Modality and Subordinators
Studies in Language Companion Series (SLCS) This series has been established as a companion series to the periodical Studies in Language.
Editors Werner Abraham University of Vienna
Elly van Gelderen
Arizona State University
Editorial Board Bernard Comrie
Max Planck Institute, Leipzig and University of California, Santa Barbara
William Croft
University of New Mexico
Östen Dahl
University of Stockholm
Gerrit J. Dimmendaal University of Cologne
Ekkehard König
Free University of Berlin
Volume 116 Modality and Subordinators by Jackie Nordström
Christian Lehmann University of Erfurt
Brian MacWhinney
Carnegie-Mellon University
Marianne Mithun
University of California, Santa Barbara
Heiko Narrog
Tohuku University
Johanna L. Wood
University of Aarhus
Modality and Subordinators Jackie Nordström Lund University
John Benjamins Publishing Company Amsterdam / Philadelphia
8
TM
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ansi z39.48-1984.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Nordstrom, Jackie. Modality and subordinators / Jackie Nordstrom. p. cm. (Studies in Language Companion Series, issn 0165-7763 ; v. 116) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Modality (Linguistics) 2. Grammar, Comparative and general--Subordinate constructions. I. Title. 2010 P299.M6N675 2009045841 415’.6--dc22 isbn 978 90 272 0583 4 (Hb ; alk. paper) isbn 978 90 272 8860 8 (Eb)
© 2010 – John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. John Benjamins Publishing Co. · P.O. Box 36224 · 1020 me Amsterdam · The Netherlands John Benjamins North America · P.O. Box 27519 · Philadelphia pa 19118-0519 · usa
To adjunkt Kerstin Nordström
Table of contents
Preface and acknowledgements Abbreviations chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 Presentation 1 1.2 Disposition 3 1.3 Research paradigms 4 1.3.1 Language typology and language universals 4 1.3.2 Generative grammar and universal grammar 8 1.3.3 Evaluation and application 10 1.4 Methods and material 11
xiii xv
1
part i. Modality and subordinators in the languages of the world chapter 2 Modality 15 2.1 Terms and definitions of modality 16 2.1.1 Three domains of modality 16 2.1.2 Factuality vs. assertion 17 2.1.3 Epistemic and evidential modality 18 2.1.4 The declarative 22 2.1.5 The conditional 24 2.2 The indicative-subjunctive and realis-irrealis distinctions 25 2.2.1 The indicative-subjunctive distinction (Palmer 1986, 2001 and Noonan 2007) 26 2.2.2 The realis-irrealis distinction (Chafe 1995, Mithun 1995) 30 2.2.3 The universal realis-irrealis distinction (Palmer 2001) 33 2.2.4 Factuality as the focal meaning of the realis-irrealis distinction 35 2.2.5 Refutation of the assertion analysis 41 2.2.6 Conclusion 46 2.3 Notions related to modality 47 2.3.1 Complement-taking predicates and the indicative-subjunctive distinction (Noonan 2007) 47 2.3.2 Speech acts and performatives (Austin 1962, Searle 1969) 49
viii Modality and Subordinators
2.3.2.1 Speech-acts within the field of modality 2.4 Conclusion 53
50
chapter 3
The morphosyntactic status of modality 55 3.1 Morphosyntax 56 3.2 The Semantic-relevance hypothesis (Bybee 1985) 58 3.2.1 Assessment of the semantic-relevance hypothesis 61 3.3 The split-inflection hypothesis (Cinque 1999) 62 3.3.1 Assessment of the split-inflection hypothesis 63 3.4 Syntactic heads and word formation (Julien 2002) 68 3.4.1 Assessment 71 3.5 Two typological surveys of the morphosyntactic status of propositional modality 78 3.5.1 Survey of the internal order between propositional modality and tense in Julien’s (2002) 530 languages 79 3.5.1.1 Results 80 3.5.2 Independent survey of the internal order between propositional modality and tense in the languages of the world 82 3.5.2.1 Results 83 3.5.3 Comparison of the two investigations 84 3.5.3.1 Discussion 85 3.6 Conclusion 88 chapter 4
Subordinators and modality 91 4.1 Subordination and subordinators 91 4.1.1 Subordination 91 4.1.2 Subordinators 94 4.2 The functional category complementizer and modality 98 4.2.1 V2, complementizer, and mood (Bhatt 1999) 98 4.2.2 The split-complementizer hypothesis (Rizzi 1997, 2002, Stroh-Wollin 2002) 100 4.2.2.1 Evaluation of the Split-Complementizer hypothesis 103 4.3 Complementizers and modality from a typological perspective 105 4.3.1 Complementizers and the realis-irrealis distinction in the languages of the world (Noonan 2007) 105 4.3.2 Complementizers as modal categories (Frajzyngier 1995) 107 4.5 Conclusion 109
Table of contents
chapter 5
Investigation of semantic, functional, and notational similarities between propositional modality and subordinators in the languages of the world 5.1 Subordinating moods of propositional modality 111 5.2 Subordinating propositional-modal particles and clitics 115 5.3 Realis and irrealis subordinators 117 5.4 Conclusion 124
111
part ii. Modality and subordinators in the Germanic languages chapter 6
The Germanic indicative and subjunctive as propositional modality markers 127 6.1 The speech-act functions of the Germanic subjunctive 127 6.2 The Germanic indicative-subjunctive as propositional-modality markers 131 6.2.1 The indicative-subjunctive in conditional constructions 131 6.2.2 Subjunctive licensing in complement clauses 134 6.3 Fossilized subjunctive forms 144 6.4 Conclusion 145 chapter 7 Modal markers and word order in the Germanic languages 7.1 The modal past 149 7.2 Verum focus and emphatic do-insertion 151 7.3 V2 and V1 as Realis and Irrealis 152 7.4 Negative polarity-sensitive items and the Irrealis 154 7.5 V2 in that-clauses 157 7.6 Modal verbs 160 7.7 Modal particles 166 7.8 Conclusion 170 chapter 8 General subordinators and propositional modality in the Germanic languages 8.1 that and if as markers of propositional modality 173 8.2 that- vs. if-selection 178 8.2.1 Swedish 178 8.2.1.1 Predicates selecting att 178 8.2.1.2 Predicates selecting om 180 8.2.1.3 Att-selecting predicates that can alternatively be constructed with om 182 8.2.1.4 Att or om after dubitative predicates 187
149
173
ix
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Modality and Subordinators
8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7
8.2.2 German 194 8.2.3 English 199 The grammaticalization of if and a typological comparison 202 Comparison between that-if and the indicative-subjunctive 205 that-omission and the subjunctive 209 Other interrogative and conditional subordinators 217 Conclusion 223
chapter 9 Speech-act modality 9.1 The interrogative 225 9.1.1 Polar questions 225 9.1.2 Content questions 227 9.2 The imperative 232 9.3 Conclusion 236
225
chapter 10
Relative and adverbial subordinators 10.1 Relative and comparative subordinators 240 10.2 Adverbial subordinators 248 10.2.1 The Scandinavian languages 250 10.2.2 The West Germanic, Celtic, and Gallo-Iberian languages 257 10.3 The for-to-construction 260 10.4 Conclusion 264 chapter 11 Conclusion and final remarks 11.1 Hypothesis 267 11.2 Research paradigms 268 11.3 Part I: Modality and subordinators in the languages of the world 268 11.3.1 Defining the relevant modality category 268 11.3.2 The morphosyntactic status of propositional modality 271 11.3.3 General subordinators and propositional modality 272 11.4 Part II: Modality and subordinators in the Germanic languages 273 11.4.1 The indicative-subjunctive distinction 273 11.4.2 The modal past, word order, and other modal morphemes 275 11.4.3 General subordinators and propositional modality 277 11.4.4 Speech-act modality 279 11.4.5 Relative and adverbial subordinators 282 11.5 Final remarks 284
239
267
Table of contents
appendix A
Two typological surveys of the morphosyntactic status of propositional modality
285
appendix B
Sources for the typological surveys
307
References
323
Language index
337
Subject index
339
xi
Preface and acknowledgements
When our ancestors left Africa some 60 – 70 000 years ago, they were endowed with particular abilities that facilitated their quick colonization of the globe. They were probably not unique in having a language, as studies of the Neanderthal genome have revealed (Krause et al. 2007). However, the sudden appearance of art objects and rockcarvings suggests that they were perhaps unique in their ability to communicate about things that were imaginary (irreal). The primary functions of language, probably not only to that of modern humans, can be said to be to refer to things in the real world, and to perform speech-acts, such as assertions, commands, requests etc. However, when humans communicate about imaginary events, they go beyond these functions. This unique ability made it possible for our ancestors to communicate what potential consequences a hypothetical action could bring about, how likely it was that a certain event would occur and what things they hoped or feared would happen. This, in turn, made the listeners more able to make the right choices for the future. The present book is about the ability to refer to imaginary events. Researchers who study languages have found that there are certain kinds of morphemes that appear to denote this, namely inflectional morphemes (mood), particles, or auxiliary verbs (modal markers). The language(s) spoken by our ancestors most likely had such grammatical markers. However, there is also another, more fundamental component to the expression of imaginary events. Since imaginary events are removed from the speech situation and the observed reality, the corresponding utterances are not assertions, but merely propositions. To avoid expressing assertions, subordination is employed (Cristofaro 2003). Thus, imaginary events tend to be realized as subordinate clauses (conditional protases, complement clauses of predicates of belief, doubt, hope and fear etc.). It is also typically in subordinate clauses that irrealis markers such as the subjunctive and conditional are found. The present investigation explores the hypothesis that these strategies are in fact two sides of the same coin, that subordinators are markers of the realis-irrealis distinction. The author wishes to express her gratitude towards the following people: Christer Platzack, Marit Julien, Kristin Eide, Henrik Rosenkvist, Katarina Tucker Spijksma, Werner Abraham, Elly van Gelderen, Terje Lohndal, Lars-Olof Delsing, Halldór Sigurðsson, Kasper Boye, Joost van de Weijer, Cedric Boeckx, everyone at the GRIMM seminar, and Viola.
Abbreviations
abs acc act actv adj adm adv advbzr aff ag agit agr allat ant aor appar append.v appl appr.ep art asp assert assur aux ben caus cert cl clt cogn
first person second person third person absolutive accusative actor active adjective admirative adverb adverbializer affirmative agentive agitative agreement allative anterior aorist apparential appended vowel applicative apprehensive epistemic article aspect assertive assurance auxiliary beneficiary causative certaintive class clitic cognitive
com comp compl cond conj cont contrst cop countrf curr dat decl def dep desid det diff.sub dim dir dist distr dub dur dyn emph epen.v erg evid excl excess exhaust exhort ext.asp
comitative complementizer completive conditional conjunctive continuative contrastive copula counterfactual current dative declarative definite dependent desiderative determiner different subject diminutive directional distant distractive dubitative durative dynamic emphatic epenthetic vowel ergative evidential exclamative excessive exhaustive exhortative extended aspect
xvi Modality and Subordinators
fact factatv fem fin form fut gen hab hon hort hyp ign imm imp impf impfv incept inch incl incompl incorp iness ind ind.obj indef indet individzr inf infer instr intent inter intr irr iter lig loc mal masc neg
factive factative feminine finite formative future genitive habitual honorific hortative hypothetical ignorative immediate imperative imperfect imperfective inceptive inchoative inclusive incompletive incorporative inessive indicative indirect object indefinite indeterminate time individualizer infinitive inferential instrumental intentive interrogative intransitive irrealis iterative ligature locative maleficiary masculine negative
neut nom nomzr num obj obl oblq opt part pass pass.inv perempt perf perfv permiss perpl pers pers act pl plu possib poss pot ppl prep pres presum presup pret prog proh pron pst punct purp quot real rec recip refl
neutral nominative nominalizer number objective obligative oblique optative particle passive passive inverse peremptive perfect perfective permissive perplexed person personal action plural pluperfect possible possessive potential participial preposition present presumptive presupposed preterite progressive prohibitive pronoun past punctual purpositive quotative realis recent recipient reflexive
Abbreviations xvii
rem.past rep retrosp same.subj seq sim sg span.seq spec stat sub sub.agr subj. subv
remote past reported retrospective same subject sequential simultaneous singular span sequence specific stative subject subject agreement subjunctive subjective
subord superl supp tent th tod.pst top trans undes undg unm val vol
subordinative superlative suppositive tentative theme today’s past topic transitive undesirable undergoer unmarked valence volitive
chapter
Introduction
1.1 Presentation This book explores the hypothesis that subordinators are modal markers. More specifically, it argues that general subordinators (or complementizers), such as the Germanic that, if, and whether1 denote propositional modality. Propositional modality stands for the “speaker’s attitude to the truth-value or factual status of the proposition” (Palmer 2001: 24) and is typically expressed by the indicative-subjunctive or realis-irrealis moods and epistemic-evidential modal morphemes. That complementizers are modal morphemes has already been proposed by Frajzyngier (1995). The present investigation can be said to be an elaboration of Frajzyngier (1995). The investigation follows Palmer (2001) who divides modality into different conceptual domains: propositional modality and event modality. Whereas propositional modality is concerned with factuality, event modality has to do with conditions on the agent in respect to the main event, and is proptotypically expressed by deontic and dynamic modal morphemes, but may also be expressed by the subjunctive or irrealis moods according to Palmer (2001). In agreement with Bybee & Fleischman (1995) and Sweetser (1990), the investigation also recognizes a third domain, speech-act modality2 (the imperative, optative, admonitive, prohibitive, interrogative etc.). In the present framework, these domains are seen as different functional categories with the following scope relations (the other categories and their internal orders are taken from Bybee 1985): (1) (speech-act modality (propositional modality (tense (aspect (event modality (voice (valence (verb)))))))) The hypothesis is based on the observation that the indicative, subjunctive, epistemicevidential modal morphemes, and the general subordinators that, if, and whether appear to denote the same thing in the Germanic languages. The indicative and that can be said to be factual (that is also potential), whereas the subjunctive and if can be said to denote that the proposition is hypothetical or uncertain (whether only denotes uncertainty). Furthermore, both the indicative-subjunctive and subordinators of the that- and if/whether-types are involved in determining clause type. The indicative and that mark declarative clauses (that is often labelled declarative), whereas 1. That = that, dat (Dut.), dass (Ger.), att (Swe.), at (Dan., Nor.), að (Ice.) etc.; if = if, of, ob, om, ef etc.; whether = whether, huruvida, hvorvidt, hvort etc. 2.
Speaker-oriented modality in Bybee & Fleischman (1995).
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Modality and Subordinators
the subjunctive and if/whether, among other things, mark interrogative and conditional subordinate clauses (in e.g. Old Swedish and Icelandic; whether only marks interrogative ones). Lastly, complementizers, the indicative-subjunctive, and epistemic modal markers all have scope over the whole proposition. The connection between propositional modality and general subordinators is supported by the fact that the subjunctive is typically a subordinate clause mood. Indeed, at a more fundamental level, the common denominator between the subjunctive and subordinators seems to be that both lack illocutionary force (assertiveness; see Cristofaro 2003 for such a definition of subordination). Interestingly, when the subjunctive and the general subordinators do occur in main clauses, they both tend to have speech-act meanings, e.g. the optative. Furthermore, it will be shown that the indicative and that and the subjunctive and if/whether, respectively, are licensed by more or less the same predicates in the Germanic languages. Semifactive predicates typically licence the indicative and that, whereas interrogative and dubitative predicates typically licence the subjunctive and if/whether. Another syntactic piece of evidence is the fact that finite verbs in main clauses occupy the same syntactic position as complementizers do in subordinate clauses in the asymmetric Germanic V2-languages (in front of the canonical subject position, see e.g. den Besten 1983, Platzack 1986a, b). In declarative clauses, the finite verb stands in complementary syntactic distribution to that, whereas, in interrogative and conditional clauses, it stands in complementary syntactic distribution to if and/or whether. The crucial point here is that the finite verb carries or represents the marker of propositional modality, through mood or modal verbs – indeed one of the characteristics of the epistemic modal verbs in the Germanic languages is that they are almost always finite. Furthermore, in Swedish, the epistemic particles kanske, kanhända, and måhända ‘maybe’ can also occupy this position (Stroh-Wollin 2002). This syntactic position, called Complementizer within the framework of Generative Grammar, should therefore be identified with propositional modality. Under more fine-grained generative analyses, Complementizer is thought to contain at least two related functional categories, one that denotes speech-act modality (“illocutionary force”) and another that is thought to denote the rather vaguely defined notion of “finiteness” (Rizzi 1997, 2002, Chomsky 2007). In agreement with Stroh-Wollin (2002), it will be argued that the latter category can be identified with propositional modality. Palmer (1986) originally defined the indicative-subjunctive distinction and modality as a whole in terms of factuality vs. non-factuality. In the second edition, Palmer (2001) favours a wider definition of the Realis-Irrealis distinction (by capital letters he refers to both the realis-irrealis and the indicative-subjunctive mood distinctions) and modality as a whole in terms of assertion vs. non-assertion. Factuality is rather seen as a part of the meaning covered by these notions (propositional modality). The wider definition more easily permits all other modality grams plus grams such as the negative and the future to be subsumed under one super-distinction and one supercategory. This analysis is not followed here. In agreement with Bybee & Fleischman (1995), the
Chapter 1. Introduction
concept of non-assertion is seen as too broad for being applicable to a typological category. Furthermore, the indicative-subjunctive distinction is mainly found in complement clauses, and complement clauses are non-assertive to begin with (Christofaro 2003, Searle 1969). Therefore, the division of modality into the more narrowly defined categories speech-act modality, propositional modality and event modality and the definition of the Realis-Irrealis distinction in terms of factuality (i.e. propositional modality) is preferred. That the indicative-subjunctive (and in extension the realis-irrealis) distinction and epistemic-evidential modality belong to one category which is different from speech-act modality and event modality was originally proposed by Bybee (1985) as regards mood. The factual-non-factual analysis of the Realis-Irrealis distinction is also compatible with the traditional definition of it as real vs. irreal (Chafe 1995) or actualized vs. non-actualized (Mithun 1995; see also Noonan 2007) and as a category that is distinct from the speech-act and event modalities (Chafe 1995, Mithun 1995). In accordance with Palmer (1986), the investigation does not draw a fundamental distinction between the indicative and the declarative. Both are seen as factual (i.e. Realis) categories. This is vital for the analysis of that as Realis, since that is a declarative subordinator. For some grammarians, however, the declarative is a clause type mood with illocutionary force, together with moods such as the interrogative and the imperative. According to that view, the declarative is part of a more peripheral category than say the indicative, the subjunctive and epistemic modal markers, and that is seen as a marker of that more peripheral category (see e.g. Chomsky 1995: 240). According to Palmer (1986), this separation is unwarranted. In many languages with mood, declarative main clauses are marked as such by the indicative. Second, there are many declarative subordinate clauses where the speaker is clearly not committed to the truth of the proposition. In fact, Cristofaro (2003) argues that the defining characteristic of subordinate clauses is that they lack illocutionary force, that they are nonassertive. For Palmer (1986), among others, the declarative is simply the unmarked epistemic modal value (i.e. Realis) and it is in this sense that complementizers of the that-type are declarative, it is argued in the present investigation. The first part of the book (Chapters 2–5) explores the hypothesis on a cross-linguistic level, searching for formal, functional, and semantic connections between modality and subordinators in the languages of the world. The second part (Chapters 6–10) is a language-branch-specific, more detailed investigation of the connection between modality and subordinators in the Germanic languages.
1.2 Disposition The book is divided into 11 chapters. The first chapter is an introduction, including the presentation above, the research paradigms that are used, methods, and materials. Chapters 2–5 treat modality and subordinators from a typological perspective. Chapter 2 is an introduction of relevant terms, definitions, and previous research on
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Modality and Subordinators
the subject. It also presents in more detail the main work of reference, Palmer (1986, 2001), and evaluates it in relation to the hypothesis explored here. Chapter 3 discusses previous research and presents two independent typological investigations on the syntactic status of propositional modality, whether it is a peripheral functional category or not. Chapter 4 introduces the notions of subordinators and complementizers and discusses previous investigations that have suggested a connection between modality and complementizers. Chapter 5 is a typological investigation of the notational, functional and semantic connections between propositional modality and subordinators. The remaining chapters contain a language-family specific investigation of the connection between propositional modality and subordinators in the Germanic languages, Swedish in particular. Chapter 6 treats the indicative and subjunctive, Chapter 7 word order and epistemic-evidential modality, Chapter 8 the general subordinators, Chapter 9 the interrogative and imperative and Chapter 10 the relative and adverbial subordinators. Chapter 11 is a conclusion.
1.3 Research paradigms In the present investigation, two research paradigms are used in particular, Language Typology and Generative Grammar, the former more than the latter. These are used with caution though, avoiding theory-internal additional premises that are not compatible with the other theory or traditional descriptive grammar. However, some of the terms and descriptions in both paradigms have gained so much acceptance within the linguistic community that they can be used without confining the investigation to one particular framework. Arguably, Language Typology, Generative Grammar and traditional descriptive grammar are compatible in the wider sense (as will be demonstrated below). The different research disciplines within linguistics must be open for results and generalizations from one another, just as the disciplines within the natural sciences are. Both Generative Grammar and the explanatory branch within Language Typology are based on the premise that there are universal linguistic categories. The present study is also based on that premise, as it explores the hypothesis that general subordinators belong to the universal category modality, propositional modality to be more precise. If the premise is not correct (as is argued in e.g. Everett 2005) the hypothesis becomes invalid. Language Typology and Generative Grammar contain many other premises, assumptions and conclusions that are pertinent to the present study. Some of these will be presented and evaluated in the following sections.
1.3.1 Language typology and language universals Within the framework of Language Typology, through works such as Greenberg (1966), Comrie (1989), Bybee (1985), Croft (1990, 2003), Bybee et al. (1994), Vogel & Comrie (2000), and World Atlas of Language Structures, it has become increasingly
Chapter 1. Introduction
clearer that some parts of speech and features are found in many of the languages of the world, including languages that are completely unrelated to one another. Within Language Typology, these phenomena are called linguistic universals3 (Comrie 1989). Among the linguistic universals are lexical categories such as noun and verb, and functional categories such as aspect, tense, and modality. The functional categories can, furthermore, be divided into smaller categories, or values, such as present, past, and future. Although it may be confusing to refer to both notions as “categories”, this is general practice in the reseach field (as in Palmer 2001) and will be followed here, although the term “value” will also be used when possible. The classes are distinguished from the items through the use of the pre-modifier “functional” in front of the former. In the present study, the functional categories that pertain to the verb and the clause are the important ones, modality in particular. Bybee (1985) proposes the following verbal functional categories: valence (transitive, causative), voice (active, passive), aspect (perfective, imperfective), tense, mood (indicative, subjunctive, imperative, interrogative) and agreement (person, number). Her investigation shows that morphemes expressing valence, aspect, and mood are particularly common in the languages of the world. The present investigation focuses on mood (modality). It is important to recognize that the items of study are realized in three levels. First, there are the actual grammatical markers (morphemes) expressed in the different languages. Second, there are the universal categories that the grammatical markers are associated with. Third, there are the semantic or pragmatic notions that the grammatical markers denote and the universal categories correspond to. Note that there is not always a 1:1 correspondance between the first and the last two notions. A grammatical marker in a particular language may denote more than one category or notion, so-called portmanteau or multi-functional morphemes. Furthermore, it is not always clear what notion a particular universal category corresponds to. There is e.g. controversy as to the meaning of the subjunctive (see Chapter 2 below). The values that belong to the lexical and functional categories have been found to have an asymmetrical distribution. Some values are more common, are used in more constructions and have a wider semantic extension. Often, these are morphologically unexpressed. Inspired by the Prague School, Greenberg (1966) therefore divided the values of each functional and lexical category into marked and unmarked ones. When there are more than two values within a category, markedness becomes relative. Among the verbal functional categories that Greenberg (1966) lists, the following can be mentioned (the last one being the most pertinent for this investigation; the values are presented as unmarked<marked): Aspect (Imperfective
3.
There are also other kinds of linguistic universals, such as implicational ones.
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Modality and Subordinators
human species, including women (Croft 2003: 100). Similarly, the present form may refer to the future in e.g. the Germanic languages. The linguistic universals should not be seen as well-defined objects that every language makes use of. Rather, they are prototypes with fuzzy boundaries (Comrie 1989). A prototype consists of the core member with a set of features, but also peripheral members having only a few of the features associated with the prototype (Croft 2003). The prototypical subject seems to have the components {animate, 1/2 person, agent} while the prototypical object has the components {inanimate, 3 person, patient}. The notion of prototypes is closely related to that of markedness: passive voice is the marked value and its subject typically has the prototypical object features mentioned above. The prototypical noun refers to an object, while the prototypical verb refers to an event. Yet, nouns derived from verbs can also refer to events, but they are more marked. Whereas Generative Grammar attempts to define fixed universal principles and parameters (see next section), Language Typology formulates implicational and prototypical generalizations, e.g. “if a language has adjectives, then words that refer to size, age, colour, and value are parts of that class”. Not surprisingly, then, Language Typology adopts a cognitive explanation of language. In fact, linguistic markedness and prototypes seem to correlate with human categorization in general (Croft 2003). One such example is colour perception. There is variation in the world’s languages as to what colours or what intervals in the colour scale are named, but the variation is not random. It follows an implicational hierarchy, and the focus nuances are often the same. Importantly, this correlates with human colour perception (Comrie 1989). In fact, many linguistic categories with fuzzy boundaries could have such a cognitive basis, Comrie (1989) suggests. Such conceptual explanations for linguistic features go under the name of iconicity. Iconicity means that linguistic forms, complexity and interrelationships more or less mirror conceptual forms, complexity and interrelationships. The idea that linguistic hierarchies mirror conceptual distance between the entities is called the iconic-distance hypothesis (Croft 2003). Particularily pertinent for the present investigation, Bybee (1985) proposes that the semantic relevance of the functional categories to the verb determines their internal order (see 3.2 below). Therefore, valence and aspect (which modifies the semantic content of the verb) are central functional categories, whereas tense and mood (which do not alter the semantic content of the verb) are peripheral ones. Semantic relevance, in turn, may be derived from human cognition, Bybee (1985: 14) suggests. Croft (2003: 210) agrees that such a semantic analysis could be translated into a conceptual one: Indeed, under most semantic analyses of nominal and verbal modifiers and of sentence modifiers, the iconic-distance hypothesis as applied to syntactic constituent structure is generally corroborated in the languages of the world.
Croft (2003) reserves himself as regards the more peripheral verbal modifiers tense and mood, however. These categories seem to modify the entire proposition, rather than the verb, he argues. Conceptual distance from the verb may not be the key factor
Chapter 1. Introduction
in these cases. On the other hand, it could be objected that although tense does not directly modify the semantic content of the verb, it modifies the event (by placing it on a timeline). Mood, however, modifies the entire proposition. At the same time, mood is clearly related to tense, which in turn is related to aspect and event modality. For example, deontic and dynamic modality are close to the future in meaning – deontic and dynamic modality tend to have future reference (or future in the past when they are in the past tense). Future, in turn, is closely related to the hypothetical, in the sense that future events cannot be certain to take place. However, deontic and dynamic modality are not that close to the hypothetical in meaning. Thus, there seem to be a semantic continuum going from the verb and the more central categories to the more peripheral ones. Interestingly, this semantic continuum is reflected in grammaticalization. In English, deontic shall has developed a future use (Palmer 2001: 104ff ). A hypothetical-conditional variant, should, has also developed, which also has future reference, but which has lost the deontic meaning. The explanatory branch within Language Typology (the functional approach) used to be contrasted with traditional Generative Grammar (the formal approach), which assumed that language in the narrow sense is autonomous and cannot be explained by other mental processes. During the last fifteen years, however, through the Minimalist Program (Chomsky 1995, 2000, 2001, 2004, 2006, 2007), Generative Grammar has opened itself to the possibility that language in the broader sense is part of a wider system of mental capacities, and Croft (2003) emphasizes that these two research disciplines are no longer as dissimilar as some may claim. Bybee et al. (1994: 1ff ), e.g., assume that human language consists of a semantic and a phonetic substance. This is also the working hypothesis of the Minimalist Program of Generative Grammar (see next section). Furthermore, Bybee et al. (1994) assume that language structure is the product, rather than the creator of the substance. This too is what the Minimalist Program assumes. Bybee et al. (1994) state that the substance is potentially universal but varies in time and space; the Minimalist Program assumes that universal grammar is a set of features that each particular language selects from. Language Typology depends on three unverified premises: that human language in the universal respect has not changed fundamentally for tens of thousands of years, that all languages spoken today represent the same fundamental level of development, and that the languages that are spoken today represent a sufficiently large sample for the researchers to be able to draw any valid conclusions about the language universals (Comrie 1989). If these conditions are not met, Language Typology loses its significance. Still, these are far from safe conclusions. The Australian languages is a good example. The Aborigines presumably arrived in Australia around 50 000 years ago and lived there in relative isolation both linguistically and genetically until the end of the eighteenth century. For Language Typology to use the Australian languages as data, the human language must not have changed fundamentally for at least 50 000 years. Another problem that has to be addressed concerns the reliability of the data. Language Typology uses data from as many languages as possible. In that respect, it is
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Modality and Subordinators
firmly rooted in data, and could to some extent be considered empirical. However, the actual data cannot be compared to physical data used in the natural sciences. In particular, the classification of parts of speech is highly subjective. As Croft (2000) points out: How can one be sure that a grammatical category in an exotic language corresponds to categories such as verb and noun in the more well known European languages? Second, the items under investigation are, as was said above, not well-defined objects but categories with fuzzy boundaries.
1.3.2 Generative grammar and universal grammar The Minimalist Program within the generative paradigm, as represented by Chomsky (1995, 2000, 2001, 2004, 2006, and 2007), is based on the assumption that the faculty of language (FL) is innate to humans, even genetically determined: “virtually shared among humans and in crucial respects unique to them, hence a kind of species property” (Chomsky 2007: 1). At least in the narrow sense, it is assumed to be autonomous and separated from the concept-intentional and the sensory-motor systems. Rather than being a part of these two systems, it is a way of linking them, Chomsky argues. The Minimalist Program attempts to formulate what is minimally required for FL (in the narrow sense) to function. It is assumed that FL works with lexical items that meet interpretability conditions for both the phonological and semantic components. Categories without interpretable features for these components are not “well formed syntactic objects”, they “not only might not exist, but cannot exist on rather plausible assumptions” (Chomsky 2000: 138ff ). These lexical items are then arranged in syntactic structures that also meet the legibility conditions, in the sense that no new elements are introduced during the course of the derivation (The Inclusiveness Condition) and that the lexical items remain unaltered (No-Tampering Condition). This use of Occam’s razor rids the theory of some of its earlier less well-motivated assumptions (such as bar-levels, projections, deep structure, and surface structure). The lexical items in any particular language are structured arrays of features that are selected from universal grammar (UG). This is reminiscent of the sets of features that constitute the language universals in Language Typology, but here, the sets seem to be absolute rather than prototypical. The features may have different values, however, and languages vary as to how these parameters are set. The features contain information “relevant to the way their arrangements are interpreted at the interfaces” (Chomsky 2007: 4). In order to form syntactic structures, at least one operation is assumed, Merge. Merge “takes n objects already constructed and constructs from them a new object, in the simplest case, the set of these n objects” (Chomsky 2005: 11), i.e. Merge(X, Y) = {X, Y}. It is assumed that some of the features carried by the lexical items need to be satisfied by other syntactic objects (including lexical items) or by features belonging to other lexical items, and that this drives the operation Merge. For one lexical item to be satisfied by another syntactic object, Chomsky (2000: 116) postulates two relations, one being derived by the other, namely that between a lexical
Chapter 1. Introduction
item in a set and the other set-member (Set-Membership), and that between a lexical item in a set and another lexical item that is part of the other set member (Agree). Through these two relations, a lexical item is able to select another syntactic object/lexical item and thus form a syntactic structure. A lexical item that selects is called a syntactic head. These relations also explain the mechanisms behind agreement (e.g. subject-verb agreement and noun-adjective concord). In this minimal version, Generative Grammar is not that different from the explanatory branch of Language Typology, as represented by Bybee et al. 1994 (see the previous section), which also assumes that language consists of a phonetic and a semantic substance that creates syntactic structures. The difference is that the Minimalist Program assumes that there is a component specific to language that combines these two other components. Yet, although autonomous from these other components, it is still the semantic and phonological features that determine what combines with what and what the outcome will be. Language in the narrow sense is no more than a discrete combinatorial system, perhaps related to the mathematical capacity, Chomsky (2006, 2007) speculates. Similar to Language Typology, Generative Grammar assumes universal categories, but in a more absolute sense and based on studies of fewer languages. Chomsky (1995: 240) assumes the following core functional categories: determiner, light-verb4, tense, and Complementizer (by an initial capital letter, the category is distinguished from the part of speech). Complementizer is the most relevant category for the present study, being the one that complementizers lexicalize and the most peripheral functional category in the clause. Complementizer is generally seen as a cover term for at least two clausal-scope categories: “(illocutionary) force” (i.e. speech-act modality) and “finiteness” (Rizzi 1997, 2002, Chomsky 2007; see 4.2 below). Finiteness determines whether the clause is finite or non-finite, whereas force is responsible for clausetype mood: “declarative, interrogative, and so on” (Chomsky 1995: 240). In English, the declarative is lexicalized by that, with “a null option” in main clauses (ibid). The interrogative is lexicalized by if in subordinate clauses. Crucially for the hypothesis explored in the present study, the finite verb can also occupy the Complementizer position in declarative main clauses in the Germanic V2-languages and in interrogative main clauses in the Germanic languages throughout (Platzack 1986a,b, Chomsky 1995). Following Cinque (1999; see 3.3 below), Chomsky (1995) further states that tense can also be divided into a set of related categories, with tense as the core member. This is somewhat reminiscent of the categories in Language Typology with a core member (a prototype) and peripheral ones that lack some of the features associated with the former. The fact that aspect is not seen as a core functional category is probably due to its not being an inflectional category in the Germanic languages.
4. Containing distinctions such as causative-applicative and active-passive and thus corresponding to Bybee’s 1985 categories valence and voice.
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The verbal functional categories are assumed to select one another in a certain order: Complementizer selects tense which selects light-verb (which selects the lexical verb). Therefore, in languages such as English, the complementizer comes before the temporal auxiliary, which in turn comes before the main verb. In so-called head-final languages, e.g. Japanese, where the head word is always to the right of its complement, exactly the reverse order of English is found. Note that there is no universal order within the actual sets formed by FL. Whether a particular language is head-initial, head-final or both depends on phonological rules in that particular language. It is easy to see that the hierarchical order of functional categories assumed within the framework of Generative Grammar has a direct parallel in the semantic-relevance and iconic-distance hypotheses within Language Typology. Both are built on the assumption that there are universal patterns, and are based on certain syntactic and morphosyntactic observations. The present investigation makes use of this common ground and also uses as a working hypothesis the idea that syntactic and morphosyntactic order to some degree mirrors the internal order of the universal categories. The Minimalist framework of Generative Grammar has the benefit of ridding the theory of some of its earlier, less well-motivated assumptions and formal language. This makes it more compatible with other linguistic disciplines, especially Language Typology. It must be pointed out, though, that the new framework also contains some new more speculative features, such as the idea that the formation of syntactic structures operates in phases. The present study does not adopt that idea.
1.3.3 Evaluation and application In some sense, Language Typology and Generative Grammar complement each other. Language Typology provides the data and categorizes them, whereas Generative Grammar provides the technical model for the formation of syntactic structures. Although Language Typology presents more facts, it is more tentative in respect to the actual description of language as an entity. Both theories offer a psychological, cognitive explanation of language, although Generative Grammar assumes that language in the narrow sense is autonomous. Both assume that there are language universals, but in Generative Grammar they are more fixed. In the present investigation, results, generalizations and terms from Language Typology will be used. At the same time, some terms and assumptions from Generative Grammar will also be used, such as UG, selection, licensing and agree. The investigation will work under the assumption that lexical items consist of features that satisfy conditions in the semantic and phonological components, that there are universal categories and that these select one another in a certain order. It will also be assumed that there is some kind of language faculty, but leave the question open as to whether it is autonomous or derived from other cognitive systems. It is true that neurologists have located specific areas that are used in language production and comprehension (Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas) and that geneticists have found a specific gene that is
Chapter 1. Introduction
connected to language production (FoxP; see e.g. Ernard et al 2002). However, these findings do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that there is a distinct language faculty. The hypothesis that language structures depend on conceptual structures (the iconic distance hypothesis) seems plausible, at least it has explanatory value.
1.4 Methods and material The present investigation studies the use of modality markers and subordinators in various languages. The central part of the book is concerned with the Germanic languages: the author’s native language Swedish plus the other Mainland Scandinavian languages, the author’s second language English, third language German and lastly Icelandic. The main source of information for Swedish is Svenska Akademiens grammatik (SAG) and for Norwegian Norsk Referansegrammatikk (NRG). For German, the main sources are Grammatik der deutschen Sprache (GDS) and Eisenberg (2006a,b). For English, The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language (CGEL) is used. For Icelandic, the main source is Íslensk tunga (IT). For Swedish, English and to some extent German and Norwegian, the author also has the help of her own intuition. On the other hand, language intuition is a highly unreliable source of information, as it involves conscious, meta-linguistic processes, whereas natural language production is often automatic and subconscious (Harley 2001: 391). This is of course also true for controlling examples on an inter-subjective level. Even though an informant claims that a grammatical example is incorrect, s/he may still produce it in the next sentence. The best way of collecting data is, therefore, arguably to use large text corpora. First, the researcher has no impact on the informants. Second, the number of informants is much higher and the selection of them more random than in an investigation based on interviews or questionnaires. The disadvantage of text corpora is that they are composed of written language. Written language is much more subjected to conscious meta-linguistic forces than spontaneous spoken language. As a text, it may also have been proofread and edited. Preferably, the text corpora should therefore be as large as possible and consist of as many different text genres as possible, even spoken language. Another disadvantage with text corpora is that they do not reveal what one cannot say. For Swedish, Språkbanken’s (The Swedish Language Bank’s) electronic on-line corpus collection Konkordanser is used, the newspaper corpora in particular (Press 65 – 98, DN 87, GP 01 – 04). These corpora are large (between one and twenty million words). For Old Swedish, Fornsvenska textbanken (The Old Swedish Language Bank) is used, which consists of on-line transcribed Old-Swedish texts, both religious and profane. In order to search through these texts, the free-trial version of the concordance program Concordance.3.2 is used. For German, the search engine Cosmas II and the text corpus W-Archiv der geschriebene Sprache are used, provided by the Institute für Deutsche Sprache (IDS). For English, the Simple Search function of the British National Corpus
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(BNC) is used, which yields a random sample of 50 hits from the search results. For Norwegian, lastly, The Oslo Corpus of Tagged Norwegian Texts, Bokmål corpus, is used If, however, a certain construction is extremely rare in a particular Germanic language, language specific Google searches are conducted (e.g. Google.se for Swedish), in accordance with Keller et al.’s (2002) findings that searches on Google.com for predicate-argument bi-grams yield frequency results that are fully comparable to BNC. The large amount of data over-shadows the fact that Google.com is uncontrolled and contaminated by various sorts of unreliable material. Google has the advantage of being so many times larger than any controlled text corpus. Keller et al. (2002) showed that there is a positive correlation between acceptability and frequency; the more marginal the construction, the larger the corpus needs to be. In fact, Google.com showed a higher correlation with an acceptability test on rare predicate-argument bi-grams than BNC did. What the researcher needs to do, however, is to confirm that the results come from a reliable source, a text written by a native speaker. One way of doing this is to only look at texts that come out of public institutions or organizations (Barðdal & Eythórsson 2005). The present investigation also uses data from a large number of non-Germanic languages. Here, the author is completely dependent on descriptions, classifications and examples made by other linguists. This is not without its problems. Apart from the fact that it is impossible for the present author to verify whether these data can be considered reliable material or not, there is also the question whether the data are comparable. Some classifications are strongly coloured by the individual linguists, their editors and the grammatical traditions pertaining to those particular languages. Indeed, the investigation will highlight just how varied these descriptions and classifications may be in some cases, especially as regards the moods realis-irrealis. The approach that is adopted to deal with these diverging analyses is to lay focus on the core function of the grammatical markers, the common denominator between all the meanings ascribed to them. Furthermore, the investigation aims at using grammatical descriptions that are modern and part of the western grammatical tradition, e.g. Word Atlas of Language Structures (WALS), Routledge Language Family Series, Mouton Grammar Library, Pacific Linguistics and SIL Academic Publications. Since the testing of a hypothesis should not only be about presenting argument in support of it, but also about refuting possible counter-arguments, quite a few sections will be devoted to presenting alternative analyses made by other researchers and then refuting these analyses. When italics are used in cited examples, these are used by the present author to highlight parts of speech that are particular important for the present discussion. Phonological stress, on the other hand, is indicated by capital letters.
part i
Modality and subordinators in the languages of the world
chapter
Modality
In order to explore the hypothesis that general subordinators (complementizers) should be subsumed under propositional modality, relevant terms, definitions and previous research in the field of modality must first be presented and evaluated. Section 2.1 and 2.2 present and evaluate forms, concepts, terms, definitions and research pertaining to modality. In 2.3, research in two fields that are related to modality are discussed, namely predicates with a modal meaning and speech acts. In agreement with Bybee & Fleischman (1995), it will be argued that modality is best divided into tree different domains: speech-act (speaker-oriented) modality, propositional (epistemic) modality and event (agent-oriented) modality. It will be argued that Palmer’s (2001) unification of all modality categories into one supercategory, Modality, with assertion as the relevant feature and Realis-Irrealis as its binary values (by capital letters, the universal values are distinguished from the moods with the same name), has the disadvantage of being too wide and conceptually vague (as it has been criticized for in e.g. Bybee et al 1994). In line with Palmer (1986), a narrower definition of the indicative-subjunctive (and in extension the Realis-Irrealis) distinction in terms of factuality (i.e. propositional modality) will therefore be preferred. This is in line with the traditional definition of the realis-irrealis distinction as real vs. irreal (Chafe 1995) or actual(ized) vs. non-actual(ized) (Mithun 1995; see also Noonan 2007). In fact, it will be argued that the lack of inherent assertiveness is one of the common denominators between subordinators and the indicative-subjunctive distinction. Subordinate clauses typically do not have assertiveness (Cristofaro 2003; see 4.1) and the indicative-subjunctive distinction is typically manifested in subordinate clauses. The placing of the indicative-subjunctive distinction together with epistemic modal markers is further in line with Lunn (1995), who states that the main function of the Spanish subjunctive is to denote epistemic modality, and Bybee (1985: 170), who suggested that these grammatical markers can be put together into one (mood) category, in opposition to speech-act modality and event modality (see 3.2). Table 1 illustrates the divisions argued for. As was said in the introduction, these are thought to have the following scope relations (the other categories and their internal order are taken from Bybee 1985; see 3.2): (2) (speech-act modality (propositional modality (tense (aspect (event modality (voice (valence (verb))))))))
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Table 1. Different types of modality Speech-act modality
Propositional modality
Event modality
– – – – – –
– – – – –
– deontic modality – dynamic modality
imperative hortative jussive prohibitive optative interrogative
epistemic modality evidential modality indicative-subjunctive realis-irrealis conditional
– general subordinators
2.1 Terms and definitions of modality 2.1.1 Three domains of modality Modality refers to both a semantic and a grammatical notion. It can be expressed in a number of ways, but the most common ways are through verb inflection (mood) and through modal verbs or particles. Within the field of modality, there are whole sets of concepts and terms, but there is not always consensus as to which term should be used for what notion. Modality include terms such as the declarative, indicative, subjunctive, realis, irrealis, conditional, interrogative, imperative, optative, hortative, jussive, prohibitive (moods); epistemic, evidential, deontic and dynamic (modal markers). The present investigation is particularly concerned with the indicative, subjunctive, realis, irrealis, conditional, declarative, epistemic, and evidential, as it considers these to form a separate functional category, propositional modality. Unfortunately, however, many of these terms are difficult to define, partly due to the fact that the categories they refer to have fuzzy boundaries, partly because grammatical markers that are labelled as such are often multifunctional. Palmer (2001) proposes that modality can be divided into two domains: propositional modality, which stands for the speaker’s attitude to the truth-value or factual status of the proposition, and which is denoted by epistemic-evidential morphemes in the modal system and the indicative-subjunctive and realis-irrealis in the mood system, and event modality, which specifies conditions on the agent with respect to the main event, and which is expressed by deontic-dynamic morphemes in the modal system, but which can also be expressed by the subjunctive and irrealis in the mood system. Palmer (2001) also recognizes that there are speech-act moods such as the imperative and jussive, and a conditional mood, although he tentatively subsumes the former under event modality and the latter under propositional modality. Somewhat similarly, Bybee & Fleischman (1995) propose that modality can be divided into three domains:
Chapter 2. Modality
speaker-oriented modality, which is associated with speech acts and includes moods such as the imperative, hortative, prohibitive, optative, declarative and interrogative; epistemic modality (corresponding to propositional modality in Palmer 2001) and agent-oriented modality (corresponding to event modality in Palmer 2001). Apart from the fact that Bybee & Fleischman (1995) assume three domains, the frameworks differ insofar as Palmer (2001) sees his two domains as members of one supercategory. Bybee (1985: 170), who formed the basis of the divisions made in Bybee & Fleischman (1995) originally proposed a functional (mood) category consisting of the indicative1, subjunctive, conditional, and epistemic modality, called “commitment to truth of proposition”2 (more or less corresponding to propositional modality in Palmer’s 2001 framework). However, since she could not find morphosyntactic support for a division between these moods and the speech-act moods, she did not exploit the idea further (see 3.2). In Bybee & Fleischman (1995), the affiliation of both the subjunctive and the irrealis is left open. The present investigation follows Palmers (2001) divisions of modality into propositional and event modality, although it, in agreement with Bybee & Fleischman’s (1995) also recognizes a third domain. Since the term speaker-oriented modality is rather vague, the more general term speech-act modality is preferred (as in Sweetser 1990 & Cinque 1999). The investigation focuses on propositional modality. In agreement with Palmer (1986, 2001), it considers the declarative to be the unmarked epistemic-evidential value rather than a member of speech-act modality. The following sections will deal with these modalities in more detail: epistemic-evidential modality, the declarative, the conditional, the indicative-subjunctive and the realis-irrealis. First, however, the two key concepts factuality and assertion must be presented.
2.1.2 Factuality vs. assertion One central issue as regards epistemic-evidential modality, the indicative-subjunctive and the realis-irrealis distinctions is exactly what notion they correspond to. In particular, there are two concepts that have been proposed: the semantic notion of factuality and the speech-act notion of assertion. In the present investigation, the former analysis is preferred. Palmer (1986) argues that the indicative-subjunctive distinction in the mood system and the declarative-epistemic distinction in the modal system correspond to a factual–non-factual distinction (Palmer 1986 also argues that event modality is a nonfactual category, since event modality determines that the main event is non-actualized, potential). 1.
The indicative was also seen as a member of the speech-act category “illocutionary force”.
2. She also called it commitment to truth of assertion, which is tautological, since an assertion is a commitment to the truth of the proposition (Searle 1969).
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Palmer (2001) instead argues that factuality is what the epistemic and evidential modal morphemes denote, but only one of the meanings covered by the indicativesubjunctive and realis-irrealis distinctions (i.e. propositional modality). In agreement with Bybee & Fleischman (1995), he considers the two mood distinctions to denote the wider speech-act notion of assertion vs. non-assertion. This analysis permits more easily all other categories of modality, including the speech-act categories, to be subsumed under one overarching Realis-Irrealis3 distinction. In addition, the unmarked epistemic-evidential value declarative also denotes assertion, he argues. Assertion also underlies the functional (mood) category proposed by Bybee (1985), containing the indicative-subjunctive distinction, epistemic modality and the conditional. Bybee (1985) argues that these moods (and modal markers) denote different degrees of assertion. The same can be said about Bybee & Fleischman’s (1995) domain epistemic modality. As was said above, the present investigation does not adopt the assertive-non-assertive analysis of the indicative-subjunctive and realis-irrealis distinctions. The indicative-subjunctive distinction is typically manifested in subordinate clauses, and subordinate clauses are by definition non-assertive (Cristofaro 2003, Searle 1969). The same line of reasoning holds for the declarative. Furthermore, the idea that there can be different degrees of assertion (from weak to strong) is not very plausible (Palmer 1986). These arguments will be made clearer in the sections to come.
2.1.3 Epistemic and evidential modality Epistemic modality has to do with the speaker’s judgement about the factuality of the proposition (Palmer 2001: 8) and is one of the core members of Palmer’s (2001) conceptual domain propositional modality. Epistemic modality can be divided into values (or categories) such as declarative, presumptive/assumptive, deductive, speculative (epistemic possibility) and dubitative (www.SIL.org). These are denoted by epistemic modal markers. Moreover, epistemic modality can also be denoted by the subjunctive and irrealis moods (Palmer 2001). In fact, apart from these moods, there are other more specific epistemic moods such as presumptive, probable, potential (or speculative) and dubitative (see e.g. Bybee 1985). On the other hand, Palmer (2001) tries to reduce the number of moods by stipulating that the mood system is binary Realis-Irrealis. The epistemic markers just mentioned should instead be regarded as modal, he argues. Beside epistemic modality, there is the related notion of evidentiality, including hearsay (reported) and sensory (Palmer 2001: 22). As with epistemic modality, evidential modality can either be denoted by evidential modal morphemes or the subjunctive/irrealis moods (Palmer 2001).
3. Again, by capital letters, the binary values of the functional supercategory are distinguished from the moods with the same name.
Chapter 2. Modality
In the present study, a distinction will be made between a modality of belief or epistemic possibility (speculative, potential) and one of doubt (dubitative). The distinction is needed for the description of the difference between the indicative and the subjunctive in the Romance languages and that and if/whether in the Germanic languages. For example Bybee & Fleischman (1995: 2) use the term dubitative in the sense ‘modality of doubt’ in relation to the use of the Spanish subjunctive. It must be pointed out, however, that the terms dubitative, speculative and potential have different, sometimes incompatible uses in different grammars. Potential is used as a name for a speculative mood in e.g. Saami, Persian and Japanese, but it is also used as a term for the abilitative modality in some language descriptions, and in the description of Mixtec (Bradley & Hollenbach 1988) it is used for a future aspect (cf. the occasional use of irrealis as an aspect denoting uninitiated events). Corresponding to the potential in the mood system, Palmer (2001) uses the term speculative for epistemic possibility in the modal system. Speculative, however, also covers the probable and dubitative domains in Palmer (2001). Dubitative, in turn, as the name suggests, is used when the speaker has doubts about the veracity of the proposition. In contrast to the speculative it does “not generally indicate positive doubt” (Palmer 2001: 25). Yet, in some language descriptions4, it also covers the potential domain. Bybee (1985: 179) explains: A dubitative [...] is usually described as expressing an element of doubt that the event described in the proposition occurred or will occur. Note however, that it is only an element of doubt, for these sentences never translate “I doubt that...” but rather “probably” or “it seems.”
Another epistemic concept that is rarely given its own term, and which will play a key role in the description of if/whether, is uncertainty. In the description of Ngiyambaa, Donaldson (1980) uses the term “ignorative” for a clitic with such a meaning (Palmer 2001: 53). Nahara (2002) also uses the term ignorative in that sense in her description of the Japanese copula. The ignorative also exists as a modality term in van Gijn’s (2006) description of Yurakaré. It will be used here as well, although always with an explicative note. An alternative term is offered by Derbyshire (1979) in his description of Hixkaryana with its “uncertainty” suffix. Lastly, the term admirative will be used for a modality of surprise or counter-expectation (see DeLancey 1997). This term will be needed in the description of the Spanish subjunctive. One problem with the definition of epistemic-evidential modality is that it formally overlaps with event modality in e.g. the Germanic languages, in the sense that there are modal verbs that both denote event and epistemic-evidential modality. This is one of the reasons why Palmer (2001) chooses to subsume propositional and event modality under
4. E.g. Aguaruna (Jivaroan; Larsen 1963), Crow (Siouan Proper; Graczyk 2007: 395), Awa (East New Guinea Highlands: Trans-New Guinea; McKaughan 1973), PreAndine Arawak (Wise 1986), Tauvya (Mandang and Albert Range: Trans New-Guinea; McDonald 1990) and Tulu (Dravidian; Bhat, 1998).
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the same universal supercategory. However, that fact may have other explanations, such as grammaticalization. According to Hopper & Traugott (2003), the grammaticalization process goes from more central, lexical categories to more peripheral, functional categories. In the Germanic languages, some morphemes have both event and epistemic-evidential meanings, e.g. must, may and can in English. Importantly, the development has gone from event to epistemic-evidential modality and not the other way around (Traugott 1989, Bybee et al. 1994). This clearly suggests that epistemic-evidential modality is a more peripheral category than event modality. Other morphemes have both event-modal and future meanings, e.g. will and shall in English. Again, the development goes from event modality to future (Palmer 2001: 104ff ). Another interesting fact as regards modal verbs in the Germanic languages is, as will be shown in more detail in Chapter 7, that modal verbs expressing event modality can be constructed with modal verbs that express epistemic-evidential modality in German, Dutch and the Mainland Scandinavian languages. In any such cluster, the most peripheral i.e. leftmost morpheme is always epistemic-evidential (constructed example from Swedish): (3) De måste/ måtte/ lär/ bör/ torde/ skulle/ ska kunna they must/ must/ ought.to/ ought.to/ would/ should/ is.said be.able.to få vilja göra det. be.allowed.to want.to do it In these languages, syntactic scope of auxiliaries mirrors semantic scope. The epistemic-evidential meanings have scope over the deontic-dynamic ones. Furthermore, in these languages, modal verbs occurring to the left of the perfect auxiliary tend to get an epistemic-evidential reading, whereas modal verbs occurring to the right are almost always event modal (Eide 2005: 301; examples from Swedish): (4) a. Banken kan ha agerat innan jag blev inkopplad. the.bank can have acted before I became involved ‘The bank may have acted before I was called in.’
(GP 04)
b. Flitiga veckotidningsläsare har kunnat ana vad diligent readers.of.weekly.magaizines have been.able.to guess what som var i görningen. (GP 04) that was in the.making ‘Diligent readers of weekly magazines have been able to guess what there was brewing in the wind.’ This has to do with the fact that epistemic-evidential modal verbs tend to be finite in the Germanic languages (Abraham 2003), whereas event-modal ones can either be finite or non-finite. Thus, event modality is generated inside of tense (can either be determined by tense or not), whereas epistemic-evidential modality is not.
Chapter 2. Modality
Cinque (1999) presents further morphosyntactic evidence that epistemic-evidential modality has syntactic scope over event modality. Reminiscent of the situation in the Germanic languages, the modal particle kan in Sranan (Creole) receives an epistemic reading when it occurs to the left of the past tense particle ben, but an abilitative reading when it occurs to the right of it: (5) a. A kan ben e nyan. he may past prog eat ‘He may have been eating.’ b. A ben kan nyan. he past can eat ‘He could eat.’ Yet another interesting example is Chickasaw (Muskogean), where epistemic and deontic-dynamic modality are expressed by the same suffixes. The modal suffix –a’ni has two uses. When it is located inside the tense suffix –tok, it has an abilitative meaning. When located outside the tense suffix, however, it has an epistemic meaning of speculation or deduction (Munro 2006: 196ff ): (6) a. Hilha -l -a’n-tok dance -1sg -a’n-pst ‘I could have danced’ b. Hilha -tok -a’ni dance -pst -a’ni ‘He must have danced’ Lastly, it should be pointed out that Bybee (1985: 20ff, 165ff ), who investigated verb derivation and inflection in 50 unrelated languages (see 3.2 below), argues that the indicative, subjunctive and epistemic modality should be kept apart from event modality. While the former can be said to denote the degree of commitment to the truth of the proposition and have scope over it, the latter is more agent- and event-related and has scope over the main event only: Excluded, however, are the other ‘modalities’, such as the deontic modalities of permission and obligation, because they describe certain conditions on the agent with regard to the main predication.
Bybee’s division was supported by the fact that deontic and dynamic modality, in contrast to epistemic modality, were rarely expressed as inflection on the verb in her sample: “However, inflectional markers of obligation, permission, ability or intention are extremely rare in the sample” (Bybee 1985: 165ff ). Interestingly, however, she found examples where event modality appeared to be derivational. To conclude, epistemicevidential modality can be separated from event modality on both semantic and formal grounds.
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As was pointed out in the previous section, Bybee’s (1985) and Bybee & Fleischman’s (1995) definitions of epistemic modality differ somewhat from that of Palmer (2001). Whereas Palmer (2001) states that epistemic-evidential modality, as a whole, has to do with the speaker’s attitude to the factual status of the proposition (propositional modality) and epistemic modality, in particular, has to do with the speaker’s judgement about the factuality of the proposition, Bybee (1985) etc. states that it denotes the speaker’s degree of commitment to the truth of the proposition, i.e. degrees of assertion. However, as Palmer (1986: 142ff ) points out, the idea that there can be different degrees of assertion, from weak (based on belief) to strong (based on knowledge) is not very plausible. A modality of belief does not commit the speaker to the truth of the proposition, but rather indicates a subjective judgement as regards the truth of it. It is not a speech act. The present author concurs with this argument.
2.1.4 The declarative One term that will be of particular importance for the present investigation is the declarative. This is due to the fact that it is often used as a label for subordinators of the that-kind but sometimes also as a name for the unmarked epistemic-evidential value. Palmer (1986: 87, 2001: 64ff ) following Lyons (1977), points out that in languages with epistemic modal markers such as English, the absence of these markers is typically called the declarative. Yet, in many languages with mood, declarative main clauses are marked as such by the indicative. Therefore, the declarative could be seen as the modal version of the indicative. As will be argued in this book, complementizers of the that-type can in turn be seen as the complementizer version of the indicative. In agreement with his analysis of the indicative, Palmer (1986) argues that the declarative denotes factuality. This is the analysis that will be followed here. However, for many other researchers (Chomsky 1995, Cinque 1999, Julien 2002), the declarative is rather seen as a speech-act mood that denotes assertion and clause type on the side of moods such as the imperative and interrogative, whereas the indicative belongs to a category that denotes the Realis-Irrealis distinction. Palmer (2001) retains his analysis of the declarative as the unmarked epistemic value and the modal counterpart of the indicative, but in agreement with e.g. Bybee (1985), he assumes that both the declarative and the indicative denote assertion. Palmer (1986: 23ff ) refutes the assertive analysis of the declarative by pointing out that the declarative seems to be semantically unmarked and based on belief rather than knowledge. Even predicates of disbelief may select declarative clauses in e.g. English (e.g. “I don’t think that...”; this is also the case in the other Germanic languages). Such declarative complement clauses can hardly be considered assertive. Moreover, in some languages (Hidatsa: Siouan, Imbabura: Quechuan, and Ngiyambaa: Australian), there is a contrast between grammatical markers that denote a categorical assertion and grammatical markers that denote what corresponds to the declarative in the European languages (Palmer 1986: 83ff ). While the categorical assertion is based
Chapter 2. Modality
on the speaker’s knowledge that the proposition is true and strongly commits him/her to it, the “declarative” is based on the speaker’s belief and does not particularly commit him/her to the truth of the proposition. Another such example that could be mentioned is Crow (Central Siouan; Graczyk 2007: 392), where the declarative marker -k is the unmarked member of a set of epistemic markers. The less common assertive -sht denotes that the speaker “is strongly vouching for the truth of his statement”. As will be shown in more detail in 2.3.2, Hooper (i.e. Bybee) & Thompson (1973) propose that even declarative complement clauses of predicates of belief are assertive, albeit in a “weak” sense (just as epistemic modality of belief is thought to be weakly assertive in Bybee 1985 etc.). However, as Palmer (1986: 142ff ) argues, this extensive use of the term assertion has many problems. It is hard to see how uttering such complement clauses can be seen as performing speech-acts. Predicates of belief express opinions about the truth of the proposition, but does not commit the speaker to it. It should be added that not only declarative complement clauses of predicates that indicate belief or even disbelief can be said to lack assertiveness. In fact, Searle (1969) argues that declarative complement clauses (that-clauses) in general lack assertiveness. To him, that-clauses are merely content clauses (propositions), since they cannot function as independent utterances, as opposed to declarative main clauses, which are assertions (see 2.3.2). Cristofaro (2003) further argues that non-assertion is the defining characteristic of subordinate clauses (see also 2.3.2). As regards the idea that the declarative belongs to a different functional category than the indicative, this is disputed by the fact that in many language descriptions, the terms declarative and indicative are used interchangeably. One such example is the final mood suffix -e in Hua (East-Central Family: East New Guinea Highlands). Haiman (1980), calls this suffix the indicative, whereas Foley (1986: 162) calls it the declarative. Another example is the mood suffix in Nootka. According to Klokeid (1978: 8), Ditidaht (a Nootka dialect) has a final mood suffix -a´, which he calls the declarative. According to Davidsson (2002: 267ff ), however, Nootka has a penultimate mood suffix -(m)a´- (followed by subject agreement) which he calls the indicative. A third example is the mood suffix -we/-o in Tonkawa. Mithun (1999: 171) calls it the indicative, whereas Hoijer (1933–38: 83ff ) calls it the declarative. Further examples could be presented. Even more remarkable, perhaps, is Lowe’s (1999: 274) description of Nambiquara, where indicative is the cover term for mood forms that are not imperative. Indicative verbs can then be divided into declarative and dubitative ones. Here the terms indicative and declarative are used in an opposite way as would be expected. Clearly, there is no universally accepted criterion that is used to distinguish the two terms declarative and indicative. For reasons such as those presented above, the present author adopts Palmer’s (1986) definition of the declarative as a term for the unmarked epistemic value, a label for a modal marker that denotes factuality and clause type and corresponds to the indicative in the mood system. With this meaning, it can also be used as a label for complementizers of the that-type.
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2.1.5 The conditional The conditional is another modality category that is highly relevant for the present investigation, since the Germanic if among other things has a conditional function, in the sense that it introduces conditional protases. In Palmer (2001), the conditional is subsumed under propositional modality, and in Bybee (1985: 170) it is placed together with the indicative-subjunctive distinction and epistemic modality in the proposed functional (mood) category “commitment to truth of proposition”. Conceptually, the conditional could be counted as a member of propositional modality since conditional clauses are always semantically non-factual; they denote hypothetical or counterfactual propositions (Palmer 1986: 189). Indeed, the conditional can be marked by modal verbs, i.e. should in English, the modal past in the Germanic languages, and by the subjunctive in several languages (Palmer 2001: 125). Furthermore, the conditional occurs with or is marked by the irrealis mood in many other languages (Palmer 2001: 177ff ). One problem with the analysis of the conditional as a modality category is the fact that a distinction is often made between real and unreal conditionals (Palmer 2001: 177ff, 207). Real conditionals denote that the truth of the proposition is left open, that it is hypothetical, whereas unreal ones denote that the proposition is unlikely or contrary to facts. In languages with modal systems, the modal past or the indicative-subjunctive, it is often only the unreal conditional that is modal or in the subjunctive (as in the Indo-European languages; Palmer 1986: 189). In that respect, the conditional should perhaps not be seen as a member of modality, per se, but rather as a category that is compatible with such markers (irrealis, subjunctive, modal markers). On the other hand, in languages with the realis-irrealis distinction (North American and Papuan) often both kinds of conditional clauses are marked as irrealis (Palmer 2001: 152ff, 177ff ). Furthermore, real and unreal should not be confused with the Realis-Irrealis distinction, since real conditional are still non-factual. Another problem with the conditional, which is of particular importance for the present investigation, is its status in conditional protases. Although conditional protases may be semantically hypothetical, counterfactual etc., it could be argued that the primary meaning of the conditional as a protasis marker is circumstance adverbial (‘in case’). In fact, in some languages, the meaning of the conditional in protasis clauses seems to be temporal (‘when’). In e.g. Dongolese Nubian, the conditional function is marked by the adverbializing suffix -k which also means ‘when’ in a purely temporal sense (Armbruster 1960: 201), and in German, conditional clauses are introduced by the adverbial subordinator wenn ‘if, when’ (which derives from the temporal adverb wann; Duden VII: 914). Again, the conditional may thus be compatible with modality markers (subjunctive, irrealis, modal markers), but not necessarily itself a member of it. The situation is not made clearer by studies of the origin of conditional protasis markers. Traugott (1985: 290ff ) found that in many languages, conditional markers have
Chapter 2. Modality
temporal origin, but there are also many that have epistemic, optative or interrogative, i.e. modal origin. The strongest indication that the conditional is indeed a modality category rather than a circumstance-adverbial one is the fact that in many languages, conditional mood markers or particles are not confined to the adverbial protasis clause but also occur in the apodosis, where they denote that the event is hypothetical or counterfactual. This is e.g. the case in Waurá (Eastern Maipuran: Arawak) with the conditional enclitic -mia (Derbyshire 1986: 550ff ) and in Tigre (Ethiopian Semitic) with the particle wa (Palmer 2001: 209). Such examples are numerous, particularly when it comes to counterfactual conditionals. In a clause chaining language like Central Pomo, lastly, it is only the apodosis clause with the final verb that carries the conditional marker (Palmer 2001: 152ff ). It must also be acknowledged, as was said above, that in some languages, the conditional and the irrealis or subjunctive may be expressed by the same morpheme. In other languages, the conditional forms a binary distinction together with either the subjunctive/irrealis or indicative/realis, e.g., in Hungarian with the mood suffixes subjunctive -ia and conditional -anaa (Abondolo 1998: 447), Limbu (Eastern Kiranti: Tibeto-Burman: Sino-Tibetan) with irrealis -gà·ni and conditional -mεn (van Driem 1987: 135–142), Mapuche (Araucanian) with indicative -(ü)y and conditional -(ü)l (Smeets 1989: 226ff ), and Moni (Wissel Lake-Kemandoga: Central and Western Main Section: Trans-New Guinea) with indicative -ija and conditional -jogo, -ogo (Larson & Larson 1958: 406–431). For these reasons, the conditional should be seen as a member of propositional modality rather than a circumstance-adverbial category.
2.2 The indicative-subjunctive and realis-irrealis distinctions At the centre of modality lie the distinctions between the moods indicative and subjunctive and realis and irrealis. Palmer (2001) and many others put these two mood distinctions together into a universal Realis-Irrealis distinction. The Realis-Irrealis distinction plays a key role in the present investigation which identifies subordinators of the that and if/whether-types with it. Since indicative-subjunctive and realisirrealis are both notationally and distributionally complex and objects of dispute, they deserve their own section here. The first three subsections present the distinctions and different definitions that have been offered. In 2.2.4, certain criticism of the Realis-Irrealis distinction of being conceptually too broad and too variable are met through arguing, in accordance with Chafe (1995) and Mithun (1995), that it denotes factuality (“reality” or “actuality”) and that it belongs to a functional category which is distinct from speech-act modality and event-modality. It will be argued that the distinction belongs to propositional modality only.
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2.2.1 The indicative-subjunctive distinction (Palmer 1986, 2001 and Noonan 2007) In many languages, (e.g. the Romance and Germanic ones), morphemes that are labelled the subjunctive can be said to have as their main function to denote the same thing as epistemic and evidential modal verbs do, i.e. propositional modality (see Lunn 1995 for such a statement as regards the Spanish subjunctive). In accordance with Lyons (1977), Palmer (1986: 1ff, 17ff ) states that the indicative-subjunctive distinction (and modality as a whole) denotes factuality vs. non-factuality (and subjectivity, i.e. attitudes and opinions). A central component of this is of course epistemic-evidential modality. In the following examples from Spanish, indicative is used when the speaker is (relatively) sure of the truth of the proposition, whereas subjunctive is used when the speaker has doubts (Palmer 2001: 2, 118): (7) a. Yo sabía que él estaba ahí. I know.past that he be.3sg.past.ind here ‘I knew that he was here.’ b. Dudo que aprenda. doubt.1sg that learn.3sg.pres.subj ‘I doubt that he’s learning.’ Furthermore, the subjunctive can be used to denote specific epistemic and evidential values (the labels, which are Palmer’s 2001, indicate the modal values; see also the use of modal morphemes in the translation): Epistemic modality: speculative: (8) latin (Palmer 2001: 109) Iam apsolutos censeas quom incedunt infectores. now paid.off think.2sg.pres.subj when come.in dyers ‘You may think that they are already paid off, when in come the dyers.’ Evidential modality: reportative: (9) italian Si dice che i soldati siano partiti. one says that the soldiers be.3pl.pres.subj left ‘They say that the soldiers apparently have left.’
(Palmer 2001: 114)
Lastly, epistemic modal morphemes licence the subjunctive in some languages in the sense that if a clause contains epistemic modal morphemes, the verb is in the subjunctive, as the following example from Spanish shows (Palmer 2001: 111): (10) Quizá viene. maybe come.3sg.pres.subj ‘Maybe he’s coming.’
Chapter 2. Modality
Indeed, as was said above, Bybee (1985: 170) proposed that the indicative-subjunctive distinction can be put together with epistemic modality (and the conditional) into one functional (mood) category denoting commitment to the truth of the proposition (more or less corresponding to propositional modality in Palmer 2001). Related to the use of the subjunctive after predicates of doubt, the subjunctive can also be associated with the negative, in the sense that negated predicates of knowledge, belief and report licence the subjunctive in subordinate clauses in the Romance and Germanic languages (Palmer 2001: 116ff ). Similarly, the subjunctive occurs in embedded interrogative clauses in many languages and when predicates of knowledge, belief and report are questioned (e.g. the Romance languages; Palmer 2001: 120ff ). Another category that is not so often associated with the subjunctive is the future. However, in Classical Greek and Spanish they occur together in temporal clauses that denote hypothetical future events (Palmer 2001: 124ff ): (11) Cuando se termine la guerra, volveré a Inglaterra. when refl finish.3sg.pres.subj the war return.fut.1sg to England ‘When the war ends, I will return to England.’ Another type of grammatical markers that often licence the subjunctive are event modal morphemes, as the following obligative example from Acholi (Western Nilotic) shows (Palmer 2001: 128): (12) myero a- ngwec -i must 1sg- run -subj ‘I must run.’ Palmer (1986: 96) points out that event modality is semantically different from epistemic modality. Whereas the latter is concerned with belief, knowledge, truth etc. in relation to the proposition, i.e. propositional modality, the former is concerned with “action, by others and by the speaker himself ”. The subjunctive can still be defined as non-factual though, since the event modal morphemes determine that the main event is non-factual (non-actualized, potential), and since there is a kind of subjectivity (attitude) to event modality (Palmer 1986: 96). A more differentiated definition of the indicative-subjunctive distinction is found in Noonan (2007; see also 2.3.1). On the basis of the use of the indicative-subjunctive (and related moods) in complement clauses after different kinds of predicates in different languages, Noonan (2007: 106ff ) distinguishes three uses of the distinction. In quite a few languages, such as Lori (Iranian) and Bulgarian, the subjunctive is used only after predicates expressing event modal meanings (commands, intention, desires,
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necessity, ability etc.) to denote that the event is potential (non-actualized), whereas the indicative is used for all other events: (13) lori (iranian; Noonan 2007: 104) Zine va pia xas ke tile -ye bedoze. woman from man wanted.3sg comp chicken -obj steal.3sg.subj ‘The woman wanted the man to steal the chicken.’ In many other languages (as in Russian, Persian, and Bemba), the subjunctive is used not only after event modal predicates, but also after predicates expressing doubt, as the following example from Russian shows (Noonan 2007: 107): (14) Ja somnevajus’, čtoby Boris prišël. I doubt comp Boris come.subj ‘I doubt that Boris will come/came.’ In these languages, the subjunctive is also used in conditional clauses to denote that the event is hypothetical. The indicative is used after predicates expressing knowledge, utterance, belief, and comment. Therefore, in these languages, the indicative-subjunctive distinction denotes that the event is factual vs. non-factual (i.e. propositional modality). Noonan (2007) calls this the realis-irrealis distinction. Lastly, in a few languages (such as Spanish), the subjunctive is not only used after predicates expressing event modality, doubt (see 7b above), and in conditional constructions, but also after predicates that express comment, as the following Spanish example shows (Noonan 2007: 109): (15) Lamento que Juan salga esta noche. regret.1sg comp John leave.3sg.subj this night ‘I regret that John will leave tonight.’ The indicative is used after predicates expressing knowledge (see 7a above), utterance and belief. Since complement clauses of commentative predicates are presupposed to be true, and therefore can be said to be equally unworthy of being asserted as potential, dubitative and conditional clauses, the indicative-subjunctive distinction can be said to be one of assertion vs. non-assertion in these languages, Noonan (2007: 109, following Klein 1975), argues, although he admits that not all of the indicative complements in these languages can be considered assertions in the “technical sense” of the term. Palmer (1986), who prefers a unified definition of the indicative-subjunctive distinction, argues against the analysis of the Spanish indicative-subjunctive distinction in terms of assertion and offers another explanation that is compatible with the factuality analysis. The use of the subjunctive in Spanish complement clauses of commentative predicates gives the clause an emotive-evaluative interpretation, he argues. This will be dealt with in more detail below. One problem with any definition of the indicative-subjunctive distinction is, as Palmer (2001: 131ff, 138ff ) shows, that subjunctive morphemes also tend to denote
Chapter 2. Modality
speech-act notions such as polite imperative, jussive and desiderative/optative, as in the following examples: Polite imperative: (16) italian Entri pure. enter.3sg.pres.subj if.you.please ‘Please enter.’
(Palmer 2001: 138)
Desiderative/optative: (17) fula: west-africa njuutaa balâe be.long.2sg.subj in.days ‘May you live long!’
(Palmer 2001: 111)
It could be argued that these functions are parts of the event modal system (as it is in Palmer 1986). They are clearly semantically related to obligative and volitive modality and determine that the event is non-actualized. Furthermore, when expressed by especially dedicated morphemes (rather than by the subjunctive), they occur in modal or mixed systems in some languages (Palmer 2001: 80ff ). On the other hand, Palmer (2001: 80) argues that the imperative and jussive should be distinguished from obligative modality in the sense that they are performative (speech-acts): “the speaker actually gives the ‘command’ in the act of speaking”. This is supported by the fact that they typically do not occur in subordinate clauses5 (Palmer 2001: 80): (18) a. You must come. b. Come in!
I said that you must come. *I said that come in!
A regards the desiderative/optative, Palmer (2001: 134ff ) points out that it is semantically related to volitional modality, but that there is one crucial difference. Volitive morphemes could be interpreted as directive under the right felicity conditions, whereas desiderative morphemes are more removed from the speech situation. Therefore, volitional clauses cannot be counterfactual, whereas desiderative clauses can: (19) a. I wish that he would have come. b. ??I want John to have come. According to Palmer (2001: 134), the desiderative should instead be regarded as a member of propositional modality, together with markers that express fears (apprehensive), since they “indicate attitudes to propositions rather than unrealized
5. It should be pointed out that there were actually embedded imperatives in Old Swedish (Platzack 2007).
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events”. Bybee & Fleischmann (1995), who assume a third domain of modality which has to do with speech acts, place the optative there instead. Although the desiderative/optative use of the subjunctive may have a non-factual explanation, the fact that the subjunctive can be used to denote speech-act notions such as polite imperative and jussive makes the definition of the subjunctive problematic per se, in the sense that it is difficult to define its main function, and to decide to which functional category it belongs. Partly for this reason, Palmer (2001) chooses a wider definition of the indicativesubjunctive distinction in terms of the speech-act notion of assertion vs. non-assertion. The explanation as to why the subjunctive is licensed by or can be used to denote not only event modality but also certain speech-act notions is that these categories are all non-assertive (representing other speech acts). Another reason for choosing the assertion definition is the fact that in Spanish, presupposed complement clauses take the subjunctive (as was shown above). If the subjunctive denoted non-factuality, it should not appear in presupposed clauses. If it denotes non-assertion, however, the subjunctive may be used, since what is presupposed does not need to be asserted. The present investigation does not adopt this analysis. As was said above, Palmer (1986) himself actually refuted this argumentation and offered another emotive-evaluative explanation that was compatible with the factuality analysis. This will be dealt with in more detail in 2.2.5.
2.2.2 The realis-irrealis distinction (Chafe 1995, Mithun 1995) The indicative-subjunctive distinction in some languages corresponds to a realis-irrealis distinction in other languages (South-East Asian, Australian, Oceanic, and North American languages, in particular). These are themselves problematic categories, but partly for other reasons. Interestingly, the realis-irrealis distinction may shed some light on the indicative-subjunctive distinction. The traditional definition of the realis-irrealis distinction, as represented by Mithun (1995, 1999) and Chafe (1995), has to do, as the terms suggest, with what the speaker categorizes as real vs. irreal (Chafe 1995) or actual(ized) vs. non-actual(ized) (Mithun 1995), and is assumed by Chafe (1995: 349ff ) to have a cognitive basis. Realis events are directly perceived by the speaker, “knowable through direct perception” (Mithun 1999: 173), whereas irrealis events are imagined events “that are judged not to accord with objective reality” (Chafe 1995: 349) and that are “purely within the realm of thought” (Mithun 1999: 173), as in the following examples from Maricopa (Yuman; Mithun 1995: 376ff ): (20) a. hot -hot -m good -good -real ‘It is very good’
Chapter 2. Modality
b. haat nyittpooy -nt -ha dogs obj.pl- kill.pl.action -too -irr ‘It might kill dogs too.’ As a consequence, clauses in the past and present tense are typically in the realis mood, whereas clauses containing the categories polar interrogative, negative, future, epistemic possibility, event modality, imperative, prohibitive, and conditional typically are in the irrealis mood (Chafe 1995: 350), as the following examples from Caddo (Caddoan) partly show (Chafe 1995: 353ff ): (21) a. kas -sanáy= aw obl -3.ag.irr- sing ‘He should/is supposed to sing.’ b. kúy- t’ayi=bahw neg- 1.ag.irr- see ‘I don’t see him.’ c. hít’ayi=bahw cond- 1.ag.irr- see ‘If I see it’ In some cases, the realis and irrealis themselves denote these categories (Palmer 2001: 145ff ). In e.g. Maricopa, the realis denote actual events in the present (see 20a) or past, whereas the irrealis can denote the future (although it more often signals a propositional-modal sense, as in 20b above; Mithun 1995: 376): (22) ny- aay -ha 1/2- give -irr ‘I will give it to you.’ Furthermore, the irrealis can express the interrogative in some languages, e.g. in Caddo (Palmer 2001: 12ff, Chafe 1995: 354): (23) sah yi=bahw -nah 2.ag.irr- see -perf ‘Have you seen him?’ The pattern that categories that entail that the event is non-actualized or irreal are marked as irrealis is not entirely consistent, however. In Caddo, the imperative and future actually co-occur with the realis (Chafe 1995: 358; the former is also the case in Maricopa; Mithun 1995: 377) and in Central Pomo (Pomoan), the future, negative and interrogative may either be marked as realis or irrealis (Mithun 1995: 378ff ). However, Chafe (1995) and Mithun (1995) argue that this only demonstrates that the realis-irrealis distinction should be seen as a category which is distinct from these other categories. Some of the typological variation may also have historical explanations. In Caddo, the imperative and future are parts of a different inflectional system than the
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grammatical markers that are constructed with the irrealis (negative, obligative, prohibitive, conditional etc.). Whereas the latter are prefixes, the imperative is unmarked and the future is marked by a suffix. Chafe (1995: 359) argues that it is likely that the future and imperative constructions stem from an older layer of Caddo morphology, before the realis-irrealis distinction was grammaticalized. Thus, they do not interact with the distinction in the same way as the prefixes do. Furthermore, Chafe (1995: 358) speculates that both future and imperative may be judged to denote events that are more likely to occur than say negative events or events in polar questions. Interestingly, negative imperatives, i.e. prohibitives, are in the irrealis in Caddo (Chafe 1995: 356). These are obviously more hypothetical than imperatives, as they ask the listener not to realize the proposition: (24) kaš- sah yi=bahw proh- 2.ag.irr- see ‘Don’t look at it!’ Even more interesting is the fact that in some of those languages that have a choice between realis and irrealis in future, imperative, interrogative or negative constructions, this choice is not random but also has to do with what is marked as actual vs. hypothetical. In Central Pomo, the future is marked as either realis or irrealis depending on the speaker’s expectancy for the event to occur (Mithun 1995: 370, 378ff ): (25) a. té·nta= lil wá-·n -hi a· qó= be -w = khe town= to go-impf -same.irr 1.ag toward= carry -perfv =fut ‘I’ll go to town and bring it back.’ b.
=da má bá -·n -č´i -w = khe á· čhó- w 1.ag neg- perfv =diff.sim.real 2.ag suffer -dur -refl -perfv =fut ‘After I’m gone, you will suffer.’
The first sentence describes events that are not predetermined to occur, but rather depend on the speaker. The second refers to the inevitable (i.e. presupposed) fact that the speaker will eventually die. In interrogative and negative clauses, the choice is not open for such factual distinctions, but is rather determined by the entailment of more central categories such as tense and aspect. If an interrogative or negative clause is in the past perfective, it is marked as realis, whereas if it is in the future it is (typically) marked as irrealis (Mithun 1995: 381ff ). In e.g. Jamul Diegueño (Yuman), lastly, the choice between realis and irrealis in imperatives serves to distinguish between direct and polite imperatives (Mithun 1995: 378). This can be connected with irreality in the sense that a hypothetical imperative is more polite than a “real” imperative. The present investigation accepts the traditional analysis of the realis-irrealis distinction as real vs. irreal or actualized vs. non-actualized. Indeed, the terms real vs. irreal or actualized vs. non-actualized are basically synonymous with the terms factual
Chapter 2. Modality
vs. non-factual (recall that Noonan 2007 refers to the factual–non-factual use of the indicative-subjunctive as the realis-irrealis distinction). The traditional analysis of the realis-irrealis distinction may also shed some light on why the subjunctive is licensed by or used to denote categories such as event modality, polite imperative, jussive and optative. These are all irreal or non-actual contexts.
2.2.3 The universal realis-irrealis distinction (Palmer 2001) One researcher who directly connects the realis-irrealis distinction with the indicativesubjunctive one is Palmer (2001). According to Palmer (2001: 148ff ), the choice between the term pairs indicative-subjunctive and realis-irrealis is mainly due to descriptive grammatical tradition, rather than a difference in meaning and function. Realis-irrealis has become the name of a mood distinction that corresponds to indicative-subjunctive in mainly Austronesian, Papuan, Tibeto-Burman and Amerindian languages: It might have seemed wise, in the interests of consistency, to use only one set of terms, either ‘indicative’ and ‘subjunctive’ or ‘realis’ and ‘irrealis’ for both sets of data, preferably the former. However, this is probably impractical now that both traditions are firmly established (Palmer 2001: 148ff ).
The terms realis-irrealis are in fact relatively young and what some researchers today would label as realis-irrealis (e.g. Mithun 1999, Foley 1986), appears to have been labelled indicative-subjunctive earlier (e.g. in Boas 1911–38, Wurm 1975). One such example is in fact Caddo. Parks (1976) calls the mood prefixes ta-/ti- and a:-/i:- indicative and subjunctive respectively, while Chafe (1995: 351ff ) calls them realis and irrealis. One reason for not using the term subjunctive throughout is that it implies subordination (Palmer 2001: 5). This follows from the fact that the subjunctive occurs more often in subordinate clauses than in main clauses in the European languages. Irrealis, on the other hand, occurs equally often in main clauses in the languages where it is used (Palmer 2001: 5). Therefore, realis-irrealis might be better terms in these languages. However, both pairs represent the universal values Realis and Irrealis, according to Palmer (2001: 148ff; by capital letters, the universal values are distinguished from the moods with the same name): if indicative/subjunctive and realis/irrealis are seen as the grammatical markers of mood, it would be appropriate to recognize ‘Realis’ and ‘Irrealis’ as the relevant typological (cross-language) categories.
The present investigation accepts Palmer’s (2001) unification of the indicative-subjunctive and realis-irrealis distinctions and the use of the labels Realis and Irrealis as the cross-linguistic categories. Since the irrealis, but also the subjunctive, may co-occur with or mark any of the other modality categories plus other categories such as the future and the negative, Palmer (2001) further argues that all these categories can be put together into one
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supercategory Modality with Realis-Irrealis as the binary values. Modality is typically expressed in two ways, through mood, which is binary Realis-Irrealis, and modal markers, which represent more differentiated values on the Realis-Irrealis scale. Although the present investigation does not adopt this model, it is nevertheless important to evaluate it. As was said above, Palmer (2001) divides Modality into two domains: propositional modality and event modality. Whereas propositional modality has to do with the factual status of the proposition, event modality is Irrealis in a non-actualized respect, Palmer (2001: 8) argues: it refers to “events that are not actualized, events that have not taken place but are merely potential”. It might seem counter-intuitive to include event and propositional modality under the same functional category, since the actual meaning of event modality is to express conditions on the agent. Palmer’s reason for doing so is that epistemic-evidential modality and deontic-dynamic modality are expressed by the same morphemes (modal verbs) in English. Since Palmer (2001) further shows that the subjunctive and irrealis can be licensed by event modal morphemes (see Examples 12 & 21a above), he assumes event modality to be their second function, on the side of propositional modality. As was also said above, Palmer (2001) prefers a wider definition of the Realis-Irrealis distinction and Modality as a whole than in the 1986 edition, namely in terms of assertion vs. non-assertion. Factuality is still a part of the meaning covered by the Realis-Irrealis distinction, however, and what the epistemic-evidential modal morphemes denote (propositional modality). The assertion definition offers a possible explanation for the use of the subjunctive and irrealis to express other modality notions, such as polite imperative, jussive, optative/desiderative and interrogative, in the sense that these can all be classified as non-assertive (through being other speech acts). Reminiscent of the Spanish subjunctive, Palmer (2001: 11) further shows that at least in Caddo, the irrealis is used when the proposition is presupposed and the speaker expresses his/her surprise towards what is obvious to the addressee (Chafe 1995: 357): (26) hús- baa=sa- yi=k’awih -sa adm- 1.ben.irr- name- know -prog ‘My goodness, he knows my name!’ At the same time as Palmer (2001) wishes to keep the mood system binary Realis-Irrealis, he acknowledges that there are languages where speech-act categories such as the imperative and jussive are expressed by especially dedicated morphemes on the side of the subjunctive (Palmer 2001: 136ff ). Furthermore, in languages with the realis irrealis distinction, the irrealis (or sometimes the realis) co-occur with such markers. Thus, the mood system is not always binary. Another speech-act mood that Palmer (2001: 204ff ) touches upon and that may occur on the side of the subjunctive is the optative, e.g. in Classical Greek. The main function of the optative is to express wishes (see WALS Ch. 73), i.e. the desiderative function, but as with the subjunctive, it may express many other functions as well. In his effort to keep the mood system binary,
Chapter 2. Modality
however, Palmer (2001: 204ff ) argues that the optative in at least Classical Greek should be regarded as a modal past subjunctive form. Although the present investigation accepts many of the observations and generalization made in Palmer (2001) such as the notational and functional connection between the moods indicative-subjunctive and realis-irrealis and the connection between these moods and epistemic-evidential modality (propositional modality), it does not accept the idea that the Realis-Irrealis distinction denotes assertion vs. nonassertion and therefore encompasses all categories of modality and beyond. As will be shown in the next section, criticism has been raised towards the typological validity of the Realis-Irrealis distinction as being too wide and conceptually vague. It will be argued below that a narrower definition of the distinction in terms of factuality can meet much of this criticism.
2.2.4 Factuality as the focal meaning of the realis-irrealis distinction Since the irrealis, but also the subjunctive, may co-occur with or even denote any of the other modality categories (and beyond), there are researchers, such as Bybee et al. (1994) & Bybee & Fleischman (1995), who have chosen to refrain from at least the terms realis-irrealis altogether. They argue that the realis-irrealis distinction lacks validity, since the irrealis (and the subjunctive), according to them “refers to a very broad conceptual category that covers a wide range of non-assertive modal meanings” (Bybee & Fleischman 1995: 9). Furthermore, apart from the fact that the moods can occur together with or denote any of the other modality categories (and beyond), the marking of realis-irrealis is not typologically consistent but varies somewhat. As was shown in 2.2.1, there are languages, e.g. Caddo, where the imperative and the future are marked as realis instead of irrealis. In some other languages (e.g. Central Pomo), the interrogative, negative and future can be marked as either realis or irrealis. This is also the case with the imperative in some languages (e.g. Jamul Diegueño). This variation would be unexpected if the irrealis and subjunctive denoted non-assertion. Note that this criticism is based on the premises that the Realis-Irrealis (including the indicative-subjunctive) distinction denotes the speech-act notions of assertion vs. non-assertion and that Realis-Irrealis are values that can be ascribed to all modality categories. In fact, much of the criticism can be properly dealt with if the Realis-Irrealis distinction is given the narrower definition real-irreal (Chafe 1995), actualized-nonactualized (Mithun 1995), or factual–non-factual (Palmer 1986, Noonan 2007) and if modality is divided into the three functional categories speech-act modality, propositional modality and event modality (corresponding to the three domains proposed in Bybee & Fleischman 1995). Whereas the speech-act moods imperative, jussive, interrogative, optative etc. are necessarily non-assertive through being other speech-acts, they are not necessarily non-factual, although they tend to be interpreted as such. They can be marked as factual to achieve certain effects.
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As was said in 2.2.2, Chafe (1995) and Mithun (1995) argue that the fact that there is variation as to what categories are marked as realis or irrealis only demonstrates that the realis-irrealis distinction should be seen as (part of) a functional category which is distinct from these other categories. Some of the typological variation may have historical explanations, e.g. the use of the realis together with the future and the imperative in Caddo (Chafe 1995: 359). Furthermore, both the future and the imperative may be judged to denote events that are more likely to occur than say prohibitives, polar questions, and negatives, which all display the irrealis in Caddo (Chafe 1995: 258). Note that this is also the case in Spanish as regards the subjunctive. Prohibitives are in the subjunctive, whereas imperatives are not (except polite ones; Palmer 2001: 139). Recall further that Mithun (1995) showed that the variation between the realis and the irrealis in future constructions in Central Pomo has to do with the speaker’s expectancy for the event to occur (Mithun 1995: 370, 378ff ). Mithun further pointed out that in Jamul Diengeño and other languages, the choice between realis and irrealis in imperatives serves to distinguish between direct and polite imperatives (Mithun 1995: 378). This can be connected with irreality in the sense that a hypothetical imperative is more polite than a “real” one. This use of the Realis-Irrealis distinction can also be said to be in place in the Germanic and Romance languages with the choice between an unmarked direct imperative and a polite imperative in the subjunctive. Lastly, Mithun (1995) argued that in interrogative and negative clauses in Central Pomo, the choice between the realis-irrealis is determined by the entailment of more central functional categories such as tense and aspect. If an interrogative or negative clause is in the past perfective, it is marked as realis, whereas if it is in the future it is (typically) marked as irrealis (Mithun 1995: 381ff ). Mithun (1995) further suggests that the difference between the languages where the negative and interrogative always co-occur with irrealis marking and those where the marking of realis-irrealis is independent of them may be explained in terms of scope. In some languages, the proposition may first be characterized as realis or irrealis and then be negated or questioned; in other languages, the proposition may first be negated or questioned and then marked for mood, in which case the mood marking may be sensitive to the negative or interrogative meaning. In the former languages, negation and the interrogative have scope over the realis-irrealis; in the latter ones, it is the other way around. This clearly suggests that the grammatical markers represent distinct functional categories, rather than one and the same. Chafe (1995: 360) offers a somewhat similar explanation for the Northern Iroquian languages, where realis-irrealis marking is also independent of the interrogative. Questions in the factual mood may be seen as requests for confirmation rather than for information, Chafe suggests. Interestingly, one of the supporting arguments Palmer (2001: 189) uses for the validity of the Realis-Irrealis distinction is the one put forward by Mithun (1995) above, namely that in some languages, typical Irrealis categories may be marked as either indicative/realis or subjunctive/irrealis depending on the speakers certainty. As regards the indicative-subjunctive distinction, Palmer (2001: 189) points out that
Chapter 2. Modality
complement clauses of verbs of belief may either be marked by the subjunctive or the indicative in Italian and Spanish depending on the level of certainty-hesitancy (Palmer 2001: 189). Belief, certainty, and hesitancy are all parts of the epistemic system, so it does not call for a functional distinction between the markers. It does, however, pinpoint the difference between the indicative and the subjunctive and shows that they are in fact not redundant. Here they mark the additional epistemic (i.e. factual) distinction of relative certainty vs. non-certainty. Since certainty–non-certainty clearly are epistemic notions, this suggests that the focal meaning of the Realis-Irrealis distinction is propositional modality. Recall that in 2.2.1 & 2.2.2, it was shown that the subjunctive and the irrealis can denote and occur together with epistemic-evidential modality. The connection between the subjunctiveirrealis and propositional modality is more fundamental than that, though. As Bybee (1985) reports, there are languages with epistemic markers that belong to a mood system, on the side of moods such as the indicative, subjunctive and conditional (but also moods such as the interrogative and optative, it seems). Palmer (2001: 162ff ) also finds languages where the indicative-subjunctive, realis-irrealis or similar distinctions appear to have intermediate epistemic values. Some examples of such mixed systems are: – – – – –
Dani (Papua) with the trio real, “likely”, and potential (Palmer 2001: 171) Seneca with the trio factual (direct perception or memory), future (prediction), and “optative” (possibility or obligation; Chafe 1995: 360) Cheyenne with the independent moods indicative, dubitative, reported (”attributive”), narrative (”mediative”), and interrogative (Mithun 1999: 172) Pawnee (Caddoan) with the mood-epistemic system indicative, assertive, conditional, potential, and subjunctive (Mithun 1999: 372ff ) Crow (Siouan Proper) with the “declarative” mood set declarative, strong assertion, indirect evidential, probability, possibility, and “definite” (Graczyk 2007: 392)
Another example of an overlap between irrealis and epistemic markers is Ngiyambaa, where the irrealis marker is found in the same system as the “purpositive”, which in its epistemic use is essentially deductive. Palmer (2001: 142) therefore proposes that a better term for the irrealis in such contexts would be the epistemic term dubitative. The suggestion that the irrealis-subjunctive in the mood system corresponds to the dubitative in the epistemic system is highly interesting, as there are many examples of languages where epistemic markers of uncertainty/doubt function in a similar way as the subjunctive or the irrealis. They not only occur in plain propositional-modality contexts but also in conjunction with those other modality categories that are often found with the irrealis or the subjunctive. In Ngiyambaa, Serrano and Hixkaryana, the
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ignorative, dubitative, and uncertainty markers, respectively, also indicate questions (Palmer 2001: 53ff, 166ff ): (27) ngiyambaa guya -ga: -ndu dha -yi fish.abs -ign -2nom eat -past ‘Did you eat a fish?/You ate a fish, I don’t know.’ (28) serrano kwa’i ta -m č kihwu:či eat dub -pl you fish.acc ‘Are you eating fish?’ This is also the case in Acoma (Keresan; Bybee 1985: 175) and Wintu (Penutian; Pitkin 1984: 142ff ) where polar questions are in the dubitative mood. Furthermore, in Serrano, the dubitative marker not only occurs in questions but also co-occurs with the future (Palmer 2001: 167): (29) ‘i:p t wahi’ pinkiv here dub coyote pass.fut ‘The coyote will pass here.’ This is also the case in Tariana (Aikhenvald 2003: 387ff ), with the uncertainty marker -da which can co-occur with the future, negation and emphatic interrogative markers. Lastly, in Namia (Sepik: Sepik-Ramu; Feldpausch & Feldpausch 1992) the dubitative marker to/ro not only denotes plain uncertainty but also marks certain conditional clauses and alternative polar questions (Feldpausch & Feldpausch 1992: 50, 67, 76): (30) a. on ineina awe, on ta- le ro ao- le ro I thinking neg.do I vol- go dub neg- go dub ‘I don’t know, maybe I will go or maybe I won’t go.’ b. lu ela pae o ro iya imoulu loko pae -ja man woman sickness do dub and healer 3sg visit -goal ro nakal -ia thus go -def.fut ‘If a man or a woman is sick, they will thus go to visit a healer.’ c. ne olirawomi -ka le ro? you morning -of go dub ‘Are you going in the morning? (or later on?) Thus, there is a special kind of connection between the irrealis-subjunctive and the dubitative/uncertain. The dubitative/uncertain can be said to be the modal counterpart of the moods irrealis and subjunctive. This indicates that the focal meaning of the irrealis and subjunctive is to denote uncertainty (i.e. propositional modality).
Chapter 2. Modality
One problem with the separation of the Realis-Irrealis distinction from categories such as the future, negative, imperative, jussive, interrogative and event modality is that these categories to some extent also denote that the event is non-factual. However, it must be stressed that the main function of these categories is to denote other notions. Take e.g. the future. It is true that the notion of futurity entails that the event is non-actualized, but that does not mean that the future category is itself a marker of non-factuality. All it means is that it may be compatible with such a marker. The actual meaning of the future is to place the event in the future of the speech situation. Therefore, a distinction can be made between a certain future (Realis) and an uncertain future (Irrealis), as in Central Pomo. It should also be noted that Central Pomo is not an isolated case. In War (Khasian: Northern Mon-Khmer: Austro-Asiatic), the future particle cu can be constructed with the epistemic particles can ‘maybe’, daŋ ‘maybe’ and cac ‘probably’, depending on the speaker’s certainty of the event to happen (Weidert 1975: 171ff ). A similar situation is found in Awa, where the future-subject portmanteau suffix may be followed by either the certituative or the dubitative suffix (Loving & McKaughan 1964: 25ff ). Most clear in this regard is perhaps Kamula (Central and South New Guinea-Kutubuan: Central and Western: Main Section: Trans-New Guinea), where the future suffix -lo must be followed by one of the five mood morphemes neutral (-ama/-epo), reported (-eyo), definite (-pe), possible (-la) or conditional (-pie) all depending on the speaker’s certainty (Routamaa 1994: 26ff ): (31) a. Na: sipala elema -lo -epo 1sg crocodile deceive -fut -neut ‘I’m going to fool the crocodile.’ b. Pleini iela pu -lo -eyo Plane tomorrow come -fut -rep ‘(I’ve heard that) the plane will come tomorrow.’ c. Yesu ma ila -me/ pu -lo -pe Jesus again return -span.seq come -fut -def ‘Jesus will (definitely) come back again.’ d. Dusupi teyu -lo -la Dusupi fall -fut -possib ‘Dusupi might fall.’ e. Sosopa yele-lo -pie/ wotia -le pato Centipede bite-fut -cond be.sore -nomzr big ‘If a centipede bites you, it’s very sore.’ These examples clearly show that the future is not a marker of non-factuality or uncertainty per se, but only compatible with such markers. It can be added that Winford (2000) went through the marking of the future and the irrealis in the Creole languages of the world and found that “The reality is that all creoles distinguish future tense categories from others which express different types of irrealis meaning associated with
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mood and modality”. To call the future an irrealis category is therefore, according to Winford, “clearly inappropriate”. The same line of reasoning can be applied to other categories that can be marked as Irrealis, i.e. the negative, interrogative, imperative, jussive, optative/desiderative, and event modality. The interrogative, imperative, jussive, and optative are performative (speech-act) categories. They entail/imply uncertainty or non-actuality, but are not necessarily themselves markers of it. They are compatible with marking of uncertainty, but may be marked as certain in some cases. Note that even Palmer (2001) seems to separate the imperative and jussive from Realis-Irrealis, in the sense that he considers the imperative to be a distinct mood with a distinct performative meaning. It should be pointed out that although the categories discussed are notationally and often morphologically distinct from Irrealis markers, there are other languages with Irrealis markers that themselves denote functions such as the future, the interrogative etc. This is partly what motivated the wider definition of the Realis-Irrealis distinction in Palmer (2001) and the idea that all modality categories belong to one supercategory. On the other hand, it could be retorted that these complex markers have other explanations that are compatible with a split-modality model and a narrow definition of Realis-Irrealis in terms of factuality. First, there may be cases of grammaticalization and multifunctional uses of one morpheme. A morpheme that expresses non-factuality may have grammaticalized into a marker of other meanings as well, e.g. the interrogative, negative and imperative. Conversely, a marker of the future may also have been grammaticalized into a marker of non-factuality. This may explain the multifunctional uses of the “irrealis” markers in the Oceanic languages. Also note the way the past marker has developed a modal use in the Germanic languages. As a temporal marker that places the event prior to the speech event, the past is still a distinct function that is part of another universal category than Modality, namely tense. Second, there may be portmanteau morphemes, i.e. morphemes that express both non-factuality and other notions at the same time. Cf. the way tense and agreement is expressed by the same inflectional morphemes in the Germanic and Romance languages. Third, there may be null morphemes for any one of the notions that are compatible with either Realis or Irrealis. This may explain the use of the irrealis prefix in Caddo to denote a polar question, and the use of the epistemic markers to denote both epistemic notions and polar questions in Ngiyambaa, Serrano and Hixkaryana, although the other explanations would apply equally well; in e.g. Serrano, questions are also marked by intonation. It may also explain the use of the subjunctive to denote polite imperatives, hortative and jussive in the Germanic and Romance languages. The last category to be separated from the Realis-Irrealis distinction is event modality. Like the future, event modality entails that the main event is non-actualized (except for the abilitative which has generic reference). Like the future, event modal morphemes also licence the subjunctive or the irrealis. However, in line with the arguments used above, these facts alone cannot be used as a criterion for identifying it with Realis-Irrealis.
Chapter 2. Modality
As with the future, event modality is compatible with markers of non-factuality, but they are not members of the same functional category. The primary function of event modality is not to mark the proposition as non-actualized, but to express semantically richer notions such as ability, volition, obligation, permission etc. It could even be argued that event modality has the ability of assigning thematic roles to the subject, e.g. maleficiary (must, shall), beneficiary (may), or experiencer (want, can; see Abraham 2002: 38ff for a similar analysis). Thus, event modality belongs to the derivational domain rather than the inflectional one. Even Palmer (1986: 96) admits that deontic (event) modality is semantically different from epistemic (propositional) modality. Whereas the latter is concerned with belief, knowledge, truth etc. in relation to the proposition, the former is concerned with “action, by others and by the speaker himself ”. As was said above, Bybee (1985: 20ff, 165ff ), who investigated verb derivation and inflection in 50 unrelated languages (see 3.2 below), argued that the indicative, subjunctive and epistemic modality should be kept apart from event modality for reasons such as those presented above. While the former can be said to denote the degree of commitment to the truth of the proposition and have scope over it, the latter are more agent- and event-related and have scope over the main event only. The division was supported by the fact that deontic and dynamic modality, in contrast to epistemic modality, were rarely expressed as inflection on the verb in Bybee’s (1985: 165ff ) sample. What she did find, however, were examples where event modality appeared to be derivational. All these facts point towards a separation between the Realis-Irrealis distinction and epistemic-evidential modality on the one hand and event modality on the one on the other. In conclusion, a division of Palmer’s supercategory Modality into more fine grained functional categories corresponding to the domains proposed in Bybee & Fleischman (1995) and a narrower definition of Realis-Irrealis in terms of the speaker’s attitude towards the factual status of the proposition (propositional modality) seem to explain some of the variation as to what categories that may be marked as Realis or Irrealis. The future, interrogative, negative, imperative, jussive, and event modality are seen as categories that are notionally compatible with Irrealis, that may licence Irrealis, but importantly they are (parts of) separate universal categories. The factuality definition of Realis-Irrealis is supported by the fact that in some languages, there is variation in the use of the indicative/realis or subjunctive/irrealis depending on the speaker’s certainty and related notions. The factual definition of Realis-Irrealis has the benefit that it offers a more well-defined functional category (propositional modality) than the one proposed in Palmer (2001).
2.2.5 Refutation of the assertion analysis In the previous section, it was argued that the Realis-Irrealis distinction denotes factuality and that it belongs to propositional modality only. One phenomenon that remains to be explained is the use of the subjunctive and irrealis in presupposed complement
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clauses. Recall that this was used as a main supporting argument for Palmer’s (2001) analysis of the Realis-Irrealis distinction as assertive vs. non-assertive. In what follows, it will be argued, in line with the analysis of the Realis-Irrealis distinction in terms of factuality presented above, that this use also has non-factual explanations. Example (15) above showed how the subjunctive was used in a presupposed clause in Spanish. Another example from Italian is the following (Palmer 2001: 122): (32) Mi sorprende che tu dica questo. me it.surprises that you say.2sg.pres.subj that ‘It surprises me that you say that.’ The argument was that if the subjunctive denoted non-factuality, it would not be used in clauses that are presupposed to be true. If it denoted non-assertion, however, the use of the subjunctive would be more expected, since what is presupposed does not need to be asserted. On the other hand, Palmer (1986: 119) argued that there may be another factor that governs the use of the subjunctive in these clauses. Presupposed complement clauses are typically selected by commentative (factive) predicates, and these predicates often have an emotive or evaluative component in their semantics (please, glad, regret, surprise etc.). Rather than being presupposed, the complement clauses may thus be seen as emotive or evaluative, Palmer (1986: 119) argues: “the speaker or subject does not present the facts, he merely evaluates them”. This is in line with the definition of the indicative-subjunctive as the speaker’s attitude to the factuality of the proposition. The indicative-subjunctive does not merely denote that the proposition is factual or nonfactual but rather the speaker’s attitude towards this factuality. The non-factual subjunctive can be used to indicate that the proposition is not in accord with the speaker expectations (the so called admirative; see DeLancey 1997). A telling example is that ‘admit’, which is implicative and evaluative, can also take complement clauses in the subjunctive in Spanish: (33) Admito que aprenda/ aprende. Admit that learn.3sg.pres.subj/ ind ‘I admit that he’s learning.’ It is clear that the subjunctive is not used here in order not to assert a known fact. Rather, it is used to yield a meaning of “grudging admittance” (Palmer 1986: 145). Another appropriate label would perhaps be the concessive. One strong indication that the subjunctive is used to achieve an emotive effect in these contexts is the fact is that there is a choice between the indicative and the subjunctive after certain factive predicates in Spanish and Italian, e.g. horrorizarse ‘be shocked’ and ser incredible ‘be incredible’, depending on the degree of emotional reaction, with the subjunctive used for the greater emotion (Palmer 2001: 122).
Chapter 2. Modality
Another interesting fact that Palmer (1986) points out is that corresponding clauses in English may be constructed with modal should: (34) It bothers me that you should complain so much. This kind of should is also used to yield a counter-expectative meaning (Palmer 1986: 120) and other emotive meanings such as frustration (the frustrative), as can be seen in the following exclamative that-clause: (35) That he should do such a thing! Furthermore, (35) is clearly a parallel to the Italian ‘surprise’ example above (32). It could therefore be argued that the subjunctive in examples such as (32) is used to yield a counter-expectative (admirative) meaning, rather than to denote non-assertion (Palmer 1986: 120). Icelandic is particularly informative in this regard. In Icelandic, complements of emotive factive predicates must also be in the subjunctive, but only in the subjunctive of the modal verb skulu ‘shall’ (Sigurðsson 2008: 14): (36) Það er gaman að tunglið skuli brosa/ *brosi/ ?brosir. it is fun that moon.the shall.sub smile/ smiles.sub/ smiles.ind ‘It is fun that the moon smiles.’ Note that skulu can also be used in exclamative clauses (Sigurðsson 2008: 11): (37) Að hún skuli segja þetta! that she shall.subj say this ‘[It is incredible/remarkable] That she says this!’ The emotive-surprise reading can also explain the Caddoan example Palmer (2001: 11, 177) cites, where the irrealis is used with an admirative prefix: (38) hús- baa=sa- yi=k’awih -sa adm- 1.ben.irr- name- know -prog ‘My goodness, he knows my name!’ Palmer (2001: 11) states that the speaker expresses his/her surprise towards what is obvious to the addressee. The source of the information, Chafe (1995: 357ff ) paraphrases it in the following way: “as if the speaker were saying ‘it’s unreal that he knows my name.”’ This suggests yet another non-factual explanation of the use of the subjunctive in Spanish. When the predicate expresses surprise or related meanings, the subjunctive may fill an evidential function. The proposition may be counter to the speaker’s expectations but s/he has evidence (visual, auditory etc.) that it is true. As DeLancey (2001) shows, the notions of admirativity and evidentiality are clearly related. That it is not presupposition that determines the use of the irrealis in the admirative Caddo example above is made clear from the fact that content (wh-)questions in
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Caddo, which are presupposed but non-emotive, are in the realis (as opposed to polar questions which are in the irrealis, as was shown above; Chafe 1995: 354): (39) dikat- yah yi=bahw -nah what?- 2ag.real- see -perf ‘What have you seen?’ Chafe (1995: 354) explains that the content question “presupposes that you have seen something, and the speaker wants only to know what it was”. These evaluative-emotive and non-factual explanations would not, however, apply to some of the uses of the subjunctive in non-emotive presupposed clauses in Spanish. Lunn (1995: 431ff ) reports that factive phrases such as el hecho de que ‘the fact that’, which evidently select presupposed complement clauses but without the emotive component can either be constructed with the subjunctive or the indicative. This can be directly linked to information value. In journalistic writing, the subjunctive is used when the proposition has already been mentioned in previous editions, which “may span a fairly long period of time”, or even in the headline. Conversely, propositions that have not been previously discussed or are not assumed to be universally known are marked by the indicative. In agreement with Klein (1975), Lunn connects this use of the indicative-subjunctive distinction with assertion vs. non-assertion. Interestingly, Lunn (1995: 432) shows that this use of the subjunctive even occurs in non-restrictive relative clauses. This she finds surprising, since non-restrictive relative clauses generally do not contain presupposed propositions, but rather additional information. In fact, non-restrictive relative clauses are generally held to be assertive (Hooper & Thompson 1973). If the subjunctive denotes non-assertion, it would therefore be unexpected to find the subjunctive marker in these clauses. Lunn explains the use of the subjunctive in these clauses as a way of flagging to a faithful readership that the information has been mentioned in a previous column. However, there may be another explanation which is more in line with the use of the subjunctive elsewhere. Note that in Swedish, the modal past can be used not only to make requests more indirect, and hence polite, and statements more emotive (40a) but also to refer to what is obvious to both the speaker and the addressee (40b; SAG IV: 226ff ): (40) a. Det var en otäck fläkt till att föra oväsen. it was a nasty fan to to make noice ‘What a nasty fan to make so much noice.’ b. Då hade vi diskat då. then had we done.the.dishes then ‘OK, now we have done the dishes.’ Literally, both these clauses are assertions about the past. The speaker chooses to remove the event from the speech situation in order to be more indirect and perhaps more intimate with the listener, in the sense that what applies to the past does not
Chapter 2. Modality
necessarily apply to the present (the pluperfect in 40b does not have relevance for the present). Since the truth of the proposition in (40b) is obvious to the addressee, it would have been superfluous to assert it in the present, potentially a violation of Grice’s maxim of quantity. Albeit removed from the speech-situation through the use of the pluperfect, (40b) is still an assertion, though, which shows that the assertive–non-assertive distinction is not employed in this case. The same can be said about the use of the subjunctive in Spanish for old information. As in the case with the polite imperative and the emotive complement clause, both to be found in Spanish, the speaker uses the subjunctive to remove the proposition from the speech situation, the present reality, into the realm of thought, in this case in order not to be superfluous. There is no reason to assume that the assertivenon-assertive distinction plays a role in any of these cases. In fact, in the imperative case, it cannot play a role, since imperatives are non-assertive to begin with. In conclusion, the use of the subjunctive in presupposed complement clauses in the Romance languages may have several related explanations. It may be emotive/evaluative, admirative, evidential or simply removed from the speech situation. It must also be added that the situation in Spanish is rather rare (Icelandic is, as was said above, another example). Most languages with an indicative/subjunctive distinction use the subjunctive in presupposed subordinate clauses (Noonan 2007: 109ff ). Examples of languages of the latter kind are Russian, Persian and German: (41) a. german (Eisenberg 2006b:322) Karl akzeptiert, dass Helga abgereist ist/ *sei. Karl accepts that Helga departed be.ind/ be.subj ‘Karl accepts that Helga has departed.’ b. russian (Noonan 2007: 109) Sožaleju, čto Ivan uedet segodnja večerom. regret.1sg comp Ivan leave.3sg.fut.ind today evening ‘I regret that Ivan will leave tonight.’ If the indicative-subjunctive distinction denoted assertion vs. non-assertion, this would mean that presupposed clauses are asserted in e.g. Russian, Persian and German, which would go against the traditional view of presupposition and assertion as being in complementary distribution (Hooper & Thompson 1973). There are also other reasons for not adopting the assertive analysis of the RealisIrrealis distinction. In 2.1.4, it was concluded, in agreement with Palmer (1986), that the declarative is the modal counterpart of the indicative(–realis) in the mood system and that the declarative denotes factuality rather than assertion. The latter conclusion was drawn from the fact that declarative complement clauses can be selected by predicates of belief and even disbelief in the Germanic languages and that there are languages where what corresponds to the declarative in the European languages is based on belief rather than on knowledge and is contrasted with a categorical assertion. The same can be said about the indicative and realis. The indicative is also a category that
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not only occurs after knowledge predicates but also after predicates of belief (e.g. in Spanish). Furthermore, there are also examples of languages where the indicative, like the declarative, is contrasted with the assertive. In e.g. Salt-Yui (Central Family: East New Guinea Highlands) there is an indicative suffix that expresses “a statement of fact with a neutral objective attitude” and an assertive suffix that can be translated as ‘certainly’ and that “indicates that the statement is a fact and that there is a considerable amount of emotional involvement by the speaker” (Irwin 1974). The same situation is found in Kosena (Eastern Family: East New Guinea Highlands; Marks 1974: 33). The most informative example as regards the opposition between Realis categories in general and the speech-act category assertive is perhaps Huichol (Sonoran: Uto-Aztecan: Grimes 1964: 27ff, 60ff, 73). Huichol has two main clause moods: assertive and narrative. The narrative mood is marked on the central clause in a period of clauses. The other clauses in the period may either be without mood marking or marked as assertive. Subordinate clauses cannot be marked as assertive (nor can main clauses that are introduced by potential particles). Instead, these are marked by Realis-Irrealis moods such as factual, which describe events that are either ongoing or completed, and potential, which describes events that are non-actualized. There are also subordinate clauses that are not marked by mood but by subordinators such as the conditional (corresponding to Germanic if) and the quotative (corresponding to Germanic that). Here, assertion is clearly a restricted main clause phenomenon, just as the imperative. The indicative, realis and declarative all appear to be neutral as to the notion of assertion.
2.2.6 Conclusion In this section, the indicative-subjunctive and realis-irrealis distinctions have been presented. In agreement with Palmer (2001), it has been concluded that these distinctions can be put together into a universal Realis-Irrealis distinction. In agreement with Chafe (1995), Mithun (1995), Palmer (1986), it has been argued that this distinction denotes factuality (“actuality” or “reality”). It has been argued that Palmer’s (2001) wider definition of the distinction in terms of assertion is conceptually too broad. Rather, the Realis-Irrealis distinction should be seen as a member of propositional modality, as opposed to speech-act modality and event modality. This would explain why the interrogative, imperative and jussive are marked as Irrealis in many languages but as Realis in some others. Like the future and the negative, these are parts of separate functional categories. They may entail that the proposition is non-factual and thus interact with Irrealis marking but are essentially not themselves markers of it, but rather markers of other notions. The same can be said about event modality. That the indicative-subjunctive distinction form a separate functional category with epistemic modality (and the conditional) was in fact what Bybee (1985) originally proposed, although she did not find sufficient morphosyntactic evidence for separating these
Chapter 2. Modality
Table 2. Different types of modality Speech-act modality
Propositional modality
Event modality
– – – – – –
– – – – –
– deontic modality – dynamic modality
imperative hortative jussive prohibitive optative interrogative
epistemic modality (incl. declarative) evidential modality (incl. declarative) indicative-subjunctive realis-irrealis conditional
– general subordinators
grammatical markers from the speech-act moods. In this section, such evidence has been presented, in particular as regards the realis-irrealis distinction. This is the analysis that will be adopted in the present investigation, which argues that subordinators of the that- and if/whether-types should be seen as modal morphemes. They are seen as members of propositional modality (lexicalizing Realis and Irrealis respectively). Table 2 summarizes these divisions. These categories are thought to have the following scope relations (the other categories and their internal order are taken from Bybee 1985; see 3.2): (42) (speech-act modality (propositional modality (tense (aspect (event modality (voice (valence (verb))))))))
2.3 Notions related to modality 2.3.1 Complement-taking predicates and the indicative-subjunctive distinction (Noonan 2007) In relation to modality, there are certain kinds of predicates that determine the mood of the complement clause. These are important for the present investigation, not only because they determine the mood of the complement clause, but also because they interact with the choice of complementizers (see 4 below). Noonan (2007) is a typological inventory of complement clauses. As was said in 2.2.1, there are three kinds of complement selecting predicates that interact with the modality of the complement, according to Noonan (2007: 102ff ), namely those that entail that the proposition is potential (non-actualized, such as commands, requests, intention, desires, attempts etc.), those that explicitly express propositional attitude (think, believe, doubt, deny, be possible etc.) and those that express comments and logically presuppose that the complement is factual (so-called factive predicates).
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Languages with an indicative-subjunctive distinction (or related moods distinctions) almost always use the subjunctive (etc.) after predicates that signal that the proposition is potential. After propositional attitude predicates, the most common strategy is to use the indicative after those that denote a positive attitude (e.g. believe), and the subjunctive after those that denote a negative one (e.g. doubt). After the third type of predicates, commentative ones, most languages, e.g. Russian and Persian, use the indicative, although there are a few, such as Spanish, that instead use the subjunctive (Noonan 2007: 109). Other kinds of predicates that are relevant for the choice of mood are predicates of utterance, knowledge, apprehension (fearing), and pretence (Noonan 2007: 120ff ). Indirect utterance predicates tend to select complement clauses in the indicative, although there are exceptions (e.g. German). Predicates of knowledge or acquisition of knowledge (e.g. know, discover, realize, see and hear) are often called semifactive predicates (from Karttunen 1971). Normally their complements have a factive (presupposed) or rather factual reading. When negated, turned into questions or conditionals, however, the complement clauses lose their factuality: (43) a. I realized/discovered that I had not told the truth. b. If I realize/discover later that I have not told the truth, I will confess it to everyone. Typically, predicates of knowledge select indicative complements. When negated or questioned, however, they are often constructed with the subjunctive (Noonan 2007: 130). Predicates of apprehension (fearing) are often constructed with either the indicative or the subjunctive depending on the certainty that the event will occur (Noonan 2007: 120ff ). Predicates of pretence (e.g. imagine, pretend, fool, trick), lastly, select complements that are not real. Unexpectedly, however, they do not select subjunctive but indicative complements (Noonan 2007: 126ff ). As was said in 2.2.1, Noonan (2007: 106ff ) distinguishes three uses of the indicative-subjunctive distinction on the basis of the use of the indicative-subjunctive (and related moods) after the aforesaid kinds of predicates in different languages: 1 potential (dependent time reference) vs. independent time reference (e.g. Lori and Bulgarian), 2 realis vs. irrealis (e.g. Russian and Persian), and 3 assertive vs. non-assertive (e.g. Spanish). Pretence predicates pose a problem for these definitions, since they invariably take indicative complements in both languages such as Russian and Spanish. Noonan (2007: 127) attempts to explain this as a matter of establishing an alternative reality and, in the Spanish case, asserting within this reality. Although some of the divisions, analyses and conclusions made in Noonan (2007) could be called into question (2.2.5 above argued against the analysis of the Spanish indicative-subjunctive distinction as assertive–non-assertive), it presents valuable typological information about the relationship between modality and complement selecting predicates. Furthermore, it offers a fruitful division of complement selecting predicates. However, in some cases, more transparent labels and even more fine-grained
Chapter 2. Modality
divisions may be called for. Rather than using different labels for the selecting predicates and the modal values they govern, the present investigation strives to use the same terms, i.e. speculative for predicates such as believe and possible, reportative for predicates such as say, and dubitative for predicates such as doubt and doubtful etc. As can be seen, the terms go with the lexical meaning denoted by these words. Again, the term ignorative (‘uncertain’) will be used (with caution) for predicates such as uncertain and unclear.
2.3.2 Speech acts and performatives (Austin 1962, Searle 1969) Any linguistic investigation that is concerned with modality and subordinators must ultimately relate itself to speech-act theory and the notions of performatives and illocutionary force. This is so because one of the functions of modality is to denote speech acts. In this book, the speech-act notion of assertion has already been treated extensively in regard to the controversy as to whether categories such as the declarative and indicative have illocutionary force or not. Furthermore, there is also the related notion of clause type, which often correlates with speech acts. Lastly, complement-selecting predicates can be divided in terms of speech acts. This division also correlates with the choice of mood in the subordinate clause. Since these are all key concepts for the book, the theory behind speech-acts must be presented and evaluated in relation to the field of modality. The terms performative, illocutionary force and assertion all stem from Austin (1962). Originally, performative utterances referred to statements that had no truth value but rather performed actions through being stated under the right felicity conditions, e.g. threats, declarations, offers, and promises. In a conventionalized society, such utterances, if felicitous, are followed by certain consequences, e.g. marriage declarations meaning that the addressees become married. Therefore, there is a kind of conventional force behind such an utterance, a so-called illocutionary force. The utterance itself is called the locutionary act, and the bringing about of consequences in the real world is called the perlocutionary act. The performative utterances were contrasted with the constatives, e.g. statements and assertions, which were merely reports of state of affairs, and whose truth value could be checked. These were initially not thought to possess any illocutionary force. However, Austin later added these to the performatives, i.e. “I hereby state that...”. The performatives could be identified by certain kinds of predicates (verbs), Austin (1962) argued, e.g. declare, warn, promise etc. When uttered in the first person singular and present tense, these utterances were performative, i.e. “I declare that...”; when uttered in e.g. the 3 person past they were not. A deciding marker for English was the adverb hereby: “I hereby declare that...”. There are, however, as was indicated above, other speech items that also carry illocutionary force, namely moods such as the imperative and interrogative. These were called implicit performatives. The criterion for these and indeed any other utterance that had consequences in the real world
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was that they should be able to be paraphrased into an explicit performative; otherwise they were not illocutionary acts but merely perlocutionary acts. Searle (1969) developed Speech act theory further. Like the late Austin, he also counted assertions as one of the illocutionary acts. Interestingly, however, Searle (1969: 29ff ) made a sharp distinction between illocutionary force indicators and propositional indicators, since the same proposition can be used in different illocutionary acts, such as assertions, requests and polar (yes-no) questions. The illocutionary force indicators have scope over the propositional indicators: (force (proposition )). A bare proposition can be identified as a that-clause, since a that-clause does not constitute its own utterance. In the performative utterance “I assert that I will come”, “I assert” is the indicator of the illocutionary force, whereas “that I will come” is the indicator of the propositional content (Searle 1969: 30). Thus, there is a sharp contrast between the main clause “I will come” and the complement clause “that I will come”. Both are propositions, but only the former is an assertion. Hence, an assertion is “a (very special kind of) commitment to the truth of a proposition” (Searle 1969: 29). The present investigation adopts Searle’s distinction between speech-acts and propositions, and the idea that subordinate clauses are merely propositions, i.e. lack illocutionary force. Indeed, his scope hierarchy between force-indicators and propositional indicators (force (proposition)) directly corresponds to the scope hierarchy between speech-act modality and propositional modality proposed in the present book. 2.3.2.1 Speech-acts within the field of modality Speech act theory has had a major influence within the field of modality and its terms have been applied rather freely on various grammatical categories. First, the moods imperative, interrogative and declarative are grouped together in a functional category given the label (illocutionary) force in many frameworks (e.g. Bybee 1985, Rizzi 1997, Julien 2002). It is true that Austin referred to these as implicit performatives, but to use the term illocutionary force for a grammatical category is more problematic. As Levinson (2005: 242ff ) points out, illocutionary force refers to the conventional force behind an utterance but not to the utterance itself (the locution). It is a notion that lies outside grammar in the narrow sense. Since Austin (1962) referred to imperative and interrogative clauses as implicit performatives, the appropriate label for the functional category that these moods belong to would perhaps be performative modality. However, since this term is not established, it may lead to unnecessary confusion. A more general term is speech-act modality (as in Sweetser 1990 & Cinque 1999), meaning modality that is involved in speech acts. In particular, the speech-act notion of assertion has been used extensively within the theory of grammar. As has already been shown in 2.2, Palmer (2001) defines modality as a whole in terms of assertion, whereas Noonan (2007) calls the Spanish indicative-subjunctive opposition an assertive–non-assertive distinction. Furthermore, Bybee (1985) proposes that both epistemic modality markers and the indicative-subjunctive distinction denote different degrees of assertion (speaker’s
Chapter 2. Modality
commitment to truth of proposition). These analyses go back to Klein’s (1975) analysis of the Spanish indicative-subjunctive and to Hooper (i.e. Bybee) & Thompson’s (1973) and Hooper’s (1975) division of predicates and complement clauses in terms of assertion. The present investigation does not adopt Hooper & Thompson’s (1973) and Hooper’s (1975) model. Since it has been and still is quite influential within the research of modality and because it addresses some of the issues dealt with in this book, namely the semantics of complement clauses, it needs to be presented and evaluated, however. Hooper (1975) divides predicates that select complement clauses in terms of assertion. By assertive predicates, Hooper (1975) refers to performative verbs such as claim and assert but also reportative verbs such as say and report. Even knowledge predicates such as know, understand, see and hear are considered to be assertive. Furthermore, Hooper distinguishes strong assertive predicates, such as assertive and reportative verbs, from what she calls weak assertive predicates, which are predicates that somewhat weaken the assertion expressed in the complement, e.g. believe and seem (i.e. speculative predicates). Predicates of possibility, doubt, uncertainty and factive predicates are categorized as non-assertive according to this framework. Factive predicates are non-assertive since the truth of the complement is presupposed. Hooper & Thompson (1973: 475) offer a similar framework and suggest that thatclauses selected by strong assertive predicates and predicates such as true, certain and sure are what they call “indirect assertions”. They are indirect in the sense that it is the main clause that constitutes the main assertion. Secondly, they may not necessarily be speaker assertions (1 person subject), but could also be reported assertions (2 or 3 person subject). That-clauses selected by predicates such as believe and think, on the other hand, actually constitute the main assertion of the utterance, they argue. The main predication typically does not assert anything, it only weakens the assertion of the complement clause, Hooper & Thompson (1973: 478) argues. This extensive use of the term assertion has many problems. If one sees assertion as a performative category, many of the utterances that are given that label in Hooper & Thompson’s framework would not pass Austin’s rather rigorous test presented above. It is doubtful if utterances such as “It is true that...”, “I’m certain/sure that...” mean “I hereby assert that”. Even less so do of course “I believe that..” and “It seems that...”. Furthermore, it is hard to see how complement clauses after the latter predicates can be seen as speech acts, and what conventional force that could lie behind such an utterance. They do not exhort the listener to think that the propositional content is true, nor does the speaker commit him/herself to the truth of the utterance, so that if it proves false, s/he is guilty of lying. As was said above, Palmer (1986: 142ff ) states that predicates of belief express an opinion about a proposition, but does not assert that it is true. The suggestion that there may be “weak assertions” is thus clearly not very plausible. Conversely, the claim that main clauses headed by a speculative predicate such as believe and think in conjunction with complement clauses do not constitute their own utterances but only weakens the assertion of the complement clause is also
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problematic. As parenthetical tags in the 1 person, this is true, but not as main clauses in 3 person: (44) a. She is in Brussels, I believe. b. The investigators believe that the report is accurate. The proposal that complement clauses of predicates such as say, claim and assert are “indirect assertions” is also problematic, in particular when the subject of the matrix clause is not 1 person. It is hard to see what consequences such reportative clauses could have in the real world for the listener and the speaker. The speaker does not assert them, s/he only reports what someone else (the matrix subject) has asserted. This is also true for the weak assertive predicates, only that in this case, it is not even an utterance that the speaker is reporting, but a modal judgement (Palmer 1986: 142). In fact, as was said above, Searle (1969) drew a sharp distinction between main clauses, which are speech acts (and propositions), and that-clauses, which are only propositions, since they cannot function as independent utterances. Even in a performative utterance such as “I assert that...”, “I assert” can be identified as the speech act, whereas the that-clause can be identified as the proposition. Thus, that-clauses are not assertions. As Cristofaro (2003), Brandt et al (1992), and SAG (IV: 475ff ) point out, complement clauses may determine the speech act directly or indirectly and even contain most of the propositional content, but they are dependent on the main clause for their interpretation. Note that in e.g. narrative discourse, embedded interrogatives and declaratives are typically posed by and addressed to a third party (“She asked him if...”, “She told him that...”). Indeed, Cristofaro (2003) sees non-assertion as the defining characteristic of subordinate clauses. She (2003: 35ff ) refutes Hooper & Thompson’s (1973: 34ff ) arguments by showing that complement clauses of reportative predicates do not pass true assertiveness tests such as the ability to be constructed with tag-questions, sentential negations, sentential questions, and speech-act adverbials: (45) a. He said it’s raining, *isn’t it? b. Is it the case that he said it’s raining? [=Did he say it’s raining?/*Is it raining?] The same can arguably be said about semifactive and “weak assertive” predicates, in particular when the speaker and the subject are not the same person (examples by the present author): (46) a. He knows it’s raining, *isn’t it? b. Is it the case that he knows that it is raining? [= Does he know that it is raining?/ *Is it raining?] c. He thinks it’s raining, *isn’t it? d. Is it the case that he thinks that it is raining? [= Does he think that it is raining?/ *Is it raining?]
Chapter 2. Modality
The very reason why the speaker chooses to embed such important information as in (45), is, according to Cristofaro (2003: 37), that s/he does not want to be held responsible for it, i.e. non-assertion.
2.4 Conclusion In this chapter, terms and definitions pertaining to mood and modality have been introduced. Inspired by Bybee & Fleischman (1995), it has been argued that modality is best divided into three categories: speech-act modality, propositional modality and event modality. Focus has been laid on propositional modality, which stands for the speaker’s attitude to the factuality of the proposition and which is denoted by epistemic-evidential modal morphemes, the conditional, and the indicative-subjunctive and realis-irrealis distinctions. As regards the latter, it has been argued, in agreement with Palmer (1986), Chafe (1995), and Mithun (1995) that these distinctions denote factuality (“reality” or “actuality”), rather than the wider speech-act notion of assertion, and therefore should be seen as members of propositional modality only. It has been argued that Palmer’s (2001) unification of all modality categories into one overarching supercategory, Modality, with assertion being the relevant feature and Realis-Irrealis the binary values, has the disadvantage of being too wide and conceptually vague. It means that any functional category that is not assertive is subsumed under Irrealis, regardless of its primary function (whether it be temporal, event-related, performative or adverbial). Second, it entails that all declarative and indicative subordinate clauses have illocutionary force, a highly controversial suggestion. A division of Modality into three distinct functional categories (in accordance with Bybee & Fleischman 1995) and a narrower definition of the Realis-Irrealis distinction in terms of factuality solves these problems, it has been argued. Explanations have been offered for apparent counter-arguments to the narrower definition of Realis-Irrealis in terms of factuality. Complement clauses of commentative predicates actually have non-factual features (evaluative and evidential) and the subjunctive can be used to yield a counter-expectative (admirative) meaning. In Spanish, the subjunctive is also used in presupposed clauses in news paper articles when the proposition has been mentioned in previous editions. In this case, it was argued that the subjunctive is used to remove the proposition from the speech-situation (into the realm of thought) in order not to be superfluous.
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The morphosyntactic status of modality
The previous chapter introduced the notion of modality and argued that it should best be divided into three distinct functional categories: speech-act modality, propositional modality and event modality. As was stated above, the present investigation explores the hypothesis that general subordinators, i.e. subordinators of the that, if, and whether-types should be regarded as members of modality, propositional modality in particular. Subordinators have scope over the clause they introduce and may thus be regarded as members of the most peripheral functional category of the subordinate clause1. As Bybee (1985) argues (see 3.2 below), indicative-subjunctive moods and epistemic modal markers also have scope over the whole proposition. This similarity in scope makes it possible to explore the hypothesis that subordinators should be seen as members of propositional modality. However, there are other researchers, such as Cinque (1999) and Julien (2002), who instead argue that many of the categories assumed under propositional modality in the present framework have less syntactic scope than tense. Therefore, the assumption that propositional modality, like subordinators, has scope over the entire proposition, including tense, needs to be tested somehow. One way of testing whether propositional modality, as defined in Chapter 2, is a functional category with scope over the whole proposition is by studying the relative order of functional morphemes in relation to the lexical category they belong to in the languages of the world. Often, the internal order of morphemes mirrors their syntactic and semantic scope relations (see 3.1 below). If morphemes denoting propositional modality tend to be situated “outside” of morphemes denoting functional categories such as tense and aspect in relation to the verb, the hypothesis that propositional modality and complementizers belong to the same functional category can be explored further. If not, the hypothesis is falsified. Bybee (1985), Cinque (1999), and Julien (2002) all study the internal order of functional morphemes in different languages. These surveys will be presented and evaluated in the given order. Bybee’s (1985) investigation finds that what corresponds to propositional modality in her framework has scope over tense. However, Cinque (1999) and Julien (2002) present languages where the opposite seems to be true. Since these constitute counter-arguments to the hypothesis explored here, efforts will be made to refute these analyses. Lastly, two independent typological investigations will
1. Called Complementizer within the Generative framework (see Ch. 4). By an initial capital letter, the functional category is distinguished from the part of speech.
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be conducted to settle the question. First, however, some technical and theoretical issues relevant to the subject must be introduced.
3.1 Morphosyntax In 1.3.1, it was briefly stated that the explanatory branch within Language Typology often tries to find conceptual/cognitive explanations for linguistic universals. Parallels have been drawn between colour naming and colour perception, and between noun phrase hierarchies and salience of entities in perception. This is called iconicity. One special kind of iconicity that is often assumed to be operating in language is iconic distance. The iconic-distance hypothesis states that morphosyntactic distance between constituents more or less mirrors the conceptual distance between the notions that these constituents refer to (Croft 2003: 205ff ). As will be seen in more detail in 3.2, Bybee (1985) suggests that the order of derivational and inflectional affixes is determined by the semantic relevance of the affix to the verb, which, in turn, may be derived from human cognition. Her investigation shows that this indeed seems to be the case. Although Bybee’s (1985) semantic relevance hypothesis and the iconic-distance hypothesis clearly have explanatory value, they are vague as to the technical mechanisms behind the formation of morphosyntactic structures. Two important points should be noted, however. Bybee’s (1985) proposed hierarchy correlates with scope; the greater the distance from the verb, the wider the scope. Furthermore, Bybee (1985) suggests that semantically more relevant categories should be realized as bound morphemes more often than less relevant ones; conversely, less relevant categories should be realized as particles more often than more relevant ones. Bybee et al. (1990: 19) develop these ideas further by proposing that affixation is a phonological process. A loss of phonological stress and a phonematic reduction of grammatical markers make them dependent on the lexical category they determine. The grammatical markers cliticize and ultimately become affixes. This analysis was supported by a typological investigation that Bybee et al. (1990) conducted, which showed that verb-first languages tend to have a higher share of prefixes than verb-medial and verb-final languages, whereas verb-final languages tend to have the highest share of suffixes. Bybee et al. (1990) argue that functional words that are situated at the edge of the clause tend to become more reduced. Hence, they become affixes to the verb which then, in turn, becomes clause initial or final. Within the framework of Generative Grammar, a more elaborate model of affixation has been proposed, which involves syntactic head-raising. This will only briefly be touched upon here. Baker (1985, 1988) proposes that the order of bound (derivational) morphemes mirrors the order in which certain morphosyntactic operations have been applied. Ultimately, it also mirrors the underlying order of universal categories. Later investigations (e.g. Cinque 1999 and Julien 2002; see below) have shown that the model can also be applied to inflection. Generally, it is thought that a lexical item can be
Chapter 3. The morphosyntactic status of modality
“moved” and “adjoined” to the lexical item that selected it (leaving a copy or trace in its original position). The resulting cluster can, in turn, also be moved and adjoined to the lexical item that selected the latter one etc. In such a way, the linear order is preserved, although it may potentially be the mirror image of the underlying order. As Chomsky (2001: 38) points out, however, such an operation is not compatible with the Minimalist Program of Generative Grammar. An adjunction of a lexical item to another one results in a syntactic object that is identical to the latter lexical item. This means that the adjoined lexical item cannot establish an agree-relation with the copy/trace left in its original position and, as a consequence, cannot be co-indexed with it. Rather than being a syntactic operation, Chomsky (2001) therefore argues that head-raising (of lexical and functional categories) but also head-lowering (of functional categories) are phonological processes “conditioned by the phonetically affixal character of the inflectional categories” (i.e. just like Bybee et al. 1990). Julien (2002: 188ff ) also entertains the possibility that a grammatical marker can be phonologically affixed to its lexical category without any syntactic operation being applied. In the present study, affixation is seen as a morpho-phonological process rather than a syntactic operation (in agreement with Bybee et al. 1990 and Chomsky 2001). At the same time, it is acknowledged that affix order to a large degree mirrors scope, in accordance with the order of the functional words from which the affixes have developed, the universal order of the functional categories that these affixes lexicalize, and the iconic-distance principle. The exact explanation as to why one category may be realized as a prefix and another as a suffix is left open, though (a question that the generative model could not offer a satisfying explanation for either). Clearly, the order between selecting and selected elements in a particular language plays a part, since verb-final languages tend to have more suffixes than verb-medial and verb-initial languages, and verb-initial languages tend to have more prefixes than verb-medial and verb-final languages (Bybee et al. 1990). A somewhat complicating circumstance is the fact that Bybee et al. (1990) found that suffixes were overall more prevalent than prefixes, even in verb-initial languages. This is also the case in languages with preverbal particles, so that the suffix order, in the extreme case, is the exact opposite of the particle order. In order to avoid these unexplained phenomena, the present study does not draw any conclusions based on particle order in relation to affix order or prefix order in relation to suffix order in a particular language. It only draws conclusions based on the internal order of suffixes, prefixes or particles in relation to the verb in a particular language. It is very important to stress that the iconic-distance principle should be seen as a strong tendency, but not as a law. Matthews (1991: 232) and Croft (1990: 181) recognize that there may be a few exceptions to it. As regards affixation, it could be speculated that although affixes are formed from reduced particles etc. and follow the original particle order and presumably also the universal order of the functional categories in question, diachronically, new functional words may grammaticalize that fill a gap in one of the inflectional paradigms. If the relevant category is a more central one, and the functional word is reduced into an affix, the result would be a conflicting or non-
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iconic order, an order that does not mirror the typical particle order in that language and the universal order of the functional categories. Although the iconic-distance principle and the universal order of the functional categories may lead to a reanalysis or potentially a redistribution of one or more of the morphemes in question, that language will for a period of time display a conflicting or non-iconic order. Such exceptional developments may explain certain cases of conflicting evidence that are found between and within the investigations that will be presented below. However, as Bybee’s (1985) investigation shows (see 3.2 below), it appears that the iconic distance is generally followed in the languages of the world. Note that the model of affixation assumed here would, as opposed to the generative head-movement model, permit deviating affix orders, since the development of affixes is seen as a diachronic morpho-phonological process. Once markers have been established as affixes, they are affixed according to the order in which they were grammaticalized, most often in agreement with the iconic distance principle and the universal order of functional categories, but sometimes potentially also in conflict with them (although these principles may eventually lead to a reanalysis or redistribution of the affixes concerned). As Chomsky (2007: 10) points out as regards morphology and phonology in general: ...phonology, morphology, and whatever else is involved in externalization [of language] might be variable and complex and subject to large-scale historical accident, satisfying the linking condition [of form and meaning] in ways that are as good as possible.
Another point that is important to make is that the classifications of the items of study are dependent on the analyses made by the individual researchers and that there may be conflicting analyses of some of the morphemes in question. It is to be expected, therefore, that a typological investigation of affix order will not be able to yield results that are without any exception and incontrovertibly one way or the other. Nevertheless, it can still be argued to be worthwhile to see what results such an investigation might yield.
3.2 The Semantic-relevance hypothesis (Bybee 1985) As has been mentioned above, Bybee (1985) presents a typological investigation of the internal order of verbal derivational and inflectional categories in the languages of the world. She explores the hypothesis that the semantic relevance of an affix to the stem determines its relative distance from the stem. Semantic relevance may, in turn, be derived from human cognition, Bybee (1985: 14) suggests. Bybee further proposes that “The degree of morpho-phonological fusion of an affix to a stem correlates with the degree of semantic relevance of the affix to the stem”. This entails that the more relevant a category is, the more likely it is to be realized as an affix and not as a particle.
Chapter 3. The morphosyntactic status of modality
By “semantic relevance”, Bybee (1985: 15) refers to the degree to which the meaning of a functional category “affects the lexical content of the verb stem”. Bybee (1985: 4) proposes the following hierarchy: (47) V-Valence-Voice-Aspect-Tense-Mood-Agreement The valence category (e.g. transitive, causative) is the one that is most relevant to the verb stem, as it introduces a new sub-event and a new argument. Aspect does not affect the lexical content of the verb to such a high degree, yet it determines if the event should be viewed from without or within, and this may have consequences for the meaning (e.g. resultative or inceptive readings). Tense is even less relevant; it is deictic and places the event on a time scale and in relation to a reference point, but crucially it does not affect the lexical content of the verb. Mood is even less relevant to the verb. It determines the whole proposition rather than just the verb; it indicates the speaker’s commitment towards the truth of the proposition and what the speaker wants to do with it in the discourse (Bybee 1985: 20ff ). The hypothesis also makes some predictions. First, the most relevant categories to the verb should be the most common affixes in the languages in the world. Second, the existence of a particular category as an affix in a language should implicate the existence of the more relevant categories, if any, as affixes too. To test the hypothesis, Bybee (1985: 24ff ) conducted an investigation of 50 languages, carefully selected in order to avoid genetic and regional biases. The results showed that valence was the most prevalent verbal affix category in her sample (90% of the languages had it), followed by aspect (74 %) and mood (68 %). Surprisingly perhaps, only 50 % of the languages in her sample had tense as an inflectional category. Contrary to predictions, mood also existed as an inflectional category in some languages that both lacked tense and aspect inflection. The relative high percentage of mood was due in particular to a high prevalence of the imperative as an affix. As regards the relative order of the inflectional categories aspect, tense, and mood, the results supported the proposed hierarchy. Aspect was closer to the verb stem than tense in 8 languages of 18 with both aspect and tense inflection. In no language was tense closer to the verb stem than aspect; the remaining 10 languages either had tense and aspect suffixes on different sides of the stem, or portmanteau morphemes that expressed both aspect and tense. Aspect was closer to the verb stem than mood in 10 out of 23 languages with both aspect and mood; no language had the other order. Tense was closer to the stem than mood in 8 out of 20 with both tense and mood; one language, Ojibwa, had the other order (with the dubitative suffix preceding the preterite suffix; Bybee 1985: 33ff, 196). Another interesting observation that Bybee made was that aspect tended to form portmanteau morphemes with tense, whereas mood tended to form portmanteau morphemes with agreement. This tendency suggests a certain amount of autonomy between the two pairs. Furthermore, Bybee found that the indicative, as could be expected
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from the unmarked value, tended to be morphologically null (15 out of 25 = 60%), whereas the subjunctive tended to be morphologically overt (7 out of 8; Bybee 1985: 53). As always in linguistic investigations, there were certain definitional problems, with categories that partly overlapped. In some languages, mood partly overlapped with the future, e.g. the potential or intentional in Kiwai, Pawnee and Zapotec. In these particular cases, Bybee (1985: 156) argued that modality was the primary function, the future being a secondary one. As was shown in 2.3, the future is a category that is often associated with the Irrealis, probably because the future entails uncertainty. It should also be added that Bybee found that the future occurred on the side of other tense markers in many other languages, so she still decided to count it as a tense category rather than a mood one. The explanation Bybee (1985: 194) offered for the partial overlaps between the functional categories was that a grammatical marker denoting a certain function may widen its meaning into also denoting a function belonging to the adjacent functional category in the hierarchy. Thus, the future preterit often has a conditional use (e.g. in the German2 and Romance languages, Tiwi, and Sierra Miwok). The conditional, in turn, has an optative use in Pawnee and Nahuatl, and the subjunctive has an imperative use in Basque, Masaii and Tarascan. Inspired by Foley & Van Valin (1984), Bybee (1985: 169ff ) further investigated whether mood may fill two separate functions, one illocutionary force function (i.e. speech act modality) and one truth-commitment function: Illocutionary force: Imperative, Optative, Admonitive, Prohibitive, Interrogative Commitment to truth of [proposition]3: Subjunctive, Dubitative, Probable, Potential, Conditional
The indicative Bybee saw as a complex category which can either indicate that the clause is a “declarative assertion of truth”, or that the speaker is committed to the truth of the proposition: In some languages (such as Quileute) the Indicative is the sign of declarative sentences, since it contrasts with an interrogative, while in other languages the Indicative contrasts with a Subjunctive or a Conditional and thus is used both in declarative assertions and questions. If the unmarked or basic utterance is a declarative assertion of truth, then contrasts with this basic utterance can develop along the two parameters – the speech act type can be modified, and the degree of assertion can be modulated.
In a morphological respect, Bybee (1985) did find evidence for placing the epistemic categories probable, potential and dubitative together with the subjunctive and condi-
2.
I.e. should.
3. As was said in footnote 2 ch. 2, she sometimes called it commitment to truth of assertion, which is tautological, since an assertion is a commitment to the truth of the proposition (Searle 1969).
Chapter 3. The morphosyntactic status of modality
tional, in the sense that probable, potential and dubitative were often realized as inflection in her sample. She did not, however, find significant morphosyntactic evidence to support the proposed division of moods into “illocutionary force” and “truth commitment”. In fact, the imperative was often mutually exclusive with either the subjunctive, dubitative, probable or potential. On the other hand, most of the languages in her sample did not have more than two mood markers, so the findings may not be significant. What she did find, however, was that the interrogative had a different distribution from the rest of the mood categories: “Indeed, the interrogative has unique expression properties not paralleled by any other markers” (Bybee 1985: 192). It was always a suffix and usually stood farthest away from the stem, outside agreement suffixes (Bybee 1985: 169–189). As was said in 2.1.3, Bybee (1985) did not include event modality in these proposed mood groups, since she considered it to be more agent and event related. This line of reasoning was supported by the fact that event modality was extremely rare as an inflectional marker in Bybee’s (1985: 20ff, 165ff ) sample. What she did find, however, were examples of event modality as derivational markers. To conclude, Bybee found support for her hypothesis that “semantic relevance to the verb” affects the morphological distance from the stem and the morpho-phonological fusion to the stem as regards the functional categories pertaining to the verb. The results deviated from her predictions in three ways. First, tense was less morpho-phonologically fused than expected. Second, there were certain overlaps between the categories. Third, mood behaved differently than expected. The imperative was realized as an affix more frequently than expected, and the interrogative had a different morphosyntactic distribution than the other moods. However, it could be argued that Bybee’s sample was too small for these deviations to be considered significant, especially as regards the internal distribution of the mood markers. Most of the languages that had mood as an inflectional category only had two mood markers.
3.2.1 Assessment of the semantic-relevance hypothesis On the whole, Bybee (1985) supports the idea that modality is a peripheral functional category, with scope over tense and aspect. In that respect, it could be compared to subordinators, complementizers in particular. Bybee (1985) also explored the possibility that “mood” could be divided into two functional categories, one that has to do with illocutionary force/speech acts and a second that pertains to truth commitment. That is also what is argued under the present hypothesis, although it is claimed that the latter category has to do with factuality (propositional modality), rather than “degrees of assertion” (see 2.2.5 & 2.3.2). Although Bybee (1985) did not find morphosyntactic evidence to support the separation, she did find evidence to suggest that the interrogative was a more peripheral category than all other modality categories. That the “declarative” function of the indicative could not be separated from the indicative, subjunctive, conditional, and epistemic mood markers is in line with the present hypothesis, which
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argues that declarative is not an speech-act modal category but merely the unmarked epistemic value. The statement that the “declarative” function of the indicative contrasts with the interrogative does not seem to be supported by her data. As regards subject agreement (person and number), the present investigation does not adopt Bybee’s view that it should be seen as a functional category. In many languages, e.g. the Romance languages, subject agreement is often the only morphological marker of the subject (the subject pronoun being “dropped”). Since the subject is an argument of the verb rather than a functional category, it is reasonable to assume that agreement affixes also lexicalize this argument through an agree-relation, rather than lexicalizing another functional category. Indeed, as Chomsky (2001: 138ff ) argues, a functional category containing only the subject agreement features would be uninterpretable in the functional domain of the verb. It “not only might not exist, but cannot exist on rather plausible assumptions” (Chomsky 2000: 138ff ). Put differently, the subject’s number and person features are completely irrelevant to the predicate and the proposition and should therefore not be seen as modifiers of it. Subject agreement is no more a functional category of the verb than the subject is. This leaves mood as the outmost functional category.
3.3 The split-inflection hypothesis (Cinque 1999) Cinque (1999) is a generative and typological investigation that explores the hypothesis that the “inflectional domain” may be split into a universal hierarchy of several functional categories. The main source of data is the internal order of clause adverbials in Italian and French. This, Cinque compares to the order of clause adverbials in English, Norwegian, Bosnian/Serbo-Croatian, Albanian, Hebrew, and Chinese. Cinque then assumes that these adverbials represent functional categories within the clause that can also be lexicalized by particles, auxiliary verbs and inflection. Cinque (1999: 178) proposes the following hierarchy (categories to the left having wider syntactic scope and being more peripheral than categories to the right; he proposes further categories to the right but these are not relevant for the present investigation): Mood
Mood
Mood
Modal
T
T
speech act
evaluative
evidential
epistemic
past
future irrealis
±declara- ±fortunate ±direct ±committive evidence ted frankly fortunately allegedly probably once
Mood ±realis
then perhaps
Modal
Modal
necessity
possibility
±necessary ±possible necessarily
possibly
Figure 1. The universal order of functional categories belonging to the inflectional domain according to Cinque (1999)
Chapter 3. The morphosyntactic status of modality
There are several points to be noted here. First, Cinque proposes that “Mood irrealis” to which he subscribes speculative particles such as perhaps and the moods indicative, subjunctive, realis and irrealis, should be placed closer to the clause centre than the temporal categories past and future (but further away than anterior). This is because temporal adverbs such as once and then can be placed before clausal adverbs such as perhaps in the languages he explored (Cinque 1999: 136, 152). Second, he draws distinctions between “mood irrealis”, epistemic probability (“epistemic”), epistemic necessity and epistemic possibility. It should also be added that Cinque (1999) proposes that event modal categories such as volitional, obligative, abilitative, and permissive are located even closer to the clause centre, inside certain aspect categories (habitual, repetitive and frequentative). Cinque’s independent evidence to support the proposal that “mood irrealis” is a more central category than the temporal categories past and future is that in Samoan (Polynesian: Central/Eastern Oceanic) and Ndyuka (Creole; Huttar & Huttar 1994: 519) the irrealis particle comes to the right of the future particle and, in Samoan, to the right of the past particle: (48) samoan (polynesian: central/eastern oceanic) Ae a lava pe a sei e alu atu e ai lelei but emph emph inter fut irr 2sg go dir gen eat well ‘But if you go and eat well...’ (49) ndyuka I be o sa poi (fu) nyan ete? you ant fut irr be.able for eat yet ‘Would you have been able to eat yet?’
(creole)
Furthermore, Cinque (1999: 145ff ) identifies clause adverbs such as frankly and honestly with the notion of speech act. Under “Speech act” he also includes the moods declarative, imperative, and interrogative. The functional category “Speech act” has a direct parallel in Rizzi’s (1997, 2002) assumed category “Force”, which Rizzi locates even further out in the clause periphery (in the Complementizer domain; see 4.2 below). However, Cinque (1999) argues that the placement of clausal adverbs such as honestly and frankly indicates that the category is also realized in the inflectional domain, perhaps with some feature differences, although he does not specify that any further.
3.3.1 Assessment of the split-inflection hypothesis Cinque’s (1999) investigation is an important one, since it opens up the possibility of a more fine grained structure of inflectional categories within the framework of Generative Grammar. It also has the strength that is uses data from a large variety of languages. The relevance of Cinque (1999) to the present investigation is that it makes a connection between the moods indicative, subjunctive, realis, irrealis and potential
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morphemes such as perhaps. Furthermore, it draws a distinction between what Cinque (1999) calls “speech act moods” and “realis-irrealis moods”, something that is also done in the present study. However, it also poses a problem for the present hypothesis, since it considers “realis-irrealis moods”, epistemic probability and the declarative to constitute or to be parts of different functional categories. The “realis-irrealis moods” are even placed “inside” of tense, which argues against the hypothesis that general subordinators should be subsumed under propositional modality, since general subordinators arguably have wider scope than tense. These conclusions can be seriously questioned though, which will be done in the following. First, it must be acknowledged that in at least Norwegian and English, the order of clausal adverbials are open for variation. Cinque (1999) offers the following order for Norwegian: (50) ærlig talt (honestly) > heldigvis (fortunately) > tydeligvis (apparently) > sannsynligvis (probably) > nå (now) > kanskje (perhaps) That means Speech act > Evaluative > Evidential > “Epistemic” > Present > “Irrealis”. For Swedish, which is closely related to Norwegian, SAG (IV: 98) offers the following order: (51) ärligt talat (honestly) > enligt X (according to) > faktiskt (actually) > tyvärr/ turligt nog (un/fortunately) > antagligen/kanske (probably/perhaps) That means Speech act > Evidential > “actually” > Evaluative > “Epistemic”/”Irrealis”. As can be seen, Swedish and Norwegian apparently have somewhat different orders. On the other hand, SAG also points out that the order of clause adverbs is rather free in Swedish. This is probably where the crucial point lies. One cannot draw definite conclusions for a system with that much internal variation. Clause adverbs are not reliable indicators of the order of functional categories. They can be adjoined to various positions in the clause. Particles, clitics and affixes, on the other hand, are typically less movable and are much better indicators. Second, epistemic clausal adverbs representing different values on the epistemic scale are difficult to combine, in at least the Germanic languages. They become paradoxical or oxymoronic (which Cinque 1999: 152 also partly concedes): (52) a. We will??probably perhaps come at eight. b. The events will??probably possibly occur. It is therefore hard to motivate the categorical separation between perhaps, probably and possibly. They represent different epistemic values, but essentially they belong to the same functional category (see Palmer 1986, 2001, Bybee 1985). Cinque’s reason for separating probably from perhaps, necessarily and possibly was the alleged distribution of temporal adverbs such as once and then, which were seen as members of past and future, respectively. This can hardly be considered a strong argument, though. First of all, it is doubtful if past, future and anterior are parts of different functional categories rather than being different values of the same functional category.
Chapter 3. The morphosyntactic status of modality
One reason for regarding them as different functional categories is that they can form complex tenses in some languages, e.g. future in the past. However, they all fill the same function, to place the event on a timeline in relation to a reference point. Indeed, in many languages, one morpheme is the unmarked value (typically the present) and may denote one of the other functions as well (in e.g. Swedish, the present can also denote the future). Secondly, as regards the relation between temporal adverbs such as once and then and the position of the functional categories past and future, it is important to note that the temporal adverbs can also be placed clause-initially and clausefinally in at least the Germanic languages. Furthermore, in these languages, they are highly movable even in the middle field of the clause. Thus they cannot be considered reliable indicators of the position of tense categories. Note also that they are phonologically light and pronominal (at least then is). It could be argued that they are placed clause initially or clause medially for information-structural reasons, rather than being associated with a certain functional category. The last point is easily demonstrated by an online-search on Google. In order to avoid pages written by non-native English speakers as much as possible, the search was conducted on Google.co.uk with English pages only. In order to obtain the temporal meaning of then and once (they also have other meanings not relevant here) and to assure that the adverbials were clause medial, search strings were constructed that included the future auxiliary will for then and the past form of be for once, e.g. “will perhaps then” and “was perhaps once”. Auxiliaries tend to be followed by verb- or adjective phrases, which means that the adverbs are not clause final. The results are presented in the table below: Table 3. The distribution of epistemic clausal adverbs and temporal adverbs in clause medial position in English then “will then perhaps” “will perhaps then” % “will perhaps then” “will then necessarily” “will necessarily then” % “will necessarily then” “will then possibly” “will possibly then” % “will possibly then”
once 1 010 1 350 57,2 526 175 24,9 9 290 200 2,1
“was once perhaps” “was perhaps once” % “was perhaps once” “was once necessarily” “was necessarily once” % “was necessarily once” “was once possibly” “was possibly once” % “was possibly once”
511 619 54,8 7 7 [50] 687 710 50,8
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Some examples of perhaps, necessarily and possibly before once and then: (53) a. We expect to see an intermediate period where American carmakers offer HPS systems but they will perhaps then try to reduce the fuel consumption by some additional measures. b. Such distortions of the MT data [...] can reasonably be treated as a stochastic process and incorporated into the data errors, although errors will necessarily then be correlated across adjacent frequencies. c. The show will possibly then go on the road to St. Augustine at the Black Box of the Limelight Theatre for 1 -2 weekends (Oct. 6th - 7th & 13th - 14th). (54) a. They lie on a tomb chest with bases of pillars at each corner, indicating that there was perhaps once a canopy. b. This is not to say that there was necessarily once an original model Chilam Balam and a model title. c. This was possibly once an old tinner’s blowing House and is situated most appropriately in the valley known as Deep Swincombe (valley of the pigs). The results show that once is equally often placed after perhaps and possibly (necessarily yielded too few hits) as before them. As for then, it can be noted that perhaps is placed before it slightly more often than after it, whereas necessarily is placed before then in every fourth case. Only possibly can definitely be said to be placed after then. The situation is by no means as clear-cut as Cinque (1999) might suggest. Cinque’s (1999) independent evidence that past and future are more peripheral functional categories than “mood irrealis” can also be disputed. The analysis of the Samoan Example (48) is questioned by Pratt (1984: 20, 262) who suggests that se’i (sei) denotes a mild imperative. Moreover, Campbell (2000: 1438) classifies se’i as optative. These classifications would better suit the meaning of (48), which appears to be a suggestion. The analysis of the Ndyuka Example (49) can also be disputed. The analysis probably originates from Bickerton (1984), who argued that Creole languages tend to have the morpheme order Anterior Tense–Ir/realis–Non-Punctual Aspect–Verb. His conclusion was drawn on the basis of morpheme orders in Creole languages such as Guyanese Creole with the particles bin and go, which Bickerton analysed as Anterior Tense and Irrealis respectively. According to Chung & Timberlake (1985), the problem with such classifications is that the irrealis is often confused with the future, since “Any future event is potential rather than actual”. According to Winford (2000) this seems particularly to be the case within Creole research, where futural auxiliaries are also considered to denote the irrealis. Examples are sa in Sranan and Ndyuka (as in Cinque’s example), which originates from the English auxiliary shall or possibly the related Dutch zal (Holm 1988), wi/e in Jamaican Creole, from English will (Gibson 1992), and go in Guyanese Creole (Bickerton’s 1984 example), or the variant o in Sranan and Ndyuka (Cinque’s example again), from going to. These are thus considered both future and irrealis markers. In Sranan, which is closely related to Ndyuka, sa and o may even be used simultaneously as either future or irrealis markers (Winford 2000). In
Chapter 3. The morphosyntactic status of modality
Cinque’s Ndyuka example above, they are used in such a way, which provokes the question how it can be certain that it is o that denotes the future and sa the irrealis and not the other way around. It could even be argued that both denote the future. This is in fact what Cinque’s source of information, Huttar & Huttar (1994: 489, 519) states about sa in these contexts. Furthermore, Winford (2000) went through most of the Creole languages in the world and found that: “The reality is that all creoles distinguish future tense categories from others which express different types of irrealis meaning associated with mood and modality”. To classify these future particles as irrealis markers is, according to Winford (2000), “clearly inappropriate”. Bybee (1985: 198) also treats Bickerton’s irrealis markers and convincingly argues that they should rather be seen as future markers with an event-modal component. There are also some points to be made in relation to the proposed category “Speech-act”. First, as regards the assumption that clause adverbials such as honestly and frankly lexicalize the same functional category as the imperative, interrogative and declarative, it is true that such adverbials modify the speech-act, in that they denote the speaker’s attitude towards it. However, at least in Swedish, they can occur almost anywhere in the clause, even outside of it: (55) Ärligt talat, jag vet inte. Honestly spoken, I know not ‘Honestly, I don’t know.’ Swedish is a strictly V2-language. Constituents placed to the left of the topicalized subject are left-dislocated. Interestingly, in Dutch, which is also a V2 language, textual adverbials must be left-dislocated when placed in the left periphery (Zwart 2005): (56) a. Eerlijk, dit voorstel is onacceptabel. honestly this proposal is unacceptable ‘Honestly, this proposal is unacceptable.’ b. *Eerlijk is dit voorstel onacceptabel. honestly is this proposal unacceptable These facts suggest that speech-act adverbials are adjoined to the clause, rather than being parts of the most peripheral phrase of the inflectional domain. Second, the assumption that the declarative and the indicative belong to different functional categories was disputed in Chapter 2. The declarative should best be seen as the unmarked epistemic value (Palmer 1986, 2001). Third, as regards the proposed functional category “Speech-act” in general, it is difficult to see the advantage of assuming that a notationally identical functional category is realized in two different positions in the clause (“Speech act” in the inflectional domain and “Force” in the complementizer domain; see 4.2 below). To conclude, the proposals made in Cinque (1999) as regards the internal order of mood and modal morphemes can be seriously questioned. Rather than splitting
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declarative, indicative-subjunctive, and epistemic-evidential modality into seven different functional categories, and placing some of them “inside” past and future, these should be considered members of the same functional category, propositional modality, as in Palmer (1986, 2001). This said, Cinque (1999) still has the benefit of dividing the inflectional domain into a more fine-grained structure. Furthermore, Cinque draws a distinction between speech-act modality and Realis-Irrealis, something that is also done in the present investigation. Lastly, Cinque proposes that event modal categories are located close to the clause center, below certain aspect categories. It should be noted that Cinque’s (1999) split-inflectional domain connects to Rizzi’s (1997, 2002; see 4.2 below) split-complementizer domain, so that the most peripheral category “Speech-act” in the inflectional domain comes directly inside of the most central category in the complementizer domain, forming a continuum of discrete functional categories. In fact, it could be argued that the proposed domains partly overlap. As was pointed out above, “Speech-act” in Cinque’s model corresponds to “Force” in Rizzi’s (1997, 2002) model, an in some elaborations of the latter, the most central category “Finiteness” is identified with the subjunctive, epistemic modality and the RealisIrrealis distinction (see 4.2 below). The main reason for this overlap may be the misconception that inflection only belongs to the “inflectional domain”, and not the “complementizer domain”. Inflection and complementizers are different formal systems that work on different levels of language (syntax and morphology). However, they can arguably denote the same functional category, even simultaneously. There are numerous examples of functional categories being denoted synthetically and analytically at the same time, especially when there is a shift in a language from a synthetic to an analytical system (e.g. the generally assumed replacement of mood inflection by modal verbs in many Germanic languages). There is no restriction that the inflected verb must be located in the syntactic position associated with the functional category that the verb is inflected for. Chomsky (2001) speculates that verb-raising is conditioned by the affixal character of inflectional categories; however, the verb must not be raised in all languages. When the inflected verb is not raised, the syntactic position may alternatively be lexicalized by a particle, or in the Complementizer case, a complementizer.
3.4 Syntactic heads and word formation (Julien 2002) Julien (2002) is another language typological and generative work that investigates the internal order of derivational and inflectional categories pertaining to the verb and the clause. Whereas Bybee (1985) had a sample of 50 languages, Julien (2002) investigates the morpheme order in no less than 530 languages from 280 so-called “genera”. Language genus is a smaller unit than language family (in the broad sense, e.g. Indo-European and Uralic). Following Dryer (1992), genera are defined as “genetic units with such a high degree of internal similarity that the validity of the unit is uncontroversial” (Julien 2002: 41). The major branches of Indo-European are examples of language genera. The
Chapter 3. The morphosyntactic status of modality
division of the languages investigated into genera is done in order to avoid generic bias. All in all, Julien’s data could be considered a representative selection of the existing languages of the world. Julien (2002) partly supports both the order of functional categories proposed in Bybee (1985) and the one proposed in Cinque (1999). As for the former, Julien (2002) suggests that morpheme distance from the verb can be translated into the kind of syntactic hierarchy of functional categories that is offered by Generative Grammar. As for mood, the bulk of her data does not indicate individual categories, but rather mood as a supercategory (the study focussed on tense and aspect). On that level of abstraction, her data seems to support Bybee’s proposal that “mood” is a functional category with wide syntactic scope that takes the whole finite proposition as a complement. However, Julien (2002) also discusses the possibility of dividing mood into fine-grained categories, more in line with Cinque (1999). In principle, Julien (2002: 270) concurs with Cinque’s (1999) proposed order, although she states that some modifications may be called for. In partial agreement with Bybee (1985) and Cinque (1999), Julien (2002) argues that the moods indicative, subjunctive, realis, irrealis, potential, dubitative, and the conditional (i.e. propositional modality in the present framework) should be put together with deontic and dynamic (i.e. event) modality into a separate functional category, which she calls “grammatical mood”. Surprisingly, Julien does not consider epistemic modal markers to be part of this functional category, although potential and dubitative clearly are epistemic moods. In contrast to the speech-act moods and epistemic modal markers, Julien (2002) places “grammatical mood” inside of tense (in line with Cinque 1999). As examples of this order, Julien (2002: 289ff ) presents relevant data from ten languages (see below). On the other hand, she also gives examples of two languages where indicative affixes are situated outside tense affixes (see below). Julien (2002: 230) also admits that the conclusion she makes is problematic, especially considering Yagua (Peba-Yaguan) where the irrealis particle is always placed initially in the subordinate clause: (57) ray -niy j ųtay -siy -tya [rą jántyuuy -siy yi -íva] I -mal say -past -neg irr have.mercy -pret you -dat ‘I didn’t intend to show you mercy.’ Julien states that “more detailed investigations of the languages just mentioned and of other languages would be required to settle the question.” In accord with Cinque (1999), Julien places epistemic and evidential modality outside of tense. She (2002: 289ff ) gives three examples where epistemic-evidential morphemes come outside tense morphemes (Lezgian, Wichita & Warao): (58) lezgian (Haspelmath 1993: 148) Baku.d -a irid itim gülle.di -z aq˜ud -na -lda Baku -iness seven man.abs bullet -dat take.out -aor -evid ‘The say that in Baku seven men were shot.’
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(59) wichita (Rood 1976: 267) khi as- kiya- iyki- hirahr- te er a -s poor- quot- indef.subj- aor- ground- lick -impfv ‘The poor ones were licking the ground.’ (60) warao (Romeo-Figueroa 1985: 129) Warao-tuma atuhe-bitu nahamutu arai kahu -ya -yama Warao-pl before-superl sky oblq live -pres -hearsay ‘The say that the Warao, long, long ago, lived in the sky.’ As said above, Julien (2002) apparently does not count the moods potential and dubitative as epistemic. In further agreement with Cinque (1999) but also partly with Bybee (1985), Julien (2002: 100) separates the declarative from the indicative, and puts declarative together with the speech-act moods. To illustrate this, she presents two languages (Haruai (East New Guinea Highlands: Main Section: Trans-New Guinea) and Nama (Central Khoisan)) with declarative morphemes outside tense morphemes, and contrasts these with two other languages (Gooniyandi (Bunaban) and Iñupiaq (Eskimo-Aleut)) with indicative morphemes inside tense morphemes. The latter two are part of the ten languages that will be treated in detail below. The two former ones will be exemplified here: (61) haruai (piawi: main section: trans-new guinea; Julien 2002: 100) an nöbö dyb hön nöy-n -ŋ -a we man big pig give-fut -1pl -decl ‘We will give the big man a pig.’ (62) nama //’ũku ke kè muu -pi they decl rem.past see -him ‘They saw him’
(khoisan; Julien 2002: 181)
On the other hand, Julien (2002: 273, 289) also presents two languages, Greenlandic (from the same family as Iñupiaq) and Hua, where the indicative is situated outside of tense: (63) greenlandic (Fortesque 1984: 120ff ) ippasaq tikip -put aqagu -lu ikinnguta -at tiki -ssa -pput yesterday arrive -ind.3pl tomorrow -and friends -3pl arrive -fut -ind.3pl ‘Yesterday they arrived, and tomorrow their friends will arrive.’ (64) hua (east new guinea highlands: main section: trans-new guinea; Haiman 1980: 236) Kamani’ -Ki’ pasi kzo -gu -e Kamani -com letter write -fut -ind.1sg ‘I will make Kamani write a letter’
Chapter 3. The morphosyntactic status of modality
3.4.1 Assessment Like Cinque (1999), Julien (2002) partly constitutes a counterargument to the hypothesis that is explored in the present investigation (that general subordinators should be subsumed under propositional modality). Many of the moods that are subsumed under propositional modality in the present framework, Julien (2002) puts together with event modality into a category called “grammatical mood”, which she places inside of tense. General subordinators, on the other hand, are generally regarded as members of the most peripheral functional category of the clause, since they determine clause type, introduce subordinate clauses and have scope over the whole proposition. Notationally, it could be argued that moods such as the indicative, subjunctive, and conditional also determine clause type and in that regard also have scope over the whole proposition. According to Julien (2002), however, there is morphosyntactic evidence to suggest that “grammatical mood” has narrower syntactic scope than tense and does not determine clause type (that being done exclusively by the speech act moods). At the same time, she argues that epistemic modality, which is a central part of propositional modality in Palmer (2001), is placed outside of tense. Since the bulk of Julien’s (2002) investigation looked at mood as one category, rather than the two proposed categories “speech-act mood” and “grammatical mood”, it does not present any statistics to support the suggestion that mood could be divided, and that “grammatical mood” is less peripheral than “speech-act mood”, even less peripheral than tense. It does, however, present ten relevant languages in support of the suggestion and three against it (the latter being Greenlandic, Hua and Yagua). The ten languages where it is argued that “grammatical mood” is closer to the verb than tense and the three where it is argued that “grammatical mood” is farther away from the root than tense will be commented on in what follows. Note that the important issue for the present investigation is not whether Julien’s category “grammatical mood” is a more or less peripheral category than tense but whether some of the categories subsumed under it, namely the indicative, subjunctive, realis, irrealis, potential, dubitative, and the conditional are. As was stated in Chapter 2, these are regarded as members of a grammatical category that is distinct from event modality, a category that denotes the speaker’s attitude to the truth-value of the proposition (propositional modality). Two of the ten languages with “grammatical mood” inside of tense are Creoles, namely Sranan and Haitian Creole. The classification of futural particles in Creole languages as irrealis has already been argued against in 3.3.1. The remaining eight languages are Shona, Turkish, North Saami, Kamoro, Lower Grand Valley-Dani, Gooniyandi, Iñupiaq and Huave: –
Shona (Bantu: Niger-Congo). As in many of the Bantu languages, Shona has a final mood suffix, either –e for the subjunctive, potential and negative or –a for all other functions. Julien, most likely correctly, analyses these final mood suffixes as realis and irrealis. Shona also has tense prefixes. According to Myers (1990), the prefixes in Shona are less tightly bound to the verb than the suffixes. The suffixes
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are part of the stem, whereas the prefixes are more clitic-like. Furthermore, the internal order of the suffixes mirrors scope, so that for any suffix, it has scope over the suffixes to the left of it. In agreement with the generative head-movement model described in 3.1 above, Julien’s (2002: 191ff ) analysis of these facts is that the verb has first been cyclically left-adjoined to the functional categories represented by the suffixes until it has reached “grammatical mood”. The more peripheral functional categories have then cliticized to the verb as prefixes. Thus, “grammatical mood”, as represented by the final mood suffixes, is a more central category than tense in this language. As was said above, the present investigation does not adopt the generative “head-movement” explanation of affixation. In agreement with Chomsky (2001) and Bybee et al. (1990), affixation is rather seen as a phonological process. That, however, does not alter the fact that the suffixes in Shona are more tied to the verb root than the prefixes. The suffixes are more phonologically reduced and more incorporated with the root. The question is only how this should be interpreted. Note that apart from the mood suffixes described above, Shona also has a potential and a subjunctive prefix (the latter as high tone on the subject agreement prefix). These occur together with –e (Myers 1990): (65) ángá-véreng -e she/he- pot-read -e ‘He/she could read.’ This suggests that at least parts of “grammatical mood” have wider scope than Julien (2002) argues. Note also that the potential prefix is morphologically heavier than the irrealis suffix. Since the prefix is more independent and less fused with the verb, as Myers (1990) states that the prefixes in general are, it could be argued to be a better indicator of the original functional position relating to both the potential prefix and the irrealis suffix. In a sense, -e has become a marker of verbal agreement with propositional modality, whereas the potential represents a more specific value and is more like a modal particle. Interestingly, in the related Bantu languages Gikuyu and Swahili, corresponding hypothetical prefixes are situated to the left of the temporal prefixes: (66) swahili unga- likita2sg- hyp- past- partpl.tense- fut‘if you had looked for it’ (67) gikuyu ĩngĩkanaendi -a 1sg- hyp- fut- indet- sell -ind ‘if I should ever sell [it]’
(Welmers 1973: 361) fut -a search -ind (Wald 1990: 299)
Chapter 3. The morphosyntactic status of modality
In conclusion, Shona cannot be considered a reliable indicator of propositional modality as a more central category than tense. –
Turkish. According to Julien (2002: 290), citing Brendemoen & Hovdhaugen (1992), Turkish has a potential suffix -ebil (-Abil) which is situated closer to the verb root than the tense suffixes. The primary meaning of this suffix, however, is not to express epitemic possibility, but rather dynamic ability (Johanson & Csató 1998: 213, Kornfilt 1997: 376). Nevertheless, Kornfilt (1997: 376) reports that it can also be used to denote epistemic possibility: (68) Hasan orada ol-abil Hasan there be-abil ‘Hasan may be there’
-ir -aor
In that respect, Turkish is an indication that propositional modality is a more central category than tense. On the other hand, Julien (2002: 336) also notes that Turkish has a conditional suffix which is situated outside tense. This rather indicates that propositional modality is a more peripheral category than tense. According to Johanson & Csató (1998: 212) and Kornfilt (1990: 238ff, 1997: 366ff ), the conditional (-sA) can be added to various thematic tense suffixes. Example (69a) is from Johanson & Csató (1998: 216); Example (69b) from Kornfilt (1997: 367): (69) a. gel -iyor -sa come -pres -cond ‘if (s)he comes’ b. oku -yakac -sa -m read -fut -cond -1sg ‘if I will read’ Therefore, Turkish can not be considered a clear indication that propositional modality is a less peripheral category that tense. It is equally an indication of the opposite. –
North Saami. According to Julien (2002: 290), the potential mood is situated closer to the verb than tense in North Saami: (70) mii veahkeh -eažza -i -met da -i -d olbmu -i -d we help -pot -past -1pl that -pl -acc person -pl -acc ‘We might (have) helped those people.’ According to Sammallahti (1998: 77), the potential suffix is -zž-/-zžzž-/-cčc-. This comes before the past tense marker -i/-j and the person-number markers. The present tense is unmarked (Sammallahti 1998: 76, Korhonen 1988: 282). North Saami is thus an indication that propositional modality is a category with narrower
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scope than tense. On the other hand, there is also a conditional mood with two markers, -sči- and -vcčcče-, which stand in complementary distribution with the tenses. Furthermore, many Saamic languages do not have a past potential, so that the potential is in complementary distribution with tense. –
Kamoro (Asmat-Kamoro: Central and South New Guinea-Kutuban: Trans-New Guinea). According to Julien’s source of information (Voorhoeve 1975), the conditional mood is situated inside of tense in Kamoro (Julien 2002: 290): (71) apa -kem -ako -ma -n -em pref -give -cond -tense -1sg.o -2sg.s ‘You would give it to me.’ On the other hand, Boelaars (1950: 98) reports that Kamoro also has an irrealis circumfix mapa–ue that is used in complement clauses after verbs of cognition. The circumfix is added to the fully tense- and person-inflected verb, whereby the suffix part -ue is situated outside tense. The situation in Kamoro is thus more complex, and it is doubtful if Kamoro can be used as an argument for any order.
–
Lower Grand Valley-Dani (Great Dani: Dani-Kwerban: Trans-New Guinea). According to Julien’s source of information, Bromley (1981), there is a suffix –h/-k in Lower Grand Valley-Dani that marks the sentence as factual and is situated closer to the verb than the past tense (Julien 2002: 290): (72) wat -h -ik -i kill -fact -rem.past -1sg ‘I killed (it) a long time ago.’ On the other hand, the analysis of –h/-k as factive is not incontrovertible. Van der Stap (1966: 15) analyses –h/-k as near past tense. Indeed, According to Bromley (1981: 31) the simple -h/-k inflection denotes an accomplished factual event in the immediate and near past and corresponds to the past or perfect tense in English. –H/-k can further be extended by –ik to yield a remote past or -ti/-ty to yield a perfect past (prior event; Bromley 1981: 32). The reason why Bromley (1981: 185) chose to analyse –h/-k as factive, rather than past tense seems to have been that although it usually refers to past events, it also occurs in the habitual aspect and in the gerund form (and perhaps also in the iterative participle). It is only with a certain amount of reservation that Lower Grand Valley-Dani can be considered an indication that propositional modality is a more central category than tense.
–
Gooniyandi (Bunaban: Australian). According to Julien’s source of information (McGregor 1990), the subjunctive is situated closer to the verb than the future (Julien 2002: 290):
Chapter 3. The morphosyntactic status of modality
(73) ngab -ja -wi -la eat -subj -fut -1sg ‘I want to eat.’ However, according to McGregor (2002: 364) the verbal system in Gooniyandi can be said to lie on the border between complex verb constructions, consisting of uninflected lexical main verbs and auxiliary-like functional verbs carrying the inflection, and grammaticalized conjugational class systems. In Gooniyandi, there is a closed set of functional morphemes that denote verbal notions such as ‘go’, ‘extend’, ‘fall’, ‘throw’ etc., and it is these morphemes that are inflected, rather than the verb stem (McGregor 2002: 55). At the same time, these morphemes change the semantics of the verb, just like derivational morphemes do, and they are phonologically dependent on the verb (McGregor 2002: 41ff ). What is interesting about these “classifiers”, as McGregor calls them, is that they are located to the right of the mood and tense affixes. In the example above, the classifier is the morpheme -a in -la (actually -l ‘1sg.nom’ + -a ‘extend’). Since the tense and mood affixes are affixes of the classifier, rather than the verb, and in that respect prefixes rather than suffixes, it is highly doubtful if Gooniyandi could be considered an indication that propositional modality is a more central category than tense. In addition to this it should also be noted that in the closely related language Bunuba, the corresponding morphemes are classified as independent auxiliary roots, whereas the verbs are classified as uninflected “preverbs” (Rumsey 2000: 75ff ). In the following Bunuba example, the verb stem ngab ‘eat’ in Gooniyandi can be discerned in the preverb ngag’: (74) bunuba ngayi ngag’ guwu- njra -ø neg eat irr- 3/2sg- aux -fut.irr ‘Do not eat!’ According to Rumsey (2000), there are tense prefixes, irrealis prefixes, tense suffixes and tense/irrealis suffixes in Bunuba4. One of the irrealis prefixes is ga (cf. ja in Goonyandi). The future indicative prefix is wu/bu (perhaps wi in Goonyandi). Thus, in light of the discussion above and the closely related language Bunuba, Goonyandi can hardly be considered an indication that propositional modality is a more central category than tense. –
Iñupiaq (Inuit: Eskimo: Eskimo-Aleut). Julien, citing McLean (1986) states that the indicative mood is situated closer to the verb than the past tense in Iñupiaq (Julien 2002: 290):
4. The tense and irrealis prefixes are in complementary distribution. So too are the irrealis/ tense and tense suffixes. Both in the indicative and the irrealis, the future suffix is null.
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(75) spinach -tu -llatu -ra -a spinach -eat -like -ind -past -1sg ‘I liked eating spinach.’
-ŋa
On the other hand, McLean (1986: 32ff ) also reports that the future suffix –niaq is situated inside of the indicative suffix -tu/ru: (76) niġi -ñiaq -tu -q eat -fut -ind -3sg ‘She will eat.’ The latter is, as was shown above, also the case in Greenlandic, which belongs to the same dialect continuum as Iñupiaq (Julien 2002: 273). Furthermore, Yupik (Eskimo-Aleut) appears to have the overall suffix order V-T-M, where M among other things consists of the indicative and T includes the past (Mithun 1999: 409). In conclusion, it is doubtful if Iñupiaq can be used as an indication that propositional modality is a more central category than tense. It is equally an indication of the opposite. –
Huave (Huavean). According to Julien’s source of information (Stairs & Erickson Hollenbach 1969), the dubitative is situated closer to the verb than the future in Huave (Julien 2002: 290): (77) ap- koma- rang fut- dub- 3sg- do ‘Maybe he will do.’ However, Noyer (1993), based on Stairs & de Hollenbach (1981) and Suárez (1975), states that the non-past affix m and past affix t attach directly to the theme vowel a (default value). The non-past and past affixes can either be realized as prefixes or suffixes, depending on the location of the theme vowel. When realized as prefixes, they are located inside more complex prefixes such as ap- (future) and ko- (dubitative). In fact, the ma- prefix in (77) consists of non-past m- and theme vowel a-. Since both the non-past and the past prefixes are located closer to the verb than the dubitative, it is doubtful if Huave can be used as an agument that propositional modality is a more central category than tense. It is equally an indication of the opposite.
In conclusion, only two of the ten languages that Julien lists indicate without too much doubt that propositional modality is a more central category than tense (North Saami and Lower Grand Valley-Dani). As was said above, Julien (2002) also presents three languages with grammatical markers of what has been referred to as propositional modality in the present book farther away from the verb root than tense. These are Yagua, Greenlandic, and Hua. As
Chapter 3. The morphosyntactic status of modality
for Hua, it should be noted that a similar pattern is seen in several other languages in the East New-Guinea Highlands Stock, e.g. Kamano (Wurm 1982: 84), Fore (Foley 1986: 145), Yagaria (Bybee et al. 1994: 228), Auyana (McKaughan 1973: 187ff ), Tairora (Vincent 1973: 561–587), and Kosena (Marks 1974: 26ff, 33ff ). In Awa, modality suffixes such as certituative, dubitative and counterfactive are also situated outside tense (McKaughan, 1973: 36–64). There are thus equally many languages (two5) that indicate that propositional modality is a more peripheral category than tense, as the opposite. The sample is too small to say anything of significance, though. There are, however, two more points to be made in relation to Julien’s (2002) examples. Julien (2002) does not consider epistemic-evidential modality and the declarative to be parts of the same category as the indicative, subjunctive, realis, irrealis, potential, dubitative, and conditional. Yet, as was said in Chapter 2, Palmer (1986, 2001) and Bybee (1985) argue that epistemic modal markers belong to the same category as these latter moods (potential and dubitative are in fact epistemic moods). Indeed, in one of the three languages Julien presents where epistemic-evidential morphemes are situated outside of tense, Lezgian, there is also a conditional suffix on the side of the evidential one that can be added to every finite verb form (Haspelmath 1993: 127ff, 148): (78) ata -na -č -ir -t’a, za wa -z ewer gu -da -j come -aor -neg -pst -cond I.erg you -dat call give -fut -ppl -wal tir -purp cop.pst ‘If you hadn’t come, I would have called you.’ As regards the declarative, it was concluded in 2.1.4, in accordance with Palmer (1986, 2001) that it is best seen as the unmarked epistemic-evidential value, corresponding to the indicative in the mood system. As was said in 2.1.4, Palmer (1986) argues that the declarative does not carry illocutionary force. In e.g. English, declarative clauses can even occur after negated speculative (i.e. dubitative) predicates. Furthermore, what corresponds to the declarative in the European languages indicates belief rather than knowledge in some languages. That the declarative belong to the same category as e.g. the indicative was further supported in 2.1.4 by the fact that the indicative and the declarative are used interchangeably in different grammatical descriptions. Among the examples presented there was actually Hua. Haiman (1980) gives the mood suffix -e in Hua the label indicative, whereas Foley (1986: 162) calls it the declarative. Lastly, it should be pointed out that Bybee’s (1985) investigation did not find evidence for a morphosyntactic separation of the indicative and the declarative. Rather, she found evidence
5. Greenlandic cannot be counted, since Iñupiaq in the same family has a past morpheme that occurs outside of mood.
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for a separation of the interrogative and the remaining moods. That the declarative should be seen as the opposite of the interrogative was thus not supported by the data. If one adds the three languages where epistemic-evidential modality is situated outside tense and the two where the declarative is situated outside of tense, the proportion becomes seven against two (Yagua, Hua, Haruai, Nama, Lezgian, Wichita, and Warao vs. North Saami and Lower Grand Valley-Dani). Again, such a small number cannot be considered significant. A larger and more detailed investigation needs to be carried out in order to “settle the question”; this will be done in the next section.
3.5 Two typological surveys of the morphosyntactic status of propositional modality The previous sections presented and assessed previous research on the syntactic status of propositional modality. It was concluded that a more detailed and targeted survey was needed to settle the question whether propositional modality is a category with scope over the whole proposition or not. In this section, two independent investigations will be carried out in order to establish whether or not propositional modality is a more peripheral functional category than tense. Only if it is found to be a more peripheral one than tense is a comparison between general subordinators and propositional modality valid, since subordinators arguably have scope over the whole finite proposition, including tense. As in the previous investigations, it is assumed that the relative distance of a functional morpheme from the verb root mirrors its scope. It is also assumed that there is a certain universal order, and that the morpheme orders in the languages of the world mirror this universal order. This is assumed for the internal order of prefixes, suffixes, clitics and particles, respectively. In order to avoid theory-internal additional premises, the scopal relations between grammatical markers that have different morphological realizations (i.e. suffixes, prefixes, clitics, and particles) are not investigated here. Above, it was speculated that there may be cases where the iconic-distance principle is overruled by other principles that usually are not in conflict with it but may be so under particular circumstances. As regards affixation, it was pointed out that although affixes are formed from reduced particles etc., and follow the original particle order, diachronically, new functional words may grammaticalize that fill a gap in one of the inflectional paradigms. If the functional word fills a gap in one of the more central categories, and this functional word is reduced into an affix, the resulting order is conflicting or non-iconic and not the mirror image of the typical particle order of that language. Although the iconic-distance principle may cause a reanalysis or potentially a redistribution of one or more of the affixes in question, that languages will for a period of time display a conflicting or a non-iconic order. Furthermore, it is acknowledged that the classification of the morphemes in question is always dependent on the analyses of the individual linguists, and that there may
Chapter 3. The morphosyntactic status of modality
be conflicting analyses in some cases. Therefore, it would be surprising if the investigation yielded results that without any exception or incontrovertibly support or refute the hypothesis. However, if one uses as a premise that there is a certain universal order that is either one way or the other, either propositional modality-tense-verb or tensepropositional modality-verb, one can draw the conclusion that one order is much more likely to be the universal one than the other. Within propositional modality are included categories such as the indicative, subjunctive, realis, irrealis, assumptive, deductive, probable, potential (speculative/epistemic possibility), dubitative, conditional, hypothetical, counterfactual, and the declarative. The declarative is included for reasons given in 2.1.4 above; in accordance with Palmer (1986), it is regarded as the unmarked epistemic value. There is some reservation as to the nature of the conditional (see 2.1.5). When a certain language contains conflicting evidence, i.e. tense morphemes on either side of modality morphemes or modality morphemes on either side of tense morphemes, that language is not counted. Under an even more detailed investigation of the syntactic status of each particular category, such languages would be particularly interesting. Due to space and time limitations, however, that is not done here. At the level assumed for the present investigation, it is uncertain how such languages should be counted, whether e.g. a language with one propositional-modality marker inside of tense and three outside should be counted as one piece of evidence for either order or one piece of evidence for the former and three pieces of evidence for the latter order. It is also empirically highly questionable if one and the same language can be considered a piece of evidence for both orders. Lastly, as was pointed out above, it is theoretically possible that a language due to an incomplete functional paradigm may grammaticalize a new affix which would be located outside the original affix position of that category, yielding a order which would not be the mirror image of the typical particle order in that language. It is very difficult to know how one should count such examples in a correct way. Therefore, only languages that show a clear pattern are counted. Following Julien (2002) and Dryer (1992), languages are compared on the “genus” level, in order to avoid generic biases. Sometimes it has been difficult for the author to decide where to draw the line. The first investigation is based on Julien (2002) and follows the divisions made there. The second investigation also follows the divisions made in Julien (2002) when possible. Since different grammatical descriptions sometimes give different names to languages and their families or even place them in different families, the language classifications given in Ethnologue.com are followed.
3.5.1 Survey of the internal order between propositional modality and tense in Julien’s (2002) 530 languages Julien (2002) can form the basis of a more detailed typological investigation of the internal order between propositional modality and tense, since she lists the morpheme
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order of the 530 languages she investigated in an appendix. The focus of Julien’s (2002) investigation was on tense and aspect; mood markers are often not specified but simply labelled M (for mood). The aim of the present study is to investigate further those languages that are listed with M or relevant modality markers outside or inside tense, i.e. to consult the sources and determine what the grams are. Since the languages dealt with in 3.4 were part of Julien’s inventory, these must be included among the results. Julien (2002: 330–356) lists another 13 languages with M or relevant modality morphemes inside of tense in relation to the verb and another 33 with the opposite order. Put together, there are only 60 languages of the 530 she investigated (11 %) that are relevant for the present investigation. At first glance, it may appear that only a small number of languages distinguish between modality and tense at all, and that the division of the two functional categories may be called into question. On the other hand, one must add to the number all the languages that cannot be included in the present investigation, namely those where tense and modality are on different sides of the verb or where one is an affix and the other a particle. It should also be noted that the number of languages where modality and tense are in complementary distribution or form portmanteau or multifunctional morphemes is not very high either: 68/530 = 13 %. Lastly, there are three languages in Julien’s list that have mood affixes both on the inside and the outside of tense. 3.5.1.1 Results Except for the ten languages exemplified in Julien (2002) that have already been treated in 3.4.1, and where two were confirmed to have markers of propositional modality inside of tense, Julien lists another 13 with mood (M) or relevant modality morphemes inside of tense, in relation to the verb. One of these, Asmat, belongs to the same genus as Kamoro, which was treated in 3.4.1, above. Furthermore, the likely source of information, Voorhoeve (1975: 373), like Julien (2002), does not specify what the modal markers are. This is also the case with another language, Uhunduni (Wissel-LakesKemandoga: Central and Western: Main Section: Trans New Guinea). Of the remaining 11 languages, five could not be used as arguments for either order, according to what the consulted sources stated. Either, modality and tense cannot co-occur, or they are intertwined. The remaining six languages are presented in appendix A1. Of these, only two could be confirmed to have markers of propositional modality inside tense. These two were: 1. Dongolese Nubian (Nubian: Eastern: Eastern Sudanic: Nilo-Saharan) 2. Wapishana (Maipuran: Arawakan) In contrast, four were in fact shown to have markers of propositional modality outside of tense. These were: 1. Magi (Mailuan: Eastern Main Section: Trans-New Guinea) 2. Tiwi (Tiwian: Australian)
Chapter 3. The morphosyntactic status of modality
3. Nitinat/Ditidaht, Nootka & Makah (Southern Wakashan) 4. Upper Chehalis (Tsamosan: Salishan) Apart from those that have already been treated in the previous section, Julien (2002: 330–356) lists another 33 languages with mood or relevant modality markers outside of tense, in relation to the verb. For three of these, the identity of the mood markers could not be established in the sources consulted. Another seven could not be used as arguments for either order according to the sources consulted. Either, modality was in complementary distribution with tense or it was intertwined with it. The remaining 23 languages were all confirmed to have markers of propositional modality outside of tense. However, two of these (Abkhaz and Karbad) belong to the same genus, and were therefore counted as one. The 23 languages are presented in detail in appendix A1, but are listed here: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.
Masalit (Maban: Nilo-Saharan) Nara (Eastern: Eastern Sudanic: Nilo-Saharan) Afar (East Cushitic: Afro-Asiatic) Abkhaz & Karbad (West Caucasian: North Caucasian) Korean (Isolate) Moni (Wissel Lake-Kemandoga: Central and Western Main Section: Trans-New Guinea) Yareba (Yareban: Eastern Main Section: Trans-New Guinea): Miriwung (Djeragan: Australian) Potawatomi (Central Algonquian: Algic) Catawba (Siouan) Pawnee (Caddoan) Achumawi (Palaihnihan: Northern Hokan) Popoloc (Popolocan: Oto-Manguean) Tarascan (Tarascan) Ngäbére (Guaymi: Chibchan) Imbabura (Equadorian Quechua) Mapuche (Araucanian) Saliva (Salivan) Candoshi (Isolate) Aguaruna (Jivaroan) Iatê (Fulniô: Macro Ge) Chiquito (Chiquito: Macro Ge)
It may appear that some of the languages above belong together, namely Abkhaz-Karbad with Lezgian (treated in the previous section) and Iatê with Chiquito. The former are all North Caucasian languages and the latter are both Macro Ge languages. However, according to Julien (2002), these languages belong to different genera. Furthermore, there is still some controversy as to what languages belong to the so-called Macro-Ge group.
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Greenberg (1987) included Chiquito under Macro-Ge, but on questionable grounds, it seems. Rodriguez (1999: 165ff ) does not include it under Macro-Ge. When the languages that were treated in 3.3.1 are added, which were also part of Julien’s (2002) investigation, the proportions are 7+4+22 = 33 languages with markers of propositional modality outside of tense compared to 2+2 = 4 languages with markers of propositional modality inside of tense. In percent, that means 33/37 = 89,2 %. If one adopts the assumption that universal categories have a certain universal order, it is almost nine times more likely that propositional modality is a more peripheral category than tense, than the opposite.
3.5.2 Independent survey of the internal order between propositional modality and tense in the languages of the world In order to draw a conclusion that has any statistic significance, an independent survey must be conducted. For an inventory of the languages and language families of the world, Ethnologue.com has been consulted. The goal of the survey has been to obtain descriptions from every language family in a wider sense, and ideally from every language genus, except for the 38 genera already covered by the last survey. A restriction that has narrowed down the sample has been the requirement that they must have a modern, western grammatical description. For some languages in the more remote areas of the world, there are only descriptions made by less grammatically oriented anthropologists or laypersons. Even without such a restriction, however, a large portion of the languages of the world cannot be included simply because they lack obtainable grammatical descriptions. Many languages in the more remote areas of the world do not even have a written language, even less a grammatical description. In particular, there are language genera among the Niger-Congo, Austro-Asiatic, “Papuan”, and “South American” languages that have not been included. Thus, the sample cannot be considered a complete representation of the languages of the world. It is ultimately a qualitative investigation. However, the large size of the sample, the sheer number of different languages and language families investigated give empirical weight to the survey. As an estimate, the sample is equal in size to that of Julien (2002), around 600 languages. The languages and language families investigated are listed in appendix B. Another option would be to make in advance a random selection of the languages of the world, balanced both regionally and genetically. However, that would lead to a qualitative problem. Again, many of the languages of the world listed in Ethologue.com do not have a sufficient grammatical description or even any at all. Now, if certain language families were determined in advance to be part of the sample and some or many of these turned out not to have a sufficient or any grammatical description, the sample would need to be redefined or else considered defective. If however, the content of the sample was left open to be determined by the supply of grammatical descriptions, it would have the potential of being larger and of higher quality. The
Chapter 3. The morphosyntactic status of modality
restriction that two or more languages from the same language genera would only count as one piece of evidence would of course still apply. Some of the data come from the handbooks in Routledge Language Family Series, which contain representative selections of language specific descriptions of 18 of the language families of the world or genus level branches of them. Other series are Mouton Grammar Library which contain grammatical description of less well-known languages and Pacific Linguistics which contains language-specific grammatical descriptions of languages from Oceania and South-East Asia. There are also certain other handbooks that have been used, which contain language-specific grammatical descriptions of languages in a certain region, e.g. Handbook of Australian Languages, The indigenous languages of the Caucasus, A Handbook of American Indian Languages, The languages of Native North America, A Handbook of Amazonian Languages, The Amazonian Languages. Campbell’s Compendium of the World’s Languages, which gives short descriptions of 300 of the languages of the world, and Comrie’s The World’s Major Languages have also been consulted. The full list is given in Appendix B. 3.5.2.1 Results Exactly as the previous one, the investigation yielded 33 languages where markers of propositional modality was situated outside of tense in relation to the verb, and four languages with the reverse order. These are presented in detail in Appendix A2, but are listed here: Languages with markers of propositional modality outside tense: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.
Gikuyu (Bantu: Benue-Congo: Niger-Congo) Efik (Kwa: North: Niger-Congo) Hdi (Chadic: Afro-Asiatic) Arabic & Modern South Arabian (Semitic: Afro-Asiatic) Pashto (Eastern Iranian) Sindhi (Indo-Aryan) Burman (Lolo-Burmese; Tibeto-Burman: Sino-Tibetan) Garo (Jingpho-Konyak-Bodo: Tibeto-Burman: Sino-Tibetan) Limbu (Mahakiranti: Himalayish: Tibeto-Burman: Sino-Tibetan) Dravidian Juray & Juang (South Munda) & Kherwarian (North Munda) Taiof, Banoni & Nalik (New Ireland: Western Oceanic: Austronesian) Sudest (Papuan Tip: Western Oceanic: Austronesian) Kamula (Central and South New Guinea-Kutubuan: Central and Western: Main Section: Trans-New Guinea) Angaataha & Kapau (Angan: Central and Western: Main Section: Trans-New Guinea) Nankina (Huon-Finisterre: Central and Western: Main Section: Trans-New Guinea) Kiwai (Trans-Fly: Trans-New Guinea) Pawaian (Teberan-Pawaian: Trans-New Guinea) Barai (Central and South Eastern: Eastern: Main Section: Trans New Guinea)
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20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.
Tauya (Brahman: Mandang and Albert Range: Trans New-Guinea) Binandere (Binanderean: Eastern: Main Section: Trans New Guinea) Djamindjungan (Australian) Karajarri (South-West: Pama-Nyungan: Australian) Siuslaw (Oregon Penutian: Penutian) Nisenan (Maiduan: Penutian) Kutenai (Isolate) Campa and Amuesha (PreAndine Arawak: Arawakan) Amahuaca (South Central Panoan) Chibcha (Chibchan Proper: Chibchan) Páez (Isolate) Kwaza (Isolate: Rondônia) Waorani (Isolate) Cocama-Cocamilla (Tupi-Guarani Subgroup III: Tupi)
Languages with markers of propositional modality inside tense: 1. Hindi, Urdu & Punjabi (Central Zone: Indo-Aryan) 2. Great Andamanese (Andamanese) 3. Southeast Ambrym (North-East Vanatu-Banks Islands: Central-Eastern Oceanic: Austronesian) 4. Panamint (Northern Uto-Aztecan) The investigation also found a few languages with markers of propositional modality on both sides of tense (and vice versa). An extreme example is Cayuvava with its 12 prefix positions (Key 1967: 28ff; the order is simplified): permiss–neg–cond/dub/pot/desid/certain/presum–[...]–fut–cond.fut–past.compl– assur/ ‘sometime’–[...]–subj.agr–class–ind.active/pass.refl.certain/ pass.refl.non. certain–stem
Since it is very difficult to determine how to correctly count such languages on the level of abstraction chosen for this investigation, they are not counted here. Another language that could not be counted was Hup. Although Epps (2008: 381) states that Hup has the overarching order V-A-T-M (including the declarative and conditional), there are exceptions to this generalization. This is also the situation in Yurakaré (van Gijn 2006) where event modality and tense morphemes generally occur closer to the verb than propositional modality morphemes, and in Epena Pedee (Choco; Harms 1994), where the mood suffixes are generally situated outside of the tense suffixes.
3.5.3 Comparison of the two investigations Since both investigations yielded exactly the same results, they support one another and show that propositional modality occurs outside tense in 66/74 = 89,2% of the
Chapter 3. The morphosyntactic status of modality
included cases. Put differently, it is almost nine times more common with propositional modality outside tense than inside it. If one adopt the assumption that universal categories have a certain universal order, it is almost nine times more likely that propositional modality is a more peripheral category than tense than the opposite. 3.5.3.1 Discussion An immediate observation from both investigations is that only a tenth of the languages investigated constitute evidence for either order. As mentioned in 3.5.1, many of the languages in Julien’s (2002) investigation either did not have one of the two categories tense and modality at all or realized them as different kinds of morphemes. Furthermore, there were languages were the categories stood in complementary distribution or formed portmanteau or multi-functional morphemes. There were even a few languages where markers of one category stood on either side of markers of the other. What can be inferred from all this is that at least affixation is a rather complex phenomenon, where related functional categories or even markers within one functional category can either be realized in the same position or in quite different ones. As long as there is no conflict with the iconic-distance principle, several options may be open. If however, there is a conflict, the morphemes may eventually be reanalysed or redistributed, yielding the iconic order. Above, a partial explanation was offered for how it can be that affixes within the same or related functional categories are realised in different positions. It was pointed out that although affixes are formed from reduced particles, and follow the original particle order, diachronically, new particles may grammaticalize that fill a gap in one of the inflectional paradigms. If the particle fills a gap in one of the more central categories, and this particle is reduced into an affix, the resulting order is conflicting. Although the iconic-distance principle may cause a reanalysis or potentially a redistribution of one or more of the affixes in question, that languages will for a period of time display a conflicting order. As regards the realization of one value as a prefix and another as a suffix, there may be various factors, e.g. lexical origin, that determine that one marker have grammaticalized into a suffix and another into a prefix. Since there is no conflict with the iconic-distance principle when one value is realized as a suffix and another as a prefix, such examples can be numerous. In both investigations, there were also some languages that seem to contradict the hypothesis. As was said above, some deviations are to be expected in this kind of linguistic investigation. On the other hand, there may be explanations for many, if not all of the counterexamples, or indications that at least cast doubts on them. First, there are cases where the morphosyntactic status of the relevant morphemes can be questioned. In e.g. Panamint, the tense suffixes –tu’ih (future) and -ppantün (past) are located outside of the mood suffixes –hi (dubitative) and –kon/hon (certaintive). However, Dayley (1989: 58ff ) states that the future suffix –tu’ih is an extended usage of the verb to’eh ‘emerge’, whereas the past tense suffix –ppühantün is a compound suffix of –ppüh ‘perfective’, -han ‘stative’ and -tün ‘pres. ppl’. Interestingly, stative -han is located inside the
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certaintive suffix (but outside the dubitative). Furthermore, there is a final indefinite future-mood suffix –nnhi which indicates that the event is not certain to occur and which probably consists of the penultimate simulfactive completive aspect suffix –nnuh and the dubitative suffix –hi (Dayley 1989: 57). Thus, the tense suffixes are compound suffixes that do not have the same status as the mood suffixes, and it is doubtful if one can say that the tense suffixes are situated outside the mood suffixes, when the mood suffixes can either be part of, or be situated outside of a part of the tense suffixes. In Hindi, Urdu and Punjabi, moreover, the subjunctive/optative suffix is the old present suffix, whereas the future suffix –ga-/-ga is an innovation (Kellogg 1955: 345). There was an old future in Sanskrit, which according to Kellogg “failed to maintain itself ” in relation to the old present form which “usurped its place” by expanding its meaning. However, this expanded use of the old present ultimately meant that it became so indefinite in its meaning that a new future form was grammaticalized. The past participle of the auxiliary gam ‘go’ was grammaticalized into a future marker gau/go,gá that was added to the old present form, the now so-called subjunctive. However, as Kellogg points out, the new future marker is not entirely dependent on the verb yet, as it still can be separated from the stem by an emphatic particle. The question is therefore whether the subjunctive and the future morphemes have the same status. The future appears to be a cliticizing particle. This is furthermore a clear example of how a new marker can be grammaticalized in order to fill a gap in the paradigm, a marker that does not belong to the same formal system as the rest of the markers within the paradigm. Second, there are cases where the order verb-propositional modality-tense holds for some of the markers but not for others. In Southeast Ambrym, the potential prefix is situated inside of the future prefix, but stands in complementary distribution with the past prefix. A somewhat similar situation is found in North Saami. The potential suffix is situated inside the past tense suffix (the present being unmarked), but the conditional suffixes stand in complementary distribution with tense. It is doubtful if one should count such languages6 as indications that tense is a more peripheral category than propositional modality. Moreover, many Saamic languages do not have the past potential form, so that the potential is also in complementary distribution with 6. This of course also applies to those languages with propositional modality generally outside of tense, but with one or more members in complementary distribution with tense. It casts doubt on the status of Kamula, where the mood suffixes realis, neutral, reported, definite, possible, and conditional occur outside of the tense suffixes far past and future, but where the tensemood portmanteau suffix reported past stands in complementary distribution to the tense suffixes (Routamaa 1994). It also casts doubt on Santali, where the optative/subjunctive and irrealis seem to occur closer to the verb stem than in the other Kherwarian languages (Anderson 2008: 63ff ). Furthermore, it casts doubt on Magi, where the conditional, like tense, is located closer to the verb than the subjunctive (Thompson 1975: 622ff ). Lastly, it casts doubt on Candoshi, where the mood suffixes generally occur outside the tense suffixes, but where the indicative is said to stand in complementary distribution with current (Cox 1957; although this can be questioned).
Chapter 3. The morphosyntactic status of modality
tense. Furthermore, in both Southeast Ambrym and North Saami, there are subordinators with identical meanings as the mood markers: a potential subordinator xos in Southeast Ambrym (Lynch et al 2002: 670) and a conditional subordinator jos in North Saami (Lagerkrantz 1929: 46ff ). Since the whole point of the investigation was to show that propositional modality, like subordinators have scope over the whole proposition, the existence of a subordinator with the same meaning in a particular language is a strong indication that a deviating pattern in that language must have some other explanation. In North Saami, the potential marker derives from a Proto-Fenno-Saamic nominal diminutive suffix *-nsji (Korhonen 1988: 281, Sammallahti 1998: 77) and has developed into a potential suffix through verbal derivatives (Korhonen 1988: 281). Thus, its grammaticalization into a potential marker has followed a rather different path to that of the past tense marker, which goes all the way back to the Proto-Uralic imperfect tense *–i, *-j (Korhonen 1988: 282). Third, there is always the classification factor. This can in fact cast doubt on many of the counterexamples7. Masica (1991: 281ff ) calls the Indo-Aryan subjunctive form referred to above into question. As was said above, the subjunctive form is the old present form which expanded its use and turned into a marker of unrealized events, “usurping” the place of the old future. It is used in optative, “imperative”, and permissive clauses, as well as in complement clauses of verbs of wanting and ordering etc. Masica (1991: 281ff ) prefers the term contingent future, since it is a form with “vaguely future reference”. As for Grand Valley Dani, there are conflicting analyses of the suffix -h/-k as a factive or a near past marker (Bromley’s 1981 vs. van der Stap’s 1966 analysis). –H/-k usually has past reference, although it can also occur in habitual, gerund and iterative contexts. A similar situation is found in Great Andamanese. According to Abbi (2006: 38), the phoneme –o/-f is an indicative suffix which is situated inside the nonpast suffix –m and the (null) past suffix -ø. According to Manoharan (1989: 96ff ), however, the phoneme -o/-f is part of the past suffix -bo and the non-past suffix –bom. There is also a present suffix –be. The fact that the present tense has a different vowel than the past and non-past tenses clearly casts doubt on Abbi’s indicative-mood analysis of the -o/-f-phoneme. In Dongolese Nubian, furthermore, Armbruster (1960) calls the “conditional” suffix –k an adverbializing suffix that has both a temporal and a conditional meaning (i.e. ‘when’ and ‘if ’). As was said in 2.1.5, the conditional is a problematic category for the very reason that it overlaps with temporal adverbs. In this particular case, it is obvious that the modal analysis can be called into question. In Wapishana, lastly, the status of the realis suffix –n(u) is doubtful. It cannot occur with the past suffix, and when constructed with the non-present, it yields a future meaning. When, however, the nonpresent occurs alone, it has a past meaning (Tracy 1974: 120–125). Thus, it appears 7. The same also applies to those languages found with the opposite order where there are conflicting analyses: Mapuche, and Tulu.
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that the realis suffix has a non-past meaning. This would be an unexpected meaning, since the typological realis category is notationally associated with the past. Furthermore, the mere circumstance that –n(u) appears to denote the non-past questions the order verb-propositional modality-tense. Thus, the validity of all of the eight counterexamples can be called into question (but also, as a consequence, the validity of six of the 66 languages in support of the hypothesis). All in all, the two investigations must be said to sustain the hypothesis that propositional modality, like subordinators, is a category with scope over tense, in the sense that that analysis is so much more likely to be correct than the opposite one.
3.6 Conclusion This chapter has dealt with previous research on the morphosyntactic status of propositional modality and presented two new typological surveys on the subject. In both typological and generative frameworks, it is believed that the relative distance of a particle or an affix from the verb root mirrors scope. Since the present investigation argues that general subordinators should be subsumed under propositional modality, and general subordinators have scope over the whole proposition, it has been important to see whether markers of propositional modality also have scope over the finite proposition, including tense. Three previous investigations have been presented and evaluated. As for propositional modality, the conclusions made in these investigations diverged. Bybee (1985) did not find any evidence in support of the idea that the moods indicative, subjunctive, potential, probable, dubitative, and conditional could be separated from the speech-act moods (except in the case of the interrogative). Both mood types were found to have wider scope than tense. Cinque (1999) and Julien (2002) both separate these mood types and argue on the basis of the morpheme order in certain languages that moods of propositional modality have narrower syntactic scope than tense. At the same time, they argue that epistemic modality (or at least parts of it) has wider syntactic scope than tense, even though the moods indicative, subjunctive, realis, irrealis, potential, probable, and dubitative also denote epistemic modality. Many of the examples that indicated that propositional modality is a more central category than tense proved under closer scrutiny to be problematic, however, and in the end there were many more examples that indicated the contrary. All in all, the examples were too few to say anything conclusive. Therefore, two independent typological investigations were carried out, one on the basis of Julien (2002), another on the basis of available grammatical descriptions of the languages of the world. Both investigations found that markers of propositional modality occur outside of tense almost nine times more often than inside of it. Since the two investigations yielded exactly the same results, they supported each other. Furthermore, many if not all of the eight languages where markers of propositional modality occurred inside tense turned out to be dubious. In some of the languages, the relevant morphemes had different status; in
Chapter 3. The morphosyntactic status of modality
others, there were notable exceptions. Lastly, in some of the languages, the analyses and classifications of the morphemes in question were doubtful. If one adopts the assumption that universal categories have a certain order, the working hypothesis that propositional modality, like general subordinators, has scope over the finite proposition could therefore be considered sustained, in the sense that it is much more likely that propositional modality is a more peripheral category than tense than the opposite.
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The present book explores the hypothesis that general subordinators (complementizers), as opposed to adverbial subordinators, should be subsumed under propositional modality. In the Germanic languages, it is hypothesized that that denotes the Realis (declarative: factual and potential), whereas if and whether denote the Irrealis (hypothetical and uncertain). In the previous chapter, the working hypothesis that propositional modality is a peripheral functional category with scope over the finite proposition was sustained by two independent typological investigations. The results showed that markers of propositional modality occurred outside markers of tense nine times more often than the opposite. A closer look at the counterexamples further showed that most of these may have other explanations (a difference in morpho-phonological status between the markers in question or incorrect analyses of them). All this makes a comparison between propositional modality and general subordinators possible. In this chapter, previous research on subordinators and the connection between subordinators and modality will be presented.
4.1 Subordination and subordinators 4.1.1 Subordination Roughly speaking, a subordinate clause can be said to be a clause that is (a part of) a constituent in another clause. More formal definitions of subordination have proven difficult to formulate, since subordination can be expressed in a variety of different forms in the languages of the world (Christofaro 2003). In e.g. the Germanic languages, the typical subordinate clause is a finite clause introduced by a subordinator. However, in clause-chaining languages, a subordinate clause may simply be realized as a verb in a verb-chain (see below). Subordination typically involves some degree of “deranking”, which means a lack of expression of one or several verbal functional categories and a use of special markers, not used in independent clauses (Cristofaro 2003: 55). However, there is no formal criterion that can be formulated to capture this in a definitive sense. Cristofaro (2003: 29ff ) attempts to solve this formal problem by giving subordination a pragmatic definition. She proposes that subordination can be defined as a lack of assertiveness, i.e. illocutionary force. Subordination is “an asymmetrical communicative organization of the sentence.” The main clause imposes its profile (illocutionary force)
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over the whole sentence, whereas the subordinate clause is construed in the perspective of the main clause. One reason for subordinating clauses, Cristofaro (2003: 31) argues, is to avoid asserting already known information, which the speaker wishes to remind the listener of. Instead, the message can focus on the new information (in the main clause) that the speaker wishes to communicate. On the other hand, subordination can also involve new information. In fact, it may even carry the most important information, as in the following example (Cristofaro 2003: 36): (79) He said it’s raining. The most important information in (79) is about the weather, not the fact that somebody said something. However, as Cristofaro (2003: 36) argues, subordination is used here because the speaker does not want to be held responsible for the claim. The clause “it’s raining” is not asserted, as Cristofaro’s assertiveness tests reveal (see also 2.3.2 above): (80) a. He said it’s raining, *isn’t it? b. Is it the case that he said it’s raining? [=Did he say it’s raining?/*Is it raining?] The present investigation adopts Cristofaro’s (2003) pragmatic definition of subordination. The definition of subordination as non-assertiveness agrees well with the hypothesis that general subordinators lexicalize propositional modality, rather than speech-act modality. Indeed, Cristofaro’s definition can be extended to cover all speech acts, not just assertion. The difference between main and embedded interrogatives can also be said to be that the latter ones lack illocutionary force. In e.g. narrative discourse, embedded interrogatives can both be stated by and addressed to a third party. In these cases, they clearly do not carry any conventional force that has consequences in the real world. The same can be said about the difference between main and embedded imperatives. This is also in line with Searle (1969) who draws a distinction between main clauses, which are illocutionary acts, and complement clauses, which are mere propositions (see 2.3.2). One traditional subordinate clause type that does seem to be asserted, however, is the non-restrictive relative clause. Compare the following (from Hooper & Thompson 1973: 490): (81) a. I just ran into Susan, who was your roommate at Radcliffe, wasn’t she? b. I just ran into the girl who was your roommate at Radcliffe, *wasn’t she? The b-example is a restrictive relative clause of a definite noun. In this case, the proposition is not asserted but presupposed. The definite noun indicates that the identity of the referent, specified in the relative clause, is known information to both the speaker and the listener. In the non-restrictive a-example, however, the proposition expressed in the relative clause is clearly asserted, as the tag-question test reveals1. Using Christofaro’s (2003) criteria, one must therefore conclude that non-restrictive relative clauses, as opposed to restrictive relative clauses, cannot be considered subordinate. Interestingly, this is also the conclusion which Hooper & Thompson arrive at. Non-restrictive relative clauses are not 1. The sentential-question or negation tests can hardly be applied to these relative constructions, as the clauses modify nouns.
Chapter 4. Subordinators and modality
“semantically subordinate”. Hooper & Thompson (1973) also argue that restictive relative clauses of indefinite nouns are asserted. This analysis can hardly be correct, however, since they cannot readily be constructed with tag-questions and can refer to non-specific referents and propositions of potential factuality (the latter pointed out by SAG IV: 502): (82) a. I just ran into a girl who was your roommate at Radcliffe, *wasn’t she? b. I want to have a book that keeps me awake at night. Note that a lack of illocutionary force does not entail a lack of propositional modality. In fact, according to the hypothesis explored in the present investigation, subordinators are propositional modal markers. Christofaro (2003) and many others use so called speechact adverbials (such as frankly and honestly) as indicators of illocutionary force. One example of adverbials that cannot be used as indicators of illocutionary force, and hence non-subordination, however, are modal adverbs such as in fact, actually, indeed: (83) a. In fact, you are wrong. b. In fact, I was wrong. c. In fact, you were right. The function of these adverbs is to signal the speaker’s attitude towards the truth of the proposition (that it is an unexpected fact), not his/her attitude towards the assertion (which adverbs such as frankly and honestly do). Sure enough, they can be used in presupposed subordinate clauses: (84) It occurred to her that she was actually wrong. Note that one cannot add the tag question wasn’t she to (84). The same can be said about modal particles such wohl ‘I suppose, probably’ in German. More problematic are particles such as ja in German. Ja denotes the speaker’s attitude towards the truth of the proposition, that it is common knowledge or an obvious fact that the listener fails to see: (85) a. Das ist ja immer dasselbe. It is part always the.same ‘Is always the same, you know’ b. Aber das habe Ich ja gesagt! but that have I part said ‘But that is what I said!’ Typically, it also signals an appeal to the listener for consent (Abraham 2009: 2), which is clearly a speech-act notion2. However, in subordinate clauses, ja does not seem to 2. Ja can also have a flavour of counter-expectation (the admirative) on the part of the speaker and/or the listener. In this sense, it typically occurs in independent exclamative clauses (example from Abraham 2009: 3): (i) Du siest ja aus! you look part out “Why, you are looking like someone!”
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signal an appeal for consent (example from Das Digitale Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache, www.dwds.de): (86) meine innere Zuversicht, daß das Glück ja doch einmal kommen müsse my inner confidence that the luck part part once come must ‘my inner confidence that my luck must surely change one day’ One cannot add the tag question nicht wahr ‘right’ to the subordinate clause, which one reasonably should be able to do if ja signalled an appeal for consent. Thus, the modal particle ja is not a clear indicator of illocutionary force3 and non-subordination. There is yet another problem with the use of speech-act adverbials as indicators of illocutionary force in subordinate clauses. As was pointed out in 3.3, speech-act adverbials are highly moveable elements, at least the Germanic languages. In Swedish and Dutch, they can even occur outside the clause (seemingly breaking the V2-rule). Therefore, the fact that they can occur in some non-factive complement clauses when the matrix subject is identical to the speaker cannot be used as an indication that these complement clauses have illocutionary force. Rather, it is the assertion in the main clause they qualify: (87) I’m afraid that, frankly, we are going to lose = Frankly, I’m afraid we are going to lose. It is not the embedded clause that is an honest speech-act, but the assertion that the speaker is afraid. Note that when the main clause is nominalized, one cannot use the speech-act adverbial in the complement clause: (88) my fear that, *frankly, we are going to lose Subordination is closely tied to the notion of complementation. Still, the two concepts do not completely overlap. In the wider sense of the term, complementation also refer to non-finite complements, i.e. infinitive phrases, participial phrases etc. Although these can clearly function as complements of verbs, nouns, adjectives etc, they can hardly be classified as subordinate clauses. A clause must at least describe a proposition, not just an event.
4.1.2 Subordinators Subordinate clauses are introduced by subordinators. Subordinators can be divided into three types, according to function: complementizers, relative subordinators, and adverbial subordinators (Shopen 2007). To simplify, complementizers introduce embedded clauses that function as arguments, whereas relative subordinators introduce 3. This, of course, depends on how one defines illocutionary force and speech-act modality. For Abraham (2009) illocutionary force is defined as speaker’s concern. In that case, propositional modal morphemes would also qualify as illocutionary force indicators.
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subordinate clauses that function as modifiers (mostly of nouns). In its literary sense, however, the term complementizer also applies to restrictive relative subordinators, since they head complements (of nouns). Adverbial subordinators introduce subordinate clauses that function as adverbials (adjuncts). Adverbial clauses modify verbs or propositions (Longacre 2007: 374). Within the framework of Generative Grammar (Chomsky 1995, 2000), complementizers are thought to lexicalize the most peripheral functional category in the clause, called Complementizer4. Complementizer, which is generally considered to be a cover term for a set of functional categories, is thought to determine clause type/illocutionary force and the rather vaguely defined notion of “finiteness”. In Germanic subordinate clauses, the declarative is thought to be lexicalised by that, whereas the interrogative is lexicalized by if or whether. In the present investigation, that, if, and whether are also thought to lexicalize the most peripheral functional category of the subordinate clause, only this is not thought to express illocutionary force but propositional modality. In agreement with Stroh-Wollin (2002; see below), the illocutionary force component is not thought to be present in subordinate clauses and the “finiteness” component is identified with propositional modality. In the present investigation, the neutral term general subordinator is preferred to the more technical term complementizer. By general subordinator, the author means subordinators without rich lexical content, as opposed to adverbial subordinators. The general subordinator only has a meaning in relation to the clause it is heading, whereas the adverbial subordinator denotes under what circumstance the matrix event takes place. The present hypothesis states that the general subordinators denote whether the subordinate clause is Realis or Irrealis (propositional modality). Another reason for not using the term complementizer is that in at least the Indo-European languages of Europe, there is a strong tendency of forming complex adverbial subordinators consisting of an adverbial first element (adposition phrase etc.) and an obligatory or optional complementizer (Kortmann 1998: 488ff ). The Germanic languages are no exception in this regard (e.g. in that). Since adverbial clauses are typically not complements of verbs, the term general subordinator is more appropriate in these contexts. On the other hand, it will be argued in Chapter 10 below that the complementizer part of a complex adverbial subordinator in fact heads a complement clause, only not a complement clause of a verb, but of a noun, adverb, or adposition (the adverbial first element). One problem with the division between general subordinators, or complementizers, and adverbial subordinators is the fact that Germanic if not only introduces complement clauses but also conditional protasis clauses in many of the Germanic languages. Like other adverbial clauses, protasis clauses are adjuncts that denote under what circumstances the main events take place (‘in case’). On the other hand, protasis clauses are hypothetical or counterfactual, so from a semantic point of view, this is 4.
By an initial capital letter, the category is distinguished from the part of speech.
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compatible with the analysis of if as Irrealis. Furthermore, conditional if-clauses resemble complement clauses in the sense that they too display a kind of complementary syntactic distribution between the subordinator and the finite verb in the Germanic languages (if- vs. the so-called question-formed conditionals). In fact, it will be argued in Chapter 10 below that conditional subordinators can like so many other adverbial subordinators in the Germanic languages, be divided into two components: a circumstance-adverbial first part (‘in case’), and a propositional-modal second part (hypothetical) which is subordinated in relation to the former. This is supported by the complex origin of conditional subordinators, described by Traugott (1985: 290ff ): epistemic, optative and interrogative, i.e. modal, on the one hand and adverbial on the other5. Since Germanic if can both introduce conditional and interrogative subordinate clauses, it will be argued that conditional if lexicalizes the hypothetical component, rather than the adverbial one. Indeed, Traugott (1985: 290) and others hold that Germanic if derives from a proto-Germanic noun meaning ‘doubt’, which originally functioned as a question marker. Therefore, it will be argued that if is a kind of complementizer even when it introduces conditional clauses. In other languages, the conditional “subordinator” has adverbial origin and can therefore be thought to lexicalize the adverbial component, e.g. wenn in German. In colloquial Norwegian and Danish, lastly, both parts are lexicalized, hvis om ‘if ’. Another question that the book will try to answer is how to analyse relative subordinators. Relative subordinators are also rather poor in their semantics, and restrictive relative clauses are complementizers in the sense that they are complements of nouns. It may appear that “relativity” and modality are rather different notions, which, in turn, can be seen as an anomaly to the hypothesis that general subordinators (complementizers) can be identified with propositional modality. However, in Chapter 10 below, it will be argued that at least English restrictive relative that should be analysed as a Realis subordinator. Restrictive relative clauses are semantically Realis. As complements of definite nouns, they are presupposed (see 81b). When complements of indefinite nouns, they are not presupposed but either factual or potential (example 82a and b, respectively). Note that even when they are potential, the proposition is still within the Realis domain; although the referent is hypothetical, it is implied that there are in fact such referents in the real world. Also note that the English relative that is confined to restrictive relative clauses and that it is hononymous with the declarative that. Lastly, infinitive markers such as to in English are analysed as complementizers or, more generally, subordinators in some frameworks (e.g. Noonan 2007, CGEL). Yet, these are clearly different from subordinators such as that and if, in the sense that their complements are non-finite. Within the framework of Generative Grammar, such morphemes are not thought to lexicalize the most peripheral functional category of the clause, Complementizer, but rather the tense category (as defective; see e.g. Chomsky 2000). Indeed, if subordinators are defined as introducers of subordinate 5.
Plus copula verbs, topic markers, and demonstratives, which are not relevant here.
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clauses, infinitive markers cannot be classified as subordinators, since infinite phrases merely denote events, not propositions. Subordinators are often contrasted with coordinators, which coordinate clauses (or phrases). This distinction works well with the European languages, but becomes more problematic from a typological perspective. In so-called clause-chaining languages (Papuan and Amerindian), at least adverbial subordinators overlap with coordinators. In these languages, what corresponds to coordinate and adverbial subordinate structures in the Indo-European languages are expressed by a chain of clauses consisting of one or more dependent medial verbs with somewhat deficient morphology (inflection) and a dominating final verb with richer morphology (Longacre 2007: 375ff ). Typically, the dependent verbs have markers denoting switch reference and temporal relations. The temporal relations are typically simultaneous events (‘while’), versus sequence of events (‘and then’). Interestingly, these can also develop other adverbial uses such as cause, effect, and result etc. (Longacre 2007: 264). Therefore, in these languages, the two alternative constructions “John chopped the tree into firewood and carried it to his house” (coordination) and “After chopping the tree into firewood, John carried it to his house” (adverbial subordination) would be expressed in the same way. For reasons such as these, the classical distinctions between main clauses and subordinate clauses, and coordinators and subordinators have been abandoned by some researchers in favour of a distinction between independent and dependent clauses. Dependent clauses can in turn be divided into interdependent (or cosubordinate) and subordinate clauses. Interdependent clauses are clauses that cannot stand alone but “are typically not wholly included within any constituent of the nucleus” (Hopper & Traugott 2003: 176). In particular, adverbial clauses tend to be interdependent in the languages of the world, whereas complement clauses tend to be true subordinate clauses. On the whole, these distinctions do not have consequences for the hypothesis explored here, which focuses on general subordinators (complementizers). If anything, the distinctions offer a typological motivation for the separation of general subordinators/complementizers (subordinate) and adverbial ones (interdependent). Again, the conditional use of if needs a special explanation. Another interesting point is that it offers a grammatical motivation for the separation of restrictive and non-restrictive relative clauses. As was pointed out above, restrictive relative subordinators are complementizers, in the sense that they head complement clauses of nouns. Nonrestrictive relative clauses on the other hand, are not complement clauses but adjunct clauses. In that respect, they are not subordinate, but interdependent. Arguably, this is also the reason why they can be asserted.
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4.2 The functional category complementizer and modality As was said in the introduction, the hypothesis that general subordinators belong to the same functional category as the moods indicative and subjunctive and epistemic modal markers is based on the observation that they appear to denote the same thing, namely whether the proposition is factual or hypothetical etc. (the Realis-Irrealis distinction). However, it is also based on the observation that the general subordinators are in complementary syntactic distribution with the finite verb in the Germanic V2 languages (except for Icelandic and Yiddish). This is also the case in English polar (yes-no) questions and protasis clauses (if- vs. question-formed conditionals). In fact, within the framework of Generative Grammar, the analysis of Germanic V2 and V1 (except V2 in Icelandic and Yiddish) is that the finite verb occupies the Complementizer position (den Besten 1983, Platzack 1986a,b). Interestingly, verb raising is often connected with inflection. According to Chomsky (2001), verb raising is “conditioned by the phonetically affixal character of the inflectional categories”. In the present study, this inflectional-driven verb raising to the Complementizer position is connected with the indicative-subjunctive distinction, once found in all the Germanic languages. It is also connected with the declarative-epistemic modal distinction, which also pertains to the finite verb, in the sense that epistemic modal verbs are almost always finite in the Germanic languages.
4.2.1 V2, complementizer, and mood (Bhatt 1999) One generative study that explicitly makes the connection between complementizers and modality on the basis of the complementary syntactic distribution between the complementizers and the finite verb in the V2 languages is Bhatt (1999). Based on data from Kashmiri (Indo-Aryan), which is also a V2-language, and the Germanic languages, Bhatt (1999: 151ff ) argues that the generative functional category Complementizer should not only be identified with subordination but also with “mood”. In V2-clauses, the finite verb is raised to the “Mood” (i.e. Complementizer) position to mark the mood of the clause. In non-V2-subordinate clauses, it is the subordinator that marks the mood of the clause (and that the clause is subordinate). This assumption is supported by the fact that the finite verb in Kashmiri can carry a subjunctive or an interrogative marker (Bhatt 1999: 120, 153): (89) a. ba khyam -haa batI I eat -subj rice ‘I would like to eat rice.’ b. nebar cha -a seThaa garam outside is -inter very hot ‘Is it very hot outside?’
Chapter 4. Subordinators and modality
At the same time, Bhatt (1999) argues that the two functions mood and subordination should be seen as separate functional categories. In German, Dutch, and the Mainland Scandinavian languages, the finite verb is typically not raised in subordinate clauses (asymmetric V2-languages). In these languages, the complementizer not only marks the clause as subordinate, but also marks clause type. In Kashmiri, Icelandic and Yiddish, however, the finite verb is raised to the V2-position in subordinate clauses as well (symmetric V2-languages). Therefore, for these languages, Batt (1999) argues that the complementizer does not determine mood, but only subordination, whereas the verb determines clause type in both main and subordinate clauses. Thus, the two functions subordination and mood actually represent two separate functional categories. In asymmetric V2-languages, the complementizer lexicalizes both of these categories. To support the idea that subordination and mood represent separate functional categories, Bhatt (1999: 152ff ) shows that Korean expresses these two functions through separate suffixes on the verb: (90) Bill-un John-i wa -ss -ta -ko sayngkakhanta Bill-top John-nom come -pst -decl -subord thinks ‘Bill thinks that John came.’ Bhatt (1999) is important to the hypothesis explored in the present investigation, since it connects complementizers and V2 at least partly with modality. On the other hand, the in-depth analysis actually constitutes a counterargument to the hypothesis, as it considers mood and subordination to be two separate categories. There are, however, certain problems with that analysis. First, the suggestion that there is a universal category which only fulfils the function of subordinating clauses is not very plausible. Subordination per se does not correspond to any semantic feature. Indeed, if one adopts Cristofaro’s (2003) definition of subordination, it is rather identified with the lack of a certain semantic-pragmatic feature, namely assertiveness. Since both the explanatory branch of Language Typology and the Minimalist Program of Generative Grammar assume that parts of speech are combinations of phonetic and semantic features, it is difficult to motivate the existence of a category without any semantic features. In fact, within the Minimalist Program of Generative Grammar, such categories are assumed not to exist6 (Chomsky 2001). Second, the assumption that the finite verb marks the clause type in main clauses, whereas the complementizer marks the clause type in embedded clauses in asymmetric V2-languages implies that the finite verb does not mark clause type in embedded clauses in these languages. However, in German, the finite verb carries mood marking in both main and subordinate clauses, and in all of these languages, there is a clear
6. It could be objected that there are other categories with little or no semantic content, such as prepositions heading prepositional objects and case markers. However, such preposition and at least lexical case are often associated with certain semantic roles and adverbial notions such as agentivity, possession, beneficiary, goal, location, etc.
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distinction between a non-modal declarative form and modal verbs in both main and subordinate clauses. Third, the suggestion that the closely related languages Icelandic and Mainland Scandinavian, Yiddish and German should have cognate complementizers that do not lexicalize the same functional categories is not very plausible. In fact, as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 9 below, Icelandic, Norwegian and Dutch all have the possibility of constructing if with that in interrogative and conditional clauses (the latter at least in Icelandic and Norwegian; Vangsnes 2006: 3, Zwart 1993: 43): (91) a. Einnig væri gaman að heyra ef að fólk er að vinna also be.pres.subj fun to hear if that people are to work við að þýða aðra components/modules. with to translate other components/modules ‘It would also be fun to hear if people are working on translating other components/modules.’ b. Ofte kan vi lure på om at endringen skjer for often can we wonder on if that the.change happens for reformens egen skyld? the.reform’s own sake ‘Often, we can wonder if the change happens for the sake of the reform itself?’ c. Piet vroeg of/ofdat Jan Marie kuste. Piet asked if/ifthat Jan Marie kissed ‘Piet asked if Jan kissed Marie.’ This would be unexpected if complementizers lexicalised both subordination and clause type in Norwegian and Dutch but only subordination in Icelandic. In all these examples, if clearly lexicalizes both clause type and subordination (interrogative or conditional) whereas that is basically redundant. It is apparent that the separation between clause type and subordination is not very tenable. Fourth, the statement that Korean marks subordination through a separate suffix on the verb is contradicted by Kim (1990), who reports that ko is a separate word, a quotative complementizer. Although the more in-depth analysis in Bhatt (1999) has many problems the observation that there is a connection between complementizers and modality lends support to the hypothesis explored in the present investigation.
4.2.2 The split-complementizer hypothesis (Rizzi 1997, 2002, Stroh-Wollin 2002) As was mentioned in 1.3.2, many generative researchers, originally Rizzi (1997, 2002), argue that the functional category Complementizer within Generative Grammar should be split into at least two parts: a more peripheral category that determines clause type and carries illocutionary force (called Force) and a more central one that
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has to do with the rather vaguely defined notion of finiteness. According to Rizzi (1997) complementizers lexicalize both these categories. This hypothesis is interesting, as some elaborations of it (Stroh-Wollin 2002 and Giorgi & Pianesi 2002) connect the finiteness category with the indicative-subjunctive distinction and draw a distinction between these moods and moods with illocutionary force (i.e. speech-act modality). Stroh-Wollin (2002) is such an elaboration of the Split-Complementizer hypothesis that removes some of its less well-motivated assumptions, based on data from the Scandinavian languages. According to Stroh-Wollin (2002: 133ff, 160ff ), Force determines four clause types: declarative, interrogative, imperative and optative/hortative. This agrees well with the illocutionary force category proposed in Bybee (1985, see 3.2). In opposition to Rizzi (1997), Stroh-Wollin (2002: 127ff ) further argues that Force can only be present in main clauses and subordinate clauses with main clause topology, since only these can be considered independent utterances. Embedded declaratives and interrogatives with subordinate clause topology merely represent the propositional content of utterances and questions, she argues. This also agrees well with the definition of subordination adopted in the present investigation (Cristofaro 2003, Searle 1969). Crucial for the hypothesis explored in the present investigation, Stroh-Wollin (2002: 154, 162) identifies the more central finiteness category with the Realis-Irrealis distinction and factuality. “Finiteness-modal”, as she calls the category, is both where complementizers of the that and if/whether types give the proposition a truthvalue and where the indicative-subjunctive moods and epistemic morphemes are licensed. This assumption is supported by the complementary syntactic distribution of complementizers and finite verbs in the Germanic V2 languages. One syntactic piece of evidence for also including epistemic modality is the fact that the epistemic particles kanske and kanhända can also occupy this position in Swedish, leaving the finite verb in the verb phrase, as in subordinate clauses: (92) Han kanske aldrig har läst en bok i sitt liv. he maybe never has read a book in his life ‘Maybe, he has never read a book in his entire life.’ Stroh-Wollin assumes there to be yet another finiteness category below Finitenessmodal which establishes the nexus relation, but that is not relevant here. The idea that the finiteness category can be associated with at least the subjunctive has also been put forward by Giorgi & Pianesi (2002). In Italian, che-deletion is only available when the verb is in the subjunctive: (93) a. Mario crede (che) sia partito. Mario believes that be.3sg.pres.subj left ‘Mario believes that he left.’
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b. Mario ha detto *(che) è partito. Mario has said that be.3sg.pres.ind left ‘Mario said that he left.’ Their analysis of the phenomenon is that both che and the subjunctive lexicalize a modal feature (“Mood”). In the complementizer case, this feature is carried by a functional category that can be identified with the finiteness category (Rizzi 2002). In the subjunctive case without an overt complementizer, the modal feature is marked by the subjunctive inflection. Since this marker is morphologically fused with subject agreement (portmanteau) and the inflected verb is in a syntactically more central position than che, Giorgi & Pianesi (2002: 198) argue that the modal feature is carried by a complex more central functional category, which also carries the subject agreement feature, called Mood/Agr. Stroh-Wollin (2002) further treats the English restrictive relative complementizer that and the Scandinavian subordinator som (Mainl. Scand.), sem (Ice.), hereby referred to as som. The latter introduces not only restrictive and non-restrictive relative clauses but also equivalent comparative clauses (‘as’) and can follow the wh-word in embedded content questions. The English restrictive relative complementizer that is analysed the same way as the declarative that due to their common origin and homonymy. Scandinavian som, however, receives a different analysis. In Danish, at can be inserted after relative som, and in Swedish, equivalent comparative som is constructed with att or om in hypothetical comparative clauses (Stroh-Wollin 2002: 100ff; cf. the English translation): (94) Han uppträder som om/ att han vore en persisk sultan. he behaves as if that he be.past.subj a Persian sultan ‘He behaves as if he were a Persian sultan.’ Stroh-Wollin argues that som att/om are two separate subordinators rather than a complex one. As in conditional clauses, om can be replaced by the finite verb (as in English): (95) Han uppträder som vore han en persisk sultan. ‘He behaves as were he a Persian sultan.’ To explain these facts, Stroh-Wollin (2002: 188ff ) assumes that som represents a more peripheral functional category than Finiteness-modal. Since relative clauses and embedded content questions with subordinate clause topology are not thought to have illocutionary force, this functional category cannot be identified with the force category. In relative clauses, she assumes that the category signals the presence of a syntactic operator in its specifier and facilitates the identification of this operator. In embedded content questions, som simply marks that the clause is embedded. Equivalent comparative som, in turn, is analysed as a head of a comparative phrase (as is comparative än ‘than’).
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4.2.2.1 Evaluation of the Split-Complementizer hypothesis The Split-Complementizer hypothesis has the benefit that it, at least partly, argues for the presence of peripheral functional categories on the basis of form and meaning, rather than just syntactic function. Thus the more technically defined category Complementizer is replaced by categories such as Force. As regards the present investigation, the Split-Complementizer hypothesis has the benefit that it captures the difference between speech-act moods and other modalities. Moreover, Stroh-Wollin’s (2002) elaboration of the model connects complementizers and the finiteness category with propositional modality, which is also in agreement with the hypothesis of the present investigation. Furthermore, Stroh-Wollin (2002) makes the important observation that subordinate clauses with subordinate clause topology cannot be considered independent utterances with illocutionary force. Thus, they cannot project the force category. There are, however, some conceptual and terminological problems with both the Split-Complementizer hypothesis at large and Stroh-Wollin’s elaboration of it that need to be addressed before the model can be adopted in the present investigation. To begin with, there is a problem with the use of the term illocutionary force for a grammatical category, as was pointed out in 2.3.2. Illocutionary force is a term from Speech Act Theory that relates to the conventional force behind an utterance (the locution). As such, illocutionary force is a notion that lies outside grammar in the narrow sense. As was stated in 2.3.2, the more general term speech-act modality is to be preferred. Furthermore, the validity of the term and category finiteness as defined in Rizzi (1997) can be called into question. According to Rizzi (1997), the finiteness category determines whether the clause is finite or non-finite by either selecting a finite or a non-finite complement. That selects a finite complement, whereas for in the for-to construction in English selects a non-finite complement. There are several problems with this analysis. First, to argue that there is a universal category on the basis of the existence of one morpheme in one language is not very convincing. Second, the analysis does not ascribe an inherent semantic feature to the category finiteness, since it is the complement that is either finite or non-finite, not the category itself. It is difficult to motivate the existence of a category without any semantic content, especially under the interpretability condition posed by Chomsky (1995, 2000; see 1.3.2). Third, the argument is entirely based on the assumption that for in the for-to construction is a complementizer and not a preposition. This assumption can be seriously questioned (see 10.3 below). Fourth, the actual notion of finiteness is vague. The rather different notions tense, mood, and agreement can all be considered finite (although there are also languages, e.g. Greek, with non-finite subject agreement, and many languages with non-finite tenses; Julien 2001). However, there is little evidence to suggest that the notion of finiteness can be considered a valid universal functional category with a marked and an unmarked value (see Dixon 2006: 45 for more such arguments). Stroh-Wollin (2002) partly solves these problems by identifying the category with the Realis-Irrealis distinction, although she still gives it the label Finiteness-modal. The term propositional modality would clearly be more valid.
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Another problem with the Split-Complementizer model is that it assumes that the declarative is a member of the more peripheral force category, rather than the less peripheral finiteness category. One reason for doing so is that the declarative determines clause type. However, as was stated in 2.1.4, there is no reason to assume that determination of clause type and illocutionary force always go together. Typically, subordinate clauses do not have illocutionary force, something which Stroh-Wollin acknowledges, yet they are still clauses of different types (declarative etc.). In agreement with Palmer (1986), the declarative should rather be seen as the unmarked epistemic value, corresponding to the indicative in the mood system. Interestingly, Stroh-Wollin (2002) proposes that only embedded declarative clauses with main clause topology have illocutionary force. This clearly suggests that declarative is not a performative category per se. Declarative clauses may be asserted but are not inherently assertive. Rather, the declarative seems to have the same status as the indicative and seems to be derived from “Finiteness-modal”. Recall that Stroh-Wollin suggests that the declarative complementizer that is generated in “Finiteness-modal” together with indicative-subjunctive and epistemic modal markers. This further supports the idea that the declarative is the unmarked epistemic value. Not only the relation between the indicative and the declarative but also between these categories and finiteness can be made clear when one looks at the description of the Kherwarian languages (Munda: Austro-Asiatic; Anderson 2008). In Santali, there is a verb suffix –a, which marks clauses as finite and indicative. The function of –a is to give “the sentence a demonstrated reality” (Anderson 2008: 63ff ) in contrast to imperative and subordinate sentences, including the conditional. The conditional is marked by a suffix in place of –a. In the description of Mundari however, -a is simply labelled the indicative, but the deletion of it makes the clause non-finite (again imperative or subordinate; Anderson 2008: 131). In the description of Ho, lastly, -a is labelled finitizer or declarative. Here, it stands in complementary distribution with the subjunctive and the conditional (Anderson 2008: 227). It is clear that the terms finiteness, indicative and declarative are used as labels for the same notion here, namely Realis (“demonstrated reality”). Finally, it should be pointed out that Stroh-Wollin’s conclusion that English restrictive relative that lexicalizes the same category as its declarative counterpart is plausible, not only because of their common origin, but also because of the fact that restrictive relative clauses are complement clauses and that they are semantically Realis (see 4.1 above). Furthermore, her analysis that Scandinavian som does not lexicalize the same functional categories as that and if is both consistent with syntactic data and the fact that som, unlike relative that in English, is not confined to restrictive relative clauses but also introduces non-restrictive ones and even equivalent comparative clauses. However, her analysis of relative som is rather technical and vague. Clearly, a more functional and semantically valid definition is needed. As for Giorgi & Pianesi (2002), their association of finiteness with mood through the distribution of the complementizer che and the subjunctive in Italian is interesting
Chapter 4. Subordinators and modality 105
and highly relevant for the present hypothesis. In 8.5, further evidence from German will be presented that strengthens the observation that there is a connection between declarative complementizer omission and the use of the subjunctive. However, Giorgi & Pianesi’s (2002) more detailed analyses of the phenomena fail to distinguish between universal grammar and forms of specific languages, and between the two formal systems inflection and complementizers. The fact that the subjunctive inflection is fuzed with the subject-agreement inflection in Italian does not necessarily mean that the universal functional category “Mood” in that case is fuzed with subject-agreement. It is a language specific, morpho-phonological phenomenon that cannot be generalized into a universal feature (unless more languages are presented that show the same pattern). Furthermore, the fact that the subjunctive-inflected verb in Italian does not raise to the che-position when che is omitted does not mean that “Mood” in that case is less peripheral than when lexicalized by che. As was pointed out in 3.3 above, complementizers and inflection are two separate formal systems that work on different levels of language (syntax and morphology respectively) and there is no condition that the inflected verb must raise to the syntactic position associated with the inflection, although it can do so in some languages.
4.3 Complementizers and modality from a typological perspective Whereas 4.2 laid emphasis on the complementary syntactic distribution between complementizers and the finite verb in the Germanic V2 languages and presented research that connected this with propositional modality, the remaining chapter will be devoted to typological investigations that have found connections between complementizers and modality.
4.3.1 Complementizers and the realis-irrealis distinction in the languages of the world (Noonan 2007) As was said in 2.4.1, Noonan (2007) is a survey of complementation in the languages of the world. As regards the relation between complementation and modality, Noonan points out that there is a distinction between indicative and subjunctive (or realis and irrealis) complements in many languages. Indicative and subjunctive complements can of course be distinguished by mood, as was shown in 2.2.1, but Noonan points out that the choice of complementizers can also determine whether the complement is indicative or subjunctive. In some languages, such as Lango and Lori, indicative and subjunctive complements have the same complementizer. In other languages, however, such as Rumanian and Bulgarian, indicative and subjunctive complements have different complementizers
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(Noonan 2007: 62). In these languages, the complementizers also denote the indicative-subjunctive (or realis-irrealis) distinction: (96) a. rumanian El spune că citeşte o carte. he says comp read.3sg.ind a book ‘He says that he’s reading a book.’
(Noonan 2007: 62)
b. El vrea să citescă o carte. he wants comp read.3sg.subj a book ‘He wants to read a book.’ (97) a. bulgarian Dobre, če te sreštnax. good comp you met.1sg.ind ‘It’s good that I met you.’
(Noonan 2007: 105)
b. Mislja da ida. think.1sg comp go.1sg.subj ‘I intend to go.’ Noonan calls s8 in Rumanian a subjunctive complementizer. It should be added that the situation in Bulgarian is also found in other South Slavonic languages. In e.g. Serbo-Croatian, the complementizer što occurs after factive predicates whereas the complementizer da occurs after semi-factive and non-factive ones (Browne 1993: 356). Friedman (1993: 290) calls these South Slavonic complementizers indicative and subjunctive respectively. In other languages, Noonan (2007) shows that the complementizers can denote a modal distinction within indicative or subjunctive complements. In e.g. Kabre (Gur), there are two complementizers n and zì which both introduce complement clauses in the subjunctive mood. When n is used, however, there is an implication that the complement is a fact. With zì, there is no such implication (Noonan 2007: 58ff ). Lastly, in some languages, the complementizers alone denote propositional attitude. In Jacaltec, the complementizers chubil and tato indicate whether the information is credible or not (Noonan 2007: 58): (98) a. xal naj tato chuluj naj presidente said he comp will.come the president ‘He said that the president would come.’
[unreliable]
b. xal naj chubil chuluj naj presidente said he comp will.come the president ‘He said that the president will come.’
[reliable]
Chapter 4. Subordinators and modality 107
Furthermore, in Kinyarwanda, the complementizers ko and ngo indicate a neutral versus negative propositional attitude on the part of the speaker (Noonan 2007: 125ff ): (99) a. yatekereže ko amazi yari mare-mare think.3sg.past comp water be.3sg deep ‘He thought that the water was deep.’ b. yatekereže ngo amazi yari mare-mare ‘He (misguidedly) thought that the water was deep.’ Palmer (1986: 148ff ) reports that there is yet another dubitative complementizer, kongo, in Kinyarwanda. Whereas ngo denotes doubt on the basis of direct evidence, kongo denotes doubt on the basis of indirect evidence. Another highly relevant example of Noonan’s is in fact if in English. As Noonan (2007: 114ff ) points out, if is used in complement clauses to cancel out positive factual implications: (100) a. Alf knows that Zeke came. b. Alf knows if Zeke came (but I don’t). The use of if in conditional protases is related, Noonan argues. It indicates that the proposition is non-actual. Both can be said to denote Irrealis modality. To conclude, Noonan’s (2007) data support the hypothesis that general subordinators denote propositional modality. The fact that he points out that English if denotes Irrealis is highly relevant. In Chapter 8, a more detailed inventory of the uses of the Germanic that and if will be presented that lends further support to this claim.
4.3.2 Complementizers as modal categories (Frajzyngier 1995) One language-typological investigation that actually explores the hypothesis that complementizers should be seen as modal morphemes is Frajzyngier (1995). Frajzyngier (1995) argues that complementizers primarily denote modality and that the function of introducing complement clauses is secondary. In support of this, he presents data from a handful of languages. One piece of evidence is the Polish complementizer czy ‘whether’ which not only introduces embedded interrogative clauses but also interrogative main clauses (Frajzyngier 1995: 478): (101) a. Spytałem czy przyszła. ask.1sg.perf.past whether come.3fem.sg.perf.past ‘I asked whether she came.’ b. Czy przyszła? whether come.3fem.sg.perf.past ‘Did she come?’
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Normally, polar questions have question intonation. When direct polar questions are introduced by czy, however, the question intonation does not have to be used. Therefore, it could be argued that czy and the question intonation fill the same function. Second, French que ‘that’ can be used as an optative marker (Frajzyngier 1995: 480): (102) Qu’il périsse! ‘May he perish!’ Here, it could be added that English if only and Swedish om ändå/bara can also be used as optative markers (the b-example is the Swedish translation of the a-example): (103) a. If only you’d told me earlier! b. Om ändå du hade berättat för mig tidigare! The reason why declarative main clauses do not contain complementizers is because they represent the unmarked value, Frajzyngier (1995: 480) argues. The indicative is not morphologically marked either. As for the marked modality value, this is typically marked by other modal particles, word order or intonation in main clauses. As regards word order, Frajzyngier (1995: 497) connects inversion in main clause polar questions with interrogative complementizers in subordinate clauses. The reason why embedded interrogative clauses cannot have inversion is because the complementizer already fills the interrogative function there. In support of this, he shows that in Old English, main clauses could be introduced by whether (hwaeðer) and then, there was no inversion: (104) Hwaeðer ge nu secan gold on treowum? whether you now seek gold in trees ‘Do you now seek gold in trees?’ Furthermore, Frajzyngier (1995) gives examples of complementizers with epistemic and evidential meanings: – – – –
że in Polish, which denotes hearsay and indirect evidence gö in Lele (East Chadic), which denotes direct perception ná also in Lele, which denotes hearsay and indirect evidence nL in Mupun, which denotes hearsay
Frajzyngier (1995) also points out that the irrealis/hypothetical clitic by in Polish can cliticize to complementizers with different effects: ni-by = dubitative, o-by, a-by, and niech by = desiderative, and że-by = obligative (occurs after obligative predicates). These clusters can also introduce main clauses. To this, it should be added that że-by also occurs after negated predicates of belief or predicates of doubt (Rothstein 1993: 735ff ). In these cases, że-by rather seems to denote the dubitative: (105) a. Sądzę, że już wyjechał. ‘I think he’s already left.’
Chapter 4. Subordinators and modality 109
b. Nie sądzę, żeby już wyjechał. ‘I don’t think he’s left yet.’ c. Wątpię żeby Janek zdążył. ‘I doubt that Janek will manage in time.’ It could also be added that in Ukrainian, šĉo ‘that’ is normally used in complement clauses. After reportative predicates, however, niby may be used when there is uncertainty or disbelief (Shevelov 1993: 982). Frajzyngier (1995) is important for the present hypothesis as it supports the idea that general subordinators (complementizers) can be connected with propositional modality, although Frajzyngier shows that some complementizers can also denote speech-act modality (interrogative and optative). As for the latter point, it could be argued that the optative and interrogative uses of complementizers are cases of grammaticalization. The fact that main clauses are normally not introduced by complementizers suggests that complementizers normally do not lexicalize the most peripheral functional category in main clauses, by hypothesis speech-act modality. In those cases where they do introduce main clauses, the complementizers have developed a speechact function. This line of reasoning is in accord with the assumption that subordinate clauses do not carry illocutionary force, i.e. do not realize the speech-act modality category. Rather, the complementizers lexicalize the category inside of speech-act modality, by hypothesis propositional modality. Note that when the complementizers denote a speech-act function, they should reasonably be syntactically more peripheral than when they denote propositional modality (although this would be difficult to test). Lastly, Frajzyngier’s (1995) analysis of że-by as obligative cannot be correct, since że-by also occurs after predicates of doubt. Rather, it is reminiscent of the subjunctive in languages such as Russian and Persian, which occurs both in potential and dubitative complement clauses (Noonan 2007; see 2.4.1). Recall that Noonan (2007) identifies this use with the Irrealis.
4.5 Conclusion This chapter has been concerned with subordinators, complementizers in particular. The typological status of subordinators has been discussed and some definitional problems pertaining to them. In agreement with Stroh-Wollin (2002), it has been argued that complementizers belong to a category that denotes factuality (i.e. propositional modality) together with the indicative-subjunctive moods and epistemic modal markers. This category is thought to be distinct from speech-act modality. Furthermore, two typological surveys were presented, Noonan (2007) and Frajzyngier (1995), which both showed that complementizers denote modal distinctions in many languages of the world, propositional modality in particular. Indeed,
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Frajzyngier (1995) argued that complementizers should best be regarded as modal morphemes. In the next chapter, a wider typological investigation will be carried out to further ascertain whether there is a formal, functional, and semantic connection between (general) subordinators and propositional modality.
chapter
Investigation of semantic, functional, and notational similarities between propositional modality and subordinators in the languages of the world
In this chapter, further typological data will be presented in support of the hypothesis that subordinators (complementizers in particular) denote propositional modality. The chapter presents semantic, functional and notational similarities between subordinators, Realis-Irrealis moods and propositional-modal particles found in the same languages as were studied in the typological investigation in 3.5.2 (see Appendix B). Since the typological investigation this time is of a qualitative nature, the data will be presented in the text without quantifying them. When a certain category is found in a large number of languages, however, an overall description will be made of this category, and a list of the languages where it is found will sometimes be presented in a foot note. The data are presented in three sections, the first concerns Realis-Irrealis moods that also mark subordination, the second propositional-modal morphemes that also mark subordination, and the third subordinators that also denote propositional modality. The data show that the three formal systems clearly overlap.
5.1 Subordinating moods of propositional modality One important connection between propositional modality and subordinators is that in many languages, subordination is marked by moods of propositional modality. The most well known case is of course the subjunctive. The subjunctive means ‘subordinate’ and is labelled that way because it typically occurs in subordinate clauses and is, in fact, a way of indicating that the clause is subordinate (Palmer 2001: 108, 142ff ). The subjunctive is found in the Indo-European languages, the Bantu languages and the Semitic languages, but also, as we have seen, in many other languages of the world. This category is an important piece of evidence that general subordinators should be subsumed under propositional modality, but there are many other examples of subordinating mood markers of propositional modality in the languages of the world. The typological investigation found the following noteworthy examples: –
In Basque (Hualde & Ortiz de Urbina 2003: 211ff, 632ff ) there is a subordinating suffix -(e)n which Hualde & Ortiz de Urbina call a “subjunctive complementizer”.
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This is in fact identical to the subjunctive suffix -(e)n. The subjunctive complementizer -(e)n occurs in complement clauses of volitive, desiderative, directive, cognitive, emotive and interrogative predicates, i.e. in Irrealis contexts. Basque also has a “declarative complementizer” -ela. –
Kamoro (Asmat-Kamoro: Trans-New Guinea) has an irrealis-circumfix mapa–ue which is used in complement clauses of verbs of cognition (Boelaars 1950: 98; see also 3.4.1):
(106) airu map -ame -k -aè -ue aka- i -mi -r -om a.boy irr- stand -lig -3sg -irr mod- say -rem.pret -lig -2pl ‘That a boy stood there, so we thought.’ –
Mangarayi (Gunwingguan: Australian) has an irrealis prefix (y)a- that denotes the potential in main clauses but marks subordination in subordinate clauses (Palmer 2001: 143ff ).
–
Wargamay and Nyawaygi (Dyiribal: Pama-Nyungan: Australian) have an irrealis suffix –(l)ma which in its apprehensive meaning typically marks apprehensive subordinate clauses (‘lest’; Dixon 1981: 54ff, 1983: 498):
(107) ŋinda ÒaŋgaÒa Òa:ga Òulaŋga ya:n9ima you-sub he-obj see-imp he-sub throw-irr ‘You watch him, he might throw [that thing].’ –
Central Algonquian has a subordinate clause mood –i, -e which Bloomfield (1946: 100ff ) calls the indicative and translates with ‘that’, e.g. pemaatesiči ‘that he lives’. –I, -e stands in complementary distribution with the “subjunctive” –e, e.g. kiiši͵nnepaate ‘When/if he has gone to sleep’. The subjunctive is used “in subordinate clauses of events which have not yet occurred”. In Delaware (East Algonquian) –e rather denotes “improbability” (Voegelin 1946: 148).
–
Nootka (Nuuchahnulth: Southern Wakashan) has two subordinating moods: the subordinate and the conditional. According to Davidson (2002: 158) this corresponds to a realis-irrealis distinction; the subordinate mood occurs after predicates of knowing, perceiving, saying and thinking and the conditional mood not only in conditional protases but also after predicates of fearing, inability and deciding etc. (Davidson 2002: 158ff, 272):
(108) a. kabat =™ap xad akw = °ič = °iq hida -idux -ši† known =caus girl =dim =art empty.root -look.for -perf =’eyik =’it =qa: takya™yu =’u:c =fut =pass.inv =subord.3sg eldest.brother =poss.3sg ‘The girl knew that she would be sought by her brother.’
Chapter 5. Investigation of semantic, functional and notational similarities 113
b. wi™dač =s wik -i™ =qeyu †uR-u™wi† afraid =ind.1sg not -append.v =cond.3sg well-incep ‘I am afraid he won’t get well.’ –
Wintu has a subordinating potential suffix (Mithun 1999: 563).
–
Chibcha (“Muisca”: Chibchan) has subordinating suffixes that denote simultaneous real events (-xin), hypothetical events (-san) and the conditional (-nan; Adelaar & Muysken 2004: 102ff ). Campbell (2000: 350ff ) calls -nan the subjunctive. Example of the hypothetical:
(109) chaquy -nga -san 1.sub.sg- do -fut.ag -hyp ‘if I would have to do’ –
Iatmul (Ndu: Middle Sepik; Foley 1986: 201) has a subordinating mood –a, which also denotes presupposition. Other moods in Iatmul are realis and irrealis. Ambulas in the same family has a dependent hypothetical suffix –katik ‘would’ (Wilson 1980: 71). The inflected verb is part of the “subjunctive aspectual dependent clause”. Whether the dependent clause is subordinate or simply cosubordinate is difficult to say, however.
Another type of subordinate clauses that are marked by mood in some languages are concessive clauses, e.g. in Telugu (Dravidian; Krishnamurti 1998: 220). It is also common among the languages of the world to have a particular mood for conditional clauses, whose meaning in protasis clauses is therefore identical to the Germanic subordinator if. One illustrative example is Caddo (Chafe 1995: 356): (110) hít’ayi=bahw cond- 1.ag.irr- see ‘if I see it’ In some of these languages, the conditional mood co-occurs with conditional particles/subordinators. On example is Middle Kipchak (Turkish; Berta 1998: 164): (111) eger qač-sa if flee-cond ‘if s/he flees’ The conditional mood has been found in a very high number of languages1. In many other languages, the conditional function is expressed by other Irrealis markers such as the subjunctive (e.g. in the European languages), irrealis, hypothetical and counterfactual. 1. Masalit (Maba; Edgar 1989: 23ff, 34ff ), Dongolese Nubian (Nubian; Julien 2002: 332), Bantu (Welmers 1973: 363, Nurse & Phillipson 2003: 9, 152), South Semitic (Hetzron 1997: 378–549), Fenno-Ugric (Abondolo 1998), South Samoyedic (Abondolo 1998: 566, 591), Mongolic (Janhunen 2003), Turkic (Johansson & Csató 1998), Udihe (Tungus; Nikolaeva &
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In 2.1.5, it was pointed out that the conditional is a problematic category in relation to propositional modality. In the Germanic and Romance languages, which display the indicative-subjunctive distinction and the modal past, ‘unreal’ conditionals are typically marked as Irrealis whereas ‘real’ conditional are unmarked, which suggests that the conditional is not an Irrealis category per se. On the other hand, it was also pointed out that in languages with the realis-irrealis distinction, the conditional is consistently marked as Irrealis. Furthermore, in many of the languages investigated, the conditional mood is in complementary distribution with other moods of propositional modality. Sometimes they form pairs, e.g. in Moni (Wissel Lake-Kemandoga: Trans-New Guinea) with the moods indicative (–ija) and conditional (-jogo, -ogo; Larson & Larson 1958: 406–431), Hungarian with the mood suffixes subjunctive (-ia-) and conditional (–anaa-; Abondolo 1998: 447), Limbu (Eastern Kiranti: Tibeto-Burman: Sino-Tibetan) with the mood suffixes irrealis (-gf·ni) and conditional (–mεn; van Driem 1987: 135–142), and Mapuche (Araucanian) with indicative (-(ü)y-) and conditional (–(ü)l-; Smeets 1989: 226ff ). Since the conditional mood stands in complementary distribution to or is marked by other moods of propositional modality in many languages, the conditional should be subsumed under propositional modality.
Tolskaya 2001: 239ff ), Tamang, Chantyal and Nar-Phu (Tibeto-Burman; Thurgood & LaPolla 2003: 302), Laz (Kartvelian; Julien 2002: 337), Abkhaz (North West Caucasian; Hewitt 1989: 51ff ), Lezgian (North Caucasian; Haspelmath 1993: 395ff ), Pashtu (Iranian; MacKenzie 1990: 143ff ), Oriya, Maithili, Gujarati, Sinhala and Kashmiri (Indo-Aryan; Cardona & Jain 2003), Dravidian (Steever 1998), Onge (Dasgupta & Sharma 1982: 37), Ho (Munda: Austro-Asiatic; Anderson 2008), Kokota (Western Oceanic: Lynch et al. 2002: 524), Kamoro (Asmat-Kamoro: Trans New Guinea; Julien 2002: 289ff ), Moni (Ekagi-Wodani-Moni: Trans-New Guinea; Larson & Larson 1958: 406–431), Magi (Mailu: Trans-New Guinea; Thomson 1975: 622ff ), Sentani (Main Section: Trans New-Guinea; Cowan 1965: 21ff ), Awa (East New Guinea Highlands; McKaughan 1973: 36–64), Barai (Central and South East Papua; Olson 1975: 481), Daga (Eastern Main Section: Trans New Guinea; Murane 1974), Iatmul & Ambulas (Middle Sepik; Foley 1986: 198, Wilson 1980: 74), Salt-Yui (Irwin 1974), Marind (Boelaars 1950: 172), Yupik (Eskimo-Aleut; Mithuin 1999: 234), Southern Wakashan (Davidson 2002: 99ff ), Shuswap (Interior Salish; Julien 2002: 346), Pawnee (Caddoan; Mithun 1999: 182), Chipewyan (Li 1946: 420) Chitimacha (Southern Lousiana; Swadesh 1946: 317ff ), Keres (Mithun 1999: 439), Pomoan (Mithun 1999: 476), Salina (Mithun 1999: 483), Tunica (Mithun 1999: 533), Hopi (Uto-Aztec; Whorf 1946: 159–183), Taos (Azteco-Tano; Trager 1946: 184–221), Tarascan (Tarascan; Foster 1969: 54ff ), Pirahã (Mura; Julien 2002: 352), Epena Pedee (Chocó; Harms 1994: 159), Ticuna (Ticuna; Julien 2002: 353), Maipuran (Payne 1991: 380), PreAndine Arawak (Wise 1986: 583ff ), Piro (Matteson 1965: 42), Chibcha (“Muisca”: Chibchan; Adelaar & Muysken 2004: 102ff ), Arauan (Jamamadí and Dení; Derbyshire 1986: 549ff ), Yagua (Peba-Yagua; Payne & Payne 1990: 308ff ), Timucua (Timucua; Granberry 1990: 84ff ), Imbabura (Equadorian Quechua: Julien 2002: 353), Mapuche (Mapudungu; Smeets 1989: 226ff ), Candoshi (Candoshi; Cox 1957: 133ff ), Kwaza (van der Voort 2004: 628ff ), Eastern Tucanoan (Dixon & Aikhenvald 1999: 216, 404), Tariana (Northern Maipuran: Arawak; Dixon & Aikhenvald 1999: 404), Hup (Epps 2008: 609), Nambiquara (Lowe 1999: 277ff )
Chapter 5. Investigation of semantic, functional and notational similarities 115
Another problem with the conditional has to do with its status as a subordinating mood. As was stated in 4.1, Hopper & Traugott (2003) among others have pointed out that adverbial clauses are not always subordinate clauses. In many languages, they should rather be seen as interdependent (cosubordinate) clauses. This is also partly true for conditional protasis clauses, and may reflect the dual nature of the conditional (adverbial + irrealis). Since the present investigation argues that only subordinators that are part of the clause, i.e. complementizers, should be identified with propositional modality, the conditional as a clause introducer can only be relevant if it introduces subordinate clauses. Yet another problem with the conditional as a subordinating mood category is the fact that in many languages, both the protasis and the apodosis can be in the conditional mood, and the apodosis is arguably not a subordinate clause. Two languages where the conditional mood or particle marks what appears to be apodoses have already been exemplified above, namely Limbu (Eastern Kiranti: Tibeto-Burman: Sino-Tibetan) and Nalik (Lavongai-Nalik: New Ireland: Western Oceanic: Austronesian). The last problem with the conditional is that it often overlaps with temporality (‘when’). These issues will be dealt with more thoroughly in the next section.
5.2 Subordinating propositional-modal particles and clitics On the side of subordinating moods and subordinators, subordination is marked by clause initial or final propositional-modal particles or clitics in many languages. Often, these are in fact classified as subordinators, but some are classified as modal particles or clitics partly because they sometimes also occur in main clauses. This illustrates the subtle difference between modal particles and subordinators: –
In Beya Lega (Bantu D25: Niger-Congo), there are particles of propositional modality that introduce conditional protases: andí ‘assumptive’, kungawá ‘hypothetical’, songó ‘uncertainty, counterfactivity’ (Botne 2003: 448):
(112) a. andí ábwa, mmáge ábogébógé ‘If (assuming) she comes, my mother will be happy.’ b. kungwá ánwa gúno murí, ôné ‘If he drinks this medicine, he will be cured.’ c. songó êndá ku Pangi, songó ámóná múnganga ‘If she would go to Pangi [but she doesn’t want to], then she would see a doctor.’ –
In Mosetén (Tsimané), there is an irrealis clitic –ra’ which denotes the Irrealis in main clauses, but which also may be used to mark subordination (Sakel 2004: 342ff ):
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(113) Moch aj ka -i’ jäe’nä’ -rä’ mi’ bae’ -i far than took -3.fem.obj there -irr 3masc.sg live -vm.masc.sub ‘He took her far away, where he lived.’ –
In To’abaita (Southeast Solomonic: Central-Eastern Oceanic: Austronesian), there is an “apprehensional-epistemic” marker ada ‘may/might’ (‘lest’) that either introduces independent clauses, or complement clauses of predicates of fearing, in which case it functions as a complementizer (Lichtenberk 1995: 294ff ):
(114) a. ada ‘oko mata’i appr.ep you.sg.seq be.sick ‘You may be sick.’ b. nau ku ma’u ‘asia na’a ada laalae to’a baa ki I I.factatv be.afraid very appr.ep.comp later people that pl keka lae mai keka thaungi kulu they.seq go hither they.seq kill us.incl ‘I am scared the people might come and kill us.’ –
In Fijian (East Fijian: Central Pacific: Central-Eastern Oceanic), there is also an apprehensional-epistemic marker dē/de/dee, which not only introduces ‘lest’clauses but also complement clauses after verbs of thinking, in which case it is translated as ‘maybe’. With this meaning, it can also introduce independent speculative clauses (Lichtenberk 1995: 315ff ).
–
In Coos (Coosan), there are two preverbal conditional particles, yūl and yanL, translated as ‘if ’, that are used in protasis clauses. These are in complementary distribution to the particles ūL ‘should’ and future hanL, which typically occur in the apodosis (Frachtenberg 1922b: 391ff ).
–
In ‘Ala‘ala (Central Papuan Family: Western Oceanic), conditional clauses are marked by the Irrealis.Sub.Agr-hypothetical cluster be-ma, which either is prefixed to the verb or occurs as a clause initial particle. The latter is also the case in Bali-Vitu (Bali-Vitu Family: Western Oceanic) with the particle mi-ri (Irr-Hyp. Pers; Lynch et al 2002: 360ff )
–
Guugu Yimidhirr (Pama Nyungan: Australian) has a particle budhu ‘if ’ which signals “uncertainty, or questions the possibility of some outcome, sometimes very much like a subordinate conjunction, sometimes in a more modal sense” (Haviland 1979: 151). In the latter sense, it may occur in main clauses.
–
In Fuyug (Eastern: Main Section: Trans-New Guinea), there is a conditional subordinating clitic =(m)alala which is cliticized to the final verb in a conditional protasis clause. It co-occurs with the conditional subordinating conjunction oto/ otunga ‘if ’ (Bradshaw 2007: 110ff )
Chapter 5. Investigation of semantic, functional and notational similarities 117
–
In Urarina (Olawsky 2006: 255ff, 266, 738ff ) there is a subordinate-clause initial irrealis-conditional particle baana which co-occurs with either the irrealis-conditional subordinator hananiane or the subordinating clitic =ba ‘when/if ’. The function of baana is to reinforce “the hypothetical status of the situation” and to “reinforce the condition” (Olawsky 2006: 740).
–
Waurá (Eastern Maipuran: Arawak) has a conditional enclitic –mia which is always cliticized to the first element of the clause. The clitic occurs in both the protasis and the apodosis. A similar pattern is found in the related language Parecis (Derbyshire 1986: 550ff ).
–
In Tigré (Ethiopian Semitic), counterfactual protasis clauses can be marked by the particle wa + perfect. The apodosis can also be marked by wa + perfect, however, and wa + perfect can even be used in independent clauses to denote uncertainty (Raz 1997: 456).
–
In Mocho (Mayan) there is a counterfactual particle kee which is used in both counterfactual protases and apodoses (Martin 1998: 207ff ).
Apart from the last two languages, counterfactual protases are marked or introduced by counterfactual particles in e.g. the following languages: Old Hebrew (Hetzron 1997: 169), Supyire (Carlson 1994: 185), Khanty (Samoyed; Abondolo 1998: 381), Kaulong (Pasismanua linkage: Western Oceanic; Lynch et al 2002: 409), Mam (Maya; Peck & Peck 1966: 187), Sanuma (Yanomani; Borgman 1990: 102), Paumarí (Arauan: Arawak; Chapman & Derbyshire 1991: 246ff )
5.3 Realis and irrealis subordinators A third typological piece of evidence that supports the connection between propositional modality and subordinators is the fact that there are subordinators in many languages of the world that are classified or described as Realis or Irrealis etc.: –
In Supyire (Gur: Niger-Congo), Realis complement clauses are marked by high tone on the subject pronoun (Carlson 1994: 421). Carlson calls this a realis complementizer. Furthermore, Supyire has a complementizer na ‘that’, which can introduce complement clauses of verbs of saying, belief, and knowledge and certain subjunctive complement clauses of manipulative verbs. After verbs of belief and knowledge, the na-complement clause must be in the indicative. Supyire also has a conditional complementizer/subordinator (k)ámpyí ‘if ’, which indicates “a subjective uncertainty”. It is used in protasis clauses but also in embedded questions and complement clauses after verbs of doubt. Interestingly, (k)ámpyí can alternatively be used after a negated verb of belief, i.e. dá ‘think’ to indicate that the speaker doubts rather than believes (Carlson 1994: 446ff ):
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(115) a. mìi Òyε a dà na u sí P- pà m I neg perf believe that he fut fp- come neg ‘I don’t believe that he’ll come.’ b. mìi Òyε a dà ámpyí u sí P- pà m I neg perf believe if he fut fp- come neg ‘I doubt if he’ll come.’ Similar to the situation with that and if in the Germanic languages, negative verbs of knowledge can either be constructed with na or (k)ámpyí depending on whether or not the actual speaker knows that the proposition is true. Like if in the Germanic languages, (k)ámpyí can also be used after affirmative verbs of knowledge instead of na to indicate that the speaker, in contrast to the subject, does not know if the proposition is true: (116) Músà a cè ámpyì Musa perf know if ‘Musa knows if Jean has come.’ –
Zhân Jean
à perf
pa come
In Hdi (Chad: Afro-Asiatic), there is a complementizer of indirect speech ká which also denotes uncertainty; ká cannot be used in complements of (semi-)factive predicates (Frajzyngier & Shay 2002: 474ff ):
(117) a. ndá sn -í ká tsá mariage -xà yá tà mággá -kú stat hear -1sg comp def marriage -pl dem impfv make -abs gà xdí ká -x`әn màndí 'ángál -xà yá prep Hdi comp -3pl like marriage -pl dem ‘I have heard that marriages are being made in Hdi.’ Cf. b. àmá ná sná -xMn tá d -ày góngàgóngà wù but dem know -3pl obj cook -pot.obj well neg:q ‘But they don’t know how to cook well.’ –
In Koyra Chiini (Songhay: Nilo Saharan), there is an “indicative complementizer” kaa ‘that’ which could be paraphrased as ‘the fact that’. It is constructed with verbs of knowing, perceiving, believing, deciding, seeing and saying (Heath 1999: 281ff ).
–
In Meitei (Tibeto-Burman: Sino-Tibetan), there are four complementizers that can be translated as ‘that’ háybәsi, háynә, háybә, and háybәdu2. Háybәsi is used when the speaker is sure that the proposition is true, whereas háynә is used when s/he is unsure (i.e. after verbs of belief, opinion, and doubt; Chelliah 1997: 300ff ):
2. All are based on the verb root háy ‘say’; -bәsi = determiner complementizer, -nә = instrumental, -pә = nominalizer, -pәdu = determiner complementizer.
Chapter 5. Investigation of semantic, functional and notational similarities 119
(118) a. m- hák -nә thoy -lә -e háybәsi Tombi-nә 3p- here -contrst first -perf -assert that Tombi-contrst khәŋ-í know-nonhyp ‘Tombi knew that she had won.’ b. nóŋ ču -kә -ni háynә әy -nә tházә -í rain fall -pot -cop that I -contrst believe -nonhyp ‘I believe that it will rain.’ Háybә and háybәdu are evidential. The former is used when the speaker has some kind of evidence (not necessarily visual) that the proposition is true, and is confined to verb such as ‘know’ and ‘see’. The latter is used when the speaker has strong first-hand evidence. –
In Burman (Tibeto-Burman: Sino-Tibetan), there are realis and irrealis nominalizers that embed clauses: -ta (realis nominalizer) and -hma (irrealis nominalizer). These stand in complementary distribution to the main-clause realis and irrealis particles -tε and –mε (Wheatley 2003: 205ff ):
(119) cәnà pәs’ò cu cá -hma sòyein -tε 1 sarong undo fall -irr.nom fear -real ‘I was afraid my sarong would fall’ It is true that the notions of nominalization and subordination should generally be kept apart (although they overlap in many respects). On the other hand, nominalization in the Tibeto-Burman languages involves the whole clause, not just the verb phrase (Genetti 2006: 140). Since the whole clause is nominalized, it still expresses a proposition. This is particularly evident in Burman, where the nominalizers also express propositional modality and stand in complementary distribution with the main clause realis-irrealis markers. Thus, the realis-irrealis nominalizers function as realis-irrealis complementizers. –
Nadrogã (Fijian: East-Fijian: Central Pacific: Central-Eastern Oceanic: Austronesian) has realis- and irrealis complementizers (Lynch et al 2002: 847):
(120) a. qu dani -ko ni o yato koto I see -2sg comp.realis you go cont ‘I saw you walking’ b. aru vinasi -a me ni-a ledru viagwane They want -3sg comp.irr be-3sg poss- they chief ‘They want him to be their chief.’ –
Niuafo’ou (Polynesian: Central Pacific: Central-Eastern Oceanic: Austronsian) has a “subjunctive” complementizer ke which introduces irrealis events (complements of ‘intend’, ‘begin’, ‘attempt’, ‘be good’, and indirect speech; Lynch et al 2002: 864ff ):
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(121) ‘e sai ke ke tala -’i ange te mo’oni fut good subj 2sg tell -trans dir spec truth ‘It would be good for you to tell the truth.’ –
In Southeast Ambrym (East Vanuatu: North and Central Vanuatu: Central-Eastern Oceanic: Austronesian) there is a potential subordinator xos ‘maybe’ (Lynch et al 2002: 670).
–
In Puluwatese (Micronesian: Central-Eastern Oceanic: Austronesian), subordinate clauses can be introduced by a dubitative subordinator, mááli (Lynch et al. 2002: 814).
–
Awyu (Central and South New Guinea: Central and Western: Main Section: Trans-New Guinea) has an irrealis-”linking element” bu which occurs in the protases of counterfactual conditional constructions (Boelaars 1950: 73):
(122) dèghi bu ifuro -di come.pres.non.1sg irr beat.fut -1sg ‘If he would have come, I should have beaten.’ –
Bargam (Mandang-Adelbert-Range: Trans-New Guinea) has dependent suffixes on the verb that denote same vs. different subject, punctiliar vs. durative, and realis vs. irrealis (Hepner 2006: 86). The dependent suffixes mark that the verb and the clause are dependent. Whether they are also subordinate is unclear.
–
In Wipi (Trans-Fly-Bulaka River: Trans-New Guinea) there are two “subjunctiveconditional” subordinate conjunctions, rada and rako. Rada not only introduces conditional protases but also subordinate clauses of general uncertainty, representing different alternatives (‘whether... or whether...’)3. Raka introduces counterfactual protases but also functions as an obligative particle in main clauses (‘should’; Shim 2008: 35ff ).
–
Yolngu (Pama-Nyuŋan: Australian) has a hypothetical particle ŋula that can introduce subordinate irrealis clauses, in which case it may be translated into ‘if/ when’ (Morphy 1983: 127ff ):
(123) ga ŋula ŋuli balkurrk -thu walala -n dharyu -n ga walal ŋuli and hyp irr rain -erg de -acc rain -unm and 3pl.nom irr bala’ -ŋur ŋalwa’yu -n dopulu house -loc play -unm gambling ‘and whenever/if it rains on them, then the children will play inside the house, gambling.’
3.
Rada can also function as an exemplifying conjunction ‘such as’.
Chapter 5. Investigation of semantic, functional and notational similarities 121
–
In the centrally located Mongolian languages, the conditional (converb) form of the proto-Mongolic *a ‘be’, *a-xa-sa ‘if it is’ has grammaticalized into a conditional subordinator, aaha(etc.) ‘if ’ (Khamingan; Janhunen 2003: 26, 95). Furthermore, in Moghol, the original conditional (converb) form –sa, which presently fills a subjunctive function, has given rise to the conditional subordinator sah (Weiers 2003: 259ff ).
–
In Japanese, there are three subordinators that can be translated as ‘that’: no, koto, and to. The difference between the first two and the last has to do with factuality. In contrast to no and koto, to indicates that the speaker does not presuppose the truth of the proposition (Palmer 1986: 148):
(124) a. John wa Mary ga sinda to sinzinakatta John top Mary nom died that not.believed ‘John did not believe that Mary was dead.’[She might or might not have been] b. John wa Mary ga sinda koto o sinzinakatta John top Mary nom dead that acc not.believed ‘John did not believe that Mary was dead.’
[She was]
–
In Korean, there is a quotative complementizer ko, which occurs after verbs of saying. There is also a set of clause nominalizers with different modal meanings, e.g. ŭm presupposed and ki non-factual. Predicates of knowing select ŭm, but not ki, whereas predicates of wanting select ki, but not ŭm (Kim 1990).
–
Alsea (Oregon) has the realis- and irrealis complementizers mis and sis with which the verb agrees (Palmer 2001: 151ff ):
(125) a. temúhu misaxa wi˙l -x and.then real.comp- back come -real.complet ‘and then, after she came back’ b. í˙mst tém-in tqaiált -әx sis kexk thus and-1sg.sub want -real.complet irr.comp assemble -ái˙ -m -irr.inch -intr ‘For that reason I want the [people] to assemble.’ –
The Pomoan languages have verb-final markers that function as either coordinators or subordinators and as realis and irrealis markers (Mithun 1995: 368). In the related Yuman languages, there are morphemes that mark dependent clauses, both coordinated (interdependent) and subordinated (Miller 2001: 227ff ). These morphemes also mark whether the subject is the same or different from that of the referent clause and whether the clause is realis or irrealis. The latter depends on whether the referent clause is realis or irrealis. The realis morphemes are –ch (same subject) and -(ch)m (different subject), the irrealis morphemes –k (same subject) and –km (different subject). Interestingly, the same-subject markers mark
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coordinate clauses, whereas the different-subject markers marks subordinate clauses. The latter ones are thus true realis and irrealis subordinators: (126) a. ‘iinyaay -km naa -x be.morning -irr.diff.sub go.pl -irr ‘We will go [when] it is morning.’ b. yay*llich puu -ch mespa -chm heart.feel.bad that.one -subv die -real.diff.sub ‘I was sad that he died.’ –
In Crow (Siouan Proper), (nominalized) complement clauses are marked by realis and irrealis complementizers: -m (realis) and –dak (irrealis) (Graczyk 2007: 245ff ). The suffix –dak also functions as a conditional and temporal subordinator in adverbial subordinate clauses and as a dubitative (epistemic possibility) marker in independent clauses4 (Graczyk 2007: 227, 395). Examples (Graczyk 2007: 248):
(127) a. sapée -o -lak iláa-(a) -watt -uu-m iikukkú -k someone -pl -det talk-cont -continue -pl-comp hear -decl ‘He heard some people talking.’ b. Jesus kuhtáa dée -lak íkaa -wia -k Jesus path go -comp see -want.to -decl ‘He wanted to see Jesus going that way.’ Cf. (128) a. basíilaalee alíatdeet -dak Baáhpuuo -ssbaalee -wia 1.poss- car all.right -cond Pryorgoal- 1.actv- go -will -waa -k -1 -decl ‘If my car is OK I’ll go to Pryor.’ (Graczyk 2007: 350) b. baaleetdák sáak- baa -lak (Graczyk 2007: 395) if what- 1.actv- say -dub ‘If [I had been there, I wonder] what I would have said.’ –
In Slave (Athapaskan), there are two complementizers: nį and gú. Nį may be translated as ‘that’ and leads to a presupposed interpretation. Gú may either be translated as ‘that’ or ‘if ’ and leads to a semi-factive or non-factive interpretation of the clause (Rice 1989: 1248–1257):
(129) a. Mary kee wehsį nį segha yedodíya Mary slippers 3.made comp 1sg.for 3.surprise ‘It surprised me that Mary made slippers.’ 4. The suffix -dak also functions as an indefinite non-specific noun determiner, whereas –m also functions as an indefinite specific noun determiner.
Chapter 5. Investigation of semantic, functional and notational similarities 123
b.
ekh’erádée gú segha godéwé 3pl.fought.recip comp 1sg.to area.surprised ‘It surprised me that they fought each other.’
The former sentence may be an answer to the question “What did you think about the fact that Mary made slippers?” whereas the latter may be an answer to “What surprised you so much?” (Rice 1989: 1248–1257). In the former case, the truth of the complement clause is presupposed, whereas in the latter, it is communicated by the speaker. This contrast becomes even more apparent after negated semifactive predicates, i.e. when the truth of the proposition is unknown for the matrix subject. Here, the translation of gú is ‘if ’ (Rice 1989: 1248–1257): (130) a.
b.
–
elá táhła gú kodeyihshá yíle boat 3.arrived comp 1sg.knew neg ‘I did not know if the boat arrived.’ elá táhła nį kodeyihshá yíle boat 3.arrive comp 1sg.know neg ‘I did not know that the boat arrived.’
[non-factive]
[presupposed]
In Urarina, there is an irrealis-conditional subordinator hananiane ‘if ’ which “indicates that the condition expressed by the dependent clause is not fulfilled, but hypothetical” (Olawsky 2006: 740ff ). Urarina also has an irrealis suffix that can be added to the verb in the apodosis (see 5.2). In the protasis, however, the irrealis suffix is not possible since “the irrealis meaning of the clause is expressed by the conjunction” (Olawsky 2006: 740ff ):
(131) kana ke neherati -a kana+kwaaun-era =ne hananiane, kwatia ka= we val get.angry -3 our.creator =subord if not this= rihjeĩ ne-ri -akat.e like be-irr -1pl ‘If our creator got angry with us, we would not live like this.’ In particular, it is common in the languages of the world that conditional subordinators come in pairs, one denoting a “real conditional” and another denoting an “unreal conditional”. Real conditionals are hypothetical, whereas unreal ones are dubitative or counterfactual. A good example is Rotuman (Central-Eastern Pacific), with the two conditional subordinators kepoi ka and nonõ ka, the former being the “unreal” one (Lynch et al. 2002: 832). There is, however, a potential problem with the real-unreal distinction. As was pointed out in 4.1, conditional protasis markers could be seen as parts of a complex category containing a circumstance-adverbial component (’in case...’) and an Irrealis component (hypothetical, counterfactual etc.). This is supported by the complex origin of conditional protasis markers found by Traugott (1985: 290ff ). Many have epistemic, optative or interrogative origin:
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Cayuga (Iroquian): kye:kwa’ ‘maybe, if ’; Minangkabau (Sumatra): kò’ ‘perhaps, maybe, if ’; Mandarin Chinese: yáo ‘wish, be necessary, if ’; Russian: esli ‘whether’; Hua: –ve interrogative, topic status, non-exhaustive conjunction, conditional
Among those with interrogative origin, Traugott (1985: 291) also includes Germanic if: “probably traceable to the dat. of the noun doubt”. Many others were found to have temporal (adverbial) origin, e.g. Hittite: mān ‘when, if ’ and Indonesian: djika ‘if, when’. The latter is also true for German wenn. There is, however, another way of interpreting these facts. It appears that in some languages, it is the “real conditional” subordinator that has the temporal origin (‘when’) and the “unreal” one that has the modal origin (‘if ’), which casts doubt on whether the distinction is really a modal one. That said, it must at least be acknowledged that unreal conditional subordinators are Irrealis subordinators. To the inventory of Realis and Irrealis subordinators given above, one could also add all the “declarative” and “interrogative” complementizers in the languages of the world, i.e. those that are translated as ‘that’ and ‘if/whether’. In Chapter 8, it will be shown why complementizers of that kind should be labelled Realis and Irrealis, at least in the Germanic languages.
5.4 Conclusion In this chapter, typological data have been presented that connect complementizers and conditional subordinators with propositional modality in semantic, notational and functional respects. Several languages from entirely different language families and regions of the world show similar patterns. There are Realis-Irrealis moods or propositional modality markers that also function as subordinators and subordinators that denote factuality. There are also subordinators that derive from Realis-Irrealis moods or propositional modality markers. In some languages, the Realis-Irrealis markers are particles that borders on subordinators or can also function as subordinators. So far, the working hypothesis has been sustained. In the remaining chapters, a language-family-specific investigation of the Germanic languages with focus on the Scandinavian ones will give a more detailed analysis of propositional modality and general subordinators.
part ii
Modality and subordinators in the Germanic languages
In the previous chapters, cross-linguistic premises were established that enabled a typological inventory of the connection between general subordinators and propositional modality. In the following chapters, the hypothesis that general subordinators belong to the same funtional category as the indicative-subjunctive moods and the epistemic-evidential modal markers will be explored in more detail in one specific language family, the Germanic languages. Focus will be placed on the Scandinavian languages, since the author’s native language is Swedish, but German and English will also be investigated. In Chapters 6, 7 and 8, the functional, semantic and syntactic statuses of the Germanic indicative, subjunctive, and epistemic-evidential modal markers will be investigated and compared to the Germanic general subordinators that, if and whether. Apart from investigating the common meanings, functions, and syntactic status of the general subordinators, the indicative-subjunctive moods, and the epistemic-evidential modal markers in the Germanic languages, i.e. propositional modality, the investigation will also address other meanings and functions of these morphemes, which they sometimes do not share. These are the speech-act functions of the subjunctive mood (imperative, hortative, jussive, and optative), the speech-act functions of the general subordinators (exclamative and optative), and, lastly, modal verbs which have both propositional-modal and event-modal functions. In line with the hypothesis explored, it will be argued that the speech-act functions of the subjunctive and the general subordinators are secondary and marginal, and that propositional modality is the primary function of both these kinds of morphemes. As regards the modal verbs, it will be shown in Chapter 7 that modal verbs denoting propositional modality can be clearly separated from modal verbs denoting event modality both morphologically and syntactically. Another respect in which subordinators differ from mood and modal morphemes is that there are subordinators which denote richer semantic notions, namely adverbial subordinators. Therefore, in order to make the hypothesis credible, efforts will be made to show that the adverbial subordinators belong to a different formal systems than the general ones. In fact, in Chapter 10, it will be argued, in agreement with CGEL, that adverbial subordinators are not subordinators in the strictest sense of the word but rather prepositions, prepositional phrases, or adverbs.
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Albeit perhaps an excursion, Chapter 9 will be devoted to speech-act modality, the interrogative and imperative, which will be placed in relation to propositional modality and subordination. This is done in order to present a full picture of the consequences the hypothesis entails.
chapter
The Germanic indicative and subjunctive as propositional modality markers
In this chapter, the syntactic, semantic, and functional status of the Germanic indicative and subjunctive will be treated. In agreement with what was proposed in Chapter 2 as regards the indicative and subjunctive from a typological perspective, it will be argued that these mood markers primarily denote propositional modality (factuality). In 6.2, several pieces of evidence will be presented in support of this claim, including the use of the subjunctive in conditional clauses and the choice between the indicative and subjunctive in complement clauses. In line with the arguments presented in 2.2.5, the use of the subjunctive in presupposed complement clauses in Icelandic will also be explained in factual terms. The first section, however, will treat the speech-act functions of the Germanic subjunctive, that is the imperative, hortative, jussive, and optative uses. It will be argued that these functions are marginal and secondary to the non-factual meaning of the subjunctive. This is done in order to make a comparison between the moods indicative-subjunctive and the Germanic complementizers more viable, since subordinate clauses arguably do not have illocutionary force (Christofaro 2003, Searle 1969). On the other hand, in 8.1, it will be shown that the general subordinators in the Germanic languages also have secondary speech-act functions, making the markers even more like the subjunctive.
6.1 The speech-act functions of the Germanic subjunctive As was said in 2.2, Palmer (1986) argues that the indicative-subjunctive distinction denotes factuality vs. non-factuality. Indicative is factual and neutral, whereas the subjunctive denotes that the proposition is non-factual (hypothetical, uncertain, dubitative etc.). The question is whether that generalization is entirely applicable to the indicative and subjunctive in the Germanic languages. In the Old Germanic languages, and modern German and Icelandic, the subjunctive fulfilled/fulfills a non-factual function (Irrealis; see 6.2 below), but also speech-act functions such as hortative/jussive and optative (Mattsson 1933: 246). This multifunctionality renders the definition of the subjunctive as non-factual problematic. The optative use of the subjunctive derives from the fact that the Germanic subjunctive has developed from the Indo-European optative. The Indo-European optative
128 Modality and Subordinators
was itself a multifunctional morpheme; it denoted both the optative and the potential (as in Classic Greek and Sanskrit; Ramat 1998: 403, Mattson 1933: 3, Wessén 1956: 123). Proto-Indo-European also had another subjunctive form, but it had been lost at the time of the Proto-Germanic crystallization (Comrie 1998: 87). Comrie (ibid) points out, however, that it is difficult to reconstruct the exact meanings of these morphemes, and that such generalizations must be viewed with caution. Although the optative use of the Germanic subjunctive has a long history, it could be argued that it is merely a secondary function today, non-factuality being the primary one. The optative is an inherited semantic feature that is losing its use. In the modern Germanic languages with a morphological subjunctive (Icelandic and German), the optative function is marginal. It is mainly found in lexicalized phrases with biblical connotations. Interestingly, the Icelandic optative has its own paradigm for vera ‘be’. Formally, it is a present subjunctive paradigm, but the non-factual present subjunctive instead uses an irregular paradigm based on the root sé (cf. sein in German; Sigurðsson 2008: 10). This clearly suggests that the optative and non-factual (true subjunctive) uses are distinct. Typologically, there is morphological evidence to support a separation between the optative and the subjunctive functions. WALS (Ch. 73) investigated 319 languages and found that 48 had inflectional morphemes that were especially dedicated to the optative function. This number may seem small, but it must be added to it all the cases where the optative is expressed by modal verbs. In particular, the optative mood is common among the Caucasian languages, which are characterized as polysynthetic and agglutinative. Since these languages typically have one morpheme per function, the fact that the optative function is fulfilled by an especially dedicated morpheme suggests that it is different from the subjunctive. According to Mattson (1933: 26ff ), the hortative/jussive use of the subjunctive in the Germanic languages arose from the need to express a directive in the 3rd person, the imperative being restricted to the 2nd person. The hortative-jussive can also be said to be related to the optative. Both express “a wish of the speaker about a future state of affairs” (WALS 294), although the hortative/jussive is clearly more agent oriented (however, the prototypical use of the Germanic optative subjunctive was in prayers (Mattson 1933: 14ff ), and prayers are agent oriented). It should be noted that Mattson (1933: 246) places these two uses of the Germanic subjunctive in one group, contrasting it with the “potential” (i.e. non-factual) use of the subjunctive. Since the hortative-jussive function of the Germanic subjunctive expresses commands, and the optative wishes, they are mostly found in main clauses in the present tense. In this respect, they are clearly distinguishable from the non-factual use of the subjunctive, which typically occurs in subordinate clauses and more often in the past tense. In Icelandic, it appears that the optative and hortative uses of the subjunctive are confined to the present tense and main clauses. As was stated above, the optative has its own paradigm for the verb vera ‘be’ which is formally a present subjunctive one (but different from the non-factual present subjunctive paradigm). Furthermore, the
Chapter 6. The Germanic indicative and subjunctive as propositional modality markers 129
1st person plural optative often has a hortative use (Sigurðsson 2008: 10). In Old Swedish, it is true that the optative and hortative/jussive subjunctives typically occurred in main clauses and in the present tense (Mattson 1933). However, the subjunctive could also be used in complement clauses of desiderative and directive predicates (vilia ‘want’, yskia ‘wish’, bidia ‘ask, beg’, mana ‘request’, biuþa ‘invite’, befala ‘command’). Mattson (1933: 96ff ) argues that this use of the subjunctive should also be seen as optative and hortative/jussive: (132) Thy wille oc gudh særdelis at the slækt ware oblandath because wanted also God especially that the family be.pres.subj unmixed mz androm. with others ‘Because God also wanted in particular the family not to be mixed with others.’ On the other hand, it could be argued that these embedded wishes and commands do not constitute actual entreaties and directives to the listener. As with other complement clauses, they present the propositional content which is being predicated, rather than constituting their own utterances. The use of the subjunctive can be said to be licensed by the non-(f)actual (Irrealis) context which the desiderative and directive predicates entail (the event is merely potential; Palmer 2001, Noonan 2007). Thus, rather than being optative or hortative/jussive, the subjunctive is simply non-factual in these cases. Indeed, in these contexts, the subjunctive was not restricted to the present tense, which it appeared to be in optative and hortative/jussive main clauses. Mostly, it followed the sequence of tenses, so that the matrix verb determined whether the subordinate verb should be in the present or the past (Mattson 1933: 96ff ). Mattson (1933: 102) presents a few examples with the past tense in the matrix clause and the present tense in the complement clause, but these seem to be exceptional. The hortative/jussive and optative uses of the Germanic subjunctive can thus be considered relatively restricted, largely main clause phenomena that can be separated from the non-factual use. Furthermore, in some cases, the hortative/jussive use of the subjunctive in main clauses can in fact be considered subordinate to or derived from the non-factual use. In the Old Swedish laws, the hortative/jussive subjunctive was particularly used in apodoses of conditional constructions that constituted directives (Wessén 1956: 125): (133) a. Bristär at eþe, böte fiuratighi markär breaks.ind at oath, pay.fine.subj fourty marks ‘If one breaks the oath, one should pay fourty marks in fine’ b. Uill han a mote suäria, þa suäri sum för uar skilt. wants.ind he a- gainst swear, then swears.subj as before was said ‘If he wants to swear against it, then he should swear as was stated before.’ Interestingly, the indicative could also be used in these constructions in order to state a fact (Wessén 1956: 125):
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(134) Dör bonde ok liwär barn äptir, þa ärwir barn faþur sin. dies.ind farmer and live.ind child after, then inherit.ind child father its ‘If a farmer dies and a child lives on, then the child is its father’s heir.’ This suggests that the subjunctive forms in (133) primarily denote non-factuality, and that the hortative/jussive interpretation is derived from it. There is also morpho-typological evidence to support a separation between the subjunctive and the hortative/jussive. In many languages of the world, there are inflectional morphemes especially dedicated to the hortative/jussive function1. In many of these languages, there is also a subjunctive marker on the side of the hortative/jussive marker(s) (e.g. Akkadian, Classic Arabic, Afar, Abkhaz, Korafe, Algonquian, Klamath, Tonkawa, and Maidu). A third performative use of the Germanic subjunctive is to indicate a polite imperative. In German, the third person plural (i.e. polite address form) subjunctive is used to express a polite imperative (Gehen Sie; Eisenberg 2006a: 203). This, however, arguably also has a non-factual explanation. By placing the directive within the realm of thought (Irrealis), the directive becomes less direct. In conclusion, it could be argued that the Germanic subjunctive primarily denotes non-factuality and that the other uses, optative, hortative-jussive, and polite imperative are marginal, restricted, and secondary to the non-factual use. The speech-act uses are typically found in main clauses, whereas the non-factual use is typically found in subordinate clauses. Note that when the subjunctive denotes speech-act functions, it can be thought to lexicalize the more peripheral functional category Speech-act modality. Since this category is assumed not to be present in subordinate clauses, the uses are confined to main clauses. Interestingly, in 8.1, it will be shown that this pattern is also found among the general subordinators in the Germanic languages, making the markers even more alike.
1. E.g. Bantu (Nurse & Phillipson 2003), Old Semitic and Ethiopic Semitic (Hetzron 1997: 69–219, 424–549), Afar (East Cushitic; Bliese 1976: 137ff ), Abkhaz (Northwest Caucasian; Hewitt 1989: 51ff ), Lezgian (Northeast Caucasian; Haspelmath 1993), Classic Armenian (Indo-European; Campbell 2000: 118), Mangghuer (Mongolian; Janhunen 2003), Korean (Kim 1990: 162ff ), Chantyal, Nar-Phu, Hakha Lai and Tshangla (Tibeto-Burman; Thurgood 2003), South Dravidian and Telugu (Dravidian; Steever 1998), Nenenets (North Samoyedic; Salminen 1998: 516–548), Seediq (Formosan; Adelaar & Himmelmann 2005: 313ff ), Ambulas and Mende (Middle Sepik: Sepik-Ramu; Wilson 1980: 168ff, Hoel et al. 1994: 111), Korafe (Binandere; Farr & Farr 1975: 745ff ), Kayardild (Tangkic; Evans 1995), Wardaman (Australian; Merlan 1994), Algonquian (Mithun 1999: 172), Kwaikiutl (Wakashan; Boas 1911: 492), Keres (Mithun 1999: 438ff ), Shastan (Mithun 1999: 499), Klamath (Mithun 1999: 451), Miwok (Utian; Mithun 1999: 538), Tonkawa (Coahuiltecan; Palmer 2001: 80ff ), Wintu (Mithun 1999: 563), Yana (Northern Hokan; Mithun 1999: 565), Yuchi (Mithun 1999: 572), Yuman (Mithun 1999: 581), Zuni (Mithun 1999: 584), Maidu (Penutian; Palmer 2001: 80ff ), and Kwaza (van der Voort 2004: 308ff )
Chapter 6. The Germanic indicative and subjunctive as propositional modality markers 131
6.2 The Germanic indicative-subjunctive as propositional-modality markers In the following section, it will be demonstrated how and to what extent the Germanic indicative and subjunctive denote propositional modality. Three languages with mood will be presented and compared, Old Swedish, Icelandic, and German.
6.2.1 The indicative-subjunctive in conditional constructions As has been stated before, the conditional construction often comes in two variants, ‘real’ and ‘unreal’. Real conditional protases leave open the possibility that the event will occur and are thus hypothetical, whereas unreal conditionals indicate “some kind of negative attitude” towards it, typically “some doubt about the likelihood” (Palmer 2001: 207), i.e. the dubitative. Typically, real conditionals are in the present tense and unreal ones in the past or pluperfect. This modal use of the past tense in the Germanic languages will be dealt with in the next chapter. However, the real-unreal distinction also interacts with the use of the indicative and subjunctive in the Germanic languages (and many other ones too). Based on the use of the subjunctive in conditional constructions, at least two meanings can be ascribed to the Germanic subjunctive: “uncertainty” and counterfactual. Mattson (1933) subsumes these under the label hypothetical. In Old Swedish, the present subjunctive was extremely rare in protases of conditional constructions (Mattson 1933: 201), except in the related exceptive-conditional and hypotheticalcomparative constructions, where it was abundant. As for the meaning of the present subjunctive in these constructions and beyond, it seems to have been one of (hypothetical) uncertainty2 (Mattson 1933: 152, 212, 224): (135) Eigh ok flera vaka, num prester uili æller bondi not and more wake, unless priest want.pres.subj or farmer uili. want.pres.subj ‘More [people] shall not wake, unless a priest or a farmer wants it.’ The present indicative was used in order to express a neutral stance towards the possibility that the event would occur (Mattsson 1933: 215ff; i.e. the “real” conditional). In sharp contrast to the present subjunctive, the past subjunctive was frequently used in conditional and related constructions, where it denoted either uncertainty or
2. Delbrück (1904) proposed that the Germanic present subjunctive denotes the potential (epistemic possibility), whereas the past subjunctive denotes the counterfactual. Mattsson (1933: 212ff ), however, points out that the Old Swedish past subjunctive also had a non-counterfactual meaning and that it is almost impossible to draw a distinction between this meaning and the meaning of the present subjunctive. Both seem to have been one of uncertainty.
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Modality and Subordinators
“unreality” (i.e. the counterfactual). The pluperfect subjunctive could also be used to denote the counterfactual (Mattson 1933: 55ff, 202ff, Wessén 1956: 129ff ): (136) a. Vare þät sua... þa bruti han giarna eþsöret. be.past.subj it so then break.past.subj he gladly the.oath ‘If it were so, then he would gladly break the oath.’ b. Vm the hafdhin farit oc leet... tha hafdho the if they have.past.subj gone and looked then have.past.ind they han äkke funnit him not found ‘If they had gone and looked [for him], then they would not have found him.’ It could perhaps be argued that the subjunctive in itself denotes uncertainty also in the counterfactual constructions above, and that the counterfactual interpretation arises from the interaction with the past and pluperfect tenses. The present subjunctive denotes present or future hypothetical events, which may occur. The past and pluperfect subjunctive also denote hypothetical events but in the past. If the events have not been realized at the utterance time, they become interpreted as counterfactual. This line of reasoning is supported by the fact that in Yimas (Nor Pondo: Sepic-Ramu), the combination of the potential marker and the remote past marker leads to a counterfactual interpretation (Foley 1986: 161): (137) m' -r'm ampGya -ntuk -ump -'n antG- ka- wa-ntut they -dual pot.3.dual- come -rem.past -seq -obl pot- 1sg- go-rem.past ‘If they had come, I would have gone.’ Foley paraphrases the sentence in the following way: “in the remote past it was possible, but unlikely, that those two would come and, as a result, that I would go; but these unlikely events did not in fact happen”. Another supporting argument is Washo, where future subjunctive has a suppositive or potential meaning, whereas the past subjunctive has a counterfactual one (Mithun 1999: 559). Yet another one is Wardaman (Australian: Merlan 1994: 184ff ). In Wardaman, the combination of the irrealis prefix and the naked verb stem yields a potential meaning (’may’), whereas the combination of the irrealis prefix and the past suffix yields a counterfactual one (‘should/would have’). The uncertainty-meaning of the Old Swedish past subjunctive must be considered more than just compositional, though. The past tense does not refer specifically to the past in these constructions, but is timeless. The past tense marker has grammaticalized, perhaps in combination with the subjunctive, into a modal marker indicating a lack of confidence by the speaker (the so called modal past; see Palmer 2001: 203ff and 7.1). Mattson (1993: 117ff ) subscribes this development to the need of a particular marker of uncertainty: “However, it is reasonable and probable, that the past subjunctive had to step in and replace the vanishing present forms, in the cases where the clause and the context demanded a marker for uncertainty [authors translation]”. From a typological
Chapter 6. The Germanic indicative and subjunctive as propositional modality markers 133
perspective, there is a clear connection between the past and the Irrealis (de Haan 2006: 51). Both can be said to denote dissociation or displacement, the first in the temporal dimension, the second in the dimension of reality (Steele 1975: 215ff ). The situation in modern Icelandic is similar to that in Old Swedish. The present subjunctive is more or less ungrammatical in protases of conditional constructions, except when the protasis is question-formed (V1). In that case, the subjunctive is instead obligatory (IT III: 470): (138) a. Ef þú kemur/ *komir á Grænlandsgrund sér=ðu if you come.pres.ind/ come.pres.subj to Grænlandsgrund, see=you áreiðanlega ýmislegt forvitnilegt. doubtless various interesting ‘If you come to Grænlandsgrund, you will doubtless see various interesting [things].’ b. *Kemur/komir þú á Grænlandsgrund sérðu áreiðanlega ýmislegt forvitnilegt. The present subjunctive is also obligatory in exceptive conditional protases (Thrainsson 1994: 184). In comparison to the indicative, the present subjunctive can denote that the proposition is more uncertain (“óvissa”; IT III: 469). The Icelandic past subjunctive, on the other hand, is used freely in conditional clauses and can furthermore denote the counterfactual (ibid): (139) a. Ég kæmi ef ég gæti. I come.past.subj if I can.past.subj ‘I would come if I could.’ b. Ég skyldi kaupa mér þrjá stiga ef ég væri ríkur. I shall.past.subj buy me three ladders if I be.past.subj rich ‘If I were rich, I would buy myself three ladders.’ It must be noted, however, that the choice between the present and past subjunctive in protases of conditional constructions, such as exceptive conditionals, is largely determined by the tense of the matrix verb. The protasis cannot be in the past subjunctive if the apodosis is in the present, and vice versa (IT III: 468ff ). The same can be said about Old Swedish exceptive clauses (Mattson 1933: 228). In German, the situation is also similar to the one found in Old Swedish and Icelandic. The present subjunctive is ungrammatical in protases of conditional constructions. The past subjunctive is used to express “Skepsis gegenüber dem Eintreten der Sachverhalte” (Eisenberg 2006b: 467). Eisenberg calls the past subjunctive potential, but clearly, uncertainty or dubitative would be more appropriate. The pluperfect subjunctive, in turn, denotes the counterfactual (Eisenberg 2006b: 115ff, 467): (140) a. Wenn du *kommest/ kommst, fahren wir. if you come.pres.subj/ come.pres.ind, go.pres.ind we ‘If you come, we will leave.’
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b. Wenn du kämest, führen wir. if you come.past.subj, go.past.subj we ‘If you came, we would leave.’ c. Wenn du gekommen wärest, wären wir gefahren if you come.ppl be.past.subj be.past.subj we leave.ppl ‘If you had come, we would have left’ In conclusion, conditional and related constructions in the Germanic languages reveal that the Germanic subjunctive denotes different degrees of non-factuality in configuration with tense. The present subjunctive is rare in these constructions, but, when used, it denotes uncertainty. The past subjunctive is much more frequent and denotes uncertainty/dubitative and sometimes the counterfactual. Here, it appears that the past tense has grammaticalized into an additional modal marker. The pluperfect subjunctive is used to denote the counterfactual.
6.2.2 Subjunctive licensing in complement clauses A strong indication that the Germanic indicative-subjunctive distinction denotes factuality is the fact that the choice between the moods in complement clauses depends on the factivity of the matrix predicate (as in many other languages, see 2.3.1). Furthermore, after certain predicates, there is a choice between the indicative and the subjunctive depending on the speaker’s attitude towards the factuality of the proposition. Icelandic is most clear in this regard. In Icelandic, nearly all non-factive predicates, including interrogative ones, only select complement clauses in the subjunctive, whereas semifactive predicates only select complement clauses in the indicative (IT III: 459ff, Thráinsson 1994: 183. The examples are taken and adapted from these sources): (141) a. Jónatan álítur/ grunar/ heldur (því fram)/ telur að tvisvar Jonatan thinks/ suspects/ believes/ thinks that two.times tveir séu fjórir. two be.pres.subj four ‘Jonathan thinks/suspects/believes that two times two is four.’ b. Það er (ó)líkeligt/sennilegt/ (ó)trúlegt að Stefán sé it is (un)likely/probable/ (im)probable that Stefan is.subj krati. Social.Democrate ‘It is (un)likely/probable/(im)probable that Stefan is a Social Democrate.’ c. Jónatan áttar sig á/ fattar/ sér/ skilur/ veit að tvisvar Jonatan understands/ catches/ sees/ grasps/ knows that two.times tveir eru fjórir. two be.pres.ind four ‘Jonathan understands/catches/sees/grasps that two times two is four.
Chapter 6. The Germanic indicative and subjunctive as propositional modality markers 135
d. Það er satt/ greinilegt/ áreiðanlegt/ ljóst að Stefán er it is true/ clear/ certain obvious that Stefan is.ind krati. Social.Democrate ‘It is true/clear/certain/obvious that Stefan is a Social Democrate.’ Interestingly, when a semifactive verbs such as átta sig á ‘understand’ is negated, it can be constructed with the subjunctive (IT III: 464). The subject does not understand that the proposition is true (although the speaker and the listener in this case clearly do): (142) Jónathan áttar sig ekki á því að þú hafir logið í hann. Jonathan catch refl not on that that you have.subj lied in him ‘Jonathan does not understand that you have lied to him.’ The subjunctive can also be used after negated sjá ‘see, realize’, taka eftir ‘notice’, and átta sig á ‘realize’, but apparently not after negated vita ‘know’ (Sigurdsson 2008: 16). After negated sjá, the subjunctive indicates that the speaker is reserved in regard to the truth of the proposition. When the speaker wishes to present the proposition as a fact, the indicative is used (Sigurðsson 2008: 16): (143) a. Ólafur sér ekki að þú sért mikilvægur. Olaf sees not that you are.sub important ‘Olaf cannot see that you should be important.’ b. Ólafur sér ekki að þú ert mikilvægur. Olaf sees not that you are.ind important ‘Olaf does not see/realize (the fact) that you are important.’ Furthermore, when a semifactive predicate such as sjá is negated and the subject and speaker is the same person, the clause must be in the subjunctive, since the speaker does not see etc. whether or not the proposition is true (Sigurðsson 2008: 17): (144) Ég sé ekki að þú *ert/ sért mikilvægur. I see not that you are.ind/ sub important ‘I cannot see that you should be important.’ Verbs of saying and asserting must take the subjunctive when the subject is someone other than the speaker, which means that the speaker is reserved in regard to the veracity of the proposition. As with verbs of believing, the comment en það er ekki rétt ‘but that is not true’ can always be added to it (IT III: 460): (145) Jónathan fullyrðir/ heldur/segir að tvisvar tveir séu fjórir – Jonathan maintains/ thinks/says that two.times two be.pres.subj four en það er ekki rétt. but that is not true
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Interestingly, verbs of hearing and reading can either take the indicative or the subjunctive. In the indicative case, the proposition is presupposed to be true (Thráinsson 1994: 183): (146) Jón las það í blaðinu að María hafði/ hefði komið heim. Jon read it in papers that Maria had.ind/ had.subj come home ‘John read in the news-paper that Maria had come home.’ In the subjunctive case, but not in the indicative one, a comment that negates the proposition can be added: en hún kom ekki heim ‘but she did not come home’. The proposition is thus clearly non-factual in the subjunctive case. German can also use the subjunctive in complement clauses of non-factive predicates. However, the indicative can also be used, especially in casual talk. As in Icelandic, it is ungrammatical with the subjunctive after affirmative semifactive predicates (Eisenberg 2006b: 117): (147) a. Karl meint/hofft/ glaubt, dass Egon bleiben will/ wolle. Karl thinks/hopes/ believes that Egon stay will.ind/ will.subj ‘Karl thinks/hopes that Egon wants to stay.’ b. Karl versteht/ weiß, dass Egon bleiben will/ *wolle. Karl understands/ knows that Egon stay will.ind/ will.subj ‘Karl understands/knows that Egon wants to stay.’ Interestingly, the choice between the indicative and the subjunctive after verbs of saying depends on whether or not the speaker accepts the proposition as true (Palmer 2001: 114, Eisenberg 2006b: 117): (148) Bild berichtet, dass der Graf verhaftet worden sei/ ist. Bild tells that the count arrested become is.subj/ is.ind ‘Bild tells that the count has become arrested.’ If the subjunctive is used, the reading cannot be a factive one, whereas it can with the indicative (Eisenberg 2006b: 117ff ). The indicative suggests that the speaker accepts the proposition as true (Palmer 2001). The subjunctive clearly denotes non-factuality in these cases. This is also illustrated by the fact that verbs of saying and asserting cannot be in the subjunctive when the subject is in the 1st person. It would be odd to be reserved in regard to the truth of one’s own statement: (149) Ich sage dir, dass er krank *sei/ ist. I tell you that he sick is.subj/ is.ind ‘I’m telling you that he is sick.’ The Old Swedish indicative-subjunctive distinction can also be connected with factuality vs. non-factuality in the sense that Old Swedish also displayed the subjunctive in complement clauses of non-factive predicates, particularly after predicates of belief and emotion (e.g. troa, ‘believe’ mögheliker ‘possible’ and rädhas ‘fear’ Mattsson 1933). Nordström (2009) performed an investigation of the frequency of the subjunctive after
Chapter 6. The Germanic indicative and subjunctive as propositional modality markers 137
non-factive predicates of belief and emotion over time and found approximately 30% subjunctive in the earliest period (1300–1330): (150) a. Hænne syntis at christus siælfwer ware præstrin. Her seemed that Christ himself was.subj the.priest ‘It seemed to her that Christ himself was the priest.’
(FL: 11)
Cf. b. ok syntis hanum at war fru bødh sancto ypolito [lata] and seemed him that our lady asked.ind Sanct Ypolito let swenin helan wardha. (FL: 424) the.boy healed be ‘And it seemed to him that Our Lady asked Sanct Ypolito to let the boy be healed.’ (151) a. Nw är thet ey wäl möghlikt at en man giti thet alt now is it not part possible that a man is.able.subj it all wanhuxat. misunderstood ‘Now, it can hardly be possible that somebody gets it all wrong.’ (KS: 4) Cf. b. Nu är thet ey wäl möghelikt at tässen Tolf al sendr now is it not part possible that these twelve all send.ind tima. (KS: 84) messages ‘Now, it can hardly be possible that these twelve all send messages.’ (152) a. oc nu ræddis moyses at han ware wredhir. and now fear.refl Moses that he was.subj angry ‘and now Moses fears that he is angry.’
(PP: 268)
Cf. b. æn pharao konungir rædhis at locustur wordho hans but Pharao king feared.refl that locusts became.ind his dødhir. death ‘but King Pharao feared that locusts would be his death.’ (PPA: 234) The use of the subjunctive in these contexts then gradually declined to insignificant by the mid 1400 (see Nordström 2009). The investigation was performed on texts from the Old Swedish Text Corpus (Fornsvenska textbanken). For the period 1300–1330, the following three texts were searched:
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Table 5. Old Swedish texts investigated Text
Manuscript
Date
Words
Fornsvenska legendariet (FL) Konungastyrelsen (KS) Pentateukparafrasen (PP) Total
B A B
Approx. 1300 Approx. 1330 Approx. 1330
124 899 21 600 145 150 291 649
The texts were searched using the unregistered version of the concordance program Concordance 3.2. The program made a list of all lexemes in the text (“Headword”). From this list, those lexemes that denoted epistemic attitude or emotion and related notions were selected. Each particular hit containing those lexemes were then studied (“Context...Word...Context”). This yielded a full representation of the existing relevant predicates, without limiting the search to words chosen beforehand. In particular, it was necessary to pursue that course since Old Swedish did not have a standardized spelling. The relevant verbs and adjectives that were found were the following (the spellings given in Söderwall 1884–1918 are followed here): (be)frukta ‘fear’, formodha ‘presume’, vanhopa ‘despair’, iäva ‘doubt’, mena ‘mean/ think’, (o)mögheliker ‘(im)possible’, ovis ‘uncertain’, räþas ‘fear’, synas ‘seem’, tea ‘appear’, (van)troa ‘(dis)believe’, (van)trösta ‘(mis)trust’, tväka ‘doubt’, tvifla ‘doubt’, thykkia ‘think’, þänkia ‘think’, vana ‘fear’, vänta ‘expect/hope’
Nominalised forms of the verbs were also included in the investigation. Not all values of the verb in Old Swedish had a particular subjunctive form. This narrowed down the result somewhat, since these values could not be considered evidence for either mood form. The subjunctive had a particular form in the following values (Wessén 1962: 120ff ): Table 6. Old Swedish subjunctive forms 1st-3rd sg.
Strong verbs (including irregular vara ‘to be’) Weak verbs (including the preterito-presentic)
3rd pl.
Pres.
Past
Pres.
Past
-i -i
-i –
-i(n) -i(n)
-i(n) -i(n)
Apparently, vara ‘to be’ in 1st pers. pl. subj. could alternatively be se-in (pres.) and varin (past), but since var-um was also a subjunctive form, homonymous with the indicative, 1st pers. pl. subj. of vara was not included in the investigation). Another form that was particularly abundant and which also had to be excluded was the preterito-present skola ‘shall’ in the past sg. and 1st and 2nd pers. pl. Lastly, phrases that occurred more or less as fixed expression were only included once.
Chapter 6. The Germanic indicative and subjunctive as propositional modality markers 139
The search generated 123 relevant hits, 36 (29,3 %) of which were in the subjunctive: Table 7. The share of the subjunctive after non-factive predicates Text
FL
KS
PP
Total
Subjunctive Indicative Total % subjunctive
8 16 24 33,3
6 6 12 50,0
20 60 80 25,0
34 82 116 29,3
Pentateukparafrasen B, which had the smallest proportion of subjunctive of the three texts, probably had more in its original version. This is suggested by the fact that the A-manuscript had the subjunctive in three places where the B-manuscript did not (see Nordström 2009). It is therefore not unreasonable to round off to 30 % in total. A control investigation was also conducted on semifactive predicates. This was done in order to confirm that it actually was the non-factual context that licensed the use of the subjunctive. The same texts were searched according to the same criteria as above. The semifactive predicates investigated were forstandha ‘understand’, undirstandha ‘understand’, sann ‘true’, and veta ‘know’. The search yielded 115 relevant hits, only 4 of which (3,5 %) were in the subjunctive: Table 8. The share of the subjunctive after semifactive predicates Text
FL
KS
PP
Total
Subjunctive Indicative Total % subjunctive
2 44 46 4,3
0 4 4 0
2 63 65 3,1
4 111 115 3,5
Of these four, one was part of a directive. Since directives describe non-actual events, the subjunctive was to be expected there: (153) Alle skuldo knæfalla honom oc wetha ath han ware vældughir everyone should kneel him and know that he was.subj great foghote iffwir alt egyptu landh. (PP: 185) governor over all Egypt’s land ‘Everyone should kneel to him and know that he was the great governor of all the land of Egypt.’ Another of the four was a negated semifactive verb. Here, the subjunctive was probably used to indicate that the subject, in contrast to the speaker, did not understand that the proposition was true:
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(154) oc ey vndirstodh abraham at thz vare gudz vili. and not understood Abraham that it was.subj God’s will ‘and Abraham didn’t understand that it was God’s will.’
(PP: 151)
The third case can probably be explained by the fact that the subject learned about the proposition by letter, i.e. evidential subjunctive: (155) Ok forstodh aff pylati brefwm som hanum waro før sænde At j and understood of Pilate’s letters that him were for send that in judha lande ware then lækin allum gaff bother. (FL: 206) Judha land was.subj that doktor all gave healing ‘And [he] understood from the letters that were sent to him, that in the land of Judah, there was this doctor who healed everyone.’ The fourth example can be explained by the use of the assumptive particle væl ‘surely’ in the matrix clause (“Tha viste han væl att…” ‘Surely, he must have known then that…’); the speaker is speculating. Although all of the 4 cases with the subjunctive after semifactive verbs probably had a non-factual explanation, a Pearson-Chi-Square test was conducted to control that the difference between the results from the two investigations was significant3: Table 9. Comparison between the two investigations Investigation 1 non-factive predicates Subjunctive Indicative Total
Count % within group Count % within group Count % within group
34 29,3 82 70,7 116 100
Investigation 2 semifactive predicates 4 3,5 111 96,5 115 100
Total 38 16,5 193 83,5 231 100
Table 10. Statistical difference
Pearson Chi-Square
Value
df
p
28,038
1
0.000
As the table show, the difference between non-factive and factive predicates in Old Swedish as regards the choice of mood was highly significant (p-value less than 0,001). The use of the subjunctive after verbs of saying was not at all as common in Old Swedish as it is in e.g. German (Mattsson 1933: 85ff ). Example:
3.
The author is indebted to Joost van de Weijer for helping her with this.
Chapter 6. The Germanic indicative and subjunctive as propositional modality markers 141
(156) Hon hördhe sighias at een ny ordon ware vpkomen. she heard being.said that a new order was.subj formed ‘She heard it being said that a new order had been formed.’ When it was used, it tended to have a component of uncertainty or unreality, rather than simply denoting non-factuality, Mattsson (1933: 90) argues. Wessén (1956: 131) arrives at a similar conclusion: if the author wishes to give what is presented the character not of a fact, but of being dependent on a subjective judgement, as to a certain degree uncertain or unreal. The use of the subjunctive in indirect speech thus connects to the potential meaning of the subjunctive [the author’s translation]
Wessén (1956: 131) illustrates this with the following example, where the indirect speech is in the indicative as long as it refers to factual events: (157) svarar, at han var þá nývaknaðr, sagði, at þá var answers that he was.ind then newly.awakened, said that then was.ind mið nótt, ok enn væri mál at sofa mid night and still was.subj time to sleep ‘[He] answers that he was newly awakened then, [he] said that it was midnight and that there was still time to sleep.’ On a higher Indo-European level, the connection between factuality and the moods indicative-subjunctive found in the Germanic languages is supported by the Romance languages, through their cognate subjunctive forms (also mainly from the Indo-European optative). Italian invariably uses the subjunctive after verbs of doubt. After verbs of belief, the subjunctive can be used “if there is hesitancy or what is stated is more hypothetical” (Palmer 2001: 113): (158) Credo che tu hai/ abbia ragione. Think.1sg that you have.2sg.pres.ind/ subj right ‘I think that you are right.’ Spanish also uses the subjunctive after verbs of doubt, but invariably the indicative after verbs of belief (Palmer 2001: 2): (159) a. Dudo que aprenda. doubt.1sg that learn.3sg.pres.subj ‘I doubt that he is learning.’ b. Creo que aprende. believe.1sg that learn.3sg.pres.ind ‘I believe that he is learning.’ If creer is negated, however, the subjunctive is used, since the meaning then becomes dubitative (Palmer 2001: 116ff ):
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(160) No creo que aprenda. not believe.1.sg that learn.3sg.pres.subj ‘I don’t think that he is learning.’ Verbs of knowing (semifactive) can also be constructed with the subjunctive when negated in the Romance languages (Palmer 2001: 118ff ). The interpretation is that the subject is unaware/uninformed of the truth of the proposition. All these facts point to a strong connection between the indicative-subjunctive and factuality. Another group of predicates that licence/govern the subjunctive in the Germanic languages are the interrogative ones. In Icelandic, the subjunctive is obligatory in embedded polar questions (IT III: 459ff ). In Old Swedish, the past subjunctive was, as always, optional (Mattson 1933: 111ff ). In German, the subjunctive also seems to be optional: (161) Jónathan spyr hvort tvisvar tveir séu fjórir. Jonathan asks whether two.times two is.subj four ‘Jonathan asks whether two times two is four.’ (162) Spordhir vm fatikdombir vare fulkomit gott... asked if poverty is.subj completely good ‘Asked whether poverty is all good...’ (163) Der eine stieg aus und fragte, ob die beiden Fremden noch hier wären? the one stepped out and asked if the both strangers still here were.subj ‘One of them stepped out and asked, if the two strangers were still here?’ (www.literaturport.de/index.php?id=50&no_cache=1&textid=1245591962) Arguably, this type of subjunctive also denotes non-factuality, uncertainty in particular, rather than interrogativity. As was stated above, Mattsson (1933: 117ff ) suggests that the past subjunctive in Old Swedish was particularily used to denote uncertainty. This was also the case after verbs of asking, he argues. This type of subjunctive was not only restricted to true interrogative predicates but occurred after all predicates that denoted uncertainty and a wish for information, e.g. vndra ‘wonder’, røna ‘investigate’, vrdela ‘determine’, (be)pröfwa ‘try’, fresta ‘try’, försiöka ‘examine’, huxa ‘conceive’, gøma ‘observe’, radha ‘decide’. It could even occur after verbs of saying and semifactive verbs under certain conditions (Mattson 1933: 113ff ): (164) Martinus wiste ey och wilde vita hwat martir ther laghe. Martinus knew not and wanted know whether martyr there lay.subj ‘Martinus didn’t know and wanted to know whether the martyr lay there.’ Italian, Spanish and Latin also use the subjunctive after verbs of asking (Palmer 2001: 121; alternatively so for Spanish and Italian). Latin is particularly interesting, since the subjunctive is obligatory in embedded questions, but ungrammatical in direct ones. If the subjunctive had denoted the interrogative in these contexts, the relation would reasonably have been the opposite, since it is the main clause that carries the illocutionary force.
Chapter 6. The Germanic indicative and subjunctive as propositional modality markers 143
As was said in 2.2.5, a possible argument against the idea that the indicative-subjunctive distinction denotes factuality is that so-called factive emotive predicates also select complement clauses in the subjunctive in Spanish. This is also the case in Icelandic, but note that the modal verb skulu is obligatory (Sigurðsson 2008: 14): (165) Það er gaman að tunglið skuli brosa/ *brosi/ ?brosir. it is fun that moon.the shall.sub smile/ smiles.sub/ smiles.ind ‘It is fun that the moon smiles.’ As was said in 2.2.5, Palmer (1986: 119) argued that the non-factual subjunctive is used to yield an evaluative or emotive meaning of counter-expectation (the admirative) or grudging admittance: “the speaker or subject does not present the facts, he merely evaluates them”. Note that factive predicates often have an emotive or evaluative component in their semantics (please, glad, regret, surprise etc.). A supporting argument was the fact that presupposed clauses can be constructed with modal should in English to achieve the same effect (Palmer 1986: 120). That the clause truly expresses surprise or frustration (the frustrative) is made clear from the fact that it can occur alone as an exclamative clause: (166) That he should do such a thing! This is also the case with Swedish skola (although not confined to the past tense, but rather following the tense of the matrix verb, like skulu in Icelandic; the Swedish b-example is a translation of the a-example): (167) a. It bothers me that you should complain so much. b. Det stör mig att du ska klaga så mycket. It is therefore interesting to note that skulu is obligatory in these clauses in Icelandic. Note that skulu in the subjunctive can also be used in independent exclamative clauses, i.e. without the emotive predicate (Sigurðsson 2008: 11): (168) Að hún skuli segja þetta! that she shall.subj say this ‘[It is incredible/remarkable] That she says this!’ In 2.2.5, yet another related non-factual explanation for the use of the subjunctive in complement clauses of factive predicates was offered. It was proposed that the subjunctive may be evidential. The proposition may be counter to the speaker’s expectations but s/he has evidence (visual, auditory) that it is true. Lastly, it was pointed out that not all Germanic mood languages have the subjunctive in complement clauses of “factive” predicates. German invariably uses the indicative (Eisenberg 2006b: 117):
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(169) Paul vergisst/ entschuldigt, dass Egon bleiben will/ *wolle. Paul forgets/ excuses that Egon stay want.ind/ want.subj ‘Paul forgets/excuses that Egon wants to stay.’ Note that the counter-expectative and evidential interpretations are not possible here. This is a strong indication that the Germanic indicative-subjunctive distinction does not denote assertion vs. non-assertion, since presupposition and assertion are generally held to be in complementary distribution. In this section, it has been shown that there is a correlation between factuality and the use of the indicative-subjunctive in complement clauses in the Germanic languages. Semifactive predicates are constructed with indicative complements, whereas nonfactive predicates (can) be constructed with subjunctive complements. Corpus searches showed that this was also true for Old Swedish. Interestingly, there is a certain variation in the Germanic languages after non-factive predicates. In German, there is a choice between the subjunctive and the indicative after verbs of saying, depending on whether or not the speaker accepts the truth of the proposition. In Icelandic, complements of verbs of hearing and reading also vary depending on whether or not the speaker accepts the proposition as true. The overall pattern is confirmed by data from the related Romance languages. As in Spanish, Icelandic also uses the subjunctive in complement clauses of factive emotive predicates. Since factive complement clauses are logically presupposed to be true, this pattern goes against the idea that the choice between the indicative and subjunctive depends on the factuality of the proposition. As was the case for Spanish, however, the use of the subjunctive was given an explanation that is compatible with the non-factual analysis of the subjunctive (in agreement with Palmer 1986). It was pointed out that factive predicates often have an emotive-evaluative component in their semantics and that the Icelandic modal verb skulu ‘shall’ is obligatory in these clauses. In English and Swedish, the corresponding should and skola suggests that the proposition is counter to the speakers expectation (the admirative). Lastly, it was pointed out that German invariably uses the indicative in these constructions.
6.3 Fossilized subjunctive forms There are a few remnant subjunctive forms in Swedish and English that deserve to be mentioned in relation to factuality. These are were in English, the corresponding vore in Swedish and, seldomly used, a few strong verbs in Swedish with –e and ablaut (past or supine stem) or a particular stem variant (SAG II: 549). English were can be used as a counterfactual or unlikelihood-marker in conditional, hypothetical-comparative, and desiderative constructions and, by some speakers, as a “backshifting” device (CGEL 85ff ):
Chapter 6. The Germanic indicative and subjunctive as propositional modality markers 145
(170) a. He talks to me as if I were a child. b. I wish I were going with you. c. %She phoned to ascertain whether he were dining at the Club. In Swedish, the fossilised subjunctive forms can also be used as a counterfactual or unlikelihood-marker in the same constructions as in English, but also in suppositive and polite constructions. In the latter case, the meaning is not counterfactual or unlikely but hypothetical, in the sense that the speaker does not have control over the proposition (SAG IV: 268ff ): (171) a. Föreställ dig att du vore en kurdisk flykting. imagine refl that you be.past.subj a Kurdish refugee ‘Imagine that you were a Kurdish refugee.’ b. Det vore önskvärt med lite fler stolar. it be.past.subj desirable with little more chairs ‘A few more chairs would be nice.’ Furthermore, in English, the plain verb form can be used with a non-factual meaning in ordinary conditional and exhaustive conditional protases, adverbial clauses introduced by in order, unless, and lest, and in complement clauses after non-factive mandative predicates (i.e. deontic constructions; CGEL 87ff, 993ff ): (172) a. If that be so, the plan will have to be revised. b. We insist that he be kept informed. However, as CGEL points out, this is not a morphological subjunctive but rather a subjunctive use of the infinitive form.
6.4 Conclusion In this chapter, it has been argued that the Germanic indicative-subjunctive distinction denotes the speaker’s attitude to the factuality of the proposition (i.e. propositional modality). The secondary optative function of the present subjunctive is a remnant from the Indo-European optative, from which the Germanic subjunctive is derived. In the Germanic languages of today, the optative only plays a minor role. Furthermore, the optative use of the subjunctive can also be formally separated from the non-factual one. In Icelandic, the two functions use different paradigms for the verb vera ‘be’. The hortative/jussive function of the Germanic subjunctive may, in turn, have developed in order to fill a gap in the imperative paradigm, the imperative being restricted to the 2nd person. In the Old Swedish laws, the hortative/jussive function of the subjunctive in apodoses of conditional constructions could be seen as secondary to its non-factual function. If the apodosis stated a fact, the indicative was used instead.
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The hortative/jussive meaning is related to the optative one in the sense that both are performative (the Old Swedish optative typically occurred in prayers). Therefore, they are restricted to the present tense and main clauses. In that respect, the non-factual function of the subjunctive can clearly be separated from the optative and hortative/jussive functions. The non-factual subjunctive typically occurs in embedded clauses and is not restricted to the present tense (on the contrary, it is most common in the past tense in German and Old Swedish). The borderline cases, namely when the subjunctive is used in complement clauses of desiderative and directive predicates, should also be considered non-factual, rather than optative and hortative/jussive, it has been argued. The proposition is non-actual. Although these clauses according to Mattsson (1933: 96ff ) showed higher frequencies of the present subjunctive in Old Swedish than those after non-factive predicates (where the present indicative was preferred), they still differed from the optative and hortative/jussive main clauses, in the sense that they were not confined to the present tense. Mostly, the complement clauses followed the sequence of tenses, so that the tense of the matrix verb determined the tense of the subordinate verb (Mattson 1933: 96ff ). The remaining part of the chapter has been devoted to the propositional modality function of the Germanic indicative-subjunctive. It has been demonstrated that the indicative-subjunctive denotes different degrees of factuality in conditional clauses in configuration with tense. The past subjunctive denotes uncertainty and, alternatively, the counterfactual, whereas the pluperfect subjunctive solely denotes the counterfactual. It has been argued that the use of the past subjunctive in conditional clauses to denote uncertainty is more than compositional, since the past no longer has past time reference but is timeless. The past has grammaticalized into a modal marker together with the subjunctive. The present subjunctive is more or less ungrammatical in conditional protases, except in question formed conditionals in Icelandic, where it is obligatory. In particular, it has been demonstrated that there is a high level of agreement between factuality and indicative-subjunctive in complement clauses in the Germanic languages. Semifactive predicates select complements in the indicative, whereas nonfactive complements (can) select complements in the subjunctive. For Old Swedish, this was demonstrated by a corpus search. There is also some interesting variation in the Germanic languages. In German, there is a choice between the subjunctive or the indicative after verbs of saying which depends on whether or not the speaker accepts the truth of the proposition. In Icelandic, complements of verbs of hearing, reading, and negated verbs of perception etc. also vary depending on whether or not the speaker accepts the proposition as true. The overall pattern has been supported by data from the related Romance languages (the forms being cognates). As in Spanish, Icelandic also uses the subjunctive in complement clauses of factive emotive predicates. At a first glance, this may seem to go against the idea that the choice between the indicative and subjunctive depends on the factuality of the proposition, since factive complement clauses are logically presupposed to be true. As in the case of Spanish, however, the use of the subjunctive has been given an explanation that
Chapter 6. The Germanic indicative and subjunctive as propositional modality markers 147
is compatible with the non-factual analysis of the subjunctive. It has been pointed out that factive predicates often have an emotive-evaluative meaning and that the modal verb skulu is obligatory in these clauses in Icelandic (although not confined to the past tense). In English and Swedish, corresponding clauses with should and skola, respectively, suggest that the proposition is counter to the speakers expectations (the admirative). Lastly, it has been pointed out that German does not use the subjunctive in these constructions. To conclude, it has been shown and argued that the Germanic indicative-subjunctive distinction denotes the speaker’s attitude to the factuality of the proposition. In Chapter 8, it will be demonstrated in a similar manner that the Germanic complementizers that, if, and whether also denote factuality. First, however, the Germanic languages that do not have an indicative-subjunctive distinction must also be treated. So too must the other modality systems that exist in the Germanic languages, namely that of modal verbs and adverbials/particles, since these can also denote propositional modality and also pertain to the finite verb.
chapter
Modal markers and word order in the Germanic languages
In this chapter, other means in the Germanic languages of marking propositional modality than mood will be treated. Apart from the more obvious modal markers, it will also be shown that the past tense, word order, and phonological stress may play a role. Word order is of particular importance, as it connects the finite verb and complementizers in the Germanic languages through V1 and V2.
7.1 The modal past In the Mainland Scandinavian languages, Dutch, and English, the morphological indicative-subjunctive distinction is no longer productive. Albeit no longer a productive morphological marker on the verb, it could be argued that propositional modality is nevertheless still expressed on the verb in these languages. Apart from modal verbs and modal particles, which will be dealt with later, the past tense has developed a modal meaning. Among other things, it denotes the dubitative in conditional constructions: “the speaker indicates some doubt about the likelihood of the event” (Palmer 2001: 207), either in itself or together with the modal verb shall (i.e. should). English examples (Palmer 2001: 215; comments by the present author): (173) a. If John came, Bill would leave. b. If John should come, Bill will leave.
[dubitative] [dubitative]
Cf. c. If John comes, Bill will leave.
[hypothetical]
Corresponding Swedish examples: (174) a. Om John kom, så skulle Bill åka. b. Om John skulle komma, så åker Bill.
[dubitative] [dubitative]
Cf. c. Om John kommer, så åker Bill.
[hypothetical]
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The pluperfect denotes the counterfactual (the b-example is the Swedish counterpart of the a-example): (175) a. If John had come, Bill would have left. b. Om John hade kommit, så skulle Bill ha åkt. Clearly, neither the simple past nor the past form of shall denote past time in these examples. In these constructions, the past has grammaticalized into a dubitative marker. The pluperfect, on the other hand, may still have a temporal meaning. The reference time of the pluperfect lies in the past. The event time lies before the reference time but the event still has relevance at the reference time. At the utterance time, however, the event has no longer relevance. That together with the fact that conditional clauses refer to hypothetical events lead to the counterfactual interpretation1:
Event time potential
Reference time potential
Utterance time counterfactual
Figure 2. The counterfactual pluperfect
More options are available. Conditional constructions can of course also have past reference. If the speaker then wishes to convey a dubitative meaning, the pluperfect is used (SAG IV: 645ff ). The modal past also plays an important role for epistemic modal verbs. These will be dealt with in 7.6. Another kind of modal past is the polite or tentative past. In English, it is commonly used in requests (Palmer 2001: 220): (176) I wanted to ask you a question. There is an irrealis component to this. It implies that the proposition is not necessarily true at the moment of speaking. Swedish has a much more extensive use of the polite or tentative past. Apart from making a request more polite, it can be used to give an evaluative component to an utterance. It often expresses mild surprise towards the proposition (SAG IV: 226ff ): (177) Vad vackert det var här ute idag! what beautiful it was here outside today ‘How beautiful it is here today!’
1.
See Rosenkvist (2004: 51ff ) for a discussion along similar lines.
Chapter 7. Modal markers and word order in the Germanic languages 151
The polite past can also be used to make a statement more indirect when the information is already known (SAG IV: 228): (178) Då hade vi diskat då. then had we done.the.dishes then ‘OK, now we have done the dishes.’ As was pointed out in 6.1, there is a clear connection between the past and the Irrealis from a typological perspective (de Haan 2006: 51). This may be due to the fact that both denote dissociation or displacement, the first in the temporal dimension, the second in the dimension of reality (Steele 1975: 215ff ).
7.2 Verum focus and emphatic do-insertion Except for the restricted use of the past as a modal marker, there are other indications that the verb still has propositional modality as a functional category in the Germanic languages without mood markers. If the finite verb is phonologically stressed in a declarative clause (i.e. without modal morphemes), the truth of the proposition becomes asserted (the b-example is the Swedish counterpart of the a-example): (179) a. The authorities HAVE done all that they can. b. Myndigheterna HAR gjort allt de kan göra. The phenomenon, called verum focus (Mörnsjö 2002: 11), exists in the Germanic V2-languages. In English, it is available for auxiliaries. If no auxiliary is present, do is inserted (emphatic do-insertion): (180) I DID do it, you know! In a sense, emphatic do-insertion may be regarded as a particular lexicalization of propositional modality (plus tense and subject agreement). The stress, in turn, can be seen as an assertive marker, it asserts the truth of the proposition. In some grammatical descriptions (e.g. CGEL 97ff ), this kind of stress on the declarative finite verb is rather seen as an affirmative marker, in contrast to stress on the negation. However, that says little about the illocutionary force the stress carries with it. It is more than just affirmative; it asserts that the proposition is true. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that clause negation also involves do-insertion, albeit not necessarily stressed. Interestingly, clause-negation denotes that the proposition is not true, i.e. semantically Irrealis: (181) I didn’t do it! As was shown in 2.2.1, there is a typological connection between negation and Irrealis. In fact, WALS (462ff ) found 40 languages of 297 investigated where negation is accompanied
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Modality and Subordinators
by some kind of Irrealis (non-reality) marking. Thus both in clauses involving emphatic do-insertion and negative do-insertion, do can be seen as a marker of propositional modality (plus tense and subject agreement), Realis and Irrealis respectively. That the finite verb carries a propositional-modal value in the Germanic languages can also be seen when it is phonologically stressed in Irrealis contexts. Interestingly, the interpretation is radically different in protases of conditional clauses compared to declarative clauses (the b-example is the Swedish counterpart of the a-example): (182) a. If the authorities HAVE done all they can, then there’s no problem. b. HAR myndigheterna gjort allt som de kan, så är det inga problem. In these clauses, the meaning becomes dubitative. The finite verb clearly carries an Irrealis feature.
7.3 V2 and V1 as Realis and Irrealis The last two sections showed that the finite verb has features (morphological and phonological) that can be connected with propositional modality in the Germanic languages without mood marking. As was said in the introduction, the finite verb can also be connected with general subordinators, in the sense that they display a complementary syntactic distribution in the asymmetric Germanic V2-languages. Both can occupy the Complementizer position. Since this book explores the hypothesis that general subordinators should be subsumed under propositional modality, it is important to show that the V1 order in polar questions and conditional protases and the V2 order in declarative clauses and content questions can also be directly connected with propositional modality. There are several facts that indicate that this is indeed the case. The V1-order in polar questions and conditional protases (optional) is in complementary distribution with if and whether (the latter only in embedded polar questions). The common denominator between these clause types is that they are both notationally Irrealis. Polar questions are Irrealis in the sense that the truth of the proposition is unknown by the speaker (SAG IV: 730), whereas conditional protases are Irrealis in the sense that the proposition is hypothetical or counterfactual. An interesting observation as regards English polar questions is the fact that do-insertion applies when no other auxiliary is available, and, as was shown above, at least emphatic and negative do-insertion can be connected with propositional modality. As regards conditional protases, it is very interesting to note that in Icelandic, conditional protases in the present tense cannot be in the subjunctive if the word order is subordinator – subject – finite verb, but must be in the subjunctive when the word order is V1 (IT III: 470; see 6.2.1 above). As will be argued in the next chapter, this is because Irrealis can either be marked by the subordinator or by the subjunctive. In the V1-case, the verb is raised to the Complementizer position, the position that is identified with propositional modality in the present framework. V1 in polar questions and conditional protases in the
Chapter 7. Modal markers and word order in the Germanic languages 153
Germanic languages can thus be connected with propositional modality, Irrealis in particular. Another clause type that displays V12 in the Germanic languages is the imperative one. Recall that the imperative is typologically often associated with the Irrealis, since the event the clause refers to is non-actualized. As was said in 3.1, verb-raising should be seen as a phonological process, conditioned by the affixal character of functional categories. In the Icelandic case, verb-raising in conditional protases is clearly conditioned by the subjunctive. In the Germanic languages that have lost a morphological subjunctive, the association can be thought to be between the verb and a null affix. Alternatively, one could see the raised verb itself as a marker of propositional modality. This is clearly the case with do, which is inserted in English main polar questions without auxiliaries only to meet the V1-criterion. Since V2 also involves verb-raising to the Complementizer position in the asymmetric V2-languages, this should by the same reasoning also be seen as a marker of propositional modality. V2 is the unmarked declarative order (plus the order of content questions, which are presupposed; see below), so from a semantic point of view, it could be associated with the Realis. However, the actual verb-raising in V2-clauses is by no means different from the verb-raising in V1-clauses. The only formal difference between the two types is the fact that the V2-order includes a constituent to the left of the finite verb. Thus, the marking of the Irrealis, as opposed to the Realis, is done indirectly (through the lack of a constituent to the left of the raised verb). The actual word orders have lexicalized into denoting that distinction. Note that in the Old Scandinavian and Old West Germanic languages, V1 was not confined to polar questions and conditional protases, but could also occur in declarative clauses (Wessén 1956: 199, van der Waal & Quak 1994: 105). When it was later lost in declarative clauses, it arguably became the sign of polar-interrogative and conditional clauses, i.e. Irrealis clauses. Since the V2-languages invariably place the finite verb in the Complementizer position in declarative main clauses (there are certain interesting exceptions that will be treated below), these are less interesting than English, which only displays V2 in certain marked contexts. Furthermore, as it is typically the auxiliary that is raised, this also involves do-insertion. V2 is obligatory in English when certain oblique constituents are fronted (CGEL 94ff ): – – –
negative constituents: wh-constituents: so-, such-constituents:
– –
only-constituents: little
Not one of them did she find useful. What did she tell you? So little time did we have that we had to cut corners. Such a fuzz would he make that we’d all agree. Only two of them did she find useful. Little did she know that this would be the end.
2. Clauses with narrative inversion and diary drop, however, are not relevant, since these are arguably declarative V2-clauses with an omitted theme in the first position.
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Note that the fronted constituent is focus; indeed only is a restrictive focussing adverbial. Note also that the rest of the clause is either presupposed (the content question) or asserted (the other examples). It appears that the auxiliary raising (alt. do-insertion) either signals presupposition or assertion in these cases3. The content question forms an interesting contrast to the polar question. In the polar question, the truth of the proposition is unknown, whereas it is presupposed in the content question. It would have been infelicitous to ask ‘What did p’ when one does not know if p happened (SAG IV: 744). Thus, in the polar question, the auxiliary raising lexicalizes Irrealis, whereas in the content question, it lexicalizes Realis. In conclusion, finite-verb raising to the C-position can clearly be connected with propositional modality. To be more precise, V1 can be connected with Irrealis, whereas V2 in English can be connected with Realis (both presupposed and asserted propositions are factual).
7.4 Negative polarity-sensitive items and the Irrealis Polar questions, conditional protases, negation, and V1 in polar questions and conditional protases inevitably lead to the issue of licensing of polarity-sensitive items. Interestingly, CGEL shows that negative polarity sensitive items such as yet, any and ever can occur not only in negative, polar-interrogative, and conditional clauses but also in complement clauses of matrix predicates expressing denial, doubt, and counter-expectation (CGEL 835ff ): (183) a. b. c. d. e. f. g.
She sees him *any longer. She does not see him any longer. Do you need me any longer? If you play any longer, you’ll get too tired. My client denies that he ever said any such thing. That they will ever have a better opportunity is very much to be doubted. It astounds me that they took any notice of him.
The same holds for Swedish någonsin ‘ever’ and ens ‘even’. Corpus searches on Språkbankens konkordanser reveal that these polarity-sensitive items can also occur after predicates of uncertainty, determination and forgetting: (184) a. Man vågar *ens be om revansch nu. One dares even ask for revenge now b. Vågar man ens be om revansch nu? ‘Does one even dare to ask for revenge now?’
(GP 04)
3. The constructions with a negated constituent and little are interesting. Both mean that the proposition is not true, but are constructed in such a way that the speaker is not negating the proposition but only the focused constituent. Little is of course also an understatement.
Chapter 7. Modal markers and word order in the Germanic languages 155
c. om det någonsin blir ett färdigförhandlat protokoll så kommer det att se mycket annorlunda ut än vad EU från början hade tänkt sig. (GP 01) ‘If there will ever be a protocol that everybody agrees on, it will look very different from what EU originally had in mind.’ d. Mannen förnekar att han någonsin skulle ha misshandlat sin dotter. (GP 04) ‘The man denies that he ever has abused his daughter.’ e. Han... tvivlar på att ens författaren själv vet vad till exempel vissa av texterna på Street legal från 1978 handlar om. (GP 03) ‘He... doubts that even the author himself knows what e.g. some of the lyrics on Street legal from 1978 are about.’ f. Det förvånar mig att man ens diskuterar saken. (GP 04) ‘It surprises me that they even discuss the matter.’ g. Om det någonsin postades är oklart. (GP 01) ‘Whether it was ever posted is unclear.’ h. – Vi kommer snabbt att fatta beslut om det ens behövs. (GP 04) ‘We will quickly make a decision whether it is needed at all.’ i. i kontakt med henne glömde man att det ens existerar något som kallas för kulturkrockar. (GP 01) ‘in her company one forgot that there even exists such a thing called cultural clashes.’ CGEL calls these contexts non-affirmative or non-assertive. As for non-affirmative, it is hard to see in what way interrogative, conditional, counter-expectational, and determinative constructions have anything to do with the negative. Nor does the term nonassertive capture the mechanism behind licensing of polarity sensitive items, since there are arguably many non-assertive clauses that cannot license negative polarity sensitive items, such as speculative and potential ones. Rather, what all these clauses have in common is that they are semantically Irrealis (uncertain, hypothetical, negative, dubitative, counter-expectational (admirative)); indeed, they would display the subjunctive in languages such as Spanish. Thus it could be argued that these “negative” polarity items are licensed by Irrealis contexts4. Again, content questions form an interesting contrast to polar questions. As was said above, content questions are semantically Realis; the truth of the proposition is presupposed. Consequently, they cannot normally licence “negative” polarity items. It is only possible when the question is a rhetorical one or an exclamation (Christer Platzack, p.c.). Typically in these cases, the underlying meaning is that the proposition is not true: (185) a. How come you like her *much? b. Who cares much about it, anyway?
(CGEL 834) (CGEL 835)
4. See Levinson (2006) for similar arguments and Giannakidou (1998), who relates polarity sensitivity to veridicality. See also Brandtler (forthcoming), for a more detailed investigation of polarity-sensitive items and clause types.
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c. Hur mycket är ??ens klockan? how much is even the.clock d. vem har någonsin tidigare mött exempelvis ett resonemang om “postmodern arkitektur” i en ungdomsroman? ‘who has ever before come across e.g. a discussion on “postmodern architecture” in a youth novel?’ (GP 04) As regards the V1-order in general, it is interesting to note that imperative clauses do not licence negative polarity-sensitive items. Recall that Chafe (1995) argued that the notational Realis-Irrealis distinction is not a binary but a gradient dimension. Imperative and future can be judged to be more in accord with the reality for the speaker than the negative and polar interrogative. Therefore, imperative and future clauses are in the realis mood in Caddo (contrary to the general typological pattern), whereas negative and polar-interrogative clauses are in the irrealis mood. Prohibitives, on the other hand, are less in accord with the reality for the speaker than the imperative, and are therefore in the irrealis mood in Caddo. In a similar way, prohibitives, as opposed to imperatives, licence negative polarity-sensitive items in English and Swedish: (186) Don’t even think about it! To recapitulate, there are phonological (verum focus), lexical (modal past, do-insertion) and syntactic means (V1, V2) for the verb to express propositional modality in the Germanic languages without mood markers. Verum focus asserts the truth of the proposition in declarative clauses and calls it into question (dubitative) in conditional clauses. Verum focus is also associated with do-insertion in English (emphatic do-insertion). Do-insertion, in turn, is further associated with propositional modality. It occurs in negative contexts and in polar questions, both Irrealis contexts. Other contexts where do-insertion applies are focus-fronting constructions, including content questions. These are notationally Realis, in the sense that the proposition is presupposed or asserted as factual. Especially significant for the hypothesis explored, both polar questions and focus-fronting constructions involve verb-raising to the Complementizer position in English, the syntactic position which the present investigation identifies with propositional modality. Another clause type which alternatively permits verb-raising is the conditional protasis. Interestingly, the conditional protasis has many similarities with the polar question: both are Irrealis, both are introduced by the same subordinator (if), and both display V1. The fact that Irrealis clauses display V1 throughout the Germanic languages and presupposed Realis clauses display V2 in English makes it possible to connect V1 with Irrealis and V2 with Realis, at least as far as the Germanic languages are concerned. Imperative clauses, which also display V1 are also notationally Irrealis in the sense that the event is non-actualized (although they are arguably more in accord with the reality for the speaker than polar-interrogatives and prohibitives; Chafe 1995).
Chapter 7. Modal markers and word order in the Germanic languages 157
The division between negative clauses, polar questions and conditional protases on the one hand (Irrealis) and content questions and certain contrastive-focus constructions on the other (Realis) is further supported by the distribution of “negative” polarity items. These are clearly confined to the former group and certain other Irrealis contexts, namely of counter-expectation, doubt, denial, uncertainty, and deciding.
7.5 V2 in that-clauses Among other topics, 7.3 dealt with V2 in main clauses in the Germanic languages and showed that V2 can be connected with Realis. As is well known, V2 is also marginally possible in that-clauses in the asymmetric V2 languages. Interestingly, this can also be connected with propositional modality and constitutes a further connection between propositional modality and general subordinators (complementizers). As with the choice between indicative and subjunctive, the possibility of having V2 in that-clauses depends upon the factivity of the matrix predicate. The most interesting Germanic language in this respect is German. In German, V2 is the common word order in dass-clauses after non-factive verbs of saying and belief, e.g. sagen, glauben, denken, meinen. Strikingly, this is also accompanied by dassomission and, in formal language, the subjunctive5. It indicates that the speaker is reserved in regard to the truth of the proposition. If the speaker wishes to indicate that s/he accepts it as true, subordinate clause topology (verb final), dass, and the indicative are used instead (Eisenberg 1994: 377, Palmer 2001: 114): (187) a. Er sagt, er müsse nach Hause. he says he must.subj to house ‘He says he must go home.’ Cf. b. Er sagt, dass er nach Hause muss. he says that he to house must.ind This pattern can be analysed in the following way: when the speaker is inclined to accept the truth of the proposition, both dass and the indicative are used, since both denote the unmarked value Realis. When the speaker is reserved in regard to the truth of the proposition, the subjunctive is used to indicate non-factuality (Irrealis). In this case, dass tends to be omitted. The fact that these two phenomena (dass-omission and the subjunctive) coincide with V2 supports the idea that complementizers also denote propositional modality. The subjunctive-inflected verb takes the place of the complementizer.
5. In informal language, the verb can be in the past subjunctive, but is typically in the indicative (present or past).
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The German pattern has a parallel in the mood-less, West Germanic language Frisian. Frisian can also have V2 in dat-clauses after verbs of saying and belief, and in these cases, it is also possible to omit dat (Hoekstra & Tiersma 1994: 524). In the Scandinavian languages, the situation is different. V2 in at(t)-clauses also occurs after semi-factive and even factive predicates. Julien (2007) conducted corpus searches for Norwegian and Swedish and found that V2 is most frequent after predicates of saying, knowledge and belief. Julien also found some examples of V2 after factive predicates, e.g. tenke på ‘think about’ and glemme ‘forget’. After predicates of doubt, denial and impossibility, she found no instances of V2. In fact, V2 is ungrammatical after these predicates (Julien 2007: 120; Norwegian examples): (188) a. Jeg tviler på at slike konserter faktisk hjelper mot volden. I doubt on that such concerts actually help against the.violence ‘I doubt that concerts like that actually have an effect on the violence.’ b. *Jeg tviler på at slike konserter hjelper faktisk mot volden. I doubt on that such concerts help actually against the.violence In agreement with Hooper & Thompson’s (1973) and Hooper’s (1975) idea that declarative complement clauses can denote different degrees of assertion, Julien (2007) argues that V2 in at(t)-clauses can be connected with assertion. As was stated in 2.3.2, the present investigation adopts Cristofaro’s (2003) and Searle’s (1969) analysis of assertion as a main clause phenomenon and not as a notion that can be expressed by complement clauses, since complement clauses are not independent utterances. Furthermore, in accordance with Palmer (1986), the present study does not subscribe to the idea that there can be different degrees of asserting, from a weak one, based on belief, to a strong one, based on knowledge. As regards constructions involving assertive predicates such as assert or claim, it is clear that the proposition expressed in the complement clause is asserted when the speech-act verb is in the 1st person and present tense. However, the actual assertive marker is the speech-act verb; the complement clause does not in itself constitute an assertion, but merely a proposition (Searle 1969: 30). That said, it must be acknowledged that the Scandinavian complement clauses in question are special, since they have main-clause topology, i.e. have the form of independent utterances (assertions). Furthermore, they have the same prosodic contour as declarative main clauses (Roll 2006). The speaker is animating or reproducing an assertion. This may even be his/her own statement (Norwegian example from Julien 2007: 119): (189) Så jeg bare sier at det kan jeg ikke gjøra. so I just say that it can I not do ‘So I’m simply telling you that I can’t do that.’
Chapter 7. Modal markers and word order in the Germanic languages 159
When the subject and the speaker is not the same person, it is somebody else’s assertion that the subject is reproducing. Interestingly, an identical6 search as the one that Julien performed for Swedish in Språkbanken’s Parole Corpus7 reveals that many of the attclauses with V2 after verbs of saying, hearing, and thinking are within quotation marks: (190) a. I piketen sade poliserna att “du kan inte göra något, in the.police.van said the.policemen that you can not do anything vi säger bara att du var aspackad”. we say just that you were pissed ‘In the police van, the policemen said that “you can’t do anything, we’ll just say that you were pissed.’ b. Man tänker att “det händer inte mig”. one thinks that it happen not me ‘On thinks that “It won’t happen to me”.’ These are clearly instances of reproduced speech (verbal or mental). Interestingly, quotation marks are sometimes also found after non-reportative predicates: (191) a. Nyliberalismen definieras bl a som uppfattningen att neoliberalism is.defined among.other.things as the.oppinion that “en majoritet har inte rätt att omfördela äganderätter i ett a majority has not right to redistribute ownerships in a samhälle”. society ‘Neoliberalism is among other things defined as the opinion that a majority does not have the right to redistribute ownerships in a society.’ b. ...även om Danmark bestämmer sig för att “vi sneglar inte på even if Denmark decides refl for that we glance not on grannarna”. the.neighbours ‘... even if Denmark decides that “we don’t glance at our neighbours”.’ Even when the att-clauses are not within quotation marks, many of the V2 clauses could be perceived as instances of reproduced speech. Often, the subject of the att-clause is in first person or the verb is in the present tense, sometimes even in conflict with the matrix clause: (192) a. så dom sa att vi kan inte ta honom och tvinga honom tillbaka so they said that we can not take him and force him back ‘so they said that we cannot take him and force him back.’ 6.
Julien does not list all the data generated in her investigation.
7. With the search string ‘[word=”att” & msd=”CSS”] [ ] [msd=”V@IPAS”] “inte”’ with up to two empty brackets.
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b. Jag sa åt henne att du behöver inte träffa din syster. I said part her that you need not see your sister ‘I told her that you need not see your sister.’ All these clauses may be seen as instances of reproduced speech. In contrast to the German and Frisian complement clauses with V2, which are non-factual, these clauses are presented as factual, at least as far as the original speaker is concerned. Therefore, V2 can be connected with Realis in these clauses. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that at(t) must be spelled out in these constructions, in contrast to the German and Frisian that-clauses with V2 above. Since the hypothesis explored in the present investigation states that that is factual (and potential), the fact that it has a stronger position in the Scandinavian V2-clauses is to be expected.
7.6 Modal verbs According to researchers such as Palmer (2001) and Mattsson (1933), the subjunctive has been replaced by modal verbs in languages such as English and Swedish. As for the non-factuality function of the subjunctive (propositional modality), arguably its main function, this corresponds to epistemic and evidential auxiliaries in the modal system. In Swedish, English, and German, the following epistemic and evidential modal verbs and functions can be distinguished (SAG Ch. 32, Palmer 1986, 2001, CGEL 3.9, GDS F5; labels are taken from Palmer 2001): –
Speculative (epistemic possibility): Swedish: kan-kunde English: may-might, could German: kann-könnte, mag-möchte, dürfte
(193) a. Kronan kan komma att devalveras igen. (SAG IV: 299) ‘The Swedish crown may be devalued again.’ b. John may be in his office. (Palmer 2001: 26) c. Mary could be at the school by now. (Palmer 2001: 32) d. ... aber diese Liebe kann sehr innig, sehr leidenschaftlich sein... (GDS 1888) ‘...but this love may be very deep, very emotional…’ e. Er dürfte krank gewesen sein. (Palmer 1986: 63) ‘He might well have been ill.’ –
Deductive: Swedish: måste, måtte, bör-borde, skulle English: must, ought to, should German: muss-müsste
(194) a. Han måste vara lycklig nu. ‘He must be happy now.’
(SAG IV: 308)
Chapter 7. Modal markers and word order in the Germanic languages 161
b. Det måtte ha regnat mycket här. (SAG IV: 306) ‘It must have rained a lot here.’ c. John must be in his office. (Palmer 2001: 28) d. Mary ought to/should be at school by now. (adapted from Palmer 2001: 32) e. Er muss krank gewesen sein. (Palmer 1986: 58) ‘He must have been ill.’ –
Assumptive: Swedish: lär, torde, ska-skulle English: will-would, should German: sollte
(195) a. Några mål på hörnor lär det inte bli. any goals on corners will it not be ‘There won’t be any goals made from corners.’
(SAG IV: 305)
b. Det ska ligga ett fotoalbum i den här lådan (minns jag). it shall lie a photo.album in this here drawer remember I ‘There should be a photo album in this drawer (I remember).’ (SAG IV: 314) c. Mary will/would be at the school by now. (adapted from Palmer 2001: 32) d. Your passport should be in the drawer. (CGEL: 179) e. Das Bier sollte kalt sein. (Heine 1995: 27) ‘The Bier should be cold.’ –
Concessive: Swedish: må-måtte English: may-might German: mag-möchte
(196) a. Vem han än må vara, så tänker jag tala med honom. who he ever may be res.pron intend I talk with him ‘Whoever he may be, I intend to talk to him.’ (SAG IV: 306)
–
b. He may be rich, but he’s not very lucky.
(Palmer 2001: 31)
c. Er mag noch so gescheit sein... aber... he may ever so intelligent be but ‘He may be intelligent, but...
(Palmer 2001: 31)
Reported (reportative): Swedish lär, ska-skulle German soll-sollte, will-wollte
(197) a. Hon lär ha studerat i Heidelberg. ‘She is said to have studied in Heidelberg.’ b. Han ska ha varit en mycket duktig violinist. ‘He is said to have been a very good violinist.’
(SAG IV: 305) (SAG IV: 313)
162 Modality and Subordinators
c. Er soll steinreich sein. ‘He is said to be very rich.’ d. Er will eine Mosquito abgeschossen haben. ‘He claims to have shut down a Mosquito (plane).’ –
(Palmer 1986: 72) (Palmer 1986: 72)
Hypothetical: Swedish: skulle English: should German: sollte
(198) a. Men jag skulle publicera samma material omigen i dag. (SAG IV: 315) ‘But I would publish the same material again today.’ b. Det är inte särskilt sannolikt att någon skulle bete sig så nuförtiden. ‘It is not very likely that anyone would act like that nowadays.’ c. If John should come, Bill will leave. (Palmer 2001: 215) d. Sollten Sie Probleme haben, helfen wir Ihnen gern. (GDS 1894) ‘If you should have any problem, we would be glad to help you.’ All the modal verbs above clearly denote different degrees of factuality. As was said in 2.1.3, there are also modal morphemes in the languages of the world that denote deontic and dynamic modality (event modality). However, Bybee (1985) argues that deontic and dynamic modality should not be included in the same functional category as epistemic-evidential modality and the subjunctive. Event modality is event- and agent related, whereas the subjunctive and epistemic-evidential modality have scope over and determine the whole proposition. It was also proposed in 2.2.4 that event modality has the possibility of assigning thematic roles to the subject, e.g. maleficiary (must, shall), beneficiary (may), or experiencer (want, can; see Abraham 2002: 38ff for a similar analysis). Thus, event modality belongs to the derivational domain rather than the inflectional one. Nevertheless, as was said in 2.1.3, the deontic and dynamic modal verbs seem to belong to the same formal system as the epistemic and evidential modal verbs do in the Germanic languages. Many of the modal can express both functions, namely the following: – – – –
Swedish: måste, kunna, skola, må, böra English: must, can, shall, may, ought German: dürfen, können, mögen, müssen, sollen, wollen Dutch: kunnen, mogen, moeten, zullen, willen, hoeven
This might be taken as an indication that propositional and event modality belong to the same functional (super-)category (as is assumed in Palmer 2001). On the other hand, as was said in 2.1.3, there is a plausible explanation for the fact that many modal verbs denote both event and propositional modality which is compatible with the idea that the two modalities represent different functional
Chapter 7. Modal markers and word order in the Germanic languages 163
categories. Traugott (1989) and Bybee et al (1994) argue that many modal verbs have both meanings because epistemic-evidential verbs often develop from deontic-dynamic verbs (and not the other way around) through grammaticalization. Since it has been observed and generalized8 that the grammaticalization process goes from more lexical and less grammatical (functional) to less lexical and more grammatical (Hopper and Traugott 2003), this suggests that the epistemic-evidential versions of the modal verbs belong to a more peripheral functional category than the deonticdynamic ones. As was said in 2.1.3, the idea that the epistemic-evidential versions of the modal verbs belong to a more peripheral functional category than the deontic-dynamic ones is supported by the fact that the epistemic-evidential, deontic and dynamic verbs can be constructed with each other in Swedish and German. Innermost are the dynamic ones, and if a verb is epistemic-evidential, it is always the outermost one (constructed examples): (199) a. De måste/ måtte/ lär/ bör/ torde/ skulle/ ska kunna they must/ must/ ought.to/ ought.to/ would/ should/ is.said be.able.to få vilja göra det. be.allowed.to want.to do it b. Die müssen/ können/ mögen/ dürfte/ sollen es machen wollen/ they must/ could/ may/ might/ is.said it do want.to/ können. be.able.to The same is true for Dutch. De Schutter (1994: 472) states that epistemic verbs precedes deontic ones which, in turn, precede dynamic ones: (200) Ze zal het ook nog moeten kunnen doen. it shall she also still must can do ‘It is probable that she also has to get the opportunity to do it.’ Note that in these languages, syntactic scope corresponds to semantic scope. The epistemic-evidential meanings have scope over the deontic-dynamic ones. There is at least one exception to the generalization that epistemic-evidential verbs are always outmost. In Swedish, the hypothetical skulle can also be constructed with the speculative kunna (i.e. skulle kunna; SAG IV: 303ff ). Another piece of evidence that the Germanic epistemic verbs represent a more peripheral functional category that has scope over the whole proposition is the fact
8.
This generalization has partly been criticized; see Hopper & Traugott (2003: 130ff ).
164 Modality and Subordinators
that they can be paraphrased by predicates that take the whole proposition as its complement (SAG IV: 283; see the translation for English examples): (201) a. Det kan börja regna när som helst. ‘It may start to rain any minute now.’ = Det är möjligt att det börjar regna när som helst. ‘It is possible that it will start to rain any minute now.’ b. Hon bör vara framme nu. ‘She should be there by now.’ = Det är troligt att hon är framme nu. ‘It is likely that she is there by now.’ On the other hand, this is also true for the deontic verbs (the b-example is the Swedish counterpart of the a-example): (202) a. You must arrive in time. = It is mandatory that you arrive in time. b. Du måste komma i tid. = Det är nödvändigt att du kommer i tid. Still, there is also the possibility in English to paraphrase deontic examples with a nonfinite construction (for-to), which suggests that deontic modality has narrow scope (being a non-finite category). This is also true for dynamic modality but, crucially, not for epistemic modality: (203) a. You must arrive in time. = It is mandatory (for you) to arrive in time. b. She could come. = It was possible for her to come. c. She could be there by now. ≠??It is possible for her to be there by now. There is also evidence to suggest that epistemic and evidential modal verbs represent more peripheral functional categories than tense, whereas deontic and dynamic modal verbs are more central than tense. Generally, Germanic epistemic and evidential verbs cannot be non-finite, whereas deontic and dynamic can in e.g. German, Dutch and Mainland Scandinavian (Abraham 2003, Plank 1984). Consider the following constructed examples from Swedish: (204) a. att skola/ böra/ kunna/ må göra ngt to have.to/ have.to/ be.able.to/ be.allowed.to do sth [can only be interpreted as event modal] b. att få/ vilja göra ngt to be.allowed.to/ want.to do sth
[are only event modal]
c. att *töra/ *lära göra ngt [are only propositional modal] to be.likely/ ought to/be.said.to do sth This generalization is not entirely true. As was shown above, Swedish speculative kunna can be non-finite when constructed with the hypothetical skulle (skulle kunna).
Chapter 7. Modal markers and word order in the Germanic languages 165
Furthermore, in Norwegian, there are apparently many epistemic-evidential modals that can be non-finite in impersonal passive constructions (Eide 2005: 22). An interesting consequence of the tendency for epistemic-evidential modal verbs to be finite is the fact that speculative kunna ‘can’ occurs to the left of the perfect auxiliary ha ‘have’ in Swedish, whereas the dynamic version occurs to the right of it. Furthermore, epistemic måste ‘must’ occurs to the left of ha, whereas deontic måste can occur on either side, depending on semantic scope: (205) a. Både aktören och publiken måste ha anat att detta var en konstutövning som troligen skulle misslyckas med sitt ärende. (GP 01) ‘Both the actor and the audience must have suspected that this was a art practice that would fail its aim.’ b. Antaganden om tillväxt har måst skrivas ned gång på gång. (GP 01) ‘Assumptions that there will be growth have needed to be written down time after time.’ c. Du måste ha fyllt 20 år för att föra in alkohol. (GP 01) ‘You must have reached 20 years to be able to bring in alcohol.’ d. Banken kan ha agerat innan jag blev inkopplad. (GP 04) ‘The bank may have acted before I was called in’ e. Flitiga veckotidningsläsare har kunnat ana vad som var i görningen. (GP 04) ‘Diligent readers of weekly magazines have been able to guess what there was brewing in the wind.’ Indeed, according to Eide (2005: 301), throughout the Germanic languages, modals occurring to the left of the perfect auxiliary typically receive an epistemic-evidential reading, whereas modals occurring to the right are almost always deontic-dynamic. Again, Norwegian seems to be somewhat freer in respect to the epistemic-evidential versions. Standard Norwegian shows the same pattern as in Swedish, but in some Norwegian dialects, epistemic-evidential modals can occur as past participials according to Eide (2005: 22ff ). Furthermore, in Swedish, speculative kunna can occur as a past participial in counterfactual constructions (hade kunnat; SAG IV: 303ff ). This is also true for epistemic modals in general in Norwegian (Eide 2005: 23ff ). There is yet another important point to be made in relation to tense. The dynamic and most of the deontic modals in the Germanic languages (except English could and might) can be used in the past tense to refer to past events (Palmer 2001: 76,79ff ). This interpretation is not available for the epistemic modals. The difference between present and past tense is instead strictly of a modal kind, namely one of greater tentativeness, lesser commitment (Palmer 2001: 31). The relevant pairs here are deductive bör-borde in Swedish; speculative may-might and assumptive will-would in English; speculative mag-möchte and kann-könnte in German: (206) a. Stockholmståget borde vara här när som helst. ‘The Stockholm train should be here at any time now.’
(SAG IV: 292)
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b. Mary might be at the school by now. c. Mary would be at the school by now.
(Palmer 2001: 32) (ibid)
d. Man möchte meinen, dass... one might.subj think that ‘One might think that...’
(ibid)
e. Er könnte krank sein. he could.subj ill be ‘He could be ill.’
(ibid)
This suggests that epistemic modality lies outside the scope of tense as a functional category. The original past tense form has grammaticalized into a modal one (modal past). Importantly, the past variants are in the subjunctive in German. This strengthens the connection between the past form and non-factuality. Interestingly, some epistemic and evidential verbs do not have different tense forms, but are invariably either present or past; there is, e.g. no past tense form of Swedish lär ‘ought to, be said to’. In particular, many epistemic and evidential verbs are invariably in the past tense, the present form being deontic or dynamic: hypothetical skulle, should and sollte; speculative could and dürfte (note, past subjunctive). This offers an explanation for the grammaticalization of some of the deontic-dynamic verbs into epistemic-evidential ones in the Germanic languages. The epistemic-evidential verbs have developed from the deontic-dynamic ones through the modal past. Skola and shall are particularly telling here, since they have also developed into future auxiliaries in Swedish and English. Again, the development from event to epistemic modality seems to be through tense. Lastly, it must be said that some epistemic-evidential verbs do not have an alternative deontic-dynamic meaning in Swedish. These are the reportative/assumptive lär and the assumptive torde.
7.7 Modal particles On the side of the modal verbs, there are many free particles or adverbs in the Germanic languages that carry epistemic and evidential meanings. All of these will not be dealt with here, but there is a particular set of particles that is of special interest, namely those that are derived from modal verbs: maybe in English; kanske, kanhända and måhända in Swedish (all meaning ‘maybe’). As can be seen, these are derived from may be, kan ske ‘can happen’, kan hända ‘can happen’, and må hända ‘may happen’. In Early Modern Swedish, kan ske and kan hända functioned as speculative predicates that selected at-clauses (SAOB: K 383, K 351, M 1777): (207) a. Kan skee at loseph är oss gramse. can happen that Josef is us grudgy ‘It may be the case that Josef bears a grudge against us.’
Chapter 7. Modal markers and word order in the Germanic languages 167
b. Kan henda at thet ena ryktet är kommet aff thet andra. can happen that the one rumour is come of the other ‘It may be the case that one rumour comes from the other.’ c. Må henda at Herren seer til mijn bedröffuelse. may happen that the.Lord sees to my despair ‘It may be the case that the Lord sees me in my despair.’ Alternatively, the combinations also seem to have functioned as parenthetical insertions in main clauses, which may have led to their incorporation in the clause and reanalysis as particles (SAOB K 383). In fact, in Icelandic, the same construction functions as an intermediate stage between a speculative predicate that selects a complement clause and a speculative main clause. It should also be noted that kannski licences the subjunctive (Sigurðsson 2008: 11): (208) Kannski (að) hún komi hingað. maybe that she comes.sub here ‘[It] May be [that] she will come here.’ What is so interesting about these particles is the fact that the highly frequent kanske and sometimes even the less frequent kanhända seem to be able to take the place of the finite verb in Swedish, leaving the finite verb in the verb phrase as in subordinate clauses: (209) a. Han kanske bara inte hann ta av sig sovluvan, (GP 01) he maybe just not had.time take off himself the.nightcap ‘Maybe he just didn’t have time to take his nightcap off,’ b. Det kanhända inte är intressant just nu, it maybe not is interesting right now ‘Maybe it isn’t interesting right now,’ (Norén, C. “Ramgång i säljandet”: luur.lub.lu.se/luur?func=downloadFile&fileOId=26726) With kanske, this even occurs in apodoses of conditional and related constructions: (210) a. Om du hämtar ett nytt barn kanske du blir bättre. if you fetch a new child maybe you get better ‘If you fetch a new child, maybe, you will get better.’
(GP 01)
b. Försök med den här adressen så kanske du kan finna någon try with this here address then maybe you can find some bra fortsättningsadress (GP 01) good continuing.address. ‘Try with this address. Maybe then, you can find some good continuing address.’ Recall that Stroh-Wollin (2002) considers this ability of kanske and kanhända to occur in the finite-verb position to be a syntactic indication that epistemic possibility and the
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indicative-subjunctive belong to the same functional category (“finiteness-modal” in Stroh-Wollin 2002; propositional modality in the present framework). This functional category denotes the Realis-Irrealis distinction, Stroh-Wollin argues. Important for the present investigation, Stroh-Wollin also includes the German complementizers that and if in the category, since they, as has already been pointed out, stand in complementary syntactic distribution with the finite verb in the Germanic (asymmetric) V2 languages. Kanske, kanhända and also måhända actually display yet another special topological characteristic. They often appear clause initially. Since Swedish is a V2 language, this should be followed by inversion, which is also often the case. However, there is also the possibility of leaving the finite verb in the verb phrase. In this case, the particle again seems to have taken the place of the finite verb, but yielding a V1-like structure, and V1 can, as was shown above, be connected with Irrealis: (211) a. Kanske han inte kommer att tycka att det är lika roligt om maybe he not will to think that it is equally funny in tio-femton år. (GP 01) ten-fifteen years ‘Maybe he will not find it equally fun in ten, fifteen years.’ b. Kanhända du har rätt i det, maybe you have right in that ‘Maybe you are right,’
(GP 01)
c. Måhända hon är blyg, maybe she is shy ‘It may be that she is shy,’
(GP 02)
It could be argued that these constructions consist of a speculative predicate and a complement clause with a deleted att (as in the Early Modern Swedish examples in 207). On the other hand, it should be retorted that the construction is also found in clauses that normally are question-formed, namely polite imperatives and questions (SAOB K 383): (212) a. Kanske det inte sitter riktigt ännu? maybe it not sit really yet ‘Maybe it isn’t quite there yet?’
(GP 01)
b. Kanske du skulle ta och rekrytera honom som PR-chef till maybe you should take and recruit him as PR-chief to The Empire? The Empire ‘Maybe you should recruit him as PR chief at The Empire?’ (GP 01)
Chapter 7. Modal markers and word order in the Germanic languages 169
c. Kanhända du skulle vilja hjälpa mig? maybe you should want help me ‘Maybe you would like to help me?’
(SAOB: K 351)
Here, att-insertion is less well-formed. It is clear that kanske and kanhända are particles that belong to the clause. In some cases, kanske and kanhända even seem to introduce protasis-like clauses: (213) Eller kanske du inte vill smutsa ner kläderna när du fått punka or maybe you not want soil down the.clothes when you get flat.tire på väg till festen? Då är det bara att ringa larmnumret on way to the.party then is it just to call the.emergency.number så kommer hjälp och byter däcket! (GP 02) than come help and change the.tire ‘Or maybe you don’t want to soil your clothes on the way to the party? Then, you can just call the emergency number and help will come and change the tyre!’ The plausible explanation for this pattern is that kanske and kanhända are particles that denote the potential. Therefore, they may occupy the syntactic position that is responsible for marking the factuality of the proposition, namely the position of the finite verb in main clauses in V2 languages and the complementizers in subordinate clauses (i.e. Complementizer within the framework of Generative Grammar). The fact that they have modal-verb origin most likely also plays a part, since potential adverbs such as möjligt ‘possible’ cannot occur is this position. Another set of modal particles that needs to be treated are German and Swedish modal particles such ja/ju, denn/då, and väl/wohl. What makes these particles unique is that they not only signal the speaker’s attitude towards the truth of the proposition but also his/her assumptions about the listener’s knowledge (Abraham 2009: 12). In that respect, they are reminiscent of the use of the subjunctive in Spanish to indicate common knowledge or old information. What makes them different from the Spanish subjunctive is that they also tend to signal an appeal for consent, which is a speech-act notion. The typical meaning of ja and ju is to signal that the proposition is common knowledge, presupposed (‘as we all know’, ‘as you know’; Abraham 2009: 12, SAG IV: 114). (214) a. Haider soll ja betrunken gewesen sein. Haider was.said part drunk be.ppl be ‘Haider was, as we all know, said to have been drunk.’ b. Sven har ju arbetat här i tre år nu. Sven has part worked here in three years now ‘Sven has, as we all know, worked here for three years now.’
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In this sense, it can also signal an appeal to the listener for consent (‘right?’): (215) Ni vet ju alla varför vi har samlats. you know part all why we have gathered ‘You all know why we are gathered here, right?’ German ja can also have an admirative (surprise) function in exclamative clauses. A somewhat similar function is fulfilled by denn in exclamative content questions (examples from Abraham 2009: 3; translation of the b-example by the present author): (216) a. Du siehst ja aus! you look part part ‘Why, you are looking like someone!’ b. Wie siehst du denn aus? how look you part part ‘And just how do you look?!’ German wohl and Swedish väl have an assumptive meaning (examples from Abraham 2009: 6, SAG IV: 116): (217) a. Leider verschlechtern sich die Forschungsleistungen wohl weiter. pity deteriorate refl the research.results part further “Unfortunately, it appears that the research results are further deteriorating” b. Klockan är väl bortåt fem på söndagsmorgonen. the.clock is part around five on the.Sunday.morning ‘I suppose the time is about five in the Sunday morning.’ In Swedish, väl can also entail that the assumption made by the speaker may not be obvious to the listener. Therefore, väl can signal an appeal for consent (SAG IV: 116): (218) Så svårt är det väl inte att laga en punktering? so difficult is it part not to fix a flat.tyre ‘It can’t be that difficult to fix a flat tyre, can it?
7.8 Conclusion In this chapter, it has been shown that the Germanic languages that no longer have a productive indicative-subjunctive distinction still have propositional modality as a functional category of the verb. Propositional modality can be expressed on the verb through the past tense form (modal past), through phonological stress on the finite verb/auxiliary (verum focus), and through finite verb/auxiliary raising to the Complementizer position. The latter yields the two orders V2 and V1, which can be connected with Realis and Irrealis, respectively. V1 occurs in conditional protases, polar questions
Chapter 7. Modal markers and word order in the Germanic languages 171
(and in imperative clauses), which are all Irrealis contexts, whereas V2 occurs in English content questions and focus-fronting constructions, which can be classified as Realis in the sense that the proposition is presupposed and asserted, respectively. In English, the dummy do plays a part in many of these expressions. When no auxiliary is available, do is inserted in both verum-focus expressions to carry the stress (emphatic do-insertion) and in verb-raising constructions of the types just mentioned in order to lexicalize the Complementizer position (V2 & V1). A related phenomenon is the use of V2 in dass-clauses in German. V2 is used after non-factive verbs and coincides with the subjunctive form on the verb and dass-deletion. After verbs of saying, it denotes that the speaker distances him/herself from the truth of the proposition. Again, it establishes a connection between verb-raising to the Complementizer position and marking of propositional modality. Furthermore, there are modal verbs that can express different degrees of factuality (epistemic and evidential) in the Germanic languages. Although many of these also can express deontic or dynamic modalities, the epistemic-evidential versions can be distinguished on both formal and functional grounds. First, the epistemic-evidential verbs are syntactically further away from the main verb. Second, the epistemic-evidential verbs cannot (in general) be non-finite, the non-finite forms being reserved for the deontic-dynamic functions. Third, the epistemic-evidential verbs are sometimes confined to a particular tense form, the past in particular. This is because they are often derived from the deontic-dynamic verbs through the modal past. Fourth, the epistemic-evidential verbs generally do not have temporal reference. All this indicates that the epistemic-evidential verbs, like the indicative-subjunctive, lexicalize a more peripheral functional category than both deontic-dynamic modality and tense, by hypothesis propositional modality. The chapter ended with a discussion of some epistemic particles that are derived from modal verbs, the Swedish particles kanske and kanhända in particular. These are important since they are able to take the place of the finite verb in main clauses, i.e. the Complementizer position. Stroh-Wollin (2002) sees this as an indication that epistemic possibility, indicative-subjunctive, and even that-if belong to the same functional category (propositional modality in the present framework). Strikingly, kanske and kanhända can even occur clause initially, with the finite verb remaining in the verb phrase, yielding a V1-like structure. Often these clauses are interpreted as polite questions or suggestions, clauses which normally display V1 in the Germanic languages.
chapter
General subordinators and propositional modality in the Germanic languages
In the two previous chapters, it was shown that the finite verb carries markers of propositional modality in the form of mood (indicative-subjunctive) and modal verbs (epistemic-evidential) in the Germanic languages. Furthermore, it was shown that the past form has grammaticalized into a modal marker in certain contexts. In agreement with the hypothesis explored, it was then shown that the raising of the finite verb to the Complementizer position can also be connected with propositional modality: V1 with Irrealis (conditional and interrogative) and V2 with Realis in English (focus-presupposition constructions, etc.). Furthermore, the epistemic modal particles kanske, kanhända, and måhända, which have modal-verb origin, can also occupy the Complementizer position in Swedish, even yielding a V1-like structure. In this chapter, it will be shown that the Germanic general subordinators also denote propositional modality. that lexicalizes Realis; if and whether Irrealis. Being the unmarked value, that has a wider domain, factual and potential (speculative), whereas if and whether are more restricted. It will be argued that if and whether denote uncertainty (undetermined factuality). if also denotes the hypothetical (in conditional clauses).
8.1 That and if as markers of propositional modality In the Germanic languages, that introduces declarative complement clauses, whereas if introduces either conditional protases, embedded polar questions, or both. This is clearly a Realis-Irrealis distinction. Declarative clauses are semantically Realis, whereas conditional protases and embedded polar questions are semantically Irrealis (hypothetical or counterfactual and uncertain respectively). The situation that conditional protases and polar questions are introduced by the same particle is not unique to the Germanic languages. As has been pointed out before, this is also the case in the Mesoamerican languages (Suárez 1983: 95). Furthermore, in Namia (Sepik: Sepik-Ramu), both certain conditional protases and alternative polar questions are marked by the dubitative particle to/ko (Feldpausch & Feldpausch 1992; see examples 30b and c). This also connects the clauses with propositional modality. Lastly, in Supyire (Gur: Niger-Congo), there is a conditional complementizer/subordinator (k)ámpyí ‘if ’, which indicates “a subjective uncertainty”, and which is used not only in
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protasis clauses but also in embedded questions and complement clauses after verbs of doubt (Carlson 1994: 446ff; see 5.3). Since if can introduce all types of conditional clauses in the Germanic languages, e.g. “real” (i.e. hypothetical), “unreal” (dubitative and counterfactual), and concessive ones (in conjunction with adverbs like even), it is reasonable to assume that if in itself denotes that the proposition is hypothetical and that mood, tense, and, in the concessive case, adverbs, are responsible for the additional meanings, e.g. hypothetical in the past meaning unlikely or counterfactual in the present. In Swedish and English, om and if, respectively, introduce both conditional protases and embedded polar questions. In other Germanic languages, if is more restricted. In Icelandic, ef only introduces conditional protases, whereas in German, ob only introduces embedded polar questions (and the marginal exhaustive conditional protasis; Köning 1991: 635). In Danish and Norwegian, om is mainly used in embedded polar questions (although it can be found in Norwegian conditional protases too). Besides if, there are also different kinds of wh-words and adverbial words that introduce either embedded polar questions or conditional protases in the Germanic languages. In English, whether often introduces embedded polar questions, and in Icelandic, embedded polar questions are introduced by hvort. In German, conditional protases are introduced by wenn (which also introduces temporal clauses, i.e. ‘when’), and in Danish and Norwegian, conditional protases are mostly introduced by hvis, om being less frequent there. Another conditional subordinator worth mentioning is ifall (Swe. Nor.), falls (Ger.). In Swedish, ifall can also introduce interrogative complement clauses. These will all be treated at the end of the chapter. The semantic difference between that and if has been formulated in somewhat similar ways for Swedish and German. As for Swedish att and om, SAG (II: 734) states that “a subordinate clause with om is never presupposed to be true” (the author’s translation). Att-clauses are either presupposed to be true or neutral in their factuality (SAG IV: 542), whereas om (and the marginal huruvida ‘whether’) is used in subordinate clauses with “undetermined truth-value” (oavgjord sanningshalt; SAG IV: 549). As for German, GDS (2256ff ) states that dass is the subordinator of truth-determined (wahrheitsbestimmte) propositions, occurring after factive, implicative, and semifactive predicates. However, dass also introduces certain truth-undetermined propositions, namely after predicates of belief and possibility (i.e. speculative predicates). Otherwise, ob is the subordinator for truth-undetermined propositions, e.g. after predicates of asking, uncertainty and investigation. Rather than using terms such as undetermined truth-value and neutral factuality, which are rather vague and hard to distinguish, the semantic difference can be reformulated in terms of Realis-Irrealis: that represents the unmarked value Realis and has a rather wide domain: both factual and potential/speculative (after speculative and reportative predicates); if and whether represent the marked value Irrealis which is more restricted, uncertainty and hypothetical. The difference between the potential that and the uncertain if, whether is that the latter indicate that the speaker leaves
Chapter 8. General subordinators and propositional modality in the Germanic languages 175
it open whether or not the proposition is true. The potential that states that the subject believes it to be true or at least hold it as possible that it is true. This is in agreement with Noonan’s (2007) findings that the indicative often covers positive propositional attitudes whereas the subjunctive covers negative ones (see 2.3.1). One piece of evidence in support of the hypothesis that general subordinators denote propositional modality is phonological stress. As in the case with stress on the declarative finite verb, phonological stress on that leads to a factual interpretation. Furthermore, just as stress on the finite verb in conditional constructions leads to a dubitative meaning, so does stress on if (The b-examples are the Swedish counterparts of the a-examples): (219) a. That is to say THAT the authorities have done all they can. b. Det vill säga ATT myndigheterna har gjort allt de kan. (220) a. That is to say IF the authorities have done all they can. b. Det vill säga OM myndigheterna har gjort allt de kan göra. Interestingly, the effect is less strong when att/that is stressed than when the declarative verb is. In the latter case, the truth of the proposition is asserted, whereas in the former, it is concluded. It does not denote the same kind of personal involvement/ commitment on the part of the speaker. This demonstrates the difference between subordinate clauses and main clauses. Main clauses can always be asserted, whereas subordinate clauses cannot always be (if at all; see Cristofaro 2003). Another indication that the Germanic complementizers that and if are modal morphemes is that they, like the subjunctive in the mood system, can have exclamative and speech-act modal uses in main clauses. Swedish att, English that, and Icelandic að can be used in exclamatory independent clauses, where the speaker expresses surprise at a fact (SAG II: 735, CGEL: 944, Sigurðsson 2008: 11; the so-called admirative). Note the use of the emotive should, which expresses the actual surprise (CGEL 188, Palmer 1986: 120) and the subjunctive form of skulu in Icelandic: (221) a. Att du bara vill vara med om det! that you just want be part of it ‘That you should want to go through that!’ b. That it should have come to this! c. Að hún skuli segja þetta! that she shall.subj say this ‘[It is incredible/remarkable] That she says this!’ Furthermore, Swedish om can be used in desiderative/optative clauses in conjunction with bara/ändå (SAG II: 734ff ). The speaker expresses a wish for something to be true which is unlikely to be so. The verb is in the past tense (modal past) or marginally in
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the lexicalized subjunctive (Andersson 1994: 298). This is also true for English if only (CGEL 945 calls it a counterfactual fragment): (222) a. Om hon ändå ville komma och hälsa på mig! if she only wanted come and greet on me ‘If only she wanted to come and visit me!’ b. If only you’d told me earlier! As in the conditional case, the finite verb may alternatively be raised to the Complementizer position and take the place of om in Swedish (the author’s example): (223) Ville hon ändå komma och hälsa på mig! wanted she only come and greet on me Arguably, the desiderative/optative should not be seen as a propositional modality category, but as a speech-act one, since it typically expresses wishes or supplications. On the other hand, it is clear that it overlaps with the conditional in these cases. Furthermore, although a distinct function, the optative entails that the proposition is unfulfilled; hence the proposition is semantically Irrealis. Swedish om can also introduce suppositive or apprehensive clauses. Mostly, it is constructed with tänk ‘imagine’ (SAG II: 734ff ). The speaker expresses a fear or a supposition that the proposition is true, although it is entirely hypothetical. The same can be said about English what if (CGEL 910) and imagine if: (224) a. (Tänk) om någon hade sett mig den gången! imagine if someone had seen me that time ‘Imagine if somebody had seen me that time!’ b.
What if we can’t get back in time?
Att and om can also introduce exclamative echo statements and echo questions respectively (Andersson 1994: 299). It may indicate that the proposition is so true that the question is unwarranted: (225) – Är du intresserad? ‘Are you interested?’ – Att/Om jag är intresserad? Det kan du lita på! that/if I am interested that can you rely on ‘Am I interested? You bet!’ Recall that Frajzyngier (1995: 478) showed that French que ‘that’ can also introduce optative clauses, and that OE hwaeðer and Polish czy ‘whether’ could/can introduce interrogative main clauses. In 4.3.2, it was argued that these optative and interrogative uses of complementizers may be cases of grammaticalization. The fact that main clauses are normally not introduced by complementizers suggests that complementizers normally do not lexicalize the most peripheral functional category in main clauses, by
Chapter 8. General subordinators and propositional modality in the Germanic languages 177
hypothesis speech-act modality. In those cases where they do introduce main clauses, the complementizers have developed an exclamatory or speech-act function, just like the subjunctive has in main clauses. This line of reasoning is in accord with the assumption that subordinate clauses do not carry illocutionary force, i.e. do not realize the speech-act modality category. Rather, the complementizers lexicalize the functional category immediately inside of speech-act modality, by hypothesis propositional modality. Note that when the complementizers have speech-act functions, they can be assumed to be syntactically more peripheral as when they denote propositional modality (although this would be difficult to test). Dutch, Icelandic, and Norwegian somewhat complicate the generalization that that is Realis and if Irrealis. In Dutch, of can be constructed with an additional dat (of(dat); Zwart 1993: 43). This is also true for Icelandic ef and Norwegian om (in colloquial language; Vangsnes 2006: 3): (226) a. Piet vroeg of/ofdat Jan Marie kuste. Piet asked if/ifthat Jan Marie kissed ‘Piet asked if Jan kissed Marie.’ b. Einnig væri gaman að heyra ef að fólk er að vinna also be.pres.subj fun to hear if that people are to work við að þýða aðra components/modules. with to translate other components/modules ‘It would also be fun to hear if people are working on translating other components/modules.’ c. Ofte kan vi lure på om at endringen skjer for reformens often can we wonder on if that the.change happens for the.reform’s egen skyld. own sake ‘Often, one may wonder if the change happens for the sake of the reform itself.’ It may appear unexpected that the unmarked value can occur together with the marked one. On the other hand, the theory of linguistic universals does permit the unmarked value to extend its domain into that of the marked one (Croft 1990: 70ff ). Interestingly, the reverse does not seem to be true. Thus, in Dutch, dat may be inserted after of in interrogative clauses, but of (dat) cannot occur after semifactive, reportative and speculative predicates. There, only dat is permitted. Furthermore, even though of can be constructed with dat after verbs of asking, dat cannot stand alone in these clauses (Zwart 1993: 43): (227) a. Piet zei dat/*of/* ofdat Jan Marie kuste. Piet said that/if/ ifthat Jan Marie kissed
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Cf. b. Piet vroeg of/ofdat/*dat Jan Marie kuste. Piet asked if/ifthat/that Jan Marie kissed Another more technical question is how it is possible that two lexical items can lexicalize the same functional category at the same time. On the other hand, there is nothing in either the framework of Language Typology or Generative Grammar that would disallow such a phenomenon. Neither theory assumes there to be a complete 1:1 correspondence between form and meaning. Indeed, if that was the case, languages would never change, which they clearly do. As long as a lexical item representing the unmarked value displays some kind of semantic and distributional opposition to the marked one, there is nothing that would prevent them from occurring together.
8.2 That- vs. if-selection The strongest indication that that and if in the subordinator system correspond to the indicative and subjunctive in the mood system is the fact that they are partly selected by the same predicates. Perhaps even more than the Germanic mood system, that and if are reminiscent of the Spanish mood system. Below follows an inventory of the predicates that select that and if, respectively, in Swedish, English, and German. This is done in order to ascertain to what degree that can be connected with Realis and if with Irrealis. Particular attention will be paid to those cases where there is a choice between that and if (after factive, semifactive, reportative and dubitative predicates) and to ascertain whether there is a difference in meaning. Furthermore, apparent anomalies to the hypothesis will be dealt with, such as the use of that after pretence and negated speculative predicates.
8.2.1 Swedish 8.2.1.1 Predicates selecting att In Swedish, att is the subordinator after the following kinds of predicates. The predicates are those listed by SAG (IV: 539ff ). The divisions and labels are the author’s: –
Factive emotive predicates: acceptera ‘accept’, bekymra ‘bother’, finna sig i ‘content oneself with’, förarga ‘anger’, förbluffa ‘astound’, förnärma ‘offend’, förvåna ‘surprise’, gilla ‘like’, vara glad åt/ glädja sig åt ‘be glad’, gräma sig över ‘fret over’, hata ‘hate’, vara häpen över ‘be amazed at’, irritera ‘irritate’, vara ledsen över ‘be sad’, vara nöjd med ‘be content with’, vara oroad av/(o)roa ‘be worried by/worry’, reta sig på/reta’ be annoyed by/ annoy’, skrämma ‘frighten’, spela roll ‘matter’, stå ut med ‘endure’, tolerera ‘tolerate’, tycka om ‘like’, tåla ‘stand’, ångra ‘regret’, älska ‘love’, vara överraskad av/överraska ‘be surprised by/surprise’
Chapter 8. General subordinators and propositional modality in the Germanic languages 179
–
Other factive predicates: berömma ‘praise’, förebrå ‘reproach’, klandra ‘accuse’, förlåta ‘forgive’, kritisera ngn för ‘criticise’, bortse ifrån ‘disregard’, reflektera över ‘reflect’, ta hänsyn till ‘take into consideration’, ta med i beräkningen ‘take into account’, vara uppmärksam på ‘pay attention to’, tänka på ‘think of ’, glömma ‘forget’, erkänna ‘admit’, förneka ‘deny’, medge ‘concede’, vara medveten om ‘be aware of ’, påminna om ‘remind’, påpeka ‘point out’
–
Semifactive predicates: begripa ‘understand’, bevittna ‘witness’, fastställa ‘determine’, förstå ‘understand’, fatta ‘grasp’, höra ‘hear’, inse ‘realize’, få reda på ‘find out’, ha klart för sig ‘know’, konstatera ‘establish’, känna till ‘know’, lägga märke till/märka ‘notice’, lära sig ‘learn’, sluta sig till ‘deduce’, upptäcka ‘discover’, veta ‘know’, visa ‘show’, komma ihåg ‘recall’, lägga på minnet ‘remember’, minnas ‘remember’, sant ‘be true’
–
Reportative and assertive predicates: hävda ‘assert’, påstå ‘claim’, understryka ‘emphasize’ säga ‘say’, intyga ‘confirm’, rapportera ‘report’, berätta ‘tell’, betona ‘stress’, försäkra ‘assure’, nämna ‘mention’, uppge ‘state’, genmäla ‘reply’, invända ‘retort’, ropa ‘call out’, skrika ‘scream’, skriva ‘write’, stamma ‘stutter’, sucka ‘sigh’, svara ‘answer’, utbrista ‘burst out’, viska ‘whisper’
–
Speculative and apprehensive predicates: ana ‘have a feeling’, anse ‘think’, anta ‘assume’, föreställa sig ‘imagine’, förmoda ‘presume’, förutsätta ‘presuppose’, gissa ‘guess’, hålla med om ‘agree’, inbilla sig ‘fancy’, känna ‘feel’, lita på ‘trust’, misstänka ‘suspect’, tro ‘believe’, tycka ‘think’, utgå ifrån ‘assume’, vara säker på/säkert’ be sure’, sannolikt ‘probable’, självklart ‘obvious’, troligt ‘likely’, möjligt ‘possible’, frukta ‘fear’, vara rädd för ‘be afraid’
–
Desiderative predicates etc.: hoppas på ‘hope’, längta efter ‘long for’, vilja ‘want’, önska ‘wish’, argumentera för/ emot ‘argue for/against’, opponera sig mot ‘object to’, plädera för ‘argue for’, propagera för/emot ‘advocate’, vara angelägen om ‘be anxious for’, yrka på ‘call for’
The list clearly shows that att is selected by factive and semifactive predicates. Att is also selected by predicates of saying, belief, possibility, apprehension and desire etc. SAG further states that att can occur after the dubitative predicates betvivla, tvivla på ‘doubt’. That will be dealt with in more detail in 8.2.1.4. SAG also lists some other kinds of predicates that can be constructed with att, but they are not relevant here. One kind of predicates SAG does not list, but which is of special interest here, are predicates of pretence (låtsa, ge sken av ‘pretend’). Recall that Noonan (2007) considered these problematic for his division of complements into indicative and subjunctive ones (see 3.2.1). Complements of pretence predicates select indicative complements, although they are semantically Irrealis. Noonan (2007: 127) explained this by proposing that the predicate establishes an alternative reality (and, in the Spanish case, that the complement is an assertion within that alternative reality). Perhaps a better explanation
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is that the speaker, as in reportative constructions, is narrating what the subject was/is pretending, namely that the proposition expressed in the complement clause is a fact. It should be pointed out that complement clauses of pretence predicates are not necessarily counterfactual, although the predicates to some degree implies that they are. As Henrik Rosenkvist (p.c.) points out, it is in fact perfectly correct to say that She pretended that the door was locked, and it was. It should also be added that the complement clause can be formulated as a hypothetical comparative clause. In this case, att is marginal, om being the preferred option. Examples from Språkbankens konkordanser, GP 01: (228) a. Låtsas som att jag frågar er vad klockan är. pretend as that I ask you what the.clock is ‘Pretend that I ask you what time it is.’ b. Det hör till god ton att låtsas som om frågan är öppen. it belongs to good tone to pretend as if the.question is open ‘It is good form to pretend as if the question was open.’ With om, but not with att, the interpretation is that the speaker is explicitly signalling that the proposition is not a fact (counterfactual). Another kind of predicates that needs to be commented on are negated speculative predicates, i.e. ‘not believe’, ‘not think’, ‘not likely’. Like their affirmative counterparts, these invariably select att (this is also true for the other Germanic languages). This might seem to contradict the idea that that denotes the Realis, since the complement clauses are judged not to be true by the speaker when the speaker and the matrix subject are the same person. On the other hand, it could be argued that these utterances are cases of litotes, a negation of the opposite of what the speaker wants to communicate. What the speaker is more likely to be communicating is that s/he thinks that X is not Y (see e.g. Lakoff 1970). By negating the opposite, the statement becomes slightly less direct. Hence, the rather uninformative statement that s/he does not think that Y is Z. It may also be a way of implying that someone else actually thinks that the proposition is true (when the speaker and the matrix subject are not the same person, this may be the speaker him/herself). 8.2.1.2 Predicates selecting om There are certain predicates in Swedish that typically select om (or the marginal huruvida,1 which will be dealt with in Section 8.4). Other predicates can be constructed with either att or om. These will be dealt with in 8.2.1.3 below. SAG (IV: 549ff ) lists both kinds of predicates together (i.e. those that select om and those that select either om or att), but the following ones can be said to primarily select om, although some can also be constructed with att (the labels are partly the author’s; all are non-factive):
1. Most of these predicates can also select complement clauses introduced by other wh-constituents, but that is a different topic. See 9.1.2 for embedded content questions.
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–
Predicates of asking: fråga ‘ask’, fråga sig ‘ask oneself ’, fråga ut ngn ‘interrogate’, förhöra ngn ‘inquire’, undra ‘wonder’, höra efter ‘inquire’
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Predicates of investigation: ge akt på ‘pay attention to’, kontrollera ‘control’, känna efter ‘see’, lista ut ‘find out’, räkna ut ‘figure out’ se efter ‘see’, slå upp ‘look up’, studera ‘study’, ta reda på ‘find out’, undersöka ‘investigate’, utreda ‘investigate’, vilja veta ‘want to know’
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Predicates of considering: fundera på/över ‘ponder’, tänka på ‘think about’, överväga ‘consider’, undra ‘wonder’,
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Predicates of discussing and disputing: diskutera ‘discuss’, förhandla ‘negociate’, rösta ‘vote’, strida ‘quarrel about’, tvista ‘dispute’, vara oense ‘disagree’, vara oeniga ‘disagree’
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Predicates of doubt and uncertainty: vara tveksamt ‘be doubtful’, undra ‘wonder’, vara [o]säkert ‘be uncertain’, vara ovisst ‘be unsure’, vara omöjligt att säga ‘be impossible to say’
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Predicates of interest: vara intresserad av ‘be interested in’, vara nyfiken på ‘be curious’, göra detsamma ‘make no difference’, kvitta ‘make no difference’, vara likgiltigt ‘not matter’
–
Predicates of dependence: bero på ‘depend on’
Examples: (229) a. Det är ovisst om hon kommer till jul. (SAG IV:552) ‘It is uncertain whether she will come at Christmas.’ b. Det är likgiltigt om hon kommer till jul. (SAG IV:552) ‘It does not matter if she comes at Christmas.’ c. Det beror på om Stenlund kommer eller ej. (SAG IV:553) ‘It depends on whether Stenlund comes or not.’ d. Vi måste mycket noggrant granska ökningen och kontrollera om belastningen på vårdpersonalen kan ligga bakom. (GP 01) ‘We must carefully examine the increase and control whether the stress laid on the nursing staff may lie behind it.’ e. Efter tjugo minuter börjar jag fundera på om alla dessa fiskar på bilderna verkligen finns. (GP 01) ‘After twenty minutes I begin to wonder whether all these fishes on the photos truly exist.’ f. Gruppen ska också diskutera om man eventuellt ska ordna transporter mellan de tre köpområdena, (GP 01) ‘The group will also discuss whether one possibly should establish transports between the three shopping areas,’
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The common denominator between the predicates that only select om is that they entail that the truth of the proposition of the complement is unknown for the speaker and/or the subject. Indeed, as SAG (IV: 549) states, om-clauses denote undetermined truth value. Like many other grammars, SAG (IV: 552) gives these clauses the label interrogative. This term is used with wide extension. For SAG, the “interrogative” subordinators do not necessarily denote that the truth of the proposition is asked for but can also denote that it is uncertain, irrelevant etc. On the other hand, it could be retorted that this use of the term interrogative is confusing if not misleading. Verbs of investigation could perhaps be called interrogative in the widest sense, but there is nothing interrogative in complement clauses of verbs of disputing, uncertainty, or dependence. As said above, the common denominator is that the truth of the proposition is unknown to the speaker and/or the matrix subject. Therefore, they should rather be labelled in such terms. Furthermore, the use of the label interrogative for om-clauses implies that they are performative. However, as has been pointed out on numerous places before, embedded clauses are not speech-acts (Cristofaro 2003, SAG IV: 475ff ). In narratives, “indirect questions” can both be posed by and addressed to people that are not present in the speech situation (“She asked him if ”). Rather than being actual questions, omclauses after verbs of asking merely reproduce the propositional content of questions. Om denotes that the propositional content is uncertain to the speaker and/or the matrix subject, rather than indicating that the clause is a question. 8.2.1.3 Att-selecting predicates that can alternatively be constructed with om SAG (IV: 549) further shows that om can also be used alternatively after certain factive and semifactive predicates and verbs of saying and the like, although att is the unmarked choice. This fact is particularly interesting, as it shows more directly the semantic opposition between att and om: –
Factive predicates: glömma ‘forget’, falla ur minnet, gå upp för ‘dawn’; bry sig om ‘care’, fästa avseende vid ‘pay heed to’, ignorera ‘ignore’, strunta i ‘not care about’, ta hänsyn till ‘consider’; avslöja ‘reveal’, dölja ‘conceal’, erkänna ‘admit’, hemlighålla ‘conceal’, tiga om ‘be silent about’; påminna om ‘remind’
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Semifactive predicates: begripa ‘understand’, dra sig till minnes, erinra sig ‘recall’ fatta ‘grasp’, få klart för sig ‘learn’, få reda på ‘find out’, få se ‘see’, få veta ‘learn’, förstå ‘understand’, ge akt på ‘observe’, ha klart för sig ‘know’, höra ‘hear’, konstatera ‘establish’, komma på ‘recall’, komma underfund med ‘learn’, känna till ‘know’, minnas ‘remember’, märka, notera ‘notice’, observera ‘observe’, upptäcka ‘discover’, veta ‘know’
–
Reportative predicates: berätta ‘tell’, bevisa ‘prove’, informera ‘inform’, låta förstå ‘let somebody know’, meddela ‘inform’, rapportera ‘report’, skriva ned ‘write down’, säga ‘say’, upplysa ‘inform’, visa ‘show’
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Om is used after these predicates to indicate that the speaker and/or matrix subject of the matrix clause does not know whether the proposition of the complement clause is true or not. After the semifactive predicates, om is particularly used when the predicate is negated, since negated semifactives mean that the subject of the matrix clause does not know etc. whether or not the proposition is true. However, om may also be used when the predicates are in the affirmative to indicate that the speaker, in contrast to the subject, does not know whether or not the proposition is true. After factive verbs, it may indicate that neither the speaker nor the subject knows (example from SAG IV: 549): (230) a. Bengt vet nog att/om Anders bor i Köpenhamn. ‘Bengt probably knows that/if Anders lives in Copenhagen.’ b. Bengt struntar i att/om Anders bor i Köpenhamn. ‘Bengt does not care that/if Anders lives in Copenhagen.’ In (230a), att is used by the speaker to mark the proposition as factual. Although the subject of the matrix clause only probably knows that the proposition is true, the speaker definitely knows that it is. With om, the speaker marks it as undetermined, it indicates that he does not know whether or not it is true, in contrast to the subject of the matrix clause who probably does. With att in (230b), the clause is presupposed: everyone, including the presumed listener, speaker and the subject of the matrix clause knows that the proposition is a fact, and it is this fact that the subject of the matrix clause does not care about. With om, the truth of the proposition is undetermined, at least for the subject of the matrix clause and presumably for the speaker, and the subject does not care whether or not it is true. Arguably, om may even be used marginally after affirmative semifactive predicates when the speaker and subject are the same person. The interpretation is then that the listener wants to know if the proposition is true and that the speaker states that s/he knows the answer (although s/he may choose not to reveal it): (231) Jag vet om Anders bor i Köpenhamn. ‘I know if Anders lives in Copenhagen.’ After verbs of saying and the like, om is also particularily used when the verb is negated. In this case, it is used because the subject has not stated whether or not the proposition is true. The affirmative clause only permits this interpretation when the clause has future reference (see below). Otherwise, the interpretation is that for some reason, the subject wishes to withhold the information from the listener, a pragmatically highly marked alternative (SAG IV: 551): (232) a. Tom sa inte om Sonja var sjuk. ‘Tom didn’t say if Sonja was ill.’ b. ?Tom sa om Sonja var sjuk. Tom said if Sonja was ill
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Another interpretation of (232b) is that the speaker has forgotten it. Interestingly, when om is used after predicates such as förstå ‘understand’ and beklaga ‘regret’ the meaning is somewhat different: (233) a. Jag förstår att/om du har mycket att göra just nu. ‘I understand that/if you have a lot to do right now.’ b. Jag beklagar att/om jag har sårat dig. ‘I regret that/if I have offended you.’ As SAG (IV: 554) argues, om denotes the conditional rather than undetermined factuality in such examples (the second meaning of om). One cannot add eller inte ‘or not’ to them: (234) a. Jag beklagar om jag har sårat dig *eller inte. I regret if I have offended you or not Cf. b. Jag struntar i om hon kommer eller inte. ‘I don’t care if she comes or not’ In order to confirm that om can be used after affirmative semifactive predicates in actual discourse (and not just in constructed examples) and to ascertain to what extent it is used and in exactly what contexts, corpus searches were conducted in Språkbankens konkordanser on the predicates veta ‘know’ and förstå ‘understand’. For veta, the Press 76 corpus was used, since later corpuses yielded too many hits to be handled. Only affirmative examples of veta were counted, excluding examples with a negated veta, a negated matrix subject (’no-one knows’) and the construction utan att veta ‘without knowing’. For förstå ‘understand’, Press 95 was used, later corpuses again yielding too many hits to be handled. Both verbs were searched for in all tense forms. The results show that att is indeed the normal, unmarked choice, but also confirms that om can be used in certain contexts: Table 11. The share of att and om in complement clauses after semifactive predicates veta (Press 76) att om % om
208 12 5,5
förstå (Press 95) 398 17 4,1
One of the cases with vet om is part of a polar question, and it follows quite naturally that om is used there. Six others are constructed with the modal verb vilja ‘want’, i.e. vill veta om ‘want to know whether’. This means that the matrix subject (and alternatively also the speaker) does not know whether the proposition is true or not. Another two cases have future reference. Om is used there because the truth of the proposition is unknown at the
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utterance time. In both cases, the subject and the speaker are (partly) the same person. One is in the modal form får veta om ‘get to know whether’; the other is the plain form: (235) Det dröjer kanske in på 1980-talet innan vi vet om det finns olja i Sverige för lönande produktion. ‘It may take until the 1980s until we know if there is enough oil in Sweden for a profitable winning’ After förstå ‘understand’, the subject and the speaker are often the same person. Interestingly, the construction is more than just conditional (as SAG suggests). Although the speaker/subject states that s/he in theory has understanding for the propositional content of the complement clause s/he still does not admit that it is actually true (in that case, att would be used). Also note the use of the abilitative kunna ‘can’, which has generic reference: (236) Men jag kan förstå om handlarna har uppfattat det på detta sättet. ‘But I can understand if the dealers have perceived it in this way.’ That om may be used after other affirmative semifactive predicates and verbs of saying and the like was also confirmed by corpus searches on Språkbankens konkordanser. In particular, om is common after verbs of perception, which then receive an investigative meaning. With verbs of saying, the clause has future reference (often indicated by future or modal auxiliaries). The speaker does not know yet what will be said. There were even some examples found with om after the apprehensive predicate orolig för ‘worried about’: (237) a. Ensemblen består av sex regissörer och 25 skådespelare, som ibland har svårt att komma ihåg om de är mördare eller offer. (GP 01) ‘The ensemble consists of six producers and 25 actors, who sometimes have difficulties remembering whether they are murderers or victims.’ b. Storbritannien och Irland skall senare meddela om de vill ansluta sig till gemensamma regler. (GP 01) ‘Great Britain and Ireland will later announce whether they will enter into joint regulation.’ c. Kontrollerna kan säga om barnet följer sin kurva och ge en gissning om hur långt barnet kan bli som vuxen. (GP 01) ‘The examinations are able to say whether the child follows its curve and give a hint as to how tall the child may become as an adult.’ d. Laboratorietester ska visa om de döda bar på viruset. (GP 04) ‘Laboratory tests will show if the deceased carried the virus.’ e. Då kan jag se om de flyttat isär eller skaffat barn. (GP 04) ‘Then I will be able to see whether they have moved apart or got children.’
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f.
…som vänder sig till högre myndigheter för att höra om det är fritt fram för kommunen att försämra servicen. (GP 04) ‘...who turns to higher authorities to hear if the municipality now has free hands to impair the service.’ g. Man blir lite orolig för om det finns någon framtid one becomes little worried about if there exists any future för SSU Göteborg, säger han. (GP 01) for SSU Gothenburg says he ‘One becomes a little worried about the future of SSU Gothenburg, he says.’
The common denominator for all these clauses is that the speaker does not know whether or not the proposition is or will be true. This is consistent with what Sitta (1971) found in German (see 8.2.2 below). The contexts that licensed ob after verbs of saying and the like were negation, modal verbs, the future, and questions. The common denominator between these contexts is, according to Sitta (1971: 198) “das Moment der Nicht-Festgelegtheit, Unsicherheit“. In fact, all of these are Irrealis contexts. As was stated above, om is particularly common after negated semifactive predicates. This follows from the fact that the meaning of the predicate then becomes one of uncertainty (the “ignorative”). Indeed, if om denotes undetermined factuality it should be the norm after negated semifactive predicates. This is also confirmed to be the case by the aforementioned corpus search in Språkbankens konkordanser, Press 76 for the different tense forms of veta ‘know’. Among the results were 35 cases of inte ‘not’ + veta or ingen ‘no-one’ + veta. Of these, 33 had om. The two cases with att are grammatical, though. The interpretation of these is that the speaker, in contrast to the subject, actually knows that the proposition is true: (238) a. Jag vet inte om de borgerliga skulle ha någon större trovärdighet i utlandet. ‘I don’t know if the right-wing parties would have any greater credibility abroad.’ b. Jag vet inte om det beror på att dom är tvillingar. ‘I don’t know if it is because they are twins.’ Cf. c. saker som de kanske inte ens vet att de borde veta. ‘things that they perhaps don’t even know that they should know.’ d. Ingen vet att Maria Reynolds skrivit dem! ‘Nobody knows that Maria Reynolds has written them!’ Arguably, att is theoretically possible even when the speaker and the subject are the same person, if the matrix clause has past time reference2. In that case, the speaker/ 2. It could also be added that att is theoretically possible after veta in the present tense when the verb has contrastive focus stress: Jag VET inte att... That, however, implies that the subject does something less than know, such as believe.
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subject has learned after the reference time but before the utterance time that the proposition is indeed true: (239) a. Jag visste inte då att/om Maria Reynolds hade skrivit dem. ‘I didn’t know then that/if Maria Reynolds had written them.’ Cf. b. Jag vet inte *att/ om Maria Reynolds har skrivit dem. I know not that/if Maria Reynolds has written them All these facts show quite clearly that att is used to indicate that the proposition is known to be true (after factive and semifactive predicates), believed to be true (after predicates of belief and apprehension), possibly true (after predicates of possibility, wishing etc.) and claimed to be true (after assertive, reportative and pretence predicates). Att thus both denote the factual and the potential (i.e. positive propositional attitudes; see 8.5 for a more detailed analysis of the potential meaning of att). Om is used to indicate that the truth of the proposition is unknown for the speaker and/or the subject (the so-called ignorative) or to mark it as hypothetical (the conditional). This is clearly a Realis-Irrealis distinction. 8.2.1.4 Att or om after dubitative predicates Interestingly, it appears that om not only denotes uncertainty but also the dubitative. At any rate, om is compatible with the dubitative. Recall that according to SAG, om can be selected by the dubitative predicate vara tveksamt ‘be doubtful’. Furthermore, it could be argued that one of the predicates of uncertainty listed by SAG, [o]säkert ‘[un] certain’, has a variant that could have a dubitative reading, namely osäker på ‘unsure’. On the other hand, SAG states that the dubitative verbs tvivla på ‘doubt’ and betvivla ‘doubt’ select att. Thus, it appears that the borderline between att and om lies within the dubitative domain. This makes om even more like the subjunctive, since the subjunctive typically occurs not only in interrogative complement clauses and conditional protases but also in dubitative complement clauses. The use of om after dubitative predicates may follow from the logic that what is doubted is uncertain. What is noteworthy about the dubitative use of om is that the truth of the proposition is no longer completely left open, as it is after predicates of uncertainty, with the two members {p, ¬p} being equally plausible. Rather, in dubitative constructions, the subject of the matrix clause holds it as likely that the proposition is not true (see CGEL 983 for a discussion on English if and whether in dubitative contexts). Contrary to other om-complement clauses, one cannot add the phrase eller inte ‘or not’ to it: (240) a. Det är tveksamt om Maria Reynolds har skrivit dem ??eller inte. It is doubtful if Maria Reynolds has written them or not
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Cf. b. Det är oklart om Maria Reynolds har skrivit dem eller inte. ‘It is unclear whether or not Maria Reynolds has written them.’ The fact that om is used in such dubitative contexts is a strong argument against it being an interrogative marker, even in the widest sense of the word. To determine the exact relationship and proportions of att and om after dubitative predicates in Swedish, corpus searches were again carried out in Språkbankens konkordanser. Not only betvivla, tvivla på and tveksamt were searched for but also the noun tvivel ‘doubt’. A comparative search was also conducted on a predicate that exclusively denotes uncertainty, namely oklart ‘unclear’. For the different forms of tveksamt/tveksam till, osäker på/osäkert, and oklart, GP 04 was searched. For tvivla på, betvivla, and tvivel, negated matrix clauses and the like had to be omitted, since inte tvivla på ‘not doubt’, inget tvivel ‘no doubt’, aldrig tvivla på ‘never doubt’, and ingen tvivlar på ‘no one doubts’ all mean ‘believe’. These kinds of litotes, which proved to be quite common, were invariably constructed with att. Related constructions were “undanröja alla tvivel på” ‘dispel all doubts’, understatements such as “få tvivlar på” ‘few doubt’, and rhetorical questions such as “finns det verkligen någon som tvivlar på” ‘would anyone really doubt’. These were also omitted. As a consequence, but also due to a general rareness, more corpuses than GP 04 had to be searched. For tvivla på, GP 03 was also searched; for betvivla and tvivel all newspaper corpuses in Konkordanser were searched. The results show that betvivla only selects att-clauses, that tvivla på and tvivel tend to select att-clauses, that tveksamt/tveksam till tends to select om-clauses and that osäkert/osäker på and oklart almost only select om-clauses. To put it differently, the results show that om is possible after tvivla på and tvivel and that att is possible after tveksamt/tveksam till: Table 12. The share of att and om after predicates of doubt and uncertainty betvivla tvivla på tvivel (om/på/ över) tveksamt/ (Press 65 - 98, (GP 03, 04) (Press 65 - 98, DN 87, tveksam DN 87, GP 01 - 04) (till) GP 01 - 04) (GP 04) att om % om
124 0 0
136 12 8,1
56 20 26,3
16 182 91,9
osäker på/ oklart osäkert (GP 04) (GP 04) 1 133 99,3
0 159 100
Examples of tvivla på att and tvivla på om: (241) a. Men i de egna leden tvivlar många på att Merkel är rätt kanslerkandidat vid valet 2006. ‘But within her own ranks, many doubt that Merkel is the right chancellor candidate for the election 2006’.
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b. Då och då tvivlar hon på om hon verkligen ska fortsätta engagera sig så mycket i föreningsarbetet. ‘Now and then, she doubts whether she really should continue to engage herself so much in organization work.’ Examples of tvivel (om/på/över) att and tvivel om: (242) a. Men redan i går framkom tvivel på att detta går att lösa. ‘But already yesterday doubts arose that this can be solved.’ b. Danmarks försvarsminister sår tvivel om danska militärer har förstått sitt uppdrag i Irak. ‘The Danish defence minister sows doubts whether Danish military personal have understood their mission in Iraq.’ With tvivel, the situation was rather complex. Om mostly stood alone after tvivel, except for a few cases with the preposition kring ‘around’. Att, on the other hand, tended to be constructed with one of the prepositions om ‘about’, på ‘on’, or över ‘over’. In those cases where the att-clause functioned as a clausal attribute, the predicate was always negated (and therefore disregarded). The reason why om did not tend to be constructed with a preposition may partly be its homonymy with the preposition om. Indeed, 5 cases were found where the rare complementizer huruvida was used instead of om after the preposition om. Huruvida was also found in four other cases. None of the hits with huruvida are counted here, but see 8.6 for comments. Suffice it to say that if one treated om and huruvida as synonyms with the same meaning and function, the share of those kinds of complementizers after tvivel would be 31,7% (in three of the hits with huruvida, the predicates were negated etc; these would not have counted). Examples of tveksamt/tveksam (till) om and tveksam till att: (243) a. Hans Bergqvist är tveksam till om alla 30 på kontoret kan behålla sina arbeten. ‘Hans Bergqvist is doubtful whether all 30 employees at the office can keep their jobs.’ b. Efter att ha sett djuret på nära håll är han nu mer tveksam till att det behöver röra sig om något ungt djur. ‘After having seen the animal at a short distance, he is now more doubtful that it has to be a young animal.’ Tveksamt was almost exclusively constructed with om, whereas tveksam till was constructed with att in approximately ¼ of the cases. There were also some examples with tveksam till att and tveksamt att, where the proposition actually appears to be presupposed to be true and where it is questioned from a moral perspective rather than a factual one. These are not relevant here:
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(244) Däremot är det lite tveksamt att de tre fina vinsterna inte dras bland alla röstande. ‘On the other hand, it is somewhat doubtful that the three grand prizes were not drawn between all the voters.’ Examples of osäker på om with a potentially dubitative meaning: (245) Han är osäker på om de fortfarande finns kvar i landet. ‘He is unsure if they are still in the country.’ The only example of osäker på att was the following: (246) men jag är osäker på att han skall bygga allt för stor tro på ett fysiskt Örgryte i framtiden. ‘but I’m not sure that he should hold too much faith in a physical Örgryte in the future.’ As in the case with tveksam att, the proposition is questioned from a moral perspective rather than a factual one (it would be unwise for him to do so). One immediate question that the results provoke is why tveksamt, tveksam till, tvivel, tvivla på, and betvivla should have such different proportions of om and att, and why att is dominant after betvivla and tvivla på but not after tveksamt and tveksam till? One plausible explanation is that tvivla på and betvivla have an explicit experiencer (the subject), whereas tveksamt usually does not. Tvivla på and betvivla mean that the matrix subject doubts that the proposition is true. This does not necessarily mean that the speaker doubts it, however. Tveksamt, on the other hand, states that the proposition has the inherent characteristic of being doubtful. Interestingly att is more common with tveksam till. As with tvivla på and betvivla there is an explicit experiencer here (the subject), and it is this experiencer who is doubtful towards the proposition, not necessarily the speaker. There are in fact many cases of tvivla på att and some with betvivla att where it is clear that the speaker, in contrast to the matrix subject, does not doubt that the proposition is true, but rather believes it is. Examples: (247) a. I december 2003 sade han också att den som tvivlar på att världen är en säkrare plats utan Saddam Hussein inte har omdöme nog att vara president. Jag håller med honom. Världen är bättre utan Saddam Hussein. ‘In December 2003, he also said that the one who doubts that the world is a safer place without Saddam Hussein does not have enough judgement to be president. I agree with him. The world is a better place without Saddam Hussein.’ b. Exit Iris är vana vid att stöta på fördomar om kvinnliga musiker, folk tvivlar på att de kan spela bara för att de är tjejer. ‘Exit Iris are accustomed to meeting with prejudices about female musicians; people doubt that they can play only because they are girls.’
Chapter 8. General subordinators and propositional modality in the Germanic languages 191
c. Det finns tydligen dom som tvivlar på att jag är skadad på riktigt. ‘Apparently, there are those who doubt that I’m actually injured.’ d. Nordbrandt berättar hur han först ska ha tvivlat på att han skulle kunna klara av att leva i “denna atmosfär där allt tycks försiggå i slow motion”. Men sedan blev han beroende av just precis detta, hävdar han. ‘Nordbrandt tells how he at first apparently doubted that he would manage to live in “this atmosphere where everything seems to occur in slowmotion.” But later he became dependent on precisely that, he claims.’ e. Många har tvivlat på att han skulle kunna komma tillbaka som en vinnare igen [...] Nu är han VM-favorit i super-G och gav dem som räknat bort honom en gliring. ‘Many have doubted that he would be able to come back as a winner again... Now, he is the world-championship favourite in super-G and gibes at those who have counted him out.’ This is also true for tvivel: (248) a. Ungas tvivel på att Förintelsen ägt rum var dessbättre inte så utbredda som många förleddes att tro. ‘Young people’s doubts that the Holocaust has taken place were fortunately not so widespread as many had been led to believe.’ b. De första veckorna hade jag starka tvivel på att något föräldrautbildningsprogram i världen skulle kunna hjälpa de här familjerna. Men det var fantastiskt att se hur snabbt relationerna kunde förbättras mellan barn och föräldrar. ‘The first weeks, I had strong doubts that any parental guidance program in the world could help these families. But it was fantastic to see how quickly the relations between children and parents could improve.’ c. Hade vi varit det minsta i tvivel om att allt stått rätt till hade vi direkt tagit in färjan på varv. ‘Had we been in the slightest doubt that everything was in order, we would have immediately taken the ferry on service’ d. Bland dessa fanns Sydafrikas president Thabo Mbeki. Han uttryckte vid mötet tvivel på att aids behöver behandlas medicinskt. ‘Among these was the South African president Thabo Mbeki. He expressed doubts that Aids needs to be treated medically.’ This alone cannot explain the large majority of att after tvivla på and tvivel, however, even less the complete dominance of att after betvivla (there are nevertheless a few instances of betvivla om at Google.se). Another explanation has to do with what exactly is being doubted. After tvivla på, tvivel and betvivla, the object of the doubt may not just be the propositional content itself but rather the clause as a statement or idea that is given in the discourse situation, potentially uttered by somebody else. This may be the interpretation when att is used, but not when om is:
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(249) a. Efter att ha sett djuret på nära håll är han nu mer tveksam till att det behöver röra sig om något ungt djur. ‘After having seen the animal at a short distance, he is now more doubtful that it has to be a young animal.’ Cf. b. Hans Bergqvist är tveksam till om alla 30 på kontoret kan behålla sina arbeten. ‘Hans Bergqvist is doubtful whether all 30 employees at the office can keep their jobs.’ I (249a), the interpretation is that the subject is doubtful towards the idea or suggestion expressed by the complement clause. Note the deductive use of behöva ‘need’ and the temporal nu mer ‘now’. These imply that the complement clause has been uttered by the subject once before. In (249b), on the other hand, it is the actual propositional content that the subject is doubtful of – not the clause as an utterance or idea. In fact, among the results, the att-clauses can often be traced back to a previous statement: (250) a. Men det förutsätter att angriparna - USA och Storbritannien - släpper igenom ett sådant beslut i säkerhetsrådet. – Jag tvivlar på att de gör det, sade Göran Persson. ‘But that requires that the attackers – USA and Great Britain – let such a resolution pass in the Security Council. – I doubt that they will do that, Göran Persson said.’ b. Men mycket sällan kan upphovsmännen presentera de ovedersägliga bevis på att de har rätt, som de brukar avkräva dem som tvivlar på att de har det. ‘But very seldom can the originators present the incontrovertible evidence that they are right, which they otherwise demand from those who doubt that they are.’ c. Jens Henriksson, finansdepartementet, ser i dag stora svårigheter att klara tidtabellen[...] Barbro Feltzing, miljöpartiets riksdagsman som länge varit med i förhandlingarna kring reformen, är en av många som nu tvivlar på att regeringen klarar att hålla tidtabellen. ‘Jens Henriksson from the Ministry of Finance sees great difficulties today in managing the time table... Barbro Felzing, the environmental party’s member of the Riksdag that for a long time has taken part in the negotiations over the reform, is one of many who now doubts that the government will manage to keep the time table.’
Chapter 8. General subordinators and propositional modality in the Germanic languages 193
d. Frankrike -- upprepade på måndagen sin försäkran att Rudolf Hess begick självmord i Spandaufängelset[...] Kommunikén sändes ut timmarna efter det att familjen Hess advokat Alfred Seidl hade upprepat sina tvivel på att Hess begått självmord. ‘France reiterated on Monday its assurance that Rudolf Hess committed suicide in the Spandau prison. The bulletin was sent out hours after the fact that the Hess family lawyer Alfred Seidl had repeated his doubts that Hess committed suicide.’ One piece of evidence that these att-clauses are more object-like than the corresponding om-clauses is the fact that they can be pronominalized by det etc.: (251) Men de tvivlar på (det) att Merkel är rätt kanslerkandidat. but they doubt on it that Merkel is right chancellor.candidate In this case, the given utterance interpretation is enforced. The definite pronoun implies that the proposition is given information. Om, however, cannot be constructed with det in these contexts. Here, it is the propositional content itself that is doubted: (252) Då och then and engagera engage
då tvivlar hon på (*det) om hon verkligen ska fortsätta then doubts she on it if she really shall continue sig så mycket i föreningsarbetet. herself so much in the.organization.work
Tvivla på and betvivla can of course also take nominal complements. Quite often, these are reportative or assertive nouns, e.g. berättelse ‘story’, uppgift ‘information’, påstående ‘claim’. In some cases these are in turn made explicit by an att-clause: (253) Därför betvivlar han de göteborgska valundersökarnas slutsats att framför allt socialdemokraternas väljare gått åt höger vid 1985 års val. ‘Therefore, he doubts the conclusion reached by the Gothenburgish election commission that especially the Social Democratic voters have moved to the right at the 1985 election.’ It is not unlikely that many att-clauses after tvivla på and betvivla in fact are such utterances. Although osäker på can have a dubitative meaning and has an experiencer subject and the complement clause as the object, it is not constructed with att at all in the sample (except in one case; see Example 246). This may be due to the fact that it is not semantically as compatible with the pending-utterance interpretation as tvivla på and tveksam till. Indeed, osäker på cannot be as readily constructed with det att: (254) De är osäkra på (?det) att Merkel är rätt kanslerkandidat. They are unsure of it that Merkel is right chancellor.candidate
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To summarize, om is used after dubitative predicates when the content of the proposition is being doubted by the speaker. When att is used in these contexts, it is often the case that the speaker him/herself does not doubt that the proposition is true. Furthermore, att is also used when the object of the doubt is somebody’s statement or idea. Together with the use of att and om after semifactive predicates to denote certainty vs. uncertainty and the use of att and om after factive predicates to denote presupposition vs. hypotheticality, the use of att and om after dubitative predicates to indicate belief vs. doubt truly shows that the att-om distinction is a Realis-Irrealis distinction. Att is used for positive propositional attitudes (knowledge, belief etc.), whereas om is used for negative ones (doubt, uncertainty etc.). Like the subjunctive, om occurs in interrogative, dubitative and conditional clauses, but it may also occur in otherwise declarative clauses to denote that the proposition is non-factual.
8.2.2 German German confirms the pattern that has been seen in Swedish as regards general subordinators and factuality in complement clauses. GDS (2253ff ) divides and lists predicates that select dass and/or ob in German: –
dass + ob: wissen ‘know’, erfahren ‚learn/get to know’, bemerken ‘notice’, sich erinnern ‘recall’, vergessen ‘forget’, lernen ‘learn’, entdecken ‘discover’, sagen ‘say’, zeigen ‘show’, informieren ‘inform’, entscheiden ‘decide’, bestimmen ‘decide’, raten ‘advice’, sehen ‘see’, hören ‘hear’, vorhersagen ‘predict’, wichtig sein ‘important’, bekannt sein ‘known’ , (un)klar sein ‘not clear’, offensichtlich sein ‘obvious’
–
dass: glauben/Glaube ‘believe/belief ’, vermuten ‘presume’, denken ‘think’, der Meinung sein ‘be of the oppinion’, überzeugt sein ‘convinced’, hoffen/Hoffnung ‘hope’, fürchten ‘fear’, möglich sein ‘be possible’, notwendig sein ‘necessary’; bestreiten ‘deny’, leugnen ‘deny’, bezweifeln ‘doubt’, bestätigen ‘certify’, bedauern/bedauerlich sein/Bedauern ‘regret/regretable/regret’, sich freuen/Freude ‘rejoice’, richtig sein ‘accurate’
–
ob: fragen/Frage ‘ask/question’, nachforschen ‚find out’, untersuchen ‘investigate’, prüfen/Probe ‘try’, Erkundigen ‘ask’, einziehen, neugerig sein ‘curious’, Zweifel ‘doubt’, Unterscheid ‘difference’
The first group consists of certain factive predicates, semifactive predicates, reportative predicates, predicates of significance, and a few others. Some examples: (255) a. Sie weiß, ob/dass er kommt. ‘She knows if/that he comes.’
(Eisenberg 2006b: 321)
Chapter 8. General subordinators and propositional modality in the Germanic languages 195
b. Stefanie beweisst, dass/ob du das warst. (Eisenberg 2006b: 320) ‘Stefanie shows that/if it was you.’ c. Gerhard erkennt, dass/ob Berlin ein gefährliches Pflaster ist. ‘Gerhard recognizes that/if Berlin is a dangerous place.’ (Eisenberg 2006b: 323) d. Sie wird dir sagen, ob/dass das richtig ist. (Sitta 1998: 777) ‘She will tell you if/that it is right.’ e. A hatte längst vergessen, [dass]/ob B verheiratet war. (GDS 2256) ‘A had long since forgotten that/if B was married.’ According to GDS, ob is used in these contexts to denote that the proposition is truthundetermined and that the speaker leaves the question open as to whether or not it is true (GDS 2256). As the examples show, this does not necessarily mean that the subject of the matrix clause does not know if it is true or not. Interestingly, as was mentioned above, Sitta (1971) found that there are certain factors that trigger the use of ob after verbs like erkennen, erzählen, sagen and zeigen, namely negation, modal verbs, the future and the interrogative. The common denominator between these contexts is according to Sitta (1971: 198) “das Moment der Nicht-Festgelegtheit, Unsicherheit“ (GDS 2261). Two important points can be made out of this. First, the interrogative is only a part of the semantic domain covered by ob; second, these are all Irrealis contexts. After verbs such as wissen ‘know’ and vergessen ‘forget’, GDS states that dass marks that the proposition is truth-determined, and, as far as the speaker is concerned, true (with vergessen, it is presupposed to be true). After verbs of belief, possibility and the like, dass has a “ganz unterschiedlich Gebrauch” according to GDS (2258). It is not anchored in the real world and is truth-undetermined. It could be argued that a more appropriate description would be to say that it marks the proposition as potential. According to Sitta (1998: 777) predicates of insignificance can also be constructed with both dass and ob: (256) a. Es ist nicht so wichtig, ob er kommt (oder nicht)/dass er kommt. ‘It is not so important if he comes (or not)/that he comes.’ b. Es spielt keine große Rolle, ob er kommt (oder nicht) / dass er kommt. ‘It does not matter very much if he comes or not/that he comes.’ Predicates of the second group (those that can only be constructed with dass) are factive emotive, assertive and speculative ones (examples from Eisenberg 2006b: 64, 322): (257) a. Paul bedauert, dass Helga schläft. ‘Paul regrets that Helga sleeps.’ b. Paul behauptet, dass Helga schläft. ‘Paul claims that Helga sleeps.’ c. Wir befürchten/ vermuten/ denken, dass/*ob er Auto fährt. We fear/ presume/ think that/whether he car drives ‘We fear/presume/think that he is driving.’
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Although the factive emotive predicates cannot be constructed with ob, they can in fact be constructed with conditional wenn, giving the clause a hypothetical/conditional meaning (GDS 2255ff ): (258) Ich hätte es sehr bedauert, wenn ich dich gekränkt hätte. ‘I would be very sorry, if I should have offended you.’ This is exactly the meaning that Swedish om and English if convey in these constructions. As for assertive and speculative predicates, these cannot be constructed with om in Swedish either (nor with whether/if in English): (259) a. Paul påstår att/ *om Helga sover. Paul claims that/ if Helga sleeps b. Vi förmodar/tror/ tycker att/*om han kör bil. We presume/believe/ think that/if he drives car Note that according to GDS, the dubitative predicate bezweifeln can only be constructed with dass. Against this, it should be added that zweifeln can select ob, and that Zweifel and zweifelhaft only select ob (Eisenberg 2006b: 321, Engel 1998: 722,): (260) a. Ich zweifle, ob das Pferd je wieder gesund wird. ‘I doubt if the horse will ever be healthy again.’ b. Es ist zweifelhaft, ob wir ihn treffen. ‘It is doubtful whether we will meet him.’ Above, it was shown that there is a similar difference in Swedish between tvivla på and tveksam till/tveksamt. Tvivla på can be constructed with om, but att is the norm. For tveksamt, in contrast, om is more or less the only option. As regards tvivla på (and betvivla), it was argued that the proposition is realized as an object that the subject of the matrix clause has doubts over. Att can be used when the speaker, in contrast to the subject, does not doubt the veracity of the proposition. Furthermore, the attclause may refer to a given statement or idea in the discourse situation. Thus att may be used, even though the subject has little or no belief in the proposition. With tveksamt the situation is different. There, the proposition is the (extraposed) subject, and it is characterized as doubtful (as to its factuality). This line of reasoning is supported by German. Bezweifeln has the transitivizing prefix be- which makes the ‘objectification’ of the proposition even clearer. As for zweifeln, Eisenberg (2006b: 501) reports that the construction with ob is the older one, whereas zweifeln, dass is relatively new. Interestingly, zweifeln can also be constructed with the preposition an, anzweifeln. As with bezweifeln, the complement clause can then only be introduced by dass, according to Eisenberg. When anzweifeln selects a complement clause, it is constructed with the deictic pronominal word da, i.e. daran zu zweifeln, dass... This also suggests that the
Chapter 8. General subordinators and propositional modality in the Germanic languages 197
proposition is already known in the discourse (if one assumes da to be an anaphor and not a cataphor). To assess the exact situation for (an)zweifeln, bezweifeln, Zweifel, and zweifelhaft, corpus searches were conducted in Cosmas II W-Archiv der geschriebene Sprache, provided by Institüt für Deutsche Sprache (IDS). The search strings were bigrams consisting of one of the predicates plus dass/daß or ob (e.g. ‘zweifelhaft /+w1 dass’). For zweifeln, all the tense forms were searched for, whereas for bezweifeln, only the infinitive one was, the rest yielding too many hits to be handled. Zweifel also yielded a vast amount of hits. Therefore, the search was restricted to the singular form and one source, Mannheimer Morgen. As in the corresponding Swedish investigation, negated predicates (nicht zu zweifeln ‘not doubt’, keinen Grund zu zweifeln ‘no cause to doubt’), predicates with a negated subject (niemand zweifelt ‘no-one doubts’) or a negated temporal adverb (nie zweifeln ‘never doubt’) were disregarded. Disregarded were also matrix clauses with kaum ‘hardly’ (kaum zu bezweifeln ‘hardly to be doubted’), weninge ‘few’ (wenige zweifeln ‘few doubt’), constructions like zerstreuen/beseitigen alle Zweifel ‘to dispel all doubts’ and rhetorical questions like Wer aber würde daran zweifeln ‘who would doubt’. These are all litotes or understatements that are used to indicate that the speaker (and sometimes the subject) believes, and does not doubt. This meant that for zweifeln, dass, no less than 121 out of 264 hits were disregarded. Compare that to zweifeln, ob, where only 2 out of 433 were left out. For zweifeln daran, dass no less than 407 out of 689 were left out; with zweifeln daran, ob only one out of 133. For bezweifeln, dass 93 out of 697 hits were left out; for bezweifeln, ob none out of 252. This clearly demonstrates that negated dubitative constructions and the like only take dass. Since these constructions are not true dubitatives but rather the opposite, this is what one should expect. The results actually show that the situation is not as clear cut as the literature states. All predicates can be constructed with both dass and ob. Zweifelhaft is the one that is most often constructed with ob, followed by Zweifel and zweifeln. Bezweifeln is the one that is most often constructed with dass, but there are also many cases with ob: Table 13. Dass and ob after dubitative predicates in German zweifelhaft
Zweifel
zweifeln ø
dass ob % ob
80 350 81,4
103 339 76,7
143 431 75,1
bezweifeln daran 282 132 31,9
604 252 29,4
There are certain patterns to be noted among the results. First, even more than in Swedish, it is common among the dass-clauses after zweifeln that the speaker questions the validity of the doubt:
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(261) a. Wer jetzt noch zweifelt, dass Österreich im Jahr 2002 zur Endrunde nach Japan und Südkorea fährt, ist selber schuld. ‘Whoever still doubts that Austria will go to Japan and South Korea in the final, is self to blame.’ b. Dieses neue Fossil ist einer der stärksten und letzten Nägel im Sarg jener, die zweifeln, dass Dinosaurier etwas mit der Entstehung von Vögeln zu tun haben. ‘This new fossil is one of the strongest and last nails in the coffin of those who doubt that the Dinosaurs have something to do with the development of birds.’ c. “Ich wäre ja ein Narr, wenn ich diesen historischen Erfolg zerstören würde.” Ein Narr, der daran zweifelt, dass der Erfolg für Haider erst dann historisch ist, wenn er selbst Bundeskanzler ist. ‘”I would be a fool if I should ruin this historical success”. A fool that doubts that the success for Haider is only historical when he himself is Federal Chancellor.’ d. Hatte der Tiroler zunächst gezweifelt, dass Motor und Reynard-Chassis zeitgerecht zusammenpassen, so atmet er langsam auf. ‘Had the Tiroler at first doubted that Motor and Reynald-Chassis fit together in time periods, he now sighs in relief.’ In these cases, it is clear that the speaker, in contrast to the subject, believes or even knows that the proposition is true. Some are even implicative or presupposed: (262) a. Das finde ich schade, dass die Deutschen daran zweifeln, dass die Marktwirtschaft ihnen Vorteile bringt. ‘I find it to be a pity that the Germans doubt that the market economy brings them benefits.’ b. Weil der Mensch Jahr für Jahr zweifelt, dass der Frühling kommt... ‘Since man year after year doubts that the spring will come...’ Clearly, the choice between dass and ob after dubitative predicates is not arbitrary, but can be explained in terms of certainty and uncertainty. Ob is used when the speaker him/herself doubts that the proposition is true, otherwise dass is used. As in Swedish, the choice of complementizer also depends on what is being doubted: the propositional content in itself (ob) or a statement given in the discourse (dass). Many dass-clauses can be traced back to a previous statement: (263) a. Er darf mitreisen, als die Könige mit ihren Karawanen nach Bethlehem fahren, um den neugeborenen König zu ehren. Viele bezweifeln, dass das Kind in der Krippe im Stall ein König sein soll. Doch der Mohr bleibt dabei. ‘He can come along when the Kings travel to Bethlehem with their caravans to honour the new-born king. Many doubt that the infant in the crib in the stable is a king. Yet, the moor sticks to it.’
Chapter 8. General subordinators and propositional modality in the Germanic languages 199
b. 948 Im Zusammenhang mit der Stiftung des Bistums Brandenburg durch Otto I wurde Brandenburg urkundlich erwähnt. (Seit dem Ende der 1990er Jahre gibt es einzelne Historiker wie Dietrich Kurze oder Helmut Assing, die bezweifeln, dass das Bistum tatsächlich bereits 948 gegründet wurde... ‘In 948, in connection with the founding of the Brandenburg bishopric by Otto I, Brandenburg was first mentioned in a document. (Since the end of the 1990s there are some historians like Dietrich Kurze or Helmut Assing who doubt that the bishopric was really founded as early as 948...’ As in Swedish, both bezweifeln and anzweifeln are often constructed with nouns of saying, asserting etc. Sometimes the contents of the statements are even expressed as dass-clauses: (264) a. Die Umweltdezernentin bezweifelt die Aussage in dem Gutachten, dass mit einer Nordlösung nur 1500 Menschen mehr von Fluglärm belastet seien. ‘The head of the Environmental Department doubts the statement in the report that only 1500 people more would be troubled by aircraft noise under a “North-solution.”’ b. Man befürchtet den Abbau von Sozialstandards und bezweifelt die Behauptung, dass neoliberale Globalisierungspolitik allen mehr Wohlstand bringe. ‘One fears the cutting down of social standards and doubts the claim that the neoliberal globalization policy brings more prosperity.’ The last groups of predicates in German, to which Zweifel and zweifelhaft belong, are those that can only be constructed with ob (or wh-words). As in Swedish, these are interrogative and dubitative ones, predicates of investigation and predicates of the type neugerig sein ‘be curious’. Example from Eisenberg (2006b: 322): (265) Renate fragt/ untersucht/ überlegt/ prüft, *dass/ob Paul Gelbsucht hat. Renate asks/ investigates/ considers/ tries, that/if Paul jaundice has ‘Renate asks/investigates/considers/tries whether Paul has jaundice.’ As with the ob-clauses after semifactive and reportative predicates, these clauses all mean that the speaker and/or subject does not know whether or not the proposition is true. According to GDS (2253ff ), the use of the label indirect question for all these clauses cannot be maintained since the predicate is clearly not always an interrogative one. They choose the term “truth-undetermined” (wahrheitsunbestimmt).
8.2.3 English The pattern seen in Swedish and German as regards general subordinators and factuality in complement clauses is also found in English. One lexical difference with English, compared to Swedish and German, is that whether has a stronger role in complement clauses than if (if being more formal and restricted; CGEL 973). Therefore, for English,
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it is more appropriate to make a comparison between that on the one hand and if plus whether on the other. According to CGEL (973ff ), if/whether are selected by the following kinds of predicates (labels partly by the author): – – – – – –
asking: investigating: debating: doubt: uncertainty: dependence:
ask, inquire, wonder investigate, determine debatable, arguable doubt, doubtful, question, questionable uncertain depend
If/whether can also occur alternatively after: –
– –
factive predicates of significance: forgetting: semifactive predicates: non-factive predicates of guessing: saying:
matter, care, concern, interest(ing), relevant forget know, find out, remember, certain, clear, obvious guess, estimate predict, judge tell, inform, point out, show
In most cases, that is used after the latter predicates. As in Swedish and German, if/ whether is used when the speaker and/or subject does not know whether the proposition is true or not. Thus after not know or not say, whether/if is readily used. In the affirmative case, whether/if is also used after know when the speaker, in contrast to the subject, does not know whether or not the proposition is true: (266) a. He does not know whether it is ready. b. He knows whether it is ready (but he won’t tell me). c. He must know whether it is ready. [Speaker does not know] Cf. d. He knows that it is ready.
[Speaker knows also]
When say is in the affirmative and past tense, whether/if would not normally be used, since the matrix clause then entails that the speaker knows what the subject said. With whether/if, the only interpretation would be that the speaker for some reason chooses not to betray the knowledge to the listener, exactly as in Swedish (CGEL 982): (267) a. She didn’t say if the door was locked. b. She said?if/that the door was locked. Arguably, there is yet another interpretation of the if-version of (267b), namely that the speaker has forgotten what the matrix subject said.
Chapter 8. General subordinators and propositional modality in the Germanic languages 201
As in Swedish and German, there is variation between if/whether and that after the dubitative verb doubt (CGEL 984). As in German, if/whether seems to be more common than that. In order to determine the proportions of if/whether and that, a minor corpus search was conducted in British National Corpus (BNC). Through “Simple Search”, the different forms of the verb doubt were searched for3. For every search, a random sample of 50 of the hits was presented. As in the Swedish and German searches, negated matrix clauses and matrix clauses with negated constituents or downwardentailing words such as few were not counted, since the meaning then becomes one of belief rather than doubt (they function as litotes/understatements). Complement clauses with an omitted complementizer were counted as that-clauses, since if/whether cannot be omitted in these kind of contexts (CGEL 956). Comparative investigations were also carried out on the noun doubt and doubtful. In order to avoid hits with ‘no doubt’, the phrase ‘be doubt’ was searched in all the different verb and noun forms. Each search yielded less than 50 hits, which meant that all the occurrences in BNC could be obtained for ‘be doubt’. Altogether, this yielded a result of 36 relevant hits. In order to obtain more hits yet another search was performed on the different forms of the common extension ‘be some doubt’. For doubtful, the simple search was conducted twice, in order to yield enough results (checking of course that no hit occurred twice). The results show that whether and if occur in approximately 2/3 of the cases with the verb doubt. After doubtful, whether and if had an even stronger position (approx. 87 %). After ‘be (some) doubt’, whether had the strongest position (89,6 %): Table 15. The share of that and if/whether after dubitative predicates doubt (verb) if whether
doubtful
be (some) doubt
that ø
23 24 12
10 23 5
0 60 7
11
–
0
% if/whether
67,1
86,8
89,6
Examples: (268) a. I doubt if it’s fashionable, and it’s probably not politically correct to espouse or approve of this kind of attitude these days. b. It might also be doubted whether the accused intended to apply any force. c. She doubted that he would ever have had reason to suggest that to Nicole. d. They doubt John Major will make his mark.
3.
The codes being ‘doubt=VVB’, ‘doubted’ and ‘doubts=VVZ’
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e. However, in nearly all the instances of so-called casual working in manufacturing examined, it is doubtful if the term” casual” was applied correctly. f. Indeed, it is doubtful that an inanimate entity can meaningfully be said to have interests, or if it could, what they would be. g. Some will say that, when there is doubt whether an apparent refusal of consent is valid in circumstances of urgent necessity, the decision of a doctor acting in good faith ought to be conclusive. h. There was doubt that this was possible, given that economic growth in 1989 had fallen to 3 per cent, from 5.6 per cent in 1988. For CGEL (983), the use of whether or if after doubt, doubtful, and questionable is conceptually problematic. CGEL sees whether and if as interrogative complementizers in the widest sense of the word. Doubt, however, does not express uncertainty but “an inclination to believe that the embedded proposition is not true”. The opposite alternative offered by predicates of uncertainty is not available for doubt: (269) a. I’m uncertain whether he wrote it or not. b. I doubt whether he wrote it *or not. It could be noted, however, that among the results of ‘be (some) doubt’, there are actually 10 cases with an overt alternative, ‘or not’ or ‘or whether’: (270) Before the Act, there was some doubt as to whether or not a person had to be aware that his conduct or language was or might be regarded as being threatening, abusive or insulting. As in similar cases in Swedish (see 8.6), doubt clearly has a meaning of uncertainty rather than doubt here. Apart from such exceptional uses of doubt, the fact that doubt, in its ordinary dubitative sense, can be constructed with if/whether must be considered a strong argument against if and whether being interrogative complementizers. They are Irrealis complementizers that denote uncertainty (the ignorative) in various contexts – including such that can hardly be considered interrogative. The explanation as to why they are used in dubitative contexts is that although the speaker/subject is inclined to doubt that the proposition is true, s/he still does not know that it is.
8.3 The grammaticalization of if and a typological comparison In the last two sections, it was demonstrated that the Germanic general subordinators that and if indicate different degrees of factuality. That is a factual or potential marker, whereas if denotes that the speaker and/or the matrix subject is uncertain of the truth of the proposition. In conditional protases, if also denotes that the proposition is hypothetical. Interestingly, if can also be used in dubitative constructions, when the
Chapter 8. General subordinators and propositional modality in the Germanic languages 203
speaker doubts rather than believes that the proposition is true. Clearly, the distinction between that and if is a Realis-Irrealis one. From a historical point of view, it is not surprising that if also occurs after dubitative predicates in the Germanic languages. if derives from a Proto-Germanic word e“a, ef (SAOB J: 497); cf. ef (O.Nors.); gif, gyf (O.Eng.); ef, of (O.Sax.); obe, oba, ibu (O.H.Ger.); iba, ibai, jabai (Goth.; Duden VII 2001: 566, Hoad 1986: 227). E“a, ef, in turn, probably derives from a Proto-Germanic dative form of a noun meaning ‘doubt’; cf. ef (Isl.) and iäf (O.Swe.) ‘doubt’ (Wessén 1965: 220, Traugott 1985: 290)4. According to Wessén (1965: 220) and Traugott (1985: 290), e“a, ef probably first functioned as a question word denoting uncertainty or doubt and then widened its use to also introducing conditional protases. Arguably, an equally likely scenario is that the original noun itself was a dubitative predicate that selected a complement clause and that the noun then grammaticalized into a dubitative and ignorative (‘uncertain’) subordinator (complementizer) to that complement clause. Later, it also developed a conditional use. Another possible scenario is that there was a verbal variant of the noun which grammaticalized into a dubitative subordinator. In e.g. Old Swedish, iäf had a verbal variant iäfva that could be constructed with clausal complements: (271) at jaua en han sannelika ware then sami æller ey. to doubt if he truly be.subj the same or not ‘to doubt if he truly is the same.’
(FL: 516)
The development of complementizers from the predicates that select the complement clauses has already been noted in the African and Asian languages, where verbs of saying have developed into declarative complementizers (Hopper & Traugott 2003: 13ff ). In fact, Hopper & Traugott (2003: 187) state that it is a very widespread phenomenon that complementizers develop not only from verbs of saying but also from verbs of desiring, fearing, and other mental states. A somewhat similar case is the use of words meaning ‘suppose’ as protasis introducers in creoles (Hopper & Traugott 2003: 186). Nevertheless, Noonan (2007: 57) states that complementizers are most often derived from pronouns, conjunctions, adpositions, and case markers. The connection between the dubitative, ignorative, and interrogative has also been observed in other languages. As has been mentioned before, Ngiyambaa has an ignorative marker that occurs in counterfactual, hypothetical, and interrogative clauses (Palmer 2001: 53ff ). Second, Hixkaryana has an uncertainty marker that occurs in both speculative and interrogative clauses (Palmer 2001: 166). Third, Serrano has a dubitative marker that occurs in future, deductive and interrogative clauses (Palmer 2001: 167). Fourth, both Acoma (Keresan: Bybee 1985: 175) and Wintu (Penutian; Pitkin 1984: 142ff ) have a dubitative mood that occurs in statements when there is an element of doubt and in questions. Most interesting is perhaps the situation in Namia (Sepik: Sepik-Ramu; Feldpausch & Feldpausch 1992) where the dubitative marker to/ 4.
See Rosenkvist (2004) for an alternative analysis of Mainland Scandinavian om.
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ro not only marks plain uncertainty but also alternative polar questions and even certain conditional protases, all of which, as subordinate clauses, would be introduced by if in the Germanic languages (Feldpausch & Feldpausch 1992: 50, 67, 76): (272) a. on ineina awe, on ta- le ro ao- le ro I thinking neg.do I vol- go dub neg- go dub ‘I don’t know, maybe I will go or maybe I won’t go.’ b. lu ela pae o ro iya imoulu loko pae -ja ro man woman sickness do dub and healer 3s visit -goal thus nakal -ia go -fut.def ‘If a man or a woman is sick, they will thus go to visit a healer.’ c. ne olirawomi -ka le ro? you morning -of go dub ‘Are you going in the morning? (or later on?) Finally in this section, it could be worthwhile to point out that the Germanic general subordinators that and if have a remarkable parallel in Supyire (Gur: Niger-Kongo; Carlson 1994: 446ff ) as regards distribution and function. As was pointed out in 5.3, Supyire has the complementizer na ‘that’ which among other things occurs after verbs of saying, belief and knowledge. In the latter cases, the complement clause must be in the indicative. Furthermore, Supyire also has a conditional subordinator (k)ámpyí ‘if ’ which indicates “subjective uncertainty”. It can be used in conditional protases but also in embedded questions and after dubitative predicates, exactly like Germanic if. Strikingly, (k)ámpyí can also occur after negated speculative predicates such as dá ‘think’ to indicate that the speaker doubts rather than believes: (273) a. mìi Òyε a dà na u sí P- pà m I not perf believe that he fut fp- come neg ‘I don’t believe that he’ll come.’ b. mìi Òyε a dà ámpyí u sí P-pà m I not perf believe if he fut fp-come neg ‘I doubt if he’ll come.’ Just as with that and if in the Germanic languages, negative verbs of knowledge can either be constructed with na or (k)ámpyí depending on whether or not the actual speaker knows that the proposition is true. Furthermore, like Germanic if, (k)ámpyí can also be used after affirmative verbs of knowledge to indicate that the speaker, in contrast to the subject, does not know whether or not the proposition is true: (274) Músà a cè ámpyí Zhân à pa Musa perf know if Jean perf come ‘Musa knows if Jean has come.’
Chapter 8. General subordinators and propositional modality in the Germanic languages 205
It is notable that languages with no genetic affiliation and presumably no influence on one another reveal almost exactly the same pattern.
8.4 Comparison between that-if and the indicative-subjunctive At this point, a connection between the Germanic complementizers that and if and the moods indicative and subjunctive can be established on several grounds. First, both the subjunctive and if occur in interrogative and conditional clauses. Second, both the subjunctive and if occur in uncertain (ignorative) and dubitative clauses. Third, both the indicative and that occur after semifactive predicates. There is, as always, some variation. In Icelandic, the subjunctive is obligatory in all non-factive complement clauses (including interrogative ones). In conditional protases, the past subjunctive is used freely, whereas the present subjunctive is more restricted. In German and Old Swedish, all non-factive predicates have the possibility of being constructed with the subjunctive (including interrogative ones). The past subjunctive is also used freely in conditional protases. if introduces polar-interrogative and uncertain (ignorative) complement clauses in the Mainland Scandinavian languages, German and English. that cannot introduce such clauses. In dubitative clauses, both if and that can be used. if is furthermore the conditional subordinator in Swedish, English, Icelandic, and partly in Norwegian. As stated in 6.2.1, the present subjunctive is only permitted in Icelandic conditional protases when the protasis is question formed. In that case, however, it is obligatory. Conversely, ef is obligatory when the clause is not question formed. Thus, the present subjunctive and ef stand in both syntactic and morphologic complementary distribution here (IT III: 470): (275) a. Ef þú kemur/ *komir á Grænlandsgrund sérðu if you come.pres.ind/ come.pres.subj to Grænlandsgrund, see.you áreiðanlega ýmislegt forvitinilegt. doubtless various interesting ‘If you come to Grænlandsgrund, you will doubtless see various interesting [things].’ b. *Kemur/komir þú á Grænlandsgrund sérðu áreiðanlega ýmislegt forvitnilegt. Since the meaning is basically the same, this complementary morphosyntactic distribution clearly suggests that the subjunctive and ef fulfill the same function. Recall that according to Generative Grammar, V1 in the Germanic languages means that the finite verb has been raised to the Complementizer position. The subjunctive inflected verb has thus been raised to the Complementizer position, taking the place of ef, presumably because they lexicalize the same functional category, propositional modality.
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Interestingly, Italian shows a somewhat similar pattern to that of Icelandic as regards the subordinator and the subjunctive in conditional protases, except for the fact that the verb is in the subjunctive throughout. Se ‘if ’ is not allowed when the subjunctive-inflected verb has been raised to the Complementizer position (Giorgi & Pianesi 2002: 194). Perhaps the most striking similarity between the indicative-subjunctive and thatif is the way in which the members of both pairs are used alternatively in order to denote certain factual distinctions. As was shown above, if can be used after verbs of knowing in the affirmative to denote that the speaker, in contrast to the subject, does not know whether the proposition is true. Conversely, that can be used after dubitative predicates to indicate that the speaker, in contrast to the subject, believes or knows rather than doubts that the proposition is true. In a somewhat similar way, the subjunctive is used after verbs of reading and hearing in Icelandic and verbs of saying in German to indicate that the speaker, in contrast to the subject, is reserved in regard to the truth of the proposition (it may or may not be true). When the indicative is used, the speaker indicates that s/he is inclined to accepting it as true. Interestingly, dass is normally omitted in the former case and replaced by the subjunctive-inflected verb (V2) in formal German (see 7.5). Furthermore, as was shown above, if is used after semifactive and reportative verbs that are negated, constructed with modal verbs, have future reference, or are questioned to indicate uncertainty. For exactly the same reason, the subjunctive was used in similar constructions in Old Swedish (Mattson 1933: 117ff ): (276) Martinus wiste ey och wilde vita hwat martir ther laghe. Martinus knew not and wanted know whether martyr there lay.subj ‘Martinus didn’t know and wanted to know whether the martyr lay there.’ Moreover, as was demonstrated in 6.2, the subjunctive appears to be used after negated semifactive predicates meaning ‘understand’ in Old Swedish and Modern Icelandic to indicate that the subject, in contrast to the speaker, does not know that the proposition is true: (277) oc ey vndirstodh abraham at thz vare gudz vili. and not understood Abraham that it was.subj God’s will ‘And Abraham didn’t understand that it was God’s will.’
(PP: 383)
In Icelandic, the subjunctive can also be used after negated semifactive predicates such as sjá ‘see, realize’ to indicate that the speaker also reserves himself as to the veracity of the proposition. Indeed, when the speaker and subject are the same person, i.e. when the speaker cannot see etc. that the proposition is true, the subjunctive must be used (Sigurðsson 2008: 17). The situation is less clear when it comes to factive predicates. In Icelandic, factive predicates are obligatorily constructed with the subjunctive, whereas in German, they are obligatorily constructed with the indicative. Some factive predicates (predicates of significance and ‘forget’) can either be constructed with that or if in Swedish, German and English, depending on whether the speaker and/or the subject knows or is
Chapter 8. General subordinators and propositional modality in the Germanic languages 207
uncertain of the factual status of the proposition. Interestingly, some emotive factive predicates (such as ‘regret’) can instead be constructed with the conditional if in Swedish and English and wenn in German. A similar conditional interpretation can be created by shall in these constructions in the Germanic languages. In fact, in Icelandic, skulu is obligatory (Sigurðsson 2008: 14). The greatest difference between that-if and the indicative-subjunctive is the fact that if can never introduce complement clauses of predicates of belief, possibility, apprehension etc. (i.e. speculative predicates; if can introduce reportative clauses, however). Thus, if covers a smaller portion of the non-factual domain than the subjunctive does in the Germanic languages. In this respect, the Germanic complementizer system has a closer parallel in the Spanish mood systems and other languages that use indicative for positive propositional attitudes and the subjunctive for negative ones, such as Russian and Persian (Noonan 2007; see 2.2.1). Spanish invariably uses the indicative after verbs of belief but the subjunctive in dubitative, conditional and interrogative clauses (in informal Spanish, the indicative can also be used in embedded interrogatives; Palmer 2001: 121). Furthermore, in Spanish, there is variation between the indicative and the subjunctive after negated verbs of knowing and saying (Palmer 2001: 118ff ): (278) Yo no sabía que él estaba/ estuviera ahí. I not knew that he be.3sg.past.ind/ subj here ‘I did not know that he was there.’ This appears to come very close to the variation between that and if in these contexts in the Germanic languages: (279) I didn’t know that/if he was there. The fact that that also covers the potential domain in the Germanic languages has the seemingly problematic effect in Icelandic that a Realis (að) and an Irrealis (subjunctive) morpheme occur together in the same clause: (280) Jón heldur að tunglið sé úr osti. Jon thinks that moon is.subj of cheese ‘Jon thinks that the moon is made of cheese.’
(Thráinsson 1994: 183)
However, this is not as problematic as it may seem. First, it will be shown in the next section that Germanic that actually has a weaker status after predicates of belief and report than after predicates of knowledge and comment. Second, the indicative can also be used after predicates of belief and report in German and Old Swedish. Third, in formal German, the subjunctive is more or less in complementary distribution with dass in these contexts, as was shown in 7.5. The indicative and dass are both used to indicate that the speaker is inclined to believe that the proposition is true, whereas the subjunctive is used to indicate that the subject is reserved in regard to the truth of the proposition. Fourth, the theory of Language Typology states that the unmarked value
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may cover some of the domain usually associated with the marked value (Croft 1990: 70ff; cf. the Germanic present tense which may refer to the future). In fact, it is typical of the unmarked value to be more or less neutral in its meaning and it is actually quite common in the languages of the world that the indicative also covers the potential domain (Noonan 2007). What is important is not the exact extension of each value, but the fact that there is an opposition between them (Christer Platzack p.c.). Fifth, since mood and complementizers are two morphologically distinct systems, that and the subjunctive must not stand in complementary distribution. Another more technical question that can be raised is how it is possible that two morphologically distinct lexical items, subordinators and mood inflection, can lexicalize the same functional category at the same time. Note, however, that this case is not unique, since modal verbs are already assumed by many linguists to be able to replace mood inflection, although they clearly belong to different morphological systems. Before the mood inflection is altogether lost, there will be a double marking of modality, as was the case in Old Swedish and is the case in German today. When the mood inflected finite verb is not situated in the Complementizer position, the latter being occupied by a complementizer, an agree relation is established between the functional category and the finite verb. The verb agrees with Complementizer or, rather, with propositional modality. A more fundamental question is what the connection could be between subordinators and modality markers. The answer to this must be scope. Since propositional modality arguably is the most peripheral functional category in a finite subordinate clause (these lack illocutionary force; see Cristofaro 2003), it is to be expected that members of this functional category introduce the clause. Indeed, in Chapter 5, several languages were presented where subordinate clauses are introduced by modal particles or clitics, some of which can also occur in main clauses as purely modal markers, some of which were exclusively subordinators. Moreover, as Hopper & Traugott (2003: 186) state, modality markers are one of the sources for protasis-introducers world-wide. Furthermore, it must be remembered that many of the world’s languages do not have subordinators, but rather have verb inflection that denotes subordination. As was demonstrated in 5.1 above, these inflectional morphemes often also carry a propositional-modality meaning. Thus, there is a clear overlap between subordinators and modality markers. As for the Germanic general subordinators that and if, it must be noted that these do not originate from modal particles in the subordinate clause but rather from the matrix clause. As was suggested above, if has grammaticalized from a dubitative predicate into an Irrealis subordinator. This fits in well with its modern modal meaning. That, in turn, derives from the pronouns ON þat, OE þæt, OHG daz, and Goth þata (Hoad 1986: 489). These functioned as cataphoric subject or object pronouns in the matrix clause, with the following content clause functioning as an apposition (Wessén 1956: 255, Hopper and Traugott 2003: 190ff ). Through the process of grammaticalization, the words eventually lost their pronominal status and were incorporated in the content clause as complementizers. Although that lacks modal origin,
Chapter 8. General subordinators and propositional modality in the Germanic languages 209
even from a semantic point of view, it can be argued that it has become the unmarked propositional modality value, forming a pair with if. The definite referential meaning has developed into a definite factual one (determined truth-value). Another very interesting development in English is the wide use of the noun fact in the definite form to link that-clauses with predicates that normally only select nominal complements (many prepositions and words such as indifferent and disguise) and to introduce that-clauses in subject position (CGEL: 965ff ): (281) a. This theory is borne out by *(the fact) that children in co-educational schools often mature earlier than those who are segregated. b. The fact that it was illegal didn’t worry him. In fact, as CGEL reports, the fact is the most frequent noun in English that selects thatclause complements. As will be seen in Chapter 10, this also occurs in complex adverbial subordinators (notwithstanding the fact that...). What is so interesting with the fact is that it so clearly indicates presupposition, indeed, it is the decisive cue for identifying factive predicates. If it grammaticalizes into a new complementizer in English, as it could be argued that it already is about to do, English would have a purely presuppositional subordinator. The lexical origin of that and if also explains why they do not normally introduce main clauses (except exclamatory and optative ones). If they had originated from clausal particles, e.g. ‘probably’ and ‘maybe’, it would have been more natural for them or cognates of them also to appear in main clauses. Interestingly, when they do introduce independent clauses, they seem to express speech-act notions such as optative, exclamative, and echo-questions. This would be expected if main clauses in contrast to subordinate clauses carried illocutionary force. The most peripheral functional category in a main clause is not propositional modality but speech-act modality.
8.5 That-omission and the subjunctive In 8.2 and 8.4 above, it was concluded that that covers a rather wide, not so easily defined domain. that marks the proposition as presupposed after factive predicates and as factual after semifactive predicates. Both of these observations indicate that that is a factual complementizer. However, as is well known, that may also introduce complement clauses of certain non-factive predicates where the truth of the proposition is not known to be true, but is rather said or believed to be true or is possibly true (reportative and speculative predicates). Thus, that denotes both the factual and potential. On the other hand, as was pointed out above, this is not that problematic. Language Typology has shown that the unmarked value often has a wider domain than the marked one, and may even denote parts of the meaning normally covered by the marked value (Croft 1990: 70ff ). Furthermore, Palmer (1986: 83ff ) points out that the declarative in general is weaker than epistemic markers such as ‘surely’. In fact, in some languages, what corresponds to the
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declarative in the European languages denotes what the speaker believes to be true rather than knows (see 2.1.4). Also recall that Noonan (2007) finds that in many languages, the indicative covers positive epistemic attitudes (see 2.3.1). Moreover, Kiparsky & Kiparsky (1971: 145,167) demonstrate that at least English that seems to have “factive” (i.e. presupposed) as its default value. Clauses with that-clauses as subjects become ungrammatical if the clause is in the canonical subject position and the predicate is non-factive. When the predicate is non-factive, the that-clause must come after the predicate: (282) a. That John has come makes sense. b. It seems that John has come. Cf. c. It makes sense that John has come. d. *That John has come seems. This also seems to be the case in German: (283) a. Es scheint, dass die Grünen gewinnen. it seems that the Green win ‘It seems that the Green party is winning.’ b. *Dass die Grünen gewinnen scheint. Kiparsky & Kiparsky (1971: 167) argue that this is so because that has an inherent “factive” feature (here presupposed feature), which may be altered through local government by a matrix predicate. Since the matrix predicate does not have syntactic scope over the that-clause when it occurs in the subject position, there is a clash in the interpretation. The author concurs with this analysis. It should also be added what was stated in the previous section, namely that the fact is the noun that selects the highest number of that-clauses in English. The fact is a way of incorporating that-clauses in complements of predicates that normally only select noun phrases, namely many prepositions and predicates such as indifferent and disguise (CGEL: 965). The easiness with which that is constructed with the fact suggests that it indeed has presupposed or factual as its default value. The most revealing fact in respect to that, however, is its omissibility after speculative and reportative predicates. Not only does this reveal that that has a weak status in these contexts; moreover, it is related to the use of the subjunctive. that-omission occurs in all Germanic languages except Dutch (perhaps due to French influence; de Schutter 1994: 467). In Swedish5, att is not so readily omitted after factive predicates, i.e. when the proposition is presupposed to be true (Platzack 1998: 74), although the acceptability rises when the predicate is a very frequent one: (284) a. Han gillar inte *(att) skatterna ska höjas. ‘He does not like that the taxes are to be raised.’ 5.
In Övdalian, however, att appears to be omissible in all context (Henrik Rosenkvist p.c.).
Chapter 8. General subordinators and propositional modality in the Germanic languages 211
b. Det bekymrar mig *(att) han försöker skuldbelägga oss. ‘It troubles me that he is trying to lay the blame on us.’ c. Jag är glad (att) du är här. ‘I’m glad that you are here.’ This also seems to be true for English: (285) a. It distresses me *(that) he is trying to lay the blame for the accident on us. (CGEL 954) b. He does not like *(that) the taxes are to be raised. c. I am glad (that) you are here. However, in Swedish, att-omission seems to be much more common after speculative and reportative predicates (Platzack 1998: 74): (286) a. Han trodde (att) Eva snart skulle komma. ‘He thought that Eva soon would come.’ b. Jag hade hoppats (att) hon skulle vara klar till jul. ‘I had hoped that she would be ready by Christmas.’ c. Han sa (att) han skulle komma. ‘He said he would come.’ This is also true for English. That-omission is particularly common after verbs of cognition and communication (CGEL 953): (287) a. I think it’s a good idea. b. She said they’d had a wonderful holiday. After semifactive predicates, the situation is less clear in Swedish. Att is not that easily omitted, especially not when the predicate is negated (SAG IV: 537): (288) a. Han vet inte?(att) jag har flyttat. ‘He does not know that I have moved.’ b. Har du hört?(att) hon har flyttat? ‘Have you heard that she has moved?’ Note that att marks the proposition as factual here. The speaker knows that the proposition is true. Otherwise, om would be used. After assertive predicates, att is not so easily omitted either, it seems: (289) a. Han hävdade?(att) Svensson skulle komma. ‘He claimed that Svensson would come.’ b. Han påstod?(att) Svensson skulle komma. ‘He claimed that Svensson would come.’ In English, that appears to be more omissible in these contexts.
(SAG IV: 536)
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To ascertain whether these generalizations are true for Swedish, corpus searches were again conducted in Språkbankens konkordanser. The predicates searched for were the very frequent speculative predicates tro ‘believe’, tycka ‘think’, and hoppas ‘hope’ and the semifactive predicates vet ‘know’ and förstår ‘understand’. Förstår ‘understand’ can also be seen as a representative of the factive predicates. Although understand cannot be constructed with the fact in English, its that-complement is clearly presupposed, and when constructed with if, it has a conditional meaning. For each verb, the aim was to obtain a result of more than 200 hits. To obtain these results, searches for each verb in its different tenses (present, past, supine, and infinitive) needed to yield around 1000 hits (approximately a third of these being relevant). Since the verbs were so common, older corpuses were searched (Press 76, DN 1987, Press 95). For hoppas, DN 1987 was used; for förstå Press 95. For the rest, Press 76 was searched. For some reason, att-omission is not possible after a preposition in Swedish (SAG IV: 537). Thus alternative constructions with a preposition could not be counted: tro på, hoppas på: (290) a. Han trodde på *(att) det var sant. he believed on that it was true ‘He believed that it was true.’ b. Han hoppades på *(att) det var sant. he hoped on that it was true ‘He hoped that it was true.’ Furthermore, constructions with a negated veta or a negated constituent in the matrix clause that results in the same meaning could not be counted, since these are non-factive (although the interpretation with att is a factual one). Other constructions that were omitted from the results were those with subject-fronting out of the complement clause or a relative construction involving the subject of the complement clause. As in English, att must be deleted in these cases (the so-called that-trace effect): (291) a. och de frestas att vända sig till andra läror som de tror erbjuder en sannare välfärd. ‘and they are tempted to turn to other teachings which they think offer a more true welfare.’ b. Den siffran tror jag gör att vi leder i landet. ‘That figure, I think, puts us in the lead in the country.’ Finally, textual adverbials such as som du vet ‘as you know’ and så vitt jag förstår ‘as far as I know’ were sifted out. The results are presented in the table below, followed by some examples:
Chapter 8. General subordinators and propositional modality in the Germanic languages 213
Table 15. Att-omission after speculative and semifactive predicates
hoppas (DN 1987) att ø %ø
398 70 15,0
speculative predicates tro tycka (Press 76) (Press 76) 388 88 18,5
241 128 34,7
semifactive predicates veta förstå (Press76) (Press 95) 208 1 [0,5]
398 0 0
(292) a. Jag hoppas det här är början på något nytt. ‘I hope this is the beginning of something new.’ b. Jag tror de klarar det riktigt hyggligt, menade Ericsson. ‘I think they will manage it quite well, Ericsson said.’ c. Fälldin tycker det ska svida lite i skinnet på arbetarna. ‘Fälldin thinks that it should hurt a little for the workers.’ The results clearly show that att-omission belongs to the speculative domain. After semifactive verbs (and factive ones too, depending on how one counts förstå), att is almost never omitted. The only instance that has been observed is the following: (293) Vet du jag är glad att jag har slutat. ‘You know I’m glad that I have quit.’ However, in such cases, vet du ‘you know’ is clearly a tag question, rather than a matrix predicate. Insertion of negation in the second clause reveals that it cannot have subordinate clause topology (Christer Platzack, p.c.): (294) Vet du jag (*inte) är (inte) glad att jag har slutat. know you I not am not glad that I have quit There are many possible explanations as to why att-omission is preferred after speculative predicates and many factors that may be involved. Frequency plays a role; the more frequent the word, the easier it is to omit att. Furthermore, CGEL (953) suggests that it may have to do with the possibility of the matrix clause of being backgrounded into a modal qualification (I think, I guess, it seems etc.), and the complement clause foregrounded into a main clause. On the other hand, the Swedish clauses are more likely to have subordinate clause topology, as intonation and adverbial insertion reveal. Embedded V2-clauses in Swedish have main clause intonation, whereas complement clauses with att-deletion normally do not. Furthermore, Swedish embedded V2-clauses are much more likely to be introduced by att (see 7.5 for several examples with att and V2). In fact, after verbs of belief, they must be. The same is true for Norwegian (NRG 984): (295) a. Polisen tror (att) utredningen inte varar länge. the.police think that the.investigation not lasts long ‘The Police think that the investigation won’t last long.’
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b. Polisen tror *(att) utredningen varar inte länge. the.police think that the.investigation lasts not long (296) a. Han trudde (at) prisane ikkje kom till å stige neste år. he thought that the.prises not came to to rise next year ‘He thought that the prises would not rise next year.’ b. Han trudde *(at) neste år kom ikkje prisane til å stige. he thought that next year came not the.prises to to rise It could instead be argued that the most important factor for the deletion of that after speculative predicates is that that has a weaker semantic status there. After factive and semifactive predicates, it has the function of marking that the clause is factual, in contrast to if etc, which marks the proposition as hypothetical (after factive predicates) or uncertain (after semifactive predicates). After speculative predicates, on the other hand, that merely denotes that the speaker holds it as possible or likely that the proposition is true, and there is no contrasting use of if. Therefore that may be omitted in these contexts. When V2 is used, however, the speaker is presenting the proposition as if it was an independent utterance (main clause topology). Although embedded under a speculative predicate, the speaker is reproducing an assertion, probably because s/he to some degree accepts its veracity. Thus, the speculative context is overruled, and att is preferred. Interestingly, NRG (987) finds that at-deletion after semifactive verbs such as forstå and høre leads to a reportative interpretation. Rather than experiencing the event him/herself, the speaker has learned it from someone else: (297) a. Jeg hører at du har fått deg nytt stereoanlegg (bråket fra leiligheten din er sterkere enn før). ‘I hear that you have got a new stereo (the noise from your apartment is louder than before).’ b. Jeg hører du har fått deg nytt stereoanlegg (noen har fortalt meg det). ‘I hear you have got a new stereo (somebody told me).’ c. Jeg forstår at du ble rasende (det hadde du god grunn til). ‘I understand that you were outraged (you had good reason for it).’ d. Jeg forstår du ble rasende (det gikk fram av referatet). ‘I understand you were outraged (it was clear from the report).’ This can be explained in factual terms. At-omission suggests that the speaker distances him/herself somewhat from the truth of the proposition. German is perhaps most revealing as regards the semantic status of that in complement clauses of non-factive predicates. As was shown in 7.5 and reiterated in 8.4, dass-omission is common in German after speculative and reportative predicates,
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accompanied not only by V2 but in formal style also by the subjunctive (Eisenberg 1994: 377, GDS 1465, Palmer 2001: 114)6: (298) a. Er sagt, er müsse nach Hause. he says he must.subj to house ‘He says he must go home.’ Cf. b. Er sagt, dass er nach Hause muss. he says that he to house must.ind The subjunctive is the norm and signals that the speaker is reserved in regard to the truth of the proposition (it may or may not be true). Dass and the indicative signals that the speaker is more inclined to accepting it as true. What this clearly shows is that dass is not preferred when the clause is overtly marked as Irrealis. Dass and the subjunctive are more or less in complementary distribution (although this is a tendency more than a rule). This is also true syntactically. The subjunctive-inflected verb takes the place of the complementizer. As was also pointed out in 7.5, the German pattern has a parallel in the mood-less, West Germanic Frisian. Frisian also allows for dat-omission after verbs of saying and belief. This is also followed by V2 (Hoekstra & Tiersma 1994: 524). The connection between that-deletion, non-factuality and the subjunctive is further strengthened by Italian. As was mentioned in 4.2, there are strict rules for cheomission in Italian. Che cannot be deleted at all after factive predicates. After nonfactive predicates, che can be deleted provided that the complement clause is in the subjunctive (Giorgi & Pianesi 2002: 191): (299) a. Mario si rammarica *(che) sia partito. Mario himself regrets that be.pres.subj left ‘Mario regrets that he has left.’ b. Mario ha confessato *(che) è partito. Mario has confessed that be.pres.ind left ‘Mario confessed that he left.’ c. Mario crede (che) sia partito. Mario believes that be.pres.subj left ‘Mario believes that he left.’ d. Mario credeva *(che) aveva telefonato. Mario believed that have.past.ind called ‘Mario believed that he had called.’
6. In informal language, the verb can also be in the past subjunctive, but is typically in the indicative (present and past).
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Another context in which che can be omitted is when the clause is independent, modal/expressive, and marked by the subjunctive (Giorgi & Pianesi 2002: 194). As in German, the facts can be interpreted in such a way that the declarative complementizer can only be omitted when the clause is marked as Irrealis (by the subjunctive). Although not mutually exclusive, che and the subjunctive clearly represent different values of the same functional system (Realis and Irrealis respectively). That che cannot be omitted when the clause is embedded under a factive predicate indicates that it fills a vital function there, namely to mark the clause as factual. The idea that Italian che-deletion has to do with non-factuality is further strengthened by the fact that there is an exception to the rule. Giorgi & Pianesi (2002: 194ff ) state that che-deletion is not possible when there is a Double Access Reading (DAR). DAR means that the event time overlaps both the matrix event time and the utterance time (Giorgi & Pianesi 2002: 195ff ). Compare the following examples: (300) a. Gianni ha ipotizzato (che) Maria fosse incinta. Gianni has hypothesized that Maria be.past.subj pregnant ‘Gianni hypothesized that Maria was pregnant.’ b. Gianni ha ipotizzato *(che) Maria sia incinta. Gianni has hypothesized that Maria be.pres.subj pregnant ‘Gianni hypothesized that Maria is pregnant.’ In the first sentence, essere is in the past. The event time of the complement clause does not overlap with the utterance time, and the interpretation is that Maria may or may not have been pregnant in the past, depending on whether or not Gianni was right in his hypothesizing. Here, che-omission is possible. In the latter case, essere is in the present tense and Maria’s pregnancy overlaps with both Gianni’s hypothesizing in the past and the utterance in the present. Since the speaker connects it with the utterance time, the interpretation is that Maria is in fact pregnant. In this case, che cannot be omitted even though it is embedded under a speculative predicate and the verb is in the subjunctive. To conclude, there are strong indications that that has two different uses, one after factive and semifactive predicates to mark the proposition as factual, another after speculative and reportative predicates to indicate that the speaker hold it as possible or likely that the proposition is true. In the latter case, it has a weaker semantic status and may therefore be omitted. This is especially the case when the clause is marked as Irrealis by the subjunctive, as both German and Italian show. In German, dass is then typically deleted and replaced syntactically by the subjunctive verb (in formal style). The subjunctive and dass-deletion suggest that the speaker reserves him/herself in regard to the truth of the proposition. This is clearly a Realis-Irrealis distinction. Strikingly, that-omission in the Germanic languages has a direct parallel in a language which is completely unrelated to them, namely Yolngu (Pama-Nyuŋan: Australian; Morphy 1983: 127ff ). Yolngu has a particle ŋunhi which partly functions as a deictic demonstrative pronoun ‘that’ and partly as a subordinator that can be
Chapter 8. General subordinators and propositional modality in the Germanic languages 217
translated as ‘that’. Interestingly, subordinating ŋunhi can be omitted if the subordinate clause contains the irrealis particle ŋuli (Morphy 1983: 129, 71): (301) (ŋunhi) ŋuli nhe nhä -ma bäyŋu -ny wäyin -gu ŋali that irr you.nom see -unm none -pro animal -dat 1dual.incl.nom marrtji nhä -ma wuŋay’ -wu go.unm see -unm honey -dat ‘If (as it is possible) you don’t see any animals, we’ll go and look for honey.’ Another possibility, which has already been shown in 5.3 above, is to introduce the subordinate clause with the hypothetical particle ŋula ‘if/when’ (Morphy 1983: 127ff ). This is clearly reminiscent of the that-if-distinction in the Germanic languages.
8.6 Other interrogative and conditional subordinators On the side of if, there are certain wh-words in the Germanic languages that introduce either interrogative or conditional clauses. Apart from English whether, these are huruvida (Swe.), hvorvidt, (Nor.), hvort (Ice.), hvis (Nor., Dan.), and wenn (Ger). Whether, huruvida, hvorvidt, and hvort introduce interrogative complement clauses, whereas hvis and wenn introduce conditional protases (whether also introduces exhaustive conditional protases ‘whether...or not’; CGEL 973). The question is whether these wh-words can also be analysed as Irrealis subordinators. In 8.2, it was shown that whether, like if, can be used in any context where the truth of the proposition is unknown, i.e. not only after interrogative predicates but after predicates of investigation, debate, uncertainty, and even doubt. Furthermore, like if, it can be used after certain factive, semifactive and reportative predicates to denote that the truth of the proposition is unknown. Thus, whether is clearly an Irrealis complementizer. SAG (IV: 552ff ) basically states that huruvida has the same distribution as om in complement clauses, except after emotive factive predicates, where the clause is conditional. There, only om is possible. Huruvida also denotes that the truth of the proposition is undetermined. The problem with confirming that huruvida has the same distribution as om in Swedish is that it is so much more rare than om. After predicates of doubt and uncertainty, huruvida seems particularly rare. The aforementioned corpus searches that were performed on Språkbankens konkordanser for tvivla, tveksamt, osäker, oklart, and inte veta only yielded one single hit with huruvida: (302) det är oklart huruvida breven kommer att innehålla besked om vem som har sista ordet eller om beslut om detta skjuts på framtiden. (GP 04) ‘it is unclear whether the letters will hold the answer as to who will have the final word, or if this decision is postponed to the future.’ With the dubitative noun tvivel, however, huruvida was slightly more common. In Språkbankens Konkordanser (Press 65–98, DN 1987 and GP 01–04) tvivel was
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constructed with huruvida 8 times. This may be due to the fact that tvivel often selects the preposition om. Rather than using the homonymic subordinator om, huruvida is preferred. Strikingly, huruvida occurred once with a negated tvivla, and twice with a meaning of dispelling doubts, despite the fact that the meaning then becomes one of belief. Furthermore, in two of these cases, the alternative proposition was expressed through eller inte/ej ‘or not’, also contrary to expectations: (303) a. På så sätt, menar han, undanröjs alla tvivel om huruvida Sverige har eller inte har rätt att stå utanför. (Press 95) ‘In such a way, he claims, all doubts will be dispelled as to whether Sweden has or has not the right to stand outside.’ b. De lyser av självsäkerhet, och alla eventuella tvivel på huruvida publiken älskar dem eller ej verkar bortblåsta. (GP 01) ‘They shine with confidence and all potential doubts as to whether the audience loves them or not seem to be blown away.’ These uses of huruvida enforce a meaning of uncertainty rather than doubt and suggests that huruvida may not have as wide an extension as om in complement clauses However, a corpus search for huruvida itself on GP 04 reveals that it occurs after many of those other predicates that licence om and not only after verbs of asking: (304) a. självfallet vet ingen huruvida AIK tjänade på att matchen var avbruten i 50 minuter. ‘of course nobody knows whether AIK gained anything from the fact that the game was disrupted for 50 minutes.’ b. Statistiken visar inte heller huruvida antalet likvidationsbolag utan verksamhet ökat eller minskat. ‘Nor do the statistics show whether the number of liquidating companies without any activities have increased or diminished.’ c. flera skribenter i tidningar och på musiksajter har diskuterat huruvida bandet är frikyrkligt eller inte. ‘several writers in news papers and on music sites have discussed whether or not the band is nonconformist.’ d. Israels högsta domstol kommer före behandlingen i Haag att analysera huruvida barriären är laglig eller inte. ‘Before the proceedings in Haag, the Israeli supreme court will analyse whether or not the barrier is legal.’ e. ...finns det efter Chelseas första semifinal i Champions League anledning att så tvivel, huruvida de lagansvariga alltid är lojala och gör sitt yttersta för arbetsgivaren. ‘after Chelsea’s first semi-final in Champions League, there are reasons for sowing doubts whether those responsible for the teams are always loyal and do their utmost for their employers.’
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f.
En speciallag tvingar parlamentariker och andra högt uppsatta tjänstemän att förklara huruvida de samarbetade med underrättelsetjänsten under kommuniståren. ‘One special law forces parliamentarians and other high officials to explain whether they cooperated with the intelligence service during the Communist years.’ g. och kanske är det Vägverkets beräkningar som ligger till grund för den osäkerhet som nu råder huruvida det kommer att investeras i en biltunnel eller ej. ‘and maybe it is Vägverket’s calculations that lie behind the present uncertainty whether or not there will be investments in a car tunnel.’ h. Det har tidigare spekulerats huruvida det finns någon receptor och helt plötsligt har vi hittat den och vi kan bättre förstå hur det hänger ihop. ‘Earlier, it has been speculated whether there is any receptor, and suddenly we have found it and we can better understand how it all connects.’
One argument against huruvida being an Irrealis complementizer is the fact that it can marginally be constructed with om. This suggests that huruvida is an ordinary whword and that the subordinate clause is its complement. A search on Språkbankens konkordanser yields a few hits: (305) a. Enligt rätten gick det inte att avgöra huruvida om hon fallit eller blivit slagen. ‘According to the court, it could be determined whether she had fallen or been beaten.’ (GP 04) b. Tommy Hedemalm som inte ytterligare vill kommentera huruvida om det är en kommunal eller privat part eller vad diskussionerna handlar om. ‘Tommy Hedemalm, who does not want to comment any further whether it is a municipal or private party or what the discussions are about.’ (GP 02) On the other hand, it must be added that the other order om huruvida is even more common. This can probably be explained as influence from the homophonous preposition om (’about/over’) which is common after the nominalised forms of the predicates (e.g. tvivel om). Sometimes, both interpretations are available (as in the last example below): (306) a. Det är dock oklart om huruvida kritiska resolutioner skulle klara sig bättre i ett utvidgat UNHRC. (GP 04) ‘However, it is unclear whether critical resolutions would manage better in an extended UNHCR.’ Cf. b. Debatten om huruvida M 4-stjärnhopen kunde innehålla en planet eller ej tycks främst varit en amerikansk företeelse. (GP 04) ‘The debate over whether the M4 star cluster could hold a planet or not, appears mostly to have been an American issue.’
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In analogy with whether, the author prefers to analyse huruvida as an Irrealis complementizer rather than an ordinary wh-word. Recall that even if can be constructed with that in some of the Germanic languages. The overall meaning, function and distribution of huruvida clearly indicate that it is an Irrealis complementizer. As for the status of the Norwegian and Danish conditional subordinator hvis, the situation is less clear. In the spoken language, there are the variants hvis at, hvis(s)om and even hvis(s)omat(te) (the last one only in Norwegian; Knudsen & Sommerfelt 1937: 1976). Of the following examples, the first two come form The Oslo Corpus of Tagged Norwegian Texts, Bokmål section7. The last example comes from a Norwegian chat forum (hvis(s)omat(te) being restricted to spoken language)8: (307) a. og det blir fryktelig dyrt hvis om man skal kjøpe nytt hvert år. ‘and it will be terribly expensive if one shall by a new one every year.’ b. Jeg vil heller ikke overraskes hvis at mange av skolene var veldig autoritære. ‘I won’t be surprised if many of the schools were very authoritarian.’ c. Hvisomatte Peder Guttormsen var døpt på Gol i året 1849 var han i tilfelle identisk med denne Peder som er registrert f.29.nov.1849 og døpt 16. des.1849 på Gol. ‘If Peder Guttormsen was baptized in Gol 1849, he happens to be identical to this Peder who is registered as born 29 November and baptized 16 December 1849 in Gol.’ (Genealogy Society of Norway. The Genealogical forum: www.disnorge.no/slektsforum/ viewtopic.php?t=70916) Furthermore, it appears that hvis is restricted to conditional constructions. All these facts indicate that hvis should be seen as an adverbial word that takes a subordinate clause as its complement rather than an Irrealis subordinator that is comparable to if. German conditional wenn has a temporal origin ‘when’ and can still be used in that sense (Eisenberg 2006b: 340, 344ff ): (308) a. Wenn Karl im Harz wanderte, schneite es. ‘When Karl was wandering in Harz, it snowed.’ Cf. b. Wenn du kommst, freuen wir uns. ‘If you come, we will be happy.’ This suggests that wenn is an adverbial word rather than an Irrealis subordinator. On the other hand, conditional wenn is interchangeable with the finite verb in initial
7. Note that Norwegian has two official languages, Bokmål and Nynorsk. The former is based on the regional variant of the Oslo area, which in turn is influenced by Danish, whereas the latter is based on western dialects. The orthographies of the languages are somewhat different. 8. Some of these variants do not seem to be acceptable for all Norwegian speakers. For Terje Lohndal (p.c.), (307a) and (c) are unacceptable.
Chapter 8. General subordinators and propositional modality in the Germanic languages 221
position, just as om in Swedish and, marginally, if in English. This suggests that it is indeed a complementizer (Eisenberg 2006b: 334): (309) a. Wenn du pünktlich kommst, bis du als erster dran. ‘If you arrive in time, you will be the first.’ b. Kommst du pünktlich, bist du als erster dran. This is of course also true for Norwegian and Danish hvis, but there, the presence of om or at or both argues against hvis being the actual subordinator. Another conditional subordinator with adverbial origin that can more easily be classified as an Irrealis subordinator is ifall ‘in case’ (Swe., Nor.; cf. falls in Ger.; see Rosenkvist 2004). In Swedish, it can not only introduce conditional protases but also interrogative complement clauses (SAG II: 735, IV: 643ff ): (310) a. Sett från de andra parternas synpunkt skulle ju staten begå ett avtalsbrott ifall riksdagen inte godkände regeringens bidrag till uppgörelsen. ‘From the other parties’ point of view, the state would actually commit a breach of the agreement if the parliament did not accept the Government’s contribution to the agreement.’ b. Hon undrade ifall vi ville åka med henne. ‘She wondered if we wanted to go with her.’ Ifall can also occur after predicates of uncertainty and doubt, as corpus searches on Språkbanken show: (311) a. Men vad som är nytt är att fransmännen inte bara börjat tvivla på ifall John Kerry kan vinna valet. (GP 04) ‘But what’s new is that the French not only doubt if John Kerry can win the election.’ b. Och om det tidigare var oklart ifall de båda lägren samarbetade så visar utvecklingen i Mosul att de nu obestridligen kämpar tillsammans. (GP 04) ‘And if it was unclear earlier whether both camps were cooperating, the development in Mosul shows that they are now indisputably fighting together.’ c. polisen kan ju inte veta ifall bilderna är manipulerade. (GP 04) ‘the police cannot possibly know whether the pictures are manipulated.’ Ifall is interesting, as it highlights the subtle difference between adverbials, subordinators and complementizers. In conditional protases, ifall has two interpretations that are not mutually exclusive, partly the adverbial one ‘in case’ and partly an Irrealis one ‘if ’. However, when ifall is used in complement clauses, only the Irrealis interpretation is available (constructed example): (312) *Jag undrar i det fall du kommer. I wonder in the case you come
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As with huruvida, ifall can also marginally be constructed with both att and om: (313) a. Kemdykare fanns dock på plats under tömningsarbetet ifall att något skulle hända. ‘Chemical divers were in place during the exhaustion process in case something would happen.’ b. Det handlar om ifall att man kan skapa mer publikyta och sälja mer biljetter. ‘It’s about whether one can create more room for the audience and sell more tickets.’ c. Om 50–60 år vet våra barn och barnbarn hur karriären kom att utvecklas för dagens författare... I fall om Carl-Johan Vallgren då kommer i nytryck, (GP 02) ‘In 50–60 years, our children will know how the careers have developed for the authors of today... if Carl Johan Vallgren then will come out in reprint,’ Rosenkvist (2004: 165ff ) shows that ifall has developed from a prepositional phrase in EMSw that could be constructed with a subordinate clause headed by att, om or där ‘there’. Through the process of univerbation, Rosenkvist (2004) suggests that fall lost its nominal features and fused with the proposition i ‘in’. Ifall became reanalysed as a subordinator and att/om/där became redundant. By analogy with om, ifall further expanded its use into also introducing interrogative subordinate clauses, Rosenkvist (2004) argues. As will be shown in Chapter 10, Germanic adverbial subordinators often have the property of being complex. Typically they consist of an adverbial lexeme plus that or if, e.g. despite the fact that and even if. It will be argued that the adverbial part signifies the adverbial function of the subordinate clause within the matrix clause, whereas the that/if part signifies whether the subordinate proposition is factual or hypothetical (Realis and Irrealis). Whereas that and if modifies the subordinate proposition, the adverbial part (together with its clause complement) modifies the event of the matrix clause. Thus, whereas the that/if-part clearly lexicalizes a functional category within the subordinate clause, the adverbial part rather belongs to the constituent domain of the matrix clause and selects the subordinate clause as its complement. Furthermore, these adverbial lexemes often have adverb or prepositional homonyms. All this indicate that they are in fact adverbs or prepositions that select complement clauses, rather than subordinators or parts of subordinators. True subordinators are complementizers such as that, if and whether. This is also the analysis that CGEL proposes for English, and SAG (II: 734) admits that their definition of subordinators is problematic for exactly this reason. On the other hand, it has also been shown that even if and whether can be constructed with that in some of the Germanic languages. Yet, the meaning, function, and distribution of these lexemes indicate that they belong to the same category as that. Furthermore, it must be noted that for some adverbial subordinators, that or if is not merely optional but obligatory. A lexeme like ifall is situated between these
Chapter 8. General subordinators and propositional modality in the Germanic languages 223
groups. On the one hand, it has a circumstance-adverbial meaning and function in conditional clauses; on the other, it lacks these in complement clauses, where it seems to denote the same thing as huruvida, i.e. uncertainty. It can be constructed with att or om but only marginally so. Thus, in complement clauses it can be seen as an Irrealis subordinator. In conditional clauses, its status is more problematic.
8.7 Conclusion In this chapter, it has been argued that the Germanic general subordinators that, if, and whether lexicalize propositional modality: that is Realis; if and whether Irrealis. Grammars of the Germanic languages and corpus searches have shown that that is used when the proposition is presupposed to be true (after factive predicates) or presented by the speaker as true (after semifactive predicates). It is also used when the speaker believes that the proposition is true or holds it as possible that it is true, i.e. after speculative and reportative predicates. Conversely, if and whether are used when the speaker does not know whether the proposition is true (after predicates of asking, uncertainty, investigation, debating etc.) and when the speaker doubts that the proposition is true. if is also used in conditional protases and related constructions in some Germanic languages, i.e. when the proposition is hypothetical. Importantly, there is variation between that and if/whether after some factive predicates, semifactive predicates and predicates of saying, guessing, determination, and even doubt. When that is used, the speaker marks the proposition as factual or potential, whereas when if/whether is used, the speaker marks it as uncertain. After dubitative predicates, that indicates that the speaker, in contrast to the subject, does not doubt that the proposition is true. That is also used when the proposition is given information, a pending statement in the discourse. The that-if/whether-distinction is reminiscent of the indicative-subjunctive distinction in the Germanic languages. The subjunctive is also used in conditional protases and when the speaker is uncertain of or has doubts over the veracity of the proposition. The fact that that not only introduces factual propositions but also potential ones is compatible with the theory of linguistic universals, which permits the unmarked value to cover some of the domain normally occupied by the marked one. Interestingly, it is particularly in these contexts that that can be omitted – conversely, that is least omissible after factive predicates. In formal German, dass-deletion after non-factive predicates even co-occurs with the use of the subjunctive and V2 – another indication that the systems belong to the same universal category. Dass and the indicative indicate that the speaker holds the proposition as likely to be true, whereas dass-omission and the subjunctive indicates that the speaker reserves him/herself as to the truth of the proposition. The connection between that-omission and the subjunctive is also seen in Italian. The Germanic complementizer system has an even closer resemblance in the Spanish mood system (and many others), which uses the indicative
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after verbs of belief but the subjunctive after verbs of doubt. As in the Germanic complementizer system, there is also variation between the indicative and the subjunctive after negated semifactive predicates in Spanish. Lastly, it was concluded that the conditional wh-subordinators hvis (Nor., Dan.) and wenn (Ger.) should probably be analysed as adverbs rather than subordinators. On the other hand, Swedish ifall appears to have grammaticalized into an Irrealis subordinator. It not only introduces conditional protases but also complement clauses of uncertainty and even doubt.
chapter
Speech-act modality
In the previous chapters, it was argued that the indicative and subjunctive moods, epistemic and evidential modality morphemes, and general subordinators such as that and if/whether lexicalize the functional category propositional modality. In this chapter, propositional modality will be placed in relation to the speech-act moods interrogative and imperative, in order to give a full picture of the consequences that the hypothesis entails. Since the book investigates the relationship between modality and subordination, embedded interrogative clauses will also be dealt with (which was also, to some extent, done in the previous chapter). Note that the previous three chapters focussed on the Germanic languages. So too will the next chapter, which deals with relative and adverbial subordinators. In this chapter, however, a more typological approach will be needed, since the Germanic languages are rather poor in their morphology as regards the speech-act moods. In agreement with Rizzi (1997), Bybee (1985) etc. it will be argued that speech-act modality (illocutionary force) is the most peripheral category of the main clause. In agreement with the hypothesis explored in the present investigation (but also Stroh-Wollin 2002), it will further be argued that speech-act modality it is not present in subordinate clauses. There, propositional modality is instead the most peripheral category: (314) (speech-act modality (propositional modality (tense (aspect (event modality (voice (valence (verb))))))))
9.1 The interrogative 9.1.1 Polar questions In 7.3, and 8.2, it was argued that polar questions are semantically Irrealis, since the speaker does not know whether or not the proposition is true (see also SAG IV: 730). This is supported by Palmer (2001; see 2.2.3) who shows that interrogative is accompanied by Irrealis marking in many languages of the world, and in some of these (Caddo, Ngiyambaa, Serrano, Hixkaryana, and Tiwi), the Irrealis morphemes themselves denote the interrogative. A supporting argument from Swedish is the fact that polar questions can be constructed with the potential particles kanske, kanhända, and möjligtvis without changing the essential meaning (they are more modest and
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suggestive; SAG IV: 104, SAOB K383). As was shown in 7.7, kanske and kanhända can even occupy the verb first position, leaving the finite verb in the verb phrase: (315) a. Är du möjligtvis den Nils Eriksson som landsteg i Normandie? ‘Are you possibly the Nils Eriksson that landed in Normandy?’ (GP 04) b. Kanske det inte sitter riktigt ännu? maybe it not sit really yet ‘Maybe it isn’t really there yet?’
(GP04)
That polar questions are Irrealis is also supported by the fact that if and whether also introduce clauses of general uncertainty and doubt (see 8.2). In Chapter 8, it was further demonstrated that polar questions in the Germanic languages are topologically very similar to another Irrealis clause type, namely protases of conditional constructions. First, they have the same subordinator (if) in Swedish and English. Second, they both display the subjunctive (embedded interrogatives). Third, Germanic conditional protases also have the V1 word order as an option. A similar pattern is seen in the Mesoamerican languages where polar questions and conditional protases are introduced by the same particle (Suárez 1983: 95). Indeed, Hopper & Traugott (2003: 186) list interrogative markers as one of the sources for conditional clause linkers (as a matter of fact, their examples, -ve in Hua and li in Russian, appear to be interrogative complementizers). Another language which also directly connects polar questions with propositional modality is Namia (Sepik: Sepik-Ramu; Feldpausch & Feldpausch 1992), where the dubitative particle to/ko not only marks general uncertainty but also alternative polar questions and certain conditional protases. In this section, it will be argued that propositional modality with the value Irrealis is selected by a speech-act category with the value interrogative [Q] in polar questions. Polar questions ask whether or not the proposition is true. This is in line with Rizzi (1997), Julien (2002), and Bybee (1985) who all propose that the most peripheral functional category within the clause denotes illocutionary force. The existence of the interrogative as a universal functional category that belongs to the verb is supported by the fact that WALS (Ch. 116) found that 687 languages, out of 842 investigated world wide, use interrogative morphemes, either in the form of particles (520) or verb morphology (155) or both (12) in order to form polar questions, as in the following examples from Kiowa (Kiowa-Tanoan) and Hunzib (North Caucasian; WALS 470): (316) a. hK ák’í· àn détmKnyáygóp inter 2.poss- husband hab 2sg.obj- wave.impfv ‘Does your husband wave to you...?’ b. b†’ e-čó -y go -pres.1/2 -inter ‘Are you going?’
Chapter 9. Speech-act modality 227
Within the framework of Generative Grammar, the interrogative has often been regarded as an operator-element which, like wh-words, is located in the topic position. However, WALS’s investigation clearly shows that the interrogative should be seen as a part of a functional category that belongs to the verb (or the clause). As many as 167 of the languages investigated actually realize it as verb morphology. Furthermore, it could be noted that the interrogative particle ko in Finnish cliticizes to the verb as the verb is raised to the initial position (Anders Holmberg p.c.). Furthermore, in Aghu (Central and Western: Main Section: Trans-New Guinea) the interrogative particle also codes tense (WALS 374). There is also typological support for the idea that the interrogative has wider scope than propositional modality (with the value Irrealis). Recall that Bybee’s (1985) investigation of 50 languages without close affiliation found that the interrogative was the outmost functional morpheme, further out than all other mood morphemes. Furthermore, Mithun (1995: 380ff ) found that in Central Pomo, realis-irrealis marking is quite independent of interrogative marking. This, she explained in terms of scope; the interrogative in Central Pomo has wider scope than realis-irrealis1. As for embedded polar questions, it was argued in the previous chapter that these are not performative, at least not in the Germanic languages. Rather than constituting actual questions, they reproduce the propositional content of questions, marked as uncertain by complementizers such as if and whether. In narrative discourse, the “indirect question” can also be posed by and addressed to a third party (“She asked him if...”). In accordance with Stroh-Wollin (2002), it is therefore assumed that the illocutionary force category with the value interrogative is not realized in embedded questions. That the complement clause in itself merely indicates uncertainty and not interrogativity can be made clear from the fact that topicalization of it leads to a dubious interpretation. The complement clause must come after the interrogative predicate to be interpreted as an indirect question (Christer Platzack p.c.): (317)
??If/Whether he would come she asked.
9.1.2 Content questions As has already been stated in 7.3, content questions differ from polar questions in two respects. First, the proposition is presupposed to be true in content questions (SAG IV: 744), i.e. they are semantically Realis. This semantic observation is supported by Alamblak, where content questions carry a presupposition marker on the verb (Foley 1986: 201): (318) frëhm dhëhnay -w -a -m who be.sick -ext.asp- presup -3pl ‘Who is sick?’ 1. Conversely, she explains the use of the irrealis to mark the interrogative in Caddo as being the other way around. Irrealis has scope over the interrogative. This is harder to justify, though, the interrogative being morphologically unmarked or marked by the irrealis.
228 Modality and Subordinators
Foley explains: “In such content questions, that someone is sick is assumed information, and what is really being questioned is ‘who is that someone who is sick’”. It is further supported by Caddo which has realis inflection in content questions but irrealis in polar questions (Chafe 1995: 353ff ): (319) a. dikat- yah yi=bahw -nah what?- 2ag.real -see -perf ‘What have you seen?’ b. sah yi=bahw -nah 2ag.irr- see -perf ‘Have you seen him?’ Chafe (1995: 354) offers the same explanation: the content question “presupposes that you have seen something, and the speaker wants only to know what it was”. The same holds for Keres (Isolate). Polar questions are in the dubitative mood, whereas content questions are in the indicative (Mithun 1999: 439). Thus, content questions are the opposite of polar questions as regards propositional modality. Further evidence that was given in 7.4 was the fact that content questions as opposed to polar questions, cannot licence “negative” polarity items, except when the question is rhetorical (320c), in which case the subject rather implies that the proposition is not true (the negative polarity item in the following examples is much): (320) a. Do you like her much? b. How come you like her *much? c. Who cares much about it, anyway?
(CGEL 834) (CGEL 835)
As was shown in 7.4, “negative” polarity items are clearly licensed by Irrealis contexts. They do not only occur in negative contexts but in conditional protases, polar questions, and complement clauses of predicates expressing surprise, determination, doubt, and forgetting, all typical Irrealis contexts which would display the subjunctive in e.g. Spanish. The second respect in which content questions differ from polar questions is what is being questioned. In polar questions, the truth of the proposition is being questioned. Thus, the interrogative has scope over the proposition in these contexts. In content questions, however, it is only the identity of a constituent that is being questioned, not the truth of the proposition. This could be interpreted in such a way that the interrogative category does not have scope over the proposition in content questions but only over one of the constituents, i.e. the interrogative is not realized as a functional category of the verb or the clause but rather as a functional category belonging to the nominal or adverbial domain. In generative terms, it would mean that the interrogative in content questions belongs to the Determiner-domain rather than the Complementizer-domain. Indeed, Chomsky (1995: 289) states that the wh-feature can be seen as “a variant of D”. In order to disambiguate the interrogative in polar questions and content questions, the latter will be referred to as wh from now on.
Chapter 9. Speech-act modality 229
A typological piece of evidence in support of the idea that content questions do not have the interrogative as a verbal functional category is the fact that they, in contrast to polar questions, do not contain the question particle ko in Finnish, which, as was stated above, cliticize to the verb (Anders Holmberg p.c.). A similar pattern is seen in Canela-Krahô (Jê). Polar questions have the question particle xà whereas content questions have interrogative pronouns (Popjes & Popjes 1986: 153ff ): (321) a. xà a -te po curan inter you -past deer kill ‘Did you kill a deer?’ b. jũ ca a -te hõmpun? what you you -past see ‘What did you see’? A similar situation is found in Urarina (Olawsky 2006: 831), Cavineña (Tacanan; Guillaume 2008: 100ff ), Old Church Slavonic (Huntley 1993: 164ff ), and in many other languages. It must be pointed out, however, that there are languages that constitute counter-arguments to this idea. In e.g. Hup (Makú; Epps 2008: 778ff ), the verb in content questions is inflected with the interrogative suffix -V .2 One argument against the idea that content questions do not realize the interrogative category as a functional category of the verb but rather as a constituent determiner is that the wh-category also appears to determine that the clause is a question and not a statement. This is supported by the fact that the wh-word occurs clause-initially in many languages, e.g. the Germanic ones. The wh-word can be thought to raise to the speech-act (force) phrase, where it has scope over the whole clause, and turn it into a question (the traditional generative analysis). This traditional analysis of content questions could be adopted without any consequences for the main hypothesis that general subordinators should be subsumed under propositional modality. It must be pointed out, however, that the most common way among the languages in the world is not to place the wh-word clause-initially, but rather to let it remain in its canonical argument position. Out of 803 investigated languages, WALS (Ch. 93) found 542 in which the latter applied. In e.g. Egyptian Arabic, the wh-word is not placed initially if it functions as the subject or an object. Either, the wh-word remains in its argument position or the clause is made into a relative-like construction (Ioup et al. 1994: 83, 86): (322) a. samiir shaf miin Samir saw who ‘Who was it that Samir saw?’
2. On the other hand, the question word also carries an interrogative marker hG, and the verb in basic polar questions do not carry the interrogative suffix, which suggest that -V may have a special explanation.
230 Modality and Subordinators
b. *miin samiir shaf who Samir saw c. miin illi samiir kallim -u who that Samir called -him ‘Who was it that Samir called?’ Another indication that content questions indeed contain the interrogative as a functional category of the verb is the fact that oblique wh-movement in main clauses is accompanied by auxiliary-raising. This is reminiscent of verb-raising in polar questions and could be used as an argument that content questions also have interrogative as a verbal functional category, as it has in many generative analyses. However, in 7.3, a different analysis of verb-raising in both polar and content questions was offered. Verb-raising in polar question is more similar to verb-raising in conditional protases, in that both display V1, are semantically Irrealis and alternate with the same subordinator (if). Verb raising in content questions in English, on the other hand, is more similar to other focus-fronting constructions in that they display V2 and are semantically Realis (presupposed and assertive respectively). As for the embedded content question, it could be argued, in analogy with the embedded polar question, that it does not carry the wh-feature. Similar to the embedded polar question, it merely reproduces the content of a question, but does not in itself constitute one. Again, indirect content questions are often posed by and addressed to a third party (“He asked her who...”). Furthermore, as with the embedded polar question, topicalization of the complement clause leads to a dubious interpretation. The complement clause must come after the interrogative predicate to be interpreted as an indirect question (Christer Platzack p.c.): (323)
??What
he said she wondered.
When the indirect content question functions as a subject, the wh-word behaves more like an indefinite pronoun than a question word: (324) How many will come depends on the weather. There is a close relationship between interrogative and indefinite pronouns. In fact, wh-words tend to grammaticalize into indefinite pronouns. For example, the Scandinavian indefinite pronoun var/varje (Swe.), hver (Dan., Nor., Ice.) derives from the O.Nors. interrogative pronoun hverr (Wessén 1962: 111). This is also true for English whoever. According to WALS (Ch. 46) this phenomenon exists in as many as 194 languages out of 326 investigated. Haspelmath (1997: 175ff ) and others propose that the common denominator between interrogative and indefinite pronouns is the lack of information about the identity of the referent. The only difference is that in the interrogative case, the speaker asks the listener to provide this information.
Chapter 9. Speech-act modality 231
After semifactive predicates, the wh-word is more reminiscent of a free relative pronoun: (325) a. I heard about what happened. b. I know who said it. What remains to be discussed is the question whether embedded content questions are Realis. Note that embedded oblique content question do not have auxiliary inversion and the alternative do-insertion in English: (326) I wonder what he said.
Cf. What did he say?
At the same time, they are equally presupposed as the main clause content questions. Arguably, the reason why they do not display V2 is the same as why embedded polarquestions do not display V1 in the Germanic languages throughout and embedded declarative clauses do not display V2 in the asymmetric V2 languages, namely that the Complementizer position is occupied by a subordinator, overt or, in this case, null. Another way of indication that the proposition is presupposed in embedded content questions is to express it as a restrictive relative construction. In Middle English, embedded wh-words could be followed by that (Mustanoja 1960: 180): (327) that ladyes... might se Who that beste were of dede This clearly related to that in restrictive relative constructions, since free relative pronouns, which are derived from interrogative ones, could also be constructed with it in Middle English (Mustanoja 1960: 192, 195ff, 201): (328) al is payed what that he hath spent In 4.1 it was pointed out that restrictive relative clauses are complement clauses that are semantically presupposed, factual, or potential, and that restrictive relative subordinators therefore could be classified as Realis subordinators. This is a feature that they share with content questions, and it is therefore not surprising that embedded content question should take the form of relative constructions. The pattern seen in Middle English is reminiscent of Scandinavian embedded content questions, where subject wh-words are obligatorily constructed with relative som (oblique wh-words are typically not constructed with som): (329) Jag vet vem som sade det. I know who som said it ‘I know who said it.’
232 Modality and Subordinators
Interestingly, in northern and western Norwegian dialects, som also occurs in independent content questions when the wh-word is subject (Westergaard & Vangsnes 2005: 141)3: (330) Kem som egentli trur på nåkka sånt? who som actually believes on something such ‘Who actually believes something like that?’ It would be appealing to draw a parallel between som- and do-insertion in content questions. However, an independent content question with a subject wh-word is exactly the environment where do-insertion cannot occur in English, whereas an independent content question with an oblique wh-word is exactly the environment where it must. The distribution of som after wh-words instead follows the distribution of restrictive relative som, which is obligatory when the antecedent is the subject of the relative clause and optional when it is not. In fact, there are indications that Scandinavian som in content question does not head the actual wh-clause at all. The construction may be equally well be analysed as a reduced cleft: (331) Jag vet vem (det var) som sa det. I know who it was som said it ‘I know who said it.’ Clefting is a very productive means in the Scandinavian languages of putting focus on one constituent and subordinating the remaining presupposed material. Since the wh-word is focus, and the proposition is presupposed, the cleft-analysis of embedded content questions with a subject wh-word is highly plausible (cf. the French Qu’est-ce que, lit. ‘What is is that’).
9.2 The imperative Among the speech-act moods proposed in Bybee (1985), the imperative remains to be commented upon in relation to propositional modality in the Germanic languages. One important investigation of the Germanic imperative is Platzack & Rosengren (1998). According to Platzack & Rosengren (1998), the imperative is a non-finite category. This is due to the fact that imperative clauses do not have an obligatory subject in many of the Germanic languages. Furthermore, they lack truth-value (i.e. factuality) – the answer to an imperative clause cannot be “No, that is not true” but can only be “No, I won’t”. Platzack & Rosengren (1998) therefore propose that imperative clauses do not project the functional category responsible for these features, in their framework called Finiteness. According to Platzack & Rosengren (1998), Finiteness is responsible for establishing the nexus relation between the subject and the finite verb 3.
The example is written in Nynorsk.
Chapter 9. Speech-act modality 233
and giving the clause a truth-value. However, the most peripheral functional category of the clause, (Illocutionary) Force (i.e. speech-act modality), is thought to be present in these clauses and hold the value [imperative]. As was stated in 4.3, the present study does not adopt the idea of a particular finiteness category. Rather, this category is identified with propositional modality. In this particular case, however, it is only a matter of terminology, since Platzack & Rosengren (1998) actually connect Finiteness with factuality. The general points made in Platzack & Rosengren (1998) are important and need to be taken into account. It can further be added that imperative clauses in the Germanic languages cannot be inflected for tense and do not have specific temporal reference. Typically, the imperative form is identical to the infintive form or the bare verb stem. All these facts actually suggest that the imperative, like event modality, is member of a central functional category, more central than tense. Indeed, according to WALS (287), there are also many non-Germanic languages that use the infinitive form or the bare stem to express the imperative, e.g. Ingush (Nakh-Dagestan: North Caucasian; WALS 287): (332) dieš-a read-imp/inf ‘Read!’ or ‘to read!’ On the other hand, WALS (286) also reports that there are many other languages in the world where the imperative paradigm is distinguished along other functional parameters such as tense, (typically present vs. future), aspect (typically perfective vs. imperfective), and politeness. In particular, it is common that the imperative is distinguished along number. The majority of the languages investigated (336 out of 547) have imperative morphology dedicated to either the 2nd person singular or 2nd person plural or both. The following examples are from Limbu (Tibeto-Burman; WALS 286): (333) a. Ips -Ø -ε ! sleep -2sg- imp ‘Sleep!’ b. Ips -amm -ε ! sleep -2pl -imp ‘Sleep!’ Arguably, tense, number, and politeness are finite categories. Furthermore, Palmer (2001: 179ff ) also shows that the imperative is accompanied by Realis-Irrealis marking in certain North-American and Papuan languages. Another common phenomenon among the languages of the world is that Irrealis markers are used to express a mild imperative (and hortative/jussive; Palmer 2001: 138ff, 181ff ). By placing the directive within the realm of thought (Irrealis), it becomes less forceful, less direct. These facts suggest that imperative clauses are indeed full-fledged finite clauses.
234 Modality and Subordinators
Although the Germanic imperative clause may be lacking in some formal features normally associated with finite clauses, there are nevertheless some indications that it contains the core functional categories. One of the arguments that was presented in Platzack & Rosengren (1998) against imperative clauses being finite is the fact that they lack the obligatory subject in many of the Germanic languages. In e.g. Swedish, the subject is optional as a 2nd person pronoun and always follows the imperative verb. In English it is also optional, but precedes the imperative verb: (334) a. Sätt (du) dig ner! sit you yourself down ‘Sit down!’ b. (You) sit down! It could be argued that these pronouns fill modal functions rather than a subject one. In Swedish, it appears to make the command more encouraging. In English, it can either make the command more encouraging or the opposite, forceful (CGEL 926). What both these uses emphasize is the speaker’s authority over the situation. On the other hand, the pronouns could also be used as contrastive focus subjects, i.e. “You sit down and you stand up!” (CGEL 926). Whatever function the pronouns have, their optional presence is more evidence of the subject category than the ungrammaticality of the nominative subject in non-finite constructions. Second, in Icelandic imperative clauses, the subject pronoun is in fact obligatory. Imperative clauses are actually very similar to direct polar questions, in the sense that the 2nd person subject is typically cliticized to the verb: (335) a. Farðu! (Far þú) go=you ‘Go!’ b. Komdu! (Kom þú) come=you ‘Come!’
Cf.
Fórstu? go=you ‘Are you going?’
Cf.
Komstu? come=you ‘Are you coming?’
Third, in Old Swedish, the imperative verb actually had number inflection: 2nd pers. pl. –in (although it was identical to the indicative and the subjunctive; Wessén 1962: 121). This is also the case in Modern Icelandic (–ið; Sigurðsson 2008: 4). In Övdalian (or Dalecarlian; a Swedish language-level dialect), there are endings for both the 1st and 2nd pers. pl. imperative: –um and -ið respectively (identical to the indicative ones; Henrik Rosenkvist p.c.). In German, lastly, there is a number distinction between the 2nd pers. sing. (–e for weak verbs and vowel-raising for some strong verbs) and 2nd pers. pl. (–(e)t/d; i.e. identical to the 2nd pers. pl. ind.; Eisenberg 2006a: 202ff ). Another syntactic piece of evidence in support of the idea that imperative clauses are finite is the fact that prohibitives have the imperative verb to the left of the negation in e.g. Swedish and English, whereas the non-finite verb in negated infinitives remains
Chapter 9. Speech-act modality 235
in the verb phrase. This suggests that the imperative verb has been raised out of the verb phrase to a more peripheral functional position, or as in the case of English, been inserted there (do-insertion): (336) a. Gör inte det! do not it ‘Don’t do it!’ Cf. b. att inte göra det to not do it ‘not to do it’ What remains is the question whether the Germanic imperative clauses host the propositional-modality category. Recall that the subjunctive is used to express the hortative and jussive functions in Old Swedish and Icelandic (only the hortative in Icelandic, it seems). In German, the 1st pers. pl. subjunctive -en can be used to express the hortative (Gehen wir), the 3rd pers. sg. to express an imperative to someone in a group (Gehe jemand), and the 3rd pers. pl. to express a polite imperative (Gehen Sie; Eisenberg 2006a: 203). These facts suggest that propositional modality is present in Germanic imperative clauses and that the subjunctive has grammaticalized into also denoting speech-act modality in these cases. Secondly, in English imperative clauses, do-insertion is possible (emphatic imperatives, CGEL 929). In declarative clauses, emphatic do-insertion asserts the truth of the proposition; in imperative clauses, the function seems to be one of encouragement, but it is clear that the constructions are related: (337) Do come in! This phenomenon actually has a close parallel in Hixkaryana (Carib; Derbyshire 1979: 143), where the certainty particle mpGnG can be used in imperative clauses with the meaning ‘see to it that you do this’. It is true that an answer to an imperative clause cannot be “no, that is not true”. However, this only shows that imperative clauses lack positive truth-value, not that they lack truth-value altogether. In fact, imperative clauses denote non-actualized events with a potential truth-value, which can be seen from the fact that the imperative is accompanied by Irrealis marking in many North-American and Papuan languages (Palmer 2001: 179ff ). A possible analysis of imperative clauses in the Germanic languages and beyond would therefore be one that is identical to direct polar questions, except that the speech-act category has the value imperative rather than interrogative. Due to the fact that the imperative denotes non-actualized, potential events, propositional modality tends to have the value Irrealis in imperative clauses. The fact that the imperative is marked as Realis in some languages (Maricopa and Caddo; Mithun 1995, Chafe 1995),
236 Modality and Subordinators
only shows that these languages draw a somewhat different line between the Realis and Irrealis domains than what is done in most languages (note that imperative clauses can be judged to be more in accord with reality than polar-interrogatives; Chafe 1995: 394). If anything, it indicates that speech-act modality and propositional modality are two separate categories. Imperative and interrogative thus stand in complementary distribution. This is supported by their formal similarity in Icelandic. It should, however, be noted that Bybee (1985) did not find any morphological evidence for separating the imperative from moods such as the indicative and subjunctive; only the interrogative could be distinguished from the rest as mood that occurred farthest away from the verb. On the other hand, it could be argued that Bybee’s sample was too small for drawing any substantial conclusions on individual categories. Furthermore, her results may have been influenced by the fact that the imperative does not have any dedicated morphology in some languages.
9.3 Conclusion In this chapter, it was argued that direct polar questions have the speech-act value interrogative and the propositional-modality value Irrealis, since the speaker does not know whether or not the proposition is true. The latter argument was supported by the fact that that the interrogative is accompanied by or associated with Irrealis marking in many languages of the world (Palmer 2001). A supporting argument from Swedish was that polar questions can be constructed with the potential particles kanske, kanhända, and möjligtvis without changing the essential meaning. It was also pointed out that polar questions in the Germanic languages are topologically very similar to another Irrealis clause type, namely protases of conditional constructions. To support the idea that polar questions contain an interrogative category which is part of a functional category in the clause, is was pointed out that WALS (Ch. 116) found that the majority of the languages they investigated used interrogative morphemes, either in the form of particles or verb morphology or both, in order to form polar questions. Bybee’s (1985) investigation of 50 languages also gave typological support for the idea that the interrogative has wider scope than propositional modality, in the sense that she found that the interrogative was the outmost functional morpheme, further out than all other mood morphemes. Furthermore, Mithun (1995: 380ff ) showed that in Central Pomo, realis-irrealis marking is quite independent of interrogative marking. This, she explained in terms of scope. The interrogative in Central Pomo has wider scope than realis-irrealis As regards embedded polar questions, it was argued that these do not contain the interrogative category, since embedded questions are not independent utterances. Rather than constituting actual questions, they reproduce the propositional content of questions. It was shown that complement clauses of interrogative predicates must
Chapter 9. Speech-act modality 237
come after the predicate to be interpreted as indirect questions. When they are topicalized, the indirect-question reading is lost. Moreover, the introducers of embedded polar questions, if and whether, also occur after predicates that cannot be considered interrogative even in the widest sense (they should be regarded as markers of uncertainty rather than interrogativity). The next section dealt with content questions. Contrary to direct polar questions, it was argued that content questions are Realis, since the proposition is semantically presupposed to be true. This was supported by Alamblak, where content questions carry a presupposition marker on the verb (Foley 1986: 201) and Caddo and Keres, where polar questions are marked as Realis and content questions as Irrealis (Chafe 1995: 353ff, Mithun 1999: 439). The claim that content questions are Realis was further supported by the fact that content questions as opposed to polar questions cannot licence “negative” polarity-sensitive items in the Germanic languages, (except when the question is rhetorical, in which case the subject rather implies that the proposition is not true). As was shown in 7.4, “negative” polarity items are clearly licensed by Irrealis contexts. It was further proposed that independent content questions do not realize the interrogative as a verbal functional category but rather as a functional category in the constituent domain (nominal or adverbial). This was based on the observation that it is only the identity of a constituent that is being questioned, not the truth of the proposition. A typological piece of evidence that was presented in support of this claim was the use of interrogative pronouns instead of clausal question particles in many languages. On the other hand, it was acknowledged that fronting of the wh-word in e.g. the Germanic languages seems to turn the clause into a question, although it was also noted that WALS (Ch. 93) found that the most common strategy among the languages in the world is not to obligatorily front the wh-word, but typically to let it remain in its canonical argument position. It was also suggested that wh-fronting may have an information-structural explanation, since it is highly reminiscent of other focus-fronting constructions in English (accompanied by auxiliary raising). In analogy with the embedded polar question, it was then argued that the embedded content question does not carry the wh-feature. Similar to the embedded polar question, it merely reproduces the content of a question, but does not in itself constitute one. Indirect content questions are often posed by and addressed to a third party. Furthermore, as with the embedded polar question, it was shown that topicalization of the complement clause leads to a dubious interpretation. The wh-complement clause must follow the interrogative predicate in order to be interpreted as an indirect question. When the indirect content question functions as a subject, the wh-word behaves more like an indefinite pronoun than a question word, and after semifactive predicates, the wh-word is more reminiscent of a free relative pronoun. The relationship between wh-words and indefinite pronouns was strengthened by the fact that WALS (Ch. 46) found that indefinite pronouns were derived from interrogative pronouns in 194 out of 326 languages investigated.
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The fact that mainland Scandinavian embedded content questions are constructed with the otherwise relative som was given two explanations. First, both restrictive relative clauses and content questions are semantically Realis. Second, the wh-word is focus, and a common strategy in the Scandinavian languages of marking focus is to use clefting constructions, which, in turn, also involves relative som. In the last section, it was argued that imperative clauses have a structure that is similar to polar questions, except that the speech-act category has the value [imperative]. Contrary to Platzack & Rosengren (1998), it was argued that imperative clauses are finite and project the propositional-modality category. Although the imperative form is identical to the infinitive form or the bare stem in many Germanic languages and others worldwide (WALS 287), it was pointed out that WALS (286) found many other languages where the imperative paradigm was distinguished along other functional parameters such as politeness, tense, aspect, and number. Indeed, in the Germanic languages, German, Icelandic, and Old Swedish imperatives distinguish number. Furthermore, it was pointed out that although imperative clauses lack an obligatory subject in e.g. Swedish and English, they still have the possibility of being constructed with one. In Icelandic, the subject is in fact obligatory and tends to cliticize to the verb, just like the 2nd person pronominal subject in polar questions tends to do. Most importantly, it was pointed out that the imperative is accompanied by Irrealis marking in certain North-American and Papuan languages (Palmer 2001: 179ff ). The fact that there are also languages (Maricopa (Yuman) and Caddo) where the imperative is marked as Realis further suggests that propositional modality is a separate functional category. It was also pointed out that Irrealis markers are often used to express a mild imperative in the languages of the world (Palmer 2001: 138ff, 181ff ). This is e.g. the case in German. Arguably, it has a non-factual explanation. By placing the directive within the realm of thought (Irrealis), the directive becomes less direct. Furthermore, it was pointed out that emphatic do-insertion is possible in English imperative clauses, and that emphatic do-insertion can be connected with Realis. The imperative and polar-interrogative were thus seen as being in complementary distribution. Against the fact that Bybee (1985) did not find any morphological evidence that the imperative could be separated from moods such as the indicative and subjunctive, but that she found that the interrogative could, it was argued that Bybee’s sample may have been too small for drawing any substantial conclusions about individual categories. Furthermore, her results may have been influenced by the fact that the imperative has no dedicated morphology in some languages.
chapter
Relative and adverbial subordinators
The present investigation has so far explored the hypothesis that general subordinators should be subsumed under propositional modality. What remains is the question whether other kinds of subordinators, namely adverbial ones should also be subsumed under propositional modality. If general and adverbial subordinators belong to the same formal system (part of speech), it would be reasonable to assume that they also belong to the same functional category. However, adverbial subordinators clearly do not primarily denote the speaker’s attitude towards the factuality of the proposition in the same way as the general subordinators arguably do. Rather, adverbial subordinators denote semantically richer notions such as comparison, temporality, causality, and circumstance. Therefore, in order to sustain the hypothesis that general subordinators should be subsumed under propositional modality, it must be shown that general subordinators are formally distinct from adverbial ones. In fact, in agreement with CGEL and Eisenberg (2006b), it will be argued below that adverbial subordinators in the Germanic languages are not subordinators in the strictest sense but rather prepositions and adverbs. SAG (II: 734) also acknowledges that adverbial subordinators are prepositional in their meaning. Another kind of subordinators that will be treated in this chapter are the relative ones. As was pointed out in 4.1, relative subordinators are rather poor in their semantics. Furthermore, at least restrictive relative subordinators are complementizers, in the sense that the head complement clauses (of nouns). Since restrictive relative clauses, like declarative that-clauses, are semantically Realis (presupposed, factual, or potential see 4.1)), and since the English restrictive relative subordinator is homonymous with the declarative one (that), it will be argued below that restrictive relative subordinators are Realis-subordinators. Scandinavian relative som, however, which not only introduces restrictive relative clauses, but also non-restrictive ones, and which derives from the equivalent-comparative som ‘as’, should not be analysed as an Irrealis subordinator, it will be argued, but rather as a preposition, like the adverbial subordinators. As was pointed out in 4.1, it would be convenient to draw a line between complementizers (including restrictive relative subordinators) and adverbial subordinators. Whereas complementizers are thought to lexicalize the most peripheral functional category of the clause (within the framework of Generative Grammar), adverbial subordinators seem to be clause-external. Typological investigations have revealed that adverbial subordinators tend to overlap with conjunctions. They are therefore classified as interdependent (cosubordinate) clause linkers rather than subordinate clause introducers in some typological frameworks (see 4.1). Considering these circumstances,
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it would be convenient to subsume complementizers under propositional modality and put aside adverbial clause linkers. On the other hand, the situation is not that simple. First, to assume that only complementizers lexicalize propositional modality would mean that conditional if cannot be considered relevant for the hypothesis. Yet, it is clearly relevant, considering the fact that it has the same syntactic and semantic characteristics as the complementizer if. Both can be replaced by the finite verb in initial position (the question formed conditional and direct polar question, respectively) and both signal that the proposition is non-factual (hypothetical and uncertain, respectively). One plausible solution, which was put forward in Chapter 8, is also to regard conditional if as a complementizer. In 8.6, it was argued that conditional clauses consist of an adverbial item meaning ‘in case’ that selects a complement clause headed by a hypothetical complementizer (if). Indeed, in colloquial Norwegian and Danish, the conditional wh-word hvis is constructed with om or at, or both. In fact, it will be shown that in the Germanic languages, adverbial subordinators tend to consist of an adverbial first element and a second element that is either that or if. This can be used as a formal criterion for distinguishing general subordinators (including restrictive relative ones) and adverbial subordinators in the Germanic languages (and in the Romance and Celtic ones too, it will be shown). Yet another complementizer that exists only in English is for in the so-called for-toconstruction. Interestingly, for typically occurs in certain Irrealis contexts (non-actualized and generic ones). This lexeme will be treated at the end of the chapter.
10.1 Relative and comparative subordinators In English and the Scandinavian languages, there are certain relative subordinators: that (Eng.), som (Mainl. Scand.), and sem (Ice.; the latter two are referred to as som below). From a functional perspective, relative subordinators put the propositional content of the clause they are heading in relation to the referent of the nominal word etc. to which they are a complement or an adjunct. At a first glance, this function has little to do with propositional modality. However, in order to relate a proposition to a referent, that proposition must, at least to some extent, be judged by the speaker to accord with observed reality, otherwise its identificational or commentatory function would be unfulfilled. Indeed, in restrictive relative clauses of definite nouns, where the relative clause helps to identify a referent out of a set of referents, the proposition is presupposed to be true, as Hooper & Thompson (1973: 486ff ) note: (338) The man who’s wearing a party hat is my uncle. It would be pointless for the speaker to make the assertion in (338) if s/he and presumably also the listener did not know that the proposition of the relative clause was true.
Chapter 10. Relative and adverbial subordinators 241
As was said in 4.1, restrictive relative clauses of indefinite nouns are not presupposed to be true, but rather marked as factual or potential: (339) a. I have a book that keeps me awake at night. b. I want to have a book that keeps me awake at night. In (339a), the proposition of the relative clause is presented as factual, whereas in (b), it is presented as potential. Note, however, that (b) implies that the speaker holds it as likely that the proposition is true (that there is such a referent in the real world). Like declarative that-clauses of speculative predicates, restrictive relative clauses of indefinite nouns with a potential meaning are within the Realis domain. Even when the main clause is negated, the relative clause still implies there is likely to be such a referent somewhere in the real world: (340) I don’t have a book that keeps me awake at night. In a negated existential construction, the interpretation is that the proposition is a given statement or idea in the discourse situation: (341) There is no book that can keep me awake at night. In 4.1, it was concluded, in agreement with Hooper & Thompson (1973) that non-restrictive relative clauses can be asserted, and that they are less subordinate than their restrictive counterparts1 in that respect. Another respect in which non-restrictive relative clauses are less subordinate is that they head adjunct rather than complement clauses. Both these facts suggest that non-restrictive relative clauses are interdependent (cosubordinate), rather than subordinate. It further suggests that non-restrictive relative-clause introducers are not complementizers but “extraclausal” clause linkers, like conjunctions and, presumably, adverbial clause linkers. Since English relative that is confined to restrictive relative clauses, it can be classified as a Realis subordinator (complementizer) that lexicalizes the most peripheral category of the subordinate clause. The fact that it is homonymic with and has the same origin as the declarative subordinator that supports this assumption. Scandinavian relative som, however, can introduce both restrictive and non-restrictive relative clauses, which makes its analysis as a Realis subordinator more problematic. Recall further that Stroh-Wollin (2002: 100ff; see 4.2) proposes that the Scandinavian relative som is not a member of the functional category associated with that and if (called “Finiteness-modal” in her framework; here called propositional modality). She
1. Recall that Hooper & Thompson (1973) also argued that restictive relative clauses of indefinite nouns are assertive. That claim was disputed in 4.1.
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supports this claim by showing that in colloquial Danish, at can be inserted after relative som (example from Haberland 1994: 345): (342) Jeg kender en karl, som at der har tjent hos ham i fjor. I know a man som that there has worked at him in last.year ‘I know a farmhand that worked for him last year.’ This is also the case in embedded content questions in colloquial Danish (Vangsnes 2006: 5): (343) ...hvem som at har gjort det who som that has done it ‘...who has done it’ Furthermore, in the Danish dialect of Bornholm, som can even be deleted before at (Haberland 1994: 345), yielding what looks like an English restrictive relative that-clause: (344) Brygjninjen va et arbeaj a kvinjfolken skulle passa. the.brewing was a job that the.women.folk should mind ‘Brewing was a job that the women should take care of.’ The fact that Danish can insert an at after relative som is not an isolated phenomenon but part of a general tendency in Danish and Norwegian of being more analytic than e.g. Swedish in respect to functional words (Askedal 1995: 178ff ). It should be added that Icelandic also permits insertion of að after relative sem: (345) Makríll, lax, sardínur og þorskur eru hentugar tegundir sem að mackerel, salmon, sardines and cod are expedient species som that innihalda mikið af Omega-3. contain much of Omega-3 ‘Mackerel, salmon, sardines and cod are expedient species that contain a lot of Omega-3.’ (Heilsubankinn “Getur maturinn sem að við borðum, hjálpað okkur að halda góðri sjón?” http://www.heilsubankinn.is/vefur/index.php?option=com_content&task= view&id=134) On the other hand, as was pointed out in 4.2 above, Norwegian and Icelandic also have the possibility of constructing ef, om with at, að (Vagnsnes 2006: 3): (346) a. Ofte kan vi lure på om at endringen skjer for often can we wonder part if that the.change happens for reformens egen skyld. the.reform’s own sake ‘Often, one may wonder if the change happens for the sake of the reform itself.’
Chapter 10. Relative and adverbial subordinators 243
b. Einnig væri gaman að heyra ef að fólk er að vinna við að also would fun to hear if that people are to win by to þýða aðra components/modules. translating other components/ modules ‘It would also be fun to hear if people are working on translating other components/modules.’ Thus, the fact that relative som can be constructed with that in some Scandinavian languages is not a definitive indication that the two words lexicalize different functional categories. Their meanings/functions must also be taken into account. Scandinavian relative som derives from the equivalent-comparative som, ‘as’, which, in turn, derives from a word meaning ‘in the same way’ (SAOB S: 8746; cf. Swe. samma and Engl. same). Interestingly, comparative som can also be constructed with at(t) or om in Danish and Swedish if the comparison is a whole proposition (i.e. a hypothetical comparative construction; Stroh-Wollin 2002: 100ff; this is also partly true for comparative as in English): (347) Han uppträder som om/att han vore en persisk sultan. ‘He behaves as if he were a Persian sultan.’ Stroh-Wollin argues that som om/att is not a complex subordinator but actually two separate ones. The om-clause can be turned into a question-formed conditional (as in English): (348) Han uppträder som vore han en persisk sultan. ‘He behaves as were he a Persian sultan.’ To this, it could be added that there are complex adverbial subordinators in Swedish with what appears to be a comparative som as the last element. These can also be constructed with att: (349) a. samtidigt som att det går att byta till mindre när at.the.same.time as that it is.possible to change to smaller when man separerar. (GP 04) one separates ‘at the same time as it is possible to change to a smaller one when one separates.’ b. Så sant som att Göran Persson för närvarande är både stats- och as true as that Göran Persson at present is both prime and finansminister, finance.minister ‘As sure as Göran Person, at present, is both prime- and finance minister,’ (Vertex 2001: 5. “Universitet bör skaffa ett program för Agenda 21”: www. vertex.umea.com/nr5–01/a1.html)
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Since relative and comparative som have the same origin and can both be constructed with that, Stroh-Wollin (2002: 11) assumes that both represent more peripheral functional categories than that does. Relative som lexicalizes a category that signals the presence and facilitates the identification of a syntactic operator in its specifier, whereas equivalent-comparative som is a head in a comparative clause. Stroh-Wollin (2002) also places comparative än (Isl. en, Eng. than, Ger. denn; hereby referred to as than) in the latter category. As regards than, it can be noted that comparative än in Swedish is also constructed with att when the comparison is a report or idea. This is also true for English than: (350) a. men jag har ingen annan information än att alla parter är positiva till en ändring. (GP 04) ‘but I have no other information than that all parties are positive towards a change.’ b. What more did they know of life than that it was life?
(BNC)
Although Stroh-Wollin’s (2002) observations and analyses have merits, they are rather vague in regard to what part of speech relative som belongs to. Comparativity is clearly an adverbial notion, whereas the function or notion associated with relative som, as described in Stroh-Wollin (2002), is rather technical and unclear. The common denominator between the two uses of som (and comparative than, for that matter) can be said to be one of relation and identity. Both relative and equivalent-comparative som take the antecedent (the figure) and relate it to the subordinate clause (the ground). In the relative case, the figure is the noun; in the comparative case, it is typically an adjective denoting a quality or an adverb denoting manner etc. Both relative and equivalent-comparative som can thus be classified as relational predicates. These observations do not, however, necessarily mean that relative and equivalent-comparative som (and comparative than for that matter) represent more peripheral functional categories than that and if. Unlike mood, tense, and aspect, “relativity” and comparativity are not notions that in any way modify the event or the proposition denoted in the subordinate clause. Rather, they modify the the antecedent (the figure). Fundamentally, this is also what prepositions do, which pairs like the following in Swedish demonstrate: (351) mannen med glasögon ‘the man with glasses’
Cf.
mannen som har glasögon ‘the man who carries glasses’
Therefore, from a functional point of view, it would be more adequate to categorize relative and equivalent-comparative som and comparative than as prepositions rather than as subordinators. One argument against the idea that relative and equivalent-comparative som and comparative than are prepositions is the fact that prepositions normally have a richer semantic content. However, there are clearly also more purely relational prepositions
Chapter 10. Relative and adverbial subordinators 245
such as genitive ones (of in English, av in Swedish). In particular, prepositions heading prepositional objects tend to be lexically rather empty. Another possible difference between relative som and prepositions is that prepositions can always be constructed with a nominal complement. This is not true for relative som, which always selects a whole subordinate clause. In the related predicative use, however, som (‘as’) does select a predicative nominal: (352) Hon arbetar som lärare. she works as teacher ‘She works as a teacher.’ Note that in the corresponding resultative construction in Swedish, the preposition till ‘to’ is preferred to som: (353) a. Några av dem håller på att utbilda sig till barnsköterskor. some of them hold part to educate themselves to nurses ‘Some of them are studying to become nurses.’ (GP 01) b. Han fortsatte att utbilda sig som grafisk formgivare. he went.on to educate himself as graphic designer ‘He went on to study to become a graphic designer.’
(GP 02)
Furthermore, in certain objective predicative constructions, som and till are used interchangeably: (354) a. Så det gäller att hålla utkik i tablåerna, fick jag so it is.important to keep watch in the.program.listings got I som svar av (GP 01) as answer by svt. ‘ So it is important to keep an eye on the program listings, I got as an answer from svt.’ b. Ringer man polisen nu på kvällarna så kan man få till call one the.police now in the.evenings then can one get to svar att de inte har någon bil ledig. (GP 02) answer that they not have any car available ‘If one calls the police in the evenings nowadays, one could get as an answer that they do not have any car available.’ Equivalent-comparative som and comparative than are often only constructed with a nominal complement. In colloquial Swedish, pronominal complements can even be in the object form. Som and än thus assign objective case to their complements, just like prepositions do. This is of course also true for English than: (355) a. Han är som mig, kan inte sitta still. he is as me can not sit still ‘He’s like me, can’t sit still.’
(GP 01)
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b. Bodström är bra. Bättre än mig faktiskt. ‘Bodström is good. Better than me actually.’ c. She was about 10 years older than me.
(GP 01) (BNC)
Another indication that relative som is a preposition is the fact that it, unlike the relative pronouns, cannot be constructed with another preposition in Swedish (Christer Platzack, p.c.). The preposition must be stranded: (356) a. boken till vilken det inte finns något omslag / vilken det inte the.book to which there not is any cover which there not finns något omslag till is any cover to ‘the book for which there isn’t any cover/which there isn’t any cover for’ b. boken *till som det inte finns något omslag / som det inte the.book to som there not is any cover som there not finns något omslag till is any cover to Another argument against analysing relative som as a preposition is that prepositional constructions do not normally involve an obligatory omission of an argument in the complement clause, which relative som does. It could also be added that comparative som neccesitates an omission of the compared constituent in the som-clause: (357) Hon är lika lång som jag är (*lång). she is as tall as I am tall ‘She is as tall as I am.’ On the other hand, the fact that constituents are obligatorily omitted in relative and equivalent-comparative som-clauses would not favour the analysis of som as a subordinator, since subordinators do not cause omission of constituents either. Thus, there is no explanatory gain in having recourse to that analysis. The reasonable explanation as to why the constituents are omitted must be that they have already been expressed in the antecedent and the main clause, respectively2. Another argument against analysing relative and equivalent-comparative som and comparative than as prepositions is the fact that prepositions render att or om
2. Yet another possibility is offered by Taraldsen (1986), who argues that relative som is an expletive, located in the canonical subject position. However, that analysis would have difficulties in accounting for the fact that relative som can be followed not only by the complementizer at but also the expletive der in colloquial Danish (see Example 342). See also Lohndal (2009) for another argument against Taraldsen’s (1986) analysis.
Chapter 10. Relative and adverbial subordinators 247
obligatory in Swedish (SAG IV: 537), which relative and equivalent comparative som and comparative än normally do not: (358) Vi längtade efter *(att) hon skulle komma. we longed after *(that) she would come ‘We longed for her to come.’ On the other hand, SAG points out that att can actually be omitted after prepositions in colloquial Swedish after certain predicates: (359) Björn räknade med ?(att) hon skulle komma. Björn counted on that she would come ‘Björn counted on that she would come.’ Furthermore, att is obligatory after comparative än when the clause is a statement or idea, and in hypothetical comparative constructions, om (and occasionally att) is at least preferred (see examples above). The use of at after relative som in colloquial Danish lends further support to the analysis. Interestingly, in Swedish, it is the preposition that can be omitted before att-clauses (SAG IV: 657): (360) a. Han blev glad (över) att du velat komma. he became happy over that you wanted come ‘He was happy that you wanted to come.’ b. Hon hade nog en känsla (av) att han visste något. she had probably a feeling of that he knew something ‘She probably had a feeling that he knew something.’ In a similar way, perhaps, som can be omitted when the relativized constituent is oblique3: (361) mannen (som) du ville träffa the.man som you wanted meet ‘the man that you wanted to meet’
3. Lohndal (2009) sees the obligatory presence of som after relativized subjects as the opposite of the obligatory omission of that when the subject is topicalized out of complement clauses in some Germanic languages (the so-called that-trace effect). However, there is a certain amount of variation among the Scandinavian languages in regard to the that-trace effect, which makes the generalization problematic. Furthermore, when the relativized or topicalized constituent is oblique, both relative and complement clauses can omit som and that, respectively. In the latter case, however, this depends on the factivity of the predicate, rather than a syntactic restriction (at least so in Swedish, see 8.5). In the present investigation, som- and that-omission are seen as unrelated phenomena.
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Indeed, as was pointed out above, in the Danish dialect of Bornholm, som can be omitted in these contexts leaving the clause headed by at (Haberland 1994: 345): (362) Brygjninjen va et arbeaj a kvinjfolken skulle passa. the.brewing was a job that the.women.folk should mind ‘Brewing was a job that the women should take care of.’ The last argument against analysing relative som as a preposition is the fact that prepositions can be stranded in the Germanic languages. However, stranded prepositions are typically heads of clause constituents, whereas relative som is a head of a noun complement. Note that predicative and equivalent-comparative som and comparative than can be stranded, and predicative and comparative phrases are clause constituents: (363) a. Vad arbetar du som? what work you as ‘What are you working as?’ b. Vem är du lika lång som? who are you as tall as ‘Who are you as tall as?’ c. Vem är du längre än? who are you taller than ‘Who are you taller than?’ Thus, som and than should not be seen as subordinators that are members of peripheral functional categories in the complement clause, but rather as prepositions that select complement clauses.
10.2 Adverbial subordinators Besides complementizers, there are a number of adverbial subordinators in the Germanic languages and beyond. The adverbial subordinators introduce adverbial subordinate clauses, which typically are adjuncts (extranuclear). As was stated in 4.1, these are classified as interdependent (cosubordinate) from a typological point of view. Interdependent clauses are clauses that cannot stand alone but “are typically not wholly included within any constituent of the nucleus” (Hopper & Traugott 2003: 176). Interdependent clauses represent the intermediate stage between independent and subordinate clauses and can both be introduced by coordinating conjunctions and adverbial clause-linkers. Within the framework of Generative Grammar, complementizers are thought to lexicalize the most peripheral functional category/ies in the clause. Coordinating conjunctions, on the other hand, are not seen as members of a functional category in the clause but rather as extraclausal. The status of the adverbial subordinators is uncertain,
Chapter 10. Relative and adverbial subordinators 249
but considering the semantic, functional and typological characteristics of adverbial clauses, a plausible assumption would be also to consider them as extraclausal. As was stated above, from a functional and semantic point of view, adverbial subordinators do not modify the events or the propositions they introduce. What they do modify, however, are the matrix clauses in which they (including their subordinate clauses) are adjuncts. They express the circumstances under which the matrix events take place. This suggests that they are in fact heads of adverbial or prepositional phrases and that the subordinate clauses are complements to these adverbial heads. This is actually the analysis that CGEL and Eisenberg (2006b) propose as regards the English and German adverbial subordinators, respectively. SAG (II 734) also notes that the adverbial subordinators are prepositional in their meaning. Furthermore, to categorize the adverbial subordinators not as subordinators but as adverbs or prepositions is in line with the theories of Language Typology, Generative Grammar, and Grammaticalization which all assume that parts of speech can be divided into lexical categories (content words, e.g. verbs, nouns, and adjectives) and functional (or grammatical) categories (e.g. inflectional categories and prepositions), the former expressing semantically richer notions, the latter fulfilling more relational functions. Recall that Bybee (1985) has shown that there is a gradual transition among the functional categories from less functional, more semantically relevant to the lexical category, to more functional and less semantically relevant. Since adverbial subordinators express semantically richer notions than that, if, and whether, namely adverbial notions that modify the matrix event, they should be seen as heads of adverbial or prepositional phrases rather than members of one of the most peripheral functional categories of the subordinate clause. In fact, as was mentioned in 4.1, at least among the Indo-European languages of Europe, there is a strong tendency of forming complex adverbial subordinators consisting of an adverbial first element (adpositional phrase etc.) and an obligatory or optional complementizer (including relativizers; Kortmann 1998: 488ff ). The Germanic languages are no exception in this regard. Below, it will be demonstrated that many, if not most of the adverbial subordinators in the Germanic languages consist of an adverbial first element that can be classified as a preposition or an adverb and a second, mainly that or if, that can be classified as a complementizer. To support this, it will be shown that many of these adverbial words can also function independently or select nominal complements. Although the adverbial subordinators do not denote propositional modality, it must be acknowledged that they often, like categories such as the future, entail or presuppose the factual status of the subordinate clause. Semantically, adverbial clauses can be divided in terms of factuality (Hengeveld 1998: 349). Adverbial clauses of cause (‘because’), simultaneousness (‘when/while’), anteriority (‘after’), reason (‘because’), concession (‘although’), and explanation (‘for’) can be classified as factual, whereas adverbial clauses of potential circumstance (‘in case’), purpose (‘so that’), condition, unreal circumstance (‘as if ’) can be classified as non-factual (Hengeveld 1998: 357ff ).
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10.2.1 The Scandinavian languages In Swedish, the complex adverbial subordinators where the second element is or can be att or om are basically the following, according to Hultman (2003: 189ff ) and SAG (II: 741ff ): därför att ‘because’, därigenom att ‘because’, därhän att ‘in the way that’, efter (det) (att) ‘after’, fast (att) ‘despite the fact that’, för att ‘in order for/so that’, från (det) (att), från och med att ‘from the moment when’, givet att ‘given the fact that’, för/i den händelse att ‘in the event that’, i det (att) ‘in that’, oaktat (det) att ‘notwithstanding the fact that’, oavsett det att ‘in spite of the fact that’, på det (att), så att ‘so that’, såtillvida att ‘in so far as’, till den grad att ‘to the degree that’, till dess (att) ‘until’, trots att ‘despite the fact that’, under det (att) ‘while’, under förutsättning att ‘provided that’, utan att, även om ‘even if ’
Norwegian examples are slik at ‘so that’, fordi (at/om) ‘because’, for at ‘because’, and etter (at) ‘after’ (NRG: 1036–1071). In Icelandic, which displays this pattern even more than e.g. Danish, the following examples can be mentioned (Kortmann 1998: 492ff, 527): an þess að ‘without’, fra þvi að ‘since’ (time), med þvi að ‘because, by’, sökum/sakir/ vegna þess að ‘because’, eftir þvi (að) ‘after’, af þvi að ‘since’ (cause), til (þess) að ‘in order to’
Swedish examples from Språkbankens konkordanser, GP 04: (364) a. Det känns ändå fel därför att alla kan kringgå lagen, it feels still wrong because that everyone can bypass the.law ‘Still, it feels wrong, because everyone can bypass the law,’ b. Hon har ingen adress i London, vilket krävs för att man she has no address in London which is.required for that one ska kunna friges mot borgen. shall be.able.to be.released against bail ‘She has no address in London which is required for her to be released on bail’. c. Huvudpersonerna har helt enkelt börjat älska varandra efter the.main.characters have quite simply begun love each.other after att Anna har arbetat hos honom, that Anna has worked at him ‘The protagonists have simply begun to love each other ever since Anna worked for him,’ d. Styrsöbolagets anställda har inte informerats trots att the.Styrsö.company’s employees have not been.informed despite that affären ska vara klar nästa vecka. the.deal shall be ready next week ‘The employees of the Styrsö company haven’t been informed, despite the fact that the deal shall be ready next week.’
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e. En av åtgärderna är att rutinerna ska ses över så att one of the.measures is that the.routines shall be.looked over so that administr- eringen skärps. the.admini- stration becomes.more.rigorous ‘One of the measures is to look over the routines so that the administration becomes more rigorous.’ f.
Utländska soldater kan bli kvar i Afghanistan på obestämd tid foreign soldiers can be left in Afghanistan for indefinite time även om afghanska styrkor övertar ett allt större ansvar even if Afghan forces take.over an ever greater responsibility för säkerheten. for the.security ‘Foreign soldiers could remain in Afghanistan indefinitely, even if Afghan troops take over an ever greater responsibility for the security.’
Note that the first element denotes under what circumstances the matrix event takes place. The subordinate clause specifies these circumstances. Note also that the first element almost exclusively has adverbial, prepositional or prepositional-phrase origin. In fact, it can be argued that these elements are still adverbs, prepositions, or prepositional phrases, only with the particular ability of selecting subordinate att- or om-clauses as their complements (when the first element is a prepositional phrase, it would in fact be the prepositional complement that selects the att or om-clause as a complement). Indeed, as SAG (II: 741) points out, new adverbial subordinators are typically derived from the combination of a preposition + att, which then becomes lexicalized. Hultman (2003: 188) also points out that e.g. cause can be expressed through different combinations of prepositions and att, e.g. genom att ‘by’. The reason why such combinations do not continue to be analysed as separate constituents may be the fact that they become so common and so lexicalized that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish the two. Most of the first elements can also occur, with the same meanings, as independent adverbials or select noun phrases, prepositional phrases, or adverbs. This is a strong reason for not analysing them as subordinators but rather as prepositions or adverbs (Examples from Språkbankens konkordanser GP 04): (365) a. Vid poliskontroll visar det sig att en av dem är efterlyst och omhändertas därför. ‘At a police check it turns out that one of them is wanted and is therefore taken into custody.’ b. Kvinna förblödde efter abort. ‘Woman bled to death after abortion.’ c. Man ligger lägst i lön trots akademisk examen. ‘One has the lowest salary despite an academic degree.’
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d. Men oaktat alla problem på vägen, har ändå en milstolpe passerats i israelisk politik. ‘But notwithstanding all the problems on the way, a milestone has nevertheless been passed in Israeli politics.’ e. ...telefonkataloger har varit flitigt använda redskap under arbetet. ‘...telephone books have been diligently used tools during the work.’ f.
Givet den fredliga upplösningen av dessa tidigare exempel, kan man förledas till betydande optimism också för Ukrainas del. ‘Given the peaceful resolution of these previous examples, one can be deluded into considerable optimism also for Ukraine’s part.’
g. en försämring för befolkningen i händelse av akut sjukdom ‘a change for the worse for the people in the event of an acute disease’ h. Men vilka tittare härdar ut tills dess? ‘But what viewers would endure until then?’ i.
Övertagandet sker vid årsskiftet och beräknas bidra positivt till vinsten per aktie från och med andra kvartalet 2005. ‘The takeover occurs at the turn of the year and is judged to contribute positively to the profit per share by the second quarter of 2005.’
Moreover, some of these adverbial lexemes can also select infinitive phrases, another indication that the ability to select subordinate clauses is only one of their functions (Note that the infinitive marker is the homonymic att. Examples are from GP 04): (366) a. De skjuter hellre upp semesterresan för att kunna amortera they postpone rather part the.vacation.trip for to be.able pay.off lite extra på huset. little extra on the.house ‘They would rather postpone the vacation trip in order to be able to pay off a little extra on the house.’ b. Efter att ha analyserat arbetsutskottets skrivelse can man after to have analysed the.working.committee’s letter can one dra slutsatsen att detta förslag helt saknar saklig draw the.conclusion that this proposal completely lacks factual grund. basis ‘After having analysed the working committee’s letter one can draw the conclusion that this proposal completely lacks a factual basis.’
Chapter 10. Relative and adverbial subordinators 253
Apart from att and om, the second element of a complex adverbial subordinator in Swedish can be the comparative particles som and än. Note that these complex subordinators are often written as one word: liksom ‘like’, såsom ‘as’, eftersom ‘because/since’, helst som ‘especially as’, speciellt som ‘especially as’, samtidigt som ‘at the same time as’, så länge (som) ‘as long as’, såvitt som ‘as far as’, så sant som ‘as sure as’, så fort som ‘as soon as’, rätt som ‘just as’, vartefter som ‘as’, allteftersom ‘as’, bäst (som) ‘just as’, så mycket mer som ‘the more so as’, förrän ‘until’
Following the analysis above of som and än as prepositions, the whole complex should be regarded as adverbial. It should be pointed out that some of these phrases are not very productive, but are rather parts of idiomatic constructions, e.g. så sant som (det är) sagt ‘quite true!’, såvitt som jag vet ‘as far as I know’, så fort som det (bara) är möjligt ‘as soon as possible’, rätt som det var ‘all of a sudden’. Among the others, some can be constructed with att (as was noted in 10.2. Examples (349a) and (b) are repeated here): (367) a. ...samtidigt som att det går att byta till mindre när at.the.same.time as that it is.possible to change to smaller when man separerar. (GP 04) one separates ‘at the same time as it is possible to change to a smaller one when one separates.’ b. Så sant som att Göran Persson för närvarande är både stats- och as true as that Göran Persson at present is both prime and finans- minister, finance. minister ‘As sure as Göran Person, at present, is both prime- and finance minister,’ (Vertex 2001: 5. “Universitet bör skaffa ett program för Agenda 21”: www. vertex.umea.com/nr5–01/a1.html) c. Så länge som att nischen är den samme som den numera är, as long as that the.niche is the same as it now is ‘As long as the niche is the same as it is now,’ (Finke Rosell, A. & Tvingsell, A. 2006: 44. “Matchnings- eller sorteringsverktyg?” The University of Gothenburg: http://www.handels.gu.se/epc/archive/00004767/01/06–04.pdf) d. Speciellt som att de olika konserterna på Frihamnspiren especially since that the different concerts on the.Free.port.pier har olika arrangörer (GP 04) have different organizers ‘Especially since the different concerts at the Free-port pier have different organizers’
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Moreover, many can either select noun phrases or appear as independent adverbials (Examples again from GP 04): (368) a. Ljungby ligger liksom en flaskhals på Lagans väg mot väst. ‘Ljungby lies like a bottleneck on Lagan’s way toward the west.’ b. Under läsningen fungerar detta unika personliga dokument även såsom en spegel för egna rädslor ‘During the reading, this unique personal document also functions as a mirror to one’s own fears’ c. Den som gick ut samtidigt som mig riskerar att klämmas och tvingas tvärnita. ‘The one who changed lanes at the same time as me is in the risk of being crushed and forced to jam on the brakes.’ d. Rätten har sedan spritts och modifierats allteftersom. ‘The recipe has then been spread around and modified bye and bye.’ e. Det har talats om 2014 som tidigaste tidpunkt för ett turkiskt medlemskap medan andra inte tror att det kan ske förrän 2025. ‘2014 has been mentioned as the earliest date for a Turkish membership, while others do not believe that it can happened before 2025.’ Among the simple adverbial subordinators are the temporal innan ‘before’, medan ‘while’, sedan ‘after’, då ‘then’, and när ‘when’. First, it should be noted that innan, sedan, and då can also be used as adverbs or prepositions (innan can also be used as a postposition. Examples again from GP 04): (369) a. Samtidigt minskade utlandsandelen av försäljning till 44 från 48 procent året innan. ‘At the same time, the foreign share of sales was reduced to 44 from 48 % the year before.’ b. Ferrari var först ut att skaffa en egen i Maranello och har vunnit alla F1mästerskap sedan 1999. ‘Ferrari was first to get their own in Maranello and has won all F1-championships since 1999.’ c. Vi får se vilka svar vi får då. ‘We shall see what answers we’ll get then.’ Second, innan, medan and sedan can be constructed with det att (cataphoric pronoun + that), an argument for analysing them in the same way as the complex adverbial subordinators containing det att, e.g. efter det att ‘after’, under det att ‘while’, tills dess att ‘until’:
Chapter 10. Relative and adverbial subordinators 255
(370) a. några år efter det att författaren lämnade Kina och långt some years after pron that the.writer left China and long innan det att han fick Nobelpriset. (GP 01) before pron that he received the.Nobel.price ‘some years after the writer left China and long before he got the Nobel price.’ b. ända sedan det att Fritidsoch turistnämnden ever since pron that the.Recreational- and tourism.commitee bildades was.founded ‘ever since the Committee for recreational activities and tourism was founded’ (Borås stad, Kommunrevisionen. “Granskning av fritids- och turistnämndens underhåll av fastigheter och anläggningar”: http://www.boras.se/revisionskontoret/revisionensrapporter.4.633e5e10039748abd7fff86556.html) Medan could further be constructed with som in (Early) Modern Swedish (SAOB M: 574): (371) Medhan som breffvedh förfärdigades, annkom en trummetare. while som the.letter was.written arrived a trumpeter ‘While the letter was written, a trumpeter arrived.’ Då can marginally be constructed with när ‘when’: (372) Då när HV avgjorde matchen then when HV settled the.game ‘When HV settled the match’
(GP 04)
This is particularly the case in colloquial Norwegian (NRG: 1067): (373) Da når ho kom heim, var alt i orden. then when she came home was everything in order ‘When she got home, everything was in order.’ Causal då, which is an expansion of the temporal adverb (SAG IV: 600ff ), could also be constructed with som in Modern Swedish (SAOB: D2470): (374) Då som den blå färgen icke var mycket mörk, så passade västen since som the blue colour not was very dark then fitted the.west tämmeligen väl till råcken och byxorna. quite nicely to the.coat and the.trousers ‘Since the blue colour wasn’t very dark, the waistcoat fitted quite nicely with the coat and the trousers.’ När (Nor. and Dan. når) has a special status among the temporal subordinators. Apart from introducing temporal adjunct clauses, it functions as a temporal wh-word. This
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is also the case in German and English, although they have actual wh-words in these contexts (Eng. when, Ger. wann). Icelandic is interesting with its wh-word hvenær, in which the Swedish, Norwegian, and Danish när/når can be discerned. Hvenær, however, is only interrogative. In colloquial/dialectal Danish, når in temporal adjunct clauses can be constructed with at (Haberland 1994: 346). This is also the case in colloquial Norwegian (NRG 1039): (375) a. Å då når ad lannsväjjen ble makadamiserad, så ble and then when that the.country.road was macadamized, then was dänn rättad it straightened. ‘And then, when the country road was macadamized, it was straightened.’ b. Det er berre til pass for deg, når at du var så dum. it is better to fit for you when that you were so stupid ‘It serves you right, since you were so stupid.’ This is strongly reminiscent of at-insertion after relative som in colloquial Danish. In Modern Swedish, när could be paraphrased with som (SAOB N: 1043): (376) När som vi var små, så sydde mamma själv alla våra klänningar. when som we were small, then sewed mom self all our clothes ‘When we were small, mom sewed all our clothes herself.’(Lagerlöf 1930) To conclude, there are many arguments for also analysing the simple temporal subordinators as adverbs that select subordinate clauses rather than subordinators themselves. The remaining simple subordinators in Swedish are fastän ‘although’, emedan ‘because’, and såvida ‘if, provided that, inasmuch that’. Fastän, which has a concessive meaning, can be constructed with att: (377) fastän att det ganska ofta händer att folk kommer fram till henne although that it quite often happens that people come up to her ‘although it quite often happens that people come up to her’ (GP 01) Emedan, which denotes cause, was often constructed with som or att in Modern Swedish (SAOB E:499). Some cases can even be found in Contemporary Swedish: (378) Emedan att konsumenter vanligen saknar dessa möjligheter since that consumers usually lack these possibilities ‘Since consumers usually lack these possibilities’ (Thureson, R. 2005. “Utvidgningen av kretsen skadeståndsberättigade enligt konkurrenslagen”. Linköping University: www.divaportal.org/diva/getDocument?urn_nbn_se_liu_diva-3109–1__ fulltext.pdf) Såvida also seems to be able to be constructed with att:
Chapter 10. Relative and adverbial subordinators 257
(379) a. Fallet är löst såvida att vi har rätt person sittande. the.case is solved insofar that we have right person sitting frihetsberövad deprived.of.liberty ‘The case is solved insofar as we have the right person in detention.’(GP 04) b. Dagen är ledig såvida att det inte är någon match eller träning. the.day is free insofar that it not is any match or training ‘The day is free insofar as there isn’t any match or training.’ (GP 02) Consequently, these words should also be analysed as adverbs. In Swedish, there is thus strong semantic and syntactic support for the division of adverbial subordinators into an adverbial part and a complementizer part, consisting of att or om. Therefore, att and om can be clearly distinguished from adverbial lexemes such as sedan, eftersom, and när.
10.2.2 The West Germanic, Celtic, and Gallo-Iberian languages The analysis of adverbial subordinators as prepositions, prepositional phrases4 or adverbs that select subordinate clauses is also supported by German. The German adverbial subordinators are roughly the following ones (Eisenberg 2006b: 203): –
– – – – – – – – –
Temporal: als ‘when, as’, bevor ‘before’, bis ‘until’, da ‘when’, ehe ‘before’, nachdem ‘after’, seit ‘since’, seitdem ‘since’, sobald ‘as soon as’, solange ‘as long as’, so wie ‘as soon as’, wenn ‘when’, während ‘while’ Conditional: wenn ‘if ’, falls ‘if, in case’, sofern ‘if, provided that’ Final: damit ‘so that’ Causal: da ‘as’, weil ‘because’ Concessive: obwohl, obgleich, obschon, wiewohl ‘although’, auch wenn ‘even though’ Consecutive: so dass/ sodass ‘so that’ Instrumental: indem ‘by’ Manner: wie ‘how’ Comparative: wie ‘as’, als ob ‘as if ’, als wenn ‘as if ’ Others: soweit ‘as far as’, wieweit, anstatt dass ‘instead of ’, ohne dass ‘without’, ungeachtet dass ‘despite the fact that’, als dass ‘for...to’, auf dass ‘that’, nur dass ‘save that’, je desto, je umso ‘the...the’
Note that some of the temporal lexemes have prepositional homonyms: seit, bis, während. Furthermore, many of the adverbial subordinators derive from prepositions or prepositional phrases: vor – bevor; nach – nachdem; seit – seitdem; mit – damit; statt – anstatt; in – indem; ohne – ohne dass. This together with the fact that they carry 4. As was pointed out above, when the first element is a prepositional phrase, it is in fact the complement of the preposition that selects the complement clause.
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adverbial meaning makes Eisenberg (2006b: 205, 480ff ) suggest that subordinators should be seen as a special kind of prepositions, which he calls “clausal prepositions”. Eisenberg (2006b: 480ff ) even suggests that the complementizers dass and ob are clausal prepositions, but without semantic content. Since they introduce complements rather than adjuncts, he compares them to prepositions that introduce prepositional objects. These are also semantically poor. However, this overlooks the observation that dass and ob stand in complementary syntactic distribution to the finite verb, which suggests that they represent a functional category in the clause. Secondly, it misses the observation that dass and ob determines clause type and denote the same thing as the indicative and subjunctive (Realis-Irrealis). Third, it fails to see the asymmetrical relation between dass and ob and the adverbial subordinators, namely that some of them are followed by dass or ob and thus appear to select them: so dass, als ob, anstatt dass, ohne dass, ungeachtet dass, als dass, auf dass, nur dass etc. If these adverbial words select subordinate clauses, then surely dass or ob introduce these clauses. As regards Eisenberg’s (2006b) claim that adverbial subordinators are prepositions, it is important to stress that some of these equally well could be analysed as prepositional phrases (damit, seitdem etc.) or adverbs (wenn, da etc.): Lastly it should be noted that some of the concessive subordinators are combinations of ob and the focus particles schon and wohl. In fact, they derive from conditional clauses with focus particles (Eisenberg 2006b: 338). The analysis of the adverbial subordinators as prepositions, prepositional phrases or adverbs is further supported by English. CGEL (1011ff ) also makes a division between complementizers such as that, if, and whether, which they categorize as subordinators, and adverbial “subordinators” such as after, since, and though, which they categorize as prepositions that can select subordinate clauses as their complements. The arguments are similar to those given above (summary by the present author): a.
They have a richer semantic content which determines the function of the subordinate clause in the main clause b. The fact that “ordinary” prepositions select nominal phrases as complements is not a valid reason not to classify the adverbial subordinators as prepositions. There are also verbs that only select clausal complements (e.g. complain) and verbs that only select nominal ones (e.g. prevent); both are still classified as verbs. What part of speech a word belongs to should not primarily be determined by what complement it selects, but its meaning and wider function. c. Some adverbial subordinators (before, after, since, until) can also select nominal complements and can be pre-modified in the same way: just/shortly before the meeting ended – just/shortly before the end of the meeting. d. Many adverbial subordinators are constructed with or can be constructed with that: in order that, notwithstanding that, but that, in that, insofar that, in the event that, save that, such that, assuming (that), considering (that), granted (that),
Chapter 10. Relative and adverbial subordinators 259
provided (that), except (that), so (that)5. Interestingly, when those that can also select nominal complements do so, that is not permitted: notwithstanding the delay, except for the delay. Thus, that introduces the subordinate clause embedded under the adverbial word. Since conditional if introduces adverbial protasis clauses, CGEL assumes that it too is a clausal preposition. For reasons that have already been given above, the present author disagrees with that analysis. First, conditional if stands in complementary syntactic distribution with auxiliaries in English (question-formed conditionals). Second, if also occurs in complement clauses (embedded polar questions and clauses of general uncertainty). Third, like interrogative if, it has an Irrealis component to its meaning (hypothetical). Fourth, it cannot select a DP argument. Fifth, it does not have prepositional origin. Sixth, it is selected by an adverbial element in certain complex adverbial “subordinators” (as if, even if). English adverbial subordinators are particularly interesting in respect to factuality. It was noted in argument d above that many adverbial subordinators are constructed with, or can be constructed with that. Moreover, some of these can be constructed with the fact that: notwithstanding the fact that, considering the fact that, except for the fact that: (380) a. This is so notwithstanding the fact that the doctor may regard the patient’s decision as wrong or ill advised. (BNC) b. In this study we found a good agreement between the two tests, particularly considering the fact that they measure two different variables. (BNC) c. The X representation functions in just the same way as the c elements in producing generalizations except for the fact that the ability of A and B to activate X is based on prior conditioning. (BNC) Since the that-clauses are semantically presupposed, these adverbial words could actually be classified as factive predicates. Since the fact is also a common device in English for linking a that-clause with a preposition (CGEL 965), it is a further indication that these adverbial subordinators are indeed prepositional. There are also some related “factive” prepositional constructions to be considered: in spite of the fact that, despite the fact that, given the fact that. In Swedish, the corresponding constructions are classified as adverbial subordinators by SAG (II: 741ff ) and Hultman (2003: 189ff ). Interestingly, these can also be constructed with det faktum att ‘the fact that’: trots det faktum att, oavsett det faktum att, oaktat det faktum att, givet det faktum att: (381) a. Trots det faktum att det fortfarande råder officiellt krigstillstånd i Basra är det i princip bara civilt arbete som nu utförs av militären i Basra. (GP 03) ‘Despite the fact that there is still an official state of war in Basra, the military in Basra basically only perform civilian work.’
5.
Quirk et al. (1985) have also been consulted here.
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b. Flera medarbetare i ett företag kan naturligtvis sluta identiska avtal [...] oaktat det faktum att utgångspunkten är en individuell avtalsrätt. (Press 95) ‘Several employees in a company can of course agree on identical contracts, despite the fact that the point of departure is an individual right to negotiate.’ Hence, trots and oaktat are clearly prepositional factive predicates rather than subordinators. The ultimate conclusion of the arguments and facts put forward above is therefore that only the central Germanic subordinators, that, if, and whether and the restrictive relative that in English can be classified as subordinators in the strictest sense. A similar pattern to that of the Germanic languages has also been reported in some of the Celtic languages. In Scottish Gaelic, gun ‘that’ “plays a strategic role in that numerous ‘complex conjunctions are based on it” (Ball 1993: 216), e.g. a chionn ‘s gun ‘because, because of the fact that’, a dh’aindeoin ‘s gun ‘despite, despite the fact that’. Moreover, in Welsh, most of the adverbial subordinate clauses are introduced by prepositions (Ball 1993: 344ff ). These can also select nominalized clauses. As was said in the beginning of the section, Kortmann (1998: 488ff ) investigated the morpho-semantic properties of adverbial subordinators in the European languages and found that the Indo-European languages often have complex adverbial subordinators consisting of an adpositional word or phrase as a first element and a complementizer (including relativizers) as the second element. On the side of the Germanic and Celtic languages, this is even more pronounced in the Gallo-Iberian Romance languages with the extensive use of the complementizer-relativizer que as a second element. Examples from French: du moment que ‘from the moment that’, du temps que ‘from the time that’, en ca que ‘in case that’, (dans) la supposition que ‘assuming that’, parce que ‘because’. Kortmann (1998: 500ff ) further reports that not only the West-European languages often have complex adverbial subordinators with a prepositional first element. In the Balkan area, prepositions are very often parts of adverbial subordinators, e.g. Albanian për-se ‘for that’, Serbo Croatian za-to Što ‘for-that comp’.
10.3 The for-to-construction What remains in this chapter is to treat the English complementizer for in the so-called for-to-construction. The question is whether it can be classified as an Irrealis subordinator, and, if not, whether it should be classified as a subordinator at all. The analysis of for in the for-to-construction as a subordinator goes back to Jespersen (1909–49 IV: 308) and has been adapted by CGEL (1181ff ). Within Generative Grammar, for has been analysed as one of the English complementizers (Chomsky & Lasnik 1977). As a subordinator/complementizer, for would have the idiosyncratic characteristics of introducing a non-finite “clause” with a subject in the oblique form.
Chapter 10. Relative and adverbial subordinators 261
As was stated in 4.2.2, this assumption has in turn been used as an argument for the existence of a functional category that determines whether the clause is finite (that) or non-finite (for; Rizzi 1997). In 4.2.2, arguments were presented against the existence of such a category. Below, it will be demonstrated that for in the for-to-construction must be considered a preposition, like its homonym from which it derives. Interestingly, the for-to-construction can partly be associated with modality. Pesetsky & Torrego (2004) have observed that the for-to-construction occurs in “irrealis” (non-actualized) or generic contexts: (382) a. I would prefer/like for Sue to by the book. b. I always prefer for my students to buy this book.
[non-actualized] [generic]
According to Palmer (2001: 190ff ), the habitual can also be categorized as Irrealis, since it refers to tendencies rather than actual events. Following Palmer’s wide definition of Irrealis, for may therefore be considered an Irrealis complementizer, making it highly relevant for the present investigation. More precisely, the for-to-construction can be connected with event modality. The matrix predicate can have volitive, obligative, or abilitative meanings: (383) a. We want/prefer/desire for you to partake. b. It is necessary/mandatory/obligatory for you to partake. c. It is possible/doable/feasible for you to partake. Furthermore, the for-to-construction can be connected with the future, another nonactualized category, in the sense that it often has future reference (specific or generic). After certain adjectival predicates, on the other hand, the construction simply has generic reference: (384) a. We have arranged for the meeting to be held in the Catchpole room at Wests. [future] b. It is rare for the bus to be late. [generic] What the for-to-construction cannot be connected to, however, is propositional modality: (385) a. *I believe/think/doubt for Sue to buy a book. b. *It seems/appears for Sue to buy a book. c. It is possible for Sue to buy a book. [can only have an abilitative meaning] The latter would be unexpected if for was an Irrealis complementizer. It is true that there is a non-actualized component to the meaning of the for-to-construction when selected by event modal predicates, but that is true for to-infinitives in general, and has to do with their generic, non-specific reference. As regards the form and function of for in the for-to-construction, there are many arguments against analysing it as a subordinator and strong indications that it still has the prepositional status from which it derives. Below, it will be argued that the
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for-to-construction is not full-fledged subordinate clause but a to-infinitive with for + NP as a pre-modifier (specifier). First, there is the problem that the for-to-construction is non-finite, i.e. it does not distinguish the finite categories tense, person, and number. If the construction does not realize these functional categories, it would be problematic to assume that it realizes the most peripheral functional category of the clause, namely Complementizer (within the framework of Generative Grammar). Second, there is the ordinary prepositional use of for, from which the for in the for-to-construction derives (CGEL 1181), and it is sometimes difficult to tell them apart. Cf.: (386) a. the desire for justice to have its course b. the desire for justice Third, as Chomsky & Lasnik (1977: 448) point out, the for-to-construction is only available as a complement of a noun when the ordinary for-object is possible – a strong indication that the ‘for + NP’-part of the for-to-construction is also a prepositional object. Fourth, for assigns oblique case to the noun phrase, which subordinators otherwise do not, but prepositions do. Fifth, as with the ordinary preposition for, the forto-construction cannot occur as a complement of a preposition (CGEL 1182): (387) a. *I’m thinking of for a holiday. b. *I’m thinking of for us to leave. The main argument for analysing for in the for-to-construction as a subordinator and not as a preposition is the fact that the for-to-construction appears in some contexts where the ordinary for-object cannot occur (CGEL 1178–1183): (388) a. b. c. d.
For you to give up now would be tragic. [subject] It’s rare for the bus to be late. [extraposed subject] This made it necessary for the meeting to be postponed.[extraposed object] I can’t afford for them to see me like this. [complement of afford]
It is true that there may be distributional differences between ordinary for-objects and the for-to-construction, but that does not necessarily entail that for in the for-to-construction is a complementizer. The head of the for-to-construction could equally well be the infinitive marker to, with for+NP as its pre-modifier. As regards the first context where ordinary for-objects cannot occur and the forto-construction can, it should be pointed out that subordinate clauses do not normally occur alone in subject positions in English either: (389) a. ?That you give up now is tragic. b. ?When you will give up is uncertain. If the for-to-construction is a clause, it would be exceptional in this regard. Furthermore, for+NP can be omitted in these contexts, indicating that it is the to-infinitive
Chapter 10. Relative and adverbial subordinators 263
phrase that is the primary constituent in the matrix clause, and that for+NP is merely a specifier of the to-infinitive: (390) To give up now would be tragic. For+NP can, of course, also be omitted in extraposed subject position (CGEL: 1178) and in extraposed object position: (391) a. It’s not necessary (for us) to wait any longer. b. This made it necessary (for us) to start immediately. It is true that an omission of for+NP in object position leads to a co-indexation of the subject of the matrix clause and the logical subject of the to-infinitive. When for+NP refers to someone else that the matrix subject, this results in a different meaning: (392)
He wants (for us) to start immediately.
This however, only means that for+NP in some cases is necessary for the listener’s correct identification of the subject of the to-infinitive. It does not indicate that for is a complementizer. As regards the fourth context, complement of afford, it should be noted that for can be omitted here, and that the oblique-case form then remains. This is also true for complements of want etc.: (393) a. I can’t afford (for) them to see me like this. b. We want (for) him to be happy. In this case, it appears that the NP instead receives oblique case from the matrix verb. That, however, would be an exceptional-case-marking (ECM) construction. In fact, it could be argued that the for-to-construction is a variant of the ECM-construction. There are several similarities between the for-to- and the ECM-construction. As in ordinary ECM-constructions, the oblique constituent can sometimes be promoted to subject when the matrix clause is passivized (raising constructions): (394) a. b. c. d.
We consider her to be intelligent. She is considered to be intelligent. They intended/arranged (for) the performance to begin at six. The performance was intended/arranged to begin at six.
Just as in ECM- and raising constructions, the NP can remain in the infinitive phrase when the infinitive phrase is passive. The NP-position in the matrix clause is then occupied by an expletive: (395) a. We arranged for there to be held several meetings. b. We expect there to be held several meetings. c. There are likely to be held several meetings.
[for-to] [ECM] [raising]
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CGEL (1182) uses the expletive for-to-construction as an argument against analysing for as a preposition, since ordinary for cannot select expletives. However, this is highly reminiscent of the obligatory object position in ECM constructions. Chomsky (2001: 7ff, 2005: 10) analyses ECM- and raising constructions as consisting of an infinitive phrase without tense, person and number features. Crucially, it lacks the Complementizer category. Without these finite features, the logical subject cannot receive nominative case, but instead receives oblique case from the matrix verb. An alternative is to fill the argument position with expletive there, leaving the logical subject in the verb phrase as extraposed. In raising constructions and passivized ECM constructions, the already promoted object is further promoted to matrix subject. Exactly the same appears to happen in the for-to-construction: either the logical subject of the infinitive phrase is realised as a for-object, or expletive there is inserted as a forcomplement, leaving the logical subject as an extraposed subject in the infinitive VP. It is therefore reasonable to analyse the for-to-construction as consisting of a toinfinitive with a prepositional object (for+NP) as a pre-modifier (specifier). This forobject is not an ordinary prepositional object in the matrix clause, since it, like the object of an ECM construction, does not carry a semantic role in the matrix event, but rather a role in the embedded event. The reason why it is realized as a prepositional object and not as a nominative subject of the to-infinitive (except as an extraposed subject) is that the to-infinitive lacks the ability of assigning nominative case. To conclude, although it would be convenient to categorise for in the for-to-construction as an Irrealis complementizer, there are various facts and indications that contradict this analysis. As with the adverbial subordinators, for is best analysed as a preposition, leaving the terms complementizer and subordinator to that, if, and whether.
10.4 Conclusion This chapter has dealt with Germanic subordinators that cannot be classified as Realis or Irrealis. These constitute a problem for the hypothesis that subordinators can be connected with propositional modality. The first section treated English restrictiverelative that, Scandinavian relative and eqivalent-comparative som, and the Germanic comparative than. In partial agreement with Stroh-Wollin (2002), it was argued that English restrictive-relative that is a Realis-complementizer, like its declarative counterpart. Restrictive relative clauses are complements of nouns and are semantically Realis (presupposed, factual, or potential). As regards Scandinavian som, it was argued that it lexicalizes a different universal category than that, if, and whether. In colloquial Danish, relative som (including som in embedded content questions) can be constructed with at, and throughout the Scandinavian languages, equivalent-comparative som can be constructed with at(t) or om. The latter is also true for comparative than. It was then argued that both som and than should be analysed as prepositions that select the subordinate clause as a complement. Both have relational meanings and
Chapter 10. Relative and adverbial subordinators 265
functions. Furthermore, both comparative som and than can select nominal complements, assign objective case to them and be stranded. Predicative som can also select nominal complements and be stranded. Lastly, relative som cannot be selected by another preposition. Next, the Germanic adverbial subordinators were treated. In agreement with Eisenberg (2006b) and CGEL, it was argued that these have a prepositional nature. They are semantically pregnant, have prepositional homonyms from which they derive, and can often be constructed with either that or if. In fact, to assume that they are members of one of the most peripheral functional categories of the clause would contradict the general theory of universal categories, where parts of speech with richer semantic content are not thought to be peripheral clause categories. Since these lexemes can often be constructed with that or if, it is more reasonable to assume that the former are adverbs or prepositions that select complement clauses, rather than introducing them themselves. In fact, some of these adverbial words seem to function as factive predicates. In Swedish, there are also complex subordinators with a comparative som as a second element. Some of these can be constructed with att, others can also select nominal complements and assign objective case to them. These were therefore analysed as adverbial complexes. Lastly, the English for-to construction was treated. It was noted that the construction occurs in certain non-actualized contexts and could therefore perhaps be categorized as Irrealis under a Palmerian (2001) framework. On the other hand, it was also noted that the for-to-construction cannot occur in epistemic contexts, which argues against for being an Irrealis complementizer. In fact, several pieces of evidence were presented which indicated that for is not a complementizer at all but a preposition. For in the for-to-construction assigns objective case to the following NP and cannot be selected by another preposition. Furthermore, the construction is only available after a noun when the ordinary for-object is possible. In fact, it was shown that the infinitive marker to is most likely the head of the construction, since for+NP can easily be omitted. It was further shown that the for-to-construction has many similarities with the ECM construction, which according to Chomsky (2001, 2005) lacks the Complementizer category. It was therefore argued that the for-to-construction should be analysed as a to-infinitive with a for-object as a pre-modifier (specifier). To conclude, there are strong reasons to suggest that the terms subordinator and complementizer in the Germanic languages should be confined to the central subordinators that, if and whether (including English restrictive relative that), which, as has been argued in Chapter 8, denote propositional modality. Thus, the most peripheral functional category of the subordinate clause, called Complementizer within the framework of Generative Grammar can be identified with propositional modality. The hypothesis explored has been sustained, at least as far as the Germanic languages are concerned.
chapter
Conclusion and final remarks 11.1 Hypothesis This book has explored the hypothesis that general subordinators, such as that, if, and whether in the Germanic languages, belong to the same functional category as the indicative and subjunctive moods and the epistemic modal markers, namely propositional modality. Propositional modality denotes the speaker’s attitude to the truthvalue or factual status of the proposition (Palmer 2001). The hypothesis was based on the observation that the indicative and the subjunctive, like that, if, and whether in the Germanic languages, are associated with certain clause types. The subjunctive and if are both found in conditional and interrogative clauses (whether only in interrogative clauses), whereas the indicative and that are found in declarative clauses. Furthermore, that, if, and whether stand in complementary syntactic distribution with the finite verb in the Germanic languages (that vs. V2 in the asymmetric V2languages; if and whether vs. V1, including question-formed conditionals), and the finite verb is responsible for marking of propositional modality, through mood and modal verbs. Adapting Palmer’s (2001) framework, Germanic that has been seen as representing the unmarked value, Realis, whereas if and whether represent the marked value Irrealis. To be more precise, that denotes the factual and potential, whereas if denotes the hypothetical (in conditional protases) and uncertainty (in complement clauses); whether only denotes uncertainty. Corpus searches have revealed that if and whether also denote the dubitative. The hypothesis has the consequence that the most peripheral functional category of the subordinate clause, called Complementizer within the framework of Generative Grammar can be identified with propositional modality. Complementizer is generally thought not only to host the complementizers that, if, and whether in complement clauses, but also the finite verb in main clauses in the Germanic asymmetric V2-languages and auxiliaries in certain constructions in English. Since finite verbs are both responsible for mood marking and epistemic-evidential modal marking and since the complementizers that, if, and whether also seem to denote factuality, the Complementizer category should be identified with propositional modality. Under more fine-grained generative analyses (Rizzi 1997, Stroh-Wollin 2002), Complementizer is split into at least two functional categories, “(Illocutionary) Force” (imperative, interrogative etc.), i.e. speech-act modality, and “Finiteness”. In agreement with Stroh-Wollin (2002), it has been argued that the former category is not present in
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subordinate clauses and that “Finiteness” can be identified with the Realis-Irrealis distinction and propositional modality.
11.2 Research paradigms The book has used two research paradigms, Language Typology and Generative Grammar. However, it has worked with these on such a general level of abstraction that it is compatible with most linguistic theories. Theory internal assumptions and additional premises particularly pertaining to Generative Grammar have been avoided. In agreement with both Language Typology and Generative Grammar, it has been assumed that parts of speech (lexical items) are combinations of sound and meaning and that there are universal categories that can be divided into lexical and functional ones. Following the theory of Language Typology (and cognitive linguistics), these categories have also been thought to display asymmetrical values (markedness; originally a concept from the Prague School) and to have prototypes and peripheral members.
11.3 Part I: Modality and subordinators in the languages of the world 11.3.1 Defining the relevant modality category Inspired by Bybee (1985), indicative, subjunctive, and epistemic modality markers have been seen as members of a functional category which is distinct from moods such as the imperative and interrogative (i.e. speech act modality) and modal categories such as deontic and dynamic (i.e. event modality). Bybee (1985) called this (mood) category “commitment to truth of proposition/assertion”. Here, Palmer’s term propositional modality has been preferred. In agreement with Bybee (1985), propositional modality has been regarded as a more peripheral functional category than event modality, since it modifies the whole proposition and not just the event. This has been supported by typological data, which has shown that epistemic modality often belong to a mood system together with categories such as the indicative and subjunctive, whereas event modality often forms a separate system. Furthermore, although epistemic modality and event modality are parts of the same formal system in the Germanic languages, there is a syntactic asymmetry between them, in that epistemic modal morphemes occur further away from the centre of the clause than event modality. Palmer (1986) originally drew a distinction between propositional modality and speech acts, in that he saw the declarative as the unmarked epistemic value and the indicative as the corresponding unmarked mood value. Following Austin (1962), he considered these to be representatives (i.e. factual propositions) and not performatives (speech acts). This approach has been adopted here. In Palmer (2001), however, the opposite view was advocated. The declarative was still seen as the unmarked epistemic
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value and indicative its mood-counterpart, but both were held to be performative (assertive). Palmer (2001) put propositional modality, event modality and what has here been referred to as speech-act modality together into one overarching universal category, Modality (with the two values Realis and Irrealis). The pragmatic feature with which he associated this category was assertion (Realis being assertive; Irrealis non-assertive). This approach has not been adopted here for reasons of validity and well-definedness which will briefly be repeated in what follows. Speech-act modality is different from propositional modality in that it performs an act in the act of speaking (directives, commissives, expressives, statements; Austin 1962). It can be identified by performative verbs such as order and adverbs such as hereby (“I hereby order that...”). As long as a statement in the declarative or indicative can be paraphrased as “I hereby state that..” it can thus be said to be assertive. There are, however, as Palmer (1986) pointed out, many kinds of subordinate declarative or indicative clauses that cannot be paraphrased as such (e.g. “I don’t think that...”). In fact, it is widely disputed whether subordinate clauses can be said to have illocutionary force at all. They may determine the speech act directly or indirectly and even contain most of the propositional content, but mostly they are dependent on the main clause and only seldom do they constitute their own utterances (Brandt et al 1992, SAG IV: 475ff ). In narrative discourse, embedded interrogatives are often posed by and addressed to a third party, and reported assertions very seldom exhort the present listener to believe in them. Indeed, Cristofaro (2003) defines subordination in terms of non-assertiveness, and Searle (1969) draws a sharp distinction between complement clauses and assertions. Complement clauses are merely propositions, since they cannot function as independent utterances. Furthermore, as Palmer (1986) demonstrated, there are languages where a distinction is made between what corresponds to the declarative in the European languages and a categorical assertion. The former is a marker of a subjective attitude of belief rather than of knowledge. More languages with this property have been presented above. A very informative example is Huichol (Sonoran: Uto-Aztecan: Grimes 1964: 27ff, 60ff, 73) with its two main clause moods assertive and narrative, and the subordinate clause moods factual and potential. Subordinate clauses cannot be marked as assertive, nor can main clauses that are introduced by potential particles. Here, assertion is clearly a restricted main clause phenomenon, just as the imperative. One of Palmer’s (2001) reasons for subsuming all the sub-types of modality into one universal supercategory was that both speech-act modality and event modality is followed by irrealis or subjunctive marking in many languages. In some languages, at least speech-act functions even seem to be denoted by the irrealis or the subjunctive itself, e.g. the use of the subjunctive in the Germanic and Romance languages to denote a polite imperative, the hortative, and the jussive. To this, it has been retorted that although members of speech-act and event modality are compatible with the irrealis or the subjunctive, it does not necessarily mean that they are identical to it. Both speech-act and event modality describe events that are non-actual and are thus notationally Irrealis. However, their primary function is not to mark the event as
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non-actual but to give commands, pose questions, express desires, and reveal abilities. Thus, although speech-act and event modality interact with propositional modality, they do not belong to the same category. This line of reasoning is in accord with Mithun’s (1995) and Chafe’s (1995) analysis of the realis-irrealis distinction as members of a separate category than the imperative, interrogative, future etc. Mithun (1995) showed that there are languages where the imperative, negative, and future can either be marked as realis or irrealis. In Central Pomo, the choice between realis and irrealis future depends on the certainty of the speaker that the events will occur. More such examples were presented. In many languages, the choice between Realis and Irrealis marking in imperative clauses has to do with politeness. This also has a non-factual explanation; by placing the directive within the realm of thought (Irrealis), it becomes less forceful. It has also been proposed that many cases where the subjunctive or the irrealis are used to convey speech-act notions are in fact cases of multifunctional or portmanteau morphemes. Another one of Palmer’s (2001) reasons for subsuming all the sub-types of modality into one universal supercategory was the use of the subjunctive in presupposed clauses. The clearest indication that the indicative-subjunctive denotes factuality has always been that non-factive predicates licence the subjunctive in e.g. the Germanic and Romance languages (to different degrees; Palmer 1986). More generally, both the subjunctive and the irrealis are used in non-factual contexts (Palmer 1986, 2001). However, the subjunctive is also used after factual predicates in some languages (e.g. Spanish), i.e. when the proposition is presupposed to be true. Therefore, Palmer (2001), following Klein (1975) argued that the subjunctive rather denotes non-assertion – what is presupposed to be true does not need to be asserted (nor does of course what is uncertain). To this it has been objected, in agreement with Palmer (1986), that the Spanish subjunctive is used after emotive factive predicates to convey emotive/evaluative meanings of grudging admittance, surprise, or even disbelief. This use is therefore compatible with the definition of the indicative-subjunctive distinction in terms of the speaker’s attitude towards the factuality of the proposition. In fact, there is variation after certain emotive predicates in Spanish, where the subjunctive is used to convey a stronger emotion. Furthermore, in the Germanic languages, the emotive modal verb shall, otherwise found in exclamative clauses denoting surprise (the admirative) and frustration (the frustrative), can also be used after emotive factive predicates to the same effect. Indeed, in Icelandic emotive complement clauses, which also use the subjunctive, skulu is even obligatory. As regards Spanish non-emotive factive constructions, Lunn (1995) showed that the subjunctive is particularily used in newspapers when the clause has already been mentioned in the column or when it is general knowledge. In these cases, it has been argued that the subjunctive is not used to denote non-assertion but rather to remove the proposition from the speech-situation (into the realm of thought) in order to avoid being superfluous. Lastly, it has been pointed out that most languages with an indicative-subjunctive distinction do not use the subjunctive in complement clauses of factive predicates.
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German, Russian, and Persian obligatorily use the indicative. It has also been argued that non-assertion is a conceptually empty term which does not capture the factual nuances denoted by the different epistemic categories. Nor is it a term that captures the meaning of speech-act categories such as the imperative and interrogative. To conclude, it has been argued that the three sub-types of modality (speech-act modality, propositional modality, and event modality) should best be regarded as three separate functional categories. Since subordinate clauses do not carry illocutionary force, it is propositional modality that the general subordinators should be associated with: Table 14. Different types of modality Speech-act modality
Propositional modality
Event modality
– – – – – –
– – – – –
– deontic modality – dynamic modality
imperative hortative jussive prohibitive optative interrogative
epistemic modality (incl. declarative) evidential modality (incl. declarative) indicative-subjunctive realis-irrealis conditional
– general subordinators
These categories are thought to have the following scope relations (the other categories and their internal order are taken from Bybee 1985): (396) (speech-act modality (propositional modality (tense (aspect (event modality (voice (valence (verb))))))))
11.3.2 The morphosyntactic status of propositional modality One obstacle for the hypothesis that general subordinators should be subsumed under propositional modality was that Julien (2002) argued that moods such as the indicative, subjunctive, realis, irrealis, potential, dubitative, and conditional belong to a more central functional category than tense. Julien (2002) presented ten languages to support this claim, out of which only two were found under closer scrutiny to be relatively clear indicators that propositional modality is a more central category than tense. Julien (2002) also presented three languages where one or more of the aforesaid moods were found outside tense, of which two could be counted, the third belonging to the same family as one of the other ten. Since the present framework also included epistemic modal markers under propositional modality and the declarative as the unmarked epistemic modal value, yet another five languages presented in Julien were
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counted, making it seven with propositional modality outside tense against two with the opposite order. In order to settle the question, two typological surveys were conducted. The first was based on the morpheme orders given in Julien (2002) of the 530 languages she investigated from 280 different language genera. Since Julien‘s survey mostly looked at mood as one category, the sources she used had to be consulted. The second investigation was an independent mapping of the morpheme order in the languages of the world. The data, which were based on availability rather than a predetermined selection of languages, were approximately equal in size to that of Julien (2002). The results were divided into genera so as to avoid generic bias. Both investigations showed that markers of propositional modality (indicative, subjunctive, realis, irrealis, declarative, epistemic modality markers, and the conditional) occurred outside of tense approximately nine times more often than the opposite (33 vs. 4 and 33 vs. 4 = 89,2%). Since the results of the two investigations were identical, they supported one another. It was further demonstrated that there were circumstances that could cast doubt on the eight counterexamples. In some of the languages, the relevant morphemes had different statuses; in others, there were notable exceptions. Lastly, in some of the languages, the analyses and classifications of the morphemes in question were doubtful.
11.3.3 General subordinators and propositional modality The next chapter dealt with subordinators and the relation between subordinators and modality. According to Shopen (2007), subordinators can be divided into three types: complementizers, relative subordinators, and adverbial subordinators. However, since complementizers also occur as second elements in complex adverbial subordinators in many languages of Europe, and since restrictive relative subordinators are also head complement clauses (of nouns), it was decided that a more fruitful distinction would be one between general subordinators, meaning subordinators without rich semantic content, and adverbial subordinators, which have rich semantic content. It was further acknowledged that the opposition between subordinators and coordinators cannot be maintained in so-called clause chaining languages, which instead display a trinary distinction between independent, interdependent (cosubordinate), and subordinate clauses. In agreement with Christofaro (2003) the defining characteristic of subordination was seen as the lack of illocutionary force. The chapter then went on to present generative analyses of the relationship between complementizers and clause peripheral categories. In particular, Stroh-Wollin (2002) argued that complementizers belong to a category that denotes factuality (i.e. propositional modality) together with the indicative-subjunctive moods and epistemic modal markers. This category was thought to be distinct from speech-act modality (“Force”). Lastly, two typological surveys were presented, Noonan (2007) and Frajzyngier (1995) which both showed that complementizers denote modal distinctions in many
Chapter 11. Conclusion and final remarks 273
languages of the world, propositional modality in particular. Indeed, Frajzyngier (1995) argued that complementizers should best be regarded as modal morphemes. In conjunction with the two typological surveys of the morphosyntactic status of propositional modality mentioned above, the languages investigated were also examined in respect to subordinators and modality, in order to test the hypothesis on a cross-linguistic scale. Apart from the fact that the subjunctive is a typical subordinative mood in the Indo-European languages and that the conditional is an extremely common mood marker for conditional protases, the investigation also found that there are other languages that denote subordination with mood markers such as the subjunctive, indicative, realis, and irrealis. Furthermore, it is common that clausal particles denote propositional modality in main clauses but additionally subordination in subordinate clauses. Sometimes, the overlap is such that it is difficult to decide whether the marker is primarily a modality particle or a subordinator. In particular, however, there are many languages with subordinators that also denote factual distinctions. In some languages, these are overtly classified as realis, irrealis, indicative, subjunctive, potential, hypothetical, or dubitative subordinators. Often they come in pairs: realisirrealis or indicative-subjunctive. In other languages, they are simply translated as ‘that’ or ‘if ’ but are demonstrated to denote a factual–non-factual distinction or related meanings such as evidentiality.
11.4 Part II: Modality and subordinators in the Germanic languages The rest of the book focused on the situation in the Germanic languages.
11.4.1 The indicative-subjunctive distinction Chapter six treated the Germanic indicative and subjunctive in relation to propositional modality. Although the Germanic subjunctive also fulfills speeech-act functions in Icelandic, Old Swedish, and German, such as hortative, jussive, and optative, it was argued, in line with what has been said above, that propositional modality is its main function. The optative use of the Germanic subjunctive has a historical explanation. The Germanic subjunctive derives from the Indo-European optative, which was also multifunctional. However, in the modern Germanic languages that display a morphological subjunctive, German and Icelandic, the optative function is marginal; it is used in lexicalized expressions. Furthermore, in Icelandic, the optative subjunctive function is formally distinct from the non-factual one, in the sense that they have different paradigms for the verb vera ‘be’. Moreover, both the optative and hortative-jussive uses of the subjunctive tend to be confined to the present tense and main clauses, as opposed to the non-factual subjunctive, which typically occurs in subordinate clauses, and which is not confined to the present tense. As regards the use of the subjunctive
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after desiderative predicates in e.g. Old Swedish, it was argued that it filled a non-factual function rather than an optative one. The same line of reasoning was applied to the use of the subjunctive in complement clauses of directive predicates. Another context in which the subjunctive was said to have had a jussive function in Old Swedish was in conditional apodoses in the Old Swedish laws. However, it was argued that this use derived from the fact that conditional constructions are notationally non-factual. It was also pointed out that the indicative could alternatively be used in these constructions in order to state a fact. It was concluded that the only contexts where the Germanic subjunctive can be said to have a truly speech-act use is in main clauses, where it seems to fill a gap in the imperative paradigm. Since the non-factual use of the subjunctive typically occurs in subordinate clauses, and the speech-act use of the subjunctive is confined to the present tense, these functions can be clearly separated. The use of the subjunctive as a polite imperative in German clearly has a non-factual explanation. By placing the directive in the realm of thought (Irrealis), it becomes less direct, less forceful. The secondary use of the subjunctive to denote speech-act functions in main clauses actually makes it even more like the general subordinators, in that these also fulfil secondary speech-act functions in independent clauses in the Germanic languages. After this, it was determined to which extent the use of the subjunctive vs. the indicative could be connected with factuality. In Icelandic, semifactive predicates only select complement clauses in the indicative, whereas non-factive predicates only select the subjunctive. Furthermore verbs of reading and hearing and negated verbs of perception and conception can either select the indicative or the subjunctive, depending on whether or not the speaker accepts the proposition as true (if the speaker and the subject are the same person, the complement clause must be in the subjunctive). It was noted that Icelandic, like Spanish, also uses the subjunctive after factive predicates, i.e. when the proposition is presupposed. For this, the same explanation was offered as for Spanish, namely that the subjunctive denotes a certain attitude (concession), or even counter-expectation (the admirative). In Icelandic, the modal verb skulu is obligatory in these clauses, and skulu is also used in exclamative clauses to denote surprise. The corresponding should in English and skola in Swedish are also found in both these contexts with the same meaning. Lastly, it was pointed out that in German, the subjunctive is not used in complement clauses of factive predicates. As regards German in general, it was noted that the subjunctive is used after nonfactive predicates to indicate that the speaker is reserved in regard to the truth of the proposition (it may or may not be true). When the indicative is used, it suggests that the speaker accepts the veracity of the proposition. After semifactive and factive predicates, the subjunctive is ungrammatical. A corpus search was also conducted on Old Swedish texts in Fornsvenska textbanken. This revealed that during the Early Old Swedish period (texts from 1300–1330), the subjunctive was used in approximately 30 % of the clauses after non-factive predicates. After semifactive predicates however, the use of the subjunctive was insignificant. The reason why the subjunctive was not
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used more extensively after non-factive predicates was probably that the subjunctive was already declining in use at that period of time. Other corpus searches showed that the use of the subjunctive in these contexts declined further to insignificant in the middle of the 15th century. As for the use of the subjunctive in conditional constructions, which are notationally non-factual, it turned out that the present subjunctive is very rarely used in the Germanic languages (except in question formed protases in Icelandic, where it in fact is obligatory). Rather, the past subjunctive is used in order to mark uncertainty, doubt or, as in Icelandic and Old Swedish, even the counterfactual. In German, the counterfactual is denoted by the pluperfect subjunctive. It was also noted that the past tense marker in the Germanic languages has grammaticalized into a modality marker which interacts with the subjunctive to different effects. The real (i.e. hypothetical) conditional is denoted by the present indicative. The chapter ended with noting that the subjunctive is also licensed by interrogative predicates in Icelandic and Old Swedish (obligatory so in the former). It was argued that the subjunctive does not denote the interrogative, per se, in these contexts, but rather the speaker-uncertainty that the interrogative entails. It was pointed out that it was not only verbs of asking that licensed the subjunctive in Old Swedish, but also predicates that denote rumination, determination, decision, and negated verbs of knowing. The common denominator is that the speaker does not know whether or not the proposition is true.
11.4.2 The modal past, word order, and other modal morphemes Chapter 7 dealt in particular with those languages where the indicative-subjunctive distinction has been lost, with focus on Swedish and English. It was argued that although propositional modality is not an inflectional category on the verb any more, the finite verb still carries features that can be connected with the category. First, it was pointed out that the past tense has grammaticalized into a modal marker denoting doubt and tentativeness, not only in conditional constructions but also in interaction with epistemic modal verbs. The modal past is also used in Swedish declarative clauses, when the speaker wishes to distance him/herself from the proposition for reasons of politeness or surprise. Second, it was demonstrated that phonological stress on the finite verb leads to an assertive interpretation in declarative clauses (verum focus) and a dubitative one in conditional protases. The former was relevant for the hypothesis explored in the sense that asserted propositions are factual. In English, this is achieved through emphatic do-insertion, when no other auxiliary is available. Emphatic do could therefore be seen as a lexicalization of propositional modality (plus tense and subject agreement). In fact, it was argued that other instances of do-support in English could also be connected with propositional modality, namely negative do-support (the negative is notationally Irrealis; Palmer 2001), polar-question do-support (the interrogative is also
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notationally Irrealis), content-question do-support (content questions are semantically presupposed, i.e. notionally Realis) and focus-fronting do-support (assertive). The latter three constructions also display inversion in the Germanic languages, and inversion is analysed as raising of the verb to the Complementizer position within the framework of Generative Grammar, the position which the present investigation identified with propositional modality. Another clause type which displays inversion in the Germanic languages is the conditional protasis, and the conditional protasis is also notationally Irrealis (hypothetical). In fact, it was concluded that V2 in English can be connected with Realis (presupposed and assertive) and V1 with Irrealis (hypothetical and uncertainty). The marked V1 word order has been lexicalized into denoting the marked value Irrealis. A related clausal phenomenon in the Germanic languages that can also be associated with propositional modality is licensing of polarity sensitive items. As CGEL shows, these items are not only licensed by negation in English but can also occur in polar questions, conditional protases, and in complement clauses of predicates expressing doubt and counter-expectation, i.e. all Irrealis contexts. Another phenomenon which could connect the finite verb both with propositional modality and complementizers was V2 in German complement clauses after non-factive predicates. It was pointed out that this is not only followed by the subjunctive in formal style, but also by an omission of dass, which indicates that the subjunctive-inflected finite verb has been raised to the Complementizer position, taking the place of dass. It is used when the speaker wishes to reserve himself in regard to the truth of the proposition. When the speaker holds the proposition to be likely, however, the indicative is used, together with subordinate clause topology and dass. A similar pattern is found in the mood-less Frisian (Hoekstra & Tiersma 1994: 524). As for the use of V2 in at(t)-clauses in the Mainland Scandinavian languages, a closer look at the results from an investigation made by Julien (2007) indicated that this should probably be regarded as reproduced speech (oral or mental). This was relevant for the hypothesis explored in the sense that reproduced assertions are presented as factual. The chapter then continued with an inventory of the modal verbs in the Germanic languages. It was acknowledged that these express various epistemic and evidential notions but, in addition, that many of them also express deontic and dynamic modality. It was argued, however, that these functions are clearly distinguishable on both formal and functional grounds. First, the epistemic-evidential verbs are syntactically further away from the verb. In a row of modal verbs consisting of both epistemic-evidential and deontic-dynamic ones, the former ones are placed further away from the main verb than the latter ones. Second, the epistemic-evidential verbs cannot (in general) be non-finite, the non-finite forms being reserved for the deontic-dynamic functions. Third, when a modal verb occurs outside of the perfect auxiliary, it is typically epistemic-evidential, whereas it is typically deontic-dynamic when it occurs inside of the perfect auxiliary. Forth, the epistemic-evidential verbs are sometimes confined to a particular tense form, especially the past. Most likely, they are derived from the deontic-dynamic verbs through the modal past. Fifth, the epistemic-evidential verbs
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generally do not have temporal reference. All this indicates that the epistemic-evidential verbs, like the indicative-subjunctive, lexicalize a more peripheral functional category than both deontic-dynamic modality and tense, i.e. propositional modality. The last part of the chapter treated epistemic particles that are derived from verbs, the Swedish particles kanske ‘maybe’ and kanhända ‘perhaps’, in particular. These are interesting, since they are able to take the place of the finite verb in main clauses, i.e. the Complementizer position. This phenomenon is not only found in declarative clauses but also in conditional apodoses. Recall that Stroh-Wollin (2002) saw this as an indication that epistemic possibility, indicative-subjunctive and that-if belong to the same functional category (what has been referred to as propositional modality here). It was further noted that kanske and kanhända can even occur clause initially, with the finite verb left in the verb phrase, yielding V1-like structures. Often, these clauses are interpreted as polite questions or polite imperatives, clauses which normally display V1 in the Germanic languages.
11.4.3 General subordinators and propositional modality Chapter 8 dealt with the Germanic general subordinators that, if, and whether. It began by pointing out that these subordinators alternatively fulfil modal functions in certain independent clauses (optatives, exclamative statements, and echo-questions), very much like the subjunctive does. As for the speech-act functions, it was argued that the subordinators in these particular cases have extended their meaning into also denoting the most peripheral functional category in main clauses, speech-act modality. Since these subordinators normally do not introduce main clauses, their main function is not to lexicalize speech-act modality, but rather the most peripheral functional category of finite subordinate clauses, by hypothesis propositional modality. The chapter then moved on to discuss the use of that, if, and whether in subordinate clauses. By studying grammars of the Germanic languages and conducting corpus searches on Swedish (Språkbankens konkordanser), German (W-Archiv der geschriebene Sprache) and English (British National Corpus), it was established that that is used when the proposition is presupposed to be true (after factive predicates), presented by the speaker as true (after semifactive predicates) and when the speaker holds it as possible or likely that the proposition is true (after speculative and reportative predicates). Conversely, if and whether are used when the speaker does not know whether or not the proposition is true (after predicates of asking, uncertainty, investigation, debating etc.) and when the speaker doubts that the proposition is true (after dubitative predicates). if is also used in conditional protases and related constructions in some Germanic languages, i.e. when the proposition is hypothetical. Importantly, it was established that there is a variation between that and if/whether after some factive, semifactive, and reportative predicates, predicates of guessing, determination, and even dubitative predicates. When that is used after semifactive and reportative predicates, the speaker indicates that s/he knows or believes that the proposition is true, whereas when if/
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whether is used, the speaker marks the proposition as uncertain. The categories that particularly licensed if in these contexts were the negative, propositional modality, event modality, the future, and the interrogative, all associated with the Irrealis. After factive predicates, if marks the proposition as hypothetical (conditional). After dubitative predicates, that is used when the speaker, in contrast to the subject, does not doubt but holds it as likely that the proposition is true. After the transitive dubitative verbs betvivla and tvivla på in Swedish and bezweifeln and anzweifeln in German, however, att and dass were so common that another explanation had to be searched for. It was found that that is also used after dubitative predicates when the proposition is given information or a pending statement in the discourse. This is especially the case after transitive dubitative verbs. The that-if/whether-distinction was then compared to the indicative-subjunctive distinction in the Germanic languages. It was pointed out that both if and the subjunctive are used when the speaker is uncertain of the veracity of the proposition and when the proposition is hypothetical (in conditional clauses). Interestingly, there is also variation in both the complementizer and mood systems after semifactive and reportative predicates, depending on whether or not the speaker accepts the proposition as true or whether or not the speaker knows if the proposition is true. It was also noted that the Germanic complementizer system has an even closer resemblance in the Spanish mood system (and the Russian and Persian ones), which uses the indicative after verbs of belief but the subjunctive after verbs of doubt. As in the Germanic complementizer system, there is also variation between the indicative and the subjunctive after negated semifactive predicates in Spanish. An explanation was also offered as to why two such different parts of speech as modality markers and subordinators should denote the same thing. If probably derives from a Proto Germanic dubitative predicate (cf. Isl. ef and O.Sw iæf ‘doubt’) and that from a cataphoric pronoun. As such, they have grammaticalized from selecting elements to members of the most peripheral functional category of the subordinate clause, by hypothesis propositional modality. The fact that that not only introduces factual propositions but also potential ones was explained in terms of its being the unmarked value. The theory of linguistic universals permits the unmarked value to cover some of the domain normally occupied by the marked one. What is important is that there is an opposition between the unmarked and the marked value. Furthermore, as Palmer (1986) pointed out, the declarative in general denotes subjective belief rather than knowledge and in many languages, the indicative also covers the potential domain (Noonan 2007). Moreover, it was shown through corpus searches in Swedish that it is particularly in speculative contexts that that can be omitted – conversely, that is least omissible after factive predicates. After the semifactive predicates høra and forsta in Norwegian, at-deletion even seems to make the interpretation reportative rather than self-experienced. Again it was pointed out that in German, dass-deletion after non-factive predicates even cooccur with the use of the subjunctive (in formal style) and V2 – both a functional and
Chapter 11. Conclusion and final remarks 279
a syntactic indication that the systems belong to the same universal category. Dass and the indicative indicate that the speaker holds the proposition as likely to be true, whereas dass-omission and the subjunctive indicates that the speaker distances him/ herself from the truth of the proposition. It was also shown that che-omission in Italian after non-factive predicates is also accompanied by the subjunctive. Lastly, it was concluded that the conditional wh-subordinators hvis (Nor., Dan.) and wenn (Ger.) should probably be analysed as adverbs rather than subordinators. Hvis can be constructed with both om and at and is restricted to conditional clauses, and wenn also has a temporal meaning. It was argued that the conditional is a complex category consisting of an circumstance-adverbial first element ‘in case’ and a modal second element (hypothetical). Hvis and wenn lexicalize the adverbial part, whereas if lexicalizes the modal one (cf. hvis om). Swedish ifall ‘in case’ is interesting here, since it can also occur in complement clauses of uncertainty and doubt. This indicates that it has partly grammaticalized into an Irrealis subordinator.
11.4.4 Speech-act modality Chapter 9 dealt with speech-act modality in the Germanic languages. In agreement with what was said in part I, it was argued that speech-act modality and propositional modality are separate functional categories, that speech-act modality has scope over propositional modality, and that speech-act modality is not present in subordinate clauses. It was argued that direct polar questions have the speech-act value interrogative and the propositional-modality value Irrealis, since the speaker does not know whether or not the proposition is true. In support of the latter claim, it was noted that Palmer (2001) has shown that the interrogative is accompanied by or associated with Irrealis marking in many languages of the world. A supporting argument from Swedish was that polar questions can be constructed with the potential particles kanske, kanhända, and möjligtvis without changing the essential meaning. It was also pointed out that polar questions in the Germanic languages are topologically very similar to another Irrealis clause type, namely protases of conditional constructions. They are both introduced by if in Swedish and English and display the V1 word order. A similar pattern is seen in the Mesoamerican languages, where polar questions and conditional protases are introduced by the same particle (Suárez 1983: 95). The idea that polar questions are Irrealis was also supported by the fact that if and whether also introduce clauses of general uncertainty and doubt, as was shown in Chapter 8. To support the claim that polar questions contain an interrogative category that is part of a functional category in the clause, it was pointed out that WALS (Ch. 116) found that the majority of the languages they investigated used interrogative morphemes, either in the form of particles, or verb morphology, or both, in order to form polar questions. Bybee’s (1985) investigation of 50 languages also gave typological support for the idea that the interrogative has wider scope than propositional modality. She found that the interrogative was the outmost functional morpheme, further
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out than all other mood morphemes. Furthermore, Mithun (1995: 380ff ) showed that in Central Pomo, realis-irrealis marking is quite independent of interrogative marking. This, she explained in terms of scope. The interrogative in Central Pomo has wider scope than realis-irrealis. It was further argued that embedded polar questions do not contain the interrogative category. Embedded questions are not independent utterances. Rather than constituting actual questions, they reproduce the propositional content of questions. The “indirect question” can be posed by and addressed to a third party in e.g. narratives. Furthermore, it was shown that embedded “polar questions” depend on the matrix verb for the indirect interrogative interpretation. When they are topicalized, the indirect interrogative reading is lost. Moreover, the introducers of embedded polar questions, if and whether, also occur after predicates that cannot be considered interrogative even in the widest sense, as was demonstrated in Chapter 8. As was concluded in that chapter, they should be regarded as markers of uncertainty rather than interrogativity. The next section dealt with content questions. Contrary to direct polar questions, it was argued that content questions are Realis, since the proposition is presupposed to be true (SAG IV: 744). This was supported by Alamblak, where content questions carry a presupposition marker on the verb (Foley 1986: 201), and some other languages, where content questions are marked as Realis and polar questions as Irrealis. The idea was further supported by the fact that content questions as opposed to polar questions cannot licence “negative” polarity-sensitive items in the Germanic languages, except when the question is rhetorical (in which case the subject rather implies that the proposition is not true). As was shown in 8.2, “negative” polarity-sensitive items are clearly licensed by Irrealis contexts. Second, it was argued that direct content questions do not realize the interrogative as clause determiner but rather as a constituent determiner, since it is only the identity of a constituent that is being asked for, not the truth of the proposition. Chomsky (1995: 289), in fact, stated that the wh-feature can be seen as “a variant of D”. Typological evidence was the absence of the interrogative verbal clitic ko in Finish content questions and the use of interrogative pronouns instead of the clausal question particle in many other languages. It was further argued that the fronting of the wh-word in the Germanic languages has an information-structural reason (focus) rather than being promoted by an association with a functional category. It was added that WALS (Ch. 93) found that the most common strategy among the languages in the world is not to obligatorily front the wh-word, but to let it remain in its canonical argument position. In agreement with what was said in Chapter 8, it was also argued that the auxiliary inversion and the alternative do-support found in English direct content questions is not similar to polar-question inversion, but rather to inversion in other focus-fronting constructions (e.g. “only then did she find out”). It was argued that the auxiliary inversion and alternative do-support indicate that the proposition is true (in this case presupposed) for this referent only.
Chapter 11. Conclusion and final remarks 281
In analogy with the embedded polar question, it was then argued that the embedded content question does not carry the wh-feature, but merely reproduces the propositional content of a question. In narrative discourse, indirect content questions are often posed by and addressed to a third party. Furthermore, topicalization of the complement clause leads to a non-interrogative interpretation, i.e. the wh-complement clause must follow the interrogative predicate in order to be interpreted as an indirect question. When the indirect content question functions as a subject, the wh-word behaves more like an indefinite pronoun than a question word. This observation was strengthened by the fact that WALS (Ch. 46) showed that interrogative pronouns tend to grammaticalize into indefinite pronouns. Furthermore, after semifactive predicates, the wh-word is more reminiscent of a free relative pronoun. Since mainland Scandinavian embedded content questions are constructed with the otherwise relative som (mostly when the wh-word is the subject), it was argued that these constructions are related to restrictive relative constructions. Embedded content questions and restrictive relative clauses are both semantically presupposed. Restrictive relative clauses help to identify a particular referent out of a set of referents by specifying certain characteristics belonging to that referent. So too does embedded content questions, it was argued. They specify what the speaker already knows about the referent, what is presupposed, in order for the listener to identify it. Interestingly, some northern and western Norwegian dialects even use the relative som and subordinate clause word order in direct content questions (after subject wh-pronouns). More precisely, it was argued that Scandinavian content questions with relative som are reduced cleft constructions. The cleft construction is a commonly used device for putting focus on one particular constituent, subordinating the remaining presupposed material. In the content question, the wh-word is focus and the proposition is presupposed (cf. the French Qu’est-ce que, lit. ‘What is it that’). The last section dealt with the imperative. It was argued that imperative clauses have a structure that is similar to polar questions, except that the speech-act category has the value [imperative]. Contrary to Platzack & Rosengren (1998), it was argued that imperative clauses are finite and contain the propositional modality category. Although the imperative form is identical to the infinitive form or the bare stem in many Germanic languages and others worldwide (WALS 287), it was pointed out that WALS (286) found many other languages where the imperative paradigm was distinguished along other functional parameters, such as politeness, tense, aspect and number. The majority of the languages investigated by WALS had imperative morphology dedicated to either the 2 person singular or 2 plural or both. In the Germanic languages, German, Icelandic, and Old Swedish imperatives distinguish number. Furthermore, although imperative clauses lack an obligatory subject in e.g. Swedish and English, they still have the possibility of being constructed with one. In Icelandic, the subject is in fact obligatory and tends to cliticize to the verb, just like the 2 person pronominal subject in polar questions tends to do.
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As for propositional modality, it was pointed out that Palmer (2001: 179ff ) shows that the imperative is accompanied by Irrealis marking in certain North-American and Papuan languages. The fact that there are also languages where the imperative is marked as Realis suggests that propositional modality functions as a separate functional category in imperative clauses. Even more common is the pattern that Irrealis markers are used to express a mild imperative (and the hortative/jussive; Palmer 2001: 138ff, 181ff ). In Old Swedish, Icelandic, and German, the subjunctive was/is used to express the hortative and jussive (only hortative in Icelandic), and in German, the subjunctive is also used as a polite imperative (3rd pers. pl.). The polite imperative clearly has a nonfactual explanation. By placing the directive in the realm of thought (Irrealis), it becomes less direct, less forceful. Lastly, in English imperative clauses, emphatic-do-insertion is possible, and emphatic do-insertion can be connected with Realis. To conclude, the imperative and interrogative were analysed as being in complementary distribution. Against the fact that Bybee (1985) did not find any morphological evidence that the imperative could be separated from moods such as the indicative and subjunctive, but that the interrogative could, it was argued that Bybee’s sample was too small for drawing any substantial conclusions on individual moods. Furthermore, her results may have been influenced by the fact that the imperative does not have any dedicated morphology in some languages.
11.4.5 Relative and adverbial subordinators Chapter 10, lastly, dealt with those subordinators in the Germanic languages that cannot be classified as Realis or Irrealis, namely adverbial ones. It also dealt with relative subordinators. As regards English restrictive relative that, it was argued (in agreement with Stroh-Wollin 2002) that it should be analysed as a Realis subordinator, like its declarative counterpart. Restrictive relative clauses are complements (of nouns) and are semantically Realis (presupposed, factual, or potential). Scandinavian som, on the other hand, was not analysed as a Realis subordinator but as a preposition. First, it not only introduces restrictive relative clauses, but also non-restrictive ones, and as was shown in Chapter 4, non-restrictive relative clauses are not true subordinate clauses, but rather interdependent ones (they are adjuncts and can be asserted). Second, in colloquial Danish, relative som (including som in embedded content questions) can be constructed with at, like other adverbial subordinators. Third, relative som cannot be constructed with another preposition, at least not in Swedish. Fourth, Scandinavian som derives from the equivalent comparative som ‘as’, which is arguably also a preposition. The common functional denominator between prepositions and relativizers can be said to be that both put a figure in relation to a ground. In the relative case, the figure is the antecedent and the relative clause is the ground. As regards the adverbial subordinators (including comparative som mentioned above), it was argued, in agreement with Eisenberg (2006b) and CGEL, that these should also be analysed as prepositions, prepositional phrases, or adverbs, rather than
Chapter 11. Conclusion and final remarks 283
subordinators. First, the adverbial “subordinators” have a richer lexical (adverbial) content than the general subordinators and should therefore be regarded as members of more lexical categories than the most peripheral functional category of the embedded clause. Second, the adverbial “subordinators” often have prepositional or adverbial homonyms or parallel uses. Third, many of the adverbial subordinators are or can be constructed with that or if. Fourth, the comparative “subordinators” can also select nominal complements, assign oblique case to them and be stranded. Therefore, all these subordinators were analysed as adverbs or prepositions that select complement clauses, rather than introducing them themselves: (397) matrix predicate [preposition/adverb/prepositional phrase [(that/if-)complement clause]] In fact, some of these adverbial words seem to function as factive predicates (e.g. notwithstanding the fact that). It was also pointed out that in Swedish, there are complex subordinators with a comparative som as a second element. Some of these can be constructed with att, others can also select nominal complements and assign objective case to them. These were therefore analysed as adverbial complexes. Lastly, some of the temporal subordinators in Swedish can/could be constructed with relative som (e.g. när ‘when’). Lastly in Chapter 10, the English for-to-construction was treated. Although it was noted that the construction occurs in non-actualized contexts and therefore could be categorized as Irrealis under a Palmerian (2001) framework, too many facts indicate that for is a preposition. First, for in the for-to-construction assigns objective case to the following NP and cannot be selected by another preposition. Second, the construction is only available after a noun when the ordinary for-object is possible. Third, for+NP can often be omitted in these contexts, which suggests that it is a pre-modifier of the to-infinitive and that the infinitive marker is the head of the construction. Fourth, the for-to-construction has many similarities with the ECM-construction, which, according to Chomsky (2001, 2005) lacks the Complementizer category. It was therefore argued that for+NP in the for-to-construction should be analysed as a prepositional object. Thus, it was concluded that the terms subordinator and complementizer in the Germanic languages should be confined to the general subordinators that, if, and whether (including the restrictive relative that in English) which, as has been argued in Chapter 8, denote propositional modality. Therefore, the functional category called Complementizer within the framework of Generative Grammar can be identified with propositional modality (or, under a more detailed Generative analysis, the functional category “Finiteness” can be). All in all, the hypothesis explored was sustained. What remains for further research is to investigate subordinators in the other languages of the world in more detail. Chapter 5 offered only a glimpse into this.
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11.5 Final remarks Finally, a few words should be said about the connection between propositional modality and subordination and their role in human communication. Hockett (1960) suggested that one of the central design features of human language, as opposed to animal communication, is displacement. Displacement means the ability to refer to things that are remote in time and space. It could be argued that factuality is a third such dimension, namely the ability to refer to things that are removed from the actual state of affairs, such as hypothetical, potential, uncertain, and counterfactual events. Since these are removed from the speech situation, and therefore not speech-acts, they tend to be realized as subordinate clauses. As was said in the preface, this kind of displacement gives humans the possibility to communicate what potential consequences an action could bring about (conditional constructions), judgements about the likelihood of an event to occur, and wishes or fears that certain event may occur. This, in turn, makes the listener more able to make the right choices for the future, and may lie behind much of our success as a species.
appendix a
Two typological surveys of the morphosyntactic status of propositional modality
A1. Survey of the internal order between propositional modality and tense in Julien’s (2002) 530 languages The orders of the grammatical markers given below the names are taken from Julien (2002: 330–356). The pertinent markers are in italics. Affixes and clitics are separated by ‘+’ whereas particles are separated by space: Languages with propositional modality inside of tense: 1.
Dongolese Nubian (Nubian: Eastern: Eastern Sudanic: Nilo-Saharan; Julien 2002: 332): Fut+SPron+Verb+Caus+Perf+Neg+Cond+Tense/Sub.Agr+Inter
According to Armbruster (1960: 195ff ), there is an adverbializing suffix –k that has both a conditional and a temporal meaning (i.e. ‘if ’ and ‘when’). The tense/agreement suffixes can be added to –k (Armbruster 1960: 195ff ): (398) ğóm -kı -ri∪ strike -advlzr -pres/Sub.Agr ‘If(when) I strike’ On the other hand, the label adverbializing suggests that -k is adverbial rather than modal. 2. Magi (Mailuan: Eastern Main Section: Trans-New Guinea; Julien 2002: 341): Caus+Verb+Asp+Mood+Tense+Sub/Obj.Agr The order, which comes from Thomson (1975: 622ff ), could be disputed. Relevant moods for this investigation are the indicative -ø, conditional -siba and subjunctive -isi. According to Thomson (1975: 622ff ), the indicative is null and the conditional cannot be constructed with tense. The subjunctive1 can be constructed with tense, but it occurs outside of it: (399) noa oni -s -a -isi he go -fut -2/3sg -subj ‘He should go’ 1.
The subjunctive can also be constructed with the conditional: -(siba)...-isi.
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Thus, rather than indicating that propositional modality is a more central category than tense, Magi seems to indicate the opposite. 3. Tiwi (Tiwian: Australian; Julien 2002: 342): Sub.Agr/Tense+Loc+Mood+Obj+Asp+Verb+Caus+Rep This order is disputed by Palmer (2001: 53) who, citing Osborn (1974), states that Tiwi has five moods, of which the indicative (unmarked) and subjunctive are relevant here. The subjunctive prefix occurs to the left of the future prefix (as does the obligative prefix): (400) pu- ma- ta- wari they- subj- fut- fight ‘Will they fight?’ 4. Nitinat/Ditidaht (Nootka Dialect: Southern Wakashan; Julien 2002: 345): Verb+Caus+Mood/Asp+Fut+Sub+Obj This order is disputed by the following example from Klokeid (1978: 8): (401) c´uqwši† -ibt -‘a John uuyuqw Bill hit.perf -past -decl John do.with Bill ‘John hit Bill’ Furthermore, both Nootka (Nuuchahnulth) and Makah (Southern Wakashan) have the order Verb-Tense-Mood, relevant moods here being the indicative, conditional, and in Nootka also the dubitative (Davidson 2002: 99ff, Nakayama 2001: 30ff ) (402) makah (Davidson 2002: 267) Sapx -a™ -‘aq† -’iSta -di† =eyik =si:cux fly -epen -inside -in.nose -perfv =fut =ind.1/2sg ‘I will fly up your nose!’ Nootka also has an irrealis suffix which is situated outside of tense, but can be followed by fronted tense suffixes (Davidson 2002: 320ff ). 5. Upper Chehalis (Tsamosan: Salishan; Julien 2002: 346): Neg+Tense/Asp+Mood+Verb+Inch+Trans+Obj.Agr+Subj.Agr+Adverb
Appendix A. Two typological surveys of the morphosyntactic status of propositional modality 287
According to Kinkade (1998: 240ff ), Upper Chehalis has the preverbal modal proclitics realis q’i and irrealis q’aS. In the examples given by Kinkade (1998: 240ff ), the irrealis clitic q’aS is actually situated outside the tense clitics past ta (and future †’a)2: (403) a.
am u q’aS tit čát -utxwt čn tit n -qé·q, wi q’aS ta when yet irr def give -appl I def 1sg.poss -camas and irr past c’Lč -s tan gone -3poss now ‘If I should give him my camas, it could be gone now’
b. ... ó·· tám t q’aS †’a swínn -s titxtí tit †’aq’wáy’ , oh, what indef irr fut sub/nom-be -3poss this def milt, ... ó· tám oh what ‘...oh, what could this milt become, oh what?’ The order exemplified in Kinkade is supported by Squamish (Central Salish), where the conditional/interrogative clitic u (and marginally the irrealis clitic q) is situated in front of the future clitic aq’/ it’ (Kuipers 1967: 160, 194, 207): (404) a.
u= aq’= mi= λ’iq cond= fut= come= arrive ‘If he will come’
b. hav q= aq’= v= an=nam neg irr= fut= form= 1sg=go ‘I won’t go’ 6. Wapishana (Maipuran; Arawakan; Julien 2002: 355): Sub.Agr+Verb+Refl+Caus+Asp+Mood+Tense+Obj.Pron The order comes from Tracy (1974: 120–125). Relevant mood suffixes here are the real -n(u) and the irrealis -´o. The tenses are the present -´naa, the non-present -´nii, -ni´na, and the past -´ka´na, -´na, -ra´na. The present is obligatorily preceeded by the real. The non-present is never preceded by the irrealis. When the non-present is preceded by the real, the future tense is denoted; when not, the past tense is denoted. Past is not preceded by mood except -´na, which is preceded by the irrealis in polar questions. Example: (405) õ- kiwa -n -ni´na 1sg- return -real -nonpres ‘I will return’
2. Kinkade presents no examples of realis q’i in construction with the tense clitics. There is also a subordinating/sequential/nominalizing prefix s- which occurs inside tense. Perhaps this prefix is what is referred to as M in Julien (2002).
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On the other hand, Payne (1991: 380) reports that most of the Maipuran languages have the order Verb-Val-Tense/Asp-Modal(negative, conditional, interrogative). Languages with propositional modality outside tense: 1. Masalit (Maban: Nilo-Saharan; Julien 2002: 332): Sub.Agr+Caus+Verb+Tense+Mood The source of the information is Edgar (1989). The relevant mood suffix here is the conditional (–an/–en)3. There are two verb stems in Masalit. Stem 1 carries a present marker; stem 2 past, future, or near future markers. Stem 1 cannot be constructed with the conditional (Edgar 1989: 21ff, 34ff ). As for stem 2, Edgar (1989: 21ff, 34ff ) states that conditional -en can be suffixed to the future -ti and the near future -ni: (406) a. g-oosiŋ-ti -en ?-know-fut -cond ‘if you shall know’
[unlikely]
b. g-oosiŋ -ni -en ?-know -near.fut -cond ‘if you shall know’ Masalit may thus be used as an argument for propositional modality being a more distant category from the verb than tense. 2. Nara (Eastern: Eastern Sudanic: Nilo-Saharan; Julien 2002: 332): Verb+Caus/Obj.Num+Tense/Asp+Sub.Agr/Mood/Inter The order comes from Thompson (1976: 487ff ). According to Thompson (1976: 487ff ), the indicative-person suffix (1sg -e) is added to the tense suffixes. These are the present continuous (–d/–ind), past completed (–t/–it), and future habitual -ø: (407) l -i:t -e drink -past -ind.1sg ‘I drank’ 3. Afar (East Cushitic: Afro-Asiatic; Julien 2002: 334): Neg+Verb+Caus+Sub.Pers+Tense/Asp+Sub.Num+Mood/Conj
3. There is also a modal suffix -tei, which Edgar ascribes the meaning subordinate/desire/intention, and which, in fact, stands in complementary distribution with tense. However, it is doubtful if this suffix can be said to denote propositional modality.
Appendix A. Two typological surveys of the morphosyntactic status of propositional modality 289
The order comes from Bliese (1976: 137ff ). Pertinent mood suffixes for this investigation are the indicative -ø and the subjunctive -u. This is also supported by Iraqw (South Cushitic), with the following order (Kießling 1996: 62ff ): Verb-Sub.Pers-Tense-Sub.Num-Aff/Neg-Decl/Inter/Neg.Inter-Ret.Inter 4. Abkhaz (West Caucasian: North Caucasian; Julien 2002: 337): ...V+Excess+Iter+Emph+Tense/Asp+Mood/Neg One of the sources is Hewitt (1989: 51ff ), although he actually gives a more extensive list4. Relevant mood suffixes here are the subjunctive -a:+yt’, inferential I and II -z+a:+p’, -z+a:+rә+n and conditional -(za+)r, t+g´ә. These can be added to various non-finite tenses (Hewitt 1989: 72): (408) d- k’àm- ħa -z -a:+yt’ ħ˚a s3sg -prev- neg- fall -non.fin.past.indef -subj speech.part 1sgš˚a -wa -n be.afraid -impf -fin ‘I was afraid that she had fallen’ This order is also supported by Karbad (Circassian: West Caucasian) with the following suffix order, according to Julien’s (2002: 337) source: ...Verb+Postp+Iter+Able+Emph+Past+Adv+Pl+Tense+Mood+Comp+Conj The order is confirmed by Colarusso (1989: 302–326; although he too gives a more extensive list5). Pertinent moods here are the declarative –s(a), and irrealis -ta: (409) wә- q’ә- sda- mә- apeq’˚ә -a-ağ -ta -ma sa ø- q’ә- s2sg- hor- ben- with- neg- help -past -irr -compl I 3sg- hor- benaħaSa -k’´ә -n -ta dat- be.hard -exhstv -fut -irr ‘If you had not helped me, it would have been very hard for me’ 5. Korean (Isolate; Julien 2002: 337): Verb+Caus+Hon+Tense+Vol+Mood
4. Irrelevant categories and grams between Verb and Tense/Aspect are omitted. Some of the slots are not compatible: V–...–Dyn/Impfv/Fut/Perf/Aor/Imp/Proh–Perf/Neg/Inter/Compl/Cond/Infer/Opt/Fin– Non.fin–Cond/Infer/Subj/Fin/Inter/Conjl–Perempt/Agit.inter/Emph/ Exhort 5. Julien’s (2002) “Past” also contains (dynamic/stative) present and infinitive. Julien’s “T” contains present dynamic, future, and stative/durative past. The future can also have a potential meaning.
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The order is confirmed by Kim (1990: 162ff ) although he gives a more extensive list6. Relevant modality and mood suffixes here are the suppositive and the declarative (Kim 1990: 166): (410) John i Mary eke chæk ŭl cu -әs’ -ta John nom Mary dat book acc give -past -decl ‘John gave a book to Mary’ 6. Moni (Wissel Lake-Kemandoga: Central and Western Main Section: Trans-New Guinea; Julien 2002: 341): (Obj)+Verb+Asp+Tense+Sub.Agr+Mood This is the order that is given by Voorhoeve (1975: 409). According to Larson & Larson (1958: 406–431) the moods are the indicative (–ija) and the conditional (–jogo, -ogo). The tenses are the remote past (–ga), less remote past (–mu), immediate past (–g), and the future (–nd). 7. Yareba (Yareban: Eastern Main Section: Trans-New Guinea; Julien 2002: 341): Dir+Verb+Asp+Tense+Agr+Mood The source of information is Weimer (1975). The relevant mood suffix here is the indicative -ø (Weimer 1978). As it is null, it does not constitute a piece of evidence. On the other hand, Yareba also has a counterfactive suffix -rona which also comes outside the tense suffixes (Weimer 1975: 709ff ): (411) na baya imutei-m -a -rona iro ibi -m -a I mother think -fut -1sg -counterfact there stay -fut -1sg -ne u -e -desid do -1sg ‘If I had been thinking of mother, I would have stayed there’ 8. Miriwung (Djeragan: Australian; Julien 2002: 343): Sub.Agr+Obj.Agr+Verb+Tense+Mood+Ind.Obj The order is partly what is presented in Kofod (1976: 646ff ). According to Kofod (1976: 646ff ), the irrealis-interrogative -gu and the subjunctive come outside the true tense markers. 9. Potawatomi (Central Algonquian: Algic; Julien 2002: 345): Agr+Mood+Tense+Asp+Incorp+Asp.+Verb+Mood/Agr The source of the information is Hocket (1948). The relevant mood prefix/particle here is the narrative e. The narrative is “the mark of a certain style, namely that of 6.
V–Honor–Past–Experl.Contrv–Vol/Supp–Form–Retrosp–Decl/Inter/Imp/Juss
Appendix A. Two typological surveys of the morphosyntactic status of propositional modality 291
story-telling and the like, in contrast to statements made about what has happened, in reality, to the speaker” (Hocket 1948: 139). Clearly, this suggests that it carries an irrealis component, perhaps hearsay. The narrative can be followed by tense prefixes/ particles ki (past time) and wi (future). 10. Catawba (Siouan; Julien 2002: 346): Verb+(±Fut±Perf/)Sub.Agr+Mood The order is partly what is stated in the source, Matthews & Red Thunder Cloud (1967: 10ff; they actually give a more comprehensive one). According to Matthews & Red Thunder Cloud (1967: 10ff ), the last suffix in a group of up to four suffixes, including the tense suffix future imperfective, must always be either a predicative suffix or a modal one. Among the latter ones are the probable and potential. 11. Pawnee (Caddoan; Julien 2002: 346): Adv+Dem+Dual+Refl+Neg/Inter+Evid+Mood+Sub+Evid+Obj+Ben+Aor+A dv+Pl+Iter+Incorp+Adj+Port/Com+Loc+Distr+Verb+Caus+Perf+Intr/ Inch/Hab Relevant moods here are the indicative (ta/ti-), subjunctive (a:-/i:-), conditional ((r)i-) and potential (kus-i-) (Mithun 1999: 182, 372). These come outside the only tense marker, aorist. 12. Achumawi (Palaihnihan: Northern Hokan; Julien 2002: 349): Sub.Agr/Mood+Verb+Dir/Caus/Ben/Asp/Tense+Agr(Num?)/Mood The order comes from De Angulo & Freeland (1930: 89ff ). The relevant person/mood suffix here is the indicative (there is also a subordinative and an optative mood). According to De Angulo & Freeland (1930: 89ff ), the distant past -i·n and “future of eventuality” -ìgúdz suffixes can be constructed with this suffix7: (412) hámm -i·n -ù -má ind.1pl -eat -dist.past -ind.1pl -ind.1pl ‘We all ate a long time ago’ 13. Popoloc (Popolocan: Oto-Manguean; Julien 2002: 351): Mood/Asp+Tense+Verb+Loc+Appl/Instr+Neg+Sub.Agr+Obj.Agr The order comes from Williams & Longacre (1967). The relevant mood prefix here is the counterfactive rú-. It can be added to a neutral tense prefix -/g-/k- in the given order (Mood–Tense–Verb; Williams & Longacre 1967: 185).
7. There is also a recent past suffix, but this cannot be constructed with the indicative/agreement suffix (De Angulo & Freeland 1930: 111).
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14. Tarascan (Tarascan; Julien 2002: 352): Verb+Tense+Mood+Obj.Agr+Sub.Agr The order comes from Foster (1969: 54ff ). Relevant mood suffixes are the indicative (+number agreement) -ka, -ti and the subjunctive -ka. The following inflections of the verb míte show how the indicative is added to tense (Foster 1969: 59ff ): míti-a-ti (know-fut-3.ind), (know-pres.dur-3.ind)
míte-Š-ka
(know-pret-1.ind),
míte-Ša-tí
15. Ngäbére (Guaymi: Chibchan; Julien 2002: 352): Verb+Asp+Tense+Mood The order comes from Young & Givón (1990). According to Young & Givón (1990: 213), the simple mood suffix is the irrealis -re. Irrealis can be added to both the past suffix -ba and the near future -di: -ba-re, -d-re. In the latter case, however, the meaning becomes obligative. 16. Imbabura (Equadorian Quechua; Julien 2002: 353): Verb+Caus+Obj.Agr+Perf+Tense/Sub.Agr+Cond/Inter The order is confirmed by Kusters (2003: 270, 284; although he gives a more comprehensive one). Campbell (2000: 1382ff ) states that the conditional –man comes outside the tense/person suffixes in Quechua8: (413) apa -nchik -man take -1pl.incl.pres -cond ‘We would take’ 17. Mapuche (Araucanian; Julien 2002: 353): Verb+Appl+Neg+Tense+Obj.Dir+Inv+Mood+Sub.Pers+Sub.Num+Obj.Inv The order comes from Smeets (1989) and is confirmed by Adelaar & Muysken (2004). Relevant moods are the indicative -(ü)y and conditional -(ü)l, although the indicative fuse with the person number suffixes in 1 and 2 person (Adelaar & Muysken 2004: 523). Tense suffixes are the past -fu and future -a (Smeets 1989: 226ff, Adelaar & Muysken 2004: 530): (414) nyi pu wenGy aku -a -y ˆ arrive -fut -ind.3 1.poss.sg pl friend ‘My friends will arrive’
8. Palmer (2001: 12) also mentions a dubitative suffix (–chá), but it is unclear if it can be constructed with tense.
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The classification of the tenses as past and future is the traditional one. However, Smeets (1989: 305ff ) points out that the past has a counterfactual and the future a potential component to their meaning. In particular, the combination of the future and the past yields a dubitative interpretation (Compare to the situation in the Germanic languages with would and should). 18. Saliva (Salivan; Julien 2002: 354): (Sub.Agr)+Verb+(Sub.Agr)+Neg+Tense/Asp+Mood One of the sources is Suárez (1977). Among the mood suffixes listed by Suárez (1977: 26ff ), the indicative -ø and subjunctive are relevant. The subjunctive present is formed by adding the suffix -de to the unmarked present stem; the subjunctive past imperfective and subjunctive pluperfect seem to be formed by adding the suffix -che to the future-imperfective -qua and past-perfective -jioca suffixes, respectively. Thus the subjunctive suffixes appear to be -de and -che (my glossing and interpretation): (415) a. quere -cha -qua -che do -1.sg -fut.impfv -subj ‘If I did’ b. quere -cua -jioca -che do -2.sg -past.perfv -subj ‘If you had done’ 19. Candoshi (Isolate; Julien 2002: 354): Verb+Loc/Ints+Tense/Asp+Sub.Agr+Neg/Pot/Emph/Inter The source of the information, Cox (1957) actually gives a more complex picture9. The relevant mood suffixes are the indicative, possible, potential, and conditional. These are situated outside the tense suffixes past and recent (Cox 1957: 133ff ): (416) kčóŋka -raŋ -k -i paddled -past -ind -1sg ‘I paddled’
9.
Main verbs have the following suffix order: V–Loc/Ints–Rec/Punct–Past–Ind/Curr–Dur/Movemnt/Hab/Possib–Incompl/ Compl–1st.ord/2nd.ord–Individzr–Pers/Num–Emp/Pot/Neg/Inter
Conditional auxiliaries has the following suffix order: V–Loc/Ints–Recent/Punct–Past–Ind/Curr–Hab–Incompl/Compl–Cond–Specif–Individzr–Pers/Num
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On the other hand, the indicative stands in complementary distribution with current, according to Cox’s order (see footnote below). To this, it can be retorted that the indicative and the current do not occur in the same kinds of constructions (“formulas”). Furthermore, current can be constructed with the recent, which gives the clause recentpast reference (Cox 1957: 134). This questions the temporal status of current. Lastly, current is also in complementary distribution with the locative in some formulas, which is one of the innermost suffixes (Cox 1957: 135). All in all, Candoshi can be considered an indication that propositional modality is a more peripheral category than tense. 20. Aguaruna (Jivaroan; Julien 2002: 354): Verb+Caus+Obj.Agr+Asp+Neg+Pl+Sub.(Obj.)Pers+Tense+Decl/Opt+Inter The source of the information is Larsen (1966); Larsen (1963: 7) actually gives a more comprehensive order. Relevant mood suffixes are the declarative -i, optative (potential rather) -stai, and dubitative -Š(a)/-aŠ (Larsen 1963: 11ff ): (417) a. taka -s -tat -ha -i work -pers.act -fut -1pers -decl ‘I will work’ b. taka -sa -in -ha -Š work -pers.act -undes.fut -1pers -dub ‘I might work (not wanting to)’ 21. Iatê (Fulniô: Macro Ge; Julien 2002: 355) Sub.Agr+Obj.Agr+Incorp+Verb+Caus+Neg+Tense/Asp+Mood+Inter The source of the information is Lapenda (1968). Among the mood10 suffixes listed by Lapenda (1968: 115ff ) are the indicative and the dubitative –khiwá. The dubitative can be added to the future suffix -he (Lapenda 1968: 157ff; uncertain translation): (418) taêmka -he -khiwa drive -fut -dub ‘He will perhaps drive’ 22. Chiquito (Chiquito: Macro Ge; Julien 2002: 356): Sub.Agr+Verb+Fut+Mood+Obj.Pron+Neg
10. The present and the preterite can further be combined with a suffix –këá (ekhwkwa-këá, ekhwkwa-s-këá) to denote events of undetermined possibility “possibilidade indeterminade” in contrast to “reale”. Whether this suffix should be regarded as irrealis is difficult for me to determine. Lapenda calls it aspectual.
Appendix A. Two typological surveys of the morphosyntactic status of propositional modality 295
According to Adam & Henry (1880: 34ff ) there are initial prefixes and final suffixes that seem to denote both subject agreement and the indicative. Tense is only marked in the future, which precedes the indicative and subject agreement suffixes (Adam & Henry 1880: 40; glossing by the present author): (419) itomoê -na -ca nburicas 1sg.ind -tie -fut -1sg.ind mule ‘I will tie the mule’ A2. Independent survey of the internal order between propositional modality and tense in the languages of the world Languages with propositional modality outside tense: 1. Gikuyu (Bantu: Benue-Congo: Niger-Congo) has a hypothetical prefix ngĩ-, which is situated outside a future prefix ka- or a prefix of indeterminate time na- (Wald 1990: 299; see the discussion of Shona in 3.4.1): (420) i‚- ngĩ- ka- na- endi-a 1sg- hyp- fut- indet-sell -ind ‘If I should ever sell [it]’ In Swahili, nga- seems to be added to the past (Welmers 1973: 361): (421) u- nga- likita- fut -a 2sg- hyp- past- ppl.tense- fut- search -ind ‘if you had looked for it’ 2. In Efik (Kwa: North: Niger-Congo; Welmers 1973: 361) there is a hypothetical prefix kpV-that is located outside the past prefix kV-: (422) ŋ- kpé -ké- dep Pbòrò 1sg- hyp -past- buy bananas ‘I would have bought bananas’ 3. In Hdi (Chadic: Afro-Asiatic; Frajzyngier & Shay 2002: 272) there is a hypothetical particle má that can be followed by a past particle sí: (423) ká ùvá mántsá má sí tà dzá -‘í mndán... comp cat comp hyp pst impfv go -1sg but ‘Cat answered “I might go, but...’
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4. In Arabic (Semitic: Afro-Asiatic), there is an indicative11 suffix –u/-n(a) which is added to the aspect-tense-person portmanteau suffix “imperfect” (with present or future reference; Fischer 1997: 208ff ): (424) tamlik -i: -na impf.2sg -own -impf.2sg -ind ‘You posses’ Similarly, although in a prefix system, there is an indicative-person portmanteau prefix in the Arabic dialects that is situated outside the aspect-tense-person prefix “imperfect” (Kay & Rosenhouse 1997: 291). Furthermore, in Modern South Arabian, there is a subjunctive prefix that is added to the “imperfect” prefixes (Simeone-Senelle 1997: 401ff ): (425) lәrkēz subj- impf.1sg- put.something.straight ‘if I put something straight’ 5. In Pashto (Eastern Iranian), there is a conditional suffix -y/-ay that can be added to the past stem, consisting of the root + past formative suffix -ed: lw-ed-āˇy (fall-past. form-cond). There is also a newer past suffix -Ll which can be added to the past stem and to which, in turn, the conditional can be added: lw-ed-Ll-ay (fall-past.form-pastcond; MacKenzie 1990: 143ff )12. 6. In Sindhi (Indo-Aryan; Khubchandani 2003: 646ff ) there is an indicative/agreement suffix that is located outside tense/participle suffixes: (426) a. lIkh -әnd -UsI write -pres -ind.1.sg.m. ‘I’ll write’ b. mũ kItab-ә pәrh-y -a I-obl book-m.pl read-pst -ind.m.pl ‘I read [past] books’ 7. In Burman (Lolo-Burmese; Tibeto-Burman: Sino-Tibetan; Wheatley 2003: 202ff ) there are realis and irrealis particles/suffixes -tε/-θe and -mε/-mә, respectively. These are placed outside aspect particles/suffixes. One of the latter particles òun ‘still, not yet’
11. There is also a subjunctive suffix –a, but this can only be added to the morphologically unmarked imperfective forms. 12. Together with the auxiliary šwәl, the conditional also has a potential meaning. There is also a prefix wL- which partly has a subjunctive function; on the other hand, when it is added to the future prefix ba-: wL-ba-lweği, the interpretation becomes aspectual (perfective) rather than modal (MacKenzie 1990: 146ff ).
Appendix A. Two typological surveys of the morphosyntactic status of propositional modality 297
denotes not only aspect but also the future. It is constructed with the irrealis and the subordinative irrealis nominalizer -hma: (427) a. sà -òun-mε eat -fut-irr ‘I will eat’ b. θe-ko θe -òun -hma die-extent die -fut -irr.nomzr ‘[You]’ll get [yourself] killed’ 8. In Garo (Jingpho-Konyak-Bodo: Tibeto-Burman: Sino-Tibetan; Burling 2003: 390) there are mood suffixes that are added to tense suffixes. Relevant mood suffixes here are the irrealis13 (–chim), probably (–kon), and quotative (–na): (428) a. re´ -ang -gin-ok -chim move -away -intent.fut -irr ‘would like to go’ b. A-gan -chak -tai -ja -wa -kon speak -answer -again -neg -fut -probably ‘[He] will probably not answer again’ 9. In Limbu (Mahakiranti: Himalayish: Tibeto-Burman: Sino-Tibetan) there is an irrealis suffix -gà·ni and a conditional suffix -mεn. Both can be added to the preterite suffix -ε or two different person-past portmanteau suffixes (van Driem 1987: 135–142): (429) a. kε- be·g -ε -gà·ni -ba! 2- go -pret -irr -impfv ‘If only you had gone!’ b. kε- hikt -ε -mεn 2- stifle -pret -cond ‘You would have difficulty breathing here’ 10. In the Dravidian language family, there are several languages (Tamil, Kannada, Tulu, Konda, Kolami) with a conditional suffix located outside a past tense suffix (Steever 1998). Old Tamil will serve as an example of this common heritage (Lehmann 1998: 86): (430) olir -nt -āl shine -past -cond
13. Burling calls it “a kind of perfect or irrealis marker. It shows that the proposition is untrue now but that it was true once or might be true at some other time” (Burling 2003: 390). This meaning is clearly irrealis rather than perfect.
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Tulu also has a dubitative postclitic which can also be added to the past suffix (plus a person suffix; Bhat 1998: 170): (431) kor -t -e =do give -past -3sg =dub ‘He might have given’ There is also a prospective suffix in Tulu -oli, which can be added to the present perfect suffix -t and receive a counterfactual meaning. It must be pointed out that what is called the future tense in the closely related Tamil (Annamalai & Steever 1998: 113) and Kannada (Steever 1998: 141), -ø/-v, is called the subjunctive in Tulu (translated as ‘may’). Morphosyntactically, -v stands in complementary distribution with the other tense markers. On the other hand, Krishnamurti (2003: 318) calls this morpheme present-future (habitual). On the whole, the Dravidian languages can be seen as a piece of evidence that propositional modality is a more peripheral category than tense. 11. In Juray and Juang (South Munda; Anderson 2008) the conditional markers -dεn and -jf, respectively, are added to the tense/aspect inflected verb stems (Anderson 2008: 340, 546): (432) juray se’d -lә’d -dεn accompany -pst.itr -cond ‘if you accompany me’ (433) juang apa ama den -f -jf you neg come -pst -cond ‘If you would have come Furthermore, in the Kherwarian languages (North Munda), there is a finite/declarative/indicative marker -a, which is situated outside of the tense/aspect markers. At least in Ho, -a is also in complementary distribution with the other modality markers conditional and optative/subjunctive (Anderson 2008: 227). On the other hand, the optative/subjunctive and irrealis seem to be situated closer to the verb stem in Santali, although they do not seem to be constructed with tense/aspect (Anderson 2008: 63ff ). All in all, though, the Munda languages could be considered an indication that propositional modality is a more peripheral category than tense. 12. Taiof (New Ireland: Western Oceanic: Austronesian) has the particle order irrealis > future > V (Ross 2002: 437): (434) are ma tañ nau =ro -r tanun tamanañ ta =na voñvoñ they irr fut go =impfv -3.pl garden tomorrow prep =art morning ‘They will go to the garden tomorrow morning’
Appendix A. Two typological surveys of the morphosyntactic status of propositional modality 299
This is supported by the closely related Banoni with the particle order SAgr:realis14 > future > V (Lynch et al. 2002: 447ff ): (435) Na ko ta kuu manguri I 1sg:real fut drink drinking.coconut ‘I’m drinking coconut’ Furthermore, the more remotely related Nalik has a counterfactual conditional particle15 lek which comes before an anterior tense particle (Volker 1998: 51ff ): (436) Ga lek tabung faral a buk. 1sg countrf.cond ant write art book ‘I wouldn’t have been writing the book’ 13. In Sudest (Papuan Tip: Western Oceanic: Austronesian) there are potential particles and a hypothetical one which come before the tense particles (in their original position; Anderson & Ross 2002: 335): (437) Mbwata ne i= mena perhaps fut 3sg= come ‘He might come/perhaps he’ll come’ 14. In Kamula (Central and South New Guinea-Kutubuan: Central and Western: Main Section: Trans-New Guinea), there are several tense and mood morphemes, some of which can be combined (Routamaa 1994). The realis mood suffix -po can be added to the far past tense suffix -wa and the future suffix -lo must be followed by one of the mood morphemes neutral (–ama/-epo), reported (–eyo) definite (–pe), possible (–la) or conditional (–pie; Routamaa 1994: 18ff ): (438) a. Kampanis opi -ta ma- pu -mhala -wa -po Companies some -source asp-come -span.seq- stand -far.pst -real ‘Other Companies came and stayed’ b. Dusupi teyu -lo -la Dusupi fall -fut -poss Dusupi might fall. On the other hand, the present tense suffix -ma cannot be constructed with mood, whilst the realis mood suffix can be used alone to indicate the present realis. Furthermore, there is also a reported past suffix (–yo) in the same slot as the tense suffixes, i.e. a tense-mood portmanteau morpheme. All in all however, Kamula can be considered an indication that propositional modality is a more peripheral category than tense.
14. Irrealis ma cannot be constructed with the future in Banoni. 15. Nalik also has a future particle na in the same position as anterior tense, but for “conceptual reasons”, it is incompatible with the counterfactual conditional particle; Volker 1998: 51ff )
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15. In Angaataha (Angan: Central and Western: Main Section: Trans New Guinea) the realis suffix comes outside the perfect suffix (Foley 1986: 197): (439) tehoáa -t -os -one -hé na- insée make.fire -1sg.actor -perf -1.real -dat eat- 3sg.act-real ‘after I made a fire, he ate’ In Kapau in the same branch (Angan Proper) there is a subjunctive suffix -nhe which is added to the tense/aspect suffixes past1 -mang, present continuous -’ and stative present -ng (Oates & Oates 1968: 78ff, 141): (440) i -mang -m -nhe do -past1 -1sg -subj ‘I would have done’ 16. Nankina (Huon-Finisterre: Central and Western: Main Section: Trans-New Guinea) has the suffix order Verb-Prog-Tense/Asp-Sub.Agr/Modality, where the tenses are present (–wa), today’s past (–i), yesterdays past (–pai) and remote past (–k¤) and the modalities indefinite (not total certainty), definite (certainty), factual (realis), evidential (second-hand information), and irrealis (Spaulding & Spaulding 1994: 44ff ). The factual and the evidential can be constructed with tense (the latter must be): (441) a. ¤min nu nanu -i -k human deic rec.1s -say.to -tod.pst -fact.3s ‘He is the one who told me’ b. ...¤min g¤pbit wit -ŋan ku-k¤ -mayak person masalai house -loc go-rem.pst -evid.2/3pl ‘...(those) two went down to the spirit’s house The irrealis-sub.agr suffix cannot be constructed with either tense or aspect morphemes, but is suffixed to the verb alone. However, since it is part of the same formal system as the other modal suffixes (forming mod.-sub.agr. portmanteaumorphemes), the proposed suffix order can be defended. The indefinite and definite have to do with future events, the farther away from the present, the more likely the use of the indefinite. Since there is no future tense suffix associated with them (although they can be preceeded by a “delayed aspect” suffix), it could perhaps be argued that they in fact are tense-modality portmanteau morphemes. On the other hand, there is also a prospective aspect suffix, which indicates that something is impending or already in progress. This can “almost” be used as a near future tense and differs from the definite and indefinite modal suffixes in the sense that “there is no question as to whether it will come about” (Spaulding & Spaulding 1994: 46). The prospective aspect can be constructed with the factual. Furthermore, the indefinite suffix is also used in conditional constructions, including counterfactual ones. All in all, Nankina can be considered a piece of evidence that propositional modality is a more peripheral category than tense.
Appendix A. Two typological surveys of the morphosyntactic status of propositional modality 301
17. In Kiwai (Trans-Fly: Trans New Guinea) there is a realis prefix that is situated outside future prefixes (Foley 1986: 131): (442) nei -to imeime ai- wido- doiregetai-ama -ri they -two all real- 2/3fut -fut-dual.actor -fall -dual.undg -fut ‘They both will fall’ 18. Pawaian (Teberan-Pawaian: Trans-New Guinea) has the following suffix order according to Wurm (1975: 505): Verb–Non-Immediate Future–Perfective/Imperfective–Declarative: Example: (443) omol hen -u -ai -e those.men look -non.imm.fut -imperfv -decl ‘They will look later’ 19. Barai (Central and South Eastern: Eastern Main Section: Trans New Guinea) has a conditional suffix16 –ne which is placed outside of either past or future (Olson 1975: 481): (444) no kuaria -vo -ne buka faememare -i we talk.to.them -past -cond they ignore -past ‘Whenever we talk to them, they ignore it’ 20. In Tauya (Brahman: Mandang and Albert Range: Trans New-Guinea) there is a dubitative and an indicative/unmarked suffix. These are located outside certain tense/ subject-agreement suffixes, indicative outside the dubitative (McDonald 1990: 207): (445) a. ni - e -rafo- a eat -3sg.fut -dub-ind ‘Maybe he’ll eat’ b. awi-rafo fofe -i - a two-dub come -3pl.aor -ind ‘Maybe two came’ There is also a subjunctive suffix in Tauya, which is also located outside tense (McDonald 1990: 214): (446) wate toporo ini -tei -pope -i -nu house group sleep -iter -hab -3pl.aor -subj ‘A group of kinsmen lived...’ 21. In Bindanere (Binanderean: Eastern Main Section: Trans New Guinea), there are final vowel suffixes on verbs -a and –e/–o that mark the verb as independent (realis) 16. Barai also has indicative and dubitative suffixes, but these cliticize to the subject.
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and dependent (irrealis), respectively (Capell 1969: 10). These are located outside temporal “linking vowels” (suffixes) yielding the order V-T-Pers-Indep (Realis)/Dep (Irrealis). The independent suffix occurs in realis contexts whereas the dependent ones occur in irrealis contexts (wishes, intentions, and consequences). Capell (1969: 10) contemplated on calling the distinction realis-irrealis but decided on independentdependent since he considered that label to be “more productive”. The dependent (irrealis) forms are almost exclusively based on the future themes. Wilson (2002: 19ff ) offers a somewhat different analysis. -A he classifies as indicative, whereas -e is classified as hortative: (447) Jusi, tai =mi kokora de =da pat -e -t -a Justin foot =instr chicken waste =loc press -tod.pst -2sg -ind ‘Justin, you stepped in the chicken manure.’ In any case, Binandere can be used as an indication that propositional modality is a more peripheral category than tense. 22. Djamindjungan (Australian) has an irrealis/negative prefix nja- located outside the future prefix ni- (Hoddinott & Kofod 1976: 698–704): (448) guranj njani- ŋa- wu not irr/neg-fut- 3sg- see.3sg ‘He will not see it’ 23. Karajarri (South-West: Pama-Nyungan: Australian) has an irrealis/potential/negative suffix –dē, -dō which is added to a future suffix (Nekes & Worms 2006: 282): (449) derbo ndala -ra milin-go yandala -ra -go -dē avoiding say -imp spear-ag spear -2sg -fut -irr/pot ‘dodge the spear, he (the man) might spear you!’ This is supported by Thargari (Inland Ngayarda: South-West Pama-Nyungan: Australian). In Thargari, there is a dubitative suffix in three variants, according to class: -lariŋkaRa, -rariŋkaRa and -ιRariŋkaRa (Klokeid 1969: 38ff ). The future suffix also comes in three variants, according to class. Interestingly, these are identical to the initial phonemes of the dubitative suffixes: -la, -ra, and –ιRa. Clearly, the dubitative suffix is in fact invariably -riŋkaRa, which is added to the future suffixes. 24. In Siuslaw (Oregon Penutian: Penutian) the indicative suffix –u is located outside the tense suffixes (Frachtenberg 1922a: 504ff, Mithun 1999: 513): (450) a. łī’t!E -t -u· -n eat -pres -ind -obj.agr ‘he ate him’
Appendix A. Two typological surveys of the morphosyntactic status of propositional modality 303
b. SEatsītc waa’ -yax -au -n thus speak -past -ind -obj.agr ‘thus he spoke to him’ c. †xmī· -yáy -u· -n =anł kill -fut -ind -3obj =1incl.pl.sub ‘We will kill him’ [a bear] 25. In Nisenan (Maiduan: Penutian) there is a tentative suffix -cee ‘maybe’ which frequently follows the future suffix -wis (Eatough 1999: 11ff ). There is also an evidential suffix -ma ‘evidently’ which can be added to the past suffix -haa or the future suffix (Eatough 1999: 17, 39, 52): (451) a. Puula -wis -cee-i ha -wis -cee nik mi fool -fut -tent say -fut -tent 1.sg.acc 2.sg.nom ‘Maybe you’ll say I’m just pulling your leg’ b. Homona dap [mysaak] uk’oj -haa-ma somewhere.allat perpl 3.dl.gen go.away -pst-evid ‘I don’t know, I guess those two must have gone off somewhere’ 26. Kutenai (Isolate) has the mood prefixes irrealis ł(i )- and suppositive łin-. These are situated outside the tense prefixes future and remote past (Garvin 1948: 171ff ): (452) a. tә·q hułqakiłqake· verb 1pers- irr- rem.pst- say ‘Had I only said it!’ b. #łin- cqawałuqkukut -ne· 3pers- supp- fut- not.rain -ind ‘It might not rain’ 27. In Campa and Amuesha (PreAndine Arawak: Arawakan) the mood suffixes are situated outside of the tense suffixes. Relevant mood suffixes here are the subjunctive, dubitative, and conditional (Wise 1986: 581–604): (453) i- siroNč -aa -ma 3m- laugh -fut.refl -dub ‘Maybe he would laugh’ 28. In Amahuaca (South Central Panoan) there is a declarative suffix -(h)nu which is situated outside of Amahuaca’s numerous tense/aspect suffixes (Sparing-Chávez 1998: 443–485): (454) Hiya -x -mun hun -ϕ jo -cu -hnu I -nom -th I -abs come -1/2rec.past.prfv -decl ‘It is I who came’
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One complicating circumstance is the fact that the person-immediate past-perfectivemorphemes -ha/-qui ‘just’ also have an alternative, marked meaning of actuality ‘actually’. On the whole, however, Amahuaca could be seen as an argument for propositional modality being a more peripheral category than tense. 29. Chibcha (Chibchan Proper: Chibchan) has a subjunctive suffix -nan, which is added to the verb stem + the present suffix. The indicative is unmarked (Campbell 2000: 350ff ): (455) tse- bquy -scua -nan 1sg- do -pres -subj ‘that I may do’ According to Adelaar & Myusken (2004: 102ff ) Chibcha (“Muisca”) also has the final suffixes -xin which express a simultaneous real subordinate event and -san, which expresses a hypothetical subordinate event. Unlike -nan (which they call the conditional), -xin and -san are not added to the finite tense suffixes but to the participial tense suffixes present and future agentive participle (–sca and -nga respectively). 30. In Páez (Isolate; Adelaar & Muysken 2004: 133ff ) there are epistemic-agreementevent enclitic markers that are situated on the outside of the tense enclitic markers remote past -ku and aorist -ø. The epistemic moods are declarative (direct knowledge), inferential knowledge, and interrogative/no knowledge (Adelaar & Muysken 2004: 133): -th (456) ah -ya p -me -ku cook -inch -neg -rem.pst -1sg.decl ‘I was not going to cook’ 31. Kwaza (Isolate: Rondônia) has the suffix order V-T-Person-Mood, the relevant mood suffix for this investigation being the declarative (indicative). The tenses are the future, the past, and the remote past. The declarative can be suffixed to all tenses. There is also a potential suffix which is located between person and mood. It can be constructed with the future. Lastly, there is also a final apparential suffix (with deductive/assumptive/potential meanings; van der Voort 2004: 388ff, 420ff, 605ff ): (457) a. txa’hb ba -jãhb -’nã -tse path clear -class.path -fut- decl ‘He wants/is going to clear the road’ b. ze’zĩju -dy -rjb oja -’nã -da -tsy -tse Zezinho -pos -class.area go -fut -1sg -pot -decl ‘I will go to Zezinho (one of these days)’ c. kreBa-’na oja -’nã -cehere Gleba-loc go -fut -appar ‘Maybe he will go to Gleba’
Appendix A. Two typological surveys of the morphosyntactic status of propositional modality 305
32. In Waorani (Isolate;) the mood suffixes inferential -ĩ, speculative -bb, dubitative -wo, cognitive (‘think’) -wæ, and assertive/declarative -pa are located outside the tense suffixes past -ta, contingent past -dõ, far past -ga and future -ki (Peeke 1973: 14–21, 38ff ): (458) a. kbwb -yõ -dãdi bõipa i -kã-ta -pa live -simul -3pl Moipa come.upriver -he-past -decl ‘While they lived there, Moipa came upriver’ b. wãka be -wa -ka w -kĩ -wæ -dõ -! fungus drink -foot -fungus die -fut -cogn -subv -excl ‘Fungus is itching my foot, I think that I shall die!’ c. botõ wbĩ -bĩdi, põ -ta -bĩdi -wo -? my children -2pl come -past -2pl -dub -inter ‘My children, did you come?’ 33. In Cocama-Cocamilla (Tupi-Guarani Subgroup III: Tupi) there are tense and mood clitics/suffixes. The tenses are the future -á, immediate past-úi, recent past/yesterdays past -ícuá, and far past/remote past -cúri/-tsuri. The moods are the subjunctive -üra/era and the potential -mia (Faust 1971: 77, 93ff, 1972: 42, 57ff ). Together with the clause nucleus17, they form tense and mood phrases, respectively. In a clause with both tense and mood, mood is suffixed/cliticized to tense and is situated outside it in relation to the clause nucleus. Mood takes the tense phrase as its complement (Faust 1971: 95, 83): (459) a. č- iamúki c-üruráka y -ui - ra my- heart- with I-bring her -imm.pst -subj ‘With deep feeling I brought her’ b. mucanakatára c-ürúra y -ui -mía to.treat.with.medicine I-bring her -imm.pst -pot ‘I brought her to be treated’ Languages with propositional modality inside tense: 1. In Hindi, Urdu, and Punjabi (Central Zone: Indo-Aryan) the future suffix -gā/-ga is added to the subjunctive form of the verb, e.g. Hindi: cal-e-gā (move-3sg.subjvfut.3sg; Shapiro 2003: 267, Schmidt 2003: 329ff ). 2. Great Andamanese (Andamanese) has the suffix order V-M/A-T, the relevant mood suffix being the indicative (–o/–f). The tenses are non-past -m and past -ø (Abbi 2006: 38): (460) khudi-o ceo -za cokbi -bi ekphuti-k -f -m 3sg -3sg.clt knife-instr turtle -acc cut -cl-ind-non.past ‘He cuts the turtle with a knife’ 17. These are suffixed/cliticized to the right-most morpheme in the clause nucleus, which may be the main verb, aspectual auxiliaries, the subject and certain recipient morphemes.
306 Modality and Subordinators
On the other hand, Manoharan (1989: 96ff ) does not analyse -o/-f as the indicative. Rather, he sees -o/-f as parts of the past -bo and non-past (“future cum present continuous tense”) -bom. There is also a present suffix -be. The initial -b in all of Manoharan’s tenses correspond to a class marker in Abbi’s analysis (see -k in the example above). In this case, it is obvious that Abbi’s analysis is superior, as the consonant changes according to verb class. However, the fact that the present tense has a different vowel than the past and non-past tenses clearly casts doubt on Abbi’s indicative-mood analysis of the past and non-past vowel. Furthermore, Dasgupta & Sharma (1982: 22ff ) report that the rather distantly related Onge (South Andamanese – if related at all; see Abbi 2006: 91ff ) has the following affix order: Sub–Obj–Verb–Dir/Loc–Sub.Pl.Agr– Past(compl)/Pres.cont/Imm.fut/ Fut(/imp)/ Dist.fut/Indef.fut/Cond/Imp –Ind/Inter Example (Dasgupta & Sharma 1982: 37): (461) lua celemegi ukutte-E -ge there moon rise -pres.cont-ind 3. Southeast Ambrym (North-East Vanatu-Banks Islands: Central-Eastern Oceanic: Austronesian) has the prefix order SAgr:Non.fut/Imm.fut/Dist.fut–Potential/Past–V (Lynch et al 2002: 665ff ): (462) lina- pat 3pl.dist.fut-pot- sleep ‘They will perhaps sleep’ Although the potential is in complementary distribution with the past, the future is located outside of it. 4. In Panamint (Northern Uto-Aztecan; Dayley 1989: 55ff, 68ff ), there is a dubitative suffix -hi and a “certaintive” suffix -kon/-hon, both of which are situated inside certain aspect-tense-event-modal suffix slots. At least the certaintive can be constructed with the tense suffixes future -tu’ih and past -ppantün (Dayley 1989: 72): (463) a. Ke nangkawi -hon -tu’ih! not talk -cert -fut ‘Don’t talk’ b. Nü tsotahe -kko -ppühantu I choke -cert -past ‘I was really choking’ On the other hand, there is also a final indefinite future suffix -nnhi which indicates that the event is not certain to occur. It probably consists of the penultimate simulfactive completive aspect suffix -nnuh and the dubitative suffix -hi (Dayley 1989: 57), which undoubtedly calls the alleged suffix order into question, at least as far as the dubitative is concerned.
appendix b
Sources for the typological surveys
Below follows a list of the grammars used in the typological surveys presented in 3.5.2 and 5. These grammars are listed under language family and sub-families. The handbooks in Routledge Language Family Series are so representative that the particular languages described in them do not need to be listed. For the series Handbook of Australian Languages, however, the particular language descriptions had to be listed, since the selection appears to be more random and the grammatical descriptions are so extensive that they could be considered books rather than articles. Other series have covered several language families from a certain region, e.g. A Handbook of American Indian Languages and A Handbook of Amazonian Languages. In these cases, each individual grammar has been listed under its respective language family. The Indigenous Languages of the Caucasus, on the other hand, contained two separate volumes, each dedicated to a particular language family. These volumes are simply listed under their respective language family. The handbook The Languages of Native North America, in turn, contains rather short grammatical sketches of every known language family in Canada and USA. In this case, the title has been listed under the heading “North American Languages”. This has also been done with other handbooks of that series (Cambridge Language Surveys) The Amazonian Languages and The Languages of the Andes. The numbers given within parentheses indicate how many languages the family or sub-family contains according to Ethnologue.com. The labels within quotation marks denote regional clusters of languages, not actual language families. “Papuan languages” refers to non-Austronesian languages on Papua, New Guinea. Campbell, George. 2000. Compendium of the World’s Languages. London: Routledge Comrie, Bernard. 1991. The World’s Major Languages. London: Routledge. Africa and the Middle East: Welmers, William E. 1973. African Language Structure. University of California Press. Nilo-Saharan (): Central Sudanic (): Blackings, Mairi John & Nigel Fabb. 2003. A grammar of Ma’di. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Eastern Sudanic (): Noonan, Michael P. 1992. A grammar of Lango. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Songhai (): Heath, Jeffrey. 1999. A Grammar of Koyra Chiini. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
308 Modality and Subordinators Afroasiatic (): Berber (): Heath, Jeffrey. 2005. A Grammar of Tamashek (Tuareg of Mali). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Cushitic () & Omotic (): Griefenow-Mewis, Catherine & Rainer M. Voigt. Cushitic and Omotic Languages. Köln: Rüdiger Köppe Verlag. Semitic (): Hetzron, Robert. 1997. The Semitic Languages. London: Routledge. Chadic (): Newman, Paul. 1990. “Hausa and the Chadic Languages”. In Comrie, Bernard (ed.) The Major Languages of South Asia, the Middle East and Africa. 211–229. London: Routledge. Biu-Mandara (): Frajzyngier, Zygmunt & Erin Shay. 2002. A Grammar of Hdi. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Frajzyngier, Zygmunt & Eric Johnston. A Grammar of Mina. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. West Chadic (): Frajzyngier, Zygmunt. 1989. A Grammar of Pero. Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag. Niger-Congo (): Bender, M. Lionel. 1976 The Non-Semitic Languages of Ethiopia. Michigan: Michigan State University. Kropp Dakubu, Mary Ester. 1988 The languages of Ghana. Kegan Paul International. Mande (): Welmers, William E. 1976 A Grammar of Vai. London: University of California Publications. Atlantic-Congo (): Atlantic (): Childs, George Tucker. 1995 A Grammar of Kisi: A Southern Atlantic Language. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Volta-Congo (): North (): Carlson, Robert. 1994. A Grammar of Supyire. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Kwa (): Lefebvre, Claire & Anne-Marie Brousseau. 2002. A Grammar of Fongbe. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Benue-Congo (): Bantiod (): Nurse, Derek & Gérard Phillipson. 2003. The Bantu Languages. London: Routledge. Defoid () Pulleyblank, Douglas. 1990. “Yoruba” In Comrie, Bernard (ed.) The Major Languages of South Asia, the Middle East and Africa. 253–284. London: Routledge.
Appendix B. Sources for the typological surveys 309 Igboid (): Meyer, Paul, Inge Meyer & John Bendor-Samuel. 1975. A Grammar of Izi. Norman: University of Oklahoma.
South-East Asia and the Pacific Ocean Dravidian (): Steever, Sanford B. 1998. The Dravidian Languages. London: Routledge. Krishnamurti, Bhadriraju. 2003. The Dravidian Languages. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Andamanese (): Abbi, Anvita. 2006. Endangered Languages of the Andaman Islands. München: Lincom Europa. Dasgupta, D. & S. R. Sharma. 1982. A Handbook of Onge Language. Calcutta: Anthropoligical Survey of India. Manoharan, S. 1989. A Descriptive and Comparative Study of Andamanese Language. Calcutta: Antropological Survey of India. Sino-Tibetan (): Thurgood, Graham & Randy J. LaPolla. 2003. The Sino-Tibetan Languages. London: Routledge. Tibeto-Burman (): Chelliah, Shobhana Lakshmi. 1997. A Grammar of Meithei. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Himalayish: Mahakiranti: Kiranti (): van Driem, George. 1987 A Grammar of Limbu. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Hmong-Mien (): Jarkey, Nerida. 2006. “Complementation strategies in White Hmong”. In Dixon, Robert M. W. & Alexandra Y. Aikhenwald, (eds.) Complementation. 115–136. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tai-Kadai (): Diller, Anthony. 2008. The Tai-Kadai Languages. London: Routledge. Tai (): Strecker, David. 1990 “Tai languages” In Comrie, Bernard (ed.) The Major Languages of East and South-East Asia. 19–28. London: Routledge. Hudak, Thomas J. 1990 “Thai” In Comrie, Bernard (ed.) The Major Languages of East and South East-Asia. 29–48. London: Routledge. Enfield, N. J. 2007. A Grammar of Lao. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Austro-asiatic (): Munda (): Anderson, Gregory D. S. 2008. The Munda Languages. London: Routledge. Mon-Khmer (): Viet Muong (): Nguyên, Đình-Hoà. 1990. “Vietnamese” In Comrie, Bernard (ed.) The Major Languages of East and South-East Asia. 49–68. London: Routledge.
310 Modality and Subordinators Aslian (): Burenhult, Niclas. 2005. A Grammar of Jahai. Canberra: Pacific Linguistics. Eastern Mon-Khmer (): Thomas, David D. 1971 Chrau Grammar. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Alves, Mark J. 2006. A Grammar of Pacoh. Canberra: Pacific Linguistics. Northern Mon-Khmer (): Weidert, Alfons. 1975. I Tkong Amwi. Deskriptive Analyse eines Wardialekts des Khasi. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz. Austronesian (): Wurm, Stephen A. (ed.) 1976. New Guinea Area Languages and Language Study Vol 2. The Austronesian Languages. Canberra: Australian National University. Adelaar, Alexander & Nikolaus P. Himmelmann. 2005. The Austronesian Languages of Asia and Madagascar. London: Routledge. Oceanic (): Lynch, John, Malcolm Ross & Terry Crowley. 2002. The Oceanic Languages. Surrey: Curzon Press. New-Ireland (): Volker, Craig Alan. 1998. The Nalik Language of New Ireland, Papua New Guinea. New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc. “Papuan languages” (approx. 850): Wurm, Stephen. A. (ed.) 1975 New Guinea area languages and language study, Vol. 1: Papuan Languages and the New Guinea Linguistic Scene. Canberra: Australian National University. Foley, William A. 1986. The Papuan Languages of New Guinea. London: Cambridge University Press. Dutton, Thomas Edward. 1975 Studies in Languages of Central- and South-East Papua. Canberra: The Australian National University. Boelaars, Jan Honore Maria Cornelius. 1950. The Linguistic Position of South-Western New Guinea. Leiden: E.J. Brill. Torricelli (): Sanders, Arden & Joy Sanders. 1994. Kamasau (Wand Tuan) Grammar: Morpheme to Sentence. Ms. http://www.sil.org/pacific/png/abstract.asp?id=47683 Alungum, John, Robert J. Conrad & Joshua Lukas. 1978. “Some Muhiang grammatical notes.” In Loving, Richard (ed.), Miscellaneous Papers on Dobu and Arapesh, 89–130. Ukarumpa: Summer Institute of Linguistics. West Papuan (): Reesink, Ger P. (ed.) 2002. Languages of the Eastern Bird’s Head. Canberra: Pacific Linguistics. Reesink, Ger P. A grammar of Hatam. Canberra: Pacific Linguistics. Sepik-Ramu (): Sepik (): Laycock, Donald C. The Ndu Language Family. Canberra: Australian National University. Wilson, Patricia. 1980. Ambulas Grammar. Ukarumpa: Summer Institute of Linguistics.
Appendix B. Sources for the typological surveys 311 Feldpausch, Thomas & Becky Feldpausch. 1992. “Namia grammar essentials.” In Roberts, John R. (ed.). Namia and Amanab grammar essentials. 1–97. Ukarumpa: Summer Institute of Linguistics. Hoel, Hanna Marie, Tarja Ikheimonen & Michiyo Nozawa. 1994. Mende Grammar Essentials. Ms.: http://www.sil.org/pacific/png/abstract.asp?id=48482 East Papuan (): Chung, Chul-Hwa & Kyung-Ja Chung. 1996. “Kuot grammar essentials.” In Clifton, John M. (ed.). Two non-Austronesian Grammars from the Islands, 1–75. Ukarumpa: Summer Institute of Linguistics. Terrill, Angela. 2003. A grammar of Lavukaleve. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Kwomtari-Baibai (): Honsberger, Murray, Carol Honsberger & Ian Tupper (eds.). 2008. Kwomtari Phonology and Grammar Essentials. Ukarumpa: SIL-PNG Academic Publications. http://www.sil. org/pacific/png/abstract.asp?id=50948 Trans-New Guinea (): Northern () Seiler, Walter. 1985. Imonda, a Papuan language. Canberra: Australian National University. Nimboran (): Anceaux, Johannes C. 1965. The Nimboran Language. ‘S-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff. South Bird’s Head-Timor-Alor-Pantar (): de Vries, Lourens. 2004. A Short Grammar of Inanwatan. Canberra: Australian National University. Trans-Fly-Bulaka River (38) Shim, Jae-Wook. 2008. “Conjunctions in Wipi”. Ms.: http://www.sil.org/pacific/png/ abstract.asp?id=50985 Mandang-Adelbert Range (): Adelbert Range (): McDonald, Lorna. 1990. A Grammar of Tauya. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Reesink, Ger P. 1987. Structures and their Functions in Usan. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Hepner, Mark. 2006. Bargam Grammar Sketch. Ms.: http://www.sil.org/pacific/ png/abstract.asp?id=49645 Mandang (): Z’graggen, John A. 1971. Classificatory and Typological studies in Languages of the Madang District. Canberra: The Australian National University. Phillips, Donald J. 1976. Waghi Phonology and Morphology. Canberra: The Australian National University. Main-Section (): Sentani (): Cowan, H. K. J. 1965. A Grammar of the Sentani Language. S- Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff.
312 Modality and Subordinators Eastern (): Capell, Arthur. 1969. “The structure of the Binandere verb.” In Papers in New Guinea Linguistics No. 9. Canberra: Australian National University. Wilson, Jonathan P. 2002. Binandere grammar essentials verbal structures. Ms.: http://www.sil.org/pacific/png/abstract.asp?id=49635 Murane, Elizabeth. 1974. Daga Grammar. Norman: SIL. Bradshaw, Robert. 2007. Fuyug Grammar Sketch. Ukarumpa: SIL-PNG Academic Publications. http://www.sil.org/pacfic/png/abstract.asp?id=49610. Central and Western (): Central and south New Guinea-Kutubuan (): Routamaa, Judy. 1994. Kamula Grammar Essentials. Ms.: http://www.sil.org/pacific/png/abstract.asp?id=50209 Angan (): Oates, William & Lynette F. Oates. 1968. Kapau Pedagogical Grammar. Canberra: The Australian National University. Huon-Finisterre (): McElhanon, Kenneth A. 1972. Selepet Grammar. Canberra: The Australian National University. Spaulding, Craig & Patricia Spaulding. 1994. Phonology and Grammar of Nankina. Ukarumpa: Summer Institute of Linguistics. Toland, Norma R. & Donald F. Toland. 1991. Reference Grammar of the Karo/ Rawa Language. Ukarumpa: Summer Institute of Linguistics. Southwell, Neville. 1979. Komba Grammar Sketch. Ukarumpa: Summer Institute of Linguistics. East New Guinea Highlands (): Irwin, Barry. 1974. Salt-Yui Grammar. Canberra: The Australian National University. Scott, Graham. 1978. The Fore Language of Papua New-Guinea. Canberra: The Australian National University. McKaughan, Howard. 1973. The Languages of the Eastern Family of the East New Guinea Highland Stock. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Australian languages (): Dixon, Robert M. W. 1976. Grammatical Categories in Australian Languages. New Jersey: Humanities Press. Kulin (?): Blake, Barry J. 1991. “Woiwurrung”. In Dixon, Robert M. W. & Barry J. Blake (eds.) The Handbook of Australian Languages Vol IV. 31 – 122. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Daly (): Tryon, Darrell Trevor. 1970. An Introduction to Maranungku (Northern Australia). Canberra: The Australian National University. Yiwaijan (): Capell, Arthur & Heather E. Hinch. 1970. Maung grammar. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Gunwingguan (): Merlan, Francesca C. 1994. A Grammar of Wardaman. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Appendix B. Sources for the typological surveys 313 Harvey, Mark. 2002. A grammar of Gaagudju. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. McKay, Graham. 2000. “ Ndjébbana”. In Dixon, Robert M. W. & Barry J. Blake (eds.) The Handbook of Australian Languages, Vol V. 155 – 355. New York: Oxford University Press. Pama-Nyungan (): Yidinic (): Patz, Elisabeth. 1991. “Djabugay”. In Dixon, Robert M. W. & Barry J. Blake (eds.) The Handbook of Australian Languages, Vol IV. 244 – 347. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Karnic (): Blake, Barry J. 1979. “Pitta-Pitta”. In Dixon, Robert M. W. & Barry J. Blake (eds.) Handbook of Australian Languages, Vol I. 183–244. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Tangic (): Evans, Nicholas D. 1995. A Grammar of Kayardild. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Keen, Sandra. 1983. “Yukulta”. In Dixon, Robert M. W. & Barry J. Blake (eds.) Handbook of Australian Languages, Vol III. 191–306. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Guugu-Yimdhirr (): Haviland, John B. 1979. “Guugu Yimidhirr”. In Dixon, Robert M. W. & Barry J. Blake (eds.) Handbook of Australian Languages, Vol I. 27–180. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Gumbaynggiric (): Eades, Diana. 1979. “Gumbaynggir”. In Dixon, Robert M. W. & Barry J. Blake (eds.) Handbook of Australian Languages, Vol I. 245–362. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Yaygir: Crowley, Terry. 1979. “Yaygir”. In Dixon, Robert M. W. & Barry J. Blake (eds.) Handbook of Australian Languages, Vol I. 363–384 Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Maric (): Breen, John Gayan. 1981 “Margany and Gunya”. In Dixon, Robert M. W. & Barry J. Blake (eds.) Handbook of Australian Languages, Vol. II. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Yuulngu (): Morphy, Frances. 1983. “Djapu, A Yolngu Dialect”. In Dixon, Robert M. W. & Barry J. Blake (eds.) Handbook of Australian Languages, Vol III. 1–190. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Paman (): Smith, Ian & Steve Johnson. 2000. “Kugu Nganhcara” In Dixon, Robert M. W. & Barry J. Blake (eds.) The Handbook of Australian Languages Vol V. 357 – 489. New York: Oxford University Press. Crowley, Terry. 1981. “The Mpakwithi Dialect of Anguthimri” In Dixon, Robert M. W. & Barry J. Blake (eds.) Handbook of Australian Languages Vol II. 147–195. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
314 Modality and Subordinators Crowley, Terry. 1983. “Uradhi” In Dixon, Robert M. W. & Barry J. Blake (eds.) Handbook of Australian Languages, Vol III. 307–430. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Dixon, Robert M. W. 1991 “Mbabaram” In Dixon, Robert M. W. & Barry J. Blake (eds.) The Handbook of Australian Languages, Vol IV. 348 – 402. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dyirbalic (): Dixon, Robert M.W. 1981. “Wargamay” In Dixon, Robert M. W. & Barry, J. Blake (eds.) Handbook of Australian Languages, Vol II. 1–145. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Dixon, Robert M. W. 1983. “Nyawaygi” In Dixon, Robert M. W. & Barry J. Blake (eds.) Handbook of Australian Languages, Vol III. 431–525. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. South-West (): Klokeid, Terry J. 1969. Thargari Phonology and Morphology. Canberra: The Australian National University. Douglas, Wilfrid H. 1981. “Watjarri”. In Dixon, Robert M. W. & Barry J. Blake (eds.) Handbook of Australian Languages, Vol II. 197–274. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Dench, Alan Charles. 1991. “Panyjima”. In Dixon, Robert M. W. & Barry J. Blake (eds.) The Handbook of Australian Languages, Vol IV. 124–243. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Eurasia except South-East Asia Indo-european (): Ramat, Anna Giacalone & Paolo Ramat. 1998. The Indo-European Languages. London: Routledge. Comrie, Bernard & Greville G. Corbett. 1993. The Slavonic Languages. London: Routledge. Ball, Martin J. 1993. The Celtic Languages. London: Routledge. Indo-Aryan (): Cardona, George & Dhanesh K. Jain. 2003. The Indo-Arian Languages. London: Routledge. Kellogg, Samuel Henry. 1955. A Grammar of the Hindí Languages. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. Kartvelian (): Harris, Alice C. 1991. The Indigenous Languages of the Caucasus. Vol. 1: The Kartvelian Languages. Delmar, New York: Caravan Books. North Caucasian (): Hewitt, B. George. (ed.) 1989. The Indigenous Languages of the Caucasus. Vol. 2: The North West Caucasian languages. Delmar, New York: Caravan Books. Basque (): Hualde, José Ignacio & Jon Ortiz de Urbina. 2003. A Grammar of Basque. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Appendix B. Sources for the typological surveys 315 Uralic (39): Abondolo, Daniel Mario. (ed.) 1998. The Uralic Languages. London: Routledge. Yukaghir (2): Maslova, Elena. 2003. A Grammar of Kolyma Yukaghir. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Altaic (): Turkic (40): Johansson, Lars & Éva Ágnes Csató. (eds.) 1998. The Turkic Languages. London: Routledge. Mongolian (): Janhunen, Juha. 2003. The Mongolic Languages. London: Routledge. Tungus (): Nikolaeva, Irina Alekseevna & Maria Tolskaya. 2001. A Grammar of Udihe. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Burushaski: Lorimer, David Lockhart Robertson. 1935. The Burushaski Language Vol. I. Introduction and Grammar. Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co. Japanese (): Shibatani, Masayoshi. 1990. “Japanese”. In Comrie, Bernard. The Major Languages of East and South-East Asia. 127–153. London: Routledge. Ainu (): Refsing, Kisten. 1986. The Ainu Language. Århus: Aarhus University Press. Chukotko-Kamchakan (): Borogaz, Waldemar. 1922. “Chukchee” In Boas, Franz (ed.) Handbook of American Indian Languages, Vol. II. 631–903. London: Routledge. “North American languages” (296) Mithun, Marianne. 1999. The Languages of Native North America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Algic (): Wiyot () Teeter, Karl V. 1964. The Wiyot Language. Berkley: University of California Press. Algonquian (): Bloomfield, Leonard A. 1946. “Algonquian”. In Hoijer, Harry (ed.) Linguistic Structures of Native America. 85–129. Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology 6. Voegelin, Charles F. 1946. “Delaware, an Eastern Algonquian language”. In Hoijer, Harry (ed.) Linguistic Structures of Native America 130–158. Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology 6. Teeter, Karl V. 1971. “The main features of Malecite-Passamaquoddy grammar”. In Sawyer, Jesse (ed.) Studies in American Indian Languages. 191–249. London: University of California Press.
316 Modality and Subordinators Siuan (): Boas, Franz & John R. Swanton. 1997 (1911). “Siouan: Dakota (Teton and Santee Dialects)”. In Boas, Franz (ed.) Handbook of American Indian Languages, Vol I. 875–965. London: Routledge. Lipkind, William. 1945 Winnebago Grammar. New York: King’s Crown Press. Graczyk, Randolph. 2007. A Grammar of Crow. London: University of Nebraska Press. Chimakuan (): Andrade, Manuel J. 1933–1938. “Quileute”. In Boas, Franz (ed.) Handbook of American Indian Languages, Vol. III. 149–292. New York: Colombia University Press. Coahuiltecan (): Hoijer, Harry 1933–1938. “Tonkawa”. In Boas, Franz (ed.) Handbook of American Indian Languages, Vol. III. 1–148. New York: Colombia University Press. Yuchi: Wagner, Günter. 1933–38. “Yuchi”. In Boas, Franz (ed.) Handbook of American Indian Languages, Vol. III. 293–384. New York: Colombia University Press. Zuni: Bunzel, Ruth. 1933–38. “Zuni”. In Boas, Franz (ed.) Handbook of American Indian Languages, Vol. III. 385–514. New York: Colombia University Press. Keres (): Miller, Wick R. 1965. Acoma Grammar and Texts. Berkley: University of California Press. Wakashan: Boas, Franz. 1997 (1911). “Kwakiutl” In Boas, Franz (ed.) Handbook of American Indian Languages, Vol. I. 423–557. London: Routledge. Kutenai: Garvin, Paul L. 1948. “Kutenai III: morpheme distributions (Prefixes, Theme, Suffix)”. In International Journal of American Linguistics 14. 171–187. Muskogean (): Kimball, Geoffrey. D. 1991. Koasati Grammar. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. Gulf (): Swadesh, Morris. 1946. “Chitimacha”. In Hoijer, Harry (ed.) Linguistic Structures of Native America. 312–336. Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology 6. Haas, Mary R. 1946. “ A grammatical sketch of Tunica”. In Hoijer, Harry (ed.) Linguistic Structures of Native America. 337–365. Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology 6. Salishan (): Kuipers, Aert H. 1974. The Shuswap language. The Hague: Mouton de Gruyter. Reichard, Gladys A. 1933–38. “Coeur d’Alene”. In Boas, Franz (ed.) Handbook of American Indian Languages, Vol. III. 1–148. New York: Colombia University Press. Thompson, Laurence C. & M. Terry Thompson. 1971. “Clallam: A Preview”. In Sawyer, Jesse (ed.) Studies in American Indian Languages. 251–294. London: University of California Press. Kuipers, Aert. H. 1967. The Squamish Language. The Hague: Mouton de Gruyter.
Appendix B. Sources for the typological surveys 317 Egesdal, Steven M. & M. Terry Thompson. 1998. “A fresh look at Tillamook (Hutyéyu) inflectional morphology”. In Czaykowska-Higgins, Eva & Marvin Dale Kinkade (eds.) Salish Languages and Linguistics. London: Mouton de Gruyter. Hokan (): Miller, Amy. 2001. A Grammar of Jamul Tiipay. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Bright, William. 1957. The Karok Language. Berkley: University of California Press. Kiowa-Tanoan (): Trager, George L. 1946. “An outline of Taos grammar”. In Hoijer, Harry (ed.) Linguistic Structures of Native America. 184–221. Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology 6. Penutian (): Californian Penutian (): Pitkin, Harvey. 1984. Wintu Grammar. London: University of California Press. Maiduan (): Dixon, Roland B. 1997 (1911). “Maidu”. In Boas, Franz (ed.) Handbook of American Indian Languages, Vol I. 679–734. London: Routledge. Eatough, Andrew. 1999. Central Hill Nisenan Texts with Grammatical Sketch. London: University of California Press. Chinookan (): Boas, Franz. 1997 (1911). “Chinook”. In Boas, Franz (ed.) Handbook of American Indian Languages, Vol. I. 559–677. London: Routledge. Tsimshian (): Boas, Franz. 1997 (1911). “Tsimshian”. In Boas, Franz (ed.) Handbook of American Indian Languages, Vol. I. 283–422. London: Routledge. Oregon Penutian (): Frachtenberg, Leo J. 1922a. “Siuslawan (Lower Umpqua)”. In Boas (ed.) Handbook of American Indian Languages, Vol. II. 431–629. London: Routledge. Frachtenberg, Leo J. 1922b “Coos”. In Boas (ed.) Handbook of American Indian Languages, Vol. II. 297–429. London: Routledge. Sapir, Edward. 1922. “Takelma”. In Boas, Franz (ed.) Handbook of American Indian Languages, Vol. II. 1–296. London: Routledge. Yok-Utian (): Callaghan, Catherine A. 1998. “Lake Miwok irrealis”. In Antropological Linguistics 40: No 2. 228–233. Mason, James Alden. 1916. The Mutsun Dialect of Costanoan. Berley: University of California Press. Na-Dene (): Haida (): Swanton, John R. 1997 (1911). “Haida”. In Boas, Franz (ed.) Handbook of American Indian Languages, Vol. I. 205–282. London: Routledge. Nuclear Na-Dene (): Tlingit (): Swanton, John R. 1997 (1911). “Tlingit”. In Boas, Franz (ed.) Handbook of American Indian Languages, Vol. I. 159–204. London: Routledge.
318 Modality and Subordinators Athapascan (): Rice, Keren & Sharon Hargus. 1989. “Conjungation and mode in the Athapaskan languages”. In Cook, Eung-Do & Keren Rice (eds.) Athapaskan Linguistics. 265–315. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Hoijer, Harry 1946. “Chiricahua Apache”. In Hoijer, Harry (ed.) Linguistic Structure of Native America. 55–84. Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology 6. Rice, Keren. 1989. A Grammar of Slave. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Li, Fang-Kuei. 1946. “Chipewyan”. In Hoijer, Harry (ed.) Linguistic Structures of Native America. 398–423. Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology 6. Goddard, Pliny Earle. 1997 (1911). “Athapascan (Hupa)”. In Boas, Franz (ed.) Handbook of American Indian Languages, Vol. I. 85–158. London: Routledge. Goddard, Pliny Earle. 1912. Elements of the Kato Language. Berkley: University of California Press. “Mesoamerican languages” (disputed) Suárez, J. A. 1983. The Mesoamerican Indian Languages. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Uto-Aztecan (): Northern Uto-Aztecan (): Whorf, Benjamn Lee. 1946. “The Hopi language, Toreva dialect” In Hoijer, Harry (ed.) Linguistic Structure of Native America. 158–183. Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology 6. Dayley, Jon P. 1989. Tümpisa (Panamint) Shoshone Grammar. Oxford: University of California Press. Fuchs, Anna. 1970. Morphologie des Verbs im Cahuilla. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter Southern Uto-Aztecan (): Campbell, Lyle 1985. The Pipil Language of El Salvador. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Whorf, Benjamin Lee. 1946. “The Milpa Alta dialect of Aztec”. In Hoijer, Harry (ed.) Linguistic Structures of Native America. 367–397. Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology 6. Grimes, Joseph Evans. 1964. Huicol Syntax. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Mayan (): Cholan-Tzeltalan (): Oakley, Helen. 1966. “Chorti”. In Mayers, Marvin K. (ed.) Languages of Guatemala. 235–250. London: Mouton de Gruyter. Cowan, Marion M. 1969. Tzotzil Grammar. Norman: Summer Institute of Linguistics. Kanjobalan-Chuelan (): Martin, Laura. 1998. “Irrealis constructions in Mocho (Mayan)”. In Antropological Linguistics 40: No 2. 198–213 Stratmeyer, Dennis & Jean Stratmeyer. 1966. “Jacaltec”. In Mayers, Marvin K. (ed.) Languages of Guatemala. 196–218. London: Mouton de Gruyter. Yucatecan (): Tozzer, Alfred M. 1977 (1921). A Maya Grammar. New York: Dover Publications.
Appendix B. Sources for the typological surveys 319 Hofling Charles Andrew. 1998. “Irrealis and perfect in Itzaj Mayan”. In Antropological Linguistics 40: 2. 214–228 Quichean-Mamean (): McArthur, Harry & Lucille McArthur. 1966. “Aguacatec”. In Mayers, Marvin K. (ed.) Languages of Guatemala. 140–165. London: Mouton de Gruyter Peck, H. Dudley & Dorothy M. Peck 1966. “Mam”. In Mayers, Marvin K. (ed.) Languages of Guatemala. 166–195. London: Mouton de Gruyter. Eachus, Francis & Ruth Carlson. 1966. “Kekchi”. In Mayers, Marvin K. (ed.) Languages of Guatemala. 110–124. London: Mouton de Gruyter. Shaw, Mary & Helen L. Neuenswander. 1966. “Achi”. In Mayers, Marvin K. (ed.) Languages of Guatemala. 15–48. London: Mouton de Gruyter. Dayley, Jon P. 1985. Tzutujil Grammar. London: University of California Press. Mixe-Zoque (): Dieterman van Haitsma, Julia & William van Haitsma. 1976. A Hierarchical Sketch of Mixe. Norman: Summer Institute of Linguistics. Oto-Manguean (): Mixtecan (): Bradley, C. Henry & Barbara E. Hollenbach. 1988. Studies in the Syntax of the Mixtec Languages, Vol. 1. Norman: Summer Institute of Linguistics Zapotecan (): Briggs, Elinor. 1961. Mitla Zapotec Grammar. Mexico: Instituto Lingüístico de Verano. Otopamean (): Hess, H. Harwood. 1968. The Syntactic Structure of Mezquital Otomi. The Hague: Mouton de Gruyter. “South American languages” (approx. 350): Dixon, Robert M. & Alexandra Y. Aikhenvald (eds.) 1999. The Amazonian Languages. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Adelaar, Willem F. H. & Pieter C. Muysken. 2004. The Languages of the Andes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Carib (): Southern (7): Derbyshire, Desmond C. 1979. Hixkaryana. Amsterdam: North Holland. Northern (): Hoff, Berend J. 1968. The Carib Language. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Koehn, Edward. H. & Sally S. Koehn. 1986. “Apalaí”. In Derbyshire, Desmond C. & Geoffrey K. Pullum (eds.). Handbook of Amazonian languages, Vol. I. 33–127. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Abbot, Miriam. 1991. “Makushi”. In Derbyshire, Desmond C. & Geoffrey K. Pullum (eds.) Handbook of Amazonian languages, Vol III. 23–160. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Hawkins, Robert E. 1998. “Wai Wai”. In Derbyshire, Desmond C. & Geoffrey K. Pullum (eds.) Handbook of Amazonian languages, Vol IV. 25–224. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
320 Modality and Subordinators Jackson, Walter S. 1972 “A Wayana grammar”. In Grimes, Joseph Evans (ed.) Languages of the Guianas. 47–77. Norman: Summer Institute of the University of Oklahoma. Arawakan (): Derbyshire, Desmond C. 1986. “Comparative survey of morphology and syntax in Brazilian Arawakan”. In Derbyshire, Desmond C. & Geoffrey K. Pullum (eds.). Handbook of Amazonian languages, Vol. I. 469–566. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Northern Maipuran (): Aikhenvald, Alexandra Y. 1998. “Warekena”. In Derbyshire, Desmond C. & Geoffrey K. Pullum (eds.) Handbook of Amazonian languages, Vol IV. 225–439. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter Aikhenvald, Alexandra Y. 2003. A Grammar of Tariana. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Allin, Trevor Reginald. 1976. A Grammar of Resígaro. Buckinghamshire: Summer Institute of Linguistics. Southern Maipuran (): Wise, Mary Ruth. 1986. “Grammatical characteristics of PreAndine Arawakan languages”. In Derbyshire, Desmond C. & Geoffrey K. Pullum (eds.). Handbook of Amazonian Languages Vol. I. 567–642. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Matteson, Esther. 1965. The Piro (Arawakan) Language. Berkley: University of California Press. Panoan (): Sparing-Chávez, Margarethe. W. 1998. “Amahuaca (Panoan)”. In Derbyshire, Desmond C. & Geoffrey K. Pullum (eds.) Handbook of Amazonian languages, Vol IV. 441–486. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Tupi (): Tupí-Guaraní (): Jensen, Cheryl. 1998. “Tupí-Guaraní”. In Derbyshire, Desmond C. & Geoffrey K. Pullum (eds.) Handbook of Amazonian languages, Vol IV. 487–617. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Gregores, Emma & Jorge A. Suárez. 1967. A Description of Colloquial Guaraní. The Hague: Mouton de Gruyter. Firestone, Homer L. 1965. Description and Classification of Sirionó. The Hague: Mouton de Gruyter. Faust, Norma. 1971. “Cocama clause types” In Bendor-Samuel, David (ed.) Tupi Studies I. 73–105. Norman: Summer Institute of Linguistics. Faust, Norma. 1972. Gramatica Cocama. Serie Lingüistica Peruana No. 6. Harrison, Carl H. 1986. “Verb prominence, verb initialness, ergativity and typological disharmony in Guajajara.” In Derbyshire, Desmond C. & Geoffrey K. Pullum (eds.) Handbook of Amazonian languages, Vol. I. 407–39. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Kakumasu, James Y. 1986. “Urubu-Kaapor”. In Derbyshire, Desmond C. & Geoffrey K. Pullum (eds.) Handbook of Amazonian languages, Vol. I. 326–403. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Tucanoan (): Jones, Wendell & Paula Jones. 1991. Barasano Syntax. Dallas: Summer Institute of Linguistics.
Appendix B. Sources for the typological surveys 321 Choco (): Harms, Phillip L. 1994. Epena Pedee Syntax. Dallas: Summer Institute of Linguistics. Arauan (): Chapman, Shirley & Desmond C. Derbyshire. 1991. “Paumari”. In Derbyshire, Desmond C. & Geoffrey K. Pullum (eds.) Handbook of Amazonian languages, Vol III. 161–354. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Katukinan (): Groth, Christa. 1985. “Syntax of the phrase types in Canamarí”. In Fortune David Lee (ed.), Porto Velho Workpapers. 93–129. Brasilia: Summer Institute of Linguistics. Yanomam (): Borgman, Donald M. 1990. “Sanumá”. In Derbyshire D. C. & Geoffrey K. Pullum (eds.) Handbook of Amazonian languages, Vol II. 249–474. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Peba-Yaguan (): Payne, Doris L. & Thomas E. Payne. 1990. “Yagua”. In Derbyshire, Desmond C. & Geoffrey K. Pullum (eds.) Handbook of Amazonian languages, Vol II. 15–248. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Macro-Ge (): Ge-Kaingang (): Popjes, Jack & Josephine Popjes. 1986. “Canela-krahô”. In Derbyshire, Desmond C. &, Geoffrey K. Pullum (eds.) Handbook of Amazonian languages, Vol I. 128–199. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter Makú (): Epps, Patience. 2008. A Grammar of Hup. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Cahuapanan (): Bendor-Samuel, John T. 1961 The Verbal Piece in Jebero. Word, Vol. 17, Supplement. Mura (): Everett, Daniel L. 1986. “Pirahã”. In Derbyshire, Desmond C. & Geoffrey K. Pullum (eds.) Handbook of Amazonian languages, Vol. I. 200–325. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Tsimané (): Sakel, Jeanette. 2004. A Grammar of Mosetén. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Urarina (): Olawsky, Knut J. 2006. A Grammar of Urarina. Berlin:Mouton de Gruyter. Koaiá (): van der Voort, Hein. 2004. A Grammar of Kwaza. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Yuracaré (): van Gijn, Rik. 2006. A Grammar of Yurakaré. Nijmegen: Radboud Universiteit. Movima (): Haude, Katharina. 2006. A Grammar of Movima. Nijmegen: Radboud Universiteit.
322 Modality and Subordinators Waorani (): Peeke, M. Catherine. 1973. Preliminary Grammar of Auca. Norman: Summer Institute of Linguistics. Holman, Thomas W. 1988. “Waorani verb affixes”. In Pike, Evelyn G. & Rachel Saint (eds.) Waroani Discourse Features. 57–69. Norman: Summer Institute of Linguistics. Aymaran (): Hardman, Martha J. 1966. Jaqaru. The Hague: Mouton de Gruyter. Cayubaba (): Key, Harold. 1967. Morphology of Cayuvava. The Hague: Mouton de Gruyter. Tacanan (): Guillaume, Antoine. 2008. A Grammar of Cavineña. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
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Text corpora used British National Corpus. www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk/ Cosmas II. W-Archiv der geschriebene Sprache. Prov. by the Institute für Deutsche Sprache.
Fornsvenska textbanken (The Old Swedish Language Bank). Prov. by the Centre for Language and Literature, Lund University. <www.nordlund.lu.se.fornsvenska/Fsv Folder> Oslo Korpuset av Taggede Norske Tekster (The Oslo Corpus of Tagged Norwegian Texts). Bokmålsdelen (the Bokmål Corpus). Prov. by the University of Oslo. Språkbanken (The Swedish Language Bank). Konkordanser. Prov. by the Department of Swedish Language, University of Gothenburg. Spraakbanken.gu.se.
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Language index A Abkhaz 81, 130, 289 Acholi 27 Achumawi 81, 291 Acoma 38, 203 Afar 81, 130, 288–289 Aghu 227 Aguaruna 81, 294 ‘Ala‘ala 116 Alamblak 227, 237, 280 Albanian 62, 260 Alsea 121 Amahuaca 84, 303–304 Amuesha 84, 303 Angaataha 83, 300 Arabic 83, 296 Awa 39, 77 Awyu 120 Auyana 77 B Banoni 83, 299 Barai 83, 301 Bargam 120 Basque 60, 111–112 Beya Lega 115 Binandere 84, 301–302 Bulgarian 27–28, 48, 105–106 Bunuba 75 Burman 83, 119, 296–297 C Caddo 31–32, 33, 34, 35–36, 40, 43–44, 113, 156, 225, 228, 235, 237, 238 Candoshi 81, 293–294 Canela-Krahô 229 Cavineña 229 Cayuga 124 Central Pomo 25, 31–32, 35–36, 39, 227, 236, 270, 280 Chibcha 84, 113, 304 Chickasaw 21 Chiquito 81–82, 294–295 Classical Greek 27, 34–35
Cocama-Cocamilla 84, 305 Coos 116 Crow 23, 37, 122 D Delaware 112 Djamindjungan 84, 302 Dongolese Nubian 24, 80, 87, 285 E Efik 83, 295 Egyptian Arabic 229 Epena Pedee 84 F Fijian 116 Fore 77 French 62, 108, 176, 210, 232, 260, 281 Fuyug 116 G Garo 83, 297 Gikuyu 72, 83, 295 Gooniyandi 70, 74–75 Great Andamanese 84, 87, 305–306 Greenlandic 70, 71, 76 Guugu Yimidhirr 116 H Haruai 70 Hdi 83, 118, 295 Hittite 124 Hixkaryana 19, 37–38, 40, 203, 225, 235 Ho 104, 298 Hua 23, 70, 71, 76–77, 78, 124, 226 Huave 71, 76 Huichol 46, 269 Hungarian 25, 114 Hunzib 226 Hup 84, 229
I Iatê 81, 294 Iatmul 113 Imbabura 22, 81, 292 Indonesian 124 Ingush 233 Iñupiaq 70, 75–76 Italian 26, 29, 37, 42–43, 62, 101, 104–105, 141–142, 205, 215–216, 223, 279 J Jamul Diegueño 32, 35 Japanese 10, 19, 121 Juang 83, 298 Juray 83, 298 K Kabre 106 Kamano 77 Kamoro 71, 74, 80, 112 Kamula 39, 83, 299 Kannada 297–298 Kapau 83, 300 Karajarri 84, 302 Karbad 81, 289 Kashmiri 98–99 Keres 228, 237 Kiowa 226 Kiwai 60, 83, 301 Koyra Chiini 118 Kutenai 84, 303 Korean 81, 99–100, 121, 289–290 Kosena 46, 77 Kwaza 84, 304 L Lango 105 Latin 26, 142–143 Lezgian 69, 77, 78, 81 Limbu 25, 83, 114, 115, 233, 297 Lori 27–28, 48, 105 Lower Grand Valley Dani 37, 71, 74, 76, 78, 87
338 Modality and Subordinators M Magi 80, 285–286 Makah 81, 286 Mangarayi 112 Maricopa 30, 31, 235, 238 Masalit 81, 288 Meitei 118 Middle Kipchak 113 Minangkabau 124 Miriwung 81, 290 Mixtec 19 Mocho 117 Modern South Arabian 83, 296 Mosetén 115–116 Mundari 104 Mupun 108
Pashto 83, 296 Pawaian 83, 301 Pawnee 37, 60, 81, 291 Persian 19, 28, 45, 48, 109, 207, 271, 278 Polish 107–108, 176 Popoloc 81, 291 Potawatomi 81, 290–291 Puluwatese 120 Punjabi 84, 86, 305
N Nadrogã 119 Nalik 83, 115, 299 Nama 70, 78 Nambiquara 23 Namia 38, 173, 203, 226 Nankina 83, 300 Nara 81, 288 Ndyuka 63, 66–67 Ngäbére 81, 292 Ngiyambaa 19, 22, 37–38, 40, 225 Nisenan 84, 303 Niuafo’ou 119–120 Nootka 23, 81, 112, 286 North Saami 71, 73–74, 76, 78, 86–87 Nyawaygi 112
S Saliva 81, 293 Salt-Yui 46 Samoan 63, 66 Sanskrit 86, 128 Santali 104, 298 Scottish Gaelic 260 Seneca 37 Serbo-Croatian 62, 106 Serrano 37–38, 40, 203, 225 Shona 71–73, 295 Sindhi 83, 296 Siuslaw 84, 302–303 Slave 122 Southeast Ambrym 84, 86–87, 120, 306 Spanish 15, 19, 26, 27, 28, 30, 34, 36, 37, 42–45, 46, 48, 50–51, 141–142, 143, 144, 155, 169, 178, 179, 207, 228 Squamish 287 Sranan 21, 66, 71 Sudest 83, 299 Supyire 117, 173, 204 Swahili 72, 295
O Old Church Slavonic 229 Old English 108, 202 Onge 306 Övdalian 234 P Páez 84, 304 Panamint 84, 85–86, 306
R Rotuman 123 Rumanian 105–106 Russian 28, 45, 48, 109, 124, 207, 226, 271, 278
T Taiof 83, 298 Tairora 77 Tamil 297–298 Tarascan 60, 81, 292 Tariana 38 Tauya 84, 301 Telugu 113 Thargari 302 Tigré 25, 117 Tiwi 60, 80, 225, 286 To’abaita 116 Tonkawa 23, 130 Tulu 297–298 Turkish 71, 73 U Upper Chehalis 81, 286–287 Urarina 117, 123, 229 Urdu 84, 86, 305 W Wapishana 80, 87, 287 Warao 69–70 Wardaman 132 War 39 Washo 132 Waurá 25, 117 Waorani 84, 305 Welsh 260 Wintu 38, 113, 203 Wipi 120 Wichita 69–70, 78 Y Yagaria 77 Yagua 69, 71, 76, 78 Yareba 81, 290 Yiddish 98, 99–100 Yimas 132 Yolngu 120, 216 Yurakaré 19, 84
Subject index A abilitative 19, 21, 40, 63, 185, 261 see also dynamic modality, event modality actualized 3, 32, 35 non-actualized 3, 17, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 35, 39–41, 46, 47, 153, 235, 261 adjunct 95, 97, 240, 241, 248, 249, 255, 256, 258, 282 see also extraclausal admirative 19, 42, 43, 45, 53, 143, 144, 147, 155, 170, 175, 270, 274 adverbializer 24, 87, 285 affirmative 118, 136, 151, 180, 183, 184, 185, 200, 204, 206 non-affirmative 155 see also negative agent-oriented modality 15, 17 see also event modality agreement 5, 9, 40, 59–62, 72, 102, 103, 105 agree-relation 9, 10, 57, 62, 208 anterior 63, 64, 66, 299 aorist 291, 304 apodosis 25, 115, 116, 117, 123, 129, 133, 146, 167, 274, 277 apprehensive 29, 112, 116, 176 predicate 179, 185 aspect 1, 5, 6, 7, 9, 19, 32, 36, 55, 59, 61, 63, 68, 233, 244, 296–297 assertion indirect assertion 51–52 weak assertion 51 assumptive 18, 79, 115, 140, 161, 165, 166, 170, 304 see also suppositive auditory 43, 143 B beneficiary 41, 162 binary values 15, 34, 53
C cataphoric pronoun 208, 254, 278 categorical assertion 22, 45, 269 causal 239, 255, 257 certainty 36, 37, 39, 41, 48, 194, 198, 235, 270, 300 uncertainty (non-certainty) 1, 19, 37–40, 60, 109, 115, 116, 117, 118, 120, 131–134, 141, 142, 173–174, 182, 187, 198, 202, 203, 204, 206, 218, 223 predicate 51, 142, 154, 174, 181–182, 186, 187, 188, 200, 202, 217, 221, 223, 277 circumstance adverbial 24–25, 96, 123, 223, 279 commentative predicate 28, 42, 53 commitment 17, 21, 22, 24, 27, 41, 50–51, 59–61, 165, 175, 268 complementary distribution 45, 74, 80–81, 86, 104, 112, 114, 116, 119, 152, 205, 207, 208, 236, 294, 298 concessive 42, 113, 161, 174, 256, 257, 258 coordinator 97, 121, 272 cosubordinate 97, 113, 115, 239, 241, 248, 272 see also interdependent counterfactual 24–25, 29, 79, 95, 113, 117, 120, 123, 131–134, 145, 150, 152, 165, 173, 174, 180, 284, 293, 299 D deductive 18, 37, 79, 160, 165, 192, 203, 304 deontic 1, 7, 16, 20, 21, 34, 41, 47, 69, 145, 162–166, 171, 268, 271, 276–277 see also event modality
dependent clause 97, 113, 120, 121, 123 independent clause 91, 97, 116, 117, 122, 143, 175, 209, 248, 272, 274, 277 desiderative 29–30, 34, 40, 108, 112, 129, 145, 146, 175–176, 179, 274 see also optative directive 29, 112, 128–130, 139, 146, 233, 238, 269, 270, 274, 282 direct perception 30, 37, 108 dubitative 18–19, 23, 28, 37–38, 39, 59, 60–61, 69–70, 71, 76, 77, 79, 85–86, 107, 108–109, 120, 122, 123, 127, 131–134, 149–150, 152, 174, 175, 187–188, 203, 207, 228, 286, 294, 298, 301, 302, 303, 305, 306 predicate 2, 49, 77, 108, 142, 155, 178, 179, 187–188, 196–199, 200–202, 203, 204, 217 dynamic 1, 7, 16, 20–21, 34, 41, 47, 69, 73, 162–166, 171, 268, 271, 276–277 see also event modality, abilitative, volitive E ECM-construction 263–264, 265, 283 emotive 28, 30, 42–45, 112, 143–144, 146–147, 175, 178, 195, 206, 217, 270 see also evaluative entailment 31, 32, 36, 39–40, 46, 47, 60, 129, 170, 176, 182, 200, 249, 275 epistemic possibility 18, 19, 31, 63, 73, 79, 122, 160, 167, 171, 277 see also potential, speculative
340 Modality and Subordinators evaluative 28, 30, 42–45, 53, 62, 64, 143, 144, 147, 150, 270 see also emotive event modality 3, 7, 15–17, 19–21, 25, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33, 35, 39–41, 61, 69, 71, 84, 162, 233, 261 see also deontic, dynamic exceptive conditional 131, 133 exclamative 43, 125, 143, 170, 175, 176, 209, 270, 274, 277 exhaustive conditional 145, 174, 217 experiencer 41, 162, 190, 193 extraclausal 241, 248, 249 see also adjunct extraposed 196, 262–264 F factivity 134, 157 factive predicate 42–44, 47, 51, 106, 143–144, 158, 174, 178–179, 182–183, 194–195, 200, 206, 209–210, 212–214, 215–216, 217, 259–260 semifactive predicate 48, 52, 106, 118, 123, 134–135, 136, 139–140, 142, 158, 174, 177, 178–179, 182–186, 194, 200, 205, 206, 211–214, 217, 231 non-factive predicate 106, 134, 136–137, 139–140, 145, 157, 180, 200, 205, 209–210, 214–215 finiteness 2, 9, 68, 95, 101–104, 168, 232–233, 241, 267–268, 283 focus 154, 157, 173, 232, 234, 238, 258, 280, 281 focus-fronting 156, 171, 230, 237, 276, 280 frustrative 43, 143, 270 future 2, 5, 7, 19, 20, 27, 31–32, 33, 35–36, 38, 39–41, 60, 62–68, 74–75, 76, 85, 86–87, 116, 132, 166, 183–186, 195, 233, 261, 286, 287, 288, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306 G generic 40, 185, 240, 261 genus 68–69, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 272
grammaticalization 7, 20, 40, 57–58, 86, 109, 121, 132, 150, 163, 176, 202–203, 208–209, 230, 235 H hearsay 18, 108, 291 see also quotative, reportative hortative 16–17, 40, 47, 101, 127–130, 145–146, 233, 235, 269, 271, 273, 282, 302 hypothetical 1, 5, 7, 24–25, 27, 28, 32, 72, 79, 95–96, 108, 113, 115, 116, 117, 120, 123, 131–132, 141, 145, 149–150, 152, 155, 162, 163, 166, 173, 174, 176, 195, 203, 222, 240, 295, 299, 304 hypothetical comparative 102, 131, 145, 180, 243, 247 I ignorative 19, 38, 49, 186, 187, 202, 203, 205 illocutionary force 2, 3, 9, 49–50, 60–61, 77, 91–94, 95, 100–104, 109, 143, 151, 209, 226–227, 233 infinitive 145, 197, 212, 233, 234, 238, 281 phrase 94, 252, 263–264 marker 96–97, 252, 262, 265, 283 to-infinitive 261–264, 265, 283 independent clause see dependent clause interdependent 97, 115, 121, 239, 241, 248, 272, 282 see also cosubordinate J jussive 16, 29–30, 33, 34, 35, 39–40, 127–130, 233, 235 M maleficiary 41, 162 markedness 5–6 marked value 5–6, 103, 174, 177, 207, 209, 267 unmarked value 5, 60, 65, 103, 108, 157, 173–174, 177–178, 207, 209
matrix clause 52, 129, 140, 159, 183, 186, 187, 188, 195, 196, 197, 200, 201, 208, 212, 213, 222, 249, 263, 264 matrix subject 52, 94, 123, 180, 182–183, 184, 190, 200, 202, 263, 264 matrix verb 129, 133, 143, 263, 264 multifunctional morpheme 5, 16, 40, 80, 85, 127–128, 270, 273 N narrative discourse 52, 92, 182, 227, 269, 280, 281 narrative (mood) 37, 46, 290–291 negative 2, 27, 31–33, 35–36, 39–41, 71, 152, 154–157, 228, 288, 302 nominalizer 119, 121, 297 nominative 234, 264 non-actualized see actualized non-factive see factivity O obligative 27, 32, 63, 108, 109, 120, 261, 286, 292 see also deontic, event modality optative 1, 2, 16, 17, 25, 29–30, 33, 34–35, 37, 40, 60, 66, 86–87, 96, 101, 108–109, 124, 127–130, 141, 175–176, 209, 291, 294, 298 see also desiderative P past 5, 7, 21, 31, 40, 44, 49, 62–66, 68, 73–74, 75, 76, 85, 86–87, 88, 128, 129, 131–134, 143, 149–151, 165–166, 174, 175, 186, 200, 216, 287, 288, 289, 291, 292, 293, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 303, 304, 305, 306 subjunctive 35, 131–134, 138–139, 142, 144, 166, 205 perfective 32, 36 completive 84, 288, recent(/near/yesterday’s) past 74, 87, 294, 300, 305 immediate(/today’s) past 74, 290, 300, 304, 305
Subject index 341 remote(/distant/far) past 74, 132, 290, 291, 299, 300, 303, 304, 305 non-past 76, 87–88, 305, 306 perfect 20, 74, 117, 165, 298, 300 pluperfect 45, 131–134, 146, 150, 293 permissive 63, 87 see also deontic, event modality politeness 233, 238 polite imperative 29–30, 32–33, 34, 36, 40, 45, 168, 235 polite request 44, 145, 150 polite address 130 portmanteau morpheme 5, 39, 40, 59, 80, 85, 102, 296, 297, 299, 300 potential 1, 17, 18–19, 27, 28, 34, 37, 46, 47–48, 60–61, 63, 66, 69, 71–72, 73–74, 77, 79, 86–87, 93, 96, 109, 112, 113, 120, 128–129, 132, 133, 141, 150, 155, 169, 173–175, 195, 207–208, 209, 225, 231, 235, 241, 249, 291, 293, 294, 299, 302, 304, 305, 306 see also speculative, epistemic possibility, non-actualized present 5, 6, 31, 45, 49, 64, 65, 73, 86–87, 131, 132, 152, 158–159, 165, 166, 174, 216, 233, 287, 288, 293, 296, 298, 299, 300, 304, 306 subjunctive 128–129, 131–134, 152, 205, 216, 293 presupposition 28, 30, 32, 34, 42–45, 47, 48, 51, 92, 93, 96, 113, 121, 122–123, 136, 143–144, 153–154, 155, 169, 174, 183, 189, 194, 195, 198, 209–210, 212, 227–228, 230, 231, 232, 240–241, 249, 259
probable 18, 19, 60–61, 79, 88, 291 prohibitive 1, 16, 17, 31, 32, 36, 47, 60, 156, 234 protasis 24–25, 95, 98, 107, 112, 113–115, 116, 117, 120, 123–124, 131, 133, 145, 152–153, 154, 169, 173–174, 187, 202–204, 205, 217, 221, 230, 259 prototype 6, 8, 9, 128 Q question-formed conditional 96, 98, 133, 168, 243, 259 quotative 46, 100, 121, 297 see also hearsay, reportative R real conditional 24, 114, 123–124 131 unreal conditional 24, 114, 123–124, 131 reanalysis 58, 78, 85, 167, 222 reportative (reported) 18, 26, 37, 39, 52, 161, 166, 180, 207, 214, 299 see also hearsay, quotative reportative predicate 49, 51–52, 109, 159, 174, 177, 178–179, 182, 187, 193, 194, 199, 206, 209, 210–211, 214, 217 S scope 1, 2, 9, 20–21, 36, 41, 50, 55, 56–57, 61, 62, 64, 69, 71, 72, 74, 78, 87, 88, 162–166, 208, 210, 227–229 semifactive predicate see factivity sensory 18 speaker-oriented modality 15, 17
speaker’s attitude 1, 16, 22, 41, 42, 53, 67, 71, 93, 134, 145, 147, 169, 239 speculative 18–19, 26, 63, 79, 116, 155, 160, 163, 165, 166, 167, 174, 203, 213, 214, 305 see also potential, epistemic possibility speculative predicate 49, 51, 77, 166–168, 174, 177, 178–180, 195–196, 204, 207, 209, 210–214, 216, 241 speech-act adverbial 52, 67, 94 subjectivity 22, 26, 27, 117, 141, 173, 204 suppositive 132, 145, 176, 290, 303 see also assumptive T tag-question 52, 92–93 temporal subordinator 24, 122, 124, 174, 220, 239, 254–256, 257 tentativeness 150, 165, 275, 303 topicalization 67, 227, 230, 237 U uncertainty see certainty unmarked value see markedness unreal conditional see real conditional V valence 1, 5, 6, 59 verb-final 56, 57, 121 verb-initial 57 verb-medial 56, 57 verb-raising 68, 98, 153–154, 156, 170–171, 230 visual 43, 119, 143 voice 1, 5, 6, 59 volitive 29, 112, 261 see also dynamic, event modality
Studies in Language Companion Series A complete list of titles in this series can be found on the publishers’ website, www.benjamins.com 118 Mühleisen, Susanne: Heterogeneity in Word–Formation Patterns. A corpus-based analysis of suffixation with -ee and its productivity in English. xiii, 239 pp. + index. Expected March 2010 117 Spevak, Olga: Constituent Order in Classical Latin Prose. xv, 315 pp. + index. Expected February 2010 116 Nordström, Jackie: Modality and Subordinators. 2010. xvii, 341 pp. 115 Hasko, Victoria and Renee Perelmutter (eds.): New Approaches to Slavic Verbs of Motion. x, 381 pp. + index. Expected February 2010 114 Roby, David Brian: Aspect and the Categorization of States. The case of ser and estar in Spanish. 2009. xiii, 191 pp. 113 Comrie, Bernard, Ray Fabri, Elizabeth Hume, Manwel Mifsud, Thomas Stolz and Martine Vanhove (eds.): Introducing Maltese Linguistics. Selected papers from the 1st International Conference on Maltese Linguistics, Bremen, 18–20 October, 2007. 2009. xi, 422 pp. 112 Dufter, Andreas and Daniel Jacob (eds.): Focus and Background in Romance Languages. 2009. vii, 362 pp. 111 Polguère, Alain and Igor A. Mel’čuk (eds.): Dependency in Linguistic Description. 2009. xxii, 281 pp. 110 Dimmendaal, Gerrit J. (ed.): Coding Participant Marking. Construction types in twelve African languages. 2009. xvi, 389 pp. 109 Narrog, Heiko: Modality in Japanese. The layered structure of the clause and hierarchies of functional categories. 2009. xxii, 277 pp. 108 Barðdal, Jóhanna and Shobhana L. Chelliah (eds.): The Role of Semantic, Pragmatic, and Discourse Factors in the Development of Case. 2009. xx, 432 pp. 107 Butler, Christopher S. and Javier Martín Arista (eds.): Deconstructing Constructions. 2009. xx, 306 pp. 106 Vanhove, Martine (ed.): From Polysemy to Semantic Change. Towards a typology of lexical semantic associations. 2008. xiii, 404 pp. 105 Van Valin, Jr., Robert D. (ed.): Investigations of the Syntax–Semantics–Pragmatics Interface. 2008. xxiv, 484 pp. 104 Mushin, Ilana and Brett Baker (eds.): Discourse and Grammar in Australian Languages. 2008. x, 239 pp. 103 Josephson, Folke and Ingmar Söhrman (eds.): Interdependence of Diachronic and Synchronic Analyses. 2008. viii, 350 pp. 102 Goddard, Cliff (ed.): Cross-Linguistic Semantics. 2008. xvi, 356 pp. 101 Stolz, Thomas, Sonja Kettler, Cornelia Stroh and Aina Urdze: Split Possession. An areallinguistic study of the alienability correlation and related phenomena in the languages of Europe. 2008. x, 546 pp. 100 Ameka, Felix K. and M.E. Kropp Dakubu (eds.): Aspect and Modality in Kwa Languages. 2008. ix, 335 pp. 99 Høeg Müller, Henrik and Alex Klinge (eds.): Essays on Nominal Determination. From morphology to discourse management. 2008. xviii, 369 pp. 98 Fabricius-Hansen, Cathrine and Wiebke Ramm (eds.): ‘Subordination’ versus ‘Coordination’ in Sentence and Text. A cross-linguistic perspective. 2008. vi, 359 pp. 97 Dollinger, Stefan: New-Dialect Formation in Canada. Evidence from the English modal auxiliaries. 2008. xxii, 355 pp. 96 Romeo, Nicoletta: Aspect in Burmese. Meaning and function. 2008. xv, 289 pp. 95 O’Connor, Loretta: Motion, Transfer and Transformation. The grammar of change in Lowland Chontal. 2007. xiv, 251 pp. 94 Miestamo, Matti, Kaius Sinnemäki and Fred Karlsson (eds.): Language Complexity. Typology, contact, change. 2008. xiv, 356 pp. 93 Schalley, Andrea C. and Drew Khlentzos (eds.): Mental States. Volume 2: Language and cognitive structure. 2007. x, 362 pp. 92 Schalley, Andrea C. and Drew Khlentzos (eds.): Mental States. Volume 1: Evolution, function, nature. 2007. xii, 304 pp.
91 Filipović, Luna: Talking about Motion. A crosslinguistic investigation of lexicalization patterns. 2007. x, 182 pp. 90 Muysken, Pieter (ed.): From Linguistic Areas to Areal Linguistics. 2008. vii, 293 pp. 89 Stark, Elisabeth, Elisabeth Leiss and Werner Abraham (eds.): Nominal Determination. Typology, context constraints, and historical emergence. 2007. viii, 370 pp. 88 Ramat, Paolo and Elisa Roma (eds.): Europe and the Mediterranean as Linguistic Areas. Convergencies from a historical and typological perspective. 2007. xxvi, 364 pp. 87 Verhoeven, Elisabeth: Experiential Constructions in Yucatec Maya. A typologically based analysis of a functional domain in a Mayan language. 2007. xiv, 380 pp. 86 Schwarz-Friesel, Monika, Manfred Consten and Mareile Knees (eds.): Anaphors in Text. Cognitive, formal and applied approaches to anaphoric reference. 2007. xvi, 282 pp. 85 Butler, Christopher S., Raquel Hidalgo Downing and Julia Lavid (eds.): Functional Perspectives on Grammar and Discourse. In honour of Angela Downing. 2007. xxx, 481 pp. 84 Wanner, Leo (ed.): Selected Lexical and Grammatical Issues in the Meaning–Text Theory. In honour of Igor Mel’čuk. 2007. xviii, 380 pp. 83 Hannay, Mike and Gerard J. Steen (eds.): Structural-Functional Studies in English Grammar. In honour of Lachlan Mackenzie. 2007. vi, 393 pp. 82 Ziegeler, Debra: Interfaces with English Aspect. Diachronic and empirical studies. 2006. xvi, 325 pp. 81 Peeters, Bert (ed.): Semantic Primes and Universal Grammar. Empirical evidence from the Romance languages. 2006. xvi, 374 pp. 80 Birner, Betty J. and Gregory Ward (eds.): Drawing the Boundaries of Meaning. Neo-Gricean studies in pragmatics and semantics in honor of Laurence R. Horn. 2006. xii, 350 pp. 79 Laffut, An: Three-Participant Constructions in English. A functional-cognitive approach to caused relations. 2006. ix, 268 pp. 78 Yamamoto, Mutsumi: Agency and Impersonality. Their Linguistic and Cultural Manifestations. 2006. x, 152 pp. 77 Kulikov, Leonid, Andrej Malchukov and Peter de Swart (eds.): Case, Valency and Transitivity. 2006. xx, 503 pp. 76 Nevalainen, Terttu, Juhani Klemola and Mikko Laitinen (eds.): Types of Variation. Diachronic, dialectal and typological interfaces. 2006. viii, 378 pp. 75 Hole, Daniel, André Meinunger and Werner Abraham (eds.): Datives and Other Cases. Between argument structure and event structure. 2006. viii, 385 pp. 74 Pietrandrea, Paola: Epistemic Modality. Functional properties and the Italian system. 2005. xii, 232 pp. 73 Xiao, Richard Zhonghua and Tony McEnery: Aspect in Mandarin Chinese. A corpus-based study. 2004. x, 305 pp. 72 Frajzyngier, Zygmunt, Adam Hodges and David S. Rood (eds.): Linguistic Diversity and Language Theories. 2005. xii, 432 pp. 71 Dahl, Östen: The Growth and Maintenance of Linguistic Complexity. 2004. x, 336 pp. 70 Lefebvre, Claire: Issues in the Study of Pidgin and Creole Languages. 2004. xvi, 358 pp. 69 Tanaka, Lidia: Gender, Language and Culture. A study of Japanese television interview discourse. 2004. xvii, 233 pp. 68 Moder, Carol Lynn and Aida Martinovic-Zic (eds.): Discourse Across Languages and Cultures. 2004. vi, 366 pp. 67 Luraghi, Silvia: On the Meaning of Prepositions and Cases. The expression of semantic roles in Ancient Greek. 2003. xii, 366 pp. 66 Nariyama, Shigeko: Ellipsis and Reference Tracking in Japanese. 2003. xvi, 400 pp. 65 Matsumoto, Kazuko: Intonation Units in Japanese Conversation. Syntactic, informational and functional structures. 2003. xviii, 215 pp. 64 Butler, Christopher S.: Structure and Function – A Guide to Three Major Structural-Functional Theories. Part 2: From clause to discourse and beyond. 2003. xiv, 579 pp. 63 Butler, Christopher S.: Structure and Function – A Guide to Three Major Structural-Functional Theories. Part 1: Approaches to the simplex clause. 2003. xx, 573 pp. 62 Field, Fredric: Linguistic Borrowing in Bilingual Contexts. With a foreword by Bernard Comrie. 2002. xviii, 255 pp.
61 Goddard, Cliff and Anna Wierzbicka (eds.): Meaning and Universal Grammar. Theory and empirical findings. Volume 2. 2002. xvi, 337 pp. 60 Goddard, Cliff and Anna Wierzbicka (eds.): Meaning and Universal Grammar. Theory and empirical findings. Volume 1. 2002. xvi, 337 pp. 59 Shi, Yuzhi: The Establishment of Modern Chinese Grammar. The formation of the resultative construction and its effects. 2002. xiv, 262 pp. 58 Maylor, B. Roger: Lexical Template Morphology. Change of state and the verbal prefixes in German. 2002. x, 273 pp. 57 Mel’čuk, Igor A.: Communicative Organization in Natural Language. The semantic-communicative structure of sentences. 2001. xii, 393 pp. 56 Faarlund, Jan Terje (ed.): Grammatical Relations in Change. 2001. viii, 326 pp. 55 Dahl, Östen and Maria Koptjevskaja-Tamm (eds.): Circum-Baltic Languages. Volume 2: Grammar and Typology. 2001. xx, 423 pp. 54 Dahl, Östen and Maria Koptjevskaja-Tamm (eds.): Circum-Baltic Languages. Volume 1: Past and Present. 2001. xx, 382 pp. 53 Fischer, Olga, Anette Rosenbach and Dieter Stein (eds.): Pathways of Change. Grammaticalization in English. 2000. x, 391 pp. 52 Torres Cacoullos, Rena: Grammaticization, Synchronic Variation, and Language Contact. A study of Spanish progressive -ndo constructions. 2000. xvi, 255 pp. 51 Ziegeler, Debra: Hypothetical Modality. Grammaticalisation in an L2 dialect. 2000. xx, 290 pp. 50 Abraham, Werner and Leonid Kulikov (eds.): Tense-Aspect, Transitivity and Causativity. Essays in honour of Vladimir Nedjalkov. 1999. xxxiv, 359 pp. 49 Bhat, D.N.S.: The Prominence of Tense, Aspect and Mood. 1999. xii, 198 pp. 48 Manney, Linda Joyce: Middle Voice in Modern Greek. Meaning and function of an inflectional category. 2000. xiii, 262 pp. 47 Brinton, Laurel J. and Minoji Akimoto (eds.): Collocational and Idiomatic Aspects of Composite Predicates in the History of English. 1999. xiv, 283 pp. 46 Yamamoto, Mutsumi: Animacy and Reference. A cognitive approach to corpus linguistics. 1999. xviii, 278 pp. 45 Collins, Peter and David Lee (eds.): The Clause in English. In honour of Rodney Huddleston. 1999. xv, 342 pp. 44 Hannay, Mike and A. Machtelt Bolkestein (eds.): Functional Grammar and Verbal Interaction. 1998. xii, 304 pp. 43 Olbertz, Hella, Kees Hengeveld and Jesús Sánchez García (eds.): The Structure of the Lexicon in Functional Grammar. 1998. xii, 312 pp. 42 Darnell, Michael, Edith A. Moravcsik, Michael Noonan, Frederick J. Newmeyer and Kathleen M. Wheatley (eds.): Functionalism and Formalism in Linguistics. Volume II: Case studies. 1999. vi, 407 pp. 41 Darnell, Michael, Edith A. Moravcsik, Michael Noonan, Frederick J. Newmeyer and Kathleen M. Wheatley (eds.): Functionalism and Formalism in Linguistics. Volume I: General papers. 1999. vi, 486 pp. 40 Birner, Betty J. and Gregory Ward: Information Status and Noncanonical Word Order in English. 1998. xiv, 314 pp. 39 Wanner, Leo (ed.): Recent Trends in Meaning–Text Theory. 1997. xx, 202 pp. 38 Hacking, Jane F.: Coding the Hypothetical. A comparative typology of Russian and Macedonian conditionals. 1998. vi, 156 pp. 37 Harvey, Mark and Nicholas Reid (eds.): Nominal Classification in Aboriginal Australia. 1997. x, 296 pp. 36 Kamio, Akio (ed.): Directions in Functional Linguistics. 1997. xiii, 259 pp. 35 Matsumoto, Yoshiko: Noun-Modifying Constructions in Japanese. A frame semantic approach. 1997. viii, 204 pp. 34 Hatav, Galia: The Semantics of Aspect and Modality. Evidence from English and Biblical Hebrew. 1997. x, 224 pp. 33 Velázquez-Castillo, Maura: The Grammar of Possession. Inalienability, incorporation and possessor ascension in Guaraní. 1996. xvi, 274 pp. 32 Frajzyngier, Zygmunt: Grammaticalization of the Complex Sentence. A case study in Chadic. 1996. xviii, 501 pp.
31 Wanner, Leo (ed.): Lexical Functions in Lexicography and Natural Language Processing. 1996. xx, 355 pp. 30 Huffman, Alan: The Categories of Grammar. French lui and le. 1997. xiv, 379 pp. 29 Engberg-Pedersen, Elisabeth, Michael Fortescue, Peter Harder, Lars Heltoft and Lisbeth Falster Jakobsen (eds.): Content, Expression and Structure. Studies in Danish functional grammar. 1996. xvi, 510 pp. 28 Herman, József (ed.): Linguistic Studies on Latin. Selected papers from the 6th International Colloquium on Latin Linguistics (Budapest, 23–27 March 1991). 1994. ix, 421 pp. 27 Abraham, Werner, T. Givón and Sandra A. Thompson (eds.): Discourse, Grammar and Typology. Papers in honor of John W.M. Verhaar. 1995. xx, 352 pp. 26 Lima, Susan D., Roberta Corrigan and Gregory K. Iverson: The Reality of Linguistic Rules. 1994. xxiii, 480 pp. 25 Goddard, Cliff and Anna Wierzbicka (eds.): Semantic and Lexical Universals. Theory and empirical findings. 1994. viii, 510 pp. 24 Bhat, D.N.S.: The Adjectival Category. Criteria for differentiation and identification. 1994. xii, 295 pp. 23 Comrie, Bernard and Maria Polinsky (eds.): Causatives and Transitivity. 1993. x, 399 pp. 22 McGregor, William B.: A Functional Grammar of Gooniyandi. 1990. xx, 618 pp. 21 Coleman, Robert (ed.): New Studies in Latin Linguistics. Proceedings of the 4th International Colloquium on Latin Linguistics, Cambridge, April 1987. 1990. x, 480 pp. 20 Verhaar, John W.M. S.J. (ed.): Melanesian Pidgin and Tok Pisin. Proceedings of the First International Conference on Pidgins and Creoles in Melanesia. 1990. xiv, 409 pp. 19 Blust, Robert A.: Austronesian Root Theory. An essay on the limits of morphology. 1988. xi, 190 pp. 18 Wierzbicka, Anna: The Semantics of Grammar. 1988. vii, 581 pp. 17 Calboli, Gualtiero (ed.): Subordination and Other Topics in Latin. Proceedings of the Third Colloquium on Latin Linguistics, Bologna, 1–5 April 1985. 1989. xxix, 691 pp. 16 Conte, Maria-Elisabeth, János Sánder Petöfi and Emel Sözer (eds.): Text and Discourse Connectedness. Proceedings of the Conference on Connexity and Coherence, Urbino, July 16–21, 1984. 1989. xxiv, 584 pp. 15 Justice, David: The Semantics of Form in Arabic. In the mirror of European languages. 1987. iv, 417 pp. 14 Benson, Morton, Evelyn Benson and Robert F. Ilson: Lexicographic Description of English. 1986. xiii, 275 pp. 13 Reesink, Ger: Structures and their Functions in Usan. 1987. xviii, 369 pp. 12 Pinkster, Harm (ed.): Latin Linguistics and Linguistic Theory. Proceedings of the 1st International Colloquium on Latin Linguistics, Amsterdam, April 1981. 1983. xviii, 307 pp. 11 Panhuis, Dirk G.J.: The Communicative Perspective in the Sentence. A study of Latin word order. 1982. viii, 172 pp. 10 Dressler, Wolfgang U., Willi Mayerthaler, Oswald Panagl and Wolfgang Ullrich Wurzel: Leitmotifs in Natural Morphology. 1988. ix, 168 pp. 9 Lang, Ewald and John Pheby: The Semantics of Coordination. (English transl. by John Pheby from the German orig. ed. ‘Semantik der koordinativen Verknüpfung’, Berlin, 1977). 1984. 300 pp. 8 Barth, E.M. and J.L. Martens (eds.): Argumentation: Approaches to Theory Formation. Containing the Contributions to the Groningen Conference on the Theory of Argumentation, October 1978. 1982. xviii, 333 pp. 7 Parret, Herman, Marina Sbisà and Jef Verschueren (eds.): Possibilities and Limitations of Pragmatics. Proceedings of the Conference on Pragmatics, Urbino, July 8–14, 1979. 1981. x, 854 pp. 6 Vago, Robert M. (ed.): Issues in Vowel Harmony. Proceedings of the CUNY Linguistics Conference on Vowel Harmony, May 14, 1977. 1980. xx, 340 pp. 5 Haiman, John: Hua: A Papuan Language of the Eastern Highlands of New Guinea. 1980. iv, 550 pp. 4 Lloyd, Albert L.: Anatomy of the Verb. The Gothic Verb as a Model for a Unified Theory of Aspect, Actional Types, and Verbal Velocity. (Part I: Theory; Part II: Application). 1979. x, 351 pp. 3 Malkiel, Yakov: From Particular to General Linguistics. Selected Essays 1965–1978. With an introduction by the author, an index rerum and an index nominum. 1983. xxii, 659 pp. 2 Anwar, Mohamed Sami: BE and Equational Sentences in Egyptian Colloquial Arabic. 1979. vi, 128 pp. 1 Abraham, Werner (ed.): Valence, Semantic Case, and Grammatical Relations. Workshop studies prepared for the 12th International Congress of Linguists, Vienna, August 29th to September 3rd, 1977. 1978. xiv, 729 pp.
