Modern Psychotherapies: A Comprehensive Christian Appraisal

Acknowledgments

7

Introduction

9

I The

17

2 A Christian View of Pe r sons

19

TheDynamic Psychologies

63

3 Classic Psychoanalysis

65

4 Contemporary Psychodyna written with Mic/wel l-'! Mongis 5.1ungi

The Behavioral Psychologies

92 119 14J

6 Beba\�or Therapy

145

7 Rational Emotive Therapy

17J

8 Cognitive-Behavioral Ther",py

196

9 Adlerian and RealityTherapies

226

The Humanistic Psychologies

251

10 Person-Centered Therapy

255

II Existential Therapy

278

12 GestaJt Therapy

]0]

1STransactionaJ Anays l is

12 4

The Family S�mPsychologies

147

14 FamilyTherapy

149

Toward I:hrisl;an Psychologies

177

15 Responsible Eclecticism

179

1 6 Christian PsychotherAPY

401

Subject Index

419

AuthQr Index

422

Acknowledgments

Rcfonned Christian thinkers oftcn assert that in pursuing truth, we attempt to Mthink God's tJlOughts after him,�We cannot be so con6dent to claim that ....e. are presenting �God's LhoughlS� in this book, but it has been exciting to pursue thai goal in this project. Nt we wrOte. we were acutely aware of those who have been mentors to us in some fonn or another along the paths of our development. In somc sense, much of what might be good in all that follows is due to their influence-we have been thinking Mtheir thoughts� as ....'ell as God's thoughts. What is inadcquate in what follo.... s. is due to our own weaknesses. Our thanks go out in a special way to C. Stephen Evans and Alan Tjelt¥cit, who rcad thc firs! draft of this manuscript in its entirety, in very rough shape. TIlcir suggestions were al­ even though it .... as . W"dYS helpful, thoughtful and honest, and their insights have signifi­ can tly advanced our thinking and so made this a better book, We are dt..-eply thankful for the help offered by Michael Mangis of Wheaton College, who did the initial draft of chapter four (Contem­ poraJ1 ' Psychodynamic Psychotherapies) for us. We ....ere . out of our depths on many areas of current psychodynamic thinking, and hi! expertise in this arca is outstanding. Dennis Okhohn, Frances]. White, Siang Yang Tan, Robert Roberts, H. Ne...0 .-1 n Malon) Kirk FarnS\'.'Onh, Don Bosch, Drew Loi7.eaux, Brian Van Dragt and Jon Petel1lOn contribUled subscmtially to our work by olIering critiques of indi"Kluai chapten> at various stages of develop­ ment. We are indebted to many of our colleagues at Wheaton College who make wat in$tinllioll a rich place to think and \-.,!ork. We wish to thank Mid\ael Maudlin, our first editor at InterVarsit}' Press, ....hose . initial emhusiasm and encouragement meant a lot. Finally, we thank our pri.ncip...,J <.'ditor at IntcrVarsity, Rodn ey Clapp, whose commiunent to Jesus Quist has been so evident. and whose skills as a thinker and writer are always in e"\�dcllce. Our secretaries at Wheaton College, Carol Blauwkamp and Geral­ dine Carlson, ha\"C been of terrific assistance in the process of finish­ ing this project, as they so often are ill all other areas, (},'er lhe yean, a number of rcsearch assistants have conuibuted to greater or Jesser �

,

,

8

deglees to this project; .....e would like to extend our thanks especially to Karen Crow Blankenship. and to Joel Arp. Rose Buier, Davi.d Dodd, Michael Gillis. Kathy Hobson, Todd Kqlock., Kathleen Lattea, Stephen Moroney. Grace Ann RobertSOn, Law-en Snick1er, Trudy Wallc., Eliza.. beth Watson, Don Workman and Chris lang. Special lhanks to David WIlcox fOT preparing the index and proofreading the manuscript. Figure 1.1, picturing the historical roots o f the major psychother­ apy approaches. is from the manual for the "'Theories and Principles ofCounseling� Extension 5IUdies course, "'heaton College Graduate School. copyright Stanto n L. Janes Ph.D.. 1986. Used by permission. This figure is bast.'CI on an carlier chart by Dave Benner, now of Redeemer College. Portions of chapten six and eight arc based on S. J ones (1988), i W. Miller and]. Manin �A religious critique ofbcha\ior lhcr apy, � n (Eds.). Behaviur therapy and religion (pp. 139-170). Newbury Park, CA: Sage: used by pe rmi ssion . Portions of ch ap ter seven were based on S. Jones (1989), *Rational-emotive therdpy in Christian perspective,� JooN/a[ ofPl)'chology awi Thtology. 17(2), 110-120; used by permission. Figure 7,1, used "'ith pennission, is from &awl! and psycluJlhmlftJ. by Albert Ellis, Ph,D, (0 1962 by the institute for Rational Living. Inc.: published b)' arran gemem with Carol Publishing Group; a Cita­ del Press Book). Our thanks go OUI to Don Browning and the faculty of the Uni­ i g to Stan J ones the vemty of Chicago Di\inity School for exte ndn status of post- doctoral fellow and use of their marvelous library (heaven-on-earth for a bookworm) for the academic rear 1988-89, Our thanks also go out to H. Newton Malony and the faculty, stu­ dents and staff of th e Graduate School of PSYChology al Fuller Theo­ logical Seminary for hosti ng Rich Bulman fOf a very rewarding sabbatical during Ihe £all of 1987. Handil ng the issue of gender in writing is an ever-troublesome matter. We have chosen to use inclusive terms wherever it did not torture the lan g uage 10 do so. In places where it was nOt styis l ticaUy pleasing to u se neutered terms, we have auemptcd to alternate refer­ ences 10 females and males. We were not compu lsi ve in the process, so some unintentional inequiti es may remain, but we hope not. To our ",ives, Brenna and Deb, v.'f! offer OUT apprecia ti on and most profound gratitude for their support, love and encouragement. without which this book would never have been done. Thank )"ou for being excellent in all that you do. .

INTRODUCTION

his book attempts to app� each of the current major psychotherapy theories in the meotaJ-health field from the pers�ctive of evangelical Christiani[}'. It is a

"dialog� be­

tween me 5UpposedJy nonreligious th erapeutic pS)'ochologies and the religious Christian tradition. But it

is a dialog where

one side of the

conversation, that of the Christian faith, is presumed to have the ultimate Standing as rruth. Nevertheless, we presume that the variOla psychologies have much to tnch us, and may in fact lead us to see certain truths of the Christian tradition in a different light. In 1977. one of us was in graduate school and came across a book. written in the 1950s relating Christian faith to the field of psychology. It was authored by one of the most eminent $Cholan in the field of dinical psychology today. An enthusiastic letterwas soonwritten to this scholar. asking him if he had wriuen more in this area. He graciously

10

replied. saying that he was no longer a Christian; he was not sure where

he stood religiously, but it was probably closest (0 Zen Buddhism. But

he also added that while he n o longer had a personal commiunent to the presuppositions from which he wrote in the 1950s, he nevertheless felt that the earlier book was logically sound; that is, the fom} and content of his analysis stood even though he no longer believed the foundations for what he wrote al that time. Because of our presumption afthe U"uth of the orthodox Christian IntdiLion, this book may be perceived as Mparochiar by some, as it represents only one religious tradition. OUT intended audience is srndents, pas[()�, mental-health professionals. and interested and in· fonned lay persons in the evangelical Christian tradition. BUl in line with the story of the scholar above, we would argue thaI the fOfm of our analysis stands even ifone is notan �YdJ1gelical Christian. Christians of other stripes, and perhaps C\'�n those of other, non-Christian faith

traditions, will, "''e hope, find this book helpful in outlining the reli­ gi ous implications of the various psychothef
(1984) has compiled a detailed and annotated list of books relating religious thought and psychology published between 1672 and 1965. Among these are many that took specific psychologies and explored their relationship with religious belief. The works by Browning (1987) and Hurding (1985) are excellent recent examples of such works. Funher, in each chapler, we cite recent literawre that examines the particular issues and psychoth�rapieswe are addressing. In composing this book we ha\'e been able to build upon the work of many able scholars, to whom we are heavily indebted. Before embarking upon our study, we "'ill briefly examine the nature of psychotherapy and counseling, since it is \ilal to have a general picture of the nature of what we are appraising before ....e. focus on the details. What Is Psychotherapy and Counseling? The topics ....e . will examine in this book are gennane to the concerns notjusl of professional psychologists, but to all mental-health workers, pastoral counselors and pastors, and indeed to the concerns of in­ formed laypeople who desire to be effective in their interpersonal

,

fNTHODVCTIO.V

11

ministries. But despite the number of people involved i n this en­ deavor, defining psrchotherapr and counseling is quite complic.ued.

The ?ioblt:m ofDivtnity ps)'diolhcuP1 i5 a generic tenD that covers awide variety oflheories and techniques, all of which ha\"e articulate spokespersons and supporters, and make claims of success. The varied theories and lfihniques are

derived, for the most part, from clinical experience and reflection rather than systematic empirical research. This helps to explain the proliferation of therapy approaches. They emerge from each theorist's unique experiences of the type of people he or she has seen for counseling, the types of problems they manifest, the cultural context of the therapist. his or her assumptions abc.)Uf how people change, and the core beliefs that shape the therapist's life standably leaves wide room for diverse approaches to people helping. And there really are an incredible array of approaches. Not only are there numerous major theories. but each seems to have a number of variations as well. A recent work identifi�d 260 distinct schools of psychotherapy (Strupp and Binder, 1984). Certainly, many of these are �k.issing cousins� rather than truly unique approaches. Since many approaches to psychotherapy claim imprciiSive results, it is difficu1t to evaluate critically the ultimate worth of a particular theory or technique. One must get the broad perspective when assess­ ing the value of a specific system: Who is working with whom, under what conditions and assumptions. and on what particular problems and concerns? There is an C\'er-present danger of the {)\'erentlmsiastic extrapolation of a theory or technique to client populations or prob­ lems for which it was never intended, or for which there is little or no reason to suggest its effectiveness (see Goldenberg, 1983). For exam­ ple. the unquestionable effectiveness of iJhavior modification with autistic children (l..o\...as, 1987) has little bearing on its use with adults struggling with the meaning of life. Like",;sc:. counselors should be appropriately humble in their pronouncements about Lheir theories and techniques, though we don', know ofa single counseling approach thal hasn' t in some form claimed to be the true and best way.

Defining PsydIothn-apy and Couns�ing In light of all this diversity. it is not surprising that academicians. clinicians and researchers have found it difficult to agree on a specific definition of coul'Utlingand psych.othemfrJ. As London (1964) has noted,

,

12

MODI;RNPSYCHOTH£RAPl£S

many find it easier to practice the an and science of people-helping than to describe it.

Still,

aCfOM

theories and techniques, there appear to be some

common features. In fact, many theoreti cians and researchers today argue that these common racoon influence. or even determine, the liuHhood of a succemul therapeutic outcome. The common tech­ niques that all psychotberapisu seem to use (though with differing frequencies) include

(1) offering reassurance and support. (2) desen­

sitizing the client to distress. (3) encouraging adaptive functioning and

(4) offering understanding and inSight (Garfield, 1980), (There is evidence, h�"e\'er, thai suggests these factors are nOl aU there is effective psychotherapy Uanes, Cumming, and Horowitz,

[0

19881.) Un­

derstanding these common features can be helpful a� one mes to define counseling. We would describe individual counseling or psychotherapy as a dyadic (two-",-"y) interaction between a client who is distre!SCd. and perhaps confused and frightened, and a professional helper whose helping skills are recognized and accepted by the client The two engage in an ongoing. pri\'ate, collabo,dtive encounter that is struc· tured as to time. place and overall purpose in a way that informal friendships are not. The relationship is likely to rely heavily on verbal communication of the client's thoughts. feelings. attirudes and beha¥­ iOTS. The client comes to believe in and develop hope from what happens in thenpy. in part because the therapist appears to have a theory for understanding and explaining the client's distress as well

�

having inter.·ention techniques for reducing it. In a supportive auno.­ sphere with an empathetic and caring therapist. the client begins to disclose and re-evaJuate f�lings and behavior pauems, to understand and accept previously rejected aspects of herself, to take risks, to become more open and honest about herself, to learn new methods of living with self and others and to gain new satisfactions from life. With the client having less need for the psychotherapy. the process is usually terminated bymutual consent with the therapiSt (adapted from Frank,

1973; Garfield. 1980; and particularly Goldenberg, 1983, pp.

172£f.). Given that counseling and psychotherapy is

so

intensely personal,

and yet is regardt..,(! as a professi onal rather than personal relationship, how is psychotherapy and counseling different from friendship? As is commonly observed, a lot of good counseling goes on over cups of

coffee, in the barber shop. orover a back-yard fence; perhaps a lot more

f.v17lODlJCT10.V

JJ

than goes on

In

any given day in the offices of psychotherapiSts

(MataroiZZO and Wiens, There

an:

1972).

some important differences, though. Ideally, the thera­

pist is able to avoid undue emotional involvement with the client so as to be more objective. allowing the client to more freely communicate his thoughts and feelings (Coparu; and Singer.

1978). The therapist's

personal qualities and the environment she creates encourage risk-tak­ ing and facilitate the acquisition of skills and sensitivities that will foster the development of health and wholeness. Perhaps the most important distinction berween psychotherapy and friendship is that the former is by definition a one-way relationship emotionally and psychologically­ is supposed to derive go9
k 1976). Friendships, on

limiled and purposeful relationship (Korchi

the other hand, are ideally mutually beneficial emotionally and psycho­ logically, and are not Slructurcd intentionally for the benefit of only one of the parties involved. It is obvious. though, that .....e cannOl say that psychotherapists derive no benefit from the therapeutic relation­ ship, as financial and social benefits certainly can and do accrue to the psychotherapist ....ho . is effective.

An! hydtotJterapy and Cowuding Diffnv:nt1 An important and often hotly debated question is h o..... psychotherapy and counseling are to be differentiated (McLemore,

1974). The tradi­

tional distinction has been that counseling is done by less comprchen­ sh'e!y and intensively trained professionals (e.g., pastors, school guidance counselors) and by paraprofessionals (lay counselors or mental-health volunteers). It is done with less seriously disturbed groups of persons, such a s those struggling with decisions of what career to pursue. whether or nOlLO get married, and so forth. Coun­ seling has often been regarded as relying heavily on the giving of wise advice as a major mode of intervention.

HisLOrically. psychotherapy ...."aS thought to be more appropriate for

�deept:r� problems and was most often done by more highly trained and/or certified therapists. TIle focus was o n significant personalit), change rather than adjusuncnt to situational and Life problems. It is sometimes said that psychOlherdpy attempts significantly LO change the personality of clients, often paying less attention to specific currellt life problems. while counseling works with in exillting personality structures to help people adjust LO the current demands on them.

/4 Although some authors still prefer to make a distinction between counseling and psychotherapy, .....e have chosen 10 use the teons imer­ .... o . main reasons. The first is thai clinical changeably in this text (or t

and counseling psychology. which were once substantially different

disciplines and arose QUI of different historical rooLS, havcgro.... ". closer

together o,'er the laslsc\'cral decades. The distinctions betv.·een the two subdisciplines are hard to make out today (sec Aitmaier, 1985). Perhaps more importantly, we will nOI make the distinctions lu!re because lhe "cry same lheories are utilized as guides for r.he change process by psychotherapists and counselors. Survey textbooks for counseling ule­ ones and methods and for psychotherapy theories and methods can­ rain almost idcl1lical COnlenl. \Vhile there can be different emphases in books to the 1\'.1) profes..'Iional populations, the basic theories are not diffcrenL SlnIcture of the Book Our perspective in this book is decidedly psychological and �spiritual. � In tak.ing this pcrspccth'e. we do not wish to millimiz.e Ihe dear importance of the biological/physical perspective on mental health, nor of the sociological/socioculLUral perspective. BUI our focus of anelllion will be on the current illleractionai psychotherapies. We believe that a careful critique of these approaches is important for the Christian world today. We also believe thaI psychologists do not have thc final word in wldentanding hUWallllC'S5, suffering and growth. If anything, psycho1ogim ha\'e been 5aying 100 much and the populace has been lis[ening too much. It is no wonder that many today describe psychologists as the "secular priests� of our age. We belicve that the ceno-dlity of religious reflection must be reas�ncd, as weU as the value of philo­ sophical, artislk, literary and other facets of our human ways of knowing. Psycholhenlpy has assumed a position of high \1sibility and impor­ tance in mally seclon of our American socicty. Our goal is to cOllie to a new understanding of this field ill order that we might more efTec­ ti\'ely participate in the

....'Ork.

that Cod

is doing in and through his

church. The needs of contemporary society arc creating new and potelllially challenging roles for Christians who d�jre lO minisler in lhe name of ChrisI to a hurting \'I·orld. We bdie"l'c strongly that a greatcr awareness and knowledge of both me assets and liabilities of the major

I' psychotherapy can contribute in a significant way to the larger mission and work of the church. This book is stnlclured in three parts. In the twO inu-oduclory chapters we have outlined a summary of our view of what it means to

relate or "integrate� the Christian fai t h with a field lile psychology or

psychotherapy theory. Chapler one discusses this process in general terms and deals with some important and frequently expressed objec­ tions (at least in conservative circles) to such an approach. Since an examination o f psychotherapy from a Chrislian perspective mll�t pro­ ceed from a foundational Christian understanding of persons, chapter two focuses specifically on the broad strokes of our Christian view of persons. Having clarified our method and the Christian view of per­ sons, we then proceed into the hean of our appraiGlI. Chapters three through fourteen cover a variety of approaches to psychothcrnpy. The four major paradigms psychodynamic. the cognitive-behaviord.l. the humanistic and the fam­ ily approaches. The most imporlant representatn'cs of each of

these

traditions are examined from our Christian perspecti\'e. Each chapter will begin with a summary presentation of each model; the interested reader can get a marc exhaustive presentation of these approaches by consulting the \"Olumes suggested "for further reading" at the end of this introduction and at the end of each chapter. The book will conclude with an examination of how one can profitably draw from more than one approach in elaborating one's approach to counseling (chapter fifteen) and a discussion of what it means to be a Christian counselor (chapter sixteen) . Our main premise in these concluding chapters is that there are many W".tys to counsel Christianl),. But it is not and cannot be dIe case that "anything goes.� We hope that our suggestions in lhese concluding chapters wiU help the proceu of �pulting it all together" for the reader.

ForFunherR� Corcy, C. (1990). ThMry and pradiu 0/ (OInu�ling and P-rychoiMmpy (4th ed.). Monterey, CA: Broou/Cole. Conini, R.. and Weddillg, D. (Em.). (1989). CUITmI psydwtherapia (4th ed.). 1l:lSal, It.: F. E. Peacock. Prochaska,]. (1984). PrjelwlhmJP'rA tralltlhwrttimlanaJy!is(2nd rd.). Chicago: Doney. These are three of the morc readablc ovcrvicw$ of p5y<:hothcrap), and counseling systems. They will be cited in man)' of the cbapters to follow. Keep thcse titles in mind as possiblc rC50urct:s for further rcading ill each

16

.\lonERNPSYCH(ffHER'u'JES

of the

therapy chapters to foUow.

ReferencE' Alunaier, E. (1985). Counseling psychology. In D. Benner (Ed.), iJaJu!r �fo. fJ«liD ofps,cMIDfD (pp. 252·254). Grand Rapids, MI: Baker. Browning. D. (1987). Rtligiow tlt.ought and tlte modtm psycMJogits. Philadelphia: Fortrcs,s. Copans. S., and Singer, T. (1978). WIlDS 1M patient hm'New York.: Oxford. Frank,J. (197!1). l'Imuaritm OM Amling (rev. ed.). Baltimore: Johru Hopkiru University PTess. Garfield, S. (1980). PsycAolhmJl'1: •.0\." «ltd!', DpproadI. New York: Wiley-Imcrscicnet'. Goldenberg, O. (1983). Omtewlporary dinjroJ prJdwlOlfJ (2d ed.). Momcrey. CA: Brooks/Cole. Hurding. R. (1985). Roots ami shoots. london: Hodder and Stoughton. Jones, E.; Cumming,J.; and Horowitz, M. (\988). Another look al the nonspe­ cific hypothesisof thenopeutic crr«tin:nali.JourmdofConrulJingand Cliniwi PsJcJwkJgJ. "6(1), 48-55. Korchin, S. (1976), Modtrn clinical prycholcgJ. New York: Basic Boob. London, P. (1964). Tiu IIIMa and morab ojfllJelwlhmll'1. Washington: Hemi­ 'phere.

lO\';US, O. (1987). Behavioral treaunem and normal educational and intell«­ lUal fUllctioning in young autistic children.Journal DfCon.rultingand QiniCilI PrjeiloWgy, ."'(1), 5-9. McLemore, C. W. (1974). CIng;_n:S psjdlOlogirol hondboo.l Grand Rapids. MJ: "rom..,..

Ma taraZZo, j., and Wiens, A. ( 197 2). 7k interWw: ikJttm:Jt on its anatom, and sInlduR.'. Chicago: Aldine. Strupp, H. and Binder, D. (1984). PrjcMtiltmP'J in a new�. New York: Ba.!ic Boob. Vanek Kemp, H. (1984). PJychologt and IhtolofD in Wtsttrn //a.oughl (1672-1965); A hiJtonrol and annolattd bibliograph,. Mill Wood, NY: Kraw.

1 THE INTEGRATION OF CHRIST ITY AND PSYCHOLOGY

hrisuan counselors and psychotherapists are \itaJly con­ cerned with understanding and improving human func­ uoning. Our field has arisen in a time when it is painfully obvious thai improving our standard of living and our physical health does not guarantee one a sense of personal ....ell-being. . Far tOO many people are in emotional, mental or spiritual pain. It is out of a desire to allc,;ate such suffering that many Christians today are interested in the mental-health field. There is a strong desire to enrich Christian ministry by dnl'o.. ing upon the resources of the developing field of psychology and its related disciplines. What thoughtful pa.�tor or counselor ....ould . not Wctnl 10 use all available knowledge and techniques to male his or her people-helping as effecth'e as possible? Bm there is also considerable ambi\-alence about, and outright

18

opposition to. drawing upon the strengths of psrchology among con­ servative Christians. Some describe the field of psychotherapy as "Sa­ tanic" or �completely secularized" and -unredeemable," While in graduate school, one of w spoke toJay Adams. a .... -ell-known v.Titer in the field of Christian counseling. Asked nhc had any words of guidance for Christians studying psychology. Adams responded. in essence, "'Drop out of graduate schooL If you want to sen.'c God as a counselor, you can only do SO by going to seminary. studying the \\ford of God rather than the words of men, and becoming a pastor." Neither one of us look Dr. Adams's advice. We have, howc\'cr, tried to maintain our foundational commiunents toJesus Christ in OUTwork as psychologists. This book is tbe fruit of the working-oul of that goal It coven the intellectual aspect of what we believe i t means to he a Christian psychologist, mental-health professional. counselor or psy­ chotherapiSt. This book is about thinking Christianly about the modern ap­ proaches to psychotherapy. We strongly believe that it is not enough simply to pray for clients, or to refrain from discouraging their spiritual .sensitivities, or to have high ethical standards. E"ery theory or method of people-helping carries with it a S)'"Stem of beliefs. a way of seeing or understanding people: who they are, why they experience what they do, how they can change and what they should be aiming for in life. These theoretical suppositions mayor may nOt conflict with direct assertions of tbe Christian faith or with more indirect implications of the faith. /I is becaUJe wtftellhaltMse thmrid of psyclwthera/J'J havt often bmJ tither summarily dismisJtd or uncritically em­ /!road IrJ Christians thai 1« haw tUternpttd 10 proutrk a bakmud appraisal of t� view$from a Christian persp«tivt. In this first chapter. we "'
TI/£ rNn:G1fATIOS OF OffUSfIi\,Wn'"''ill PSYCUOLOGI'

19

comer of one's life. But the living God has a mind of his own. NO! being content with such limits, he often breaks out into the rest of our lives and lays claim to tcrritory we had not yet thought abom deeding over to him, Oftcn he first lays claim to our moral lives. �'ilh the result that we discover that being a Christian entails confronting and struggling wilh our selfishness, jealousy, pettiness or rebelliousnes.�. This often has implications for our vocational livcs-such as ,,'hen ,,'e musl curtail unethical practices or when we IIllist rcassess Ihe values that have energized us for years, But God can lay claim to our thought li\'es as \\'ell, Do we need to think difTerentJy areas of life as a result of our fdith? Indeed \,'e do. The claims of the gospel arc all-inclusivc, spanning cvery dimension of our prh-dte and public lives, 1:15-20).

But what does it mean for sincere Christians to relate their religious beliefs and faith to an area nOI ol'ertJy or obviously religious or tJ1CQ­ logical? There is a Christian position on the nature of sah';ltion, bm is there one, correct Christian position on literary criticism, on thermo­ dynamics, on the fundamemal motivations of human personality, or on the nature of depression? Answering this general question on the relation of faith and scholarship and/or science has absorlx:d the energies of many Christian thinken; over the centuries, As we mentioned earlier, in conservS)-'chotheology" or Mtheopsychology.M There are a number of different approaches to understanding the integration of Christian faith with the discipline of psychology, 1 Jones I Mud) of Ih� discu.uion of Ihese is.�ucs of inlegr.lUon

has been influenced by TectO) de-

20

(1986) has characterized the main three of these as (1) tthical j1i� tion,

the application of religious moral principles to the practice of

science (in this case, to the field of psychotherapy); (2)

integratiUTI, the view that scientific and religious

pmptctiTlflI

views of any aspect of

reality are independent, with the result that scientific/psychological views and religious understandings complement but don't really affect each other (e.g.,Jec\'cs, 1976); or (3)

inugratitm,

humaniuror ChrisJ.ianiuro/lcUna

an approach that involves the explicit incorporation of

religiously based beliefs as the control bclic£5 that shape the percep­ tions OrracLS, theories and methods in social science (e.g., Evans, 1977.

1989; Of Van Leeuwen, 1985). We will use this last view as our frame­ work for examining psychotherapy theories. Thus the task afthe Christian scholar is �[O sLUdy reality in the light of biblical relielation� (Grcidanus, 1982, p. 147). Bec-.I.USC the claims of lhe gospel arc aU-inclusive and the gospcl.'lhould penctnlle to the core of all who claim the name Christian, lht': task of integration is mat of being distincu\'ciy Christian in an appropriate and responsible fashion in one's scholarly pursuits,

Dei" uctiw and Comtnlmw Modes of1",,%, ution Integration can be performed whh either an essentially destrucu\'e or constructive stance toward relating the Christian faith to the life of the mind, with very different results. Many opponents of integral ion (such as Adams, 1979; Bobgan and Bobgan, 1979. 1987; Hunt. 1987; Hunt and McMahon, 1985; Kil­ patrick, 1985) assume a destructive stance toward non-Christian lhought in psychology. feeling mis is the only viable option. They ap­ proach me studyof psychothel'apy theories \\-ith the assumption that each therapy model is a ,;sion of human nature that is in direct competition with the Christian faim. Thus l.he theory must be disproved by finding ....,Iopments in the philosophy of 5Cience. Wewish to acknowledge immediately that lll<�

fie ld Ofps)"Cholhempydoes not conronn in alt 1>'a}'lW the common meaning ofllle lenn Jamu. III other words, _ are I\I)t Imting Ille temu Jcino«. �and �uJ11

:u

e-qun-alenL BUI wt: would argue. on the other hand. Ihal the JIIQM cellln! iMun in re lati ng rdigioUJ faith 10 a putatio.-ely lIonrdigiouo am of scholanhip ha,-e hem illum i nated by d iKwsion5 of the harde�1 cue. that ofscience, &inC/: Kienee issupp!»O:diy the hurna" a<:tniTy "ith the leasl to do I>illl other W3)'lI ofhurnan knowing. What ,,'e are after in thiJscction � thl: le»onJ that ha\-e been lcamcd aboul thl: genenal ehal"aCIel'" ofinleKI"�tio n (rom the dialog about rdating faith wKi.:nce gelier.III)· and Ihe oclentific discipline ofpsych ology in particular. The� le:sso nswill rOTm thec:onlCxt forour!pCCific: docUMion ofpq<:hothera.pr.

,

,

THEL\n,Q«nON01 CHRI$Tf.VlnYA.NDPSYCHOUlGY

21

critical flaws in it so that it can be rejected. This certainly appeared to be the main method ofAdams (1970) in CAmJmmt If) Counselwhere he di5Il1issed the th�ries of Freud and Rogen after showing that the assumptions on which they are buill were in places incompatible with

Christian faith. The "destructive� mode of functioning is vital for Christians today. There are times when the best response of the Christian is to "demolish arguments and every pretension that sets itself up against the knowl­ edge ofGodft (2 Cor 10:5). But we contend that the appropriate time for such apologetic efforts is when the views actually are raised up

against Cod. In other words, when the views of romantic humanist Carl Rogers. for instance, are presented llJ ultim"fely so.tisfying answers to the major qm:stwns of lifo, the right Chrisuan response is to point OUl critical icws. This is what we appreciate flaws in the approach and to reject his ... about the critics of psychotherapy-they take maner.; of fai th SO seri­

ously that they are zealous to proteCt the faith from distortion or

perver.;ion. Surely it is right and good to have such a concern.

8m there is a constructive side of relating Christian f.tith to human

scholarship that is unrecognized by the critics of psychotherapy (from Stoker,

1971). A belieyer who stri\'es to stand upon a distinctive com­

mitment to the tmths of the Ih"ng Christian faith and bui l d an under­

standing of persons that is true, broad and more complete can validly engage n i a cOll5tructive dialog with the ps)�chotherapy theories. TIle

Bible, although containing God-inspired revelation that i5 infallible and authoritative, is ncvenheless of limited scope (Le., Scriprurc doesn't cover C\'erylhing). Thus it is not unfaithful to search out how

to reasonably expand our undellitanding beyond what God chose to

reveal in the Bible. i this 50rt ofconstructive interaction Chrisuan theologians engage n when they gain enlightenment from secular hilosophers for resolving nagging theologicaJ problems (e.g., Allen, 1985). In [act, Christian

�

theologians sometimes even derive benefit from the study of other

religions! The late AngliC"dn bishop and theologian Stephen Neill

(1 984) summarized a respected position on this matter: "fhe Christian faith may learn much from other faiths; but it is uni\"t�rsal in its claims; in the end Christ must be acknowledged as Lord of aU� (p. 284). \'I'e can profitably learn from other thought systems that are not explicitJy Christian f i we retain the distinctiveness of our faith conuniunents to Christ in the process. Yet, e\'Cn this constructive approach should embodY50me elements

22

MOIH:R.'VI'SYCHOTHF.RAPJF.s

of the more "critical spirit" of the desu'uctivc approach. While appro­ priating what is good in a particular theory, we mUSt also discern the erroneous baggage it car-fies. Christiall5 who get naively excited about. some superficial compatibilities of a psychotherapy theory with the r",ith and turn olTthcir critical faculties will often be led astray. Chris­ tians examining lhe psychotherapy theories \','ith a consl.ruclivc motive (as we \\ill u')' to do) should retain an attitude of careful criticism, and should notc problems encountered in order not to fall prt:y to error. But neither should they summarily dismiss an entire system because of the problems encoulltered. In summary, f i our goal is, for instance . to show how Skinnerian behaviorism is an inadequate life philosophy, then our Slance must be destructive, showing how the Skinnerian metaphysical system is an impoverished and unsoHisfying materialistic deception. Bm if our task is a constntctivc one of building the trUell distinctively Christian view of psychotherapy po�ible, we would look at and learn from Skinnerian behaviorism, after taking a firm stand on the foundation of the ortho­ dox Christian faith and tradition. This would be especially the case if God had given us a burden for a population ""'here behavioral mcthods have been shown to be effective. The Two Stages ofOmstructive Integration There arc two stages in constructivcly integrdting Christian scholarship wilh secular thought. The first is critical evaI1IU(ion, where we engage in a dialog with secular thought to find what may be of value in models thai are not easily and obviously compatible with a Christian stance. This phase is essentially one of sorting through the approaches of others to retain the good and discharge the bad. We must recognize, however, that the end product of this phase alone ....'ill be a nHher disjointed conglomeration of useful insights and helpful tidbits that hardly form a powerful and cohesive system of thought. Critical evaluation needs to be followed up \\'ith the second stage, tllLOr'j-biu khng. Mler Christian scholars ha\'e discerned the ad\'all�lgcs ith which they have interacted in the critical­ of secular models .... t develop ne..... and different theories to C'.-dluation phase, they need o incorporate these insights. They need to propose new hypotheses and theories for scholarly examination, ones .....hich bear the imprint of the Christian presuppositions. \"\'e would contend lhat good "'in tegrators� must not only review rt.'Search, but do research as well. This implies active invoh'cment in the proce!lS of doing science. informed by CII-

Tilt; INI1iGRATlONOFCHRISTIANTTl'",,";1) PSYCHOLOGY

lightened notions of philosophy of science (Evans,

23

1989). Good inte­

graton; must be committed to eV"aluation and assessment of their endeavors. Currently, the community ofChristian psychologists is weak in this area.

Our hope is to contribute e\'cnlually to thc theory-building cnter­

prise from

:.I.

Christian P"csupposiLional base. Ths i is critical because,

as we w ill argue

in chapter fifteen, the work of the mental·heahh field

significantly overlaps with the healing and reconciling work of the

church. It is "ital that Christian scholars develop thoroughly Christian

approaches to counseling. The work of the church has suffered from

those who promote either hastily "baptized� versions ofsecular models

or superficial renderings of "biblical" models.

Whilc developing a tested Christian psychotherapy theory is our

dream, wc know !hat this book represents only the flfSt stage. thc

criticakvaluation phase, of constructive scholarship. We do nOt offer

a powerful new theory, bUl hope to encourage the development of

thoroughly Christian thinking by offering a critique of existing secular theories. In other ....or
thinking ohhe secular theorists who h3\'e gone before us. We belie\'c

that carefully listening to them from the pen;pecti\'e of the Christian

tradition is an essential first step.

... We anticipate that a thoughtful reader will find this book inadl..

quate, in that .... ·e will end ",ith finding none ofthe approaches adequate

for understanding human nature, while pointing out many benefits of most oflhe approaches. We challcnge such a thoughtful reader tojoin

in the dialog ofdeveloping the comprehensi\'e Christian approach that

we all so need!

17Ie Dangnr ofI nteg .a n on

The process of integration is complicated in pan because in many areas, and es�cially in psychology, adequate scholarship requires

interacting with scientific theories and clinical models that are ques­

tionable from a Christian standpoint. We believe that the field of

psychology in general, and psychotherapy in particular, can be 3 �slippery path� for Christians to walk. Why do we regard the study and

practice of psychotherapy as a different and riskier endeavor com­ pared to other areas such as forestry, dentistry or physics?

first, many of the major proponents lof seodar approaches to

psychother.tpywere (or are) non-Christian thinkers, with many ha\ing

large axes to grind ag-dinst religion generally and Christianity in partic-

24

ular. In this field of study. one ine\ilably encounten dirl.'Ct and indirect �jabs� against the Christian faith. Some of the major psychotherapy systems have been set up as competing -life views� that are religiow n i scope and conten!. (In our chapter on Transactional Analysis, for instance, ""C criticize the �messianic� pronouncements of some of its proponents.) Research has shown that psychologislS as a group tend to be socially and politic-.lIly more liberal and less traditionaUy religious than the general population (Lovinger, 1984, chap. I). Thus it is not uncommon to have the type ofencounter onc orus had when he began his graduate studies: In the opening momenlS of the first class the professor ga\'C a five-minute diatribe against Christianity! More oflen, the antagonism against Christianity is subtle. demon­ str.llcd morc in the silence about religion n i ps}'chology LCxts, papers and classes than in open antagonism. Kirkpatrick and Spilka (1989). for instance, have documented the almost total neglect of religion as a meaningful human phenomenon in major psychology texts. \'I'e are convinced that this conspiracy of silence about things spiritual can be more deadly than open antagonism. Christians are .seduced intO 10....... ering their guard and being luUed into a secular mind.set where faith is neither good nor bad, true nor false, bUI simply irrelevant. (This has not always been the case. In the first half<entury ofAmerican psyc:hoJ.. ogy-I880-1930--religion was a majorarea ofim'csligation for the field [Spilka. Hood. and Gorsuch, 19851.) Second, we believe that pS)'chology in general and psychotherapy in particular are especially prone to subtle Merrors" or departures from truth. As theologian Emil Brunner (1946) has suggested, sin biases and distorts not only our moral bcha\ior, but also biases and distortS our thoughts (this is called the noetic effectofsin by theologians). Brunner went 011 to argue that sin would have a more subtle and profoundly l the closer one gets to the Mcenler of exts. disturbing effect on beief tence," where one is struggling with the core truths of human life. Proportionally. the further onc is a....'lly from this core, the less the influence of sin upon thoughL Thw when one is studying the noctur.. nal migration beha...ior of the notCh..wi nged red..bellied thrush, one is not grappling with quite the same core issues that one encounters in grappling with the central motivations and needs of human ife. l Also, the closer one gets to this core of existence, the further one gets from the "facts" or data of experience and the more one depends on speculation. Data can be seen as a restrainl upon speculation (being held accountable to clear and irrefutable fac(5); in the absence of such

.

,

THE r..'ffCRATIO,v a:OIR/S11A.\'fTYAND PSYOIQLOGY

close resU"ainl, when the scholar is attempting to propose a grand theor}' of pcrsonalil}' and thentpy. one may be freer to drift from the facts n i to pure speculation and hence error. We are nOI, however, arguing that science can only function with pure facts or thatChristians should only deal \\ith pure facts; actually, contemporary philosophers of science have shown thaI there really is no such thing as a pure fact. All "fucts� rest in a web of interpretation of some kind: it is simply the case that some human assertions are more interpretation than others (see WolterslorlJ, 1984). Third, as we will de"elop more fully in our last two chapters, we believe that tllt:re are some "cry seductive elements of the profession

.. isc Christian. of psychotherapy that can ensnare the immature or um Ps),chOlherdpists take great pride in being in a "peopk...helping" pro­

fession and, in most circles, are accorded respect for their skills and professional activities. One can subtly begin to belie\'e that helping people on an interpersonal dimension is all there is to caring forothers. ft is all

too

easy to become enamored with the powerful position one

occupies in relation to one's clients and to the financial rel'o'afds possible in the field (though these have been greatly exaggerated). which can open the door to great error. We have offered these points as what we Ct.-el are realistic warnings i egnuion. Critics of integration. about some dangers of the task of m those we call tile �psycholog)' bashcrs.� go beyond these warnings to voice concerns they claim render the entire task of integration illegit­ imate. We l'oill summarize t11eircore concerns belo...... sho\\ing that every concern has a kernel of truth. but has been exaggerated beyond reasonable and biblical bounds. Criticism.s oftlte Task rflnteglOh'Of1 There are four core arguments that have been ad\�d.nced ag-.tinst the integnuion of Christianity and psychotherapy. They ill'C: I. The assertion that the Bible declares iuelf (in passages such as 2 Tim 3:16-17 and 2 Pet 1:4; 3:14-18) to be sufficient to meet all human needs. Thus to argue that one could or should study anything other than the Bible (such as psychology) in order to better meet human needs is tantamount to declaring the Holy Scriptures to be inadequate lO equip the servant of God and also to rejecting God's own claims for

his revelation (80bgan and Bobgan, 1987. p. I J; Adams 1979. p. 46).

2. The belief that there are two sources of counsel in this world.

i that all counsel that is God and Satan. Funher. 'The Bible's position s

,

26

MODERNPSyorOTHF.JW>I.ES

not revelational (biblical), or based upon God's revelation, is Satanic" (Adams, 1979. p. 4; see also Bobgan and Bobgan, 1987, p. 32). Thus to decide to lislen to and learn from a non-Christian in an area where God has revealed his \\-ill (i.e., in psychology) is to "walk in the counsel oftbe wicked" (Ps 1:1) . .3. The argument that psychology is bad science. lfwe are to accept truth from any quarter, surely (it is argued) il should only be on the assurance that we are accepting lrue truth, real U"uth. Surely the vain speculations and philosophies of mere humans (2 Cor 10:5) do not merit a place in our beliefs alongside God's Word (Swaggan. 1986, pp. 6-7; Bobg'.m and Bobgan, 1987, pp. 29-30). 4. The argument that n i tegration is amalgamation or syncretism. This argument of the anti-imegrationisLS. simply put, is that �combin­ ing Christianity and psychotherapy is joining two or more religious systems" (Bobgan and Bobgan, 1987, p. 23). This position assumes fint that psychotherapy systems are religious systems ("Psychotherapy . . . is not only a substitute method of helping troubled souls, it is a surrogate religion- [Bobgan & Bobgan, 1987, p. 15]) and second that "the goal is to integrate or amalgamate the truth ofScriprure with the so-called truth of psychology to produce a hybrid that is superior to the truth of each" (Bobgan & Bobgan, 1987, p. 33). We cannot take the time here thoroughly to refute all of lhese arguments, but we will summarize our responses. Fint, we affirm the sufficiency of the Bible. At the same time, we must remember that it is God, not the Bible itself. who is declared to be alt.sufficient, to provide all that pertains unto life. Christians should courageously claim and proclaim whatever authority and power that the Scriptures declare for themselves no less and no more. On this basis, let us look at 2 Timothy 3:16-17: "All Scripture s i God-breathed and is useful for teaching, rebuking, correcting and training in righteousness, so that the man of God may be thoroughly equipped for every good work.Note that, while inspired ("Cod-breathed"), ScriplUre is not de­ clared to be the only and alkuffident source for every word ever needed anytime by anyone for any purpose related to human need; rather, it is called '"useful. � In other words, we do not look to Scripture for guidance for plumbing; nor should we for distinguishing schizo­ phrenia from a character disorder. Also, Paul te�ches that Scripture is essential to the forming of our core character, Which, if shaped and molded by God's living Word, can prepare us for beginning any good

n(£ tNn:GRI.TIOXor OffUsntl.NAND rn' /'SYCJIOI.OCY

27

work-though the accomplishment of that good work may \\'eU also depend on the mastery of other key skills. The Bible is thus an essential foundation for a Christian approach to psychotherapy and is very relevant to this field. Nevertheless, while ith life's most imporlant and ultimate answers the Bible provides us ... .. as well as the starting points for knowledge of the human condition, it is nOl an all-sufficient guide for the discipline ofcounseling. The Bible is inspired and preciolL�, bUl it is also a revelation of limited scope. the main concern ofwhich is religious n i its presentation ofGod's redemp­ tive plan for his people and the great doctrines of the faith. The Bible doesn't claim to reveal everything that human beings might want to know. Second. all truth is from above (las I :17). Correspondingly. Satan is lhe father of lies. ranging from oUl-and"ut fabrications (e.g., athe­

ism) to lies that are subtle t",ists and perversions of the truth (e.g., cults based on distortions of scriptural re\·clation). In addition. people are fallible. fallen and finite. Thus our theolo­ gies, our confessional heritages, our Bible teachings (not the Bible ilSClf) and ollr prayers are filled with subtle and sometimes blatant falsehoods and imperfections. \\'e are not right in all that .....e believe, though

by God's grace

through the Holy Spirit and the influence of

lhe body of Christ, we are guided into sufficient truth to be able to actually relate to God and understand sometlling of his nature, and to even be able to proclaim our faith as the truth. TIle flip side is that Christians are flOt the sole possessors of truth. Just as the rain falls on the JUSl and the unjust. so too docs truth, by the process that theologians call God's common grace. Romans

I speaks

ofGod cven revcaling central trUlhs about his nature to unbclie\'crs (v.

19). John Calvin, the couragcous defender and expositor of the Scrip­ tures who

\\�dS

so central to the Prolestant Reformation, stated it ... :ell

wht'n he said, '"TIle human mind. however much fallen and perverted from its oribrinal integrity. is still adorned and invested with admirable

i LS from itS Creator, . . . We will be careful . . . nOl lO reject orcondemn gf truth wherever it appt"ars�

(/nstituus of lhe Christill" &ligiOIl, 2.2.15),

There are twO sources of counsel in the world. God's and Satan's, ,Uld we should follow Cod's counsel. 8m God's counsel is nOt always synon}1nOUS with the counsel of a Christian, and Satan's counsel is not synonymous

with

tile counsel of a non-Christian. Rather, we .....ould

i tll the tnlth, and Satan's counsel with f31st. identify God's counsel ....

...

hood. Thus sometimes a so
•

P'

,

28

a given topic may be nearer the truth than the distorted understanding of a particular Christian person. If we undentand God's counsel to be b'uth, we ",ill be committed to punuing [TUrh wherever we frod it. And we may sometimes find it in the careful and insightful writings of unbelie\'ers. Third, responding to the charge that psycholog)' is "bad science," let us firsteut to the heart ar th is argument. We deny the fundamental premise that Christians can only derive knowledge from two sources, i infallible, nOI authoritatin� re\'e1arion or science. It is the Bible thai s the human beings who read iL Thus, while the Scriptures are infallible, any given human interpretation of the Bible may be fraught with problems. Further, science is a human acm'ity, and since humans are fallible, science is fallible. Revelation merits the most prominent place among human ways of kno\\ing, and science also merits a place as well. In fact, properly understood, all human routes 10 knowledge deserve an appropriate place in the cognit:i\'e life of the believer. Authority (including revela­ tion) , experience, intuition and reason-the fourcommonlydcscribed I'o'a}'S of knowing-all have legitimate roles to play (FOSler and Ledbet­ ter, 1987). On the basil! of the foregoing, then, we rejeCl the simplistic assertion that Christians need heed only authoritative reyelation and science. If only life were that simplel The second pari of the argument is the as.sertion that psychology il! "bad science.M This argument il! u.�ually pressed 00 the basil! of misrtp­ resentati"e quotations and misperceptions. A major historian and philosopher ofpsycholog}" Sigmund Koch, is often quoted correctly by psychology-bashers regarding his conclusions that Mpsychology cannot be a coherent science" (Koch, 1981, p. 262), but tbis statement is taken to mean that psychological research is incoherent or that p.!i)·chologists 'as . that are incoherent. What Koch was acmally arguing, however, .... psychology covers toO broad a span of reality (from the neurons of insects to the psychology of human communities) 10 ever have one model of scientific methodology govern all areas of study. Thus if the requirement for coherence as a science isa uniform methodology, then psychology will nC"o'cr be a coherent science. We mUSt we different methods to study neurons and multiple personalities. Koch is also often quoted as saying that some areas of psychological inquiry �cannot be properly labeled scientifk� (quoted in Bobgan and Bobg".m, 1979, p. 44). This is interpreted by the Bobgans and others as asserting lhalsome areas of psychology are nonsense, fiction or fantasy.

TIlE INT'f.:G/Ut.TION OF

Ci I /U S TI ... .v m AND PSYClfOLOGI'

29

. in some areas of study Far from it! Koch was arguing that in\'l'�stig-..tors should properlydistaflce themsd,,'c5 £rom the rigidly empirical methods

traditionally associated with �hard science, � such as physics and chem­ istry, if these im'estigators are to do justice t6 their areas of study, In

these areas, psychologists may properly use methods traditionally as.» ciated v.ith history, anthropology or co.·en literary scholarship in their pursuit of truth. In other words, being ·nonscientific� in some areas of psychology is a virtue to Koch, and the area ofpsychotherapy throry u probably one such area (see also Evans, 1989; Van Leeuwen, 1985).

Koch would argue, and 'we would agree, that psychology is an amazingly

broad discipline thal cannot be easily defmed by one model ofscience, and that suffers from confusion and lack of clarity regarding standards for properly scientific methodology (see Koch and Leary, 1985). i nOt necessarily "bad science.· In In summary, then, psychology s

any case, Christians should carefully look at any way of knowing that helps us better understand the human condition, even if that "''aY of knowing does not confornl to some narrow definition of "good sci­ ence.M On the other hand, we must acknowledge that some areas of psychotherapy are neither good science nor good reason, good intu­ ition or anything else; they are rather examp'les of slipshod argumen­ tation and speculation. Some psychology, and some psychotherapy writings, are simply good-for-nothing.

A similar conclusion might

be

drawn about some writings by psychology-bashers, and perhaps even about some of ",'hat passes for Christian theology!

Finally, in response to the charge of syncretism, the key assertion

here is that n i tegr.uion is t he blending of psychology and Christianity.

We simply reject thaI this is the case. We know of no major writers in the area of integration whose �recipe� for integration is to �take equal parts psychology and Christianity and mix in a blender until all you

have left is a sticky. unappealing mishmash of beliefs.� We will admit

that solile Chri5tian psychologiSts doing integration h:wc not been above sloppy bibical l interpretation and farfetched theological specu­ lation. The critics ofinlegration do not ha\'e to look far to find examples of unsubstantiated clinical speculation, sloppy logic, careless biblical ,

interpretation, theological naivete or feideism, and unbridled self.pr" motion. In many of the chaplers to follow where we examine the meriu and drawbacks of therapy theories, we will be forced to criticize state­ ments made by Christian mental health professionals regarding the merits of different approaches. Christians doing integration have de-

30 served much of the criticism they ha\'c received from the ps)'<:hology­ bashers.

Methodology for Christian Appn i..! i evaluating models of counseling and As we have seen, what we need n

ing about our presuppositions, our views psychotherapy is clear think

of humanity, and our moral standards and how to apply these to real �iluations. While we must be careful abOlIl being overly dogmatic and rigid. good evaluation is bmtally honest about the realities of the human condition in all their tragic complexities. We need guidelines on how to think dearly. critically and coura­ geoUSly. The follo\\-ing are the major guidelines we intend to pursue in ' critiquing the theories in this book,

Pf>ilorophu.u _mp"""

We begin with the \·itally important taSk of looking carefully at the philosophical assumptions or presuppositions thal undergird an ap­ proach to counseling. Ideas about human character and personality do not arise in a philosophical vacuum. As Browning (1987, p. 95) has said, �the modem psychologies function within larger contexts of meaning about the WAy the world is." The approaches we will examine vary widely in terms of how explicitly the influence of philosophical 'aSSumptions arc acknowledged. Behavior modifica­ tion has been an easy target for Christian critique over the years because Skinner has been so transparent about his assumptions (see chapter six). The originators of some other approaches have not been so explicit, resulung in the need for careful work in unearthing their presuppositions.

'our colleague al Wheawn, Robert C. Robo:ru, ha$ d<:rivc:d indcpC'ndemly (riteria for

the ev.d..ation ofth�r:iP'l' ..,,,tems which are $imil:or to ow own. Rohens ( I9&'>, 1987) ha'l

argued forwhalhe call, the "Vil'Ulel aPPTl)a(h 10 inu'gr.nion.-He Il:u'U me examination

of an approach to psychotherapy by looking al (he >irtu<:s Ihal the approach nri>"el 10

(1IIti\...le. This it sintilar 10 our criterion of a mooers \ision of ideal humanfl� or

wholeness. Koheru argues in (Urn Ihat each vinue ;s emboedded ;n a 1l<:lwork ofa!lllump­

UoIU thaI he calls the "gnmmar- oflhe >irtlL<: (alluding 10 the way thaI \�rbal idca'l arc

naled in Iinguillic gr.unm:.r ..,'Mellls). Minimally. ihn grammar system includo a c(>nupl of human narurc ($lmilar 10 our crilerion of Ihe view of pc:oouillil}'), an

achif!'o"e virtue (a (hcory of abnonnalilY), and �...., ideal the d"""doP'""n1 of the vinues of we JyStem can be fadlit:l\ed

ellplanation for the biJurc:: fOT how change

loward

(pr....:ription.t fo.- change).

10

111F.. INf};GRAnON �CJfIUSTlA.WT't'AbV PS'fGIOl.OCY

31

No common philosophy unifies the many diverse and varied ap­ proaches. Each has a different view of reality, truth, purpose, per­ sonhood and the like. These assumptions and presuppositions are of crucial importance for the Christian academician, clinician or researcher, especially those that pertain to our notions of person­ hood and philosophy of science. These convictions direct.ly or indirectly affect ever)' phase of science and the people-helping process. In short, theory signilicant.ly affects practice whether or not this relationship is acknowledged.

It might be helpfuJ for the reader to get some sense for the history or

"roots" ofme various theories and models ofpsychotherapy. The TOOts of

the four major traditions--hwnanistic-existential. dynamic, cognitive-�

ha\ioral and famity systems--are duply imbedded in certain world \iews and contrOl beliefs, especially about the narure of persons and the way good science proceeds. In figure 1.1, the readercan see a\'erybriefoutline of the ·parentagc� of the major psychotherapy !o)'SteRU.

I'.&piolob..

' '

� . .,... .

•

.

•

•

•

-

---:.,�- , \ Freud • . -, � .,-- '� "

Jvnt---

. ' .. ' " . , ' " . , • , • . ' . ' . , . . , ' " ,

.

•

,

"

•

•

'

. ' " . • • • ,

._ -

(a.. _hyc hoanolyoi..

1U.in. f.nt.Aim_

' ��

___

..... --

(F""Iy"""S',"""Th!r!pr

I

I

f ! x

'\. 1.1 "-$.1- (l'II16A ."..,.", _ .... , r 0("- . '.,- I•.!• '"

', s....;.

_ ....

11_ C", c" dwSdoaol

A distinctively Christian approach to counseling and psychotherapy will have theological and philosophical underpinnings compatible with Christian faith; this will be rn051 clearly reflected in its notions of personhood and philosophy of science. It will look at th� task of the

MODeRNI'5YCJIOTHERA.PIES

J2

psychotherapist from both eternal and temporal perspectives and will fully acknowledge the reality of the supernatural. Sin and the conse­ quences of the Fall will be taken seriously, aswell as the realityofhuman and supernatural t.'ViJ. MotkI ofPthwoa/ity We must also examine the personality theory or model of humanity

upon which an approach is buill. E\'ery theory must build upon an understanding of what determines human character and action, and these theories vary widely in terms of their understandings of human motivations, personality stnJcture and core characteristics. As Tjcltvcil (1989, p. 1) said, �Models of human beings explicit or implicit. complex or simple, internally consistent or inconsistent, . . . open to change or slatic-shapc society, the actions of c\'cry human being, and every individual's worldview. . . . [They are] part of every psychotherapy session. Our understanding of persons and personhood must be grounded in the worw of Scripture and in Christian experience in me context of confessional communities (Farnsworth, 1985). It is n i adequate to look to the Scriptures and/or religious experience alone to develop one's personality theory. The purpose of Scripture is to present a record of God's redemptive dealings with persons throughout history, to present a plan of sal\r,lIjon and discipleship, and to provide us with the knowl­ edge necessary to guide us into producti\'e life, The Scriptures were never intended to be a textbook of all psychological conditions and disorders, although they should anchor and condition our metaphysi­ cal and ontological assertions about persons and provide a practical foundation for moral guidance, So at the start we begin by asking if the theory of personality is compatible with Christian truth. Further, is it clear yet comprehensive? Does it dojustice 10 what s i known about human behavior and experi­ ence, and does it reflect diverse gender, socioeconomic and sociocul­ tural contexts? Is the pe�nality theory concerned with all dimensions of human behavior and experience cognitive, affective, interpersonal, spirirual, physical and behavioral? (Counseling methodologies often tend to focus on one dimension ofhuman experience, giving otherdimensions short shrift.. Quistiaru, in particular, shou1d expect their theory or theories to respect and acknowledge all dimensions of personhood, and nOI overemphasize any dimension of hwnan experience,) b the theory elegant and parsimonious, gh'en the complexity of the subject? Does it •

•

THEINTF£HATION '"CJIH./)TIANm',\.\Dp:,wCI/OLOGr

JJ

generate seriOWl research and study? Does it directly inform dinical practice and theory? In shon, is the theory valuable at multiple levels of inquiry (i.e., theory. research and practice)?

Model ofAbrwrmolity We should look carefully at a theory's core understanding of human

almormolity. To discuss a theory ofpcflKlnality is usually to presume that

one also understands deviations from normal personality de\'e!op­ ment. To suggest how one can change human action s i to presume that one has some understanding as to tbe processes that explain how it caDle 10 need changing in the first place. How compatible is the vjew of abnormalil}' ",ith the Christian faith? Are core concepts like human accountability, responsibility and sinful­ ne5S compatible ",ith the model? Is faith itself classified a..'i a pathology?

Are the \;nucs that Christians are 10 cultivate and express viewed as abnormal? Is there a balance between pe'Wnal causation of distress ("because of my sins·) and system causation ofdistress (�because I live in a fallen ",'orld")?

Modd ofHN/tII Related to we last point, e'I'ery theory seems 10 have a vision oJhuman wholeness ",'hiel! complements its vie",' of abnormality. To discus�

abnormality and the change OLle intends to work in the client's life is to presume a direction t.hat one is going 10 move in, a goal one is mo\·ing toward. Even theoreticia1l5 who are aiming to be �value neutral" by saying that they are JUSt tryiog 10 decrease pain are working from an m i plicit hypothesis thal minimizing pain is pan of human wholeness. The goals and views of nomlalcy within a particular psychotherapy tradition should be closely examined. What does lhe theory propose the truly healthy individual will be like? Whm are the explicit and implicit notions of maturit}', wellness, holiness, wholeness or health i tertwined being advocated? Methods of therapy are often intimately n with the theory of normalcy of the approach, For instance, a therapist may use emotional catharsis (·discharge�) techniques because the therapist's \;ew of normalcy includes emotional expressiveness as one of the criteria for health. Further, unless theorists or therapists are dear about where they are headed, therapy tends to become directionless and unfocused, heavily affected by whatever popular technique the change-agent has been expo&ed to lately, Such goals need to be explicit

34

MOiJCl/NI'SI'CJLOTllEII.-.p1ES

from the start. Ideally. these should � communicated to clientJi 31 the beginning of therapy. Motkl ofhydIotherapy Next we nced to look at the methods of change themselves to gauge their essential credibility. Some proposed change methods are quite similar to inruitivc or lay under.otandings of the process of growth (e.g., the rational discourse of Rational Emotive Therapy [chapter SC\'en] or the loving support of Person-Cemered Therapy [chapter ten)), while others are $0 radically different as to require substantial support merely to make mem look credible (e.g., the role-playing of Psychodrama or the "body-work� ofBioenergeucs, which we will not be able to cover in this book). Do the counseling processes and techniques provide real resources for healing? Are the techniques proposed ethical and moral? One critical question is me ethical context ofheaJing: Is that context the church or the menral-health profession? Is the clinician seen as a value-neutral technician or as a disciple. shaped by the rilUals and discernment of Christian community (see Dueck, 1986)? As Tan (1987) has observed, a distinctively Christian approach to people-helping will emphasize the primacy of warm. empathic and genuine relationships, stressing the relevance of agape love. Such compassion should extend to the clinician's personal and professional relationships with others. A distinctively Christian approach will take the role of the Holy Spirit seriously, as well as the many spiritual resources a"aHable to the Christian counselor (see chapters fifteen and sixteen). Large contextual factors like familial, socieral, religious and cultural influences will not be minimized, and appropriate community and church resources will be mobilized when necessary. We have to be more than pragmatists (using whatever ... .. orks), being sure to employ only dlOse techniques mal are consistent with biblicaJ truth and the wisdom and discernment of the confessional community. lHmoNtratftl F/fer:tivenns

Fmally, as a matter of Christian stewardship, it behooves us to look. not merely at the five more -conceptual- criteria Ihted above, but also at what the scientific research says about the effe<:ti\'eness of a particular approach. We should add thaiwe are using scientijidn the broad sense discussed earlier. which we take to n i clude the standard empirical methods of traditional American psychology and those nontraditional methods that are \'aJ'iously known as phenomenological, "human-sci-

1TYAND psrcIIOUX;Y THI.: 1N11:.·(;I(AnON a:' CJl Rl sA n....

35

ence� or humanistic (Evans, 1989: Famsworth. 1985; Van Leeuwen, 1985).

Research literature on the empirical evaluation of psychotherapy and counseling is emerging and deserves the .serious consideralion of the .....ould-be Christian peopk'-helper. A full-fledged literature re... iew of effectiveness studies for every approach is surely beyond the scope of the present volume. but we \\ill try at leasl lO provide the readerv.ith a feel for the state oflhc empirical litcrature on each major approach today. Because solid data of any kind are often missing for many of the approachcs. we \\ill put our discussion of demonstrated effectr.'cncss in one section in chapter fifteen. The other fIve criteria will be dis­ cussed in cach chapter. Conclusion

The business ofevaluating psychotherapy theories is very complex, and healthy (bulnol paranoiac) caution s i in order. We arc concerned that the reader recognizes that what at first seem like dear compatibilities l between faith and a particular theory can hide radical incompatibii­ ties. On the other hand, superficial incompatibilities can often distract the Christian learner from perceiving what are actually some rather deep and slriking areas of compatibility between the faith and the theory. To gi\'e twO quick examples: On the one hand, many Christians ha\'e uncritic."\lIy accepted Rogcrian person
36

sionatcty about the validity of their positions. Not only do we need to see the facts fOT ourselves, but we need to get to know how othen see me facts. and we can only get thai sense by reading their writings or by ta1king to them directly. If "'"e waru the whole truth, we will let others tell us why they see what we don't see and why they hear what we don '( hear. Good C\wuation will be done in the context of dialog and community. But genuine listening is risky. If we really listen, we may have to adjwl our view of the facts, revise our sense of their relevance. qualify our interpretations of them and modulate our feelings about them. But the truth about facts s i that if we look at them through our 0"''1) �s only. we may miss their meanings. And if we look at them with other people, people we respect and listen to, we might have a better sense of seeing them right and a much better chance of making good judgmenu about their relev-.rnce and appropriateness (Smedt=s. 1987, pp. 4{).42).

For Further hading

Brownn i g, D. (1987). &ligitlw lhmJ.ghl and I� modtn! PSJchoJogia. Philadelphia: Fortress. Though ",Titlen from a nonev.rngelical Chri5tian perspective and requiring much theological sophistication to fully digf:$(" this is an extremely valuable work eltploring the religious impliCiition$ of mOSt of the major therapy 5}'5t.eIllS we will examine in this book.. CoUiru, G. (1989). Can JIN trusI psycholog,' Dov.ners GrO\-e. IL: InlerVarsity PreMo

A readable and reasonable fC$ponse 10 the �psychology-bashers.w

Evans, C.

( 1977) . Pmnving 1M /NI=n. Grand Rapid\, Ml: Baker. Evans, C. (1989). Wutknn andhU lIIQnrn:ss in fJJJdwlorJ. Grand Rapids, MI; Baker. The ""ork of Evans in exploring the shape ofa Christian understanding of the socia1 sciences is the most wldcrstandable and important available for the evangelical Christian reader. Hurding, R. (1985). Roots lind sJwots. London: Hodder and Stoughton. This is an excellent work attempting the same SOrt of appntisal we eng..ge in here. Hurding's book differs in offering somewhat more condensed l or therapies. We will offer much critiques ora slightly more abbreviated ist more cO\-erage of pastoral and "Christianw counseling approaches. Roots i Britain, and we will qUOte throughout from the and.sJwou was published n Britillh edition. The book ,",WoIS more recently published in the U.S. under the title 'Thehwofht'aling (Zondervan). Jones, S. (Ed.). (1986). PsycMJog, and lhe Chri.Jlian failh. Grand Rapids, MI:

Balr..er.

A readable sampler of ways to approach integration in the \'ariou5 sub-

nl£.lN1'f:CRATlONOFCJIRlSTIANrrYANDPSYCIIOLOCI'

37

disciplines of academic psychology. Koch, S., & Leary, D.

(Eds.). (1985) .

McGraw-Hili. A massi\'e and challenging

\ ernlu? 0/fnJchoIogy as leiena. New Yorl.:

...

O\'crview of the Statu! of psychology as a diS(:i­

pUne. Probably not readable by lhe nonpsychologist, it has n i adequate

covcrage of applied psychology. c:spttially the area of ptyChotherap)'.

Van Leeuwen, M. (1985). TIIe� inp"yclwlogy. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans. One of the more comprehensil'e altempl( to critique the range of the · paradigms of eontemporary psychology (e.g.• behaviorism. cognitive J>S)"" chology, ele.) from a Christian pcl'5ptttivc. Essential reading. Woltcrstorff, N.

(1984).

RtaJ
within flu bounds of rtligifJn

(2d ed.). Grand

Rapids. MI: Eerdman5. A readable and intriguing discussion of contemporary philosophy of sci· ence from a Christian pe�pecth·e.

References

Adams,]. (1970). Ccmpdnlf to tounMl. Grand Rapids. Ml: Raker. Adams,J. (1979). Mortlhon fflkmptiqn: A �(JjCJtriJtian toullsdillg. Philli� burg, Nj: Presbyterian and Refomled. Allen, O.

Bobgan.

(1985). l'hillJSCf!hyf()l' utUimfmuiing I�. Atianta:John Knox. M. and Bobgan, D. (1979). The pJ]cholagiwl W6J� Jpiritutll WtIJ·

Minneapolis: Bethall)' Fellowship. Bobgan, M. and Bobgan, O.

(1987). Psychohmsy! The PJ](/wlogicai sldllairm 0/

ChriJti.anity. Santa Barbara, CA.: Eastgate. Browning, D. (1987). &ligiOlts thougnt and the IfIOtkmpsyr1uJlogir.J. Philadelphia: Fontess.

and fflUOII (0. W)'Qn, Trall5.). Philadelphia: Westminster. (Original work. published 1958). Dueck., A. (1986,january). The ethical context of healing. Paper presented at Bnmner, E.

(1946).

�Iitm

the]. G. Finch lectu� series at FullerThcologic.al Seminary, Pasadena, CA­ bans, C.

(1977). Prr:sm.ring the pmon. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker. E\'an5, C. (1989). WisdOlll and hllllltlfllWSJ inpsycholorJ. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker. Fam5wonh. K. (1985) . U7w.lt-htm1id integral/1m. Grand Rapids, MI; Baker. Foster, ]., and Ledbetter. M. (1987). Christian anti·psycholog)' and the ,den-

tific method. Journal (JjPsycluJkJr;J and Th«Hoo. 15, 10-18.

Gre:idanw, 5.

(1982). The use of the Bible in Christian scholarship. ChriJti.al'l

Sdtolarl RM#:w. JJ, 1M-147.

Hunt. D.

(1987). &yond uduaiqn. Eugene, OR: Han.-est House Hunt. D. a11 d McMahon, T. (1985). Tlu HdllaiOf1 (Jj ChriJtianily. Eugene, OR: Han'est House.

j(:e\.'e$, M. (1976). lTjcholcg] and ChriJtianity; 17Kviewboth IMJ'-I. Downen Grm-e, ll..: InterVanity Preas.

jones, S. (1986). Relating the Christian faith to psychology. In 5.jon« (Ed.), hjdwlogy and tlu ChristiOIl jaith (pp. 15-34). Grand Rapids, M1: Baker. Kilpauick, W. (1985). T1u em/JtftJI's new dctlw: Tlu ntWd truth about the ntlll JwJchoIof;J. We5tches�r, ll..: CrolSWlly.

38 Kirkpau-ick, L., and Spilka, B. (1989, August). Trealmcnt of religion in psychology texts. Paper presented al the annual convention of the Ameri­ can Psychological Association, New Orleans. Koch S. (1981). 11lc nature and limits of psychological knowledge. Amtriam P$JclwWgiJl, 36, 257-269. Koch S., and Leary, D. (Em.) (1985). A cmtury ofJnJeJwlogyc.ucinut. New York: McG""....HiII. Lo\.inger. R. (1984). Wming with rtiigiOUJ � I,. therapy. New York: Ja50n Aronson. Neill. S. (1984). Christianfaith and otMfailhs.. Downen Gro\'c, IL: InterVarsity Press. Roheru, R. (1985). Carl Rogers and Christian \irlUn.Joumal of� and TMoIcgy, 13(4), 263-273, Robcru, R. (1987). P$)'Chothcrnpeuticvinucsand the grammaroffaith.Joumal of �andT�. H(!'!), 191-204. Smedes, L. (1987). Clw;us. New York: Harper &: Ro...... Spilka, B., Hood, R., and Gorsuch. R. (1985). TM /MJchoJogy oj rtligion: A1I mpirirol approtuh. Englewood Cliff,. NJ: Prentice-Hall. Stoker, H. (1971). Rttonnoitering the lhcory of knowledge of Professor Dr. Comelius Van Til. In E. Gcehan (Ed ). Jmutllem and .�Ihtru (pp. 25-70) . Phillipsburg, NJ; Presb)'lCrian and Reformed. SW'.o.ggart.J. (1986. November). Christian psychology? TheEvangrWl, pp. 4-9. Tan. S. (1987). Inll
,

.

2 VIEW A CHRIST OF PERSONS

ur task is to critically evaluate the major secular psycho.­ therapy theories in liglll ofChlistian revelation and fai m. But what is me Christian view by which we are going to grade the secular psychotherapy approaches? Is there a Christian personality tJ1(:ory hidden in the pages of the Bible? The purpose of this ehaptLOf is to highlight what we believe the Christian Scriptures assert about human beings. as these beliefs will be lhe backdrop or plumbline affdinsl which all else will be evaluated.

It

is our contcntion thaI LIle Scriptures and Christian theology do not

teach a theory of personality ali understood by contemporary psychol­

ogy. These sources teach us a great deal morc than thaL They teach us the way to eternal fellowship with the CreaLOr-God and

e � .. erything .... -e

need LO know about ourselves and our predicament to obtain salvation and to grow

as persons, They record God's redemptive dealings v.ith

40 his people throughout the ages. But they teach us les.s than we need to know to understand why individual persons have the characteristics they do (for m i W1ce, why a particular person struggles with obsessive tendencies Of another is blessed with incredible strength ofcharacter) . And they teach us less than we need to know in order to help many individuals mo\'c beyond the pain and confusion they feel. What the Scripture does leach aboUl persons lacks the specificity and precision necessary for qualifying either as a formal scientific theory of personality or as a clinic.uly useful heuristic model for underst:mding personality functioning. ('7he general judgment of theologians has been thai the Bible gives us no scientific teaching on man, no anthropology, which should or could concur .... 1th scientific anthropological research on man� [Beri:ouwer.

1962. p. 194)}. Even

in ancient times. pastoral theologians found it necessary to develop models for undentanding personality that were buih UJX>n, but went beyond, scriptural n!\'elation in order to develop guidelines for pastor­ al care. In doing lhis, Christian pastoral thinkers ha\'e frequently turned to contemporary nonreligious5(;holarship about dimensions of personhood to construct more completc models of ministry (Clebsch

1975; Oden, 1984). While some secm to regard this as heresy (e.g., Adams. 1979), as discussed in the previous chapter, we and Jaekle,

reg-Md this as a strength as long as the distinctives of the Christian faith are preserved and g1\'en prexminence.

But if we are not searching for a personality theory, what n i the Scriptures is it reasonable to expect to lind? In brief, we believe that our foray into theological and biblical anthropology will give us the essenUai foundation for a more true and more complete undentand­ ing of persons by giving

Wi

"control belief.s� (Woherstorff,

1984) or

presuppositions. These Control beliefs are the Mgivens,M the assump­ tions that conlrOl or shape all other thought. We can then use the� control beliefs to build a theory of personality ,,-jlh greater Christian distincth·eness.

Before embarking on this task, ....·e would endorse a number ofbasic

hermeneutical prinCiples (from Greidanus,

1982) that undergird or­

thodox biblical interpretation. First. since God is the Creator, !.here can be no ultimate conflict between knowledge from special revelation (what the Bible says) and creation (also known as Mgeneral revelation, � what nature sal's). There can and often ha! been, however, conflict bel\\'een interpretations of 5pecial re\'elation and interpretations about the

facts of the created

41

order. In such cases of conflict. !.he interpretation of either special or general !"e'.,elation can be wrong. or possibly both. Second, �the Bible is the Word of God addressed to the hean of man6 (Greidanus, 1982, p. 140). Hence a sincere submission to the Lord who speaks through the Scriptures and s i revealed n i them enables us to see reality, howC!\'er imperfectl)" from God's perspective, the ani)' proper perspective. Special revelation is sptcial. and that is why Calvin suggested that the Scriptures can function as spectacles that correct our vision of God's creation when sin has distorted our under­ standing. Third, the Bible is a historical book written first ofall to a panicular people in thcircuhure at a cenain time, answering their questions and meeting their needs. Thus the biblical message to us today cannot be understood properly without understanding lits historical and cultural context. With a proper app�ciation of these factors, we can conrl­ denlly expect that wc will hear God's voice speak to us !hrough his words to ancient peoples. Fourth, the Bible was written in nonscientific, cvcryday language that somctimes used (or assumed) commonly held �scienti£ic� con­ cept<; of that timc but which we nm.' know to be fal�. But thi� does not mean that the Bible teaches those concept<;. For example, Exodus 20:4 ("You shall nOI make for yourself a graven image, or any likeness of anything . . . th
ogy.

Similarly, many of !he verses often cited as teaching formal p!>)'cho­ logical concept<; cannOI responsibly be interpreted in that way. The folk psychology in the \'crses is merely a vehiclc by which to teach the main point of the verse. For instance. Paul's use of �spirit, sow and bodyW ( I Thess 5:23) connOles the whole person, every aspeCI orthe belie\'er, and cannot necessarily be taken to mean that Paul was authoritatively teaching a tripartite (three-part) vicw of personhood (see further discussion of this matter later in this chapter) , The danger hcre is expecting from Scripture something God did nOt intend to provide. Fifth, biblical passages must be understood in light of the author's intention or meaning, and in the light of the totality of the biblical revelation. It is especially important to remember that obscure or unclear biblical passages are 10 be interpreted in light ofclearer, mo�

M(){)lo;/lSPSI'CJIOTIf1:RAPIf:S

42

unequivocal passages, and deference musl � gi\'cn to the cumulative weight of many passages over onc seemingly dear lext if there i$ apparent conflict. Humanity in It.! Created Stale

IntftligWility, Meaning and Value' �IIl the beginning Cod created the heavens and lhe earth� (Ceo 1:1). The historic Christian doctrine of creation

ex nihilo (creation from or

out of nothing) is derived from the first chapters of the Bible and hall assumed a place of priority in all the hislOric creeds (e.g., the Apostles Creed: MI believe in Cod, the Father Almight)'. Maker of hea\'cn and eanh), The first biblical information we have about humanity occurs later n i the creation story. where we find, "'Then God said, 'Let us make man in our image. in our likeness'" (Ceo 1:26). Humanity and the entire created order were made by the intentional actions of the Sovereign

God of the universe. Far from being the chance products of blind causal forces. with lives that are thereby unintelligible and meaningless, we were created intentionally. Our understanding of ourseh'es begins here. Our basic identity .... ill remain confused until we see oW""Selves as part of God's creation, In his book Maker offI�vt:n and Earth, theologian Langdon Gilkey (1985)

examines

the myriad implications of this cenu-al Christian

docuine. Prominent among these implicatiolU is the notion that being created, rather than having simply come to exist by naturalistic proc­ esses operating without purpose or meaning. is the foundation of in­ telligibility and meaning for our lives. Our lives are intelligible precisely because we can ha\'c fait.h that our existence is the result of the actions of an all.lmo....ing. intelligent God. Our lives have meaning because God meant or intended for us to be. His plan or purpose remains so\'ereign throughout history. In addition to having meaningwe accrue vallui n allcast three ways. First, being the creation of the all-perfect Lord imputes value to us in the same way that all creation has value; we are the work of the Lord, and all of God's works have y.LJue, It would be contempt toward God

(0 suggest that any of his creations are ....ithout value (as is said in our vernacular, "God doesn't make junk") . Second, we have special value in that we arc the ouly aspeCt of creation specifically said to be crealed i n God's "image. � Finally, and gettiuga bit ahead of ourselves. we have

,

,

.... CHRlSTI:I..!'" \'IEWOf'I'f.RSONS

43

value because God chose to make his Son a human like us and to die for us, Surely, God would not waste the life of his dear Son on be­ ings that are without value, and ....'C further gainc..."'C.i value through the acts ofthe Incamation, the death and resurrection ofJesus Chri§t, Thus God's mighty works both gh'e us wJue and show that we had and have value. These realities form the basis for our psychological perception of value. As one final implication of being created, we should note that if we were made by God out of nothing, then we alit different from and separalLJrom God, though we are continually dependent on him as the ultimate ground of our very being. As Gilkey ( 1985, pp. 581T.) has notc...-d, it is an undeniable implication ofEastern moni5m (the doctrine that the uni\'erse is of one indivisible essence; C\'erything is God) and pantheism (God is everything) that humans are part of God and thus finiteness (being less than God) and individuality (being a creature separate from others, including God) are illusory and evil. For Christians, separateness from God and others is real and good. We belong in relationship 10 God and others, bm this relatedness is not meant 10 consume and destroy our separateness, Union .ith God is a theme of Scripture, but nowhere are we taught that we cease h.:ing ourselves in the process of this wlion, As in marriage tWO persons become onc without the loss of thcir personal identities, so it is .... ith our union wilh God, The image of heaven as the time when we will mcrge and become one with the Godhead, losing our individuality in the proce!iS, is a l>cr·version of Ihe Christian view of heaven; it is based on non-Christian Eastem religions, Such thinking is pervasive in many of the �New Age views so common today. ft

The lmo.ge ofGod

"''hat does it mean to be created �in God's image'? This complex question has been the subject of some or the most dh'erse biblical and theological study in the history of Christian thought. As summarized by McDonald (I982) and Pla.:ntinga (I988), the concept has, o\'cr time, been interpreted to mean many differcnt thinbtS, and interpreters ha\'e taken fundamentally different ap­ proaches (0 Lhe problem. Somc have taken the approach of asserting that we are the image of God because ""hat we are mirrors what God is. A widely argued version of this tradition is the argument thai we image God ill being pn-ronal beings. Another widely accepted version of this view is the notion thai we have an immaterial, spiritual soul and

" lhw arc at our core spiritual beings like God.

Oilien emphasize the work. or activities that we can perfonn that

mirror God's work. TIle most common form arthis view focuses on the

faCt that we exerci� responsible dominion over a portion of the universe,just as God exercises dominion over it all. God rules over all, and has designated persons to rule over the earthly component of his kingdom as his stewards (Cell I:28) as a direct reflection of his own aClhity. Another example would be the assertion mat we image Cod when we manifest his perfect virtues. In

so

doing we function in the

world as a manifestation of God's characterJUSt as ht. Son, lhe perfect image of the Father. did and does. An e'\'cn broader presentation of this idea would say that we image God in living out the gospel message in our iw!$, l through suffering M well as triumph. Authentic life is to image God ever more closely by becoming like Jesus Christ, the expressed image of Father. In our rufJering we are called to be open to the wounds of the world. We "''ere created with the capacity to feel the pain of me other. and to "weep with those who weep." In some profound and mysterious way we have the potential to be wounded by the wounds of others and thus reflect the work of God (adapted from Woherstorff, 1987, p. 86). Yet another approach points out mat we image or mirror God in our possession ofcertain distinct capacities that set us olTfrom the rest of creation. The classic Refonned teaching that human beings image God in their capacity for Tationality

and momlity is an example

(these

two capacities will be very important as we engage in our dialog with the therapy theories). Another \'ersion is that of Jewett ( 1975) who i age of God in being foUo",'ed the lead of Barth in locating the m diversified genders, male and female (Cen 1 :27), who can relate to and become one willi one another; in this union, we can bear fruit (pr\? creation) in a refle1:tion of God's creativity which flows from his

innerrelatedness. In exercising this capacity for relatedness, "''e mirror

God's diversity within unity as manifested within the Godhead.

As McDonald (1982) and Plantinga ( 1988) have argued, it seems

judicious at this time w not fight for an exclusive meaning oflhe image, but rather to conclude that being created in the image of God means

all this and more. All Plantinga put it, 'The image of God may plausibly be said w consist . . , in the whole set of these (and many more) likenesses. . . . The image will thus emerge as a rich, multi-faceted reality. comprising acts, relations, capacities, vinues, dispositions. and even emotioD5� (p. 52).

45

eo..pmmd &ing<

A debate has raged for centuries aooul lhe essential elements of our identity. There ace those who argue thal the Scriptures leach a �tripar� lite (three-part) understanding of humanity. Dra\\ing on such verses w

as 1 TheSl'ialonians 5:23 ("spiril. soul and bod() , this view suggests thai we aTe fonned of three distinct pan,: the physical body \\'ilh its pa.
four parts to the person based on Mark 12:30 (heart, soul, mind and strength) or a different three elements (hean, soul and might) based on Deuteronomy 6:5, or only twO elements (50ul and body) based all Matthew 10:28. With this diverse presentation ofdhisions in these and many other Scriptures, we are driven to think theologically rather than literalistic­ ally on the biblical evidence. Based on such reasoning. McDonald

(1982. p. 77) concludes that the weight of the C'oidence seems to favor i . and the bipartite side. Through our physical �ing, we are placed n are part of, nature, but by \inue of our immaterial being,

Vie

have a

cenain degree offreedom from the temporal order and are responsive to and responsible before God. Three m i ponam facets of this matter deserve special emphasis.

First, though the biblical data do suppon a bipartite view, the biblical emphasis is always on the unity of the person. N McDonald (1982, p.

78) says, persons are "constituted of a unity of these I:WO entities, � and i not true that one aspect (the soul-spirit or the body) is the hence it s real person and the other part an add�n. We are embodied soul-be­ ings. This is why the term lripartiu, and nOt the term

didwtomqw, was

used for this \iew; the latter term might imply that the two elements are fundamentally opposed and irreducibly separate and nonmteract­ n i g. The former term, howe\'er, implies that while the lWO elements are distinguishable in the human person, full human identity is vested in

M()I)#'.RNI'SYCHOTHl-:JIAPJES

46

the union of the two aspects. We can never say, "That was my body that did that, not my spirit. � or vice versa. Often biblical words for the various asp«ts of our being are used i a to refer to the whole person from a certain pcrsp«tivc. But !.here s (cuter to our persons, and biblically the term

luart (d. Mt

15:18; U.

16: 15; Acu 14: 17: 2 Cor 5: 12) is most consistently used to describe this core of what psychologists and philosophers often

caU our self. The

.scriptural enlphasis on marl teaches us the importance of understand­ ing ourselves as a unity. Second, this recognition of two distinct essences cannot be used to make a hard differcmjation in value between the

t¥.'O

c.s.sem::es (most

Christians are exposed to teachings emphasizing soul over body) . In spite of passages suggesting that our temporal existence is of lesser imponance (e.g., Ml 10:28: 2 Cor 12:3). ultimately people are their bodies and soul-spirits in unity. The value oftxKiily existence is unques­ tionably assumed in the creation Incarnation

(God made us bodily beings), the

(God became a bodily being) and in our resurrection

(through which we will remain bodily beings. albeit perfected bodies. for etcrnil}'). As McDonald said, "'Thus does the biblical view of man represent him as consisting of twO principles. the cosmicaJ and the holy. which unite the individual into a free and personal oneness of being"

(1982, p. 78). Finally, one tendency that can be quickl}' noted an10ng secular (and Christian) thinkers s i that of exaggerating one end or the other of our compound natures (Evans.

1990). Some so emphasi7.e or exaggeratc

the imm;uerial side of our being as to deifY humanity and deny that we are inevitably conditioned by our physical existence. We will see this tcndency among the humanistic psychologists (chapter ten). The other extreme is to emphasize or exaggerate our temporal existence so as to make us mcre physical machines that arejust another biological phenomenon caught up in the grand mechanistic universe. Beha\;or.d and classical psychoanalytic thought make this mistake (chapters three and six). A Christian view of the person balances these twO diverse aspeCtS of

personhood, rcspt-'Cting that we are both emboditdspirits and embodied spirits, embodied souls and ensou](:d bodies.

Pe,sonhood and Agency

As we pul together the diverse elements that we have uncovcred SO far concerning our esscnlial natures, we begin LO see an emerging pattern

.�

47

OIHlSJ'IANI'Il:W(»'PHlSONS

of humans as persons with capacities and qualities unique among the created order. One of the premier capacilies of personhood meriu special attention, that of responsibility. limited freedom. or agency. Evans

(1 977, p. 144) put i t well in saying thaI. �human beings are

fiot and foremost agents. Their lives do not merely consist ofa suing ofhappenings orevenlS. butconstitllte a series ofchoices and decisions about what they \\i11 do. " C. S. Lewis ( 1 963, p. 50), in discussing this matter, said, �Yet. for us rational creamres. to be created also means 'to

be made agents.' We have nothing thai we ha\'e not received; but parI of what we have received is the po\\'er of being something more than receptacles. �

To be a human being is to reflect God in our capacity to act responsibly, which logicallycntails the capacity to ha\'e acted ollier than we did. It is not necessary LO a Christian view offreedom to argue that a person always and in every instance reacts \\ith complete and un, bounded freedom. Some events in our Ih'cs may be

so

po\\'erful as to

cause us to react involuntarily, as may occur when a young woman sexually abused since chiJdhood reacts with fear and revulsion when

approached by an aggressive young man interested in a date. In such instances. she may have practically no freedom to respond as she might rationalI}' choose. AI other times, we may be characterized as ha\ing limited freedom, as when the abused woman has struggled with and refleCled on her experience and can make some choices or thought and action as an adult that will at least panially reshape her responses to men, Finally. there may be some instances wherein people act .... ; t11 almost total freedom, when they have few powerful rorces impinging on their choices and they freely choose their actions. A pastor whose marriage is relati\,c1y stable bUl who chooses to ha\'e an affair to experience the excitement of rebellion against "rules and regulations­ might be such an example. 'nle Christian view of persons requires lhat people ha\'c some responsibility in life, not that we al",,'3.YS act without innuence or constraint. Precisely how this innuence interacLS \\ith human respon­ sibility and agency is a profound m}'stery. TIle fact that we are

so

profoundly innuenced by our biological inheritance, our families, our communities, our cultures and by the idiosyncratic events that happen in the course of lire only adds to the mystery, HUmiln Motivations The Bible gives no direct message about the nature or human motjva-

MOOERNPSYCJIOTIIEJ/APlJ:S

48

lion, but thai does not mean that we are left drifting on this important point. We find it highly inslrUcth'e to study carefully the first two chapters of the Bible to sec the tasks that the first persons were assigned in lhe beginning. If we believe thai God created us in a perfect match for the role that we were intended to fiJI in the garden, then perhaps part ofthe matching would be that we are "motivated� al a fundamental level to live out the tasks assigned to us. In Genesis I :26 we read that we were made LO ruk over all of creation. We y,lere also made male and female. and in being blessed by

God, we were n i structed to be "fruitful and increase in number� (I :28). God then repeated the nstruction i thai we arc to rule over all living lhings, plant and animal. In Genesis 2 the charge to rule reoccurs in the instTuction to cultivate and keep the Garden of Eden (2:15).

Funher, Old Testamem scholars poim out the addilional significance of Adam naming the animals. since naming was a function ofauthority in ancient times, of one who owns or controls. In the creation of E\'e, we learn that God himselfuttered the words th
ma.n to be alone" (2:18). We learn that it was God's cre�uional intent to prO\�de a paruler for the man, one for whom he W"dS to scpamte from

his family, to whom he was to cleave and with whom he W".iS to become one flesh.

Two themes emerge. The first is the theme of mponsibk dominion.

Humans were meant to rule in God's behalf. Our vocalions, our callings, are a primary vehicle through which we rule. Even seemingly

mundane work stich as gardening is a manifestation ofour capacity for exercising dominion. We are God's stewards in this world, and all pef50IlS arc meant to live om their Godlikeness in exercising responsi. ble dominion over their part of the created order. Our contention is that this command entailed a human need for purposeful activit)' n i

i e, a need for meaningful work and the realization of purpose outside lf of ourselves

.

The second theme s i that of kwingrtltilldlU.U. God related to himself before we were created (God said to himself, �Lel us make man�). We image God in his n i ner oneness by our capacity to become one with another who is separate and different from us, our spouse. Our rela­ tional capacity is abo reflected in the rich poss ibilities of celibate

friendship, through which the single person can live a life of Im'e and sharing in the community of the people of God. Such relatedness with the brothers and sisters is as

"ital

for the married person

as

for the

single. We al$O image Cod in having the capacity for procreation. a

A CHRJSTfM' \'/EW U'P91SQ,';.l

49

reflection of God's much more profound capacity for creativity
Though we were created for dominion and relatedness, we managed to pervert bow capadties in we Fall, First. y,'e were gi\'en the task of accountable dominion o\'er the earth and were given me freedom and the abilities to discharge mose responsibilities, But there were limit! to the dominion marked by God, and we \iolated those guidelines in prideful disobedience. Second, though created to be in loving relation­ ship y,ith we Father, we beu-a)'ed his faithfulness and love toward us with our rebellion and deceitfulness, We betrayed the 100
50

MODERNPS)'CHCflHl:RAPl£$

to God, .,·:e became willful, accQunl;tble rebels against God, and as

(1979, p. 78) said, Kal that moment God'� scepter of glory became his gavel ofjusuce. M Hubbard

This is seen as unpopular and harsh language in cenain evangelical

circles, but biblic-d1 realism takes sin seriously, and we must do the same.

ik<:ause we are fallcn and under divine wrath. we became alienated frolll God and disoriented within ourselves twin faccL5 of the Fall . As Peck

(1983) has so capably written, we are Mpeoplc of the lie," as is

"a}'i we deal with money. sex and especially evident in the unhealthy .... power

(FOSler, 1985). We all have a rather predictable LCndency to

de£civc ourselves and others. and often attempt to deceive our Creator. Perhaps the most powerful literary rendering of this capacity and i C. S. Lewis's tendency for self-deceit s

(1956) brilliant novel Till We

Have Faca, n i which the main character. who had spent her whole life

justifying her actions, realizes her tmreadiness lO confront her Judge and asks rhetorically, "How can they meet us face to face ti l l .... ' e have faces?� (p,

294), In other words, how can we meet God face to lace

when we spend so much ofour ti"es decehing ourselves about who and what we really are and hiding our true faces from ourscn'es and God? The divine wrath thai we are under is not only an expression of God's justice and dignity; it is an expression of his love. Where such V'dSt capacity for fellowship exists, the capacity for hurt is enonnollS, not unlike that of a broken marital CQ\'cnanL �Whal we were made to do and what we were besl at doing are now our sharpesl and dearest failures� (Hubbard,

1979, p. 79).

1M Naturr of Si"

Sin (J.f slate and act, Sin is dealt with in vcry complex ways in the Scrip­ lures, and getting a dear handle on this slippery concept is difficult. Christians often think of sin as i.solated acts that ,iolale moral stan­ dards. In the Gospels sin is presemed as wiIIful disobed ience (Mc­ Donald,

1982, p. 8), But left by itself, this \iew becomes a legalistic

definition of sin that can trivialize it, Sin also refers to a state of being. Individual sins testify that we have a -sin nature,� which predisposes us to individual acts of ,iolation

(cr. Mk

7:20-23, which states that indi\idual acts proceed out of a heart of corruption). A.� Bloesch (1984. p. 1012) against God's law

sialed, �Sin s i nOt just a conscious transgression of the law but a debilitating ongoing State of enmity with God." Yct sin is C\'cn marc than a disposition in our natures: it is �a power thal holds us in

51 bondage� (Morris.

1986, p. 57). Paul especiall), among the New Testa­

ment writers seem."l at urnes to rcitysin asa transpcrsonal �force�acting against God and his purposes (cf. Rom 6--7 ). So sin is at oncc acts of transgression, a nature or disposition, and a force in opposition to Cod.

RebtUi01l (It anxitty �Whal is the flaLUre of our sinfulness? Why do "'C

commit sins and/or have a sinful nature? The classic orthodox answer to this question has been to highlight our human rebelliousness against

God. Bloesch (1984, p. 1012) states that Min Reformed theology. the corc of sin is unbelief. . . . Hardness of hean, which is closely related to unbelief, . . . means refusing to repent and belie\� the promises of God (Ps 95:8; Heb 3:8, 15; 4:7), It connotes . . . slUbborn unwillingness to open ourseh'es to the love of God

(2 ehr 36: 13; Eph 4: 18).M In this

fonnulation sin is a culpable rejection br humans of their rightful submission toGod'ssovereignty, II isa willful abuse ofthe freedom God impaned to us, TIle other major current understanding of the nature of sin might be characterized as -nt»Qrthodox." Originaung with Niebuhr and lillich, this view suggt:st� that sin originates in the "union between man's

de�ndcnce as a

crearure and his frec spiritual lifc" (Gilk.ey. 1985, p. 231). Confronted v.;th the awesome responsibility ofmanaging

the tension betv.cen our human finiteness and conungency (depen­ dence upon God for our yery existcnce), on

the one

hand, and our

capacity for freedom and transcendence, on the other, we experience anxiety of an existenlial nature. We don't ....wt to be dominated by our temporal existence. but neither dowe want ule responsibility ofchoice. The righteous response to this dilemma is to balance the tcnsion and choose to live in humble submission to the Creator as a dependent being with responsible choice. But the sinful response is to evade the human responsibility of managing th.is tension by eithcr denying our freedom and living life dominated by UIC can.'S of Utis .....orld (plunging oneself into sensuality wiul thc cry "I

can '( help

myself," for example),

or denying our dependence all Cod and trying to become gods unto

ourselves (thus rebelling a�,linsl God's la.... '$ and saying, "No one is

going to Icgislate my life for me!"). Bolh ofulcse imbalanced responses are reg-Mded as sin, as both shrink from responsibly living om life in the way Cod created i t 10 be. There are actually many other understandings of sin (see Bloesch,

1984). ubention theology. for example, rightly recognizing that sin can and often does become insututionalized, emphasizes the exploit­

alive, oppressive, greedy narure of corporate sin. And

IIllUlY

of these

52 views are nOl mUlUally exclusive; it is not hard, for instance, to see the Refonned and nc()-()rthodox views as complementary truths.

A Christian understanding ofsin that is truly biblical must maintain a balance between seeing sin as a violation oflaw and as a violation of

relationship. of sin as n i dividual and sin as corporate, of sin as driven

by rebellion and sin as dri\"en by anxiety, of sin as something we are in bondage to and are yet responsible for.

Moral roi4 natu.ral euil and jillitll.tU. Ethicists commonly make the distinction between moral and natural evil. Moral C\il is the result of moral choice such as intcntionaJ theft, for instance. Some thing!, though. are bad, but are not the result of a culpable choice. The accidental injury ofa young child who falls down a set of stairs is such a natural evil, as arc most instances of disease, decay and death. They may be no one's fault, but they are bad nevertheless. We can also cfutinguish moral and natural evil from our finitw:k, our limitedness as human beings. Our human limitations exist because we are nOI gods, and thus finitude existed

in

creation prior LO either

moral or natur.tl evil. There is much that is beyond our possible reach physically, mentally. emotionally and spiritually. Adam could not run a lwo-minllle mile, will immediate emotional changes, know the future or in anyway exceed the capacities God had given him. Humans must confront their finitude and achieve some reconciliation .... ith their limitations. Many imitations l are not flaws or sins; they are simply the limits of Lhe raw material from which we are to forge who we are and

who .... e. are to become.

These distinctions become important when sorting out our under­ standing of human problems. Some human difficulties are due exclu­

i s

vely

'11 , sometimes that of to human moral c\il. sometimes our 0....

. deceive our.seh'cs and engage in others, but most often both. If ....e

immoral behavior, we will bear the consequences. But many human problems are essentially natural evils rather than moral evils. Chemical brain imbalances appear to be predisposing facton in such disorders as manic-depressive illness, and are probable facwrs in other serious disorders. Not limited to biochemical pro!;) . lems, natural evil also occun; when people endure deprived or trau­ matic childhood environments and so suffer psychologically in adulthood for what they failed to recej..·e as children. Finally, .....e may experience problems beause of our finitude ....ith­ out that problem being a sin. The college student struggling with the

difficulty of making decisions about careers is confronting the reality

A alRJ�TlAN �1EWOl.'n-:JiSONS

53

of her finitude-no one knows the answers to all the questions one could ask about careen and the future, and il is no sin nOI to know these answen and to struggle with the decision. The malter gets more complex when we begin 10 interrelate moral and natural evil and fmitude. Some can have problems because of the moral evils n i flicled on them. For n i stance, research suggests that an extremely high percentage of persons \
1988). Such persons have been victimized by the mardi evils

inflicted on them, but their adult psychological troubles may ha\<e originated from their childhood overreliance on dissociath'e defense mechanisms (the splitting of part of one's consciousness off as a way ofcoping), which began al an early age because no other defenses were available to respond to those moral evils. The coping mechanism of dissociation might be seen as a result of human finitude, and the overrle\oclopment of that capacity might be seen as a naturn.1 evil resulting from the child never having been helped to de\'elop other coping mechanisms. We can also respond with mora] evil to the occurrence of natura]

�il (e.g., cursing God because a disastrous storm destroyed your home) or to our finitude (e.g., plunging into emy and bitterness because onc has not been blessed with physical beauty or robust health). Johnson

(1987) suggested the designation of "moral fauh� to de­

scribe instances where both moral evil and "weakness" (his ternl for what we are callingfiniludt) are involved. We prefer a thret"'Componem designation as developed above, but his concepl of moral fault is a good one that suggests that often, perhaps almost alwa)'S. probh:ms invoh'e all three components. We must also mention another

significant instance of moral e\il, that oCthe active opposition against God's purposes and gOCKIness by the �forces of wid:.edness� and darkness (Epn

6:12).

Satanic and

demonic evil are real, as we are becoming increasingly aware in our time. Police officials in many communitiesa:rc encountering ever more brazen criminal acts committed in the name ofSatan. Psychopathology researchen are finding occult torture and oppression to be among the crimes commill.ed in child-abuse

cases

and in the backgrounds of a

significant number of the severely psychologically impaired. Inpatient

lreaunent programs for children and adults involved in Satanism �

beginning to appear on the professional scene. The personal evil of

the supernatural forces in rebellion against Cod must be taken seri­ ously by all Christian menlal-health workers. Yet influence of Satanic forces must not be limited to the obviously occull. Shuster

( 1 987) has argued that there is a demonic element to

all evil and that Scripture suggests thai these personal forces of evil have infilu·ated all aspects of human life. This further complicates our understanding of moral evil, namra.l evil and fmirudewhen we grapple with how the forces of darkness corrupt our experience and contribute 10 the evil we are exposed 10 and commit. Usually, all l.hese elemcnts-­ the moral evil of ourselves and those about us and of the demonic world, natural evil and human finitude-are n i volved in the problems of the person who comes for psychotherapy.

Sin and HumtJlI FIV!NDm We need to briefly address a topic of mind-boggling cumplexil)', the stale of human freedom after the Fall. Humanity is now burdened with an impaired capacity for freedom, n i that sin now infuses our vcry being and clouds our cvery choice. The desperate cries of Paul in Romans

7 are repeated by all Christians who

find their desire to follow God in righteousness frustnlled by a contin­ ual bondage of the will to sin. We can all tesLif): to ollr impotence to obey God perfectly and to follow him wholeheartedly. And yet God

holds w responsible for ollr disobedience. In short, .....e have the dual

experience of choice vcrsus bondage, culpability versus an incapacity to do otherwise. This experience matches thc scriptural puzzle of our secming inabilil)' not to sin coupled with our undeniable culpability for sinning. We can offer no easy resolutions to this maUcr (see McDonald,

1982, pp. 57-67, 92-100). We would note that theological discussion of the malter of frec v.iU has usually centered upon the person's choice to become a Christian, with Calvinists asserLing that such an action is .....holly the work of God through his grace, and that to believe that any element of being born again is attributable to the person's choice diminishes GocI·s sovereignty and makes faith a "work� and thus Chris­ tianity a religion of works rather than grace. Arminians, on the ot.her hand, assert thai there s i an element of choice or human freedom in becoming a believer, and that to assert otherwise is to make humans into moral robots and God into the grand puppet-master. They do nOt, howe\'er, deny our bondage losin nor the central imponance of God's work in freeing us from lhat bondage.

A CJIRJ:.'11.i.... I'J.!:'WOI"I'H?SONS

55

For our purposes here we are 1Iot so concerned wilh the decision of becoming a Christian as we are with the capacity for human freedom

n i the give-and-take of everyday life. Suffice it to say that in the give and take of eycryday life, humans marool, on a moment-to-moment basis, be free to choose the perfect good. Most often this appears beyond our grasp. But the inaccessibility of that choice does not render nonexistent other choices that we can make. For example, we may not be able to choose to be perfectly hone$(. but we have real choices dar by day of particular instances where we can be either honest or deceitful. God in his sovereignty rna)' shape human choices to insure the triumph of his grace and

of his redemptive plan for humanity, but

human choicc is nonetheless real. For example, one of our children may be destined by God to somc work of critical importance to God's purposes on earth, and as such he may be guiding our actions lOward them, drawing them toward him, either through our good example and discipline or lhmugh the pm'ert), and pathos of our hypocrisy. in either case, we still make choices of how 10 deal with them and are accountable to

God for those aclions. There are, from eternity's per­

spective, no small decisions and no unimportant persons.

Human Motivations Earier l we addressed human motivoltions implied in the creation nar­ rative. There are also implications for our undcrstanding of human motivation to be dnlWJl from the saga of humanity's Fall. Rebellion againsl God, the desire lO be gods ourselves, now becomes

an operative motivc in all thai ....'C do. Also. to the extent that sin is rooted

in the onlologKaI anxiety of grappling with our freedom in light of our limitations.. the desire to nm away from this burdensome responsibility now oper-.ltes as an ever-present motivation as well. The SlOrr of the Fall makes it dearthatAdam and Eve tried lO cover up their sin byflrslavoiding God and then attempting to shift blame and abrogate personal responsi­ bility. This awareness of dhine judgment, and the desire to avoid that righteousjudgmenl, no..... colors all that .....e do.

Thi s immeas.urably complicates our understanding of human mo­ tivation. Humans experience compound and conflicting motivations as pan of their essential unredeemed natures (and redeemed natures

too). For example. as we approach dating and marriage. we may desire ith the good motive ofdesiring intimacy and the bad motive anolhcr ....

. over. in summary. the constelof desiring somcone to exercise po....er

,l/CXJfJ/,VPSYCJIOTIIF.MPIES

lation of our motivations is vastIy complicated by our rebellion against

God Our motivations are seldom pure and ne.·er sm i ple. .

Hwnanity in Its Redeemed Slate Using covenant lenninology (after Anderson.

1987). we might say UH!.l

in the midst of tIle devastation of the Fall, the marriage between

human ity and God had been shattered. but from one side only. Grace -

for ret:onciliation is needed. God has promised restoration in the life,

death and resurrection ofJesus Christ. the pivotal events in all ofhistory and the only source for our hope and salvation. Receiving this grace may lead to significant transform ations in the Ih'es of ordinary people through believing and acting on the tnlths of the faith.

Life betwem 1m &ginning and th� End Roberta Hestenes has observed that lhe experiences oflhe Hebrews in being redeemed from Egypt by he t Lord (ExodUs through Deutero­ nomy) is a powerful model of our own redemption process. While the Israelites .....ere oppressed, God raised up for them a savior. Moses (a type of Christ). God ulrough Moses freed them from their bondage and setvitude to an alien master, and initially they exuberantly cele­ bnued their freedom. But release from captivity was not immediately followed by entering the Promised Land. Rather. the Israelites had to wander in the wilderness for many years before being ushered into the "land of milk and honey. � Christians similarly live between the day of emancipation and the day of final deliverance. A battle has been won but the war is not over. Brunner

(1939, p. 114 and throughout) calls lhis "life in contradic­

tion�-living life suspended be�1!en our rallen and redeemed natures. We live belween the kingdom of God which is presem, and the kingdom of God which is to come. We must navigdte the struggles and tensions orthis "in-ben..·ccn � life by depending on God and others who share thi3 journey. We do this by becoming part of a covenant people.

by beroming deeply n i volved with a local body ofbelievers. Only in the context ofa healing community can we learn to cultivate and express the fruits of the Spirit, which along ",ith a deep concern and compas­ sion for others should epitomize mature, committed Chri5tians.

."", Goal
Paul's centr.d prayer for the Philippians expresses well the central

.i OIRJS11.iN l'If.WOFPf:'.RSO.VS

57

goal of life in Jesus Chrisl:

I considcr c\'erything a loss compared to the surpassing grealness

of knowing Chrisl Jesus my Lord, for whose sake I have losl all things. I consider them rubbish, that I may gain Christ and be found

in him, nOI having a lighteousncss of Ill)' own thai comes from the law, but that which s i through faith in Christ-the righteousness that comes from God and is by faith. J want to know Christ. and the power of his resurrection and the fello....'Ship of sharing in his sufferings, becoming like him in his death, and so, somehow, to attain to the resurrection from the dead.

(3:8-11)

According to the apostle Paul, the goal of the Christian life is to know Christ, which entails having a righteousness based on faith, being conformed to (or in some way identifying ,\ilh) Christ's sufferings and

death, and finally attaining eternal fellOl . .'Ship . .... ith Christ through the resurrection of the dead. On our contemporary scene, much has been written about emo­

tional wholeness and Christian holiness. Some authors seem to regard the IWO as essentially identical. Surely growth in Christ means to become more like Jesus, and the more we are like him, the marc holy and whole we must be. Yet wholeness and holiness are actually very different. We live in a fallen

.....

orld. It s i easy for our conceptions of wholeness to become

contaminated ",<jtll sub-Christian notions ofwell-being, especially those that emphasize easy accommodation ",ith the world. All tOO often in psychology, the goals for clients are to become well adjusted and do one's best at a purely human level. rather than radical realignment of

one's life to the claims of ChrisI. In conU"aSt to such ideals as minimizing conflict, total emotional awareness and expression, maximizing life satisfaction and pleasure

.

and lhing up to our innate potential, note that Paul prescribes the goals of becoming conformed to Christ's suffering, death and resurrection.

Such a calling certainly includes a number ofpersonal experiences that are far from secular psychology's ideals for ....el . l-adjusted human Ji\ing.

In shan, we are called to a way oflife that is often at odds ....ith . the ways of the ..... orld, a way of life where suffering and pain are an inevitable part of our lot in life, where being holy, which literally means being set apart to God's purposes and manifesting his righteous character. can

be difficult and even desps i ed by the world. McLemore (1982) cautions that it is quite possible for an individual to

be a paragon of mental health, as it is traditionally defined in

J8 psychology, yet be living without (aith in God through Christ. The peaceful practitioner of Zen Buddhism, unruffied by lifc's rlemands as he retreats into an inner world, might be supremely healthy by the definition of some. On the other hand, a �sainlfl n i the local church i estnmgement may be lhing a life of emotional pain and nterpersonal

as she faithfully folloW!! God's calling. thus living a life of holiness that is far from the current psychological undcrsrnnding of wholeness. Thus, while there may be much thaI overlaps between wholeness and

holiness (especially as both are embodied in the concept of Christlike­

be contradictory n i any way, we mw! be exceedingly careful when we discllss the two LCrms. The chief

ness). and the two concepts may nOI

danger is that the pursuit of wholeness is so easily and widely approved

of in the Western world that it would be easy for Christians to pursue "growth � as defined by some therapy approach while deluding them­ selves that they are thus pursuing holines..'i as well. Christian clinicians need to think carefully, critically and counl­ geously aOOUi the goals that they are advocating in the context of counseling and psychotherapy. to think in the light of what it means for a believer to be �!lalt and lighl- in Ihe world and to be abearing the

marks ofCh rist. � It is imperath'e that these goals include considerations of Christian faith and experience.

Conclusion It is essential for Christian pastors, academicians, clinicians and re­ searchers 10 take Christian world views and control beliefs seriously. As McDonald

( 1986, p. 138) has nOlcd. there is no purely psychological

theory of personality that can give an effective account of all the ethical and religioWi concerns of the human individual. What we ha\'e covered above does not constitute a personality theory, but it does fonn a vision of personhood that should undergird a personality theory acceptable

to Christians. No such theory exislll today. Christian psy<:hologisu must therefore tentatively .... 'Ork within incomplete personality systems while striving for development ofa fulJ-bodied Christian \;ew.

As Brunner (1939, p.

62) has argued, there can be no Christian psychology ifby Ihal we mean a theory of elemental sensory processes or memory. BUI when we move to !.he level of a comprchensive understanding of the Mperson , � then

there will be a distinctively Christian approach to psrchology.

Does the faith have imp lications for how we inten'cne .... ; th per.;ons?

II OIP.JsrIAN VlliWOFI'OISO,VS

59

Docs it specify modes of counseling .... ith troubled people? From

5un'e)ing the writings of Christian counselors. one sometimes gets the idea thaI God specifies one and only one way of dealing with all problems and difficulties. The

problem is

thaI each of the Christian

counselors specifics a different It:dmique. claiming thaI his or hers is the one endorsed by Scriplure. One emphasizes exhortation to behav­ ior change. another a change to biblica! thinking, another healing prayer, another supernatural inten'ention and yet another the casting

OUI of demons

.

Our position 011 this

matter s i

that we have much 10

learn

from

various forms of pasloral intervention recommended and utilized in the Scriptures. In I Thessalonians 5:14, lhe apostJe P'olul says, "'And we urge you, brothers. warn those who are idle. encourage the timid. help the weak. be

patient with

everyone,"' Paul's admonition shows that

different types of human problemscaJl for different types of responses

from counselors. Many other types of in terpersonal helping responses are specified in the Bible, including lo\ing. forgiling. providing mate­ ith. rebuking. excommu­ rial charity, teaching, comforting, grieo.ing .... nicating and so forth. Clearly ....hat . is needed is a flexible repenoire of approaches, grounded in coherent theory and deeply respectful afthe complexity and profundity of human stnlggles, Almost any form of counseling interaction in the Bible can find its counterpart in the practice of secular psychotherapy. It is interesting, though, that each major school of psychotherapy tends to build its identity around a rather limited number

of styles

of therapist-client

interactions-so (hal cognitive therapists are leachc�,

pcrson-cen­

tered therapists are accepting, psychoanalytic therapists are dislant and interpreth'e, and so forth. No counseling model ....e . know ofembodies

seem to be recommended in Scripture. So, as the Christian therapist moves beyond a sccular theory, one nec.-ded area of gro.....th is an expanded vision of technique thal the diversit}' of interdction styles that

incorporates the eclecticism found in Scripture,

As a final nOle, ....'e would •.usc the issue ohIle curious place of those few secular theories (and Christian tJleories as well) thaI propose styles ofhealing interactions for ....hich . there is absolutely no pardliel ill those sections of Scripture thaI afTer pastoral advice on change and growth. The .... . most obvious examples are the theories that call for the client t o to go about rc-experiencing specific life e\'ents, most notably the birth troluma (as in secular and Christian versions of primal therapy-Jano\! we have not included in this book) and and Lake respectively-....hich .

60

the theories that call for bodily interventions for the purpose of releasing pent-up emotional responses (such as the �body·work� mas­ sages of bioenergetic therapy-also not included in this book), These types of interventions depan from the -norma1� patterns of interpersonal relating that are modeled and lauded in the Scriptures and are abo on the ·outskirts" of the psychotherapy establishment. Given this, we feel a need for special caution as the Christian aI> proaches these types of therapies. We would not argue for a naive biblical literalism of saying that a technique must be specifically sug­ gested in the Bible for a therapist to use it (-Tmns/aenu isn't in my concordance so I'm against itl�), but we would suggest that the further i tervention becomes from normal removed a mode ofpsychological n patterns of human interaction, the greater the need for a Strong theoretical rationale for its use, for empirical documentation of it.! potential helpfulness and for a high degree of humility aOOIll its applicability.

For Funbel' Reading 8crkouwer, C.

(1962). Mono' TM imogr of God (D. Jdlema. Trans.). Cn.nd

Rapids. MI: £.erdmans. (Originally published n.d.). An excellent Reformed study of theological anthropology. emphiL'lizing the image of Cod.

(19!J9). Man in mJOil (0. \\')'On. Tran$.). Philadelphia: Westmin­ ster. (Originally pubished l 19!J7).

Brunner, E.

A challenging and insightful study from a neo-orthodox perspecti\'e. Qebsch, W.• andJaekJe, C.

(1975). P(JJtqmiumin hjstQl'icaipm/JlCtiw. New York:

J3$On Aronson. One of the best studies of the hi510ry of the paslOraI care U"oI.dition. Tilings in pa5toral care from throughout including ·exhibit.'l� of original .... history. Lewis, C.

S. (1946).

1M

grtOl divoru. New York: Macmillan.

A moving and thought-provoting depiction of physical existence afler the resurrection.

McDonald, H.

(1982). T� Christian via.I ofmono Westchester, It.: Cros.sway.

An excellent ()\'ervicw of Christian anthropology

R.efe.cences Adams.J. (1979). Mort/han mJemption: A IMoIogyofChristiiln roIlllHling. Phillip. burg. NJ: Presbyterian and Refonned. Anderson, R. (1987). Far thou wIw rounul. Unpublished mallUKript, Fuller Theological Seminary, Pasadena, CA.

,

,

61

Bcrkouwer, G. (1962). Man: TM image of God (D. Jdlc:ma, Trnns .). Grand Rapid" MI: Eerdmant. (Originally published n.d.), Sloesch, O. (1984). Sin . In \'1', Elwell (Ed.). EV(lllgtlicai didiOllory o/IMology (pp. 1012-1016), Grand Rapids. MI: Baker. Brunner, E. (1939). Man in m.oolt (0. Wyon. Trans.). Philadelphia: Wcsunin­ ster. (Originally pubis l hed 1937). Clebsc.h, W., andJaekle, C. (197.5). P4$lomicanin hiJtC1rict11pmptctiw. NewYork:

Jason Aronson. Evans, C. (1977) . Pmnving/M pm<m:A looIc al/M Inllrn:m Jrienus. Grand Rapids, �U: Baker. [\';illS, C. (1990). Smn IGerl!.tgaard's Christian p�. Grand Rapids. MI: Zondervan. Foster, R. (1985) . MolI'J, .!LX, aM power: T1tnhalhtlgt of 1M disciplin«1 lift. San Frand.K:o: Ha�r & Row. Friesen. J. (1988), Treauncnt for multiplt: personality disorder. Workshop presented 8t the International Congre" on Chrutian Coun5t'ling, Atlanta. GA. Gilkey. L (1985). MaMr oj hmwn and tarth. Lanham, �m: Unh'cnity PIns. (Originall)' published 1959). Greid;mw, S. (1982). The use of the Bible in Christian scholanhip. Chmlinn ScJwior's ReWw, JJ, 138-147. Hubbard. O. (1979). ",not wtnHHlgrliUlls bdin>t. Pasadena, CA: Fuller Theolog. ical Seminary. jewett. P. (1975). Man os IIIan OMftTMu. Grand Rapids, MI: E.erdmaIlS. johnson, E. (1987). Sin. weakness, and pS}·chopalhology. jllUrnal ofPs'}c 1wUJgy llnd ThtolorJ, 15, 218-226. Lewis, C. S. (1956). Till wt MWfO«5. New York.: Harcourt BracejO\'al1o\1ch. Lewis, C. S. (1963). uttm 10 M(Jlco/m: ChitfIJ on pmp. New York.: Harcourt BraceJo\·anovich. McDonald, H. (1982). TM ChriJtion vj� of 'lMn. Westchester IL.: Crossway. McDonald. H. (1986). Bibical l teaching on personality. In S. jona (Ed.), PsydwWg, (Jnd I� Christian foilA: An inlrodrulqry rtOdeT (pp. 118-140). Grand Rapids, M.I: Baker. McLemore, C. (1982). 1k scandal f o PlJt/wtIu:raf1J. Wheaton It.: Tyndale. Morn.. L. (1986). New Teslll'nmt l� Grand Rapids. MI: Zonden'lln. Oden. T. (1984). um ofsools in till c/al$jc tradition. Philadelphia: Fortress. f New York: Simon and Schuster. Peck., M. (1983). Propk ofllu it. Plantinga. C. (1988). lmages of God. 10 M. Noll and O. Wells (Eds.), Christian jailA and praaia in 1M modern IWrld (pp. 51-67). Grand Rapids. MI: Eerdmans. Shuster. M. (1987). �, fMtAoWgy, and parak¥: 1M dynnmia ofgood aM roil. Grand Rapi
,

THE DYNAMIC PSYCHOLOGIES

3 ClASSIC PSYCHOANALYSIS

hhough psychoanal)'5is is the grandparent of all psycho­ lhcl""dpeulic methods, it lends to be unpopularin conserva­ tive Christian circles. The specific concerns focus around three If"oubling themes in psychoanalysis: ( I ) the emphasis on sex and aggression as motivational bases for behavior; (2) the detcnninistic and naturalistic a5Sumptions of lhe modd; and

(3) the dircrt attacks on

religion Freud made in his later writings. Despite these reservations, many Christian mental-health prorcs­ sionals have a profound respect for this tradition (.sec. for example, Crabb,

1988: Mclemore, 1984; Narramore, 1984; or Peck, 1983).

Certainly the resen'ations are legitimate, but to dismiss psychoanalysis as irrelevant to the real problems of life is 10 fail to see its poten­ tial significance for the church and the society (cf. Browning,

1987.

p. 32).

,

MODERN�YClfarJl£R.O,J'1fS

66

PsychoanalysisI is certainly the "most comprehensh'C and far.rcach­ ing conceptuaJization ofpersonality. psychopathology, and psychother­ apy in e"istence� (Korchin, 1976. p. 332) . The influence of Freudian thought in the Western world has been profound. and in spite of legitimate Christian objections, \Ole seriously doubt that all the influ­ ence has been neg-.uh·c. Our endorsement is less enthusiastic than that of McLemore (1982, p. 164), who asserts "that a weU,onduCled psy­ choanalysis is still the bestway bywhich to come to understand oneself. � Still. the direct impact of this system can be seen in nearly all academic discipline5, including history, liternntre and philosophy. The morc i fluence on the larger public consciousness can hardly be indirect n overestimated Oones and Wilson, 1987). Civen the brevity of our treatment, we cannot analyze the de\'e!op­ flICnL of psychoanalytic thought over time. Freud', thinking evolved over hi, producth'<': years; the most striking example of thu s i his gradual move away from a harshly biological approach to his .!illbject matter, and his widening of his understanding of motivation to include 'ell. For the notjust the sexuaJ drive but the aggu�ssive/death drive as .... sake of economy, we will present Freud's system as a static whole, l l appraise though we recognize that this is not whoUy accurate. We wi contemporary derivatives of the analytic tradition (called psychody­ namic theories) in the next chapter.

Descriptive Survey PhiJosoplrioal AssumjJti"OftS and Modd of? fisonality i detennined Cl:wic psychoanalysu assumes that all human behavior s

by psychic energy and early childhood experiences. In order to make sense of a penon's current behavioral patterns, it is necessary to understand the behavior's roots n i largely unconsciow conflicts and moti,·cs. The forces that �mo\·e� us are irrdtional and strong, and most often related to aggressive or sexual impulses. Consequenlly, the goal 1..\ word aboutlCnninoiogy is IU.'Ceuary. niC words �,lIot"'ll#JsiJ and ps,t.lwtmaIJticar�

J>Ottmia.llyambiguow.. At thc mosl relilrictive Ic>-.:I, they refer 10 a dassiotl ordilllinclivcly

f"reudioln approach to psychologlcal n:scarch, stlldy orU'calmcnc.Atasomewhatbroadcr Ic\"t';\. they ruer 10 specific modeb of �na.lity, psychopathology or psychothen.py. At the broadest \ael, they an refcr to a (omprehenJivl, and wel1-articulatl!d wurldview (el.

Van ucuwen, 19&)). Indeal, itls at this fimo! �I, ofu:n rcfcrred. 10 ...,a mel3P5}"t:hology, that "'-': "',lOt 10 focu5 much of 0Uf' allcnoon. We will telC'O'e the word ps,dIodJMrIIit. which isusuallyalso Iued in n:fc:rcnc:e to p5)'Choanal)�l, 10 ref"eronly to the post.Freudian approaches WI:will dhclU$ In (tapitt four.

67

Q...uSJCPSI·CJ/OA.'IlI!LYS/S

is to illuminate critical life events in the formati" e childhood years in order to resolve the �problems in li\;ng" that emerge throughout the remainder of the life span. Only through greater self-knowledge and self
.•

.

.

.•

68 is primarily oriented around the oon themes of aggmsion and dtaJh. Both drives have creaw:e or destructi\'e potential (Prochaska, Both drives can be understood

;u

1979).

deterministic at the intrapsychic.

inte�rsonal or 50cietal levels. These "life instincts" and "death m­ stinctsft are at the core of the Freudian view of human nature. The .structural assu.mption asserts that the psychic apparatuS can best be under�tood in terms of three separate but interdependent entities

known as the id, ego and suptltgo. The id is the repository for our most

primitive 5exuaJ and aggressl\"e

drives and urges. Id processes are

amuned to be pr�nt at birth and to be largely unconscious, illogical,

demanding and relentleMly driving toward personal gratification

(this

is called the pleasunprinciple). The ego is reality-based and de'>'elops as an individual interacts with the external ...."(ITld. The ego is largely conscious and serves a vital role in mediating the primitive urges afthe id with the constraints or opportunities of reality. Finally, the w.fJe"go places restrictive demands on both the id and lhe ego. It is generally understood as a split�(f from the ego and as the repository of the moralistic standards one has absorbed from "significant others," most often parents and society. Often seen

a5

a kind of �conscience.R the

superego s i assumed to be only partially com-cious. Finally. the

tt{m

omu: (U$umptitm asse rts that human personality can

best be understood as a closed or quasi-hydraulic S}'Slem. In other

i introduced imo the S}'stem in the words. a certain amount of energy s

i energy must be released, ways must form of the basic drives. Since ths

be found to disperse it in a direct or transformed manner, This s i "economic" in the sense that energy is neither gained nor lost; the bank account alwclYS balance�, The goal of psychoanalytic lteatmenl is to develop the capacity for the release of energy in SOCially acceptable and

i understood a.s disper­ appropriate ways. In contrast, psychopathology s sion of energy without regard to the constraints of reality or external

social norms (e.g., psychotic regression). For Freud. consciousnes..<; was only a small pact of Lhe lotal psyche. Although it can '1 be studied directly, the existence of the unconscious can be inferred from direct observation of behavior or lhrough con­ scious experiences such as dreams, �slips of the tOngue or material derived from free association. Freud hypothesized that all the stored experiences, memories and repressed material of a lifetime can be found in the unconscious. Since unconscious material influences all behavior, lhe deeper contents of lhe mind must be explored at some level to achieve any significant measure of health and wholeness.

.

,

CUss/C PSYClICMNAU 'S)S

69

Awareness and insight of Ihis material alone isn't curath'e-it must be "worked through,� ideally in the context of a psychotherapeutic rela­ tionship. In the absence of such \\x>rking through, however, means must be found to deal with the anxiety that dc.;elops outofthe conflict between the id, ego and superego over the control of the available psychic energy. Idc..-ally, the ego can control the anxiety through direct and rational means, but more often than not the largely unconscious and often primitive ego defense mulumisms must be utilized. These defense mechanisms transform the threatening anxiety into some alternate fonn the person can deal with, and thus help one cope \\ith threatening unconscious conflicLS. The more primitive defense mechanisms often result in marginal coping. Most abnormal psychology, personality or psychotherapy textbooks contain summaries of the most important defense mechanisms, The main lesson to be learned about defense mechanisms is that overt beha\ior rarely means what it seems to, because in U'aIlsforming the anxiety caused by unconscious conflicts, the true reasons for our behavior become largely inaccessible. The classic Freudian understanding of the de\oclopment of person­ ality assens the existence of a series ofpS)·dwuxu.al s/agt$. According to this perspecli\'e, the personal and social development that occurs in these critical stages of infancy. childhood and adolescence lays the foundation on which furthermatunuion can be builL Both healthy and unhealthy personality development reflect the manner in which the relevam tasks were accomplished. Each slage ;s distinguished by the focal area of the body where the gratification of libidinal impulses is concentrated. The oral stagt (first year of life) is foundational to later personality de\'elopment. TIle caregiver's focus is on ule fc..-eding and nurturing of the n i fant, and gratification for the baby centers on the mouth; sucking and chewing are primary. Failure to gel onc's needs mel potentially leads to greediness or an unhealthy preoccupation ....;Ul possessions in later life. The atwl swgt (ages one to three) ct;ntcrs around the child's experience of p.1.rcn,,:tI demands, di5Ciplinc and expectations, espe­ cially as they relate lO toilel training. Psychic gratification centers on retention and expulsion offeces, Unresol\'ca issues at this stage poten­ tially lead to unhealulY attitudes about the bod)' or bodily functions, Extremes of orderliness or messiness are also assumed to be related to unresolved issues in this period.

MODeRNI'Sl'ClJaTllERAP/ES

70 III the

pho.llic Slilgt

(ages three to six) the focus for gratification

mmcs away from the mouth and anus to the genitals. It s i during this stage mat the child learns much about sex-role identity and develops an interest in sexual malters. Parental atthudes in particular arc com­ municated verbally or nonvcrbally, and negative experiences can affect feelings about sexuali!)' throughout the remainder of the life span. The phallic stage is assumed to be the period in which Offlipat (for boys) or I:."kctra (for girls) conflicts emerge, in which the child develops threatening, erotically charged feelings for the parent of the opposite sex. Freud developed his notions of what happens at this stage for boys to a much greater extent than for girls, so we will focus on those. (The Oedipal crisis

"'''as

named after the famous Qt.'dipus myth in which

Oedipus was destined to murder his father and marry his mother.)

The boy. Freud proposed. comes to experience vague libidinal longings for union \\;Ih his mother. These are rarely experienced consciously. These feelings are often exhibited by intense attachments 10 mother. jealousy for her auentiOIl and so forth. Realizing that the fallier is a competitor foJ' the love oflhe mother, the boy first experi­ ences an angry compeliLivenes.'I wilh the father, followed by a fearful realization lhal he cannot, as a child, hope to compete for the attention of the mother (assuming the basic health of the parenLaI relationship). The healthiest resolution to lhis terrible dilemma is for the boy to identify with the father and actually absorb pans of the father's person­ ality, so that at least the boy can have some sense of special attachment to the mother on a vicarious level by being like lhe father. In the

itltmg stage (ages six to twelve), increased socialization with

other dlildren typically replaces the inwardness of the phallic period. i terests in others. the child develops academic, Coupled with new n athletic. interpelWnal or recreational competencies. These social themes are predominant lhroughoUl the prepubescence period.

In adolescence the child moves into the gnlilal stlJgt (ages tweh'e to eighteen) where again sexual impulses bc1:ome predominant. Interest in the opposite sex de\'eiops, often with some sexual experimentaLioll. Ideally, libidinal energies are redirected in socially appropriate activi­ .•

ties <e.g dating friendships) . The genital stage is assumed to continue lhroughout the remainder of life as one searches for a hcaJthy balance , between lo\'e. work and play. i tSomt'What par.dlel but complementary understandings orth� $Gtge$ can be round n til" work of Erik"""" (1982) o� other major de'o-.:;lopmental lheori51s (cr. I\e'ller. 1988).

71

E\'en the mOSI ardent critic of psychoanalysis ,,",'Quid agree that the approach is comprehensh-e and Lhal its mooel of personality has heuristic value (R}'ckman. \985), Unfortunately. the theory aU tOO often lacks precision and LCSlability, and runs the risk of leading to �nothing-bul,M or reductionistic, interpretaliolls of behavior (e.g" C\'­ erything becomes the result of aggressi\-c or sexual drives). Still, as Sih'crman (1976) has observed. aspects of psychosexual theory can be clinically demonstrated. For example, several studies suggest that per­ sons with primitive defenses against aggressive and sexual impulses do seem to exhibit greater rates ofneurotic psychopathology, an observa­ tion consistent ,."jIll Freudian theory.

Model ofHealth In the psychoanalytic u-adition, healthy indi\1duals are ones who have enough conscious awareness of their basic issues to have self
Model ofAbnormality According to this tradition, everyone is pathologicaJ, to a greater or

72

MODERNPSYDI(ffHERltPfES

lesser degree, due to the inevilable conflicts am! fixations that develop in OUf formative years. The specific symptoms that develop refleci both the psychosexual stage in which the confliC(s and fixations first de ....e1oped and the particular manner in which m i mature or primitive ego defense mechanisms are utilized to deal with the resulting anxiety. In other ","'Ords, psychoanalysis assumes that �problcms in living� are universal. since nobody proceeds through the developmental stages n

without difficulty. At me intrapsychic level, all symptoms "work, in that they help us cope with the demands of everyday living. even though the symptoms may be self-defeating and perhaps self-destnlctive. The model is thoroughly psychosocial in its assessment of the etiology and maintenance of emotional difficulties. The more n i tense the conflicts and fixations are, the more severe the psychopathology. Given sufficient environmema1 or internal stress. the defenses can be overwhelmed and symptoms emerge. These internal Lhreats are typi­ cally avoided rather man dealt with directly, and the person is highly motivated to keep unacceptable impulses or childish anxieties out of direct consciousness at whatever cost. When the avoidance strategy is coupled with often well-meaning attention from family and friends­ which helps continue the unhealthy way of dealing with the conflicl­ the cycle of avoidance can become a deeply ingrained pattern (what has come to be designated Mthe neurotic nucleus"). In short, stress makes the penon anxious; the anxiery is avoided at all costs (which can be highly reinforcing) ; and a ... iciom habit becomes established. A more direct strategy of resolving the conflict is not adopted because the deeper unconscious "primary proceS5� is nonlog­ ical (irrational) and atemporal (makes no differentiation with respect to time)

(d. Prochaska, 1979, pp. 34-S5).

According to the model, conflict is not incidental to being human. Rather, conflict is intrinsic to human nature and forms the core of our being. The key psychic drives inevitably conflict beeause the aggreS!live and erotic drives do not naturally complement each other. The struc­ tures conflict also: id and superego battle, like two powerful horses, with the relatively impotent ego astride them both. Consequently, conflict is as much a part of normalcy as it is of pathology.

Anxiety is at the core of all psychopathology, operating largely at the unconscious level. Generally speaking, the person has no a....'areness of the deeper significance of immediate precipitating events and how they affect the underlying impulses or unresolved conflicL<; and fixa­ tions. As the largely unconscious anxiety intrudes on consciousness,

,

,

73

the person tends to panic. Depending on where these conflicts and ftxations first developed ps),chosexuall)" and the specific ego deJen�s mechanism utilized to �bind M the anxiery. the full spectrum of psycho­ pathology takes shape. Ob\;ously. certain responses to immediate precipitating evenlS are more healthy than olhers. 8U1 at some level all symptoms are gratifying. (.oven to highly functioning individuals. This inevitable tendency to deny and distort reality is apparently generic to the human condition (cf. Munroe, 1955, for an especially insightful treaunent of these themes), Mod" ofPrj
experiences and work them through. This process is called abrraction or cot harru. In making the unconscious conscious, the ego is strength­ ened, thereby facilitating a greater capacity for managing the de­ mands of the instinctual urges within the constraints of reality. The resulting self-awareness and insight is more than merely intellec­ tual-it is deeply felt and experienced after an agonizingly difficult and often painful process of change. Standard psychoanalysis usually involves multiple appointments every week for at least two or three years, and often more. Obviously, this can be an expensive and demanding commiunent. In actual practice, analysts work in diverse and varied ways. depending on their personal styles and the needsoftheir clients. Despite these differences, concerned analysu early recognized the need to reduce the length of the standard treatment, without sacrificing the technique's unique properties (Korchin, 1976, p. 325). But it i$ precisely because of the length and intensity of the treat­ men! that psychoanalysis is so widely disparaged in both lay and i an professional circles. Specifically, it is asserted that psychoanalysis s elitist therapy. geared toward the rich and self-indulgent who find thal ta1king about themselves to a highly trained analyst a great deal promotes their own sense of well-being. In their defense. psychoana1}'Sts assert that promoting lasting and significant change is of necessity a difficult and time-consuming process. Not only do clients need to unlearn self-defeating coping strategies, but they must also develop newand more effective ones. Further. change is resisted became these

,lfOOt:J/NPSYCJIOTIIERM'IES

7.

same patterns hal'c historically worked for the client, n i that they bind an"iely and often lead LO attention from others. As Korchin

(1976, p.

325) has summarized it, "the process of character reorgani7.ation . . . is about on par with learning a new language to replace one's mother longue, particularly

f i the

student i:s ambivalent in his motivation.

lighting the ne¥.' experience while seeking it. � Psychoanalysts usually agree that thcy should remain relatively aloof and anonymous to their clients. They assert that more directive and supportive approaches have limited value, in that they lcnd to promote dependency rather than autonomy. Further. psychoanalysts assert that these therapies run the ri.�k of becoming "antidevelopmenta1,� in that

Ihey lend to lessen the necessity of the "legitimate suffering� that will OCCllr when the client works at self-exp!or.ltion. Only deep self-aware­ ness and understanding can lead to the kind of insight needed to promote lasting change (see Meissner,

1985).

The most basic tool of psychoanalysis s i Jrn assoaalion. Clients are asked to minimize conscious control and tell e"erything that comes to their minds, with the expectation that more and more significant unconscious material will emerge. This �basic ru[e� of psychoanalysis is exceedingly difficult to follow even \\-ith the best of intentions. Most of us are loathe to speak directly and truthfully, even

in

the best of

situations. nlis is especially pronounced in the context of a clinical relationship. where difficult and onen painful material musl be ex­

plored and v,"Orked through. Resistance to free association often builds

in direct proportion to the psychic significance of the unconscious material emerging. Indeed. Freudians assert that the forces that are striving toward recm·ery are usually mel with equally strOllg opposing ones. And it is the analysis of these blocks or disruptions

in

free

associ ation lhat often give the analyst clues as to the nature of psychic conflicts and flXations. If they can be brought to awareness and effec­ tively dealt with, increased insight can resulL Another major theme n i this tradition is the analysis of the

�IU

transJer­

relationship that occurs between the therapist and the client.

Strong. personal feelings of both a positive and a negative nature usually develop bet v ..een client and lberapisl !.hat go beyond lbe actual clinical relationship. Specifically, both client and therapist bring to !.he current relationship issues that are brought forwMd (transferred) from earlier relationships with significant albers. Assuming that the analYSI has dealt with his or hero\VTl �countertransference� issues (basic conflicts that mighl be transformed into feelings toward the client) ,

•

P'

,

75 the focus can beon bringing thedient's hidden and repressed conflicts or feelings from the p3$1, which are transferred into feelings about the therapist. into lhe present where they can be examined, undeThtood and resolved. Thus client reactions loward the therapist arc vitally imponant. [ndeed. th(,'ycan develop to the point where a M1ransference neurosis" will emerge, .....hich then becomes the m,,:jor focus of therapy. AL<;o, a potential transition between illness and health becom� possible if the deeper meaning of the neurotic origins of Lhe expressed feelings can be explored and worked through in the comexi of the diem's currelll difficulties and needs. Interpreting the client's resistances and dcfensi\'c maneuvcn is anotber fundamental strategy utilil.ed in psychoanalysis. Good inter­ pretations are appropriate in timing, lact and sensitivity. Specifically, they must be given at the level at which the client can hear them. undentand them, appreciate them and incorporate them. If the inter­ pretations are premature or inappropriate. they only lead to greater resistance. If they are well-suited. thL1' can conuibute 10 greater under­ standing and perhaps relief. Ideally, good illlerpretations help the client to make sense of current behavior in light of the past. Psychoanalysts assert that

drtam analysis

is especially helpful in

uncovering m i portant unconscious material. During dreams. normal conscious conU'ols are relaxed, perhaps e\-en more deeply then they are in free

association.

Through inquiry, inference and eventuaUy

interpretation. the meanings of both current and long-standing con­ niCI.S or diflic:ulties can be explored and worked through. Although Freud once described dreams as �the royal road to the ullcon.scious, � they are "hardly a freeway with unlimited visibility. nor do hidden meanings roll forth with simple clarity" (Korchin.

J 976, p. 328). As with

free association. resistance and transference, working through the

material is hard work that takes time and all extremely high degree of

commitment on the part of the psychoamtl),st and patient. In summary. psychoanalysis consists ofa variety of methods to make the unconscious conscious so that it can be worked through in the con­ text of the psychotherapeutic relationship. In particular, the conmets and fIXations of the formati"e years ofchildhood and early adolescence are explored. These must be "reconstructed, discussed. interpreted, i any hope oflasting change s i going and analrl.ed� (Corey, J 986, p. 38) f to occur. Since the therapeutic goab are so high and difficult to obain, t and the self-defeating pallcms so deepl}' CSl3hlished with the client, it is inevitable that treaUllent be intensive and long-term.

76

MOilERNl'1Ji',J/OTHEILiPi£S

Few clinicians alive today can deny that they have felt the impact of Freudian thought. Hardly any welkie"doped approach to people· helping lacks a conception of an unconscious, an appreciation of the role of early childhood development, or an understanding of the relevance of such clinical concepts as transference and counlenrans­ ference, resistance or the ego defense mechanisms. The model stresses biological and instinctual factOrs to the neglect of other psychosocial or sociocultural factors, hut it does speak broadly and deeply to certain dimensions of the human experience. On the other hand, as Alston has noted (1967, p. 516), psychoanalytic concepts need to be more explicitly stated and anchored in objective criteria if they are going to be the basis for further interdisciplinary dialog. The works of Hackett (1986). Oakland (1977) and Walters (1973) are good initial examples of 5uch interdisciplinary ,",,'Ork. While we will discuss the documented effe<:ti\'eness of psychoanalysis in chapter fourteen, we note that the perceived effectiveness of Freud's psychoanalysis was enhanced by the evidenl clinical insightfulness he demonstrated in his writings. But according to Storr (1989, pp, 10000,), while Freud mentioned 133 cases in his writings, he only provided exten­ sive reporu on six cases, Of these six, he only saw tv.'O for over six months. and onl), one for a full course of psychoanalysis. This case, the famous "Wolf Man,� ",-as "not quite the advertisement for psychoanalysis which Freud might have hopc.'rl for� (pp. 106-107) , Apparently while Freud reported his analysis to be a complete success, a foUow-up sludysuggested thai the Wolf Man's analysis with Freud "''as only somewhat helpfu], allowing him to live a life of moderale maladjtlSUllellL Christian Critique As might be evident from the previous section, Freudian thought has

come under fire from many senors. As Hurding (1985, p. 70) nOles, Freud receives criticism �from the academic psychologists for being unscientific, from humanistic and theistic ps)'chologist� for being too reductionistic, and from the behaviourists for not being reductionistic enough." Still, a balanced and fair assessment would recognize that we owe much to Freud in assisting us in our efforts to make sense of the often bewildering complexity of our psychospiriluaJ narures. PhilosophiaJlAmlmpfions Freud is pt!rhaps best known in religious circles ror his attacks on

,LiSSiePSYOIOANAI,)'SIS

77

religion. Psychoanalysis is essentially an agnostic or atheistic system,

since religion is treated as an iIlusioIl, Genuine religious motivation and the spiritual life are ignored or treated negatively in psychoanalysis (Vitt, 1987, p. 66). Exemplified in works like The FUlI4rt of an IUusWn, Civilization andIts Discontents, and Moses and Monotheism, the essence of Freud's argument is that the religious believer in adolescence or adulthood comes face to face ....ith a cold, ambiguous and threatening universe in which annihilation, isolation or meaninglessness are seen as likely options. This creates overwhelming anxiety. In a primitive, self-protecting gesture, we create for ourselves a comforting illusion with which to shield ourselves. The illusion we embrace stems from real or distorted memories of our childhood years, when as weak and vul­ nerable persons we felt nurtured and protected by what we perceived

to be omnipotent, omniscient and lo'ing parents, specifically a father. In a desperate attempt to maintain tha: sense of security and well-being and meet our adult needs and wants, we embrace some form

of religion, creating an imaginary deity. a divine father-figure. Freud

specifically argued that religion fulfilled three needs: �{The gods people believe in] must exorcise the terrors of nature, they must reconcile men to the cruelty of Fate, and . . . they must compensate them for the sufferings which a civilized life in common has imposed

upon them� (quoted in Storr 1989, p. 89). Indeed. the iUusions we create ,

for oursch'CS

GlIl

also serve as a symbolic means to mcet unfulfilled

childhood longings as \\o-ell. From tJ1C psychoanalytic pcrspecth-e re1ibrion isseen as a kind ofuniversal neurosis thatchili7.ation substitUles for a more authentic personal reality based on scientific knowledge. In light ofVitz's (1988) treatment of the deeper motives for Freud's rejection of religion, it seems reasonable to assert tJmt important events

matters of faith. In in his own life contributcd to his antipathy to.... a rd .

fact, Freud s profound ambi\'alence about Christianity in particular appean to be as much a function or his own projective tcndencics as if '

is the logical outcome orhis theorizing. Via suggests, for instance, tJlat the traumatic early loss of a nanny who may have been a devout Catholic beliC\'er could have complicated Freud's feeling about reli­ gion. Vitz also documents Freud's possible dabbling in matters of the occult. There is apparently more to Freud's contention that religion lacked integrity than his Madulation oCthe scientilk method oflhe day� (Hurding, 1985, p. 73). His attitudes about Christianity reflected his complex hostility and attraction to a faith that meant something to him at a deeply personal le,'eI. at the level of Freud s unconscious.

MOOERNPSI'CI/oTIIERAPlES

78

The analysu byViu and CarOler (1984a, 1984b) of Freud's under­ standing of religion also reveals some interesting .....eaknesses in the theoTY. They argue that if one presumes God is an illusion, then the kprojection of a father ligure� understanding of religion males sense. Btu if olle SLarlS with a presupposition that God exists, psychoanalysis

does equally well in explaining atheism! How would the denial of a real God happen psychologically if psychoanalysis is true? If God is a hea�'enly Mfather,M then disbelief in

God must dearly be attributable to the Oedipal period ofdevelopment. During this period, the child feels infantile rage at the same-sex parent who competes with the child for the love of the oppo�ite-sex parent. If the child does not adequately resolve !.hat unconscious rage at the parent during the genital stage. the unconscious mge might be played out as atheism in adulthood-what beuer ",oay to get back at (or murder) a father figure than 10 simply not believe in him! Since one can only go so far in rejecting the earthly parelll, a deeper rage, an eyen more primitive aggressive impulse, denying his \'ery existence. While interesting in itself, we

can

can

be vcmed on God by

also see in this brief sketch that

one frequently noted problem of Ihe theory of psychoanalysis is its \'ery adaptabi l ity. Psychoanalysis can literally explain anything! This s i quile a conundrum, in thata true and comprehensive theory would ha\'e 10 explain

all facets of human experience, but a theory that is so flexible

that it s i impossible to come up with ally human f
1Ul

all­

encompassing �psychologizing� of our capacity 10 know is repugnant lO Christians. who believe that .....e are capable of knowing truly. al leasl

at some k'Vei. POSitively, it is an asset of psychoanalysis that it deeply

Cl.ASSJCPSI'JlU."MI.ISIS

79

understands our profound capacities for self-deception (which we will develop below) . Further, psychoanalysis tends to be thoroughly mechanisti c and naturalistic in terms of its core hypotheses, in mat it assumes mal all mental events are ultimately biological and instinctual in origin. This inevitably leads LO reduClionistic explanations about religious matters and indeed about an that we regard as distinctively human. Freud is consistent in assening thaI biological and physical laws determine every important aspect of human existence. And naturalism was not just a working hypothesis for him: "Freud (Browning,

W'dS

dogmatic about itP

1987, p. 37).

Such a philosophical and scicntific commitmclll allows no room for anything supernatural, for the kind of geneml or spt:(:ial revelation

so central to the

Christian faith, nor for a more constmctive perspet:ti,'e

about our �piritual urgings fordet::per mcaning and significance in life. Freud's system is a dosed system of cause and effect with no room for a transcendclll realil)'. It is at this point that there is no possible reconciliation .... ith the fundamental assertions of the Christian tradi­ tion and lhe dictates of Freudian ps),choanalysis. We concur with Hurding

(1985, pp. 74-75), ....'ho st.·ues:

The Christian belia'es in a creator God who brought all lh3t exists into being and who sustains the uni,'erse by his power and lo\'e; he also declares a redeemer God who has intervened in history in

death and resur­ countless ....,,}'5 but supremely in the incarnation, ife, l

rection of His Son, and in the sending of the Holy Spirit. This is a

God who calls man. both individually and corporately, to choose good rdther than evil, life rather than death, the Lord's way rather than the Enemy's. This blend of divine detenninism . . . and man's freedom to choose . . . is atlhe heaT! of�iblical revelation and is a far cry from Freud's naturdlistic world \iew.'

M od "ofp....ono1ity Narramore (1985) argues Lilal the personality concepts in pS)'choanaly­

sis should stand or faU on whether or not they enable lIS to make sense

ofthe complexity of human nature in light of biblical revelation and

'other hc1pful llc:nmenu from a ,wi"ry uf pcnp«ID'eS un the phiJowphical tensioru between M't:ho;lIlaJ�, and ChriMian tht'()Log)' can be found in 8f'O\Oolling (l987), Burnham (J98S), Irwin { l97!p}, Kri5lOi (1970), Robin�n (19M), Wallao:c (1983) and Wood (1980).

MOD£RNPSYCJ/07"HERAP/ES

80

human experience. As with nearly every major theory we will discuss in this book, .....e contend that it would be a mistake to reject hypothetical constructs Ix'cause their exact equivalent cannot be found directly in the Scriptures. Our perspectives on some of the Freudian notions of psychosexual development have changed since our initial exposure to these concepts as undergraduates. Initially. we were quite skeptical, but our experi­ ences since with our O�l1 children and clients have taught us that, broadly understood, these developmental themes have contemporary relevance. As we isten l to the struggles of our diems and students, certain themes often emerge, including powerful �feelings tov.'3.rru parents of the opposite sex, . . . guilt over sexual feelings and actions, fears related to sexual intimacy and loving, fears of abandonment, struggles in the area of defining one's own saual identity, anger and rage in not getting what one wanted as a child, and love/hate conflictS" (Corey,

1986, p. 39). Psychoanalysis speaks directly and deeply to the

roots of these concerns. One does not need

to accept all the tenets of

orthodox psychoanalysis to appreciate the potential conlribution of the� emphases for our awareness and understanding of our client's difficulties. Psychoanalytic thought is certainly a unifying perspecti\'e that stresses the developmental, hislOrical and unconscious dimensions of the human experience. Although deterministic, we share Korchin's

we

find the approach to be overly

(1976, p. 332) assessment that many

of the central tenets of Freud's intrapsychic theory are perhaps less biological and universal than originally posited, and more overtly interpersonal or sociocultural. Browning

(1987) summarizes several scholars who suggest that

Freud himself was actually quite torn on this point, writing sometimes

in a mechanistic, deterministic vein, but at other times in an �inter· subjective or . . . dialogical one� (p.

39). It is from an emphasis on the

nonmechanistic aspects of Freud that the broad popularity of the contemporaI"}' psychodynamic theories has geo\\-ll. There is cenainly more possibility for Christian appreciation of psychoanalytic thought when theorists move a....'3.y from the mechanistic aspects of psychoanal­ ysis; we shan find this to be precisely the case in the next chapter. Freud made his understanding of personality the backdrop for understanding all of existence. By doing so, he presemed Christians with an unsatisfactory scheme for understanding the foundations for

life. As 8ro\\>iling (1987,

pp.

4$44) says, �By taking the position that

,

,

81 the psychobiological realm is the only relevan t context for human

action he has indeed elevated eros [libido drivel and death [aggression driveJ 10 metaphors of ultimacy that is, to metaphors which represent !lle only effective and relevant uhimate context of experience. � Are eros/libido and death/aggression the ultimate motivational context for life? These id..drivcs could be dcscribt.-d as abel'rdlll and distortt:d reflections of the relational and dominion moti\
,

82

MOI)I'.RIJPSYCHOTIII!:JW'J£S

reality but i5 consistent with that scripturally described process. � P�1'choanalysis can contribute much to our awareness of both the unhealthy and healthy ways that conflict and sin can be dealt ",;I.h in the context of our religious communities. Indeed. the language orthe ego defense mechanisms has so widely and thoroughly permeated cOlllemporary West.em culture that it is difficult to imagine how we could discus.� our 3\'Oidant tendencies wilhoUi such terminology. Psy.­ choanalysis asserts that we can learn more adaptive and task-Qriemed means of managing anxiety. The limitation, however, of the psychoan­ alytic approach s i that lhere are serious constraints on that potential due to our sinful nature (i.e.. we arc in need of divine intervention; we can't heal ourselve�) . Psychoanalysis essentially contends ulal all behavior is purposeful and motivated. This assenion is not inconsistenl with scriptural teach­ ings about the nature of human beings. Nor is the assumption about the crucial import."lnce of early childhood experience. Indeed, the Scriptures assert that the parenting relationship. like the marital rela­ tionship. ought to reflect the di\�ne-human encounter (cr. Narramore. 1979; Prov 22:6), with aU the inherem risk.� and responsibilities. The psychoanalytic a.�serlion of the imponance of familial, early life cxpe­ ever, constillHe a substantial contact point riences alone does not, ho..... with Christianity. as any reasonable under�tanding ofhuman life ""ould emphasize these primary relationships as formative. Model ofHMlth It should be evident from the earlier section on Freudian notions of health that the model stresses individualism oycr and against imerde­ pendence. We find this to be a maller of deep concern, since our understanding of the Christian tradition emphasizes a deep awareness ofour utter dependence on God and the absolute ncccssityofdevelop­ ing meaningful and significant relationships with others, both ... ,ithin . the body of Christ and in the broader community and socicry in which we live. Our concern is that the insight and self-awareness so deeply valued in the psychoanalytic tradition won't necessarily t.rdnslate into appropriate other-direcred behaviors. Rather, it will remain largely self-directed or self-serving. Pl»"Choanalysis is actually so oriented to understanding the person as a self
,

,

Ct..'IsSIe PS I '0 /0"-"' . ... 1-)'XIS

Browning

83

(1987) noted that a literal interpret.ttion of Freudian

thought would inc."itablr mak.e us skeptical aboUl ,,'hether or not thefe

is such a thing as authentic and legitimate altntistic service 1O.... � drd

others that s i free of sdf-sening gain. How could Freudian thought,

i the for cxamplt·, accoun t for the sacrificial service of Mother Teresa n slums of Calcutta? A dearly articulated, stable ethical system is lacking in psychoanal­ ysis (Browning,

1987, pp. 48ff.) . t.hough like all systems, it actually

contains an implicit system in its \'iew of heahh. The best description of its implicit et.hic might be that of a �calltious but fair re dprocity � (p.

49) .

It is a reciprocity system

because Freud recognized lhat if each

person 1Il timatcl), cares ani), about his or her own gratification. then

we must each trade gratifications to keep e'i'crrone satisfied_ It is cautious because Freud belieyed that libidinal energies arc ul timately

for our o.....n salisfaction. We cautiousl), gh'e to ot.hers so that ....'e can get what. we want.

But the stance of wcautious rcciprocilY� stands in stark. contr.tSt tD

the kind of costly discipleship and risk-taking inhcrem in Christian morality. Authclllic love for the other

(agaIN.) is not based on reciproc­

ity, but on ollr common family mcmbership on Chlist's example, and on the Spirit's cnablement. Granted. many ofour efforlS to be �Ioving� ,

Of distinctively and decidedl)' ;oChristian� in our compassion are less than noblc or pure. But the assumption in ps}"choanal)'sis is that there is no normative basis for responsible ethical decision-making and action. In particular, psychoanal}'sis is profoundly ambivalent about whether or not there can be an)' genuine commiuncnt to an absolutc like the love of Cod or

thc lo\'c of one's ncighhor. Psychoanalysis s i

brul.a.lly honest about our propensilY toward extrinsic motivation, but asscrts that intrinsic Illoth�.llion, especially in a rt'ligious Context, is largc1)' all illusion.

Another concern about lhe Freudi;m notion of wellnc� is its

eXIIeme emphasis on subjeclivism. Self-awareness tends to become a major goal of the maturation proce&'i. Our fear is whether a preoccu­ pation with the �inner reality � of onc's ps}'chic life will replace any appropriate concern about he t "outer realil}'� of God or the necessary i that obligations to the local church and community. Our I·mrst fcar s the psychoanalytic mindsct become so aU
ullhealthy narcissism and self-absorption that removes onc from en­

...,cf}·day living. No doubt therc is a need for gaging .....ith the world of t.

greittcr sdf-a.... -areness and understanding

n i our Christian communi-

84 lies, but this should notdcvelop into an escape from active involvement in the local church or with the lives of suffering persons. Obviously, a healthy balance between escape and eng-olgemenl is essential. The need

to KknO....• thyselr must nOt Tt!place the command to "love God and othen. �

What is desper.ttely needed in OUT Christian communities today are persons who can balance a desire and willingness to know sel(...dth an equally strong passion LO know Cod. This accords man�lously with

John Calvin '0$ discussion in the first chapter of his Instituus

of tJu

Chrislian &ligum (1.1. 1-2): Our wisdom, in SO far as it ought to be deemed true and solid wisdom, consists almostcntirelyoftwQ pam: the knowledge of God and of ourselves. But as these are connected together by many ties, it is not easy to determine which aCthe two precedes. and gives birth to

the other. For, i n the first place. no man

can

survey himself

.... ithout forthwith turning his thoughts toward God in whom he On the other hand, it is evident that man never attains to a true .sclf-knowk>dge until he has previously contem­ plated the face of God and come down after such contemplation to look into himself. lives and moves.

.

.

.

,

A final fear relates to aUf concern about the ultimate direction of the maturation process in psychoanalysis. As Christians, we must continu­ ally remind ourselves that our ultimate salvation comes from without, not from within. There is the distinct danger in psychoanalysis of a kind of gnosticism where self-knowledge is seen as a means (0 self-sah�dtion (cf. Vitt, 1987, p. 73). Specifically, the cultivation and expression ohhe Christian virtues (Roberts, 1982. 1984) should be seen as the apex of sanCtification for the committed believer, not self-alo'!-areness and in­ sight. The search for psychological wholeness ought not to replace our desire

(0

know God or pursue authentic holiness.

A wonderfully helpful example of how concerned and committed Christian theoreticians can correct some of these inadequacies can be found in two articles by Vitz and Gartner ( J984a. 1984b). At r.he core of the Freudian clitique ofChristianity is the assertion that unresolved Oedipal issues are found.-uional in the formation of one's superego (e.g.. lhe son tries to lake over the role of lhe father) . In contrast, a more theologically infomled understanding of tbe sacrificial love of the Son for the Father and how the obedienl death of the Son brings ultimale redemption, can iUusU-dle how we life of Jesus becomes a needed corrective for the unresolved issues of the "unredeemed self'

8J

caught in unresolved Oedipal tensions. In short,Jesus sen'es as a kind of "anti-Oedipus" who finds life by obediently doing his Father's will rather than trying to destroy the Father. Part afme "good new!� afthe gospel, then, is the potential power thai comes when the perpetual fear and self-hatred of the Father due to the Oedipal crisis can be replaced by a thorough transformation of the mind through conversion and Christian commitment. The "un�deemed self" studied by Freud can be changed into a "redeemed self' in Christ through the mystery of belief in the Incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection ofJesus. Modd of A/momvJ ; ty The psychoanalytic approach speak.s deeply and meaningfully to the origins and functions of symptoms. It seems foolish to dislegard the impact ofcritical life events in the fonnative years or to neglect the role of the ego defense mechanisms in the etiology and maintenance of l y follow "problems in living. � On the other hand, it does nOt necessari that one must dwell exclwive1yon these matters in order to help clients make sense of the rOOL5 of their difficulties. Psychoanalysis contends that the root ofmuch of our psychopathol­ ogycan be found in aberrant psychosexual deveiopmenL In particular. aggressh'e or sexual impulses are major det�rminants of our neurotic tendencies. This is not consistent with the thrust of Scripture. where our own drive to be autonomous and godlike (i.e., pride) is seen as a more basic sotln.:e ofmaladjusunent and sin �Narramore, 1985. p. 9(0). Sexual impulses are troublesome but have become so because of our rebeliion ag-diost God. The Freudian tradition is prone to reductionistic interpretations of the etiolog)' and maintenance of symptoms. This is inconsistent with the thrust of contemporary thought in the human sciences, where etiology is more accurately seen as a function of multiple factors for almost all disorders. Despite iL5 strong emphasis on the biological and instinctual bases for beha\;ors, Freudian thought has \'ery little to say about more re<:ent advances in biological psychiatry and medicine (e.g., neurotransmitters, chemical imbalances, genetic predispositions and so on). In its defense, psychoanalysis was originally focused on the concerns of reasonably high-functioning neurotics in a particular cultural and historical context. But the scope ofpsychoanalytic practice has been considerably broadened since iL5 inception. Traditional psychoanalysis needs a much broader base of social motivations and dynamics to be closer to a more biblical understanding

86

MOOf.RNPSYOIOTHERAPla

of persons. TIle more onc views psychoanalysis as notjust a tool in the therapist's armamenlarium, but as a lomrld view as well, the more difficult it seems to reconcile psychoanalysis and legitimate religious concerns (WalJace,

1983).

Model ofhydIotht:rtl.frY Responsible eclectic therapists find psychodynamic concepts like resis­ laIlce, transference and countertransference, and the ego defense mechanisms to be extremely useful in exploring (UITem difficulties in a client's life. runher. awareness of the psychoanalytic distinctives probably helps these same clinicians to have a greater depth of aware­ ness and underslanding in their efforts to assist their clients. Broadly understood, Freudian thought can be a powerful model for under­ standing behavior. Psychoanalysis, when practiced in its strict classical form. is widely perceived as impractical for !.he majority of mental-heal!.h seuings in this couOlry or abroad. This is due to !.he lime and expense that is invoh'ed and the limited availability of highly rrained psychoanal}'5tS. Few potential clientS have the necessary financial and personal re­ sources «(:.g introspc=clive and verbal skills) and f(:wer still are willing .•

to make the kind of commiunent of those resources that would be necessary for a successful analysis. The lofty goal of personality recon­ strUction is probably inappropriate and unrealistic for the vast majority of suffering persons. -ays to rranscend certain of these limitations. But there might be .... Klein

(1970) . for example. suggests !.hat society should underwrite part

of the cost of psychoanalysis for truly ne(:dy clients as well as a limited number of future psychotherapisu. He suggests !.hat this would con­ tribute much to the continued deo.·clopmeOl of the memal-heah.h movement and to the direct well-being of the persons invoh'cd. The Institute for Psychoanalysis in Chicago (Desnlisseaux,

1983) has been

exemplary in offering low-cost psychoanalytic training and treaunent to human-service providers (e.g., teachers, child<are workers, etc. ) . By ill\"esting in !.he lives ofthose persons �in the trenches,� they are making a long-Lerm contribution to the mental and emotional well-being of the lives their clients ....;ll touch. We respect the emphasis of this tradition on the tmining and supervision of fUlUre therapists. No major system of psychotherapy lakes the personal developmeOl of the clinician more seriously Ihan does psychoanalysis. Onty after years of personal therapy. spt."Cialized

87

CUSSICP:l'YCJlOA.NAl.YSIS

coursework and careful supervision of select cases c.tn the psychoana· Iyst become �certified.� Historically. theM! individuah ha\'e been trained initially as medical doctors and psychiatrists. bUI recently the way has been cleared for members of other mental·health professions 10 become certified analysu. With the incredible proliferation of

people-helpers in our society, the Glreful and meticulous preparation of the psychoanalyst i� certainly to be commended. Such If'3ining. however, is not v.ithout its risks. Psychoanalysis is often accused of being a professional guild, But even Vtithin that establishment many articulate and vocal critics can be found (e.g., Robert Coles, a committed Christian psychiatrist and Harvard profes­ sor) . But aI.1 too often the professional s i olation remains, creating for

all practical purposes rdther exclusive clubs of the rull)' initiated, �true belic\'cn.� This has done liule to create good will with other traditions withjn the mental·health field. We also have a concern that classic psychoanalytic rreatment is nOt necessaril}' a good model for either clinical or personal relationllhips. Certainly there is a need for clinicians to listen attenti,"ely and respect­ fully to the ,"erbalizations of their clients. But the risk is that the often cold, distant, anonymous style of the analyst

can

replace a more

balanced and genuinel), wann style thai v.'e more oflen assoca i te with authentic Christian lo\"e and concern. The anonymous relationship that rnay be necessary for the fonnation ofa tr.tnsference neurosis can cO\'ertly or even overtly communiC'dte deeper Y'.dues about relation­ ships in general. As Miller and Jackson (1985) have noted, notions of -ideal- clinical or penonal relationships should be deepl)' informed by

both societal standards and religious belief systems, Ps)'choanal)'tic therapy raises tough questions aboUl what if means to care for omen and be fully presenl to them. Specifically, it asserts that there is an essential place for the quiet receptivity of the psychoanalyst (KO\"e1,

1976) . But whether or not it should be the primary relational modality of the psychoanalyst is a maUer of intense;: debate both within and

ithout psychoanalytic circles. ... .. Finally, we Sl!nSl! a certain fatalism and pessimism in intensive and

long-term psychoanalytic rreatmenL Obviomly, a tremendous commit­ ment of time, energy and expense is Jl(�ede� to bring about increased self- control and self-regulation through greater insight and self-aware­ ness. Although we agree with Wheelis (1978) that change is all too often painfully slow and agonizingly difficult. the Christian faith commit­ ment raises the possibility of quick, dramatic change in an individual's

,\fOD£JiNPSYClf0111ERAP1ES

88 life (cr. Mclemore,

1982). Granted, persons bring into their Christian

convenion their �ra..... material,

W

but the possibilities for change are

certainly greater than psychoanalysis would have us believe, although perhaps less dramatic and sudden man many Christians .... ,ou1d like to believe. Still, lhe beliefin the possibility of the miraculous is at the root of some of the hope we ha\'c n i our Creator-God.

Conclusion Psychoanalysis deserves to be more than a whipping boy for conserva­ tive Christians. It is a comprehensi,'c and exhaustive system of person­

ality. psychopathology and psychotherapy that should be carefully considered bycommillcd and thoughtful persons of faith. Our primary concerns have to do ",ilh some of the metapsychological assumptions of the Freudian world view.

In our judgment, psychoanalysis as a therapy is probably inappro­ priate and impmctical for all but a very few carefully selected individ· uals. The model certainly needs !O be more clearly articulated so that the central tenets are amenable to more rigorous clinical and empirical investigation. But we still assert that it is highly advisable to think, on occasion, in psychoanalytic tenns so as to give greater structure and direction to our effortS to be effective change agents. On the other hand, the commiued Christian needs to offer dearly anicuJated cor· rectives to some of the deficiencies that can be found in this rradition, especially "'ith reference to the O\'Crly deterministic and naturalistic assumptions. We fuJly suspect that classic psychoanalysis will serve as a springboard for discussion. debate and dialog for decades to come in Christian counseling circles. Perhaps its most enduring legacy will be

that it gave birth to the approacht.-s discussed in the next chapter.

For Further hading &uch, M. (1980) . .l)otngpsydWlherofrJ. New York: Basic Books. All excellent cOlllempor.uy introduction to the process or ps)'(:hwnalytic psychotherapy. Brenner. C. (1973). An tln_ta" kxtboolc of pryChoolUlrysu. Garden City. NY: Anchor/Doubleda�·. A brierimroductioll to Freudian thought. Gay. P. (1989). TheFrnuJ rtodn. New York: W. W. Norton. TIle best oflhe many edited readers 3\-aiJabJe in prim «xlay. Gay ;' a highly respected freud Kholar. Meissner, W. (1985). Theories or penonaJiry and ps}"chopaLhology: Chwical

cu.SSlCPSYGIQANAl.YSTS

89

ps}·choanalysu.ln H.I. Kaplan and B.J. Sadod: (E
References Alston, W. (1967). Psychoanalytic theories. logical 5tat1U of. In P. Edwards (Ed.), Tht e11CJcIcptdUJ ofphikJsoph'j (Vols. 5-6) (pp. 512-516). New York: Macmillan. Arlow,j. (1984). Psychoanalysis. In R. Corsini (Ed.), Cunml f'.ryc/wlMmpia (3d ed.) (pp. J4-55). ltasca, IL: F. E. Peacock. Berger, K. (1988) . 77w lkwlopingf-Mm through tM lif,. j/Jan (2d cd.). New York: Worth. Brenner. C. (1973). An tlnrlentary tcdboole ofPSYc/warwl-pis. Garden City. NY: Anchor/Doubleday. BrowTling, D. (1987). Migirrus thought and 1M modern psychologies. Philadelphia: Fortress I'ress. Burnham. j. (1985). The encounter of Christian theology with det�rministic psychology and psychoanalysis. Bullttin "J'M Mmnillgtr Qink, 49. 321-352. Calvin,j. (1981). Instilutes ojlh.t Christian rtligiun tH. Bc\.�ridgc, Tnms.). Grand Rapids. MI: urdmans (original work published 1559). Corey, G. (1986). 1'1u!cry and practice oj fOU1Ulling ond psychollu:ro/11 (3d l'
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MODF.RNPSYCJIOTHElUJ'lES

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"orchil), S. (1976). MtJtkrn cliniuu prycJwlqgy. New York.: Basic Boob.

Ko\.'(:I,j. (1976). A WtllpINguilk to them",. New York; Pantbe<m. Kristol. l. (1970), God and the psychoanal),sts. In A. H. Cohen (Ed.), Arrmmts

and doctrill4 New York.: Harper & Row.

McLemore, C. (1982). The uandol 0/pfJcltotMm/J1. Wbeilton, lL: Tyndale. McLemore, C. (19&1). Hrmct CIIrntUmi ". Philadelphia: Westmini.5tcr. Meissner, W. (1985), Theori� of pcf$()nality and psychopathology: Classical

psychoanal)'$i,.11I H.1. Kaplan and B.J. Sadod. (Eds.), eamprrMnsivtlol1Joo«

oftnJehiolry (Vol. 4) (pp. 337-418). Bahimo�, MO: \\'illhuns and Wilkins. Miller. W., and Jat:bon. K.. (1985). Practical pryclwlogy P pasion. Englewood Cliffs, Nj:

Prentice-Hall.

Munroe, R. (1955), &JIQOO 0/�M1Jtjc fhttughl. NI:V>' York: Holr., Rinehart and Winston. Narramore, S. (1979). I'"",,ling with dl"'lv.m.

Namunore, S. (1984). No

Invt and limits. Grand Rapids.

Zon­

roruUmnaliQn. Cl
Narramore, S. (1985). Psychoanalytic psychotherapy. In Bahr eru:ycJoptdia

Ml:

D. G. Benner (Ed.),

ofpsyehoUJgJ (pp. 89&000). Grand Rapids, MI: Baker.

Oakland, J. (1977). The n i trojected and the inuinsic in psychology and Christianity. j<mrnai ofhydw/J)gf and 'T7u!oIog"

J, 91-94.

PtOpu iftlu tit.. New York: Simon and Schuster. (1979). SJ$IemJ ofPS'Jrhollu:rafrJ: A imJUtis«1mi{IJ1 anal)ris. Home­

Peck, S. (1983). i'rochuka,j.

","OOd, IL: Dorsey PrcS$. Rober15. R. (1982). Spirituality and hUlMn

tIItO

I;Q7I.

Grand Rapids, MI:

Ec:rdntans. Roberts. R. ( 1984). TM stmlgths ofa Christian. Philadelphia: We5tmini�r. Robinson. L ( 1 985). The ilIus.ion of no future: PS)'choanal)'5is and religion. }mIrnlll of tlu Amrrialrl .otcadt'InJ ojPrychoonaiJsis, /1, 211·228. Rychlak, 1- ( 1 973). Introdudion 10 �tmatity aml psyclu;Hhn-apy. Boston:

Houghton Mimin. Ryckman, R. (1985).

ThrorilJ of pmonaliry (!kJ ed.). Monterey,

CA:

Brooks/Cole. Silvennan, L. (1976). Psychoanalytic uu:ory. The reporu of my death. are greatly exaggerated. American hjchoWgiJt, )1,621.637.

Storr, A. (1989). FmuL New York: Oxford. Van Leeuwen, M. (1985).

1"" pt:rum in �: A wn'-f'071I" Christian

aPfJrnuaL Grand Rapids. MI: Ec:rdmans. Via, P. (1987). Secular pen
Mall and mind: A Chmlinn IhImJ ofpmonnUty (pp. 65-94). Hill5dale, MI: Hillsdale College Prns. Via. P. (1988). Sipllmd frrud's Christian UII� New York: Guilford. Yiu, P., and Gartner,j. (1 98401). Christianity and p5)'Choanalysis. part I: jcsus as the anti-Oedipus. Jf1Ilrnal ojhjdiolof:! aM 77uologJ, 12, 4-14. (Ed.),

Yin. P., and Caroler,j. ( 1984b). Christianity and pS)·c.hoanalysis, part JI:j�us as

the transfomlcr

of the

superego. Joumal 0/hj,1wiot:J and TIuolotrJ, 12,

82-90. Wallace, E. (1983). ReOecoonson the relaliollship between pS)'Choanalp.i5and

91

Christianity. Pastqral p¥)'choJor:1. Jl, 215-24.5. Walters. 0, (1973). PS}'I:hodyllamics ill Tillich's thcology.joumalof&ligirm and /{fflllh, 12, 342-35!t \\lheclis. A (1978), HfIW ptopW (ha"gr. New York: Harper & Row. Wood, B. (1980), The religion of psychoanalysis. Tlu Allltriam )ourrnll oj PrychO(JnalysiJ, 40, 13-26. -

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4 CONTEMPO Y PSYCHODYNAMIC PSYCHOTHE IES written with Michael W Mangis +

he contemporary psychodynamic psychotherapies are those schools Df thought influenced by Freud and classic psychoanalysis that have evolved substantially beyond or­ thodox analytic thoughL Christians ha't'e not been alone in being dissatisfied with the detenninistic and mechanistic assumptions of the Freudian system, which paint a picture of humans as isolated beings irrationally driven by biological, primitive drives weUing up within them, their personalities molded by discrete psychic structures inter­ acting mechanically and unconsciously to achie\'c compromises lead­ ing to drive gratification. Christians have also not been a10ne in seeing the rich possibilities of a system that seeks to understand the profound impact of early relationships upon our character, the mysterious way in which we are shaped by unconscious processes, and me pervasive presence of psychological conflict in our lives.

93

CONTEMPOR!l.RYPSlT.J/OOYXUUCPSYCJIOTHEllA.PlES

In fact, many argue that Freud himself led the ,,,;ay in attempting to resoh'e 50me afthe mechanistic and deterministic problems in his O\\-TI model. The focus of much of Freud's later work was on the ego as presented in The Ego and the /d (originally published

1923), In his

earliesl theorizing. when he was working from his �seduction theory, � Freud emphasized interpersonal environment as the cause of pathol­

ogy. He quickly moved away from thai position to a morc �5Cientific· view where psychological dC\'elopment was seen as an almost entirely internal and ·self-conlained process. The person was seen as controlled by biological instincts and drives and by the actions and fantasies 3S$OCiated with those drives. The ego had little true efficacy. Bm in

Ego and lhe 111, Freud began

to

The

acknowledge ag-din the role of the

environment, of relationships, in the development of the internal workings of the mind. Some theorists ha\'e suggested that Freud intended The Ego and lhe Id

to be

a major paradigm shift, a new direction in his thinking, but

others \·chcmcntly disagree. Thc classical psychoanalytic school, de­ scribed in the prC\ious chaptcr, believes Freud was not overhauling his thought but fine-tuning it. They havc remained true to the bulk of Freud's work and see psychological devclopmcnt as being entirely controlled by biological drives; the psychic Structures of id, ego and superego; and the effects of pS}"(hosexuai deo.·elopmenl. For the ttadi­ tional psychoanalyst, the instinctual drive model was and continues 10 be the only viable focal point for understanding human nature.

Descriptive Survey Whether it was his n i tent or not, Freud's new thinking about the ego did create a dramatic shift in some psychoanalytic circles, resulting in

several

new models and paradigms. These Neo-Freudian, or POSl­

Freudian, theorists share an appreciation for the way traditional psy­ choanalysis illuminates the complexity of our conflicting motivations and the influence of unconscious processes. Their key differences with

classic psychoanalysis have to do with the .... '3. ys in which these intricate

processes are explained. Generally speaking, their fonnulations are less hiologicaJ and mechanistic, and more respectful of cognitive and interpenonal processes. precisely because they have shifted from Freud', emphasis on id and drive to an emphasis on ego, self and relationships. As Cunnip

(1969, p. 326) has noted,

Emphasis has moved away from Minstinct entities" and their control,

,\fOlJF.R."PS¥OfOTIf}:RItPlES on to the \·ital problem of how we begin to grow an ego, Ihe core

i personal reality ofa personal self, in infancy; and how Ihis growth n is rooted in Ihe baby's environment ofpersonal relations. first with the mother, then the falher, family, neighbours, school, and the ever-widening world around. Contemporary psychodynamic thinking is usually divided into three camps (Pine,

1988): ego ps),chology, object-relations theories and self

psychology.

Ego pSYcMlogy,

usually dubbed the �Amcrican sc.hool,� stresses the

development of personality across the life span. It does not deny that cenain conflicts reflect id.impulscsstriving for immediate gratification, but it does asscn that the ego suivings for adaptability, competency and mastery are at least as important. The model is mosLly an adaptation of Freud's original thought ....i!.h a heightened emphasis on ego and relationships. Berond the tensions surrounding sex and aggression, issues ofidentity, intimacy and integrity be<:ome especially striking and salient in this tradition. Erik Erikson, Anna Freud, Heinz Hanmann, Rudolf Lowenstein and David Rapaport are among the major theore­ ticians in this rradition (cf. Korchin,

1976; Prochaska, 1984).

Olfrct rtwtions similarly emphasizes the outward focus of the ego,

rejects Freud's narrow range of hypothesized instinClli and d�mph... sizes or ignores his main psychic structures. Collectively ca.lled the "British school,� these theorists concentr,l.le on those first few years of life where !.hey beli(!\'e the foundation of the personality s i laid. Expe­ riences and relationships in these earl}' years, they assert, leave impres­ sions on

the personality that profoundly affect the indi'idual

throughoUl the life span. The main determinafll of personality is ithin us presumed to be the internalized images that we each carry .... of the primary relational figures ill our past (�objects� such as mother and father). Personality is !.hen understood primarily in terms of the relationships among and charaCleristics of these internalized �objects. � These internal imagcs or objects then are the primary psychic Struc­ tures, replacing id, ego and superego. The illlcrrclations of the objects create our psychological drives, rather than them weUing up from the id

(Edkins, 1985). The drives themselves arc deemed relational rAther

than crudely sexual and aggressive. Well-known theoris� n i this tradi­ tion includc W. R. D. Fairbairn and Duo Kernberg.

Self psythology.

established by Heinz Kohut and his followers, also

emphasi zes the experiences of the carly rean n i the de\'Clopment of a sense of identity after a process of differentiation and integr.nion (to

OOWl:.\U'OR.tRYf'S)'ClfOOI'NA..\1/CPSYCi/Of/fERAPlES

95

be explained shortly). If early relationships are healthy and nurruring, a SLable or �t.rue� self will devt:lop that is c.:apablc of malure reladon­ ships. If the early environmellt is charactcrized by dcprivation, how­ ever. the resuhing �f.dse" selfremains limited in its relationship capacity (Le., the indh,idual cannot \'alue both autonomy and community). A morc mature identity is olle that is open to input from others wiLhout a competing fear of being overwhelmed, Whereas the objcct-relation� school focuses 011 psycholobrical relations between internalized objects. self psychology goes the funher step of positing a strong entity of Stllf Lhat is not a scpar.lIc ps}'chic structure, but rather "might be said [to be] the sum of all these (inutlpsychic] entilies plus an unnamed imegrating function� Uohnson, 1985. p. 1052). Such a cohesive and higher-order entity is quite a dcparture from Freud's original Lhought. Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) point out thaL the three traditions share a common view of the primacy of cognitive and interpersonal processes as the building blocks of pe�nality, The ego psychologists accommodatc classic psychoanalysis by building upon it. Thcy modify the classical id-dri\'e model by emphasizing early. formative relation­ ships, A more rAdical alternative strAtegy. adopted by the obje<:t-rela­ lions theoristS, requires complete replacement of the dJi\'c concept with a strong interpe�nal model, Greenberg and M.itchell suggest that a third category, one of model mi.xing, describes the self psychol­ ogy of Heinz Kohut and his followers; they have adopted drive-model conceptS and mixed thcm with the relational model. Our rocus in this chapter will be on the commonalities of the psychodynamic models. Because each of the three models, and indeed different UlCorists within the thRoe tntditiorlS, can be radically differem ill stay at a general level in our presentation. from one another, we .... Because of the popularity of object-relations theory, .....e wiU discuss il more than the other models, As should be evident from the prc\'iolls chapter. many of the fundamental teneL� of classic psychoanalysis are simply irreconcilable .... ith an orthodox Christian world view. It is our judgment. ho.....e\'ef. that these contemporary variations on Freudian thought dcsen'c a closer inspection because of their rich integrative potential, These contemporAry psychodynamic movements ha\'e generally inherited the distrust of organized religion because of their roolS in traditional psychoanalysis. But lhere seems to be cons iderably less overt hostility toward religion in general in the writin� of these contemporary theorisLS than was u'ue of Freud himself.

% Further. psychodynamic psychotherapy has become enonnously influential in recent decades. In the judgment of many academicians and clinicians, these approaches have been fertile ground for broad­ ranging discussions about personaJil}'. psychopathology and psycho­ therapy. It is nOI surprising then that gro.....ing numbers of Christian mental-health professionals h3"C found these cver-evoiving formula­

tions LO be 1I.'!efui in relating lheir Christian faith :U1d practice wilh their

professional lives. I We suspeCt that !.he majority of Christian psycholo­ gists today would describe themselves as psychodynamic or at least "psychodynamically informed.� PhilosoplrimlAssuntflticnu Few ifany ofthe psychodynamic theorists have made the kindsofbroad dogmatic assertions thai Freud did, and this makes it difficult to expli­ caLC any fundamental philosophical presuppositions in these models. Since all are re\;sions of Freudian thought, all arc likely to share the naturalistic or materialistic assumptions ofpsychoanalysis. Yet all ofthe models ha\'C r�ected the mechanistic metaps),chology of Freud and have thus opened up the possibility for a more !atisfactol'Y resolu­ tion of the detenninism/causality issue than was possible with Freud. Nevertheless, none of the models, to our knowledge. havc explicitly embraced a limited human freedom stance compatible with Chris.­ tian beief. l We will dc...·velop in the critique below how this might. n i fact, be attainable. Workman

(1988) convincingly argues that thcse models share what

might be called a Msubjectivc epistemology� that is congruent ",ith contempor.try thinking in philosophical epistemology. The core ofthis view is that Imowable reality is a -function of the inner world of experience as perceivedH by the person (p.

3). External reality is

ultimately unknO\o\'able except through the intermediary of psycholog­ ical experience.

lin fact, W\'eral approachCf, to Christian counseling hil\"C their roou in this tradition. The work ofLake (1965. 1986), ailed 4dinial thcolog)'." is rundamelltally a derin.tivt' from

c;ontc:mponry ps)'Chodynamic: thought. spedfially of the objc:ct-",Iauon. ,-a riery. The "healing ofmemories'phenomenon (".g.

.

Linn and Unn, 1978: Seamarnh, 19M) 15 tw,R

undentoOd a'I a lay deri\lIti\'[ ofa ps)'Chod)llamlc und"nW1ding of pc:r�ms, though il propotn a dlr«tIy wpernaluraJ m"thodology for lH:aling. Hurding (19M) hat de<...,\'

oped :a thoughtful mtiqu" oIth" clinicakheology and h"a1lng-of-m"morl"511pproacha. Kirwan (1984) h..,;ilio d�'el0p"d ill (5)'Chodynamic approa,h 10 Christian coun!eling that he claims is compatible "'ith Chrutian belief.

,

,

97 Model ofPersonality

Object representations, or introfrcu, arc intrapsychic structures thai are significantly affe<:led by interpersonal relations. More specifically. in­ trojecLS arc the memal representations of the self and others (the

objects) <\5 mentioned previously, the central LCnCt of psychoanalysis .

.

and of pS}'chodynamic theories in gener.tl is thal each individual has an internal world lhal is affected by the past and which, in (urn, affects one's functioning in the present. external world. According to object­ rclations theories, the past affects us through intema1ized memories and images of events and relationships. We aTe usually not conscious of these imprin ts bUI they influence our daily lives in profound and ,

significam ways.

When we inlCI-aCI with a person we aTe relating nOljust 10 me real

person that stands before us but to an internal representation or idea that we have of who that person is. It is seldom possible for that internalized representation of the person to

be wholly based on the

real ity of who the person is. Ralher, our perception is colored by past images of events and people. In a sense, we relate to real people through our n i t.ernal representations of past relations. For example. a person may look like someone we once knew; or someone Illay be in a

position of authority and therefore stir up melllories of our parents; a person's mannerisms or lone of voice may sel ofT other cues, and so fonh . In shan, we transfer parts of past images of people (often called objm rrpr�mlll.tions) onlo others. If these past mages i are strong enough, and ifour ability to sort out lhe distortions from the reali ty is

weak enough, we lIlay act and feel in quite unrealistic ways to....'ard lhis person. We may feel resentful

to.... 'ard them when they have done

nothing to anger us. We may feel dependent on them for no apparent

reason. Our feelings may vary dramatically tOward them in any given encounter or across lime. in addition 10 these internal representations of others, ",'e have internal representations of ourseh-es. In our earliest interactions with the imponant people in our enviromnent we form ideas ofwho we are. A common example is the "gleam in the mother's ere. �When an infant gazes up into his mother's eyes, her expression provides the child with a mirror m i age of himself. These mirror images form the earliest perceptions of .self. If we are treated with adequate nurturing and protection we will develop a whole and integrated sense of self.

This

representation "'ill include a realistic awareness ofhoth good and bad quali ties coexisling. In an emironment where the needs are not

MOOt:R.VPSI'QlfYTtlI!JW'IES

98

adequately met, however, this integrated sense of self (anllot develop. . arc is fonned. Imlead, an incomplete or inaccurate sense of who ....e The development of the

mature,

or inu.-gratl!d, self is thought to

rake place in $C\'cral stages through the first few yean of life. To adequately complete a stage. parents need to meet the needs of the child in a loving and consistent fdShion. In their study of yOlmg children, Mahler man,

( 1968) and her associates (Mahler, Pine and Berg­

1975) utilized object-relauons theory to provide a model of Lhe

psychological birth of the child, which is considered to take place over

the ,.... -0 yean follov.ing lhe biological birth. They suggest that the self

develops in lhrec primary Slages. From physical birth (or perhaps C\'en within the womb) until approximately twO momhs of age. !.he normal infant exists ill the Glllism sta8J!. characterized by what is called �absolUle primary nardssism.� During this phase. infants are aware only of physical �nsations which they experience as globally pleasant or UIl­

v ..een selfand external pleasant. Children are not able to distinguish bet world; they have no sense of identity whatsoever. In the symbiotic

stagt,

from about two to six months. the infant

experiences a sense of oneness or symbiosis with the primary caregiver. The child s i presumed to be only aware of the functions that the parent

sen'es in meeting the needs of the infant. TIlUS. the infant \�ews the parent as something of an �object.� From six months to two years, the child is engaged in the process

of stparati()1l and illdividualicm. which has sev er ....] stages. The child first begins to focus externally. rather than on her

own

bodily scnsations,

As she begins to move ahout and explore her world. and to be able

to

affect her .... ,odd (by grabbing things, etc.), her sense of separateness or difTerenUless from the external world is heightened, This usually resulUi in ambivalence as the child is conflicted bclWeen feelings of independence and wonder. on the one hand, and fear, on the other, which results from the loss of the ever-present

sense

of the parent's

reassuring presence, These feelings feed the infant's sense of the parent as good and i()\ing but also bad and frustrating. Similarly, the child begins n i this slage to realize that she can aL'iO be good and bad, For normal development to occur, the parent must walk the fine line ofhoth encouraging independence ....hile . continuing

to serve as a source of protection and nurturauce. Overemphasis on either extreme can result in personality disturbances. If this phase is successfully navig-.lled, the child achieves the optimal resolution of being able to inlernalize meDlal represenunionsofparent and self that

CONTr...... ro Rlt Rl 'I'�WC1fOOr.v.t.M1C PSlCllOTIfE.RAPlf:S

99

. are stable, realistic (n -cogni zing good and bad in self and parent) and

comforting (because the parent'S love and protection are ....ith the child even when separated from the parent). The child feels loved and

lovable, and has a sense of her capacity for independence and interde­ pendence. Since we carry around internal images of ourselves and of others, relationships can become complicated evenl�. Not only are fWO real people interacting. but one's internal image of oneself is relating to the internal image of the other person, and the saille is happening n i the other person as welt In a reasonably mature individual the internal objects, or representations of self and others, have been aUowcd to dewlop adequately and come close to external reality. In a person who has been subjected to inadequate or nonexislelll parenting there is little ability to discriminate between the reality and the distoned internal objeCls; this person 5eems to be responding to an "inner agenda� rather than true interpersonal reality. This function of dis­ criminating between the internal images and the external reality belongs to the ego, and this emphasis on the relation between the internal images and the external realit), is the primary difference between contempord.TY psychoanalysis and its classical ancestry. (This interest in relationships is also what led to the establishment of an object-relations school of family therapy,

flS

discussed in chapler

fourleen.)

Mod
unaware

of the existence of othen. A5 the child dt. ...·c1ops, a

process oflcaming to separate and individuate from others takes place. The child learns to differentiate self from other, and can calT}' on a healthy, interdcpendelll relationship with another person. Such a relationship s i characterized by a V"a1uing of other persons for more

than their usefulness in meeting needs and desires. Maturity is, then.

�lhc realization of our full potentialities as persons in personal relat.ionships� (Gun trip, 1969, p. 324). One of the most refreshing aspects of contempor.lr)' pS)'chody­ i its definition of health. This is somewhat ironic namic psychology s since it, like its psychoanalytic counterpart, is essentially a psychology of sickness. This focus on the abnonnal is obvious in light of the "�ar in which the prc\ious discussion of personality theory turned quickly to a discussion of disruptions of development. Psychodynamic lheol'y

100

!o'OO€RNPSYCHOTIlERAPiES

has been constructed through the clinical ex�riences of the theorists

who practice therapy. Such a system is necessarily skewed toward finding pathology. Neverthdess, by extrapolating from the theories of pathology and byobserving the health that is there. as well cu the health thai develops, a model of maturity can be de\·eloped. The mature adult. according to the relational model, sees self and others in a constant way that de.. iates only minimally from reality. The adult is, as a result, capable of enjoyable and interdependent relation­ ships. Such individua1s have learned to value others for qualities beyond their usefulness (unlike the narcissistic permo). They can a1so view self and others as having an integration of both good and bad qualities .....ithout ha\ing to either reject or idealize othen on the basis of passing moods Of pressing needs (unlike the person with a border­ line personality disorder). Since the mature indhidual perceives the world, and other people, accurately, there is no need for exaggerated psychological defenses. Defenses are built initially against the real ha7.ards of the world-pain inflicted, acddenlally or intentionally, by people or events of our childhood. Later, however, we continue 10 project the threats of pain onto the world or people in the world when, in reality, those threats do not exist. The mature n i dividual trWts others but remains aware that at times of potential pain the self may need to be defended. Mod
101 can bcrome distoned in many Wd)'S. One common example is an inability to �own· or experience as part of oursch-es those aspects that our parents found unacceptable, as when a parent rejects a child when she is needy. This may resull in a fragmented psychology wherein the Mbad" parts are "split off" ITom the acceptable parts, and the person's sense ora coherent identity is damaged. Freud essentially di\;ded psychopathology into two categories, neu­ rosis and psychosis. Psychosis, the inability orthe ego 10 interact with the reality of the external �'Orld. was seen as largely untreatable

through traditional psychoanalysis. Neurosis, however, reflected unre­ soh'cd conflicts from the O<..-dipaJ period of dt.'ve!opment. The individ­ ual gencraJly remained cognizant of realit)" and had established the capacity to develop a u-ansference relationship which

was

seen as

essential for a successful course of psychoanalysis. Other analysIS, working with populations morc diverse than those visiting Freud in Victorian Vienna, found that lTlany nonpsychotic patients were untreatable using the techniques of classic psychoanaly­ sis. These patients were nOt capable ofsustaining a consistent sellse of self or of olllers and were, therefore, unable to invest in the necessarily intense analytic relationship. The consistent variable in the personality of such patients

... .. as

thc focus on pre-Oedipal disturbances in their

relationships, disturbances rooted in problems before the age of four. Thc existence of such patients suggested a realm of abnormality between neurosis and psychosis. Initially, these patients werc seen

a.,

walking a fine line between

neurosis and psychosis, what some called a �borderline" state. In time, psychodynamically orieOled clinicians began to view this state as an entirely separate cluster of srndromes. the "perwnality disorders,� constellation of with features unlike either lIle neurotic or psychotic . .

symptoms.

Disruptions in the early de"elopment of object relations aTe usually considered to Icad to the formation of either

narcissistic or bordnfint

disorders. What any two theorists mean by either of these terms,

howc"cr, can y.try ....idely. . Stone

(1986), for example. has identified six

different uses for the term borr:Urlint in describing personality dysfunc­ tion. While theorists may disagree as to the number, differen tiation and organization of personality disorders, they consistently assert that

disruptions n i early relationships lca\'c Ihc personality in an m i mature

or incomplete state, largely incapable of forming healthy and lIlature adult relationships. By dcfmilion, an indhidual with a personality

.

,

102

MOIJ;}{ f V PSl'CJfOnlt:/W'IU

disorder has remained "stuck in pre-Oedipal development and is thus alwa}'! looking for ways to MsatiSfYM unmct needs. A neurotic individual, by comparison, has a reasonably wcll-dc\'elopcd personality. hut is still unable lO eff(!t:livcly manage anxiety in his or her lile. There is disagreement as lO whether the infant is born with a complete and unblemished egoor3 frdgmented ego in need offurthcr development. Relational model theorists agree, however, lhat the ade­ quate development afulc personaity l depends on the care and nurtttrc provided by the primary parental figure(s). The parelll who adequately meets the child's needs. or to use Winnicou's ( 1 965) term, the good­ enough parent, provides the child with the necess."lry raw materials for the development ofa consistent and heahhysense of selfand the world. As men [joned earlier, the parent whose net:ds were not adec!uately met in her or his own childhood probably cannot adequately meet those needs for the child. Instead the child will be provided ....ith conditional love and an inconsistent or negative sense ofl\·orth. The relational model's emphasis on the effects of [he behavior and mOli\'ations of the parent on the personality of the child has been criticized by feminists and others as �Illother-bashing,� particularly since the mother is typically the primary caregiver (cf. Van Leeuwen, 1990, pp. 125-143). Indeed, the responsibility ror the adequacy of the child's personality is placed disproportionately on the shoulders ofthe parents. The child is not able to have much volitional control over the dt.'Velopmem or reparation of his or her personality until [ate adoles­ cence at the earliest. This certainly places an awesome responsibility on the primary caregivcr(s). ft

Mockl of17ychotherafrY One of I.he strengths of lhe psychodynamic model s i the direci link between theory and therapy. The theory s i derived rrom the clinical work ofLhe lheorists with their clients. Because we are fundamentally relational beings, healing can only come through relationships. The core assumplion is that healthy relalionships have Iherapculic po­ tential. In the classical approach to psychoanalysis tJle patient-analyst rela­ tionship was defined by transference. The analyst is an anonymous and blank call\"as on ....·hich the patient recreates the \"icis..�ilUdcs of his or her past. Any feelings or personal involvemelll on the panofthc analyst are seen as countertr,l.nsrerence. the therapisr's own unresoh'ed neu· i fair to say that tJle classic analytic relationship rotic conniclS. Thus, it s

/03

CO.\7F.MPOR-IRrPSITJlOOr,v,v.Uc f:)I'CJI011l£R.WIJ-;S

is not a real relationship at all. Greenberg and Mitchell

(1983) argue that the relational psychody­

namic models see therapy quite differently from the classical model. Thcrdpy is a relationship. The analyst and the patient participatc n i a dynamic interaction. Transference is an irnponam part bUl the therapist cannOI be a blank canvas. Who she isasa person wi l l necessarily influence the transference. Cowllertransference (the reaction of the therapist LO the client) also plays an important part. R..ther than being the m i maturi ty or '\lIlflllished business� of the therapist, it is

an

eS5Cntiai 1.001 and

empathetic guide LO the patient's inner experience oftbe ,,·:orld. in a sense lhe transference and COwllel1rdnsference imer.acl as in a dance. a mutua! event. In all likelihood. therapy may be the fIrst authentic or consistent intimacy Ihat many patients have encountered The mpersonal i and artificial methods ofclassical analysis had to be discarded. becaust: in this model the only hope for real change for the client is through a real relationship, and not through Ie
1983, p. 390)

Object-relations theories do nOt prescribe lechniques or exercises for therapy. On the contrary, the spontaneity and mutual exploration of the I'elationship constiLUte the healing process. The therapist does not keep the theo'1' always in mind. It becomes second nature, �the invisible backdrop, the unseen framework, within which lhe ana­ lyst hears the patient's stOry � (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 15). While the patient remains always the focus of the relationship (therapist self-disc1osure is not a common practice), the clinician is present in a real and intense W".ly ror the patient. Through mirroring back to lhe patient the therapiSl's own experience of what the patient is S3)ing, the therapist provides lhe patient the experience of being unde.-stood and valued. In such a context, it is asserted that the vit a l internal representations ,

of primary figures. which fonn the core of personality, will begin lO

,1l focus on past and present experiences to encour­ emerge. Therapy .... age this uncovering. What makes therapy different from other relation­

i that ships (where internalized representations al'e JUSt as operative) s the trained therapist can recognize distortions based on maladap-

MOOERSPSYCJJOTII£RA.NES

104

i the relationship in such a waras to live inner images and can main tan allow the client to begin to change these imag� and come to have a more accur,He understanding of self and the in terpersonal environ­ ment. The countertransference, or responsive and reacth-c state of the therdpist, is her or his primary tool. TIlcrapy hinges on it. The subtle confrontations or interpretations of the patient "s experience of the world are chosen ;md worded through the matrix of the thenlpist's experience of the world. A healthy therapist willjudge the maturity ofLhc patient'S behavior wilh reasonable effectiveness and accuracy. He can monitor the coun­ tertransference and separate much of what is his internal interpreta­ tion of reality from that of lhe patient. An imm:uurc therapist. howe�·er. can model a dislOrted sense of maturity and influence the c1iem to de\'elop according to lhe therapist's faulty perspective. Little possibility exislS, in this theoretical framework, for the therapist leading the patient to a greater level of maturity than the herapist t has personally attained. Psychodynamic therapies are typically longer term and do not foclls directly on problem resolution. A rreauncnt course of twice weekly meetings over a three-to five-rear period for those v,ith personality dis­ orders seems to be the norm. While insight is still often an important goal of the therapy process, it is not considered the primary goal. Through their relationship, client and therapist strive to develop the cli�nt's ability to relate to sclfand others in healthy ways unencum­ bered by painful rel ato i nships from the past. In a real sense this is a chance for meeting needs left unmel since childhood. This process is primarily experiential, although the c1ient"s ability to refleci on the experience and gain insight into these issues may play an imponaOl role. As opposed to otlle!" approaches which we will CO\'er laler, there is little faith in the client's capacity to grapple directly and rationally with the true detenninants of his or her problems. Rather. the thcmpist must work to cultivate change gradually, through skillfully guided explorations of the client·ther.lpist relationship and other current relationships and their m i pact on the client. A� insight grows and the relationship between client and therapist becomes morc innuemial, the tllcrapy scssion can actually become a powerful context for re-ex­ peliencing one s relationships \\1111 others in a way that is freeing and fruitful. '

•

P'

,

Christian Critique

Philosophical Assumptions In reacting against the scientism and mechanism of classical dri\'e theory, comemporary psychodynamic pS)'chology has adopted a theo­ retical undersmndingofhuman natUre based primarily on the analysis of human relationships. Object-relations lhcorists look firs! and foremost at the primal}' attachments made between children and the caregivers in the early dcvelopmental yean;. Other biological, psychosocial and sociocultural variablcs are deemed as less forma­ tive on later personality development and functioning. These influ­ ences are n o t seen as irrcie\'ant, only less uniquely and fundamentally Mhuman.M Who we are and who we tend to become, they argue, can best be understood in the interpersonal context. In basing the foundation of its psychology on the relational rather than biological components of personality, psychodynamic thoory has essentially taken a step back into the phenomenological and philo­ sophical realms in which psychology as a discipline began. In embrdc­ ing such an emphasis and in moving away from a mechanistic model, psychod)namic theorists have removed many major obstacles for Chris­ tians who appreciate their model. Object-relations theory lends itself to questions of human nature, values and subjective experience. Not surprisingly, object relations has b(."Come a realm for creative discussion among theologians and Christian mental-health professionals. Object-relations uleorists claim that humans ha\'e an inherent cap. "l city and need for relationships. Gunlrip ( 1969), for example, suggests Ihat Mthe universe has begoucn us ",,1th an absolute need to be able to relate in fully personal terms to an environment that we feel relates bcneficcnu)' to us� (p. 328). Such a statemcnt is reminiscent of the discussion in chaplcr two about the relational nature ofhumankind and how 50me sa)' u,is is the central feature of what it means to be creau�d in the image of God. Vanderploeg (198Ia, 1981b). White (1984), Greenlee (l986) and others have noted how this common ground-an emphasis on the centrality of relationships-provides a foundation for ule integration of the relational model and Chrislian thought. Further, the notion that we internalize ollr relationships, that uley become part of us, corresponds with Christian belief in marital union (Eph 5). family relatedness in the body of Christ (I Cor 12) and (.'wn the notion of God residing in our very being when we become his child.

/06

is a purely psychological understanding of relatedness, but it is at least a step in the right direction. Since the relational model addresses itself to thaI which is funda­ mental to human nalUre, the place of sin and particularly of original sin plays a prominent role in a Christian critique of its Lheories. Henrlef50n ( 1975, 1977) points to a parallel betwecn lhe object-rela­ tions view of the infant's earliest st.age of primary narcissism, or eg� centrism. \\ith the Judeo-Christian \iew of original sin as selfishness. a 5ense of omnipotence or ofviewing self as the cenler of the universe. He suggests. hov,ever, mal �the approach of dynamic psychology, in commSl to thaI ofmcology. is lO assist the individual ego to search for, discOl:er and know its inherent quantum orbadnes. � in the view that a badness which is well-known and familiar is mereby rendered impoLent� (1975, p. 114). Christianity, however, goes further b)' offering forgh'tness fur and vicrory Surely theirs

moer sin. rather than merely rendering it psychologkalty impotenL Again.

though, this is a step n i the right directioll, and there are almost certainly helpful aspects of this psychodynamic understanding afhow \\'t: come 10 overcome our own -badness.� One resuh of the classic psychoanalytic approach has been a grad­ ual erosion ofaconceptof.fin. What theology had ascribed to sin, Freud ascribed to symptoms of illness, especially to ps)'chological defenses. A person is not ·bad� but -ill: Henderson (1977) resists this tendency with the accurate rationale that such a vie¥.' tends to steer us away from -individual human accountability for the human situation- (p. 427). He sugges1.5 that -psychothernp istS should bring a concept of sin back into theirwod:. and emphasiz.e personal moral culpability and accoullt­ i consistent with the ability as vital to mental health- (p. 432). -Illis s view of psychodynamically oriented clinicians such as Peck (1983) and Menninger (1973), and is a move all Christians can applaud. The importance of individual moral culpability notwithstanding, a psychod}namic perspective may have 5()mething to leach us aboul sin. To search far a psychological Factor in some forms of sin does nOl require a correspondin g diminution of personal accountability. Si nce early deprivation C:lIl leave the pe.rsonalil)' in an immature and vuln er­ able SL'lte. itscems feasible that some means ofprotccung the selfcould reflect our sinfulness. This would not equate sin with defen$(;, but some sins could sef\"e a defensive function. Sexual sins. for example. might, in 5()me cases, be motivated by early Ullmet needs for int imacy. A propensity toW'"dTd gossip might be motiV".ned by an inner need to feci superior to others. This controversial area of human accountability

('.l)NTl-:!,IPOMHrI'WC/{(JOJ'NAMiC I'SYc/I071{ERltPfES

107

l e ground for dialog between theolO!:.>ians and psycho­ may providc fcrti dynamically oriented clin icians. Specifically, grcatcr awareness and understanding of the nature of sinful behavior may aid in more effective (albeit limited) interventions that address it. Obviously, human beings in and of themselves are pov.·erless LO ameliorate either the ultimate causes or efTens of sin. But thex can serve an impormnl and vital role a.� being agents of ..econciliatio� and renewal in human relationships. Discllssions conccrning moral accountability inevitably raise phi l {)o sophical questions as to the ex.istencc of free will. On first glance, contcmporary psychodynamic thought, in abandoning or altering the emphasis on biological instincts and dri\'cs, appears to ha\'C rejected the accompanying assumptions ofdctcnninism . In an apparent rejec­ tion of dcterminism, Cunu'ip

( 1 969, pp. 330-331) states that:

We havc non-dynamic behaviour theonesdescribing human beings asjust rcperLOircs of behaviour panems 10 be treated by techniques of reconditioning. . . O .. er and against this is the dynamic psychol­ .

ogy of the psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic schools, standing for man's basic freedom and right not to be manipulated, bUlIO be supportcd till he can find his own proper mature sellhood. While proponents of the relational model may seem 10 have wholly accepted the concept of free will, it is more likely that most have, n i Evans's

( 1984, 1989) terms, rejected a �hard" detenninism. which

acknowledges the incompatibility of psychological causation and human freedom, for a "soft" dctenninistll. which simply redefines freedom lO make it secminglycompatible with psychological determin­ s i m. In both cases, imemal forces exert powerful influcnces on our thoughts, feelings and behaviors. But lhe relational models are much more amenable to a "libertar­ ian" perspective on personal responsibility than is classic analysis. Evans

(1984) has. ill fact, argued forcefully that contemporary psychody­ namic theory really has no need to retain the deterministic assumption of psychoanalysis. Eliminating thaI assumption would eradicate a stum­ bling block for Christian utilization of this approach. He argues that these approaches arc quite compatible \\<; th a type of "limited free­ dom." We exist in the contextofollr personal histories. We are certainly influenced in powerful and significant ways by past relationships. We do nOt have to assume, howevcr. that this history "forces" us to behavc in a prt.."dclcrmined \\·ay, but rathcr provides "probabilities" of how we will act. Wi thin certain boundaries. wc have freedom and are. there-

MOOF.RNl'SrCJIOTIfI:RttPIES

108

fore, still accountable for our actions. MOth" ofhnonality amJ Abn .,./h a l i ty While the emphasis of object-relations theorists is on the parents' impact on the child's personality, they do so-ess that no paren! can be pelfect. only "good enough." Kohut even emphasizes the importance

of occasional failures by the parents 50 as to aid the intemalization of

the child's sense of responsibility for the maintenance oCher or his own self-image. i difficult to criticize the relational model rOfits emphasis on the It s impomnce of the relationship between parent and child for person­ ality development. If the imago dn (the image or God) is at some level a need for relatedness. it follows that our healthy dt ....,e\opmcm ,,"'Quid depend largely on the adequate meeting of lhal nced. and LhalOUI' earliest and most profound relationships would leave powerful impres.­ sions on us. Greenlee (1986) has pointed out that the dynamic of persons deprived of adequate caring in childhood in tum depriving

their own children might be seen as a ....·ay in which the sins of the fathers are passed on to the succeeding generations (Ex 34:7). Cer­

tainly the notion of intcrgenerational sin and psychopathology de­ serves more serious allention in our religious circles in light of the alarmingly high rates of childhood trauma (e.g. , phYSical and sexual abuse) . TIle view of

imagv cki as

"need for relatedness" certainly is not

restricted to relations with olher humans snch as parentS. According to a Christian creatiollai perspective, the need it.self arises from the fact

that humankind

as .... �

cl'eatL-d for relationship with Cod and others. It

is nOt surprising, then, that being created for ;, relationship .... ith God and being born into a ....orld . where we find only broken and fallible images of God, we should have difficulty finding adequate resources for the building of a mature self capable of healthy relationships.

It is

also not surprising that we should have JUSt as much difficulty de\'elop­ ing a healthy relationship with Cod as with other hWllan beings. . are ne\'enheless on this eanh Though created for this relationship, ....e separated fTom Cod, anqthus there "ill always be a hunger for a greater sense of connectedness with him. This laner difficulty, that of relating to Cod, has been a prominent area ofdiscourse between object-relations theorists and Christian theo­ logians. The center of this discussion has been how individuals image or conceptualize God. This area of reseilrch de\'Cloped Ollt of the

CQ"'7�IPQH.JV/rPSI'CJlOOYNAMIC1'!i}'(',!IOlHF.RAffl:S

109

common and pUl.7.ling observation thaI people have radically different core views of God even within the same religious groups (e,g., God as Daddy. Judge. Distant Originating Cause, Buddy, Cosmic Vending Machine. etc.). Ana-Maria Rizzuto (1974, 1979) is probably best knov.n for her work in this area. She draws on the ob ject-relations concept of internal representations, developed in e-.u-ly childhood, which later influence our interactions with other people and our world. She suggest! that in infancy, the child, dependent on the parents for the provision of even the most elemental needs, creates an idealized representation of the parenl as God. \\'bile later development will lead to separ.\te representations for the parents. tltis original Cod-image remallls.

TIlls concept is not new to psychodynamic thought. As discussed in chapter tllree, Freud saw the child's view of the parents as the origin of belief in Cod. He enjoyed a play on words of the Genesisaccounlof God making humankind in his own image and suggested that. instead,

humankind makes God in its own image. Freud saw God as an individ­ ual and corporate myth arising OUI of early relations with our own human fathers. The healthy adult must, therefore, abandon the infan­ tile belief in a supreme being and resign herself or himself to the relative and impersonal nature of the universe. The object-relations perspective of our image of God is decidedl)' more tolerant than that of Freud. Rizzuto sees one's image ofGed as a dynamic and creative part of the self which can grow and chauge. particularly as our perceptions of our parents. the original models for the God-image. grow and change. Cuntrip ( 1 969) argued lhat � 'rcli­ gious experience' is the same kind of 'Stuff' as human 'personal relations experience' � (p, 328). and that a relationship with God is the �personal hean of reality- (p. 331). Such a relationship, he suggests, can contribute to the maturation and int r or the del'eloping egation perronality. Rizzuto ( 1974, p. 98) did not take her interpretation this ,

far but did suggest lhat such a s)'Stematic grasp of the sources and the adaptive or maladap­ tive potential of internalized God-images within the larger uleory of object relations would be, I submit, a useful LOol, notjust in the hand of the clinician, but also in the hands of ule minister. rabbi and priest in lheir pastoral work as well as in the religious education of children. But ulere isstill potential here ror views ulat are destructive oftNe faith

as conceived in onhodox Christianity. Guntrip, for example. regards

MODEN.., PSYCHO1'lIt:f<.'lI'll;!; .

110 Cod

a.'I

an -indefinable term

-

(1969. p. 331). Similarly, religion as a

relationship with God is an overall way of experiencing life. of experiencing ourselves and our relationships together; an experience of growing personal integration or scJf-reali1 .ation through communion with all that is around us, and finally our way of relaring to the univer$C, the lota. reality which has. after all, evoh'cd us with the intelligence and motiv:'ltion to explore this problem: all that is mealll by �expcrience ofGod.- (p.

326)

An internal relationship with a more hcahhy image of God or the uni\'crse ",;11 remain, however, a unidirectional relationship. It is relat­ ing to an illusion within. When we foml an inlCmai image or repre­ senlalioll of our parent, on lhe other hand, it originates out of an aw,'!mpt to relate LO the real person of the parent. No malter how distorted that intemal image of the parent is, thc potential alwa� exisu for further interactions with the parent and further maturing of the selflo lead to a more accurate and �reality-basedP internal image. Such a relationship is bidirectional. We can test aspects ofour internal image againsl the real pel'SOIl and the real pt:rSOIl c:an take action 10 attempt to altcr our internal image of her or him.

A

secular objeCl-relalions theory cannot conceive of an internal

relationship with an internal image of Cod as bidirectional. In fact, any belief in a real supernatural world ill which the rcal God CXisL� would be interpreted

a�

MOUt-
worship" (Guillrip.

1969. p. 329), a projection of our own subjective beliefs onLO an impersonal external ....orld. . If this view were tme, then Christianity would subsist purely of personal or coltective aULObiogra­ phy. reprc5emations and images of God as recorded by our ancestors. together with our individual inner images of God formed in the context of relationships with significant others. Obviously this runs the risk of developing into a theology of personal subjective experience only (see discussion ofJungian psychology in chapter five) . Such a perspective by a sc<:ular object-relations theorist could allow for our image of God and our religion to be healthy. important, even artistic and poetic, but could nOt see ilas a rcal relationship with a real person. The LCmptation. of course, is to believe that the discovery of lhc source and the distOrtion of our image of God is lhe end. to conclude that "we have discovered God and he is us.P It is tempting to see an MalmostM relationship with ollr internal image ofGod as the same thing as a relationship with God. to confuse sentimentali y t about vague

J./ Of warn

II/

CO. \71::M I 'OI!.tRYI'!ItDIOO}'.\'AMIe1"!>1'CIIOTlIFJM.PI£S

ith a true relationship. It seems plausible, after all. religious impulses .... that our illlag� of God could be distorted by our el'periences \";th fallen people. l..'Spccially parents, in a fallen world. The slope can be quite slippery from that point. howe\'cr. Having �psychologizcd� our experience of God, it ilIay then .seem logical to conclude that what Chfistians often interpret as their experience of God is actually the work of the

unconsciOllS,

and

so,

perhaps, we should worship the

"God-image- in all of us. To counter this, more accurate conceplS of the Creator-God must be shaped in the context of Christiall worship. education, fellowship and service. We need the inpUl of these external sources for corrcctive feedback ag-dinst ollr subj«ti\·e and

projective

tendencies. TIle .seductiveness of these arguments does not invalidatc the possible helpfulness of the object-relations theories. Knowledge of early development may truly n i fonn us about distortions in our images of God; ths i knowledge could serve LO lead us

LO a

truer and more

intinrille relationship with God and others, JUSt as undemanding how our spouse is in reality quilC different from our internalized image of -r..lommy- or "Daddy- can aid the matur.uion of our marriages. It can take on an important role in therapy, especially .....hen .....e k. now that in

Christ ....e . have a current.

....o-\\o'ay t .. relationship with a li\ing, objectivc

God both through the Word in us and the written Word, �Iiving and active, [sJharper than any double-edged sword- (Heb 4: 12). The relational model ofcontempOl-ary psrchodynamic psychology may also provide helpful

insights into ho....' our image of God can gro.....

and become more healthy as our capacity for relationships goes through its necessary healing and maturing process. We ....ould . note in dosing thai this notion of the God-image being profoundly shaped by parental images has been subjected to careful empirical assessment. Spilka. Hood and Gorsuch

(1985, p. 81) summa­

rize the rcsulu of lhis research by slating thallhe complex.it)' and the subtlety of the hypothesis, and the difficult and challenging measure­ ment issues involved. make this a very complicated question indeed. The existing data provide some modest support for lhe projecli\'e hypothesis, suggesting mild simi l arity in concepts of God and concepts of the satne-sex or most-liked parent..

Theory ofHraltJr

According to psychodynamic thco,)"

the mature individual \'3.iues

relationships and can maint."lin a commiunenl to them. even when the

,

,

112 other person is nOt presem. Such malUrity requires a v.tluing of self since our perceptions of others arc highly dependent on our intemal representation of self. This notion is cenainly in accord with the commandment to �Io\'e your neighbor as yourselr"

eMt 22:39), It s i

• • ' of God, that this is the significant. in light of the object-relations vie'

second greatest commandment. Jesus said

tJlal it

....-as

like the greatest

commandment to �lo\'e the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul

and with all your mind�

(MI 22:37), Our greatest com­

mandment, to lo\'e God, places love of self and other second, an impossibility if self and other arc real while God is only an illl cmal representation. Perhaps lhe primary point should be, though. tbatlovc is central lO what God wants in

liS

when we are fully human. and it is

to their credit lhal these models pUl lhe kind ofinterpersonal bonding that might be called �at the very center of their model ofnonnalc)'. TIle psychodynamic S}'5tem. like all psychotherapy !o)'Slems, COntains an implicit ethical system embedded in its

understanding of normalcy.

Altruism and mUtual dependence arevalued within the contexts ofdose, especially famity, relationships, bm self-sacrifice, giving to the point of

allowing pain to be infliCled on the :self, would not be highlyvalued. The

hidden ethical vision of this tr,ldition �is that one has a moral obligation to do that which deep dO\\TI one wants to do. Or to say it differendy, it is morally justifiable to do what one is inclined to do because what one is inclined to do is also mOr".u� (Browning,

1987, p. 225).

Bec,lusc of our relational natures. we are n i clined to care for those

do:se to us because the)' care for US and nUr!ure us. This view direcuy parallels thaI of classic psychoanalysis. Thus a self-sacrificial act would generally be ulought of as a self-induced punishmcnI for irrational guih or the resuh of an inaccurate view thai others are more wonhy of lo\'e Ihan oneself. While this is probably often tnle (e.g., the self-sryled Christian �doormat"). this model has little place for the reality of Christ's unilateral sacrifice and our commandment to model ourselves after his example (CL Smedes,

1988). Since contemporary psychody­

namic psychology is agnostic regarding the existence of reality or truth outside of this temporal world. it cannot allow for choices or value� which caJl for lhe sacrifice of Lhe needs of the self. It cannot envision a relaLionship wilh a real God thalcould cmpoweronc to make a truly self-sacrificial aCl. In calling for the importance of equal and trusting relationships, and in highly prizing inter-relatedness. howe"\'cr, it farcs decidedly better lhan some theoretical S}'stem� which seem to actively embf"dce

.

,

UJ,'-/G"}.(PORAHI'PSI'C } /OOtNA.MfCPSI'CJ101'IfF.RM'IJ-:S

113

narcissism alone (Browning, 1987, chap, 8), Its ethic is still partial and incomplete, but it is an imponam improvement.

Model afPrydtotherapy Benner (1983), Workman ( 1 988) and others have suggcsLCd provoca­ tive parallels between the process of psychodynamic psychotherapy and God's work of salvation and sanctification. Salvation and sanctifi­ cation, it is argued. might be loosely understood as the process bywhich in intimate relationship with God we gro..... by the pmcc1i.'i of God himM!lf. through Christ, taking upon himself our �badness. �Through Christ's death, Mhe is open to receive all our sin, able to cont."Lin anything we can project OIllO him. In this relationship, we are offered the opportunity to become whole pcrsonsM (Workman, 1988. p. 21), TheM! authors suggest this is an analog to the psychotherapy relation­ ship wherein the therapist acts as a human mediator who accepts, on behalf of God, the �bad introjects, � the Mpsychic split-offs. ft that the client must be rid of to become whole. This conception dot."S parallel our call to be "Christ's ambassadorsft (2 Cor 5:20-21). reconciling sinners ....ith God. TheM! authors do not wish to stretch these analogies tOO far, and we would agree with this caution, The analogies are fascinating, but the dangers of rendering God's work into a purely psychological framework and ofelevating the redempti\'e work of the therapist to a grandiose le\-el are great. The psychodynamic methods of therap), may also be criticized for their seeming lack of appreciation for methods for change olnn- than baving a curative relationship. The pastoral instruction of the New Testament gives a great deal of attention to remo..ing the character­ ological barriers to good relationships, We are to lay aside jealousy, envy, malice and so forth. But there is also ample biblical attention paid 10 other functions such as correcting our thinking, disciplined prayer and st!cking restoration of shaucH..d rdationships. In the psychody­ namic camp. such inten'entions are often reg-drded as trivial or neces­ sarily ineffectual. Further, these models are subtly humanistic in assuming that all will be well if the cliem ha.� one really good relation­ ship. The person will. as it were, be able to function autollomollsly through the direction of the ego once tlle bad internalized objects are straightened out. What is missing is all understanding of health that includes a long-term relationship ....ith a living God and an appreciation for anchoring sclfin commitments to the church and God's revelation of himself in the Bible.

/1 4 from a Christian perspective, the faith afme therJ.pist is important. though nOllhe only factor, in dCLCrmining effccth'cness in p�1'chother. apr. The world view of a Christian will. presumably, � substantially difTercn! from that of a non-Christian lherapist. A non-Christian ther­ ith a healthy capacity for relationships may do far morc good apist .... LO\\'afd the healing of the personality than an inunalure Christian therapist, and a mawre Christian therapist CQuid possibly lead a patient away from true Christlikeness. On the whole, howcvt'r, the greaten capacity for healing must cenainly come from a Christian therdpisl directed by the Holy Spirit. As people, and in a profound and sobering way as thcrnpists. we are imagers of Cod. The more that the therapist can be an accurate imager of God and therefore direct the individual to a greater capacity for relationship with Cod, the more healing will take place, A Christian object-relations thempist would, therefore, realize the importance of a relationship between the patient and God in which God actively participates. and therapy may be While the intimate connection between heory t

considered the strength of contemporary psychodynamic modds. those who aspire to a morc objC<:live science of psychology will view it ness. Because all knowledge of internal d)'llamics comes as a fatal weak from the therap)' process, in which the therapist is intimately imrolved. all conclusions are subject to the interpretations and distortions of the therapist. nlis might help explain the substantial disagreements be­ tween p�,'chodynamic theorists from different schools and different i possible to scparate the conclusions of the theorist from eras. It is m his or her own individual dynamics. To the question. MHave the premises of comcmporary psychoanal­ ysis been adequately researchedr the answer can be yes or no depend­ ing on one's theoretical orientation. There s i litde cxpclimcntal literdture in support of central constructs of object-reliuions theory. On dIe other hand, the amount of written literature based on

CdSC

conceptualizations and actual hours of therapy conducted in this trddition is impressive. With a growing and dynamic clinic-.tI database. the p�choanalytic literature may provide a ,,"'Calth ofimpornm infor­ mation. There has been some movemcm lOward the empirical Icstingofthe psychodynamic model. Perhaps the foremost example is the positive showing of K1ennan :md WeisillIan's psychodynamically oriented in­ terpersonal therapy for depression (Elkin et a!..

1989), v:hich

was

rigorously compared with the two other most effective treaunenu of

.

,

co.m:�rPOlU.lII' PSYCJIOIJ)',vtl.MICl�rCJlOfiln/:"PIJo:S depression, antidepressant tricrclic medication and Beck's cognitive therapy. In these comparisons, lhe short-ternl psyt:hodynamic therapy

fared as well as the other l 'O approaches. This work can stand as a .... model of the adaptation of lhe psychodynamic approach to a shorter term format and to the challenges of empiricl , i rcsearch. Hopefully,

morc such ","'Ork with other problem areas wiII be forthcoming. The e\'olving theoretical frame....,ork of contemporary psychoanaly­ sis has been painfully devoid of Christian influence. The fact that pS)'choanalytic theory gro","'s out of the personaJ interactions of theo­ rists with their patien ts providcs an urgent call for Chrislian psychody­ namically oriented therapists. Since the indh·idual perspective and dynamics of the theorist nec(:ssarily (orm his or her conceptualization of lhcory and practice, object-relations

Iheories ha\'e been formed

primarily with non-Christian underpinnings. The truth that is disco\'­ ered will be no less true, but the unintentional distortions will skew the interpretation and application of the results, especially with reg-.ard to matters involving the supernatural. as we have seen,

Conclusion The psychodynamic psychotherapies are among the broadesl, most comprehensi\'e sySlems in usc today. In mo\;ng bt.'}·ond Freud', naITO\',' commitment to a biologically fOOled, �scientific� theory, contemporary pS)'Chod)llamic theorists have developed a !>)'Stem that does not present many of the problems to the committed Christian psychotherapist that

cl assical analysis did.

These models are rclat.ional in nature, balance a cautious optimism with a deep appreciat.ion of our capacity for self-deception and ha\"C a subslantial (though secondary in emphasis) understanding of our rational capacities as humans. 'nle values imbedded ill the model are •

broadly compatible widl Christian vahlCS, though ofcouP.)(' there is not

a perfect match. The obsen'anl reader ....ill note that our criticisms ofthis modcl were not MdevasL.1.ting.� Rather, they took the form of cautions. We Ulink il filting that this is onc or UIC models thai mall)' Christian therapislS arc

embmcing: il holds much promise as a possible foundation for futurc

elabordlion of a thoroughly Christian understanding of human per­ sonality.

116

MOD£//.V1'Sl"CIfOTllEl/APl£S

for Further Reading Browning, O. (1987). Rrligiqw though/lind 1M modem. pS}chologi4 Philadelphia: Foro-l"M. Browning"s 5}'I1lpaliletic analysis of the potential cOIlU'ibution� of Kohut i his chapler eight is and Erikwn to a Christian undc:nmnding of pcrwns n i the mainline denominational a model of5Cholarl)· lhoroughnes.s, though n rather than evangelical tradition. Crabb, L (1988). iruidi out. Colorado Springs, CO: NavPrcu. A recent work thai rcflfiLS Crabb'! mo\'cment toward �ychodyllamic thought. Gn�enberg, J.. and Mitchell. S. (1983). ObjIct.rt!ltitioru in p.rychoano1ytic IMIry. Cambridge. MA: Hal"'''ard University PrCSii Perhaps the definitivc work in object-relations psychology to dale. Gunuip. H. ( 1971 ), PSJdlOanaJylic IMrJry, Ihcuf'J, and 1M ulj. New York: Basic Boo,,_ A readable general introduction to all of the psychod}llamic lI1odels. Lake, F. (1986). Cliniro/ lhrology (Edited and abridged by M. Yeomans). New

York: Crossroad. i U"oduction to thc fasdnating thought ofa dedicated A readablt: abridged n Chri5tian cxpounding a thoroughly p5}'chod)namic \;ew of the counscling process. Miller, A. (1981). 1"ht! drama ojthe giftt:d child. New York: Basic Books. A book accessible to the lay reader, applying psychodynamic psychology to the understanding of childhood experience. SL Clair. M. (1986). Oljtd rtlatiQ,u and sdfPIJcholctJJ: ."" jPltrodudUm. Monterey. 0\: Broob/Colc. A readable gener..ll inu"Oductioll to all of the psychodynamic models. Stropp, Ii, 1-1., and Binder,]. L (1984). Prycholhmlp, i" a 1UW key: t\ gui(k la timNirniUti dyna"uc psyclwlMmpy. New York: Basic Books. A fascinatiug discussion of how psychod)11amic concepu can be adapte
[\"3115, C. (1989). nisdom and h"lMnnm in P$JdwltJgJ. Grand R.tpid$, MI: Baker.

CO,vl'EMJ'OIY I..1lI P$t'CHOOYNMtfCPSYCHOTHER.APIES Freud, S. (1961).

The tgo and the id.

117

In J. StraChey (Ed. and Trans.), The

standard edition of the complele psychological works of Sigmund Freud (pp. 5-66: Vol. 19). London: Hogarth Pre!lS. (Original work pubished l 1923). Greenberg,j., and Milchell, S. (1983).

Objed-rtlatiorn in prychoanalJlic tMory.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni\'enity Press.

Greenlee,

L., Jr.

(1986). Kohut's self ps)"chology and theory of narcis,i!Ill:

Some implications regardi.ng the fall and restoration of humanity.jourrnU

0/PsycluJlot;y and Throlcgj, 14, 1I()"116.

Guntrip, H. (1969). Religion in relation to personal n i tegration.

Britishjournal

ofMtdicol Psydw�, 42. 323-333. Henderson. j. (1975). Object relations and the doctrine of original sin.

InlmlOlianal &virw 0/ Ptychoonarysis, 2, 107·120.

Henderson.J. (1977). Object relations and the psychotherapy ofsin.

Qmadian

Psychiatric Anodatfun jtmrna� 22, 427433. Hurdillg. R. (1985). Rool!; and shoots. Londou; Hodder and Stoughton. Johnson. R. (1985). Self psycholog)·. In D. Benner (Ed.), BaMr mcycloptdw 0/ prych� (pp. 1051-1053). Grand Rapids. MI: Baker. Kirwan, W. (1984). Biblical {(}J1(qJlJ for Chmlian coon:uli1lg. Grand Rapids, M.i: Baker.

Modnn dinical psyt:llolq;J. New York: B.uic Books. Lake. F. (1966). Cliniroi lheo/Qgy. London: Danon, Longman and Todd. Lake, F. (1986). CJiniroJ tht!ology (Edited and abridged by M. Yeomans). New

Korchill. S. (1976).

York: Crossroad. Linn. M., and Unn, D. (1978).

Healing li/e's hurts: Healing mmwms Ihrwghjiw

stagp o//orgiw:nw. New York: Paulis! Press. Mahler. M. (1968). On huma1l symbWsis ond the virissirwic o/individuolion. New

York: Imemational Universities Press. Mahler, M.; Pine f.; and Bergman. A. (1975). Thlpsychologirol birth ofthlhuman .

in/ant. New York: Basic. Menninger. K. (1973). Ul1!o/t:vtr bt!W1IUI 0/sint New York: Hawthome

Peck, S. (1983).

Books.

Ptople o/the fie. Ne",' York: Simon and Schuster.

Pine, F. (1988). The four psychologies of psychoanal)'5is and their place in clinical work.jtmmal o/IM Allltrialn Psychoanalytic ,.\uoaation,

Prochaska.].

36, 571-596.

(J 984). SyJtem.J 0/ps-jclWIhn"aP'J (2d ed.). Chicago: Dorsey.

Riuuto. A. (1974). Object relations and the formulation of the image of God.

Britishjouma/ 0/ Mtdical PsycluJlot;y. 47, 83-99. Rizzuto, A. (1979). TM birth O/ IM Iivi1lg GOO: A psychoanarytic study.

ChicagQ:

Uni\'enity of Chicago.

$eamandJ, D. A (1985).

Healing o/"fIIeTIIOries. Wheaton, IL: Victor Bookl. Smedes, L (1988). Cori1lg and rommitmt7lt. San FranciKo: Harper & Row. SpUka, B.; Hood, R.: and (rimuch, R (1985). The psychology of rtligion: An nnpiric.ol «pp,oach. Englewood Clift's, r>.:J: Prentice-Hall.

M. (1986). Borderline personality disorder. In A. Cooper, A. Frances, and M. Sacks (Eds.), Psychiatry: Vol. I . The Personalit)· Di.scmim and Neurosts

Stone.

(pp. 203-217). New York: &lsic Books.

Vanderploeg, R. (198Ia). Imago dei. creation as election: Foundations for

11 8

MQO£RNP:5I'CJIOTIfCR-u'1ES

ps)'Cholhcrapy.jounwJ of Psycholbgy and TMdOlf}. 9, 209-215. Vanderploeg R (1981b). Imago dei il.'II foundational (0 psychotherapy: hHe­ ,

gntion \'ersu� iW!gregauon. .ftJu-ma/ ofPsydwlogy lind Tht:oIogy, 9, 299-304. Van Lecu""cn, M. (1990). Gnukr and gmu. Downen; GrO\'c, 1[,; InterVarsity Pre,". Whill:, S, (1984). Imago dei and object rdations lheory: Implications for a modd of human development. Journal of�dwIoto and T�, 12, 286293. Winnicou, D. (1965). The IMtumtifJf1Jlf f1ro«$5 and Ik facilitating mvirtmllk'l'll. New York: International Univcniti� Press. Workman, D. (1988, April) , Au analysis of object-relations theory. P:lpcr prellf:lHed at the Christian Association for Psychological SlUdir:5 conven­ tion, Denver, CO. .

.

,

5 THE

JUNG

nlcrest in the

y

anal)'tic psychology of Carl Jung remains strong

in certain religious circles and shows signs of increasing. According lO Vin

( 1 987. p. 77), much or its enduring and

immediate appeal may be a function of the hybrid nature ofJungian hought-il t is a mixture of a formal, or �Catholic, M psychoanalytic p�,'chology (with its appealing imellectualism) and a less formal, or MProtcstant,M counseling p!.),chology approach (with its appealing free­ dom of choice), In Via's analysis. this mixing of elements results in a kind of MEpiscopalianM psychological mindset. Indeed, two of lhe foremost interpreters ofJungian thought for me ecumenical religious audience, Morton Kelsey and John Sanford, are Episcopalians who share a deep and abiding interest in aesthetics. ritual. symbolism and the -depth� dimensions of religious experience. AltllOugh only a small percentage of clinicians today would describe

/20

MOlJIiItIlPSYCHOTII£RAPIES

themselves as :Iungian,� concepts cenlfai lO analytic p!oj'chology have .. been ..idely disseminated. The professional literature on Jungian thought

is impressive in itself. but aspects of analytic psychology have

heell widely interpreted through numerous popular books, workshops and media pro�;TIuns as .....ell (e.g., lhe work of Campbell and Moyers,

1988. in The p� oj M)'lh. a book and PBS video production,

was

fundamentallyJungian in thought). This tradition, like existential psychology (chapter eleven), speaks directly to the questions of meaning in life. Indeed, Jung saw h.is most basic task as "the care of soulsft

(cum animarum).

Profoundly disillu­

sioned \\ith what he perceived as the unwillingness of the church to take lip this most basic task. Jung felt it imperative that clinicians see their role:: 110\ onl}' M healers of the mind, but as comfoners of the whole psychological person or S()tJ� including the MspiriUial� aspect of the person. as well. But whether or not his proposed solution is distinctively or decidedly Christian is a mauer of intense debate and discussion. Carl jung left a considerable legacy of written material to ponder (see lile Collected Works) , an intimidating corpus which is often difficult to understand. Ryckman

( \985) has correcLly described lhe

system as McompJcx, esoteric. and obscureM (p.

62),

and pointed out

that it is extremely difficult to define lile core concepts or to test them expcriment.'llly. Jungian insights often n i tegrate s('''eral '\' disciplines. including nOI ani), medicine. psychiatry and psychology, but nearly aJt lilt: humanities, natural sciences and social sciences, including compar­ ative religions! jungian psychology is second only to Freudian psychol­ ogy in tenus of the sheer number and diversity of the phenomena it attempts to examineor explore. There is litLle debate that the approach is comprehensive. This makes it easier still to ignore or dismiss r.he jungian perspeclive, since so few pCrrollS ill lilis day of increasing sp<'cializatioll have the necessary baCkground to assimilate or evaluate this incredible array of complex material. E\'enjung's most ardent and harsh critics tend to affirm him for his intellectual risk-taking.

Descriptive SW'Vey PhilosophicalAuumptiOflS Althoughjung's work resists summarization, there are certain underly­ ing assumptions and values. Perhaps foremost among these is the belief

in a collectiw unconsciow.

,

,

JIP,.'I'JA.vTItERAl'l'

121

jung, like Freud, conceived of a

penonal zmco,uci()tls that l\'aS inac­

cessible to conscious reflection and could be connected to observable beha"iors, and he resisted the neo-Freudian or post-Freudian tendency

(d. chapter four) to collapse the unconscious into the conscious, But for jung, the domain of the unconscious �onl}' became interesting beyond the point where Freud's melhod left off" (Kovcl,

1976, p. 93).

For jung, the individual life of the client, e\'cn the individual uncon­

scious life, was only it small part of the picture. A complete understand­

ing had to re(]eel also the trnnspenonal, the elements of existence that transcended the pel"5Onal, that connected one with the history of lhe human species (and indeed the cosmic order) that had preceded an individual's limited existence. For jung. "consciousness is but a small boat on the sea of the unconsciolls� (Kau&n ann

,

1984. p. lOB), and the

personal unconscious (that which is unique to a person and uncon­ nected to others) is but a small part of the unconscious. The most fundamental reality in Jung's psychology is the collective unconscious.

It is our source or energy, and it shapes or SU'uctures lhe

mOSt fundamemal dimensions of our experience. It is secn as the stOrehouse of all the latent memories of our human and prchuman ancestry. This deep and most n i accessible level of the person contains the ""wisdom of the ages� and serves as a potential guide for human dc\·elopment. Some have explained this concept by analogy 10 a human hand submerged with Ule finger tips protruding above the water; the finger tips would

be

akin to the consciOliS experiences of different

individuals: the submerged shafts of the fingers akin LO the personal unconsciouscs of dill'crcnt individuals; and the

to

body of the hand akin

the collective unconscious which all persons share in common. The anal�'tic approach ofJung is certainly more open to the inef.Ta­

ble and mysterious than any other major approach to people-helping. Although it embraces a�pects of the scientific approach, JWlgian thought refuses to embrace the spirit of scientific objectification or reductionism. It repeatedly reminds us or mysteries beyond our cur­ rent comprehension and understanding. �Faith � is "ery much ali\'e in Jungian thought. The Illystical. spiritual or transpersonal is granted an intellectual respectability that is on par l\ilh the results of more formal i not reduced and traditional scientific endeavors. The spiritual world s to rationalistic formulations. Such thinking naturally follows from

an

understanding of the

collective unconscious as the wellspring of creativity and the ultimate source or direction in life (Corey,

1982). There thoughu point to the

Mom:.JlNI'S)'CJIDT/IEllAPIES

122

Quliincs of an epistemology n i Jungian p!>'}'chology that \'alues illl ro­ spccuon and examination of the unconscious as the most important ways of /mOlvi"II. This valuing of the "spiritual� also partially explains the positive reception of Jungian thought in religious circles. When Jungian acceptance of spirituality is conu-asted with the antagonism or antipathy against religion of most Iwentieth
Jungians combine an optimistic leleology with a deterministic view

of causality. From the Jungian perspeclivc. we are nOI really "in COI1trol,� bm are ruled by powerful transpersonal unconscious forces of which

l'.'e

ha\'c only limited awareness. But this system s i not as pesst­

mistic as classic psychoanalysis, becausc the Jungian perspective is a decidedly forward-looking one. where we are shaped not only by our immcdiate and inherited pasts. but also by our aspirations for the fumre. We have adrive 10 grow and evolye toward e\'cn gre-Atcr .....holeness in body. mind and spirit. A more complete self-realization is a distinct possibility for the person who is willing to embrace fuUy the mysteries of life,

especial�· those of the depth dimension of his or her own psyche. To live a full and meaningful existence we must come to understand something of tllese mysteries beyond our immediate expericnce.

As

McLemorc

(1982) has noted, Jung found Christianity psych"

logically useful but certainly did not take the gospel or Christian

theology seriously. Jung's father was a Protestant minister in the Cal­ vinistic tradition. By his own tclling. Jung

(1961)

was

profoundly

a1Tected by his fatllcr's vacillating and doubt-filled faith,Jung was also innuenccd by personal and professional encounters with the occult. His grandmother was a medium; his mother had ps)'chic experiences; his medical thesis

was

on occult phenomena; and he had repeated

m)'Stcrious encounters with Mspirits� throughout his adult life. Hc was

a serious student of comparative religion, especially EaStern religions

and the occult.

For all the apparent spiritual affirmations inJung, Kovel

( 19i6)

asserts that Jungian thought is essemially .....orldly and tolerant. Jung's ultimate criteria for truth is vague and undefined, but ;s decidedly subjectivistic. The experiential nature of analytic psychol­ ogy resists an external. authoritative understanding oftruth, empha­ sizing, in cOlllmst, the personal myth and story of the individual. Thus the Christia.n reader ofJung and Jungian psychology must be extremely cautious when encoulllering phrases and concepts bor­ ro....'ed from Christian theology.

•

P'

,

123

jUNGIM'TJIF.MPY Modd ofPmonality

The Jungian peTlipective undel'$tands personality in terms of several unique but interdependent st.rUctures, Collectively �pcaking, the total personality is called the psyche, a general entity that opt:r.lles according to the principle of opposites and is undergirded by a general life-pro­ cess ellergy and motivational force that

is more

tJlan aggression or

sexual libido. The ego is a unifying force in the psyche and the cemer of con­ sciousness. It is primarily concerned with thinking, feeling. percei\�ng and remembering. The

perso"al ullCQ'ucious includes

all of the forgotten experiences

that ha\'e lOs! their accessibility to consciousness. When these experi­ ences begin to duster they tend to form

complexes.

Within the collective unconscious, which we have already discussed. dfe the great orch#),/Jts that can

be discovered through the symbolic

interpretation of dreams, fantasies, myths, rituals and traditions. Therein lies the great potential sources of creativity. energy. guidance, wholeness and wisdom for living, Archetypes are best undersLOod as universal mental structures or cognith'C organizing principles that give shape LO human psychic experience, They are the fonns or molds through which our previously unformed energy passes. Thus the particular archetypes that arc acti\'e form our psychological reality. Archetypes. though. must be "activated (or evoked) by an experiential reality·

(Kaufmann, 1984, p. I l l) : and so while they form our reality,

i exterior our experience of them is also inOuenced by what occurs n reality. Jung determined the basic archetypes through introspection, clinical work with clientS, and the study of mythology, literature and comparati\'e religions.

Se\'t'nu of the archetypes are especiaUy important in Jungian thought. The

pemTlla is the mask we WC'd.f in

social situations. It is our

public 5Clf, our psychological �skin,� the part of ourseh'cs we sho..... in our daily routines, Our unconsciously feminine side is our anima, and it is yielding, containing. nurturing. concrete and intuitive; our unconsciously masculine side is our

alli rnllS,

and it is dri\�hg. penetrating, aggrcs-­

sh'e and disciplined. Males and fe males have both anima and animus archetypes. Whole persons are willing to embrace both dimensions of their personhood (d, Van Leeu....en, .

1990, for a more contempo­

rary discussion of tJlis issue). The

shadow

is the part of our personality we would rather not

124

MQI)£RNPSYClfOTHERAPIES

acknowledge. the so-called dark side of the person. Unless we have

integtated the shadow, \'o'e tend not to recognize these attributes or tnl.its,

n i ourselves and project. them onto others. A1though seen most often as our "e\-il side," item be a source ofcreativity and spontaneity ifit becomes appropriately controlled and responsibly expressed. Finally, the

ulJis perhaps the most important archetype, and only

emerges when the other dimensions of personality develop in the direction ofwholeness. ForJung, nOt until middle age does the neces­ sary unity and stabilit)' potentiruly develop that can 5en'e as a true basis

for centeredness, increasingly pulling the person from ahead rather than pushing from behind (Corey, 1982, p. 35). Other archetypes include the

hero, death and rebirth and {he wi.st: old man.

It s i within the context afthe collective unconscious that we form an all-powerful be ing that we call "GodR: God is an absolute, necessary function ofan irrational naLUre, which has nothing to do with Lhe question of God's existence. The human intellect can never answer this question of God's existence. The human ntellect i can ne\'er answer this question. still less give any

proof of God. Moreover, such proof is superfluous, for the idea of an all-powerful divine Being is present everywhere. unconsciously if not consciously, because it is an archetype. Qung, 1964b, p. 81)

In other words, the "idea of God has validity n i a subjective or inner reality sense because it has its roots in human experience on a uni....ersal basisM (Ryckman, 1985, p. 67). Finally, the basic personality attitudes n i Jungian thought are txtro­

version and jntrovtlJ'Um. In briefest detail, me extroverted person is oriented toward. the external and social world, whereas the introverted individual focuses more on the internal and subjective world. Beyond mese broad dimensions, Jung posited an eighlfold classification

scheme of psychological types. Within these broad and basic attitudes of extroversion and introversion, he described four types:

( l ) the

thinking �ogical. objective and rational; (2) the feeling type­ oriented around affective and subjective experience;

(�)

the sensa­

tion type organized around stimuli from the senses; and

(4) the

intuitive type creative, imaginative and integrative. Using this basic typology. Jung developed complex notions of how dominant attitudes and functions can influence our actions and beha\'1ors n i everyday life. Despite the lack of c1aril)' and precision in cenain core concepts, mere is research evidence supporting certain aspect! of the JWlgian

125

theory of psychological types. Much of me focus of these investigative efforts has centered around the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), a personality lcSt that is loosely based on Jungian concepts (ef. Keirsey and Bates, 1984; Kaplan and Saccuzzo. 1989) . The MBTI is used to identify inlro\'erl� and extro\'cns as well as sensing. thinking, feeling and illluilivc paucms. An impressive amount of technical work has been done on the MBTI (d. rcvicl'o'lJ in any recent edition oflhe widely respected Mmlal Measures l'tarbook; Buros, 1978), and a number of studies have IItilized the MBTI to explore dimensions of the typology for a wide varielY of purposes. Unforlunately, the MBTI bas probably been overuti l ized and per­ haps miSlised in certain lay or professional settings (especially in o\'crintcrprcling the results of the test). This has lowered its credi­ bility in the larger academic and research community, since its appliciuion has sometimes bccn inconsistent with v.idely under­ stood psychometric or clinical imperatives (cf. Standards for Educa· tional and PlJchological Ttl/ing, American Education Research Association et aI., 1985). Still, research with the MBTI does suggest that it is possible to translate some complex Jungian concepts into empirically verifiable terminology.

Mod�ls ofHealth andAbnormality Jtrng viewed penonality development as a dynamic and evolving process across the life span. The movement toward selfhood and actualization is orten a painful and difficult process as we inCl�ngiy attempt to organize and integrate internal processes and structures. By the middle yean, and perhaps not C\,'en then, we may learn what it nur means to mo\'e toward greater degrees of setf-l"eaIi1.arioll and wholeness. In Jungian psychology, self-realization is genera1ly seen as the last stage of the lifelong process of .indhiduation. It is an ideal to work toward rather than an actuality that can be achieved n i the course of one's life. Psychological wholeness and i theJWlgian pel1ipective spirirual wholeness appear to be the same thing n (Hughs, 1987). \-\'hether this process is centered on or empo�red by Jesw Christ is apparendy a matter of personal choice in this highly experiential and subjective system of understanding human nature. Jungians trust the psyche to guide us in adapting to our social and lFor a mOre complete analy5is of thete eomplelC themC1o, :oce especially the insightful treatments in Munroe'"5 SdtoolJ. 0/PlJrlwtJ"alyr;� Tlwught ( 19�!i) or Ry.::hiak'$ l"trodllctUm '0 PmtmalifJ and

I'syrltolhmrfrJ ( 1973).

126

MODf:JtVPS)0I0Tf/�:RAPf£S

physical cm;ronment, much like the humanistic psychologies. Jungians assen that we are born with the potential for achieving greater wholeness throughout the process of our lives. Funher, we 3Clually have a drive to achieve this wholeness, a drive toward in­ dividuation which pushes us to become our truest self. According to Jung, Personality is the supreme realization ohhe innate idiosyncrasy of a Jhing being. It is an act of high courage flung in the face of life. the absolute affirmation of all that constitutes the individual, the most successful adaptarion 10 the universal conditions of existence coupled with the greatest possible freedom for self-determination. (Jung,

1934. p. 171)

This instinct for individuation is central to the Jungian understand­ ing of health and wholeness. As Vitz

(1987) has observed, the chief

aim of life appears to be 'Oto know thyself' as an end in and of itself. The process of facilitating the emergence of the authentic self is a highly subjective and relativistic one. In the end, the healt.hy person is the one who follo�'s the urgings of the unconscious, Health

can

only come from be<:oming what one

was meant to become, and Lhis ideal St!'lf is actualized by becoming able to experience all of the archetypes in their proper balance, For example, the fulfilled person experiences both anima and animus in balance, emphasizing neither rigid or stereotyped fonns of masculin­ ity nor femininity. In experiencing the unconscious, the healulY per­ son will inevitably be responsive to and appreciative of the mystical, transpersonai. spiritual aspeCts of life.

In the Jungian perspective, we all develop more or less one-sidedly,

We suffer from a number of incompatible opposites thaL we generate

in the process of li\>ing, Psychopathology can be understood as our uncomdous attempt to compensate for a lack of balance in our Ii\'es. or the resulr of our inattention LO the deeper messages we receive fTOm our personal or collective unconscious. These are most often ex­ pressed in ternlS of the specific complexes that foml in our conscious ego and inhibit the emergence of the true self. When filtered thlUugh their chiu-acteristic attitudes and tendencies (e.g.. eXlro\"ened-feeling type). the full range of functional psychopadlOlogy can be seen. The depth of the psychopathology is detelmined by the intensity of the re­ pressed forces in (he unconscious. which is in tum a function of the degree (0 which an individual is avoiding fulfilling the urgings of lhe unconscious. Overall, the Jungian view of abnonnality is sketchy.

JUS(;/A,II11{�:RJtl"l '

127

Mood of/'ryy For Jungians. hope for the alleviation of symptomatology lies in the acceptance and integr.l.lion of the content oflheir pt'!rsonal and collec­ tive unconsciolls. Awareness can be beSt facilitated by recognizing the tendencies of the distressed or disturbed individual to project aspecu of unconscious expericnce into daily experiencc. Finding new mean­ ing through 5)'1110015 I.hat increasingly emerge into the conscious ego is the ultimate hope for releasing the creative and growth-producing potential of the archetypes stOred in the collective unconscious. Mean­ ing can only be found whcn we arc willing to confront that which we don't fully know or understand from the greater depths of our being. Ifwe are going to live a more complete and whole existence, we need to learn how to dTecth'elydeal with the dualities. polarities and contra· dictions of our existence. When ....e . recognize and dC\·elop these different �sides." ....e . will become more effective in our process of individuation and live with our opposites in a more integrated fashion. Jung himself did nOI prescribe any set trealmCIll methodology (Kaufmann. 1984; SanfOJ'd, 1985). Many methods are used, but the coJ'c principle is to help the unconscious become conscious. and for the therapist to affirm whatever direction and guidance the uncoll­ scious is pro\iding. especially through the self archetype. Jungian therapisLS tend to be a r.uher diverse and eclectic group, dr.... ..ing on Lhe broad existential. humanistic or psychodynamic traditions.Jungian therdpisLS h:wc a profound respect for relationship between the thcr· apist and the clienl. TIley see the maturational and personal attribute5 of both the anal}'5t and client as major variables in thc process of change. Consequentl)·. standard5 for certification al fonnal Jungian training institutes n i major cities around the world arc rigorous and demanding. A conunon theme is a deep appreciation for how clinical techniques need to be adjusted or modified depending on the psycho­ i dividualized logiC'dl l}-pe of the client; therapy needs to be a highly n and personalizcd encounter. Jungian anal�'SLS lend to see dreams in a far more optimistic light than do Frcudians. who viC\\-' dreams as representations of unaccept­ able aggressi\'c or 5Cxual impulses, repressed or as disguised manifes­ tations of connicLS. Unlike {heir more 5uspidous counterparts, Juugians assert that dreams need to be taken somewhat more literally. They arc enoffilously difficult to decipher siuce tht.'}' oflen drdw on unconscious archetypes and symbols. TIle meanings of dreams are meant to be uncovered; they are l11ess."\ges fl'om the unconscious that

128

M()I)£RNPSY(",IIOTHERAPIES

map out the road to wholeness. Interpreted in sequence over a peliod i , they arc typically central to effective of time (mther than in solation) psychotherapeutic process. TIlt: ss i ues and themes they mise can help

i they are successfully explored in the unconscious become conscious f 2 the context afme psychotherapeutic relationship.

Jungian therapy tends to be long-term, typically lasting over a year or more. Jungians usually work individually with a highly select popu­ lation of well-educated and high-functioning persons. Experiencing is valued far morc man understanding. Although Jungians assert that their method has broad application, the �ideal� client appears to be the relativdy normal or moderately dissatisfied or maladjusted, mid­ dle-aged individual seeking greater wisdom orenlightenmenL In short, Jungian therapy tends to be viewed as a "growth rnerapy� by most clinicians.

Christian Critique

PhilMophioal Auumptirms Jungian thought has had enomlOUS appeal for many rcJigiolis per­ 3 sons. As we menlioned earlier, we suspect that much of its appeal for Christians today is thai it speaks forcefully of the centrali lY of the

spiritual and to the need for cura anima,,"n-the care of souls (Hempelmann,

1986). The Christian psychologist thirsty for a spir­

itually minded approach to therapy, and tired of the religious antipathy or apathy of other systems, can warm to Jungian thought because il is profoundly religious in its outlook. Jung saw himself as a "lover of the soul," and it deeply pained him that he was largely ignored before his death. He felt that the institUlional religion of his day was not meeting the deeper needs of individuals, although histOrically i t had supplied meaning through worship, fellowship

2Hall and Undzey (1985) have an eSp«ially helpfulllUmmaryoftheJungian penpeeti� on drc:-.uns and dream analysis.

'Aulollg the more interesting and helpful c"n�rnpor.uJ' religioua diloCUMiol1� ofJungian

thoughl are

Bry.uIt'sJu.. g fwd 1M ChrisUan 1"11)' f 1983):John.son's three-book series

Wr

fl98!'.). HI (]989) and SIu (1989): KdKY', Chrill<>-PJyI\dDg1 (\968) or Tiu DlItrr Siduf

Siknct (1977); Moore', cdi�ed ,"OltonI
UnknwndingJu.. g.

Jung and Cltrillia" $fnrilualiry (1988) ;

�ruli"g Yall1U!f(l985); Sai.ford·s IJrNlM.J: GodJ

F
Ki..grlo....

or 'f'M ' Ltilili.. (l981): or Stein'sJ.... g s Trnumnrl 0/Cltrilli",,;/) (]9M). HlIrding (1985)

dOC!$ lUl excellcllIjob Cril;(luing 5e\eral of Ul<:� approaches thaI :!ttempl Jungian psychology anti orthodox Christian;!}'.

10

h"mlon;z",

JIlNC/A.\· Tf/ER.\1')'

129

and service. He meant his psychology to fjll this breach. But this is precisely what is most disturbing about Jungian PSlcho!. ogy. Of all ule s}�tems. Jungian psychology (and perhaps existential p� .. ychology, chapter twelve) comes dosest to being a ri,"ai religion. It is comprehensive in its claim to explain the totality of human psycholog· ical and religious experience. In grounding his analysis of archetypes in the analysis of mythology and compa.rati,'e religions. Jung psychol. ,

ogized religious experience much as Freud did. He looked to explain the psychological realities behind the \�dgarie5 of different types of religious experience. It was thus inC\�table that his .....ould be a relati''" istic understanding of the functional value of different "religious mythologies. M Jung's w;e of religious terminology and concepts can lead the less discerning rellder to imagine him to be in closer allegiance \\-ith the fai th than is justified. Jung seemed to fmd Christianity useful in prJ> moting the larger quest for meaning. but he dearly did not emb.-..ce the cross and the resurrection as histOlical fuCIS. As Browning

( 1987)

observed,Jung supposed that overt material expression W'olS needed for coven psychic realities and thereby came to view important religious S)'TTlbols as having great significance and mcaningas "mystificd� psychic

projections. The notion of a God ....ho . loves and forgivcs or a Cod who

died for us and rose again to gi''e liS eternal life are the symbolic representations of deep archet)'Pal. and thus purely psychological. realities. TIlUs historic realities are n i terpreted as projections of psy­ chological needs. Jung reasoned from the recurrence across religions of cerrain motifs, such as death and rebirth or atonement, Utat UICse motifs represent or reflect underlying archet)'pes. This is a psychological explanation of religious commonalities. Bm it s i vital to realize that this is not the only po�ible explanation ofslIch commonalities. A dogmatic understanding could. for example. propose the enduring historic truthfulness of one religion. Christianity. and suggest thai commonal· iLies shared \\-iUl other religions represent the residual of shared trUth still left with us after the human fragmcmation and alienation of the Fall. This appears to ha,'e been C. S. Lewis's ....orking . model in 1M . listing ofwhat he callcd �thc Abolilion of Man, which doses with Le....is's

Tao.� the shared mo....tl foundation of all the world's great religions. In

other "'orels, commonalities between religions could either mean that "II religions are partially true and all represent projecLions ofps)'cho­ logical realities or needs. or thc}' could mean Ulal one religion is true

130 and others still share commonalities with the trlle faith to varying degrees. Jung's explanation works best if one has made an a priori commitment to some sort of psychological universalism in ex­ plaining religion.

This leads us (0 ask if there s i a Christian objection to the idea of a collective uncon§CiQ1I5. Fr.mkJy, we perceive mal many Christians react

negati"eI}' witb knee-jerk rapidity to the vcry idea of the unconscious,

bUi with no apparent rational basis. They of l en are concerned about determination or all psychological reality by the unconscious, but this

is an objection to determinism. Ilot to the idea or an unconscious per se. II may n i fact be true that the unconscious exists a� Jung asserts,

�. must know and funher that to know ourselves and hence be whole ....

more about what s i in our unconscious. But it isJung's profound trUSt of the unconscious that is questionable. We have no warrant as Chris. tians to regard any asp«t of our being as untouched by the Fall and hence an inerrant guide for life and growth toward wholeness. Further. .....e ha,·e no .... 'arrant from a Christian perspective to accept or deny the idea ofa collective unconscious. The Christian understand­ . are one human family, and hence ing of creation would assert that ....e the idea of a shared species repository of common experience is not incredible. Also, the doctrine of creation would male it possible to believe that God made us LO think about our lives in certain ways (i.e.,

archetypes).Just as Kant assened that causality .s i a structure that we

impose upon expericnce, similarly therc may indced be unh·crsal mental structures like .....hat Jung claimed to have discovered !bat undergird our most important psychological realities. If they do exist and if Christianity

is true, it

makes sense that those structures would

give us some access to religious truth. This is neither a point for or against Jungian psychology. It

is an

acknowledgment that he may be

right here. and that Christians cannot prematurely declare him wrong. Jungian thought is also popular in religious circles because it prizes

the mystical. Disenchantmem with the tyranny of propositional logic and purely dogmatic understandings of religious faith appears to be � increasing in many Christian cirdes. as is the desire to see our lives as .•

sLOries that are gradually unfolding (c.g Buechner,

1982, 1983). In an

age when sciemific understanding is prominent. �Jung was one of the

"'see Hunting (I9&>. pp. 33+S(0) lUran informed dUc;uwon ofil(lme dimensiomof!he mon: experiential dimensions of Christian faith and a ean:fui llna� of the PI"()5 and

cons ofJungian though! in uudemanding cach.

fl"SGlAN THERAPY

first in a long line of twentieth century intellectuals ",'ho championed a 'meliorative sense of m}th'-myth as a source of wisdom, vitality, .. (Browning, 1987, p. 164; cf. Taylor. 1987). As a leader in and rene....I" this movement, Jung is thus wannly received by many persons of faith. There is much to be said for the Jungian appreciation of our "u""ansrational" aesthetic, symbolic, mystical and slOry-telling natures. But we share Vin's (1987) concern that with too much emphasis on the mystical. the Jungian perspective can become a kind of intellec­ tuaJ gnosticism where the chief aim of life is to " know thyself' nlther than the workings of the CrealOr-God in the larger universe (see also Hurding, 1985). The self·awareness or self-knowledge so deeply prized in this tradition can too easily become a kind of substitute form of "self·salvation," with a limited (or nonexistent) understanding of the vital imponance of the incarnation and resulTection. or the cru­ cial need for the txtt:rnal manifestations of confession, redemption and reconciliation. TIle great cosmic mysteries of the faith are ren­ dered mere imrapsychic events that have their origill.5 n i the collec­ tive unconscious-not historical events anchored in lile larger march of salvation hislOry. There is a low view of authority and external validation within the Jungian tradition. Ultimately, the auLhentic. healthy person is the one who trustS the meaning of the symbols that emerge from Lhe collec­ tive unconscious. This highly subjective and experiential understand­ ing of ll"Uth can certainly lead to a low view of lhe authotity of the core teachings of the Christian Sctiptures and of the crucial impor­ L1.nCe of lhe disceming role of the larger community of faith. If .....e are to assume that we best undc:rstand external realiry from Lhe muhs thaI emerge from wilhin, ....hal . preventS us from lapsing into an ex­ treme tolerance of relativism? Is our theolpKY ultimately a personal "psycho-theology" only? Is the " henneneutic of self-understanding the authoritati\'e means for disco\"c:ring biblical truth? Knowing trutl, becomes a matter of individual discernment for lhe Jungian. The Jungian tradition seems (0 truSt completely the guid­ ance of Lhe unconscious. but doesn't address the limitations of this awareness, including our capacities for self-serving bias, self-decep­ tion and superficiality. Christians rightly hunger for an approach lhat prizes other ways of knowing and oLher aspects of human faith and experience beyond lhe rational and lhe dogmatic, but Jungian psy­ chology goes tOO far in its re\; . tiviSlic embrace of m}1h and its subjec­ tive epistemology.

IIIOf»:I/Nl'SI'CIIOTIlIillN'if:S

JJ2

We also share Vitz's fear that the Jungian perspective leads to an exaggerated indh'idualism. For the Jungian, growth toward health is an "inner jaurncyM (as Hurding has labeled it,

1985, pp. 334-360), a

journey within oneself to the exclusion of real horizontal or vcrtical contact outside of oneself. A more fully developed appreciation for the

t importance of the community. family and society s i needed in this vial

tradition, as well as our ultimate dependence on the Creator-God. ralher than an almost exclusive focus on the isolated, autonomous individual (\'itt,

1987). We are not faulting self-awareness per se-ill­

deed, that is often vitally needed in our Chri.!ilian communities (cf. Crabb, 1987). But when that is done al the expense of at least an equally strong desire to relate to God through the spiritual disciplines and worship, or to other persons through actS of charity, there is reason to be alanned. Christianity is ultimately an other-directed faith that is not

oriented exclusively LO .... 'a rd self-realization and indivi.duation.

MOOtl cfPtnonaJity Beyond those issues covered in the last section, we find the Jungian work on psychological classification useful in elucidating aspects of human nature. This typOlogy, as epitomized by the MBTI, issufficiently researched and validated to be responsibly adapted for clinical appli­ cation, assuming that it is sensitively and accurately interpreted. But

i church the reduction of persons to their "types," as is often done n

applications of the MBTI, s i inconsi.stent .... ith the broader Jungian

understanding of personality.Jung saw personality as much more fluid and multiply detennined than one would suppose from the lay litera­ ture or misapplications of the MBTI. The essentially unmeasurable nature of the linchpin of Jungian theorizing, the collective unconscious, is disturbing. As Macintyre

(1967, p. 296) has observed: That the existence of the collective unconscious is intended as a hypothesis is clear from the fact that it

s i a\'owedly introduced

to

explain why the same symbols keep recurring in dreams, mytholo­ gies, and works of art. However, there are no predictions that we can deduce from this hypothesis other than the vague generaliza­ tion that such symbols do and will recur-and this, after all, is what

the hypothesis was originally intended to explain.

MacIntyre mayhave been askingfora type of direct proof incompatible .... ith a concept like the collective unconsciow. But his criticism can at least serve to remind us that such a slippery concept should be held

jUNCIAN1'IWRAP'I'

133

with a good deal more tentativeness than the convincedJungians tend to manifest.

On the other hand, to state categorically that there is no reality beyond that which we can �see� seems equally foolish. As McLemore

(1982) has observed, all 100 many conservative Christians have devel­ oped -an irrational bias against the non rational.- Many Christians would benefit from a healthy expansion of their spiritual conscious­ ness, one perhaps that will foster understanding and awareness of the mystical and transcendent

.so

deeply V"dlued by Jungians. But such a

·spiritual consciollsnes,yraising- should protect alf.tinst the quagmires of an obsession with the mysterious and mystical as an end in and of il.SClf (McLemore,

1982, p. 128).

On a more positive note,Jungians have a high '1ew of the worlb of the indi\1dual. Theya.rc far less deterministic and mechanistic than the strict Freudians: they view human action as potentially more proactive

i the largcrcontext ofa quest than reactilie. Our behavior makes sense n i teleological. Although affect and for meaning and purpose in life; it s

feeling arc strongly emphasized, there is an appropriate respect for the imponance of cognition and beha\1or in Jungian thought.

Model ofHealth Jungian notions of health and \o\'eUness afe certainly in the spirit of the humanistic tradition in psychology. This is �roblematic, because it is an incomplete understanding of wholeness. Like Gestah and person­ centered therapies (chapters twelve and ten), analytic psychology asserts that we have an infallible guide in the pursuit of wholeness, which in thiss},"stem is the collenive unconscious. ForJung, affirmation and self-actualization are virtues, but accountability and obt'dience to authority are '1ewed with suspicion. Any focus on the content of religious beliefs and world views would be viewed as an obstacle in the process of authentic self-realization. Browning

(1987, pp. 1 77ff.) astutely points out a fundamental

ambiguity in Jungian thought. In some contexts,Jung speaks as ifone passively folio\.\-'5 the dictates of the unconscious in order to become whole. There appear to be no real choices to be made in this process other than to become what we were meant to become. In ot.her contexts, Jung speaks as

if we

must make responsible choices about

which archetypes to actualize at different paints in life. and that we thus choose who we arc becoming. This renders the growth process more of a reflective enterprise and underscores its fundamentally

,

"""

MOiJFRNPSYCJIOnlERllPfES

moral nature. The beliefs that shape our choic.:::s �'ould then beeome highly relevant, even determinative, of the direction of our growth.

Thus, Jung's theor),. like all personality theories, is in Bro\\ling's l analysis a m0T31 theory: �Il is a theory ofwhat humans want, quest after,

and need in order to be human. . . . It does indeed boil down to an ethics of self-actualization � (pp. 179-1SO). Browning argues (successfully, we think) that Jung·s ethic s i nOI wholly incompatible with Christian thought, but does need careful correction for it

10

be compatible with Christian ethics.

A related concern with reference to the Jungian understanding of

health and wholeness has to do with its obvious cgocem r ic tendencies, especially in conceiving of growth onl), as ajourne), inwArd, We do nOI want to disparage appropriate and responsible relf-realization. Indeed,

this can be conceived as a matter of good stewardship and integrity for the committed Christian. What we fear is a lack of vision of our need for a love relationship with our Creator-God, attainable ani), through thc forgivcness offered through the death and resurrection ofJesus Chrisl. A full understanding of Christian maturity is deeply informed by the confession of Jesus Christ as Lord of one's life. the cultiVAtion and expression of the Christian virtues, and the deep lovc for thc brOlhers and sisters. A biblically informed notion of costly discipleship is simply not partoflhe message ofhcaltll and wholcness in theJungian lT3dition. Jungian thought is ccrtainly to be commended for ilS �illingncss to addres.� the problem of pain. Indeed, forJung, neurosis is aIwa}'s based in the Ma\'oidance of Iq"ritimatc suffering.

M

Unlike the more naivcly

optimistic proponents in the humanistic lJ'adition who ad\'Qcate a Mculture ofjoy· (Browning, 1987, pp, 1 76-177), Jungians advocate a vision for life that suggests that there

be meaning to suffering. .... Individuation ill nOt thc inevitable result of self-a\.' reness alone; it may can

also require conscious and deliberAte effort sustained throughout the life span. The notion of a God that is absolutc and beyond all human experience would be alien toJung. For him, God had lO be experienced first and foremost in the soul . Logically, lhen, religious beliefs arc important only to the extent which they are expetienced as p&)'chic phenomena (Hcmpelmann, 1986), His "'theology" was based on a \�ew ofwholeness thai comes from the depths of our psychic nature. It Wd.'i not theocentric at any level, but anthropocentric (1'. 162), Wholeness does not have anything directly to do with a creed or membership in a

/35

JUNGIAN 1'H1ilIAPY

local church. We grow through our responses to the psychic symbols which point the ...."a}' toward greater personal integration. Reason and rationality, men, are viewed with suspicion byJungians. Through hstory, Jung asserted, the enduring truths of Christianity gradually lost some of their meaning as religious symbols deteriorated into mere signs or into dogmas. He felt that Chlistianit)' was too one..sided, .... ith reason enthroned and the emotional side of the faith impoverished. For Jung, symbolic language. not propositional truth, should be at the heart of the faith. TIle wellspring offuith can be found, for example, in the deeper meanings of the sacraments. Effective preaching and tcaching must bridge the gap between the world of the unconscious and the conscious, through symbols that relate the human to the infinite, uansccndcnt Cod. For many Christians, there is no more powerful l"econciling symbol than the cross. Consider the perceptive insights of Hempelmann ( 1986. p. 165), In the cross . . . .....e have a symbol that (through the story in which it participates) holds IOgcthcr the (wo o�posiLCs: sinful man, who has denied God. and lhe loving God ....ho . forgi\'es lhem and takes them back. This is ho..... 1 understand lhe symbol sYStem to function in helping the individual be healed. In Christ alone is there sah-a­ tion (and) healing. BUIJung would never go so far as to embrace the �a1one nature of Christianity. Further, in Christianity the symbols are not merely means of access into the realm of the collective unconscious. TIley also summarize historic extemal realities thaI are also at least partially understandable propositionally.Jung would seem to hold back from giving lhi.� sort of meaning to the symbols of failh. i

.

Model ofAbnormality

'ant to raise about theJungian Perhaps the most importaIH concem we .... understanding ofthe etiology and maintenance of"problems in living� has to do ....ith the understanding ofevil implicitwithin that perspective. No Hempehnann (1986, p. 162) has noted: Orthodox CI-nistians believe thaI sin and the devil are rea\. While it is true that many Christians ha\'e not given the devil his due, thinking and speaking as though sin was only a mistake or error, but not the essential evil thaI ·d....ells . in me,' as S1. Paul taught. Christianit}' has never gone so far as to deny the reality of evil. . In orthodox Christianity the problem of evil is central. It is lhe .

.

/36

l lhat cornell from the cross, the symbol thai points victory over evi directly to the reality of evi l . It also points to the power of love in God to conquer all evil-the resurrection. In contrast,Jung was ambivalent about evil (Bro.. , : ning, 1987). He did not fully appreciate the power of sin and evil at either the individual or insuflItiona1 1c\'cl. At times, he seemed LO trivialize evil by psychol­ ogizing it as the archetype afthe shadow, a kind of�culturally despised and suppressed side of unused human potentiality. Here e\i l is simply that part of human potentiality that the prejudices of particular histor­ ical epochs teach us to disparage� (Browning, 1987, p. 169). On the other hand,Jung sometimes assumes a quasi-Gnostic position of the simultaneous existence ofgood and evil in both the divine and human levels. There are problems with both options. In the former case, evil is psychologized and is primarily ....-ithin, and thus the po..... er to O\'t:rcome it must come from ",ithin by making �good choices� through the raised human consciousness. In this vein.Jungians often talk about �embrac­ ing the shadow,� that part of ourselves that we have cast off. There is . to O\�rcome no clearly articulated external force that has the po....er all evil; there is no conception of the importance of the hope of the resurrection. Indeed, the \"f�ry notion of evil has been sanitized or trivialized if it has been converted to something we can embrace; it is no longer Msubstantially evil� (Browning, 1987, p. 194). At a rather informal theological level, it could be said thatJung essentially posits a kind of�'Orlu righteousness� approach to personal redemption. We become our own redeemers. Certainly this is a major liability inJungian thoughL The latter case of conceiving of evil as substantial, coexistent and indeed coequal in God and humanity s i equally troubling. An intrigu­ ing exchange in the Journal ofPS)'clwlog), and TJuoJocj (Griffin, 198&, 1986b; Haule, 1986; Kelsey. 1986) addressed this theme. For Griffin (1 986a. p. 276), the accurate understanding of human evil should be at the heart of the integrath'e dialog. He pov,erfully asserted thatJung had inserted a "newM tradition, a psychology of modernity. to replace the essential and enduring truths of Chri.nian faith and experience, and that the new cosmology does not do justice to the understanding of the depths of our decepth'e and evil tendencies (d. Homans, 1978). Evident in this exchange is theJungian tendency to view evi l merely as an aspect of the good. a stance that is common in certain Eastern and "new age� religions but antithetical to orthodox Christian faith.Jung •

JUNGiAN TIIERItPf

J 37

actually suggested making the Trinity into a quaternity to allow for the inclusion of Satan in Ihe Godhead (Browning, 1987, p. 193). God is not, however, equal pans of good and evil, a melange of Star Wars' "good Force and bad rorce.� For Christians, c\i.1 is real and has no part in the Godhead. Evil ought nc\'er to be ui\ialized. Jungian thought needs fully to appreci· ate the power of sin and evil. It needs to acknowledge the reality of an external transcendcnt realm that can influence day-to-day humall functioning. And it mUSt honestly confront the "powers" and "princi­ palities" from without and nOtjusI from within. Jung had little patience with classification of abnormality beyond the differentiation between functional and organic conditions. He had little interest in the biological bases of behavior or what we un­ derstand today as some of the sociocultural variables involved in the etiology and maintenance of psychopathology. Six de<:ades latcr, thaI is a dangerously irresponsible position (0 take. Our undel1itanding of the etiology and maintenance of psychopathology has broadened considerably to include the biological as well as sociocultural realms. Indeed, most responsible clinicians today see clearly how "problems in living" are multiply dctennined, so it is probably best to adopt a p0sition of "epistemic humil ity with reference to causation. Jungian ex­ planatory schemes are too grand and overconfidenL The stance of most clinicians today is considerably more modesl and cautious. "

Mothl of Psyclwthwapy One does not need to embrace the Jungian view of the transpersonal unconscious to derive considerable gain from its rather broad and synthesizing perspecti"e on life. Indeed, such an out1ook, when com­ bined "ith a wann and supporth'e counseling relationship, is likel}' to result in some movement toward greater wholeness. On the other hand, the tendency in Jungiall therapy to avoid the specific details of an individual's life is potentially a dangerous way to approach the res­ olution of emotional conflicts (Kovel, 1976). Mystifying the mundane and material explanations of psychopathology runs the risk of aban­ doning the overt for the coven, or the observable for the transcen· denL Certain aspects of t11e Jungian model of change and psychotherapy offer rich n i sights 10 the Christian tradition. Although we find the lack of insiStence on a specific treatment methodology frustrating, we do appreciate the profound respect thaiJungians have for lhe self-healing

MOf»:RNPSt'CiI01'HEJ«J'1£S

138

thaI can occur within the client n i the context ofgood ther-dpy. We find the wiUingness to explore boLh the n i ternal and external realities

illumin ating. The keen anention gh'en to the projecti\'c tendencies of clients meritS funher study. as docs the deep and abiding concern to assist c1i('nlS in discovering the personal meanings of their inner lives

the exploration of what Jungians call archetypes and symbols

may be a legitimate part of such a process. Spiritual mauers are deemed highly appropriate maners to explore in Jungian therapy. We appre<:ialc the mentor-Iype role that Jungian analysts often adopt in their work wilh clients. not unlik.e that of a spiritual director

(d.

Foster,

1978). In addition, perhaps no tradition of spiritual or

psychological helping takes dreams morc seriously thiln does the Jungian approach. As Sanford

(1 985, p. 618) observed, MJung's empha­

sis on the imporlance of dreams . . . finds ample support in the view of the Bible and early church, where dreams were unh'ersally reg-arded as an importanl way in which God spoke to people .M It certainly would be fair to a.ssen that mOSt contemporary approaches 10 people-helping that ;Ire informed by Cillistiall distincth-es have relatively little to say about the importance of dreams, or, for that matler, the importance of

an active imagination, of the symbolic, or the Mas ir language of the par-abIes ofJesus. Perhaps we have something to learn here. We agree

v.ilh

Griffin

(19800. pp. 274-275) that the fundamental

constructs ofJungian psychology need to be more rigoroLL�ly argued or demonSU,Hed 10 be uuly intcll«tuaily compelling. There is lillIe or no data addressing the efficacy ofJungian therapy per se.Jung himself

(1946, p. 7) was less than receptive to Ihe call by experimentalists for

quantification:

Theories in psychology are the very devil. It is true that we need certain points of view for their orienting and heuristic value; but they should always be regarded as mere auxiliary concepts that can be laid aside at any time. We still know so \'ery little about the psyche that it is positi\.-ely grotesque to think we are far enough advanced to frame general theories. \-\'e have not e\'en established the empir­ ical extent of the psyche's phenomenology: how lhen can we dream of general theories? No doubt lheory s i the best cloak for lack of experience and ignorance bUl the consequences are depressing: bigotedness. superliciality, and scientific sectarianism. Unfortunately,Jung set up an Meithcr-Qr" choice that is not helpful. Van Leeuwen

( 1985) and others ha\'e G. l Ued for a wposl·modem" philoso­

ph y of science that takes phenomenological experience seriously, but

•

P'

,

IJ9 which also makes a conscious and deliberate effort to be: more explicit about theory and terminology. and a comlll.itmeni to produce data of some kind. There certainty needs to be mOTC of a "both-and� dialog between those who f",.. 'or Jung's narrative method of research and the morc rraditional distinctivcs of conu-oUed experimentation. What the Jungian movement really needs is more persons like Carlson and BeLson

(1980)

.'ha see the need to derive meaningful and signit: ( 1982) · ..

kant hypotheses from Jungian thought thai can be tested against i pact ofJungian concepts would be I!\'en more objective criteria. The m widespread with funhcr serious scientific investigation.

Conclusion C.

G. Jung W:IS a prolific and creative thinker willI few equals in this

century. His impact on modern thought is quite remarkable. E...en his harshest critics have to admit that his thinking was Moriginal and audacious�

(I-1a1l and Lindzey. 1985), We appreciate his willingness to

raise concerns about �the soul of man, M and to do so at a depth and intensity that has been seldom matched by �'en our most respected and articulate theological or ps)'chological �pokespersons today.

It

would be foolish to ignore the issues he addressed as we stnlggle in our attempts to become increasingly lllaUire in Christ. But while the issues he raised and questions hc asked arc vital. the . .. ith answersJung generated are of deep concern. When he grappled .. Christianity. Jung seemed to ha\'e focused solely on its experiential aspects which he reinterpreted within his own system of thoughL Consequentl),. his thought appeals more to those of a meditativc. or perhaps mystical. bent. In contrast. those .. :ith a more intellecLUal or · activistic bent have seldom been impressed (Hurding.

1985. p. 81).

Pemaps !.he enduring '�d.lue ofJungian thought for Christians will be that it raised our a.......H:lless of the great Christian mystical tradition in terms of devotional practice and godliness in life (Hurdillg.

357). The Jungian perspective may leach

1985. p,

us that our Creator-God s i

not only concerned about the events of everyday li\ing but also the deepest depths of Ollr peoonalities as well. Still. reaching in to pursue the inner journey is not without some risks, especiall)' for persons who are already unstable. lOO willing to wit.hdraw from ot.hers. or looking lor a kind of spurious spirituality !.hat wi l l substitllle for authentic Christian confession. character and com­ mitment (cr, Boyer.

1988) . And the ps),chology ofJung. with its deepl)'

140

nawed understanding of our religious nanu-e and the mOSt fundamen­ tal religious truths, would be a poor guide on thaI innerjourney,

For Further Reading Campbell,]. (Ed.).

(1971). TM portabkJung. New York: Viking Press.

Along wilt! Storr listed below, one oCme be$l primers onJungian thought.

(1986). Is the Jungian approach Christian? An analysis. Om«mliaJoumal, 12, 161-166.

Hempeim3lln, L.

A brief but insighl.ful critique of analytic M'Chology. Homans, P.

(1978). jlt'ng in «mto:l: Mobrnity ami

I'"

Chicago: Ulli\'ersit�· of Chicago Press.

making of psy{/wlogy.

A scholarly and thoughtful analysis ofJungian thought ill the larger socio­ (;UllUr.d context.

(19&1). MUll and hiJ symbob. New York: Dell. jUllg, C. (1961), Memoril'$, dl"M'IrIS, Qlld rtfl«tions. New York: Random Hou$e. jung, C.

Interesting initial readillgs inJungian ps)'chology. O'Connor, P.

(1985). UntkrllandingJu.ng,

Imdnllanding JOurstlf. New York:

Paulist PreMo

A useful discussion of the relationship between spirituality and analytic psychology from a broad Catholic persp«til'e.

(1985).jungs mat1lletll l)fChrUtianity. WUmene, IL: Chirion. Another good treaunclII of the relationship betwt'Cn spirimality and ana�

St.ein, M.

lytic psychology from a broad Catholic perspective. Siorr. A.

(198:S) . The ef5nltinljung. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Along with Campbell listed abo\'e, one of the best primers on Jungian thought.

References American Educational Research Nwciation, American Psychological �i­ ation, National Council on Measurement in Education (1986).

Standards

fur tduwt1l)flai and psycJwlogical Itsting. Washington, DC: American PS)..:;ho­ logical A.5.sociation.

(1988). FindingGcd 01 holM. New York.: Harper &: Row. Browning, O. (1987). &iigiow thought and lhe J/IOo'km psydwhgU:!. Philadelphia,

Boyer, E.

PA: Foltress. Bryant, C.

(198!!). Jung and 1M Chmtian WO)'. London: Darton, Longman and

Todd.

(1982). The sacrtd ftm"'9' New York: Harper &: Row. Buechner, F. (198!!). NDIJJ and lAm. N�' York: Harper &: Row. Buros, O. K. (Ed.). (1978). The righth mmlal �mnDI/..I" yto.rbooIt (2 Voll.).

Buechner. F.

Highland Park, NJ: Gryphon Press. Campbell.J and Moyers, B. .•

(1988).

Tlrl power of,"yth. New 'tork: Doubleday.

(1980) . SludiC1 in Jungian typology I: Memory, social perception and social action. jaurT\IJl l)/Per.wrnllity, J8, 80 J -81 O.

Carl�n. R.

jUN('.JM' TIIF.RAI'Y

14/

ThNrJ aM pmaia a/ cotmsdin, a'ld fMyclwihmlJry (2d ed.). Monterejo', CA.: Brooks/Cole. Cnbb, L. (1987). lnJUh oul. Colondo Springs, CO: NavPress. Foster, R. (1978). OItbralan i �disdpi1U l �. New York: Harper &: RO\". Griffin . E. (1986a). Anal}ucal psychology and the dynamics of human elil: A problematic case in the integration of psychology and thcology.juurTUll of PsydtoiOfIJ and ThtoJogy, 14. 269-277. Griffin, E. (198fib) . Ndther/nor: A response to Haule and KeI.scy. jO'urna/ (>f Psymofqgy and T�, /4, 285-287. Hall. C.. and Lind7.'1', G. (1985). /nl1'Q(/udiqn W Ihtaries o/fJmorudiry. New York: Corey, G. (1982).

john WilL1' and Sons. Haule, j. ( 1986). Integrating psychology and theology "'ith bricolage: A � sponse to Griffin. Juurnaf 0'/PS)'choJogy and Thrology, 14, 278.28 1,

Hebon. R. (1982). Critics and thdr texts: An approach tojung's theory of cognition and personalily. joornal of Pn-sffl1ality and Social PsycJwWgy, 43,

40'J.4IB. Hempelmann, L ( 1 986). Is the jungian approach Christian? An analysis. Ctmawdil1jouml1l, 12, 161-166. HOI)!;u\$, P. (1978). j!mg ill am/at: Moonnily lind 1M making of psychoWcJ', Chicago: Uni\'crsity of Chicago Pre.ss. Hughs,J. (1987). iWJuIpingllupJYehoIogirol dQmain. Ikrkelt..1'. CA: Uni\'e rsity of Califomia Press.

Hurding, R. (1985). RoolJ and lMoo, London: Hodder and StoughtOn. johnson, P. (1985). \Vt: Umlmumding t� PJyclwlcgy ofT(Jl1I{lntil lovt. Nt..'W York: Harper & Row.

j ohnson P. (1989). He: Unwlanding rruurulinepsyc/wJog)' (rev, cd.). New York: Harper & Row. johnson, p, (1989). S1u: Ulldmlandillgfeminilu PSYCIwlofrl (re\', ed.), New York: Harper & Rm.'. jung. C. (19.$4) . A review of the complex theory. In TJu s/'TllctUIl! and dylUJmUJ �/htpryc1u, CoUected Works (Vol. 8). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960. (Fiut Gennan edition, 1934). jung. C. (1946). Two e5SayS 01'1 linal)·tic psydwlogy. N�w York: Meridian. jung, c. (1953-1978). Collected Yo'orks (20 Vots). U. Read. M. Fordham, and G, Adler, Ecb.), Princeton. Nj: Princeton UniversilY PreMo jUng, C. (1964). Ma'i and hiJ SJmboi.s. New York: Dell, jung, C. (1961), MhMTitS, drmm�, mId ll!j1«tions. New York: Random House. Kaplan. R.. andSaccuuo, O. (1989). PS'jchoiogicol ttSting (2d ed.). Pacific Grove, .

CA.: Brooks/Cole. Kaufmann. Y. (1984). Analytical ps},dlOlherapy, 1.11 R. Conini (Ed.). Curnnl fJ.ryclwlhtropitS (3d ed.) (pp. 10&.141). Iwca. IL F. E. Peacock. Kei�, D., and Bates, M. (1984). Pi«ul:unwland wu: Chan:uttl'alld ItI'Ilptmmenl Iypes. Delmar, CA: Prometheus Nemuis. Kd�, M. (1968). ChristojJsydt%gJ. New York.: Crtlssroads. Kelsey, M. (1977). TM OlMr side ofsilenct. London: SPCK. Kelsey, M. (1986). Repl}' to analytic psychology and human elil. }oomal of PsythokJgy and ThtrJ/DyJ·, 14, 282-284.

142

MOllERNPSYCHOTIIUlAJ'lES

(19i6), " (Qmp�U guiM to tilml/1J, New York: Pantheon, Madnl}'l"e, A. (1967),Jung. earl GWtav, In P. Edwards (Ed,), Tlu tncyclCfHdia of philosoph, (Vols, 3-4) (pp. 294-296). New York: Macmillan , McLemore, C. (1982). Tlu J(nndal ofPSJc/wlhtraJrJ. Wheaton, IL: Tyndale. Moore, R. (Ed.) (1988). CarlJlmgand Chrn/ian spirituality. New York: Paulin Kovel,j.

Press, Munroe,

R.( 1955). Schools of p5Jchoonal),lic Ih()ll.glit. New York: Holt. Rinehart

and Winston, O'Connor, p,

(1985). Undmlanding jung, Ilndmlanding you�1f New York:

Pauli!t Pres". Rychlak, j.

(1973). 1nlroduction /0 fJn3{JT1ulil] and ps)'dwlhempy. Boston:

Houghton Mifflin. Ryckman, R.

(1985). Thtrmu oJ pmona/ity (3d cd.). Monterey, CA:

Brooks/Cole. Sanford,j.

(1980). Tlu invisible partlln:J.. New York: Paulist Press. Sallford, J. (1982), [k/1,IJHfI pttJp�: Comrn"" imling Ollt lo ont. New York: Pau1ist Press.

(1985). Jungian analysis. In O. C. Senller (Ed.). Bnki'rtncyrktpMia ofprydwlogy (pp, 615-618), Grand Rapids, MJ: Baker, Sanford . J, (1987). Tht lIil,grlo," withi,,: 7M inIW /IIl'ani"K oJjesw. ' MlJi"/f$. New

Sanford.j.

York: Harper & Row.

Sanford,j. (1989). Dmuru: God'j fOWJlIm langrla�. New \'ol'1e Harper & Row.

Stein, M.. (1985) .jungs trl'Vllmenl of Chm/jan;l], WilmClle. 11.: Chirion. Taylor, D. (198i). Tlu myth ofurtainl]. Waco, TX: Word. Van l...«u....el1. M, S. (1985). 1M pmml in PSYlholl>,:r " rontem/Jlmll} C hri$ti(m aptmJUal. Grand

Van Leeu....en, M.

R
S. (1990), Gmtkr(J."dgr(l(�. Downers Grove, IL: IUlerVal'5ity. Viti:, p, C, (l98i), Sc<:ular personality theories: A critical analysis. In T.j. Burke

(Ed. ), Man mid mimi: '" Christian lluory ofpmn,w[jty (pp. 6..�4). Hillsdale,

MI: Hillsdale College Press.

THE BE HAVI 0 PSYCHOLOGIES

6 BEHAVIOR THE Y .;.

ehavior therapy has been describf=:d as having �a long past hut a short history� (O'leary and Wilson, 1987, p. 1), meaning that although many of the techniques of thi.s approach have been used before in human history, the systematized field has had only a shon h51 i 0ry dating back about 40 yean (see Kazdin, l982; or Masters, Bmish, Hollon and Rimm, 1987, chap. I ) . Since the 1950s, howe\'er, beha\;or thernpy (especially cognilh'e-behavior therapy in the

last decade) has aggresshely stepped to center stage in the mental-health field, emerging as one of the four major paradigms in the field (along with psychod)namic, humanistic and family.,system psychologies), Academic

clinical psychology seems to be particularly dominated by this ap­

proach. if the typic-.u comtnlS of the leading joumal, the j(JUrno.i of

Conrullingand ClinicaJPs,'cJwlogy, s i any indication. The best explanation of this popularity is probably thai behavior-therapy researchers have

146 bet!n

so

vcry successful at generating empirical studies.

We have chosen to present the general field of behavior therapy in twO separate chapters. In most Christian analyses. it is u'cated

as

one

unified whole. and unfortunately the writings ofB. F. Skinner are often all that are considered.

This evcn !.hough Skinner has had littJe direct

effect on contemporary behavior Lherapy. except as a historical and perhaps �inspirational � figure. Within the field of beha\ior therapy itself, distinctions between a number of subgroups are usually made (e.g.,

J 987) . We

....

ill consider the

subgroups in this chapter,

�havioranaJy5is)

O'leary

and Wilson,

two most stringemly beha\�oristic of the

behavior modijica/ion

ll as (also knO....

appUd l

and what is called bthauior tliernpy proper. We ....ill refer

to these together as behavior therapy. We will then deal with the less dogmaticall)' behavioristic. more "cognitive� approaches of sociaJ
Descriptive Slln'ey PfrihJsophicaJ Assumptions . of bthauionsm. which in tum Behavior therapy \\'a! and is an outgro....th

was a product of two factors: a view of metaphysics. specifically that of

lIatumlism; and a view of science. first that of inductive �piricism and later that of logico./pruitiuisrn (see Van Leeu..... en,

19i9a, among others,

for an expanded discussion oflhese matters) . Naturalism assumes that the uni\'Crsc is composed exclUSively of matter and energy. and hence there are no such lhings as sup.ma:uural entities such as gods or spirits The human qualities that supposedly distinguish

us

.

from the rest of

the universe (especially -mind-), and which are commonly assumed to

t:ranscend nature, are in this view presumed either not to exist or to be

understandable by the same physical la....s. that explain the rest of existence Human beings are not special in the sense ofu-.rnscending .

these laws ohhe unh·erse. Behaviorism took shape under the inOuellce ofa particular vie..... of science. that of logical positivism and

its predecessor inductive ,

empiricism. According to logical positivism, all meaningful asser­ tions must be either analyti c (statements that are (rue by definition, such as

2

+

2

""

4) or be

empiricafJy verifiabk or Jalsifwble.

Statements

such as "God exiSl\" are, in Lllis view, not merely false; they are mean­ ingless because they are not analytic and are not verifiable by empirical

lJEJlA VTOR T/1ERAJ>l'

147

means. In this view, empirical sense data become the highest court of meaning and hence detennine trulh. ConlCmptWary philosophers of

science have convincingly documemed the problems

",;th

this out·

moded view of science and have begun to sketch the outlines for a better understanding of the process of human knowing (see Evans.

1977, 1989: and Van Leeuwen, 1982, for specifically Christian analyses; and Brown. 1977, for a more standard treatment of this issue from the perspecth'e of the phil osophy of science ) . If the material uni\'erse, understandable only as matter and energy operating according to uni\'ersallaws, is all that is, then human bdngs are material beings only and hence explainable by natural laws. Be­ cause mental phenomena were nOt accessible to empirical study. be­ haviorism

eschewed all �men talism . Philosophical behaviorism was -

first given clear articulation by the famousJohn B. Watson. In the

19205

he directlr challenged the nodon that mind or consciollsness rp�l"

) was the prOJX:r subject matter of psychology, because it could not be empirically examined. For Wal'iOll, the road to progress in psychol ogy was to follow after the natural sciences in dealing only with empirically verifiable constructs (i.e.. behavior): thus behavior was che

"

­

undersTood through its material and causal relationships to otJler behaviors and em�ronmelltal events. The specific formula for undel'� standing behavior was supplied later by the learning theories ofPa"lov,

Thorndike, Skinner and others. Beha\iorism's embrace of naturalism gave rise to what has been

called mturtionism, the principle of breaking down more complex phenomena inTo simpler more elemental ones. Thus human language ,

became understood as -verbal behavior, � olx:ratin g by the same prill'

dples as all oven beha\;or and reflexes. Thought in turn became

�subvocal verbal beha\'ior.� These complex phenomena were in turn believed to be understandable in tenns oflile most elemeOlal processes of learning. In this \iew, ,-'hat \\'e call Mmellal L e\'cnl.S� (such as thoughl.S and beliefs) become ctispositiol1s to engage in behavior and do nOt hold much interest apan from their direct ties to oven behavior.

Everything was reduced LO elemental processes. Another implicat ion ofnaltu-alism was mvirrmmtmlalism, not in the ecological sense but in lile sense that all behaviors arc caused by factOrs outside of or external to themsel\'esAiI human and animal beha\;or is

as caused by events in the environment. The typing behavior that created the word� on this page is seen by a beh aviorist as ha\ing

vewe d i

been generated by the stimuli of lilt' books and articles lyi ng duttered

/48 about the desk, by the contingencies of others expecting a promptly delivered book manusclipt and so forth. Authors write not because they want to, \,;11 to or because of SOllle iU·defined creative urges or libidinal impulses for procreation, hut because outside stimuli impinging on them compel the writing behavior.

compefabove signals that we must deal with the concept dl!termiuism as well. Gcnerdlly speaking, behaviorists accept the The word

of

notion that all behaviors are the inC\'itable results of the causally relcml\t conditions that preceded them (Erwin. 1978). Skinner (1976, p. 185) has said, MA person is not an originating agent; he is a locus, a poim at which man)' genetic and environmental conditions come tOgether in ajoint effect.M If the beha\iors of human bcinb"S afC merely pan of the stream of natural material e\·ents occurring in a mechanistic cosmos. then it surely follows that all our anions, including even what we GIll our decisions and choices, are caused in such a way that, as Wolpe (1978, p. 444) put it. "We ah-"lys do \\'hat we must do." Human choice is ultimately illusory; our actions are the inevitable results of the causal forces impinging on us.

Mod�t ofPenmJatity Behaviorism is uniquc in that writers in this t.r..ldition typically make Slatemcnts about their vjew of persons onl)' indireClly. The real focus oft he model ison the principles ofbeha\10r that apply to all beh�l\ing

organisms, both animal and human. Since there s i really nothing spe­ cial about human beings, to understand persons you only ha\'e to understand the laws of leaming. Behavioral undcrst.:mdjngs of the

person arc generally that the person is a bundle of behavior pauems, reflexes, perceptions and impressions. The .selfis nothing more. in this view, than the aggregation of the person's empirical charaCteristics. In contemporary texts on behavioral assessment (e.g., Hersen and Bellack, 1981). it is not persons or their personalities that are assessed, but rather it is beha..iors and their controlling variables. Some take this position to its logical conclusion, such as BeUack and Hersen (197i, p.

12). who say bluntly that "personalil)' is not a real thing.M Behavioral views of the person are clearly atomistic; persons are best understood by looking at the Matoms� of their behavior patterns and how these atoms are arranged and related. These atoms are not seen as being held together by. or emanating from, any comprehensive. core of the person which \\'C might call a self.

8IJIII I7OH TIIHR,WI'

149

The committed beha\;orist asserts Ihal (uusicaland

opnalll kanJI'11K

processes explain all behavior, So it is 10 these processes ....e . now briefly turn, though the reader should be fore....'amed that these topics are immensely complex and have spawned an enormous liter-Hure; Ihus any briefsummary is bOlmd to be misleading due to o\'ersimplification and selecth>e attention. Operant iMming. Operant learning is also c.uled inslrumental learn­ ing. It refers to the modification of freely emitted behavior; that s i , behavior which is free n i the sense of being nonreflexi\'e and non­

cocro .. . d, not fret: in the philosophical sense, Operant learning is the process by which this emitted beha\ior is modified O\'er timc by the

colWl1Utmusthat follow conringenr.ly upon the responses and by the 5timuJi that form the context under which the behavior

occurs.

TIIC

classic

example i5, ofcourse, the rat in the Skinner box. Lever pressing or other fonns of emitted r.u behavior are modifiable by the consequences ar· ranged to follow the behavior. Responses followed by such events as prescnlation of food or drink, or by the removal of lmpleasalll noise or

shock are likely to increase the frequency of the behavior (rtinfi»ajj�II)

.

Responses followed by consequences such as a spray orice water or shock, l to decrease the frequency of or by the removal offood or drink are ikely the behavior (punishtMlt), Rats can attend to and learn to respond to stimuli such as light! which signal that reinforcement is available (lever pressing leads to food when the green light is on) or is unavailable (lever

pressing s i ineffective when the red light is on).

Whereas classical conditioning (below) does not create new behav­ ior, operant learning can lead to new and very complex beha,;or. First. new behaviors never before emitted by the organism can be taught through the process ofshaping. Shaping invoh'es reinforcing closer and closer approximations to a goal response. For example. a chicken can be taught to peck a piano key by reinforcing the behavior of being nearer and nCaTer the piano, then the behavior of touching the piano closer and closer to the keyboard, until a peck on the keys can be reinforced. New complex patterns of behavior can be created

chnining.

wherein more and more

�linksft

by

(specific beha,iors) are

required to occur together for reinforcement to be delivered. until an entire �chainft of behavior occurs before the final reinforcement (the chicken now raises a curtain. movcs a stool and then plays the piano). Those who practice beha,ior modification claim that human be-­ havior is largely the re!lulr ofthese operant processes. Human problems in living occur when: (I) people learn maladaptive or inappropriate

1'0 responses;

(2) people fail to tearn effective or appropriate responses due to their previous learning environments; or (3) people respond to the wrong environmental contingencies. Often the cause is described

as the combination of all three factors. The negative behavior of the hyperacti\'c child in the home and classroom may be the result of failure to learn proper skills of paying attention for swtained periods and appropriate ways of expressing boredom and anger. It may also inmlve having pre\;ous:Iy learned inappropriate responses of tantrum­ n i g, whining and manipulating. Finally. the hyperactive behavior may be reinforced by peers, parenlS and teachers who. perhaps unwittingly, pay anemian to the child when misbehavior is occurring and do not reinforce good behavior. The therapeutic techniques that emerge out of this model are powerful methods for teaching new behavioN and for arranging envi­ ronments to make desired behavior Rpay oft' and undesired behavior go unreinforced or punished. Several examples will iUuslTatc these principles. One of the dramatic successes of behavior modification has been in the rreatment of autistic children, whose bizarre behavior and unresponsiveness to norma] human inter.tction ha\'e puuled profes­ sionals for decades. While the causes of this problem are still obscure, the application of operant procedures has tielded the most effecti\'e (though not perf«t) treatment for this disorder (Lo\'aas,

1987). In

Lovaas's model, autistic children are given intensive u-d.ining for bours e\'Cry day. They are first rewarded with food for appropriate behavior at whatever elemental level they can begin with, and new forms of behavior are slowly developed through shaping and chaining. Ex­ tremely dangerous behavior such as self-injurious head-banging may have to be directly punished, but as Illuch negative behavior as pos.�ible is simply ignored in hopes that it will be displaced with positive responses as the child improves. Progressing from very fundamental behaviors such as language sounds and paying attention. the program reinforces increasingly more complex and socially important beha\'­ iors. As Lovaas

(1987) has reported, this treatment program produced

the asLOnishing outcome mal fully half of the autistic children in the program were indistinguishable from normal children by late elemen­ tary school age. and most of the others were improved. Another classic exanlple of operant behavior modification is the token economy in the classrom o . Skinner and othen have argued for

years that the best .... ay to manage bcha\ioris to usc positive reinforttment.

.

,

8Ei1Al'lOR TIII!RM'Y but this has proved difficult n i the dassToom, where misbehavior so of ten willS all inordinate amoulll of ,mcntion from the teacher as well as from pecB. Additionally. it ....'Quld be practically m i possible to imple­ mcnt a program of immediate food reinforcers for good behavior in elementary school children; after all. a teacher only has so many hands and kids can only eat so many M&Ms! The cr(.'3th-e solution to the problems of dire<"t reinforcemelU came through creating an economic system in the classroom where children

can

earn tokens which count

as points toward obtaining some desired reward (everything from candy to school supplies to ulloring time ....ith older children to field uips, panies or longer recesses). Because each reward is "broken dov.'Il� into poinl� n i this system, teachers can specify desired beha\ior and reinforce the child frequently with tokens. Such programs ha\'e been sh()\','11 efTecth-e n i n i creasing positive social behavior, academic perfor­ mance and have even been used to teach children greater self-control. One final ex.ample of behavior modification based on operant psychology is asserti\'eness training. Many individuals who report inter­ personal difficulties lack critical relationship skills. Treatment then becomes a process of teaching clients the social skills necessary 10 interface more effectively .... ith their so<:ial world. Clienu will need reinforcing support and careful guidance from the therapist during the initial stages of de\'elopment of new social skills. especially to pn. · ...ent them from accidentally getting into failure situations where

their skills are n i adequate. The therapist mar try to help the person take a stronger stand ....ith regard to her personal v.ishes. help the person communicate more forcefully her positi\'e reelin� such as \ovc and respect, or may try to develop fundamental communicalion abili­ ties such as how to make polite initial convers.·uion or how to express

ith someone. that she would like to spend more time ....

Qassil:al amdit(millg. i Classical conditioning is the process by which

an invo[uncary response becomes re£1exi\'Cly associated with new elic­ iting stimuli. All human bein� exhibit

reflexive respollses that are

unlearned (or unconditioned) to stimuli that elicit these responses from us, as when the smell offocxl e1iciu salivation, a puff of air elicits eye blinking, a burn elicits pain, a nox.ious odor elicits Ilausea and so forth. These reactions do not demonstrate learning; .....e exhibit these responses .... itJ10llt prior training. Pavlov showed that lItese reactions could be

associated

.....ith new stimuli which themselves had previously

not elicited these responses; this is learning. ic example of this is Pavlov's dogs, who learned to salivate The class

•

,

"""

152

MOI)fJtVp:.,n;H071IJ:RAJ>IF.5

at the sound of a bell because of the repealed association uf the bell

with the presentation orrood. In this case the food .....as the !.mcmuJiI;onui

stimulus which elicited

an

um:cmdit;onM m/J011u

of �Iivation. Micr

conditioning trials, the previously irrelevant bell became a

cQrldilitmed

stimulus (i.e., it became a relc\,;\m stimulus only through conditioning trials) which could elicit .1 ronditiomt/ mponst of salivation even when

no food Wd,S presented.

The procedures of Wolpe's behavior therapy are based Oll these principles. For Wolpe. a central feature OrmOSI adult psychopathology

is anxiety, and anxiety can be r.tther handily concepwalized in terms of classical conditioning. For example. an n i tense emotional reaction,

such asfear, to a "'legitimate � or understandable stimulus, such a... being bitten by a dog. can become associated through the process of classical condftioning with previously emotionally nemral stimuli such a.� going

out of one's house, A person lInforiunate enough to make the associ­ ations just described might well become an agoraphobic (a person generally fearful of being away from home and/or n i situations where escape would be difficuh) , especially f i he further conditioned himself by constantly reliving the dog bite in his thought life (including the pain and fear he felt). lfin trying to lea,'c his home and Mcrcome his anxiety he gave in to the anxiety and did not leave, thus experiencing a powerful relief from his anxiety by a\'Oiding what he feared, he ....ould . be further reinforcing the agoraphobia. This analysis of the dynamics of the establishment of debilitating fears also leads to some fruitful hypotheses abom fc-ar reduction. Pavlov demonstrated early in the CCntUl), that most conditioned responses could be changed or "wiped out" byeither conditioning a oe\\' response to the conditioned stimulus. one tllal was incompatible 10 the pre\ious conditioned response, or by

exlingui.�hing the

conditioned response by

presenting the conditioned stimulus I
Wolpe pioneered the technique called SY5lematic desen.siliwlio1l

based on the fonner process of pairing a

Il(:W

response with the old

stimulus. Wolpe undcNiiood the phenomenon of anxiety largely in terms ofits physical. observable manifestations and thus reasoned that

the response most antithetical to anxiety

was

muscular relaxation.

Desensitization was developed to provide a way for rela.xation to be­ come

assoc

iated \o\ith what had previously been an anxiet}'-evoking

stimulus. He first lcaches anxious clients physical relaxation and then has them slo....ly . and gradually imagine closer and closer approaches to

IJEHIIv/UH Tllt:JiII.PY

stimulus while lhe client maintains a relaxed Slate. After the clients are able to mainLain physical relaxation while imagining an approach to the previously feared stimulus Wolpe lhen guides them to closer real·life approaches 10 the feared stimulus. Using this procedure. one of the authors assisted his ,'ery first dient in graduate school to go from having a long-standing and .severe spider phobia thou was undermining her school performanc.e and social relationships (due to constant debilitating fear) to comfortably ha'�ng a spider collection (live, of course) in her aparunent and being totally free from her previous fears. Other beha,�or therapists have preferred to utilize Pavlov's notion of extinguishing the unwanted response. Extinction for Pavlov's dogs oc­ i curred simply by presenting me bell, which had previouslybcen assocated with food, over and over again y,ithout any presentation of the food. In this way the salivation response to the bell f"'entuaJly died OUL Similarly, Marks (1981) has argued that many forms ofanxiery are best e:..:tinguisht.'I:i by exposing the client to me feared stimulus or stimuli without the feared outcome occurri g. Exposure to a feared stimulus can be gradual or massed (all at once). For example, Marks reported the case of a woman y,.ith a long-standing obsessi\'e--compu\­ sive problem which had previously not responded 10 e ither drugs or several forms of psychotherapy, including psychoanalysis. He worked with the formulation that the fears of germs, sickness, death and 50 forth were generating avoidance behaviors such as compulsive clean­ lhe anxiety-provoking

.

h

ing rituals and avoidance ofsocial contacts. These avoidance behaviors

tum reduced the anxiety, which reinforced the avoidance. Ther:.lpy then consisted of exposing the patient 10 the feared stimuli, which Marks did in an imensi"e inpatient treaunent program. Marks had the woman touch "contaminaled� objects such as dirt. shoes. used (but not contagious) bandages, toilet seats floors and used eating utensils, aU while fIl.-"frainillg from cleansing herself; she even y,wd.S asked to put her fingers in her mouth and to rub her clothes before putting them on and to rub her ovm eating utensils before using them. Within days, since there .....as .. no trauma to keep the conditioned fear ali\'e (the feared disease and death did not occur) , me obsessive-compulsi\'e neurosis and the anxierycausing it slowly dimins i hed to a manageable IC'-'CI (exti nguished) . At follo.....up, she maintained her dlerapeutic g'dins. in

,

Motkl ofhydtotJrt:rOfrj Based on the notion that behavior is caused by its environment. beha,ior

/54

MOilJ;I/.V l'St'CJ/arl/�:RM'IES

therapy begins with a careful aSII'$S7IImi orlhe �conrroUing� conditions influencing the occurrence oflhe problematic behavior pauerns. the factOn that seem LO exerl some SOrt of influence on the problematic behavior. Note that it is not persons that are assessed, but behaviors. This is called conducting af1llldi01il11 ana/ysisof the problem beha\'ior. For instance, the temper-tantruming behavior of a fiw!'-year-old may be seen by the parent as being caused by low self-esteem, but the behavior modifier looks for reliable predictors of Lhe Ian(J"uITIS and for the consequences that reinforce it (e.g., thatlhe behavior occurs only when mother is present and father isn't, that the mother usually tries to �rea.�ure" the child with attention and afTcctjon when this behavior occurs, etc.). Therapy docs not begin until a clear conce� lllalization is obtained. Behmtior modification conducted on an outpatient basis then pro­ ceeds to foster a collaborative relationship \\ith the client by sharing as much of the conceptualization with the client as is feasible, modifying the conceptualization as needed and enlisting the client as a coUal» ralOr in the therapy process. When behavior modification is conducted with persons with whom infonned consent is not possible due to either inability to comprehend the problem (psychotics or the retarded) or the persons would not consent volunt:l.rily to the trcatmem (such as prison inmates or hospirn.l.ized antisocial adoles<:ems) . permission to proceed

is

obtained from the custodians legally in charge of the

person's welfare. At this point the intervention has begun. Because of their commit­ ment to the scientific method, behavior modifiers emphasize continu­ ing assessment both throughout and after the intervention period to "erify that change is occurring as expected. In inpatient settings, professionals

an:

usually the penons directly managing lhe illlen-en­

tion process, as when psychiatric hospital staff manage a token ccon­ omyon a hospital ward. In outpatient setlings, the modification process is usually managed by the clients themseh'Cs or through the agency of intermediaries, such as parents implementing prescribl..'Ci procedures for their child or leachers implementing procedures in lhe classroom.

Christia.n Critique PhilosophiCt11 Assumptions The first philosophical presupposition we mentioned in regard to s i at behavior therapy was lhat of naturalism. Ob,iously, naturaism l

155

BEllA170R THERAPY

odds with the Christian faith: GQd exists and is above nature since he is the maker of nature, and therefore dogmatic naturalism is false. There are such supernatural entities as Cod, angels. the devi l and demons. But this quick dismis.\al of doctrinaire naturalism is not an endorsement of the opposite belief-that human beings are purely supernatural beings. Authors such as Boivin

(1985) have argued that while Christians

must reject a behavioristic 'world view that denies the realit}' of the supernatural, it may be biblical to assert that while there are supernat­ ural entities that interact \\;th the created order, the created order itself (including humanity) is purely naturalistic, Compare the words of Watson

(1930, p. v), �Man is an animal different from other animals

ith the words of Boivin only in the types of behal;or he displays,� ....

(1985, p, 83), �Only our relationship and responsibility to Cod makes us qualitatively different from animals. � Boivin asserts thai a Christian understanding of the person does not need to posit more than a natural existence for humanity. He supports this view by pointing to the Hebraic notion of the unity of human existence, to the doctrines of embodied life, and

to the confusion of traditional Christian anthr�

i pology about soul and spirit. He suggests, in short, that naturalism s O"ue with reference 10 human beings.

\Ve agree that there has been at times a misplaced emphasis on doctrines ofdisembodied souls in the Christian tradition. Nonetheless, the Christian faith seems LO require viewing persons as partially imma­ terial beings. The naturalism of behaviorism does, however, remind us that bumans hal'e pridefully underestimated the extent to which our embodied existence conditions, shapes and even determines some aspeCts of our experience. But in emphasizing only bodily existence, the behaviorist misses a key aspeC( of human nature, thai being the interplay of body and soul-spirit and the distinctively u-anscendent aspeCts of our natul'es (see chapter two), The beha,"ioristic rejection of�mentalism� and its view of the mind is also problematic. If thought is merely a behavioral disposition or a by-produClOfphysical brain events, then humans cannot transcend the physical order of things. This provides a conceptual grounding for the doctrine of determinism.

As \\'e shall see in

the paragraphs to come,

such detenninism is not acceptable. As one ofus has argued previously Uones,

1985). Christian belief docs not lead to an easy resolution to

the brain-mind issue, though it does sel up certain parameters within which to choose proper resolutions to the malter, One ofthese param-

1'6 i more than just an ctef'S, though. must be some notion that thought s -epiphenomenon � as behaviorists propose. Christians cannot accept a notion thai belief and thought are not efTeclUal causes of behavior. We ha\'c already delineated how behaviorists accept determinism. Even so, it is common to rcad of "freely emiued behavior� and even Mfreedom� in behaviorAl writings. How can this be? ZurifT ( I 98!)) is helpful here in noting thal the language of freedom or action is used by behaviorist!! to designate behavion which are not reflexively elicited or coerced. In this view, a certain action (for example. raising a hand) ith onc's desires (as when waving is free if the beha,;or coincides .... l d) but is nOl free when il is against one's desires (as bye-bye to a chi when one raises both hands during a robbery or in response to stimulation of the motor cortex of the brain during neurosurgery). Note, though. that the actions in all three examples ,""ould be regarded 'S of by the behaviorist as causally determined; the fIrst twO by the 1a.... learning� and the last one by neurological stimulation. What makes the first instance of waving bye-bye �free� for the behaviorist is not that one could have acted otherwise under the same circumstancesj in the behavioral analysis one could not have done so given one's learning history and the current environment. It was �free." in the viewofSkinner and others, because the enacting of that behavior was not unpleasant for the actor and it was in accord .... ith the person's causally predetermined desires at the moment. In other words, the actor had the subjective experience of choice, but the choice and the desires that motivated it were really predetermined by learning hislOry. All behavior is regarded as inevitable; we can ne>.'erdo other than what we do. As ZuriB' (1985, p. 199) says, behavioristic psychology �is not . . . compatible v.ith the notion of a free -.... illed �lf-initiating agent. .. In critiquing this view, we mUSt first nOte that not all psychologists who study even animal behavior use mechanistic forms of analysis that are characteristic of the strict behaviorist. Domjam (1987), for in­ stance, argues that theoretical perspectives that emphasize �choice� and that emphasize how patterns of reward and punishment restrict the "freedom of action� (p. 562) of animals are more fruitful than old-style stimulus-respon� models. But this view probably cannot be taken 3$ a belief n i animal freedom in the sense that Christians mean by thai term. We argued in chapter tv."O thaI Christian belief requires a rejection of determinism-the view that C\'ery human e\�nl is the inevitable outcome of preceding C\'ents--and requires beliefin limited freedom.

•

P'

,

157 Though some Christian ps}'chologists (e.g., Bufford,

1981) and some

Chrinian groups embrace such a strong view of Cod's sovereignty that they could be labeled theological delcmlinists. such a position has not been typical of historic. orthodox Christianity. John

Calvin

is com­ monly believed to ha\'c denied the freedom of persons, bUl along with Muller and Vande Kemp (1 985) . we would argue that hisbeliefin COO's sovereignty.

,

divine election predestination and lhe depravity of the

human will C'dllnOt be equated with philosophical determinism as accepted

by most behaviorists. Human freedom is even defended in

the Cahinistic tradition, as staled in the Wesuninster Confession of Faith (Leith,

19i3); MCod hath endued the will orman with that natural

liberty. that [it] is neither forced nor by any absolute necessity ofnature determined to good or evil.M

In most segments of the Christian rradition, human beings are regarded as

resp

onsible as morally culpable Responsibiity l ror our ,

.

actions seems to require the capacity to have acted other than we did in a given situation. ThU$. from a Christian perspective total determin­ ism is unacceptable and limited freedom s i an essential belier (Evans,

1977). PlantiDga (1983) nicely summarized the essence of a Christian position by defining the concept or "agent �ausation: the notion of a person as an ultimate source or action� (p. 23). The Christian must believe that a person 'schoices are sometimes the ultimate and deCiding factor in the occurrence of an action in order to believe that we are truly responsible beings who can be held accountable ror our actions before God. i But no te that causes do not have to be exclusive. To argue that n \\-'as

an ultimate cause does not rule out that other causes also affected the behavioral outcome. Even

a particular instance the person

though we make reaJ choices, we do so as persons with experiences and

constraints that exert an effect. Accepting the notion of agent causa­

tion does not mean denying the assertion that some or even much or our behavior is determined, or that the true choices ofa free agent are shaped by comtitU(ional or environ mental factors. The Christian concept of limited freedom is not the same as

freedom from regularit)·, freedom from influences on behavior or freedom from fini tude It simply means that the final choices that create behavior were not lhe result of impersonal rorces and the .

chooser was not merely a �IOCUSM ofinfluencescoming together. Rather,

the per50n decided among real options. influenced by his or her

history and constitution. This position has been excellently delineated

158 by Browning (1987, p. 113): The doctrine aflhe freedom. transcendence, and responsibility of humaru does not mean that

we

are totally free and completely

unconditioned by eithu internal impwse or external reinforce­ ments. In faCt. it meansjuSt the opposite. It means that in spite of our massive conditionedness by these forces, there is still asufficient modicum of transcendence over them to make it possible for us to alter, however slightly, the course of our lives. It would seem thai we are stuck with incompatible perspective! on this topic; detenninism and limited freedom do not in fact ap�ar to be reconcilable. Positively, we can learn from the behavior modifier that our behav­ ior s i influenced and shaped by many factors of which we are often unaware. In denying determinism, Christians are often in danger of embracing a prideful claim thai their choices and actions are toLa.lly free and unconditioned by their material existence. We are danger­ ously close to a self-denying view that denies the finilUde and depen­ dency in which we exisL It also seems true that human beings are a .... -er and higher capacities, and that again OUt of pride composite oflo we want to deny the real part conditioning influences play in our basic psychological make-up. Mockl ofl'mohality We introduced earlier the atomistic view of the person imbedded in behavioristic psychology. In mils view there are no necessary i nterrela­ tionships between discrete components of the person's behavior. If interrelationships exist between cJustersofbehavion;, as when a person tends to lie and to steal. they are there by the accident of conditioned assoc

iation or some such process. There is no necessary grounding of

any particular behavior or behavior pattern in a self. Thus a concept ofgeneral human responsibility is impo�ible, since each behavioral pattern has itS own specific controlling conditions which bears no necessary relationship to the person as a whole. There s i no �person � 10 hold responsible for the behavior e>:hibited. ntis ils why Skinner (1971) can call for the abolition of our criminal jurispru­ dence 5}'Slem as it exists today-there really are no perstniS to be punished but only response patterns to be modified. and thus behavior modification should replace judicial punishmenL For the behavior modifier, one negati\-e behavior pattern (such as repeated lying) doesn't make the person a bad person; rather. the lying is a behavior

BFJIAVTOR TlIE1IAP1'

JS9

pattern that needs to be modified. That pattern s i unrelated to the �pcrson,M as the person docs not exist. There is a certain clinical wisdom and utility to such an approach. in that the spurious O\'eridentification by a client (as a person) with a particular negative aspeCt of her or his behavior is genuinely problem­ atic. We have known sincere Christians who ignore many positive areas ofdiscipline and matlu;ty in their I.ives to focus on one negative pauern (�]'ve not 1x:cn able to kick my fingernail-biting habit; how dare I say that God is active in my life when I have no self-conu-oW). Thus this insight is of central value for the religious thinker: Not every behavior pattern i� a true index of the state of the self. One person's rudeness in a situation may be an accurate index of their arrogance, pride and self-deification. The exact same act by another person may be an anomaly related to being inattentive to social cues at that moment because of a deep inner struggle of some son. And perhaps

C\'eD

behavior patterns that are good indices of the condition of the hean

will ha\'e to be changed deliberately after the heart changes. Old, sinful habit patterns don't automatically change when the heart changes, as many a new convcn has disco\'Crcd. Ln chapter [\\.'0 we discussed the need for Christians to \;ew the person as a substantive agent or self. Christian thought requires the identification ofspecific behaviors in some significant manner with the unified person, because a person who commits specific behavioral acts which are sins must be capable of validly being labeled a sinner. In a powerful W"dY, a person's behavioral acts often are diagnostic of the inner condition of the �heart� or unified core of the person. As Christ said, �By their fruit you will recognize them� (Mt 7:16). So behaviors are not atoms unconnected with lhe heart; they are often (but not always) evidence of what lies in the hearL If we deny that persons are unified beings, then there s i no ant! to hold responsible for sin, no unified pef50n to be redeemed and �ncti6ed or punished. and sins arejuslbehaviorswhich occur in a person's b:odyorin his or her actions but are unconnected with the person per se.Atomism is thus unaccept­ able. though n i structive. to the Christian. Every theory ofpersonality has a \;CW ofhuman motivation, though we ha\'e dea1t only implicidy with it in behavior therapy so far. The behavioral \iew is actuallyvery simple and very complex. It is simple in i the driving, e\'OlutionariJy based proposing that hnman survival s motiva[ion behind our behavior.

As Browning (1987) and others ha\'e pointed out, there are remark-

"'DDffiNPSYCHOTHEIW'IES

160

able parallels between Skinner's environmental reinforcement and Darwin '5 concept of naLUral selection. For the Darwinian evolutionist, nature "selects" species that successfully adapt to their environmental niche. For the behaviorist, the environment "selects" behavion by reinforcing those responses that aid survival and adaptation to the organism's niche in life. Looking only at rat beha,,;or in Skinner boxes, we often mistakenly imagine reinforcement to be something that others intentionally do because they dcliberately want the behavior of the subject (rat or child) to change. But in the "real world," reinforcement and punishment occur naturally depending on how good of a match the organism's behavior is to the demands of the environment. For example. a partic­ ular type of hunting behavior may be reinforced by a greater kill at the end afme hunt because the hunting response meshed well with nature. To Skinner, individual adaptation to the environment, and hence greater chance of survival, is the motivation for human behavior. And one of the distinctives of behaviorism is that it proposes only a small list of inherent motivations or instincts that are themselves critical to survival, including such drives as for food, drink and sex (Herrnstein,

1977) . But the behavioral view of motivdtion is also exquisitely complex. because Skinner and others belie\'e that almost anything can become a reinforcer through its association .... 1th the limited number of more primary or basic reinforcers. Things like money or verbal praise come to be reinforcers through constant association with primary reinforcen such as food. warmth and sexual outleL In this way we can be led to \'3lue (and hence be motivated

by)

a diversity of stimuli, including

financial reward, the praise of our parents and peen, or by interper­ sonal recognition. Further, respome patterns like academic excel­ lence,

artistic

creativity,

physical

brutality

and

psychopathic

manipulation can become \'ehicles for obtaining primary reinforcen and hence Lhe response patterns can come to have a positive \�J.lue in

'T1 . right. So in the beha\ioristic analysis there is no one core their 0....

human motivation thaI is easily appealed to in order to underst.,nd

i idiosyncratically organ­ human behavior, Rather, human motivation s ized; each person's motivations may be different from those of his or her neighbors. Christians may applaud the motivational dh'ersity of behavior ther­ apy. but be righLly troubkd by its assumption thaI all effective moti\'a­ tions ultimately depend on basal drives shared with animals. Chrislians

BEllAVlOR 71fEJ«Y'I

161

must claim that human beings are capable of acting out of higher motives, such as the desire to serve God, and that such higher motives -ays reduce to the drive for tangible reinforcers. do not al.... A Christianjudgment that human motivations can and ought to be more noble and higher than they are may be valid; at the same time, i centives to change a appeals to Whigher moth'es� may be ineffective n person's behavior. For instance, Christians often object to token econ­ omies for their problem chi l dren on the grounds that the children Mought8 to obey their parents and do their chores because Mit is the right thing to do,� nOt to earn points to purchase video games. But ....hen . a disruptive child is moth-ated only by the a\'oidance of punish­ ment and the acquisition ofto),s. those appetites may be the best avenue for modification of the child's behavior, Such an initial change may establish the very possibility of the child being motivated by other things. Having children obey their parents. improve their school per­ formance and attend church to earn tokens to buy toys may be the beSt way to expose them to aclivities which they MoughtM to ,'3Iuc more, and

thus increase the likelihood that they will come to prefer them. Just

because Christianiry teaches that people ought to value more than material things does not mean they, in fact, do, and there is no psychotherapy system more humble and realistic about the depth to which human motivation can sink than behavior modification. The approach also suggests a technology for the alteration of human values and moti\'(:s through the acquisition of skills and associ­ ation ofevcnts. As Clouse

(1985, p. 94) pul it, �God created us as beings

who respond to reinforcer.; and punishers in our environment.M Per­ haps it is human pride more than aJl}1.hing that makes us prone to believe dlat we supersede all environmental influence. The deliberate �tructuring of onr environments to build up helpful and righteous beha\'ior seems a helpful le5S0u lo learn from behavior modification. The Nt.."W Tc�tament epistles often give instructions not for individual effort and growth but to the creation ofpo.....erful fellowship contexts, ....hich .

can

be effective mechanisms for the modification of individual

behavior. Sometimes the best path to person�change is the immcnion of the n i dividual into the community. with the person thus being subject to the contingencies of the personal consequences of that community. The behavioral analysis of this influence is, on an ultimate level. unsatisfactory, but it points us LO an aspeCt ofpersonal reality that we might notolher.... ise attend to. We can also mention in passing the behavioral view of good and

162

AlODF.RNPSYOIOTIfERAPIES

evil (see CosgrO\'e, 1982; or Bro....'Iling. 1987). For the behaviorist, good and evil as such do nOt exist because there are no values that exist outside of human conditioning pallerns. Moral codes, to Skinner, are believed to embody codified instructions about how 10 obtain rein­ forcement

(this is the -good�) and avoid punishment (the things to

avoid are the �bad"). A moral absolute such as "Thou shalt not steal� is behaviorally understood as expressing the normative pattern in a particular culture by which persons can generally expeCt rewards for honesty, diligence and thrift and punishment for theft and cheating. Browning (1 987) has convincingly argued that a dose examination of Skinner's worl, espe<:ially of his fumous utOpian novel about a beha.... ioristic commWlity, Wald.m

Too,

shows that beneath Skinner's appar­

ent1y purely evolutionary eth.ic lies a commitment to a radical egalitarian justice ethic that places special emphasis on the �primary goods of liberty and opportunity" (p. 109). But because this detailed examination of Skinnerian ethics is more relevant to Skinner's utopian aspirations and is not so relevant to behavior modification as a therapy

system, .... e.. refer the reader to Brov.ning for further information.

One of the most frequenlcriticismsofbehavior modification is that its views of the person are simplistic. But it not the case that behaviorists think human behavior is simple. They acknowledge that we are capable of exquisitely complex behavior. They atuibute this complexity to the human capacity for enacting complex chains of behavior, for making fine discriminations between stimuli so that our complex behavior is ....ell .. tailored to our exact circumstances, and for being guided by symbolic rules. They are forced to regard these rules as mere com� e.. pound stimuli that shape our behavior rather than concepts that ....

�understand.� because they must stay away from any mentalistic con� cepts. They con lend the basic processes governing behavior are simple,

but that just as simple brwhstrokes of color may gro...... n i to paintings

of the most exquisite sorts, similarly simple learning processes can yield behavioral patterns of true complexity. The core of our complaint then must not be that behavior therapy sees complex humanity as simple. but rather that it does irrevocable harm to our view of persons for complex human pro­ cesses to be reduced to instances ofbasic learning phenomena. This is

Ttdw:tionism.

The danger is that at some point in reductionistic

arguments ....hat .. is essential for maintaining a full sense of what it means to be human will be IOSL At the point where the human as a self, as a person, disappears and is replaced by conditioned response

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patterns,reductionism has gone [()() far. On the other hand, we must remcmber that to intervene, or to have science at all, some level of reductionism is necessary. No human being can

ever fully understand another in all one's complexity and richness.

All of our judgmenLS about others are "reductions" of some sorL All pithy sayings, proverbs and common .... isdoms simplifr situations by ignoring some aspeCLS of human uniqueness; this seems to be the cost of choosing actions. If counselors had to understand clienLS in all their unique and incredible complexity before intervening, no cOlmseling would ever get done. The issue is whether in the process of simplification too much geLS lost. Vie would argue that this s i indeed the case in beha\iorism. Even though basic leruning processes can yield startling complexity, it still demeans humanity to reg-Md all behavior as resulting from basic · ever, learning processes shared with animals. (It is not demeaning, ho.... to suggest thai some or even much of our behavior mar be shaped by such processes.) This is the fundamental and irrevocable .... ·eakness of behavior modification; that in the process of reducing complexity to fundamental processes, all that is recognizably and distinctly human disappears. This leads us to examine the concepts of oorI.YtJuenu, habit and rompeterul. Remember from chapler twO that a Christian view of per­ sons asserLS that ....·e were created to exercise purposeful dominion over the carth. We might conclude from this that we are intrinsically goal­ orienled beings whose actions are meant to produce tangible outcomes in our world. Hence, it is not nonsense from a Christian point ohiew to expect human beings to be influenced by the consequences of their actions. Scripture is full, ifyou will, of direct appeals 10 act in our own

is (1980) poimed out so ....ell welfare, as C. S. Lc .... . in

his sennon

"The

Weight of Glory. � God through his re\'erued \"\'ord promises us uni* maginable and eternal rewards bolh now and in the hereafler ifwe will btl! become his follo.... 'ers. and unimaginable punishmeOl ifwe do not (see Piper, 1977). As Bufford (1981) effectively argues, one of the primary ways in which

God

deals ....11.h humanil}' is through conse­

quences for our actions, and il would be foolish to denr thai human behaviol' is profoundl)" shaped b)' the contingencies we interact with

and perceive. Beha\'iorislS have something 1.0 remind us of here.

But ,,'e cannOl simplemindedly say that behaviorism is true because lhe Bible talks about rewards. First, behaviorlsLS talk about reinforce­ ment, not rewards, and use the concept in a technical sense that implies

164

much more about human beha\�or and nature than Christians can accept. The concept of reward, in the Christian view, onen implies moral wonhiness LO rcceh'c the reward. not just manipulation by comequences. Second, any psychological theory can make sense of human beings responding to material inccnti\'cs; so behaviorists are merely unique in their emphasis on this dynamic, rather than being the only ones who recognize iI. Nevertheless. it seems true that by emphasizing lhis human tendency w respond to inccnth'es, they have come up wiLh unique and effecth'c means of intervening, especially with populations, such as the retarded and children, where verbal methods are less likely to effect change. Christian thought s i also hospitable to the notion of habit. In fact, the Christian counseling method arjay Adams is actually buill in part around the notion that bom sinful and righteous behaviors can and do become habits. Adams (1979, chap. \4) argues that the core ofa Christian counseling approach is contained in Ephesians 4:22-24, where we are n i structed to lay aside me old self and put on the new self. Adams argues that these tenns of self refer essentially to habit pauerns fanned Out of the choices one has accommodated one's self to. Thw, for Adams, laying aside !.he old self is "dehabituation � and putting on the new self is �rehabituation � (p. 237). Habit is said to be "a great blessing of God that has been misused by sinners� (p. 161). The capacity to respond automatically is misused by it being adapted to perform sinful acts out of habit, as when we train our hearts in greed

(2 Pet 2: 14; see also Jer 13:23). But Adams argues that the believer can

also develop godly habits with !.he help of !.he Holy Spirit (Heb 5: 14), and that these habits can be undermined by. for example, bad company

(1 Cor 15:33). A Christian view of persons will recognize the place of habit in human life, and behavior modification certainly does this. Adams would distinguish his approach from behavior modification on many points, but espedally in his assertion that real change only happens with !.he indwelling of the Holy Spirit. and not through unaided human effort alone. Behavior modification suggess t indirecliy that optimal human well­ being is correlated with !.he de,'elopment of competencies: the more varied capacities individuals ha�'e for interacting productively wi!.h their world, the beuer. With the notion of dominion in the biblical framework, competence does seem an m i portant concept in human life. Christianity is sometimes mistakenly identified as a religion that

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N:tlll\/lOH TllERIll"Y

requires persons to dey-dlue Ihcmsclves and view themseh'cs as worth­ less and incompetent, and there are biblical passages that gi\'C this impression-such as the injunction to bcliC'.'c that �all have sinned and fan short of the glory of God" (Rom 3:23). But recognition of moral bankruptcy s i not equivalent to incompetence. Christianity is not chained to perceptions of incompetence. Jesus Christ and Moses were the only two figures in the Bible that were described as mffk; the best understanding ofmcekness biblically is nOt weak.ness, as s i commonly supposed, but �power under control.M The Creek word for meekness was actually used to describe powerful, aggrcssh'e, but well
Mod
Applied behaviorism has often been criticized with reference to how it might be applied in a utopian attempt to shape all of humanity. For instance, many regard C. S. Lewis's famous science fiction novel That HUkQus Strength to have been an early antibehavioristic tract (and a thought-provoking one it is!). More directJ)'. Van Leeuwen (1979b. 1979c) and Browning (1987) spend a great deal of time critiquing and drawing implications from lUlldtn Two, Skinner's behavioristic utopian novel. It is a recurrent theine among critia of Skinner thai in Sp:iIC of his deterministic assumptions. he often makes messianic pronouncements of how lI."e should or mUSt implement beha\ioral control technology on a socie­ tally wide basis if we are to see "what man can make from man � (Skinner, 1971, p. 206). His critics point out the contradiction of saying on the one hand that "all behavior is determined. everything happens as it must, while at the same time saying, ....·e .. must seize the opponunily now to reform and reshape humanity to save our race and better our plight. Yet there is no contradiction in this for Skinner, as he call argue that it is W

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MOO£R,.'{PSYCilOTHERAP!£S

reinforcing for him to say such Lhings and that h:: has come to the place through his reinforcement history where he believes these things (i.e.. these verbalizations are established response patterns), and he would thus predict that society as a whole would receive a greater sum total of reinforcement from following his advice. Browning is right injudg­ ing Skinner to be endorsing something like societal husbandry to cultivate the types ofbeha\'ior pauerns among the populace thaI the elite behavior-control experlS would judge as being [or the common good of our species. Such a system would of necessity be elitist and totalitarian. It is on the basis of these tendencies that many dismiss behavior modification out ofhand. SUI we will not interact further .... ith how behaviorism tnighl be implemented as social poliq and grapple i used clinically. instead with how it s Let us first takewhalare for many the most troublesome cases: those where the recipients of therapy are not able or \\i.lling to agree to the change process. What of behavior modification with the developmen­ tally disabled (mentally retarded) or as applied on inpatient child, adolescent and adult psychiatric

wards

where patients are detained

against their will? There are some legitimate similaritit!S be�'een bt. ...

i these situations and the more specula­ havior modification applied n th'e accountS ofhow they might be applied in a tOralirarian system. First, we must acknowledge that the inter-'entions in these situations are applied with the consent of lhe parent., legal guardian or custodian of the persons because the clients are judged by their guardians to be n i the client's best welfare. This particular dilemma is one faced by all coercive applications of therapy methods. Further. behavior modifiers typically view what they are doing as building necessary behavior changes into clientS to equip them to acquire greater freedom and choice in life. Rebellious adolescentS. it would be argued, are actually experiencing diminished freedom be­ cause their behaviors are largely being shaped by deviant social cltes

and reinforcers. Coercive intervention may be nect'".ssary. in this anal­ ysis, to alter established behavior patterns, as I\·hen adolescents pre­ \·jously

�addictedW

to

Satanic

practices

must

confonn

to

a

loken-economy system. Hopefully in the process the new "normalw behavior acquires greater value and the deviant beha\;or fades with disuse. Even highly aversive t.reaunenl (such as punishment by shock or physical restraint) rna)' be necessary to disrupt highly destruclh'e behavior such as self-abuse. We can see some legilimacy to lhe behaviorist's argument that

.

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167

coercive treatment is sometimes valid

.....hen

the suffering person is

failing to act in self-enhancillg fashions. What compassionate person .....eivt!-)iear-old that only her peer will accept the strident demands of a t group should tell her how to bell,we? What peroon will withhold shock

a retardate with a ten-year history of horrible head­ banging, when this treatment promises to eliminate that behavior n i punishmem from

two days?

But ....hat . legitimately frightens skeptical nonbehaviorists is the lack

of any sharp and dear delineation in the

theory of how practitioners

distinguish between incompetent and compJtent persons and between adaptive and mal adaptive behavior patterns, especially since in the behavioristic view, everyone's actions are determined an}way. Behavior modification is tnunpeted as a ool t thai can be applied to dlange any behavior. What then will StOP abuses such as the application of "behay­

ioral principles� in prisoner-of-v.�dr camps where human beings were deprived of sufficient food to make them more responsi\'e to food as a reinforcer for compliance and hard work? The potential for such abuses is frightening.

In the outpatient situation, however, behavior-modification prac­ tice is less cOlltro\'ersial. Two reviewers of behavior-therapy practice even referred to the wamor.tlityW of behavior therapy (Woolfolk and

1984). They argued lhat whi l e behavior modification has v.alues built into its system. as a ther.lpy model it has a much less wclklevclopcd notion of human health or perfection t.han the classic Richardson,

psychoanalytic or persoll-ccntered models, Its supponers argue that a less defined ideal allo\\'s for

greater flexibility of direction and less

n i lrusive influence of lhe therapy's embedded values, This may be somewhat true, but our

concern would be that such amoraliry would simply relocate lhe influence from a relatively public therapeutic model to a more elusive and idiosyncratic locus; Le., the penonaJ

opinions and "alues of the

lh
In other words. the informed

consumer of gestalt therapy services knows the values of the gestalt therapist with some accuracy before beginning therapy. but this is less true with the behavior therapies. Hence. its techniques can be pointed in many directions, as its abuses show. Without a built-in explicit model of healthy humanness, behavior modification becomes almOSt a collec­

(1987) has noted. The fact that behavior modification has developed a diversity of teChniques s i both a strength and a .....eakness. On the surface, students of beha\;or therapy often feci they are studying a loosely woven collage tion oftechniques in search of an application, as Tan

168

MODEJINPSYCi/(fTllERAPI£S

of intervention strategies. None of the other therapies rival behavior lherapy in the degree to which treaunent for different persons can be truly individualized because of the many techniques found in the model, and this s i a strength. Further. its supporters argue that it is not a set of techniques but a framework for analysis and modification. And ret the most frequent complaint against behavior therapy is its super­ ficiality, and the appearance of superficiality is certainly strengthened by the chaotic explosion of technologies available. This apparent superficiality is more than mere appearance; it may reflect the more profound lack of a central organizing understanding of personhood at the center of the model. ,\nother rea.\On that behavior modification isjudged superficial is that its view of persons is ahistorical; the important determinants of human action (and hence of personality) are almOSt exdllSively in the present. While operant psychologists use concepts such as learning history, their emphasis is on the current determinants ofbehavior. The origins of the self-defeating habit pattern are of little intrinsic interest to the therapist; the factors that cue the behavior and currently rein· force it are pre-eminent. The issue here is the cause of distress, and the behavior therapist! do have a point worth considering, that of how an event from the past can have any causal impact upon llS now. They argue that past events mllSt be made current in some form to affectllS in the present. So if a person is troubled by memories of a traumatic event from the past, it is the determinants of their current memories that must be examined rather than tht'! event in the past. Some Christians might see this present focus a mength, in that it facilitates accountability and action for growth. Olhers would see it as a negati,'e in that it trivializcs a person's sense of history and hence sense of self. Of all the models, the person of me therapist is least important in behavior modification and therapy (Tan.

1987), Bcha\�or therapists

have been forced by empirical research to admit of late that the quality of the rnerapisl
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describing the relationship as an important medium through which reinforcemelll and modeling occur and a source of motivation for the c1iem. Bm regardless how you cut il, there is an impersonal feel to the description of how the therapist influences the dienl, even though in empirical slUdies behavior therapists have been regarded as more empathic and positive than even "humanistic" therapists (O'leary and Wilson, 1987, pp, 383.388). In behavior therapy, the relationship of client to therapist is never regarded as a curative factor in itself, un­ like such approaches as person<emered therapy or psychoanalysis. Behavior therapy corresponds well to the Christian concept of slt:v.'ardship. Stewardship would dictate that Christian counselors be committed to documenting the effectiveness of their effons. It is easy for counselors 10 get a warm feeling that they are helping people, but if hard research would show that the people who talk to those couusel­ ors were, three yeaTS after the end of therapy, no bener off than be­ fore entering therapy, then all the wann feelings in the world would notjustify the time and expense invested in the counseling. Behavior therapists are typically more committed than many other types of practitioners to outcome evaluation, which is actually one of the defining principles that shapes the field. They seek hard docu­ mentation for the outcomes they strive for. In spitt: of this, behavior therapy has not proven more effective than traditional psychother­ apy when applied to general populations (Parloif, London and Wolfe, 1986; Smith, Glass and M.iller, 1980). Behavior therapists have ques­ tioned these findin�, however, arguing in part that they have never claimed global eif&ti\'eness, but only to have proven superioril)' in specific areas. For instance, behavior modification has emerged as the most effective model that has been Lhoroughly tested with chil­ dren and adolescents (\VeiSl, Weiss, Alicke and KJotz, 1987). These grand effectiveness studies have also been questioned on method­ ological grounds (Rachman and Wilson, 1980). Regardless of the Sla­ tuS of the effectiveness debate, we would applaud the emphasis on outcome evaluation of psychotherapy in this model. U counseling were not a profession established on the presumption of effective­ ness, this might not mauer. But it is built upon that presumption, and effons should be directed al establishing such accountability.

Conclusion The fundamental vision of humanity embedded in the behavioristic

MOl)f'.RNPS'fCJ l OT / "' :R.1.I' IES

1 70

tradition s i one ofhumans as temporal beings only. motivated by surviv­ al and the drive to adapt to a challenging environmem successfully.

Our capacities for learning, which so often serve us well, can go awry. with the resuIL that we learn conditioned responses and operant behaviors that interfere with our capacity to deal adaptivcly wiUI the challenges life throws our way. Despite being detennined by OUT

learning histories, human beings can change through their efforts and their interactions with those about them. Through the creative appli­ cation of techniques based on research in the basic psychology of learning. human problems can be ameliorated. From a Christian perspective, the behavioristic claims of material­ ism and determinism arc easily rejected. Yet the model serves to remind us

of our crealedness and temporality. While we are transcendent

beings, we are not only tr.lnsccndent. In our temporality and creature­ liness, the reality of habit, the power of consequences and of our environments, and the very 8conditionedne$S� of our existence must be more thoroughly underslOod and accepLCd by Christian counselors. While persons may not be understood as only loose collections of action patterns and potentials, we are beings whose behavior has different degrees of relaLCdness to the conditions of our hearts. 8eha\'­ ior modification is one of the few approaches to counseling that gives us effective procedures for dealing with children and olhers for whom verbal discussion is an ineffective impetus for change. It also has produced techniques for many problems which have been docu­ mented to be effecti\'e. Nevertheless, though behavior therapy may give us a useful account of our creatureliness, it falls far short in appreciat­ ing our higher human capacities.

For Further Reading Bufford. R. (1981).

� Alima'! "fox: &Julllioml/Jj]cAology in bibliMI jJerJP«tj�.

San Francisco: Harper &. ROVo'.

A spnpathetic apolc>gy for behaviorism by a "Christian behaviorist.'

Erwin, E. (1978). &hauior tlu:ro/'J: &Untiftc, philiJ£oplliMI and muraljou'!dotions. New York: Cambridge University Prc.'SS.

A ground-breaking study ofwhat the true fouudations for behavior therapy really are.

Woolfolk. R., and Richardson, F. (1984). Beh..,ior therapy and the ideology of modcmity. Alfltrico'! PsydwWgUt, 19(7), 777-786.

A penetrating analysis of how behavior th�r
conuptual m:D"-'truaitm. New York; Columbia

lJEJ/,t

I'lOH TIlERAPt'

171

University Press. A recent philosophically sophisticaled auempt to make behaviorism palat­ able again.

Reference1l Adams,j. (1979). AIOTtthan mkmptit.m: A 1�()fChrislian rounsding. Philli!»" burg, Nj: Pre$byterian and Refonned. Bellack, A., and Hersen, M. (1977). Blhmft(}'f mooification: An

inlrodudory /at.

booII. New York: Oxford.

Boivin, M. ( 1 985). Behavioral psychology: \\.'hal docs it ha�'c to otTer the Christian church? journal oflhe A merican Salt/liftc Affiliacion, 37, 79-85. Brawn, H . ( 1977). PtrUfttion.

theory lind commilmmt: The ntwphilMophy ofsdnrct.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Browning, D. (1987). &ligilJ1lsthnughl a..d 1M nwdml prydwhJgies. Philadelphia: Fortress. Bufford, R. (1981).

Th� humall I1'fla: Behavi()T(l1 pJ)'chol<>g;j in bibliwl pmptctiVt:.

San Francisco: Harper & Row. Clouse, 8. (1985). Moral reasoning and Chmuan faith. Journal

of Psychology

and ThnJIogy, 13, 19().198. Cosgtm'C. M. (1982). B. F. Slim/as bt:havicnism. Grand Rapids: Zonder\'an. Domjam M. ( 1987). Allimal learnillg comes of age. American Prydwlagisl, 42, ,

556-564. [rwin. E. (1978).

Behatlior therapy: Scimtific, philDsaphical and momlfoundatillll$.

New York: Cambridge Unh'crsiy t Press. E\'aIlS. C. ( 1 977). PrtservinglMpmon: A /ooI! at Ihthumar. uit71ctS. Grand Rapids, MI: B.'1ker.

Wisdoma..d hUl1Ulnnm in /M)'cliololJy. Grand Rapids, Ml: Baker. HerrnMcin, R. (1977). The cmlution of behaviorism. Amtrica.. PsJcholcgisl, 32, [''ailS, C. (1989). 593-603. Herscn. M .. and Bellack. A. (1981).

&havioral mM.llmn!l: ,0\ pmdical ha..dbooll

(2d ed.). Elmsford, NV: Pergamon. jones. S. (1984). Asserti\'eness training in Christian perspecti\·e.

Journal if

PsyduJWg; a..d Theology, 12, 91-99. jones. S. ( 1 985). Mind-brain relatiOIl$hip. In O.Benner (Ed.), &W:rmcychJp«tia

ofprycho/Qgy (pp. 712-715). Grand R.'1pids. Ml: Baker. Ka7.din. A. ( 1982). History ofbehavior modification. In A. Bellack, M. Hersen. and A. Kazdin (Eds.).

.. hll�atio,.al handbool! of hthal1ior modificat i o

mid

behavi(}'f theropy. New York: Plenum.

i..eith,j. (Ed.) (1973).

Crmb (>flht. cht.rcha: A rnukr in Chrisli" .. doctriru,jrom 1M

Bible w 1M preMfflt. Atlanla:john Kllox Press. 1...: .... ;s. C. S. (1980). The wright ofglory and oIht.ruddrmes. New York.: Macmillan. (Ed. by W. "Iooper: originally published 1949).

Lo\'aa.�. O. (1987). Beh�l\ior..1 treatment and nonnal educational and intellec­ tual functioning in young autistic children. Journal ofOm.sulti..gand Qir.ical P$ychoJOSO', .5.5( I ) 3-9. Marks, I. (1981). Ct'11! ami roTt of 'II'UTllI
,

1 72

MODJ.:.RNPSYOI01'Hl-:RAJ'1£S

Masters, J.; Burish,

T.;

Hollon, S.; and Rimm, D. (1987).

Ttchniques and rmpirim( jindj'lgs

&hatrior therapy:

(3d ed.). Orlando. FL: Harcourt Brace

Jovanovich. Muller, R., and Vande Kemp. H. (1985). On ps)'chologisl$' u:s<:!o(-Q\hiniSTTI. ­

Amtrical'l PsydwWgist, 40, 466-468.

O'Lcllf}'.

K.., and Wilson, C. (1987).

&/wviqr

Ih�upy: A.pplicatilm and outCQIIU

(2d cd.). Englewood ailTs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Parloff. M.: London, P.; and Wolfe, B. (1986). Individual psycholherapy and beha\;or change. Annual Reviw ofPsycJwWgy, 37, 321-349. Piper,]. {1977. March}. How I became a Christian hedonist. His, pp. I . ....5. Plalltinga,A. (1983) . Ad\;ce to Christian philosophers. (A paper a\'a.ilable from the aulhor, Department of Philosophy. Uni\'crsiry of Notre Dame. South Bend. IN). Rachman. S., and \\.�b()n. C. (1980). The ifltCU ofprycholcgir.al thera/J)'. Oxford: Pergamon.

Skinner, B. (1971). &pndfrttdom and dignity. N�' York: Bantam. Skinner. B. (1976). Aboul bthaviorum. New '.\:Irk: Vintage Books. Smith. M.; Class, G.; and Miller. T. (1980). The bnufits 0/ PI1clioIMrIJ/'J. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Tan. S. Y. (1987). Cogniti\'�havioral lherapy: A biblical approach and critique.jourrn:d ofPlychoioK:J and TWogy, I', 103-112. Van

Leeuwen, M. (1979a).

The beha\ioristic bandwagon and the body of

Christ (Part 1): What is behaviorism? Journal O/fMAmtrimn Sdentific

ammo 31. 3-8.

AffiU­

Van Leeuwen, M. (1979b). The behavioristic bandwagon and the body of ChriS! (Part 2): A critique of on tological behaviorism from a Christian

penpectiu::.jouTTIfJI Of1M Amtrican Srimfijic A/filiMion. 31, 8�91.

Van Leeuwen, M. (1979c). The behaviori!uc bandwagon and the body of Chrut (Part 3): A Christian examination of applied beh�l\iorism.jOll.mo1 o f

llie '"mmcan Scientific "'/filiaion. t JJ, 129-138. Villi Leeuwen. M. (1982). The .J07Ul'll"'$ app,tutiu.:A Christian WoIu atlluchanging fact. ofpsyc1wlogy. Downers Grove. IL: InterVarsity Press. WatJOn,j. (1930) . &haviorinn (3d M.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Weisz, J: Weiss. 8.; Mi cke M.; and K1ou. M. (1987). Eff'ecth'eness of psycho­ therapy with children and adolescents: A me ta-analysis for clinicians. Journal .

af Consuiting and Clinical PJJch�, " (4). 542-549. Wolpe, J. (1978). Cognition and cau!ation in human beh,nolor.

American

Psychologisl, 33, 4.37-446.

Woolfolk. R., and RichardSOll, F. (1984). Behavior therapy and t.he ideology

of modernity. Amniam Psychologist, 39(7), 777.786, ZurifT, G. (1985), &havWris".: A ronU/Jlu(l.l rm1l1Jlrudion. New York: Columbia University Press.

7

RATIONAL EMOTIVE THE

Y

he founder and moving force behind rational emotive ther­ apy (RET), Alben Ells i , traces the origins of RET back to

ancient Greece. Epictetus. a Creek Stoic philosopher (c. A.D. 50-130) said, "Men are disturbed not by things, but by the vjews which they take ofthcmR (quoted from Elli!!, 1978). This pithy saying captures a major theme in Stoic thought �d also expresses the core idea arRET: changingpeoplc's beliefs, the view they take ofsomething, will reduce or eliminate psychological disturbance.

As Ellis himself tells it (Ellis and Bemard, 1985, p. 2 ) , though hi
resolve his own peoonal struggle!! and gave up psychoanalysis entirely after SC\'cral years in order to fonn his own model of therapy He .

J 74

subsequently went on to originate rational therapy (later REn based on his personal experience and his wide reading in philosophy. He has built his professional life around his RET model, publishing an amaz· ing number ofanides and books on the topic. The books and articles by Ellis arc, frankly. repetitive and self.promoting. One only needs to read a few of his works LO gain a generally accurate undentanding of his approach. Descriptive Sun-ey Philo.5ophiad Aswmptiom

The philosophical presuppositions of RET are quile explicit, since the approach is said to be drawn from philosophical sources. RET does not, according to Ellis and Bernard (1985, p. 5), �pretend to be entirely objective and v.tllle free. � This is a bit unu5ual as psychotherapy systems go, so the assumptions behind RET merit close examination. First, �Ellis is an unabashed hedonist, humanist and atheist� (Walen, DiGiuseppe and Wessler, 1980, p. 12). Atheism is Ellis's per­ !Kmal position on the existence of God, and his atheistic beliefs dramat­ ically shape some of the other positions he takes. For instance, Ellis (1978, p. 42) says, kOur behaving during ollr lifetime as ifwe ....·ere going to be immortal doesn't make very good sense when the over­ whelming probability s i that we will nolo � Ellis does allow for the possibility that perrons with some religious faith i.n God can be emo­ tionally healthy as long as they don't go overboard with their religion. RET hypothesi1.t."S thai "'de\'Out belief . . . tends to foster human dependency and in crease emotional disturbance � (Ellis and Bernard, 1985, p. 22), and hence, too much religion is necessarily bad. Atheism s i not, however, an essential premise of the RET approach. Ellis explicitly assumes that all human beings are "basically hedon­ istic" (1978, p. 39)-that is, \o"e are happiness-seeking beings who try to maximize the fulfillment of our chosen goals. This point permeates Rl:.T. Though people are presumed to be hedonistic, Ellis does not claim that most people are impulsi\'Cly driven to gratifY their short­ lerm desires. Rather, people have the cal)acity to make choices to delay gratification of an immediate desire in order to maximize opportunities to ret:eive the greatest amount of happiness in !.he long­ term. Some casually dismiss hedonism as not fitting the real beha\ior of persons who, for instance, delay gratification to attend collc:gc and then

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grnduate school or seminary. Ellis, howe\'cr, would say thaI such beha\'­ ior is still hedonistic in the sense of maximizing reward in a longer span of time; in other ....'Ol'ds, it is �Iong-teml� hedonism. Even earthly ascelicism can be considered an example of long-term hedonism since such persons deny themselves shon-term pleasure for the purpose of maximizing long-term (or hea\'(�nly) rewards. Given the flexibility of Ellis's descriplion of hedonism, it might actually make more sense to describe his position on basic human molivation as egoism rather than hedonism, The term hedonism usually carries wilh it the m i plicalion ofshol'Herm pleasurc-sceking.

Egoism s i

a term that more precisely refers to persons acling Out of their own personal self-interest, without the more narrow as5umplion that this implies exclusive imerest in shorter-term pleasures. We will, however, continue to usc Ellis's preferred tcrm of lollg-range hMonism here. i lhe source of wisdom, �In humanism, the reasoning individual s not the almighty God. . . . God is not needed to explain the creation of things (that is the job of science), nor is He needed

to

create an

ethical code (for that can be done by clear thinking) " (Walen et al.,

1980, p. I I ) . According to Ellis himself, MPeoplc had belterdefine their

n . freedom, cultivate a good measure of individuality, live in dialogue o....

....ith . others . . . and learn to accept their own human limitalions and the fact that therwill (!\'entually dieM (Ellis,

1978, p. 47). Clearly, n i RET

people are the only real measure of people: God is irrelevant to the human outlook. As a part of his humanistic outlook, Ellis asscns that .....e have the freedom to pursue rational or irrntional ways of thinking. Though people seem to ba\'c innate tcndencies to behave and think irrationally. we ha\'e the freedom 10 choose rationality. Ellis

( 1978)

has denied that RET authoritatively or rigidly pre­

scribes a particular SCt of values for c\'cry client. Nevertheless, he enthusiastically concludes from his long-range hedonistic assumptions thm people hhad IL�uaUy bener strive to acquire and inlernali�e lhe follo",ing values, many ofwhich can be tbought ofas rntional attitudes� (Ellis and Bernard,

1985, p. 7); self-interest, social imerest.

self-direc­

lion, high fmsn..tion tolerance, flexibility, acceptance of uncertainty, commitment to creative pursuits, scientific thinking, self-acceptance, risk-taking, long-r.mge hedonism, non-utopianism and responsibility for our own emotional disturbance, Bya change of terminology from

values to r(ltjOlUli altitudes,

Ellis in many of his writings slips n i to a

value-prescription mode. contradicting his sC l lCd reluctance 10 pre-. scribe v,dues.

176

MODERNI'SYCHOTlfERAPtES

As accurately described by Sharkey (1981), Ellis vjell'S the self as merely a coll«tion of empirical characteristics, and in this way he s i very much like the traditional behavioristS. In other words, there really isn't a self (in the sense ofa responsible agent) that is at the core ofa person. Rather, our feeling of selfhood is what we sense from the coincidental co-occurrence of our behavior, traits, performances, thoughts, memories and so forth. Thus Ellis often ",Tites that while we mightjudge or evaluate a specific performance, action or trail, we can neverjudge or evaluate our .uivd, any more than one could judge the quality of the whole group of objects (the barrel of apples) by the quality of one element (the rotten apple). Why? Because those ele­ ments were gathered together by pure chance. Thus Ellis's ultimate answer to the self-esteem question is not to evaluate our selves at all. But recognizing the pernicious and irrational human tendency to evaluate their whole selves globally n'm a sinner; look at what I did"), Ellis concedes that at times it may be more efficient to globally and arbitrarily evaluate our whole selves, dedare ourselves acceptable and be done with it. He would rather that we not grade oursel\oes at all, but

if we are going to grade ourselvC! anyway, then let everyone assign themseh'e.5 A+'s and be happy.

Model ifP elsonality RET does not have a comprehensive theory of personality per se, but focuses more on a view of emotional disturbance and health. The core assertion ofRET is thata person's thoughts are central to understanding that person. Ellis formulates this relationship in an A-B-C format in all of his writings. People often come for therapy because ofa torIMqumce (C) , an emotional or behavioral consequence which is disturbing them (e.g., �rm horribly depressed�).

It

is common for people to auribute

their emotional or behavioral consequence to activatin.g experiences Qr I!VeJII.s (A). as if there were some necessary and invariant cawal relation­

ship between A and C (e.g.,

"I

keep having troubling thoughts about

immordl behavior; that's why I'm depressed-) . TIle

A can be an

external event (e.g.. death of a family member, a financial setback, a fight with a girlfriend) or it can be a person's own thought or behavior. But according to Ellis (and Epictetus before him), people are not l ft (B) they hold about dislUrbed by eventS themselves, but by the btu those events. So in order for immoral thoughu [Q result in depression,

Ellis would postulale that an inlermediate belief mUSI be broughl into play. For example,

) shullldn 't

..

have such thoughtS, and I'm a

,

,

IV.TION.4L EMOTlI'l-: TIII-:IIAJ'I'

177

horribl�, awful human being ""ho desc,,"cs to go to hell for having such t.houghts.� The A-B-Cs of RET are the core of its approach to personality. As mentioned earlier, a full-fledged theory of personality usually attempts to predict and

explain behavior in all or most areas oflife. Ellis's A-B-C

theory could be pressed to do

so,

but this would most Iikel)' result in

weak. ambiguous explanations or predictions such as Mher thinking and beliefs led her to act that way. M Such loose explanations are largely useless in the scientific study of personality, and so RET has spawned no serious scientific hypotheses or research regarding the broader aspects ofhuman personality. Butforclinical purposes, where the focus is less on predicting or explaining behavior generally and more on the focal explanation and modification of distress, the simplicity ofRET is regarded by its proponents as a \irme, in that that simplicity n i creases me utility of the theory.

Model t(Abrwnnality The RET theory of pathology is quite simple. Irrational beliefs result in undesirable emotional consequences, while rJ.tional beliefs result in appropriate emotional consequences. What is an irrational bcliefand how is it different from a rational belief? In large part, the twO are to be differentiated by their quite different emotional consequences. (Defining the rationality of a belief by its effect is a critical point in evaluating the theory, so further discussion of this .... ;11 be postpOned until later.) from time to time, Ellis has developed specific lists of commonly occurring r i rational beliefs, but such lists have tended to change over time. Elis l hasyel lo lake a stand on one finished lisl of major irrational beliefS. Table I contains his ('leven major irrntional beliefs as fonnu­ laled in an earlier work (Ellis, 1962). More recently, Ellis and Bernard (1985, pp. 1()'11) staled there were three main irmtionai beliefs ....· hich people hold: a. I must do well and win approval, or else I rate as a rotten person. b. Others must lreat me considerately and kindly in precisely the ....ay . I want them to treat me; if they don't, society and the Wliverse should severely blame, damn, and punish them for their inconsid­ erateness. c. Conditions under which J live must be arranged so that I get practically ali i W,lIlt comfortably. quickly and easily. and get \inu­ ally nothing that J don't want.

,

,

178

MODERN /'SYC.ifOT1f£1/API£;S

Deven Common Irrational lkliefs lRRATIONAL mEA NO. I: Th� idea that il is a dire necessity for an adult buman being 10 be loved or appnn'ed by virtually every signifICant penon in his community. nutATIONAL IDEA NO. t: The idea that one should be thoroughly competent. �qual" and ach�ng in :ill possible rape-cIS if one ;1 to consider onrselfworthwhile. IRRATIONAL mEA NO. 3: The idea thai cerrain people an: bad, wick.ed or \;llainOlU and thal lhey should be 5C\' .. �ly blamed and punished for tbeir villainy. IRRATIONAL mEA NO. 4, The idea mal il is awful and cataStrophic when things arc nOi the Wily one would ..ery much like them to be. IRRATIONAL IDEA NO. 5: The idea that human unhappincu il cXlemally aouoe-d and that pc<>ple hil".. linlc or no ability \0 control tbeir 100 . iOW$ and disturbance$. IRRATIONAL mEA NO. 6: The idea mal if something is or may be dangeroul or feanome One should be !el'Tibly concerned about ;1 and .!ohould k«p �Lling on the pouibiliry of iu ottlHring. IRRATIONAL IDEA NO, 7: Thr idea Ihat ;1 il euirr 10 avoid Ihan 10 face crnain life difficulties and ..elf. rrsponsibllitir$. IRRATIONAL IDEA NO, 8: Thr idea thai one should be 1, 1962,

1t41"1ONAL£MUrTI'E THEJlM>t'

179

Model ofPrychothempy Therapy begins with the detection of irrational beliefs by the th�rapist and the client. If the theory ofpersonality proposes an A-B-Csequence. \\'e might not be surprised that the core of therapy is a Di that is

,

disputation

of irrational beliefs. There are many possible methods

available for disputing ilTluional beliefs. Ellis personally uses a great

deal of Socratic qucstioning and challenging of clients to p roduc� scientific clidence for their irrational belicfs (wilh the obl�ous supposi­ tion that the)· will come up empty-handed from such a 5earch) or to examine the practical emotional impact of IhoS(: beliefs ("'Why would you choose to bcliele something that causes rou pain?H), Some lhcra.­ pists who p'dclice RET use a 101 of didactic teaching aboUi the theory of RET with their clients. All RET pr.tclitioners uy 10 enable their '1 1 irrational beliefs. since clients 10 engage ill stlfdisputation oflheir 0.... therapy will presumably be maximally effective when clients are en­ '

ablcd to movc themselves toward health and wholeness. In addition to acti",ities focusing all changes in belief. the therapist also commonly

of the behavior and cogni­ as well as some techniques designed to be

uses many of the active change slr.negies ti\'e-beha\10r

ther.tpists

,

emotionally evocative such as imagery exercises and role-playing.

In Ellis and Harper (1975), the authors distinguished between twO forms of RE1� Ineleganl RET is focused on changing the particular irrational beliefs that aft"! causing the particular undesirable conse­ quences that broughl lhc client to therapy. Eleg(JtlI RET, on the other hand, has the much glOlnder goal of not only curing the person's focal

disturbance but also, for thc sake of the pre\'clilioll of future distur­

bance, Mconverting- the person 10 embrace :t rational life philosophy; that is, RET as a religion and wa)' of tife .

Christian Critique

We should notc that RET has replaced transactional anal) sis .\5 the secular therapy model most adapted for Christian consumption. Whether in the form of Cmbb's biblical counseling (in its early form, 1975, 1977), Backus's misbelief lherapy (Backus and Chapian 1980; Backus. 1985). Thurman's Lies lVe &iinle ( 1989) . or others (e.g., Sc hm idt 1983), RET ideas have been .....idely adapted for Christian '

.

,

consumption.

the importance of though! and belief in emOlional life, or lhe viability of direct change It seems unlikely that CIH'istians will dispute

180

ofmese aspects oflifc 10 produce helpful change. In a remarkably dear parallel 10 Epictctus, Martin Luther has said, "for the Holy Spirit knows ilia! a thing has only such meaning and value for a man as be a.ssign� to it in his thoughlS� (dtt.-d in Clebsch and Jackie. 1975, p. 213). Nevertheless, there are some rcal concerns to grapple with ill RET, as we will develop below.

PflilosophjooJ Assumptions The major presuppositions arRET about humanism and hedonism are incompatible with Christian assumptions. Human being5 are nOi the final aulhority in the universe, nor are they capable ohotal autonomy and self-perfection. Allhough human beings are certainly drawn to. ward pleasure and self-.gratification. especially in our unregenerate condition, we are motivated by more thanjusl the narrow gratification of our own desires. (The problems of hedonism as a motivational base are more thoroughly dealt with in chapters six and eighl..) Regarding valuing and values, we first note, a.� pointed out by Hauck (1985), that RET and Christianity share a perspective on human experience that says that what humans value is vital to their welfare and psychological functioning. RET contends to be a philosophically, and to some extent theologically, sensitive approach to psychotherapy that does not pretend to be value neutral. For the Christian reading in the field of psychotherapy. it is a breath of fresh air to encounter a major theoretician who fonhrighdy declares his presuppositions and values. According to Hauck (19S5. p. 238), �this emphasis on the profound beliefs and values held by clients makes it a comfortable medium for the pastoral counselor and religious client. � But while RET is an avo....·edly and openly philosophical and value-laden system, are its values and goals compatible with Christian values and goals? Ellis (1980) once wrote a response to Bergin, a Monnon and r.hus a theist, who espoused theistic values as a foundation for an approach to psychotherapy. Bergin (1980) asserted that "values are an inevitable and pervasive part of psychotherapy� (p. 97), and Ellis agreed with this. Ellis tOok issue ",ith Bergin's description of humanistic values, and -a1ues that Ellis proposed proposed his own list of atheistic values. The ... contrasted with theistic values in asserting thal there is no one supreme being in the universe, that personal identity is temporal and ephem­ eral, that self-acceptance docs not depend on the existence of a deity, thai self-satisfaction is cenual lO personal growth, that the structure of family life and sexual morality is a personal choice. lhal personaJ

/B/

1lA11ONAI.f:lofOTI\1: 1"IIERApt·

responsibility can exist without guill, and that we determine our 0\\-11 meanings in life basco on our personal desires and re:tllOll. Ellis himself dedared that there are Tllan�' points of conlraSt between his �clinical-hu­ manistic....theistic� values and those of the theist. The Christian readerwiU immediately see many points at which Ellis mml be judged wrong by Christian standards. Clearly, Hauck is \\"ong lhat value explicimess alone makes this approach suitable for pa5tOlal counseing! l Further. we can look at the respccti\'e goals of RET and Christianity. Ellis is clear about the goals of RET. which are to "'help people think more rationally: . . . to feel more appropriately; and to act more functionally . . . in order to achieve their goals ofliving longer and marc happily � (Ellis and Bernard, 1985, p. 5). Hauck declares that gthe welfare of each person. indeed, tJle good of society, arc the goals of both religion and REr (1985. p. 239). Lawrence and Huber (1982, p. 2 1 1 ) , after summarizing the goals afRET in much the fa.�hion which we ha\'e, declared �similar goals are found in the Bible. � Are the goals of Christianity equivalent to those of Ellis, as Hauck, i La"'Tence and Huber claim? The Wesuninster Confession of Faith, n answering the question "What is the chief end of man?� says, ;OMan's chief end is to glorify God and enjoy him forever. � Glorifying God is not synonymous ....ith human happiness: a person whose human hal)­ pincss is fulfil1ed in sexual promiscuity is hardly contributing to God's glory. Indeed, human sacrifice in the fOI'm of costly obedience (Bonhoeffer, 1959) is what God most desires from us ("Does the LoRD delight in burnt offerings and sacrifices as much as in obeying the \'Dice of the LORD?� 1 Sam 15:22). Kreeft (1986) has dt.'\·eloped this idea funJler. arguing that what God desires n i his people s i goodness, which is nOl synon)nlOUS with maximized lon�it}' or happiness. While goodness and happiness are surely not opposites nor incompatible, they are not equivalcnL The vision of God's goal ror Illunanity that pennea� the Scriptures is that of human beings bringing glory to the Father through their obedient manifestation of 01list's presence in their Ii\'es through ....·ol'd and dl'Cd (see also Tan, 1987; ;Uld Craigie and Tan, 1989a). Model r{Pt:r$onality

We have already criticized RET as nOl having a tnle, fully dC\'eloped theory of personality. We will further consider two principal aspectS of this incomplete approach to pcr!;(lnality: itS views of rationality and of emotion. Christianity is a religion that emphasizes belief. \Vhat we believe

,

MODERNI'SH:JIOTlfEJW'/ES

182

matters profoundly. People are urged to change their beliefs (�Come now, let us reason logether,� Is

1:18),

to think on certain things (Phil

to learn Scripture (2 Tim

3:15),

4:8), to �have the mind ofChrist� ( l

( l Tim 4:1..6). One afthe most often-citcd \'crses by Christians favorable to RET is Proverbs 23:7, Cor

2:16)

and to attend to sound doctrine

"as he thinketh in his heart. so is he� Rationality

(KJV).

s i so prized by Christians that it s i

described by some

theologians as one of the core human characteristics that comprise the image of Cod in humanil}' (e.g., Berkhor. 1939). On this point, as we have poinled Ollt in other chapters. Christians often detect real defi­ ciencies in other approaches to psychotherapy that de-emphasize rationality or expain l it n i such a way as to leave rationality an empty shell (e.g., gcsta1L, psychoanalysis). RET does nOt commit !.his error, placing human rationality in an appropriately prominent place among human capabilities. RET assumes !.hat people can ascertain tru!.h. This leads to the related point that this emphasis on rationality in therapy is possible precisely because human belief is concei\'ed of as directly changeable by argumentation. C\.-idence, logic and human deter­ mination. In a sense. RET looks at human beliefs as mental habits that can be influenced in the

same

way behavioral habits can be Changed. This is

an optimistic "iew of the human mind. and Christians can generally concurv.ith this portraiL Forinstance, Paul in Romans 12:2 and Ephesians

4:23 calls for a renewing of the mind which seems to be a process whereby

we actively participate in

a radical change ofunderstanding that results in

a revolution ofour spirirua1 li\'es. Such a call would be m i possible V.ithOUI

a presumpLion of r.ltionality similar to RET's. Though this valuing ofhuman rationality is avirtue orRET, we must note that it is lIle extremely high prizing and estimation of rationality that is the foundation for the arrogant humanistic atheism ofEllis, who seems lo ask, "Why do we need God when we have our brains?H Human reason is best understood not as the premier human characteristic of the image of God in us. but as one of quite an array of such wapi in which we "image� the Lord (see chapter two). Funher, it is \ital to note again that human reason is as prone to the influence of sin as any olher aspect of our being. For example. the fruilS of the flesh in Galatians

5: 19-20 contain as many sins of the mind as that of any other category. Ellis would agree that our rational capacities can cause

lIS

problems,

but views rationality as our means of -saJvation.H Christians, however, would not trust rationality to such an extent because il is as cont:uni­ nated by sin as the rest of us.

183 Further, we mUin inquire carefully about me RET understanding of the nature of belief as cognitive habit. If beliefs

3re

cognitive habits,

then simple diligence and skill \\;11 result in a change of belief. This

could undergird a bel e i f that human beings are ultimately perfectible by human effort alone. But while there

are

portion! of Scriplure that

seem to support such a view (as cited earlier), there are several very significant passages thaI do not. In Romans

1: 18-32, Paul caustically

describes the SOfry plight of those to whom God has re\'caled himself (v.

20), who respond

to this r�'e1ation

by not

humbling themselves

before the truth but rather refusing to honor God (\'. 2 1 ) . Proclaiming themselves wise (v. 22), they exchange the U'urn ofCod for a lie (v. 25). and refuse to �'en acknowledge God's existence (v. 28). Note thal lhis

response on t.he part of people whom Paul calls "fools� (and [lJis must

fall in this category) is

nM QuI of"� ig7l(mHl"j (a bad mental habit) ; it

s i rather a culpable and deliberate rejection of God in the face of the

truth. This type of response cannol be explained by a view of belief as mere mental habit. Qlristian supporters of RET often cile Mark. 7:20-23: 'What comes OUl ofa man is what makes him 'unclean: For from within . out ofmen's heans. come evil thoughts, sexual immorality. theft [m,my other sins i side and make a man 'unclean.' � are listedl. All lhese evils come from n BUlthis \'erse cannot be made to fil the RET fonnula. TIlis verse has

been interpreted (e.g.. Sterner, 1977) as &'lying that it is the c.'vil i not what Christ thoughts that lead to the sinful behaviors, but that s

said. Rather. he Slated that evil thoughts and the

specific

sins of

commission both proceed out of the heart; Ihus. the heart is surely nOt synonymous with a thought pallern, because the heart

f!rtCttks the

thought pattern. Thus a Christianized RET cannot simply look on ule heart as a belief �1'Stem; the heart must be more. This casts doubt on the most fundamental aspec::ts of the RETundefSlanding of rationality.

leI us turn to Ellis's view ofemOlion. Ellis contends that beliefs lead

to or cause emotions. Roberts (1982, 1988) has developed a more

fonnal and sophisticated view of emotion, which was fonnulated spe-­ cifically to be compatible with a Christian understanding of persons ith an RET and their emotions. Hisview has some broad compatibility .... \.-jew of emotions. In brief. Roberts argues that all emotions are

�founded upon concents� (1982, p. 14); that is. emotions are predi­

cated on the individual caring about or having some significant interest

in something. We do not have emotions in areas where we have no concerns (fOT inslance, one may have no emotional response at all to

/84

,1/Ol)ERNPSYCHOTHEJ«J'IES

hearing professional hockey scores on the radio if hockey was not an object of concern) ,

BUI

a concern is not

an

emotion; rather, �An

construal of one's circumstances in a manner relevant to concem� (1982, p. 15). In other words, an emotion is an

emotion is a some such

interpretation about a concern or object of value in light of one's

circumstances. For example. the emotion of jealousy is founded n i one's passionate love for anolher and that emotion occurs \\-;m me interpretation (accurate or not) that one's relationship .... ith . the loved one

is threatened.

It should be noted that among Roberts's concerns in formulating

was the fact that certain distincth'e1y Christian emotions are described in the Scriptures and Christians are commanded his theory of emotion

to exhibit or develop certain emotions (e.g., hope. gratitude, kind­ ness) . If emotions are reflexive involuntary phenomena. then the teachings of Scripture

are erroneous or misleading. "The fact that

emotions are construals goes a long way tOW'dfd explaining how we have control over them. . . . To succeed in bringing myself into a certain emotional state is to succeed in coming to see my situation in certain terms" (1982, pp. 21·22)-specifically to come to see the situation in Christian terms or from God's point of \lC\\.'. When we come to think and belie\'c deeply in a Christian \\'3.y. we will come to feel Christian

emotions. Note that for Roberts. this is not JUSt a matter of merely changing cognitions (as it is for Ellis) , as construals are more than beliefs and emotions are founded upon concerns. So to change an emotion, I may have to change my concerns. We can conclude posi­ tively that Ellis has a view of emotion that attributes some appropriate responsibility for what we experience emotionally and has some good beginning ideas about how we call change al least some emotions. The view of Roberts, though, s i more finely nuanced than that of Ellis. On the negative side. the complexity of what we call the human

Marl, as we haveJUSt discussed, raises questions about a monolimic \iew of emotions flowing from or being constituted of beliefs or consU'uals. Eschenroeder (1982). Zajonc (1980) and others have championed the cause of what we might call a "limited primacy of affect"; mat s i , mer espouse me view that while cognition might oflen shape and determine emotional experience, it is credible to suggest that the re\'erse is often the case; that as c1ient-cemered and dynamic models of personality propose, affect can come before and shape cognition. These highly complex mailers cannOl be resolved here, We raise the debate to suggest thai. Ellis and other cogniLively oriented theorists have not

185

It'"nONM. £.\fOT/Vf. THERAPY

totally carried the day in terms of understanding the nature ofhuman emotions.

Mrxhl rfHmlth Reflected in the values of RET (as in other psychotherapy systems) is a particular vision of what the optimally functioning or truly healthy human being looks like. Ellis's pieture of ideal humanity is transpar­ ently reflected in the list ofvalued characteristics we described earlier. It s i impossible in this limited space to critique every aspect of Ellis's vision, but let us briefly examine two aspeCLS. First, Hauck, a staunch devotee of Ellis and RET, S3.}'5 regarding

human destiny, �We were meant to live with dignity and pride in our awesome talents. To espouse a program [i.e., a religious doctrine] that

robs human giants of their Slamre is fooish l � (1985, p. 251). From our Christian perspective, Hauck has a point. in that human beings are created in God's image (Cen 1:27) and are amazing creamres (Ps 8). But the essence of sin is the aspiration to be gods ourselves, and inordinate pride is perhaps the quickest route to that OUlCome. We are not giants, rather. we are what",e are-human beings, created in God's image and fallen n i to sin and rebellion against our Creator, created of the dust (and thus part ofcreation) and yet made into living souls (Cen 2:7). We are the pinnacle of earthly creation, but we are not the pinnacle of existence; that rank belongs to God alone.

As a second example ofa rdated conception of ideal hUJrnmir}, we

can

look at the RET ,ireue of

�Ilanjmjly.

Roberts (1987) carefully

anal}"les a number of themes in RET and suggests that a fundamental characteristic Ellis is trying to develop in his client5 is equanimiry (a term which Ellis himself never uses). which Roberts describes as being �emotionally flexible and adaptable, relatively content regardlelis of what happens� (1987, p. 196). This is interesting in light ofElli§'s t)ing of RET to ancient Stoic philosophy. It is cJmmonly argued that Sto­ icilim was a �defealist� philosophy of life. The Creeks, experiencing a cultural decline and repeated brutal invasions and military defeats, developed a philosophy that sought to control the inner world of the

mind and $0 be unaffe<:tcd by the OULCr\'oo'Orld, which W'dS unpredictable and out of control. The vinue Ellis espouses is Stoic in nature. Roberts suggests that there

s i

a Christian virtue corresponding to

Ellis's principal virtue. ",'hieh might also be called

tquanimity-a com·

posite of gratitude in all circumstances (I Thess 5: 18), cOlltcnunent (Phil 4: I 1-1 2), perseverance (2 Cor 4:8-9, 16-18) and countgc (2 Cor

186

5:6). What Roberts goes on to show, though. is that despite the super· ficial compatibility of the two vinues. they are really constituted in quite diHerent WdYS because they come out of radically different mindselS. The RET virtue of equanimity carries with it the belief that when we arc the recipicm of disappointment or suffering that "nothing is ultimately appalling . . . nothing is of ultimate valuc� (Roberts. \987. p. 197) and therefore mere is nothing to be upset about c\'er. Only your own happiness is of high value. The Christian response of equanimity to such occurrences. however, is based on having our priorities in place and dealing with eanhly disappointments -by gelling them into a perspective where, by comparison with what is truly momentous, they i are seen as relatively unmomentousM (p. 197). For Ellis, nothing s momentous. and so he can be described as ha\�ng a trivial view of pain and suffering. For the mature Christian. the things pertaining to the kingdom of God are momentous. while other e\'ents can be highly significant but not parallel to the centrality of ctcmit}' (Rom 8:18: MI consider that our present sufferings are not ....'orth comparing with the glory thai will be revealed in us") . The source and characlerofequanimity s i Ihusquite different in the two systems. And ....e. must aL'iO remember that equanimity is not the only virtue in the Christian scheme. By examining the notion of Mself-accept.ance M in RET, ....e. '''Iill grap­ ple with the RET view of the ulJ The essence of Ellis's poSition on self-acceptance is that .....e must not evaluate ourselves, eitJu:r positively or negatively, based on either the molecular or general nature of our behaviors. performances and so forth. Sharkey (1981, p. 152) has argued that the essence of a "liberal Christian M view ofGQd is that God's prime activity in human life is the absolute and unconditional accep­ tance of a fallible self. Even conservative Christians, who would add that God's acceptance of us occurs only through the atoning death of Christ, ....ould . agree that QUI' acceptance by God is not contingent Qn any particular merit in our actions or character, but is absolute because it is based on Christ and not upon us at all. So with Ellis, all Christians would agree thaI a leg-alistic mindset that bases our value and acccp­ t.'1.llce on mccting the st.'\lldards of God's law or our OWIl idiosyncratic standards is antithetical to Christian faith. As we nOled. earlier, the RET conception of the self is basically an atomistic one, following the long tradition of Hume and other philos­ ophers. While this view does have some merits, it basically robs people person of seeing themselves as a self-as-agent, a substantial self, a view that we as human beings are responsible moral agenL� with a continu-

187 ous identity through tife. Ellis uses this atOmistic ,.jew of the self consistently n i his writings as the answer to self-acceptance issues. He urges us never to let any

particular aspe<:l of our beha..ior or character become the standard by which the acceptance of the ....hole . person is,judged, because there is no whole person, no substantive self, to bejudgcd. We should evaluate each part of our persons (the "aloms� of our being) in so i lation from

the whole. Lazarus

(1977) expressed this well as the gap beno.·cen mtas

a whole duster of linle is (with each i standing for a different aspect of the person s behavior) versus ,,� as one capital I. Lazarus and Ellis '

prefer to look at a person as a cluster of is. Grieger and Boyd

(1980, pp. 255-256) exhibit the practical import

of this approach v.ith an extended transcript of a counseling session

with a woman struggling with guilt over an abortion she had. The

therapist, rather than dealing ....ilh her guilt and remor� through forgiveness or other means, deals with the abortion as an isolated

behaviorwilh no ser1()US jrnplicatiqnsforevaiuating the .....oman as a whole being. "Well, let's say you did make a mistake how does that make you .

a rotten person?M asks the therapist. After some discussion, the thera­ pist clearly states the conclusion toward which he is drawing the client, saying the abortion may have been Ma hig mistake, but it's still only a mistake . , , one action orthe thousands you £;ommit in your life." The ,

implication is clear; the isolated action of the abortion has no implica­ tions forjudgment of the person as a whole, Clearly, as .....e argued in the last chapter this view has the advantage ,

of prohibiting clients from spuriously or tragically passing judgment on their seh'es based on some quite inconsequential or superficial aspeCt of their beha\ior (MI failed my fim history test! I'm a total miserable wretch ofa human being"). But this \icv.' carries with it quite a disadvantage from a Christian perspecu\·e. It contradicts and under­ mines a Christian understanding of sin, depravity, forgiveness and

redemption. Hauck (1985, p.

242) dcmonstnlles this clearly by saying

!.hal Mthere are no bad people in the world, only bad behavior and

.

..

people who commit sins, , . should not be u'cated harshly or regarded

as evil. . . . Ifrating ofbehavior and rating ofpeople arc separated

.

it

is .......ong

then

to judge people by their actions and total forgh'Cness

is

logically allowed; onc need never damn others or oneself. and it is wrong to feel gui lt at any time o\'er any act. M He actually presents this as the Christian \icw consistent ",i.th RET. Hauck is wrong. ho.....ever, to state that this s i the Cluilstian view. We

188

are each persons who sin (rebel against and hence disobey God's moral ....'). and the fact that we sin is both caused by our being sinners and la at the same time proof of our sinful narures. This is why Olle who violates one aspect of the Law is guilty of the whole Law; any single violation testifies to our whole natures being corrupted Of poUuted by sinfulness (!.his s i the meaning of dep'd\�ty). Because we arc sinners as

whole persons, Christ had to die for us as sinners r,uher than merely overlook the bad behavior of other",;se acceptable fallible human beings. Hauck calls for pastors and other Christians to revise their religious beliefs on these matters to accommodate the U"uths of RET; we are afraid that it i� Hauck, Ellis and other secular RET lherapislS that need to have their view modified on these maners. Model ofAbTlOnTKl/ity The heart of Ellis's explanation for the occurrence of psychological problems is the concepl of irralional beli4s. Some have acnlally seen EHis's understanding of the specific irrational beliefs that trouble humanity as being compatible with a Christian perspective. Ellis's notion of the human error of absolutizing and demanding might be viewed by the Christian as the essence of a sinful, prideful, �lf·aggran­ dizingw'ayofthinking (Stemer, 1977). Elliseven declared thataperson who is disturbed by absolutizing can be characterized as a "whiney little tin god� (cited in Wessler, 1984) . Christians agree thai self-deification goes hand-in-hand "";th demanding and insisting on life fitting our

preferences rather than the .... ;11 of God. Craigie and Tan (1989b). for example, have sensitively explored the dysfunctional implications of our cultural mindset of Mentitlement,� the idea that we are �owed� or descl"\'e things in this life. They argue that such a mindset is antithetical 10 biblical faith. Lawrence and Huber (1982) .....ent further, declaring that Ellis's (1962) eleven r i rational beliefs (see Table I ) were each compatible with biblical revelation and that the Christian therapist could aid the process of using RET as a pastoral counseling approach by usin� scriptural references as disfrulalional aids with the Christian client.

ILa"T
mended for we in refuting the fint five QfEllu', BlI (Table I). We will neither quOte the

Bs northe verses. but we urge )'OlItocompare me Bible pauages along..ith otherthema

(BI) Ps 118:6. 8; (B2) b45:24; &1:6; (8S) Rom IS:9: M( 7:I: (84) Phil 4:II :In I6:SS; (85) Prov 2.5:7; Gen 1:28

in Scripture with the specific &:;u liued in the table:

189

R....nOSAl. £MOm'1-: THEJl.\I'Y

They suggest that "when the Bible is included in the disputation procedure with these indil'iduals, the approach becomes far more therapeutically effective than when based on secular reasoning alone� (Lawrence and Huber. 1982. p. 2 1 1 ) .While there are some substantial and many superficial compatibilities between RETjudg­ ments of irrational belief and Christian teaching. there are also many areas of contradiction. At the level of specific belief, we might first note that many of ElIis's irrational beli....fs are easily seen as irrational from a Christian perspective as well. 8U1 some of them are quite problematic. For example. irrational belief eight in Table I specifically declares that dependency on another is irrational. Yet isn'1 it precisely this human characteristic of dependency that is the foundation upon which a living faith in God is built? Human beings seem to need something or someone beyond themselves. We might judge the motive for listing this belief as irrational to be the secular assertion of human autonomy and rejection of authority. The Christian faith. on the other hand, seems to suggest that human beings are needy people designed to live in utter dependence on Cod and in a healthy interdependence on one another, and that a healthy dependence on a spiritual authority (pastor, cider, priest) may be an essential pari of spiritual maturation. Front a broader perspective, we would note that the RET rejection of absolutistic thinking is itself absolute. According to Ellis. there are no absolutes precisely because there is no supreme authQrity to pro­ claim such uni\'ersals (Wessler, 1984). Ellis rejects the use of any �should� or "must.� declaring any such use to be "musturbating. � We can agree that we often hide our choices of what we choose to do behind �shoulds.� and thus hide from taking responsibility for our choices. There are also many Christians who are enslaved to shoulds that do not come from God but rather from social convention or social pressure. These supposed absolutes come from the warped and irra­ tional thinking of themselves and others. BUt RET s i wrong in denying that shoulds exist and that .....e have an obligation to obey them. Sterner is absolutely right in saying that "a rational Christian therapy, therefore, .....ould encourage the client to accept the shoulds of Cod. while discard­ ing the shoulds of man� ( 1977 p. 7). To deny any legitimate shoulds would be to undennine the importance ofCed's will in our daily lives. Perhaps the most important question in thinking through the issue of RET's understanding of psychopathology is that of the standards by .

190

MOOF.R,\'PSI'OIOTU!;RAf'rES

which it judges rationality and irrationality are judged by RET. A dis-conccrting asp«t of critiquing RET is Ellis's propensity for s.'lying different (often conflicting) things in the same or different articles. Ellis (1978, p. 40) SlateS dearly that -RET posits no absolutistic Of invariant criteria of rationality_ . . . The leon ratumal, as used in RET. refers to peoples' ( I ) setting up or choosing for themselves basic values. purposes, goals, or ideals and then (2) using efficient, flexible. scien­ tific, logic
RA T/oNII.LF.MOTT\ 1 : Tf (l;RII.PI'

191

ma.ximal longevity and happiness. Evans calls mis the evolutionary i some of his \\Titings, Ellis talks of survival rather standard because n an evolutionary concept of than longevity, ums appealing to a Darwini sunival value. The pragmatic standard sa)'S mat rationality is not really judged by the truth content of me assertion. but rather by me prag­ matic or functional impact of mal belief. If a belief helps you, it is true. Eschenroeder points Olll mat the pragmatic standard, as Ellis formulates it, im'olvcs a bit of circular reasoning. Judging by the effect of the belief, a belief is irrational if it produces an irrdtional or inappropriate effect. But how docs one recognize an n i appropriate effect except by the irrationality of the belief that produced it.? If one has a catastrophic depressive reaction to a beliefthat "My wife has been

unfaiulful to me, and that s i a....ful.� an RET therapist cannotjudge mat reaction as excessive except by having an a pliori notion of exactly how upset one can legitimately be in such circumstances. Ellis and Bernard (1985, p. 6) have attempled to o\'ercome this problem by concretely

defining an inappropriate emotional response as one that impedes rather than helps persons overcome me obstacle mat is causing their distress. While he saw the pragmatic standard as having problems, Eschenroeder (1982) accepted the empirical standard. Evans (1988a) pointed oUlthatneither the pragmatic standard nor the empirical standard is self-evident and that they actually can conflict with one another. The pragmatic standard is troublesome because happina$ is hard (0 define. What is good for happiness and survival separately may nOt always be the same, and given our limited capacity for foresight we may not always know what beliefs arc helpful for either happiness or longevity. For example, Ellis might well dismiss a Christian's feeling that he has disappointed God by saying that that reaclion is interfering with enjoying life now. But on what basis is pleasing God as a source of happiness being dismissed? TIle empirical standan:l, on UH: other hand, is troublesome for the

same rea.�m mat logical positivism (chapter six) was troublesome; that is, it is internally contradictory or what philosophers call self-slultif}ing. Logical positivism said that for an assertion to be meaningful, it must be empirically verifiable. Unfortunately, the defmition of logical pos.i­ ti\ism itself was not empirically \'eriliable and thus by its own standard

was

meaningless. The assertion that a beliefis irrdtional ifit is not based

on facts or contradicts facts is not itself a matter of fact and therefore is irrational. Even if we accept both of Ellis's standards, it is conceivable that a

192

belief based on facts (empirical standard) \I'ili nOI be particularly helpful for survival and vice versa. For instance, believing in God may be seen as necessary for happiness for some but is nOI perfectly amenable to empirical proof; on the other hand, a person living in Gelmany in 1939 may ha\'c been empirically convinced that thcJe .....s were nOt children of Satan and yet their survival would have been threatened if that belief were publicized. Ellis (1988), in response to Emns, suggested that Evans has imcrpreted him as being too absolu­ tistic and suggested that happiness isn', all that hard to undcrsland and that the two standards usually cooperate nicely. Evans (1988b) dosed the interchange by noting that looking across cultures and history (and we would add religious faiths). onc orten finds SIMk differences in how people define IuJppilla.'i.

ould also note that there is no one dear stand,u-d of rationality We ..... from a Christian perspective, though Christian faith does involve a reliance on the Scriptures as an infallible source of truth. Unfortu­ nately tht: infallible Scriptures must always be interpreted by fallible human beings living and working in fallible societal and community contexts. The interested reader might ....", .- nt to coosuh Holmes's (19i7) ,

helpful book AU Truth Is Cod's Truth to reflect further on standards of rationality (sec also Echc..-crria, 1986). Model of&ychoth=py

The highly rational and didactic nature of RET as a counseling method fits with the instincts of man)' conservative Christian believers who tend to be comfortable with rational discourse about belief and are primed to believe that belief has a fonnative impact on behavior and
there are many styles of doing rational therapy and that there are gentle respectful ways to aid the process of cogniti\<e change. It is vital in studyng RET to separate the ideas of Ellis from his manner with ,

,

clients.

i

193

When we evaluate RET for the breadlh of methods it proposes, we can see that it is one aCme narrower approaches. The combination of RET with the acti\'e methods of beha\ior therapy (see next chapter> helps to diminish the centrality of this problem. Conclusion Perhaps the greatest value of RET for the Christian ther.tpisl can be dcri\'cd from looking at RET through a �ide·angle lens nuher than through a microscope. In the broad view, one sees in RET a therapy that is openly value-oriented. prizes rationality and is balanced in its aucmpt to deal with the thoughts, behavior and feelings of the client from a rational perspcclh·c. As a comprehensive approach to under­ standing personality, RET is extremely limited. On close examination, many troublesome tensionsappcar between RET and Christian systems of thought. Principal among these are the highly humanistic defini­ tions of ratio1wlif)'. an indi\idualistic. rationalistic and hedonistic ..ision of human healt.h and troublesome understandings of rationality and emotion. For Further Reading Cr.lbb, L. ( 1 975). 8Mir frri1U:ipll:3 of biblical (fI!m�ling. Gr.md Rilpids, M.I: ZondelY.lll .

A reprcscmath'c WChristianiled" version of RET.

Ellis. A., and Bernard. M. (Em.). (1985). ainiml uppiirations Q/raliollul..fflO l livt

IMm/1J. New York: 1'lcllUm. A good introduction 10 RET. Ellis. A.. and Harper. R. (l9iS).

A II"" guidt

10

rtlli<Jnal livi"K'

Wils.hire. A good sample ofEllis's RET. Thurman. C. (1989). 17I1.Iirs wt �litvt. Nash\;lIe: Thomas Nelson .

Hollywood:

A reprel!entalin: wChristianiled" \'ersion of RET. Walen. S.; DiGiuseppe. R.; and WeMler, R.

rotional-rowtiw IIl1'ra/J)'. N� York: Oxford.

(1980). A prorliti(ml'Y� guid�

/Q

A fine guidebook to RET for the practitioncr.

References TI.IIing the Intlh /Q lroubid �". Minneapolis: Bethany. and Chapian. M. ( 1 980). Tilling y()Urulf '� truth. Minneapolis:

Backus, W. (1985). Backus, w., Bethan)'.

Bergin, A. (1980). PS)'cholherJPy and religious \'alucs.}Qllrna/ o!vm.mlJingand

Clinical Ps)'cholorJ" 48, 95-105.

Berkhof. L (1939).

SYJttmatir IWogy. Grand Rapids, Ml: E�rdmam.

1 94

BonhoefTer. D. (1959). ThUOSI ofdiscipleJhip. (R. H. Fuller, Trails.). New York: Macmillan. (OriginaIly published. 1937.) i New York: Clebsch, W. andJaekle. C. (1975) . Pasl(1rtJiuJrtin hutoricalfJmP«lt.¥, .

ja,$()11 Aronson. Crabb, L ( 1975).

&uic

principles of bibliwl

wIHw.

ling. Crnnd Rapids, MI:

Zondcryau.

Crbb, L ( 1977) . Eftl divt biblirol cuwmling. Grand Rapids. �U: Zonden'3ll. Cr.ligie, r., and Tan. S. (1989a). Changing resistant assumptions in Chri$lian cognitive-bchavioral lherapy. JI1!Imai ofP$ycholl>gy Qnd TMoIog], 17, 93-100. Craigie. F.. and Tan. S. (1989b). Entitlement. Journal ojPlylhoWgj ami Orris/i· ..

anity. 8, 57-68. siian ' Echeverria, E. (1986). Rationality and the theory of rationalil),. Chn Scholor'J RtWw, U, 372-387. Ellis, A. (1962). Rl6son and tmOIiQ71 in psydtolMmfrJ. New York: L)'Je Stuart. Ellis, A. (1 978). The theory of rationakmoti\'1': therapy. I.n A. Ellis and J. Whitely (Eds.), Th«>�tical and nnpiricalfouruwtions ofralUmukmolivt tMrapy (pp. 33-60) . Monterey, 0\; Brookll/Cole. Ellis, A (1980). Psychotherapy and atheistic values. Journal of Comulti,rg and

Oinical Psycholof;J, 48, 635-639. Ellis. A

(1988). Yes, ho.... reasonable is rational-emotive tht:rapr? Revi� of

Eristmtial Psyclwlogy and Psychiatry. 19, 135--140. Ellis, A., and Bernard. M. ( 1 985). What is rational-emoti\'e therapy? In A. Ellis and M. Bemard (Eds.), Cliniad appUcaliun.J uf rati01UJkmotiVlr IhLmpy (pp. 1-30), New York: Plenum.

.....ood: A., and Harper, R. (1975). A nnu guid, 10 rali(l11(J/ living. 1-loJ1� Wilshire. EK.henrocder. C. ( 1982) . How rational is ratiolla.i-emotive theraP}'? Cognitiw Therapy and Rmarch, 6, 381·392. [vans. C. ( 1988a) . Albert Ellis' conception of rationality: How reasonable is RET? Reuiew of£:ri.Juntial Psychology and Psychiatry, 19, 129-134. Evans. C. (1 988b) . A rejoinder to Ellis. lVvi� rif ExU/eJlliaJ Pryclwlogy and Prjchiatry, 19, 141-142. Grieger. R., and Boyd,]. (1980). RatiQlrai-t7lWlivc: lhera",: A skiU-lxwd ofJlrrotl.ch. Ellis,

New York: Van Nosuand Reinhold. Hauck. P. ( 1985) . Religion and RET: Friendsor foc5? In A. Ellis and M. Bemard (Eels.), ainical opplittllioru of m/i(moi--enwlive IMraf1Y (pp. 237·256) . New York: Plenum. Hohne5, A. (1977). AU truth j.l God's truth.. Grand Rapid.�, MI: Eerdrnar15. Kreefl, P. (1986). Making � QUI ofroffmng. Ann Arbor, MI: Sc:n'ant. Lawrence C and Huber, C. (1982). Strange bedfello"",,? Rational-cmou"t: tht:r.lPY and pastor.l.! counseling. The Pmom�l tlnd GIJidtlnujQUrnal, 61, 21 0-21 2. Ia u nts. A. (1977). Toward an egolt:ss state ofilCing. In A. Ellis and R. Griegt:r (Ed�.), flarniboo« of rationai·t1IIotiw theraPJ (pp. 1 1 3-118). New York: Springer. Roberts, R. (1982). Spirituality and human rnu)tion. Grand Rapids, MI: Et:rdmam. ,

..

19'

I«nOSM.f.IIIOTI\£ nn:1VV'Y

(198;). PS),cholhcrapeulicvirtues and the grammaroffaith.Joumllf ofPJ]cMlOfD and ThrologJ, H. 191-204. Roberts. R. (1988). What an emotion is: A sketch. Philosophical Rmiw, 47, 183-209. Schmidt.]. (1983). Do)'ou �r what you 're Ihinking! Wheaton, IL: ViclOr. Sharkey, P. (1981), Something irrational about nnional emotive psycholog)'. Psycholht"ffJp'F Thit:n)� &smrth and Pm,riu, 18, 15(}154. Slemer.J. (19;;). Is rational�molin,: ther-dpysuitable for pastoral counseling? CAPS Bulldin, 3,6-8. Tan. S. (1987). Cognitive.behavior therapy: A biblical approach and critique. j(lUnlal ofPsychology and 7Mologj, H. 103-112. Thumlan, C. (1989). Tiu /itS Wi! btlilVe. Nasmille: Thomas Nelson. Walen. S.; DiGiuseppe. R.; and Wessler R. (\980). A I"actitiont'rJ guide 10 ralianai-emQlilM IMrlIP'!. New York: Oxford. We�ler, R. (1984). A bridge too far: Incompatibilities of rational�motive therapy and paslOml counseling. The Pmonnel and Guidance J(lUnlll� 6), 264-265. Zajonc, R, (1980). Feeling and thinking: Prerercm:e5 need no inferences. American Psychologist, )5, 151-162. Roberts. R.

,

8

COGNITIVE­ BEHAVIO THE

n chapter six we distinguished between the more -behavior­

istic· variants of behavior modification and behavior ther­ apy, on the ooe hand, and cognitive-behavioral therapy on the other, and focused on the former. 10 chapter seven, ",'C explored RET, which was a forerunner to cognitive-behavioral therapy. In this chapter, we want to understand and crit ique cognitive behavo ioral therapy. an imereHing, recent, and highly influential de scendant of behavior therapy and RET. -

­

Descriptive StuVey There are many valiations of this model. Unlike most sc'lools of psychology, cognitive.behavioral therapy does not have one founding

coc..vrrll'E_ lII;JfAI'IORAL TIfEIIAI'Y

197

theorist to gh-e it cohesion. We shall examine the three most represen­ tative groups: The first is the social- cogniti\'c approach to human per.;onaliryof Sandura (J986) and M.ischcl (1973), which constitutes the most aggressive attempl LO understand human personality from a behaviora1 and cognitive perspeclivc-thou&h it ha.� not developed a cOITesponding school of therapy. We will also examine he t cognitive­ behavior therapy of Meichenbaum (1977, 1985) and the cognitive therapy uf Beck (e.g., Beck, Rush, Hollon and Shaw, 1979). Collec­ 1 tively, we wi ll call these approaches cognitive-bchaviomJ therapy. The work of Bandura, Meichenbaum and omen c\'Olvcd out of tradiLional behaviorism. Beck, howcver, was uailled psychoanalytically, but developed a rationally oriented approach to therapy in much the way that Ellis did, though Beck was always more open LO the infusion of Olher therapy tet:hniques than was Ellis. Beck emphasized scientific evaluation of effectiveness, was clinically pragmatic rather than theo­ retically speculative, and emphasj;�ed the dire�t and focused r.reatment of the client's presenting problems. This led to the incorporation of Beck '5 approach into cogniti\'e-behavioral therapy.

As a group, aJl lhe thempies in lIlis chapter differ from more tradition­ ".lys. First, cognit:i\"e-behav­ ally behavioristic approaches in two centr.\1 .... ioral practitioners believe that some human beha\;or is caused by internal or mental events. for the true behaviOlist, all lIle ultimate causes of behavior are c.xternal to lIle person. Internal C\'CtlLSare real but ineffectual epiphenomena, mere temporary conduil� for environmenal t forces. In

cognit:i\·e·bchavio.... .u ilier-lp)" internal events arc S(."Cn as real, pov.·ctful n i their own right, and not ultimately rtducilU to environmental

... t. 'cnts.

In

sum, thought isjudged to be real and to be important. TIle second major difference is that the beha\�orist believes that the same laws of learning-namely, operam and classical condition­ ing--explain all behavior, overt

ami n i ternal or mental. But cognitive­

behavionl.l lherapy asserts that the internal behaving of humans (i.e., thoughts and feelings) may operate by differem principles lIlan lIle

IThese apl,roachn ha'"C nOllTcei\"Co.I lhe te.,.d ofauemiCin fr01l1 Chrinian lhi"kcn lhal

many other appr03chcs have. Edwards (1916). Tan (1987). Propst (1988) and JonC1l

( 1988) lIa'"e been among the few to interACt ..

illl C<J8"ilh'c-bch!\\"ionll therapy as a system

from a Christian pcnpccth-·e. Anumbc:rofChristia.n coun:ldillg 3pproaches hav" draWJl from lhill model

iI!I

well,

as "'c

shaU ill�tratc lalcr.

This rdatiye lack of altelltiOll

b)'

ChrUtians ieI'm, due I() Christian ""pugna.llce to the behaviorum ofSkinllcr (and thi,

modd , guilt by a550Ciation), lhc modd's fe<:Cncy aud iLS lack of cohesi\"('ne5l! '

which

makes il hard to sumrmuize and digesl.

•

P'

""

/98 2 simple twO learning processes used 10 explain animal behavior. These approaches differ from RET in being more .....ell imegralcd into the o\'crall di.o;cipline of psychology. more scientific in their formulation, less dogmatic and more well researched. If there is one lhillg that characterizes actukmicdinical psychology loda)" it is the relative neglect of grand personality theories in favor of what miglH be called �microtheories� of specific phenomena (Briggs,

1987). Researchers today tend 10 be eclectic about the grand theories they draw inspiration from, bei ng srrongly wedded to none of them. articulated smaller-scaIe theories about . Their goal is to develop ...·ellspecific phenomena (such as altruism. panic. depres.�ion or social skills).

not about persons as whole

beings. The hope is thus to make

the$(" theories morc accurale than the Mgrand � theories by making the universe of phenomena they 3uempt to explain smaller. For example. cognitive therapy began as an attempt to understand and treat depres­ sion and then broadened to an approach for dealing with all �afIecth'e disorders.� bringing under irs umbrella anxiety as well. Il s i more direcdy a theory about pathological emotions and a proposal for effective change mcthods for altering maladapti\·c emotional reac­ tions. Il is important to note, however. that even microtheorics must make generaJ assumptions about human beings that ex.hibit the phe­ nomenon of study, and thus these approaches 3re necessarily embed­ ded in grand theories of human personality, though they are often less explicit about those assumptions. This complicates the evaluation of their approaches. Philosophical Assumptions The presuppositions of this group of approaches are nOt as conspicu· ous as those of more docuinaire beha\1orism. Cognitive-�havioral therapy

i.s built upon the foundations of behaviorism. and thus the

basic presuppositions are consistent with that perspective. Materialism, natur,dism and atomism seem to be embraced by proponents of cognitive- behavioral therdpy. As stated in chapter six, these are unac­ ceptable to Christians, though there are important positive poinrs to consider with each. While materialism denies the existence of the spiritual realm, it selVes to rcmind us oflhe physi calness and finitude

'l'For 3gene,.,.} ucatment ofIhe .hifl of tho: lie1d off'S}'chologr )'wayfrom .tri(I \.Ic.h..,-;or.u conceptions and coward cogniti\� "al1cn. $toe Dobson and Block

vie-oo'. 5« Hodges

(1976) or Van 1..ceu....en . (]�).

(1988) ; for a Chrhtian

199 of our existence and the \\-'
Awmism, as embrdced by cognitive-behavioral theorists, suggests

that each person is a loose collection ofbehaviO....ll and cognitive habits and predispositions. While this undermines notions of personal re­ sponsibility (since there is no Mpcrson" behind the behavior), atomism does help us nOt to overidentify with our actions. Reductionism s i also present. though the steps of �reducing" a phenomenon do not seem to go so far in the direction of basic processes as ,",,'ilh behavior modification. Instead of reducing all events

to operant learning human phenomena arc understood in terms of expectancies, self-statemenl<; and 50 forth. Still, this is not a "holistic� view of persons such as is found in Adlerian or existential approaches to therapy. Finally, cognitive-behavioral therapy embraces a view of science akin to that of behavior modification, though "covert e\'cnls," such as thought, are not dismissed perfunctorily as nonscientific phenomena. TIle anumelltalism or behavior modification is altered in an inter­ esting way in cognith·e-beha";oral therapy. TIle \1ew that thoughts are noncausal epiphenomena gives way to the notion of thought patterns being powerful determinants of beha\ior. At the same time, thoughIS are also I·egarded as being the resuh of naturalistic processes. Since these thought patterns are not presumed to operate by the rules of operant and classical learning. cognitive-beha\iorists can remain mao terialists who do not believe in mentalism (in the sense orbclieving in an immateliai mind or soul), but at the same lime can believe that human thought is a complex and causally efficacious phenomenon

i not a simple resuh ofreinfon:ement. For the behavior modifier, that s the thought

�J should write some more on my book today� is presumed

to be a mere b�'Prod\lct of the external reinforcement contingencies

that produce chaplel�writing behavior (such as calls from an editor, the

past history of payment and praise for wriling, etc.). In cogniti\'t."-be­ ha\>ioral therapy, such a thought is seen as an important contributor to writing beha\ior occurring; it is a causal force in its 0,",,'Il righL Thai is '""'ily cognitive- beha";orisLS

are often called "mentalists" by behavior

modifiers; this is perhaps the highest insult the behaVior modifier can inflict. Determinism is also modified substantially in this model, Remem­ ber that the classic beha\1orist believes that el,'enlS outside the person, operating through the laws of learning, totally determine all beha";or. We cannot do other than .....hat we do. Cognitive-bcha";orisLS sometimes

"

200

MODI-:R.VPSYCHO'('HERAPn:s

take similar stances, as when Marlatt (1982, p. 333), speaking 3bom responsibility in the development ofan addiction problem. states, "The faCI i s thaI an individual .....ho acquires a maladaptive habit pattern on the basis of past conditioning and the effects of reinforcement is no more 'responsible' for his behavior than one of Pavlov's dogs would be held responsible for salivating at the sound of a ringing bell. M Most cognitive-behaviorists. though, take a different ,�tance toward i on in-depth, and other detenninism. Randum has taken this ssue cognitive-behaviorists ha\'e IYpically endorsed his fannulation of this maner enthusiastically. He dC\'eloped the notion of reciprocal deter­ nl;nism (1978) (also the related concept of person-environment inLer­ actionism), which asserts that ""hile we are determined by our environments, ....'e are also the determiners of what our environments are (10 a limited degree). For example, we may be affected by what ....>e watch on lV. but \,'e choose what to watch, creating our "video envi­ ronment" when we turn the tube on and set the dial. We may be .m:i us at work. but we can choose affected by how others behave to....� (within limits) where we work, and we can be part of determining how others treat us by treating them in certain ways. We reciprocally deter­ mine and are determined by our environments. In Bandura's words (1978, p. 357), II is within the framework of reciprocal determinism that the concept of freedom assumes meaning. . . . Because people's con­ ceptions, their behavior, and their environments arc reciprocal determinants of each other, individuals are neither powerless oJ>. jects controlled by environmental forces nor entirely free agents who can do whatever they choose. People can be considered par­ tially free insofar as they shape future conditions by influencing their courses of action. Thus Bandura combines a belief in freedom with a recognition oflhe limitations and constraints on that freedom. Mood ofPencmoIity

In the cognitive-behavioral camp, only Mischel ( 1 973) has proposed anything approaching a grand theory of personality. He has suggested that rather than understanding personality from the perspective of unh'ersal dispositions or traits, people are bener suited to Midiographic analysisR where each person s i analyzed individually without reducing individual differences to measurements of universal {railS (Stich as dominance, eXlro\'er�ion. sensation-seeking, etc.). Each person 's per·

201

COGvrrM� /ll£HAI70RAJ. THf.RA.PY

$Qnality is unique and must be understood as such.

Mi.scMC.s Five Person Hzriabks.

Mischel organizes his idiographic

approach to understanding persons around fiveperron variablM. These are not traits or psychological structures (such as the id, ego, superego of psychoanalysis). but are categories of processes lhat can develop diiTerently in different persons. There is a strong similarity becv,een this approach and the behavioristic explanation of all personality according to the laws of learning. though here the list of processes is longer and more complex. These five person variables are:

1. Cognitivt encoding .strawgits. All persons SOrt the raw data of their sensations of the "'"arid in different ways. It is our encoding strategies that transform a perception of a mouth movement of another into either a warm, accepting smile or ajudgmental grimace of condescen­ sion; that categorize a three-sentence statement by a work supervisor into a \icious attack or a helpful exhortation. Some Christians might look at others in the church and categorize a small group as �real believers� and all others as �hypocrites,M while another person may son persons according to maturityjudged by how gracious and loving they

.. seem to be. AI a broad level, the way we sort the complex world v e

confront "channelsM OUI" personalities and can make us different peo­ ple. Persons with sophisticated, broad, adaptable ways of sorting or encoding their experiences will be more adjusted and adaptable than persons with simplistic, rigid and narrow encoding strategies.

2. OJgnitiVl'1 and bthavWml ron.slruction cmnpttmcies. ln response to the raw data we take in through our senses and our encoded perceptions,

we

must �figurc om� oW" world by constructing a cognitive model of it

and then go on to construct actions for responding to it. Once we have

i a way given a label to experience. we put bits of experience together n that seems to make sense. These models may vary from highly acc.urate and productive (such as the insightful understanding of the politically astute employee ill an organization) to highly inaccurate and destruc.­ tive (such as the paranoid delusions of the psychotic). On the basis of that model and utilizing me skills available, the person then

a(1.'.

People differ widely in the actions they are capable of exhibiting. For example, husbands differ �idely in their capacity to be emotionally sensiti\"t': and responsive to their .... ;ves. We all differ in terms of the ways we make sense of our world and the capacities we possess for acting in response tf) it.

3. Sul1tCtilH stimulus values. Another dimension on which persons differ is what they value and hence what motivales lhem. According to

202 Mischel, people build lip from the few basic motivations that Skinner allowed (need for food, v.rarmth. water, pleasure. elc.) to almost an infmite array of valued stimuli, which then become incentives for behavior or a focus for motivation. People can then differ immen5eiy on what are motivations for them because of their \"Cry different learning histories.

4.

Dpcunt and classical condilioning. Though he has mo\'ed beyond

tTaditionaJ behaviorism, Mischel believes that basic leaming processes arc still influential in human behavior. He does not understand these in the mechanistic manner of a Skinnerian, but believes them to be operative at a Cognilh'e leo.·el. For instance, operanl icarning (changes n i beha\i.or based on reinforcement paucms) is understood not as the mechanistic conditioning of operAnt behavior but as the influencing of choice behavior by the alteration of expectations of re. .. : ard.

5. &If-rIa rgu IOfJ sy,stnns alld plans. One of the major conuibutions of Bandura

(1978) and Kanfer (1979) in moving beyond traditional

behavioral conceptions of persons was the proposal that persons typi­ caUy internalize control of their behavior as they dew lop. Skinner may believe that our environment controls all, but these theorists argued that lhrough memory, expectancy and language we take our environ­ i side us, and thus the thoughts we engage in become as fX)werful ment n determinanlS of our actions as the external environment. \\,hi l e the study behavior of a student may be partially due to external contingen­ cies, such as social praise from dorm

assocates, i

availability of other

activities and so forth, the student can also create alternative forces that in fluence behavior through, for example, self-statements such as �I

must study now or I will flunk out of school," or -Imagine how my i age boyfriend will be impressed when I get an A in this course! � The m of the boyfriend conjured up at will can be as powerful a determinant of behavior as the real person. People then differ n i their capabilities

to regulate lheir own behavior. People differ according lO what beha''''

ior they pay attention to in themselves, how theyjudge that behavior (e.g., stringent versus generous sLandards ofjudgment) and how effec­ tively they give o,'crtconsequences ("No 1V for me lOnigh!; I didn't do my housc�'Ork!") orcovcn consequences (self-statemelll5 such as -I did a great job!- or �I'm a hopeless case !�) to lhemseJ\'es. Mischel's understanding of personality has not resulted in a formal therapy approach per se, bUl his model provides the best integrative framework for understanding all of cogniti\'e-behav­ ioral therapy, in thaI each intervention can be seen as targeting

COGXn1n:- BF.J/.4.\·/OIItL t TIIYJl.V1·

20;

oneor more of his person variables.

Bandura's Social-('..ognitiw Thl!tJ7). B'l.ndur.!. a prolific researcher n i this field, has contributed many important concepts to cognitive­ behavioral therapy, First. he focused 011 the phenomenon of model­ ing-the capacity of humans to learn notjust by direct experience but by watching the behavior or hearing the thoughlS or others. Modeling has becume an important component of cognitive-behavioral psycho­ therapy. Funher. Bandura developed the concepLS of self-regulation and reciprocal determinism, ,,·hich vo'c have already discussed. Finally. B;.Uldur.l developed the concept of ulf-effu:acy, which has become central in cognitive-behavioral practice laday. This is the concepl that it is notjust pastconsequences arall action that determine its occurrence (as Skinner might argue) or c\'en the expectation ofa future consequence (a cognitive event which Skinner would deny the importance of), but it is also OUI' roalualion of our

own

ro"'fNtellCY or

effectiveness in behaving iliat determines action. FoJ' example. a Skinnerian Vo'ould say a shy person's reluctance to interact with others is a function of having not been rewarded for such acti"itles in the past and of receiving ongoing rewarru for shy behavior. As Ireannenl, the Skinnerian would implement a learning so-.neg)' that

....·ould positively reinforce outgoing beha\ior. To this Sandura would add that the shy person must not only expect reinforcement for outgoing beha\�or. but shc must also manifest a sense of personal efficacy for those types of behaviors, a sense that she can effectively interact with OIhers. The point here is that people do not attempt things juSt bet:ausc therc are rewards; we also considcr our expectanc.y thaI we can be effecti\'e at the behavior it rakes to obtain the rewards. This s i important in cognitive-behavioral therapy where one is trying to establish new behavior. The therapist cannot simply create a reward. but must also create a sense of personal effcctivcncss to get the fearful person to act in courageous ways, or the lonely and depressed person to attempt new social interactions.

Mtichellbaum's Cognitive lkhuviar Theraf/)" vision

was

Meichenbaum's (1977)

to develop a method for understanding the impact of

cognitions (thoughts) on behavior and cmotion, and a method for changing the nature of thai impact. He proposed a three-stage process for effective change. First. a person mUSt become aware of thoughts relevant to the problem being experienc<.-rl. Next. therapist and client must determine allCrnative thoughts (self-statements) Lilal can belic\"

204

MOOF.RNPSrCllonfFJW>1£S

ably replace thoughtS !.hat are causing the person trouble. Finally. lhe person must implement thought changes and begin to enjoy the benefits of nondestructive cognition.

For example, some ofMeichenbaum's work has been with impulsive,

i assumed that the problems hyperactive children. In this population it s are due in part to a fdilure to eSGlblish the cogniu\'e skills that normal children have to manage their

0\',11

behavior.

TI1US m i pulsive

children

might be taught initially to define their task and continually remind themselves what to do (�J'm in class and my job here is listening lQ the tcacherft), [Q usc thoughts to cope .... ith distractions or less than optimal � lI1 . dered! Back on track; just pick up perfonnancc ("Oops. My mind .... where you left otr) and to usc positive thoughts to

rew

Md good perfor­

mance and perhaps negative thoughts to punish unw3med performance ("'Great! I 'm doing better. I paid attention for len minUies n i a row!"), Meichenbaum's methods have been applied a L such populations as chil­ dren, schizophrenics. adults ....;th anxiety disorders or chruni<: pain. and those ....ith explosive tempers (see Mcichenbaum,

1985).

Bide's Cognitive ThhafrY. Beck's work has been similar to, !.hough independent from. Meichenbaum's. Working with deprcssi\'es (Beck

1979). those with amdcty disorders (Beck and Emery, 1985), and most recently couples with marital problems (1988), Beck has been a

et aI.,

producu\'e clinician and researcher. His work differs from RET in more fully utilizing cognitive and behavioralmelhods. in being less docuinairc i rational (using instead !.he labels in what he regards as rational and r "adaptive'" and "'maladaptive � beliefs) and most imponant1y in encour· aging a therapeutic sryle less combative and rigid than Ellis's in favor of a genller though direct Socratic questioning style. Beck proposes that pathological lcvcls of depression and anxiety are thc result of �distorted cognitions,- It is commonly noted lhal depressed and anxious people report thoughts that are dearly inaccurate. A depressed man says, "Everything I've ever done has been a failurc"; yet friends who know him well reveal that he has done and still is doing many things satisfactorily. An anxious woman says. "There is no way I can handle that situation; it will destroy meM; yet family members disclose that she has in fact handled situations like what she is afraid of in the past and that what she fears cannot destroy her. Other approaches to counseling view these thoughts as

symptomatic of other problems (low self-esteem. projection of un­ acceptable impulses) and thus see no benefit in directly changing lhe thoughts. In Beck's mind. the distorted Lhinling is not the

20J

symptom or the problem, it s i the cause or the problem. Cognitive therapy [)'pically proceeds in three sblges; first, lhe pres­ entation of the therapeutic rationale; sccond, the dC\'e!opment of awareness of dysfunctional thoughl$ on the part of the client; finally. the actual alteration oftJle dysfullctional thoughts and the substitution of more functional thinking. In a direct fashion, most dearly reflective of the Socratic philosophical tradition, Beck uses persistent but gentle logic and persuasion 10 alter the person's think ing. He might use such lffhniques as involving the diem in calJceLing evidence to support or undermine beliefs (-Please gather all rOUf employee reviews for the last five years; if you really are a complete failure, there shouldn 'I be a single positke statement on them�) or suggesting new thoughts to foclls on ("Please co11eeL a list of your positive traits from your friends, list those you feel arc most lnle, and think on these five times each day�). NOI al1 cognitiolls arejudged to be Y�rbal in form. Some of the most po....erful . can be visual images (everyone in the neighborhood staring), auditory (the sound of people laughing at you) and so forth. There is a danger that cogniti\"t� change can be construed in a ,·ery superficial manner. Beck and others emphasize the need to gel down to the �core bdiefs� of the client, and a major portion of the therapeu­ tic effort is devoted 10 developing a self·awareness of what the core issues arc. Often the thcrnpist must help the client by utilizing creative modes of self·assessment or cven illlcrpreL the actions and statements of the client from an objeCli\Oe standpoint. Changes thai arc not relc\-dnl to the p.·csenting problem b«ause Lhey are superficial will not be that ht:lpful. A client who complains of doubting herself, but whom the Lherapist suspects s i deeply afraid of Lhe rejection of her husband who makes periodic threal$ ofleaving her. must come to grips ",;th the real cognitive e\'cnlS thai arc shaping her responses. Beck also uses traditional beha\;or-therapy techniques as well. For example. a person depressed over bi5 unemploymen t may be paraJyled and miserable in pan because of the catastrophic things he is telling himself, but that person may also be diso ized (and (hus able (0 benefit from some bcha\ioral self·management training) and interper­ sonally awkward. especially in job-interview situations (and Lhus able to benefit from assertiveness tf'.lining)o Beck would utilize a (J"catmenl package of all of these methods.

rkan

Mod�ls ofHealth and Abnormality One of the most curious things about this approach to therapy s i that

206

MOtJ£l1NmOIOTJlEHAPlf;S

due to itS emphasis 011 microtheories of disorders rather than broad understanding of persons, these approaches are sketchy about defin­ ing nonnalcy and abnormality. Thc.-y assume thal lhese arc defined by society and by a person's own assessment of his or her level of distress and functioning. Thus

cognitive-behavioral

Woolfolk and Richardson

therapy

is characterized by what

(1984) call �all1orality.w a tendency to go

along with Ihe individual's definitions of normalcy and abnormality. If a client comes illlo a clinic complaining that a pallem is a problem. then for thaI person it is a problem. 111i s usually meshes well with

common sense; no one s i going to disagrct: I.hatagoraphobia orsuicidal depression is abnormal. 8U1 it lea\'C5 open to the individual decision of the therapist and client the normalcy or abnormaliy t of border cases. A perhaps extreme example is w.arus's

ith a woman (1980) work ....

who reponed having married her husband onl), for ute financial rewards he gave her. She had had numerous sexual affairs. She came

(0 thenpybecause of a dC\'cloping a\'ersion to sexual relations with her

husband. La7.arus's response was not to confront the obvious narcis­ sism of lhe c1iem or lO urge her to work on the marriage. Rather he deemed her aversion to sex in a lm·dcss and pragmatic marriage a worthwhile target for therapy and taught her cognitive techniques

to

allow her to �turn herself off em otionally� SO that shc could continue to tolerate sex with her husband while continuing to enjoy her adulu:!r­ ous affairs. \"hile this is an extreme example, it points up the risks of an obscure definition of normalcy. Mod" ofPrydooth�1'Y Cognitive--beha\ioraJ therapy in clinical practice tends to be character­ z i ed by shoner-term interventions targeted at spedfic-dlly defined prob­ \en15. These problems are attacked as directly as possible. in a manner some belitue as mere �symptom reduction. � Cognitive-bchavioral thcr­

ap), emphasizes empirical documelHation of cffecti\·cness, so it is no coincidence that cognhive-beha\'ioral-I.herapy techniques have been

mostly de\·elopcd for the treatment of problems which are easier 10 measure directly. such as depression, stress, anxiety or academic un­ derachievement. Problems charaClerized br more vague complaints tend to be ignored by lhis approach.

'nlC

therapist-client relationship in cogniuve-behavioral lherapy is

cOllcei'·ed of in a less personal \\�dy than in man)' approaches. For example, Kendall and Bemis

( 1983,

p.

566) state, 1l1e task of the

COCNrrll'& SFJIIo.11Of/.H. Tllf:RAPt'

207

i to act as diagnostician, educator, cognitive-behavioral therapist s

and

technical consultant who assess se maladapti\'e cognitive processes and works with the ciient to design learning experiences that may remed" ate these dysfunctional cognitions. ft This is hardly a description that warms the soul! Ne\'ertheless, as we showed in chapter six. research has acrually shown that practitioners of behavior therapy and cognitive­

behavioral therapy are typically perceived as very warnl and caring by

clients. All of these cognitive-behavioral theoriSts male use of the assort­ ment of methods of behavior modification and behavior therapy, but

additionally target thought pauerns and cognitive habits of the client,

using methods that are not common to behavior modification, such as

modeling, \'crbal instruction, rehearsal of thoughts and so fOM.

Dob­

son and Block (I988) suggest that there are three major types of cognitive- behavioral-therapy interventions:

ropingslfills lrainillg, where

the client is assisted in developing behavioral and cognitive skills for dealing with challenging situations;

wgnifivt resrructuring,

where the

focus is on some direct form of modificatioh of maladaptive thoughI pauerns; and problem-solving training. where the person expands his or her general capacity for understanding and facing challenging prob­ lems.

Christian Critique

PfliloMJphioal Assumptions As stated in chapler six, the behavioristic presuppositions of material­ ism, naturalism, atomism, reductionism and scientism are unaccept­ able for Christians because they exclude God and supernatural activity

and they slrip humanity ofits God.. g h ·cn ralionality and dignity. Let us then tum to the matter of detenninism.

As Chri�tians, we must bdiC\'e in limited freedom, as developed in chapter two. And we must reject the kind of materialistic determinism espoused by Skinner. But is miprocnl

tUfbmillism,

as

d<. · · ..eloped by

adequatc as an understanding of limited freedom? Bandura (1989, p. 1182) says explicitly I�at "freedom . . . is defined

Ba.ndura,

positively in terms of the exercise of self-influence . . . . Sclf-generated influences operate detenninistically on beha�ior the same way as external sources of innuencc do. . . . The self is thus partly fashioned through the continued exercise of self-influcnce. � Note SC\'cral things

about this statement. First, Bandura defines freedom "positivcly� rather

,

208 than �negati"ely," presumably meaning that freedom does not mean the absence of causes. Second, it is clear that Bandura conceives of !he working oflhe self in a mechanical way, suggesting that it develops by uni\'e� laws of behavior and is activated� by extema1 influences thai "

impinge on the penon. For Bandura, human beings are fret: in the

i

sense that their behavior has an impact on the r environment and

hence on the changing of their o\'m behavior (which he calls the development of Lhe self) . Further, these self-SYSlcms ar-e not mere way stations for emironmcmal inf1uence but contribute something to behavior beyond the influence of environment. Bandura'5 view can beSt be understood in terms of the distinction

between hard and soft determinism (as ...·c discussed in chapter four; [\'3.0S,

1989). Both forms ofdeterminism share the beliefthat behavior

s i determined and thus could not have occurred otherwise. Where the two views differ is that the hard detenninist (e.g., Skinner) explicitly acknowledges that his \iew is incompatible \\;th freedom while the soft dete

with

hninist redefines freedom in such a \\'ay as to make it compatible

determinism, thus creating the illusion of freedom. 8andura

engaged in just such a redefining move in the reference above by defining freedom nOt as the capacity to have acted other than the causal forces dictated butas the exercise of self-influence

tWn

when 1M

txmise of self-influnlce is ity/fcawally thtC"mimd 10 o(Xur! In other words.

we have freedom whene\'er the self exercises its influence, even tllOugh the self-syslem openues by determined rules and thus could nOt ha\'e behaved otherwise. Bandura s i d�dfly a soft detenninist. In 8andurA'sview, we are not free in the sense of having any choices over which we exercise ultimate control as responsible agents. B.mdurd himself stated that there s i no Mpsychic agent that controls beha\;orM

(1978, p. 348). For example, according to Bandura honesty may be described as an ahiliry to !'(:sist extcrnal temptations to steal or lie, but that personality disposition is itself caused by

dtcisiun ofllu: person.

somtthing oIlur than th"

At a dcscripti\"C Ic\'cI, Bandura would agree that

the person has the sense of making decisions to be honest. But ultimately the development of the characteristic of honest)' is caused by factors o\'er which the person has "no control. M The person learned to define honest and dishonest behavior, to value honest}' and to regulate

his or her own behavior, to be able to resist external tempta­

tion by the standard laws of learning. Moral choice becomes just another beha\;or that is acquired the wa)' all behaviors are acquired

.

This is why Wren

(1982) described the social-learning understanding

CtX.,.m·",£,_ W:W.VlORM. THf.RAPY

209

of persons as "paramechanical." The person never escapes the closed circle of determined acts. In none of the behavioristic conceptions of the person do we have

U'ue limited freedom. All ofthesc models arc thus �dangerous� in that

they propose a liew of human persons in which we are mechanisms of some sort or another, beings which always do ,,.hat they must do. This is 35 true for Bandura's conception of the person as for Skinner's or Wolpe·s. In the tauer. we are noncognitive machines; in the former. we are thinking machines. Such views demean our U'ue nature and under­ mine our sense (which reflects reality) of our responsibility for our actions. \et ofaLl the various psychotherapies it is perhaps Bandura's view, faull)' as it is, that comes closest to a Christian liew offreedom. It a\'oids the radical suggestion of autOnomous freedom embraced by the hu­ manistic psychologies (chapters ten to thirteen) and auempts to avoid the suffocating determinism of classical psychoanalysis (chapter four) and behavior modification (chapter six). It fails because only a theistic \iew ofpersons that assens that we are created for moral accountabi l ity has an adequate grounding for a full conception of limited freedom. Even though at the metatheoretical level

all behavior therapists

emhrace determinism, cognitive-behavioral therapy practitioners are distinctive among the psychotherapy approaches for being open "'ith clientS abom the change process and trying to enist l the client as a �col1aborator.M a concept which carries with it a high view of the client's powers of choice and freedom. Compared to psrchoanalysis, person­ centered therapy and family-systems approaches, which seem to ha�"e a low \�ew of t.he person's capacity for meaningful change apart from expert intervention. cognitil'e-beha\ioral therapy has a high view of the person's capacity for change through �sclf-(ontroIM and related proc­ esses. UI us now mO\'c from Ilu: assumption of determinism to the cognitil'e-behavioraJ vie",' ofmind.Thcl'c is no one cognitive-beha\1oraJ theory of mind. The general approach to the mind-brain problem in cognitive-behavior.t! therapy $ i consistent with that of behaviorism in embracing an implicitly materialistic theo!)', viewing thought as a naturalistic process rooted in Ollr neurology and gO\'emed by causal laws. But there are options in thinking about the mind-brain distinction that take the physical bases of thought .seriously but do not lea\'e us trapped n i a detenninistic frame",·ork. In particular, ",'e can look at the

210 emergentisl view of Nobel Prize winner Roger Sperry. Sperry's

(1980)

view of mind-brain imcr.tction, in much tOO brief

summary, is thai human thought is founded on

but traruamds in limited

ways physical determination. He suggests that human thought. charac­ terized by limited freedom, emerges from the complex neurological building blocks of brain processes, which are fundamentally depen­ dem on their physical 5ubslratcs yet capable of l'dnscending lhal physical programming. One of the analogies he uses is that of a rubber tire. By being formed into a tire shape. the rubber molecules behave in .... a ys not predictable from knowledge of just their physical proper­ ties. Rolling freely is a properry of wheels, not of rubber. Similarly,

Sperry argues that thought emerges from-and has properties based

on bur not completely predictable from-the physical functioning of i that it proposes real freedom (a the brolin. Thi5 view is intriguing, n transcendent properly), bm nOl a freedom that ignores or is indepen­ dent from the physical realities of our created natures. Cognitive-behavioral therapy does not embrace an emergentisl view of mind, but it moves in that direction in suggesting that the rules governing me beha\;or ofcognition arc nOllhe same rulesofleaming that govern lower-order animal behavior. Our argument here is that if cognitive-behavioral therapists were 10 take the step of embracing emergentism. their view could be more acceptable to Christians as an integrating vie..... of persons. We would no longer be forced LO choose between operant learning at one extreme and existential choice al the olher. Rather, the focus would be on understanding the gamut of processes that are at play in human experience, from lhe naturalistic to the transcendent.

Sperry's view suggests that the marc distinctly human char.tcteris­ tios are built upon but not wholly rulllciblt to the more basic processes wc share with animals.

A complicated human

phenomenon such as reli­

gious conversion can invoh'C basic processes, sllch as oper,l.Jlt and dassica.l conditioning; middle-level phenomena. such as expectancies, encoding strategies and stimulus values; and highest-level proceSSc.'S, such as human responsibility and existential 3mhenticity. Problems, too, can occur at different levcls of functioning. One pcBOn may have an existential crisis (a problem at the highcsl le\'el of trolnscendence) -' which is manifested as anxiety, while another can have a biologically ml'diated anxiety problem (perhaps as a bad reaction to a prescription medication, a "purely� chemical problem). human concerns

are

mllltiplt-ltvd problems. An

BUI

most

example would be a

.

,

0)(;-,,"(1"':- B£HJIl'fORM, THf:Ji.ltn'

211

person wi!.h a phobia who is biolObrically predisposed to emotional o\'erreacu"ity and who is unfortunately exposed 10 some powerful dassical
1986), This view suggcsts that .....e can validly learn

aI and cognitive-beha\ioral-thcrapy approaches in from !.he behavio ... spite of their reductionism, as they gi\'e some pen;picacious under· standin).'5 of more primitive aspects of human psychological function­ mg.

Models ofPersonality, Health and Abnormality Because of the propensity of practitioners in this school of psycholOb'Y to focus on microtheories of the specific pathologies, there is little .....e can commcnt on from a ChriStian perspective regarding lhe discipline's overall approach to defining personality, health and abnor­ mality, There are no g md postulates about ultimate human ideals ... . or about 1Il00ivalions.

As we pointed out in !.he chapter on RET, thcre is some compatibil­ ity be ..... t een Christianity and any system that rlaces a high premium on . say that what .....e believe human rationality. O:>gnitive lherapy ....ould has tremendous m i plications for our personal \o''CIl-being. This Cer­

tainly

I'csonates \o'ith biblical themes, such as the 'o\'ords of Paul n i

Philippians

4:8-9:

"Whatever is true, whatever is liable, whatever is

right, whatever is pure, whatever is Im'ely, . , . lhink about such things. . . . And the God of peace ",;11 be wilh you. � According to cogniti�"C-bchavioral the.-apy and the Bible, our thoughLS

are actions ovcr which

we have control, and these !.houghts

l lhe have implications for !.he quality of our lives. A failure to beieve right things can lead to spiritual impoverishment, as we fail 10 appro­ priate God's resources. We see this especially in lhe area of suffering. When we view our Icmporal l.i\'cs as primary and have as our highest goals comfort and prosperity, lhen suffering will be a misery-producing and faith-under· mining experience. But if suffering is viewed as an opponuniry for testimony for the gospel. as a means for fellowship Wilh Christ in his sufTerings, as prepanl.tion for eternal glory through learning to loosen our ties to lhis life. and 3.'S an opponunity to learn 10 better comfort others, suffering Cd.Jl be transformed into a meaningful path that one

treads for the sake of Cod's love (Krecft,

1986).

,

212 As an example of the famrable reaction to cognitin!·bchaviorai

therapy's prizing of r.tuonality, Pecheur (1 978, p. 251) suggested Mthal the process of change which takes place in sanctification s i the same as lhe process of change which occurs with cognitive therapy." According to Pecheur, Scripture teaches thai what .....e think upon is a powerful

detenninant of our spiritual n3lUre; fOf example, Romans 8:5 reads, "Those who Live according to the sinfui n3LUre ha\'c their minds set on l in accordance with the .....hat thaI nature desires: but those who ive Spirit have their minds set on what the Spirit dcsires,Pecheur argues the Scriptures generally cncourdge the 5affiC sort ofself·awareness of cognitions as cogniti\'t.'-heha\iora\ therapy ("Search me, O Cod, and knowmy heart: test me and know my anxious thoughts. . .. .. And lead mc in the way everlasting, � Ps 139:23-24) . We are to forsake unrighteous thoughtS (Is 55:7) and seck a renewing of the mind ([ph 4:22-25; Rom 12:1-2) by replacing unrighteous wi th righteous thinking that is based on biblical standards. Thus cognitive change is believed

to lead to growth. [d.... ruds (19i6, p. 99) argues similarly that �it is the positive. Christ-centered thought·life that counterdClS anxiety and ;th God.� TIle major difference noted by Pecheur leads to peace .... between Christian sanctification and cognitive-behavioraJ herapy t is God's active participation in the process of !'>anclification. This vit!W of sanctification is one I.hal fiLS well wilh many of the directive messages ofScripture thiU tcnd 10 be cognitive-behavioral in chardcler; that is. liley urge a dual emphasis on cognitive and beha.... ioral change (as Pecheur ably points out). Further, this view meshes well with the methods ad�"OCated to promot.e spiritual growth by many conservdti,·c Christian groups. such as rigorous Bible study, Bible memorization. disciplined prayer and attention to good deeds. We would agree t.hat UlC processes and means Jor accomplishing sanctification are perhaps ule most powerful paraJleJ in the Scriptures to the therdpeutic process or growth. We ....·ould not. however. assert a rundamental identity between sanctification and therdp), generally or cogniti\'{:-b - chavioral thcl-apy particularly. Cognitive-behavioral change does not mesh well

....

;1h the more charismatic understandings or

spiritual gro....th. . which emphasize direct experiences of God's grdce, nor with the more socially oriented Anabaptist traditions. which em­ phasize corporate life and the dynamics oflife together as the route to gro....th . (Foster, 1978; Propst. 1988). Funher. the emphasis on cognitive-behavioral change does not thoroughly comport with a relational understanding of spirituality

•

•

P'

,

213

CQGWTlllf:.lJEJ/A170R.-\L TIIEltAJ'Y

wherein spiritual growm is more a function of an alive relationship ....i.th the personal God than anything else. As Tan (1987, p. 106) says. �Cognitive· behavioral therapy may o\'eremphasi1.e the rational think· ingdimension of human functioning and undermine me experiential. and e,'en mystical aspects of the Christian life and faith. � (Tan cites I Cor 1:I8-S1; 2 Cor 2:12·16; 5:7 to support his contention.) One exampleofthe type ofoveremphasis Tan is criticizing might come from Edwards (1976. p. 104), who says that he would �postulate that most of God's supernatural influence on His people is through cognitions inspired by the Holy Spin!. � While the cogniti\'c......behavioral therapy emphasis on rationality is a positive, it cannot be made an absolllle. Perhaps the greatest danger in cogniti\'e therapy is one shared .... i.th RET, that of wing a distOrted Standard of rationality. Since the goal of therapy is the eradication of pathological emotional reactions, the beliefs or cognitions ofme client lend to bejudged by their utilil),rather than by their trumfulness. (We called this the pragmali& criterion for rationality in the last chapter.) For example, suppose that the continual recurrence of the thought "I am a sinner whose righteousness is as filthy rdgs before the Lord; I am wholtywilhout ITlcri i bt:fore him� brought substantial distress to its thinker, including loss of sleep and loss of enjoyment of worldly success. With only a pragmatic standard to guide the therapist, the most expeditious course would be to attempt to undermine the belief by whate,·er means a\'ailable Voi.th the goal of either eradicating or modifying the client's thought. Questions such as �What e\'idence is there that God exists or that God cares about your behavior at a11?W might be pursued. The goal would be to eradicate me mought because it bothers the client. The religious counselor, on the other hand, mightjudge the negative emotional reaction appropriate because of the validity of the moughts themselves. A time of true repentance and grieving over our sinfulneSS is a healthy pan of the Christian life. Bm it s i.5h that we all i also tnle that it does not seem to be God's .... be paralyzed by our grief over our sin, and there should come a time where believers come to see their sinfulness in me context of the marvelous provision of salvation from God and where our remorse becomes secondary to our lo\'e for this marvelous redeeming God who desires us to worship him and serve him. So in the case of a protracted and Q\·erty 5e\'cre preoccupation .... i.th one's own sinfulness, the ChriT tian cognitive-behavioral thcrapist would regard the thoughts as truc but perhaps not n i their proper context among Olher Christian beliefs, ,

MODfAVPSYCJICJrli£RltJ>/U

214

and hence might see the emotional response as problematic. Thus the Christian counselor would not be using the pragmatic standard for judging beliefs. The therapist's method "'ould not be to undermine the belief, but to put it in proper perspective among other beliefs.

It is a strength of cognitive-behavioral therapy that it has a high view of rationality. But a� Woolfolk and Richardson

(1984) point out,

in

(;ognitive-.behavioral therapy emotion is often treated as an add-on, a nuisance variable that must be controlled, modified or explained. Emotion is nOi conceived as a human capacity that enriches life or as a source of knowledge and growth. Just as in many evangelical circles.

emotion in cognitive·behavioral therapy s i treated a,o; a nuisance: �Get

l l jU5t fall in �'our beliefs and your actions straight, and the emotions wi line.M This is a demeaning view of emotion, and s i perhaps the result

i that because cognition can of a logical fallacy. Presumably the logic s in some cases modify or produce emotion (as when thinking "I'm a failure� leads to depression). all cmotion s i cogniti\'ely caused and hence incidental, which s i simply not the case. Cognitive-behavioral therdpy shares th.is weakness with RET. Next we will consider tile cogniti\,c-beha\io... d' notion that a person's behavior is thejoint product of personal and environmental influences. TIlis concept is called

pmcm-nlvironmt:ni interaaio'listn by

some. Though we earlier rejected Lhe deterministic residual in Bandura's reciprocal determinism, intcractionism seems consistent with the Christian view that we are not radically autonomous from our environmenL We arc

substantially affected by our surroundings. The

Christian ideal is not one of rugged individualism and radical insensi­ tivity to our mpersonal i and

interpersonal environments. Rather, we

Ii\'c neccssarily in mutual intcrdcpendence .... ith orner persons and are creatures of tile earth affe(:ted by our material univcrse.

Cognitive-behavioral t.herapy is thus a poSili\'c balance berween lhe "'ddical individualism of the humanistic psychologies (chapters len to thineen) and the collectivism of family systems (chapter fifteen) . Bufford

(1977) discusses with somc forcefulness how the

biblical directives to exercise discernment take seriously the influ­ ence social surroundings have on us; for example, we are instructed LO avoid angry persons (Pro\' and fools (Prov

22:24-25), sexual tempters (Pro\' 5)

13:20). Also, since parents form the personal envi­

ronment for their childrcn, modeling s i thus an important element in tcaching our

childrcn. Deuteronomy 6:4-9 would urge us to

engage in behavior that will be a positive model for our children,

COCNnnE- 81;J1A110RA1. TIf£RIIJ'I'

215

thus drawing them closer to God. Nevertheless, while cognitin:'-bchavioral therapy pays attention to rne interpersonal environment, it manages to do so in an impersonal way. Other �rsons are seen as �stimuli� in an cnvironment; they

are

only sources of reinforcement, punishment or modeling. The more human and "warmM concepts such as lo\-e, wisdom and compassion are missing in cognitive-bcha...ioral therapy_ Thus, while cognitive-beha\'­ iornl therapy achieves a creative balance between individualism and environmentalism. it loses the personal dimension of our interaction with others in the process. Another issue worth addressing is rnat offundamental motivations. Unlike some othcr approaches that explicitly label one or two core motivations, cognitive-behavioral therapy embraces motkational diver­ sity (Mischel's �subjecti\-e stimulus values�) just as behavior therapy does. Ne ...enhcless. the underlying assumption seems to be that hu­

mans are fundamentall�' motivated to enhancc their mm y.relfare. For example. most cognitive-behavioral considerations of interpersonal behavior use the organizing conception of rom��J(:y to evaluate inter­

personal action. This concept suggests that human behavior is primar­ ily dire<:ted at obtaining desired goods from the personal and impersonal em;ronmenl. Competent responses are most often de­ fined as those rnal are �efTective� or "competenl� at getting what we want 01' at accomplishing a specific �task" (see McFall.

1982). Beha""

ioral theories and concepts direct our attention in�xorably to the functional

value

of any human behavior; that is,

what it tkes for the

organism.. This seems to be a holdover from the Skinnerian understand­ ing that sees all significant beha\ior as operant--designed LO operate on the environment to produce a desired outcome_ lltis orientation manifests itself in the cognitive-behavioral under.. st.anding of love and altruism. Cognitive-beha\ioraJ therapists have been active in dC\'eloping clinical models of marital lherapy. The fundamental premise they use in analrling marriage is that indj\idllals tend 10 pallern their behavior to maximize reinforcement for them­ selves (sceJacobson and Margolin ,

1979, chap. I). Stuart ( 1980. p. 370)

calls this "the bt.'Sl bargain principle: The behaviors that aU panics in relationships display at all)' given moment represent the best means that each person beJiC\'cs he or she has availablc for obtaining desired satisfactions. � So !..""cn in ute most giving of human relationships, marriage.

persons arc assumed LO be attempting to maximize their own receipt

216 of personal satisfactions. This is also true of cognitive-beha\ioral therapy's vicv.' of altruism (doing good for another for no apparent reason). Kanfer

(1979), for example. suggested that altruism is a fonn

of behavior where one delays personal and immediate reinforcement for the sake oflong-term outcomes: �[The] task, as i.n self
manity. Seeing self-enhancement as a core motivation should not be it

surprise for persons who believe n i human dcpmviry. But we afC not just depraved, selfish beings; we are

God

,

the

God of all

also all created in the image of

love, the giving and self-sacrificing

God

.

Thus it

....ould . seem that all humans have some capacity for transcending their human egocentrism and that Christians should have a special capacit}t for self-transcendence through Cod's grace, for compassion and self­ sacrificing love. The love described in I Corin thians 13 is definitely not a sclf-intercstt.>d love devoid ofpersonal sacrifice. Love is a foundational human capaciry created in us from the beginning, as when the first humans in the creation Story were told to cleave to one another and that the tv.'o ....ould . become one Oesh. Oescripti\-ety, the Christian Scriptures and tradition seem to take human selfishness n i to account, appealing, for example, to the rewards we will personally receive in hea\·en to motivate good bchaviol" here on earth. But the Scriptures never stop at that point, going on to call persons to a life wherein our desires come to conform evermore o t God's purposes .... ithout regard for our own welfare. \-\,iUl Cod's help, we are capablc of such a transition.

JUSt as ....ith behavior modification, cognitive-behavioral ulcrapists

oftcn emphasize compe ence t and Ule pursuit of consequences. Whereas behavior modification might emphasize lite narrow pursuit of material reinforcers (paralleling the sentiment expressed by the memorable bumper sticker "Whoever Dies with the Most Toys Wins�). cognitivt'-behavioral therApy has a brooder OIientation focusing on diffuse skills for mastering life's tasks, using such concepts as self-cffi­ cacy. cognitivc and beha\ioral construction competencies. and compe­ tence. If we belic\'e that the task of dominion is consis{t:nt with a biblicaJ

undentanding of persons and that we are each to be about some

217 dimension of a dominion work, then competence seems an impor­ tam concept in human life. If self-efficacy (the idea that we are moti­ vated by our beliefs in our own effectiveness) is equated with human pride, it will be viewed Ilcgath'ely by Christians, but il should not be viewed as such.

R..ther, our actions seem to have been meant hy God

to maner. to be effective. \'I'e are beings designed for meaningtiil work and effective interactions with our world. CtlristianilY is nO! wedded to prescribing thai each of us feci or perceive ourselves to be incolll­ ]>Clcnt, as if the feeling of helplessness were a vinuc. Propst (1 988) correi:l.ly reminds us that Christianity is not merely a religion of the afierlife. 11U1 one which endorses a cenain spirituality of c\'cryday life. As we submit our dar-to-day lives to God, he redeems them and al­ lows us to li\'e 10 his gloI)'.

BUI we

continue to Ih'e in this world and

must ha"e effective and righteous '''dYS of dealing with iL Thus, it \\'ould seem that helping c1ienLS achieve meaningful mas­ tery (wer their Ii\'es is a goal compatible with Christian faith. As Tan

(1987) suggesled, though, an overemphasis 011 sc1f-etlicacy call lead to pride. In our effectiveness, we seem to hal'e been meant 10 !.iI'C in a

dynamic tension of detight in our competencies and realization of our uner dependence on God. Perhaps the best summaI)' of this dy­ namic is lhe statement of Paul in Philippians

4:13:

'"I can do every­

thing through him who gives me strength." A Christian "iew of will and self-control also has some broad COIll' patibilities with the liew expressed by cognitive-behavioral therapy. The Christian view of will is that it is a capacity that can be developed.

as opposed brews

10 it being

an all-or-nothing, Slatic personality trait. He­

12, for inS13.llce, discusses at length the notion of discipline from

God, noting that we arc disciplined for our good (v. 1 0 : note the ap­ peal to personally desirable consequences) and that discipline is often unpleasant. Verses

12-13

("Srrengthen YOllr feeble anns and weak

knees. Make level palhs for )'our feet") arc especially interesting, ill lhat they provide a practical agenda for lhe strengthening of lI'eak slXll� in our personal discipline, The injullct�on to "make le\'el paths for yOllr feet" dearly means 10 choose a course thaI puts minimal str�s on an area of personal weakness, as when a person consumed wilh env}' of others might refrolin from obt."lining any knowledge about the penommllce and possessions of others in order 110t to open a win­ dow of opponuniry for sin to occur. A 1"OIuntary refraining from op­ poounit}' for sin may give lime for gro\\th in strength to withstand sin. Compare this view to that of cognitive-behavioral therapy's I'iew of

MOD£RNP,,'YClIQTllD/AJ'1ES

218 self-regulation (as did Bufford. ing

aware

1977). Self-regulation involves develop­

ness of the external factors that are powerful determinants

of onc's behavior and allering them deliberately to produce desired change (for instance, avoiding tcmptation situations and surrounding oneself with encouraging. strengthening influences) , and also dt:vel­ oping effective internal or cognitive control capacities through more effective self-observation and administration of consequences to the self (e.g., naming God's commandments, instructing and exhorting oneself), In this view. will is developed as a skill, and thus growth in self-control is possible. rather than being an unalterable personaljty u-ai l caused by loilcl-t.r.tining practices. as in classical psychoanalysis. In this area there are meaningful compatibilities between cognitive·be· havioral therapy and the biblical view of persons.

As with aU the secular therapies. there is a danger in cogoitive­ behavioral therapy that the therapist will focus only on psychological change without any spiritual emphasis at all. The focus of cognitive­ behaviordl therapy is limited only to temporal aspeCts of perwnhood. Spiritual and religious matters have no intrinsic or integral part in the model Reading a standard cognitive-behavioral therapy work. one would think that religion only existed as one rather unusual category of belief .....hich occasionally crops up with a client, or as a nuisance variable mal affecu .....hat a client values. Humans are not \1ewed as inmnsically religious or spiritual beings in this approach. One final positive attribute of this approach is its idiographic emphasis. Cognitive-behavioral lherapy embodies a high view of human uniqueness. Persons are not regarded as reducible to ten scales on a personality i",·cntory. This idiographic method allows for some understanding of persons developmentally. but it makes no

use

of common schemes for understanding human develop­

ment, such as the psychOSOCial scheme of Erikson. This is perhaps a good example of how the idiographic tendencies can be a curse as well as a blessing. The extreme embracing of uniqueness can mean that no two person's experience is comparable and that their devel­ opment cannot be understood in common terms. This conclusion clearly seems too extreme. Modd ofPrydtotheropy Perhaps no other therapy approach so closely mirrors a biblical balance of cognitive and action orientation as cognitive-behavioral therapy. Even a superficial reading of the pastoral exhortations of the New

COGNrm1.:- IIF.HA-V1ORA.L THF./W'Y

219

Testament epistles yields a dear theme of obedience in actions and in thought.'l as the way to maturity. If one look.5 at Philippians 3 'l or Eph�ians 4, onc sees dearly an exhortation to think new thought.'l and engage in new deeds to genninate the seed offailh into full spiritual maturity. Perhaps the reason why Adams's

(1973) nouthetic counsel­

ing and Crabb's (1977) biblical counseling are twO ofthe more popular Christian counseling approaches is th;tt both embody a combined beha\ioraJ and cogniti\'e emphasis that paraJlels the theme of diren change expressed in Scripture. The real ssue i is whether this is the exdusi\'e and/ordominant theme ofScripture. In any case, cognitive­ beha\'ioraJ therapy shares this focus. PropSt (1988) pro\'ocati\-eiy nanlCS one of her chapters -Spirituality of Action: Necessary living Skills. � In the chapter she develops some of the cogniti\'e-behavioral strategies for returning a sense of control and effectiveness to dienLS in their daily livcs. To tbe extent that this represenL5 a God-honoring development of the capacity to exerci..e better stewardship over the ponion of creation God has placed us in, this can cenainly be a worthwhile set of procedures for Christians 10 embrace. To live effectively we must be able to order the practical ,

challenges of daily Life by managing time and seuing goals as well as kno\\;ng how to pray, how to communicate our feelings to our spouses and so on. The cognitive-beha\10raJ approach assumes that many people experiencing problems of living lack one or more oflhese basic living skills and that directi\'e therapy can correct these deficits. Butjust as we discussed with behavior modification, the anwrality of cognitive-beha\'ior-dl therapy is problematic. "Amorality . . the modern

se

.

refen to

paration of fact and value . . . . The goals of traditional

psychotherapy were pro\ided in large measure by theories of person­ ality thaI supplied 5Qme definition of what people ought to be and a picture of optimal human functioning.

.

. . [Beha,�or therapy] is

neutral witll respect

to what would cOllstitute a personal ideal or ideal personR (Woolfolk. and Richardson, 1984. pp. i80-78J). Thus, according to Woolfolk and Richardson, cognitive-behavioral

therapists seem content to have their clients' values dictate the <:ourse of therapy as we noted earlier. Because cognitive-behavioral therapy .

has a less well-de\'CIopcd notion of lhe ideal human sene than such theories as pcrson-ccmered therapy (chapter tcn), it is difficult for cogniti...e-behavioml ther-dpy to be a �growth� psychotherapy because there

is no built-in compass pointing out the direction ofgrowl.h. To

read some cognitive-behaviornl literdrurc, one would get the con-

220

stricted impression that growth means the absence of anxiety. depres­ sion and the majorfonns ofdiscomfort; hence, to be fully human is to be \
,

,

221 the use of the image of surrendering our thoughts, emotiom and experiences to Christ. This example would stem acceptable 10 almost all Christians,

i plication of the in that such surrendering seems an m

concept of the lordship of Christ. Propst then mO\1!S 011 to examples that may be more troublesome to some Christians, examples lhat involve the person imaging Chrin doing or saying things judg(.'d to be �thcrapeutic� bUI which may or may not fil his real character. The imagery examples that PropSt shares include the image or Christ telling a woman that il s i okay LO be scared

of breast cancer, of Christ rescuing and comforting a client when as a child she

'0\-"35

being abused, and of ChrisI expressing acceptance and

,oman who had experienced gang rape to touch him. encouraging a .... The problem here is that we are making the CllI;st of our image do what we want or expeci him to do in situations where his response may or may not be dear.

WI": ha\"e talked with clients who on their own have used even more troubling images for comfort n i situations where somc Christians would believe that Christ would speak rebuke. For example, alTIan who hadjusl lefl his wife because of his agony due to being n i a marriage with no love imagill(:'d Christ lovingly sayit:lg, MI understand. I have experienced unbearable agony 100.� In other words, he imagined Cllrist supporting his decision to desert his wife. Some would argue that in that situation Christ would really say, -rake up your cross and go back to your wife; follow me in obedience and I will sustain you. �

\Ve risk twisting God into the shape we desire when we imagine s�cific responses on his part. At the same time, perhaps in manycircumstancc5 we can understand his character. his grace and his law sufficiently to know ....ith confidence what he would do. It will require real spiritual maturity and .... isdom to understand when we are on finn ground in projecting the nature of his responses to us, and perhaps will require accoulllability to the church as well. Some authors have suggested that the modeling emphasis n i cog­ nitive-beha\;oraJ lhcrapy has its imponant parallels n i Christian disci­ pleship. EdwMds

(1976) compared Paul's exhortations for others to

follow his example 10 the lherapist's role as a positive model for the client. While cognitive-behavioral themp)' embraces a more formal emphasis on modeling than other approaches, it would seem wrong to O\'ersell t.his poillL In fact, apart [rom modeling, the cognitive-behav­ ioral approach actually pays less attention 1.0 the personhood of the lherapist than mosl other models. If one consU"ucs the modeling

222

,IJOlleR.\'l'$fO{OTllf;w.pJl-:�

impact of the therapist narrowly (such as the therapist showing the i an a.sscnhoeness situation), cognitive'­ client how (O behave and think n

behavioral ther.tpy emphasizes it more than other approaches. BUl if one considers the perronal innuence of th e therapist more broadly, other approaches such as existential, pcrson-centered and psychoana­ lytic therapies put more empha.�is on the person oCthe therapist having

a direc t m i pact on the client.

Conclusion Cognitive-behavioral therapy has al least the following strengths when evaluated from a Christian perspective: It posits limited freedom for the person, though me fonnal understanding of that freedom s i incompatible with a Christian understanding of human responsibility. Cognitive-beha\ioraJ therApy appreciates the embodied, human aspeCl

of our existence and has a well-articulated understanding of at least some of the person variables and processes which seem foundational

to human action. The atomism of cognitive-beha\ioral ther-dpy goes too far in dissolving the self, bUl it can help

us

see what s i tangential

and what is central to self. The ideographic style of behavioral assess.. ment seems respecuul of human uniqueness. An appreciation of the influence of the environment on behavior (though not environmental determinism) seems appropriate from a Christian perspective. The humbling and broad understanding of human motivation as b-clSically selfIs h bUl complex is a strength. Cognitive-behavioral therapy's high

view of rationality is a plus though the standards of rarionality mUSt ,

be modified for the Christian. The view of the cen trali ty of habits of thought and acrion to making life adjustmentS seems realistic. The

relatively less intrusive place ohalues, as reflected in itS amorality and lack ofa vision of maturity, makes it. a somewhat more accessible tool for the Christian therapist than, say. Gestalt therapy. Finally cogniti"e­ ,

behavioral therapy emphasizes em pirical accountability in all aspects

of its practice, and, for Ch ristians, this accords well with a commiunent to good steW"drrlship of time and energies, and with a commiunen t to honesty.

In spite ofall these positives one is left with a dear sense ulal ulere ,

s i much more to human beings than cognitive-behavioral therapy

would lead liS to believe. Where is transcendence and spirituality? How

do we understand self-deception or evil? Does this view really plumb the profound depths of relationships and the tenific impact we ha\'e

CQGVn'fl'j.� NJIA1'lORAt THY.RAPJ'

223

on one another? Isn't emotion more than the output of cognitive ithin the person; isn't this inC'oiLable and habits? What about conflict .... indeed helpful to us understanding what it means to be Inll)' human? How are we to grow? Are there any important regularities to the way we del'clop as human beings? Cognitive-behavioral therapy's silence on each of these questions is disconcerting. It seems likely that we are what cognitive-behavioral therapy depicts us as being: thinking and acting creawres of habit who act upon and are acted upon by our environments for lhe purpose of obtaining that which we value. But it also scemsdear to the Christian thatwe are more than this. Ne\'erthcJess, gi\'en its many strengths, cogniti\,e-beha\ioraJ therapy is likely to be one of the more fruitful models for Christians to explore for iL� integrative potentials.

For further reading Dobson. K. (Ed.). (1988). Handboolc tJ/ (t>g'ltiW« i Mw",aI IMrapin. New York: Guilford.

informative professional handbook for this approach. Meichcnbaum, D. (1977). Ccgniliw«havior IMdiJkatirm. New York: Plenum. One of the original ground-breaking proposals for mO\ing beyond tradi­ tional behavior modification. Prop5t, R. (1988). �dwl'-apy in a rtligiolUftalMWOrlr.: Spirituality in l�tmQti(ltla1 Maling/Jtl1Ull New York: Human ScicnC('s Pr�5S. Perhaps the most fully developed religious approach to counseling based on cognith·e-bchavioral l.herapy. l.beha';or therapy A biblical approach and critique. Tan, S. (1987). Cognitiv... Journal o/Psy(holO1IJ lind T�. I'. 103-112. A helprul article. An

References Adam�,J. (1973). The Chri�tian cmm�{qr's 1111.11.1111. 11 Grand Rapids, MI: &.ker. Bandllra, A. (I978). The s.elf sy5lem in re.:iprocal determinism. Ameria:1'I

P5-jcluJkJgist, JJ, 34....358.

Bandura, A. (1986). $odal/()IJ.ndatioFIJ o/Ilwugllt and adjon. Englewood Ciffs, l NJ: Prentice-Hall. Ba.ndllTa, A. (1989). Human agenl.1' in social cognith'e lhrory.

rJwlogist, 44, 1 175-1184. Beck, A. (1988). J.uw is"rot>' a'()IJ.gh. New York: Harper & Row.

AlII(I"ican Pry­

Beck, A.. and Emery, G. (1985). "nxuty diJordm and phobillJ. New York: &uic 1\00,,_

Beck, A.; Rush.A.; Hollon, S.; and Shaw. B. (1979). eog,.jtiV(lhn'apyof�j(m. NC\',' York: Guilford. Bufford,

R. t 1977). The humon rifIa: Bthavioral psy(holcgy in bibliwl pmpectivt.

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Cmbh, L ( 1 977). Ef« f ti1R. biblical wunst!ling. Grand Rapids, MI: Zonderv.l.Il. Craigie. F.. and Tan, S. (1989). Changing resislafI l assumptions n i Christian cognitive-behavioral ther.!P}'. Journal ojPrydwIogy and Dobson. K.. and Block,

L.

(1988).

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and philosophical bases of the

cogn iti\"l � ..beha\ioral therapies. In K. Dobson (Ed.),

Hal1dboolr ofwgniljvNJt.

haviorai fhnnpies (pp. 3-38) . New York: Guilford. Edwards. K. (1976). Effective coul1$1':ling and psychotherapy: An imegrath'(: ra;ev.' of the research. joumal ofPrydwlogy and TIuoIog;y, J. 94-107. E\01IU, C. (1986, January 17). The bleuings of mental anguish.

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"JOday, pp. 2&-30. Evms, C. ( 1 989), Wisdom and ""manlUSs in p5)dwlog:y. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker. Foster, R. (1978). Ctltbration ofdiscipfi1ll. San Fmncisco: Harper & Row.

(1976). Toward a model of psychological man and his science. ChriJlum Sehofuts Rtvitw, 6, 3-19. Jacobson. N., and Margoln i G. (1979). Mariwl IMrt:lP'J. New York: Brun· Hodges, B.

.

ncr/Maze!. Jones. S. (1988). A religious critique of beh,1\10r therapy. In W. Miller and J. Martin (Eds.), lkhaviM IhmJpy and rtfigion (pp. 139-170) . Newhul)' Park, CA: Sage.

KAnfer, F. (1979). Penonal control, social control, and allTUism: Can society sumyt: the agt: of individualism? Amtriam J4, 231-239.

PJyChoiogUI,

Kendall, P., and Bemi$. K. (1983). Thought and action in psychotherapy: The cognitive-beha\ioral approache!;. In M. Hersen, A. K:udin, and A. Bellack

(Eds.),

11u clinical pSJr.hology h6ndboo/l; (pp. 565-592). New York: Pergamon.

Mailing serm oul ofsufftring. Ann Arbor. l\U: Servant. Ia ra ms , A. (1980). Treatment of dyspareunia. In S. Leiblum and L. Pe....
Kredt, P. (1986).

Marlatt, G. (1982). Relapse prC\'ention: A self
�n8rafjUllion if! bthaviora/ mt'diriou

Adhermu, romplianu and

(pp. 329-378). New York: Brun­

ner/Maze!.

McFall, R. ( 1982) . A re\'iew and refonnulation of the concept of social skills.

&hnviorol AJ�1ftt1I1, 4,

1·33. Meichenbaum. D. (1977). Cognjti�bt1uwiqr modiji(l1.ticm. New York: Plenum. Meichcnbaum. D. ( 1 985). SlrtM inoculation tmining. New York: Pergamon. Mischel. W. (1973). Toward a cognitil'c social lcaming reconc�pLUalization of

Psydwiogi«lf Review, 80, 252·285. Pecheur, D. (1978). Cognitive theory/therapy and sanctification. Journal of Plyclwiogy and ThtolOErJ, 6, 239-253. Propst, R. (1988). Ps)·chol.hnnpy in a rdigious.framewort: 5pirilllali lJ ill Ihumol.ional Mating fmKe.u. New York : Human ScienC�5 Pre". personality.

Sperry, R. (19BO). Mind·brain intcractionism: Mentalism. yes; dualism, no. NrufOSrit:nce, '. 195-206. Stuan, R. (1980). Htlping couples changt. New York: Guilford.

Cognitive-beha\;or therapy: A biblical approach and critique. Journal ofPsychology and TheoIcgj, lJ, 103-112.

Tan, S. (1987).

COCNfTl\E-BEIIA\'10RAL Tfl£RM't"

225

Van LceUWl;n. M. (1985). TMpnwn in PJ)'cllohJgy. Gral1d Rapids, MI: Ecrdmans. Woolfolk. R.. and Richardson, r. (1984). Behavior lherapy and thl!' idr:ology ofmodemity. American P3,dwwgis/, 39, 777-786. Wren. T. (1982). Social leaming lheory. self-l"I!'gulalion, and morality. £lilies,

92, 409-424.

.

,

9

ADLE AND REALITY THE IES .;.

he ....ork . of Alfred Adler has been \'cry influential in the secular counseling field. As we shall see below, it is in many

wa)'3 onc of the most adaptable �tems for religious coun­ selors. Despite

this, it has received little

aucntion. Adler's ideas are

widely used professionally but seldom attributed to the original lheo­ retician. The work of Adler is not easily categorized. It is sometimes listed among the psychodynamic psychologies, sometimes among the hu­ manistic, and sometimes among the cognith·e-bchavioml. We are fol­ lowing the Ialter approach because ofAdler's emphasis on cognition. choice and shorter-term directive counseling. Adler

was

a sickly child who overcame physical difficulties (indud­

ing rickets) and an unimpressive start in school (a teacher urged his father to place him ill lraining to become a cobbler) to attend medical

.wL£RlAN,t.,\TJR&.UTYTllJ;JIAPlf;S

227

school. Adler moved from ophthalmology to general pmctice, neurol­ ogy and finally to psychiatry. He was, for a time, a colleague and collaborator wiLh Freud. Conflict ensued when Adler began to advo­ cate \;ev.'5 or his 0\\11 which, in Freud's eyes, underestimated the importance or sexual drives and psychic determinism. Adler resigned as presidentorthe Vienna Psychoanalytic Society and a permanent split developed \\ith Freud, who openly expressed contempt for the work of his fonner colleague. In the remaining lWenty--six years or his ife, l Adler was a tireless speaker, author and innovator in America and Europe. He did nOl narrowly focus on therap)', but was also interested n i \\'hat are now called preventative community psychology interventions and indeed social change asa means or promoting human welfare. U)'tman (1967) characterized Adler as more ofa preacher than a scientist lOward the end of his career, in that he offered litt1e scientific proof ror his ideas or documentation or the effectiveness of his ",,-ark. He tended to use the .same case examples O\'er and over in his writings, and it is unclear how many clients he saw in a sustained fashion given his demanding tra"els and frequent relocations. Despite Adler's vigor, the decimation of v.'aT-torn Europe and the ascendency of behaviorism and psychoanalysis in America restricted the success of the Adlerian S)'stem, The model continued to be prom­ ulgated after his death by a few devoted followers, and it is saf"e to say that the S)'Stem is probably enjoying more popularity now than ever in its history. It is commonly suggested that the greatest sign of the influence ofAdlerian ideas is thatthey find theirwayinto othermodeb, whether explicitly noted or nol. For example, one or the first major disagreements between Freud and Adler was the lauer's early postula­ tion ofan aggression drive; Freud initially dismissed Adler's hypOlhesis, but over fifteen yean later incorporated such a drive into his theories (long after Adler had rejected his own hypothesi, ). It u commonly

noted that Adler has influenced the tllOught or the ego psychologies, rational-emotin� therapy, family therapy and many other systems (e.g., Corey, 1986, pp. 66-67). Descriptive SUJ"Vey

Philosophical Assumptions Brink (1985b) has described fi\"c major Ysource5� or inspir.nions for Adler's thought. From Janet, Adler took the generdl idea of the

MODERNPSYCJ/oTHEllAPIES

228

significance of inferiority feelings. From Nicl2SChe, he adapted lhe notion of striving for superiority. From V.uhinger, he lOOK the idea of the -gui ding fiction,- the Mas ir relativism of a subjective underst.anding oCthe person. From Marx, he absorbed the ideal ofservice to the social order which came to be expressed as the concern for -social interest. M And from Freud, he look ageneral dynamic orientmion. including the emphasis on early childhood experience ilnd the purposefulness of neurotic symptoms. h ,seems significant that Adler was an adult. com'en from Judaism to Mlibernl protestantismM (Brink. 1977) and was a socialist by political conviction (Brink. 1985a), The European Chlistian church v.�.lS in a period of decline during the first three decades of this century: Mclas..�ic liberalism" was at its zenith. and more purely social underslaI1dings of the gospe l were in ascendancy. We will further de\'elop this re lationship la ter. One of the most important influences on Adler '",as a \-ariam of idealism, Vaihinger's �as r i philosophy, Ule notion that the "guiding fi(tions� t hat persons lived by were lhe major determinants of choice and action. These ideas were to be judged by their functional impact rather than their truth per se. Vaihingcr actually described truth as �mercly the most expedient error� (in Ansbacher and Ansbacher, 1956, p. 83), meaning that lI"uth is the myth that happens to work beSl. To understand persons, then. one need not understand the reality they live in but must underSL1.nd lhe world as !hey perceive it. lhe myths they live by. This is clearly a relativistic and subjective understanding of the person. For example. Mosak (1984, p. 60) has said, "Life has no intrinsic meaning. We give meaning to life, each of us in his own fashion." Guiding fictions are thus more imporL1.nt tllan reality, and there are doublS that reality can really be known at all. Adler believed that the ultimate causes 01" behavior wcre the final goals that a person embr.l.ct-d; these goals were considered m)'thr.. nle notion of ultimate causation is Aristotelian in origin. Adler dubbed his own position "fictional finalism." His view was a teleological one wherein a person chooses aClions in order to alL. 1. in the goals to which he or she is commiued. As Erikson (1 984, p. 131) stated. Adler saw �lhe person as holistically pursuing self-seleCted goals. � Thus for Adler the cause of a person s depression would be the person's goal of minimiz· ing risk, rather than the childhood e\'ents that shaped the goal. Adler rejected the hard determinism of Freud in favor ofa 1I0tion '

229

of human freedom bounded by the subjective world arthe person; we

make real choices, but do so in the context ora subjecth-e world that

channels or shapes the actions.

Adler also rejected the biological scientific approach to persons

that typified Freud in fa"'or ofwhat is todaytermed a "human science�

(Evans, 1977) approach that does nOl aucmpl lO reduce the distinc­

tively human to universal laws formulated in a narrowly scientific

fashion. Related

U)

this, Adler insisted on a holistic approach to

pef!KIns. To dissect a person into pans (such as Freud's id, ego and superego) ""'as to risk reducing the person to an impersonal system.

Thus persons were to be regarded as "indi.. ;siblc.� (This is why Adler's

system is also known as jndiuidualp�·cholof!J'. lIhis phrase is based on the

Latin word individium for indivisible or holistic.) Model ofPers01l41ity

Adler argued that the fundamental ground out of which persons grew

was a perception of infmonty. as he frequen;ttr said, "to Ijve is to feel

inferior: This was unquestionably true for Adler personally as he strug­ gled against the burdens of physical frailty and academic underachie\'e­

i childhood, All children, according to {--dler, by\li.nue of their size ment n

and lesser capabilities, feel inferior. It is out of experience that lhe drin!

to feel signijimnt emerges. We crave a sense of mastery, purposefulness

and meaning, and this becomes the prime mdtivator of adult life,

In me context of family, persons begin a baule 10 cope with their

feelings of inferiority. Family has a potent impact on growing children in shaping the fictions that they live b)'. Adler was a major ftgure in

�g attention 10 birth order and the ps),choWgirol position of the

d ra

III

the family as a prime detenninant of personality. Family interactions impart an understanding oflife and the child's place in iL child

Out of me raw material imparted by family, the de'l'eloping person fonns the lif�t)'h, a psychological map of self and world that becomes our guide for action as we suive to overcome feelings of inferiority.

Mom (1984) has understood the lifestyle to be composed of four

elements: the ulJ-cunapt, or view ofLhe self �as is�; the �lfidro' or self

as one ought to be; the pidu�ofthe 1J.1fn'ld, on� 's model or �myth � about

why things worK as they do outside of oneself; and one's tthical tmlUic­ IWns. This map determines who we each are, as it determines the

choices we make.

Adler also proposed that we each have common life tasks

10

be

worked out in the course of normal li\li.ng; these "'Cre the tasks of living

230

MOOF./lNPSI'CHOTHf:RAPf£S

in the society of others. the task of UI01'k or occupation, and the task of sex or marriage. To these three, Mosak and Dreikurs (see Masak, 1984) added the rtligious task of determining one's relationship to the ulti­ mate and the task of coping with 01U'S self. We approach meeting these tasks quite differently depending on the lifestyles we have de\·eloped. Modd ofHtallh Adler believed that it is normal w have problems to cope with; in fact, life tasks are ongoing problems thai every person must continuallycope with, as no problem is c\'cr soked perfectly. The healthy person is ikely l to ha\'c grown up in a family where the parents modeled how to choose attainable goals and effective and flex.ible .... '
231

disrouragt:ment. When people lose courage for directly facing ife's l demands and achieving significance, they may move from having inferiority feelings to ha\ing an inferiority romplnr (a concept which originated with Adler). In this discouraged stale where people are unconsciowlyconvinced of inferiority, the}' engage in face-saving maneuvers to divert their oym attention from the u-oubling feelings. The dassk example of this is the de...elopmem of neurotic S}1nptomatology, which benefiLS the person by serving as an excuse for why he or she cannot meet life's demands: "How could anyone do well at thcir work when someone is as depressed as J am?� The neurotic symptoms protect people from having to struggle with their discouragement, as they can passivel}' wait for the problems to dissipate or search for someone to cure them. They can protect their fragile self-esteem by not demanding much ofthemseh1!s while they are thus indisposed.

MoM ofhydoolMmpy Therapy becomes a process of encouragement and change of the life­ style for Adlerians. It is concei\'ed to progress through four phases (Dinkmcyer, Pew and Dinkmeyer. 1979). The first phase is that of the

e.Mablishl1lrot oja coopnnl;ve rellltionship with the client. This is facilitated by (mst, respect, encouragement and a clear understanding of thera­

peutic goals. Next follows the phase of Q1wlysis and asu«menl of the lifesryle. in which imemew techniques are used La understand how clients see themselves and their world and what their goals arc. A frequently used technique is that of �early recollections." It is assumed that our earliest memory or memolies give vital information about our fundamcmal view of ourselves. The third phase is that of iTlle'tnetation mullillg iTi insight, wherein the therapist begins to broaden the under­ standing of the client regarding the way that the person's lifestyle shapes his or her cxpelience. Finally, �in the rwriroroliotl phase, coun­ selor and counselee work together to consider alternative attitudes. belief'!, and actions� (Dinkmeyer, Pew and Dinkmeyer, 1979, p. 98). Adlerian counselors aucmpt to inten'cne cognitively and behaviorally to facilitate change. Christian Critique The Adlerian approach appeal'S easily compatible with the �Iiberal Christianity� of Europe in Adler's day. Adler participated in a church

,

,

2)2 that assened that God exists and has revealed himself as the one who

loves and desires faithful union with each person, that Christ was a man

(and not the only one) through whom God manifested himself 10

humanity, that Christ showed u.s through his life and death that we are to suivC': to actualize the Godlikeness within us and to love one another,

in our Godlikeness, that the mythic spiritual reality of Christ's resurrection is our inspira·

that what we ultimately need is courage to trust

lion to live in the face of what seems like difficulty and defeat. and finally that the specifics oftheologicaJ dogma do not matter as much as whether what one believes inspires onc to faithfulness and actualiza­ tion afme God within. The Kcuh value� ofsuch a faith can be measured, it was sometimes said, by how one treats one's feUow persons. The Adlerian notion of religion is somewhat akin to the viewwejusl sketched. Adler regarded the idea of God as "a concretization of the idea of perfection. greatness, and superiority" (quoted in Ansbacher and Ansbacher, 1956, p. 460). God, then, s i seen as a projection ofour own psyche (which was the same view as Freud's). Adler seems to have

regarded the idea of God as a p5}cJwlogical concretization of an idea or m i pulse. and thw a projection. rather than as a particularization of a Platonic ideal as may have been typical for the liberal Christianity of his day. For onhodox Christians, God is certainly the fulfillment of perfection; the issue is whether he exists as the Creator-King who is

perfect, or is a projection of our psyches because we n�d a concrete

image of the perfecL According to Brink (1977, p. 147), Adlerians today typically believe that "religion is health promoting insofar as it alleviates an individual's own self-bounded concern with his demise and encourages him to contribute to the welfare of me ongoing social order,M and h is on this basis that so many Adlerian! feci an easy kinship \\ith the pastoral community. beieving l that therapists and pastors are all after the same goals (see also Baruth and Manning. 1987). Since this is presumed to

i clear that religious faith per be the goal and function of religion, it s se becomes a mere primiti\'e transitional step toward the lriumph of social interest based more directly on "intellectual clarification" and secularized "religious feeling� (Adler quoted in Ansbacher and Ans­ bacher. 1956, p.

462). Gibson (1985) rightly reported that Adler saw

no serious conflict between his psychology and Christianity. Gibson seems to concur with Adler's view, but we would argue that me conflicu have been minimized by Adler's "demythologized" undemanding of

Christianity. Similarly. many of the enlhwiastic articles compiled

by

AD/£:R/A.NANn H£.MIn' 711F.RA1'ff:S

2JJ

Huber (198i) on commonalities between pastoral and Adlerian counsel­ ing are based on subtle or ob\ious demythologizations of the Christian

message. Christianity, stripped of its distincth-e docuines and transcen­ dent realities, is r.t.ther easily meldc.-d "'ith Adlerian psychology. In his work ofinlcgrdtion, Brink

(19i7)

did 1101 e\'3.luate Adlerian

psychology in lightofChristian faith, but rather tried to see if the gospel could be satisfactorily translated into Adlerian terms. This made AdJer­ ian thought. not Christian doctrine, the measure of truth. Brink's application provides some interesting and helpful interpretations, however, such

3.$

an understanding of the ups and dov.ns of the

Hebrews' obedience to God in the Old Testament as a paradigmatic example of the

fruits of neurotic avoidance of a courageous and

obedient life v.ith God. In Brink's Adlerian perspecti"e, the tension between

law and grAce is illuminated; Jaw is fruitless, as one either

succeeds and becomes arrogant or fails and feels inferior, whi l e grace pro\ides the solution ofencouraging us, through Cod's acceptance. to live a courageous, responsh-e

life of obedience.

But Brink's analysis significantly distorts orthodox Christianity at crucial points. Sin becomes �the improper attitude one has about his

(1977, p. 148). The Fall then mUSt become "the realization of inferiority feeling" ( l985b, p. 5i2). and therefore salvation is a purely

defects�

psychological phenomenon and faith a therapy rather than the basis for a relationship ....ith God. Brink (1977, p.

148) says, �Faith is faith in

oneself as a child of Cod and 5ervf'li 10 break the power of inferiority feeling. � The metaphysical richness of the Christian understanding of our situation thus is reduced to mere psychological perceptions.

Brink claims indh�dual psychology is more compatible ....ith Chris­ tian doctrine than classic psychoanal)'Sis, but establishes this only by reinterpreting the gospel in Adlerian terms. For the orthodox beliC'o·er,

sin. salvation and so forth may have some of the characteri50cs de­ scribed by Brink, but Oley are certainly much more than what he claims. In the dialog between a thempy theo!"}' and Christianity, it can be fruitful to do such a translation, as our understanding of Christian

doctrine and experience can be expanded, but we must be careful that

distortion nOt be n i troduced in the process. PhilowphicaJ Assumptions Using Christian belief as our benchmark. we can first applaud Adler's embracing of a �humanized� understanding of the role of science in understanding humanity. Human beings are not purely naturalistic

234

phenomena that can be unden;tood reducrionisticaliy in tenns of chemical hormone reactions and neuronal firings. It does seem, how­ ever, thal Adler overreacted against the scientific attitudes of Freud and did not properly appreciate the appropriate place for empirical . (1989) presents a scientific study in understanding humanity. E....ms balanced picture aCthe relationship between these two understandings ofscience, and Christians interested in Adler's approach would do well to strh'c for such a balance. Adler's resolution afme issue of causality is onc Christians may well desire to embrace. He rejects hard determinism in favor of a limited libt:rtarianism. Choice and human responsibility arc emphasized, but always .... ith an appreciation for the formative impact of family and I.he pezwn's lifestyle (Anderson, 1970). Eribon (1984, p. 134) callsAdlcr's resolution of this problem briHianr., noting that �by making a distinc­ tion between 'purposeful' and 'on purpose: as it .....ere, he succeeds in investing the individual ....ith . responsibility without at the same time moralistically blaming him for his actions." In thi s fashion, ""e can look at an adult characterized by narcissistic preoccupation and see that she holds some responsibility for LIle decisions that brought her to her current condition, in that she was acting purposefully in creating her symptoms. Yet we are not forced to pretend that she made a deiberate l decision to become what she is. Adler's views are indeed a .....elcome balance bet'A'cen the detemlinism of behaviorism and the radical freedom of the humanistic psychologies. It may .....ell be that a fully developed Christian psychology ...'Ould place greater emphasis than Adlerians on human finitude, evil and the powerful influences from olltside oun;el\'es that Adler seemed to min­ imize. His is definitely an optimistic psychology. a precursor of LIle humanistic psychologies. and is another example of belief in the powerful individual who can transform one's life by changing how one LIlinks about it. Such a view can risk "blaming the victim· at times. imputing responsibility to a person when the person actually was po....erless . in the face of overwhelming external forces. Adlerian psychology is ultimately a re1ati\1stic psychology. Every­ one. it is argued. has a guiding fiction, and the relative merits of each fiction are only lO be judged by how they aid the pursuit of social intel·est. As HeSler ( 1987) has correctly pointed out. our religion would .�uggest that we are beings ....ho . live by stories; if this were not so. .....hy would so much of the Scriptures be parables and life stories? But a Christian psychology, ....h . iJc it can and must appreciate the subjecti\"e

23> side of our lives, cannot be relativistic. Christianity presumes objective commonalities among all people and a truth that transcends human existence, with we result that values and beliefs must be measured by ultimate standards. lllis firm stance must be balanced by a humble recognition that while truth exists, Christians never possess it perfectly, and thai the P�1'chological beliefs thal Me of concern to Adlclians are often as amenable to nonreligious analysis as to a religious one. For example, Christians and Adleri:ms alike can recogni1.c that the lifestyle belief "you have 10 ucp on people to get to lhe lOp because that is all Ihal mallcrs- is wrong. but they would probablr diverge 011 why it is wrong and whal LO replace that belief with.

Wilh their understanding of causation, Adlerians view humans as

fundamentaUy teleological, goal-directed, and this ccrtainly filS with a

Christian view of persons. At a dCKriptive level, humans seem charac­ tcrized in Scripture as goaKuient<."d, whethcr the goals being pursued are the gr'd.tificatioll of our own appetites Of the glorification of the

Father. Adlcrians suggest that a majof pan of grov.1.h s i the choosillg of the correct goals (which for them always invoh'c social intcresy; ... ;incd with pursuit of Christians can certainly agrce that health is intert thc right cnds. Ind"-;dua1 p!lychology is a vMue psychology and this is a plus for the r approach. According to Adlerians, social interest s i thc highest inuinsic value. Christians can applaud this value, cspcciallywhen it iscontr.l.5tcd

to the purely humanistic psychology \'alucs of REf and person
tian values, and no Christian

b

s i among the premier Chris.­

can think of social interest \\;thout

reflecting 011 Mloving Qur neighbor as ourseh·es� (Anderson. 1970; this is a recurrent theme in Huber, 1987, asweJl). Sut the soils for lhe twO value5 afe vastly different; for Adler. social interest is lhe pinnacle value because humans are Mlhe celller of the world� (Adler quoted in Ansbacher and Ansbacher. 1956, p. 461) and hence are to be worshiped, in a sense. For Christians, ch,u;!), is rooted in humans being created in God·s image. They are thus not 10 be worshiped. Raulcr. we sene God in !lome profound way through our service to persons (e.g., the parable of the shcep and goats. M l 25:31-46). And charity at a horizontal lcve1, dirccted only at other human beings, is not the premier human value; it only achic\·cs thal place when it i5 directed at God first and thcn othcrs.

236

MOi»:RNPSYCJIOTIlElHPIES

Finally. holism is a vital philosophic commitment of n i dividual psychology and a characteristic of the Christian \�ev.' ofpersons as well, Van Leeuwen (1987) cites theologian Berkouwer's conclusion that Scripture consistently maintains a holistic emphasis in its understand­ ing of persons, and in this way the Adlerian approach is similar to that of Scripture, But Scripture does not forbid a more atomistic focus, it simply focuses at a more gcneral le"eJ because the main purpose of scriptural revelation is redemptive, not psychological. To pursue salvation, a person mUSt understand how God views him or her as a whole. Yet a more atomistic understanding may be essential for personal change as opposed to salvation. So the focus of Scripture on the unity of persons cannOI be seen as forbidding a more atomistic analysis. As with all holistic theories, this approach can be frustrating in its lack ofspecific­ ity for why things occur as they do. One must raise the question of whether holism is a cop-out for lack of explanatOrJ' power, on the one hand. or a strategically maintained distinctive on the other. MlHku ofPenon.aIity and Health There s i an obvious parallel between the t'lo'O primary Adlerian drives of superiority and social interest and the two moti"es we abstracted from the Christian creation story n i chapter two, namely the dominion and relational motives. Human beings, in a Christian perspective, are designed for purposeful work, accrue self-esteem from that pursuit and gain affinnation and acceptance from interacting productively in a relational context. Note also that Adler's three original life tasks ....'ere the occupational task (a parallel to the dominion task), the task of marriage (a dear parallel to the relational task) and the task ofrelating in society. The last can unquestionably be regarded as an extension of the relational task, in that we must relate productively O\llside of mar­ riage to our families and our society. Adler's theory is unique n i describing nOljust psychological struc­ tures, dri\'es and processes, but tasks as well, and this comports well with the Christian understanding of persons having tasks to fulfill. The twO tasks added by later Adlerians. those of religious belief and com­ miunelll and of coping with one!lelf, are posiLive additions. It is com­ monly noted that the Fall fractured our relationships with every part of our existence; with God. other persons, the material universe and with ourselves. The last two tasks address the repair of two of these fractures (d. Barmh and Manning. 1987).

,

238

MOlJERNP:'il'C!IOTlfERAPIHS

The key to normalcy for Adler is the virtue of courage. Mosak (1984, p. 59) nOled thaI. for Lhe Adlerian, "Courage refers

(0

the willingness

engage in risk-taking beha\10r when one either docs not know the consequences or when the consequences might be advcrse.� Haavik LO

(1986) argued thai while courage per se is not a clear Christian virtue, a compardb\e Christian virtue would be a wi l lingness to hear and obey God's law and Word. Such a willing obedience for the Christian would seem 10 flow from a clear perception of our creaturcly status, of God's status as the rightful lawgiver and beneficent Father who is disciplining his children, and from a perception of the obstacles to obedience as inconsequentiaJ compared to we rewards for failhful service to God (e.g., Rom 8:12-25), There arc some direct parallels to the Adlerian notion of courage as well. As Christians, we are called to Ih-e as imperfl"t:t persons in an imperfect world, to have !he counlgc to do the best we are capable of right now and to commit ourselves to our life !.aSks without evasion or excuse, serving o!hers courageously and sacrificially_ We walk a delicate balance of suiving for !he highest calling of perfect life in Christ, but realize that we will never achieve !his perfection and must contiltuallr find acceptance from Cod not through our worthiness but through God 's forgiveness. (This closely par-dllels lhe understanding of Chris­ tian existentialism we ha\'e developed in chapter eleven.) Haavik also notes that Adlerian courage appears to be largely an individua.l virtue, while for Christians, encouragement is truly to be a corporate function (I Thes:; 5:14). Many have suggested that Adlerwasan early cognitive-behavioral theorist. As Dowd and Kelly (1980) have Doted, there arc many parallels between Adlerian psychology and cognitive-behavioral therapy. The core similarities bclWeen the two include that both are fUlUre-oriellted in their vjew of the sources of iHunan motivation; both are cognitive psychologies which emphasize the subjectivity of the persOll'S view of the world; both are idiographic, preferring an individual focus in the understanding of the person; both emphasize the .social/interactional nature of existence; and both share some striking similarities n i how they conceive of and structure the therapy process. The cognitive- beha\;oral approach s i more .....ell developed in terllls of scientific articulation ofils hypothesized personality processes and in terms of intervention techniques, while the Adlerian approach has the advantages of a more articulated view of d<..'"\'elopmental proc­ esses in the family context and sho....s. an existential perspccti,·c that is

241

narcissism call be equated with adult pride.

M
ItJjU:RJANAATJ REAI.ny TIIF.RltPfF.S

243

intervelllion modali ty that Christians should feci called to, ranging rrom one-to-one therapeutic work to the pursuit or social justice at a

polilical level. Growth can flow narrowly from a therapeutic relation­

ship or broadly from common interactions wi th healthy others in one s commumty. •

•

Conclusion We agree with Brink's ( 1 977) conclusion, mentioned earlier, that there is more compatibility between Christianity and Adlerian con­

ceptions than with classical psychoanalysis or indeed with most of the other systems of psychotherapy, but we reached this con clusio n in substantially difTcrelll wa),s than Brink did. In Adler, we find an approach lha( respects human rt:sponsibility, rationa lity indi\'idual· ,

ity. social interconnectedness and capacitics for change. It is a view that has rcceived scant altention from religious counselors over the years and may bear further invcstigaii on in the future. ,

Reality Therapy William Glasser, as he tells the story himselr ( 1 984b), developed the system of rrolif)' Ihera/l}', based on practical experience common ,

sense,

some basic ideas from the cogniti\'e nelITosdences and perceplUal psychology, and some indirect influence from existential thought through his mentor and fellow psychiatrist, G. L Harrington (Kahoe, 1985). He acknowledges broad similarities 10 Adlerian psychology and rational-emotive therapy. but denies that these systems had any fonna­ tiye impact on his thinking-though others have suggested that Adler's i a direct ancestor to reality therapy (Rozsnafszky, 1974: White­ model s house, 1984). In fact, much of what ,,'C said in regard 10 a Christian critique ofAdlerian t.houghl .....;11 apply as well to realily lherapy. and so ;11 . not spend a� much time with this approach as ....'c have ....ith most we ...

of the other theoretical orientations. While reality therapy has had little impact on lhe professional psychotherapeutic commwlity at large, it is very popular among teachers and youth guida nce counselors, substance--abusc treatment counselors (Glasser, \984b) and rehabilitation counselors (Corey, 1986) . As Kahoe ( 1 985) points out, one reason why reality therapy is not more ,,'ide I)' practiced than it is may be tilat Glasser maintains tight control of all -certified- reality-ther.lpy training, having several

244

MODf.RNPSI'CHO,(lff.MPlf.s

franchised reality-therapy training cemers. This insures quality of training but prevents proliferation into estab lished counseling training centers in university settings.

Descriptive Survey Philosophiml Amlmptions and Model ofPmonality Reality therapy s i based on the fundamental notion that persons are responsible for the actions they take. Glasser explicitly rejects deter­ minism. He defines a responsible action as "one that satisfies one's needs and does nOi prevent others from satisfying theirs� (1984b, p.

320). Glasser really does not have a formal theory of personality; rather, he works within the framt\'.'Ork of what he calls a control tMory of brain functioning. He argues thatall persons and all organisms act to control their environment to achiC\'e sun-ivai and other needs. Human beings are not passhe. determined responders, but aClOrs pursuing desired ends. The brain creates an inner image of external reality and !.hen acts in accord with that inner image to meet needs (compare this to Adler's lifestyle) , Thus the factors that shape behavior are primarily the nature of the inner image the action capabilities the person has available and expectations based on the past track record for how the various beha\;oral options have worked. "Our personality is beSt described as the characteristic way n i which we engage, act upon, or attempt to control the world to satisfy the pictures ofwhat we desire" (l984b. p. 329). What are the needs which are presumed to shape behavior? Glasser (1965) originally proposed two fundamental needs: (1) to belong. to 10"e and be loved; and (2) to define or establish onc's sense of personal ....orth. . po....er . and purpose (in striking parallel to Adler). The former i relationship, the laner through achievement of s i to be established u some sort. In his lateSl writings, Glasser broadens the list by al50 including biological survh'al (a base level need which is usually oflittle relevance to psychological problems) and the needs for fun and freedom (which do not seem to figure prominently in his work). In Glasser's earliesl writings, the successful meeting of needs was believed to aid in the establishmem of what he called a succm icknlity. which was the composite perception of one's acceptability and mean· ingfulness; the alternative ....· dS a failure itinllity, which .... a. s . ule source of ineffectual behavior. He placed !.he formation of identity as the highest ,

.

,wL£JiJI.,v"SD RF.AlJIY T1IElHPiES

245

level need. comprised of two subdri\'es: belonging and worth. His latest writings have focused more on comrol theory than identity. Humans are teleological and phenomenological bein� who work to meet lheir needs as they perceive lhem. Classer suggests that our brain systems compare lheir pictures of our needs with their pictures of ;l\'aiJable behal'ioral responses. thus selecting out ways of dealing with perceived reality. "We both choose the world we "''ant [i.e., our goals] and choose the beh,wiar thaI is our attempt to mm'c thc real world doser to the in-the-head world we ....-am . (Classcr. 1981, p. 238). Actions. thoughts and evcn cmotions are secn as actively chosen ways of responding to Ihe perceived world. and hence we are respon­ sible for all aspects of our personal reality. El>en destnlctivc emotions are chosen behaviors. Thus, Glasser (1984a) never says someone is depressed (a passi"e description), but that they are depressing (as in "depressing thcmsclves as a way to control"). We can ncver control others. but we afe accounwble for our own actions of all kinds. .

MO
MODCRNI'SYCHOTlfERAPIE.S

246

suggests that religious circles are consistent sources of excessive criti­ cism thaI undermine people's sense of effectiveness (1981, p. 149) and that religion is primarily an arena in which satisfaction of the more basic needs of belonging and power is attempted (1984a, pp. 1&-17). His approach has no seeming appreciation for the rranscendent in human experience.

Mod�l ofl'$ydtothempy There are eight major steps in conducting reali£)' therapy (Classer. 1984b); with brief commentary. they are: 1 . "Make friends and ask clients what they ....CU1t.� The therapist is [0 establish a caring rappon within the context of a profeMionaJ helping relationship. be positive and emphasize dient strengths. The therapist then proceeds to find out what it is that the client really wantS (what need the penon is trying ineffectually to meet) and whether lhe "want� � l possible. 2. "Ask, what are you doing now" The current behavior of the client is presumed to be an attempt at some fonn ofcontrol, a means to satisfy a want or need. TIle therapist attempts to get the client to ovm up to what he or she is doing now and to deal with evasions and abstractions

by focusing on behavior. 3. "Is what clienl� choose to do getting them whal they want?" It is essential for the therapist to help the clien( realize thai what he or she is currently doing i.s ineffectual. This is not to be seen as a callous judgment of the client by the therapisL 4. "Make a plan to do bener." Next the therapist helps the client to devise a plan to more effectively connul that part of life that is the area of concern. Whi l e being a solution resource person and concrete planner. one nt\'er solyes anything for the clients; that i.s their work. 5. "Get a commitment to follow the plan worked out in step 4." Those with failure identities are particularly reluctant to commit to change. 6. �No excuses. � Excuses are always pan of the ineffectual patterns of the past. Reality therapislS are interested in the future. Mlf)'Ou didn ( do it this ....eek. . when will )'ou do it?"The reasons for failure can rightly Ix: grounds for altering future plans for change, but can IIc\'Cr be excuses for inaction. 7. �No punishmcriL Punishment usually invol\'es another person controlling lhe c1icnt's life. Therefore, the only possible punishmenlS avai l able to the therapist are those th;u are tempordry and are namrally '

M

248

MODERNPSl'CHOTIlERAPfF..s

system for school discipline. At the t!xpansivc level, Young's argument is clearly flawed; it could be compared 10 equating Islam and Christianity because they assert the existence of onc God and of heaven, the importance of morauty and so fonh. E\'ell some of his specific principles are not clear compatibil­ ities: in his fourth principle. Young equates godly repentance ,,:im mere behavior change. as if an adulterer's decision to stop his affairs out of fear of AIDS wcre cquivalcnl lo true repentance. At a narrow level, however, Young is quite right that at some fundamental points-those of human responsibility, consequences for actions and the capacity for human change-reality therapy and Chris­ tianil)' are in agreement. And for the limited purposes of a school-dis­ cipUne program, this may be enough compatibility to placate Christian parents. It would not be enough, however, if reality therapy was the

i "Rational Religion for Today." main course in a required cia..... n

Like Adlerian psychology, reality therapy comports well with Chris­ tian beljef in the following areas: lIS emphasis on human responsibility and limited freedom is a

definite

plus. Both systems see persons as

teleological beings rather than as driven inexorably by their past. Both posit that the mO!lt centrdl needs of persons are for belonging and purpose or wonh; these compare well t,o the relational and dominion motives found in the creation story. Both arc holistic and do nOt reduce the person to interacting parts. Both. like Christianity, cdll for persons

10 live cou....geously .. as beSt they

can as impelfect persons in an

imperfect world. Each therapy system is a balance between cognitive and beha\ioral aspects, consistent with the most clear passages in Scripture rcg-.rn:Iing personal Change. (It should be noted that the cogniti\·c dimens.ions of reality therapy are underdeveloped compared

lO those of Adler.) Both appro.aches have attempted to go beyond the onc- to,me counseling room LO change society for the belter, and this is a plus fTom a Christian penpecti\'e, in lhal any Christian approach LO counseling should do lhe same. In tenns of dissimilarities with Christian belief, reality therapy, like Adlerian psrchology, has a limited and overly optimistic underst."lnding of human evil and falJcnncss. Both are "superfidal� in seeing persons as having no necessary conflict built into lheir \'ery being. Both are relathistic psychologies at the core; Glasser' s increasing cmphasi.5 on internal pictures is akin to Adler's concept ohhe lifestyle and has some

i nOl the subjectivity of each person's lifestyle of the same limitations. It s or internal pictures that is the problem, but rather the supposition that

tWu:RJANAND REAIJ1l' TIIERAI'fE5

all

249

we can ever know are these internally constructed fictions. That s i

",'hat makes both systems inherently relativistic. Both systems see pathology a.� the purposeful evasion of life tasks

to preserve self-esteem and maintain the besu control possible of one's world: Christiani!)' doesn't have a normative view of pathology, but

would probably not necessarily contradict this view.

All of tile issues summarized in the abO\'e few paragraphs were more

fully developed before in discussi ng Adler's $tem Now let w develop .

several points peculiar to realit)' therapy.

Fil1it,

we would .... "aIlt to

emp hasize that unlike Adler, who viev.-s reliIDon as an ally, there is no conc.ept of tr.lIlSCendelll reality built into reality therapy. Human beings apparently can achieve no sense of belonging and probably no sensc of worth from their relationship with the Deity in Glasser s view. '

Second, Glasser, more than Adler, specifically steps into the moral and ethical domains in his proclamations ofwhat responsible behavior is. It is affirming for a secular system to acknowledge the need for more rather than less emphasis on doing what s i �ight (Lapsley,

1972). But

Glasser essentially urges us to "do what is loving aud satisfies your needs as long as you don't interfere with the n

eieds of othcrs.� This is a

human-celllered morality 5}'Siem that is an inadequate guide for

l e. Satan would seem to bean example ofa beingwho s i taking human if

' ho.sees himself as right in his oven responsibility for his behavior and .... own eyes,yet he is destined for eternal destruction and probably should not be held up as a model ofps)'Chological health.

Passages such

as Romans

l : 1 8-�2 offer

tunher examples that

re­

sponsible human<eDlered action by itself falls far short of Cod's intended lIonn for humanity. Human beings are responsible for many of their actions and are capable ofsubstantial change, as Glasser posiu. But the Scriptures teach that neither obedience to human law nor e\'('n

i sufficient for sah�dtion or even for fulfillment to ule divine la..... of God s

of our intended humanne5�. GI;uscr'� S)'Stcm

is all law and no grace.

and further it is law wiUlont a lawgiver, a law where right is judged primarily in terms of how actions impact human needs and nOt in the relations of UlOSC actions 10 divine will.

Mod"
MODERNPSYCJIOTIl£JW>lES GI:u.ser, W. (1981). SlotUnu oflhemind: NewdirtdiolUJ(}f'fwlity IMl'afrJ. New York: Harper &: Row. Glasser. W. (1984a) . Centro//heory: � new o:planalionJor /tow WI': CUlltroi our li�. New York: Harper &: Row. (A hardback \'erslon of this book appeared under the title Tuk, if/tc/iw rontroi of'jour life, also in 1984.) Glasser. w. ( 1984b) . RealiTy therapy. In R. Corsini (Ed.). CUrtmtprydwthaapin (3d cd.). (pp. 320-353). IWCl. IL: F. E. Peacock. Ha;n'ik, C. (1 986) . Adlerian psychotherapy; The neurotic 5ymptom. Unpub­ lished paper, Wheaton College Graduate School. Hester. R. (1987). Memory. myth, parable, and tJle therapeutic process. lmlividual PrydwWgy. 43. 444-150. Huber. R. (1986). Adler and the Trinity Rdl!;:clions on a residency ill pastoral counseling. Individual PrydlQlogJ, 42, 413-419. Huber. R. (Ed.). (1987). Individual Psychology, 43(4). Jones. S. (1986) . Community psycholog}" III S.Jonc:s (Ed.), Psychology and Ihll C/trutian f (lith (pp. 240-258). Gr:tnd Rapids. MI: Baker. Kahoc. R. (1985). Reality therapy. In D. Benner (Ed.). &Ju:r nlcycWpMi(l of prychoJog, (pp. 978-981). Grand Rapids, M1: Baker. LaJ»It:y. J. (I 972). Reality tJlerapy revisited. Pro/oral Psycholog)', 23. 3-4. McDonald, M. (1981). The Chri$/ian view of mall. Westchester, lL: Crossway. Mosak, H. (1984). Adlerian psychotherapy. In R. Corsini (Ed.), Curtml pryc/w. /Mmpit.J (3d cd.) (pp. 5&-107). Itasca, IL: F. E. Pe.u;:ock. Myers, D. (1981). 7'h.t infoikd Jtlf New York: Seabury. R01.snafs:l.ky,j. (1974). The impact of Alfred Adler on three "(ree-wiUW ther.t­ piC!l of the 1960's.JmmUlI t>fIndividllal P�, 30, 6!).8(). U),lman,j. (1967). Adler, Alfred. In P. Edwards (Ed.), Enc}'�lopedia of philoit' ophy (pp. 15--1 7). New York: Macmillan. Van Leeuwen, M. ( 1987) . Pcnonality thl."oril:ing within a Christian wodd \·;cw. In T. Burke (Ed.), Mall allff mimi: � Christiall theory of pmonality (pp. 171.198). Hillsdale, Ml: Hillsdale College PreM. \\lhitdlOUse, D. (1984). Adleriall antecedents to reality therapy and control theory. }lJUrnaJ ojReality Thmlpy, 3, 1()'14. Young,]. (1982). The morality of reality therapy. }OO"Ull of Rmliry Therapy, I, 8-11.

10 PERSON-CENTERED THE Y

t is

especially difficult

to get beyond mere intuiti�'e and emo­

tional appeal when evaluating pel'5On-centered therapy. A.!; Mclemore

(1982, p. 142) has nOled, when it s i thoroughly

described, person-centered therapy sounds Mmuch like the skillful administration of grace-not easy-to-roll-off-the-tongue grace, but dt.-eply meaningful interpersonal acceptance and communion.� In­ deed, a counselor in this tradition would strike many

as

a good

model ofwhat it meam to be a wi� and patient friend, a person ",,;th an enonnous capacity to isten l attenLively and respectfully. In a cuhure like ours where interpersonal contact and intimacy can be

IOSl IO absorption in the tasks ofeveryday living, few would find these qualities unattractive. Perhaps one reason why Carl Rogen's theory and technique has been so warmly embraced within significant portions of the religious community is that it appears to give us

256 "aluable dues and guidance on how to respond to those in misery and distress, or how to concretely �Iove the brothers and sisters. �

Descriptive Survey

PhilosophicalAmlmptioru Probably no theory of counseling and psychotherapy more fully mani­ fests the humanistic spirit in contemporary psychology than does person-cemered therapy, and perhaps no single individual belter em­ bodied its essence than its founder, Carl Rogers. An ever�'ohing approach since the early 19405, penon-centered therapy has experi­ enced a noticeable rene....-al of late (Boy and Pine, 1982). It boldly asserts that the client, not the therapist, should be at the hean of psychotherapy (and hence, it is person-centered) since only the dient has the reSOllTce5 by which to become more aware of and remove his or her obstacles to personal growth. It is significant that Rogers,

i a fundamentalist Christian home and recently deceased, grew up n rejected the faith of his parents during college in favor of "liberalistic humanism� (Van Belle, 1985b. p. 1016). He appeared not to deviate from this position for the rest of his life.

h is quite clear that person-centered therd.py s i a reaction against .....hat Rogers perceived as the dogmatism of �preK"riptive� religion and the elitist and rAtionalistic tendencies of classical psychoanalysis. In stark contrast to the strongly biological and deterministic assumptions of the early Freudian model (chapter three), Rogers stressed a highly personal, phenomenological and positive \iew of human experience. Person-centered therapy is often said to embody the permissive and pragmatic mindset of the contemporary North American milieu (Van Belle, 1980). Person-centered therapy emphasizes the primacy of the individual and is often criticized for contributing to modern narcissism and the erosion of any shared sense of meaning orv-.t1ue in Contempo­ rary !>OCiety (Viu, 1977). Consistent with other humanistic approaches to counseling and

psychotherapy, person-centercd therapy warmly embraces a number

of key values (adapted from Korchin, 1976, pp. 353fT.): (I) Persons should not be �atOmized� or broken down into their component parts. bUl rather should be studied as whole and unique beings; (2) What persons tell

us

through self-report of their experience is to be more

highly valued than what we can observe direclly or objec:th,eJy; (3)Since we are coparticipants in the process of self-actualization, we must be

,

2J7 willing to enter into the consciousness and experiential field ofothers (as well as OUf own); (4) Intuition and empathic understanding should be \1ewed as extremely important means of gaining insight and under­ standing; (5) Knowing something about the aspirations, dreams, goals and values of others tells us far more than does a comparable amount of knowledge about the biological. environmental or historical deter­ minants of their behavior;

l choice, (6) Distinctive human qualities ike

creativity, self-actualization and valuation should be emphasized in our study of persons,

a�

well as health and normalcy; and (7) Persons have

the potential (0 act .... ith . choice. freedom and responsibility. and not be merely reactive to events. The heritage of person
nommology (R}'chlak, 1973). Edmund Husserl. often called the �father of phenomenology, � strongly influenced this distinctive approach to philosophy. In briefest summary, phenomenology contends that what we are and what wc do is a reflection of our subjective experience of the world and ourselvcs. External reality can only be kno\\n through the inner reality of personal experience.

As Van Belle (19853) has observed, Rogers had a profound respect for the diem's perception of reality. since this inner reality

v.m

ultimately the means for promoting development and growth in the i indivi.dual. Indeed, Rogers is dogmatic in asserting that experience s the ultimate authority in life: -It s i to experience that I must return again and again; to discover a closer approximation to truth as it is in the process of becoming in me. Neither the Bible nor the prophets­ neither Freud nor research-neither the re\'elations of God nor man--
1961. pp. 2�24) .

Model ofPersonality Perhaps the core assertion of this personality theory is that there is but one motivational force for all humanity: the tendency toward Sl!lf

arlllaiiUJI;(J1I. All persons have an inherelll tendency to develop their

capacities to the fullest, in .... 'ays thal will either maintain or enhance their o....n ....ell·being. . Detractors of person-<:cmcred therapy often equale self-aclualil.a­ tion with selfIshness, but this is not striclly true. Actuali1.ation is the realization of our potential. and our potential certainly includes the capacity to love. Thus, Robrers would believe that out of the fully actualized, fully fUllctioning n i di\idual would come acts ofcharilY and

258

MCWJt:JlNPS)'CHOTfl£RAj'lES

. be a free and loving expression of the person's kindness that ....ould i ner state. Profound narcissism would actually be one mark of a true n fdiiure to actualize one s potential. While this motivation produces our rnO\'Cmelll, the direction for '

the movement comes from the urganismictJ(liuing proasr-an inherent capacity to choose that which will enhance

u.s

and reject that which does not. The Olctuali7.ation drive creates in us an urge for fulfillment, and lhe organismic valuing process tells us what will provide that fulfillment. The organismic \'aluing process is presumed to be an infallible and instinctive compass or guide for choice and action. Mod
What then is the ideal course for human development, according to pcrson-<:enr.ered therapy? The child, blessed with a drive toward actu­ alization and an inerrant organismic valuing process to guide her, still needs the acccptance and pos.itive reg-Md of her parents. Ifthe parents provide this positive regard u7Ironditionaliy, the child grows up always exquisitely aware of her nallmd urges and awareness (her SLlf-cpm­ ence) . As consciousness of self emerges, the person will begin to define herself (develop her ulf-roncefJf) in accord wilb her own experience of herself and not in tenns of how olbers see her or expect her to be. Further, she has no aspirations to be other than what she is, and her itkalSLif, the perception of....hat . 5he should be, then perfectly matches the self-<:oncepl which in tum perfec uy matchcs the self-expericnce. As we develop and mature, it is our self
2j9 organismic valuing process and who completely trusts the vaJuing process. That person is fully aware, honest, personally satisfied and spontaneous. Health reflects lTUst of self. openness to experiencing and existential living in the present. Ideally, person<entered therapy posits. this will lead to a new kind of freedom whereby the person chooses to direct his or her life from within rather lhan by the dictates

of the external world. Such �centeredness� (in the sense of balance,

i ll release enormous potential to further one­ not self-centeredness) .... self C'o'cn more. There will be no need to denyordistorl the information that

is recei�'ed perceptually since a strong sense of self has emerged

that is consistent with deeply internalized conditions of worth. The chief Rogerian virtues are to be fully alive to the moment, completely self-accepting and strongly committed to an ongoing proce5.'i ofperson­ al growth.

Mothl ofAImt1muJJity

Unfonunately, few of us get through childhood so unscathed. Most of us are subjected to conditions ofworth, are loyed conditionally; that is,

we are expected to act in accord with the expectations of parents or significant others rather than by our instincts in order to receh'e acceptance. Christian discipline and instruction would, for Rogers, be a prime example of disrespect for the child's sclf-directedness. The chi l d is confronted with the need to deny cenain aspects of his expe­ rience and act according to rules or judgments of authority figures

(�God wanL'! me to honor my parents; I guess I'm not really angry at Daddy�). He then develops an ideal .self, dictated by parental wishes, which does not fil who he really is (MGood boys love their parents and don't get angry with them�) and develops a self
of what the child feels he must be ('Tm a good boy who doesn't get angry at Mom and Dad�). The distorted self,oncept quickly wArpS the organismic valuing process, resulting in impaired perceptions of him­ self and his world and of the choiccs he can make. In pcrson
260

MODDINPSYCH(1TIlERAI'Jl:S

functioning of the organismic \oaluing process, so thaI the person makes more bad (incongruent) choices about what .. ..Quid further his or her personal actualization. The symptoms of abnormality afe seen as �signs" or �symbols- of

WdYS in which we prevent threatening experiences from becoming more accurately represented in our conscious and subjective aware-. ness. As the symptoms become more pronounced, our informational and perceptual processes become increasingly inadequate and rigid. In short, psychopathology is a split or incongruence between self and expenence.

MO
If external conditions afworth result in the distortion of the self, what

can be done about this condition Connally in the context of counseling and psychotlu�rapy, or more infonnally in the setting of everyday interactions? Person<emered therapy suggests that positive self-re­ gard, and thw congruence between self-concept and the person 's experience, can be encouraged by relating to the individual with congruence. empathy and unconditional positive regard. Thi s will, according to Rogers, encourage the person to more fully

lJ"wt the

organismic valuing process and move toward greater self·

actualization. The major task of the therapist is to provide a climate of safety and tnlst, one which will encourage clients to reintegrate their self-actualizing and self-valuing processes, The therdpist accomplishes this through encouraging the psychotherapeutic conditions (the "ther­

apeutic triad") of auumuempathi, undmwnding. a:mgruenuor gmuirw1WS

and

unronditional positilM rtgard, which are seen as the necessary sufficient conditions for effective counseling (cf. Hammond,

and

Hepwonh and Smith, 1978). Empathy is not sympathy; rather, it is the therapist's capacity to experience \o\i.th the client and accept the client's subjective inner world. Congruence or genuineness is the therapist'S capacity to truthfully and accurately perceive her or his own inner experiencing in response to the client and to a1lo\o\' that inner experience to affect the counseling

relationship ill a healthy way: it is the capacity to be fully oneself while fully relating to the client.

Unconditional positive regard s i an unyielding acceptance of, re­ spect for and prizing of the client', experience, actualizing tendencies and organismic vdluing process. Each of these qualities are seen by

261

Rogerians as being rooted in lIle personhood of the therapist. and not a.� mere techniques. They can be learned as practical skil15 (one can learn lists of empathic responses, genuine responses, etc.), but to be used etTecth'e1y, they must take root in the vcry being of the counselor. Person<entered therapy 1lC\'cr im'olves advice-ghing, shaming, teach­ ing. giving interpretations, manipulation or other ingenuine interac­ tions. These, it is argued. are based on a fundamental disrespt.'C1 of others: they foster dependency. and they thWArt the dt....·clopmcnt of any meaningful sense of aulonomy. Understandably, for the pcrson<entered thcrdpisl, lhe then.peutic t approaches which relationship is oruUnost importance. Unlike oher see therapy as the therapist "doing something 10· the client. persoll­ centered therapy s i bt."St understood b)' an analogy lO gardening: It is the prmision of the right inteq>t:rsonal soil in which the client's hidden drive to grow and dc\'elop can finally be released. Only through lhe proper char.l.ctcristics and competencies of the therdpist can the client. i nate move IOward greater congruence and retease of his or her own n capacities. A� coparticipants in a process of change and discovery. the diem/ therdpist relationship s i egalitarian. informal and nonauthoritarian. Fonnal assessment oEthe presenting concerns or underlying dynamics n i the forms of psychological testing or psychiatric diagnosis are seen as inappropriatc and unnecessary. Techniques, of which !.here are few in person<entered lherapy, are secondary to the therapist 'S attitudes. sensitivities and skills. Active listening, clarification and reflection of feelings, personal presence and �coparlicipation" are seen as Ihe only necessary -tools" in the repertoire of the person<emered therapist, coupled \\�lh a profound respeci for process and inner-directcdness. 1t is assumed that thc client will freely choose to translate the changes experienced in the intimate con text of therapy to outside relationships with others. Christian Critique

Philosophical Assumptions Compared to some traditions, pcrson<entcred therdpy is explicit about its philosophical presuppositions. Many aspects ohhese a�sump­ clons can be appreciate-d. The insistence on seeing people hOlistically and as purposeful, the appreciation of olher vrd)'S of knowing beyond rationality, and the pl'ofound respect of....·hat it means to be a person

I'f.RSU."-CJ. �\'tHIEJ) 'fIIHHP)"

263

hUlTlaJl llaturt: through greater self-a....oareness and understanding, has

been more hesi al1lly t asserted (d. Roberts. 1985). Rogers takes the opposite position. He is opt imistic about one's

cxperiem :e as the basis of delCrmining ( ..mh. but rather pessimistic abom the \allic of culture, dOb'lna. traditions and systems of morality (Roberts. in press)

.

Per'SOn-untcred therapy is also implici dy a system of ethics. In person-ccmered therap),.

one is ultimately responsible only to oneself.

Personal wholeness assumes primacy: it hecOIll{.'S a moral imperative (Brown ing I 987) , oflen at die expense ofa propcrappredation of our .

responsibilities to others. Focllsing on ly on removing our 0....·0 barriers to our personal growth poten tial can lead to regarding ourselves too high ly or to a naive optimism about the human condit.ion. Certainly there is a sense in which we are troubled because we don"t

know ourscl,'cs, but it

\\'

ould hc inaccurate to state that ""e

.

Mgh·e birth to ourselves M In conversion, we become more of a tfltt:

self. bllt certainl), not a complete self. For lhe Chri5ti an it is God alone who gives us birth-not the therapist. nor the i ncrea5ingly ,

congruent person. And with thai profession of fai th . !lew oppOrtu­ ni lies and responsibililies must be assumed. includi ng a strong eomrniuncnl to becoming manifCSlaliolU of God's grace in this world in .....ord and deed. MSelf_ismM runs the risk of developing into �rne-ism� (Vitz, 1977). Christians can appreciate thc

emphasis in pcrson-centcred therapy

individual freedom and responsi bility. Individual choice and ule capacity to c hange is affirmed in the Rogerian trAdition. Initiall),. as on

Tisdale ( 1988) has noted, such an assessment of the human condition

in lhe therapeutic COOlext might seem harsh and inscnsiti�·e since it 011

the cliell t. It .isks blaming clients for all ulcir problems or regarding them as having more freedom Ih.m they actually possess B1I I lhis view has reassuring implications. People are seen as ha\'ing the potential to act and make decisious despite their situations,

Ct!nters responsibility .

histories or limitations. a.� the Scri ptures frequendy assert. On

the other hand. the Christian tradition describes certain

limit;lIinns on our freedom: ....e . arc portra),cd as in bondage 10 e\'jl, self-deception and sin. Person-celHcred

therapy recognizes nonc of these Iirnitations. Still. the cm phasis on rcsponsibi li ty in person-ccll­

tered therapy is a refreshing contrasl 10 th e more pessim istic It'll­ dencies of the deterministie models and

lhe current infatuation with

�addiclion� models for all human problcms There is far too much .

264 extcrnali1.alion and projection of responsibility going on in con­ temporary American society. Browning (1987) points om a major problem with the Rogerian COllcept offreedom, however. Person-ccnlcred therapy reduces human growth to the process of pursuing self-actualization by following the direction of one's instinctual organismic valuing process. Rogers thus renders the intricate and complex task of moral decision-making to the merely instinctual. Browning argues that this s i actually destructive of a robust view of human freedom, in that freedom "'Would descend to allenti,'!'! listening to our biology� (p. 134). A robust view of freedom requires thal we choose responsibly between real options. 8Ul in the Ragerian scheme, there is al....'a}'s only one real option, thaloffollowing our biologically rooted imlinets. Morality men runs the risk of beeom­ ing a matter of following the instinctual compass, rather man being a rigorous and demanding response of the whole person. Finally, person-centered merapy sees itself strongl}' in the human science ramer than natural science tradition (Van Leeuwen, 1985).

Although a number of me assertions about the philosophy of science endorsed by person-centered therapy and me broad humanislic�xis­ tenlial tradition have enormous appeal to many Christian students of psychology, there is reason to be concerned about some of the conse­ quences of such thinking. Relatively little high-quality empirical

re­

search has been generated by this approach to the study of persons,

although Rogers himself \\."as a noticeable exception (Prochaska, 1984,

pp. 1 16-120). The founder of person-centered therapy promoted an Munusual combination of phenomenological understanding of clients and empirical evaluation of psychotherapyM (p. 116). Serious proposals by Christians for more human-science strategies have been thought-prl> \'Oking (e.g.. Farns\"'·onh. 1985: Van Leeuwen, 1985), but ha\'e stimulated noticeably less research than more traditional research methodologies (d. Evans. 1989). Christian minkcrs must be cautious about endorsing "ei­ ther-or" options with reference to a philosophy of science. Few theore­ ticians or thenlpists ha\'e been able to emulate Rogers's exanlple of phenomenological and empirical sophistication.

Mod"
265

person who is fixed to any specific dispositions, roles or traits. and this respects OUT individuality. In person<entered ther.lpy our principal life task is conceived to be thal of uncovt!ring our true self. The sclf
n i to congruence \vitIl sdf-expcriencc, as cxpcliencc can only

be what it is, while the former two can readily Change. Thus people arc thought only capable of change bydiscoveringwhal lhcy really are We .

would agree with Roger! that most of us arc not now our true selves and that growth really does mean at some significant levels becoming onc's true self. \Ve would also agree with Bro\\-Tling (1 987) that the core notion of being born with a unique set of potentialities that we are meant 10 actualize s i not incompatible with a Christian vie",' ofpersons. We are. after all. created in God's image and each person has a unique calling from God to become the person he or she was meant to become. The seWs lack of form is troubling, for as Roberts (in press) has noted. the Rogerian self has no center or anchor, and if taken to an extreme, can turn into a formless entity defined only by its urges and sensing. According to the Christian tradition, tnle selves are nOI to be merely uncovered, but are to be formed by acting in obedience to God's call ([vans, 1990; see chapter eleven), Thus, we are not funda­ mentally good beings, as person-cemered therapy asserts, but ones whose ,'ery selves need transformation. Becoming a self, in the Christian view, requires a wiltingness 10 face direClly one's creaLUrelilless as well as finiteness. In our uncorrupted

n of creation, but we became estranged from state, we were the cro·....

our creator. Inwardly depraved, we are incapable ofrelUrning to God apart from grace, The ultimate hope for our transformation is divine interverllion as we confront our sinfulness. Christian maturity reaches its apex in tenns ofcharact.er formation when the Christian virtues are

cultivated and expressed (Roberts, 1982). This truth, that human selves h;we to be transformed because we are not perfectly good, cannot be overemphasized. While the concept of self-acceptance is vilally impor­ passionate and compassionate living (Wagner, 1975), the Chrislian sees the need LO balance a desire for

tant (0

a hope-filled call

to

self-fuUilimem with a strOng pordon of self-discipline. We accept our­ selves, but also yearn to become who and what Cod is calling us to be. We would also argue that person-centered therapy crrs in positing only one dri,'e for human personality. Suggesting one drive, and a totally good one at tllat. leads 10 attributing all human distress to forces external 10 lhe person. If we C\'cr experience conflict, it cannot be due

.

,

266

MOf»:H.N�,),CI/OTIiI':MI'IK'l

to a true slruggle within ourselves, but rather to a pseudostruggle between our true selves (all good) and some sort offalse selves, which are presumed to have originated externally from how significant others have treated liS. This is why Browning

(1987, p. 62) describes the

person-centcred Iherapy \icw as Minstinctual utopianismM; it suggests perfect inner congruence at the deepest levels for the healthy person. Christianit),. on the ollicr hand, suggests that our good impulses and our bad impulses, our love for and rebellion against God, are both represcntative of our lrue selves. Conflict is real, and goes on in the deepest dimensiom afthe person. Person-centered therapy has a uivial view of conflict within lhe person. Christianity views conflict as both internal and external, and evident at both the individual and corporate Icvels. In person<entered therapy the true self is a�'are, through the organismic valuing process, of in/n""nal rwds, but nm necessarily or anything external like the needs and wanlS or others, at least until a high degree of personal congruence has been achie"l"ed. Such notions should trouble us as Christians. Person<entered therdpy may appeal to our pr�xisting tendencies toward beiIlg o"crly individualistic. The

i pan defined in terms of true self in the Christian ITadition is n relationships-with God, with neighbor, with others and with God's absolutes. Our sense of identity is meant to be shaped by both organ­ ismic needs (which cenainly play a rolc) and by a strong sense of belonging shaped by the Christian story and our place in the Christian community (c.f. Gaede, 1985). A sense of meaning and personal contentment are potentially enriched and enlivened by a �trong sense of heritage, hiswry and tradition as children of the Creator-Cod. The true self is the person who lovcs God with all of one's heart, seeks after righteousness. and loves others as oneself. A more complete understanding of the true self goes beyond self­ awareness and subjecth'e experience to a keen awareness and knowl­ edge of others (Roberts. in press). In a \'ery real sense, we find our identity in being and doing. It would be fair to say that there is a dimension of self-actualizing potential in all ofus. Sma more traditional Christian perspective would be that this is based on a potential for a gradual. painful process of rt.-co\·ering the original fonn of the imtlgo dej (image

of God)

that

became disloned as a resuh of the Fall. A more balanced and theolog­

ically sensitive perspective on the forces that move us would contend that there are !lOme less than noble drivcs within. and this is why we

268

MODERNPSYCHOTH£RAPIES

meanings are held tentatively and Te\-;sed according to changing expe­

riences). In contrast, Christianity paint! humans as having pasts, presents and futures of fIXed meanings determined by God. We are part of a community offaith that has a stable identity. We are nOlour o\'/n gods, but owe our submission to the rightful Lord of the universe. There are certainly absolutes in the Christian faith, but there are relatively few in pertoOn
the complex reality of .serious psychopathology. Since careful assess.. ment is seen as largely futile according to this model (because of the emphasis on experiencing) , important clinical symptoms can be missed or minimized. Penon-centered therapy runs the risk. of indif­ ference to or ignorance about the full range of human misery and suffering. Its perspective on psychopatholog)' is at best partial and seems to have less to add to our overall understanding of human psychopathology than any other mainline approach. A fundamental naw ill the humanistic and relativistic philosophy behind pcDOn-cemcred therapy is ....'hat appears to be a lack. ofwilling­ ness to seriously confront the f\Uldamental depra\ity of persons and the reality of evil (Peck, 1983). There is so much focus on affinnation of the person that it seriously neglectS those matters for which we are to be held accountable. As Mclemore ( 1 982, p. 143) has .... a . rned, there

270

MOOfRNPSt"CJlO1'1lf:R1tJ'J£S

tered therapy encourages a hwnan

m3.11if(!sution

of

agape love, it

should claim our allegiance and profound respect.

A truly Christian approach to healing and helping will surely scress the primacy of warm, empathic and genuine relationships, thoroughly grounded in an understanding of tzgrJ/J'love (cf. Tan,

(1968).

35

1987).

Odell

in his earlier analysis of pcrson
to say thai unconditional positive regard, mediated through a good

psychotherapeutic rciaLionship,

\\-"as

the secular translation of the

Christian understanding ofredemption. Ellens (1982) recognized and applauded the supreme emphasis placed on ¥gr.lce � in the person-cen­ tered lherapy u-adition.

8m it is a scrious error for the Christian to equate unconditional positive rt."g'Md or evcn the whole triad wilh Christian love (Oakland,

1974; Ortberg. 1981; Roberu. 1988). Christian 100'e warmly embrAces

sinners. is gracious and unconditionally accepting, but docs not cease to be firm and hold the self and others accountable. Certainly we need to be "fed- by deep affirmation and acceptance, but we also need LO be "pruned- in the process of our gro\'!th by GO(rS discipline and to be forgiven. Our Creato� disciplines because he loves

12:7-10).

us

(cf. Heb

In pcrson-ccmered therapy there is no discipline. no firm­

i lf3ined nOt to express disap­ ness. The person-ccll1erc..-d therapist s proval or gn'e instruction in any form or fashion (Ortberg.

1981).

We as Christians need to learn more about the importance of affirming persons deeply "as they are." Indeed, we are all too often

preaching or talking when ....e . should be allen tively and respectfully listening. But divine acceptance and Christian love place certain demands and expectations on relationships. Discipline and struggle go hand in hand with accepting that we are of immense wonh in the cre-.niollal order. Cod's grace is a boift that is nOI merited but is given freely. It can not be earned and

we

should reject a ....,orks theology

fonhrightly. But that does not mean that there is no place for a proper understanding of discipline. moral accountability,judgmcll1 or repen­ i these tance in the Christian life. And f

arc

present, therapy will

certai n I)' be more than the creation o f a IOlcrant, accepting atmo­ sphere in the counseling rcialioluhip. UnfOrtunalely, we scem to know far more about preaching and exhorting lhan we do about lislening and comforting. There is much we need lO learn about love wilhin limilS and aboul caring and commiunent (cf. Smcdes,

1978).

Because ofilli one-sided cmbrdce oflO\'c without diSCipline, person­ centered therApy may llUpporl dienlS without challenging them. Cliellt

27J and therapist lIlily hide �hind empathic listening and reflecting with·

out getting into the deeper issues that need to be confronted if growth

and change are to occur. In all fairness, person-centered therapy has

moved in the direction of "caring confrontation" (cr. Rogers.

1980),

but there still seems to be an almost phobic :noidance of dealing with the inevitable differences of opinions or conflicL'i thai occur in hu­

mall relationships. In fact. descriptiolls and definitions of the thera­

peutic qualities are typically written in such a v,'3y that most cOllfroll­ lations that olle might imagine £lowing from Christian moral st..mces would be judged to be ingenuine. nonempathic or conditional, and hence to be avoided. Sometimes these concerns are well-taken; Chris­ t.ians probably engage in a fair amount of "premarure onhado).)"" (i.e.. jumping to conclusions). What we are concerned about. how­ ever, is a steadfast pattern of avoidance. which can only lead 10 a moral relativism or an ethic without any "teeth." Truth-telling is full of

risks and responsibilities, but so is the alternative. Next we will examine the motivation for Im'e or positive regard of the counselee, For the person-cemered therapist, we arc to love be­ cause the other merits it and it is congruent for us to do

so.

For the

Christian, there are a number of foundations for positive regard. First, love is rooted in the recognition of Ollr common status

som created in God's image;

....e .

as

per­

are all part of one COlllmon family.

Aho, we are urged 10 100'e others because Gdd firstlO\'cd us, to love as an overflow of God's love of us (RobcltS. 1 988). We are urged to love

as a rcflc(."tion of God's character, of his presellce ill our lives. Fi.nally.

we are commanded to lo\'e others ;\5 oursch-es because it is a deep ex­ pression of our understanding of our purpose on earth. Agflpt love is grounded in an objective reality outside the self, whereas positive re­ gard is ultimately anchored withjn the individual. What of the process by .....hich therapy occurs. the tYJ>C of experi, ence the c1ielll is urged to have? Persoll-ccntered therapy appears to focus 100 much on inner subjective experience and presem-centered·

ness. If " problems in living" are seen as rooted in aberralions in per·

ception, then it makes sense to focus on lhe client's awarencss of lhe here-and·now. Christian faith is not nec.essarily incompatible with a deep concern about individual inner experience. and there is a sense in which the Christian tradition \'3lues the immediac}' of the present

existential moment. After all. ....e . arc told to ask onl)' for our "daily

bread" and to live each moment fully "as untO the Lord."

But the Christian tradition values others as well. Even mystical

272

contemplation is �en largely as a means to emfJO"o-er oneself for more focused and concentrated ministry rather than as an end in iLSeIf. And Lhe Christian tradition is deeply rOOled in a strong sense of God's working throughout redemptive histOry. Becoming centered -fully n i the Tl\oment� rum the risk of leading to a limited sense of familial, historical. personal or spiritual identity. We need a personal and collective �story,� or we will eventually have to face an overwhelming sense of emptiness (cf. Lasch, 1979; OT Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan. Swindler and Tipton. 1985). There are risks for the pcrson-ccntered therapy lherapisl as well. It s i tempting for the Rogerian therapist to mask his or her own identily and uniqueness by being constrained to relate to clients in a �person· cenlered" manner. The therapeutic uiad ofcongruence. empath)' and unconditional positive regard can all too easily degenerate into a i effecrual way of relating to persons in general. bland, safe and n runher, these qualities should not be reduced to skllb or sensitivities that can be turned on or off as the occasion demands. Indeed, this would be the epitome of incongruity. There is a risk in perwn<entered therapy of the client developing an unhealthy dependency relationship with the therapisL McLemore (1982) reminds us of the almOSt inevitable tendency of a client to O\'eridentify with the therapist if the therapist does nOt set appropriate expectations, clarify hisor herrole, orestablish reasonable limits. Good therapy needs to help persons to learn how to deal with the reaJity of conditional love in the world (Strupp and Binder, 1986), but a poorly managed empathic relationship can eventua1ly increase unhealthy dependence and regression, rather than a greater degree ofaulonomy i particular, it is impera­ and maturation. For the Christian clinician n tive Lha! credit is given to the ultimate source of grace, since, in some m)'steriow and powerful way, we embody "Jesus Christ� for the client Person<entered the,dpy has probably been the most widely adapted approach to people-helping that has C\'er been developed. Applications for the business, educational, familial. group, individual, marit.'l.l and parental contextabound i.n the literature (cf. Corey, 1986). Person<entered thempy is also \\.idely appreciated for the \'o�dyS in which it has been adapted for the training of lay and paraprofessional coun.selof'$, It has helped mental heaJLh professionals to �give p�)'chol­ ogy awol}''' to the people. with all the ob\oloUS risks and benefits that entails, No doubt person-centered therapy is the dominant method used n i the initial phases of counselor training (c[ Meier, 1989)-per-

•

P'

,

274

miSlic. Rogers's unbridled optimism about the potential for growth from within can be less than helpfill LO those whose hun and pain rencel a greater variety of biological, psychosocial or socioculLural causal faclors than merely "blocks to their self-actualization. � No doubt, the therapeutic conditions of acceptance, empathy and honesty are powerful medicine. but they are nOl neccMarily sufficient La combat the diverse challenges of the human situation, Perhaps the approach is most helpful when the dientdoesn't need 10 go very deep or very far, or where. practically speaking, I.he e1ien! cannOI (cf. Kovc1, 19i6). And as Corcy (1986) has argued. are we really LO believe thai one particular relationship. no matler how powerful it is, can reverse the effecLS of years (or decades) of highly conditional Im'e? And how does an experience ofperson-cenlcred therapy prepare us for a world where so few persons evidence those qualities of health thaI arc -canonized- by Rogerian therapy (i.e., congruence, empathy and unconditional po5iti\"(� regard)? The greater the discrepancy be­ tween the dream and the realil)', the more potential there is for despair and frustration. Conclusion Few models of peapk'-helping han! been as widely discussed in Chris­ tian circles as has person<enlered therapy, We have already developed at length the most imponam criticisms of this model. N a ·purist­ humanistic theory, there are tOO many inadequacies in person<en­ terre therdpy for it e\'er to ser\'c as the foundation for a thoroughI)· Christian approach to personal healing. Perhal)S the enduring legacy of pcrson<entcred therapy for Chris­ tians will be the respect this tradition has for persons. Rogerians have taught us much about what it means to deeply care for (and be cared for by) others. Although we must be careful to realign certain concepts so that they conform more closely to the truth of the re\'ealed will of God, we can certainly be grateful that Rogers and his followers have deeply sensitized us to what it means 10 listen to someone (Jacobs. 1975). As Bonhoeffer (1954, p. 97) pcrcepti,·cly observed more than a half­ century before. 'The first service one o... :es to others in the fellowship consists in listening to them. Just as lo\"e to God begins with listening to His Word, so the beginning of love for the brethren is learning to listen to them. - All too often Christiam are talk.ing when we should be

,

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MODE.RSPStTJfaTHEMJ'iE.S

1 9+202. Ellens,]. (1982). God's grace and hUmlIl1 MaltA. Nashville: Abingdon. E\"Mls, C. (1989). n'Udom and hUlllan1U!U in psycJwloD. Grand Ibpids, MI: Baker. E\"anil, C. (1990), 5fflon Kinttgara d'j ChriJliaPl prycholofrl. Grand Rapids. MI: Zondel"'all, FamS'o'oX)rth, K. (1985). ltlluJU.hMrUd inkgrflticn. Grand Rapids. MI: Baker. Gaede. S. (1985). &longing. Grand Rapid!. t.U: Zonden-all. Garfield, S. (1980), Psyc/wthlrfJ(fJ: An tclectic approach. New Yorlr.:John Wiley. Hammond, D.; Hepworth. D.; and Smith, V. (1978), IWlfJrotring therapeutic (Ol1un'.!nirofiqn, San �'raJ:1CiJcO: josscy-&w. Jaco�J. (1975). A Christian client cousidcn Carl Roge�. Journal ofPrycilolOfD and ThtoIhgy, J, 25-30. Korchin, S. (1976). Mcxknl (linienl PSJ'IuJkJgJ. New York: Sa.sic Books. Ken'!':!']. (1976). !r. «mt/Jkk guitk 10 llina",. New York : Pamlieon. Lasch,J. (1979). 1M cui/un ofnarcis.si5111. New York; Warner Books. Lewis, C. S. (1968). A. mind au.oak: An anthology ol e s. Lewis. (e. Kilby, Ed.) New York: Harcourt. Brace ;Uld World. McLemore, C. (1982). 7M IUmdol ofP$J(.holhnofT1. \'rneaLOn, Il: Tyndale. Mclemore, C. (1984). Honet Chrutimlil]. J'hiladelphia: Wesuninster. Meador. B., and Rogers. C. (1984). PenolH;cntered theI';tpy. In R. Corsini (Ed.), CUm'PIt �holhmlpia (3d cd.) (pp. 142-195). lta!lCa.lL: F. E. Peacock. Meier, S. (1989). ThL �IS ofrot.lJu.c/i1lg. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole. Myers. D. (1981). The inflottd ulf. New York: Seabury. Oakland, j. (1974). Sclf-actuaJization and sanctification. j(JUrnol of PsydiobJgj mId Th.tobJgy. 2, 202·209. Oden, T. (1968). Klrygma and counseling. Philadelphia: Westminster. Ortberg.J. (1981). Accepting our acceptance: 50me limitatiom ofa Rogerian approach to the nature of grace. Joomat of PrjchologJ lind ChriJtilinity. I, 45-50.

Patterson. C. (1985). Th.c thmlp.cutic rtlntiomhip: Fmmdatimu for a/I «itdic fn'}ehol/u:mfT1. MOllterey, CA.: Brooks/CoOle. Peck. M. (1983). p. of thllit. New York: Simon and Schuster. Prochaska,j. (1984). SyjlD/f.! ofpsycholMrafrJ: A. tmruthtorrlical amllysis (2d ed.). Homewood, 11.: Oo�. Roberu, R. (1982). Spirituality and hU7IIO/1 tfMtions. Grand RapidS. MI: EerdmaJl$. Roberts. R. {I 985). Carl Rogers and the Christian \irtues.jfJUnwi of Pry c1wlo/l:] and tMrJJogy. 1J. 263-273. Roberts. R. (1988). Unpublished class notes. Wheaton College Cr.tduate School, Wheaton, IL Roberts. R. (in prc:ss) . Taking tA, ward to hMrl. Grand Rapids. MI: Eerdmans. RogCT$, C. (1961). On M.Offling a pm,,,,. Boston: Houghton Mimin. Rogers, C. (1980). A U1aJ oJbnng. BasIon: Houghton r-.liffiin. Rychlak. j. (1973). hllrodudion to /'nJlmaliI'J tJlld psycJwtht:m/YJ. Boston: Houghton Mimin. Smede5. L (1978). Low within limilS. Grand Rapids, Ml: Eerdmalls. Strupp, H., and Binder. G. (1986). PsydwlhnufT1 in d n.cw key. N"",' York: Basic

277 Boob.

Tall, S. (1987). Intr.l.penonal intcgration: The ser ... a nl'$ spirituaiity.JOtlmal of

Psycholot:! and Christanil], i 6, 34-39. Thielicke, H. (1964). TIIetthies ofSiX. U. Doberstein, Trans.)

New York.: Harper

&: Row.

TIsdaJe.J. (1988, October). Humanistic psycholherapyassumptions and Chri.... tian counseling. Paper presented al the International Conference on Christian Counseling, Atlanta, Georgia. Van Belle, H. (1980), &.ric inlml and IhmJ�ti, approach ol eAr! R. 1Wgm. Toronto: Wedge Pubti�hing. Van Belle, H. ( 1985a). PCI"$OII-centered therapy. In D. Bellner (t:d.), lJaMr Encycloptdia ofPsychology (pp. 822-825). Grand Rapids, MI: Baker.

Van Belle. H. (1985b) . Rogers. Carl Ransom. in D. Benner (Ed.), &Mr l ETlCJelcfJmia ofP.sytMJfJt{J. (pp. 1016-101 7). Grand R3pids, MI: Baker. Van Leeu....en. M. (1985). T� pmDn in psyduJlDg]: A amtnnporory Christian DpflroisaL Grand Rapids. Ml: Eerdmans. Viu:. P. (1977). PsycholofJ IlS rtligi01l: TM cult of�lfwonhip. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans. Wagner. M. (1975). TM SClsation of bting JOnubod,. Grand Ibpilh. MI: 7.on­ dCI''an. Wohl.J. (1982). Eclecticism and Asian counseling: Critique and application. 1111mu1tionnljofJ.T1Iaifor 1MAduanamtrll of Cou�Ujng. ,. 21�222.

11 EXISTENTIAl, THE Y +

xistential therapy has been defined as -" dynamic ap­ proach to therapy which focuses on concerns that are rOOled in the indi\idual's existenceM (Yalom, 1980, p. 5). Although only four per cent of the psychotherapists in America en­ dorse exiStentialism as their primary orientation (Prochaska and Norcross, 1983). this approach has had a far greater impact than this small figure would suggest. Indeed, one Christian existential psycho­ therapist, John Finch, had a major influence in the founding and development of the Graduate School of Psychology at Fuller Theolog­ ical Seminary (Malony, 1980). Perhaps most accurdtely described as a divc� group of attitudes and philosophical approaches to psychomcrapcutic practice. existen­ tial Iherdpy is generally not seen as a sepante school ofp�1'chotherapy like behaviorism or psychoanalysis. Nor does exislential lherapy seem

,

279

to lend itself to neatly defined models of personality, pSrChOpalhology or psychotherApy. Yet the attitudes and values that undergird existen­ tial therapy have been incorporated into many systems of counseling [ has become a Mstrange but and psychotherapy: so thal cxi.�tel1tiaism oddly familiar" orientation for therapists of all persuasions irrespective oflheir control beliefs and world views (Valom, 1980), At the 5.'lme lime, in the judgment of Norcross (1987. p. 4 1 ) . existential therapy "is a diffuse and declining approach plagued by a lack of consistency. coherency. and scrutiny. � D u oiplive Survey

l understanding of this dilfuse but important approach lO To faciit.ue understanding human difficulties and growth. we \<'ill stan with a summa­ rization of the psychological thought ofS0ren Kierkegaard. reganit.-d as the father of existentialism and a controversial though increasingly appreciated figure in Christian circles. (Existential lherapy is a unique system in that it counu a Christian thinker asone ofiu founders.) We \\;11 then briefl)' discuss the most popularizcd version of existential therapy, Viktor Frankl's logother.lpy. Finally, we will pro<:eed lhrough our morc formaJ presentation of the essentials of existential therapy in iu broader fonns and conclude \\;th our Christian critique. s.rm Kierlrqraarrl's msfmfial psycholbgy. S0ren Kierkcgaard1 viewed personhood both in tenns ofwhat we are and what we should become, with lhe emphasis on the latter. Therefore, we both are selves and must become seh-es. Kierkeg-.tard regarded human beings as created by God and constituted of disparate elementS that did not naturally syn thesize. He argued that these disparate elementS could only be synthesized through an effortful deciding; we must act to create our selves. In a tcmporal and limited sense, we are the amhon of our li..-es. Kierkeg-.t.ard regarded the fundamental incompatibilities that re­ quire continuous active wrestling to be the polarities of infinitljde andfinitude, possibility and lUfelsity, and eternity and tnrlporality. lin pracnting it sketch of the \ieo.'SofKkrkeg-Aard. ....e . �lied hC'Ot\ily on

,. iL i ngs of the ...

Evan. (1990) and Mullen (1981). The ... 1itings of Kierl:.epard him5<:lf aJ'C' diffICult for (he "'<"al reader to penetnte. though byun;\'ersal acclaim hisSidl>lm unloDtath (1980)

is tile one ,,'Or" mOM pi''Ql ha\'e been ;II di,tinctivcly Ou;"t;all tilin);.er who de.el'\""

�ading by all "'ho rc:.d thi, book.

it

thoughtful

MODFJtVPSYCHOTHERAPfF.,S

280

To gi� only one example of these polarities. Kierkegaard would say that we all struggle with the nearly infmite possibilities of our existence, all the things we might do with our lives, on the one hand, and the pathetic necessities of our existence, induding our limirnuons, failings and creature1inc$$, on the other. Many of us lose our courage as we manage this tension and cop-out by Ih·;ng a life of dreaming or fantasy about our possibilities, while others give up their dreams to live a life of grudging sla\'cry to the necessities of life. Both of these options are failures to be a self, because in both instances the person has surren­ dered and stopped living by choice, choosing instead to simply Jive one of the twO polarities of tension. &coming a true self, a true person. �glnswith anxiLty. which is the result of the 3"'
to escape from anxiety is to deny the reality of choice; and so the only

humans living without anxiety are those who are less than human because they are evading choice. Thus, "anxiety s i a necessary pan of genuine human life" (Mullen,

1981, p. 52).

The failure to become a self

v .. a s

caUed despair by Kicrkcgaard;

despair as he describes it s i an objecw:e state and not an emotion, so thaI a person can be in despair and yet never feel despairing. We are in despair when we stop choosing to be �1tJt;S.

The crux ofKierkegaard's ideas comes in his assertion that to be a true self is to synthesize our opposing tendencies as ....e . � grounded in God. Being a U'ue self is something that does not come naturally, and which few actually achieve. In fact, Kierkegaard proposed a theory of human development ofsorlS. According to Evans

(1990), he sug­

gested that we all start at the .usIMit stage. wherein the essence oflife is belie\'ed to be ha..ing one's own way. Sometimes this takes the foml of rude ht.-dooism. but IDOSt often is a more cuhured and subtJe selfishness that comports well with getting along or succeeding in life. Many despair of aestheticism and then progress to the

�thiMI stage.

wherein one commits oneself to ethica1 principlcs to guidc onc's life. Finally, a few go on to the rtligiotu stage, which is constitmed by a trusting personal relationship with the transcendent Cod. of the Chris.. tian faith. Thus, to be a fully functioning or developed human being, a true

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self, is lO respond to the gift of anxiety by making one's existential choices in the conlcxt of onc's transparcnt (or totally honest) relation­ ship to God. In the words of Kjerkegaard. �the self in being itself and in wi.lling to be itselfrests Imnsparcntly in God� (quoted in Evans. 1990, p. 57). For Kierkegaard. LO be a true self is lO be a self grounded in Self

(i.c., the Creator.('.od) . To become perfectly transparent is to be fully md . cognizant of our propensity to... deception and denial (i.e

.•

nOt

being ourselves). It is inLeresting to note two additional points. First, Kierkegaard. the "father of existentialism,� would almost certainly regard modem secular existentialism a� a form of despair. specifically what he called the despair of defiance. He believed that the only genuine and true decisions that could be made about becoming a self had to be made transparently before and in relationship with God. The very idea of autonomously choosing ....·hat SOrt of self to become. with no recourse to the one in whom we have our being (the essence of secular existen­ tialism) . was anathema to the thought of Kierkegaard. Second, because .....e are to make our choices of who to become in the context of our relationship with God, it s i clear that there is definitely a self thaI I am to become, a �lrue selr that I am to actualize by making the �right� choices. Our personhood is not wholly "plastic,� moldable to any shape, as many existential thinkers today would asseI'L Rather. we arc to become the people that God would hold Out for us to become. Thus. we see in the thought of Kierkegaard a Christian analysis of the nature of humanity. of where we go wrong in not becoming what .....e should be and a prescription for how to change and grow. In this way. as [,'ans

(1990)

has declared, Kierkeg-otard is surely a Christian

�psychologist� whom more contemporary Christian thinken should study. While there are

man

)' other dimensions to Kierkegaard's

thought, this skeletal ouuine will give us a sufficient ballC from which to interact ....·ith existential therapy.

Viklor Fro/lA/'s lngvthn"apy. Viktor Frankl authored the widely read MUll S &arch 1M Mffl1ling (1959), in which he oul.lined the essentials of logothe'dpy. In all his works (e.g

..

1965, 1975).

Frankl discusses the

fomlati,,·e impaCi of his personal experiences in the Nazi concentration camps of World War

2, and his depictions of those experiences are

profound and mO\;ng. From those experiences, he took one overrid­ ing lesson; Ula! persons .....ho have a purpose or meaning for what they are experiencing can endure and grow C\'en in the most dC\'aStating of

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. he feared and might be asked to put himself in the presence of ....hat make himself have the very panic attack he feared most, He argued that because ....e. are responsible agents, this choosing to exhibit a symptom allo....s. the person to experience a control he had previously denied and to thus regain control o,'er a part of his life, Frankl d�reloped orner techniques for dealing with problems of meaning, Having the therapist prescribe a meaning is never likely to help. though a therapist ma)' tcnativcly t suggest meanings for the client to Mtry on. � Frankl argued that those without meaning may find a ''a\ue for themseln:�5 by doing a meaningful deed (in order to find meaning in the doing), by experiencing a value such 3.$ 10\'e or by experiencing suffering. F'rankl also used the technique of Mderef1ection,M ....herein . clients choose to deflect attention from thei.' troubling symptomatol· ogy and thereby put that attention onto the real meanings of their existence and the actions that a conUniUllelll to those meanmgs demands. Frankl seems often to challenge clients to look over their life. induding imagining their future, and to choose or even ;usen a value or of that is .....orth living by. He gives the example of a depressed survi .... the concentration camps ""'ho had lost all of his family. wife and many children to the Nazi ovens and gas chambers. This indi,';duai could find no meaning to his suffering or his life. Frankl lCnlath'ely asked if it was possible that his suffering might be meanl to allow the dient, through his suffering, "'0 become worthy ofjoining them [his familyI in heaven M (1959, p. 190). He reported that the individual subsequently became better able to bear his suffering. PhilosophicalAssumptions

Existcntial therapy is first and foremost a grov.'th modd of people-help­ ing, stressingwellness rather than illness, and mdical personal freedom over and against psychic or biological detenninism. From lhe milks of philosophers and thcologians. it drdwlI hea\';ly on Lhe works of Bergson, Brunner, Buber, Heidegger. Klerkegaard. Niebuhr. Nietzsche and s.'\ru·e. From lhe ranks of European psychiatrist.s, it emphasizes the work orBinswanger, Boss and Frankl (Corey, 1986; Rychlak. 1973). But in this country. a ps)'chologiSl, Rollo May (1961. 1981; May and Yalom. 1984). has probably done more than anyone to explain the personal relevance of the existential attitude for both applied clinical practice and life in general. More reccmly. Bugental (1978, 1981) and Yalom (1980) have had a significant impact on shaping the chamCler of the

284 movement through their more clinically oriented efforts. In tenns of its philosophical moUl, existential therapy can best be understood as a strong reaction to what it perceives as the overly deterministic. mechanistic or reductionistic tendencies of classical behaviorism and psychoanalysis. The word

existential comes from

the

Latin tx tistre, meaning literally �to emerge or to stand out� (Finch and Van Dragt.

1985).

Existentialism

!

emerged in European intellectual and religious

circles in the last century, largely as a strong protestagainsl the growing dominance of rationalism and empirica1 science �cross the disciplines. It was in part a respon� to what Maritain called Hegel's "totalitarianism of reason � (i.e., �Ifyou can 't measure it it does"'t exist�i KorchiD, 1976. p.

355). In

response to science and philosophy attempting to under­

stand human beings in tenns of fixed mechanisms or substances (�essences"), some argued that persons mwt be understood in terms

of �existence." $arrre argued that Mman'5 essence is his existence. The

meaning of this sentence is that man is a being of whom no essence can be affirmed . . . . According to Sanre, man is what he acts to beM (Tillich,

1960. p. 12).

The nature of humanity is deemed to be fluid, being defined and bounded only by the choices we make. Thus existentialists seek to understand persons in tlleir processes of becoming or emerging. They prefer to stress the uniqueness of persons, not the commonalities between persons. Existentialists stress the primacy of the �self, � seeing persons as dynamic and fluid beings, rather than as fixed or static individuals. In shon. to adopt an existential attitude is to respect the primacy of the developing or emerging person. As Evans

(1984) has observed, existentialism is in the purest sense autobiography: to describe one's own experience and to relate it to the experience of one's audience. Knowledge is highly personal. and the basis of authority is the

allthen­

ticity of personal experience. Existential therapy shares much in common "'ith cenain other humanistic approaches. especially aspects of person--cenlered and gestalt therapies. It shares most of the orienting values of the hu-

'To understand mo�e fuUy the philosophical heritogt of exi5lemiali5Dl. the inlerested reader rould eUllJIult ""ufman (1975) and SolumOll (1974) for straighuorw;ord and appreciative prl':l<:nl3tionl from :.. no"religiou� perspectil·t. Friedm:"11 (1973) for a critical nonreligious p<:rspecth"1:. and �:''"iUl5 (19&1) (or a distinctively ChrnUan appraiJilI.

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manistic U'adition, especially its holistic emphasis, me importance of the self-report of direct experience. the need for coparticipation in research and clinical work. me high respect for empadlic understand­ ing and intuition, and the emphasis on strivings for growth and health (Korchin, 1976). Existential thel'apy. however, as it has devel­ oped in this country. is nuher distinci from its roots in European philosophy and meology and certainly reflects aspects ofcontemporary American culture. The core assertions of the existential outJook would include the following (May and Yalom, 1984): ( I ) human beings are free and have to make a choice ofwhemer or not to be aumentic-we create ourselves through our choices; (2) we must make choices in a world without fixed meanings: (3) we are deeply related to others and to the world, but ultimately we are alone in the universe; (4) existence inescapably implies nonexistence or death, which is the $Ource ofmuch of our anxiety; (5) we grow through encounter with the abyss, our personal and private �dark night of me soul� (Van Dragt. 1985); (6) modern man feels alienated, resuhing in an wexiStential vacuum"; (i) psychological symptoms are symbols and signs of our despair, the meanings of which need to be explored; and (8) ....'C tend to become dependent persons who want other persons, places and mings to be �good to us on our tenns- (cf. Finch, 1982). There appeared to be little serious interest in such MphilosophicalM matters in many sectors of contemporary American psychology until the last decade, especially in mose traditions that stressed the more explicitly "scientificM approach. Thus it is not surprising to learn that existential therapy has generally not been well received in academic and research circles. Yalom (1980, p. 14) notes that existential merapy a if . who was not j>l!nnitted into the better academic s i like "a homeless .... neighborhoods. " ModN ofPwstmlJlity and H«Jlth

The respect for persons and their unique experiences of Mbeing in me ....'orld� are me distinctive emphases ofan existential model ofpersonal. . ity. We are all in a continual, ongoing process of "becoming,. according to existential meorists, trying to discover and make sense of our existence. Though me specific questions .....e ask may vary according to our de\'elopmentaL maturational and sociocultural Context, the fun­ damental que�tions persist: "Who am I? Who have J been? Who can I become? Where am 1 going?M (cf. Corey, 1986), Surely lhesc are questions that also ought to interest serious Christian thinkers as well,

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286

... ,'ers� or and these can hardly be dismissed wilh wcll-reheaned �ans simple wsolutions," responses mal are far too common in many Chris­ tian circles. Although it is hard to characterize a particular personality theory as definitively and distinctly �exiStelltial," most Iheoreticians talk about three levels of existence. These are referred to as

tHlluvit, mit1lJtit and

eigtmwtU. UmwtlJ refers to the physical or biological dimension of i

existence. Mi(u'f:ll s the relational a5pe<:l of existence. And tigmwtll is

the personal, existential world of meaning (i.e., the reality that Kierkegaard termed spirit, the most important concept in an existential understanding ofhuman nature). Because we are capable ofself..av.'3.re­ ness,

we

can reflect and make choices in all aspects of being. lhereby

increasing our possibilities for freedom. ith Finding meaning is a struggle. \\fe are constamly confronted .... the choice ofwhat kind of person we are becoming, a task that is never fully completed in this lifetime. We must accept the responsibility for directing our In·es. Periods ofemptiness, guilt, isolation, loneliness and meaninglessness are inevitable in this qUesL Although baskally alone, .....e have the oppornmity with a dearer sense of identit)' to relate to others at deeper and more meaningful levels (cf. Tillich,

1952).

With the awareness of our responsibility for the choices available to

us and

of the consequences of those choices. comes anxiety. Anxiety, in

the existential therapy tr.tdition and in line with Kierkegaard, informs us of our freedom and responsibility. In order to fulfill our destiny. we must be a selfin truth, relentlessly. To bewhole, .....e must be deeply rooted n i our being, nOt the being ofothers who are too important to us. Like anxiety, guilt resulting from our failure to make authentic choices is an ally. not a foe. since it too reminds us of our refusal to be ourselves in truth. When .....e attempt to deny or diston the anxiety or guilt

.... e.

experience, our seifbe<:omes strange to our spirit, and conse­

quently, .....e become unknown to ourselves and others (cf. Finch and

Van Dragt, 1985). Healthy relationships .....ith othen are built on the basis of clearly established identitie$, not by tT)ing to be or become something other than who .....e are. To summarize, then: Persons are essentially spirit. radically free and responsible for the quality oftheir existence and the choices they make.

Ali ....'(' develop a dear $Cnse of identity, ....e . have an increasing ability to make conscious and deliberate choices aboul whether or not .....e will be a self in truth, or alternatively protecl ourselves from real or

imagined threats by becoming more inauthentic. Daily we face an

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287

uncertain ....'Orld without fixed vd..lues and must confront the possibility of our nonbeing (i. e., death). The healthy adult has a clear commit­ ment to becoming, which includes ha\ing a well-formulated philoso­ ph)' of life thaI will guide current and future actions. These persons see themsei\'es as increasingly capable ofidentifYing and removing blocks thai th\\""arl the maturation process.

Model ofAbnormality Our personal response to the issues of death, freedom. isolation and meaninglessness are al the core of the existential model of psychopa­ tholog}'. As Yalom (1980) has nOled, the core of existential ps),chodr­ namics has to do with how spedficallywe have avoided these challenges and how that has led 10 psychological disturbance. Psychopathology arises when we refuse to !i\'e authentically and responsibly in all of the levels of exi.�tence (umwelt, mitwtll, tigenwtll). AU tOO oflen we adopt defenses and strau:gies that are inauthentic and self-deceptive. in Lhat they evade freedom and responsibiliry (i.e.. we ally evidenl when we are lie to our.;elvcs and/or others). This is especi afraid to stand on Ollr own twO feet and are intimidated by the possibility of self-transcendence. We lend to lose touch with our own vital center. our capacity to be a self. and thereby commit our.;eJves to ,Ul inadequate philosophy of life that inevitably gives rise to symptOms. Ifwe do not embrace both the freedom and responsibi l jtyofbeing a true self. ".Ie are choosing to stagnate or regress toward a more inauthentic alld immature life stance. It is nol surprising, considering the enormity of this task, that so many in our confused society choose to become externally directed beings only. resulting in an inward sense of emptiness and hollowness, and a lack of any clear sense ofidentiry or worth. All psychological symptoms, according to existential therapy, result at some k've! from decisions LO be inauthentic. \'I'e 100 often prefer the illusory safety and securit), of superficial self-proleclh'cness over and against the more meaningful and significant life of the self. We make a conscious and deliberate choice to live in a �state offorgetfulness of being� (after Heidegger, 1962). We allow ourselves to become trapped in a web of self-deceit. Living in the awareness of one's being produces authenticity. but it is also fnHlghl with an.xiety. R.."l.ther than directly confronting and dealing with the anxict)', we tend to lie to ourselves and others about the nature of our predicament and anempt to coerce or manipulate

289 to help lhe cliellt to risk acting freely and responsibly. The search for meaning and significance constitutes a major focal point in therapy. Assisting clientS to morc fully appr«iat.e their 0\\<1\ identity and uniqueness is encouraged so that they can increasingly tolerate being alone as well as with othen in heallhy, interdependent relationships. Anxiety, guilt and a....'a reness of the inevitability of death are seen as important dimensions of the human condition, rather than topics to be avoided in the context orlhe PS},cholherdpeutic encoullter. The reader can see thaI these are emphases and topics .....hich might be pursued, rather than clearly specified ways of imen'ening; this s i why existential therapy is so often wed to other approaches. Existential therapy appears to be well suited for individuals who must confront developmental and personal crises. �Existential con­ cerns� are .... ,despread in our culture, and many struggle with issues like making choices. dealing with freedom and responsibility. coping lI.ith anxiety and guilt, or finding a sense of direction in life.

Christian Critique

Philosophiool Assumptions and Mrxkl lfPersonality One finds n i existential therapy (including logotherapy) an approach to understanding human beings that is genuinely sU'Uggling with the very aspects of existence that Christians find to be mOSl significant. Compared to the bulk of"majnlinc� psychology, which is preoccupied with what seem at times (Q be compardti,'cly rrivial sJices oflife, existen­ tial therapy distinguishes itself by grappling with death. aloneness, choice. meaning. growth, responsibility, guil! and so rorth (Tweedie,

1961, p. 163). No approach to psychology mirrors the concerns of the faith as well as does existential therapy. These concerns are biblical concerns as well. Haden

(1987. p. 58)

argues that the writer of Eccksiastes surveys human life from the ,

human perspective, anI), to confrom what l'laden calls -alienation. He {the lI.'riterj is unable to find significance in nature, in his achie\'e­ ments, ....,Ih reason. or e\'en in seeking OUl lhc plansofGod.-Christians

i the answer- 10 all such concerns, at times naively assert that �Jesus s offering as answers what are often no more than trite Cluistian bumper­ stickel' slogans. But the MiteI' of Ecclesiasles s i more honest than this. Like Kierkegaard. the writer of Ecdesiastes docs nOt simply lapse into relativism either. Rather, he finds meaning in living and choosing responsibly before God. TIle beginning OfUlis proccu s i to "fear God

,

293 right in arguing that the forging of a self is an cIToroul and demanding enterprise. The existence of the realm of�ought,� in addi tion [Q �must �

i human action s i and �can � n ,

an

i ndicati on that OUf nat.ui,11 instincts

do nOI always guide us rightly and that our choices may be agonizing (T....·cedic

.

1961,

p.

164). In this ""IY exislcntial therapy is a refreshing

COntrast to the more nai\'ely optimistic Rogerian and Gestah notions sclf

i g the of formn

by follov.ing one's instinc ts. The Christian may also

lind the distinction between the authentic self and he t -rake selr to be

quite compatible with the biblical pcr.;pective on lhe humall condition.

A Christian understanding of persons could hardly dispute the asser­ tions lhal self-deception and general deception are commonplace and

that despite our beSt efforlS, our trut! self all too oftt!n gelS through to

us

with lhe ·spirit urgings� overl.ly expressed in symptoms of anxiety.

guilt or mood disturbance.

Another problem that we ha\"t� with the existential therapy under­

standing of human nature is the danger of ·psychologizingft-the tendency to gI\'e the subjective psychological perspective on an}' phe­

nomenon pre-eminence over other valid pcrs�cti\'es or the tendency .

to assume that the psychological perspc<:tive is the most basic perspec­ u"e (Vande Kemp, 1986). In existen tial therapy the problem is the ,

extreme emphasis on the subjectivity of our inner experience By .

understanding the reality �out thereft onl}' through the reality Min here

,

ft

we run the risk of becoming almost reductionistic oUrk)"es. The

radical openness [Q experience so deeply valued in existential therapy

can all too easily degenerate into an almost excessll'e emotionalism. Since a true understanding ofour selfdepends on a deep appreciation of a reality external to ourselves (i.e., God), we must become fully cognizant of how we limit our full awareness of the nature of person­ hood when we adopt an epistemological stan�e of extreme relativism and subjectivity. We must understand the limiL5 of our capacities to know or to be known.

Model ofAbnarmality We appreciate that in existential therapy choice and responsibility are taken seriollsly. The existential tradition perceptively describes howwe can bt:come

slUck

"

"

at certain stages of development and become

overly dependent on others to nunure us. The Christian gospel clearly

:usens that to be human is (0 evade responsibilities (cf. the Slory of Adam and Eve; Cen 3). There are striking parallels between thl!

I

existential ther-tpy account of pal.llOJogy and the Romans

I drama

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294

depic ting humans ··...,ho suppress the truth by lheirwickednessw (\I,

18) ; this suppression is both tJle result of their failure to acknowledge the muh they know (self-deception) and a defen se that allo\\'S them to sustain their self-deception. Bul we are convinced thaI the existential understanding of psycho­ pathology is incomplete. first, it looks at guilt only existentially as a manifestation of inauthenticity and nOl as the result ofmoral violatioll (Tweedie. 1961, p. 167). Also, as with OIher humanistic approaches, existential therapy seems to ignore or minimize the importance afthe creaturel), a$pec!.S ofour existence, particularly any biological or socio­ cultura! factors that can play such an important role in the causation or maintenance of psychopathology. Its rather extreme emphasis on choice and rcspomibility introduces an element of hope into the change process, but runs the risk of attributing behavior to choice rather than to other causal faclOTS. Existent.ia1 therapy also runs the risk of only blaming !.he victim. Although personal choice and respon­ sibility are certainly moUor factors in psychopathology, they are dearly not the complete picture. Indeed, 1 Thessalonians 5:14 dearly states ,

that different responses are needed depending on whether a person � i rebellious discouraged or ""'·eak. � Certainly, there are varying degree s ,

or choice and respon sibili ty .....hen dealing .....ith the challenges or

evcryday living.

On the other hand. it is all tOO common ror person� who ha\'egreat

capacities to change to hide behind their symptoms. Existential therapy

correctly srates that anxiety and guilt are all 100 quickly interpreted as �negauve symptoms to be eliminated rather than signs or symbols or tl1C s�ific manner in ....h . ich we ha"en t listened to our awarenesscs. ,

'

few of us do not harbor funtasies or unhealthy dependencies 10....'ilrd symbolic Kp'lrents� in our lives (d. Mt 10:34-39), nor arc many of us

willing to "fmd our 1ife� through losing iL Indeed, existential therapy seems to be a much needed COITt.'Ctive ror tJlOse oruswho become contcnt in our current situations, unwilling LO discipline ourselvcs LO �bt.'Come a self in Ullt.h, relelltJcssly� (cf_ Malony, 1980). We are rar too easily pleased and content \\;tJ1 tJle preservation orhomeostasis or stabili� in our lives, often at great expense 10 our personal dt. ...'e1opmcnL Existentialism tends to assume that there are enormous resources for choice to dra..... on within aU indi\<jduals, Existential ther.lpy should be appreciated ror lhe contribution it has made to our understanding ofhow hgh.runc i tioning persons struggle in Ihe quC:St ror meaning and sibrnificance in tJleir lives. TIlere are probably different degrees or

f;Xlsn:'N1H/. 'I"HEIlAP'J'

295

capacities for choice and responsibility in the broad spectrum of humanity. People struggle with such a diverse range of �problems n i li\'ing� that it seems likely that some are pure wchoice" issues (e.g., to be authentic or inauthentic) while others may invoh'e lesser degrees of choice (e.g., a biologicallr based mania or the residual struggles of a person severely abused as a child). Tlms the expectations for respon­ sibility of the existential (hemp), tradition are highly appropriate for many, but they could become inappropriate and/or unrealistic for others. We thus must be careful about the potential arrog-.mce or pride of applying such an interpretation of competence in a conde!;Cending or patronizing mannel". One can onty wonder whether or not these keen assenions about psychopathology are generalizable outside the context ofAnglo-Amer­ ican psychology. Although uli5 could be said of ncarly all major psycho­ ulerapies, we often arc not aware of the ways in which fundamental assumptions might be limited beyond a particular sociocultural con­ tex!. While choice and Ule ability to shape our self through reflection WQuld dearly seem universal human capacities, is existential therapy's way of understanding these choices pecuia.r l to OUI" highly individual­ istic and selfish culture? Do persons in more communal and less plur.disDc cultures look at these choices differently? Persons in socie­ ties with less leisure time and material prosperity may not have the luxury of reflecting on issues of meaning to such a length as to cause problems in living as they miglu in our culture. Model ofHealth Again. there

are cenainly dimcnsions of existential thelotpy that can be

endorsed by the Christian, bm its view of health appears limited and incomplete. Existential therapy calls us to have an obje
(2 Cor 5:17). Ideally, this should affect how we view believers, unbelit..'\"CfS and the social order (d. Caner, 1985). creatures in Christ

Like"is.e, existential thempy calls us to acccpt ourseh'Cs (or more accurdte1y, our authentic selves) . Unfonunately, it is far less dear about ule need for accepting others as well. The Christian gospel stresses both. bm also stresses the consequences of the Fall (i.e., the recogni­

tion Ihat both the self and others are sinful and fallen) . True Christian

acceptance of ourselves calls us to a high standard of warmth and

,

298

can thus have, in the secular versions, is with oneself; there is no God to meet one in the depths. This does not diminish. however, the importance of the imensifica­ tion of a"''areness n i the context of psychotherapy. As McLemore (1983) has observed, it is lhis vcry dcliber,He kind of soul-searching that will gel us beyond the ready-made explanations for the complexi­ ties that all too often confront us in life. Existential therapy can reduce our inevitable tendencies toward r,u..ionalization, intellectuali7.ation and projection by powerfully confronting us with the many ways in which we attempt to deny and distort our inner realities (Kovel, 1976), i the immediacy of But again, what is to prevent us from waJlowing n ' 1 subjeclh-e experience? t\ keener appreciation for the impor­ our 0.... tance of deep insiglll in existential therapy must be coupled wi!.h an equally strong commiunent to tru!.h external to !.he person, as well as action and healthy relationships with othen. Likewise, there is a real need to recognize !.he importance of our history and heritage, grounded in a Spirit outside of our5Clvcs. Certain themes tend to emerge from !.he .... " ritingsof clinicians about the assets and liabilities of existential therapy. Bt..-cause of its lack of proven effectiveness, atleasl as assessed by widely accepted melhods of empirical validation, some consider it an approach or an attitude with some intuitive appeal. but prefer not to view it as a theory of therapy. Existential therapy offers little specific help in terms of intervention. Wilhout more clearly articulated working models, it is possible for existential therapy to lead to a kind ofanylhing-gocs anarchy, a concern raised by even May himself in his early writings on the subject (1961 ). The philosophy of science embedded in existential therapy cannot help bill lead to some degree of ilTationalism or solipsism, creating a .... dy ofrnea:mring the relatin! dilemma in which we have no "objectiveM ' worth of any clinician's or client's experience. Norcross (1987, p. (3) warns that "in the future, existential therdp)' must move towards a definition for something: !.hat is, in a proacti\'e or positive manner. In doing so, its identity must be firmly rooted n i a coherent and useful theoretical structure. More importaJH. existential therapislS' practices must be examined with particular reference to !.herap)' process and outcome. � Bugental (1978) sees lhis as a difficult but not m i possiblec:hallenge. By rejecting any serious type ofscientific evaluation, existential lherapy lea,,'es us in the difficult position of not kno....ing . how beSt to approach the serious study of ilS distinctive emphases. Hard and creative work

299 \\i.ll need to be done to de\'clop the kind of measures and instruments that get at the deeper dimensions of personhood.

More psychodynamically oriented clinicians fault existential ther­ apy for not doing justice to the complexity of psychodynamics, espe­ dally in terms of the crucial importance of the complex relationship between dient and therapist. There arc certainI)' limitations on free­ dom and choice. both in terms of responsibiity l for symptoms at an indi\'idual le'o'ci, and responsibility [or social order al the community Ie\'ct. We ought not to be radically free for our choices, especially in choosing our rules for living-the Ilet result could be chaos Prochaska,

(cf.

1984). Some tend to criticize secular existential therapy for

focusing too much on anguish, despair and death wiLholit offering much solace beyond keeping a stifTupper lip. Certain emphases in existential therapy on the impanance of the phenomenal world can be appreciated. Indeed, much ofAnglo-Amer­ ican psychology is probably overly objective, dctemlinistic or detached from the �subjecl" (Van Leeuwen,

1985). But existential

therapy runs

the risk of overstating the case for conscious and contemporary expe­ rience (Korchin,

1976).

TIlere is a dear ahistorical bias in existential

therapy that risks ignoring the fact that who ....e . are at any moment in

our del-·clopment surely rcfleCL'i where we have come from. Our capac­ iues to deal with the demands ofeveryday living can surely be increased

i the past and what by a deeper recognition of ho\\' we have coped n skills and sensitivities we need currently to adapt even more effectively. Clearly, much work need'! to be done to make the centr.tl concepLS of existential therapy more readily accessible to academicians, clients. clini­ cians and researchers. The approach needs to ,be more honest abom ilS

limitt.-d applicability in terms of the diverse

and emotional disorders. StiU, both Yalom

an� mried

(1980)

...

.mge of mental

and Bugem al (1978)

claim that it is a powerful paradigm whose key concepts and ideas can be readily n i corpor.u.ed into most p>)'chothcrapemic traditions.

TIlerapisL� in existelllial therapy take on an incredibly imparlao t

role. As Evans

(1989)

has noted, it is on the role of �midwife. Mar \\'hat

Kier].;egaard called the

maielt/ie itito! As Christian clinicians. we want

to assist persons in the war].; of de, cloping the ].;ind of self
will allow t.hem to engage more fully the claims of the Christian gospel on their li"es. Alt.hough it

s i only God who creat.es faith in the individ·

ual, we musllearn how to becomea channcl in which others meet God.

Correctly understood, existential lherapy sees pan of he t problem as our constricted understanding of what our most. essential task is 10 be

•

P'

""

301 -

Afine exampJe ofhow the "existential attitude traditional approache., 10 psychotherapy.

(1990). Zondcrv3.n.

E\'alls. C.

S"m

Kinkpgalml's

Excdkm introduction to

Christinn

can ()(! combined with more

PJ)'ChoWgy. CI-and

R:lpids, MI:

the specifically psychological thought of

Kierkcgaard. Frankl. V,

( 1959). Mall's �arr:h for "wming: All j'ltrodlulum /1) WgrJIhtmpy. New

York: I'ocl:.et Books. The essential imroduclion to logothcrapy. Malon},. H. (Ed,).

(1980). A

GInS/Un!

mslt1Ilial pS)'chology: johll G. fillch. Washington: Unin:rsil}' Press of America.

'I11e

amlribl/riO"l of

A MIr'I"L1' of the thought ofJohn Finch, an influential Christian existential p�"Chologisl. May. R. ( Ed.) .

(\961). ExUUnliolps)'choll>g)'. Na.' York: Random House. The book that is widely credi tcd �il.h inu-oducing existential thought to the North Amerk:1n Kenc.

Mullen.j. (1981). Kitrletgtwrds phirosophy. New York: New American Library. Excellent illlrOOuctioll

lO

the general lhought of Kierkegaard.

Yalom. I. (1980). £xiIUnliolprych(Jlh«afT'j. New York: B...,ic BooklJ. The definitive reference in exislential psychotherapy.

References Benner. O. (1988). PsydlothtrafrJand Ihnpirilualqutjl. Grand Rapids MI; Baker. Bugental.j. (1978). PSJchothtrap>' and frroCts:s Tillfimdamental.s ofan exiJlt7Itial· h"mar,ishC afJIJrrKUh. Reading. M-\.: Addison·Wesley. Bugental J. (1981). Tlu mlrch for authC1licity: An triJtrntialofJnai)'lic approach kJ p!i)'chothtrapy (re\'. cd.). KewYork: Holt, Rinehan and Winston. Carter ] (1985). Healthy personality. In D. Benner (Ed.). Bam C1t:ycJqpdia of prydwlogy (pp. 498-504). Grand Rapids, MI: Baker. Corey. G. (1986). Throry and proaia of coun.sding and psychOlhtrallJ (&I cd.). ,

.

,

.

Mon terey. CA: BrooIu/Coh:.

(1984). ExisIC1halism: Tht phikwphy Of dtjptJir and tht qut$1 f()T h�. Grand Rapids MI: Zonder.-an. E\'3os. C. (1989). Wildo," and humtJnlU'll in psychology. Grand Rapids, Ml: Baker. E\'am, C. (1990). S.rrn �rr1's ChriJhali fJJ>·chckJgy. Grand Rapids. Ml: Zondervan. Finch.J. (1982). Nishkal1Ullwrma. Pasadena. CA: Integration Press. Finch,j., and Van Dragt, B. (1985). Existential psychology and pS)'chotherapy. In D. Benner (Ed.), BaktrrncydofHdia ofprychology (pp. 372 ·377) . Gr.md E\"allS. C.

,

Rapids, Ml: Baker.

(1978). Celtbralion ofdiJciplint. New York: Harper & Row. Frankl, V. (1959). Man$ �TCh Jar IIIfn fl ing: An inlTodl4ction to logothtrapy. New

Foster, R.

York: Pocket Books.

Fraokl, V. (1965).

Tlu dfKt()T and Ih� sIJ!lL' Fro", prychothtruP'J

10

il>gothuap>'. New

York: B:uHam. Frankl, V. (I 9i5).

Tlu IlnmllJciOU5 god. Nel,1 York: Simon and Schusler.

,\/OlJ£R,\'PSYCJIOTllElW'lES

302

"'riedman, M. (Ed.). (1973). TM wori.ds o/ecistmlialiJm: A crihwi rrodn. Chicago:

Uni\'crsiry of Chicago. Haden, N. (1987). Qoheleth and the problem ofalienatioll.

RnJiw, 17, 52-66.

Chrisli4n SdwkJrJ

Heidcgger, �.1. (1962).

Being (lnd timt. New York: Harper & Row. Hurding, R. (1985). RooI� and shoots. London: Hodder and Stoughton. Kaufman, W. (Ed.). (1975). Existnltinlism from DtJ5/orosky 10 Sartu. New York: Meridian.

Kierkegaard, S. ( 1 980). Thuicknes.5 unwMalh (H. Hong and E. Hong, Trans.) . Princeton: Princeton University Pre". Korchin. S. (1976).

MOIhm clinical PSJr1IO�. New Vork: Basic Books.

Ka.'e\.J. (1976). A tomph" guiik to (hl:ropy. New York: Pantheon, 1-.talon)'. H. (Ed.). (1980).

A ChriJtian mJkrlliaf /My,JUJwg:F

77Ii amlriim/ion

of

John G. Find!, Washington: Unh'er5iIY Press of America.

ExislmliaJ /»'jchologj. New York: Random Hou$(:. (1981). FTffl/am and ooliny. Ne",' York: Nonon.

May. R. (Ed,). (1961). May. R.

May. R., and Yalom. L (1984). Existential psychothempy. ln R. Corsilli (Ed.),

ClHT�t ps,CMtMropies (3d ed.) (pp. 354-391). Itasca, IL F'. E. Peacock. McLemore, C. (1983). Hrmt.'it ChriJtianity. Phi l adelphia: Westminster. Mullen,j. (1981). KUmgaard 's philasophy. New York: New American Library. NorcrOM.J. ( 198i). A rational and empirical analysis ofexistential ps),chotherap)'.Jmmml oj ffulfWniJtic Psychakgy,

27, 41-68.

7M critir4i ),fflJl. New York: Harper & Row. i (2d ed.). Chicago: Prochaska.J. (1984). PsJclwthC'apy: A translhmrfflcal analyss

Parks, S. (1986). Doney.

Prochaska,J., and Norcross,J. (1983). Colltcmporal'Y psychotherapistS: Char­ acteristics, pr.lctices, theories. and attitudes.

Ps)'daallwapy: Theary, Rt.0lrda

and Prattiu. 20, 620-627. RoberI.'!. R. (1986. Apri l ) . John Hneh on our IWO selves. Unpublished paper pre5ented at Wheaton College, Wheaton. IL. Rychlak, J. (1973).

Introoudian 10 /Jmanalit), and prydwtlumpy. BOSlon:

Houghton Mimin. Solomon, R. (Ed.). (1974). &isltlitiaLUm. New York: Modern Libr.uy. TiJljch. 1'. ( 1952). � mural?

Tillieh,

to be New Ha\-en, Cf: Yale Uni,'t:�jty Press.

P. (1960). ExL�lenlialism. p!!),chother
['(ll/om/

PsycMlogy, JI. 10-18.

T",·eedie. O. (1961). Logotkrllfr,.. All nHJiuaru i l1 ojFm7lJtl's txistmliai llpproocil to

pSJrhotht.mfr>·from a Christiall IIitu-opoint. Grand Rapids, ;\I1; Baker. Vande Kemp. H. (1986). The dangers or p�)'chologism: The place of God in psyc.hology.Joumal ofPrydwlolrJ and 1'1ita1ogy. 14, 97·109. Van Omgt. 8. (1985). A peace lhal passeth understanding: An existential view of the �dark night.'Journal rifp$)'cJwiogy Vall Leeuwen. M. (1985).

and C/lriJli(lnity, 4, 15-18. TM pmtm in P$)'chology; A (OIltmtfJorary C/lrtili(ln

(lppraisaL Gr.ll1d Rapids, Ml: £erdman,. Yalom. I. (1980). &isle1ltiaillJ)·dwtlu:mfr:j. NL'W York: Basic Book.$.

12 GESTALT THE

y

+

esmh therapy is perhaps the most phenomenological and pragmatic of the humanistic approaciles to people-help­

ing. The exciusi,'e focus in Gestalt therapy is all the here­

and-now ofimmediate experience and the integration offragmented parts of the penonality. Gestalt therapists agree mat emph�g the "why" of beha,ior (i.e.. insight and explanations) or analrz.ing past C\'("nts is far k'SS

therapeutically useful than sucs,ling the more CNen ".'hat� and "how" of present beha,ior. or the specific ways in which unfinished bus.iUCM from the

past intrudes on cum:nt functioning. GestaJt therapy appcals to those who are looking for g,eater depth and meaning in their intimate I'dacionships. Member.; of the religious community might find it especially attractive if they want something beyond the �unheallhy. sticky. manipulative, and symbiotic togetherness" that someLimes �haraclerizes our efforts to build and maintain community (McLemore.

1982, p. 162).

304 The founder of Gestalt therapy, "Fritz� Perls, u-ained as a psy. choanaly:;t in Germany between the wars (as he discusses in his

autobiography. I 969b) . Gestail lherapy reflects certain emphases of t.he psychoanalytic tradition, especially me role of the defense mech­ anisms in the development of symptoms. The academic Gestalt psychology tradition in Europe. which researched sensation and perception, also innuenced Perls. The major characteristics of per­ ception which these researchers stressed arc summarized in such maxims as "The whole is more than the sum of the parts.� The prevalell l existential philosophy of the time also had a substantial impact on Perls. He eventually forged Gestalt therapy as a creative merger of concepts from existential philosophy, psychoanalytic and GeStalt psychology, and techniques developed in the creative or expressive arts (e.g., psychodrama) . Before his death in

19;0, Perls made considerable use of ideas from

Zen Buddhism. Taoism and the human-potential movement. Foryears.

he \\-"a5 a resident "guru� in workshop and retreat centers across North

America. A strong and forceful personality, Perls had a devoted follow­ ing in both lay and professional circles. Although the influence of Gestalt therapy hlU waned considerably in the past decade, il was documented n i videotapes. audiotapes and therapy transcriptS when it l .... '35 at its apex of popularity. Although few clinicians today 'would describe themselves as Gestalt therapy "purists" philosophically or methodologically, many of the techniques of this approach have been widely adapted to the psychotherapeutic context.

Descriptive Survey

Philos&lJhcal i Assumptions aNd Model ofPtncmality The initial formulations ofCestalt therapy by Perls and his colleagues are difficult to evaluate becau!oe they are so decidedly antirational, openly disparaging intellectual precision and rigor. More recent "er­ sions of Gestalt therapy are more respectful of cognitive processes, but they share with earlier formulations a tremendous di5dain for "mind games" (irrational intellectualisms or rationalization!'), A5 such, its proponents lend not to delaiJ the philosophical assumplGood $umm.arie� of its therapc:ulk strategies can be found in F3ian and Shepherd 11970).JamenndJongeward (1971). Lamer (197') . Passon& ( 1975). Polsterand Po�ter (197'). Simkin and VanIer (1984). Van De Riel:and Korb (1980) and Zinker (l978).

305

(;JI �TM.TTNEJHI'I'

tions or v.dues on which the Gestalt therapy is based. making it more difficult

to perceive ils implicit con\1cuons aoom human nature.

C' ...cst..'lh therapy is an approach that stresses the unity of mind, body and feelings. It is a hybrid approach th:tt draws rdther freely on psychodynamic and phenomenological formulauons. Gestah places great emphasis on awareness, authenucity, confrontation. encounter. immediacy, personal responsibililyand ri5k taking. The keyassumpuon is that .....e are fully resfxmsible for our own behavior and experiencing. Perhaps this is nowhere more clearly evident than in the widely qUOled �Gestah pra}"er�: "I do my thing and you do your thing. I am nOt in this ....orld . to live up to your expectations and you are nOt in this ....orld . to live lip to mine. You are you and

I am I and ifb)' chance .....e find each other, i['s beautiful. IfnO{, it can't be helped� (Perls. 1969a, p. 4). Easily

n i terpreted only as a license for self-gratification or irresponsible hedonism, it more accurately reflects the extreme emphasis gestalt therapy places on personal autonomy as well as the need for individuals to more fully experience the present moment through n i creased awareness of what they are thinking, feeling and doing when they are interacting with others. Perls argued that persons are essentially biological organisms .... 'ith slTong needs. He generally limited these to breathing, hunger, thirst, sex, shelter and survival. A major task in a given day is to gel these organismic needs, or "end-goals,M meL The meeting of these needs in the present situational context i� the Gestalt-therapy version of a "self-actualization" drive (as opposed to the "optimization of personal potential" version of Rogenan psychology, chapter ten). Meeting one's o' .. .. n current organismic needs in a constructive. creative and healthy fashion is the ultimate goal ofGestah therapy. This could result in either greater self-integration or hedonism, depending on one's perspective. Whether this will translate into more responsible ethical and moral behavior in th(' larger societal context is a matter of n i tense debate in both lay and professional circles (e.g., Browning, 1987) . Gestalt therapy assumes that greater a....areness of organismic needs and situational requirements s i curative in and of itself. Persons are assumed to have the capacity

.....

within to support themselves in adaptive

a ys if the), are \\illing to examine and perhaps change the unique and

specific ways in which they see, feel, sense and interpret the realities of their personal needs and

of their situational context in the present

moment. In other words, accurate perception ofselfand surroundings

,I'ODFA\,I'SI'alanlF.RAPIr.5

306

will unk-ash the inherent capacity of the individual to rn/!(!t his or her own needs.

Fonner students of "introductory psychology should remember "

the example of the [amOlL' figurt/grmmd perceptual phenomenon,

most often exemplified by the ·fac�...ase� figure When olle focuses on .

the vase, the faces become mere background. but when onc focuses on the faces on either side of lhevase figure, the vase disappears to become mere background. Perls assened that ....e . nonnally form figure/ground perceptions of our needs, but experience these as discomfort or pain when they are disrupted (called "dis-imegratctr figure-glound differ­

entiation by Gestalt therapiSts). Perls argued that grtaU:r QUNlfflUSS of

our organismic needs and silUational requirements could pOlcntially result n i greater j1lt�gratum. We try out wlutions, discard those that do

not work for us and assimilate those I"hich do work for us. As we bring completion to these end-goals, we form wholes or

·GestaltsM which we can �Ict go or.M The assumption, consistent with

other humanistic approaches. is that there is an innate tendencywilhin all ofus to become more self-aware and thereby move toward a position

orgreater autonODl)' orwhoJem.-ss (the term Gestalt therapy practition­ er.! tcnd to use instead of aUlonomy).

GeStalt therapy places absolute confidence in our capacity to regu­ late ourselves from within. Authority resides exdusiw/y with that a....-are­ ness. External criteria apan from subjective experience are not to be tnlSted. "Mind g-.unes· (and often cognitive processes in general) are downplayed becauS(: Ihey lend to be the repository of rules, laws or regulations that have been assimilated from others withoU! personal integration. Thus these externally dcril'Cd rules almost inc\;tably result in unhealthy forms of dependence. usually in persons rdying on moralisms or Mshoulds- for guidance rather than on their own percep­ tions. Gestalt therapy has a rather low view of accountability to others since our wants and needs assume a position of absolute primacy. The i fully alive and aware, who fully functioning person is the one who s meets biological needs in an adult and responsible fashion. and who is not dependen t on others to meet these needs. lndh�duality tends to

be glorified and this can readily translate into a low view of relation­ ,

ships. In other words, we arc responsible to support ourselves fint and foremost and to stop depending on othen; to meet our needs for u�. Self-sufficiency, then, is a pre-eminent \;rtue in GeStalt therapy. In therapy Gestalt practitioners place great emphasis on our capac-

CESrALTTHERAI"l

307

it)' to take care of ourselves. The assumption is that in the long run il1 help us find continuous perceptual feedback and integl<'ltion .... adaptive and healthy \\<'Iys \0 meet our needs through our proactive responding. This is certainly a pragmatic and often bnlt.ally realistic (if 1101 pessims i tic) approach LO human relationships. The visible social roles we adopt. Perls argued. usually reflect the kind of dependencies \\'e prefer o\'er more autonomous methods of meeling our needs, Gestalt therdpists are oftcn suspicious of roles.

Model ofHealth i itself. In Gestalt therapy. psychological wholeness is seen as an end n Peds "'armly embraced the humanistic spirit of the 1960s, contend­ i you truly want to grow as a person. you must �lose your ing that f mind and come to your senses. � This is generally interpreted to mean that ....'c think tOO much in self-defeating ways and are not aW·dre enough of what we arc doing or experiencing, especially emotionally. in any given moment. In Gestalt therapy, the healthy person is the one who is free of fa{ades and is not preoccupied with fixed social roles or with thinking �too much"' (e.g .. alwa}'s making excuses), Healthy indi\iduals are fully cognizant of their end-goals and find constructive ways to meet their biological needs. The psychologically whole person in Gestalt therapy is open and respon­ sh'e to the full range of organismic experience and is fully function­ ing in the hcre-and-now. The "constraints of the pastR or the �puJl of the futureW are generally seen as kdistrdctions." Healthy individuals take full responsibility for themselves but not for anyone el<;e. TIley arc truly self-supporting and certainly nOt dependent on outside sources of affirmation for their existence. In shon, authentic and healthy adult'l trust tJlt'mselvcs, arc fully alive and aware. know their biological ne(.'"{\s and can meet these in a nondcpendem and non­ manipulatke manner. By doing thm. they f,lcilil.1.te their personal groM.h and achieve a higher degree of organismic seU: regulation. Since consid­ erably less time will be spenl on manipulating the environment to meet their needs, they arc a lot freer 10 authentically and congruently respond to the needs of others. CorrecrJy speaking, che goal of Gestalt ther.lpy is nonmanipulation--one's true identity will only emerge LO che extent that aile is ultimately �truthfll[" with self and othe�. Model ofAbnormality

Problems in Ih'ing originate when one is not fuJI)' functioning (expcri·

30B i most often due to the intrusion cllcing) in the here-and-now. This s of '"unfinished business� from the past or an unwillingness to become more fully aware. For example, as children, we may be taught nOi to

truSt ourseh'e5 but rather to obey rules forced on liS ("You'll take a nap

when I saYroli'\I take a nap. young man!"). to deny and disLOrt our own emotional reactions ("Wipe that scowl off your face and say you are son,.I"). to define QursclvC5 in ingenuine ways ( "You wert: quiet all afternoon; that's a nice girl!") and to prefer environmental support 10 self-supporl (�I don '\ care \\'hal yOli think; do it my way and itwill come Qut right!"), Our needs cannOt be mer in adaptive and heallhyways if we are IlOt aware of them to begin with. The Wofigure" (our needs) never clearly emerges from the �bad.ground-

(all the competing needs) and thus

we never act in accordance with our more "intuitive� instincts. When needs are unmet, they do not namrally recede into the back.ground; this is what Gestalt therapy calls

unfinisW flusines.s. We then

tend to

subsequently distort the sensory-perceptual field and stimuli ve receive ..

in other contexts. Eventually, we begin to see everything incorrectly

(d. Perls. 1969a) . We become ncreasingly i preoccupied with the social

roles we choose as an expression of our other-dependence; these evemually become the games we play. WiLh repetition. these games 'Iled � become self-destructive and rigid patterns that symbolize diso.... ..

or "fragmented � parts of our true personality; they are only pan of ....ho .

we are, hut we mistakenly belie\� they make up

ali of our identity. We

choose to he less than we could be by not choosing to become more alive and authentic in the present moment. Our problems or symptoms are "signs� or "symbols" of the dh-eTSe

. we attempt to avoid awareness of Qur momenl-to-mo­ and varied ....ays ment experiencing. All problems are at some level �con games" perpe­ trated by the person for the purpose of running away from awareness. Consequently, our energies � misguided intO the social roles we play i to meeting our biological and the symptoms we manifest. rather than n needs in more adaptive ways. The full range of our emotional and sensor),-perceptual processes becomes constricted. and ....e . develop in�asingly fragmented vieo..-'S of ourselves as well as our external environments. Perhaps the most widely recognized contribution of the Geslalt therapy model of psychopathology is its emphasis on the differem layers of deceit (after Corey. 1986) . The initial layer is the phon, level

where we play games in our social relations, acting out what we think

•

P'

,

)10

MODERNPSrCJIOTIIFJIM>fES

Model yd>oll"fry ", In a now-famous demonstration of his methods, Perls (Perls and ShoSlrum, 1965) began an interview with Gloria by smung that they ....·ould be talking for ", brief time. Gloria responded that she was ver)' nervous and afraid about talking with Perls, to which FritZ immediatel)' replied, "You say you are afraid but you are smiling.� He proceeded into a series of rather direct confrontations with the dient about the incompatibility of fear and smjJjng. and never once throughout the intelView asked what the dient would like to talk about. He thus exemplified how Gestalt therapy pushes for awareness (and -frustrates

the neurosis�) in the present, with rhe confidence that the aware dient

\\-;\1 solve her own problems in her

0\\'11

time. To push for insight.

conceptual formulations and so forth is notJUSt a waste of time, but can be a reinforcement of the client's defenses against awareness. Gestalt therapy is a highly ex.periential therapy that stresses -doing" more than -.saying. -It seems especiallY"'eU suited for group rather than individual therapy. Its core assertion is that we "ill grow only to the extent that we come to grips with the "what"and -how" of our behavior

n i the here-and-now. For Perls

.

....'C

less need to be affirmed for who we

are (Rogers) and more need to stop pla)ing games, summon the courage to percei\'e ourselves and our ....,orld accurately. and stand on our 0....'1 twO feeL Grov.'th is thw not through affirmation (Rogers) as much as it is through confrontation and encounter. Immediacy and \�tality in experience are the ultimate virtues in Gestalt therapy. The ·shoulds· of collecti\'e morality are seen as vices, especially when they are used as a substitute for avoiding personal responsibility or risk-taking in the interpersonal context. As Korchin

(1976) has perceptively observed, Gestalt therapy's strongest appeal is perhaps to lhosc persons who feel o\'erburdened and oversocialized by the demands of contemporary Western societies btll feel relatively powerless in their drorts to become more aware of their own needs and wallL'1 (i.e., they are ·out of IOUch,. Gestalt therapy is certainly the most directive and confronti\'C approach to people-helping. If it follo\"'$ rrom the theory that clients must discover the fragmented parIS of their personality. then it follows that this can only be achieved by focusing exclusi\'eiy on the direct experience of the here-and-now. Working primarily through the ob­ ,orks tow-.m! the servable nonverbal and bodily clues. the therapisl .... goal of assisting the client in scelting fe....er environmental or external supports and (award greater intl.'grity and personal respons.ibility. B)'

]J2 whal CQnsu;clcd ill lheir abilil}' LO express either the depth orfull range of their feelings and who arc relatively free of �gross� psychopathology (e.g., psychosis. severe neurosis, org-<mic mental disorders, develop­ mental disabilities, ctc.). While judged by many to be effective in helping those who tcnd to overcontrol or repress their emotional expressiveness, serious concern should be raised about whether it should be used wilh persolls who are, comparatively speaking. un­ dercolltrOlled or impulsive (e.g., antisocial or oorderline). Both clients and therapists in Gestalt therapy are actively involved

n i encountering and confronting unfinished business--that is, unre­ solved figure/background Gestalts. Trea.�ured virtues in Gestalt ther­ apy. developed through greater organismic self-regulation, include full acceptance of personal responsibility, living fully n i the present mo­ ment and direCi experiencing as opposed to talking about things. \Vhen we are truly willing to confront our Mimpasse," greater energy is released as we �implode" and e\'Cnmally �explode � into the full recog­ nition of our biological needs. Until then, we will only wperfecl our nt'uroses� rather than conIron! them. Only when we are willing to confront lhe contradictions and polarities of our lives can we move toward reintegration of the -disowned� pans of our being.

Ouistian Critique

Pflilosophiool Assumptions and Model ofPersrmality GeStalt therapy smves to be a system that optimizes human freedom and autonomy while putting thinking in its proper place. We will discuss autonomy below, but will here focus all the understanding of freedom and cognition. First. \\-;th Browning

(1987)

we

\\-1)uld note thaI in making self-ac­

tualization a narrowly biologically based dri,'e for fulfillment, Gestalt thcr..lpy renders il� account of human nature one which actually makes it impossible for human beings LO transcend their physiological con­ straints. Gestalt therapy a.ssens thai

.... e .

are ultimately free only when

.....e do what our biological llrges push us to do, assuming that we act n i a nonmanipulativc manner. This runs the risk of being a profoundly impoverished view offreedom. By equating being human \\;th being physiological, humans are trapped. Perls's injunctions to follow one's biological urges rna)' create lhe illusion of choice, but Ih(..",), aClually dcplelc our greatest window of choice, thai being our capacity to transcend, lI.;th God's help, the

,

r .l :sT M .T TIIM/'"'1'1'

113

bounds or Ollr own sellishncss and physicalness to do what God calls U� to. To he human is to be a biological being (and to rejoice in that stale) . but we are not merely biological beings. The broader issue in Browning's (1987) analysis is that psychothcr­ apy systems often take somewhat legitimate descriptions of Mnonmoral goods,� such as feelings. needs, awareness and so forth, and then arrange them in conll
.

,

314

An undue emphasis on objectivity and detachment in science and tife may contribute to some seriOllS social and relational problems. Nonethclcs�, these are some of the �ssential qualities that will be nceded (in proper perspective) f i we are c....cr going to improve lhe ....orld . in which we live, Gestalt therapy's abandonmemofthe quest fOf purpose and meaning is hardly a satisfying alternative. The need to know. to properly understand, is at least as central to living a life of integrity as is the Geslah·therapy imperati\·c to be fully alive to the moment. Quite frankly. undersranding is a basis for hope. The socialization process inherent in cerlain versions of Gestalt therapy rna)' run the risk of encouraging people 10 adopt unhealthy positions of arrogance. autOnomy. irrationality or isolation. Personal freedom and the need for organismic self-expression, the values pushed in Gestalt therapy, can easily lead to a -do your own thing" approach in life. Granted, this may more accuralely reflect a lack of !.rue awareness of self, or a paucity of good feedback from others, but without any dear sense of obligation or responsibility to an)'one except oneself, GeStalt therap)' runs the risk of epitomizing a philosophy of irresponsible hedonism. We would agree with Yankelovich (1982, p. 239), who in discussing some of the potential risks of the more explicitly humanistic strdlcgics of personal growth and dC\'e!opmelit commented: "By concentrating day and flight on your feelings, potentials, needs, wants, and desires, and by learning 10 assen them more frecly, you do not become a freer, more spontaneous, more creative self; you become a narrower, more self-<entered, more isolated one. You do not grow, you shrink.� Such a stance is nowhere commended in Scripture. Perhaps for some who are excessively emotionally constrained or locked in martyr roles, this socialil.alion process makes sense in a limited, lempor.tl way. But for tlle majoril}' of us, the n«d is to learn how to relate to others in more loving and nonmanipulative ways, with the distinct risk that cermin of our needs most certainly will not be met. Indeed, it is this kind ofcommitment to caring that speaks volumes about our character as well as to those virtues we hold most dear. The initial goal of greater self-awareness in Gestalt therapy is not necessarily incompatible with the Christian tradition. BUl lhe key issue is the type of �self-a\>''3.Teness'' being ad\'0C3.ted. The conformity pres­ sures within our Christian communities and subcultures run the risk or denying and distorting �rsol1a1 experience (d. McLemore. 1984). More underslanding about the way we manage the inevitable differ-

,

,

315 encesofopinion that occur in human relationships might do much to help our Christian communities achie\'c a grealcr sense of unity of purpose. Like.... ise. greater candor about our efforts to create intimacy i portant beginning point in establishing in relationships might be an m and enhancing rruly interdependent relationships. But we are concerned about the extreme emph;asis in Gestalt lherapy on self-awareness and self-fulfillment as critically important goals in themselves, especially when they arc not translated into a broader relational context. The balanced Christian is nOtjusl selfo(.ii­ reeled but other-directed as well. Self-sufficiency is ultimately an illu­ sion since we are created

to be

in relationship with God and others.

While we should take seriously the need 10 be fully alj\"c and aware, it is not a substitute for: concentrated and focllsed ministry that is primar· ily other-directed. Personal experience should indeed be valued, but its value is limited, especially .....hen compared to the importance of the authority of Scripture or the discerning role of the local community of belicvers. To Perls and other Gestalt therapists, the willingness to conform oneself to moral rules from the Scriptures and the guidance of others would

be seen as a form of dependent, ingenuine �other-regtllation. �

The pursuit of autonomy or wholeness rules a1l. Gestalt therapy at its best-when it is relatively free of its irresponsible hedonistic distor­ l l an incomplete education. The awareness that isso deeply tion�is sti \'3.lued in Gestalt therapy is only a partial and temporal understanding of ccrtain aspeCtS of selves, but when this assumes a position of absolutc primacy in our understanding of who we arc it is most certainly a pemicious \lc...... Finall)', we note the strong distrust of thinking in most \"Crsions of Gcstalt therapy (Benner,

1985). Though it would be fuir to say that we

all engage in '-mind games� in the course of evcryday existence, the fear of irrational intellectualism and rationalizations need not-and should not-generalize to the whole domain of cogniti\'e processes. The �go .....ith your gUl� instinct that lends lO emcrge from most forms of Gestalt therapy potentially leads to destructive pluralism and re\ati,·· ism where there is eventually little hope of achieving any clear consen­ sus on integrating theory or, more import.'lntiy. a cohercOI purpose or reason for li'lng. Pan of our difficulty in writing about Gestall thcnpy is Ihat a clearly

i the writings of Peds and articulatcd model of personality is lacking n others. Gestalt thenpy is almost deliberately antiscientific or at least

Jl6 prcscientific. Indeed, to be told that !.he only true WdY LO wunderstand�

GeSL1.Jt therapy s i to

cxpc rience

w

it� can iea\'c the "uninitiated" with a

strong sense of frustration (if not exasperation ) . To be fair though ,

,

this is not unlike the dilem ma that exi�ts when the nonbeliever uies to fully comprehend Scripture. A fair statement would probably be to

assert that Gestalt therapy requires a "leap offaith in which lhe novice ..

must be willing, al lea�t temporarily. to suspend certain critical faculties in order to morc fully appreciate its cUr.l.tive potemials.

Model ofHmlth Some aspects of Gestalt therapy's view of health are not incompatible with the Christian \iew ofwholeness. For example. Gestalt therapy has enriched our understandn i g ofwhat it means to be truLhful

.

ItS prim:uy

emphasis on nonverbal distortions has given us significant insights

aOOm the �larel'S of deccit� that all too oftcn charactel;ze our in terper­ sonal relationships (d. Mclemore.

1984). Gestalt therapy tcaches us

about the need to place greater stress on experiencing and doing rather dian merely talking about things. cenai nly a reasonable admon­

ishment to lilo8C ofus .....ho care deeply about facilitating a commitment

to lifelong learning and growing.

To a limited but significant degree. the emphases in Gestalt therapy on body awareness. direcmess, freedom. honesty. openness. responsi­ bility and spontaneity can be appreciated. Perls correctly says that our �problems in living� are often a function of our mjsuse of these capacities. of our deliberate decisions LO �play games� or of our 10slng

courage. But these �means, R these capacities. "'ere meant to serve far different �ends� for the Christian. They are not directionless, but ....ere .

meant to be targeted on a goal. We are told repeatedly to embrace

justice and mercy, walk humblr and show compa.\Sion not because of .

what they �do� for us, but because they are appropriate responses to Cod's grace. Clearly lacking in Gestall therapy is any concept of hol.iness or spiritual maturity, Self-fulfillment in proper alignment might be good temporal stewardship of our gifts and talents, but it needs to be directed tOward a much higher purpose worshiping God and serving others because "he first loved us."

A person may embody the characteristia. of health as developed in

the Gestalt therapy tradition, yet be living an impoverished life in a

spiritual sense. On the other hand, persons who appear (at least on the surface ) to have achieved some measure ofspri i mal holiness could be

living lh"cs that are personally or psychologically bankrupL To be fair,

317

however, it should be said thai it is possible for a person to embody aspects of the Gestalt therapy vicw of health and also be mature spiritually. Indeed, we have both inleraned with colleagues who em· braced certain clementS orthe Gestalt therapy vision ofhealth without visibly sacrificing their Christian commitment and witness. Authentic maturity implies a high degree of congruence between the inner and outer dimensions of our lives. We fear that GeStalt therapy all too often stresses the former ""iLhout seriously addressing the laller. The enduring question Ulat emerges is whether the more fully functioning person in the Gestalt therapy tradition is any more reccp­ li\'c to basic assertions of the Christian faith. Our fear is that this fulfilled penon in the Gestalt therapy understanding may be an indi­ vidual who is culturaJly, historically and personally dislocated. Indeed, the person may have an inflated .sense of self, or at least a seriously incomplete understanding of her or his fundamental humanity. Our identity as Christians is deeply rooted in a grO\\ing sense of our place in the march of redemptive history, nurtured in the context of Christian community. We feel strongly that it is a decided risk in Gestalt therapy that one can be so Wfully alive to the moment� that one loses all sense of a proper respect for the past or appropriate concern aboul the future. The potential distrusl of�righl thinking" (i.e., orthodoxy) can result in such extreme detachmelll from external reality and transcendent absolutes that there is little engagement in the demands of everyday living iJerond the personal realm. Although it may be argued thai we exaggenHe Ihe risk.� invoh'ed, from an eternal perspec" tive, we should nOt take these concerns liglllly. We fear that one of the main \inues of Gestalt therapy, self-understanding, might potentially lead to the pride inherent in a gro""ing sense of self- sufficiency rather than self-support.

Model ofAbrllJrmaJity There is much in the Gestalt therapy model of psychopathology that the Christian can find useful. The description of the levels of our deception, for example. can be painfully aCCU••He (cf. McLemore, 1984; Peck, 1983). In Christianity. these aberrations are ultimately consequences of the Fall, and more directly and immediately the result of our propensity toward sinning. In Gestalt therapy, they are first and foremost decisions to get others to take responsibility for us and meet our needs. Further, Gestalt therapy does not addreS!! the origins ohuch deceit in the larger societal context; psychopathology s i primarily a

MOI)fJtVl'Sl'CHOTHERAPD:S

318

�nalchoice to remain o\'erly dependent, inauthentic and irrespon

­

sible. In contraSt, a mOTe complete understanding of deception in the

Christian context v;c\\'5 sin as both personal and corporate. as well as

both phenomenological and historically determined. Ge5tah therapy focuses only on how the broader context s i individually manifested and/or experienced. Gestalt therapy manifests a om "-dimensional perspective on causa­ .. tion of abnormality, with little attention paid to broader physiological or sociocultural determinantS. As with other humanistic therapies. there is the decided risk in Gestalt therapy of placing too much emphasis on personal responsibility, thw mistakenly attributing too much responsibility to the self. a prodi\ity that social psychologists have convincingly demonstrated thai we are all prone 10. Still, radical personal responsibility. although initially overwhelm­ ing. carries with it the polential for change and Ihe hope for alleviation of S}mploms (i.e f i )'ou "cawed- your problems. you can v.ith greater .•

awareness �confront- them). Dt.'Spite this o,,",iou$ advantage. the one­ sided emphasis on personal atuibmion is simply misguided in ligtH of

the O\'Crwhclming evidence for the complcxiry ofcausation. Christian, would do well to be reminded that emotional and personal problems are nearly always more complex than they appear to be on the surface

(i.e., they are multiplely determined and multiplety maintained) . Un­ fortunately. our statements about the origins of these concerns are far too often naively simptistic, if not condescending and patronizing.

Mod" "hydooth=py

Responsible clinicians generally appreciate a number of emphases in GeStalt therapy. Exploring inconsistencies between what is said and

what is done is fertile material to pursut'- in any approach. Gestalt

therapy seems unusually insightful with reference to the games ,,'e play in our interpersonal relationship s. Its emphasis on �doing� rather than

just Msaying� introduces

nt.'W

dimensions of accountability into the

psychotherapeutic relationship. The methods of confronting and directly encountering "unfin­ ished business- have enormous intuitive appeal to many clinicians who

work wilh reasonably high-functioning diems. Focusing on the -how� .. :hal� of behavior and experience ce rtainly seems to mise clienl and '\

awareness. Although few therapists wilt go as far as the Gestalt therapist

does to MfrUSU-.Ht: the neurosis,� they generally agree ulat Mcontrol

issues� are cemrnl to the process of change and healing. Perls pereep-

,

,

('�:sr

"" .T 1'l1Jo;J1AM'

319

b"c!y observed that many of us \o'oould rather have Mconfirmation of our

neuroses" than confront our inevitable tendency to deny, diston or

diso\O,ll parts of ourselves, Most of us can recogniz e dimensions of

ounelves in the "Iarc� of deceit- in the model of psych opathology in Gestalt therapy. Gesrah therapy is decidedly critical of what it perceh"e5 to

be

distorted dC£ensive thinking, and often tends to be explicitly nonra­ ,

tiona!. Cognitive processes arc distrusted as a source of insigh t into

ourselves. This is simpl)' inconsistent with the more holistic emphases

of Scripture and the Christian tradition. The Scriptures emphasize the

rene\'ral of the mind as well as otller important aspects of our human­

ness (e .g. the body and feelings). Correctly understood, what \\'e really ,

need to do is to stop engaging n i SO many speculations rationalizations, ,

explanations or mani pulations (Perls's -lose your mind") and renew

our whole beings.

As

is increasingly being seen in the cognitivl.'-behavioral tradition

(cf. chapters seven and eigh t)

,

lhouglllS and beliefs appear to play a

significant role in the deve.lopment and main�enance ofpsychopathol­

ogy and the healing of these problems. Perhaps in part because it so

questions lhe value ofexcuses and explanations Gestalt therapy all too ,

easily translates into a more widespread distnJsI ofcogn itive processing

in general. Gestalt lherapy is obviously ill nec..-d of a cognitive theory that will balance its overemphasis on biological end-goals. It correctly

diagnoses the potential distortions of certain cognitive processes. but it is less than satisfying in what it proposes as a viable alte rnative.

Another concern often raised by some contemporary clinicians has

10 do with the Mg-allles� or �nJles" of Gesralt therapy. Few doubt that

these procedures and techniques are powerful tools, but the concerns

surround the possible misuse or abuse of these tools in a power game

perpetrated by the thcrapi.�t. It is certainly possible for the clinician to er wit h he enter into all unhealthy relationship of po.... l client, or lO

a\'oid dealing

\\-itll

his or her own countertnmsference problems.

As

with all approaches lhe issue appe-ars to be one or timing, tact and ,

sen:;itv i ity as well as the pc:rsonal and profess ional competencie5 and ,

qualities of Ule clinician (Guy.

1987). BUI until recently (Hedlin. 1987;

Simkin and Yomef. 1984) there ha.\ been little written about how best

to deal with some of the polential limitations or risks inherent in these

GeStalt therapy proced m-cs.

Gesctlt lhcrapycan be of use to us as we seek to more fully compre­ hend import:Ul t dimensions of the human condition. Gestalt therapy

)20 has taught ussomcthing aboUl Lht: importance ofbcing more fully alive to

the momenL It would certainly be fair to say thai for some of us, our

obsessive remembering of the past, OUf anxious anticipation of lhe future or QlIr drive to understand everything in a three-point sermon greatly interferes with our capacity to be present to onc another in our fcllo....-ship. A11 lOo often in our Christian communities, what passes

for ,;lovcP is more accurately an unhealthy dependence on others. masked under the guise of ·togcthcrness� Of MChriSlian unity" (d. Parks, 1986). What is truly needed in an age of cultural relativism and isolated individualism is examples of cohesi\'c and healthy communities where commilmenLS 10 one another are made, honored and maintained (cr. Smcdes, 1988), That sticky and manipulative symbiotic clo�ncs.� that

Gestalt therapy so accur.llCly exposes raises tough questions about the b."\ses on which �Christian fellowship" all too often forms. As 1\lillcrand Jackson (1985) have observed, perhaps this is because ...·.c rcally do not know how to be fully present to one another 01' how to really listen to

what the othcr person has to say. A'I a Gestalt therapist might respond, if \'i'e \'i'ere more �aware" and look greater �responsibility" for our thoughlS, feelings and actions, wc might be able \0 become mare sensitive and U'uly compassionate in our relationships. One can only wonder f i the atlCmpts at community in the Gestalt thentpy tradition during the past three dec-ddes have been any more successful than the Christian fellowships throughout U1C last IWO mil· lennia. Suffice it to say that it is our position that these communities will need a much deepe.· commitment to shared trllLhs. the Truth, if they are going

[0

sun;ve the less than attractive dimensions of our

fundamental humanity.

Although ule vk....'.. of persons in Gestalt therdpy is incomplete and

the suggested strategies for remediation are inadequate for fully con­ fronting the human condition, onc can hardly fault this tradition's blunt and frank assessment of the layers of deceit that all lOO oflen surround us. Awareness of the many subllc and diverse forms of .sclf­ deception we engage in is certainly a desirable goal for the committed . �the truth" has been more Christian, especially in those circles ....here . (Mclemore. 1984), or as a me-dns to bringing oflen used as a ....eapon about conformity to the expectations of others (Peck., 1987). The resulting enmeshment of identities, or the symbiosis of relationships. often makes it exceedingly difficult to separate our authentic ChriStian

beliefs and convictions from the cultural U'ends and values ....e . all 1.00

,

M()()f.RNPSt "C/ f(ftH£RIi I'ffS

)22 Mclemore:,

C. (1984). ffrmt'sl Chrislillnity. Philadelphia: Westminster.

Although not directly related w Gestah therapy. its powerful anai)-ms ofwhy it s i

50 diflicuh to be truthful in the (onu:.Kt of Christian conununitics s i

ccrtainly relevant. Perls, F. (1969). hi and oul OIIM gurlxlgt pwI Moab, lIT: Real People Press The rather entertaining autobiography of the founder of Ge1talt tberap)'. .

Polster. E., and Poister, M. (1973).

(Astall. Ihtrofry intwatm: Conl(ll.lr:J of IhnJry

and pmdia. New York: Bnltlncrjl>'Iazd. A major professional I'ourk gcared toward practicing clinicians ... 'ho walH to under:smnd and appreciate me contributions of Gestalt therapy. Van Dicrt V and Korb, M. (1980). .

.•

�1aiJ 1luran': An introduction. New York:

Pergamon Prm. A morc recent profc$Ilionai discussion of the therapy

U.5C'$

and benefitS of gt:lltah

.

Zinker, J. (1978).

CUaliw prrxtD

in Getalt

tMm/? New York: Random

House!Vintage.

Represents some of the more reccm adaptations of Gestah therapy for a

variety of clinical concerns and populations.

Rererences Bellah, R., Ma
ofllu Iuort. New York: Harper &: Row. Benner, D. (1985). Gestah therapy. In I). Benner (Ed.). lJaIw f'nC'Jtlopedia

of

ps,dIoJogJ (pp. 468470) . Gr-.md Rapiw, M): Baker. BrOWIlillg, D. (1987). Jli!ligiow Ihought and /he�, prydwu'l,rin. Philadelphia: Fortress. Corey, G. (1986). Thiory and

pmctia of rouPiStling and pryclwthmJ", (3d ed).

MOnlcrey, CA: Brooks/Cnlc.

100, am m<1I1. Waco TX: Word. DonOV"An, V. (198.5). Ollistianiry Tf'diJwr.vrtd. r.·bryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.

Dolby,j. (1968). /,

.

Fagan,].. and Slu:pherd. I. (Eds.). (1970). Jile laJmiqun in Galoll themfrJ. New York: Harper &: Row. Guy,j. (1987).

Tlu pt:rJtmaJ life of 1M PJYdwtherapiJl. New York.:

Wiley-Illlcrsd..

cnce.

Hedlin. S. (1987). Gestalt therapy: Asp«15 of e"\"Olving theory and practice. Tlu:

HlllMniJtilPrytlwlogi.Jt,

15, 184-196

James. M., andjongeward. D. (1971). Hom 10 wi,,;

TmnJacti01Uli lmalysis with

�tall .xptj"ilPWnU. Reading. rotA: Addison-Wesley.

Modern clinirolps,dwwgy. New York: Basic Books. L'lmcr,j. (197�). TIv GQlait thnapy booIt.. New York: Bantam. Korchin. S. (1976).

J..e.u .1 ky. A., and Perls, F. ( 1970). The rules and games of Gestall therapy. In J. Fag:Ul and I. Shepherd

(Eds.), Catah IhmJpy now (pp. 14()..149). New

York: Harper & Row/Colophon. McLemorc.

C. (1982). T� $Catidol oJp�,·,hoIhnaPJ. Whcaton: TyndaJe.

Mclemore, C. (1984). Miller, W

.•

HOTllsl Chrislianity. Philadelphia: Wcsuninster.

and Jackson. K. (1985). Pmaico/

prycholog] lor pa1·lrm. Englewood ,

,

CI-:STALTTIfEJW"I'

323

Cliffs. NJ: Prentice-Hall. Parks, S. (1986),

77� crilico./JMQ. New York: Harper & Row Pauon�, W. (1975). Gnlalt approaches in wunMlirlg. New York: Holt, Rilll:han and Winston. Peck. M. ( 1 983).

PropII: a/llu Ii,. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Peck, M. ( 1 987).

Tlu difftrelll drum. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Perls. F. (Featured therdpistJ. and ShOSlflUiI. £.. (Producer) . (1965). 17rra approacAeJ to prycholhm1.py: Part 2, FmJrid P,rn {FilmJ. Corona Del Mar, CA.:

Psychological and Educational Film,. Perls. F. (l969a).

GtslalllMm/'Y verMlim, Moab. lIT: Rcal People Press. Perls. F. (1969b). In and aut oJt� gartxwpaiL Moab. UT: Real People Prcu. Polster. E., and Poisler, M. (1973). GnmlllMm/Y1 inllgrnUd: Con/lmr:l oj Ihmry and ",adj". N�' York: Brunner/Maze!.

Simkin.]., and Vontef. G. (1984). Gestah lhemP}'. In R. Corsini (Ed.). Con/eln·

pornry pSJdwihtrapin (3d cd.) (pp. 279-319). ItaSCa. IL: F. E. Peacock. Smedc:s. L. (1988). Cari.11( and colllll;l lmmt. San Francisco: Harper & Row. Smith. E. (Ed.) . (1976). The growing tdgt of GtsltJlt IMraf'1. Ne...· \-brk: Brun· ner/Maze!. Vall Dc Rict. V.. and Kol'b, M. (1980). Gestalt

Iht:ra{l)': Arl i'IIT(ld,utum. Ne..· York:

Pergamon. Yankelo...ich, D. ( 1 982). N� rules: SMrthingfor uiJ1ulfiUIMnI

in a WfII'id turmd

upWJe down. New York: Bantam Books. Zinker, J. (1978). Crwlil>e proms in CA5tait therapy. New Vork: Random House/Villtage.

13 SACTIONAL ANALYSIS +

any of the psychotherapy systems

ha\'c been utilized in

religious and

church settings, but few have ever been as enthusiastically uncritically or as widely as lransactional anaf)'sis (frequently referrcd to as TA) . For an extended period in the 19705 and early 19805, TA was wUled as the pastor's best tool for improving ministry, and books relating TA to the work aCthe .

church abounded. This was probably a function ofa number off4Ctors, including the packaging

afTA in a way that made it understandable

outside of professiona1 psychotherapy circles, iLS short·term

a

ction

orientation, its optimistic stance toward change and the insight it fostered regarding puzzling human interactions.

As we will see, there

are ways in which TA is helpful to the Christian counselor. but major problems in its being

the approach for the church.

TII... SM:1WNM.ANAL

N

YSIS

325

Descriptive Survey Philosophical AMumptions

1 TA analYles persons at four levels, The stn/dural analysis looks at individual personality; ImnmctiQnaf anaysis l looks at interpersonal in­ teractions in a molecular fashion; ,-arlit! and game analysis looks at repetitive relational pattems that are dysfunctional; and script O1lOlysis looks at life pattems al the broadesl thematic levels. Because each level of analysis has iL� own implications for the understanding of personal­ ity, health and abnormality. these will be discussed in presenting the levels. (We should also note that TA has often been creath'ely melded with Gestalt therap�': e.g.,James andJongeward, 1971.) The philosophical presuppositions ofTA are not explicitly stated, One quickly di�erns in the approach a commitment to human respon­ sibilitywithin the limits offamilyand cultural influence; in otherwords, a belief ill limiled freedom. TA asserts that acceptance (OKness) and

oolue are fundamental to aU persons. Persons sart t from a position of OKness in childhood, only to have thai position eroded by parents and the child's social environment. Other presuppositions ....ill emerge in the discussion below.

Models ofPenonality, Health and Abnormality Stl1fCtural al/fllysis. BcOlC and his followers taught llmt each person's personalilY SlmClUre is composed of three conscious or preconscious

ego slutrs, which are organized psychological systems of feelings. thoughts and beha\'iors that are usuallydistincl and mutually exclusive. The three are Ihe Parent (1'). Ihe '"tape-recorder-like� composite of the memories of how parenlS and significant others acted, thought and felt the AdulJ (A). the computerlikc processor of infoonatioll from t.he OIher two

egoslatcsand the extemal \\-"Orld: and the Chilli (C) , the urges, feelings

and thoughts oflht: �(:hild_within'lIlSM Ihal nC\o'Cr gnw.s up.

Students often imagine more ovcrlap than is accuratc between lhe TA ego Slates ilnd the three Freudian psychic structures, since

one could superficially see the id as childish. tht: ego as an informa· tion processor like Berne's Adull. and the superego as parental. But for Berne, all three structures are part oft.he ego. as all are conscious

following I'll':so:nlali()n ..ill cl",w from Berne (19641; Harri5 fl969); Jamc. and Joogel'o'J.rd (1971): Woollam5. Rro"ll and Huige (1976); and woonam,� and Bro",l IThc

( 1 979).

,

326

or potenually so, whereas only Freud's ego was deemed conscious. Second, to the Freudian, psychological experience is the resull of the interaction of the three structures of personality. but to the TA thera­ pist, personality is largely the function of one autonomously experi­ enced ego state ala time. Proponents afTA emphasize the distincme.ss and complementarity of the ego states ramer than their constant interaction in dctemlining behavior.

Adult

8

Child

Further complexity is n i troduced by suggesting that lhe Parent can be further subdivided into the Nurturing Parent, the composite of the loving. supportive. accepting messages we received, and the Critical

Panmt, the composite of the rejecting. conrrolling. judgmental mes­ sages. The Child also is subdhided into the Adaptrd Chiul, the child that denies or ignores its own instincts and tries desperately to please parents by confonning to their demands; and the Natural (or Frtt)

Child, the spontaneous, joyous, impish, uninhibited responder to the world. Some theorists even add a third division in the Child, the

LilIk

Professor, which delights in learning and is the childlike parallel 10 the Adult ego state, TA proposes that we are almost always in one ego state or another, and that the ego state we are functioning in can be detected straight­ forwardly by the content and manner ofexpression (especiaUy nOI1\'cr­ hal) of what

we

think, feel, say and do. The preacher proclaiming

universal sinfulness

s i

in the Critical Parent; the charismatic believer

i in the Natural Child; the student dancing before the Lord in ecsta!o)' s in a Bible study on major doctrines of the church is in the Adult; the peniUmt sa}ing confession before a priest is in the Adapted Child; and 50 forth.

Healthy individuals are able to act outof each of the ego states,

but will spend the majority of their experience in the Adult, Natural Child and Nurturing Parent (in that order). The innuence of the

Critical Parent and Adapted Child arc to be minimized.

Psychopathology can occur when persons confuse their ego states, constant1y slipping back and forth between them without completing transactions with others. An example might be the person who is

327 ineffectual in making business presentations (an Adult function) be· cause she lapse� into inappropriate humor (the Child). Problems also occufwhen people do not experience their ego stales distinClly, but rather one state contaminates another. An example might be a racist, in whom the infonnation-processing Adult is contam­ inated by the Critical Parent

so

that prejudicial attitudes and feelings

of hale bias his capaciry 00 see the objective equality of persons. Pathology can abo occur when one or two ego states dominate the

i always in the personality and exclude the oLhers---as when a believer s

Critical Parenl state and thus acts moralistically, superior and judg­ menial at all times; or when a husband is always n i the Adult and is a dispassionate information-processor (like the computers he works ith his wife. with), incapable of sharing any spontaneous feeling .... Huma.ns need

stm/us, and this need is called stimulus-hungtrin TA

circles. Strokes can be physical, verbal and nonverbal. A stroke is any interpersonal event thal "recognizes" the existence ofanother person. Obviously, some strokes are better than others. bUl any stroke is better than none. True intimacy is lhe most powerful stroke of all. Criticism and rejection are deslruelive, bUI are bener than being ignored. It s i in relationships that we exchange strokes, and so TA neXI focuses on the analysis of transactions.

Transactional analysis. AI the most molecular 1e\'e1. because persons are usually n i one of their three major ego states (Parent, Adult, Child) , transactions are typically bet .....een ego SLales, and the Woly thai these internelions occur determines their meaning and effect. Healthy inter­ actions occur in romplemenwry ways, meaning Ihat the ego state com­ municated from and to is r«iprocated: ( 1 ) "\Vbal time is it?" (A to A); vit's

10:00� (A to A); (2) �l.ook at my new car!- (C 10 C); �Awe50me!�

(C LO C);

(3) �rll never learn Greek; I'm so discouraged" (C to P); "You

can do anything you set your mind to; you're so .iman!" (P to C).

TIlus the arrows depicting the complementary inlcrJ.ction are parallel.

Transactions are pathological when theyare C'ITJ.SSt'd; as when a srndem asks the professor for more detail regarding a lecUlre paim (A to A), and the professor responds, �If you paid attention betler, you wouldn't ask queslOns like thatl " (P 10C),Anoiherprobiematic transaction is the IllJnim transaction where there is a cO\'Cn message that crosses the superficially complementary messages, as when by the fiflh requesl for clari­ fication, Ihe professor begins 10 discern Ihat the student is less asking for inronllation (A to A) and more communicating, "You are a lousy lecturer and I'm going to humiliale you in front of the dw" (P to C),

328

8 8 A

A

Comp1ememary

0

'

,

--i/8

Crossed Tr.a.nlllCUon

Transaction

A

c Ulterior

Transaction

rljpn lU

As people interact, we experience stimulus-hunger and the second need, a desire for smbility or StnlCLUre in our transactions. This s i called

5truclurt"hungn:

Beme creatively suggested that lhere is

11

continuum

of human interaction based on how stable and predictable the interactions are and ho..... truly rewarding it is. At the extreme orlotal stability and least reward, we have withdrawal. where we take no risks at all and we achieve total predictability by interacting not ....ith real people, but only ",;th our fantasies of people. The person addicted to pornography might be a withdrawn person willing only to deal with fantasized women who do exactly what the pictures show. At the other extreme we have tnlC intimacy lhat is spontaneous and unpredictable. lnlSting and affirming of the OKness of the other; intimacy is very risky and rei has the potenti
mal c;hannel lheir interactions in spontaneous but safe ways; and finally

games (wd rtuivts, where meaningful strokes are exchanged but the OUl­ comes are predetennined rnlher than sponlaIleous (disctL..sed below).

Intimacy s i the most rewarding but most risky form ofinleraction because

it is the least sU'UCtured and most unpredictable.

Rndcet and game QTla/:ysis. Each of us assumes a lift position regarding our own OKness and the OKness of olhers. This results in the famous

,

,

329

TRANSACTION/,L ANAI.I'SIS

four possibili ties of Ml'm not OK, you're not OK�j MI'm not OK, you're ORM; �I'm OK. you're not OKM; and �rm OK. you're OK, M described by Harris

(1969; Berne aCLUally discussed nine positions based on the

combinations of tile OKness of I, you and they).

We all havc a dlird need, called positum-/l1Inger, to have our basic

assumption

of a life position confirml.-d or supported in interactions

with other!;. Thuse\'Cn though the last position, Ml'm OK, you re OK,� '

is the healthiest, we all tend to stay static in our assumed position. We generate support for

an

rm-OK�you're-OK position via real. risky

intimacy, and solicit support for the ower three negative posi tions by games and rackets.

IwrkrlS are habitual ways of feeling that persons create within themselves, such as the woman whose anger is always on slow-burn (lhe

chip-on-thc-shoulder syndrome) or lhc man who is in an habitual slate ofself pity These inauthentic habit.ual feelings, which are unrelated to -

.

reality as currently experienced. are created expressly to authenticate the person's life position assumptions. Self·pity (Mnothing c\'er turns -

out right for me; rye gOt LO accept second-best in life because it is my lotM) affirms the position I'm not OK/you're OK and justifies the persoll never taking risks with real inlima<.:y or achievemcnL After

people experience enough inauthentic icelings (Ms.'wing up $tamps�). theyoftcn ieeljustilied in cng"dging in self-orowerdcslfucti\·c behavior (Mtr:\ding in their Marnp�M), as when persons wallowi ng ill self-pity engage in a drunken binge because of all they Mha\'e to bear in life. �

GmIUS occur when lX!rsDllS tum (0 OlhcnI for confirmation of their

nt.·gativc '"not OK· position assumption Rmhcr than allov.ing ullprt.-dict­ .

able intimac), to occur; ther predelcnnine the outcome ofthe U
a prmictabk

Olilrom� JulptJrn. TIle payoff is the confirmation of weir assumption; the game works when the assumption of nOl-OKness is confirmed by the rC::lctiOIl ofthe other with whom the S'dillC ha.� been played.

Beme and other TA therapists give provoca tive and creative names

to the game!; (her analyze. The most famous TA book. Berne s Carnes '

Propk PIn)" discusses Rapo, Now I\'c Got You You SOB, See What You Made Me Do, Harried and

so

forth. A� one example. we g-ame See

What You Made Me Do is probably plared by the person who takes lhe I'm not OK/you're not OK position Due 10 fcar offailure and inabili ty .

to accept his own foibles, a man subtly looks for another to blame when he nears completion of significant t.asks or interactions. Any distraction (the misbehavior of a child, an argument with the spouse, "stressM at

.

,

MO()£RNI'SrCHafllt:lt!iJ'If�'

330

work) becomes the handy scapegoat to hide behind, with loud protesl$ to selfand oLhers of"Look how you made me mess up [You're !latOK) l

It's nOI my fault thai it didn't turn out ....ell . {I'm not OK, but I have an

excuse for thatl . H Some people majoran one game all their lives; others have a wide repertoire of games to play.

Games and rackets are pathological. though to varying degrees. They cause us to Stay anchored in a nonfunctional life position and yet provide enough payoff to prevent

liS

from looking seriously for beuer

sttokes. Games can be particularly troublesome when two people, such as a husband and wife, parent and child, or boss and employee. begin to play games that are pathologically complementary. One such example is when a husband plays Kick Me, a game ofrelf­ defeating mistakes that prove onc's not-OKness, and the \\'ifc plays If Il Weren't for You, a game of not even trying to achie\·e an)'t.hing and blaming your failure to lXy 011 the person rou are connected with. In this case, the wife has no real desire for the husband to overcome his pitiful ineptimde because it protects her from the threat of finding OUt who she could really be; and t.he husband can use the wife's moaning about how she could have done so much better in life without him as one more negative payoff for his failures, which furt.her pro\'es he is

not OK, one more failure others can kick him for.

Script (malysis. In discussing scripting, TA therapi5ts assume that bad transactions, r.l.ckets and games do not occur at random, but are patterned toW"drd a desired end. Scripts encapsulate a person's life direction, one's life themes. Scripts are set. up for the person at. an early age, usually by the parents. In the publications of some TA experts, scripts consist largely of grand injunctions against certain critical, healthy life developments or processes, Examples include scriptS of Don't Feel. Don't Get Close, Don't Grow Up, Don't Be Childish or Don't Succeed, For others, scripts are defined temporally, such as the Always script of unyielding consistency, the Never script of total pessi­ mi5m and the Almost script of never-ending near·misses. Some define scripts in terms of life-theme cliches, stich as Getting Even, Being Helpful. Carrying My Cross or Looking for t.he Pot of Gold. Finany, some define scripts in terms of childhood m}1hology, with the belief that adults live oUl literary melllphors from childhood that have come (0 symbolize their lives; these would include the Cinderella script of sighing and waiting for the invitation to the ball to arrive, or the Peler Pan script of refusing to grow up. Just as

v.ith

games, scripts are especially destructive when they

1 'H.i ...·MC110NIlL ANAU'SlS

333

conuibution of the approach. 111t: negative side (0 this accessibility is that lhe TA language system can be used to excess, thus creating a barrier to the outsider in much the way that religious language ('"God_talkM) can create a distance be ween t the Christian and the unbeliever. In TA literature, the reader ith phrases, concepts, lists, cliches, in-group language is bombarded .... or abbreviations that can baflle even the most devoted reader. A hearty dose of second-degree games. se<:ond-order functional analyses of structural diagrams. Parent-in-Child ego states, drama triangles, NIG)S()B and so forth can present a real challenge. In its attempt to be accessible. TA theoriSts have created a SYStem more encumbered by awkward idioms than perhaps any other: it has become a subculture of its own, replete ....ith i ts o....n . �sociological passwords. � Classification or naming can often be the first step toward under­ standing and is oflen a first step in gaining insight in therapy, but true understanding is premised on correct classification. We can mistakenly believe that we ha\'e understood or explained somethingjusl because we ha\'e labeled it. Do we really understand a person's ecstatic uuer­ ance of�Hallelujah!� merely because we have labeled itascomingfrom the Natural Child? A system that categorizes stimuli incorrectly may obscure more than enable true understanding. Because there has been � little scientific validation ofTA concepts, while TAjargon has become so extensi\'e1y de\'e1opcd and seemingly precise, the TA approach risks confusing labeling and understanding. This criticism holds for many approaches to therapy, but s i a special risk for TA.

Philosophical A.srurnptions The philosophical assumptions behind TA arc not clear. They are obscured behind an aggressive auention to popularizing the system. Berne claimed that his system was complete, Mencompassing every­ thing [a personJ may feel. think, s.."I)" or do� (cited in Hedman and K..uus, 1987, p. 176). Given such a claim of totalunderstandillg of personhood and its elH'ironmenl, the exclusion of any spiritual reality with­ in or outside of the person cannOt be interpreted as a function 'Tt'"Chniqoc. liJ<., the MCgog.... llM .. dcv-eloped by Do ...y (Dl.I$I.y ;U\d Ouaay. 1984), wh.,re ., .d or cathec:u.d 10 each ofthc ego Stat.,s isportrayed in ab..1r graph. the "cncrg)"" comrniu

h ion of pr.,c:ision or f "'hal u only" subjc<:uvcjudgmen t by the TA

merely crealC thc il

l$

the",pi'L A oimibt crilkisrn holds for

of tr-.msacuons or ego Stales.

rC$Catch that ron';SI$ only of concellsua\ raungs

JJ4

of mere modesty, but as a denial of the spiritual or an attempt to radically reinterpret it. Thus we must approach this system cau­ tiously as we would an ahemative faith system. because in its claims of all�ncompaS5ing breadth (e .g., James, 1985) this seems to be its ambition. The matter of human freedom has been a recurrent one in our analyses. The TA vision of human freedom is broadly compatible \\;1h the idea oflimitcd freedom we out.lined in chapter two. TA recognizes the human tendency to be shaped by our past (Oden, 1974, cites biblical examples of -intergenerational scripting," including Ezek 16:'1445 and Jer 31:29). Yet we have the capacity to transcend our �programming� by responsibly making those decisions we are con­ sciously confronted .....ith in the present. Lawrence ( 1983) correctly poillled Out that the mai n emphasis in the biblical concept of repentance is change. making a new decision. BUI there are obvious differences. between the TA and Christian views of freedom, repen­ tance and redecision. While TA superficially appears to embody a balance of opdmism and pessimism, recognizing the human capacity to change but also the barriers to change. its proponents err consistently in embracing a humanistic optimism thai asserts humans exercising their (n!·cdom have a boundless capacity for change. This position is certainly much morc optimistic about the human condition than classic Christianity. WhcreasTA seems toempha'lize the romantic notion offreedom from restraints. Chlistiallity emphasizes freedom to serve God and fn"'cdom in submission (Oden. 1974). In TA, freedom is the capacity to act autonomously. but in Christianity God is the empowering agent for all good human action. In fact. Christianity posits that a fundamental problem of humanity is our tendency to live on our own su-ength (Malony, 1980), and TA encoumges this tendency. To the Christian protesting that we need power from outside ourselvcs. TA would respond that il is an cvdSiou and denial of our capaciry for human change to make a deity the source of thal capacity. Perhaps proponents ofTA have a point when we confront the extent to which some Christians evade change by denying that God has empowered them to make responsible choice, choosing instead tOW'dit for a dramatic -empowering- or -healing.� Furthennore, the TA vision of human e\�1 is too bland. It appreci­ ates the phenomenon or human weakness a.nd finiteness. but does not grapple with the depth of human depravilY. Oden (1974) discusses the

l'RANSACrrONM. tWM.1m

JJ5

TA understanding of self-deception as mired in destructive scripts ....� are Ih'ing ouL Evil is psychologized into lIle mere result of not-OKness or the influence of the Parent ego state (e.g.. B<mu-ager, 1974;James and Savary. 1974), and is again understood as embedded in our scripts. But note lila! the motivations behind scripts are always benign; tlu:y

boil down to validating the nOl-OK assumptions we absorbed as chil­ dren. Oden (1974, p. 88) states. �For Berne, it is ·the adapt.1.tion to parental influences' thatspoils Ihe natural child.� But since parents were just acting out their sclipts as well, we are left. as with all humanistic therapies, with a naive view of evil where e\'eryone is excused. Thus full-blooded hatred, human rebellion against

God and the like become mere "mistakes� that flow from our

psychological conditioning. The result of this is lIlat TA lacks a com­ pelling moral vi.sion. Morality in the TA system means acting spontane­ ously OUI ofthe NalUral Child ;u moderated by theAdultego state. This reduces to a typical humanistic self-actualization ethic where it is presumed that all fully functioning persons .... , 11 naturally act in moral accord. As Malony said, "'fA does not analyze the human condition with enough seriousness, and thus il lacks the power to transfonn persons from scripts to freedom� (1980, p. 105).

Modd ofhrsonality A major concern ....ith TA is that it is guilty of ovcrly �dichotomous� thinking at the most fundamental lC'\'els (Hedman and Kruus, 1987). Especiall), in comparison to the psychodynamic system, where there is tremendous appredation for uniqueness and flexibility ill concep­ tions, TA is prone to simplistic. cra)"on-stroke divisions between human characteristics: people are OK or nOI OK, scripted or nOt scripted. engaging in intimacy or not, and so forth. We also see this in TA's grappling with each persnll'S past. We are to negate the past and our continuity with it by throwing offlifc scripts and old �Parcnt tapes� and engage in spontaneous redeciding of our identities. Hedman and Kru.us (1987) point Out that this means that continuity of human identity is neg-died; .....e are to throw off all impoyd sources of identity in

favor of Ii,,;ng spontaneously in the now. We must compare this negati\'ely to the �redemptive history� approach of Scriprure, where

Cod continually calls us to understand our identity in light of his historical dealings ....ith us (e.g.. sec

I Pet 2:9 for

an

example of

"bestowed� idcntity). This dichotomous thinking is especially dear in TA's dealing with

336 ego states (Oden,

MODERNPSH;HUT"IIF.RAPtLS

1974, and others) . In TA. we are n i trinsically and

properly divided beings. It is simply incredible to believe mal we consist

ofthree distinct and separate psy<:hological SLales (or five. ifone further

divides into Nurturing and CriticaJ ParentS, Natural and Adapted Children; six, if one adds the lillIe Professor) . Is a person truly in a separate ego state if she lakes a break. from work to have a tickle fight with her children? TA would have us think so. Such a supposition

suggests thai we are all �garden-variety� multiple personalities who d is.'lSSOCiatc from stale to stale in the courM! of any given day. Some approaches to contemporary psychodynamic thoughl lllight agree to some common level of dissociative experience. but would call this a mark of our unheahhiness. nOt a standard for no rmalcy. TA would call us to celebrate and enhance this p�)'choJogical divisi,·enc.�. Positi,·ely. it must be said that there probably are different fdcelS to persons, and drawing these facets in sharp COntrast may aid in encour­ aging the manifestation of all the God
The only attention to intrapsychic integration of ego states in the TA literaLUre is an occasional common border drawn around the three principal ego Slates in some TA diagrams. but even this is usually

omitted. In TA, we are aCLUally encour'dgcd to pursue further "segre­ gation of ego states� (Hedman and Kruus. 1987. p. 177) as we grow. rather than to integrate these disparate parts. The earliest work in the structural-anal�is stage of TA therapy is that of sharpening client aWart:ncS5 of heir t ego-state status. The cOlilmon sense reaction to this i credulity; the idea of people changing ego states like must be one of n they might change hats. of the ideal being separation of the feeling

and fun-lovi ng paJ't of u.s from the thinking part from the moral and i unacceplable. nurturing part of us. � TA's stance on ego segreg'dtion both as what is and what should be

is unacceptable from a Christian perspective a� well. At a rather naive le\"c1. one could argue that the Christian revelation supports personal­ ity division, what ....ith anemion given in the Bible to such �parts� as mind. spirit, soul. body, flesh. bowels, kidneys. heart and so forth. But it is al\\'
MODEJ/.\'PSYClIOTIII:RAJ>lfS

J40

God holds OUl to us, starling with repentance and forgh'cness leading to salV'.ltion, and induding the spiritual resources he offers such

as

liS

direclly

the fellowship of the community of faith. daily forgive ness

,

prayer, growth through knowing his Word and so forth.

Bm the failure to grasp these resources is morc complex than TA would propose. As \\'C mentioned earlier in discussing evil, ours is a fallen state where we

arc

both victims of natural and moral c\·il and

perpetrators of moral evil. We arc culpable rebels as well

as

victims.

In TA, pathology results from failing to appropriate that which is naturally and rightfully OUfS; in Christianity. our pa thology is a result of our faUenness, our ovm

c

ulpabil ity, our victimization by a fallen

world, and our failure to allow God to transform us into a �new

creature� (2 Cor 5:17). TA is a fulfillment model of personality, in thal all of the natural instinct's and moti"es of humans are regarded as fundamentally g ood

.

and thus the sources for all problems are regarded

as

external to the

person. At the mOSt profound level, persons are consistent, and conflict is an unnatural state for us. This conflicts with the Christian view of pencILS, wherein to be human is to be conflicted and torn by the internal and external conditions of our lives. i TA parents are consistently the �bad guys, � the As a result of this, n

source of all problems (the system hardly stands alone on this point) .

.... a ysJ the witch. devil, In the TA literature, �the parenting voice is [aI·

ogre, or pig� ( Oden 1974. p. 87). V.'hether the parenting voice is that .

of the biological parents or of one of the parent.ing institutions (teach­ ers. clergy, etc ) makes little difference. Recognition of Lhe positive .

influence of biologicaI parents is nire-of illstitutional parent figures,

nonexistent. This may be bc<:ause TA is focusing on problematic cases,

i pression that tllC less they interfere but parents are left with a clear m with their children, the better off they will be. The implicit model clearly is the romantic notion of the actuali1.ing child who s i best left alone to develop naturally; outside interference can only damage Lhe child.

In TA publications, health is consistently proposed to be a function of the Adult and Natural Child ego .nates. The goals of TA are the unblocking of love and the experiencing of true spontaneity. joy,

excitement and .solid decision.making. Healthy individuals are un­ scripted; Lhey have left the confines of their parental programmingand have emerged to become their own spontaneous sclves. AI the most fundamental level, the goal of all life is that of intimacy.

343

wade slowly and unknowingly fOT\l<ard at the direction of the guide; father, ...·hat is expected of them is acknowledged up front, and they h.wc as much access to the theory guiding the therapist as does the therapist. The acceptance of clients offered by the therapist is meant 10 empower them to appropriate their own OKness. But in Cluistian counseling, ule hope ....ould . be that the responses of lhe therapist would be an incamalion of God's response, so that the client would be dra....'Yl LOward the source of all good. ralher than to simply trust in his or her avm autonomous OKness. TA takes a no-nonsense approach to change; Berne (quoted in Malony, 1980) stated, �Cet well firsl-\';e can raIl; about it later!" This can be viewed positively as good slewardship---the attempt for therapy to be efficient and goa.k>rienled. TA therapy is typically brief, iotenM:. and highly educational. This fits well v.ith an American evangelical orientation toward rational anS\\'ers, a success orientation and clfi­ clenC)'. Unfortunately. TA doesn't seem to have an appreciation for the mysterious. conflicted dimensions of human life, Hedman and Kruus (1987) complain that the TA therapy process rreats clients as objects n •her than starting with trust, one starts .... ith a conlract, and in that, • instead of underslanding lhe clients, one teaches the language of TA so the clients understand the therapist (and hopefully come to understand themselves), There is a sense in TA that the therapist s i less interacting with beings only -a lillie lower than the heavenly beings� (Ps 8:5) and more teaching a system, separating ego states, rewriting scripts and so forth. This may be an inevitable repercus­ sion of the foclis in TA being less on persons than on states, transactions and scripts, One particular approach within TA circles mat merits considerable suspicion is malar repamttillg. a natural outgrowth ofthe less aggressive standard therapeutic approache� of redeciding or de-scri pting, In reparenting the therapist aims at a total restructuring of the client's Parent ego state by becoming a new and effective Parent, Such proce­ dures sometimes invoh-e the therapin�:lirected regression of the client to childlike SlaleS and the almost total guidance of ule client's life by the therapist. We have seen M:\'eraJ tnlgic examples of such work, with clients of repMenting therapists forsaking vocations, spouses and even their own children as they atlempl to req:mstilllte their ParCnL ego state. Oden (1974) recognized early the authoritarian dangers of

MOIJ#':Jl.'1�YCJIOTTf£JUI'TF.s 1

346 Lawrence,

na(

C. (1983), Rcdecision and repem:tncc. Tmnsm;lumal Analysis jour­

13, 158-162.

Malon),. H. (1980). Transactional analysis. In G. Collins (Ed.), Hdping ptoplt grow (pp. 99-112). S.'lllGl Ana. CA: Vi.'lioll House. Oden, T. (1974) . GamljrN. N� York: Harper & Row. Reuler, A. (1974). �Ww My.! I'm OK! St Louis, MO; Concordia. .. lly don', f1HZ OK1 hvine, C\: Harvest Umphrey. M., and Laird, R. (1977). n House. Woollams, S., and Brovm, M. (1979). TA: 1'M toUfl lwndbooll o/ lrOtI.S(Ulionnl onaJyru. Englewood C1iffs. 1'
THE F ILY SYSTEM PSYCHOLOGIES

14 FAMILY THE

ami!y therapy is a gelleric name for a r.Hher di\'crse and varied group of treatment approaches thaI ha,·c emerged since the early

19505. The family therapy movement de<.'cJ­

oped out of the growing recognition in child guidance and outpatient

clinics that often a lroutkdfamily, rather thanJUSt a troubled individual

in a family, needed treatment. This was especially evidem in studies of

communication patterns in the families of schizophrenic patients (Korchin,

1976). [,rentually. the clinical relevance of treating entire

families was readily apparent, cspeciaJly when there were crises that

affected all members or when there "as noticeable marital discord or intergenerational conflict. Just how dramatically this went against the

analytic tradition of indh1dual treaunent as the onJy a11o v . ..able option

cannot be underemphasized. Proponents argued thaI ifsufficient focus

was not given to the family system. but onl}' to the �identified patienl�

;'0

MODERNPSYCHUllIf :RAPIES

(the person labeled as �ha\'illg a problem�), the benefitS ofpsychother­ apy would be limited. Rather than focusing on the intrapsychic or unconscious dynamics or tvCI 0t1

the i11diuidtlai at ail, this approach by and large examines n i terpersonal rtlationships wilhin the social structure of the ramil}', According to Hazelrigg. Cooper and Bourdn i (1987). family

of the individual.

therapy representS a major paradigmatic shift in the conceptualization and treaunent of pS}'chopathology in its move to examining families rather than

n i dividuals.

These reformulations are pOlenLially freeing

and liberating, enabling clinicians creath'ely to focus more on commu­ nication patterns and family interactional styles rather than on just individual psychodynamics (Schreck, 1983). If �problems in living- are intimately related

lO these larger systemic variables, it makes a great

deal of sense to explore conceptual alternath'es to traditional individ­ ualistic formulations.

A core assertion in this movement is that to be a person requires relatedness in the family of OIigin and beyond. What a refreshing contrast, notes Roberts (in press), to the all-tao-familiar encourage­ ment of narcissism and self-centeredness that is evident in so much of the human-potential mo\·ement. Family therapy at its best encourages social virtues as ....ell . as an ethic of personal responsibility. The focus on Mme" (the individual) is replaced with an emphasis on "we� (the family) . And it is within this comeKt thal family thernpist5 explore er expectations, fonns ofcomffiunication. po.... . structures and the roles of family members. Since membership in the family system is Mfixed," it makes sense 10 explore how the participants will affect and influence each other throughout the life span in the conteKt of this most basic and important social sy5tem.

Descriptiye Survey Philosophical Assumptions and Modd ofPersonality The nuclear family is assumed to be the basic cont,ext in �'hich problems occur (Hazelrigg. Cooper and Bourdin.

1987). The

family is secn as a rule-governed organization that has a dynamic which transcends that of its separate panicipants (Anderson and Guernsey. 1985). The analysis and exploration of those variables that either facilitate or retard this dynamic are the subject matter of the systems therapies. If it is our intclltion to really Ull derstand a particular individual. it is ugued. then we must become thQr-

3'1

FAMIl.I' TI{F.IW"t·

oughly familiar with his or her larger social COOlexl. Such thinking logically follows from a tradition that accepts the rc:ie\'ancc ofgeneral S)�tems theory in biology (\'On Bertalanffy. 1968) and cybemelics in computer science (Prochaska, 1984) to the people.. helping context. S),stemic thinkers dislike analyzing and reducing phenomena to their most basic elements (reduclionism or atomism) : they prefer srudying the complexities oforganizational structures. And they

arc

especially curious about patterns of communicalion and

control in troubled individuals and their extended f.lmi l ies.

A l)'stemcan be defined as a group ofinterconne<:ted or interrelated parts which mutually interact across time (Foley. 1984) . Thus, a family is a system, as is a living cell or a human body. while a group of persons in an elevator is not. A group of people who work together at an office are a system. but not as influential a one as the family. A SYStem has as real of an existence as the parts that make it up. JUSt as a human is as real as the organs that make him up, so also is a family as real as the people that make it up. Systems have distincth'e properties. First, they are charaClerized by

wlwknw; liley are made up of their parts and the relationships of the parts, and thus the system is greater than the slim of its parts in isolation. The human body. like a family, can only be understood by looking at the parts

and the

systems are characterized by

....'3.y the parts work together. Second,

inln"rtlatedIUSS, in that all parts influence

each other; there really are no unimportant parts. as lile person who stubs her little toe often finds OliL Third. systems have

boundarits that

differentiate one system from another system or define their subsys­ tems. Our bodies StOP at our skin; our families must stop at some point or they cease to exist. Fourth, living systems are either open (ideally) or

dcs.tti; in other words, they

are either capable of change and respon­

siveness (0 a changing environment or they are rigid and fossilized. When mel' are flexible, open and responsive to forces within and

witllOut, liley can maintain a dynamic equilibrium, or hQlII
dynamic !umu:os/M;.s is the

fifth critical charac­

teristic of systems.

All living systems are complex in terms of their alliances, coalitions and relationships. Ideally, they are fluid rather than Static, continually evolving as developmental crises and challenges are fdced and dealt wilil in an adaptive and healtllY manner (0. Carter and McGoldrick,

1980) . How famil}' members in these systems cope wim conflict and change will

be reflected in their n i teractional styles across time (i.e.,

•

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352 they are prediclablc). Perhaps the most formidable challenge facing the fumily system is instilling in its members a sense of belonbring while al the same lime modeling and teaching those competencies that arc essential formembers (especially children) to indi\�duale and esablish t a sense of separateness within the context of belonging (5.llinger,

1985) . If these essential skills and sensitivities are imparted, there

comes a gro....ing sense of self-esteem and personal security. Without them, it is difficuh to see how a person can develop a repertoire of adaptive life skills or establish a new identity apart from the fumily of ongm. The family is seen as a living social system that extends over at least

three generations. The specific .. I.IY it functions (e.g., establishes roles,

communicates and deals with differences of opinions) has significant m i plications for the well-being of its individual members (Goldenberg and Goldenberg,

1985) . A particular member's dysfuncuonal behavior

reflects a family system that s i in disequilibrium. Thus, the �identified i trouble. Unless lhe family rela­ patient" represents a fdmily that is n uonships mal undergird Lhe lack of stability can be addressed, penna­ !lent change is not likely. How those family members deal wiul Ule inevitable changes and crises of life, or the de\'e!opmelltal [asks that face any family (cf. Carter and McGoldrick,

1980). will determine the

course of development of individual family members as .... ·ell as the . family as a ...·hole. Family therapists usually speak less about nolions of persons and more about functional or dysfunctional family systems. There s i a sense in which the psychodynamics of any given individual disappear in lhe larger social context. While ulis may be a welcome change from the oppre!iSive individualism of much of contemponl.ry personality theory, it tends to blur or erode the m i portance of individuality (d. Van Leeuwen.

1984), A personality theory, lhen, is more implicit than

explicit in mOSt system therapies. because they frankly tcnd to be disinterested in the functioning of individual human beinb"S' And since SC'.'eral orLhe family approaches can be viewed as extensions or extrap­ olations from some of the major individual approaches to people-help­ ing. it is not possible LO summarize coherent or consistent notions of personhood.

Model ofHeolth Perhaps some of the most valuable contributions from the family therapy mO\'cment have to do with its characterizations of the qualities

353

of slffing families. Many of these qualities have lhcil' dear parallels in ScripUlre. Both popular (e.g., Stinnett. 1979; Curran. 1983) and pr� fessional (Beavers, 1982; Kantor and LehT, 1975; Lewis, Cosset! and Phillips, 1976: Olson, Sprenkle and Russell, 1979) treatments of the subject suggest a number of parallel themes. When coupled with a full appreciation of the nonnau\c Slnlctures and functions estabLished by God as part of the created order, we can gain grealer insight into our obligations and responsibilities as members of both biological and spiritual families from grappling with this literature. In the family therapies perspective, strong families: I. &sptmd positively /() challmges and crises. Rather than denying or distorting reality, they drdw on their individual and collecth'c resources to deveiop adaptive and healthy coping: strategi($. When these families arc unable to find the resources ",ithin. they readily admi t problems and seek help elsewhere. 2. Hmlt: (J ckarly arliculated world view, sometimes expressed in tcnns of a specific religious CQmmiunenL This undergirds their moral devel­ opmen t altruistic endea\'Ors and sense of history and heritage. 3. Commrmicali! w�IL They know how In actively listen. affirm and support express their LhoughLS and feelings, and manage the inevita­ ble differences of opinion that can occur in the family system. These fumiies l have a well-devcloped repertoire of conflict-management '

,

,

skills.

4. Owt)$e to spend tim" /Ogf.IJu.r in a V{J};�ty of tasks, including both

planned and spon tan eous activities. They can work hard together to\.\'ard a common goal and they know how to enjoy each other when they play or ",·orlt. 5. M((RePfOtrlises all(i h()7lorcommitmenls to()7!�anolhn: The marital and i a sense familial tasks and responsibilities are taken seriously. There s of belonging and respect for indhidual differences. The family is sc..."tu as the context for the developme nt ofa strong sense of self�steem and personal security so as lO encourdge an affiliativc and risk-taking attitude toward life. 6. Know !unv to ex{mSS tlldr lwe and ajJfrrecialiOIlfor one anolhr:r. Family members know and respect one another. They arc caring, compas.�ion­ ate, respectful, lOleranl and trusting. As m igh t be assumed from earlier comments, health and normalcy are viewed from the con text of the social system rath er than from a more personal perspective. Qualities that contribute to the well-bei ng of the family of origin may not necessarily .

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AlOO£RNPSI'OI(fTIIF.RAJ'IES

354 translate in to personal wholeness.

Modd ofAlnwmuJity

�Problems in living� are usually viewed as symptoms of a dysfunctional

family system by most family therapists. In particular, the unique and specific ways in which the family faces the stresses related to the inevitable changes, challenges and crises of liCe will detennine familial well-being. Pathological communkation patterns, enmeshment or dis­ engagement, scapegoating. family violence or substance abuse arejust some of the dysfunctional ways in which these events and transitions can be mishandled by the family system. The characteristic of homeo­ staSis, the tendency to maintain the $l:l.lUS quo mentioned earlier. is an asset to the healthy family. but is an enemy when maladapli\'c patterns are occurring, as it m i pedes change. Wynne. Jones and Al-Khayyal

(1982) argue thaI healthy communi­

cation ill essential if parents are going to develop adaptive behaviors n i their children.

Communitatioll deviance occurs when two or more per­

sons are unable to stay focused and share meaning in their interac­ tional efforts. In dysfunctional families, the verbal coment and/or nonverbal behaviors are often strikingly dissonant between family members. This is especially evident in the patterns of communication where overt content (what is said) is inconsistent with covert process (how it is said), as when a parent yells. �Of course I love youl Do yOll think I

....'Quld

put up with all yOllr crap if I didn'tr Indeed, such

dissonance and inconsistency s i the most common reason family mem­ bers seek professional help. Some examples of particularly pathological communication patterns include: (a) the

doub0bind, where two messages are logically n i consistent,

as when an ky, rejecting husband scolds his wife for nOl being more affectionate, thus communicating both �Iove mew and wdoll't love me"; (b) mJ$lijirotion, where family membel'5 befuddle. confuse or mask what

is really going on, as when people deal n i such generalities as "'the feeling just isn'( there"; (c)

sym1'flLt1i«d rtlalionships or ()t�pmd1/.Ship, where rigid

roles are the norm and power relationships emphasize rule gi\'ing and enforcing, exemplified by the rigidly authori tarian father who s i afraid LO relate to his children in a personal way; and (d) cmnpkmmtmy rtlationships. where penonal pa!hologies feed on each other,

as

when !he alcoholic

�Ioser" is married to !he "suffering martyr.� (Gurman and Kniskem [ 1981 ]

s i an especially helpful reference source for greal.er clarification oflhese destructive patterns.)

,

355

Ever), family system is seen as having Tules, some of which are explicit and many ofwhich arc implicit. When family systems have rules that allow for change, there is potential for constructive adaptations to life's challenges. BUI if the system is too rigid. due to incff«tual rules (e.g., "a 'real man' never asks for helpl�) or pathological communica­ tion, tension builds up and needs to be released in order for the system to maintain equilibrium or homeostaSis. Unhealthy !»'Stems lcnd to be static and resistant to change. They can project the tension between two members of the system (such as marital contlict) onto a third member of the system (such as the adolescenl daughter who lakes on an identity as the Mrcbellious onew or as Mthe bulimicM) rather than dealing mOTe directly \
356

�'OO£J/NI'SYOIOTJlF.JW'1F..S

behavior of the family member(s) s i assumed

to

reflect distress and

dysfunction in the S)'stcm. which is struggling to man i tain its equilib­ rium and homeostasis. The symptomatic family member. whether a fearful child, anorexic adolescent or alcoholic husband, is deemed to he manifesting SY51em

disturbance.

The shape the pathology lakes and

the way family members deal with it are critical clues to understanding

and interveni ng to change the ramil)'.

Modd qPrydoolh""frY As Goldenberg (1983, p. 297) has summarized. the Mfocus of family

lherapy is on changing the system-the characteristic family pattern of interacting with each other, their style and mannerofcommunication,

or the structure of their relationships

so

that each member experi­

ences a sense of independence, uniqueness. and wholeness while remaining within the context and security of the family relationship. � There arc: probably at least seven major models of family therapy

n i the field lOday (after Balswick, 1987): The

structural family Ihn-opy model

sees the reorgani7.ation or

strengthening of family relational stl'uclUres treaunent

(cr. Minuchin,

as

t.he major goal of

1974). A \'ery direct and often manipulative

approach. it focuses on establishing more adaptive patterns ofimerac­ tions by creating clear, flexible boundaries between fam ily members and strengthening the parental hierarchy.

The slmltgic family IlurafrY model focUS(.'
is

a highly active and problem­

(o. Fisch, WeakJand and Segal, 1982:

Haley 1976) . R:tt.her than auempting to alter family slructures, it ,

aucmplS to resolve the presenting problems through a variety of creative and often �parndoxical� (seemingly n i direct and opposite) therapeutic direcu\'es that have no obvious bearing 011 the problem or

existing f.unily strUCtures. Its practitioners assume the family wiu sort

OUI new relational structures as a result of symptomatic change,

Thefamily.!)'Stems model offamily therapy can be described as a direct

but nonconfrontational approach that focuses on the individual's role

in th e extended family system (Bowen , 1978). Assistingfamily members in differentiating themselves from the �ego ma5S� in their family of origin (i.e" establishing independent identity) is the major task of treaunent, Ideally, this differentiation improves individual cognith'e functioning and emotional reactivity through modification of the family system,

The communications model of family therapy

asse

rts that symptoms

"AMfLl' TlIER,,]>'/,

357

are nOlwerbal messages in reaction to dysfunctions in the imenctional styles of family members (S..tir,

1983). 111erapisrs in this tradition arc

!tither active and see themselves as role models and teachers of good communication skills and sensitivities. II is assumed that when commu­ nication becomes dear and direct, significalll growth and improve­ ment can occur for all family membcfll. The bthaujqral .weial txchange model of ramily therapy stresses the application of behavioral or social-learning principles (chapters six and eight) to the resolution offamily concerns (Patterson, 1971,

1982).

As might be expected, i t stresses the need to establish concrete and observable goals, the realignment of lhe contingencies of social rein­ forcement. the modeling of appropriate behaviors and the establish­ ment of family -COntnCls� th.1.! seek to develop more adaptive interactional .'Slyles. It also tends to be an acti\'e and direct approach to

trea.Ullent, with the therapist often functioning as a. teacher or contract negotiator.

The psycJwdJTIIlInjc/�d-rfflJtiom "uxkl (chapter four) focmcs more

on the individual in the context of the family system. Unresoh-ed contlicrs and losses in the family of origin are explored so as to assess how thL"")' might be influencing current inter'dctional patlems (Acker­ man.

1966; Boszoremenyi-N,lgy and Ulrich, 198 1 ) . It is assumed that

in addition to individuals having intrapsychic problems. family mem­ bers contaminate each other with their pathologies. with the result that only a family intervcntion can produce cffective change. Through increa'ICd insight and aWMeness. unresolved issues from childhood can be processed. e"l'enlually leading to morc satisfying interpersonal rela­ tionships. As might be expected, the therapist tend, to adopt a more neutral stand than n i the previous approaches. Finally. the

(;).pt.il!1ltial

m(}(ul sh31'cs the humanistic spirit of the

communications model by emphasizing increased awareness. greater authenticity and more fulfilling inter.l.ction styles in the family system (\\'hitaker.

1976). As might be expected, lhe lhenpist is acti\'e!y in­

volved and highly responsive (chapt.er twelve ) . The kcr difference is that the focus is on the self in the context of the family rather than on communication patterns per se. Obviously, ......th such di\'erse models it is hard to make broad

generalization about such it complex and e,'er-c.hanging movement. It is possible, however, to differentiate models in terms of whether they are pragmatic or

atSlhdic,

based on their goals and t)'Picai modes of

action (cf. Hazelrigg, Cooper and Bourdin.

1987. pp.

428-4.29) .

•

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358 Pragmatic approaches are typically concerned with behavioral out­ comes and stress activity. Hence, they focus on direcuy and quickly alleviating prc5eming

concerns by disrupting unhealthy po,",,'er coali·

tions or interactive

panerns in the family system. The strucUiral, strategic and behavioral approaches probably best fit this description. Aeslht:tic approaches. in camrdst, are more "process-oricntcd. � They are less likely to foclIs only on presenting complaints, but morc likely to see them

as

ca talysu for growth . Therapists in this tradition

tend to be less active and directi\'e. and more willing to bypass imme­

diate concems for what they consider to be morc important ways to promote long-term grO\\lth and healing. The family systems, commu­ nications, pS)'{:hodynamic and experiential models most often fit this

description .

ever, . For t.he remainder of this chapter, ho.... we will focus largely

(though not exdusi\'cly) on the models which have arisen out of the systems-theory Illo\'ement, namely the structural, strategic, f,mlily sys­ ,

tems and communications models. The beha\�oral, experiential and psychodynamic models are largely adaptation s of more traditional individual p�1'chother"py techniques fOI' the family context. TllIl!i they each respectivdy share Lhc strengths and weaknesses of Lheir parem theories. The models most influenced by systems theory. however. are

truly different ways of looking at human nalUre. Initi ally family therapists are concerned about how presenting .

symptoms are related to the interactional patlcl'lls in the family. and how panicuJ;lr family members may play difTerent roles in lhat process. III an effort to assess tllese dynamics, family therapists may meet witll the entire family or an)' ora number of the members of lhe system or imerdependenl subs}'stcms. For instance they may meet "�Lh children, .

parcnLS and grandparents together or with Lhe parents alone. Accord­ ing to Goldenberg and Goldenberg

(1985, p. 262) . this seems most useful when tltcre is serious marital conflict. sibling rivalry, imcr­

generational conflict or other relationship difficulties. Family sessions seem contraindicated when OIlC or morc member$ are tOO destructive,

violent or psychologically fragile. Although lhe slyles adopl widely. they by family tllerapislS ....try .

ed

lend to ab'Tet! on the plimar), goals of treatment. According 10 Lhe

Group ror the Ad\�mcement of Psychiatry ( 1 970). imprO\'cd commu­

nication, autonomy and individuation

arc

most important followed by .

increast.'d empathy, !lime flexible leadership sryles. imprQ\'ed role ab'Tec­

mem, n.'(\uced conflict and greater ind�1dual -,,-ymptomatic and task

.

,

359

f"A..\I/J.Y TIIf:RAP1'

perfonnance improw�menL Different traditions may stress individual

p:.)t:hodynamics o\'er and against family processes. Across the tradi­ tions. me role of the therapist is

seen

variously

a�

a role model. facilitator. teacher or change agent. The emphasis placed on assess. ment varies considenlbly. wilb some seeing it as

an

e!.Sential and useful

activity, and others as potentially disruptive and distracting. Creative and novel assessment strategies have been developed by some (e.g., Haley,

1976) .

A bewildering number of interventions ha"e been described in the family therapy literature. As Seels and Ferber

(1969)

ha\'e des.cribed

it, some family lher.tpists could best be described as reactors who tend to be nondirective and passive. whereas olhers could be more accu­ rately described as conductors who tend to be highly active and direc­ live in all phases of treatment. Obviousl)" the latter hal-'e generated me bulk of the more creative and i.:nnovati\'C techniques. Genernlly, the latter group "act on � the family ralber than looking at family members as collaborators in the lherapeutic process. The general presumption seems to be that since family systems are nonrational entities which tend LO maintain the dysfunctional homeosta�is. there cannot be much collabor.tlion \",ilb the individual clients. One of the mOSt widely used and often controversial of the family techniques is

rifromil!g,

which involves giving an interpretation that

pUts the problem symptOms in a new lighL For example. a married couple may be asked to thank a fearful child for distracting them all from their unresolved arguments. Another technique is

scriptiQn,

symptom fJrfJ­

such as asking the family to intentionally schedule its argu·

ments late at night when they are most likely to have really destructive battle5 (Deschenes and Shepperson.

H)83). Symplon prescription is

one form of paradQxical n i tervention, ....hich . .....e ",ill discuss at the end of this chapter. A third

is the creati\'C utili7.ation of metaphors and

pamblt:.f, which arc ai med al alr.ering a family's understanding ofits own functioning by creating new �StO!ies� by which they define themselves (Boghosian,

1983). Finally. family

gmograms are used,

where families

graphically portray how they are perpetuating or recapitulating long­ slanding problem patterns in their current relationships (cf. Gold­ enbergand Goldenberg,

1985).

The family therapy movement has grown enormollsly in the past three decades. The majority of its practitioners came Out of rraditions of individual therapy and have incorporated those perspectives into their systemic theorizing and practice. It would be fair to say that the

361 primary context in which people can grow. For the Christian, lhe nonnative structure and essential functions of the family are a crucially imporl
1982). Indeed. an

important pan of our identity as Christians has to do with our place in bOlh our biological families and in the church

a.�

nur new family of

God. As we noted in chapler twO, Cod seems clearly concerned "'ith more th:mjust indhiduals, and has in the biblical record dealt with his people as families, as a uibe and as a body. Through Christ we are connected by grace and by a covenant of lo\'c in which we are all brothers and sisters-a family in a vel)' deep sense Guernsey.

(d. Anderson and

1985).

8Ul we are concerned about the difference bern'cen studying both the family and the individual venus focusing on the family ralh" lhan the indi\lidual. $c\'CraJ (though not all) \'crsions offamily therapy seem to impliciuy or explicitly embrace what might be called a "collectivist� \liew of persons. A collectivist \iL'W of persons is one that sees persons as largely or exclusively a product of social interaction. More specific­ i best seen as that of being part ally, it contends that our core identity s of a system, a collective of people, ....'hether that be a class, familial or societal grouping. Individual personality is deemed trivial or insignifi. cant. Because who we are and how ....·e beha\'e is a function of the interpersonal systems we exist in, what mailers is the chardcter and functioning of the system, nOt the person. Our fear is that in the more extreme \'ersions of the collecti\;st perspeclh·e. indi\iduaity l largely disappears. With this largely exclusive foclls on structured relationships in family systems, a respect for inter­ nal processes and dt.·\"elopmental histories vanishes

(d.

Prochaska,

1984). These concerns are similar to those expressed about a much more strident and extreme colleClhist approach to persons. that of doctrinaire Marxism, where individuality evaporates into the collective of the social class. \Ve want to draw some lessons from one critique of Marxism. bUl please nolC that we are not equating fdmily therapy with Marxism. nor are we saying t.hat family therapy is Marxist. Pannenberg

(1989, p. 217), in critiquing �tarxism, stales that a

collectivist view of persons is �sharply opposed to Christian personal­ ism. because in a Christian perspective the individual person is consti­ LUted by his or her immediate relation to God. Therefore in a Christian t person cannot be considered to be thoroughly dependent on view he the social context. � An)' concepLion of persons that minimizes or obliterates the individual on behalr of the family runs the risk or

FMfII.YTIII:RAP'Y

365

accord \\;th clear roles for the marital dyad as well as for the y.trious subsystems be(WI.."t!ll parcm(s) and child(ren) . But these scriptUral guidelines need to be worked Ollt in such a "''aY that they transcend our personal and cultural idiosyncrasies and preferences, eSpe<:ially as they relate to single-parent. wblended� or �child-frce· familics (Johnson,

1983; Van Leeuwen, 1990). Healthy family functioning also presupposes clearly established (but not inflcxible) boundaries, Family cohesion must aJ",,'ays be bal­ anced with the individual growth of the members. The Scriptures

dearly warn about the possibility of conflict in onc's family of origin as one seeks 10 do the

\\ill of God

(cf Mt

10:34-39). Indecd, integrity

seems to demand, at times, a r�sponse that will tax our emotional resources as we seek to reconcile seemingly discrepant personal and familial priorities (cf. Salinger,

1985, p.

406).

But Christian commit­

ment dcmands an even more challenging responsibility-to expand our boundaries to include our brothers and sisters in the larger -family of faith� (cf. Anderson and Guernsey,

198!D. Indeed, Christians are

called to balance love and respect for one's m i mediatc family with appropriate care and concern for all who love and obey God

(cf. Mt

12:50). These are all -boundary issucs.h YCt our understanding of these biblical imperatives ",ill alwa)'s be interpretl..-d within the context of our pcr§Onal problems, failings and inevitable distortions due to our humanness, fallenne55 and finitencss.

All tOO easily our family relationships can become distorted, fixalCd and/or stagnated g l, Ice can turn into law, empo\\'crmem can lead to a sense of possessI\'e power, covenant can be replaced by contract, and personal aloofness can substitute for any real sense of intimacy Balswick and Balswick,

(cf.

1987). Once again, it is m i perative that we dr.lw

from the resources of our faith and the local disccllling community of believers. This presupposes that we are connected in the kind of .5Upport system that is characterized by a healthy balance between affirmation and accountability and by a slfOng commitment to "being the church� in word and deed (Anderson and Guernsey,

1985).

In summary, then, we St.� much in the family lherapy understand­ ingoffamilies that has exciting integrati\"C possibilities for the Christian concerned aOOm helping people grow. The importance of clearly defined roles and structures. and firm but flexible boundaries, has been consistently emphasized. Indeed. research efforts appear to sup­ port these key assertions (e.g., l...c\is, \ Gosset! and Phillips.

1976). A key

difference between much of family therapy and the Christian view

MMII.r l'Hl:R.il"I·

367

structure and authority higher than flexibiity. l Obviously. these are potential are:1S for discussion and debate between practitioners and laypersons alike. Indeed, such n i teraction might enrich our under­ standing of what it means to be Mfamily,� whether we undersand t that to mean our biological families only (the historic secular emphasis) or our larger and more eXlended family of faith (the classic Christian unden;tanding).

As with any approach to people-helping. family therapy approaches endo� a certain philosophy oflife and world view, especially abom the relative importance of indh�dual well-being in the context of the functioning of the family. Pragmatic and uLititarian family practition­ ers, argued Hare-MUSlin

(1980). all tOO quickly give inappropriate

prioriry to the good of the famil)' 35 a whole when an individual's needs

conflict with the whole. This could potentially thwart legiLimate at­ tempts 10 "differentiate or "individuateM and perhaps even encourage M

a new kind of Menmeshment." Hare-Mustin, like others, also argued that family therapy rypically is not conducted in a gender egalitarian way, but implicitly and thoughtlessly endorses stereotyped or tradi­ tional roles for men and Yo'omen. Possible abuse of authority and Q\'eremph
(1976)

recognized early the potenLial for abuse here, but he himscU'ended up advocating power for the therapist rather tllan to the person in !he system

as

the

amwer

issue of Ctxmseli7lg

to this conundrum. Recently, an entire special

anti Vaiuts

(Doherty, 1985), the official journal of

tlle Association for Religious and Value Issues in Counseling, was devoted to consideration of \a1ues and ethics in family tllerdpy. This hopefully indicates that we

are

entering a time when full and public

; 11 occur. discwsiolls of these issues ....

Apart from me concerns about the potential abuse ofauLhority and po....·er in the context of treatment, there is growing concern about some of the assumptions made by family tllerapislS about the nailire of the Mideal familr.� More specifically. attention is focusing on the im­ plicit assumptions being made about sex roles and division of respon-

f.iMIU Tl(f..R!tPI'

369

Despite these reservations. we find a number of the theoretical concepts in family therapy to be enormously helpful in our effons to understand the richness and complexities of human interactions. A therapist .....ho can be reasonably objective about these familial dynam­ ics can help family members ....·ho need to learn ho..... to effectively communicate ....ith one another. Candor and direcmess, as .....ell as

loving support and encouragement, seem in order as family members

seek to develop skills in fanning a sense of personal as ....eU . as familial identity, both in the context of the biological family and the larger family of faith (cf. McLemore,

1983) . .'\.11 too often, �ministry to fami­

Iies� in the local church has been rather superficial. We would like to see a greater respect for how religious attitudes, w.1ues and behaviors are innuenced by family dynamics (and vice versa) . Family concepts give us a language that docs justice to the all·tao-familiar but often subtle ways in which we attempt to deceh'e ourselves and each other in our interpersonal relationships.

Model ofPsyrhotht:rapy Family therapy correctly recognizes that symptoms often appear in a larger context (e.g., the family of origin or in a marriage). Directly confTonting abe rrant power coalitions and dysfunctional interaction patterns is a logical way to confront neuroses and related fonns of psychopathology. This docs not necessarily imply any sacred commit­ ment on the part of practitioners to the �sanctity of hearth and home" (Kavel,

19i6, p. 185). In reality, the appeal ofthe focus on the family

system is probabl)' related to more pragmatic and utililJ.rian concerns, namely, the perceh'ed effectiveness of the methods, than to a deep moral commilIDenl to the family. This ethos sounds dangerously close to an

ends-justifying-the-means approach to clinical intervention (Pro­

chaska,

1984).

A more generous n i terpretation would be that family therapy practitioners

are deeply concerned about

the need for greater related­

ness in COlllemporary American SOciety. A fair assessment would be to conclude that the individually focused approaches ha\'e taught us much about what it means to assist persons in becoming more self· aware and capable individuals who can better respond La the demands of everyday li\ing. In contrast, the family therapy movement may be able to help individuals gro\<,' to.... � ard greater maturity in the context of , : ith lhe seconda,'y effect of helpin g families their families of origin. ..

grow.

,

370

M{)()t.'IlNI'SI'CHOTIIHRA}'IJ;S

We appreciat(: this emphasis, since it is clear from a careful reading of Scripture that God works out his plan for humankind in families acroi>S the generations (cf. Anderson and Guernsey, 1985). Contempo­ rary Americans often lack a slrong sense of cultur
3 71

spiritual problems. Many dysfunctional families simply do not change as

a resiXlnse to morc direct ·collabordtkeW interventions. As Boghos­

ian (1983) has observed, certain �countcr-rational- interventions like ! ith persons paradox' par.l.ble and metaphor can be quite helpful .... whose dysfunctional patterns arc highly resislant to change. AlLhollgh there is considcr.tblc controversy about the ethics of stich procedures as paradox (cr. Deschenes and Shepperson, 1983), family therapy procedures have the pOlential for �lligh mirage-responses in the family system. One of me lasting legacies offamily therapy may bc the recognition of the need to consider -nonrational- alternatives to morc conven­ tional and direct intervcntions. The Christian understanding of me need for such interventions docs not, however, rest ultimately in a low view of flltionaliry. but rather in a sad recognition of the profound ' e all capacity for self-deceit, rebellion and bondage to sin which .... manifest. Indeed, such inlen'entions, when used with integrity, might be the most eflicaciotls, effective and elhically appropriate procedures available,

Conclusion We find family therapy to be a refreshing comrast 10 some aflhe excess­ es associated with certain overly individualistic approaches to change. Certain emphases in lhis tradition bring a whole new understanding to what it means to be in the family of God as well as a member of our biological families, llie approach reminds us of lhe need

10

struggle

with \"hat il means 10 honor first our Creator.(;od rather than familial

i 0....11 relationships ("A man's enermes will be the members of hs

household,� MI 10:36). "Problem� in 1i,'ing� more limes than not have dimensions of furnitial in\'ol,'cmcnl, and family tllt'rnpy certainly illuminates this. I\y emphasizing certain themes like the need for a finn parental coalition and appropriate generational boundaries, family therapy has encour!rcrh�p� U1C bibliC'.Jt examples thar corne (1ose�1 lu cxemptif)ing pa...doxical ;Ulc,,'cn·

rions would t... God's wllullanding "bt"ham to sacrifice his son 1.'I.'I: < r (Gt':n Z'l) and

Solomon lhrcmcnjn8 10 chop a baby in two to rC.!oOh'c a disputc ol'<�r ....hom

d,e child

hclongcd IU ( I Kings 3: I:"2K). In neither C� ....ere the �upposo:dl)' de!iroo outcomC$ rhe

real focus; Go.;: did nor ......m lsa..:.c dead, and Solomon did nor .....ml .. rhe baby dead. Both H

jntcn'l'Uliu"s had uutcO'""S that uo:itlon Abralmm nor the disputingworn,'n cuuld ha"c proj«tcd,

I'SYCJlOTIlE/tAPIF-S

,II()[J£R.\'

374

PryrJwlogy (md T�,

11(2), 92-98. Doherty. W. (1985), COllnsding and va/IUS, 30(2). Fisch, R.; \\'ealdand,j.; and Seg-41. L (1982). T� laailS of Winge: Doing fMra/'J

britfly. Sail Frallci�o: Josscy-Bass.

Fole)'. V. (1984). Family IherJ.p)', In R. Corsini (Ed.), Contempomry /M)'cholhn"a­ pits (3d ed.) (pp. 447490). Itasca, IL: F. E. Peacock. Goldenberg. H. (1983). Ccnkmpomry clinical/JfJcMWgy (2d ed.). MOnlcre}" CA.: Brooks/Cole. GoldC:ll�rg. I.. and Goldenberg. H. (1985). Fomil)' thnapy: An overoirw. Monterey. CA: Brooks/Cole. Croup for (he: Advancement of Ps),chiatry. (1970), Tiu foUl ofJami!] IMroPY. (GAP Report lt7S) . New York: GAP. Gnmlan, S. ( 1 984). Marriagrand llu/omif)'." A Q,ri.tian l f-sputillfl. Grand Rapids. MJ: 7..ondCI'''an. .•

Gunnan, A and Kniskem, D. (f.ds.). (1981). Ifawlboolr. affafflil)· lherapy. New York: Bnmner/Malr.eI. Haler. J. (1976), �-wlvblg /linafry. San Franci3co: jossey-Bass. Hare-Mustin, R. (1980). Family therapy may be dang("rous to your h("allil.

Proftsrio'IUIl Ps-jchology, /1(6), 935-938. Hazelrigg, M.; Cooper, H.; and Bourdin, C. (1987). Evaluating the effecth'e­ ne� of family

therapies: An integrative rel;ew and analysi5. Ps-jclwwgicaJ

Bulk/in, 1O/{'3), 428-442. Hoistege. H. (1982). Tiu CJm's/ianfamily. Grand Rapids. MI: Calvin College. jacobson, N. (1985). Towarru a nonseclaTia..n blueprint for th(" empirical study of family therapiet. Journal ofMamagt and F(lmily Th�T(lpy. 11(2), 163-165. johnson. C. (1983). 1'ht p!)'dw/.0t.3 Of biblical inlnfrrda/i(l1l, Grand Rapids. Ml: Zonden-an. Kantor. D. and LLhr. W. (1975). lruid� llu family: Towarth a IMury offamily proms. San FranciKO: jossey-Bass. Korchin. S. (1976). MOikm dilliw/ fJJ)chofug]. New York: Basic Books. }(m·d.j. (1976). A rompkupith 10 therapy. N�' York: Pantheon Books. Langsford. R. (1978). Undentanding the role of extr.uamilial social forces in family treatmem: A critique of family therapy. Fa,nily Tlv:raJly, 5( I), 73-79. i..ewis,j.: Gos-sell.j.; and Phillips. V. (1976). No singk l/trtGd: PJychologiwl Mll/h andfamily syJlmlS. �ew York: Brunner/Maze1. McKeon. D and Piercy. F. (1983). Health}' family functioning: What family therapistS. priestS, and mininers .say. hltmlGtionaJjoanwl ofFamily TMml'1, .

..

5(3), 190-2{)2. McLt:more, C. (1983). Horlai CIlristiarlity. Philadelphia: Westminster. Minuchin, S. (1974). FumiiltJ and family thera/']. Cambridge, MA: HarVlud University Press. Narramore, B. (1979). PaTtfl/i,lg wilh Urue all/I limits. Grand Rapids. MI: Zon­ den'an. Olson. D.; Spn:nkle, D.; and Russell, C. (1979). Circumplex model of marital and family systems I: Cohesion and adaptability dimensions, family l}·pt..'S. and clinical applications. Family l'rocw, 18, �28. I'annenberg, \\'. (1989). Christianity. �ian:i�m, and liberalion theology. Chris-

•

P'

,

TOW CHRIST PSYCHOLOGIES

15 RESPONSIBLE ECLECTICISM .;.

( the broaden possible lC\'c!s, wha� ha\"t� I<'C claimed.so far

n i this book? We have claimed that it is legitimate and necessary for the dedicated Chlistian to stand on the fun­ damentals of the faith. We must let those beliefs. values, attitudes and commiunems have their proper SWdY in aU lhat we think do, and feel. .

This is what integration of faith and understanding means al the most basic le\'el. We have argued thallhe: Christian faith has a great deal to say abom personhood, though it does not propose a specific psychol­ ogy as we understand il today. Further, we nml a psychology, a comprehensive and explicit under­ standing of persons, if we arc to be of optimal assistance in helping hurting people achieve healing and growth. In �)Ur analysis orlhe main psychotherapy theories. we hope we havc documenLCd twO main points. Fil1lt, that each of the models ha.� sevcral compatibilities \\;th

MODERNPSI'CJiOTll£ItAI>fES

380

the faith, as well as many insights, strengths. uses and points of aurae­ tivcness. Second, that each model

has both incompatibi l ities with

biblical faith and other flav.'S, inconsistencies, weaknesses and prob­ lems. None of the theories can be rejecu�d out of hand, but none can

be wholeheartedly endorsed by the Christian counselor. Some models hold more promise than others because they are more well elaborated, have more evidence supporting their effectiveness or have more per­ vash'c commonalities with Christian belief and practice. We do not have lhedefinith'e model 10 propose in place oflhe many theories we have examined. In fact. we do not believe that a definitive model exists and think it unlikely that it will ever exisL If after twO millennia Christians cannot agree aboulsome oflhe most fundamental points of theology (as documented by the din�rsiry of denominations

and theological "schools"), how can we expect congruence on a �Chris­ tian" psychology? So how can the field be put together? How can counselors achieve some order in their understanding of people so as not to be paralyzed \.\'ith indecision and confusion when confronted with a hurting person? We would argue that it is reasonable at this point ill history for Christian counselors to be tCkctieor pluralistic in their approach, dra\.\ing flrst all

the faith for the foundations of a view ofpersons and then elaborating on that view with conceptions taken from secular psychology or the writings of the Christian counselors of the past and the present. And lest the result of this be a sloppy, unsystematic hodgepodge of ideas, we will sUryey wdYs in which this eclecticism might be conducted.

As we stan out, we would argue again, as we did in chapter two, that the Bible does not teach a personality theory, though it does teach us much about persons. Van Leeuwen ( 1987), working within the frame­ i vital to work of personality theorist Salvatore Maddi, suggests that it s

distinguish bet ... ..een suppositions of

COrt

personality tendencies and

characteristics (about which the Bible and the faith has much, though not (:\'erything, to �y) and more the pmphLrol statements about per­ sonality types, modes of human development and the like. For example, the concept of sin

is

central to the faith, but that

concept, with all its meaning. does not tell

us

why one person sins by

committing adultery while another sins with a prideful.

arrogant atti­

rud� or by a lack of compassion for the poor, The faith tells US that God

did not intend for US to

be riddled ",ith anxiety, but it does not tell us

how to d�al with a person who is phobicly afraid of social siruations,

nor does it tell us why some avoid feared objects while others o"ercom-

.

,

381 pensate for their fear with an exaggerated bravado. OUf faith tells u.s the ultimate meaning of life, but it does not tell

w

why so many

conversions to saving faith occur in adolescence rather than in late aduhhood. Only our psychologies address lhesecomplex and intricate

ISSUes. Several authors ha\'e notoo that the theoretical allegiances ofcoun­ selors to different counseling approaches tend to change over time. While there is no solid empirical research 10 back up these claims, they are intuitively appealing. Halgin

(1985) suggested that there are a

number of pressures that encourdge students of counseling ap­ proaches to make identificalioll5 with particular approaches even before they have received substantive training in these approaches. This may be due

to student

perceived congruences between a model

and that student's pel"5OnaJ life philosophy, identification with a pro­ fessor or teacher who emulated a certain approach, or pressure exerted by graduate admission processes which encourage early identification of a preferred model. In the graduate training envi­ ronment, student allegiances to a model are drAmatically affected by training opportunities available, both in tcnllS of courses and practicum experiences and personal experiences willl therapy. Training programs often are strong in one approach 10 the delri­ men 1 ofothers. Also, those educating students in Iherapy seem more likely to be theoretical purists than community practitioners be­ cause such theoretical purity makes classroom communication eas­ ier and may facilitate research productivi ty.

In practicing therapy (following J-Ialgin, 1985; and Norcross, 1985) the clinician inevitably confronts lhe limits of his or her model. This may be minimized for those who work

n i

settings where they are

exposed only to a homogeneous population needing help, as in the case of the behavior modifier working only with the mildly develop­ mentally disabled (retarded), or the existential therapist only working with high-functioning, \'erbal and intelligent persons experiencing milder dissatisfactions with life. For m05l, though, confrontations with the limits of one's model occur quite soon in practice; we run into counseling problems that either stretch our working model to the limits or clearly fall beyond the bounds of our model. We also encounter cases where our model should MW worked if the approach is true, and .....e musl confront the fact thal it did not work.. These experiences are akin to the psychological challenges we race in personal development when our status quo is shaken and the resulting

382 disequilibrium forces us to gro..... a bit morc. Without such crises, we would be unlikel)' to ever grow. Our reaction to such challenges may be rigidly to claim the exclu­ sive correctness of our model and to deny its limitations (a response nOt in the beSt interest of therapist or dient). Some will acknowledge the limitations but confidently believe that it is only a matter of time until the essential correctness of their approach is borne out. Some rna)' lapse into a relativism mal results in the kind of MsupermarkclM

(Nelson:Jones, 1985) or chaotic eclecticism we \\;11 describe below. But £he healthiest response is to make a commitment to growing in effec­

tiveness through knowing the limits of our approach and understand­ ing how other models might complement and make lip for the weaknesses of our own. The options for responsible eclecticism \\,'0 or more theories, and !.he belief thaI no present t heory is adequate to explain or predicl all of the behavior a clinician observesw (Norcross.

1985, p. 21). As Smith (1985) notes,

the ""ord uluticetymologically means 10 �pick OUl from among or select from.� The most frequently cited ps)"chological definition of ukcticism

is that of English and English ( 1958. p. 168). ""ho describe it as the Mselection and orderly combination of compatible features from di­ verse sources, sometimes from othelwise incompatible theories and systems; the effort to find vdlid elements in all doctrines and theories and to combine them inlO a harmonious whole."

As Slated, this position seems to make infinite sense, especially after the analysis in lhis book which has been directed at showing the inadl..""<juacies in all the approaches. As Garfield and Bergin ( 1 986, p.

7) note, �None of the traditional theories of change has succeeded in convincing the professional public that it deserves singular prece­

dence; consequemly, practition ers and researchers are exploring ways of synthesizi ng diverse elements imo nexible multifaceted OIienta­ tions. " Nevertheless, eclecticism has largely been ,;ewed 1H..'gatively n i psychology lip until lhe last decade. In the period of ascendancy of the

major theories there WIDi unbridled optimism about their accuracy and efficacy. In lhis context, eclecticism was often branded with labels such

,

383

as "muddle-headedness, � Mthe Jast refuge of mediocrity. � Mundisci­ plined subjectivity," "conceptual laziness, � l.dinical indecisiveness," "professional nihilism" and even "minimal brain damage" (Norcross. 1985; Rychlak. \985; and olhers).

But in the Jast len to ftfteen years, theoretical dilettantes have been

humbled by the positive but nonspectacular empirical evaluations of the effectiveness of their personally accepted approaches and the indisputable positive outcomes of other models which are quite incom­ patible with their own perspectives. Eclecticism is seen by many as necessary if there is no one best approach and if the literature cant:.Un§

documentation of effective approaches emerging from theories other

than one's own (Smith, 1985).

The end result today is that between a third and a half of clinical

psychologists now describe themseh'es as eclectic, the largest identifI­ able group orientation (Norcross and Prochaska, 1988). Other me nlo ... l

health therapists (social work.ers, guidance tounselors) are probably c"cn morc eclectic than psychologists. Yet, 3$ pointed out by Garfield

and Bergin (1986), this identification as eclectic tells u.s very ittle l about what these practitioners do. The tcrm tclecticis actually more a term of negation CI do not adhere to any one approach�) than a positive

description (�I do adhere to x, y and z�). In its v'"ont manifestations, eclecticism cad be aptly described by the

negative terms listed earlier. We do know therdpists who seem to be morc influenced by the latest charismatic speaker at a professional

conference or weekend seminar making unsubstantiated claims of therapeutic effectiveness than by any rcaroned and deliberate multi­

faceted approach to understanding persons. This can result in the therapist attempting to combine mutually contrddiclory concepts and

techniques, and approaching the client in a manner that lacks logical

coherence. Patterson ( 1 985) calLs such a stance �athcoretical syncre­ tism.- We hope, by the discussion to follow, to encour.lge a reasoned,

deliberate and Christian approach to eclecticism.

Approaches to Eclecticism There are numerous schellles for undt!fSrnnding eclecticism (e.g.,

Neison:lones, 1985; Norcross. 1985; Norcross and Procha.�ka, 1988; Held, 1984).

In

Ihe scheme we utilize below, we 3re combining c1e­

menL� of lhese and other authors, and adding vcry little tJlal is new from us. We will describe four basic approaches to eclecticislJl.

MODEJINPSYClIOTHElW'I£S

386

clients that do not fit the narrow definitions of the study popuJation are screened out of experimental studies. We do not feel thai these considerations should lead one to a crippling skepticism about the use of such research on comparative effccth·cness. But we must be careful about impulsively jumping to conclusions before strong conclusions can be drawn from the literature. We will briclly summarize the current stale of knowledge regarding the empirical cJTeclh·cne.s.s of lhc major dlcrapy approaches. First. we can generally sa)' !.hat the Jungian, Adlerian, reality, existential, Gestalt and transactional analysis approaches each ha\'c too few methodolog­ ically sound studies to provide e\'cn minimal evidence about effective-. ness. Each literature includes a wealth of case studies, which provides some encouragement abom their potential, but none of these can be regarded as fmally persuash'e.

It must be noted that some of the

approaches embrace an understanding of persons, of the change process, and of science .....hich makes empirical study somewhat incom­ patible \\;th their approach. Existential, Gestalt andJungian therapies are perhaps notable in this regard. They would each argue that empir­ ical research inevitably

rum

the risk. of dehumanizing persons by

treating them as "objec�" in a mechanistic or reductionistic fashion. Each of these approaches reportS findings in morc phenomenologi­ cally ot;ented case studies. Such reports can further our understanding of the inner subjective experience of a limited number of clients. bUI they are not maximally helpful in evaluating ....hether . or nOt the model achieves itS stated purpose of helping people grow compared to other approaches

(d. Norcross, 1987).

With regard to person
use

of

scientific methodology. The resuil ofthose commitmentS is a rich body of sophisticated research on this approach. Most of this research has, howevcr, been on undcrstanding the proass of successful therapy ,."jth

a

limited population of clients. This research has fed me gradual

e,·olution of the person<enlered·thcrapy approach oycr time by high­ lighting the critical elements of successful Rogenan therapy- But the research has notfocused on gauging the ifftctivmess ofthe thempy .... ith

the wide range of client populations. with the result that we cannOt say forcefully how succcssful person<entered thcmp}' is or with .....hat type of problems it is most effective. The effectiveness of classical psychoanalysis has not becn ade-

.

,

387 quately assessed, though there is a substantial literature in this at'ea. Throughout much of the first half of this century. case studies which are open to many possible biases and disLOnions were the nQrm. Gradually these case studies were supplemented by stlney studies that relied initially on subjective, then later more objective. out.comc cri­ teria. Only a limited Ilumber of reasonably controlled n:search studies have heen published to date (e.g.. Kernberg.

1 973; Sloane, SUlples,

Cristo], Yorkilton aud Whipple. 1975). Wcll-designed research studies are rare in this tradition. This is a rather sad comment.'l.ry on a method that Freud himsclfinitialty perceived to be more of a research LOol than a clinical strategy for facilitating change. Currently, the defense of psychoanalysis lends to remain an assertion of faith as much

a.s

it is a

conviction based on .scientific methods. In lhe interim. Freudian the­ ory and technique will mosl likcly continue to be viewed by many

a.s

more descripti\'e than prescriptive. Similar evaluative comments could be made about contemporary P�1'chodynamic therapy approaches. The bulk of the scholarly work of psychodynamic theorists continues to be case slUdies and challenging conceptual refinements.

As

mentioned in chapter four. the recent

de\-elopmem of empirical tests of some \'ersions of this model, such as the study of interpersonal therapy as a treatment ofdepression (Elkin. Shea, Watkins. Imber et a!., 1989), are producing posith-e results. This is a welcome and much needed development. There ha\'e been a nwnber of excellent integrative reviews of family therapy orlate. stimulated perhaps by the many public pronouncements of the effc..·(uvene.s.s of this approach. The earliest stUdy

....-as

the most

positive. suggesting that flrnil)' thempy appeared to be as effective as

individual therapyfora....ide range ofprescntingproblems (Olson. RusseU and Spl-enkle.

1980) . Hazelrigg. Cooper and Bourdin (1987) were some­

what more cautious and sober in lheir assessment of the effectiveness of family therapies. They concluded

that the

results of their meta-analysis

sho\.-ed that the family therapies in their general form do have a positive effect on clients compared to no treatment, but were only slightly more effccti\'e than some a1tcmati\·c u-eaunem strategies. BUI the mOSt impressive integrative effon done to date was the most humbling (Bednar. Burlingame and Masters.

1988). This review pre­

sented separate meta-analyscs on the systems approaches and the beha\'ioral approaches to family therapy. They concluded that the basic conceplS of the S}'5tems approach .....ere not defined "ilh sufficient clarity and precision to assert that family therapy i5 (!\'en a unique

.

,

388

M(){)£.J/.\1PS)'OIOTllERM'IJ:S

treatment modality. much less that it s i as efficacious as individual therapy (p. 417). They argued thai the S)'Stems approach is in dire need of more fundamental dCKriplive information before it attempts to : crucial variables in treatmenL establish empilical relations unollg

They ....ere somewhat mol'C optimistic in their a5S(.'SSmClll of lhe behav­ ioral familyappro."l.ch, noting thal the conceptual system is more dearly defined and that there is more evidence that it is a useful fomI of treatment.

They do not view it as a major concepruai advance over

existing treaunent options. however. Overall, aggressi\'e assertions about family therapy's cfTe1:tiveness are premature (see also Piercy and Sprenkle, in press), Its widespread

acceptance is probably as much a

response to the intuitive appeal of the approach and to the reality of the disintegration of so many families lil cOnlemporary American sociel}' as to any demonstrated empirical or dinical effectiveness. Finally.

\\-'e

must discuss the lhree more �bcha\'ioraJ� approaches.

Behavior modification has been ShO\\-11 to be effective with a variety of problems. as discus.-.ed in chapter six. These methods must be seen as lhe l.ream1ent of choice for such problems as childhood autism. devel­ opmental disabilities (retardalion), nocturnal enuresis (bed-wetting) and so forth. Funher, the methods have been ShO\\-11 helpful in work with acting-out adolescents, psychotic populations and substance abu!>­ ers. But demonstr.u,ing effectiveness with renain highly defined proJ>. lems is not the same as globally establishmg the approach as the beu overall approach. especially as applied to adult problems. Here. behav­ ior modification is clearly lacking. While Ellis is prone to claiming that his rational emotive therapy has been broadly and

conclusively shown to be clinically etTecli\'e, and

typically cites very long lists of studies to supporr his daims. others (such as Mahoney. 1977) ha\'e been much more modest in surveying the clinical research. Ellis tends to cite studies thal are methodologi­ cally flawed or provide only the most tangential and \'ague support for his methods. But as with behavior modification. while there is littJe doubl about the utility ofhis methods \\ith some populations. ule RET approach falls shorr of being a comprehensive system.

As we ha\'e noted. behavior modification and RET ha\'e been subsumed into cognitive-behavioral therapy, making lhjs approach one or the

more broadly based and important therapies today. Because i t

is a recent de\'e!opmem. an extensive literature on Ute effectiveness or l ity of cognitive-behavioral therapy is still dc\-eloping. Reports of ule uti cogniti\'e-bchavioral therapy with selected disorders have beer. puJ>.

MODER.\'psyrJlOTHERAPIES

390

number of other reasons. It would be callous and unethical for coun­ selon to tum

,..'ar ,,,,

people coming for counseling

Oil

the basis that

research does not exist regarding which treatment approaches

work

beSt with their type of problem.

The prabrmatic edectic stance also presupposes that practitioners

are committed to keeping up on the empirical treatment literature. We regard this <&san ethical m i perative; who would go to a ml..-dial dOClOr who had not read a medical journal in fifLCen years? But whole approaches to therapy exist whose proponents rarely if ever bother to

assess their empirical utility.

as

we have already discussed. This fact

means that �t.he daim that practice is based 011 what ...,'orks is supponcd

only by the subjective evaluation of the praClitioner� (Patterson, p. vi). And to be blum,

....'t

1985,

must remember that the aumor or practi­

tioner claiming effectiveness usually has a vested financial interest in making such a claim. Furmer. ....e . would ask what a therapist is to do in those areas where empirical outcome research

s i inconclusive.

Finally, we wouldnote that it is simply unrealistic to expect that most

counselon can know so many theories well that they can be a cogniti\'t merapist one hour, a beha,,;or therapist the next,

an

object-relations

pS}'chotherapist the third, an experientially oriented Gestalt therapist

before lunch and so forth. The only practical way this position could

be worked out would be for groups of professionals of varying a� proaches to work together and freely refer clients to each other according to empirically determined effectio ..eness; this is an attractive ideal.

Metathunetiad or TrmvthtQietioal Eclecticism

While pragmatic edecticism is the approach mOSt often endorsed

by

practitioners responding to SUlVeyS, it is our impression that it is mCLatheoretical or transthcoretical eclecticism that is most likely to be followed by researchen and authors. Metatheoretical eclecticism is the approach that looks for a �theory or practice behind or beyond the theory.� This approach suggests that proponents of psychotherap), may simpl)' be WTOng about how "what they do� works, and that the best chance for the ad\'aIlcemem of the effectiveness of the profession is the empirical or phenomenological study of what differentiates cffec­ ti\'e person helpers from those who are less effective. regardless of the -theories" that they think differentiate !hem from others. Suppose, for example. that empirical study ofeffectin= helpers from several different orientations showed that ....·hat distinguished the effective helpers from

MODF.RS�·rCllorm:JV.Plf.s

392

they are a conceptual analysis of therapy processes. The approach of Prochaska and his colleagues is perhaps a good example of this (Pro­ 1. , chaska 1984; DiClemente, McConnaughy. Norcross and Prochask. \986). In their truly inc1ush'e model therapy is analyl.ed according to what clients try to change orwhat problems they try to solve, where the client is in the process of change and the type of technique the therapist chooses to use. Prochaska classifies types of dienl problems in thirleen spec ific cawgories under the four general headings of inu-apersonaJ confliclS, interpersonal conflicts. individual conflicts "'ith society and the problem of life fulfillment and meaning. Where a client is in the prOCC!5 of change b; cI:usified according to a five-stage model (pre­ contemplation : �I don 't ha\'c any problems. so why is everyone worried about me?�; contemplation: �I've got to do something about this before I crack up! �; action: "I'm working on it bUI why is it SO hard to change? �; and maintenance: �I've tried and tried to change but it seems I'm slipping back into the same old patterns. "). Finally, DiClemente I::t al. (1986) list tell major therapist inwrventions, including conscious-rais­ ing/i nsight contingenc}' control in the spirit of operant behavioral psycholog)' and social liberation such as joining a support group. Prochaska would argue tha t how a therapist or counselor inten'enes is .

,

,

a function ofwhat problem the client presents and where in the change

process thai person is.

that of Patterson in that in the lauer, relatiollShip s i primary and the content of he t therapy is largely secondary; whereas for Prochaska there is specification of the content offocus (client problems) and oftypcsofintcrventions. so uml we know that it s i notjust the qualityohhe relationship Ihatdelemlincs The appfO
the outcome. The I1lcl3.theoretical

position is harder to critique than pragmatic eclecticism and has many Strenguls. There must be some explanation for why so many different therapies seem to work well at least some of the time. Also, since Christians believe in the centrality of relationships to human life. we should lIot resist placing quality of l'elationship at lhe very core of our underst...'lnding of Ule lherapy proces�. Perhaps the majorweakness of the metalhcorclical approach is that there s i a central inconsistency imoc"tl.ded in the ,'cry notion of lfying to Mget behind the th eories � in that we can nc'"cr be without a ulcory" i g as rAW, unintcrprcted reali ty We are beings of There is no slich thn meaning, ofinterprcl3.tion and we are al...."3ys seeing through the filters ,

.

,

R£'iI'O,vSl81.£ECJ .J: C170S.'tI

J9J

of our underst.mding. As such, mCGuheoretidans are never getting beh.ind a theory; they are rather auempting to subsume one theory with anOliler. In the process, they see some new information hut ignore olher informauon, much in the same ....oly .. that a practitioner of one psychotherapy theory sees thinl,<S difTeren uy than anouler.

h is significant that most of the skill-training models (Egan, 1986; Ivey and Authier,

1978; CarkhufT and Anthony, 19i9) wind up being

problem·
way to other approaches.

Tht!ON!tical InllJ51utionism Theoretical imegrdlionislIl (also called pluralism by Smith, Glass and Miller [J 9801 ) typically attempts to overcome the limitations oCa single

preferred theory by using it ,tS one's fowldauon or "'home base" while reaching out beyond thaI theory to one or two other models which can, by assimilation of parts of the new approaches. help to expand and enrich the foundational approach. The .....ork of Strupp and Binder

(1984) or of Garfield (1980) are good examples of attempts to work from a P�1·choanalytic or psychodynamic foundation to build a more indush'e approach. Norcross and Prochaska

( 1988) reported that the

five most common combinations of two theoretical approaches self-re­ ported by practitioners were: cognitive and behavioral, humanistic and cognili,'e, psychoanalytic and cognitive, behavioral and humanistic.

and n i terpersonal and humanistic. Anyone who kno....'S well the therapy theories will see instantly .....hat a

terrific chasm there is between many

of these pairings, yet we can see ho..... the pairings could, if achieved, ameliorate some of the glaring deficiencies or each or the models. Perhaps the only Msuccess slOryM n i n i tegrating models to dale is tile uniting of traditional beha\-ior therapywith RET and cognitive ther.1p)' to form cognitive-behaviorlu therapy. The foundations for thi! 5UCCC5S­ ful marriage ....·ere laid through the empirical

documentation of thera­

peutic efTecti"eness of each of the models in different areas: Ellis and Beck's experimentation

....-iOl

incorporating behavioral elcmenL� in

their treatment paradigms, and the careful conceptual work of

,

,

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395

approach can be sensitivc and responsi\'e to the empiric.-tI outcome literature (like !.he pragmatic eclecticism approach) . especially as that literature serves to document an area ofweakness n i aile model. II can recognize weaknesses in an approach and l,l.ke steps to deal with those weakne5ses. Perhaps most importamly. it auempts to produce CQnap.­ tual inlegril)' bynot dtrowing together incompatible ideas and concepts, and practiml inlegrity by providing a common, consistent core model 10 guide counseling, so that !.he practitioner is not bouncing around the psychotherapeutic landscape in dealing wi th differelll clients. Its main we-.tkness is simply thai thejury is still out as to whether separate models from differelll sources actually can be satisfactorily united. There arc

not lIlany who regard the marriage of psychoanalysis and behavior therap), to have been sati�faclorily consummated at this time. Whether the theoretical integrationist agenda can actually be achie"ed remains to be seen. Suggesting this approach as a model for the individual practitioner places a tremendous challenge before that 1)cI-son-how is the individual practitioner, whethcr psychologist. pas­ tOral counselor or social worker. to achieve a workable integration of models in the midst of demanding professional duties and other obligations when the academics who have time to think and .... Tite about such matters cannot see tJleir \\�.ty clear to achievc the final synthesis? This remains an unsol\'ed puzzle and a continuing challenge.

Conclusion Giwn the relative merits of chaotic eclecticism, pragmatic eclecticism, tI<mstheorelical eclecticism and theoretical inH.'gralionism. we belie"e that theoretical int.cgrationism is the approach of choice for the Chris-­ tian counselor. We take this position because we regard the Christian faith to be one ....,hich emphasizes coherence and truthfulness oft>elief. The faith has a core message about hnman nature, a.� discussed in chapter two. which can sen'c as an org-.tnizing foundation for our i pain. With such a cohesi\'e core, we have a basis approach to persons n from \\'hich to critique theories a� we have in this book, and from which to build an illlegnucd approach La therapy. We have described the many strengths and \.\'Caknes.�s of !.he \�.t.rious approaches 10 psychotherapy. and fe.d thai each model has problems which need to be remedied. Prob.1.bly the

tWO

models thaI

come closest to true comprehensi\·cne.ss and have the least problems are thc ne\.\'er and broader psychodynamic approaches (chaptcr lour)

II£SPQN!il/l!.J,·t:CU:Cl'IClSJ'.'

397

lhe presence of divisiveness, territOriality and claims of exclusive pos5Cssion of the truth (MMy wa), is Yahweh.M as a colleague has said). Humility and a commitment to community interaction and feedback

are vital for progress to occur. Second, the effon must be interdiscipli­ nary both in spirit and reality. The exclusion of certai n groups from

me dialog will be coUlHerproduCli\'c. Third. thc effort mUSLcmphasize a balanced COlTlmiunenl to concepLUal in tegrity and rigorous research.

Finally, and most importanu)" those making lhis effort roUSL seek to be

lhoroughly biblical and faithful to the historic orthodox Christian failh while being appropriately ecumenical in spirit

.

Dimensions ofa lAmprehensive OIristian Counseling AfJPrrHlch \Vilal will a comprehell5i\'e approach to Christian counseling embody?

Drawing from chapter two and our discussions in each of the Chapters. we would suggest the follov.ing skeletal and nonexhausti\'e outline A .

comprehensive theoretical approach to Christian coun�ling would embody: A deep appreciation of the value of being human and ofindh-idual human beings; A vision of our need for a love relationship with our Creator, attainable only through lhe forgiveness offered through the death ofJesus Christ; An understanding of the essential place of the work oflhe Holy

Spirit in ultimate healing; An understanding of our intrinsic purposefulness and need for meaning:

An understanding of our fundamenta.lly relational natures and need for lo'-e and acceptance. including the importance offamily and community for us all; A balance of emphasis on lhinking, feeling and behaving, as each has a clear and important place in human life; An appreciation of the power of sin and evil; An understanding of the influence of a spiritual world on dar-to-day human functioning; A respect for human freedom and agency, yet one which recog­ nizes limitaLions to human choice as well; An appreciation of habit, skill and learning; A balanced attention to within-the-person and external-to-the­

person influences on human action: A vision of life thal suggesUi there

elm

be meaning to sufferi ng

16 CHRIST PSYCHOTHE

n

the last chapter.

we

elabor-ned on options in theoretical

eclecticism. In a sense, that chapter culminated our discussion of IhaJriL5 of psychotherapy and counseling by suggesting how we might mo\"e toward a Christian theOl)' of counseling. A Christian psychotherapist may

use

an}' one or number of therApy approaches.

when such approaches are suitably criticized and modified to deal with lhe central incompatibilities wilh Christian faith. A counselor is nOI Christian merely by vinue ofbeing anti-Freudian or anti-behavioral, but we would also argue that a counselor i.� not thoroughly Christian merely by vinut: of thro\\ing around a few Bible verses. None of the existing counseling theories, religious or nonrelig­ ious, adequately plumb the depths of the complexity of human char­ acter and orlhe change proce:lS. So lhere are Ulany theoretical options open to counselors who desire to be distinctively Christian in what the)'

,

402

MOOtiRN'SI"C/IOTHI:'IlAPf£S l

do. Christian counselors may operate vcry different.ly from each Olher. But we would argue that there .... ill be or should btccrlain common­ alities across all thCTapislS who are auempting to be distinctly Christian. It is these commonalities we wish to develop in this chapter. The basi<; for these commonalities is the special claim the gospel has on the counseling proce.'tS compared to work in other vocations, such as medicine, accounting or construction. We agree with Chrisdan critics of psychology such

as Jay

Adams who say thai lhe counseling

processes are ofsuch a nature that they must be thoroughly recollecp­ tualized from a biblical foundation 10 lay claim to the adjective �Chrisuan. •

•

This assumes. that there is something special about the field of psychology specifically, and the mental hcahh professions generally. that demands that we put unusual efforlS into making our work an extension of the Christian faith and of GQd's redemptive acti\itit:s in the world. We would argue that the theoretical appraisal process, of i only pan of the process of adjusting which this book is an example, s the nature of the counseling process in a way to allow it to be honoring to God. This chapter is about other aspects of that task.

The Counseling Vocation Persons who hold to rigid sacred/secular distinctions and claim that

rtal Christians go into the ministry ....·hile people of lesser faith go into secular work are quite wrong. They arc also wrong

to think that Cod

has different values for different lYJ>es ofwork, such that the work of a fanner or engincer is less honoring to God than that of a minister of the gospel. Christ redeems all of life and gi\"es e\"erything honor and goodness and meaning, whether it be plowing a field, counseling a

suicidal person or administering the sacraments. All work is to be done under the lordship of Christ, as unto him (Col 3:23), and this lordship commitment means different things in differelll \'ocations. We must work creatively and diligently to effectively disc.harge this lordship responsibility. While almost all careen

arc

good potential options for Chrisuam

(we might rule out prostitute, drug dealer, assasis n and so forth), and

God honon all righteous vocational commitments, neyertheless the claims of the gospel on different vocations V"Ary in kind and extent. The claims of the gospel over our yocalional li,'es express themselves both in the area of characln and

conarns

(including our ethical standards)

CJ IIU�TL1.\'PSYCJ1011lf .1I/I1'I'

403

and in the area of the slnIC/r.m" {lnd (01l1t1!/ ofrh, work. We can take farming as one example. Christian farmers are called to be patient, honest,

just,

compassionate and generous. They are

called to farm in accord with kingdom ethics, looking on what they do as an exercise of stewardship m·er the eanh. Thus the), might think carefull), about the ecological implications of their planting, 'n"""3.leling, fertilizing and pest control procedures. But with regard to structure and content, the gospel does not have very much to say, except perhaps al the very broadest level of seeing the earth as God's creation and so forth. The faith simpl)' does not dicate t the way farmen are to plow a field, fenilize, harvest and so fonh. The gospel does not change their understanding of what they I,'ork v.ith-corn is sti l l corn and a pig is still a pig. The gospel exerts its claims almost exclusively O\'er their character and concerns, but has less to say of the structure of Ulcir work. At the other extreme. we might take Ule gospel minisu'y. Here, as with farming. the claims of the gospel over ule character of ministers are clear and total, demanding that they exhibit the same virtues that

God desires in Christian farmers. But the gospel also directl), dictates much. but nOI all, of the su'ucture and content orthe work of ministers. The gospel dictates the general form ofworship, of the sacraments, of pasLOral ministry. of docu;ne and hence the content of Christian education. The faith prescribes the core of how we understand salva­ tion and sanctification, and how we understand the people that are to be sa\'ed and growing. TIle gospel does not dictate all ministers do: they can profitably learn from social science smdies of church growth or small b'l'OUP dynamics, from recent studies of innovative educational methods or from administr.tti\'e studies of office management. But ministcrs' work, ifit is honoring to God, should clearly bear the mark of God's revelation in his Word in ils \·cry structure and content. We would argue thai the work of counseling and psychotherapy is much more like that of the ministry than faruling. It is a clear example of a group ofvocations that. arejusl one step back from the professional minisu'y in tcrms of the demand for u-ansfol'mation of our work by the gospel. And we share many of the same risks and responsibilities of those in the professional minisuies. The claims of Christian u'uth should fundamentally transform. at a basic and profound level. ule ways v.'e conceprualize and understand our human subjcct maner, as well as our problems, our goals and the processes of change. That is what the bulk of this book has been

.

,

404

MODf.RNPSYCJlOTHERAPlES

about-how Christians can interact thoughtfully with secular psycho­ therapeutic theory and trdnsform these approaches to conform ....ith Christian revelation. We would argue that it does not stop there. It is not just our theones, our understanding of our subject matter, that needs to be u'Mlsformed, but our wry understanding of the amtOUll a/the fmJjessiem as wtlL

Why is this so? The reason is bffause of the undeniable relevance of Cod's revelation for the work of mentaJ health professionals, and because Christian marriage and family therapists. clinical social work· ers, p�)'ChologiSIS, p�)'chiauislS and pastoral counselors are doing pan of the work of the church. The mental health field mirrors in some striking ways the redemptive work orlhe church when it strives to foster the salvation orits members. Salvation is biblically more than a ooe-shot harvesting of the ephemeral souls of the believers in one instantaneous com'ersion. Biblically, solvation refers to the healing and restoration of wholeness to the entire lives of belie\'ers, though especially in their relationship with God (White. 1984). Mental health workers. then, whose work is so often seen in our societ)' as facilitating growth toward wholeness, are mirroring and partaking in the redemptive or salvific work of the church whether we like to think so or not. As Ray Anderson says, 'The cure of souls . . . is a ministry and service of the Christian community� (1982, p. 202). E\'en though many mental health professionals do not style !.hem­ selves evangelists or pastors, the U"uth is that our work ohen penetrates to the personal core of!.he life of our clienLS. In that core, there is often very little distinction �tween !.he religious/spiritual component and the personal/emotional/psychological component. Because our work 1th kingdom concerns, we must be about the task so closely n i tersects .... of structuring our work deliberately and thoroughly in ways that are honoring (0 the kingdom and which are compatible with God's own efforts on behalf of his people (Anderson, 1987). Ifwe don't make this a premier concern, we run the risk ofcontriburing to a system compet­ ingwith the church of Christ for servicing the welfare of God's people. We ought to supplement or complement the work of the church. nOt offer an alternative to it. When we work to bring healing and wholeness to the hurting, Christ is present in a unique way. He is present in the one seeking help, for he promised that anyone ministering to the suffering was minister­ ing to him (Mt 25:31-46). And he is present in the one ministering and

40J attempting to heal, for he is the source of all growth and healing and comfon

(2 Cor 1:3-5), Some have even called P�1'chotberapy an in­ carnational ministry (Benner, 1983). [f in the healing encounter, then, both persons are partaking oftile presence ofChrist, ho..... can we argue that there is nothing special thai distinguishes the therapeutic vocation from many other professions? Imaging God in Therapy In chapter two we discussed the centralily of the concept of the imago deiand its implications for our personality theories. Understanding the nature of the imago deihas been an important concern of theology off and on throughout the last t ....o . millennia. Theological anlhropology usually looks at the image as our common denominalQr or denomina­ tors. the image as shared necessarily by all persons, askingwhal it is that we al1 share that males us individually and corporately imagers of the Most High, We are all responsible moral agenu; we are all rational beings; \'I'e are all gender differentiated and thus intrinsically social beings and so forth, We might call this the descriptive or de facto dimension of the m i age. because these things and more art: true of us all as a maucrofour existing as humans because we are made in God's image. We exert no special efforts to manifest this aspect of the image. In fact, no matter how we nm from it, \'I'e are always imagers of God n i these fashions. We cannot not m i age him in these ways. But there is another side of the imaging reality thaI s i captured in numerous biblical verses: "Be imitators of God, therefore, as dearly loved children" (Eph 5: I); �Put on the new self, which is being renc..owed in knowledge in the image of its Creator" (Col

3:10). From this

perspective. ",'e are 10 be continually suiving 10 actualize the image we have been entn..tsted with in an e\'er more conspicuous and pure fashion, to work diligently and deiberately l

to

image our Maker, ,\3

i an article entitled "Looking like Dallas Willard said (1990, p, 29), n Jesus," "As disciples (literally

studmls) ofJesus, our goal is to learn

to

be like him," The mage i of God n i us, from this perspective. goes quite beyond tJle more passive "common denominatOr" approach we often take when discussing the image of God. It has suddenly become something we must strive 10 bei:ome or actualize, and we can fall painfully short i age, rather than beingjuSt a passh'c chardcleri.s­ in the process. The m tic, a birthmark as itwere, is also a declaration oflife purpose, a binding

MONAV PSKJIOTHERtIPIES

406

agenda for action and a map for necessary grov.th which we as believ­ en are obliged to follow. It is, in fact, ule entire goal of the process of our sanctification. This is the prescriptiVt or ,wnlwliVt dimensiOf1 of the image-of-God concept The very nature of the mental health professions dictates that we must work at this prescriptive aspect of actualizing God's image in building our mental health professional identities in a way that few professions share quite so extensively. When we are reflecting all what we are to become, we must look berand the de facto image and get a vision for what we are called to be; in our case, how we can aClu­ alize lhe image of Cod more clearly in our work ill the mental health professions. We will explore three aspeclS of imaging that are rele­ vant 10 the field of counseling, namely, aClUalizing the image of God's

roks or offtct5. God's dw.racJer and God's COnct'l"lU.

Imaging tM Offices of Cod By offias we refer to the functional roles God assumes in interacting ....-lth his p eople. There are a number of these roles that are relevant

to our work in the mental health field. Not all of his offices, however, are ours [0 assume: some may be impossible for us to assume. God's office as the Killg and sovereign lord of the universe is an obvious example of this. Another would be his function as the Redeemer of humaniry through sacrificing himself as the Lamb of God. But what are some of the roles he fills which are instructive to liS and perhaps in some sense binding on our professional identities?

The first is that of God the Holy Spirit functioning as the Paracl&, the

one who draw:J aUnlgSl"de of us to JU!lp, texts

«mIj,", and rnamragr:. In some con­

(I In 2:1), the concept of Pardclete means an advocate, one who

pleads for us before the Father when we sin. In other contexts. the con­ cept: of Paraclete clearly takes on a more emotionally supporth'e mean­ ing, as in 2 Corinthians I (especially v. 4) where we learn thai God com­

fons us through the Holy Spirit so that we might be able to comfort others around us. In some contextS, the Paradete helps concretely by equipping and providing to enable us to meet the deficiencies in our

li\'es (as when he functions as the teacher who relieves our ignorance).

What rich instruction ....·e can draw for our professional roles from

this office that God discharges! Advocacy is a function counselors arc called to fill from time to time, ....'hen we

are

dealing .... -lID peNions who

have been robbed of their choices, their hope or their rights. What

a

loop ofbeauty and purpose we have in suffering when we know thaI

cnmsnANf'SYOIOTllt;I«/"Y

407

God enlered into our sufferings so that he might perfectly meet our needs, so that we in turn can give comfOri to others, and in that process be ministering direcLly to Christ himselO The comforting L1lUS floY<-s in all directions when we image Christ and the HolySpirit (or are allowed i age) by being paracletes oursch·es. dra",i.ng alongside to be his m anOlher with hope and comfort. This function adds new meaning and

validity to the concept of the ··wounded healer� that we hear SO much of today (developed often in the Io·,ritings of Henri Nouwen;

see

also

) j or Crabb, 1988). Finally. as providers of !.hat Miller and Jackson, 198[ which was lacking, we act as the unage of God in comforting by taking part in making up ....·hat is lacking in the sufferer. .'\. second role or office of God which is instructivc is his work as !.he

fuamciler. Second Corin thians 5: 18-21 inSlructs us directly !.hat Christ nxonciles each believer with God, and that we are in turn to bei:ome his agents of reconciliation, �amba.ssadors for Christ M (v. 20) , who lake seriously the call to draw others into reconciling relationships with the Father and the Son. The reconciliation called for by the gospel s i nOt merely spiritual (God to person) . however; the reconciliation that God works in our hearts is also intendc..-d to spill out into our human relationships

as

well. leading Christians to be blidges of healing be­

tween estranged persons ....·hercver possible (Mt 5:24). Clearly, recon­ ciliation

between

persons

is designed

to folio.....

me

spiJilUai

reconciliation which me gospel brings beu-.'cen God and us, There are two implications of this work of reconciliation, The first is !.he eternal value of the personal reconciliations which are so often achiC\'ed

a.�

a result of p�)'chotherapy. The second is that e\�.rngelism

will alwa� play some role in counseling, because mere should be some dimension of our professional [h'es which draws people toward recon­ ciliation wiUI God 111i s does not mean lhat counseling becomes a .

�scamM to lure to us emotionally distraught people who !.hink they are going to be helped when our real motivdtion is to save their souls. Rather, Christian concern for the whole person will lead to a transpar­ cnc)' for and centcredness on the Christ that could lead o!.hers to a saving knowledge of lhe gospel.

A third vital office of God is mat of l-ltakr, LIlt: �Great Physician. M When the Lordo.s \irtues arc extolled in me Sclipmres, his healing grace

is oflen mentioned pmminently, as in Psalm 103:2-4: ;'Praise the LoRD,

o m)' soul, and forget nOI all his benefits--who forgives all your sins and heals all your diseases, who redeems your life fmm the pit and crOWIlS you wim lo\'e and compassion. � A narrow evangelicalism can

MODERNPSrCHCffHERAPlES

'08

focus exclusively on forgiveness of sins and neglect God's healing intent. Healing is an n i timate part of God's identity n i relating to his people. This implies that he has a heart of compassion fOT suffering and a passion for wholeness for his afflicted children which \\"C would do well 10 cultivate. The final office of God is that of his being the source of all wisdom;

he is in fact the beginning ofwisdom (Prov I :7) and ....isdom incarnate (Prov 1 :20-33). Derek Tidball (1986) pointsoUl that before the coming of Christ, there were three types of "pastOr5� in ancientJewish society: priests, prophets and \\;se men. We had never understood the term �ise men� to refer to an institutionalized role in Old Testament sociery. It seems to us that there are many parallels between the wise man role in ancientJewish life and the role mental health professionals sen'e in contemporary American life. Tidball wrote, "11le objective of the ....ise men was to provide down-to-earth courud about the ordinary ith steady logic. the affairs oflife. . . . Their approach "''35 to consider. ....

truth which was hidden ....ithin human nature and creation in order to discover the regularities which could form the basis of their lives and counselM

(1986. p. 43). Certainly the prmuion of such ",isdom is a

prime duty of the ps),chotherapisL And it is vital to remember that true wisdom begins with "the fear ofLhe LoRD" (Prov

1:7).

Tidball suggest."!l that the wise men did not often work according to explicit divine revelation in any direct sense. as they were grappling .... ith practical matters which simply were not a preoccupation of God's revelatory energies. In other words, they dealt ... ith . matters for which no simple recourse to �the Bible sa}'SM was possible, Nevertheless, they were guided by the notion that �il is only a commitment to [God] which

will reveal truth. as there can be no reality except that which he controls� (1986, p. 44). This need to ground wisdom in the word of God is further demonstrated byJeremiah 8:8-9: �How can you say, '\'I'e are wise. for we have the law of the LoRD,' when acrually the l}ing pen of me seribes has handled it falsely? The wise will be put to shame; they

will be dismayed and trapped. Since they ha\'e rejected the word of the LoRD, what kind of wisdom do they ha\'er Like the wise men of Israel, contemporary counselors must be cautious i.n delving into psychother­ apeutic theory and practice to remain carcfuUy. deliberately and cou­ rageously Christian in our core commitments, lest we merit the same condemnation that Jeremiah pronounced. Unique spiritual resources are available to lhe Christian counselor and

ps),chotherdpist who is suiving to live out lhe images of God's

.

,

CR/us/1iWpsrClI(1TllERAPl'

4/3

At the individual level, good counseling or psychotherapy ought to seek to promote a client's spiritual and psychological maturiry. We need

to

be dear about v,'hat v,'e are trying to promote as counselors and

psychotherapists, which requires us lO examine not only the function of symplOms and sickness in a person's life, but the deeper meanings of the counselee's problems in living. As FOSler

(1978) has noted, the

counselor is not unlik.e a spiritual guide in the process of deepening faith and understanding. Healers can take clientS no further than they have been tak.en themselves. You can only love persons you know, and rou can only love another f i you have been deeply loved yourself. Clients can only grow if they ha\'e felt heard, understood, appreciated and valued. With the necessary skills, competencies and motivation, the process of growth and developmem can be facilitated. Malony

(1985) described a recent attempt to capture some of the

essence of understanding mature spirituality in his �religio\ls status interview." The eight dimensions of his semistructured interview in­ clude: (a) awareness of God. (b) acceptance of God's grace and steadfast love, (c) being repentant and responsible, (d) knowing God's leadership and direction, (e) imoh'emem in organized religion, (f) experiencing fellov,1!hip, (g) being ethical and (h) affirming openness in faith. Together with the notions of spiritual wellness postuL1.ted by Carter

(1985). Clinebell (1965) and White (1985), we have rich re­

sources available to help us unden;tand what constitutes healthy spiri­ tuality in the Christian counselor. And the development of such a faith is part of our most profound concerns. But while God unquestionably lo\'es individuals. there is a special status to the corporate church, It has its own identity that is more than the sum of its individual parts, and God's passion in a special way is for the corporate entity. Similarly, Christian mental health professionals must see the welfare of Christ's bride, the church. asa premier concem in their li"es. A focused and passionate concern for the welfare of the individuals in our caseloads or churches is not t.he same thing as concern for the

church itself. Earlier we asserted that counselors are inescapably doing

the work of the church n i being agents of personal healing in the Jives of our clients. If we are preaccupied exclusively with the individual impact of our work and not its corporate effect on the church, we may not have the effect of building up the body of Christ t.hat we should have. This is not to argue that individual growth and healing is unim­ portant-it is in fact vital. But we live in an era when many influences

414

are dr.tining the vitality of the Western church. In the same way that those seeking to minister in the electronic media must grapple with the uninlcnded fallout ofuwizing a medium !.hat specializes in unre­ ality. superficial appearances and personal isolation, so also we in the mental health field must realize that nOI aJl of the effects of our work ne<:essarily contribute to the benefit aCthe church. We need to ask hard questions about the corporate effects of our ,,·:ork. Counseling that deserves to be called Christian will promOte lhe kingdom of God in word and deed. It will stand in marked conlrnSt, at limes. to the modernity of Western cuhure. The church, nOt !.he profession, will be iu source of accountability, as well as its well-spring for healing and helping. Its practitioners will be disciples. not indepen­ dent practitioners or technicians, and its driving force will

be shaped

by the rituals and discernment of the confessional community (after Dueck,

1986). Conclusion

There are many subtle and nOl-$O-Subtle influences thai work against the Christian mental health professional effectivdy actualizing the

i a culturally image of the Father in his or her work. Psychotherapy s defined activity. and we all work in fashions that we have not adopted deliberately out of a desire to be an effective imager, bm rather unreflectively by "going with the flow." in the give and take of daily life mental health professionals face many preoccupying concerns: there is fierce competition for the mental health dollar; imerdisciplinary friction is rampant; financial stability for families and bwines5es (not JUSt ideas) is at risk; and there is probably greater overall stress and insecurity than at any other time in recent history. In this context, counselors onen feel already overloaded with the mundane concerns of maintenance and advancement of their practices and professional careers to take on the additional burdens of grappling with imaging

God bener. But this is precisely what Christian counselors are called to do at this point in history. The Christian mental health establishmem is far from being lhe effective handmaiden of the church lhat it ought to be. Pastors, when lhey are honest, often feel that they are mainly seen as a referral source by the mental health professional, people 10 be r" manced

by the

psychotherapist to yield the obvious payoff of paying

clients. Pastors are happy about the

frequent

positive OUlcomes of

Ol}fJSl1M' �1'ClI077lfJW>l'

415

therdpy, but are perhaps more skeptical about psychotherapy than they have been in past years. They are bombarded with "Christian Psychology Is Apostasy" literature on the one hand and "99 Reasons to Refer Your Parishioners (0 Us" literarure 011 the other. Pastors are more aware than ever lhat it cannot be taken for granted that psycho­ therapy is ad"ancing the cause of the churcb, because there is often too much slippage between herapy t goals and the church's needs.

What are we advocating? Obviously, we must start with urging a

re­

newed commimlent to sclving Cod and his church, a commiunem to imaging the Father through our professional work. If this isn't a fore· most commitment, than the rest hardly makes sense. Second, we would advocate the need to think with Christian darity about the theoretical approaches to understanding and changing pe<>­ pie. which pro,,;de the backb'l"Ound for all counseling practice. It is our prayer that this book represenlS an advancement of that enterprise. Funher, it is essential LO be infonncd biblically and theologically about God's caring for his people and about the inSU1.lctiOIl he has gi\'en tiS for the care of souls in the church. Too much of what passes for integration today is anemic theologically or biblically, and tends to be little more than a spiritualized rehashing of mainstream mental health thought. TIle church has a rich corponlte history in the field of pastoral care which

.... -e

need to know about if we are to be Chri5-

tian psychotherapists. Psychology was a division of practical theology long before it became a separate field and the pastoral care tradition has rich resources to digest. Pastoral ministers were far from ineffective and uninsigluful be­

fore the advent of Freud. The mental health professions oflen un....;I­ tingly believe and promulgate lhe fable that nothing significant oc· curred in the psychological care of persons before modem times­ just look at (he coverage in a typical introductory psychology text, where discussion of religion is typically paired with picture!! of spin· ning chairs, su-digackelS and inhumane insane asylums (Kirkpatrick and Spilka, (989).

BUI premodern pastoral care was not ineffective.

Thomas Oden ( 1984), well·known pastoral theologian and fonner en· thusiastic advocate of several psychotherapeutic methods, now calls himself a "classicist" and devotes his time to the study of the pastoral care techniques of Pope Gregory the Great (from the early sa
416

MODERNPSYCHOTII£RAJ'l£S

contemporary prnclices will be.

Finally, we would recommend that Christian counselors be

In

ex­

plicit. ongoing dialog with responsible members of their own faith community about how beslLO be

distincti\'cly and appropriately Chris­

tian in their work. We can be dangerously myopic when we dialog only

widl other mental health professionals about these matters, because

this lessens the chances that we ..ill .. be able to see effccti\'cly beyond our disciplinary

blinders. We know of several Christian psychologists

who have formed accountability groups within their local churches. These

groups of clergy and laypersons do not oversee or supervise their work at a specific level, but they were account. ...blc to them at me

broader level for the Christian distinctiveness and integrity of their functioning

as

therapists. We are impressed by their courage and

openness in committing themselves to a deeper level of accountability than most of us would find "comfortable" or "convenient." Christian counselors

will

probably arn\'e at a diversity of conclu­

sions on how to be accounlable for their Christian distinctiveness, but our concem is not so much ....ith the conclusion

as

the process by

which we get there. Have we engaged in an intentional dialog whereby we put in practice our desire to be responsh-e

10

and cen­

tered on the \\ill of God and the welfare of the church over and be­ yond our individual professional welfare? That is the question we must seriously and regularly ask ourselves.

For Further Reading Clebsch. W., andJaekle, C. (1975). Pastoral am in hist&rical pmp«tilN. New York: Jason Aronson.

Holifield, B. (1983). It. hUtor)' ofpastoral call' in America, l"ashville: Abingdon. Oden, T. (19M). Cart ofsouls in 1M tla.uic rradilum. Philadelphia: Fortress. 'Tidball, D, (1986), Skillful sluphc-ds: .in inlroduction 10 pasloral lh«Jlogy. Grand Rapids, MI: Zonderv.tn. Four excellent staning points in broadening one's understanding of dle church's historical ministry in the "care of SOUIS,M Each has thought-pro­

vok ing implications for rethinking the psychotherapeutic 1
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I

:Ill

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,., ..", ...., ..

TA

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151. .. '

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•. '"

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2'11."

family ther;apy. ';7.'.8

!omnegifi. !ill

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Colleah i1.l ,iew ofper· $On$. 'lli1.Ji'l Commitment to reK'an::h.

Anti·HthinkingM philosoph)·. lli

Common'iense I)$),(hol·

AmoralitY ttndenC)·. 2Q!i.

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ill

637 . Atomism; IMho,{!, 111 198-99 Autiml lU.ge of dt"o't'lopment, 98

Autonomy. !!ti7

AWlI,eneu of feelings.

120-2 4. J.3O

'"

ogy.2"

Commumcation de\13IlC't'. 3* �;': double· bind. � m�iflCal.inn. �; symmetrical rela. tionshipUone-upman. .hip. � complemen·

ta.ry ,datioruhips. m triangulation. m Communications model.

'1'>6-'"

2fH. ..

Colllpettnce. 16$·M Compound nalure. 4W; tri�rtile. •!I; bipllltite.

166-69. 19!I

Congruence ofself. 1!:fb,

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"7

Ikcir;', cogulti'll:! ther;apy, Ikha>ior modifICatiOn.

8e.h ..,;or modificttion ""

Ikha'iorai social n·

""

Co'i/' penon"li!)' 1(,lIckli' cie�. 380:

Coull5<"ling. 1$.14. St\. a1J4 Ps)1:hOlherapy Courage. 238 De�nlk'N;(, on th('np!M.

'"

Di!'pril"ity af penon" 2fi&

'"

l)Cs�ir. 21:!0

�ennlnj.m. IP9-WIl

.,

"

148. 15248,

Din-ar.'t' oonfrontatilHl.

ll1l

Di500uragemem, 211

Di5C'npgtmtnt, !1M Diston«l uandard of rea!iry. 2.13 Ore.,n, analy,.ls. Th �

28. I !VI ,I I

Oynamio: llUumption. fi7

D):,funl1ional family ')'5tem, �

[d�cum: nalUre of.

.: approachel to. ; chaotic: edeeli·

""

Cogniti\'�h..\ioral >ie"· of the mind. 2Q!l.1l Colleo.i''t' unron5do�

AeSlhetic Slag", 2I!ll

funcUoning. 2M Coping ,kills training.

�-

thO:OreUc�1 Or

trantt.llroretical edecu· ci.m. 390-9]: tho:oretical imel(J1llloni$m 39\-9; Economio: auumption. liS Effectiveneu ofps)'1:hoIher ..py. :y..,� Ego dcl�n5C' me<:haniJml. .

.,

Ego 1")'1:hology !H Ego Slate' in TA. �25. .

W .. , 2 E1ectl1il conflict. 10 Ellis .. nd Wlf'ilm. ill Empirical Slandard. J..9tl, " Empirical ttstilll ofpsY' chodynllmk mockl. ill Enmf'shmenl: lli En'il'Onm�nali l sm. l..iZ,.

...

Equanimity. 1MJi/j Ethical Mage. 2I!ll

Ethin in person<enttl't'd th�DPY. 2fi'\..64

[,.;\. IM?, '" 'IS

Exhlential pI)'Chology.

ALAN C 1 J El. rvEl't