Modern Applications of Austrian Thought
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Modern Applications of Austrian Thought
Austrian economics is often criticized as being hostile to empirical research and seen purely as an ideology. On the contrary, the purpose of this book is to show that Austrian economics provides an interesting approach to most conceivable subjects in economics. The book includes Austrian analysis of health economics, labour economics, taxation, business cycle theory and property rights. The authors include Roger Koppl, Laurence S. Moss, Bart Nooteboom and Gerrit Meijer. This book will prove invaluable to students studying economics and prove to be interesting reading for the applied economist in any area of application. Jürgen G. Backhaus holds the Krupp Foundation Chair of Public Finance and Fiscal Sociology at the University of Erfurt in Germany. He is also the founding editor of the European Journal of Law and Economics.
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Modern Applications of Austrian Thought
Edited by Jürgen G. Backhaus
First published 2005 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2005 editorial matters and selection, Jürgen G. Backhaus; individual chapters, the contributors Typeset in Baskerville by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-415-36542-2
Contents
List of illustrations List of contributors Preface
xii xiii xv
A
General economics and teaching 1 The applied economics of the modern Austrian school
1 3
LAURENCE S. MOSS
B
Schools of economic thought and methodology 2 F.A. Hayek’s methodological U-turn reconsidered in light of his concept of social facts
21 23
G.M. HUUSSEN
D
Microeconomics 3 The consumer in Austrian economics and the Austrian perspective on consumer policy
39 41
AUKE R. LEEN
E
Macroeconomics and monetary economics 4 Austrian cycle theory and the prospect of a coordinationist macroeconomics RICHARD E. WAGNER
75 77
x Contents G
Financial economics 5 Big Players and money demand
93 95
CATHERINE BECKETT GILANSHAH AND ROGER KOPPL
H
Public economics 6 Taxation: an Austrian approach
113 115
JÜRGEN G. BACKHAUS
7 Some aspects of the relationship between the Freiburg school and the Austrian school
139
GERRIT MEIJER
I
Health, education, and welfare 8 A model of the dynamic welfare state: Friedrich von Hayek revisited
151 153
MANFRED PRISCHING
9 Austrian aspects to health economics
175
URSULA BACKHAUS
J
Labor and demographic economics
195
10 Austrian theory in the area of labor economics
197
DON BELLANTE
L
Industrial organization
207
11 Neo-Austrian, industrial and Ordo-Austrian competition policy
209
J.A. HANS MAKS
M
Business administration and business economics; marketing; accounting
223
12 Discovery, competence and services
225
BART NOOTEBOOM
Contents
xi
N
Economic history
241
13 Werner Sombart’s views on profit, capital, credit, and the Austrian school of economics
243
GÜNTHER CHALOUPEK
O
Economic development, technological change, and growth
251
14 Austrian economics and ‘The Other Canon’
253
ERIK S. REINERT
P
Economic systems
299
15 The property rights basis of von Mises’s critique of socialism and its relevance for the privatization of state enterprises in Eastern Europe
301
WILLEM KEIZER
16 Comparative economic systems
327
STEVEN HORWITZ
Q
Agricultural and natural resource economics; environmental and ecological economics
345
17 Austrian views on environmental protection
347
ANDRIES NENTJES
Index
371
Illustrations
Figures 6.1 Relationship between tax base and public services 14.1 The Renaissance world-view 14.2 Reality economics: the knowledge- and production-based other canon of economics
123 258 262
Tables 5.1 The Hurst coefficient for the initial and the final period 14.1 The two canons of economics
108 263–264
Contributors
Jürgen G. Backhaus, Krupp Chair in Public Finance and Fiscal Sociology, University of Erfurt, Nordhäuser Str. 63, 99089 Erfurt, Germany Ursula Backhaus, Magdeburger Allee 55, D-99086 Erfurt, Germany Catherine Beckett Gilanshah, Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030, USA Don Bellante, Department of Economics, University of South Florida, 4202 East Fowler Avenue, BSN 3403, Tampa, FL 33620-5524 Günther Chaloupek, Prinz Eugen Str. 20, A-1041 Vienna, Austria Steven Horwitz, Department of Economics, St Lawrence University, Canton, NY 13617, USA G.M. Huussen, Heemraadsingel 12, 3641 JH Mijdrecht, The Netherlands Willem Keizer, Joh. Vermeerplein 16 II, 1071 DV Amsterdam, The Netherlands Roger Koppl, Department of Economics and Finance, Fairleight Dickinson University, Madison, NJ 07940, USA Auke R. Leen, Department of Tax Law and Economics, Faculty of Law, Leiden University, Steenschuur 25, PO Box 9520, 2300 RA Leiden, The Netherlands J.A. Hans Maks, EURECOM, Maastricht University, PO Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands Gerrit Meijer, Department of Economics, Maastricht University, PO Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands Laurence S. Moss, Babson College, Babson Park, MA 02157, USA Andries Nentjes, Vakgroep Belastingrecht, Economie en Openbare Financien, Faculteit de Rechtsgeleerdheid, Postbus 716, 9700 AS Groningen, The Netherlands
xiv
Contributors
Bart Nooteboom, Adelheidstraat 82, 2595 EE The Hague, The Netherlands Manfred Prisching, Karl Franzens University Graz, Universitätsstraße 15, A-8010 Graz, Austria Erik S. Reinert, Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo and Norsk Investforum, Oslo, Norway Richard E. Wagner, George Mason University, St Georges Hall, 4400 University Drive, Fairfax, VA 22030, USA
Preface
Austrian economics is often conceived as an ideology. People are thought to stir in the older mud of unintelligible writings, and henceforth disagree among another. It is also often said that Austrian economics is not empirical. With this book, I try to dispel all three of these notions. I believe that Austrian economics is a sensible way of approaching current economic issues, it is not backward-looking and it can make sense when mainstream economics does not. Austrian economics may be clustered by economists who emphasize ideologies. These ideologies actually differ, but their study is not the purpose of this book. Austrian economics is also often criticized as being hostile to empirical research. The studies in this book prove the contrary. The purpose of this book is to show that Austrian economics provides an interesting approach to most any conceivable subject in economics, and this is demonstrated by the table of contents. We have, using the index of the Journal of Economic Literature, tried to cover each sub-discipline of economics that is currently taught at most Western universities. This provides for an impressive compendium that is meant to be a reference source for researchers who may have a particular research project in mind, but cannot readily deal with mainstream theories in their effort to understand a particular programme. These graduate students or researchers may find a framework for their own research design in their own studies. 1
Ideology, by and in itself, as Schumpeter (1949) has pointed out, is not only a vice, but can also be a virtue. If it drives particular research programmes, a free market of ideas should ultimately divide the grain from the chaff. We are interested in harvesting the corn. It is true, and it cannot be contested, that a lot of what passes for Austrian economics is published on the fringe. This is true for any economic approach one can think of. Even the current mainstream of economics is tainted in this way (Stigler 1980). This problem can only be resolved once the free competition of ideas leads to a better refinement of propositions, models and solid conclusions. It is even
xvi
2
3
Preface conceivable that a Marxian-Austrian perspective could lead to particulars that cannot be otherwise captured. We do not have an AustrianMarxist contribution in this collection, but I would never have hesitated to include one, had I received one. As regards method, in textbook renditions it is often said that the Austrian approach stood for the deductivist method, while its conceived counterpart, the so-called historical school, stood for inductivist methods. Nothing could be further from the truth. Menger, although he started from observing financial markets as a journalist, was not empirically minded. Hayek, on a Ford Foundation grant, observed empirical facts in order to determine business cycles. The difficulty, in my mind, does not lie in the method. The approach, since it is based on individual judgement, required case studies showing individuals’ decisions. This can only be done on the basis of very careful case research. In this sense, there is little disagreement between the Austrian school and the mainstream. As for the third issue, the contributors to this volume have no problem with empirical work, and hence the case can be laid to rest. Prof. Dr. Jürgen Backhaus Lic. jur. March 2004
References Schumpeter, J.A. (1949) “Science and Ideology”, American Economic Review 39 (March): 345–359. Stigler, George J. (1980) “The Economist as Preacher”, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State Working Papers Series.
A
General economics and teaching
1
The applied economics of the modern Austrian school Laurence S. Moss
Introduction One criterion for assessing the significance of a school of thought in economics is to ask, “What problems can it solve with the tools that it has developed?” This question has long haunted the proponents of the modern Austrian school. During the 1970s and 1980s, Israel Kirzner, Ludwig Lachmann, and their students offered their readers (1) lengthy discussions about the subjectivist underpinnings of market behavior, and (2) exhaustive discussions of what it means to claim that markets “coordinate” the economic behavior of private individuals and the behavior of the associations to which they belong (Kirzner 1973, 1976, 1985a, 1986, 1992; Lachmann 1973, 1976, 1977). In the eyes of the rest of the economics profession it appeared that modern Austrians were unable and perhaps entirely unwilling to provide any specific analytic tools that might help predict and control the outcome of the market process.1 This may explain why modern Austrians have earned a reputation as “methodologists” and have received little recognition for their practice of normal science. Modern Austrians do indeed attach greater importance to a cultivated and sophisticated understanding and appreciation of the market process than they do to “mere” prediction and control (see Dolan 1976; Vaughn 1994). This, however, is a matter of personal preference and not one of logical necessity. Indeed, there is an applied side to the teachings of the modern Austrian school that sometimes is unnoticed. I shall emphasize this aspect of the Austrian contribution here. At the outset, I readily admit that Austrian writers have not been kind to those in the profession who claim to have derived models that can predict the future course of market activity in such detail that profits can be made. Modern Austrians consider such claims mostly ill-conceived, or, even worse, fraudulent (see Skousen 1988). The Austrian school is a “humbling school,” one that cautions other economists not to pretend that they can make marvelous forecasts about future market conditions. Austrians have most consistently ridiculed the pretensions of statistical economists and econometricians who, whether for private gain or for
4 Laurence S. Moss media reputation, declare that they can estimate some specific market rate, such as short-term interest rates, with enough accuracy to guide business decision-making or (in some circumstances) orchestrate national economic planning (Hayek 1978: 23–24; Mises 1949: 352; cf. Vaughn 1994). This war against arrogance and pseudo-science constitutes perhaps the greatest of all the practical achievements of the modern Austrian school. Unfortunately, it has contributed to the reputation of modern Austrians as mavericks in the economics profession. This verdict is particularly harsh, and in this chapter I shall offer a more balanced view. The first section takes a careful look at statistical economic research and offers evidence that Austrian theorizing has not emerged in a historical vacuum. Indeed, Austrian economics can be appreciated as a defensive reaction to the long struggle against ferocious price inflation, first in Central Europe and later, in a less virulent form, among all major industrialized nations. The second section returns to the problem of hawking economic research for business consulting purposes and highlights an inner tension that exists within modern Austrian economics over precisely this problem, the practical significance of economic knowledge. The third section outlines the varieties of modern policy analysis and at the same time distinguishes the intentionally limited focus of the Austrian school from the wider interests that mainstream economics offers. In the final section, I offer some concluding remarks.
Statistical economic research Modern Austrians stubbornly refuse to join the legions of professional economists who search for (stable) empirical economic relationships among the truckloads of economic data that are now available to researchers. Most agree with Mises’s verdict that there are no “constant relations” in economics, as there are in the natural sciences (Mises 1949: 354). Economists who pretend these constants exist and apply for funding to try to hunt for them are committing an elementary blunder. In his Nobel lecture, Hayek (1978) criticized those in economics who try to mimic the natural scientists by employing methods that are quite inappropriate to the study of complex social phenomena. Elsewhere, however, Hayek (1967a) admitted that it is appropriate when studying complex social phenomena to recognize that certain patterns or sequences of events tend to occur in similar situations. The modern Austrians Gerald O’Driscoll and Mario Rizzo (1985: 27) have expanded on Hayek’s insights here. They admit that economists can predict certain patterns of market activity and anticipate certain broad sequences of events. If they can do this, then of course the Austrians can go one step further, and provide some analysis and discussion of the linkages between statistical regularities and the underlying market processes at work. While Austrians make much of their differences with the econometri-
The modern Austrian school 5 cians, there is nothing about the Austrian brand of methodological discussion that rules out the possibility that a major discovery in statistical research will help improve our understanding of the market process and aid us in a search for new statistical patterns. This statement requires some clariffication. The place to start is with Mises himself. Early in his career, Mises flatly denied that there was any sense in trying to express the relationship between money and prices in the form of a simple deterministic equation.2 Mises was reacting in part to Irving Fisher’s classic book Theory of the Purchasing Power of Money, published in 1911, which provided an important quantitative statement of the quantity theory (Fisher [1911] 1971; cf. Mises [1924] 1953: 136). Still, Mises agreed with Fisher that money and prices were connected in some systematic way, with changes in the money supply causing prices to change. Mises, in his Theory of Money and Credit, offered a “market process” account of the popular quantity theory of the purchasing power of money ([1924] 1953: 97–186). Mises’s account was intentionally qualitative and not quantitative, and, perhaps as a consequence, he was able to offer a more insightful interpretation of the existing statistical record regarding the empirical connections between money and prices. Observing that individuals hold cash balances as part of their daily routine, Mises ([1924] 1953: 139–140) offered a subjectivist account of how private efforts to adjust cash balances at a time when nominal balances are increasing throughout the relevant currency area lead to price rises. On the basis of this analysis, Mises agreed with the older “currency school group” that insisted that the cause of a sustained rise in prices was an overly rapid growth of the money supply (ibid.: 219–231). Mises assumed that most responsible political leaders found inflation to be quite unacceptable. Using a broader definition of the money supply that included bank deposits subject to check, Mises evaluated the large variety of institutional reforms to identify those that would make it difficult for the money supply to rise and inflation to follow.3 After World War II, Mises came to realize that instructing politicians about what they should do when they consistently lack the political will to do it will not produce useful results. This realization led Mises to a prescient analysis (1978b – written in 1946) of the connections between political parties, politicians, credit-financed booms and the subsequent economic crises that follow. Others, including Hayek and Murray Rothbard, expanded on Mises’s teachings. It was generally agreed in Austrian circles during the 1950s and 1960s that adherence to the “trade cycle theory” was the hallmark of the Austrian school. For this reason, the Austrian theory of the credit trade cycle held pride of place among Mises’s contributions to the modern Austrian school.4 It is sufficient for our purposes here to credit Mises with an early and persuasive version of the political theory of the business cycle and with a keen understanding of the phenomenon now dubbed “rent seeking” in the economic literature (Tullock [1962] 1993).5
6 Laurence S. Moss The consistency between statistical research and Austrian school theorizing is nicely brought out by one important episode in Mises’s career: the experience of the Central European economies during the early 1920s. The historical record in Central Europe, seemed to contradict the alleged connection between money and prices. Many of Mises’s contemporaries, especially those working for the central bank, delighted in querying why if it is true that the rapid growth of the money supply causes high prices, the majority of market participants – despite rising prices – complained of a “shortage” of money (Mises [1924] 1953)?6 Mises answered this question with novel tools of analysis. He pointed to the critical role expectations play in markets. According to Mises, when an episode of inflation has proceeded for some time, people make commitments to pay prices according to the criterion of what future prices will turn out to be. They believe that they will have enough cash on hand to meet those extra cash obligations because they expect their private cash balances to rise along with the higher prices.7 If the money-issuing authorities were to retrench and try to stop the inflation by slowing down the rate of growth of the money supply, people would experience a veritable “shortage” of money. Indeed, they would complain of a shortage even if the money supply’s rate of growth were to remain constant. To state this another way, the community’s real balances decline while at the same time their nominal balances increase because the increase in the nominal balances is smaller than they had expected. This explains political lobbying to keep the inflation going, so that many can meet their contractual commitments and avoid financial embarrassment. Mises went on to suggest that a statistical time-series plot of the ratio of some index of the quantity of money to prices would show a downward trend during prolonged inflationary periods.8 This statistical record mirrors the disappointed price expectations. My efforts here to link the evolution of Mises’s pioneering contributions to monetary economics to some of the stylized findings of statistical economics will not satisfy many of Mises’s strongest critics. Milton Friedman, in an informal interview that took place in 1988, was uncharacteristically harsh in his assessment of Mises’s credentials as an applied economist (see Hammond 1992). According to Friedman, Mises claimed that the more prolonged the inflationary boom, the more severe the subsequent business crisis. Friedman claimed that the opposite relationship is in fact true, as he himself demonstrated in earlier published work.9 Friedman faulted the Austrian school in general and Mises in particular for showing a wanton disregard of the statistical record. Surprisingly, Friedman did not comment on the many other parts of Mises’s monetary economics, such as his theory of price expectations, which was developed to help rationalize the actual statistical series. Nor did Friedman offer any opinion on the role Mises played in promoting sta-
The modern Austrian school 7 tistical research in Austria by his association with the Austrian Institute for Trade Cycle Research. It is quite obvious that any correct overall assessment of Mises’s contribution to statistical economics would have to balance a number of contributions, rather than single out one episode while ignoring others, as Friedman appears to have done. Suffice it to say that the evidence, while mixed, certainly provides no basis for the claim that modern Austrian school members are opposed, as a matter of methodological principle, to careful statistical analysis. Let me conclude this section on an even more constructive note. A statistical pattern has come to light that may offer fertile ground for Austrian research. William J. Baumol, Richard R. Nelson and Edward N. Wolff (economists not associated with the Austrian school) have pointed to a surprising statistical regularity. Apparently, there is a tendency among the industrialized nations of the world to grow increasingly homogeneous with regard to technology, productivity, and per capita income. This is the “convergence of productivity phenomenon” (Baumol et al. 1994). It seems to me that the Austrian theorists now have a dramatic statistical illustration of how quickly and effectively the market system encourages its participants to utilize information and apply it in valuable ways (Hayek 1945; Thomsen 1992). This is what now happens with accelerating speed among the industrialized nations. It is proving increasingly difficult for one trading nation to maintain a significant productivity lead over the others. The development of new institutions in communications and transportation is what has probably hastened the diffusion of scientific as well as what Hayek has termed “circumstantially relevant” business information (1945: 80). This rapid utilization of knowledge has now become a veritable global phenomenon. To the best of my knowledge, modern Austrians have not as yet taken up this topic for research and analysis. Austrians can explain what institutions serve to promote this development and its probable impact on material progress. When they do this work – and there is no reason why they should neglect such international developments – they will be following the precedent set by Ludwig von Mises in his monetary debates during the interwar period. Again we see statistical economics and Austrian economic theory developing side by side in mutually supportive ways. It was the historical situation in Central Europe that prompted Mises to develop the subjectivist foundations for the so-called quantity theory, and it may indeed be the important “convergence of productivity phenomenon” that will inspire additional useful research about the production and diffusion of information in years ahead.
Practical advice sold to business We have seen that modern Austrians do not (and should not) rule out the possibility that broad statistical relationships both exist to suggest
8 Laurence S. Moss conceptual innovations and can themselves can be explained in terms of market processes. Austrians remain skeptical if not contemptuous of those who pretend to have the power to discover lucrative arbitrage opportunities in the market and then try to sell this information to others.10 In a market setting, anyone may discover a veritable “rule to make it rich.” Some may go the next step and exploit their rule to their personal advantage (Mises 1949). Such discoveries are usually the province of entrepreneurs, and it is not likely that standard statistical research can produce any information about where economic profits can be found. Statistical categorization necessarily strips economic information of its distinctive or local aspects and therefore of much of its relevance to making money. In addition, by the time the statistical series have been published, individual actors in the chain of production will have had an opportunity to exploit these patterns and thereby destroy whatever market value the information might originally have had. Both the “rational expectations” school and the modern Austrians agree that anyone who claims to have a “rule to riches” is more likely than not a huckster and mountebank (Malkiel 1992). This is because as an empirical matter there are an ample number of “soldiers of fortune” in the market to exploit differences in prices and promote economic coordination. Mises (1949: 252–255) and later Kirzner (1976) analyzed the type of mental and conceptual activity involved when the entrepreneurial function is exercised in market settings. Entrepreneurs are alert to opportunities and are lured to make commitments toward the exploitation of these opportunities by the prospect of what Kirzner (1985b) called “open-ended” profits. Interestingly, the problem of the self-destructing nature of rules to riches has also come to haunt the Austrian school for its claims to have “explained” the precise series of economic events that lead up to a business crash. From a logical point of view, if the modern Austrian theorist were to foresee this series of events, the possibility exists that entrepreneurs who take up the study of economics can themselves profit from this knowledge (cf. Mises 1949: 871–872). And if they were to profit from this knowledge, wouldn’t their actions substantially alter the economic sequence? Consider one important example. Throughout his career, Hayek insisted that the “Ricardo effect” lay hidden within any boom phase of the business cycle (see Moss and Vaughn 1986). Furthermore, the Ricardo effect provided the ultimate explanation as to why government attempts to prolong the boom phase of the cycle indefinitely must end in failure. According to Hayek, if the credit expansion boom does not come to an end sooner for some other reason, it must come to an end when consumer product prices advance ahead of wage and resource prices. The Ricardo effect lowers real wages and encourages a shift toward labor-intensive methods of production. A lowering of the real wage of labor makes
The modern Austrian school 9 short-term (labor-intensive) projects appear to be more profitable than long-term (capital-intensive) methods of production. The Ricardo effect may account for the sudden wave of bankruptcies among the large fixedinvestment projects that occurred toward the end of many nineteenthcentury business cycles.11 If, however, Hayek’s Ricardo effect were publicized among investors, the investors would speculate by purchasing the stock (or stock options) of those firms primarily involved in the management of short-term investment projects. The resulting rise in the capitalized value of the business organizations would bring an earlier end to the boom itself. By 1943, Mises began to admit that this consequence was possible (Mises 1943). The action of self-fulfilling prophecies may indeed unravel each and every one of the so-called laws of the market. In short, the Austrian emphasis on “entrepreneurial alertness” may provide a logical reason why certain historical patterns of market activity tend to reverse themselves and disappear over time. Some students of Austrian economics claim that the credit expansion business cycle has itself become a phenomenon of the past. In the end, the only pattern prediction that endures is one that claims that pattern predictions themselves tend to vanish!
Policy advice to policymakers Austrians are not shy about offering practical advice on matters of public concern. Surely the growth of the modern bureaucratic state has been viewed with alarm by those fearing the threats to liberty posed by state power more than they fear threats posed by unchecked market power in the hands of cabals, or cartels or by the general machinations of business (Rothbard 1977; cf. Mises 1944). I shall restrict myself here to the strictly twentieth-century concern of the Austrian school: that the unprecedented growth of national governments may have a negative effect on the development of those economic institutions that themselves contribute to rising living standards. Economists who criticize others Austrians are upset by economists who pretend that their special training in economics contributes to a heightened awareness of what some might call the “aesthetics” of economic justice. These critics delight in proving that such policy analysis is simply one economist’s private subjective value judgments carefully packaged in the rhetoric of economic reasoning. Such a juxtaposition of norms and science is, in short, an awful fraud of the public trust. Indeed, in his celebrated critique of John Kenneth Galbraith’s Affluent Society, Hayek (1967b) pointed to the author’s repeated practice of substituting his own preferences for those of the people he studied (see also Mises 1944). As we shall see, Austrian economists insist
10 Laurence S. Moss that where something cannot be scientifically proven to be true, the economist is forbidden to speak. Among modern economists this normative position, which acts as a self-imposed gag order on what the Austrians can contribute to public debates, is seen as quite eccentric. Instrumental critiques Consider a law that promises to increase the supply of housing by holding down rents. Modern Austrians delight in showing how laws such as these are “wrong-headed.” Rent controls, usury laws, and minimum wage laws are all wrong-headed. They are wrong-headed because they lead to results that are precisely the opposite of those originally intended. This type of policy analysis, one that passes judgment on the suitability of certain means to stated ends, is the crux of much modern Austrian policy analysis. Such critiques of government policy are persuasive if not exciting, and at seminars and public engagements modern Austrians tend to focus on analyses of “wrong-headed” government intervention (Mises 1929). Unfortunately, not all governmental laws and regulations can be criticized in this way. Efficiency critiques Some government interventions do actually achieve their intended results. For example, command and control clean-up requirements at industrial water dump sites do actually make the areas better for recreational lake users (Frederick 1982). Also, some recipients of government welfare actually do use the funding to provide for the care and comfort of dependent children (Murray 1984). Only a madman would deny that sometimes legislation does achieve its stated mandates. This does not mean that government laws and their implementation are unassailable on other grounds. Indeed, Austrians point out and describe alternative methods of intervention that have been used in the past to achieve similar objectives. The comparative study of different institutional reforms allows a comparison of the pros and cons of the different methods. Finally, modern Austrians spell out in shocking detail the political consequences of some interventions, such as those that propose to replace the market with national planning (Hayek 1944). Other interventions, such as direct controls to overvalue a local currency, sometimes lead to borderline body searches and household raids that cause lovers of individual liberty to recoil in disgust (cf. Yeager 1976). All of this and more constitutes a contribution to policy assessment, but none of it allows efficiency comparisons. Efficiency comparisons are what mainstream economists do best: a dollar comparison of one intervention to another in order to determine which achieves the policy objectives at the smallest opportunity cost. Much of the clamor for government intervention in the twentieth
The modern Austrian school 11 century stemmed from one individual or small group of individuals trying to extract subsidies from other individuals. Redistribution politics fuels the well-known phenomenon of “rent seeking” (Tullock [1962] 1993; Robbins 1962). The modern Austrian may secretly agree with the mainstream economist that what the subsidy receivers receive is only a tiny part of what the losers lose but will, ironically, refuse to conclude that this sort of legislation is “inefficient.” To say an intervention is not wrong-headed but “inefficient” is to imply that the losers lose more utility than the winners win. Unfortunately, according to the modern Austrian school, such a comparison of psychological states is invalid because interpersonal comparisons of utility are impossible to make (Rothbard 1956; Pasour 1987). Even if one feels in both body and soul that the losers lose more than the winners win, “feeling something” is not proving it to be true. Unlike modern Austrians, mainstream economists are eager to use market prices as simple “indices of worth” and thereby compare levels of gain against levels of loss. After World War II the scientific economic journals filled with articles of this sort and the field of welfare economics grew in stature (Mishan 1983). Generally speaking, modern Austrians have not contributed to this literature. Austrians insist that it makes no sense to compare governmental interventions and deduce which program is “least harmful” to the economy. Suppose the problem is to compare a government-run rent subsidy program with another program involving the construction and provision of public housing by the government. Generally, an economist would propose a measure of utility gained and resources consumed and then go on to recommend the program that promised the greatest benefit–cost ratio. Such constructions rely on dollar prices as measures of utility and perform a variety of heroic arithmetical operations in which interpersonal comparisons of utility are made with something approximating complete abandon (Mills 1986). Modern Austrian theorists recoil at the thought of making such efficiency comparison, and some will go so far as to say they insist on remaining “pure” (Hoppe 1994). This stubbornness is an example of “scientific purity” in a world in which most economists keep busy by providing the public with what it enjoys most of all: that is, the scientific measurement of waste. By refusing to compromise about the legitimacy of “efficiency” calculations, the modern Austrians rule out the possibility of a measured criticism of those government policies that may not be wrong-headed (that is, they do achieve their intended outcome) but “succeed” only at a large and in some cases an enormous economic cost. Unable to offer an efficiency critique, modern Austrians choose to remain outside the major policy debates that fascinate many mainstream economists.
12 Laurence S. Moss A scientific welfare economics According to one line of analysis that has taken root among adherents of the Rothbardian branch of the Austrian school, no government intervention can ever be scientifically demonstrated to have raised social welfare (Rothbard 1956).12 The reason is that all government intervention relies on the initiation of either direct coercion or the threat of coercion, and therefore at least one person’s utility level has been lowered. Those who derive benefits from the government intervention will naturally find their utility levels raised. Unfortunately, interpersonal comparisons of utility cannot be made on any precise quantitative basis and so (therefore) no act of government intervention can be said with any degree of scientific precision to have raised social welfare (ibid.: 255n). It is argued that the opposite conclusion can be reached when it comes to voluntary market trade. Market exchange would not occur unless both parties expected to gain utility. Since market activity is mostly based on mutually advantageous trading, only market activity can be said with any degree of scientific precision to raise social welfare. This sweeping conclusion does not involve any interpersonal comparison of utility and therefore, according to its proponents, it is not an efficiency critique and hence passes scientific muster. The first version of this argument appeared in a remarkable essay by Murray N. Rothbard (1956). Two decades later, I pointed out that from a logical point of view one could not reach the implied conclusion that the removal of some forms of government intervention would invariably make everyone better off (Moss 1974). The reason was that the absence of a coercive intervention does not automatically lead to a world of voluntary trading. In the absence of government hegemony in the marketplace, gangs competing for merchant contributions may emerge in the vacuum created by the destruction of the central taxing authority. Indeed, the extent of felonious behavior in the former Soviet Union may be a dramatic example of this phenomenon.13 As Thomas Schelling (1984) reminded us, the substitution of “disorganized” for “organized crime” can make everyone worse off (1984: esp. 172 passim). I insist that any thinking and feeling person can reach such a conclusion even if interpersonal comparisons of utility are impossible. As David L. Prychitko has pointed out, Rothbard’s scientific proof that only the market system can be said to raise social welfare has been deduced from “a questionable view of science [namely, that] we only scientifically ‘know’ that which can be deduced from ‘absolutely true’ axioms” (1993: 525). Surely we can also “know” other things as well, such as the tremendous extent of suffering that accompanies national sovereignty movements when they eliminate ethnic minorities and so on. Reasonable thinkers can conclude that the suffering of the many outweighs the joys of a few even if a precise scientific measure of net utility gain cannot be made. In Prychitko’s words, “The immeasura-
The modern Austrian school 13 bility of utility gains and losses in no way entails their complete inaccessibility to analysis” (ibid.: 583). Comparative institutional analysis Modern Austrians have excelled at the careful analysis and evaluation of contemporary institutions. By “institutions” I mean all those decisionmaking procedures and routines both within and between organizations that affect the performance of the market system.14 Institutions of great interest to the Austrians are those that (1) connect the national treasuries and the central banks; (2) link special interest groups, such as unions and manufacturers’ lobbies; (3) guide political parties and the competition among them to obtain votes from special interest groups; (4) emerge when governments try to reshape international payments mechanisms; (5) arise out of central planning agencies trying to plan the economy; and (6) connect government policies to third-world business investment. The list of institutions evaluated by modern Austrians is thus quite long (see Mises 1951; Hayek 1971, [1933] 1979, 1988; Rothbard 1962). If there were a single political attitude that permeates Austrian policy analysis, it would be this: Austrians distrust broadly popular democratic processes because they fear that the voters are doomed to place their short-run private interests above the policies that are needed to sustain the market system. Although Mises implored men and women to trust their “rightly understood long-run interests” as the surest safeguard against the abuses of demagogues and popular democracy, he and especially Hayek advocated speciffic constitutional reforms in case human diligence failed (cf. Yeager 1976). Constitutional reform is designed to limit the excesses of popular democracy by restraining popular emotions from voting out the basic framework and legal structures needed to support a market system. A survey of all this important work is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it will be suffficient to summarize the policy component of this work as follows: Modern Austrians have been and remain keenly interested in the problem of how incentives come to be (or fail to be) aligned within and between these large institutions. Through the judgments they have made about this phenomenon, they have provided rich insight into our understanding of contemporary economic history. Under the nineteenth-century international gold exchange system, local political leaders were given a powerful excuse for not capitulating to the infflationary fi f nancing of government programs. Politicians could blame the international community for preventing them from catering to the interests of local political parties that wanted to redistribute income by effecting artifficially contrived changes in the quantity of money. The Austrians explained how large budget defficits fi f nanced by money-supply creation would diminish gold reserves in the banking system and threaten fi f nancial default and currency devaluation. Mises and Hayek predicted that once the reigns of the gold-exchange
14 Laurence S. Moss standard were loosened, especially as happened after World War II, national governments would end up under the control of leaders who would fi f nd infflationary ffinance irresistible (see, for example, Hayek 1972). It has been over a half-century since the end of the war and the installation of the International Monetary Fund. It has been more than a quarter of a century since the U.S. government removed the last links between the dollar and gold in 1971. The feared hyperinfflation has not yet arrived, but neither have clusters of prices moved in any other way than steadily upward in the United States and also among other industrialized nations (Yeager 1976). The problem national governments face is not whether to accept a mild infflation but rather how much infflation is politically feasible because, whatever its conceptual merits, defflation has become politically unacceptable. The proponents of the Austrian school have been the veritable chroniclers of and astonished witnesses to this development.15 If there is one common theme to the policy writings of the modern Austrian school, that theme is how to discipline and constrain the appetites of vote-gathering politicians for issuing money. It is well known how Hayek labored to compare the consequences of monetary nationalism (i.e., separate currencies and fflexible exchange rates) with the outcomes of alternative institutional arrangements such as the gold exchange standard (Yeager 1976). In his later years Hayek endorsed “private competing money” as the best institutional device to avoid sustained infflation (1976). Here Hayek departed from Mises, who rested his hope in a return to full-bodied gold coins.16 While a speciffic topical index to the modern Austrian school would fi f ll many volumes, what all these writings have in common is the attention paid to the broad problem of aligning incentives and responsibilities within alternative institutional structures so that the basis for material economic progress is not destroyed or diminished. The wisdom that modern Austrians have brought to these questions is quite literally unsurpassed in the policy literature and constitutes another important contribution of the school to practical problem solving.
Conclusion The conclusion I reach is quite defensible and I hope entirely persuasive. It is clear that characterizing the modern Austrian school as being entirely embroiled in methodological discussions and having little to contribute to the leading policy problems of the day overlooks the historical record. It is somewhat misleading to claim that the modern Austrian school asks interesting questions but (by implication) lacks adequate tools to provide proper answers to these questions (Vaughn 1994). As I have demonstrated here, important questions have been raised, and important answers have been offered. This is not to deny that by refusing to use money as the “measuring rod” of utility, modern Austrians have excluded themselves from the enormous policy literature that calculates benefit–cost ratios and makes
The modern Austrian school 15 efficiency comparisons of different forms of government intervention. Remaining “conceptually pure” has (apparently) led the Rothbardian variant of Austrian economics into the uncomfortable corner of arguing that only deductive logic matters in policy analysis. This position gives no place at all to historical understanding and common sense, which are also pertinent to our understanding of the linkages between government intervention and private economic welfare. Finally, by excelling at comparative institutional analysis, Austrians have pioneered the analysis of rules and institutions well in advance of other contemporary schools of thought, such as the “public choice school” and the “Coaseian property rights school.”17 I offer this chapter as a modest contribution toward correcting the historical record by pointing to these Austrian contributions.
Notes 1 Milton Friedman plainly speaks his mind as follows: “the so-called Austrians, or von Misesians [champion a] philosophy which admits no role whatsoever for empirical evidence – it’s entirely introspective – [and] leads to an attitude of human intolerance. . . . The scientific work [on the modern Austrians] is from my point of view useless” (quoted in Hammond 1992). See also Ernesto Screpanti and Stefano Zamagni, who remark that Austrians “refuse to reduce economics to a discipline that seeks observed regularities or mechanical laws from which quantitative predictions can be derived” (1993: 389). 2 Mises characterized the mechanical version of the quantity theory as the “erroneous transference of static law to the dynamic sphere” ([1924] 1953: 152). 3 In preparation for the 1953 edition, Mises added a section to his Theory of Money and Credit entitled “Monetary Reconstruction,” in which he stated, “The eminence of the gold standard consists in the fact that it makes the determination of the monetary unit’s purchasing power independent of the measures of governments. It wrests from the hands of the ‘economic tsars’ their most redoubtable instrument. It makes it difficult for them to inflate. This is why the gold standard is furiously attacked by all those who expect that they will be benefited by bounties from the seemingly inexhaustible government purse” (p. 438). 4 According to Rothbard, Mises’s cycle theory was the “only such theory integrated with general micro-economics and built on the foundations of the analysis of individual action” (1988). 5 On the political business cycle, see Mueller (1989: 277–306). 6 On the German Reichsbank’s stubborn refusal to believe that “printing money in favour of businessmen . . . could have any inflationary effect,” see Yeager (1976). 7 In Mises’s words, there is a “maladjustment between depreciation and circulation” ([1924] 1953: 229). Unfortunately, Mises makes no mention of this controversy in his short autobiography (1978a). Mises credits himself and his colleague Wilhelm Rosenberg with preventing the collapse of the Austrian crown in 1922 (ibid.: 78). 8 Mises must have added this discussion in the 1924 second edition of his Theory of Money and Credit ([1924] 1953: 228). Mises’s formulation was essentially the inverse of the one described in the text. Mises objected to the use of prices indexes (ibid.: 187–190) and preferred to use a single price. The price he used was the price of gold – expressed in local currency – the price established in
16 Laurence S. Moss
9
10
11 12 13 14
15
16 17
the international market. Mises stated that the behavior of the ratio of the money stock to its gold price had “often been shown by simple statistical investigations” to have fallen during the course of the inflation, suggesting that the commodity (gold) value of the stock of money had shrunk. This shrinking is what creates the impression that there is a “shortage” of money rather than an overabundance (ibid.). According to Friedman, “I looked at the relationship between the amplitude of a recession and the amplitude of expansions and amplitude of the succeeding recessions. There’s zero correlation. On the other hand, there’s a very high correlation between the amplitude of the succeeding expansion. That’s utterly inconsistent with the von Mises theory. It seems to me that that one little bit of evidence is decisive refutation of von Mises” (1969: 271–275). “Entrepreneurs . . . would never venture to take their economic life into their hands because an expert advised them to do so. Those ignorant people who operate on the stock and commodity exchange according to tips are destined to lose their money” (Mises 1949: 871–872). Also see Skousen (1988). On the importance of this “empirical fact” in the applicability of the Austrian cycle theory (see Rothbard 1963). On the statistical evidence and its relationship to the Ricardo effect, see Tsiang (1947). On the “Rothbardian wing” of the modern Austrian school and other personal reflections on the sociology of the school of thought, see Vaughn (1994: 99–100). A fuller analysis of this problem remains to be written; see Specter (1994). “U.S. Business and the Russian Mob,” New York Times (July 8, 1994). According to Richard N. Langlois, there are spontaneously generated institutions such as money and others that are constructed, such as the “outer framework” of society: that is, its laws and rules. Langlois explained that what “unifies both types of institutions, and what makes the same methods of analysis more or less applicable to both, is that both are in large measure regularities of behavior understandable in terms of rules, norms and routines” (1986: 19). Modern Austrians favor neither inflation nor deflation. They prefer whatever the ordinary market process happens to bring. Hayek stubbornly refused to allow the authorities to depart from the market situation in his Prices and Production (1935). Mises pointed out that a “metallic currency is not subject to government manipulation” (1949: 786). Compare Rothbard (1965). See Moss and MacDonald (1981: 98–109). On the “public choice” school, see Mueller (1989). On the “property rights” approach, see Coase (1988).
References Baumol, William J., Nelson, Richard R. and Wolff, Edward N. (1994), Convergence of Productivity: Cross-national Studies and Historical Experience, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Coase, R.H. (1988), The Firm, the Market and the Law, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Dolan, E.G. (ed.) (1976), The Foundations of Modern Austrian Economics, Sheed & Ward, Kansas City. Fisher, Irving ([1911] 1971), Theory of the Purchasing Power of Money: Its Determination and Relation to Credit, Interest and Crises, Augustus M. Kelley, New York.
The modern Austrian school 17 Frederick, K.D. (1982), “Water Supplies,” in P.R. Portney (ed.) Current Issues in Natural Resource Policy, Resources for the Future, Washington, DC. Friedman, M. (1969), “The Monetary Studies of the National Bureau,” in “The Optimal Quantity of Money” and Other Essays, Aldine, Chicago, pp. 271–275. Hammond, D. (1992), “An Interview with Milton Friedman on Methodology,” in W. Samuels and J. Biddle (eds) Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology, vol. 10, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. Hayek, F.A. (ed.) ([1933] 1975), Collectivist Economic Planning, Augustus M. Kelley, New York. Hayek, F.A. ([1933] 1979), Law, Legislation and Liberty, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Hayek, F.A. (1935), Prices and Production, 2nd edn, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. Hayek, F.A. (1944), The Road to Serfdom, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Hayek, F.A. (1945), “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” American Economic Review 35: 519–530; reprinted in Hayek, F.A. (1949), Individualism and Economic Order, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, pp. 77–91. Hayek, F.A. (1967a), “Degrees of Explanation,” in Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Chicago Press, pp. 3–21. Hayek, F.A. (1967b), “The Non Sequitur of the ‘Dependence Effect’,” in Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Hayek, F.A. (1971), “Monetary Nationalism and International Stability,” in The Collected Works of F.A. Hayek, ed. W.W. Hartley III, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Hayek, F.A. (1972), A Tiger by the Tail: A 40-Year Running Commentary on Keynesianism, ed. Sudha R. Shenoy, Institute of Economic Affairs, London. Hayek, F.A. (1976), Denationalization of Money: The Argument Refined, Institute of Economic Affairs, London. Hayek, F.A. (1978), “The Pretence of Knowledge,” in New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 23–34. Hayek, F.A. (1988), Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, vol. 1 of The Collected Works of F.A. Hayek, ed. W.W. Bartley III, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Hoppe, C. Hans Hermann (1994), “F.A. Hayek on Government and Social Evolution: A Critique,” in Murray A. Rothbard (ed.) The Review of Austrian Economics, Lexington Heath, Lexington, MA, pp. 67–93. Kirzner, Israel M. (1973), Competition and Entrepreneurship, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Kirzner, Israel M. (1976), Perception, Opportunity and Profit, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Kirzner, Israel M. (1985a), Discovery and the Capitalist Process, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Kirzner, Israel M. (1985b), “Taxes and Discovery: An Entrepreneurial Perspective,” in Discovery and the Capitalist Process, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 93–118. Kirzner, Israel M. (1986), Subjectivism, Intelligibility and Economic Understanding, New York University Press, New York. Kirzner, Israel M. (1992), The Meaning of the Market Process: Essays in the Development of Modern Austrian Economics, Routledge, London.
18 Laurence S. Moss Lachmann, Ludwig M. (1973), Macroeconomic Theory and the Market Economy, Institute of Economic Affairs, London. Lachmann, Ludwig M. (1976), “From Mises to Shackle: An Essay,” Journal of Economic Literature 14 (1): 54–62. Lachmann, Ludwig M. (1977), Capital Expectations and the Market Process, ed. Walter E. Grinder, Sheed Andrews & McMeel, Mission, KS. Langlois, Richard N. (1986), Economics as a Process: Essays in the New Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Malkiel, Burton G. (1992), “Efficient Market Hypothesis,” in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance, ed. P. Newman, M. Milgate and J. Eatwell, Macmillan, London, pp. 739–744. Mills, Edwin S. (1986), The Burden of Government, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, CA. Mises, Ludwig von (1924), Theory of Money and Credit, 2nd edn, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT. Mises, Ludwig von (1929), A Critique of Interventionism, New Rochelle, NY. Mises, Ludwig von (1943), “ ‘Elastic Expectations’ and the Austrian Theory of the Trade Cycle,” Economica 10 (39): 251–252. Mises, Ludwig von (1944), Bureaucracy, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT. Mises, Ludwig von (1949), Human Action, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT. Mises, Ludwig von (1951), Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis, trans. J. Kahane, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT. Mises, Ludwig von (1978a) Notes and Recollections, Libertarian Press, South Holland, IL. Mises, Ludwig von (1978b) “The Trade Cycle and Credit Expansion: The Economic Consequences of Cheap Money,” in Percy L. Greaves (ed.) On the Manipulation of Money and Credit, Free Market Books, New York. Mishan, E.J. (1983) Cost–Benefit Analysis, George Allen & Unwin, London. Moss, Laurence S. (1974), “Private Property Anarchism: An American Variant,” in G. Tullock (ed.) Further Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy, University Publications, Blacksburg, VA, pp. 1–31. Moss, Laurence S. and MacDonald, Stephen (1981), “An Economical or a Social Currency? Ludwig von Mises and the Defense of the Gold Standard,” Wirtschaftspolitische Blätter, pp. 98–109. Moss, Laurence S. and Vaughn, Karen I. (1986), “Hayek’s Ricardo Effect: A Second Look,” History of Political Economy 18 (Winter): 545–565. Mueller, Dennis C. (1989), Public Choice II, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Murray, Charles (1984) Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950–1980, Basic Books, New York. O’Driscoll, Gerald P., Jr. and Rizzo, Mario (1985), The Economics of Time and Ignorance, Blackwell, Cambridge, p. 27. Pasour, E.C., Jr. (1987), “Rent Seeking: Some Conceptual Problems and Implications,” in Murray N. Rothbard (ed.) The Review of Austrian Economics, Lexington Books, Lexington, MA, pp. 123–143. Prychitko, David L. (1993), “Welfare Economics and Austrian Economics,” Critical Review 7: 567–592. Robbins, L. (1962), An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, Macmillan, London.
The modern Austrian school 19 Rothbard, Murray N. (1956), “Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics,” in M. Senholz (ed.) On Freedom and Free Enterprise, Van Nostrand, New York, pp. 224–262. Rothbard, Murray N. (1962), Man, Economy and States, 2 vols., Van Nostrand, New York. Rothbard, Murray N. (1963), America’s Great Depression, Van Nostrand, Princeton, NJ. Rothbard, Murray N. (1965), What Has Government Done to Our Money?, Studies in Human Action, Pine Tree Press, Colorado Springs, CO. Rothbard, Murray N. (1977), Power and Market: Government and the Economy, Sheed Andrews & McMeel, Kansas City. Rothbard, Murray N. (1988), Ludwig von Mises: Scholar, Creator, Hero, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn, AL. Schelling, Thomas C. (1984), Choice and Consequences: Perspectives of an Errant Economist, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Screpanti, Ernesto and Zamagni, Stefano (1993), An Outline in the History of Economic Thought, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Skousen, Mark (1988), “Murray Rothbard as Investment Advisor,” in Walter Block and Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr. (eds) Man, Economy and Liberty: Essays in Honor of Murray N. Rothbard, Auburn University, Auburn, AL. Specter, Michael (1994), “U.S. Business and the Russian Mob,” New York Times, July 8. Thomsen, Esteban F. (1992), Prices and Knowledge: A Market Process Perspective, Routledge, London. Tsiang, Sho-chieh (1947), The Variation of Real Wages and Profit Margins in Relation to the Trade Cycle, Pitman, London. Tullock, G. ([1962] 1993), “Rent Seeking,” Shaftesbury Papers, Elgar Publishing, Brookfield, VT. Vaughn, Karen I. (1994), Austrian Economics in America: The Migration of a Tradition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Yeager, Leland (1976), International Money Relations: The History and Policy, Harper & Row, New York.
B
Schools of economic thought and methodology
2
F.A. Hayek’s methodological U-turn reconsidered in light of his concept of social facts G.M. Huussen
The thesis of the U-turn does not do justice to the development of Hayek’s thought The purpose of this chapter is to disprove the thesis of the U-turn. I shall show that even right at the start of his career, Hayek had different methodological ideas from those of his mentor Mises. This argumentation is sufficient for my objective, but it is rather unsatisfactory if we want to gain a better understanding of the development of Hayek’s thought. I will defend the thesis that he derived his ideas on the philosophy of science from Mach and the logical positivists. In my opinion, this more elaborate argumentation is preferable – not because I subscribe to Hayek’s ideas, but because any attempt to take up a critical position should be based on a correct understanding of his own intentions. Hayek wrote only one work, The Sensory Order (1952), that was devoted exclusively to the theory of knowledge, although it was to give a basis to theoretical psychology. For the rest we have to manage with his casual remarks and allusions, particularly in his early work. However, the core of his interest for the philosophy of science is in his criticism of ‘scientism’, already found in a series of articles in Economica (1941–1944) and later collected under the title The Counter-revolution of Science ([1952] 1955). Hayek was full of admiration for the ‘hard’ sciences, but was hesitant regarding the slavish imitation of their methods in the fields of the social sciences. This hesitancy was born out of concern for the empirical basis of economics – that is, the facts of the social sciences in general – rather than the wish to achieve an indisputable aprioristic foundation.
The thesis of the U-turn examined Hutchison (1981: 210) suggests that Hayek initially was profoundly influenced by his mentor Mises, but increasingly shifted towards Popper’s direction later on. In order to make this plausible, he distinguishes various
24 G.M. Huussen phases in the development of Hayek’s thought. He states that in the first phase Hayek based his monetary theory of the trade cycle not only on Mises’s monetary theory ([1912] 1924), but also – and this is the crucial point here – on his eccentric methodological views. With biting irony, Hutchison dates the change in Hayek’s views to 1937, when in his opinion Hayek broke with the assumption of perfect knowledge (Alwissenheit) in his famous article ‘Economics and Knowledge’. In this article, Hayek introduced the distinction between what one now would call objective, scientific knowledge and the subjective or private knowledge of economic subjects – such as their knowledge of their own preferences and local situations. In ‘Economics and Knowledge’, Hayek briefly refers for the first time to Popper’s falsificationism. According to Hutchison (1981: 215), this article marks ‘a vital turning-point, or even a U-turn in Hayek’s methodological ideas’. In his opinion the second phase in Hayek’s development starts here: from now on, Hayek would gradually depart from Mises’s ideas and finally take sides with Popper openly in his Nobel Prize Lecture (1974). Against this background the thesis of the U-turn seems very plausible. Nevertheless, the relationship between mentor and pupil proves nothing concerning the specific contents of the thesis: that is, their methodological descent. This still will have to be proved from Hayek’s early and later work. In this respect I am inclined to protect Hayek against his critics. As will be shown, Hutchison does not provide convincing proof to support his thesis.
Two interpretations of the early Hayek Hutchison states that the methodological ideas that Hayek had before and after 1937 were ‘quite incompatible’. However, Hayek’s work can also be viewed as a unity, but then as a unity in a process of development. The theme of freedom was unfolded ever more consequently – first in the economic field and later in studies in philosophy, politics and the history of ideas. This also applies to Hayek’s ideas in the field of the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of science. Barry (1979: 41), for instance, speaks of ‘a basic continuity in Hayek’s writings on methodology’. But he considers that continuity as a strained relationship full of tension between Mises’s ‘praxeology and empirical science’. For his thesis, Hutchison (1981: 219) gratefully exploits Barry’s ill-founded hint. The neo-Austrians Kirzner (1976) and Rothbard (1976) even go a step further. They consider Hayek to be an exponent of Mises’s praxeology. I will not further elaborate on these one-sided interpretations, because, together with Hutchison’s thesis, they will be refuted, provided that I can prove that Hayek did not follow Mises, but Mach. Without a doubt, Hayek was challenged by his mentor Mises and made sensitive to problems that kept him occupied. In his festive speech in
F.A. Hayek’s methodological U-turn 25 honour of the seventy-fifth birthday of Mises he mentions that most members of the Mises circle had socialist ideals: ‘Professor Mises’s theory seemed to deny everything that we were taught to believe until now’ (M. von Mises [1976] 1981: 284). After Mises had published his anti-socialist book Die Gemeinwirtschaft (1922), Hayek continues, ‘we were left almost with nothing else than dark, brooding doubts’. Apparently Hayek only gradually became a supporter of the liberal ideas of Mises. However, it can be questioned for two reasons whether Hayek also adopted the methodological ideas of his mentor. At that time the methodological ideas of Mises were not crystallised out in the least. Furthermore, Hayek came from a totally different, more scientific intellectual climate. The shock experience of the collapse of the Danube monarchy induced him, as he stated in an interview for Video Arts Television (1985), to focus his scientific interest not on physical or biological questions but, contrary to the family tradition, on political and economic issues. This means that for the interpretation of Hayek’s early period we have the choice between two competitive hypotheses: the ‘Misesian’ hypothesis of Hutchison and the ‘scientific’ hypothesis of Hayek himself. About this second hypothesis, Hayek wrote in ‘The Facts of the Social Sciences’ (1943, para. 1): I had, perhaps, better explain that I myself originally approached my subject thoroughly imbued with a belief in the universal validity of the methods of the natural sciences. Not only was my first technical training largely scientific in the narrow sense of the word, but also what little training I had in philosophy or scientific method was entirely in the school of Ernst Mach and later of the logical positivists. Thus, the second, ‘scientific’ hypothesis fits in with Hayek’s own account. In addition, this hypothesis corresponds with his critical stance against scientism, because, he continues: Yet all this had the effect only of creating the awareness, which became more and more definite as time went on, that, certainly in economics, all the people who are universally regarded as talking sense are constantly infringing the accepted canons of scientific method evolved from the practice of the natural sciences. These quotations from Hayek’s later work show that his criticism of the slavish imitation of the methods of the natural sciences in the fields of social sciences (or scientism, as he prefers to call it) can be considered as a self-criticism, as a matter which he advocates in his own thinking. In other words, he gradually became aware of the ‘devastating effects’ that a ‘scientistic’ approach has on our views concerning social issues.
26 G.M. Huussen When one assumes that Hayek was ‘nurtured in the Viennese school of Ernst Mach and the logical positivists’, as Klant rather ironically does (1984: 79), and one bears in mind that he was challenged by Mises, the fight against scientism is placed in a different perspective. There seems to be a gradual rapprochement with Mises rather than a farewell. Should one therefore not speak of a convergence rather than a U-turn?
More Mach than Mises The methodological ideas of the early Hayek were discussed by Hutchison on the basis of Hayek’s ‘Habilitationsvortrag’ ([1929] 1976) and essays entitled ‘Socialist Calculation’ (1935). Hutchison’s critique of ‘Habilitationsvortrag’ focuses in particular on two aspects. In his opinion Hayek wanted to save static equilibrium theory and to maintain the assumption of Alwissenheit. This would reveal the influence of Menger and maybe of Mises, although Hutchison (1981: 213) thinks that he can only definitely catch Hayek on a Misesian apriorism in ‘Socialist Calculation’. We will first discuss the points of criticism concerning Hayek’s ‘Habilitationsvortrag’. These points refer to theoretical rather than methodological issues, and they are incorrect on theoretical grounds. The fact is that Alwissenheit and statics are contrary to the essence of Hayek’s monetary theory of the trade cycle. According to this theory, the use of money is the necessary condition to moderate the rigorous exchange equilibrium which the static equilibrium theory still assumes on the basis of Say’s law. Subsequently, an elastic money supply forms the sufficient condition for the trade cycle phenomenon. As a result of these new circumstances, market prices, to which the actors must take recourse because of their limited knowledge, provide ‘false’ information. Thus, the actors are not omniscient. In whatever way this theory is further assessed, it assumes neither Alwissenheit nor a static approach; it has an intent contrary to the one Hutchison imputes to it. This will be shown more extensively with quotations. We will first examine the methodological aspects, which Hutchison almost completely ignores. ‘Habilitationsvortrag’ comprises the first three chapters of Geldtheorie und Konjunkturforschung (1929; GK for short), to which two papers for Verein für Sozialpolitik from the same period and some concluding observations have been added. Hayek’s methodological ideas, stated in his ‘Habilitationsvortrag’, can be summarised in the following five theses: 1
2
All theoretical social sciences, including economics, are predictive sciences (GK: 7n1). Economists have to do with the equilibrium theory; they have no better alternative. Statistical investigations are not theoretical, but descriptive. Scientific predictions are conditional; they say what will necessarily
F.A. Hayek’s methodological U-turn 27
3
4
5
happen if certain conditions occur and no interventions are undertaken. This is why statistical extrapolations, for example of economic trends, are scientifically inadequate. They lack a theoretical explanation based on necessary interconnections. ‘Empirically established relations between various economic phenomena continue to present a problem to theory until the necessity for their interconnections can be demonstrated independently of any statistical evidence’ (Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle, Hayek [1933] 1975: 31; MT for short). However, this independent demonstration or ‘obviousness’ (GK: 4) is not something that is based on intuition or intellectual contemplation, because: For a theory ‘there are only two criteria of correctness’ (MT: 32). A theory can be incorrect owing to a logical deficiency or because under the given conditions it explains something different from what we observe. At most a theory can be found to be logically sound and empirically not untrue. After all, verification is only possible in a negative sense. An unexplained residue proves that a theory is inadequate, but ‘It cannot be expected [however] to confirm [a] theory in a positive sense’ (GK: 6; MT: 34). A correspondence with the observed facts (or ‘corroboration’, as the English translation of 1933 has it; MT: 35) still does not prove that the theory is empirically true (GK: 4). After all, in what way could a necessary interconnection be substantiated on contingent grounds? Conditional predictions mainly have a practical meaning. They allow us to intervene so as to affect the conditions in a purposeful way. Collective forecasts in the socio-economic field, for example on tradecycle movements, are usually ‘too unconditional in forms’, therefore without a practical meaning and of a doubtful scientific standard (GK: 7n; MT: 36n).
Whoever reads these propositions will be struck by their similarity with the present hypothetico-deductive model of science. The explicitly mentioned logical and empirical ‘criteria of correctness’ reveal a logical positivist intent, which is hardly compatible with a Misesian apriorism. Furthermore, it is significant that the method of verification is treated with a caution that reminds us of Popper rather than of logical positivism. But Popper’s Logik der Forschung appeared only at the end of 1934! Did Hayek anticipate the ideas of Popper? This may seem to be the case, but the simplest explanation for their methodological resemblance is that both base themselves on Mach.
A comparison with Mach’s philosophy of science When we, following Hayek’s hint, draw a parallel with Mach, it is in particular his philosophy of scientific discovery that is relevant here. Later,
28 G.M. Huussen the epistemological principles of this philosophy will be discussed in so far as they are relevant concerning Hayek’s view regarding the task of the social sciences. In his compellingly written Knowledge and Error ([1905] (1976; KE for short), Mach argues that errors are no regrettable aberrations of scientific research, but a source of discoveries and thus of the growth of knowledge. Errors are connected with our ignorance, with the incongruence between theory and experience. According to Mach, the development of scientific theories shows a smooth transition with our daily experience. The patterns of expectation that we form on the basis of experience are improved by the concepts and theories of the natural sciences. A law of nature forbids certain expectations. It is not a prescription for nature, as Kant wrongly thought, but rather a restriction on our expectations with respect to the course of natural events (KE: 352ff.). The aim of science is to try to organise our thoughts as economically as possible, both mutually and in relation to the facts. The first aspect is a matter of logic and mathematics; the second is a matter of concept and theory development. Theories consist of conditional, functional relations: they have a hypothetical ‘if–then’ character. The essential function of a hypothesis is that it ‘leads to new observations and experiments, which confirm, refute or modify our surmises and so widen our experience’ (KE: 176).Because of the logical problem with induction, a confirmation can never remove the ‘self-destroying’ function of a hypothesis (KE: 176, 181, 228). The error or refutation, the finding that a general hypothesis suddenly does not apply to the usual conditions, ‘makes us look for so far unknown complementary conditions’ (KE: 354). We should not accept the incongruence between theory and experience, but regard it as an opportunity to make new discoveries. These ideas on the method of science appear to have inspired not only Hayek, but also Popper. Because Popper developed his philosophy of science as a move away from the ‘received view’ of the Vienna Circle, more attention is usually paid to their mutual differences than to their common backgrounds. Mach is undoubtedly also part of these common roots. The dynamic, open-ended model of science outlined by Popper in The Logic of Scientific Discovery ([1935] 1959/74) appears to be very similar to that of Mach, but is placed under a different sign. The difference of opinion with Mach, which is mainly fought out by Popper in footnotes, focuses on the question of whether theories are merely instruments of thought, which can predict adequately or inadequately, or descriptions that can be true or false. Against Mach’s instrumentalism Popper puts his realistic interpretation of theories. Theories are descriptive, universal hypotheses; they can be true or false (although we can never establish their truth with certainty).
F.A. Hayek’s methodological U-turn 29 Hayek shares this realism with Popper, in contrast with his liberal kindred spirit Friedman. An instrumentalist is not concerned about the question whether his or her assumptions are realistic and whether they are able to explain the observed phenomena. Hayek states this as a requirement: the theory has to be able to explain the empirically observed phenomena even without a residue.
Contra Hutchison: no ‘omniscience’ and no ‘instrumentalism’ The problem that Hayek tries to solve in his ‘Habilitationsvortrag’ ([1929] 1976) is that addressed by Mach: the incongruence between theory and experience. General equilibrium theory (GET) offers no explanation for the phenomenon of the trade cycle, although it claims to cover the entire range of economic phenomena (GK: 2). While rejecting various alternatives, Hayek claims that the trade cycle theory has as a task to ‘broaden’ the ‘explanatory scheme’ of GET in such a manner that the trade-cycle phenomena can be deduced in a purely deductive manner from its premises (GK: 13ff.). The problem is how a theory of a general disturbance can possibly be derived from ‘presuppositions, according to which such a disturbance is rendered impossible by the regulatory mechanism of the economic system’. This is, according to Heimann (1945: 220), like squaring the circle. In agreement with Mach’s indications, according to Hayek (GK: 46–48), the theory will have to be extended with a so far unknown complementary condition. For this additional assumption he consults the monetary theory of Mises, though not without criticism. Say’s law, which is fundamental for equilibrium theory, assumes barter. This does not fit in with the reality of the modern monetary and credit system. The monetary system is the absent assumption that will have to be built in the static theory in order to be able to deduce the trade-cycle phenomena from it. In his criticism, Hutchison (1981: 213) suggests that Hayek sticks to the ‘static assumptions’ of equilibrium theory in his trade-cycle-theory, which in his opinion includes perfect expectations or ‘omniscience’, besides assuming perfect competition. In its purport this criticism is incorrect, because – as we saw – Hayek aims at broadening the empirical range of the theory by enriching its premises with certain explanatory principles: ‘no one has yet undertaken the decisive step which creates a complete theory by using one of these principles to incorporate all the known phenomena into the existing system in a satisfactory way’ (MT: 40). For the same reason, Hayek (MT: 93) does not want to save the equilibrium theory, as Lowe does in an instrumentalist sense, by reconciling himself to the discrepancy between the closed theoretical system and the supposed openness, elasticity or indefiniteness of the economic system.
30 G.M. Huussen The endorsement of the incongruence between theory and experience boils down to a sacrificium intellectus (cf. MT: 96). It is this passage that Hutchison completely erroneously explains as an allusion to the definiteness of the system as a result of a supposed ‘omniscience’ of the actors. Hayek does not defend ‘omniscience’ here; he is fighting instrumentalism. The suggestion that Hayek considers ‘omniscience’ a necessary condition for a vigorous deductive theoretical system is unfounded. Hayek (MT: 84) does not base himself on ‘omniscience’, but on ‘imperfect knowledge’. He argues expressis verbis that imperfect knowledge does play a role, but is not a sufficient condition to explain the trade-cycle phenomena, because even in a barter economy that obeys Say’s law, ‘production is governed by prices, independently of any knowledge of the whole process on the part of individual producers’ (ibid.). The decisive point is that ‘ “wrong” prices . . . which lead to “wrong” dispositions, cannot in turn be explained by a mistake’ (MT: 85). The unknown sufficient condition, which creates as it were a wrong inclination of the ‘market compass’, is not part of the psychological sphere, but part of the modern monetary system. Hutchison (1981: 213) concludes rather cautiously that ‘in the context of the problem of the trade cycle Hayek seems to have expressing a somewhat similar fundamental methodological aperçu to that of J.S. Mill and F.Y. Edgeworth’. He suspects that in this respect it is not so much a Misesian apriorism, but a ‘Millian’ or ‘empirical apriorism’, as Klant ([1979] 1984) calls it – a surmise based on the putative ‘omniscient’ economic subjects. However, this empirical apriorism is definitely no apriorism in the neoKantian sense of the word, as found with Mises (Huussen 1989). By ‘knowledge a priori’, Mill ([1836] 1984: 56) does not mean knowledge preceding experience, but empirical knowledge of a psychological nature which precedes economic theories and their testing. In my opinion the label ‘psychological reductionism’ instead of ‘empirical apriorism’ would be more apt (Huussen 1988: 117). Precisely these ‘psychological theories’ are criticised by Hayek because of their logical inadequacies in the paragraph quoted by Hutchison. Thus, hitherto the thesis of the U-turn seems to be based on a confusion of Misesian apriorism with ‘empirical apriorism’ and an alleged ‘psychological reductionism’ with Hayek.
The so-called apriorism in ‘Socialist Calculation’ Hayek’s article ‘Socialist Calculation I’ ([1935] 1947: 1–40) appears to be more in line with Mill. He reasons: physicists can experimentally test inductively established hypotheses on causal relations. Economists cannot. However, they have something better: ‘The essential basic facts which we need for the explanation of social phenomena are part of common experience, part of the stuff of our thinking’ (ibid.: para. 3). This quotation appears to be an allusion to Mill’s method of introspec-
F.A. Hayek’s methodological U-turn 31 tion to lay down the fundamental postulates of the human behaviour in the pursuit of wealth: ‘The material of this knowledge every-one can principally collect within himself’ ([1836] 1984: 60). However, such a psychological reductionism cannot be compatible with Hayek’s previous objections raised against a psychological foundation of economic theories. Hutchison argues that Mill’s ‘empirical apriorism’ is at least open to correction through empirical data, while Hayek excludes this possibility when he continues, ‘In the social sciences it is the elements of the complex phenomena which are known beyond the possibility of dispute. In the natural sciences they can only be at best surmised’ (1981: 213; my italics). In this claim to justified knowledge, Hutchison definitely senses the influence of Misesian apriorism. However, there is still a third possibility: the empiriocriticism of Mach. This third interpretation is worth a serious consideration, as Hayek subsequently calls the explanatory factors, or ‘elements’, ‘the truly empirical factor in the social sciences’ ([1935] 1947). Mises would not come up with this. In his view the ‘logic of action’ is a priori – that is to say, non-empirical, ‘prior to experience’, like mathematics ([1933] 1960/81: 17ff.). Instead of rashly classifying the early Hayek now with Mill’s apriorism and now with the apriorism of Mises, it would be more worthwhile to analyse the tenor of Hayek’s ‘empiricism’. Besides the typical concept of ‘elements’ (or ‘empiricism’), empiriocriticism is also a serious option for the Hayek interpretation for a different reason. It concerns the methodological unity or plurality of the social and natural sciences. According to Hutchison (1981: 210), Hayek initially followed Mises in his support of a methodological dualism, but later acknowledged Popper’s unified vision on the method of science. However, it is striking that Hayek already establishes a methodological similarity in the paragraph in which Hutchison thinks he can catch him on a Misesian apriorism and methodological dualism. Here Hayek characterises the social and physical sciences as ‘empirically deductive sciences’ ([1935] 1947). The difference is their ‘empirical basis’. The concept of ‘experience’ is ambiguous here.
Hayek’s concepts of ‘experience’ and ‘social facts’ We will return to Mach for Hayek’s concept of experience. In his theory of knowledge Mach continued Kant’s criticism under the influence of the late nineteenth-century ‘back-to-Kant’ movement, which aimed at purifying mathematics and physics from metaphysics. In a criticism of pure experience, the so-called empirio-criticism, Mach removes the last metaphysical residues. He drops the Kantian ‘things in themselves’ and related essentialistic concepts in physics, such as causality, atom, force (cf. Passmore [1957] 1972: 321). For the same reason, the concept ‘I’ is removed from psychology.
32 G.M. Huussen In addition, scientific language becomes more pre-eminent. It should be able to dissolve all our scientific judgements about material matters or a spiritual ‘I’ in series of perceptions or ‘elements’. Empirio-criticism leads to this radical conclusion: the elements, or most simple perception data, are the only concrete phenomena in the world. They are neither mental nor physical, but have a neutral character. Therefore, it is called ‘neutral monism’ (see Passmore [1957] 1972). According to the theory of neutral monism, the same elements can be grouped in two different ways. They show a physical order (as it were, ‘outside’ us) and at the same time a mental or biographical connection (as it were, ‘inside’ us). Thus, the same elements can be viewed in a physical or a psychological context. Considered in this way, the so-called external and internal world with their material and mental contents are nothing else than theoretical constructions from the same elements or data. Hayek wrote in The Sensory Order (1952: vi) that he can vividly remember how he read Mach when he was a student: ‘I suddenly realized how a consistent development of Mach’s analysis of perceptual organization made his own concept of sensory elements superfluous and otiose, an idle construction in conflict with most of his acute psychological analysis.’ The student Hayek attempted to solve this inconsistency, but only succeeded in doing so thirty years later. In design and purpose The Sensory Order is a criticism of a tacit assumption by Mach: the assumption that a ‘simple one-toone correspondence’ exists (Hayek 1952: 3) between the elements of the physical and mental order. Therefore, it is significant that the name of Mach is conspicuous by its absence in Barry’s work on ‘Hayek’s philosophy’ (1979). The most important points in Hayek’s argument are the following. Similar stimuli can bring about dissimilar perceptions. This fact indicates that our perceptions are already loaded with classifying concepts. Physics solves enigmas in our perceptual field by reconceptualising these often unintentional classification systems. This allows us to explain regularities in the course of nature more adequately, but does not solve the psychological issue of our daily experience. Even if we can explain that the broken appearance of the stick in the water is based on optical deception, the question remains: why is it that we still see the stick in a broken state? This theme of the double, physical and mental, order forms the pattern in which the pieces of Hayek’s methodology can be combined in an unconstrained manner. An allusion to this double order in our experience can be found in Hayek’s trade-cycle theory, in which he speaks of the Eigenart der Erkenntnismittel of economic theory and statistics (GK: 2; the English translation gives ‘the means of perception’, MT: 28). These typical means of perception now prove to be the classification systems of the physical and mental order. More Kantian than Mach, Hayek resumes with the theme of the con-
F.A. Hayek’s methodological U-turn 33 ceptual frameworks, and less Kantian than Kant, he considers these frameworks to be open to reconstruction under guidance of higher regulatory systems. In this respect he acknowledges affinity with the group theory of Piaget (Hayek 1952: 48). The distinction made by Hayek in 1943 between physical and social facts fits into the same pattern. Social sciences are based on social facts: that is to say, ‘the things are what people think they are’ (Individualism and Economic Order, Hayek 1949: 60; for short IEO). Economists cannot deduct from a physical object whether it is a means of production or consumption and what its value is. They do not work with physical concepts, but with teleological concepts: that is to say, with perception frameworks that can be reconceptualised, but that nevertheless continue to play a role in the actions of the economic subjects. The fight against scientism also fits into the pattern. Scientism reduces the development of scientific concepts to the physical order; it does not consider teleological concepts, although they are fundamental to the economic actions that it wants to study. Better than Hutchison, Popper understood that the struggle against scientism refers not so much to scientific method, as to physical reductionism: the monopoly of the physicalist concept of experience. Falsificationism can put right the logical inadequacies in that method. The physicalistically reduced concept of experience is a different matter. In contrast with Hutchison, Popper ([1972] 1975: 106) advocates no physical reductionism, but an interactionism between the world of the physical and mental phenomena, to which he adds a world of language. In this respect, Popper repeatedly supports Hayek’s warning (1943: 65) against behaviourism: ‘there is nothing wrong . . . in thinking anthropomorphically about man’ (Popper [1963] 1974: 81n; Popper and Eccles 1977: 105n2). There is nothing wrong in assuming that the economic subjects use teleological concepts when a social scientist is theoretically explaining their actions. The problem is whether these concepts may also occur in the ‘empirical basis’ that is the touchstone for the theory. This problem leads to the question whether introspection is a reliable observation method.
Introspection and ‘other minds’ Physical reductionism limits the language of science to physical statements. Statements about certain ‘inner’ experiences, which we do have, are not allowed. ‘The pin pricks the finger’ is allowed, but not ‘the prick gives me pain’. This last statement has to be translated into terms of overt behaviour for the sake of intersubjective testability. This is why logical positivism requires a physicalist unified language, while Mach still kept room for psychological language. The problem is: can everything that is said in a psychological sense also be translated into physical terms? In
34 G.M. Huussen principle it can, because physical reductionism is a direct consequence of the ‘one-to-one correspondence’ that Mach assumed between the physical and the mental order. Illustrative of this language problem is the issue of the knowledge of ‘other minds’. Mach reasons that we cannot tell from someone’s behaviour what he or she experiences internally, but can imagine it through our own experience in analogous cases. In essence this is the method of introspection. Thus, knowledge of ‘other minds’ is based on an argument by analogy. But this logically risky indirect manner to obtain knowledge of ‘other minds’ is strictly speaking superfluous if there is a ‘one-to-one correspondence’ between the physical and the mental order. This is indeed what radical behaviourists argue. As we saw, like the logical positivists, Hayek links up with Mach, but immediately rejects the thesis of the ‘one-to-one correspondence’ and thus physical reductionism. On this point he parts the ways with logical positivism, and this is where Hayek’s criticism of the slavish imitation of the methods of natural sciences in the fields of the social sciences (like behaviourism and historicism) starts. Hayek assumes a double order without postulating a ‘one-to-one correspondence’. This is why first of all the knowledge of ‘other minds’ is problematical. There is a discrepancy between the overt behaviour of the economic actors and their subjective experience. This discrepancy is exactly what the transition of the classical to the subjective theory of value is about. Value is no ‘illusory substance’, but a relation. This concept expresses an ordering of preferences that subjects apply to goods, which implies: so many men, so many scales (Hayek [1935] 1947 I: para. 8). Therefore, the subjective theory of value is based on an argument by analogy with respect to ‘other minds’. The argument by analogy is logically inadequate, but according to Hayek it is indispensable and reliable enough for us to understand the rational behaviour of others ([1943] 1949: 66). ‘Understanding’ refers to the mental order, to elements in a psychological context. Social facts are elements placed in subjective concepts by the actors. So, establishing social facts would be a task for social psychologists. But Hayek did not draw this conclusion. In the ‘turning-point’ article ‘Economics and Knowledge’, Hayek argues that it is possible to distil from ‘the facts of economic life those parts which are truly a priori’ (1937: 35). Understanding implies that something can be placed in a meaningful scheme. According to the subjective theory of value, these schemes are, in the context of economic action, rational choice schemes. If one abstracts from the contents of a choice, a purely formal logic of choice is conceivable, which is comparable with mathematics. In the same part of Hayek’s work we find for the first time an explicit reference to the apriorism of Mises (1937: 36n). Thus, the turning point is
F.A. Hayek’s methodological U-turn 35 not a turning away from Mises, but a turning away from Mach and rapprochement with Mises. The double order with its two ‘means of perception’ which the early Hayek referred to has become two worlds. The mental order has become a mental world, which does not coincide with the psychological context any more. A formal ‘choice-logic’ component can be separated, which is not psychological. Apparently this occurs under the influence of Mises, whose ideas had matured in the meantime. Understanding is something different from explanation. Understanding concerns the knowledge of ‘other minds’; the explanation concerns social interaction. What Hayek calls the purely formal components of social facts are now the elements from which a theory has to be constructed in order to explain the phenomenon of social interaction. This is illustrated by a distinction Hayek had made in 1937 between the ‘individual’ equilibrium concept of the logic of choice of Mises and the concept of an interpersonal equilibrium. A few years later he specified this distinction in terms of the ‘taxonomic’ and ‘explanatory’ task of economics. Explaining means the ‘construction of hypothetical models’ from the taxonomic elements in order to reproduce social relationship patterns ([1943] 1949: 68). If one wishes to statistically test economic theories, for instance the trade-cycle theory, the empty boxes of the ‘aprioristic’ classification system will have to be filled with data. In economics these ‘data’ are ‘economic facts’: that is to say, the result of subjective valuations. Knowledge of these valuations is dispersed among many persons and there is no ‘master brain’ who can directly survey all these data (Hayek [1952] 1955: 52). Although introspection is not possible, statistical measuring is possible provided that there is a communication system in which these ‘data’ can be expressed – that is, the system of free market prices. I mention these well-known theses of Hayek to indicate the relation with his methodological ideas. This shows that the later Hayek increasingly considered the specific nature of ‘social facts’ to be a central element of his philosophy of the social sciences, so that also in this respect there is more a rapprochement with his mentor than alienation.
Conclusions According to the U-turn thesis, Hayek switched over from Mises to Popper around 1937. On closer examination this thesis turns out to be untenable. The hypothesis that Hayek developed his ideas from the empirio-criticism of Mach offers more perspective. This hypothesis is preferable for five reasons. It corresponds with Hayek’s own justification and the model of science in his trade-cycle theory; furthermore, it is essential for the interpretation of Hayek’s concept of experience and his struggle against scientism. Finally, it has become possible now to explain why Hayek explicitly refers to the
36 G.M. Huussen apriorism of Mises only at a later stage and, even then, only between quotation marks.
References Barry, N.P. (1979), Hayek’s Social and Economic Philosophy, Macmillan, London. Hayek, F.A. ([1929] 1976), Geldtheorie und Konjunkturforschung (GK), W. Neugebauer, Salzburg. Hayek, F.A. ([1933] 1975), Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle (MT), Augustus M. Kelley, Clifton. Hayek, F.A. ([1935] 1947), ‘Socialist Calculation I & II’, in F.A. Hayek (ed.) Collectivist Economic Planning, G. Routledge, London (also in IEO 1949, pp. 119–180). Hayek, F.A. (1937), ‘Economics and Knowledge’, Economica 4: 33–54 (also in IEO 1949, pp. 33–56). Hayek, F.A. (1943), ‘The Facts of the Social Sciences’, Ethics 54: 1–13 (quoted from IEO 1949, pp. 57–76). Hayek, F.A. (1949), Individualism and Economic Order (IEO), Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. Hayek, F.A. (1952), The Sensory Order, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. Hayek, F.A. ([1952] 1955), The Counter-revolution of Science, Free Press, Glencoe, IL. Hayek, F.A. (1974), ‘The Pretence of Knowledge’, in New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, pp. 23–35. Heimann, E. (1945), History of Economic Doctrines, New York. Hutchison, T.W. (1981), The Politics and Philosophy of Economics, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. Huussen, G.M. (1988), De keerzijde van de munt, Amsterdam. Huussen, G.M. (1989), ‘Mises and the praxeological point of view’, Journal of Economic Studies 15: 121–133. Kirzner, I.M. ([1976] 1979), ‘On the Method of Austrian Economics’, in E.G. Dolan (ed.) The Foundations of Austrian Economics, Steed & Ward, Kansas City, pp. 40–52. Klant, J.J. (1979), Spelregels voor economen (1972), Stenfert Kroese, Leiden; English transl., The Rules of the Game, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984. Mach, E. (1905), Erkenntnis und Irrtum; English transl., Knowledge and Error, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1976. Mill, J.S. (1836), ‘On the Definition of Political Economy and the Method of Investigation Proper to It’, in D.M. Hausman (ed.) The Philosophy of Economics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984, pp. 52–70. Mises, L. von ([1912] 1924), Theorie des Geldes und der Umlaufsmittel, Munich. Mises, L. von (1922), Die Gemeinwirtschaft, Gustav Fischer, Jena. Mises, L. von (1933), Grundprobleme der Nationaloekonomie; Eng. transl., Epistemological Problems of Economics, New York, 1960/81. Mises, M. von (1976), My Years with Ludwig von Mises; German transl., Ludwig von Mises. Der Mensch und sein Werk, Philosophia Verlag, Munich, 1981. Passmore, J. ([1952] 1972), A Hundred Years of Philosophy, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, UK. Popper, K.R. (1935), Logik der Forschung; English transl., The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Hutchinson, London, 1959/74.
F.A. Hayek’s methodological U-turn 37 Popper, K.R. ([1963] 1974), Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. Popper, K.R. ([1972] 1975), Objective Knowledge, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Popper, K.R. and Eccles, J.C. (1977), The Self and Its Brain, Springer, Berlin. Rothbard, M.N. ([1976] 1979), ‘Praxeology: The Methodology of Austrian Economics’, in E.G. Dolan (ed.) The Foundations of Austrian Economics, Steed & Ward, Kansas City, pp. 19–39. Video Arts Television (1985), ‘Hayek – His Life and Thought’, interviewer John O’Sullivan, London.
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The consumer in Austrian economics and the Austrian perspective on consumer policy Auke R. Leen
The consumer in Austrian economics Austrian economics: what’s in a name? In the 1880s, German professors attached the epithet ‘Austrian’ to the economic theories of Menger, Böhm-Bawerk and Wieser. It was a pejorative epithet bestowed by disdainful German economists. Why was it pejorative, and what was the reason for their disdain? As far as the epithet ‘Austrian’ relates to a geographical area, it is justified because of the historic fact that it was founded and first elaborated by three Austrians, holding chairs at the universities of Vienna, Innsbruck and Prague. In 1871, Carl Menger published his Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre (Principles of Economics), an event usually recognized as the birth of the Austrian school of economics. Until the end of the 1870s, however, there was no Austrian school: there was only Menger. Later on he was joined by two younger economists, brothers-in-law, Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk and Friedrich Wieser. They became enthusiastic supporters of Menger’s new ideas. The pejorative overtone of the word ‘Austrian’ was the result of another historic fact: never before had any new mode of thinking originated in Austria. For people who were not familiar with economics, the predicate ‘Austrian’ as applied to a doctrine carried strong overtones of the darkdays of the Counter-Reformation and of Metternich. To an Austrian intellectual, nothing could appear more disastrous than a relapse of his country into the spiritual inanity of the good old days. (Mises 1969: 14) The German economists attached the smear to Menger and his followers because for them Austrian economics meant backwardness. Both the Germans and the Austrians attacked classical economics. The Germans were appealing for an allegedly modern historical approach. Menger, on
42 Auke R. Leen the contrary, retained the abstract, theoretical character of economics. The clash over methods is known as the Methodenstreit. In the end, the clash over methods seemed one of precedence and relative importance of historical research versus analytic tools. Later commentaries interpreted the whole quarrel as one ‘of wasted energies, which could have been put to better use . . . [to be] settled by allowing every type of work to find the place to which its weight entitled it’ (Schumpeter 1954: 814). For Ludwig von Mises, the founder of modern Austrianism, on the other hand, [i]t is a complete misunderstanding of the meaning of the debates concerning the essence, scope, and logical character of economics to dismiss them as the scholastic quibbling of pedantic professors. The real issue was the epistemological foundations of the science of human action and its logical legitimacy. (1966: 4) At stake was the value and usefulness of economic theory. The real motivation of the ‘Prussian Historical School, the self-styled “intellectual bodyguard of the House of Hohenzollern” ’ (Mises 1966: 4), Mises says, was to make coercive government intervention in the free market respectable. The historical school could not demolish, by means of the classicals’ own abstract methodology, the classical school’s conclusions regarding laissezfaire. It had to take recourse to another, empirical methodology to sustain its toleration of government intervention. Because for the historical school there are no economic laws transcending mere description of the circumstances of individual time and place, there are no inconvenient economic laws for government to violate. Subjectivism Menger’s theory turned the value theory of the classicals upside down. The classical Ricardian theory held that the normal value of consumption goods was determined by their cost of production. Menger’s theory, on the contrary, held that the cost of production itself is ultimately determined by the value of consumption goods. Labour is not the source of value, but is a means to value. Value was no longer to be seen as governed by past resource costs but as expressing judgements concerning future usefulness in meeting consumer wants (Kirzner 1987: 146). Menger’s theory came to be known as the subjective theory of value. The classical objective value theory was a second-best solution to the problem of how prices are determined. Classical economists ‘were fully aware of the fact that prices are not a product of the activities of a special group of people, but the result of an interplay of all members of the
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market society’ (Mises 1966: 62), but because of the problems encountered in the famous value paradox they considered the activities of the producer only. The puzzle of the value paradox was that, in exchange, diamonds are more highly valued than water, although the latter is more useful than the former. Because the classical economist could not solve the puzzle, rather than its use value the exchange value of a good became the kernel of their labour theory of value. Utility, and so the consumer, was left aside. The Austrians solved the value paradox by stating that no individual on the market is ever faced with the choice between water as a class and diamonds as a class. Prices arise in connection with definite amounts of goods, and the greater the quantity of a good that anyone possesses, the less that person will value any given unit (the law of diminishing marginal utility). Value has nothing to do with broad classes, either of human beings or of products. Consequently, the reason that water is so much cheaper than diamonds is that the number of litres of water is enormously greater than the number of carats of diamonds. The value and the price of a litre of water will be far less than the value and price of a carat of diamonds. And if one were in the impossible position of having the choice between all water and all diamonds, one would rate water first and diamonds second. What disproves the existence of the paradox of value. By offering a more satisfactory theory of demand, the subjective or marginal theory of value was more comprehensive than the classical theory. Value is in the mind of the one who chooses and maximizes, for whatever reason, his or her profit or utility. From the interaction of the valuations of the consumers flows the market demand. The market supply of the producers is determined by expected demand. The interaction of demand and supply determines the market price. Israel Kirzner (1986: 134, 152) describes modern Austrianism as an authentic extension of Menger’s older static subjectivism: a consequent dynamic subjectivism. In modern Austrianism, the post-World War II continuation of the Austrian tradition, the two central figures are Mises and Friedrich Hayek. Both authors focus in their theories on market adjustment processes. For Kirzner, building his theory along the lines of Mises and Hayek, one of the greatest failures of neoclassical equilibrium analysis is that it takes it for granted that equilibrium is actually achieved. For instance, in a disequilibrium, would-be buyers who have returned home empty-handed should learn that it is necessary to outbid other buyers, and buyers who have paid high prices should discover that they could have obtained the same goods at lower prices (Kirzner 1973: 14). The real problem for modern Austrians is to describe the possible realization of an equilibrium as the result of ‘the systematic way in which plan revisions are made as a consequence of the disappointment of earlier plans’ (Kirzner 1962: 381). Neoclassical equilibrium theory cannot describe endogenous changes in the end–means framework; its maximization scheme is not fit for the
44 Auke R. Leen task of generating systematic modifications of choices. The allocation model suffers from a discontinuity in the succession of decisions. Only an exogenous change in the data – for example, in tastes, in technology, or in information – can generate a new decision, a decision unexplainable in terms of the original framework. Without exogenous changes there is no ‘choice-theoretic’ explanation as to why yesterday’s plans are replaced by today’s. Mises and Hayek made it possible to describe the adjustment process as a systematic sequence of decisions. Mises’s extension of subjectivism was to describe the individual decision unit not only as maximizing but also as finding out the relevant ends–means relationship. This opens the way for incorporating learning into the understanding of market processes. Hayek’s extension of subjectivism was to describe the market process as one of learning by discovery (Kirzner 1986: 147; cf. Kirzner 1985: 26). Endogenous change in the ends–means relationship is possible with the entrepreneurial element in each individual market participant: alertness (Kirzner 1967: 793–794; 1973: 70–72). Alertness is the propensity of knowing where to look for information (ibid.: 68), ‘the propensity . . . toward fresh goals and the discovery of hitherto unknown resources’ (ibid.: 34). A disequilibrium situation points to a situation of market ignorance. From the ignorance emerge profitable opportunities that entrepreneurial alertness exploits (Kirzner 1979: 30). Alertness gives a more realistic image of human action and makes possible the description of the market as a unified discovery process. [The] ‘alertness’ view of the entrepreneurial role rejects the thesis that if we attribute genuine novelty to the entrepreneur, we must necessarily treat entrepreneurially generated market events as not related to earlier market events in any systematic way. The genuine novelty . . . attribute[d] to the entrepreneur consists in his spontaneous discovery of the opportunities marked out by earlier market conditions (or by future market conditions as they would be in the absence of his own actions) . . . [These] entrepreneurial discoveries are the steps through which any possible tendency toward market equilibrium must proceed. (Kirzner 1985: 11–12) The missing consumer: the socialist calculation debate The consumer was central to Menger (cf. Menger 1923), but the consumer is not for modern Austrian economics. Somewhere in the traject between Menger’s contribution – the way in which all value in economics derives from the final valuation of the consumer – and the modern Austrian contribution – the process through which consumer valuations are being translated in production decisions – the consumer got lost.
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From their early start onwards, Austrian economists have been polemical in their writings. Menger fought the historical school, Böhm-Bawerk fought the Marxists, and Mises and Hayek had their own clash with the socialists. And, in these days, modern Austrians are fulminating against the mixed economy. No wonder that it is claimed that the ‘debate over economic calculation under socialism . . . [was] a catalyst in the development and articulation of the modern Austrian view of the market’ (Kirzner 1988: 1; cf. Rothbard 1980: 27). The socialist calculation debate in the interwar period started with Mises’s denial of the possibility of allocating factors of production efficiently in a socialist economy. For most economists the debate ended with the answer of Lange and Lerner, namely to ‘play at’ markets and market prices: centrally promulgated given prices. The debate brought to the fore two modern Austrian insights (Taylor 1980: 23). First, because there are no market-determined monetary prices, in a centralized economy rational calculation is impossible. Subjectivism entails the contention that one does not and cannot calculate or measure values directly. One can only calculate with the results of individual valuations: money prices. Money prices do not measure value; value is merely expressed in money prices. There is a need of a market for the means of production. Second, because there are no market-determined monetary prices, a centralized economy lacks ability to promote a discovery process. ‘The most impressive aspect of the market system is the tendency for . . . opportunities to be discovered’ (Kirzner 1985: 30). Monetary prices show price discrepancies and stimulate, by the possibility of monetary profits, the discovery of valuable information. I shall not discuss the question of whether one of (or both) the insights was the crucial point in the calculation debate. Rothbard (1988: 37) and Salerno (1990: 45) represent the calculation insight; Kirzner, (1985: 129; 1989b: 66) and Lavoie (1985) represent the discovery insight. Though both insights are theoretically compatible, they differ in their consequences for the possibility of a socialistic system. The calculation insight states that socialistic calculation is fundamentally impossible. In a socialistic system there are no markets, hence there are no market prices to base the calculation upon (Rothbard 1988: 37). The discovery insight, on the other hand, states that socialistic calculation is fundamentally flawed. The scope for entrepreneurial decisions is available only for the central planner. In a market economy with its decentralized decision making, however, there is widespread scope for entrepreneurial decision making (Kirzner 1989: 94; cf. Rothbard 1988: 78n28). As a direct consequence of the focus on the central planner in the socialist calculation debate, modern Austrian economics discusses the two insights from the producers’ side. The first is discussed explicitly as a problem of the calculation of the means of production (Salerno 1990: 39). How can a central planner rationally calculate costs or allocate factors
46 Auke R. Leen of production efficiently? The second one is discussed by way of the methodological makeshift of an entrepreneurial producer and a nonentrepreneurial consumer (Mises 1966: 253; Kirzner 1973: 41). Though alertness is in principle present in every action, in their elaborations the modern Austrians ascribe it to the producer (cf. Rothbard 1985: 282; Ekelund and Saurman 1988: xx; Pasour 1989: 95). Consumers are passive, non-alert, Robbinsian maximizers. For instance, one of the functions of advertising is ‘getting the Robbinsians [the potential consumers] to see the availability of . . . opportunities’ (Kirzner 1973: 148). Advertising differs from changing the consumers’ taste or providing information (non-entrepreneurial knowledge) to them. Advertising (an entrepreneurial device) makes consumers aware of available opportunities, regardless of the level of alertness. As Mises did before him (1966: 251–256), Kirzner motivates the identification of alertness with the role of the producer in the market process as ‘purely for simplicity for analysis’ (Kirzner 1967: 797; 1973: 18, 41). In addition, there is some sense in the identification if we consider the ‘nearinevitability of an entrepreneurial role’s, being filled by the producer’ (Kirzner 1973: 72). Whether the identification makes the analysis less complicated I leave out of consideration for the moment. Yet why is there ‘some sense’ in situating the entrepreneurial element with the producer? To answer the question, Kirzner looks at the roles of the different market participants. He distinguishes consumers, resource owners and producers. Producers, converting resources into commodities, are alert to price discrepancies between the total price paid for each unit of a product on the resource markets and the price to be obtained on the final product markets. This alertness, however, is a form of entrepreneurial behaviour. We can distinguish ‘a built-in group of entrepreneurs’ in society (Kirzner 1973: 18). In other words, the essential difference between consumers and resource owners on the one hand and producers on the other is that producers do not have to possess means. The pure producer can gain profit by being alert to price discrepancies. We can think of all consumers and resource owners as pure Robbinsian allocators, which is unthinkable for all producers. For a pure producer, alertness is a conditio sine qua non (Kirzner 1973: 39). In the modern Austrian discussions about calculation and entrepreneurship, the consumer as the personification of the ends fades into the background. But what about the consumer? Is there no relevant distinction between the calculations of the producer and those of the consumer? Also, perhaps the methodological makeshift of a Misesian entrepreneur and a Robbinsian consumer is spun out too far.
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The consumer: entrepreneurial and calculative Menger The end of the preceding section showed us that the socialist calculation debate brought to the fore two modern Austrian tenets. In their opposition towards the possibility of central planning the modern Austrians state that (1) a centralized economy is fundamentally flawed in its discovery process, and (2) rational calculations of production decisions are impossible in a socialistic commonwealth. As a direct consequence of the context of discovery, both tenets are discussed for the case of rational, purposeful production only. Therefore, I look first at the discovery element in the act of consumption, and later at the possibility of calculation in the act of consumption. It is necessary to take a consequent look at the consumer’s subjectivism. What aspects does the consumer, the consumption aspect of action, add to calculation and entrepreneurship? For [t]he conduct of the consumer – i.e., of everybody – is no less a topic of economic studies than that of anybody else. The businessman is, in his capacity as a businessman, not more closely related to or involved in the process that produces market phenomena than anybody else [i.e., the consumer]. (Mises 1962: 77) We know from Mises that ‘every actor is always an entrepreneur’ (1949: 253) and from Kirzner what entrepreneurship entails for the producer. For Mises (1949: 255), ‘entrepreneur means acting man in regard to the changes occurring in the data of the market’. For Kirzner (1988: 4), entrepreneurship is the ‘alertness to and the discovery of as yet unknown information’ (both in regard to existing opportunities for potential gains from trade with existing techniques and in regard to possibilities for innovative processes of production). What, however, are the explicit repercussions for the consumer – that is, the act of consumption – of the modern Austrian emphasis on adjustment processes instead of the more usual neoclassical market equilibria? Producers are always calculating in monetary prices between two markets, their input and their output market. The producer ‘should buy in the cheapest market and sell in the dearest market. In buying and selling [he or she] should know no other goal than the greatest monetary profit’ (Mises 1960: 176). Consumers, on the other hand, are always only spending their money on one market. They try to bring their immeasurable utility in a motivated, efficient way into their monetary calculation process. Consumers places utility at the centre of their calculations. Utility and marginal utility
48 Auke R. Leen are present in the calculations of the consumer only (Schönfeld-Illy 1924: 13–14; 1948: 1). Let me start at the beginning: the choices of the consumer – that is, consumer demand. For [t]he demand for goods with the expected utility and marginal utility which it recalls, is the first and last link, the alpha and the omega, in the chain of the origin in price, it is the driving and decisive force, the dynamics of it all. (Schönfeld-Illy 1948: 231; cf. Abbott 1955: 24) The demand of the consumer, however, is not the present desire of consumers for a hypothetical product not yet produced. ‘[T]he demand that is expressed in the demand curve for a product means the quantities of it that consumers will be prepared to buy, at given prices, when offered the opportunity of doing so’ (Kirzner 1973: 178). The sovereignty of the consumer, production patterns dictated by the pattern of consumer demand, means that ‘production decisions are determined by entrepreneurial anticipation of the patterns of demand that will be evoked by alternative production plans’ (Kirzner 1973: 176). Opportunities are placed before the eyes of consumers after the production decisions have taken place. So, the consumer’s alertness must be part of the answer to the question: what makes for a consumer of an already existing thing a consumer’s good? This is a question the modern Austrians lost sight of when giving predominance to the producer. As Böhm-Bawerk said, ‘How frequently, for instance, in a society which engages extensively in “utilization by way of exchange” [i.e. production] do we find there is a watering down in the subjective requirements that makes of a thing a consumer’s good?’ ([1881] 1962: 101). The goods question brings us, says Menger, to the heart of economics. For one of the first questions encountered in economics is: what makes a thing a good (Menger [1871] 1950: 48)? The answer from a subjectivistic point of view reads like this. ‘[G]oods-character is nothing inherent in goods . . . but merely a relationship between certain things and men’ (ibid.: 52). In his magnum opus, Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre ([1871] 1950), Menger gave four essential characteristics of a good (need, useful properties, knowledge, and power of disposal). In this way he was trying to define the essence of a good. Ten years later, Böhm-Bawerk, in his Habilitationsschrift, Rechte und Verhältnisse vom Standpunkte der volkswirtschaftlichen Güterlehre ([1881] 1962), added as a fifth characteristic the condition that individuals must possess knowledge of how to utilize the thing (Gebrauchskunst). In the history of economic thought the difference between Menger’s and Böhm-Bawerk’s characterizations has almost been forgotten. In most cases the difference is not even noticed (e.g. Amonn 1911: 266). If men-
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tioned, the addition of a fifth characteristic is characterized as a sign of Böhm-Bawerk’s objectivism (Endres 1987: 294). Compare an often quoted remark made by Menger, that the error of objectivism was made inside the Austrian camp in the works of Böhm-Bawerk (Schumpeter 1954: 847n8). But according to Mises, in Böhm-Bawerk’s case this was probably only a matter of stylistic habit, inherited from Böhm-Bawerk’s own ‘objectivistic’ economic childhood – stylistic faults to which even Menger sometimes fell prey (Mises [1928] 1960: 167, 171). So – again according to Mises – it is better to turn to the more clearly stated views of the epigones (Mises [1928] 1960: 174, 178). One of the results of this chapter is to prove exactly the opposite: that there is still something to be learned from one of the founding fathers of Austrianism: Böhm-Bawerk. He, however, in a remark characteristic of his general attitude towards Menger, said that he supplemented Menger’s findings ‘only in one minor respect’ (BöhmBawerk [1881] 1962: 41). In his magnum opus, Kapital und Kapitalzins, of 1884, he dropped his fifth characteristic. Is, however, Böhm-Bawerk’s own and other people’s negative verdict on this fifth goods-characteristic correct? Or have I come across a hint of the entrepreneurial appraisal of a consumer good? The question will be: what light does Böhm-Bawerk’s subjectivistic goods-concept shed on the untouched subject of the entrepreneurial behaviour of the consumer? What are the formal characteristics of this alertness concept? What are the implications for the theoretical underpinnings of the idea of competition: that which keeps the market process in motion? Competition (‘entrepreneurial activities that . . . are . . . creative acts of discovery’; Kirzner 1985: x) is in the modern Austrian vision not only a process of rivalry between producers for the money of the consumer, but above all things a two-sided discovery process between producer and consumer (Kirzner 1963: 110). Competition is a process that takes place between producer and consumers and at the same time within each of these groups. Still, when it comes to the point, the modern Austrians impute, as we saw, the entrepreneurial role in the competitive process to the producer (Kirzner 1973: 72). This is in spite of the fact that the ultimate king in market processes is without doubt the consumer (cf. Mises 1966: 269–270). But if the consumer king rules, he must occupy a place in the market process. Böhm-Bawerk In his Principles, Menger gave four characteristics of goods. He described them by stating the standard ends–means relationship. People have needs. The only way in which needs can be satisfied is by means of a causal process. What things, to be called useful things (Nützlichkeiten), can satisfy the needs in such a causal process? Two conditions must be fulfilled: (1) a human need must exist, and (2) the thing must have useful properties to satisfy the need. If the causal process is recognized and if there is control
50 Auke R. Leen over the useful things, the thing is not only useful but also a good. This leads to two further conditions: (3) knowledge of the causal relationship, and (4) the power of disposal over the thing (Verfügungsmacht) (Menger [1871] 1950: 52). The four characteristics were the culmination and more or less also the end of a lively discussion about goods-characteristics. Alter (1982) gives an explanation why the four characteristics are the ‘end’ of economic thought on goods-characteristics for the Austrians in general and for Menger in particular. He refers to the Aristotelian character of the foundations of Menger’s economic theory, a statement that can be extended to older Austrianism in general (Smith 1986: 9). The four necessary and jointly sufficient conditions to make a thing into a good are ‘nothing else but Aristotle’s four causes operating in the realm of immaterial objects [psychological states]. They are the material [need], the efficient [useful properties], the formal [power of disposal], and the final cause [knowledge]’ (Alter 1982: 152–153). In his Rechte, Böhm-Bawerk stated five goods-characteristics. To Menger’s four he added a fifth characteristic: individuals should know how to utilize a useful thing (Gebrauchskunst; Böhm-Bawerk [1881] 1962: 42). He must have had good reasons to add this fifth condition. Austrian thinking is usually not very light-hearted about essences. Goods-characteristics are part and parcel of the Austrians’ essentialism. Böhm-Bawerk himself played down his divergence from Menger, stating his reasons only in a footnote in which he said that the knowing-how condition cannot be included in the fourth condition on the command over the thing. He gave two reasons for this: (1) the knowing-how condition is too subjective; and (2) it would stretch language usage too much to include knowing-how as a part of the condition on the command over the thing (ibid.: 42n2). First I classify Böhm-Bawerk’s fifth (knowing how to use) characteristic by differentiating it from the other four characteristics. To start with, I will differentiate it explicitly from the common characteristic, stated by both Menger and Böhm-Bawerk, that there must exist a knowledge of the causal relationship between the means and the end. I use the second reason (that it would stretch language usage too much) – or, actually, hint – in Böhm-Bawerk’s explicative footnote. The first reason (that it is too subjective) I shall discuss later. Subsequently I use the stated classification for analysing Menger’s implicit concept of knowing how to utilize a useful thing. I call Menger’s knowing-how condition ‘implicit’ because in the posthumously published (second) edition of his Principles there is a remark that the knowledge of how to utilize a thing should be classified under the power of disposal (command) condition (Menger 1923: 17). It comes down to the question: how must Menger’s fourth characteristic be interpreted to include the whole or part of Böhm-Bawerk’s fifth characteristic? Both Menger and Böhm-Bawerk put forward the condition that one must have knowledge of the causal connection between a useful thing and
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a need; one must have the knowledge that such a situation exists. The knowledge, on the other hand, of how to use a thing – Böhm-Bawerk’s fifth characteristic – refers to a form of knowing-how. The knowing-how aspect states what it is for someone to have the know-how to be able to perform certain tasks. It refers to the possession of certain skills. There is a difference between a theoretical knowing that something is the case and a practical knowing how to do things. The consumer’s knowing-how concept I have in mind is directly combined with utility. It is particularly revealed in consuming the subjective images of services. Classical music, for example, has no value for someone who only loves pop music: that person does not know how to use it. He or she cannot do a thing with it. This is an instance of the general fact that ‘[p]eople want products because they want the experience-bringing services [psychological states, immaterial objects] which they hope the products will render’ (Abbott 1955: 40). Here, knowing-how clearly does not have the ‘objective’ connotation of, say, knowing how to use a can-opener. In Austrian thinking the difference between knowing-how and knowingthat is widely known and considered of fundamental importance (Hayek 1967: 44; Lavoie 1985: 62; O’Driscoll and Rizzo 1985: 104). It functioned as an argument of the Austrians against the efficiency of a central planning system. Knowing-how cannot be communicated to and therefore used by a central authority. What I want to do is to look at the concept of knowinghow and see how it relates to Kirzner’s concept of entrepreneurship. At this point I refer to the famous elucidation of the concepts by the British language philosopher Gilbert Ryle (Ryle 1945, 1949). This in contrast to the more usual Austrian explication of it based on Michael Polanyi. Given their appropriate logical uses, knowing-how and knowingthat ought to be clearly distinguished. If this is not done, a category mistake is made – a mistake comparable to the one somebody makes when he asks where the university is after a tour of the grounds of the university in which he has been shown a number of colleges, libraries, playing fields and museums. ‘He was [by asking the question] mistakenly allocating the University to the same category as that to which the other institutions belong’ (Ryle 1949: 18). Why are the logical uses of the concepts so different? Knowing-how refers to an observable regularity in the behaviour of a person. The concept does not refer to a possession of knowledge-that, neither does it signal the occurrence of special (theoretical) internal acts of thought. Knowing-how has the character of a disposition, not that of an occurrence. ‘Just as the habit of talking loudly is not itself loud or quiet, since it is not the sort of term of which “loud” and “quiet” can be predicated’ (Ryle 1949: 33). Neither do we have to know-that before we know-how. The crucial objection to the [what Ryle called] intellectualist legend [which means trying to reassimilate knowing-how to knowing-that] is
52 Auke R. Leen this. The consideration of propositions is itself an operation the execution of which can be more or less intelligent, less or more stupid. But if, for any operation to be intelligently executed, a prior theoretical operation had first to be performed and performed intelligently, it would be a logical impossibility for anyone ever to break into the circle. (Ryle 1949: 31) For the intelligence of an act is given by another, preceding intelligent act and so on ad infinitum. If we confront the Misesian (entrepreneurial) producer and the Robbinsian (non-entrepreneurial) consumer with each other, we find two irreducible concepts. There is on the one hand the dynamic market concept, seen as the disposition to perform a certain activity (a knowing-how) and on the other hand the static market concept, seen as the possession of a certain knowledge (a knowing-that). The market may be seen as a capacity to perform certain tasks, to sort something out, or as a theory, a stock of cognitive knowledge. The two descriptions have parallels and differences. It is possible to speak of learning an activity, as well as learning knowledge, although learning-how differs from learning-that (cf. Kirzner 1979: 29). ‘We can be instructed in truths, we can only be disciplined in methods’ (Ryle 1945: 14). We can ask for the reasons why someone accepts a proposition, but we cannot ask this if someone’s skill is at stake. So, a distinction is made between the market conceived as a disposition and as a stock of knowing-that. Knowing-how is made clear through actions, not through internal or external dicta (which is knowing-that). To conjoin or disjoin them is a category mistake. Compare the conjunction ‘She came home in a flood of tears and a sedan-chair’ with the disjunction ‘She came home either in a flood of tears or else in a sedan-chair’ (Ryle 1949: 23). The distinction Ryle made in the use of the different kinds of categorical concepts is of interest in expanding on Böhm-Bawerk’s concern that it would stretch language too much if one included knowing-how as part of the condition that requires command of the thing. Böhm-Bawerk’s fifth characteristic of knowing-how, in the light of Ryle’s classification, cannot logically be put under the condition that states factual command over the thing. In language we make a distinction between a state of things and a mental disposition. The condition of command as used by Menger refers to an entity at our disposal. Likewise, Menger’s discussion of the other characteristics clearly reveals the need of their actual occurrence (Menger [1871] 1950: 52–53). The question can be asked as to how the five characteristics of BöhmBawerk fit into Alter’s explanation of Menger’s four goods characteristics in terms of Aristotle’s four causes. The question disappears as soon as it is realized that knowing-how is a dispositional concept and not the description of another cause.
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The sense in which we ‘explain’ . . . is not that we infer to occult causes, but that we subsume under hypothetical . . . propositions. . . . The explanation is not of the type ‘the glass broke because a stone hit it’; but more nearly of the different type ‘the glass broke when the stone hit it, because it was brittle’. (Ryle 1949: 49, 113; cf. O’Driscoll and Rizzo 1985: 26) In the second edition of his Principles, Menger said that knowing-how can be classified under the command of a thing. This begs the question as to how to interpret the command condition to make this happen. For Menger the command of a thing appeared in the description that he gave of the production process of goods – that is, the process of converting higher- into lower-order goods. Menger’s first law on goods-character concerned the causal connection between goods: ‘The goods-character of goods of higher order is dependent on command of corresponding complementary goods’ (Menger [1871] 1950: 58). If the command condition was to ‘include’ a form of knowing-how, then, for Menger, it had to be that aspect of knowing how which stated a capacity or skill of the producer. The producer could bring off certain things: he or she could actually produce the goods. He or she had control over the necessary complementary goods. For Böhm-Bawerk, on the other hand, to illustrate the explicit condition of knowing-how in the context of a production process would be completely out of the question. For him, the possibility of multiple uses of higher-order goods, and especially the existence of barter in our society, both change the order of a good: the place a good occupies in the causal nexus of goods. Like the conditions of need and knowing-how, the prerequisites for a thing to become a good show themselves precisely in these situations in a very watered-down version. The strange phenomenon of ‘utilization by way of exchange’ simply reveals here a feature which is apparent in many other aspects of the nature of goods, the vexatious power of causing supposedly welldefined characteristics to fade and become obliterated – a power which has so often caused economists in general to surrender to what Robinson calls ‘the role of the inevitable supernumerary’. (Böhm-Bawerk [1881] 1962: 101n2) So, the object of this chapter can also be characterized as sketching out, from a consequent subjectivistic point of view, the difference between first-order (consumer) and higher-order (producer) goods. For the causal nexus between goods, just like goods-character itself, is not a property inherent in the goods themselves but a relationship between man and goods (Menger [1871] 1950: 58). The conclusions up to this point are that (1) Böhm-Bawerk’s added
54 Auke R. Leen fifth goods characteristic is different from the other four goods characteristics; (2) in Ryle’s terminology the difference is parallel to the difference between knowing-that and knowing-how, or, more generally, between episodes (occurrences) and dispositions; and (3) if knowing-how is to be included – as Menger is inclined to do – in the goods-characteristic of command over a good, then that characteristic seems to designate the capacity aspect of the role of the producer in the market process. The entrepreneurial consumer Kirzner describes alertness as ‘ “knowing where to look for knowledge” rather than knowledge of substantive market information’ (1973: 68). ‘He [the entrepreneur] has not “deployed” his hunch for a specific purpose; rather, his hunch has propelled him to make his entrepreneurial purchase and sale’ (Kirzner 1985: 22). Entrepreneurial alertness is not an ingredient to be deployed in decision-making; it is rather something in which the decision itself is embedded and without which it would be unthinkable. (Kirzner 1985: 22; cf. Kirzner 1989: 23–24) . . . No matter how calculative a man’s behaviour may be, it seems impossible to avoid having accepted, without calculation, some framework within which to self-consciously engage in cost–benefit comparisons. (Kirzner 1985: 22, 48; cf. Kirzner 1989b: 23–24) The descriptions of alertness are analogous to the ones given by Ryle of the knowing-how concept. For Ryle, too, ‘the explanation is not of the type “the glass broke because a stone hit it”; but more nearly of the different type “the glass broke when the stone hit it, because it was brittle” ’. (1949: 49). And we do not have to know-that before we know-how (ibid.: 29). Alertness, ‘the elusive analytical category’, then clearly becomes a form of knowing-how, a mental quality. It is a disposition that expresses itself in practice for the producer as the capacity or skill to bring about certain things. Alertness and the capacity aspect of the command condition are two sides of the same coin. They bring about or create the producer’s ends–means relationship as far as it depends on the category of knowing-how. Böhm-Bawerk’s explicit concept of knowing-how as shaped implicitly in Menger’s concept of the power of disposal has found its counterpart in the modern Austrian theory about market processes. It refers to the producer’s propensity of alertness. The core role in the market is for the producer and not for the consumer. This is a rather startling conclusion. For
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it puts things back – as we saw – in the same position as described by Mises over sixty years ago. Even more astonishing, it was precisely this position that the Austrians tried to get rid of with their subjectivism. To solve this riddle I return to Böhm-Bawerk and expand on his other, first reason for adding the fifth goods-characteristic. What is so subjective about knowing-how that it can neither be part of the command condition nor coincide with the above-mentioned ‘implicit’ (producer’s) capacity aspect of the command condition? To answer the question I look at someone who simulates the disposition of alertness (knowing-how). How can such acts be qualified? ‘We use abusive names like “charlatan” and “quack” for the frauds who pretend to be able to bring things off, while we use the word “hypocrite” for the frauds who affect motives and habits’ (Ryle 1949: 128). With the disqualifications of both forms of reproachable behaviour, I differentiate between two forms of alertness: a tendency to act or react in a certain manner, and a capacity to get something right. Compare the difference between proneness and competence. ‘ “Tends to” implies “can”, but is not implied by it’ (Ryle 1949: 126). A tendency concerns a proneness, in which the source is of interest, in contrast to a capacity, a skill, in which the method is of interest. This difference coincides with the different roles that can be ascribed to consumption and production in the market process. The consumer is asked why he or she believes something, whereas the producer is asked how he or she knows something and what his or her method has been. The fraudulent behaviour of the hypocrite, for instance, is often a problem in market research when the consumer who is interviewed wants to give a socially acceptable answer. Ask the consumer the wrong question (alertness being understood as a capacity aspect, which the modern Austrians are inclined to do), and the possible silence following that question does not signal a lack of alertness. It signifies different forms of alertness by producer and consumer. I interpret Böhm-Bawerk’s concept of knowing-how as being broader than the implicit capacity aspect of the producer, which is part of Menger’s command condition. Böhm-Bawerk’s explicit concept includes the subjective aspect of a tendency, the liability to a certain tendency which is pre-eminently applicable to the entrepreneurial role of the consumer in the market process. To describe a market process, both forms of alertness – alertness towards monetary profit (producer goods) and alertness towards utility gains (consumer goods) – are formally necessary. The pejorative terms in which Mises describes the consumers do not contradict but reinforce my interpretation of the alertness concept. Mises speaks of ‘[t]he hosts of inferior people’, ‘[t]he inferiority of the multitude’, and ‘[t]hese dull beneficiaries’ (1962: 112–113). It is exactly the quality of verbs expressing a tendency, which imply that a person tends to act or react in certain manners and which do not imply that anything is brought off, that they can be qualified by such adjectives as ‘fanatical’, ‘stupid’ and ‘childlike’. On the other hand, none of the qualifications are
56 Auke R. Leen applicable to capacity verbs, which express that a person is equipped to bring things off, or to get things right (Ryle 1949: 128–129). Therefore, probably the best attitude for an economist to take towards these pejorative terms has already been given by Mises himself: There is little sense in distinguishing between economic and other motives [error, ignorance, incapacity, laziness, neglectfulness] . . . if one starts with the action of the marginal consumer and not with that of the businessman. . . . One can see how ridiculous such scholastic distinctions are. The maxims of the businessman cannot be applied to the action of the consumers, which, in the last analysis, governs all business. ([1928] 1981: 176) In this way I gave a theoretical answer to the unexploited subject of the entrepreneurial behaviour of the consumer. I have stated the logical domain of the categories to be used, with what other propositions they are consistent and inconsistent, what propositions follow from them and from what propositions they follow. Moreover, the idea of competition has changed. The alertness concept referred to earlier in the chapter focused on the relaxation of the postulate of full knowledge in the traditional neoclassical market model. The alertness concept as shaped in the consumer’s goods concept, on the contrary, focuses on the relaxation of the postulate of homogeneous goods. At the centre of the analysis is the goods quality as a means of satisfaction. Competition for a consumer, the entrepreneurial appraisal of a consumer good, does not only give rise to price competition, price behaviour, but also to goods competition, goods behaviour. [T]he study of competitive exchange, in order to be significant, must concern itself with the quos as well as the quids of an economy’s quid pro quo transactions – that is, not only with the prices paid but with the things for which the payments have been made. (Abbott 1955: 24) Goods – that is, quality-competition, however, is not always an inverted form of price competition. Of course, a different-quality good for the same price is often equivalent to a different price for the same good. For example, a restaurant that wishes to raise the price of its cup of coffee without actually altering the price on the menu can either serve the coffee in smaller cups or use a cheaper grade of coffee. The first is a change in size, the second a change of quality. But both have the same end in view as a price increase: to give less for the money. (Abbott 1955: 126)
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But in some matters of quality there is no clear-cut agreement. Different people will rank qualities in a different order – for example, according to aesthetic considerations (the cut of a woman’s dress) or matters of convenience (the arrangement of the shelves in a refrigerator). What attracts some buyers may repel others. ‘It will be useful to label such differences as horizontal differences – as opposed to vertical differences, which may properly be thought of in terms of “higher” or “lower” ’ (Abbott 1955: 127). For modern Austrianism, with its emphasis on the producer and higher-order goods, quality competition is connected with vertical quality. Henceforth, competition can be reduced to price competition. For the consumer, on the other hand, this is not a viable option. There is horizontal quality differentiation at the level of consumer goods. The entrepreneurship of the consumer is directed not only at prices, but also at goods. The consumer discovers new, unexpected ends, new forms of utility, to (old) means (cf. Kirzner 1989: 107). Consequently, it is not always the case that the role of the producer ‘consists in relieving the consumer of the necessity to be his own entrepreneur’ (Kirzner 1973: 136). The situation can also be the other way around. The producer hires his or her trendwatcher: someone who looks out for what a trendy consumer discovers. Rosenstein-Rodan In this and the following section I examine whether there is an equally important role for market-determined monetary prices in consumption as there is for them in production. In what sense are market prices a relief for consumption? In older Austrian economics, marginalism not only is the solution to a problem, but also gives rise to a new problem. Marginalism, the solution to the value paradox, poses the problem of finding an overall goods allocation, with its astonishing number of individual comparisons. Comparisons are necessary in order to determine the values of the different goods and thereby the optimal goods allocation. In the classical objective value theory this problem was not as intimately connected with the core of economics and could for that reason be relegated by the theoretical economists. With subjective use value this changed. Value was no longer given from outside, but had to be calculated by human beings themselves. The problem was further aggravated with the transition from a cardinal to an ordinal utility concept, because now the calculation problem changed from a quantitative to a much more difficult to handle qualitative one. The solution to this problem was so important that Paul RosensteinRodan in his summarizing article on marginal utility said, ‘[T]he essential function of marginal utility is to abbreviate economic calculation’ ([1927] 1960: 94). For Mises, too, economics is first and foremost concerned with the question how calculable action is possible (1940: 186). ‘No other
58 Auke R. Leen distinction is of greater significance . . . than that between calculable action and incalculable action’ (Mises 1966: 199). The infinity of the calculation process arises as we go from simple consumer decisions regarding first-order goods to complicated producer decisions concerning higherorder goods (Mises [1922] 1981: 98). ‘Here [in a production context] the processes of production are so many and so long, the conditions necessary to the success of the undertaking so multitudinous’ (ibid.: 98). In other words, for Mises the calculation problem arises if we change the analyses from an isolated individual to an individual in a full-grown exchange economy ([1912] 1971: 48). For Mises, the solution to the calculation problem is given with the possibility of monetary calculations in an exchange economy: ‘No individual could so discriminate between the infinite number of alternative methods of production that he could make direct judgments of their relative value without auxiliary calculations’ ([1922] 1981: 101). Money makes it possible to come to grips with ‘the confusing multiplicity of the exchange ratios’ (Mises [1912] 1971: 48). The division of labour in an exchange economy, with money as its collateral, ‘effects a kind of mental division of labour, without which neither economy nor systematic production would be possible’ (Mises [1922] 1981: 101). It is not only that it would cost the consumer too much time and trouble to make all the necessary calculations. It is also the case, claims the older Austrian Leo Schönfeld-Illy, that not all utilities can be stated and henceforth compared. It is, for example, almost impossible for someone to state with certainty whether a good that protects against death by starvation has a higher value than a second good that protects from freezing, or a third good that protects from being choked to death. These utilities cannot be compared or grasped at all (Schönfeld-Illy 1924: 21). But if this is the situation, how can our theory be useful if it has to be in accordance with the rightly named practical facts of life? Do we have to admit that, at least partially, subjective value cannot explain economic calculation? For we do buy goods in certain quantities without which we cannot survive (Schönfeld-Illy 1924: 21). Modern Austrians, with their emphasis on the producer’s point of view, do not worry about these problems. Indifference is not a concept of action. It lies outside economics, a science of human action (Rothbard 1962: 265). Moreover, if utility cannot be grasped, it simply lies outside the field of economic calculation (Mises 1966: 215). The question arises, what relief does money give the consumer? Money is the sine qua non for rational production save for primitive production and consumption. What is the role of money for the consumer in a fullgrown market economy in respect of the multiplicity of all the necessary calculations and the impossibility of stating all the necessary utilities? There are questions that take us to the core of modern subjectivism: ‘the analysis of the mental processes performed by acting man in applying
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quantitative distinctions when planning conduct’ (Mises 1966: 210). Subjectivism ‘systematically recomposes market phenomena in terms of typical structural components of everyday decision making’ (O’Driscoll and Rizzo 1986: 252). In his ‘Grundzüge der Theorie des wirtschaftlichen Güterwerts’ (1886), Böhm-Bawerk discusses the calculation problem. From a purely theoretical point of view, calculation has to be very labour- and timeconsuming. To compute the marginal utilities we have to state again and again the needs that goods of the first order can satisfy, and so on for all the units of the goods we have at our disposition. The problem even grows in complexity with goods of higher order, for then we have to state the needs to be fulfilled not only by the goods themselves, but also by their intermediate products (Böhm-Bawerk 1886: 74). But, he continues, we know from our experience that calculations do not give us much trouble. First, we do have a lot of practice. We are great virtuosi in our value calculations – calculations, after all, that from a cost–benefit point of view do not have to be scrupulously careful. We do not have to be more exact than is worthwhile. This reason is analogous to the one given by Kirzner. For him, ‘[t]he essence of the problem facing the consumer . . . consists in choosing one out of an immense number of alternative assortments of goods’ (1963: 64). The solution to this problem, however, so far as it concerns the ‘immense number’, does not need special attention inside theoretical economics. ‘[I]ncome allocation can be made as precise as the consumer wishes; that is, as precise as the consumer feels worthwhile in view of the difficulty of choosing carefully between a number of closely similar alternatives’ (ibid.: 65). Second, we have all sorts of short cuts and rules of thumb – our own recollections of earlier, similar decisions, what we have learned from other people – and we follow routines. All these reliefs can be used as long as our situation does not drastically change, which in practice is the case for most of us. Third, there is a reason that is particularly relevant for the increased calculation problem for goods of higher order. Nearly all stages of production are taken care of by separate industries: the familiar phenomenon of the division of labour. Consequently, further stages of production lie outside the economic calculation problem of the individual producer. The producer only asks him- or herself: what are these goods worth on my next market? Rosenstein-Rodan made the solution of this calculation problem the central function of marginal utility. He specifies the condition that permits abbreviation: ‘Observation shows that during an economic period the majority of the needs . . . usually remain constant’ (Rosenstein-Rodan [1927] 1960: 84), and the same holds for the supply of productive resources. The complementarity of utilities seems to pose a problem. It suggests the necessity of a complete revision of the whole economic plan,
60 Auke R. Leen even with a relatively small change in the data. This, however, is not the case. For the layers of goods allocation under discussion are the marginal ones. Here complementarity is always the lowest and the utilities the smallest. For these reasons, complementarity has no great repercussions elsewhere in the system. But how do we find the initial situation, the one that holds in the first place, and that is of relevance if nothing changes? The situation is the result of a process of historical development. We cannot create it instantaneously, it is the result of a historical process of trial and error. If we are in this situation, the attained marginal utilities fulfil their function as a short cut without which there simply can be no rational economic conduct. The utilities of the new uses which are contemplated are compared with past marginal utilities in these uses; if they are larger, the new uses are expedient, if smaller, the new uses are not expedient. The marginal utility in different need classes (kinds of uses) thus fulfills a watch-dog function with respect to consumption. (Rosenstein-Rodan [1927] 1960: 85) Schönfeld-Illy In two of his books (1924, 1948), Schönfeld-Illy extensively investigates the abbreviation procedure of consumer calculations. For him, the use of marginal utility as an instrument of abbreviation changes the situation from one of equilibrium to one of disequilibrium. The phenomena to be explained are no longer associated with marginal changes in an equilibrium allocation, but with abrupt, great changes in means and ends. His favourite examples of budget allocation are students who receive their first income after graduation, people who get married, or emigrants upon arrival in a foreign country (Schönfeld-Illy 1948: 125–126, 321). A theory able to describe small changes in equilibrium only, and not the origination of this equilibrium itself, would be just as unsatisfying to him as a theory that could explain only price changes and not their origination. We cannot take as given the results that our theory intends to explain. What is noteworthy is that with this change comes not only a different definition and function of the marginal utility concept, but also a change in the character of the proof of the abbreviation procedure. Schönfeld-Illy introduces his version of marginal utility with the following question: How can the transition process come about to deduce from the data, which include Gossen’s first law of diminishing marginal utility, the result formulated as Gossen’s second law of equi-marginality? This is a question overlooked because of the mathematical mould of economics (Schönfeld-Illy 1924: 204–205; 1948: 3–4). To explain the function of marginal utility he states the principles that can substitute for an actual numerical calculation process, since utility is immeasurable (Schönfeld-
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Illy 1924: 40, 56). He distinguishes three principles. All three are necessary and sufficient. The first principle is the principle of the separate utility of a good (Prinzip des Einzelnutzens) (Schönfeld-Illy 1924: 49). Though the consumers’ aim is to reach the greatest total utility, they do not and cannot calculate total utility as such, but only changes in total utility, changes brought about by adding goods to the ones already used. These changes give the utility of each good separately. To determine the utility of each good separately, in the sense of its own abstract utility, is impossible. The utilities of goods influence each other simultaneously and depend on the actual situation. (ibid.: 3). The second principle is the principle of quid pro quo (Prinzip des Vergleichens von Leistung und Gegenleistung) (ibid.: 44, 50). Changes in total utility do not give consumers numbers in which they can calculate. What they can do is compare the changes with other changes. Given scarcity, a change in total utility can always be compared with another change in total utility, a comparison that must be made if the calculation is to have any economic significance. In discussing the principle, Schönfeld-Illy clarifies the object of Gossen’s first law: the pivotal fact behind the third principle (ibid.: 198n1). In conformity with modern Austrianism (Kirzner 1963: 50, 56; Mises 1966: 126), the object of Gossen’s law is not the image of a subsequent consumption of goods (Schönfeld-Illy 1924: 92), but a contemplated variation in goods quantities. The interpretation of marginal utility as a subjective demand price gives us the third principle of economic relevance (Prinzip der ökonomischen Relevanz) (Schönfeld-Illy 1924: 48). It states the economic relevance of a margin for the whole. The price relevant for the marginal part of a divisible amount of goods has an economic relevance for all other units of that amount of goods, a fortiori: for the utility of the other units is higher than the utility of the marginal unit and therefore the price paid for the other units certainly must be justified (ibid.: 59–60). The cumulative validity of marginal utility makes it possible to abbreviate the calculation process and to solve problems of goods of which the utilities cannot be stated or compared. With the three principles, not only utility in general and the two problems in particular are brought into the calculation process, but marginal utility fulfils a special role, too. It no longer functions pre-eminently as a watchdog that precludes all utility under it and sustains all utility above it. But its function becomes its economic relevance: the relevance of the economic use at a margin for a whole. For Schönfeld-Illy, this interpretation of marginal utility dissolves an inconsistency in the thinking of Wieser. Wieser takes the description of marginal utility from the situation in which the calculation is already completed. ‘The measure of marginal utility is got from the least useful of the
62 Auke R. Leen most important uses . . . conditional on the highest use of the supply and the most careful inquiry of the needs’ (Schönfeld-Illy 1924: 75). On the other hand, Wieser draws the description of the function of marginal utility inside calculation from the situation whereby action starts. ‘All uses, which stand below, are forbidden . . . all uses which stand above or are equal, are permitted’ (ibid.: 75). Schönfeld-Illy wonders whether the last stage of calculation contains all those things that have been used during the actual economic action and, consequently, are contained in a conceptional description grafted onto this final stage. The correct definition of marginal utility consistent with the function it performs, reads: For a particular consumer, the marginal utility of a certain amount of goods is the utility of the smallest part of a stock of goods relevant from an economic point of view. The economically smallest part is the part that lies at the circumstantial margin of use of the stock of goods and is of relevance for the whole stock of goods considering the plans one has for using it. Marginal utility is an instrument in a process of trial and error (SchönfeldIlly 1948: 67, 126). As a result, Schönfeld-Illy and Rosenstein-Rodan give a different interpretation of Wieser’s statement that the entire surplus utility (Übernutzen) can be neglected. For Rosenstein-Rodan the surplus utilities are the utilities above the equilibrium marginal utilities ([1927] 1960: 85). For Schönfeld-Illy they are the utilities above the marginal utilities of certain quantities of goods in a disequilibrium situation (1948: 65). What about the change in character of the proof of the abbreviation procedure? For Böhm-Bawerk and Rosenstein-Rodan the possibility of abbreviation procedures is a direct consequence of certain empirical, psychological characterizations: an unchanging world around and within us. For Schönfeld-Illy, on the other hand, abbreviation is a direct consequence of Gossen’s first law. Schönfeld-Illy gives a, in a modern Austrian terminology, praxeological proof. The calculating consumer What is the subjective demand price in which each consumer calculates (Schönfeld-Illy 1948: 194)? The answer is the price that functions as an intermediary (die Vorgestalt des Preises) between the price that prevails on the market and the incalculable marginal utility (Schönfeld-Illy 1948: 40–41). The subjective demand price is an expected price. (Schönfeld-Illy 1924: 6, 62). The combined actions of consumers and other factors lead to the actual price on the market (Schönfeld-Illy 1924: 6, 62; 1948: 238). There are for the consumer no unchangeable, unambiguous data (Schönfeld-Illy 1948: 210, 237). Consumers live and learn (ibid.: 210, 237) from their experiences and adapt their behaviour (ibid.: 222–223, 264). Schönfeld-Illy also characterizes this price as a dynamic price. While determining the price, the consumer focuses on the existing state of the
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market. The price with which the consumer operates on the market is not the maximum subjective price he or she is willing to pay for a good. The consumer might not even be aware of the highest price, a price that would not allow him or her any ‘profit’ (ibid.: 241) Just as the producer bases his or her price on the prices presently charged by competitors and the probable changes thereto (ibid.: 229), consumers base their price on the circumstances of the marginal buyer on the market (ibid.: 244). The rich buyer pays after the measuring-rod of the poor buyer (ibid.: 245, 289). Schönfeld-Illy’s view about the dynamic, expected demand price is analogous to Kirzner’s alertness and related price concept. Kirzner endorses Mises’s thesis that ‘there is nothing automatic or mechanical in the operation of the market’ (Mises 1966: 335). ‘The idea of a price that does not reflect and express entrepreneurial judgment and hunch is virtually a contradiction in terms’ (Kirzner 1988: 6). The dynamic, expected demand price has not only internal aspects for the economic calculations of the consumer, but also external aspects of interest to the market as a whole. On the market level the expected price solves the problem of the so-called economic determination circle: the mutual, reciprocal dependence of the variables in the functional equilibrium theories (Preisveränderungstheorie). The circular reasoning occurs because on the one hand market prices follow from the value estimations of the economic subjects, but on the other hand these value estimations presuppose the existence of given prices. The utility of a good depends on the amount of other goods one consumes. The consumption of these goods in its turn depends on the prices of these goods (Schönfeld-Illy 1948: 184). In other words, in the special theory about consumer behaviour prices are given; in the general price theory (of which the special theory forms a part) the prices are the unknowns of the system (ibid.: 187). This Gordian knot is due to a confusion between the expected and the actual price (ibid.: 214). The market is a causal-genetic process (Preisbildungstheorie). On the bases of actual prices, producers and consumers are calculating with dynamic, expected prices ibid.: 215, 229, 245). To start with a world without prices is completely unreal. ‘The aim, which is actually realized only later, is placed in the form of its subjective expectation causally in the economic thinking and action of the actor’ (ibid.: 213). Both parties learn from their market experiences (for example, the good cannot be bought by the consumer at the expected price; the producer cannot sell all the goods that he or she wants to sell) and revise their conduct (ibid.: 222). This leads to a process in time that is similar to ‘the modern Austrian view of the market as a competitive-entrepreneurial process of discovery’ (Kirzner 1988: 1). To conclude, the dynamic, expected demand price of the consumer gets around two consumer calculation problems: (1) the multiplicity of all the necessary calculations, and (2) the impossibility of stating all the
64 Auke R. Leen necessary utilities. These are problems situated within a given ends relationship (in a certain sense). This dynamic, expected demand price is the result of entrepreneurship: the process of conceiving the ends–means relationship. The consumer is alert towards monetary profits and utility gains.
The Austrian perspective on consumer policy Consumer policy Opposition towards a free market for consumer goods is manifold. It ranges from radical critics of capitalism to people who though in general appreciate the role of the market system in the efficient allocation of resources, because of chronic market failures admit the necessity of government intervention. It has been said that the theory of market failure is ‘now more suitable as a story line for texts in the history of economic thought than for texts in economic theory’ (Wagner 1991: 295). Yet consumer policy seems to be one of the strongholds of the theory of market failure. Hardly any measures to protect consumers’ interests are ever revoked. Rather, new justifications for consumer policy are given. Of course the critics know that government regulation produces its own undesirable distortions in market outcomes. Therefore, it is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for intervention when one of the conditions fails for the (Pareto) optimal operation of a competitive market as described in the static neoclassical equilibrium model. To show sufficiency, one has to make an assessment of the costs and benefits of government intervention in each particular case. Next to the already stated undesirable distortions in market outcomes, it is another well-known drawback of consumer policy that it is often undertaken to further the well-being of special interests instead of the interest of the public at large. William Stanley Jevons said that ‘the great lesson which we can learn, and it is an impressive one, is that legislation with regard to labour [in which Jevons included laws to protect the consumer] has always been class-legislation’ (1882: 33–34). The so-called sumptuary laws in the Middle Ages, which defined what to wear and to eat, ‘were mere class laws, intended to support the pride of an aristocracy by restraining the tastes of the lower class’ (ibid.: 40). More recently, Tibor Scitovsky suggested more or less the opposite for modern capitalism: In the modern economy, therefore, wherever economies of scale lead to important reductions in cost, plutocracy [each consumer’s influence on what gets produced depends on how much he or she spends] is combined with mob rule: the crowd’s ability to get those things on whose desirability its members agree. (1976: 9)
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And if it is not unequivocally the aristocracy or the lower classes that fix consumer policy, then, as Beat Bürgenmeier concludes for the Swiss consumer protection laws, there is always the possibility that ‘[t]his codification will reflect more closely the relative strength of different political pressure groups than considerations based on economic theory’ (1985: 45). But what are, quite apart from such already well-known difficulties, the harmful effects, according to the Austrians, of government intervention on the entrepreneurial processes of producers and consumers? For the most basic of the market’s virtues in the Austrian vision is the ability of the spontaneous discovery process of the market to generate equilibrating tendencies. Ever since the early beginnings of economic science the welfare of the consumer has taken a central position. Economic processes start and end with consumers. Consumption is, according to Adam Smith, the sole end of all production. The interest of the producer ought to be attended to only so far as it may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer. Policies to strengthen the functioning of the market, however, concern the consumer only indirectly or, if directly, on an ad hoc, temporary basis. We may think of price policies (e.g. rationing devices in situations of extreme scarcity) or the prescription of certain product qualities in the case of dangerous products (e.g. food quality). From the 1960s onwards, however, the aim of consumer policy has been a systematic and direct improvement of the position of the consumer on the market. The traditional motivation for consumer policy goes as follows. First, consumer sovereignty is absent in present-day society. The will of the consumers is no longer fundamental for production decisions. Second, in choosing, consumers are confronted with a highly complicated, untransparent market. The consumer faces a situation of information shortage as well as one of information overload (Imkamp 1986: 235; cf. Thorelli and Thorelli 1977: 23). I take a closer look at both reasons. The first reason goes along the following lines. Full sovereignty of the consumer implies a complete servitude of the producer to the consumer. The consumer ‘king’, however, is capricious and unpredictable in his consumer behaviour. To secure their capital investments, producers try to plan production and distribution. Through all kinds of sales effort the producer tries to secure its existence. Consumers feel their impotence. They feel themselves played upon by the producer. Consumer sovereignty becomes an empty word. The second reason emphasizes that consumers also feel a certain discomfort in choosing from all the available, constantly growing and changing products and services. Present-day consumers are confronted with a rich but, because of its magnitude and variation, untransparent assortment of goods. Product information is mainly given by the producers and is, consequently, one-sided. In choosing, the consumer is stifled by
66 Auke R. Leen information dependence. The market for consumer goods is highly untransparent. Consumer policy tries to answer these feelings of impotence and discomfort. The first reason, lack of consumer sovereignty, gives rise to a top to bottom motivation of consumer policy. Aims are deduced from certain basic values or needs of the consumer (Kuhlmann 1990: 60). Consumer policy becomes the protection of individual rights in the economic context. Deriving from President Kennedy’s presidential address of 1962, these rights are (1) the right to safety; (2) the right to be informed; (3) the right to choose; and (4) the right to be heard. The implementation of the rights must restore the equality in the producer–consumer relationship. The second reason, consumer feelings of discomfort, gives rise to a bottom to top motivation of consumer policy. Inductive methods show consumer complaints; in aggregated form they build up the aims of consumer policy. The purpose of the inductively formed aims is, for example, to restore the market transparency of the consumers. Consumer policy tries to ensure that all consumers obtain what they would really want, were they fully informed, subject to the limitation of their income (Maynes 1979: 97). What measures are proposed to strengthen the position of the consumer on the market? Some are primarily aimed at changing the behaviour of the producers, others at changing the behaviour of the consumers. In both fields they try to protect or inform the consumers. The overall aim is to ensure that no unreasonable physical and economic risks fall on the consumer. For physical safety, protection means bans on certain dangerous products and, for other, less dangerous products, technical standards specifying acceptable safety standards. For economic safety, protection means, for example, regulation of the information content of advertising, and one-sided producer-formulated standard contracts are regulated. Furthermore, there are subsidies for comparative testing, mandatory informative labelling, and quality certification (Thorelli and Thorelli 1974: 2), all aimed at better consumer information. The measures try to increase the market transparency for the consumer. From an Austrian perspective the common denominator of all the measures is that the ends–means relationship is supposed to be already known to consumers and government officials. The essence of consumer policy is, first, to increase the efficiency of the known (household) production process, and second, in cases of conflict between certain ends, from an individual or social perspective, consumer policy also tries to influence the ends of the consumer household. But given a socially accepted hierarchy of ends, these latter policies are in a certain sense also only trying to ensure the efficiency of the household production process (Kuhlmann 1990: 5–6). The government claims to know which products are unequivocably
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dangerous and ought to be banned and what the minimally acceptable safety standards are. The government also claims to know the standard price, standard quality, standard contract terms, the relevant product characteristics in comparative testing, and the relevant product characteristics for the product labels. To sum up, consumer policy tries to reduce the known transaction costs of a consumer transaction in terms of physical risk, economic risk and search costs. The theoretical motivation behind consumer policy is taken from the neoclassical market model. The consumer is a maximizer: action follows from an optimal choice in a given and known ends–means relationship which includes situations of measurable uncertainty that can be reduced with search. Because, in reality, the consumer is confronted with an information gap as well as, just the opposite, an information overload, the essence of consumer policy is to direct or restrict the choices of the consumers. Prices per standard quantity and comparative testing, for instance, increase the market transparency for the consumer and direct consumers’ choices. Laws putting limits on interests rates or prescribing standard rules, on the other hand, restrict the choices of consumers. Consumer policy and the competitive-entrepreneurial market process For Austrians, however, the consumer and producer are more than mere calculators: they are venturing, innovating, exploring, and searching for new means and new ends. Contrary to the neoclassical market model, consumer problems are not to be attributed to inadequate resources or to a faulty institutional structure. There is also the possibility of sheer error: opportunities costlessly available are overlooked. The question becomes, what is the impact of consumer policy upon the perception by consumers and producers of the available array of opportunities? Consumer policy ‘may affect what it is that decision makers discover to be the situation in which they act’ (Kirzner 1985: 94). These consequences are to be taken account of, in terms of costs, in each assessment of the likely consequences of consumer policy (cf. Kirzner 1985: 137). A consumer problem by itself does not necessarily point to the necessity of government intervention. The market is a discovery process: genuine inefficiencies can be relied upon in the future to generate market processes for their own correction. But inefficiencies are not solved the very instant they emerge. The systematic tendency for imperfect knowledge to be spontaneously improved upon is not an instantaneous one. In Austrian economics, time is not the problem but part of the solution. What are, for instance, the market responses in the case of consumer services to the noted information asymmetry between producers and consumers? Of course sellers, as specialized producers, know more about their services than buyers who are not specialists possibly can. Also, sellers, by knowing more about the quality of their service than consumers, are
68 Auke R. Leen able to manipulate consumers. This led Akerlof to his prediction that in equilibrium, only ‘lemons’ will be offered for sale (Akerlof 1970: 490). Governments’ answer to this problem often takes the form of occupational licences or governmental organizations of certification to protect the public health or safety. But there are also many free-market responses to this alleged market failure. Producers supply guarantees, private information services, producer-provided quality screening services, and all forms of non-governmental organization of certification. Besides, there are many information surrogates that keep consumers adequately informed – for instance, by repeatedly purchasing certain services, by drawing on the experience of friends, relatives and neighbours, or by inferences drawn from the length of life of firms offering services. In conclusion: (1) ‘if consumers are able to check the veracity of suppliers in any manner, laissez-faire market equilibrium can support [contrary to Akerlof’s assertion] high quality’ (Young 1987: 18); and (2) consumers who prefer lower-priced, lower-quality service will be worse off with licensing, because such suppliers will not be permitted to practise, and in this way the poor subsidize the lower information search costs of the rich (ibid.: 21). It is significant to notice that even in an untransparent market, such as the market for heroin, institutions arise that lower the transaction costs of both producer and consumer. Producer and consumer both face high transaction costs. For consumers there are high search costs and high costs in the form of uncertainty over the quality of the goods, and in cases of fraud there is no law to protect them. If caught, a producer faces high costs in terms of imprisonment. In this disequilibrium case it is to be expected that some entrepreneurial people will try to make some profit as middlemen. They try to reduce the high costs for both producer and consumer in offering information that the consumer of heroin needs and the heroin supplier likes to be spread (Kunz 1985: 93–103). The middleman separates the market of heroin supply from that of heroin selling. He creates an information market that lowers the transaction (selling) costs of the supplier in the form of imprisonment costs. The middleman himself does not face these costs. At the same time, he lowers the search costs for the consumer. Both supplier and consumer value the middleman, because for both the transaction costs are lowered. Both have an interest, too, in maintaining such an information market. The question can be asked: How do government officials know what prices to set or qualities to require? Given the absence of the pure profit incentive, market opportunities that present themselves in the form of potential profit opportunities are not likely to be discovered by the regulators. It is doubtful in the extreme if ideals such as benevolence or patriotism can be relied upon, in general, to enable a potential discoverer
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to identify his own personal interest with that of the discovery of an opportunity for a reallocation of resources desirable for society. (Kirzner 1985: 33) The discovery process of the market cannot be simulated by regulatory activity. Because in consumption consumers always capture the profit themselves, at first sight it looks as though for consumers their alertness is stimulated irrespective of the market form. The relevant information will always be of benefit to the potential discoverer. In a regulated market, however, things are a bit more complicated. Regulators and consumers in a regulated economy are focusing on the efficiency of the household production process for which traditional incentives, such as lowering the search costs, are of help. Consumers in a non-regulated economy, however, are next to the efficiency of the transformation process and alert to the discovery of genuine errors: they expect the unexpected. Government regulation of producer decisions, however, takes possible surprises out of the open-ended surroundings of the consumer. It is to be expected that consumers in a regulated market will be less alert to new ends and means than consumers in an unregulated market are. Profit-inspired diversity in consumer goods and services stimulates consumers. Consumers’ alertness is switched on by the fact that there may be something lurking around the corner – something hopeful or something to be fearful of. Government regulation – for example, price and quality restraints – tends to bar entry by potential new competitors. A quality or price restraint does not merely block the upper reaches of a given supply curve, but also may inhibit the discovery of as yet unsuspected sources of supply. As well as the miscoordination generated by imposed prices and qualities in markets for existing goods, there is the effect that such ceilings may inhibit the discovery of as yet wholly unknown new products (Kirzner 1985: 143). To stick to my earlier example of the drugs market, think of such ‘undiscovered’ uses of marijuana as a valuable source of such products as paper, fuel, building materials, clothing, animal food and a protein source for humans. The Austrian methodological makeshift of a Misesian entrepreneurial producer and a Robbinsian non-entrepreneurial consumer, used for the elucidation of the market process, is at this point of no help and leads to wrong policy conclusions. If the methodological makeshift is not removed, then the Austrians do not have valid arguments against, for example, those forms of consumer policy that try to increase the market transparency of the consumer. For then there are no valid arguments against passing on to the consumer comparable and relevant product characteristics for the existing supply of products. Consequently, when the methodological makeshift is not removed, it is possible from an Austrian
70 Auke R. Leen perspective to make a plea for quality certification, as a form of collective (public) good (Hayek 1982, III: 44). It is also possible to defend the subsidization by the government of comparative testing by consumer organizations (Kaufmann 1985: 24). From the Austrian vision concerning the functioning of the market in general, however, these policies can only be rejected. The questions are: What are the relevant product characteristics? How have these characteristics changed over time (cf. Rothbard 1970: 43–47; O’Driscoll and Rizzo 1985: 105, 236). The consumer, too, discovers new, unexpected ends (new forms of utility) to (old) means and new means. For Scitovsky, the mass market, the mob rule, ‘pushes us toward standardization and uniformity, both of which inhibit our ability to exploit the possibilities it creates’ (1976: 11). The fact that the mass market does not stimulate the consumer has serious consequences. ‘The yearning for new things and ideas is the source of all progress, all civilization; to ignore it as a source of satisfaction is surely wrong’ (ibid.: 11). For Austrians, however, capitalism, with its fundamental principle of mass production, stimulates novelty (Mises 1966: 621). To be more specific, the functioning of the market depends on being alert to new and unexpected means and ends. The Austrian idea of the role of novelty in capitalism is in direct opposition to the one of Scitovsky. Measures taken by government officials to protect consumers are likely to open up new avenues for entrepreneurial gain. It is likely that government measures introduce a different disequilibrium situation. This new disequilibrium situation, however, will generate its own discovery process with its own wholly unexpected and even undesired final outcomes – for example, enterprising bribery and corruption of the regulators.
Conclusion From the Austrian perspective, consumer policy stifles the profit or utility incentive that converts a socially desirable opportunity (an opportunity that transcends an existing framework of perceived opportunities) into a personally gainful one. These ‘conversions’ are the steps of the discovery process through which any possible tendency towards market equilibrium must proceed. So, consumer policy ends up with just about the opposite of what it intends. For is not its ultimate aim to better the possibilities of satisfying needs by means of consumption? The Austrian understanding of the market economy provides a novel angle for a critique of the regulated consumer. Regulatory restrictions interfere with the spontaneous discovery process that the unregulated market generates. In order to give a full appreciation of the market as a competitive-entrepreneurial discovery process it was necessary to emphasize the entrepreneurial role of the consumer.
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References Abbott, L. (1955), Quality and Competition, Columbia University Press, New York. Akerlof, G.A. (1970), ‘The Market for “Lemons”: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 84: 488–500. Alter, M. (1982), ‘Carl Menger and Homo Oeconomicus: Some Thoughts on Austrian Theory and Methodology’, Journal of Economic Issues 16 (1): 149–160. Amonn, A. (1911), Object und Grundbegriffe der theoretischen Nationalökonomie, Franz Deuticke, Vienna. Böhm-Bawerk, E. von ([1881] 1962), Rechte und Verhältnisse vom Standpunkte der volkswirtschaftlichen Güterlehre, Verlag der Wagner’schen Universitäts-Buchhandlung, Innsbruck; translated by G.D. Huncke as Whether Legal Rights and Relations Are Economic Goods, in Shorter Classics of Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, vol. 1, Libertarian Press, South Holland, IL. Böhm-Bawerk, E. von (1884), Kapital und Kapitalzins, Gustav Fischer, Jena. Böhm-Bawerk, E. von (1886), ‘Grundzüge der Theorie des wirtschaftlichen Güterwerts’, Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik NS 13: 1–82. Bürgenmeier, B. (1985), ‘Consumer Protection in Switzerland: Strengthening Countervailing Power or Competition?’, Journal of Consumer Policy 8: 45–52. Ekelund, R.B. and Saurman, D.S. (1988), Advertising and the Market Process, Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, San Francisco. Endres, A.M. (1987), ‘The Origins of Böhm-Bawerk’s “Greatest Error”: Theoretical Points of Separation from Menger’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 143: 291–309. Hayek, F.A. (1967), Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, Routledge, London. Hayek, F.A. (1982), Law, Legislation and Liberty, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. Imkamp, H. (1986), ‘Zur Operationalisierung des individuellen Informationsdefizits von Verbrauchern’, Hauswirtschaftliche Wissenschaft 34: 232–235. Jevons, W.S. (1882), The State in Relation to Labour, Macmillan, London. Kaufmann, P.J. (1985), ‘Passing Off and Misappropriation in the Law of Unfair Competition’, PhD thesis, Utrecht. Kirzner, I.M. (1962), Market Theory and the Price System, Van Nostrand, Princeton, NJ. Kirzner, I.M. (1967), ‘Methodological Individualism, Market Equilibrium and Market Process’, Il Politico 32: 787–798. Kirzner, I.M. (1973), Competition and Entrepreneurship, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Kirzner, I.M. (1979), Perception, Opportunity, and Profit: Studies in the Theory of Entrepreneurship, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Kirzner, I.M. (1985), Discovery and the Capitalist Process, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Kirzner, I.M. (1986), ‘Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek: The modern Extension of Austrian Subjectivism’, in N. Leser (ed.) Die Wiener Schule der Nationalökonomie, Böhlau, Vienna. Kirzner, I.M. (1987), ‘Austrian Economics’, in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, ed. J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman, Macmillan, London. Kirzner, I.M. (1988), ‘The Economic Calculation Debate: Lessons for Austrians’, Review of Austrian Economics 2: 1–18. Kirzner, I.M. (1989), Discovery, Capitalism, and Distributive Justice, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
72 Auke R. Leen Kuhlmann, E. (1990), Verbraucherpolitik: Grundzüge ihrer Theorie und Praxis, Franz Vahlen, Munich. Kunz, H. (1985), Marktsystem und Information, Mohr, Tübingen. Lavoie, D. (1985), Rivalry and Central Planning: The Socialist Calculation Debate Reconsidered, Cambridge University Press, New York. Maynes, S.E. (1979), ‘Consumer Protection: The Issues’, Journal of Consumer Policy 3: 97–109. Menger, C. ([1871] 1950), Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre, Wilhelm Braumüller, Vienna; translated by J. Dingwall and B.F. Hoselitz as Principles of Economics, Free Press, Glencoe, IL. Menger, C., (1923), Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre, 2nd edn, Hölder-PichlerTempsky, Vienna. Mises, L. von ([1912] 1971), The Theory of Money and Credit, Foundation for Economic Education, Irvington-on-Hudson, NY. Mises, L. von ([1922] 1981), Socialism, Liberty Classics, Indianapolis. Mises, L. von (1940), Nationalökonomie. Theorie des Handelns und Wirtschaftens, Genf; reprinted (1980), Philosophia Verlag, Munich. Mises, L. von (1949), Human Action, Contemporary Books, Chicago. Mises, L. von ([1928] 1960), Epistemological Problems of Economics, Van Nostrand, Princeton, NJ. Mises, L. von (1962), The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science, Van Nostrand, New York. Mises, L. von (1966), Human Action, 3rd edn, Contemporary Books, Chicago. Mises, L. von (1969), The Historical Setting of the Austrian School of Economics, Arlington House, New Rochelle, NY. O’Driscoll, G.P. and Rizzo, M.J. (1985), The Economics of Time and Ignorance, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. O’Driscoll, G.P. and Rizzo, M.J. (1986), ‘Subjectivism, Uncertainty, and Rules’, in I.M. Kirzner (ed.) Subjectivism, Intelligibility and Economic Understanding, Macmillan, London. Pasour, E.C. (1989), ‘The Efficient-Markets Hypothesis and Entrepreneurship’, Review of Austrian Economics 3: 95–107. Rosenstein-Rodan, P. ([1927] 1960), ‘Marginal Utility’, International Economic Papers no. 10. London and New York. Rothbard, M.N. (1962), Man, Economy and State, Van Nostrand, Princeton, NJ. Rothbard, M.N. (1970), Power and Market, Sheed Andrews & McMeel, Kansas. Rothbard, M.N. (1980), The Essential Ludwig von Mises, Ludwig Mises Institute, Auburn, AL. Rothbard, M.N. (1985), ‘Professor Hébert on Entrepreneurship’, Journal of Libertarian Studies 7 (2): 281–286. Rothbard, M.N. (1988), Ludwig von Mises: Scholar, Creator, Hero, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn, AL. Ryle, G. (1945), ‘Knowing How and Knowing That’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society NS 46: 1–16. Ryle, G. (1949), The Concept of Mind, Hutchinson, London. Salerno, J.T. (1990), ‘Ludwig von Mises as a Social Rationalist’, Review of Austrian Economics 4: 26–54. Schönfeld-Illy, L. (1924), Grenznutzen und Wirtschaftsrechnung, Vienna; reprinted in 1982 with a introduction by Kurt R. Leube, Philosophia Verlag, Munich and Vienna.
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Schönfeld-Illy, L. (1948), Das Gesetz des Grenznutzes: Untersuchung über die Wirtschaftsrechnung des Konsumenten, Springer-Verlag, Vienna. Schumpeter, J.A. (1954), History of Economic Analysis, Oxford University Press, New York. Scitovsky, T. (1976), The Joyless Economy, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Smith, B. (1986), ‘Austrian Economics and Austrian Philosophy’, in W. Grassl and B. Smith (eds) Austrian Economics, Croom Helm, London. Taylor, T.C. (1980), The Fundamentals of Austrian Economics, Adam Smith Institute, London. Thorelli, H.B. and Thorelli, S.V. (1974), Consumer Information Handbook: Europe and North America, Praeger, New York. Thorelli, H.B. and Thorelli, S.V. (1977), Consumer Information Systems and Consumer Policy, Ballinger, Cambridge, MA. Wagner, R.E. (1991), Review of T. Cowen (ed.) ‘The Theory of Market Failure: A Critical Examination’, Public Choice, Jan. 295–297. Young, S.D. (1987), The Rule of Experts, Cato Institute, Washington, DC.
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Macroeconomics and monetary economics
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Austrian cycle theory and the prospect of a coordinationist macroeconomics1 Richard E. Wagner
Introduction Someone who surveyed the literature on business cycles in the early 1930s, and who then jumped ahead just twenty years to survey the literature in the early 1950s, would surely be astonished by the stark contrast in the treatment accorded to Austrian formulations. In the 1930s, Austrian cycle theory held a prominent position in the efforts of economists to understand and explain business cycles. This can be seen readily by perusing such treatises as those of Alec Macfie (1934) and Gottfried Haberler (1964; first edition 1937). Twenty years later the standing of Austrian cycle theory had collapsed dramatically. Robert Gordon (1961; first edition 1952), for instance, gave only a couple of pages of dismissive references to Austrian cycle theory in a treatise of some 700 pages. The bulk of the contemporary textbook literature does not mention Austrian contributions at all. Most of those texts portray a menu of options for macro theory that include classical, Keynesian, monetarist, new classical, and new Keynesian, but which mention an Austrian contribution hardly at all. There are a number of possible explanations that might be advanced for the evanescence of interest in Austrian cycle theory. One possibility is that Austrian cycle theory was not readily assimilable to the growing demand for mathematical and econometric modeling that was entering economics around the same time. Another is that Austrian cycle theory clashed with the increasingly collectivist temper of the times that emerged in the 1930s and started to recede only in the 1960s. With a present recession attributed to a past inflation, an Austrian remedy of market-based liquidation had no chance against any remedy that called for yet more state-sponsored inflation. Yet a third possibility, one that I think can be dismissed readily, is that Austrian cycle theory fared quite poorly compared with other options when those various theories were assessed against the world of experience. Whatever the explanation, Austrian cycle theory did disappear from the analytical radar screen of the economics profession within a short period of time, and has yet to make any significant reappearance. At the same
78 Richard E. Wagner time, however, there has been a growing interest in a coordinationist approach to macroeconomics, an approach that differs severely from the single or representative agent approaches that have been so dominant in recent times. Austrian cycle theory is also a form of coordinationist macroeconomics, and it is plausible that a program of coordinationist macroeconomics could be advanced by some insights from a suitably renovated Austrian cycle theory. This chapter starts by presenting a stylized portrait of Austrian cycle theory at its apogee in the 1930s. The remainder of the chapter explores some of the contours of a coordinationist macroeconomics and notes some of the ways that considerations from Austrian cycle theory might advance a program of coordinationist macroeconomics. The central theme of the chapter is that the central ideas of Austrian cycle theory still have merit, but only within the framework of a coordinationist approach to macroeconomics. At the same time, however, a coordinationist macroeconomics involves much more than restatements of Austrian cycle theory circa 1935.
Austrian cycle theory: a quick review When people refer to Austrian cycle theory, they are referring primarily to an analytical framework initially articulated by Ludwig von Mises ([1912] 1934) and refined by Friedrich Hayek (1935). This Mises–Hayek theory of the business cycle was in turn erected principally upon foundations laid by Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk ([1884–1889] 1959) and Knut Wicksell ([1898] 1936). Central to Austrian cycle theory is a particular capital-theoretic formulation of the capitalist production process, where the relationship between production processes that require different amounts of time is governed by the rate of interest. Most economists characterize production as taking place instantaneously, as illustrated by a production function that describes current production as a function of the amount of inputs currently applied. This common formulation yields the conventional circular flow of income that appears in nearly all the texts these days. In sharp contrast, Böhm-Bawerk described production as possessing a time structure. Inputs that were applied today would contribute to output only sometime in the future. When in the future this might occur would depend on where in the structure of production those inputs were applied. For instance, someone who constructed a plant to freeze-dry vegetables would contribute to an increased consumption of food more quickly than would someone who constructed a laboratory to do research on plant genetics, although the laboratory might eventually contribute more to food consumption than the freeze-drying plant. An economy would be described as a river, where the volume of consumer goods that flow through the terminus depends on the amounts of water that enter from the various tributaries, and where those inflows do
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not reach the terminus without some passing of time. The rate of interest connects and renders consistent the prices of all goods within the structure of production. Böhm-Bawerk recognized that the rate of interest governed the structure of production within a society. If the rate of interest is, say, 5 percent, the structure of production will include some relative investment in plants to freeze-dry vegetables and laboratories to pursue research on plant genetics. Should that rate of interest be, say, 8 percent instead, the structure of production will entail less capital invested in laboratories and more in freezers. Wicksell subsequently distinguished two kinds of interest rate, a real rate and a loan rate. The real rate was a theoretical construct. It was the rate of interest that was consistent with equilibrium in the structure of production, as illustrated above. The loan rate was the rate of interest that was available on the market. If the loan rate diverged from the natural rate, a process of adjustment would be set in motion. This adjustment would continue until equality was restored between the two rates. For instance, suppose the loan rate were lower than the real rate. In the presence of this divergence, people would bid up the prices of capital goods and associated inputs. These increased demands would generate increases in money incomes, which in turn would lead to increased demands for consumer goods. The economic structure of production in the society would change, by becoming more roundabout in Böhm-Bawerk’s unnecessary terminology.2 It is but a short distance from the formulations of Böhm-Bawerk and Wicksell to the Austrian theory of the cycle articulated by Mises and Hayek. In its inception, Austrian cycle theory looks like a standard monetarist explanation of expansion or contraction. In both cases a monetary expansion quickens the pace of economic activity, while a monetary contraction slows it. What gives a different character to Austrian cycle theory is that the monetary disturbance affects the entire structure of production. For instance, an expansion of bank credit that drives the loan rate of interest below the real rate will upset the entire structure of price relationships within the economy. This change in the structure of price relationships will affect calculations of anticipated profitability throughout the economy, with relatively more roundabout projects becoming relatively more profitable. Both a plant to freeze-dry vegetables and a laboratory for research on plant genetics may appear more profitable after the loan rate falls below the natural rate, but the increase in profitability will be relatively stronger for the laboratory. The initial impact of an expansion in bank credit, in the canonical Austrian formulations of the 1930s, is to lengthen the structure of production. This lengthening results because the decline in the loan rate of interest affects the entire structure of price relationships within the economy, by increasing relatively more strongly the anticipated profitability of projects whose eventual contribution to consumption is further removed in time.
80 Richard E. Wagner What happens next depends on the source of the expansion in bank credit. One possible source of credit expansion is a genuine reduction in time preferences among a significant set of people within the society. This increased desire to save would enable banks to expand their offerings of credit. The structure of production within the economy would lengthen as the economy moved to a more capital-intensive structure of production, and this new structure of production could be maintained so long as there were no further changes in time preference. The alternative source of credit expansion is one that does not stem from an increase in saving. Even if there is no change in time preferences and desires to save, a central bank may pursue a program of credit expansion. The initial effect of this credit expansion is identical to the expansion that results from an increase in desires to save: the structure of production lengthens, owing to the increased relative profitability of more roundabout projects. This increased profitability, however, is not genuine, but only temporary. Time preferences are unchanged, so there has been no decreased desire for consumer goods. The lengthening in the structure of production reduces the relative supply of consumer goods. Without a decreased demand for consumer goods that would have accompanied a fall in time preferences, the prices of consumer goods will rise. This leads to revisions in entrepreneurial calculations of profitability, as the production of consumer goods now appears more attractive than it would have done had time preferences truly fallen. The structure of production thus shortens. If the original lengthening in the structure of production corresponds to the expansion phase in a business cycle, the subsequent shortening corresponds to the contraction phase. Both the initial expansion and the subsequent contraction are set in motion by the initial monetary expansion.
Austrian cycle theory: continuing verities and particularistic obsolescence Austrian cycle theory pretty much reached canonical status in the mid1930s, and subsequent expositions have been largely restatements.3 As was mentioned earlier, it had pretty much disappeared from economics by the 1950s. While there has been some resurgence of interest in Austrian economics over the past twenty years or so, that resurgence does not seem to have extended to Austrian cycle theory.4 While there are a number of explanations that might be advanced for the evanescence of Austrian cycle theory, I have no desire to pursue any effort at historical explanation here. My interest is rather to make some effort to distinguish between those aspects of Austrian cycle theory that are still valuable for macroeconomics today and those that are not. Perhaps the two places where obsolescence most strongly dates the canonical formulations of Austrian cycle theory are the treatment of
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expectations and the process through which credit expansion generates economic expansion. As for expectations, even Wicksell wondered about the impact of expectations on the cumulative process. In these days of continual, large-scale financial observation and reporting, expectations must be incorporated into any theoretical enterprise. If the fate of an entrepreneurial undertaking were to depend on making an accurate distinction between credit creation by a central bank and an increase in saving, it would surely be unreasonable to use a theoretical construction that ignored that distinction. If one element of rationality in expectation involves an effort to distinguish between the two different processes of credit expansion, people would treat the lower interest rate due to credit expansion as transitory, and would treat as permanent only the lower interest rate due to increased saving. Austrian cycle theory must incorporate some requirement of rationality in expectation, in conjunction with a recognition that aggregate data are widely and readily reported. For a profession whose members almost universally embrace a belief in rationality, it is difficult to do anything but embrace rational expectations. To be sure, there is quite a bit of experimental work on such things as preference reversals that might seem to challenge rationality, but theories are rarely abandoned simply because of contrary evidence. What is the alternative to rational expectations? It certainly cannot be adaptive expectations. Indeed, adaptive expectations violates thoroughly the entire corpus of Austrian scholarship. More than any other set of economists, Austrians have stressed the forward-looking character of economic action. It is this feature that makes entrepreneurship so central to Austrian economics. It is in acts of entrepreneurship that the future is made. The Lange–Lerner scheme of socialist planning illustrated a version of adaptive expectations, in that it looked backward to what was already known and in existence. There is no way that such a planner could announce prices for what had not yet come into existence. The other source of particularistic obsolescence for the canonical version of Austrian cycle theory is the portrayal of how a credit expansion generates a general lengthening of the structure of production. Even setting aside questions of expectation and their formation, the canonical story of credit expansion leading to increased roundaboutness is highly particular and neither general nor necessary. In the presence of the small governments and institutional arrangements that existed in the early part of the twentieth century, the canonical Austrian formulation had great plausibility. At that time, currency was freely convertible into gold, governments were small, and credit transactions and markets operated and were organized almost wholly within the sphere of private ordering. The world is now ruled by wholly fiat standards. Governments are gigantic. Public ordering is ubiquitous. These modern developments have opened many channels for credit to operate besides the purely private calculus of commercial profitability that was incorporated into the canonical Austrian
82 Richard E. Wagner formulation. To mention just two plausible instances, credit expansion might take the form of booms in real estate markets or securities markets, as against a general lengthening in the structure of production.5 What is of continuing value in Austrian cycle theory is its foundational orientation toward a coordinationist style of macroeconomics. In sharp contrast, conventional macroeconomics is choice-theoretic and not coordinationist. Macro variables are treated as direct objects of choice, whereas within a coordinationist perspective macro variables are simply phenomena that emerge through interaction among people, but which are not chosen directly by anyone. Central to the entire corpus of Austrian economics is the claim that macro variables are not direct objects of choice but are built up through the interactions among participants within the economic process. In recent years there has been a growing interest in bringing issues of coordination back into macroeconomics. Much of this has doubtlessly been spurred by a slowly growing recognition of the inadequacies of macro modeling based on single agents or representative individuals.6 This growing interest in restoring coordination to a place of prominence in macroeconomic theory surely provides an opportunity for a redeployment of Austrian insights. However, such redeployment would have to involve more than restatement. We are a long way removed from the 1930s, and in a way that would lend a good deal of obsolescence to any effort at restatement, as I have already noted. Moreover, Austrian cycle theory is actually a blend of two distinct conceptual frameworks that clash with each other. One is the coordinationist framework, where aggregate economic patterns are emergent phenomena. The task of economic analysis within this framework is to explain how orderly patterns of economic activity emerge out of interactions among people. This framework of emergent order is truly central to the Austrian orientation toward the economic process. It was conveyed, however, with the use of a contradictory framework of postulated order.7 In this alternative framework, order is not an emergent tendency or property, but rather is a postulate to which the theoretical exercise must conform. This framework of postulated general equilibrium renders impotent any formulation that treats aggregate variables as emergent phenomena and not direct objects of choice. The challenge for Austrian cycle theory is the same as that for coordinationist macroeconomics generally, which is to explain macro phenomena as emergent features of interaction and not as direct objects of choice. The canonical Austrian formulation of a lengthening in the structure of production is simply one particular way of locating coordination and emergence at the core of the macro enterprise. There may be numerous ways that a credit expansion influences macro phenomena, depending on historical and institutional details. In all such instances, however, the Austrian orientation holds that the course of macro variables is to be
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built up out of interactions among those who participate within the economic process.
Reason, expectation, and coordination How might elementary requirements of rationality in the formation of expectations operate within the purview of an Austrian-type orientation toward a coordinationist approach to macro phenomena? The use of the faculty of reason to form expectations would surely have to occupy a prominent position in any analytical effort. That expectations are products of reason and imagination is surely noncontroversial at the level of general principle. It is a different matter, however, when it comes to particular methods for implementing that principle. Consider, for instance, the simple expectation-augmented Phillips relationship Yt Y¯ (t et) (where 0) that dominates contemporary macro formulations. In this expression, Yt is actual growth in output during period t and Y¯ is the natural rate of growth in the economy. The remainder of the equation shows that deviations of the actual from the natural rate of growth depend on the direction and size of the deviation of actual from expected inflation. Save for deviations of actual from expected inflation, the rate of growth would be steady at its natural rate. Variability in growth rates through time thus depends on inaccuracies in forecasting inflation. Indeed, forecast inflation is the only variable of relevance for the explanation of why macro variables do not follow some steady-state path. A de-trended flat line is the norm, with variability due either to exogenous shocks to the natural rate of growth or to error in forecasted inflation. Nowhere in this formulation is there any room for macro variability to result from processes of interaction among people. There is simply no room for coordination to proceed with some variable degree of smoothness that, in turn, influences observed macro outcomes. Yet growth is surely an emergent property of an economic system, and it is hardly sensible to treat it as a exogenous shock to that system. Further, the only object of future interest to market participants is a forecast of future inflation. Yet entrepreneurs who made their choices based only on information about probable inflation would be acting foolishly in the extreme. In most instances a rate of inflation has but limited relevance for economic conduct. It might be of strong concern to bond traders and other dealers in financial paper, but these activities comprise only a small part of the universe of economic activities. For most entrepreneurial activities a forecast about some average level of future prices is surely of secondary importance. Of much greater importance would be forecasts that pertain to the particular markets in which the entrepreneur is engaged.
84 Richard E. Wagner There would be different particular objects of expectation, depending on the particular activity about which expectations are being formed. If the course of the economy is built up out of dispersed individual decisions, and with a rate of inflation rarely being a consideration in those decisions, how do expectations about inflation come to command such interest in the macro literature? It comes back to the presumption of postulated order. It may be granted that people form expectations over particular variables that are of particular interest in light of their commercial niches. So long as a consistent array of general equilibrium prices is assumed to exist, individual expectations must be consistent with one another, and with all being consistent with some aggregate price level. The postulated order framework thus presumes a consistency and sustainability among plans and prices that makes it plausible to resort to aggregate measures in place of individually relevant variables. From a framework of postulated order, Austrian cycle theory would seem to violate elementary requirements of rationality in expectation, because it seems to presume that people cannot distinguish changes in saving from changes in central bank holdings of government debt. A framework of postulated order neuters the economic significance of any distinction between ex ante and ex post, by relegating the distinction to a simple error term. Within a framework of emergent order, by contrast, the distinction between people’s ex ante beliefs or expectations and the ex post observations that are revealed as the economic process proceeds is central to many features of the economic process, as is a dissimilarity and divergence among expectations. An economy will be characterized by a plethora of objects of expectation. It would not possess some common object of expectation. What is the appropriate conceptualization of the macroeconomy? One thing I would say about a good macro theory is that it should be consistent and conformable with the central features of the microeconomy. At first glance, this might seem simply to represent a show of support for the literature on micro foundations.8 At the level of principle this is correct, but it is not correct with respect to actual practice. I make this distinction between principle and practice out of recognition that there are two different ways that a principle of micro foundations can be put into practice. The existing literature seeks to postulate choice-theoretic foundations for macroeconomics. The maximization of utility by Robinson Crusoe is the paradigmatic model that guides the search for micro foundations. Macro phenomena are simply micro phenomena spoken of more loudly. For instance, individual firms are thought of as moving along supply and marginal product schedules, and it is the same for the aggregate economy. The alternative to a choice-theoretic foundation for macroeconomics is a coordinationist foundation.9 While a choice-theoretic foundation might be workable for a small reclusive tribe here or there, for modern complex societies only exchange and its various extensions can provide a suitable
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framework for approaching microfoundations. Only in this way can there be an order of movement from simple to complex that corresponds with the distinction between micro and macro. The economy is a dense network of transactions that no one can control or apprehend in its entirety in any great detail. Central planning is impossible, though participants can achieve a generally coordinated pattern of activity with the help of various institutions and conventions that they develop. If macroeconomics rested on adequate micro foundations, it would involve analytical constructs that were consistent with spontaneous order and related notions. To hold that the microeconomy is created through the development of networks of transactions and then to treat the macroeconomy in simple choice-theoretic terms is clearly a backwards movement, from more to less complex phenomena. The standard variables of macroeconomics – rates of growth, levels of employment, and rates of inflation – are not objects of choice for anyone, but rather are emergent outcomes of complex economic processes. Governments may do things that might influence the subsequent measures that are assigned to those variables, but this is a very different thing from choosing values for those variables. Macro and micro would thus both be concerned centrally with the coordination of economic activities, and within an analytical framework where economic outcomes are not objects of policy choice, but emerge through interactions among participants within the economic process. False trading wreaks havoc with the calm facade of postulated order. Yet it is surely a ubiquitous feature of reality that could never be excluded from a framework of emergent order. The distinction between postulated order and emergent order, along with its relevance for macro theory, can be illustrated by comparing the movement of troops on a military parade ground with the movement of people leaving a stadium after an athletic event. The postulated order framework is suitable to explain the movement of troops, for the march has been coordinated in advance. There is no scope for any endogenous source of surprise. Any surprise must be exogenous to the march. A tank might throw a track. A horse might throw its rider. A soldier might faint or die. Observed discoordination can only be exogenous to the coordinator’s intentions and plans. It is wholly different for the spectators leaving an athletic event. The order that results in this case emerges through some process of spontaneous ordering. There is no informative value in stating that the exodus proceeds “as if” it were organized by a coordinator. To do this is simply to clothe ignorance with a fictional garment. There is no coordinator, and the order that results must be explained by other means. Some of these surely involve such conventions as walking on the right, along with some elementary principles of courtesy. Traffic lights and police barricades also help the exodus. These rules and institutions provide a framework that allows a generally orderly exodus to be generated on the spot. Among
86 Richard E. Wagner other things, this exodus will generate some volume of false trades as an endogenous part of the process. In some cases there will be sufficient pushing and shoving to cause some people to be injured and require first aid, thereby causing them to be late in arriving at their next appointment. Capital gains and losses are endogenous and anticipatable elements of the emergent order. Suppose a central bank increases its holding of government debt. It is, of course, a strong empirical regularity that increases in money growth are accompanied by increases in real output in the short run. There are several ways to account for this regularity within the postulated-order context of an expectations-augmented Phillips curve. These mostly involve informational asymmetries and price rigidities of some type. For instance, it might be claimed that entrepreneurs initially interpret price increases incorrectly as signifying increased demands for their particular products. To maintain a crisp focus on the distinction between postulated and emergent order as it pertains to macro theory, however, I will assume that price rigidities are absent and that there is full knowledge of the monetary expansion. Within the framework of postulated order there has been no change in real variables, and the monetary expansion will have no effect on the real economy. In standard macro terms the situation just described is one of a vertical Phillips curve, in the short run as well as in the long run. The postulated increase in central bank holdings of government debt presents no opportunities for a profitable credit expansion because nothing has changed in real terms, in the aggregate. In this instance the credit expansion will inject no errors into the economy, entrepreneurial or otherwise. The same result does not follow, however, from a framework of emergent order. For a theory of emergent order, it is not sufficient to compare presumed equilibrium conditions before and after the credit expansion, declare them to be identical, and to conclude from this that the credit expansion had no macro effect. Macro variables are built up or emerge out of interactions among people, and from the perspective of postulated order it is necessary to ask whether a credit expansion, even under the austere conditions postulated above, might lead to changes in the conduct of individual entrepreneurs. If so, macro consequences can arise in the aggregate. A credit expansion will take place if lenders and potential borrowers recognize opportunities for profitable trade, even if there are no such opportunities in the aggregate. Consider a simple illustration of a model economy where each of 100 lenders has initially extended 100 units of credit. Suppose the central bank’s increased holdings of government debt expand potential aggregate lending ability by 10 percent. Under the aforementioned situation of postulated order, no opportunities for profitable lending would exist. In this situation the lenders would put their increased reserves into such things as treasury bills. There would be no
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change in the aggregate volume of loans. This, however, is to derive aggregate outcomes in terms of postulated equilibrium values, and not to derive them through aggregation from market interaction. There would seem to be a number of avenues by which the central bank purchase of government debt might exert aggregate effects even under the postulated conditions. What matters most of all is whether there are individual contractual opportunities that appear profitable in light of the loosened reserve position of banks. A claim that there are no profit opportunities in the aggregate is irrelevant. The aggregate conditions do not determine the content of individual acts of exchange, for those aggregate conditions are rather the reflections of those individual exchanges. A claim that in the aggregate lenders cannot increase their volume of profitable loans does not mean that no loans will be made. To be sure, this claim involves a presumption of possessing knowledge that is available to no one. But even if that claim is granted purely for the sake of pursuing the argument, the aggregate condition does not guarantee that no new loans will be made. Even if we might grant that the ex post volume of profitable loans might be unchanged, it does not follow that the ex ante plans will start from that resting point. This situation is sensible only in terms of a framework of postulated order, where the economy is presumed to move down unchanging marginal productivity schedules. The most profitable credit contracts are executed first, and the resulting equilibrium pattern of contracts is not changed by the central bank’s increased holdings of government debt. This proposition from comparative statics is, however, a proposition of the logic of postulated relations, and is not adequate for an examination of emergent order where history moves sequentially and unidirectionally. There is plenty of reason to think that ex ante commercial judgments among commercial participants will lead to some credit expansion. Credit contracts are created in a historical sequence, and all of them are thought by the participants to be ex ante profitable. At any subsequent moment, however, some of those contracts will remain profitable while others will seem inferior to new possibilities. In this situation a credit expansion will allow lenders to exploit new credit opportunities.10 Moreover, a claim that on average new profit opportunities do not exist does not bring the matter to a close. Few participants in any field of endeavor think of themselves as merely average. The mere making of a claim that there is no change in the total volume of loans that will be profitable does not imply that all lenders will refrain from seeking new business. There is no external selection procedure that selects and matches opportunities with lenders. Rather, the selection and matching occurs through an openly competitive process in which most competitors think of themselves as above average. In this situation it is surely plausible that some aggregation of ex ante commercial calculations will both lead to an
88 Richard E. Wagner expansion in the volume of loans and bring about a situation that will prove incompatible with the ex post observations that will eventually materialize. To make this latter statement is simply to assert that capital gains and losses are an endogenous part of the economic process, and are not exogenous shocks to some otherwise pre-coordinated process.
Two types of cycles and the problem of policy Traditional Austrian cycle theory treats cycles as undesirable deviations from normally stable conditions. The blame for this instability is generally placed on fractional reserve banking, particularly as supported by central banking, and with central banks often acting to support governmental fiscal policies. The remedies that have appeared in the Austrian literature seek to address these sources of instability in one fashion or another. Currency competition and free banking are at the forefront of most Austrian proposals for a program for economic stability.11 Other suggestions can be found in the Austrian literature as well, and there is also some controversy about whether fractional reserve banking should be permitted or should be replaced with a requirement of 100 percent reserves. It is not my interest here either to support or to dispute Austrian claims about central banking and economic disruption. Rather, what I want to do in closing is to point to some difficulties in the conventional use of aggregate economic variables to judge economic performance. I would like to do this by advancing two claims: (1) variability in economic time series is not a necessarily sign of poor economic performance; and (2) constancy in economic time series is not necessarily a sign of good economic performance. The original point of departure for Austrian cycle theory was a postulated state of general equilibrium. The normal economy was a flat-line economy, at least after the incorporation of seasonal adjustments. Within this analytical framework, observed variability was a sign of economic miscoordination. The booms and busts characterized by Austrian cycle theory describe an inferior state of affairs relative to the postulated flat-line economy of general equilibrium. By contrast, within a framework of emergent order, variability in observed time series can also be a sign of progress in an interdependent world with capital complementarity. There would thus be two types of cycles, one that was consistent with the orderly coordination of economic activities in a complex environment and another that emanated from disruptions to the processes of orderly coordination. The second claim means that the mere observation of stability in aggregate variables does not mean that coordinative processes are working as well as they might. Consider a simple micro-level illustration of the point I have in mind. An artist who makes pen-and-ink sketches can make 100 pieces ready for sale by working full time, if everything goes well.
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Suppose a time comes when not everything goes well. While making the frames and mounting the sketches, some of the frames fracture, causing her to divert time from sketching to making more frames. During this period she is able to produce only 80 finished sketches. We would not, however, say she experienced an unemployment rate of 20 percent, even though her output of finished product would show such a drop. Rather, we would say that her pattern of output shifted, as she made more frames than in previous periods. Suppose we analogize the artist’s situation to standard macro formulations of shocks to the economy. The first instance is one of full employment equilibrium. In the second instance her studio is hit with negative shocks that she had not anticipated. Yet full employment continues to exist, only with a different pattern of activities in the face of disruptions than when those disruptions are absent. At the macro level this second situation would be characterized as involving miscoordination, at least as regarded from a posture of omniscience. A rise in the volume of miscoordination means that there will be some shift of human activity away from executing original plans into activities that revise or reorient plans that have proven unsatisfactory.12 An economy can be represented by a network of human activity, some of which is engaged in executing original plans and some of which is engaged in rectifying plans judged to have been unsatisfactory. This distinction between types of activity is, of course, an analytical and not an empirical distinction. There is no way, at least so far as I know, that a census could be taken to determine how many people are employed in executing plans and how many are employed in revising plans that have been judged unsuccessful. Yet this analytical distinction follows from the claim that the degree of coordination is a variable that can be influenced, for good or for bad, depending on a variety of institutional arrangements and policy measures. An increase in the volume of miscoordination in a society will shift the pattern of activity in a society, but it need not alter the total volume of activity. In traditional Austrian cycle theory, micro disruption in the pattern of prices leads to boom followed by bust. Both the boom and the bust result from the reactions of market participants to nonsustainable price signals. There is no need to consider rationality in anticipations again at this point. Still, it does not follow that nonsustainable price signals must show up as variations in aggregate series through time. It is conceivable that miscoordination could increase without any impact on aggregate time series. Miscoordination induces revisions in plans. Labor is shifted from the execution of plans to the revision of plans. It is conceivable that this shift of labor can be accommodated within an unchanged aggregate volume of employment. Using normative language, cyclical variability may be either good or bad. It depends on the source of the cyclicity. In like manner the absence
90 Richard E. Wagner of cyclical variability can be either a good thing or a bad thing. It depends on the degree of coordination that is present. A benevolent policy maker would seem to face an insoluble problem of knowledge. It would be necessary to be able to distinguish good cycles from bad, a task rendered even more difficult by a recognition that both features may be present at the same moment. It would also be necessary to know when aggregate stability is a sign of a smooth coordination of plans and when it rather means merely a unitary elasticity of movement between the execution of plans and the revision or reassembly of plans. The active promotion of stability in aggregate time series is neither per se desirable nor is it possible. Aggregate outcomes are emergent outcomes and not direct objects of choice. There is no sense to a policy aimed to prevent cycles, any more than it would be sensible to prevent traffic delays. What is sensible is to seek to preclude unnecessary cycles or disturbances to the coordination of economic activity. Policy for a coordinationist macroeconomics would be of the same genre as policy generally, and would be concerned with providing and maintaining a framework within which people can order their activities. The pursuit of a truly activist stabilization policy will be both impossible and mischievous. Appropriate macro policy cannot aim to achieve particular values for macro variables, for these variables are not objects of choice. Appropriate macro policy is indistinct from appropriate micro policy, and both involve the creation and maintenance of a constitutive framework within which people can generate orderly patterns of economic activity.
Notes 1 An earlier version of this chapter was presented as a paper given at a workshop on “New Perspectives on Austrian Economics,” held at the Max Planck Institute in Jena, 7–8 August 1998. I am particularly grateful to Nicolai Foss, Sylvie Geisendorf, Ulrich Witt, and Michael Wohlgemuth for their comments and suggestions at that time. A revised version of that paper was published as Wagner (1999), and this chapter addresses similar themes in a somewhat different manner. 2 It is possible to argue that the period of production has some useful heuristic properties even if it must also be acknowledged that there is no way of developing a coherent measure of the period of production. 3 See, for instance, Gerald O’Driscoll (1977) and Roger Garrison (1989, 1991). 4 For sharply contrasting assessments of that resurgence, compare Nicolai Foss (1995) and Karen Vaughn (1994). 5 For an effort to reconcile some of the Austrian insights with real estate booms, see Fred Foldvary (1997). 6 For a splendid, pithy examination of the dead ends to which a non-coordinationist macroeconomics leads, see Alan Kirman (1992). 7 This point is developed crisply by Ulrich Witt (1997). 8 For a lucid and penetrating survey of this literature, see Maarten Janssen (1993). 9 See, for instance, Axel Leijonhufvud (1981) and John Bryant (1994).
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10 To be sure, the emergence of secondary markets, whereby an original lender sells a note to someone else, operates in a somewhat similar manner. Indeed, the emergence of such secondary market arrangements is itself an endogenous market phenomenon that is best treated in light of a theory of spontaneous order applied to institutional development, a nice survey of which is presented by Thráinn Eggertsson (1990). 11 See, for instance, F.A. Hayek (1976), George Selgin (1988), and Lawrence White (1989). 12 Such miscoordination can be categorized as wasteful, as explained by W.H. Hutt (1943).
References Böhm-Bawerk, Eugen von ([1884–1889] 1959), Capital and Interest, 3 vols., Libertarian Press, South Holland, IL. Bryant, John (1994), “Coordination Theory, the Stag Hunt, and Macroeconomics,” in J.W. Friedman (ed.) Problems of Coordination in Economic Theory, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, pp. 207–225. Eggertsson, Thráinn (1990), Economic Behavior and Institutions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Foldvary, Fred (1997), “The Business Cycle: A Georgist–Austrian Synthesis,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 56: 521–541. Foss, Nicolai (1995), The Austrian School and Modern Economics, Munksgaard, Copenhagen. Garrison, Roger W. (1989), “The Austrian Theory of the Business Cycle in Light of Modern Macroeconomics,” Review of Austrian Economics 3: 3–29. Garrison, Roger W. (1991), “New Classical and Old Austrian Economics: Equilibrium Business Cycle Theory in Perspective,” Review of Austrian Economics 5: 91–103. Gordon, Robert Aaron (1961), Business Fluctuations, 2nd edn, Harper & Row, New York. Haberler, Gottfried (1964), Prosperity and Depression, 5th edn, Allen & Unwin, London. Hayek, Friedrich A. (1935), Prices and Production, 2nd edn, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. Hayek, Friedrich A. (1976), Denationalisation of Money, Institute of Economic Affairs, London. Hutt, William H. (1943), “The Concept of Waste,” South African Journal of Economics 11: 1–10. Janssen, Maarten C.W. (1993), Microfoundations: A Critical Inquiry, Routledge, London. Kirman, Alan P. (1992), “Whom or What Does the Representative Individual Represent?,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 6: 117–136. Leijonhufvud, Axel (1981), Information and Coordination, Oxford University Press, New York. Macfie, Alec (1934), Theories of the Trade Cycle, Macmillan, London. Mises, Ludwig von ([1912] 1934), The Theory of Money and Credit, Jonathan Cape, London. O’Driscoll, Gerald P., Jr. (1977), Economics as a Coordination Problem, Sheed Andrews, Kansas City.
92 Richard E. Wagner Selgin, George A. (1988), The Theory of Free Banking, Rowman & Littlefield, Totowa, NJ. Vaughn, Karen I. (1994), Austrian Economics in America, Cambridge University Press, New York. Wagner, Richard E. (1999), “Austrian Cycle Theory: Saving the Wheat while Discarding the Chaff,” Review of Austrian Economics 12: 65–80. White, Lawrence H. (1989), Competition and Currency, New York University Press, New York. Wicksell, Knut ([1898] 1936), Interest and Prices, Macmillan, London. Witt, Ulrich (1997), “The Hayekian Puzzle: Spontaneous Order and the Business Cycle,” Scottish Journal of Political Economy 44 (February): 44–58.
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Financial economics
5
Big Players and money demand Catherine Beckett Gilanshah and Roger Koppl
Introduction In this chapter we build on Hayek and Lachmann to further develop Austrian ideas about knowledge and institutions. We apply the theory of Big Players (Butos and Koppl 1993, 1999; Koppl and Yeager 1996) to the problem of the stability of money demand. We find that discretionary monetary policy produces instability of money demand. The difficulty of predicting a discretionary monetary policy reduces money holders’ knowledge of the future. This ignorance of the future induces a kind of herding (explained on p. 99), which creates instability of money demand. The institutions governing money supply influence the stability of money demand by way of their influence on the knowledge and expectations of economic actors. Our Austrian interest in knowledge and institutions has its origins in the work of Carl Menger. Ludwig von Mises ([1920] 1935) greatly expanded the Austrian understanding of knowledge and institutions. The position he and Hayek defended during the socialist calculation debate clarified the Austrian “knowledge problem” upon which Hayek and Lachmann both worked. Hayek’s work has given rise to the theory of expectations proposed by Butos and Koppl (1993, 1997). Lachmann’s work refined our understanding of the role and importance of institutions. Our results build on Butos and Koppl’s Hayekian theory of expectations. They illustrate important themes of Lachmann’s work, especially as expressed in his essay The Legacy of Max Weber (1971). The second section discusses money demand in the context of the theory of Big Players. The section after that reviews the history of monetary policy in the United States from 1950 through the 1980s. We argue that it became more discretionary after 1970. The fourth section explains our statistical methods and results. Our numerical evidence supports our theoretical claim that discretionary monetary policy creates instability of money demand. The fifth section, the conclusion, contains some comments on the implications of our study for future work in the theoretical and empirical study of money demand. If the results of our preliminary
96 Catherine B. Gilanshah and Roger Koppl study hold up in other studies, the theory of money demand will require amendment.
Money demand and the theory of Big Players The demand for money has potentially profound effects on economic activity. In the absence of offsetting factors, an unstable demand for money translates into instabilities in prices, employment, and output. Despite its significance, however, the demand for money is a variable whose behavior perplexes economists. Most monetary economists have been in search of a well-specified model that will allow them to track accurately the demand for money and predict its future movements. By the early 1970s a consensus had emerged among economists as to the functional form of money demand, which seemed to exhibit a high degree of empirical stability in the period after World War II (see Laidler 1993: 171, Goldfeld 1973). At about the same time, the Fed began a long series of changes in its policies and procedures. As we shall argue, these changes produced greater activism and discretion on the part of the Federal Reserve System. Shortly thereafter, money demand estimates became unstable, and the emerging data began to expose shortcomings in the accepted models. Most economists came to believe these problems with tracking money demand were a product of mis-specification of the models. Thus, since the 1970s the game has been one of discovering which measure of income or wealth to use, which measure of risk, and which measure of liquidity, as well as some way to account for advances in payment technologies and institutional change. Yet no model to date has proved to be robust over a satisfactorily long period. Was it merely a coincidence that the shortcomings of money demand specifications became obvious at roughly the same time that the Fed adopted much more activist and discretionary policies? The theory of the Big Players would suggest that it was not. A Big Player is an important actor such as the Federal Reserve that is insensitive to profit and loss and acts on discretion rather than according to a known rule. We review the theory of Big Players and briefly discuss its theoretical origins. We then apply it to U.S. money demand from 1950s to 1980s. We find that after 1970, Fed policy grew more discretionary and that this increase in Big Player influence at least contributed to greater instability in money demand. The facts are as follows: (1) the Fed began to undertake more discretionary policy actions beginning in 1970; (2) shortly thereafter, the estimates generated by the standard money demand specifications began to show sizable prediction errors; (3) despite considerable effort, no new and improved specification of money demand has emerged that can satisfactorily account for its seemingly aberrant behavior during the 1970s and 1980s. The puzzle is that if the prediction errors were purely a product of
Big Players and money demand 97 mis-specification, why, despite the enormous resources devoted to this task, have economists been unable to produce a better model for money demand? Though we do not deny that financial innovation, changes in definition of money, wage and price controls, and other factors might have contributed to instabilities in money demand during the period in question, we take a different approach in attempting to solve the money demand puzzles of the 1970s and 1980s. If the theory of the Big Players is correct, then the sort of instabilities generated by the discretionary actions of Fed policy makers cannot be explained by the addition of new variables. Instead, we will contrast the behavior of money demand estimates over two periods, the 1950s–1960s and the 1970s–1980s. Using rescaledrange analysis, we will test whether the more discretionary and interventionist monetary policies of the latter period were indeed a factor in the observed instabilities of money demand estimates. We find evidence that Fed activism did induce instability in money demand. If the result holds under scrutiny, it has important implications for monetary policy. The implication is that the Fed should not abandon money supply targets, but should pursue them according to a fixed rule. This implication contradicts one common inference drawn from the literature on instability of money demand. Mishkin’s undergraduate text is representative of this common view. Mishkin argues that “because the money demand function has become unstable, velocity is now harder to predict, and setting rigid money supply targets in order to control aggregate spending in the economy may not be an effective way to conduct monetary policy” (1995: 572). But if this instability of money demand is a product of Fed activism, Mishkin’s conclusion does not follow. If discretion produces instability, we have an argument for less of it, not more. The debate over rules versus discretion in monetary policy is one part of the larger issue of flexibility versus coherence of a society’s institutional order. Ludwig Lachmann has argued that an “institution provides means of orientation to a large number of actors.” They can “co-ordinate their actions by means of orientation to a common signpost.” But a signpost must not be moved too often. “If institutions are to serve us as firm points of orientation their position in the social firmament must be fixed.” But, of course, “it is hardly possible to imagine” that any institution could be “totally exempt from change.” A change known in advance “need not interfere with the plans of users.” But some changes will be surprises. “What happens then?” In situations of unexpected change, could “institutions mislead rather than guide planned action?” (1971: 49–51). Lachmann argued that regular and predictable changes pose no fundamental problem, but “irregular” change does. “Not movement as such, but irregular movement that disqualifies an institution from serving as a point of orientation. The crucial requirement is for actors to be able to take their bearings by existing institutions, to be able to ‘steer by them’ ” (ibid.: 79). The theory of the Big Player fits well with Lachmann’s theoretical work
98 Catherine B. Gilanshah and Roger Koppl on institutions. In fact, the Big Player’s discretion can be viewed as creating the irregular movement Lachmann warned of. As defined by Koppl and Yeager (1996) and Butos and Koppl (1993, 1997), a Big Player must satisfy three criteria: 1 2 3
He must be big in the sense that his actions influence the course of economic events. He must be relatively insensitive to profit and loss. He must use discretion in his exercise of market power.
Koppl and Yeager (1996) and Butos and Koppl (1993, 1995) argue that when a Big Player is present, not only will his actions directly affect economic variables, but also they will lower the informational content of many market signals, including prices and interest rates. That is, the signposts will shift. This has several implications. First, “small players” will have increased difficulty extracting useful knowledge about economic fundamentals, thereby reducing the reliability and usefulness of their expectations. Second, success now becomes more closely tied to anticipating the behavior of the Big Player, resulting in a reallocation of entrepreneurial alertness toward this task and away from fundamentals. Finally, discretionary policies on the part of the Big Player will create “Keynesian Beauty Contests” (Butos and Koppl 1999). That is, the decisions of policy makers will be based on their expectations of how private actors will behave, while the decisions of private actors will be based on their expectations of how policy makers will behave. This, at least in part, divorces the process of expectations formation from underlying economic fundamentals. The theory maintains, then, that the Big Player’s discretionary policies increase the uncertainty of the market, and contribute to greater volatility or market instabilities.1 According to the theory, an independent central bank may easily become the quintessential Big Player. First, the policy actions of the Federal Reserve System clearly affect the course of economic events. Second, the System’s policy-making committee may exercise any desired degree of discretion in setting and pursuing various targets; it may choose either rules or discretion. Third, the Federal Reserve System is free of profit and loss constraints with respect to its policy actions. All three characteristics of a Big Player are present potentially. The central bank’s choice between rules and discretion decides the case. If the Fed chooses rules, it is not a Big Player, and may indeed act as Lachmann’s “signpost” for guiding and coordinating the money management decisions of many. If it chooses discretion, it becomes a Big Player. In the case at hand, one of the many variables that may be affected by the discretionary actions of Federal Reserve policy makers is the demand for money. Since Federal Reserve policies directly affect the opportunity cost of holding money, they also affect the quantity of it demanded.
Big Players and money demand 99 Past work on the theory has argued that Big Players induce “herding” or “bandwagon effects” in asset markets such as the stock market and the foreign exchange market. The evidence so far collected supports this claim (Koppl and Yeager 1996; Ahmed et al. 1997; Koppl and Mramor 2003; Koppl and Nardone 2001). We argue that Big Players also induce herding in the demand for money. Our argument is similar to that of Koppl and Yeager, who build on Scharfstein and Stein (1990). Bandwagon effects enter money demand through the role of cash managers. A substantial portion of money demand is, of course, demand on the part of business enterprises. The decision of how much money to hold is often made by a professional cash manager. Scharfstein and Stein (1990) have noted the importance of reputation for portfolio managers. We note that the same holds for cash managers. As with the portfolio manager, the cash manager’s job prospects depend mostly on his or her reputation. It is hard for a cash manager’s supervisors and potential employers to measure the quality of his or her decisions. One criterion they will employ is the cash manager’s conformity to industry practice. This is a global criterion. Supervisors who use this global criterion will ask, for example, if their cash manager reduced money holdings when trade journals warned of the dangers of excess liquidity in the current macroeconomic climate. They will also want to know, however, if the cash manager’s decisions were appropriate to the unique circumstances of their business situation. This is a local criterion. Because the cash manager is judged partly on global criteria, he or she has an incentive to act as other cash managers act. If you act as others do and things go well, your reputation is ensured. If you act as others do and things go badly, you can share the blame with others. It is dangerous to act on one’s own judgment. If you defy common wisdom and things go badly, your reputation is shot and your job prospects diminished. Scharfstein and Stein (who considered only portfolio managers) call this incentive to imitate the “sharing-the-blame effect” (1990: 466). Cash managers are not judged on global criteria only. They are also judged on local criteria. A cash manager who can consistently make good decisions in defiance of common wisdom will earn a strongly favorable reputation and enjoy improved job prospects. There is therefore a counter-incentive discouraging bandwagon effects. Money demand is influenced by the sharing-the-blame effect, which creates herding and the incentive to ignore local information. At any one time we can expect some herding to occur without imagining cash managers to be perfect sheep. Some will herd, others will not. Big Player activism increases the fraction who herd. A Big Player monetary authority weakens the counter-incentives to sharing the blame and thus encourages herding. The Big Player’s discretionary actions influence the opportunity cost of holding money. It is thus important for cash managers to pay attention to the actions and prospective
100 Catherine B. Gilanshah and Roger Koppl actions of the Big Player. Fed watching is necessitated by discretionary monetary policy. Fed watching, however, diverts attention from local factors. Moreover, a Big Player Fed is difficult to fathom. Almost by definition, the actions of a discretionary agent cannot be predicted (see Koppl and Yeager 1996; Koppl 1996). Thus, cash managers’ attention is diverted from what is relatively easy to predict to what is relatively hard to predict. In this greater state of ignorance, the cash manager has a stronger incentive to share the blame. Each cash manager has a stronger incentive to act as other cash managers do. The advice promulgated in trade journals will be more universally adhered to, less frequently ignored. There will be more herding in money demand. Fed policy went from one of little Big Player discretion in the 1950s and 1960s to one of greater Big Player discretion in the 1970s and 1980s. We chronicle this change and provide evidence that it induced increased herding in money demand.
The Federal Reserve as Big Player In the 1950s and 1960s the primary operational guide for Federal Reserve policy makers was free reserves (excess reserves less borrowed reserves), with bank credit (commercial loans and investments) serving as an intermediate guide (Meulendyke 1989: 34). Free reserve targets did not constitute a strict and binding rule; nonetheless, throughout this period the Federal Reserve would respond to changes in the level of free reserves in a predictable manner. Equally importantly, throughout this period the assumptions underlying monetary policy procedures were relatively stable. This meant that private actors could form reasonably certain expectations of what the Federal Reserve was going to do or how it was going to react to a given change. In other words, the element of discretion in Federal Reserve policy making was relatively low. As a number of studies showed, money demand behaved in a predictable manner over this period such that by 1970 there was general agreement among economists over its longterm functional form – which seemed to exhibit stability over time. The basic model utilized in studies such as those of Laidler (1977) and Goldfeld (1973) took the following form: ln (Mt /Pt) 0 1 ln Yt 2 ln R st 3 ln R mt 4 ln (Mt1/Pt1)
(1)
where Yt some measure of wealth or income, such as GNP; R st interest rate on savings deposits; R mt some market interest rate, such as the rate on T-bills; and Mt1/Pt1 real money balances, lagged one period. The inflationary pressure of the late 1960s prompted many economists to question the assumed relationships underlying current monetary policy (Meulendyke 1989: 38). This led to a number of policy initiatives in the early 1970s that resulted in much more discretionary and activist policies.
Big Players and money demand 101 Indeed, 1970 marked the beginning of a new era in Federal Reserve policy in which there would be greater discretion not only as to the appropriate range for a given Federal Reserve target, but as to which targets were appropriate. In other words, what had previously been a system of relatively modest discretion within the rules now turned into a series of discretionary and unpredictable changes in the rules themselves. The Federal Reserve had truly become a Big Player. We will argue in this section that there were three identifiable regime shifts in the 1970s and 1980s: 1970–1972, 1979, and 1983. Following each shift to a new regime, there was a significant period of experimentation and modification on the part of the Federal Reserve policy makers as they sought the best way to implement their new objectives. During these periods the market was characterized by greater uncertainty, as small players could not clearly distinguish signals reflecting discretionary interventions from those reflecting shifts in underlying economic fundamentals. Furthermore, following a shift the market would reward entrepreneurs who could correctly anticipate the actions of the Big Player, resulting in a reallocation of resources toward “Fed watching” (see Meulendyke 1989: 197–198; Jones 1989; Melton 1985). At the same time, the Federal Reserve, uncertain of how its new technique would affect the market, responded to every jitter and jump, basing each move on how it expected the market to react. Likewise, the market expectations of “private actors” would now have to be based not only on their theories of what the market would do in the absence of intervention, but also on their theories of what the Fed would do. Meulendyke (1989: 188) describes the market’s response to the changes in the following way: Decisions about the management of money and credit were influenced by estimates of how rapidly the monetary authorities would raise or lower the funds rate; the judgement often depended as much on assessing policymakers’ willingness to allow interest rates to change as on observing the behavior of money growth and the economy. Most forecasting focused on the factors believed to affect the timing and magnitude of funds rate changes. The result, as the Big Players theory suggests, was a separation of expectations formation from underlying economic fundamentals; the Federal Reserve had created a “Keynesian beauty contest.” Discretion becomes the rule: the 1970s 2 In an attempt to bring down inflation, the Federal Reserve formally adopted monetary targets in 1970.3 The new operational guides required new techniques, however, for setting targets and pursuing monetary policy, and this process involved much experimentation and modification
102 Catherine B. Gilanshah and Roger Koppl during the early years of the decade. At various stages, the Fed attempted to control money through the demand side, at others, through the supply side, and at others still, by manipulating both. For instance, in 1972 the Federal Reserve briefly experimented with targeting reserves on private deposits (RPD). Fearing unacceptable volatility in interest rates, however, it also attempted to constrain the federal funds rate. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) was always reluctant to change the federal funds rate by more than incremental steps, even when larger movements were deemed necessary to hit monetary targets. Thus, despite the stated policy of RPD targeting, the narrow range set for the federal funds rate was typically the binding constraint, and the reserve targets were frequently missed. The result, of course, was inflation. By 1973 the targets on RPD were already widely perceived to be unachievable, and they were downgraded to an intermediate target4 (see Meulendyke 1989: 38–43). By the mid-1970s the federal funds rate had essentially become the de facto operational target (Roley 1990: 39–40). Once this shift had taken place, the FOMC’s desk became increasingly reluctant to permit the federal funds rate to deviate from its target. Thus, by the late 1970s the desk was promptly and predictably responding “to even small wiggles in the federal funds rate” (Meulendyke 1989: 43). This again created an environment in which private actors could form expectations of Federal Reserve behavior with some degree of certainty; however, the inability of this regime to contain the runaway inflation indicated that a new technique or target was just around the corner. The Volcker experiment: 1979–1982 The federal funds targeting regime clearly had not brought inflation under control. Many critics of the federal funds regime, influenced by the monetarists, argued that what was needed was a rule-based operating technique in which the Federal Reserve would control money from the supply side. Driven by pressures on all sides, in October 1979 Paul Volcker, the new chairman of the Board of Governors, implemented sweeping changes in the Federal Reserve’s operating technique. Although the new regime appeared to be rule based, it was actually a convoluted scheme of multiple targets and derived estimates. As described by Meulendyke (1989: 43–44), operationally the FOMC would choose a desired quarterly growth rate for one of the monetary aggregates. The Federal Reserve staff would then estimate a level of total reserves consistent with that growth rate, as well as deposit and currency mixes to derive average reserve ratios and currency deposit ratios. Finally, the desk would derive a target for nonborrowed reserves, which at the same time would determine the level of borrowed reserves, given the FOMC’s total reserve target. Thus, what was called M1 targeting was based on an estimation technique that involved the analyst’s discretion at nearly every one of the four steps.
Big Players and money demand 103 Even under this “supply-side” regime the federal funds rate was not ignored. It was recognized that this key rate, along with all other interest rates, would be both higher and more volatile; yet its level was considered, and could result in the acceleration or delay of an operation necessary for a reserve adjustment (Meulendyke 1989: 45). In addition, it was occasionally deemed that the adjustment implied by the FOMC’s orders was proceeding at either too slow or too fast a pace, in which case, discretion entered the equation again as the desk was granted permission to make alterations in the borrowing objective between official meetings. Under this regime, nonborrowed reserve growth targets were derived for inter-meeting average periods. As Meulendyke (1989: 44–45) describes it, this technique meant that if a reserve target were missed in the early part of the period, as it often was, it had to be offset by large swings in borrowing at the end of the period. Thus, “informal adjustments” were sometimes implemented to smooth temporary spikes and drops that were deemed inconsistent with the longer term patterns. Although [these] adjustments were considered necessary to avoid severe short-term swings in reserve availability and interest rates, they gave the appearance of “fiddling” and caused considerable confusion for outside observers.5 Only three years after its introduction, in late 1982, the Federal Reserve abandoned M1 targeting. New data indicated that the relationship between M1 and economic activity was not a stable one – a prerequisite for monetary targeting. The FOMC briefly experimented with M2 targeting in the final quarter of 1982, but the introduction of money-market deposit accounts in December of that year strongly affected the demand for M2, and this scheme, too, proved unsuccessful (Meulendyke 1989: 46). The Volcker years, while successful in moderating inflation, generated further unpredictable swings in money demand. In 1980–1982 the demand for M1 rose sharply in a way that no model predicted. Though the theory of the Big Player does not speak to the direction of changes in key variables, it does suggest that the unpredictable movements in money demand were, at least in part, a consequence of the unpredictable and discretionary actions of the Federal Reserve. The guise of borrowed reserve targeting: 1983–1987 Beginning in the last weeks of 1982, the Federal Reserve shifted its focus from the indirect method of nonborrowed reserve targeting to targeting borrowed reserves directly. This, however, was essentially a move back toward targeting interest rates. The FOMC would choose the desired level of borrowed reserves, but the way to attain that level was through the interest rate. Then, if interest rates threatened to rise, the Fed would
104 Catherine B. Gilanshah and Roger Koppl supply nonborrowed reserves to the market to bring the interest rate back down. Operationally, in addition to weighing economic activity and inflation, the FOMC would consider a number of “supplemental indicators” such as foreign exchange movements and financial market conditions in formulating its policy decisions. In essence, the FOMC considered whatever variables it deemed important at that time, and often even gave the desk further discretionary powers within the targeted ranges (Meulendyke 1989: 47). The borrowed reserve targeting regime was no different than the previous regimes in that it relied heavily on the discretion of a few individuals. “Fed watchers” tried, as they had in previous monetary regimes, to estimate reaction functions for the Big Player. Yet policies that rely on the discretion of individuals are by their nature impervious to such quantification. Thus, small players had to form expectations of both what the market would do, and how the Federal Reserve would react. Meulendyke (1989: 189