniestr.34 During the summer of 1919, Clemenceau sensed the direction in which American policy was moving; and renewing the traditional French policy of encircling Germany, France adjusted its policy towards Romania and the other Eastern European states accordingly. Because of events in Russia (France’s traditional ally against Germany), the only hope was in the new states in Central and Eastern Europe which could, at least theoretically, replace Russia as an impediment to future German expansionism. Romania, as the second largest state in the region, could play an important role in those plans, and it was no surprise that France then defended certain Romanian actions against the decisions of the Conference. If, previously, the French had tried to avoid anything that might strike the Romanians as being directed

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against their interests, from now on they were twice as careful. By the time the Americans understood the reasons behind French policy toward Romania, and the extent to which this weakened the Peace Conference, the damage had already been done. After the Americans withdrew from the Peace Conference, the Romanian position improved. Still, French diplomats continued to play the role of defenders of Romanian interests against US and British subterfuge. As expressed by Saint Aulaire: No doubt, in order not to expose Romania to the dirty maneuvers of the British and the US . . . [Clemenceau] should take the initiative in this matter . . . The US minister in Romania told me that . . . some circles in the US are pressing President Wilson in order to provoke, by any means, a split between the Entente and Romania, and if these plans are not counterbalanced by the other powers in the Entente, and especially France, Romania would no longer be treated as an ally but as a rebel and it would be possible to exploit it without any limits.35 One of the best presentations of France’s policy toward Romania is to be found in the instructions sent by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Millerand, to the newly appointed French Minister in Bucharest, Emile Daeschner, on March 6, 1920. After describing the poor political relations between France and Romania before the war, caused by German influence in Romania, Millerand observes: Close relations had been established between the Romanian and the French and British governments. But it was not the same with the Russian government, where there still were some frictions. By her alliance with Russia, Romania had to limit her claims to Bukovina and to abandon her claim to Bessarabia. However, it is true that Romania had a free hand in Transylvania and Banat. Still, the relations with Petrograd had no cordiality . . . The tragic circumstances resulting from the Russian Revolution and the Bolshevik betrayal gave way to Germany to impose on Romania the disastrous Bucharest Peace. At the same time, the Romanian Government took its liberty vis-à-vis Russia and occupied Bessarabia, which its troops saved from the Bolshevik tyranny. . . . As soon as victory was clearly on the Allies’ side, the entire Romanian nation, with the Berthelot Mission still fresh in their minds, had been animated by the biggest enthusiasm for France. However, this enthusiasm failed little by little because of a certain bitterness. . . . In other questions we have been the most faithful defenders of Romania. It is mainly because of us that they received the Hungarian counties bordering Transylvania [Crisana]. And, if in the Banat case we backed the legitimate claims of the Serbs, our allies, regarding the Bessarabian question, for example, we have given Romania the most ardent assistance. . . .

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Romania is not the only one interested in herself. Placed at the mouth of Danube, she is bound to become a warehouse for the riparian countries. This is another reason for us to concentrate our efforts in order to dominate this market. . . . We have to deal in this context with a delicate question, that of the Danube regime . . . The Commission of Danube . . . is a sort of state in state. It is difficult for Romania to support this European servitude and she will make every effort to replace it, by taking control of the international services on the Danube. . . . Regarding the delicate question of Romania’s relations with Russia, you will receive, under the circumstances, the necessary specific instructions. As a general manner, we advise the Romanian government to manifest great prudence regarding everything that may touch the Russian national feelings. But, regarding the Bessarabian question, France maintains the position favorable to Romania that she already adopted and which has been confirmed by the decision of the Supreme Council. On the other hand, you should stay away of any intervention, even an indirect one, in the Dobrudja question.36 In just a few words, Millerand synthesized the past and future evolution of French diplomatic relations with Romania. He also directed Daeschner to take advantage of France’s intellectual prestige and to act decisively in the economic field, in which France was facing fierce competition from England and the US. In the next few years French diplomacy would follow the directions outlined in the abovementioned document, with but one temporary exception: Bessarabia. A matter of weeks after the instructions were sent to Daeschner, the French position on Bessarabia changed. As a direct result of the Polish-Russian war in 1920, the situation was greatly complicated for the French — just when it had seemed that there could be no further reason to postpone international recognition of the union. France badly needed Poland in order to encircle Germany and, when the Poles were on the brink of military disaster, Romania’s help against the Bolsheviks was one of the few options France had. The Romanians were quite set against entering war and the French leaders had only one card to play that could induce them to change their minds: Bessarabia. If, from January to March 1920, French efforts came close to bringing the Bessarabian question to a final resolution favorable to Romania, things changed during March, once the Russo-Polish war started. Instead of openly supporting military intervention against Russia, the Romanian Prime Minister Alexandru Vaida-Voevod decided, with British approval, to open negotiations with the Soviets, dealing a serious blow to the French diplomacy. As a result, the French became even more decided to use the Bessarabian question as a diplomatic pledge of Romania’s fidelity towards Poland.37 Vaida-Voevod’s replacement as Prime Minister brought the Romanian-Russian negotiations to an end, improving the French position, particularly

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after the Francophile Take Ionescu took the lead in the Romanian Foreign Ministry on June 13, 1920; but the Romanians stood by their decision not to intervene in the Russo-Polish war. The French position was complicated even more as a result of her relations with the White Russians: as it was the French who were asking for a White Russian offensive against the Bolsheviks, in order to ease the pressure on the Polish front, they were in no position to tell the Russian generals that at the same time their government was supporting the Romanian claim to Bessarabia. In order to put pressure on Romania by postponing the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty, the French once again enrolled the US as a scapegoat. The French argued to both the Romanians and the British that they were very keen to obtain the US signature on the Bessarabian Treaty, and by so doing to give more power to the Treaty. In fact, they knew that a US adhesion to the Treaty would be altogether impossible and furthermore that it would bring only a doubtful prestige since the US Congress was refusing to ratify the Peace Treaties. This maneuver, however, allowed the French to play for time, waiting for a clear signal in the Russo-Polish war. Taking into account the previous chapter it might be argued that, without the decisive British pressure to sign, the French would have kept stalling indefinitely. Still, it would be unfair to blame the French: they expected to recover quite an impressive sum of money from Russia and they needed Russia as a potential ally against Germany. By recognizing Bessarabia’s union with Romania they clearly would have forsaken their chances of achieving either of the two objectives. As a poor consolation for the funds lost in Russia, the French intended to resolve the matter of French landowners expropriated in Bessarabia in a highly favorable manner and to ask Romania to assume part of the international debt of the former Russian Empire (by adding Article No 8 to the projected draft Treaty). The Colby Note (August 10, 1920) further complicated the situation, as the French government stated its full support for the Note, provoking some uncertainty in Romania.38 In August 1920, French uncertainty regarding the Bessarabian Treaty was so high that they saw no alternative but to postpone the signing for an unlimited period of time: by waiting until both the Soviets and Wrangel should accept Bessarabia as Romanian territory and until the US joined in the Treaty. It is difficult for us to decide on a certain line or position regarding Bessarabia. On one hand, the British are pressing for the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty, insisting that the US approval is unnecessary. On the other, in the recent telegram sent to Washington regarding our policy towards the Soviets, the French government expressed its agreement with the US policy of not sanctioning any territorial dismemberment of the Russian Empire without the agreement of Russia. Romania gives Bessarabia the highest importance. A postponement is not good because it would generate a Russian-Romanian conflict, which must be avoided, so that the only logical solution, in accordance with the ethnographi-

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Moldova, a Romanian Province cal situation and the will of the people, is to leave Bessarabia to Romania. On one hand, we must avoid taking a decision too early. On the other, we also have to try and obtain a general agreement regarding the inclusion of Bessarabia in Romania. The simplest solution would be to wait for the result of the Romanian-Soviet negotiations, even as we cannot recognize the validity of a treaty signed by the Soviets. But the Soviets’ agreement could, generally speaking, be harmful for Romania in the future, in case the Romanian government should try to negotiate a pact with a future Russian government. As for Wrangel, we could obtain his recognition in exchange for our (and Romanian) help, especially after the Soviets’ agreement. Once both Russian sides declare their agreement for an identical solution, we can consider the signing of the treaty during the spring. Because these negotiations require time, it is clear that we should avoid an immediate solution, which might embarrass us.39 By October 1920, as a result of combined British and Romanian pressure, and particularly with a view to the fact that France would lose all sway in Bucharest if the British were the only Great Power to sign the Bessarabian Treaty, and given that a direction was becoming clear in the Polish-Russian war, the French decided in favor of Romania. Take Ionescu’s visit to Paris in mid-September gave them the necessary assurances regarding both the indemnification of the French subjects expropriated in Bessarabia and the attitude of Romania towards the Soviets. Ionescu asked for the French opinion regarding the negotiations with the Bolsheviks, and agreed with them that the recognition of the Soviets would only increase the Soviets’ international prestige and bolster the communists and anarchists acting inside Romania.40 On the other hand, the need to stop the growing anti-French movement in Romania, organized by the Liberal Party headed by Ion I. C. Bratianu (who could not forget his failure in Paris) as well as some other political parties, also weighed in the French decision.41 Signing the Bessarabian Treaty seemed the ideal solution in order to counterbalance the anti-French propaganda and to enlist Romania among France’s Eastern Allies. The French Ratification France regarded a strong Romania as an important political and military interest. She conceived its strategic role as that of a rearguard charged with preventing Soviet Russia, Hungary and Bulgaria from impeding the action of Poland and Czechoslovakia, France’s only fully fledged allies in Eastern Europe, in a war against Germany.42 At the same time, France had economic interests in Romania, seeing it as both an important market for its products and as a supplier of raw materials (especially petroleum). During the first years after the war, economic matters seemed to prevail over the strategic or political considerations. The French Government and businessmen

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expected Romania to fulfill the financial obligations she had undertaken towards France, such as repaying the war credits, and to also allow a growing penetration of French capital into the Romanian markets. But the Romanian Government had different plans regarding the payment of foreign debts, and asked for a number of postponements, justified by the difficult situation of the country after the war. By 1922, soon after coming back into power, the Liberal Party was already elaborating plans for its “by ourselves” economic policy that would limit the penetration of foreign capital in key sectors of the economy. The French, dissatisfied with the Romanian economic policy, looked upon the postponement of the Bessarabian Treaty ratification as a useful tool in this regard as well. In March 1922, the Romanian Minister in Paris described the bitter feelings provoked among the Frenchmen by this Romanian policy: The allusion made by the French President that “Romania is eluding” was referring in ensemble to the non-execution of contracts like the ones for wheat and petroleum, the contract for aviation and others, plus some other initial proposals and promises that are not followed in practice. We are all having here the feeling that these methods are not helping us in maintaining our esteem and trustworthy relations.43 Influenced by the British position and the suggestion that the Treaty should be ratified before the meeting of the Genoa Conference, the first international conference in which Bolshevik representatives were invited to take part, the French took a first step towards the ratification. On March 14, the French Government decided to send the Bessarabian Treaty to the Parliament for ratification. The French action had three purposes: first, to obtain the Romanian adhesion to the French proposals during the Conference; second, to avoid offering the Soviets any possibility of raising the Bessarabian question during the workings of the Genoa Conference; third, to pressure the Romanian government into coming to an agreement regarding the payment of indemnities for the French landowners expropriated in Bessarabia. On March 21, 1922, the president of the Conference of Ambassadors, Jules Cambon, following his March 15 proposal that all the signatories should ratify before the beginning of the Genoa Conference, asked Georges Leygues, the president of the French Parliament’s Commission of Foreign Affairs: On the eve of the Genoa Conference it seems indispensable to me to avoid the existence of any possible doubts regarding the will of France and her Allies to recognize the rights of Romania over Bessarabia. It was in this spirit that the Government deposited the Treaty in Parliament for ratification on March 14.44 A few weeks later, the Romanian representatives in Paris were notified that the draft of a law for ratification had been deposited at the Chamber of Deputies but, as the Chamber was in recess until May 25, the project would have to wait. Still, the

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Moldova, a Romanian Province situation in the Chamber was far from favorable to the proposed ratification, so that the Romanian representatives had to increase their efforts to gather the necessary support in the Chamber. The difficulties are described in a report sent by Victor Antonescu, the Romanian minister in Paris: Senator Helmer d’Alsace, whose wife is of Bessarabian origin and who owns land properties in Bessarabia, is campaigning against the Treaty, a campaign justified by the fact that the Romanian State did not keep its promises towards the French citizens who had land properties in Bessarabia. I recently met Peretti dela Rocca and Guy Laroche (sub-director for political affairs in the French Foreign Ministry). They confirmed the campaign initiated by Mr. Helmer and also by some other deputies interested in the Credit du Levant et Bousac affair, which Vintila Bratianu knows well. I insisted on them showing the bad impression a postponement of the ratification as a result of protecting the interests of some French senators and deputies would have over the Romanian public opinion, especially when the Soviets are contesting in Genoa the Romanian rights over Bessarabia. I asked them if the French Government intends to connect the question of compensations for the French citizens in Bessarabia with the draft of law [for the ratification]. They answered that this was not the Government’s intention but, taking into account the enormous difference between the 33 millions lei offered and the amount assessed by the French experts (10 million gold rubles), it would be helpful that a compromise formula should be reached before sending the draft for the Chamber’s approval. In this sense the French Government would be satisfied by the nomination of a Commission made of French and Romanian experts in order to evaluate the mentioned properties, in agreement with Daeschner. Forges is favorable to us and he insists on reaching a compromise before May 23.45 The direct interest of certain influential French Parliamentarians in the matter of land properties expropriated in Bessarabia explains France’s initial insistence that the matter should be inserted in the draft Treaty. Their influence over French foreign policy seems to have been quite powerful, since they were twice able to change the government’s position regarding Bessarabia. This was a strange twist of fate that, of just nine French landowners in Bessarabia, one should have had such a strong connection to the French Parliament. The answer from the Romanian Foreign Ministry came on the next day: It is impossible to solve the question of evaluating the French possessions in Bessarabia before May 24. The Council of Ministers tries to avoid the establishment of a connection between the ratification and this question. It is regrettable that the French Parliament could be so easily influenced by financial questions when it comes to one of the main allies of France. I think that the

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real solution is not a negotiation with Mr. Daeschner but an open discussion between Bratianu and Poincare in Paris. Please let me know if Bratianu should leave for Paris earlier.46 However, no government does a favor to another government based simply on friendship. The best weapon in politics was (and remains) money. Unfortunately, Bratianu apparently failed to understand that basic equation in international relations and over-estimated the French strategic interest in Romania. The same day, Victor Antonescu communicated the Romanian response to the French diplomats, only in order to have them restate their position: I met Poincare. He told me that he has decided to pass the draft law for the ratification of Bessarabia’s union through the Parliament but that it would be helpful and useful to have the Romanian Government give him some explanations and also some proofs regarding the payment of compensations to the French subjects.47 Ion I. C. Bratianu, who was in Genoa at the time, also expressed his unhappiness with Poincare’s position and, according to French sources, it seems that what upset him most was the idea of subordinating the ratification to the interests of a few landowners of French nationality.48 The French diplomats, not directly interested in the Romanian payment of compensations, seemed to be on Romania’s side. Louis Barthou, the French Foreign Minister, declared during a reception in the honor of Bratianu on May 24, that “the French government has a strong desire to obtain the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty from the Parliament”.49 But in the absence of any new concessions from the Romanians, the sympathy of Barthou was not enough to convince the Parliament. Taking advantage of his visit to Paris during the second half of May 1922, Prime Minister Bratianu raised the ratification question, with no results. Although the negotiations went on the problem remained the same, as well described in a British report: My French colleague informed me in a conversation that the French Government intended to bring up a Bill in this sense for discussion in Parliament this summer but desisted on being warned that it would meet with strong opposition in view of the non-payment of the compensation due to French landowners expropriated in Bessarabia.50 On July 7, 1922, the Parliament’s Commission on Foreign Affairs debated the Draft Law for the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty, presented by Mr. Forges. The Draft contained a general description of Bessarabia’s geography, population, industry, history, and economy, all the controversial matters being presented in a fairly objective manner, without much Romanian bias.51 Although the Commission

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Moldova, a Romanian Province adopted the Report presented by Forges, no further step was taken towards ratification, and all that followed was a controversy between the Parliament and the Government as to whom to blame for the delay. Poincare instructed the French minister in Bucharest: Faced with the actual circumstances, the French Government is in fact obliged to take into account general considerations that influence the sanction of Bessarabia’s cession to Romania. . . . From this viewpoint comes the inconvenience of expressly relating this question to that of French properties, but it is essential for us to take advantage of this occasion and to pressure the Romanian Government to give us satisfactory guarantees regarding the conclusion of an arrangement.52 The Romanian refusal to grant the French request for compensations (in part because of the exaggerated evaluation presented by the Frenchmen, particularly as they were being offered higher compensation than that offered to expropriated Romanians), was the reason the French put forward to justify their failure to ratify in 1922. And it worked as the French intended: “The question of the French landowners expropriated in Bessarabia is about to be resolved because we have a very efficient means of pressuring the Romanians in order to give us satisfaction: our recognition of Bessarabia’s annexation by Romania”.53 However, there were other reasons for the French to withhold their ratification as well. Even after settling the compensation dispute, they stalled for another year. The other financial questions pending also played a certain role regarding the French delays. Also playing into this process in the summer of 1922 was the French hope that the Bolshevik Government, which was on the verge of being accepted as a member of the international community, would be willing to pay back at least a part of the international debt of the former Czarist Government. If that were the case, in order to boost its position with the Soviet government the French would need bargaining chips, and the Bessarabian Treaty was one. Soviet recognition of the Czarist debt would have been a first serious step towards re-establishing the French-Russian alliance, an alliance that would have greatly decreased the strategic importance of Romania vis-à-vis the French. In the meantime the compensations question gave the French government an excuse to postpone the ratification. Thus, the first opportunity to obtain the French ratification was lost by the Romanians. While the French correlated ratification with payment, the Romanians ostensibly expected the French ratification to come simply out of “friendship” from their “best ally”. It probably would not have been all that difficult to come to terms on the settlement for the French landowners, as the amount requested was not terribly high and the French surely expected the Romanian government to negotiate the amount downward. The Romanians misplayed their hand, and France refused to ratify the Treaty in 1922.

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In fairness, one might speculate on the French position regarding the Bessarabian Treaty if the Romanians had indeed accepted a compromise on the compensation question before the summer of 1922. The year that passed between the resolution of that matter and the French ratification certainly proves that the compensation was not necessarily the main reason for the French foot-dragging. It might also be argued that, in fact, the French government was simply continuing its summer 1920 policy on Bessarabia. In any event, following the Romanian refusal to pay a higher amount in compensation, the ratification question was deferred for a period. Whether this issue was real or just window-dressing, the logjam was broken when the Romanians decided to offer satisfaction to the expropriated French landowners. In October 1922, as a result of combined negotiations with the British and the French, Romanian Foreign Minister I.G. Duca informed the French government that the payment to the French landowners would be made in consolidation bonds (made out in French Francs), carrying 4% interest. He also stated that, when the Romanian government succeeded in contracting the projected loan that it was negotiating in France, it would consider the modality of effectively paying these titles.54 By the end of the year, the Romanian government agreed to include the indemnities due to the French and British landowners expropriated in Bessarabia in the law for the consolidation of the Romanian external debt.55 Once the compensations matter had been settled, by January 1923, the Romanians raised again the question of ratification. During a meeting between Victor Antonescu and Peretti dela Rocca, among other topics, Antonescu asked Peretti to speed up the ratification of the Treaty. All he got was a polite answer: “I will talk to Poincare and he will take the necessary steps”.56 Two months later, after another similar meeting, the Romanians were more successful, dela Rocca sending a letter to Georges Leygues asking for the ratification in view of Russian war preparations.57 The answer from Georges Leygues (March 28) states that the Commission on Foreign Affairs had already adopted the Report on the Draft Law for the ratification, fulfilling its duty, and that the delay was not their fault as the Government would be the one to take the next step, namely, to bring the Draft into the Chamber’s debate.58 This was the beginning of a Government-Commission controversy as to who should take the next step for ratification. However, as soon as Poincare decided to take an active interest in the matter, the Ratification Law was voted, so it can be seen that in this round the blame for the delay resided with the Government. In June 1923, in the context of the decision regarding the inclusion of a separate immigration quota for Bessarabia into the general Russian immigration quota, administered from Riga, the US government asked the French government what was the actual situation of the Bessarabian Treaty. They had asked the Japanese government the same question in May. As will be shown in a different chapter, the US used the failure of the Bessarabian Treaty to come into force as their main justification for the immigration quota decision. Arguing that the Romanian government had asked the US to sign the Bessarabian Treaty, the US government stated that it remained

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Moldova, a Romanian Province unwilling to sign it and that they would like to know whether France intended to ratify the Treaty.59 While the French government officially responded that it had sent the Treaty to the Parliament for ratification on March 14, 1922, unofficially it ordered its representative in Washington to make inquiries regarding the US intentions vis-à-vis the Treaty. The answer from Jusserand, the French Ambassador, was clear: “The US government does not intend to adhere to the Bessarabian Treaty for the moment”.60 (Traian Sandu argues that the US intervention came about as a result of a Romanian initiative to increase the pressure for a French ratification, by signaling to the French that while they were postponing the ratification, the US were willing to sign; but this was not the case.61) In reality, the intervention was motivated by the need to use the Romanian government’s failure to bring the Bessarabian Treaty into force as a justification for the decision to merge the Bessarabian immigration quota with the Russian immigration quota (as presented in a following chapter), although it was formulated in such a manner as to avoid raising any suspicions from the French or the Japanese. The Romanian Foreign Ministry officials charged with the execution of treaties analyzed the situation in October 1923, asking for intervention in order to obtain the ratification: As until now only Great Britain has ratified, this treaty is not yet valid from the international viewpoint and, as a result, a number of questions which devolve from this ratification are pending, for example, the right to choose the desired nationality, which covers a period of two years since the ratification. This delay could cause certain prejudices to the Romanian State regarding the application of the land reform in Bessarabia.62 More or less as a result of the aforementioned report, I.G. Duca decided to initiate a new campaign in favor of ratification. The difference was that this time he intended to put pressure on all the remaining signatory Powers. He sent telegrams to Paris, Rome and Tokyo asking for ratification, and stepped up the pressure on the three countries’ diplomatic representatives in Bucharest.63 At the same time, he used the Danube question in order to speed up the French ratification, asking Antonescu to remind the French how easily the workings of the Danube Commission would proceed if the Bessarabian Treaty came into force.64 As proved by both the British (who undertook to ask the Japanese, Italian and French governments to take the necessary steps for ratification) and French reaction, the latter initiative was successful. Poincare sent a letter to Georges Leygues, observing that the work of the Danube Commission was indeed being impeded, and asking for the ratification. The answer from Leygues was almost identical to the one sent on March 28, 1923, noting that, in fact, it was the duty of the Government and not of the Commission to place the debate of the draft law for ratification on the Parliament’s agenda.65 Unhappy with the French Senate’s refusal to approve a credit for Romania’s military needs, while Poland had received one that was four times higher than that

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requested by the Romanians, I.G. Duca expressed his dissatisfaction with the French attitude: If there were anything to reproach the French with, we could talk about this credit solemnly promised to us almost two years ago; also the non-ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty in four years, or about the strange conditions imposed for the recognition of this Romanian province.66 Impressed by Duca’s position or simply by the possibility that French influence over Romania was fading away, Poincare decided that the time to close the Bessarabian Treaty question had come. He instructed his subordinates to take the necessary steps: The Draft Law for the ratification has been approved by the Commission on July 7, 1922, and placed on the Parliament’s agenda on July 12, 1923. Unfortunately, it is among the last items and it will not be possible to have it voted before the end of the year. This is a regrettable situation. The fact that we keep postponing makes a poor impression in Romania, especially as the Romanian government has scrupulously executed all our conditions regarding the union, paying compensations for the expropriated French landowners on bases clearly more advantageous than the ones used for Romanian landowners. As a result of parliamentary interpellations regarding the payment of compensations for British and French landowners in Bessarabia, the Romanian government is in a delicate position, having to justify somehow the very high level of those indemnizations. The non-ratification also influences the Danube Commission. . . . I wonder if it is not possible for the ratification Law to avoid waiting its turn and to come into debate ahead of other items.67 The answer to Poincare states: Poincare suggested the Political Director to ask Forges to make possible the voting of the draft law as soon as possible, without debate, in order to satisfy the Romanians. But on November 23, 1922, an amendment was proposed by the socialist deputies, with the purpose of subordinating the approval of the treaty to the agreement of the Russian government. The existence of this amendment makes a debate necessary and the project cannot be voted as asked by the President [without debate]. Due to the objections coming from the same opposition, the item could not be placed ahead of other projects.68 The British government joined the Romanian government in pressing for the French ratification, arguing that ratification was necessary in order to bring an end to the Romanian opposition to the Danube Commission’s activity on the Chilia Arm.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province The British were informed that the French government had already taken all the necessary measures for ratification, which probably would be done during the current parliamentary session.69 The result of the British intervention was another exchange of letters between Poincare and Leygues. It is interesting that, about a month later, when the Italian government asked the French whether the British government had pressed them to ratify, the answer was negative, indicating that, wishing to improve her relations with Romania and to ease the traffic on Danube, France intended to ratify anyway.70 Therefore, the French decision to place the ratification law on the Parliament’s agenda at the end of November 1923 came as the combined result of a number of facts: the Romanian government’s payment of a satisfactory amount for the French landowners expropriated in Bessarabia; the new Romanian campaign for the ratification; the Romanian leaders’ bitter feelings toward France as a result of the French Senate’s refusal to grant the long-negotiated credit for armament; the Romanian action regarding the Chilia Arm which prompted the British intervention; the apparent improvement in Russo-Romanian relations; the still difficult diplomatic position of France in the aftermath of the Ruhr occupation; and the benefits ratification would bring by boosting French influence in Romania.71 In January 1924 France signed a Friendship Treaty with Czechoslovakia and, with a view toward increasing her influence in Eastern Europe at the expense of Italy, Poincare planned to sign similar friendship treaties with Yugoslavia and Romania too. The conflict with the Soviets over Bessarabia stood in the way of signing such a treaty with Romania. In this sense, Magda Adam argues, “It was obvious that the struggle for influence in Romania would be won by the country which was prepared to grant a loan and ratify the Bessarabian convention the soonest; the French government promised both”.72 Still, the situation was not necessarily so simple: on one hand, the Romanians wanted much more from France than ratification; on the other hand, Magda Adam exaggerates Italy’s influence in Romania (even if Italy had ratified the Bessarabian Treaty and offered a loan, the Liberal Party was neither ready nor willing to replace France with Italy). Even more, by February 1924 Mussolini already had an agreement with the Soviets regarding the postponement of ratification. At the end of January 1924 Poincare pressed Leygues once again for ratification, only to receive the same answer as before. However, this time Poincare was told that it would be advisable to talk personally to the presidents of the Chambers and, in agreement with them, to fix a date for debating the draft law.73 Poincare’s advisers were already providing him with the necessary data in order to respond to the amendment proposed by the socialist deputies. They emphasized historical and ethnographic arguments as well as the British “competition”: they had already ratified the Bessarabian Treaty, but also were very keen to point out that, although they recognized the Soviet government, they considered Bessarabia to be Romanian territory.74 On March 11, 1924, the French Chamber ratified the Bessarabian Treaty by a

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majority of 478 votes against 74. The votes against belonged to the leftist deputies. In order to convince the Chamber to ratify the Treaty, the French Prime Minister Raymond Poincare had presented a detailed and very passionate history of the Bessarabian question, noting that Bessarabia should under ordinary circumstances belong to Romania. The counter arguments of the leftist opposition illustrate the degree of influence the Soviet propaganda had in France, showing that the brotherhood of “origins” did not stand up to the brotherhood of ideology (meaning socialism). The fact that a number of French parliamentarians (bear in mind that the Romanians considered France the friendliest Great Power) were clearly on the Soviet side in the conflict proves that Romanian propaganda in France was none too effective. Poincare’s opponents (the deputies of the Left), especially Marcel Cachin and Mr. Morucci, presented a number of arguments in order to persuade the Chamber not to ratify the Treaty, but to no avail. Even after the ratification, the leftist deputy Ernest Lafont made a long speech asking that the article regarding ratification (“The President of the French Republic is authorized to ratify and make executable the Bessarabian Treaty . . .”) should be followed by the clause, “after agreement with the Russian Government”. Of course, the result would have been another postponement. A new vote took place and Ernest Lafont’s proposed amendment was rejected by a majority of 415 votes against and 74 in favor. (The difference comes from the fact that at the time of the second vote there were only 489 voters present, while at the first vote there had been 552. The 63 missing voters were probably taking a break, due to Lafont’s rather long speech).75 The following is a short excerpt of the French Parliamentary debate. M. Morucci: Russia is unwilling to give up her territory, to be separated from the Moldavian population. . . . You know very well that, according to the treaties, Russia has the right to Bessarabia. She pretends or claims that Moldavia is Ukrainian land. She also states that Romania, by having received Dobrudja through the Berlin Treaty, has no right to claim Bessarabia. . . . Do not bring into being the risk of a new conflagration with Bessarabia. . . . Poincare: In his remarkable report, Mr. Forges has clearly presented, in the name, I think, of the entire Commission for Foreign Affairs, the reasons justifying this treaty. He has made an impressive description of the geographical nature and also of the ethnographical character of Bessarabia. He has proven that the majority of the population there is Moldavian, from the standpoint of their customs as well as their race. He has equally proven that Bessarabia is connected to Romania by common geography as well as by economic, commercial and banking interests. . . . The fate of Moldavia, and especially of the territory between the two rivers, worsened again at the end of the 18th century due to the rivalry between the Ottomans and the Russia of Catherine II, whose legacy you demand today to be restored. This is what the Bolsheviks are demanding from you today. . . .

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Moldova, a Romanian Province The Romanian peasants had to bear with more and more requisitions and, three years later, in 1809, the country had been virtually stripped clean when the Russian army had to retreat to Odessa and cross the Dniestr. The Romanians were condemned to carry out the most diverse duties; thousands of them died as a result. A French Report, prepared in 1812, ascertained that the Russian exigencies had brought the exasperated inhabitants to the boiling point. This is what one keeps on calling “a Russian province”. Marcel Cachin: It is a hundred years since that happened. Poincare: I think that justice is not a matter of years. In the territory ceded to her, Russia felt herself the need to create a special province, which it named Bessarabia, as a remembrance of the family of Prince Bessarab, the Wallachian princes that once reigned over this territory. During the last war, when the Russian defection took place . . . the Moldavians in Bessarabia started, as I said, by proclaiming their autonomy. Then, a Parliament, a veritable Parliament, was organized and it decided to call in the Romanian troops for defending the country against the Russians. On March 27, 1918, this Parliament proclaimed the union between Moldavia and Romania. . . . It is by all means strange that the Bolsheviks are claiming today the legacy of Russian Imperialism. The British government, which is willing to de jure recognize the Soviets, as you know, has ratified the treaty with no difficulties from Russia. It even ratified it on April 14, 1922, which was exactly the moment when Lloyd George was negotiating with the Russians, in Genoa and later in Hague. I repeat that it is in the interest of improving our relations with Romania that we quickly vote the Treaty. Our Romanian friends, and not only the Romanian King but also the people all over Romania, are not favorably impressed by the delay in the ratification. They accepted our conditions regarding the payment of compensations for the French landowners expropriated in Bessarabia as a result of the agrarian reform. . . . Ernest Lafont: In the report presented by Mr. Forges one can see that a large part of the population is incontestably and exclusively Ruthenian . . . In any case, Bessarabia has never been consulted. If we examine the question in detail we demand you to consult the population of Bessarabia, which previously decided in the presence of soldiers and machine guns, but this time through a referendum organized with all the necessary guarantees. . . . Poincare: I will read again the Single Article — The President of the French Republic is authorized to ratify and execute, if it is the case, the treaty regarding Bessarabia signed in Paris on October 28, 1920, between France, the British Empire, Italy and Japan, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and Romania.76 Although by fall 1923 Poincare had already decided in favor of the ratification, the moment chosen by the French government for the ratification had a special sig-

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nificance. The Romanian Royal Family was preparing a visit to Paris, and the ratification came as a welcome sign from the French, indicating a growing interest in Romania, with a view to a future Treaty of Friendship between the two states. Simultaneously, a new round of Russo-Romanian negotiations was about to start in Vienna. Another factor that could have influenced the French decision, speeding it up, was the improvement in Russo-Italian relations, which some French diplomatic circles believed to be a threat to French influence in Eastern Europe. In order to counterbalance the Italian move, Poincare sought to improve relations with Romania, and the best way was by ratifying the Bessarabian Treaty. The Romanian reaction was very positive and I.G. Duca intended to use it to bolster the Romanian position during the up-coming Vienna Conference: The actual circumstances make the ratification so welcome. Generally, the impression produced on the public opinion by the ratification was very positive. Still, the French Senate vote should be sped up so that everything will be finished before March 24 when the negotiations with the Russians start in Vienna.77 On March 16, 1924, the French Senate voted unanimously in favor of ratification and, two weeks later, France officially deposited the ratification instruments. The ratification brought about a real improvement in French-Romanian relations, particularly regarding the Romanian government’s attitude towards France (this time an attitude backed by all the Romanian political parties). The “chill” characterizing the bilateral relations at the end of 1923 vanished overnight, so that both governments felt the need to further improve their relations; consequently France proposed the signing of a bilateral political treaty.78 The Soviet representatives reacted strongly to the French ratification. While debating the ratification in the French Chamber, Poincare had presented Bessarabia’s history and the entire Bessarabian question from the Romanian viewpoint; he was accused of making propaganda in favor of the Romanian cause exactly when a new round of negotiations between the two countries was about to begin. In Cicerin’s words, the French action was “a third party intervention which would inevitably prevent the establishment of a lasting peace. The Soviet Government holds France responsible for any damage it may suffer.”79 However, it should be clear that the stress Cicerin laid on the fact that the French ratification came just weeks before the new Soviet-Romanian negotiation was simply propaganda, since the French ratification had far less effect than suggested on the final outcome of the Vienna Conference.80 At no point (including 1924) had the Romanians been willing to accept the Russian conditions, which would have meant recognizing the existence of a conflict over Bessarabia between the two states, nor, certainly, the idea of a plebiscite. Neither were the Soviets, as previously mentioned, prepared to make any significant concessions to the Romanians. If they had been prepared to make concessions, as they claimed, there was nothing to stop

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Moldova, a Romanian Province them from doing so after a few months, when everybody had forgotten about the French ratification; instead they took a tougher line in their relations with Romania. The fact that in a matter of weeks the Soviets seemed to have forgotten the French ratification and failed to take any measures against France proves that, indeed, Cicerin was simply bluffing for propaganda reasons. In a sense, it might be considered that the French ratification matched quite well with the Bessarabian propaganda campaign prepared by the Soviets during 1924 and with their change of policy towards Romania. But it was not only the Soviets who were upset by the French ratification. An article published in The New York Times in March 1924 shows the American opinion on the matter: “The recent vote in the French Parliament seems to have done Russia greater service than Romania, inasmuch as it has spurred Russian nationalism and reinforced the centripetal sentiment of the outlying elements of the Russian confederated union, like the Ukraine and White Russia . . . ”81 This quotation (and indeed the entire article) reminds us of the official American stance on the Bessarabian question. However sharp the initial Soviet reaction, in just a few weeks the Soviet representatives changed their tactic and tried to downplay the importance of the ratification. During the Soviet-Romanian negotiations in Vienna, Litvinov took the opportunity to express the view that the French ratification was far from a definitive solution to the Bessarabian question and that the Soviets still had sufficient means to block the Bessarabian Treaty from coming into force: It could scarcely be credited that Japan, which has offered to resume negotiations with the Soviets, desires to aid new claims to the list already presented to it by the Soviet Government. Similarly, Italy, which has begun friendly relations with the Soviet Union, cannot desire to compromise the results of the Italo-Soviet commercial treaty for the beautiful eyes of Romania and France. They will understand perfectly that any support given to Romania in the Bessarabian question is considered by the Soviets as a direct act of hostility and an indirect participation in the invasion of Soviet territory . . . 82

Conclusion — The French Position after Ratification Although it came some two years later than the Romanians initially expected, the French ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty was a Romanian diplomatic success. It also boosted the Romanians’ hopes to get much more from France, namely, guaranteed French military involvement in case of a Russian attack over Bessarabia. While Romania alone or with the help of her neighbors was able to handle the threats from Hungary or Bulgaria, the situation was quite different regarding the Soviet Union. In order to counterbalance the huge military potential of the Soviets, Romania had two choices: (1) to make peace with them at the price of returning at

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least a part of Bessarabia; (2) to establish an alliance with a Great Power — and there were only two states to choose from — France and Germany. (Italy was too small for such a task; Great Britain was set on neutrality). The Romanians took the second option and France, only to find themselves disappointed; and, in the end, they lost all of Bessarabia plus northern Bukovina. The two years France took to sign the Bessarabian Treaty and the additional four years to ratify it exemplify both the failure of Romanian diplomacy to secure a solid French support and the French vacillation with regard to Romania. In fact, some scholars consider that, for a number of reasons, French political interest in Romania remained lukewarm until the late 1930s, even though she was a member of the French-supported alliance system in Eastern Europe.83 One of the consequences of the French ratification was that it gave a real impetus to the negotiations for a bilateral Friendship and Alliance Treaty. The Romanians’ principal purpose was to obtain written guarantees of a French military intervention in case the Soviets attacked Bessarabia; that is exactly what the French were reluctant to offer. The negotiations for the Treaty started as early as March 1924, influenced also by the signing of the French-Czechoslovak Friendship Treaty.84 But the French failure to mention the Bessarabian question displeased the Romanians. On March 28, during a meeting with Peretti dela Rocca, Antonescu expressed the Romanian view: “Romania is strong enough to defeat Bulgaria or Hungary in a war. The situation is different with Russia”.85 The Romanian request was perhaps unexpected for the French and it was not welcome: The Romanian demand to expressly mention Bessarabia in the projected treaty is inadmissible . . . our treaty with Poland has no similar clause. For us, the purpose of the Treaties signed with Poland and the Little Entente is essentially that of maintaining the political status established by the Peace Treaties. A special clause regarding a territory that has not been liberated by the Allied Armies from the enemy is unjustified, and a little bit imprudent from the viewpoint of French interests.86 Further negotiations took place in Paris between Duca and the French leaders, with the latter insisting on a general draft while the Romanians sought more concrete obligations, namely a military convention;87 but the French proved unwilling to give in, arguing, Why should we guarantee Bessarabia? We did not ask Romania to guarantee us the province of Bretagne . . . What Duca wants is a military treaty and not a general political treaty, which has an extraordinary moral value. Is it not clear that the simple existence of a French-Czechoslovak Treaty is enough to make Russia hesitate in attacking Czechoslovakia?”88 Duca decided to postpone any negotiations regarding the treaty at least until

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Moldova, a Romanian Province the international situation would be more favorable to Romania. In May 1924 the political situation in France changed and the new government headed by Edouard Herriot decided on a different course for French foreign policy. Herriot was not very favorable to the system of Eastern alliances and decided to open diplomatic relation with the Soviets in October 1924.89 One of the immediate consequences of the French recognition of the Soviets was that, according to a promise France had made during the war, she would return the Russian fleet (to “the first recognized government of Russia”). For Romania, this meant facing the danger of a very powerful Russian Black Sea Fleet. Under the circumstances, the Romanians proposed the establishment of a common Anglo-French naval base on Romanian territory, at Constanta, or asked that France refuse the Soviet request for the former Russian fleet.90 The negotiations for the Alliance Treaty continued, the Romanians insisting that it should stipulate the presence of a French military contingent in Romania in case of war with Russia. However, the French were opposed, Herriot justifying his refusal by saying, “I am afraid that in a few years we will have a common action of Germany against Danzig combined with a Russian action in Bessarabia”.91 During the negotiations for the Alliance Treaty, the French also pinned down their real position regarding the Bessarabian Treaty: “Poincare declared that the Bessarabian territory could not be guaranteed against an attack, the Bessarabian Treaty being only a recognition of her annexation by Romania.” Quite upset by this interpretation, Duca replied (written on the document) that “If France is not neighboring Russia, neither are we Germany’s neighbor”.92 Trying to answer Poincare’s interpretation, during the same meeting Diamandi raised the matter of the French position in case the Soviets, attacking Bessarabia, should also attack a village on the territory of the Old Kingdom. He raised this point in order to counterbalance the distinction made by Poincare between the Bessarabian Treaty and the Peace Treaties (a distinction probably, but not necessarily, based on the fact that the Bessarabian Treaty had failed to come into force), showing that the distinction could not stand up to a practical examination. However, worse was still to come: the French “step back” regarding the Bessarabian Treaty. One and a half years earlier, when the same Poincare had insisted on the ratification, he failed to mention that he did not actually consider the treaty to be among the Peace Treaties. This French position actually gives a different significance to the Treaty: if it was not one of the Peace Treaties, France did not have to guarantee it in the same manner. Simply said, the French indecision regarding the Bessarabian Treaty comes to the surface once again in 1925, in a new way. Although political reasons were important in delaying the signature of the Alliance treaty, economical reasons also figured in. A Report prepared by the French Finance Ministry in March 1925 identified no less than seven financial matters not yet solved; only six such matters had been resolved after 1920.93 In fact, as remarked in April 1925 by Constantin Diamandi, the Romanian Minister to France, the Romanians were quite unhappy about the French policy of constantly giving priority to economic matters in their bilateral relations:

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I realized that, since 1919, there has been no kind of political collaboration with us, no exchange of opinions; during different conferences, instead of looking for our help and collaboration we are kept at a distance, suspected; the shadow of the Supreme Council is still alive and, whenever we go to the Quai d’Orsay I hear only requests regarding the payment of our debts; mercantilism.94 In fact, this French policy only points up France’s slender military and strategic interest in Romania as compared to their economic interests. Since neither side was willing to abandon her position, what followed was a new postponement in the negotiations until the signing of the Locarno Agreement (meant to reinforce the new European frontiers established at the end of World War I). The Romanian Government, left out of the guarantees offered by the Locarno agreements and sensing the need to strengthen its international position, insisted on signing an alliance with France. However, the much-publicized “spirit of Locarno” blocked France from undertaking any kind of concrete engagements outside the League of Nations Pact. This was one of the reasons behind the continuous postponement in signing the treaty with Romania, as well as in voiding it of concrete military obligations and the attempt to keep it secret for as long as possible.95 On the other hand, as stated by Poincare: “Whatever you might tell me and even adding in the non-aggression pact, the Bessarabian question characterizes the treaty between us as directed against Russia”.96 A major reason for the French postponement was the need to avoid exacerbating relations with Russia. As a result, they successfully kept on postponing the signature of the Treaty,97 even as the treaty was ready to be signed in September 1925, when the Romanians abandoned their request regarding Bessarabia and accepted a general Treaty with two annexes — a non-aggression statement by Romania towards the Soviets and a military convention.98 On June 10, 1926, the long negotiated Friendship Treaty between Romania and France was finally signed in Paris, prompted more or less directly by the Soviet signing of a political treaty with Germany (April 24, 1926) and by the ongoing Romanian-Italian negotiations for an Alliance Treaty. However, it was quite short of what the Romanians had hoped to achieve. It stipulated only that in case of an unprovoked attack upon one of its signatories, the two parties would consult, within the framework of the League, as to the measures to be taken against the aggressor. In order to please both signatories, it was completed with a Military Convention (to be kept secret) and a Protocol. The Protocol reiterated Romania’s unilateral nonaggression pact towards the Soviet Union, initially proposed during the Genoa Conference of May 1922, offering in this way a written guarantee to the French that they would not be dragged into a war started by Romania against the Soviets. On the other hand, the Military Convention, although it was “secret”, was only of a general nature, stipulating that the Military Headquarters of the two states should come into contact in case of war but providing no clear obligations. The Treaty certainly

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Moldova, a Romanian Province gave a moral boost to the Romanians, but it felt short of offering military guarantees of the inviolability of the Romanian frontiers, particularly in Bessarabia. The blame for the general nature of the Military Convention does not lie only with France. One of the conditions for appropriate military collaboration would have been for Romania to have a strong army and a firm High Command. Unfortunately, in the Romanian High Command there were too many generals, and the war preparedness of the Romanian Army was low.99 The French were eager to rectify this situation, and offered to send a new military mission to Romania with the purpose of reorganizing the Romanian High Command, and also to cover the ammunition needs of the Romanian Army; but they had to abandon their plans due to the Romanians’ opposition.100 Somewhat worse for the Romanian government was the French insistence on keeping the signing of the Treaty secret for as long as possible, a secrecy determined by the need to avoid setting off Soviet and Italian reactions. On August 13, when the Romanian government officially confirmed the news of the treaty, the press in the main European capitals took up positions against it, considering it proof of a Romanian-Polish-French military block. Yet, there are scholars who, due to the common interest of maintaining the existing European order, consider that “the French and the Romanians regarded themselves as allies even without a formal treaty”.101 The other side of the story, more “pessimistic” is: The attachment of Romania, a state without border on Germany, to the PolishCzech nucleus of the French eastern system introduced the complexities of Bucharest’s relations with USSR . . . the meagerness of France’s obligations under the 1926 treaty — consultation at the outbreak of a conflict — also restricted the chance of French embroilment in what internal memoranda, in a reference to antecedents of the First World War, called “obscure Balkan quarrels”.102 Overall, the Friendship Treaty offers one of the best illustration of the French foreign policy dilemma of choosing between the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries, as well as of the failure of Romanian attempts to secure the help of a Great Power against her powerful neighbor in the East. A small controversy between the French representatives in Moscow and Bucharest regarding the Bessarabian question and Soviet-Romanian relations comes as an excellent illustration of both the French dilemma and the Romanian failure. After a meeting with Litvinov (May 1927), in which the Soviet position on Bessarabia and the idea of a Romanian-Soviet non-aggression pact were discussed, the French Ambassador to the Soviets, Jean Herbette, argued: It is not in Romania’s interest to put the Soviet recognition of Bessarabia’s union as a necessary and preliminary condition for a Soviet-Romanian rapproche-

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ment. . . . The de facto situation is clearly in Romania’s advantage and she has all the interest to prolong and use it in order to gain the sympathy of all the people living in Bessarabia (not only a majority). . . . Instead, Romania chose to abandon her favorable position as a defendant and to pose as a plaintiff, and by doing so has offered the Soviets an opportunity to challenge her title [to Bessarabia].”103 The answer to Herbette’s comments came from the French Minister to Romania, George Clinchant: Romania is asking the Soviets to recognize her rights over Bessarabia because she feels that time is working against her. In my view, Odessa is the natural outlet for Bessarabian agricultural products, because they do not have to compete with the similar Romanian products; the day when Russia will inspire enough confidence for commerce will be the day when a plebiscite in Bessarabia will definitely be detrimental for Romania. From the Soviet view, time would be used for a better internal organization and an increase in its international prestige; therefore the Soviets have all the interest to leave the Bessarabian question open. . . . I think that, while we have to watch closely the evolution of Romanian-Soviet relations, we do not have, at least for the moment, any interest to either interfere with the manner in which Romania intends to conduct her policy regarding Bessarabia or to give her any advice on this topic.104

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Notes 1 For the French intervention in Romania’s favor during the 1856 Paris Peace negotiations see Barbara Jelavich, Russia and the Formation of the Romanian National State, p. 68. 2 Dov B. Lungu, Romania and . . . , p. 8. 3 Nicole Jordan, The Popular Front and Central Europe, p. 50. 4 For a glimpse at the competition for influence existing inside the Little Entente, with insistence on the more favorable position of Czechoslovakia in this contest, see Magda Adam, “The Genoa Conference and the Little Entente”, in Genoa, Rapallo, . . . , p. 187-199. 5 “The record of French diplomacy in Eastern Europe from 1935 through 1937 shows a strong connection between economic and political developments; because the French government could not meet its eastern allies’ economic needs, it found it increasingly difficult to maintain its political relations with them”. David E. Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy . . . , p. 216-217. 6 Richard Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, Vol. 2, p. 314. 7 During the Genoa Conference “there was evidence that France tried seriously to establish a satisfactory de facto relationship with Russia that met France’s specific needs, even if it did bypass the multilateral negotiations then under way”. Anne Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff, “French Plans for the Reconstruction of Russia”, in Genoa, Rapallo, . . . , p. 134. 8 K. Hovi, Alliance de Revers . . . , p. 36. 9 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 168, Report by Saint Aulaire, April 18, 1919, c. 687-694. 10 David Dutton, The Politics of Diplomacy . . . , p. 151. 11 Anne Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff, “French Plans for the Reconstruction of Russia”, in Genoa, Rapallo, . . . , p. 139. 12 For details on the making and the composition of the Committee see Jacques Bariety “Le Comite d’etudes du Quai d’Orsay et la frontiere rhenane (1917-1919)” in The Establishment of Frontiers . . . , p. 251254. 13 A look at Clemenceau’s newspaper, “L’Homme Enchaine”, gives a good illustration of his opinions and especially of his attitude towards Bratianu. 14 Armand Gosu, “Ion Pelivan la Conferinta de pace de la Paris”, in Revista istorica, 1993, no. 9, p. 1-17. 15 At one point, the British and American representatives were so disgruntled with the proRomanian attitude of French Foreign Ministry officials that they asked for the sessions of the Council of Ten and Council of Four to be moved from Quai d’Orsay to another place. S.D. Spector, Romania la . . . , p. 225. 16 During the war, the most numerous of the French Military Missions was in Romania. Of course that the war camaraderie established between the French officers and the Romanian military and civil leaders lasted long after the war and had a benefic effect on the bilateral relations. Jean Noel Grandhomme, “Le general Berthelot auxiliaire de la diplomatie francaise en Romanie, 1922-1930” in La fin de la Premiere Guerre mondiale . . . , p. 107-126. 17 Glenn E. Torrey, General Henri Berthelot and Romania . . . , passim. Comte de Saint Aulaire, Confession d’un vieux diplomate, p. 301-496. 18 He was instructed to do everything necessary, including encouragement for those in opposition that were in favor of an immediate intervention, at Bratianu’s expense. Comte de Saint Aulaire, Confession d’un . . . , p. 307, 331. 19 Comte de Saint Aulaire, Confession d’un . . . , p. 461. 20 He also points out the difficult position for the French in front of their Russian Allies, the Romanian intervention in Bessarabia being heavily used by the German propaganda in Russia. G.E. Torrey, General Henri Berthelot …, p. 150. 21 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Telegram Saint Aulaire to Clemenceau, June 20, 1918, c. 562. 22 M.J. Carley, Revolution and Intervention . . . , p. 166. 23 Admiral de Bou, Commander of the Naval Army, presents this opinion in a Report prepared on March 1, 1920, also pointing the underestimation by the Romanians of the Bolshevik danger. RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 189, Report on Romania, March 1, 1920, c. 256-258. 24 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 189, Report by Jules Cambon on “Romania and the Soviet Government”, October 12, 1920, c. 289-290. 25 T. Sandu, “La France et la Bessarabie romaine de 1918 a 1920 …” in “The Establishment of …”, p. 369. 26 “Until the Conference will take a decision we must avoid, in our quality of old allies of Russia,

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CHAPTER 6. FRANCE which places us in a special situation, any armed action against the Russian population in this region”. RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Instructions by Stephen Pichon, February 17, 1919, c. 584. 27 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Telegram Pichon to Saint Aulaire, July 13, 1919, c. 626-627. 28 He was one of Romania’s best friends in Paris. Professor of geography at Sorbonne University he wrote a few brochures in favor of Romania’s territorial claims, including one on Bessarabia. As a member in the Committee d’Etudes, De Martonne presented four reports on Romania, all based on geographical, ethnic, demographical, economical and strategical considerations: Dobrudja on May 6, 1918; Transylvania on May 22, 1918; Banat on February 3, 1919; and Bessarabia on July 1919. It is important to show that the first two reports were presented at a time when Romania was in the most difficult situation, after the Bucharest Peace, showing a continuing French solidarity with the Romanian cause. For a resume of the four reports see J. Bariety, “Le Comite d’Etudes du Quai d’Orsay et …” in Revue Romaine d’Histoire, 1996, no. 1, p. 43-51. 29 Quoted in S.D. Spector, Romania la . . . , p.127. 30 The declaration belongs to Philippe Berthelot and was made in September 1919 during a conversation with the Romanian representatives in Paris. Quoted in D. Preda, In apararea . . . , p. 123, 301. 31 DDI, Serie 6, Vol. 1, p. 430-431. Also S.D. Spector, Romania la . . . , p. 92. 32 Telegram Stephen Pichon (French Foreign Minister) to French representatives in Bucharest, London, Washington and Brussels, December 28, 1918, quoted in 1920. Un act de justitie. Documente, p. 101-102. 32 Maxime Mourin, Les Relations Franco-Sovietique, p. 105. 33 M.J. Carley, Revolution and Intervention . . . , p. 111-113. 35 DDF, 1920, Telegram Saint Aulaire for Paris, January 14, 1920, p. 17. 36 DDF, 1920, Letter Millerand to Daeschner, March 6th 1920, p. 309-312 37 T. Sandu, “La France et la Bessarabie romaine de 1918 a 1920…”in The Establishment of . . . , p. 379-380. 38 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Telegram Daeschner to Millerand, August 27, 1920, c. 697. 39 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Note for the President of the Council, August 20, 1920, c. 694. 40 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 183, Telegram Pichon to Daeschner, September 14, 1920, c. 147. 41 General Petin, the French military attaché to Romania, prepared a very comprehensive report on the anti-French campaign in Romania in September 1920, stressing both the causes and the main actors in the campaign. RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 183, Report by General Petin, September 29, 1920, c. 153-160. 42 Dov B. Lungu, Romania and . . . , p. 8. 43 RFMA, Fond 71/France, Vol. 63, 1920-1926, Telegram Diamandi to Duca, March 1, 1922. 44 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Note Cambon to Leygues, March 21, 1922, c. 727. 45 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Antonescu to Duca, May 15, 1922. 46 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Duca to Antonescu, May 16, 1922. 47 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Antonescu to Duca, May 16, 1922. 48 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 189, Telegram Barrere (in Genoa) to Barthou, May 17, 1922, c. 478479. 49 RFMA, Fond 71/France, Vol. 63, 1920-1926, Telegram Antonescu to Duca, May 26, 1922. 50 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 213, Telegram Dering to Lord Curzon, August 9, 1922, c. 197. 51 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Report French Chamber of Deputies, 1922, No. 4752, c. 730-750. 52 Quoted in T. Sandu, “Les avatars de la ratification …”, in Revue Romaine d’Histoire, p. 64. 53 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 183, Report of French-Romanian relations, December 26, 1922, c. 441. 54 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 213, Note Duca to the French Legation, October 25, 1922, c. 25. 55 RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 213, Telegram Drake to Lord Curzon, December 17, 1922, c. 76-78. 56 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Antonescu to Duca, January 16, 1923. 57 T. Sandu, “Les avatars de la ratification …”, in Revue Romaine d’Histoire, p. 65. 58 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Letter Leygues to Poincare, November 14, 1923, c. 774. 59 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Note by de la Baume, June 21, 1923, c 758. 60 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Telegram Jusserand to Poincare, July 13, 1923, c. 760. 61 T. Sandu, “Les avatars de la ratification …”, in Revue Romaine d’Histoire, p. 65. 62 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Report prepared by the Department for the Implementation of Treaties, October 24, 1923. 63 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Notes by Duca to the French, Italian, and Japanese Legations in

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Bucharest, October 26, 1923. 64 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Note on visit by Antonescu to Peretti, November 6, 1923, c. 766. 65 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Letter Poincare to Leygues, November 10, 1923, and Leygues to Poincare, November 14, 1923, c. c. 773-774. 66 RFMA, Fond 71/France, Vol. 63, 1920-1926, Telegram Duca to Antonescu, November 18, 1923. 67 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Note Poincare to the Political Director, November 23, 1923, c. 775. 68 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Note Political Director to Poincare, November 27, 1923, c. 777. 69 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Letter Lord Derby to Poincare and Letter Poincare to Lord Derby, December 12 and 20, 1923, c. 780-781. 70 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Note on Visit by Count Vanutelly to Peretti, January 9, 1924, c. 784. 71 As for this last matter, “an immediate ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty by our Parliament would be really welcomed in here”. RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 189, Telegram Maneville to Poincare, February 1, 1924, c. 544. 72 M. Adam, The Little Entente . . . , p. 210. 73 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Note Leygues to Poincare, January 30, 1924, c. 785. 74 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Note for the President of the Council, February 2nd 1924, c 787 75 French Chamber of Deputies, Debates, 1924, Vol. 2, p. 1204-1211. 76 French Chamber of Deputies, Debates, 1924, Vol. 2, p. 1204-1211. 77 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Duca to Antonescu, March 15, 1924. 78 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 183, Note on matters regarding Romania, April 8, 1924, c. 566-578. 79 The Times, March 20, 1924. 80 There are scholars arguing that, in fact, the French ratification was one of the main causes for the failure of the Romanian-Soviets Conference in Vienna. T. Sandu, “Les avatars de la ratification …”, p. 68. 81 The New York Times, March 17, 1924. 82 The Manchester Guardian, April 10, 1924. 83 Keith Hitchins argues that the French government was not interested in a military alliance with Romania because it considered the latter’s army incapacity to undertake a serious military campaign. K. Hitchins, Romania, 1866-1947, p. 427. 84 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 191, Report by Peretti on his meeting with I.G. Duca, March 14, 1924, c. 20. 85 Quoted in M. Adam, The Little Entente . . . , p. 213. 86 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 191, Note by Guy Laroche, March 28, 1924, c. 29-31. 87 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 191, Report by Peretti on his meeting with Duca, April 15, 1924, c. 37. 88 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 191 (c. 64) and R 183 (c. 614), Report by Peretti on his meeting with Duca, April 27, 1924. On the other hand, referring to the same meeting, Magda Adam mistakenly argues, “Duca accepted that the political agreement should include no military clauses”. M. Adam, The Little Entente . . . , p. 214. 89 Although Magda Adam argues that “the Franco-Yugoslav and Franco-Romanian agreements were removed from the agenda for a number of years”, as proved by the documents in the RFMA, the negotiations for a treaty continued even under Herriot’s government. M. Adam, The Little Entente . . . , p. 223. 90 The French position on the proposed naval base was that it would be of great utility but against Turkey and not against Russia, also realizing that the Romanian condition for such a base would be the signing of an Alliance Treaty. RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 191, Report by Laroche on his meeting with Diamandi, February 20, 1925, c. 108. On the other hand, considering the limits of the French War Navy, Briand was against the projected naval base. RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 191, Report on Briand-Diamandi meeting, April 25, 1925, c. 120. 91 RFMA, Fond 71/France, Vol. 63, 1920-1926, Telegram Diamandi to Duca, January 12, 1925. 92 RFMA, Fond 71/France, Vol. 63, 1920-1926, Telegram Diamandi to Duca, July 24, 1925. 93 RFMA, Fond 71/France, Vol. 63, 1920-1926, Note by the French Finance Ministry on FrenchRomanian financial matters, March 1925.

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Telegram Diamandi to Duca, April 28, 1925, quoted in C. Iordan, Romania si relatiile internationale din sud estul Europei: modelul Locarno, p. 35. 955 C. Iordan, Romania si relatiile internationale din sud estul European; modelul Locarno, p. 131. 96 RFMA, Fond 71/France, Vol. 63, 1920-1926, Telegrams Diamandi to Duca, December 18 and 23, 1925. 97 “The postponement in the signing of the French-Romanian Treaty comes in order to avoid any false interpretations and it is necessary due to our Locarno negotiations and the talks with the Soviets.” RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 191, Telegram Berthelot to de Billly, February 17, 1926, c. 528. 98 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 191, Telegram Briand to de Billy, September 10, 1925. Briand instructs de Billy that “although the drafts are ready, the signing is not opportune yet, due to France’s image”. 99 An excellent report on Romanian Army’s situation was prepared by the French military attaché to Romania, lt. colonel Thierry, pointing to its insufficient preparedness for war, due mainly to the inexistence of adequate supplies of war materials. RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 191, Report by Thierry, July 1, 1926, c. 236-250. In fact, although not too many Romanians are eager to say it, the poor state of the Army continues today, being one of the main reasons why Romania, with all her strategic potential, has been left out of NATO. 100 Jean Noel Granhomme, “Le general Berthelot …” in La fin de la Premiere Guerre . . . , p. 122-123. 101 Dov B. Lungu, Romania and . . . , p. 9. 102 Nicole Jordan, The Popular Front and Central Europe, p. 15. 103 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 189, Telegram Herbette to Briand, May 4, 1927, c. 718-719. 104 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 189, Telegram Clinchant to Briand, June 3, 1927, c. 729-730.

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Romanian-Italian Relations Before and During the Peace Conference Italy’s role in the Bessarabian Treaty process, and especially in connection with the ratification, offers an interesting insight into Italian foreign policy. Romania’s efforts to obtain Italy’s ratification, although they came a little late, illustrate the Treaty’s importance for Romania and its international impact. Before the World War, Italy and Romania had been, at least theoretically, on Germany’s side. When the war started, they proclaimed their neutrality and started negotiations with both sides in the conflict. They each had misgivings about the Austria-Hungarian Empire, which they had considered their principal enemy. And also, as a condition for going to war, both states had signed secret treaties with the Entente Powers in an effort to guarantee the fulfillment of their territorial aspirations. Soon after the war began, a secret agreement was reached between Italy and Romania, by which the two countries undertook to communicate each other their future intentions regarding the war.1 During the Paris Peace Conference afterward, Italy’s main concern was to see that the secret treaty signed with the Entente Powers would be respected; that would ensure her territorial ambitions and it was also likely to help produce a close relationship between Italy and Romania. As a result, Italy was the country that insisted most in favor of the validity of the 1916 Entente Treaty with Romania, considering that if the Romanian Treaty were respected, the Italian Treaty would be also. On a general plan, the Italians had been disappointed with the attitude taken by the other Powers at the Conference. They were admitted to the Council of Five and, at least theoretically, had the status of a Great Power, but their real influence and territorial gains were reduced as a result of French and US policies. When the Conference ended, Italy was disappointed with its results, even though it had achieved a great part of its territorial aspirations; this discontent would have pro-

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Moldova, a Romanian Province found consequences for Italian foreign policy during the interwar period. Many scholars also blame what they consider to be the utterly misguided policies of V.E. Orlando and Sidney Sonnino for the Italian cry of la vittoria mutilata.2 Italy’s staunchest opponent during and after the Peace Conference was France. Both Italy and France had their own plans regarding the future of Europe and they each considered the Balkan area vital to their interests. The French influence in Eastern Europe was a threat to Italy’s plans, especially because of the sympathy France showed to the Serbs. One other country in which the fast-growing French influence was worrisome was Romania, as described in a February 1919 Report from Bucharest: Romania seems almost completely subordinated to the French, who keep increasing their influence by systematically imposing it over all the state administration. Nothing moves without French authorization and the French also dominate the Romanian Supreme Military Headquarters. The Romanian people, having had enough Gallicism, would like to end this situation but cannot liberate itself.3 Italy’s attitude, backing up Romania’s territorial claims at the Conference, was clearly expressed by the Italian Foreign Minister, Sidney Sonnino: For the Oriental boundaries: we recognize the complete annexation of Bessarabia. For Dobrudja we defend the 1913 Treaty but we recognize that for ethnic reasons proposed by other delegations it is possible to give Bulgaria a partial rectification of the border South of the Silistria-Mangalia line. [Actually, it was not for ethnic reasons but for strategic reasons that Italy pronounced itself in favor of Bulgaria, which was supposed to have an important role in the Italian strategy of containing Yugo-Slavia.] For the Occidental boundaries: we recognize the plain validity of the 1916 Treaty of Alliance. Because of the fierce opposition of the French, English and American delegations, caused for the first two by the concept of favoring the Slavs at any costs, and for the last by a meticulous appreciation of the ethnic situation, the Italian delegation had to renounce that first scope, which left her in an isolation that could prejudice her more vital interests.4 However, the Italian delegation, in order to adhere to the restrictive modifications of the line established by the 1916 Treaty, made a verbal statement that it considers such a solution not to be the best. Regarding particularly the Banat, the Italian delegation, failing to give all of it to Romania, proposed the division of the remaining region between Serbia and Hungary. [In essence, this equates to an admission that the Banat could be Romanian or Hungarian territory, as long as it is kept away from the Serbs.] The Italian delegation made another proposal that provoked a powerful reaction from the other three delegations, for the attribution to Romania of

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Ruthenian territories situated between the Carpathian Mountains and the Theiss as a way to give Transylvania a direct communication route with Poland on the railway running from Jablonitza.5 Things did not go their way during the Peace Conference, which eventually led the Italian representatives abruptly to leave the Conference. The more Italian interests were dismissed by the Conference, the fiercer was the Italian opposition to the decisions taken by the other delegations — especially regarding territorial modifications. Whenever the Conference came to a conclusion regarding Romania’s borders, the Italian delegation argued for something different (particularly during the debates in the Territorial Commission);6 and Romania’s affairs were only one area where this opposition was shown. During the Hungarian crisis, Romanian-Italian relations took a turn for the worse as a secondary effect of the Italian attempt to isolate Yugoslavia. The union of the Croats and Slovenes with the Serbs was an unexpected and worrying development for the Italians. Their initial plans had been to obtain territorial claims from the Habsburg Empire and to use Austria as a bulwark against Slavdom in the Balkans; Croatia and Slovenia were to remain parts of a reduced Habsburg Empire, which would naturally retain Fiume as its only outlet to the sea. Instead, a vigorous unitary Slav state had emerged, and claimed Dalmatia, the Islands and Fiume, and also Istria, Gorizia and Trieste.7 As a result, Serbia grew to a degree where it could contend with Italy, and it offered refuge to the Croats and Slovenes, whom Italy had always considered enemies. (Croat troops fought for the Monarchy until the last days of the war, hoping to achieve a better position inside the Empire afterward.) Italy wanted to isolate Yugoslavia, and for that it needed to have Austria, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary on her side. However, Romania had territorial disputes with both Hungary and Bulgaria, disputes that made any diplomatic arrangement between them impossible. Still, Bratianu agreed during 1919 with the Italian policy of isolating the Yugoslavs, hoping to get all of Banat for Romania. But Italy’s move toward closer relations with Hungary during the summer of 1919 (by supplying armament to the Hungarians), and Italy’s attitude on the South Dobrudja question (in which they proposed negotiations between Romania and Bulgaria) won them no friends in Romania. The worst part for the Italian side was the military and diplomatic conflict between Romania and Hungary over Transylvania, which proved to be an insurmountable barrier to any possible alliance between the two countries. In June 1919, Sonnino instructed Prince Borghese, in Budapest, to support a projected RomanianHungarian alliance; the thought was that some form of agreement could be built on the basis of a common understanding to weaken and isolate Yugoslavia.8 The Italians had already started to put into practice their dream of completely isolating the Yugoslavs, but their policy of helping Hungary clearly displeased the Romanians. They remembered clearly that, when the Romanian Army had entered Budapest in pursuit of Bela Kun’s army, it was an Italian colonel who came to negotiate in the

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Moldova, a Romanian Province name of the Hungarian communist government — proving that it was Italy who had supported Hungary’s war against Romania with weapons and ammunition. During the debates over the ultimatum sent to Romania on November 15, 1920, the Italians supported the Romanian cause, convincing the other delegates to make some modifications and agreeing only at the last moment to play a part in delivering it to the Romanians.9 This attitude was dictated by the Fiume crisis, which had some similarities with the Hungarian crisis; the Italians were aware that an action such as this one against Romania would create a precedent that might someday be used against Italy. As stated by one of the British representatives in Paris: I called the attention to the necessity for making the most exact arrangements for the immediate delivery of this note by all the Allied representatives in Bucharest. I quoted some of the information which has reached me as to the extraordinary maneuvers of the Italian Minister at Bucharest and his insertion in the Romanian press of statements that Italy disagreed with the decisions of the Supreme Council, and that Romania could rely on Italian support in a policy of resistance to the Council’s notes.10 As previously noted, after the American withdrawal, the Peace Conference decided to recognize de jure and not only de facto the union of Bessarabia with Romania. Italy too signed the Bessarabian Treaty of October 28, 1920. The only difference between Italy, on the one hand, and the UK and France, on the other, while negotiating for the Treaty, was that the Romanian Government did not propose to the former an exchange of notes regarding compensation for land expropriated in Bessarabia. Although initially the Romanians had in view an exchange of notes with the Peace Conference, they changed their position and left out Italy and Japan. This decision was probably related to the more and more passive attitude taken by the Italian foreign policy team with regard to the Peace Conference, the need to keep the exchange secret from Romanian landowners, and the discontent regarding some of Italy’s actions. The Romanian Government understood that the real forces at the Conference were the UK and France, and considered that Italy and Japan were almost powerless to resist those two. A few years later, in the context created by Mussolini’s foreign policy, the Romanians had to pay a certain price for under-estimating Italy. The Ratification Question. First Phase, 1920-1926 During the inter-war period, Romanian-Italian relations had not, with one exception, been very friendly. Despite their shared Latin roots, as with France, political and strategic factors complicated the situation. The Italian drive to isolate Yugoslavia was thwarted by the establishment of the Little Entente (Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia), and by France’s influence in the area. To counterbalance the Little Entente, Italy tried to increase its influence in Bulgaria, Hungary and Austria. However, in each of its actions in the Balkan area, Italy was confronted with the Little

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Entente. Putting a definitive chill on Romanian-Italian relations were Italy’s actions in favor of Hungary, especially arms deliveries, and interventions in favor of the ethnic Hungarians in Romania; the leaders of the Romanian National Party (one of Romania’s biggest, based in Transylvania), expressed their discontent with the proHungarian policy of Italy,11 and Bratianu noted both that and Italy’s opposition to the Little Entente.12 A number of open economic issues also had a negative influence. It is difficult to take the Bessarabian Treaty ratification out of the context of Italian-Romanian relations in general. Ratification was among Romania’s main goals with Italy, especially between 1924 and 1927. Economic matters were more at issue for the Italians, who hoped for a favorable solution to a number of pending financial questions and also for a larger share of the Romanian market. The Italian Minister in Bucharest, Martin Franklin, analyzed Romanian-Italian relations in January 1923 in a memorandum to the Romanian Foreign Minister, I.G. Duca, noting the problems en suspens between the two countries: In order to give a greater intimacy to Romanian-Italian relations it is first necessary that the Romanian Government gives a satisfactory solution to the question of equality of treatment regarding the expropriations in Bessarabia and a liberal application for the other expropriations [of land/property in areas other than Bessarabia]. The Romanian Government should take measures to solve the financial problems in order to dissipate the unfavorable atmosphere produced by the grave consequences of its actions in this field. These questions . . . have been: the war debts; the Treasury Bonds; Stamps; credits for the payment of the destroyers; credits from the Bank of Italy for the Romanian Legation in Rome; payment of the interest for the Romanian public debt in Italy. . . . The most delicate and gravest question is that of Italian properties in Bessarabia. The Italian Government cannot admit that the Italians are not treated in the same manner as the English and the French just because the Italian Government had recognized the annexation of Bessarabia with brotherhood zeal and without conditions.13 As for the last matter, the accent placed on it comes at the beginning of 1923 as a result of the Romanian payment of compensations to the expropriated French and British landowners, when the news of the 1920 exchange of letters “transpired”, infuriating the Italians. However, for Italy it was more a matter of prestige than money, and that is why Mussolini reacted to it so strongly. As there was only one Italian landowner in question, it is difficult to understand why Romania waited another year before solving this minor problem. When Mussolini came to power, he carefully avoided any action that could encourage Hungarian or Bulgarian revisionism and, most important for Romania, in 1923 Italy showed no sympathy for Hungary’s claim to Transylvania.14 During his

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Moldova, a Romanian Province first months in office Mussolini preferred a rapprochement with the Little Entente rather than with Hungary and Bulgaria. And, as proved by the signing of the Pact of Rome with Yugoslavia and by on-going negotiations with the Czechoslovaks, he seemed to be successful in this approach. The Italian-Czechoslovak negotiations offer an interesting comparison to Romanian-Italian negotiations, as Mussolini was trying to settle war debts with both Romania and Czechoslovakia, and the latter both sought to have Italy more concretely committed to guaranteeing their borders. Of the three members in the Little Entente, Romania would have appeared to be the most open to an understanding with Italy, as they had no territorial problems between them and they had the cultural bridge created by their common Latin origins. However, the Romanians were clearly much closer to the French and even to the British than to the Italians, as they doubted Italy’s ability to impose her ideas or interests at the international level; they considered that Italy lacked the military and economic might necessary to enforce her international status. In fact, during the entire interwar period, and especially during Titulescu’s tenure as the Foreign Minister the Romanians, following in the footprints of French diplomacy, were very keen to avoid any reference to Italy as a Great Power. The failure of Bratianu’s plan to obtain for Romania a position similar Italy’s at the end of the war also played a role. So that, adding up the two political sore points (the Italian-Hungarian partnership and the Bessarabian Treaty ratification) with the French influence, skepticism and a few financial issues, there were plenty of obstacles. Soon after Mussolini came to power, the Romanians tried to improve their relations, hoping for an Italian military guarantee of Romania’s borders both in Transylvania and Bessarabia. However, as soon as January 1923 Mussolini had already expressed his view, using his famous formula that a political agreement should be preceded by increased economic cooperation, hinting especially at the newly-opened oilfields in Romania.15 Mussolini’s proposal not only failed to make a good impression in Bucharest but also coincided with the Liberal Party’s campaign for the implementation of the so-called “by ourselves” economic policy, aimed at reducing the control of Romanian economy by foreign investors. The Italian quest for Romanian oil also collided with French, British and American interests in the area. As a result, Romania decided to slow down the economic negotiations (particularly over the treasury bonds controversy) initiated by Pompeo Aloisi, the new Italian Minister to Romania.16 In October 1923, the Romanian Foreign Ministry opened a discussion regarding ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty with the Italian representatives, only to be disappointed. One might ask why Romania waited three years to ask; there were at least four reasons. First, it took Romania herself about a year and a half to ratify the Treaty (and even then, with a little British “help”); how, then, could she ask the Italians to ratify? Second, as the Romanians considered the French guarantees to be worth far more than the Italian or Japanese, it is possible that they focused only on France. In a sense, that would mean a continuation of the 1920 policy of neglecting Italy and over-evaluating France and Great Britain. Then, there were the unresolved

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economic issues existing between the two states, and the Italian attitude towards Hungary. Unfortunately, while the Romanians were placing all their bets on France, Italy was won over by one of Romania’s adversaries, the Soviet Union. In February 1924 Italy gave official recognition to the Soviet Union, at the same time as Great Britain, but without having ratified the Bessarabian Treaty.17 There were rumors at the time that Mussolini had agreed not to ratify the treaty in exchange for economic benefits from the Soviets, and subsequent events suggest that there was some truth to that. Regardless, Italy’s recognition was bad news for Romania, as it further decreased the number of possible allies against the Soviets. That spring, a potential crisis emerged in the form of the Treasury Bonds dispute.18 Mussolini had been personally insisting, for over a year, that the Romanian authorities should solve this problem as soon as possible. Perhaps coincidentally, in early March 1924, just a few weeks after the recognition of the Soviet Union, Mussolini suggested putting off the planned visit of the Romanian Royal Family to Italy due to the bad press Romania was given for the Treasury Bonds question19 and the different treatment accorded Italian landlords expropriated in Bessarabia.20 This suggestion was received in Bucharest as a slap, and the Royal Family rescinded its decision to visit Rome. The King found it inappropriate that a manifestation of friendship between sovereigns should be obstructed by mere financial considerations.21 With the honor of the Romanian Royal Family at stake, there was a risk of eroding Romanian-Italian relations to a dangerous level. Realizing that he may have over-stepped, Mussolini tried to soften the message a little, suggesting that he had only asked for the postponement because the Italian public opinion had become hostile to Romania as a result of her economic policy. However, he adamantly repeated that the Romanian Government should solve the Treasury Bonds problem.22 The worst aspect of the crisis was that it came at a time when the French Parliament had ratified the Bessarabian Treaty and negotiations between Romania and Russia were about to begin in Vienna. In other words, Mussolini’s action vitiated the advantage given by the French ratification, giving an advantage to the Soviet delegation.23 Mussolini was not about to allow the French influence in the Balkans to increase; with this gesture, Mussolini was able to improve his relations with the Soviets while giving a warning to Romania as to Italy’s importance in Balkan politics. And it seems that, indeed, the Romanians changed their policy towards Italy. As for Soviet-Italian relations, there is every indication that indeed Mussolini had come to a verbal agreement to delay ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty.24 But did Mussolini have another agreement with the Soviets, promising to provoke a brief crisis in Italian-Romanian relations in order to offset the effect of the French ratification and thereby shift the balance at the Vienna negotiations? Only a few weeks later, the whole incident was forgotten. As Alan Cassels expressed it: “After the storm blew over, the stalemate remained as before; the Romanians sought political assurances and the Italians economic assurances, with both sides reluctant to equate one set of desiderata with the other”.25 Later that March, the Italians indicated that they would ratify as soon as the

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Italian landowners expropriated in Bessarabia had been compensated, at the same level as for the French and British subjects.26 This time, the Romanian government set out to give satisfaction, and the results proved that, in fact, the Italians had been exaggerating the compensation question in order to use it as a cover for other existing motives, as France did in 1922: We took the decision long ago to compensate the Italian landowners in Bessarabia in the same way as the French and English. Until today Malabassi is the only case we know of, and his rights we have already estimated. I do not have to add what a good impression would be made, in these conditions, especially today, by a quick ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty.27 Understanding the real importance of the Italian ratification, the Romanian side took action to improve the bilateral relations, and the problem of Treasury Bonds was partially solved. At the beginning of August 1924 the Romanian Foreign Minister, I.G. Duca, had a meeting with Pompeo Aloisi, the Italian Minister in Bucharest. Duca proposed that the two countries sign a Treaty similar to the ItaloCzechoslovak Treaty, with a special emphasis on Italy’s ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty. When the Italian Minister expressed his opinion that the ratification could not be considered, for the moment, because of its implications for ItalianSoviet relations, Duca offered the necessary “incentives”, suggesting that the political accord could be followed by oil concessions, contracts for the Romanian Railways System, and so on. In fact the Romanians, whenever the Italians delayed, tried to induce them with the kind of economic arguments that Mussolini sought with his favorite slogan, niente per niente. Concluding his report, Aloisi stated: It is clear that the Romanian Government, after the spring incidents, and especially during the last few months, has demonstrated and continues to demonstrate greater willingness for a rapprochement with Italy, for two reasons: improving its foreign credit; solving the Bessarabian question and finding a more stable asset for its foreign policy.28 However, Mussolini was unwilling to abandon his position: On diverse occasions, Lahovary [Romanian Minister in Rome] asked me about the Italian ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty and I tried to avoid giving him an explicit answer. I am still waiting for the Romanian-Russian negotiations to continue, wishing that they would end with a satisfactory result. You should make Duca understand that, in any case, our accord with Romania should coincide with a commercial treaty. . .29 As a sign of good faith on the part of the Romanian Government, on September 1924 the Minister of Agriculture, Alexandru Constantinescu, went to Italy. The ne-

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gotiations focused mainly on economic issues, the ratification being put off again by Mussolini’s proposal to start conversations with the Soviet Ambassador in Rome for an amicable solution to the Bessarabian question.30 On the same day, Mussolini had a conversation on the same matter with the leader of the People’s Party, Alexandru Averescu (former Romanian Prime Minister). Although the Romanians had not asked for Mussolini’s intervention in improving Romanian-Soviet relations, he was all too glad to undertake this task, for two reasons. One, he could pose as someone doing everything for the Romanian cause in Bessarabia by exerting his influence over the Soviets — while justifying the delay in the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty. And two, this offer fit well with Mussolini’s more general objective in recognizing the Soviets: his dream of mediating between Bolshevism and the West.31 Although it seemed that Romanian-Italian relations were on the right path, in just a few days a new crises erupted, provoked by information published by the semi-official Stefani Agency: that the Italian Government was about to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty. This generated a polemic in the Italian press, with arguments pro and con.32 While Il Mondo, opposed to Mussolini, was on the Romanians’ side and pleaded in favor of ratification, a number of other newspapers expressing the official government viewpoint (such as Il Popolo d’Italia), argued the contrary. And worse, pleading against ratification, they used the Russian thesis regarding Bessarabia, calling for a plebiscite and claiming that, in fact, the Italian non-ratification had spared Romania from a Soviet military campaign. The Romanian press hit back, as soon as the word spread.33 In this context Mussolini’s secret agreement with the Soviets on ratification became a leitmotiv of the mass media. The Romanian side officially concluded that no such secret agreement existed: There is no proof of the existence of such an agreement; the only indications come through its effects: 1. The mild tone used by the Soviet press towards Mussolini; 2. During the Matteoti affair, Moscow simply kept complete silence, failing to protest in any way; 3. The attitude of the Italian communist party is more and more strange (they oppose the boycott of the Chamber initiated by the opposition parties as a result of the Matteoti affair); 4. The existence of a reciprocal agreement between the Rosta (Russian) and Stefani Press Agencies regarding the publication of news; 5. Mussolini’s attitude regarding the Bessarabian question; 6. The existing affinities between the Soviet and the Mussolini regimes.34 The question is, what kind of proof was Cretzianu looking for? If it was a verbal agreement, no signed papers could be expected. And, as it was supposedly a secret that neither Mussolini nor the Soviets would have an interest in leaking, it would be surprising to find any concrete proof. Still, in this author’s view, it does appear, from

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Moldova, a Romanian Province published Italian documents, that a secret verbal agreement on the ratification did exist. Realizing that the press campaign both in Italy and Romania was not at all benefiting the Romanian cause, Duca instructed Alexandru E. Lahovary, the Romanian minister to Italy, to take action in order to put an end to it: I think that it is necessary to end this campaign because, as you know, Mussolini is unwilling yet to make known his intentions, of which he assured us, so that the actual dispute could only place him in an unpleasant situation.35 Still, the campaign went on and, as a result, relations between the two states once again froze. The troubles were discussed during a meeting between I.G. Duca and H. Dering, the British Minister in Romania, in December 1924. As Dering reports: I asked whether Italy showed any signs of ratifying the Treaty recognizing Romania’s sovereignty over Bessarabia. Duca replied, not yet, but that Mussolini still declared that he was trying to induce the Soviet Government to give similar recognition, when he, Duca, supposed Italian ratification would, in that rather unlikely contingency, follow. I expressed wonder over what Italy expected to be the outcome of her negotiations with the Soviet Government . . . I merely remarked that Italy generally expected something in exchange for favors. Duca agreed with a smile, remarking, “a policy of du ut des”.36 The press campaign continued, reaching a new peak in February-March 1925. One of the most controversial moments came as the Italian press published passages taken from Cicerin’s speech in Tiflis regarding the Bessarabian question. The Romanians were outraged and asked the Italian government for explanations, arguing that the sentiment of the Romanian public could only become anti-Italian as a result of this kind of article. After a meeting with Contarini, Lahovary reports: Contarini declared that he does not know exactly the declaration made by Cicerin; that Mussolini has not lost his hope that, in time, the Soviets would recognize the Bessarabian Treaty; that the articles published in Il Mondo could only harm the Romanian cause. He advised us [nonetheless] to have patience because time is a great master and that by insisting we only risk to infuriate Mussolini and he might even decide to take the Italian signature off the Bessarabian Treaty. That, in the end, a Government, the same as an individual, is free to change his opinions and decisions as he wishes. . . . Finally he asked me what was the situation of the commercial negotiations between us. I told him honestly that Italian economic interests could not expect to be welcome in Romania as long as the Italian ratification is missing.”37

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This position suggests that Contarini (and probably Mussolini as well) was either really upset about the articles published in Il Mondo or that he had no idea how international customs or procedures work; these might be the only explanations as to why did he came with such an aberrant idea of taking Italy’s signature off the Bessarabian Treaty. Even if this had been possible, at that stage it actually would have offered a small advantage to Romania, at least logically, because if the Italians were no longer party to the Treaty, their ratification would become unnecessary. More probably, as Mussolini had no interest to completely alienate Romania (and even he realized this), it was only the usual Italian bluffing. Unsatisfied that the press campaign kept on going, Duca insisted again: You have done well in answering immediately the Russian Ambassador [in the press] . . . Still, I believe that it would be better to end this campaign. While the interest of the Soviets is to agitate the Bessarabian question, we do not have such interest. Therefore, as this depends on us, it would be necessary to exercise our influence in order to stop this campaign . . . in this moment a press campaign regarding the Bessarabian question is more inopportune than ever, so I ask you to take the necessary measures.38 It should be noted that the Romanian representatives in Italy did not actively sponsor the pro-Romanian writings. Of course, they were happy to publish information on Bessarabia when asked by journalists but there were no payments made by the Legation in order to publish articles favorable to Romania, precisely because Duca was clearly against the campaign. However, the ratification question offered a good weapon for those who wished to use foreign policy controversies to weaken Mussolini. In a sense, the Bessarabian issue was more of a weapon against Mussolini than a manifestation of friendship towards Romania. A similar attempt was made in Japan, initiated not by the press but by members of another political party, when the postponement of the ratification was used in order to criticize the foreign policy of Baron Shidehara. Aloisi analyzed the Romanian political circles in April 1925 and concluded that the Bessarabian question was the main reason for the existing chill in RomanianItalian relations; a chill that could affect the economic interests of Italy in Romania: I do not think that for the moment any special demonstrations are necessary, but with the purpose of maintaining firm the principles regarding our Bessarabian policy, I find it opportune that, in order to clarify the situation, something favorable for Romania should be done in other field.39 Romania’s representatives also consulted with leaders of the remaining Italian opposition in an attempt to obtain the ratification. However, Don Sturdzo, one of Mussolini’s political enemies, blamed them squarely for the failure:

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As for the Bessarabian question he said, why have you been so late with your request? Italy would have ratified much more easily three years ago. But today I can see no possibility, none.40 Summing the result of his negotiations during 1925 Lahovary concludes: “After prolonged talks I came to the belief that, in the current circumstances, it is not possible to obtain, either directly or indirectly, the much desired Italian ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty.”41 Still, as he had clear instructions, Lahovary continued to pursue the matter by initiating new negotiations with the Italians and trying to induce them to ratify: Contarini declared: it seems to me that you have forgotten that Constantinescu has made a number of promises which have failed yet to became reality, and which were in a sense the preliminary conditions asked for by Mussolini. You must not think that we have been inactive since that time; it is just that our interventions could not greatly modify the Soviets attitude. I answered by showing him the great opportunities for investment offered by Romania, especially in mining and oil extraction, and gave him the example of French investments in Romania, suggesting the sending of an Italian economic delegation to Romania.42 In December 1925 the new Italian Minister in Romania, Marquis Durazzo, tried to defuse the situation. After a number of meetings with Romanian policy makers, he sent an impressive report to Mussolini, making a case that Romania was important for Italy and stressing the need to improve bilateral relations. He understood clearly, the same as his predecessor had, that the main holdback, in the Romanian view, was Bessarabia. In his report, Durazzo gave an excellent review of both the Romanian and Italian positions on the Bessarabian question: The Romanian arguments were: 1. The obligation assumed by Italy in signing the treaty; 2. By not fulfilling her obligation Italy is siding with Romania’s enemies in a question that is vital for Romania; 3. Assurances given by us in the past indicating that the ratification would come soon after solving the questions en suspens; 4. The grave consequences resulting for Romania from the postponement of the ratification — it only prolongs the situation existing in Bessarabia by the fact that there is no definitive sanction of Romanian rights in there, which can only serve the Russian attempts at disturbing the region; 5. Only if the Treaty is ratified by all signatory powers can the annexation

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of Bessarabia to Romania be considered on the same footing with the other territorial modifications made after the war, sanctioned by treaties; 6. The Italian postponement of the ratification represents one of the main arguments of the Bolshevik agents . . . in showing that the Romanian administration in the area is only temporary. The Italian arguments were: 1. The Romanian government should not understand our attitude as an unfriendly one; 2. The Treaty was signed when Russia was completely excluded from the European international community, but even when the Treaty is ratified by all the signatories it will have no practical value, [if that were so, then why did Romanian, British and French governments insist on the ratification?] while the ratification can influence our relations, which already have promising practical results, with Moscow; 3. Above all, Romania should understand that Bessarabia is and will remain under her possession, and should not believe the illusion that one international sanction can in any case change the situation, which is in the end a matter of opposed interests and forces and not one of rights that are more or less recognized by others; 4. I consider that it is in the interest of Romania and in the general interest of peace to postpone the ratification, because it could generate a violent reaction from Russia. 5. Because of its position in the Bessarabian question and of its good relations with the Moscow Government, the Italian Government has the best position to act as a moderator in the difficult Romanian-Russo relations. . . . I have to insist that, if we cannot repair somehow the still actual repercussions of the postponed ratification not only with the Government but also with the public opinion, we will continue to be practically excluded from any advantageous economic or political collaboration that we can hope for in this country . . . By continuing to postpone the ratification we will be in no position to establish profitable relations with this country. . . . Italy could give Romania an assurance, bound to remain secret, that in case of Russia opening the discussion over Bessarabia, whether by guns or only diplomatically, the Italian Government would offer Romania all the necessary support, both moral and diplomatic. . . . Mussolini could play the role of mediator between Romania and Russia in order to make them sign a non-aggression pact. . . . [and extend] an official invitation for the Romanian Royal Family to visit Italy and a great reception while they are there.43

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Durazzo’s Report had no effect on Mussolini, who simply answered that he might take the initiative for the non-aggression pact and that “as regards the visit of the Romanian Royal Family, it should be preceded by progress in the commercial negotiations or by some other concrete manifestation of goodwill.”44 As for the idea of mediating the conflict over Bessarabia, a leitmotiv of Mussolini’s diplomacy, it seems that he actually took it seriously and came up with a compromise solution based on the idea of self-determination for Bessarabia: that the Soviets should recognize Romanian sovereignty over Bessarabia, and the Romanian government should offer the greatest possible autonomy to the province, under the leadership of a General Governor named by a local Council.45 By February 1926 the Italian government suggested signing an Alliance Treaty with Romania, in a formula that guaranteed the Romanian borders.46 Although it failed to mention the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty, the Italian move seemed to signal a shift in policy towards Romania. Of course, it is possible that the main impetus behind this proposal was the news of the ongoing French-Romanian negotiations for an Alliance Treaty. Mussolini understood that, in order to counterbalance the French influence, he would have to come up with something. Still, Mussolini insisted, in his characteristic manner, that a commercial treaty should precede the military one. Although the Romanians were dissatisfied with the Italian draft, Mussolini took the opportunity to express his displeasure with the French-Romanian negotiations, arguing that it was unfair for the Romanians to play at two different tables at the same time (a peculiar complaint, given that Mussolini was constantly negotiating with both the Romanians and the Soviets). He claimed that an Italian-Romanian alliance should actually preclude a Franco-Romanian alliance.47 Since Romania was by no means willing to renounce to the nearly complete draft Treaty with France for a speculative one with Italy, the negotiations came to a halt. Not every Romanian diplomat agreed with the line suggested from Bucharest and particularly with the necessity of immediate Italian ratification. Illustrative in this sense is the opinion expressed by Langa-Rascanu, one of Romania’s representatives in Italy, in a report sent to Bucharest in May 1926: It will be a great deception to believe that the Italian ratification would solve the Bessarabian question or would lead to the establishment of RussoRomanian relations. Let’s suppose that Italy gives us the ratification. What would be the result — a freeze in Russo-Italian relations and an increase in the animosity of the Soviet government against us. Thus, no practical results. By contrast, the Italian ratification could postpone even longer the day of reestablishing normal relations with Russia. It would also generate a freeze in Romanian-Italian relations, as a result of Romania’s insistence. Our intervention in Rome would face increased difficulties because Mussolini would try to take advantage, especially in the economic field, of the recent

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break-off in Russo-British relations. Romania needs not Italian ratification but Italian mediation, because Romania needs not the Italian ratification regarding Bessarabia but the Russian ratification. And only Italy could reconcile us with the Russians and of course Mussolini would be very happy to elevate himself with this achievement. Still, the most difficult problem is to find a reconciliation formula between Romania and Russia.48 The Ratification Question. Second Phase, 1926-1927 During the second half of the 1920s, Italian foreign policy became even more aggressive and Mussolini’s hostile attitude towards the Little Entente more acute. His aim was to weaken or even liquidate both the Little Entente and the French influence in Eastern Europe.49 The best period for Romanian-Italian relations was during the Alexandru Averescu Government (March 1926-June 1927). Averescu, the hero of the Romanian Army, had close personal ties with Italy (he had studied at Turin Military School, his wife was Italian, and in 1926 he became a Marshall in the Italian Army), ties which would prove to have a powerful influence on the bilateral relations. It was in February 1926, before Averescu came to power, that Italy had proposed to Romania a treaty of alliance with the purpose of maintaining the territorial status quo. The Romanians had welcomed the Italian proposal and tried to use it to boost their negotiating position with the French. Analyzing the Italian proposal during a meeting with Austin Chamberlain on February 18, Nicolae Titulescu observed that it was motivated by the current impossibility of the Italian government to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty. He believed that the Italian government had committed not to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty and that, to the eventual reaction of the Soviets regarding the alliance treaty with Romania, Mussolini could answer: “It is a purely defensive agreement, conceived in the spirit of Locarno, which would come into power only in case of an unprovoked Russian attack”.50 But what was behind Titulescu’s remarks: did he have any firm evidence of the existence of a Soviet-Italian agreement on the Bessarabian Treaty (which had been clearly dismissed earlier by Cretzianu) or it was only an expression of his Italo-phobia? Initially, Mussolini insisted that the French-Romanian negotiations should be suspended but the Romanians refused. The French-Romanian negotiations did stimulate Italy to reach some accord with Bucharest, lest Romania slip completely into the French orbit; and Averescu was willing to balance his Francophile gesture by an agreement with Italy.51 Averescu understood that in order to improve relations, he would have to start in the economic field. Therefore, he sent Mihail Manoilescu, undersecretary at the Ministry of Finance, to Rome in June, where he signed an agreement regarding the consolidation of the Romanian war debt in Italy52 and accepted a credit of 200 millions Italian lira that Romania would use to buy Italian products.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province But Romania’s commercial concessions were not enough for Mussolini. Unhappy about the French-Romanian Treaty, Mussolini changed his projected draft Treaty with Romania, proposing in July 1926 only a Friendship Pact with a more circumscribed character than had initially been proposed. Although the Romanians were disappointed, Averescu agreed to drop the formula proposed by the Bratianu government — that Italy should guarantee Romania in its current (existing) borders. The political opposition accused Averescu of being unable, with all his friendship for Italy, to obtain at least a treaty similar to that proposed to the previous Government.53 Mussolini reiterated that he had no intention of damaging his relations with the Soviets because of the Romanians’ wish to see the Bessarabian Treaty ratified.54 Meanwhile, the French, too, were unhappy to see Romania negotiating with the Italians.55 Why did the Romanian Government not abandon the projected Treaty since, demoted to a statement of “Friendship” it represented a refusal to follow through on Italy’s de jure recognition of Romania’s borders, acting against Romanian interests in a vital question? There is only one answer: the Italophile Averescu was heading the government. Even though there was talk only of a friendship treaty, Cicerin expressed concern that a military one might follow. Mussolini had Manzoni, the Italian Ambassador in Moscow, declare to Cicerin that it was only an “absolutely platonic friendship treaty” and that a military treaty had been just signed between France and Romania.56 In August 1926 Averescu went to Italy, for private reasons, and also met Mussolini. By August 31, Mussolini had clarified his position on the ratification question and presented it to the Romanians a few days later: There is no doubt that a ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty by Italy would provoke a crisis in Italian-Russian relations, relations that have importance especially from the economic viewpoint, because the Italian economy needs raw materials. 1. The amplitude and character of this crisis cannot be determined. 2. Italy is not afraid of the crisis from the political viewpoint. . . . . 3. The problem is only from the economic viewpoint. The Italian ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty, of great importance for Romania, must be met by a counterproposal: 1. One of political nature, which should consist in an Italian-BulgarianRomanian pact or a Romanian-Bulgarian pact made under Italy’s aegis; 2. One of economic nature, which should be a written obligation from Romania to help Italy through whatever economic difficulties with Russia result from the ratification; 3. One of moral nature, which should be the obligation taken by the Romanian Government to introduce the Italian language into Romanian

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secondary schools. All this can be done by exchange of letters.57 Underlying Mussolini’s demands was the argument of the presumed Russian reaction, especially in the economic field (which did not prohibit him from requesting favors also in the political field). Still, as Mussolini knew that Italy’s commerce with the Soviets was more advantageous to the latter, who therefore did not have an interest to cut economic relations, we can fairly conclude that he was bluffing. Apparently the Romanians were less familiar with the state of affairs, so that by exaggerating the possible Russian reaction, Mussolini had another useful bargaining chip.58 While the Romanians had expected the second of Mussolini’s requests, the other two were something of a surprise. The most interesting of the three requests was definitely the first one, as it highlights one of Mussolini’s greatest dreams for the future of Central Europe and his over-estimation of his influence over both Bulgaria and Romania. The last request was easy to meet, and could have been of concern only to a hyper nationalist like Mussolini.59 Mussolini’s next step was to find out what the real Soviet attitude would be in case Italy ratified the Bessarabian Treaty and, like any good merchant, to find out whether they would be willing to offer him a better deal. Therefore on September 7, 1926, before the signing of Romanian-Italian Friendship Treaty, he asked Manzoni to make the necessary inquiries and gave Manzoni the necessary means to bargain with the Soviets: The treaty between Romania and Italy is ready; the difficult question of Bessarabia is en suspens for the moment and Averescu did not insist. But in the meanwhile I have come to the decision to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty if the Romanians offer a convenient counterproposal. . . . More than anything, this is a question of international sincerity. When a representative of Italy signed a treaty it should honor this signature by making the necessary ratification. It is possible to postpone it but the ratification cannot be avoided. Second, if Averescu goes back to Romania with my promise to ratify, it will be a great success and his political and personal position will be more powerful. This is convenient for us because Averescu is a real friend of Italy. In our relations with Russia there are verbal assurances but no formal obligations [regarding the Bessarabian Treaty]; the delay in the ratification was a proof of our friendship towards Russia but Russia has proven that it was not worthy. During the recent past Russia has intensified the propaganda hostile to the fascist regime [Mussolini was especially upset by the discovery that Russian diplomats in Milan had sponsored the Italian communist party]. The Italian ratification is an act of international sincerity . . . and would not change in any way the actual situation in Bessarabia.60 The important element is Mussolini’s mention of what he calls “verbal assur-

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Moldova, a Romanian Province ances” with the Soviets. At the beginning of 1924, when Italy recognized the Soviet Union, Mussolini needed to avoid any propaganda against his regime, both inside and outside Italy. His political enemies were the communists and, if a verbal agreement had indeed been reached, swapping non-ratification for non-disparagement, it was a great victory for Mussolini. According to a number of references in Italian documents, such an agreement was reached and this is supported by the facts as presented in the Cretzianu Report plus Mussolini’s willingness to act precisely when the Soviets broke their promise regarding the propaganda. Documents also prove that the Soviets had insisted on having a similar agreement on the postponement of ratification during their negotiations for the Basic Treaty in 1924 with the Japanese. Moscow did not show much eagerness to go back to the negotiating table; they answered that the Italian ratification would be considered a hostile act, which would provoke a crisis not only with the Bolsheviks but also with all the Russian people.61 Mussolini also tried to strike an agreement with the Soviets back in Rome. During a meeting with the Soviet Ambassador, Mussolini touted the sincere Italian friendship toward Russia and called for a similar friendship in response. He cited his reasons for disappointment with the Soviet attitude but still he showed himself willing to postpone ratification if the Soviets should offer a viable quid pro quo.62 No counterproposal was forthcoming from the Soviets. On September 16, Mussolini and Averescu signed the Pact of Friendship and Collaboration between Romania and Italy. The Pact had six articles of a very general nature; a Protocol by which the two parties undertook to develop mutual economic relations, a secret exchange of letters providing for consultation between the Military Headquarters in case of unprovoked aggression, and an exchange of letters by which Mussolini promised to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty were also annexed to the Pact. In Romania, the Pact had been amply criticized, almost the entire mass media speaking out against the idea of signing a friendship treaty with a country that was obstructing the consolidation of Romania’s international position by publicly postponing ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty. However, Averescu had a plan regarding that ratification; but he preferred to keep it secret from the media and many of the political leaders, so that only the King and Bratianu knew about it. In order to convince the King to approve the Friendship Treaty, Averescu told him that his move was based on the engagement assumed by Mussolini that, in case the Soviets should express any opposition towards the Friendship Treaty, he would ratify the Bessarabian Treaty.63 The above-cited telegram from Mussolini to Manzoni (September 7) argues in favor of the fact that, indeed, Mussolini promised the ratification to Averescu, although he did it in a very private and secretive manner. The international press gave different interpretations to the Pact. The Soviet reaction came only after a few weeks and took the form of a vigorous protest against the Pact and against the exchange of letters regarding Bessarabia. The Soviet Note, which was not anticipated, puzzled Mussolini. All the previous signals had sug-

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gested that the Soviets had accepted the Pact and had no special comments to make, particularly as Mussolini had done his best to draw it up in such a manner as to avoid any such comments. Mussolini instructed Manzoni: The Moscow’s protest and especially its tone cannot be justified and are inadmissible because, as an act of respect toward the Soviet Government and not without great resistance [from the Romanians] we made the Treaty with Romania without mentioning Bessarabia. The quasi-unanimous hostility with which the Pact was received in Romania because of this exclusion should be the best proof of the difficulty that we faced.”64 The Soviet Note caused the opposite of the intended reaction: Mussolini was simply infuriated and indeed decided to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty as soon as possible. His reaction bears out the supposition that indeed he had an agreement with Averescu. This is one of the very few examples of a failure in the Soviet strategy towards Romania: constantly raising the Bessarabian question at every possible level of propaganda. Although in the end this strategy proved successful, in the immediate aftermath of the Italian-Romanian Pact it harmed the Soviet interests. On the other hand, the three weeks that passed between the signing of the Pact and the Soviet reaction would seem to indicate that the Soviets were actually undecided as to how to respond, and that it was only after some internal debate that they chose to take the tough line. Mussolini was not ready to give up so easily. He made one more attempt to mediate the Bessarabian question: “He suggested to the Soviets a plebiscite under Italian control or an arbitration to be entrusted to a person favorable to the Soviets, like Nansen”.65 The Soviets rejected the Italian proposals. Soon after signing the Friendship Pact, Romanian-Italian relations enjoyed a balmy period during which the Duke of Spoleto, the Italian Royal Family, and Marshall Badoglio (the Chief of the Italian Military Staff) all made visits to Romania. Badoglio visited not only Bucharest but Chisinau, Bessarabia’s capital, where he declared in a public discourse, “My brothers . . . if there ever comes a day when you will be in danger, I will be together with you.”66 For many observers, Badoglio’s declarations announced a change in the Italian position towards Bessarabia, as they could not have been made without Mussolini’s approval.67 Even more, some Italian newspapers published a number of articles in support of the Romanian cause, one of which clearly stated, “the boundary of Bessarabia is the boundary of the Latinity”.68 In January 1927, Italy’s position improved as a result of signing the Rapallo treaty with Germany, and Averescu took advantage by reopening the ratification question. He argued that Italy was in a better position now to support the possible Soviet reaction.69 Mussolini’s answer proves his character once again and, at the same time, his misunderstanding of the real situation in the Balkan area. Mussolini simply repeated his old refrain, that the ratification would cause a break-off in Soviet-Italian relations, this time adding a new argument: the ratification would open

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Moldova, a Romanian Province an opportunity for improved relations between the Soviets and Yugoslavia. He also tried to win more time, stating that the treaty with Germany had to be ratified first (and that would require a few more weeks). Therefore, Romania should offer a counter-partite (one of Mussolini’s characteristic terms — contropartita), and should do so in the next few weeks. It would not be sufficient to make concessions in the economic treaty that is negotiated between the two. The counter-partite capable of compensating a break in Russo-Italian diplomatic relations should be an offer from Romania in the Danubian political sphere. Under the coordination and eventually with the participation of Italy, Romania should move toward realizing an accord with Hungary, on one side, and with Bulgaria, on the other. Only by realizing, under the Italian inspiration and guidance, a quadruple Italian-RomanianHungarian-Bulgarian alliance, can the Italian Government face easily the inevitable crisis with Russia.70 Mussolini had returned to his August 31, 1926, position. He dreamed of having Romania and Hungary on the same side, during peacetime, and less than ten years after a war in which the two countries had fought each other bitterly. Even in the 21st century, more than 80 years after the First World War, the two countries are in opposition. Mussolini’s plan was bound to fail. Romania could not join the camp of revisionist countries, when the basis of her entire foreign policy was to seek the recognition and respect of the new boundaries established by the Paris Peace Conference. Unlike Italy, Romania had no further territorial requests that would have the backing of public opinion. Mussolini seemed to have misunderstood the entire course of Romania’s foreign policy. Durazzo understood better, and clearly stated that there was no chance for improvement in Romanian-Hungarian or RomanianBulgarian relations in the near future. In fact, as explained by Alan Cassels: Mussolini’s game was to break the Little Entente, . . . by the detachment of Romania. . . . While Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were allowed to drift into Italo-phobia, all the eggs were put in the Romanian basket. As for the alienation of Russia by ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty, this was entirely satisfactory to Mussolini’s ideology. . . . By far the greatest departure from conventional Italian diplomacy in Mussolini’s strategy was the proposal to cut across the line between victors and vanquished by associating Italy and Romania with Hungary and Bulgaria. The entire scheme turned on Mussolini’s ability to convince Bucharest to follow this new and radical path.71 Averescu did not openly refuse Mussolini’s conditions, but he insisted on the ratification. He tried to appeal to Mussolini’s ego, declaring to Durazzo, “Mussolini’s

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word is more than enough for me” (referring to the ratification).72 Durazzo also insisted on ratification, indicating to Mussolini that all the Italian achievements in Romania, including some important economic contracts, had come as a result of Averescu’s friendship for Italy. As Averescu was confronted every day with the political opposition, his position (and implicitly that of Italy’s interests in Romania) was gradually eroding. Durazzo believed that the Italian ratification would bolster Averescu’s position.73 By early February, Mussolini had decided to ratify, but he preferred to wait for the end of the bilateral negotiations for a commercial treaty before making that public.74 On February 28, 1927, Mussolini asked Durazzo to secretly inform Averescu that he had decided to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty in the following days. Averescu responded, along the same lines as before: “[He] never had any doubt in Mussolini’s word.”75 The Romanians continued pressing for the ratification in Rome, insisting that there was no reason for new postponements.76 It is difficult to know how much weight to give to each of the possible reasons for Mussolini’s change of mind regarding ratification. There are quite a number of possibilities: the existence of the previously mentioned secret agreement between him and Averescu (ratification if the Soviets should protest against the ItalianRomanian Friendship Treaty); a real improvement in Romanian-Italian relations, particularly in the economic field; the prospect of transforming Averescu into a Mussolini of Romania (due to the illness of the Romanian King); the worsening relations with the Soviets as a result of the Soviet intervention in Italian politics; the ItalianFrench rivalry for influence in Eastern Europe; the improvement in British-Italian relations in tandem with the worsening British-Soviets relations;77 and the need to counter-balance the Romanian reaction to the improvement in Italian-Hungarian relations. On the other hand, how can Averescu’s action be justified: was he so Italophile as to be ready to sacrifice the Bessarabian Treaty in exchange for closer relations with Italy, or was he ready to sacrifice his political career just to have Italy ratify the treaty? The fact is that he did get Mussolini to ratify, and he did pay heavily for this: his party won only 2% of votes in the June 1927 elections and it was the end of his political career. Once Mussolini had made up his mind, another hold-up occurred. Mussolini wanted the ratification to take place only after Count Manzoni, the Italian Ambassador, had left Russia, so that the Soviet Government’s eventual protests would be addressed only to a Chargé d’affaires, thus reducing the political repercussions. Unfortunately, despite Mussolini’s urging, Count Manzoni could not leave Russia immediately because of illness and, as a result, the ratification was delayed for another month.78 The Bessarabian Treaty question had been well analyzed in a comprehensive memorandum prepared for Mussolini before March 7 by Guariglia, the Chief of the Department for Europe and the Levant in the Italian Foreign Ministry. The report confirmed that during the negotiations in Rome for the recognition of the Soviet Gov-

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Moldova, a Romanian Province ernment, the Italian Government had given verbal guarantees that they had no intention, at that time, of ratifying the Bessarabian Treaty.79 The Soviet Government considered these verbal guarantees as a firm obligation undertaken by the Italian Government. To assuage both the Romanian and the world public, Guariglia advised that Italy justify the delay in ratifying by citing her action seeking a mediated and peaceful solution of the Bessarabian question between Romania and the Soviet Union. Guariglia presented a good analysis of possible international implications of the Italian ratification: the UK Government would be pleased, because its own relations with the Soviets had taken a turn for the worse; France would also be pleased, because tension between Italy and Russia would create opportunities for French policy; Germany would remain neutral; in Yugoslavia there would be a higher tendency toward a rapprochement with the Soviet Union; and the biggest problems would be in Turkey, a country that feared possible Italian aggression and that would probably move toward closer relations with the Soviets. Therefore, he advised Mussolini to look for a way to use the ratification in order to improve ItalianBritish relations. Guariglia singled out the fact that commerce between Italy and the Soviet Union was more favorable to the latter, but also noted that Romania was not capable of replacing the Soviet Union as a market for raw materials.80 On March 7, 1927, Mussolini informed the Italian representatives overseas that the Italian Chamber would ratify the Bessarabian Treaty the following day, justifying the past delay by Italy’s hope to mediate an agreement between the two concerned parties. On the same day he also gave news of the ratification to both the Romanian and Soviet representatives in Rome.81 On March 9, King Victor Emmanuel and Mussolini signed the Royal Decree-Law for the ratification. On April 3, the Italian Senate ratified the Treaty. Finally, on May 23, the Italian Ambassador in Paris deposited the necessary instruments for the ratification. The Romanian reaction was enthusiastic to say the least, at all levels. The Romanian representatives overseas sent numerous congratulatory telegrams to Bucharest,82 and the Romanian mass media expressed the country’s gratitude towards Italy, taking the Italian ratification as a gesture of friendship and a prelude to much closer relations between the two sister-nations. The strongest reaction came, of course, from Bessarabia. Alexandru Averescu was congratulated by people from all over the province and was made an honorary citizen of some Bessarabian cities (Soroca, Tighina, Cahul).83 This moment (brief though it was) was a high point in Romanian-Italian relations. Meanwhile, the international press cast the Italian ratification in a different light, seeing it much more as a move closer to Great Britain and against the Soviets than as a move towards a closer alliance with Romania.84 In practical terms, this connection was caused by the continuing improvement in British-Italian relations (illustrated by the September 30, 1926, meeting in Livorno between Austin Chamberlain and Benito Mussolini85); and a sudden worsening in British-Soviet relations prior to the Italian ratification. This linkage more or less eclipsed all the other com-

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ments about the ratification. Still, the Italian press was very keen to avoid presenting the ratification as an act made in order to please Great Britain. The bulk of the press reported that, as a result of the Italian ratification, the Bessarabian Treaty finally had come into force. Even such a well-respected newspaper as The Manchester Guardian initially failed to realize that the Treaty still required one more ratification: “until Tuesday, the treaty was inoperative, because only two Powers had ratified it, and consequently there existed only a de facto situation. It is held, however, in certain quarters that Romania’s title to Bessarabia is now de jure . . .”86 By March 11, the Romanians had made the necessary correction, announcing that the treaty still needed Japan’s ratification. This was the moment when the attention focused on Japan’s position: The Romanian spokesman today explained that the treaty still needs ratification by Japan, the fourth signatory. They said that Italy’s ratification gave weight to the treaty, which already had been ratified by Great Britain and France, but the Japanese ratification was still needed in order to make it officially operative. The re-establishment of the Romanian Legation in Tokyo, from this viewpoint, is very significant. The Japanese spokesman here [Geneva] said that Japan has been awaiting definite action by the European powers before taking her position.87 The Soviet propaganda machine tried to follow the same path as in spring 1924 and to downplay the importance of the Italian ratification. Their best argument was to stress that Japan had no interest in ratifying the Bessarabian Treaty: Following the Italian ratification of the Bessarabian Protocol, despite the strenuous effort of Soviet diplomacy, the hope is expressed in political quarters here that Japan will continue to withhold her ratification. Japan’s attitude is of special interest because the Bessarabian Protocol requires confirmation by all signatory Powers before acquiring full legal validity, and Japan is the only signatory who has not ratified. In reporting alleged Romanian efforts to obtain Japanese ratification, Izvestia couples a warning that the Soviet Government would regard such a step as a definitely unfriendly act, and suggests that Japan cannot have any interests in connection with Romania that would suffer from nonratification.88

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Moldova, a Romanian Province The Aftermath of the Ratification In the end, Mussolini was unable to gain any new advantages from Romania as a result of ratification and he had to settle for the economic concessions he had secured beforehand. The only positive result he obtained after the ratification was that it partially offset the extremely negative effect produced in Bucharest by his Treaty with the Hungarians:89 soon after the ratification, Mussolini announced that Italy was negotiating with Hungary for a friendship treaty. He instructed Durazzo to explain to Averescu that the rapprochement between Italy and Hungary could be an element favorable even for Romania, a country encircled by the Slav race. Mussolini would persist in his plan of developing close ties with both Romania and Hungary, but the Romanians were quite unprepared for such a step. The Romanian press became quite vocal, decrying Mussolini’s plans and especially the Pact of Amity, Conciliation, and Arbitration signed with Hungary on April 5, 1927, in Rome. Although he had expected a certain reaction in Romanian circles, Mussolini was really displeased with the vehement attacks by the Romanian press.90 As a result, in a relatively short period of time, Romania’s enthusiasm for Italy decreased dramatically and soon after Averescu’s dismissal the political relations between the two countries were frozen again. When the Averescu government failed, Mussolini was convinced that it was because there was no sense for the Liberal Party to keep Averescu in power once the Italian ratification was finalized. In Mussolini’s words, With that ratification, Averescu gave everybody all that his sincere Italophilia permitted him to obtain. Once the ratification was achieved there was no reason to have a Prime Minister so pro-Italian; therefore, at the proper moment, he was dismissed.91 However, Mussolini was wrong again; his own minister to Bucharest clearly demonstrated in one of his reports that the reason for Averescu’s dismissal was related to internal politics and not the ratification.92 The ratification also impacted Italian-Soviet relations, although not to the extent that Mussolini had suggested would be the case. Throughout the entire period, Mussolini used the same arguments in an effort to obtain a better contra-partite from the Romanians: once Italy would ratify, Russia would sever (or, at least, decrease) her economic relations with Italy and would launch military operations against Romania. However, as the Italian ratification was not enough to make the Treaty come into force, the Italian ratification alone could not justify the Soviets in starting a war. Other than the usual value of a bluff, if successful, we must consider that Mussolini and other Italian diplomats were using this argument on the assumption that as soon as Italy had ratified, Japan would do so. As detailed in the next chapter, the Japanese had clearly stated in 1924 that they had no reason not to ratify, except for

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the fact that it was a European matter and that the interested European Powers should deal with it before asking Japan to intervene. Japan had never before failed to ratify a political treaty once it had signed it, even if it was quite damaging to Japanese interests, so that it was widely believed in some circles that the Japanese would ratify automatically. This presumption supports Manzoni’s and Mussolini’s fear that the Italian ratification would produce a diplomatic break off between Italy and the Soviet Union. The importance of the Italian ratification for Italian-Soviet relations is also stressed by Allan Cassels, who considers that: So long as Mussolini withheld it, and thereby also withheld Romania’s full legal title to the region, the Soviets would endure much at Italian hands and preserve at least the semblance of friendship between Moscow and Rome. But Mussolini was less concerned with ratification as a means of maintaining a tie with Russia than he was with ratification as a bribe to entice Romania to join his grand design in the Danube valley.93 The only flaw in Allan Cassels’s analysis, which leads him to somewhat exaggerate the importance of the ratification issue for Soviet-Italian relations, comes from his failure to read the Bessarabian Treaty itself. Cassels’s assumptions that “the agreement was not valid until ratified by three of the four signatories” and that “Romania’s legal title to Bessarabia awaited only Italian ratification of the Allied protocol of 1920”94 are equally mistaken and fit into a more general pattern regarding the Bessarabian Treaty. The weak Soviet response to the Italian ratification also shows that the ratification was not as important for the Soviets as it was believed at the time or as was argued by Cassels a few decades later. The Soviet reaction was quite far from breaking off relations with Italy, despite the latter’s fears. It was limited to the sending a number of diplomatic notes to Mussolini and a relative cooling in bilateral relations. Indeed, the reaction was much more connected to the moment when the ratification came than to the ratification itself. In March 1927, Soviet-British relations were at a dangerous level because of certain encounters in China. The Italian move to ratify was considered more as an attempt by Mussolini to get closer to Britain and to snub the Soviets than as a move in favor of the Romanians. Italy could anticipate two main international outcomes from ratification: a British-Italian alliance against the Soviets, or an improvement of Italy’s position in the Balkan area by creating a new system of alliances; the first proved to be the more important. The Soviet response was largely limited to propaganda, protesting the Italian government’s action. For example, during the fourth Congress of the Soviets, Commissar Rykov made a formal protest: In the light of this anti-Soviet campaign and this public bidding, the Italian government’s ratification of the protocol legalizing Romania’s seizure of a part

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Moldova, a Romanian Province of Soviet territory — Bessarabia — is distinctly significant. For a long time the Italian Government considered it unnecessary and untimely to ratify this protocol, but just now, during the anti-Soviet campaign, it renounces this point if view. With regard to the Bessarabian protocol and annexation of Bessarabia by Romania, we must say once and for all that no papers, notes, ratifications or affirmations have any significance whatsoever, nor can they have, unless the Soviet Government participates in them.95 And by July of that year, Soviet-Italian relations were back on track. Why was the Soviet response so muted? As has been mentioned, just a few months before, the Soviets had responded vigorously to the signing of the Friendship Treaty between Romania and Italy. But the situation had changed in various ways: 1. Because the Soviet Union was experiencing difficulties at that time with Great Britain, difficulties that led to a break in British-Soviet relations during May, it could not afford to break off relations with Italy. Even so, Italy’s ratification had been interpreted by the press in the sense of a possible Italian-British rapprochement, and was very well received in British circles. A strong anti-Italian reaction only would have fuelled an improvement in Italian-British relations. 2. During 1926, Russian exports to Italy were valued at an equivalent of some 300 million Italian lire, while the Italians exported to Russia only about 130 million worth of goods. The Soviet Government was restricting imports while trying to boost its exports, and Italy was an excellent market for Russian raw materials.96 3. The ratification’s impact on Romanian-Italian relations had not been as feared, because Italy’s action in Hungary gave a real blow to Italy’s popularity in Romania. This was obvious in just a few weeks, and it soon became clear that Italy would not be a new ally in Romania’s defensive system. In fact, realizing that as soon as Averescu was gone, the Italian influence in Romania was decreasing very rapidly in favor of France, Mussolini clearly switched his policy in favor of Hungary.97 4. The negotiations initiated with the Japanese Government on the Bessarabian Treaty ratification question indicated that the Japanese Government had no intention of taking the necessary steps for ratification. And the Soviets knew all too well that, while Romania was able to offer something to Italy in exchange for ratification, they had nothing to offer Japan — certainly, nothing that would stack up against Japan’s numerous economic and political interests in the Soviet Union. The Russian diplomats were very prompt and proactive, obtaining before the end of March a confirmation of the Japanese policy of postponing the ratification question. The Italian ratification not only presents a useful insight into the ItalianRomanian relations but also offers a good comparison for the Romanian-Japanese

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negotiations. Italy’s case is more similar to that of Japan than were the cases of France or the UK, due to the fact that, for both, ratification became a serious problem after their recognition of the Soviet Government. The most common element invoked by both Italy and Japan as a reason for delaying the ratification was their fear of Soviet reaction, specifically against their economic interests. Another similarity is that both Japan and Italy promised officially (more or less) to postpone the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty when they recognized the Soviet Government. The greatest difference between the two cases, in fact between the case of Japan and all the other signatories, resides in the fact that Japan had no real interests in Romania at all, so that there was very little the Romanian Government could do after 1925 in order to influence the Japanese decision.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Notes 1

Tomasso Tittoni, “Basarabia, Romania si Italia”, in Convorbiri Literare, 1927, p. 25. Tittoni’s pamphlet was first published in the aftermath of the Italian ratification. Tittoni was Foreign Minister of Italy in the autumn of 1919 and was one of the members of the Council of Ten and Council of Foreign Ministers. 2 C.J. Lowe, F. Marzari, Italian Foreign Policy, p. 160. 3 DDI, Serie 6, Vol. 2, Telegram Olivotto to Grazioli, February 25, 1919, p. 365. 4 In fact, there are accounts arguing to the contrary. According to Seymour’s account of events in the territorial commission, it was the Italian representatives that, after keeping silence for a while, came to the American representatives and told them that they had decided to support unequivocally the American-drawn border line in Transylvania and not the French or the British, which were more advantageous for Romania. C.Seymour, Letters from the Paris Peace Conference, p. 172-173. The Italian plan to weave the powerful Hungary into an alliance against Yugoslavia explains this position, particularly as the Italians might have realized that it would be difficult to diminish the French influence over Romania. 5 DDI, Serie 6, Vol. 2, Letter Sonnino to Fasciotti, March 3, 1919, p. 447-448. 6 S.D. Spector, Romania la . . . , p. 148. 7 C.J. Lowe, F. Marzari, Italian Foreign Policy, p. 166. 8 C.J. Lowe, F. Marzari, Italian Foreign Policy, p. 165. 9 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 9, p. 176-179. 10 DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 6, Lord Crowe to Lord Curzon, December 3, 1919, p. 489. 11 DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 1, Telegram Franklin to Mussolini, January 28, 1923, p. 296. 12 DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 2, Telegram Aloisi to Mussolini, November 17, 1923, p. 322. 13 DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 1, Telegram Franklin to Duca, January 26, 1923, p. 295-296. 14 Alan Cassels, Mussolini’s Early Diplomacy, p. 176. 15 A. Cassels, Mussolini’s Early Diplomacy, p. 182. 16 C. Iordan, Romania si relatiile internationale din sud estul European: 1919-1924, p. 91. 17 For details regarding the Italian recognition of the Soviet Union see, best, A. Cassels, Mussolini’s Early Diplomacy, p. 184-193. 18 The Romanians, when they decided to pay, offered only a 4% return on those bonds while the Italians asked for more, arguing that the Italian State offered a 5% premium for its own bonds. DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 3, Telegram Mussolini to Aloisi, April 8, 1924, p. 81. 19 Actually, because Bratianu refused to pay the Italian holders of Treasury Bonds, they asked Carlo Bazzi (of the Nuovo Paese newspaper) to initiate a press campaign directed against the Romanian government and Royal Family, which Bazzi did successfully, pressuring Mussolini to act on the matter. RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 191, Telegrams Rene Hesnard to Poincare, March 20 and May 3, 1924, c. 507, 512. 20 DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 3, Telegram Mussolini to Aloisi, March 5, 1924, p. 32. 21 DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 3, Telegram Savona to Mussolini, March 7, 1924, p. 37. 22 DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 3, Telegram Mussolini to Savona, March 20, 1924, p. 60. 23 RFMA, Fond 71/1920, R 6, vol. 46/6, Telegram Titulescu (probably) to Duca, May 20, 1924. 24 The Italian opposition was convinced that, indeed, Mussolini had concluded a secret agreement with the Soviets: that in exchange for the non-ratification, Moscow would influence the Italian communist deputies to split from the opposition block, which was boycotting the activities of the Italian Parliament, and to go back into the Chamber. RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 22, Telegram Cretzianu to Duca, October 25, 1924. 25 A. Cassels, Mussolini’s Early Diplomacy, p. 183. 26 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 22, Telegram Lahovary to Duca, March 19, 1924. 27 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 22, Telegram Duca to Lahovary, March 19, 1924.

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DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 3, Telegram Aloisi to Mussolini, August 5, 1924, p. 249. DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 3, Telegram Mussolini to Aloisi, August 14, 1924, p. 257. 30 At first, Mussolini declared that he intended to ratify the Treaty but that it was not yet clear what legal procedure should be followed (by Decree-Law, or by Decree). He told Constantinescu that he had suggested to the Soviet Government, in his name, to recognize the union of Bessarabia in exchange for the abandonment of the Romanian Treasury and the other existing Romanian valuables in Russia. RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 20 and Vol. 22, Resume of the negotiations between Mussolini and Al Constantinescu, September 5, 1924. 31 A. Cassels, Mussolini’s Early Diplomacy, p. 193. 32 On the other hand, the Volta Agency published a communiqué stating that Constantinescu did not obtain the Italian ratification. Ioan Chiper, “Italia si ratificarea tratatului din 28 octombrie”, in Revista Romana de Studii Istorice, 1992, No 2, p. 9. 33 For excerpts from the Romanian press, see DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 3, Telegrams Aloisi to Mussolini, October 14 and November 12, 1924, p. 324-325, 336. 34 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 22, Telegrams Cretzianu to Duca, October 25 and 28, 1924. 35 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 22, Telegram Duca to Lahovary, November 8, 1924. 36 DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 26, Telegram Dering to Lord Curzon, December 30, 1924, p. 474. 37 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 22, Telegrams Lahovary to Duca, March 10 and March 13, 1925. 38 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Telegrams Duca to Lahovary, February 20 (Vol. 21) and March 18, 1925 (Vol. 22). 39 DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 3, Telegram Aloisi to Mussolini, April 13, 1924, p. 518. 40 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 22, Telegram Ciotori to Duca, August 1925. 41 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 22, Telegram Lahovary to Duca, December 11, 1925. 42 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 22, Report Lahovary to Duca, December 11, 1925. 43 DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Telegram Durazzo to Mussolini, December 13, 1925, p. 143-147. 44 DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Telegram Mussolini to Durazzo, January 2, 1926, p. 158. 45 The information comes from a secret agent working in the service of the US Legation in Riga, but neither in the Romanian nor Italian Archives has it been possible to confirm it, at least not yet. Report Coleman (in Riga) to the Secretary of State, September 9, 1926, quoted in C. Iordan, Romania si relatiile internationale din sud estul european: modelul Locarno, p. 215. 46 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 191, Telegram Berthelot to de Billy, February 16, 1926, c. 528. 47 I. Chiper, “Italia si . . . ”, in Revista Romana de Studii Istorice, 1992, No 2, p. 11-13. 48 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 22, Telegram Langa Rascanu to Mitilineu, May 20, 1926. On the other hand, this position is expressed only after the Italophile Averescu came to power. 49 M. Adam, The Little Entente . . . , p. 296-297. 50 Telegram Chamberlain to Herbert Dering, February 19, 1926, quoted in C. Iordan, Romania si relatiile internationale din sud estul European: modelul Locarno, p. 160. 51 A. Cassels, Mussolini’s Early Diplomacy, p. 339. 52 C. Iordan, Romania si relatiile internationale din sud estul European: modelul Locarno, p. 189. 53 DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Telegram Durazzo to Mussolini, July 20, 1926, p. 286. 54 DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Telegram Mussolini to Durazzo, July 23, 1926, p. 286-288. 55 C. Iordan-Sima, “La Romanie et les relations Franco-Italiennes dans les années 1926-1927”, in Revista Romana de Istorie, tome XIV, 1975, No 2, p. 330, 336. 56 DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Telegram Mussolini to Manzoni, July 24, 1926, p. 288. 57 DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Note by Mussolini, August 31, 1926, p. 310. 58 In fact, as soon as March 1925 Mussolini openly admitted that the commercial treaty with the Soviets failed to bring startling results. A. Cassels, Mussolini’s Early Diplomacy, p. 192-193, 341. 59 A. Cassels, Mussolini’s Early Diplomacy, p. 341. 60 DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Telegram Mussolini to Manzoni, September 7, 1926, p. 315. 61 DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Telegram Manzoni to Mussolini, September 8, 1926, p. 317. 29

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DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Telegram Mussolini to Manzoni, September 12, 1926, p. 321. RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 191, Telegram de Billy to Briand, September 27, 1926, c. 578. 64 DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Telegram Mussolini to Manzoni, October 7, 1926, p. 351. 65 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 191, Telegram Herbette to Briand, October 16, 1926, c. 587. 66 Adevarul, Bucharest, November 19, 1926. 67 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 191, Telegram de Billy to Briand, November 13, 1926, c. 607-608. 68 Tribuna, Roma, quoted in DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Telegram Manzoni to Mussolini, November 20, 1926, p. 381. 69 DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Telegram Durazzo to Mussolini, January 7, 1927, p. 449. 70 DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Telegram Mussolini to Durazzo, January 16, 1927, p. 452-453. 71 A. Cassels, Mussolini’s Early Diplomacy, p. 341-342. 72 DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Telegram Durazzo to Mussolini, January 25, 1927, p. 459. 73 DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Telegram Durazzo to Mussolini, January 30, 1927, p. 465 74 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 191, Confidential Note from the Secretariat General (Geneva), February 11, 1927, c. 640. The mentioned note (signed by Clauzel) also states that the ratification is motivated by Italy’s policy of strengthening her relations with Great Britain. 75 DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 5, Telegram Durazzo to Mussolini, March 6, 1927, p. 52. 76 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 22, Telegram Lahovary to Mitilineu, March 4, 1927. 77 According to C. Iordan, Mussolini’s decision came as a result of an action initiated by the British Ambassador, Sir Ronald Graham, at the request of his superiors in London, under the influence of Nicolae Titulescu. C. Iordan, Romania si relatiile internationale din sud estul European: modelul Locarno, p. 292. Still, if this is true, some questions need an answer: why did Mussolini fail to follow the British example in breaking off relations with the Soviets (if British-Italian relations were so good), what did Mussolini gain from the British in exchange for ratifying (niente per niente must also apply here, but there are no British documents to indicate that they bought Mussolini’s ratification); why this sudden British interest in the ratification (they having abandoned the matter by the end of 1923); was Titulescu quite so influential in London and, if so, why he did fail to act sooner? 78 RFMA, Fond71/1914, E 2, Vol. 22, Telegram Lahovary to Mitilineu, March 30, 1927. 79 The Guariglia Report proves once again that, indeed, a verbal and secret agreement was reached between Mussolini and the Soviets regarding the postponement of the Italian ratification. And, according to Mussolini’s slogan niente per niente, he definitely received something in exchange from the Soviets. Therefore, as the agreement is confirmed by Italian official documents, it is mistaken to argue against its existence based on the assumption that all the affair comes as a result of the antiRussian bent of the Romanian press during the interwar period, as expressed by C.I. Stan, “Recunoasterea . . . ”, in Sargetia, 1995-1996, p. 424. 80 DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 5, Report by Guariglia to Mussolini, February 1927, p. 58-66. 81 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 22, Telegram Lahovary to Mitilineu, March 7, 1927. 82 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 22, March 1927, passim. 83 C.I. Stan, “Recunoasterea . . . ” in Sargetia, 1995-1996, p. 427-429. 84 “Italy Slaps Soviet by Bessarabia Deal”, in New York Times, March 9, 1927; also “Italy, Romania, Russia”, in New York Times, March 10, 1927. 85 C. Iordan, Romania si relatiile internationale din sud estul European; modelul Locarno, p. 122-124. 86 Manchester Guardian, March 10, 1927. 87 Times, March 12, 1927. 88 Manchester Guardian, March 21, 1927. For Soviet press see best Izvestia of March 17, 18 and 20, 1927. 89 A treaty with Hungary while still postponing the ratification of the Bessarabian treaty would have meant the end of any Italian influence over Romania. Mussolini was smart enough to give the Romanians a spoonful of sugar in order to make them swallow the bitter pill of the Italian-Hungarian Treaty, the first bilateral agreement signed by Hungary with any of the victors in the World War One. A. Cassels, Mussolini’s Early Diplomacy, p. 346. 63

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DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 5, Telegram Mussolini to Durazzo, April 11, 1927, p. 143. DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 5, Telegram Mussolini to Durazzo, June 7, 1927, p. 250. 92 DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 5, Telegram Durazzo to Mussolini, June 12, 1927, p. 263-269. 93 A. Cassels, Mussolini’s Early Diplomacy, p. 350-351. 94 A. Cassels, Mussolini’s Early Diplomacy, p. 182, 338. 95 Xenia J Eudin, Harold H Fischer, Soviet Russia and the West, p. 374. 96 T. Tittoni, “Basarabia, . . . ” in Convorbiri literare, 1927, p. 37. 97 During August, 1927, Mussolini took a position on the side of the Hungarian optants in their conflict with the Romanian State at the League of Nations, instructing the Italian representative at the League, Vittorio Sciajola, to back the Hungarian thesis. C. Iordan, Romania si relatiile internationale din sud estul european: modelul Locarno, p. 344. 91

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Japan’s great importance in the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty resides in Article No. 9, which stipulates that all the signatory states must ratify it in order for the treaty to come into force. In the end, Japan failed to ratify, and the Treaty remained moot. After all the efforts made by the Romanians (as well as the British and French), the Japanese handed the Soviets a victory. This obliged Romania to seek other diplomatic instruments to take the place of the Bessarabian Treaty; unfortunately, this search proved unsuccessful and, in 1940 or in 1945, they had to pay the price. Of course, it is arguable whether a valid international agreement would have stopped the Soviets, but it certainly would have made some difference to the attitude of the other Great Powers. The issue of Japan’s involvement in European matters during and especially in the aftermath of the Paris Peace Conference has been much neglected by scholars of Japan; instead, they have focused on the Washington Naval Conference.1 And, if relations with Western Europe (which is what most of the mentioned scholars understand by “Europe”) have been neglected then those with Eastern Europe (excepting the Soviet Union) have been ignored. The reason invoked for this “neglect” is simple: Japan was neutral and took no part in European affairs, particularly after the end of the Peace Conference. However, the Bessarabian Treaty question is only one example proving that matters were not so simple and that Japan, under the façade of neutrality, did indeed take an active part in European affairs. In order to ascertain Japan’s position, the author had recourse to numerous original documents in the Japanese and Romanian archives. As very little research has been done on the relations between the two countries during the interwar period, most of these documents remain unpublished. The Archives of the Japanese Foreign Ministry (or Gaimusho) show that the Ministry officials carefully followed the evolution of the Bessarabian question. There

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Moldova, a Romanian Province are many documents sent from Bucharest, the USSR, and many other places dealing with the Bessarabian question; every time something happened, the Japanese representatives overseas sent a report to Tokyo. Japanese interest was not limited to the Bessarabian Treaty; they collected all possible facts and data on Bessarabia (history, population, geography, economy) to aid their analysis.2 Nineteen syntheses (ranging from 15 to 80 pages in length) on the Bessarabian question were prepared; Gaimusho officials were keenly interested in the matter.3 In addition, two booklets on Bessarabia were published by Gaimusho in 1940. Six of the analyses were prepared during 1927 when, after Italy ratified, Japan remained the only signatory state that had not yet moved to ratification. The syntheses are fairly similar in structure and content; mainly, they describe Bessarabia’s history, going as far back as the Roman period, and emphasize the Russian administration and the events of 1917-1918. Also considered in depth is the drafting, the content and the implications of the Bessarabian Treaty (the Japanese translation of the Treaty being presented not once but seven times). Economic, demographic and ethnographic matters are dealt with in separate chapters, and are quite exact in data. The last topic in almost all the syntheses deals with Japan’s attitude toward the ratification up to the moment the synthesis was written. They also contain maps and some pamphlets on Bessarabia. One may distinguish three chronological phases in the Romanian-Japanese relations regarding the ratification problem. The first extends from the moment the Treaty was signed until the Italian ratification. The second period lasts until the end of 1932, when Nicolae Titulescu came to the fore in Romanian foreign policy decisionmaking and he decided to abandon the Bessarabian Treaty question. During this period Japan was the only State that had failed to ratify. The third period covers 19331940, ending with the Soviets taking back Bessarabia (plus northern Bukovina and the Herta region), during which there were no more attempts to obtain the Japanese ratification. Of course, one could also say there were just two phases: before and after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Japan.

FIRST PERIOD: 1920 TO 1927 Signing the Bessarabian Treaty The first period is characterized by poor diplomatic relations between the two states. In 1922 Japan opened a Legation in Bucharest, but for budgetary reasons the Romanian Legation in Tokyo was closed in 1922 (together with several others) and was re-opened only in 1927. During the Paris Peace Conference, Japan was represented in both the Council of Five and the Council of Ten. But during the Conference the Japanese representatives showed little or no interest in Romanian or Balkan matters (nor did anyone really expect them to, since Japan had neither economic nor strategic interests

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there). During the Romanian-Hungarian conflict, for a period, the Japanese representative even decided to leave the Council of Five. The Romanian representatives made no effort to lobby the Japanese delegation. As one of the Romanian delegates put it bluntly: “Japan? You can imagine how troubled she is on our behalf.”4 Only once, in November 1919, was the Japanese opinion asked regarding a matter concerning Romania. During the debates on the Ultimatum Note to be sent to the Romanian Government by the Peace Conference, the American representative, Frank Polk, in order to give more weight to the Note, asked Japanese representative Tetsuku Matsui, if he too was prepared to sign it. The answer was that he first would have to consult his Government, having no instructions on the matter5 (which meant, in fact, that he wished to abstain from that particular conflict). During 1920 Japan took part, as a member of the Conference of Ambassadors, in the negotiations for the drafting of the Bessarabian Treaty. But the Japanese participation was basically neutral; the Japanese representatives attended, rather than participating in, the discussions, and took no initiative. Regarding the negotiations for the Bessarabian Treaty, the documents in Gaimusho’s Archive simply record the events, present the Draft Treaty, the American opposition to any dismemberment of Russia, Romania’s proposed modifications and the final Treaty.6 The Japanese representatives had no knowledge of the exchange of letters (regarding the payment of special compensations for the foreign landowners expropriated in Bessarabia) between Romania and France and Britain. Even when the Italians found out about the exchange of letters later on, there still is no documentary evidence to show that the Japanese representatives heard about them.7 This is important because, as in the case of Italy, it could have served as a good argument to justify Japan’s continued postponement of the ratification before and especially after 1927. The first question that comes to mind nowadays (especially for a Japanese scholar) is why Japan signed the Treaty in the first place? Japan had few interests in the Balkan area and almost none in Romania. Why did not Japan simply follow the US example and avoid signing? Theoretically, it would have been easy for the Japanese representative to justify a refusal to sign the Bessarabian Treaty or, at least, so it appears from today’s perspective. However, as Japan signed all the other treaties prepared by the Peace Conference during 1919-1920, even if it had no direct interest in them, the answer is simple: Japan had to fulfill her Great Power “duty” of signing the Peace Treaties; and Japan shared with the United States neither the geographical position nor the willingness to stay out of world affairs. And indeed, in retrospective, at least in the case of the Bessarabian Treaty, Japan had something material to gain as a result of her acting as a Great Power. In fact, unlike the US, Japan continued to play a certain role in European politics even during 1921, getting involved in questions like the settlement of the Upper Silesia dispute between Poland and Germany. As stated by Viscount Ishii, the Japanese Ambassador to France, he “believed that Japan as a major Allied power should play an active part in solving this problem [of Upper Silesia] because Japan was free

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Moldova, a Romanian Province from direct interests in this region. He suggested that if Japan could settle this dispute, it could consolidate its future status and enhance its prestige”.8 Japan’s reasons for intervening into matters in which she had no direct or immediate interest can hardly be more clearly presented. Of course, there are plenty of additional possible reasons. The Japanese-British alliance of 1902 was still in place, Russia being one of the countries with which both had conflicts, and the British were the ones pressing hardest for the Bessarabian Treaty. The old strategic principle that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” seemed to apply in Romania’s case. It would be advantageous to keep some of the Soviet troops engaged at the Bessarabian border instead of having them sent to the Far East. The Treaty imposed no concrete military or economic obligations on the signatories (apart from Romania herself), so there was nothing to lose. And the visit made by the Romanian Crown Prince Carol to Japan in 1920 (the first European Crown Prince to visit Japan) might have had an effect.9 In fact, the Bessarabian Treaty was not the only one regarding the Balkans to be signed by the Japanese government. The Treaty establishing the borders in Central Europe, signed on August 10, 1920, in Sèvres, between Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, on one side, and Czechoslovakia, Romania, Poland, and the Serbo-CroatoSloven Kingdom on the other, would have been assessed in a similar way, from the Japanese perspective. Soon after Japan signed the Bessarabian Treaty, the international situation changed, to Japan’s disadvantage, at the Washington Conference of 1921. In that sense, the Bessarabian Treaty was among the last to be signed by the powerful and victorious Japan that attended the Paris Peace Conference. As time went on, all Japan’s plans regarding Russian territory had to be altered and the Japanese were forced to improve their relations with the Soviet Union. During the Washington Conference, the Japanese leaders came to understand that the Americans would oppose any further Japanese territorial gains in Asia, and they realized that, sooner or later, they would have to start negotiating with the Soviets to normalize relations. With that in mind, their interest in ratifying the Bessarabian Treaty clearly diminished; it only would have introduced new complications into the already troubled Japanese-Russian relationship. The “Passive” Period The so-called “passive” period goes from the moment of the treaty signing until the French ratification. During this period the Japanese refrained from taking any action regarding ratification. During the immediate period after the Bessarabian Treaty was signed, there was no pressure on Japan to ratify; nobody expected Japan to be the first State to do it. Quite to the contrary, Japanese officials became the target of White Russian propaganda. One memorandum, signed by Kroupenski, contains a plea from the White Russians in favor of a Russian Bessarabia.10 The Japanese Government

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adopted a passive attitude and decided to wait and see, keeping a close eye on events related to Bessarabia, and especially to Romanian-Soviet relations. They continued to receive notes and memos from both parties. The Russian interests were represented by the White Russians, who continued to be heard in Tokyo, and not by the Soviet Government. On the other side, in one of the few actions taken by the Romanian Government, by a Mémoire dated July 24, 1922, the Japanese were informed of the numerous military incidents at the Bessarabian border; but they were not asked to ratify.11 Regarding the Romanian action in Japan before closing the Romanian Legation in 1922, it must be said that the first Romanian minister to Japan, Nicolae Xenopol, died soon after arriving in Tokyo (at the end of 1918) and until the visit of Prince Carol, the Legation was actually unstaffed. During his visit to Japan in July 1920 (during his tour around the world — Egypt, India, Japan), Prince Carol decided to leave Colonel Nicolae Arion, a member of his retinue, as a temporary representative of Romania to Tokyo. Arion joined Prince Carol when he was already in Egypt, and he had a special mission. His instructions from Prime Minister Alexandru Averescu state, “You should search for all the necessary data in order to judge the financial situation of Japan and also try to speed up the opening of financial and economic relations between Japan and Romania”.12 Arion advised the Romanian Foreign Ministry on Japan’s situation and took the initiative in organizing some common business in which Romania would import certain Japanese products; but his efforts to mediate a bilateral transaction eventually failed. After arriving back in Romania, in January 1921, Arion presented a detailed report. He argued that the campaign he initiated had positive results, the Japanese businessmen showing interest in offering their products to Romania, and the difficulty lay in Japan’s mistrust in the Romanian modality of payment. He set up a Committee including a number of financial and industrial leaders through which he provided the necessary explanations on the Romanian economy and the opportunities for doing business with Romania. He also received guarantees from the Japanese Foreign Minister that a Japanese Legation would be opened in Bucharest during the following year, that a Japanese economic delegation would visit Romania (referring to the visit of the Japanese consul in Hamburg), and that the date of July 24 would be remembered as an anniversary day for the establishment of relations between the two States. Arion also took the initiative of giving a few suggestions regarding the future representation of Romania in Japan: Meanwhile I realized that Romania was totally unknown in Japan and that the first thing to do was to begin a propaganda campaign, by holding a number of conferences, publishing articles in the Japanese press, offering post cards and brochures. . . . The Japanese are waiting for the arrival of our Minister. Due to the expensive life in Tokyo it would be advisable that the Legation’s personnel be limited, only a minister and a commercial attaché, with no secretary, military atta-

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Moldova, a Romanian Province ché, consul. It would be wise to nominate a Japanese honorary consul in the main Japanese industrial and commercial centers. For Osaka I recommend Inabata, a businessman from Osaka, vice-president of Osaka’s Chamber of Commerce, who is personally known by Prince Carol and kindly helped me during the propaganda activity.”13 The Foreign Ministry took Arion’s suggestions and the Romanian Legation reopened in 1921, under the leadership of Edgard Mavrocordat. Little data exists on Mavrocordat’s activity while in Japan, and none of them mentions the ratification question. He probably continued the public relations efforts initiated by Arion. Whatever results he may have achieved, the Legation was closed in March 1922, exactly when it was most needed, without asking even once for the Japanese ratification. The first Power to ask the Japanese government to take the necessary steps to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty was Great Britain. During a meeting of the Ambassadors Conference on June 8, 1921, the British Ambassador notified the other Ambassadors that his Government was ready to ratify, and asked them to take similar steps so that all the ratification letters would be deposited at the same time.14 Ambassador Ishii asked for instructions from his government but all he received from Tokyo was a request to send a copy of the Treaty as soon as possible, and nothing more.15 As the British government did not insist on ratification during the following months, the Japanese government made no attempt to consider ratifying. During the March 15, 1922, Conference of Ambassadors in Paris, the Bessarabian Treaty came under debate as the French Ambassador asked the other Ambassadors to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty. Ishii informed his government of the French and British request16 and later of the British and Romanian ratifications, but he received no instructions on the matter. As the French Chamber failed to ratify in 1922, the Conference did not insist any more on the Japanese ratification. A new official inquiry into Japan’s stance on ratification came about one year later, this time from the US. On May 10, 1923, the US Ambassador to Japan, Hugh R. Wilson, made an official inquiry at the Japanese Foreign Ministry. The Japanese answer came after two days and simply stated that Japan had not ratified the Treaty.17 For Gaimusho, the American intervention was a simple question and they gave a clear answer; for the US it had a different implication: it gave them a green light to use the Bessarabian Treaty to justify their decision to merge the Bessarabian immigration quota with the general Russian immigration quota. The first Romanian intervention pressing the Japanese Government to ratify came in 1923. Taking advantage of the establishment of Japan’s Legation in Bucharest, the Romanian Foreign Minister, I.G. Duca, repeatedly asked the Japanese minister to press his Government on this matter, but with no success. The first time he officially invited Genshiro Nishi, the first Japanese Minister to Romania, to suggest his Government take the necessary steps for ratification was on October 26, in connection with the intensification of the campaign for the French and Italian ratifica-

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tions.18 Duca’s main argument was the plight of the Bessarabians, whose unclear international position was prolonged by the delayed ratification.19 The Japanese Government responded that it would take the necessary measures for ratification after the French and Italian ratifications, without giving any explanation.20 A new invitation for the Japanese Government to ratify came from the British Government in November 1923. The British preferred to ask the Japanese Government directly and not the Japanese representatives overseas. The British Ambassador in Tokyo justified his request by saying that: Difficulties have arisen with the Romanian representatives at the European Commission of the Danube as to the application of Article No. 7 of the Treaty regarding Bessarabia signed in Paris on October 28, 1920. The Romanian Government declined to be bound by this Article so long as the Treaty is not ratified by all its signatories.21 The Japanese answer to the British initiative was the same as for Duca; first, let France and Italy ratify and then Japan would take the necessary steps.22 Unfortunately, the Romanian Government was unaware of the British intervention in their favor and, consequently, was unable to use it to further press the Japanese. While Romania had almost nothing to offer to Japan in exchange for ratification (except for Romanian oil),23 it had enough to offer to Great Britain in exchange for common pressure on the Japanese Government. The fact that Romania had no representative in Tokyo at that time, and therefore no way to find out about the British request, meant that the possibility of leveraging British support in favor of the ratification evaporated. It should be mentioned that the term “passive” refers to the Japanese attitude towards the Bessarabian Treaty alone and not towards other treaties involving European matters in which Japan had no direct interest. A good comparison for the Bessarabian Treaty is that of the Central European Frontiers Treaty. Known also as the Treaty for the Establishment of Frontiers in Central Europe, the treaty was signed in Sèvres on August 10, 1920, initially by France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and Czechoslovakia. Later on, Romania (on October 28, 1920), Poland and Yugoslavia also signed it. Art. No. 3 of the Treaty referred to Romania but left out her border with Russia, as that border was to be covered by the Bessarabian Treaty. Great Britain, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia ratified the Treaty in 1921. On March 25 and April 22, 1922, during the Conference of Ambassadors, the British representative asked the other signatory states to take the necessary steps in order to ratify the treaty but, due to the Czech-Polish conflict over the Teschen region, progress was stalled. However, on May 2, 1922, Japan decided to ratify the treaty and even though it had no direct interest in it, during the next period Japan together with Great Britain would urge the other signatory Powers to ratify the Treaty.24

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Moldova, a Romanian Province The Ishii Note The correspondence received at the Japanese Foreign Ministry regarding the Bessarabian Treaty intensified in 1924 as a result of the French ratification. There are many reports regarding the course of events in France, the implications of the French ratification, the conflict between Poincare and Cicerin, the attitude of Italy, the Vienna Conference, the evolution of Soviet-Romanian relations during 1924, events in Bessarabia,25 reactions in press and so on. Reports on the Bessarabian question come from Romania, the Soviet Union and France but also from Poland and Czechoslovakia, so that we may gauge the Romanian-Soviet conflict as perceived by public opinion in those countries.26 The Ministry officials started showing interest in the Bessarabian question and, for the first time after 1921, a comprehensive synthesis on the matter was prepared in order to familiarize them with it. Once France had ratified, there were only two other ratifications pending, the Italian and the Japanese. The Romanians took steps to obtain both. The reasons for Italy’s hesitance were clear, but not for Japan’s. Although since 1923 I.G. Duca had been asking the Japanese minister to Bucharest to press his government on the question, it was only in the aftermath of the French ratification that a more serious campaign was launched. At first, Duca tried again to use the Japanese minister to Bucharest, Kumaichi Horiguchi, and took advantage of the bilateral commercial negotiations going on in Bucharest in order to ask him to intercede with his government, but to no avail.27 Romanian hopes for Japanese ratification were advanced by a rather unexpected event: the visit of Japanese Prince Naruhiko Higashi Kuni to Romania in early April. The timing of the visit was ideal for Romania: exactly when the Vienna negotiations broke down and Soviet propaganda was at its peak. The visit was part of a larger European tour by Prince Naruhiko and had been planned well ahead of the March-April events regarding Bessarabia, so the Japanese side was taken by surprise by the high level of publicity. Even if they had anticipated this situation, it would have been almost impossible to cancel the visit due to the reaction in Romania and in the international press, which would have colored it as a gesture of protest and a win for the Soviets. In the end, the visit produced only a propaganda coup. As stated by the French minister in Bucharest: “The visit had no political consequences; the Romanian officials hoped that the Prince, even as he was not bringing the ratification, would at least give some formal assurances in that regard, but Naruhiko avoided any conversation on political topics.”28 A few weeks after the Imperial visit, the German press was spreading a strange rumor: during the visit, a treaty of alliance directed against Russia had been signed between Japan and Romania, according to French instructions. The Japanese Ambassador in Berlin denied it, stating that Japan has no political treaty with any European state. Interestingly enough, for unknown reasons, Ambassador Honda blamed the Romanians for the rumor, although it could have come from others:

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Mr. Honda told me that this dubious information seems to be originating with the Romanians. He thinks that the Romanian government is very much preoccupied with the Bessarabian question. During conversations with Japanese diplomats accompanying Prince Naruhiko, Bratianu and the others insisted on the community of interest between Japan and Romania vis-à-vis the Soviet danger, with an insistence that was clearly hiding certain intentions. Because these apropos had no effect, the Romanian government tried to improve the people’s morale by giving the visit an ostensible political character when it was in fact only a protocol visit [answering Romanian Crown Prince Carol’s visit to Japan in 1920]. Japan is constantly represented in the German press as the necessary partner for France in order to realize, in collaboration with Poland and Romania, the encirclement of the Soviets.29 Duca understood that the Japanese representative in Bucharest did not have much influence on Japanese policy in general, and decided to go a step further. In April 1924 the Romanian campaign targeted Viscount Kikujiro Ishii, Japan’s Ambassador to France and one of the best-known Japanese diplomats.30 During the visit of the Romanian royal family to Paris, in April 1924, Ambassador Ishii had a number of meetings with I.G. Duca, Prime Minister Ion Bratianu, and King Ferdinand (April 12). The Romanians stressed the common fight against their communist neighbor, pointing to Romania’s efforts to reach an agreement with the Soviets, and insisted on the need to have the Japanese Diet ratify the Bessarabian Treaty.31 During April and May 1924, Duca kept pressuring Horiguchi, but this time he changed his tactic. He understood that his previous line of argument (the plight of the Bessarabian people) was not working and switched to something that he believed would be more effective with the Japanese: their pride. He maintained that by failing to ratify, Japan would dishonor her signature and consequently damage her international position.32 Following his lead, the entire Romanian campaign will focus on the damage to Japan’s international image that would follow non-ratification. This line of argument was bolstered by the fact that the Bessarabian Treaty was the first such treaty that Japan signed but failed to ratify. In fact, Horiguchi himself was trying to get a clear image of the Bessarabian issue, as demonstrated by the comprehensive report he prepared in May 1924, which makes much of Bessarabia’s history and her union with Romania, presenting the events not entirely from the Romanian view but from a neutral stand.33 As a result of the intensified Romanian pressure, as well as in order to respond to the Soviet campaign against ratification, the Japanese government decided to make official its position on the Bessarabian Treaty. This time Foreign Minister Matsui not only stated Japan’s position but gave a reason for it. On May 8, 1924, he instructed the Japanese representatives in Paris, London and Bucharest that his Government’s view on the matter was that, as the Bessarabian question was a European matter, it would be difficult for Japan to take any action before all the European

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Powers had made their decisions.34 According to his instructions, Ishii took the first opportunity to send a Note to the Romanian Foreign Ministry regarding the Japanese position on the ratification question: The Japanese Government has really no objections to the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty, except for the fact that this question is one of the most important ones en suspense in Europe, so it is difficult to take a decision before all the European powers, directly interested in the matter, have taken a decision regarding this subject. Also, the Japanese Government considers that since the mentioned Treaty could not come into force before the ratification of all the signatory states, the Japanese ratification would not be sufficient to solve the matter in question.35 In other words, until Italy ratified the Treaty, there would be no purpose in expecting Japan to do so. This was almost the same position as that adopted a few months earlier. In the meanwhile, because the French had finally ratified, Italy had become the only European Power still holding back. However, the justification given by the Japanese represents an innovation on their part, given they had supported the Central European Frontiers Treaty. In that case Japan ratified before France, Romania or Italy, and it encouraged the other signatories to ratify the Treaty. What made the Japanese change their position in the case of the Bessarabian Treaty was, most definitely, the Soviet factor. By the Ishii Note what had been unofficial became official. The Japanese had found a polite line of reasoning by which to postpone the ratification, while avoiding upsetting either the Soviet Union or Romania. They were, in a manner of speaking, passing the buck to the Italians, while keeping their image clean vis-à-vis the Soviets, the Romanians, and the other signatory Powers. And, with a little bit of luck (at that time Italy had good relations with the Soviets and poor relations with Romania) the problem might have been solved for the Japanese. We should also not exclude the possibility that the Japanese understood very well how powerful a weapon the ratification question could become in their negotiations with the Soviets, if the Italians should ratify — particularly since they had nothing to lose if the Italians kept on stalling. This maneuver strongly suggests that the Japanese were already aware of the Soviets’ special “weakness” regarding the Bessarabian Treaty. However, they did a small favor to the Soviet Union by announcing their decision to postpone the ratification. In Romania and in the other European countries, the Japanese note was accepted at face value, the Romanians considering only its good part: that Japan really had no other reason to avoid ratification except for her policy of non-intervention in European affairs. And the Note by itself did not bind Japan to the Italian ratification. The Japanese could, at any moment, declare that they are ready to ratify and the Note would not stop them from doing so. The real game was being played quite far away from Europe. In 1924, the Japa-

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nese-Soviet negotiations for the normalization of diplomatic relations were at an advanced stage. Since 1921 they had held a few rounds of negotiations, but with uncertain results. The fact that by the beginning of 1924 the Soviet Government had been officially recognized by three of Europe’s main Powers (Germany, Italy and Great Britain) and, before the end of the year, by France, certainly influenced Japan’s decision to improve their mutual relations. On March 19, 1924, a new round of negotiations begun in Peking between Kenkichi Yoshizawa and Lev Mikhailovici Karakhan, which would successfully lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviets and Japan in January 1925. Only days after the negotiations started, probably under pressure since the French ratification, Karakhan was already declaring that Japan should avoid following the French example.36 During a meeting on March 26 Karakhan insisted that Japan should not ratify because it would endanger the negotiations. And, in order to shore up his position, he used the mass media, presenting the Soviet position on Bessarabia during a press conference and also claiming that it would be highly inopportune for Japan to ratify. He knew the newspapers in Japan would publish his declarations.37 This was the beginning of Soviet Bessarabian propaganda on Japanese soil, propaganda that would prove quite successful in influencing Japanese public opinion in favor of the Soviet thesis. During May 1924, Karakhan kept pressing Yoshizawa on the ratification question (mainly by continually asking what was the Japanese position) so that, at one point, the Japanese government decided to give an answer to his requests. On May 24 Yoshizawa was instructed to present his Government’s position, that “until all the European Powers interested in the Bessarabian Treaty complete the ratification, the Japanese Government will not start the procedures for ratification.”38 Although that was the same as the position expressed by the Ishii Note, there is one important difference: the instructions to Yoshizawa clearly state that he should present the Japanese position in a verbal manner and not in writing. All the other documents in the Gaimusho Archives stress that the answer given to Karakhan’s request was verbal. The question is, why? Was it because there were no diplomatic relations with the Soviets or in order to boost the Japanese position at a later stage? The following salient points should be weighed. First, the Japanese expressed their position regarding the Bessarabian question directly to the Soviet representatives, in an official manner. Second, the fact that the Japanese position was expressed only verbally and not in a written form reminds us of the Italians, who did the same in February 1924, when they established diplomatic relations with the Soviets and Mussolini undertook not to ratify in exchange for a “contropartita” (counterpartite). Third, the Japanese could have argued that Yoshizawa’s statement was only an expression of good intentions towards the Soviets and not binding, at least as long as it was not followed by any quid pro quo from the Soviets. Fourth, as shown by later events, the Soviets were not completely satisfied with the Japanese answer and continued their campaign against Japanese ratification. The Yoshizawa statement, although it simply presents to the Soviets the Japanese position regarding ratification, was a clear step towards non-ratification.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province The Japanese action was motivated by their growing interest in establishing normal relations with the Soviets, which ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty would have jeopardized. Karakhan already failed once in the Bessarabian question (during the Warsaw Conference of 1921) and a second failure, meaning the Japanese ratification, would have clearly influenced the negotiations and not in the way wanted by the Japanese. And, once again, by 1924 the Japanese government realized that it had nothing to win by ratifying the Treaty, particularly as there was not much pressure on it in order to do so; it could only lose by arousing new tensions with the Soviets. Thus, the Ishii Note and the Yoshizawa verbal statement did not come as a direct consequence of the French ratification; they simply made official a position taken a few months earlier. The Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between Japan and the Soviet Union Of great importance to our topic is the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union in January 1925. At that time there had been speculations both in the press and in diplomatic circles that Japan had undertaken not to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty. Speculation went so far as to consider the Japanese non-ratification as proof of a possible Japanese-Soviet alliance against the interests of other powers in the Far East. Was there truth in these speculations? If we only consider that finally Japan failed to ratify the treaty, the answer appears positive. But if we consider the reopening of the ratification question in March 1927 by the Soviets, then the answer is no: there was no definitive agreement regarding Bessarabia. Why would the Soviet representatives raise the Bessarabian Treaty question again in March 1927, if they already had Japan’s secret agreement not to ratify? The Bessarabian question had been a topic in Japanese-Soviet negotiations since March 1924. After Yoshizawa gave his verbal statement, the next step for Karakhan was to get a written declaration from the Japanese that would confirm it. As the Romans used to say, verba volant, scripta manent. Unfortunately, few Soviet documents have been published on the Karakhan-Yoshizawa talks and this author has had only limited access to the Soviet Foreign Ministry Archives, so that it has not yet been possible to compare the Japanese account of events with the Soviets’.39 At first, Karakhan sought to have the Bessarabian question inserted into the general agreement. The best he could have achieved in that sense was that the Japanese government would have assumed an obligation regarding its recognition of the Soviet borders, including those territories disputed with other states. The Soviets tried to obtain the same from the British government but failed. In the Draft Treaty handed to Yoshizawa in May 1924, one of the articles stated: Each of the Contracting Parties agrees to annul, upon the signing of the present agreement, any treaties or agreements of any kind that may have been concluded between itself and third parties, prejudicing sovereign or territorial rights of the other party, or constituting a menace to the safety of the latter.40

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Had Japan agreed to this article, there would have been no possibility of Japan ratifying the Bessarabian Treaty. The Draft article proposed by Karakhan was clearly directed at Bessarabia, although not only Bessarabia, as the Soviet Union had other territorial problems too. The Japanese proposed a different Draft for the article: At the time of signing the basic convention both contracting parties should declare that neither had any treaty or agreement about a military alliance or a secret agreement, concluded with any third power, in violation of the sovereign or territorial rights of the other side or threatening the security of the other side.41 The Japanese draft limited the scope of the article; as the Bessarabian Treaty was neither secret nor a military alliance, Japan would retain the right to ratify it at any time. Karakhan attempted to revise the article in his favor on August 4, proposing another version to Yoshizawa, but Yoshizawa again refused to accept Karakhan’s terms. That the difference between the two drafts was directed specifically toward the Bessarabian Treaty is proven by a top-secret Japanese document that describes the evolution of negotiations regarding the future Article No. 4 of Protocol A in relation to the treaty. On October 9, 1924, Karakhan told Yoshizawa that because Art. 4 of the Protocol A did not cover the Bessarabian Treaty, he wanted a note from the Japanese side in which the Japanese would bind themselves not to ratify it. This was his only condition in order to accept the Japanese proposed draft of the article. The Japanese answered that they could not promise not to ratify. When the negotiations reopened after a two-week hiatus, October 24, Karakhan insisted again, declaring that the Japanese Government’s refusal to promise not to ratify would offend Moscow. Karakhan stated that Moscow would consider this not simply as a ratification question but as a sign of Japanese bad intentions (the same argument that the Soviets had used with the French and Italians). The next day Karakhan expressed his dissatisfaction with the Japanese answer and suggested, “We should make a secret document by which the Japanese Government indicates that it will not attempt to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty”.42 This proposal formed the basis for a future exchange of letters. What should be stressed in here is that Karakhan’s pressure came exactly at the time when the Bessarabian question was again on the front pages in Europe, this time as a result of unfolding events in Italy and of the Tatar-Bunar uprising. As previously mentioned, October 1924 was the peak of the controversy in the Italian press regarding the Italian ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty. In order to counterbalance a possible Italian move closer to Romania, a move that might have led to the ratification, the Soviets did all they could to prevent Japan from ratifying. On October 30 Karakhan handed to Yoshizawa the full text of the revised Draft Treaty, with all the protocols and notes. As for Protocol A, Art. 4, Karakhan

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Moldova, a Romanian Province said that Russia would accept the Japanese draft, but that he wanted the Japanese Government to indicate (in writing) that it had no intention of ratifying the Bessarabian Treaty. On January 9, 1925, Karakhan spoke with Yoshizawa again on the Bessarabian question. “I have the honor to bring to Your Excellency’s knowledge that the ratification of the said Treaty by Japan could not be construed by my Government otherwise than an unfriendly act.”43 Karakhan’s threat was nothing new. The Soviet Government had used it before with France — but nothing happened, as the Japanese were well aware. However, this time the Japanese decided to grant the Soviet request and to offer them a written guarantee. Still, they were unwilling to go as far as the Soviets requested and simply decided to bind their decision on that of Italy (meaning that they would not ratify before Italy did so). The Yoshizawa-Karakhan talks were supposed to be confidential. However, from time to time, both camps leaked information to the press. It is interesting to note that Karakhan did so in regard to the ratification question too. The first public information that connects the Bessarabian Treaty question with the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union was published on January 16, 1925, in The New York Times, when an article headed “Japan and Soviet Near Agreement” presented the text of the draft agreement between the two, as taken from the Japanese press by the newspaper’s correspondent in Tokyo, and noting that “Japan states that she will not ratify the protocol on Bessarabia, signed in Paris in 1921 [this is a mistake, it should be 1920] by the Ambassadors of four powers.”44 The New York Times article was based on information from Tokyo and not from Peking, where the negotiations took place. Since the Japanese Government had no interest in making this matter public, it is logical to assume that the leak was made by Karakhan. Aware of the implications of such information, he probably used one of the Japanese correspondents in Peking (the New York Times journalist took the information from the Japanese press, as I said, but the information got into the Japanese press through one of the Japanese journalists working in Shanghai – how can we say this in fewer words?), in order to keep up the pressure on the Japanese Government. The article does not say that the Japanese ratification was connected with that of Italy, as was actually the case, and this fact also points to Karakhan as the source. This interpretation provoked a powerful reaction in Romanian press. Soon after this article was published, the Japanese diplomatic circles denied having undertaken any obligation towards the Soviets regarding the Bessarabian Treaty. After signing the Basic Convention, Karakhan leaked new information regarding the secret exchange of letters between him and Yoshizawa: In an interview with Karakhan, the Soviet representative in Peking, he referred to his complete understanding with Yoshizawa, the Japanese Ambassador, that Japan would not ratify the inter-Allied decision giving Bessarabia to Romania. Although this was not in the text of the recent agreement, said the Soviet

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Ambassador, it was implicit in the renewal of relations between the two countries. He did not doubt it would be respected, as the understanding was as binding as if it had been written.45 Of course, the Japanese government again rushed to deny this information. Still, the press made one more interesting association: “In a series of declarations the Soviet Government expresses regret for the Nicolaievsk Incident and Japan agrees not to ratify the Bessarabian Convention until all the other powers have ratified.”46 In the Basic Convention, Article No. 4 of Protocol A used the wording proposed by the Japanese, but Yoshizawa had to make a certain concession to Karakhan regarding the Bessarabian Treaty. This concession was made in the form of a private exchange of letters that would be kept secret (out of respect for the Japanese Government’s considerations — avoiding adverse reactions from the other signatory countries and obviating any negative press that could portray them as unscrupulous merchants willing to bend international engagements in order to promote trade), on the day when the Basic Convention was signed. Finally, on January 20, 1925, the long-awaited written guarantee came from the Japanese side. In response to an inquiry made by Karakhan, in a letter addressed to Yoshizawa and asking for the Japanese non-ratification, the latter signed a letter on the same day, stating: Unless and until the said Treaty shall have been ratified by all the European signatory Powers, the Japanese Government has no intention of proceeding to the steps required for its ratification, considering that it deals with an essentially European question.47 The exchange of letters was both secret and private, and this is stressed in all the Japanes documents. That was for two reasons; first, that it was the wish of the Japanese Government to keep the matter secret quite from the beginning, given the reaction such an agreement might provoke overseas.48 Second, as a “private” letter, there was no need to make it public; and therefore the exchange of letters is not to be found among the documents mentioned in the Protocol of Signature made on January 20, 1925, between Yoshizawa and Karakhan.49 The private character of the letter means that it was binding only on Yoshizawa, as a private person, at least in the Gaimusho’s view. On the other hand, from the Soviet viewpoint, Yoshizawa was at that time the representative of Japan, having full powers to sign the Basic Convention, which means that he was representing Japan when he signed the letter (on the same day as the Basic Convention); therefore the letter could not be considered as having only a private character. The truth must lie somewhere in the middle. The exchange of letters was a compromise solution, made in such a way that both parts could claim a victory. Of course the Japanese representatives were aware of the Soviet interpretation, and vice versa. While Japan

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Moldova, a Romanian Province retained the liberty of ratifying if Italy should do so, Karakhan was able to claim that the Japanese had undertaken, in writing, not to ratify the Treaty. In actuality, it was only a partial victory for him because all he managed to secure was a written form of Japan’s previous verbal declarations, but the Japanese ratification was still tied to the Italian one.50 Bruce A. Eleman, one of the few scholars to study the Japanese implications of the Bessarabian Treaty, based his research mainly on Gaimusho’s Archives (his chronological errors would seem to indicate that he has never cast eyes on a single book on Bessarabia), argues that the exchange of letters was a “secret agreement”. In diplomatic and juridical circles it is considered that there are important differences between an agreement and an exchange of letters as diplomatic instruments. The signatories must ratify a written agreement, while an exchange of letters is not supposed to be ratified. In other words, a written agreement is a much powerful diplomatic instrument, clearly binding on its signatories, and that is not the case with an exchange of letters. In fact, Eleman tries to make a point not so much about the Japanese position on ratification as on the means used by Soviet diplomacy, namely that even while they were loudly proclaiming against the use of secret treaties, they were making full use of them. He comes to the conclusion that the KarakhanYoshizawa “secret agreement” is the first example of secret Soviet diplomacy in the 1920s. As the secrecy issue was explained before, what remains is the term “agreement” (considering that Eleman was referring to a written agreement and not to a verbal one, as he uses the exchange of letters as the agreement). Even Eleman notes the fact that the matter was later (after the Italian ratification) re-opened by the Soviet side in connection to fishery negotiations, but he fails to explain. If a secret agreement had been in place, why should the Soviets bring it up again? Eleman had no knowledge of the Ishii Note and Yoshizawa’s verbal statement, which radically change the circumstances, and therefore he jumped to his conclusion. Professor Shigeo Mutsushika (the only Japanese scholar who has attempted to study the Bessarabian Treaty question) also published the exchange of letters and he too considered the exchange as the reason for the eventual Japanese demurral. But Prof. Mutsushika does not consider the exchange of letters to be a secret agreement. He considers that the two letters are attachments or attached notes (fuzoku bunsho, in Japanese) to the Basic Convention.51 But in the Protocol of Signature of January 20 only one set of notes and one annexed note are mentioned, and there is no mention of the exchange of letters regarding the Bessarabian Treaty.52 If had been attached to the Basic Convention, as Prof. Mutsushika suggests, the exchange of letters would have lost at least the private character, which was clearly not the intention of the Japanese government. In this case, if the Japanese ratified before Italy did, that could be considered, in the Russian view, as encroaching upon the Basic Convention; the implications of such an encroachment are obvious. Therefore, the letters could not have been considered as annexed notes to the Basic Convention, which had by no means a private or secret character. Of course, from the Soviet view, presented above, this opinion is at least debatable but the fact that the letters were not men-

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tioned in the Protocol of Signature considerably weakens their case. Nevertheless, there is nothing new in the content of this document. The only difference was that now the Japanese position was made in a written form addressed to the Soviets. The Japanese Government in January 1925 used the same solution as in May 1924, when it answered the pressures coming from Romania to ratify the treaty, but this time in order to meet the opposite pressures and with different implications. The Japanese liberty of movement regarding the ratification was limited by the exchange of letters, as compared to the Ishii Note, but Japan lost nothing because it kept the door open. It did give the Soviets a small advantage over the Romanians, however, so that at least some of the anxiety generated by Japan’s latest move was justified. They had gone one step further toward non-ratification; and even in the event of a sudden improvement in Japanese-Romanian relations, the Soviets had a written assurance that Japan would not ratify before Italy did so. Considering only the Ishii Note, the Japanese could have simply informed the Romanian government of their decision to ratify without waiting for the Italian ratification. This alternative was no longer a possibility. The only problem for the Soviets could have come from Italy, and that is what in fact happened. When Italy announced her intention in 1926 to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty, the Soviets understood that the exchange of letters would not be enough to hold the Japanese back. At the same time, the Japanese understood that their patience was about to be rewarded. As previously mentioned, some international newspapers knew that the Bessarabian Treaty had been debated during the Japanese-Soviet negotiations. Two opinions had been expressed: first, that Japan would not ratify at all, and second, that Japan would not ratify until Italy had done so. The biggest reaction was in Romania, where the press made numerous comments connecting Japan’s delay in ratifying the Treaty with her de jure recognition of the Soviet Union. In order to respond to these allegations the Japanese Legation in Bucharest issued a statement to the effect that: The Japanese Government cannot perfidiously dishonor its signature of the Bessarabian Treaty and attributes the delay in ratifying to the fact that the Japanese government is still waiting for the European signatory powers to decide first in questions regarding Europe.53 Still, as can be seen, this statement did not contradict the rumors that the Japanese Government had framed the ratification as a secret stipulation of the SovietJapanese treaty, at least as regards Japan’s decision (or engagement) not to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty until all the other signatory Powers had done so. Although the Japanese government informed many of its representatives in Europe of the content and character of the exchange of letters,54 Romania’s diplomats apparently knew only what was published in the mass media. Even without the mentioned exchange of letters, the establishment of diplo-

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Moldova, a Romanian Province matic relations between the Soviet Union and Japan in itself weakened Romania’s chances of obtaining the Japanese ratification. While Romania had almost nothing to bargain with (except for its oil resources), the Soviets had plenty of “carrots” and “sticks” as well. It is clear that for the Romanian cause the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union was a defeat (albeit one that it could by no means have prevented). But even at this moment, Bucharest failed to grasp the situation; the Romanian Foreign Ministry officials were still dreaming that Japan would automatically ratify after Italy. The least they could have done was to reopen the Romanian Legation in Tokyo and to intensify the Romanian propaganda in Japan. Another significant episode related to the Romanian attitude towards the Japanese ratification came during 1924. A new round of negotiations for a Commercial Treaty between Romania and Japan took place, only to fail in November 1924.55 It was a lost opportunity to increase Japan’s interest in Romania. If the Romanian representatives at the negotiations had been more accommodating to the Japanese proposals, which were not in any case exaggerated, the Treaty could have become reality. Yugoslavia managed, where Romania failed. Theoretically, at least, by signing a Commercial Treaty Japanese interest in Romania would have been increased. Romania could have given something to Japan, as they did in case of the other signatories, although much less, and start building a base for a future offensive in favor of ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty. Unfortunately, nobody in the RFM saw the possible correlation between the Commercial Treaty and the ratification question.56 Also influencing the atmosphere in Bucharest in the aftermath of the Japanese recognition of the Soviet Union is the Gaimusho’s decision to replace the Japanese minister to Romania, Kumaichi Horiguchi. In fact, it seems to have been more than a simple replacement. Horiguchi was, at that time, Japan’s Plenipotentiary Minister for both Romania and Yugoslavia, with his permanent office in Romania. At the beginning of February 1925, Horiguchi officially announced that he was taking an unlimited leave. Surprisingly, he also announced that he was going on leave only for Romania and that he was removing his residence to Belgrade. He was to be replaced in Romania by a Chargé d’affaires (a lower diplomatic rank) who would have less authority. The justification provided by the Japanese Government for this action was ingenious. In 1922 the Japanese had opened their Legation in Bucharest, based on conditions of reciprocity. But the Romanians failed to open a legation in Tokyo, due to budgetary constraints (although there had been plenty of funds for Titulescu, who had the highest salary of all the acting foreign representatives in London). At first, the Japanese decided to wait until the Romanian economy recovered. By 1923 the Romanian economy was already coming back, and the Japanese expected to see the reopening of the Romanian Legation in Tokyo; but this did not take place. This was, at least theoretically, a perfectly valid reason for the Japanese to express their dissatisfaction and withdraw Horiguchi. However, the reciprocity invoked by the Japanese Government was first broken by the Japanese themselves, during the 1917-1922

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period (in which a Romanian Legation was operating in Tokyo). That Horiguchi’s departure coincided with the establishment of SovietJapanese relations was not lost on anyone. And if we think of the Italian example, with Mussolini taking steps against Romania soon after his recognition of the Soviets, the similarity is striking. Had the Japanese decision come at another time, there would have been probably no reaction; and in the end, the Japanese government decided that the replacement of Horiguchi was in fact not opportune and they kept him on as representative to Romania until July 1925. Still, the question of a possible link between the establishment of Soviet-Japanese relations and Horiguchi’s departure remains.57 However, it is true that Japan had been renewing its invitation to the Romanian Government to reopen its Legation in Tokyo, and it is an open question why. Did the Japanese Government want a Romanian representative in Tokyo at all, or was it only bluffing in order to justify Horiguchi’s departure? Did they feel that having a Romanian representative in Tokyo, promoting the Bessarabian Treaty, would give them some small leverage in their negotiations with the Soviets? In any case, the Romanians failed to follow through. How could they fail to appreciate the Japanese suggestion, when it was so desirable to secure Japan’s ratification? The need for a Romanian Legation in Tokyo was expressed in the press as early as April 1924, but the appeal had no practical consequences. The courtesy shown by the Japanese Government in maintaining its Bucharest Legation was also mentioned.58 Holland’s Foreign Minister, Mr. de Karnebeek, expressed this opinion for the first time in December 1925, during a discussion with the Romanian representative in Holland, P.P. Carp. He suggested that Japan’s stated motive for non-ratification was inadequate and that the real reason must be a different one. In his opinion, Japanese foreign policy was taking on a new, more aggressive orientation in the Extreme Orient against the other Powers engaged there (including Holland), based on a secret agreement with the Soviet Union; and one of the best proofs in this sense was the Japanese failure to ratify.59 This opinion suggests a possible motive for the US position on Bessarabia as well, namely the fear of Japanese expansionism in the Far East. The same fear existed, to a certain degree, in Europe. The idea of an alliance in the Far East between Japan and the Soviets must have alarmed many diplomats and politicians. De Karnebeek’s opinion proves once again the importance of the Bessarabian Treaty for the international community. The reaction in Britain after the Italian ratification would be another example in this sense. From the Exchange of Letters to the Italian Ratification The establishment of Soviet-Japanese relations evoked an official reaction from Italy, as well. On February 1925, the Italian government sent a note to the Japanese Ambassador in Rome, Ochiai, arguing that, as Italy and Japan had the same attitude toward the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty, if in the future one of them in-

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Moldova, a Romanian Province tended to take a step in this matter, they should communicate before taking such steps.60 The Japanese answer was: We said that we took the decision that until all the European states finish the ratification procedures we will not take any steps toward the ratification. But if interested European countries do not ratify, we will freely decide whether to ratify or not. So, we have instructed Ochiai not to go deeply into this problem.61 The Japanese answer seems to show the real position taken by the Japanese representatives. It is the first time they clearly stated that their ratification was not bound by the Italian one. In other words, they understood that the ratification might prove useful with the Soviets, sooner or later, and they wanted to preserve their right to use it even if the Italians never did ratify. The answer also indicates that the Japanese saw the exchange of letters as no real barrier to ratifying before Italy. On the other hand, it shows that the Japanese, although closely following the events in Italy, were unwilling to be influenced or used by the Italians in relation to the ratification. They were aware of Mussolini’s intentions in the Balkans and did not plan to play along. The Soviet diplomats had been very active in Japan. In October 1925, the Soviet Ambassador to Japan, Joseph Kopp, visited Baron Shidehara, Japanese Foreign Minister at the time, and handed him a memorandum in which he expressed the Soviet discontent over the Bessarabian Treaty question. He inquired once again about the Japanese Government’s attitude toward ratification and asked whether it would be possible to send a telegram to Moscow regarding these talks. The Soviet memorandum argues against the ratification and states once more the Soviets position: the Treaty violates important international human rights; its ratification would be a very unfriendly act towards the Soviet Union; the text of the treaty shows clearly the impossibility of its application at the present moment; the ratification of the Treaty would contradict Art. Y of the Peking Treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union (actually Art. 4 of Protocol A). The Soviet Government calls Japan’s attention to the uncomfortable effect that the ratification and subsequent activation of the Treaty would create; they hope that the illegal engagements of 1920 cannot be accepted by a State that formally recognized the Soviet Union, and suggest that the latter would have to consider ratification as impinging its sovereign rights.62 The Japanese answer was conciliatory: Regarding the Bessarabian Treaty, the Japanese Government will not go beyond the statement made in Peking. That statement is the secret and private letter from Yoshizawa to Karakhan. The Japanese Government did not promise to the Romanian Government that after the Italian ratification we would soon ratify. Even if Italy ratifies, the Japanese Government will decide whether to ratify or not only after a substantial study of this matter, so we will not ratify automatically.63

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The answer given to Kopp seems to be the opposite of that given to the Italians. Still, a new element comes into being: the interpretation given to the Ishii note (and to the Japanese declarations before and after January 20, 1925) by the Romanians, and not only by them, that the only reason for the Japanese postponement of the ratification was Italy and that, as soon as Italy ratified, Japan would do the same. It was widely considered that the Japanese ratification would come automatically after that of Italy. The Soviets had become aware of this interpretation and probed to ascertain what was the Japanese position. The Japanese answer was the one they expected, and expressed the Japanese readiness to negotiate with the Soviets if Italy ratified. In fact, the Japanese were simply showing the Soviets that, in the end, their readiness to ratify or not to ratify was a function of what the Soviets would be willing to offer in exchange. While the Soviets were sending official memoranda against ratification, the Romanians tried to obtain the Japanese ratification, but by using propaganda instead of negotiations. Relying on historical and demographic arguments in favor of Bessarabia’s union with Romania, they sent to Gaimusho a big map of Bessarabia and two books: La Romanie et les Provinces Romaines by Prof. A.D. Athanasiu (Paris, 1919) and Chronology of the Most Important Events in the Life of Bessarabia, by Ion G. Pelivan, former member in the Sfatul Tserii (Paris, 1920). The books expressed very well the Romanian argumentation in favor of the Union — a nice gesture, but hardly likely to outweigh the Soviet action. Unfortunately, Romania had little to offer to Japan in exchange for ratification and, even worse, she had no idea of the Soviet diplomatic action in Tokyo. Closing her Tokyo Legation seems, in the end, to have cost more than maintaining it would have done. THE SECOND PERIOD: 1927 TO 1932 The ratification question had the greatest implications for Japan in the year 1927. Japan remained the only state that had failed to ratify. Six out of the 19 syntheses on the Bessarabian Treaty question prepared at the Gaimusho were made that year, and three of them were among the lengthiest, proving that the Japanese government was studying the ratification question closely. In 1926 the relations between Romania and Italy improved quickly and in September a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Collaboration was signed, followed by the Italian ratification on March 8, 1927. Japan was now in a difficult position, having lost one more excuse for delay. If she refrained from the ratification, she would be going against all the official statements and declarations made previously by Japanese diplomats; Japan’s credibility in the international arena was at stake. But the Soviet diplomats (ironically, representing a communist country) knew that “everything has a price” in “capitalist” countries, and they made known their willingness to pay. While the Romanian government and the other three signatories were convinced that the Japanese ratification would come very soon, and automatically, their expectations were mistaken.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province The Japanese diplomats were not taken by surprise by the Italian move. More than six months had passed between the signing of the Friendship Treaty and the Italian ratification. By November 1926, the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow was already asking the Italian Ambassador what effect the Italian-Romanian Pact would have on Russo-Italian relations.64 The Gaimusho received a great deal of information regarding the Bessarabian Treaty question during this period, including numerous reports, articles from newspapers all over the world (especially from Italy and the Soviet Union), telegrams and memorandums regarding Bessarabia. Quite active were the Japanese representatives in Italy and Odessa (any article about Bessarabia published in Izvestia was translated and sent home). The Italian decision to ratify specified: “Japan declared that it will ratify the Treaty only after all the other signatory States ratified it”.65 In other words, in order to give more weight to their ratification, the Italians were the first to invite Japan to ratify. All over the world the press focused on the situation created by the Italian ratification, many of them pointing out Japan’s difficult situation while guessing that Japan would soon ratify, because she had thus far respected every diplomatic engagement she had undertaken. One such article stated: The ratification by Italy of the Treaty . . . leaves Japan the only signatory which has not yet ratified it and obliges the Government to make a decision on a somewhat embarrassing question, which it has hitherto postponed. Soviet Russia opposes the ratification and Japan has too many points of contact with Russia to risk having differences over matters that do not affect Japanese interests. Action has been delayed in the meantime till the adjournment of the Diet a fortnight hence, and this gives Ministers more leisure to come to a decision. The probable decision was indicated by Baron Shidehara, the Foreign Minister, in Diet recently, when he said that Japan had no vital interest in the matter and would be guided by the action of the European signatories.66 Among the first reactions to the Italian ratification coming from a Japanese diplomat and registered in the Romanian Foreign Ministry’s Archives was that of the Japanese representative in Athens, on March 16, 1927. According to the Romanian representative in Greece, Constantin Langa-Rascanu: “Japan’s Minister [to Athens] declared that his Government’s ratification would come without any doubt, the delay in the ratification being caused by the fact that Japan has the rule of not taking any decisions towards the European affairs while the European Powers have not yet pronounced themselves.67 Another reaction, more indirect, came from the Hague, where the Romanian representative P.P. Carp considered that, if Japan failed to ratify, the fears expressed by De Karnebeek would be confirmed.68 Based on Japan’s earlier declarations (indicating that it would ratify if Italy did so), the Romanian Foreign Minister, I.G. Mitilineu, announced officially on March 9 that Japan was now on the verge of ratifying the Treaty,69 and at the same time asked

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the Japanese government, through its representative in Bucharest, Kintomo Mushanokoji, to take the necessary steps. At that very moment Mushanokoji was doing exactly the contrary, expressing his personal opinion in a telegram sent to his superiors and asking them not to ratify automatically but to first analyze all the implications that such a move would have for Japanese foreign policy.70 It seems that he was somewhat concerned by what he heard in Bucharest, where the Japanese ratification was regarded as a certainty. His position shows the weakness of the Romanian campaign for ratification: if they were unable to convince the Japanese minister to Romania of the necessity for Japan to ratify, how could they imagine that they would be able to convince the Japanese government in Tokyo? The answer from Gaimusho came very quickly, and it was in line with Mushanokoji’s suggestion. The official position was that the Romanians had based their announcement only on suppositions, as there was no intention of immediate ratification due to ongoing negotiations with the Soviet Union — although the question was “receiving attention”.71 And indeed, that was the case, as proved by a Report called “Matters regarding the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty”, prepared by Gaimusho’s Treaty Department on March 11. The Report presents the positions previously taken by Gaimusho regarding the ratification, emphasizing the YoshizawaKarakhan negotiations, and carefully analyzes Japan’s choices after the Italian ratification. It identifies four such options, presenting the advantages and disadvantages of each one: to ratify; not to ratify; to remain silent; and to ratify after obtaining Soviet approval.72 Japan was in a tight spot. At a first glance, Japan had nothing to gain by the Bessarabian Treaty. If she ratified it, the Soviet Union would not simply swallow its displeasure. If she failed to ratify it, Great Britain, France, Italy and Romania would be displeased, as their efforts to resolve the Bessarabian problem would be nullified. However, Japan was less concerned with the reaction in Romania than in the rest of Europe, and tried to gauge what possible consequences her non-ratification might have for her relations with the other Powers. At that time there was serious talk of a possible confrontation between Britain and the Soviet Union. If Japan announced publicly her intention not to ratify, this could have been understood as a defeat for the British policy towards the Soviets, who would now be seen as having Japan as their newest ally. That would not be in Japan’s interest, and the Japanese Government tried to avoid any possible suggestion that it would not ratify. This situation explains the Japanese permanent insistence on postponing the matter while refusing to make any declaration stating that it would not ratify.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province The Ratification Question and the Fishery Negotiations At this moment, the Soviets took action to resolve Japan’s dilemma. The Soviet propaganda machine insisted that Japan had nothing to win from Romania, politically or economically, and that ratification would only damage her relations with the Soviets.73 At the same time they used the lure of the fishery negotiations taking place in Moscow (the sixth plenary session of the fishery talks) between Japan and the Soviet Union. In Tokyo, the Soviets’ representative Gregorij Bessedovskii (Chargé d’affaires ad interim since Kopp’s recall in June 1926) had a number of meetings with the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Katsuji Debuchi. The following account of negotiations is based mainly on documents in the Gaimusho Archives.74 On March 10, 1927, Bessedovskii visited Debuchi and the following conversation took place: Bessedovskii: According to the newspapers, Italy is about to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty. I was born in Ukraine and I have a high interest in Bessarabia, so I was very surprised. Even if Italy ratifies, I hope that the Japanese Government would not ratify because of the friendly relations it has with Russia. Debuchi: Two years ago, in Peking, Japan signed the Basic Convention with the Soviet Union. At that time, Japan promised that until Italy ratified it would not take the necessary steps for the ratification. This also means that Japan did not promise that it would not ratify after all the other European signatories finish ratifying. Therefore, Japan has a free hand for the ratification. But if Italy ratifies, we will be in a very difficult position because we have friendly relations with Russia. In fact, since this morning, we had a hard time with this matter. It is not clear yet what the Japanese Government should do; I cannot find an answer to this. . . . Debuchi: Gaimusho shows a very friendly attitude towards Russia and, during the last Parliament, as Bessedovskii knows, the Foreign Minister had such a friendly speech towards Russia that the Russian Government and the intellectuals were very pleased. Regarding the friendly relations with Russia, the Government and the intellectuals have the correct opinion, but the usual people offer many criticisms towards Russia, as you know. Some people attacked the government for the slow pace of the fishery negotiations, so if we cannot sign that treaty until the beginning of the fishery season this year, the fishermen are of the opinion that they will have to go fishing under the protection of military vessels. [He was referring to the crab and herring fishing season]. Japan has the idea that fishing rights on the Russian coast are a correct result of the Russo-Japanese war. So, if we limit the fishing rights [as asked by the Soviet Government during the Moscow fishery negotiations] it will be a violation of previous rights. Of course, we have to think whether this understanding is right or not, but if Russia will suddenly change its customs, the Japanese will have an unpleasant feeling.

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I wish that fishing along the Russian coasts might be open for Japan, considering every situation. If you fail to do that, it is only natural for Japan’s unpleasant feelings towards Russia to increase.75 Debuchi also considered that this was a good time to discuss other problems that were complicating relations between the two countries and told Bessedovskii that Japan was unhappy with some of the actions initiated by Michael Borodin in China, actions that could harm the Japanese feelings toward Russia. The Kremlin had sent Borodin to China in September 1923 as Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s chief adviser, with the purpose of stirring up a Chinese revolution that would bring China much closer to the Soviets. Although things did not go as planned by the Soviets, Borodin repeatedly came into conflict with the Japanese, who had every reason to wish that the Soviet presence and influence in China would be diminished. Borodin was the bestknown Soviet revolutionary in China, and he exerted a great influence over a number of Chinese warlords and political leaders including Chang Kai-Shek. Around the end of 1926 and early 1927 Borodin’s activities became more and more irritating to the Japanese government, threatening its position in Manchuria.76 In asking for Borodin’s removal from China in exchange for the nonratification, Debuchi seems to have overestimated his advantage, or he may have been ready to use the Borodin question in order to reinforce his position regarding the fishery negotiations (which in the end seems to have succeeded). More or less coincidentally, at the end of July 1927 Borodin and his staff did leave China;77 still, their withdrawal seems to have been related more to the failure to organize a Chinese revolution and create a unified China, and to Soviet internal politics, than to the Japanese request.78 The fact that during the subsequent Soviet-Japanese negotiations Borodin’s name was not mentioned, except for the Solf-Debuchi meeting of March 10, seems to indicate that the Japanese dropped this demand and that Borodin’s return to Moscow in July 1927 was unrelated to the Bessarabian Treaty. However, the fact remains that Japan attempted to use the ratification question in order to obtain a change in the Soviet policy toward China. Toward the end of the March 10 meeting, Bessedovskii told Debuchi that he already had sent a telegram to his Government about the fishery problem but they could not come to a resolution as yet, and that he also had asked his Government to stop supporting Borodin too. Soon after Bessedovskii’s visit, Debuchi had another guest who manifested interest in the Bessarabian question. The German Ambassador, Walter Solf (former Foreign Secretary during October-November 1918), came to see Debuchi and they talked about the Bessarabian question and the Chinese problem (regarding Borodin). According to Debuchi: I told Solf that the Japanese Government has not decided yet regarding the ratification, but the activities of Borodin’s group and the slow pace of the fishery negotiations are offending the Japanese feelings towards Russia. The German Ambas-

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Moldova, a Romanian Province sador answered that he understands perfectly well that Japan is in a difficult situation between England and Russia, and that Germany too has to face a similar dilemma of choosing between Russia and England.79 The document barely needs any comments. It is clear that Debuchi proposed, in an indirect manner of course, to solve some of the problems existing between the two states by compromise: Japan would not ratify (or would actually postpone the ratification) if the Soviets increased the speed of the fishery negotiations (by abandoning some points that the Japanese were unwilling to concede), especially regarding the opening of the fishing season for herring and crab, and stop helping Borodin’s group. He did not suggest the exchange explicitly because of possible later implications, but his apropos were quite clear. In a telegram sent from Moscow on March 22, Ambassador Tanaka describes his last meeting with Karakhan. When Karakhan brought up the ratification question, asking the position of the Japanese government, Tanaka told him (insisting that this was only his personal opinion) that the fishery talks and the ratification question should not be connected. When Karakhan answered that for him the two problems were clearly connected, Tanaka said that he did not care whether Karakhan connected them or not, but that his personal opinion remained unchanged.80 In the meanwhile the difficult fishery negotiations in Moscow started to bear fruit. On March 17, Stomoniakov, the chief Soviet negotiator, cabled to Bessedovskii that agreement had been reached on a series of problems, but there still were some important matters in disagreement.81 On March 18 Debuchi and Bessedovskii had a new meeting, the main theme being the stagnation in the fishery negotiations. Bessedovskii informed Debuchi of the latest developments. After their previous meeting, he had sent a Telegram to his Government and now he was in possession of Karakhan’s answer. Karakhan transmitted to Debuchi: It is difficult for the Japanese Government to state that it will not ratify the Bessarabian Treaty. The Russian Government understands very well this difficulty, but in order to show the friendly feelings that Japan has toward Russia, for the time being he would like the Japanese Government to make a statement that it regards the Bessarabian question as purely a European problem that is not connected with Japan’s interests. The Soviet peoples would welcome such a statement.82 Now the Soviets were not asking the Japanese government for a declaration of non-ratification but simply for a statement that it regarded the Bessarabian question as purely a European problem, not connected with Japan’s interests. The result would have been the same, except that the Japanese position was to be presented in a more “diplomatic” manner. Debuchi’s response was that the Japanese Government could not state whether it would or would not ratify the Bessarabian Treaty. He explained that, for well-known reasons, it would be difficult for the Japanese side to

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state that it had no interests in the Bessarabian question at that time. The same document also describes a meeting that took place at the German Embassy between Walter Solf and Bessedovskii, at which the Bessarabian question was discussed, both agreeing that it was difficult for Japan to make a statement on the Bessarabian question. The two also discussed the implications of the Italian policy toward the Near East and the Balkan area.83 It would be interesting to know how the Japanese were able to obtain reliable information so quickly on what was happening inside the German Embassy. On March 23 Debuchi was discussing the Bessarabian problem with Walter Solf. Debuchi commented that: . . . theoretically, the Japanese plenipotentiary had signed that Treaty and all European Associated Powers have already ratified, so that if only Japan fails to ratify, the Treaty will fail to come into force. And, as [he remembered], there is no example of a treaty signed by a Japanese plenipotentiary and not ratified later by the Japanese Government. So, there is no other way for Japan except to ratify the treaty. On the other hand, from the practical point of view, how to handle the Bessarabian question is purely a European problem. At the time of signing, the Russian Government was not included. Now Japan has already recognized Russia as a friendly nation so, if she ratifies, it will offend the Russian Government. This is not the kind of matter that we should decide quickly. The ratification question brings Japan a dilemma [giri in Japanese]. The Japanese Government should consider it very seriously and decide the course slowly. [This is already a concession made to the Russians, as everybody was expecting Japan to ratify automatically.] Therefore, we cannot answer now whether we will ratify or not.84 Next, Solf opened the discussion on fishing rights, giving Debuchi the opportunity to express his harsh feelings on the slow pace of the negotiations, caused by the new rules and institutions established in the Soviet Russia. Both agreed that Russia should make some more concessions to Japan regarding fishery rights and thus improve the friendly relations between the two countries. After describing the meeting, Debuchi made some statements in the same document: According to the talks it seems that Ambassador Solf has been paying serious attention to the Bessarabian and fishing questions for some time. He is one of those who insist that the four countries (Japan, China, Russia, Germany) should be connected by friendship. He asked about the problem of the East Manchurian Railway, over which there is a conflict between Japan and Russia. This time he heard that the two countries have different opinions about the fishery question and he hopes that smooth results will be reached. It is recognized that he advised

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Bessedovskii to solve the problem smoothly. Incidentally, yesterday [23], Ambassador Nagaoka [in Berlin] sent me a personal telegram. According to the talks he had with officials in the German Foreign Ministry, it seems that Solf had sent a telegram with the following information: “Debuchi told me that Japan will bargain the problem of the Bessarabian treaty for the fishery agreement. I secretly told the Russian Minister in Tokyo about this”. I have never said such words to Solf as described by him in the telegram and there is no way for me to say those words. Until now I have spoken to Ambassador Solf in a fragmentary way about the fishery problem and the Bessarabian problem. All the time I have shown him a “non-committal” attitude about the Bessarabian and the fishery problems. I have always insisted that Russia should accept Japan’s principal requests. He summed up these talks and sent the telegram to his country. This matter alone is enough to show how much attention the German Ambassador pays to Russian-Japanese relations.85 The German interest in Japanese-Russian relations is, of course, an important point; the Germans were interested not only in the said relations but in the Bessarabian question too. They had been following the events related to the Bessarabian problem quite closely everywhere that they had representatives.86 Their interest in the Bessarabian question is not surprising, in the light of their general policy towards the Balkans. Following the line opened by Bismarck at the Berlin Peace of 1878, the Germans were interested in preserving Bessarabia as a disputed territory between Russia and Romania. And, in 1927, it was the Soviets who were Germany’s allies and not the Romanians. Therefore, Solf’s action regarding the ratification should not come as a surprise. Of course, his main objective was, at least nominally, or in Debuchi’s opinion, to improve the Russian-Japanese relations, but the German policy regarding Bessarabia offered another reason for him to serve as intermediary between the Soviet Union and Japan. Another point of interest that comes from the above-mentioned documents is the influence Solf seems to have had on Bessedovskii.87 As a sign of goodwill, the Soviets announced on March 22 that the auction of fishery lots for the catching of herrings and crabs would be fixed as soon as possible, expressing confidence that the fishery convention too would be signed very soon.88 The date of the auction had not been established until that moment in order to pressure the Japanese negotiators to be more conciliatory, as the fishing season was fast approaching and no fishing would be possible without an agreement. This time, the Soviets made a real concession to the Japanese. On March 25 Bessedovskii visited Debuchi once again. Carrying a new telegram from Karakhan, he informed Debuchi that Karakhan, in spite of fierce opposition from the Ministry of Economy and Agriculture, had decided to accept the request of the Japanese government and, under the same conditions as the previous year, would allow Japan to fish in the same fishery lots. Debuchi expressed his satis-

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faction with Karakhan’s decision and then continued the talks with Bessedovskii on fishery matters that had not yet been solved. At last, Bessedovskii opened again the Bessarabian question, indicating that British-Soviet relations were delicate at the moment and that a Japanese move toward ratification would not be welcomed in Russia. He mentioned the Soviet-British relations in connection with the effect that the Italian ratification had had on these relations. Karakhan’s opinion, as expressed by Bessedovskii, was that: Now the Japanese opinion is moving toward opposition to the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty and [he is] very pleased. For Japan it is difficult to promise not to ratify and the Russian Government understands this very well . . . So, instead of promising that they will not ratify [he asked] if there is any possibility that, under certain conditions, the Japanese Government might promise the postponement of the ratification.89 Bessedovskii suggested that the postponement could be limited to a certain period, for example until the establishment of Romanian-Russian diplomatic relations. This shows a change in the Soviet position. The Soviets understood that a postponement that might last forever was better than nothing. As their main interest was to avoid the ratification at any cost, they realized that their objective could be achieved even without forcing the Japanese Government into the difficult position that could result from a public declaration of non-ratification. Debuchi: the Japanese Government is now considering the ratification question and they cannot commit anything as yet. But my opinion is that as long as you [Bessedovskii] are working in Japan, the Japanese Government should not ratify and postpone the ratification, under the condition that you will remain in Japan. [Bessedovskii thanked him for the compliment and smiled.] Now we can stop joking. Tell me what are the prospects for RussoRomanian relations in the near future. Bessedovskii: Actually, soon after the beginning of the European War, Imperial Russia took the Romanian National Treasury, equivalent of about 400 millions JY, which had been sent to Russia and taken [spent] by the Soviet Government. The Romanians require the return of the Treasury. But it is impossible for Russia to repay such an amount of money today,90 and there is an opinion within the Russian Government that they should offset the Bessarabian problem with the Romanian National Treasury. Probably, after two or three years, I think that the situation will be solved in this manner. It is really painful for Russia not to have diplomatic relations with such a country as Romania. Anyway, in the near future, we would begin talks with the Romanian Government.”91

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Moldova, a Romanian Province On May 24, 1927, Debuchi met Valerii Dovgalevskii, the newly appointed Soviet Ambassador to Japan, who said that he hoped Japan will not offend the Russian feelings in vain by ratifying, repeating that Japan had no interests in Bessarabia. On June 16 Prime Minister Tanaka told Dovgalevskii, “as regards the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty, Japan should be faithful to France, Great Britain, Italy and Romania, so at the moment I could not promise anything to the Russian side and I would like Russia to understand my position”.92 And the Russians understood, so that only a few days later, on June 30, the Soviets made further concessions to the Japanese on the fishery negotiations.93 Finally, the Fishery Convention was signed in Moscow on January 23, 1928. Before signing the Convention Cicerin declared that: It was the same thing all the time. We made concessions and the ambassador thereafter came and said that we must take another little step. Finally after so many efforts the treaty was concluded. It contains a mass of concessions on our part. The population of the Russian Far East is outraged by our concessions.94 Were the Japanese diplomats hoping to extract more from the Soviets by playing the Bessarabian card for as long as possible, or this was just Soviet propaganda? What the documents prove is that the Bessarabian Treaty played a part in the fishery negotiations and that the Japanese side gained certain advantages in exchange for postponing the ratification. Still, it did not lead to the immediate signing of the fishing Convention, seemingly because the Japanese increased their demands once more after June 1927, but it certainly speeded the reaching of an agreement. Debuchi and German Ambassador Solf also tried, although it seems without much success, to connect the ratification with the conflict in China between the Japanese and the Soviets over the activities of the Borodin group. These documents, as well as the fact that the Japanese Government postponed the ratification until it was too late for Romania, clearly show that there was an understanding between the two sides. It was definitely not put explicitly in writing, but a verbal understanding was reached, Debuchi promising to postpone the ratification. It would be difficult to pinpoint who initiated this solution. On the one hand, as the March 10 document shows, Debuchi was the first who tried to link the Bessarabian and fishery questions; on the other he insistently denies taking any initiative in this sense. It could have been the Soviets who first tied the two issues together, as suggested by Debuchi’s denial and by Ambassador Tanaka’s letter. At the same time, it might have come up through German efforts to mediate between Japan and the Soviets, with the purpose of keeping Romania in a bind regarding Bessarabia or with a more general plan for a German-Japanese-Soviet coalition. Either way, the agreement to postpone the ratification in exchange for concessions regarding Japanese fishery rights remains, and this author therefore has decided to refer to it as the Debuchi-Bessedovskii verbal agreement. A number of years later, Bessedovskii “defected” from the Soviet camp and wrote a number of articles and a book on his experience as a Soviet diplomat. Unfortunately, many of his comments are colored by personal feeling and bias and it is dif-

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ficult to distinguish the truth. For example, when he states that after a few months in Japan he was able to read the news in Japanese, he does more than stretch our credulity. He mentions the Bessarabian Treaty ratification question but fails to make any mention of his March 1927 negotiations with Debuchi. Even more, the only time he mentions the Bessarabian Treaty, he mistakenly states that the Treaty would come into force when three of its signatories ratified it (page 127 in his book). On the other hand, he insists on his friendship with Debuchi, describing him very vividly as “one of Japan’s most brilliant diplomats . . . he had immense vitality and vast experience . . . his logic was marvelous” (page 136-137). He also mentions a verbal agreement between him and Debuchi, an agreement that in his view was equivalent to a signed treaty, regarding a non-aggression pact between Japan and the Soviets (page 157-160) but makes no mention at all of the similar verbal agreement regarding the ratification. It is difficult to explain exactly why Bessedovskii makes no mention of the 1927 negotiations regarding the ratification. One reason might be that, due to his friendship for Debuchi, at that time (1931) Japan’s Ambassador in the US, he intended to avoid placing his friend in a difficult position (although the Japanese could have denied any implications). On the other hand, his statement that the Treaty would come into force if only three states ratified is even more puzzling, as he must have known what the real situation was. One further reason could be that, although he defected, he was still trying to protect the interests of the Soviet Union (in his book he directs his attacks at different persons inside the Soviet nomenclature and not at the Soviet system as a whole) and he understood that it would not serve Soviet interests to have the ratification question coming again into the spotlight. A few months after the March 1927 negotiations, the Japanese presented their new position on the ratification question to France, one of the European Powers directly interested in the Bessarabian Treaty: Japan’s Ambassador (Viscount Goto) told me that the Soviet government tried to obtain assurances that the Japanese government would not ratify the Bessarabian Treaty, but the Japanese government was unwilling to give this promise, neither was it intending to encourage the Romanians’ hopes for ratification. In Japan’s eyes, the Bessarabian question should be regulated one day by a direct agreement between Romania and the Soviets. Viscount Goto’s visit to Moscow has nothing to do with the ratification, his purpose here being related to the Fishery Convention and Soviet policy in China.95 Although Viscount Goto denied any connection between the ratification and the Fishery Convention, he clearly confirms the Japanese obligation taken as a result of the Bessedovskii-Debuchi agreement: that they would postpone the ratification at least until the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Romania and the Soviet Union (by that time the necessary and preliminary condition before reaching any bilateral agreement on Bessarabia).

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Moldova, a Romanian Province The Romanian Campaign for Ratification during the Ministry of Ion Aurel Vassiliu In the meanwhile, the Romanian Foreign Ministry had finally recognized that the Japanese ratification would not come automatically or for free. The first step they took was to reopen the Romanian Legation in Tokyo, informing the Japanese government of their decision on March 9, 1927 and asking their agreement for the nomination of Ion Aurel Vassiliu as Romanian Minister to Japan.96 In fact, as the new Romanian Foreign Minister, Nicolae Titulescu, stressed, one of the three main directions for the Romanian foreign policy was: To have even more cordial relations with the countries that helped us in achieving our national unity. Our gratitude towards the US will always form the basis of our policy towards the Great American Republic. The reopening of our Tokyo Legation shows our wish to cultivate Japan’s friendship.97 Having little enough to use as leverage, the Romanians’ main tool for encouraging the ratification was Japan’s moral obligation to ratify the Treaty. At every opportunity, the Romanian diplomats asked the Japanese what their Government was doing about the ratification. Of course, to appeal to a nation’s honor, with nothing concrete or material to support one’s claims, can backfire if used too much. And although there had been some speculation at the time, the Romanian side seems to have been totally unaware that the ratification was indeed being linked to the Japanese-Soviet Fishery Talks.98 A starting point for the Romanian campaign was a declaration made by the Japanese Minister in Geneva, M. Sato, who declared: “This is the first time that Japan does not immediately honor an international engagement . . . It depends on the activity and ability of the Romanian representative in Tokyo and on the understanding that the Japanese representative in Bucharest has about the solidarity of interests between our countries.”99 Unfortunately, Romania clearly failed in both places. Before going to Tokyo, the newly appointed Romanian Minister to Tokyo, Ion Aurel Vassiliu (unfortunately, not one of Romania’s best prepared diplomats)100 had a discussion with the Japanese Ambassador in Paris, Viscount Kikujiro Ishii. Ishii was considered to be supportive of the Bessarabian cause because of his role in the matter and, for this reason, Vassiliu decided to talk to him before going to Tokyo. He argued that: 1. Romania does not give the Paris Treaty a determinate character because that Treaty did not give Bessarabia to Romania. It is the decision of union taken by the Sfatul Tserii in March 1918 and the incontestable historical rights that are the bases of the Romanian rights. 2. Romania waited confidently for the Japanese ratification and still has no idea what are the reasons for the non-ratification. The public opinion too is

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very concerned because of this inexplicable delay, the Bessarabian Treaty being the only international act signed by Japan and not ratified yet. Twice Viscount Ishii signed the Bessarabian Treaty, the first time in 1920 on the original act, and second time on the Note sent in 1924 to the Romanian Foreign Ministry. Unfortunately the ratification of the Treaty remains on the international political market as a political bill made by Japan but with the signature still not honored. The answer given by Viscount Ishii justified the Japanese postponement of ratification based on the following reasons: 1. The difficult financial situation of Japan and the poverty of the northern Japan population that lives only from fishing and for the preservation of whom it was more than necessary to sign the fishery convention with the Soviet Union. [He was honest in mentioning the connection between the Bessarabian question and the fishery talks, but Vassiliu was unable to make the necessary connection.] 2. Therefore, because of Japan’s special situation vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, Japan cannot take any steps against the former. 3. For the same reason, it would be difficult to make the ratification question a popular one with Japanese public opinion. At the same time, Vassiliu answered Ishii’s inquiries about the economic results of the Russian manifestations at the preceding ratifications: “Threats followed by no actions, because Russia needs money and because all the Soviet missions are their principal centers of Bolsheviks propaganda.”101 Vassiliu ended his report with an interesting conclusion: “On the other hand, it is believed that the fishery convention would be signed in September. I doubt that the preparation of this convention is the only obstacle to the ratification.” He seems to have been gravely mistaken. From March 1927 the official Japanese position, at least towards the Romanians, would be that they would like to ratify the Treaty, the first international engagement that Japan had assumed and failed to honor, but that there were many unsolved problems with the Soviet Union and a deterioration in relations must be avoided. Soon after his arrival in Tokyo, the new Romanian Minister started his campaign for ratification. Unfortunately the events were such that he had to start his campaign on the wrong footing. One day before his arrival in Tokyo, on July 21, 1927, King Ferdinand of Romania died. According to diplomatic custom, before being officially recognized as Romania’s representative, he had to present his Letters of Accreditation, which had to be in original and signed by the King. The Japanese officials took the position that Vassiliu’s Letters were not valid anymore and they required that he obtain new ones signed by the Romanian Regency. Both Vassiliu and

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Moldova, a Romanian Province the Japanese representative in Bucharest, Kintomo Mushanokoji, argued with Gaimusho’s officials that the Letters might be easily reconfirmed by telegraph, but to no avail.102 Gaimusho claimed that this was a new situation for them, and that there was no precedent for admitting a confirmation by telegraph regarding a letter sent by one Sovereign to another Sovereign.103 Vassiliu was forced to ask his superiors to send him new Letters of Accreditation. In the meantime, Vassiliu continued to press the Gaimusho to accept the Letters he had, but they were unyielding.104 The RFM transmitted his new Letters by the longest instead of the shortest route, so that Vassiliu received them only on October 25, 1927.105 His disappointment is clear in his telegrams: “People have started asking me questions with an irony that I suppose you understand. The situation begins to take on an aspect of ridicule, which unfortunately is spreading not only over my person.”106 Finally, on November 9, 1927, Vassiliu was received by the Emperor and tendered the Letters of Accreditation so that he could enter into his full attributions as Plenipotentiary Minister and Special Envoy to Japan.107 In the end, the entire affair with the Letters of Accreditation cost Vassiliu three valuable months of action for the ratification but also introduced him to Gaimusho officials as a not very “sociable” person, even though it was not his fault, and surely delighted Soviet representatives in Tokyo, who were well aware of Vassiliu’s mission. More or less coincidentally, the only financial matter poisoning the RomanianJapanese relations came to light for the second time during 1926-1927. On March 2, 1918, a certain G. Kawaguchi, a Japanese citizen living in Vladivostock, had made a contract to supply the Romanian Ministry of War with 959 pounds of biscuits. Kawaguchi delivered the biscuits and the Romanians made the payment to the Petrograd branch of the Russo-Asiatic Bank of Vladivostock. But due to the war, the Petrograd branch seemed unable to transfer the money to Vladivostock and the Bank refused to make any payment to Kawaguchi. Kawaguchi complained to the Japanese authorities, asking them to intervene in his interest by pressing the Romanian government to make a new payment, this time directly to him. Soon after the Japanese Legation opened in Bucharest, the Japanese representatives started making the necessary interventions, but with no success. Although the amount concerned was reduced, the question dragged on until 1933. On September 22, 1927, the Japanese representative in Bucharest, Kintomo Mushanokoji, reopened the question by sending a detailed report to the RFM, asking for payment.108 I.G. Duca conducted the necessary inquiries and answered the Japanese request through a verbal note, stating that as far as the Romanian Ministry of War was concerned, the payment for Kawaguchi had been made. But, proving itself reasonable, the Romanian side declared that, in case the situation were such as described by Kawaguchi, he should return the check he had received as payment and the Romanian Ministry of War would analyze the situation anew.109 However, this was not directly connected to the ratification question, and the Japanese did not mention the Kawaguchi matter at any point during the Romanian-Japanese negotiations for ratification, so that chances are that the reopening of the Kawaguchi affair in 1927 was only a coincidence.

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The first place Vassiliu went in order to launch his campaign for the ratification was the Imperial Palace, where he met with Prince Higashi Kuni, the Emperor’s father-in-law,110 who had three years earlier visited Romania. But Vassiliu had no idea that the Prince held no political power, and came back empty handed. December 1927 was the peak of the Romanian campaign for the ratification. Vassiliu had a number of meetings with high officials from the Gaimusho, as well as with Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi. The Japanese tried to build a credible case against ratification, offering various superficial arguments to justify their attitude. The first meeting on the ratification question took place between Vassiliu and the Japanese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Debuchi, at Vassiliu’s request, on December 13, 1927. As presented by Vassiliu: Vassiliu: When is Japan going to ratify? Debuchi: Well, not at the present moment, because now we have too many problems under discussion with Russia. . . . The treaty was signed when Japan was not on friendly terms with Russia and, actually, had no relations at all with Russia. Vassiliu: Then, why did you fail to ratify it immediately? Debuchi: Italy only ratified after seven years. Vassiliu: Between Italy and Romania there had been some big economic misunderstandings, while the Japanese situation is not similar at all. . . . Vassiliu [concluding, the report, noted that] He knew nothing about the Bessarabian question, he used the words occupation and annexation instead of Union, above all he did not know about the existence of the RomanianRussian Commission on the Dniestr for dealing with border incidents.111 It should not be understood from Vassiliu’s comments that the Japanese representative knew nothing about the Bessarabian problem: this was the same Debuchi who had negotiated with Bessedovskii and he surely had read at least one of the many reports prepared by Gaimusho officials. Rather, his opinions were based mainly on the Soviet thesis. In other words, either the Soviets were way ahead in their propaganda in Japan or Debuchi was using the Soviet thesis in order to defend Japan’s failure to ratify. It is also clear that Vassiliu’s attitude during the meeting betrayed his poor knowledge of Japan: “I engaged the fight . . . I stopped and corrected him . . . I corrected him again”. This is exactly the wrong approach to take in Japanese politics, which is known for its tatemae or “under the table” way of dealing with problems, particularly when there is no mass media involved. Two days later, Vassiliu met the Prime Minister, Tanaka Giichi, and heard another denial regarding the existence of a Soviet-Japanese agreement dealing with the Bessarabian Treaty, this time from Tanaka. He asked Vassiliu to hold more talks with Gaimusho officials but to keep them secret, telling him that Japan could not ratify at the present moment due to its negotiations with the Soviets. Tanaka also

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Moldova, a Romanian Province said that he could not control the Parliament because his Government did not hold the majority of seats, so that even if he would propose the ratification, it would be very difficult to convince the opposition to vote in favor of it.112 Vassiliu’s talks with representatives of the Gaimusho continued, the Japanese presenting their main arguments for delaying the ratification as follows: 1. The special relations then existing with the Soviet Union because of the Fishery talks, Siberian concessions, and the Manchurian railways. 2. The different situation since 1920. Still, Japan had made no promise of nonratification to Russia, only stating that she would ratify when she liked. 3. The fear of Russian economic reprisals. 4. Japanese public opinion. Having long been prepared for a close friendship with the Soviets, they would not accept very easily an action directed against the Soviets, particularly one that it would fail to understand (as Japan had nothing to do with Bessarabia). 5. Italy had ratified quite late, after seven years. It would require much time and patience before the Bessarabian Treaty could be ratified. 6. The Japanese Government’s lack of a majority in Parliament. Other objections raised by the Japanese were related to the juridical validity of the ratification. If Russia considered the Bessarabian treaty res inter alia, why was she so firmly opposed to its ratification? And vice versa: the Treaty not being juridically accepted by the Soviets (meaning that they would not recognize the Dniestr border), why did Romania want it to come into force?113 And, trying to find a way to definitively vitiate the Romanian requests, the Japanese officials were as “ingenious” at one point, according to Vassiliu’s reports, as to declare that Japan had made a mistake by signing the Treaty. It would have been much better if Japan had followed the US attitude of leaving the European matters to the Europeans, because Japan had nothing to win from an involvement in European affairs. The parallel between the actions of Japan and that of the US towards the Bessarabian Treaty would be made again in the following years. Ironically, as argued in the next chapter, it was exactly because of Japan that the US not only failed to sign the Treaty but also to de facto recognize the union between Bessarabia and Romania. And, if the Japanese diplomats truly appreciated the US position, then what happened in 1938 when the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union, in a time of tense relations with the Soviets (and experiencing difficulties with the fishery concessions) suddenly proposed to the Romanians to ratify? The comparison with the US attitude was only dust in Romanian’s eyes. During the December 20, 1927, meeting, Debuchi added one more argument to his thesis: he told Vassiliu that until now Japan had only heard Russia’s voice and nothing from Romania.114 This was not far from the truth and highlighted Romania’s diplomatic default in failing to take concerted action to seek the Japanese ratification, and to do so especially in Tokyo. On January 1, 1928, Vassiliu sent a new telegram home, this time asking for a

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number of papers and documents related to Soviet-Romanian relations, which might help him raise doubts among the Japanese as to how much importance the Soviets ascribed to the ratification. The comments written on the telegram by a staff member in the RFM (N. Stoica) are significant: “Then, did Mr. Vassiliu go to Tokyo with only a tourist manual in his luggage?”115 However, in response to Vassiliu’s request, the RFM sent him a number of books and brochures on Bessarabia and SovietRomanian relations in February. The Romanian campaign was not limited to Tokyo, the Romanians also trying to pressure the Japanese Minister to Bucharest, Kintomo Mushanokoji, into influencing his government in favor of the ratification. However, the effort fared no better than in Tokyo, as proven by the January 18, 1928, meeting between Mushanokoji and I.G. Duca, at that time Home Affairs Minister.116 Duca expressed his regret that Japan had prolonged the ratification for so long after that of Italy’s and he asked when Japan would fulfill her international duty. Unfortunately, as the Japanese document states, Duca asked this question “with ironic sarcasm”. The answer Duca received from Mushanokoji is thus predictably frosty: Japanese foreign policy does not consist of Japanese-Romanian relations alone; bear in mind that Japan has relations with the Soviet Union and all other important states and also has domestic affairs. If you do so, you will understand that this problem is not so easy for us as you see it. And you have already worked a long period of time for the Romanian Foreign Ministry, so you should have the necessary experience to understand that it is not easy at all to solve one foreign issue because of the influence it has over both domestic affairs and relations with third countries.117 Which provoked Mushanokoji more: Duca’s irony, the Romanians’ persistence on the matter, or the fact that Duca was in the right? Surprisingly, although the way in which Mushanokoji (a middle-ranking official in Gaimusho) addressed Duca, a Foreign Minister and one of the most important Romanian political figures, might be considered from the standpoint of diplomatic conduct (as well as Japanese customs) as quite impolite, his superiors did not disavow his action. What remains from this incident, about which Duca took great care to avoid any mention, is the fact that the RFM proved unable to convince the Japanese representatives in Romania of how necessary the ratification was for Romania; even more, it seems that they could not even induce those representatives to take a friendly attitude towards Romania. Under such conditions, the failure of the Romanian campaign in Tokyo does not come as a surprise at all. After the December 1927 meetings, Vassiliu understood that there was no chance of obtaining the Japanese ratification anytime soon, and that he had to set to work at the propaganda level. He thought one good approach would be to diminish Japan’s assessment of the value the Soviets would give to the ratification, and convince the Japanese that the Russians would not be overly offended if Japan ratified.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Of course, he had no idea how important the friendship of the Soviets was for the Japanese. He decided to start with what he could achieve easily, to make known in Japan that Bessarabia’s Union with Romania was justified by both history and demography. In March 1928, at Duca’s request,118 Vassiliu analyzed how the results of the recent elections in Japan would influence the attitude of the Japanese Government towards ratification. Vassiliu considered that: Regarding the Bessarabian question, the political situation after the elections has, for the moment, no immediate positive or negative influence. And this is especially so because it is not the Parliament that would be called to ratify but the Privy Council. I have targeted my activity especially towards the most influential personality in the Privy Council [perhaps Prince Saionji] . . . Because of the difficult situation that I found here, I had to choose the path of close personal relations and to avoid firm action in order not to receive an open refusal. . . . I have acting against me not only a pro-Russian policy, based on economic reasons, but the Soviet Embassy too, with an official staff of 14 persons that organizes anti-Romanian propaganda.119 From the telegram we can see that by March 1928 Vassiliu understood that he had no chance of obtaining the ratification and was already trying to justify his future inactivity on the ratification front: because of the risk of an open refusal, and more efficient Soviet propaganda. In the same telegram he asks once again to have the public relations material sent to him. “I have with me no publication on Bessarabia;” to which his colleagues at the RFM have replied, in the margins, “Way to go, rookie” [Bravos, bobocule in Romanian] and from Duca himself, “I am surprised that, knowing that the Bessarabian question is the main aim of your mission in Japan, you left without the necessary instruments in order to defend this great national interest”.120 On March 16, 1928 Vassiliu met again with Debuchi. His conclusion was: “Because of the unclear political situation resulting after the elections, the Bessarabian question requires a new postponement and further patience.”121 Here, he is contradicting himself. In the preceding report he states that it was not the Parliament that would decide whether to ratify but the Privy Council, which is not elected. Which is right? At the end of May 1928, Vassiliu gave a comprehensive report on his activity in Japan. He presented again his tactic and the main arguments used during the bilateral negotiations, coming again to his March conclusion that the Japanese ratification risked being blocked by a non-possumus. He also observes, [That:] 1. The Government is taking the Bessarabian question into serious consideration.

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2.

No commitment had been made by Japan toward the Soviets to not ratify. The ratification will be done, but it is not known when because of Japan’s special interests in China, Siberia, and Manchuria and because of governmental instability. The same reasons made Japan avoid taking harsh actions against the communist threat inside Japan. . . . All my attention is now focused toward the least problem that could come up in Russo-Japanese relations and, on the other hand, toward the difficulties that Japan could face in China and Manchuria, regarding which Romania, as a member of the League of Nations’ Council, might someday have an important word to say.122 After almost one year in Japan, he finally came up with something that could, given certain conditions, help the Romanian cause, although it would mean passing the ball to other Romanian representatives overseas. In hindsight we can say that his anticipations proved correct in this respect and that Romania could have played an important role during the League of Nations debates over the 1931-1932 SinoJapanese conflicts. However, when this happened Titulescu failed to use the occasion in order to press for Japanese ratification. Unfortunately, this was the only really promising idea, and not necessarily an original one, that Vassiliu offered on how to change the Japanese position. The only answer he received from Bucharest indicates the kind of support he received from the RFM during his campaign: “We will immediately send the new documents asked for. I regret the length of this expensive telegram. When Mr. Titulescu comes back you will receive the necessary instructions.”123 On a different plane, one suggestion made by the Romanian representative in Poland, G. Davidescu, in April 1929, seems interesting: “Because of the current tension between Japan and Russia provoked by the problem of fishing in Soviet waters, a new test in Tokyo regarding the question interesting us [Bessarabia] could have a positive result.”124 The question is: did he know something about the “ratification vs. fishing rights” deal, or was it just a coincidence? In March 1929 the Japanese fishing companies were boycotting the auctions for fishery lots, and the misunderstandings between the two parties came to dangerous levels. It seems probable that Davidescu had knowledge about these complications, and not about the role played by the ratification question during the fishery talks. But either way, the RFM failed to follow his suggestion. Before going back home, Vassiliu had a meeting with the Chief of the American-European Division in the Gaimusho. Vassiliu asked what the Japanese attitude was toward the ratification and he was answered that Japan would not ratify very soon (this declaration of postponement takes us to the March 25, 1927, meeting between Debuchi and Bessedovskii). Vassiliu asked if there were any possibility, given that he would soon be going back home, to see the Prime Minister; he received an affirmative answer. On May 31, 1929, Vassiliu met Tanaka Giichi and asked again about ratification. The meeting is described in the Japanese documents as follows:

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Tanaka: We have not decided not to ratify but it is difficult to ratify right now for a number of reasons. This is not because of the request coming from another country, if we say it straightly, the Soviet Union. Vassiliu: I understand that you could not ratify right now, but we imagine that you will ratify in the future. Can we hope for ratification? Tanaka: When the time comes, we will have to solve this problem, but we cannot make it clear when this time will be. Vassiliu: I understand the difficulties faced by the Japanese Government, but Romania would not understand this situation, so I will work with all my power to make them understand. [And he asked for some words from Tanaka in order to relieve the Romanian government.] Tanaka: They should not be worried, because we will not be against Romania.125 Vassiliu too reported the meeting with Tanaka to his superiors in Bucharest. His conclusion at the end of his mission is significant for all his activity after March 1928: “The situation here is such that an intervention by our adversaries could provoke a decision in a definitive sense, detrimental to our interests, which until now I have been able to avoid.”126 In other words, he failed to understand the Japanese way of playing in the international arena. The Soviets had no interest in insisting on an official declaration from the Japanese Government, and the Japanese had no interest to make one (and not out of concern for Romania’s reaction but out of concern for the reaction that it could provoke in the other signatory countries). The Gaimusho would never have declared outright that it would not ratify the treaty at all. The reasons are simple: they could still use the Treaty in their negotiations with the Soviets; they were still somewhat reticent to risk offending the other signatory Powers; and it could tarnish Japan’s international image by publicly showing that Japan had failed to honor her international obligations. Because of Japanese tradition (to say “no” continues to be considered very impolite in Japan) and interests too, even if Vassiliu had continued pressing for ratification, the Japanese answer would not have been a non-possumus, as Vassiliu was afraid. Instead of keeping up the pressure on the Japanese Government to ratify, he acted unnecessarily to avoid an imaginary definitive decision of non-ratification from the Japanese. He hoped that it would be possible in the future, if the Soviet-Japanese relations took a turn for the worse, to obtain the Japanese ratification. He was right in this prediction; only in 1938 it was Romania who could not afford to have the Bessarabian question reopened. The main problem Vassiliu and his successor had to face was that Romania represented almost no interest to Japan because it could offer almost nothing in exchange for the ratification. In fairness to Vassiliu, we should add that he had, apart for a few books and brochures, no help from the RFM. And, even more important, by the time Vassiliu reached Tokyo, the Japanese government had already decided, due

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to the material advantages, to postpone ratification at least until the establishment of diplomatic relations between Romania and the Soviets. The Romanian Campaign for Ratification during the Ministry of G.G. Stoicescu G.G. Stoicescu replaced Ion Aurel Vassiliu as Romanian representative to Japan in June 1929. Although he met the Japanese Foreign Minister, Baron Kijuro Shidehara, at the beginning of his ministry (July 19), he avoided (or failed) raising the ratification question.127 He made a first report on the Bessarabian Treaty ratification as late as December 4, 1929, after a meeting with Kenkichi Yoshizawa, the former Japanese Ambassador to China. This report brings nothing about Vassiliu’s activity, but the comments made by the person who read it in Bucharest (perhaps the Foreign Minister or a high ranked official) are interesting: “Japan could not ratify at this time because of her relations with Russia” — comments: “same tune!!! This has been going on for years” “From what Mr. Yoshizawa said, I did not have the impression that Japan was involved in a certain agreement, a written one, regarding the nonratification” — comments: “So why is the treaty not ratified?” “In conclusion, in the current circumstances it is difficult for us to obtain the ratification and if we push too hard on the Japanese government we risk to receive a negative answer, a non-possumus, which must be avoided.” — comments: “They all said the same thing.”128 The new Romanian representative was not much above his predecessor, at least regarding his activity to promote Japan’s ratification. At first he was only appointed as a Chargé d’affaires, and he was of lower rank than Vassiliu in the RFM.129 His lack of diplomatic knowledge shows in the fact that he simply borrowed Vassiliu’s words in the reports sent home. He tried to improve Romanian-Japanese relations in the economic and cultural areas but he did almost nothing for the most important point in the bilateral relations, the Bessarabian Treaty ratification. In the same report, Stoicescu mentions Yoshizawa’s suggestion that he would view with sympathy the signing of a friendship pact between Romania and Japan. The RFM thoroughly analyzed the new Japanese proposal, while also reviewing the status of the ratification question. Pointing once again to the Japanese postponement, it concluded that the opening of negotiations for a friendship treaty was not opportune. The signing of a friendship pact between two countries implies that there are no problems en suspense between the two countries; thus a friendship pact with Japan could be interpreted as a formal renunciation to the ratification and consequently, to the Bessarabian Treaty entirely. And how would Japan, knowing that any Friendship Treaty implies the recognition of each one’s borders, recognize the Romanian border when that was exactly what she was refusing to do by postponing the ratification? Even if the Japanese had in mind a friendship pact in which there

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Moldova, a Romanian Province might be no reference to the borders, that would have been interpreted as a formal renunciation by Romania to the Bessarabian Treaty.130 The same arguments were used against Averescu by the opposition parties after the signing of the Friendship Treaty with Italy in September 1926. On December 15, 1930, Stoicescu had a meeting with the new Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ryutaro Nagai, who expressed once again the impossibility for Japan to ratify the treaty at that moment. As a result of the meeting, Stoicescu came up with a new idea: what if Nicolae Titulescu would try to use his personal relations with M. Adachi, the Japanese representative at the League of Nations131 in order to influence the Japanese Government?132 Perhaps not the most original thought. Stoicescu kept a lower profile than Vassiliu had done, while trying to press the Japanese for ratification. His attitude during the negotiations with Japanese representatives was clearly different, and this difference is illustrated in one of his reports: “He took my hand and told me in English: do not insist; you only embarrass us and all we can do is to apologize”.133 At least he avoided antagonizing the Gaimusho officials; but he certainly did nothing to advance the cause of ratification. Still, in fairness to Stoicescu, it must be pointed that it was already too late to obtain the ratification and, at the same time, that his activity in improving Romania’s general image in Japan, centered more on cultural and economic aspects, was more successful than that of his predecessor.134 The Nakamura Interpellations What Stoicescu and Vassiliu had to do while they were in Tokyo was to raise again and again the Bessarabian question. As long as this question was in the public eyes, there was a chance, although a very small one, for a change in the Japanese attitude. There was no way to say at that time whether Soviet-Japanese relations would improve or deteriorate in the future and, in this case of the latter, an opportunity for ratification could appear unexpectedly. It was thus necessary that a certain basis for Romanian action be prepared. Unfortunately, both Vassiliu and Stoicescu failed to use public opinion to keep on pressing for ratification. In this sense, the activity of Kaju Nakamura, a member of the Japanese Lower Chamber, is important for our topic. During the October 1925 inter-Parliamentary Conference in Washington the Romanian delegation initiated contacts with the Japanese delegation. When the Bessarabian question came into discussion, the Romanians presented their version of the story to the Japanese and in a friendly way asked them to influence their government in favor of the ratification. The Japanese deputies agreed to raise the Bessarabian Treaty question in Parliament. In order to pursue the matter, the chief of the Japanese delegation, Kaju Nakamura, of the Seiyukai party, a former minister, visited Romania (including Bessarabia) in January 1926, with the purpose of collecting the necessary information. In March 1926 Nakamura took the Bessarabian question to the Parliamentary

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Commission on Foreign Affairs. During his interpellation he presented a short history of Bessarabia and the importance of the Bessarabian Treaty for Romania, asking when Japan would ratify the treaty. The answer was that Japan, even while it had at one point taken an active part in European affairs, in order to contribute to the establishment of world peace, did not intend to continue interfering into European politics. As long as all the interested European powers had failed to ratify, Japan would not take any step toward ratification.135 The second interpellation on the ratification question was made in Parliament on February 3, 1931. This came after the signing of the London Naval Treaty, at a moment when there was a great dissatisfaction among Japanese politicians, especially those in the opposition, with the foreign policy promoted by Baron Shidehara, and particularly with his pro-Soviet policy. Even though Nakamura considered the Bessarabian question to be in the category of relatively unimportant relations with various countries in Europe, he gave a good presentation: Nakamura: There is a minor Power in Europe, known as Romania, and after the war there was a question known as the Bessarabian question . . . Japan has now become inextricably involved in this question. A long time has now passed since Italy took action and it seems to me that the Japanese government must be considerably perplexed as to what it should do. It is only natural that the Romanian people should be indignant. The fact that Japan has reserved its action is probably due to considerations rising out of its relations with Russia, but I think it is very doubtful whether the reservation of action because of Russia is of equal importance to the loss of Japan’s international good faith. Ryutaro Nagai: Even if we were to suppose that all the European Powers acted in concert with regard to the Bessarabian question, it must be remembered that Japan has its own individual position to maintain. This example may be advanced as proof of the fact that Japan is not following the leadership of the European Powers. Nakamura: The fact of the matter is that Baron Shidehara said in reply to a question of mine a few years ago that, if Italy gave her recognition, Japan would be obliged also to give her recognition. If it is impossible for Japan to give her recognition, is it not reasonable to assume that there must be some reason? I do not intend to pursue the matter further, but it seems to me that the position which we are in is due to pressure brought to bear by Russia.136 What was Nakamura’s purpose in making the second interpellation? If it was only to criticize Baron Shidehara’s foreign policy, he found a good example. It was definitely not the first time when an issue of foreign policy was used by the Japanese opposition as ammunition in order to attack the government. If he did it because he thought that Japan needed a much stronger policy against the Soviets, which could be achieved by a show of force, then he found a good example too. By ratifying the

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Treaty, Japan would have shown the Soviets that she was not afraid of their reaction and that she could be tough if necessary. But this was not the Japanese diplomatic style in dealing with her muscular neighbor. Another possibility is that he made these interpellations because he was a friend of Romania (or an enemy of the Soviet Union). This view is supported by the fact that it was not the first time he had raised the Bessarabian question, and by the tenor of his declarations when he visited Romania. Whatever Nakamura’s reasons, nothing came out of his intervention. Stoicescu found out about the interpellation from the US representatives in Japan, who provided him with the text. For the official version, he had to wait two weeks until Vice-Minister Nagai gave him the text of Nakamura’s interpellation. Although he tried to take advantage of the context and raise again the ratification question, he received the same answer as before: no ratification because of Japan’s complex relations with the Soviets.137 Unfortunately, there does not seem to have been any coordination between Nakamura’s interpellation and an action in favor of the ratification coming from the Romanian representative in Tokyo. As Stoicescu found about the matter only as a result of US courtesy, it is clear that he had not contacted Kaju Nakamura before the interpellation and asked him to use his influence in favor of the ratification. As for later contacts with Nakamura, I found no trace in the Romanian or Japanese archives regarding any meeting between Romanian diplomats and Kaju Nakamura. Charles Davila and the Japanese Ratification Question One of the most interesting reports on the Japanese ratification found in the Romanian Foreign Ministry’s Archives came from Charles A. Davila, at that time (July 1931) Romania’s Minister to the USA. His theory not only offers a good argument for influencing the Japanese decision but goes as far as to connect the Bessarabian question with Japan-USA relations. He states in his report: Studying the US policy in the Far East he [Davila was referring to Frederic C. Nanu] could closely follow the American consequence in constantly trying to stop the Japanese from making territorial acquisition from China or especially from Russia. Between us, this policy is really difficult to understand. Taking into account the growing overpopulation in Japan, it would be in America’s interest to channel Japanese overpopulation to the less populated territories of Siberia instead of risking the yellow torrent going East. However, America was alarmed when the Japanese took advantage of the unclear situation in Russia after the Revolution and started, under various pretexts, to enter into Siberia and later to occupy, after the Nicolaievsk massacre, the Maritime Provinces and the Northern Sakhalin. It was only logical for the Americans to proclaim the principles enunciated in the Colby Note (August 1920) and later, under the pretext of their friendship toward the Russian people, to take an anti-Japanese attitude and to refuse to recognize any definitive an-

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nexation of territory belonging to the former Russian Empire, if Japan would have gone to that point. Even today America is worried about Japan’s intentions, and this gives us probably the key to the American attitude towards Bessarabia’s Union: it would create a precedent that the Japanese could call in their favor. I wonder if we can use this argument towards the Japanese, by convincing them that they have all the interest to create a precedent that, at some point, might prove very useful for them.138 The new idea comes from the same person who was able to convince the Americans to stop the “public discrimination” against Romania and to influence their position on the Bessarabian question. He understood America’s guiding reasons for its policy (their fear of Japan and Japan’s possible use of the precedent Bessarabia creates) and tried to use them in Romania’s favor. He believed that what was working against Romania in the US might well be working in her favor in Japan. A few months after the start of the Manchurian War, in February 1932, Davila made a new report insisting that now would be a good moment to ask for the Japanese ratification.139 Theoretically, he was right, but practically speaking, at that time Japan had to avoid any action that could upset the Soviets, since her troops were engaged in Manchuria and Shanghai. However, Romanian diplomacy followed none of Davila’s suggestions for obtaining the ratification. There were no instructions sent to Stoicescu in this sense. The reason for their inactivity remains a mystery. In a new report sent in April 1932, a frustrated Davila tried again to press for action: A few months ago the Japanese occupied Manchuria and, if they had ratified the Bessarabian Treaty before this action, they could, in the case of China and the Great Powers not recognizing the independence of Manchuria, oppose them with the case of Bessarabia. This case was, from the juridical viewpoint, quite similar with that of Manchuria. In Bessarabia’s case, without the agreement of Russia, certain Powers recognized the free re-unification of Bessarabia with Romania. . . . The precedent created by the fact that the signature of the mother country (Russia) was not indispensable could be used by Japan against England, France and Italy in the question of the Manchurian independence.140 Davila did more, taking the initiative of talking with the Japanese Ambassador to the US, by coincidence the same Katsuji Debuchi. He told Debuchi that Japan could only gain by ratifying the Bessarabian Treaty because of the precedent it would create (at any point, a representative Assembly of Manchuria or Sakhalin could decide the unification with Japan). Debuchi simply declared to Davila that the Tokyo Government had so far failed to realize this aspect of the ratification question.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province It is difficult to know whether Debuchi was telling the truth. Based on the documents detailing his negotiations with both the Soviets and Romanians, it seems that the Japanese had been unaware of this juridical implication of the Bessarabian Treaty. In fact, even the Romanians failed to realize this juridical aspect for at least ten years, so it would not be surprising if the Japanese had failed to notice, as well. Concluding with Davila’s theory, it should be said that, for two reasons, it came a little too late. First, the Japanese were compelled to avoid stirring up any new tensions with the Soviets in order to have their hands free in Manchuria. And the possible (and not necessarily automatic) recognition of the Manchurian state or of a union between Manchuria (or Sakhalin) and Japan by England, France or Italy by virtue of an existing international precedent was not worth the risk of increasing frictions. Second, in 1932 Japan was no longer preoccupied with the international treaty system and her decision to leave the League of Nations one year later proves that she did not give much credit to the international community. In other words, the international recognition of Manchuria was immaterial, as long as they understood that the international community was unable to do anything to stop them. In order to gain the theoretical advantage provided by the existence of a precedent to her action in Manchuria, or to back a possible Japanese action in Sakhalin, Japan would best have ratified the Bessarabian Treaty in 1921-1922, hoping that it would come into force. Unfortunately, at that time, neither the RFM nor Gaimusho had any idea about this juridical implication. The End of the Romanian Campaign for the Japanese Ratification By 1932, more or less as a result of Davila’s insistence, the RFM reopened its campaign for the Japanese ratification. In a report sent by the Romanian representative to the Hague, in September 1932, a declaration regarding Bessarabia made by the Japanese representative there, Adachi Mineichiro, says, “We are still ‘defaillants’ on the Bessarabian question. We are the only ‘defaillant’ State. We did not ratify the Bessarabian Treaty until now because we thought that we should spare some common interests with Russia.”141 On November 14, 1932, Stoicescu had a meeting with vice-minister of Foreign Affairs, Arita, the last one in which the ratification question was discussed. Stoicescu asked the Japanese position on ratification and the following discussion took place: Arita: Japan has a very important relationship with the Soviet Union, so the ratification question has serious implications for us. We definitely want to keep our promise but it cannot proceed very quickly. Stoicescu: Romania has a great interest in this problem, so we hope that Japan will ratify quickly. Arita: We will discuss this problem after studying the recent developments related to it.142

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And indeed, Arita kept his word and ordered one of his subordinates to prepare a report on the evolution of the ratification question. The report, after reviewing the important moments in the evolution of the mentioned matter, presents once again the official Japanese position on the matter: The Bessarabian Treaty ratification question did not develop after the meeting between Tanaka and Vassiliu on May 11, 1929. Japan considers that the ratification is a problem of faith for such countries as France, England, and Italy but, to say it openly, the Bessarabian question is a European problem. On the other hand, Japan has a very important economic and politic relationship with the Soviet Union, so this ratification question is very important and complicated. Therefore we cannot decide it quickly. And, in addition, Japan’s international position caused by the Manchurian conflict has made us think very seriously regarding the ratification. For these reasons Japan cannot state whether it will ratify or not for the time being. And we will add that Japan’s failure to ratify is not the result of a request coming from another country.143 In other words, the solution is to simply continue the policy of endless postponement initiated in March 1927 as a result of the Bessedovskii-Debuchi verbal agreement, while closely following the new developments in Soviet-Romanian relations.144 The end of 1932 signified the beginning of a new orientation in the Romanian policy towards the Soviet Union, due to the nomination of Nicolae Titulescu as Foreign Minister. Seeking to normalize Romanian-Soviet relations, Titulescu aimed to avoid any actions that might upset the Soviet representatives. Japan’s ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty would have been one such event, as it would have re-opened the debate on Bessarabia. Consequently, starting with 1933, the Romanian Foreign Ministry abandoned any campaign for Japanese ratification, motivated by the previous failure and the new necessity to avoid ruffling Russia’s feathers (especially after the Titulescu-Litvinov gentlemen’s agreement). In 1933 the Little Entente and the Soviets signed the Convention for the Definition of the Aggressor. This act was interpreted in Japan as a success for both Soviet diplomacy and the Romanians. Some newspapers considered that now the thorny issue of the Bessarabian Treaty had been resolved and that, because her international credibility was at stake, Japan would ratify (assuming that the Soviets recognized Bessarabia as Romanian territory and would not object to the ratification). But Gaimusho understood that the Convention did not address the Bessarabian question and was reluctant to take any action. To the contrary, they continued to play the old leitmotiv: “we would like to ratify but we have too many questions en suspense in our relations with Russia, so we must wait for a better moment”.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province THE THIRD PERIOD: 1933 TO 1940 After the improvement in Soviet-Romanian relations in 1933, no more calls were made for the Japanese ratification. In other words, the Romanian Government considered the ratification question closed. In fact, there is one instance that shows Nicolae Titulescu being quite keen to avoid anything that might be understood as a campaign for the Japanese ratification. In August 1936 a group of about 20 Japanese businessmen, under the leadership of O. Kinoshita, administrator of the Japanese Association for Encouragement of Foreign Trade, visited Romania, at the well-intended suggestion of G.G. Stoicescu, who insisted that they should include Romania as a part of their visit to Europe, staying in Romania for about three days.145 Although it was only a simple visit, with the purpose of forging commercial ties, it provoked a strange reaction from Nicolae Titulescu, Romania’s Foreign Minister at the time, proving once again that his dismissal three weeks later was neither an accident nor a mistake: The Romanian Minister to Tokyo cannot take the initiative and invite the Japanese delegation to Romania without the previous approval of the Government. I sense that I will have difficulties from the Soviet Union because of this visit. Therefore I suggest that the visit should be given a normal (protocol) character, we the Romanians being good friends with the Japanese, but we have no interest to stir against us those who are Japan’s enemies.146 If Titulescu was so set against a simple visit by a Japanese economic delegation, it becomes clear why there were no more Romanian calls for the Japanese ratification after he took office as Foreign Minister. Titulescu’s position towards the visit by the Japanese delegation is even more significant if we consider that, years earlier, during the drafting of the Lytton Report, he held a different position regarding the Japanese. In 1931 Titulescu declined the seat as president of the 19-person Committee for investigating the causes of the Japanese-Chinese conflict in Manchuria (the future Lytton Commission) and in February 1932 he also declined the Germanbacked proposal to preside over the coming General Assembly that was to deal with the conflict. In his words: I replied to the German secretary that it is impossible for me to accept their proposal, due to the fact that I am too busy with the Disarmament Conference. However, I want to let Your Majesty know my real reasons for refusing: . . . I consider that the duty of Romania is to win the benevolence of the other Great Powers for the great interests of the country and not for honors . . . taking into account the special geographical situation of Romania (sic) it is our duty to avoid being placed into a position that might justify later a resentment or even a Japanese hostility.147

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This is from the same Titulescu who believed in the values and the force of the League of Nations and who, a few years later, in a very similar situation, proposed strong economic sanctions against Italy (as a result of Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia), in order to protect the credibility of the League. During this period, the much-prolonged Bessarabian Treaty ratification process underwent an unexpected development. The Japanese Government suddenly remembered that Japan still had an obligation toward Romania, and announced to the Romanian Government their intention of ratifying.148 Mamoru Shigemitsu, the Japanese Ambassador to the Soviet Union, twice contacted the Romanian representatives and asked for their opinion regarding Japanese ratification. Had they taken such an initiative ten years earlier, they would have earned Romania’s unending loyalty. Unfortunately, in 1938 it was Romania’s turn to avoid any possible difficulties in her relations with the Soviets, and she had to decline the Japanese offer. Why were the Japanese suddenly ready to ratify? Since 1932, nobody had asked them to do so. As there is no information in the Archives regarding Shigemitsu’s motivation, we can only speculate: 1.

2.

3.

4.

Was it because of the worsening Soviet-Japanese relations? (The second proposal was made during the Changkufeng Incident.) Japan needed allies against the Soviets. However, it was well known that Romania was in no position to fight the Soviets. More probable is that the Japanese were looking for a means to press Moscow in some way, to stop the Soviet aid to the Chinese Army. Perhaps they remembered their success in playing the Bessarabian card in March 1927, when the Japanese insisted the Soviets recall Borodin, and wanted to do it again. Economics could have played a part, as it usually does. At that time Japan lacked oil and Romania was one of the biggest petroleum exporting countries in Europe. There had been contacts between Japanese and Romanian authorities regarding the possibility of exporting Romanian petroleum to Japan, which would have reduced Japan’s dependence on the Soviets and the US. The best way to obtain the Romanian oil, at a favorable price, would be by obtaining Romania’s benevolence by ratifying the Bessarabian Treaty. The Japanese were again experiencing troubles regarding their fishery rights in the Northern Waters and, as the two questions were related, they understood that, if the Soviets failed to keep their end of the bargain, they could do so too.

However, in the author’s opinion, Shigemitsu only intended to use the ratification question as a trial balloon in order to enhance his position during negotiations with the Soviets (by leaking this information and creating a rumor that the Japanese government was about to ratify the treaty), and not to ratify in fact. If he could get

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Moldova, a Romanian Province something in exchange from the Soviets, it was a victory, and if not he would have lost nothing because he knew that the Romanians were in such a position that they would avoid anything that might provoke the Soviets. Mamoru Shigemitsu took the initiative of suggesting the reopening of the ratification question on February 15, 1938, when he approached the Romanian representative in Moscow, Edmond Ciuntu, declaring that: “There was a time when you [the Romanians] wanted Japan to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty. What I do not know is whether you are still interested in ratification, because Japan could be determined today to take this action.”149 The Romanian side concluded that Japan wished to win Romania’s benevolence for political or economical reasons, and thought that the best way to do this would be by ratifying the Bessarabian Treaty. But now Romania was neither in a position to reopen the Bessarabian question nor to offend Japan through a refusal of the overture, so they gave no answer. On July 30, 1938, during a conversation with N. Dianu, the Romanian Minister to Moscow, Shigemitsu suggested again that in case Romania still wanted it, Japan would ratify the Bessarabian Treaty without any difficulty. And more, that he personally would like to act as an intermediary for obtaining the ratification.150 The proposal came just as tension was mounting between the Soviet and Japanese Armies in the Changkufeng Hills area. Some time after the end of the Changkufeng incident, Shigemitsu politely withdrew the ratification proposal. On November 2, 1938, he declared to Dianu that: “The Japanese minister in Bucharest made some indirect inquiries but he came to the conclusion that any Japanese manifestation regarding the ratification would not be welcomed by the Romanian government”.151 It is impossible to say whether the Japanese would have gone forward with the ratification if Romania had agreed or if the Changkufeng incident had not ended. In order to clarify the situation, earlier that year, Alexandru Cretzianu, secretary general of the Romanian Foreign Ministry, prepared a report (one of the most interesting on the Bessarabian Treaty ratification question) in September 1938 regarding the new Japanese proposals. His starting point was that “We should ask first if the proposal made by the Ambassador [Mamoru Shigemitsu] was authorized by his Government or is just his personal idea. . . Why did Japan fail to go through official channels, through our minister in Tokyo or through the Japanese representative in Bucharest?”152 Cretzianu was suspicious about Shigemitsu’s intentions; still, such a proposal could not have come from the Japanese representative in Bucharest because he was not of high enough rank to deal with such an important matter. It should be mentioned that this was not the only time the Romanians suspected that a Japanese proposal lacked the approval of the Japanese Government. As early as 1910, after repeated proposals for a Commercial Treaty between the two countries made by the Japanese Ambassador to Vienna, Count Makino,153 the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reached the conclusion that, in fact, Ambassador Makino did not have the approval of his Government for the proposals he made. This

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belief surfaces only when the Romanian Foreign Ministry decides to refuse a Japanese proposal. The Romanians failed to understand that it would be highly unusual for Japanese diplomats to act without the agreement of their superiors. Cretzianu clearly states in his report that since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Romania and the Soviet Union, the Romanian Government had refrained from asking for the Japanese ratification. Then, he shows both the advantages and disadvantages for Romania in case Japan ratified: Advantages: After the Japanese ratification, the treaty would come into force, so the four Great Powers would be definitively bound by Article No. 1 of the Treaty to recognize our sovereignty over Bessarabia. These stipulations would have a special significance in regard to Great Britain and France, members of the League of Nations, because of Article No. 10 from the Pact [of the League of Nations]. If the guarantees provided by Article No. 10 still have value today, it is useful that there be no doubts regarding the territories covered by this guarantee. A document like this could be important for us should the Great Powers try to make any territorial adjustments. It should be observed that, by virtue of the fact that France, England and Italy ratified the Bessarabian Treaty, they cannot debate our rights to Bessarabia regardless whether the treaty comes into force [was that so?]. Generally, we must accentuate that, if we look at the question from the standpoint of international law, the Bessarabian Treaty has more of a moral value over each signatory, but it is not a juridical title because for Russia this Treaty represents a res inter alias acta. [This was not the view taken by the Romanian Foreign Ministry some ten years earlier]. . . . Disadvantages: It would provoke an official protest from Russia, which would reopen the entire question of Bessarabia, silently avoided by both parties. The result would be a return to the situation existing before 1934. [The Russians reopened the Bessarabian question just a year later, anyway; the Romanian Government should have been expecting them to do so.] Because of Article No. 2 (the Common Commission for fixing the border) and No. 9 (the arbitrage of the Council of the League of Nations regarding litigious questions) ratification is not indicated. As the Soviet Union is a member in that Council it is clear that it would take advantage and discuss the juridical value of the treaty and of Romanian rights over Bessarabia. The Soviet representative would no doubt show that, in order to obtain the signature of France, England and Italy we had to pay considerable compensations to their citizens expropriated in Bessarabia. Would we welcome such a discussion? It would reopen the debate over the respect accorded by Romania towards

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Moldova, a Romanian Province the Minorities Treaty (see Article No. 3), always considered by the Romanian Government as a threat to national sovereignty. Through Article No. 8 of the treaty we assume the obligations of paying a proportional part of the public debt of the Russian state. Therefore, soon after the Treaty’s coming into force, the French creditors of Russian rent would start pressing over their Government to make us pay those moneys. [Surprisingly, both the Romanians and the French had failed to stress this aspect during 1922-1924]. . . [Concluding]: At the present moment it would not be opportune for us to insist on the Japanese ratification . . . but if the Japanese government decides to ratify, we cannot ask them not to do so. All we can do is to ask them to keep the ratification secret and to deposit the ratification instruments only at the moment decided by us. We would then have an instrument of pressure over the Soviets that could prove useful at some point.154 Cretzianu’s last conclusion was exactly the opposite of what Shigemitsu intended by raising the ratification problem. The Romanian government followed Cretzianu’s conclusions and made no intervention for ratification. Analyzing the disadvantages presented above, we have a possible explanation for the Romanian Foreign Ministry’s general attitude, at least during the fourth decade. Cretzianu’s arguments, coupled with the changes taking place in the international balance of power, partially justify the Foreign Ministry’s silence over the ratification question after 1934. Although their attempt failed, the Japanese did not abandon the Bessarabian question. During June 1939, one of the Japanese representatives in Romania made a visit to the northern parts of Bessarabia, in order to assess the actual condition of the region. Following his visit, he sent a detailed report to Gaimusho in October 1939, together with a number of photographs.155 The Bessarabian question last came to Gaimusho’s attention during 1939-1940, when two of its Departments published booklets on Bessarabia (in Japanese). Why Gaimusho expended resources, extremely scarce due to the war with China, in order to publish brochures on Bessarabia remains a matter of conjecture. The first booklet, “Report on the Soviet Foreign Policy under Molotov and on Bessarabia’s Situation” was published in December 1939 by the Department of Investigation. As its title suggests, the first half describes Soviet policy in Europe, making much of the consequences of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact: the situation in Poland, the war in Europe and the relations between the Great Powers, the Soviet intervention in Poland and in the Baltic States, the war with Finland over Karelia, the Soviet claims to the islands in the Baltic Sea, and the territorial controversy with Turkey. The second part deals with the Bessarabian question, making a detailed presentation of the province (including population, industry, history, and the Romanian government’s policy towards Bessarabia) and in the end analyses the Romanian-Soviet conflict over Bessarabia. The information is quite similar with that existing in the syn-

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thesis prepared by Gaimusho’s officials in connection with the ratification question. The most interesting part comes toward the end, when it is suggested that Bessarabia is the next target for the Soviets, and Romania’s difficult position is analyzed, in case the Soviets did attempt to retrieve Bessarabia. The publishing of this booklet is proof enough of Japan’s continuing interest in the Bessarabian question, and Japan’s growing interest in European affairs (it also underscores the fact that Bucharest ought to have known the Soviets’ intentions). The second booklet, called “The Bessarabian Question and the Division of Oil; Romania and the German-Soviet Relations”, was published in 1940 by Gaimusho’s Department of Information. THE MASS MEDIA AND THE JAPANESE RATIFICATION QUESTION A more complete picture of the entire Bessarabian Treaty question might include a detailed analysis not only of official documents but the mass media as well. The press played an important role in this saga, illustrated best during the Romanian-Italian negotiations for the ratification. As for Romania’s failure to convince Japan to ratify, the press, and particularly the Romanian press, also played a role: by constantly pointing out the positive character of the Japanese people and of their traditions, and suggesting that the notion that Japan might fail to ratify was simply unrealistic.156 The Romanian Press A comprehensive survey of the Romanian press in the first half of the 20th century reveals how Japan was seen in Romania. Here we will be concerned only with the perception of the Japanese attitude regarding the Bessarabian question, which is addressed only in a small percentage of the articles that actually appeared. The Romanian press expressed a different opinion from that of the foreign press, which was not necessarily preoccupied with the consequences of the ratifications for Romania but with their international significance. Both in 1924 and in 1927 the accent in the international press was on French-Soviet, and respectively BritishItalian relations and not on Romania. It was these broad international implications that lent the Bessarabian Treaty such importance worldwide. Japan’s unofficial and real image was very positive. There were many articles regarding political events but also many on the process of modernization in Japan. Japan’s development was given as an example that merited attention: they adopted new technologies and theories while, at the same time, preserving their own way of living, their traditions. Romania had more or less the same problem as Japan: how to modernize its economy and structures without destroying the traditional customs and the spirit of the nation. The peak of Japan’s good image was in 1904, when she went to war against the common neighbor, Russia; Romanian sympathy for Japan was at its height in the aftermath of the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province The public’s expectations were high and everybody was convinced that Japan would ratify the Treaty. The representatives of the Foreign Ministry shared that view. Interestingly enough, although Japan failed to ratify the Treaty, its image in Romania did not change significantly. From 1928 onward there were articles expressing admiration for the Japanese culture and economic development, and even during the fourth decade the topic of modernization and tradition in Japan can be found throughout the Romanian press. In a sense, it could be said that the press “forgot” about the ratification question. Regarding the ratification question itself, there were only three periods when the Romanian press focused on the Japanese position. The first was March-April 1924, spurred by the coincidence of the French ratification, the Vienna negotiations and Prince Naruhiko Higashi Kuni’s visit to Romania. Even though the Japanese side had not intended to give the visit any political connotations, it was thought to be no accident that the visit coincided in time with the failure of the Vienna Conference, since it was known that Japan too had some unresolved issues in her relations with the Soviet Union.157 And just a few days before the Conference, France ratified the treaty, so that Italy and Japan were the only two states left to ratify. It was assumed that the Imperial Family had as much power in Japan, if not more, as the Royal Family had in Romania; therefore the press understood the visit as a sign of goodwill and a demonstration of Japan’s intentions.158 It was thought that the Prince must have brought with him good news. The visit received wide publicity, and Prince Naruhiko was welcomed by the Romanian Royal Family and by all the high officials.159 The Prince was evidently surprised to be received in such an official and pleasant manner but he was even more surprised to find himself having to fend off all the questions regarding the exact moment when the Japanese would ratify — a question he was not at all prepared to deal with. He took the position that he had no idea of when Japan would ratify and that he did not have the mission of bringing the ratification to the Romanians.160 Nonetheless, some newspapers declared that, in fact, the Prince had promised that Japan would ratify, and such a promise, coming from a member of the Imperial Family, certainly affected Romanian public opinion. The press had been talking up the good bilateral relations and even a possible alliance between Romania and Japan, an alliance directed against their common neighbor, touting Japan’s interest in Romania as a future ally. But as soon as the prince left, there was no more talk of the Japanese ratification. In view of the timing of the visit and their misconception of the Prince’s influence, the Romanians’ confusion is no surprise. Nonetheless, it is also conceivable that this confusion was to some extent consciously manufactured through a “publicity campaign” initiated by the Romanian government, with the purpose of raising the people’s morale.161 The Japanese were caught; by the time they realized how the visit would be interpreted, it was too late to cancel. One of the indirect results of the visit was the Soviet insistence on the Bessara-

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bian question during the Karakhan-Yoshizawa talks. The intense publicity given to the Japanese visit (and not only in the Romanian press) and to the possibility of a Japan-Romania alliance was not well received by the Soviets. As a result, the Soviets pushed hard to prevent the Japanese ratification. Of course, they were probably already moving in that direction, long before the imperial visit, but the visit definitely gave the matter a new sense of urgency. The Romanian press focused on the Japanese ratification again in January 1925, when the Japanese recognized the Soviet Government. There were strong mixed reactions in the Romanian press, ranging from accusations that Japan was selling off the ratification against economic concessions from the Soviets, to wishful assertions that Japan, by virtue of the secular tradition of her famous samurai, could never betray her word — and Japan had promised Romania to ratify. The first, and not the most reliable, news item that connected the JapaneseSoviet negotiations with the ratification was this: Because of Bessarabia, Japan has decided to break off negotiations with the Soviet Union. Karakhan’s call, expressly presented, for Japan to desist from ratifying in exchange for economic advantages had been categorically refused by Japan. The Japanese representative stated that Japan does not obey orders or suggestions coming from a foreign government. Japan said that she recognized the Bessarabian Treaty and that would not allow the Soviet Union to exert any kind of pressures over her in this matter. The Russo-Japanese negotiations are definitely broken off.162 This is an interesting account of the Karakhan-Yoshizawa negotiations. Even though the negotiations were secret, even in Romania it was supposedly known that Karakhan had made an express demand related to the ratification. However, Japan is portrayed in bright colors, staunchly rejecting any deal. The debate over Japan’s attitude was rekindled in January. The ratification was presented as a problem in Romania’s relations with both Italy and Japan, but the accent was on Italy, which was blamed for asking more and more concessions from Romania. The press suggested that the Romanian diplomatic leadership should take action first in Italy’s direction. This article, reviewing the developments in the Bessarabian question during the previous year, after criticizing Mussolini’s attitude, goes to Japan: In these moments our eyes turned to Japan. It is characteristic for the excessive complexity existing nowadays in international relations that for putting one of our diplomatic problems in order we need the cooperation of a state in the Far East. For a moment, last year, during the visit of the Japanese Prince, it was considered that Japan’s collaboration was assured. But this affirmation came too early and was not true. The Prince had no political or diplomatic mission. Now, this perspective, of the Japanese ratification, seems to be more and more excluded. The Government in

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Tokyo is on the verge not only of recognizing the Soviet Union but also of entering into an alliance with it . . . Anyway, even if this is not true, it should be understood that Japan cannot afford to make gestures or to take measures that will displease the Russians, even though there could be willingness to show the Russians that she might take that kind of step.163 On January 23, the day when the news of the signing of the Russo-Japanese Basic Convention reached Bucharest, all the newspapers carried comments regarding the Japanese position on Bessarabia. Some of the newspapers expressed the official Japanese position, following a declaration made the Japanese representative in Romania, Kumaichi Horiguchi, on January 22.164 Horiguchi, following his instructions, had made a declaration one day before the press found out about the Basic Convention, and in this way took the opportunity of “preparing” public opinion. In this manner, he was able to avoid quite a difficult situation. Among the articles favorable to Japan one stated: Japan signed the Bessarabian treaty . . . the noble character and the history of the Nippon race are the best proofs that Japan will respect her signature. If the ratification has not come yet, this is because the Japanese Government is waiting for the European Powers to be the first to take action, and only then will Japan give her ratification.165 A more realistic view, showing the main disadvantage of the Romanian campaign for the Japanese ratification, is expressed by another newspaper: Even while we have no word to cause worry for the moment, we should pay the closest attention to events. Especially if the news that Japan gave private assurances that it would not ratify is false. But it is quite clear that, while Italy has difficulties in ratifying, in the case of Japan, after she signed with the Soviets a treaty giving her considerable material and strategic advantages for the defense of her national security, advantages which are the basis of stable relations with the Russian Government — we are talking about the oil and coal concessions in Sakhalin — it will be very difficult for the Japanese Government to take a decision that would indispose the Russian government without having assured, and this is the truth and we have to say it, a certain material advantage somewhere else.166 Another similar article in the same newspaper states: It should be clear to everybody that, even if Japan did not assume any engagement [towards the Russians] regarding ratification, the recognition of the Soviet Union will make the Japanese Government more reserved in the case of an action that can only displease the Russians.167

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As time passed, some Romanians became more and more convinced that the Japanese ratification would come. One such expression of trust comes in an article significantly entitled, “We must trust Japan’s word”: The Prince from the famous country of Japan declared, “the Imperial Parliament will soon ratify the union of Bessarabia with Romania”. Since then we have waited for the ratification. The delay in the ratification, and the unpleasant news that the economic treaty signed between Japan and Russia has a special clause regarding the Bessarabian Treaty ratification, made my trust go down, but not my spirit, which continues to refuse to believe that the word of a “Cherry’s knight”, son of Japan’s emperor, could not be honored . . . I hope that the 1904-born sympathy of the entire Romanian people for the Japanese cause will always grow.168 The Japanese question came to the fore for a third time in March 1927, as a result of the Italian ratification. The tenor of the Romanian press was, at that time, optimistic. It was believed that Japan would now take the necessary steps for ratification. However, the press focused mainly on the Italian ratification, with only brief comments on Japan: “Japan will soon follow Italy’s example” or “The Japanese Government is already considering the necessary steps for the ratification”.169 The press invoked the promises made by all the Japanese representatives, including Horiguchi, Prince Naruhiko, and Kaju Nakamura, that as soon as Italy ratified they would ratify too: “Today we have the right to consider Japan’s ratification as imminent.”170 Japan’s official position was soon made known to the Romanians, the Japanese representatives repeating that the ratification would definitely come — but not yet, due to the fact that, at the moment, there were some complicated problems with Russia and they would like to avoid complicating them further. At first, there was talk of only a few weeks’ delay, stressing that Japan had no vital interest against the ratification and that it would go along with the other signatories.171 The few weeks became a few months. This 1927 window was closed by the Romanian Government’s announcement of the reopening of the Romanian Legation in Tokyo, and the hope that the Japanese Government would give the ratification to the new Romanian Minister the moment he reached Tokyo.172 Even as the Japanese ratification failed to materialize, Japan’s positive image in Romania remained in place. Articles about Japanese life and customs,173 or about the Japanese successes on their way toward modernization continued to be published. During the next years there was almost no trace of a harsh attitude against Japan in relation to the ratification question. Articles published as early as 1931 tried to justify the Japanese action in China by demographic considerations and not at all to blame Japan for opening the war against China. Although the Romanian government exerted a great deal of control and censorship over the mass media, it does not seem to have been any intervention in regard to

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Moldova, a Romanian Province articles on Japan. Japan’s positive image in Romania was not a result of government intervention (which supposedly would have had the aim of improving bilateral relations), nor was it a result of a Japanese propaganda campaign. It stemmed from a general feeling of sympathy and esteem for the Japanese people and for its impressive progress. Indeed, it seems that the press influenced the actions of the Romanian Government and not vice versa. The Japanese Press If we set out to examine parallel developments in the Japanese media regarding Romania (and particularly regarding Bessarabia), anyone who is familiar with the style of the Japanese media would first suppose that there would be no material to examine. Still, there were a number of articles regarding both Romania and the Bessarabian question. In a way, the Japanese press was on the same footing with the press overseas. Whenever the Bessarabian question captured the attention of the public internationally, there were articles in the Japanese press too. Interest in the Bessarabian question starts as early as 1920, when the Bessarabian Treaty was signed in Paris.174 The Japanese press focused on the ratification question twice: March-April 1924 and March 1927. Although there were some short comments on the KarakhanYoshizawa deal on Bessarabia, the problem did not have the same resonance as it had in the foreign or Romanian press. Quite surprising is the attention given to the Bessarabian problem in March 1924. There were numerous articles on the French ratification,175 the consequences of this act, the Soviet reaction and, a few days later, the failure of the Russo-Romanian negotiations in Vienna.176 Mainly, these were short articles dealing with the implications of the ratification, and none of them addressed the question of Japanese ratification. Their subject was the union between Bessarabia and Romania, offering some data on how the union was made, or the Poincare-Cicerin controversy.177 Tokyo Nichi Nichi on March 29, 1924 stated that Karakhan had asked Yoshizawa a problematic question on Japan’s stand regarding the ratification. The article reports Karakhan’s question and his plea against a Japanese ratification, which would be considered a blow to the improving relations between Japan and the Soviet Union.178 By March 1924, as we know, Karakhan was already taking action in order to avoid Japanese ratification, and the press soon became aware of his intentions — which indicates that Karakhan was using the Japanese mass media to spread propaganda against the ratification. Over the next few days, several other articles dealt with the same problem.179 The ratification question received the greatest attention in March 1927. All the newspapers stressed the difficult situation in which the Japanese Government found itself, between the two choices. There were some simple presentations of the events, of Italy’s ratification and Moscow’s reaction,180 and also some lengthier discussions of the implications of the Italian ratification for British-Russian relations (although

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not as much as in the European press): [Talking about the Italian ratification] To account for such extraordinary sensation intelligently, we must look into the relations between Great Britain and Soviet Russia, the aggravation of which has no doubt brought the former Power and Italy closer together in order to bear down upon Russia.181 At the same time, some articles were asking the Japanese Government not to ratify. If we judge by the few articles that can be found, the conclusion is that the current against ratification prevailed in March 1927. Had the Romanians been adequately represented in Tokyo, perhaps the situation might have been different. There is no way to gauge whether public opinion could have been swayed in Romania’s favor, and whether that would have made a critical difference. While there were some predictions that Japan would choose to ratify, other articles clearly called for the Government not to do so. The pro-Soviet camp used some translations from Izvestia, highlighting the good relations between Japan and the Soviets, but there was no corresponding propaganda on behalf of the Romanians. The Nippon Dempo United Press presented such an article on March 19: Izvestia — Proceeds to point out that Japan does not have, nor can have, any political or economical interest in binding it to Romania and that Japan’s refusal to ratify would not sacrifice any interest in this part of East Europe. But the Japanese ratification would give the document legal force . . . a definitely hostile act toward the Soviets peoples on the part of Japan.”182 Somewhat unexpected was the attitude of The Japan Times, the biggest English newspaper in Japan, which instead of focusing on the ratification published two long (and solid) articles regarding the possible evolution in the Romanian political arena as a result of the approaching death of King Ferdinand (who was very ill at the time); neither of the two articles mentions the Bessarabian question.183 Of the articles asking the Japanese Government not to ratify, the two most interesting were published in Osaka Mainichi and Yamato. The first one supports the Soviet viewpoint and expresses considerations in favor of Japan avoiding the ratification.184 Along the same lines was the following article published by Yamato, under the headline, “Bessarabia”: Now that France, Great Britain and Italy have ratified the Bessarabian Treaty, it is a very delicate problem for Japan to consider the ratification of this Treaty, because Soviet Russia is determined to keep the territory by all means. The decision to give Bessarabia to Romania was made during the world war, when the Allies were sure of victory, but Russia does not recognize such an international pact. Great Britain and the two other European states persuaded Romania to

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Moldova, a Romanian Province join the Allies on condition that she should obtain Bessarabia after the war. [This is actually erroneous, and it is probable that the author of the article had no real idea what had happened in Bessarabia.] It may be necessary for these European nations to keep their pledge, but Japan’s position is entirely different. She has nothing to do with the matter, which is purely European. She ought not to involve herself in such a complication. When this Treaty was signed, Japan was to receive Shantung, but subsequently she gave up this Chinese territory, so that her obligation to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty is no longer binding upon her. Soviet Russia is willing to fight for her right to retain Bessarabia, so that Japan will injure her sentiment by giving ratification to the Treaty in question. Non-ratification does not, however, mean support given to Russia. The position Japan ought to uphold is perfect neutrality. Europe will take proper care of its own problems like this, without bothering a country outside of the European Commonwealth. Considering the matter in its essential character, however, we doubt whether the ratification of the Bessarabia Treaty will help Great Britain, France and Italy. None of these Powers will get any share in the territory, but their support of Romania’s claim will only increase Russia’s hatred toward these three Powers. To make matters worse, the support given to Romania against Russia may lead to actual war between Russia and the three other European Powers. The latter will suffer terribly from a joint expedition against Soviet Russia. In all probability they will find it impossible to carry on such a warlike policy. If they are not fully prepared to support Romania by arms, their ratification of the Treaty will not be worth much. Under such circumstance it will be wise for the Japanese Government to take no positive steps in respect to the ratification of the Bessarabia Treaty.185 This is an excellent proof of the success of Soviet propaganda in Japan. It also fits into a more general pattern: that many of those writing about the Bessarabian Treaty actually knew little of what the Treaty’s stipulations actually were, and presented a purely propagandistic view. Still, the message was clear: Japan should not ratify. Some of the most cogent comments in connection with the ratification question were made in The Japan Advertiser. At first, the newspaper only presented the Italian ratification and its consequences: It is said that Italy had delayed the ratification in the hope of mediating between Romania and the Soviets. Italy has understood that Japan made her ratification of the treaty dependent on ratification by the other three Powers who now have all ratified. Diplomatic circles in Berlin believe, however, that even now Japan will not ratify the Treaty [this takes us back to Ambassador Solf’s role in the Bessedovskii-Debuchi negotiations] as she is not interested any longer in siding

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with anti-Russian powers on such an issue, inasmuch as the belief prevails that at the conclusion of the treaty recognizing the Soviet Union she definitely agreed not to ratify. Speculation is active in Paris too regarding the probable attitude of Japan.186 A few days later: Japan’s problem concerns Britain. London newspapers think Tokyo may not act on Bessarabian Pact. In the Daily Telegraph it is pointed out that Moscow, after Italy’s ratification, will be able to remind Tokyo that under the Soviet-Japanese treaties of 1925 Japan undertook not to enter any agreement contrary to the interests of the cosignatory, and will call attention to the fact that Bessarabia is a sore point with the Soviet. Tokyo may possibly content itself with the assertion that Italy having already made the Bessarabian Treaty valid by her ratification, that of Japan is unnecessary to Romania.187 And on March 23, clearly expressing the Japanese dilemma: Japan’s obligations as one of the Big Four have involved her in questions of South Eastern Europe in which she has no material interest and which have, in consequence, given her government a somewhat delicate question to deal with . . . Although it is true that Japan has but little direct interest in ownership of Bessarabia, it is equally true that the question of ratifying the treaty handing that territory over to Romania places her in a somewhat awkward predicament. If she ratifies it, she offends the Soviet Union; if she withholds her ratification she nullifies the action of Britain, France, and Italy. In the case of Bessarabia, however, Japan has nothing but a negative gain in prospect; namely avoidance of causing annoyance to Britain and France and avoidance of giving offense to Moscow’s wishes. But it is, nevertheless, a gain of seemingly greater importance politically than the mere avoidance of giving offense to Moscow, as that is too of a political rather than a material nature. It is, in fact, a case of choosing the lesser of two political evils rather than, as in the instance of Toonan-Tsitsihar Railway, choosing between giving up a definite political-strategic-economic gain and causing annoyance of a purely political nature. As, therefore, the lesser of the two evils in the case of Bessarabia appears to be Soviet displeasure, the likelihood is that ratification will be forthcoming in due course. This whole question of Bessarabia, however, brings two important points into prominence. The first of them is that Japan, by taking a hand in European politics, may be playing her part in the lime-light as one of the Big Four but, in

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Moldova, a Romanian Province doing so, she is running the risk of involving herself in political difficulties without any chance of compensation in the way of material gain. The second point brought out by this question of ratification is that the catch-phrase “rights of smaller nations” is still bringing untold trouble in its train and has been twisted and distorted in a most unscrupulous manner, even more so, in fact, than that other parrot-cry “the white man’s burden”. The “rights of the smaller nations” and “the white man’s burden” had been both invoked almost as frequently and hypocritically as “liberty”. Bessarabia, Lithuania, Estonia and Finland, to name but a few, were each brought into being as independent states as a result of that unfortunately interpreted catch phrase, and what do we find? For the time being they act as break waters to check the spread of Bolshevism into other parts of Europe. Sooner or later, however, the time will come when the Powers renew their former friendly relations with Russia. When this time comes about, they will lose their interest in all these minor states, which in reality are only in existence of sufferance and entirely dependent on the good will of the Powers and would be unable to stand without their active support. In the case of Bessarabia it was claimed that the native inhabitants of Bessarabia desired to break away from Russia and to return to the benevolent rule of Romania. From the accounts given by independent foreign investigators, however, it would seem that the native inhabitants, so called, have no more love for the one than for the other. In fairness to Soviet Russia it must be admitted that Romania’s refusal to submit the question to the test of a plebiscite would seem to indicate that she feels not too sure of her ground in the matter, and the Powers, in ratifying the Treaty, can hardly withstand the charge of hypocrisy if they continue to talk about the rights of small nations. Like the Japanese Government Earthquake Bill, the Bessarabian Treaty may be an eminently practical measure but, like the same piece of legislation, it contains distinct elements of injustice.”188 The Bessarabian question continued to surface in the Japanese press during the coming years, but no reference was made to the ratification question. Quite to the contrary, the attention shifted to the Russo-Romanian negotiations, pointing up the significance of moments such as February 1929 (the Litvinov Protocol), July 1933 (The Convention for the Definition of the Aggression), when the Bessarabian question had been considered finally closed,189 and June 1934 (the establishment of Russo-Romanian relations).

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CONCLUSIONS The Bessarabian Treaty question is a good example of Japanese involvement in European affairs, and underscores the need for a more detailed study of Japan’s policy towards Europe during the interwar period. As Ian Nish states: As a Great Power and as a founding-member of the League of Nations, Japan had to play a part in Europe. There has been a tendency among historians of modern Japan to focus attention on her relations with China and the US. This is not necessarily wrong; but it may be a distortion to exclude Europe [and particularly Eastern Europe, as we might add] to the extent that is commonly done.190 It was only a few years after the Bessarabian Treaty was signed, when the Soviet Government started acting as a powerful force in the international arena, that the international implications and real importance of the Bessarabian Treaty emerged. As the increasingly fierce Soviet opposition became highly publicized, the Japanese government understood that ratification was no longer a simple act, and that the possible consequences of the ratification could affect Japan directly. The ability to take advantage of the Bessarabian Treaty even as the international situation was changing proves the adaptability of Japanese diplomacy to new situations. The only price Japan had to pay in exchange for the commercial advantages obtained from the Soviets was a moral one, a slight dimming of Japan’s international image and credibility. During the interwar period the Japanese Diet did indeed ratify a great number of international treaties, including some that were not at all helpful to the interests of the Empire, adhering to a “rule” that, no matter how harsh the conditions were for Japan, once they had signed a treaty they proceeded to ratify it. The case of the Bessarabian Treaty, even though it contained no concrete military or economic obligations for its signatories, was a notable exception. Still, Gaimusho acted carefully enough to avoid setting off any press campaign that would capitalize on its failure to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty in order to attack different aspects of Japanese foreign policy. On the other hand, it is difficult to believe that any Japanese diplomat was thinking in 1920 that the Bessarabian Treaty would produce benefits for Japanese fishermen (which translates into important votes during the Parliamentary elections), although they might have had in mind using the Bessarabian Treaty as a bargaining chip with the Soviet Union. In conclusion, the Japanese failure to ratify can be ascribed principally to Japan’s relations with Russia, and secondarily, to Romania’s failure to do what it could on the diplomatic front. Romania’s Diplomatic Actions As detailed above, Romania had closed her Tokyo Legation in February 1922; but although the Legation was still functional during 1921, with not only a Chargé

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Moldova, a Romanian Province d’affaires but also a military attaché, nothing was done to encourage the Japanese ratification. The reason is simple: none of the signatory states, including Romania, deposited the ratification instruments before April 1922. Instead of pressing for ratification in Japan, the Romanian Government sought to preserve resources: in the end, it was a poor bargain. Of course, apart from this treaty, Romania had few interests in Japan, and in any case they did not realize that Japan’s ratification was questionable. On the other hand, the first official attempt to obtain the Japanese ratification, in 1923, three years after signing the treaty, was tardy at best, especially as the Romanians already knew how large a role the ratification played in their dispute with the Soviet Union. The decision to close the Legation had important consequences later. Having no diplomatic representative in Japan at the moment when the Japanese could have been convinced to ratify, during 1922 or even 1923, may have cost them exactly the chance they needed. The Romanians failed to analyze Japanese-Soviet relations and exploit their misunderstandings. In 1922, after the UK’s ratification, when RussoJapanese relations were far from normal,191 and when Japan was still taking an active part in European affairs (as proved by her participation in the Genoa Conference), the Japanese ratification seems to have been attainable. The Japanese ratification of the Central European Frontiers Treaty in May 1922, ahead of other signatories, proves that Japan was still interested in events taking place in Europe. Even during 1923 there may have been real chances of convincing the Japanese Government to ratify, especially by obtaining direct British help. The importance of having a representative in Japan was also demonstrated during the settlement of the Upper Silesia question in 1921. The Polish Chargé d’Affaires sent several Aide-Memoires to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, presenting the Polish case, and was able to influence (more or less) the final Japanese decision on the Upper Silesia border. When the Japanese Ambassador in London expressed an opinion contrary to that of Poland, he was able to quickly send a note of protest to Gaimusho, which immediately disapproved the action of Ambassador Hayashi.192 At the beginning of 1924, when the Japanese proposed signing a Commercial Treaty with Romania, the Romanians had in hand a powerful argument in favor of ratification. But they did not use the proposed Commercial Treaty to their advantage and the negotiations ended in failure. The Japanese conditions for the Commercial Treaty could have been accepted entirely, without any fear that they would damage the Romanian economy (Japan was too far away to be able to act influentially on the Romanian market) — in exchange for ratification. Unfortunately, all the Romanians had in mind was the famous “by ourselves” economic policy, aimed at limiting the control of foreign capital over the Romanian economy. Given that the negotiations for the Commercial Treaty started in January 1924, before the Yoshizawa-Karakhan talks in Peking, the argument of better commercial relations stood a chance of success. The Ishii Note clearly presented the Japanese position: because Japan is not a European Power and it had no (direct) interest in the Bessarabian question, she had

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decided to wait until all the interested European Powers had ratified. Ishii told Duca that Japan really had no other reason not to ratify (at that time). In this situation, Duca had two alternatives: to continue pressing for the Japanese ratification, or to believe what Ishii said and to consider that after the Italian ratification Japan would automatically ratify. Since the Italian ratification was not in sight, he preferred the second alternative. In a vital oversight, no one in the RFM made the connection with the Japanese attitude regarding the Central European Frontiers Treaty. During the following years the idea that Japan would automatically ratify after Italy did so became more and more accepted, not only in Romania but in other European countries too, except for the Soviet Union. Romania’s “passivity” should also be seen as more or less related to the positive image Japan had in the Romanian press; with so many articles praising Japan for its achievements and for its moral values it should not come as a surprise that the officials in the Foreign Ministry failed to apply any pressure for the Japanese ratification. Still, all the Romanians did to encourage the Japanese ratification after 1924 was to send some books on Bessarabia to Gaimusho — a lackluster performance, indeed. Even worse, when there were signs that the Japanese ratification might never be obtained, when in January 1925 the press was full of articles showing that Japan had traded the ratification in exchange for economic concessions in Sakhalin, the RFM did almost nothing and continued, blindly, to believe that the Japanese ratification would definitely come as soon as Italy ratified. January 1925 was the moment when the Japanese foreign policy changed clearly in favor of the Soviet Union and against Romania. If, up to that point, there had been some chance of obtaining Japan’s ratification (because Japan had not officially recognized the Soviet Government), after that moment Romania stood no chance. The RFM finally realized that it would have to fight for Japanese ratification only in the aftermath of the Italian ratification. They proudly announced that Japan too was taking the necessary steps for ratification, but the Japanese representative in Bucharest gave them a cold shower, declaring that Japan was not even remotely planning to ratify. The Romanian reaction was to reopen the Romanian Legation in Tokyo and, in this way, to press for ratification. Too little, and far too late. Besides the fact that the Soviets held all the cards to influence the Japanese by then, Romania shot herself in the foot by sending a representative who promptly acquired a poor image for himself (and implicitly Romania) at Gaimusho. Whatever positive influence the Legation might have had was annihilated by the inexperience of its leader. Even in later stages, during 1930-1932, when new events (like the Nakamura interpellation or the Davila juridical hypothesis) might have helped the Romanian cause, the Romanian representatives in Japan failed to take any new steps regarding the ratification. On the other hand, it seems that the RFM expected a miracle from its representatives to Japan and offered almost no backing to their campaign, proving unable to convince even the Japanese minister in Bucharest of the desirability and necessity of ratification.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Romanian Foreign Ministry might invoke, in its defense, the fact that Romania had nothing to offer to Japan in exchange for ratification, except for petroleum. In the French or Italian cases, they had plenty of “material” for negotiations. However, the Polish had nothing to offer to the Japanese in 1921 either, but they were able to convince them at least not to side with Germany. In conclusion, the gravest error made by Romania with respect to the Japanese ratification was that of not taking decisive action when Soviet-Japanese relations were still tense. In 1921-1923, it seems that the ratification could have been obtained (although not necessarily easily) by using the same arguments that were tried in 1927 (the moral need for Japan to honor her signature), and when additional advantages were provided by England’s intervention or by the Commercial Treaty. By the time the Romanian officials finally understood that they must take action in Tokyo, it was too late, the Soviets already being active in Japan — so active that they had already reached a deal ensuring the postponement of the Japanese ratification. Japan’s Relations with the Soviet Union Like the other signatory Great Powers, Japan sought to take advantage of the ratification. But, in contrast to France and England, who obtained benefits from Romania, or to Italy, which had finagled advantages from both Romania and the Soviets, Japan took her part of the pie from the Soviets. At first, the Japanese did not intend to use the ratification problem in order to gain commercial advantages from Russia. Perhaps they did not even think of that. But, as time passed and the Soviet campaign against ratification grew more insistent, Japan saw herself in a dilemma. On the one hand, if she were to ratify, relations with Russia would suffer a serious blow. On the other hand, if she failed to ratify, her relations with the other signatory Powers might be affected. These were the relations that the Japanese really cared about and not their relations with Romania, a country in which they had almost no interest. By autumn 1923, there was no longer an Anglo-Japanese alliance, no longer a “Conference of the Ambassadors”, and Japan’s role in European and world politics had, indeed, dramatically decreased. On the other hand, there was the continuing consolidation of the new Russia. At this juncture, Japanese expressed a new position on the matter: we are not a European power, so we have decided to wait until the European Powers decide. It was a good compromise solution. By May 1924, the Japanese government officially expressed its position to the Romanians, via the Ishii Note, the first concession made to the Soviets, in order to avoid a possible blow to the talks going on in Peking. Following the French ratification, the Japanese understood how significant the ratification was for the Soviets. During the Karakhan-Yoshizawa talks in Peking, the ratification was an important topic and, following the same reasoning behind the Ishii Note, a compromise solution was reached. The Japanese carefully avoided promising not to ratify. Nevertheless, they made a second concession to the Rus-

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sians, in two steps: the Yoshizawa verbal statement of May 1924 (not to ratify before the European Powers) and the Yoshizawa-Karakhan exchange of letters, stating the same facts in writing. The Soviets could claim that Japan had undertaken not to ratify, and their propaganda made full use of this. But the Japanese did not give the Soviets all they wanted: the secret and private exchange of letters specified only that Japan would not ratify before Italy did so. Nevertheless, the Soviets were satisfied, firstly because they could focus their efforts only on Italy; and secondly, because they understood that the Japanese could be convinced not to ratify, especially as time was working in the Soviets’ favor. The next and the most important moment for Japan was March 1927 when the Italians ratified. The pressure was great, both for and against ratification. The pressure in favor was operated more at the moral level, while the second worked at the material level. Japanese officials seized the Italian ratification as an opportunity to extract Soviet concessions in the fishery negotiations.193 In fact, Debuchi gave Bessedovskii a choice of inducements to offer the Japanese for non-ratification: accommodation in the fishery talks, or withdrawing Borodin from China. Bessedovskii chose the former. As proved by both the documents and history (the failure to ratify), the two parties finally came to a verbal understanding, the Japanese simply postponing the ratification until at least the establishment of Romanian-Soviet relations. The Soviets understood very well the difficult position Japan was in, and renounced their initial insistence that Japan declare outright its non-intent to ratify. Even though Romania or another Power might insist on ratification, they could at any time take action against the Japanese fishery industry or bring other pressures to bear. Both the Soviets and Japan were satisfied with the solution. Japan even tried, during 1938, to make use of the ratification question again in order to solve some of her problems with the Soviets, coincidentally exactly at a time when there were intense discussions over fishery rights. Summing up, the Japanese attitude toward the ratification and the influence of the Soviets over Japan’s failure to ratify could be reduced to six key moments: the Ishii Note (May 1924), the Yoshizawa verbal statement (May 1924), the secret and private exchange of letters between Karakhan and Yoshizawa (January 1925), the Shidehara-Kopp meeting in October 1925 (and the campaign initiated by Kopp for the non-ratification), the Debuchi-Bessedovskii verbal agreement (March 1927), and the Shigemitsu trial balloon (1938).

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Notes 1

Takako Ueta, “The Genoa Conference and Japan: A Lesson in Great-Power Diplomacy” in Genoa, Rapallo, and European Reconstruction in 1922, p. 217. 2 There is also an important amount of information regarding the evolution of Russo-Romanian relations even before the start of the war (JFMA, Fond 1.2.3, 1-82, passim), and on the Bessarabian question and the worsening Russo-Romanian relations during 1917 (JFMA, Fond 5.2.15, 35, passim), proving Japan’s interest with European matters years before achieving its Great Power status. 3 The mentioned 19 syntheses are all located in the file dealing with the Bessarabian Treaty ratification question, B 7.6.0, 2. There are a number of similar descriptions of Bessarabia located in other files too, but the former ones make no reference to the ratification question. 4 Letter Alexandru Vaida-Voevod to Iuliu Maniu, February 20, 1919, quoted in 1920. Un act de justitie. Documente, p. 111. 5 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 9, p. 127. 6 See, for example, JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 1, Telegram Matsui to Uchida, June 24, 1920, in which the US official position regarding the signing of a Bessarabian Treaty is presented in details. Or Telegram Ishii to Uchida, October 15, 1920, which reviews the entire matter while insisting on the negotiations between Take Ionescu and the French diplomats regarding the final form of the Treaty. 7 Although some reports sent by the Japanese representatives in Italy during 1924 mentioned, while describing the press campaign pro and against the ratification, the problem of the Italians landlords expropriated in Bessarabia, there is no connection made to the exchange of letters. JFMA, Fond 1.2.3, 1-147, Report from Rome, March 26, 1924; also JFMA, Fond 1.2.3, 1-151, Telegram from Rome, October 8, 1924. 8 Quoted from the report prepared by Viscount Ishii for Gaimusho during September 1921, in Takako Ueta, “The Upper Silesia question and Japan” in The Establishment of European Frontiers after the Two World Wars, p. 171. 9 For details on his visit to Japan and the numerous festivities organized in his honor see RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, Vol. 46/2, R 2 and JFMA, Fond L 1.3.0, 2-8. Also, an excellent description of the visit, made by one of those accompanying Prince Carol, is presented in C. Gavanescul, Ocolul lumii in sapte luni si o saptamana, Volume 5, “Japonia”, passim. 10 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 1, Memorandum by Kroupenski, November 1920. 11 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 1, Memoire by the Romanian Government regarding Events in Bessarabia, July 24, 1922. 12 RFMA, Fond 71, Special Files, R2, Vol. 46/2, Telegram Averescu to Arion, April 7, 1920. 13 RFMA, Fond 71, Special Files, R2, Vol. 46/2, Report Arion to Prince Carol, January 4, 1921. 14 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 1, Telegram Ishii to Uchida, June 8, 1921. 15 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 1, Telegram Uchida to Ishii, June 23, 1921. 16 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 1, Telegram Ishii to Uchida, March 15, 1922. 17 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 1, Note Hugh Wilson to Tanaka, May 10 and answer from Tanaka, May 12, 1922. 18 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 24, Letter Duca to Genshiro Nishi, October 26, 1923. 19 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 1, Telegram from Bucharest containing a Memoire by Duca on the importance the ratification has over the development of Bessarabia, October 30, 1923. 20 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 24, Letter Nishi to Duca, October 31, 1923. 21 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 1, Letter British Embassy to Gaimusho, November 1923. 22 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 1, Instructions for Ishii, November 27, 1923. 23 The Japanese government seriously analyzed the possibility of acquiring oil from Romania. As soon as 1921, the Japanese Consul General in Hamburg, Morie Ohno, presented a very comprehensive report on Romania, as a result of his trip to Romania during the fall of 1920, in which a really large part is dedicated to the Romanian oil industry (reserves, exploitations, legislation, export).

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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN JFMA, Fond 1.6.3, 17-17, Report on Romania, February 26, 1921. Another proof of Japan’s interest is given by the huge report on the Romanian oil industry (460 pages full of data, statistics, photographs and comments) sent at the end of 1924 from Bucharest. JFMA, Fond 1.7.6, 4-3, Report from Bucharest, December 17, 1924. The main obstacle for the Japanese was the huge transportation cost. 24 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 8, passim. Also, as the Treaty came before the Privy Council, the entire question regarding Japan’s involvement with the Treaty, including the Treaty itself translated into Japanese, is presented in “Records of the Meetings of the Privy Council”, vol. 43 (1927), p. 151-215 25 For example, the Japanese representatives also closely watched the Tatar-Bunar episode or the making of the Autonomous Moldavian SSR. JFMA, Fond 1.6.3, 2-34, November 1924. 26 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 1, Telegrams Tamura (Prague) to Matsui, March 24 and April 3, 1924. 27 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 1, Telegram Horiguchi to Matsui, April 9, 1924. 28 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 183, Telegram de Maneville to Poincare, April 10, 1924, c. 582. 29 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 183, Telegram Pierre de Margerie (Berlin) to Poincare, May 2, 1924, c. 615. 30 Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kikujiro Ishii was Ambassador of Japan to France and also the Japanese representative in the Council of the League of Nations. Later on he published an interesting account of his diplomatic activity, “Diplomatic Commentaries”. 31 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Note by Matsui, April 17, 1924. 32 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Telegrams Horiguchi to Matsui, May 6 and 12, 1924. 33 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Report Horiguchi to Matsui, May 29, 1924. 34 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Telegram Matsui to Ishii, May 8, 1924. 35 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Note Ishii to Duca, May 31, 1924. 36 The Tokyo Nichi Nichi, March 29, 1924. 37 And indeed, his declarations insisting that Japan should not ratify, were published in a number of Japanese newspapers, among which the most influential were Asahi Shinbun and Osaka Maininchi Shinbun, March 31, 1924. 38 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 1, Telegram Matsui to Yoshizawa, May 24, 1924. 39 Although I was not granted access to secret documents existing in the former Soviet Foreign Ministry Archives, Mr. Pavlov, the Chief of the Lecture Hall at the mentioned Archives, was kind enough to look for any documents that might relate the Karakhan-Yoshizawa negotiations with the Bessarabian Treaty question. Unfortunately, the result of his search was a negative one, both him and the person in charge with keeping the archives for the Japanese-Soviet relations stressing out that there were no such documents. 40 A.G. Lensen, Japanese Recognition of the USSR. Soviet-Japanese Relations 1921-1930, p.155. 41 A.G. Lensen, Japanese Recognition . . . , p. 160. 42 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 1, Top secret document on the negotiations for the Article no 4 of Protocol A, not dated, attached to the December 1924 Report on the Bessarabian question. 43 Quoted in Bruce A. Eleman, “The 1925 Soviet-Japanese Secret Agreement on Bessarabia”, in Diplomacy & Statecraft, July 1994, p. 290. 44 The New York Times, January 15, 1925. 45 The Manchester Guardian, January 29, 1925. 46 The Times, January 21, 1925. 47 For the letters see Shigeo Mutsushika, “The Second World War and the Balkans” in Nobuyuki Shiba, Barukan shi, p. 332. 48 However secret was the understanding between Yoshizawa and Karakhan, as soon as 1934 historian P. Milioukow mentions that in 1925, reaching agreement with the Soviet Union on the Sakhalin question, Japan undertook by a secret agreement not to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty, probably based on information he obtained from Bessedovskii. P. Milioukow, La politique exterieure des Soviets, quoted in A. Boldur, Istoria Basarabiei, p. 514. 49 For the Basic Convention and the other documents signed on January 20, 1925, see A.G. Lensen,

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Japanese Recognition . . . , p. 177-191. 50 Less than a month after signing the Basic Convention, unhappy with the turn of events, the Japanese government asked Yoshizawa to remind Karakhan of both the exact content and the private character of the exchange of letters. JFMA, Fond 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 2, Telegram Shidehara to Yoshizawa, February 15, 1925. 51 Shigeo Mutsushika, “The Second …” in Nobuyuki Shiba, Barukan shi, p. 332-333. 52 A.G. Lensen, Japanese Recognition . . . , p. 191. On the other hand, it is a little bit surprising that A.G. Lensen, who had seen the Japanese documents, fails to mention in his book the exchange of letters, as well as the entire Bessarabian question as part of the Russo-Japanese negotiations. 53 Neamul Romanesc, January 22, 1925. 54 JFMA, Fond 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 2, Telegrams Shidehara to Horiguchi, January 22 and 23, 1925. Also Telegram Shidehara to Ishii, February 16, 1925. 55 Actually, the Japanese were preparing a commercial treaty with Romania as soon as 1917, due to the opening of the Romanian Legation in Japan, when they thought that Romania intends to sign a commercial treaty. Their efforts had been canceled by Romania’s armistice with the Central Powers. Before the visit of Prince Carol to Japan, again a new draft for a commercial treaty was prepared, but they were wrong about Carol’s attributions while in Japan. For details see JFMA, Fond 2.5.1, 67, Vol. 1, passim. 56 For the Japanese account of the 1924 negotiations see JFMA, Fond 2.5.1, 67, Vol. 2, passim. For the Romanian account see RFMA, Fond Conventions 2, J 2, Vol. 1, passim. 57 During my research in both, RFMA and JFMA, I found no documents connecting the two events. However, until the Soviet documents are available for study, the possibility that Horiguchi’s intended leave was caused by the events related to the ratification question (not a simple coincidence) should not be excluded. 58 Adevarul, April 6, 1924. 59 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Carp to Duca, December 3, 1925. 60 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 2, Telegram Ochiai to Shidehara, February 23, 1925. 61 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, The November 1932 Report. 62 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 2, Memorandum by Kopp, October 1925. 63 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, The November 1932 Report. 64 DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Telegram Manzoni for Mussolini, November 20, 1926, p. 380. 65 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, Report from the Japanese Embassy in Rome, March 16, 1927. 66 The Times, March 18, 1927. 67 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Langa Rascanu to Mitilineu, March 16, 1927. 68 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Carp to Mitilineu, March 19, 1927. 69 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 189, Telegram Clinchant to Briand, March 8, 1927, c. 701. 70 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, Telegram Mushanokoji to Shidehara, March 9, 1927. A few years later, when Mushanokoji was named Japan’s Ambassador to Berlin, his pro-German sympathies came into light, somehow pointing the reasons for his action against the ratification. 71 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, Telegram Shidehara to Mushanokoji, March 11, 1927. 72 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, Report on matters regarding the Bessarabian Treaty ratification, March 11, 1927. 73 Ambassador Tanaka sent to Tokyo a number of translations from articles published in Izvestia that were dealing with Japan’s attitude towards the ratification, presenting the main Soviet arguments. JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Telegrams Tanaka to Shidehara, March 20 and March 21, 1927. 74 While in Russia, the author of the present paper informally asked the people in charge of the former Soviet Foreign Ministry Archives about the existence of documents pointing to the Bessedovskii-Debuchi or Dovgalevski-Debuchi negotiations, but the answer was the same as regarding the 1925 exchange of letters. 75 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, “The visit of the Russian representative in connection to the Bessarabian Treaty Problem”, March 10, 1927.

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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN 76

G. Bessedovskii, Revelations . . . , p. 151-152. For details on Borodin’s activity in China see Louis Fischer, Russia’s Road from Peace to War, p. 119120, 125-130, 136-139. Also, for a different and more critical, although not necessarily objective view on Borodin’s activities see G. Bessedovskii, Revelations . . . , p. 99, 118-168. 78 According to Fischer, Borodin’s decision to leave China was due to his controversy with Manabendra Nath Roy, the new emissary sent by the Kremlin to China, and due to his frustration over the impasse at Wuhan in July, which permitted neither military success nor revolutionary progress. Louis Fischer, Russia’s Road . . . , p. 139. 79 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, “The visit of the Russian representative in connection to the Bessarabian Treaty Problem”, March 10, 1927. 80 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, Telegram Tanaka to Shidehara, March 22, 1927. 81 A.G. Lensen, Japanese Recognition . . . , p. 257. Interesting is that the agreements had been reached, according to Stomoniakov, because the Japanese decided to accept some of the Russian proposals and renounced to some of their demands, and not vice versa. The fact that the agreements had been reached in favor of the Soviet Union is a little bit troubling and makes us think that Stomoniakov’s letter was simply overstating the real situation, fact proved by the continuation of the BessedovskiiDebuchi negotiations. 82 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, “The visit of the Russian Chargé d’affaires and the fishery question”, not dated but probably March 25, 1927. 83 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, “The visit of the Russian Chargé d’affaires and the fishery question”, not dated but probably March 25, 1927. 84 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, “Discussions with the German Ambassador Regarding the Bessarabian and Fishery Problems”, March 24, 1927. 85 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, “Discussions with the German Ambassador Regarding the Bessarabian and Fishery Problems”, March 24, 1927. 86 See the documents published by Dumitru Hincu in “Problema Basarabiei in arhivele diplomatice germane si austriece. Un tratat uitat”, in Magazin Istoric, 1994. 87 A somehow similar example of friendship between Soviet and German diplomats is that between Brockdorf-Rantzau, the German ambassador in Moscow, and Gheorghi Cicerin. Louis Fischer, Russia’s Road . . . , p. 84. Bessedovskii himself also confirms his friendship with Solf, stating that Solf “was a good friend . . . he did me many services” which means that, indeed, Solf might have acted as an intermediary between Bessedovskii and Debuchi. G. Bessedovskii, Revelations . . . , p. 135. 88 A.G. Lensen, Japanese Recognition . . . , p. 259. The Soviets had clearly opposed the opening of the fishing season on the conditions presented by the Japanese one week earlier, but they suddenly changed their position. Lensen fails to give any explanation for this change, but there can be only one: the ratification question. 89 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, “The visit of the Russian representative and the fishery problem”, not dated but probably March 25, 1927. 90 Interesting is that the treasury was made of gold and the Crown’s Jewels, and not paper money, so that the Soviets did not have to pay back anything to the Romanians, they simply had to return the gold and the jewelries. Problem was that they already spent the gold and sold the jewelries overseas. 91 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, “The visit of the Russian representative and the fishery problem”, not dated but probably March 25, 1927. 92 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, Telegram Tanaka Giichi to Ambassador Tanaka, June 20, 1927. 93 The concessions are detailed in A.G. Lensen, Japanese Recognition . . . , p. 259-260. The Soviet Union agreed to give to the Japanese the right to build and operate an unlimited number of factories for the period of the lease of the respective fishery lots, going further than the Japanese demand that permission be granted for 25 factories; the Soviet Union agreed to exclude the point about labor from Protocol 3 and to delete the demand about the relief of workers in factories; the Soviet Union was lowering considerably the amount deducted per crate of canned goods and was prepared to decrease the 77

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Moldova, a Romanian Province total sum of duties on fish to 30% of the lease fee; limiting the participation of the cooperative and of enterprises with a minority of state capital to the auctions for the fishery lots; the Tsentrosoiuz (the central union of consumers’ cooperative) did not intend to include the fishery in the convention region during the period that the convention was in effect. 94 A.G. Lensen, Japanese Recognition . . . , p. 266. 95 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 189, Telegram Herbette to Briand, January 26, 1928, c. 745. 96 JFMA, Fond M 2.5.0, 4-43, Telegram Mushanokoji to Tanaka, March 9, 1927. 97 L’Independence Romaine, Bucharest, July 13, 1927. 98 As an interesting aspect it should be noted that on September 24, 1935, Radu Flondor, secretary of the Romanian Legation, wrote a paper (necessary in order to be promoted) called “The Japanese Fishing Industry and the Japanese-Russian Controversy over the Fishing Rights in Northern Waters”. The paper proves that, although he studied this topic, he was completely unaware of the connection between the fishing rights and the ratification, meaning that even as the Romanians opened their Legation in Tokyo the information they were able to gather on the ratification question was quite poor. 99 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Petrescu Comnen to Mitilineu, April 26, 1927. 100 Before being named as Romania’s minister to Japan, Vassiliu’s career was spent mostly in the central administration of the Romanian Foreign Ministry. Although he was promoted to a high rank in the ministry, his international experience was very limited and he also had no particular knowledge of Japan. This situation greatly influenced his actions during the first months in Tokyo. 101 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Vassiliu to Titulescu, August 13, 1927. 102 JFMA, Fond M 2.5.0, 4-43, Telegram Mushanokoji to Tanaka, July 26, 1927. 103 RFMA, Personal Files, Ion Aurel Vassiliu, Telegram Vassiliu to Titulescu, July 30, 1927. Also JFMA, Fond M 2.5.0, 4-43, Meeting between Vassiliu and Tanaka, July 28, 1927. 104 RFMA, Personal Files, Ion Aurel Vassiliu, Telegram Vassiliu for Bucharest, August 28, 1927. It is quite known, even nowadays, that when a Japanese official or bureaucrat tells you that your request has been rejected due to existing regulations, any more insisting would only embarrass him. This is one of the first rules any foreigner coming to Japan has to learn (be it the easy or the hard way) and it seems that Vassiliu failed to do his homework. He did not learn much about the Japanese ways of handling different things before and even after coming to Tokyo. On the other hand, if we compare Vassiliu’s accommodation period with that of Bessedovskii (as presented by him in his book and probably exaggerated) the difference is striking. Although this situation might happen to anyone, Vassiliu was supposed to represent Romania in Tokyo and to do it in an honorable manner, particularly since honor was his only argument towards the Japanese. 105 JFMA, Fond 2.5.0, 4-43, Letter Vassiliu to Tanaka, October 25, 1927. 106 RFMA, Personal Files, I.A. Vassiliu, Telegram Vassiliu for Bucharest, October 15, 1927. 107 JFMA, Fond M 2.5.0, 4-43, Invitation for Vassiliu, November 7, 1927. 108 JFMA, E 2-9-0, 1-6-1, Telegram Mushanokoji to Tanaka, September 22, 1927. 109 JFMA, E 2-9-0, 1-6-1, Telegram Mushanokoji reporting on Duca’s note, December 30, 1927. 110 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Vassiliu to Titulescu, November 30, 1927. 111 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Vassiliu to Titulescu, December 13, 1927. 112 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Vassiliu to Titulescu, December 16, 1927. Still, this last argument is at least strange if we consider that the Government was able to convince the Parliament to ratify all the other treaties that it signed, including those imposed on Japan on arms limitation. 113 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegrams Vassiliu to Titulescu, December 18 and 20, 1927. 114 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Vassiliu to Titulescu, December 20, 1927. 115 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Vassiliu to Titulescu, January 1, 1928. 116 Actually Duca met Mushanokoji in a different quality: due to the absence from the country of Foreign Minister Nicolae Titulescu, Duca was also acting Foreign Minister. 117 JFMA, Fond B7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, Telegram Mushanokoji to Tanaka, January 18, 1928. 118 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Duca to Vassiliu, February 27, 1928.

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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN 119

RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Vassiliu to Duca, March 6, 1928. RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Vassiliu to Duca, March 6, 1928. Still, if we remember the Duca-Mushanokoji incident, Duca’s comments are a little bit too harsh on Vassiliu. 121 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Vassiliu for Bucharest, March 16th 1928 122 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Vassiliu to Titulescu, May 31, 1928. 123 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Ad notated on the Telegram Vassiliu to Titulescu, May 31, 1928. 124 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Davidescu to Mironescu, April 14, 1929. 125 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, The November 1932 Report. 126 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Vassiliu to Mironescu, June 15, 1929. 127 JFMA, Fond M 5.2.0, 4-43, Invitation for Stoicescu, July 17, 1929. 128 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Report by Stoicescu, December 4, 1929. 129 In fact, the Foreign Ministry justified Vassiliu’s change on budgetary reasons, sending in a replacement with a lower salary. The same happened in a number of Romanian Legations throughout June: Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Turkey, and Egypt. RFMA, Personal Files, I.A. Vassiliu, Telegram Mironescu to Vassiliu, May 9, 1929. 130 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, “Report on the Opportunity of the Signing a Friendship Treaty between Romania and Japan”, January 31, 1930. 131 Count Adachi Mineichiro arbitrated the Hungarian Optants conflict between Romania (represented by Titulescu) and Hungary in 1923, which ended in a Convention favorable to Romania, and later on he was considered as a friend of Titulescu. For details on the 1923 events see M. Matsushita, Japan in the League of Nations, p. 104-109. Also JFMA, Fond 1.2.3, 1-144, Telegram from London, June 29, 1923. 132 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Stoicescu to Mironescu, December 15, 1930. 133 The Japanese official was the Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs, Yoshida. RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Stoicescu to Mironescu, June 21, 1930. 134 In fact, when he left Japan, he donated the house and land he bought for himself in the famous Nikko resort to the Japanese government, in order to transform it into a Romanian house in Japan, generously offering to continue support a part of the expenses with the house after leaving Japan. It must be admitted that not many diplomats would be willing to do such a gesture. JFMA, Fond M 1.5.0, 3-37, July 1939. 135 Universul, Bucharest, March 11, 1927. The article, published in the aftermath of Italy’s ratification, presents a number of previous Japanese statements regarding the ratification, including Nakamura’s interpellation. 136 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Report on Japan and the Bessarabian Treaty Ratification Problem, February 28, 1931. 137 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Stoicescu to Mironescu, Report on Japan and the Bessarabian Treaty Ratification Question, February 28, 1931. 138 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Report from the Romanian Legation in Washington, July 21, 1931. 139 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Davila to Ghika, February 20, 1932. 140 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Davila to Ghika, April 15, 1932. 141 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Visoianu to Vaida-Voevod, September 9, 1932. 142 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, The November 1932 Report. 143 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, The November 1932 Report. 144 For example, during 1932 a number of telegrams and reports were sent from Riga, Bucharest and Warsaw regarding the Soviet-Romanian negotiations for a non-aggression pact. JFMA, Fond B 1.0.0, R-RU1, passim. 145 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Stoicescu to Titulescu, July 1, 1936. 146 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Titulescu for Bucharest, August 7, 1936. 147 Telegram Titulescu to King Carol, Geneva, February 25, 1932, quoted in Nicolae Titulescu, Diplomatic Documents, p. 395. 148 JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, Final Report regarding “The Bessarabian Treaty Ratification Problem”. 120

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Moldova, a Romanian Province 149

RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Ciuntu to Tatarescu, February 15, 1938. RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Dianu to Petrescu-Comnen, July 30, 1938. 151 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Dianu to Petrescu-Comnen, November 3, 1938. 152 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, “Report on the Opportunity of Obtaining an Eventual Japanese Ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty”, September 2, 1938. 153 As soon as 1902, the Japanese representative in Vienna asked his Romanian counterpart of the possibility of signing a commercial treaty between Japan and Romania. In 1904 the Romanians declined the Japanese proposal, arguing that they are not prepared to upset Russia by signing a treaty with Japan. In 1906 and 1910, Count Makino suggested again negotiations for the signing of a commercial treaty, as a result of clear instructions received from Tokyo, only in order to be refused by the Romanians. JFMA, Fond 2.5.1, 67, passim. 154 RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, “Report on the Opportunity of Obtaining an Eventual Japanese Ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty”, September 2, 1938. 155 JFMA, Fond A 6.0.0, 6-5, Report from Bucharest, October 26, 1939. 156 The author of the present paper is the beneficiary of a very generous scholarship from the Japanese Ministry of Education. During his period as a student, both in Romania and Japan he has focused much of his efforts on the Romanian-Japanese relations making a thorough survey of the Japanese and Romanian mass media and also of historical archives. It is for this particular reason that a detailed survey of Romanian and Japanese press related to the Bessarabian Treaty is presented in the following pages while there are no similar presentations for the relations between Romania and France, Britain or Italy. 157 Neamul Romanesc, Bucharest, April 6, 1924. 158 Argus, Bucharest, April 4, 1924. 159 The visit was described by all the Romanian press, making the first page of the newspapers like Universul, Adevarul, or Neamul Romanesc during the first days of April 1924. 160 Adevarul, Bucharest, April 5, 1924. 161 The Japanese Ambassador to Berlin expresses this opinion during a conversation with his French counterpart. RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 183, Telegram Pierre de Margerie to Poincare, May 2, 1924, c. 615. 162 Universul, December 25, 1924. 163 Adevarul, January 8, 1925. 164 Neamul Romanesc, January 22, 1925. 165 Universul, January 23, 1925. 166 Adevarul, January 23, 1925. 167 Adevarul, January 24, 1925. 168 Adevarul, February 21, 1925. 169 Adevarul, March 10, 1927. Also, Argus, March 20, 1927. 170 Universul, March 11, 1927. 171 Universul, March 26, 1927. 172 Adevarul, June 1, 1927. 173 For example “The Christening in Japan”, published in Universul, March 11, 1927. 174 The Japan Times, October 30, 1920. 175 The Japan Times, March 18, 1924. 176 Tokyo Nichi Nichi, Asahi Shinbun, April 4, 1924. 177 Asahi Shinbun, March 19 and April 1, 1924. Tokyo Nichi Nichi, April 11, 1924. 178 Tokyo Nichi Nichi, March 29, 1924. 179 For example, “Russia’s Manner. The Bessarabian Question and Karakhan’s Request”, in Asahi Shinbun, March 31, 1924. 180 Tokiji (Jiji) Shinbun, March, 21, 1927. Tokyo Nichi Nichi, March 22, 1927. 150

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Tokyo Nichi Nichi, March 20, 1927. Nippon Dempo United Press, March 19, 1927. 183 “Romania Marches Toward Republicanism”, by Karl H. Von Wiegand on March 13, and “What Romania Needs” by C.A. Macartney, reproduced from Foreign Affairs, on March 17, 1927. 184 Osaka Mainichi, March 28, 1927. 185 Yamato Shinbun, March 16, 1927. 186 “Japanese Treaty Action” in The Japan Advertiser, March 10, 1927. 187 The Japan Advertiser, March 23, 1927. 188 “Japan and Bessarabia” in The Japan Advertiser, March 23, 1927. 189 See, for example, Tokyo Nichi Nichi, July 21, 1933. Also Asahi Shinbun, July 21, 1933. 190 Ian Nish, “A Japanese Diplomat Looks at Europe, 1920-39” in European Studies on Japan, p. 135. 191 According to the instructions sent by Uchida, the Foreign Minister at the time, “the Japanese delegates were to oppose any recognition of the Bolshevik government or any financial assistance until Moscow accepted the repayment of its debts”. Quoted in Takako Ueta, “The Genoa Conference and Japan” in A Missed Opportunity . . . , p. 222-223. 192 Takako Ueta, “The Upper Silesia Question and Japan” in The Establishment of Frontiers . . . , p. 172-174. 193 The increasing pressure coming from the Japanese fishermen over the Government for obtaining the Soviet agreement regarding the opening of the new fishing season was difficult to bear by the Government. During the fishery negotiations, aimed at reaching a broader agreement, the Soviets had successfully used their opposition to the opening of a new fishing season, arguing that at first a new Fishing Agreement should be reached. As the negotiations moved on quite slowly and the beginning of the fishing season was closer and closer, the Japanese were able to obtain a change in the Soviet diplomacy, which allowed the fishermen to start fishing on the same conditions as during the previous year (meaning no new auctions for the fishing lots – less money to be paid by the Japanese fishing companies), and by this taking off some of the pressure the Government had to bear from the fishermen. 182

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Of all the Great Powers that played a direct or indirect role in the Bessarabian question, except for the Soviet Union, the United States was by far the biggest obstacle to Romania during the interwar period. It is by no means easy to ascertain the reasons behind the US policy, and many previous scholars for various reasons have preferred to either portray it in brighter colors than seems appropriate to this writer, or have failed to mention it at all. Therefore, in order to articulate a different opinion regarding the US policy on Bessarabian, this chapter will go into considerable detail (despite the topic’s slight removal from the question of the Treaty itself).1 The US followed two distinct policies on the Bessarabian question before World War Two. The first (chronologically) approved Romania’s action in Bessarabia and acknowledged that Bessarabia should belong to Romania. The second was expressed for the first time in May 1919 when the US Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, announced that, in the view of President Wilson, there should be no modification regarding the territory belonging to the former Russian Empire without the approval of a recognized Russian government. The new policy not only blocked any recognition by the Peace Conference of Romania’s rights to Bessarabia but also, after the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty, was directed against Romanian interests by clearly indicating the US refusal to even de facto recognize Bessarabia’s union (through the inclusion of Bessarabia into the general Russian immigration quota). It was only in 1931 that the US Government, pressured by the Romanians, decided to create a special immigration quota for Bessarabia. And in 1933, in a very secretive and disputable manner, the immigration quota for Bessarabia was incorporated into the general quota for Romania. Therefore, we are left with three main questions. What was behind the sudden change in the American position regarding the Bessarabian question in May 1919? Why did it take the US fifteen years to recognize a de facto situation2 or, in other words, to end a situation of “public discrimination” against Romania, and even then

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Moldova, a Romanian Province in such a way that it might have been turned against Romania at any time? And finally, how is it that the Romanian government accepted this situation without a struggle, for years? Romanian-US Relations During the War Before the war, the Romanian government had no representative in the US; it was only in 1917 that a Romanian Legation was established in Washington (by the same decree law a Romanian Legation was established in Tokyo). By contrast, the US already had a Minister in Romania at the beginning of the war.3 During 19131920, the US Minister to Romania was Charles J. Vopicka. His activities were clearly directed in favor of Romanian interests. Born in Bohemia, he had a deep-seated hostility toward the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the sympathy he expressed for the achievement of the Romanian national aspirations in Transylvania made him genuinely popular with the Romanian people.4 He had a positive influence on the development of bilateral relations and left an interesting account of his mission to Romania and Serbia in a book of memoirs published in 1921 and tellingly titled, Secrets of the Balkans. Acting in more or less the opposite direction were the efforts of William H. Andrews, the US Chargé d’affaires in Jassy while Vopicka was absent.5 During his forced return to the US at the beginning of 1917 (as a result of German complaints), Vopicka worked intensely on behalf of Romania. When he went back to Romania and saw the disastrous effects of the Russian Revolution on the Romanian front, during the fall and winter 1917-18, he did everything possible to keep Romania in the war and to revitalize the Russian Army (what remained of it) on the Eastern front. Starting with the summer of 1917, American relief funds were available for Romania. A number of groups and associations had been established in the US, comprised of Romanian-Americans or of Americans willing to help Romania. Romania had received, by March 1918, the third largest allocation of American assistance, exceeded only by France and Armenia.6 In addition, considerable propaganda was produced in favor of the Romanian cause. It is not a surprise that members of the Inquiry panel held numerous consultations during 1918 with Vasile Stoica, the Transylvanian emissary sent to US by the Romanian government.7 Part of the American press was on Romania’s side in 1918, and showed a clear understanding of the trap Romania was in that forced her to sign a separate peace. As a result of this propaganda, by the time of the Paris Peace Conference, American public opinion generally lay with Romania.8 However, pro-Romanian sympathies in the US were at a much lower level than those reserved for the Polish, Serb, or Czech peoples. The US policy played an indirect but important role in the Romanian decision to make peace with the Central Powers. At first, the American entry into war was received with great enthusiasm, Bratianu considering that the US policy towards Austria-Hungary was in line with the opinions expressed by Vopicka. He decided to open a Romanian Legation in the US but, due to the difficulty of transportation, it

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was only in January 1918 that the first Romanian minister, Dr. Constantin Angelescu, was able to present his credentials. Of course, the Romanians’ first objective was to obtain the US approval, if not signature, for the Romanian territorial claims comprised in the August 1916 Treaty between Romania and the Entente. But in this question they were to be disappointed; the Americans were unprepared to agree to those claims, especially as they were not at war with Austria-Hungary. All they were willing to offer Romania during 1917 was a loan of some five million dollars, which Romania was not able to avail herself of due to the absence of a Romanian Minister in Washington to sign for it.9 The Romanian hopes of obtaining the US blessing for their territorial claims received quite a cold shower at the end of November 1917, in the message sent by President Wilson to King Ferdinand. He stated, “I wish to assure Your Majesty that the US will support Romania after the war to the best of its ability and that, in any final negotiations for peace, it will use its constant efforts to see to it that the integrity of Romania as a free and independent nation is adequately safeguarded”.10 In the Romanian view, that fell far short of what the occasion required, and their decision to sign the armistice at the beginning of December 1917 was at least indirectly influenced by the American position. The timing was particularly bad when the Romanians received news of President Wilson’s famous speech of January 1918. When the Wilsonian points reached the Romanian government, Vopicka reported the reaction: “The Romanian government proclaims that if Romania should now have her occupied territory returned, without occupying Transylvania, there is no necessity to stay in the war any further”.11 One of the controversies regarding the US position towards the future peace has to do with the process of the crafting of the 14 Wilsonian points, with an accent on both the influence of the Inquiry12 and on President Wilson’s own position, with Colonel House somewhere in the middle. Still, although the American literature agrees that the 14 points were definitely the result of American thinking, the view differs among scholars of different origins.13 It is not the purpose of the work to analyze either the degree of influence the Inquiry had over the President in preparing the speech or the conflict between the State Department and the President on this matter.14 Among the 14 Wilsonian points, the two referring to Austria-Hungary and the Balkans were of particular interest for Romania. The first, actually Point No. 10, emphasized that the peoples of Austria-Hungary should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.15 There was no suggestion either of breaking up Austria-Hungary, or of making any territorial adjustment with its neighbors. This was a serious blow for the Romanians. Point No. 11 was along the same lines, simply stating that Romania should be evacuated, her territory restored and that “the relationship among of the several Balkan states to one another should be determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality”.16 As there are no such lines in the

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Balkans, the last phrase really meant nothing. In these conditions any incentive for the Romanians to keep on fighting had been lost, their main aim in the war being clearly wiped out by the American peace proposal. From the viewpoint of the French and British governments the President had put his foot into the Romanian situation at a most inopportune time, when, even after the Romanian armistice of December 9, 1917, they were still battling to keep Romania in the war. The implications of President Wilson’s decision to plead for the integrity of Austria-Hungary instead of giving a free hand to the nationalities living in the Empire have been presented by many scholars and what becomes clear is that the only concrete result was the prolongation of the war by at least a few months.17 The proposals made by the Inquiry were even worse for Romania than the presidential points. The Inquiry Report stated: “No just or lasting settlement of the tangled problems confronting the deeply wronged peoples of the Balkans can be based upon the arbitrary Treaty of Bucharest [of 1913] . . . the area annexed by Romania in the Dobrudja is almost surely Bulgarian in character and should be returned.”18 Apart from the fact that the history of the US itself contravenes such argumentation (when Texas was taken from Mexico it was almost surely Mexican in character), it seems that the Inquiry members were not really aware who were the US allies (Romania, Serbia, Greece) and who were the US enemies in the war. Realizing how the Balkans might react to such a proposal, President Wilson was wise enough not to take the advice of the Inquiry on this matter. The US insisted that Romania should not make a separate peace, suggesting the evacuation of the Romanian authorities and army in Russia. However, the 1916 Treaty with Romania did not bind the US, so they had no obligations toward the Romanians. While Dr. Constantin Angelescu was presenting his credentials as the first Romanian Minister to the US, Wilson showed his opinion once more. When Angelescu tried to raise the issue of Romanians living under foreign rule, the President simply ignored his attmept.19 Still, as a result of French pressure, generated by the need to keep Romania in war, the US representatives had to soften their position. Although they remained unbending in their refusal to join the other Great Powers in guaranteeing Romania’s territorial claims, they made a statement to the French Ambassador, later forwarded to the Romanians too, on February 21, 1918, offering to help Romania maintain her political and territorial integrity and to provide the necessary means to maintain the Romanian government and army, whether located within or outside the national territorial limits of Romania.20 In view of the traditional American aloofness from East European affairs, this declaration was a far-reaching commitment, but it failed to impress the Romanians.21 Regarding the Bessarabian question, the President took a position for the first time in early May 1918. As a reaction to a rumor spread by the Central Powers, that the US had given Austria a free hand in the Balkans, a denial was prepared by President Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing. They said, “The government of the

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United States has not and will not commit itself to a policy which denies the rights of small nations and recognizes in Austria-Hungary a supremacy which it does not and ought not to possess.”22 In the same context, the Allied Ministers in Jassy advised their governments to welcome sympathetically the union of Bessarabia with Romania. But when the President analyzed the matter on May 1, 1918, he was not ready to approve the union of Bessarabia with Romania, at least not before he had more information available on the matter. In his words, “I would very much like to know whether there are not some serious complications involved in the case. Are we sure that Bessarabia is willing and that the union is one which we should wish in any case to advocate and approve?”23 His position was reinforced a few days later by the decision of the other Entente Powers to postpone a final decision regarding Bessarabia’s union, although they had different reasons for this postponement. After the signing of the Peace Treaty between Romania and the Central Powers in Bucharest (May 7, 1918) the State Department deferred consideration of the question of Romanian national unification until the end of the war, even while it recognized the claims of other subject peoples of Austria-Hungary and encouraged their movements for freedom or unification.24 Apart from the appeals made by Vopicka, the only intervention in favor of the Romanian cause came from George D. Herror, a confidant of President Wilson. On May 25, 1918, he sent a memorandum to the State Department in which he blamed the Bucharest Peace on the Allied failure to adequately assist Romania.25 The Romanians did not abandon their cause with the US representatives. On July 5, 1918, Vasile Stoica founded the Romanian National League of America and intensified his pressure on both the War Department (for a Transylvanian Legion) and the State Department. He was joined in his pressure by the Romanian Chargé d’affaires, Alexandru Lahovary.26 Starting in October 1918, Vopicka intensified his efforts to convince his Government that it was necessary to adopt a policy favorable to the Romanians in Transylvania.27 In accordance with the Cobb-Lippman Memorandum of October 29, 1918, and also already having the backing of Vaida-Voevod’s statement in the Hungarian Parliament (made in the name of the Romanians living in Transylvania and asking for their independence),28 Secretary of State Lansing sent a message stating the official position of the US towards Romania, on November 5, 1918: The Government of the US is not unmindful of the aspirations of the Romanian people without as well as within the boundaries of the Kingdom. It has witnessed their struggles and sufferings and sacrifices in the cause of freedom from their enemies and their oppressors. With the spirit of national unity and the aspirations of the Romanians everywhere the Government of the US deeply sympathizes and will not neglect at the proper time to exert its influence so that the just political and territorial rights of the Romanian people may be obtained and made secure from all foreign aggression.29

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The Romanian reaction to the American position was one of joy and gratitude. November 1918 was, in a way, the beginning of a short honeymoon in the RomanianUS relations. And there is nothing more appropriate to describe the Romanian feelings toward the US than the letter sent by Queen Marie of Romania to Vopicka: I saw with the greatest satisfaction the message issued at Washington by Mr. Lansing, concerning the fulfillment of the aspirations of the Romanian Nation. The terms of this message are what we always expected from the noble American people and Mr. Wilson, their eminent President, who have entered this war for the rights and liberties of all nations, small and great, in order to establish a new order of things in this world on a humanitarian and righteous basis . . . I beg you to convey also on my behalf to the President and Mr. Lansing, my heartfelt thanks . . . for their interest in the justice of the Romanian cause.30 The aforementioned Cobb-Lippman Memorandum of October 29, 1918, prepared in order to readjust the 14 points, states for Romania: In any case the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest must be cancelled as palpably fraudulent . . . Transylvania will undoubtedly join Romania, but provisions must be made for the protection of Magyars, Szeklers and Germans who constitute a large minority . . . Romania will have acquired the Dobrudja, Bessarabia and probably Transylvania . . . Bulgaria should clearly have her frontier in the Southern Dobrudja as it stood before the Second Balkan War. . . . [As to Russia] The first question is whether Russian territory is synonymous with territory belonging to the former Russian Empire. This is clearly not so . . . what is recognized as valid for the Poles will certainly have to be recognized for the Finns, the Lithuanians, the Letts and perhaps also for the Ukrainians . . . the recognition by the Peace Conference of a series of de facto governments representing Finns, Esths, Lithuanians, Ukrainians. This primary act of recognition should be conditional upon the calling of national assemblies for the creation of de facto governments, as soon as the peace conference has drawn frontiers for these new states.31 The final recommendations regarding Romania made by the Inquiry Commission and handed to President Wilson in January 1919 stipulated that: 1. Transylvania should be accorded to Romania, with the exception of the cities where the majority of the population was Magyar (Arad, Oradea, Satu Mare). 2. The Banat should be divided on an ethnic basis, with the necessary accent on economic and political criteria. 3. Romania should cede the southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria.32 This was

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the most unsuccessful point on the American agenda. There was no way to convince Romania to simply give away a part of the territory it had already possessed before the war. 4. Certain ethnic Romanian parts of Crisana (northwest of Transylvania) and Bukovina should belong to Romania. In the end, because of the failure to establish a so-called Ruthenian state, Romania acquired almost all of Bukovina. 5. International control would be established over the Danube and over the railroads crossing Hungary. The discussions regarding the status of the Danube continued long after the Peace Conference ended. 6. All of Bessarabia should belong to Romania.33 It was stated that: Bessarabia was once part of Romania (14th century to 1812; 1856-1878) and is quite predominantly Romanian in its character. The idea of detaching the northern and southeastern corners (Hotin and Ackerman respectively) and giving them to the Ukraine is unwise, since it would break up an historic province and abandon a good natural frontier, the River Dniestr, on account of relatively new Ukrainian colonies.34 One other Inquiry document asserted: “The outstanding fact of the Bessarabian issue is unquestionably the close racial and linguistic connection of a large and fairly well-defined part of the population with Romania”.35 This was the only point where the American policy changed radically during the Peace Conference without any overt pressure from the other Powers. These proposals show that the US intention was to simply ignore the 1916 Treaty with Romania and to make peace based on other considerations. When the Romanians realized what stance the Americans were taking at the Peace Conference, it was the end of a very brief honeymoon. The first disappointment for Romania was her placement among states with limited interests. But as for Bessarabia, at the beginning of the Peace Conference and during the deliberations of the Territorial Commission on Romania, the American experts agreed that Bessarabia should belong to Romania. After the hostilities had ended, Vopicka worked tirelessly to get American relief supplies sent to Romania; he was so effective that Acting Secretary of State Frank Lyon Polk recalled him to Paris in 1919 for consultations over what he considered an excessively pro-Romanian attitude. Polk wrote: “Vopicka is far too enthusiastic in his admiration for the Romanians; I may let him go next week, but by that time he will be sufficiently educated not to be too enthusiastic every time the Romanians’ name is mentioned.”36

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Romanian-US Relations During the Peace Conference Relations between Romania and the Peace Conference were severely strained starting in April, as a direct result of the Hungarian crisis, and it was in this context that the American policy on Bessarabia shifted. The declaration made by Secretary of State Robert Lansing during a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers on May 8, 1919, signaled the change. What inspired this policy shift, and why was the US so adamant in adhering to the new view, considering Bessarabia as Russian territory for the entire interwar period? The US position regarding Bessarabia was affected by Romania’s attitude towards the Peace Conference and, implicitly, the US representatives; but even more so by the Russian question in broader terms, including the conflict between the White Russians and the Bolsheviks, and the Japanese factor. But before examining these questions, we must consider the relationships within the US delegation at the Peace Conference, representing the US in the different commissions, and President Wilson. Before the May 8 declaration on Bessarabia, the American experts had always agreed that Bessarabia should belong to Romania and that, in exchange, Romania need only offer sufficient guarantees to the minorities living there. On the other hand, neither President Wilson nor Secretary Lansing had declared, at any point, that Bessarabia should belong to Romania; they had kept silent on that question. That might lead to the conclusion that there was no change of policy regarding Bessarabia, rather that perhaps the President never had considered the territory as belonging to Romania. Some scholars argue that Wilson took the important decisions by himself and that, in fact, the experts had little or no influence over him. On the other hand, members of the American peace delegation said that the President asked for their advice repeatedly and made his decisions based on that advice.37 In that case, Bessarabia would be one of the very few cases in which the President not only refused to follow the advice of his experts but directly interfered, canceling their previous decisions in the territorial commissions. Still, whatever the differences between President Wilson and his advisors, this author finds it quite unlikely that the experts could have voted twice in favor of Bessarabia’s union with Romania without having at least the tacit agreement of the President. But when Wilson realized that it was no longer in the American interest to have Bessarabia joined to Romania, he simply opposed the union. Wilson’s approach to the peacemaking process set its stamp on the American delegation at the Peace Conference. Although he proclaimed the need for open discussions, in his wish to bring about a real peace, based on the ideals of democracy and self-determination, Wilson found himself in a more or less dictatorial position.38 As for the real influence of the territorial committees on the final settlement, opinions are divided. As Ivo J. Lederer states:

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The territorial committees were created on the theory that territorial disputes not directly involving immediate Great Power interests should be submitted to the judgment of technical experts in the interest of objectivity. . . . When finally approved, however, the committees were haphazardly appointed (and subsequently treated) and their work suffered from imprecise instructions as to their tasks and methods. The experts were naively enjoined to disregard political considerations in all their proceedings, a lofty objective which, as the Italians realistically warned, was quite impossible to fulfill.39 The way the US delegation was formed caused many problems. Not only did Wilson refuse to allow Republican members of the Congress to attend the Peace Conference (a refusal that later cost him dearly, when the Congress decided not to ratify the Peace Treaties), but he also alienated the officials of the State Department, who expected to lead the peace negotiations. In his favor Charles Seymour, a member of one of the committees, noted, “The State Department people are much vexed to see these jobs go to the amateurs, but really our system of government is such that there are no State Department people who could hold their own when it comes to command of facts; this sounds rather egotistic, but the small roster of regulars simply doesn’t know enough”.40 Instead, Wilson used the members of the Inquiry, whom he could control much more easily than the Republicans or the officials in the State Department. These experts were to provide him with information — but they also had to represent US interests at the Conference, which they were not necessarily the best prepared to do.41 And, indeed, the case of Bessarabia proves it: they made no protest over the President’s decision canceling their efforts to attribute Bessarabia to Romania.42 Taking all the decisions on himself, Wilson alienated not only a great part of the European public opinion (blaming him for the failures of the peace conference) but also the American public opinion. Analyzing the May 8 change of policy from the standpoint of US-Romanian relations, we will begin by looking at the Romanian attitude towards the Peace Conference. Seeking to bring Romania to heel, the Great Powers seized on Bessarabia as an excellent tool; for before May 8, there were two events that may have turned the balance against the Romanians. On May 6, Romania sent an ultimatum to Bela Kun, calling for an armistice between the two armies; this was refused by the Hungarians but it provoked the Great Powers who had no desire to see Romania imposing her own terms on her neighbor. The other event was related to the question of oil. It was the French representatives brought the oil question up for debate, asking for a privileged position in the exploitation of Romanian resources, but the US representatives were very keen to have a similar position. In the words of Bratianu, one of the US representatives, Baruch, said: His country could not agree that, through agreements directed against her interests, we shall give to other countries exclusive concession over the petro-

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Moldova, a Romanian Province leum and that, in such a case, their relief funds for Romania would cease and that they will also stop helping us on any other matters.43 This was the beginning of a new controversy between Romania and the Great Powers, this time one in which the US intended to take an active part. However, although one Romanian historian argues, “this question of petroleum . . . is the key to all the events that followed”,44 the Romanian oil question had only just surfaced and the chances that it could have influenced the May 8 change are scant, even though it certainly played a role during the following months. On the other hand, the ultimatum and subsequent action in Hungary are not enough to explain the US change of policy; therefore, we must also consider it from a broader perspective, that of US-Russian relations. Since the beginning of the Peace Conference, relations between Romania and the Supreme Council had slipped from good to bad to worse. The American representatives became, for many reasons, Romania’s stiffest opponents at the Peace Conference. Their inexperience in the ways of European diplomacy played a role: France and Great Britain, even when they agreed with the US stand against Romanian interests, were wise enough to stay in the shadows and let the US bear the brunt of Romania’s discontent. Therefore, whenever the Council decided something against the Romanian interests, it was always the American representatives who seemed to be in the fore. The French, British and Italian representatives knew that they need Romania much more than the Americans did, and they were too canny to join them openly in statements regarding decisions against Romania. This relationship between Romania and the Conference changed in December 1919, when a new Romanian government came into power and Romania decided to comply with some of the Council’s demands. Coincidentally, this was exactly the same moment when the American delegation was about to leave the Peace Conference. Less than two weeks after the American withdrawal, the Conference decided to authorize the resumption of commercial relations with Romania. Romanian-US relations at the beginning of the Peace Conference had not been bad at all. To the contrary: the Romanians, like many other European nations, hoped that the US representatives would bring the necessary support for their territorial claims, which were based on the principle of self-determination. The first contacts between the American delegates and the Romanians went quite well and it seemed that there would be a good collaboration. Still, the Romanians sized up the Americans based on Vopicka’s attitude, but (due to the very recent opening of a Romanian Legation in the US and to its minimal activity) lacked a clear image of the real purposes of, and the relations within, the US delegation. On the other hand, the American delegation had no broad understanding of the genesis of the terms “Balkanism” and “Balkanization”, failing to appreciate just how complicated the situation really was in the area. The Romanians were but one of the very proud Balkan nations and had in mind only one thought: Greater Romania. One more fact greatly influencing Romanian-US relations was the conflict of interests between the Great Powers

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themselves with regard to different aspects of the peace settlement. A good account of the first private meetings between members of the Romanian delegation and US representatives is presented by one of those who took an active part in the events, Charles Seymour. Starting in January, the Americans had already been invited to a number of receptions by the Romanians and they took advantage of those meetings in order to better understand the Romanian position at the Conference.45 Unfortunately, only the low-level members of the American delegation took part in these informal meetings and the three most powerful members of the US delegation (Wilson, Lansing and Colonel House), with very few exceptions, did not take the time for a private discussion with Romanian representatives. Still, it was exactly these low-level American delegates that represented the US in the territorial commissions and who decided in favor of Bessarabia’s union with Romania. Although at the beginning the US representatives initiated contacts with Take Ionescu, the leader of the Romanian Conservative Party and one of Romania’s leading diplomats (but not a member of the official Romanian delegation), soon after the arrival of the delegation they met with Ion I.C. Bratianu a few times.46 Still, there were only a limited number of meetings and, as soon as each side understood what the other side’s position was, these private meetings became more and more infrequent. It would be hard to say how much influence these contacts had on the general attitude of the US delegation towards the Romanian position. However, at the time of those meetings, Romanian-US relations were still friendly, even though there were some differences of opinion on various matters. But, once the serious business began, with the drawing of new borders, the Hungarian question and so on, the atmosphere between the two delegations changed dramatically. A clear sign of this cooling in relations came during the meetings of Romania’s Queen Marie with President Wilson and Secretary Lansing.47 Upset that the meetings did not go as she had hoped, Queen Marie gave a very interesting characterization of President Wilson, after they had dinner together on April 11 (one of the very few occasions in which President Wilson met a Romanian representative in a private setting): He is always convinced that he is right [not unlike many another American president]. He preached to me how to deal with the minorities. I was especially surprised by the pleasure he had in listening to himself. I timidly suggested that he must be familiar with these difficulties because of the presence of Blacks and Japanese in the US. To this, he smiled politely and declared that he has no knowledge whatsoever of the existence of a Japanese problem in the US.48 Still, the best illustration of the cooling relations between the Romanian and the US delegations belongs to President Wilson. Annoyed by what was called the “little revolution” initiated by the representatives of the so-called “states with limited interests”,49 during the debate regarding the Minorities Treaty, on May 31, 1918, President Wilson stated:

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In those circumstances is it unreasonable that the US should insist upon being satisfied that the settlements are correct? Mr. Bratianu — and I speak of his suggestions with utmost respect — suggested that we could not, so to say, invade the sovereignty of Romania, an ancient sovereignty, and make certain prescriptions with regard to the rights of minorities. But I beg him to observe that he is overlooking the fact that he is asking the sanction of the Allied and Associated Powers for great additions of territory which come to Romania by the common victory of arms, and that, therefore, we are entitled to say, “If we agree to these additions of territory, we have the right to insist upon certain guarantees of peace”.50 Even in the 21st century, it would be difficult to find a Romanian who could agree with President Wilson’s statement. Even now, as in 1919, it insults Romania’s sovereignty. The statement clearly cut off anything that may have been left of Romania’s hopes for American receptivity. It comes as no surprise that the Romanians saw the US representatives as their chief adversaries in Paris, with President Wilson as quarterback. Even Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, a moderate political leader, characterized Wilson in the aftermath of the May 31 speech, as “the most hypocritical political impostor”.51 The US attitude towards Romania continued to erode during 1919. Still, during the months to come, despite the temptation, the Americans unlike the other Great Powers steadfastly refused to use the Bessarabian question in order to prod the Romanians into compliance with the Peace Conference. They tried every other ploy to persuade them to get in line, while protecting their own interests in Romania. They tried: 1.

2. 3.

A commercial blockade. Polk had no doubt that the Romanians would “behave” as long as the embargo was enforced,52 but even that was not so. Continuous propaganda favoring the cession of southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria. Territorial blackmail, by threatening to block the return of Bukovina and even Transylvania to Romania.

There are many examples of these intentions. On November 12, 1919, after the Romanian reply to the Note of October 20 was received, Frank Polk “said that he had always felt that if Romania refused to accede to the very reasonable demands of the Council, she should not have Transylvania given to her. He thought that such action was entirely too generous.”53 This remark is at best strange, as it means that Romania would receive Transylvania as a bonus for good behavior and not because of the existing realities in that province. They also tried:

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4. Threatening to send the US Fleet to the Black Sea, in order to make a show of force against Romania. 5. Opposition to any modifications regarding the Minorities Treaty.54 6. Threatening to break off diplomatic relations, by the ultimatum Note of November 15, 1919. 7. Threatening to cut the American relief funds and products for Romania. In fact, on July 1919 the ARA’s assistance to Romania ceased, while continuing for other European countries until 1921.55 8. Leveraging the Romanian war debt to the US to enhance the future position of the American economic interests in Romania, by demanding the “Bratianu guarantees” of May 17, 1919. These stipulate that the Romanian government would not offer any concession that might prejudice the US government or the US citizens to other governments and their subjects until the Romanian government had liquidated its entire debt to the US government.56 Additionally, when the other Great Powers suggested the use of Bessarabia as a mean of influencing Romania (for example, the Italian proposal to recognize Romanian rights in Bessarabia if Romania would agree to the cession of southern Dobrudja), the American representatives were the only ones opposed to such a plan, although they clearly realized that Bessarabia would be an effective tool.57 The fact that the US representatives were willing to make use of all the means at their disposal in order to press the Romanians into agreeing to the decisions taken by the Conference except for Bessarabia suggests that the US saw Bessarabia as relating to a different part of the game, to something beyond Romania. One of the main reasons for the rapid decline in relations between Romania and the Peace Conference, particularly the US delegation, was the Romanian Army’s attitude during the occupation of Hungary. The American representatives became the champions defending Hungarian interests, which certainly added to the antiAmerican feeling in Romania. The reports sent by the American representative in the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control in Budapest, General Bandholtz, are the best illustration of their much-exaggerated preoccupation with the Romanian requisitions in Hungary.58 The American representatives, headed by Frank Lyon Polk,59 took at face value any information coming from Hungarian sources. They failed to understand that the power of the Conference derived from its unity, which was more and more difficult to achieve. The Romanians knew that the military power of the Conference in Central Europe was weak and they exploited the contradictions between the Great Powers to promote their own interests. They also had the backing of at least a part of the French team, and of Italy. Whenever a new report on the Hungarian situation came before the Conference, the American representatives were the first to ask for measures against Romania, while both France and Italy sought to weaken the proposed American measures. It should not come as a surprise that the Romanian pub-

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Moldova, a Romanian Province lic soon lost all enthusiasm for the Americans, especially as the Romanian press was almost entirely under the control of the leading Liberal Party (Bratianu’s party). It’s no wonder that, in this situation, “the US delegation, increasingly impatient to be through with its work, manifested growing anger toward Romania, if that were possible, and impatience with the Allies. . . . Bratianu for his part hoped to delay until the exasperated Americans withdrew, leaving a much more pliable, diminished, Council behind”.60 At last, during September 1919, the American Commissioner in Paris finally began to understand how things were working regarding Romania and expressed his frustration. During the September 2, 1919, meeting of the Council of Heads of Delegations, Polk said that: The Romanians had now been defying the Conference for an entire three weeks, and had given no answer to the numerous communications sent to them. Every kind of Note had been sent to them . . . Each style had failed to produce any result, and he thought that the time for sending notes was now over . . . It was inconceivable to [him] that Romania should defy the Council, which had behind it the support of three Great European Powers, without receiving encouragement from some quarter or another.61 The next day, September 3, Polk complained again: The Romanians regard America as their number one enemy. A distinguished Romanian has informed an American of this. When told that all the communications sent to the Romanian Government had been sent collectively from all the Allied and Associated Powers, in reply he drew attention to the views expressed in the French Press.62 However, it was not only the Hungarians or Jews that had the protection of the American representatives. Polk expressed his “friendly” position on certain other matters relating to Romania too, and made himself the first to listen to complaints expressed by the Bessarabian Russians and placing them on the agenda for the Council of Heads of Delegations. Another factor wearing on relations between the US representatives in Paris and the Romanians was the Minorities Treaty. In November, the Romanians finally agreed to sign the Treaty, but attached a number of conditions. They asked for the elimination from the preamble of all references to the 1878 Treaty of Berlin (by which the Great Powers recognized Romania’s independence, but in which special articles referring to the treatment of the Jewish population had been inserted). The United States alone was opposed to this request. Going further, when the Romanians seemed ready a sign a modified Minorities Treaty, they asked for the suppression of articles 10 and 11, granting special protection to the Jews, arguing that the Jews living in Romania have the same rights as all the other Romanian citizens and that

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there is no need for the Great Powers to interfere in Romanian internal matters in order to protect the Jews. The majority in the Committee of New States, charged with negotiating with the Romanian representatives, was in favor of the elimination of both articles; the American Delegation alone reserved judgment on this point.63 Finally, and only as a result of the pressure exercised by the other Powers and because of their withdrawal from the Conference, the American delegation agreed with the Romanian requests and signed the Treaty in a modified form, on December 9, 1919. Still, the most eloquent expression of the 1919 collapse of US-Romanian relations is found in the correspondence between Frank Lyon Polk and the Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, in the weeks prior to the American withdrawal from the Peace Conference. In one of his telegrams, Polk states: As to Bessarabia, the British and French showed a disposition to discuss the matter and in some way to hand over this territory to Romania. I made two objections to this plan. First, that I do not think now is the time to discuss the dismemberment of the Russian Empire and, second, that I think it would be a fatal mistake to consider giving Romania any more territory in view of its defiant attitude. I think the European Governments will agree with me on the first point, but if Romania by any chance shows itself to be more reasonable, which I very much doubt, it may be that the question of their being given some sort of a mandate on Bessarabia will come up.64 And in another telegram, November 30: Treaty with Hungary . . . You could also state with some emphasis that if the Supreme Council had only taken a firm stand with Romania in August, as had been urged by the US Government, the Hungarian and Romanian questions would have been settled long ago; that the US Government thoroughly approves the stand now taken by the Supreme Council, but that it is regretted that it was not taken sooner; that undoubtedly D’Annunzio had been encouraged to defy the Supreme Council on account of the consideration shown for the feelings of Romania.65 Polk mentions that the main problems with the Romanians arose in August, some three months after the change in the American policy regarding Bessarabia. This substantiates the idea that it was not Romania’s attitude toward the Supreme Council that caused the mentioned change but that the real reason was something quite different. August also coincides with the Romanian occupation of Budapest and with the beginning of the debate over the requisitions made by the Romanian Army in Hungary. The passage has another significance too; not only were relations between the Romanians and the Conference suffering due to the situation in Hungary, now Romania was blamed for other failures of the Conference as well.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province In another telegram sent on the same day, Polk said: Our relations with Romania. It would not be possible, to my mind, particularly in connection with the Romanian matter, for us to withdraw entirely. It will therefore be necessary for the Ambassador, in order to complete these measures, to sit in the Supreme Council for a short time. The matters are routine in character and have been practically settled but could not be handled by the Allies with Washington. This is particularly true in the case of Romania; and, as we have been taking a firm and consistent stand from the first, our withdrawal would be a great embarrassment to the Allies, and would be great benefit to Romania and would hurt our prestige.66 As Polk himself recognized, the US withdrawal from the Conference would make things much easier for the Romanian diplomatic team. Why did he have such harsh feelings against the Romanians? Did these feelings have a lasting effect on the US policy on Romania, explaining at least partially the US attitude of discrimination against Romania on the Bessarabian question? As Polk retired from politics by 1920, it would be difficult to say whether he had a real influence over the State Department’s officials, particularly as many of them were excluded from direct participation in the workings of the Peace Conference. On the other hand, in mid-November the Romanians were still hoping to obtain the US backing regarding Bessarabia’s Union. As presented by the French, Romania seems to be hesitating between two possible attitudes: to obtain the US agreement, at the price of sacrificing southern Dobrudja, in a manner that should bring an end to the Bessarabian question before the recognition of a Russian government; or to wait for the US retreat from the Conference and to deal only with the European Allies, even if they have to pay them for their support, especially the English, while trying to come to terms with Denikin.67 Polk continued to press Washington in the direction already mentioned. He states, in another telegram: I would like to urge most earnestly that Ambassador Wallace be directed to represent the US Government in Paris in the negotiations with Romania and in connection with the Hungarian Treaty. All along, as you know, we have taken the very strongest position regarding Romania and the US Government was responsible in the main for the minorities’ treaties . . . we could say nothing which would justify our withdrawing from all of these negotiations at this time. In addition the Romanians are already making use of the rumor of our withdrawal as an excuse for resisting the orders of the Supreme Council.68

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After the US withdrew, the policy of concessions promoted by the European Great Powers toward the Romanians proved to be more successful than the policy of a firm stand taken by the Americans. In just a few months, relations between the Conference and Romania improved considerably; the Romanians proved more malleable (they signed the Austrian and the Minorities treaties) and the frictions between the two sides had been considerably reduced. Concluding this concise presentation of Romanian-US relations during the Peace Conference it should be noted that the US position presented on May 8 with regard to Bessarabia had little, if anything, to do with Romania’s conduct vis-à-vis the Peace Conference; it must have been motivated by other reasons. However, it is quite possible that, during the following months, the worsening US-Romanian relations had an influence, at least indirectly, on the American stance regarding Bessarabia. Most probably, the American decision was shaped by events in Russia, namely Admiral Kolchak’s offensive (indeed, this was the official American explanation), as well as by the Japanese military presence in Far Eastern Russia. The Russian Question and the US Position on Bessarabia If it was not the Romanian attitude toward the Peace Conference that triggered the sudden change in American policy regarding Bessarabia, then to seek the reasons behind that change one might look from a more broader perspective, namely that of America’s relations with Russia. Like the British leaders, the Americans believed that Kolchak had a real chance of success and, in order to support him, they declared that they would not recognize the union of Bessarabia with Romania. The US declaration was intended as a blow to the Bolshevik propaganda campaign that claimed the Powers in Paris were ready to dispose of Russian territory, without Russian input, and claimed that Kolchak had sold Bessarabia to Romania in exchange for Western help. The problem is that, even when it became clear that the Kolchak offensive had become a lost cause, following the trend established by the other White Armies, the US position on Bessarabia remained unchanged. And, if the Kolchak offensive was the real reason behind the May 8 decision on Bessarabia, then why did the US continue supporting that decision even after his defeat? Was it the worsening Romanian-US relations, propaganda reasons, or the fear of Japanese expansion into Russia? The famous Colby Note of August 10, 1920, could offer a key to the change in the American policy regarding Bessarabia. There has been much talk about the Colby Note, the reasons behind it, and the consequences it had for US-Soviet relations. Of interest here is what the Note states in connection with Bessarabia or, better said, its influence on the future US policy on Bessarabia. This Government believes in a united, free and autonomous Polish government . . . in its reply to the Lithuanian National Council on October 15, 1919, in its persistent refusal to recognize the Baltic States as separate nations independent of Russia . . .

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Moldova, a Romanian Province In line with these important declarations of policy, the US withheld its approval from the decision of the Supreme Council at Paris recognizing the independence of the so-called republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan. Finally, while gladly giving recognition to the independence of Armenia, the Government of the US has taken the position that the final determination of its boundaries must not be made without Russia’s cooperation and agreement. . . . It is not possible for the Government of the US to recognize the present rulers of Russia as a government with which the relations common to friendly governments can be maintained. . . . This Government would regard with satisfaction a declaration by the Allied and Associated Powers, that the territorial integrity and the true boundaries of Russia shall be respected. These boundaries should properly include the whole of the former Russian Empire, with the exception of Finland proper, ethnic Poland, and such territory as may by agreement form a part of the Armenian state. The aspirations of these nations for independence are legitimate. Each was forcibly annexed and their liberation from oppressive alien rule involves no aggression against Russia’s territorial rights, and has received the sanction of the public opinion of all free peoples. Such a declaration presupposes the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory embraced by these boundaries, and in the opinion of this Government should be accompanied by the announcement that no transgression by Poland, Finland or any other Power, of the line so drawn and proclaimed will be permitted. Thus only can the Bolshevik regime be deprived of its false, but effective, appeal to Russian nationalism. . . . 69 The Colby Note is striking, from the Romanian viewpoint, in its failure to mention Bessarabia. It should be clear to anyone that Bessarabia was also forcibly annexed by Russia and that its aspirations to independence were legitimate, involving no aggression against the Russian territory. Even the Soviet propaganda indirectly admitted that Bessarabia was not necessarily Russian territory, by contesting its union with Romania and not her declaration of independence or her autonomy. Of all the territorial annexations by Russia, Bessarabia was the most recent. It is undoubtedly for these reasons that the Principal Allied Powers had agreed in the first place to recognize the union between Bessarabia and Romania. The American experts representing the US at the Peace Conference and taking part in the deliberations of the Territorial Commission also shared in this view and had been convinced that Bessarabia should belong to Romania. Therefore, the question of why there was no mention of Bessarabia in the Colby Note remains a difficult one. The Bolshevik reaction to the Note soon was heard. The answer takes an interesting line of argument; would that the Bolsheviks had respected their own premise — the world probably would have looked different today.

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M. Colby imagines that the other oppressed nationalities of Tsarist Russia were not annexed by force and that the aspirations of the Georgian, Azerbaijan, Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian and Ukrainian peoples for independence in the form of either secession or state sovereignty and federation with Russia are illegal. The discrimination on the part of the American Government in favor of some of these nationalities as against the others is unintelligible, being probably due to lack of information concerning national conditions in Eastern Europe.70 The Bolshevik answer also fails to mention Bessarabia. The American opinion on Bessarabia could have provided an excellent example of American “friendship” toward the Russian people, so it is surprising that Colby omitted mentioning it. It is not our objective to analyze in detail the thinking behind the Colby Note. But the Note was made in close connection with the Japanese invasion of Russia, as was thought at the time. The fact that the Note was issued just a few weeks after the Japanese occupation of the Sakhalin (in retaliation for the Nicolaievsk Incident) could not have been simple coincidence. America’s annoyance with Japan’s action in Sakhalin is clearly expressed in the US-Japanese correspondence regarding Russian affairs.71 In 1918, taking advantage of the situation in Russia, the Japanese decided to intervene in Siberia. They were not the only Great Power to have that thought — France, US and Great Britain did the same. The Allies wanted to stop Bolshevism and were willing to compensate Japan for helping them in this matter.72 The US at first tried to oppose an intervention, but President Wilson finally decided that it would be better to go ahead. Some scholars argue that the Americans sent troops into Russia only in order to limit Japan’s influence and to avoid any territorial loss to Russia in favor of Japan, and not for other reaons.73 Even after the American intervention at Murmansk, Wilson continued to object to the Japanese occupation of Siberia. Within a few months Japan had several times as many soldiers in Siberia as all the other nations combined (of course, this was partly a result of their geographical proximity and the scarcity of troops in Europe due to the war). Sharp conflicts developed between the American and Japanese chiefs in Siberia. The Americans made representations against the size of the Japanese force and the degree of control they had assumed in Manchuria and Siberia, but to no avail. The Japanese were not the only ones with whom the American military chiefs were displeased; there had been misunderstandings with the British generals too. But the Japanese were by far the biggest threat to the balance of power in the Far East. The scope of the Japanese intervention in Russia touched off strategic concerns in the US: Japanese control of Siberia would inevitably lead to a growing Japanese influence over China. And while the US had only limited economic interests in Russia, in China the situation was different. In addition, a Japan that dominated China would dominate over all the other territories in Southeast Asia as well. One of the best means of keeping the Japanese expansionism under control was to have a powerful Russia (the same is true today vis-à-vis China). Therefore, the US considered it

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Moldova, a Romanian Province preferable to have a strong Russia, even it were a communist one, rather than a dismembered Russia, in order to keep Japan in check.74 Thus the Japanese policy of territorial expansionism fueled the need to have a powerful Russia the interwar period. Can a connection be established between the Japanese expansion into Siberia (and the Maritime Provinces) and the Bessarabian question? There are some similarities: 1. The interventions in Bessarabia and Siberia were impelled by similar proximate motives: the need to protect the railways, so crucial during war, against any possible threat (such as the actions of either Bolsheviks or bandits). 2. Both interventions had the approval of the Great Powers at first and were opposed by the US after a period of time. 3. Both shortly evolved into direct, open opposition to the Bolsheviks. 4. Military troops were kept in the areas for a prolonged period of time. 5. Although Romania and Japan had a number of conflicts and unsolved territorial issues with Russia, they both had been Russia’s allies during the war. Still, that temporary ally status did not prevent them from taking advantage of Russia's weakness during its Revolution and the Civil War. 6. As Russia’s neighbors, they had nationals living in Russia. This meant, at least in the case of Romania, that those nationals should be protected, and it also gave them a good justification for acting against their former ally. 7. Japan and Romania were Russia’s only neighboring states that had existed before the war and decided to act militarily against their common neighbor. Japan and Romania were the only monarchies surrounding the new communist regime, whose communist republican propaganda was not at all welcome. 8. Both Romania and Japan had to pay, at the end of World War II and ever since, for their 1918 intervention against Russia. It is very possible that these similarities (except for the last one), explain the change in the American policy regarding Bessarabia in May 1919. They boil down to two overarching phenomena: the Kolchak offensive (which may have been the main cause, but it also provided an excellent justification for a change that might have been driven by other motives) and the increasing anxiety over Japan’s military occupation of Far Eastern Russia (perhaps this was the moment when the Americans understood that they could no longer control the Japanese advance into Russia). The other Great Powers and Romania did not contest America’s changed policy at the time, which seems to indicate that they accepted the Kolchak offensive as the reason behind it. In fact, France and Great Britain too were hoping that the Bolsheviks would be defeated, and they agreed with the US stance. However, unwilling to see their relations with Romania deteriorate, they let the US take the lead. It was only

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later, when Kolchak had been defeated, that the representatives of the other Great Powers, trying to solve the Bessarabian question, realized that the US stand on Bessarabia had remained unchanged. However, this became clear at a moment when the US was losing influence over the Conference, due to the Senate’s refusal to ratify the Versailles Treaty. All attempts to remind the US representatives of their initial agreement on Bessarabia’s going to Romania failed. What is certain is that, at some point during Spring 1919, the Americans became aware that recognition of Bessarabia’s union with Romania could have certain implications for the situation in the Far East, due to the precedent that it would create. As presented in the previous chapter, that would have been a precedent that Japan could use to their own advantage in order to acquire new territories from Russia. Why did the Americans fail to realize the implications of the Bessarabian question earlier? Or, were they simply waiting for an opportunity to establish their position without raising suspicions? During the debates in the Territorial Commissions, they easily could have expressed their opposition to the recognition of Bessarabia’s union, but they approved it. In addition, why did the Japanese fail to realize the possible implications of the Bessarabian question, even as late as 1922 or 1923, when they could have ratified the Bessarabian Treaty and make use of the Bessarabian precedent? In conclusion, the May 8 decision to oppose the recognition of Bessarabia’s union with Romania demarcated a clear change in the US policy towards Bessarabia. From that time onward, the new US stance on Bessarabia was kept in place; only the justifications changed over time. The main (though unspoken) reason became that of avoiding the possibility of offering a precedent or example that could justify a Japanese seizure of Russian territory, such as a staged union of Sakhalin with Japan, followed by the recognition of that union. In close connection with this was the need to keep Russia strong in order to counter Japan’s further expansionism into Asia, a need that remained in place during at least the 1930s. And apart from Japan, by recognizing Bessarabia’s union, the US would have agreed to yet one more dismemberment of Russia, setting a precedent that other Russian-controlled territories might have used in order to break away, particularly in the long run. On another level, there was the need to counter the communist propaganda. Taking away parts of Russia would actually strengthen the Bolshevik regime, by heightening its appeal to Russian national feelings. It might also be argued that the US took a different view of the realities existing in Bessarabia (they probably had different data regarding the ethnic distribution of the population, different from those used by the other Great Powers, which clearly showed Bessarabia to be Romanian territory). Still, if that were the case, it is surprising that the US experts (and not politicians) twice voted in favor of recognizing the union (the second time, less than a month before the May 8 change of policy), based on statistical, demographic and ethnic data.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Romanian-US Relations during the 1920s During the 1920s, a number of questions were pending between Romania and the USA, including that of Bessarabia. Economic and political relations between the two suffered as a result of Romania’s policy regarding the repayment of war debts and its controversial attitude towards foreign investments in exploitation of natural resources. The Romanian “by ourselves” economic policy, illustrated by the Mining Law of 1924, limited the participation of foreign capital in the exploitation of both coal and oil. The Americans, as well as others, had investments in the Romanian petroleum industry and were dissatisfied with the new legislation and with the consequences it had for American investments in Romania. On February 26, 1926, the two countries signed an Agreement according mutual, unconditional, most-favored-nation treatment in customs matters, followed by a Provisional Commercial Agreement providing for the most-favored-nation treatment, signed on August 20, 1930. On March 21, 1929, Romania and the US signed a Treaty of Arbitration and a Treaty of Conciliation.75 Apart from economic matters, another issue that came to the State Department’s attention was the treatment of Jews in Romania. The State Department had to answer, on more than one occasion, to pressures from American Jews. Each time, the State Department had shown that it had no power to interfere with the internal matters of a sovereign state and the only measures it took were some unofficial consultations with the Romanian Minister in Washington. Later on, in 1938, when the situation of the Romanian Jews seemed to be worsening, the State Department took the same position, avoiding any interference in Romanian internal matters.76 The Bessarabian question had been, from the political viewpoint, the most important issue in the bilateral relations. The Romanian government failed not only to obtain the US signature on the Bessarabian Treaty but even to obtain a simple de facto recognition of Bessarabia’s union, the US being the only state to go on maintaining relations with Romania but openly considering that Bessarabia was not Romanian territory. The first duty of the Romanian representatives in the US was to improve Romania’s general image. They had to counter two very powerful enemies: the Jewish media and the White Russians. As early as March 1921 they already had focused on the necessity of counterbalancing the Russian propaganda and had asked Bucharest for instructions regarding the opportunity to apply pressure on the new US government to obtain the recognition of Bessarabia’s union. As presented by Minister Bibescu, I understood that a serious press campaign had been prepared in order to present the situation of Bessarabia in very dark colors. I think that efforts are made over at the State Department by my Russian colleagues in order to block an eventual recognition of Bessarabia’s union by the US.77

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The Romanian Foreign Ministry was cautious at first, instructing Bibescu to refrain from starting official negotiations regarding the Bessarabian question unless he was certain of a positive result. As for the propaganda campaign, Bibescu received clear instructions: You could definitely argue that Bessarabia’s situation is good, the people are calm, and the administration had made real progress. It is the great landowners who are complaining, seeming to forget how the expropriation was conducted on the other side of the Dniestr, and also the Bolshevik revolutionaries, who are still hoping. The American government made the mistake of not recognizing the union, and by doing so they gave hopes to these Bolshevik elements.78 While continuing to press for Bessarabia’s recognition by the US, Bibescu was aware that the US policy remained where Secretary of State Robert Lansing had placed it some two years earlier: “While the US have a traditional sympathy for the aspirations of the people oppressed, it also considers that it would be unfair and unjust to make a prejudgment regarding the fate of the Russian Constitutional Government and of the principle regarding Russia’s unity as a whole.”79 Bibescu considered that Secretary of State Hughes simply continued that line, convinced that, when Russia rid itself of the Bolsheviks, a very fragmented Russia would result (about 70 regions). During his meetings with influential persons in Washington Bibescu explained again and again the real situation of Bessarabia, although without much success in convincing the Americans. He also tried to use the mass media, and one of his achievements was the publication of a pamphlet in 1921, called “Redeeming Bessarabia”. By 1921, Bibescu came to two important conclusions: that an improvement in economic relations could bring about a change in the US attitude; and that the US policy towards Bessarabia would be cleared the day a New Russia became a reality — but he was certain that, in the eyes of the Americans, that day was gradually fading.80 During the Washington Conference of 1921-1922, the Romanians were faced with the possibility of a new American declaration regarding the principle of maintaining Russia’s integrity. Alarmed, Bibescu successfully contacted the British and French delegations at the Conference, asking for their intervention against any declaration that could contradict Romania’s rights to Bessarabia, rights which had been recognized by their governments. Take Ionescu congratulated Bibescu for his success in warding off the new declaration.81 The Bessarabian question remained a thorn in Romanian-US relations during the summer of 1922, as the US government announced that it would recognize the governments of Albania, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, but failed to do the same for Bessarabia’s union with Romania. The only action initiated by the Romanians was to present the official Romanian theses regarding the union of Bessarabia; Frederic C. Nanu asked his superiors in Bucharest to send him propaganda material for this task.82

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Moldova, a Romanian Province The controversy over the recognition of Bessarabia’s union by the US government became heated up in 1923, due to America’s recognition of the Baltic States and the question of the immigration quota for Bessarabia. The US government’s decision to recognize the Baltic States in 1923 contradicted the policy enunciated by the Colby Note, signaling a change in the US policy towards Russia’s territorial integrity. Since it was the same Colby Note that opposed the recognition of Bessarabia’s union, the Romanians hoped that the US would change their position on Bessarabia too. However, this was not the case, the US representatives insisting that, as Bessarabia was not an independent state but a territory under Romanian military occupation, its case was clearly different. Therefore, they decided not only to maintain their policy on Bessarabia but also to make it even clearer to the Romanians that they opposed the union. In order to do so, they used the immigration quota for Bessarabia. This question was raised for the first time in 1923: As a result of information received from the US Legation regarding the distinction made between the emigrants coming from the Old Kingdom and those coming from Bessarabia, I understood that this distinction is due to the fact that the US government does not recognize Bessarabia’s union. Of course we could not admit either this viewpoint nor its consequences . . . we could not admit a distinction between the citizens of different provinces, we can only admit a distinction between different social categories of emigrants.83 The Romanian Foreign Minister, I.G. Duca, instructed Bibescu to take all possible actions in order to obtain the US recognition of the union. The latter asked that information regarding the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty as well as the history of the Soviet-Romanian negotiations be forwarded to him, arguing, “I realize that a slow but progressive modification in favor of our viewpoint is underway in here”.84 Bibescu met again the US Secretary of State, using every argument he could think of in order to influence him. He also observed that the Bessarabian question would be examined during the June meeting of the State, Commerce and Labor Secretaries, which is supposed to deal with the litigious questions regarding the immigration. He anticipated that, during the mentioned meeting, the immigration quota for Bessarabia and that for Romania would be probably unified, which would mean the recognition of Bessarabia’s union with Romania. Bibescu insisted that “he gave me the precise impression that all my arguments were taken . . . The American government would not come to a decision, which I have every reason to believe would be favorable for us, until the end of June.85 The Romanians’ efforts in Washington did not pass unobserved. A telegram sent by the German Ambassador in the US, Dr. Wiedfelt, to the German Foreign Ministry on April 23, 1923, stated:

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From a well-informed source I found confidentially that Romania is now trying to obtain an American recognition for the annexation of Bessarabia . . . I do not think that the US Government will take position in this conflict, excepting the case of Romania making some very advantageous proposals regarding the petroleum exploitations.86 Unfortunately, the outcome in 1923 was negative: the US Government decided to incorporate the Bessarabian immigration quota into the general Russian immigration quota, administered from Riga, in Latvia, exactly the opposite of what Minister Bibescu had anticipated. This incorporation could be related to the stand taken by the US Government in recognizing the Baltic States, namely that parts of the Russian territory could be taken under a different sovereignty only with Russian recognition, which the Soviet Government (a government that, according to the Colby Note, could not be recognized by the US) had just done for the Baltic States. This theory was very influential in regard to the territory of Russia — so much so that it was decided that a separate Bessarabian immigration quota did not conform to the US policy and thought it best to eliminate it by inclusion in the Russian immigration quota. In other words, Bibescu’s efforts resulted not in an improvement in the US posture on Bessarabia but a significant worsening. The bad news was confirmed during a meeting between Bibescu and the Secretary of State.87 Bibescu describes the meeting: The Secretary of State told me that the US would not take the necessary measures to recognize the union of Bessarabia with Romania before all the signatory states of the Bessarabian Treaty decided to ratify it. I asked the Secretary if he had any other reasons and the answer was negative. Please let me know when the Japanese and Italian ratifications will be made, in order to take the necessary action. . . . At my question regarding the connection between the Bessarabian recognition and the resolution of some of the Romanian-US financial disputes, the answer was absolutely negative. There is no way that such a deal might become reality. The reasons mentioned previously are the only available ones in order to explain the delay in recognizing Bessarabia’s union.88 I.G. Duca commented, in response to Bibescu’s telegram: “I regret that your prediction failed to come true, but I am less surprised than you are. I will intervene to press for the ratifications by France, Italy, Japan.”89 Duca probably already knew of the US decision from the representatives in Bucharest, or he somehow may have anticipated the US decision. Still, for a number of years, there was almost no attempt to change the US position. Why were no such attempts made? The Romanian government failed to take a decided stand against the quota decision; what persuaded them that it would not be productive to engage the battle? One possibility is that the Romanian Government either did not much care about the US position (and America’s isolationism might

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Moldova, a Romanian Province justify that); another is that Romania simply believed that whatever they did, they could not change the US position (or more precisely, that changing the American position towards Bessarabia was not considered worth the intense diplomatic campaign and economic or financial concessions that it would require). Other possible reasons, at least theoretical, are that they failed to understand the significance of the structure of the US immigration quota or that they wished at least to avoid goading the US into taking further actions against Bessarabia’s union (for example, making public statements favoring the Bolsheviks). Even if the Romanian Foreign Ministry probably would have failed to sway the United States, at least they could have changed the US decision to incorporate the Bessarabian immigration quota into the general Russia quota. This was, in this author’s view, attainable during the 1920s as it was some ten years later, by using the same means (economic measures against US interests and an able and targeted propaganda campaign in the US). Bibescu noted another US maneuver: “The American administration, preoccupied with the well-being of American citizens, is searching to find out whether there are any American citizens expropriated in Bessarabia, in order to obtain for them the same favorable treatment as for the British and French landowners”.90 If this is true, it means that the Americans, after refusing to sign and actively opposing the Bessarabian Treaty, were looking to have the benefits paid by the Romanian government to those States that had signed the treaty extend to US too. The only state opposed to even a de facto recognition of Bessarabia’s union, they were ready to ask for what the Romanian government had refused to offer Italy and Japan, states that had signed the treaty. Did Bibescu invent the American interest in landowners expropriated in Bessarabia, or was he trying to use it as a suggestion in order to allow for a bribe to the Americans? Whatever was behind it, the fact is that during 1920 the Romanian government was considering the possibility of paying compensation to US landowners expropriated in Bessarabia (there were indeed two such cases); but, as the US opposed the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty, the Romanians simply dropped the matter. The only attempt to prod the US came soon after the French ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty, when Duca instructed Bibescu to take action: “Now, when England and France have ratified, could you try to obtain from Harding a change in the US attitude?”91 Bibescu took the necessary steps; the only encouraging hint he could find was the example of a book on the Romanian economy published by the US Commerce Department, in which both the statistical data and the maps showed Bessarabia as a part of Romania. He used this example to argue that the US attitude was gradually becoming more positive towards Romania. As for Bessarabia: “My greatest wish is to see the American recognition of Bessarabia’s union, but I know from a well-placed source that at this moment my intervention would fail to have the result we hope for. It might be possible that we will have to wait until after the presidential elections.”92 Bibescu’s statement takes us back to some similar statements by his colleagues in Tokyo, who feared that by keeping up the pressure they would receive a non-possumus from the Japanese government.

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The question of the new immigration quotas, revised in 1924 by the American government in order to reduce the number of immigrants coming from southern and eastern Europe and also from Asia, hurt US-Romanian relations further. The new Immigration Law, which replaced the 1910 census with the 1890 census as the basis for establishing immigration quotas for each nationality, reduced the Romanian quota by about 90%, provoking a vehement reaction from Nanu. Italy and Japan, too, sent powerful protests to the US government regarding the new Immigration Law. But the State Department, discounting diplomatic customs and norms (at least in Nanu’s opinion), published Nanu’s note, in this way creating an unpleasant situation for the Romanians.93 Although Nanu’s protest was justified, and he would continue to argue his case to the Romanian Foreign Ministry,94 bolstered by the Japanese reaction to the Immigration Law, Romanian-US relations were irretrievably damaged. The US officials considered Romania as a secondary Power and they took exception to the Romanians reacting to something they claimed was an internal matter. Nanu’s protest in 1924 came during a context of deteriorating relations caused by the Liberal Government’s economic policy. To the unsolved financial matters, a new element was added: the proposed Mining Law, which would hurt the American interests in Romania, especially the capital invested in the oil industry. The misunderstandings went as far as the US government sending a strongly worded Note of Protest on July 10, 1924, accusing the Romanian government of a number of bad intentions, and also called back their minister to Romania, Peter A. Jay, for consultations.95 What is puzzling is that, during the entire controversy with the Americans over the effects of the Mining Law, at no time did the Romanians mention what Davila later used to call “the US discriminatory policy towards Romania”, avoiding any mention of the Bessarabian immigration quota. The probable justification is that the Mining Law involved Romania’s relations with all the Great Powers and not only with the US so that, if they had made a concession to US capital (in exchange for a modification regarding the Bessarabian immigration quota), the other Powers would have asked for the same concession. The US representatives to Romania continued to follow the evolution of the Bessarabian question. W.S. Culbertson, the US minister to Romania, sent a report on the opinions expressed by Pan Halippa (a Bessarabian leader and member of the opposition) regarding the present and future status of Bessarabia. Relevant to our topic is Culbertson’s own remark that even after the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty by Italy and Japan, the Bessarabian question would remain open; that its solution could be obtained only through direct negotiations.96 During the following years, the Romanian representatives in the US limited their action to propaganda in favor of the Romanian cause in general, and no attempt was made to pressure the US government to change its position regarding Bessarabia. The only exception was in January-February 1925 when, as a result of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviets, Frederic Nanu had a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador to the US regarding the Japanese ratification, only in order to find out that Japan would not ratify until all the European

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Moldova, a Romanian Province powers did so. The Romanian Foreign Ministry kept a tight lid on the Bessarabian immigration quota question. Davila’s Campaign for the US Recognition of the Bessarabian Union The Romanian approach to the US regarding the Bessarabian union changed in 1930. A new Romanian minister to the US had been nominated in 1929, and this time it was one of Romania’s finest diplomats, Charles A. Davila. He was the first Romanian diplomat to officially visit the Soviet Union after 1918, when he signed for Romania the Litvinov Protocol in Moscow, in February 1929. Soon after his arrival in the US, Davila started a veritable campaign in favor of Bessarabia directed at the State Department, using a two-pronged approach: direct meetings with State Department officials and a barrage of memoranda sent to the State Department. As of his first meeting with President Hoover, he opened his campaign: “The President asked me, among other things, about the Russian viewpoint regarding Bessarabia. I told him that, due to the signatures exchanged in Moscow, there was no more war danger coming from Russia.” He also had to answer once again the American suggestion of a plebiscite in Bessarabia, presenting the Romanian arguments against the idea.97 His first Aide-Memoire on Bessarabia was handed to the State Department in February 1930. After a brief history of the Bessarabian Question, it goes straight to the point, questioning the US policy on Bessarabia. Davila presents his arguments in a very precise manner, and his points would all prove to be justified: “It is to be deeply regretted that, judging from certain information, one would reach the conclusion that the Government of the US does not recognize that Bessarabia is an integral part of the Kingdom of Romania. One of those indications is the fact that on the official maps of the State Department this territory is designated as being “under Romanian occupation”. [NB: i.e., State Dept. maps from 1924, not Commerce Dept. 1930, which are cited in another context.] Another indication is that the immigration quota for Bessarabia is at present incorporated into the Russian quota, although when the quota system was first adopted the Bessarabian quota was included in the quota allotted to Romania. Later, a separate Bessarabian quota was established but, since July 1, 1923, this was merged with the Russian quota so that Romanian citizens residing in Bessarabia and desirous of immigrating to the US have to obtain their visa from the quantum allotted to Russia. . . . Representatives of the State Department . . . claimed that the attitude of the US Government in regard to Bessarabia was in conformity with the principles laid down in the Colby Note . . . When it was pointed out that Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia . . . were taken from Russia and that the US Government accorded them recognition, a fact which sanctioned a diminution of Russian territory — representatives of the State Department replied that the case of Bes-

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sarabia is not identical, as the Soviet government had concurred in the abovementioned territorial changes but not in the loss of Bessarabia. However, it is difficult to understand how such recognition by the Soviet Government might affect the situation inasmuch as this is exactly the same Russian Government which the Colby Note disqualifies from having the right to voice the will of the Russian people and which is still not recognized by the USA. . . . The de facto situation is that for over ten years Bessarabia is an integral part of the Kingdom of Romania, a country with which the USA is on friendly terms. . . . The Romanians cannot but be painfully impressed by the fact that the USA seems to have adopted the Russian point of view . . . Apart from the three Great European Powers who have solemnly and explicitly recognized de jure the reunion of Bessarabia to Romania, all other countries have tacitly acquiesced in the de facto situation as it now exists, with the sole exception of the USA.98 (This is hardly the first time that the clause, “with the sole exception of the US”, cropped up in policy discussions relating to Romania. During the Paris Peace Conference, as previously noted, it came up many times.) Davila also reported home of his action: Until today the US has maintained the immigration quota for Bessarabia as a part of the Russian quota. Even today, on the official American maps, Bessarabia is described as belonging to Russia, with the mention label “under Romanian occupation”. Until now, no written approaches were made [by the Romanians] regarding this matter. Therefore, I sent an aide-memoire to the US subSecretary of State, Cotton. Due to the attitude adopted by the US after the Colby Note, I do not have too many hopes. . . . Of course, in case we come to an agreement, this must be done without publicity, because the American government might have difficulties with the pro-Russians members of the Congress.99 The letter sent by Davila struck a chord with the Romanian Foreign Ministry, and a report was made on the matter, stating: From the history of the matter it results that, in 1923, under the Republican regime, the American government invoked as the only available reason in order to justify the delay in recognizing Bessarabia’s union the ratification by all signatories of the Bessarabian Treaty. . . . Instructions should be sent to Washington that, as soon as an opportunity comes, they should remind State Department of their stand in 1923 and, at the same time, they should make it plain that, in the meanwhile, all the European Powers have ratified.100 After receiving the instructions, F.C. Nanu (as Davila was out of Washington) sent a telegram to his superiors, indicating one of the reasons for his failure to act

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Moldova, a Romanian Province sooner on the matter: “I thought that the Bessarabian Treaty would not come into force unless all the signatories had ratified it, but the Japanese ratification is still missing. Please let me know if I am mistaken.101 The Ministry answered, indicating its own interpretation of the actual situation regarding the Bessarabian Treaty: You are not mistaken but it must be emphasized that all the Powers with interests in the area have ratified. . . . The coming into force of the Treaty regards only the signatory Powers. . . . It must be taken into consideration that this is a situation that is, in fact, admitted by all the Powers, due to the fact that they signed so many Conventions and treaties with Romania in her actual borders.102 Nanu took the first opportunity and raised the Bessarabian question during a meeting with Wallace Murray, the Chief of the Division for Near Eastern Affairs, arguing the Romanian case: I reminded him that Romania too had signed no treaty with Russia recognizing the 1878 occupation of three Bessarabian counties; therefore the principle invoked by the Americans, of acknowledging only the territorial modifications approved by the both sides, simply turns against them. He believes that the American formal recognition would be given implicitly as soon as Japan ratifies the Bessarabian Treaty, and asked what was the probability of a Japanese ratification.103 The RFM informed Nanu, “We have no guarantee that the Japanese government will ratify in the near future”.104 It can be seen that the US representatives were ready to use the Bessarabian Treaty in their favor whenever they had the opportunity, although they were the only State (except for Bolshevik Russia) that had opposed the Treaty altogether. Whatever the reasons, contradictory, opportunistic, or cynical, the US government made full use of the Bessarabian Treaty in order to justify their failure to de facto recognize Bessarabia’s union. The State Department did not bother to answer the Aide Memoire, so that Davila had to insist in August on receiving a response. Finally, on October 1, 1930, the State Department responded, verbally, during a meeting between Wallace Murray and the Romanian Chargé d’affaires, Frederic Nanu. Nanu made it clear that a formal recognition of Bessarabia’s union would be welcome, but that his government would be pleased even with as less as a correction to the external signs of the US policy (the maps and the immigration quota). Murray rationalized the US stand once again, indicating that is was not his Department’s fault how the maps were drawn, and saying that the question of the immigration quota could not be solved because it would go against the Immigration Law of 1924. This was not a satisfactory answer, and Nanu countered with some interesting arguments, which appear to have an effect on Murray, who wrote:

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It might be difficult for the Romanian Government to secure from the Romanian Parliament ratification of the American-Romanian treaties [including the one according the most-favored-nation treatment to the USA] since the deputies from Bessarabia might obstruct it on the ground that this Government had refused to recognize the Romanian annexation of Bessarabia. . . . I hope that what Mr. Nanu said in the above connection is not true, since we shall only be negotiating a new treaty of commerce and navigation with Romania and it would be unfortunate to have the treaty defeated because of the opposition of Bessarabian deputies. . . . He expressed himself as unable to understand how this government could take cognizance of any act of the Soviet Government, which this Government refuses to recognize as the proper spokesman for the Russian people. I must confess that there is a good deal in what Mr. Nanu says in the above connection.105 After describing the meeting to his superiors in Bucharest, Nanu concludes by indicating yet one more reason for his inactivity prior to Davila’s arrival: I think that it would be futile to ask for more because we would only give them (the Americans) the impression that no territorial modification in Europe has value without their express ratification, which would be insulting for us, and in the current political situation I find it impossible to obtain . . . except for the case of worsening RussoAmerican relations.106 In March 1931 Davila sent a telegram to Bucharest, presenting the success of his efforts: As a result of the action initiated by me through the February 18, 1930, memorandum for the State Department, the immigration quota for Bessarabia was taken out from the Russian quota and its administration moved from Riga to Bucharest. Also, on the American maps Bessarabia is today simply included inside the Romanian borders. Murray told me that the matter is resolved according to our wish, and that the future Presidential Proclamation would include it. Until then the matter must be kept completely secret, in order to avoid any discussions.107 The State Department’s action answered only half of the Romanians’ concerns and they saw it as a compromise, at best. In Davila’s words: I am glad to publicly announce that on July 1 the Presidential Proclamation was published, through which the immigration quota for Bessarabia was taken out of the Russian quota and will be administered in Bucharest as a special quota. I beg you not to give this news to the newspapers; any political aspects must be

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Moldova, a Romanian Province avoided. I hope that, through new arguments, I will be able to obtain the inclusion of the Bessarabian quota in that for Romania, which would mean the definitive recognition of the de facto situation.108 On July 21, 1931, Davila sent a very detailed report to Bucharest, a report in which he presents once again all the arguments he had used in favor of the Romanian thesis, together with the American counter-arguments: The fact that the State Department had finally adopted a neutral attitude in our dispute with Russia, after so many years of being clearly pro-Russian, is an incontestable success for us. . . . They invoked the principles established by the Colby Note in 1920, which they are still following . . . There is still some doubt over the fact that this decision [of the union] was taken under foreign pressure, which could not be the case when the state remains independent . . . And, as a last resort, the American diplomats invoked another argument: the US are not interested in territorial modifications taking place in Europe. At best, they are ready to ratify territorial modifications approved and ratified by the interested Powers. Our Treaty of 1920, through which our possession of Bessarabia was recognized, failed to come into force, Japan still delaying the ratification. Why would they decide before the Great Powers more closely interested in the question do so? Once the Treaty comes into power, the question would be reexamined. I must point out, here, that it is not historical or juridical arguments, much used in the past, that have determined the change in the State Department’s attitude towards us, but practical arguments, like the presence of Bessarabian representatives in Romania’s Parliament, which votes the conventions signed with the US, etc., and especially the argument that the American option to choose between the two theses (one belonging to Romania, her former war ally, regarding the free union of Bessarabia, and the other belonging to the Soviets, not recognized by the US, regarding the military occupation of Bessarabia) . . . the Soviet one is an inimical act towards us. . . . My opinion is that, except for the case of an unexpected worsening in Russo-American relations, America would not be in a hurry to make disappear the last signs showing that she failed as yet to de facto recognize Bessarabia’s union with Romania, at least for as long as she can invoke the welcome pretext of the Bessarabian Treaty’s failure to come into force. Of course, it might be argued whether the US failure to de facto recognize the existing situation has any significance for us, leaving aside the question of our self-esteem. Still, if obtaining it would not cost us more than a few diplomatic approaches, I think that it would be worth trying, especially now when America has to be more and more interested in European matters, including territorial matters . . . However convinced are we of the justice in our thesis, I think that it would be an advantage to eliminate the possibility for our enemies to use in their deal-

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ings with the Americans the fact that for them the juridical borders of Romania starts only at the Pruth River.109 All the arguments used by Davila could have been easily used a few years earlier, by any of the other Romanian representatives in the US, including the same F.C. Nanu, even if they had no instructions from Bucharest in this sense. And there was no new development, except maybe for the Litvinov Protocol, that would justify a sudden American interest in Bessarabia. From the documents studied, it seems that Davila actually took the initiative for this action, without having special instructions from the RFM. If this was the case, it means that, indeed, the RFM was simply ignoring the American failure to de facto recognize the union. The least they could have done between 1924 and 1929 was to reopen the Bessarabian question after the Italian ratification, but there is no evidence of any such effort. In this respect Davila’s merits are great, as he was able not only to convince the US government to take some steps in Romania’s favor, but also to change the previous “immobility” of the RFM regarding the US position towards Bessarabia. In February 1932, encouraged by his success, Davila came up with a more ambitious plan; he set out to attract the US to Romania’s side in the dispute with the Soviet Union regarding Bessarabia. This time, he intended to use America’s willingness to facilitate the success of the Geneva Disarmament Conference. Accordingly, in February 1932 Davila asked the Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, if he would be willing, should the need arise, to authorize the American delegates in Geneva to express approval of the Romanian contention that Soviet Russia should agree to refrain from any acts of aggression beyond the Dniestr River (in the non-aggression pact under negotiation between the two states at that time). Davila avoided raising the question of recognizing the annexation of Bessarabia. However, the Secretary of State refused to interfere in the Romanian-Soviet negotiations, and Davila’s plan failed.110 In March 1932, Davila reopened the question of Bessarabia. He took as his opening the Secretary of State’s February 23, 1932, letter addressed to Senator Borah, in which the Secretary expressed his agreement not to recognize territorial changes resulting from the use of force.111 During a meeting with the Under Secretary of State, William R. Castle, Davila asked if the letter applied to a de facto as well as a de jure situation. Castle answered: It is impossible for me to forecast what attitude we might take if Russia merely took back Bessarabia, which we have never recognized as an integral part of Romania. I pointed out to [Davila] that the situation was made even more complicated by the fact that we had not recognized Russia. . . . I am afraid the only point he definitely got before the end of his call was that I did not propose to commit myself as to probable American action in case of a very hypothetical and improbable attack on the part of Russia.112

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Moldova, a Romanian Province As can be seen, the US government did not accept that its 1931 action regarding the Bessarabian immigration quota equated to a tacit recognition of Bessarabia’s union. In April 1932 Davila sent another Memoire to the State Department. The new element presented was a comparison between the case of Bessarabia and that of Texas.113 This time Davila asked for the inclusion of the Bessarabian immigration quota in the Romanian immigration quota.114 Describing one of his meetings with State Department officials, Davila presents the reasons why he avoided asking for express American recognition of Bessarabia’s union: I know the Americans’ abhorrence for such acts and their attitude in similar cases (like Vilna); because the recently formulated principle in the StimsonBorah Letter could impede them; because I do not know if the Romanian government has the intention of asking all the other governments for such a recognition; because what I want to obtain now is the implicit recognition, through the elimination of the existing discrimination. Our chances to succeed are truly favorable.115 On May 13, 1932, Wallace Murray prepared a report for William Castle regarding the status of the Bessarabian question. He made a complete review of arguments previously used by Davila in favor of an American recognition of the de facto situation of Bessarabia: the US recognition of the possession of Vilna by Poland, despite the dispute that still existed between Poland and Lithuania; the temporary nature ascribed to the Bolshevist regime in the Colby Note (it was expected to last for only a few more months); that the inclusion of Bessarabia in the consular jurisdiction of the American Consulate in Bucharest might mean a de facto recognition of the status quo; the desirability of settling this matter in some fashion prior to American recognition of Soviet Russia. Concluding his report, Murray states that: I may add, in conclusion, that Mr. Flournoy [another official of the State Department] feels that this matter could be settled in a purely administrative way by including the Bessarabian quota in the Romanian quota, such a procedure constituting ipso facto a recognition of that territory as Romanian soil. Mr. Flournoy furthermore feels that if the matter were ever raised we could easily justify our action not only on the grounds of an administration of a quota but also because of the necessity of regularizing our consular jurisdiction in the disputed province. This question has dragged along now for well over a decade and I, for one, would welcome an opportunity to bring it to a close if this could be done without causing any injury to American interests. I do not see that we gain anything particularly by upholding the Colby principle so rigidly in the case of Bessarabia when it has been treated somewhat lightly in other instances of the alienation of Russian territory.116

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Unfortunately, Murray’s opinion was not enough to convince his superiors that the time had come for a new change in their policy towards Bessarabia. Having in view the possible US recognition of Soviet Russia, Nicolae Titulescu, Romania’s new Foreign Ministry, tried to avoid an implicit recognition by the US of the Bessarabian conflict. He instructed Davila and Nanu to act accordingly: I will remind you that, when Great Britain recognized the Soviets, she expressly declared that she was recognizing their sovereignty only over the territories that recognize Moscow’s authority, which clearly excludes Bessarabia. Also, in the declaration made by Prime Minister Herriot in 1924 it was expressly stated that the recognition of the Soviets is made on the conditions imposed by France, meaning the respect of France’s previous treaties, including our treaty with France regarding Bessarabia’s recognition.117 Titulescu’s intervention shows that, for the first time in a long period, a Romanian Foreign Minster was interested in the US policy towards Bessarabia and seemed to care about its implications. Davila answered Titulescu’s request only on January 31, asking that the history of the Russo-Romanian negotiations be sent to him before the end of February. Davila’s answer provoked Titulescu’s anger, particularly as he was not one of Titulescu’s favorites: Taking into account the pressing terms in which I asked you to take care of the Bessarabian question in the case of an eventual recognition of the Soviets by the US, we can not but express our surprise at the fact that only as late as January 31, meaning more than one and a half months since you received your instructions, you ask for the missing data and even mention that you need this data before the end of February.118 Davila was quick to answer Titulescu’s criticism. After observing that there were actually two very different aspects to the Bessarabian question, that of the immigration quota and that of possible US actions to influence the Soviet stance vis-àvis Romania as a result of their recognition of the former, Davila noted the Ministry’s silence regarding his actions on the immigration quota question. He complained that no instructions were sent to him regarding what actions he should take and what liberty he had in his actions regarding this question. He also spelled out his campaign plan: In 1932 the resolution of the Bessarabian question was suspended due to presidential elections. Until March 4 no action can be taken because it is uncertain who will form the Cabinet of President Roosevelt. Public debates or discussions with senators and deputies are unwelcome because this is a question that might be resolved simply with the help of the State Department. . . .

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Moldova, a Romanian Province By recognizing the Soviets, the State Department could act in Romania’s favor, pressing the Soviets to drop the thesis of existing litigation with Romania. . . . However, I do not have too high hopes of being able to orchestrate such an action. As the litigation does not exist for us, it is only by indirect means that I might suggest such an action. . . . The question regarding the quota inclusion and the definitive recognition is different. The general mood is favorable to us but they often point to their dissatisfaction regarding the treatment of the American interests in Romania (the new import quotas, the Thompson-Houston auction). Until now I have declined any discussions on those points. I ask your Excellency to be kind enough and let me know what are the limits of my actions in the possible case of difficulties with the new administration.119 By March 6, 1933, Davila had already started up his diplomatic campaign again, meeting with Wallace Murray and presenting again his arguments in favor of settling the Bessarabian question, along with some new ideas. Murray reported that: The Romanian minister asserts that the US is the only country besides the Soviet Union that has refused to recognize the annexation by Romania of Bessarabia. . . . As a special concession to Romanian sensibilities on this subject, the Department, in June 1931, separated the Bessarabian immigration quota from the Russian quota and set up an independent Bessarabian quota. The Romanians have since that time urged that the Department go one step further and include the Bessarabian quota in the Romanian quota. This cannot be done without at the same time tacitly recognizing Bessarabia as a part of Romania. . . . The Romanian Minister emphasized the viewpoint of Mr. Titulescu, the Romanian Foreign Minister, that if we recognize the Soviet regime without modifying our position on the Bessarabian question we shall be recognizing at the same time that a dispute — question litigieuse — exists between Romania and the Soviet Union. . . . The Romanian Minister described our position on the Bessarabian question as a “public discrimination” against Romania. He said that while it had been possible hitherto to suppress discussions of this question in the Romanian press, it would not be possible to do so in the future; that Romanian official opinion is aroused at our attitude and that public opinion will be much more so once the question is discussed in the Romanian press.120 . . . The US position is that governments or regimes are recognized, not the specific territories over which they exercise control. . . . I contested his statement that a commercial treaty between two countries necessarily implied a recognition by each other of the boundaries of the other.121 Davila also reported home, in a way that must have pleased Titulescu, stating, “I have the State Department’s promise that no decision would be taken regarding

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Russia’s recognition before a preliminary discussion on the Bessarabian question.”122 On March 16, 1933, Robert F. Kelley, Chief of the Division for Eastern European Affairs, had an extended conversation with members of the Romanian Legation in Washington. On this occasion, Davila gave an excellent presentation of the evolution of Russo-Romanian relations after the war, as well as of the current situation existing between the two countries. As reported by Kelley: Davila also advanced the argument that the settlement of the Bessarabian question would tend to strengthen Russia’s position in the Far East, and he thought that this was a factor which would be of interest for us. . . . He devoted the greater part of his remarks to urging that the US, in its discussions with the Soviet authorities preceding recognition, intimate that it would be pleased if a settlement were reached between Romania and Russia with respect to Bessarabia.123 In other words, Davila came back to his February 1932 idea of having the Americans suggest to the Soviets that they reach an agreement with Romania regarding Bessarabia before the establishment of US-Soviets diplomatic relations. However, at that time the State Department was not really eager to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and it would take the direct intervention of President Roosevelt, bypassing the State Department, in November the same year, to establish them.124 On March 22 Davila received new instructions regarding the possible US recognition of the Soviets: “The formula of an eventual recognition of the Soviets by the US must be the same as in England’s case: the US recognizes as Soviet territory only those territories that are today under Soviet authority.”125 Davila made the necessary inquiries and reported home, stating, “I warn you that the American traditional policy is to recognize governments through the simple nomination of ambassadors, without any act in which conditions or explanations might be inserted”.126 By far the most important paper presented by the Romanians to the State Department was the Aide-Memoire delivered by Davila on March 29, 1933. It is remarkable in that it comes in “American language”, in other words, it conforms to the American way of arguing a legal case. In its twenty pages, the Memoire refers to favorable precedents existing in US history and in US law for the settlement of the Bessarabian question, while also presenting the international implications of the American position. Even more, it comes with a clear solution for the unsettled question of US recognition for Bessarabia’s union. While we can only concentrate on a few of its highlights, this memo is a prime example of how a case should be argued in order to be convincing to American diplomats. It starts with a brief history of Bessarabia, underscoring the fact that Turkey could never have ceded territories that did not belong to her, and then presents the Soviet-Romanian negotiations regarding the Bessarabian question and the actual stage of these discussions. Later it reveals what would be the benefits for the US in case the two neighbors should reach an agreement on Bessarabia:

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The US might have now a unique opportunity to interpose their good offices in case, of course, they do begin conversations with Russia on the subject of recognition. The image of the US as a promoter of peace would be clearly enhanced as a result of a possible success. . . . The fascist victory in Germany. This event might easily hasten a rapprochement between the USSR and the democratic states of the world and prove to be an important milestone on the path of Russian evolution towards Western ideals. A further practical benefit for the US, which would result from successful mediation in this controversy, would undoubtedly be improved trade with Romania. In order to convince the US representatives that it was possible for them to mediate in the Soviet-Romanian dispute, Davila offers the example of US mediation in the conflict between Spain and Mexico in 1823. Davila’s main argument centers on the question of immigration quotas, going back to ideas expressed in the February 1930 memorandum: Among all the countries in the world, excepting of course Russia, which tacitly or formally have recognized that Bessarabia is a territorial part of Romania, the US maintain an overt discrimination intended to show that they still consider this matter unsettled. This discrimination is to be found in the immigration quotas, which provide a separate quota for Bessarabia. The question can well be raised whether there is any justification for the maintenance of this double anomaly, if there ever was one. . . . The feeling exists among Romanians that it is hard to see why Romania should grant the most favorable treatment to American trade, when in the only important matter in which the US so far had occasion to discriminate against Romania, they have chosen to do it. America is not only the only country which adopted this attitude, but it is only with regard to Romania that it is maintaining it, whereas it has long since given it up in all similar cases involving other countries (the Baltic States, Vilna, etc.). . . . It is an anomaly that one of two states enjoying normal and friendly relations should not recognize the sovereignty of the other over its entire territory. . . . The only conclusion to be drawn is that the Colby doctrine was abandoned as far back as 1922, in so far as former Russian territories were concerned, with but one sole exception, Bessarabia. . . . The fact that Romania has, since 1918, exercised continuous and undisturbed sovereignty over Bessarabia, is undisputed. . . . As an independent state [Bessarabia] had the further right to dispose of its sovereignty as it thought fit, in this case to merge it with Romanian sovereignty. . . The reason usually advanced by the Department of State to justify its exceptional attitude in case of Romania has been that the independence of Bes-

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sarabia had been of too short duration to satisfy the traditional (but by no means invariable, as the case of Panama proves) requirement of proof of stability before recognizing a new state. The well established American doctrine in the matter of changes of sovereignty is to make recognition conditional on: a reasonable period of stability of the new situation; acquiescence, even tacit, of the population; willingness and ability of the new government to discharge its obligations. The case of Bessarabia meets all these tests. . . . The above considerations are believed to show that there is no reason for the US not to recognize the de facto situation and continue to discriminate against a Romanian territory . . . Any international agreement between the US and Romania, ratified by the Parliament of the latter, in which sit the representatives of Bessarabia, would be of doubtful validity if America does not recognize even tacitly that Bessarabia is an integral part of Romania. . . . If the immigration quotas had not existed, the whole question would not have arisen. America would have been in the same position as the majority of the other countries. . . . Unfortunately, an American Law, the Immigration Act, establishes geographical quotas that can reflect overt discriminations against certain territories. . . . Romania has always granted and still grants the most favored nation treatment to American imports, without demanding any compensation. The tremendous advantage for America is clear, as in normal times America’s exports to Romania reached a substantial sum, whereas Romania could never expect to sell any of her agricultural products to America in more than negligible quantities. For the five-year period (1926-1930), American exports to Romania were valued at $32,182,000 while Romanian exports to America were valued at $3,297,000, according to American statistics. The Romanian statistics are even more favorable to America. In conclusion, Davila insisted on the necessity for the US to recognize Bessarabia as a Romanian territory as soon as possible and definitely before the US recognized the Russian Government: “When the immigration quotas are established sometime in June, the Bessarabian quota [should] merely be omitted and the Romanian one slightly augmented.” And what better end to his Memoire could Davila have found than by making a reference to one of the most famous American presidents (ironically, the one who initiated this US policy on Bessarabia): The reunion of Bessarabia with her mother country should not only not be frowned upon by the US, but should be eagerly welcomed. For it constitutes the perfection, as far as Romania is concerned, of the principle of selfdetermination, so ardently championed by Woodrow Wilson.127

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Moldova, a Romanian Province It was a masterfully written memorandum, crafted in the American style, rich with references to supporting precedents (Texas, Panama, Vilna), and showing clearly the possible advantages, and especially the economic ones, that would result from American recognition of Bessarabia as Romanian territory. Davila also knew that the argument to which the US was the most sensitive and to which they would pay the greatest attention was money, and he highlighted the large positive balance trade. His timing was good, too, at the end of March — just a few weeks before the establishment of the new immigration quotas. Unfortunately, Davila’s diplomatic acumen was not rivaled by any of his predecessors in Washington or by his colleagues in Tokyo, whether or not they had adequate backing from Bucharest. Bibescu’s and Vassiliu’s actions were negligible, compared with Davila’s campaign, and the results each produced show the difference. Less than two weeks after the Memoire had been handed in, the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, asked for President Roosevelt’s permission to resolve the problem: There is no longer any reason why we should continue to adhere to the doctrine enunciated by Mr. Colby in 1920. On the contrary, I feel that we should now recognize the de facto situation. This can be accomplished by a simple administrative act. . . . It would be my idea to omit any reference to Bessarabia in this Proclamation. The elimination of the Bessarabian quota and the inclusion of the territory within the Romanian quota area would have the result of according American recognition to Romanian sovereignty over Bessarabia and would set at rest the contention of Romania that the existence of the Bessarabian quota constitutes a “public discrimination” against that country.128 Hull’s telegram is important because, unlike all the other US documents, particularly those sent to the Romanians, it clearly states that the disappearance of the quota meant US recognition of Romania’s sovereignty over Bessarabia. On April 15, 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt approved the inclusion of the Bessarabian quota in the Romanian quota. Still, even after the President had approved the settlement of the Bessarabian immigration quota question, the American diplomats did not find it necessary to change their position. While informing Davila that the Romanian request had been approved by the President, the acting Secretary of State William Phillips stated that the American move was to take place only “provided that the Romanian Government did not continue its policy of discrimination against American trade”.129 In other words, it was indeed money that made the difference. Davila also reported the meeting home asking that, in order to boost his position, some pressure should be brought upon the Finance Ministry: The State Department’s decision regarding the implicit recognition of Bessarabia’s union must be taken soon. The representative of the State Department

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gave me a memorandum with secret documents regarding discrimination in various areas of Romanian imports of American goods. The State Department complains that the way in which the import quotas are applied is highly inequitable for them.130 In 1933 as a result of the economic crisis, the Romanian Government, like other governments, introduced a system of import quotas in order to equilibrate the trade balance. This proved to be detrimental to American interests and, although it was not intended as a mean of pressuring the US into a more pro-Romanian policy regarding Bessarabia, it seems to have had that effect. Davila defended the Romanian commercial policy, indicating that “Romania was in such a precarious situation at that time that she was obliged to trade primarily with countries that purchased from her.”131 Toward the end of 1933, as the world economy and the Romanian economy climbed out of the crises, the Romanians ceased to discriminate against American imports. On May 31 Davila was officially informed that the decision to merge the immigration quotas for Bessarabia and Romania had been taken and would be published in the Presidential Proclamation to be made in June. Still, unlike the aforementioned letter from Secretary Hull to the President, there was no suggestion or mention that this meant the US de facto recognition of Bessarabia’s union. The State Department asked, in exchange, for an improvement regarding the import quotas, and Davila noted that “a certain improvement would be enough”.132 Another meeting between Davila and Murray took place on June 8, focusing on the Romanian import quotas. Murray explained that: What we are protesting against is therefore not the establishment of import quotas by Romania, but the arbitrary administration of those quotas which threatens to shut us out of the Romanian market altogether. . . . What the Romanians are actually doing at the present time is to refuse to grant permits to importers of American goods and to grant such permits to importers of goods from other countries on the score that Romania’s trade with each and every country should be made to balance.133 Davila had to insist again with his superiors to make some commercial concessions to the Americans: Please transmit my gratitude to Mr. Madgearu [Romanian Finance Minister] and my request that the he should decide the necessary measures in order to satisfy the Americans before he leaves for London, because if the Bessarabian question is not solved here before the end of June, it will be postponed for the next year. I would also like to remind you that I promised State Department that, for the moment, no publicity will be made regarding the recognition of Bessarabia.134

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Finally, by Presidential Proclamation No. 2048 of June 16, 1933, establishing immigration quotas for the year beginning July 1, the Bessarabian quota area was included with the Romanian quota area. Wilbur J. Carr, the Assistant Secretary of State, sent the proclamation to Davila, together with the following comments: As you will observe this Proclamation omits any reference to Bessarabia. The effect of this omission is to abolish the Bessarabian quota established under Executive Order no 1952 of June 19, 1931. The Bessarabian quota area has been included within the Romanian quota area and, as you will note upon comparing the new order with that of June 19, 1931, the Romanian quota has been increased from 295 to 377.135 It was considered that, by the Presidential Proclamation, the US had de facto recognized the union of Bessarabia with Romania.136 The Romanian Foreign Ministry congratulated Davila for the results of his campaign137 and Davila sent one last report reviewing the entire campaign and underscoring again Murray’s opinion that it was an implicit recognition of Bessarabia’s union.138 Still, judging by the content of Carr’s message, or by the Presidential Proclamation, there was no mention by the Americans of a de facto recognition of Bessarabia’s union. It was clearly specified that the US saw the matter as a purely technical one having no political implications whatsoever for the US. In case complications should arise, they could back off easily, explaining the entire matter on administrative grounds and rejecting any political connection between the inclusion of the immigration quota and the official American policy on Bessarabia. On the other hand, it might be argued that, since the discrimination had disappeared, there was no need to have the matter expressly presented in writing. No official statement regarding a change in US policy regarding Bessarabia followed the quota decision; and events in fact shifted the other way again. In order to maintain confidentiality with regard to the American decision and to avoid a possible Soviet reaction, both governments kept the issue quiet, at least for the moment. Still, as a precaution the State Department drafted a declaration, with the agreement of the Romanian Legation in Washington, to be published by the Romanian government (and not by the US government, which gives it a different meaning) in case the decision should come to light.139 After presenting a short overview of the Bessarabian immigration quota question, the draft specified: Although the Romanian government understands that, from the American viewpoint, these decisions concerning the Bessarabian quota were taken primarily for reasons of administrative convenience, the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers that the inclusion of the Bessarabian quota area within the quota area of Romania may properly be interpreted as recognition by the US of the de facto situation in Bessarabia.140

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The draft declaration, although it seems to acknowledge the US de facto recognition of the situation in Bessarabia (without mentioning the words union or sovereignty, like all the other US documents addressed to the Romanians), falls short of acknowledging it in clear terms. This draft casts the US recognition in a different light. Of course, with the elimination of the special Bessarabian quota, the US discrimination against Romania ceased — which means that there were no more outward signs to show the US opposition to the union and that the US finally had done what all the other states entertaining relations with Romania had done since 1920: acknowledge a de facto situation. But the Draft, as well as the other documents addressed to the Romanians, stress that it was done only for reasons of administrative convenience and not as in response to historical, demographic or juridical arguments proving that Bessarabia was indeed Romanian territory. Then, was it recognition? The US officials left themselves an escape hatch: they could go back to imposing a new Bessarabian quota at any time later, and the Draft might be interpreted in the sense that the US was still opposed to the union between Bessarabia and Romania. For this reason the Draft could have been used, at any point, against Romania. The secretive manner in which the quota inclusion was made supports that view, as the US would be able to deny at any point a so-called de facto recognition of Bessarabia’s union. And so they actually did. In fact, it might be argued that the Draft and the secrecy surrounding the Bessarabian quota cancelled out any positive effects that should have redounded from the US decision to merge the two immigration quotas. The Romanians were unable, at any time, to use the 1933 Presidential Proclamation for propaganda, although it would have been a real boost for the Romanian position; to the contrary, they had to avoid any reference to it. Their win was more of a private than a public nature and it could have been turned against them by the Americans at any time. Titulescu’s reaction to the draft declaration, although initially based on a different reasoning, further supports this notion. Soon after learning of it, he vocally opposed its publication. “I see that Davila is talking about a communiqué to be given by the Romanian government regarding the Bessarabian quota. Please stop any communiqué on this question. For us it is important to have the thing in fact and not to advertise it. This is my line of action regarding these kind of matters.”141 Although Titulescu was not aware at that moment of the content of the draft he considered it wiser to keep it under wraps, particularly as it could have interfered with his policy moves towards the Soviets. After he learned of its contents, he was even more opposed to publishing it, correctly stating, “The communiqué is in total contradiction to all his previous telegrams and is inadmissible for me.”142 Although both States tried to keep the quota inclusion secret, someone at the Romanian Legation in Washington leaked it to the Romanian press. As a result, one Romanian newspaper published a small notice on the matter.143 As the article was more favorable to Romania than reality would have suggested was actually the case,

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Moldova, a Romanian Province and as the matter was also supposed to be kept secret, the US minister in Bucharest immediately contacted the Romanian Foreign Ministry expressing his surprise and reminding of the commitment to avoid any publicity. The ministry made the necessary interventions so that the news published in Argus would not be published in any other Romanian newspaper.143 In order to justify their implication in the making of the draft declaration, Nanu clarified that the communiqué was to be published only in the case of a violent press campaign or of a parliamentary interpellation. He also pointed that “the State Department wishes to continue keeping the secret regarding the Bessarabian quota”.144 Titulescu was very keen to end the discussions regarding the Draft declaration, perfectly understanding its real significance, and instructed Nanu: We refuse, whatever the situation might be, the publication of the communiqué regarding the Bessarabian quota, the text of which is not satisfactory for us, as I telegraphed you. We are astonished that, although you had clear instructions in the past, you exceeded them once again.145 Taking into account the short period of time between the US decision to merge the immigration quotas in 1933 and the US recognition of the Soviets, one might well argue that the two decisions were connected. Still, although the Romanians made that argument during their campaign there is nothing, at least in the available documents, that would indicate a connection between the quota merger and the recognition of the Soviet Union. The main argument against such a connection is the fact that the Romanians were negotiating with the State Department (which was still opposed to recognition of the Soviets in 1933) and not with President Roosevelt, who made up his own mind to improve relations with the Soviets.146 Under these conditions, the decision to merge the immigration quotas had little if anything to do with the US recognition of the Soviets. In 1938 the immigration quota question was mentioned for the last time. The Romanian Legation in the US sent a telegram stating: With this inclusion of the immigration quota for Austria in that for Germany, the State Department acknowledged publicly for the first time that a similar operation took place in 1933, when the Bessarabian quota was added to that of Romania. I remind you that State Department insisted five years ago that this action should not be advertised. . . . By the publication of the State Department’s declaration on April 28 any possibility that the State Department will ask us to publish the draft communiqué is definitively eliminated.147 In July 1940, when the Soviets took Bessarabia from Romania, the US government made no attempt to help Romania. As Irimescu has observed:

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The commentaries here show the occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina as a move against Germany. Therefore, the Soviet action finds not only understanding but also tacit approval. . . . In private conversations they show me sympathy but they also add that what is of most importance is the defeat of Germany and the contribution which the Soviet Union might make in this sense. From the Jewish and the left wing circles we face, of course, pronounced hostility.148 As an interesting detail, on June 24, 1941, a State Department official informed the Romanian Chargé d’affaires in Washington that “as long as the Romanian Army does not cross the old Romanian border [the border before the territorial losses suffered in 1940, including Bessarabia], the US has no reason to criticize the Romanian action [against the Soviet Union].”149 After the US entered the war, by 1942 the US was solidly supporting the future of Bessarabia as a part of the Soviet Union. The only reservations expressed by the Americans referred to northern Bukovina, which had never belonged to Russia; but they dropped those objections shortly.150 In February 1944, when the Soviet Army was about to re-occupy Bessarabia, a new debate sprang up between the US and Great Britain regarding the fate of Bessarabia. According to a telegram sent to the British Foreign Office by George Kennan, from Moscow, “The State Department considers that they [the Russians] could occupy Bessarabia, as its annexation by Romania had never been recognized by the Soviet and US governments.”151 In fact, the US terms for the Romanian surrender, approved by the Joint Chief of Staff in February 1944, called not only for the incorporation of northern Bukovina and Bessarabia into the Soviet Union but also for an adjustment of the Hungarian-Romanian frontier in Transylvania, along ethnic lines.152 Conclusions There are several key episodes to consider in analyzing the connection to the Bessarabian question in the context of Romanian-US relations: 1. President Wilson’s first analysis of the Bessarabian question, in May 1918, which did not inspire him to agree that it should automatically belong to Romania; 2. The recognition of Romanian rights in Bessarabia, clearly expressed in the final recommendations of the Inquiry Commission and by the vote of the American representatives in the Territorial Commissions. It seems improbable that this was done without the knowledge and approval of President Wilson. 3. The May 8, 1919, declaration by Secretary of State Robert Lansing, that no modifications should be made regarding the territory belonging to the former Russian Empire without the approval of a recognized Russian government (presumably, a White Russian government).

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Moldova, a Romanian Province As we have shown, the change in the American policy toward the Bessarabian question did not come as a result of Romania’s “uncooperative” attitude toward the Peace Conference but more probably was due to the Great Powers’ hopes in a victorious Kolchak offensive, and also to increased American anxiety regarding Japan’s military intervention in Russia. The change in the US stance was intended to support Kolchak (at least, that was the official story) but was kept in place even after Kolchak’s defeat, as a warning to the Japanese that the US would oppose by any means to a Japanese attempt to take away any Russian territories. The US policymakers sacrificed the interests of Romania while going after bigger fish in the Far East. Together with Bessarabia (which was the first to pay the price), the interests of the Baltic States were sacrificed too, although only for a short period. However, Bessarabia’s case shows some clear similarities to that of the Japanese intervention in Siberia, while the Baltic States had none. The main argument for the May 8 decision was the possibly impending recognition of Kolchak’s Government. But if that had been the point, a similar action could have been taken earlier, at the start of the Kolchak offensive. Lansing’s insistence on a plebiscite in Bessarabia also points to one more possible reason behind that decision: the US delegates were not convinced that the decision of union taken by the Sfatul Tserii was really representative. Still, in that case, they could have argued so during the debates in the territorial commissions; but they did not. Lansing knew all too well that, by conditioning the recognition of Bessarabia’s union on the question of a plebiscite in Bessarabia, he could defend his position before the other Powers and public opinion. He also understood very well why the Romanian government was opposed to the idea of a plebiscite in Bessarabia (their fear of communist agitation) and he took advantage of the Romanians’ position in order to justify the US policy towards Bessarabia. Still, the question remains: if the US representatives were so convinced of the necessity of a plebiscite, why had none of them said anything about it during the debates in the territorial commissions, or some twenty years later? The Colby Note acknowledges the American policy toward Russia, stressing two aspects: that no more territory of Russia would be taken away from her (this was justified on the basis of the Bolsheviks’ success in appealing to the national feelings of the Russians, and not at all on the basis of concerns over Japanese action in Siberia and Sakhalin), and that there could be no diplomatic relations with a communist government. 1. 1922-1923, when the Baltic States were recognized by the US. 2. Instead of recognizing Bessarabia as Romanian territory, the US government did the opposite: by July 1, 1923, the Bessarabian immigration quota was included in the Russian immigration quota. They rationalized this by noting that there was as yet no valid international act recognizing Bessarabia as Romanian territory.

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3. 1931, when the US representatives agreed to reintroduce a distinct Bessarabian immigration quota, as a result of Romanian Minister Charles A. Davila’s campaign. The question remains, why did they choose a compromise over a definitive solution? 4. 1933, when the US government merged the Bessarabian immigration quota into the Romanian quota. The American decision should be seen through the lens of Davila’s campaign, with an eye on the coincidence between the first Romanian economic discriminatory measures against American interests and the speed with which the Americans resolved the Bessarabian quota issue. The Second World War, during which the US did not oppose the Soviet occupation of Bessarabia but argued that the US government had never recognized Bessarabia’s union with Romania. In the end, many questions remain open regarding the US policy on Bessarabia during the interwar period. Why was the US so eager to highlight its refusal to recognize Bessarabia’s union and, unlike any other state, to take steps clearly indicating their decision? Why was the US so set against Romania in the Bessarabian question, since Romania was a “friendly” country with whom it had not only political but also economic relations? What was the Soviet Union’s role in this; were they aware of (and, if so, did they fully appreciate) the Bessarabian immigration quota and the US maps?153 Before ending the chapter, we will pose one more riddle. Did the US recognize the union of Bessarabia with Romania? There are two ways to recognize a territorial modification: de jure (as France or Great Britain did) and de facto (as Holland, Belgium and other states did). The US clearly did not recognize it de jure, as it refused to sign the Bessarabian Treaty. But by de facto recognition, the existing situation is acknowledged without any special treaty or convention required. The US is a special case; it failed to deliver, in the 1920s or later, even a de facto recognition of Bessarabia’s union. But later, after World War II, it changed its tune once again — and retroactively, at that. By the way they drew the maps and set the immigration quotas, they made sure to indicate that in America’s view Bessarabia was “under Romanian occupation”. And, although the US had signed a number of treaties with Romania, they avoided any reference to Romania’s borders in Bessarabia. As a result of Romanian pressure, in 1931 the maps were changed and a distinct Bessarabian immigration quota was restored, but the Americans explained this move on administrative grounds and said they did not consider it a de facto recognition of Bessarabia’s union. In 1933, the US went a step further and included the Bessarabian quota in the Romanian quota. Theoretically, there is nothing in the way of interpreting this move as a de facto recognition of the union.154 Practically, the secretive man-

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Moldova, a Romanian Province ner in which it was done, and its justification (administrative reasons and not the Romanian character of Bessarabia), plus the Draft declaration to be published in case the affair became public, prevent that interpretation. First, as Davila clearly understood, it was only an implicit and not an explicit recognition. The US could, at any point, back off, which they actually did during the war. And the US attitude towards Bessarabia during World War II clearly shows that the reality behind the de facto recognition (if we choose to consider it so) was not what the Romanians had hoped. It must be admitted that, after May 8, 1919, no US representative officially declared that Bessarabia belonged to Romania or that the US recognized, even de facto, Bessarabia’s union, although they knew that the Romanians would interpret their decision to merge the Bessarabian and Romanian immigration quotas in this sense. The US attitude towards Bessarabia changed in the aftermath of the Second World War, when the Cold War started. At that moment they decided to make use of the Bessarabian question in order to damage Soviet-Romanian relations, a plan that, at one point, worked quite well. However, before giving any support to the Romanians in their claims to Bessarabia, the US had to show that they had recognized Bessarabia’s union with Romania before 1940. In order to do so, they gave a free hand to US scholars in publishing a number of papers arguing in favor of the Romanian view on Bessarabia.155 One other method, closely related to this propaganda, was the selective publishing of State Department documents, in the “Foreign Relations of the United States” collection. In the volumes of documents published during the 1930s and referring to US foreign policy in the 1920s, there had been no mention at all regarding the US policy towards Bessarabia after the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty, although there had been Romanian-US negotiations on the matter during 1921-1924.156 By contrast, the documents published during the 1950s and referring to the 1930s do mention the Bessarabian question. In fact, they not only mention it but, in order to assist the reader to frame it all properly, the chapter is titled: “Recognition by the US of Romania’s de facto sovereignty over Bessarabia”.157 After such a formulation and based on the documents published in the volume, who could argue that the US had failed to de facto recognize Bessarabia’s union? They omitted to publish or even to mention the Draft declaration of July 1933, which, taken at face value, suggested a conclusion that directly contradicts the title of the chapter.158 This maneuver was so successful that in Romania nowadays it is considered that the US did give de facto recognition of Bessarabia’s union, and most scholarly papers published after 1990 take this recognition for granted. Still, let’s consider that, indeed, the US did give de facto recognition of Bessarabia’s union with Romania, although the Americans carefully avoided the word “union”. How much of a success was this for Romanian diplomacy? The US merely brought itself in line with all the other countries maintaining relations with Romania, except for the Soviets. It should be added that the US only became neutral in the Soviet-Romanian dispute, after so many years of pro-Soviet policy. The Romanian

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government might have expected more from a country with which they had considerable economic relations, in fact an impressive negative trade balance at a time when every state was taking measures to reduce imports and boost exports. At least, as Davila said, at one point, by having the US adopting a neutral position regarding Bessarabia, the Romanians might avoid the possibility of the Soviets taking advantage of the situation. Taking into account the fact that the 1933 quota merger ended the discrimination against Romania, it might be considered that it was a success for Romania (although it came a little late in the game). But, in the general picture, given the way in which the “recognition” was given and the fact that the US only became neutral to Romania in her conflict with the Soviets, the 1933 maneuver seems to be only at best a “semi-success” or a step in the right direction (one that should have come a few good years earlier) — but it was the last such step until the end of World War II. We should also compare the US attitude toward Bessarabia with the US position during the Second World War regarding other territories of Russia that underwent a similar fate. In fact, if one considers Poland and the help it received from the US during the war, there are barely terms for comparison with the case of Bessarabia. Even more crushing is the example of the Baltic States. Although the US accepted with almost no comment their re-annexation by the USSR, juridically, Washington did not recognize this annexation. The Legations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania continued to exist de jure in the USA until the three states regained their independence in 1991.159 And, once again, it should be noted that Romanian diplomacy also played a role in the entire affair. How was it possible that for more than five years there was no call for a change in the US policy towards Bessarabia? Even if we know of a few contributing factors, the whole situation is odd.160 This writer considers that the Romanians could have done much more to obtain a change in the US attitude towards Bessarabia. The present chapter has offered a different image, a darker one but, in our opinion, closer to the reality. It also presents a number of new documents to support this view. As with any new viewpoint, this one will be heavily criticized by some and, hopefully, accepted by others. In a sense, we might call it “The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Tweaking the Nose of the Romanians — Thirty Years of AmericanRomanian Relations, 1919-1948”.161 We should also keep in mind that many documents remain out of reach that might cast a new light on the entire affair. Most palpably missing are the Soviet documents relating to the US policy on the Bessarabian question.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Notes 1

In the chapters on the other countries (except for Russia) that played a role in the saga of the Bessarabian Treaty, the accent was mostly on the Treaty question and not on the Bessarabian question as a whole; the present chapter focuses much more on the US attitude towards the Bessarabian question broadly than on the Treaty itself. 2 A distinction should be made regarding the two possible levels of recognition, de facto and de jure, let alone the option of refusing recognition outright. Still, there are scholars who make no such distinction, simply considering that Bessarabia’s union was recognized only by the states that ratified the Bessarabian Treaty, arguing that “in fact, Romania’s allies within the Little Entente refused even to recognize the annexation of Bessarabia”. M. Adam, The Little Entente . . . , p. 222, 303, 305. A comparison between the US position towards Bessarabia’s union with that of, say, Czechoslovakia should be enough to illustrate the need to make the distinction. 3 The Romanian government had sent a number of diplomatic missions to the US starting in 1868, but a Legation was opened only in 1917. On the other hand, the US government opened a Consular Agency in Galati in 1858, and in 1880 a Legation in Bucharest. Stelian Popescu-Boteni, Relatii intre Romania si SUA pana in 1914, p. 49-52. 4 G.E. Torrey, “The Diplomatic Career of Charles J Vopicka in Romania, 1913-1920,” in Romania between East and West, p. 322. 5 Mamatey, who offers the example of Andrews’s attitude towards the Transylvanian Mission to the US headed by Vasile Stoica, castigates his attitude and lack of objectivity. After failing to inform his government of the coming of the mission he tried to make up for his mistake by belittling the purpose and personnel of the Mission and by proceeding to demolish the ideal of Romanian unity. Mamatey is so revolted at the anomalies written by Andrews that he states, “for malice, bias, and ignorance, Andrew’s report is unique among the hundreds of such reports in the files of the State Department sifted by this author”. Victor S. Mamatey, The US and East Central Europe 1914-1918, p. 124125. 6 G. Bobango, I. Stanciu, “Romanian-Americans and the Union of 1918” in Romania between East and West, p. 349. 7 Details on the activity of the Transylvanian Mission in the US are available in Vasile Stoica’s own book In America pentru cauza romaneasca, passim. Also Boris Ranghet, Relatii romano-americane . . . , p. 3044, and V. Mamatey, The United States and . . . , p. 123-126. 8 G. Bobango, I. Stanciu, “Romanian-Americans . . .” in Romania between East and West, p. 351. 9 V. Mamatey, The United States and . . . , p. 127. In fact, this was the price the Romanian government paid for its failure to open a Legation in the US before or during the first years of the war. 10 FRUS, 1917, Supplement 2, Vol. 1, p. 309. 11 FRUS, 1918, Supplement 1, Vol. 1, Telegram Vopicka to the Secretary of State, January 19, 1918, p. 752. 12 For a concise presentation on the making and the activity of the Inquiry see Sidney Edward Mezes, “The Inquiry” in What Really Happened at Paris . . . , p. I-VIII. 13 For example, Saint Aulaire considers that Wilson was only the “step father” of the 14 points, which in fact had been suggested to him from Moscow. Saint Aulaire, Confession d’un . . . , p. 454-455. While mentioning that, in fact, one of the main purposes of President Wilson’s 14 points was to answer the Bolsheviks’s demand for an explanation of the war aims, an answer that might persuade Russia to stand by the Allies in their fight against the Central Powers, American scholars insist that he also had two other clear purposes in mind: an appeal to German socialists, and a notice to the Entente that there must be a revision in a liberal sense of the war aims which had been crystallized in the secret treaties. C. Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, p. 331. 14 While the majority of Inquiry members have been very keen to point out their positive contribution to the establishment of a “lasting peace”, not every scholar agrees with this viewpoint. Mamatey

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CHAPTER 9. THE UNITED STATES offers the best example: “In historical perspective it cannot be said that the Inquiry’s blueprint for victory and peace was either wise or noble. Blinded by a doctrinaire economic determinism, the Inquiry greatly overestimated the importance of economic and geographic factors and grossly underestimated the dynamism of nationalistic and social movements. Their recommendation to stir up a nationalist revolution in Austria and then deny the revolutionaries the fruits of their battles revealed an opportunism and irresponsibility which harmonized ill with the usually straightforward and honest methods of American diplomacy”. V. Mamatey, The US and . . . , p. 183. Mamatey is referring to the following 1917 recommendation of the Inquiry, with regard to Austria-Hungary: “Our policy must therefore consist first in a stirring up of nationalist discontent and then in refusing to accept the extreme logic of this discontent, which would be the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary”, C. Seymour, The Intimate Papers . . . , Vol. 3, p. 343. 15 C. Seymour, Woodrow Wilson and the Word War, p. 236. 16 C Seymour, The Intimate Papers . . . , Vol. 3, p. 342. 17 C Seymour, The Intimate Papers . . . , Vol. 3, p. 347. 18 C. Seymour, The Intimate Papers . . . , Vol. 3, p. 342-343. 19 V. Mamatey, The United States and . . . , p. 204. 20 FRUS, 1918, Supplement 1, Telegram Secretary of State to Vopicka, February 21, 1918, p. 758-759. 21 V. Mamatey, The United States and . . . , p. 208. Mamatey also points out (p. 209) that it would be erroneous to suppose that, if the President had sanctioned the Romanian territorial claims they would have kept on fighting. They were thoroughly weary of the war and appeared glad for an excuse to get out of it. 22 FRUS, 1918, Supplement 1, Telegram Secretary of State to Vopicka, May 3, 1918, p. 770-771. 23 Letter Wilson to Lansing, May 1, 1918, State Department Files, quoted in V. Mamatey, The US and . . . , p. 251. 24 V. Mamatey, The United States and . . . , p. 252. 25 Bernard Cook, “The US and Romania during World War I and Peace Settlement” in La fin de la Premiere Guerre . . . , p. 50. 26 V. Mamatey, The United States and . . . , p. 376-377. 27 FRUS, 1918, Supplement 1, Telegrams Vopicka to Secretary of State, October 21 and 26, 1918, p. 783-784. 28 Mamatey considers that the action of the Transylvanian Romanians was decisive in changing Lansing’s attitude toward the Romanian cause in Transylvania. V. Mamatey, The United States and . . . , p. 377-378. 29 FRUS, 1918, Supplement 1, Telegram Secretary of State to Vopicka, November 5, 1918, p. 785. 30 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 2, Telegram Vopicka to Secretary of State, November 9, 1918, p. 386. 31 FRUS, 1918, Supplement 1, The Cobb-Lippman Memorandum, October 29, 1918, p. 407-411. 32 For details on Inquiry’s position on Dobrudja see in B. Cook, “The US and Romania . . .” in La fin de la . . . , p. 52-53. 33 S.D. Spector, Romania la . . . , p.126. 34 Miller, Diary IV, p. 233 in VF Dobrinescu, Ion Patroiu, “American Opinion on Bessarabia at the Paris Peace Conference” in . . .. 35 William Howell Reed, “Bessarabia”, The Inquiry, Document 478, quoted in B. Cook, “The US and Romania” in La fin de la . . . , p. 57. 36 G.E. Torrey, “The Diplomatic Career of . . .” in Romania between East and West, p. 327. 37 It is argued, “the staff of the Inquiry were concerned in Paris, as members of commissions, with delicate questions of policy, and it may be noted that the decisions which they had a part in negotiating were only in the rarest instances modified by the supreme council”. S.E. Mezes, “The Inquiry” in What Really Happened at Paris, p. VIII. 3 8 For an old presentation of the complex relations inside the US delegation, illustrating the communist view on the matter, see B. Ranghet, Relatii romano-americane . . . , p. 155-159.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province 3

9. Ivo J. Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference, p. 172. For a glimpse at the conflict between the Inquiry members and the State Department: C. Seymour, Letters from . . . , p. 163. 41 The members of the Inquiry were very keen to stress their role during the peace conference, only a number of years later admitting that they had to suffer in Paris as a result of two outstanding defects: their amateur status that made them hesitate to stand up to their European opposites with determination (in a dozen spots along the Czech or the Romanian border, the Americans were too polite or too timid to quarrel) and they were also unorganized as a group, so that their judgment was never effectively concentrated or forcefully exercised. C. Seymour, Letters from . . . , p. XXIX-XXX. 42 If instead of the experts (by experts we mean the former members of the Inquiry) there had been US politicians in the territorial commissions, they probably would have contested Wilson’s decision to cancel the agreement reached by them, be it only from vanity or self-respect. But the experts would have had much more to lose than the politicians by contesting the President’s decision. In fact, during the entire peace conference, the experts simply applied the President’s decisions, and this brings us once more to their attitude in the territorial commissions. 43 Telegram Ion I.C. Bratianu (in Paris) to Pherekide (in Bucharest), April 23 (May 6), 1919, quoted in Ghe. I. Bratianu, Actiunea politica . . . , p. 54. 44 Ghe. I. Bratianu, Actiunea politica . . . , p. 56. G. Bratianu also argues (p. 63) that the minorities question was in close connection with the petroleum question. 45 In fact, Seymour states it clearly: “so apparently it is up to us to play around with the Czechs and Romanians, even more than we have done, and see what is on their mind”. C Seymour, Letters from . . . , p. 131. 46 One such meeting, of January 31, 1919, in the aftermath of the Council’s hearing on the RomanianYugoslav conflict over the Banat, when Bratianu tried the “flattery method” for improving Romania’s relations with the US representatives, is well described, together with a concise presentation of the Romanian thesis, in C. Seymour, Letters from . . . , p. 144-148. 47 Ion I.C. Bratianu invited the Queen to Paris in order to improve Romania’s image. A. Iordache, “Ion I.C. Bratianu la . . .” in Revista Istorica, 1993, No. 9, p. 7. 48 S.D. Spector, Romania la . . . , p. 139. For more details on Queen Marie’s visits to Paris and London during the Paris Peace Conference, see Queen Marie, “My Mission” in The Cornhill Magazine, 1939. 49 A very interesting account of the role played by Romania on this occasion is the report sent by Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, a member of the Romanian delegation, to Iuliu Maniu, published by Gheorghe Iancu in Romania si relatiile internationale in secolul XX, p. 9-43. 50 Quoted in Manley O. Hudson, “The Protection of Minorities and Natives in Transferred Territories” in “What Really Happened at Paris . . .”, p. 214 51 Quoted in Gheorghe Iancu, “Conferinta de pace de la Paris. Alexandru Vaida-Voevod catre Iuliu Maniu” in Romania si relatiile internationale in secolul XX, p. 34. 52 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 11, p. 441 53 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 9, p. 126. 54 For the opinion of the US representatives regarding the minorities question, and especially that of the treatment of Jewish population in Romania (a first official US inquiry into the treatment of Jewish people in Romania, based on the Berlin Treaty of 1878, was made as early as 1902 by Secretary John Hay) see M. Hudson, “The Protection of . . .” in What Really Happened at Paris, p. 204-231. 55 The war relief for Romania was based on the agreement signed by Ion I.C. Bratianu and Herbert Hoover, the chief of the ARA on February 28, 1919. In a letter sent to Romanian King Ferdinand on May 22, Hoover stated that if the oil question were not resolved in the Americans’ favor, they would not only cut off any relief but also refuse to grant any credits in the future for Romania. B. Ranghet, Relatii romano-americane . . . , p. 193-194. 56 The US representatives asked for similar guarantees from Yugoslavia and Poland too but the Romanians agreed to sign the guarantees only after they had been threatened with cutting off Roma40

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CHAPTER 9. THE UNITED STATES nia’s supplies. In fact, there was a small conflict between Herbert Hoover and the Romanians regarding the guarantees, due to the fact that the Romanians connected the threat of cutting supplies with the interests of American oil companies in Romania. Hoover asked the Romanian government to apologize for this incident. Ion Ciuperca, “Bucuresti-Washington, diplomatie si petrol” in Relatii Romano-Americane in timpurile moderne, p. 161-184. 57 As shown by the meeting of the Steering Committee on July 26, 1919 (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 8, p. 838) and by a telegram sent by White to Lansing, on July 23, 1919, “if we assent to giving Bessarabia to Romania, our position regarding the Dobrudja would be strengthened”. V.F. Dobrinescu, Ion Patroiu, “American Opinion . . .”, p. 12. 58 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 12, The Bandholtz Mission, p. 635-670. 59 Frank Lyon Polk became Under-Secretary of State in 1919 and was appointed Commissioner to head the US delegation during the six months of negotiations with the lesser Central Powers, after President Wilson left Paris following the signing of the Versailles Treaty. 60 B. Cook, “The US and Romania” in La fin de la Premiere Guerre . . . , p. 58-59. 61 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 8, p. 58. 62 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 8, p. 78. 63 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 9, p. 368. 64 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 11, The Commission to Negotiate Peace (signed Polk) to the Secretary of State (Lansing), November 15, p. 664 65 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 11, Telegram Polk to Lansing, November 30, 1919, p. 677. 66 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 11, Telegram Polk to Lansing, November 30, 1919, p. 679. 67 RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Report on visit by Antonescu to Laroche, November 18, 1919, c. 660-662. 68 FRUS, PPC, Vol. 11, Telegram Polk to Lansing, December 4, 1919, p. 688 69 FRUS, 1920, Vol. 3, Telegram Secretary of State to Avezzana, August 20, 1920, p. 463-468. 70 FRUS, 1920, Vol. 3, Telegram Martens to Avezzana, October 4, 1920, p. 474. 71 FRUS, 1920, Vol. 3, p. 514-524. 72 George Bronson Rea, “The Great Mistake” in Readings in Russian Foreign Policy, p. 22. 73 Louis Fisher, “Woodrow Wilson and Intervention” in Readings in Russian Foreign Policy, p. 7. 74 L. Fisher, “Woodrow Wilson and Intervention”, in Readings . . . , p. 14. 75 FRUS, 1926, Vol. 2, p. 898-901; 1930, Vol. 3, p. 798-800; 1929, Vol. 3, p.747-754. 76 FRUS, 1928, Vol. 2, p. 819-821; 1938, Vol. 2, p. 672-683. 77 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegrams Bibescu to Ionescu, March 15 and April 11, 1921. 78 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegrams Ionescu to Bibescu, April 12 and 15, 1921. 79 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Bibescu to Ionescu, May 27, 1921. 80 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Bibescu to Ionescu, May 15, 1921. 81 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 21, ad noted by Take Ionescu on Telegram Bibescu to Ionescu, December 21, 1921. 82 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Nanu to Duca, July 30, 1922. 83 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegrams Duca to Bibescu, March 27 and 28, 1923. 84 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Bibescu to Duca, April 2, 1923. 85 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegrams Bibescu to Duca, April 6 and 18, 1923. Unfortunately, based on this supposition, Bibescu decided to go and inspect the other Romanian centers and consulates in the US, leaving F.C. Nanu in charge of the correspondence, instead of staying in Washington and continuing to lobby for a favorable decision. 86 Quoted in Dumitru Hincu, “Problema Basarabiei . . .” in Magazin Istoric, 1994. 87 It is interesting that the FRUS collection fails, for reasons that will be presented at the end of the chapter, to mention any of the 1923 events related to the US position regarding the Bessarabian question. 88 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegrams Bibescu to Duca, June 22 and 24, 1923.

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Moldova, a Romanian Province 89

RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, ad noted on Telegram Bibescu to Duca, June 22, 1923. 90 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Bibescu to Duca, June 24, 1923. 91 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Duca to Bibescu, March 15, 1924. 92 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Bibescu to Duca, March 24, 1924. 93 RFMA, Fond 71/1920-1944, Special Files, S 18, Vol. 81, Telegram Nanu to Duca, January 15, 1924. 94 RFMA, Fond 71/1920-1944, Special Files, S 18, Vol. 81, Memorandum Nanu to Duca, June 17, 1924. 95 For details on this controversy see FRUS, 1924, Vol. 2, p. 597-647. The Romanian viewpoint is best presented in the Memorandum handed to the US Legation in Bucharest on July 21, 1924 (p. 621-626). 96 Report Culbertson to Secretary of State, November 9, 1925, quoted in C. Iordan, Romania si relatiile internationale din sud estul European: modelul Locarno, p. 161-162. 97 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Davila to Mironescu, October 17, 1929. 98 FRUS, 1930, Vol. 3, Aide-Memoire on Bessarabia, February 18, 1930, p. 801-805. 99 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Davila to Mironescu, February 20, 1930. 100 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 21, Report on the US and the Bessarabian Question, March 1930, p. 249. 101 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Nanu to Mironescu, April 5, 1930. 102 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Mironescu to Nanu, April 7, 1930. 103 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Nanu to Mironescu, April 28, 1930. 104 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Mironescu to Nanu, April 29, 1930. 105 FRUS, 1930, Vol. 3, Report by Murray on his meeting with Nanu, October 1, 1930, p. 806-807. 106 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Nanu to Mironescu, October 3, 1930. 107 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Davila to Mironescu, March 14, 1931. 108 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Davila to Ghika, July 7, 1931. 109 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Report Davila to Ghika, July 21, 1931. 110 FRUS, 1932, Vol. 2, Memorandum by Murray for Stimson before the latter’s meeting with Davila (February 4) and Memorandum by Secretary of State, February 4, 1932, p. 504-505. 111 The letter referred to the situation in China after the opening of the Sino-Japanese war. It is probable that this letter prompted Davila to insist again that the RFM take action for the Japanese ratification. 112 FRUS, 1932, Vol. 2, Memorandum by Castle of Conversation with Davila, March 24, 1932, p. 506. 113 FRUS, 1933, Vol. 2, Memorandum by Davila to Secretary of State, March 29, 1932, p. 671. 114 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Davila to Ghika, April 18, 1932. 115 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Davila to Ghika, April 30, 1932. 116 FRUS, 1932, Vol. 2, Memorandum by Murray to Castle, May 13, 1932, p. 507-508. 117 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Titulescu to Davila and Nanu, December 9, 1932. 118 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Titulescu to Davila, February 2, 1933. 119 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Davila to Titulescu, February 7, 1933. 120 The last argument clearly shows a more confident and decided manner in approaching the Bessarabian question, justified by the fact that this time Davila had the backing of the RFM. If, up to this point, Davila tried to use more peaceful arguments, this time he used the threat of anti-American public opinion in Romania. 121 FRUS, 1933, Vol.2, Memorandum by Murray to Secretary of State and Under Secretary of State, March 6, 1934, p. 657. 122 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Davila to Titulescu, March 6, 1933. 123 FRUS, 1933, Vol. 2, Memorandum by Kelley, March 16, 1933, p. 659-661. 124 L. Fischer, Russia’s Road from peace to War, p. 215-217. 125 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Savel Radescu to Davila, March 22, 1933. 126 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Davila for Bucharest, April 14,1933. 127 FRUS, 1933, Vol. 2, Aide Memoire by Davila, March 29, 1933, p. 662-680. For the Romanian trans-

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CHAPTER 9. THE UNITED STATES lation of the Memorandum see RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, p. 253-283. 128 FRUS, 1933, Vol. 2, Telegram Secretary of State to Roosevelt, April 12, 1933, p. 681. 129 FRUS, 1933, Vol. 2, Memorandum by Phillips, May 31, 1933, p. 682. 130 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Davila to Titulescu, April 31, 1933. 131 FRUS, 1933, Vol. 2, Report by Murray to Acting Secretary of State, June 8, 1933, p. 689. 132 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Davila to Titulescu, May 31, 1933. 133 FRUS, 1933, Vol. 2, Report by Murray to Acting Secretary of State, June 8, 1933, p. 689. 134 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Davila to Titulescu, June 8, 1933. 135 FRUS, 1933, Vol. 2, Telegram Carr to Davila, June 21, 1933, p. 682. 136 Whereas many Romanian scholars clearly state that it was a de facto recognition, some mistakenly argue that the US recognized the Union de jure too. I. Constantin, Romania, Marile Puteri . . . , p. 27. 137 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Mironescu to Davila, June 20, 1933. 138 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Davila to Titulescu, June 28, 1933. 139 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 21, Report on Positions Taken by Different Powers Regarding the Recognition of Bessarabia, by D.G. Popescu, September 7, 1937, p. 288. 140 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, p. 383-384, not dated — but no later than midJuly 1933. 141 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Titulescu for Bucharest, July 29, 1933. 142 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Titulescu for Bucharest, October 7, 1933. 143 “The negotiations undertaken by M. Davila with the US government resulted in the US recognition of Bessarabia’s union with Romania. As a consequence of this ratification, the immigration quota for the US includes, from today on, the Bessarabian territory too, which used to have a separate quota, added to the Soviet quota.” Argus, Bucharest, September 29, 1933. 143 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Radescu to Titulescu, October 5, 1933. 144 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegrams Nanu to Bucharest, October 7 and December 13, 1933. 145 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Titulescu to Nanu, January 16, 1934. 146 L. Fischer, Russia’s Road from Peace to War, p. 212-218. 147 RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Irimescu to Petrescu-Comnen, May 3, 1938. 148 RFMA, Fond 71/1920-1944, USA, Vol. 39, Telegram Irimescu to Gigurtu, July 1, 1940. 149 A. Cretzianu, Captive Romania, p. 66. 150 V.F. Dobrinescu, I. Constantin, Basarabia in anii celui de-al doilea razboi mondial, p. 254-255. 151 Quoted in V.F. Dobrinescu, I. Constantin, Basarabia in anii. . . , p. 270. 152 J.F. Harrington, B.J. Courtney, The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe . . . , p. 4. 153 Unfortunately, going back to the secrecy still maintained at the former Soviet Foreign Ministry Archives, the answer to this last question will have to wait a few good years. So far, the author has found no comments or documents pointing to this aspect of the US-Soviet relations. 154 Most Romanian scholars, starting with G. Buzatu, V.F. Dobrinescu, I. Constantin, A. Karetki, and many others dealing with this aspect consider that it was clearly a de facto recognition and celebrate it as a great success for Romanian foreign policy. They do so based mainly on the US published documents and, although those documents were published a long time ago, it was only after 1990 (due to the communist regime) that the scholars were able to present those documents to the Romanian public. 155 In this sense see the excellent article published by Gheorghe I. Florescu, “Bessarabia, a Subject of American Historiography, 1945-1995”, in Anuarul Institutului de Istorie AD Xenopol, 1996. While during the interwar period there was only one book published by an American scholar on the Bessarabian question, that of Charles Upson Clark in 1927, things clearly changed starting with the 1950s, an increased number of papers pointing to the rightfulness of the Romanian claims to Bessarabia. 156 The argument that the Bessarabian question was not an important matter in US foreign policy and that this is why one can find no mention of it is a very fragile hypothesis. As the US was the only

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Power, besides the Soviets, clearly refusing (de jure and de facto) to recognize the union of Bessarabia with Romania, it could not be argued that this was of no significance for US policy. 157 FRUS, 1933, Vol. 2, p. 656. 158 It is interesting that the Romanian scholars who had direct access to the American archives, for example Gheorghe Buzatu, failed to find any trace of the Draft declaration. 159 Dinu C. Giurescu, Romania in the Second World War, p. 417. 160 And we have identified two of them: lack of first-class diplomats representing Romania in the US; and Romania’s general attitude towards the US, dismissing it as isolationist, not interested in European affairs, and not worth the effort of pursuing. There is also the hypothesis that there are documents proving the contrary, although the author has found none that indicates a Romanian intervention between 1925 and 1929. 161 The title is taken from a paper written by J.F. Harrington and B.J. Courtney, “The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Tweaking the Nose of the Russians: Fifty Years of American-Romanian Relations, 1940-1990”.

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PART THREE - TO CONCLUDE . . . CHAPTER 10. SUMMARY

THE GREAT POWERS AND THE BESSARABIAN TREATY The Bessarabian Treaty, signed on October 28, 1920 by Romania on one side and France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan on the other, had as its main objective to give official de jure recognition to a de facto situation. More than two years had passed since Bessarabia had voted to unite with Romanian and it was about time that the international community should grant recognition to the union. However, even though at first all parties at the peace conference (excepting the White Russians) had agreed that Bessarabia properly belonged to Romania, in the interim the situation had become more and more complex, so that recognition of the union had to be postponed. The main reason for the delay was the fact that, in the period just before the war, Bessarabia had belonged to Russia: an ally that had made numerous sacrifices for the cause of Entente, and not an enemy state. As long as there was a hope of bringing that old Russia back, the Great Powers preferred to postpone a definitive decision on Bessarabia. In October 1920, four of the five Great Powers agreed to officially recognize the Union and, by this gesture, to offer Romania a guarantee against any future claims to Bessarabia coming from Russia. They did so not only because they were convinced that Bessarabia belonged to Romania but (perhaps more so) because they had their own interests to protect, and the Bessarabian Treaty offered them some bargaining power. Romania obtained from the Great Powers a very watered-down treaty that specified no direct or concrete obligations for the signatories in case of a Soviet attack on Bessarabia. And it is clear that, even without such guarantees, the Treaty did not come for free. The Bessarabian question was used as a mean of pressuring the Romanians into becoming more “obedient” towards the wishes of the Great Powers. The pressure applied to two main points: one regarding the Bessarabian question in general, and one regarding the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty specifically. The general ru-

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Moldova, a Romanian Province bric included matters like the Hungarian conflict, the attitude towards the Civil War in Russia, and the Minorities Treaty controversy. The specific one refers to matters directly connected to the Bessarabian Treaty, including the future status of the Danube, the engagement to take on part of the former Russian Empire’s international debt, and compensations for foreign landowners expropriated in Bessarabia. The Romanian government understood that it would have to pay a price in exchange for international recognition of the union, and it did so, although not without negotiating the price. The only Great Power opposing the Romanian efforts to obtain a Bessarabian Treaty was the USA. However, as history proved, getting the Bessarabian Treaty signed was not enough. In order to bring it into force it was necessary, as stipulated by Article No. 9, that all signatory States ratify it — and here began a new struggle for the Romanian Government. Almost none of the signatory Powers agreed to ratify the Treaty simply in order to honor its signature. They wanted something in exchange; some of them settled for less (like Great Britain) while others wanted quite a lot (Italy). In the end, the Romanian Government had no other option except to pay, by making economic and political concessions. But the Romanian government was not disposed to pay everything the Great Powers asked in exchange for the ratification, and complicated negotiations ensued. As these negotiations dragged on, the Romanians lost their main advantage over the Soviets: time. The longer the negotiations went on, the lower were the chances of having the treaty come into force. While Russia was weak, the Romanian government was neither ready nor willing to pay a high price in exchange for the ratification. As soon as it became clear that Bolshevik Russia was starting to recover, after 1922, and the danger coming from this reconstructed neighbor grew greater and greater, the necessity to counterbalance it made Romania adopt a more accommodating position in the negotiations for the ratifications. Step by step, Romania was able to convince both France and Italy to ratify. But all these efforts and concessions made by Romania were voided by the action of Japan, which — claiming to have no interests in Europe, meaning no interests in Romania — decided that, for the sake of her relations with the Soviets (and in exchange for some material advantages), it would be better not to ratify. The Romanian campaign for the ratification could be characterized as poor, at best. There was no concerted action from the Romanian Foreign Ministry in order to obtain the ratifications. It simply went on a case-by-case basis, one at a time, instead of trying to pressure all the signatories to ratify as soon as possible and at the same time, by keeping up constant pressure over at least one (if not all) of the signatories. Only when pressed from the outside did the RFM act to secure the ratification. In fact, the Romanian government needed “foreign help” (if not pressure) in order to send the Treaty to its own Parliament for ratification. The one and a half years Romania dawdled before ratifying its only international act supporting its position in Bessarabia is emblematic of the entire campaign for ratification. In fact, it seems that the Romanian ratification came in response to the British ratification more than from any perception of the need to get the job done. This situation more or less re-

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peated itself in 1927, when the Romanian government opened the campaign for the Japanese ratification only as a result of the Italian ratification. The inability of the RFM to obtain the French ratification in 1922, which meant missing the best opportunity of bringing the Treaty into force, only points to the same conclusion: miscalculation (or lack of interest) or shortsightedness regarding the ratification. By the time the French ratification finally came, in 1924, the RFM was in a difficult situation regarding the remaining two ratifications since both Italy and Japan had improved their relations with the Soviets. As a result of the Soviet propaganda surrounding the ratification, what previously could have been obtained in exchange for a few million lei (the difference between what the French landowners had asked for in 1922 and the Romanian government offered to pay — thereby holding up the ratification) now became much more expensive. Even worse, at the first clear sign that there would be problems with Japan, it was decided to simply abandon the Japanese cause and focus only on Italy. In other words, after losing the first battle they quit the war; after the Ishii Note of May 1924 no effort was made to secure the Japanese ratification until 1927. The only exception to this strategy (if we may call it so) was in October 1923, when Foreign Minister I.G. Duca tried to put pressure for ratification on all three remaining signatories. More or less coincidentally, at the end of October a controversy came up between Romania and the other members in the Danube Commission, and the Romanians decided to block navigation on the Chilia arm of the Danube. They argued that, as the Bessarabian Treaty was not ratified, the Commission could not use Article No. 7 regarding the Chilia, at least until France and Italy ratified. The Commission argued back that the Romanian position might be presented to France or Italy, signatories of the Bessarabian Treaty, but not to the Commission, which had a neutral status.1 However, more or less according to the RFM’s expectations, the Romanian position did put pressure on the British government, which initiated a number of actions in order to influence France, Italy and Japan to ratify. But, as attention shifted to France and as that the RFM was apparently quite unaware of the British actions (and therefore missed any opportunity to use them to press Italy and Japan), this concerted campaign was short lived. In hindsight, it might be stated that the best occasion the Romanian government had to bring the Bessarabian Treaty into force was in 1922 and that it lost this opportunity due to the failure to persuade the French to ratify. The Japanese ratification could have become reality in 1922, as proved by the Japanese ratification of the Central European Frontiers Treaty, ahead of other European signatories, in the climate of still-troubled Soviet-Japanese relations. Even in 1923 and at the beginning of 1924 there were still real chances for the Romanian government to obtain the Japanese ratification, with a little help from the British. As for the Italian ratification, it was “all about money”, which means that it was a reachable target in 1922 or 1923. And in the end, Romania had to pay the asking price for ratification by France and Italy, but by then it was too late. The RFM’s campaign to change the US position regarding Bessarabia is similar

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Moldova, a Romanian Province to the campaign for ratification. The aim of the campaign was to induce the US to renounce its policy of “public discrimination” against Romania and to recognize the union, at least de facto if not de jure. How the Romanians, a very proud nation, could accept a policy of discrimination from the US and to do nothing about it for years is difficult to understand. The success of the efforts made by Charles A. Davila proves that even some of Romania’s opponents on the Bessarabian question could be convinced of the necessity to adjust their position, at least partially. And Davila’s success came at a relatively low price, raising further questions as to the inability of the Romanian government to act sooner and more decisively with regard to the US recognition. As they paid for the French and the Italian ratifications, they could have paid for the US recognition, and with the US they had plenty of bargaining power. The only possible justification for the RFM’s failure to take action for so long is that the US had proclaimed an attitude of isolationism. Still, even when it took action, it seems to have been at Davila’s personal initiative rather than as part of a carefully orchestrated campaign by the RFM. Overall, it should be said that the Romanian government failed to grasp the new realities in international relations, and the need to “think globally”. The fact that itIt was in the US and Japan that they lost their battle with the Soviets illustrates that clearly. Opening Legations in the US and Japan only by the end of 1917 proved a little bit too late, preventing them from obtaining the backing of US and Japan during the Peace Conference. Even when the Conference was over, the RFM failed to learn the lesson and either closed its Legations in the US and Japan, or staffed them with second-rate personnel. They were oblivious to the long-term trends in world policy, with more and more influence going to Powers outside Europe. They could have done much more to promote the Romanian interests if they had adjusted their thinking, and the Polish case offers a good example. This author believes that a strong and continuous propaganda campaign in the US would have had a real chance of changing the US policy on Romania, whereas ignoring the US (or considering it insignificant for Romanian interests) was a clear mistake. Ironically, the best illustration of this mistake comes from Frederic C. Nanu, one of those representing Romania in the US during the interwar period, and who should have understood (as he was actually living in the US for so long) the new realities in world politics: I think that it would be futile to ask for more because we would only give them (the Americans) the impression that no territorial modification in Europe has value without their express ratification, which would be insulting for us. . . [my emphasis]. 2 Closely connected to this we have Bibescu’s comment (that it would be impossible to change the US policy on Bessarabia, at least for the time being) and the similar non-possumus mentioned by I.A. Vassiliu, the Romanian minister in Japan, a few years later; there were no such comments coming from France or Italy. The connection has to do with the diplomatic skills of the Romanian representatives in Japan and the US. Although there were a number of capable and well-prepared diplomats

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in the service of the RFM, at that time diplomatic positions outside of Europe were not appealing to the best-qualified candidates. For example, Warsaw was considered much more important than Washington. In fact, the RFM considered it unwise to send its best diplomats, who were needed at Legations situated in Europe’s main capitals, to posts in America or Asia. Therefore, the only diplomats representing Romania outside of Europe were either junior or inferior. There were some exceptions from this rule, in the persons of those diplomats who were “exiled” outside Europe due to their political views and had no choice but to accept their new posts, as was Davila’s case. The result of this misguided RFM policy was that it simply left the US and Japan to the influence of Soviet propaganda regarding the Bessarabian question. Even more, although a number of Romanian diplomats understood the need for closer relations with Japan and the US (as proved by Nicolae Titulescu’s July 1927 presentation on Romanian foreign policy), they failed to follow through. Unlike Romania, other East European states, among which Poland offers the best example, clearly realized the importance of globalization during the interwar period — even though they were new states with almost no international experience. The United Kingdom Of the five Great Powers that came to the Paris Peace Conference, the United Kingdom was the friendliest toward the Bessarabian Treaty. Not only was the Treaty signed at the UK’s insistence, but the UK was the first Power to ratify it. The importance of the Bessarabian Treaty for the UK stems from the fact that the Treaty, by Article No. 7, gave the UK and the other Great control over the navigation on the Danube mouths, although it was Romanian territory. At the time of signing, they did obtain a special policy regarding the status of the Danube — the internationalization of Europe’s great river; Romanian Government guarantees for British interests and properties in Bessarabia; plus the protection of the minorities living in Bessarabia. But when it came to ratification, the UK did not ask for any additional concessions. In fact, even though the British ratification passed almost unobserved in the press at that time, it had a great influence over the coming events. The only nation to take it very seriously was Romania, who realized that, although the Bessarabian Treaty was in their interests far more than anyone else’s, they had not yet ratified themselves. However, the British government was keen to state that, although it had ratified the Bessarabian Treaty it did not consider itself bound to help Romania in case of an attack on Bessarabia. During a number of Parliamentary interpellations, the British stated clearly that as long as the treaty was not ratified the UK had no special obligations toward Romania regarding Bessarabia. Even if the Treaty should come into force, the UK would only help Romania in her capacity as a member of the League of Nations. This attitude, although it was in complete agreement with the

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Moldova, a Romanian Province stipulations in the Bessarabian Treaty, was not good news for the Romanians who had hoped that the UK would do more. However, if we take into account Britain’s self-proclaimed neutrality regarding the Balkans, it was a success for the Romanians to have their rights over Bessarabia clearly recognized by the UK government. France The First World War radically changed relations between France and Romania. During the inter-war period the two countries became more and more connected, both politically and economically. Romania played an important role in the postwar French system of alliances in Eastern Europe. Taking advantage of the cultural affinities and their military prestige, the French increased considerably their influence in Romania by using both economic and political means. The Bessarabian question offered France a chance to increase her influence, being the only Great Power seemingly disposed to come to a deal with Romania and offer help against the Soviets in exchange for similar help from Romania against Germany. The French policy on Bessarabia was an oscillating and undecided one and they had one good reason for this: their relations with Russia. On one hand, they needed Russia as an ally against Germany; on the other they hoped to recover their pre-war Russian investments and, if possible, to have full access on the huge Russian market. From the French view, Romania was only a surrogate solution of replacing Russia strategically and economically, particularly as Romania had no common border with Germany. The key to the French indecision between Romania and Russia was the difficult question of Bessarabia, one that obliged her to choose only one of the two potential allies. The French failure to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty during 1922 gave a real blow to the Romanian chances of bringing the Treaty into power, although nobody realized this as that moment. On the other hand, the French decision to ratify came at an important moment for Romania, just a few days before the beginning of the Vienna Conference with the Soviets, offering the Romanians the necessary moral backing in those negotiations. Italy During the Peace Conference, Italy too expressed the opinion that Bessarabia belonged to Romania and it did sign the Bessarabian Treaty. The issue of ItalianYugoslav relations dominated relations between Italy and Romania; Italy’s Balkan policy after the war was subordinated to the task of isolating Yugoslavia, which meant good relations with Bulgaria, Hungary, Austria and Romania. However, since Romania had territorial conflicts with both Bulgaria and Hungary, any Italian initiative directed toward closer relations with Hungary was received in Romania as a threat, and starting in 1920 there were quite a number of such initiatives. While Romania was one of the most active members of the anti-revisionist camp, her main ob-

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jective being the defense of the territorial status quo that was in place after the Peace Conference, Italy became an active member of the revisionist camp. The more active Italy was in this sense, the greater was the wedge between herself and Romania. Starting in 1920, for political reasons (mainly due to Romania’s membership in the “Little Entente” —Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Romania, which opposed Italy’s initiatives in both Hungary and Bulgaria), as well as for economic reasons (there were a number of financial matters pending between the two states), RomanianItalian relations tended more and more toward competition instead of friendship. There was only one exception to this trend, during the premiership of Alexandru Averescu, Italy’s best friend in Romania. The campaign initiated by the Romanian Government to obtain the Italian ratification was very difficult. Italy demanded economic and political concessions. Mussolini’s favorite word during this campaign was contropartita (quid pro quo), which says it all. And, with the Italian recognition of the Soviet Union (including a verbal agreement offering non-ratification in exchange for an end to Soviet support for the Italian communists) everything became twice as difficult. The Italian example illustrates how many international ramifications there were to the ratification question. Finally, the success in obtaining the ratification proved to be the work of one person, Averescu, who had working against him not only the exaggerated Italian claims but also a great part of the Romanian public opinion, which was quiet put off by the Italian attitude. Japan The only signatory Power that failed to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty, preventing it from ever coming into force, was Japan. It might seem strange that Japan, a country so far from Europe, was able to have a decisive influence over the fate of one European territory. It offers an excellent example of the new global implications of every move in the area of foreign relations, as early as the 1920s. Even more, it stands as an exception to the assumption of many scholars in the field of Japanese foreign policy, who argue that Japan held to a position of isolation or neutrality towards European affairs after the Peace Conference (except for those related to war reparations). The saga of the Bessarabian Treaty stands out in contrast; by failing to ratify the Treaty, Japan did take a position on a European matter, and it was clearly not a neutral one. What would have been a neutral policy for Japan? Was there any other option? If the Bessarabian Treaty had omitted the clause stipulating that all the signatory powers had to ratify in order for the treaty to come into force, it might be argued that a neutral position for Japan would have been to abstain from ratifying. However, this was not the case. Taking into account the fact that the Treaty involved no special or concrete obligations for its signatories, Japan did not have to worry about being dragged into a conflict after the ratification, and no one could have said that Japan had failed to

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Moldova, a Romanian Province respect its neutrality in European matters. On the other hand, by failing to ratify, not only did Japan cancel the ratifications of the other Powers but it harmed the Romanian position regarding the Bessarabian question. In this situation, a neutral position for Japan would have been to ratify the Treaty. The direct consequence of the Japanese failure to ratify was that Romania had no international instrument to support or justify Bessarabia’s union. By failing to ratify, in exchange for Soviet concessions, the Japanese were clearly supporting the Soviets against Romania, definitely not a neutral policy as they claimed. And, as for the claim of having no interest in European matters, they proved the contrary: by skillfully exploiting a European issue they were able to win a number of economic advantages from the Soviets. They were so satisfied with their success that, a number of years later, they reopened the question to see if they could get more. The Japanese attitude towards the Bessarabian Treaty ratification question was influenced by two main factors: strong Soviet pressure against ratification and a weak Romanian campaign for it. The Japanese foreign policy makers decided that the honor of Japanese diplomacy was not worth upsetting her powerful neighbor. Conversely, when they discovered that it might even bring them some material (fishery concessions) or strategic (an end to the activity of Borodin’s group in China) advantages from the Soviets, they decided to postpone the ratification until Romania and the Soviets reached an agreement on Bessarabia (in practical terms, this meant postponing indefinitely, as the Soviets and the Japanese were well aware). However, it should be clear that the Japanese, under the cover of neutrality, observed the same policy as the representatives of every other State (abandoning matters of image in exchange for concrete material gains) and they could not really be blamed for this. The lackluster Romanian campaign also contributed to the success of the Soviet pressure on Japan. Romania closed its Legation in Tokyo exactly at the moment when it was most needed, and took almost no action before 1927. Then, when it was already extremely late in the game, the Romanians did launch a campaign but only under the leadership of an individual who was in no way up to the task. He had no knowledge of the Japanese policy-making process, and only turned the effects of the campaign against Romanian interests. Although a number of factors contributed to Romania’s decision not to pursue this goal more aggressively (such as the impossibility of competing with the economic concessions made by the Soviets) it should be clear that more could have been done. The Soviet Union Even though the Soviet Union was not a signatory to the Bessarabian Treaty, it was directly interested in the Bessarabian question. Before the Russian Revolution, nobody in Romania thought that, at the end of the war, Romania could have both Transylvania and Bessarabia. In 1914, the Romanians had had to choose Transylvania and Bukovina (offered by the Entente Powers) versus Bessarabia (offered by the Central Powers).

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Following the lead of the other nations in the Russian Empire, the Bessarabians declared their autonomy, then, a few weeks later, their independence, followed in March 1918 by a decision to unite with Romania. It was not an easy decision for Bessarabia and Russia contested it relentlessly. The Russians were not pleased to lose Bessarabia and during the entire inter-war period, with a brief exception, they raised claims over Bessarabia. By constantly raising the question of Bessarabia and forcing Romania to keep a large number of men under arms, the Soviets hampered any Romanian investment in the economic or social fields while, at the same time, any increase in military expenses provoked further protests from the Soviets. In the long run, the Soviet policy proved successful, and the beginning of the Second World War found a weak Romania both economically and militarily (although not only because of the Soviet policy). Romania and the Soviet Union made a number of attempts to reach a consensus over the Bessarabian issue but with no lasting results. In 1934 the two opened diplomatic relations and the Bessarabian question was, for a while, avoided. The Romanian position of considering the matter to have been resolved was optimistic and unjustified. As soon as an opportunity arose, the Soviets clearly expressed their view and in 1940 took back Bessarabia. The Bessarabian Treaty played a very important role in bilateral relations. The Soviets did their best to keep the treaty from coming into force, all the while repeatedly declaring it res inter alia treaty. In the end, they proved successful, and their biggest help came from Japan. The United States The representatives of the United States were largely responsible for the postponement of the international recognition of Bessarabia’s Union in 1919. When they came to the Peace Conference, they had nothing against the Union; indeed, they said they considered that Bessarabia should go to Romania. Suddenly, their opinion changed radically and they opposed by every possible means the recognition of the Union. And, since this opposition alone was not enough, long after the end of the Peace Conference they continued to refuse even a de facto recognition of the existing situation, acknowledged by all the other countries in the world (except for the Soviet Union). For the sudden change in American policy, one possible explanation would be the successful Kolchak offensive against the Bolsheviks. Second, we have the theory that taking territories from Russia would only strengthen the hand of the Bolshevik Government, giving them an excellent propaganda advantage and enabling them to stir up the national feelings of the Russian people in their own advantage. How much truth there was in this theory, and how much the Americans believed in it, is debatable. In the end, they had to pay with fifty years of Cold War for their shortsighted protection of communism during its first years.3 Another possible contributing factor, although it is hard to say whether or how much it influenced the US pol-

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Moldova, a Romanian Province icy, is the worsening relations between Romania and the US representatives at the Peace Conference. However, there was one more reason behind the US attitude, one that all the representatives avoided discussing. While Europe was still far from the US and the events on the old continent could not really affect those in America, the situation was different in the Far East. The Americans had a special fear of Japan, a feeling that continued to preoccupy them during the entire inter-war period. Only this feeling can explain the American policy toward Japanese immigration and the incarceration of US citizens of Japanese heritage during the Second World War: a shocking move in a state that claimed to be a pioneer of democracy. This sentiment was especially heightened toward the end of the war when Japan, becoming more and more powerful, expressed its desire for territorial expansionism. The Washington Conference showed clearly the American discontent with Japan’s territorial aggrandizement. The Americans realized that a weak Russia would be highly vulnerable to Japan, and saw that the consequences would include Japanese domination in Siberia. Of course they did not intend to foster (nor could they have conceived of) a communist Russia that would become so powerful that it would shortly be their main competitor. But they did want to avoid any territorial gains by Japan at the expense of Russia. As an unassailable motive, they hit upon opposition to the dismemberment of the former Russian Empire. In this context, the case of Bessarabia acquires a particular significance, as Bessarabia was the only European territory of Russia that was to be granted a state that had existed before the war. This could offer a tempting example for Japan, and the precedent it would create in international law, by the recognition of a territorial modification made without the consent of the mother country, was unacceptable to some in the US. Unfortunately for Romania, this meant that recognition of Bessarabia’s Union, however justified by historical and demographic arguments, might work against US interests. Therefore, Bessarabia (together with the Baltic States) became a European victim of the American policy in Asia. Was the idea that Bessarabia offered an excellent example for a Japanese action in Siberia behind the American policy of avoiding even de facto recognizing the Union? In this author’s opinion, the answer is: yes, it was one of the main reasons. Were the Americans really afraid that Japan would use the juridical precedent created by the Bessarabian case in Sakhalin or in Siberia or was it seen only as a part of a more general problem (the fate of the Russian Empire) and they were afraid that by compromising on the Bessarabian question they would trigger a chain reaction leading to the dismemberment of the Russian Empire? The signs are unclear. The only fact that seems to indicate a positive answer to the first part of the question is the long period during which the American Government accepted the view of a government that it considered to be an aberration, instead of listening to a government with which it was on good terms and to publicly discriminate against the latter. During the entire inter-war period, not only did US officials steer clear of giving any hint that they might recognize Bessarabia’s union, they were very keen to emphasize

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the contrary (describing Bessarabia as “under Romanian occupation” on official maps, and setting a separate immigration quota). Even in 1933, when they abandoned these tools, the US failed to do so in a public or explicit manner and considering that the de facto recognition of Bessarabia’s union was only a Romanian interpretation of their action and not their own interpretation. Although the US opposed the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty and delayed its signature for as long as possible, they made full use of the Treaty’s failure to come into force in order to justify their policy on Bessarabia and to answer the Romanian requests for US recognition of Bessarabia’s union. Only during the Cold War did the US position towards the recognition of Bessarabia’s union change. Starting in the 1950s the US started using Bessarabia, with varying degrees of success, as a tool in the old divide et impera principle behind the Iron Curtain. CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILURE TO BRING THE TREATY INTO FORCE Since the Bessarabian Treaty never came into force, the Romanians had no valid International Act to justify their possession of Bessarabia. Although the Bessarabian Treaty granted Romania sovereignty over Bessarabia, the signatories did not assume any obligations towards Romania; nothing obliged them to intervene directly in case of a conflict over Bessarabia. In such a case, they were free to respond however they deemed best, depending on the situation and according to their own interests, under the leadership of the League of Nations. The importance of the treaty comes from the fact that, the moment it came into force, the dispositions of Article No. 10 of the League of Nations Pact would automatically apply to Bessarabia. That article obliges the members of the League to respect and maintain the territorial integrity of its members against any foreign aggression. The article provides that “the members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League”.4 Some scholars have suggested that the article refers to the existing integrity at the date when the League Covenant was signed (June 28, 1919), the date of the Versailles Pact, of which the League’s Pact was an integral part. Article No. 10 is completed by Articles 117 and 134, which recognize the full validity of those future treaties that would regulate the yet undecided fate of territories that belonged to Imperial Russia, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey. As a result, Article 10 would apply to those territories too.5 According to this interpretation — contested by the Romanians — the fact that the Bessarabian Treaty did not come into force produced a situation in which Romania’s possession of Bessarabia was recognized only de facto and not de jure.6 The first consequence was that, in the case of Soviet aggression against Bessarabia, the League had no obligations toward Romania. This placed Romania in a very awkward situation: on one hand, as an active member of the League (one of her firmest allies against revisionism), Romania hoped for the League’s assistance in case of an act of

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Moldova, a Romanian Province aggression coming from the Soviet Union. On the other hand, if the aggression was limited to Bessarabia, which was only de facto a part of Romania, the League had no juridical obligation to intervene in favor of Romania.7 Of course, it would have a moral one, but as history shows, such values often pale beside a physical threat such as that which the Soviet Union might bring to bear. Thus, full ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty was absolutely essential for Romania, and it is unthinkable that she failed to pursue it full force and at full speed. And even more, it means that when the Soviet Union was admitted as a member of the League, it was under no obligation to automatically recognize Bessarabia as Romanian territory, as was argued by the Romanians. Nevertheless, the Romanians had a different theory. Their main line of argument was to prove that “territory” should be understood to indicate the territory over which a state exercises its control and administration. Therefore, when Romania became a member of the League, since she had full control over Bessarabia, the province ought to have been considered a part of Romania and therefore guaranteed under Article No. 10 of the League’s Pact. The point here is that the mere existence of an alternative theory, contrary to Romanian interests and based on the non-ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty, could have given Romania a rude shock in case of a Soviet aggression against Bessarabia. The Italians, for example, could have argued that based on the fact that the Bessarabian Treaty was not in force, they had no obligation to intervene in Romania’s favor, even as members of the League and quite apart from the Bessarabian Treaty. Certain other countries having friendly relations with the Soviets, most probably including Germany, would have followed suit. It would have also offered an excellent pretext for many of Romania’s allies to avoid taking an anti-Soviet position and to settle some of their own disputes with the Soviets at Bessarabia’s expense. The Romanians argued that in fact, by ratifying, the UK, France, and Italy had recognized de jure the Bessarabian Union with Romania, and because of their ratification they could not join the other camp but had a “moral obligation” to help Romania. As Japan failed to ratify and the Treaty did not come into force, this “moral obligation” was all the Romanian government could cling to. But they were unsuccessful in imposing this idea at the international level, and “moral obligations” are of no use in countering strategic or political considerations. A third theory that represents a pro-Soviet view was expressed in an article published by the Manchester Guardian in the aftermath of the Italian ratification: It is held, however, in certain quarters that Romania’s title to Bessarabia is now a de jure one, with the consequence that, in the event of a Russian attack on that province, she could claim the assistance of all her fellow-members of the League of Nations under Articles 10 and 17 of the Covenant. It is with this contention, if justified, that the danger lies. Surely, however, it may be held that the treaty of 1920 does not confer a de jure right, but merely accepts a de facto

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situation. The Allied Powers accepted the Romanian solution of the Bessarabian question. Whether they did so rightly or wrongly is a matter of argument, but they could not render that solution legal, any more than any other selfappointed committee could make legal the possession by one of their members of a watch forcibly abstracted from someone else. A de jure title, it would seem, must depend solely on a Russo-Romanian treaty in which that title is stated and admitted, just as Poland’s right to her White Russian provinces — but not to Vilna — is not conferred by the recognition by the Conference of Ambassadors, but by the Treaty of Riga. A legal title to Russian territory without Russian consent is surely unthinkable, and Bessarabia, however wrongfully acquired, was in 1918 legally Russian territory. Only a de jure frontier can be the subject of aggression such as would compel League intervention. It would be well to know just where we stand by having the legal point authoritatively settled.8 According to this last theory, even if Japan had ratified, the treaty would have had no value in legally designating Bessarabia as Romanian territory. That is exactly the Soviet attitude towards the ratifications; but their fierce opposition to and harsh reaction after each of them raises doubts over the validity of this theory. Would they have initiated such intense pressures and so many bilateral agreements, and even offer material advantages in exchange for the promise of non-ratification, if they were confident that the Treaty could not influence Romania’s rights over Bessarabia? Perhaps they would, as a precaution — given the slippery nature of diplomatic honor, but not to this degree. One more “if” has to do with the possibility that the US attitude towards the Bessarabian question would have changed if the treaty had come into force. An explicit recognition of Bessarabia’s union might have made a difference during World War Two, when the Allies decided the future of Bessarabia. The main consequence of the Bessarabian Treaty’s failure to come into force was that Romania had no valid international document to justify her rights in Bessarabia. The only juridical arguments to prove the Romanian rights over Bessarabia were the Decision of Union taken by the Sfatul Tserii, and the Declaration of November 2, 1917, regarding the rights of all the peoples in Russia. The Japanese abstention clearly limited Romania’s ability to use the Bessarabian Treaty in order to justify the status of Bessarabia. In the end, even though historians are not supposed to indulge in conjecture, knowing how events unfolded we might ask one rhetorical question: supposing that Japan had ratified, and the Treaty had come into force — would the situation of Bessarabia have been different in 1940, in 1945 or in the 1990s? Most probably, not very different. Definitely, a piece of paper would not have stopped Stalin from taking Bessarabia back — especially a piece of paper without Russia’s signature on it. Poland found herself in the opposite corner, from the standpoint of international recognition of her borders: the Riga Treaty granted Soviet rec-

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Moldova, a Romanian Province ognition of her new Eastern borders in 1922 and the Allied Powers too had accepted those borders, plus they had signed a non-aggression pact with the Soviets. Even so, in 1939 Stalin decided to launch an attack on Poland and at the end of the war Poland’s eastern borders were greatly modified, with the consent of the Western powers (it is true that the Poles received some territorial compensations in the West). The saga of the Bessarabian Treaty is a lesson in diplomatic history during an early phase of the globalization of international relations, and is a caution to any who fail to appreciate the its implications: economical, political, ethnic, strategic, and social. It is the saga of a small State vying with a Great Power, of democracy against communism, of historical rights and demographic realities against material interests, of honor and friendship against economic and strategic realities.

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Notes

1

RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Telegram Roux to William Martin, November 7, 1923, c. 769. RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Nanu to Mironescu, October 3, 1930. 3 As a Romanian professor says: “they (the US) paid, but we (and all the other countries in the area) suffered” as a result of the US policy of encouraging the Soviet Union during the interwar period. 4 A. Cretzianu, Captive Romania, p. 8. 5 T. Tittoni, “Basarabia, Romania …” in Convorbiri Literare, 1927, p. 34-35. 6 In fact, as becomes clear from the answer to an interpellation in the British Parliament, the Bessarabian Treaty was not even deposited with the League, since full ratification was a pre-condition for making the deposit. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 170, p. 1944. 7 And indeed, during the January 1926 negotiations for the renewal of the Polish-Romanian Alliance Treaty, in order to justify his reluctance to intervene automatically in case of a Soviet attack on Bessarabia, Count Skrzynski, the Polish Premier and Foreign Minister, cited the consequences of the Bessarabian Treaty’s still inactive state: that Poland retained the right to choose in which ways to help Romania. C. Iordan, Romania si relatiile internationale din sud estul european: modelul Locarno, p. 164. 8 The Manchester Guardian, March 10, 1927. 2

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APPENDICES

THE BESSARABIAN TREATY1 THE BRITISH EMPIRE, FRANCE, ITALY, JAPAN, THE PRINCIPAL ALLIED POWERS, AND ROUMANIA: Whereas in the interest of general peace in Europe it is of importance to assure henceforth a sovereignty over Bessarabia consistent with the aspirations of the population and guaranteeing to racial, religious and linguistic minorities the protection which is due to them; Whereas from geographic, ethnographic, historic, and economic points of view, the reunion of Bessarabia with Romania is fully justified; Whereas the population of Bessarabia has given proof of its desire to see Bessarabia reunited with Romania; In fine, whereas Romania, of her own free will, desires to give positive guarantees of liberty and justice to the inhabitants of the former Kingdom of Roumania, and also to those of the territories newly transferred, irrespective of race, religion or language, in conformity with the Treaty signed at Paris on 9th December 1919: Have decided to conclude the present Treaty and, to this end, have the following as their Plenipotentiaries, reserving the right to appoint others to sign it: - For the United Kingdom: the Honorable Edward George Villiers, Earl of Derby, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of His Britannic Majesty to Paris; - For the Canadian Dominion: Sir G. Foster, Minister of Commerce; - For the Australian Commonwealth: Honorable Andrew Fisher, High Commissioner for Australia in the United Kingdom; - For the New Zealand Dominion: Edward George Villiers, Earl of Derby; - For the South African Union: Edward George Villiers, Earl of Derby; - For India: Edward George Villiers, Earl of Derby; - The president of the French Republic: - M. George Leygues, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs; - M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador of France; - His Majesty, the King of Italy: Count Lelio Bonin Longare, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of his Majesty the King of Italy at Paris; - His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan: Viscount Kikujiro Ishii, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at Paris; - His Majesty, the King of Romania: - M. Take Ionescu, Minister of Foreign Affairs; - Prince Dimitrie Ghika, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Envoy of his Majesty the King of Romania at Paris;

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Who have agreed on the following stipulations: Article No. 1 The High Contracting Parties declare that they recognize the sovereignty of Romania over the territory of Bessarabia comprised between the present frontier of Romania, the Black Sea, the course of the Dniestr River from its mouth to the point where it meets the old boundary between Bessarabia and Bukovina, and that old boundary. Article No. 2 A Commission consisting of three members, one of whom should be appointed by the Principal Allied Powers, one by Romania, and one by the League of Nations on the part of Russia shall be constituted within 15 days following the coming into force of the present Treaty, in order to trace on the spot the new frontier of Romania. Article No. 3 Romania undertakes to observe the stipulations of the Treaty signed at Paris on 9th December 1919, by the principal Allied and Associated Powers and Romania [the Treaty of the Minorities] and to ensure their rigorous observance in the territory of Bessarabia as defined in Article 1, and particularly to assure to its inhabitants, without distinction of race, language or religion, the same guarantees of liberty and justice as to the inhabitants of all other territories forming part of the Kingdom of Romania. Article No. 4 Romanian nationality, to the exclusion of any other nationality, shall be accorded ipso facto to the nationals of the former Russian Empire settled in the territory of Bessarabia, as defined in Article 1. Article No. 5 Within a period of two years from the date of the coming into force of the present treaty, nationals of the former Russian Empire over the age of eighteen years and settled in the territory of Bessarabia, as defined in Article 1, shall be allowed to opt for any other nationality which may be open to them. Option by the husband will include that by the wife, and option by the parents will include that by their children under the age of 18 years. Persons who have exercised the right of option above provided must within the ensuing twelve months transfer their place of residence to the State for which they have opted. They shall be at liberty to retain the immovable property which they possess in Romanian territory. They may carry away their personal property of every description. No export duties shall be imposed on them on account of this removal.

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APPENDICES

Article No. 6 Roumania recognizes as Romanian nationals, ipso facto and without any formality, nationals of the former Russian Empire who were born on the territory of Bessarabia, as described in Article 1, of parents having their domicile there, although at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty they may not themselves be domiciled there. Nevertheless, within two years from the coming into force of the present Treaty, these persons may make a declaration before the competent Romanian authorities in the country in which they reside, that they renounce to the Romanian nationality, and they will then cease to be considered as Romanian nationals. In this respect, the declaration of the husband will be held valid for the wife, and that of the parents will be held valid for children under the age of 18 years. Article No. 7 The High Contracting Parties recognize that the mouth of Danube, called the Kilia mouth, must pass under the jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube. Pending the conclusion of a general convention for the international control of waterways, Romania undertakes to apply to the sections of the river system of the Dniestr comprised between her territory or constituting its frontiers, the regime provided in the paragraph 1 of Article 332 and in Articles 333 to 338 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany of June 28, 1919. Article No. 8 Romania shall assume responsibility for the share of the Russian public debt and all other financial obligations of the Russian state allotted to Bessarabia, which shall be fixed by a special Convention between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the one part and Romania on the other part. A Commission appointed by the aforesaid Powers shall draw up this Convention. Should the Commission not come to an agreement within a period of two years, the questions in dispute shall be at once submitted to the arbitration of the Council of the League of Nations. Article No. 9 The High Contracting Parties will invite Russia to adhere to the present Treaty as soon as a Russian Government recognized by them shall be in existence. They reserve the right to submit to the arbitration of the Council of the League of Nations all questions which the Russian Government may raise respecting the details of this Treaty, it being understood that the frontiers defined in the present Treaty, as well as the sovereignty of Romania over the territories therein comprised, cannot be called in question. The same procedure applies to all difficulties that may subsequently arise from the carrying out of the treaty. The signatory Powers shall ratify the present Treaty. It shall not come into force until after the deposit of these ratifications and not before the coming into

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Moldova, a Romanian Province force of the Treaty signed by the Principal Allied and Associate Powers and Romania on the 9th December 1919. The deposit of ratifications shall take place in Paris. Powers of which the seat of the government is outside Europe will be entitled merely to inform the Government of the French Republic, through their diplomatic representative at Paris, that their ratification has been given; in that case they must transmit the instrument of ratification as soon as possible. A proces-verbal of the deposit of ratifications will be drawn up. The French Government will transmit to all the signatory Powers a certified copy of the proces-verbal of the deposit of ratifications. Done at Paris, October 28th 1920. The plenipotentiaries who, owing to their temporary absence from Paris, are unable to attach their signature to the present treaty, will be allowed to do so until the 15th December 1920. The present plenipotentiaries, whose plain powers have been recognized, have signed the present Treaty. Notes 1

The original of this treaty was written in French, and there is no official authenticated English translation of it; the above translation was published in The American Journal of Law, New York, 1923, Suppl., v. 17.

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APPENDICES

BIBLIOGRAPHY Although comprehensive bibliographies regarding the Bessarabian question (or Romanian foreign policy in general) are still wanting, a number of papers have made the attempt. The best one on the Bessarabian issue, comprising not only Romanian but also Russian and foreign language papers, although limited to publications printed before 1944, is to be found in Alexandru Boldur, Istoria Basarabiei. Two other good bibliographies are presented in Wim Van Meurs, The Bessarabian Question in Communist Historiography and Charles King, The Moldovans. As for Romanian foreign policy, the most comprehensive source of bibliographical information is Bibliografia istorica a Romaniei. However, the best bibliography for both topics can be found at www.newfirstsearch. oclc.org or OPAC, a site that lists the inventories of the largest university libraries in the world (access might not be for free). The following resources were consulted for the present work.

A. Primary Sources 1.

Unpublished Sources

Japan, Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (JFMA) Romania, Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (RFMA) Romanian National Archives, Central Historical Archives (RNA) - microfilms from France, Great Britain 2.

Published Sources

Berciu Draghicescu, Adina, Branceanu, Lidia, Unirea Basarabiei cu Romania 1918-1927. Documente [The Union of Bessarabia with Romania 1918-1927. Documents] Bucharest: Globus, 1994 Boga, Leon, Documente Basarabene, [Bessarabian Documents], Chisinau: Tip. CCPC, 1928 Calafeteanu, Ion, Moisuc, Viorica, Unirea Basarabiei si a Bucovinei cu Romania, 1917-1918: documente, Chisinau: Hyperion, 1995 Degras, Jane, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1951-1953, Vol. I-III Documente privind relatiile romano-sovietice 1917-1924, [Documents on Romanian-Soviet Relations] Bucharest, 1928 Documents Diplomatiques Francais, (DDF), Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Commission de publication des Documents diplomatiques Francais, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1997Documents on British Foreign Policy, (DBFP), London, First Series, 1982Eudin, Xenia J, Fischer, Harold H, Soviet Russia and the West, 1920-1927: A Documentary Survey, London: Oxford University, 1957 Eudin, Xenia J, Slusser, Robert M, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1928-1934: Documents and Materials, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1967 French Chamber of Deputies, Debates, 1924 Gheorghe, Gheorghe, Tratatele internationale ale Romaniei, Vol. 2, 1921-1939, Bucharest: Stiintifica si Pedagogica, 1982 I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, (DDI), Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Commissione per la publicatione dei documenti diplomatici, 1953-

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Moldova, a Romanian Province 5th Serie 1914-1918 6th Serie 1918-1922 7th Serie 1922-1932 Interventia romana in Basarabia. Culegere de materiale si documente (1917-1918), [The Romanian intervention in Bessarabia. Collection of Documents and Materials (1917-1918)], ed. by E. Bagrov, Tiraspol: Editura de Stat a Moldovei, 1933 Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, (FRUS), Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1933-1959 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, Fifth Series Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente 1917-1934, ed. by Dumitru Preda et. al.,1 Bucharest: Enciclopedica, 1999 Records of the Meetings of the Privy Council, ed. by the National Archives of Japan, Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1990- (in Japanese) Slusser, Robert M, Triska, Ian F, A Calendar of Soviet Treaties, 1917-1957, Stanford Univ. Press, Stanford, 1959 Siscanu, Ion, Varatic, Vitalie, Pactul Molotov-Ribbentrop si consecintele lui pentru Basarabia: culegere de documente, Chisinau: Universitas, 1991 The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920, Washington, US Government Printing Office, 1939-1940 Unirea Basarabiei cu Romania, 1918-1927. Documente, [The Union of Bessarabia with Romania. Documents], ed. by Adina Berciu Draghicescu and Lidia Branceanu, Bucharest, 1994 Varatic, Vitalie, Preliminarii la raptul Basarabiei si Nordului Bucovinei, 1938-1940, Volum de documente din fostele arhive secrete romanesti, [Preliminaries to the rapture of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina, 19381940. Documents from the former Romanian Secret Archives], Bucharest: Libra, 2000 1920. Un act de justitie. Documente, [1920. An Act of Justice. Documents], ed. by Corneliu Mihail Lungu and Ioana Grigorie, Bucharest: Elion, 2001 3.

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Foreign press

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Argus

Tokyo Nichi Nichi

Le Temps

Cuvantul

The Japan Times

Manchester Guardian

Neamul Romanesc

The Japan Advertiser

The New York Times

Universul

The Times

B. Secondary Sources 1. Books A History of Romania, Ed. by Kurt W. Treptow, Boulder Colorado: East European Monographs no. 448, 1996 A Missed Opportunity? : 1922, The Reconstruction of Europe: Proceedings of the International Conference, Florence, 13 October 1992, Ed. by Marta Petricioli and Massimiliano Guderzo, New York: P Lang, 1995 Adam, Magda, The Little Entente and Europe (1920-1929), Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1993 Adaniloaie, Nicolae, The Formation of the Romanian National State, Bucharest: Meridiane, 1965 Adauge, Mihai, Fapte trecute si Basarabeni uitati [Past Deeds and Forgotten Bessarabians] Chisinau: Universitas, 1992 Adauge, Mihai, Danu, Eugenia, Popovschi, Valeriu, Miscarea nationala din Basarabia: cronica evenimentelor din anii 1917-1918, [The National Movement in Bessarabia: Chronology of Events 1917-1918], Chisinau: Civitas, 1998

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APPENDICES Agrigoroaiei, Ion, Palade, Gh, Basarabia in cadrul Romaniei intregite 1918-1940 [Bessarabia Inside the Greater Romania, 1918-1940], Chisinau: Stiinta, 1993 A Hidden Fire: Russian and Japanese Cultural Encounters, 1868-1926, ed. by J. Thomas Rimer, Washington D. C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995 Alexandrescu, Ion, A Short History of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, Iasi: Romanian Cultural Foundation, 1994 Aleksandri, Lev N., Bessarabiia I bessarabskii vopros [The History of Bessarabia and the Bessarabians], Moscow: Gosizdat, 1924 Arbure, Zamfir C., Liberarea Basarabiei, [The Liberation of Bessarabia] Bucharest: Tipografia Curtii Regale, 1915 Arnautu, Nicolae I, Douze Invasions russes en Roumanie, Buenos Aires: Cuget Romanesc, 1956 Ascherson, Neal, Black Sea, London: J. Cape, 1995 Assertion of Unitary, Independent National States in Central and Southeast Europe, 1821-1923, ed. by Viorica Moisuc and Ion Calafeteanu, Bucharest: Academia RSR, 1980 Balaj, Teofil, Romania: The Land and the People, Bucharest: Meridiane Publishing House, 1972 Babel, A., La Bessarabie. Etude historique, ethnographique et economique, Paris: Felix Alcan, 1926 Bacon, Walter M., Behind Closed Doors. Secret Papers on the Failure of Romanian-Soviet Negotiations, 1931-1932, Stanford California: Hoover Institution Press, 1979 Baerlein, Henry, Bessarabia and Beyond, London: Methuen, 1935 Basarabia desrobita. Drepturi istorice, neleguiri bolsevice, infaptuiri romanesti [Bessarabia liberated. Historical Rights, Bolshevik Crimes, Romanian Achievements], Bucharest: Marvan, 1942 Basarabia romana. Antologie, [The Romanian Bessarabia. Anthology] Ed. by Florin Rotaru, Bucharest: Semne, 1996 Basarabia romaneasca. Bucuriile si dramele ei istorice intre 27 martie 1918-27 martie 1980 [The Romanian Bessarabia. Her Historical Joys and Tragedies between 27 March 1918 – 27 March 1980], Madrid: Carpatii, 1980 Basilescu, Nicolae, La Roumanie dans la Guerre et dans la Paix, Paris: Felix Alcan, 1919 Beloff, Max, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1929-1941, London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1952 Bessarabia, Handbook Prepared under the Direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office, No. 51 London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1920 Bessarabia mondai to sekiyu sodatsusen: Rumania to Doku-So kankei, [The Bessarabian Question and the Division of Oil; Romania and the German-Soviets Relations], Tokyo: Gaimusho Johobu, 1940 Bessedovskii, Gregorij, Revelations of a Soviet Diplomat, rpt. of the 1931 edition, Westport, Connecticut: Hyperion Press, 1977 Bobango, G.J., The Emergence of the Romanian National State, East European Monographs, No. 58, Boulder Colo: East European Quarterly, 1979 Bobeica, Alexandru, Sfatul Terii: stindard al renasterii nationale, [Sfatul Tserii: Standard of the National Revival] Chisinau: Universitas, 1993 Bodea, Cornelia, Seton-Watson, Hugh, R.W. Seton-Watson si romanii: 1906-1920 [R.W. Seton-Watson and the Romanians], Bucharest: Stiintifica si Pedagogica, 1988 Boia, Eugene, Romania’s Diplomatic Relations with Yugoslavia in the Interwar Period, 1919-1941, Boulder Colorado: East European Monographs, no. 356, 1993 Boicu, Leonid, Platon, Gheorghe, The Romanians’ Way to Independence, Bucharest: Stiintifica si Enciclopedica, 1977 Boldur, Alexandru V., La Bessarabie et les relations russo-roumaine. (La question bessarabiene et le droit international), Paris: Librairie Universitaire, 1927, rpt. Munich: Verlag Rumanische Studien, 1973 Boldur, A.V., Istoria Basarabiei [The History of Bessarabia], Chisinau: Dreptatea, 1937-1940; rpt. Bucharest: Victor Frunza, 1992 Bratianu, Gheorghe Ioan, Actiunea politica si militara a Romaniei in 1919 in lumina corespondentei diplomatice a lui Ion I.C. Bratianu, [The military and diplomatic action of Romania as shown by the diplomatic correspondence of Ion I.C. Bratianu], ed. by Serban Papacostea, Bucharest: Corint, 2001

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APPENDICES Probleme de politica Externa a Romaniei 1918-1940: Culegere de studii, [Problems of Romanian Foreign Policy 1919-1940: A Collection of Studies], ed. by Viorica Moisuc, Bucharest: Militara, 1988 Prost, Henry, Destin de la Roumanie, 1918-1954, Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1954 Quinlan, Paul D., Clash over Romania: British and American Policies toward Romania: 1938-1947, Oakland California: American Romanian Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1977 Ragsdale, Hugh, Imperial Russian Foreign Policy, Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1993 Rakowski, Christian, Roumanie et Bessarabie, Paris: Librairie du Travail, 1925 Ranghet, Boris, Relatii romano - americane in perioada primului razboi mondial 1916-1920, [The RomanianAmerican Relations during the First World War] Cluj Napoca: Dacia, 1975 Ranki, Gyorgy, Economy and Foreign Policy: The Struggle of the Great Powers for Hegemony in the Danube Valley, 1919-1939, Boulder Colorado: East European Monographs no. 141, 1983 Readings in Russian Foreign Policy, Theory and Practice, ed. by Arthur E Adams, Boston: DC Heath and Company, 1961 Relatii interetnice in zona de contact romano-maghiaro-ucraineana din secolul al XVIII-lea pana in present, [Interethnic Relations …], ed. by Hans Gehl and Viorel Ciubota, Satu Mare: Muzeul Satmarean, 1999 Relatii romano-americane in timpurile moderne, [Roumanian-American Relations during the Modern Time], ed. by Gheorghe I. Florescu, Iasi: Universitatea A.I. Cuza, 1993 Romania: A Historic Perspective, ed. by Dinu C. Giurescu, Stephen Fischer-Galati, Boulder Colorado: East European Monographs no. 457, 1998 Romania and World War I: A Collection of Studies, The Center for Romanian Studies, Iasi, Oxford, Portland, 1998 Romania between East and West. Historical Essays in Memory of C.C. Giurescu, ed. by Stephen Fischer-Galati, Boulder Colorado: East European Monographs no. 103, 1982 Romania in the First World War 1914-1918: An Annotated Bibliography, ed. Glenn E. Torrey, Emporia State Research Studies, No. 29.4, Emporia Kan.: Emporia State Research Studies, 1981 Romania si Conferinta de Pace de la Paris (1919-1920), [Romania and the Paris Peace Conference], coord. by Gheorghe Buzatu and Valeriu Florin Dobrinescu, Focsani: Emparo, 1999 Romania si relatiile internationale in secolul XX, [Romania and the International Relations during the 20th Century], ed. by Liviu Tarau and Virgiliu Tarau, Cluj Napoca: Clusium, 2000 Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Perspective, ed. by Ivo J. Lederer, New haven: Yale University Press, 1962 Rossos, Andrew, Russia and the Balkans: Inter-Balkan Rivalries and Russian Foreign Policy, 1908-1914, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981 Rotschild, Joseph, East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974 Roucek, Joseph S., Contemporary Romania and her Problems, New York: Arno Press, 1971 Saint Aulaire, Comte de Auguste Felix, Confession d’un vieux diplomate, Paris: Flamarion, 1953 Scalapino, Robert A., The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977 Scurtu, Ioan, Almas, Dumitru, Gosu, Armand, Pavelescu, Ion, Ionita, Ghe. I., Siscanu, Ion, Enciu, Nicolae, Cojocaru, Ghe. E., Istoria Basarabiei de la inceputuri pina in 1998, [The History of Bessarabia since the beginnings and until 1988], Bucharest: Semne, 1998 Seicaru, Pamfil, Romania in marele razboi, [Romania during the Great War], first published in French in 1968, Bucharest: Eminescu, 1994 Seton-Watson, Hugh, Eastern Europe between the Wars 1918-1941, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1945 Seton-Watson, Robert W., The History of the Romanians, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934 Seymour, Charles, American Diplomacy During the World War, Hamden Connecticut: Archon 1964 Seymour, C., Letters from the Paris Peace Conference, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965 Seymour, C., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1926 Seymour, C., Woodrow Wilson and the World War: A Chronicle of Our Own Times, New Haven, 1921

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Shafir, Michael, Romania. Politics, Economics and Society. Political Stagnation and Simulated Change, Marxist Regimes Series, London: Frances Pinter, 1985 Shiba, Nobuyuki, Barukan shi [The History of the Balkans], Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppan, 1998 Shukhat, M., Moldavia: A guide, Moscow: Raduga Publishers, 1986 Smith Jr., C. Jay, The Russian Struggle for Power, 1914-1917: a Study of Russian Foreign Policy during the First World War, New York: Greenwood Press, 1969 Sorenpou taigai seisaku nikansuru Molotov no houkoku oyobi Bessarabia jijyou, [Report on the Soviet Foreign Policy under Molotov and on Bessarabia’s Situation], Tokyo: Gaimusho Chousabu, 1939 Spector, Sherman David, Romania at the Paris Peace Conference. A Study of the Diplomacy of Ioan IC Bratianu, New York: Bookman, 1962, Romanian edition Iasi: Institutul European, 1995 Stanciu, Ion, Aliati fara alianta. Romania si SUA 1914-1920, [Allies with no Alliance. Romania and the USA, 1914-1920] Bucharest: Albatros, 1992 Stanciu, Ion, In umbra Europei: relatiile Romaniei cu Statele Unite in anii 1919-1939, [In the Shadow of Europe: Romanian-US Relations 1919-1939], Bucharest: Silex, 1996 Stanciu, Ion, Cernovodeanu, Paul, Distant Lands: the Genesis and Evolution of Romanian-American Relations, Boulder Colorado: East European Monographs no. 195, 1985 Stere, Constantin, Singur impotriva tuturor, [Alone Against Everybody], ed. by Alina Ciobanu, Bucharest: Cartier, 1997 Stirban, Marcel, Politica externa a Romaniei in perioada interbelica, [Romanian Foreign Policy during the Interwar Period], Cluj Napoca: Universitatea Babes-Bolyai, 1994 Stoica, Vasile, In America pentru cauza romaneasca, [In America for the Romanian Cause], Bucharest: Universul, 1926 Stoica, V., The Romanians and their Lands, Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh Printing Co., 1919 Stoica, V., The Romanian Nation and the Romanian Kingdom, Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh Printing Co., 1919 Stokes, Gale, Nationalism in the Balkans. An Annotated Bibliography, New York: Garlan Publishing Inc, 1984 Studies in Moldovan: the History, Culture, Language and Contemporary Politics of the People of Moldova, ed. by Donald L. Dyer, Boulder Colorado: East European Monographs no. 454, 1996 Sturdza, Mihail, Romania si sfarsitul Europei. Amintiri din Tara pierduta, [Romania and the End of Europe], Alba Iulia: Fronde, 1994 Tatarescu, Gheorghe, Marturii pentru istorie [Testimonies for History], in the edition of Nicolae Serban Tanasoca, Bucharest: Enciclopedica, 1996 Temperley, Harold W.V., A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, London: Henry Frowde, 1920-1924 The Balkans in the Policy of Western Powers, Ed. by Evgueni Alexandrov, Sofia; Intela Publishing House, 1995 The Establishment of European Frontiers after the Two World Wars; proceedings of the International Conferences, Strasbourg and Montreal (June and September 1995), ed. by Christian Baechler and Carole Fink, New York: P. Lang, 1996 The Japanese and Europe; Images and Perceptions, ed. by Bert Edstrom, Tokyo: Japan Library, 2000 The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society, ed. by Lubomyr Hajda, Mark Beissinger, John M. Olin, Critical Issues Series, Boulder: Westview Press, 1990 The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union, ed. by G. Smith, London: Longman, 1990 The South-West Region of the Former USSR: a short analysis of the socio-political and economic situation in Moldova, the Dniestr Area, Southern Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, ed. by Mezhdunarodnyi fond sotsialno-ekonomicheskikh i politologicheskikh issledovanii, Moscow: Gorbachev Foundation, 1992 The Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, 1945-1989, ed. by Odd Arne Westad, Sven Holtsmark, Iver B. Neumann, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994 The Versailles Settlement: Was it Foredoomed to failure?, ed. by Ivo J. Lederer, Boston: Heath, 1960 Tilea, Vasile V., “Actiunea diplomatica a Romaniei. Noiembrie 1919 – Martie 1920”, [The Diplomatic Action of Romania, November 1919-March 1920], Sibiu, 1925

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APPENDICES Titulescu, Nicolae, Basarabia pamant romanesc, [Bessarabia, Romanian Land] Bucharest: Rum Irina, 1992 Titulescu, Nicolae, Documente diplomatice, ed. by George Macovescu, Bucharest: Politica, 1967 Titulescu, Nicolae, Romania’s Foreign Policy (1937), Bucharest: Encyclopedic Publishing House, 1994 Tolescu, I., La Bessarabie et la Bukovine du Nord, terre roumaine, Le Livre Blanc Roumain sur le Probleme Bessarabien, No 1 Madrid: Collection Dacoromania, 1967 Torrey, Glenn E., General Henri Berthelot and Romania: Memoires et Correspondance, 1916-1919, Boulder Colorado: East European Monographs no. 219, 1987 Torrey, Glenn E., Henri Mathias Berthelot. Soldier of France, Defender of Romania, Iasi, Oxford, and Portland: The Center for Romanian Studies, 2001 Trandafilo, Franco, Bessarabia, terra di dolore; storia del secolare conflitto russo-romeno, Bucharest: Imprimeria Statului, 1941 Treptow, Kurt W., Bolovan, Ioan, A History of Romania, Boulder Colorado: East European Monographs no. 448, 1996 Tsurcan, Ivan Aleksandrovich, Unirea Basarabiei cu Romania: preludii, premise, realizari, [the Union of Bessarabia with Roumania], Chisinau: Tipografia Centrala, 1998 Ulam, Adam Bruno, Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967, New York: F. A. Praeger, 1968 Ullman, Richard Henry, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921, 3 vols., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961-72 Vanku, Milan, Mica Intelegere si politica externa a Iugoslaviei, 1920-1938, [The Little Entente and the Foreign Policy of Yugoslavia], Bucharest: Politica, 1979 Volovici, Leon, Nationalist Ideology and Anti-Semitism: The Case of Romanian Intellectuals in the 1930s, Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1991 Vopicka, Charles, Secrets of the Balkans, Chicago: Rand, McNally & Co, 1921 What Really Happened at Paris: The Story of The Peace Conference, 1918-1919 / by American Delegates, Edward Mandell House and Charles Seymour, eds., London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1921 Wolff, Robert Lee, The Balkans in Our Time, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1956 2.

Articles

Bariety, Jacques, “Le Comite d’Etudes du Quai d’Orsay et les frontieres de la Grande Roumanie, 19181919” in Revue Roumaine d’Histoire, Bucharest, 1996, no. 1 Cernovodeanu, Paul, “Basarabia. Istoria unui rapt teritorial in documente secrete ale diplomatiei engleze” in Memoria, 1990, no. 1 Cernovodeanu, Paul, “Initiative romanesti de redobindire a Basarabiei in perioada razboiului Crimeii (1854-1856)” in Revista Istorica, 3, No. 1-2 (1992), 81-96 Chiper, Ioan, “Italia si ratificarea tratatului din 28 octombrie cu privire la Basarabia” in Revista Romana de Studii Istorice, 1992, no. 2 Cipaianu, George, “Le general Henri Mathias Berthelot et la Bessarabie” in Transylvanian Review, Vol. V, No.4, Winter 1996 Ciuperca, Ion, “Mom. ale rel. rom-italiene (1924-1937)”, in Analele Stiintifice ale Universitatii Iasi. istorie, 1987, p. 53-65 Dascalu, Nicolae, Eggleston, Patricia, “Evaluari SUA din anii celui de al doilea razboi mondial privind statul postbelic al Basarabiei” in Revista Romana de Studii Istorice, 1992, no. 2 Dascalu, Nicolae, “Propaganda Romaniei in Japonia in perioada interbelica si la inceputul celui de-al doilea razboi mondial(1919-1942)”, in Revista Istorica, 1993, no. 3 Dascalu, Nicolae, ”Relatii romano-japoneze in perioada interbelica” in Romanii in istoria universala, vol. II/1, Iasi: Universitatea A.I. Cuza, 1987 Denize, Eugen, ”Documente diplomatice spaniole referitoare la Unirea Basarabiei cu Romania 1918” in Revista Istorica, 1992, no. 1

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Moldova, a Romanian Province Dima, Nicholas, ”The Moldavian-Dnestr Republic: a Geopolitical Game”, in The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, v. 24, no. 1 (spring 1999), p. 37-63 Dobrinescu, Valeriu Florin, “American Opinion on Bessarabia at the Paris Conference”, Revista de Istorie a Moldovei, 1991 Dutu, Tatiana, ”Problema Basarabiei si relatiile romano-ucrainiene (1918-1922)” in Revista Istorica, 1993, No. 9 Eleman, Bruce A., “The 1925 Soviet – Japanese Secret Agreement on Bessarabia”, in Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 5, July 1994, no. 2, Frank Cass - London, p 287-295 Florescu, Gheorghe I., ”Bessarabia: A Topic of the American Historiography, 1945-1995” in Anuarul Institutului de Istorie A.D. Xenopol, Iasi, 1996 Gosu, Armand, ”Ioan Pelivan la Conferinta de pace de la Paris” in Revista Istorica, 1993, no. 9 Gould, Jack, ”Bessarabia: The Thorny ‘Non-Existent’ Problem” in East European Quarterly 13, no. 1 (1979): 47-74 Graham, M.W., ”The Legal Status of the Bukovina and Bessarabia” in American Journal of International Law, 1944, no. 4, 667-673 Grecu, Adrian, ”Pace sau razboi in relatiile romano-sovietice” in Revista Istorica, 1993, no. 9 Hincu,Dumitru,Problema Basarabiei in arhivele diplomatice germ. si aus.-un tratat uitat?, in Magazin storic, serie noua — august 1994, Anul XXVIII-nr. 8 (329) p. 44 Iancu, Gheorghe, “Dor de tara. Scrisoarea unui prizonier roman din Uniunea Sovietica din anul 1926” in Tribuna (Cluj Napoca), No 25-28, July 2000 Iordache, Anastasie, “Ion I.C. Bratianu la Conferinta de pace de la Paris din 1919”, in Revista istorica, 1993, no 9 Iordan Sima, Constantin, “La Roumanie et les relations Franco-Italiennes dans les annes 1926-1927. Une page d’histoire de la diplomatie roumaine” in Revista Romana de Istorie, tome XIV, no. 2, 1975, p. 327-340 Ivan, Adrian Liviu, ”Aspecte ale relatiilor romano-italiene intre anii 1920-1923 si problema exproprierilor in Romania” in Studii de Istorie a Transilvaniei, Cluj, 1994 Jackson, Marvin R., ”Industrial Output in Romania and its Historical Regions, 1880-1930” in The Journal of European Economic History, 1986, no 1,2 Marzari, Frank, ”The Bessarabian Microcosm: September 1939-February 1940” in Canadian Slavonic Papers, 1970, no. 2 Oprea, Ion M., ”Basarabia la conferinta romano-sovietica de la Viena (1924)” in Revista Istorica, 1992, no.1 Otetea, Andrei, ”Karl Marx et la lutte des Roumains pour l’emancipation sociale at la liberation nationale” in Revista Romana de Istorie, 7, No. 5 (1968), 725-732 Petreanu, Elisabeta, ”1921: Vaticanul recunoaste unirea Basarabiei cu Romania” in Magazin Istoric, 1994, no. 3 Petrencu, Anatol, ”Istoriografia sovietica despre politica nationala a statului roman in Basarabia in 1918-1940” in Revista de Istorie a Moldovei, 1993, no. 3 Rus, Ionas Aurelian, ”The Roots and Early Development of Moldovan Romanian Nationalism in Bessarabia, 1900-1917” in Anuarul Institutului A.D. Xenopol, Iasi, no. 33, 1996 Sandu, Traian, ”Les avatars de la ratification de la Convention bessarabiene par la France, 1921-1924” in Revue Roumaine d’Histoire, 1996, no. 1 Stan, Constantin I., ”Recunoasterea internationala a unirii Basarabiei cu Romania” in Sargetia, 19951996, no. 2 Stanescu, Marin, ”Acordul Averescu-Rakovsky”, in Revista de Istorie Militara, 1993, no. 2 Stanescu, Marin, ”Basarabia 1917-1918” in Revista de Istorie Militara, 1993, no 3 Stefan, Marian, ”Basarabia, ziua intii a marii uniri” in Magazin Istoric, 1991, no 3

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APPENDICES Stoica, Vasile, ”Mizeriile unei ratificari” in Campia Libertatii, anul I, no 3, 15-29 February 1944 Tittoni, Tomasso, ”Basarabia, Romania si Italia” in Convorbiri Literare, 1927 “Treaty between the principal Allied Powers and Romania respecting Bessarabia”, Signed at Paris, October 28, 1920, in American Journal of International Law, New York, 1923, Suppl., v. 17 Torrey, Glenn E., “Romania, France and Bessarabia, 1917-1918” in Romanian Civilization, 1997, no. 2

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Index

Adachi, Mineichiro, 313, 317, 345 Aloisi, Pompeo, 244, 246, 249, 266, 267 Angelescu, Constantin, 351, 352 Arion, Nicolae, 276, 277, 339 Averescu, Alexandru, 99, 111, 156, 173, 174, 247, 253, 260, 276, 412 Badoglio, Marshall, 257 Balfour, Lord, 71, 74, 75, 76, 86, 88, 90, 91 Barthou, Louis, 219, 235 Benes, Edouard, 124 Berthelot, Charles, 77 Bessedovskii, Gregorij, 124, 156, 159, 295-302, 306, 310, 318, 338, 340, 341, 342, 343, 428 Bibescu, Anton, 177, 199, 201, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 388, 401, 402, 409 Boerescu, V., 178, 179, 180, 201 Bratianu, Ion C., 22, 25 Bratianu, Ion I.C., 54, 68, 100, 120, 359, 400, 428, 439 Bratianu, Vintila, 218 Briand-Kellogg Pact, 124, 125, 126 Britain, Sir Harry, 194, 195 Cachin, Marcel, 225, 226 Cadere, Victor, 127, 160 Cambon, Jules, 189, 217, 234, 235, 422 Carol II, King of Romania, 134, 140, 141, 185 Carp, Petre P., 290, 293, 341 Carr, Wilbur J., 162, 390, 404 Castle, William R., 381, 382, 402 Central Powers, 37, 39, 56-61, 65, 68,

99, 100, 108, 110, 207-210, 341, 350, 352, 353, 398, 401, 413 Chamberlain, Austin, 203, 253, 261, 267 Cicerin, Gheorghi, 39, 108- 111, 113, 117—119, 156- 158, 186, 227, 248, 254, 279, 301, 329, 342 Ciotori, D.N., 110, 156, 267 Ciuntu, Edmond, 133, 321, 346 Clemenceau, George, 58-60, 71, 86, 90—95, 99, 201, 206- 213, 234 Clerk, George, 169 Clinchant, George, 233, 237, 341 Cobb-Lippman Memorandum, 101, 353, 354, 399 Colby Note, 172, 181, 215, 315, 365, 366, 367, 372, 373, 376, 377, 380, 382, 394 Contarini, A., 248, 249, 250 Cretzianu, Alexandru, 156, 160, 247, 253, 256, 266, 267, 321- 323, 404, 420, 429, 430 Crow, Sir Eyre, 64, 69 Culbertson, W.S., 375, 402 Curzon, Lord, 79, 102, 103, 164, 178, 182, 185, 190, 197, 199-203, 235, 266, 267 Daeschner, Emile, 156, 157, 201, 213, 214, 218, 219, 235 Davidescu, Gheorghe, 140, 310, 345 Davila, Charles A., 124, 125, 159, 163, 315-317, 336, 345, 375- 391, 395-397, 402-404, 409, 410 De Martonne, Emmanuel, 31, 210, 235

< 437 >

Moldova, a Romanian Province Debuchi, Katsuji, 295-302, 306, 307, 309, 310, 316, 318, 332, 338, 341, 342 Denikin, General, 40, 144, 147, 148, 156, 170, 212, 364 Derby, Lord, 81- 83, 102, 103, 178-186, 199, 201-203, 236, 422 Dering, Herbert G., 186, 190, 191, 203, 235, 248, 267 Diamandi, Constantin, 118, 157, 230, 235, 236, 237 Dianu, Nicolae, 321, 346 Dovgalevskii, Valerii, 301 Drake, Millington, 187, 188, 191, 203, 235 Drummond, Sir Eric, 150 Duca, Ion Gheorghe, 40, 50, 157, 158, 164, 191, 221-223, 227, 229, 230, 235-237, 243, 246, 248, 249, 266, 267, 277-280, 305, 308, 309, 336, 339, 340-345, 372-374, 401, 402, 408, 431 Dulles, Allen W., 73, 102, 431 Durazzo, Marquis, 250, 252, 258, 259, 262, 267, 269, 270 Dutasta, Paul Eugene, 71 Ferdinand, King of Romania, 38-40, 50, 59, 280, 304, 330, 351, 400 Filality, Gheorghe, 105, 114, 115, 157 Forges, A., 218, 219, 223, 226 Franklin, Martin, 66, 243, 266, 388 Frontotdel, 35, 49 Ghika, Dimitrie Ion, 102, 176, 185, 199, 345, 402, 422 Grant, Colonel U.S., 74, 102 Hardinge, Lord, 180, 188, 189, 190, 201, 203 Herbette, Jean, 232, 233, 237, 269, 343 Herriot, Edouard, 230, 236, 383 Hoover, Herbert, 375, 400, 401, 428, 433 Horiguchi, Kumaichi, 279, 280, 289, 290, 327, 328, 340, 341 Hull, Cordell, 388, 389 Ionescu, Take, 10, 39, 50, 56, 58, 80, 100, 102, 109, 111, 115, 156, 157, 165, 174, 176, 182, 185, 186, 187, 188, 199, 200, 215, 216, 339, 359, 371, 401, 422 Iorga, Nicolae, 45, 48, 159, 432 Ishii, Viscount Kikujiro, 280, 303, 340, 422 Karakhan, Lev Mikhailovici, 105, 114, 115, 116, 118, 155, 157, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 291, 294, 297, 299, 300, 326, 329, 335, 337, 338, 340, 341, 346 Kelley, Robert F., 385, 403 Kenworthy, Lt-commander, 172, 194 Kolchak, Admiral, 71-73, 90, 91, 94, 146, 170,

365, 368, 394, 414 Kopp, Joseph, 291, 292, 295, 338, 341 Krestinsky, Nikolai Nikolaievich, 119, 136, 158, 161 Krofta, Kamil, 135, 139 Kroupenski, Alexander N., 72, 76, 144, 146, 148, 149, 150, 151, 164, 275, 339, 433 Lafont, Ernest, 225, 226 Lahovary, Alexandru, 164, 246, 248, 250, 266, 267, 269, 353 Langa-Rascanu, Constantin, 119, 120, 252, 293 Lansing, Robert, 70- 74, 86-89, 349, 352354, 356, 359, 363, 371, 393, 394, 399, 401, 427 Laroche, Guy, 64, 69, 81, 92, 156, 176, 199, 218, 236, 401 Leeper, Allan W.A., 64, 79, 169, 171, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 199, 201, 202, 203 Leygues, George, 156, 217, 221, 222, 224, 235, 236, 422 Little Entente, 10, 16, 123, 124, 129, 131, 132, 138, 158, 159, 162, 185, 186, 203, 229, 234, 236, 242, 244, 253, 258, 267, 318, 398, 412, 427, 434, 438 Litvinov, Maxim, 108, 110, 111, 114, 123, 124, 125, 127, 128, 130, 131, 132, 134, 136, 137, 138, 139, 156, 157, 159-162, 181, 228, 232, 318, 333, 375, 381 Lloyd George, David, 59, 68, 71, 78, 81, 94, 95, 96, 164, 167, 170-173, 180, 199, 226 Manzoni, Count, 254, 255, 256, 257, 259, 263, 267, 268, 269, 341 Marie, Queen, 354, 359, 400 Martino, Giacomo de, 64, 69 Matsui, Tetsuku, 274, 280, 339, 340 Millerand, Alexandre, 95, 201, 213, 214, 235 Molotov, Viaceslav, 43, 140, 162, 323, 427, 437 Murray, Wallace, 377, 378, 379, 382-384, 389, 390, 402, 403, 404 Mushanokoji, Kintomo, 294, 305, 308, 341, 343, 344, 345 Mussolini, Benito, 195, 224, 242-260, 262264, 266-270, 282, 290, 291, 326, 341, 412, 429 Nagai, Ryutaro, 313, 314, 315 Nakamura, Kaju, 313, 314, 315, 328, 336, 345 Nanu, Frederic C., 24, 49, 50, 156, 157, 159, 160, 163, 315, 371, 375, 377-381, 383, 392, 401, 402, 404, 409, 420, 434 Naruhiko, Prince, 279, 280, 325, 328

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APPENDICES Nishi, Genshiro, 277, 339 Orlando, V.E., 240 Ostrovski, Mihail S., 133, 161 Peretti, dela Rocca, 218, 221, 229, 236 Petliura, Simion, 112, 117, 144, 147, 156, 170 Petrescu-Comnen, Nicolae, 139, 346, 404 Phillips, William, 388, 404 Pichon, Stephen, 75, 90, 156, 209, 235 Poincare, Raymond, 219, 220-227, 230, 231, 235, 236, 266, 279, 329, 340, 346 Polk, Frank Lyon, 74-77, 91, 92, 167, 274, 355, 360-364, 401 Ponsonby, M., 193, 194, 195 Rakovsky, Christian, 37, 38, 49, 50, 108, 110, 111, 156, 157, 194, 430, 439 Rattigan, Frank, 66, 145, 164, 168, 172, 175, 176-188, 197, 199, 200, 201 Romanian National Treasury, 35, 105, 107, 111, 114, 118, 124, 125, 300 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 383, 385, 388, 392, 404 RUMCEROD, 35, 108 Saint Aulaire, Count Felix August de, 60, 98, 99, 100, 208, 209, 213, 234, 235, 398, 436 Scerbacev, General, 33, 36, 46, 49, 92, 143 Schmidt, Alexander C., 72, 76, 144, 146, 148, 164, 433 Seymour, Charles, 64, 70, 101, 266, 357, 359, 398, 399, 400, 436, 437, 438 Sfatul Tserii, 12, 33-50, 72, 87, 88, 108, 109, 143, 144, 145, 208, 292, 303, 394, 418, 428, 430 Shidehara, Baron Kijuro, 249, 291, 293, 312, 314, 338, 341, 342 Shigemitsu, Mamoru, 320, 321, 323, 338 Sinclair, Sir Archibald, 193 Solf, Walter, 296, 298, 299, 301, 331, 342 Sonnino, Sidney, 49, 99, 240, 241, 266

Stalin, I.V., 124, 125, 142, 159, 418, 430 Stimson, Henry L., 381, 382, 402 Stoicescu, George G., 50, 312, 313, 315, 316, 317, 319, 345 Stomoniakov, Boris Spiridonovici, 126, 127, 297, 342 Sturdza, Mihail, 20, 125, 127, 155, 159, 160, 161, 437 Tanaka, Giichi, 297, 301, 306, 310, 311, 318, 339, 341-344 Tardieu, Andre, 64, 69, 72, 73, 86-91, 210 Tavernier, Edouard, 207 Tittoni, Tomasso, 24, 72, 75, 76, 88, 90, 91, 266, 270, 420, 440 Titulescu, Nicolae, 10, 83, 102, 116, 126-137, 142, 155, 158-161, 174, 176, 178, 183-185, 199, 201, 202, 206, 244, 253, 266, 269, 273, 289, 303, 310, 313, 318, 319, 320, 343, 345, 383, 384, 391, 392, 402-404, 410, 438 Ukrainian Rada, 34, 37 Vaida-Voevod, Alexandru, 51, 66, 78, 93, 94, 95, 96, 109, 110, 111, 148, 156, 160, 171, 173, 214, 339, 345, 353, 360, 400 Vannutelli Rey, Count Luigi, 64 Vassiliu, Ion Aurel, 303-313, 318, 343-345, 388, 409 Vopicka, Charles J., 49, 57, 62, 66, 99, 101, 350, 351, 353, 354, 355, 358, 398, 399, 438 Wallace, Andrew, 78, 79, 81-83, 102, 103, 364, 377, 378, 382, 384 Wilson, Woodrow, 53, 58-60, 62, 64, 65, 71, 86, 207, 213, 277, 339, 349, 351-354, 356, 357, 359, 360, 367, 387, 393, 398-401, 428, 432, 436, 437 Wrangel, General, 111, 117, 147, 181, 201, 215, 216 Yoshizawa, Kenkichi, 282-287, 291, 294, 312, 326, 329, 335, 337, 338, 340, 341

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